United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2024 Decided June 21, 2024

No. 23-5122

IOWASKA CHURCH OF HEALING,

APPELLANT

v.

DANIEL I. WERFEL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS 

COMMISSIONER, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cv-02475)

Simon A. Steel argued the cause for appellant. With him 

on the briefs was William A. Boatwright.

Matthew C. Zorn and David J. Gutierrez were on the brief 

for amici curiae the Chacruna Institute for Psychedelic Plant 

Medicines and Sacred Plant Alliance in support of appellant.

Kathleen E. Lyon, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief was Jacob 

Earl Christensen, Attorney.
2

Before: HENDERSON and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Iowaska Church of 

Healing (the “Church”) is an organization whose members’ 

sincerely-held religious belief involves the consumption of 

Ayahuasca—a tea that contains the hallucinogenic drug

dimethyltryptamine (“DMT”), which is a drug that is regulated 

by the federal government under the Controlled Substances Act 

(“CSA”). See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(a), 812 Schedule I(c)(5). The 

Church sued Appellees the Commissioner of the Internal 

Revenue Service (“IRS”) and the United States (together, the 

“Government”) in the District Court to challenge the IRS’s 

denial of its application for tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. 

§ 501(c)(3). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the

District Court denied the Church’s motion and granted the 

Government’s motion. The Church now appeals the District 

Court’s decision. 

The Church argues, first, that the District Court erred in 

affirming the IRS’s determination because it was based on an 

incorrect assumption that the Church’s religious Ayahuasca 

use was illegal. Second, the Church contends that the District 

Court further erred in holding that the Church lacks Article III 

standing to assert a Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 

(“RFRA”) claim against the Government for impermissibly 

burdening the Church’s free exercise of religion by denying its 

tax-exemption application. The District Court did not, 

however, err on either front. As the District Court held, the 

Church lacks standing to assert its RFRA claim. That lack of 

standing, in turn, dooms its tax-exemption claim; without a 

prima facie showing on its RFRA claim, we have no occasion 

to question the IRS’s decisions to deny the Church’s 
3

application for tax-exempt status and to refuse the Church’s 

demand that the agency assess whether the Church’s proposed 

Ayahuasca use warrants a religious exemption from the CSA—

an assessment that the IRS has no authority to entertain. 

Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s judgment as to the 

Church’s tax-exemption claim and dismiss the Church’s RFRA 

claim without prejudice for lack of standing.

I.

A.

Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 

certain entities “organized and operated exclusively for 

religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes” may be 

exempt from federal taxation, provided that “no part of the net 

earnings of [the entity] inures to the benefit of any private 

shareholder or individual,” “no substantial part” of the 

organization’s “activities” involves the attempt “to influence 

legislation,” and the organization “does not participate in” any 

“political campaign[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); see id. § 501(a). 

“[A]n organization must be both organized and operated for 

one or more of the purposes specified” in Section 501(c)(3) to 

qualify for tax-exempt status under that section. 26 C.F.R. 

§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1); see id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(i). “If an 

organization fails to meet either the organizational test or the 

operational test,” however, “it is not exempt.” Id.

§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1).

IRS regulations clarify the requirements of the 

organizational and operational tests. To survive the 

“organizational” test, the organization’s articles of 

organization must “limit” the organization’s purposes to 

exempt purposes and may “not expressly empower the 

organization to engage . . . in activities which in themselves 
4

are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.” Id.

§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(a)–(b). More specifically, “[a]n 

organization is not organized exclusively for one or more 

exempt purposes if its articles expressly empower it to carry 

on, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, 

activities which are not in furtherance of one or more exempt 

purposes.” Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(iii). To pass the 

“operational” test, the organization must separately be 

“engage[d] primarily in activities which accomplish one or 

more . . . exempt purposes” and will fail that test “if more than 

an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an 

exempt purpose.” Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). Importantly, an 

organization may be denied tax-exempt status if its purposes or 

activities are illegal or otherwise contrary to public policy. Bob 

Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983); 

Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 (“All charitable trusts, 

educational or otherwise, are subject to the requirement that the 

purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary to public 

policy”); see also IRS, PUB. NO. 1828, TAX GUIDE FOR 

CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 33 (2015)

(explaining that the IRS “makes no attempt to evaluate the 

content of whatever doctrine a particular organization claims is 

religious, provided the particular beliefs of the organization are 

truly and sincerely held” and “the practices and rites associated

with the organization’s belief or creed are not illegal or 

contrary to clearly defined public policy.”).

A charitable religious organization’s use of a controlled 

substance such as DMT, the possession and distribution of 

which is generally illegal under the CSA, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 

Schedule I(c)(6), 841(a), 844(a), may obtain an exemption for 

such use in one of two ways—from the Drug Enforcement 

Agency (“DEA”) or a federal court. The CSA authorizes the 

Attorney General to “waive the requirement for registration of 

certain manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds it 
5

consistent with the public health and safety.” 21 U.S.C. 

§ 822(d). The Attorney General has delegated the authority to 

grant CSA waivers or exemptions to the DEA. See 21 C.F.R. 

§ 1307.03. Pursuant to that delegated authority, the DEA

issued guidance in 2009 (“2009 Guidance”) for “[p]arties 

requesting religious exemptions from” the CSA. DEA,

NO. EO-DEA007, GUIDANCE REGARDING PETITIONS FOR 

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION FROM THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 

ACT PURSUANT TO THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION 

ACT 1 (Nov. 20, 2020). The 2009 Guidance directs applicants 

to provide information detailing the applicant’s planned use of 

a controlled substance, together with information showing that 

barring of the applicant’s use of that substance would “(1) be a 

substantial burden on (2) his/her sincere (3) religious exercise.” 

Id. Further, the 2009 Guidance provides that “[n]o petitioner 

may engage in any activity prohibited under the [CSA] or its 

regulations unless the petition has been granted and the 

petitioner has applied for and received a DEA Certificate of 

Registration.” Id. at 2. 

Separately, a federal court may issue a CSA exemption.

Under RFRA, the government “shall not substantially burden a 

person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 

rule of general applicability” unless “it demonstrates that 

application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of 

a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 

restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 

interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). The statute’s coverage 

is expansive—RFRA explicitly protects “any exercise of 

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system 

of religious belief,” id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); see id. § 2000bb2(4), “applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of that 

law, whether statutory or otherwise,’” id. § 2000bb-3(a), and 

defines the term “government” to include “a branch, 

department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other 
6

person acting under color of law) of the United States, or of a 

covered entity,” id. § 2000bb-2(1). To effectuate RFRA’s 

protections, Congress has authorized federal courts to provide 

relief where a person’s religious exercise has been burdened by 

the government in violation of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1(c) (providing that “[a] person whose religious exercise has 

been burdened in violation of [the Act] may assert that 

violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and 

obtain appropriate relief against a government”). Affirming 

RFRA’s application in this context, the Supreme Court has held 

that “it is the obligation of courts to consider whether [CSA] 

exceptions are required under the [RFRA] test set forth by 

Congress.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao 

do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434 (2006).

Pursuant to RFRA, a plaintiff must, as an initial matter, 

“establish that its free exercise right has been substantially 

burdened.” Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of 

Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384–85 (1990)). Only if a litigant 

can establish that their exercise of religion has been 

substantially burdened does the burden shift to the government 

to show that the burden is “in furtherance of a compelling 

governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive means” of 

doing so. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b); see Singh v. Berger, 56 

F.4th 88, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2022). 

B.

The Church is an organization and religious corporation 

whose members’ sincerely-held religious belief involves the 

consumption of Ayahuasca, which contains DMT. In January 

2019, the Church filed an application with the IRS for

designation as a federally tax-exempt organization under 
7

Section 501(c)(3).1 One month later, the Church also applied 

to the DEA for a religious exemption from the CSA to 

authorize its Ayahuasca use. In that application, the Church 

acknowledged that DMT “is illegal absent the appropriate 

registration with the DEA or pursuant to a judicial or other 

registration exemption” from the CSA. J.A. 247. The Church 

represents that the DEA, to date, has yet to issue a 

determination. 

The Church’s purpose and mission revolve primarily 

around the consumption of Ayahuasca and embracing certain 

spiritual benefits that the Church’s members believe follow 

from Ayahuasca consumption. The Church’s articles of 

incorporation define its mission as “inspir[ing] individuals to 

seek and embrace authentic, self-realized healing of the mind, 

body and spirit through the use of the sacred, indigenous plantmedicine of Ayahuasca.” J.A. 236. The articles additionally

list several other purposes and activities, which notably include

“offer[ing] the public access to spiritual growth, development 

and healing through the sacred Sacrament of Ayahuasca” and 

“provid[ing] necessary information to all participants of sacred 

1 The Church also applied for designation as a church under 26 

U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i), which would permit individuals to 

categorize contributions to the Church as tax-deductible charitable 

contributions. 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(1). The IRS 

determined that the Church did not qualify as a church for lack of an 

“associational role,” given that the Church’s members “reside in 

various states and countries,” often “do not come to 

weekend . . . ceremonies on a regular basis,” and “do not return for 

weeks, months, or . . . at all.” J.A. 331. Although the Church also 

challenged the IRS’s rejection of its Section 170 application in its 

complaint, the District Court declined to reach the issue and so the 

Church does not raise it on appeal. See Iowaska Church of Healing 

v. United States (“Iowaska I”), 2023 WL 2733774 at *5, n.6 (citing 

26 U.S.C. § 509(a)). 
8

healing ceremonies involving the consumption of Ayahuasca.”

J.A. 208. Pursuant to its primary mission, and despite a socalled “savings clause” in the articles that promises the Church 

“shall not carry on any other activities not permitted” by a 

Section 501(c)(3) organization, J.A. 211, the Church 

distributed Ayahuasca in multiple ceremonies between May 

and July 2019—while its IRS and DEA applications were 

pending—before voluntarily suspending its ceremonies.

Before issuing a determination, the IRS sent the Church 

several follow-up questions regarding its application. In June 

2019, the IRS sought information regarding “the status of [the 

Church’s] religious exemption application with the DEA[.]” 

J.A. 271. The Church timely responded that it had been 

informed by the DEA that the CSA application was “still in 

progress.” J.A. 281. In September 2019, the IRS asked the 

Church for, inter alia, its plans for operation if the DEA were 

to deny the Church’s application for a CSA exemption, an 

explanation of how the Ayahuasca ceremonies in 2019 were 

legal without a CSA exemption, and information on whether 

any of the Church’s members do not regularly participate in the 

Ayahuasca ceremonies. The Church replied that its Ayahuasca 

ceremonies in 2019 were “protected under federal law” 

because of the Supreme Court’s recognition in O Centro that 

“sacramental use of Ayahuasca as a sincere exercise of religion 

under the First Amendment.” Id. at 293–94. On the Church’s 

read, O Centro made clear that “it is not necessary for a church 

to first apply for and secure a religious exemption from the 

[CSA] before enforcing its religious freedom rights in the 

courts.” J.A. 294. The Church further related that, if the CSA 

exemption were to be denied, it would seek judicial relief under 

RFRA. Notably, the Church neither represented that any of its 

members forgo Ayahuasca ceremonies nor described how it 

would operate if it were denied CSA exemption by both the 

DEA and a court.
9

In February 2020, the IRS again requested more

information, asking, as relevant here, whether the Church had 

received guidance for applying for a CSA exemption from the 

DEA or the Department of Justice (“DOJ”); how the Church 

could be in compliance with the part of the 2009 Guidance that 

directly prohibits petitioners with pending applications from 

“engag[ing] in an activity prohibited under the [CSA] or its 

regulations unless” the petition has been granted, id. at 315; and 

whether the Church had sought relief in the courts to “enforc[e] 

[the Church’s] religious freedom rights” since it had not 

secured the exemption, id. at 312. The Church answered that 

it had not received any DEA or DOJ guidance, that the 2009 

Guidance “d[id] not carry the force of law,” id. at 317, that the 

Supreme Court’s holding in O Centro trumps the 2009 

Guidance, and that the Church had not sought relief in any 

court because it did not believe that doing so was necessary

since its actions were already protected by the First 

Amendment and RFRA, id. at 320.

Unpersuaded by the Church’s responses, the IRS issued a 

proposed adverse determination in June 2020. The IRS 

explained that the Church failed the organizational test, both

because it was formed in part for the illegal purpose of 

distributing a substance containing DMT and because “[m]ore 

than an insubstantial part of [the Church’s] activities” were 

“not in furtherance of an exempt purpose,” but instead 

“serve[d] a substantial nonexempt purpose” in that they

primarily involved “advocating and engaging in activities that 

contravene federal law” and “enabling individuals to engage in 

an activity illegal under federal law[.]” J.A. 331. The IRS also 

rejected the Church’s defense that its activities are protected by 

RFRA following O Centro. The agency concluded that, in O 

Centro, the Supreme Court held only that “an organization does 

not have to apply for . . . exemption [from the DEA] prior to 

seeking relief in the courts,” not that applicants can “simply use 
10

[Ayahuasca] without the exemption.” Id. at 333. The Church 

quickly filed to protest the IRS’s proposed adverse 

determination, but the IRS, unmoved by the Church’s 

challenge, issued a final adverse determination (“IRS 

Decision”) in June 2021 affirming its earlier proposed

determination. 

The Church then sued the Government in District Court to 

challenge the IRS Decision. The Church claimed, first, that the 

IRS erred in denying the Church’s tax-exemption application 

by failing to recognize that O Centro “recognized the use 

of . . . Ayahuasca in religious ceremonies as a sincere exercise 

of . . . religion under the First Amendment” and, second, that 

the Government violated RFRA by “ruling [in the IRS 

Decision] that [the Church’s] activities are illegal[.]” J.A. 26–

27. When the parties later filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment, the Government challenged the Church’s standing 

to raise its RFRA claim. Iowaska Church of Healing v. United 

States (“Iowaska I”), 2023 WL 2733774, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 

31, 2023). To defend its standing, the Church claimed that it 

had sustained three injuries. First, the Church suffered from 

the “chilling effect on its religious freedom” occasioned by the 

IRS’s second information request, which it said “caused [the 

Church] and its members to fear law enforcement intrusion into 

their ceremonies and potential prosecution under the CSA,” 

J.A. 139–40. Second, it endured “reputational damage” from 

the IRS Decision’s “characterization [of] the Church’s 

activities as ‘illegal,’” which the Church said prevented it from 

conducting other “charitable activities.” Id. at 140, 141. And 

finally, it suffered economic injury in the form of lost income 

and profits, which caused the Church to have “no membership 

income or contributions with which to carry on its programs for 

nearly three years.” Id. at 142.
11

The District Court granted the Government’s motion for 

summary judgment, concluding that the Church was not 

eligible for tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) and that 

it lacked Article III standing to assert its RFRA claim. Iowaska

I, 2023 WL 2733774, at *3. Starting with the tax-exemption 

claim, the District Court affirmed that the Church “falls short” 

of Section 501(c)(3)’s “‘organized and operated exclusively’ 

for [an] enumerated public purpose[]” requirement. Id. On the 

“organizational” prong, the District Court interpreted the 

Church’s articles of incorporation to “make explicit the 

organization’s purpose to distribute and facilitate the use of 

Ayahuasca” and the District Court agreed that purpose was 

impermissible because the Church “ha[d] not obtained a CSA 

exemption that would render such ceremonial distribution and 

use legal.” Id. at *4. On the “operational” prong, the District 

Court found that “the bulk of the organization’s time is devoted 

to conducting or preparing for weekend ceremonies in which 

Ayahuasca is to be distributed to participating members,” 

which, “[a]bsent a CSA exemption . . . amount[s] to the illegal 

distribution and promotion of the use of a controlled 

substance”—that is, “a non-exempt purpose.” Id. The District 

Court further rejected the Church’s reading of O Centro. The 

District Court reasoned that case had no bearing on whether the 

Church is entitled to tax-exempt status because it “addressed

religious Ayahuasca use in an entirely different legal context.” 

Id.

Turning next to the RFRA claim, the District Court held

that the none of the injuries the Church claimed could support 

Article III standing. Id. at *6; id. at *6 n.7. Addressing the 

Church’s claimed “chilling” injury primarily and most 

extensively, the District Court determined that the fact that 

“members cannot exercise their sincerely held religious beliefs 

by consuming Ayahuasca” was “neither traceable to the IRS’s 

denial of [the Church’s] application nor redressable with a 
12

favorable ruling[.]” Id. at *6. The District Court reasoned that 

the Church ceased its Ayahuasca ceremonies because it 

“lack[ed] . . . a CSA exemption” that would permit use and 

distribution of Ayahuasca, not because of any action by IRS; 

the District Court additionally emphasized that the IRS “has no 

authority to address [the Church’s] application for a CSA 

exemption.” Id. Moreover, the District Court found the 

Church’s claim that the IRS Decision would “likely put [the 

Church’s] pending DEA religious exemption application at a 

much higher risk of being denied” was, “at best, speculative” 

and could not satisfy the traceability requirement. Id. at *7. 

Finally, the District Court concluded that a favorable decision 

on the Church’s RFRA claim would not redress its alleged

“chilling” injury “since granting [the Church] tax-exempt 

status w[ould] not necessarily lead to DEA’s approval of [the 

Church’s] CSA exemption application.” Id. 

The District Court also briefly addressed the Church’s

claimed reputational and economic injuries, finding that neither 

injury conferred standing. Id. at *6 n.7. The District Court 

reasoned, first, that the Church’s alleged reputational injury is 

not sufficiently concrete since the record contains no evidence 

that the IRS Decision caused any stigmatic harm. Id. As to the 

Church’s alleged economic injury, the District Court found that 

the Church “flunk[ed] the traceability and redressability 

requirements” because its economic injury depended “entirely 

on the independent decisions of third-party donors.” Id. 

The Church timely appealed. 

II.

We review the question of whether the Church has Article 

III standing to raise its RFRA claim de novo. Air Excursions 

LLC v. Yellen, 66 F.4th 272, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2023); Defenders 

of Wildlife v. Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 
13

2013). We review the District Court’s ruling that the Church 

is neither organized nor operated exclusively for tax exempt 

purposes, however, for clear error. Fund for the Study of 

Economic Growth & Tax Reform (“FSEGTR”) v. IRS, 161 F.3d 

755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see Family Trust of Mass., Inc. v. 

United States, 722 F.3d 355, 359 (D.C. Cir. 2013).2 We 

conclude that the Church lacks standing to assert its RFRA 

claim because the economic injury the Church asserts on 

appeal is neither an injury-in-fact nor redressable and any other 

standing theories asserted below have been forfeited. Without 

the specter of a cognizable RFRA claim, the Church’s taxexemption claim also fails; the District Court’s affirmance of 

the IRS Decision was not clearly erroneous given that the 

Church could not proffer evidence of a CSA exemption to show 

it passed the organizational and operational tests.

2 The Church argues that the appropriate standard of review for the 

tax-exemption claim is de novo because the District Court ruled on 

cross-motions for summary judgment. In support, the Church cites 

two D.C. Circuit cases where this Court specifically gave summary 

judgment decisions in tax cases de novo review—Byers v. Comm’r, 

740 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 

211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Neither of these cases, however, 

displaces FSEGTR as the most applicable case. In Byers and Branch 

Ministries, we entertained only clear questions of law. Byers, 740 

F.3d at 674; Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140–41. Here, there is 

precedent directly on point requiring us to treat “the determination of 

whether an organization is organized and operated exclusively for 

exempt purposes [as] a factual determination,” which demands 

review “only for clear error.” FSEGTR, 161 F.3d at 758. That said, 

we would be remiss if we failed to reiterate FSEGTR’s instruction

that “it would be more appropriate for future district courts to decide 

501(c)(3) issues at bench trial, rather than on summary judgment.” 

Id. at 759.
14

A.

On appeal, the Church relies on its economic injury to 

support its argument that it has standing to assert the RFRA 

claim, but that injury fails the injury-in-fact and redressability 

requirements. 

“Standing to assert a [RFRA] claim or defense . . . shall be 

governed by the general rules of standing under [A]rticle III[.]” 

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). To establish Article III standing, a 

plaintiff must show (1) an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and 

particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical[;]” (2) “a causal connection between the injury 

and the conduct complained of,” or traceability; and (3) that it 

is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will 

be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); accord United States v. 

Texas, 143 S. Ct. 1964, 1970 (2023). “[S]tanding is not 

dispensed in gross[;]” plaintiffs “must demonstrate standing for 

each claim [they] seek[] to press and for each form of relief that 

is sought.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 

433, 439 (2017) (quoting Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 

554 U.S. 724, 734 (1996)). Accordingly, the Church cannot 

use the standing it has to assert its tax-exemption claim to 

establish standing to assert its RFRA claim. 

To allege an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must have 

“suffered . . . an invasion of a legally protected interest.” Nat’l 

Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States (“NTU”), 68 F.3d 1428, 

1433 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 

Organizations, specifically, must show “[s]uch concrete and 

demonstrable injury to the organization’s activities—with [a] 

consequent drain on the organization’s resources—

constitut[ing] . . . more than simply a setback to the 

organization’s abstract social interests.” Id. (quoting Havens 

Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982)). Indeed,
15

a demonstration that “discrete programmatic concerns are 

being directly and adversely affected” is required. Id. (quoting 

Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 

The economic injury the Church claims—the loss of the 

“inherently valuable statutory right” to Section 501(c)(3) tax 

exemption—is unsupported by any clear assertions about how 

the economic aspect of that injury has harmed “the 

organization’s activities—with [a] consequent drain on the 

organization’s resources” beyond a simple “setback to the 

organization’s abstract social interests.” NTU, 68 F.3d at 1433

(quoting Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 379). The Church did 

clarify before the District Court that the IRS Decision caused

the Church “loss of income and profits” and to have “no 

membership income or contributions with which to carry on its 

programs for three years,” J.A. 142, but even if that is so, those 

supposed impacts on the Church are too vague to show a

“direct[] and adverse[]” impact on any “discrete programmatic 

concerns.” NTU, 68 F.3d at 1433 (quoting Am. Legal Found., 

808 F.2d at 92).

To the degree that the Church also claims the loss of 

“charitable contributions and membership income” are part and

parcel of its claimed economic injury, Appellant’s Br. 44, the 

Church still fails to show traceability and redressability. 

Traceability requires “[t]he ‘causal connection between the 

injury and the conduct complained of’” to be “fairly traceable 

to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of 

the independent action of some third party not before the 

court.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). “‘When considering any 

chain of allegations for standing purposes, [this Court] may 

reject as overly speculative those links which are predictions of 

future events (especially future actions to be taken by third 

parties),’ as well as predictions of future injury that are ‘not 

normally susceptible of labelling as ‘true’ or ‘false.’” Id. at 21 

(quoting United Transp. Union v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 
16

891 F.2d 908, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Injuries from any lost 

“current and future . . . income and profits” are not traceable to 

the IRS Decision, J.A. 142, but instead, as the District Court 

explained, “depend[] entirely on the independent decisions of 

third-party donors,” Iowaska I, 2023 WL 2733774, at *6 n.7 

(citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 413 

(2013)). 

The Church relies upon Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 

682 (2014), for its standing argument, but that case is 

inapposite. There, the Supreme Court determined it was 

“predictable” that companies that chose to exercise their 

religious right to refuse insurance coverage for contraception 

and incur an Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) penalty would 

either have to pay the penalty in addition to paying for 

employee insurance or “face a competitive disadvantage in 

retaining and attracting skilled workers” by requiring 

employees to seek insurance on the ACA exchanges. Id. at 

722. The Court speculated about the potential third-party 

actions of workers, however, to determine whether the 

contraceptive coverage requirement imposed a substantial 

burden under RFRA, not to assess whether the companies had 

alleged an injury-in-fact traceable to a defendant’s conduct. 

The Church also urges that it has standing to assert its 

RFRA claim based on the chilling and reputational injuries it 

raised below, but the Church has waived these alleged bases 

for standing by referencing them only vaguely in a footnote.

“A party forfeits an argument by mentioning it only ‘in the 

most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, 

create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its 

bones.’” Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 179 

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 

190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). An argument left so naked “is 

tantamount to failing to raise it.” Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 

F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Here, the Church references the
17

chilling and reputational injuries introduced below in passing

but asserts in a footnote it “does not minimize or waive its 

claim of standing” based on these injuries. 

Appellant’s Br. 45 n.15. However, “[w]e need not consider 

cursory arguments made only in a footnote.” Hutchins v. 

District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 

(en banc).

B.

1. 

Having held that the Church lacks standing to assert its 

RFRA claim, we turn to the question of whether the District 

Court erred in affirming the IRS Decision. 

When a taxpayer challenges an IRS denial of tax-exempt 

status, “the burden is on the taxpayer seeking exemption to 

demonstrate that it is in fact entitled to tax-exempt status[.]” 

FSEGTR, 161 F.3d at 759. “[E]ntitlement to tax exemption 

[under Section 501(c)(3)] depends on meeting certain common 

law standards of charity—namely, that an institution seeking 

tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be 

contrary to established public policy.” Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 

586; see Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230 (same). While “a 

declaration that a given institution is not ‘charitable’ should be 

made only where there can be no doubt that the activity 

involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy,” Bob 

Jones, 461 U.S. at 592, “the presence of a single [non-exempt] 

purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption 

regardless of the number or importance of truly [non-exempt] 

purposes,” Better Bus. Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. 

United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945). 

The District Court did not clearly err in determining that 

the Church did not meet its burden here. “[T]he public purpose 
18

of a charitable [organization] may not be illegal or violate 

established public policy[.]” Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 591; see 

also Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 

311 (1878) (“A charitable use, where neither law nor public 

policy forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to 

promote the well-doing and well-being of social man.”). The 

Church’s primary organizational and operational purpose—

Ayahuasca use and ceremony—is illegal on its face without a 

CSA exemption and the Church did not prove otherwise to 

either the IRS or the District Court. Indeed, in its initial taxexemption application, the Church acknowledged that DMT “is 

illegal absent the appropriate registration with the DEA or 

pursuant to a judicial or other registration exemption” from the 

CSA. J.A. 247. The IRS was under the same impression, 

which is why the IRS both asked the Church about the status 

of its CSA exemption several times while considering the 

Church’s application and, ultimately, denied the Church’s 

application. 

Even though the Church, at some point during the 

pendency of its application to the IRS, changed its tune and 

began defending its past and proposed Ayahuasca use as 

protected under RFRA following O Centro, the IRS’s 

interpretation of O Centro to mean that “an organization does 

not have to apply for . . . exemption [from the DEA] prior to 

seeking relief in the courts,” not that applicants can “simply use 

[Ayahuasca] without the exemption,” is correct. Id. at 333. O 

Centro established that “the [CSA] do[es] not preclude 

exceptions [to the use of Schedule I drugs] altogether.” O 

Centro, 546 U.S. at 434. The case did not, however, establish 

the presumptive legality of Ayahuasca use by any purportedly 

religious group. While “RFRA . . . plainly contemplates that 

courts would recognize exceptions” to the CSA, the statute 

does not explicitly empower administrative agencies outside of 

the DEA to make those kinds of exceptions. Id. In the absence 
19

of such a decree, a citation to O Centro cannot foist the 

Church’s proposed Ayahuasca use into the realm of legality for 

the IRS’s Section 501(c)(3) assessment purposes without a 

grant, either directly or through delegation, by Congress. Thus, 

the IRS was correct in concluding that the Church’s Ayahuasca 

use foreclosed its eligibility for tax-exempt status. 

2.

The Church counters the preceding reasoning on several 

grounds, but none of the grounds it provides persuade us to 

change our holding.

To start, the Church contends that its proposed Ayahuasca

use is “presumptively legal” and, thus, cannot serve as a basis 

for failing the Church on the organizational or operational tests.

Appellant’s Br. 20. This argument is unconvincing, however,

because it conflates the burden the Church would face for an 

actionable RFRA claim with its burden for the instant taxexemption claim to obscure the fact that the Church fails to 

meet the latter.

3 For a RFRA claim, an “effective[] 

demonstrat[ion] that . . . [a] sincere exercise of religion was 

substantially burdened” is sufficient to make out a prima facie 

case. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 428. Under that framework, a 

showing that an organization’s Ayahuasca ceremonies are a 

“sincere exercise of religion” could be sufficient to establish 

the presumptive legality of those ceremonies and shift the 

burden to the government. For a tax-exemption claim, 

however, the burden is both different and higher: the taxpayer 

must show entitlement to tax-exempt status, which, here, puts 

the onus on the Church to demonstrate that its proposed 

Ayahuasca use is not “illegal” or “contrary to established 

3 In light of our conclusion that the Church lacks standing to assert 

its RFRA claim, we will not opine on whether it meets its burden for 

that claim on the merits.
20

public policy” in the first instance. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586;

see FSEGTR, 161 F.3d at 759. This is why, contrary to what 

the Church says, it was not the IRS’s responsibility to presume 

the Church’s Ayahuasca ceremonies were legal. It was, 

instead, the Church’s job to establish that it had a CSA 

exemption and it failed to do so.

4

The Church also relies on O Centro to bolster its 

presumptive legality argument, asserting that, since the 

Government concedes that the plaintiff’s Ayahuasca use in O 

Centro was protected by RFRA, the IRS should have, without 

court intervention, conceded the same as to the Church’s 

Ayahuasca use. But the Church’s conclusion falters because it 

is premised on a misinterpretation of the precedent. The 

Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff in O Centro, in 

part, because the Court deemed the DEA’s justification for 

withholding a CSA exemption for the plaintiff’s religious 

Ayahuasca use—namely, the need for uniform application of 

the CSA—an insufficiently “compelling government interest” 

in that context. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 437. Here, as even 

O Centro notes, the IRS Decision and the attendant tax 

regulatory scheme could be justified by a compelling 

government interest that necessitates uniform application. See 

id. at 435 (citing the tax exemption cases United States v. Lee, 

455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982), and Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 

680, 700 (1989), as examples of where the Court scrutinized an 

exemption request and determined “the denied [religious] 

exemptions could not be accommodated” in the face of a

4 The Church’s related argument that RFRA is both a “remedial

cause of action” and a “substantive restriction[] on the Government” 

that “sets substantive standards about what conduct the Government 

can and cannot deem illegal (or otherwise restrict)” fails for the same 

reason—the Church cannot leapfrog its way to shifting the RFRA 

burden to the Government when it has not, first, established that it 

has standing to assert the claim. Appellant’s Br. 22. 
21

“compelling interest in uniform application of a particular 

program”). The difference between the IRS and CSA

regulatory schemes is significant enough to render O Centro

inapposite on this point and in this posture.

The Church’s final argument in support of presumptive 

legality—that “RFRA effectively amended the CSA” to protect 

Ayahuasca use as a sincere religious exercise—is also plainly 

wrong. Appellant’s Reply Br. 8. “Where there is no clear 

[congressional] intention otherwise, a specific statute will not 

be controlled or nullified by a general one.” Morton v. 

Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974). Here, there is no 

indication that Congress intended RFRA to amend, control, or 

nullify the CSA, which is the more specific statute of the two. 

The IRS’s deference to the CSA was, thus, warranted. 

The Church next argues that the District Court, in 

declining to entertain whether the Church had made a sufficient 

showing to the DEA that it qualified for a CSA exemption,

impermissibly introduced an “exhaustion of administrative 

remedies” requirement. Appellant’s Br. 26. This contention 

relies on a mischaracterization of the District Court’s 

reasoning, however. The District Court merely held, as RFRA 

provides, that the IRS properly concluded that the Church’s

Ayahuasca use “remains illegal under federal law” until “[the 

Church] obtains a CSA exemption.” Iowaska I, 2023 WL 

2733774, at *5. The District Court did not purport to require

the Church to pursue an exemption exclusively through the 

DEA. Instead, it reasonably suggested that the Church had 

sued the wrong agency, erecting no barrier to the Church 

pursuing exemption through judicial action with the right party 

on the other side of the “v.”

The precedent the Church cites to further support its 

administrative exhaustion argument is neither on point nor 

binding on this Circuit. Oklevueha Native American Church of 
22

Hawaii, Inc. v. Holder, which the Church cites to say that 

courts “have repeatedly rejected [the] argument” that RFRA 

permits exhaustion requirements, Appellant’s Br. 24, 

addressed whether a church could obtain a CSA exemption in 

the courts without first seeking an exemption with the DEA. 

676 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit 

concluded courts can review “a RFRA-based challenge to the 

CSA without requiring that the plaintiffs first seek a religious 

use exemption from the DEA,” but did not deny that an 

exemption in some form is necessary prior to engaging in 

religious acts that would otherwise be illegal under the CSA. 

Id. at 838. 

The Church’s remaining arguments that it nevertheless 

passes the organizational and operational tests are, likewise, in 

vain. In its brief, the Church leans on the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Bob Jones for its announcement that “a declaration 

that a given institution is not ‘charitable’ should be made only 

where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is 

contrary to a fundamental public policy”—a passage the 

Church refers to as the “no doubt” rule—to say that the IRS 

could not have based its decision on the Church’s Ayahuasca 

use because the legality of that use is “uncertain.” Bob Jones, 

461 U.S. at 592. The Church is, again, wrong on this point; 

while the “no doubt” rule may be sufficient to save an 

organization committed to unpopular but not illegal activities, 

it is insufficient to counter the explicitly illegal activity of using 

and distributing a DMT-rich substance without a CSA 

exemption. See Ould, 95 U.S. at 311. 

The Church offers additional explanations for why it

passes the organizational and operational tests even if its 

proposed Ayahuasca use were to be deemed fully illegal, but 

those explanations, too, are unpersuasive. Addressing the

organizational test first, the Church argues its proposed 

Ayahuasca use in its articles of incorporation is “aspiration[al]” 
23

and does not specify how “‘access’ will be offered” or “commit 

to doing so in an illegal manner.” Appellant’s Br. 39–40. But 

in pointing this out, the Church ignores that the applicable 

regulation itself requires the IRS to discern “the organization’s 

purposes . . . by the terms of [the organization’s] articles.” 

26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(ii). Whether aspirational or 

not, the Church plainly listed the provision of Ayahuasca in 

religious ceremony as a purpose and the IRS reasonably 

incorporated that purpose into its organizational test 

assessment. 

The Church finally contends that the savings clause in its 

articles of incorporation proves that it does not “expressly 

empower the organization to engage . . . in [non-exempt] 

activities.” Id. § 1-501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(B). This contention is 

lacking because the Church forfeited its savings clause 

argument by failing to raise it before the District Court. 

Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 179 (“Absent exceptional 

circumstances, a party forfeits an argument by failing to press 

it in district court.”).5

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

District Court as to the Church’s tax-exemption claim. Given 

that the District Court’s order granted the Government’s 

motion for summary judgment but did not clearly articulate that 

the Church’s RFRA claim was dismissed for lack of standing, 

we affirmatively dismiss the Church’s RFRA claim here. 

5 The Church further argues that it passes the operational test because 

it has conducted, and continued to conduct, other religious and 

charitable activities that are unrelated to Ayahuasca ceremonies. The 

Church makes this claim for the first time on appeal, however, so we 

cannot consider it. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 179. 
24

So ordered.