Slip Op. 08-48 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

EAST JORDAN IRON WORKS, INC., 

LEBARON FOUNDRY INC., 

MUNICIPAL CASTINGS, INC., 

NEENAH FOUNDRY CO., TYLER PIPE 

COMPANY, U.S. FOUNDRY & 

MANUFACTURING CO., BINGHAM & 

TAYLOR, and MUNICIPAL CASTINGS 

FAIR TRADE COUNCIL, 

 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 

 Defendant, 

and 

A.Y. MCDONALD MFG. CO., 

 Defendant- 

 Intervenor. 

Before: Richard W. Goldberg, 

 Senior Judge 

Court No. 07-00082 

OPINION

[Commerce’s determination is sustained]. 

 Date: May 1, 2008 

Kelley Drye Collier Shannon (Robin H. Gilbert) for Plaintiffs 

East Jordan Iron Works, Inc., LeBaron Foundry Inc., Municipal 

Castings, Inc., Neenah Foundry Co., Tyler Pipe Company, U.S. 

Foundry & Manufacturing Co., Bingham & Taylor, and Municipal 

Castings Fair Trade Council. 

Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Patricia 

M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (Michael J. 

Dierberg); Office of the Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of 
Court No. 07-00082 Page 2

Commerce (Sapna Sharma), Of Counsel, for Defendant United 

States. 

Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP (Mark S. Zolno, Eric R. Rock, and 

Kazumune V. Kano) for Defendant-Intervenor A.Y. McDonald Mfg. 

Co. 

GOLDBERG, Senior Judge: East Jordan Iron Works, Inc., LeBaron 

Foundry Inc., Municipal Castings, Inc., Neenah Foundry Co., 

Tyler Pipe Company, U.S. Foundry & Manufacturing Co., Bingham & 

Taylor, and Municipal Castings Fair Trade Council (collectively 

“East Jordan”) challenge the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 

(“Commerce”) determination that A.Y. McDonald Manufacturing 

Company’s (“AYM”) imports are not within the scope of the 

antidumping duty order in place against certain iron products. 

For the reasons that follow, Commerce’s final scope ruling is 

sustained. 

I. BACKGROUND

 In 1986, Commerce published an antidumping duty order on 

certain iron products manufactured in China. See Iron 

Construction Castings from the People’s Republic of China, 51 

Fed. Reg. 17,222 (Dep’t Commerce May 9, 1986) (notice of 

antidumping duty order). This antidumping duty order covered 

meter, service, and valve boxes. In July 2006, AYM asked 

Commerce to determine whether its imports of meter box bases and 

upper bodies from China were within the scope of the antidumping 

duty order. Upon investigation, Commerce found that “cast iron 
Court No. 07-00082 Page 3

bases and cast iron upper bodies, when imported independently, 

do not fall within the scope of the order because the order does 

not contain language to include parts or components of meter 

boxes.” Scope Ruling on the Antidumping Duty Order on Iron 

Construction Castings from the People’s Republic of China: 

Request by A.Y. McDonald Mfg. Co. (Jan. 18, 2007) (“AYM Scope 

Ruling”). East Jordan challenges this determination arguing 

that: (1) Commerce’s scope ruling lacks substantial evidence; 

and (2) Commerce acted contrary to law by abdicating its 

responsibility for administering the antidumping duty order.1

 

II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

 The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1581(c). In reviewing a scope ruling, the Court must sustain a 

determination “unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence 

or is otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 

1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2000). Substantial evidence “is something 

less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of 

drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not 

prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported 

by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 

U.S. 607, 620 (1966). It “requires more than a mere scintilla, 

 

1

 East Jordan also argues that Commerce erred in not considering 

the evidence it submitted related to potential circumvention of 

the antidumping duty order. However, this type of evidence is 

not a part of Commerce’s regulatory interpretive process. See

19 C.F.R. § 351.225 (2007). 
Court No. 07-00082 Page 4

but is satisfied by something less than the weight of the 

evidence.” Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1116 

(Fed. Cir. 2004). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Commerce’s Scope Ruling is Supported by Substantial 

 Evidence 

 For Commerce’s final scope ruling to be supported by 

substantial evidence, the agency must have properly followed its 

regulatory interpretive process. This interpretive process 

consists of two steps.2 See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(d) (2007). 

First, Commerce considers “the descriptions of the merchandise 

contained in the petition, the initial investigation, and the 

 

2

 A necessary precondition to Commerce’s regulatory interpretive 

process is language in the antidumping duty order that is 

subject to interpretation. See Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United 

States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1096—97 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In this case, 

Commerce applied its regulatory interpretive process without 

finding the language of the scope ambiguous as to whether parts 

or components were within the order’s scope. See Scope Ruling 

on the Antidumping Duty Order on Iron Construction Castings from 

the People’s Republic of China: Request by A.Y. McDonald Mfg. 

Co. (Jan. 18, 2007), at 9. The Court finds no error in this 

analysis. Duferco does not require Commerce to halt its 

analysis after finding that the scope language is not subject to 

a proposed interpretation, or to resolve this question at all. 

Rather, Duferco seeks to emphasize the fact that Commerce cannot 

use this interpretive process to override the express language 

of the antidumping duty order. Id. “[R]eview of the petition 

and investigation may provide valuable guidance as to the 

interpretation of the order. But they cannot substitute for 

language in the order itself.” Id. at 1097. Here, Commerce’s 

application of its regulatory interpretative process is 

consistent with the language of the antidumping duty order. As 

such, its analysis is not in conflict with the Federal Circuit’s 

holding in Duferco. 
Court No. 07-00082 Page 5

determinations of the Secretary (including prior scope 

determinations) and the Commission.” Id. § 351.225(k)(1). If 

these criteria are dispositive of the order’s scope, Commerce 

will issue the appropriate scope ruling. If the order’s scope 

is still unclear, Commerce must continue and evaluate the 

criteria provided under section 351.225(k)(2). Here, Commerce 

concluded that the section 351.225(k)(1) criteria dispositively 

excluded parts and components from the order’s scope. East 

Jordan now argues that Commerce erred in finding these criteria 

dispositive and in failing to consider the section 351.225(k)(2) 

criteria. The Court must now analyze whether substantial 

evidence supports the agency’s determination that the section 

351.225(k)(1) criteria are dispositive of the order’s scope. 

See Sango Int’l L.P. v. United States, 484 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007). 

 To be dispositive, the section 351.225(k)(1) criteria “must 

be controlling of the scope inquiry in the sense that they 

definitively answer the scope question.” Id. Here, the section 

351.225(k)(1) criteria definitively answer the scope question. 

All evidence indicates that the focus of Commerce’s 

investigations was on completed meter boxes and box sets rather 

than individual parts or components. For example, the initial 

petition explained that meter boxes are “also manufactured in 

sets, usually containing three pieces—a base, a straight 
Court No. 07-00082 Page 6

midsection, and a cover.” This language indicates that while a 

meter box set does need not to be preassembled, the set must 

consist of all of the parts required to form a completed meter 

box to be within the order’s scope. A prior scope ruling 

further supports this conclusion.3

 See Scope Ruling on the 

Antidumping Duty Order on Construction Castings from the 

People’s Republic of China: Request by Frank J. Martin Company 

(Oct. 17, 2003). In the Martin Scope Ruling, Commerce found 

that “the scope does not contain language that can reasonably be 

constructed to cover parts or components of ‘valve, service and 

meter boxes.’” Id. at 8. The Martin Scope Ruling further noted 

that “including individual parts within the scope of the order 

in question would impermissibly expand the terms in the order.” 

Id. at 7. When considered collectively, the section 

351.225(k)(1) criteria definitively resolve the scope question. 

Accordingly, Commerce’s conclusion that AYM’s imports are not 

 

3

 East Jordan argues that Commerce erred in relying on the Martin 

Scope Ruling for several reasons. First, East Jordan objects to 

the validity of the Martin Scope Ruling’s interpretation of the 

scope language. However, this argument fails as Commerce’s 

interpretation was reasonable and the result of the proper 

application of the agency’s interpretive process. East Jordan’s 

argument that factual distinctions prevent Commerce from relying 

on the Martin Scope Ruling also fails. Factual distinctions 

have no bearing on the reasonableness of the agency’s 

interpretation of the scope language. Notably, East Jordan does 

not dispute Commerce’s factual finding that AYM’s imports are 

meter box parts or components as opposed to a complete meter box 

set. 

 
Court No. 07-00082 Page 7

within the scope of the order is supported by substantial 

evidence as its interpretation is based on a reasonable 

construction of the scope language and is the result of the 

proper application of the agency’s regulatory interpretive 

process. 

B. Commerce Did Not Abdicate Its Administrative 

 Responsibilities 

 East Jordan also argues that Commerce abdicated its 

administrative responsibility by failing to more broadly 

interpret the scope language in order to prevent potential 

circumvention. This argument also lacks merit. While Commerce 

enjoys substantial freedom in conducting scope inquiries, the 

agency’s role is to clarify the scope of the order; not to 

expand or modify it. Eckstrom Indus. Inc. v. United States, 254 

F.3d 1068, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Additionally, a scope ruling 

is not a proper mechanism for addressing circumvention concerns. 

If a party is “concerned about the possibility of circumvention, 

the appropriate method to resolve such concern would appear to 

be proceedings under the provisions specifically designed to 

prevent circumvention.” Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United 

States, 16 CIT 730, 739, 802 F. Supp. 455, 462-63 (1992); see

also Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1370 

(Fed. Cir. 1998). Adopting East Jordan’s argument would lead to 

the impermissible expansion of the underlying antidumping duty 
Court No. 07-00082 Page 8

order to parts and components, and East Jordan’s circumvention 

concerns have no bearing on Commerce’s reasonable interpretation 

of the scope language. As such, Commerce did not act contrary 

to law in refusing to expand the scope of the antidumping duty 

order to meter and valve box parts and components. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Commerce’s scope ruling is 

sustained. 

 /s/ Richard W. Goldberg 

 Richard W. Goldberg 

 Senior Judge

Date: May 1, 2008 

 New York, New York