Present: All the Justices 

JOSE GRANADOS 

v. Record No. 980190 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 January 8, 1999 

WINDSON DEVELOPMENT 

CORP., ET AL. 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 The primary issue in this appeal is whether the Court of 

Appeals erred in affirming a decision of the Workers' 

Compensation Commission denying a claimant, an illegal alien, 

benefits because he misrepresented his immigration status and 

eligibility for employment in the United States. 

 Jose Ismael Granados was employed as a carpenter's helper 

by Windson Development Corporation (Windson) in January 1995. 

He speaks Spanish and does not speak or read English. At the 

time Granados was hired, Cleo Heavener, Windson's 

representative, asked Granados to provide his "social security 

card" and one other form of identification, in accordance with 

the requirements of the United States Department of Justice, 

Immigration and Naturalization Service. 

 Granados gave Heavener a "social security card" bearing his 

name and a card purportedly issued by the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, containing his photograph and 

identifying him as a resident alien. At that time, Granados 
also signed an employment eligibility and verification form 

required by federal law, attesting that he was an alien lawfully 

admitted for permanent residence in the United States. The 

documents Granados provided were forged. He was ineligible for 

lawful employment in the United States both on the date he began 

work and on the date he sustained a work-related injury. 

 In February 1995, Granados was injured in the course of his 

employment when he fell off a "stack of lumber" and fractured 

his right ankle. He was totally disabled until June 1995, when 

his treating physician released him for light duty work. Based 

on his illegal work status, Granados was unable to market his 

remaining work capacity. 

 Granados filed a claim for benefits with the Workers' 

Compensation Commission (the Commission). At a hearing before a 

deputy commissioner, and in his responses to interrogatories, 

Granados admitted that he had never applied for a social 

security card or any kind of work permit, that he was not a 

permanent resident alien, and that he was ineligible for 

employment in the United States. Granados did not dispute that 

the documents he provided to Windson were forged. 

 Heavner testified that Windson did not hire applicants who 

lacked proper documentation of their immigration status. He 

also stated that Windson would not have hired Granados if he had 

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failed to produce documents indicating that he was eligible for 

employment. 

 Granados asked the deputy commissioner to compel Windson to 

respond to his discovery request seeking all of Windson's 

employment records from 1990 to 1995. The deputy commissioner 

determined that the documents were not relevant to the 

proceeding and denied the request. The deputy commissioner 

issued an opinion denying Granados benefits on the ground that 

he "materially misrepresented his employment eligibility by (1) 

providing a false social security card, (2) providing a [false] 

alien immigration card[,] and (3) signing the Employment 

Eligibility Verification Form." 

 The full Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's 

decision, holding that Granados' claim for benefits was properly 

denied because he obtained his employment by misrepresentation. 

The Commission stated that Windson "properly relied on the 

documents presented. Had [Heavener] been aware of claimant's 

true alien status, he would not have hired him. . . . The 

claimant cannot now complain that the employer was taken in by 

the forged documents which he presented to obtain this 

employment." The Commission also affirmed the deputy 

commissioner's ruling denying Granados' motion to compel the 

production of Windson's employment records. 

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 A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's 

decision in an opinion that was withdrawn when the Court granted 

Granados' request for a rehearing en banc. On rehearing en 

banc, the Court entered an order, without opinion, affirming the 

Commission's decision "by an equally divided court." Granados 

v. Windson Dev. Corp., 26 Va. App. 251, 494 S.E.2d 162 (1997). 

 On appeal, Granados first asserts that the Commission erred 

in denying him benefits on the basis of his false 

representations, because there was no causal connection between 

those representations and the injury he sustained. He argues 

that his injury was "independent of the condition which was 

misrepresented." 

 In response, Windson contends that Granados was properly 

denied benefits based on his false representations. Windson 

argues that there was a causal connection between Granados' 

false representations and his injury, because the evidence 

showed that he would not have been hired without the "proof" he 

submitted to document his immigration and employment status. 

 The test we apply on review is well settled. A false 

representation made by an employee in applying for employment 

will bar a later claim for workers' compensation benefits if the 

employer proves that 1) the employee intentionally made a 

material false representation; 2) the employer relied on that 

misrepresentation; 3) the employer's reliance resulted in the 

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consequent injury; and 4) there is a causal relationship between 

the injury at issue and the misrepresentation. Prince William 

County Serv. Auth. v. Harper, 256 Va. 277, 280, 504 S.E.2d 616, 

617 (1998); Falls Church Constr. Co. v. Laidler, 254 Va. 474, 

477-78, 493 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1997). 

 The case before us presents the same type of causation 

issue we addressed in Harper. There, an employee sustained 

injuries to her wrist and coccyx while performing her job. She 

had been hired after falsely stating in her employment 

application that she had not been convicted of a crime as an 

adult. In fact, she had been convicted of the felonies of 

insurance fraud and criminal conspiracy. Her employer's 

personnel director testified at a hearing before a deputy 

commissioner that the employee would not have been hired if she 

had disclosed her felony convictions, because of the nature of 

the convictions and their recent date. 256 Va. at 279, 504 

S.E.2d at 617. 

 We affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment upholding the 

award of compensation. We stated that the employer failed to 

prove its claim of false representation, because testimony that 

the employee would not have been hired if she had disclosed her 

felony convictions "is not sufficient to demonstrate the 

existence of a causal relationship between [the employee's] 

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work-related injury and her misrepresentation." Id. at 280, 504 

S.E.2d at 617. 

 The required causal connection between an injury and a 

false representation was demonstrated in McDaniel v. Colonial 

Mechanical Corp., 3 Va. App. 408, 350 S.E.2d 225 (1986), in 

which the complainant had sustained a work-related back injury. 

At the time he was hired, the employee denied in his employment 

application that he had any physical limitations that would 

prevent him from performing certain types of work, and stated 

that he had never received workers' compensation benefits for 

his injuries. However, the employee had injured his back about 

six months earlier in a previous job and had received 

compensation benefits for that injury for about five weeks. Id.

at 410, 350 S.E.2d at 226. 

 The Court of Appeals held that there was a causal 

relationship between the employee's false representations and 

his injury. The Court based its holding on the medical 

evidence, which established that the second injury was in the 

same area of the employee's back as the earlier injury and was 

accompanied by similar complaints of pain radiating into the 

right leg. Id. at 413, 350 S.E.2d at 228. 

 In the present case, Windson failed to demonstrate the 

required causal relationship between Granados' false 

representation and his resulting injury. Granados' injury was 

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unrelated to the substance of his false representations 

concerning his immigration status and eligibility for 

employment. Therefore, based on Harper, we conclude that the 

Commission erred in ruling that Granados' false representations 

precluded an award of benefits. 

 Windson asserts, however, that even if the Commission's 

reason for denying benefits to Granados was erroneous, the 

record still demonstrates that the Commission reached the 

correct result. Windson argues that Granados was properly 

denied benefits because he was not Windson's "employee," within 

the meaning of the workers' compensation statutes. Windson 

contends that an illegal alien cannot enter into an employment 

contract in the United States and, thus, that Granados' alleged 

contract of employment with Windson was void and unenforceable. 

 In response, Granados argues that the illegality of a 

contract does not bar the receipt of workers' compensation 

benefits. He relies primarily on Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 

146 Va. 91, 108, 135 S.E. 890, 895 (1926), in which this Court 

applied the provisions of the workers' compensation statutes to 

a minor who was unlawfully employed at the time he sustained a 

work-related injury. We disagree with Granados' argument. 

 The determination whether Granados was Windson's "employee" 

depends on whether he met the definition of "employee" set forth 

in the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code §§ 65.2-100 to -

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1310 (the Act). Virginia Beach Police Dept. v. Compton-Waldrop, 

252 Va. 302, 305, 477 S.E.2d 514, 516 (1996). As a claimant 

seeking benefits under the Act, Granados had the burden of 

proving that he met this definition. See Behrensen v. Whitaker, 

10 Va. App. 364, 366, 392 S.E.2d 508, 509 (1990). 

 Code § 65.2-101 defines, in material part, an "[e]mployee" 

as "[e]very person, including a minor, in the service of another 

under any contract of hire." Granados was not in the service of 

Windson under any contract of hire because, under the 

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, an illegal alien 

cannot be employed lawfully in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1324a; see also Code § 40.1-11.1. Therefore, Granados was not 

eligible to receive compensation benefits as an "employee" under 

the Act because his purported contract of hire was void and 

unenforceable. 

 We disagree with Granados' argument that our decision in 

Humphrees requires a different result. There, we held that a 

minor was subject to the provisions of the workers' compensation 

statutes despite the fact that he was not lawfully employed in 

conformance with the child labor laws. We stressed that, since 

the principal object of the child labor laws is the protection 

of the child, the workers compensation statutes should be 

interpreted with due regard to the child's care and welfare. 

146 Va. at 94-95, 135 S.E. at 891. 

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 Those concerns are not present in this appeal. Also, 

unlike the case before us, the employer in Humphrees accepted 

the child for work without an employment certificate required by 

statute. Here, the record shows that Windson was diligent in 

obtaining from Granados the documentation required under state 

and federal law to verify his immigration status and eligibility 

for employment. Therefore, Windson's conduct does not provide a 

basis for reaching a different result in this case. 

 We find no merit in Granados' argument that the denial of 

workers' compensation benefits violates his constitutional right 

of equal protection. The denial of benefits results from 

Granados' failure to meet his burden of proving that he was an 

"employee" under the Act, not from his status as an illegal 

alien. Likewise, we find no merit in Granados' contention that 

the deputy commissioner improperly denied him discovery of 

Windson's corporate records relating to all employment 

applications made between 1990 and 1995, because those records 

were irrelevant to Granados' claim for benefits. 

 Since the Commission reached the correct conclusion in 

denying benefits to Granados, although it gave the wrong reason, 

we sustain that conclusion and assign the right ground set forth 

above. See Harrison & Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assoc., 253 

Va. 364, 369, 484 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997); First Sec. Fed. Sav. 

Bank, Inc. v. McQuilken, 253 Va. 110, 115, 480 S.E.2d 485, 488 

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(1997). Therefore, we will affirm the Court of Appeals' 

judgment. 

Affirmed.

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