Rel: January 26, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 

Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0395

_________________________

Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Voncille Askew and Don Askew 

v. 

Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital) 

(Houston Circuit Court: CV-22-900177)

SELLERS, Justice.

Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital, the defendant 

below in a pending personal-injury action, petitions this Court for a writ 
SC-2023-0395

2

of mandamus directing the Houston Circuit Court to vacate its order 

granting a motion filed by the plaintiffs, Voncille Askew and Don Askew,

striking Triad's affirmative defense under what the parties refer to as the 

Alabama COVID-19 Immunity Act ("the ACIA"), 

Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-790 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we 

grant the petition and issue the writ.

Factual Background

Around August 16, 2021, Triad began providing 

monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy at Flowers Hospital to patients 

infected with Coronavirus, which is commonly referred to as COVID-19.

See, e.g., § 6-5-791(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. According to Triad, it directed 

those patients to enter the hospital through a preexisting entrance

designated as "Infusion entry" to help isolate those patients infected with 

COVID-19 from the hospital's general population. According to the 

Askews, that entrance had been created as part of a 2014 construction 

project and had been frequently used since its creation as an entrance 

and an exit for both hospital patients and employees. Furthermore, 

according to the Askews, neither the entrance nor the small, concrete 

ramp leading up to it had been modified since their creation.
SC-2023-0395

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Around September 21, 2021, Voncille Askew was diagnosed with 

COVID-19, and her physician scheduled her for 

monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy at the hospital on the following 

day. At approximately 12:30 p.m. on September 22, 2021, Voncille

proceeded through the "Infusion entry" for her appointment. After 

undergoing therapy for approximately two hours, Voncille was 

discharged and instructed to leave through the same "Infusion entry." 

According to the Askews, as Voncille exited, her foot caught the edge of 

the concrete ramp, causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries.

Procedural History

On May 10, 2022, the Askews sued Triad, alleging claims of 

negligence, negligence per se, wantonness, and loss of consortium. In its 

answers to both the complaint and the second amended complaint, Triad

raised the affirmative defense of civil immunity under the ACIA. On 

February 16, 2023, the Askews moved to strike Triad's affirmative 

defense, averring that the immunity provisions of the ACIA had no 

applicability to their claims. Specifically, the Askews asserted that 

because their "claims ar[o]se from the hospital's negligence in 

maintaining a safe premises and [its] failure to comply with key safety 
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4

codes," such claims were not "health emergency claims" for which Triad, 

even as a covered entity under the ACIA, could be accorded immunity 

under § 6-5-792(a), Ala. Code 1975. Moreover, the Askews contended

that, because "[n]o health care services or treatment were being 

performed on or provided to [Voncille] at the time of her fall," Triad was 

not entitled to immunity under § 6-5-794(a), Ala. Code 1975.

On March 7, 2023, Triad responded to the Askews' motion to strike, 

arguing that, pursuant to the plain text of §§ 6-5-792 and 6-5-794, it was

entitled to immunity under both provisions. Nevertheless, on April 20, 

2023, the trial court entered an order granting the Askews' motion to 

strike without having conducted a hearing and without explaining its 

rationale for granting the motion. Consequently, Triad petitioned this 

Court for a writ of mandamus. After ordering answers and briefs, we held 

oral argument on November 1, 2023.

Standard of Review

The standard for granting mandamus relief is well established:

"The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal 

remedy. Therefore, this Court will not grant mandamus relief 

unless the petitioner shows: (1) a clear legal right to the order 

sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to perform, 

accompanied by its refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another 
SC-2023-0395

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adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of 

the Court."

Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 2005) (citations omitted).

Moreover, this Court has recognized that "[a] trial court's disallowance of 

a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by a petition for a writ of 

mandamus." Ex parte Buffalo Rock Co., 941 So. 2d 273, 277 (Ala. 2006) 

(citing Ex parte Neely Truck Line, Inc., 588 So. 2d 484 (Ala. Civ. App. 

1991)). 

When a motion to strike an affirmative defense seeks "a dispositive 

ruling on the basis of evidence outside the pleadings, we construe it as a 

motion seeking the entry of a partial summary judgment."1 Ex parte 

Teal, 336 So. 3d 165, 167 n.3 (Ala. 2021) (citing Rule 56(a), Ala. R. Civ. 

P.). Because the order striking Triad's affirmative defense amounted to a

partial summary judgment and because no genuine issues of material 

fact are in dispute, the standard of review is as follows:

"'An order granting or denying a summary judgment is 

reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as the trial 

court applied. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. 

Underwood, 886 So. 2d 807, 811 (Ala. 2004). In addition, 

"[t]his court reviews de novo a trial court's interpretation of a 

statute, because only a question of law is presented." Scott 

1Included in support of the Askews' motion to strike were excerpts 

from a deposition of Triad's COO, Matthew Blevins.
SC-2023-0395

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Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Ala. 2003). 

Where, as here, the facts of a case are essentially undisputed, 

this Court must determine whether the trial court misapplied 

the law to the undisputed facts, applying a de novo standard 

of review. Carter v. City of Haleyville, 669 So. 2d 812, 815 

(Ala. 1995). Here, in reviewing the ... summary judgment 

when the facts are undisputed, we review de novo the trial 

court's interpretation of statutory language and our previous 

caselaw on a controlling question of law.'"

McKinney v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 So. 3d 1203, 1206 (Ala. 

2009) (quoting Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033, 

1034-35 (Ala. 2005)).

Discussion

I. Lack of Another Adequate Remedy

Triad contends that, "[b]ecause one of the purposes of immunity is 

to spare a defendant from the demands associated with defending a 

drawn-out lawsuit, a defendant wrongfully denied immunity protection 

has no adequate remedy on appeal if the case is erroneously permitted to 

go to trial." Petition at 25. This is so, Triad avers, even though it would 

not be entitled to immunity as to the wantonness claim against it, and 

thus would still have to litigate that claim, see § 6-5-792(b) and § 6-5-

794(a), noting that this Court has previously granted mandamus relief to 

a defendant, determining that that defendant was entitled to State-agent 
SC-2023-0395

7

immunity as to the claims against her even though the case would 

proceed on the claims against the other defendants. See Ex parte Mestas, 

371 So. 3d 220, 221-22 (Ala. 2022).

Although we agree with Triad that it lacks another adequate 

remedy, we do not agree with its rationale. A review of our precedents 

reveals considerable tension between the immunity exception in our 

mandamus jurisprudence, see, e.g., Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 

(Ala. 1996), and the broader concept that mandamus relief is appropriate 

to permit a disallowed affirmative defense only when that affirmative 

defense, if successful, would be determinative of the entire action against 

a particular defendant, see, e.g., Ex parte Tahsin Indus. Corp., U.S.A., 4 

So. 3d 1121, 1123-24 (Ala. 2008).

A. The Immunity Exception in Our Mandamus Jurisprudence

This Court has long held that "the general rule is that denial of a 

summary-judgment motion is not immediately reviewable by an 

appellate court." Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002). There 

exists an important exception, however: The "denial of a motion for a 

summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is immediately 

reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Id. (citing Ex parte 
SC-2023-0395

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Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795) (emphasis added). Although this Court initially 

created this exception to apply to claims of sovereign (or State) immunity, 

see Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795, we have since expanded the

applicability of the exception to claims of State-agent immunity, see, e.g.,

Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000), qualified immunity, see, 

e.g., Ex parte Sawyer, 876 So. 2d 433, 439 (Ala. 2003), municipal 

substantive immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, [Ms. SC2022-0524, Mar. 31, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2023), and statutory 

immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So. 

3d 325, 327, 331 (Ala. 2015) (granting in part a mandamus petition based 

on a claim of immunity under the Volunteer Service Act); Ex parte Tenax 

Corp., 228 So. 3d 387, 390-91 (Ala. 2017) (granting a mandamus petition 

premised on a claim of immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions 

of the Workers' Compensation Act); Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, 257 

So. 3d 850, 852, 854 (Ala. 2018) (granting a mandamus petition based on 

a claim of municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975). 

Notably, we have reviewed by mandamus petition an order denying

a motion for a summary judgment premised on an immunity defense even 

though that immunity defense, if successful, would not have resolved the 
SC-2023-0395

9

action in its entirety against the petitioner. For example, in Ex parte 

Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala. 2019), the petitioners sought mandamus 

relief from orders denying their motions for a summary judgment 

predicated on claims of parental immunity. This Court granted their 

petitions on the basis of parental immunity insofar as the "wrongfuldeath claims against [them] [we]re based on allegations of negligence," 

notwithstanding the fact that the wrongful-death claims against them

founded on allegations of wantonness would remain to be litigated. Id. at 

834. Thus far, however, we have granted mandamus relief in this manner 

only in the context of orders denying a motion for a summary judgment. 

When petitioners have requested mandamus relief from a trial court's 

order merely disallowing their affirmative defenses, however, we have 

employed a different approach.

B. Mandamus Relief for the Disallowance of Affirmative 

Defenses

As mentioned previously, this Court has acknowledged that "[a] 

trial court's disallowance of a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by 

a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Buffalo Rock Co., 941 So. 2d 

at 277. Thus, we permit mandamus review when a trial court either 

refuses a defendant's request to amend his or her pleadings to assert an 
SC-2023-0395

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affirmative defense, see, e.g., Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 858 So. 

2d 950, 952 (Ala. 2003), or -- as relevant here -- when a trial court grants 

a plaintiff's motion to strike a defendant's affirmative defense, see, e.g., 

Ex parte Gadsden Country Club, 14 So. 3d 830, 832 (Ala. 2009).

Although, in the context of a trial court's disallowing a party's affirmative 

defense, we have typically required that that affirmative defense, if 

successful, be determinative of the entire action against a particular 

defendant in order to support granting mandamus relief, see, e.g., Ex 

parte TruckMax, Inc. [Ms. SC-2022-0957, Feb. 17, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __ 

(Ala. 2023), the importance of addressing questions of immunity does not 

change depending on the context of how those questions are presented.

Thus, we conclude that Triad has no other adequate remedy at law and 

is entitled to mandamus review.

II. Clear Legal Right

There are two immunity provisions relevant here: § 6-5-792(a) and 

§ 6-5-794(a). Triad states that it is insulated from liability under both 

sections of the ACIA; the Askews believe that neither section is applicable

to Triad. 

A. Immunity Under § 6-5-792
SC-2023-0395

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The ACIA provides, in relevant part, that "a covered entity[2] shall 

not be liable for any damages, injury, or death suffered by any person or 

entity as a result of, or in connection with, a health emergency claim that 

results from any act or omission of the covered entity." § 6-5-792(a). The 

ACIA further defines a "health emergency claim" as follows:

"Any claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus. All 

such claims, no matter how denominated, shall be considered 

a health emergency claim for purposes of [the ACIA]. The 

term includes, but is not limited to, any cause of action that is 

related in any manner to either or both of the following:

"a. The actual, alleged, or feared exposure to 

or contraction of Coronavirus from the premises of 

a covered entity or otherwise related to or arising 

from its operations, products, or services provided 

on or off-premises.

"b. The covered entity's efforts to prevent or 

delay the spread of Coronavirus, including, but not 

limited to, any of the following:

2A covered entity includes, among other things, "[a] health care 

provider." § 6-5-791(a)(5)b., Ala. Code 1975. Included within the ACIA's 

definition of "health care provider" is "[a]ny health care provider as that 

term is defined in ... Section 6-5-481(1)-(8)[, Ala. Code 

1975]." § 6-5-791(a)(11)a. Thus, a health-care provider encompasses

"[s]uch institutions as are defined in Section 22-21-21[, Ala. Code 1975,]

as hospitals." § 6-5-481(7). The reference to § 22-21-21 in § 6-5-481(7) 

appears to be a typographical error; it further appears that the correct 

reference should be to § 22-21-20(1), Ala. Code 1975. Section 22-21-20(1)

defines hospitals as "[g]eneral and specialized hospitals." Therefore, and 

as both parties agree, Triad, which operates Flowers Hospital, is a

covered entity for purposes of the ACIA.
SC-2023-0395

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"1. Testing.

