NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0244n.06 F iled: May 7, 2008 No. 07-1674 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT A l an d o B ar

r y, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. Noble Meta l Processing , I nc., Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APP E AL

FROM THE UN I TED STA TE S DI STR I CT CO UR T F OR TH E EA STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN O P I N I O N

BEFORE: G ILMAN, ROG ERS, an d McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges. McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. I n Aug ust of 2004, Alando B arr y (“Plaintiff” ), an A frica

nAm e ri c an ma le , wa s ter

min a te d fr om his e mpl oy

me nt as a fo rk lif

t op e ra tor wi th D e fe nd ant, No ble Me ta l Pr o c e s s in g , I n c . ( “ N M P” )
. A c c o r d in g to N M P, Pl a in ti f f w a s te r mi n a te d f o r v io lati n g the
c omp any ’s wo rk

pla c e vio le nc e po lic y

by a ssa ultin g a su per

vis or . B a se d o n h is b e lie f t hat N MP actua lly terminated him bec ause of his ra ce , P l ai ntiff filed suit in fede ral c ourt alleg ing r ace discrimination in violation of Title VI I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq ., a lon g wi th v ari ou s st ate law c la ims . In a ru lin g fr om t

he be nc h, the distri ct cou rt grante d f ull
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n tf

o r N M P
. P l a i n t i f

f t i m e l y a p p e a l e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’ s d e c i s i o no nt h e T i t l e V II claim only . For

the re asons stated be low, we AF F IRM the dec ision of the district court.

I. BACKG ROUND On August 15 , 2 00 4, Pla int if f, a fo rk lif t op e ra tor , r e po rt e d to his a ssi g ne d w or k s ta tio n in Are a 2 of the NMP facility . Upon ar riving at his work station, Plaintiff noticed t hat he ha d not beenNo. 07-1674

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At the time of the incide nt in question, P laintiff did not report to Kolleda b ec au se he w as 1 a ssi g ne d to Ar e a 2. Ho we ve r, Ko lle da ha d sup e rv ise d Plai nti ff se ve ra l y e ars be fo re . D ur inghe r t ime a s Pla int if

f’ s su pe rv iso r, the tw o h a d a

dis a g re e me nt o ve r a

wr ite -u p th a t K oll e da had is sued to Plaintiff. Plainti ff c omplained to Kolleda’ s supervisor, who r ipped up the document and explained to Koll eda that such a disciplinary action wa s unwarr anted. Plaintiff alleg es that Kolleda held a g rudg e ag ainst him beca

use she was embar

rasse d by the incident, and he r cla im that Pl aintiff violated the workplac e violence policy was re veng e for

the prior disag ree ment. I t appea rs from the r ecor d that afte r the write-up incident, Plaintiff move d to A rea 2 and had no conta ct with Kolleda until the alterc ation with West approx imately two y ear s later.

- 2 - pr ov ide d w itha

ke y to o ne of the fo ur he a vy -d uty fo rk lif ts r e fe rr e d to aro un d t he sh op a s a “ B ig Red.” B eca

use a Big Red was necessa ry to lift the heavy loads that Plaintiff was re quired to move throug hout Area

2, he drove a smaller forklift out of Are a 2 and into Ar ea 1 in se arc h of a B ig Re d. Upon his arr ival in Area

1, Plaintiff witnessed one of his c o-worke rs, Ken West, who is a lso AfricanAmeric an, sitting on a

