Filed 6/23/15 P. v. Raoult CA2/6 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SIX 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

JEREMY EVAN RAOULT, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

2d Crim. No. B256148 

(Super. Ct. No. 2012004512) 

(Ventura County) 

 After a police officer arrested Jeremy Evan Raoult for possessing 

methamphetamine, he searched the passenger compartment of Raoult's car and found 

incriminating videos in a camera's digital storage. Subsequently, the United States 

Supreme Court decided that officers may not search a cell phone's digital storage incident 

to lawful arrest. (Riley v. California (2014) __ U.S.__ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2495] (Riley).) 

We conclude that Riley does not extend to the digital camera on this record, and, even if 

it did, the officer acted in good faith reliance on existing authority. 

 Raoult appeals from an order denying his motion to suppress and the 

judgment that followed his conviction by jury of three counts of committing lewd acts 

upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1))1

; one count of possessing a controlled 

substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377); and one count of failing to appear on bond 

(§ 1320.5). We affirm. 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
2 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In 2012, Raoult was on probation following a conviction for possessing 

narcotics. As a term of his probation, Raoult consented to warrantless searches of his 

person and property "for controlled substances including marijuana and related 

paraphernalia . . . ."2

 Ventura City Police Officer Arthur Gonzales stopped Raoult's car because 

the rear license plate was not illuminated. When Gonzales checked Raoult's records, he 

learned that Raoult was wanted and subject to the controlled substance probation search 

term. 

 Gonzales arrested Raoult. The parties agree that the detention and arrest 

were lawful. 

 Raoult complied with Gonzales's instructions to get out of the car. After 

Gonzales handcuffed Raoult, Raoult told Gonzales that he "had dope on him." Gonzales 

found baggies that held about 10 grams of methamphetamine in Raoult's pocket. 

 Gonzales searched Raoult's car and found a backpack with a camera inside. 

He searched through the camera's digital storage and found three videos of Raoult's 15-

year-old female passenger performing sexual acts. Gonzales also searched Raoult's cell 

phone, but found nothing incriminating. 

 In July 2013, Raoult moved to suppress evidence found in his "Nikon 

Coolpix Camera" and in his cell phone. (§ 1538.5.) The trial court heard the motion to 

suppress in December 2013, about six months before the United States Supreme Court 

decided Riley, supra, __ U.S.__ [134 S.Ct. 2473]. 

 Gonzales testified that, in his experience, it is common for drug users and 

dealers to have photographs of drugs and drug paraphernalia. He knew Raoult was 

 

2

 The trial court took judicial notice of Raoult's probation terms and read them into the 

record. The terms are not included in the clerk's transcript. 
3 

subject only to a specific search term "[f]or controlled substances." He was not aware of 

any general search term or stolen property search term.3

 The trial court denied the motion to suppress. It relied on then-current 

California precedent that held that searches of cell phones incident to lawful arrest do not 

violate the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, 93; People v. 

Nottoli (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 557-558.) 

DISCUSSION 

 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. Generally, a nonconsensual search is only reasonable if it is made pursuant to a 

warrant. (Riley, supra, __ U.S.__ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482].) But warrantless searches may 

be reasonable under established exceptions. (Ibid.) One such exception is a search 

incident to lawful arrest. (Ibid.) It allows officers to search (1) an arrestee's person and 

the area within his or her immediate control to protect officer safety and preserve 

evidence (id. at p. 2483; Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763); and (2) the 

passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle when it is reasonable to believe evidence 

relevant to the crime of arrest might be found there, for the sole purpose of gathering 

evidence (Riley, at p. __ [at pp. 2484, 2492]; Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 350). 

Gonzales reasonably believed that evidence of drug possession might be found in the 

camera's digital storage because drug users and dealers commonly photograph their drugs 

and paraphernalia. 

 When Gonzales arrested Raoult, California law held that the scope of a 

search incident to lawful arrest extends to the contents of the arrestee's cell phone, 

whether the phone is on their person or in their vehicle. (People v. Diaz, supra, 51 

Cal.4th 84, 93 [the warrantless search of a cell phone within arrestee's immediate control 

does not violate the Fourth Amendment when incident to lawful arrest]; People v. Nottoli, 

 3

 The prosecutor asserted that Raoult was also subject to a general search term as a 

condition of a supervised release program, but conceded that was "irrelevant for the 

purposes of this motion since the officer didn't know that." The trial court agreed it was 

irrelevant. 
4 

supra, 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 558 [the warrantless search of a cell phone in the passenger 

compartment of the arrestee's vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment when 

incident to lawful arrest].) 

 The California's Legislature responded to Diaz and Nottoli by passing a bill 

that would require a warrant for a search of any portable electronic device, incident to 

arrest. (Sen. Bill No. 914 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) § 2.) Governor Brown vetoed the bill, 

explaining that it would "overturn a California Supreme Court decision," and "[t]he 

courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to 

constitutional search-and-seizure protections." (Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., letter 

to Cal. Sen., Oct. 9, 2011.) 

 After the hearing on Raoult's motion to suppress, the United States 

Supreme Court resolved the issue. It decided that "the search incident to arrest exception 

does not apply to cell phones." (Riley, supra, at p. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494].) Justice 

Roberts wrote for the unanimous court: "Our answer to the question of what police must 

do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a 

warrant." (Id. at p. __ [p. 2495].) The court refused to extend the Gant exception to cell 

phones, which would have "allow[ed] a warrantless search of an arrestee's cell phone 

whenever it is reasonable to believe that the phone contains evidence of the crime of 

arrest." (Riley, at p. __ [p. 2492].) It decided that proposal "would prove no practical 

limit at all when it comes to cell phone searches." (Ibid.) The court reasoned, "It would 

be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law enforcement officer who could not 

come up with several reasons to suppose evidence of just about any crime could be found 

on a cell phone." (Ibid.) 

Riley was concerned that "a cell phone search would typically expose to the 

government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house." (Riley, supra, __ 

U.S.__ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2491.) An argument can be made that the digital storage of a 

camera and the digital storage of a cell phone are similar for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment, but the argument is not supported by this record. Some digital cameras may 

have the capabilities of a smartphone, but there is no evidence that Raoult's camera did. 
5 

There is no evidence of its capabilities at all, except that it stored video footage. Nothing 

in the record establishes that the camera held "a cache of sensitive personal information" 

of the scope that supported the Riley court's protection of a cell phone. (Riley, supra, __ 

U.S.__ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2490; id. at pp. 2489-2490, 2493].) The Riley court observed 

that "[t]he sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed through a thousand 

photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions" (id. at p. __ [p. 2489]), but 

there is no evidence that Raoult's photographs and videos were thus labeled. Riley does 

not extend to protect Raoult's camera on this record. 

 Because the search was justified incident to lawful arrest, we do not reach 

the question whether Raoult consented to a warrantless search of his person and property 

for "controlled substances including marijuana and related paraphernalia" as a term of his 

probation. 

 Even if the search was unlawful under Riley, the evidence would not be 

subject to exclusion. "[T]he sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct 

by law enforcement." (Davis v. United States (2011) __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2419, 2432].) 

Exclusion is not a personal right designed to redress injury; rather, it is a sanction to deter 

future violations. (Id. at p. __ [pp. 2433-2434].) Thus, the exclusionary rule does not 

apply when police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding 

appellate precedent that is later overturned. (Id. at p. __ [pp. 2423-2424].) Officer 

Gonzales searched the cell phone and camera in objectively reasonable reliance on Diaz 

and Nottoli. The trial court reasonably relied on the same authority. 

 Raoult argues that Gonzales could not reasonably rely on Diaz and Nottoli 

because they were uncertain and non-binding. He points out that the Diaz court was 

divided, Diaz and Nottoli were not long-standing, neither case involved a digital camera, 

both relied on authority that preceded modern technology, and Diaz anticipated that the 

United States Supreme Court would "reevaluate" its precedent in light of "modern 

technology." (People v. Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th 84, 101.) 

 But Gonzales was bound by Diaz and Nottoli, the holdings of which were 

sufficiently clear to trigger legislative response. As the Legislative Counsel's Digest of 
6 

Senate Bill No. 914 (2011 Reg. Sess.) explained, "Existing case law authorizes arresting 

officers, without a warrant, to conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest, including to 

search the contents of a cellular telephone taken from a suspect during an arrest." If it 

authorized officers to search the digital contents of a phone, it authorized them to search 

the digital contents of a camera, which are far less sensitive. And Gonzales could not be 

expected to question the veracity of Diaz and Nottoli. The United States Supreme Court 

expresses a "general preference to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through 

categorical rules." (Riley, supra, __ U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2491].) "[I]f police are to 

have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . 'must in large part be 

done on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police 

officers.'" (Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 705, fn. 19.) Gonzales 

reasonably relied on categorical binding precedent. The evidence he found is not subject 

to exclusion. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 GILBERT, P.J. 

We concur: 

 YEGAN, J. 

 PERREN, J. 
7 

Kevin G. DeNoce, Judge 

Superior Court County of Ventura 

______________________________ 

 Stephen P. Lipson, Public Defender, Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy, 

William Quest, Senior Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. 

Maxwell, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Tannaz Kouhpainezhad, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.