___________ ______________________________________________________________ ___________________ _

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________

__________________________________ Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

Chief Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. 

# Opinion

Stephen J. Markman

FILED JUNE 20, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 120437 CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 121698 MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF, Defendant-Appellee.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH YOUNG, J. We granted leave to appeal in these ca ses to considerwhether the lower courts properly applied the exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to (1) a search warrant that

was issued in violation of MCL 780.653 and (2) a bench warrant that was issued in violation of MCR 3.606(A). Beca use we conclude that neither the statute nor the court rule contemplates application of the exclusionary rule,

we reverse in both cases. In People v Hawkins (see unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 28, 2001 [Docket No. 230839]), we hold that evidence of firearms and cocaine seized pursuant to a search warrant should not have been suppressed on the ground that the warrant was issued in violation of the affidavit requirements of MCL 780.653(b). In People v Scherf (see 251 Mich App 410; 651 NW2d 77 [2002]), we hold tha t e vidence of marijuana seized from defendant following his arrest should not have been suppressed on the ground that the bench warrant purs uant t o whichhe was arrested was issued in violation of the affidavit requirements of MCR 3.606(A).

I. F ACTUAL 1 AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND A. P EOPLE V H AWKINS Detective Todd Butler of the Grand Rapids Police

1 These c ases have not yet been tried. Our statement of facts is derived from the preliminary examination and motion hearing transcripts and from the documentation cont aine d in the lower court records. 2Department received tips from two informants that illegal controlled substances were being sold from a residence located at 921 Humbolt, S.E., in Grand Rapids. On the basis of the informationprovided by these sources, Butler sought a search warrant to search the residence. Butler’s affidavit set forth the following facts in support of the issuance of the warrant: 1. Your affiant received information from an informant on 10/14/99 that the resident of 921 Humbolt S.E. was involved inthe sale of narcotics. The informant stated the residence [sic] is selling the controlled substance crack cocaine. The informant described the resident and seller of the controlled substance as “Chris,” B/M, approx. 20, 5'8", 170 [lbs], medium build/complexion, short hair. 2. Your affiant met with a reliable and credible informant on 11/3/99. Your affiant was advised that the informant had observed the controlled substance cocaine available for sale from the residence within the past 36 hours. 3. Your affiant was advised by the informant the entry door to the suspects [sic] apartment has been reinforced to delay a police entry. On November 3, 1999, a judge of the 61st District Court issued the requested warrant, and the residence was searched the same day. During the search, police seized two stolen firearms, approximately 20 grams of cocaine, and other contraband. Defendant, who was not present during the search,

was st opped by police while driving his vehicle. Defendant

was then arrested and later bound over for trial on several

3charges. 2 Defendant sought suppression o f th e evidence seized in the execution of the searc h wa rrant, arguing that the affidavit in support of the wa rrant was constitutionally deficient in that it did not support a finding of probable cause, the information it contained was stale, and it did not clearly reveal whether one or two informants had supplied the information. Defendant additionally contended that the affidavit did not meet the requirements of MC L 78 0.653(B) because it did not include information concerning the credibility of the unnamed in form ants or the reliability of the information they supplied. The circuit court granted defendant’s motionto suppress the evidence and dismissed the case on the grounds that the affidavit was bothconstitutionally deficient and in violation of MCL 780.653. The court declined the prosecutor’s invitationto apply the federal “good-faith exception,” under whichthe Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not applicable to evidence seized by officers acting in reasonable reliance

2 Defendant was charged with possession with inten t t o deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(1)(d); possessionof a fir earm by a felon, MCL 750.224f; driving with a suspended lice nse, MCL 257.904(3)(b); and two counts of receiving and co ncealing a stolen firearm, MCL 750.535b. Additiona lly , defendant was charged with being a second-time drug offender, MCL 333.7413(2), and a fourth-time felony offender, MCL 769.12. 4ona warrant that is subsequently adjudged constit utio nally deficient. 3 Onappeal, t he C ourt of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s order to suppress evidence on the sole basis that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not meet the requirements of MCL 780. 653. Sl ip op at 3. The panel concluded that People v Sloan , 450 Mich 160; 538 NW2d 380 (1995), in whichthis Court held that evidence obtained under

a search warrant issued in violation of § 653 must be suppressed, was dispositive. Slip op at 2 . Accordingly, the panel declined to address the constitutionality of the warrant

or the prosecution’s argu ment that the good-faith exception was applicable. Id. at 3. We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal to this Court, limited to the issue whether the exclusionary rule applies to a violation of § 653. 466 Mich 860 (2002). B. P EOPLE V S CHERF Ina prior case, def en dant pleaded guilty ofmanufacturing with intent to deliver between five and fortyfive kilograms of marijuana in violation o f M CL 333.7401(2)(D)(ii) and was sentenced to probation. Defendant

3 See Arizon a v Evans , 514 US 1; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995); United States v Leon , 468 US 897; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984). 5allegedly moved ou t o f Michigan without permission and th ereafter failed to report to his probation officer i n violationof two of the terms of his probation. Consequently, defendant’s probation officer filed a standard form petition requesting that a bench warrant be issued for his arrest. The petition contained the following statements: Petitioner requests that a bench warrant be issued and Michael Brandon Scherf be a rrested and held in contempt of court for the following reason(s): Violation of Rule Number 3: The defendant has failed to report as ordered and his whereabouts are unknown. Violation of Rule Number 4: Failure to notify agent of change of address. The petition contained the statement, “I decl are that the statemen ts abo ve are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief,” and was signed by the probation officer. The district court issued the reques ted bench warrant. Subsequently, police were interviewing defendant in connectionwith an unrelated l arceny complaint when they discovered, via the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN), the outstanding bench warrant for his arrest. Defendant was arrested pursuant to the warrant. During a searchincident to the arrest, police seized several grams of marijuana from defendant’s person. Thereafter, defendant was charged with possession of marijuana in violation of MCL

6333.7403(2)(d). Defendant sought suppression of evidence of the marijuana

onthe ground that the bench warrant petition was technically deficient in tha t it was not supported by affidavits as required by MCR 3.606(A), which governs conte mpt o ffenses committed outsid e the immediate presence of the court. The prosecutor conceded that MCR 3.606(A) was violated because no affidavit was submitted in support of the probation officer’s petition. The prosecutor argued, however, that the district court division of the Isabella County Trial Court should apply the federal “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. The district court division denied defendant’s motion, holding that the bench warrant petition was confirmed by oath or affirmationand was therefore properly issued. Additionally, the district court division noted that it found Arizona v Evans , 514 US 1; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995), which

re affirmed and applied the good-faith exception, to be persuasive authority. Defendant appealed, an d th e circuit court reversed the district court division’s order, granted defendant’s motionto suppress the marijuana evidence, and dismissed the case. The court held that although the failure to provide an affidavit withthe bench warrant petition was merely “technical,” it rendered the warrant invalid. The court rejecte d th e