BigRed. Plaintiff pr ocee ded to a ng rily confr ont West reg arding his use of a B ig Re d, which—ac cordingto Plainti ff—West’s job assig nment did not require. Averba l alterc ation ensued be tween the two men about whose turn it was to use a BigRed. Concer

ned that the war of words betwee n West a nd Plaintiff w as on the verg e of becoming phy sical, L inda Kolleda, a white f emale a nd the Are a 1 super

visor, attempted to interve ne. 1 Exa c tly wh a t ha pp e ne d n e xt dif

fe rs de pe nd ingon

wh ic h in div idu a l is re c ounti ngthe e ve nts
. A c c o r d i n g t o K o l l e d a , P l a i n t i f f p l a c e d h i s h a n d s o n h e r

s h o u l d e r an d “ p u l l e d m e b a c k a b r u p t l y” while saying “ excuse me.” K olleda De p. at 66. Kolleda indicated in her deposition that the forc e applied to her

shoulder ca

used her to stag g er sever al steps backw ard. K olleda fur ther testified that the alter cation ende d with Plaintiff’ s informing West in a threatening manner that “he took c are ofNo. 07-1674

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- 3 - all his business in the parking lot.” Kolleda De p. at 68. Alt houg h the i ncident scared K olleda, she d i d n o tc o n t a c tt h e p o l i c e o r

N M P s e c u r i t y. Pe rh a ps un surp ri sin g ly , Pl a int if f t e lls a so me wh a t di ff

e re nt s tor y . A c c or din g to h is deposition testimony , when Kolleda attempted to interve ne, he m e r e ly “ to uched” her on the shoulder as if to say “excuse me.” Ba rry Dep. at 141. Plaintiff denied having pulled K olleda out of the w ay by her shoulder

or otherw ise exerting any forc e on her person. In Plaintiff’s opinion, Kolleda has exagg erated the incident be cause she has a v endetta a g ainst him. W hen intervie wed by Human Re so ur c e s p e rs on ne l a

bo ut the e ve nt, Wes t in dic a te d th a t he did no t se e Pla int if

f p us h K oll e da . We st further stated t hat he never felt t hreatened by Plaintiff, and the two men l ater place d the alter cation be hin d th e m by

sh a kin g ha

nd s. Following the alter cation, Kolleda filed an inc ident repor t with NMP’s Human Resource s D e p art m e n t
. T h e r e p o rt a l l e g e d t h a t P l a i n t i f f ’ s c o n d u c t v i o l a t e d

N M P ’ s w o r

k p l a c e v i o l e n c e p o l i c y. Upon re ceiving the incident re port, Michelle Ve rker kee, the n-NMP Human Resourc es Mana g er,
commence d an investig ation into Kolleda’s alleg ations. After briefly speakingwith Plainti ff a

bout the situation, Verke rkee suspended him p en d i n g further investigation. During her inve stigation, Ver kerke e spoke w ith Pl aintiff, West, and Kolleda . She also consulted with Tom Dave nport, NMP’s Vice Pre s i d en t o f Hum an Resourc es, as we ll as Br ian B ickimer, NMP’s Plant Manag er. A t the conclusion of he r investig ation, Ver ker k ee d et ermined that Plainti ff ha d violated the wor kplace violence policy . As a re sult—with Davenport’s blessing—she terminated Plaintiff’s e mploy ment eff ective Aug ust 17, 2004.No. 07-1674

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Pla int if f’ s b ri e f c on ta ins no argum ent re g ard inghis state -l aw c la ims ; th e re fo re , th e on ly 2 issue proper ly

befor e thi s court is whether the di strict court erre d in gr anting summary judgme nt for NMP on Pl aintiff’s Title VI Iclaim. - 4 - Plaintiff then fil ed a g rieva nce, alleg ing that he was te rminated without ca use in violation of the collective barg aining ag ree ment enter ed int o betwee n Plaintiff’s union and NMP. The g rieva nce proce eded to a

rbitration. Followinga full-f ledg ed ar bitration hea ring , the ar

bitrator held that Plaintiff h ad v i o lated the wor kplace violence policy , and the violation was c ause f or termination
un de r the c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini ng a g re e me nt. Af

te r h a vin g his g ri e va

nc e de nie d, Pla int if

f r e c e ive d h is EEOC rig ht to sue letter and c ommenced this Title VI Iaction. Upon the completion of discove ry , NMP move d for summary judgme nt on all of Plaintiff’s claims. The district cour

t held a hearing on NMP’s motion. At the conclusion of the he aring , the district court g rante d NMP summary judgme nt on all of Plaintiff’s claims in a ruling from the be nch. Apply ing the burde n -s h i fting analy sis announced by the Supreme Court in McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Gree n , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the district c ourt expressed doubt a s to w hether Plaintiff had established a pr ima fac ie ca s e o f d i scrimination. But, it rea soned that eve n if the ele ments of the prima fa cie c ase ha d been pr oven, Plaintiff’s Title VI Iclaim fa iled beca use there was no e vidence that his violation of the workplac e violence policy on which NMP based its termination dec ision was
mere ly a pre text for r ace discrimination. 2 II. AN AL YSI S A. St anda r d of R e vie w and Sum m ar y J udgm e nt St anda r d This court reviews a

district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt de novo. Nic ho ls v . M oo re , 477 F.3d 396, 398 ( 6th Cir. 2007). At the summary judgme nt stag e, the district c ourt must construeNo. 07-1674

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- 5 - the evidenc e and dr aw a ll reasona ble infer ence s in favor of the nonmoving pa

rty
. Jones v . Potter , 488 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2007). The mere allegation of a factua l dispute is ins ufficie nt to “defe at an other wise prope rly

supported motion for summary judgme nt; the dispute must present a genuine issue of ma te ria l fac t.” He nd e rso n v . W

all e d Lak e Con so l. S

c hs

. , 469 F.3d 479, 487 ( 6th Cir. 2006). A “g enuine” dispute is one t hat would per mit a rea sonable jury

to return a

verdic t in favor of

the nonmoving pa

rty , and a f

act i s “mater ial” only

if its resolution could affe ct the outcome of the litigation under

the applica

ble law. Id
. B . Di s cu s s i o n o f

Pl a i n ti f f ’s T i tl e V I I Cl a i m A plaintiff may

prove that he was subject to disparate tr eatment ba sed on ra ce in violation of Tit le VI I by way of either direc t or circumstantial evidenc e. Clay v. United Parcel Se rv., Inc

. , 501 F.3d 695, 703 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I n case s—like that curren t l y b ef o re this court—wher e ther e is no direc t evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff’s circ umstantial e vidence must be prese nted via the burden- shifting fra

mework established by the Supreme Court in McD onnell Douglas
. See M ichael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. , 496 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2007). Under McD onnell Douglas , the plaintiff must first prove a prima fa cie c ase of

discrimination. Texas De pt. of Cmty. Affair

s v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). I f the plaintiff succ eeds in e stablishing a pr ima fac ie ca se, the burden t h en s h ifts to the defe ndant to articulate a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for the
ac t i o n taken a g ainst the plaintiff. Id
. a t 2 5 3
. Sh o u ld th e d e f e n d an t b e a

b le to o f f e r a le g itimate, nondiscriminatory

rea son, the burden shifts ba ck to the plaintiff to pr ove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the de fenda

nt’s offe red justification was mere ly a pretext for unlaw ful discrimination. Id
.No. 07-1674

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Whil e the dis tr ic t c ourt

re c og nize d the dis pu te re g ard ingthe sim ila rl y sit uate d r e qu ir e me nt, 3 it elected to a ssume arguendo that a sim ila rl y sit uate d Ca uc a sia n e mpl oy e e wa s tr e a te d d if fe re ntl y and pr oc e e de d to g ra

nt s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or NM P on the g ro un d tha t Plai nti ff c ou ld not e sta bli sh prete x t. Be cause this court can a ffirm a district court’s summary judgme nt decision on any g rounds supported by

the re cord, e ven if differ ent than those relied on by the district c ourt, we f ind it proper to first consider whether Plaintiff has established a prima fac ie case. See J ones , 488 F.3d at 404. - 6 - I n the cur rent c ase, Plaintiff a

rg ues that he ha s established a pr ima fac ie ca se and that NMP’s le g it im a te , n o n d is c r im in a t o r y r e a s o n
— h i s v i o lati o no f

th e w o r k p la c e v io le n c e p o li c y

— w a s a p r e te xt fo r r a c ia l di sc ri min a tio n. NM P f ir st a rgue s th a t summa

ry jud g me nt wa s p ro pe rl y

g ra nte d b e c a us e Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima fa cie c ase. It further states that eve n if a prima f acie case has been e stablished, Plaintiff’s claim lacks merit beca use there is no evidence that his violation of NMP’s workplac e violence policy was a prete x t for ra ce disc rimination. To establish a prima f

acie case of di scrimination, a plaintiff must prove by a pre pondera

nce of the e vid e nc e tha

t: ( 1) he is a

me mbe r o f a

pr ote c ted class ; ( 2) he wa s su bje c t to an a dv e rs e employ ment action; (3) he was qua lified for the position; and (4) a similarly situated person outside of the prote cted c lass was tre ated more favor ably
. Mitchell v. Tol edo Hosp. , 964 F.2d 577, 582- 83 (6 th C ir . 1 99 2) . T he re is n o d e bate in thi s ca se that Plai nti ff ha s sa tis fi e d th e fi rs t th re e re qu ir e me nts of a pr ima fac ie case. The parties, howeve r, vi g orously dispute whether Plaintiff has established that N M P t r e a t e d

a s i m i l ar l y s i tu a t e d

C a u c a s i anm o r e f

a v o r a b l y. 3 To satis fy

the sim ila

rl y sit uate d requi rem ent, a

pla int if f m us t sh owthat th e c omp a ra ble employ ee is simil ar “in all of the re le v an t aspec ts.” Ercegov ich v. Goody ear Tire & Rubber Co. , 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998) (interna l quotation mar ks omitted). I n announcing th e “ al l o f t he rele vant aspe cts” standa

rd, Ercegov ich narr owed this c ourt’s prior holding in Mi tc he ll , which hadNo. 07-1674

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- 7 - require d that the pl aintiff and the comparable e mploy ee be “similarly situated in all

re sp e c ts .” Id .; see also Clayton v. Me ijer, Inc. , 2 81 F .3 d 60 5, 61 0- 11 (6 th Cir . 2 00 2) (r e c og nizi ngthat Ercegov ich modified the ana ly sis set forth by the Mi tc he ll court). Whil e the prec ise aspec ts of employ ment that
are rele vant to deter

mining whe ther the simil arly situated require ment has been satisfied depe nd on t h e facts and circ umstances of eac h case , this court has g ener ally focuse d on whether

the plaintiff
and the c omp ara

ble e mpl oy e e : ( 1) sh are the same su pe rv iso r; (2 ) a

re su bje c t to the same sta

nd a rd s; and (3) have e ng ag ed in the same conduct “without such differ entiating or mitigating c ircumstance s that would distinguish their conduct or the employ er’ s treatment of them for it.” Ercegov ich , 154 F.3d at 352 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). 1. Sam e Supervisor The deter mination of

whether two employ ees sha

red the same super

visor is made on a c aseby -c a se ba sis and

do e s n ot d e pe nd

e nti re ly on wh e ther th e tw o s ha

re d th e same imm e diate supervisor. Se e Mc

Mi lla n v . Ca str o , 4 0 5 F
. 3 d 4 0 5 , 4 1 4 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 5 )
. Rath e r , th is c o u rt ha s det e r mi n e d th a t i nma

n y in s ta n c e s th e te r

m “ s u p e r v is o r ” s h o u ld

b e c o n s tr

u e d b r o a d ly to in c lu de
case s where both employ ees’ situations were ha n d l ed b y the same “ ultimate decision-make r.” Id
. I n McM illan , the plaint i ff cl ai m ed that the dist rict cour t erre d by instructing the jury

that to be simil arly situated the comparable employ ee “must have de alt with the same super visor.” Id . at 413- 14. Acc ording to the plaintiff in McM illan , the instruction err oneously implied that two employ ees who did not share the same immediate supe rvisor—but did share the same ultimate de cision-maker and we re subjec t to employ ment decisions issued by

that individual—could not be simil arly situated. Id . at 413-14.No. 07-1674

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- 8 - Rejecting this arg ument, the McM illan c ourt e xpla ine d tha t the jur y c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly conclude d that the term “ s u p e r v is o r ” e n c o mp a s s e d

th o s e in d iv id

u a ls who ultimately

deter mined what employ ment actions would be taken ag ainst the plaintiff and the compar able e mploy ee. Id . at 414;

s ee also Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth. , 3 3 9 F
. 3 d 4 5 4 , 4 5 9 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t th e “ sa me
su pe rv iso r” ana ly sis is f

oc us e d le ss o n w he the r t

he c o m pa ra ble e mpl oy e e sh are d th e same imm e diate supervisor a s the plaintiff and more on whether the individual who ultimately met ed out t he discipline to both indivi duals was the sa me). Thus, unde r McM

illan and Seay , two employ ees w ho
are direc tly

supervised by differ ent i ndividuals are not nece ssarily dissimi lar if the sa

me member

of manag ement disciplined both the plaintiff a nd the compar able e mploy ee. Th is c ourt ha s p re vio us ly he ld t hat a pla int if f a nd a c omp ara ble e mpl oy e e are no t si mil a rl y situated wher e t h ey we re disciplined by differ ent ultimate decision-make rs. Se e Sm ith v . Le gg e tt W ire Co. , 220 F.3d 752, 762- 63 (6th Cir. 2000). I n Sm ith , the plaintiff cla imed that his former employ er discr iminated ag ainst him on the basis of rac e in violation of a state statute that mirrore d Title V I I in all respec ts. Id . at 758. Applying T itle VI Icase law and pr inciples to the plaintiff’s complaint, this c ourt in Sm ith deter mined that the non-minority employ ees that he claimed r ece ived pref ere ntial treatment “ wer e not similarly situated as a matter of law .” Id . at 763. The Smith court
rea soned that the c ompara ble employ ees w ere not simi larly situated in p ar t b ec ause they wer e disciplined by

a diffe rent de cision-maker than was the plaintiff. Id
. at 762. I n fac t, the individual who di s ci p l i n ed the compar able e mploy ees w as no long er e mploy ed by the def endant whe n the decision wa s made to terminate Smit h. Id . at 763.No. 07-1674

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At oral a rg ument, Plaintiff’s counsel re peate dly stated that NMP failed to follow its own 4 zero toleranc e workplac e violence policy beca use Dunca

n was issued a war

ning i n s t ea d o f b eing terminated a s the policy require s. A revie w of the r ecor d, howeve r, illustrates that a violation of the po lic y ne e d n ot r e su lt i n te rm inatio n. NM P’ s p oli c y pr ov ide s th at any

e mpl oy e e wh o e ng a g e s in workplac e violence “will be disciplined, up to and including termination .” NMP 2004 Ba rg aining Unit Associate Ha

nd b ook at 16 (e mphasis added) . Thus, Plaintiff’s asser tion that NMP’s poli cy require s termination, and the c ompany ’s fa ilure to terminate D uncan indicates that the policy was selec tively

enfor ced a g ainst Plainti ff, lac ks merit. - 9 - I n th is c a se , Pl a int if

f a rgue s tha t he is simil arl y sit uate d to a Ca uc a sia n e mpl oy e e name d Pe te Dunca n, who Plaintiff say s violated NMP’s workplac e violence policy in 2003, but wa s not subject to termination. Acc ording to Plaintiff, Dunc an wa s involved in a workplac e alter cation with another NM P e mpl oy e e , Ch arl e s B ro wn . T he imp e tus fo r t he a lte rc a tio n w as Brown’s a pp are nt r oma

nti c interest in a f

emale co-wor

ker who had previously dated Duncan. As Plaintiff re counts the Dunc anB ro wn inc ide nt, Dunc an s ho ve d a nd thr e a te ne d B ro wn

wh ile the tw o w e re on

the c loc k at N MP. Id . Following the alter cation, B rown lodg ed a c omplaint wi t h NM P ’s Human Resourc es De partment. Id
. N M P th e n c o n d u c te d an inv e s ti g a ti o n an d D u n c an w a s d is c ip li n ed, but not terminated. Id . I n Plaintiff’s opinion, this information is sufficient to esta blish that P laintiff and 4 Dunca n wer e similarly

situated. Unfortunately

for Plaintiff, ther e ar e cr itical differ ence s betwee n the Dunca n-B rown i n c id ent and Plaintiff’s assa

ult of Kolleda that a

re fat al t o Plaintiff’s claim when c onsidered in lig ht of the leg al standar ds set forth above . First, like the plai n t i ff and the compara ble employ ees in Sm ith , Plaintiff and Dunca

n share d neither the same immed i at e supervisor nor we re the ir disciplinary matters handle d by

the same ultimate de cision-maker
. At the t ime of t he incident involving B rown, Dunc an h ims e lf

wa s e mpl oy e d by NM P a s a su pe rv iso r, wh e re a s a t th e tim e of the a lte rc a tio n w ithNo. 07-1674

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- 10 - Kolleda a nd West, P laintiff was not e mploy ed in a supe rvisory capa city
. Ba sed on this differ ence in t he ir status , th e re is no ar g ume nt to be ma de that Plai nti ff and Dunc an s ha re d th e same imm e diate supervisor; Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor would have be en a pe rson of the same ra nk as Dunc an. I n e sse nc e , it

is Pl a int if

f’ s p os iti on

that he and

Du nc an s ha re d th e same su

pe rv iso r b e c a

us e bo th inc ide nts we re ha

nd le d b y NM P’ s V ic e Pr e sid e nt o f H um an Res ourc e s, To m D a ve np or t. T his argument finds no support in the rec ord. The a lleg ations lodge d ag ainst Plainti ff we re inve stigated b y NM P ’s Human Resour ces Manag er, Miche lle Ver

kerke e, who ultimately

deter mined, in cons u l t at i o n with Davenpor t, that te rm inatio n w a s w arr ante d. Duri nghe r d e po sit ion , V e rk e rk e e ind ic a te d th a t sh e wa s o n mate rn ity leave at the time of the D uncan- Br own incident and h ad n o involvement in the resolution of that matter. Give n her a

bsence , Ver

kerke e testified that the Duncan-B rown incident had been addr essed by H u ma nRe s o u r c e s St a f

f in g Sp e c ia li s t, Ra

y an a M ar il an d , w it

h o u t a n y in p u t f r o m V e r k e r kee. Additionally , the re cord indicates that Dave nport was a lso entirely oblivious to the handling of the Dunca n-B rown incide nt. I n fac t, Davenpor t testified in his deposition t hat he wa s unawa re of the in c id e n t u n ti l it w a s r a is e d b y Pl a in ti f f in th is c a s e . H e f

u rth e r te s ti f

ie d th a t a s an NMP Vice Pr e sid e nt, he wo uld

no t ha ve be e n a dv ise d of the Dunc an- B ro wn a lte rc a tio n b e c a

us e “ the re wo uld be no rea son for the plant HR person to bringa ver bal war ning to my

attention.” Davenport De p. at 18. As the re c or d b e ars ou t, V e rkerke e and , to a le sse r e xten t, D a ve np or

t w e re the ind ivi du a ls
re sp on sib le fo r t e rm inatin g Pla int if f. Con sid e ri ngthe e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to Plaintiff, there is not eve n a scinti lla of evidence that either of those individuals had any involvementNo. 07-1674

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- 11 - in the handling of the Dunc an-B rown incide nt. There is also no evidenc e that Ray ana Ma riland or any of the other

individ u al s involved in the resolution of the Dunc an-B rown incide nt participate d in the decision to te rminate Plaintiff. Acc ording ly , Plaintiff ha s failed to produc e any evidenc e fr om a which a rea sonable jury

could conc lude that he a

nd Dunca n share d the same supe rvisor. 2. Sam e St anda r ds Th e re is n o d isp ute in thi s ca se that Plai nti ff and Dunc an, a s e mpl oy e e s o f N MP, we re bo th g ov e rn e d b y the same NM P wo rk pla c e vio le nc e po lic y . T hu s, the y we re bo th s ub

je c t to the same standard s o f conduct during the ir employ ment with NMP and further analy sis is not nece ssary reg ardingthis factor. 3. Sam e Conduct I n order for the c onduct of a compar able employ ee and the Title VI I plaintiff to be considere d th e “ s a me c o n d

u c t, ” it mu s t b e s im il ar

in k in d and severity
. See M eijer , 281 F.3d at 611. The plaintiff in Meijer , an Af

ri c an- Am e ri c an tru c k- dr ive r, wa s ter min a te d for vio la tin g a

c omp any sa fe ty policy reg ardingthe prope r wa

y to drive a truc k awa

y from a loa ding doc k. Id
. a t 60 7. As a re su lt of the plaintiff’ s failure to follow Meijer’s c ompany policy , a dockw orker

who was loa ding the truck suffe red severe injuries. Id
. a t 60 8. Cla imi ng that he wa s te rm inate d ba se d on his ra c e and

no t hi s violation of company

policy , the plaintiff filed a Title VI Iaction ag ainst Meijer. Id . at 607. Attempting to esta

blish a prima fa cie c ase, the plaintiff in Meijer argued t hat seve ral Cauca sian truck- drivers w ere not terminated for violations of t he same company safe ty policy
. Id
. at 610. This court re

jected the plaintiff’s ar g ument, holding that the Ca uca s i an truck drive rs who vio la te d th e same saf

ety po lic y we re no t si mil arl y

sit uate d b e c a

us e the ir c on du c t di d n ot r e su lt i nNo. 07-1674

Barry v. Noble M

etal Processing, Inc

.

- 12 - serious harm to another individual. Id . at 611. I n the words of the Meijer

court, whe n meting out discipline an “e mploy er is not pr eclude d from conside ring the har m resulting f

rom the conduc t of its employ ees.” Id . at 612. Simi larly , in Sm ith thi s c ourt e xpla ine d th a t c om para ble e mpl oy e e s w e re no t si mil a rl y situated with the plaintiff bec ause—in a ddition to being dis ciplined by differ ent dec ision-makers a s pr e vi o u s l y

d i s c u s s e d

—t h e p l a i n t i f

f ’ s c o n d u c tw a s m o r e e g r e g i o u s t h ant h a to f t h e c o mpa ra

ble employ ees. Sm ith , 2 20 F .3 d at 76 3. Th e c ou rt stre sse d th a t Smi th’ s th re a t to “ blo w a wa y so me MFe rs” at the plant was more seri o u s t h an the threats leveled by the compar able e mploy ees w ho
rec eived lesse r for

ms of discipline. Id .; see also Braithwaite v. Timken Co. , 2 58 F .3 d 4 88 , 4 97 (6 th Cir. 2001) (exp l ainingthat the plaintiff wa s not simi larly situated to compara

ble employ ees w ho
wer e not terminate d beca use his conduct amounted to a more se rious violation). Her e, as with the plaintiffs’ attempts to establish that the compara ble employ ees in Meijer
and Sm ith we re simi larly situated, Plaintiff’s conduc t was more se rious than that eng ag ed in by Dunca n. I n this case —acc epting Plaintiff’s rec ollection of t he incident as t rue—he place d his hands on Kol le d a , an N M P s u

p e r v is o r , a s s h e a tt e mp te d to in te r v e n e in an a lt e r c a ti o n th a t Pl a intiff had initiated with W est. This phy sical touching of Koll eda during a heated altercation in the workpla ce could clea

rly be conside red a

violation of the NMP workplac e violence policy
. Whil e it appea

rs from the rec ord t hat Duncan “nudge d” Brown in a manner si milar to the way Plaintiff describe s his contact with Kolleda, like the cond u c t i nv o lv e d

in Meijer and Sm ith , Plaintiff’s cond u c t w a s mo r e s e v e r e th anth a t e n g a g e d in b y D u n c an . Wh e r e a s D u n c ana s s a u lt e d a f e ll ow employ ee w ith whom he was having a n argument, Plaintiff put hands on an uninvolved super visorNo. 07-1674

Barry v. Noble M

etal Processing, Inc

.

Havingconclude d that Plaintiff has failed to e stablish a prima fa cie c ase, it is not nece ssary 5 for this court to deter

mine whether the l eg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for the te rmination was a me re pr e te xt fo r d isc ri min a tio n. We w ish to n ote , ho we ve r, that e ve n we re we to fi nd a pr ima fa c ie case , Plaintiff has failed to pr oduce a ny evidenc e of prete x t; there is simpl y no evidenc e sug g esting that Plaintiff’s termination was r acia lly motivated. - 13 - who attempted to dispel the situation betwee n him and West. There is a ma rked diff ere nce in the workplac e setting betwee n nudg ing a co- worke r with whom y ou are eng ag ed in a he ated discussion
and ph y sic a lly

int e rf e ri ngwi th a

su pe rv iso r w ho —in

the perf or manc e of he r d uti e s— a tte mpt s to intervene in a

n argument involving one of her subor dinates. This diffe renc e in the seve rity of the conduct be tween Plaintiff a nd Dunca n leads thi s court to conclude that no rea sonable jury could find that th e ir c on du c t w a s th e “ same c on du c t” fo r p ur po se s o f t he sim ila rl y sit uate d a na ly sis
. L ooking to the f

actor s t h at t his court examines to determine whe ther a plaintiff has
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a ta s i m i l ar l y s i tu a t e d n o n - m i n o r i t y

e mp l o y e e r e c e i v e d

m o r e f a v o r a b l e t r e a tme nt, part ic u la r ly th e d if

f e r e n c e in s u

p e r v is o r s , Pl a in ti f

f h a s f a il e d to a d d

u c e e v id e n c e f

r o m awhich a
rea sonable jury

could conclude that he and Dunc an we re similarly situated. Ther efor e, Plaintiff has
no t e s t a b l i s h e d t h e f

o u rt h e l e m e n t o f h i s p r i m a f a c i e c a s e , an d s u m m ar

y j u d g m e n t w a s pr op e rl y g ra nte d f or NM P. 5 C. P laintif

f’s Ar gum ent Regar din g the District Court’s Reliance on the Ar bitrator’ s Dec ision At the c on c lus ion

of his br ie f, Pla int if

f c ur s o r i l y a r g u e s that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e rr on e ou sly

he ld that his Title VI I claim was barr ed by the arbitrator’s resolution of his g rieva nce, in contrave ntion of Alexande r v. Gardner- Denv er Co. , 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). While Plainti ff is corre ct that the Supreme C o u rt d i d hold in Alexande r that an ar

bitration proce eding reg ardingan employ ee’ s termination does not pre clude the e mploy ee f rom later br inginga Title VI I ac t i o n , n o such thingNo. 07-1674

Barry v. Noble M

etal Processing, Inc

.

- 14 - occur r e d in th is c a s e . T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s r u li n g o nPl a in ti f

f ’ s T it le V I Ic la im

d id n o t r e ly o nthe arbitrator’s denia l of Plaintiff’s g rieva nce in any

way . I n g ranting summary judgme nt for NMP on Plaintiff’s Title VI Iclaim, the district court conducte d a proper ana ly sis under McD onnell Douglas
and de te rm ine d that no re a so na ble jur y c ou ld c on c lud e that Pla int if f w a s te rm inate d b e c a

us e of his
rac e. Plaintiff’s ar g ument that the district court found that his Titl e VI I cl ai m wa s barr ed by the arbitrator’s dec ision is completely devoid of mer it and does not war rant fur ther discussion. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing rea sons, we AF F IRM the di strict court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt for NMP.