Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 03A05-1510-CR-1573 | April 28, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Benjamin Loheide

Columbus, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jerry Strawser,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 28, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

03A05-1510-CR-1573

Appeal from the Bartholomew 

Superior Court

The Honorable James D. Worton, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

03D01-1410-F3-4542

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] Jerry Strawser pled guilty to three counts of Robbery as a Level 3 felony and 

was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-six years executed in the 

Department of Correction. Strawser now appeals, contending that his sentence 

is inappropriate pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). 

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On September 28, 2014, Strawser and James Maddox drove from Detroit, 

Michigan to Columbus, Indiana for the purpose of robbing a specific gas 

station. During the ride, Strawser used heroin and smoked marijuana. When 

they arrived in Columbus, Strawser entered the gas station while wearing a 

mask and pointed a handgun at the clerk, Miranda Baker, and demanded 

money. Baker gave Strawser the money from the register, and he then ordered 

her to the back room and demanded that she open two safes. 

[4] While Strawser was behind the counter with Baker, Florentina Perez Ruiz and 

her brother, Rogelio Perez Ruiz, entered the gas station for their morning 

coffee. Florentina saw Strawser’s mask and thought it was a joke, so she smiled 

at him and laughed. Strawser pointed his gun at Florentina and Rogelio and 

demanded money. Florentina immediately complied, but Rogelio gave 

Strawser only part of his money. Strawser became angry and struck Rogelio in 

the head with the gun. 
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[5] Meanwhile, police had been alerted to the robbery and surrounded the gas 

station. Strawser exited the gas station and ran to a neighboring parking lot 

where Maddox was waiting for him in a vehicle. Strawser and Maddox 

managed to elude police and drove to a restaurant approximately eight miles 

away. Strawser and Maddox were apprehended after police located the vehicle 

in the restaurant’s parking lot.

[6] As a result of these events, the State charged Strawser with three counts of 

Level 3 felony robbery, one count of Level 5 felony battery, and one count of 

Level 5 felony possession of an altered handgun. Strawser subsequently entered 

into a plea agreement pursuant to which he pled guilty to the three counts of 

robbery in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. On September 8, 

2015, the trial court sentenced Strawser to consecutive terms of ten years for 

robbing Baker, sixteen years for robbing Rogelio, and ten years for robbing 

Florentina. Thus, Strawser received an aggregate sentence of thirty-six years 

executed in the Department of Correction. Strawser now appeals. Additional 

facts will be provided as necessary. 

Discussion & Decision

[7] Strawser contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his 

offense and his character. Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution grants 

our Supreme Court the power to review and revise criminal sentences. See 

Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 978 

(2015). Pursuant to A.R. 7, our Supreme Court authorized this court to 
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perform the same task. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). 

Per App. R. 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if after due consideration of the 

trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light 

of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Inman v. State, 4 

N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7). “Sentence review under 

Appellate Rule 7(B) is very deferential to the trial court.” Conley v. State, 972 

N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome 

by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense 

(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the 

defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples 

of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

Strawser bears the burden on appeal of persuading us that his sentence is 

inappropriate. See Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 876.

[8] The determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on 

our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the 

damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given 

case.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell, 895 

N.E.2d at 1224). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to attempt to 

leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is 

not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the perceived “correct” sentence in 

each case. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1292. Accordingly, “the question under 

Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, 

the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State, 
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894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original). Additionally, 

“appellate review should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather 

than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the 

sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225.

[9] To assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the statutory range 

established for the classification of the relevant offenses. Strawser was 

convicted of three Level 3 felonies. The advisory sentence for a Level 3 felony 

is nine years, with a minimum and maximum sentence of three years and 

sixteen years, respectively. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. Strawser was sentenced to 

consecutive terms of ten years for robbing Baker, ten years for robbing 

Florentina, and sixteen years for robbing Rogelio, for an aggregate sentence of 

thirty-six years.

[10] With respect to the nature of the offenses, we note that Strawser and Maddox 

drove approximately five hours from Detroit to Columbus for the purpose of 

robbing this specific gas station. At his sentencing hearing, Strawser testified 

that he had targeted Columbus because it was a “clean city” with “nice 

people.” Transcript at 26. Strawser robbed Baker at gunpoint, and when 

Florentina and Rogelio came into the gas station to buy their morning coffee, 

Strawser took the opportunity to rob them as well. When Rogelio resisted 

giving Strawser his money, Strawser struck him in the head with the gun. 

Strawser then fled from the gas station and was subsequently apprehended at a 

nearby restaurant. We are unpersuaded by Strawser’s argument that 

consecutive sentences are inappropriate because the offenses were part of a 
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single episode of criminal conduct. As Strawser acknowledges, consecutive 

sentences were permissible under I.C. § 35-50-1-2 because robbery is classified 

as a crime of violence. The existence of multiple victims was sufficient to 

justify consecutive sentences in this case. See Gilliam v. State, 901 N.E.2d 72, 74 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that a single aggravating circumstance, such as the 

presence of multiple victims, may justify the imposition of consecutive 

sentences).

[11] As to Strawser’s character, the record reveals that at only twenty-three years 

old, he already has a long history of delinquent and criminal behavior in his 

home state of Michigan. At fourteen years old, Strawser was adjudicated 

delinquent for committing retail fraud. At eighteen years old, Strawser was 

convicted under two separate cause numbers of attempted breaking and 

entering and malicious destruction of a building, both as misdemeanors. While 

on probation for these offenses, Strawser committed attempted retail fraud, a 

felony. He was sentenced to eighteen months on probation, but his probation 

was revoked because he “didn’t show up.” Transcript at 12. He was sentenced 

to the Michigan Department of Correction for a term ranging from four months 

to two and a half years. He was released in January 2014 without parole 

supervision after serving the maximum sentence due to his poor behavior in 

prison, including fighting and gang involvement. Less than a year later, he 

committed the instant offenses. Strawser’s behavior while incarcerated in 

Indiana has been atrocious. He has been found guilty of numerous jail rule 

violations for actions ranging from flooding his cell, physically attacking 
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another inmate, throwing bodily waste on another inmate, damaging jail 

property, intimidation, and disorderly conduct.

[12] Nevertheless, Strawser argues that his sentence should be reduced because he 

had a difficult childhood. Our Supreme Court has noted, however, “that 

evidence of a difficult childhood warrants little, if any, mitigating weight.” 

Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 725 (Ind. 2007). Strawser also suggests that his 

sentence is inappropriately harsh in light of his substance abuse problems and 

his expression of remorse. Although we acknowledge that Strawser apparently 

has a substance abuse problem, we also note that he was ordered to participate 

in substance abuse services while on probation in Michigan. In February 2011, 

a warrant was issued for his arrest for failure to attend outpatient counseling 

and drug testing, and he was ordered to perform community service as a 

sanction. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Strawser’s 

substance abuse problem weighs significantly in favor of a sentence reduction. 

See Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that 

substance abuse may be considered an aggravating circumstance where the 

defendant is aware of his addiction and does not seek treatment), trans. denied. 

[13] We also observe that the trial court did not find Strawser’s expression of 

remorse to be a significant mitigating factor. See Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 

1002-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that “our review of a trial court’s 

determination of a defendant’s remorse is similar to our review of credibility 

judgments: without evidence of some impermissible consideration by the trial 

court, we accept its determination”), trans. denied. We find the sincerity of his 
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remorse highly dubious in light of his behavior while in jail and his attempts to 

minimize the severity of his crimes at the sentencing hearing and in the presentence investigation report.1

 For all of these reasons, we readily conclude that 

Strawser’s thirty-six-year executed sentence is not inappropriate.

[14] We affirm. 

[15] Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.

 

1 At the sentencing hearing, Strawser testified that he “tapped [Rogelio] on the head” with the gun and that 

“if [he] was really trying to harm anybody [he] would have shot somebody.” Transcript at 21. Strawser told 

the probation officer preparing his pre-sentence investigation report that he believed the sentencing range 

applicable to his offenses was “ridiculous” because “nobody died, got shot, everything was returned.” 

Appellant’s Appendix at 39.