## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

Italia F oods, Inc. v. Sun Tours, In c. , 2011 IL 110350

Caption in S upreme Court: I TAL IA FOODS, I NC., Appellee
, v. SUN TOURS, I NC., d/b / a Hobbit Trave l, et al. , Appellants.

Docke t No. 110350

Filed Rehea ringdenied J une 3, 2011

September 26, 2011

Held ( Note : This syl l abus

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r t er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Under the fede ral Telephone Consumer Pro t ec t i o n Act of 1991, the I llinois Gene ral Assembly did not have to enac t enablin g l eg islation befor e a private action could be broug ht under the Act in state court, since, under the “ac knowledg ment approa ch” followed by the majority of jurisdictions, state courts must, as a matter of supremac y clause jurisprudenc e, rema in open to litigants with fede ral cause s of action and

are not free to refuse enfor ceme nt.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the Second Di s trict; hear d in that
court on appea l from the Circuit Court of L ake County
, the Hon. Mitchell L . Hoffma

n, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Certified que stion answere d; cause rema nded.Counsel on

Appea l M i chae l D. Richman and Henr y Pietrkowski, of Reed Smith L L P, of Chicag o, and C h ar l es W. Smit h, of Smit h & L aluzerne, L td., of Waukeg an, for

appellants.

Michae l T. Reag an, of Ottawa, Phill ip A. Boc k and Robert M. Hatch, of Bo ck & Hatch, L L C, of Chicag o, and Br ian J

. Wanca and Dav i d M

. Oppenhe im, of Anderson +Wanca, of Rolli ngMeadow s, for a

ppellee.

J ustices J USTI CE FREEMAN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Chief J ustice Kil bride and J ustices Thomas, Ga rman, Ka rmeier , Bur

ke, and The is concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The circ uit court of L ake County cer tified sever al questions of law fo r i n t er l o cu t o ry appea l (I ll. S. Ct. R. 308 (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994)). The appellate court conclude d that its answe rs to the following two questions wer e dispositi ve. First, does the fede ral Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) (4 7 U. S

. C. § 227 (2000)) require that the I llinois Gene ral Assembly enac t leg islation to enable I llinois state courts to he ar and enfor ce private TCPA claims? The second cer

tified question asks essentially whether the TCPA claim in this case is assignable under I llinois law. The appellate court answe red the first question in the neg ative and the second question in the aff irmative. 399 I ll. App. 3d 1038. We allowed leave
to appea l (I ll. S. Ct . R. 315 (eff . Fe b. 26, 2010)). For the following rea sons, we ag ree with
t h e ap p ellate court’s answe r to the first question, vacate the court’s discussion o f assig nability , and re mand the ca use to the appe llate cour

t for fur ther proc eeding s.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 In J une 2003, Eclipse Manufa cturing Company filed its orig inal class action complaint ag ainst d ef

endant Sun Tours, Inc., doing business as Hobbit Trave l. In Fe bruar y 2004, E cl i p s e filed a first amende d complaint adding defe ndant P aul Grosso, who i s Sun Tou rs ’ president and sole share holder. Eclipse alleg ed that in J uly and August 2002 defe ndants sent via fac simil e, i.e. , “fax ed,” Eclipse four unsolicited adver tisements for discount trave l. In August 2007, Eclipse’s president and sole share holder, Robert Hinman, fi l ed t he second amende d complaint repla cing Eclipse as the named plaintiff. Hinman alleg ed that the same four fac simil es (fax es) wer e sent to him and not to Eclipse. He also alleg ed that in November 2005, he sold Eclipse’s stock, but expressly reta ined the right to pursue the TCPA claim based on its assig nment from Ec lipse to Hinman. ¶ 4 Def

endants moved to dismiss the second amende d complaint. Def endants c o n t en d ed, inter alia
, that Hinman’s claims wer e time-barr ed beca use he broug ht the m ove r five y ear s

-2-afte r he a lleg edly rec eived the f

our fax es. In J anuar

y 2008, over de fenda

nts’ objection, the circ uit c ourt g rante d I talia Foods, Inc., leave to f ile the instant third amende d complaint, in which I talia substitut ed itself for Hinman. Italia alleg ed that fr om J une 2005 throug h April 2007 defe ndants sent I talia 28 unsolicited faxes of discount trave l a dvertisements. Fur ther, defe ndants faxed the same an d s i milar adver tisements to more than 39 other rec ipients wi t h o u t first rec eiving their permission or invitation. I talia claimed that defe ndants: (1) violated the TCPA, and (2) committed common law conve rsion. 1 ¶ 5 Def

endants filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure (735 I L CS 5/2-619.1 (West 2008)). Def endants asser

ted that private TCPA claims are not cognizable in I llinois state courts. 735 I L CS 5/2-615 (West 2008). Def endants also contende d that TCPA claims are not a ssigna ble as a matter of I llinois law. Id. Def endants alternatively soug ht dismiss al arguing that I talia’s TCPA claim was timebarr ed. 735 I L CS 5/ 2-619 (West 2008). 2 ¶ 6 The circ uit court denied defe ndants’ motion. Howeve r, the court cer tified the following
q u es t i o n s fo r interlocutory revie w pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 308 (ef f. F eb. 1, 1994)) : “I

. Does the languag e and purpose of the fede ral Telephone Consumer Protection Act (‘TCPA’) re quire that the I llinois Gene ral Asse mbly enac t enablingleg islation befor e private TCPA claims can be broug ht and enf orce d in I llinois state cour ts?
I I

. Are the TC PA claims alleg ed in this case ‘statutory penalties’ u n d er I llinois law? And if so: (a) Are those claims assignable unde r I llinois law? (b) Does I llinois ’ two y ear statutory penalty limit ations perio d [c it a ti o n ] a pply to such claims, as opposed to [the fede ral limitations period for c ivil actions] ?
I I I

. I f the claim is not as s i gn able, then should absent class members’ putative claims ag ainst defe ndants be treated as tolled whe n n o class repr esentative with
proper standingrepr esente d the putative cla ss for a 27- month period? ” ¶ 7 The appellate court allowed defe ndants’ application for leave to appea l (I ll. S. Ct. R. 308 (ef f. Feb. 1, 1994)). The court answere d the first question in the neg ative. 399 I ll. App. 3d
at 1043-63. As to the second cer tified question, the appellate court conclude d that the TCPA claim in this case is assig nable unde r I llinois law and that, ba sed on the admitted fac ts, the
court ne ed not answe r subsec tion ( b) conce rning the appropr iate statute of limit ations. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 1063-72. L astly
, beca use the appellate court conclude d that the TCPA c laim in this case is assig nable, the court did not addre ss the third cer tified question. 399 I ll. App.

T he ori ginal and fi rs t a me n d ed complai nts inc lud ed a thi rd cou nt cl ai m ing a viola ti on of 1 the Cons um er Fra ud and De cep ti ve Busi nes s Pr act ic es Act(8 15 I LCS 505 /1 et seq

. (W est 2002 ))

. However, the ci rc uit cou rt grant ed def end ant s’ m oti on to dis m is s thi s cou nt wit h pre j udi ce, and I ta li a doe s no t appe al th er ef

rom.

Def end ant s al so ra is e d s ect ion s 2- 615 and 2- 619 cha ll enges to I ta li a’ s comm on la w 2

con versi on c la im.

-3-3d at 1072. We allowed de fenda nts’ petition for leave to appea l (I ll. S. C t. R. 315(a)).

¶ 8 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 9 Be cause this appeal conce rns questions of law ce rtified by

the circ uit court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 308 (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994)), our revie w is de novo

. Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.
, 227 I ll. 2d 45, 57-58 (2007). Our revie w is de novo also b ec au se this appea l arose in the context of an order denying a section 2-619.1 motion t o dismiss

. See Morris v. Har ve y C ycle & Camper, Inc.
, 392 I ll. App. 3d 399, 402 (2009); McG ee v . Snyder , 326 I ll. App. 3d 343, 347 (2001).

