FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JULY 10, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-15254

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 04-02866-CV-KOB-PWG

MICHAEL JEFFREY LAND,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

RICHARD F. ALLEN, Commissioner,

Alabama Department of Corrections,

STATE OF ALABAMA ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

_________________________

(July 10, 2009)

Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Michael Jeffrey Land appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. §

2254 habeas petition in which he sought to overturn his conviction and death

sentence for the murder of Candace Brown.

Regarding the conviction, he argues that his habeas petition should be

granted because: (1) an incriminating statement, allegedly made as a result of

police coercion, was admitted at trial in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments; (2) the trial court violated Land’s due process rights when it

instructed the jury that the incriminating statement was made voluntarily, thereby

tainting the jury’s ability to fulfill its duty of reaching a credibility determination

regarding that statement; (3) the prosecutor violated Land’s right to a fair trial by

arguing facts unsubstantiated by the record; and (4) his Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel was violated when his defense attorneys failed to

object to the prosecutor’s factually unsubstantiated arguments.

With reference to his death sentence, Land claims that his counsel were

constitutionally ineffective during sentencing for failing to reasonably investigate

and present mitigation evidence.

The district court considered these arguments and found no merit. After

careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and oral argument, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

2
The police were called to Brown’s house after her landlord found that a

window had been broken and the telephone wires had been cut. Upon entering the

house, the police had discovered Brown’s unharmed two-year-old child, a note on

a bulletin board with Land’s name and phone number, and a shoe print with

distinctive tread (spelling out “USA”) on one of the broken windowpanes. They

then located Land, who agreed to accompany them to the police station for

questioning. He was given his Miranda rights, signed a waiver-of-rights form and

agreed to have his statement tape recorded.

Land initially claimed not to have seen Brown for a week and provided an

alibi to account for the time relevant to Brown’s disappearance. During the course

of the interview, one detective noticed what appeared to be bloodstains on Land’s

shoes and asked to inspect them. The detective saw that the tread on his shoes

seemed to match the “USA” print on the windowpane at Brown’s house and took

them for further analysis. Land also complied with a request to change into a jail

jumpsuit so his clothes could be inspected for bloodstains. During this period, the

police contacted Land’s alibi witness, who did not substantiate his story.

The police then confronted Land about the evidence, his inconsistencies, and

the lack of corroboration from his alibi witness, telling him he needed to be

truthful. He was again informed of, and waived, his Miranda rights. He proceeded

3
to give another statement to the police which was not recorded (hereafter his

“second statement”). This time he said he met two men at a service station who

1

asked him if he knew an “easy mark” for a burglary. He suggested Brown’s home

and the men paid him $20 to cut the window glass of her residence, after which

they all entered the kitchen. During the burglary, Brown woke up from the

commotion and appeared in the kitchen, where one of the two men knocked her to

the floor. Land claimed he became frightened at this point and left. He also

admitted in this second statement that he had lied previously about where his car

was and informed the detectives it could be found at the mall where he worked.

The detectives then formally arrested Land.

The next day Brown’s body was discovered near her residence. She had

been shot in the back of her head by a .45 caliber automatic handgun. A search of

Land’s car turned up a .45 handgun, and the bullet from her head matched a bullet

test-fired from that gun. They also found wire-cutters and a pair of gloves that had

imbedded glass fragments consistent with the glass of the broken window in

Brown’s house. A DNA profile made from a semen stain, which was found on

Brown’s blouse, matched Land’s blood sample with a degree of certainty of

 At the suppression hearing and at trial, the detectives testified that Land initially made 1

this statement to one detective, who did not record it. The detective then asked if they could

record the statement but Land refused, citing his concern that he was admitting to burglary. 

Land did not refute this testimony.

4
roughly one in 20 million.

Land was convicted and sentenced to death in Alabama state court for two

counts of capital murder—murder during burglary and murder during kidnapping.

His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals, Land v. State, 678 So. 2d 201 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), and the Alabama

Supreme Court, Ex parte Land, 678 So. 2d 224 (Ala. 1996). The U.S. Supreme

Court denied Land’s petition for writ of certiorari. Land v. Alabama, 519 U.S. 933

(1996). Land then filed a post-conviction petition in state court pursuant to

Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. After conducting an evidentiary hearing,

the trial court denied Land’s Rule 32 petition and the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court then denied his petition for writ of

certiorari. Having lost on all his state court appeals, Land filed a writ of habeas

corpus in federal district court, which was also denied. He was then granted a

certificate of appealability on five issues, and we now review the district court’s

denial of his federal petition based on those claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of Land’s habeas petition, which was filed after April 24, 1996,

is limited by the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

5
402–03 (2000). In this case, the state court adjudicated on the merits all of the

issues Land presents so we must apply AEDPA’s deferential standard of review.

2

That is, we may grant habeas only in those cases where the state court’s decision

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2), or “was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1). The

Supreme Court has further clarified this latter requirement as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

 Land argues that the district court should not have applied § 2254(d)’s deferential 2

standard of review on two of his claims—the erroneous jury instruction and the prosecutorial

misconduct—because it incorrectly found that the state court had adjudicated them on the merits. 

Land asserts it should have instead applied de novo review to these claims as the Alabama

Supreme Court did not explicitly rule on them despite his raising the issues. We disagree. The

Alabama Supreme Court stated in its opinion that

Land has raised for this Court’s review 23 issues, some of which were also raised

before the Court of Criminal Appeals and discussed in that court’s lengthy

opinion. We have thoroughly reviewed the issues raised before the Court of

Criminal Appeals, and we find no error in the opinion of that court. We have also

thoroughly reviewed the additional issues Land has raised for the first time before

this Court and have found no reversible error. 

Ex parte Land, 678 So. 2d at 230. While not explicitly addressing the claims, the Alabama

Supreme Court’s statement is sufficient to qualify as having adjudicated them on the merits. We

have previously held that “[t]he statutory language [of § 2254] focuses on the result, not on the

reasoning that led to the result . . . . [A]ll that is required is a rejection of the claim on the merits,

not an explanation.” Wright v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corrections, 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir.

2002) (finding the summary state appellate court order in Wright v. State, 536 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.

4th DCA 1988), —“[w]e affirm the convictions and life sentences imposed thereon for count I

and count II”—was sufficient to receive § 2254(d) deference). Thus, the district court was

correct in finding that the state court had adjudicated each claim on the merits.

6
writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached

by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13. We now turn to Land’s arguments applying this

standard of review.

DISCUSSION

1. The Admission of Land’s Second Statement Did Not Violate the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments

Land claims that his incriminating second statement was made involuntarily

because it was coerced by the police officers, who created a threatening

atmosphere in the interrogation room. Under Federal law, a confession is deemed

3

involuntary if the “[speaker’s] will was overborne in such a way to render his

confession the product of coercion.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288

(1991). In making this determination, a court must consider the totality of the

surrounding circumstances and ensure that the State has met its burden of

demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was a result

of voluntary choice. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).

 Land does not contest that he waived his Miranda warnings again before the second 3

statement.

7
The district court, applying AEDPA deference, found that the state court’s

conclusion that Land’s confession was voluntary was not an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the testimony presented at the suppression

hearing and at trial, nor was it contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law.

As an initial matter, Land argues that AEDPA deference is inappropriate

with regard to the state court’s legal conclusion that the statement was voluntary,

citing Miller v. Fenton, in which the Supreme Court held that “the ultimate

question whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged

confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the

Constitution is a matter for independent federal determination.” 474 U.S. 104, 112

(1985). Recognizing that Miller predated the recent AEDPA provisions, Land

claims that AEDPA did not alter the standard of review that Miller established,

relying on a post-AEDPA Fifth Circuit case. See ShisInday v. Quarterman, 511

F.3d 514, 522 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that the defendant “is correct that the

voluntariness of a confession is a matter for independent federal determination” but

that “subsidiary factual questions . . . are entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption”)

(quotation and citation omitted).

We agree that we must independently ascertain and apply Federal law to

8
determine whether the challenged statement was obtained in accordance with the

Constitution. However, we do so as a first step in order to ultimately determine

whether the state court’s finding that Land’s statement was voluntary was contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, that law. See, e.g., Lam v. Kelchner, 304

F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal

question requiring an independent federal determination. Thus, under the AEDPA

habeas standard, we are required to determine whether the state court’s legal

determination of voluntariness was contrary to or an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent.”) (internal citation omitted).

Turning to the substance of Land’s coercion claim, we first note that he did

not testify in state court in connection with the motion to suppress, therefore the

testimony of the three officers regarding the circumstances of the second statement

is unrefuted. Nonetheless, Land argues that the police testimony itself supports a

conclusion that his statement was coerced, pointing to the following facts elicited

at trial: When Land commenced his second statement, the police had taken his

shoes and clothes, and he was in an orange jumpsuit and barefoot. He changed

positions often during the interview, at certain points curling himself up into “a

semi-fetal position” with his feet pulled up onto the chair and his hands covering

his face. At one point, one officer took Land’s wrist and moved his hand away

9
from his head, saying something to the effect of “Boy, look up at me when I talk to

you.” This officer also acknowledged that “Mr. Land was probably frightened of

[him].” Finally, Land argues that the simple fact that the statement was

unrecorded suggests that it was the police who chose not to record it in order to

avoid having an objective account of the events.

The officers, however, all provided direct testimony describing the

circumstances surrounding Land’s statement. They each testified that Land was

not threatened in any way. One officer said he perceived Land’s behavior as

simply trying to avoid the questions and that Land’s changes in position were not

the result of any touching or any other conduct by the officers. Furthermore,

nothing in the record suggests that the change of clothes and the confiscation of his

shoes were attempts to humiliate Land; on the contrary, it appears unrefuted that

this was done solely so that further forensic analysis could be undertaken. And,

finally, there is nothing in the record to refute the detectives’ testimony that it was

Land who requested that the statement not be taped.

Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the trial court found

that Land’s body language indicated an aversion to the questions rather than a fear

of the questioner and that his will was not “overborne.” Land attempts to rebut the

trial court’s finding through inference and implication, relying primarily on the

10
theory that the body language that the police described simply could not be

consistent with a voluntary statement. These ex post explanations of his own

behavior in the interrogation room, standing alone, are not enough to counteract

the weight of the officers’ unrefuted testimony and we cannot say that the state

court erred in crediting their testimony.

We find that the conclusion that Land’s statement was voluntary is not an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, nor is it

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Land’s Due Process Rights When it Instructed

the Jury That His Incriminating Statement Was Voluntary

Land next asserts that even if the state trial court did not err in finding his

second statement voluntarily given for purposes of admitting the statement into

evidence, the court nonetheless violated his due process rights by instructing the

jury that the second statement was made voluntarily, because the instruction tainted

the jury’s analysis of the credibility of that statement. The trial judge gave the

following instruction:

With regard to the alleged statements made by the defendant to the

officers, whether we are talking about the recorded statement or the

alleged unrecorded statement, you should know that you may consider

all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking of the

statement in determining the weight or credibility that you give to the

statement.

11
In exercising your exclusive prerogative of determining the credibility

of the evidence or the weight to which the evidence is properly

entitled, you people may consider the circumstances under which the

statement or statements were obtained, including the situation and the

mutual relation to the parties.

I determine the voluntariness of the statement, you people determine

the weight and credibility of one’s statement and may disregard a

defendant’s statement which is unworthy of belief or in which you

entertain a reasonable doubt as to its truth.

(emphasis added). Land argues that this instruction placed him at a severe

disadvantage because the defense’s theory of the case rested on showing that the

statement was a result of police coercion and therefore untruthful, unreliable and

not credible. Specifically, he suggests that these instructions were contradictory,

conveying that the issue of voluntariness had been resolved and was outside the

jury’s purview but that, at the same time, the jury still had the right to reject the

statement as not credible due to a finding of coercion.

The Supreme Court has made clear that it is

the province or capacity of juries to assess the truthfulness of

confessions . . . [and] any evidence relating to the accuracy or weight

of confessions admitted into evidence. A defendant . . . [is free] to

familiarize a jury with circumstances that attend the taking of his

confession, including facts bearing upon its weight and voluntariness.

In like measure, of course, juries [are] at liberty to disregard

confessions that are insufficiently corroborated or otherwise deemed

unworthy of belief.

12
Lego, 404 U.S. at 485–86 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Harper, 432

4

F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that “the fairest method for determining the

5

voluntariness of a confession” is for the judge to “permit[] the confession and the

question of voluntariness to go to the jury, after having made his own preliminary

determination that there was no taint of compulsion but without indicating his

evaluation to the jury”) (emphasis added).

The heart of the matter, then, is whether one can truly “familiarize a jury

with . . . facts bearing upon . . . voluntariness,” Lego, 404 U.S. at 486, if the trial

court explicitly tells the jury it has already found the statement to be voluntary

without further explication of this concept. Given that the trial court had stated it

found the statement was made voluntarily and that a credibility determination

would be based on the same coercion evidence, the jurors may have been under the

 Although 18 U. S. C. § 3501 (a) is inapplicable to this case, it helps to illuminate the 4

scope of the voluntariness instruction vis-a-vis Federal law:

(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of

Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in

evidence if it is voluntarily given. . . . If the trial judge determines that the

confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial

judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness

and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it

deserves under all the circumstances.

(emphasis added).

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this 5

Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior

to close of business on September 30, 1981.

13
belief that they were de facto compelled to find the statement credible. “The

proper standard for reviewing such claims [of constitutionally defective jury

instructions] is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.” Jones v. United

States, 527 U.S. 373, 390 (1999) (quotations omitted). Here, we believe that there

is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would apply the given instruction in such a

way that it would not feel like it could make an independent determination of the

credibility of the statement, in violation of the Supreme Court’s dictates in Lego.

As such, we find that a decision upholding this instruction, as given, is contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.

However, only if “the ailing [jury] instruction by itself so infected the entire

trial [will] the resulting conviction violate[] due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). While it is quite

possible the instruction was confusing, we do not think it so infected the entire trial

as to warrant habeas relief. See, e.g, United States v. Bear Killer, 534 F.2d 1253,

1259 (finding that while the judge erred in instructing the jury the statement was

voluntary, “the erroneous instruction was harmless and did not have a substantial

influence on the jury’s verdict of guilty in this cause”). Viewing the set of jury

instructions in its entirety, of which the voluntariness portion was but a small part,

14
and given all the available evidence and arguments presented to the jury, we cannot

say that the addition of the offending clause had a “substantial influence on the

jury’s verdict of guilty.” Id.

3. The Prosecutor Arguing Facts Outside the Record Did Not Result in a Violation

of Due Process

Land next asserts that the prosecutor unconstitutionally argued facts that

were not supported by the evidence in the record. Prosecutorial misconduct can be

a basis for relief if it “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181

(1986) (quotations omitted). In determining whether arguments are sufficiently

egregious to result in the denial of due process, we have considered the statements

in the context of the entire proceeding, including factors such as: (1) whether the

remarks were isolated, ambiguous, or unintentional; (2) whether there was a

contemporaneous objection by defense counsel; (3) the trial court’s instructions;

and (4) the weight of aggravating and mitigating factors. Romine v. Head, 253

F.3d 1349, 1369–70 (11th Cir. 2001).

No direct evidence was presented describing the events that took place in

Candace Brown’s home. Nonetheless, the prosecutor made the following

statements at closing:

[Mr. Land] goes in and at some point Candy Brown wakes up and he

15
says you’re going with me. She said I’m not going anywhere. Maybe

she ran towards the front door, maybe she was trying to get out. But

at one point Michael Jeffrey Land fires the gun and said the next one’s

for your kid.

I submit to you that at the point Candy Brown pulled her pants on and

puts some shoes on and walks out of the house and on the way out

Candy Brown did one last desperate attempt to protect her child, she

locked the door.

. . . .

[Jeff Land] didn’t think nobody was going to find her. But Candy

Brown knew, Candy Brown knew somebody would find Michael, the

little boy.

[T]here is a phrase in [the Bible], no greater love have one man than

to lay down his life for his friend. And that ladies and gentlemen, is

what Candy Brown did for her little boy, she gave up everything that

she had, not knowing if it would work. And she gave up everything in

the world to save that little boy. That’s exactly what happened.

(emphasis added). Land argues that these statements were unsubstantiated by any

testimony and erroneously made to inflame the passions of the jurors. The district

court below found that they were reasonably inferred from the evidence at trial.

We agree with Land that the statements were improper. This reenactment

was not comprised of reasonable inferences from the evidence but rather pure

speculation. No witnesses recounted what was said and we have no way of

knowing whether Land threatened the child. The prosecutor exceeded the bounds

of appropriate conduct by claiming to describe exactly what happened, and

16
particularly what was said, with such specificity. Given the context and the

evidence on the record, we do not agree with the district court that such evidence

could provide a legitimate basis for the prosecutor to assert either what was said or

done in the interaction between Land and Brown.

However, the bar for granting habeas based on prosecutorial misconduct is a

high one. While we by no means condone the prosecutor’s behavior, we are hardpressed to reach the conclusion that these statements rendered the trial

“fundamentally unfair.” See Brooks v. Francis, 716 F.2d 780, 788 (11th Cir. 1983)

(“[P]rosecutorial misconduct, though outside the bounds of propriety, is not

reversible error where it does not render the trial fundamentally unfair.”) (citation

omitted). As noted earlier, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and thus any

error was harmless. Therefore, we agree with the district court opinion that it is

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Federal law to reach the

conclusion that Land’s statements did not “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” (quoting Darden, 477 U.S.

at 181).

Furthermore, because we ultimately find that Land is not entitled to relief

based on prosecutorial misconduct, we likewise find that he is not entitled to relief

on his claim that defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s statements

17
amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. “An ineffective

assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.”

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Land, however, cannot show prejudice in his defense

counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct that, itself, does not warrant

reversal.

4. Defense Counsel’s Failure to Present Mitigation Evidence at the Penalty Phase

of the Trial Did Not Amount to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Lastly, Land argues that his defense counsel were constitutionally deficient

during sentencing because they failed to investigate and present mitigating

evidence regarding Land’s abusive childhood and his mental illness. The

6

mitigation evidence actually presented involved the testimony of two

witnesses—his mother and grandfather—who, Land now asserts, “simply made

naked pleas to the jury that they spare Mr. Land from the death penalty.” Land

claims that had his attorneys presented all the available mitigating evidence, the

 Land also challenges his attorneys’ failure to retain and present a mitigation specialist. 6

The State argues that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Land failed to raise it during

his state post-conviction proceedings. However, as discussed below, Land did present the

testimony of psychologist Dr. Katherine Boyer at his Rule 32 hearing. Therefore, we will

address this argument to the extent Land is arguing that his attorneys were ineffective for failing

to present experts such as Dr. Boyer, whose testimony regarding Land’s abusive childhood and

mental illness was similar to that which would have been presented by a mitigation expert.

18
jury would not have imposed a death sentence and therefore he was prejudiced.

To establish deficiency, a defendant must show that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under

prevailing professional norms.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687 (quotations omitted). As to the penalty phase of the trial, “we consider

whether counsel reasonably investigated possible mitigating factors and made a

reasonable effort to present mitigating evidence to the sentencing court.” Henyard

v. McDonough, 459 F.3d 1217, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006).

