## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

### D O R IS 

### V IR G IN IA 

### M C 

### G R E G O R 

### S T R IB L IN G 

### , M A R T H A 

### L E E 

### M C 

### G R E G O R 

### , A N D 

### F R A N K



### B O B B IT T 

### M C 

### G R E G O R 

### , J R 

### . , P E T IT IO N E R S 

### ,

v . 

### M IL L IC A N 

### D P C P A R T N E R S 

### , L P , A N D 

### P E A C H 

### C R E E K 

### P A R T N E R S 

### , L T D 

### . , R E S P O N D E N T S

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F O U R T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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P ER CURIAM

When the metes-a

nd-bounds descr iption in a deed conflicts with another , more g ener al, descr iption in the deed, which controls? I n this boundary -disp u t e case, the court of appea ls sided with t h e g ener al descr iption. But, beca use the metes-a

nd-bounds descr iption better indicates the parties’ intent, and beca

use the court of appea ls’ approa ch cre ates uncer tainty in land title whene ver a dee d’s g ener al and spe cific de scriptions differ , we r ever se.Milli can and the McGre g ors are adjac ent landowner s. They dispute owner ship of a 34.28- 1 2

acr e trac t ( the “Tra ct”) in a heavily wooded a

rea in Bra zos C ounty

. Milli can asser ts r ecor d title to the Trac t, but a long- standing fenc e place s the Trac t on the McGre g ors’ side. The McGre g ors deny that Milli can has rec ord title, and, in the alterna tive, the McGre g ors assert adver se possession. Milli can filed a sui t to quiet title and declara tory -judg ment action , and the trial court, finding that Milli can did not have rec ord title, g rante d summary judgme nt for the McGre g ors without rea ching adver se possession. I t order ed that Milli can take nothing but all o we d the McGre g ors to rec over attorney s’ fee s. See T E X . C I V . P R A C . & R E M . C O D E § 37.004(c) (authorizing decla ratory -judg ment actions in boundary -dispute case s). The court of appea ls, howeve r, reve rsed, holding that Milli can had rec ord title to the 34.28-ac re Trac t, and rema nded for the trial court to consider the McGre g ors’ adver se possession claim. 433 S.W .3d 67, 68 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014). This appea l

conce rns only

whether Milli can ha s rec ord title to the Trac t. This case turns on two deeds in Milli can’ s chain of title: a 1945 Dee d g ranting land from Roy Nunn to P.P. Prescott and a 1973 Dee d convey ing land from the Prescott family to E.T. Ba rre tt and J oel Guedr

y . The 1945 Dee d is straig htforwa rd, convey

ing 202 acr es in the Thomas Henr y Survey , Abstrac t No. 130, in Br azos County

. These 202 acr es wer e descr ibed by metes and bounds, and they undisputedly

include the c ontested 34.28-a cre Trac t.

W e r e f e r t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t s

— M i l l i c a n D P C P a r t n e r s , L P , a n d P e a c h C r e e k P a r t n e r s , L t d

. — c o l l e c t i v e l y a s 1

“ M i l l i c a n . ”

W e r e f e r t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r s

— D o r i s V i r g i n i a M c G r e g o r S t r i b l i n g , M a r t h a L e e M c G r e g o r , a n d F r a n k B o b b i t t 2 M c G r e g o r , J r . — c o l l e c t i v e l y a s t h e “ M c G r e g o r s . ” T h e y a r e s u c c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t t o t h e o r i g i n a l d e f e n d a n t b e l o w , t h e F r a n k B o b b i t t M c G r e g o r T r u s t , D o r i s M c G r e g o r , t r u s t e e . 2Whether t he 1973 Dee d subsequently convey ed the same 34.28-acr e T ra ct i n cl uded in the

1945 Dee d is disputed. I f it did not, then Milli can does not have rec ord title to the Trac t. The 1973 Dee d convey ed 4,943.75 acr es, composed of three separ ate trac ts. I t descr ibed the first of these three
trac ts (the “F irst Trac t”) i n t wo d i fferent way s. First, it listed nine smaller parc els, and their respe ctive acr eag es, that ostensibly composed the larg er “F i rs t Trac t.” Added toge ther, the individual a cre ag es of the nine parc els total 1,145.95 acr es (thoug h the Dee d did not itself provide this sum). One of these nine par cels wa s “a 202 acr e trac t out of Thomas Henr

y Survey , Abs. No. 130, and described in a deed from Roy W. Nunn, t o P.P. Prescott, of rec ord i n Vol. 137 Pag e 285 of the Dee d Records of Br azos County , Texa s . ” T h i s wa s the same 202-ac re trac t from the 1945 Dee d that contained the 34.28-ac re Tr act. I n other wor ds, in the 1973 Dee d’s g ener al desc ription, the P resc ott family claimed to convey their entire 202-ac re tract obtained t h ro u gh the 1945 Dee d, including the 34.28-ac re Tr act. I n contra st, the 1973 Dee d’s m etes-and-bounds descr iption—purporting to “more fully descr ibe[] ” the First Trac t—does not c ontain the 34.28-ac re Tr act. Rathe r, the 34.28-a cre Trac t is contig uous to the First Trac t a s descr ibed by the metes and bounds. Subsequent to the metes-andbounds descr iption, the 1973 Deed state d that the Fir st Trac t totals 1,167.203 acre s. Thus, the 1973 Dee d contains two inconsistencies. First, the g ener al descr iption purports to convey the 34.28-ac re Trac t, wher eas the metes and bounds do not. Second, the acr eag es of the parc els supposedly composing the First Trac t total only 1,145.95 acr es, but the 197 3 De ed itself
states that the total acr eag e is 1,167.203 acr es. Acc ording to undispute d summary judgme nt

3evidenc e, the metes and bounds in the 1973 Dee d acc urate ly descr ibe an are a of about 1,167 acr es.

The source of the excess acr eag e is unclea r, but no evidenc e exis ts that the Prescotts did not own it. Neither party contends that the 1973 Dee d is ambig uous, and we construe an unambig uous deed as a matter of law. Luckel v. W hite , 819 S.W .2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). We discern the parties’ intent from the dee d’s lang uag e in its entire ty “without ref

ere nce to matter s of mere form, re lative position of descr iptions, technica lities, or arbitra ry rules.” Id. at 462 (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Burns , 84 S.W .2d 442, 444 (Tex. 1935)). W e h ave long held that “[a]ll parts of a written instrument must be harmoniz ed an d gi v en eff ect if possible, but in case of a conflict the more specific provisions will cont ro l o v er g ener al expressions which are worde d as being applicable to the same land.” U.S. Enters., Inc. v . Dauley , 535 S.W .2d 623, 630–31 (Tex. 1976). This rule of construction is not an arbitra ry rule, but a means 3 of discerning the parties’ true intent. See Gulf Prod. Co. v. Spear , 84 S.W .2d 452, 455 (Tex. 1935). When the specific d escr iption is clea r, there is “no nece ssity for invoking the aid of the g ener al descr iption.” Cullers , 16 S.W . at 1005. For example, in Southern Pine Lumber Co. v

. Hart , a deed’ s g ener al descr iption purpor ted
to convey the same land the g rantor had obtained by a previous deed, but the metes and bounds descr ibed a smaller

are a. 340 S.W.2d at 779. W e held the dee d ref err ed only

to the smaller ar ea. Id. at 780. Simi larly , in Cullers v. P l a t t , a d ee d gave metes and bounds for the proper ty being convey ed, stating that it was “all of [a cer tain] survey except 140 acr es belong ing to the Montgome ry

S e e a l s o S

. P i n e L u m b e r C o . v . H a r t , 3 4 0 S

. W

. 2 d 7 7 5 , 7 7 9

– 8 0 ( T e x . 1 9 6 0 ) ; S u n O i l C o . , 8 4 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 4 6 ; 3 C u l l e r s v . P l a t t , 1 6 S

. W

. 1 0 0 3 , 1 0 0 5 ( T e x . 1 8 9 1 )

. 4estate.” 16 S.W

. at 1004. I n rea lity , the s u rv ey contained more land than was in the metes-andbounds descr iption or belonge d to the M ontgome ry estate. Id. at 1005. Nonethele ss, t h e s p ec ific descr iption controlled and the deed only convey ed the land within the met es an d b ounds, not the additional are a allowe d by the g ener al desc ription. Id. The prese nt case closely rese mbles Cullers and Southern Pine Lumber Co. The metes-andbounds descr iption in the 1973 Dee d does not include the 34.28-ac re Trac t, but the g ener al descr i p t i o n , ref

err ing to a previous deed, does. As in Cullers and Southern Pine L umber Co. , the “dee d

. . . contains an unambig uous descr iption” and “[n] o ref ere nce to any other deed is nece ssary to lo ca t e t h e t ra ct

. ” S. Pine Lumber Co. , 340 S.W .2d at 780. Milli can urg es that the g ener al descr iption in the 1973 Dee d is more specific than those in Cullers and Southern Pine Lumber Co. beca use it not only ref

err ed to a prior deed, but also identified the proper ty being convey ed as “a 202-

acr e trac t.” The call for acr eag e, howeve r, “is the least reliable of all calls in a deed.” Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson , 334 S.W .2d 436, 439 (Tex. 1960). Fu rt h er m o re, the metes-a nd-bounds descr iption is mo re specific and there fore better indicates the parties’ intent. Milli can’ s position would inject uncer

tainty into long- settled land rec ords whene ver the metes-a nd-bounds descr iption conflicts with other la

ng uag e in the dee d. The spec ific desc ription controls. 4 Milli can asser

ts that rese rvations should be expressly made, not by implication. See Derwen Res., LLC v. Carr i

z o Oi l & Gas, Inc. , No. 09-07-00597- CV, 2008 WL 6141597, at *6 (Tex.

T h i s r u l e f

a v o r i n g t h e m e t e s a n d b o u n d s d o e s n o t u n d e r m i n e , w h e n a p p l i c a b l e , t h e s t r i p a n d g o r e d o c t r i n e , 4 w h i c h u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a l l o w s f o r a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l a n d n a r r o w s t r i p o f l a n d o m i t t e d f r o m t h e d e e d i s s t i l l c o n v e y e d

. S e e A n g e l o v . B i s c a m p , 4 4 1 S

. W

. 2 d 5 2 4 , 5 2 6

– 2 7 ( T e x . 1 9 6 9 )

. M i l l i c a n d o e s n o t a s s e r t t h e d o c t r i n e , a n d w e n e e d n o t c o n s i d e r i t

. 5App.—B eaumont May 21, 2009, pet. denied)

. Her e, howeve r, the question is not whether the 34.28-

acr e Trac t was rese rved from the convey ance , but whether it was included in the convey ance to beg in with. Sp ec i fi c re s er v ati ons are nece ssary in some situations, but not for the metes and bounds to control over a direc tly contra ry g ener al descr iption. I ndeed, had the 1973 Dee d expressly stated that the 34.28-ac re Trac t w as excluded, then the Dee d’s meaning would be clea r without need to r esort to a rule of

construction. This approa ch does not rende r the g ener al descri p t i o n m eaning less; the g ener al descr iption—refer

ring to previous deeds—r emains a h el p fu l tool for trac ing title. Schaffer v. Heidenhe imer , 43 Tex. Civ. App. 366, 370, 96 S.W

. 61, 62 (San Antonio 1906, writ re f’ d ); s ee S. Pine Lumber Co. , 340 S.W .2d at 780; Coffee v. Manly , 166 S.W .2d 377 , 3 7 9

– 8 0 (T ex . Civ. App.—Eastland 1942, wr it ref’ d). I t continues to be true, of

course , that the metes-a

nd-bounds desc ription i s n o t t o be g iven controlling eff ect, when it is appar ent from the lang uag e of t h e deed, rea d in the light of the surrounding circ umstances, that the parties intended that the g ener al descr iption should control, or when the g ener al descr iption more surely indicates the true intention, or when the g rantor’ s intention clea rly and unmistakably appea rs from the la

ng uag e of the entire instrument. Ford v. McRae , 96 S.W .2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1936) (citations omitted); see also Sun Oil Co. , 84 S.W .2d
at 445–46. Neve rtheless, we have never held that there was a clea r intent for the g ener al descr iption to control when dire ctly

contra ry metes and bounds clea

rly define d an ar ea ow ned by the g rantor. Rather, the g ener al descr iption may be used to h el p i n t er p re t the specific descr iption when the

6specific descr iption is “def ective or doubtful,” Cullers , 16 S.W . at 1005, when the deed lang uag e 5 evidenc es an intent to conv ey both the land cover ed by the metes and bounds and additional land descr ibed by the g ener al descr iption, Sun Oil Co. , 84 S.W .2d at 443, or when the g ener al and specific descr iptions may otherwise be harmonized withou t s ac ri ficing one for the other, see Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Hous. v. Musick , 531 S.W .2d 581, 585 (Tex. 1975). Her e, the metes-a

nd-bounds descr iption is not “def ective or doubtful.” Mere inconsistencies betwee n the metes and bounds and the g ener al descr iption do not themselves rende r the metes and bounds doubtful. Otherw ise , an unambig uous metes-a nd-bounds descr iption would never , on its own, control de spite an inconsistent g ener al desc ription. I n this case, the metes and bounds in the 1973 Dee d canno t b e harmonized with the gene ral description. The two conflict with eac h other, and the g ener al descr iption cannot “over ride a particula

r descr iption about wh i ch t h ere can be no doubt.” Cullers , 16 S.W . at 1005. The court of appea ls below rea soned that the 1973 Dee d should be construed to convey the g rea test es tate it s terms permit. 433 S.W .3d at 73 (citing Lott v. L ott , 370 S.W .2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963)). The pref

ere nce for the g rea

ter estate, howeve r, cannot overc ome a clea r and unambig uous specific descr iption. I ndeed, in both Cullers and Southern Pine Lumber Co. , we relied on the metes

F o r e x a m p l e , i n G u l

f P r o d u c t i o n C o . v . S

p e a r , t h e m e t e s a n d b o u n d s w e r e “ i n c o m p l e t e a n d i n c o r r e c t ” w h e n 5 t h e y p r o v i d e d a n i n c o r r e c t l e n g t h a n d d i d n o t d e s c r i b e t h e c o u r s e o f o n e b o u n d a r y o f a t r a c t

. 8 4 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 5 5

. I n S t r o n g v . G a r r e t t , t h e m e t e s a n d b o u n d s d e s c r i b e d l a n d n e x t

- d o o r t o t h e g r a n t o r ’ s p r o p e r t y , w h e r e a s t h e g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n m a d e c l e a r t h a t t h e t r a c t t o b e c o n v e y e d b e l o n g e d t o t h e g r a n t o r . 2 2 4 S

. W

. 2 d 4 7 1 , 4 7 5 ( T e x . 1 9 4 9 )

. A n d i n F o r d v . M c R a e , t h e g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n

— a l o n g w i t h o n e c a l l i n t h e m e t e s - a n d

- b o u n d s d e s c r i p t i o n

— w a s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e m a

j o r i t y o f t h e m e t e s a n d b o u n d s . 9 6 S

. W

. 2 d a t 8 3

. I n t h e s e c a s e s , w e l o o k e d t o t h e g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e p a r t i e s ’ i n t e n t b e c a u s e t h e s p e c i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n w a s d e f

e c t i v e o r i n c o m p l e t e . 7and bounds to hold that the deeds convey ed l es s acr eag e than the gene ral descriptions sug g ested.

See S. P ine Lumber Co. , 340 S.W .2d at 779–80; Cullers , 16 S.W . at 1004–05. The court of appea ls also held that the 1973 Dee d incorporated the 1945 Dee d by ref ere nce, indicating an intent to convey the entire 202-ac re parc el from the 1945 Dee d, including the 34.28-

acr e Trac t. 433 S.W .3d at 73. The case s cited for this point by the court of appea ls, howeve r, do not focu s o n co n fl i cts betwee n g ener al and specific descr iptions. I nstead, they discuss the statute of fra uds, estoppel by deed, or g ener al and specific provisions that can be rec onciled. Although “a 6 ref ere nce to a former deed is a valid means of descr ibing land,” W inters v. Slover , 251 S.W .2d 726, 728 (Tex. 1952), a ref

ere nce to a prior deed does not preva il over a clea rly contra ry metes-a

ndbounds descr iption, S. Pine Lumber Co. , 340 S.W .2d at 362–63. The court of appea ls’ decision cre ates other difficulties. The 1973 Dee d states that the First Trac t was composed of

1,167.203 acr es. The g ener al desc ription, however , ref ers to nine pa

rce ls, and their acr eag es (listed individually in the 1973 Dee d) total only 1,145.95 acr es. Thus, though the
metes-a nd-bounds d e s c r ip ti o n e

x c lu d e s the 34.28-ac re Trac t, it convey s a larger are a than the g ener al descr iption. I f the court of appea ls wer e rig ht that the 34.28-ac re Trac t was convey ed despite the
metes and bounds, does this also mean that only the smaller are a descr ibed by the g ener al descr iption

was co n v ey ed , but not the larg er are a descr ibed by the metes and bounds? But surely such a

S e e X T O E n e r

g y I n c . v . N i k o l a i , 3 5 7 S

. W

. 3 d 4 7 , 5 8 ( T e x . A p p . — F o r t W o r t h 2 0 1 1 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( d i s c u s s i n g 6 e s t o p p e l b y d e e d ) ; C e n t e r P o i n t E n e r

g y H o u s . E l e c . , L

. L

. P

. v . O l d T J C C o . , 1 7 7 S

. W

. 3 d 4 2 5 , 4 3 0 , 4 3 2 ( T e x . A p p . — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 0 5 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( c o n s i d e r i n g p r i o r d e e d t h a t w a s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h c u r r e n t d e e d ) ; D i x o n v . A m o c o P r o d

. C o . , 1 5 0 S

. W

. 3 d 1 9 1 , 1 9 4 ( T e x . A p p . — T y l e r 2 0 0 4 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( d i s c u s s i n g s t a t u t e o f f r a u d s ) ; H a r r i s v . W i n d s o r , 2 7 9 S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 8 , 6 4 8

– 5 0 ( T e x . C i v . A p p . — T e x a r k a n a 1 9 5 5 ) ( c o n s i d e r i n g p r i o r d e e d t h a t w a s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h c u r r e n t d e e d ) , a

f f ’ d , 2 9 4 S

. W

. 2 d 7 9 8 ( 1 9 5 6 ) ; s e e a l s o B r o w n v . C h a m b e r s , 6 3 T e x . 1 3 1 , 1 3 5

– 3 6 ( 1 8 8 5 ) ( r e l y i n g o n r e f e r e n c e t o p r i o r d e e d t o d e s c r i b e p r o p e r t y )

. 8conclusion would depar t from the parties’ true intentions as evidenc ed by the metes and bounds. For consist en cy ’s sake, the metes and bounds must control lest trac ing title be reduc ed to g uesswork about the parties’ true intent y ear s afte r the convey ance occur s. The metes-a nd-bounds descr iption is better evide nce of

intent. Fo r all these rea sons, the court of appea ls err ed by reve rsing the trial court’s j u d gm en t

. Acc o r d in g ly , w e g r a

n t th e McGre g ors’ petition for revie w and, without hear ing oral arg ument, rende r judgme nt in their favor

. We reve rse the judgme nt of the court of appea ls and aff irm that of the trial court. T E X . R. A P P . P. 59.1.

OPI NI ON DEL I VERED: Marc h 20, 2015

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