7prosecutor’s argument that the good-faith exception was applicable, stating on the record that the exception was not recognized in Michigan. The prosecutor sought leave to appeal to t he Court of Appeals, asserting that the good-faith exception should be applied under the circumstanc es. The Court granted the prosecutor’s application and affirmed the circuit court division’s order. 251 Mich App 410. The majority 4 noted that the bench warrant petition“was not supported by an affidavit

as required by MCR 3.606," id. at 411, and that “it is undisputed that defendant’s arrest, and the resultant search of defendant and seizure of evidence, were based on an invalid benchwarrant and, therefore, the arrest and consequential searchwere unlawful,” id. at 415. The majority indicated that it would have appli ed the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and reversed the circuit court div isio n’s decisionif it w ere not obligated under MCR 7.215(I)(1) to follow People v Hill , 192 Mich App 54; 480 NW2d 594 (1991), in whichanother panel of the Court specifically decli ned to recognize the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 5 215 Mich App 415-416.

4 Judge Jessica R. Cooper concurred in the result only.

5 The Court subsequently declined to conven e a special panel to resolve the potential conflict with Hill , s upra . People v Scherf , 251 Mich App 805 (2002). 8This Court granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 467 Mich 856 (2002).

II. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW Questions of law relevant to a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed de novo. People v Hamilton , 465 Mich 526, 529; 638 NW2d 92 (2002); People v Stevens (After Remand) , 460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (1999). 6 We must determine in these cases whether suppression of evidence is required when MCL 780.653 or MCR 3.606(A) has been violated. Where a state statute is involved, “whether suppressionis appropriate is a question of statutory interpretation and thus one of legislative intent.” People v Sobczak-Obetts , 463 Mich 687, 694; 625 NW2d 764 ( 2001 ), quoting Stevens , supra at 644, quoting People v Wood , 450 Mich 399, 408; 538 NW2d 351 (1995) (B OYLE , J., concurring). Similarly, “[t]he interpretation of a court rule is a question of law and is reviewed de novo.” Hinkle v Wayne Co Clerk , 467 Mich 337, 340; 654 NW2d 315 (2002); see also People v Petit , 466 Mich 624, 627; 648 NW2d 193 (2002).

6 See also People v Hudson , 465 Mich 932 (2001). 9III. A NALYSIS A. I NTRODUCTION First and foremost, it is important to understand what is not before this Court in deciding the issues presented in these cases. We are concerned solely with application of the exclusionary rule to a statutory violation ( People v Hawkins) and to a court rule violation( People v Scherf) . The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Hawkins was based exclusively on the conceded violation of MCL 780.653, and the Court specifically declined to address the constitutional validity of the search warrant affidavit or the good-faithexception to the constitutional exclusionary rule. Likewise, in Scherf we

are not concerned with the constitutional validi ty o f the benchwarrant or of the potent ial application of the goodfaith except ion. Although the Court of Appeals majority in Scherf indicated a willingness to apply the good-faith exceptionin order to avoid suppression of the evid ence f or the conceded violation of MCR 3.606(A), app lica tion of that exceptionwould have been wholly premature, given that neither the circuit court division nor the Court of Appeals panel had found a constitutional violation in the first instance. 7

7 Moreover, defendant Scherf did not preserve for our re view a ny argument that the affidavit in support of the issuance of the bench warrant was constitutionally deficient. Rather, his sole argument in support of his motion to suppress was that the affidavit did not meet the technical requirements of MCR 3.606(A). 10With that in mind, we must determine whether the statutory and court rule violations in these cases warrant suppression of the evidence. B. T HE E XCLUSIONARY R ULE The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that originated as a means to protect the Fourth Amendment right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Stevens , supra at 634-635; see also Weeks v United States , 23 2 US 383; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914), ov erruled o n other grounds in Elkins v United States , 364 US 206; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960); Adams v New York , 192 US 585; 24 S Ct 372; 48 L Ed 575 (1904); Boyd v Un ite d States , 116 US 616; 6 S Ct 524; 29 L Ed 746 (1886). The exclusionary rule, modified by several exceptions, 8 generally bars the introductioninto evidence of materials seized and observations made during an unconstitutional search. Stevens , supra at 634, 636. However, application of the exclusionary

8 For example, the “ good-faith exception,” which has been asserted by the prosecutors in the cas es at bar, permits admissionof evidence seized by police officers in reasonable reliance on a constitutionally defective search warrant. See Arizona , supra ; Leon , supra. As noted, because of the procedural posture of the instant cases, we do not reach the constitutionality of the warrants at issue and, consequently, we do not address t he a pplicability of the good-faith exceptionto a violation of Michigan’s counterpart t o th e FourthAmendment, Const 1963, art 1, § 11. We note that leave has recently been granted in People v Goldston , 467 Mich 938 (2003), in which this Court will consider whether to adopt and apply a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 11rule is not constitutionally mandated, and [t]he question whether the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context [is] regarded as an issue separate from th e que stion whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. [ Illinois v Gates , 462 US 213, 223; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).] Moreover, the exclusionary rule is not designed to “make whole” a citizen who has been subjected to an unconstitutional searchor seizure. Rather, the aim of the rule is one of police deterrence: The wrong condemned by the [Fourth] Amendment is “fully accomplished” by the un lawf ul search or seizur e itself . . . and the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to “cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffere d.” . . . The rule thus operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard FourthAmendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” . . . . [ United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906; 104 S Ct 3407; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984) . ] Irrespective of the application of the exclusionary rule inthe context of a constitutional violation, the dra stic remedy of exclusion of evidence does not necessarily apply to

a statutory violation. 9 Whether the exclusionary rule should

9 The exclusionary rule is particularly harsh in that it is neither narrowly tailored nor discerning of the magnitude of the error it is intended to deter. By taking no cognizance of the effect of a police error upon a particular defendant, or of the actual guilt or innocence of a defendant, the exclusionary rule lacks proportionality. Given these characteristics, we decline to expand the use of this rule in (continued...) 12be applied to evidence seized in violation of a statute is purely a matter of legislative intent. Hamilton , supra at 534. “‘Because our judicial role precludes imposing different policy choices from those selected by the Legislature, our obligation is, by examining the statutory language, to discern the legislative intent that may re asona bly be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. . . . When a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial constructionor interpretation is unnecessary and therefore, precluded.’” [ Sobczak-Obetts , supra at 694-695 (citations omitted).] Likewise, whether suppression of evidence on the basis of the violation of a court rule is appropriate is controlled by the language of the rule. “This Court applies principles of statutory interpretation to the interpretation of court rules. Whenthe language is unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning plainly expressed, and judicial construction is not permitted.” Hinkle , supra at 340.

C. P EOPLE V H AWKINS At issue in Hawkins is whether evidence seized from a residence pursuant to a search warrant was properly suppressed because the affidavit sup port ing the search warrant did not

me et the requirements of MCL 780.653 in Michigan’s sea rc h warrant act, MCL 780.651 to 780.659. MCL 780.653 provides, in

9 (...continued) the ab sence of an explicit constitutional or legislative requirement. 13pertinent part: The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based upon all the facts related within the affidavit made bef ore h im or her. Th e affidavit may be based upon information supplied to the comp lain ant by a named or unnamed personif the affidavit contains 1 of the following: * * * (b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative allegations from which the magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the information and either that the unnamed person is credible or that the informationis reliable. [ 10 ] MCL 780.653(b) derives from the defunct “two-pronged test” enunciated by the United States Supre me Court in Aguilar v Texas , 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1 509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v United States , 393 US 410; 89 S Ct 584; 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969), for determining whether an anonymous informant’s ti p established probable cause for issuance of a sea rc h warrant. See People v Sherbine , 421 Mich 502, 509; 364 NW2d 658 (1984). Under the Aguilar-Spinelli formulation as it was

10 Section1 of the search warrant act, MCL 780.651, provides in part: (1) When an affidavit is made on oath to a m agistrate authorized to issue warrants in criminal cases, a nd the affidavit establishes grounds for issuing a warrant pursuant to this act, the magistrate, if he or she is satisfied that there is prob able c ause for the search, shall issue a warrant to search the house, building, or other location or place where the property or thing to be searched for and seized is situated. 14generally understood, a search warrant affida vit b ased on informationsupplied by an anonymous informant was required to containboth (1) some of the underlying circumstances evidencing the informant’s bas is of knowledge and (2) facts establishing either the veracity or the reliability of the information. See Gates , supra at 228-229; Sherbine , supra at 509. 11 Thi s Court has previously held that a violation of th e affidavit requirements of MCL 780.653 warranted suppression of evidence. Sloan , supra ; Sherbine , supra . Because we are unable to conclude that the Legislature intended application of the exclusionary rule where the requirements of § 653 have not been met, we overrule Sloanand Sherbine to the extent that they so hold, and we conclude that defendant was not entitled to suppression of evidence on the basis of th e statutory violation. In Sherbine , this Court held that suppression of evidence

11 In Gates , the United States Supreme Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test in favor of a “totality of the circumstances” approach. Accordingly, in determining whether a search warran t affi davit that is based on hearsay information passes Fourth Amendment muster, [t] he task of the issuing magistrate is simply t o make a practical, common-sense decision whether, givenall the cir cum stances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. [ Gates , supra at 238.] 15was required where a search warrant affidavit violated a previous version of § 653 12 in that it did not make any showing that an informant was a credible person and that he supplied reliable information. 13 Although this Court specifically declined to de cid e whether satisfaction of the federal Aguilar-Spinelli test is required under Const 1963, art 1, § 11—that is, whether the requirements of § 653 are rooted in Michigan’s constitutional search and seizure provision—this Co urt ne vertheless applied the exclusionary rule to the statutory vio lation. In so doing, this Court failed to examine the language of § 653 to determine whether the Legislature intended that such a drastic remedy be applied to

a violation of the statutory affidavit requirements. Rather, this Court reli ed on People v Dixon , 392 Mich 691; 222 NW2d

12 In 1984, § 653 provided: The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based upon all the facts related within the affidavit made before him. The affidavit may be based upon reliable information supplied to the complainant from a credible person, named or unnamed, so long as the affidavit contains affirmative allegations that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein.

13 We conclu ded i n Sherbine that preamendment § 653 expa nde d the Aguilar-Spinelli test to require that the affidavit set forth facts showing boththat a confidential informant was credible and that the information was reliable. Sherbine , supra at 509-510. The current version of § 653, as amended by 1988 PA 80, makes clear that a showing of ei ther credibility or reliability is required. 16749 (1974), in which this Court similarly appli ed t he exclusionary rule to a statutory violation without performing the requisite examination of legislative i nt ent. 14 We concluded, “T he s tatutory violation here is clear. The statute requires proof that the informant who supplied the informationbe credible. The affidavit here failed to satisfy this requirement. The evidence must therefore be suppressed.” Sherbine, supra at 512. Justice Boyle dissented, opining that preamendment § 653 required a showing of either reliability or credibility, and that this Court had misconstrued the statute as an expansion of Aguilar . Sherbine, 421 Mich513-514. Additionally, Justice Boyle questioned whether suppression of the evidence was required under the circumstances: “I cannot conceive of

a reason why we should apply the exclusionary rule to the supposed violation of a statute where the affidavit would pass

14 In Dixon , this Court held that suppression of evidence was required, and reversed the defendant’s conviction on the ground that a search of the defendant at a police station was inderogation of his rig ht to bail under MCL 780.581. This Court cited decisions from Californ ia and Oregon courts suppressing evidence for similar statutory violations, but noted that in several of tho se d ecisions the courts specifically found Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 704, n18. Acknowledging that its decision was not premised on the FourthAmendment, id. , this Court nevertheless concluded that suppressionof evidence obtained in derogation of the statutory right to bail was required because “no other remedy [was] as likely to assure its full enforcement,” id. at 705.

17constitutional muster under either Const 1963, art 1, § 11, or US Const, Am IV . . . .” Id . at 516. In Sloan , this Court held that a violation of a different provisionin the current versionof § 653 required application of the exclusionary rule. A search warrant was issued to obtaina blood test from the defendant, who was later charged withmansl aughter with a motor vehicle, 15 operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicatin g liquor causing death, 16 and felonious driving. 17 The portion of § 653 at issue was the provisionthat “[t]he magistrate’s finding of reasonable or probable cause shall be based on all the facts related within the affidavit made before him or her.” This Court held that this provision was violated when the magistrate looked beyond the affidavit, to unrecorded oral testimony of a police officer, in issuing the search warrant. 18 Relying on Sherbine , this Court further concluded that the blood test evidence had to be excluded becau se of the

15 MCL 750.321.

16 MCL 257.625(4).

17 MCL 752.191.

18 As in Sherbine , the Sloan Court specifically stated that it was not addressing whether the probable cause determination was constitutionally defective. Sloan , supra at 183 n 17. Indeed, this Court noted that the affidavit requirement of § 653 was not constitutionally mandated under either Const 1963, art 1, § 11 or the Fourth Amendment. Id. 18statutory violation: In Sherbine , we held that evidence obtained specifically inviolation of MCL 780.653 . . . must be excl uded. The Legislature appears to have acquiesced in this particular construction of MCL 780.653 . . . . While the Legislature subsequently amended MCL 780.653 . . . because it disagreed with portions of our statutory analysis provided in Sherbine , it is significant that the Legislature when instituting such amendments did not alter our holding that evidence obtained in violation of the statute must be excluded. To change the law in that regard would have been an easy and convenient task for the Legislature. Neither the language in the amendments, nor the legislative history per tinent to the amendments provide a basis fo r concluding that a sanction other than exclusion is appropriate for the violation of MCL 780.653 . . .

. Clearly, the Legislature shares our view that no remedy other than exclusion is as likely to assure the full enforcement of all of the requirements under MCL 780.653 . . .— a statute specifically designed by the Legislature to implement the constitutional mandate for probable cause under Const 1963, art 1, § 11. [ Sloan , supra at 183­ 184.] Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Ri le y and Weaver, dissented, arguing that the statute was complied wit h and that, in any event, a viola tion of § 653 did not require application of the exclusionary rule: Applicationof the exc lusionary rule to any technical violation of our search warran t s tatute that may have oc curred in the present case is unwarranted. Particularly where the magistrate is a sitting j udge, as are virtually all magistrates in this state, I cannot conclude that th e r isk of relying on after-the-fact allegations ar e [sic] so substantial that we must suppre ss evi dence. The exclusionary ru le is intended to serve a deterrent purpose, and loses any useful force and eff ect whe n appl ied to technical errors that do not rise to the level o f neg ligent or wilful conduct, serving then 19only to deprive the trier of fact of relevant and probative evidence. As explained bythe United States Supreme Co urt in Michigan v Tucker , 417 US 433, 446-447; 94 S Ct 2357; 41 L Ed 2d 182 (1974): * * * “The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, c o nduct which has deprived the defendant of some rig ht. B y refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill inthose particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an ac cuse d. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses muchof its force.” [ Sloan , supra at 200 (B OYLE , J., dissenting).] Justice Boyle additionally c ri ticized the majority’s invocation of the “legislative acquiescence” doctrine: The majority’s assertion of l egislative acquiescence in the decision in Sherbine . . . to use of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained in alleged violation of the statute be fore u s is wholly mistaken. In Sherb ine , this Court’s majority interpreted the form er version of the statute as if it imposed a more r estric tive standard than the Fourth Amendment and suppressed evi dence on the basis of that consideration. The swift reacti on of the Legislature was to amend MCL 780.653 . . . to make it clear that the Court was incorrect in concluding that what had occurred was a statutory violation. The Legislature had no need to say what should not b e excluded; it relied on the Court’s word that were it clear that the Legislature had aut horized the warrant, suppression would not be ordered. Acting on our rep re sentation, the amended legislation tracked the FourthAmendment. Because “our hold ing that evidence obtained in violation of the statute must be excluded” . . . was wholly derived from our narrow reading of MC L 780.653 . . . , the legislative amendment of the statute is not an 20acquiescence in, but rather a repudiation of, th e vie w in Sherbine that the evidence should be excluded. [ Sloan , supra at 202-203 (B OYLE , J., dissenting).] We agree with Justice Boyle and once again reaffirm that where th er e is no determination that a statutory violation constitutes an error of constitutional dimension s, applicationof the exclusionary rule is inappropriate unless the plain language of the statute indicates a l egisla tive intent that the rule be applied. Hamilton , supra at 534; Sobczak-Obetts , supra at 694. Moreover, we reject the Sloan Court’s conclusion that the Legislature’s silence constituted agreement with this Court’s applica t ion of the exclusionary rule in Sherbine . As we have repeatedly stated, the “legislative acq ui escence" principle of statutory constructionhas been squarely rejected by this Court because it reflects a critical misapprehension of the legisla ti ve process. See Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp , 465 Mich732, 760 n15; 641 NW2d 567 (2002); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm , 463 Mich 1 43, 177-178 n 33; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). Rather, “Michigancourts [mu st] determine the Legislature’s intent from its words , not from its silence.” Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co , 460 Mich 243, 261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999). The dissent asserts that “the majority [has] imposed its

ownpolicy on the Legislature . . . .” Post at 10. Respect fully, we disagree and believe that it is not this

21majority but the Sherbine and Sloanmajorities that impos ed their own policy choices on the Legislature with respect to the application of the exclusionary rule to a violation of § 653. Citing nothing inthe text of the statute, the Sherbine Court simply declared, without further analysis, that because the statute was violated, “[t]he ev idence must . . . be suppres sed. ” Sherbine, supra at 512. Similarly, the Sloan majority opined that “no remedy other than exclusion is as likel y to assure the full enforcement of all of th e requirements under MCL 780.653 . . . .” Sloan, supra at 184. The dissent purports to apply a “contextual analysis” of § 653 in reaching t he con clusion that the Legislature inte nded the exclusionary rule to apply to a violatio n o f that statute. Yet, as the dissenters readily admit, the text of § 653 is entirely silent in this regard. Post at 2 -3 , genera lly. Clearly, there is no principled basis for t he contentionthat this C ourt’ s injection of the exclusionary rule in Sherbine and Sloanis grounded in the statutory text. The dissent attempts to draw a distin cti on between legislative silen ce and reenactment of a statute following judicial interpretation. While we have no reason to contest that t he “reenactment doctrine” can sometimes be a useful tool for determining legislative intent where the statutory language is ambiguous, such a tool of construction may not be

22utilized to subo rd inate the plain language of a statute. This Court’s constitutional charge to interpret the laws does

no t end merely because the Legislature reenacts a statute. 19 Inthe absence of a clear indication that the Legisl ature intended to either adopt or repu di ate this Court’s prior constructi on, th ere is no reason to subordinate our primary principle of construction–to ascertain t he Legislature’s intent by first examining the statute’s langu age –to the reenactment rule. 20

19 Takento its logical conclusion, application of the reenactment doctrine under circumstances such as those present inthe case at bar would undoubtedly lead to results never anti cipa ted or intended by the Legislature. For example, suppose that the Legislature amends a statutory code to make all pronouns gender-neutral, but otherwise reenacts the code as originally written. It would be neither accurate nor reasonable to presume, as the dissent would have us do, that the L egis lature intended to adopt in toto every appellate decision construing or applying the code.

20 Even t he United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that there has been no stable, consistent formulation of this amorphous doctrine. Helvering v Griffiths , 318 US 371, 396; 63 S Ct 636; 87 L Ed 843 (1943). Under the broadest formulationof the reenactment doctr ine, there is no reason why only judicial interp retati ons of statutes should be incorporated by implication upon reenactment of a statute. Indeed, even administrative interpretations of statutes have beenrecognized as binding. See United States v Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co , 297 US 88, 95; 56 S Ct 353; 80 L Ed 500 (1936). Our point is not that the reenactment doctrine, properly limited and applied, is without value as a statutory constructionaid, but that it ca nnot b e employed indiscriminately and without recognition of the fact that its more expansive versions impose an unreasonable burden on the (continued...) 23The Legislature has stated its views on the construction of its statutes, in pa rt by providing that all words and phrases that are not terms of art 21 be given their “common and

20 (...continued) Legislature to affirmatively scan our appellate casebooks to discernjudicial constructions of statutes that the Legislature desires for entirely other reason s to amend. Applying the reenactment rule here would, in our view, be the effective eq uiva lent of imposing anaffirmative duty on the Legislature to keep abreast of all binding judicial pronouncements involving the construction of statutes and to revise those statutes to repudiate any judicial construction withwhich it disagrees. For similar reasons, we have rejected precisely such a duty in other contexts. See, e.g., Donajkowski, supra at 261-262. To apply the reenactment doctrine under these circumstances would not only likely fail to g ive effect to legislative intent, but would also presumably violate separationof powers principl es. See Grabow, Congressional silence and the search for legislative intent: A venture into “speculative unrealites,” 64 BUL R 737, 759-761 (1984) . Accordingly, before we ignore the plain meaning of the text of a statute, we reject formulations of the reenactment doctrine involving circumstances that fail to demonstrate the Legislature's conscious considerationof a judicial decision, coupled with some compelling indication that the Legislature intended to accept or reject that inte rpreta tion. As is illustrated by Justice B oyle’s dissent in Sloan, supra , discussed at pp 22-23, it is a perilous exercise to attempt to discernlegislative intent from the Legislature’s silence, evenwhen a statutory amendment responds to some portionof a judicial decision. See Sloan, supra at 202-203.

21 We note that in the case of a term of art , application of the “reenactment rule” would generally be appropriate be cause such a term by definition carries with it the constructionaccorded it by the courts. See People v Law , 459 Mich 419, 425 n 8; 591 NW2d 20 (1999). In contrast, in this case we are confronted with the amendment of a statute following the imposition of a judicially created remedy that is grounded nowhere in the text of the statute. Our dissenting colleagues opine that “the Legislature could have (continued...) 24approved” meanings. MCL 8.3a. Such is consistent w ith our most fundamental principle of constructionthat there is no

room for judicial interpretation when the Legislature’s in tent can be ascertained from the statute’s plain and unambiguous languag e. See Stanton v Battle Creek , 466 Mich 61 1, 615; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). Accordingly, we decline to apply the “reenactment rule” whenthe Legislature’s intent is evidenced by the plainlanguage of the statute and there is

no clear indication of any intent to adopt or repudiate this Court’s prior construction. Nothing in the plain language of § 653 provides us with

a sound basis for concluding that th e Legislature intended that noncompliance withits affidavit requirements, standing alone, justifi es app lication of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by police in reliance on a searchwarrant. 22

21 (...continued) easily modified the applicability of the exclusionary rule whenenacting 1988 PA 80,” post at 6-7, and that therefore the Legislature must have intended to adopt, sub silentio , the exclusionary rule. However, an equally plausible conclusion is that, because the Legislature could easi ly h ave modified the statute to expressly provide for the appli cation of the exclusionary rule, it must have intended to reject thi s Court’s decision in Sherbine . This precisely illustrates one of the reasons that the “legislative acquiescence” doctrine is an untrustworthy indicator of legislative intent, as well as why the “reenactment rule” should not be applied as an aid in interpreting legislative silence . 22 Any error concerning the sea rch warrant in this case rests squarely on the shoulders of the district court judge, (continued...) 25Moreover, applic atio n of the exclusionary rule is particularly i napp ropriate under the circumstances of this case, where the objectiv e of the rule—to sanction police miscon du ct as a means of deterrence—would not be served. 23 See Sobczak-Obetts , supra at 712. Because we applied the exclusionary rule to the statutory violations a t issu e in Sh erbine and Sloanwithout performing the requis it e examinationof legislative intent, we are compelled to overrule those decisions to the extent that they confli ct with today’s holding. 24

22 (...continued) whose duty it is to ensure that warrants are issued in compliance with state and federal law. There is no indication inthe record that the officer who applied for the search warrant, or the officers who executed the warrant, acted improperly.

23 Indeed, w e note that the Legislature has specifically provided for a sanction in the case of misconduct in the executionor procurement of a search warrant. See MCL 780.657 (“[a]ny person who in executing a search warrant, wilfully exceeds his au tho rity or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year”); MCL 780.658 (“[a]ny person who maliciously and without probable cause procures a se arch warrant to be issued and executed shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year”). That the Legislat ure has elected to deter police misconduct in the mann er indicated by MCL 780.657 and MCL 780.658 further evidences the la ck o f any legislative intent that the exclusionary rule be applied under the circumstances of this case.

24 Our dissenting colleagues charge us withignoring this Court’s prohibition-era decisions in People v Knopka , 220 Mich 540; 190 NW 731 (1922), People v Moten , 233 Mich 169; 206 NW (continued...) 26Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred inholding that suppression of the evidenc e wa s required as

a remedy f or the vio lation of § 653 in this case. Because the Court of Appeals declined to address the prosec utor’s additional arguments onappeal, we remand this matter to that Court for further proceedings. D. People v Scherf The Court of Appeals held in Scherf that a bench warrant issued in violation of a court rule was invalid and th at suppressionof evid ence obtained in connection with defendant’s arrest pursuant to that warrant was t he refore

24 (...continued) 506 (1925), People v Bules , 234 Mich 335; 207 NW 818 (1926), and People v Galnt , 235 Mich 646; 209 NW 915 (1926), all of which involved search warrant requirements as set forth in § 27 of Michigan’s “liquor law,” 1922 CL 7079(27). As we explained in Sobczak-Obetts, supra , Knopka involved a violation of Const 1908, art 2, § 10, not merely a statutory vio lation. The Motenand Bules Courts applied, without analysis, the Knopka exclusionary rule to purely statutory searchwarrant violations. The Galnt Court, similarly to the Knopka Court, expressly found a constitutional violation. The Motenand Bules decisions, which conclusorily ap plied the exclusionary rule without determi ni ng that there was any constitutional violation, are distinguishable in any event becau se they did not involve the search warrant statute at issue. See Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 700 n 11. Moreover, as we noted in Sobczak-Obetts , supra at 707 , th e statutory violations in Moten, Bules, and Galnt pertained to the warrant form; in such a case , “the resulting search may be constitutionally defective.” (Emphasis in original.) As we have taken pains in this opinion to make clear, we are reviewing only the Court of Appeals application of the exclusionary rule to the alleged violations of a statute and a court rule, a nd we do not address any claims that the warrants at issue were constitutionally insufficient. 27required. We disagree. MCR 3.606(A) provides: Initiat ion of Proceeding. For a contempt committed outs ide the immediate view and presence of the court, on a proper showing on ex parte motionsupported by affid avit s, the court shall either (1) order the accused person to show cause, at a reasonable time specified in the order, why that personshould not b e p unished for the alleged misconduct; or (2) issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the person. N othing in the wording of MCR 3.606(A) provides any indicationthat the exclusionary rule should be applied to a violationof its affidavit requirement. 25 To eng raft the exclusionary rule—a harsh remedy designed to sanction and deter police misconduct where it has resulted in a violation of constitutional rights—on t o the technical provisions of a rule of court in this manner would extend the deterrent well beyon d its intended application. Indeed, the task of scrutinizing the police papers submitted in su pport of a warrant for technical compliance withthe law falls squarely withthe judicial offi cer. I n the absence of language

25 Inlight of the p rose cutor’s concession of error, we need not address whether the issuance of the bench warrant was actually violative of the affida vit requirement of MCR 3.606(A). 28evincing an intent that suppression of evidence should follow from the violation of MCR3.606(A), we decline to infer one.

IV. C ONCLUSION The exclusionar y rule was improperly applied to the violations of the statutory and court ru l e affidavit requirements at issue in these cases. We cannot conclude, on the basis of the p lain language of MCL 780.653, that the Legislature intended that noncompliance with its terms should result in su ppress ion of evidence obtained by police acting inreasona bl e and good-faith reliance on a search warrant. Likewi se , MCR 3.606(A) does not provide for suppression of evidence on the ba sis of noncompliance with its affidavit requirement, and we decline to infer an intent that the exclusionary rule should apply under these circumstances. In Hawkins , we reverse th e ju dgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for further proceedings. In Scherf , we r everse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the matter to the district court division for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. Robert P. Young, Jr. Maura D. Corrigan Clifford W. Taylor Stephen J. Markman

29____________________________________ S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 120437 CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 121698 MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF, Defendant-Appellee.

WEAVER, J. (concurring) . I concu r in the majority’s holding that the violations of MCL 780.653(b) and MCR3.606(A) do not require suppression of the evidence seized in these cases. I write separately to note that I do not believe the reenactment rule canbe relied

onin the present cases. As expl ained by Justice Boyle in her dissent in People v Sloan , 4 50 Mich 160, 202-203; 538 NW2d 380 (1995), in which I joined,The [ Sloan ] majority’s assertion of legislative acquiesce nc e in the decision in Sherbine, [1] to use of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained in alleged violation of the stat ute before us is wholly mistaken. In Sherbine , thi s Court’s majority interpreted the former version of the statute as if it imposed a more restrictive standard thanthe FourthAmendment and suppressed evidence on the basis of that co nsid eration. The swift reaction of the Legislature was to amend MCL 750.6 53; MSA 28.1259(3), to make it clear that the C ourt w as incorrect in concluding that what had occurred was a statutory violation. The Leg islatu re had no need to say what should not be excluded; it relied onthe Court’s word that were it clear that the Legislature had authorized the warrant, suppression would not be ordered. Acting on our represen ta tion, the amended legislationtracked the FourthAmendment. Because “our holding that evidence obtained in violation of the statute must be excluded , ” ante at 183 (Cavanagh, J.), was wholly derived from our narrow reading of MCL 780.653; MSA28.1259(3), the legisl ative amendment of the statute is not an a cquiescence in, but rather a repudiation of, the view in Sherbine that the evidence should be excluded. However, while I do not believe the reenactment rule should be relied on in the pr es ent cases for the reasons outlined by Justice Boyle, my opinion should not be construed to m ean that the rule may not be relied on in othe r case s where it is appropriate. Elizabeth A. Weaver

1 People v Sherbine , 421 Mich 502; 364 NW2d 658 (1984). 2S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

v Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 120437 CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS, Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 121698 MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF, Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________________ CAVANAGH, J. ( dissenting ). Today the majority discounts decades of pre ce dent in order to adopt its preferred policy of limiting application of the exclusionary rule. Because contextual interpretations

o f the statute and the court rule mandate use of the exclusionary rule, and because the task o f altering our state’s policy concerning statutory remedies belongs to the Legislature, I must respectfully dissent. MCL 780.653Like the majority, I agree that a contextual analysis of MCL 780.653 will determine the appropriate re medy f or its violation. However, I depart from the majority’s analysis insofar as it negl ec ts material rules of statutory interpretation. Since its enactment i n 1966, MCL 780.653 has codified the requirement that search warrants i ssue only upon a finding of probable cause, giving form to the constitutional protectionagainst unreasonable searches and s eizures. The provisionclarifies that information insupport of a warrant must be supplied by an individual who has personal knowledge of the facts alleged. MCL 780.653, as amended by 1988 PA 80, provides: The magistrate's finding of reasonable or probable cause sha ll be based upon all the facts re lated within the affidavit made before him or her . The affidavit may be based upon informa tio n supplied to the co mplainant by a named or unnamed personif t he affidavit contains 1 of the following: (a) If the person is named, affirmative allegations from whichthe magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with personal knowl edge of the information. (b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative allegations from whichthe magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with per sonal knowledge of the informationand either that the unnamed person is credible or that the information is reliable. Similarly to the federal and state con stitutional prohibitionagainst the issuance of a warran t wi thout

2probable cause, the text of this subsection provid es no specific guida nce a bout the requisite judicial response to its violation. Statutory cons truction is, therefore, required. In re MCI , 460 Mic h 39 6; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). Althoughthe consequence of an infraction is not prescribed, 1966 PA 189 does authorize a p enalty for those who intentionally exceed their authority wh en e xecuting a

wa rran t, who exercise such authority with unnecessary severity, or who maliciously procure a warrant. S ee M CL 780.657, 780.658. 1 Wh ile I agree that these statutory provisions must inform our understanding of MCL 780.653, I am not persuaded that they mandate the result envisioned by the majority. As an initial matter, the penalty provisions only pertainto a small number of violations. Most violations of 1966 PA 189 are not ca used by wilful misconduct. If the criminal provisions are deemed the exclusi ve rem edy for any

1 MCL 780.657 provides: Any person who in executing a search warrant, wilfully exceeds his authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year. MCL 780.658 provides: Any person who maliciously and without probable cause procures a search war ra nt to be issued and executed shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year. 3violationof this act, its directives would have no force. Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude tha t th e presence of criminal penalties for rare incide n ts of extreme misconduct indicates a legislative in t ent to displace the exclusionary rule. To so hold would assume the Legislature promulgated an impotent (or ineffectual) statute. 2 For this reason, I find several other well-respected doctrines of interpretation more compelling. Among them is the strong presumptionthat a high court’s constructionof a statute should be given a heightened stare decisis effect. As notedby the United States Supreme Court, [the] reluctance to overturn precedents derives in part from in st itutional concerns about the relationship o f the Judiciary to Congress. One reasonthat we give great weigh t to s tare decisis inthe area of statutory construct ion is that "Congres s is free to change this Court's interpretationof its legislation.” Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720, 736[; 97 S Ct 2061; 52 L Ed 2d 707] (1977) . W e have overruled our precedents when the intervening development of the law has "removed or weakened the con ceptual underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable withcompeting legal doctr in es or policies." Pattersonv McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 173[; 109 S Ct 2363; 105 L Ed 2d 132] ( 1989) (citations omitted). Abse nt those changes or compelling evidence bearing onCongress' original intent, NLRB v

Longshoremen, 473 US 61, 84[; 10 5 S Ct 3045; 87 L Ed 2d 47] (1985), our system de mand s that we

2 See People v Sobczak-Obetts , 463 Mich687, 713-716; 625 NW2d 764 (2001) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 648-666; 597 NW2d 53 (1999) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 4adhere to ou r pr ior interpretations of statutes. [ Neal v United States, 516 US 2 84 , 295; 116 S Ct 763; 133 L Ed 2d 709 (1996) (emphasis added).] Because this Court shares a simi lar relationship with the Michigan Legislature, I find no reason to reject this Court’s precedent in P eople v Sloan , 450 Mich 160; 538 NW2d 380 (1995), or People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502; 364 NW2d 658 (1984), which clarify that evidence obtained in violation of MCL 780.653 must be suppressed. In Sherbine, this Court held that the exclusionary rule is the proper remedy for a violation of MCL 780.653. In support, the Court cited People v Dixon, 392 M ich 691; 222 N

W2d 749 (1974), People v Chartrand, 73 Mich App 645; 2 52 NW2d 569 (1977), and State v Russell, 293 Or 469 ; 650 P2d 79 (1982). Sherbine, supra at 512 and ns 18-21. Tenyears later, this Court affirmed the applicationof the excl usionary rule for violations of MCL 780.653 (§ 653) in Sloan, supra . In Sloan, this Court held that a magistrate must base the probable-cause determination on the r ecord (i.e., an affidavit is necessary; swo r n testimony is insufficient), and that a violation of this statute requires the exclusion of tainted evidence. The Court’s rationale was based , in part, on the Legislature’s acquiescence to the applicationo f the exclusionary rule as expressed in Sherbine . In 1988, the Legislature revised § 653 in response

5to Sherbine , overruling by le gislative enactment the informant- relia bi lity standard. In doing so, it approved the use of the exclusionary rule to re dress violations of § 653. Thoughone might be tempted to dismiss the authoritative value of Sloan onthe basis of its stated reliance on the now disfavored doctrine of legislative acquiesce nce, a close examinationreveals the Court utilized a related—but quit e distinct—rule of interpretation, i.e., the reenactment rule. If a legislature reenacts a statute without modifying a high court’s practical co nstr uction of that statute, that constructionis implicitl yadopted. See Singer, 28 Statutes and St atutory Construction (2000 rev), Contemporaneous Construction, § 49 :09, pp 103-112. The reenactment rule differs from the legisla tive -acquiescence doctrine in that the form er canon provides “prima facie evidence of legislative intent” by the adoption, without modification, of

a statutory provision that had a lreadyreceived judicial interpret at ion. Id. at 107. As articulated by the United States Supreme Court, a legislature “is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation whenit [reenacts] a statute without change . . . .” Lorillard, a Div of Loew’s Theatres, Inc v Pons, 434 U S 575, 580; 98 S Ct 866; 55 L Ed 2d 40

6(1978). As I not ed in Sloan , the Legislature could have easily modified the a pplicability of the exclusionary rule whenenacting 1988 PA 80. By altering the text to renounce the informant rule modified in Sherbine , while reenacting the remaining text, the Legislature indicated its detailed knowledge of Sherbine and approved the u se of the exclusionary rule for vio lations of § 653. 3 Long before the Le gi slature incorporated the exclusionary rule into MCL 780.653, this Court adopted a presumptionin favor of utilizing the exclu sionar y rule for sta tutory violations. Over eighty years ago, in Peo ple v Knopka , 220 Mich 540, 545; 190 NW 731 (1922), the Court suppressed evi dence obtained by warrant issued without

3 T he m ajority’s attempt to diminish the value of the reenactment doctrine is misguided. As noted above, the rule mer ely provides prima facie evidence of legislative intent , and a bill replacing male pronouns with neutral pronouns throughout the code–as suggested in the majority opinion, ante at 23 n 19–would not justify a strong presumption in favor of its application because there would be no indication that the Legislature thoughtfully familiarized itself with the subsections modified. Application of the reenactment rule in this case, by contrast, does she d lig ht on the scope of the Legislature’s familiarity with Sherbine, supra . F urther , unlike the majority, I have more faith in the Legislature’s ability to competently execute its duties. To assume the Legislature would not familiarize itself with the whole of a particular case when revising one subsection of the code in response to that very case does not, as the majority suggests, “violate separation of powers principles.” Ante at 24 n 20. Rather, reference to the reenactment rule under such circumstances simply acknowledges legislative competency. 7probable cause: It not a p pearing that the search warrant was issued upon the constituti on al and statutory showing of probable cause, it must be held that the evidence procured by it was inadmissible and should have been suppressed and that, with such evidence out, defendant should have been discharged. Inreaching this conclusion, the C ourt focused exclusively on the statutes estab li shing search-warrant requirements. Three years later, in People v Moten , 233 Mich 169; 206 NW 506 (1925), the Cour t again applied the exclusionary rule to remedy a statutory vio l ation, relying, inpart, on Knopka. See also People v Bules, 234 Mich 335; 207 NW 818 (1926) (reversing a conviction on the ba sis of evidence obtained in violati on o f statutory warrant requirements); People v Galnt, 235 Mich 646; 209 NW 915 (1926) (discharging the defendant where evidence obtained in violation of statute required suppression). Althoughthis Court has recently attempted to narrow the impor t of Moten and its progeny, the distinction is particularly in appos ite here. In People v Sobczak-Obetts , 463 Mich 687; 625 NW2d 764 (2001), the majority distinguished the Moten-Bules-Galnt t ri logy because each analyzed substantive warrant requirements, i.e., the sufficiency of a

war ra nt’s “form,” whereas the statute at issue in Sobczak- Obett s concerned procedures relevant to warrant execution.

8See also People v Hamilton, 465 Mich 526; 638 NW 2d 92 (2002)(holding that an absence of statutory authority did not warrant application of the exclusionary rule where the statute was meant to protect the rights of autonomous local governments); People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626; 597 NW2d 53 (1 99 9) (holding that failure to comply with the knock- and- a nnounce rule did not warrant application of the

exc lusionary rule). However, this distinction between substantive and procedural interests collapses wh en a pplied to defendant Hawkins, who challenged the warran t issued for his arrest on substantive grounds, maintaining the affidavit contained neither credible nor reliable allegatio ns . The trial court agree d: “Th e affidavit clearly does not conform withMich igan statutory authority; namely, MCL 780.653(B).” Regrettably, the majority today conflates substan tive and procedural concerns, ignores decades of precedent , an d—in spite of evidence to the contrary—disregards the Legislature’s unambiguous approval of the application of the exclusionary rule for violations of MCL 780.653. See 1988 PA 80. Until the tide began to sh ift with Stevens (After Remand) , the use of the exclusionary rule to remedy statutory viol ations was well settled. By dismissing the impor t o f th is Court’s precedent, including Moten, Bules, Sherbi ne , 9Sloan, et al., the ma jority has imposed a policy-based doctrine that requires express s tate ments to authorize applicationof the exclusionary rule. Ante at 21. This runs afoul of the Legislature’s approval of the rule’s application to MCL 780.653 as articulated in Sherbine . 1988 PA 80. While I can appreciate the ma jority’s need to balance important and competing interests, I take issu e with its attempt to ground the analysis in the text of MCL 780. 65 3. Moreover, shifting the focus to a “clear statement ” policy works a bait-and-switchon the Legislature. Not only has the majority imposed its own policy on the Legislature, it has displaced the controlling interpretive standard—on which our Legislature has relied—under the guise of strict textualism. MCR 3.606(A) The majority concludes that the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy b ec ause the text of MCR 3.606(A) does not specifically demand its application. Ante at 25. “When called on to con st rue a court rule, this Court applies the legal principles that govern the construction and application of statutes. . . . Accordingly, we begin wi th t he plain language of the court rule.” Grievance Administ rator v Underwood , 46 2 Mich 188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000). Appl ied he re, the doctrine clarifies our rule’s rigorous demands. MCR 3.606(A) provides:

10Initiationof Proceeding. For a contempt committed outside the immediate view a nd p resence of the court, on a proper showing on ex parte motionsupported by a ffidavits, the court shall either: (1) order the accused person to show cause, at a reasonable time specified in the order, why that personsh ould not be punished for the alleged misconduct; or (2 ) issue a bench warrant for the arrest of the person. As re quired by this rule, before contempt proceedings may be initiated for any conduct outside of the court’s “immediate view,” a party must provid e “a proper showing on

exparte motion supported by affidav its . . . .” A motion alone is in suffic ient. An affidavit, i.e., “a signed statement,” must be provided. Once this requirement is met, the c ou rt must either order the accused person to prove why punishment should not be inflicted or issue a benchwarrant. Inthe l ight of the potential peril, as well as the substantive safeguards contained in MCR 3.606( A), I find it particul arlytroublesome that the majority members suggest suchrules are mere “tec hnical provisions.” This assertion ignor es their function as guarantors of procedural rights. MCR3.606(A) threatens punishment solely o n the basis of exclusive communications between an adversarial party and the court. The procedure authorizes the exercise of police power by judicial officers, wh ich— contrary to the majority’s

11implication—may not be used to detain an individua l with out probable cause. As an arm of the state, our actions mu st respect the polity’s civil rights, and our court rules are drafted to ensure that the exercise of judicial authority is

no t arbitrary or unlawful. To deem such rules “technical” distorts the substance of the r ules and the role of the judiciary. Althoughthe majority holds otherwise, the exclusionary rule would be particularly appropriate in this instance. As

a tool to prevent th e abuse of state power, this Court promulgated the co ur t rule to mark the boundaries of acceptable judicial cond uct. 4 If the exclusionary rule applied, magistrates and judges would surely ta ke car e to

4 Th e majority claims that application of the exclusionary rule to MCL 78 0.6 53 or MCR 3.606(A) would not further the purpose of either because “the aim of the rule is one of police deterrence . . . .” Ante at 12. While I agree that we suppress evidence in an attempt to prevent police misconduct, the exclusionary rule is also utilized to ensure compliance with the law at an institutional level. The ease with which we lose sight of this goal is apparent in People v

Cartwright, 454 Mich 550; 563 NW2d 208 (1997), where we equated “good police practice” with violations of the Fourth Amendment: While conceding that [the officer's] entry into the mobile home might have been good police practice, the district court held that, nonetheless, it was not a proper sear ch w ithout a warrant. [ Id . at 554.] One wonders how it can be "good police practice" to violate the Fourth Amendment. 12confirm that war rant s were issued on a proper showing of probable cause. Such proof is all the cou rt rule requires. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE’S UTILITY I agree that the exclusionary rule wields signi ficant power, but only because it is the sole efficacious method by whichto protect individuals from state misconduct, as defined by our laws. If any other metho d of enforcement worked so well, it, too, would be deemed disproportionate and heavy- handed. Thus, our debate is not simp lyabout which remedy is appropriate, but how sacred we deem the right to be free from unlawful state condu ct . Whether codified in federal or state constitutions, statutes, or court rules, the judicial branch must enforce the laws that p rescrib e the scope of state power and protect individual s from the unreasonable exercise of that authority. Inthe aftermath of September 11, 2001, as our nation struggl es to secure its boundaries while protecting our freedoms, the role of the judiciary–charged with maintaining the delicate balance bet w een state authority and individual liberty–becomes i ncreasingly vital. Our statutes and court rules ha ve b een drafted to protect these freedoms. Because both th e statute, MCL 780.653, and the court rule, MCR 3.606(A), would be without force but for the exclus ionary rule, and because this Court should avoid ov erruling sound

13precedent and imposing its policy upon the Le gislat ure, I must reject the majority’s analysis. CONCLUSION Thoughcloaked in a strict Textualism garb, the majority attempts to justify its decisiono n the basis of its own policy considerations. According to the majo rity, in the absence of an express legislative statement i nd icating an intentionto invoke the exclusionary rule, the rule will not be app li ed. However, a more legitimate analysis would require an inference in favor of its application. I n so doing, it coul d be g uaranteed that the well-settled and authoritative interpretation of our statutes could be relied upon, an d that a statute’s purpose would be effectuated. Moreover, without this tool, aggrieved individuals would have

no opportunity for redress. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Hawkins . Withregard to the proper remedy for a violation of MCR 3.606(A), I would also apply the exclusionary rule. The text of the court rule evinces an intention to impose substantive procedural safeguards into the warrant-authorization process. To effectuate this end, the exclusionary rule is required to remedy violations of MCR 3.606(A). Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Scherf. Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly 1415