¶ 10 A. I llinois Circuit Court J urisdiction Over TCPA Claims ¶ 11 T h e fi rst cer

tified question asks whether the TCPA require s t h e I l l i n o i s Ge n er al Assembly to enac t leg islation to enable I llinois state courts to hear and enfor ce private TCPA claims. Def

endants contend that the Gene ral Assembly is require d to so act. I t is undisputed that the leg islature has not enac ted leg islation authorizing TCPA suits in I llinois state courts. There fore
, defe ndants ask this court to direc t that Italia’s TCPA claim be dismiss ed with prejudice

. This issue is a matter of statutory construction, which we analy ze within a settled framework. ¶ 12 “ ‘Our task is to g ive eff ect to the will of Congr ess, and wher e its will has been e x presse d in rea sonably plain terms, that languag e must o rd i n arily be reg arde d as conclusive.’ ” Negonsott v. Samuels
, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (quoting Griffin v. Oce anic Contractors, Inc.
, 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)) ; acc ord County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board
, 231 I ll. 2d 593, 603-04 (2008) (stating“plain languag e” c anon of statutory construction); In re Detention of

Lieberman
, 201 I ll. 2d 300, 307-08 (2002) (same)

. “The definition of words in isolation, howeve r, is not nece s s a ril y c o ntrolling in statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may

not ext end to the outer

limit s of its definitional possibil ities.” Dolan v. United States Postal Servic e , 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006). Thus, in construing a statute, a court must not focus ex clusively on a si ng le s entenc e or phrase
, but must view the statute as a whole. The court may consider the rea son for the law, the problems soug ht to be reme died, and the
p u rp o s es to be achie ved. See United States National Bank of Oregon v. Indepe nden t Insurance Agents of America, Inc. , 508 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993); County of Du Page
, 231 I ll. 2d at 604; W

illiams v. Staples
, 208 I ll. 2d 480, 487 (2004); Lieberman
, 201 I ll. 2d at 308. ¶ 13 Acc ording to its leg islative history
, Congr ess enac ted the TCPA to addre ss telemarke ting abuses attributable to the use of automated telephone calls to device s including telephones, cellular telephones, and fax machi nes. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L

. No. 102-243, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat. 2394) 1969-70. When the TCPA was enac ted,

o ver 40 states had leg islation restric ting unsolicited telemar keting

. Howeve r, those state

measure s had limit ed eff

ect beca use states lack jurisdiction over interstate calls. Id. at 1970. The p urposes of the TCPA “ar e to protec t the privac y interests of residential telephone subscriber s by placing restric tions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the home and
to fac ilitate interstate commerc e by restric ting cer tain uses of [fax ] machines and automatic dialers.” Id. at 1968; see Portuguese American Leadership Council of the United States, Inc.

-4-v. Inve stors’ Alert, Inc.
, 956 A.2d 671, 673-74 (D.C. 2008); R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Inve stors’ Alert, Inc.
, 857 A.2d 1, 9, 11-12 (Md. 2004); Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank
, 710 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (N.Y. A pp. Div. 2000). ¶ 14 The TCPA provides three methods of enfor ceme nt. First, a state attorney g ene ra l m ay bring a civil action on behalf of a state’s residents. 47 U.S.C. § 227(f) (1). Second, the Fe dera l Communi cations C ommissi on (F CC) may bring a civil action for violations of t he TCP A. Id. §§ 227(f) (3), (f) (7). Fe dera l district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over TCPA claims broug ht by state attorney s g ener al and the FCC. Id. § 227(f) (2). Third, individuals may bring actions on their own be half in state c ourts. Id. §§ 227(b)( 3), (c )(5)

. 3 ¶ 15 The TCPA provides in rele vant part: “It shall be un l aw fu l fo r an y p erson within the United S tates, or any person outsi de the United S tates i f t he re ci p i en t i s within the Unit ed States *** to use any telephone fac simil e machine, computer, or other de vice to send, to a telephone fac simil e machine, an unsolicited adver tisement.” Id

. § 227(b)( 1)(C). Subsection (b)( 3) provides a s follows:

“(3) Private right of ac tion. A per son or entity

may , if otherwis e perm itted by the laws or rules of court of a State , bringin an appr opriate c ourt of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations
presc ribed unde r this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B ) an ac t i on to rec over for actual monetary loss from such a viol ation,

or to r ece ive $500 in damag es for eac h such violation, whic hever is greater,

or (C) both such ac tions.” (Emphasis adde d.) Id. § 227(b)( 3).
I f the court finds that the defe ndant “willfully or knowing ly violated” this section, the court has the discr etion to awar d an amount up to three times the amount specifie d above. Id. 4 ¶ 16 The f

i rs t ce rt ified question conce rns t he congr essional i ntent underly ing the phrase “if otherwise permi t t ed b y t h e laws or rules of court of a State.” Id. § 227(b)( 3). Def endants
conte n d that this statutory languag e require s that the I llinois Gene ral Assembly enac t leg islation to enable I llinois circ u i t courts to hear private TCPA claims. Be cause the leg islature has not enac ted such a law, defe ndants argue that circ uit courts may not hear these claims. On the other hand, I talia contends that I llinois circ uit courts may hear private TCPA

T h e m aj ori ty of fe der al cou rt s tha t have con si der ed the is sue have hel d tha t the y la ck 3 j uri sdi ct i o n t o h ear pri vate T CPA act ion s. 399 I ll

. App. 3d at 1046 n.4; Port ugue se Ameri can Leaders hip Counc il , 956 A.2d at 675 n.3. However, sever al cou rt s of app eal have hel d tha t fe der al

cou rt s m ay hea r pri vate T CPA cl ai m s when sub j ect m at te r j uri sdi ct ion is bas ed on diver si ty. 399 I ll

. App. 3 d at 104 6 n.4 (c oll ect ing ca ses ).

T he T CPA al so inc lud es a sub sec ti on tha t pro te ct s re si den ti al te le phon e sub scr ibe rs ’ 4 pri vacy ri gh t s a ga i n st te le phon e sol ic it at ion s. T his sub sec ti on al so est abl is hes a pri vate ri ght of
act ion , whi ch l ikewis e appl ie s “ if ot her wis e pe rmitt ed b y the la ws or rule s of cour t of a Sta te .” Id. § 22 7(c )( 5).

-5-claims with no need f or ena bling leg islation. ¶ 17 Where, as here
, re s o l u t i o n o f a qu es t i o n o f fe d era l law turns on a statute and congressional intent, we look first to the statutory languag e and then to the leg islative history if the statutory languag e is ambiguous. See Toibb v. Radlo f f
, 5 0 1 U.S. 157, 162 (1991). “Ambiguity is a cre ature not of definitional possibili ties but of statutory context.” Brown v. Gardner
, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). A statute is amb i gu o u s i f it is capa ble of being

rea sonably understood in two or more differ ent way s. See Solon v. Midwest Medic al Rec ords Ass’n
, 236 I ll. 2d 433, 440 (2010); W illiams
, 208 I ll. 2d at 489-90; Khan v. U n i t ed St a tes , 548 F.3d 549, 556 ( 7th Cir. 2008). ¶ 18 In the prese nt case , we conclude that the statutory phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a S tate” is ambiguous. Many courts fr o m ac ross the country have been fac ed with construing this statutory languag e. These decisions indicate that it is unclea r what, if any , state leg islative action is require d in order for state courts to hear private TCPA claims. Courts have used one of three interpre tative approa ches in construing this statutory languag e. See, e.g. , MLC Mortgage Corp. v. Sun America Mortgage Co.
, 2009 OK 37, ¶ 11, 212 P.3d 1199; Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Affordable Health Care Solutions, Inc.
, 121 P.3d 350, 353 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 19 1. “Acknowledgme nt” Approach ¶ 20 The “ac knowledg ment” approa ch construes the p h ra s e “i f o therwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State” to mere ly acknow ledg e that states have the rig ht to structure their own court s y s t em s ; that neutra l state laws and court rules conce rning state court jurisdiction a

nd proce dure apply to TCPA claims; and that state courts are not oblig ated to chang e their proce dural rules to acc ommodate TCPA claims. Consumer Crusade
, 121 P.3d
at 354; Ponte
, 857 A.2d at 11; Schulman
, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 372. Under the “ac knowledg ment” approa ch, state enabling leg islation is not nece ssary for parties to asser t private TCPA claims in state courts (

