If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re Salisbury, Minors. January 5, 2023

Nos. 361149; 361150

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2016-522708-NA

In re J Y C Salisbury, Minor. No. 361242

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2021-001192-NA

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MURRAY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondents are the parents of AB and JS. In addition, respondent-father is the father of 

CS. In Docket No. 361149, respondent-mother appeals as of right the order terminating her 

parental rights to AB and JS pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or 

custody), (i) (parental rights to a sibling have previously been terminated due to serious and chronic 

neglect or physical or sexual abuse), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to the 

parent’s home). In Docket No. 361150, respondent-father appeals as of right the order terminating 

his parental rights to AB and JS pursuant to the same three subsections. In Docket No. 361242, 

respondent-father appeals as of right the order terminating his parental rights to CS pursuant to the 

same three subsections as well. In all three appeals, respondents argue that the trial court clearly 

erred by finding that the statutory grounds for termination were proven and that termination of 

parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We affirm.

I. FACTS

On May 10, 2016, petitioner filed its petition with regard to AB and JS, alleging that 

respondents provided improper supervision and based on the history of CPS involvement. The 

trial court authorized the petition, stating that “[t]he children are at risk in the care of mother and 
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father.” On July 6, 2016, respondents entered a plea to allegations indicating that jurisdiction was 

warranted because of “an unfit home environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, 

criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or other custodian.” 

Eventually, in July 2018, the two children were returned to respondent-father’s care.

On March 4, 2019, petitioner filed a supplemental petition requesting that the two children 

be removed from respondent-father’s care. The petition stated that “CPS substantiated . . . 

allegations and found Preponderance for Improper Supervision, Maltreatment and Physical 

Neglect.” An August 2019 dispositional order explained the status of the case as follows:

THE REMAINING BARRIER[S] ARE HOUSING, EMPLOYMENT, 

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION. THE BIGGEST 

BARRIER IS HOUSING. . . . THE COURT WILL ALLOW THE FATHER TO 

RESIDE IN THE HOME OF THE PATERNAL GREAT GRANDPARENTS 

WHERE THE CHILDREN ARE PLACED. MOTHER WAS NOT PRESENT. 

DHHS LAST HAD CONTACT WITH THE MOTHER IN JULY. THE MOTHER 

INDICATED THAT SHE HAD RELAPSED AND WAS ENTERING INTO 

SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES. . . .

The children were returned to respondent-father’s care in October 2019.

In November 2021, the trial court again ordered AB and JS removed from respondentfather’s care. The temporary order explained that respondents were abusing drugs and that they 

did not have a suitable home for the children. At about the same time, petitioner filed a petition 

requesting that the trial court terminate respondents’ parental rights to AB and JS, and another 

petition requesting that the trial court terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to CS. The 

petition concerning AB and JS included numerous allegations regarding respondents’ use of 

cocaine and other unspecified drugs in the presence of all three children. The petition alleged that 

respondent-father partially owned a home, but he “reported he cannot go back to the house he is 

partial owner of in Detroit due to fear of the people [respondent-mother] keeps bringing to the 

house.” The petition added that respondents previously lost parental rights to another child in 

Florida. The petition concerning CS similarly included numerous allegations regarding 

respondent-father’s use of drugs. That petition requested that the trial court assume jurisdiction 

over CS and that she be returned to her non-respondent mother.1

Testimony at the bench trial confirmed that respondents were generally abusing drugs 

during these proceedings, and that neither respondent had a stable job or a suitable home for the 

children. Petitioner had offered services to respondents since 2007, but unfortunately, those 

services showed no long-term benefit to either respondent. To his credit, however, respondentfather left the children in the care of his grandparents in the fall of 2021. He did this after

apparently recognizing that he was incapable of caring for them himself. The paternal greatgrandparents were willing to adopt AB and JS. 

 

1 This is the first petition requesting that the trial court assume jurisdiction over CS. Apparently, 

she lived with her mother until October 2020, when custody was awarded to respondent-father.
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The trial court decided to terminate respondents’ parental rights, explaining at the 

conclusion of the bench trial that respondents have “been given a number of opportunities to get it 

together and yet here we are.” The trial court expressed its hope that respondents would overcome 

their respective drug addictions but indicated that the status quo was unacceptable. 

These consolidated appeals followed.

II. GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

“This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate 

determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re Keillor, 325 Mich App 80, 85; 923 

NW2d 617 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A trial court’s findings of fact are 

clearly erroneous if we are definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake.” Id. (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least 

one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and 

convincing evidence.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).

MCL 712A.19b(3) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court 

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, 

fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a 

reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated 

due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and the parent has 

failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights.

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent.

We question whether the trial court properly found that MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was proven 

by clear and convincing evidence, given the minimal testimony and evidence concerning 

respondents’ financial status. We also question whether the trial court properly found that MCL 

712A.19b(3)(i) was proven by clear and convincing evidence, given that the circumstances 

surrounding the previous termination of parental rights in Florida were not detailed. 

However, with regard to MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), the trial court did not clearly err. The 

testimony at the bench trial showed that respondents were generally unemployed and often 

homeless. Although respondent-father partially owned a home in Detroit, the individuals 

frequenting that home were so threatening that respondent-father himself was afraid to reside or 

bring the children there. Thus, even though respondents nominally had a home, it was not, per 
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respondent-father’s statements, suitable for the children. Further, as the trial court detailed in its 

opinion and order, the evidence showed that respondent-mother used drugs in the presence of all 

three children, and respondent-father gave CS drugs to temporarily hold for him. This suggests 

that the three children would be continuously exposed to drug use and possession if they were 

returned to either respondent’s care. The facts that respondent-mother could not be contacted 

during the most recent proceedings, presumably because she was regularly abusing drugs and not 

living in a stable household, and respondent-father was unwilling to provide the trial court with 

the name of his purported long-term rehabilitation program, reinforce the trial court’s conclusion. 

Even if exposure to drug use and possession would not necessarily result in physical harm to the 

children, it invariably would result in some type of mental or emotional harm to the children. See 

In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 473; 951 NW2d 704 (2020) (“For purposes of [subsection (j)], 

the harm in question need not be physical; a ‘risk of emotional harm’ can suffice.”) (citation 

omitted). Simply put, respondents’ drug abuse and resultant household instability over the course 

of several years despite petitioner’s repeated involvement created “a reasonable likelihood” that 

the three children would be “harmed if . . . returned to the home of [respondents].” MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j). The trial court did not clearly err by finding that this statutory ground for 

termination was proven by clear and convincing evidence. Further, because the trial court did not 

clearly err by finding that one statutory ground for termination was proven by clear and convincing 

evidence, any error with regard to the other two grounds for termination, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) 

and (i), was harmless. See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32. 

III. BEST INTERESTS

“We review for clear error the trial court’s determination regarding the children’s best 

interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “[W]hether termination 

of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013).

“If a statutory ground for termination is established and the trial court finds ‘that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be 

made.’ ” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32-33, quoting MCL 712A.19b(5).

To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, 

the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include the child’s bond 

to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, 

stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home. 

The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the 

parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history 

with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of 

adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (cleaned up).]

In this case, respondents had an extensive history with CPS, including multiple 

substantiated allegations of neglect. The trial court looked at drug abuse as the primary issue that 

caused this neglect and that issue clearly had not been resolved by the time the instant termination 

proceedings were initiated or by the time the termination orders were entered. Further, before the 

three children were removed from respondent-father’s care, they were repeatedly exposed to 
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respondents’ drug problems. Throughout these proceedings, the whereabouts of respondentmother were unknown, and respondent-father admitted that he had no home or job. Unfortunately, 

respondents showed little promise of being able to resolve their drug problems within a reasonable 

time, given that respondent-father refused to identify his rehabilitation program for the trial court,

and respondent-mother candidly admitted to a caseworker that she would continue to use drugs 

until she was subjected to a drug test.

As the trial court observed, all three children had far superior alternatives to remaining in 

respondents’ unstable care. AB and JS were to be adopted by their paternal great-grandparents, 

and CS was released to the care of her mother, who was not a respondent in these proceedings. In 

light of these facts, as well as respondents’ repeated inability to successfully resolve their drug 

problems, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondents’ parental 

rights was in the children’s best interests.

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court did not clearly err by finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) was proven by clear 

and convincing evidence or by finding that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in the 

children’s best interests. We affirm.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan