This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-37264 4 ROBERT PIPKIN, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 John A. Dean, Jr., District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 Gregory B. Dawkins, Assi stant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 VANZI, Chief Judge. 17
{1} Defendant appeals from his convictions for CSPM and CSCM. We previously 18 issued a notice of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to affirm. 192 Defendant has filed a jo int memorandum in opposition and motion to amend the 1 docketing statement. After due consider ation, we deny the motion and affirm. 2
{2} We will begin our discussion with the i ssues originally raised in the docketing 3 statement. Although Defendant does not renew his challenge to the sufficiency of the 4 evidence, he does continue to argue th at his convictions violate double jeopardy. 5 [MIO 3] We will limit the sc ope of discussion accordingly. See, e.g., State v. 6 Martinez , 1982-NMCA-002, ¶ 1, 97 N.M. 585, 642 P.2d 188. 7
{3} As previously described in the notice of proposed summary disposition, in this 8 case the charge of CSCM was based on Defendant’s touching of S.B.’s breasts, while 9 the charge of CSPM was ba sed on Defendant’s subsequent insertion of a finger into 10 S.B.’s vulva or vagina. [RP 237, 240] Weregard this conduc t as non-unitary, both 11 because the specific acts are clearly dis tinct in quality, and because the crime of 12 CSCM was completed before the crime of CSPM began. See, e.g., State v. Sena , 13 2018-NMCA-037, ¶¶ 37, 48, 56, 419 P.3d 1240 (reflecting that conduct underlying 14 a conviction for CSC, entailing touching of the victim’s breasts, was distinct from 15 conduct underlying a convi ction for CSP, entailing digital vaginal penetration, and 16 ultimately upholding both convictions), cert. granted , ___-NMSC-____ (No. S-1-SC17 36932, May 25, 2018); see also State v. DeGraff , 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 27, 139 N.M. 183 211, 131 P.3d 61 (“In our consideration of wh ether conduct is unitary, we have looked 1 for an identifiable point at which one of the charged crimes had been completed and 2 the other not yet committed.”); State v. Contreras , 2007-NMCA-045, ¶ 21, 141 N.M. 3 434, 156 P.3d 725 (“[W]e will not find that a defendant’s conduct is unitary where the 4 defendant completes one of th e charged crimes before committing the other.”). To the 5 extent that the conduct is non-unitary, there is no double jeopardy violation. State v. 6 Silvas , 2015-NMSC-006, ¶ 9, 343 P.3d 616. 7
{4} Furthermore, even if the conduct could beregarded as unitary, we nevertheless 8 remain of the opinion that Defendant’s convictions for CS CM and CSPM are 9 consistent with legislative intent. In this regard, we note that the offenses contain 10 different elements, and st and independently in re lation to one another. See State v. 11 Swick , 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 13, 279 P.3d 747 (“If eachstatute requires proof of a fact 12 that the other does not, it may be inferred th at the Legislature intended to authorize 13 separate punishments under each statute.”). Wehave also previously recognized that 14 the statutes prohibiting sex crimes against children list five separate protected areas, 15 including the genital area and breast, and we have held that “the legislative intent was 16 to protect the victim from intrus ions to each enumerated part.” State v. Haskins , 17 2008-NMCA-086, ¶ 24, 144 N.M. 287, 186 P.3d 916 (internal quotation marks and 184 citation omitted); see State v. Williams , 1986-NMCA-122, ¶ 9, 105 N.M. 214, 730 1 P.2d 1196. Thus, under the facts of this cas e, which showed first a touching of one 2 protected area and subsequently a penetr ation of a different protected area, we 3 conclude that Defendant wa s properly convicted and sepa rately sentenced for both 4 CSCM and CSPM. See, e.g., Sena , 2018-NMCA-037, ¶¶ 37, 48, 56; Haskins , 5 2008-NMCA-086, ¶¶ 18, 24; Williams , 1986-NMCA-122, ¶¶ 7-9 (all upholding 6 multiple convictions based upon touching of the victim’s breast and genital area). 7
{5} Defendant’s memorandum in oppositi on does not address the foregoing 8 authorities. Instead, he re lies on a case involving multiplecounts of CSCM, based 9 upon touchings that occurred within a short period of time in the course of a massage. 10 [MIO 11-12] We do not find this to be persuasive or to require a different result. In 11 summary therefore, we conclude that th e convictions do not violate double jeopardy. 12
{6} We turn next to the issue that Defendant seeks to raise by his motion to amend, 13 concerning the withdrawal of his attorney prio r to trial. [MIO 4-9] The record reflects 14 that this occurred upon his attorney’s mo tion, which he filed after Defendant’s 15 unexplained failure to appear at his scheduled jury trial. [RP 142-48] A hearing was 16 conducted on that motion, and Defendant registered no opposition. [RP 158-60] 17 Shortly thereafter the district court granted the attorney’s motion, substitution of 185 counsel occurred, and the re scheduled trial was repeatedly continued to accommodate 1 defense preparation. [RP 161, 165, 167, 176, 183] 2
{7} Defendant contends that the withdrawal of his attorney was procured by the 3 prosecution, and this effectively denied hi m his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of 4 choice. [MIO 4-9] To succeedon his argument, Defendant must establish a sufficient 5 causal link between the State’s actions and the withdrawal of Defendant’s attorney. 6 See State v. Gamlen , 2009-NMCA-073, ¶ 10, 213 P.3d 818 (explaining). 7 However, the record before us reflects that counsel sought to withdraw due to 8 Defendant’s failure to uphold his obligations to counsel, when he failed to appear at 9 the originally-schedule jury trial. [RP 148] To the extent that Defendant’s own 10 conduct motivated his attorney to withdr aw, we perceive no merit to Defendant’s 11 argument. 12
{8} Although Defendant does not acknowledge the role that his own conduct played 13 in his attorney’s withdrawal, he does arguethat the prosecutor’s announced intention 14 to pursue a separate criminal action agains t Defendant based upon hi s failure to appear 15 created a conflict of interest for his attorney , insofar as his attorney would be a likely 16 witness in that separate action. [MIO 4- 9] We will assume, for the present purposes, 17 that this situation could supply the requis ite causal link between State action and the 186 attorney’s withdrawal. See id. Nevertheless, we conclude that Defendant has failed to 1 demonstrate that the prosecutor’s behavi or had “a demonstrable impact on [his 2 attorney’s] ability to represent [the d]ef endant or upon the outcome of the case.” Id. 3 ¶ 13. In this regard we note that although the prospect of a subpoena may have been 4 distasteful, we fail to see how it created an irreconcilable conflict. Neither Rule 16- 5 108(B) NMRA, nor Rule 16-109(C)(1) NMRA (prohibiting lawyers from using 6 information relating to representation to th e disadvantage of a c lient unless the client 7 gives informed consent, except as permitte d or required by the rules), both of which 8 Defendant invokes, [MIO 6] nor any other authority of which we are aware, would 9 have precluded the attorney from continuing the representation. And in any event, if 10 Defendant wished the attorney to continuethe representation, he was at liberty to 11 waive the perceived conflict. State v. Barnett , 1998-NMCA-105, ¶ 26, 125 N.M. 739, 12 965 P.2d 323. 13
{9} Under the circumstances presented in this case, and in light of the foregoing 14 considerations, we conclude that the evid ence is insufficient to establish a Sixth 15 Amendment violation. See, e.g., Gamlen , 2009-NMCA-073, ¶¶ 6-16 (rejecting a Sixth 16 Amendment claim of deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, where an attorney 17 withdrew following hostile and combative interaction with the State, where the 187 defendant did not object to the withdrawal, and the facts of the case did not indicate 1 that the State’s behavior had, or would have had, a demonstrable impact on the 2 attorney’s ability to represent the defe ndant or upon the outcome of the case). We 3 therefore deny the motion to amend, on grounds that the issue is not viable. See, e.g., 4 State v. Sommer , 1994-NMCA-070, ¶ 11, 118 N.M. 58, 878 P.2d 1007 (indicating that 5 a motion to amend will be denied if the putative issue is not viable). 6
{10} Accordingly, for the reasons statedabove and in the notice of proposed 7 summary disposition, we affirm. 8
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

10 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 11 WE CONCUR: 12

13 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 14

15 JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Judge 16