SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2250-17T1

MORRIS IMAGING

ASSOCIATES, PA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROSA SEMILIA,

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL HARRISON, ESQ., and

STACY FRONAPFEL, ESQ.,

Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________________________

Submitted October 29, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris 

County, Docket No. DC-005061-17.

Rosa Semilia, appellant pro se.

Michael S. Harrison, attorney for respondents.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 7, 2019
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A-2250-17T1

PER CURIAM

This dispute arises from the collection of an outstanding bill for x-rays 

and a CAT scan (the services). The patient, defendant Rosa Semilia, appeals 

from Special Civil Part orders: granting summary judgment to the provider, 

plaintiff Morris Imaging Associates, P.A. (Morris Imaging); and granting 

motions dismissing defendant's counterclaim against Morris Imaging and her 

third-party complaint against Morris Imaging's legal representatives, Michael 

Harrison, Stacy Fronapfel, and the Law Office of Michael Harrison, LLC (the 

Law Office); and denying defendant's motion for reconsideration of the 

dismissal of her counterclaim and third-party complaint. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

I

In November 2016, Semilia received the services at the Morristown 

Medical Center emergency room from physicians employed by Morris Imaging. 

Prior to the services being rendered, Semilia's husband signed a consent and 

payment authorization form on her behalf, which stated, in pertinent part, 

I understand and acknowledge that the majority of the 

physicians at the Hospital are members of the 

Voluntary Medical Staff and are not employees or 

agents of the Hospital, but are either independent 

contractors or independent practitioners who have been 

granted the privilege of using the Hospital's facilities 
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A-2250-17T1

for the care and treatment of their patients[, including] 

. . . Emergency Department physicians, . . . radiologists, 

. . . on call physician[s], and other consultants who may 

treat me. 

Morris Imaging billed Semilia $499 for the services. After the bill for the 

services went unpaid for six months, Semilia received a letter dated May 15, 

2017, from Harrison, on behalf of his client Morris Imaging, requesting 

payment. The letter stated that it was "not an implied or actual threat of a lawsuit 

on the debt" being collected. 

Over a month later, Semilia disputed the bill in a letter to Harrison 

demanding proof of validity of the debt and warning that any further 

communications would "constitute[] a scheme of fraud and inland piracy by 

advancing a writing that you know or should know is false[.]" Harrison 

promptly responded three days later with a June 16 letter to Semilia, forwarding 

her an account statement titled "Morris Imaging Associates, P.A." with an 

amount due of $499. The letter informed Semilia that "[i]f payment is not 

forthcoming we will institute suit without further notice." About a month 

thereafter, the Law Office filed a breach of contract complaint for "Morris 

Imaging PA" against Semilia seeking payment of the $499 bill. The complaint 

was signed by Harrison and listed Fronapfel, an associate with the Law Office,

as the filing attorney. However, a certification by Fronapfel states that she was 
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not working at the Law Office at the time the complaint was filed, nor did she 

have anything to do with the filing. 

In her answer, Semilia denied breaching a contract with Morris Imaging 

and challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Asserting violation of the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a to 1692p, she 

filed a counterclaim against Morris Imaging and a third-party complaint against 

the Law Office, Harrison, and Fronapfel. In particular, Semilia alleged: Morris 

Imaging injured her with false "material representations"; the Law Office 

engaged in misleading and threatening conduct; Harrison and Fronapfel, as debt 

collectors, made false representations; and Fronapfel filed a frivolous complaint 

against her. 

On October 3, 2017, the motion judge granted the Rule 4:6-2(e) motions 

by Morris Imaging, and third-party defendants Harrison and Fronapfel,

1

dismissing both the counterclaim and third-party complaint with prejudice,

respectively. The judge denied Semilia's motion for reconsideration on 

December 1. On December 7, the judge entered an order granting Morris 

Imaging's summary judgment motion. 

 

1

In her opposition to the motion to dismiss the counterclaim and third-party 

complaint, Semilia consented to the dismissal of her claims against the Law 

Office as being a mistakenly named third party. 
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II

In appealing the aforementioned orders, Semilia raises the following 

arguments in her initial brief:2

POINT I

THE APPELLATE DIVISION MUST DECIDE 

WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULED 

CORRECTLY ON THE LAW OR RULES OF COURT 

WHEN IT GRANTED NON-EXISTENT 

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE 

COUNTERCLAIM, THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, 

AND GRANTED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED THE 

REQUIREMENTS OF N.J.S.A. 14A:13-4; N.J.S.A. 

14A:4-1; AND N.J.S.A. 14A:13-11.

POINT III

DENIAL OF EQUAL ACCESS TO THE COURT AND 

DENIAL OF REMEDY UNDER LAW.

POINT IV 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE 

BEEN GRANTED WITHOUT A HEARING AND 

COMPETENT WITNESS.

 

2

 Semilia's brief does not include the required point headings for her arguments; 

we therefore added them for organizational purposes.
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A-2250-17T1

POINT V 

DENIAL OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT.

POINT VI

DISPUTE OF FACTS; CREDIBILITY ISSUES.

POINT VII 

VIOLATION OF HEARSAY RULE AND DICTATES 

OF [SELLERS V. SCHONFELD,] 270 N.J. SUPER. 

424 (APP. DIV. 1993).

POINT VIII 

A LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

[RULE] 4:6-2(a).

POINT IX 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 

FOLLOW THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 

FDCPA'S PROVISIONS WHERE THE FDCPA 

SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIBERALLY CONSTRUED.

POINT X

MICHAEL HARRISON, ATTORNEY AT LAW IS A 

"DEBT COLLECTOR" UNDER THE FDCPA AS 

WAS CONCLUDED BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

COURT OF APPEALS IN GRAZIANO V. 

HARRISON, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).
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POINT XI 

THE ALLEGED DEBT IS COVERED UNDER THE 

FDCPA.

POINT XII 

CONDUCT OF COLLECTION LITIGATION.

POINT XIII 

FILING THE INSTANT COMPLAINT IS AN 

ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT AND IS 

COVERED UNDER FDCPA.

POINT XIV 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED 

THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT WHERE IN 

FACT IT DOES NOT FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE OF 

ACTION AGAINST MICHAEL HARRISON, ESQ., 

AND STACY FRONAPFEL.

In her reply brief,3 Semilia argues:

POINT I

PLAINTIFF THROUGH ITS ATTORNEY LIES TO 

THE APPELLATE DIVISION.

POINT II

APPELLEES' COUNSEL MICHAEL HARRISON IS 

IN VIOLATION OF RPC 3.3 WHERE MICHAEL 

HARRISON ON APPEAL KNOWINGLY MAKES 

 

3 Again, we add point headings for her arguments for organization. 
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A-2250-17T1

FALSE STATEMENT TO A TRIBUNAL[.] (NOT 

ARGUED [BELOW]).

POINT III

APPELLEES' COUNSEL MICHAEL HARRISON IS 

IN VIOLATION OF RPC 4.1 (a) (1) WHERE 

MICHAEL HARRISON KNOWINGLY ON APPEAL 

MAKES A FALSE STATEMENT OF MATERIAL 

FACT TO A THIRD PERSON[.] (NOT ARGUED 

[BELOW]). 

POINT IV

APPELLEES' COUNSEL MICHAEL HARRISON IS 

IN VIOLATION OF RPC 8.4 MISCONDUCT[.] (NOT 

ARGUED [BELOW]).

Initially, we note that from the record provided it appears the motion judge

made his decisions on the papers without oral argument. The Notice of Appeal 

reflects that there is no transcript of the judge's decisions. None of the orders 

indicate that the reasons for granting or denying relief were set forth on the 

record or in written decisions. Thus, it appears that the judge failed to set forth, 

in a meaningful fashion, his factual findings and conclusions of law as required 

by Rule 1:7-4.

4 Usually, when this is not done, this court's review is impeded 

 

4

 Below the judge's signature at the end of the following orders, it is simply 

stated: December 1, 2017, – "Defendant has failed to set forth any new facts not 

previously raised in her original application. She does not satisfy the criterion 

of [Rule] 4:49-2 et seq."; and December 7, 2017, –"Plaintiff is entitled to 
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A-2250-17T1

and a remand is necessary. Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 443 (App. Div. 

2015). However, in this case, to avoid unnecessary litigation delay, we will not 

remand because the record provided allows us to determine whether it was 

appropriate for the judge to grant summary judgment and dismiss the 

counterclaim and third-party complaint for failure to state a cause of action. See

Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2018) (citing 

Leeds v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 331 N.J. Super. 416, 420-21 (App. Div. 

2000) (affirming the grant of summary judgment even though order merely 

stated "denied")). 

Summary Judgment

Semilia argues Morris Imaging's summary judgment motion should have 

been denied because a hearing was not provided with competent witnesses 

testifying, and there are "very important issues regarding . . . violations of due 

process, violations rights [sic] under the state and federal law, equal access to 

the courts and credibility issue[s]," which all lead to her "standing and ability to 

prosecute [her] complaint." She further contends the court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over the claim because Morris Imaging is not incorporated in New 

 

judgment as per [Rule] 4:46. There is no genuine issue of material fact." As for 

the October 3, 2017 order dismissing the counterclaims and third-party 

complaint, there is no statement.
10 A-2250-17T1

Jersey and, therefore, is fictitious. These arguments are completely unfounded 

and reflect a misunderstanding of the summary judgment process. 

When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply "the 

same standard governing the trial court." Oyola v. Liu, 431 N.J. Super. 493, 497 

(App. Div. 2013). A court should grant summary judgment when the record 

reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). We consider 

"whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party," in consideration of the applicable 

evidentiary standard, "are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the 

alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life 

Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). 

A non-moving party "cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment 

merely by pointing to any fact in dispute." Ibid. at 541. Thus, "once the moving 

party presents sufficient evidence in support of the motion, the opposing party 

must 'demonstrate by competent evidential material that a genuine issue of fact 

exists[.]'" Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016) (citing Robbins 

v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229, 241 (1957)). 
11 A-2250-17T1

Indeed, "if the opposing party [in a] summary judgment motion 'offers 

. . . only facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, 

"[f]anciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious," he will not be heard to 

complain if the court grants summary judgment.'" Id. (citing Judson v. Peoples 

Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954)). "[T]hese general rules . . . without 

unjustly depriving a party of a trial, can effectively eliminate from crowded 

court calendars cases in which a trial would serve no useful purpose . . . knowing 

that a rational jury can reach but one conclusion." Brill, 142 N.J. at 541. 

We agree with Morris Imaging that summary judgment was proper as 

there was no dispute of material facts and it was entitled to dismissal of the suit 

as a matter of law. As evidenced by Morris Imaging's Articles of Incorporation, 

the undisputed proofs established that Morris Imaging is a New Jersey 

corporation, which rendered services to Semilia at Morristown Medical Center;

therefore, providing the court with subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. 

In addition, undisputed proofs establish that Morris Imaging's physicians 

performed services for Semilia which she failed to pay for. Because there were 

no disputed issues of material facts, a trial was not necessary, and the judge was 

correct in granting summary judgment. 
12 A-2250-17T1

Motions to Dismiss

Semilia contends that the judge erred in dismissing the counterclaim 

against Morris Imaging and the third-party complaint against the Law Office, 

Harrison, and Fronapfel. In her counterclaim, she argued that Morris Imaging's 

collections complaint was frivolous because she did not enter into a contractual 

agreement with the company. She therefore alleged, "[c]ommon [l]aw [f]raud[,] 

[c]ommon [l]aw [m]isrepresentaion [a]nd [i]njurious [f]alsehood, [f]raud upon 

the [c]ourt" seeking "statutory damages of $1000[] and treble damages in the 

amount of $3,000[]." Moreover, she claimed that Morris Imaging violated the 

FDCPA. In her third-party complaint, she likewise claimed the third-party 

defendants violated her rights under the FDCPA. These contentions are 

unpersuasive. 

In order for the FDCPA to apply, Semilia must establish there was a debt 

communication from a debt collector to a debtor. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. There 

are two communications in question: letters by Harrison – as counsel for Morris 

Imaging – dated May 15, 2017, and June 16, 2017. Neither letter qualifies 

Morris Imaging as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA, which is "any person 

who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business 

the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly 
13 A-2250-17T1

collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or 

asserted to be owed or due another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Morris Imaging 

was a creditor seeking payment from Semilia through its counsel for services, 

and there is no dispute that the services were provided to Semilia and remained 

unpaid. Because under the FDCPA, there was no debt communication and 

Morris Imaging is not a debt collector, the statute does not apply in this case.

See FTC v. Check Inv'rs, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2007); Hodges v. Sasil 

Corp., 189 N.J. 210, 224 (2007). 

Moreover, even if Morris Imaging was a debt collector, nothing in the 

record suggests that it harassed, oppressed, or abused Semilia, 15 U.S.C. § 

1692d; used false, deceptive, or misleading representations to collect their debt, 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e; or used unfair or unconscionable means to collect their debt, 

15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Thus, the counterclaim against it was properly denied. 

As for Harrison, his initial communication with Semilia provided her with 

a debt collection notice that indicated: the amount of debt owed, 15 U.S.C. § 

1692g(a)(1); the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, 15 U.S.C. § 

1692g(a)(2); informed her that he is a debt collector and it was "not an implied 

or actual threat of a lawsuit on the debt. . . ," 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3); and a 

statement that, upon Semilia's written request within the thirty-day period, he 
14 A-2250-17T1

will provide the name and address of Morris Imaging, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5). 

The notice also contained a statement of legal rights which included "if [Semilia] 

notif[ies] this office, in writing, within thirty (30) days after [her] receipt of this 

notice[,] that [she] dispute[s] the debt or any portion thereof, this office will 

obtain verification of the debt" and mail it to her. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4). 

The notice did not mention any credit bureaus, threaten adverse credit reporting 

or lawsuits, and was generally polite. Thereafter, as noted previously, Semilia 

disputed the bill, Harrison promptly responded within three days, and suit was 

filed against Semilia two months later. 

Harrison's conduct did not give rise to an actionable claim because even 

the least sophisticated debtor would know, based on the language contained in 

the initial notice, this was not a lawsuit but a pre-lawsuit action to collect a debt. 

See Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 420 (3d Cir. 2015). The notice 

was clear and included information required under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692g(a). Moreover, neither of Harrison's letters were misleading. They were

on his law firm's official letterhead and they explicitly notified Semilia that this 

was not a legal process and that Harrison was a debt collector assigned to collect 

a debt. 
15 A-2250-17T1

The only questionable violation was in the second letter that failed to state

when a suit would be instituted if payment was not received. Even so, Harrison 

provided Semilia with the validation of the debt as requested and required under 

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). There is nothing, however, indicating that she took any 

action during the two months between the receipt of the letter and the filing of 

the complaint. As stated previously, the debt is valid based upon the record. 

Hence, Harrison was properly dismissed as a third-party defendant. 

The same can be said with respect to Fronapfel. Just because she may 

have filed the complaint against Semilia on behalf of the Law Firm is not 

abusive. As the Sixth Circuit recognized,

"the filing of a debt-collection lawsuit without the 

immediate means of proving the debt does not have the 

natural consequence of harassing, abusing, or 

oppressing a debtor. Any attempt to collect a defaulted 

debt will be unwanted by a debtor, but employing the 

court system . . . cannot be said to be an abusive tactic 

under the FDCPA." 

Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 330-

31 (6th Cir. 2006). 

Further, because a debt collector is responsible for "the activities of those it 

enlists to collect debts on its behalf," Marucci v. Cawley & Bergmann, LLP, 66 

F. Supp. 3d 559, 564 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting Pollice v. Natl. Tax Funding, L.P., 

225 F.3d 379, 405 (3d Cir. 2000)), thus Fronapfel, as an associate of the Law 
16 A-2250-17T1

Office, would be immune from liability under the FDCPA. Accordingly, we 

conclude there was no error in dismissing the third-party complaint against 

Fronapfel. 

We next turn to the judge's order denying Semilia's motion for 

reconsideration of the orders dismissing the counterclaim and third-party 

complaint. Semilia argued: (1) "[p]laintiff's/[t]hird [p]arty [d]efendants' Notice 

of Motion fails to schedule the return date[,]" and the court made a "rush to 

judgment" and violated due process by not considering her opposition; (2) the 

court "failed to notify [her] of the October 3, 2017[,] return date[, a]s required 

by the court rules . . . "; and (3) "the [c]ourt procedurally err[ed] by issuing [the]

October 3, 2017 order to dismiss . . . because the statements contained in 

counsel's [b]rief . . . could [not] and should [not] have been considered . . . since 

these statements were not attested to by counsel in a certification[.]" As noted 

previously, the judge rejected these arguments on the basis that Semilia "failed 

to set forth any new facts not previously raised in her original application [, and 

therefore,] [s]he does not satisfy the criterion of [Rule] 4:49-2 et seq." 

When we consider a trial judge's denial of a Rule 4:49-2 motion for 

reconsideration, we have determined:

Reconsideration itself is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the [c]ourt, to be exercised in the interest 
17 A-2250-17T1

of justice[.] It is not appropriate merely because a 

litigant is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or 

wishes to reargue a motion, but should be utilized only 

for those cases which fall into that narrow corridor in 

which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision 

based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 

2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, 

or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, 

competent evidence.

[Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. 

Div. 2010) (citation omitted).]

Therefore, we will not disturb a judge's denial of a motion for reconsideration 

absent an abuse of discretion. See id. at 289. 

Our review of the record reveals that there was no new information or any 

evidence that would significantly change the outcome of the motion. Semilia 

merely recites the same arguments she previously made in the original 

counterclaim and third-party complaint. Hence, we see no reason to disturb the 

judge's order denying reconsideration. 

R.P.C. Claims

In Points II, III, and IV of her reply brief, Semilia contends Harrison 

violated various provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Since these 

contentions were not raised before the motion judge will not be considered on 

appeal because they do not "'go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern 
18 A-2250-17T1

matters of great public interest.'" Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014) 

(quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). 

Lastly, as for any of Semilia's arguments not expressly discussed above, 

they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.