In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-23-00235-CR 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

CORBIN VOSS, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from County Court at Law Number 9 

Bexar County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 680611, Honorable Gloria Saldana, Presiding 

November 8, 2023 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

The State of Texas appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing its case against 

Appellee, Corbin Voss, for violating his constitutional right to a speedy trial. By a sole 

issue, the State asserts the trial court misapplied the factors in Barker v. Wingo. 

Specifically, the State argues the trial court failed to properly weigh Voss’s acquiescence 
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to the delay and there was a minimal showing of prejudice against the State’s reasons for 

the delay.1 We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Voss was arrested on March 8, 2022, for driving while intoxicated. At that time, he 

was a part-time college student and was also employed. He was charged by information 

on August 3, 2022. On March 27, 2023, a year after his arrest, Voss filed his Assertion 

of Right to Speedy Trial. Approximately two months later, he filed a motion to set aside 

the information for failure to afford him a speedy trial. The trial court held a hearing on 

May 1, 2023, at which Voss was the only witness. Following the hearing, the trial court 

signed an order granting Voss’s motion to set aside the information for failure to grant him 

a speedy trial. The State appealed the ruling.

RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused’s 

right to a speedy trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Hopper v. State, 520 S.W.3d 915, 923

(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In determining whether that right was violated, a reviewing court 

must balance four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) 

the time at which the accused asserted the right, and (4) the prejudice, if any, suffered by 

1 Originally appealed to the Fourth Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by 

the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. 

Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant 

issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 

41.3.
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the defendant due to the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 

L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).

The first factor, the length of the delay, is a “triggering mechanism” for the analysis 

under the remaining factors. State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1999) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). A defendant must show the delay was 

“presumptively prejudicial” before consideration of the remaining factors is necessary. Id. 

In reviewing a claim of a violation of the right to a speedy trial, we apply a bifurcated 

standard: an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components and a de novo 

standard for legal components. State v. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 113–14 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2021). Where, as here, the State does not request findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, we imply all findings necessary to support the trial court’s ruling if those findings 

are supported by the record. Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767–68 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2016).

ANALYSIS

Length Of Delay

To calculate the length of the delay, a reviewing court measures from the time the 

accused is arrested or formally accused. Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014). The “speedy-trial clock” thus starts when a formal indictment, 

information, or actual arrest occurs. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S. 

Ct. 455, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971). Generally, a delay of eight months is presumptively 

prejudicial and triggers a speedy trial analysis. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113.

Circumstances considered in the length of the delay include the nature of the charged 
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offense and whether the defendant can make bail or must await trial while confined. 

Barker, 407 U.S. at 519–20. 

In the underlying case, the State yielded the delay was beyond what is 

presumptively prejudicial and urged the trial court to balance the remaining Barker factors. 

The delay beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of Voss’s

speedy trial claim weighs heavily against the State. Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 

649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (State conceded the delay in “this plain-vanilla DWI case”) 

was sufficient to trigger analysis of the Barker factors).

Reasons for Delay

The burden of justifying the delay is on the State. State v. Melendez, Nos. 04-18-

00478-CR, 04-18-00479-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 7109, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

Aug. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Valid reasons for delay 

do not weigh against the State, whereas bad-faith delays weigh heavily against the State. 

Hopper v. State, 495 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016), aff’d, 520 

S.W.3d 915 (Tex. 2017). Neutral reasons, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, 

weigh against the State, although less heavily, because the responsibility for such 

circumstances rests with the government, not the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.

During the hearing, numerous reasons were offered for the delay. Initially, the 

case was filed in County Court at Law Number Two but was transferred in June 2022 to 

County Court at Law Number Nine. The trial court explained as follows:

I don’t know how to say this in a nice way. There was involvement by the 

County Clerk with taking files out of that court and only providing the docket 

files. . . . So while that’s no fault of the DA’s Office . . . it seems to me that 
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there was interference with court proceedings by not allowing the Court to 

have the tools it needed to make sure that people’s Constitutional rights 

were protected. . . . 

The trial court attributed some of the delay to “administrative problems” and 

acknowledged “actions by the County Clerk that interfered with our proceedings.” The 

trial court advised the parties that a notice was sent to the County Clerk “to stop interfering 

with court proceedings or we would have to issue a hearing on contempt.” See Huff v. 

State, 467 S.W.3d 11, 29 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d) (attributing some of 

the delay by negligence of court clerk and finding it weighed against the State). The trial 

court continued that county court cases generally involve first-time offenders and there is 

no “right to interfere with their normal lives and their employment and their personal lives.” 

The record shows the Covid-19 pandemic prevented in-person trials in the 

jurisdiction until October 2022, seven months after Voss’s arrest. The trial court 

recognized the pandemic did not waive or make the Constitution unenforceable. The 

State also cited the pandemic and overcrowding as reasons for the delay and 

acknowledged those factors weigh against the State.

Although the State asserted the delay was due in part to Voss’s failure to invoke 

his right to a speedy trial, the record shows otherwise. As noted herein, Voss asserted 

his right to a speedy trial on March 27, 2023, and moved to set aside the information on 

May 12, 2023. Although the trial court observed the county clerk’s interference was not 

attributable to the State, Huff found the court clerk’s negligence in delaying trial weighed

against the State. Id. at 29. Additionally, the prosecutor conceded the pandemic and 

overcrowding also weigh against the State. Although the State did not act in bad faith, 
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as the government entity responsible for prosecuting Voss, we find the delay 

demonstrated by the record weighs against the State. 

Assertion of the Right

A defendant may assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial by requesting a 

trial date. Velasco v. State, No. 04-22-00030-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 5247, at *15 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio July 19, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (citing Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 283–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). A 

defendant’s failure to make a timely demand for a speedy trial “indicates strongly that he 

did not really want a speedy trial” and was not prejudiced by the lack of one. Dragoo v. 

State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 

949, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 942 (1992)).

The record shows Voss filed an Assertion of Right to Speedy Trial. There is 

nothing in the record to indicate he did not want a speedy trial. Additionally, his request 

to set aside the information did not weaken his assertion of his right because he “ha[d] no 

duty to bring himself to trial; that [was] the State’s duty.” Melendez, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 

7109, at *11. We find Voss’s assertion of his right “is entitled to strong evidentiary weight.” 

Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 651.

Prejudice by the Delay

A delay in trial may result in oppressive incarceration, anxiety, and concerns of the 

accused, as well as possible impairment to the defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. 

Impairment to the defense is the most serious because the inability of a defendant to 

adequately prepare his defense skews the fairness of the system. Id.
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Voss testified the delay in trial caused him stress, anxiety, and loss of sleep. He 

worried about how the DWI charge would affect his education and employment. The 

pending case caused him to miss important family events because he was unable to 

obtain permission to attend from his pretrial officer. 

During cross-examination, he testified he was incarcerated for approximately 

twenty-four hours. When asked if any defense witnesses had been lost due to the delay, 

he answered “no.” Thus, he was not prejudiced by oppressive incarceration and the

defense did not lose any witnesses. Anxiety, although relevant, is not sufficient proof of 

prejudice under Barker, especially when it is not greater anxiety or concern beyond the 

level normally associated with a criminal charge or investigation. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 

286. The record establishes the absence of serious prejudice from the delay. Thus, 

Voss’s testimony that he was stressed and anxious is not sufficient to cause the prejudice 

prong to weigh in his favor. 

Having analyzed the Barker factors, we must balance them “with common sense 

and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that 

a defendant’s actual and asserted interest in a speedy trial have been infringed.” 

Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 773. The delay, the reasons for the delay, and Voss’s assertion 

of his right to a speedy trial weigh in his favor. The prejudice factor, however, weighs 

against him. The weight of the four factors, when balanced together, result in a finding of 

a violation of Voss’s right to a speedy trial. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court’s order, we conclude Voss’s right to a speedy trial was violated. 

The State’s sole issue is overruled.
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CONCLUSION

The trial court’s Order to Dismiss is affirmed.

Alex Yarbrough

 Justice

Do not publish.