UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ NICOLE B. STREETER, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-5040 (D.C. No. 4:15- CV-00438-FHM) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , McHUGH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Nicole B. Streeter, proceeding pro se , appeals from a dist rict court order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of di sability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI). We have ju risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Ms. Streeter has not asserted any factua l or legal challenge to the decisions, and we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 2, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. Ms. Streeter applied for DIB and SSI cl aiming an inability to work since 2011, at age 39, due to hypertension, a history of cervical, thoracic and lumbar strains, depression, and panic attacks. She comp leted college and prev iously worked as packer/sorter, boys monitor, and residentia l counselor. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing, which Ms. Streeter elected not to attend, and found Ms. Streeter not disabled. The ALJ found that Ms. Streeter had severe impairments of hypertension, a history of spinal strains, depression, a nxiety, and panic att acks. Despite these impairments, the ALJ found Ms. Streeter has the residual func tional capacity (RFC) to perform a range of medium work, as th at is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c), except she is limited to si mple, routine tasks involving no more than superficial contact with coworkers and supervisors and no contact with the public, and she must avoid unprotected heights and dangerous machinery. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Streeter could not return to her past wo rk, but could perform ot her jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national econo my, including medium work of industrial cleaner and housekeeper/maid, light work of sorter and hand packer, and sedentary jobs of clerical mail er and assembler. In making this determination, the ALJ relied on the medical evidence, Ms. St reeter’s statements , the record, and the testimony of a vocational expert. Ms. Streeter appealed pro se, and the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge under 28 U.S. C. § 636(c). Ms. Streeter di d not articulate any factual3 or legal challenge to the ALJ’s decision, but she did include a paragraph in her district court brief describi ng the findings of Dr. Snider, a consultative psychologist. Dr. Snider determined that Ms. Streeter would be able to understand and carry out simple instructions, but woul d have marked difficulty with complex instructions and with concentrating through a normal work day and work week due to psychiatric symptoms. Dr. Snider opined that with consistent psychi atric care, Ms. Streeter’s symptoms would improve. The magistrate judge construed Ms. Str eeter’s pro se brie f liberally as a challenge to the ALJ’s RFC determin ation because the ALJ arguably found Ms. Streeter more capable than had Dr. Snid er. But the magistrate judge determined that the ALJ accurately described Dr. Snide r’s findings and had given it some weight. The magistrate judge explained that the AL J concluded Dr. Snider’s opinion that Ms. Streeter would have marked difficulty c oncentrating through a normal work day and week was based only on Ms. Streeter’s s ubjective complaints, and was not supported by other mental status examinations and fi ndings of other mental health providers. The magistrate judge ruled that this findi ng, and the ALJ’s RFC determination, were supported by substantial ev idence, and he affirmed.
II. Ms. Streeter appears pr o se, so we liberally construe her filings. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But even under this liberal standard , Ms. Streeter’s opening brief falls short. Ms. Streeter states that sh e needs disability benefits b ecause she cannot work, but she4 does not articulate any reason why she beli eves the ALJ or the magistrate judge applied the wrong law, incorrectly evalua ted the medical evid ence, or otherwise erred. Even pro se appella nts must allege sufficient fa cts on which a recognized legal claim can be based; conclusory allegations will not suffice. Hall , 935 F.2d at 1110. We cannot serve as an advocate or attorney for a pr o se litigant by “constructing arguments and search ing the record” on her behalf. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10t h Cir. 2005). “The first task of an appellant is to explain to us why th e district court’s decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver , 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). “Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc ., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998). This is true even where the litigant proceeds pro

se. See Garrett , 425 F.3d at 841. Ms. Streeter states that she has severe impairments. But the ALJ explained why he concluded she still had the capac ity to work despite her severe and nonsevere impairments, and Ms. Streeter does not offer any reason why his conclusion is flawed. A finding of severe impairments does not require the ALJ to conclude a claimant is unable to work. See Oldham v. Astrue , 509 F.3d 1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 2007). Ms. Streeter states that Dr. Snider said she ha d difficulty concentrating and maintaining a normal work week. But she does not dispute the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the ALJ properly evaluated Dr. Snider’s opinion and that the ALJ’s RFC determination was supporte d by substantial evidence.5 “[I]t is the appellant’s responsibility to tie the salient facts, supported by specific record cita tion, to [her] legal contentions.” United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre , 108 F.3d 1228, 1237 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the rules of appella te procedure, “which appl[y] equally to pro se litigants, a brief must contain more than a genera lized assertion of error.”
Garrett , 425 F.3d at 841 (ellipsis and inte rnal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (“[A]ppella nt’s brief must contain . . . citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellan t relies.”). “When a pr o se litigant fails to comply with that ru le, we cannot fill the voi d by crafting arguments and performing the necessary legal research.” Garrett , 425 F.3d at 841 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Ms. Streeter failed to articul ate any factual or legal argument on appeal, she has forfeited appellate review. See id. at 840. Nevertheless, we have exercised our discretion to review the record, see id . at 841, and find no reversible

error, Keyes–Zachary v. Astrue , 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Ci r. 2012) (explaining we review the Commissioner’s decision to determ ine if substantial ev idence in the record supports the Commissioner’s de cision and that correct lega l standards were applied). Judgment affirmed.

Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge