## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

People v . Dom ingu ez , 2012 IL 111336

Caption in S upreme Court: THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOIS, Appellee
, v. SI L VESTRE DOMI

NGUEZ , Appellant.

Docke t No. 111336

Filed
Rehea ringdenied April 19, 2012

September 24, 2012

Held ( Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Di smissal of a Spanish-speake r’s appea l for failure to file proper po s t

guilty -plea motions was aff irmed wher e Rule 6 0 5 ( c ) a dvice on prese rving his rig ht to appea l was g iven orally
, althoug h not verbatim, and defe ndant signe d an Eng lish version of the rule, which he said he understood, even though the rec ord failed to ref lec t t hat defe ndant’s interpre ter rea d the form to him or that the court repor ter translated it—substantial rule compliance

.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the First District; hear d in that court

on appea l f

rom the Circuit Court of Cook County , the Hon. Thomas M. Tucke r, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Michae l J

. Pelletie r, State Appellate Def ender
, Alan D. Goldberg
, Deputy D e f e n d e r , a n d Michae l H. Ore nstein, Assistant Appellate Def ender
, o f th e Offic e of the State Appellate D efe nder, of Chicag o, for a

ppellant.

L isa Madigan, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield, and Anita Alvare z, State’s Attorney
, of Chicag o (Alan J

. Sp el l berg
, Annette Colli ns and Yvette L oizon, Assi stant State’s Attorney s, of counse l), for the People.

J ustices J USTI CE GARMAN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J u s tices Thomas, Kar

meier, and Theis concur

red in the judgme n t an d opinion.
J ustice Bur

ke dissented, with opinion, joined by C hief J ustice Kilbride and Just ice F ree man.

OP INION

¶ 1 Def

endant, Silvestre Domingue z, pleade d guilty to one co u n t o f p reda tory criminal 1 sexual assault of a child (720 I L CS 5/12-14.1(a) (1) (West 2008)) a nd was sentenced to 16
y ear s in prison. Defe ndant appealed, arguing that the cause should be rema nded due to the ci rc uit court’s failure to provide adequate postplea admonishments as require d u n d er Supreme Court Rule 605 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 605 (ef f. Oct. 1, 2001)). The appellate court aff irmed. No. 1-09-0125 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the f o ll owing rea sons,

we a ffirm the judg ment of the a ppellate c ourt.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 In J une 2007 defe ndant was ind i ct ed o n 26 counts, mostly relating to the s exual abuse of a single minor victim. By September 2007 defe ndant had been appointed a public defe nder. A Spanish languag e interpre ter was also prese nt in the courtroom for defe ndant’s
appea ranc es. On September 10, 2008, defe ndant indicated to his attorney that he wished to waive his rig ht to a jury trial. A bench trial was set for October 9, 2008. Def endant appea

red in court on October 9
, 2 0 0 8
, with his attorney and the Spanish languag e interpre ter. The circ uit c ourt discussed the c harg es ag ainst defe ndant and the possible pe nalties. Def endant indicated that he understood. The court then state d to defe ndant:

Def end ant ’s name was spe ll ed “Dominque z” by the a p p e l l a t e cou rt , and in the vario us 1

c i r c u i t cou rt fi li ngs and tr ans cr ipt s the spe ll ings “Dominque z” and “Dominguez” ar e use d int er cha ngeabl y. I n thi s cou rt , the fi li ngs have use d the “Dominguez” spe ll ing. In a d d i t i o n , in def end ant ’s not ic e of app eal
, he spe ll s it “Dominguez.” T her ef ore , thi s cou rt wil l spe ll def end ant ’s la stname “Dominguez.”

-2-“THE COURT: Howeve r, y our lawyer has told me that y ou are willing at this point to have a confe renc e with the Court which means we would revie w y our case and come up with a sentenc e for you. So Iam g oing to a dmonish y ou as to that. Your lawy er a

nd the State ar e see king a confe renc e reg arding your ca se. At the confe renc e, I will hear the fac ts and circ umstances surrounding y o u r arrest. I will hear about any traff

ic or criminal backg round y ou may have. Normally , I wouldn’t hear this unless there was a trial or a plea. We may re ach an ag ree ment that’s

acc eptable to you and y our attorney

. We may not. In the event we do not, y ou would not have a

rig ht to have anothe r judg e pre side at your trial, be it benc h or jury trial, for the r eason I

participated in the conf

ere nce. Do you understand, a

nd do y ou want me to par ticipate in the conf

ere nce?
DEF ENDAN T: Yes.” ¶ 4 The attorney s and circuit court then he ld the confe renc e in t he court’s chambe rs. After the confe renc e, the court ag ain addre ssed defe ndant conce rning the charg es ag ainst him and the possible penalties he fac ed. Def endant said he understood and wanted to plead guilty

. The
court then, in detail, discussed with defe ndant what he would be g iving up by pleading guilty
, such as the right to trial and the rig ht to confr ont witnesses ag ainst him. The court noted there

was a signe d waiver from defe ndant indicat i n g that he understood he was g iving up those rig hts. The court asked, “You signe d that afte r making y ourself awa re of that rig ht a

nd y ou wish to g ive it up? ” Def

endant indicated “yes” and that it was his signature on the waiver of rig hts. Def

endant indicated he understood th e rig hts he was g iving up and still wished to plead guilty , which he did. The State then pre sented the f actua l basis for def

endant’ s plea. ¶ 5 After hear ing the fac tual basis, the court asked defe ndant if those fac ts wer e what he wa s pleading guilty to and defen d an t s tated “yes.” Def endant also waived his rig ht to a prese ntence investigation. Defe ndant was se ntence d to 16 y ear s in prison. The victim then addre ssed the cour

t, askingfor more than 16 y ear s. The cour t then stated to defe ndant:
“THE COURT: Sir, even though y ou have pled guilty and been found guilty
, y ou have cer tain rig hts. Those rig hts include y our rig ht to return to the courtroom within 30 day s to file motions to vacate y our plea of guilty and/or rec onsider y our sentenc e. The mot i ons must be in writing and contain all the rea sons to support them. Any

re as o n s not contained therein will not be preserve d for purposes of appeal. S hould
y our motion to vacate y o u r p l ea of guilty be g rante d, y our plea of guilty and the judgme nt I have enter ed there on will be vaca ted, meaning era sed. Your case will be
set back down on the t rial cale ndar for further procee dings. Shoul d your m otion to

rec onsider sentenc e be g rante d, y ou will be rese ntence d. In the event the motions are denied, you have 30 day s from denial to return to file a notice of appea l the Court’s ruling

. I f y ou wish to do so and could not aff ord an at t o rn ey , we will g ive y ou an attorney fre e of c harg e, alongwith the transcr ipts necessa ry for those pur

poses. I have a signe d acknow ledg ment of those rig hts. I s that y our si gn at u re (indicating )?
DEF ENDAN T: Yes.
THE COURT: And y ou signe d that afte r making y ourself awa re of those rig hts,

-3-is that corre ct?
DEF ENDAN T: Yes. THE COURT: Good luck to you.” ¶ 6 Def

endant filed a form entitled “Ac kno w le d gme nt B y D e f e n d ant of Advice Given to Him By the Trial Judge Pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 605 (B )” w ith the circuit cour t

on October 9, 2008. The space labeled “Date” on the for m wa s left bl ank, but defe ndant’s signature wa s on the form. The form re cited Rule 605(c ) almost verbatim. 2 ¶ 7 The State dismissed all other charg es and defe ndant di d not file a postplea motion. On J anuar y 20, 2009, defe ndant filed a pro se “Notice of Appea l” with the appellate court. The notice wa s dated De cembe r 4, 2008. In the notice, de fenda nt stated:
“1. Def endant Silvestre Domingue z was told by court appointed counsel to sign

a paper at plea barg ain court date. 2. Def endant Silvestre Domingue z court appoinde [ sic ] counsel Ms. Diana Gar cia told Def endant that signing that document would g ive Def endant the rig ht for an Appea l. 3. Def endant Silvestre Domingue z is n o t well spoken or have any understanding whatsoeve r in rea ding, compre hen d ing leg al materia ls. WHEREFORE, the Def enda n t , S ilvestre Domingue z, reque st that this
court e nter a

Notice of Appea l in this case .” ¶ 8 The appellate court dismiss ed defe ndant’s appea l, finding he had failed to file the proper p ostplea m otions to perf

ect his rig ht to appea l and challeng e his guilty plea. The appell at e court found the substance of the rule was convey ed to defe ndant and that defe ndant indicated, both orally and in writing
, that he understo o d the rule. The court reje cted defe ndant’s remaining arguments, finding that defe ndant (1) was made awa re by the court of the g ener al rig ht to counsel in ref ere nce to postplea motions; (2) did not file any postplea motions; and (3) understood the proce eding s, as he h ad b een provided with a Spanish interpre ter and informed the court he understood what was happening and had even signe d documents to this effe ct.

¶ 9 ANALYSI S ¶ 10 Def

endant argues that the circ uit court failed to strictly comply with Supreme Court Rule 605(c)

. Alternatively
, if strict compliance is not require d, defe ndant asks this court to

3

T he fou rt h par agraph of Rule 605( c) st at es “t hat upon the re que st of the Sta te any cha rges 2 tha t m ay have bee n dis m is sed as a par t of a ple a agree m ent wil l be re ins ta te d and wil l al so be set for
tr ia l.” I ll

. S. Ct. R. 605( c) (4)

. On the pri nte d for m si gned by def end ant , “an y” was m is ta kenly spe ll ed “an d.”

Fro m the re cor d, it app ear s tha t thi s was a negoti at ed ple a (i t is not qui te cer ta in if thi s was

3
ope n or negoti at ed, but the eviden ce fr om the re cor d s e e ms t o w e i gh on the si de of negoti at ed)

. However, bot h par ti es con ced e tha t it doe s not m ake a dif fe re nce whic h admonis hm ent s app ly, si nce bot h sub sec ti ons con ta in the par ti cul ar admonis hm ent s at is sue in thi s cas e. Base d on the ci rc um st ant ia l eviden ce ci te d by the Sta te , and for s i mp l i ci ty’s sake, thi s opi nio n wil l con duc t it s

ana lysis und er

Rul e 60 5(c ).

-4-re mand beca use the circ uit court failed to provide advice essential to a knowing and intelligent waiver of co u n s el and the rig ht to appea l. Finally
, in the third alternative, defe ndant ar gues the c ircuit court’ s admonishments affirma tively misled defenda

nt. ¶ 11 We conclude that, based on the plain meaning of Rule 605(c), t he rule must be st rictly

com p l i ed wi t h in that the admonitions must be g iven to a defe ndant who has pled guilty

. Fa ilure to do so require s rema nd for proper admonishment. Howeve r, the plain meaning of the rule require s only that a defe ndant be “substantially” advised of the actua l content of Rule 605(c)

. A verbatim rea ding of the rule is n o t re qu i re d. We find this interpre tation to be consistent with our ca se law on this issue. ¶ 12 Supreme Court Rule 604(d) require s a defe ndant who is appea ling from a plea of g uilty
to file a motion challeng ing the sentenc e or plea in the circ uit court within 30 day s of the day
sentenc e is imposed. The rule states, in rele vant par t: “No a ppeal f rom a judgment enter ed upon a plea of guilty shall be take n unless the defe ndant, within 30 day s of the date on which sentenc e is imposed, files in the trial
court a mot ion to rec onsider the sentenc e, if only the s entenc e is being challeng ed,
or, if the plea is being challeng ed, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgme nt. No appea l shall be taken upon a neg otiated plea of guilty challeng ing the sentenc e as e x cessive unle ss the defe ndant, within 30 day s of the imposition of
sentenc e, files a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgme nt. *** Up o n appea l any issue not raised by the defe ndant in the motion to rec onside r t h e sentenc e or withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgm ent shall be deeme d waived.” I ll. S. C t. R. 604(d) (ef f. Jul y 1, 2006). ¶ 13 Ru l e 6 0 5 (b) and Rule 605(c)
, which complement Rule 604(d) and serve as a corollary
to the require ments of Rule 604(d), provide the admoni t i ons the trial judge must g ive a defe ndant when imposing sentenc e on a defe ndant who has pled guilty

. People v. Jamison
, 181 I ll. 2d 24, 27 (1998). Rule 605(c) states: “In all case s in which a judg ment is entere d upon a neg otiated plea of guilty , at t he time of imposing sentenc e, the trial court shall advise the defe ndant substantially as follows: (1) that the de fenda

nt has a right to appeal; (2) that p ri or to taking an appea l the defe ndant must file in the trial court, within 30 day s of the date on which sentenc e is imposed, a written motion asking
to have the judgme nt vacated and for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty
, setting forth the grounds for the motion; (3) that if the motion i s all owed, the plea of guilty
, sentenc e and judgme nt will be vaca

ted and a trial date will be set o n t h e char g es to which the plea of
guilty was made ; (4) that up o n the reque st of the State any char g es that may have been dismiss ed as a part of a plea ag ree ment will be reinstated and will also be set for trial; (5) that if the defe ndant is indige nt, a copy of the transcr ipt of the proce eding s

-5-at the time of the defe ndant’s plea of guilty and sentenc e will be provided without
cost to the defe ndant and counsel will be appointed to a ssist the defe ndant with the pre paration of the motions; and (6) that in any appea l taken from the judgme nt on the plea of guilty any issue

or claim of err or not raised in the motion to vaca te the judgme nt and to withdraw the plea of

guilty shall be dee med waive d.
For the purposes of this rule, a neg otiated plea is one in which the prosec ution has bound itself to rec ommend a specific sentenc e, or a specific ra n ge o f s entence, or wher e the prosec ution ha s made conce ssions relating to the sentenc e to be imposed and not mere ly to the char g e or char g es then pending .” I ll. S. Ct. R. 605(c) (ef f. Oct. 1, 2001).
“B eca use this issue conce rns the proper interpre tation of a supreme court rule, our revie w is de novo .” People v . Hende rson , 217 I ll. 2d 449, 458 (2005).

¶ 14 A. Rule 605(c) Compli ance : Subst antial v. Strict ¶ 15 The a ctual languag e of Rule 605( c) sa y s that the trial cour

t “ shall advise the defenda nt substantial ly as follows.” (Emphase s added.) I ll. S. Ct. R. 605(c)

. Def endant first argues that Rule 605’s guilty plea admonitions demand stri ct compliance

. There is no question that a circ uit court must g ive the Rule 605(c) admonitions. This court has held that, throug h the use of the word “shall,” the Rule 605(c) admonitions are mandatory an d fa ilure to g ive such admonitions will result in rema nd to the trial court for proce eding s in acc ordanc e with Rule 605(c)

. Jamison
, 181 I ll. 2d at 27-28. Howeve r, whether the admonitions need be g iven at all is not the issue befor e the court in the instant cas e. R at h er , t h e court must deter mine whether the rule must be “ strictly ” or “ substantially ” complied with, i.e. , must a trial court

rea d the rule verba

tim to a defenda

nt or i s such a r eadingnot nece ssary so long as the t rial court “ substantially ” complies with the rule ’s re quirements? ¶ 16 The rule itself require s the defe ndant be substantial l y ad v i s ed o f ce rt ai n rig hts. To deter mine what is meant b y “s ub s t an tially ,” we must turn to the rules of statutory interpre tation. T he rules of statutory interpre tation a re applied with equa l force to supr eme court rules. People v. Roberts
, 214 I ll. 2d 106, 116 (2005); In re Estate of R ennick
, 181 I ll. 2 d 3 9 5, 404 (1998). The primary objective is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to th e ru l e’ s draf ters’ intent, the s u re s t and most reliable indicator of which is the languag e of the rule itself, g iven its plain and ordinary meaning

. People v. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d 312, 323 (2007). In deter mining the plain m ea n i n g o f the rule’s terms, we consider the rule in its entirety
, keeping in mind the s ubject it addre sses and the appar ent i ntent of t h e draf ters in enac ting it. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d at 323. Where th e l an gu age of the rule is clea r and unambiguous, we must apply it as written, without resor t to extrinsi c aids to statutory construction. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d at 323. We i n t erp re t t h e rule so that no part of it is rende red meaning less or superf luous and we do not depar t from the plain languag e of the rul e b y re ad i ng into it exceptions, limit ations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent. Holly v. Montes
, 231 I ll. 2d 153, 159 (2008); People v . Jones , 214 I ll. 2d 187, 193 (2005). ¶ 17 Her e, we find the plain languag e of the rule to be clea r and unambiguous. The use of the

-6-word “shall” means that it is mandatory that defe ndants be admonished under Rule 605(c)
,

and this interpre tation has been consistently applied by this court. See People v. Breedlov e , 213 I ll. 2d 509, 521 (2004); Jamison
, 181 I ll. 2d at 27-28; People v. Foster
, 171 I ll. 2d 469, 474 (1996). In interpre ting the meaning of “substantially advise,” the languag e of the rule is

s imilarly clea

r. The rule does not say that the court must “complete ly ” inform a defenda n t “as follows” of the require ments, nor does it say that the court must “strictly rea d verbatim” from the r ule. Rather, it uses the te rm “substantially advise.” ¶ 18 I n d et ermini ng the plain, ordinary
, and popularly understood meaning of a term, i t i s entirely approp ri at e t o look to the dictionary for a definition. Perry
, 224 I ll. 2d at 330. “Substantially ” is the ad v erb form of “substantial.” Acc ording to Merr iam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionar

y , “substantial” means: “5 : being larg ely but not wholly that which is specifie d.” Merr iam-Webster’s Collegiate Dicti onary 1174 (10th ed. 1998). Although “substantial” is not define d in B lack’ s L aw Dictionary
, the related term “substance ” is: “1. The essence of som ething ; the essenti al quality of som ething
, as opposed to its mere form
<matter of substance >.” B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary 1565 (9th ed. 2009). ¶ 19 Thus, under its plain and ordinary meaning
, “substantially” in the rule does not require

a strict verbatim rea ding of the rule so as to “substantially advise” defe ndants of its contents. Rather, the court must impart to a defe ndant larg ely that which is specifie d in the rule, or the rule’s “ essenc e,” a s opposed to “wholly” what is specified in the rule

. ¶ 20 This is consistent with our court’s most rec ent application of whether admonitions we re sufficie nt under Rule 6 05(c)

. In In re J.T. we found that a circ uit court’s Rule 605(c) admonishments to a juvenile defe ndant s atisfied the rule wher e the admonishments, while
not perf ect, larg ely specifie d the essenc e of the rule. In re J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d 338, 347-48 (2006) (“While these admonitions did not strictly comply with Rule 605(c)
, they wer e sufficie nt to p ut J .T. on notice that he could challeng e his guilty plea, and that some action o n h i s p ar t within 30 day s was nec essar y if he wished to a

ppeal.” ). ¶ 21 In his b r ie f

, d e f e n d a nt urg es that “Foster
, Jamison
, Breedlov e , and Hende rson all demand strict Rule 605(b) and (c) compliance .” That is true
, in that the admonitions must be g iven. Howeve r, in Foster no 605(b) admonitions wer e g iven whatsoeve r and in Jamison all the defe ndan t was told was that any posttrial motions must be filed within 30 day s. Clearly
, under those circ umstances, beca use the conseque nces to a defe ndant’s appea l rights wer e so g rave , strict compliance demande d that the case be rema nded. Breedlov e and Hende rson are distinguishable in that those case s conce rned admonitions under Rule 60 5 (a ). T h ere, the
court distinguished Rule 605(a) from Rule 605(b). Hende rson , 217 I ll. 2d at 462 (noting how Rule 605(b) defenda

nts who fail to file t he proper postplea m otion lose their appeal rights completely
, wher eas Rule 605(a) defe ndants who fail to file a motion to rec onsider sentenc e lose the rig ht to appea l that issue, but r etain the rig ht to appea l trial err ors); Breedlov e , 213 I ll. 2d at 520. 4

Als o, in con tr ast to Rule 605( b) or (c ) si tua ti ons , fa il ure to giv e the pro per admonis hm ent s 4 unde r Rule 605( a) wil l on l y re sul t in re m and “whe re the re has bee n pre j udi ce or a den ia l of re al j ust ic e a s a re sul t o f t he i nad equ at e a dm oni shment.” Hende rso n , 217 I ll . 2d at 466

.

-7-¶ 22 Howeve r, in a Rule 605(b) or (c) setting, wher e a trial court has substantially complied with the rule so as to impart to the defe ndant the substance of the rule, automatic rema nd is
not nece ssary

. The rule need not be “strictly” administered, i.e.
, it need not be rea d near ly verbatim. See J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d at 366 (F ree man, J
., dissenting) (“A s the appellate court noted, ‘[t] rial courts are held to strict compliance with Rule 605(c) require ments. [C itation.] Although the trial court is not require d to use the exact languag e of the rule, the admonitions

are insufficient wher e the trial court leave s o u t t h e substance of the rule.’ ” (quoting In re J.T.
, 347 I ll. App. 3d 533, 536 (2004)) ). Rather, we conclude that the co u rt must “substantially” advise a defe ndant under Rule 605(c) in such a way that the d ef en dant is
p roperly informed, or put on notice, of what he must do in order to prese rve h i s ri gh t t o appea l his guilt y p l ea or sentenc e. So long as the court’s admonitions wer e sufficie nt to impart to a defe ndant t h e essenc e or substance of the rule, the court has substantially complied with the rule. The question that rema ins befor e this court, then, is whether
, in this instance, the circ uit court’s admonitions imparted such notice to defe ndant.

¶ 23 B. Whether the Circuit Court Subst antially Advised De fenda

nt Under Rule 605( c) ¶ 24 We mu s t n e xt d e te r mi ne whether the circ uit court’s admonishments substantially advised defe ndant of the contents of Rule 605(c)

. In addition to the oral admonishments, the circ uit
court acc epted a signe d form from defe ndant containing near ly word-f or-wor d Rule 605(c) admonishments. The court discussed the form immed i at ely afte r orally admonishing defe ndant under

Rule 605(c)

. Def

endant acknowledg ed that the s igna ture on the form wa s his and that he had signe d the form afte r making himself awa re of the ri gh t s co n t ained there in. Def

endant, howeve r, challe n g e s th e v a lu e of the written admonishments in analy zing whether a circ uit court proper ly complied with Rule 605(c)

. He also arg ues that the form is written in Eng lish and defe ndant speaks Spanish and the rec ord fails to ref lect that the court repor ter had translated the form. There fo re , befor e deter mining whether the circ uit court substantially advised defe ndant of Rule 605(c)
, this court must decide what value, if any , to attach to wr itten admonishments in a Rule 605(c) a naly sis.

¶ 25 1. The Value of the W ritten Admonishments ¶ 26 Ba sed on this c ourt’s rese arc h, and the absenc e of any case cited by the par ties, written admonishments have not been part of a Rule 605(c) analy sis befor e this case

. There fore
, the specific value of tho s e wr i t t en admonishments in a Rule 605 setting is an issue of first impression. Howeve r, written admonishments have been used and acknow ledg ed in conjunction with or al admonishments by courts in other for ms, suc h as a written waiver of

a jury trial or the require d admonishments befor e a court acc epts a plea of guilty pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402. See People v. Scott , 186 I ll. 2d 283, 284-85 (1999) (a statutorily require d written jury waiver
, standing alone, does not waive a defe ndant’s rig ht to a jury trial, but rathe r a defe ndant must be prese nt in open court wh en a j ury waiver
, written or otherwise, was at least discussed); People v. Diaz , 15 I ll. App. 3d 280, 284 (1973) (in case finding sub s ta

nti a l compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402, court held, “Althoug h we have

-8-held that a written waiver form may not substitut e for the require d admonishments [citation]
,

when the substance of the form and defe ndant’s open-co u rt response s to it have been
t h o ro ug hly aire d on the record as here
, this court is further assure d that the defen d an t wa s informed of

and under stood the nature of the cha rg e.”)

. ¶ 27 Under Rule 605(c)
, “the trial court shall advise the defe ndant,” which means there must be some colloquy in open court betwee n the court and a defe ndant. Writt en admonishments
may not completely be substitut ed for the absenc e of oral admonishments. Howeve r, wher e written admonishments are acknow ledg ed by the court in open court, and the court asce rtains that the defe ndant is awa

re of the content of the admonishments and understands them, they
may be conside red. The y can serve to supplement or complement the oral admonishments require d u n d er t h e rule. The written admonishments by themselves are not adequate. Howeve r, in a situation wher e, as here
, there is arg ument over the completene ss, or whether the oral ad m o n i s hments imparted the substance of Rule 605(c) to a defe ndant, written admonishments, provided the court has discussed the m in open court with defe ndant, m ay inform the court’s analy sis of whether a defe ndant has been substantially advised under Rule 605. ¶ 28 Def

endant, to support his argument th at t h e wr i t t en admonishments are no substitut e when the judge is require d by rule to g ive oral admonishments in open court, cites to sever al

case s conce rning a defe ndant’s rig ht to a jury t ri al

. S ee P eople v. Phillips
, 242 I ll. 2d 189 (2011) (whe re s t at u t e required that judge war n acc used to appea

r for court, war

ning on signe d bond slip was no substitut e); Scott
, 186 I ll. 2d at 284-85 (a written waiver form alone does not validly waive a defendant’s right to a jury trial); People v. Cu mmings
, 7 I ll. App. 3d 306, 308 (1972) (pre printed Rule 402 admonishments did not substitut e fo r i n -cour t admonishments). ¶ 29 The case s cited by defe ndant are distinguishable from the instant case

. First, none of the

case s conce rn Rule 605(c)

. Fur ther, and most important, no oral admonishments wer e g iven wh at s o ev er in Phillips and Scott
, thus the writt en forms wer e offere d as pure substitut ion. Phillips
, 242 I ll. 2d at 192; Scott
, 186 I ll. 2d at 284-85. In Cummings
, t he oral admonishments wer e so lacking that the written for m was offe red as a near -complete substitut ion. Cummings , 7 I ll. App. 3d at 308. ¶ 30 Her e, the written admonishment form did not act as substitut e, but rathe r as a supplement
to complement the oral admonishments g iven by the circ uit court in open court. The Phillips

case , cited by defe ndant, actua lly prov i d es support for the position that written admonishments, while not acc eptable as a total substitut e for require d oral admonishments, can be of value wher e incomplete or al admonishments may have be en g iven. ¶ 31 In Phillips
, the defe ndant was char g ed with attempted first deg ree murder, amongother offe nses, and a

rra igne d befor e subseque ntly posting ba il. On the back of the bail bond slip executed on the day of the defe ndant’s rele ase on bond, a notice appea red fully informing the d ef en d ant that his future failure to appea r could result in a trial in his absenc e and t h at h e could be found guilty and sentenced in his absenc e. On the front side of t he sl ip, languag e stated that he understood and acc epted the terms and conditions on the slip and understood the conseque nces if he failed to appea r for trial. The defe ndant signe d the slip. Even though

-9-the defe ndant was prese nt in court for his arr ai gn m en t , nothing appea red in the rec ord indicating that the trial court orally advised the defe ndant conce rning the possibili ty of trial in absentia if the def

endant f ailed to appe ar, which was r equire d by statute. The de fenda

nt failed to a ppear for the la st part of his trial and w as convic ted and se ntence d in absentia

. ¶ 32 This court aff

irmed the appellate court judgme nt r ever sing the conviction and sentenc e due to the trial court’s failure to proper ly advise the defe ndant under the statute. The statute in que stion states that a trial court “ ‘shall advise [t he defe ndant] a t tha t time or at any later
court date on which he is prese nt that if he *** is rele ased on bond and fails to appea r in court whe n require d by

the cour t that his failure to appe ar w ould constitute a waive r of his rig ht to confr ont the witnesses ag ainst him and trial could proce ed in his absenc e.’ ” Phillips
, 242 I ll. 2d at 196 (quoting 725 I L CS 5/113-4(e) (West 2000)). The court found “that section 113-4(e ) unambiguously require [d] the trial court to admonish a defe ndant in open court and reje ct[ed] the State’s claim that defe ndant waived his rig ht to be admonished by a trial judge based upon the signe d bond slip in this case .” Phillips
, 2 4 2 I ll. 2d at 199. The court conclude d “that a war

ning provided outsi d e the prese nce of the court throug h languag e contain ed o n a b o n d slip does not constitute a blanket waiver prec luding the need for any section 113-4(e ) admonishment by the trial judge .” (Emphasis in orig inal.) Phillips
, 242 I ll. 2d at 199. ¶ 33 The c ourt furthe r noted:

“[T] he leg islature intended for the trial court to orally admonish a defe ndant as to the possibili ty of trial in abse ntia when he is prese nt in open court at arr aig nment, or at any later date. We also believe that oral admonishment is most eff ective to meet the leg islative purpose of section 113-4(e ) as i t provides the trial court with an opportunity to both notify a defe ndant of his rig ht and obligation to be prese nt at trial, and to verify that he understands this important rig ht and duty .” Phillips
, 242 I ll. 2d at 200. ¶ 34 The court also addre ssed Peop l e v. Co n d o n , 272 I ll. App. 3d 437 (1995), wher e the appellate court held that section 113-4(e ) did not specific ally require oral admonishment and that an admonition, written or oral, which advised a defe ndant of all the information require d by section 113-4(e ) was sufficie nt to leg itimi ze a trial in absentia

. This court held that “[t] o the extent that the Condon court held t h at written admonishment by the trial court alone would satisfy

the re quirements of section 113-4(e ), it is inconsistent w ith this opinion and, there fore
, overr

uled.” (Emphasis added.) Phillips
, 242 I ll. 2d at 201. This court further noted that, in Condon
, in contra st to Phillips
, the trial court did later orally admonish the defe ndant about the possibili ty of trial in absentia
, thus the defe ndant was provided with both oral and written admonishments. Phillips , 242 I ll. 2d at 201. ¶ 35 Unlike i n Phillips , the written a dmonishments wer e provided here in conjunction wit h oral admonishments. Specifica lly ref err ing to th e wr i t t en form, the circ uit court noted he “had a signe d acknow ledg ment of those rights” and asked defe ndant if that was his signature. Def endant told him it was. The court then asked defe ndant, “And y ou signe d it afte r making
y ourself awa

re of those rig hts, is that corr ect? ” Def endant answe red “yes.” The rec ord thus indicates that defe ndant s i gn ed and understood the written form, which repr inted near ly

-10-verbatim Rule 605(c)

. Unlike a bail slip signe d by a defe ndant on the day he is rele ased from

jail on bond, the written admonis h m en t s signe d by defe ndant here wer e discussed with defe ndant by the circ uit co u rt i n open court immediately afte r the oral admonishments, providingthe judg e with an opportunit y to asce rtain t hat defendant signed the form and to verify that defe ndant understood and was awa re of the important ri gh t s contained in the admonishment form. See Phillips , 242 I ll. 2d at 200. ¶ 36 As to the languag e barrier, while it is true that the written form was in Eng lish, the re cord ref lects that defe ndant had a Spanish interpre ter prese nt with him, along with counsel, in the
courtroom on t h e d ay h e pled guilty

. Given the colloquy betwee n the circ uit court and defe ndan t n o t ed in the above para g raph, we will not assume that defe ndant did not understand the form si mply beca use t here is nothing on rec ord ex plicit l y d ocumenting the interpre ter readingthe form to defe ndant. There is nothing in the record that indicates that defe ndant or his counsel raised any questions reg arding defe ndant’s understanding of the admonishments, written or oral. Rather, the rec ord reve als defe ndant und erstood the form and, once he wa s awa

re of the rights discussed there in, signe d it. W e conc lude that, due to the nature and circ umstances of the written admonishments in this case , they are of value in deter mining whether the circ uit court substantially advised defe ndant under Rule 605(c)
, and we will consider

them in our ana ly sis.

¶ 37 2. The Circuit Court’s Substantial Compliance W

ith Rule 605(

c) ¶ 38 In support of his argument that the circ uit court’s ad m o n i t i o n s did not substantially comply with the rule, defe ndant points to three problematic admonitions: (1) u n d er Rule 605(c) (2), the circ uit court told defe ndant he must “re turn to the courtroom within 30 day s” to f ile any postplea motion, instead of being able to f ile by mail; (2) the cir cuit court failed
to proper ly convey Rule 605(c) (5), when he sug g ested to defe ndant that only after postplea
proce eding s could defe ndant g et fre e transcr ipts and appointed counsel, when Rule 605(c) ( 5) provides that counsel will be appointed to help with the preparation of the motions; and (3) the circ uit c ourt completely failed to explain under Rule 605(c) (4) that, should defe ndant’s plea be vaca

ted, the dismissed char g es could be reinstated.

¶ 39 a. Rule 605(c )(2) Admonishment ¶ 40 Rule 605(c) (2) pr ovides that a de fenda nt must be told:
“that prior to taking an appea l the defe ndant must file in the trial court, within 30 day s of the date on which sente nce is imposed, a written motion asking to have the judgme nt vaca

ted an d for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty
, setting forth the
g rounds for the motion[ .]” ¶ 41 Her e, the c ircuit court a dmonished defe ndant:

“Sir, even though y ou have ple d guilty and been found guilty
, y ou have cer tain rig hts. Those rights i nclude y our right t o return to the court ro o m within 30 day s to file motions to vaca

te y our plea of guilty and/or rec onsider y our sentenc e. The motions m ust be in writing a nd contain all the r easons to support them.”

-11-¶ 42 Def endant argues that he was misinformed beca use the court’s admonition made it sound like he had to phy sicall y return to the courtroom to file his motion and, since he was in custody
, it would be impossibl e for him to do so, and he could no m o re return to the

co u rt ro om than he could “climb a mountain.” Also, defe ndant argues that he was “af firmatively misled” and thus the court violated due proce ss. Breedlov e , 213 I ll. 2d at 514- 15. The St at e co u n t ers that this argument is belied by the fac ts, as defe ndant was well familiar with the leg al sy stem and filed his notice o f ap p ea l t h rough the mail, showing he knew he did not have to phy sically appea r in court. ¶ 43 The ora l admonishment give n to defe ndant under Rule 605(c) (2) is imperf ect, a nd it is unfortunate that the circ uit court used the phrase “re turn to the courtroom.” Howeve r, when combined with the written form signe d by defe ndant acknow ledg ing he understood the Rule 605 admonishments, which did trac k the actua l languag e of the rule, we cannot say defe ndant

was not substantially advised of what was require d to perf ect a ri gh t t o appea l under that subsection. Def

endant was g iven notice that he must file a motion within 30 day s if he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. Simpl y beca use the circ uit court used the phrase “re turn to the courtroom” does not indicate defe ndant was not substantially put on notice of what he
must do within 30 day s to withdraw his guilty plea. See J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d at 347-48 (whe re the
court informed the responde nt that, in order to perf ect his rig ht to appea l the guilty plea, the responde nt first had to “file a petition befor e me,” this court found this was sufficie nt to put J .T. on notice that he could challeng e his guilty plea, and that some action on his part within 30 day s was nec essar

y if he wished to a

ppeal)

. 5

¶ 44 b. The Tr ial Court’s Rule 605(c) (5) Admonition Made
I t Seem Def

endant Could Obtain Counsel Only After He Ha d Filed Motions ¶ 45 Rule 605(c) (5) r equire s that a def endant be put on notice:
“that if the defe ndant is indige nt, a copy of the transcr ipt of the proce eding s at the time of the defe ndant’s plea of guilty and sentenc e will be provided without c ost to

T his cou rt acknowl edges tha t the pro cedura l pos t u r e i n J.T. is dis ti nguish abl e fr om the 5 ins ta nt cas e and inf

ormed m uch of the J.T. cou rt ’s ana lysis when it came to is sue s suc h as pre j udi ce, how m uch the re spo nde nt had bee n in cou rt , et c. I n tha t cas e, thi s cou rt employed a fun damenta l fa irnes s/pre

j udi ce ana lysis bec aus e the re spo nde nt had fa il ed to fi le a ti m el y not ic e of app eal
, le ave to fi le la te not ic e of app eal
, or m oti on to re con si der sen te nce /wi thd ra w gu i l t y p l e a a n d thu s the
app el la te cou rthadno j uri sdi ct ion , ne ces si ta ti ng a sup er visor y orderfr om th is cou rt

. However, thi s cou r t ’ s f

i n d i n g tha t the “ad m oni ti ons did not st ri ct ly comply wit h Rule 605( c) ” but “wer e suf

fi ci ent to put J .T

. on not ic e tha t he cou ld cha ll enge his gui l t y p l e a and tha t

some act ion on his par t wit hin 30 days was nec ess ary if he wis hed to app eal ” is inf ormati ve of what the st and ar d sho uld be for det er m ini ng whet her a ci rc uit cou rt has pro per ly admonis hed a guilt y ple a def end ant unde r Rule 605( b) or (c ) so as not to viola te due pro ces s. Th is app li es to the sub st ant ive

ana lysis of whet her Rule 605( c) admonit ion s wer e ade qua te , sep ar at e and apa rt fr om the pre j udi ce and“f unda m ent al fa ir nes s” is sue s a t p la y in J.T. due to th e r equ estfo r a sup er visor y order

.
-12-t he defe ndant and counsel will be appointed to assist the defe ndant wit h t h e prepa ration of the motions.” ¶ 46 Her e, the c ircuit court or ally admonished def

endant a s follows:
“Should y our motion to rec onsider sentenc e be g rante d, y ou will be rese ntence d. In the event the motions are denied, y ou have 30 day s from denial to r eturn to f ile a notice of appea l the C ourt’s ruling

. I f y ou wish to do so and could not aff ord an attorney , we will g ive y ou an attorney fre e of charg e, alon g wi t h t h e transcr ipts

nece ssary for those pur

poses.” ¶ 47 Def

endant argues that he was misinformed and misled by the circ uit court when the court offe red counsel only in the event the m o t i o n s wer e denied. By implication, the court sug g ested defe ndant lacke d the rig ht to counsel to pr epar e the motions. The rule order s the
court to clea

rly explain to a defe ndant when and how counsel can assist. This defic ient admo n i s h m ent was particula rly damag ing beca

use it failed to ensure that defe ndant knowing ly and voluntarily waived his rig ht to counsel. The State cou n t er s that the oral admonishments provided to defe ndant are simil ar to those provided in J.T.
, wher e this court found the a dmonishment subst antially complied with Rule 605(c)

. ¶ 48 I n J. T

. , t h e circ uit court admonished the respondent about hi s rig ht to file a petition to withdraw his guilty

plea but that, if it denied the petition, the petition would: “ ‘g o up to the highe r cour t and they will look at every

thing. They will take this rec ord this lady is ty ping up or transcr ibing and they will rea d

ever y thing that was sai d i n the courtroom by the attorney s, by you, by me, to see whether or not y our rig hts were violated in any way

. Do you understand that? [J .T.]: Yes, y our Honor.
THE C OURT: All rig ht. Ver y well. S o—and they will look it over for y ou and also if you g o up on appea l and y ou are unable to hire an attorne y to repre sent y ou, the C ourt will appoint an attorney for you fre e of ch ar ge. That’s y our right t o have

an attorney if y ou can’ t aff ord one. Also, we will provide you with a fre e copy of the
transcr ipt.’ ” J.T. , 221 I ll. 2d at 343. ¶ 49 This court in J.T. found that these admonitions “we re sufficie nt to put J .T. on notice that he could challeng e his guilty plea, and that some action on his p ar t wi thin 30 day s was

nece ssary if he wished to a

ppeal.” J.T. , 221 I ll. 2d at 347-48. ¶ 50 In People v. Dunn
, 342 I ll. App. 3d 872 (2003), the circ uit cour t ad m o n i s h ed t h e defe ndant under Rule 605(c) : “ Any rea sons not set forth in your motion will be waived f or purposes of appea l. I f y ou couldn’t aff ord an attorney or a copy of the transcr ipt, those will be provided for y ou fre e of char g e. I f I allow y ou to withdraw y our plea of guilty
, all char g es will be reinstated.” Dunn
, 342 I ll. App. 3d at 876. The defe ndant challeng ed the sufficie ncy of the admonishment, particula rly the failure to a dmonish that his a ppointed counsel could help him draf

t his postplea motions. The appellate court reje cted the defe ndant’s argument, finding that “[t] he court proper ly informed defe ndant of his r ight to a ppeal, the need to f

ile

a written motion to withdraw the plea within 30 day s of sentenc ing, waiver of any issues not

-13-raised in such motion, and, if indige nt, his rig ht to a fre e transcr ipt and to an attorney fre e of

char g e.” Dunn , 342 I ll. App. 3d at 882. The c ourt conc luded:
“D efendant’s contention that the trial court failed to admonish him that appoin t ed counsel could help him draf t postplea motions is ref

uted by the rec ord. The trial court admonished defe ndant that in order to appea l, he m u s t file a written motion to withdraw the guilty

plea. The trial court a lso admonished defe ndant that if he we re indige nt, an attorne y

would be appointed f

ree of charg e. These admonit ions ref lect that a court-a

ppointed attorney would be available for defe ndant. The languag e used by the trial court was not the exact languag e employ ed by the rule; howeve r, the trial court’s admonitions did convey the substance of the rule.” Dunn
, 342 I ll. App. 3d at 882. ¶ 51 He re , as i n b o th J.T. and Dunn
, the trial court arg uably did not ex p l i ci t l y i n fo rm defe ndant that he was entitled to have an attorney appointed to help him prepa re the postplea motions. Ho we v er, as in both those case s, the admonitions ref lect that a court-a

ppointed attorney would be available for defe ndant. Thus, like in those case s, the t ri al court’s admonitions did convey the substance of the rule to defe ndant and complied with Rule 605(c)

. Fur

ther, unlike in either J.T. or Dunn
, the written admonition form signe d by defe ndant which supplemented the oral admonitions did clea rly indicate that counsel could be appointed to help him prepa re his postplea motions. Whil e the oral admonishments might have been more g ener al about the rig ht to counsel, the written admonishment specific ally made it clea

r defe ndant was entitled to counsel to help him prepa re the motions. Def

endant

was put on notice that a co u rt ap pointed attorney would be available for him, and thus it
cannot be said that there was an unknowing or involuntary waiver of counsel. See J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d at 347-48; Dunn , 342 I ll. App. 3d at 882.

¶ 52 c. The Circuit Court’s Failure to Ex plain Under Rule 605(c) (4) That, Should Defe ndant’s Plea B e Va cate d, the Dismissed Charg es

Could Be Reinstated ¶ 53 Her e, t h e ci rc u i t court, in its oral admonishments, completely failed to mention the possibili ty that should defe ndant’s plea be vacated, t h e S t ate could reinstate all char g es dismiss ed in acc ordanc e with t h e neg otiated plea. Howeve r, the State arg ues there was substantial compliance beca use t he written admonishments provided full compli ance with Rule 605(c) (4). We ag ree

. T h i s i s n o t a situation wher e it can be argued the oral admonishment misled defe ndant or even conflicte d with t h e written admonishments. Def endant signe d off on having rec eived this admoni s hme n t a n d acknow ledg ed in open court that he had r ead a

nd understood it. ¶ 54 We conclude that, taken as a whole, t h e o ral and written admonishments substantially advised defe ndant of the require ments of Rule 605(c) so as to put him on noti ce of steps

neces s ar y t o prese rve an appea l pursuant to Rule 604(d). Whil e the circ uit court’s oral admonishments wer e imperfe ct and did not use the exact languag e employ ed by Rule 605(c)
, the admonishments provided in this case as a whole, both oral a nd written, we re suf

ficient
to impart the esse n ce or substance of the rule to defe ndant. S ee J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d at 347-48;

-14-People v. Tlatenchi
, 391 I ll. App. 3d 705, 722 (2009); People v. C l a udin
, 369 I ll. App. 3d

532, 534 (2006); Dunn , 342 I ll. App. 3d at 882.

¶ 55 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 56 The judg ments of the cir cuit and appe llate cour ts are a ffirme d.

¶ 57 Affir

med.

¶ 58 J USTI CE BURKE, dissenting : ¶ 59 Today
, the m ajority holds that Supreme Court Rule 605 require s only that a def en d an t be “substantially” advised of the content of the rule ( supra ¶ 11) and that the t ri al co u rt’s ad m o n i s h m ents in the case at bar met that standard (supra ¶¶ 37-54). I disag ree with the majority ’s conclusion that the ad m o n ishments substantially complied with the dictates of Rule 605. More importantly
, though, I write separ ately beca use I believe Rule 605 should be amende d to require a ver

batim rea ding of

the admonishments, i.e. , strict compliance

. ¶ 60 Initially
, I do not ag ree with the majority that the trial court substantially complied with Rule 605 wher e three of the six admonishments require d by the rule wer e g iven err oneously

or we re c ompletely

absent. ¶ 61 Wit h respe ct to the admonishment which req u i re s t h e co u rt to explain that a wr itten motion must be filed in the trial court within 30 day s of the date of sentenc e, the trial judge

err oneously stated that defe ndant had to “re turn to the courtroom.” The majority desig nates it as “unfor

tunate” that the tr i al judge used this phrase ( supra ¶ 43). I would g o further
, howeve r; it is not j ust unfortunate, but improper

. ¶ 62 Mo re o v er , wi t h re s p ect to the admonishment which require s the court to explain to defe ndant he is entitled to the assistance of counsel, the trial judge ’s statements indicated that defe ndant was not entitled to counsel until afte r he filed his postplea motions, i.e.
, for appea l only

. The admonishm ent was inacc urate and, in my view, did not put defe ndant on notice that he was entitled to counsel to prepa re any postplea motions—t he very motions defe ndant failed to file in this ca se. ¶ 63 L astly
, the admonishment which require s the trial court to explain to defe ndant that if the
court vacated his guilty plea the State could reinstate all of the charg es it had dismiss ed was entirely lacking. As t h e majority points out, the t rial j udg e “completely failed” to mention this possibili ty

. Supra ¶ 53. Howeve r, the majority conclude s that beca use defe ndant signe d the written admonishment, this was sufficie nt to put defe ndant on notice. I disag ree

. In this instance, the written admonishment was a complete substitut e for the oral admonishments—something which the majority itself holds is insufficient: “[t] he written admonishments by

themselves ar e not ade quate.” Supra ¶ 27. ¶ 64 There can be no “substantial compliance ” when the trial court omits completely one of the six admonishments, fails to rela y to defe ndant the vital fac t he is entitled to the assistance of counsel to prepa

re the require d postplea m otions neede d to prese rve his rig ht to appea l, and tells defe ndant he must return to the court to file his motions. Over all, the

-15-admonishments wer e incomplete and misleading

. Thus, I cannot ag ree with the majority that

substantial compliance w as met in this case. ¶ 65 This bring s me to my second important point: I believe this court should amend Rule 605
to require strict compliance throug h a v erb atim rea ding of the rule. As the disag ree ment among the members of this court in this case illust rate s, the question of what constitutes “substantial compliance ” is not easily ag ree d upon. Our appellate court fre quently disag ree s

as t o wh et h er a particula r omission from the rule amounts to “substantial compliance .” Compare, e.g. , People v. Vasques
, No. 5-08-0476 (Jan. 15, 2010) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), and People v. Hopkins-Be y , No. 2-10-0091 (June 4, 2010) (unpublished orde r under Supreme Court Rule 23). 6 ¶ 66 A brig ht line rule requiring trial courts to rea d Rule 605 verbatim “would g rea tly simpli fy the proce ss a

nd eliminate unnece ssary litigation on appea l.” In re J.T.
, 221 I ll. 2d 338, 357 (2006) (Kilbride, J
., concur ring in part and dissenting in part). Fur ther, a brig h t l i n e ru le would be easy to comply with. All the trial judge need do is re ad the words from the rule direc tly into the rec ord. Requiring a verbatim rea ding of the rule will eliminate any need for trial judge s to “memorize” the substance of the rule and will eliminate the situat i o n t hat exis ts in the case at bar, wher e the trial judge
, in attempting to para phrase the rule in his own words, combined the admonishments required b y p arag raph (b) with those require d by
para g raph (c)
, incorre ctly used the phrase “re turn to the courtroom,” failed to make it clea r that defe ndant h ad a ri gh t to counsel for prepa ration of postplea documents, and failed to explain to defendant that the dismissed cha rg es could a ll be reinstated. ¶ 67 Moreove r, a de termination of whe ther a trial judg e complied with Rule 605 will easily be made by the appellate court by asking one simple question: Did the trial judge rea d Rule 605 verbati m ? I f t h e answe r is in the neg ative, the case will be rema nded for proper admonishments and additional proce eding s. Reviewing courts will not have to undertake a

case -by -ca se analy sis, requiring time and energy , to deter mine whether and t o what ex tent the t rial j udg e complied with Rule 605. A b ri gh t line rule will prese rve judicial resour ces, expedite resolution of any challeng es, and r esult in predictable and consistent re sults. ¶ 68 This is a situation wher e a brig ht line rule is appropr iate. Not only will a brig ht line rule
prese rve judicial resour ces by simpl if y in g the proce ss and eliminating unnece ssary litigation, it will prese rve the important rig ht of defe ndants at issue: the right to appea l a nd challeng e his or her guilty plea and/or sentenc e. According ly
, I urg e thi s court to amend Rul e 605 to require a ver

batim rea ding of

the re quired a dmonishments.

T her e is no do u b t dis agree m ent among the app el la te cou rt pan el s as to how to evalua te 6 whet her “su bst ant ia l complia nce ” exi st s and whet her a par ti cul ar tr ia l j udge has
, in fa ct , su bst ant ia ll y complie d w i t h t h e r u l e ’ s re qui re m ent s. See
, e.g. , Peop le v. Clau din
, 369 I ll

. App. 3d 532 (20 06) ; Peop le v. Per

per , 359 I ll

. App. 3d 863 (20 05) ; Peop le v. Crump
, 344 I ll

. App. 3d 558 (20 03) ; Peop le

v. Llo yd
, 338 I ll

. App. 3d 379 (20 03) ; Peop le v. Gree n , 332 I ll

. App. 3d 481 (20 02) ; Peop le v. W yat t , 305 I ll

. App. 3d 291 (19 99)

. See al so Peop le v. Ste ven son , No. 1- 08- 1393 (M ar

. 9, 2010 ) (un publ is hed ord er unde r Supr eme Cour t Rule 23) ; Peop le v. She ber
, No. 2- 08- 0173 (Se pt. 8, 2009 ) (un publ is hedor derund erSupr eme Court Rul e 23 ).

-16-¶ 69 CHI EF JUSTI CE KI L BRI DE and JUSTI CE FREEMAN join in this diss ent.

-17-