# C_2018058EN.01010901.xml

| 15.2.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 58/109 |
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15.2.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 58/109

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P8_TA(2016)0120

The EU in a changing global environment — a more connected, contested and complex world

European Parliament resolution of 13 April 2016 on the EU in a changing global environment — a more connected, contested and complex world (2015/2272(INI))

(2018/C 058/12)

The European Parliament,

The European Parliament

| — | having regard to Article 3(1), (2) and (5), Article 21, in particular paragraphs (1), (2), point (h) and paragraph (3), second subparagraph thereof, Articles 8, 22, 24, 25, 26, Article 42, in particular paragraph (7) thereof, and Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), |
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having regard to Article 3(1), (2) and (5), Article 21, in particular paragraphs (1), (2), point (h) and paragraph (3), second subparagraph thereof, Articles 8, 22, 24, 25, 26, Article 42, in particular paragraph (7) thereof, and Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

| — | having regard to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
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having regard to Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS, |
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having regard to the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS,

| — | having regard to the report from the Vice-President/High Representative (VP/HR) on ‘The European Union in a changing global environment — a more connected, contested and complex world’, |
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having regard to the report from the Vice-President/High Representative (VP/HR) on ‘The European Union in a changing global environment — a more connected, contested and complex world’,

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the European Commission and the High Representative on ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises’ (JOIN(2013)0030), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the European Commission and the High Representative on ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises’ (JOIN(2013)0030),

| — | having regard to the Commission communication on ‘The European Agenda on Security’ (COM(2015)0185), |
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having regard to the Commission communication on ‘The European Agenda on Security’ (COM(2015)0185),

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative on ‘Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ (JOIN(2015)0050), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative on ‘Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ (JOIN(2015)0050),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 May 2015 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) (1), |
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having regard to its resolution of 21 May 2015 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) (1),

1

| — | having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2016 on the mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) TEU) (2), |
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having regard to its resolution of 21 January 2016 on the mutual defence clause (Article 42(7) TEU) (2),

2

| — | having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 and 20 December 2013 (EUCO 217/13) and of 25 and 26 June 2015 (EUCO 22/15), and to the Council conclusions on CSDP of 18 May 2015 (8971/15), |
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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 19 and 20 December 2013 (EUCO 217/13) and of 25 and 26 June 2015 (EUCO 22/15), and to the Council conclusions on CSDP of 18 May 2015 (8971/15),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency (3), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency (3),

3

| — | having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative on ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’ (JOIN(2013)0001), |
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having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative on ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace’ (JOIN(2013)0001),

| — | having regard to the European Union Maritime Security Strategy, as adopted by the Council of the European Union on 24 June 2014, |
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having regard to the European Union Maritime Security Strategy, as adopted by the Council of the European Union on 24 June 2014,

| — | having regard to the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept and the 2014 NATO Wales Summit Declaration, |
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having regard to the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept and the 2014 NATO Wales Summit Declaration,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2015 on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (4), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2015 on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (4),

4

| — | having regard to the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, as adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 25 June 2012, |
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having regard to the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, as adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council on 25 June 2012,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2015 on arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (5), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2015 on arms export: implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (5),

5

| — | having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, |
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having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change,

| — | having regard to the letter of the Committee on International Trade, |
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having regard to the letter of the Committee on International Trade,

| — | having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Development (A8-0069/2016), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Development (A8-0069/2016),

| A. | whereas many present and future challenges and threats to the EU are complex and interrelated, stemming from state and non-state actors and coming from inside just as much as from outside the common borders; whereas there is a need to connect local, regional and global contexts; whereas strong political will and leadership for resolute common action on the part of the EU and its Member States are needed in order to respond proactively, collectively and effectively to these challenges, to safeguard the EU’s values and societal model, and to turn the EU into an effective and more strategic actor and contribute to global security; whereas the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy must pave the way for this development by defining a political level of ambition of the EU as an international actor; |
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A.

whereas many present and future challenges and threats to the EU are complex and interrelated, stemming from state and non-state actors and coming from inside just as much as from outside the common borders; whereas there is a need to connect local, regional and global contexts; whereas strong political will and leadership for resolute common action on the part of the EU and its Member States are needed in order to respond proactively, collectively and effectively to these challenges, to safeguard the EU’s values and societal model, and to turn the EU into an effective and more strategic actor and contribute to global security; whereas the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy must pave the way for this development by defining a political level of ambition of the EU as an international actor;

| B. | whereas the EU must recognise the full extent of the deterioration in its immediate strategic environment, and the long-term consequences thereof; whereas the fact that multiple crises are occurring simultaneously and having increasingly direct consequences within the EU means that no Member State can respond alone and that Europeans should exercise their responsibilities collectively to ensure their security; |
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B.

whereas the EU must recognise the full extent of the deterioration in its immediate strategic environment, and the long-term consequences thereof; whereas the fact that multiple crises are occurring simultaneously and having increasingly direct consequences within the EU means that no Member State can respond alone and that Europeans should exercise their responsibilities collectively to ensure their security;

| C. | whereas the threats identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy — terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime — remain for the most part relevant; whereas today the EU is faced with a number of serious and unforeseen additional challenges, such as the attempts by revisionist powers to redraw borders by force by violating international law and to challenge rules-based global order, climate change, slow economic growth, major migratory and refugee flows, and the largest refugee crisis since World War II, in addition to technological developments in space and cybernetics, financial crime, nuclear proliferation and arms races, hybrid and asymmetric warfare and threats; |
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C.

whereas the threats identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy — terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime — remain for the most part relevant; whereas today the EU is faced with a number of serious and unforeseen additional challenges, such as the attempts by revisionist powers to redraw borders by force by violating international law and to challenge rules-based global order, climate change, slow economic growth, major migratory and refugee flows, and the largest refugee crisis since World War II, in addition to technological developments in space and cybernetics, financial crime, nuclear proliferation and arms races, hybrid and asymmetric warfare and threats;

| D. | whereas Europe’s security architecture has been based on the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); whereas the EU is a key player in the OSCE; |
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D.

whereas Europe’s security architecture has been based on the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); whereas the EU is a key player in the OSCE;

| E. | whereas, in light of the deterioration in regional security, the EU must give priority to stabilising its immediate neighbourhood, but without forgoing its global commitments; whereas security crises on the EU’s doorstep are compounded and shaped by global trends and, conversely, effective management of regional security is a prerequisite for the EU’s capacity to act globally; |
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E.

whereas, in light of the deterioration in regional security, the EU must give priority to stabilising its immediate neighbourhood, but without forgoing its global commitments; whereas security crises on the EU’s doorstep are compounded and shaped by global trends and, conversely, effective management of regional security is a prerequisite for the EU’s capacity to act globally;

| F. | whereas the European Council tasked the High Representative on 26 June 2015 with continuing the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with the Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016; |
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F.

whereas the European Council tasked the High Representative on 26 June 2015 with continuing the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with the Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016;

| G. | whereas a swift and efficient response to threats on the part of the EU requires strong solidarity between Member States, barriers being overcome and silo mentalities broken down within the institutions, as well as in the foreign representations of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States, and sufficient and flexible budgetary resources being allocated to support the achievement of the EU’s interests; whereas an effective European strategy requires first and foremost a strong political will and sense of common purpose shared among Member States to develop and use true European instruments; |
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G.

whereas a swift and efficient response to threats on the part of the EU requires strong solidarity between Member States, barriers being overcome and silo mentalities broken down within the institutions, as well as in the foreign representations of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States, and sufficient and flexible budgetary resources being allocated to support the achievement of the EU’s interests; whereas an effective European strategy requires first and foremost a strong political will and sense of common purpose shared among Member States to develop and use true European instruments;

| H. | whereas threats of different kinds targeting individual Member States must be seen as threats to the Union as a whole, calling for strong unity and solidarity between Member States and a consistent common foreign and security policy; |
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H.

whereas threats of different kinds targeting individual Member States must be seen as threats to the Union as a whole, calling for strong unity and solidarity between Member States and a consistent common foreign and security policy;

| I. | whereas the comprehensive approach and the consistent and coordinated use of the EU’s external and internal policy instruments should be at the core of the new strategy; whereas EU arms exports cannot be considered to be in the direct security interests of the EU, and Common Position 2008/944/CFSP should be taken into account in the context of developing an EU Global Strategy; whereas the EU’s primary objective is to promote its values, thus contributing to peace, security and the sustainable development of the earth, in addition to solidarity and the mutual respect of peoples; whereas these fundamental goals must not be overlooked when the EU takes measures to implement its internal and external policies; whereas even when the EU acts to promote its commercial interests, it must always strive to ensure that its actions are consistent with the pursuit of its objectives relating to peacekeeping and the protection of human rights; |
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I.

whereas the comprehensive approach and the consistent and coordinated use of the EU’s external and internal policy instruments should be at the core of the new strategy; whereas EU arms exports cannot be considered to be in the direct security interests of the EU, and Common Position 2008/944/CFSP should be taken into account in the context of developing an EU Global Strategy; whereas the EU’s primary objective is to promote its values, thus contributing to peace, security and the sustainable development of the earth, in addition to solidarity and the mutual respect of peoples; whereas these fundamental goals must not be overlooked when the EU takes measures to implement its internal and external policies; whereas even when the EU acts to promote its commercial interests, it must always strive to ensure that its actions are consistent with the pursuit of its objectives relating to peacekeeping and the protection of human rights;

| J. | whereas, in such a volatile and uncertain international environment, the EU must have the strategic independence to allow it to ensure its security and promote its interests and values; |
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J.

whereas, in such a volatile and uncertain international environment, the EU must have the strategic independence to allow it to ensure its security and promote its interests and values;

| K. | whereas human security must be at the heart of the EU Global Strategy, and the gender perspective of security and UN Security Council resolution 1325 need to be fully taken into account; |
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K.

whereas human security must be at the heart of the EU Global Strategy, and the gender perspective of security and UN Security Council resolution 1325 need to be fully taken into account;

| L. | whereas since the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy the EU has set the goal of achieving an international order based on effective multilateralism and the rules of international law; |
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L.

whereas since the adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy the EU has set the goal of achieving an international order based on effective multilateralism and the rules of international law;

| M. | whereas the new strategy must be in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; |
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M.

whereas the new strategy must be in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;

| N. | whereas the future strategy should be followed up by annual implementation reports and include the following objectives, which should be further detailed in ‘substrategies’ laying down specific provisions for different areas of action; |
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N.

whereas the future strategy should be followed up by annual implementation reports and include the following objectives, which should be further detailed in ‘substrategies’ laying down specific provisions for different areas of action;

Defend the European Union

Defend the European Union

| 1. | Notes that the aim of the European Union is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people, while ensuring the security of its citizens and of its territory; stresses that the Union’s external action is guided by the principles enshrined in Article 21 TEU; emphasises that the EU must therefore ensure both its internal and its external resilience, its capacity to anticipate, pre-empt and resolve predictable challenges and threats and to be prepared to take swift action on unpredictable crises, and its capacity to recover from various types of attack, as well as safeguarding security of supply of energy and raw materials, while taking into account the effects of climate change, which must be addressed urgently, with the EU taking a leading role in global climate action and in promoting sustainable development; |
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1.

Notes that the aim of the European Union is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people, while ensuring the security of its citizens and of its territory; stresses that the Union’s external action is guided by the principles enshrined in Article 21 TEU; emphasises that the EU must therefore ensure both its internal and its external resilience, its capacity to anticipate, pre-empt and resolve predictable challenges and threats and to be prepared to take swift action on unpredictable crises, and its capacity to recover from various types of attack, as well as safeguarding security of supply of energy and raw materials, while taking into account the effects of climate change, which must be addressed urgently, with the EU taking a leading role in global climate action and in promoting sustainable development;

| 2. | Believes that in order to deal with a changing global environment, the EU strategy should be based on:






  (a) | identifying and prioritising the threats and challenges; |
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2.

Believes that in order to deal with a changing global environment, the EU strategy should be based on:

(a)

identifying and prioritising the threats and challenges;

| (b) | defining the responses thereto; |
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(b)

defining the responses thereto;

| (c) | determining the necessary resources; |
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(c)

determining the necessary resources;

| 3. | Underlines that the borders of each Member State are the borders of the Union and must be defended as such; |
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3.

Underlines that the borders of each Member State are the borders of the Union and must be defended as such;

| 4. | Takes the view that the EU, as a global actor, has a key role in upholding the principles enshrined in international human rights law, in particular the principles of universality and indivisibility of human rights; believes therefore that human rights must be meaningfully integrated into the new Global Strategy in order to implement fully the EU Strategic Framework, EU Human Rights Guidelines and the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy; highlights in this regard the need to always consult EU, Member State and third-country civil society so as to enable the experience and expertise of practitioners and human rights defenders to inform and sharpen EU foreign and security policy; calls on the EU and its Member States to ensure that EU foreign policy adopts a strategic approach to human rights, emphasising concrete actions and outcomes and demonstrating coherence in the EU’s engagement on human rights across different countries and regions, regardless of security, foreign policy, trade, energy, aid or other concerns; |
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4.

Takes the view that the EU, as a global actor, has a key role in upholding the principles enshrined in international human rights law, in particular the principles of universality and indivisibility of human rights; believes therefore that human rights must be meaningfully integrated into the new Global Strategy in order to implement fully the EU Strategic Framework, EU Human Rights Guidelines and the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy; highlights in this regard the need to always consult EU, Member State and third-country civil society so as to enable the experience and expertise of practitioners and human rights defenders to inform and sharpen EU foreign and security policy; calls on the EU and its Member States to ensure that EU foreign policy adopts a strategic approach to human rights, emphasising concrete actions and outcomes and demonstrating coherence in the EU’s engagement on human rights across different countries and regions, regardless of security, foreign policy, trade, energy, aid or other concerns;

| 5. | Believes that it is crucial to identify the genuine shared foreign policy interests of all 28 EU Member States in every region of the world and in every relevant policy field; stresses, in addition, that making these shared interests visible would on its own significantly strengthen the EU as an actor in foreign affairs; calls on the VP/HR to task the EEAS with mapping these specific interests and helping to define strategic and operational objectives that could lead directly to concrete outcomes; |
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5.

Believes that it is crucial to identify the genuine shared foreign policy interests of all 28 EU Member States in every region of the world and in every relevant policy field; stresses, in addition, that making these shared interests visible would on its own significantly strengthen the EU as an actor in foreign affairs; calls on the VP/HR to task the EEAS with mapping these specific interests and helping to define strategic and operational objectives that could lead directly to concrete outcomes;

| 6. | Believes that the United States is the EU’s key strategic partner; notes that the EU and its Member States must be more united and prepared to take greater responsibility for their collective security and territorial defence, relying less on the United States, especially in Europe’s neighbourhood; stresses that the transatlantic alliance must remain a crucial pillar of a global rules-based system; calls on the EU and the Member States, therefore, to step up their defence capabilities, in order to be prepared to respond to the broad spectrum of civilian, military and hybrid threats and risks, in synergy with NATO, and to make full use of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); |
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6.

Believes that the United States is the EU’s key strategic partner; notes that the EU and its Member States must be more united and prepared to take greater responsibility for their collective security and territorial defence, relying less on the United States, especially in Europe’s neighbourhood; stresses that the transatlantic alliance must remain a crucial pillar of a global rules-based system; calls on the EU and the Member States, therefore, to step up their defence capabilities, in order to be prepared to respond to the broad spectrum of civilian, military and hybrid threats and risks, in synergy with NATO, and to make full use of the Lisbon Treaty provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);

| 7. | Urges the EU in consequence to enhance coherent and structured cooperation on defence research, the industrial base and cyber defence through pooling and sharing and other cooperative projects, in order to use national defence budgets more efficiently, to achieve the collective target of 2 % of defence spending on research and to launch an EU-funded defence research and technology programme in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF); considers that the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) needs to be strengthened and its resources increased to enable it to act more effectively; considers also that Member States should take more responsibility for building urgently needed European capabilities and contributing to EU strategic autonomy, increase their military research expenditure through the EDA and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and the European Defence Market (EDM); calls for more transparent and accountable use of security and defence budgets by Member States; calls also on the Member States to ensure that appropriate capabilities for fulfilling the tasks under Article 43 TEU are made available, including for relevant UN peacekeeping missions; considers, furthermore, that European intelligence exchanges should be improved and a true European intelligence and forecasting capacity developed, with the appropriate oversight mechanisms in place; |
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7.

Urges the EU in consequence to enhance coherent and structured cooperation on defence research, the industrial base and cyber defence through pooling and sharing and other cooperative projects, in order to use national defence budgets more efficiently, to achieve the collective target of 2 % of defence spending on research and to launch an EU-funded defence research and technology programme in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF); considers that the role of the European Defence Agency (EDA) needs to be strengthened and its resources increased to enable it to act more effectively; considers also that Member States should take more responsibility for building urgently needed European capabilities and contributing to EU strategic autonomy, increase their military research expenditure through the EDA and strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and the European Defence Market (EDM); calls for more transparent and accountable use of security and defence budgets by Member States; calls also on the Member States to ensure that appropriate capabilities for fulfilling the tasks under Article 43 TEU are made available, including for relevant UN peacekeeping missions; considers, furthermore, that European intelligence exchanges should be improved and a true European intelligence and forecasting capacity developed, with the appropriate oversight mechanisms in place;

| 8. | Calls on the VP/HR to address the lack of clarity regarding the mutual defence clause contained in Article 42(7) TEU and to define the guidelines and procedures for its implementation in order to allow the Member States to respond effectively when it is invoked; |
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8.

Calls on the VP/HR to address the lack of clarity regarding the mutual defence clause contained in Article 42(7) TEU and to define the guidelines and procedures for its implementation in order to allow the Member States to respond effectively when it is invoked;

| 9. | Strongly criticises the Commission for not completing in time the tasks entrusted to it by the European Council in 2013 regarding a planned roadmap for a comprehensive EU-wide security-of-supply regime, a planned Green Paper on the control of defence and sensitive security industrial capabilities, the monitoring of defence and security procurement and ‘government-to-government sales’ in the defence sector; |
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9.

Strongly criticises the Commission for not completing in time the tasks entrusted to it by the European Council in 2013 regarding a planned roadmap for a comprehensive EU-wide security-of-supply regime, a planned Green Paper on the control of defence and sensitive security industrial capabilities, the monitoring of defence and security procurement and ‘government-to-government sales’ in the defence sector;

| 10. | Takes note of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015; calls on the head of the European Defence Agency and the VP/HR to inform Parliament as to how this Council Decision reflects Parliament’s repeated call for the EDA to be strengthened by financing its staffing and running costs from the Union budget; |
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10.

Takes note of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015; calls on the head of the European Defence Agency and the VP/HR to inform Parliament as to how this Council Decision reflects Parliament’s repeated call for the EDA to be strengthened by financing its staffing and running costs from the Union budget;

| 11. | Believes that a principal objective should be to move towards permanently pooled multinational military units, joint defence forces and the framing of a common defence policy which should ultimately lead to a European Defence Union; demands, in this regard, the establishment of a permanent EU military headquarters to improve military crisis management capability, and ensure contingency planning and the interoperability of forces and equipment; calls on the Member States to reinforce defence cooperation collectively, bilaterally and in regional clusters; supports the adoption of a White Paper on EU Defence, based on the EU Global Strategy; |
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11.

Believes that a principal objective should be to move towards permanently pooled multinational military units, joint defence forces and the framing of a common defence policy which should ultimately lead to a European Defence Union; demands, in this regard, the establishment of a permanent EU military headquarters to improve military crisis management capability, and ensure contingency planning and the interoperability of forces and equipment; calls on the Member States to reinforce defence cooperation collectively, bilaterally and in regional clusters; supports the adoption of a White Paper on EU Defence, based on the EU Global Strategy;

| 12. | Takes the view that the current activation of Article 42(7) TEU should serve as a catalyst for unleashing the potential of all the security- and defence-related Treaty provisions; |
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12.

Takes the view that the current activation of Article 42(7) TEU should serve as a catalyst for unleashing the potential of all the security- and defence-related Treaty provisions;

| 13. | Stresses the vital importance of strengthening EU-NATO cooperation, which should guarantee the coordination between operations, and supports the establishment of European capabilities which strengthen NATO in territorial defence and are able to conduct intervention operations autonomously beyond the EU’s borders; stresses that the CSDP should reinforce the European pillar of NATO and ensure that European members of NATO actually live up to their NATO commitments; suggests combining the concepts of EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force; recalls that the military contributions should be based on the principle of solidarity among EU Member States; |
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13.

Stresses the vital importance of strengthening EU-NATO cooperation, which should guarantee the coordination between operations, and supports the establishment of European capabilities which strengthen NATO in territorial defence and are able to conduct intervention operations autonomously beyond the EU’s borders; stresses that the CSDP should reinforce the European pillar of NATO and ensure that European members of NATO actually live up to their NATO commitments; suggests combining the concepts of EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force; recalls that the military contributions should be based on the principle of solidarity among EU Member States;

| 14. | Stresses that arms export controls are an integral part of EU foreign and security policy and must be guided by the principles enshrined in Article 21 TEU, notably the promotion of democracy and the rule of law and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security; recalls that it is crucial to ensure coherence between arms exports and the credibility of the EU as a global human rights advocate; is deeply convinced that a more effective implementation of the eight criteria of the Common Position would represent an important contribution to the development of the EU Global Strategy; |
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14.

Stresses that arms export controls are an integral part of EU foreign and security policy and must be guided by the principles enshrined in Article 21 TEU, notably the promotion of democracy and the rule of law and the preservation of peace, prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security; recalls that it is crucial to ensure coherence between arms exports and the credibility of the EU as a global human rights advocate; is deeply convinced that a more effective implementation of the eight criteria of the Common Position would represent an important contribution to the development of the EU Global Strategy;

| 15. | Calls on the Member States to respect the Common Position on arms exports and to cease arms trade with third countries who do not fulfil the criteria listed; |
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15.

Calls on the Member States to respect the Common Position on arms exports and to cease arms trade with third countries who do not fulfil the criteria listed;

| 16. | Supports a further deepening of the efficient governance of global common domains such as sea, air, space and cyberspace; |
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16.

Supports a further deepening of the efficient governance of global common domains such as sea, air, space and cyberspace;

| 17. | Notes that the role technology plays in our societies is growing and that EU policy must respond to the rapid changes in technological development; stresses in this regard the fundamental empowering role that the internet and technologies can play in development, democratisation and emancipation of citizens across the globe and therefore highlights the importance of the EU working to promote and safeguard the free and open internet and to protect digital rights; |
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17.

Notes that the role technology plays in our societies is growing and that EU policy must respond to the rapid changes in technological development; stresses in this regard the fundamental empowering role that the internet and technologies can play in development, democratisation and emancipation of citizens across the globe and therefore highlights the importance of the EU working to promote and safeguard the free and open internet and to protect digital rights;

| 18. | Stresses that the impact of technologies should also be reflected in the global strategy, as well as in cybersecurity initiatives, while the improvement of human rights should be an integral part of, and be mainstreamed in, all EU policies and programmes, if applicable, in order to advance the protection of human rights, the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and peaceful conflict resolution; |
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18.

Stresses that the impact of technologies should also be reflected in the global strategy, as well as in cybersecurity initiatives, while the improvement of human rights should be an integral part of, and be mainstreamed in, all EU policies and programmes, if applicable, in order to advance the protection of human rights, the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and peaceful conflict resolution;

Stabilise Europe’s wider neighbourhood

Stabilise Europe’s wider neighbourhood

| 19. | Believes that in order to be a more effective and credible global actor, the EU should take greater responsibility and focus on filling the security vacuum in its vicinity and its wider neighbourhood, and on creating conditions for stability and prosperity based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, which necessarily comprises addressing the root causes of the current wars and conflicts, migratory flows and the refugee crisis; |
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19.

Believes that in order to be a more effective and credible global actor, the EU should take greater responsibility and focus on filling the security vacuum in its vicinity and its wider neighbourhood, and on creating conditions for stability and prosperity based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, which necessarily comprises addressing the root causes of the current wars and conflicts, migratory flows and the refugee crisis;

| 20. | Is convinced that the EU should be more engaged in de-escalatory diplomacy, especially in the Southern Neighbourhood; believes that the new strategy should include ways in which the EU could build on the recent Iran nuclear deal and promote further confidence building and other security-related regional arrangements, which might also build on Europe’s own experiences with regional security arrangements such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act; |
| --- | --- |

20.

Is convinced that the EU should be more engaged in de-escalatory diplomacy, especially in the Southern Neighbourhood; believes that the new strategy should include ways in which the EU could build on the recent Iran nuclear deal and promote further confidence building and other security-related regional arrangements, which might also build on Europe’s own experiences with regional security arrangements such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and agreements such as the Helsinki Final Act;

| 21. | Is of the opinion that in order to build stability and peace, and promote human security, the rule of law, respect for human rights and democratisation, the EU should keep up its enlargement and integration commitments, based on policies which foster economic growth and inclusive societies, and continue cooperation with very closely associated countries within the context of the newly revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); recalls that according to Article 49 TEU any European state may apply to become a member of the European Union, provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria, which are set and non-negotiable, and the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and ensures the rule of law; considers that the EU should maintain at all times a coherent and consistent engagement in both its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; |
| --- | --- |

21.

Is of the opinion that in order to build stability and peace, and promote human security, the rule of law, respect for human rights and democratisation, the EU should keep up its enlargement and integration commitments, based on policies which foster economic growth and inclusive societies, and continue cooperation with very closely associated countries within the context of the newly revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); recalls that according to Article 49 TEU any European state may apply to become a member of the European Union, provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria, which are set and non-negotiable, and the principles of democracy and respect for fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and ensures the rule of law; considers that the EU should maintain at all times a coherent and consistent engagement in both its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods;

| 22. | Believes that the current refugee crisis demands a holistic European approach and urgent concerted action, employing both internal and external instruments; calls for a long-term strategy and sustainable management of asylum, migration and readmission policies on the basis of common principles and solidarity and with due regard for human rights and human security; calls for the reinforcement of the Schengen system, the European Border and Coast Guard and FRONTEX; in this context, asks the Commission to propose effective and sustainable solutions; believes that in this regard the EU should promote a more practical and comprehensive approach to assist Africa, the Middle East and fragile and war-prone countries and regions; |
| --- | --- |

22.

Believes that the current refugee crisis demands a holistic European approach and urgent concerted action, employing both internal and external instruments; calls for a long-term strategy and sustainable management of asylum, migration and readmission policies on the basis of common principles and solidarity and with due regard for human rights and human security; calls for the reinforcement of the Schengen system, the European Border and Coast Guard and FRONTEX; in this context, asks the Commission to propose effective and sustainable solutions; believes that in this regard the EU should promote a more practical and comprehensive approach to assist Africa, the Middle East and fragile and war-prone countries and regions;

| 23. | Believes that inclusive multilateral diplomacy under the coordination and leadership of the VP/HR is crucial in conflict resolution and crisis management, both in the neighbourhood and globally; stresses that more strategic direction, consistency and positive synergies need to be developed between increasingly interlinked external action policies and internal policies at EU level, within Member States, and between the EEAS and the Commission; |
| --- | --- |

23.

Believes that inclusive multilateral diplomacy under the coordination and leadership of the VP/HR is crucial in conflict resolution and crisis management, both in the neighbourhood and globally; stresses that more strategic direction, consistency and positive synergies need to be developed between increasingly interlinked external action policies and internal policies at EU level, within Member States, and between the EEAS and the Commission;

Strengthen multilateral global governance

Strengthen multilateral global governance

| 24. | Believes that the EU should be a constructive and resilient global actor with a regional focus, equipped with the necessary civilian and military means, and aspire to be a ‘rule-maker’, contributing to and reinforcing an efficient multilateral global governance with the aim of strengthening democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights; emphasises that the CSDP is a key instrument for crisis prevention and resolution; |
| --- | --- |

24.

Believes that the EU should be a constructive and resilient global actor with a regional focus, equipped with the necessary civilian and military means, and aspire to be a ‘rule-maker’, contributing to and reinforcing an efficient multilateral global governance with the aim of strengthening democracy, good governance, the rule of law and human rights; emphasises that the CSDP is a key instrument for crisis prevention and resolution;

| 25. | Calls on the EU institutions and Member States to pursue the comprehensive / joined-up / integral approach in their external action and to take account of the inextricable link between internal and external security; in this regard, calls on the EU to develop synergies between security, development, trade, human rights, democracy promotion activities and EU external action, and to make these policies part of its global strategy; emphasises the need to ensure that EU action in the area of trade also helps to achieve objectives relating to non-proliferation, the promotion of peace and the safeguarding of human rights; |
| --- | --- |

25.

Calls on the EU institutions and Member States to pursue the comprehensive / joined-up / integral approach in their external action and to take account of the inextricable link between internal and external security; in this regard, calls on the EU to develop synergies between security, development, trade, human rights, democracy promotion activities and EU external action, and to make these policies part of its global strategy; emphasises the need to ensure that EU action in the area of trade also helps to achieve objectives relating to non-proliferation, the promotion of peace and the safeguarding of human rights;

| 26. | Recalls the significant and growing role that energy security will play in EU internal development and its relations with local, regional and international partners; calls for swift and full implementation of the five pillars of the Energy Union; believes that it is in the strategic interest of the EU to endow the Commission with a prerogative to co-negotiate and co-sign all contracts on energy supplies from, and production in, third countries; |
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26.

Recalls the significant and growing role that energy security will play in EU internal development and its relations with local, regional and international partners; calls for swift and full implementation of the five pillars of the Energy Union; believes that it is in the strategic interest of the EU to endow the Commission with a prerogative to co-negotiate and co-sign all contracts on energy supplies from, and production in, third countries;

| 27. | Highlights the need for a political will in the Member States to show greater flexibility on CSDP issues in order to create genuine momentum in this area; supports the establishment of the Council of Defence Ministers format, as well as regular European Council meetings on defence; urges willing Member States to establish a Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PESCO); stresses, in this regard, the need to overcome structural limitations related in particular to needs assessment, capabilities (civilian and military) and common financing; believes that the use of PESCO and of Article 44 TEU represent the institutional methods best suited to moving this common policy forward in a realistic manner; |
| --- | --- |

27.

