Th e Cle rk of Court is d ir e c te d to ame nd

the of fi c ia l c a pti on in t his c a se to c on fo rm

to * th e l i s t i n g o f

th e p a rt i e s a b o v e . J am e s J

. L aw l o r

h a s b e e nr e m o v e d , a s h e w a s i n i t i a l l y a defe ndant below but all cla ims ag ainst him were w ithdrawn at the District Court level. SeeJ .A. 1 (re vised complaint). -1- 08-2626-c v Gros s v . R e ll 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 3

_______________ 4 5 August Term, 2008 6 7 (Argued: May

20, 2009 Question Certified: Oc tober 27, 2009) 8 9 Docke t No. 08-2626-c v 10

_______________ 11 12 D A N I EL G RO SS , 13 Plain tif f , 14 15 C AR OL YN D EE K I NG , 16 Plaintif f-Appellant , 17 18 —v.— 19 20 M. J O D I R ELL , G OVE R NOR , S T A T E O F C ONNE C TI C UT , I N HE R O F F I C I AL C AP AC I TY ; M A G G IE 21 E WA LD , F O RM ER A C TI NG L ONG -T E R M C ARE O MBUD S MA N OF TH E C ON NE C TI C UT D EP AR TMENT 22 O F S O CI A L S ER VI CE S , I N HE R I ND I VI DU AL C AP AC I TY ; T H O M A S P. B RUN N O CK , P ROBATE J UDGE 23 F OR THE D I ST RI CT O F W A T ERBU RY , I N HI S I ND I VI DU AL C AP AC I TY ; K ATHL EE N D ONOVAN , I N HER 24 I ND I VI DU AL C AP AC I TY ; J ONATHAN N EW MAN , I N HI S I ND I VI DU AL C AP AC I TY ; G ROVE M ANOR 25 N UR S I NG H OME , I NC ., I N I TS I ND I VI DU AL C AP AC I TY , * 26 Defendants-A ppellees

. 27 28

_______________ 29 B e f o r e : 30 J A COBS , Chief Judge , S TR AUB AND H A LL , Circuit Judges

. 31

_______________-2- 1 Appea l from dismissal of all claims as to all defe ndants in civil rights law suit arising out 2 of the a lleg ed mistreatment of Plaintiff Daniel Gr oss. An involuntary conser vatorship was 3 instit uted as to Gross by the Waterbury , Connecticut Probate Court; the c onservatorship was 4 ended when a Conne cticut Superior Court judg e grante d Gross’s pe tition for a writ of ha beas 5 corpus, f

inding that the c onservatorship should not have bee n imposed. Gross subsequently sued 6 the Pr ob a te Court

jud g e , th e c on se rv ator , th e c ourt -a pp ointe d atto rn e y , th e nurs ingho me in 7 which he w as plac ed, and va rious state off

icials. The U.S. District Court for the District of 8 Connecticut (Va

nessa L . Br

y ant, Judge ) dismissed the complaint, primarily on the basis of 9 j u d i c i a l i m mun i ty ( a s t o th e j u d g e ) an d qu a s i

- j u d i c i a l i m mun i ty ( a s t o th e c o n s e r v a t o r , a t t o r

n e y, 10 and

nurs ingho me ). Cla ims a g a ins t th e state of fi c ia ls w e re dis mis se d f

or pr oc e dura l r e a so ns . 11 We affir

m the dismiss al of c laims ag ainst the state off icials, the tort claims ag ainst the 12 nursing home, and the f inding of absolute judicial immunity as to the judg e. Howe ver, 13 Connecticut law on qua si-judicial immunit y , which applies to state- law cla ims, is unclear. 14 There fore , we c ertify questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court re g ardingquasi-judicial 15 immunit y . 16 As to the fede ral c laims: our circuit is bound to apply the fe dera l law of qua si-judicial 17 immun ity . H ow e ve r, in t his c a se and

on the se fa c ts, the fa c tor s w e mus t c on sid e r d ir e c tly 18 implicate unsettled questions of state la w. Ther efor e, we cer

tify a question to the Connecticut 19 Supreme Court, askingfor its guidance as to those fa ctors. Upon r ece iving the Conne cticut 20 Supreme Court’s re sponse, we w ill decide the f eder al question. 21 Af fi rm e d in pa rt , Ce rt if ie d to the Con

ne c tic ut S up re me Court

in p art

. 22

_________________________________-3- 1 S AL L Y R. Z ANG ER , Connecticut L eg al Rights Projec t, I nc., Middletown, CT, for Plain tiff2 Appellant

. 3 4 G R EG OR Y T. D’A U R IA , Associate A ttorney Gene ral for

the State of Connec ticut (Richard 5 Blumentha l, Attorney Gene ral, Jane R. Rosenberg , Assistant Attorney Gene ral, Clare 6 Kindall, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, of counsel), Ha

rtford, CT, for Defendants-A ppellees 7 M. Jodi Re ll, Maggie Ewald, and Thomas P. Brunnock

. 8 9 R I C HAR D A. R O BE RT S (Na dine M. Pare, James R. Fiore , of counsel), Nu zzo & Rob e rt s 10 L .L .C., Cheshire, CT, for Defendant- AppelleeKathleen Donovan

. 11 12 L O U I S B. B LU M EN FELD (L orinda S. Coon, of counsel), C o o n ey , S cu l l y an d Do wl i n g, 13 Har

tford, CT, for Defendant- AppelleeJonathan Newman

. 14 15 J EF F R EY R. B A B B IN , Wigg in and Dana , L L P, New Haven, CT, for Defendant-

Appellee 16 GroveManor Nursing Home, Inc

. 17

_________________________________ 18 S TR AUB , Circuit Judge : 19 F or

ne arl y a y e ar b e g inn ingin 2 00 5, Da nie l G ro ss, an o c tog e na

ri an, ha d a

c on se rv a tor sh ip 20 imposed for his estate and per son ag ainst his will. He was kept in a nur sing home for ten 21 months, unti l a Superior Court judg e in Connecticut, c iting “a terrible misca

rriag e of justice,” 22 g ra

nte d h is p e tit ion

fo r a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s a nd or de re d h im r e le a se d. Th is l aws uit ste ms 23 fr om t

hat un fo rt un ate se ri e s o f e ve nts

. 24 I t is alleg ed that a pr obate c ourt judg e sig ned a f acia lly impossibl e orde r that did not 25 c omp ly

wi th t he law; the c ourt -a

pp ointe d atto rn e y

dis re g ard e d G ro ss’ s w ish e s to re tur n to his 26 home in New Y ork; the cour t-appointed c onservator forc ibly kept Gross in a nur sing home , 27 ag ainst medical a dvice; and a nursing home housed Gr oss with a violent roommate who attacked 28 him. The complaint furthe r alleg es that def endant Ma g g ie Ewa ld, Connecticut’s L ong -Ter m 29 Care O mbudsman at the time, did not act on complaints about Gr oss’s treatment at the nursing 3 0 h o m e b e c a

u s e o f c o n c e r n s a b o u ta dv e r s e p u

b l i c i ty.-4- 1 T h es e a l l ega t i o n s , i f t ru e, m i gh tm ak e o u ta c as e a gai n s tth e d ef en d an t s . Ho we v er , J u d ge 2 Thomas P. Brunnoc k, Conservator K athleen D onovan, Attorne y J onathan Ne wman, and G rove 3 Manor Nur sing H ome, Inc. (“ Grove Manor” ) have asser ted absolute immunity

to suit: Br

unnock 4 has asse rted judicial immunity and the other

three have a sserted qua si-judicial immunit y . The 5 Di str ic t Co ur

t a g re e d a nd dis mis se d a ll c la ims a g a ins t th os e de fe nd ants . ( Cla ims a g a ins t 6 Go ve rn or

M. Jodi R e ll a

nd Ew a ld, a s w e ll a s c e rt a in o f G ro ss’ s st a tut or y and tor t c la ims a g a ins t 7 Grove Manor, we re dismissed for va rious proce dural re asons.) 8 The fe dera l common law def ense of quasi-judicial immunity

applies to Gross’s f

eder al 9 c la ims , a

nd the sim ila

r b ut d ist inc t state common law def ense of quasi-judicial immunity

applies 10 to Gross’s state law claims. Connecticut state la w is unsettled as to quasi-judicial immunity

. 11 Th e re fo re , w e c e rt if y qu e sti on s to the Conne c tic ut S up re me Court on the state law c la ims

. 12 On the fe dera l law claims, we apply the multi-factor

test for qua si-judicial immunit y set 13 forth by

the Supreme Court. How ever , in this case, applica tion of those fac tors involves 14 unsettled questions of Connecticut state statutory and common law. T here fore , we a sk the 15 Connecticut Supreme Court f or its guida

nce a s to these fa ctors. Upon r ece iving its response , we 16 wi ll d e c ide the fe de ra l c la ims

. 1 7 Q u a s i-

ju d ic ia l i mm

un it y a p p li e s o n ly

to D o n o v an , N e w ma

n , an d G r o v e M an o r . We 18 a ff

ir m th e g ra nt o f j ud ic ia l immun ity

a s to B ru nn oc k a nd a ff ir m th e dis mis sa l of

the oth e r c la ims

. 19 BACK GR OUND 20 In 2 00 5, Da nie l G ro ss, a

lif e -l on g Ne w Y or

k r e sid e nt, wa s d isc ha

rg e d f ro m a ho sp ita l inAs an a pp e llate c ourt , w e do no t e ng a g e in f a c t- fi nd ing . We take a ll f a c ts a nd dr aw a ll 1 infere nces in the lig ht most favorable to appellant, as w e must do at the motion to dism iss stage , althoug h we ne ed not g ive cr edenc e to “plea dings that, beca use they are no more than conclusions, ar e not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . 1937, 1950 (2009). Connecticut’s statutory conser vatorship sche me was a

mended in 2007, af

ter the 2 incidents in this case took plac e. Unless other wise spec ified, this opinion cites to the version of the statute in place at the re levant time. We a re of the op ini on

that th e 20 07 re vis ion s d o n ot a ff e c t th e un de rl yingiss ue s in thi s case reg ardingquasi-judicial immunity

. See, e .g. , C ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 45a-648( a)- (d) (We st 2 00 8 p oc ke t pa

rt ) ( outli nin g va

ri ou s p ro vis ion s f

or an invo luntary

c on se rv a tor sh ip a s to on e wh o is a

no n- re sid e nt o r n on -d omi c ili ary ); id. § 45a-649a

(makingvarious provisions for re pr e se ntatio n o f a

re sp on de nt i n a

n invo luntary

c on se rv a tor sh ip p ro c e e din g ); id. § 45a-650( a) (spec ifying that probate c ourt must “require clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the c ourt has jurisdiction, that the respondent ha s been g iven notice . . . , a nd that the re spondent has bee n advised of the rig ht to retain an attorney”). The se cha ng es do not g o to the underlying que stion here , namely , whether

conser vators, attorne y s, and nursinghomes may , as a matter of law , enjoy quasi-judicial immunity

under f eder al and state common law. So far as we can a scer

tain, the questions we ar e ce rtifying, r eg ardingimmunit y g ener ally , are unaff

ecte d by this revision. I n any event, we have no r eason to c onclude that this amendme nt should apply retroa ctively , and the parties do not sug g est otherwise

. -5- 1 N e wY o r

k a f t e r tr e at m e n tf

o r a l e g i n f e c t i o n . S h o rt l y th e r e a f

t e r , h e w e n tt o W a t e r

b ur y, 1 2 Conne c tic ut, wh e re his da ug hte r l ive d, to c onva le sc e . O n Augus t 8, 20 05 , h e wa s a dmi tte d to 3 Waterbury

Hospital beca

use of c omplications from his previous treatment. Nine day s later, on 4 August 17, 2005, Bar bara F. L imauro, a hospital employ ee, f iled an application for appointment 5 of conse rvator in Water bury Probate Court. The r ecor d does not indicate what prompted 6 L imauro to file this application. 7 The pe rtinent statute re quires the pr obate c ourt, as a thr eshold matter, to g ive the 8 responde nt seven da y s’ notice in any

application for

an involuntary

conser vatorship. C ONN . G EN . 9 S TAT . ANN . § 45a-649( a). In addition, the notice must be ser ved on the r espondent or, if doing 2 10 so “would be de trimental to the hea lth or welfa re of the re spondent,” his attorne y . Id. § 45a--6- 1 649(a) (1)( A). The statute makes no pr ovision for g iving notice to the responde nt other than by 2 p e r s o n a l s e r

v i c e o r s e r v i c e u p o nh i s at t o r

n e y. 3 On

Au g us t 25 , 2 00 5, Judg e Th oma s P. B ru nn oc k is su e d a

n o rd e r o f n oti c e of

a he ari ngto 4 be held on Septembe r 1, 2005, in conne ction with L imauro’s a pplication. On August 30, 2005, 5 the notice wa s serve d on L imauro. Ho we ve r, a s th e Conne c tic ut S up e ri or Court po int e d o ut i n 6 the subsequent ha

beas pr ocee ding, the re w as no indication that Gross himself e ver r ece ived 7 no tic e of

the Se pte mbe r 1 pr oc e e din g . T he pa rt ie s d o n ot d isp ute that ( 1) Gr os s w a s e nti tle d to 8 no tic e of

the he ari ng , ( 2) he sh ou ld h ave be e n g ive n at le a st s e ve n d ay s’ no tic e , p ur su ant t o 9 Section 45a-649( a), a nd (3) the or der dated August 25, 2005, specified that Gross should be 1 0 s e r

v e d b y August 24

. 11 Al so on

Au g us t 25 , 2 00 5, B ru

nn oc k a pp ointe d Jon a tha

n N e wm an to re pr e se nt G ro ss i n 12 the involuntary

conser vatorship ac tion. Newman inter viewed G ross, who told Newma n that he 13 opposed the c onservatorship. Newman de scribed G ross as ale rt and intellig ent and state d in a 14 repor

t that Gross wante d to live at home and mana g e his own af fairs. N ever

theless, Newman 15 conclude d that he could not “f ind any leg al basis in which to object to the a ppointment of a 16 conser

vator of D aniel Gr oss’ person a nd estate.” Newma

n also signe d the form “ attorney for 17 war d.” The rele vant statute def ines a “ war d” as “ a per son “for whom involuntary

repr esentation 18 is granted

” pursua nt to statute. C ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 45a-644( h) (e mphasis added) . At the 19 time Newman sig ned the f orm, no such re prese ntation had bee n g rante d; Gross was not a “ war d” 20 but rather

a “r espondent.” Id. § 45a-644( f). 21 A Superior Court judg e would later say that Newma

n’s conc lusion that there wa s no leg al 22 basis for objec ting to the involuntary conser vatorship “c ompletely

blows my

mind,” that there-7- 1 wa s “ [n]o s up po rt

fo r i t,” and

that “ it j us t de fi e s im a g inatio n. . . . T his wa s c ouns e l f or Mr . G ro ss 2 and it is obvious to m e that he grossly under a nd misrepre sented Mr. G ross at the time.” J.A. 3 115. 4 The re spondent also has a rig ht to attend any

hear ing on the application. C ONN . G EN . 5 S TAT . ANN . § 45a-649( b)(2) . I f he w ishes to attend “but is unable to do so bec ause of phy sical 6 inc a

pa c ity , th e c ourt sh all

schedule the hea

ring. . . at a plac e which w ould fac ilitate attendanc e . . 7 . but if not practica l, then the judge shall visit the respondent ” bef ore the hear ing, if

he is in the 8 state. Id. (empha sis added). The next s ection re iterate s that a judg e could “ hold the hear ing on 9 the a

pp lic a tio n at a

pla c e wi thi n th e state oth e r t ha n it s u su a l c ou

rt ro om i f i t w ou ld f

a c ili tate 10 attendanc e by

the re spondent.” Id. § 4 5 a- 6 5 0 (c ). T h e p art i es d o n o td i s p u t e t h at(1 ) J u d ge 11 B ru

nn oc k n e ve r v isi te d G ro ss, (2 ) t he he ari ngwa s n ot h e ld at a loc a tio n th a t w ou ld f

a c ili tate 12 Gross’s attendance , and (3) Gross wa s not personally prese nt at the hea

ring

. 13 Fur

thermore , Connecticut law at the time only permitted a c onservatorship for those who 14 wer e re siding or domiciled in Connec ticut, id. § 45a-648( a); Gr oss was neither a re sident nor a 15 domiciliary . I t is undisput ed that Ne wman fa iled to bring this jurisdi ctional def ect to the c ourt’s 16 attention. (As will be explained inf ra , it was on the basis of this defe ct that the Connec ticut 17 Superior Court eve ntually g rante d Gross’s pe tition for a writ of ha beas c orpus and he ld the 18 conser

vatorship void ab ini tio .) 1 9 On S ep t em b er 1 , 2 0 0 5 , Br

un n o ckap p o i n t edKa th l ee nDo n o v an as co n s erv at o r t o m an age 20 Gross’s pe rson and e state. Connecticut state law provide s that the probate court must require a 21 probate bond and, “if it deems it nece ssary

for the pr otection of the r espondent, [it may ] require a 22 bond of any

conser vator” as we ll. C ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 45a-650( g ). Donova n never posted-8- 1 a bond. 2 A wee k or two later , Donovan plac ed Gr oss in the “locked w ard” of Grove Manor 3 NursingHome. Gr oss alleg es in his complaint that his roommate was a confe ssed robbe r who 4 threatened a

nd assaulted him. Gross a lso claims that Grove Ma nor, with the knowledg e and 5 c on se nt o f D on ov an, ke pt h im i n a ro om w iththe vio le nt r oo mmate a ft e r i t le arn e d o f t he a ssa ult , 6 which wa s not reporte d to the police. 7 In April of 2006, Gr oss was on an a uthorized day

visit t o L ong I sland. Whil e ther e, he 8 experience d chest pa ins and was a dmitted to a hospital. Accordingto the complaint, Donovan 9 came to L ong I sland with an ambulanc e and insisted that Gr oss be re turned to Connecticut. 10 Whe n th e do c tor

ind ic ate d th at th is w a s me dic a lly unwi se , D on ov an n on e the le ss r e mov e d G ro ss 11 from the hospital ag ainst his wishes and re turned him to the locked w ard at Grove Ma nor. 12 Gross alleg es in his complaint that there w as no re ason to put him in t he locke d war d. He 13 further

alleg es that Ewa ld, the state ombudsman, and Donova n, the conse rvator, w ere awa re of 14 these proble ms but failed to take steps to alleviate them. The pa rties do not dispute that Donovan 15 obtained fr om Brunnoc k e xpa rteor de rs lim iti ngGr os s’ s c on ta c t w ithfa mil y and wi th c ouns e l; 1 6 G r o s s c la im s th at t h e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e s u g g e s ti n g th a t s u c hc o n ta c t w a s h ar mf u l t o h im

. We 17 are very

troubled by

one such or der in pa

rticular. A ccor ding to Gr oss’s complaint, this order 18 re str ic te d G ro ss’ s d a ug hte r’ s a bil ity to v isi t hi m: the vis its we re re qu ir e d to be on -p re mis e s, on ly 19 once pe r day , for no long er tha n one hour. Strang ely , it also prohibits her from bring ing “ any 20 rec ordingdevice s (visual and/or a udio) into Grove Ma

nor NursingHome.” T he re strictive nature 21 of the orde r, and the prohibition on the use of re cordingdevice s, g ives cre dence to Gross’s 22 alleg ation that there was a conspirac y

to deprive him of his rig hts — and potentially , to preve nt-9- 1 the e xpos ur e of

su c h in jus tic e s. 2 On J une 9, 2006, Gr oss filed a pe tition for a writ of ha beas c orpus in Connecticut 3 Superior Court. A hea ringwas he ld on J uly

12. Br unnock moved to dismiss, making the ( rathe r 4 rema

rkable ) ar g ument that habea s relief was unne cessa

ry beca use, if the Probate Court acte d 5 without jurisdiction, t he conse rvatorship wa s void ab ini tio and Gr oss could leave Grove Manor 6 a t any

tim e . T he Sup e ri or

Court g ra nte d th e wr it: 7 [O] ut of an a bsolute caution that somebody else may come in and 8 file [an] appeara nce in this ca se, I ’m g oing to g rant the writ of 9 ha

be a s c or pu s[;] I ’m

g oin g to f

ind in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he statut e 10 that he has – is and ha s been, since September 1, be en depr ived of 11 his liberty . And at the time of his – of his appointment of the 12 conser vator of both his per son and his estate, Probate Court lacke d 13 the jurisdiction on the basis that he wa s not a domiciliary and/or a 14 re sid e nt o f t he [S]ta te of

Conne c tic ut. Th e c on se rv a tor sh ip i s 15 terminated a s a re sult of the decision on the ha beas c orpus and Mr. 1 6 G r o s s i s f r e e t o l e av e h e r e t o d ay. 17 18 Th e c ourt

a lso ha lte d a ll p e nd ingtr ans a c tio ns inv olv ingGr os s’ s p ro pe rt y , s aying“ that no thi ng[is 19 to] be done w ith the sale of [Gross’s] house in New Yor k,” and that “any

previous orde rs of the 20 Pr ob a te Court

wi th r e fe re nc e to t

hat r e a l pr op e rt

y in N e w Y or

k a re a lso te rm inate d, so the re is 21 nothing in Ne w York.” The Superior Court said there ha d been “ a ter rible miscar

riag e of 22 justice.” 23 Up on

re tur nin g to N e w Y or

k, Gr os s f ound that hi s h ou se ha d b e e n, in h is w or ds , 24 “ ra

ns a c ke d. ” Th e c omp la int a lle g e s th a t a

c ha nd e lie r a nd so me fu rn iture we re mis sin g . G ro ss 25 lived independe ntly in his home from the time of his rele ase at least until the tim e of the 26 complaint, and appa rently until the tim e of his death in 2007. 27 In 2 00 7, pla int if f b ro ug ht t

he c omp la int

and the Di str ic t Co ur

t di smi sse d it

a s to a llThe statutory claims ag ainst the nursinghome alleg ed violations of the Omnibus Budg et 3 Reconc iliation Act of 1989, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, and the Patients’ B ill of Rights, C ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 19a-550. The ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress claim ag ainst the ombudsman was 4 dismiss ed bec ause Connec ticut state offic ials have immunity for ne g lige nt acts. C ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 4-165. -10- 1 defe ndants. The District Court found that Brunnoc k was e ntitled to judi cial immunity . The c ourt 2 we nt o n to re a so n th at th e c on se rv ator , atto rn e y , a nd nurs ingho me we re e nti tle d to immun ity 3 beca

use they wer e ser ving the judicial proce ss. Howeve r, the District Court re asoned that the 4 nurs ingho me wa s no t entitled to derivative, qua si-judicial immunit y for discr etionary

acts that 5 we re no t pe rf

or me d s pe c if

ic a lly fo r t he purp os e of

c omp lyingwi th a

Pr ob a te Court

or de r. Thus , 6 the nursinghome’s dec ision to l eave Gross in a room with his roommate f or seve ral da

y s, after 7 his roommate attac ked him, was he ld to be discretionar y and not protec ted by

quasi-judicial 8 immunit y . This left statutory and tort cla ims ag ainst the nursinghome. The D istrict Court 3 9 dismiss ed the statutory claims on the basis of wa iver, lea ving only the tort claims, which 10 consisted of c laims for intentional and ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress. 11 The District Court also dismissed all claims ag ainst the g overnor and mos t c la ims a g a ins t 12 the ombudsman, essentially on failure to prosecute or wa iver g rounds. Howe ver, it initially let 13 stand the cla ims ag ainst the ombudsman for f ailure to investig ate c omplaints about Gross’s 14 detention in the nursinghome. Thus, there wer e two sets of c laims remaining : intentional and 15 neg lige nt infliction of emotional distress ag ainst the nursinghome re g ardingthe violent 16 ro omm a te and

int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss a g a ins t th e omb ud sma n f or fa ilure to 17 investigate. 4 18 Th e n, at th e e nd of a te le ph on e c on fe re nc e a

bo ut d isc ov e ry

and the c ours e of

the laws uit ,We note that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim ag ainst Ewald and the 5 nursing home, and the ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress claim ag ainst the nursinghome, wer e dismissed without prejudice f or wa nt of jurisdictional minim um. These c laims may be rea sserted if qua si-judicial immunit y does not apply

and the c laims as to Donovan, Ne wman, and Gr ov e Ma

no r a re re ins tate d. Th e y

may a lso be re a sse rt e d in

a se pa rate a c tio n in

any e ve nt. Additionally , as noted e arlier , J ames J. L awlor ( Connecticut’s Probate Court Ad min istrator) i s li ste d in

the c a pti on ; ho we ve r, the re vis e d c omp la int a sse rt s n o c la ims a g a ins t him

. -11- 1 the District Court announce d that it did not t hink those remainingclaims would exceed $75,000 2 and

sa id i t w ou ld d ism iss the c a se . Co un se l di d n ot o bje c t to thi s d ism iss a l, a nd tho se c la ims 3 wer e dismissed without prejudice. Onc e these wer e dismissed, there w ere no rema ining c laims. 4 Gross’s timely

appea l followed. 5 DI SCU SSIO N 6 The main issue in this case perta ins to judi cial and qua si-judicial immunit y . For the 7 rea sons describe d below, B runnock is entitled to judicial immunity . Howeve r, we cer tify to the 8 Connecticut Supreme Court c erta in questions relatingto quasi-judicial immunity as to the 9 c on se rv a tor , th e atto rn e y , a nd the nurs ingho me . We a ff ir m th e Di str ic t Co ur

t’ s d ism iss a l of

a ll 10 other c laims as to Rell and Ewald and the statutory claims ag ainst the nursinghome. We note at 5 11 the outset that, althoug h we a ffirm the D istrict Court’s dismi ssal of many claims, we do not 12 condone the actions of the de fenda nts. 13 I. An Overview of Judi cial and Q uasi-Jud icial Im m uni ty 14 A. In Gener al 15 In th is c a se , th e re are se ve ra l in te rs e c tin g iss ue s. Th e fi rs t qu e sti on is whe the r d e fe nd ants 16 B ru

nn oc k, Do no va

n, Ne wm an, and

Gr ov e Ma

no r m ay a sse rt jud ic ia l or

qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity 17 as a de fense . The sec ond question, assuming immunity applies, per

tains to the scopeof that-12- 1 immunit y . Finally , as to ea ch of the defe ndants and c laims pled in this case, there is the question 2 of whe ther fe dera l or state law on immunity g overns. The defe ndants’ brie fs — and, to be sur e, 3 so me of

the c a se s in

thi s are a — e ith e r b lur , o r d o n ot r e c og nize , th e se dis tin c tio ns . 4 Gross is asser ting f eder al and state law cla ims ag ainst state offic ials. The doctr ine of 5 jud ic ia l and

qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity

is, in t he ma in, a

c re a tio n o f t

he U. S. Su

pr e me Court

wi th 6 reg ard to fe dera l claims and thus a fe dera l law doctrine . The c ases support e mploy ing the fede ral 7 de fe ns e of

qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity

a s a g a ins t f

e de ra l c la ims . H ow e ve r, Gr os s h a d a lso ple d s tate 8 law cla ims ag ainst state def endants. Connec ticut has adopted te sts for judicial and qua si-judicial 9 immun ity

that are ne arl y

ide nti c a l to the fe de ra l la w t e sts . H ow e ve r, the state law d oc tr ine is 10 conce ptually

distinct from the fede ral lawdoctrine. 11 Wit h reg ard to the state law cla ims, we rec og nize the uncer tainty reg ardingthe state law 12 do c tr ine of

qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity

and c e rt if y qu e sti on s to the Conne c tic ut S up re me Court a s to 13 the ava ilability

of immunity . Normally , we would a pply fede ral lawto the fede ral c laims and 14 simply

decide them. Howeve r, in this case, the fede ral test involves apply ing the so-ca lled 15 Cleavinger

fac tors. See Cleav inger v. Sax ner , 474 U.S. 193 (1985). The se fa ctors — which 16 inquire into the nature of the a ctor in the judicial sy stem, the exist ence of saf eguards, the r ole of 17 prec edent, a

nd so on — impli cate unsettled questions of state law . There fore , we a sk the 18 Conne c tic ut S up re me Court fo r i ts guid anc e a s to tho se fa c tor s. Af te r t he c ou rt re sp on ds , w e wi ll 19 make the ultimate de termination, as a matter of f eder al law, of

whether immunit y

applies. 20 B. App lic abl e Le ga l St anda r ds 21 Def

endant B runnock a sserts the def ense of judicial immunit y , while def endants Donova

n, 22 Ne wm an, and

Gr ov e Mano r a sse rt

the de fe ns e of

qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity . T he fi rs t, t hr e sh old-13- 1 question is whether the se def endants may

asser t these def

enses at all. The ca ses indicate that the 2 fe de ra l common law on judicial immunities applies even to state of fi c ia ls whe n th e y

are su e d in 3 fede ral c ourt on fede ral c laims. See P ierson v. Ray , 3 86 U. S. 5 47 (1 96 7) (§ 19 83 a c tio n a g a ins t 4 loc a l po lic e of

fi c e rs and jud g e s) ; Tucker v . Outwater , 118 F.3d 930 ( 2d Cir), cert. de nied , 522 5 U.S. 997 (1997) (§ 1983 a ction ag ainst New Y ork town justice). We a pply this feder al test eve n 6 when the substantive inquiry involves state law. See Tuck er , 118 F.3d a

t 932 (noting that 7 whether

the judg e “a cted in the c lear absenc e of a ll jurisdiction” turned on NewYork law 8 re g ard ingthe sc op e of the jud g e ’s jur isd ic tio n) ; Huminski v. Corsones , 396 F.3d 53, 76 ( 2d Cir. 9 2005) (noting , in a § 1983 ac tion ag ainst state judg es, that cour ts “look to state law to deter mine 10 wh e the r [the jud g e s] a c te d w ith in t he ir jur isd ic tio n a

nd

. . . a s to wh e the r t

he y a c te d .

. . in t

he ir 11 judicial capa cities,” a nd then applying the fede ral lawtest for judicial immunity). As we descr ibe 12 be low , w e may

a pp ly se ttl e d f e de ra l la w t o d isp os e of

the qu e sti on

of jud ic ia l immun ity

a s to 13 B ru

nn oc k w ithre g ard

to f e de ra l c la ims

. 14 In this case, f eder al jurisdiction over the state -law c laims ag ainst Br unnock we re ba sed on 15 diversity

jurisdiction. Diversity

of citizenship cases, thoug h broug ht pursuant to fede ral subjec t 16 matter jurisdiction, are decide d on the basis of state substantive law. Kra us s v . M an ha tta n Li

fe 17 I n s . C o . o f N

. Y. , 6 43 F .2 d 9 8, 10 0 ( 2d

Cir . 1 98 1) . T he re fo re , a s to tho se c la ims , w e loo k to 18 Connecticut law to de termine if judg es enjoy immunit y

and, if so, under

what cir cumstance s. 19 Connecticut has a doctrine of

judicial immunit y , which is, in all respe cts rele vant her e, identica l 20 to the fede ral test. See Sh ay v . R os si , 2 5 3 C o n n . 1 3 4 , 1 7 0 (2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Stump v. Sparkm an , 435 21 U.S. 349, 364 (1978)), overruled on othe r grounds , Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 (2003);-14- 1 Leseberg v . O’Grady , 1 1 5 C o n n . Ap p . 1 8 , 2 2 (2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Mireles v . W aco , 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 2 (1991)) . There fore , beca use Connecticut law

is clear as to judicial immunit y , we may decide that 3 qu e sti on

a s w e ll. 4 As to the rema ining de fenda nts, the issue is closer. Donova n, Newma

n, and Gr ove 5 Mano r a

re a sse rt ingno t ju dic ia l immun ity , b ut quasi-judicial immun ity . In th is c on te xt, th e U. S. 6 Supreme Court has se t forth a “ functional” test that is binding on this court on matters of fede ral 7 law. See Cleav inger , 474 U.S. at 201-02 (e x plaining that quasi-judicial immunity is determined 8 by a fu nc tio na l a pp ro a c h, in l ig ht o f s e ve ra l e nume ra te d f a c tor s) ; see also Butz v. Ec onomou , 438 9 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978) ( descr ibing the f unctional appr oach) . We clarify now that the fe dera l 10 law on quasi-judicia l immuni ty applies to state off

icials sued in fe dera l court on fe dera l claims. 11 Courts have so held in the c ontext of judicial immunity

