Slip Op. 07-18 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge 

Court No. 04-00508 

OPINION 

[Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency record denied; Commerce’s administrative 

review results sustained.] 

 Dated: January 31, 2007 

Kelley Drye Collier Shannon (Robin H. Gilbert) for the plaintiff. 

 

 Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director, and 

Jeanne E. Davidson, Deputy Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice (Michael Panzera); and Office of Chief Counsel for Import 

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (Ada E. Bosque), of counsel, for the 

defendant. 

Gordon, Judge: Plaintiff Carpenter Technology Corporation moves for judgment 

upon the agency record pursuant to USCIT R. 56.2, challenging a decision by the 

U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) to partially revoke the antidumping duty 

order covering stainless steel bar from India. See Stainless Steel Bar from India, 

69 Fed. Reg. 55,409, 55,411 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 14, 2004) (final results admin. 

review) (“2004 Administrative Review”). The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 

CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY 

CORPORATION, 

 

Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant. 

 
Court No. 04-00508 Page 2 

Section 516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2000),1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000). 

Commerce’s decision to partially revoke the antidumping order is supported by 

substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law. The court therefore 

sustains Commerce’s administrative review final results and denies Plaintiff’s motion for 

judgment on the agency record.2

I. Background 

The Viraj Group is a collection of affiliated Indian exporters/producers of stainless 

steel bar that includes Viraj Alloys, Ltd., Viraj Forgings, Ltd., and Viraj ImpoExpo, Ltd. 

In two consecutive prior administrative reviews the Viraj Group received zero or 

de minimis margins. Stainless Steel Bar From India, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,336 (Dep’t of 

Commerce Aug. 15, 2002) (amended final results of administrative review) 

(“2002 Administrative Review”); and Stainless Steel Bar From India, 68 Fed. Reg. 

47,543 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 11, 2003) (final results of administrative review) 

(“2003 Administrative Review”). Anticipating a third consecutive zero or de minimis

margin for the 2004 Administrative Review (meeting the revocation requirement under 

19 C.F.R. § 351.222 (2004) that merchandise not be sold at less than normal value for a 

period of at least three consecutive years), the Viraj Group requested partial revocation 

of the antidumping duty order. 

 

1 All further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930 are to the relevant provision in Title 19 of 

the U.S. Code, 2000 edition. 

2 In its motion for judgment on the agency record, Plaintiff also challenged Commerce’s 

decision to collapse three foreign exporters/producers into a single entity for the 

dumping analysis. In a separate opinion the court sustained Commerce’s collapsing 

decision, holding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies on this issue. 

Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. United States, 30 CIT __, Slip Op. 06-147 (Oct. 5, 2006). 
Court No. 04-00508 Page 3 

Opposing this request, Plaintiff argued to Commerce that revocation was 

impermissible because there had been no final determination of Viraj’s dumping 

margins in the two consecutive prior reviews. Petitioner’s Public Case Brief at 5 

(Pub. R. Doc. No. 219, Pl.’s Br. App. 3). Specifically, Plaintiff noted that it had 

challenged the results of the two prior administrative reviews, and that one of the issues 

challenged, collapsing the Viraj Group for the dumping analysis, would likely be 

reversed, potentially requiring Commerce to reverse its previous findings of no dumping. 

Id. at 2-4. Plaintiff also noted that the Court of International Trade had remanded the 

collapsing issue to Commerce twice, and each time required Commerce to provide 

additional justification for collapsing the Viraj Group. Id.

Plaintiff argued that the revocation regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.222 (2004), 

prohibits Commerce from revoking an order “if there are claims or challenges directly 

affecting the basis for revocation that have not been resolved with finality.” Id. at 5. 

Plaintiff also cited Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products and Certain 

Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Canada, 65 Fed. Reg. 9,243, 9244-45 (Dept. of 

Commerce Feb. 24, 2000) (final results admin. review) (“Carbon Steel”), an 

administrative proceeding in which Commerce declined to revoke an antidumping duty 

order because of a pending anti-circumvention investigation. 

In the final results Commerce calculated a third consecutive zero/de minimis

dumping margin for the Viraj Group and partially revoked the antidumping duty order. 

2004 Administrative Review, 69 Fed. Reg. at 55,411. Commerce addressed Plaintiff’s 

revocation arguments as follows: 
Court No. 04-00508 Page 4 

We disagree with the petitioners that this action cannot be taken 

before the litigation in previous segments has been concluded. It is not 

the Department’s policy to delay granting revocation because of pending 

court appeals. [See, e.g., Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Colombia, 59 

Fed. Reg. 15,159, 15,166 (Dept. of Commerce Mar. 31, 1994) (final 

results admin review); Color Television Receivers from the Republic of 

Korea; 61 Fed. Reg. 4,408, 4,414 (Dept. of Commerce Feb. 6, 1996) (final 

results admin review)]. While we acknowledge that the CIT has remanded 

a portion of one of our prior decisions, it has not yet issued a ruling on our 

most recent remand redetermination. Moreover, our position in that 

litigation remains unchanged – namely that the final results were 

supported by substantial evidence and are fully in accordance with U.S. 

antidumping law. We note that, even after the remand redetermination, 

Viraj’s margin remains de minimis. See Final Results of Redetermination 

Pursuant to Remand: Slater Steels Corporation v. United States, Slip Op. 

04-22 (CIT March 8, 2004), (May 7, 2004). In any event, as the CIT has 

not rendered a final opinion in the cases under litigation that reverses the 

Department’s decisions, we have continued to rely on the margins 

determined in the segments at issue because we consider them to be 

valid and reliable. 

We also disagree with the petitioners that the circumstances here 

are similar to those involving pending anti-circumvention claims. As part of 

its revocation analysis under 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2)(i), the Department 

must determine whether the continued application of the antidumping 

order is otherwise necessary to offset dumping. It is entirely reasonable for 

the Department to consider a company’s commercial behavior under the 

existing antidumping order (and any attempts to evade that antidumping 

order) in the context of this analysis. In contrast, here we have found that 

Viraj exported subject merchandise to the United States in commercial 

quantities for three years, and no party to the proceeding has alleged that 

Viraj has attempted to circumvent the antidumping order. Thus, we have 

no reason before us to question that Viraj’s past commercial behavior will 

not be an accurate reflection of its future experience, and we have made 

our revocation decision accordingly. 

2004 Administrative Review Decision Memorandum at 17, A-533-810, AR: 2/1/02-

1/31/03 (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/india/E4-2188-

1.pdf (“Decision Memorandum”). 

In its opening brief before this court, Plaintiff effectively challenges Commerce’s 

revocation decision as not being in accordance with law, arguing that the applicable 
Court No. 04-00508 Page 5 

regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.222 (2004), prohibits revocation while there is pending 

litigation involving prior administrative reviews that form the basis for the revocation. 

Pl’s. Br. at 11. In its reply brief, however, Plaintiff appears to shift the basis for its 

challenge and instead argues that Commerce’s revocation decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence. Plaintiff contends that “Commerce has not shown that it was 

reasonable, given this record, to forge ahead to revoke the order, when there was a 

likely possibility that Viraj's dumping margins would increase from zero or de minimis, 

and thereby preclude granting the Viraj Group's revocation request.” Pl.’s Reply 

Br. at 6. 

II. Standard of Review 

Generally, the court sustains Commerce’s determinations, findings, or 

conclusions unless they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). More specifically, 

when reviewing Commerce’s interpretation of its regulations, the court must give 

substantial deference to Commerce’s interpretation, Torrington Co. v. U.S., 

156 F.3d 1361, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1998), according it “‘controlling weight unless it is 

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. 

Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (citations omitted). And when reviewing whether 

Commerce’s partial revocation decision for the Viraj Group is ‘unsupported by 

substantial evidence,’ the Court assesses whether the agency’s determination, finding, 

or conclusion is “unreasonable.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 

1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
Court No. 04-00508 Page 6 

III. Discussion 

The antidumping statute authorizes Commerce to “revoke, in whole or in part, . . . 

an antidumping duty order . . . after [an administrative review].” 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d)(1). 

By regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2) (2004), Commerce has defined the criteria for 

partial revocation of an antidumping duty order. One requirement is that the exporter or 

producer has sold the merchandise at not less than normal value for a period of at least 

three consecutive years. 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2)(i)(A) (2004). Another is that the 

continued application of the antidumping order is not otherwise necessary to offset 

dumping. 19 C.F.R. § 351.222(b)(2)(C) (2004). 

Commerce’s interpretation of the revocation regulation, which is supported by 

administrative precedent, allows the agency to consider revocation requests even when 

there is pending litigation involving prior reviews. Commerce stated in its Decision 

Memorandum that it did not agree with Plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of the 

regulation, which would prohibit the consideration of revocation requests until pending 

litigation became final. The problem for Plaintiff is that nothing in 19 C.F.R. § 351.222 

(2004) suggests that Commerce’s interpretation is incorrect, let alone “‘plainly 

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Thomas Jefferson Univ., 

512 U.S. at 512. Plaintiff all but concedes this point in its reply brief by choosing not to 

address this standard. Instead, Plaintiff changes its focus to an issue that it raises for 

the first time in its reply brief: whether Commerce’s revocation decision is reasonable 

given the record—that is—whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Pl.’s Reply 

Br. at 6. 
Court No. 04-00508 Page 7 

On the substantial evidence issue, Plaintiff incorrectly states that “Commerce has 

not explained why the facts of this case did not warrant a reasonable delay in deciding 

the revocation issue.” Id. Commerce explained in its Decision Memorandum why 

Commerce continued to rely on the margin calculations from the prior reviews despite 

the pending litigation: 

While we acknowledge that the CIT has remanded a portion of one 

of our prior decisions, it has not yet issued a ruling on our most recent 

remand redetermination. Moreover, our position in that litigation remains 

unchanged – namely that the final results were supported by substantial 

evidence and are fully in accordance with U.S. antidumping law. We note 

that, even after the remand redetermination, Viraj’s margin remains 

de minimis. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand: 

Slater Steels Corporation v. United States, Slip Op. 04-22 (CIT March 8, 

2004), (May 7, 2004). In any event, as the CIT has not rendered a final 

opinion in the cases under litigation that reverses the Department’s 

decisions, we have continued to rely on the margins determined in the 

segments at issue because we consider them to be valid and reliable. 

Decision Memorandum at 17. 

In reviewing the reasonableness of Commerce’s conclusion that the prior review 

margin calculations were valid and reliable despite the pending Slater litigation, the 

court does not review Commerce’s conclusion based on how the Slater litigation 

ultimately unfolded after the 2004 Administrative Review. Instead, the court considers 

the posture of the Slater litigation as it existed at the time of Commerce’s decision in the 

2004 Administrative Review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2640(b) (2000); 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2); 

cf. Co-Steel Raritan, Inc. v. ITC 357 F.3d 1294, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that 

agency’s decision has to be judged by the information available to the agency at the 

time of the agency’s decision). At the time of the 2004 Administrative Review, the 

Slater court had issued two remands on the issue of collapsing the Viraj Group, but the 
Court No. 04-00508 Page 8 

dumping margins for the Viraj Group were still de minimis. Commerce noted there had 

been no discernible effect on the Viraj Group’s margins. Additionally, multiple remands 

in and of themselves do not necessarily implicate a change to a dumping margin. See, 

e.g., Böwe Passat Reinigungs-Und Wäschereitechnik GmbH v. U.S., 21 CIT 604, 

604-05, 980 F. Supp. 1262, 1263 (1997) (sustaining third remand determination with no 

change to original dumping margin). Based on its experience conducting three 

administrative reviews with the Viraj Group, Commerce concluded that the Slater

litigation would not affect the margin calculation for the Viraj Group in the prior 

administrative reviews. Such fact-finding by Commerce was reasonable on this 

administrative record. 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that Commerce’s decision in Carbon Steel (where 

Commerce declined to revoke an antidumping order because of pending anticircumvention litigation) and the 2004 Administrative Review are inconsistent. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Commerce has “not explained in any meaningful way 

why it is justified in deferring revocation when anti-circumvention claims are pending, 

but not to defer revocation when a fundamental finding of fact on which revocation 

depends (i.e., the lack of dumping for three years) may well change because of a court 

challenge.” Pl.’s Reply Br. at 6-7. Here again Plaintiff is incorrect because Commerce 

did explain in its Decision Memorandum why the two proceedings were different and 

why the outcomes were consistent: 

We also disagree with the petitioners that the circumstances here 

are similar to those involving pending anti-circumvention claims. As part of 

its revocation analysis under 19 CFR 351.222(b)(2)(i), the Department 

must determine whether the continued application of the antidumping 

order is otherwise necessary to offset dumping. It is entirely reasonable for 
Court No. 04-00508 Page 9 

the Department to consider a company’s commercial behavior under the 

existing antidumping order (and any attempts to evade that antidumping 

order) in the context of this analysis. In contrast, here we have found that 

Viraj exported subject merchandise to the United States in commercial 

quantities for three years, and no party to the proceeding has alleged that 

Viraj has attempted to circumvent the antidumping order. Thus, we have 

no reason before us to question that Viraj’s past commercial behavior will 

not be an accurate reflection of its future experience, and we have made 

our revocation decision accordingly. 

Decision Memorandum at 17. Commerce concluded that the commercial behavior of 

the Viraj Group manifested in three consecutive administrative reviews demonstrated to 

Commerce that continued application of the antidumping order was not necessary to 

offset dumping with respect to the Viraj Group, whereas the conduct of the 

exporter/producer in Carbon Steel, who was mired in an anti-circumvention proceeding, 

led Commerce to conclude that continued application of the antidumping order was 

necessary to offset dumping. 

IV. Conclusion 

Commerce’s decision to partially revoke the antidumping order for the Viraj 

Group is supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with law. 

The court denies Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency record and will enter 

judgment in favor of defendant sustaining Commerce’s administrative review final 

results. 

 

 /s/ Leo M. Gordon 

 Judge Leo M. Gordon 

 

 

Dated: January 31, 2007 

 New York, New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge 

Court No. 04-00508 

JUDGMENT 

 This case having been submitted for decision, and the court, after due 

deliberation, having rendered opinions; now in conformity with those opinions, it is 

hereby 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency record is denied; 

and it is further 

ORDERED that judgment is entered for the Defendant. 

 

 

 

 /s/ Leo M. Gordon 

 Judge Leo M. Gordon 

 

Dated: January 31, 2007 

 New York, New York 

 

CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY 

CORPORATION, 

 

Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant.