UNITED STATES NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

J.R. MCFARLANE, M.C. HOLIFIELD, K.J. BRUBAKER

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JULIEN L. BRONDEAU

LANCE CORPORAL (E-3), U.S. MARINE CORPS

NMCCA 201400140

GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 5 November 2013.

Military Judge: Maj N.A. Martz, USMC.

Convening Authority: Commanding General, 2d Marine 

Division, Camp Lejeune, NC.

Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: Maj J.N. Nelson, 

USMC.

For Appellant: LCDR Dillon J. Ambrose, JAGC, USN.

For Appellee: LT Ian D. MacLean, JAGC, USN.

23 September 2014

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OPINION OF THE COURT 

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THIS OPINION DOES NOT SERVE AS BINDING PRECEDENT, BUT MAY BE CITED AS 

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY UNDER NMCCA RULE OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18.2.

 

PER CURIAM:

A military judge, sitting as a general court-martial, 

convicted the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of one 

specification of attempting to commit a lewd act on a child 

under the age of twelve, one specification of possessing child 

pornography, one specification of distributing child 

pornography, one specification of soliciting the taking of 
2

indecent liberties with a child under the age of sixteen, two 

specifications of soliciting lewd acts upon a child under the 

age of sixteen, and one specification of soliciting the 

commission of a lewd act upon a child under the age of twelve, 

in violation of Articles 80 and 134, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880 and 934. The military judge sentenced 

the appellant to reduction to pay grade E-1, forfeiture of all 

pay and allowances, confinement for 10 years, and a dishonorable 

discharge. The convening authority (CA) approved the sentence 

as adjudged. Pursuant to a pretrial agreement, the CA suspended 

all confinement in excess of 60 months. 

In his three assignments of error (AOEs), the appellant 

contends that: first, his pleas to Specifications 9 

(solicitation to take indecent liberties with a child) and 10 

(solicitation to commit a lewd act upon a child) of Charge II 

were improvident where there was no evidence presented that an 

actual person was solicited; second, his pleas to Specifications 

9, 10, 12 (solicitation to commit a lewd act upon a child) and 

13 (solicitation to commit a lewd act upon a child) of Charge II 

were improvident where there was no evidence presented that the 

person solicited knew the conduct was wrongful; and, third, his 

pleas to Specifications 9, 10, 12 and 13 of Charge II were 

improvident where the person solicited could not commit an 

offense under the UCMJ. We disagree with all three AOEs.

After carefully considering the record of trial and the 

submissions of the parties, we conclude that the findings and 

the sentence are correct in law and fact and that no error 

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the 

appellant was committed. Arts. 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ.

Background

Utilizing Craigslist.com, a public classified 

advertisements website, the appellant posted requests seeking 

men and women willing to engage in sexual activity in the 

presence of their children. These requests were viewable by 

anyone accessing the website and not aimed at any specific 

person. 

The appellant also used an online chat room to communicate 

with a purported father of two young girls. He requested that 

the man send him video of his daughters engaging in sexual 

misconduct.
3

While the appellant did receive responses to some of his 

postings seeking a sexual encounter in the presence of a child, 

on only one occasion did contact move beyond on-line 

communication. This event involved an undercover Naval Criminal 

Investigative Service (NCIS) agent portraying a mother with a 

child under the age of twelve. After meeting with the agent and 

agreeing to engage in sexual activity in the presence of the 

agent’s purported child, the appellant travelled to what he 

believed was the agent’s home. He was apprehended upon arrival.

Except for the specification alleging solicitation of the 

NCIS agent, the appellant was charged in each relevant 

specification with soliciting an “unknown person.” 

The Providence of the Appellant’s Guilty Plea

We review a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty 

plea for an abuse of discretion.1 A military judge is afforded 

“significant deference” in accepting a guilty plea, and there 

must be a “substantial basis” in law or fact for us to question 

his decision.2 

1. An Actual Person Solicited

Included in the first element of the offense of 

solicitation is that an “accused. . . solicited. . . a certain 

person or persons.”3 In Specifications 9 and 10 of Charge II, 

this element is alleged as the appellant soliciting “an unknown 

person.” The appellant testified that the recipient of his 

requests “could be anybody,”4 agreeing that the Craigslist 

advertisements were “accessible to the public.”5 

The appellant argues, without citing authority, that, if no 

one read his online advertisements, no solicitation occurred. 

We need not speculate, however, as the record makes clear that 

unknown persons did both read and respond to the advertisements. 

First, the appellant testified that the postings throughout the 

periods covered by the two specifications were substantially 

 

1 United States v. Eberle, 44 M.J. 374, 375 (C.A.A.F. 1996).

2 United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

3 MANUAL FOR COURT-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012 ed.), PART IV, ¶ 105b(1),

4 Record at 49. 

5 Id. at 50. 
4

similar, in that they sought a mother willing to have sex in the 

presence of her young children. Second, when asked if anyone 

had responded to the advertisements, he replied, “Yes, sir, some 

people have,”6 and “people . . . answered before [the NCIS agent 

did].”7 

These statements, taken together and in context of the 

entire plea inquiry, sufficiently establish this first element 

of solicitation, as “the factual circumstances as revealed by 

the accused himself objectively support [the] plea.”8 When the 

appellant entered an unconditional plea of guilty, he 

“relinquished his right to contest the prosecution’s theory on 

appeal . . . unless the record discloses matter inconsistent 

with the plea.”9 We find no such inconsistency. 

2. Knowledge that Conduct is Criminal

During the plea inquiry, the military judge did not ask the 

appellant whether he believed the persons he solicited knew that 

the requested conduct was wrongful. Given the circumstances of 

the advertisements, we find such a line of questioning to be 

unnecessary. These were not facially innocent requests.10 The 

posts consisted of requests to engage in sexual activity with a 

man or woman while his or her young children observed, with the 

appellant offering to pay for the experience. He also requested 

a man provide video of his young daughters engaging in sexual 

activity. The appellant admitted under oath that these 

requested acts would be indecent conduct in that they amount to 

a “form of immorality relating to sexual impurity that is 

grossly vulgar, obscene, or repugnant to common propriety and 

tends to excite sexual desire or deprave morals with respect to 

sexual relations.”11 

 

6 Id. at 52. 

7 Id. at 53. 

8 United States v. Ferguson, 68 M.J. 431, 434 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (quoting United 

States v. Faircloth, 45 M.J. 172, 174 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (additional citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

9 Id. at 435 (citing Article 45(a), UCMJ) (internal citation omitted).

10 See United States v. Higgins, 40 M.J. 67, 68-69 (C.M.A. 1994); United 

States v. Oakley, 23 C.M.R. 197, 199 (C.M.A. 1957). 

11 Record at 28; see also Record at 64.
5

We do not find it possible the appellant could have 

believed the persons he solicited did not understand he was 

asking them to engage in a criminal act. Accordingly, the 

military judge did not abuse his discretion in accepting the 

appellant’s pleas without inquiring on this point.

3. Capable of Committing Offenses under the Code

In his third AOE, the appellant claims that only persons 

subject to the UCMJ can be solicited under Article 134. In 

seeking to distinguish case law holding that solicitation of 

civilians can constitute a violation of Article 134,12 he cites 

United States v. Sutton, 68 M.J. 455 (C.A.A.F 2010). He is 

mistaken. In Sutton, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Armed Forces held that it was not legally possible for a child 

to be solicited to commit indecent liberties with herself. This 

holding was based not on the lack of UCMJ jurisdiction over the 

child, but on the fact that the person solicited to commit the 

underlying offense is also the victim of that offense; indecent 

acts or liberties with a child requires two persons - both an 

accused and a child. 

Here, it was certainly legally possible for the persons 

solicited to commit a lewd act upon a child. The solicited 

person’s status as someone not subject to the UCMJ is 

irrelevant. “[T]he solicitation of another person to commit an 

offense which, if committed by one subject to the UCMJ, would be 

punishable under the UCMJ, is an offense cognizable under 

Article 134.” United States v. Robertson, 17 M.J. 846, 850 

(NMCMR 1984).

Conclusion

The findings and the sentence as approved by the convening 

authority are affirmed.

For the Court

 

 

 

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court

 

12 United States v. Harris, No. 9901587, 2003 CCA LEXIS 269, unpublished op.

(N.M.Ct.Crim.App. 26 Nov 2003); United States v. Conway, 40 M.J. 859, 862-63

(A.F.C.M.R. 1994).