. Cf. Pierson , 3 86 U. S. 5 47 ; Tucker , 118 12 F.3d 930. Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity are both absolute immunit ies. See M itchell v. 13 Fo rsy th , 4 72 U. S. 5 11 , 5 21 (1 98 5) (n oti ngthat bo th a re a bs olute immun iti e s) ; but see Kalina v. 14 Fletche r , 5 22 U. S. 1 18 , 1 32 (1 99 7) (S c a lia , J., c on c ur ri ng ) ( no tin g that, h ist or ic a lly , q ua si15 judicial immunit y “wa s more akin to what we now c all ‘qualified,’ rathe r than a bsolute, 16 immunit y ”). We disce rn no re ason to treat them differ ently with reg ard to c hoice of

law 17 questions. Thus, fede ral lawon quasi-judicial immunity , and spec ifically , the func tional 18 approa ch spec ified in Cleavinger , applies to Gross’s f eder al claims ag ainst Donovan, Ne wman, 19 and Gr ove Manor

. 20 Howeve r, ag ain bec ause our jurisdiction over state c laims is grounde d in diversity of 21 citizenship, st ate substantive law applies to Gross’s state -law c laims ag ainst Donovan a ndAs we e x plain inf ra , all state law c laims ag ainst the nursinghome have been dismissed. 6 Th e re fo re , th e re is n o n e e d to de c ide wh e the r a nurs ingho me may

ra ise the de fe ns e of

qu a sijudicial immunit y

under state law. We will, of course , have to de cide the que stion as a matter of fede ral lawwith respec t to the fede ral c laims. -15- 1 Newma

n. See, e .g. , Bonime v . Avay a, Inc. , 547 F.3d 497, 501 n.4 ( 2d Cir. 2008). Once ag ain, 6 2 we look to Connecticut lawto determine if c onservators and cour t-appointed attorney s for 3 conser

vatee s are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity , and, if so, under what 4 c ir c ums tanc e s. Conne c tic ut l aw, lik e fe de ra l la w, e mpl oy s a

“ fu nc tio na l” a

pp ro a c h to qu a si5 judicial immunit y . Se e Car ru bb a v . M

os k owi tz , 2 74 Conn. 53 3, 54 2- 43 (2 00 5) (e mpl oyinga te st 6 de ri ve d f

ro m Bu tz , 438 U.S. at 513-17). Carrubba involved state cla ims (emotional distress and 7 malprac tice) a g ainst a cour t-appointed c ounsel for a

minor child. Id. at 536. The Connec ticut 8 Sup re me Court

no te d th at Bu tz

involved claims broug ht under fe dera l law pursuant to § 1983. 9 See id. at 542. Howe ver, the Carrubba court did not sug g est that the test should be any differ ent 10 when state law cla ims were a t issue, as they

wer e in that ca se. See id. (stating that it was 1 1 a d o p t i n g th e S u

p r e m e C o urt ’ s t e s tf

o r qu a s i

- j u d i c i a l i m mun i ty t o d e t e r m i n e w h e th e r

a t t o r n e ys 12 appointed as c ounsel for minor c hildren “should be a ccor ded absolute immunity under 13 [C onnecticut] state common law” ). 14 Thus , in

the no rm a l c ours e , to de te rm ine wh e the r q ua si- jud ic ia l immun ity

e xten ds to 1 5 D o n o v anan d

N e w m an , w e w o u l d

s i mp l y a p p l y Cleavinger

to t e st the va lid ity

of the qu a si16 judicial immunit y defe nse to the fe dera l law claims and the simil ar Carrubba fu nc tio na l ana ly sis 17 in c onne c tio n w iththe state law c la ims . H ow e ve r, in t his pa rt ic ula r c a se and on the se fa c ts, bo th 18 ana ly se s inte rs e c t un se ttl e d q ue sti on s o f s tate law. F ir st, a s to the qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity-16- 1 defe nse re g ardingstate law c laims: no Connecticut case square ly addre sses whethe r conse rvators 2 and

c ourt -a pp ointe d atto rn e y s f

or c on se rv a te e s ma

y e njo y qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity . T he mos t 3 analog ous case perta ins only to attorney s appointed as c ounsel for minor c hildren, see Carrubba , 4 274 Conn. 533, and it is not s ufficie ntly simil ar to this case for us to dete rmine with confide nce 5 what state la

w on this point i s. There fore , we c ertify questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court 6 so that it may

decide whether

conser vators and c ourt-appointed attorney s for c onservatees may 7 a s s e rtqu a s i

-

j u d i c i a l i m mun i ty as to state claims , and the sc ope of a ny such immunity , as a matter 8 of state law. Th e state c ourt ’s pr on ounc e me nt a s to tho se qu e sti on s w ill be fi na l. 9 As to the quasi-judicial immunity defe nse to the fe dera l law claims, Cleavinger ins tr uc ts 10 courts to ana ly

ze various fa ctors, desc ribed inf ra , in determiningwhether quasi-judicial 11 immunit y

applies. Cleavinger , 474 U.S. at 201-02. In this case, these fac tors intersec t with the 12 nature and func tion of the Connecticut probate cour t sy stem. Although w e could ana ly ze t ho se 13 fac tors and simply decide the immunity

question as a matter

of fe dera l law, we de em it the more 14 prudent c ourse to allow the Conne cticut Supreme Court to speak to the issue first. 15 In decidingthe fe dera l immuni ty question, we would a

pply the Cleavinger

fac tors, which 16 we de ta il inf

ra . We re sp e c tf

ull y re qu e st that th e Conne c tic ut S up re me Court dis c us s th e se 17 fac tors in light of the r ole play ed by conser vators, attorne y s, and nursinghomes. We will decide, 18 afte r re ceivingthe Connecticut Supreme Court’s g uidance , the fe dera l law immunity questions. 19 In so doing, w e do not intend to sug g est that judicial immunit y alway s turns on state law. 20 Indeed, the common law doctr ine pre dates e ven our g overnme nt. See F loyd v. Bark

er , 7 7 E n g. 21 Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607). The U .S. Supreme Court has re cog nized judicial imm unity for-17- 1 over one hundred year s, see Bradley v . Fisher , 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871), as ha ve fe dera l 2 courts ar ound the country , see, e .g. , Cok v. Consentino , 876 F.2d 1 ( 1st Cir. 1989), including our 3 own, see Tuck

er , 1 18 F .3 d 9 30 , w he n a dd re ssi ngfe de ra l c ivi l r ig hts c la ims . N e ve rt he le ss, 4 application of Cleavinger in t his c a se dir e c tly

imp lic a te s th e ro le and

fu nc tio n o f c on se rv a tor s, 5 a tto rn e y s, and

nurs ingho me s in

the Conne c tic ut p ro bate c ourt sy ste m and

Conne c tic ut p ub lic 6 policy , matters that the Connec ticut Supreme Court is better e quipped to speak to. 7 I f, base d on the Connecticut Supreme Court’s g uidance as to the Cle av inge r fac tors, we 8 conclude that the quasi-judicial immunity defe nse is not available to Donova n, Newma

n, or 9 Grove Manor, a s a matter of fede ral law , then we ne ed not dec ide the pre cise outer bounds of 10 immunit y . Howeve r, if we ultimately conclude that the immunity defe nse is available to any of 11 the def

endants unde r fe dera l law, we w ill have to deter mine the circ umstances unde r which 12 immunit y

is defea ted. Even judicia l immuni ty , which provide s judge s with very broad 13 protec tion, may

be over come if the judge acts in the c lear absenc e of a ll jurisdiction or if he is not 14 actingin his judi cial ca pacity

. See, e .g. , Tucker , 118 F.3d at 933 (citing case s). I t may be the 15 c a se that qu as i-

jud ic ial immunit y

may simil arly be over come: for

example, if the plaintiff alleg es 16 that th e a c tio ns a de fe nd ant t oo k w e re dis c re tio na ry (a s o pp os e d to in s tr ic t c omp lia nc e wi th 17 court orde rs), unde rtake n in bad fa ith, intentional torts, etc. No case in our Circuit spells out the 18 c ir c ums tanc e s und e r whic h q ua si- jud ic ia l im mun ity

may be surm ounte d. I f s uc h immun ity e xists 19 in this case, we will undertake to decide this sec ond-orde r question. I f it does not, then Gross’s 20 lawsuit may

proce ed in the norma l course. 21 The nature of this “se cond step” can be illust rate d with an example from Donova n’s brief

.Indeed, at least at one junc ture — with re g ard to Gr oss’s forc ible return to Gr ove Manor 7 from Ne w York — D onovan conc edes that the probate court did not have a ctual knowledg e of what wa s happening , sug g esting only that “it can r easona

bly be inferred that r e tur

nin g Gr os s to Grove Manor wa s done under the supervision, knowledg e, and implied conse nt of the Court.” B ri e f f or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lle e Do no va n at 22 (e mph a sis a dd e d) . B e c a us e we mus t dr aw a ll inf e re nc e s in the light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pla int if

f, we mus t de c lin e Do no va n’ s invit a tio n to rea sonably

infer that she forc ibly

returne d Gross to Grove Manor f rom NewYork “ under the supervision, knowledg e, and implied conse nt of the Court.” -18- 1 Donovan a

rgues that the a ctions she took — selling G ross’s prope rty , maintaining a bank ac count 2 with him, chang ing the locks on his house, etc. — w ere proper and within the scope of the duties 3 that a conse rvator ty pically car ries out. Howe ver, the se ar g uments do not go to whe ther a 4 conser

vator ha s immuni ty

(step one) . They

g o to whether

Gross’s c omplaint, as su mi ng the reis 5 im mu nit

y , alleg es suffic ient fac ts to overcome it. It may , or it may not (we do not de cide that 6 qu e sti on

no w) , b ut i t is a

dis tin c t qu e sti on

fr om whe the r q

ua si- jud ic ia l immun ity

e ve n e xten ds to 7 the se kin ds of

de fe nd ants

. 8 Of

c ours e , it sh ou ld g o w ith out sa

yingthat D on ov an ( or

any de fe nd ant) c ann ot, a t th is 9 stag e, ar g ue that ce rtain ac tions (such as plac ing G ross in the locked w ard of the nursinghome, 10 restric ting his ac cess to his children, a nd forc ibly

returninghim to Grove Manor from a N ew 11 York hospital) we re f or his own protec tion. At this stag e, we must construe all fa cts in the light 12 most favora

ble to Gross. A de fenda

nt may not bootstrap an ar g ument that she should not be 13 liable on theme rit s into an argument that she is protec ted by absolute immunity . We cannot 14 resolve f

actua l disputes in the defendants’ fa vo r a t th is s ta g e to c on c lud e that th e y are a bs olute ly 15 immun e fr om s uit

