J-S47033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SAMIR BENTLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3103 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002293-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 4, 2024

Appellant, Samir Bentley, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on October 12, 2022, in the Montgomery County Court of Common 

Pleas. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history, thoroughly laid out by the 

trial court, are as follows:

The four-day jury trial commenced on October 7, 2022 and 

established the following facts. On October 23, 2021, at 

approximately 8:26 p.m., Officer Eric Weber, of the Pottstown 

Police Department was on patrol and was dispatched to the 400 

block of East High Street, Pottstown for a call of shots fired. (N.T., 

Trial by Jury, 10/7/22, p. 39, 40). He arrived on the scene and 

found Robert Stiles with two gunshot wounds to his abdomen. Id.

at 43. While rendering aid to the victim, the officer testified that 

he did not find any weapon on or in the vicinity of the victim. Id.

at 43 - 44. Officer Weber secured the crime scene, and canvassed 

the area for evidence. Id. at 43, 47. He observed a significant 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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amount of shell casings, a 22 caliber, a .9 caliber, and .45 caliber. 

Id. at 48. The paramedic also provided the officer with a bullet 

fragment that fell from the victim’s clothing. Id. at 44 - 45.

Detective Brooke Hatfield of the Pottstown Police 

Department responded to the initial crime scene. Id. at 53. She 

located video surveillance from the area and from a Wawa in 

Royersford. Id. at 58 - 59. The surveillance video audio from the 

Blue Moon Deli, right where the murder occurred, at 8:24 p.m., 

recorded Quadir Nixon saying, “Jig, Mir, and (unintelligible) are 

robbing County right now, have him gunned down in the corner 

now. They have a gat to him right now.” Id. at 66. The video 

depicted Mohammed, the individual in a black and white 

sweatshirt pull the victim into the cut. Id. at 67, 69. It also showed 

Harrison, who was wearing a pink hat hand the gun to Appellant. 

Id. Appellant, who was wearing a teddy bear sweatshirt, fired 

three shots at the victim. Id. at 67, 69 - 70. Another video 

depicted much of the same, in addition the video depicted a single 

shot being fired, followed by three more shots. Id. at 71 - 73. The 

significance of this video was that law enforcement found one 

9mm shell casing inside the cut and three .45 caliber shell casings 

on the sidewalk where Appellant fired the three shots. Id. at 73. 

The video also showed that in response to the shooting, Eric Baker 

fired off seven or eight .22 caliber shell casings. Id. No firearms 

were found at the crime scene, and no weapon was recovered 

from the victim's belongings. Id. at 78. In addition to this video 

evidence, detective Hatfield testified that a grey minivan was 

associated with the murder, and that a license plate reader 

determined it was a stolen vehicle. Id. at 92, 94.

Detective Heather Long with the Montgomery County 

Detective Bureau testified that surveillance footage showed that 

after the murder, Appellant and Mohammed got into the minivan 

and drove off, while Harrison fled the scene on foot. Id. at 228. 

Additional surveillance footage recorded the minivan traveling 

towards a Wawa in Royersford. Id. at 128 - 129. Mohammed 

made a purchase in Wawa, and he had a handful of cash. Id. at 

129. Appellant and Mohammed exited the Wawa and got into a 

different vehicle. Id. at 130.

Dr. Supriya Kuruvilla performed the autopsy on the victim 

on October 24, 2021. (N.T., Trial by Jury, 10/10/22, p. at 23). The 

doctor noted two gunshot wounds, one on the right lower back, 

and the other was to the right lower abdomen. Id. at 25. Both of 

these wounds involved extensive damage to the victim's internal 

organs and either could have been fatal. Id. at 25 - 26, 30, 39.
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On October 25, 2021, Officer Eric Pistilli of the Royersford 

Borough Police Department received a call for an abandoned 

minivan in a residential driveway at 962 Walnut Street. Id. at 52 

- 54. The Wawa where Appellant and Mohammed were caught on 

surveillance was just north of this location. Id. at 57. The right 

passenger tire was completely flat and there were bullet holes in 

the driver's side. Id. at 54. The officer determined that it was a 

stolen vehicle. Id. at 55. The minivan was taken to a secure 

facility. Id. at 56. Detective Terrance Lewis from the Montgomery 

County Detective Bureau processed the minivan on October 26, 

2021. Id. at 68. In part, the detective recovered ballistic evidence 

from the minivan and he turned over this evidence and additional 

ballistic evidence to Detective Nelson, a firearms examiner. Id. at 

77, 78. 

Firearm expert, Detective Eric Nelson, conducted several 

examinations on the ballistic evidence. Id. at 86, 92, 96. He 

examined seven 22 caliber fired shell casings ("FCC"), three 45 

caliber shell casings, and one .9mm shell casing, which were all 

found at the murder scene. Id. at 98. From a microscopic analysis 

he determined, that all of the 22 caliber FCCs were fired from the 

same firearm. Id. The three .45 caliber FCCs were fired from the 

same firearm. Id. at 100. Detective Nelson could not compare any 

of these FCCs to a specific firearm since none were recovered. Id.

at 98, 100. He further explained that the bullet recovered during 

the autopsy and the bullet fragment recovered from the surgery 

on the victim were both 45 caliber and from the same firearm[.] 

Id. at 103.

Co-conspirator Harrison was called to testify. On October of 

2022, he was living in Philadelphia. Id. at 142. He was good 

friends with Appellant and had known him for over ten years. Id.

at 142, 144. Harrison had been in a relationship with Appellant's 

sister for years, and Appellant is his daughter's uncle. Id. at 143 

- 144. Harrison knew Appellant's nickname to be Miro and Mir. Id.

at 147. Harrison also knew the victim, and knew him as County. 

He had bought marijuana from County many times over the years.

Id. at 154 - 155. However, Harrison only met Mohammed on the 

day of the murder. Id. at 147. 

During the afternoon of October 23, 2021, Harrison went 

from his home in Philadelphia to Pottstown. Id. at 156. The plan 

was to hang out with his brother and work on rap videos together. 

Id. Appellant picked Harrison up from his home around 3 or 4 

p.m., in a dark minivan. Id. at 158, 159. Mohammed was also 

present when Harrison was picked up. Id. at 160. Harrison 

admitted to having a 45 caliber firearm with him. Id. at 161. When 
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they got to Pottstown, they pulled into the Gulf gas station, and 

he saw Quadir Nixon (“Nixon”) and the victim there. Id. at 162 -

163. Nixon was pumping gas, and he saw the victim in the back 

seat of the white car counting cash, about $300 or $400. Id. at 

164, 166. Harrison joked with the victim about having all that 

money, and he laughed and pulled out more money. Id. at 167. 

He estimated it was a total of $5000. Id. at 168. When Harrison, 

Appellant, and Mohammed were all back in the vehicle, 

Mohammed was on his phone on FaceTime. Id. at 170. The person 

on the phone was asking whether they knew of someone to rob. 

Id. at 170 - 171. After the call ended, Harrison mentioned that 

the victim and Nixon were just flashing money, so they could rob 

one of them. Id. at 172. Harrison told Mohammed that the plan 

would be that Mohammed would ask the victim if he had 

marijuana, get him away from everyone, and Mohammed would 

rob him, using a gun. Id. at 172, 174. Harrison offered 

Mohammed his gun, but he did not take it. Id. at 175. Appellant 

wasn't really a part of the conversation because he had his 

earphones in, but it was possible he heard it. Id. at 175. Harrison 

said that Appellant would be the lookout. Id. at 176.

Harrison knew that the victim and Nixon would be in front 

of the Blue Moon Deli, and Appellant drove there. Id. at 177, 232. 

The three of them get there around 6 p.m, and parked the minivan 

across the street. Id. at 177, 178. While they were hanging out 

there, the topic of the robbery came back up. Id. at 178. They 

were talking about what was going to happen. Id. at 233. Harrison 

told police in his statement that Appellant and Mohammed were 

both involved in the conversation about the robbery with him. Id.

at 234 - 235, 236. Harrison said he would go into the Blue Moon 

Deli and ask the victim if he had any marijuana, which he did. Id.

at 178. The victim told him he did not have any marijuana. Id. at 

179. He communicated this back to Mohammed and to Appellant. 

Id. at 179, 180. This did not change the plan, because Harrison 

knew the victim had money. Id. at 180. The opportune moment 

presented itself when the three of them were three stores down 

from the Blue Moon Deli, right near the cut. Id. at 181. Harrison 

turned around and looked at Appellant. Id. at 182. He gave 

Appellant a head nod as a signal to put the plan in motion. Id.

Harrison turned away. Id. at 183, He heard Nixon say, “Y’all 

weird. What y’all doing?” Id. Appellant told him to “Chill.” Id. 

Appellant was positioned between the cut and Nixon. Id. at 183 -

184. Nixon walked away. Id. at 183. Once Harrison walked past 

the cut, he realized that the robbery was happening. Id. He saw 

the back of the victim, and it looked like the victim was going into 
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his jacket pocket. Id. at 184 - 185. Although Harrison could not 

see what was coming out of his pocket, he never saw the victim 

with a gun. Id. at 185. He assumed that the victim was giving 

things up as part of the robbery. Id. at 186. Mohammed was 

behind the victim in the cut. Id. at 185. Harrison also heard 

Appellant say, “He got a jawn, he got a jawn.” Id. at 186 - 187. 

Harrison believed Appellant was referring to Nixon, that Nixon had 

a gun. Id. at 187, 238 - 239. Harrison turned around, walked 

towards Appellant, and handed him his 45 caliber gun. Id. at 187, 

188. Harrison walked to the street, and heard grabbing and 

wrestling in the cut. Id. at 189. Harrison heard a single gunshot 

from inside the cut, ran away, and heard three more shots from 

around the cut. Id. at 190. The three of them ran back to the 

minivan. Id. at 191. Harrison took an Uber back to Philadelphia. 

Id. at 194. Five days later he heard that there was a warrant for 

his arrest, and he turned himself in on November 1, 2021. Id. at 

196.

William Bentley, Appellant's older brother, spoke to 

detectives in December 30, 2021 about conversations he had with 

Appellant after the murder. Id. at 248, 249, 251. Mr. Bentley told 

detectives that at the time of the interview Appellant was in North 

Carolina and gave them his address. Id. at 251. He also told 

detectives that Appellant had changed his appearance by cutting 

off his hair. Id. Mr. Bentley spoke to Appellant, with Mohammed 

present, after the murder, and Appellant told him he did 

something stupid. Id. at 253. Mr. Bentley told detectives that 

Appellant told him the plan was to rob the victim and Mohammed 

would do the robbery. When Mohammed pulled out his gun, the 

victim hit him. Id. at 255, 257. Mr. Bentley also relayed that 

Appellant told him that Mohammed and the victim were fighting, 

and Mohammed shot him. Id. at 257. Because the victim was still 

moving, Appellant took the gun from Mohammed and shot the 

victim. Id. Mr. Bentley knew from Appellant that they set the 

robbery up as a drug deal, but there was never any intent to do a 

drug deal. Id. It was strictly a robbery. Id. at 258. Mr. Bentley 

also knew that after the robbery they went to Wawa. Mr. Bentley 

encouraged Appellant to go to North Carolina. Id. at 260.

On cross-examination, in part, defense counsel tried to 

undercut Mr. Bentley[’s] testimony. He noted inconsistencies in 

Mr. Bentley's statement to police, namely that Mohammed was 

the one who was going to buy the marijuana, but that he also told 

police that it was Appellant who set up the drug deal. Id. at 272 

- 277. Defense counsel also highlighted that Mr. Bentley's trial 

testimony that was erroneous in that he told detectives that 
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Appellant told him that the gun he used was from Mohammed and 

that the minivan broke down when they were driving. Id. at 277 

- 278.

On re-direct, Mr. Bentley was able to clarify that Appellant 

and Harrison were going to set up the drug deal because they 

knew him, but that it was Mohammed who was going to actually 

rob him, since the victim did not know him. Id. at 278 - 279.

Appellant testified in his own defense. He admitted to having 

killed the victim, but stated that he did not intend to. (N.T., Trial 

by Jury, 10/11/22, p. 8). Appellant denied knowledge of the 

robbery plot or of any intention to be part of the robbery plan. Id. 

Appellant claimed that he never heard the conversation between 

Harrison and Mohammed in the minivan about the robbery 

because he had his earbuds in on a loud volume. Id. at 20 - 22. 

He also denied that [he] was part of the conversation outside the 

Blue Moon Deli about the robbery, the fake drug deal, or that he 

would be the lookout. Id. at 26 - 27. Appellant told the jury that 

right before the murder he was near the cut trying to sell Xanax. 

Id. at 29. He heard feet shuffling against cement, and he look[ed] 

over to the cut and saw the victim there. Id. at 30. He denied 

seeing a struggle between the victim and Mohammed. Id. He 

thought it was just a drug deal. Id. at 31. He recalled Nixon 

walked over and said, [“]What you got going on?[”] Id. at 32. 

Appellant responded, “He handling his business. He getting 

money. The same thing you got going on.” Id. Nixon replied and 

said, “You all weird.” Id. At one point Appellant looked over at 

Mohammed and he saw what looked like the victim reaching 

toward his waistband. Id. at 33. Appellant testified that the victim 

lifted up his shirt or jacket, and he saw a gun handle. Id. He was 

scared and getting ready to run away. He told Harrison that the 

victim had a gun, and Harrison handed him his gun and told him 

to protect Mohammed. Id. at 34. According to Appellant, he 

turned back to the cut, and got the gun in position, and a shot 

went off. Id. at 34 - 35. Appellant then fired three shots. Id. at 

35. Appellant believed the victim had fired the first shot, and he 

was afraid for his life. Id. at 36, 37. He was also afraid that if he 

tried to leave he would be shot and he was afraid that Ahmed 

would be shot. Id. at 38. After shooting the victim, Appellant ran 

to the minivan, and when Harrison was there he got his gun back 

from the backseat. Id. at 39. Appellant denied ever having a 

conversation with his brother. Id. at 44.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of 

guilty of the aforementioned charges. [Appellant] was sentenced 

to a life term of imprisonment for his second-degree murder 
J-S47033-23

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conviction, and a concurrent aggregate sentence of 11 to 22 years' 

imprisonment on his remaining convictions. A post-sentence 

motion was timely filed on October 24, 20223, which was denied 

on November 14, 2022. A timely appeal followed.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 3-11. 

On appeal, Appellant raises these six issues verbatim:

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 

TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF SECOND-DEGREE MURDER, ROBBERY, AND 

CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 

SHOWED APPELLANT DID NOT PLAN A ROBBERY, KNOW OF THE PLOT 

TO COMMIT ROBBERY AMONG HIS CO-DEFENDANTS, OR KNOWINGLY 

PARTICIPATE IN THE ROBBERY OF THE DECEDENT?

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE COMMONWEALTH 

DISPROVED SELF-DEFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT WHERE 

APPELLANT TESTIFIED AS TO HIS FEAR FOR HIS LIFE UPON SEEING 

THE DECEDENT WITH A FIREARM?

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL 

WHERE THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, 

AS IT RELIED ON THE TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT'S BROTHER, WHOSE 

TESTIMONY WAS SO RIDDLED WITH INCONSISTENCIES AS TO MAKE 

IT IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE?

IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING OTHER BAD ACTS THAT 

THE ALLEGED GETAWAY VAN HAD BEEN REPORTED STOLEN TEN DAYS 

PRIOR TO THE ALLEGED HOMICIDE AND THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED 

TO SHOW KNOWLEDGE ON PART OF APPELLANT OF THE VAN'S STOLEN 

STATUS?

V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING OTHER BAD ACTS OF 

APPELLANT IN POSSESSION OF FIREARMS NOT ALLEGED TO HAVE 

BEEN USED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES HE WAS CONVICTED 

OF AND ALLEGEDLY IN HIS POSSESSION SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE 

HOMICIDE?

VI. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING THE AUDIO PORTION OF 

SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE WHEREIN A DECLARANT IDENTIFIES 

APPELLANT WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO CALL THE 

DECLARANT AS A WITNESS AT TRIAL?
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Appellant’s Br. at 6-7.1

Appellant’s first issue is that the evidence was insufficient to convict him 

of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy to commit 

robbery. Appellant’s Br. at 6. We are constrained to conclude that Appellant's 

sufficiency claim is waived, as Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement did not 

sufficiently identify the error that Appellant intended to challenge on appeal.

As this Court has consistently held:

If Appellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was 

insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the 

element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient. 

This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal. 

[Where a] 1925(b) statement [] does not specify the allegedly 

unproven elements[,] . . . the sufficiency issue is waived [on 

appeal].

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Flores, 921 A.2d 517, 522-523 (Pa. Super. 

2007).

In this case, Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement simply declared, in 

boilerplate fashion, that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

convictions. See Appellant's 1925(b) Statement, 12/28/22, at 1. The 

statement thus failed to “specify the element or elements upon which the 

evidence was insufficient” to support Appellant's conviction, and we must 

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1 Appellant has waived his fifth issue on appeal and declined to set forth an 

argument; thus we will address issues one, two, three, four, and six. See

Appellant’s Br. at 28 (withdrawing issue as moot). 
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conclude that Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claim is waived on appeal. 

Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257.

Appellant’s second issue is that the Commonwealth failed to meet its 

burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant acted in selfdefense. Appellant’s Br. at 6. Specifically, Appellant claims that his testimony 

that the victim had a firearm and Appellant was scared for his life upon seeing 

it was uncontradicted by the Commonwealth. Id. at 19. We view Appellant’s 

second issue as a challenge to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence 

disproving the element of Appellant’s self-defense claim that he reasonably 

believed himself to be in danger.

Our review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is well 

settled:

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with 

all reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier of fact could have

found that each and every element of the crimes charged was 

established beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. To 

sustain a conviction, however, the facts and circumstances which 

the Commonwealth must prove must be such that every essential 

element of the crime is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Cain, 906 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 916 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). Lastly, the finder of fact 

may believe all, some or none of a witness's testimony. Id. 

In order to legally establish one's right to self-defense and to use deadly 

force, three factors must be shown to have existed at the time of the incident:
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First, the actor must have reasonably believed himself to be in 

imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that it was 

necessary to use deadly force against the victim to prevent such 

harm. Second, the actor must have been free from fault in 

provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying. 

Third, the actor must have violated no duty to retreat. 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 505; Commonwealth v. McGuire, 487 Pa. 208, 409 

A.2d 313 (1979); Commonwealth v. Black, [474 Pa. 47, 376 

A.2d 627 (1977)]; Commonwealth v. McComb, 462 Pa 504, 

341 A.2d 496 (1975).

Commonwealth v. Brown, 421 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa. 1980). See also

Commonwealth v. Molina, 516 A.2d 752 (Pa. 1986).

When a defendant presents evidence of self-defense, “the 

Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving the self-defense claim beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Although the Commonwealth is required to disprove a 

claim of self-defense . . . a jury is not required to believe the testimony of the 

defendant who raises the claim.” Commonwealth v. Chine, 40 A.3d 1239, 

1243 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 

1135 (Pa. 2011)). However, “[t]he Commonwealth cannot sustain its burden 

of proof solely on the fact[-]finder's disbelief of the defendant's testimony.” 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1221 (Pa. 2009) (citations, 

internal quotation marks, and modifications omitted).

The Commonwealth sustains that burden of negation “if it proves 

any of the following: that the slayer was not free from fault in 

provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying; 

that the slayer did not reasonably believe that [he] was in 

imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that it was 

necessary to kill in order to save [him]self therefrom; or that the 

slayer violated a duty to retreat or avoid the danger.”

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740-41 (Pa. 2012).
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As the trial court notes in its opinion, the Commonwealth sufficiently 

established that the Appellant and his co-conspirators provoked the use of 

force by robbing the victim at gunpoint, negating the provocation element. Tr. 

Ct. Op. at 17. Moreover, the record reflects that Appellant's allegations that 

he acted in self-defense were called into question during the trial. Only the 

Appellant stated the victim had a firearm and no firearm was recovered from 

the body of the victim. N.T., 10/7/22, at 78. Appellant admitted that the victim 

did not lunge at him, threaten him, or point a gun at him. N.T., 10/11/22, at 

78, 76. These findings, and the rational inferences to be drawn from them, 

are not based on a mere disbelief of Appellant's 

testimony. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452 (Pa. Super. 

2021) (concluding that the Commonwealth disproved self-defense where the 

appellant shot victim after a bar fight; noting that no weapon was found on 

the victim, none of the witnesses saw the victim with a weapon, and threats 

made by the victim did not involve use of a firearm or a weapon). The 

Commonwealth met its burden by cross-examining Appellant which resulted 

in these findings. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 825 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (finding the Commonwealth met its burden in disproving a selfdefense claim when defendant’s allegation that he acted in self-defense was 

challenged during the trial). As such, Appellant's assertion that the evidence 

was insufficient to disprove his self-defense claim is without merit.

Appellant’s third claim is that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

request for a new trial when the verdict was against the weight of the 
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evidence. Appellant’s Br. at 22. Specifically, Appellant submits that the 

testimony of Appellant’s brother, William Bentley, was so riddled with 

inconsistencies and contradicted independent evidence that it cannot be 

believed. Id.

Initially, the following legal principles apply when a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence supporting a conviction is presented to the trial court:

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary 

to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no 

obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A 

new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the 

testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have 

arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than 

reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would 

not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, 

in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the 

trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (citations, 

footnotes and quotation marks omitted). Thus, to allow an appellant “to 

prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so 

tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the 

[trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (internal citation omitted).
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An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight 

of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the 

trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of 

discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court 

will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced 

by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable 

reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction 

that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and 

that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis in 

original).

A challenge to the weight of the evidence must be preserved by a motion 

for a new trial or else it is waived. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Additionally, in order 

to preserve a challenge to either the sufficiency or weight of the evidence on 

appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) concise statement must state with 

specificity the elements or verdicts for which the appellant alleges that the 

evidence was insufficient or against the weight of the evidence. See 

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1248-49 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(finding waiver of appellant's sufficiency and weight challenges where the 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement was too vague to permit the court to identify (1) 

which crimes, or the elements of any crimes, that the Commonwealth 

allegedly failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; or (2) which verdicts 

were contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the specific reasons why the 
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verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence). Any attempt by the trial 

court to correctly identify and address weight and sufficiency issues does not 

affect our finding of waiver. Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 76 

(Pa. Super. 2020).

Here, Appellant preserved the weight claim by raising it in a postsentence motion. However, he did not specify in his concise statement which 

of his three convictions he believes were against the weight of the evidence. 

His concise statement asserts only that “the trial court err[ed] in failing to 

grant a new trial where the verdict was against the weight of the evidence . . 

. .” Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement, 12/28/22. In Commonwealth v. Rogers, 

250 A.3d 1209, 1225 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme Court held that appellate courts 

may reach the merits of a weight claim, notwithstanding the brevity of a Rule 

1925(b) statement, where the trial court has no difficulty apprehending the 

claim or addressing its substance, and meaningful appellate review is 

unhampered. Id. Here, Appellant’s post-sentence motion states that “the 

verdict convicting Mr. Bentley of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal 

conspiracy to commit robbery was so against the weight of the evidence as to 

shock the conscience.” Post-Sentence Motion, 10/24/22, at 4 (unnumbered). 

He further specifies which evidence he believes was inconsistent or 

contradictory, resulting in the verdicts begin against the weight of the 

evidence. Id. Thus, we will address the merits. 

Appellant asserts that his conviction is against the weight of the 

evidence because his brother, who was not present for the robbery, testified 
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to facts of the robbery as they were apparently relayed to him by Appellant in 

the days following it, but Appellant denied having a conversation with his 

brother about the incident. Appellant’s brother testified that Appellant 

received a firearm from Mohammed, but Appellant testified he received the 

firearm from co-defendant Harrison. Appellant’s brother further stated that 

Appellant’s minivan “just stopped working” when Appellant testified it stopped 

working because an individual was shooting at it. Appellant’s Br. at 24. 

Appellant contends that these inconsistencies prove he never spoke with his 

brother about the robbery and thus his brother was not to be believed. 

The record reflects that Appellant’s brother testified correctly to most of 

the details of Appellant’s robbery. During Appellant’s cross-examination, he 

admitted that his brother had most of the details correct including the 

relationship between Appellant and his co-defendant, that he shaved his head 

after the robbery, that he went to Wawa and then fled to North Carolina, that 

the victim was a weed dealer and had weed on him the day of the robbery, 

that Appellant shot and killed the victim, and that Appellant used a gun he 

was handed by one of his co-conspirators. N.T., 10/11/22, at 66-73. The trial 

court quotes portions of Appellant’s cross-examination and states in its 

opinion, 

The testimony brought out on cross-examination shows that 

[Appellant’s brother]'s testimony was not inaccurate and not 

riddled with inconsistencies. Quite the opposite, his testimony 

showed that he knew most of the pertinent details, despite getting 

a few wrong. This undercut Appellant's testimony that he did not 

talk to his brother after the murder. Further, [Appellant’s 
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brother]'s testimony was corroborated by the facts as stated by 

Harrison. This bolstered [Appellant’s brother]'s testimony. 

Accordingly, the weight of the evidence supported the verdict.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 25.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion 

for a new trial because the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the 

evidence. Appellant’s brother’s testimony mostly corroborated Daijon 

Harrison’s testimony of the events of the robbery. Although Appellant claimed 

he never spoke to his brother about the robbery, Appellant’s brother claimed 

to have learned those facts from Appellant. Thus, the jury did not believe 

Appellant’s testimony that he never spoke to his brother about the robbery, 

which it was free to do. Cain, supra. Notwithstanding Appellant’s claims that 

he was unaware of the robbery being planned and carried out around him, the 

jury did not lend his testimony credibility, and the trial court determined that 

the facts opposing Appellant’s version to events to be of greater weight. Thus, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a 

new trial. 

Appellant’s fourth claim is that the trial court erred in admitting prior 

bad acts of Appellant. Appellant’s Br. at 25. Specifically, he contends that the 

Commonwealth introduced evidence that the van used during the robbery had 

been stolen ten days prior but did not produce any evidence that Appellant 

knew of the van’s stolen status. Id. 

Our standard of review over evidentiary matters is well-settled: “[the] 

admission of evidence is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the trial 
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court, whose decision thereon can only be reversed by this Court upon a 

showing of an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 792 A.2d 

1261, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 815 A.2d 633 (Pa. 2002), cert. 

denied, 540 U.S. 828, (2003) (citation omitted). 

Evidence of prior bad acts committed by a defendant is not admissible 

solely to show the defendant's bad character or his propensity for 

committing bad acts. However, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible 

where there is a legitimate reason for the evidence, such as to establish 

motive. In order for evidence of prior bad acts to be admissible as 

evidence of motive, the prior bad acts must give sufficient ground to 

believe that the crime currently being considered grew out of or was in 

any way caused by the prior set of facts and circumstances. In weighing 

whether evidence of prior bad acts will be admissible, however, the trial 

court must still weigh the relevance and probative value of the evidence 

against the prejudicial impact of that evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 883 A.2d 570, 578 (Pa. 2005) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, our courts have long recognized the special significance of 

evidence which provides jurors with the res gestae, or complete history, of a 

crime. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 308 (Pa. 2002). In Paddy, 

our Supreme Court permitted the introduction in the Commonwealth's casein-chief of prior bad acts, even though the evidence was clearly prejudicial to 

the accused:

the [trial] court is not . . . required to sanitize the trial to eliminate 

all unpleasant facts from the jury's consideration where those 

facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the 

history and natural development of the events and offenses for 

which the defendant is charged.
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Id. (citation and quotation omitted). The court reasoned that this res gestae

evidence was necessary for the jurors to be able to evaluate properly the 

totality of the evidence, and further, to be able to draw accurate inferences 

therefrom. Id. Instantly, our scope of review is limited to an examination of 

the trial court's stated reason for its decision to allow the admission testimony 

that the van used in the robbery had been stolen. Commonwealth v. 

Minerd, 753 A.2d 225, 229 (Pa. 2000).

Here, the van that was driven by Appellant in committing the robbery 

had been reported stolen ten days prior. N.T., 10/10/22, at 55. Two mentions 

of the van’s stolen status were made during trial: First, Detective Hatfield 

testified that she reviewed the video, and a license plate reader was used to 

determine based on the license plate that the van used to flee the scene was 

stolen. N.T., 10/7/22, at 92-93. Officer Pistilli testified that when he located 

the van abandoned in a driveway and ran its registration, it came back stolen. 

N.T., 10/10/22, at 54-55.

Our review of the trial court’s stated reason for admitting this evidence 

reveals that the trial court deemed the van’s stolen status to be relevant to 

the natural unfolding of events:

Officer Pistilli testified how he responded to the call of an abandoned 

vehicle, and his attempts to identify what the vehicle was doing at that 

location. In doing so, he testified how he ran the registration. It was 

only a natural way of discussing the results of his attempt to investigate 

the abandoned vehicle, to explain the results of running the registration.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 29. 
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Here, the trial court classified the van’s stolen status as evidence of a 

prior bad act, but justified the admission of the evidence based on the res 

gestae exception. We do not agree that the fleeting mentions of the van's 

stolen status were evidence of a prior bad act of Appellant thereby requiring 

an exception or another legitimate reason to be admitted. “Evidence of prior 

bad acts committed by a defendant is not admissible solely to show the 

defendant's bad character or his propensity for committing bad acts. However, 

evidence of prior bad acts is admissible where there is a legitimate reason for 

the evidence . . . .” Dowling, supra (emphasis added). That a van was stolen 

is evidence of a crime, wrong, or bad act on the part of some individual, but 

not necessarily Appellant or his co-defendants. No testimony regarding the 

stolen van by either Detective Hatfield or by Officer Pistilli tended to attribute 

the theft of the van to Appellant. Appellant was not charged with theft of the 

van or receiving stolen property. No allusions were made by the 

Commonwealth or its witnesses that Appellant had knowledge of the van’s 

stolen status. The fact that the van was stolen served only to complete the 

story for the jurors as to the reason for and result of Officer Pistilli running the 

vehicle’s registration.

Moreover, the trial court twice gave a cautionary instruction to the jury 

regarding the use of this evidence; one instruction was given after Officer 

Pistilli’s testimony about it, and one was given before the jury began 

deliberations. N.T., 10/10/22, at 55; N.T., 10/11/22, at 171-72. The trial 

court’s first cautionary instruction stated this:
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Let me give the instruction there. This defendant is not charged 

with any crime related to stealing the van or receiving stolen 

property, but the evidence is admissible to tell you the natural 

development of the facts in this case and the complete story. You 

should consider this evidence for that purpose only. You must not 

consider it as evidence that would tend to show that the defendant 

is a person of bad character, or criminal tendencies from which 

you might be inclined to infer guilt.

N.T., 10/10/22, at 55. The second instruction advised the jury:

You've heard evidence concerning other acts that the defendant 

is not charged with, for example, whether the car was stolen, 

whether it was a receiving stolen property situation, and then you 

heard about drug activity on the day in question. Once again, the 

defendant is not charged with these things. It's introduced to allow 

you to understand the whole story of the case, the natural 

development of the facts. It may not be considered by you in other 

ways such as you may not regard this evidence as showing that 

the defendant is a person of bad character or criminal tendencies 

from which you might be inclined to infer guilt.

N.T., 10/11/22, 171-72.

It is well established that it is possible to eradicate any prejudice 

resulting from reference to prior criminal activity through a curative instruction 

to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Haag, 562 A.2d 289, 295 (Pa. 1989) 

(“where the Commonwealth did not deliberately elicit the reference to a prior 

unrelated crime, did not exploit the reference, and introduced no evidence of 

the prior unrelated crime, a prompt curative instruction is sufficient to negate 

any prejudice which may have resulted.”). Juries are presumed to follow a 

court's instruction including an instruction that certain matters are not to be 

considered for certain purposes. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 715 A.2d 1136, 

1139 (Pa. Super. 1998). Thus, we find that the court did not abuse its 
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discretion in admitting the evidence that the van was stolen because it was 

not evidence of a prior bad act of Appellant’s and because there was no 

prejudice to Appellant. 

Appellant’s sixth issue is that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

motion in limine to exclude the audio portion of the video footage of the 

robbery wherein a declarant identified Appellant. Appellant’s Br. at 28. 

Our standard of review of a denial of a motion in limine is as follows:

When ruling on a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 

in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of 

review. The admission of evidence is committed to the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's ruling regarding the 

admission of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that 

ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Moser, 999 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). 

At trial, the audio portion of the video footage showing the robbery was 

admitted. In the footage, Quadir Nixon can be heard saying, “Jig, Mir, and 

(unintelligible) is just robbing County right now on the corner bro. They just 

gunned him down right now, bro. He got the gat to County right now, bro.”2

Motion in Limine, 7/29/22, at 2. Appellant’s nickname is Mir, so the statement 

implicated him, but the Commonwealth did not call Quadir Nixon, the 

declarant in the audio, as a witness. Appellant asserts that the audio 

____________________________________________

2 “Jig” is the nickname for Nafis Hawkins. “Mir” is the nickname for Appellant, 

Samir Bentley. “County” is the nickname for the victim, Robert Stiles. A “gat” 

is a gun. 
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identification was hearsay and fails to meet the statement of identification 

exception because the declarant was never called as a witness to be 

questioned about making the identification. Appellant’s Br. at 29. 

Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of 

the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible unless it falls within an 

exception to the hearsay rule set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 482 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citing Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2015); 

Pa.R.E. 801 and 802). There is an exception for statements made for the 

purpose of identification:

The following statements are not excluded by the rule against 

hearsay if the declarant testifies and is subject to crossexamination about the prior statement: . . . A prior statement by 

a declarant-witness identifying a person or thing, made after 

perceiving the person or thing, provided that the declarantwitness testifies to the making of the prior statement.

Pa.R.E. 803.1(2) (emphasis added).

Here, the trial court concluded that the statements made by Nixon in 

the audio recording were admissible under the excited utterance and the 

present sense impression exceptions to hearsay. Tr. Ct. Op. at 32. Our 

Supreme Court has consistently defined “excited utterance” as:

[A] spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been 

suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by 

some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person has 

just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference to 

some phase of that occurrence which he perceived, and this 

declaration must be made so near the occurrence both in time and 
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place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole 

or in part from his reflective faculties.

