## Un ited S ta tes Co u rt o f A p p eals F O R T H E E IG H T H C IR C U IT

____ ____ ___ N o. 09- 1025

____ ____ ___ N an cy Ma de r, P er sona l R ep re se nta tiv e * of the E state of Robert Ma der * * Appe llant, * * Appeal f

rom the United State s v. * D istri ct Co urt f or the * District of N ebraska. United States of Am erica , * * Appellee. *

____ ____ ___ Su bm itt ed : O ct obe r 22, 200 9 Fi le d: A ugus t 31 , 201 0

____ ____ ___ Be fo re BY E , BE A M and S H E PH E RD , Ci rc uit Jud ge s.

____ ____ ___ BYE , C ircuit Judg e. N an cy Ma de r sue d th e U nit ed S ta te s unde r the F ed er al T ort C la im s A ct , al legi ng the D ep ar

tm en t of V et er an s A ff

ai rs ( V A ) ac te d ne gli ge ntl y in pr ovi din g m ed ic al tr ea tm en t t o he r la te hus ba nd, Ro be rt Ma de r. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e gove rn m en t’ s m oti on to dism iss fo r la ck of sub j ec t m at te r j ur isd ic tio n, F ed

. R. Ci v. P. 12( b) (1 ), hol din g M ad er ’ s f ai lur e to p ro vid e the V A w ith pr oof of he r sta tus a s th e l eg al re p re s e n t a t i v e o f h erh u s b an d ’s es t at e, as we l l as p ro o f o f M ad er ’s at t o rn ey’s authorityto bring a claim on her behalf, precluded j urisdictio n. W e co n cl u de a pla int if f m ee ts the A ct ’ s j ur isd ic tio na l pr er equis ite s w he n sh e pr ovi de s th e re le va nt ag en cy wit h “ (1 ) su ffi ci en t i nf

or m at i o n forth e ag en cy

to in ve st ig at e th e cl ai m s . . .T his opi nio n w ill a lte rn at ive ly r ef er to N an cy Ma de r as sim

ply “ Ma de r. ” A ll 1 refe rences to Robert Ma der w ill includ e his full nam e. -2

- a n d ( 2 ) t h e a mo u n t o f d a ma g e s s o u g h t

. ” F a rme r s S t a t e S a v . B a n kv . F a rme r s H o me A dm in. , 866 F

. 2d 2 76, 277 (8 th Ci r. 1989 ). Be ca use Ma de r m et

the se r equir em en ts,
w e re ve rs e an d r em an d.

I

Ro be rt Ma de r re ce ive d m ed ic al c ar e at the V et er an s A ff

ai rs Me dic al Ce nte r in L inc oln , N eb ra ska

. O n or ab out May 28, 2004 , a phy sic ian in str uc te d M r. Ma de r to ta pe r of f his pr ev iou sly pr es cr ibe d m ed ic ine of Pa xil by ta kin g ha lf a ta ble t da ily f or one w ee k and the n stoppi ng ent ir el y . Mr

. Ma de r w as the n in str uc te d to be ginta kin g Seroquel. Mr. Mader followed these instructio ns. O n or about August 3, 2004, Mr. Ma de r die d du e to a

se lf -i nf lic te d gu nsho t w ound

to the he ad

.
N an cy Mader f ir st s ough t an a dm ini str at ive r em edy , f ili ng a c om pla int w ith 1 the V A , a lle gin g ne gli ge nc e in the V A ’ s m ed ic al care of he r husb an d. A ft er r ec ei vin g the c om pla int , the V A re que ste d pr oof of Ma de r’ s sta tus as the le ga l r ep re se nta tiv e of he r husb an d’s es ta te , a s w el l a s pr oof of Ma de r’ s a tto rn ey ’ s auth or ity to br ing a cl ai m on he r be ha lf

. N ei the r Ma de r nor

he r at tor ne y r es pond ed

to thi s r eque st. T he V A de nie d M ad er ’ s a dm ini str at ive c la im on b o thp r o c e d

ur a l a nd s ubst an tiv e gr ound s. First, the VAfound that Mader, by failing to subm it the requested agency in fo rm at io n, ha d f

ai le d to pe rf

ec t a c la im

. S ec ond, a nd i n th e al te rn at ive , the VA fo und tha t e ve n if

Ma de r ha d su

bm itt ed ava lid c la im , no n eg lig en ce oc curr ed in the
care of Robert Mader

.
N an cy Ma de r fi le d su it in d istri ct c ourt un de r the F ed er al T ort Cl ai m s A ct

. T he U nit ed S ta te s br ough t a

m oti on t o di sm is s purs ua nt t o F ed er al Ru le s of Ci vil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court granted the governm ent’ s m otion , holding th at Ma de r, by

f ai lin g to an sw er

the V A ’ s r eque st f

or inf orm at ion , ha d f

ai le d to sa tis fy

the-3

-

j ur isd ic tio na l pr er eq ui si tes t o br ing ing a n a ct ionin fe de ra l c ourt. A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed

Ma de r’ s c om

pla int wit ho ut pre

j udi ce
. Ma de r ap pe al s th e dism issal of her case.

II

This court review s the district court’ s subject m atter j urisdictio n de novo
. See Ke ene Corp. v. Ca ss, 908 F.2d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1990).

The U nite d St at es enj oy s sovereign imm unityexcept to the extent it has
co ns en te d t o b e su ed . Uni te d S ta te s v . She rwo od , 31 2 U.S. 5 8 4 , 58 6 (1 94 1) ; Io wa Pub. Se rv. C o. v. Iowa

State C omm erce Com ’ n, 407 F. 2d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 1969 ). A c or oll ar

y to the im

m uni ty doc tr ine is the r

ule tha t the U nit ed

S ta te s m ay

de fi ne the
co nditi ons unde r w hic h a ct ion s are pe rm itt ed a ga ins t i t. P et er son v. U nit ed S ta te s, 428 F.2d 368 , 369 (8th Cir. 1970 ).

The c ondi tion at iss ue here is the r equirem ent found at 28 U. S. C. § 267 5(a) that a claim be properly

presented to the appropriate federa l agency and denied before an
ac tio n c anbe br ought in fed era l di str ic t c ourt. T his c ourt ha s he ld tha t the adm ini str at ive ex haust ion re qui re m en t of 28 U. S. C. § 2675( a) is j ur isd ic tio na l, Me lo
v. U nit ed S ta te s, 505 F

. 2d 1 026, 102 8 ( 8thCi r. 197 4) ; M ee ke r v. U nit ed St at es , 435 F. 2d 1 219, 122 0 ( 8thCi r. 197 0) , a nd thus, it c an not be w ai ve d.

Se ct ion267 5( a) sta te s, in re le va nt par t: “ A n act ion sha ll not be ins tit ute d up on a cl ai m a ga ins t the U nit ed

S ta te s
. . . unl es s th e cl ai m an t sh al l have f ir st p re se nte d th e cl ai m to the appr opr ia te F ed er al ag en cy
. . . . ” T he statut e is s ile nt o n th e m eanin g of th e p hr as e “ pr es en te d t he cla im .”

T he r el ev an t l eg isl at ive his tor y de sc ri be d th e adm inistr at ive e xhaust ion
re qui re m en t a s:-4

-

int en de d to e as e co urt c onge sti on and av oid unn ec es sa ry

li tig at ion , w hil e m ak ing it

possib le f

or the G ove rn m en t t o e xpe dit e the f ai r settlem ent of tort claim s asserted against the United States. In accom pli s hing these purposes, the m ore expeditious procedures pr ovi de d by

thi s bi ll w ill ha ve the e ff ec t of r ed uc in g the nu m

be r of p e n d i n g c l a i ms w h i c h ma y b e c o me s t a l e b e c au s e o f t h e e x t e n d e dt i me re qui re d f

or the ir c onsi de rat ion. T he c om m itt ee obs er

ve s th at the im pr ove m en ts c ont em

pla te d by the bil l w oul d no t on ly be nefi t pr iva te lit igants , but

w oul d a lso be be ne fi ci al to the co urts, the ag en ci es , a nd the De partm ent of Justice itself. S. Rep . No. 8 9- 13 27 (19 66 ), as rep rin te d i n 1 96 6 U.S.C.C .A.N 25 15 , 25 16

.
T he D ep ar

tm en t of Jus tic e ha s pr om

ulg at ed r eg ul at ions gov er

nin g th e presentm ent process which the governm ent contends govern the suffic iency of notice fo r j ur isd ic tio na l purp ose s. T he r el ev an t r eg ulati on , 28 C. F. R. § 14

. 2, state s, in
re le va nt p ar

t:
a claim shall be deem ed to have been presented when a Federa l agency rece ives from

a claim ant, his duly authorized ag en t or legal represe ntative, an exec uted Standard Form 95 or o t h er w ritten notification o f an incident, a ccom panied by a claim for m oney

dam ages i n a s u m c e rt a i n f

o r i n j u ry t o o r l o s s o f p r o p e rt y , p e r s o n a l i n j u ry , or de ath a lle ge d to ha ve oc curr ed by re as on of the inc ide nt; a nd the ti tle or le ga l c ap ac ity

of the pe rs on signi ng, an d is acc om pa nie d by ev ide nc e of his au tho ri ty

to pr es en t a

c la im on b eh al f of

the c la im an t a s a ge nt, executor, adm inistrator, pare nt, guardian, or other represe ntative.

28 C.F. R. § 14.2(a).

T he re is a spl it of

auth or ity

a m on g c ourts r eg ar din g th e sc ope of the j urisdictio nal prerequisites necessary to hear cla im s brough t pursuant to the Federal T ort C la im s A ct

. T he m ajority of c ourts h av e he ld tha t a

pla int if f m ust gi ve the ap pli ca ble a ge nc y

“ m ini m al not ic e, ” w hic h in cl ude s (1 ) a w ri tte n st at em en t-5

-

suf fi ci en tly de sc ri bin g the inj ur

y to en ab le the ag en cy

to be ginit s ow n in ve sti ga tio n, an d ( 2) asum -c er

ta in d am ag es cl ai m
. Se e, e. g. , G A F Co rp
. v. U nit ed S ta te s, 818 F

. 2d 901, 919 ( D

. C. Ci r. 1987 ). A m ino ri ty of c ourts h av e im

pose d am or e str ing en t standard, holding that a plaintiff m ust com ply wi t h ea ch of the regulatory requirem ents found in 28 C.F. R. § 14.2, which include evidence of “ the title or legal
ca pa ci ty o f th e pers on s ign ing

. . . a cc om pa nie d by

e vid en ce of

his auth or ity

to pr es en t a c la im on b eh al f of

the c la im an t a s a ge nt, e xe cu tor , a dm inistra tor , pare nt, guard ian, or

oth er r ep re se nta tiv e. ” Se e, e. g. , K an ar v. U nit ed St at es , 118 F

. 3d 5 27, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1997 ).

The le adi ng c a se f

or t he m a j or i t y po si t i on i s G A F C or p. T he r e , t he D. C. Circuit exam ined the statuto ry text, structure of the statute, and legislative histo ry be fo re c onc lud ing tha t Co ngr es s did not au tho ri ze the D ep ar tm en t of Jus tic e to c re at e juri sd ic ti on al hu rd le s ab ov e an d b ey on d t ho se crea t e d e x p l i ci tl y by stat ut e. GAF Co rp
. , 818 F

. 2d a t 91 9 ( “ [I ] t i s a ppare nt tha t the pr es en tm en t r equir em en t im pose s on cl ai m an ts a

bur de n of

not ic e, not

sub stanti at ion , of

c la im s. ”)

. I n su

ppor t of thi s posi tio n, the G A F Co rp
. co urt not ed tha t w hil e Co ngr es s gave e xe cu tiv e ag en ci es the
au tho ri ty to pr om ulg at e re gul at ion s r eg ula tin g th e cl ai m s se ttl em en t pr oc es s, se e 28 U

. S

. C

. § 2 6 7 2 , e x e c u t i v e a g e n c i e s w e r e g i v e n n o au t h o r i t y b y C o n g r e ss t o se t t he j ur isd ic tio na l hurd le s to br ing ing a n a ct ion in fe de ra l co urt. T hus, a cc or din g to the G A F Co rp
. c ourt, w hil e the r eg ula tio ns d ef ini ng the pr es en ta tio n of a c la im a re va lid ins of ar a s th e re gul at ion s di ct at e w ha t a pla int if f m ust subm it be fo re the gov er nm en t will consider entering into a settlem ent, the r egulation s are invalid insofar as they pu rp or t t o a lt er t he Fed eral Tort Cla im s Ac t’s jur is di ct io na l re qu ire m en ts . GAF Co rp
. , 818 F. 2d at 919. T he m aj or ity posi tio n has bee n adop te d in the N inth C ir cu it,
se e W ar re n v. U nit ed

S ta te s D ep ’ t of

I nte ri or Bure auof

L an d M gm

t. , 724 F

. 2d 7 76, 780 (9th Cir. 1984 ) (e n banc), the Third Cir cuit, see Tucker v. U nited States Postal Se rv
. , 676 F

. 2d 9 54, 959 (3 d Ci r. 1982 ), the Fi fth Ci rc uit , se e A da m s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 615 F. 2d 284, 289 (5 th Ci r. ) cl ar if ie d, re h’ g de nie d, 622 F. 2d 1 97 ( 5thCi r. 198 0) , the-6

-

Si xthCi rc uit , se e D ougl as v. U nit ed S ta te s, 658 F

. 2d 4 45, 447 ( 6thCi r. 198 1) , a nd the Eleventh Circ uit, see B ush v. United States, 7 03 F. 2d 491, 494 (11t h Cir. 1983 ).

T he le ad ing c as e fo r the m ino ri ty pos iti on i s K an ar
. T he re , the S ev en th C ir cu it he ld 2 8 C

. F. R. § 14

. 2 do es ind ee d su ppl y the de fi ni ti on of p re se nti ng a c la im f or j ur isd ic tio na l purp ose s. Kana r, 118 F. 3d at 529. A cc or din g to the S ev en th C ir cu it, G A F C o r p
. a n do t h e r

c o u rt s r e a dC o n g r e s s ’ g r a n t o f au t h o r i t y t o o n a rr o w l y,

“ co ve r[ ing ] on ly

the m eans o f cl ai m s- pr oc es sin g, a nd n ot the ide nti fi ca tio n of

‘ cl ai m s’ in the fi rs t pla ce
. ” Id

. I nde ed , a cc or din g to the K an ar c our t, the pr oc es s of
se ttl ing c la im s is ine xtr ic ab le f ro m the pr es en tati on of cl ai m s it se lf ; a poo rl y pr es en te d c la im

c an not r ea lis ticall y be settl ed

. T he re fo re , the statut or y gr an t of
au tho ri ty , a cc or din g to the K an ar co urt, is br oa d enou gh to cove r se tti ng the te rm s f or the pr es en ta tio n of

c la im s. I d.

The E ighth Circuit is com m onlycited in other circuits as an exam ple of a court having adopted the m inority posit ion. See, e. g., Kanar, 118 F. 3d at 529

. How ever, a reviewo f

t he t w o app os i t e E i gh t h C i r c ui tc a se s l e a ve s t hi s c ourt ’ s e st abl ished posi tio n f ar fr om cl ear. In shor

t, w hil e L unsf

or d v. U nit ed St at es , 570 F. 2d 221 (8 th Ci r. 197 7) , a rg uably

hol ds tha t f

oll ow ing the r eg ula tor

y r equir em en ts f

or pr es en tin g a c l a i m i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l p r e r e qu i s i t e t o f i l i n g as u i tu n d e r

t h e F e d e r a l T o rtC l a i ms A ct , F ar m er s St at e Savin gs B an k v. F ar m er s H om e A dm ini str at ion , 866 F

. 2d 2 76 ( 8th Cir. 1 9 8 9 ), adopts th e “ m inim al notice” rule ac cepted by the m aj ority

of our sister ci rc uit s.

InL unsf or d, agr ou p of pl ai nti ff

s a tte m pte d to br ing ac la ss a ct ionlaw sui t ag ai nst the f ed er al gov er

nm en t un de r the F ed er al T ort C la im s A ct

. Lun sf or d, 570 F. 2d at 22 2. A lth oughf ive of the na m ed

pla int if fs f ir st p re se nte d c la im s to the Bureau of R ecla m at i o n , the nam ed plaintiffs attem pted to file suit o n behalf of a subs tantial class of unnam ed, sim ilarly -situated plainti ffs. Id

. The district court dis m iss ed the c as e fo r la ck

of j ur isd ic tio n wi th r es pe ct to the unn am ed

pla int if fs ,-7

-

re as oni ng tha t th ey ha d ne ve r pr es en te d ac la im to the appr opr ia te a dm ini str at ive agency
. Id. This court aff irm ed, ci t i n g three re asons why the district court lacked j ur isd ic tio n: (1 ) the na m ed pla int if fs ne ve r at te m

pt t o pr es en t cla im s onbe ha lf of
unnam ed class m em

bers t o the Bureau of Reclam ation, (2) the nam ed plaintiffs failed to state a sum

certain with respect to t he class claim s, and (3) the nam ed plaintiffs failed to establish auth ority to act as agents and present claim s on behalf of unnam ed cl as s m em

be rs
. I d. a t 22 5- 27.

I n F a rme r s S t a t e S a v i n g s B a n k , t h e p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e dF a rme r s H o me Adm inistration , an executive agency , f ailed to m ake a prom ised loan, which resulted in m one tary

los s to the pla int if

f. Farm er s Sta te Sav. Bank, 866 F

. 2d a t 27 6. P ri or to fi lin g suit , t he pla int if

f se nt a se ri es of le tte rs to the F ar

m er s H om e A dm ini str at ion de ta ili ng i ts gr ie va nc e an d se ek ing ase ttl em en t. I d. U nable to se ttl e the m at te r, the pla int if f fi le d su it unde r the Fe de ra l T ort C la im s A ct

. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed the case f or lack of j urisdictio n, and this court reversed and re m anded. I d. at 277. In contrast to Lunsford, t h e Farm ers court held that “ a claim ant satisfies the notice
re qui re m en t of

se ct ion267 5 if

he pr ovi de s inw ri tin g ( 1) suf fi ci en t i nf orm at ionf

or the a ge nc y

to inve sti ga te the cl ai m s.
. . an d ( 2) the a m ount of da m ag es sou ght

. ” I d. (citations om itted).

Pu tti ng a sid e m om en tari ly E igh th C ir cu it pr ec ed en t, it is evi de nt the m aj or ity of our sis te r ci rc uit s have r ea ch ed the m or e pe rs ua siv e re sul t i n ho ldi ng tha t the presentation of a claim , as contem plated by section 267 5, re quires noth ing m ore than suf fi ci en t i nf

orm at ionf

or the a ge nc y

to inv es tig at e the c la im s an d th e am ount of da m ag es sou ght

. T his c om ports w iththe na tur al a nd o rd inary m eanin g of

pr es en tin g a claim

. W ith respect to the regulations prom ulgated by the Depar

tm ent of Justice,
we agree 28 U. S. C. § 267 2 doe s n o t delegate the authority to set the jur isdictio nal requirem ents of a Feder al T ort Claim s Act suit; rather, Congress m erely authorizedT he dis se nt w oul d co nc lud e tha t co m pli an ce w ith the re gul at or y r equir em en ts 2 fo und in 2 8 C

. F. R. § 14

. 2 is am an da tor y pr er equi si te to jur isd ic tio n. B ut the dis se nt’ s a sse rt iontha t “ tod ay ’ s holdi ng im pe de s the ex pe dit iou s and f ai r se ttl em en t of F TCA cl ai m s” m iss es the c or e iss ue pr es en te d by thi s c as e. W e ca st n o do ubt tod ay on the va lid ity

of 2 8 C.F.R. § 14. 2 in sof ar a s th e ru le se ts o ut r equir em en ts pla int if fs m ust f oll owa s apr er equis ite to ana dm ini str at ive se ttl em en t. C ong res s cl earl y auth or iz ed

the pr om ulg at ionof ru le s fo r thi s pur pose
. S ee 28 U

. S. C. § 26 72. How ever, nowhere in 28 U. S. C. § 2672 or an y other statute did Congress autho rize the D ep ar tm en t of Jus tic e to c onstri ct the j ur isd ic tio n of the f ed er al c ourts b y

a ddi ng j urisdictio nal requirem ents bey ond what is required by section 267 5(a). -8

- the De partm ent of Justi ce to prom ulgate rules regulating th e settlem ent of potential cl ai m s. 2

Further , t h e E i g h t h ’s Ci rc u i t ’s p o s i t i o n i s u n s et t l ed . P l ai n l y, th e L u n s fo rd co urt
wa s of the opini on that th e cl aim presentation rules found in 28 C.F. R. § 14.2 are j urisdictio nal; otherwise, the court would not have cited the abs en ce o f proof of an ag en cy r el at ion shi p onit s w ay to af fi rm ing the dis m iss al of

the pla int if

fs ’ c la ss a ct ion sui t. H ow ev er , the L unsf

or d court neve r j ust if

ie d its posit ion tha t c om

ply ing w iththe D ep ar tm en t of Jus tic e’ s r eg ula tio ns i s m an da tor y ; rathe r the c ourt a sse rt ed the poi nt with no discus sion. Finally , it is w orth noti ng that th e L un s fo rd court’ s prim ary hol din g–c la ss a ct ionsui ts are not c ogni za ble und er the F ed er al T ort Cl ai m s Ac t–i s not c ont ing en t onathr es hol d de te rm ina tio n th at pla int if fs m ust f oll owa ll of

the
re qui re m en ts i n 28 C. F. R. § 14

. 2. I nde ed , tw o of the L unsf

or d c ourt’ s r ea sons f

or rej ecting the suit– the nam ed plaintiffs’ failure to pre sent claim s on behalf of unnam ed class m em

bers and failure to state a sum certain with respect to the class cla im s–are va lidr e a s o n s f

o r r e j e c t i n g c l a s s a c t i o n s u i t s e v e n u n d e r t h e l e s s - s t r i n g e nt j ur isd ic tio na l st an da rd

a dopt ed by the m aj or ity

of oth er c ir cu its

. S ee , e
. g. , Ca idi n v. United States, 564 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1977 ).

T he sa m e fl aw s inthe L unsf or d op ini on are e vid en t i n Fa rm er s S ta te S av ing s Bank. S im ilar to L unsford, the Fa rmer s court adopted th e m inim al notice standardT he dis se nt w oul d inte rp re t Lunsf or d to “ de fi ne [] w ha t cons tit ute s su ff ic ie nt 3 inf orm at ionto inv es tig at e the c la im w he n athi rd

party pr es en ts a

c la im on the claim ant’ s behalf,” thereby purpor t ing to harm onize Lunsforth with the m inim al no tice standard

a nnounc ed

in Farm er s. T his int er pr et at ionof

L unsf or d is not pe rs ua siv e. A t the ou tset, it is dif fi cu lt to s ee howe vid en ce of auth or ity to br ing a claim could affec t the “ suff i ci ent inform ation” prong of the m inim al notice re qui re m en t, w hic h r equir es nothin g m or e than “ a w ri tte n st at em en t suf fic ie ntl y desc rib ing

the inj uryto en ab le th e a g e nc y to be gi n i ts own in ve st ig at io n.” GAF Corp. v. United St at es, 818 F. 2d 90 1, 919 (D. C. Cir. 1987 ) (e m phasis add ed). In Lunsford, the court had no inform ation w hatsoever about th e inj uries of the unnam ed pla int if fs

. T his ca se , by co ntr as t, furthe r unde rc uts the dis se nt’ s r ea soni ng. A lth ough the VAsough t from

Mader evidence of her authority to bring a c laim , Ma der’ s refusal to p ro vid e the inf

orm at iondid

not hin de r the V A f

ro m inv es tig at ing the c la im

on the m er its a nd m ak ing af

orm al de te rm ina tio n that

no n eg lig en ce oc curr ed

in the c ar e of Robert Mader. -9

- w ith out m eanin gf

ul d isc uss ion . In a ddi tio n, the f ina l r es ult

in Farm er s w as not conting ent on a resolution of the j urisdictio nal standard; rather, the court’s
co nc lus ion

–that le tte rs se nt t o th e ap pr opr ia te e xe cu tiv e ag en cy a re suf fi ci en t t o provide the su bstance of a cla i m

– wo uld be the sam e under either j urisdictio nal standard , pr ovi de d th e le tte rs inc lud ed the ne ce ssary

inf orm at ion

.
In lig ht of L unsf

or d and Farm er s, thi s ca se pr es en ts d if fi cu lti es in fo llo w ing the

“ card in al ru le in ou r ci rcu it th at on e pa ne l is bo un d by the de ci si on of a pri orpa ne l.” U nit ed S ta te s v. Be tc he r, 534 F

. 3d 8 20, 823 -2 4 ( 8thCi r. 2008 ). L unsf or d and Farm er s e ac h a

ppl ie d am at er ia lly

dif fe re nt s tandar d; co m

pli an ce w ithboth pr ior decisions appears to be logically im poss ible. When thi s co u rt has confronted

3 intracircuit splits of autho rity , the c ourt ha s n o t considered itself boun d by either posit ion; in stead, this court has endeavored to dete rm ine the “ better approach.” See , e
. g
. , U n i t e dS t a t e s v . L e B r u n , 3 6 3 F

. 3 d7 1 5 , 7 1 9 ( 8 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 4 )

. B u ts e e Wi l l i a ms v. N at’ l Fo otball League, Nos. 09-2247 , 09-2462, 09-2249 , 2009 W L 6044000 , a t *2-3 (Dec . 14, 2009 ) (C ollot on, J., d i s s en t i ng from denial of rehearing en banc)-1 0-

(p oin tin g ou t tha t othe r ci rc uit s have c onc lud ed the be tte r pr ac tic e nor

m al ly is to follow the ear liest opin ion). Adopting the “ better rule” here, we conclude a plaintiff m eets the Feder al T ort Cl ai m s A ct ’ s juri sdi ct ion al pr er equis ite s w he n sh e pr ovi de s th e re le va nt a ge nc y w ith

“ (1 ) suf fi ci en t inf

orm at ionf

or the a ge nc y

to inv es tig at e the c la im s .
. . a nd ( 2) the
am ount of da m ag es sou ght

. ” F ar

m er s S ta te S av ing s B an k, 866 F

. 2d a t 27 7. B ec au se it is undi sputed Mader m et t hese requirem ents, we con clude the district erred w hen it de te rm ine d it

la ck ed j ur isd ic tio n.

III

A lth oughnot

a ddr es se d by

the part ie s or the dis tr ic t c ourt be lowor e ith er party on appeal, Judge Beam , in his dissent, would conclude the d i strict court lacked j ur isd ic tio n f

or the ind ep en de nt re as on tha t Mad er ’ s cla im w as unt im el y . A lth ough
w e ag re e w ith the dis se nt tha t the appl ic ab le statut e of li m ita tio ns i s j ur isd ic tio na l and t h er ef o re an ap p ro p ri at e s ub

je ct o f i n qu i ry b y t h i s co u rt , we co n cl u d e M ad er ’s
co m pla int w as ti m el y

f ile d.

The r elevant statute of l im itations is contained in 28 U. S. C. § 240 1(b), which pr ovi de s that

aF e d e r a l T o rtC l a i m s A c tc l a i m “ s h a l l b e f

o r e v e r b a rr e du n l e s s i tis presented in writing to the appropriate Federa l agency within two y ears a fter such cl ai m accrue s.”

N an cy Ma de r’ s c la im

a cc ru ed on Augus t 3, 200 4, the day Ro be rt Ma de r die d. The V A r eceived Mader ’ s claim via m ail on Au gust 3 , 2006. A ccordingly , Ma der pr es en te d he r cl ai m on A ugus t 3, 200 6–tw o y ears to the day a ft er the c la im a cc ru ed

. The question p re s en t ed, ther efore, is whether the la st day to file a c laim

wa s A ugus t 2, 200 6, or

A ugus t 3, 200 6. That que sti on, in tur n, is larg el y

r es olv ed by-1 1-

de te rm ini ng w he the r the da te the c la im a cc ru ed –A ugus t 3, 200 4–c ount s a s “ da y z er o” or “ day one” for purposes of the lim itations clock. P re v i o u s o p i nion s of this court str ongl y sug ge st tha t w he n f

ili ng a F ed er al T ort C la im s A ct

c la im , the da te the c la im
ac cr ue s c ount s a s day

z er o. S ee , e
. g. , W ils on e x r el

. W ils on v
. G unn, 403 F

. 3d 5 24, 526 (8th Cir. 2005 ) (“ Since W ilson ’ s adm inis t ra t i v e cl aim [under the FT CA] wa s pr es en te d onJanuary

28, 200 2, it

is tim e- barr ed

if it a cc ru ed be fo re January

28, 2000

. ”) ; M cD uf

fe e v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 769 F

. 2d 4 92, 494 (8 th C ir

. 198 5) ( ex cl udi ng the da te the a ct iona cc ru ed

w he n c al cu la tin g th e Fe de ra l T ort Cl aim s A ct statut e of lim itations ).

T y pic al ly , c al cu la tin g astatut e of li m ita tio ns pe ri od u nde r fe de ra l l awis done by r ef er en ce to Fe de ra l Rul e of Ci vil P ro ce dur e 6( a)

. S ee F ed

. R. Ci v. P

. 6( a) ( “ T he fo llo w ing r

ule s a ppl y in co m put ing a ny

ti m e pe ri od s pe ci fi ed

in the se r

ule s, in an y loc al r ule or c ourt or de r, or

in an y statut e tha t do es not

spe ci fy am ethod of

c om put ing t i me. ” )

. R

u l e 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) d i r e c t s c o u rt s a s f o l l o w s : “ Wh e n t h e p e r i o di s s t a t e d i n d a ys ora lo ng er un it of

ti m e . . . excl ud e th e d ay

of t he ev en t t ha t t rig ge rs th e p eri od

. . . .” Although Rule 6(a) cannot e xpand or constrict the j urisdictio n of federa l courts, see Mattson v. U. S. W

. Com

m c’ ns, Inc. , 967 F. 2d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1992 ), the rule m ay pr ovi de ause fu l “ m eans o f de te rm ini ng the be gin nin g and en d of a statu te of lim ita tio ns pre sc ri be d else w he re in la w . ” Bart lik v. U

. S. D ep t. of L ab or , 62 F

. 3d 1 63, 166 ( 6 t h C i r
. 1 9 9 5 ) ( e n b a n c ) ; c f

. U n i o n N a t ’ l B a n k v . L a m b , 3 3 7 U

. S

. 38, 40- 41 (1949) (“ Since [Rule 6(a) ] had the concurrence of Congress, and since no contrary pol ic y is ex pr es se d inthe statut e gove rn ing thi s rev ie w , w e thi nk tha t the considerations of liberality and leniency

wh i ch fi nd expressio n in Rule 6(a) ar e equally applicable to [the feder al statute at issue] .” ).

T he dis se nt w oul d c onc lud e the tw o- y ea r sta tut e of

li m ita tio ns g ove rn ing Ma de r’ s cl ai m ex pir ed on A ugus t 2, 200 6. F or sup port, the dis se nt r el ie s so le ly on Ma tts on. In Ma tts on, T he sta tut e of lim ita tio ns re qui re d plai nti ff s to br ing a ct ion s under the Fair D ebt Collection Practices A ct “ within one y ear from the date on whichSee generally Te resa D . C askey

Locke, Note, Oh, What a D iffer en ce a D ay 4 Make s: Ma tts on v. U

. S. W es t Com m uni ca tio ns, In c. , 62 U MK C L

. Re v. 227 ( 1993 ) (c ri tic iz ing Ma tts on f

or “ de pa rt [i ng] fr om

the tr ad iti ona l and c le ar ly de fi ne d m ethod of c al cu la tin g ti m e” a nd “ ad d[ ing ] c onf usi on t o an are a of

the law tha t m

ust be ab sol ute ly

c le ar a nd c er ta in t o e nsur e pot en tia l l iti ga nts the f ull sc ope of

the ir statutory rights”). -1 2- the vio la tio n oc curs
. ” 15 U

. S.C. § 16 92k(d) ; se e Ma tts on, 967 F

. 2d a t 26 0. T he vio la tio n inMa tts on o cc ur re d on N ove m

be r 27, 1989 , an d the cl ai m an t fil ed sui t on N ove m be r 27, 1990

. Ma tts on, 967 F. 2d at 260- 62. O ve r a sharp dis se nt by Judge Mc Mi lli an , i d. at 2 62- 64 ( Mc Mi lli an , J. , dis se nti ng) , w e int er pr et ed the phr as e

“ w ith in o ne y ear fr om

[ the vio la tio n da te ] ” to giv e the c la im an t 36 5 day s be gin nin g o n t h e v i o l a t i o n d at e t o b ri n g h erac t i o n , a n du l t i m at el y co n cl u d ed t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s claim wa s untim ely

. Id. at 262 (m aj ority opini on).

W e note that i n the eighteen y ears since Ma ttson wa s decided, the ca se has be enr ej ec te d by

e ve ry appe lla te c ourt tha t ha s c onsi de re d a do pt in g its hol din g on ca lc ula tin g sta tut es of lim ita tio ns. Se e A m er ic an Canoe A ss’ n, In c. , Si er ra Cl ub v. A tta lla , 363 F

. 3d 1 085, 108 9 n. 4 ( 11th C ir

. 200 4) ( not ing tha t M at tso n “ ap pe ar s to stand alone”); John son v. Ridd le, 305 F. 3d 1107 , 1115 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that

“ [a ] ppare ntl y , e ve ry

oth er c ir cu it to h av e w ei gh ed in o n th e iss ue ha s r ej ec te d th e p o s i t i o n ad o p t ed b y M at t s o n ”) ; Ma l o y v . P h i l l i p s , 6 4 F. 3 d 6 0 7 (1 1 t h Ci r. 1 9 9 5 ) ( “ We

. . . a dopt the ap pr oa ch use d in Ma tts on, sa ve fo r the ca lc ula tio n of the da y s f ro m the
m ai lin g o f t h e c o l l e c t i o n l e t t e r
. ” )

. A t l e a s t t w o f e d e r a l c o u rt s o f ap p e a l s ha ve de sc ri be d th e posi tio n a dopt ed by Ma tts on a s “ fr ivo lou s. ” U nit ed Mi ne W orke rs v. D ole , 870 F

. 2d 6 62, 665 ( D

. C. Ci r. 198 9) ; F rey v . Woo da rd , 748 F

. 2d 1 73, 175 ( 3d Cir. 1984 ). In addition, we also note that the sin gle case Ma ttson relied on to sup port its pos ition , R

ust v. Quality

Car Corra l, I nc., 614 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir. 1980 ), has subs equently

been unanim ouslyoverruled by the Sixth C ircuit sitting en banc. See Bart lik v. U

. S. D ep t. of L ab or , 62 F. 3d 163, 166 (6 th C ir

. 199 5) ( enbanc ) (r ef er ri ng to Rust as “ erroneous”). 4The dissent’ s interpretation of the statute would also lead to potentially absurd 5 results. Consider a hy

poth etical statute–identical to th e Fe de ral Tort Claim s Act sta tut e of li m ita tio ns e xc ep t for the le ngth of t im e inv olv ed –r equir ing ac la im an t t o ta ke a ct ion “ w ith in one day af te r suc h cl ai m ac cr

ue s. ” T he dis se nt w oul d ne ce ssari ly int er pr et the phr as e “ one da y aft er suc h c la im a cc ru es ” to m ean th e sa m e da y the claim accr ued. S uch a rea ding confound s com m on sense. Of course, such one-day

periods of l im itations are com m on across m any

are as of law

. Consid er 18 U .S .C. § 922, the fam iliar federal statute crim inalizing firearm poss ession in a num

ber of diffe rent circ um stances. S ection 922 (s)(1)( A) (i )( III) pr ovi de s: Be gin nin g on the da te tha t is 9 0 day s a ft er the da te of

e na ctm en t of

thi s subs ection and endin g on th e day before the date that is 60 m onth s after su c h da t e of e na c t m e nt , i t sh a l l be un l a w f ul f or a ny l i c e ns e d im

porter, -1 3- Wha te ve r the c ont inu ing vit al ity of Ma tts on, w e de cl ine to ap ply it s r ea soni ng to the st at ut e of lim ita tio ns a t i ssu e in this c as e. A s th e dis se nt c onc ed es , the langua ge of

the F ed er al T ort C laim s A ct ’ s st at ute of li m ita tio ns d if

fe rs f ro m the lim itations language contained in the Fair Debt Coll ection Prac tices Ac t and analy zed in M at tso n. Whil e the F air D eb t C oll ec tio n P ra ct ic es A ct ’ s st at ute of li m ita tio ns re qui re s f ili ng s uit “ w ith in o ne y ear fr om

the da te on w hic h the vio la tio n oc curs , ” 15 U

. S. C. § 16 92k( d) , the F ed er al T ort C la im s Act re qui re s c la im an ts t o pr es en t the ir cl ai m s “ w ith in tw o y ears af te r suc h cla im ac cr

ue s. ” 28 U. S. C. § 24 01( b) ( em pha sis ad de d)

. T he pr es en ce of

the w or d “ af

te r” c onc lus ive ly

de m onstrate s th at

Co ngr es s did not int en d th e da te the c la im a cc ru ed to co unt a s th e fi rs t day

of the li m ita tio ns pe ri od. S ee Joh nsonv. Me y er s, 54 F. 417, 417 (8 th Ci r. 1893 ) (c onstru ing astatut e of li m it at ion s st at ing “ tha t no appe al

. . . in the c ir cu it co urt of appe al s .
. . sha ll be ta ke n or sue d out ex ce pt w ith in s ix m onths a ft er the e ntr y of the or de r, j udgm en t, or de cr ee sou ght

to be r ev ie w ed , ” an d ho ldi ng tha t “ [a ] s th e de cr ee sought to b e re vie w ed he re w as e nte re d M ay 27, 1892 , the la st day w ith in the six m onths a ft er it s en tr y w as N ove m

be r 27, 189 2. ”)

. See al so W ils on, 403 F. 3d a t 52 6; M cD uf fe e, 769 F. 2d a t 49 4. W e the re fo re c onc lud e tha t M ad er ’ s c la im w as ti m el y

f ile d. 5licensed m anufacturer , or licensed dealer to sell, deliver, or transfer a ha ndgun . . . t o an in div idu al w ho i s no t l ic en se d un de r se ct ion923 , unless . . . th e transferor has .

. . w ithin 1 day after the transfer ee furn ish es the sta te m en t, pr ovi de d not ic e of the co nte nts of the state m en t to the ch ie f la w e nf

or ce m en t of

fi ce r of the pla ce of

r es ide nc e of

the tra ns fere e . . . . 18 U

. S. C. § 92 2( s) (1 )( A )( i) (I II ) (e m pha sis a dde d)

. The r

ule s go ve rn ing the pr oc ed ur es of the N at ion al L ab or Re la tio ns Bo ar d co nta in a sim ila r one -d ay pe ri od of lim itations

. Those rules provide that “ [w ] ithin o n e d ay after a vote to close a m ee tin g .
. . the ag en cy sha ll m ak e publ ic ly av ai la ble a fu ll w ri tte n e xpl an at ionof it s a c t i o n c l o s i n g t h e mee t i n g
. . . . ” 2 9 C

. F

. R

. § 1 0 2

. 1 4 1 ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. S i mi l a r l y, the r ule s go ve rn ing the pr oc ed ur es of the F ed er al T ra de Co m

m iss ionstate tha t, in the course of filing an i n t er l ocutory appeal, “ [t] he party

[seeking review ] m ay

file an ap pli ca tio n f

or r ev ie w w iththe Co m

m iss ionw ith in 1 day

a ft er not ic e tha t the Adm ini s t ra t i v e Law Judge has issued th e re quested determ ination

. . . . 16 C.F .R. § 3. 23 ( em

pha sis a dde d)

. S ec tio n 35 53( b) (1 ) of Co m pe tit ionin Co ntr ac tin g A ct of 1984 requires the G overnm ent Acc ount ability Of fice to notify the “ Federa l agency inv olv ed ” “ [w ] ith in o ne day a ft er the r ec ei pt o f a pr ote st. ” 31 U

. S. C. § 35 53(b) (1 ) (e m ph as is a dde d)

. S ee a lso Co nn. G en
. S ta t. § 9- 445 (unde r Co nne ct ic ut e le ct ion law , “ the re sha ll be a re canva ss of the re tur ns of the vot ing m ac hin e
. . . unl es s w ith in one d a y a f t e r t h e p r i m a ry . . . t h e d e f

e a t e dc a n d i d a t e
. . . f

i l e [ s ] aw r i t t e n s t at em en t waiv in g t hi s ri gh t t o s uc h re can va ss” ) (e m ph as is ad de d) ; Al a. Co de § 3 5- 11 -3 71 (“ [A] cl ai m an t sh al l a lso w ith in o ne day a ft er the fi lin g of suc h c la im

or li en , m ai l a

c opy the re of by reg is te re d or

c er tif ie d m ai l, pos ta ge pr ep ai d, f or e ac h pe rs on, f

irm or co rp or at io n so cla im ed

to be li ab le on a cc ount

of suc h in j ur ie s .
. . . ”) ( em

pha sis ad de d) ; Mi nn. R. Ci v. P. 63. 03 (1 984) (“ he af fi da vit sha ll be se rv ed an d fi le d

. . . in any district having two or m ore j udges, within one day after it is ascertained w hich j udge is t o pr es ide a t the tr ia l or he ar ing

. ”) ( em

pha sis a dde d) ; O r. Re v. S ta t. § 65 2. 140 (“ Whe n an e m

plo y er dis ch ar ge s an em

plo y ee or w he n em

plo ym en t is te rm ina te d by m utu al a gr ee m en t, a ll w ag es e ar ne d and u npa id a t the ti m e of the dis ch ar ge or term ination becom e due and pay able not later than the end of the first busin ess day after the discharge or term inat i o n .” ) (em phasis add ed); N .Y . R eal Pr op. A cts. L aw § 73 5 ( “ [S ] er

vic e of the not ice of

pe tit iona nd p et iti on s ha ll be m ad e by pe rs ona lly delivering them

to the respondent

. . . and in additi on, w ithin one day after such de liv er ing to suc h su ita

ble pe rs on o r suc h a ffi xi ng or plac em en t, by m ai lin g to the -1 4-res po nd en t b ot h b y reg is te red or c ert ifi edm ai l an d b y reg ul ar fi rs t cl as s m ai l . . . .) (em phasis add ed).
If a dopt ed , the r ea soni ng o f the dis se nt w oul d co m pe l the c onc lus iontha t the action required by

each of these and other sim ilar law s be accom plish ed the sam e day as the tr igg er ing e ve nt, pos sib ly w ith in m er e m inu te s of

the tr igg er ing e ve nt. B ut the pla in l an gua ge of

the law s qu ote d a

bove sim

ply doe s no t to le rat e suc h a co unt er int

uit ive c onstru ct ion

. -1 5- IV

Re ve rs ed a nd r em an de d.

BE A M, Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng.

Beca use I w ould aff

irm the district court's corre ct concl u s i on that Personal Representative Nancy Mader (Mader) is jurisdictionally barre d from

advancing her FT CAc la im , I r es pe ct fu lly dis se nt.
In its quest to form

ulate a re sult th at the panel m aj ority apparently

finds m ore favor ab le to its e xot ic le ga l and p oli cy not ion s, the c ourt su m

m ar ily r ej ec ts c le ar ly
es ta bli she d law a nd p re ce de nt a ppl ic ab le to thr ee iss ue s pr es en te d. S pe ci fi ca lly , the
m aj or ity r ej ec ts tw o instanc es of bin din g Ei ghth Cir cu it pr ec ed en t and, in a ddi tio n, snub s cl earl y fo rm

ula te d N eb ra ska law as es ta bli she d by le gis la tiv e m an da te and Ne braska Suprem e Court opinio n. W ith this approach, I disagree.

I.

First and forem ost, the c ou r t v e r y r e l uc t ant l y

and i nc or r e c tly , a ddresses whether Mad er t im el y

pre se nt edhe r FTCA cl ai m . "Fed eral su bjec t m at te r juri sd ic ti on
. . . m ust be r ai se d sua spon te by a fe deral court w hen t h ere is an indication that j ur isd ic tio n is la ck ing

. " A lum ax Mi ll Pr ods. , I nc
. v. Co ngr es s F in. Co rp
. , 912 F

. 2dMa de r' s S tandard F orm 95, Cl ai m

f or D am ag e, I nj ur

y , o r Death si m ilarl y 6 as se rts th atMr. Ma de r co m m it te d s ui ci de on Aug us t 3 , 20 04

.

-1 6- 996, 100 2 (8 th Ci r. 1990 ) (quot at ion om itt ed ). Be ca use Ma de r' s c om

pli an ce w iththe FT CA ' s sta tut e of lim ita tio ns is a j ur isd ic tio na l pr er equis ite to br ing ing asui t a ga ins t the United States, T. L. ex rel. Ingram v. U nited States, 443 F. 3d 95 6, 961 (8th Cir. 20 06 ), an d t he re i s a q ue st io n a s t o wh et h er Ma de r ti m el y pre se nt edhe r cl ai m , we m ust begin , not end, w ith this issue.

28 U. S. C. § 240 1(b) provides tha t an FT CA claim "shall be forever barred unless it is pr esented in writing to the appropriate Federa l agency with i n t wo y ears af te r suc h c la im

a cc ru es
. " An F T CAc la im a cc ru es w he n " the pla int if f know s or re as on ab ly

sho uld kno w both th e ex ist en ce a nd c au se of the inj ur y . " S la at env. U nit ed S ta te s, 990 F

. 2d 1 038, 104 1 ( 8thCi r. 199 3)

. I n de ath ca se s, "i t i s f ai r fo r the cl ai m to ac cr ue a t the ti m e of de ath. " Cl if fo rd ex r el

. Cl if

fo rd v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 738 F. 2d 97 7, 980 (8th Cir. 1984 ). He re, Mr. Mader' s death certific ate reports that he died at 11: 00 p.m . o n A ugus t 3, 200 4, im m ed ia te ly f oll ow ing ase lf

-i nf lic te d gu nsho t t o the he ad

. T hus, Ma de r' s c la im a cc ru ed on Augus t 3, 200 4. 6

Ne xt, an FT CA claim

is "presented" when the appropriate f ed er al agency rece ives the claim , not w hen it is m ailed. See 28 C. F. R. § 14.2(a); D razan v. U nited St at es , 762 F. 2d 56, 58 (7th C ir

. 198 5) ( "[ M] ai lin g [ anF T CAc la im ] is not pr es en tin g; there m ust be receipt." ). T he rec ord reveals that Mader 's attorney m ailed a Standard Form 95, Claim for Dam age, Inj ury , or De ath to the De partm ent of Ve teran A ffair s (V A ) via ove rn igh t m ai l onA ugus t 2, 200 6, a nd the V Ar ec ei ve d th e fo rm on Augus t 3, 20 06. A cc or din gly , Ma de r pur ports t o have "p re se nte d" he r al le ge d c la im on Aug us t 3 , 20 06

.
T hus, Ma de r' s c la im

a cc ru ed on Augus t 3, 200 4, if sh e ti m el y be cam e the pe rs ona l re pr es en ta tiv e (P R) of Mr

. Ma de r' s est at e, an d w as pr es en te d onA ugus t 3, 2006 , if she r em ai ne d th e PR

on tha t da te

. T his r ai se s th e que sti on o f w he the r theT he c al en da r- y ear m etho d co unt s th e ac cr ua l da te a s th e fi rs t day of 7 com putatio n where as t h e an niversary m ethod coun ts the day

following the accrual da te a s th e fi rs t day

of c om put at ion

. Se e U nit ed St at es v. Marc el lo, 212 F

. 3d 1 005, 1008 -1 0 ( 7thCi r. 200 0) ( dis cu ssi ng the "c al en da r- y ear" an d " an niv er sa ry " m ethods of cal cu la ti ng li m it at io ns pe rio ds ). -1 7- fi na l a llo w ab le day

to pr es en t M ad er ' s c la im und er § 24 01( b) was ( 1) A ugus t 2, 2006 –i. e. , tw o " ca le ndar y ears " fr om the da te of Mr

. Ma de r' s dea th; or ( 2) A ugus t 3, 2006 –i. e. , the "anni ve rs ar y da te " o f Mr

. Ma de r' s dea th. I f the c al en da r- y ear m ethod 7 of com putatio n appl i es , M ad er presented her claim one day late; if the anniv ersar

y m ethod appl ies, Ma d er tim ely presented her cla im

on the anniv ersar

y date of Mr

. Mad er's de at h.

Severa l of o ur s ister circuits have applied Federa l Rule o f Civi l Procedure 6(a),
w hic h e m bodi es the a nni ve rs ar

y m ethod, to ca lc ula te § 24 01( b) ' s li m ita tio n pe ri ods. Se e, e
. g. , Ma ah s v. Unit ed S ta te s, 840 F

. 2d 8 63, 866 -6 7 ( 11th C ir

. 198 8) ; H ar t v. U nit ed S ta te s, 817 F

. 2d 78 , 8 0 (9th C ir

. 198 7) ( pe r curi am); F re y v. W oodard , 748 F. 2d 17 3, 175 (3d Cir. 1984 ). But , this circuit does not applythe Rule 6(a) anniversary

date to com

pute jurisdictional statutes o f lim itations , it uses the calendary ear m ethod. Se e M at t s on v. U. S. W . C omm c'ns, Inc. , 967 F. 2d 25 9, 262 (8th Cir. 1992 ). G ive n th at

§ 24 01( b) is a j ur isd ic tio na l s ta tu te of lim ita tio ns, T

. L

. e x r el

. In gr am , 443 F

. 3d a t 96 1, thi s pane l c an not appl y Ru le 6( a) to r es olv e the ti m el ine ss is su e p res en te d i n t hi s ca se
.
A lth o u g h R

u l e 6 ( a ) d o e s n o t ap p l y , s o m e s t i l l a r g u e t h a t t h e l a n g u a ge of § 24 01( b) ad opt s the an niv er sa ry m ethod of ca lc ula tio n. S ee Ma ah s, 840 F

. 2d a t 86 5- 66 (di sc uss ing va ri ous poss ibl e int er pr et at ion s of § 2401 (b ))

. H ow ev er , our de ci sio n in M at tso n f

or ec los es thi s arg um en t. T he statut e of li m ita tio ns a t i ssu e in M at tso n required claim ants to bring actio n s u n d er the Fair D ebt Collection Practices A ct (FDCP A) "wi th in on e y ear f ro m th e da te on whi ch th e [FDCP A] vi ol at io n o ccu rs ." 15 U

. S. C. § 1 692k (d ); se e Ma tts on, 967 F

. 2d a t 26 0. Th ere, the F D CP A vio la tio nRandom H ouse W eb ste r' s Una

br idg ed D ic tio na ry (2 d ed. 1997 ), pr ovi de s th e 8 fo llo w ing re le va nt de fi nit ion s of the w or ds: Fr om –"u se d to spe ci fy a start ing poi nt in an expression of lim its," id. a t 770; Af ter–"later in tim e than," id. at 36. A s used in sections 1692 k(d) and 2401 (b), the words present a distinctio n without a differe nce an d to re j ec t Mattso n' s bindi ng ef fe ct by se ei ng suc h a diff er en ce in the use of

the se two word s b or de rs on th e ex tre m e. -1 8- in que sti on occ ur

re d on N ove m

be r 27, 1989 , an d the cl ai m an t br ough t he r ac tio n on N ove m be r 27, 199 0. Ma tts on, 967 F. 2d at 260- 62. T he c ourt i nte rp re te d th e phr as e "w ith in one y ear fr om [the vio la tio n da te ] " to giv e the cl ai m an t 365 da y s be gin nin g on the violatio n date to bring her action. Id. at 262. In other w ords, the cale ndar-y ear m ethod was applied and the claim ant was dee m ed t o have filed her cla im one day la te . Id.

W h i l e t h e s t a tu t e i n M a t t s o n r e qu i r e d a c l a i m a n t t o b r i n g h e r F D CP A a ct ion "within one y ear fr om [the v iolation date] ," § 2401 (b) required Mader to present her FT CAc la im

"w ith in tw o y ears aft er such cl ai m a cc ru es
. " T he onl y

r el ev an t dif fe re nc e be tw ee n th es e phr as es is § 24 01( b) ' s us e of the te rm "a fter" in st ead of "f ro m
. " " T he w or ds ' fr om ' a nd ' af te r' a re f re que ntl y em

plo y ed as adve rb s of t im e, a nd whe n u se d wit h refe ren ce to ti m e are ge ne ral ly treat edas h av in g t he same m ean in g." 86 C.J.S. Ti me § 17 ( 2006 ). N ota bly , the re is "so m e di ffe re nc e of opi nio n a s to 8 whether the words ar e used as inclusiv e or exclusive of the day or event from

which the ti m e is c om

put ed

. " Id. In Ma tts on, the co urt re ad the te rm "f ro m " as i nc lus ive of the vio latio n da te , a nd I se e no r ea son to r ea d " af te r" a s exc lus ive of

the a cc ru al da te spe ci fi ed in § 24 01( b)

. I nde ed , w he n th e lim ita tio n is ti ed to the w or ds " cl ai m ac cr ue [d ] " a s inthe F T CA , a n eve n stro nge r ar gum en t f or Ma tts on' s r el ev an ce c anbe
m ad e. Thus, because the calendar- y ear m ethod of com putatio n applies to § 2401(b)'s tw o- y ear sta tut e of

li m ita tio ns, the la st d ay

f or Ma de r to p re se nt h er

c la im w as A ugus tIn t he m aj ority 's footnote 5, it incorporates a hy poth etical one-day

FT CA 9 sta tut e of li m ita tio ns i n argu ing tha t M at tso n' s " ca le ndar- da y " m ethod "c onf ound s com m on sense." A nte at 1 3 n .5. T o the contrary , it is the m aj ority 's hy poth etical (whic h is sup er fi ci al , m i sbe got te n and w hol ly unc onst itu tio na l, W ils on e x r el

. W ils on v. G unn, 403 F

. 3d 524, 527 (8 th Ci r. 2005 ); Fi el ds v

. L eg ac y H ea lthS y s. , 413 F

. 3d 94 3, 9 56 -5 7 (9 th Cir . 20 05 )), th at"co nf ou nd s co m

m on sen se ." And , so far as I kn ow, there is n o purported "confound s com m on sense" test (especially an unconst itutio nal one ) tha t pe rm its apane l m aj or ity to dis re ga rd

lon g- es ta bli she d c ir cu it pr ec ed en t. -1 9- 2, 2006. G iven that Mader presented her c laim on August 3, 20 06, h er c laim is tim eba rr ed

. 9

A f ai r re ad ing of

the opi nio n f

or the c ourt di sc los es th at th e pa ne l m aj or ity
ac tua lly r ec ogni ze s th at

Ma tts on p re ce de nt c ontro ls th e ou tcom e of thi s c as e, but
c h o o s e s t o i g n o r e i ta n ywa y a s a mat t e r o f d i s c r e t i o n
. I n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e maj o r i t y s a ys "[w ] e note that in the eighteen y ears since Ma ttson wa s decided, the ca se has been
re j ec te d by e ve ry appe lla te c ourt tha t ha s cons ide re d a dopt ing it s ho ldi ng o n c a l c u l a t i n g s t a tu t e s o f

l i mi t a t i o n s
. " An t e a t1 2

. Th e c o u rtt h e n f u rt h e r s a ys "[ w ] ha te ve r the c ont inu ing vit al ity of Ma tts on, w e de cl ine to ap ply it s r ea soni ng t o the statut e of

li m ita tio ns a t i ssu e in this ca se
. " Id

. at 13. T his a tte m

pte d di sc onne ct , of c o u r s e , i s n o t t h e p a n e l m a j o r i t y ' s p r e r o g a t i v e a s d i c t a t e d b y e v e n m o r e fi rm ly
em be dde d bi ndi ng pr ec ed en t of thi s c ir cu it. A s f orm er Ch ie f Judg e L ay

state s inhis
concurrence and diss ent in United States v. Stew art, 7 F. 3d 1350 ( 8th Cir . 1993), e ven if all other cir cuits dis agree with our est ablished precedent, it m ay not be dis regarded by apane l of

thi s c ourt un til it

ha s bee n over

ru le d by the co urt en ban c. Id

. a t 13 54 (L ay , J. , c onc ur

ri ng and d iss en tin g)

. Matts on h as ne ve r be en ove rr ule d by an enbanc co ur t o f th is cir cu it an d m us t b e res pe ct edby the pa ne l m ajor it y in th is cas e.

II.

E ve n assu m ing tha t M ad er ti m el y pr es en te d he r cl ai m , I dis ag re e w iththe
co urt' s c onc lus ion tha t sh e fu lf ill ed 28 U

. S. C. § 26 75( a) ' s a dm ini str at ive e xhaust ion-2 0-

requirem ent despite failing to send the VA(1) proof of her st at us as personal represe ntative of Mr. Mader' s estate, or (2) proof of her atto rney 's status as her legal
re pr es en ta tiv e. A nte a t 2, 10. Sect io n 26 75( a) , aj ur isd ic tio na l a dm ini str at ive
ex haust ionr equir em en t, pr ovi de s tha t FT CAc la im an ts s ha ll pr es en t the ir c la im s to the ap pr opria te f

ed er al a ge nc y

be fo re ins tit

uti ng an a ct ionf

or da m ag es a ga ins t the U nit ed S ta te s. T he m aj or

r ea son fo r thi s r equir em en t i s to "' fa ci lit at e se ttl em en t of
ca se s. ' " L unsf

or d v. U nit ed St at es , 570 F. 2d 221, 226 (8 th Ci r. 197 7) ( quot ing Ca idi n v. U nit ed S ta te s, 564 F

. 2d 2 84, 286 ( 9thCi r. 19 77 )). Althoug h § 2 675( a) doe s no t explain what constitu tes the presentation of a claim , 28 C. F. R. § 14.2(a), an im ple m en ta tio na l ru le ad opt ed a t the dir ec tio n of

Co ngr es s, se e 28 U

. S. C. § 26 72, provides, in relevant part, that claim s m ust be "accom

panied by evidence of [a

third party 's] authority

to present a claim

on behalf of the claiman t as agent .

. . or other represe ntative."

In L unsford, third parties attem pted to present FT CA claim s to a feder al agency on beh al f of a cl as s of unna m ed cl ai m an ts (1 ) w ith out ev ide nc e of the ir auth or ity to do so, and (2) w ithou t stati n g a s u m certa in as to dam ages. Lunsford, 570 F.2d at 224- 25. T his c ir cu it he ld tha t the thi rd pa rt ie s "i na de qua te ly pr es en te d th e cl ai m s of
un na m ed c la ss m em

be rs b e c a u s e th e

yf a i l e d t o d e m o n s tr a t e th e e

x is t e n c e o f the
ne cessa ryage nc

y re lat io ns hip ." Id. at 226 (em phasis add ed). T he court rea soned tha t be ca use the pur

pose of § 26 75( a) is to fa ci lit at e se ttl em en t of c as es , e vid en ce of t h e e x i s t e n c e o f

o n e ' s l e g a l au t h o r i t y

t o p r e s e n tac l a i m

o n b e h a l f

o f t h e c l a i m a n tis
re qui r e d

. I d

. T r

u l y , w i t h o u tt h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s u c h e v i d e n c e , " ' t h e ab i l i t y o f the U nit ed S ta te s to ne got ia te ase ttl em en t is impede d. ' " I d. ( quot ing Ca idi n, 564 F

. 2d at 286 ). T he c ourt a lso he ld tha t the a dm ini str at ive c la im s w er e ina de qua te ly presented because they failed to state a sum certa in a s to dam ages. Id.; see 28 C. F. R. § 1 4.2 (a) (s um

cert ai n re qu ire m en t).

L at er , in Farm er s S ta te S av ing s B an k v. F ar m er s H om e A dm ini str at ion , 866 F. 2d 27 6, 277 (8th Cir. 1989), this circuit held th at the claim ant satisfied § 267 5(a)' s-2 1-

ex haust ionr equir em en t. T he re , abank, a sse rt ing ac la im on i ts o w n be ha lf

, se nt
se ve ra l l et te rs to a fe de ra l a ge nc y tha t ( 1) state d inde ta il the e ve nts th at le d to it s as se rt ed c la im , a nd ( 2) r eque ste d r el ie f in the a m ount of $80 , 000. I d. a t 2 76 . T he
co urt e xpl ai ne d th at to sa ti sf y § 26 75( a) , ac la im an t m ust pr es en t i n w ri tin g " (1 ) suf fi ci en t i nf orm at ionf

or the a ge nc y to inv es tig at e the cl ai m s, a nd ( 2) the a m ount of dam ages sough t." I d. at 277 (internal citations om itted). The panel then clarified that "tw o pr er equis ite s f

or a dm ini str at ive inv es tig at iona re the ide nti ty of the c la im an ts,
se e L unsf or d, 570 F

. 2d a t 22 6, a nd the na tu re o f the c la im s. " I d. ( int er na l c ita tio n om itt ed ). Be ca

use the ba nk ide nti fi ed its el f, cl earl y de ta ile d the ba sis of its c la im s, an d sp ec if

ie d asum c er ta in, the bank' s le tte rs sa tis fi ed § 26 75( a)

. I d.

T he pa ne l m aj or ity tod ay , by it s ow n a dm iss ion"[ p] utt ing a sid e m om en tari ly Eighth C i rc uit precedent" in favor of the m ore re laxed standards of som e other ci rc uit s, a nte at 7, de te rm ine s that "L unsf or d and Farm er s e ac h a

ppl ie d am at er ia lly dif fe re nt s tandard ; c om

pl ianc e w ithboth pr ior

de ci sio ns a

ppe ar s to be log ic al ly im poss ibl e. " A nte a t 9. T he m aj or ity a cknow le dge s th at

the "c ar din al r

ule in our ci rc uit [ is] tha t on e pa ne l i s bo und by the de ci sio n of a pr ior pane l. " U nit ed St at es v. Be tc he r, 534 F

. 3d 8 20, 823 -2 4 (8 th Ci r. 2008 ) (quot at ionom itt ed ), c er t. de nie d, 129 S. Ct. 962 (2009). But, it claim s, w hen faced w ith conflicting prece dents, "[w ] e ar e

. . . f re e to c hoos e w hic h li ne of c as es to fo llo w . " K ost el ec v. St at e Farm Fi re & Ca s. Co., 64 F. 3d 1220 , 122 8 n.8 (8th Cir. 1995 ). But, in this circuit, "'the better practice
nor m al ly is to f oll owthe e ar lie st opin ion , as it shou ld hav e con tr oll ed the sub se que nt pa ne ls tha t c re at ed

the co nf lic t. ' " U nit ed St at es v. Ro be rt son, 606 F

. 3d 9 43, 949 ( 8th Ci r. 201 0) ( quot ing T

. L

. e x r el

. In gr am , 443 F. 3d a t 96 0) ). H er e, the c ourt di sr eg ar ds our earlier

decision in Lunsford, concludin g that Farm ers enca psulates th e "better
ru le "–i

. e. , w he n athi rd pa rty a tte m pts to pr es en t a

c la im to a fe de ra l a ge nc y

on b eh al f of an FT CA claim ant, she need not subm it accom pany ing ev i d en ce of her legal authorityto do so. The court's decision to di sregard L unsford is in correc t for three
re as ons.G ive n th at on its fa ce Farm er s tw ic e ap pr ovi ngl y ci te s L unsf or d, se e Farm er s, 10 866 F. 2d a t 27 7, the co ur t' s c onc lus ionthat i t i s " log ic al ly im poss ibl e" to re co nc ile th es e cas es imm ed ia te ly rais es redfla gs
. -2 2- First, the court erroneously treats Farm ers as binding on the issu e of w hether
a thi rd party pr ope rl y pr es en ts a

c la im on b eh al f of

ac la im an t w he n th e thi rd party subm its no evi de nc e of

he r le ga l auth or ity

to do s o. T his iss ue w as ne ve r ra ise d, ad dr es se d, or

r es olv ed in Farm er s be ca use the c la im an t i n th at

c as e pr es en te d ac la im on i ts o wn be hal

f

. "[ W ] e ar e gen er al ly not boun d by a pr ior pane l' s im pli ci t r es olu tio n of an issue that was neith er r aised by the parties nor discussed bythe panel." Streu
v. D orm ir e, 55 7 F.3 d 96 0, 964 ( 8thCi r. 200 9)

. I n c ontra st t o F ar m er s, the pr ec ise iss ue r ai se d inthe pr es en t c as e w as e xpl ic itl y rai se d, addr es se d, a nd r es olv ed in L unsf or d. A cc or din gly , the pa ne l m ust adhe re to our ci rc uit ' s ca rd ina l rul e and f oll ow L unsf or d.

