This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 33,376 4 MARVIN ROMERO, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY 7 Jeff F. McElroy, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Olga Serafimova, Assist ant Attorney General 10 Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General 11 Santa Fe, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 14 Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 SUTIN, Judge. 192 {1} A jury found Defendant Marvin Romero guilty of driving while under the 1 influence of alcohol (DWI) contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(C)(1) (2010). 2 Because Defendant had at least seven prior DWI convictions, he was sentenced 3 pursuant to Section 66-8-102(J) to three years of imprisonment, with one year 4 suspended for a total of two years of incarceration. Defendant seeks reversal of his 5 conviction on the grounds that: (1) expert testimony was im properly admitted, (2) the 6 district court erred in denyi ng his motion for a directed verdict, (3) the bureau chief 7 of the toxicology division of the Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD) should not 8 have been permitted to tes tify regarding Defendant’s breath alcohol content because 9 SLD benefits financially from DWI convictions, (4) the district court erred in denying 10 his motion to suppress an officer’s tes timony, (5) the district court erred in 11 disqualifying a Spanish-speaking juror, and (6 ) his right to a speedy trial was violated. 12 Defendant also seeks to have his sentence vacated and the issue of sentencing 13 remanded to the district court on the ground that the district court miscalculated 14 Defendant’s pre-sentence c onfinement time. We hold th at Defendant has failed to 15 demonstrate any basis for reversal of hi s conviction or his sentence. We affirm. 16 BACKGROUND 17 {2} Defendant’s neighbor, Augustin Apodaca, testified that at around 7:00 p.m. on 18 April 22, 2011, Defendant arri ved at home and spent the next three to four hours “on 193 a rampage” during which Defendant switc hed back and forth between his two 1 vehicles, doing donuts and causing gravel tofly everywhere, and ramping over wood 2 piles. In response to Defe ndant’s conduct, Mr. Apodaca ev entually called the police. 3 Officer Elias Montoya of the New Mexico St ate Police testified that at 10:13 p.m. he 4 received a call from dispatch regarding an individual “doing donuts,” and after 5 traveling for half an hour, he arrived at the scene at 10:43 p.m. 6 {3} When Officer Montoya arrived at the re sidence, Defendant was inside his home 7 making something to eat. Officer Montoya used a voice recorder to record his 8 encounter with Defendant, and the recording was played for the jury at trial. 9 Defendant told Officer Montoya that he had been inside his home for five minutes and 10 that he had not had anything to eat or drink since he had been inside. Defendant 11 explained to Officer Montoya that he had b een working out of town and that it was his 12 weekend off, he had been drinking, and headmitted that when he came in, he was 13 driving fast, had done some donuts, and kickedup some rocks. He also stated that he 14 had purchased two half pints of whiskey and that he drank them before he arrived at 15 home. Officer Montoya did not see any alcohol inside Defendant’s home. 16 {4} Officer Montoya had Defendant perform two standardi zed field sobriety tests, 17 informing Defendant that his reason for doing so was that he wanted to see whether 18 Defendant had been “okay to drive.” Defendant performed poorly on both field 194 sobriety tests. Following the field sobrietytests, Officer Montoya arrested Defendant 1 for DWI. 2 {5} Defendant’s breath-alcohol c ontent (BAC) was tested twice at the police station. 3 The first test, taken at 1:24 a.m. revealedthat Defendant had a BAC of .17g/210L. The 4 second test, taken at 1:26 a.m. revealedthat Defendant had a BAC of .16g/210L. 5 {6} Dr. Rong-Jen Hwang, the Toxicology Bureau Chief of SLD testified as an 6 expert in forensic toxicology. Using a formula that has been ge nerally accepted in the 7 field of forensic toxicology since 1932, Dr. Hwang was able to “calculate back” 8 Defendant’s BAC to 12:13 a.m., two hours af ter Officer Montoya was dispatched to 9 the residence. Based on his calculation, Dr. Hwang concluded that at 12:13 a.m. 10 Defendant’s BAC “was at least above a .08.” 11 {7} Based in part on the foregoing, a juryfound Defendant guilty of violating 12 Section 66-8-102(C)(1) pursuant to which it is unlawful for a person to drive a motor 13 vehicle if the person has an alcohol concentr ation of .08 or more in his blood or breath 14 within three hours of driving as a result of having consumed alcohol before or while 15 driving. 16 {8} Defendant appeals his convi ction, raising numerous claims of error as grounds 17 for reversal, and as an alternative, seeking remand for anadjustment to his sentence. 18 We conclude Defendant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, including 195 Dr. Hwang’s admissible testimony. We further conclude that the district court did not 1 err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress or his motion to dismiss for a violation 2 of his right to a speedy trial. Nor did the court err in excusing a prospective juror. 3 Finally, we conclude that De fendant has failed to demonstr ate error in regard to his 4 sentence. 5 DISCUSSION 6 I. The District Court Did Not Err in Admitting Dr. Hwang’s Testimony 7 Regarding Defendant’s BAC 8 {9} “We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for [an] abuse of discretion.” 9 State v. Christmas , 2002-NMCA-020, ¶ 8, 131 N.M. 591, 40 P.3d 1035. “An abuse 10 of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearlyagainst the logic and effect of the facts 11 and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by 12 its ruling unless we can characterize it as cl early untenable or not justified by reason.” 13 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 14 {10} The district court permitted Dr. Hwang to testify as an expert in forensic 15 toxicology regarding Defendant’s BAC level. Prior to offering an opinion in this case, 16 Dr. Hwang reviewed Defendant’s BAC results and the police report. From the police 17 report, Dr. Hwang understood that the time of the incident was 10:13 p.m., which was 18 the time that Officer Montoya was di spatched to Defendant’s residence. 196 {11} Using the “formula” that is generally accepted in the forensic community, Dr. 1 Hwang used Defendant’s lowest BAC result, the score of .16 taken at 1:26 a.m., to 2 “calculate back” what Defendant’s BAC was at 12:13 a.m., “two hours after the 3 incident.” Based on his calculations, Dr. Hwang concluded that at 12:13 a.m., April 4 23, 2011, Defendant’s BAC was at leas t .08g/210L, and was actually .17g/210L or 5 .18g/210L. 6 {12} Dr. Hwang testified that his calculations were premised on the following 7 assumptions. Dr. Hwang assumed that from “the time of the incident” at 10:13 p.m. 8 to the time that Defendant’s breath was te sted Defendant had not had anything to eat 9 or drink. Dr. Hwang also assumed that De fendant was in a post-absorptive stage at 10 12:13 a.m., two hours after “the inci dent.” Although Dr. Hwang assumed that 11 Defendant was in a post-absorptive stag e by the time Mr. Apodaca called the police, 12 he also testified that even assuming that Defendant was in a pre-absorptive stage when 13 Mr. Apodaca called the police and when Defendant’s BAC was measured, that 14 assumption would not change his conclu sion that Defendant’s BAC at “around 15 midnight” was above a .08. 16 {13} Although Dr. Hwang did not explain it, the term “post-absorptive” refers to one 17 of three points on the “BAC curve.” In turn, the phrase “BAC curve” refers to the 18 scientific principle that when alcohol is consumed, it is processed by the body in three 197 stages, pre-absorptive, p eak, and post-absorptive. See, e.g. , State v. Downey , 2008- 1 NMSC-061, ¶¶ 17, 20, 145 N.M. 232, 195 P. 3d 1244 (discussing the three stages of 2 the BAC curve). In other words, “when alc ohol is ingested, it is absorbed by the body 3 until a peak BAC is reached, and then it is eliminated from the body by the breath, 4 sweat, liver, or kidneys.” Id. ¶ 20 (relating the testimony of a pharmacist and professor 5 emeritus at the University of New Mexico School of Medicine as to how alcohol is 6 processed by the human body). 7 {14} Dr. Hwang did not offer any opinion as towhat Defendant’s BAC was at the 8 time that he was driving nor did he offer any opinion as to whether Defendant was in 9 a pre-absorptive or post-absorptive stage at 10:13 p.m. In response to defense 10 counsel’s questions on cross-examinati on, Dr. Hwang testified that according to 11 scientific literature, the majo rity of people who are involved in DWI traffic stops are 12 in the post-absorptive stage already; howev er, Dr. Hwang clarified that he had no way 13 of knowing whether Defendant fit within th at majority, and he offered no opinion to 14 that effect. 15 {15} Defendant argues that the district court erred by allowing Dr. Hwang’s 16 testimony as to Defendant’s BAC. Acco rding to Defendant, Dr. Hwang’s testimony 17 was based on an inconclusivetime-line and assumptions not supported by the record. 18 Specifically, Defendant argues that the State failed to conclusively establish what time 198 Defendant was actually driving and that Dr. Hwang’s opinion regarding Defendant’s 1 BAC at 12:13 a.m. was only incriminating if Defendant was driv ing at 9:00 p.m. or 2 later because Section 66-8-102(C)(1) prohibits a BAC of .08 or higher within three 3 hours of driving. Defendant ar gues further that the State failed to prove what time he 4 started or stopped drinking, and what and when he had last eaten, and that it was 5 improper for Dr. Hwang to have assumed th at Defendant was in a post-absorptive 6 stage when his BAC was tested. We concludethat the evidence presented in this case 7 fully supported Dr. Hwang’s testimony, and therefore, the district court did not err in 8 allowing Dr. Hwang to testify as to Defendant’s BAC at 12:13 a.m. 9 {16} Defendant told Officer M ontoya that he had consumed his alcohol before he 10 arrived at home. Based upon Mr. Apodaca’s testimony, the 10:13 p.m. dispatch call 11 that Officer Montoya received, Officer M ontoya’s arrival time at Defendant’s home, 12 and Defendant’s statement to Officer Montoya that he had been inside his house for 13 five minutes, it is reasonable to infer th at Defendant arrive d home around 7:00 p.m., 14 having already consumed his alcohol, and that from 7:00 p.m. until around 10:38 p.m. 15 Defendant drove his trucks in a “rampage” manner causing gravel to fly everywhere. 16 Further, based upon Defendant’s statement toOfficer Montoya that he had not had 17 anything to eat or drink since he had b een inside his home and when the officers 18 arrived, he was making something to eat, a reasonable inference is that Defendant had 199 not eaten anything since at least 10:38 p. m. Finally, although Dr. Hwang stated that 1 he assumed Defendant was in a post-absorptive stage when his BAC was measured 2 at the police station, he also testified that even were he to assu me that Defendant was 3 in a pre-absorptive stage, his conclusion that Defendant’s BAC was at least .08 at 4 around midnight would be the same. In lightof Dr. Hwang’s testimony that whether 5 Defendant was in a pre-absorptive or post-ab sorptive stage at the police station, his 6 conclusion regarding Defendant’s BAC at around midnight would be the same renders 7 the propriety of his assumption one way or th e other irrelevant in the context of this 8

case. 9 {17} Defendant analogizes this case to Downey , 2008-NMSC-061, ¶¶ 1, 33-34, and 10 claims that here, as in Downey , reversal is warranted because the expert did not have 11 the facts necessary to plot Defendant’s placement on the BAC curve, and therefore, 12 he could not determine whether Defendant was under the influence of intoxicating 13 liquor when he was driving. 14 {18} In Downey , the defendant caused a fatal co llision at approximately 7:00 p.m. 15 Id. ¶ 2. Six hours later, at approximately 1:00 a.m., the defendant’s blood was drawn 16 revealing a BAC of .04. Id. ¶ 10. In the interim betweenthe time of the collision and 17 the time of the blood draw, the defendantleft the scene of the collision for 18 approximately ten minutes, and when he returned to the scene, he was observed 1910 walking alongside the roadway and sitting in his truck. Id. ¶ 36. He was not in the 1 custody or control of the police, norwas he under their supervision until 2 approximately 10:00 p.m. Id. Although there was no evidence of when the defendant 3 had started or stopped drinking, the expert assumed that the defendant had stopped 4 drinking prior to the collision and had not consumed any alcohol after the collision. 5 Id. ¶¶ 31, 34. Based on these assumptions, the expert assumed that the defendant was 6 in a post-absorptive stage when his BAC wa s tested, and the expert used a relation7 back calculation to conclude that the defe ndant’s BAC at the time of the collision was 8 between .075 to .11. Id. ¶ 31. Our Supreme Court held that the expert’s assumption 9 as to when the defendant had consumed alcohol was not supported by facts in the 10 record, and his conclusion regarding the de fendant’s BAC at the time of the collision 11 was, therefore, “nothing morethan mere conjecture[.]” Id. ¶ 34. Accordingly, the 12 court vacated the defendant’s convic tion and remanded for a new trial. Id. ¶ 1. In so 13 doing, however, our Supreme Court distinguished the facts in Downeyfrom those of 14 State v. Hughey , 2007-NMSC-036, ¶¶ 10, 15, 142 N.M . 83, 163 P.3d 470, in which 15 the Court determined that the district c ourt had improperly excl uded expert testimony. 16 Downey , 2008-NMSC-061, ¶ 37. 17 {19} In Hughey , the defendant told the police the time at which she had stopped 18 drinking. 2007-NMSC-036, ¶ 15. Based on th e assumption that the defendant had 1911 stopped drinking at the stated time, the Court concluded that the expert could 1 reasonably infer when the de fendant had reached her peak BAC and thereby estimate 2 her BAC at the time that th e defendant was driving. See Downey , 2008-NMSC-061, 3 ¶ 37 (discussing Hughey , 2007-NMSC-036, ¶ 15). The HugheyCourt concluded that 4 insofar as the expert’s testimony was ba sed upon reasonable inferences drawn from 5 the evidence, the question whether the de fendant was guilty of driving under the 6 influence was a matter to be resolved by the jury. 2007-NMSC-036, ¶ 15. 7 {20} As discussed earlier, Defendant told O fficer Montoya that he drank two half 8 pints of whiskey before hearrived home, and Mr. Apod aca testified that Defendant 9 arrived home at approximately 7:00 p.m. This and other evidence that was known to 10 Dr. Hwang permitted him to draw reasona ble inferences about when Defendant 11 consumed alcohol in relationship to when he drove his vehicles after returning home. 12 Thus, the facts in the present case mo re closely resemble the facts in Hugheythan 13 those in Downey , and Hugheysupports the district court’s decision to admit Dr. 14 Hwang’s testimony. Furthermore, the presen t case comes within the view expressed 15 in State v. Day , 2008-NMSC-007, ¶ 24, 143 N.M. 359, 176 P.3d 1091, that the 16 circumstances, “viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, [the expert’s 17 testimony] . . . could well have informed the jury’s verdict that [the d]efendant’s BAC 18 was 0.08 or higher at the [critical time].” Insum, we cannot conclude that the district 1912 court abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Hwang’s opinion as to Defendant’s BAC 1 at 12:13 a.m. 2 II. The District Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Motion for a Directed 3 Verdict 4 {21} “We review denials of directed verdic ts by asking whether sufficient evidence 5 was adduced to support the underlying charge.” State v. Johnson , 2010-NMSC-016, 6 ¶ 57, 148 N.M. 50, 229 P.3d 523 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In 7 reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider “whether substantial evidence 8 of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond 9 a reasonable doubt” when the evidence is viewed as a whole and all reasonable 10 inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict are indulged. Id. (internal quotation marks and 11 citation omitted). 12 {22} In order to prove that De fendant was guilty of the crime charged, the State was 13 required to establish beyond a reasonable doubtthat within three hours of operating 14 a motor vehicle, Defendant had an alcohol concentration of .08 g/210L or more as a 15 result of having consumed alcohol before or while driving. See§ 66-8-102(C)(1). 16 Based on the premise that the district c ourt erred in admitting Dr. Hwang’s testimony, 17 Defendant argues that the court should have granted his mo tion for a directed verdict 18 on the ground that there was no evidence thatDefendant’s BAC was at or above .08 19 within the relevant time period. 2013 {23} The unmistakable propriety of the jury’s verdict in this case is confirmed by the 1 testimony of the expert which, contrary to what Defendant contends, was properly 2 admitted by the district court. Moreover, evenwere we to have held that Dr. Hwang’s 3 testimony was inadmissible, we would affirm Defendant’s convi ction based on other 4 evidence presented at trial. From the evidence at trial, the jury could reasonably have 5 concluded that Defendant consumed his al cohol before 7:00 p.m. and that he drove 6 from 7:00 p.m. until approximately 10:38 p. m. Within three hours of the 10:38 p.m. 7 driving time, Defendant’s BAC was measured twice, revealing that at 1:24 a.m. his 8 BAC was .17 and that at 1:26 a.m. his BAC was .16. Based on the foregoing, even 9 without considering Dr. Hwang’s testimony, wewould conclude that the jury’s verdict 10 was supported by sufficient evidence. 11 III. Allowing Dr. Hwang to Testify Did Not Violate Defendant’s Right to Due 12 Process 13 {24} Defendant argues that the district c ourt violated his due process rights by 14 allowing Dr. Hwang to testify because a person convicted of DWI is statutorily 15 required to pay an $85 fee, and all fees collected are statutorily designated as 16 “funding” for SLD. See NMSA 1978, § 31-12-7(A) (2010) (assessing the $85 fee); 17 NMSA 1978, § 31-12-9 (1991) (providing that all fees collected pursuant to Section 18 31-12-7(A) are appropriated for payment to th e SLD “for costs related to chemical and 19 other tests and analyses”). Defe ndant contends that as a result of this statutory scheme, 2014 Dr. Hwang was a “contingency fee witness” and that the court therefore violated 1 Defendant’s due process rights by allowi ng Dr. Hwang to testify. We review due 2 process claims de novo. State v. Tafoya , 2010-NMCA-010, ¶ 7, 147 N.M. 602, 227 3 P.3d 92. 4 {25} Defendant’s attempt to characterize Dr . Hwang as a contingency fee witness 5 based solely on the legislative scheme di scussed here is not persuasive. Dr. Hwang 6 testified that the $85 fee was a legislativ e matter that had nothing to do with him, 7 personally. There is no evidence that Dr . Hwang personally profited from Defendant’s 8 conviction in this case. To the extent th at Defendant’s due process argument derives 9 from the notion that Dr. Hwang was motivated by self-interest to provide false or 10 misleading testimony in order to assure Defendant’s conviction and thereby add to the 11 payment of fees to SLD, the matter was tobe addressed through cross-examination 12 and not by excluding Dr. Hwang’s testimony. See State v. Brown , 1984-NMSC-014, 13 ¶ 14, 100 N.M. 726, 676 P.2d 253 (“Matters aff ecting the witness’s bias or motive to 14 testify falsely are to be attacked through cross-examination, rather than the exclusion 151 Defendant cites one case in support of his due process argument, State v. 16 Glosson , 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985). The Glossoncourt held that a trial court may 17 dismiss criminal charges on due process grounds “where an informant stands to gain 18 a contingent fee conditioned on cooperation and testimony in the criminal prosecution 19 when that testimony is critical to a successful prosecution.” Id. at 1085. Defendant 20 also cites an advisory opinion of the New Mexico State Bar Ethics Committee for the 21 proposition that contingency fee payments to expert witnesses should be prohibited 22 so as to preclude the presentation of expert testimony that is motivated by self-interest. 18 These authorities are not persuasive in th e context of this case, and they do not 19 warrant further consideration. 20 15 of a witness.”). Defendant ’s citation to inapplicable, non-binding authorities 1 does not 1 persuasively demonstrate a due process violation. 2 IV. The District Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 3 {26} At trial, Defendant argued that Offi cer Montoya made an illegal warrantless 4 entry into Defendant’s home, and theref ore, statements and evidence that were 5 collected after the entry should be suppressed. The district court denied the 6 suppression motion on the ground that Defendant voluntarily admitted Officer 7 Montoya into his home. On appeal , Defendant argues, pursuant to State v. Franklin , 8 1967-NMSC-151, ¶ 9, 78 N.M . 127, 428 P.2d 982, and State v. Boyer , 1985-NMCA9 029, ¶¶ 17-24, 103 N.M. 655, 712 P. 2d 1, that the district court erred in denying his 10 motion to suppress. See Franklin , 1967-NMSC-151, ¶ 9 (“[G]e nerally . . . appointed 11 counsel should set forth contentions urge d by a [defendant] whether or not counsel 12 feels they have merit[.]”); Boyer , 1985-NMCA-029, ¶ 17 (same). 1316 {27} “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, [the appellate 1 courts] observe the distinction between factual determinations which are subject to a 2 substantial evidence standard of review and application of law to the facts, which is 3 subject to de novo review.” State v. Hubble , 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 146 N.M. 70, 206 4 P.3d 579 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “An officer’s 5 warrantless entry into a person’s home is the exact type of intrusion against which the 6 language of the Fourth Amendment to th e United States Constitution and Article II, 7 Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution is directed.” State v. Moran , 2008- 8 NMCA-160, ¶ 7, 145 N.M. 297, 197 P.3d 1079 (internal quotation marks and citation 9 omitted). One exception to the warrant requirement is consent. State v. Gutierrez , 10 2005-NMCA-015, ¶ 11, 136 N.M. 779, 105 P.3d 332. 11 {28} The district court’s finding that Defendant voluntarily admitted Officer 12 Montoya into his home is supported by evidence in the record. Officer Montoya 13 testified that he entered Defendant’s home only after Defendant invited him in. Officer 14 Montoya’s testimony in thatregard was supported by the audio recording of his 15 encounter with Defendant in which Defe ndant audibly invited Officer Montoya to 16 “come on inside.” In light of Defendant’s invitation to Officer Montoya, the consent 17 exception to the warrant requirement applies in these circumstances . The district court 18 properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. 1917 V. Excluding the Spanish-Speaking Juror Was Not Reversible Error 1 {29} Defendant argues that the district court committed reversible error by excluding 2 a monolingual, Spanish-speaking, potential juror without making every reasonable 3 effort to accommodate the juror. Defendant also argues that improperly excluding the 4 Spanish-speaking juror is per se reversibleerror since the district court overruled a 5 timely objection, citing State v. Samora , 2013-NMSC-038, ¶ 18, 307 P.3d 328. We 6 agree with the State that De fendant invited the alleged error, and we do not reach the 7 merits of Defendant’s argument. 8 {30} We review constituti onal claims de novo. See State v. Pacheco , 2007-NMSC9 009, ¶ 12, 141 N.M. 340, 155 P.3d 745. In State v. Rico , 2002-NMSC-022, ¶ 11, 132 10 N.M. 570, 52 P.3d 942, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that Article VII, Section 11 3 of the New Mexico Constitution “requires that a trial court make every reasonable 12 effort to accommodate a potential juror for whom language difficulties present a 13 barrier to participation in court proceedings .” The Court listed several factors to weigh 14 when considering what “constitutes sufficientlyreasonable efforts” and stated that “a 15 trial court shall not excuse a juror [who n eeds an interpreter ] absent a showing that 16 accommodating that juror will create a substantial burden[.]” Id. ¶ 12. The Court held 17 specifically that “the [trial] court is under a constitutional obligation to continue the 18 trial for a reasonable time if the conti nuance will be effective in securing an 1918 interpreter.” Id. ¶ 16. In Samora , our Supreme Court expounded on its holding in 1 Rico , stating that “[w]hen Article VII, Secti on 3 is violated and the objection properly 2 preserved, an appellate court is required to reverse what w ould have been an otherwise 3 valid conviction.” Samora , 2013-NMSC-038, ¶ 15. 4 {31} Defendant emphasizes the dearth of eviden ce in the record regarding the district 5 court’s efforts to secure an interpreter for the potential juro r and cites the lack of proof 6 of the court’s effort as ground for reversib le error. Defendant states there is no 7 evidence that the district c ourt contacted surrounding counties to secure an interpreter 8 or considered a continuance until an interpreter was available. However, Defendant 9 is responsible for the lack of evidence in the record regarding what the district court 10 actually did or considered in order to secure an interpreter. After the court informed 11 counsel of the potential juror’s excusal and Defendant timely objected, the following 12 colloquy took place. 13 Court: Would you like the court to make a record with the court 14 administrators as to what steps we took to try to make accommodations 15 for [the potential juror’s] language, or do you accept the court’s 16 representation that we did make every effort to get an interpreter here 17 this morning? 18 Defense Counsel: I accept the court’s representation, but I’m sure the 19 court understands my objection as well. 20 Court: I do. 2119 {32} Thus, the court asked Defendant explic itly if Defendant wanted the court’s 1 efforts to secure an interpreter on the record and Defendant declined. Defendant 2 therefore contributed to the condition of which he now complains, namely absence 3 from the record of proof of the court’s effort s to secure an interp reter. We decline to 4 reach the merits of this ar gument because Defendant invite d the error of which he now 5 complains. See State v. Young , 1994-NMCA-061, ¶ 5, 117 N.M. 688, 875 P.2d 1119 6 (“[T]o allow a defendant to i nvite error and to subsequently complain about that very 7 error would subvert the orderly and e quitable administration of justice.”). 8 VI. Defendant’s Right to a Speedy Trial Was Not Violated 9 {33} Defendant filed a motion in the district court seeking dismissal of the charge 10 against him on the ground that his right to a speedy trial was violated. The district 11 court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant reasserts his claim that dismissal was 12 warranted on speedy trial grounds. 13 {34} Determining whether a defendant’s speedy trial right has been violated requires 14 a review of the particular circumstances of each case including consideration of the 15 conduct of the prosecution, that of the defe ndant, and “the harm to the defendant from 16 the delay.” State v. Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. Our 17 analysis in this regard is guided by considering four factors: “(1) the length of delay[;] 18 (2) the reasons for the delay[;] (3) the defe ndant’s assertion of his right[;] and (4) the 1920 actual prejudice to the defendant that, on balance, determines whether a defendant’s 1 right to speedy trial has been violated.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 2 omitted). On appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss for a violation of a 3 defendant’s right to a speedy trial, “we givedeference to the district court’s factual 4 findings, but we review the [s peedy trial] factors de novo.” State v. Spearman , 2012- 5 NMSC-023, ¶ 19, 283 P.3d 272 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 6 omitted). 7 1. The Length of the Delay 8 {35} “The length of delay serv es two purposes under the speedy trial analysis.” Id. 9 ¶ 20. On one hand, it triggers an analysis of the speedy trial factors, and on the other 10 hand, it is, itself, a speedy trial fact or to be weighed in the balance. Id. 11 {36} Defendant was arrested and charged with DWI on April 22, 2011. On May 17, 12 2011, the charge against him was dismissed pending further investigation. The State 13 reinstated the charges on October 24, 2011. Defendant’s trial began on July 10, 2013. 14 {37} In his argument, Defendant assumes that the length of the delay is measured 15 from the time of his arrest to the time of hi s trial; however, when a charge is dismissed 16 in good faith and later re-file d, the interim delay is not included in a speedy trial 17 analysis. State v. Hill , 2005-NMCA-143, ¶¶ 11-12, 138 N.M. 693, 125 P.3d 1175. 18 Nothing in the record proper or in the arguments on appeal indicate that the dismissal 1921 and re-filing of the charge against Defendant was done in bad faith. Accordingly, in 1 our speedy trial analysis we consider the relevant period of de lay to have occurred 2 between October 24, 2011, when the charge was re-filed and the commencement of 3 trial, July 10, 2013, a period of approximately twenty months. 4 {38} The district court concluded that this was a simple case. See State v. Plouse , 5 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 42, 133 N.M. 495, 64 P.3d 522 (“We give due deference to the 6 district court’s findings as to the level of complexity.”), abrogated on other grounds 7 by Garza , 2009-NMSC-038. In a simple case, a delay of one year is considered 8 presumptively prejudicial. Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 48. Thus, the approximate 9 twenty-month delay in this case requires an examination of the remaining speedy trial 10 factors. 11 {39} In terms of the weight given to the length of the delay, “thegreater the delay[,] 12 the more heavily it will potentially weigh against the [prosecution].” Id. ¶ 24. In State 13 v. Montoya , this Court held that a delay of six months beyond the triggering date in 14 an intermediate case weighed only slightly against the prosecution. 2011-NMCA-074, 15 ¶ 17, 150 N.M. 415, 259 P.3d 820. In contrast, in Garza , our Supreme Court 16 recognized that a delay of five or more y ears weighed heavily in the defendant’s favor. 17 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 24. Here, the delay of approximately twenty months, eight 18 months beyond the triggering date, being sli ghtly longer than the six-month delay in 1922 Montoya , but significantly shorter than the five to six years recognized in Garza , 1 weighs moderately against the State and in Defendant’s favor. See, e.g , State v. 2 Steinmetz , 2014-NMCA-070, ¶¶ 5-6, 327 P.3d 1145 ( holding that a delay of twenty3 eight months beyond the date of presump tive prejudice in an intermediate case 4 weighed moderately against the prosecution). 5 2. The Reasons for the Delay 6 {40} “Closely related to [the] length of de lay is the reason the government assigns 7 to justify the delay.” Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and 8 citation omitted). Negligent or administrative delay, caused, for example, by 9 overcrowded courts, the reassignment of judges, or governmental negligence weighs 10 against the prosecution, but not heavily. Id. ¶¶ 26, 29. 11 {41} Here, the district court concluded that the first fourteen-month period of delay 12 was attributed to a variety of issues thatwere “essential[ly] systemic and caused by 13 the courts.” Accordingly, in weighing th e reasons-for-the-delay factor, the court 14 weighed this fourteen-month period “slightly against the State.” Defendant’s argument 15 reflects his agreement with the court’s c onclusion that this period of delay was 16 administrative and should be weighed against the State. The district court concluded 17 that the remaining delay, a period of approximately six months, was caused by 18 Defendant’s request for a continuance of a February 2013 trial date and subsequent 1923 scheduling issues as a result of that continuance. Defendant attempts to parse the 1 reasons for the delay within that six-month period in order to cause the reasons-for2 the-delay factor to weigh more heavily ag ainst the State. Under the circumstances of 3 this case, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the final six months of 4 delay was attributed to Defendant. 5 3. The Assertion of the Right 6 {42} Defendant asserted his right to a spee dy trial twice; first when his counsel 7 entered an appearance and again when new counsel entered an appearance. These pro 8 forma assertions were neither frequent nor forceful, therefore, the assertion-of-the9 right factor weighs only slightly in Defendant’s favor. See id. ¶ 34 (weighing the 10 assertion-of-the-right factor slightly in th e defendant’s favor b ecause the right was not 11 vigorously asserted); State v. Fierro , 2012-NMCA-054, ¶ 53, 278 P.3d 541 (stating 12 that pro forma assertions of the right to a speedy trial that accompany entries of 13 appearance are afforded “relatively littleweight” (internal quotation marks and 14 citation omitted)). 15 4. Prejudice 16 {43} The right to a speedy trial is intended to guard against three forms of prejudice: 17 oppressive pretrial incarceration, undue anxiety and concern of the accused, and 18 impairment to the defense. Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 35. In seeking to establish a 192SCRAM is an acronym that stands for “Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol 18 Monitoring.” The SCRAM unit that Defendant wore was an ankle bracelet that 19 monitored Defendant’s alcohol consumption. 20 24 speedy trial violation, it is incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate and to 1 provide evidence of a causal link between the delay and any alleged prejudice as a 2 result of the delay. Spearman , 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 39. 3 {44} Defendant argues that he su ffered two forms of prejudice as a result of the delay 4 in bringing his case to trial: compromised liberty as a result of having to wear a 5 “SCRAM bracelet,” as well as stress, anxiety, and concern. Defendant fails to provide 6 citations to the record proper to support hi s assertion that evidence was presented to 7 support his claims of prejudice. SeeRule 12-213(A)(4) NMRA (requiring an appellant 8 to cite the record in support of each ar gument). Further because Defendant fails to 9 attack the district court’s findings in regard to prejudice, the court’s findings are 10 conclusive. See id. (stating that where the appellant does not set forth “a specific 11 attack on any finding, [the unattacked] finding shall be deemed conclusive”). 12 {45} The district court’s conclusive findings in regard to the prejudice claimed by 13 Defendant were, in relevant part, that De fendant’s movements were not monitored or 14 restricted and that by wearing the “SCRAM unit,” 2Defendant was spared from regular 15 drug or alcohol tests in person several times a week. For the eleven months leading 16 up to the court’s speedy trial order, issued on July 5, 2013, Defendant did not have to 1725 wear the SCRAM unit, and he had “essentially no restrictions on his activity[.]” As 1 to Defendant’s claims of anxiety or hardshipas a consequence of the delay in bringing 2 his case to trial, the district court found “no anxiety and hardship that is not a normal 3 and expected consequence of a pending criminal action.” The court found that 4 although Defendant had not b een employed since June or July 2012, his lack of 5 employment and the related adverse effects thereof were “primarily due to economic 6 factors or [to] Defendant’s numerous previ ous DWI convictions.” Finally, as to the 7 anxiety that Defendant suffere d as a result of the fact that his neighbor was a witness 8 for the State, the court found that circumst ance to be “not extraordinary or unusual in 9 this type of case.” In sum, the court found that Defendant failed to make a 10 particularized showing of prejudice as a resu lt of the delay in bringing his case to trial. 11 5. Balancing the Factors 12 {46} To summarize, we conclude that the le ngth of the delay we ighs moderately in 13 Defendant’s favor, that the reasons-for-the-del ay factor weighs slightly against the 14 State as a result of the fourteen-month administratively caused delay, and that the 15 assertion-of-the-right factor weighs only slightly in Defendant’s favor. We also 16 conclude that Defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the delay 17 in bringing his case to trial. Without a s howing of prejudice and with the other three 1826 factors not weighing sufficiently heavy in Defendant’s favor, De fendant has failed to 1 demonstrate that the alleged speedy trial vi olation warrants reversal of his conviction. 2 VII. Defendant Was Not Entitled toPresentence Confinement Credit 3 {47} Defendant argues that the district c ourt erred in sentencing him because the 4 court failed to include presentence confin ement credit for the time Defendant spent 5 in jail and the time he spent wearing the SCRAM unit. We review whether a defendant 6 qualifies for presentence confinement credit de novo. See State v. Guillen , 2001- 7 NMCA-079, ¶¶ 6, 9, 130 N.M. 803, 32 P.3d 812 (analyzing presentence confinement 8 credit for time spent wearing an electronic ankle monitor as a matter of statutory 9 interpretation). NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-12 (1977) provides that a defendant “held 10 in official confinement on suspicion or charges of the commission of a felony shall, 11 upon conviction of that or a lesser included offense, be given credit for the period 12 spent in presentence confinement agains t any sentence finally imposed for that 13 offense.” In State v. Fellhauer , this Court held that time spent outside of jail qualifies 14 as official confinement if 15 (1) a court has entered an order re leasing the defendant from a facility 16 but has imposed limitations on the de fendant’s freedom of movement, or 17 the defendant is in the actual or cons tructive custody of state or local law 18 enforcement or correctional officers; and (2) the defendant is punishable 19 for a crime of escape if there is an unauthorized departure from the place 20 of confinement or other non-compliance with the court’s order. 21 1997-NMCA-064, ¶ 17, 123 N.M. 476, 943 P.2d 123 (emphasis omitted). 2227 {48} The district court found that the first prong of the Fellhauer test was not met 1 because Defendant’s freedom of movement was not actuallylimited or restricted by 2 the SCRAM unit. Defendant rebuts the c ourt’s conclusion, arguing that he was 3 required to obtain permission before leavi ng his home, that his employer was required 4 to submit Defendant’s work schedule, and th at Defendant was required to “check in” 5 with the Human Resources Development Asso ciation (HRDA) multiple times a week, 6 and that these conditions sufficiently impinged his freedom of movement under the 7 first prong of the Fellhauer test. The State responds thatthe only actual restriction on 8 Defendant’s movement was that he was not allowed to leave the State of New Mexico 9 without prior approval and that that condition alone does not satisfy the first prong of 10 the Fellhauer test. 11 {49} We hold that Defendant’s freedom of movement was not limited to a sufficient 12 degree to qualify as official confinement under Fellhauer . The record shows that the 13 only restriction on Defendant’s freedom of movement was that he was not allowed to 14 leave the State of New Mexico withoutprior permission of the court. In Fellhauer , the 15 defendant was under house arre st and was not allowed to leave Bernalillo County 16 without court permission. Id. ¶ 2. Thus, the conditions in Fellhauer were more 17 stringent than the ones imposed on Defendant inthis case, yet this Court held that the 18 conditions in Fellhauer did not qualify as official confinement. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. We 1928 cannot hold that Defendant is entitled to presentence credit under conditions more lax 1 than those in Fellhauer

. 2 {50} Defendant compares his circumstances to that of the defendant in Guillen , 3 where that defendant was subject to el ectronic monitoring. 2001-NMCA-079, ¶¶ 2-3. 4 However, the fact that the defendant in Guillenwas subject to electronic monitoring 5 did not affect this Court’s analysis. Rather, we stated that “the critical question” was 6 whether the condition that the defendant “remain at his home at all times except to 7 attend alcohol counseling, work, or relig ious services” sufficiently limited the 8 defendant’s freedom of movement to meet the first part of the Fellhauer test. Guillen , 9 2001-NMCA-079, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant here was not 10 subject to similar restrictions. Defendant nevertheless argues that he was required to 11 obtain permission before leav ing his home. That statement mischaracterizes the 12 testimony at trial. Defendant was required to call and in form HRDA when he left or 13 returned home in order to ensure the S CRAM unit was functioni ng properly. He was 14 not required to obtain permission to comeand go; he was onl y required to inform 15 HRDA when he was coming or going. The SCRAM unit’s purpose was not to monitor 16 and constrain Defendant’s whereabouts, but to monitor Defendant’s alcohol 17 consumption, and Defendant n eeded to inform HRDA when he left and returned home 18 in order to ensure that the unit’s readi ngs were electronically sent to HRDA. Unlike 1929 the defendant in Guillen , these conditions did not impose limitations on Defendant’s 1 freedom of movement. As such, we hold Defendant is not entitled to presentence 2 confinement credit for time spent wearing the SCRAM unit. 3 {51} Defendant also asserts, without a statement of preservation, without citation to 4 the record or to any authority, and without developing an argument, that he is entitled 5 to presentence confinement credit for tw o and a half weeks spent under house arrest 6 and fourteen days credit for time actuallyspent in the Taos Detention Center. SeeRule 7 12-213(A)(4) (stating that, as to each argument, the appellant must provide a 8 statement of preservation, citations to th e record proper, and citations to relevant 9 authorities). Because Defendant has failed to develop his argument and failed to 10 comply with Rule 12-213(A)(4), we decline to consider this issue. See State v. 11 Stephenson , 2015-NMCA-038, ¶ 24, 346 P.3d 409 (s tating that this Court will not 12 address undeveloped arguments that are not supported by authority), cert. granted , 13 2015-NMCERT-001, ___ P.3d ___; State v. Lopez , 2009-NMCA-127, ¶ 14, 147 N.M. 14 364, 223 P.3d 361 (stating that th e appellate court may declin e to address an argument 15 on appeal as to which the appellant ha s failed to comply with Rule 12-213). 16 CONCLUSION 17 {52} We affirm. 18 {53} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1930 __________________________________ 1 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 2 WE CONCUR: 3

_______________________________ 4 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 5

_______________________________ 6 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 7