United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 22-30240 

Justin Granier, 

Petitioner—Appellant, 

versus

Tim Hooper, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, 

Respondent—Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 3:18-CV-901 

Before Clement, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Justin Granier petitions for habeas relief from his state conviction of 

second-degree murder. But he cannot meet the strictures of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. 

I. 

 A Louisiana grand jury charged Granier with murdering Luke Villar, 

a DeLaune’s Supermarket employee, while Villar was cleaning the store 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

March 27, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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parking lot. Granier pleaded not guilty. At trial, both sides agreed to empanel 

Juror Gladys Mobley (“Juror Mobley”) without objection. The Louisiana 

jury found Granier guilty of second-degree murder. Granier was sentenced 

to life imprisonment, without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. 

Granier appealed. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed. The 

Louisiana Supreme Court denied review. Granier did not petition for 

certiorari. 

 After his conviction became final, Granier filed an application for 

post-conviction relief in Louisiana state court. The trial court denied all 

claims. The Louisiana Court of Appeal and Louisiana Supreme Court denied 

his writ applications. 

Granier filed a second petition for post-conviction relief in state court, 

raising his claim of juror bias for the first time. Specifically, he argued that 

Juror Mobley knew and failed to disclose during voir dire that her son, Sam 

Mobley, was interviewed as part of the murder investigation. 

The trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing. Upon learning that 

Juror Mobley died before the hearing, Granier filed a motion to submit an 

investigator’s hearsay affidavit. The trial court admitted the hearsay 

evidence. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed, and the Louisiana 

Supreme Court denied Granier’s writ application. 

 On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Sam 

Mobley and Granier’s trial counsel, Wade Petite, testified. Upon Granier’s 

motion, the trial court ordered the State to disclose any information related 

to the search of Sam Mobley’s residence. The State produced Sam Mobley’s 

application for employment at DeLaune’s Supermarket as well as detective 

notes documenting Sam Mobley’s interview, Juror Mobley’s relationship to 

Sam, and Juror Mobley’s address. 

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 Granier then filed a supplemental memorandum, adding a Fifth 

Amendment prosecutorial misconduct claim for failure to disclose Juror 

Mobley’s connection to the case. The State filed multiple motions to dismiss. 

The trial court rejected all the State’s motions. The Louisiana Supreme 

Court reversed. It stated: 

Defendant’s complaint regarding the seating of the nowdeceased juror fails to allege a claim which, if established, 

would entitle him to relief. La.C.Cr.P. art 928. See also Burton 

v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A party who 

seeks a new trial because of non-disclosure by a juror during 

voir dire must show actual bias, either by express admission or 

proof of specific facts showing a close connection to the 

circumstances at hand that bias must be presumed.”). In 

addition, defendant has failed to show the state withheld 

material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 

ROA.4176. 

 Subsequently, Granier filed a petition for federal habeas review under 

the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. The magistrate judge concluded that, absent factual findings on 

whether Granier could prove his allegations, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 

decision was “contrary to clearly established federal law.” ROA.1010. The 

magistrate judge therefore ordered a federal evidentiary hearing. After the 

hearing, however, the magistrate judge agreed with the State and 

recommended the court deny the claims on the merits. The district court 

agreed but granted Granier a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on his 

juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct claims. 

II. 

Our review is highly deferential to the state court’s decision. 

AEDPA’s relitigation bar applies to both of Granier’s claims because the 

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state courts adjudicated them on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under 

the relitigation bar, we are authorized to grant habeas relief only if there “is 

no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision 

conflicts with [the United States Supreme] Court’s precedents.” Harrington 

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). We can only review the state court record 

in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Shoop v. Twyford, 142 S. Ct. 2037, 

2043 (2022); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). These standards 

doom Granier’s claims for both (A) juror bias and (B) prosecutorial 

misconduct. 

A. 

 We first address Granier’s juror bias claim. The Sixth Amendment 

guarantees the right to an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; 

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 377 (2010). “On federal habeas review, 

state court findings concerning a juror’s impartiality are factual 

determinations entitled to a presumption of correctness.” Buckner v. Davis, 

945 F.3d 906, 910 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 

(1984) (finding that a question of juror bias “is plainly one of historical fact”); 

Skilling, 561 U.S. at 386 (emphasizing, on direct review of a federal 

conviction and hence without the added strictures of AEDPA, that reviewing 

courts must resist “second-guessing the trial judge’s estimation of a juror’s 

impartiality”). 

 To bring a claim of bias, Granier “must first demonstrate that a juror 

failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further 

show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge 

for cause.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 

(1984). Granier must first point to a clear voir dire question that Juror Mobley 

failed to answer truthfully. See Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 602 (5th 

Cir. 2009). Then Granier must show that Juror Mobley lied. See id.

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Specifically, Granier must show that—on the record before the state court—

Juror Mobley knew about her son’s connection to the case and lied, not 

merely that she provided an inaccurate or incomplete answer. See id. 

Allegations based on “subjective,” “vague and ambiguous” questions are 

insufficient. Id. Then of course, even assuming he could show that Juror 

Mobley was unconstitutionally biased, Granier would also have to show that 

the Louisiana state court’s contrary determination was not only wrong but 

was so wrong that it contravened AEDPA’s relitigation bar. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). 

Granier cannot come close to meeting these standards. He does not 

identify any voir dire question that Juror Mobley failed to answer honestly. 

Nor can he state a claim—much less overcome the relitigation bar—by 

arguing that Juror Mobley failed to disclose her knowledge. The record 

before the state court—which is all that matters for the relitigation bar, see 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)—contained only Sam Mobley’s testimony, Wade 

Petite’s testimony, and the police notes. Taken together, they don’t prove 

that Juror Mobley failed to disclose anything. 

Granier also argues that we should imply Juror Mobley’s bias. This 

implied-bias claim faces two insurmountable hurdles. First, Granier 

concedes that he cannot meet the McDonough Power Equipment framework. 

And second, it’s impossible for Granier to show that the state court 

contravened “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States” if he cannot point to a relevant holding from the 

Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (holding that “clearly established Federal law” in 

§ 2254(d)(1) “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s 

decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision” (emphasis 

added)); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (same). But Granier can 

point to no such holding. The best he can muster is Justice O’Connor’s 

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concurrence in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), and Justice Brennan’s 

concurrence in McDonough Power Equipment. But concurrences do not create 

clearly established law. See Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Accordingly, we 

cannot rely on these authorities, and Granier’s bias claims fail. 

B. 

 Granier also brings a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, alleging that 

the State violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process when it withheld 

information about Juror Mobley and failed to correct her during voir dire. 

The success of this claim depends on his juror bias claim. Because his juror 

bias claim fails, his prosecutorial misconduct one does too. 

III. 

 Finally, even if Granier could satisfy AEDPA’s rigid threshold 

requirements, he still cannot show that “law and justice require” his release. 

28 U.S.C. § 2243. That’s because “law and justice do not compel issuance 

of the writ in the absence of factual innocence,” and Granier has never 

claimed to be factually innocent. Crawford v. Cain, 55 F.4th 981, 993–94 (5th 

Cir. 2022). 

AFFIRMED. 

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