Commonwealth v. Keys, 814 A.2d 1256, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2003). The 

present sense impression exception has been characterized as follows:

This exception requires that the declarant see the event and make 

an observation about it to another person also present at the 

scene; the observation must be made at the time of the event, or 

so shortly thereafter that it is unlikely that the declarant had the 

opportunity to form the purpose of misstating his observation. 

Commentators have generally characterized the occurrence giving 

rise to the declaration as an unexciting event. Reliability is 

considered assured by the contemporaneousness of the 

statement, and by the fact that the observation is made to another 

person. 

The Supreme Court has observed further that[] under this 

exception the necessity for the presence of a startling occurrence 

or accident to serve as a source of reliability is not required. The 

truthfulness of the utterance is dependent upon its spontaneity. It 

must be certain from the circumstances that the utterance is a 

reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by 

retrospective mental processes. Restated, the utterance must be 

“instinctive, rather than deliberate.”

Commonwealth v. Harper, 614 A.2d 1180, 1183 (1992) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted).

The present sense impression exception applies to “[a] statement 

describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately 

after the declarant perceived it.” Pa.R.E. 803(1). The rationale for the present 

sense impression exception is that the “[r]elative immediacy of the declaration 

ensures that there will have been little opportunity for reflection or calculated 

misstatement.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 326 A.2d 387, 389 (Pa. 1974). 

For example, a call to 911 may qualify as a present sense impression if the 

statement is reported contemporaneously with the event or is so 
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instantaneous “that it is unlikely that the declarant had the opportunity to 

form the purpose of misstating his observation.” Commonwealth v. 

Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 573 (Pa. Super. 2002). The excited utterance 

exception applies to “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, 

made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” 

Pa.R.E. 803(2). Thus, “[t]he spontaneity of such an excited declaration is the 

source of reliability and the touchstone of admissibility.” Coleman, 326 A.2d 

at 389.

In explaining its reasons for denying the motion in limine, the trial court 

stated:

This [c]ourt rejected defense counsel's position, because it is 

simply not the law and Cordona, supra, does not support his 

position. While the persuasive case does stand for the proposition 

that under Pa.R.E. 803.1(2), the hearsay exception, “prior 

statement of identification by declarant-witness” does require the 

declarant to testify at trial and that the declarant has to also testify 

to making the prior statement; it does not stand for the 

proposition that defense counsel suggested. When a party invokes 

a hearsay exception, a court must ascertain whether the proffered 

statement meets the exacting demands of the exception. That is 

exactly what occurred here. The Commonwealth invoked both the 

presence sense impression and excited utterance hearsay 

exceptions. The Commonwealth detailed how the statement fit 

both the present sense impression, and the excited utterance 

exception. This [c]ourt agreed with this analysis.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 33. 

We agree. Because Nixon was the declarant of the out-of-court 

statement and was not called as a witness, the statement in the audio 

recording is hearsay and must have satisfied a hearsay exception in which the 
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declarant’s availability is immaterial—i.e., an exception enumerated in Pa.R.E. 

803— in order to have been properly admitted. The trial court found the 

exceptions in Pa.R.E. 803(1) and 803(2) to be satisfied.

However, we need not perform an independent analysis to determine if 

the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the present sense 

impression and excited utterance exceptions were met because Appellant did 

not challenge on appeal the finding that the statements satisfied the present 

sense impression and/or excited utterance exceptions. He devoted his 

argument entirely to the point that the Commonwealth needed to additionally 

meet the more stringent requirement for statement of identification, requiring 

the declarant testify in court to the statement made for the purpose of 

identification, which it did not. Appellant’s Br. at 28-30. That is not the law; 

one layer of hearsay requires one hearsay exception for the evidence to be 

admissible, and no additional hearsay exception is required to be met. See 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 658 A.2d 392, 394 (Pa. Super. 1995) (murder 

victim's statement identifying appellant was admissible as present sense 

impression where it gave a “contemporaneous verbalization of her 

observation” of him outside her door); see also Commonwealth v. Kulb, 

220 A.3d 652, 2019 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2694 at *10 (Pa. Super. 2019)3

(witnesses’ statements identifying Appellant were properly considered excited 

____________________________________________

3 We note that, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-precedential 

decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their 

persuasive value. We find guidance in the unpublished memorandum cited 

supra and find it to be persuasive in this matter. 
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utterances and admitted under that exception to the hearsay rule); see also 

Commonwealth v. Harper, A.2d 1180, 1183 (Pa. Super. 1992) (although 

declarant identified appellant’s clothing, the observation was relayed as a 

present sense impression and thus admissible); see also Commonwealth v. 

Holton, 906 A.2d 1346, 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2006) (when a detective 

wearing a hidden wire bought drugs from a woman, the audio tape was 

admissible without the woman’s testimony under the co-conspirator 

exception, which does not require availability of the declarant as a witness, 

despite the woman identifying appellant as her drug dealer in the audio 

recording). Accordingly, the audio was properly admitted and Appellant’s 

claim fails. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Date: 3/4/2024