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D ock e t 96-7299

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. e du/thir dc ir c uit_1997/186iled August 11, 1997

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 96-7299

ROBERT EUGENE ROGERS,

Appellant

v.

OFFICER KEVIN POWELL; OFFICER JEFFREY STINE, a/k/a Stiney; OFFICER TIMOTHY EILER;
OFFICER JAMES EDWARDS,

Appellees

On Appeal From the United States District Court For the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-01204)

Argued: January 28, 1997

Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges , and ORLOFSKY, District Judge .*

(Filed August 11, 1997)

DONALD A. BAILEY, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) 3540 Progress Avenue, Suite 209 Harrisburg, PA 17110

Attorney for Appellant

___________________________________________________ ______________ * Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky, United States Dist rict Judge for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation.THOMAS W. CORBETT, JR.,

ESQUIRE Attorney General
JACQUELINE E. JACKSON- DEGARCIA, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) Deputy Attorney General CALVIN R. KOONS, ESQUIRE Senior Deputy Attorney General
JOHN G. KNORR, III, ESQUIRE Chief Deputy Attorney General

Office of Attorney General Strawberry Square, 15th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120

Attorneys for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURTCKER, Circuit Judge

.

This is an appeal by plaintiff Robert Rogers from a district court final judgment in a civil rights act ion, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in favor of four Pennsylvania state police troopers who Rogers claims violated his civil right s by arresting him without probable cause and by using

excessive force in connection with the arrest. The unlawful arrest claim was disposed of by summary judgment. T he excessive force claim was tried to a jury which fou nd for the

defendants. We find no error in connection with the trial, and affirm summarily with respect to the excessive force claim. However, we find the existence of a triable fact with respect to aspects of the unlawful arrest claim aga inst some

of the defendants.

More specifically, we conclude that the information received by Trooper James Edwards from Probation Of ficer Rita Miller about the supposed existence of an arre st warrant for Rogers was too insubstantial to justify detaining him. Moreover, because Edwards' reliance on the vague and inconclusive statements of a parole offic er was not reasonable, he was not entitled to qualified im munity.

2Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as t o

Edwards. With respect to Trooper Timothy Eiler, who arrested Rogers along with Edwards based on Edwards ' representation that there was a valid arrest warran t, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the grounds that he is properly held entitled to qualified immunity.

We also conclude that Troopers Jeffrey Stine and Ke vin Powell, whose detention of Rogers was also based on Edwards' representation, are entitled to qualified immunity, but only up to the point at which they were informe d that there was no reason to hold Rogers in custody. Thei r qualified immunity disappeared when they continued to detain him for approximately one hour thereafter. W e therefore affirm in part and reverse in part with r espect to
Stine and Powell.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On September 25, 1994, Troopers James Edwards and Timothy Eiler were working the midnight shift in Cl inton County, Pennsylvania.1 Edwards was assigned to the desk while Eiler was on patrol with Trooper Dale Gillett e. Prior to starting his shift, Edwards claims that he had spok en with Trooper Davy. During this conversation, Davy allege dly mentioned that there was a "court paper out on Roge rs." The record, however, is devoid of any declaration o r deposition by Davy, so we cannot confirm exactly wh at he
said to Edwards.

Later that evening Edwards received a report of afi ght in nearby Logantown in which Rogers was allegedly invo lved. Edwards dispatched Eiler and Gillette to the scene of the fight. When they arrived, Rogers was not present. E iler and Gillette then began to search for him. At this poin t, because of Edwards' earlier conversation with Davy, as well as Rogers' alleged involvement in the Logantown fight, Edwards decided to determine if any warrants were p ending for Rogers.

Following Pennsylvania State Police procedure, Edwa rds contacted the Clinton County Communications Center

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1. The "midnight shift" began at 11 P.M. on Septemb er 25, and ended at 7 A.M. on September 26.

3which informed him that there were two summary warr ants

pending for Rogers. Additionally, Edwards said he w as informed that there might be other "open" paperwork on Rogers from the Clinton County Probation Office. As a result, Edwards called the probation office and req uested that the officer on duty that evening contact him. Edwards
then contacted Eiler and Gillette and told them not to pick up Rogers if they found him because the only warran ts of whose existence Edwards knew were summary warrants. When an individual is arrested for outstanding summ ary offense warrants, he must be taken to appear before the proper issuing authority "without delay." Pa. R. Cr . P. 76(b)(4). Therefore, officers typically do not arre st an individual during the late evening or early morning hours for outstanding summary offense warrants because th ey are reluctant to awaken the district justice on dut y.

Later that night, Rita Miller, from the Clinton Cou nty Probation Office responded to Edwards' call. She to o advised Edwards of the two summary warrants. Miller also stated that Trooper Davy wanted Rogers "because he [Davy] said that Lycoming County said that they'll hold hi m as an absconding witness."2 Edwards maintains that this statement gave him the belief that there was a warr ant for Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County.

A transcript of the conversation between Edwards an d Miller, prepared by police communications officer R uth Eoute at the request of Sergeant Salinas of the Pennsylvania State Police, the accuracy of which is not disputed by any of the parties, supports Miller's c laim that

she never confirmed the existence of a warrant for Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County:

Edwards: State Police, Tpr. Edwards.

Miller: Hi, it's Rita Miller.

Edwards: Rita?

Miller: Yeah.

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2. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5125 (West 1983) (dealin g with "absconding witnesses" and defining the offense as a misdemeanor of the third degree).

4Edwards: Do you want Robert Rogers?

Miller: There's a warrant out for him. It's a summary warrant. Davy wants him. Because he says that Lycoming County said that they'll have him as an absconding witness.

Edwards: Who will? Lycoming County?

Miller: Yeah. Because he's to testify against Doctor Bender in the hearing.

Edwards: Mm Hm.

Miller: Okay. And also I think there's two warrants out from Lycoming County.3 I think they're both from Frazier's office

. One's for Hit and Run over at (inaudible ) and one's for assaulting that guy and th ey charged him with harassment. So he has two summary warrants. Do you have them? Copies of the warrants.

Edwards: No. The Comm. Center does.

Miller: Okay. No. I don't have him on any more because they left him off of probation a fter giving him that deal. You know, if he wo uld testify?

Edwards: Yeah.

Miller: So I don't have anything on him any more

. Do you guys have him?

Edwards: No. He's with Mike Marshall tonight and Gilly Stevenson and they're causing some

shit.

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3. In her sworn deposition, Miller stated that she misspoke at this point

in the conversation with Edwards. Frazier is a dist rict justice in Clinton County, so it seems clear from the context of the c onversation that Miller intended to say "there's two warrants out from Clin ton County" when in fact she said "there's two warrants out from Lycomi ng County." We conclude from Edwards' response that he, too, under stood that Miller meant to refer to Clinton County, rather that Lycom ing County at this point in the conversation. (Appellees' Supplemental Appendix, p. 169).

5Miller: Mm Hm.

Edwards: So, uh, the one guy that was out on the road (inaudible)

Miller: Mm Hm.

Edwards: So they went to look to get him again an d he had left. So they're going down to a place in Flemington to see if they're do wn there.

Miller: Okay.

Edwards: So then if they get him, definitely pick him up. Yes?

Miller: Yeah. They can pick him up on the warrants and then they can let Lycoming County know and they were going to put like high bail on him to hold him so tha t he'd be able to testify at the trial.

Edwards: Okay. If we're going to pick him up for the warrants, what are we to do, take him to Lycoming County or take him here?

Miller: You better bring him here. And then get ahold of Trooper Davy and let him get ahold of Lycoming County and let them know. Because he said (inaudible), Davy

did.

Edwards: This is Bob Rogers the third?

Miller: Yep.

Edwards: Okay. Okay.

Miller: Okay?

Edwards: Go back to sleep.

Miller: Thanks.

Edwards: Bye.

Miller: Bye.

After this conversation, Edwards radioed Gillette a nd Eiler and told them that if they found Rogers, they shoul d arrest him. Gillette and Eiler did not locate Rogers that evening.

6The following evening, Edwards, Eiler, and Gillette were

again working the midnight shift. This time Edwards and Eiler were on patrol and Gillette was on desk duty. At approximately 2:40 A.M., Gillette dispatched Eiler and Edwards to Dr. Barry Bender's residence. When they arrived at the residence, Bender informed the two t roopers that they were not needed. Edwards and Eiler left, but returned within twenty minutes after Gillette again dispatched them to Bender's residence because Roger s was creating a disturbance inside Bender's house. After receiving consent to enter, Edwards and Eiler arres ted Rogers inside. When Rogers demanded to see the warr ant for his arrest, Edwards replied that he did not hav e the warrant and that Rogers would see it when he arrive d at the Montoursville State Police Barracks in Lycoming County. Edwards and Eiler left Bender's residence w ith Rogers at 3:19 A.M.

While en route to Lycoming County, Edwards contacte d Gillette and requested that Gillette arrange for a patrol car to meet them at the Clinton/Lycoming County line. G illette then contacted the dispatch officer in Lycoming Cou nty, Police Communications Officer James Pfleegor, to re quest that he send a patrol car to the county line. Gille tte informed Pfleegor that Rogers was being transferred to their custody because there was an outstanding warrant or detainer waiting for him at Lycoming County Prison. At approximately 3:54 A.M., Pfleegor dispatched Troope rs Stine and Powell to the county line to transport Ro gers to Lycoming County Prison. Edwards and Eiler took Roge rs to the county line and transferred him to the custody of Stine and Powell. Stine and Powell did not personally kno w Edwards or Eiler, or know of Rogers before this tra nsfer. When Stine and Powell took Rogers into their custod y, they noticed that he was belligerent and appeared to be

intoxicated.

While en route to the Lycoming County Prison, Stine and Powell radioed Pfleegor and requested that he notif y the prison that they would be arriving shortly with Rog ers and that the prison should begin to prepare any necessa ry paperwork. Pfleegor radioed back a short time later and informed Stine and Powell that the prison could not locate

7an outstanding warrant or detainer for Rogers' arre st.

According to Stine and Powell, they did not immedia tely release Rogers after receiving Pfleegor's message b ecause they were unclear as to whether an outstanding warr ant or detainer for Rogers' arrest existed. Instead, they drove to the Montoursville Barracks to clarify the situation

.

Once they reached the barracks, both troopers took Rogers upstairs to the patrol room. It was at this point that the incident occurred between Stine and Rogers givi ng rise to the excessive force claim. Stine then sat Rogers into a chair, placed handcuffs on him, and connected him t o a chain on the floor. Rogers fell asleep.

While Rogers was sleeping, Powell spoke with Nancy Butts, an assistant district attorney of Lycoming C ounty. Butts advised Powell that there was no outstanding bench warrant or detainer for Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County and that since they had no reason to hold Rogers th ey should release him and transport him back to the co unty
line.

At some point after 5:45 A.M., notwithstanding Butt 's advice, Powell and Stine transported Rogers in hand cuffs back to the county line. Edwards, Eiler, and Davy m et Stine and Powell at the county line. Rogers remained in handcuffs until he was released back to Edwards, Ei ler, and Davy at approximately 6:04 A.M. Rogers was fina lly dropped off, at his request, at the Dunkin Donuts i n Lock Haven, Clinton County at approximately 6:25 A.M.

Rogers brought suit against Powell, Stine, Eiler, a nd Edwards pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the offic ers violated his right to be free from unlawful seizure s under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 The defenda nts

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4. In addition to his unlawful seizure claims again st all four defendants, Rogers brought two claims solely against Stine. Fir st, Rogers brought a § 1983 claim against Stine arising out of an incide nt at the Montoursville Barracks alleging that Stine violated his right to be free from excessive

force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. S tine moved for summary judgment as to this excessive force claim, but the District

Court denied Stine's motion. The claim went to tria l and the jury entered a verdict in favor of Stine. Rogers asserts that th e district court erred in

8moved for summary judgment on the grounds that no

genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the issue of whether the troopers had probable cause to arrest Rogers without a warrant. The district court agreed , and granted the defendants' motion.

The district court properly exercised its jurisdict ion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; we exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our revi ew of the district court's grant of summary judgment is plena ry. Ersek v. Township of Springfield , 102 F.3d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1996).

II. The Unlawful Arrest Claim

We begin our inquiry by examining the question whet her the arrest of Rogers was unlawful and thus violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unlawful seizure. That the defendants may have violated the Fourth Amendment does not end our inquiry, however. They w ill be liable for damages only if the doctrine of quali fied immunity does not protect them.

A. The Applicable Rules

The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer fro m arresting a citizen except upon probable cause. Ors atti v. New Jersey State Police , 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville , 405 U.S. 156 (1972)). In Pennsylvania, "[n]o arrest warrant shal l issue but upon probable cause . . ." Pa. R. Cr. Pr. 119. The gravamen of Rogers' claim is that he was arrested w ithout the requisite probable cause. The crux of the defen dants' argument is that Edwards' mistaken belief that an a rrest warrant had issued for Rogers supplied the probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment.

___________________________________________________ ______________

refusing to allow him to offer evidence during the trial that he suffered some type of injury or damage during the incident. We find this claim patently without merit.

Rogers also brought a pendent state law assault cla im against Trooper Stine. The district court granted Stine's motion fo r summary judgment as to this claim on sovereign immunity grounds. Rog ers did not appeal this ruling.

9"[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts a nd

circumstances within the arresting officer's knowle dge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable pe rson to believe that an offense has been or is being commit ted by the person to be arrested." Orsatti , 71 F.3d at 483. The district court found that no genuine issue of mater ial fact existed with respect to whether the officers had pr obable cause to arrest Rogers without a warrant because Ed wards' conversations with Davy and Miller supplied him wit h the "facts and circumstances" necessary to support his finding of probable cause to arrest Rogers.

The district court's conclusion was legally erroneo us because statements by fellow officers conveying tha t there is probable cause for a person's arrest, by themsel ves, cannot provide the "facts and circumstances" necess ary to support a finding of probable cause. Whitely v. War den , 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971) ("[A]n otherwise illegal arres t cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to m ake the arrest."). Probable cause exists only if the statem ents made by fellow officers are supported by actual facts th at satisfy the probable cause standard. In United States v. He nsley , 469 U.S. 221 (1985) the Court held that the lawfuln ess of
a seizure made in reliance on the statements of fel low
officers

turns on whether the officers who issued the [statements] possessed probable cause to make the arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying o n the [statements] were themselves aware of the specific facts which led their colleagues to seek their assistance

.

Id. at 231.

Thus, the required basis for a lawful seizure where police rely on the statements of fellow officers is as fol lows. The legality of a seizure based solely on statements is sued by fellow officers depends on whether the officers who issued the statements possessed the requisite basis to sei ze the suspect. Id. at 231. Moreover, an officer can lawfully act solely on the basis of statements issued by fellow officers if the officers issuing the statements possessed the f acts and circumstances necessary to support a finding of the requisite basis. Id. at 232.

10We now apply these teachings to the facts to determ ine

whether Rogers' Fourth Amendment rights were violat ed as
a result of his arrest.

B. Lawfulness of the Arrest in this Case

We conclude that the arrest of Rogers was unlawful. Edwards had no knowledge of any facts or circumstan ces to support his own independent determination that prob able cause to arrest Rogers existed.5 He relied solely o n the statements made by Davy and Miller in arresting Rog ers. However, it is clear that neither Davy nor Miller h ad knowledge of the requisite facts and circumstances necessary to support a finding of probable cause to arrest Rogers.

Edwards arrested Rogers on the basis of the suppose d Lycoming County arrest warrants. The undisputed fac ts make clear that no warrant existed in Lycoming Coun ty for Rogers' arrest. Miller did not confirm the existenc e of any Lycoming County warrants. Miller did nothing more t han
relate her awareness of rumors that were circulatin g about the possibility that an arrest warrant had issued, or was going to issue for Rogers in Lycoming County.6 At o ne

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5. We reject the appellee's suggestion that because Edwards could have lawfully arrested Rogers on the basis of two outsta nding summary warrants in Clinton County, he possessed the requis ite probable cause. It is clear from Edwards' signed declaration and th e circumstances of Rogers' arrest that the summary warrants were not t he basis for the

arrest.

We acknowledge that an arrest is not rendered inval id by the fact that the basis for the arrest, though legitimate, was me rely pretextual. See
Whren v. United States , 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). In other words, had Edwards actually arrested Rogers on the basis o f the summary warrants, even though he had subjectively arrested Rogers based on a non-existing Lycoming County warrant, he might have had the requisite probable cause. However, Edwards did not articulate the legitimate basis for the arrest (the Clinton County summary warrants ) at the time of the seizure, nor did he advance it as a justification f or the arrest at any point in the proceedings prior to this appeal. Alth ough we do not reach the issue, we would be troubled by an argument sugg esting that a legitimate basis for an arrest identified only afte r the arrest would provide sufficient grounds therefor. 6. The only clear statement Miller made to Edwards concerning the existence of arrest warrants for Rogers referred to the Clinton County summary warrants, but those warrants were not the b asis for Rogers'

arrest.

11point, she said "So I don't have anything on him an ymore."

There is no information in the record about Davy's communication with Edwards, except that Miller said that Davy said that Lycoming County said that they'll ha ve him as an absconding witness. That is "thin soup", as t he old saying goes. Therefore, Edwards relied solely on hi s fellow officers' statements in arresting Rogers on the bas is of a Lycoming County arrest warrant, and none of those o fficers had knowledge of facts and circumstances to support an independent finding of probable cause.

Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, had no know ledge of facts or circumstances sufficient to support an independent determination of probable cause to arre st Rogers; all of them relied on the statements of oth ers. Eiler, Stine, and Powell relied solely on the statements o f Edwards in determining that there was probable caus e. Although there will be differences when we address the question of qualified immunity, at this juncture th e significant question remains the same: did the offi cer making the statements (in this case Edwards) have knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a conclusion of probable cause? As we have already concluded, the answer is no. Thus, under Whitely and Hensley , Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, did not have probable cause to arrest Rogers, and as a resu lt, the arrest was unlawful and violated Rogers' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures.

III. Qualified Immunity

A. The Applicable Rules

Despite unlawfully arresting Rogers and violating h is Fourth Amendment rights, the defendants may still b e shielded from civil liability by the doctrine of qu alified immunity.7 The doctrine of qualified immunity prote cts "government officials performing discretionary func tions . . .

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7. The district court never reached the qualified i mmunity question

because it determined that the officers had lawfull y arrested Rogers. However, since the qualified immunity issue is prim arily a question of law and was raised by the defendants in both their motions for summary judgment and their appeal, we will address the issu e.

12from liability for civil damages insofar as their c onduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or consti tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have know n." Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The reasoning behind the doctrine is that "[r]eliance o n the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, s hould avoid excessive disruptions of government and permi t the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." Id. (footnote omitted).

Whether a government official is entitled to protec tion under the doctrine of qualified immunity is a"purel y legal question." Acierno v. Cloutier , 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 1994). The appropriate inquiry is as follows:

On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, b ut whether that law was clearly established at the tim e an action occurred. If the law at that time was not cl early established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal development s, nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawf ul. . . . If the law was clearly established, the immun ity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.

Harlow , 457 U.S. at 818-19. Moreover, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasona ble official would understand that what he is doing violates tha t right." Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

The closest case to the one at bar is Capone v. Mar inelli , 868 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1989). In Capone , a police officer took an affidavit alleging probable cause for arres t based on criminal conduct attributed to Capone. Id. at 103. An arrest warrant was issued, the details of which were enter ed into the National Crime Information Center computer syst em which sent out an electronically transmitted bullet in across the country. Id. The bulletin clearly stated that Capone was wanted for kidnapping and other offenses, and that a warrant had been issued for his arrest. Id. Two days later

13 a police officer from a different Pennsylvania coun ty arrested Capone in reliance on that bulletin. Id.

We granted summary judgment in favor of the officer s, holding that a "police officer who reasonably relie s upon a bulletin that establishes the existence of a warran t for arrest is entitled to qualified immunity in a civil rights action brought against him for unlawful arrest andprosecution." Id. at 104. Our decision relied heavily on the

dicta in Whitely and Hensley . In Whitely , the Court stated:

We do not, of course, question that the . . . polic e were entitled to act on the strength of the radio bullet in. Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magist rate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause.

401 U.S. at 568.

In Hensley , the Court wrote:

If the flyer has been issued in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment. In such a situation, of course, the officers making th e stop may have a good-faith defense to any civil sui t. It is the objective reading of the flyer or bulletin t hat determines whether other police officers can defens ibly

act in reliance on it.

469 U.S. 232-33 (emphasis added). Thus we concluded in Capone :

Given that the . . . bulletin expressly states that a warrant existed for the arrest of Capone, as well a s the nature of the alleged offenses . . . [the] officer[ 's] reliance upon the bulletin cannot be said to have b een unreasonable. Therefore, as a matter of law, the protection of qualified immunity . . . extends to[t he officer].

868 F.2d at 106. These cases teach us that the acti ons of a police officer acting in reliance on what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fellow police officer may b e

14reasonable nonetheless and thus protected by the do ctrine

of qualified immunity.

Although Capone dealt with the objective reading of a written flyer or bulletin, we see no reason why the same analysis should not be used in considering oral sta tements. Therefore, we hold that where a police officer make s an arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow of ficers, an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in a civil rights suit for unlawful arrest provided it was objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the b asis of the statements, that probable cause for the arrest exis ted.

B. Immunity in this Case

1. Edwards

Edwards acted in reliance on statements made by Dav y and Miller concerning the existence of an outstandi ng arrest warrant for Rogers in Lycoming County. The r elevant question is whether it was objectively reasonable f or him to believe, on the basis of the statements, that proba ble cause existed for the arrest. Unlike the officers in Capo ne , Edwards never received a clear statement from a fel low law enforcement officer confirming the existence of pro bable cause for the suspect's arrest. The content of the statements made by Davy and Miller merely related r umors that were circulating about Rogers. The statements never confirmed the existence of an arrest warrant for Ro gers in Lycoming County. Statements made by Miller regardin g the existence of summary warrants in Clinton County wer e sufficiently clear; however those statements are no t relevant since the summary warrants were not the basis for Edwards' arrest of Rogers.

Given the facts before us and in the absence of any statement confirming the existence of probable caus e or a warrant itself, we do not believe that Edwards' rel iance on the statements was reasonable. Thus, as a matter of law it was not objectively reasonable for Edwards to belie ve that probable cause existed for the arrest and hence Edw ards is not protected against Rogers' § 1983 claim by the d octrine of qualified immunity. Accordingly, we will reverse the

15district court's order granting summary judgment as to

Edwards.8

2. Eiler

Eiler acted in reliance on the statements of Edward s. Unlike the vague statements of Davy and Miller, the statements made by Edwards to the other troopers in volved were clear, and unambiguously related the existence of an arrest warrant for Rogers in Lycoming County. The circumstances surrounding Eiler's participation in Rogers' arrest are very similar to the circumstances in Cap one and as a matter of law we find that it was objectively reasonable for Eiler to believe that probable cause existed fo r the

arrest.

Although the district court wrongly granted summary judgment as to Eiler on the basis of a finding of p robable cause for the arrest, we will affirm the order on t he alternative grounds that having participated in the unlawful arrest of Rogers, Eiler is nonetheless shielded fro m civil liability for the § 1983 claim by the doctrine of q ualified immunity. See Williams v. Stone , 109 F.3d 890, 891 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming the judgment of the district court, although on different grounds than those relied upo n by the district court).

3. Powell and Stine

Our holding as to Eiler largely controls our analys is of qualified immunity for Powell and Stine. Powell and Stine acted on the basis of the statements made by Edward s and conveyed by the Lycoming County dispatcher Pfleegor , stating that Rogers needed to be transported to the

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8. Despite our conclusions that the arrest of Roger s was unlawful and that Edwards is not shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity, we do not enter summary judgment for Roge rs. The district court never ruled on Rogers' motion for summary jud gment, and hence Rogers was not able to appeal the issue to this cou rt. We recognize precedent which, broadly construed, suggests that w e could appropriately enter summary judgment for Rogers in this instance. See

Schmidt v. Farm Credit Services , 977 F.2d 511, 513 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992).

However we decline to do so and instead remand the matter to the
district court for decision in the first instance.

16Lycoming County Prison pursuant to an arrest warran t. It

was objectively reasonable for Powell and Stine to believe, on the basis of those statements, that probable cau se existed for the arrest of Rogers. Thus, for the ini tial period of time that Powell and Stine held Rogers, they are protected from Rogers' § 1983 claim by the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Powell and Stine do not enjoy qualified immunity, however, beyond the time at which assistant distric t attorney Butts communicated to them that there was no reason to hold Rogers in custody. Continuing to hol d an
individual in handcuffs once it has been determined that
there was no lawful basis for the initial seizure i s unlawful within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Uni ted

States v. Shareef , 100 F.3d 1491, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996). Of course, we recognize the possibility of some additi onal basis, independent of that claimed to support the i nitial seizure, that could support an official continuing to hold an individual in handcuffs. However, no such basis exi sts here.9 As noted, Powell and Stine failed to remove the han dcuffs from Rogers when they learned from their conversati on with Butts that there was no basis for holding him, but rather detained him for an additional period time. For thi s reason they are not immunized from a § 1983 claim by Roger s regarding this final interval of time. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's or der granting summary judgment as to Powell and Stine. T he precise length of the additional holding period can not be
determined from the evidence contained in the recor d and
will have to be decided on remand.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the district court's gran t of summary judgment in favor of Eiler will be affirmed . The court's order granting summary judgment as to Edwar ds

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9. Even assuming, without so holding, that the offi cers might have been justified in leaving the handcuffs on Rogers while transporting him to Clinton County had Rogers' behavior posed a threat of some kind during that time, there is nothing in the record to indica te that Rogers posed such a threat, nor did the appellees raise such an argument in these proceedings.

17will be reversed. The grant of summary judgment as to

Powell and Stine will be affirmed in part but also reversed in part, and the cases against Edwards, Powell, and Stine

will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

18