"2. Monitoring, collecting, 

reporting, tracking, tracing, disclosing, 

or investigating exposures or other 

information.

"3. Using or supplying 

precautionary equipment or supplies 

such as personal protective 

equipment."

§ 6-5-791(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975.

The parties disagree as to the meaning and scope of the above 

language. Triad argues that because Voncille was at the hospital to be 

treated for COVID-19, the Askews' negligence claims "arise[] from or 

[are] related to Coronavirus," and resulted from Triad's actions, and, 

thus, that those claims were health emergency claims for which it cannot 

be liable. The Askews view this section much more narrowly. They 

contend that health emergency claims are only those that either relate to 

exposure to or contraction of COVID-19 or arise from a covered entity's 

efforts to prevent or delay the spread of the virus. Furthermore, they

opine that any other reading of this section would render §§ 6-5-792(a)

and 6-5-794(a) redundant.

1. The Scope of § 6-5-792(a)
SC-2023-0395

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Incorporating the definition of "health emergency claim" into the 

language of § 6-5-792(a) results in the following unambiguous text: "[A] 

covered entity shall not be liable for any damages, injury, or death 

suffered by any person or entity as a result of, or in connection with, [any 

claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus] that results from any 

act or omission of the covered entity." Both sides agree that Triad was 

providing monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy to COVID-19 patients. 

Both sides further agree that Triad directed those patients seeking that 

treatment to enter and exit through an entrance designated "Infusion 

entry." Accordingly, both sides agree that Triad directed Voncille, in 

order to receive that treatment, to enter and exit through the "Infusion 

entry." Finally, both sides agree that Voncille fell and sustained injuries 

after exiting through the "Infusion entry." Factually, then, Voncille

suffered an injury in connection with her seeking treatment for 

COVID-19 when Triad directed her to enter and exit through a specific 

entrance devoted exclusively for patients seeking 

monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy for COVID-19.

The Askews believe that we cannot reach this conclusion for two 

reasons. First, they assert that this conclusion relies on too broad an 
SC-2023-0395

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interpretation of the language "[a]ny claim that arises from or is related 

to Coronavirus." § 6-5-791(a)(13). Instead, they aver that the only claims 

for which a covered entity may be immune are those claims -- or causes 

of actions that bear resemblance to those claims -- that are expressly 

listed under the ACIA's definition of "health emergency claim." 

Therefore, because, according to the Askews, their negligence claims bear 

"striking dissimilarity to" the types of claims described in

§ 6-5-791(a)(13)a.-b., Triad cannot be immune as to those claims. Askews' 

brief at 7. What the Askews are asking us to do, in so many words, is 

apply the rule of ejusdem generis to the statute. Under that rule, "where 

general words or phrases follow or precede a specific list of classes of 

persons or things, the general word or phrase is interpreted to be of the 

same nature or class as those named in the specific list." Ex parte 

Mitchell, 989 So. 2d 1083, 1091 (Ala. 2008) (citing Ex parte McLeod, 718 

So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1997)). However, that rule applies only "if the provision 

in question does not express a contrary intent." Cintech Indus. Coatings, 

Inc. v. Bennett Indus., Inc., 85 F.3d 1198, 1202 (6th Cir. 1996). As noted 

earlier, the language preceding the specific examples contained in § 6-5-

791(a)(13)a.-b. states that a health emergency claim "includes, but is not 
SC-2023-0395

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limited to," those listed examples. § 6-5-791(a)(13). "Numerous courts 

have found that the use of the words 'includ[es], but [is] not limited to,' 

as appear in this clause, reflect such a contrary intent." Cintech Indus. 

Coatings, 85 F.3d at 1202. Therefore, we reject the Askews' invitation to 

use the rule of ejusdem generis to narrow our interpretation of the ACIA, 

and we recognize the sweeping breadth of the language in 6-5-791(a)(13) 

as expressing the intent of the legislature to grant immunity for "[a]ny 

claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus." The statute imposes 

no limitations on the chain of causation or on the relation between a claim 

and Coronavirus outside of those limitations inherent to the words 

"arises from" or "is related to."

2. Potential Overlap Between §§ 6-5-792(a) and 

6-5-794(a)

Second, the Askews appear to contest a broad interpretation of 

§ 6-5-791(a)(13) on the ground that such an interpretation would make 

the immunity under § 6-5-792(a) so far reaching in the context of healthcare providers as to render immunity under § 6-5-794(a) superfluous. 

Essentially, the Askews ask us to forgo a plain-language interpretation 

of the ACIA and to instead rely on the rule against surplusage -- a canon 

of statutory interpretation that "cautions against needlessly reading a 
SC-2023-0395

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statute in a way that renders ... certain [provisions] superfluous," Barton 

v. United States Att'y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2018) -- to 

narrow the scope of claims as to which a health-care provider is immune.

However, "the usual 'preference' for 'avoiding surplusage constructions is 

not absolute' and ... 'applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other 

indications, inappropriate' when it would make an otherwise 

unambiguous statute ambiguous." Id. at 1301 (quoting Lamie v. United 

States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004), citing in turn Chickasaw Nation v. 

United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001)). Even assuming, for the sake of 

argument, that our interpretation of §§ 6-5-791(a)(13) and 6-5-792(a) 

renders § 6-5-794(a) superfluous, when "faced with a choice between a 

plain-text reading that renders a [provision] superfluous and an 

interpretation that gives every [provision] independent meaning but, in 

the doing, muddies up the statute," we "'should prefer the plain meaning 

since that approach respects the words of [our legislature].'" Id. (quoting 

Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536). Therefore, we also reject the Askews' invitation 

to employ the rule against surplusage to narrow our interpretation of the 

ACIA. 
SC-2023-0395

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Accordingly, the plain language of §§ 6-5-791(a)(13) and 6-5-792(a) 

mandate Triad's entitlement to immunity as to the Askews' negligence 

claims.

B. Immunity Under § 6-5-794(a)

Because we resolve this dispute under § 6-5-792(a), we pretermit 

discussion of the question whether Triad is entitled to immunity under 

§ 6-5-794(a).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Triad's mandamus petition and 

issue the writ; the trial court is directed to vacate its order striking 

Triad's affirmative defense under the ACIA.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Mendheim, J., concurs.

Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur in 

the result.

Mitchell, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

Cook, J., recuses himself.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in the result).

Although Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital is entitled 

to mandamus relief, I disagree with material parts of the main opinion's 

reasoning. In particular, I believe that the adequate-remedy element of 

our mandamus test is satisfied on immunity grounds only, thus obviating 

the need to analyze affirmative-defense grounds. And while I agree that 

Triad has a clear legal right to immunity on Voncille and Don Askews'

negligence claims under what the parties refer to as the Alabama 

COVID-19 Immunity Act ("the ACIA"), §§ 6-5-790 to -799, Ala. Code 

1975, I believe we must acknowledge that the statutory phrase "arises

from or is related to" imposes meaningful limitations on what claims are 

covered by immunity. § 6-5-791(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975. For these 

reasons, I concur in the result only.

Adequate Remedy

Unlike the main opinion, I see no tension between our Court's 

mandamus jurisprudence on immunity and the striking of affirmative 

defenses. Our Court recognizes the denial of immunity as a standalone 

reason for seeking mandamus relief, so the procedural posture in which 

an immunity issue comes to us does not matter. See, e.g., Ex parte 
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Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 (Ala. 1996) (granting mandamus review on 

the denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds); Ex parte Smith, 

327 So. 3d 184, 187 (Ala. 2020) (granting mandamus review on the denial 

of a summary-judgment motion on immunity grounds). That's because 

"a defendant wrongfully denied immunity protection has no adequate 

remedy if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial," Ex parte 

Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala. 2019); indeed, the whole point of 

immunity is to "spare a defendant from ... defending" against the claim 

at issue. Id. And, as the main opinion recognizes, the solicitude our 

Court gives to immunity is not limited to State or State-agent immunity;

it extends to all kinds of common-law and statutory immunity. See, e.g.,

id. (parental immunity); Ex parte Johnson, [Ms. SC-2023-0251, Dec. 15, 

2023] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2023) (self-defense immunity); Ex parte Tenax 

Corp., 228 So. 3d 387 (Ala. 2017) (Workers' Compensation Act immunity); 

Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So. 3d 325 (Ala. 2015) 

(Volunteer Service Act immunity). 

Because we have recognized that immunity is a "well established"

and independent ground for mandamus review, we need not address the 

circumstances in which the striking of an affirmative defense might also 
SC-2023-0395

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justify such review. Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps., Inc., 321 So. 3d 629, 

632 (Ala. 2020). Therefore, in my view, immunity by itself is a sufficient 

ground for mandamus review here.

Clear Legal Right

Whether Triad has a clear legal right to mandamus rests on the 

ordinary meaning of the phrase "arises from or is related to" as found in 

the ACIA. § 6-5-791(a)(13). If the Askews' claim "arises from or is related 

to Coronavirus," id., then it is a "health emergency claim" and Triad 

would be entitled to immunity. § 6-5-792(a), Ala. Code 1975. The 

disagreement I have with the main opinion is that it does not indicate 

whether there is any real limit to what claims may be covered by 

immunity. As I see it -- and as our cases suggest -- the phrase "arises 

from or is related to" incorporates substantive limitations; I believe we 

must acknowledge those limitations here.

We have previously encountered phrases similar to "arises from or 

is related to" in our contract-law jurisprudence. In the context of a jurytrial-waiver provision, we have held that the terms "'arising from' or 

'arising under' cover[] only claims requiring a reference to the terms of 

the contract." Ex parte AIG Baker Orange Beach Wharf, L.L.C., 49 So. 
SC-2023-0395

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3d 1198, 1203 (Ala. 2010). But adding the phrase "is related to" broadens 

contracts to cover a wider range of circumstances. See Ex parte Cupps, 

782 So. 2d 772, 776 (Ala. 2000); see also Beaver Constr. Co. v. Lakehouse, 

L.L.C., 742 So. 2d 159, 165 (Ala. 1999) (noting that "'relating-to' 

language" is "relatively broad"). 

We have dealt with similar phrasing in arbitration clauses. In that 

context, to rein in the far-reaching implications of those words, our Court 

has held that "'there must be some legal and logical nexus' between the 

dispute and the arbitration provision." State v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1 

So. 3d 1, 9 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. v. Bruner-Wells 

Trucking, Inc., 745 So. 2d 271, 275 (Ala. 1999)). In other words, the 

phrase "arises from or is related to" incorporates a causal link, which a 

reasonable reader would understand to track traditional notions of 

foreseeability.

Applying these lessons from our cases interpreting contracts, I 

believe that the phrase "arises from or is related to" in the ACIA carries 

with it limitations that foreclose immunity for extremely remote or 

attenuated claims. § 6-5-791(a)(13). That is, for a claim to qualify as a 

"health emergency claim," it must have some reasonably apparent "'legal 
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and logical nexus '" with Coronavirus. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1 So. 3d at 

9. Here, the Askews' claims have easily satisfied that test. As the main 

opinion explains, Triad's decision to designate the relevant entrance for 

use by Coronavirus patients to mitigate the spread of the illness directly 

led to Voncille Askew's use of the entrance and her subsequent injury and 

lawsuit. Thus, the Askews' claims have an obvious "'legal and logical 

nexus '" with Coronavirus, id., and qualify as "health emergency claims." 

§ 6-5-791(a)(13). Accordingly, Triad is entitled to immunity on the 

Askews' negligence claims. § 6-5-792(a).

Interpreting the ACIA without an eye to those limitations is 

dangerous. As Justice Scalia once noted, the phrase "relate to" is so broad 

that applying it "according to its terms [is] a project doomed to failure, 

since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is 

related to everything else." California Div. of Lab. Standards Enf't v. 

Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., 

concurring). Those limitations are especially important here. Almost 

every claim made since March 2020 can be traced back to Coronavirus 

given that the virus and the governmental response affected the entire 

world for the better part of three years. 
SC-2023-0395

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***

For these reasons, I concur only in the result granting the petition 

and issuing the writ of mandamus.