N ex t, the cou rt

e rr one ousl y

c onc lud es tha t i t i s " log ic al ly im poss ibl e" to
re co nc ile L unsf

or d and F ar

m er s. I nde ed , a pr ope r re ad ing of the se c as es r ev ea ls n o 10 ge nui ne c onf

lic t. U nde r Farm er s, ac la im an t satis fie s § 2675(a ) if she pr es en ts i n w ri tin g ( 1) suffi ci en t inf orm at ionto inv es tig at e the c la im , a nd ( 2) the a m ount of dam ages soug ht. Farm ers, 866 F. 2d a t 276. Lunsford sim ply defines what constitutes sufficient inform ation to investigate the claim when a third party pr es en ts a

c la im on the cl ai m an t' s beha lf

. Intha t c ont ex t, the re is ins uf fi ci en t i nf orm at ionto inv es tig at e a claim wher e a third party fails "to dem onstrate the existence of the necessar y agency r e l a t i o n s h i p " b e t w e e n h e r s e l f a n d t h e c l a i man t

. Lu n s f o r d , 5 7 0 F

. 2 da t2 2 6

. No t ab l y, the L unsf or d c la im an ts, li ke Ma de r, ar gue d tha t "t ec hni ca l nonc om pli an ce w iththe ad m ini st rat iv e reg ul at io ns sh ou ld no t p recl ud e rec ov ery whe n th e cl ai m w as suf fi ci ent to giv e the governm ent notice of the clai m ." Id

. While the L unsford court acknowledged that other circuits applied this "m inim al notice" rule, it poin ted out th at in e ac h of

tho se c as es "an id en tif

ia ble cla im an t ha d f

ile d ac la im

f or asum c er ta in thus g iving the government the oppo rtuni ty t o evaluate and settle the claim later sued upon . " I d. a t 22 7 ( em

pha sis a dde d)

. I t i s n ot su rp ris in g thentha t the c ourt f ound-2 3-

§ 267 5(a) satisfied in Farm ers w here the c laim ant, asserting a claim on its own behalf,
wa s (1) identifiable, and (2) stated a s u m ce rtain

. Thus, c ontrary to the m aj ority 's
v i e w , F a rmer s a n dLu n s f o r da r e i n h a rmo n y.
Fi na lly , e ve n a ssu m ing th at (1 ) Farm er s is som eh owbin din g onthe pr ec ise iss ue pr es en te d inthi s c as e, a nd ( 2) the re is a ge nui ne c onf lic t be tw ee n L unsf

or d and Farm ers on th is is su e, th e co ur t's ho ld i n g do es no t re fle ctth e "b et te r ru le ." As dis cu sse d a

bove , the m aj or

pur pose of § 26 75( a) is to fa ci lit at e se ttl em en t of c as es
. T he c ir cu m stanc es sur

ro undi ng this ca se de m onstrate pr ec ise ly w hy tod ay ' s ho ldi ng im pe de s th e ex pe dit iou s and f ai r se ttl em en t of

F T CA c la im s.
Under 28 C. F. R. § 14.3(c), an FT CA "claim based on death m ay

be presented by the e xe cu tor

or a dm ini str at or

of the de cede nt' s e sta te , or by a ny oth er pe rs on le ga ll y en ti tl edto ass ert su ch a cl ai m in acco rd a n c e w it h app li cab le Sta te law." U nde r N eb ras ka la w, w ro ngf ul d ea th a ct ion s m ay

onl y "b e br ough t by

a nd i n th e na m e of the

. . . pe rs ona l r ep re se nta tiv e. " N eb

. Re v. S ta t. § 30 -8 10; se e Sp ra dli n v. D ai ry land I ns. Co

. , 641 N

. W

. 2d 6 34, 637 ( N eb

. 2002 ) (" T he pla in la ngua ge of [§ 30- 810] a llows only the personal r epresentative to bring [a wr ongful death] action . .

. .")

. When Mader attem

pted to present the wr ongful death claim , she asserte d t h e l eg al title of "Per sonal Representative of t he Estate of Robert L . Ma der. " D espite the VA 's repeate d requests, Mader did no t provide the VA with evidence t hat she was in fa ct the personal r epresentative of Mr. Mader' s estate. It wa s not un til the panel requested such evidence at oral ar gum ent that Mader' s attorney finally subm itted to th is court
a doc um en t e nti tled "Let te rs of P er sona l R ep re se nta tiv e. " S ee D oc ke t E ntr y on 1 1 / 0 4 / 2 0 0 9

. Th i s d o c u men t , o r i g i n a l l y fi l e di n t h e C o u n t y C o u rto f Ha l l C o u n t y, Ne braska, r eports that on Augus t 12 , 2 0 0 4 , M ader w as appointed as personal
re pr es en ta tiv e of

Mr

. Ma de r' s e sta te

. I d.

How ever, Mader still did not provide evidence that she wa s the p ersonal
re pr es en ta tiv e on the da te she a tte m pte d to pr es en t the cl ai m to the V A

. I n f ac t, on-2 4-

Jul y 8, 200 5, Ma de r fi le d a "V er if ie d Sta te m en t" in the H al l C ounty c ourt i nf orm al ly cl o s i n g Mr. Mader' s estate. See Docket E ntry on 11/ 18/2 009. The Ve rified St at em en t pr ovi de s: [T ] he unde rs ign ed be lie ve s the a ff ai rs of thi s e sta te a re c om

ple te d and is clo si ng th e es ta te by the fil in g o f th is Veri fie d S t a t em en t. If no proc ee din gs i nv olv ing

the P er sona l R ep rese nta tiv e are pe ndi ng in th is Co urt one y ea r af

te r th e fil ing

of thi s V er ifi ed Sta te m en t, the appo intment of the Personal Representative s hall thereupo n terminate.

Id

. ( em pha sis a dde d) ; se e N eb

. Re v. S ta t. §§ 3 0- 24, 117( b) , 30- 2453 (a ). T he re is n o ev ide nc e tha t " pr oc ee din gs i nvol vin g the Pe rs ona l Re pr es en ta tiv e" w er e pe ndi ng i n the Hall C ount y

court one y ear after Mader filed this statem ent. A ssum ing no such pr oc ee din gs were pe ndi ng, Ma de r' s a ppoi ntm en t a s pe rs ona l r ep re se nta tiv e te rm i n a t e d i n J u l y 2 0 0 6 , s e e N e b

. R e v . S t a t

. § 3 0

- 2 4 , 1 1 7 ( b ) , w e l l b e f o r e she attem pted to present the wrongful death claim on Augus t 3, 2006

. Im

portantly , under N eb ra ska law , te rm ina tio n of

appoi ntm en t " te rm ina te s [the pe rs ona l r ep re se nta tiv e' s]
au tho ri ty to re pr es en t the e sta te in a n yp e n d i n g

o r f u t u r e p r o ce ed ing

. " N eb

. Re v. Stat. § 30-245 1 (em

phasis add ed).

T hus, on A ugus t 3, 2006 , Ma de r ha d no au tho ri ty to pr es en t or se ttl e the c la im she subm itted to th e VA. While the rule articulated in Lunsford helps we ed out such de fe ct ive c la im s, the c ourt si de ste ps L unsf or d and holds tha t M ad er ' s m er e as se rt ion of pe rsona l r ep re se nta tiv e sta tus sa tis fi es § 26 75( a) ' s a dm ini str at ive e xhaust ion
re qui re m en t. A llo w ing thi rd part ie s to pr es en t F T CA cl ai m s w ith out le ga l auth or ity to d o so not

onl y ign or es the le tte r of

the law but

a lso m ost

de fi nit el y im

pe de s th e settlem ent of claim s, and theref o re cann ot be the better approach. In light of § 2675 (a )' s un de rl y ing pur

pose , it is onl y r ea sona ble fo r a fe de ra l a ge nc y

to de m an d
an d r ec ei ve ev id en ce of o ne ' s le ga l auth or ity to pr es en t and s et tle ac la im be fo re it div er ts v al uable ti m e an d r es our ce s to inv es tig at e the c laim

. Mad er's re fu sa l t o-2 5-

re spon d to the V A ' s nu m er ous an d vari ed r eque sts f

or thi s ne ce ssary

inf orm at ion , r e qu i r e s d i s mi s s a l o f

t h i s F T C A c l a i m.

III

.
Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , I dis se nt.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __