In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

TERRANCE J. SHAW, FRED T. ROBINSON, 

RASHANN GRIER, and ROMOND FOULKS, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 07-CR-10004 — Joe B. McDade, Judge. 

No. 10-CR-20031 — James E. Shadid, Judge. 

Nos. 05-CR-10053 & 09-CR-40081 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 13, 2019 — DECIDED APRIL 28, 2020 

____________________ 

Before MANION, KANNE, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. In 2018, Congress passed the First 

Step Act to address the disparities between sentences for 

crack and powder cocaine. Among other things, the First Step 

Act allows certain criminal defendants to seek, and district 
2 Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

courts to impose, sentence reductions if the defendant was 

previously convicted of a “covered offense.” 

To determine whether a defendant is eligible for a reduced 

sentence under the First Step Act, a court needs to look only 

at a defendant’s statute of conviction, not to the quantities of 

crack involved in the offense. More specifically, if a defendant 

was convicted of a crack-cocaine offense that was later modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, he or she is eligible to have a 

court consider whether to reduce the previously imposed 

term of imprisonment. Here, each defendant’s statutory penalties for crack-cocaine offenses had been modified by the Fair 

Sentencing Act, so each is eligible to have a court consider 

whether to reduce the defendant’s sentence under the First 

Step Act. Because each district court did not do so in each of 

their respective cases, we reverse and remand all three respective district court orders denying the motions for a sentence 

reduction. 

I. BACKGROUND

The First Step Act gives a court discretion to reduce the 

sentence of a defendant previously convicted of a “covered 

offense.” See Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, § 404(a) 

(2018). A “covered offense” is “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified 

by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” Id.

§ 404(a). The offense must also have been “committed before 

August 3, 2010.” Id. 

A judge considering a motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act is faced with two questions. First, may

the court reduce the sentence? And second, should the court 

reduce the sentence? The first question, which concerns a 
Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 3

defendant’s eligibility for a sentence reduction, is governed 

by sections 404(a) and 404(c) of the First Step Act. If a defendant is eligible for a reduction, then a court “may” impose a 

reduced sentence. This appeal primarily concerns the question of eligibility. 

Because the operation of the First Step Act is contingent 

upon changes made to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, we 

begin with a bit of background about the Fair Sentencing Act. 

Drug-offense penalties under federal law depend in part 

on the weight and type of the drug at issue and in part on the 

defendant’s prior convictions. For crack offenses committed 

before August 2010, the statutory penalties relating to imprisonment were the following: 

Section 841 Quantity No prior 

offense

1 prior

offense

2 prior

offenses 

(b)(1)(A) > 50 grams 10 years–

life 

20 years–

life 

life 

(b)(1)(B) > 5 grams 5-40 years 10 years–

life 

10 years–

life 

(b)(1)(C) any 0–20 years 0–30 years 0–30 years 

21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006 & Supp. IV). 

In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act. See Pub. 

L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). Section 2 of that Act, referred to in the First Step Act,1 changed the statutory penalties 

1 The First Step Act also refers to section 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, 

which eliminated the mandatory minimum prison term for simple possession of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). That section is not at issue 

in this case. 
4 Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

for crack offenses by increasing the quantity of crack required 

for imprisonment: 

Section 841 Quantity No prior 

offense

1 prior

offense

2 prior

offenses 

(b)(1)(A) > 280 

grams 

10 years–

life 

20 years–

life 

life 

(b)(1)(B) > 28 grams 5-40 years 10 years–

life 

10 years–

life 

(b)(1)(C) any 0–20 years 0–30 years 0–30 years 

As the two charts illustrate, the Fair Sentencing Act 

changed the quantity that triggers certain penalties of imprisonment. Under § 841(b)(1)(A), the threshold quantity increased from 50 grams to 280 grams; and under § 841(b)(1)(B), 

the threshold quantity increased from 5 grams to 28 grams. 

These changes reflected a recognition that the tremendous 

disparities in punishment of powder-cocaine and crack-cocaine offenses disparately impacted African Americans. See

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268–69 (2012). 

But the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes to the sentencing 

scheme applied only to defendants who were sentenced after 

the law’s enactment on August 3, 2010, United States v. Fisher, 

635 F.3d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Dorsey, 567 U.S. 

at 282, leading us to comment that the Act might more accurately be known as “The Not Quite as Fair as it could be Sentencing Act of 2010.” 

Congress eventually addressed this deficiency when it 

passed the First Step Act of 2018. Section 404(b) of that Act 

makes the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively applicable to defendants whose offenses were committed before August 3, 
Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 5

2010. Now, a district court may “impose a reduced sentence 

as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act ... were in 

effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” First 

Step Act, § 404(b). 

Defendants Terrance Shaw and Fred Robinson were convicted—in 2007 and 2010, respectively—of possessing crack 

cocaine with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B). Defendants Rashann Grier and Romond Foulks 

were convicted—in 2003 and 2010, respectively—of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine. Id. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. In 2019, 

each defendant moved for a sentence reduction under Section 

404(b) of the newly passed First Step Act. Each district court 

denied the motion, concluding that the defendant was ineligible to seek relief under the First Step Act because his crack 

offense is not a “covered offense” under the Act. As for Robinson, the court ruled in the alternative that, even if Robinson 

were eligible for a sentence reduction, the court would not exercise its discretion to reduce his sentence. 

The defendants and the government disagree about 

whether the defendants are eligible to have a court consider 

reducing their sentences under the First Step Act. The crux of 

this disagreement is whether the defendants’ crack offenses 

are “covered offenses,” as defined by the First Step Act. 

The defendants contend that anyone sentenced for violating a federal criminal statute that was modified by the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010 is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. Under this straightforward theory, a 

court need only (1) examine the statute under which a defendant was charged, and (2) determine whether the statutory 

penalties for that offense were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. 
6 Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

The government offers a contrasting interpretation that 

would have a court conduct a more fact-intensive analysis to 

determine eligibility for resentencing under the First Step Act. 

Under this interpretation, a court would look to the drug 

quantity described in a defendant’s presentence investigation 

report or a plea agreement’s factual basis to determine 

whether the Fair Sentencing Act altered a defendant’s penalty 

range. 

The facts of these cases underscore the practical differences between these competing interpretations. Under the defendants’ theory, they are eligible to have a court consider 

their motions. They were convicted of crack offenses carrying 

statutory penalties the Fair Sentencing Act modified. But under the government’s proposed framework, the defendants 

would be ineligible for sentence reductions. That’s because 

the quantities of crack involved in each defendant’s offense 

exceeded the new quantity thresholds set by the Fair Sentencing Act. 

Shaw and Robinson were each convicted of possession of 

crack with intent to distribute, and the penalties for this offense are established under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The Fair 

Sentencing Act changed the drug quantities that trigger mandatory-minimum prison terms under § 841(b)(1)(B) from 5 

grams to 28 grams. Officers found 33.8 grams of crack in 

Shaw’s kitchen cabinet. Robinson possessed 32.7 grams of 

crack. Both quantities exceed the 28-gram threshold. 

Similarly, Grier and Foulks were convicted of conspiracy 

to distribute crack, the punishment for which is set out in 21 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The trigger amount for the mandatoryminimum penalties under § 841(b)(1)(A) changed from 50 

grams to 280 grams. Grier conspired to distribute 2.91 
Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 7

kilograms of crack, which is well over the 280-gram threshold. 

Foulks conspired to distribute 8.4 kilograms of crack. 

II. ANALYSIS

 The district courts denied each defendant’s motion for a 

sentence reduction by concluding that the defendant in each 

case was ineligible under the First Step Act to have his sentence reduced. Because these decisions turn on a question of 

statutory interpretation, we review them de novo. See United 

States v. Miller, 883 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 2018). 

A. The Defendants Were Convicted of “Covered Offenses” 

Our first interpretive task is to determine the meaning of 

a “covered offense.” First Step Act, § 404(a). We begin, as we 

must, with the relevant text of the First Step Act, which defines a covered offense as “a violation of a Federal criminal 

statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by 

section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” Id. The question is: does “the statutory penalties for which were modified 

by section 2 or 3” refer to “Federal criminal statute” or to “a 

violation of a federal criminal statute”? We join our sister circuits in holding that the phrase modifies “federal criminal 

statute.” See United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 446 (1st Cir. 2020); 

United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 2019); United 

States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2019); United 

States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789, 791–92 (6th Cir. 2019); United 

States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 185–86 (4th Cir. 2019). This sensible interpretation is supported by both a time-honored 

canon of statutory construction and the statutory context. 

First, under the nearest-reasonable-referent canon, we 

presume a modifier refers to the nearest reasonable referent. 

“Modifiers should come, if possible, next to the words they 
8 Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

modify.” William Strunk Jr. & E.B. White, The Elements of 

Style 30 (50th Anniversary ed. 2009). And, as is the case here, 

“[w]hen the syntax involves something other than a parallel 

series of nouns or verbs, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies only to the nearest reasonable referent.” 

Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152–53 (2012). 

Let’s apply that canon to the statute, which reads: 

“covered offense” means a violation of a Federal 

criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which 

were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ... that was committed before August 

3, 2010.

First Step Act, § 404(a). Mindful that modifiers generally attach to the closest noun, we conclude the phrase “the statutory penalties for which were modified by Section 2” relates 

to “federal criminal statute,” not “violation,” because the former is closer to the modifier, making “federal criminal statute” the nearest reasonable referent. Under this interpretation, whether an offense is covered simply depends on the 

statute under which a defendant was convicted. See also 

Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015) (applying nearest-reasonable-referent canon to statute that reads “[a]ny alien who ... has been convicted of a violation of ... any law or 

regulation ... relating to a controlled substance” is deportable 

and concluding “relating to” modified “law or regulation,” 

not “violation”). 

Arguing for the opposing interpretation—that the modifying phrase applies to “a violation”—the government reasons that the First Step Act’s language “committed before August 3, 2010,” § 404(a), points towards a fact-specific inquiry 
Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 9

into the particular circumstances of the offense. See Nijhawan 

v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 33–34 (2009). But the language indicating when an offense must have been committed by does not 

transform the eligibility inquiry into a complicated, fact-intensive determination. As we explained above, that language 

makes the changes in the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively applicable to those whose offenses were committed before August 3, 2010. 

Our interpretation is further strengthened by the statutory 

context. See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 963 (2016) 

(interpretation under statutory canon of construction can be 

overcome by other indicia of meaning within the statutory 

scheme). The relevant provision of the Fair Sentencing Act of 

2010, section 2, did not modify the penalties on an individual 

basis. Instead, it broadly modified penalties for entire categories of offenses that include fixed aggravating elements, such 

as the weight of the drug. 

Accordingly, we hold that the statute of conviction alone 

determines eligibility for First Step Act relief. The defendants’ 

offenses are “covered offenses” under the plain language of 

the First Step Act because the Fair Sentencing Act modified 

the penalties for crack offenses as a whole, not for individual 

violations. 

With this conclusion, each defendant is eligible to seek relief under the First Step Act because each committed a crackcocaine offense before August 3, 2010, and the penalty for each 

of those crimes was modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. Because Shaw, Grier, and Foulks are eligible to seek relief under 

the First Step Act, the district courts’ orders in those cases 

should be reversed. 
10 Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

Robinson is also eligible to seek relief under the First Step 

Act, but his case requires further analysis. 

B. The District Court Did Not Provide a Sufficient Explanation 

for Its Alternative Holding as to Robinson 

While the district court found Robinson ineligible to seek 

relief under the First Step Act, the court also ruled that, even 

if Robinson were eligible, it would not reduce his sentence. 

Robinson challenges that alternate conclusion. 

In arriving at its alternate conclusion, the district court reasoned that Robinson’s “amended guidelines range would become 188–235 months instead of 262–327 months.” But Robinson was initially sentenced to 180 months, which “would be 

a downward departure even from the amended guidelines 

range.” So, the court “decline[d] to reduce” Robinson’s sentence, “even if he were eligible.” The court gave no indication 

that it had considered the arguments presented in Robinson’s 

motion or accounted for 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 

The government contends that the district court’s alternative ruling makes its eligibility error harmless. To show harmless error, the government must show that the district court’s 

eligibility analysis did not affect the district court’s decision 

not to reduce Robinson’s sentence. Cf. United States v. Abbas, 

560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). We must be sure that an alternate ruling is “‘not just a conclusory comment tossed in for 

good measure,’ but rather reflected a ‘detailed explanation of 

the basis for the parallel result.’” United States v. Foster, 701 

F.3d 1142, 1158 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Hill, 

645 F.3d 900, 912 (7th Cir. 2011)). 

Given the complexities of sentencing, the adequacy of a 

court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence depends on 
Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 11

“the circumstances of the particular case.” Chavez-Meza v. 

United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018) (explaining the extent of a district court’s explanation for a sentence imposed 

varies with the circumstances). At the very least, we must be 

assured that a court weighing the appropriateness of a sentence “relied upon the record” and “considered the parties’ 

arguments.” Id. 

Robinson presented two arguments in support of his assertion that his sentence should be reduced to 129 months’ 

imprisonment. His first argument addressed his pre-sentence 

conduct; his second addressed his post-sentence conduct. 

First, he argued that the original sentencing court’s reasons for departing downward from the guidelines needed to 

be revisited as reasons for reducing his sentence in light of the 

First Step Act. When Robinson was first sentenced in 2010 by 

a different sentencing judge, Judge McCuskey, his guidelines 

range was 262–327 months. But Judge McCuskey departed 

from the guidelines and imposed a sentence of 180 months. 

Judge McCuskey believed Robinson’s career-offender enhancement overrepresented the seriousness of his criminal 

history. Robinson also provided substantial assistance to the 

government; so much so, that the government previously recommended to Judge McCuskey a sentence 10% below the 

guidelines range. Because Robinson’s initial sentence was imposed by a different sentencing judge, Robinson urged the 

new court to take note of the reasons for his previous, belowguidelines sentence. Notably, the government represented to 

the district court that if the First Step Act applied to Robinson’s offense, it would honor its previous recommendation 

for a 10% reduction. Accordingly, the government requested 
12 Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

a below-guidelines sentence of 170 months if the First Step Act 

applied. 

Second, Robinson also provided compelling information 

about his conduct in prison after sentencing and argued that 

this conduct warranted a sentence reduction. He reasoned 

that he had taken many educational courses; he had received 

consistently exemplary recommendations from his work supervisor in the prison-industries program, who noted that “he 

takes on extra duties, helps other areas, has a high level of 

personal conduct, and has great work ethic”; and he incurred 

only one disciplinary infraction—a minor one—over the nine 

years he had been incarcerated. 

Nothing in the First Step Act prevents the district court 

from taking Robinson’s arguments into consideration. See

United States v. Allen, 19-3606, 2020 WL 1861973, at *2–3 (6th 

Cir. Apr. 14, 2020) (district court may consider evidence of a 

defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation when deciding 

whether to impose a reduced sentence under the First Step 

Act); accord United States v. Williams, 943 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 

2019), and United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 322 n.7 (5th 

Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 499 (4th 

Cir. 2020) (noting the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements that are normally binding on a court in a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) are not binding on a court 

considering a First Step Act motion). For example, post-sentencing conduct may be relevant to § 3553(a) factors a court 

may wish to consider when determining whether to “impose 

a reduced sentence.” First Step Act, § 404(b); see, e.g., Pepper v. 

United States, 562 U.S. 476, 504 (2011). That is because conduct 

after sentencing is “plainly relevant to ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant’”; “pertinent to ‘the need for the 
Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 13

sentence imposed’”; and may “critically inform a sentencing 

judge’s overarching duty under § 3553(a) to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’ to comply 

with the sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2).” Pepper, 

562 U.S. at 491 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 

Importantly, nothing in the First Step Act precludes a 

court from utilizing § 3553(a)’s familiar framework when assessing a defendant’s arguments; and doing so makes good 

sense. See Allen, 2020 WL 1861973, at *3.2 Familiarity fosters 

manageability, and courts are well versed in using § 3553 as 

an analytical tool for making discretionary decisions. Similarly, nothing in the First Step Act precludes a court from 

looking at § 3553(a) factors anew. Id. Because of lengthy statutory penalties attached to crack offenses, a judge presiding 

over a request for a sentence reduction under the Act may not 

be the same judge who imposed a defendant’s original sentence. This could hamper a judge’s consideration of a defendant’s arguments, because the new judge would be heavily reliant on a previous explanation and record that was “not created with the current statutory framework in mind.” Id.; accord United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 446, 451 (1st Cir. 2020). 

Counsel may have pressed different arguments based on a 

different statutory framework; a court may have credited 

those arguments differently, as the statutory minimum and 

maximum often anchor a court’s choice of a suitable sentence. 

Smith, 954 F.3d at 451. What is more, today’s Guidelines may 

2 We leave for another day whether a court is required to take 

§ 3553(a) factors into consideration. The issue was not squarely presented 

in this case, and our court would benefit from more thorough briefing on 

it. 
14 Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

reflect updated views about the seriousness of a defendant’s 

offense or criminal history. 

So, a defendant may, as Robinson did, present evidence of 

his post-sentencing conduct in support of a reduced sentence. 

And a court may look to § 3553(a)’s familiar framework when 

assessing whether to impose a reduced sentence. 

The First Step Act is a novel statute; and Robinson presented commensurately inventive arguments. Chavez-Meza, 

138 S. Ct. at 1965 (“explanation may be necessary depending, 

perhaps, upon the legal arguments raised”) (internal punctuation omitted). Despite the originality and potential of Robinson’s arguments, the district court acknowledged neither in 

its summary holding that it would not reduce Robinson’s sentence even if he were eligible. Nor does the order otherwise 

indicate that the court considered the arguments Robinson 

presented. It did not, for example, acknowledge the government’s noteworthy recommendation that it would continue to 

endorse a sentence 10% below the new guidelines range (188–

235 months), which would result in a sentence of 170 months 

instead of 180 months. And because the district court did not 

hold a hearing on the motion, we lack a corresponding transcript that might further supplement the court’s explanation. 

That silence leaves us without assurance that the district 

court considered Robinson’s arguments, even if it didn’t ultimately find them persuasive. Cf. Hill, 645 F.3d at 912–13, and 

United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cir. 2019). As a 

result, the district court did not provide a sufficient explanation for its alternate holding. We must be satisfied that the 

court considered Robinson’s arguments. On the limited record before us, we cannot be sure that the district court did so. 

And we cannot confidently say that, had the district court 
Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 15

taken Robinson’s arguments into account, the court would 

have decided as it did: denying Robinson’s motion for a reduced sentence. Cf. United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 960, 966 

(7th Cir. 2014). When, as here, we feel that a court’s explanation is “inadequate,” we may “send the case back to the district court for a more complete explanation.” Chavez-Meza, 138 

S. Ct. at 1965. We opt to exercise that course of action today 

with regard to Robinson. 

We address one final argument. Robinson contends that 

the court misunderstood the scope of its discretion under the 

First Step Act by mistakenly believing it could not sentence 

Robinson to a below-guidelines sentence. He says the court’s 

rationale—that Robinson’s sentence is below the guidelines 

range, so no further adjustment is necessary or possible—is 

more akin to an analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) than to 

the individual review envisaged by the First Step Act. In support, Robinson points to other cases pending before us, in 

which the same district court made remarks similar to those 

in Robinson’s case. See, e.g., United States v. David Vorties, No. 

19-2476; United States v. Thaddeus Speed, No. 19-2708. 

In light of statements made in all three cases, Robinson expresses concern that the court’s proposed distinction between 

“resentencing” and “sentence reduction” not only reflects a 

misapprehension about the extent of its discretion under the 

First Step Act, but also improperly likens a motion brought 

under the First Step Act to one brought under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2). See Wirsing, 943 F.3d at 185 (holding the “the distinct language of the First Step Act compels the interpretation 

that motions for relief under that statute are appropriately 

brought under § 3582(c)(1)(B)” and surmising “there is no reason to suppose that motions brought pursuant to 
16 Nos. 19-2067, 19-2069, 19-2078 & 19-2117 

§ 3582(c)(1)(B) are subject to the restrictions particular to 

§ 3582(c)(2), which are grounded in the text of the latter statute”). Robinson’s concern about the court’s distinction between a “resentencing” and “sentence reduction” may be justified, and we agree with the Fourth Circuit that the First Step 

Act does not include the limitations particular to § 3582(c)(2). 

But because our decision rests on other grounds, we have no 

occasion to speculate about the court’s understanding of its 

discretion. 

Our decision also expresses no view on how the district 

court should rule on remand. We say nothing further about 

the extent to which a court must address the various arguments a defendant presents, because here, the district court 

said nothing of the arguments we’ve mentioned. It is for the 

district court, in its discretion, to undertake a “complete review” of Robinson’s motion and to determine whether he is 

entitled to relief. First Step Act, § 404(c). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE all four district court orders denying each defendant’s respective motion 

for a sentence reduction, and REMAND to each district court 

the respective cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion.