UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4602

BRENDA S. BEDNORZ,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg.

Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-96-707)

Submitted: March 6, 2001

Decided: March 26, 2001

Before WILLIAMS and KING, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,

South Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens, Assistant

United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Brenda S. Bednorz appeals the district court’s order revoking her

term of supervised release and sentencing her to eighteen months

imprisonment. Bednorz’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Although Bednorz was

informed of her right to file a supplemental brief, she has not done

so. Her attorney raises three issues. 

First, Bednorz challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

the district court’s finding that she violated the terms of her supervised release. The district court need only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. See 18

U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000). The Government presented evidence establishing that Bednorz admitted to the police that she committed new criminal conduct while on supervised release by stealing

from her employer, that she failed to report her employment to her

probation officer, and that she submitted false monthly reports to her

probation officer, all in violation of the terms of her supervised

release. Thus, there was a sufficient factual basis in the record for the

district court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Bednorz

violated her supervised release. 

Second, Bednorz challenges the district court’s revocation of her

supervised release and the sentence imposed upon revocation. We

review the district court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised

release and impose a term of imprisonment for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). The district court abuses its discretion when it fails or refuses to exercise its

discretion or when its exercise of discretion is flawed by an erroneous

legal or factual premise. See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th

Cir. 1993). 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000), the district court may

revoke a defendant’s supervised release upon a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a term of her

supervised release. Since the district court properly found that Bednorz violated not one, but three separate conditions of her supervised

2 UNITED STATES v. BEDNORZ
release, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in revoking Bednorz’s supervised release. Furthermore, since the sentence imposed is well within the limits prescribed by statute and by

the guidelines, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in sentencing Bednorz. 

Third, Bednorz contends that the district judge committed plain

error by failing to recuse himself. Bednorz claims the district judge

harbored personal bias towards her, that his impartiality could reasonably be questioned, and that as a result he should have recused himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994). Because Bednorz did not

bring this issue to the attention of the district court, we review for

plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). Finding none, we affirm. 

Pursuant to Anders, this court has reviewed the record for reversible error and found none. We therefore affirm the district court’s

revocation of Bednorz’s supervised release and the ensuing sentence.

This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of her

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, then counsel may

move this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. BEDNORZ 3