1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CYNTHIA WARMBIER, et al. , Plaintiffs,

v. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, Defendant. Civil Action No. 18-977 (BAH) Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION “What the heck did you do to my kid?” 1 This is the anguished question voiced by the mother of Otto Warmbier when, after detaining the young man for over 17 months, the Democratic People’s Republic of K orea (“North Korea”) returned Otto’s comatose body to the United States. 2 Before Otto traveled with atour group on a five-day trip to North Korea, he was a healthy, athletic student of economics and business in his ju nior year at the University of Virginia, with “big dreams” and bot h the smarts and people skil ls to make him his high school class salutatorian, homecomi ng king, and prom king. Decl. of C ynthia Warmbier (“C. W. Decl.”) ¶¶ 11–16, ECF No. 16-2; H’r g Tr. (Rough) at 50–51 (Aust in Warmbier (“A. W.”)); id. at 58 (C. W.). He was blind, deaf, and brain dead when North Kore a turned him over to U.S. government officials for his fi nal trip home. H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 31, 36 (Frederick Warmbier

1 Rough Transcript of Hearing (Dec. 19, 2018) (“H’rg Tr. (Rough )”) at 82 (Cynthia Warmbier (“C. W.”)). Citations to the December 19, 2 018 hearing are to a rough draft of the transcript, since no final transcript is yet available. The final transcri pt will be posted on this case’s docket when available. Discr epancies in page numbers between the rough and final transcripts may exist. 2 The Warmbier family members w ill be referenced in the text bytheir first names t o simplify their identification in this Memorandum Opinion, and by their initial s in citations to the hearing transcript.2 (“F. W.”)). Otto died within aweek of his return. Decl. of D r. Daniel Kanter ( “Kanter Decl.”) ¶ 20, ECF No. 16-4. A deeply knowledgeable expert fro m the Fletcher School of Law a nd Diplomacy at Tufts University describes North Kor ea as “unique” in the world today : North Korea is the “most advanced, most perfected totalit arian state in world history,” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 105, 110 (Expert Prof. Sung-Yoon Lee), and h as “perfected its means of t errorizing” both its own people and others, id. at 111. The dictator who leads No rth Korea, and his cronies, “show[] no regard for human life,” id. at 127, creating, for example, a “manmade . . . famine” in the late 1990s that killed “upwards of 2 million people,” id. , and maintaining “political prisoner concentration camps,” id. at 110, such that “North Korea n escapees” tell “a consistent s tory” of “a life of extreme deprivation and repression,” id. at 111. Moreover, North Kor ea is “unprecedented” in its state sponsorship of “elicit activities, like proliferationof weapons of mass destruction, counterfeiting U.S. dollars, [a nd] the production and sale of drugs like opium, heroin, and meth[amphetamines].” Id. at 106. Indeed, North Korea is the world’s “leading” and “bes t qualified candidate for indictment ” at the International Crimin al Court for crimes against humanity. Id. at 122. An American family, the Warmbiers, experienced North Korea’s brutality first-hand when North Korea seized their son to use as a pawn i n that totalitarian state’s global shenanigans and face-off with the United States. As Otto’s mother said, “there’s evil in this world,” id. at 82 (C. W.), and “[i]t’s North Korea,” id. Having been compelled to keep sil ent during Otto’s detention inNorth Korea in an effort to protect his safety, Otto’s pare nts have since promised to “s tand up” and hold North Korea accountable for its “evil” ac tions against their son. Id. at 58–60 (C. W.). To that end, Otto’s parents, Cynthia (“Cindy”) and F rederick (“Fred”) Warmbier, ini tiated this action individually3 and as personal representatives of Otto’s estate, seeking damag es under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq. , against North Korea for its torture, hostage taking, and extrajudicial killing of Otto. Compl. ¶¶ 1–5, ECF No. 1. North Korea never entered an appearance in, or defended again st, this action, and the plaint iffs now move for default judgment for the damage caused by North Korea to Otto and his parents. For the reasons discussed below, default judgment is granted a nd Otto and his pare nts are awarde d damages totaling $501,134,683.80.
I. BACKGROUND The factual background surrounding Otto’s detenti on in North Ko rea is summarized below, followed by an overview of the procedural history of thi s case. The factual background is based upon the detailed declarations submitted by the plaintiff s in support of their motion for default judgment, as well as exh ibits and testimony presented a t an evidentiary hearing held on December 19, 2018. 3
A. Otto Warmbier’s Detention in North Korea Otto Warmbier, a 21-year-old Uni versity of Virginia student, wi th a curiosity to learn more about the world through tra vel, took a five-day trip to No rth Korea, between December 29, 2015 and January 2, 2016, in advance of a study abroad program in China. H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 13–15 (F. W.); id. at 59 (C. W.); C. W. Decl. ¶¶ 15–16. Otto had an “open mind” and “wanted to explore,” and he viewed the t rip to North Korea as an opportunity to experience a different culture and way of life. H’r g Tr. (Rough) at 59, 64–65 (C. W.) ; C. W. Decl. ¶ 15. Although Otto’s parents were “nervous” a bout Otto’s trip, a University o f Virginia professor advised Otto

3 Six witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing: Otto’s p arents, Fred and Cindy Warmbier, his younger siblings, Austin and Gre ta Warmbier, and two experts onNorth Korea, David Hawk and Professor SungYoon Lee.4 that travel to North Korea was safe with certain tour groups, and the website for the operator of Otto’s tour group, Young Pioneer Tou rs, attested to the safety of their guided trips into North Korea. Decl. of Frederick Warmbie r ¶ 5 (“F. W. Decl.”), ECF No . 16-1; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 14 (F. W.). On January 2, 2016, Otto’s schedule d departure date from North Korea, Fred and Cindy expected Otto to call them whe n he arrived in China, but that c all never came. H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 14–15 (F. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 5. The next morning, the tour company explained that Otto missed his flight because Nort h Korean officials took him out o f the security line at the Pyongyang Sunan International Ai rport, and he could not leave N orth Korea with the rest of his tour group. H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 15 (F. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 5; C .W Decl. ¶ 16. The tour company reassured Otto’s parents that “ everything was fine,” adding tha t the president of the tour company stayed with Otto and he would be “on the next flight ou t.” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 15–16 (F. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 5. Over “the next day or two,” the tour company again reassured Otto’s parents that “everything was fi ne,” and Otto’s inability to leave North Korea “was just a misunderstanding.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 6; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 15 (F. W.). Shortly thereafter, however, the tour company said that Otto was sick and had been taken to a hospital, and the president of the tour company l eft North Korea for China, leavi ng Otto unaccompanied in North Korea. H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 15–16 ( F. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 6. When Otto was detained, the U.S. S tate Department advised Fred and Cindy that Otto’s detention was part of North Korea ’s “normal routine” when “they want something,” and assured them that, “based on history,” Ott o would “be home in six month s.” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 17–18 (F. W.). The State Department cautioned the Warmbiers against speaking to media outlets or publicly about Otto’s detention because North Korea was “going to want something for Otto,”5 and the more the family spoke publ icly, “the more it’s going to cost.” Id. at 17, 22–24 (F. W.);
id. at 65 (C. W.). Otto’s parents wer e also told that, at some po int, North Korea would permit Otto to call home, usually late at night, and in a statement di ctated by North Korea through Otto would provide a clue as to what North Korea wanted as a conditi on of his release. Id. at 67 (C. W.). Given the repeated cautions aga inst speaking publicly, Otto’s p arents were “[t]errified,” “afraid to . . . speak out or discus s” Otto “with anyone,” incl uding their neighbors and friends.
Id. at 16, 23 (F. W.); id. at 72 (C. W.). They had a “sixth s ense” that “things were bad for Otto,” but what transpired was worse than they “could have imagined.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 27. Even Otto’s two younger siblings, Austin and Greta Warmbier, and Otto’s fri ends were fearful about speaking publicly due to the possi bility that North Korea would punish Otto. H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 45 (Greta Warmbier (“G. W.”)); id. at 59–60 (C. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 7. “[S]peaking out against North Korea would antagonize th e country and prolong or worsen Otto’s detention.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 16. In this way, over the durati on of Otto’s detention, North Korea “controlled” the “dialogue the whole time.” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 82–83 (C. W.). Otto’s parents remained in the dark about the reason for Otto’s detention in North Korea until three weeks later, o n January 22, 2016, F. W. Decl. ¶ 7, when the Korean Central News Agency (“KCNA”), North Korea’s state media outlet, Expert Decl. of David Hawk (“Hawk Expert Decl.”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 16-9, r eleased an article stating Otto was “under investigation,” Decl. of Benjamin L. Hatch (“HatchDecl.”), Ex. A (KCNA Article titled, “American Arrested for His Hostile Act Against DPR K”), ECF No. 16-1. The article reported that Otto had been “arrested while perpetrating a hosti le act against the DPRK,” h aving entered the country “under6 the guise of tourist [ sic ] for the purpose of bringing dow n the foundation of its single -minded unity at the tacit connivance of the U.S. government and under its manipulation.” Id. Then, on February 29, 2016, North Kor ea televised Otto reciting a prepared “confession” to “severe crimes against” the DPRK, that amounted to Otto alle gedly taking down a poster with a political slogan supporting Nort h Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong- Il, from a hotel’s staff-only area, at the behest of a church in O hio and the CIA. Hatch Decl., Ex . B (Tr. of Otto’s “Confession”); Hatch Decl., Ex. C (Video of Otto’s “Confession”); see also Expert Decl. of Robert M. Collins (“Collins Expert Decl.”) ¶ 21, ECF No. 16-10. The preposterous “confession” was riddled with “totally bizarre,” “co mpletely false” statements, F. W. Decl. ¶ 8, and malapropisms tied to North Korean cultural references t hat would not be used by an America n, H’rg Tr. at 123–26 (Expert Prof. Sung-Yoon Lee). In short, the “confession” was plainly c oerced and “completely manipulated.” Id. at 18 (F. W.). Examples of the many untruths i n the purported “confession” inc lude: (1) Otto called his father’s company “Finishing Cinci nnati Black Oxide,” but that c ompany, in fact, is called “Finishing Technology,” F. W. D ecl. ¶ 8; (2) Otto said he pra cticed for his alleged crime by stealing street signs at the Univ ersity of Virginia and storing the stolen signs under his bed, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 19 (F. W.); F. W . Decl. ¶ 8, yet his father neve r found any such stolen signs, let alone under Otto’s bed at Otto’s a partment, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at19 (F. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 8; (3) Otto said he conspired with the Friendship United Methodist Chu rch, which had assets of $42 million, even though Otto had no relationship with that church, was not Methodist, and the church has no such extensive a ssets, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 19 (F. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 8; (4) Otto said he agreed to take the poster because he “‘desperately’ nee ded a car” and $200,000 to fund his two siblings’ college tuit ion, when Otto “had his own car a nd was never expected or asked to7 pay for his siblings’ tuition,” F. W. Decl. ¶ 8; and (5) Otto s aid he conspired with “the Z Society,” but had no connecti on to any such organization, id. In addition to these false state ments in his “confession,” Otto spoke with “unnatural” language that sounded as if he had “been forced to memorize” th e words. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. Otto, for instance, said “I came to commit this crime task,” “[t]he Unite d States administration already knows about my act through the CIA , which is closely linked to the Z Society and connived at my crime,” “[t]his was a very foolish aim,” “[t]his made an inn ocent-minded, adventurous young man, like myself, want to show my bravery to improve my reputat ion and show a Western victory of the DPR Korea,” and “ I intentionally packed my quiet est boots, the best for sneaking. I knew that I would wear them during my crime commitment.” Id. ¶ 9. Otto’s “strange phrases,” such as the references to the “U.S. administration,” “DPR Korea instead of DPRK,” and his “quietest boots for sneaking” w ere “clumsy” North Korean “stock phrase[s]” that provide “no doubt . . . that this was a coerced confession under great duress.” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 123–25 (Expert Prof. Sung-Yoon Le e). Moreover, Otto’s reference to “hostile U.S. policy” three times, and the notion that Otto, as the oldest child, would need to subsidize his younger siblings’ co llege tuition—an expectation of the eldest son in Korean culture—are reflective of “Kor ean connotation,” further indicat ing North Korea “imposed” this material in Otto’s confession. Id. at 124–25 (Expert Prof. Sung-Yoon Lee). Shortly after Otto’s purported “ confession,” the U.S. State Dep artment assured Otto’s parents that Otto’s detention w as nearing a “mature phase,” and North Korea would “finally call.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 10. Fre d and Cindy learned nothing, howe ver, until KCNA reported on North Korea’s “trial” of O tto, on March 16, 2016, where North K orea convicted Otto on a charge of state subversion and sentence d him to fifteen years of hard labor, based on his purported8 “confession” to the crime. Hat ch Decl., Ex. E (KCNA Article onOtto’s “Trial,” titled “American Student Sentenced to 15 Years of Hard Labor in DPRK”) . KCNA stated Otto committed the crime “pursuant to the U.S. government’s hostile policy” towards North Korea.
Id. Short video excerpts of Otto’s “ trial” were released, but no public court records have ever been made available. See Hatch Decl., Ex. F (ABC Good Morning America News Broadcast Containing Clips of Ott o’s “Trial”) (“Video of ‘Trial’”); HatchDecl. ¶ 7. In the excerpts, Otto’s hands are “curled in,” and he i s “completely distressed” and “v isibly upset.” See Hatch Decl., Ex. F (Video of “Trial”); F. W. Decl. ¶ 11. North Korea continued to detai n Otto for an additional 15 month s after this “trial,” for a total detention period of approximately 17.5 months. See F. W. Decl. ¶ 21. During Otto’s detention, Otto’s family receiv ed “almost no information about [Otto’s] condition,” F. W. Decl. ¶ 15, and Otto’s parents ultimately ha d no way to communicate wit h him, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 21– 22 (F. W.); C. W. Decl. ¶ 17. Alth ough Otto’s parents initiall y were told they could send Otto emails through the State Departmen t, which forwarded them to Sw edish intermediaries in North Korea for delivery to Otto, Otto’s parents never heard anything directly from Otto and have no idea if he received any of this c orrespondence. H’rg Tr. (Roug h) at 21–22 (F. W.); C. W. Decl. ¶ 17; F. W. Decl. ¶ 12. By June 2016, the State Department told Otto’s parents that they could no longer email Otto because North Korea considered him a “Prisone r of War” and a “War Criminal.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 14. Over the course of Otto’s deten tion, Otto’s parents spoke regul arly with State Department and other senior officials, and w ere told “on several occasions ” that Otto was being imprisoned because “North Korea wanted something from the United States,” and he “would not be released until they obtained that.” Id. ¶ 15; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 67 (C. W.). Then-Secretary of State John9 Kerry told Otto’s family at a meeting that “Otto is being held hostage by North Korea,” F. W. Decl. ¶ 15, and “they want someth ing for Otto,” H’rg Tr. (Roug h) at 26 (F. W.). Otto’s parents “knew he was a hostage, a pawn, apolitical prisoner,” “left al one” and “abandoned,” id. at 28 (F. W.). They lived “in fear” of t alking about Otto because of the “threat” of what North Korea would do to Otto as a result. Id. at 23, 25 (F. W.). In June 2017, Joseph Yun, the former U.S. Special Representativ e for North Korea Policy at the State Department, and the Deputy Secretary of State info rmed Fred that Otto had been in a coma for over a year since April 2016. Id. at 29 (F. W.); F. W. Decl . ¶ 18; C. W. Decl. ¶ 23. Once again, however, Otto’s pare nts were advised not to speak about Otto’s condition publicly because if they mentioned Otto in the media, North Korea would not release him and there was “no guarantee” about his safety. H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 29, 31 (F . W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 18. Otto’s family remained silent a fter that call, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 31 (F. W.), and ultimately, North Korea agreed t o release Otto, after pardoning Otto for his purported crime, F. W. Decl. ¶ 20. Representative Yun t raveled to North Korea to b ring Otto back. Id. Cindy “held out hope” that “Otto could be brought back” as the “young man” she once knew. C. W. Decl. ¶ 23. Having been told Otto was in a coma, she pictured him asle ep and thought he would be able to recover with medical care. Id. These hopes were “shattered” on June 13, 2017, when Otto landed at the Cincinnati M unicipal Lunken Airport. Id. ¶¶ 23–24; F. W. Decl. ¶ 21. Fred, Cindy, and Otto’s younger sibli ngs climbed the steps of t he plane and immediately heard “loud inhuman sounds.” H ’rg Tr. (Rough) at 33 (F. W.). When Otto’s family saw him, Otto’s condition was “horrible and unrecognizable.” C. W. Decl . ¶ 24. Otto was “jerking violently” and “howling.” F. W . Decl. ¶ 22; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 33 (F. W.). He wore a diaper and had a “feeding tube” and a “ shaved head,” “his arms . . . c urled and mangled,” “his eyes . . .10 bulging out,” and it “almost appear ed that he had chewed a hole through his bottom lip.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 22; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 33 (F. W.); id. at 47 (G. W.); id. at 54 (A. W.). His once “perfectly straight” teeth wer e misaligned, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 61 (C. W.), and Otto was blind and deaf, with severe brain dama ge, unable to perceive anything around him, id. at 36 (F. W.). The entire family was “shocked” upon seeing Otto. Id. at 35 (F. W.); id. at 46, 47 (G. W.); id. at 54 (A. W.). Greta “ran off the plane screaming” because Ot to looked like a “monster,” and “not Otto”; she w as scared of him. C. W. Decl. ¶ 24; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 47 (G. W.). Otto’s mother, too, “almo st passed out” upon seeing Otto, and ran off the plane with Greta. C. W. Decl. ¶ 24; F. W. Decl. ¶ 22; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 47 (G. W.). Fred and Austin remained on the plane with Otto until he was transported to an ambulance , an experience that was “traumatic” and “tragic.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 22; H’rg Tr. (Rough) a t 33–34 (F. W.). Otto’s mother, although distraught by the sight of her son in s uch a state, rode in the ambulance with Otto from the airport to the hospital because sh e did not want Otto “to be alone anymore.” C. W. Decl. ¶ 24. Over the next couple of days at the hospital, Otto’s family was advised by medical personnel about t he severity of Otto’s braindamage: he was a “vegetable,” completely unresponsive to his family, blind, deaf and without “any signs of consciousness.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 25; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 33, 36 (F. W.). In addition to these horrendous signs of his torture, Otto also had “a large scar on his left foot,” a wound not present before he left for North Korea, and his once “perfectly s traight” teeth were “noticeablymisaligned.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 24; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 36 (F. W.); id . at 61 (C. W.). Seeing Otto in that state “was horrible.” H’ rg Tr. (Rough) at 36 (F. W.). Otto’s lead neurologist, Dr. D aniel Kanter, c oncluded Otto’s br ain damage most likely resulted from the loss of blood f low to the brain for a period of five to twenty minutes. Kanter11 Decl. ¶ 15. Otto was in an unrec overable state of non-responsi veness. Id. ¶ 16. After Otto’s physicians concluded that his condition would never improve, Ot to’s family transitioned him to palliative care and ultimately ceased feeding and breathing ass istance. Id. ¶ 20; F. W. Decl. ¶ 25. Otto died quickly on June 19, 2017, le ss than a week after his release from North Korea. Kanter Decl. ¶ 20. Since Otto’s death, North Korea ha s denied any responsibility, calling his death a mystery and blaming it on “botulis m” and the United States gove rnment. F. W. Decl. ¶ 24; Hatch Decl., Ex. G (KCNA Article t itled, “DPRK FM Spokesman Acc uses U.S. of Slandering Humanitarian Measure”).
B. Procedural History Plaintiffs Fred and Cindy Warmb ier, individually and as persona l representatives of the estate of Otto Warmbier, filed thi s lawsuit against North Korea , on April 26, 2018. See Compl. They served North Korea in accord ance with the FSIA, which prov ides the procedure for completing service upon a forei gn state or political subdivisio n of a foreign state. Decl. Supp. Default, ECF No. 13; see also infra Part III.B for further disc ussion. After the plaintiffs sough t entry of default, see Decl. Supp. Default, the Clerk ent ered default against North Ko rea on September 7, 2018, see Entry of Default, ECF No. 14; see also F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment f or affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is show n by affidavit or otherwise, th e clerk must enter the party’s default.”). The plaintiffs subs equently filed the instant moti on for default judgment, see Pls.’ Mot. Default J., ECF No. 16 (“Pls .’ Mot.”), supported by elevendeclarations, as well as testimony and exhibits presented a t an evidentiary hearing on D ecember 19, 2018, pursuant to12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). 4 The plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), a court may con sider entering a default judgment when a party applies for that relief. See F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 55(b)(2). “[S]trong policies favor resolution of disputes on the ir merits,” and therefore, “ ‘[t]he default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unres ponsive party.’” Jackson v. Beech , 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe , 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). Notwithstanding its appropriatene ss in some circumstances, “ent ry of a default judgment is not automatic.” Mwani v. bin Laden , 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Thus, the procedural posture of a defau lt does not relieve a federal court of its “affirmative obligation” to determine whether it has s ubject matter ju risdiction over th e action. James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig , 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Additionally, “a court should satisfy itself that it has personal juri sdiction before entering judgme nt against an absent defendant.”
Mwani , 417 F.3d at 6. The “plaintiffs r etain ‘the burden of proving personal jurisdiction, [and] they can satisfy that burden with a prima facie showing.’” Id. (quoting Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel , 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). I n doing so, “they may rest their

4 The plaintiffs have submitted eleven declarations, with exhib its, that detail eviden ce about (1) Otto’s detention in North Korea, see Hatch Decl.; C. W. Decl.; F. W. Decl.; (2) Otto’s medical and d ental history, see Kanter Decl., Decl. of Dr. Murray Dock, ECF No. 16-5; Decl. of Dr. Todd Williams, ECF No. 16-6; Decl. of Dr. Barbara J. Walker, ECF No. 18 (sealed); (3) expe rt declarations on North Korean torture, hostage taking, and extrajudicial killing, see Expert Decl. of Professor Sung-Yo on Lee (“Lee Expert Decl.”), E CF No. 16-8; Hawk Expert Decl.; Collins Expert Decl .; and (4) an expert report onlost wages, see Report of James V. Koch (“Koch Report”), ECF No. 16-11. The plaintiffs also filed post-hearin g evidence regarding Otto ’s medical expenses. See Decl. of Benjamin L. H atch (“Hatch Medical Expenses Decl.”), EC F No. 23 (sealed).13 argument on their pleadings, bolst ered by such affidavits and o ther written materials as they can otherwise obtain.” Id. at 7. When default judgment is sought und er the FSIA, a claimant must “establish[] his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). “This provides foreign sovereigns a special pro tection akin to that assured th e federal government by F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 55(e),” which has been renumbered by the 2007 amendment to R ule 55(d). Jerez v. Republic of Cuba , 775 F.3d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also H.R. R EP . No. 94-1487, at 26 (1976) (stating that § 1608(e) estab lishes “the same requiremen t applicable to default judgments against the U.S. Government unde r rule 55(e), F.R. Civ. P.”). While the “FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely howmuch and what kinds of evidenc e the plaintiff must provide, requiring only that it be ‘satisfact ory to the court,’” courts must be mindful that Congress enacted Section 1605A, FSIA’s terrorism e xception, and Section 1608(e) with the “aim[] to prevent state sponsors of terrorism—entitie s particularly unlikely to submit to this country’s laws—from escaping liability f or their sins.” Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea , 774 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e)). With this objective in mind, the D .C. Circuit has instructed th at “courts have the authority—indeed, we think, the ob ligation—to ‘adjust evidentiary requirements to . . . differing situations.’” Id. at 1048 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson , 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (alteration adopted). Courts mu st draw their “findings of fact and conclusions of law from admissible testimony in accordance with the Federal Rules of Ev idence.” Id. at 1049 (quoting Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq , 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 n.1 (D.D.C. 2001)). Uncontroverted fa ctual allegations that are supported by admissible evidence are takenas true. Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 78 F. Supp. 3d 379, 386 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Courts may rely on un controverted factual14 allegations that are supp orted by affidavits.” (citing Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 171 (D.D.C. 2010))); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic , 580 F. Supp. 2d 53, 63 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d , 646 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 510 F. Supp. 2d 101, 103 (D.D.C. 2007)); accord F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(e)(2) (authorizing court to “consider the fact undi sputed for purposes of the moti on” when adverse party “fails to properly address another party’ s assertion of f act”). Section 1608(e), thus, “doe s not require a court to step into the shoes of the defaulting party and pursue every possible evidentiary challenge.” Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “This is part of the risk a sovereign runs whe n it does not appear and alert the court to evidentiary problems.”
Id. at 786. In a FSIA default proceeding, adistrict court can find that th e evidence presented is satisfactory “when the plaintiff shows ‘her claim has some factual basis,’. . . even if she might not have prevailed in a contested proceeding.” Id. at 785 (citations omitted). “This lenient standard is particularly appropr iate for a FSIA terrorism case, for which firsthand evidence and eyewitness testimony is difficult or impossible to obtain from an absent and likely hostile sovereign.” Id. Thus, courts are accorded “a n unusual degree of discretion ov er evidentiary rulings in a FSIA case against a defaulting state sponsor of te rrorism.” Id. This “broad discretion extends to the admi ssion of expert testimony, which, even in the ordinary case, ‘does not constitute an abuse of discretion merely because the factua l bases for an expert’s opinion are weak.’” Id. (quoting Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. , 999 F.2d 549, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Indeed, “[t]he testimony of expert witnesses is of crucial impo rtance in terrorism cases . . . because firsthand evidence of te rrorist activities is difficult , if not impossible, to obtain,” “[v]ictims of terrorist attack s, if not dead, are often incapac itated and unable to testify about their15 experiences,” and “[p]erpetrato rs of terrorism typically lie be yond the reach of the courts and go to great lengths to avoid detection.” Id. at 787 (citations omitted). “Eyewitnesses in a state that sponsors terrorism are similarl y difficult to locate and may be unwilling to testify for fear of retaliation,” and “[t]he soverei gns themselves often fail to ap pear and to participate in discovery.” Id. Accordingly, “[w]ith a dearth of firsthand evidence, reliance upon secondary materials and the opinions of e xperts is often critical in orde r to establish the f actual basis of a claim under the FSIA terrorism exception.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION In a FSIA case, “[a] default j udgment may be entered when (1) t he Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, (2) personal jurisdiction is properly exercised over the defendants, (3) the plaintiffs ha ve presented satisfactory evid ence to establish their claims against the defendants, and (4) t he plaintiffs have satisfactor ily proven that the y are entitled to the monetary damages they seek.” Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2017); accord Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 332 F. Supp. 3d 1, 32 (D.D.C. 2018). Each of these requirements is addressed seriatim below.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction This Court may exercise “origina l jurisdiction” over a foreign state “without regard to amount in controversy” in “nonjury civil action[s]” seeking “re lief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either unde r sections 1605–1607 of this title or under any applicable internati onal agreement.” 28 U.S.C. § 133 0(a). As the plaintiffs have not demanded a jury trial, see Civil Cover Sheet at 2, ECF No. 1-1, and they seek in personam relief,

see Compl. at 21, the remaining ques tion is whether North Korea is entitled to immunity under the FSIA or another international agreement.16 Foreign governments are generally immunized from lawsuits broug ht against them in the United States unless an FSIA exception applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604; Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 782 F.3d 9, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The plaintiffs invoke ju risdiction under the FSIA’s terrorism exception, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, see Pls.’ Mot. at 9, which provides that “[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the j urisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in a ny case . . . in which money damage s are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death t hat was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act . . . ,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Subject m atter jurisd iction under thi s terrorism exception may be exercised when the plaintiff es tablishes the following four ele ments: (1) “the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time [of] the act . . . or was so designated as a result of such act, and . . . remai ns so designated when the cl aim is filed,” id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); (2) “the claimant or the victim was, at the time [of] the act . . . a national of the United States,” id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii); (3) “in a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought, the cla imant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim,” id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii ); and (4) the plaintiff seeks monetary damages “for personal injury or death caused by ‘torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hos tage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act,’ if ‘engaged in by a n official, employee, or agent ’ of a foreign country,”
Mohammadi , 782 F.3d at 14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). These four elements, which are discussed below, have been sat isfactorily proven here.17 1. First Element: North Korea Was Timely Designated a State Sponso r of Terrorism With respect to the first eleme nt, North Korea was designated astate sponsor of terrorism, in part due to Otto’s de tention and abusive treatmen t resulting in his death. North Korea was first designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by t he State Department in 1988. See Notice, Determination Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Ad ministration Act of 1979; North Korea, 53 Fed. Reg. 3477–01 (Feb. 5, 1988). The State Departme nt, however, rescinded that determination in 2008. Notice, Res cission of Determination Reg arding North Korea, 73 Fed. Reg. 63540–01 (Oct. 24, 2008). The State Department re-designa ted North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in Novemb er 2017, and that designation has not been rescinded. See Notice, Democratic People’s Re public of Korea (D PRK) Designatio n as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), 82 Fed. Reg. 56100–01 (Nov. 27, 2017). North Korea thus “remain[ed] so designated when” the plaintiffs filed their claims in April 201 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); see also Compl. at 1, 21. Notwithstanding that North Korea was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism “at the time” of Otto’s detenti on in January 2016 or by the time of his subsequent release in June 2017, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), subject ma tter jurisdiction is establis hed if the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism “a s a result of such act,” id. Here, the State Department’s designation of North Korea as a state sponso r of terrorism w as, at least in part, a result of North Korea’s detention and mistreatment of O tto, which is sufficient to meet the state-sponsor-of-terrorism requirement. See Massie v. Gov’t of Democr atic People’s Republic of
Korea , 592 F. Supp. 2d 57, 74 (D.D.C. 2008) (“North Korea has been d esignated a state sponsor of terrorism, in part due to its unl awful seizure of the [USS] Pueblo,” an act upon which the FSIA claim was based); see also Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 6518 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i) wa s satisfied where Iran was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism “in partial response to the Beirut bombing,” the act which gave rise to the FSIA claim). After Otto’s death, Fred and Ci ndy recounted Otto’s story “to v arious government officials”—including members of C ongress, State Department and Executive Branch officials— “in support of re-adding North Korea to the list of state spons ors of terrorism.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 26;
see also H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 38–39 (F. W.). On October 20, 2017, sixte en Congressmen wrote a letter to the Secretary of State stating, “We write to urge you to exercise your authority to relist North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism,” and noting that “ [s]ince North Korea was removed from the State Sponsor s of Terrorism list in 2008, the Kim regime has repeatedly perpetrated or supported heinous acts, the most recent example of which was the illegitimate detention, murderous mistreatm ent, and tragic death of Otto War mbier.” Hatch Decl., Ex. K (Letter from Congressmen to Secr etary of State). Ultimately, P resident Trump announced that the United States would be re-de signating North Korea as a stat e sponsor of terrorism on November 20, 2017, the same date that the State Department list s as the designation date for North Korea. Hatch Decl., Ex. H (CNN Video titled “Trump: N. K orea Is a State Sponsor of Terror”); Hatch Decl., Ex. I (CNN Article titled, “Trump Names North Korea a State Sponsor of Terrorism”); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www. state.gov/j/ ct/list/c14151.htm (last visi ted Dec. 24, 2018). In his announ cement, President Trump stated, “As we take this action today our thoughts turn to Otto Warmbie r, a wonderful young man.” Hatch Decl., Ex. H; see also Hatch Decl., Ex. I. This eviden ce plainly establishes that th e plaintiffs meet the first element for the exercise of subject m atter jurisdiction because, under 2819 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because the lawsuit was filed after Nor th Korea was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, i n part, “as a result of” its bar baric treatment of Otto.
2. Second Element: The Plaintiffs Are U.S. Citizens As to the second element, the pla intiffs have averred in sworn declarations that they, as well as their son, Otto, have bee n United States citizens for t heir entire lives , including at the time of Otto’s seizure and dete ntion in North Korea and of his death. F. W. Decl. ¶ 1; C. W. Decl. ¶ 1. Thus, the second element is firmly established.
3. Third Element: Plaintiffs’ Offer to Arbitrate with North Korea For the third element, the FSI A “does not require any particula r form of offer to arbitrate, simply the extension of a ‘reasonable opportunity.’” Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 326 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Th e plaintiffs filed a N otice of Offer to Arbitrate on the same day they filed their Complaint. See Offer to Arbitrate at 1, ECF No. 3. The Notice offered “to submit the above-captioned matter to arb itration in accordance with accepted international rules of arbitration,” and stated that N orth Korea could accept such offer “by filing with the Clerk . . . an acceptance in lieu of filing an answer or other responsive pleading.” Id. A translated copy of the Notice was served on North Korea on Ju ne 19, 2018, see Return of Service, ECF No. 12, and N orth Korea has failed to fi le an acceptance or contact Plaintiffs regarding their offe r to arbitrate , Hatch Decl. ¶ 18 . The plaintiffs have thus satisfied the arbitration offer requirement, under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2 )(A)(iii). See Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 278 F. Supp. 3d 145, 158 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[A]n offer of arbitr ation was included with the documents served on Iran . . . , which is suf ficient to satisfy the FSIA’s requirement.”); Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 77 F. Supp. 3d 57, 66 (D.D.C. 2015)20 (including an offer of arbitrati on in the documents served on t he foreign state satisfied the FSIA’s requirement).
4. Fourth Element: Actions of North Korea Qualify for the Terroris m Exception Finally, as detailed be low, the plaintiffs have provided ample evidence to establish the fourth element: that their damage s arise from North Korea’s bar baric mistreatment of Otto, including “torture,” “hostage t aking,” and “extrajudicial killi ng.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).

a. Torture “[T]orture,” for purposes of the FSIA’s terrorism exception, i s defined by “the meaning given” to that term in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 199 1 (“TVPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). The TVPA, drawing f rom the 1984 United Nations Co nvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( “Torture Convention”), defines torture as follows: any act, directed against an indi vidual in the offender’s custo dy or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incid ental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inf licted on that individual for su ch purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for a n act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third pers on, or for any reason based on discri mination of any kind. Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(b)(1), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codifi ed at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note)); see also Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 294 F.3d 82, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (explaining that the TVPA’s defi nition of torture “borrows exte nsively from the [Torture Convention]”). To establish torture, the plaintiffs must show that the conductwas sufficiently severe and purposeful. See Price , 294 F.3d at 92–93. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “suffering alone is21 insufficient to establish a cla im under the FSIA’s terrorism ex ception. To qualify as torture, the mistreatment must be purposeful—that is, the defendant must hav e targeted the victim, for instance, to punish him for his religious or political beliefs. ” Kim , 774 F.3d at 1050. Severity “is crucial to ensuring that the c onduct proscribed by the Conventi on and the TVPA is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to warrantthe universal condemnation th at the term ‘torture’ both connotes and invokes.” Price , 294 F.3d at 92. “The critical issue is the degree of pain an d suffering that the alleged tort urer intended to, and actually d id, inflict upon the vi ctim,” and [t]he more intense, lasting, or heinous the agony, the more likely it is to be torture.” Id. at 93. Thus, “torture does not automatically r esult whenever individuals in official custody are subjected even to direct physical a ssault,” as “[n]ot all police brutality, not every instance of excessive force used against prisoners, is torture under the FSIA.” Id. (emphases in original). The TPVA lists certain purposes for which extreme and outrageou s measures might be torturous, such as “obtaining from that individual or a third p erson information or a confession,” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note), although th e list of purposes in the T VPA “was not meant to be exhaustive,” Price , 294 F.3d 82 at 93. In sum, “[i]n order to lose its sovereignimmunity, a foreign state must impose suffe ring cruelly and deliberately, r ather than as the unforeseen or unavoidable incident of some legitimate end.” Id. Here, ascertaining precisely w hat North Korea did to Otto to cu t off the blood flow to his brain, rendering him blind, deaf and brain dead, is not forensi cally doable, but also is unnecessary. Certainl y, Otto, who was retur ned by North Korea to the United States with severe brain damage that eventually killed him, see Kanter Decl. ¶ 21, was “ incapacitated” and “unable to testify about [hi s] experiences,” Owens , 864 F.3d at 787. Further, North Korea has not appeared in this case and, not surprisingly, no witnesses are a vailable to provide any eyewitness22 or even hearsay evidence on this point. Indeed, North Korea “i s known to intimidate defectors and potential witnesses.” Kim , 774 F.3d at 1048; see also, e.g. , Hawk Expert Decl. ¶ 28 (“North Korea is known to intimidate pot ential witnesses to its human r ights abuses to prevent information about such abuses from reaching the outside world.” ). Accordingly, “[w]ith a dearth of firsthand evidence, relian ce upon secondary materials and th e opinions of experts is often critical in order to establish the factual basis of a claim und er the FSIA terrorism exception.”
Owens , 864 F.3d at 787; see also Kim , 774 F.3d at 1049 (“[W]here a plaintiff has produced compelling, admissible evidence that the regime abducted the vi ctim and that it routinely tortures and kills the people it abducts, t he courts can assume that the defendant probably tortured and killed the victim.”). “In these c ircumstances, requiring that the [plaintiffs] prove exactly what happened to the [victim] and whe n would defeat the Act’s very p urpose” of “punish[ing] foreign states who have committed or sponsored such acts and deter them from doing so in the future.”
Kim , 774 F.3d at 1048. The plaintiffs have satisfactor ily established that North Korea more likely than not barbarically tortured Otto to e xtract a false confession and th en, after a proceeding characterized by North Korea as a “trial,” use d Otto’s lengthy sentence as le verage against the United States to further North Korea’s own for eign policy objectives. Here, as in similar cases, reliance on expert testimony is sufficient and appropriate. See, e.g. , Owens , 864 F.3d at 787; Kim , 774 F. 3d at 1049 (finding sufficient evidence of torture where experts “rep orted that victims of forced disappearance in North Korea usua lly suffer torture” and that t he victim was an “especially likely target”). Three separate expert s on North Korea confirm that O tto was tortured during different stages of his detention in North Korea.23 First, Otto was likely tortured w hile interrogated to obtain a false confession. David Hawk, an expert on human rights in North Korea who has intervie wed many North Korean refugees, see Hawk Expert Decl. ¶¶ 1–4, and whos e testimony the D.C. Circuit has previously credited, see Kim , 774 F.3d at 1050, opined that Otto “ was almost certainly subj ect to harsh interrogation methods, i ncluding torture and/ or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” Hawk Expert Decl . ¶ 37. North Korea ultimately ob tained a false confession from Otto, and “the initial or pretr ial interrogation stage, when in terrogators are attempting to extract a confession, is when torture mos t commonly occurs in North Korea ; indeed, it would be unusual if torture did not occu r in this phase.” Id. Similarly, Bob Collins, an expert having extensive familiarity with North Korean interrogation methods, see Collins Expert Decl. ¶¶ 1–7, noted that Otto’s purported “confe ssion,” which was full of patently false statements and unnatural langu age, see id. ¶ 27, indicates the confession was “most likely dict ated to [Otto] in advance and the product of torture,” id. ¶¶ 27– 28. Professor Sung-Yoon Lee, who sp ecializes in Korean Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, see Lee Expert Decl. ¶ 1, simila rly concluded that “Otto was likely tortured by North Korean age nts while detained in order to obtain a confession from him,” because it is a “routinized wa y through which North Korea obtai ns confessions from individuals in its custody,” id. ¶ 24. Second, Otto was likely tortur ed based on the nature of the Nor th Korean crime to which he was forced to confess and for which he was convicted: remov ing a poster that said, “Let’s arm ourselves strongly with Kim Jong-il patriotism!” Collins E xpert Decl. ¶ 21. According to Mr. Hawk, “North Korea almost certa inly tortured Otto” because this crime would carry a penalty of “particularly brutal treatment” in North Korea, Hawk Expert Decl. ¶ 38, or even the24 penalty of “execution,” H’rg Tr. ( Rough) at 97 (Expert David Ha wk). Mr. Collins confirms that, “[a] crime of the nature of wh ich Otto was accused is in fact t he ultimate crime in North Korea;” and North Koreans suspected of s imilar political offenses “are seized and deported without judicial process to political prison camps . . . where they are routinely tortured and mistreated.” Collins Expert Decl. ¶ 22. Third, North Korea “most likely further tortured” Otto after hi s trial and sentencing “for their own intelligence and f oreign relations purposes.” Id. ¶ 30. Indeed, North Korea probably “both seized and maintained cust ody of Otto” and then “systemat ically tortured” him to “further certain policy goals: namely, in o rder to deter the United Stat es from responding either with military action or sanctions in the face of North Korea’s incre ased nuclear and conventional weapons testing.” Lee E xpert Decl. ¶¶ 20, 25. Fourth, the general fact of Otto ’s detention in North Korea sug gests he was tortured. For example, Mr. Hawk opined that i n all North Korean detention fac ilities, prisoners “are uniformly treated with brutality and disreg ard for human rights.” Hawk E xpert Decl. ¶ 13. The “practice of torture permeates the Nort h Korean prison and detention syst em,” id. ¶ 20, and “is particularly common . . . during interrogations,” id. ¶ 23. Likewise, Mr. Collins explained that he is “aware of hundreds of North Koreans . . . w ho have been subject to” to rture, Collins Expert Decl. ¶ 27, and concluded Otto was likely tor tured based on that “routine” practice, id. ¶¶ 18, 28. According to Professor Lee, given the exp ected and routinized nature of t orture in North Korean facilities, North Korean interrogators “w ould have found it unpatriotic not to use torture t o get what they want.” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 126 ( Expert Prof. Sung-Yoon Lee). Fifth, notably, several torture m ethods regularly employed by N orth Korea are “consistent with Otto’s condition when he returned.” Collins Ex pert Decl. ¶ 31. Dr. Daniel25 Kanter, the neurologist who car ed for Otto when he returned to the United States, concluded Otto’s brain damage resulted f rom the cessation or significant reduction of blood flow to the brain for five to twenty minut es, which can be caused by “cessa tion of breathing.” Kanter Decl. ¶¶ 1, 14, 15. “[N]ormal North Korean torture methods,” which i nclude “[w]ater-boarding,” “manipulating teeth with pliers,” and “application of electric shock,” “can lead to a cessation of breathing,” and if Otto began “to r esist,” “interrogators would have become infuriated . . . and suffocated him or otherwise cau sed him to stop breathing, only to be forced to revive him.” Collins Expert Decl. ¶ 31. Even more, Otto “had a large scar o n his foot and . . . certain of his bottom teeth appeared repositioned,” further evidence supportin g that his physical condition resulted from “[t]he applicati on of electric shocks” to Otto’s foot and the use of pliers to rearrange Otto’s teeth. Id. ¶ 30. Although “there were not any apparent visible wounds on Otto [i n the video footage available of him while in North Korean detention],” “bruises, w ounds or other injury on the body anywhere other than his hands, head and neck would not have bee n visible” from the “methods of torture commonly applied t o North Korean detainees in order to extract [a] confession.” Collins Expert Decl. ¶ 28. For i nstance, “water-boarding, bein g forced to squat for several hours, and being placed in a box too small to either stand or lie down in for long periods of time,” all “cause severe pain and suffering without leaving obvious physic al evidence.” Id. ; see also H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 92–93 (Expert David Hawk) (explaining “common me thods of torture and pain infliction during the initial dete ntion and interrogation perio ds,” such as “string[ing] prisoners up by their wrists from the bars in the cells just with their toes off the floor,” forced kneeling or squatting with an “iron ore woode n bar” behind the legs, puttin g people in a “very, very small box so that they can’t stand up or lie down,” and beatings, wou ld not leave scars). Moreover,26 United States officials have pub licly confirmed that North Kore a tortured Otto. Hatch Decl. ¶
17. The plaintiffs, therefore, ha ve “produced compelling, admissibl e evidence” that North Korea detained Otto and “routin ely tortures” its detainees. Kim , 774 F.3d at 1049.
b. Hostage Taking The plaintiffs have also satisfa ctorily shown that North Korea took Otto hostage. “[H]ostage taking” is define d under Section 1605A(h)(2) as havi ng “the meaning given that term in Article 1 of the Internationa l Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,” which in turn provides: Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (herein after referred to as the “hosta ge”) in order to compel a third party, namely, a S tate, an international intergo vernmental organization, a natural or jur idicial person, or a group of per sons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an e xplicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages (“hostage -taking”) within the meaning of this Convention. United Nations, International C onvention Against the Taking of Hostages, No. 21931, Article I (Dec. 17, 1979). “Courts thus have found ‘hostage taking’ in c ases involving physical capture and confinement.” Mohammadi , 782 F.3d at 16. “The essential elem ent of the hostage-taking claim is that the intended purpose of the detention be to accom plish the sort of third-party compulsion described in the [C]onvention.” Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (“Simpson II” ), 470 F.3d 356, 359 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Simpson , 326 F.3d at 234–35). This requires “some ‘ quid pro quo ’ arrangement whereby the hostage would have been released ‘upon performance or non-performance of any action by that third party,’” and the plaintiff must identify a “ne xus between what happened to [the hostage] in [the foreign state] and any concrete concession that [the foreign sovereign] may have hoped to extract from the outside27 world.’” Id. at 360 (quoting Price , 294 F.3d at 94). A plaintiff, howe ver, “need not allege that the hostage taker had communicate d its intended purpose to the outside world.” Id. Here, ample evidence has been pr esented that North Korea detain ed Otto and persisted in detaining him for political leverag e with the United States. F or instance, Fred and Cindy spoke “regularly with representatives from the Department of State as well as other senior United States officials, and were tol d on several occasions that Otto was being imprisoned in North Korea because North Korea wanted something from the United Stat es, and that he would not be released until they had obtaine d that.” F. W. Decl. ¶ 15. The n-Secretary of State John Kerry, in particular, told Otto’s family i n a meeting, after Otto’s trial and sentencing in North Korea, that “Otto is being held hostage by NorthKorea,” and “they will wan t something in exchange for releasing him.” Id. ; see also H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 26 (F. W. ); C. W. Decl. ¶ 19 (“Several Uni ted States officials also told us that Otto was continuing to be he ld because North Korea wanted something from the United Sta tes and would not let him go until they got somethi ng in return.”). The expert David Hawk, who has authored multiple reports on Nor th Korean prison facilities for international or ganizations, explained that, “No rth Korea imprisoned and continued to imprison Otto in order to use his fifteen-year sentence of i mprisonment to compel the United States to send a high level offici al to North Korea to increase its stature and to open a dialogue with North Korea during a time wh en the two countries were not communicating . . . .” Hawk Expert Decl. ¶ 39; see also H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 102–03 (Expert David Hawk) (explaining Otto ’s detention fit North Korea’s “pa ttern” of holding Americans host age to serve its goal of “opening dialogue” with the United State s). This view is corroborated b y the expert Bob Collins, who confirmed that, “North Korea w ould view” Otto’s detention “as g iving it leverage in its foreign policy goals, such as the ongoing de velopment of its nuclear pr ogram during the time of Otto’s28 imprisonment.” Collins Expert Decl. ¶ 33; id. ¶ 34 (“[North Korea] w ould have believed the nature of [Otto’s] crime as gi ving them a particularly strong a bility to leverage their custody of him into achieving foreign policy go als with the United States as they could attribute the United States with a heinous affront to N orth Korean sovereignty.”). Quite transparently, North Korea made the political leverage pur pose of Otto’s detention clear w hen a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry stated a fter Otto’s death, “Warmbier is a victim of policy of ‘strategic patience’ of Obama who was e ngrossed in utmost hostility and ne gation against the DPRK and refused to have dialogue with the DPRK.” Hatch Decl., Ex. G (K CNA Article titled, “DPRK FM Spokesman Accuses U.S. of Slandering Humanitarian Measure”). According to Professor Lee, for N orth Korea, hostage taking is “a very well-honed craft” and “a tool of North Korea’s dipl omacy,” designed “to compel th e United States to negotiate from a position of weakness.” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 121. “NorthKorea carefully plans the timing of events that it knows will have a substantial geopolitical im pact.” Lee Expert Decl. ¶ 11. Otto’s case is no exception, as North Korea detained Otto “to d eter the United States from responding either with military action or sanctions in the face of North Korea’s increased nuclear and conventional weapons testing.” Id. ¶ 20. Thus, “[i]t was not an accident that Otto’s arrest occurred in early January 2016,” be cause at that time, North Ko rea “was then pursuing the rapid and highly public expansion of its nuclear weapons program.” Id. ¶ 21. On January 6, 2016, just four days after North Korea se ized Otto at the Pyongyang Intern ational Airport, “North Korea claimed to have tested the natio n’s first hydrogen bomb,” and “ [o]n September 9, 2016, North Korea announced that it successf ully tested a nuclear warhead that could be mounted onto ballistic missiles.” Id. Even if North Korea “may have gone ahead with these weapons t ests whether or not it had Otto in its custody,” North Korea “would have believed that having Otto29 gave it an extra level of securi ty that would deter the United States from being aggressive in response.” Id. Additionally, legisla tion to sanction No rth Korea had been pend ing in the U.S. Congress in 2015, which “North Korea woul d . . . have been aware and app rehensive of . . . before it seized Otto.” Id. ¶ 22. Less than two weeks after enactment in the United State s of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enha ncement Act of 2016 (H.R. 757, P ub. L. 114–122), North Korea made public Otto’s purported “confession.” Id. Then, Otto’s tri al and sentencing occurred on March 16, 2016, the day af ter “President Obama had signed an Executive Order imposing a variety of sanctions on N orth Korea,” with Otto’s tr ial held on the actual day this Executive Order became effective. Id. ¶ 23. Just as in Massie , where North Korea took hostage t he USS Pueblo crew to “extrac t a public apology” from the United S tates, in violation of the FSI A, here, too, North Korea detained, convicted and impose d a lengthy prison term on Otto i n order to gain leverage as North Korea engaged in highly publici zed nuclear and long-range missi le tests and the United States developed its North K orea sanctions policy. See Massie , 592 F. Supp. 2d at 65, 67; see also
Hekmati , 278 F. Supp. 3d at 162 (finding sufficient proof of hosta ge taking under the FSIA when “Iran detained Hekmati on false e spionage charges and, for four -and-a-half years, continuously threatened to kill, injure, and detain him, in an effort to com pel the United States to release Iranians imprisoned in the Unite d States or make other politica l or financial concessions to Iran.”). This is sufficient evidence for hostage taking. Another pernicious purpose of N orth Korea’s hostage taking must be highlighted. North Korea, as a totalitarian state , exercises tight control on its own media and citizenry, and by seizing an American hostage, seeks to extend this control outsi de its borders by muting criticism30 of its actions in the U nited States and the international commu nity through the explicit and implicit threat to th e safety and well-being of the hostage. See H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 121 (Expert Prof. Sung-Yoon Lee) (explaining that North Korea publicly port rays itself as a “highfunctioning” nation “based on the . . . rule of law” to maintai n “the semblance of normalcy”); id. at 104 (Expert David Hawk) (stati ng that North K orea “care[s] about its international reputation with respect to human rights”). A s Otto’s case illustrates, fe ar that public criticism of North Korea will result in reprisal against the hostage worked as Nor th Korea intended to keep the Warmbiers and their family and fri ends silent about Otto’s dete ntion. U.S. government officials repeated ly cautioned the Warmbiers th at North Korea threatened to injure Otto if they spoke out publicly about Otto ’s confinement and questioned or criticized publicly the North K orean story about the circumstan ces of Otto’s detention. Otto’s mother stated that, “we were to ld by all the government officia ls we met with that we should stay quiet and not speak out against No rth Korea because doing so wo uld probably mean that Otto would be punished for what we sai d.” C. W. Decl. ¶ 19. In Jun e 2017, Joseph Yun, the former U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy at the State Department, told Fred Warmbier that North Korean representatives “won’t release Otto” if the W armbiers spoke to the media about Otto’s detenti on. F. W. Decl. ¶ 18. In sum, North Korea used Otto’s detention to “control” the “dialogue the whol e time,” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 82 –83 (C. W.), and Otto’s parents were “[t]errified,” “afrai d to . . . speak out or discuss” Otto “with anyone,” id. at 16, 23 (F. W.). This same fear was shared by Otto’s siblings, id. at 45 (G. W.); F. W. Decl. ¶ 7, and Otto’s friends, who also declined to speak to the media about North Ko rea’s detention of Otto, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 59–60 (C. W.).31 c. Extrajudicial Killing Next, North Korea’s treatment of Otto amounted to an extrajudic ial killing. Under Section 1605A(h)(7), “extrajudici al killing” has the meaning gi ven to it in the TVPA, which defines an extraj udicial killing as: a deliberated killing not authori zed by a previous judgment pro nounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarante es which are recognized as indispensable by c ivilized peoples. Such term, ho wever, does not include any such killing that, unde r international law, is lawf ully carried out under the authorit y of a foreign nation. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note). “On its f ace, this definition contain s three elements: (1) a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and (3) is not authorized by a previous ju dgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.” Owens , 864 F.3d at 770. As to the first element, the pl aintiffs acknowledge that “the precise cause of the condition that caused Otto’s death is unknowable,” Pls.’ Mot. at 29, but there is overwhelming evidence that North Korea’s barbaric act s were a substantial factor in c ausing Otto’s death. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “jurisdi ctional causation” is evaluated under a “proximate cause” standard, which requires “some reasonable connection between the act or o mission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered,” such that the act was a “substantial factor,” and the victim’s injury was “reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence” of the defendant’s act. Owens , 864 F.3d at 794. Here, North Korea released Otto f rom his detention with such ir revocable, extensive brain damage that this resulted in Otto’s death. Kanter Decl. ¶¶ 9, 16, 21. Dr. Kanter opined, “based on a reasonable degree of med ical certainty,” that Otto “died because of his brain injury,” which “was caused by the sustained cessation of blood flow to t he brain, an injury occurring in North Korea after the last video that was released of him from his trial and sentencing.” Id. ¶ 21. After reviewing brain scans tak en when Otto returned and brain scans from North Korea, Dr.32 Kanter opined that “the brain inj ury occurred in the weeks prio r to” an April 2016 brain scan taken in North Korea. Id. ¶ 17. Dr. Kanter “diagnosed [Otto ’s] brain injury as severe a nd unrecoverable,” concluding Otto “could have continued indefinit ely with artificial” life support, “but he could not have lived w ithout that assistance.” Id. ¶ 20. As to North K orea’s alternative public claim that Otto died fro m botulism, F. W. Decl. ¶ 24, Dr . Kanter’s team conducted on Otto an “electromyography study,” w hich tests for “neuromuscula r junction dysfunction,” “an important feature of botulism,” Kanter Decl. ¶ 13. The test “w as normal, indicating that [Otto] had not contracted botulism while i n North Korea that would hav e caused respiratory failure.”
Id. ¶ 18. That Otto would die from thi s brain injury was also reas onably foreseeable. According to Mr. Hawk, North Korea releas ed Otto “just before he would ha ve died in detention,” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 98 (Expert David Haw k), deciding it “needed to get h im out of the country before he [died] in detention, which would be harder for [North Korea] to explain,” id. at 104. With respect to the second eleme nt, North Korea deliberately caused Otto’s brain damage, which resulted in his de ath. North Korea’s torture methods “pose a substantial danger to human life,” and North Korea “routinely withholds medical ca re from those in its custody, with such frequency that it amount s to an intentional act.” Hawk Expert Decl. ¶ 40; see also id. ¶ 25 (explaining denial of food r ations and imposition of hard labor are also “common” intentional acts resulting i n death); Kanter Decl. ¶ 15 (“Becau se the [brain] injury was so extensive, it was unlikely that [Otto] was with medical personn el who were willing and able to intervene to resusc itate him when the injury occurred.”). The expert’s conclusions are “more than sufficient” evidence that N orth Korea deliberately caused Otto’s death. Kim , 774 F.3d at 1050; see also id. at 1051. Moreover, the fact tha t North Korea continued to det ain Otto in this severely compromised condition f or over a year, rather than sen d him home earlier to obtain33 medical care, compounds the delibe rate nature of that totalitar ian state’s brutal treatment of Otto.
See F.W. Decl. ¶ 12. Finally, as for the third ele ment, Otto’s death was not authori zed by a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” 28 U.S.C . § 1350 (note). The North Koreancriminal judgment against Otto was illegitimate because North Korea does not have an independe nt judiciary, fabricated Otto’s “confession,” and put on a “show t rial.” H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 1 00–01 (Expert David Hawk); Collins Expert Decl. ¶ 14 (“[T]he judiciary and prosecutors are thus highly controlled by the same entity that controls all ot her party and state apparatuses .”); id. ¶ 27 (concluding Otto’s “speech at the press conference purporting to confess to the al leged crime was most likely dictated to him in advance and the product of torture”). Furth er, even if North Korea’s judiciary were legitimate, Otto’s sentence authorized 15 years of hard la bor, not death. Hatch. Decl., Ex. E (KCNA Article on Otto’s “Trial, ” titled “American Student Sen tenced to 15 Years of Hard Labor in DPRK”).
B. Personal Jurisdiction To impose judgment on a foreign s tate under the FSIA, this Cour t must have personal jurisdiction. Persona l jurisdiction over Nor th Korea, as a for eign state, depends on whether “service has been made unde r section 1608 of this title.” 28 U .S.C. § 1330(b) (defining limits of personal jurisdiction over forei gn states). Service may be eff ected under 28 U.S.C. § 1608 in one of four ways: (1) by “special ar rangement for service between t he plaintiff and the foreign state,” (2) “in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents,” or, if the first two options are not applicable, (3) by “sendin g a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit , together with a translation of each into the official language of the34 foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the h ead of the ministry of foreign a ffairs of the foreign state concerned,” or, if service cannot be made under the third option, (4) by re questing the Clerk of the Court to send the aforementioned package to “the Secretary of State in W ashington, District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special Consular Services—a nd the Secretary shall transmit one copy of the papers through diplom atic channels to the forei gn state and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified c opy of the diplomatic note indi cating when the papers were transmitted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). North Korea has neither made a s pecial arrangement for service with the plaintiffs, Hatch Decl. ¶ 19, nor entered into any i nternational convention gover ning service, see A TTORNEY M ANUAL FOR S ERVICE OF P ROCESS ON A F OREIGN D EFENDANT , U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT C OURT

FOR THE D ISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA 6 (July 2018) (“North Korea is not a party to the [Hague] Convention . . . .”). Instead, Nor th Korea was served here und er the third option: the necessary papers were mailed through DHL a nd delivered to North Korea on June 19, 2018, see Return of Service, ECF No. 12. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have establis hed that service was properly effected against the defendant s and, thus, personal jurisdictio n is properly exercised.
C. North Korea’s Liability Section 1605A not only “provides fede ral courts with jurisdicti on over, and withdraws sovereign immunity from” certain suits, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1), but “also creates a federal cause of action directly again st foreign governments,” Fraenkel v. Islamic Republic of Iran , Ministry of Foreign Affairs , 892 F.3d 348, 352–53 (D.C. Cir. 2018). “Under § 1605A(c), ‘national[s] of the United Sta tes’ may sue certain foreign gove rnments—those designated by the U.S. government as state sponsors of terrorism—for the acts des cribed in § 1605A(a)(1),” id. at35 353 (alteration in original) ( quoting § 1605A(c)), such as tort ure, hostage taking a nd extrajudicial killing, “causing ‘personal injury or death,’” id. at 352–53 (quoting § 1605A(c )). The statute specifies that, “[i]n any such act ion, damages may include econ omic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” Id. (alteration in original) (i nternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting § 1605A(c)). Here, the plaintiffs, who are all citizens of the United States , have establish ed their first claim for relief, which seeks to hold North Korea liable under § 1605A(c), the FSIA terrorism exception’s private right of action. See Compl. ¶¶ 57–66 (First Claim for Relief Action for Damages Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)); Pls.’ Mot. at 35–36, 38. 5 To determine liability under Section 1605A(c), “th e elements of immun ity and liability . . . are essentially the same,” Kilburn v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 699 F. Supp. 2d 136, 155 (D.D.C. 2010), a nd liability under s ection 1605A(c) will, in most cases, “exis t whenever the jurisdictiona l requirements of section 1605A are met,” Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 153 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Kilburn , 699 F. Supp. 2d at 155); see also Hekmati , 278 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (“In concluding that there is jurisdiction over Hekmati’s cl aims . . . the Court has already determined all of the essential elements for imposing liability under 1605A(c) have been establ ished . . . .”); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran , 55 F. Supp. 3d 189, 198 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[P]laintiffs’ claims against North Korea meet [the FSI A terrorism exception’s] requi rements for purposes of subject-

5 The plaintiffs bring three other claims based on common law t orts. See Compl. ¶¶ 67–70 (Second Claim for Relief based on wrongful death and survival); id. ¶¶ 71–74 (Third Claim for Relief based on intentional inflicti on of emotional distress); id. ¶¶ 75–77 (Fourth Claim for Re lief based on assault and battery ). The D.C. Circuit has explained that while a plaintiff may rely on “alternative sourc es of substantive law,” incl uding “state tort law,” to bring a claim against a foreign state after establishing a waiv er of sovereign immunity through the FSIA’s terrorism exception, such relian ce is not needed. See Owens , 864 F.3d at 808–09 (“[I]n most cases brought under the new terrorism exception, the plaintiff need not rely upon state tor t law.”). Accordingly, discussion of the plaintiffs’ tortbased claims for relief is unnecessary, since those claims woul d give rise to no more damages than those available under the FSIA’s private right of action, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), and are therefore “subsumed in the FSIA claims.” Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran , 896 F.3d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2018).36 matter jurisdiction and liability.”). Accordingly, for the rea sons discussed in Part III.A, supra , the plaintiffs have establishe d North Korea’s liability to them under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), leaving only the amount of damages allowable to the plaintiffs to resolve.
D. Damages Otto’s estate seeks to recove r economic, pain and suffering, an d punitive damages, and Fred and Cindy Warmbier seek solatium and punitive damages. See Pls.’ Mot at 2–3. The damages to which each plaintiff is entitled are described below

. 1. Legal Standard for Damages Under Section 1605A(c) Congress, in creating a private right of action in Section 1605 A(c) for victims of statesponsored terrorism, also provide d, in the same subsection, tha t such foreign states are liable for money damages, including “economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) . “Upon obtaining a default jud gment, successful plaintiffs may recover damages by proving ‘th at the projected consequences are reasonably certain (i.e., more likely than not) to occur, a nd must prove the amount of da mages by a reasonable estimate.’” Fraenkel , 892 F.3d at 353 (quoting Hill v. Republic of Iraq , 328 F.3d 680, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see also Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea , 87 F. Supp. 3d 286, 289 (D.D.C. 2015); Roth , 78 F. Supp. 3d at 402; Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 370 F. Supp. 2d 105, 115–16 (D.D.C. 2005). In determini ng the “reasonable esti mate,” courts may look to expert testimony and prior awards f or comparable injury. Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 845 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (D.D.C. 2012); Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 2008).37 For the reasons detailed supra , in Part III.A, the plaintiffs have satisfactorily shown that North Korea’s torture, hostage t aking and extrajudicial killing of Otto was likely, and reasonably certain, to result in injury a nd death to Otto and to devastate his family.
2. Economic Losses and Medical Expenses (Otto’s Estate) Otto’s estate seeks to recover for Otto’s “lost earning capacit y, or the likely wages that he would have earned had his life not been cut short.” Pl.’s Mot. at 40; see also Compl. at 21. “Unlike damages for pain and su ffering, lost earnings are not h ard to quantify, a nd the Court will not excuse [a plaintiff’s] failure to support the claim for los t earnings with competent evidence.”
Moradi , 77 F. Supp. 3d at 71. A plaintiff, however, may prove lost e arnings based on reasoned analysis of an expert economist, see Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic , 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 48 (D.D.C. 2016), as the plai ntiffs have done here. In support of Otto’s lost wages, the plaintiffs submitted evide nce in the form of a report from Professor James V. Koch, a B oard of Visitors Professor of Economics Emeritus and President Emeritus at Old Domin ion University, with a Ph.D. fro m Northwestern University. Koch Report at 12. Mr. Koch accoun ted for Otto’s life expectan cy and work life expectancy, as well as Otto’s “exceptional[] talent[],” “academic success at U VA,” “his attendance at the London School of Economics,” and hi s “signal selection” as a “h ighly compensated summer intern” at Millstein, a New Y ork City investment firm. Id. at 2–3. Mr. Koch then ran three models. Id. at 3. The first assumed Otto woul d reject the “possibility of Wall Street” and instead earn the income of a “typical Uni versity of Virginia graduate,” and the second assumed Otto would work at Millstein or a “comparable Wall Street firm and d o[] good work, but . . . not [be]
a star.” Id. The third model assumed Otto would work at Millstein or a “co mparable Wall Street firm,” and “advance[] to [the] position of Director after twent y years.” Id. Relying on his own38 “education, training and experience, and accounting for the rea lities of the marketplace,” Mr. Koch concluded, after reviewing O tto’s case, that the third mod el provided the “most credible” estimate of “losses suffered by [Otto’s] estate,” at $6,038,308

. Id. at 4. Despite the obvious assumptions underlying this model, Otto excelled at all that he set out to do in hi s young life, and his “driven” nature, H’rg Tr . (Rough) at 58 (C. W.), makes high ly plausible that this success would have continued. Accordingl y, Otto’s estate is awarded $6 ,038,308 for his estimated economic losses as a result of N orth Korea’s heinous treatment of him. The plaintiffs also seek to recover Otto’s medical expenses, Co mpl. at 21, and have submitted satisfactory evidence of those expenses, reflected in itemized medical bills totaling $96,375.80, see Hatch Medical Expenses Decl. ¶ 6; see also id. , Ex. A (UC Health Itemization of Otto’s Hospital Services); id. , Ex. B (UC Health Itemization for Physician Providers); id. , Ex. C (UC Health Email Summary of Ex. B). See Levin v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 529 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[P]laintiffs , through their own testimony, h ave reasonably proven the costs incurred as a result of past medical expenses.”); Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 275 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[Plaint iff] has also requeste d damages for his past medical expenses and has ‘reasonably prove n’ these expenses through the testimony of his mother.”). Although plaintiffs’ counsel repre sented at the evidentiary hea ring that insurance “covered part of” these expens es, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 134, Otto ’s medical expenses are still recoverable in full. “[A] di strict court may rely on well-esta blished statement s of common law, found in state reporters, the Res tatement of Torts, and other r espected treatises, in determining damages under § 1605A(c).” Fraenkel , 892 F.3d at 353. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that “[p]ayments made or benefits conferred by” collat eral sources “do not have the effect of reducing the recover y against the defendant.” R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) OF T ORTS §39 920A cmt. b (1979). Therefore, Otto ’s estate is awarded $96,375.80 for Otto’s medical
expenses. 3. Pain and Suffering (Otto’s Estate) “[W]hen assessing damages for surviving victims of terrorist h ostilities,” the “baseline assumption” is that “‘persons s uffering injuries in terrorist a ttacks are entitled to $5 million in damages.’” Kaplan v. Hezbollah , 213 F. Supp. 3d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Davis v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2012)). This baseline may be m oderated either upward or downward. An upwar d departure would be warran ted “in the presence of ‘severe instances of physical a nd psychological pain, such as w here victims suffered relatively more numerous and severe injuries , were rendered quadriplegic, including partially lost vision and hearing, or were mistaken f or dead,’ or downward in the fac e of ‘minor shrapnel injuries or minor injury from small-arms fire.’” Id. at 35–36 (quoting Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 84 (D.D.C. 2010)) (citation omitted and alt eration adopted). An award of “$9 to $10 million in compensatory damages” has bee n appropriate “in cases where the victims were hel d as hostages an d tortured for extensive periods of time,” Gill v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 249 F. Supp. 3d 88, 103 (D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases), and $10 million has been awarded to an estate when a victim was “subjec ted to mental and physical torture before being murdered by m eans involving the applicatio n of ‘significant force’ to his jaw,” Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic , 281 F. Supp. 3d 153, 157 (D.D.C. 2017). Similar to these cases, North K orea detained Otto for approxim ately 17.5 months, and North Korea is known to use extrem e methods of torture to extra ct confessions from those it detains, including “water-board ing, being forced to squat for s everal hours, . . . being placed in a box too small to either stand or l ie down in for long periods o f time,” Collins Expert Decl. ¶ 28,40 “string[ing] prisoners up by their wrists from the bars in the cells just with their toes off the floor,” forced kneeling or squat ting with an “iron ore wooden b ar” behind the legs, and beatings, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 92–93 (Expert David Hawk). North Korea als o returned Otto to the United States with such severe brain in jury that he was blind, deaf an d completely unresponsive. F. W. Decl. ¶ 25; H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 33, 36 (F. W.). While the prec ise torture applied to Otto for this resulting injury is unknown, the blood flow to his brain was cu t off for from five to twenty minutes, Kanter Decl. ¶ 15, whi ch could have been caused by “[w ]ater-boarding,” “manipulating teeth with pliers,” “applicati on of electric shock,” or suffoca tion. Collins Expert Decl. ¶ 31. Furthermore, Otto’s perfectly s traight teeth ha d been rearrange d to be misaligned, further indicative of the use of pliers or other tools to inflict that painful damage, plus the scar on his foot may have been caused by multip le applications of electrica l shocks. Id. ¶ 30. Due to the duration of Otto’s detention, the public humiliation to which h e was subjected with a publicized coerced “confession” and trial, a nd the severity of the torture to which he was subjected over such a long period of time, Otto’s estate is awarded $15 millio n in compensatory damages for pain and suffering.
4. Solatium (Fred and Cindy Warmbier) Fred and Cindy Warmbier, in thei r individual capacities, seek s olatium damages to compensate for the emotional di stress they experienced as famil y members of victims of the attack. “District Court judges have discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) to grant solatium awards based on the particular fact s of each case, subject to a buse-of-discretion review for errors of law, clearly erroneous fact ual findings, and faulty reasonin g.” Fraenkel , 892 F.3d at 351. Citing Judge Lamberth’s “semin al opinion explaining the origins and particulars of solatium damages” in Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran , the D.C. Circuit has explained that “‘[s]olatium41 is traditionally a compensator y damage which belongs to the ind ividual heir personally for injury to the feelings and loss of deceden t’s comfort and society,’” a nd was an award that “began as a remedy for the loss of a spouse or a parent,” but is now unders tood to include the loss of a child or a sibling, as well. Id. at 356 (quoting Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 999 F. Supp. 1, 29 (D.D.C. 1998)). “Mental anguish, bereavement and grief resulting from” an immed iate family member’s death or injury “constitutes the preponderant element of a clai m for solatium.” Id. at 356–57 (quoting Flatow , 999 F. Supp. at 30) (alteration adopted); see also Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya , 775 F. Supp. 2d 48, 83 (D.D.C. 2011) (“A claim of solatium se eks compensation for the ‘mental anguish, bereavement and grief tha t those with a close personal relationship to a decedent experience as a result of the decede nt’s death, as well as the harm caused by the loss of the decedent, society and comfort.’” (quo ting Belkin v. Islamic Republic of
Iran , 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 (D.D.C. 2009))). In determining the ap propriate amount to compensate victims’ family membe rs for emotional distress, “the Court may look to prior decisions awarding damages . . . for solatium.” Acosta , 574 F. Supp. 2d at 29. Solatium damages, by their nature, are “unquantifiable,” Moradi , 77 F. Supp. 3d at 72, and, therefore, this Court has developed a commonly accepted st andardized framework, known as the Heiser damages framework, for solatium damages, Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of
Iran , 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 269 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Roth , 78 F. Supp. 3d at 403 (noting the “framework has been adopted by ot her courts as an appropriate m easure of solatium damages for the family members of victims of state-sponsored terror” (citin g Valore , 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85)). Though use of the Heiser framework is not mandatory, Fraenkel , 892 F.3d at 351 (“District Court judges invariably must ex ercise discretion in determining damages awards under the FSIA.42 There is no statutory basis for c oncluding that district courts must award solatium damages in the amounts that Heiser found commonly granted.” (emphasi s in original)), this Court ad opts this framework here in the interest of consistency. As a baseline, under the Heiser framework, parents “received $5 million.” Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 774 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2010). As noted, “families of victims who have died are typically awa rded greater damages than families of victims who remain alive.” Estate of Heiser , 466 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (quoting Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 75 (D.D.C. 2006)). These numbers serve only as a base line from which the Court maydeviate to compensate for specific circumstances. See Fraenkel , 892 F.3d at 362 (“While past solatium awards from comparable cases are appropriate sources of guidance for distri ct courts, different plaintiffs (even under FSIA) will prove different facts that may well (and shoul d) result in different damage awards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Factors militati ng in favor of an award enhancement generally fall int o one of three categories: “evide nce establishing a n especially close relationship between the plaintiff and decedent, particul arly in comparison to the normal interactions to be expected given the familial relationship; me dical proof of sever e pain, grief or suffering on behalf of the claimant; and circumstances surround ing the terrorist attack which made the suffering particularly more acute or agonizing.” Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 768 F. Supp. 2d 16, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2011). “Decisions to deviate from the starting points provided by the Heiser framework are committed to the d iscretion of the particular co urt in each
case . . . .” Id. at 26. In Fred and Cindy’s case, an upwar d enhancement is warranted. “While it is difficult to quantify the grief that” Fred a nd Cindy “have experienced, and continue to experience, as a result of North Korea’s violent actions, these plaintiffs are e ntitled to compensati on for their loss,43 pain, mental anguish, and suffering.” Kim , 87 F. Supp. 3d at 290. There is no question, based on their moving live testimony, tha t Fred and Cindy were close wit h Otto and miss him greatly. The circumstances surrounding Otto ’s detention made North Korea ’s acts particularly agonizing for his parents. While North K orea detained O tto, this totalit arian state permitted almost no facts regarding his condition to be know n, and Fred and Cindy constan tly worried about their son, unsure of what was happening to him. See Stansell v. Republic of Cuba , 217 F. Supp. 3d 320, 347 (D.D.C. 2016) (spouse recei ved award of $12 million where “ [t]he pain and suffering she has experienced were magnifie d by the initial la ck of informati on surrounding [victim’s] death” and where she had to spend years le arning “exactly what happene d”). Moreover, families of torture and hostage-taking victims “are typically awarded greater damages than are the families of victims of a single attack,” b ecause in the former cases, “the afflicted party not only had to cope with the grief that follow s the loss of a loved one, but—at the time of the event—was also for ced to endure unending anxiety an d an extended period of extreme distress over the healthand safety of their captive family member.” Oveissi , 768 F. Supp. 2d at 27. Finally, North Korea returned Otto with such e xtensive brain damage that Otto’s parents witnessed his discomfort, monstrous condition and, fina lly, his death shortly after his

return. Having examined closely the facts of this particular case, Fred and Cindy Warmbier are entitled to $15 million each, to acc ount for their “first-hand observations and acute memories of [their] child’s death,” Braun , 228 F. Supp. 3d at 86, and their agonizi ng wait for him to re turn home, see Kim , 87 F. Supp. 3d at 290 (awarding $15 million each to brother a nd son of victim kidnapped and killed by North Korea).44 5. Punitive Damages (All Plaintiffs) The plaintiffs also seek punitive damages, which are awarded no t to compensate the victims, but to “punish outrageous behavior and deter such outr ageous conduct in the future.”
Kim , 87 F. Supp. 3d at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quo ting Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 907 F. Supp. 2d 93, 105 (D.D.C. 2012)); see also R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND ) O F T ORTS § 908(1) (1979). Punitive damages are warranted where “defend ants supported, protected, harbored, aided, abett ed, enabled, sponsored, conspi red with, and subsidized a known terrorist organization whose modus operandi included the target ing, brutalization, a nd murder of American citizens and others.” Baker , 775 F. Supp. 2d at 85. North Korea’s conduct toward Otto justifies the imposition of significant punitive damages h ere. See, e.g. , Hekmati , 278 F. Supp. 3d at 166 (punitive damages awar ded where plaintiff was h eld in solitary confinement, beaten, threatened, and psychol ogically battered for years in I ran). In determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages, cour ts consider “(1) the character of the defendants’ act , (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or intended t o cause, (3) the need for deterr ence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants.” Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 41 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting
Acosta , 574 F. Supp. 2d at 30). Taking these factors into account, s everal approaches have been articulated for calculation of the appropriate amount of puniti ve damages in state-sponsored terrorism cases. One approach is to multiply the foreign state ’s “annual expenditures on terrorism” by a factor be tween three and five. See Baker , 775 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (citing Valore , 700 F. Supp. 2d at 88–90; Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 30– 31; Acosta , 574 F. Supp. 2d at 31); Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 789 F. Supp. 2d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2011). This approach, which may result in awards in th e billions of dollars, has been45 used in the case of exceptionall y deadly attacks, such as the 1 983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, which kille d 241 American military servicem en. See Baker , 775 F. Supp. 2d at 85. A second approach bases punitive damages on “the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages set forth in earlier cases ,” if similar conduct has bee n previously litigated. See Spencer v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 71 F. Supp. 3d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2014); Goldberg–Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 938 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11–12 (D.D.C. 2013). A third approach awa rds a fixed amount of $150,000,000 per affected family. See Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic , 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 233 (awarding $300,000,000 in total to two victims and their families); Baker , 775 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (awarding $150,000,000 each to families of three deceased victims); Gates , 580 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (awarding $150,000,000 each to the estates of two victims). In this case, although egregious, O tto’s detention in North Kor ea is not on the scale of an exceptionally deadly attack again st many Americans, making the first method, which might result in an award in the billi ons of dollars, as the plaintiff s request, see Pls.’ Mot. at 44, out-ofline with analogous circumstan ces. In addition, the first meth od requires knowing how much North Korea spends on terrorist activities, and that informatio n is not available. See Kim , 87 F. Supp. 3d at 291 (explaining that “[ n]o such information for North Korea is readily accessible, . . . if it is accessible at all”). The second method, likewise, is not appropriate since Otto’s case is unique. The third approach, thus, is th e most appropriate, but recogniz ing that North Korea has committed acts that are “awful and worthy of the gravest condem nation,” id. (quoting Roth , 78 F. Supp. 3d at 405), and that North Korea is “keenly aware” of the “political environment” in the United States, including judgmen ts issued by United States cour ts, H’rg Tr. (Rough) at 131–32 (Expert Prof. Sung-Yoon Lee), a lar ger award is appropriate to punish and deter North Korea.46 Accordingly, punitive damages are awarded to each of the three plaintiffs in the amount of $150 million, for a total of $450 million in punitive damages. See Kim , 87 F. Supp. 3d at 291 (awarding $300 million in punitive damages in 2015, based on No rth Korea’s “presumed torture” of a missionary in North Korea, w hich was insufficient to deter North Korea in 2016 in Otto’s case).
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons outlined above, the plaintiffs’ motion for defa ult judgment is granted. North Korea is liable for the t orture, hostage taking, and extr ajudicial killing of Otto Warmbier, and the injuries to his mother and father, Fred and Cindy Warmb ier. The plaintiffs are awarded monetary damages in the followi ng amounts: Otto Warmbier’s esta te is entitled to $6,038,308 in economic losses, $96,375.80 in medical expenses, $15,000,000 inpain and suffering, and $150,000,000 in punitive damages. Fred a nd Cindy Warmbier are each entitled to $15,000,000 in solatium damages a nd a total of $300,000,000 in punitive dam ages. Thus, the total damage award is $501,134,683.80.

Date: December 24, 2018

__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL Chief Judge