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Filed 10/5/20 P. v. Hughes CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SEMEGREIAN HUGHES, 

Defendant and Appellant.

 A158260

(San Francisco City and County 

Super. Ct. Nos. 18001036 / 

228650)

After Semegreian Hughes stole a pair of sunglasses from an 

eyewear shop and struck the 69-year-old shop owner on the head, a 

jury convicted him of second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, 

subd. (c)),1 assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, 

subd. (a)(4)), and misdemeanor elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (c)). Hughes 

contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated, the trial court 

erroneously admitted evidence that he had shoplifted on two prior 

occasions, and the record contains insufficient evidence to support his 

misdemeanor elder abuse conviction. We conclude his contentions lack 

merit and affirm the judgment.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND

One rainy day, Hughes opened the door to an optometry shop in 

San Francisco, stepped inside, and grabbed a pair of sunglasses from a 

display in the front window. The shop owner, Robert K., was working 

in the back of the store at the time and asked Hughes if he could help 

him find something. Hughes responded that he had found what he was 

looking for and left the store without paying for the sunglasses. When 

Robert tried to catch up to him, Hughes turned and hit him on the side 

of the head, knocking him to the ground. Christine S. witnessed the 

incident and called 911.

At trial, Hughes argued that the prosecution could not establish 

the elements of robbery because, in light of his mental disorder, he did 

not intend to permanently deprive Robert of his property. The parties 

stipulated that Hughes suffered a traumatic brain injury in 1999. 

Hughes also presented evidence that he suffered from transitory 

periods of psychosis in which he experienced hallucinations and 

delusions, and that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar 

disorder, and schizoaffective disorder. 

However, the prosecution argued that Hughes behaved rationally 

when he walked into the shop, responded to Robert’s question, and 

struck Robert when he tried to retrieve the sunglasses. The 

prosecution also put on evidence that Hughes had shoplifted in the past 

and argued that the prior incidents showed that Hughes similarly 

intended to steal when he took the sunglasses. 

With respect to the elder abuse charge, Hughes contended that 

he could not have known that Robert was over the age of 65 because 

their interactions occurred in a matter of seconds.
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DISCUSSION

A.

Hughes asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

granting the prosecution’s motion to continue his trial until Christine

was available to testify, in violation of his right to a speedy trial under 

section 1382. However, Hughes does not dispute that he failed to 

preserve this issue for appeal by failing to object below. As a result, he 

has forfeited his challenge. (See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 

633.)

B.

Hughes contends that the trial court erred in allowing the 

prosecution to introduce evidence of two prior shoplifting incidents. 

Applying the abuse of discretion standard (People v. Harris (2013) 57 

Cal.4th 804, 841 (Harris)), we find no error.

The prosecution offered evidence that Hughes had shoplifted 

from stores in San Francisco in 2013 and 2017. The prosecution 

alleged that in 2017, Hughes took multiple items from a CVS store 

without paying for them, gave some of the items back when confronted 

by a store guard, and punched the guard in the face when he tried to 

recover the remaining items just outside the store. When the guard

called the police, Hughes tried to take his phone from him. After the 

police told him he was under arrest for robbery, Hughes told them, “I 

got some money in my pocket.” Hughes subsequently acknowledged 

that the victim was a guard, but told the police that once he exited the 

store with the items, the items belonged to him, and not to the victim.

In the 2013 incident, the prosecution alleged that Hughes took 

four wallets from a Macy’s store and left without paying. When several 
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guards confronted him just outside the store, Hughes handed them his 

backpack and said, “They’re in there[.]” When a guard asked him why 

he stole the wallets, Hughes responded, “It’s a bad habit.”

Evidence that a person committed a crime is generally 

inadmissible to prove that the person has a criminal propensity or 

disposition. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) But evidence of uncharged 

crimes may be admissible to prove other material facts, such as a 

person’s identity or intent. (Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 841; Evid. 

Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Compared to other permissible uses of prior 

act evidence, only the “ ‘least degree of similarity’ ” between 

the prior act and the charged offense is required to prove intent. 

(Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 841.) “[T]o be admissible to prove 

intent, the uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar” to support 

an inference that the defendant likely had the same intent in both 

instances. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402 (Ewoldt))

Here, the prior shoplifting incidents were admissible on the 

question of Hughes’s intent. Hughes contended that, as a consequence 

of his 1999 brain injury and his psychotic episodes, he truly believed 

the sunglasses were his, and he therefore did not intend to 

permanently deprive Robert of his property. The jury could rely on the 

prior offenses to conclude that Hughes understood the nature of his 

actions and was capable of forming the requisite intent, even after his 

brain injury. (See Ewoldt, supra 7 Cal.4th at p. 394, fn. 2 [“in a 

prosecution for shoplifting in which . . . the defendant left the store 

without paying for certain merchandise, the defendant’s uncharged 

similar acts of theft might be admitted to demonstrate that he or she 
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did not inadvertently neglect to pay for the merchandise, but rather 

harbored the intent to steal it”].)

We reject Hughes’s assertion that the prior incidents were too 

dissimilar. Like the robbery here, the two prior incidents involved 

Hughes taking items from stores in San Francisco and walking out 

without paying. In both the CVS incident and the instant offense, 

Hughes punched the victim in the head when the victim attempted to 

recover the stolen property. The prior offenses were sufficiently similar 

to prove intent. (See People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 637 (Lewis) 

[two robberies were sufficiently similar where defendant took wallets 

from victims by force in both incidents].) Further, as the trial court 

instructed, the jury was free to consider any dissimilarities in 

evaluating the evidence. (See CALCRIM No. 375.)

In addition, we disagree with Hughes’s contention that the trial 

court should have excluded the prior acts because they were more 

prejudicial than probative. (See Evid. Code, § 352.) The facts of the 

prior offenses were not particularly inflammatory. (See Harris, supra,

57 Cal.4th at p. 842.) Although Hughes asserts that the evidence 

improperly suggested to the jury that he has a disposition as a thief,

the trial court instructed the jury that it could not rely on the evidence 

to conclude that Hughes has a bad character. (See CALCRIM No. 375.)

We presume the jury followed the instructions. (Harris, supra, 57 

Cal.4th at p. 842.)

Hughes is mistaken that the prosecutor improperly described to 

the jury the applicable burden of proof regarding the prior incidents. 

First, Hughes forfeited any claim of error on this ground by failing to 

object. Second, the prosecutor’s argument was consistent with the trial 
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court’s instruction and the applicable law that the jury may consider 

prior acts “only if the conduct has been proven by a preponderance of 

the evidence.” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 597; see also 

CALCRIM No. 375.)

C.

Hughes argues that the record contains insufficient evidence that 

he knew, or reasonably should have known, that Robert was 65 years of 

age or older for purposes of his elder abuse conviction. (See 

§ 368, subds. (c), (g).) We disagree.

To determine whether the record contains sufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s finding, “ ‘we examine the entire record in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, presuming in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce 

from the evidence[.]’ ” (People v. Coffman & Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 

1, 87.) 

Substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding here. As 

Hughes walked into the shop, he was facing the 69-year-old Robert,

who was only 15 to 20 feet away. They spoke briefly to each other in 

the store. The jury was also shown photographs of Robert at the time 

of the offense and was able to observe Robert when he testified at the 

time of trial. The jury could have reasonably concluded from this 

evidence that Hughes should have known that Robert was over 65 

years old. Hughes argues otherwise, but he is asking us to reweigh the 

evidence, which we cannot do. (People v. Riley (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 

1152, 1165-1166.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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_______________________

BURNS, J. 

We concur:

____________________________

SIMONS, ACTING P.J.

____________________________

NEEDHAM, J.

A158260