## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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### No. 16-0260

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### AC I NTERESTS 

### , L.P., FORMERLY 

### A MERICAN 

### C OATINGS 

### , L.P., P ETITIONER 

### ,

v. 

### T EXAS 

### C OMMISSION ON 

### E NVIRONMENTAL 

### Q UALITY 

### , R ESPONDENT

══════════════════════ ════════════════════ O N P ETITION FOR R EVIEW FROM THE C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS

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J USTICE B OYD , joined by J USTICE J OHNSON , dissenting. The Texas Clean Air Act provides that a person “may appeal” a Texas Commission on Environmental Quality decision “b y filing a petition in a district court of Travis County.” T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 382.032(a). The petition “must be filed within 30 days after” the decision’s effective date, id. § 382.032(b), and service of cita tion on the Commission “must be accomplished within 30 days after the da te on which the petition is filed,” id. § 382.032(c). AC Interests filed this suit to appeal the Commission’ s decision to deny AC Interests’s claim to certain emission-reduction credits. It timely filed its petition within thirty days after the Commission’s decision, but it did not serve citation on the Commi ssion until fifty-eight da ys later. The primary issue is whether AC Interests may pursue the appeal after missing the statute’s service-of-citation deadline.2 The Court holds that subsecti on (c)’s deadline is merely “directory,” rather than “mandatory,” so AC Interests’s failure to meet the deadline does not preclude it from pursuing the appeal. Ante at ___. The Court agrees that the deadline creates a condition precedent, ante at ___, but it identifies no right or duty that is condi tioned on the precedent. 1 Under the Court’s reasoning, the deadline is a condition precedent that conditions nothing at all. As a result, the deadline means nothing at all. I disagree. The deadline—which su bsection (c) says the party “must” meet—must be a condition on something , and the only thing it can be a condition on is the right to pursue the appeal. The statute’s plain language compels that result, and that result promotes the statute’s apparent purposes. I would hold that because AC Interests failed to serve citation on the Commission within thirty days, as the statute says a party who wants to appeal a Commission decision “must” do, it cannot pursue th is appeal. Because the Court hol ds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
I. The Statute’s Plain Language The Clean Air Act prescribes a specific proce ss for those who want to appeal a Commission decision, and it does so by using varying directives—“may,” “must,” or “shall”—for each step along the way:

 A person “may” appeal the Commission’s decisi on “by filing a petition in a district court of Travis County.” 2

1 “A condition precedent is an event that must happen or be performed before a right can accrue to enforce an obligation.” Centex Corp. v. Dalton , 840 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. 1992) (citing Hohenberg Bros. Co. v. George E. Gibbons & Co. , 537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1976)); see also Helton v. R.R. Com’n of Tex. , 126 S.W.3d 111, 119 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“By not serv ing Harris with a copy of the petition for judicial review, as mandated by section 2001.176(b)(2) of the APA, however, Helton did not meet a necessary condition on which its right to seek judicial review of the commission’s order depended.”).

2 T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 382.032(a).3  The petition “must be filed within 30 days” after the decision’s effective date. 3

 Service of citation on the Commission “must be accomplished within 30 days” after the plaintiff files the petition. 4

 The citation “may” be served on the executive director or any member of the Commission. 5

 The plaintiff “shall” pursue the action with reasonable diligence. 6

 The court “shall” presume the action has been abandoned if the plainti ff fails to prosecute the action within one year after the date on which the action is filed. 7

 The court “shall” dismiss the suit upon the a ttorney general’s motion, unless the plaintiff “can show good cause for the delay.” 8 We need not guess at the meanings of these di rectives, as the Legislature has defined them in the Code Construction Act. When a statute uses the term “must,” it “c reates or recognizes a condition precedent,” T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE § 311.016(3); when a statute uses the term “shall,” it “imposes a duty,” id. § 311.016(2); and when a statute uses the term “may,” it “creates discretionary authority or gr ants permission or a power,” id. § 311.016(1). These definitions apply to all statutes “unless the context in which th e word or phrase appears necessarily requires a different construction” or “a different cons truction is expressly provided by statute.” Id. § 311.016. The Clean Air Act does not provid e an alternative meaning for these terms and, contextually,

3 Id. § 382.032(b).

4 Id. § 382.032(c).

5 Id.

6 Id. § 382.032(d).

7 Id.

8 Id.4 nothing compels a contrary conclusion. In the contex t of the Clean Air Act’s procedural provisions, affording these words their statutorily prescrib ed meaning enforces the orderly administrative process the Legislature provide d for claimants to appeal the Commission’s decisions. See T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 382.032. Applying the definitions the Legislature ha s provided, I would follow a simple, plainlanguage approach and construe the st atutorily-required process as follows:

 “May” appeal: AC Interests had statutory perm ission to appeal the Commission’s decision, and it could exercise that right “by fi ling a petition in a district court of Travis County,” but it was not required to appeal.

 “Must” file within thirty days: As a condition precedent to pursuing its appeal, AC Interests was required to file its petition within thirty da ys after the decision’s effective date. If AC Interests failed to file its petition within that time frame, it could not pursue its appeal.

 “Must” accomplish service of citation within thirty days: As another condition precedent to pursuing its appeal, AC Interests was requi red to accomplish servi ce of citation within thirty days after filing its petition. If AC Inte rests failed to effectuate service within that time frame, it could not pursue its appeal.

 “May” serve on director or members: In effecting service, AC Interests had statutory permission to serve the cita tion either on the Commission’s executive director or any Commission member.

 “Shall” pursue with diligence: After it completed the first three steps, AC Interests had a duty to prosecute its action with reasonable diligence.

 “Shall” presume abandoned and “shall” dismiss: If AC Interests failed to prosecute the appeal within one year, the court had a duty to presume that AC Interests had abandoned the suit—and a duty to dismiss the suit—abse nt a showing of good cause for the delay. The Court rejects this construc tion, at least of the service-of -citation deadline, because the statute does not expressly state that the suit will be dismissed if the claimant fails to meet that deadline. Ante at ___. According to the Court, even though the statute uses the word “must,” even though that word creates a condition precedent, a nd even though it is therefore “mandatory” under5 any ordinary understanding, the requirement is merely directory becaus e the statute does not expressly state that AC Interests can not pursue its appeal if it fails to effectuate service of citation within thirty days. This Court has struggled for decades—without much meaningful success—to identify a clear standard for determining whether a statut ory requirement is “mandatory” or “directory.” See Chisholm v. Bewley Mills , 287 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. 1956) (“There is no absolute test by which it may be determined whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory.”). We have said that, in general, in determining “whether the Le gislature intended a provis ion to be mandatory or directory, we consider the plain meaning of the word s used, as well as the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that w ould follow from each construction.” Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins , 47 S.W.3d 486, 494 (Tex. 2001). When the stat ute expressly states a consequence for noncompliance, of course, the Court’s task is s imply to apply that consequence. But when the statute fails to expressly state a consequence for noncompliance, our task becomes more difficult. We have concluded that the absence of any st ated consequence “may be considered as a circumstance tending to suppor t a directory construction,” m eaning the statute imposes no consequence for noncompliance. Chisolm , 287 S.W.2d at 945. But we have also warned that this holding “does not suggest that when no penalty is prescribed, ‘must’ is non-mandatory.” Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Chem. Lime, Ltd. , 291 S.W.3d 392, 404 (Tex. 2009). Ultimately, we have concluded that when “the statute is silent about consequences of noncompliance, we look to the statute’s purpo se in determining the proper consequence of noncompliance.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Sinclair , 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Te x. 1999) (per curiam); see Hines v. Hash , 843 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Tex. 1992) (“When the st atute is silent, we have looked to6 its purpose for guidance.”). Applying this approach here, I conclude that the Clean Air Act requires timely service of citation as a c ondition precedent to a suit for j udicial review both because the statute’s text and context compel that result a nd because that result best supports the statute’s presumed purposes.
II. Text and Context Reading subsection 382.032(c)’s service-of-citati on deadline in context makes dismissal the only logical consequence for noncompliance. S ubsections (a), (b), and (c) together stipulate that a person “may appeal” a Commission decision by filing a petition, but the petition must be filed within thirty days after the decision, and service of citation must be accomplished within thirty days after filing. The Court agrees that a party who misses subsecti on (b)’s filing deadline “may not appeal,” because that deadline is “juris dictional” and “relates to the very act necessary to establish a claim, right, or benefit under the statute.” Ante at ___. 9 But according to the Court, a party who misses subsection (c)’s service-of -citation deadline may still appeal because subsection (a) says the party “may appeal” by filing the petition, not by serving the citation. Ante at ___. According to the Court, we can only concl ude that dismissal is the consequence for failing to timely serve citation by “blindly searching” the statute and then “creati ng” or “inventing” that
consequence. Ante at ___.

9 The Court cites to section 311.034 of the Government Code for the proposition that “Filing a timely petition under the statute is a jurisdictional requirement.” Ante at ___ (citing T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE § 311.034). But section 331.034 actually supports the notion that serving citation and any embedded timing requirements are also jurisdictional requirements. See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE § 311.034 (“Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity.”).7 I disagree. If, as the Court s uggests, merely filing a petition is the sole condition precedent to appeal, then the mere filing of a petition w ould always be sufficient, and subsection (b)’s deadline for that filing would not be a condition precedent. But if timely filing the petition is also a condition precedent to the right to appeal, as the Court ag rees it is, then we mu st read subsections (a) and (b) together to determine the effect of mi ssing that deadline. But then there is no principled reason to read subsection (c)—or to understand its application to subsectio n (a)—differently from subsection (b) and its application. Even after the plaintiff has f iled a petition, the trial court’s “jurisdiction is dependent upon citation issued an d served in a manner provided for by law,” and “[a]bsent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pe nding suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.” Wilson v. Dunn , 800 S.W.2d 833, 836–37 (Tex. 1 990). Service of citation, in other words, is effectively as “jurisdictional” as the fili ng of the petition, and equally as “necessary to establish a claim, right, or benefit under the statute.” Ante , at ___. A claimant cannot obtain judicial review simply by fili ng a petition. While subsection (a)— when read alone—says that a person “may app eal by filing a petition,” subsection (c) recognizes that inherent in the act of filing a petition is the constitutionally required step of serving process on the named defendant. The “mere f iling of the plaintiff’s petition is not all that is required to ‘commence’ the suit,” Owen v. City of Eastland , 78 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Te x. Comm’n App. 1935) (addressing statutes of limitations), because “those not properly served [with citation] have no duty to act, diligently or otherwise,” Ross v. Nat’l Ctr. for the Emp’t of the Disabled , 197 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2006) (per curi am). Initiating a lawsuit is al ways a two-step process of filing and serving process, and s ubsections (b) and (c) impose dead lines on both of those steps.8 The Court asserts that subsecti ons (a) and (b) must be read together because both refer to the filing of the petition and subsection (b) simply defines what it means to file a petition as subsection (a) requires. Ante at ___. Thus, according to the C ourt, if you file a petition (as subsection (a) requires) but fail to file it within thirty days (as subsection (b) requires), “you have not filed a petition and, th erefore, may not appeal.” Ante at ___. The statute’s language does not support that construction. If you file a petition but fail to file it w ithin thirty days, you have still filed a petition, but you have not filed it timely. Because subsection (b) says you “must” file it timely—making timely filing a condition precedent to appeal—you cannot pursue the appeal even though you have filed a petition. In the same way, because subsecti on (c) says you “must” timely serve citation on the Commission, you cannot pursue the appeal even though you have timely filed the petition. Without serv ice of citation, the filed petition ca nnot provide any basis for judicial review. For this reason, I concl ude that the statute requires that the consequence for failing to timely serve citation on the Commission is dismissa l of the petition seeki ng judicial review. The person who elects to appeal by filing a petition “must” timely file the petition and “must” timely serve citation, and the consequence fo r failing to comply with either requirement is simply that the person cannot appeal. Under the Court’s approach, by contrast, the te rm “must” requires dismissal if the person fails to timely file the petition, but the same te rm imposes no consequence at all if the person fails to timely serve citation. The Court reasons that, un like a “jurisdictional requ irement, where failure to comply results in dismissal,” subsection (c) “does not state a conseque nce and, importantly, no9 consequence is logically necessary.” Ante at ___. 10 But serving citation is jurisdictional, as is any requirement that can be fairly characterized as a “statutory prerequisite.” See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE § 311.034. (“Statutory prerequi sites to a suit, including th e provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity.”). The Court’s construction improperly renders the service-of-citati on deadline completely meaningless. See Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc. , 430 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. 2014) (“We presume the Legislature chose statutory language deliberately and purposefu lly. We must not interpret the statute ‘in a manner that renders any part of the statut e meaningless or superfluous.’”) (citing Tex. Lottery Com’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen , 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010) and quoting Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue , 271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008)). If AC Interests can pursue this appeal even though it failed to serve citati on within thirty days, then it is not true that the claimant “must” accomplish service of citati on within thirty days. A ccording to the Court’s reading, AC Interests “can,” “could, ” “may,” “might,” or even “shoul d” serve citation within thirty days, but it cannot be said that it “must” do so, even though that’s what su bsection (c) in fact says. The Court attempts to avoid this reality by suggesting that “other possible consequences exist,” ante at ___, but it cannot identify any other conse quences that could apply to the failure to timely serve citation under subsection (c). The onl y “other consequence” the Court suggests is abatement, ante at ___, but it makes no effort to explai n how abatement would ever be appropriate to address the late service of citation, and I cannot see how it would. The only “possible”

10 The Court also cites Roccaforte v. Jefferson County , 341 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. 2011) for the proposition that “failure to give statutorily requir ed post-suit notice is not jurisdictional.” Ante at ___. The statute in that case did not address service of citation, but rather general notice. See Roccaforte , 341 S.W.3d at 927 (“Roccaforte’s claims against the county should not have been dismissed for lack of notice.”).10 consequence that could appropria tely result from missing the service-of-citation deadline is the one the statute itself requires by using the word “m ust”: the loss of the right to pursue the appeal. See, e.g. , Edwards Aquifer , 291 S.W.3d at 404 (“ The only penalty the [act at issue] suggests is that late applications will not be considered.”). We have recognized that, when a particular statutory prov ision imposes a requirement without expressly stating a consequence for noncomp liance, other provisions of the same statute may provide guidance as to what the consequence should be. In Helena Chemical , for example, although the statute required that a claim for arbitration be filed by a particular time, we concluded that the failure to timely file the claim did not require dismissal because another provision of the statute required trial courts to take into account th e arbitrators’ findings “as to the effect of delay in filing the arbitration claim.” 47 S.W.3d at 494. Here, however, ot her statutory provisions support the conclusion that the conse quence for failing to timely serv e citation is dismissal. First, the Legislature’s incl usion of a good-cause exception for delay in subsection (d)— which applies only after a claimant has timely filed its petition and timely served citation— evidences the Legislature’s intent that a claima nt strictly comply with the filing and service deadlines in subsections (a), (b ), and (c), none of which contai n a good-cause exception. This is not a novel concept. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Hous. Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship , 146 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2004) (“When the Legislature includes a right or remedy in one part of a code but omits it in another, that may be precisely what the Legislature in tended. If so, we must honor that difference.”). As the court of appeals correctly noted, the thirty-day serv ice provision “does not have an exception for good and su fficient cause.” 521 S.W.3d at 63; see also TJFA, L.P. v. Tex. Com’n on Envtl. Quality , 368 S.W.3d 727, 737 (Tex. App.—A ustin 2012, pet. denied) (“The11 legislature’s decision to not in clude a provision allowing a party to explain why compliance with the deadline was not achieved is instructive. This s eems particularly true in this case in light of the fact that in the very next provision, the legislatur e afforded parties the abi lity to explain why their suit should not be dismissed for failure to pur sue the claim ‘with reas onable diligence.’”). Second, the Legislature’s decision to include a specific time period compels the conclusion that dismissal is required, and that deci sion must be afforded some significance. See Edwards Aquifer , 291 S.W.3d at 403 (“The importance of a fixed filing deadline is apparent in the [Edwards Aquifer Authority Act]. The Legislature picked a specific, calendar date by which permit applications were required to be filed.”); TJFA , 368 S.W.3d at 735 (conclu ding that an analogous provision regarding service of citation under the So lid Waste Disposal Act was mandatory and that by providing an explicit deadline , “the legislature has indicated its intention to foreclose the possibility of excusing delays between filing and ex ecuting service due to diligent efforts at service undertaken by plaintiffs”). Recently, we noted that “absent statutory langu age to the contrary, a statutorily imposed time period does not allow for substantial compliance.” BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC , 519 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tex. 2017) . In addition, we have recognized that a deadline “is not something one can substantially comply with. A miss is as good as a mile.” Edwards Aquifer , 291 S.W.3d at 403. And although the Court may be concer ned that dismissal is too harsh a remedy, we noted in BankDirect that “[s]tatutes that impose timelines naturally burden those who miss them.” 519 S.W.3d at 85. When the statut e’s words are clear, equity mu st give way to certainty and predictability. This is especially true in the service-of-citation context, which generally requires strict compliance in one form or another. See Wilson , 800 S.W.2d at 836; Uvalde Country Club v.12 Martin Linen Supply Co. , 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (“Moreover, failure to affirmatively show strict compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedur e renders the attempted service of process invalid and of no effect.”) (citing McKanna v. Edgar , 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965)). 11
III. The Statute’s Purposes Even if we concluded that th e statute’s plain language does not make the timely service of citation a condition precedent to pursuing the appeal, and we were thus required to “look to the statute’s purpose in determining the proper consequence of noncompliance,” Albertson’s , 984 S.W.2d at 961, I would reach the same conclusion. In the broadest sense, the Clean Air Act’s “policy and purpose is ‘to safeguard the state’s air resources from pollution by controlling or abating air pollution and emissi ons of air contaminants.’” S. Crushed Concrete, LLC v. City of
Houston , 398 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. 2013) (quoting T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 382.002(a)).

11 See also Wilson , 800 S.W.2d at 836 (“Absent service, waiver, or citation, mere knowledge of a pending suit does not place any duty on a defendant to act.”); Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Samaria Baptist Church , 840 S.W.2d 382, 382–83 (Tex. 1992) (“[U]se of certified mail by a public official to effect service of process when a statute provides only for registered ma il does not violate our st rict compliance standard for service of process.”); McKanna , 388 S.W.2d at 929 (reversing default judgment when plai ntiff failed to strictly comply with rules for service of citation and stating that its holding “is in accord with the established law of this State that it is imperative and essential that the record affirma tively show a strict compliance with the provided mode of service”); In the Interest of K.M.C. , No. 05-16-00635-CV, 2017 WL 745802, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Strict compliance with the rules governing service of citation is mandatory, and failure to comply constitutes error on the face of the record.”); Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Anderson , 809 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (“Because rule 101 applies and appellant was served more than 90 days after issuance of the citation, the citation was void and appellant was not required to answer”) (citing Lewis v. Lewis , 667 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. App.—Waco 1984, no writ)); Lewis , 667 S.W.2d at 911 (“Since service of citation on defendant was 96 days after its issuance, such was ineffective; defendant was not required to answ er; and the default judgment must be vacated.”); Mega v. Anglo Iron & Metal Co. of Harlingen , 601 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (“The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the issuance, service an d return of citation are generally regarded as mandatory, and failure to show affirmatively a strict compliance with the Rules will render the attempted service of process invalid and of no effect.”); Lemothe v. Cimbalista by Gates , 236 S.W.2d 681, 681–82 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1951, writ ref’d) (“[A]ll other rules relating to the issuing and serv ing of processes are generally regarded as mandatory, and failure to comply with such rules renders the serv ice thereunder of no eff ect.”) (citations omitted).13 The Court suggests that the Act’s judicial-review provisions’ more specific purpose is to “provide a process for the judicial review of [Commission] decisions” and “to expedite filing and notice and presumably the appeal itself.” Ante at ___. Even assuming that correctly states the statut e’s purpose, construing the service-of-citation requirement as a condition precedent to appeal best promotes that purpose. By conditioning the right to appeal on the claimant’s fulfillment of a duty to diligently and timely seek such review, the statute ensures that any app eal from a Commission decision must be pursued and resolved in an efficient and expedited manner. This is consis tent with other language in the statute, which places particular emphasis on timeliness and strict compliance, noting that each chapter must be “vigorously enforced” and that violations of Commission rules or orders must result in “expeditious initiation of enforcement actions.” T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 382.002(b). As a court, we have no power to say otherwise. Borowski v. Ayers , 524 S.W.3d 292, 305 (Tex. App.— Waco 2016, pet. denied) (“The courts possess no legi slative powers; therefore, the courts cannot excuse plaintiffs’ noncompliance with statutory requirements merely because defendants, despite plaintiffs’ noncompliance, are able to accomplish some of the Legislature’s purpose in imposing the statutory requirements.”). The Court, however, makes no effort to addr ess whether and how its construction supports this purpose. Instead, it simply c oncludes that, even though the statut e’s purpose is to expedite the resolution of appeals from Commi ssion decisions, it finds “no textual basis to conclude that serving citation within 30 days of filing the petition is so essential to the statute’s purpose that the Legislature intended anything less than strict compliance to require dismissal.” Ante at ___. But because subsection (c) addresses constitutional serv ice of citation, without which the trial court14 lacks jurisdiction, the Commission has no duty to appear or take any action, and the suit cannot begin at all, until citation is served. See Wilson , 800 S.W.2d at 836–37; El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alspini , 315 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (“Citation serves the purposes of giving the court jurisdiction over the defendant , satisfying due process requirements, and giving the defendant an opportunity to appear and defend.”) (citing Cockrell v. Estevez , 737 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ)); Cockrell , 737 S.W.2d at 140 (“The purpose of citation is to give the court prope r jurisdiction of the parties and to provide notice to the defendant that he has been sued and by whom and for what so that due process will be served and he will have an opportunity to app ear and defend the action.”); see also Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Com’n v. Sierra Club , 70 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex. 2002) (“[A] ‘cita tion’ is directed to the defendant, telling the defendant that he or she has been sued and commanding the defendant to appear and answer the opposing party’s claims.”). Thus, service of citation is different from mere notice, and we should be loath to confuse the two. See Perez v. Perez , 59 Tex. 322, 324 (1883) (“The words citation and notice are by no means synonymous. . . . A notice is much less form al.”). Indeed, we have observed that “service of citation” is “a term of art that describes the formal process by wh ich a party is informed that it has been sued.” Sierra Club , 70 S.W.3d at 813. Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, the statute provides a “textual basis to infer that” service of citation “is essential to the statute’s purpose” because, until citation has been served on the Co mmission, the process of j udicial review cannot commence at all. Beyond the Court’s identified pur pose of expediting appeals from Commission decisions, I would conclude that another “purpose”—or, I w ould say, “effect”—of the statute is to express15 the Legislature’s policy decisions as to when to waive the Commission’ s sovereign immunity and allow for judicial review of executive-branch d ecisions. Because the statute provides a limited waiver of immunity, we must construe it narrow ly in favor of retaining the State’s immunity. See In re Smith , 333 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. 2011) (“First, a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity must be construed narrowly.”) (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia , 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008) (“We interpret statutory wa ivers of immunity narrowly. . . .”)); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor , 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003) (“[W]hen construing a statute that purportedly waives sovereign immunity, we generally resolve ambiguities by retaining immunity.”); Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy , 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2002) (“Subjecting the government to liability may hamper governmen tal functions by shifting tax resources away from their intended purposes towa rd defending lawsuits and paying judgments.”); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Walker , 83 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex. 1935) (“‘Legislative grants of property, rights, or privileges must be construed st rictly in favor of the state. . . .’”) (quoting Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State , 47 S.W.2d 265, 272 (Tex. 1932)). Construing the statute to permit judicial review only when the claimant has complie d with the statute’s expr ess requirements best fulfills this purpose of providing a limited waiver of immunity.
IV. Conclusion The Clean Air Act allows a person to appeal a Commission decision by filing a petition in a Travis County district court. Th e petition “must” be filed within thirty days after the decision and service of citation “mus t” be accomplished within thirty days after fili ng. The filing and service requirements are conditions precedent to the right to pursue the appeal. The statute’s plain language compels this result, and the statute’s effects likewise support this conclusion. I would16 hold that because AC Interests failed to serve citation on the Commission w ithin thirty days, as the statute says it “must” do, it cannot pursue this appeal. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

_____________________ Jeffrey S. Boyd Justice Opinion delivered: March 23, 2018