F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

R I V K O K N O X , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v.

M A R K B R N O V I C H , Attorney General, in his official capacity as Ariz ona Attorney

General, Defendant-Appellee. No. 18-16613

D.C. No. 2:18-cv-02089-DL R

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na Doug las L . Ray es, District J udg e, Presiding

A rg ued and Submitted October 3, 2018 San F rancisco, California

F iled October 31, 2018

B efore: Sidney

R. Thomas, Chief J udg e , and Carlos T. B ea and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by J udg e I k

utaK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 2

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The p anel affirmed the district c ourt’s denial of a preliminary injunction and its bench trial judg ment in an action facially challeng ing HB 2023, Ariz ona’s 2016 election law prohibiting certain persons from collecting voters’ early mail ballots.

Under HB 2023, a person who knowing ly collects voted

or unvot e d e ar l y ballots from another person is g uilty of a class 6 felony

. A n election offici a l
, a United States postal service worker or any

other person who is a llowed by law to transmit United States mail is deemed not to have collected

an e arly ballot if the official, worker or other p erson is
eng ag ed in official duties. F amily members, ho usehold members, a

nd careg ivers of the voter are ex empted from this
g eneral prohibition ag ainst collecting ballots.

The panel held that HB 2023 is n ot preempted by federal laws reg ulating the United States P o s t a l Service. T h e panel determined that the presumption ag a inst preemption a pplied in this instance because state reg ulation of e arly v o t i n g procedures was not “an area where there has been a history o f sig nificant f

ederal presence,” and that p laintiff failed to rebut this presumption.

The panel held that HB 2023 does not implicate the F irst Amendment rig hts of ballot c o llectors like plaintiff. The

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 3

panel determined that plaintiff f a iled to carry her burden o f d emonstrating that the conduct of collecting ballots wou l d reasonably be und e r stood by viewers as convey ing any o f plaintiff’s ex pressive m e s sag es or convey ing a sy mbolic
messag e of any

sort.

F inally
, the panel rejected plaintiff’s claim that HB 2023 violates her rig ht to due process under the F ifth A mendment because it is an overly vag ue criminal statute. T he panel h eld that HB 2 023 provides fair notice of prohibited conduct and that because th e s c o p e of HB 2023 w as clear, it p osed no sig nificant threat of arbitrary enforcement.

COUNSEL

Spencer G

. Scharff ( arg ued), Scharff PL C, Phoenix
, Ariz o na; Roopali H

. D esai, Coppersmith B rockelman PL C, P h oenix
, Ariz ona; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Andr ew G. Pappas (arg ued), Assistant Solicitor General; J oseph E. L a Rue and Kara M. Karlson, Assistant Attorney s Gene r a l; D ominic E. Dray e, Solicitor General; Mark B rnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix , Ariz o na; for Defendant-Appellee.K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 4

OP INION

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e:

Rivko Knox bring s a f

a c ial c h a lleng e to H.B

. 2023, Ariz ona’s 2 016 election law prohibiting certain persons from collecting voters’ early

mail ballots. W e conclude that H.B

. 2023 is not preempted by federal laws reg ulating the United States Postal Service, does not violate the F irst Amendment’s protection of speech, and is not an unconstitutionally v ag ue criminal statute. According ly
, we affirm.

I

Ariz ona law permits “[ a] ny qualified elector” to “vote b y early ballot,” Ariz

. Rev. Stat. § 16-541(A), in add i t i o n to

v o t i ng in person on E lection Day

. Voters can either mail i n early ballots or drop them off at an o n

- s i te early voting location in the 27 day s leading up to an election. See id

. § 16- 542(D). Voters c hoosing to r eturn their early ballots b y mail need not pay any postag e, but their b a l l o t s m ust b e received by 7:00 p.m. o n E lection Day

. Id

. §§ 16-542(C), 16-548(A).

A riz ona has p laced various restrictions on possession o f early ballots. I n 1992, Ariz ona p rohibited a ny person other than the voter from possessing a n u nvoted absentee ballot. See 1991 Ariz

. L eg is. Serv. ch. 310, § 22 (S.B

. 1390) (W est). Ariz ona la t e r ex tended this prohibition to unvoted e arly b a llots of any ty

pe, see 1997 Ariz

. L eg is. Serv. ch. 5, § 1 8 (S.B

. 1 003) (W est) (codified at Ariz

. Rev. Stat. § 16-542(D)). I n 2016, Ariz ona imposed re s trictions on the collection o f early ballots. Under H.B . 2023:K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 5

H. A person w ho knowing ly collects voted o r

unvo t e d early ballots from another person is
g uilty of a class 6 felony

. An election official,

a United State s postal service worker or any other p erson w ho is allowed by law to transmit United States m a i l is deemed not to have c ollected an e arly ballot if the official, worker or o ther person is e n ga ged in official duties.

Ariz . Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H). F amily members, h ousehold members, a

nd careg ivers of the voter are ex empted from this
g eneral prohibition ag ainst coll e c t i n g ballots. Id

. § 16- 1005(I )

.

Rivko Knox h as been a D emocrati c precinct committeeperson (an elected position) for the Acacia Precinct since 2004. 1 Knox eng ag es in door-to- d oor canvassing o f prospective voters to e d

ucate, reg ister, and encourag e them to vote. As part of her canvassing
, Knox often en c o urag e s prospective voters to watch for their early ballot to a rrive, to complete it, and to mail it b ack. B efore the 2016 election
cy cle, Knox “accepted and delivered at least one voted ballot f o r a v oter that [ she] met while canvassing [prospecti v e voters]
, and w ho requested that [ she] deliver their e arly ballot.”

Knox states that “[ a] ssisting voters with the delivery o f their early ballots w as, and continue s t o b e, a p art o f

ex p ressing [ her] political belief that all reg istered voters have

an opportunity to use their franchise.” Throug h the act o f

1 T h is u n d isp u

ted f actu al back g ro u n d is d raw n f ro m Kn o x ’ s d eclaratio n

in su p p o rt o f h er m otio n

f o r a p relim in ary

in j u n ctio n

.K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 6

collecting and delivering individuals ’ voted early ballots, Knox intends to communicate the mess a ge that she “support[ s] the contin u e d and widespread use of voting b y mail, and that the United States’ postal sy stem provid e s a

secure and easy platform to ex ercise the franchise a nd conduct elections.” Knox also intends her c onduct to communicate the messag e that “votin g is the most fundamental rig ht in a democratic society and that [ she is] committed to helping qualified electors ex ercise their rig ht to vote reg ardless of who they vote for.”

Prior to the 2016 election cy cle, Knox was w i l ling to assist voters who asked h er to d eliver their voted early ballot
to a U nited States mail receptacle o r o ther appropriate ballot drop-off location. Since H .B

. 202 3 w e n t into effect, she understands that she is “pr o hibited f rom collecting a

nd delivering another person’s early ballot.” Knox is n ow “very careful no t t o offer to deliver o r accept for delivery another person’s early

ballot, even if they

ask for [ her] assistance.”

After H.B

. 2 023 was enacted, Knox canvassed prospective voters for a candidate s e e k i n g election in the special election for Cong re s s i onal District 8. During those

e f forts, K nox encountered several voters w ho had not y et mailed their early ballo t s

. K nox felt compelled to “censor [ hers e l f ] b y not offering to collect and deliver” their e arly ballots. I nstead, K nox encourag ed them “not to place their ba l l o t s in the mail because it was too late and, instead, to deliver their ballots to an appropriate location before the p o lls closed.”

Knox plans t o c a nvass prospective voters ag ain in the upcoming 2018 election and would like to collect and deliver voted mail-in ballots, but fears doing so because of H.B

. 2023K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 7

and the state’s “threats to strictly enforce H.B

. 2 023.” B ut for H.B

. 2023, Knox “would a ffirmatively o ffer to deliver e arly ballots for voters

. . . o r, at a minimum, [ ] would be willing to oblig e a voter who r equested that [ she] deliver his or h er ballot.”

Knox filed this lawsuit in district court, claiming that H.B

. 2023 is facially invalid be c ause it: (1) was preempted b y federal law under the Supremacy Clause; (2) violated speech rig hts p rotected by the F irst Am endment as applied to the
states by the Fo u r t ee n th Amendment; and (3) was void for
vag u e n e s s b ecause of its f ailure to define when a person is deemed to h ave co l l ec t e d an early ballot in violation of the Due Proce s s C lause. I n her concurrent motion for a preliminary injunction, Knox asked the court for ex p edited relief and to consolidate the heari n g on her motion for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits. S ee F e d. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). A fter holding a consolidat e d p r e liminary injunction hearing and bench trial, the district court denied Knox ’ s motion for a preliminary injunction and ruled ag ainst her on all three of her claims.

Knox timely appealed. W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2 W e review the d istrict court’s conclusions of law de novo and review its f inding s of fact for clear error.

2 K n o x h as stan din g to b rin g th ese claim s. S ee S p o keo

, In c. v. Ro b in s , 1 3 6 S. C t. 1 54 0
, 1 5 4 7 (2 0 1 6 ), a s revised (May 2 4, 2 0 1 6). A lth o u g h Kn ox h as n ot v io lated H.B

. 2 0 2 3 o r b een m ad e su b j ect to i t s p e n alties, sh e alleg es sh e w as f

o rced to m o dif

y h er s p eech an d b eh av io r to co m p ly w i th H.B

. 2 0 2 3

. T h i s self

- cen s o rsh ip in r e s p o n s e to a reaso n ab le f ear of
p ro secu tio n co n stitu

tes an in j u ry in f act th at w o u ld b e red ressed b y a d eclaratio n th at H. B

. 2 0 2 3 is u n co n stitu tio n al. S ee Ariz. Rig h t t o Life Po litica l Actio n Co m m. v. Ba yless
, 3 2 0 F.3 d 1 0 0 2
, 1 0 0 6 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 0 3 ).K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 8

Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv.
, 535 F .3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

I I

W e beg in with Knox ’s claim that H.B

. 2023 is p reempted by the f ederal post a l m o n opoly
, as set forth in the Private Ex press Statutes, a series of provisions e stablishing a monopoly for the U.S. P o s t al Service, 18 U .S.C. §§ 1 693–1696; 39 U.S.C. §§ 4 01, 601–606, and their implementing reg ulations, 3 9 C .F .R. §§ 310, 320. T o succeed on such a facial challeng e, Knox “must show that ‘no
set of circumstances ex ists under which the [ state] Act would be valid.’” Puente A riz. v. Arpaio
, 821 F .3d 1098, 1 104 (9th Cir. 2016) ( quoting United States v. Salerno
, 481 U.S. 7 3 9
, 746 (1987)).

A

W e first outline the leg al framework f or d etermining when a state statute is preempted. The Supremacy Clause o f the Constitution provides that t h e l a ws of the United States “shall be the supreme L aw o f t h e L a n d

. . . any Thing in the Constitution or L aws o f any State to the C o n t rary notwithstanding .” U.S. Const. art. VI
, c l. 2. “This means that when federal and state law conflict, federal law prevails and
state law is preempted.” Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).

“[ T] he purpose of Cong ress is the ultimate touchstone in
every pre-emption case.” W yeth v. Levine
, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). I n determining Cong ress’s intent, we start “with the basic assumption that Cong ress d id not intend to disp l a ceK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 9

state law,” Maryland v. Louisiana
, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981), and that fed eral law does not supersede “the historic police
powers of the States” unless “that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Cong r ess.” W

yeth
, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Lohr
, 518 U.S. at 485). This p resumption a ga i nst preemption applies when a state r e g ulates in an area of historic state power even if the l a w “touche[ s] on” an area of sig nificant federal presence. Puente
, 8 21 F .3d at 1104 n.5 (citing W yeth
, 555 U.S. a t 5 6 5 n.3). I n Puente
, for instance, althoug h Ariz ona’s identity

- theft laws ha d undisputed “ effects in the

area of immig ration,” we held there w as a presumption
ag ainst preemption because “the tex t of the laws reg u late[ d] for the health and safety of the people o f Ariz ona.” I d

. (citing Lohr
, 518 U.S. at 475). B y contrast, there is no presumption
ag ainst preemption when the State reg ulates in an area s u ch

as “national and international m a ritime commerce,” where “the federal interest has been manifest since the beg inning o f our Republic a

nd is now well established.” United States v. Locke , 529 U.S. 89, 99 (2000). 3

I n dete rmining cong ressional intent, we first consider whether Cong r ess made its intent to preempt state law clear throug h ex press lang u ag e in a statute. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.
, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015). Even when a statute does
not ex pressly refer to p reemption
, Cong ress may implicitly preempt stat e l e gislation throug h either field preemption o r conflict preemption. Id.

3 A lth o u g h so m e J u stices h av e cast d o u b t o n th e c o n tin

u ed v iab ility

o f th e p resu m

p t i o n ag ain st p reem

p tio n , see PLIVA, In c. v. M en sin g , 5 6 4 U.S. 6 0 4
, 6 21

– 2 3 (2 0 11 ) (p lu rality o p in io n ), th e Su p rem e Co u rt h as

n o t y et ab an d o n ed th is p rin cip le. S ee Arizo n a v. Un ited S ta tes , 56 7 U .S. 3 8 7
, 4 00 (2 0 12 ); see a lso CTS Co rp

. v. W a l d bu rg er , 1 3 4 S

. Ct. 2 1 7 5
, 2 1 8 8

– 8 9 (2 0 1 4 ).K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 10

“F ield preemption occ u r s when federal law occupies a ‘field’ of reg u lation ‘so comprehensively that it h a s left no

room for supplementary state le gi s l a t ion.’” Murphy
, 1 38 S. Ct. at 1480 (quoting R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cty. , 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986)). I n other words, courts will infer that Cong ress intended “to displace state law altog ether” when Co ng ress enacts “a f ramework of reg ulation so pervasive that Cong ress l e ft n o r oom for the States to supplement it or where there is a federal interest so dominant that the f

e deral sy stem will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on t h e s a m e subject.” Arizona
, 567 U .S. at 3 99 (internal quotations and ellipses omitted) (quoting Rice v. S

anta Fe E levator Corp.
, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). “T h e e ssential field preemption inquiry is whether the density and detail o f f ederal reg ulation merits the inference that any state reg ulation within the same field will necessarily interfere with the f e d eral r e gu latory scheme.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v

. U nited Airlines Inc.
, 813 F .3d 718, 734 (9th Ci r. 2 016). B ecause “Cong ress must clearly manifest an intention” to “enter and co m p letely a bsorb the field” in o rder to preclude state reg ulation in that f ield, Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi
, 326 U.S. 88, 97 (1945), it is n ecessary to delineate “the pertinent reg ulatory field” with specificity
, Nat’l Fed’n , 813 F .3d at 734.

I n some lim i t ed circumstances where the overall field
appears to be federally reg ulated, “a federal decision to forg o reg ulation in a g iven a

r ea may imply a

n authoritative federal determination that the area is best left un reg u lated, and in that event would have as muc h p re-emptive force as a decisi o n to reg ulate.” Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. P ub. Serv. Comm’n
, 461 U.S. 3 75, 384 (1983). Thus, Cong r ess

can impliedly create a “federally mandated free-market” area that must be left unreg ulated by any state enactments. P

. R.K N O X V

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N O V I C H 11

Dep’t. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp.
, 485 U.S. 495, 500 ( 1988). B ut such an u nreg ulated z o n e is “decidedly unty pical” and c a n n o t b e “ created subtly .” Id. Courts consider the “lang u ag e , hist ory , o r policy of” the relevant f e d eral law to determine whether Cong ress purposefully ac t e d
to perpetuate a “reg

ulatory g ap.” See Ark. Elec. , 461 U.S. at 384.

Conflict preemption is n arrower than field preemption. Under confli c t preemption principles, “state law is preempted to the ex tent that i t actually conflicts with federal law.” English v. Gen. E lec. Co

. , 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). Courts have found con f

l i ct preemption in two situations: [ 1] “where compliance wi t h b oth state and federal law is impossible, or [ 2] where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex ecution of t h e f ull purposes a

nd objectives of Cong ress.” Oneok, Inc

. , 1 3 5 S. Ct. at 1595 (internal quotation marks omitted). A state law may stand a s “an obstacle to the reg ulatory sy stem C o n gr e s s chose” if Cong r ess chooses a spe cific method of enforcement to achieve federal g o als, and a state law a d o p t s a different enforcement method that interferes with “the careful balance struck by Cong ress.” Arizona , 567 U.S. at 4 0 6. I f Cong ress has not adop t e d a comprehensive r eg ulatory prog ram in a specific area, however, the state has “authority to pass its o wn laws on the subject.” Id. at 404. F or instance, at a time when Cong r ess had ex pressed n o more than “a peripheral c oncern”
reg arding the employ

ment o f aliens n ot entitled t o lawful residence in the United States, a state h ad broad authority to impose civil penalties o n such employ ment. Id. (quoting a

nd disting uishing De Canas v. Bica
, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976)). A f ter Cong ress later enacted “a comprehensive framew o r k for combating the employ ment of illeg al aliens,” a similarK N O X V

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N O V I C H 12

state enactment interfered with Cong ress’s purposes and was therefore preempted. Id

. (internal quotation marks omitted).

B

B e cause the preemptive scope of the Private Ex press Statutes depends on Cong ress’s intent, W yeth
, 555 U.S. at 566, we n ow consider the scope a n d purpose of these statutes and their implementing reg ulations, 39 C.F .R. §§ 310, 320.

“Since its establishment, the United States Postal Service has ex ercised a monopo l y o v er the carriag e of letters in a nd from the United States.” Air Cou r i er Conference o f Am. v

. Am. Posta l W

orkers Union AFL-CIO
, 498 U.S. 517, 519 (1991). This monopoly has “alway s been limited to the carriag e of mail for hire,” and did not e x tend to the “ private,
g ratuitous c arriag e” of mail. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. P ub. Emp’t Relations Bd. , 485 U.S. 589, 597 (1988).

Cong r ess enacted the first statute limiting private carriag e in 1792. Air Courier
, 4 98 U.S. a t 5 2 6

. “ I n 1825 and 1827, Acts w ere p assed prohibiting the p ri v ate carriag e of letters throug h the use o f stag es or other vehicles, packet boats, o r other vessels, § 1 9, c h

. 6 4 of Act of March 3, 1825, 4 Stat. 107, and f oot and horse posts, § 3, ch. 61 of Act of March 2, 1827, 4 Stat. 238.” I

d. I n 1845, Cong ress enacted “An A ct to r educe the rates of postag e, to limit the use and c orrect the abuse of the franking privileg e, and for the prevention o f frauds on the r evenues of the Post O ffice Department,” which sig nificantly revised the Private Ex press Statutes. Id ; Act o f Mar. 3, 1872, ch. 43, 5 Stat. 732. According to the Supreme Court, Cong ress was mo t i v a t ed to enact the 1845 Act by a

concern that “the Post Office Department continued t o run substantial deficits in s p ite o f hig h postag e rates.” AirK N O X V

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N O V I C H 13

Courier
, 4 9 8 U.S. a t 526. Cong ress recog niz ed that the Postal Service had a duty “to serve outly ing
, front i e r a r e as,

even if it meant doing so b elow c o s t ,” in order “ to achieve national integ r ation and to ensure that all areas of the Nation

w e r e e qually served by the Postal Service.” Id. at 5 2 7

. Cong r ess b e lieved the Postal Service’s shaky financial situation was primarily c aused by competition from p r i vate companies, which h a d n ot been successfully prosecuted under the 1825 a

nd 1827 Acts. Id

. These competitors undercut the Postal Service’s prices on low-cost routes and left it with only “hig h-cost routes and insufficient means to fulfill its mandate of providing uniform rates and service to patrons in all areas, including those that are remote or less populated.” Id. at 519. The best way to address these con c e rn s , Cong ress decided,

was “driving private ex p resses out of business and increasing mail volume o f the Post Office” in order to protect the Postal Services’s revenues a

nd ensure it could fulfill its mission. Id.
at 527. A c c ording ly
, the 1845 Act included a broad prohibition on private carriag e aimed a t s t r eng thening the postal monopoly

. Act of Mar. 3
, 1872, c h

. 4 3
, § 9
, 5 Stat. 732. I n its modern form, the prohibitio n on private carriag e reads:

W h oever establishes a ny p rivate ex p r e ss for the convey ance of letters or packets, o r in any

manner causes or provides f or the convey a

nce

o f the same by reg ular trips or at sta t e d periods over a

n y post r o u te which is o r may be established b y law, or from any city
, town,

or place to a

ny other city
, town, or place, between which the mail is reg ularly car r ied,K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 14

shall b e f

ined not more than $500 o r imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1696(a). 4

W h ile ensuring that courier services c ould not “compet[ e] selectively with the Postal Service on its most pro f itable routes,” Air Courier
, at 527–28, the Private Ex press Statutes did not purport to reg u late conduct that did not affect

revenues. Most important h er e , t h e 1845 Act carved out a “private hands” ex ception, which provided that t h e Private E x press Statutes “ shall not prohibit the convey ance o r transmission of letters or packets by private hands without compensation.” 18 U.S.C. § 1696(c). This ex ception was “a reflection of the limited n a ture of the monopoly ; it was desig ned to e nsure that private carriag e is not undertaken ‘for hire or reward.’” Regents
, 485 U.S. at 5 97 (citation omitted).

The 1845 Act permitted other ex ceptions to the postal monopoly that did not threaten postal revenues. Section 1696(a) provides that the Private E x pres s Statutes do not “prohibit a

ny person from receiving and delivering to the
nearest post o f

fice, postal car, o r other authoriz ed depository for mail matter any mail matter properly stamped.” 1 8 U .S.C. § 1 6 9 6 ( a). Section 1694 allows businesses to operate an internal mai l s y s t e m b y carry ing letters that relate “to the

4 In 1 8 7 2, C o n g r e s s reen acted th e Priv ate Ex p ress S tatu tes an d

u p d ated its w o rd in g w ith o u t m a k i n g an y su b stan tiv e ch an g es. R o g er P

. Craig & W illiam T

. A l v is, Th e Po sta l Mo n o p o ly: Two Hu n dred Yea r s o f Co verin g C

o mmercia l a s W

ell a s Perso n a l Messa g es , 1 2 U.S.F. L . Rev

. 5 7
, 7 4

– 7 6 (1 97 7 ). Co m

p a re A ct o f Mar. 3
, 1 87 2
, ch

. 4 3
, § 9
, 5 Stat. 7 3 2
, with A ct o f J u n e 8, 1 8 7 2
, ch

. 3 3 5
, § 2 2 8
, 1 7 Stat. 2 8 3 (cu rren t v ersio n at 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 6 9 6)

. T h e P r iv ate Ex press S tatu tes h av e n o t su b stan tially ch an g ed sin ce th e 1 87 2 reco d if icatio n . Craig & A lv is, su p ra , at 7 7

.K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 15

current business of the carrier.” 18 U .S.C. § 1 694; Regents
, 485 U .S. at 594. And Section 1 696(c) allows a ny “special
messeng er employ e d for the particular occasion only ” to transmit letters. 18 U.S.C. § 1696(c).

The Postal Reg ulatory Commission’s su b s equent reg ulations to enfo r c e t he Private Ex press Statutes did not alter t h i s approach to the scope o f the Postal Service’s monopoly

. S

ee 39 C.F .R. § § 3 1 0

. 1–310.7. The reg ulations reiterate the Private Ex p ress Statutes’ prohibition on carriag e for hire on p ostal routes, see 3 9 C.F .R. § 310. 2 ( a )
, while formaliz ing the statutory ex ceptions for uncompensated

c a r r iag e of mail. 5 The Postal Reorg aniz ation Act of 1970 l a t er made additional e x ceptions to the postal monopoly f o r compensated carriage, including authoriz ing the Postal Reg ulatory

Commission to suspend the postal monopoly for services described by

reg ulation. 39 U.S.C. § 601(b). 6

5 3 9 C .F.R. § § 3 1 0 .2 (d )(2 ), 3 10 .3 (b ) (p erm ittin g d eliv ery of letters of th e carrie r ) ; id

. §§ 3 1 0 .2 (d )(3 ), 3 10 .3 (c) (p erm ittin g d eliv ery o f letters
tran sm itted w ith o u t co m p en satio n ); id

. § § 3 1 0 .2 (d )(4 ), 3 1 0

. 3 (d ) (p erm ittin g d eliv ery o f letters tran sm i tted by sp ecial m essen g er em p lo y ed f o r th e p articu lar o ccasio n o n l y ); id

. § § 3 10 .2 (d )(4 ), 3 1 0 .3 (e) (p erm ittin g d eliv ery o f letters carried p rio r o r su b seq u en t to m ailin g ).

6 T h e relev an t reg u latio n s p ro v i d e f o r s u s p en sio n o f th e p o stal

m o n o po ly f

or certain lim ited activ ities. S ee 39 C. F

. R

. § 3 2 0 .2 (d ata p ro cessin g m aterials); id

. § 3 2 0 .4 (certain letters o f co lleg e an d u n i v ersity

o rg an i zatio n s); id

. § 32 0 .5 (certain in tern a t i o n al- o cean carrier- related d o cu m en ts); id

. § 3 2 0 .6 (ex trem ely u rg en t l e tters); id

. § 3 2 0 .7 (ad v ertisem en ts acco m

pan y in g p arcels o r p erio d i c a l s ); id

. § 3 2 0 .8 (in t ern atio n al rem ailin g ).K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 16

C

W e now turn to Knox ’s c laim that the Privat e E x press Statutes and their implementing reg ulations implic itly preempt H.B

. 2 023 throug h either field preemption or conflict preemption a

nd that there is no set of circumstances under which H.B . 2023 would be valid.

W e b eg in by c onsidering whether the presumption a g ainst preemption a

pplies in this contex t. W e conclude that it does, because state reg ulation of early voting procedures is not “an

area where there has been a history of sig nifi c a n t federal presence.” Locke
, 529 U.S. at 108. A lthoug h H.B

. 2023 touches on the broader field o f l e tter carriag e and delivery
, such incidental effec t s in an area of federal interest is not enoug h to overcome the presumption ag ainst preemption. See Puente
, 821 F .3d at 1104 n.5 (citing W yeth
, 5 5 5 U.S. at 565 n.3). Therefore, our analy sis m u s t f ocus on whether Knox rebutted this presumption.

W e first consider K n o x ’ s field preemption claim. Our precedent requires us to beg in by “delineat[ ing ] the pertinent
reg ulatory field” Cong ress intended to o ccupy by enacting the Private Ex press Statutes. Nat’l Fed’n
, 813 F .3d at 734. The Supreme Court has a lready establish e d that the Private Ex press Statutes regulate “the conduct of competitors of the Postal Service,” Air Courier
, 498 U.S. at 528 n.5, and does
not address the uncompensated carriag e of mail, which poses

no threat to the Post Office’s revenues, see Regents
, 485 U.S. at 597.

H.B

. 2023 do e s n o t reg ulate within this field of mail carriag e for hire; rather, it ex plici t l y e x empts a ny “United States postal service worker

. . . e ng ag ed in offici a l duties”K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 17

from r eg ulation. Ariz

. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H). On its face, therefore, the Privat e E x press Statutes do not implicitly preempt H.B . 2023 throug h field preemption.

To avoid this conclusion, Knox raises two arg uments. F irst, Knox a

rg ues tha t H .B

. 2 023 r eg ulates the c arriag e o f mail for hire b e ca use it does not prohibit election officials and careg ivers from collecting ballots, a n d such individuals receive salaries for performing their jobs. T his arg ument fails. H .B

. 2023 does not r e gu l a t e the ballot-collection activities of election officials or careg ivers, b ut merely

ex e mpts them from the state statute’s prohibition. Moreover, such individuals are not collecting ballots for a fee in competition with the Postal Service; r ather, their collection o f ballots is merely

an incidental part of their jobs.

Second, K

nox urg es us to read the Private Ex press Statutes a s ex p ressing a c lear and manifest intent t o o c cupy the broadly defined field o f letter ca r r iag e a nd delivery
g e n erally
, leaving no r oom for state reg ulation o f compensated or uncompensated mail carriers. According to Knox
, by declining to prohibit uncompensated carriag e o f mail, Cong ress intended to prevent r egu l ation of any sort, state or federal, in this area. See Isla Petroleum
, 4 85 U.S. at 50 0

. I n support of this arg ument, Knox points to the
reg ulatory e x ceptions to the Pri v a t e Ex press Statutes that permit specified conduct, a n d c laims that the lan gu a g e providing t h a t certain conduct is “permitted,” 39 C.F .R. § 310.2(d), o r “permissible,” id. § 310.3, indicates Cong ress’s intent to leave t h e p ermitted c onduct unreg ulated by the
state. 7

7 Kn o x also n o tes o th er reg u latio n s th at su sp en d th e p o stal m o n o p o ly f o r sp ecif ied co n d u ct, 3 9 C.F.R. § § 3 2 0.1

– 3 2 0 .9

.K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 18

W e reject this arg ument. T he Supreme Court made clear that Cong r ess did not intend to reg ulate the uncompensated carriag e of mail; Cong ress’s sole concern was p r ev e nting competitors from r educing the Post Office’s revenues. See Regents
, 485 U.S. at 597–98. The reg u lations cited by K nox

are consistent with Cong ress’s f ocus on competitors rather than on the f

ield of mail carriag e as a whole; they provide that the po s t a l m onopoly does not apply to a limited rang e o f activities that do not pose a c ompeti t ive threat to the Post Office. C arving out specified c o n duct from a broad prohibi t ion is not equivalent to reg ulating that conduct o r ensuring that such conduct may proceed unreg ulated. Given
t h e p r e s u m p t i o n a g a i n s t preemption, the Postal Commission’s
reg ulations are best read as withdrawing from part o f a field, rather than occupy

ing it. B ecause Cong ress has n ot made a cl e a r a n d m a n i f e s t d etermination that uncompensated carriag e of mail should be left u n reg ulated by states as well as federal authorities, see Ark. Elec.
, 461 U.S. at 383, we conclude that Cong r ess did not implic i t l y preempt the field o f uncompensated carriag e of mail. 8

8 Kn ox also claim s th at Co n g ress ex pressed its in ten t to reg u late th e f ield o f u n co m

p en sated carriag e o f m ail b y crim in alizin g in terf eren ce w i th

m ail carriers. See, e.g

. , 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 7 0 2 (p ro h ib itin g tak in g an y letter

“ f ro m a letter o r m ail carrier” w ith desig n to “o b s t ru ct th e

co rresp o n d en ce” o r p ry

in to th e b u sin ess o f

an o th er); see a l

so 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 7 0 8 (p ro h ib itin g th ef

t o r receip t o f s to len letter “ f ro m a l etter o r m ail carrier”). W e rej ect th is arg u m en t. On t h eir fa c e , t h e crim i n al statu tes cited by Kn o x ap p ly to i n terf eren ce w ith m ail t h at is i n th e U.S. P o stal Serv ice’ s cu sto d y (w

h eth er f ro m a p o st of

f i ce, m ail d ep o sito ry , o r o t h e r

rece p t a c le, o r in t

h e cu s to d y o f letter o r m ail carriers), n o t to th e p riv ate carriag e o f m ail. No r h av e w e f o u n d an y case i n ter p retin g th e statu te as

a p p ly in g to u n co m

p en sated letter carriers, as Kn o x asserts. T h e c a s e s cited b y Kn o x are in ap p o site h ere, as th ey ap p ly th e statu tes to def en d an ts

w h o h av e in terf

ered w ith m ail th at h as b een d ep o sit e d i n a U

. S. m ailK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 19

W e nex t turn to Knox ’s conflict preemption arg ument s, and consider whether H.B

. 2023 is pr e e m p t ed because it conflic t s with the Private Ex press Statutes and other postal
reg ulations. Knox does not arg ue that compliance with H.B

. 2023 and federal law is impossible. Oneok, Inc.
, 135 S. Ct.

a t 1595. Rather, she arg ues that H.B

. 2023 stands a s an obstacle to the o peration of comprehensive f ederal postal laws. Id.

F irst, Knox contends that H.B

. 2023 obstructs Cong ress’s objective of ensuring efficient delivery of the mail. W e disag ree. State laws may obstruct the feder a l p ostal monopoly “where state reg ulation involved a direct, phy sical interference with federal activities under the postal power o r

some direct, immediate b u rden on the performance of the postal functions.” Corsi
, 326 U.S. a t 9 6

. Apply ing this principle, we have held that a local ordinance that requi r ed postal letter carriers to “obtain ex press consent from residents before crossing their lawns in the course o f mail delivery ”

was preempted by federal r eg ulations that “authoriz e [ d] postal carriers to c ross lawns u nless th e o w n er objects.” United States v. City of

Pittsburg, Cal.
, 661 F .2d 783, 784–85 (9th Cir. 1981). B ecause the local “ordinance interfere[ d] with postal carriers’ f

edera l duty to deliver the mail efficiently

” it was therefore unconstitutional. I d. at 786. No such conflict is prese nt here: H.B

. 2023’s prohibitions
reg ardi ng the collection of voters’ early ballots e x empt federal postal officials and therefore d o n ot interfere with any federal activities under Congr e s s’s postal power. B ecause H.B

. 2023 ex e mpts federal postal workers from reg ulation, it does not frustrate Cong ress’s objectives in enacting the

recep tacle. S

ee U n i t ed Sta tes v. Ch ild

s , 5 98 F .2 d 1 6 9
, 17 2 (D.C. Cir. 1 9 7 9 ); Un ited

S ta tes v. W

a d e , 3 6 4 F.2 d 9 3 1, 9 3 4 (6 th Cir. 1 9 6 6 ).K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 20

Private Ex press Statutes; n amely
, to protect the postal monopoly and its ability to g e nera t e revenue. Air Courier
, 498 U.S. at 525–26.

Nex t, Knox notes that the Postal Reg ulatory Commission has pro mulg ated reg ulations that suspend the postal

mon opoly for the delivery of “ex tremely urg ent letters,” 39 C.F .R. § 320.6, which is r e lied on by private carriers such

as F e dEx and DHL

. Knox arg u es that H.B

. 2023 conflicts

w ith f ederal law because it would prohibit such priv a t e carriers from accepting a b allot for delivery
, despite the authori z ation under federal reg u lation. W e reject this
arg ument for substantially the same r e a son we r e jected her similar arg ument in the field preemption contex t. Cong ress’s
purpose in enacting th e P rivate Ex press Statutes was to protect the Postal Service’s revenues, and a state statute that prohibits private carriers f rom collecting state ballots does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Cong ress’s
purpose. Under the presumption ag ainst preempt i on, we decline to interpret a f

ederal reg ulation withdrawing a federal prohibition on certain ty

pes of private carriag e as conflicting with a state statute imposing a d ifferent prohibition on that carriag e.

W e also r e

ject Knox ’s arg ument that H.B

. 2023 obstructs Cong r ess’s g oal of ac h i eving “national integ ration” because it precludes individuals from offering more efficient methods of early

- ballot delivery

. This theory is directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s analy sis of the Private Ex press S t at u tes. Ac c o r d i ng to the Supreme Court, Cong ress’s g oal o f achievingnational unity required the Postal Service to reach all the far-flung reaches of the nation. Air Courier
, 498 U.S.
at 528. I n order t o ensure the Postal Service could g enerate sufficient revenues to accom plish this mission, Cong ressK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 21

decided to e limin a t e i t s competition. Id. Cong ress did not consider whether private, uncompensated deli v e r y of mail

m i gh t provide more efficient delivery to remote a reas; i t s only intent was to enhance t h e P ostal Service’s revenues so it could discharg e its duty of p roviding delivery to such areas.

F inally
, we reject K n o x ’s arg ument that by imposing penalties o n the uncompensated carriag e of letters, H.B

. 2023 is an obstacle to the reg ulatory sy stem c h osen by Cong ress in enacting the Private Ex press Statutes. See Arizona
, 567 U.S.
at 405–06. B ecause Cong r ess did not choose to reg ulate uncompensated carriers in the P r ivate Ex press Statutes, a state has “authority

to pass its own laws on the subject.” Id.
at 4 04. B ecause H.B

. 2023 imposes penalties on individuals

ex c luded from Cong ress ’ s reg u latory scheme, it does not conflict with that reg

ulatory scheme.

B e cause Cong ress has n o t implicitly preempted H.B

. 2023 throug h field or conflict preemption, w e conclude that H.B . 2023 is not preempted by federal law. 9

I I I

W e nex t consider Knox ’s claim that H.B

. 2023 v i o lates the F irst Amendment, made applica b le to the states throug h

9 W e also rej ect K

n o x ’ s arg u m en t th at Co n g ress h a s s u p e r sed ed H.B

. 2 0 2 3 p u rsu an t to its au th ority u n d er th e Electio n s Clau se, U.S. Co n st. art. I, § 4
, cl. 1, b ecau s e K n o x f ailed to raise th i s arg u m en t d i stin ctly on ap p eal. Hilo v. Esta te o

f Ma rco s , 1 0 3 F .3 d 7 67
, 7 7 8 n .4 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 6 ). Fu rth er, Kn o x f

ails to id en tif

y an y f ed eral statu te w

h ere “ C o n g ress leg i slates w i th resp ect to t h e ‘ T i m es, P laces an d Man n er’ o f h o ld in g

co n g ressio n al electio n s,” let alo n e o n e w h ich su p ersed es A rizo n a’ s early

b allo t- co llectio n l a w

. Arizo na v. In ter T rib a l Co u n cil o

f Ariz., In c. , 5 7 0 U.S. 1 , 1 4 (2 0 1 3).K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 22

the F ourteenth Amendment, by burdening freedom of speech. I n the F irst Amendmen t contex t, a party bring ing a facial challeng e need show o n l y t h a t “a substantial number o f [ a law’s] a pplications are unconstitutional, judg ed in relation to the statute’s plainly leg itimate sweep.” United S tat e s v. Stevens
, 5 5 9 U. S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting W ash. State Grange v. W

ash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)). 1 0

Th e F irst Amendment, provides that “Cong ress shall make n o law

. . . abridg ing th e f r e e d o m of speech.” U.S. Const. am end I

. “W hile [ t] h e F irst Amendment literally forbids the abridg ment only o f speech, the Supreme Court has long recog niz ed that its p r otection d oes not end at the spoken

or written word.” U

nited States v. Swisher
, 811 F .3d 299, 310–11 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal q u o tation marks omitted) (quoting Texas v. Johnson
, 491 U. S

. 397, 404 (1989)). A

m e s s a g e “delivered by conduct that is intended to be communicative and that, in contex t, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative” is sy mbolic speech protected by the F irst and F ourteenth A m e n dments. Clark v

. Cmty.

for Creative Non-Violence
, 468 U.S. 288, 294, (1984); see also Texas
, 491 U.S. at 404. Apply ing this principle, the Supreme Court has h eld that burning an American flag as part of a d emonstration, Texas
, 491 U.S. at 406, wearing a black armband to protest the Vietnam war, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.
, 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969), and “a sit-in by blacks in a ‘whites only ’ area to

10 B ecau s e Kn o x s eek s a d eclaratio n “ th at H.B

. 2 0 2 3 is

u n co n stitu

tio n al in its en tirety ” an d an in j u n ctio n p rev en tin g en f

orcem en t

o f th e statu te f

or an y p u rp o s e, w e co n s tru e h er claim s as m ak in g a f acial ch allen g e, see Jo h n Do e No

. 1 v. Reed
, 5 6 1 U.S. 1 8 6
, 1 9 4 (2 0 10 ), ev en th o u g h so m e o f h er arg u m en ts are sp ecif ic to h er o w

n circu m stan ces.K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 23

protest seg reg ation,” Texas
, 491 U.S. a t 404 (citing Brown v

. Louisi a na , 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966)), constitute

ex p ressive conduct protected by the F irst Amendment.

Nevertheless, the Court has r ejected the c oncept that “an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person eng a g ing in the conduct intends thereby to ex press an idea.” U nited State s v

. O '

B rien
, 391 U.S. 3 67, 376 ( 1 968). Rather the F irst A mendment protects o n l y c onduct that “is intended to convey a ‘particulariz e d messag e’ and the likelihood is g r e at t h a t the
messag e would be so understood.” Nunez v. Davis
, 169 F .3d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Texas
, 491 U.S. at 404). B ecause the Court has eschewed a rule that “ a l l conduct is presumptively ex pressi v e , ” i n d i v i d u a l s c l a i m i ng the protection of the F irst Amendment must car ry the burden o f demonstrating that their nonverbal conduct meets the applicable standard. Clark , 468 U.S. at 293 n.5.

Knox a rg ues that the act of collecting early ba l l o t s is

ex p ressive c onduct. Knox ’ s sworn declaration states that her conduct in collecting early ballots c ommunicates the messag e that she “ support[ s] the continued and widespread use o f voting by mail, and that the United States’ postal sy stem provides a secure and e asy platform to ex ercise the franchise and conduct elections,” and that “vo t i ng is the most fundamental rig ht in a democratic society and that [ she is] committed to h elping qualified electors ex ercise their rig ht to vote reg ardless of who they vote for.” W e conclude that she has not carried her burden of demonstrating that the conduct of collecting ballots would r easonably be understood b y

v i ewers a s convey

ing any of these messag es or conve y i n g a sy mbolic messag e of any sort. See Voting for Am., Inc. v

. Steen
, 7 32 F .3d 382, 392 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting arg umentK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 24

t hat collecting voter r eg istration documents is inherentl y

ex p ressive conduct).

Knox also claims that H.B

. 2023 is analog o u s to laws that burden the ability of individuals to make c ampaig n contributions or to deliver information throug h the mail a nd the refore raises F irst Amendment concerns. W e d isag ree;

none of Knox ’s a

nalog ies are apposite. While restrictions on

“ the amount o f money a person or g roup can spe n d o n political communication du ri n g a campaig n necessarily reduces the quantity of ex pression,” Buckley v. Valeo
, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976), H.B

. 2023 d oes not limit the ability o f would-be ballot collectors to communicate their messag es in
any comparable w ay

. F urther, prohibitions ag ainst using the mails to c ommunicate specified ty pes of information (such a s laws prohibiting sending or re ceiving pornog raphy o r seditious literatur e throug h the mail) may raise serious F irst Amendment issues. Blount v. R izzi
, 400 U.S. 4 10, 428 (1971); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S.
, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965). B u t courts have ex tended such pro t ec t i on to the senders a nd recipients of mail, Curr i e r v

. Potter
, 379 F .3d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 2004), never to the carriers o f o t her people’s mail.

F urther, Knox ’s reliance on Bartnicki v. Vopper
, 5 3 2 U.S. 514, 517–19, 526–27 (2001), which held that the delivery o f

a newsw o r t hy recording to the media was protected by the F irst Amendment, is also misplaced. I n Bartnicki
, the Supreme C ourt acknowledg ed that the delivery of a tape recording o f i lleg ally intercepted conversations to a radio
commentator “mig ht b e reg arded as conduct,” but reasoned tha t i n c ontex t it was “the kind o f ‘speech’ that the F irst Amendment p rotects.” Id

. a t 527. A ccording to the Court, the purpose of the delivery was “to provide the recipient withK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 25

the tex t of recorded statements,” analog iz ing such conduct to the act of disclosing and publishing the information. Id

. This rationale does not apply to the d e l i v ery of a voter’s e arly ba l l o t , which is not conduct analog ous to the disclosure a nd pub l i c ation of newsworthy information. A lthoug h voted early ballots constitu t e the voter’s speech, K nox “does not ‘speak’ in this contex t by handling another person’s ‘speech.’” S

teen , 732 F .3d at 390 (rejecting the arg ument that

a third party ’s collection and delivery of a voter’s completed
reg istration application constitutes the t h i rd party ’s speech for F irst Amendment purposes).

According ly
, H.B

. 2023 d oes not implicate the Fi r s t Amendment rig hts of ballot collectors like Knox

.

I V

F inally
, we consider K

nox ’s claim that H.B

. 2023 violates her rig ht to due process u nder the F ifth Amendment because it is an overly

vag ue criminal statute. 1 1

A

The void for v a gu e n es s doctrine is rooted in the Due P r ocess Clause of the F ifth Amendment. United States v

. W illiams
, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). “The F ifth A mendment provides that ‘[ n] o p e r s on shall

. . . be deprived of life,

11 Kn o x also arg u es th at w e sh o u ld co n sid er h er v ag u en ess ch allen g e

u n d er t h e relax ed s tan d ard ap p licab le to crim in al statu tes th at b u rd en p ro tected s p eech

. S

ee Un ited S ta tes v. Wi l l ia ms , 5 53 U.S. 2 8 5, 3 0 4 (2 0 0 8). B ecau se w e h av e co n clu d ed th at H.B

. 2 0 2 3 d o es n o t b u rd en sp eech o r ex p ressiv e co n d u ct p ro tected by th e First A m en d m en t, w e rej ect th is arg u m en t.K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 26

liberty
, or prope r t y , w ithout due process of law,’” and “the Governmen t violates this g uarantee by taking away someone’s life, libert y , o r property under a criminal law [ 1] so vag ue that it fails to g ive ordinary people fair notice o f the conduct it punishes, or [ 2 ] so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. U nited States
, 1 35 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (citing K

olender v. Lawson
, 4 61 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)). A criminal statute violates the “ f air notice” requirement if it “f

a ils to g ive a person of ordinary intellig ence f

air notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden b y the statute.” Colautti v. Franklin
, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979) (internal quotation m a r k s o mitted). A statute violates the “arbitrary enforcement ” requirement if it is “so ind e f i n i te that it encourag es arbitrary and erratic arrests a nd convictions.” I

d. (internal quotation marks omitted). I n other words, “ordinary notions of f air play and the settled rules o f law,” Johnson
, 135 S. Ct. at 2 557, a r e violated if police officers, p rosecutors, and judg es are e ssenti a lly “defining crimes and fix ing penalties” b y filling statutory g aps “so larg e that doing so becomes e ssentially leg islative.” United States v. Evans
, 333 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1948).

B

H

. B. 2023 does n ot violate either the fair notice or the arbitrary enforcement requirements.

F irst, H.B

. 2023 provides fair notice of the p rohibited conduct. I t s t at e s that “[ a] person w ho knowing ly collects voted or unvoted early ballots from another person i s g uilty of a class 6 felo n y

. ” A r i z

. Rev. Stat. § 16-1005(H). I t then

ex e mpts from that prohibition “[ a] n e lection official, a United St ates postal service worker or any other person who is allowed by law to transm i t U n i t e d States mail

. . . if theK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 27

official, worker or other person is eng ag ed in official d uties.” Id

. A reasonable person w ould understand that this lang uag e g enerally prohibi ts the collection o f ballots b ut makes

ex c e ptions for (1) an election official, if eng ag e d i n o f ficial duties, and ( 2) U.S. postal service workers and other persons

a llowed by law to transmit U .S. mail, if eng ag ed in o f f i c i al duties. Knox point s t o n o evidence that the public has h ad difficulties in understanding or comply ing with H.B . 2023.

Knox ’ s primary arg ument is that the ex c e p t ion for “any other person who is allowed by law to transmit U nited States mail

. . . if

. . . e ng age d i n o f f i c i al duties” is unclear. W e disag ree. A person of ordinary intellig e n c e would understand that the lang uag e covers p ersons w h o h ave official duties involving the delivery of U nited States mail, provided t h at th e y a r e e ng ag ed in such duties at the time they pick up the ballots (and not vo l u n t eering as third-party b allot collectors during their day s off). See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v

. Reagan
, — F

. 3d —, No. 18-15845, 2018 W L 4344291, at *4 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2018) (summariz ing all ex ceptions to H.B

. 2023); Knox v. Brnovich
, — F

. Supp.3d —, N o. CV-1 8

- 02089-PHX-DL R, 2018 W L 4 042765, at *8 (D. A r i z

. A u g

. 27, 2018).

Knox also arg ues that H.B. 2 0 23 is vag ue because the

ex c e ption for “any other p e r son a l l o w ed by law to transmit United States mail” could be interpreted as ex empting
every one in the c ountry

. She reasons that the private h ands

ex e mption to the postal monopoly effectively a llows any o ne t o deliver U nited States mail, so long as the d el i v e r y i s uncompensated. Such a reading would deprive H.B

. 2023 o f
any meaning ful impact, because it w ould effectively a l low
any one to collect early b a l l o t s

. W e reject this arg ument, because a person of ordinary intellig ence would not read H.B

.K N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 28

2023 in a manner that would make its r e strictions meaning less. I ndeed, Knox h erself stated that she u nderstood H.B

. 2023 p rohibits her from collecting ear l y b a llots. M o reover, we have stated that H.B

. 2023’s restrictions a r e meaning ful. See F

eldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office
, 843 F .3d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 2016) (en b anc) (stating that H.B

. 202 3 m a de “ the collection of leg itimate ballots by third parties a felony

”).

W e a lso reject Knox ’s a

rg ument that a p l a in reading o f the ex ception makes it dupl i c a t i ve o f the separate ex c eption for “a United States postal ser v ice w orker.” F ederal law authoriz es g overnment officials who are not employ ees of the Postal Service to d eliver U

. S

. mail as part of their official duties. See, e.g. , 39 U.S.C. § 406 (authoriz ing Department o f Defense a

nd Department of T r ansportation personnel “to perform postal services” at branch post o f f ices at “camps, posts, bases, or stations o f the Armed F orces and at defense

or other strateg ic installations”); see also 3 9 U

. S

. C

. § 413 ( a uthoriz ing Department of State personnel “to p erform postal services” at branch post offices at United States diplomatic missions in locations abroad). Under H.B

. 2023, such officials w ould not q ualify as postal service workers, but would qualify as “any other person w ho is a llowed by law to transmit United States mail.”

W e also reject Knox ’s arg ument that it is unclear when an individual is “ eng ag ed in offi cial duties” when collecting early ballots. Similar phrases are common in th e federal criminal code 1 2 and have been upheld ag a inst vag ueness

12 S ee, e

. g

. , 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 1 (crim i n alizin g an y o n e w h o “ assau lts, resists, op p o ses, i m

p ed es, in tim id ates, or in t erf eres w ith ” an y f

ed eral

em p l o y ee o r o f

f icial w h i le th ey are “ en g a g ed in o r o n a c c o u n t o f th eK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 29

challeng es. See Uni t e d States v. Linn
, 438 F .2d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Varkonyi
, 645 F .2d 45 3
, 456–57 (5th Cir. 1981).

F inally
, K

n o x claims that she could qualify as an “election official

. . . eng ag ed in official duties” because her duties as a p recinct committeeperson include the delivery of United S t a tes mail. W e disag ree. No person of ordinary intellig ence would conclude that a precinct committeeperson is an e lection official w ho is authoriz ed to col l ect e arly ballots as part o f her official duties. Compare Ariz

. Rev. Stat. § 16-822(E) (detailing precinct committeep e r s o n d u t i e s), with 39 U.S.C. § 413 (authoriz ing State Department personnel “to perform postal services”).

B e cause the scope o f H.B

. 2023 i s c lear, it poses no sig nificant threat of arbitrary enforcement. A J uly 16, 2018,
statement issued by the Maricopa County A t t o r ney is n ot to the contrary

. 1 3 I n that statement, the County Attorney stated

p erfo r ma n ce of officia l d

u ties

. . . ”) (em

p h asis ad d ed ); see a lso 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 5 (crim i n alizin g th e assau lt, k id n ap , o r m u rd er, o r th e attem

p t o r th reat to d o so , o f a f

ed eral o f f i cial, j u d ge , o r law en f

o rcem en t of

f icer, o r th eir f am ily m em

b er, “ w ith in t en t to i m

p ed e, in tim id ate, or in terf ere w ith su ch

o f f icial, j u d g e, o r law en f orcem en t of

f i cer w h ile en g a g ed in th e p erfo r ma n ce o f offi c ia l du ties
, o r w ith in t en t t o retaliate ag ain st su ch

o f f icial, j u d g e, o r law en f

orcem en t o f

f icer o n acco u n t o f th e p erfo rma n ce

o f o fficia l d u ties . . . ”) (em ph asis ad d ed ).

13 T h e Marico p a Co u n ty A t to rn ey ’ s Ju ly 1 6
, 2 0 1 8 statem en t read s in f u ll:

I t h a s co m e to m y atten tio n th at th ere m ay b e s o m e

c o n fu sio n ab o u t th e in ten tio n to en f o rce th e electi o n law s in A rizo n a. I w an t to assu re an y o n e w

h o m ay b e p lan n in g to en g ag e in b allo t h arv estin g f o r th is P rim aryK N O X V

. B R

N O V I C H 30

he intended to enforce H.B

. 2023 and informed anyone who

was planning to eng a g e in “ballot h a rvesting ” that it was a class 6 f elony to collect a bal l o t “ u nless y ou are a family member, household member, or careg iver for the v oter to whom the b allot was issued.” Althoug h, as Knox arg ues, the County Attorney did not state that H.B . 2023 also ex e mpted postal service workers or other authoriz ed personnel eng ag ed in offic i a l d uties, Knox does not e x plain h ow such an omission poses a risk of “encourag [ ing ] arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions,” Papachristou v. Jacksonville
, 405 U .S. 156, 1 62 (1972), o r raises the spectre of prosecutors “defining crimes and fix ing penalties” by filling in g aps in
statutes. United States v. Evans
, 3 33 U.S. 483, 486 (1948). W e conclude that H.B . 2023 is not void for vag ueness.

AF F IRMED

.

Electio n an d Gen eral Electio n th at it is a class 6 f elo n y to k n o w in g ly co llect a m ail- in b allo t f o r th e p rim ary electio n in A

u g u s t, o r f

o r th e g en eral electio n in No v em b er, u n less y o u are a f

am ily m em

b er, h o u seh old

m em b er, o r careg iv er f

o r th e v o ter to w

h o m th e b allo t

w as issu ed

. B ased o n its co n cern s ab o u t th e p o ten tial f o r f rau d an d m isco n d u ct af

f ectin g o u r electio n s, th e Ar i zo n a State L eg islatu

re p assed th is law in o rd er t o p ro tect th e in g erity o f A rizo n a electio n s. T h e Marico p a Co u n ty A t t o r ney ’ s O f

f ice is co m

m itted to p ro tectin g

o u r v o tin g p ro cess b y en f

o rcin g th is law

. If y o u are n o t

au th orized b y th e statu te to tak e p ossessio n o f an o th er

v o ter’ s b allo t , i n stru ct th e v o ter p erso n ally to p lace th eir [sic] b allo t in th e m ail, to deliv er th e b allo t i n p erso n , or to v o te in p erso n

.