To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove “a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In determining whether a

defendant has established prejudice at sentencing, the reviewing court must

evaluate “the totality of the available mitigation evidence – both that adduced at

trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding – in reweighing it against

the evidence in aggravation.” Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 534 (11th Cir.

2000) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 397–98).

The bulk of the mitigating evidence presented at the Rule 32 hearing, which

Land argues should have been presented at trial, addressed two issues—his

childhood upbringing and his mental state. The essence of the testimony by his

19
mother was that her first husband, Land’s biological father, ignored him and was

abusive towards her. This abuse, which sometimes had occurred in Land’s

presence, led to their divorce when Land was just over one year old. Her

subsequent remarriage a few years later did not provide a loving father figure, as

Land’s stepfather did not treat him kindly. For example, at times his stepfather

would take pictures of Land crying and then show them to him, saying “this is

what you look like - a cry baby,” and when Land’s grandmother died, his

stepfather told him he had fifteen minutes to cry in his room and then he had to

“straighten up.” Testimony was also presented by Land’s mother and a friend

discussing Land’s physical appearance during childhood. This testimony included

the fact that Land was born with a club foot, had eyes that were wide apart, and

was bullied extensively as an adolescent because he was shorter than his

classmates (Land is 5'2" tall as an adult).

The evidence regarding Land’s mental state was presented by Dr. Katherine

Boyer, who testified that Land met the criteria for an antisocial personality

disorder. Dr. Boyer explained that as a young child, Land lived in a “climate of

fear” due to his father’s domineering personality and that his father had “disrupted

Mr. Land’s ability to connect with other people, emotionally.” Consequently, she

said that Land had developed into an emotionally unstable person.

20
On cross-examination, Land’s trial counsel testified that he was sure he had

considered introducing evidence regarding Land’s broken home but concluded that

such evidence was unremarkable because the degree of difficulty in Land’s

childhood was the same as that suffered by many.

7

Dr. Boyer also testified on cross-examination that Land’s “failure to

conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior” as well as his

“deceitfulness, use of aliases or conning others for personal profit or pleasure,

[and] impulsivity” were among the characteristics she used to reach her diagnosis.

Land’s trial counsel further testified that keeping from the jury Land’s criminal

history, to which Dr. Boyer referred, (which they did successfully), formed an

important part of the trial strategy. Thus, not presenting any of the mitigation

evidence developed at the Rule 32 hearing appears consistent with trial counsel’s

defense strategy and would not qualify as objectively unreasonable.

Regardless, however, it is clear that Land cannot meet the prejudice prong.

As the state post-conviction court pointed out, many of the facts adduced at the

 As to the mitigating evidence actually presented at sentencing, defense counsel testified 7

that he chose to put Land’s mother on the stand at sentencing because she “made a very good

impression” and Land’s grandfather because he was “a very, very stately gentleman” who made

a “compelling figure.” Together, he explained, the two witnesses made an emotional appeal to

the jury that caused some of the jurors’ eyes to tear up. Although the emotional appeal was

ultimately insufficient to avoid Land’s death sentence, it was not unreasonable for the state court

to conclude, under Strickland, that Land’s counsel had made a reasonable tactical decision and

was not ineffective in doing so.

21
Rule 32 proceeding—for example, having divorced parents, being picked on at

school, and losing a grandmother—were unremarkable because they “are things

most people have to deal with while growing up.” As to Land’s mental state, we

believe Land’s history of deception and criminality, which would almost certainly

have been revealed to the jury because they were an integral part of Dr. Boyer’s

diagnosis, substantially undercuts any potential benefit her mitigation testimony

might have had. We cannot say that the state court’s determination that Land was

not prejudiced by his counsel’s sentencing strategy was an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law.

Having considered each of Land’s claims, we find no support for a reversal

of the district court’s denial of habeas relief.

AFFIRMED

22