Highlights the need for a political will in the Member States to show greater flexibility on CSDP issues in order to create genuine momentum in this area; supports the establishment of the Council of Defence Ministers format, as well as regular European Council meetings on defence; urges willing Member States to establish a Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PESCO); stresses, in this regard, the need to overcome structural limitations related in particular to needs assessment, capabilities (civilian and military) and common financing; believes that the use of PESCO and of Article 44 TEU represent the institutional methods best suited to moving this common policy forward in a realistic manner;

| 28. | Supports the principle that EU Member States should commit to using at least 2 % of their GDP for defence expenditure by 2024 in order to attain the necessary and adequate civilian and military capabilities to implement the objectives of the CFSP/CSDP, while enhancing economies of scale through co-development and cooperation and reducing disparities among Member States; |
| --- | --- |

28.

Supports the principle that EU Member States should commit to using at least 2 % of their GDP for defence expenditure by 2024 in order to attain the necessary and adequate civilian and military capabilities to implement the objectives of the CFSP/CSDP, while enhancing economies of scale through co-development and cooperation and reducing disparities among Member States;

| 29. | Emphasises that enhancing cooperation with global and regional actors on global threats and challenges is necessary in order to achieve a global rules-based order; believes that pairing up on specific sectoral issues with interested regional actors allows European values to be shared and contributes to growth and development; recalls that global threats often have local causes and that, as a result, their solution requires the involvement of local actors; notes that establishing closer relationships with non-state actors, local and regional governments and civil society is also crucial to ensuring a comprehensive approach to global challenges such as climate change and terrorism, and that the way the EU builds and defines partnerships needs to be reviewed in order to enhance partners’ sense of ownership and further incorporate a multi-stakeholder approach; |
| --- | --- |

29.

Emphasises that enhancing cooperation with global and regional actors on global threats and challenges is necessary in order to achieve a global rules-based order; believes that pairing up on specific sectoral issues with interested regional actors allows European values to be shared and contributes to growth and development; recalls that global threats often have local causes and that, as a result, their solution requires the involvement of local actors; notes that establishing closer relationships with non-state actors, local and regional governments and civil society is also crucial to ensuring a comprehensive approach to global challenges such as climate change and terrorism, and that the way the EU builds and defines partnerships needs to be reviewed in order to enhance partners’ sense of ownership and further incorporate a multi-stakeholder approach;

| 30. | Believes that engagement with key global and regional actors — states, organisations and institutions — must be based on the fundamental principles and strategic interests of the Union, respect for international law, and identified common objectives and interests, taking into account their strategic weight and their potential contribution to addressing global threats and challenges; believes that strategic connectivity projects can play a vital role in building strong and stable relations with Europe’s key partners; |
| --- | --- |

30.

Believes that engagement with key global and regional actors — states, organisations and institutions — must be based on the fundamental principles and strategic interests of the Union, respect for international law, and identified common objectives and interests, taking into account their strategic weight and their potential contribution to addressing global threats and challenges; believes that strategic connectivity projects can play a vital role in building strong and stable relations with Europe’s key partners;

| 31. | Calls for stepped-up engagement with regional powers and frameworks in pursuit of sustainable synergies on peace, security, conflict prevention and crisis management, and for reinforced support to countries that are under severe pressure from regional crises, including engagement in building resilient and stable institutions and an inclusive society for leveraging trade and sectoral agreements to promote security, stability and prosperity, and pursuing comprehensive regional strategies; |
| --- | --- |

31.

Calls for stepped-up engagement with regional powers and frameworks in pursuit of sustainable synergies on peace, security, conflict prevention and crisis management, and for reinforced support to countries that are under severe pressure from regional crises, including engagement in building resilient and stable institutions and an inclusive society for leveraging trade and sectoral agreements to promote security, stability and prosperity, and pursuing comprehensive regional strategies;

| 32. | Deplores the fact that autocratic and repressive regimes are increasingly successful with regard to their ability to undermine or thwart human rights, development, democracy and the development of an active civil society; urges the VP/HR to address this negative global trend in the context of the Global Strategy; |
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32.

Deplores the fact that autocratic and repressive regimes are increasingly successful with regard to their ability to undermine or thwart human rights, development, democracy and the development of an active civil society; urges the VP/HR to address this negative global trend in the context of the Global Strategy;

| 33. | Notes that the Union’s prosperity is determined by its capacity to stay innovative and competitive and to profit from a high-paced global economy; considers that the EU must use all its policy tools in a coherent manner to create favourable external conditions for the sustainable growth of the European economy; considers that the EU must be an engaged and active actor, promoting free and fair trade and investment, secure trade channels and increased market access throughout the world, and safeguarding the stability of the global financial system by promoting high standards of regulation and governance; |
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33.

Notes that the Union’s prosperity is determined by its capacity to stay innovative and competitive and to profit from a high-paced global economy; considers that the EU must use all its policy tools in a coherent manner to create favourable external conditions for the sustainable growth of the European economy; considers that the EU must be an engaged and active actor, promoting free and fair trade and investment, secure trade channels and increased market access throughout the world, and safeguarding the stability of the global financial system by promoting high standards of regulation and governance;

| 34. | Notes that in order to attain the above objectives, the EU must reinforce its cooperation with a reformed UN and position itself to influence and steer action in the global fora on the governance of those domains where EU strategic interests and security unfold, and must deepen its partnerships with other global and regional actors, revitalise its strategic partnerships and transform these into effective policy tools, including its partnerships with non-state actors; considers that the EU must also strengthen European diplomacy, enhance its operational capacities to prevent conflict, support democracy and peace, manage crises and build alliances through mediation and dialogue, and promote and empower civil society; encourages deeper cooperation between the EU and the UN and between the EU and the AU in Peace Support Operations; stresses that approaches to conflict-solving should be embedded as much as possible in multilateral agreed solutions, with due respect for the multiple dimensions such interventions need to cover in the fields of peacekeeping and enforcing, sustainable development, tackling root causes of migration and respect for human rights; |
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34.

Notes that in order to attain the above objectives, the EU must reinforce its cooperation with a reformed UN and position itself to influence and steer action in the global fora on the governance of those domains where EU strategic interests and security unfold, and must deepen its partnerships with other global and regional actors, revitalise its strategic partnerships and transform these into effective policy tools, including its partnerships with non-state actors; considers that the EU must also strengthen European diplomacy, enhance its operational capacities to prevent conflict, support democracy and peace, manage crises and build alliances through mediation and dialogue, and promote and empower civil society; encourages deeper cooperation between the EU and the UN and between the EU and the AU in Peace Support Operations; stresses that approaches to conflict-solving should be embedded as much as possible in multilateral agreed solutions, with due respect for the multiple dimensions such interventions need to cover in the fields of peacekeeping and enforcing, sustainable development, tackling root causes of migration and respect for human rights;

| 35. | Draws attention to the key role which the Union plays in the area of development aid, and calls on the Member States to honour their undertakings to earmark 0,7 % of their GDP for public development aid; calls on the EU to foster a more pragmatic approach to aid by encouraging the use of budgetary support; calls on the Member States to do everything in their power to achieve the sustainable development objectives; |
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35.

Draws attention to the key role which the Union plays in the area of development aid, and calls on the Member States to honour their undertakings to earmark 0,7 % of their GDP for public development aid; calls on the EU to foster a more pragmatic approach to aid by encouraging the use of budgetary support; calls on the Member States to do everything in their power to achieve the sustainable development objectives;

| 36. | Stresses that development is not possible without security, and security is not possible without development; points out that EU development policy therefore needs to be an essential part of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy; |
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36.

Stresses that development is not possible without security, and security is not possible without development; points out that EU development policy therefore needs to be an essential part of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy;

| 37. | Welcomes the aim of the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy to be comprehensive, enhance coherence between internal and external policies and improve coordination between institutions and with Member States; recalls the Treaty obligation to respect the principle of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and to avoid any contradictions between development and non-development policies that have an impact on developing countries; calls on the Member States and the Commission therefore to establish and consolidate systems of coordination between their respective ministries and among the whole College of Commissioners respectively, and to further involve national parliaments in the PCD agenda, and calls for the EU to reinforce a coordination mechanism for identifying the potential implications of policies on development objectives, integrating development aspects into policy initiatives from the outset and introducing a more systematic measurement of impacts and progress as regards PCD; calls in this regard for the establishment of effective remedies for victims in cases where domestic jurisdiction is clearly unable to deal with policies implemented by any foreign entity; |
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37.

Welcomes the aim of the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy to be comprehensive, enhance coherence between internal and external policies and improve coordination between institutions and with Member States; recalls the Treaty obligation to respect the principle of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) and to avoid any contradictions between development and non-development policies that have an impact on developing countries; calls on the Member States and the Commission therefore to establish and consolidate systems of coordination between their respective ministries and among the whole College of Commissioners respectively, and to further involve national parliaments in the PCD agenda, and calls for the EU to reinforce a coordination mechanism for identifying the potential implications of policies on development objectives, integrating development aspects into policy initiatives from the outset and introducing a more systematic measurement of impacts and progress as regards PCD; calls in this regard for the establishment of effective remedies for victims in cases where domestic jurisdiction is clearly unable to deal with policies implemented by any foreign entity;

| 38. | Welcomes the fact that the link between peace and development has been duly reflected in the new Agenda 2030 and, as a result, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peace and justice was introduced; calls for the EU and the Member States to prioritise, inter alia, activities related to fulfilling SDG 16 (human rights, good governance, peace and democracy building) and to ensure that these are among the focal sectors of National Indicative Programmes (NIP) within development cooperation programming; |
| --- | --- |

38.

Welcomes the fact that the link between peace and development has been duly reflected in the new Agenda 2030 and, as a result, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peace and justice was introduced; calls for the EU and the Member States to prioritise, inter alia, activities related to fulfilling SDG 16 (human rights, good governance, peace and democracy building) and to ensure that these are among the focal sectors of National Indicative Programmes (NIP) within development cooperation programming;

| 39. | Calls for a revision of the European consensus on development as an important contribution to an updated, coherent global EU strategy; underlines that such a revision should take into consideration new global challenges, address the EU’s implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and reiterate underlying values such as respect for human rights, paying special attention to the rights of vulnerable groups such as girls, women, and people with disabilities, democracy, and the rule of law, but also key development effectiveness principles such as ownership of development strategies by partner countries, enhanced accountability as regards partner countries’ national systems, and differentiation based on needs, but also performance criteria based on sustainable development objectives; stresses that the European Union should do its utmost to strengthen the complementarity between all development actors in order to exploit the full potential of European development policy and thus accelerate the implementation of the development agenda for 2030; |
| --- | --- |

39.

Calls for a revision of the European consensus on development as an important contribution to an updated, coherent global EU strategy; underlines that such a revision should take into consideration new global challenges, address the EU’s implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and reiterate underlying values such as respect for human rights, paying special attention to the rights of vulnerable groups such as girls, women, and people with disabilities, democracy, and the rule of law, but also key development effectiveness principles such as ownership of development strategies by partner countries, enhanced accountability as regards partner countries’ national systems, and differentiation based on needs, but also performance criteria based on sustainable development objectives; stresses that the European Union should do its utmost to strengthen the complementarity between all development actors in order to exploit the full potential of European development policy and thus accelerate the implementation of the development agenda for 2030;

| 40. | Notes with concern the increase in debt unsustainability both in developed and developing countries; calls on the Commission to enhance the principle of common responsibility of borrowers and lenders, and to effectively follow and promote the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) principles on responsible borrowing and lending in all its policy areas; calls, in this regard, for the EU and its Member States to engage constructively with the UN’s work towards a sovereign debt workout international mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

40.

Notes with concern the increase in debt unsustainability both in developed and developing countries; calls on the Commission to enhance the principle of common responsibility of borrowers and lenders, and to effectively follow and promote the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) principles on responsible borrowing and lending in all its policy areas; calls, in this regard, for the EU and its Member States to engage constructively with the UN’s work towards a sovereign debt workout international mechanism;

| 41. | Considers it regrettable that a regulatory framework on the way corporations comply with human rights and obligations with respect to social and environmental standards is still lacking, which allows certain states and companies to circumvent them with impunity; calls for the EU and the Member States to engage actively with the work of the UN Human Rights Council and of the UN Environment Programme on an international treaty to hold transnational corporations accountable for human rights abuses and violations of environmental standards; |
| --- | --- |

41.

Considers it regrettable that a regulatory framework on the way corporations comply with human rights and obligations with respect to social and environmental standards is still lacking, which allows certain states and companies to circumvent them with impunity; calls for the EU and the Member States to engage actively with the work of the UN Human Rights Council and of the UN Environment Programme on an international treaty to hold transnational corporations accountable for human rights abuses and violations of environmental standards;

| 42. | Supports the idea of redefining the EU’s relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries by enhancing an equal partners policy, respecting the democratic policy space of sovereign countries’ governments to take policy decisions to the benefit of their populations and upgrading the principle of good governance and human rights as essential elements of the post-Cotonou agreement and by effectively enhancing links between EU development objectives on trade, security, climate change and migration policies for mutual reinforcement; calls for the putting in place of formal scrutiny powers in relation to the European Development Fund, possibly through a binding interinstitutional agreement under Article 295 of the Lisbon Treaty; calls for a fair and ambitious post-2020 EU-ACP partnership based on the principles of ownership and mutual respect between partners with equal rights and obligations that better focuses on common challenges and interests and that is better adapted to make a real change to the wills of both parties and the challenges they face; calls for the European Union to promote instruments for trade with the ACP countries, in particular Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), in order to make a real change to the security and prosperity of both parties; |
| --- | --- |

42.

Supports the idea of redefining the EU’s relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries by enhancing an equal partners policy, respecting the democratic policy space of sovereign countries’ governments to take policy decisions to the benefit of their populations and upgrading the principle of good governance and human rights as essential elements of the post-Cotonou agreement and by effectively enhancing links between EU development objectives on trade, security, climate change and migration policies for mutual reinforcement; calls for the putting in place of formal scrutiny powers in relation to the European Development Fund, possibly through a binding interinstitutional agreement under Article 295 of the Lisbon Treaty; calls for a fair and ambitious post-2020 EU-ACP partnership based on the principles of ownership and mutual respect between partners with equal rights and obligations that better focuses on common challenges and interests and that is better adapted to make a real change to the wills of both parties and the challenges they face; calls for the European Union to promote instruments for trade with the ACP countries, in particular Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), in order to make a real change to the security and prosperity of both parties;

| 43. | Emphasises that the EU must continue and reinforce its efforts to promote economic development and resilience in its neighbourhood and in regions that are critical to EU interests; recalls that small and medium-sized enterprises are the prime suppliers of jobs and that facilitating their work is thus crucial to foster economic development; |
| --- | --- |

43.

Emphasises that the EU must continue and reinforce its efforts to promote economic development and resilience in its neighbourhood and in regions that are critical to EU interests; recalls that small and medium-sized enterprises are the prime suppliers of jobs and that facilitating their work is thus crucial to foster economic development;

| 44. | Calls on the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to establish a clear link between the EU Global Strategy and the structure and priorities of the EU budget, including enhanced own resources, to allocate the necessary resources for its implementation and to make the best possible use of existing budgets through better cooperation and coordinated action in the fields of diplomacy, development, trade, energy and defence; |
| --- | --- |

44.

Calls on the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to establish a clear link between the EU Global Strategy and the structure and priorities of the EU budget, including enhanced own resources, to allocate the necessary resources for its implementation and to make the best possible use of existing budgets through better cooperation and coordinated action in the fields of diplomacy, development, trade, energy and defence;

Engage — the EU, national parliaments and European citizens

Engage — the EU, national parliaments and European citizens

| 45. | Emphasises that the Global Strategy should be revised every five years, in synchrony with the new European Parliament and the new Commission, which would allow verification of whether its objectives and priorities still fitted the threats and security environment and enable the new VP/HR to engage in a revision; |
| --- | --- |

45.

Emphasises that the Global Strategy should be revised every five years, in synchrony with the new European Parliament and the new Commission, which would allow verification of whether its objectives and priorities still fitted the threats and security environment and enable the new VP/HR to engage in a revision;

| 46. | Emphasises that EU actions are subject to oversight by the European Parliament and national parliaments and that the European Parliament plays a key role in the regular, detailed monitoring of the external action of the EU institutions and considers that the national parliaments could be more closely involved in this monitoring exercise; recalls that the European Parliament is a key partner of the VP/HR in shaping the EU’s external relations and addressing the current challenges, including by monitoring EU foreign policy actions; calls for annual implementation reports of the strategy to be submitted to the European Parliament; |
| --- | --- |

46.

Emphasises that EU actions are subject to oversight by the European Parliament and national parliaments and that the European Parliament plays a key role in the regular, detailed monitoring of the external action of the EU institutions and considers that the national parliaments could be more closely involved in this monitoring exercise; recalls that the European Parliament is a key partner of the VP/HR in shaping the EU’s external relations and addressing the current challenges, including by monitoring EU foreign policy actions; calls for annual implementation reports of the strategy to be submitted to the European Parliament;

| 47. | Takes the view that Parliament should play its full role within EU efforts to prevent conflict; |
| --- | --- |

47.

Takes the view that Parliament should play its full role within EU efforts to prevent conflict;

| 48. | Emphasises the importance of actively involving national parliaments in the process by means of more thorough joint scrutiny with the European Parliament during the sessions of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP; |
| --- | --- |

48.

Emphasises the importance of actively involving national parliaments in the process by means of more thorough joint scrutiny with the European Parliament during the sessions of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP;

| 49. | Strongly urges European policy-makers to engage with citizens, civil society, industry, and local and regional authorities on the necessity and benefits of providing a stronger framework for Europe’s security; |
| --- | --- |

49.

Strongly urges European policy-makers to engage with citizens, civil society, industry, and local and regional authorities on the necessity and benefits of providing a stronger framework for Europe’s security;

o

o o

| 50. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0213.

1

(2)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0019.

2

(3)  OJ L 266, 13.10.2015, p. 55.

3

(4)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0470.

4

(5)  Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0472.

5

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