MLC Mortgage
, 2009 OK 37, ¶ 12; Condon v. Office Depot, Inc.
, 855 So. 2d 644, 647 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)), and no state can ref use to enter

tain that claim beca

use it is a feder al ca

use of a ction. Consumer Crusade , 121 P.3d at 354; Ponte , 857 A.2d at 9. ¶ 21 Severa l y ears ago , o u r ap pellate court construed the “if otherwise permitted” c lause

acc ording to the acknow ledg m en t ap p roach. In First Capital Mortgage Corp. v. Union Fede ral Bank ofIndianapolis
, 374 I ll. App. 3d 739 (2007), the parties agree d that the court “should interpre t the phrase as an ac kn o wl edg ment that state courts need not chang e proce dural rules to acc ommodate claims under the [TC PA] ,” and the court held that private TCPA claims wer e cognizable in I llinois circ uit courts. Id. at 741-72; see MLC Mortgage
, 2009 OK 37, ¶ 12 n.21 (citing case for I llinois being “ac knowledg ment state”)

. In the prese nt

case , the appellate court, afte r exhaustive analy sis, rea ched the sam e conclusion (399 I ll. App. 3d at 1050-53, 1056-61), which Italia urg es us to uphold. We agree with the conclusion

rea ched by our appellate court in First Capital Mortgage and the prese nt case , and adopt the acknow ledg ment approa ch to construing the statutory phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws or r ules of cour

t of a State.” ¶ 22 “The ‘ac knowledg ment’ approa ch is g rounded in the Supremac y C l au se of the United

-6-States Constitution.” MLC Mortgage
, 2009 OK 37, ¶ 12; see Condon
, 855 So. 2d at 647. The

supremac y clause provides: “This Constitution, and the L aws of the United State s wh i ch shall be made in Pursuance there of *** shall be the supreme L aw of the L and; and the J udg es in ever y State shall be bound there by
, any Thing in the Constitution or L aws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const., art. VI
, cl. 2. The United States Supreme Court has explained:

“F eder al law is enfor cea

ble in state courts not beca use Congr ess has deter

mined that fede ral courts would otherwise be burdene d or that state courts might provide a

more convenie nt forum–although both might well be true–but beca use the Constitution and laws passed p u rs u an t t o it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state leg islatu re. The Supremac y Clause makes those laws ‘the supreme L aw of the L and,’ and char g es state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enfor ce that law ac cording

to their regular modes of procedure .” Howlett v. Rose , 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990). Th er ef o re : “The obligation on State courts to hear Fe dera l cause s of action is not selfimposed b y en ab l i n g leg islation, but arises under the supremac y clause .” Mulhern v. MacLeod, 808 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ma ss. 2004). ¶ 23 Corollaries follow from the supremac y clause

. First, absent a valid excuse, a state cour t may not deny a fede ral rig ht when the parties and t h e co n t ro versy are proper ly befor e it. Howlet t , 4 9 6 U.S

. at 369. The supremac y clause forbids state courts to disassociate themselves from fede ral law beca use they disag ree with its substance or beca use they ref

use to r ecognize the superior authority of fede ral law. Id. at 371. By virtue of the United States Constitution, state courts mu s t rema in open to litigants wit h fede ral causes of action “ ‘on the same basis that they are open to litigants with cause s of action spring ing from a differ ent

source .’ ” Id. at 372 (quoting Miles v. Illinois Central R.R. Co

. , 3 15 U.S. 698, 703-04 (1942))

. ¶ 24 Second, a state court may ref use jurisdiction of a fede ral claim based on “a neutra l state rule re g ardingthe administration of the c ourts.” Howlett , 496 U.S. at 372. “The require ment that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat fede ral law as the law of the land does not nece ssarily in cl u de within it a require ment that the State

cre ate a court competent to hear the case in which the fede ral claim is prese nted. The g ener al rule, ‘bottomed deeply in belief i n t h e i mportance of state control of state judicial proce dure, is that fede ral l aw takes the state courts as it finds them.’ [C itations.] The States thus have great latitude to establis h t h e structure and jurisdiction of their own courts. [C itations.] In addition, States may apply their own neutra l proce dural rules to fede ral claims, unless those rules ar e p re- empted by fede ral law .” Id.
Ho wever, when a state court has jurisdiction “ade quate and appropr iate under establ i s h ed local law to adjudicate ” a fede ral claim, the court is “not fre e to ref use enfor ceme nt.” Testa v. Katt , 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947). ¶ 25 The United States Supreme Court ha s decla red: “The se principles are fundame ntal to a sy stem of fede ralism in which the state courts s h ar e responsibility for the application and

-7-enfor ceme nt o f fe d er al law.” Howlett
, 496 U.S. at 372-73. We conclude that the statutory

phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State” simply acknow ledg es this supremacy

clause jurisprudenc e. See, e.g. , Ponte , 857 A.2d at 9-10 ( collectingcase s). ¶ 26 Ou r construction of the “if otherwise permitted” clause finds support in th e T C P A’ s leg islative history

. In introducing the bill containing the private cause of action now codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) , Senator Holling s expl ained a s follows:

“The [bi ll] contains a private rig ht-of-a ction provision that will make it easie r for

consumers to rec over damag es from rec eiving these computerized calls

. T he provision would allow consumers to bring an action in State court ag ainst any entity that violates the bill. The bill does not, because of constitutional constraints, dictate
to the States which court in each State shall be the proper venue for such an action,

as this is a matter for State legislators to determine

. Neve rtheless, it is my hope that States will make it as easy as possible for consumers to bring such actions, pref era bly in small claims court. The consumer outrag e at rec eiving these calls is clea r. Unless Congr ess m akes it easie r for consumers t o o b tain damag es from those who vi olate this bil l, these abuse s will undoubtedly continue. Small claims court or a simil ar court would allow the consumer to appea r befor e the court without an attorney

. The amount of damag es in this leg islation is set to be fair to both the consumer and the telemar keter

. Howeve r, it wo u l d defe at the
purposes o f t he bil l if the attorney s’ costs to consumers of bring ing an action wer e g reater than the pot ential damage s. I thus expect that the S tates wil l act reasona bly in permitting their citizens to g o to court to enfor ce this bill.” (Emphasis added.) 137 Cong. Rec. 30,821-22 (1991) (quoted in Portuguese American Leadership Council
, 956 A.2d at 677, and Ponte , 857 A.2d at 13-14)

. Senator Hollings’ explanation of the TCPA’s private cause of action makes clea r that the “if otherwise permitted” clause simply ref lects supremac y clause jurisprudenc e. “The

s ub s t an t ive issue of whether the fede ral cause of action should be enter tained in t h e ap p ro priate state court was not a matter left to state leg islators.” (Emphasis in orig inal. ) Ponte
, 857 A.2d at 14. Rather, Congr ess “ex p ec t ed state leg islation to addre ss issues like venue.” Condon , 855 So. 2d at 648. ¶ 27 I n d ee d
, we observe that I llinois Supreme Court Rules 2 8 1 t h ro u gh 2 8 9 es t ab l i s h
pro ce dures specific ally for small claims actions–the ty pe of proce eding Senator Hollings envisioned for private TCPA claims. T h ese are neutra l state rules reg arding the administration of the cour ts (see Howlett
, 496 U.S. at 372) to which the statutory languag e “if other wise per mitted by the laws or r

ules of cour

t of a State” expressly

ref ers.

¶ 28 2. “Opt In” Approach ¶ 29 Def

endants urg e us to utiliz e the “opt in” approa ch in construing the statutory phrase “if otherwise permitted by the l aws or rules of c ourt of a State.” Under the “opt in” approach,
t h e T C P A did not cre ate an immediately enfor cea ble cause of action. Rather, Congr ess intended to deprive state courts of jurisdiction over private TCPA cause s of action unless and until a state takes aff

irmative steps, either by leg islation or court rule, to “opt in” the TCPA,

-8-i.e. , to exercise jurisdiction over private TCPA claims. See, e.g. , MLC Mortgage
, 2009 OK

37, ¶ 14; Consumer Crusade
, 121 P.3d at 353. We reje ct defe ndants’ contention beca use the “opt in” appr oach “ runs af oul” of the supr emac y

clause . See Condon , 855 So. 2d at 647. ¶ 30 Initially
, the very definition of the “opt in” approa ch g ives pause. There is a conce ptual tension betwee n the rule of presumed enfor cea bility derive d from the supremac y clause and

an interpre tation of the TCPA that wo uld require the I llinois Gene ral Assembly to enac t leg islation to enable I llinois circ uit courts to hear private TCPA actions. S ee Portuguese American Leade rship Council , 956 A.2d at 676-77. ¶ 31 Fur

ther, this presumption of enfor ce ab l i l i t y i s bolstered by I llinois constitutional law. This court has repe atedly rec ognized that the I llinois Constitution, not the leg islatu r e, confe rs jurisdiction on I llinois circ uit courts. Pursuant to article VI
, section 9, of our constitution, the circ uit courts have jurisd i ct i o n over all justiciable matters. I ll. Const. 1970, art. VI
, § 9; People e x rel. Alvare

z v. Skry d , 241 I ll. 2d 34, 40 (2011); People v . Davis , 156 I ll. 2d 149, 156 (1993). There fore
, the premi s e of the “opt in” approa ch–that the I llinois Gene ral As sembly is require d to enac t leg islation to “ena ble” I llinois circ uit courts to hear the justiciable matter c reated by Congr ess, i.e. , TCPA actions–is especia lly problematic. ¶ 32 We reje ct defe ndants’ arguments in support of the “opt in” approa ch. Def endants a rgue that the plain languag e of the statutory phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of
court o f a S t ate” expli citly contemplates enabling leg islation. Howeve r, as we ear lier conclude d, this statutory phrase mere ly ref lects congressional rec og nition of s up re m ac y clause jurisprudenc e. See, e.g. , Mulhern
, 808 N.E.2d at 780-81 (“The TCPA was cra fted to

a ccommodate State interests, while respe cting the structur e , ju ris d ic ti o n , a

n d p r o c e d u r a l r u le s of State courts.”)

. Def

endants further

argue that the e arlier

discussed leg islative history “is inconclusive and does not chang e the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory languag e.” Howeve r, as we ear lier conclude d, the leg islative history demonstrates that Congr ess made

a deliberate choice to confe r jurisdiction immediately in s t at e courts in order to fac ilitate enfor ceme nt of the ac t by individual consumers. See Schulman , 710 N.Y.S.2d at 371. ¶ 33 We observe that defe ndants cite to The C h air King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc.
, 184 S.W

. 3 d 7 0 7 (Tex. 2006), in support of the “opt in” approa ch. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has de scribed the result of Chair K ing as follows:
“In contra st to the rea soning of the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, only

one state has unequivoca lly espoused the ‘opt in’ theory

. In [ Chair King ], the Texas Supreme Court held that the TCPA did not cre ate an immediately enfor cea ble private ri gh t o f ac t i o n for unsolicited faxes and that such a cause of action would not be

rec og nized in Texas courts until the L eg islature amende d the state’s business and

commerc e code to provide for such a suit by private parties. Such a p ro v ision was added ***. There fore, there are now no states who have considered the issue of enforce ment under the TCPA which do not allow such actions i n their respec tive
courts. ” (Empha sis in original.) MLC Mortgage , 2009 OK 37, ¶ 15. This result obtains for a g ood rea son. Given supremac y clause principles, the plain languag e of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)( 3) and its l eg islative history
, we doubt that Congr ess intended to require the states to adopt additional laws or court rules to enable TCPA claims to be hear d

-9-in state courts. See Consumer Crusade
, 121 P.3d at 353. We agree with the decisions of

those courts that have reje cted the “opt in” interpre tation of the “if other wi s e p er mitted” clause of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) . See Mulhern , 808 N.E.2d at 779.

¶ 34 3. “Opt Out” Approach ¶ 35 The appellate court discussed a third inter pretative approa ch to the statutory phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State.” The “opt out” ap proac h
construes the statutory languag e as cre ating an immediately enfor cea ble private TCPA claim in state courts without the need for state enabling leg islati on. Howeve r, acc ording to this theory
, a state may “opt out” of the TCPA throug h leg islation or court rule that specific ally ref uses to e ntertain private TCPA claims. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 1047-50; see MLC M ortgage , 2009 OK 37, ¶ 13; Consumer Crusade , 121 P.3d at 354; Ponte , 857 A.2d at 10. ¶ 36 In the prese nt case , none of the parties argue that we adopt the “opt out” ap p ro ach, or

even point to any statute or court rule that purports to “opt out” of the TCPA. There fore
, we need not and do not discuss the merits of this interpre tative approa ch. See, e.g. , Mulhern
, 808 A.2d at 782. ¶ 37 For the fore g oing rea sons, we conclude that the TCPA “for ms part of the law enfor cea ble in I llinois courts” (

First Capital Mortgage
, 374 I ll. App. 3d at 741) without the need for the I llinois Gene ral Asse mbly to enac t enablingleg islation. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 1063.

¶ 38 B. A ssigna bility of Instant TCPA Cl aim ¶ 39 The second cer tified question asks essentially whet h er t h e T C P A claim in the pre sent

case is assig nable under I llinois law and, if so, what is the appropr iate statute of limit ations. The a ppellate c ourt held t hat t he ins tant TCPA claim i s assig nable. The court r ejec ted two contentions by defe ndants ag ainst assig nability

. First, the court conclude d that the TCPA is

a reme dial and not a penal statute. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 1064-68. Second, the court conclude d that corpor ations may bring TCPA claims to protec t the proper ty interests that the statute protec ts. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 1068-72. ¶ 40 Be fore this court, defe nd ants assig n err or to these conclusions. For the followingrea sons, we hold that the appellate court’s analy sis led t he court t o discuss an is sue t hat i t need not have disc ussed, and to fa il to answer a question that it should have answe red. ¶ 41 In t h e i nstant third amende d complaint, I talia does not mere ly rely on the same TCPA violations that Eclipse alleg ed in the orig inal complaint. I talia does not alleg e that it acquir ed i ts TCPA claim throug h assig nment from Eclipse or Hinman. Rather, the third amend ed complaint alleg es a TCPA claim b as ed on junk faxes that Italia itself rec eived from defe ndants. Thus, the appellate court’s discussion of assig nability in the context of the third amende d complaint does not aff ect the outcome of this litigation, but is on l y ad visory

. Gene rally
, I llinois courts do not decide moot questions, rende r advisory opinions, or c o n s ider issues wher e the result will not be aff ecte d reg ardle ss of how those issues are decide d. In re Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d 345, 351 (2009); Golden Rule Insurance Co. v. Schwartz
, 203 I ll. 2d 456, 469 (2003).

-10-¶ 42 Acc ording ly
, the appellate court need not a nd should not have discussed this issue. We

vacate that portion of the appellate court’s opinion (399 I l l

. App. 3d at 1064-72) that discussed the issue of assig nability

. See, e.g. , Golden Rule Insurance
, 203 I ll. 2d at 469; Oliveira v. Am oco Oil Co. , 201 I ll. 2d 134, 157 (2002).

¶ 43 Applicable Statute of Limitations ¶ 44 As part of the second cer tified question, defe ndants also asked what was the applica ble
statute of limit ations for the instant TCPA claim, the I llinois two-year limit ations period for actions including persona l injuries and statutory penalties (735 I L CS 5/13-202 (West 2002))
or t he four-year limit ations period for fede ral c ivil actions (28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000))

. The appellate court c oncluded that it nee d not answer this question. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 1072. ¶ 45 The appellate court should have answe red this question. I talia filed the thi rd am en d ed

co m plaint in J anuar

y 2008. I talia alleg ed that defe ndants sent it 28 junk faxes fr o m J u n e 2005 throug h April 2007. Thus, application of either the fede ral four- y ear limit ations period (28 U.S.C. § 1658) or the I llinois t wo -y ear limit ations period (735 I L CS 5/13-202 (West 2002)) would rende r a differ ent outcome for some of I talia’s al l eged TCPA violations. Acc ording ly
, we rema

nd the cause to the appellate court to answe r this and any other

rema ining questions consistent with this opinion. See, e.g. , Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co.
, 237 I ll. 2d 30, 51 (2010); Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook
, 232 I ll. 2d 463, 503 (2009).

¶ 46 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 47 Fo r t h e fo regoing rea sons, we answe r the first cer tified question in t h e n ega t i v e. Reg arding the second cer tified question, we vaca

te the appellate court’s discussion of assig nability

. The cause is rema nded to the appellate court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

¶ 48 Certified que stion answere d; ¶ 49 cause rema

nded.

-11-