November 8, 

### 1948

Han’. James C. Martin, CountyAttorney J%q
Nueces county eJ-a”p+. Corpus Christi, Texas Opinion Ho. V-714. all ruJad 61 3
Re: Whether Section 51 of the Uniform Traffic Code of 1947prohibits reckless driving as a criminal offense.

Your letter of September 20, 

### 1948,asks our opinion as to whether Section 51 

### of the Uniform Traffic Code OS 1947, codifiedas Article 6701d, Vernon’s Civil SMtutes, do~flnes a criminal offense. We held in our OplnlomNo. V-413, dated October 24, 1947, that the 3ectlon In questionwas not unconstltut$onala8 against’the objection of Its being! lndel’lhlte in its description of the offense of reckless driving.

You have inquiredas to whether Sectiom$1 ,of theUniform Traffic Code of 1947makes the act of reckleas driving, as thereindefined, unlawful or a crime. Your position Is that since the Section In question does mot exnreasly forbid such drlvlag, or exnresrlymake such driving tinbffense, It does‘notcreate the crime or the offense af reCkless driving.

are : The pertinentprovisions of theAct in questlom

“ARTICLE II--0REDIERCETO AND EFFECT OF

TRAFFIC LAW3 ”

. . . “Sec. 22. Required Obedience to Traffic Laws. It is unlawful and unless’ot=rmclared in thisAct wlXh respect to particular offenses, It is a misdemeanor for any person to. do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required in this Act.Hon. James C. Martin, Page 2, V-714.

‘I

. . . "ARTICLEV--DRIVING WHILEUIVDER TRE IKFLUERCE OFDRUGS AIVD RECKLESS DRIVING

II

. . . "Sec. 51. Reckless Drlvin -73' Every person whodrives am vehicle n Yelfull or wanton disregard of the Eights or safety of others oP' without due caution or circumspection,and at ,,1' a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likelyto endanger a person or property shell .be guilty,of r>eckless driving.

such this (b) ”

. . . 'ARTICLEXVI--PERALTIESAND DISPOSITIOB

OF FINES AND FORFEITURE3
"Sec. 143. Penalties for Misdemeanors. It 1,s a misdemeanor forny~person to vloany of the provisions, of thisAct unless violation is by thisAct or other law of State declared to be 8 felony.~ Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for a violation of any of the provisions of thisAct for which another penalty is aot provided shall be unished by a fine of not less than One ($l.OOpDollar nor more than Two Hundred,($200.00) Dollars,." The exact point was before the SupremeCourt of Texas in Queens Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 9. .W. 397, 22 L. R. A. 483, reversing the'court of Civil Appeals in 22 s. w. 1048. That case Involveda consideration of en anti-trust statute which defined a 'trust"but felled to prohibit expressly such act. The Court of Civil Appeals at Austin held that: ,,

"It commandsnothing and prohibitsnothing.

. . !'Th& act does not prohibit a trust, or declare it Illegal. It does not declare it en offense, or propose to punish It. It defines a trust,but does not denounce l,t. The act provl.des.for

peneltiesand forfeitures for any violations of its provisions,but thesepenalties cannot be incurred,because, Hon. James C. Martin, Page T,, V-714.

there Is no provision that can be Infracted or violated. .,. . These sections,as well as every other, proceed upon the assumption that a trust is ll~lega~~, and that It had been so declared, which is not the case. There is en important omlssFon In the act.
. . . ,Wemust hold that it Is not a law, and that .nosuit or prosecution can be maintained under It.’ The Supreme Court, however, after deciding that the casemust be reversed on other grounds, end noting that a decision on the point was not necessary, disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals, and said:

“Confiningourselves to the letter of the law, there Is a clear hiatus, a lack of connection in its provisions.

. . .There Is no express declaration.that trustsare unlawful, -- the acts which are declared to constitutea trustare not expresslymade punishable,nor Is any act expressly declared to be a violation of the provisions of the statute; yet the language Is sufflcient,.wethink, to manifest unmistakably the intention.

of the legislature to punish as offenses some of the acts defined In the first section, end it is but reasonable to conclude that the purpose was to subject them all to a like punishment. The intention of the legislature is the aim of stetutory construction,end where, thoughnot expressed, it is clearlymanifested by lmpllcation from the languageused,, we cannot say that it should .nothave effect. That which Is not expressed in, words IUELL

be lplalnlyimported’ by implication.

. . This case is a leading case in Texas on stetutory construction,and the language of the Court on this point has been quoted as.authority. See Storrie v. Houston City St. Ry. Co. (Sup. Ct.), 46 S. W. 796, 802. The Act In question Is for the purpose of regulating traffic. Such regulation is Impressedwith penal consequences throughou,t theAct. Reckless driving and driving while under the Influence of drugs,,vhlch letter act is expresslymade unlawful In the Section defining such actlon, e.rethe two subjects of Article VHon. James C. Martln, Page 4,, V-714.

of theAct, and thiswould suggest parallel trea,tment in so far as crlmlnellty Is concerned. In fact, Section 51, In defining reckless driving, is replete with deflnitlve referenceswhich are incompatiblewith any ,lnterpretatlon other than that reckless driving Is prohibited. Such languageas “vilfullor wanton”, “withoutdue caution or circumspection”, “guilty” -- “endangera person or property”,

all connoteprohibitionand not condonation or casual definition.

It will be observed that Section 51 concludes that a ‘personcommittingen action within the definition ~herelnnprescrlbedshall be “guilty of recklessdriving”. Guilty Is defined inWebster’s Dictionary as:

%avlng committeda breech or breaches of conduct; justly chargeablewith, or responslbl$ for, a delinquency, crime, or sin

. . . . Unless Section 51 be given the effect’of prohibiting the activity of reckless driving, es thereindefined, the Section Is superfluous, inoperativeand nugetory. Such e constructionviolatesa cardinal rule that all of the languageand every part of a statute should be given effect, if reasonably possible. 208, Section 112. 39 Tex. Jur. Words may be supplied, or one word substituted for another in order to give effect ‘tothe clear intent of a statute. 225 3. W. 532. Davis v. State,,88 Tex. Cr. R. 183,

Finally, es stated in Oliver v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 150, 144 S. W. 601, 612:

!‘Athingwhich iswithin the intention ofthe makers of a statute 1s 8s much within the statute es if itwere within the let-, ter,
. . .’
You are, therefore,’ respectfullyadvised that the activity defined In Section 51 of theUniform Traffic,Code of 1947, es reckless driving, is prohibited end Is a criminal offensewithin the comprehension of Section 143 of theAct. SUMMARY

The activity defined in Section 51 of the Uniform Traffic Code of 1947 (Article 6701d, V. C. S.), being, reckless driving,Bim. Jamem C. Martin, Page 5, V-714.

is prohibited within the meaning of Section 22 oi the Act, and is a crlmlnal oftense within tha comprehension of Sections 143 of the Aot. Your8 very truly



### ATTORNEY@EN&AL OF TEXAS 

# JGtt%~ / BY Red HcRmlel

Assistant