Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed February 15, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-1932

Lower Tribunal No. 21-6801 SP

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The Restoration Team a/a/o Rick Santos and Idalia Santos,

Appellant,

vs.

Southern Oak Insurance Company,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Elijah A. 

Levitt, Judge.

Giasi Law, P.A., and Melissa A. Giasi and Erin M. Berger (Tampa), for 

appellant.

Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., and Thomas A. Valdez and 

Megan G. Colter (Tampa), for appellee.

Before EMAS, HENDON and MILLER, JJ. 

EMAS, J.
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INTRODUCTION

The Restoration Team (“TRT”), as assignee of Rick and Idalia Santos

(“Santos”), appeals the trial court’s order dismissing its breach-of-contract

lawsuit against Southern Oak Insurance Company. The dismissal was 

based on TRT’s failure to comply with section 627.7152, Florida Statutes 

(2019). TRT asserts that the trial court erroneously applied the statute 

retroactively, and that TRT was not required to comply with its provisions. 

TRT is incorrect and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm and hold that the 

trial court correctly applied section 627.7152 to the assignment of benefits 

agreement in this case, and that such application was prospective, not 

retroactive. 

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

Santos owned a home that was insured against property damage by 

Southern Oak Insurance Company under a policy which was effective from 

August 12, 2018 to August 12, 2019. Santos’ home reportedly sustained 

windstorm damage on August 6, 2019 and Santos subsequently assigned 

their rights under the insurance policy to TRT. 

Thereafter, TRT presented Southern Oak with an invoice for mitigation

services provided at the property, in the amount of $6,246.27. When 
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Southern Oak failed to pay, TRT filed the instant complaint, alleging breach 

of contract and seeking damages.

Southern Oak moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the 

assignment was invalid under section 627.7152 because, inter alia, the 

assignment did not contain a “written, itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the 

services to be performed by the assignee,” section 627.7152(2)(a)(4), and 

because the assignment of benefits violated the $3,000 or 1% cap set forth 

in section 627.7152(2)(c).

In response, TRT contended it was not required to comply with section

627.7152 because the statute did not exist when the insurance policy 

became effective on August 12, 2018, and, further, that the motion to dismiss 

improperly contained allegations outside the four corners of the complaint. 

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, 

finding section 627.7152 applied to the assignment of benefits, despite the 

effective date of the insurance policy, because the assignment of benefits 

was executed after the effective date of the statute. The court further found 

that because the assignment of benefits failed to comply with the 

requirements of section 627.7152, it was invalid and that this failure to 

comply was evident from the four corners of the complaint and its 

attachments. This appeal followed. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the issue on appeal is one of statutory construction, we apply 

a de novo standard of review. Richards v. State, 288 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 

2020) (“Because the issue in this case ultimately turns on the interpretation 

of a statute, we review it de novo”). Further, the “question of whether a 

statute applies retroactively or prospectively is a pure question of law; thus, 

our standard of review is de novo.” Dimitri v. Com. Ctr. of Miami Master 

Ass’n, Inc., 253 So. 3d 715, 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (quoting Bionetics Corp. 

v. Kenniasty, 69 So. 3d 943, 947 (Fla. 2011)).

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In this appeal we must determine whether an assignment of benefits 

is subject to the requirements of section 627.7152 (entitled “Assignment 

agreements”) where it was executed after the statute’s effective date but the 

corresponding insurance policy was in force prior to the effective date of the 

statute. 

Section 627.7152 imposes certain requirements for an assignment of 

post-loss benefits under a property insurance policy in Florida, including, 

relevant to our discussion, that an assignment agreement must:

Contain a written, itemized, per-unit cost estimate of the services 

to be performed by the assignee. 

§ 627.7152(2)(a)4.
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In addition, subsection (2)(c) provides: 

(c) If an assignor acts under an urgent or emergency 

circumstance to protect property from damage and executes an 

assignment agreement to protect, repair, restore, or replace 

property or to mitigate against further damage to the property, an 

assignee may not receive an assignment of post-loss benefits 

under a residential property insurance policy in excess of the 

greater of $3,000 or 1 percent of the Coverage A limit under such 

policy. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “urgent or 

emergency circumstance” means a situation in which a loss to 

property, if not addressed immediately, will result in additional 

damage until measures are completed to prevent such damage.

Finally, subsection (13) provides the effective date: 

§ 627.7152(2)(c) 

Finally, and most significant to our review, the Legislature provided, in 

the final subsection of the statute, express language regarding the statute’s 

effective date: 

(13) This section applies to an assignment agreement

executed on or after July 1, 2019.

§ 627.7152(13) (emphasis added).

Thus, by its express terms, the statute applies to the instant 

assignment of benefits: it is undisputed that the assignment was executed 

after the statute’s July 1, 2019, effective date. 

Nevertheless, TRT contends that requiring this assignment to comply 

with the statute constitutes a retroactive application of the statute, because 

Santos’ insurance policy went into effect on August 12, 2018, prior to the 
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effective date of the statute. For this argument, TRT relies on Menendez v. 

Progressive Express Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2010), which held that an 

amendment to the PIP statute (adding a presuit notice requirement) could 

not be applied in a case involving an insurance policy issued before the 

effective date of the statutory amendment. In so holding, Menendez stated 

the general proposition that “the statute in effect at the time an insurance 

contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with 

that contract.” Id. at 876 (citations omitted). Menendez, however, is 

distinguishable, and does not support TRT’s position that the instant statute 

is being applied retroactively to the assignment of benefits. 

Section 627.7152 does not apply to an insurance agreement executed 

on or after July 1, 2019; rather it applies to an assignment agreement

executed on or after July 1, 2019, without regard to when the underlying 

policy was executed. While TRT is correct that the insurance policy itself—

a contract between Santos and Southern Oak, and not involving TRT—

predated the effective date of the statute, the assignment of benefits

agreement—between Santos and TRT—was executed on August 23, 2019, 

well after the July 1, 2019 effective date expressly provided by the 

Legislature.
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In Menendez, the statutory amendment imposed a presuit notice 

requirement upon insurance policies which were in effect prior to the 

amendment, affecting pre-existing contractual rights between the insured 

and the insurer. By contrast, TRT’s contractual rights did not come into 

existence until the assignment of benefits agreement was executed, some 

seven weeks after the statute’s effective date. The date on which the insured 

and insurer executed the underlying insurance policy is irrelevant here, 

because section 627.7152 (unlike the statute in Menendez) does not impose 

requirements upon an existing insurance policy, but rather imposes 

requirements upon an assignment of benefits agreement entered into 

between an assignor and assignee after the effective date of the statute. 

We reject TRT’s argument that, because it stands in the shoes of the 

insureds, it is the date of execution of the underlying insurance policy that

governs. Section 627.7152 was not enacted to modify rights and duties as 

between the insured and insurer under a preexisting insurance policy; it was 

enacted “to regulate assignment agreements that seek to transfer insurance 

benefits from the policyholder to a third party.” Total Care Restoration, LLC 

v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 337 So. 3d 74, 75-76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

It must be kept in mind that the “agreement” addressed by section 

627.7152 is not the insurance agreement between the insured and insurer, 
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but rather the post-loss assignment agreement between the 

insured/assignor and the third-party assignee. “A trial court applies a statute 

prospectively, not retroactively, to a contract where the statute preexisted 

the contract.” Kidwell Grp., LLC v. Am. Integrity Ins. Co. of Fla., 347 So. 3d 

501, 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). Once the focus is properly placed on the 

agreement at issue (the assignment of benefits rather than the insurance 

policy), it becomes self-evident that the statute is being applied 

prospectively, not retroactively. 

We are guided by this court’s recent decision in Adjei v. First Cmty.

Ins. Co., 47 Fla. L. Weekly D2116, 2022 WL 10733838 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 

19, 2022). In that case, homeowners covered by an insurance policy 

sustained damage to their property following Hurricane Irma, and later 

assigned their post-loss benefits under that policy to their children. Although 

the insurance policy was in effect before the effective date of section 

627.7152, the post-loss assignment agreement was executed three months 

after the statute’s July 1, 2019 effective date. 

The children-assignees later filed a breach of contract suit against the 

insurance company, and the insurance company moved to dismiss the suit, 

contending “the assignment was noncompliant because it omitted essential 

items [required by section 627.7152], including the assignees’ signatures, a 
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rescission provision, a cost estimate, an indemnification clause, a boilerplate 

statutory notice provision, and language confirming that the assignees would 

furnish the insurer with a copy of the agreement within three business days 

after either execution or commencement of work.” Id. at *2.1 The childrenassignees countered, inter alia, that applying this statutory “checklist” to a 

post-loss assignment agreement, where the insurance policy was in effect 

before the statute’s effective date, would result in an unconstitutional 

impairment of contract in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the United States 

Constitution.

2 The trial court dismissed the case and this court affirmed, 

holding in relevant part that the portion of section 627.7152 at issue 

merely regulates the contents of any assignment agreement by 

requiring the contracting parties to include certain language. Had 

the legislature wished to do so, it indubitably could have 

designated certain claims unassignable, prohibited a class of 

potential assignees from accepting an assignment, limited the 

circumstances under which an insured might legally assign a 

claim, or imposed any other substantively restrictive measures. 

Consequently, insofar as it merely requires the inclusion of 

certain words, we conclude the statute solely “affect[s] rights 

under the assignment of benefits, not substantive rights under 

1 Assignment agreements that fail to comply with the statutory requirements 

of section 627.7152 are “invalid and unenforceable.” § 627.7152(2)(d), Fla. 

Stat.

2 We note that no party to the instant appeal has raised the applicability of 

section 627.7153, Florida Statutes (2019). See also Adjei v. First Community 

Ins. Co., 47 Fla. L. Weekly D2116, 2022 WL 10733838 at *1 n.1 (Fla. 3d 

DCA Oct. 19, 2022) (“We summarily reject the notion that section 627.7153, 

Florida Statutes (2019), which governs anti-assignment provisions in 

insurance policies, has any application to this case.”)
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the insurance policy.” SFR Servs., LLC v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 

529 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 2021). Thus, applying the 

provisions to assignments executed after its effective date does 

not “impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a 

party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 

respect to transactions already completed.” Landgraf [v. USI Film 

Prod.], 511 U.S. [244], at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483.

We further note that our sister court, on relevant facts indistinguishable 

from the instant case, has held: 

This case does not involve the application of a statute to a 

preexisting insurance policy; it concerns a statute's application to 

an assignment created after the effective date of the statute. 

Thus, section 627.7152—the law in effect at the time the 

assignment of benefits was executed—was properly applied to 

the assignment in this case.

Total Care Restoration, 337 So. 3d at 77. 

As in Adjei, the application of section 627.7152 to the instant 

assignment agreement—executed after the statute’s effective date—does 

not constitute a retroactive application or unconstitutionally impair the 

parties’ right to contract. Instead, and as observed in Total Care, the 

application of section 627.7152 to the assignment agreement is prospective. 

We note that two other district courts have adopted this analysis. See

Kidwell Grp, LLC v. Olympus Ins. Co., 346 So. 3d 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) 

(aligning with the Fourth District’s decision in Total Care, holding that the trial 

court properly applied section 627.7152 prospectively to the assignment 

agreement, and that because the assignee failed to comply with section 
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627.7152 it never stepped into the insurer’s shoes); Kidwell Grp., LLC, 347 

So. 3d at 507 (the Second District, relying upon Total Care, held: “It seems 

beyond cavil that an assignee acquires no rights to an insured claim until it 

executes a valid AOB” and reaffirming that “the law in effect at the time the 

parties executed the AOB controls).3

CONCLUSION

Consistent with this court’s earlier decision in Adjei, as well as the

related decisions of the Second, Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, 

we hold that the assignment of benefits agreement executed after July 1, 

2019 was governed by section 627.7152 and did not constitute a retroactive 

application of the statute, even if the underlying insurance policy was in effect 

prior to July 1, 2019. As a result, because the assignment of benefits did not 

comply with the requirements of that statute, the trial court correctly 

3 But see Procraft Exteriors, Inc. v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., 29 Fla. L. Weekly 

Fed. D71, 2020 WL 5943845 (M.D. Fla. May 13, 2020) (holding section 

627.7152 did not apply to an AOB issued after July 1, 2019 because the

version of the statute in effect when the insurance policy was issued is the 

version that applies). We note that at the time the United States District Court 

issued its decision in Procraft, Florida appellate courts had yet to decide the 

question presented. 
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determined the assignment was invalid and properly dismissed TRT’s suit 

against Southern Oak.

4

Affirmed.

4 TRT also argues the trial court erred in dismissing the case because it relied 

on matters outside the four corners of the complaint in doing so. However, 

attached to the complaint was the insurance policy, the assignment of 

benefits and the estimate of repairs dated three days later. The trial court 

properly considered these attachments in reaching its determination that the 

assignment of benefits failed to comply with the statute. See Santiago v. 

Mauna Loa Invs., LLC, 189 So. 3d 752, 756 (Fla. 2016) (holding that the 

“four-corners rule” allows a court to review not only the complaint, but also 

any exhibit attached thereto).