. 7 16 Withthi s b a c kg ro un d in min d, we ana ly

ze t he jud ic ia l and

qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity-19- 1 questions as to Br

unnock, Donova

n, Newma

n, and Gr ove Manor

. 2 II. Judi cial Im m uni ty: Judge Thomas P . Brunn ock 3 Plaintiff makes seve ral c laims ag ainst Br unnock, includingviolation of the Americ ans 4 with Disabiliti es Ac t, conspirac y (per 42 U.S.C. § 1985), violation of due proce ss rig hts, abuse of 5 pr oc e ss, and

ne g lig e nt a

nd int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss. I t is unne c e ssa ry to p ars e 6 the spec ifics of e ach c laim beca use the only

issue on appea l is im munity . We affir m the g rant of 7 judicial immunit y

as to the judg e. 8 The proble ms in thi s case beg an whe n Br unnock sig ned an or der on Aug ust 25, 2005 9 indicating that a hea ringwould occur

on September 1 — a

nd that Gross wa s to be notified of the 1 0 h e ar i n g b y August 24 . Moreove r, there is no indication that Gross even le arne d of the he aring 11 until August 30, just two day s prior. Additional dilige nce on B runnock’ s part could have 1 2 un co v er edth e f

ac tth atGr o s s wa s n ei th er a r es i d en tn o r ad o m i ci l i ary o f C o n n ec t i cu t ; as J u d ge 13 Gormley

of the Superior

Court noted at the hea

ringon the habe as petition, there w as not “a 14 scintilla of evidenc e that [Gross was] a re sident or domiciliary of the state of

Connecticut.” 15 Obviously , Br

unnock to some extent had to rely on the re prese ntations of Gross’s a ppointed 16 c ouns e l, b ut —

in p art ic ula

r, kn ow ingthat G ro ss w a s n ot s e rv e d w ithno tic e of the he ari ngun til 17 past the statutory deadline, a

nd obviously

awa re of the fa ct that Gross wa s not at the hea ring 18 itself — it would have bee n advisable to inquire f urther into the f

acts. Indeed, a s J udg e Gor mley 19 no te d, “ Mr . G ro ss d oe sn ’t g e t to g o to the he ari ng , o r g e t no tic e of the he ari ng , a

nd ha s n o a bil ity 20 to say

to any body [, ‘] Idon’t live here .[’] . . . [T] his case ha s disturbed me fr om day one. I kept 21 looking f

or some evide nce that would support what has take n place in this case but I find none . .-20- 1 . .” 2 Neve rtheless, B runnock’ s mishandling of the case is insufficient to defe at judicial 3 immunit y . “A judg e will not be depr ived of immunity beca use the a ction he took was in e rror , 4 w a s d o n e m a l i c i o u s l y, o r w a s i ne x c e s s o f

h i s a u th o r i ty; r a th e r , h e w i l l b e s u b j e c tt o l i a b i l i ty on ly 5 when he has acte d in the clear absenc e of all jurisdi ction .” Stump v. Sparkm an , 435 U.S. 349, 6 35 6- 57 (1 97 8) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d a

nd e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he c ri tic a l qu e sti on is 7 whether

he had jur isdiction. Id. at 356. Howe ver, the re is a dif fer ence betwee n exc eeding 8 jurisdiction and actingin the absenceof jurisdiction: 9 if

a pr ob ate jud g e , w ithjur isd ic tio n o ve r o nly wi lls and e state s, 10 should try a cr iminal case, he would be ac ting in the c lear absenc e 11 of jur isd ic tio n a

nd wo uld no t be imm

un e fr om l ia

bil ity fo r h is 12 a c tio n; o n th e oth e r h and , if a jud g e of a c ri min a l c ourt

sh ou ld 13 convict a de fenda nt of a none x istent crime, he w ould merely be 14 actingin excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune. 15 16 Id. at 357 n.7. J udicial immunity is not defeated “e ven whe n the judg e is ac cused of acting 17 maliciously

and cor ruptly .” Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 18 Gr os s su g g e sts that it sh ou ld b e e a sie r t o d e fe a t ju dic ia l immun ity wh e n th e jud g e in 1 9 qu e s t i o ni s s i t t i n g o na c o urto f l i m i t e d j ur i s d i c t i o n . H o w e v e r , th i s i s n o tth e l aw . A dm i t t e d l y, 20 some discussion in Stump sug g ests that the judg e wa s immune beca use he sat on a cour

t of 21 g ener al jurisdiction. See Stump , 435 U.S. at 357 (noting that the judg e had “ orig inal exclusive 22 jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity

whatsoeve r”) (interna l quotation marks omitted). 23 The point is not that a judge on a cour t of g ener al jurisdiction enjoy s “more” immunit y than one 24 on a cour

t of limit ed jurisdiction. Rather, the point is that a judg e on a c ourt of g ener al-21- 1 jurisdiction is l ess likely to have a cted in the c lear absenc e of a ll jurisdiction. 2 More to the point, the discussion in these ca ses — and in the pa rties’ brie fs in this case — 3 involve an “e lastic,” a nd there fore imprecise, “ conce pt of jurisdiction.” United States v. Cotton , 4 53 5 U .S. 62 5, 63 0 ( 20 02 ). In th is c on te xt, a c ourt a c ts i n th e a

bs e nc e of a ll j ur isd ic tio n w he n it 5 do e s n ot h ave any

“ statut or y or c on sti tut ion a l power

to adjudicate the case .” Id. (interna l 6 qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . H e re , it

is und isp ute d th a t B ru

nn oc k h a d th e po we r t o a dju dic a te 7 c on se rv a tor sh ip a

pp lic atio ns . T he de fe c t aro se out of the e rr on e ou s c on c lus ion that G ro ss w a s a 8 resident of

Connecticut. This err oneous leg al conc lusion is i nsufficie nt to strip the judge of 9 immunit y . 10 In Maestri v. J utkofsky , 8 60 F .2 d 5 0 ( 2d Cir . 1 98 8) , w e a dd

re sse d ju dic ia l immun ity

in 11 the context of a lawsuit ag ainst a town justice. In that case , the plaintiffs we re a rre sted, based on 12 an ar

rest wa rra nt issued by

the def endant, in the town of

Ger mantown. Howe ver, the defe ndant 13 was a

town justice in Tag hkanic, whic h is not adjace nt to Germantown. B y statute, town justices 14 have jur isd ic tio n “ on ly in t he town in

wh ic h th e of

fe ns e wa s c omm itt e d [or , in c e rt a in 15 circ umstances,] any adjoining town w ithin the same county .” Id. at 52. We explained in Ma estr i 16 that “a judg e will be denie d immunit y only wher e it appea

rs, first, that the judg e ac ted in the clea r 17 absenc e of jurisdiction, and se cond, that the judg e mu st h av e k no wn that he or

sh e wa s a c tin g in 18 the clea

r abse nce of

jurisdiction.” Id. at 53 (e mphasis added) . In that case , we he ld that 19 immunit y

did not apply , beca

use the off

ense in que stion occurr ed in a non- adjoining town, a nd 20 “[n] o rea sonable town judg e would have thought himself to have had jurisdiction over anon21 adjoining town.” Id.-22- 1 Gross seizes on that languag e her e, ar g uing that no rea sonable Connec ticut Probate Court 2 judge would have thoug ht he had jurisdiction over a Ne w York r esident. This misses the cruc ial 3 distinction between Ma estr i and this case , v iz ., that it was undisputed that the judg e in Ma estr i 4 knew the pla intiffs were from a town ove r which he had no jurisdiction. See id. at 51-52. He re, 5 B ru

nn oc k h a d s ub

je c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r c a se s li ke Gr os s’ s, and tho ug h it wa s u lti mate ly 6 held that he did not have persona l jurisdiction over Gross, B runnock did not know it at the time. 7 I mmunity

there fore applies. 8 Plaintiff also argues that B runnock kne w or should have known that he did not have 9 jurisdiction as of the September 1, 2005, hear ing, be cause (1) the notice that Br unnock sig ned on 10 Au g us t 25 wa s f

a c ia lly de fe c tiv e , a s it

did no t a llo w f

or the statut or ily -m and a te d s e ve n d ay s’ 11 notice, seeC ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 45a-649( a); (2) the re turn of ser vice indicated that 12 L imauro, and not Gr oss himself (or his attorney ), wa s the person se rved; a nd (3) Ne wman’s 13 re po rt

to t he c ourt ind ic ate d th at G ro ss l ive d in Ne w Y or k, so that a

re a so na ble jud g e wo uld 14 have, at a minimum, enga g ed in furthe r fa ct-findingto determine if jur isdiction were pr oper. 15 These c laims find some support in the statute, which provide s that the responde nt must be give n 16 seven da

y s’ notice of

a hea ringand that he himself must be se rved. Mor eover , if the re spondent 17 wishes to attend the he aring , the judg e mu st either hold the he aringin a conve nient location or 18 visit t he re spondent. Id. § 45a-649( a)- (b). 19 B ut a s th e Sup re me Court ha s in str uc te d, “ jud g e s sh ou ld b e a t li be rt y to e xer c ise the ir 20 functions with independe nce a nd without fear

of conse quence s.” Pierson , 386 U.S. at 554. 21 Moreove r, “the scope of the judg e’s jurisdiction must be construe d broadly wher e the issue is the-23- 1 immunit y

of the judg e.” Stump , 435 U.S. at 356. Br unnock cle arly

had jurisdiction over c ases 2 like Gross’s . T he jud g e sim ply did no t ha ve jur isd ic tio n o ve r G ro ss’ s c a se its e lf . Ind e e d, a s a 3 re c e nt C onne c tic ut A pp e llate Court

c a se e xpla ins , “ [a] ju dg e do e s n ot a c t in the c omp le te 4 absenc e of a

uthority , even if

she ac ts errone ously , unless the judicial conduc t is so far outside the 5 normal scope of judicial func tions that the judge was in ef fec t not acting as a judg e.” Leseberg v

. 6 O’Grady , 115 Conn. App. 18, 23 (2009) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). That test is not met 7 here ; ruling on c onservatorship applications and re lated matter s are judicial functions within the 8 rea lm of a probate judg e. See id. at 24. A judg e’s “ fail[ure] to comply fully with statutory 9 proce dures,” as wa s the ca se her e, is insufficient to strip the judg e of immunity

. Id. at 23. 10 The for eg oing a naly sis applies to state as we ll as fede ral c laims. As expl ained a bove, 11 Connecticut’s c ommon law of judicial immunity is, so far a s releva

nt here , the same a s the 12 fede ral test. See Sh ay v . R os si , 2 5 3 C o n n . 1 3 4 , 1 7 0 (2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Stump v. Sparkm an , 4 35 U. S. 13 349, 364 (1978)) , overruled on othe r grounds , Miller v. Egan , 2 65 Conn. 30 1 ( 20 03 ); Lese be rg 14 v. O’ Grady , 1 1 5 C o n n . Ap p . 1 8 , 2 2 (2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Mireles v . W aco , 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991))

. 15 F or

the re a so ns dis c us se d a

bo ve , w e ho ld t

hat B ru nn oc k is e nti tle d to jud ic ia l im mun ity on state 16 law c la ims

. 17 Thus, Br

unnock did not act in the c lear absenc e of subjec t matter jurisdiction, and he w as 1 8 n o t a

w ar e o f th e d e f e c ts in p e r s o n a l j ur is d ic ti o n , ma k in g ju d ic ia l i mm

un it y a p p r o p r iate

. We 19 there fore aff

irm the District Court’s g rant of judicia l immuni ty to Brunnoc k and its dismis sal ofCas e v . B us h , 93 Conn. 550 (1919), does not cha ng e the a naly sis. Accor ding to a 8 treatise, Cas e stands for the pr oposition t hat a judg e who a cts without subject matter jurisdiction could be subjec t to civil li ability

. See RAL PH H. F OL S ON & G AYLE B. W I LH ELM , P R OB AT E J UR I S DI C TI ON & P R OC ED UR E I N C ONN . § 2:5, at 2-19 (2d e d. 2008). Howe ver, Cas e signif ic antl y pr e date s th e U. S. a

nd Conne c tic ut S up re me Court s’ a uth or iti e s o n th e qu e sti on and , mo st important, does not distinguish betwee n a judg e exc eeding his jurisdiction and actingin the clea r absenceof

jur isd ic tio n, wh ic h is the re le va nt l e g a l te st. -24- 1 a ll c la ims a g a ins t hi m. 8 2 III. Quasi -Judicial Imm uni ty 3 A. F ederal vs. State Law 4 As discussed above , there are two distinct but related questions in this case: first, whe ther 5 Donovan, Ne wman, and G rove Ma nor ar e entitled to the def ense of absolute quasi-judicia l 6 immunit y

as to fede ral c laims (a question of f eder al law) , and sec ond, whether Donovan a

nd 7 Newma

n are entitled to such immunit y as to state law c laims (a question of state law). We a re 8 c e rt if

yingqu e sti on s a s to bo th o f t he se iss ue s. We a

re c e rt if yingqu e sti on s r e g ard ingthe state 9 law issue bec ause the Connecticut Supreme Court ha s not definitively spoken on the subjec t of 10 quasi-judicial immunity for c onservators and cour t-appointed attorney s for c onservatees. 11 We a

re a lso c e rt if

yinga qu e sti on that r e late s to the fe de ra l la w q ue sti on . We do so 12 beca

use application of the fac tors the Supreme Court ha s outlined intersects unsettled que stions 13 of Connecticut state law and policy . There fore , we a sk the Connecticut Supreme Court to give 14 us g uidance as to the role of conser vators, attorne y s, and nursinghomes within the Connecticut 15 probate court sy stem. Upon rec eiving this guidanc e, we will decide the f eder al claims at issue 16 here

.A re cent c ase f rom the D.C. Circuit illust rate s the potential for diff ere nce. I n Atherton 9 v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 567 F.3d 672 ( D.C. Cir. 2009), the cour t had to addre ss the question of whether a juror of fice r and a

n Assistant United States Attorney wer e entitled to quasi-judicial immun ity fo r d ism iss inga

jur or , a lle g e dly

on a c c ount o f h is e thn ic ity . T he D. C. C ir c uit employ ed a thr ee- part func tional analy sis based on Bu tz to d e te rm ine the qu e sti on of qu a sijudicial immunit y , see id. at 683, just as the Connecticut Supreme Court did, see Carrubba , 274 Conn. at 542-43. Howeve r, Connecticut se ems to ext end immunity to those who are “per forminga func tion that was integ ral to the judicial proc ess.” Id. at 542. The D .C. Circuit, on the other hand — re lyingon

the same Sup re me Court c a se a s Co nn e c tic ut —

se e ms t o e xten d immun ity on ly to those who ar e exerc ising a judicial function or a ctingin a way integ rally

related to adjudication

. See Atherton , 567 F.3d at 683. For e x ample, in Atherton , the D.C. Circuit expl ained that the juror off icer “wa s not involved in the resolution of any fac tual or leg al issue; and her responsibilities did not i nvolve handlingany pleading s, disputes, or controve rsies of law .” Id. at 683-84. Thus, eve n officia ls who are important in providing the ne cessa ry conditions for the operation of the judicial sy stem are not protecte d by immunit y

unless they

are perf orming adjudicative f

unctions. See id. at 684. The D .C. Circuit, relying a t least in part on the same ca ses a s th e Conne c tic ut S up re me Court , a pp e ars to h ave de ve lop e d a te st f or qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity that is na rr ow e r t ha n th at in Conne c tic ut. We n ote thi s d if

fe re nc e , n ot t o s ug g e st that th e Conne c tic ut t e st i s “ inc or re c t,” but on ly

to po int out ho w a

fe de ra l c ourt

and a state c ourt , e mpl oyingthe same le g a l f ra me wo rk , ma

y c ome to differ ent conc lusions when one is apply ing f eder al law a

nd the other is apply

ing state law. Suc h a n o utc ome may

or may no t ari se in t

his c a se , b ut s uc h a

po ssi bil ity

is what r e qu ir e s u s to c e rt if y tw o s e ts o f q

ue sti on s. -25- 1 We note that, in prac tice, the division betwee n the fe dera l and state lawissues may 2 vanish. As we e x plain inf ra , th e Conne c tic ut S up re me Court , in its mos t r e c e nt c a se on

qu a si3 j u d i c i a l i m mun i ty , e x p l a i n e d th ati tw a s a d o p t i n g U

. S

. S u p r e m e C o urtc a s e l awo nth e s u b j e c t

. It 4 does not appe ar to us that the f eder al and Connec ticut tests diverg e much, if at all. Howeve r, we 5 do no t pr e sume to d e c ide the c on tou rs of Conne c tic ut l aw. Af

te r a ll, the Conne c tic ut S up re me 9 6 Court may

expand, restrict, a

bandon, or othe rwise modify its curre nt state common law doc trine 7 on thi s p oint. E ve n if

that is the c a se , w e wo uld no ne the le ss f

ind he lpf ul a dis c us sio n o f t

he ro le-26- 1 of the va

rious actor s in the Connecticut probate sy stem in light of the f eder al law f

actor s as 2 enunciated in Cleavinger

. 3 Of

c ours e , if Conne c tic ut’ s state law analy sis of quasi-judicial immunity relies on the 4 same fa ctors as the fede ral lawtest, then the Connecticut Supre me Court will so advise us. 5 In either e vent, we w ill ult imately apply and ela borate on the federal lawte st f or qu a si6 judicial immunit y . First, in light of the guidance rec eived by the Connecticut Supreme Court, we 7 will decide whe ther the de fense of quasi-judicia l immuni ty is available to these defe ndants at all. 8 Then, we may

also nee d to decide r elated que stions, such as whether the def ense should be r aised 9 a t a

mot ion to d ism iss , o r at a

late r s ta g e . I f w e c on c lud e that qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity

a pp lie s to 10 any

of the fe dera l claims ag ainst the defe ndants, we ma y also nee d to answer

the sec ond-orde r 11 question of pre cise scope and contour s of that immunity . These de terminations would be made 12 as a matter of f

eder al law. 13 There fore , althoug h state and f eder al law que stions are posed w ith reg ard to e ach 14 defe ndant, we do not bifur cate our ana ly sis below. 15 B. ConservatorKat hleen Donovan 16 Gross plea ds sever al fe dera l and state lawclaims ag ainst the forme r conse rvator, 17 Kathlee n Donovan: conspira cy pursuant to § 1985, violation of his rig ht to due proce ss, neg lige nt 18 and intentional infliction of emotional distress, bre ach of fiduciar y duty , false a

rre st and tortious 19 assault, and f

alse imprisonment. The District Court dismissed all of these c laims, concluding 20 that Donovan, a s a cour t-appointed c onservator ac ting pur suant to the Probate Court’s or der, w as 21 entitled to quasi-judicial immunity . The District Court wrote ,-27- 1 Donovan’ s argument to ext end Judge B runnock’ s judicial 2 immun ity to h e r a c tio ns is a

sim ple on e a s th e law i s c le ar a nd we ll 3 e sta bli sh e d. Do no va

n w a s a c tin g a s a

n a g e nt o f t

he Pr ob a te Court , 4 atth e d i r e c t i o nan d un d e r th e s u p e r v i s i o no f J u d g e B r un n o c k

. If 5 J udg e B runnock is immune from suit, than [ sic ] Donovan as 6 conser vator a cting as his ag ent or at his direction must be immune. 7 8 Howeve r, we are not of the view that “the law is c lear and we ll-established.” To the 9 contra

ry , as we rea d them, the statutes and c ase la w in Connecticut do not sufficie ntly enable us 10 to a

na ly ze t he fa c tor s se t f

or th b y the Sup re me Court

in d e c idi ngwh e n a

n in div idu a l is e nti tle d to 11 quasi-judicial immunity

. 12 At

the outse t, w e no te that D on ov an is c or re c t: c ourt s a

re wi lli ngto e xten d a

bs olute 13 judicial immunit y to those who “pe rfor

m functions closely

associate d with the judicial proce ss.” 14 Cleavinger v. Sax ner , 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985). Those who seek this absolute immunity bear 15 the burde n of demonstrating that public policy require s such a br oad exemption from suit. See 16 id. at 201. The Supre me Court has set for th a “f unctional” a

pproac h to determine whether a 17 particula

r individual is entitled to quasi-judicial immuni ty . The fa ctors include 18 (a) the nee d to assure that the individual can per form his functions 19 without harassment or intimidation; (b) the pre sence of saf eguards 20 that reduc e the ne ed for private da

mag es ac tions as a means of 21 controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from politi cal 22 influence ; (d) the importanc e of pr ece dent; (e) the adve rsar y nature 23 of the pr oc e ss; and

(f ) t he c or re c ta bil ity of e rr or on a pp e a l. 24 25 Id. a t 20 2; see also Butz v. Ec onomou , 4 38 U. S. 4 78 , 5 11 -1 2 ( 19 78 ) ( de sc ri bin g the fa c tor s in 26 g reater de tail). 27 In this case, the a pplication of these f

actor s directly

intersec ts the nature a

nd function of 28 the Connecticut probate cour t sy stem and consider ations of Connecticut public policy . For-28- 1 e xamp le , a lth ou g h a ll i nd ivi du a ls c onne c te d to the jud ic ia l pr oc e ss i n s ome wa y wo uld sure ly 2 like to “per form [their] functions without hara ssment or intimi dation,” Cleavinger , 474 U.S. at 3 202, cer

tain of those individuals enjoy absolute immunity , see, e .g. , Imbler v . Pachtman , 424 4 U.S. 409 (1976) (pr osecutors e ntitled to absolute imm unity) , while other s do not , see, e .g. , 5 Antoine v. By ers &Anderson, Inc

. , 5 08 U. S. 4 29 (1 99 3) (c ourt re po rt e rs no t e nti tle d to a bs olute 6 immunit y

). Which side of the line a court-a ppointed conser

vator fa lls on necessa

rily involves 7 qu e sti on s r e g ard ingthe ro le of a c on se rv a tor

in C onne c tic ut a

nd the wa y that po sit ion

is 8 envisioned in Connecticut’s statutory and common law sc heme. 9 C o n n e c t i c u tc a s e l awi s n o ts u f f i c i e n t l y o np o i n tt o p r o v i d e a

r u l e o f d e c i s i o nh e r e . In 10 Car

ru bb a v . M

os k owi tz , 2 74 Conn. 53 3 ( 20 05 ), the Conne c tic ut S up re me Court he ld t hat c ourt

11 appointed counse l for minor childre n wer e entitled to quasi-judicial immunity . The c ourt beg an 12 the ana ly sis by

noting that the “ extension [ of judicial immunity to others] ge nera lly

has bee n very 13 limit ed.” Id. at 540. Moreove r, 14 no t e ve ry c ate g or y of pe rs on s p ro te c te d b y

immun ity

are e nti tle d to 15 ab so lute immun ity . In f a c t, j us t th e op po sit e pr e sumpt ion pr e va ils 16 — c ate g or ie s o f p e rs on s p ro te c te d b y immun ity

are e nti tle d o nly

to 17 the sc op e of immun ity

that is ne c e ssa

ry to p ro te c t th os e pe rs on s in 18 the per formanc e of the ir duties. The pre sumption i s that qualified 19 rathe r than a bsolute immuni ty

is sufficient to protec t gove rnment 20 of fi c ia ls i n th e e xer c ise of

the ir dutie s. 21 22 Id. a t 54 1 ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and a lte ra tio n o mitte d) . T he se c omm e nts mig ht l e a d o ne to 23 conclude that courts should be ve ry reluc tant to expand the rea ch of qua si-judicial immunit y . 24 Howeve r, af ter a dopting the U .S. Supreme Court’s functional a pproac h, the cour

t 25 deter

mined that court-a

ppointed counsel for

minor children were entitled to absolute immunit y .-29- 1 The c ourt rea soned that cour t-appointed c ounsel for minor c hildren we re “ subject to the cour t’s 2 discretion,” c ould “be r emoved by the cour t at any time,” and we re, “

just as any

other attorney , . . 3 . subject to discipline for violations of the Code of Professional Conduct.” Id. at 543. The c ourt 4 e mph a size d th at c ourt -a pp ointe d c ouns e l f

or min or c hil dr e n s e rv e d a

du a l f un c tio n; i n a dd iti on

to 5 be inga tto rn e y s a dv oc atin g the ir c lie nts ’ ( i.e ., the c hil d’ s) wi sh e s, the y mus t “ pr omo t[e ] the be st 6 interests of the c hild,” id. at 54 4, wh ic h invo lve s “ be [ing ] mor e ob je c tiv e tha

n a pr ivate ly 7 reta ined attorne y ,” id. at 545. The c ourt ac knowledg ed that the “ dual obliga tions im posed on the 8 attorney

for a minor child . . . are not easily disentang led.” Id. Ho we ve r, the ro le a s a dv oc a te 9 “must alway s be subordinate d to the attorney ’s duty to serve the best interests of the child.” Id. 10 at 546. The c ourt also distinguished the c ase of repr esentinga child — which “ imposes a hig her 11 deg ree of objec tivity on [an] attorney” — fr om that of repr esentingan adult. Id. at 545 (interna l 12 quotation marks omitted). 13 Thus, afte r explaining that the attorney had an obje ctive role (i.e., not pure ly as an 14 advocate) that made her integral to the judicial proc ess, and that the c omplaint made no 15 alleg ation that the attorne y “ac ted outside the usual role of an attorney for the minor c hildren,” 16 the cour

t concluded that the attorney was e ntitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunit y . Id. at 549. 17 Relying pr imarily on Carrubba , Donovan a rgues that she should be immune fr om suit. 18 Carrubba , h ow e ve r, is n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y ins tr uc tiv e . T he a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he fa c tor s se t f

or th i n 19 Cleavinger

to t he c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

his c a se (a

fe de ra l qu e sti on ) d e pe nd s o n th e natur e of the ro le 20 a c on se rv a tor

se rv e s und e r C onne c tic ut l aw, a top ic that Carrubba does not discuss. There fore , 21 we thi nk

it m os t pr

ud e nt t o s e e k th e a ssi sta

nc e of the Conne c tic ut S up re me Court wi th r e sp e c t to-30- 1 the Cle av inge r fac tors. 2 Indeed, Conne cticut law se ems to rec og nize that, in certain c ircumstance s, conser vators 3 can be liable f

or their of ficial a ctions. First, a pr obate c ourt is require d by statute to require the 4 posting of a

probate bond if it appoints a conser vator for the estate of a r espondent. See C ONN . 5 G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 4 5a -6 50 (g ). Th e c ourt a lso ha s th e a

bil ity , in its dis c re tio n, if

it a pp oints a 6 conser

vator of the person, to re quire the c onservator to post a bond “for the protec tion of the 7 responde nt.” Id. The c ourt did not require such a bond in this case , which Gr oss claims was par t 8 of the c onspiracy

ag ainst him. Rega

rdless, the fa ct that the law r equire s a probate bond, and 9 permits a bond for the protec tion of the conser ved per son, sugg ests that the leg islature wa s awa re 1 0 o f

th e p o s s i b i l i ty o f

c o n s e r v at o r s ’ l i a

b i l i ty. 11 The Connec ticut Supreme Court’s dec ision in J e wis h H om e for theEl de rly of F air fie ld 12 Cou nty

, I nc . v . Ca nto re , 257 Conn. 531 (2001), is instructive. The home at which the de cede nt 13 stay ed sued the conser vator whe n the conse rvator did not pay it for its service s. I t alleg ed “a n 14 a c tio n o n th e pr ob ate bo nd to r e c ov e r f

or the los s it

su ff e re d a s a re su lt o f [the c on se rv a tor ’s ] 15 failure to ensure timely pay ment for [the conser

vatee Kosminer’s] car e.” Id. at 539. The 16 Connecticut Supreme Court de termined that the c omplaint had stated a c laim ag ainst Cantore a nd 17 that the home had sta nding to br ing its cla im. Id. at 543. I t held that Cantore ha d a duty , among 18 other thing s, to use Kosminer’s e state to support her a nd pay her de bts. Id. at 540. Thus, the 19 Connecticut Supreme Court’ s holding in the Can tor e lit ig a tio n s e e ms t o r e c og nize that a 20 conser

vator c an be sue d in an ac tion on the probate bond when he f ails to perfor

m his duty

. 21 Moreove r, a c onservator is defined a s a fiducia ry , seeC ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 45a--31- 1 199, and fiduc iaries “ who[,] in good f aith[,] make[] pay

ments . . . pursuant to the orde r of the 2 court of pr obate ha ving jur isdiction before an appe al has be en take n from such or der, sha ll not be 3 lia ble fo r t he mon e y so pa id .

. . e ve n if

the or de r u

nd e r whic h s uc h p ay

me nt .

. . ha s b e e n ma de is 4 later r ever sed, vac ated, or set aside,” id. § 4 5 a - 2 0 2 ( a )

. Itc o u l d b e , h o w e v e r , th a ta

f i d u c i ar y may 5 be liable ( 1) if he did not ac t in good f aith, (2) if the probate court lac ked jurisdiction, or (3) if he 6 acte d afte r an appe al was taken and the underly ing or der is re verse d. 7 Thus, Connecticut law se ems to imply that (at lea st certa in ty

pes of) conser

vators may

be 8 lia ble in c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s. Th is s ug g e sts that c on se rv a tor s d o n ot h ave a bs olute immun ity 9 from suit (the first-or der que stion) but that they may raise c erta in affir

mative def

enses to liability

. 10 In such a c ontext , it appear s inappropriate for us to hold that conse rvators a re a bsolutely immune 11 from suit. 12 I t w ou ld b e pa rt ic ula rl y ina pp ro pr iate fo r u s to so ho ld b e c a us e , in oth e r c on te xts, 13 Connecticut law e x plicitly rec og nizes certain c onservators’ immunity . By law, “[a]ll rece ivers or 14 c on se rv a tor s of trust banks or unins ured banks

. . . s ha ll b e immun e fr om s uit and lia bil ity , b oth 15 persona lly

and in their off

icial ca pacities . . . .” C ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 36 a -2 37 h( a )- (b ) ( Wes t 16 2008 pocket pa

rt) (e mphasis added) . Moreove r, immunity under this sec tion does not e xten d to 17 attorney s retaine d by the conse rvator, id. § 36a-237h( a), or to “intentional or wilful and wa nton 18 misconduct of the r ece iver or c onservator,” id. § 36a-237h( b). Other ty pes of c onservators are 19 simil arly

immune, s ee, e .g. , id. §§ 45 a -6 83 (gua rd ians of pe op le wi th m e nta l r e tard a tio n) . T he se 20 provisions do not apply to the kind of conser

vator at issue in this case . The fa ct that the 21 leg islature spec ifically made se vera l ty

pes of guardia

ns and conse rvators immune but not othersCol lin s is c ur re ntl y on a pp e a l be fo re our c ourt . H ow e ve r, to t he e xtent th a t Colli ns 10 overla ps, our pane l has prec edenc e, bec ause Colli ns has not y et bee n hear d. -32- 1 lends support for the proposition that conservators like Donovan a re not immune or that, if such 2 immunit y

exis ts, it i s not absolute. Inclusio unius est exc lusio alt erius

. 3 To be sure , the Connecticut Supreme Court may disag ree and conc lude that it is more 4 consistent with the overa ll statutory scheme to hold that conservators like Donovan ar e immune 5 despite the fa ct that no statute explicitl y confe rs immunity . For

example, the court may

rea son 6 that if other c onservators are immune, Donovan should be a s well. This undersc ores the 7 ratio na le fo r c e rt if ic atio n; t he state c ourt

is i n a be tte r p os iti on

to s pe ak to that qu e sti on

of state 8 policy

. Cf. See Seale d v. Seale d , 332 F.3d 51, 59 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (“Wher e a que stion of statutory 9 int e rp re tatio n im

pli c ate s th e we ig hin g of

po lic y c on c e rn s, pr inc ipl e s o f c omi ty and fe de ra lis m 10 strong ly

support cer

tification.”) ( citation omitted). 11 Admittedly , other fe dera l case s have he ld that a conse rvator is entitled to quasi-judicial 12 immunit y . See, e .g. , Cok v. Cosentino , 8 76 F .2 d 1 (1 st C ir . 1 98 9) (p e r c ur iam) ; Col lin s v . W est 13 Hartford Police Departme nt , 3 80 F . Su pp . 2 d 8 3 ( D. Conn. 20 05 ); Rzayev a v. United States , 492 14 F . Su

pp . 2 d 6 0 ( D. Conn. 20 07 ); Sa ssc e r v . B arrio s-Pa oli , No. 05-c v-2196, 2008 WL5215466, 15 at *5 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. D ec. 8, 2008)

. 10 16 Do no va

n s ug g e sts that c on se rv a tor s a re sim ply an a rm of the pr ob a te c ourt . B ut t

his is 17 not the end of the inquiry . Although “ it is clear that the c onservator ac ts under the supe rvision 18 and contr ol of the Probate Court,” they do so “ in t

hec ar e an d m an age me nt o f th e war d’ s e sta te ” 19 or per son. Probate of Marcus , 199 Conn. 524, 529 (1986) (e mphasis added) . Indeed, Marcus ,Def endants have ar g ued that plaintiff implicitly rec og nized that the judge ’s orde rs wer e 11 proper beca use there was no a

ppeal. This ig nores the obvious fa ct that if one is held to be inc omp e te nt, po ssi bly

wi tho ut n oti c e , it

is d if fi c ult if no t im po ssi ble to f

ile an a pp e a l. -33- 1 wh ic h D on ov an c ite s, he ld t hat it wa s im pe rm iss ibl e fo r a

c on se rv a tor

to m ake a

g if t to he rs e lf 2 from the wa

rd’s e state. (The conser

vatrice s sought to make such a g ift, the probate court de nied 3 them permission, and they appea led.) Id. I t seems at first c ut illogical to hold that, if the 4 conser

vatrice s in that case ma de such a n ultra vires dis tr ibutio n, the y wo uld be a bs olute ly 5 immune from suit by the war d, even thoug h the ac tions they took were clea

rly impermissible. 6 In s um, our c on c lus ion a s to qu a si-

jud ic ia l immun ity

a s to fe de ra l c la ims a g a ins t 7 Donovan is g overne d by the Cle av inge r fac tors. The a naly sis of those fac tors implicates 8 questions of Connecticut state la w that, as de scribed a

bove, ar e not entire ly

clea r. F or example, 9 there is obviously

a nee d to assure tha

t conservators can ope rate without the threat of ha rassing 10 litigation, but Connecticut cour ts, familiar with the role of the conse rvator w ithin that st ate’ s 11 sy stem, may

believe that this factor de serve s less weig ht than we mig ht otherwise g ive it. 12 Simi larly , the Connecticut Supreme Court might inform us that there are strong proce dural 13 safe g uards in plac e (the second f actor ), but that these a

re unde rcut by

the fa ct that probate judg es 14 in C onne c tic ut a

re e le c te d ( the thi rd

fa c tor). Th e Conne c tic ut c ourt c an a lso a ssi st u s in 15 deter

mining, for

example, the chanc es of e rror s beingcorr ecte d on appea l or the role of prec edent 16 in t

he Conne c tic ut p ro bate sy ste m. 11 17 There fore , as to Gross’s f eder al claims ag ainst Donovan, we cer tify a question to the 18 Conne c tic ut S up re me Court . We a sk the c ourt to e xpla in t

he ro le and

fu nc tio n o f a

c ourt

--34- 1 appointed conse rvator, in the c ontext of Connecticut’ s probate c ourt sy stem, in light of the 2 f a c t o r s s e tf

o rthb y Cleavinger v. Sax ner , 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985). Upon r ece iving the 3 Connecticut Supreme Court’ s response, w e will decide whether quasi-judicial immunity

extends 4 to c on se rv a tor s a s a matte r o f f

e de ra l la w, and if so , th e se c on d- or de r q

ue sti on of wh a t th e pr e c ise 5 scope of

that immunit y

is. 6 As to the state cla ims ag ainst Donovan, we simply cer tify the question of whe ther 7 conser

vators ar e entitled to quasi-judicial immunity . Reg ardingthe state lawclaims, the 8 Conne c tic ut S up re me Court ’s de te rm inatio n w ill be fi na l. 9 C. Attor ney Jonathan Newm an 10 Gross make s sever al fe dera l and state c laims ag ainst Newma n: conspirac y

(by way of 11 § 1985), violation of his rig ht to due proce ss, intentional and neg lige nt infliction of emotional 12 dis tr e ss, and

ma lpr a c tic e . A lth ou g h D on ov an a nd Ne wm an a

re bo th atto rn e y s, the re is a 13 signific ant ca

veat: Ne wman, as G ross’s attorne y , was a n advocate, while Donova n, as the 14 c on se rv a tor , w a s n ot. Th e pa rt ie s se e m to dis pute wh e the r N e wm an’ s r ole wa s solely that of an 15 advocate (Gr oss’s position) or whether he wa s to advocate Gross’s vie ws tempere d by his own 16 judgme nt (Newman’s position). Howeve r, it is clear that, at least to some extent, Newman w as 17 supposed to act a s an advoc ate. The ref ore, his role was to some degree less as an “ arm of the 1 8 c o urt , ” an d

h e h a s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y w e ak e r

c l a i mt o qu a s i

-

j u d i c i a l i m mun i ty. 19 The Cleavinger fa c tor s are re le va

nt h e re , a s th e y

we re fo r D on ov an: 20 (a) the nee d to assure that the individual can per form his functions without 21 hara ssment or intimi dation; (b) the pr esenc e of sa feguards that r educe the nee d for 22 private da mag es ac tions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c)-35- 1 insulation from politi cal influe nce; ( d) the importanc e of pr ece dent; (e) the 2 a dv e rs ary

natur e of the pr oc e ss; and

(f ) t he c or re c ta bil ity of e rr or on a pp e a l. 3 4 474 U.S. at 202. 5 Newma

n argues that he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity beca use he w as ac ting a s an 6 arm of the court, notingthat he wa s “appointed by the [probate] court to repr esent the inter ests of 7 a per son beingconsidere d for a conser vatorship.” B rief of

Def endant- Appellant Ne wman at 6. 8 Ho we ve r, thi s st ate me nt m isl e a din g ly e vo ke s th e “ be st i nte re sts ” sta nd ard that a pp lie s to c ourt

9 appointed counse l for minor childre n. See Carrubba , 274 Conn. at 544-45 (holdingthat counsel 10 for a

minor child has a “ duty

to secure the best intere sts of the child”). B y contra st, the statute on 11 conser

vatorships indicates that the c ourt may appoint an attorne y

to “re prese nt the responde nt,” 12 C ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 45a-649( b)(2) , with no mention of “best intere sts.” In light of thi s 13 statute, Newman’s ar g ument that “[a] phy sician has already dete rmined that th e pe rs on is” 14 incompetent and the ref ore “ the attorne y

could not simply

parr ot the client’s wishes, but wa s 15 ob lig a te d to a ssi st the c ourt in s e rv ingthe c lie nt’ s b e st i nte re st, ” is p art ic ula rl y we ak. I t a lso 16 appea

rs to misconstrue the nature of the proce eding s. The cour t must find by

clea r and 17 convincingevidenc e that the re spondent is incompetent. Id. § 45a-650( d). Until that time, the 18 responde nt is li ke any other c ompetent client. More over, after the conse rvator is a

ppointed, she 19 is the one who mana g es the wa rd’s a ffa irs and his person. Id. Thus, if anyone, it is the 20 conser

vator who e x erc ises independe nt judgment a s ag ainst the war d’s wishes, not the attorne y . 21 Indeed, one can imag ine that the sy stem works best whe n the conse rvator r eports to the cour t an 22 independe nt judgment a bout what the wa

rd’s “ best interests” w ould be, and the a ttorneyWe note that Newma n’s citation to Lesn e wsk

i v . R e dv e rs , 276 Conn. 526 (2005) 12 appea rs entire ly inapposite. -36- 1 advocates for his client’ s wishes, with the probate court ultimately responsible for

the war d’s 2 p r o t e c t i o n . O f

c o ur s e , w h e th e r

s u c ha s ys t e m“ w o r

k s b e s t ” i s a

m a t t e r o f C o n n e c t i c u tp o l i c y. 12 3 N e w m ana l s o p o i n t s t o v ar i o u s f a c t s th a th e s ays s u

p p o rth i s c l a i mth a th e a c t e d p r o p e r l y: 4 Gross could not attend the hear ing be cause he wa s in the hospital (though a lternative 5 arr ang ements could have, and by statute must have, bee n made) ; signingpaper s as “attorney for 6 war d” whe n Gross had not y et bee n adjudg ed incompete nt was mere ly a tec hnical er

ror; the lac k 7 of notice w as cur able; and so on. H oweve r, just as with Donovan, Ne wman may not bootstrap 8 his arguments on the me rit s into an argument for im mu nit y . A t th is s ta g e , w e mus t take a ll f a c ts 9 in the light most favor able to Gr oss. The only issue on appea l is that of quasi-judicial immunity

. 10 Whe the r N e wm an w a s o r w a s n ot n e g lig e nt i s n ot b e fo re us . 11 Instead, our a naly sis is gover

ned by the Cle av inge r fac tors, and as w ith Donovan, that 12 ana ly sis imp lic ate s q ue sti on s o f s tate pr ob a te law. F or e xamp le , th ou g h atto rn e y s ty pic a lly 13 should operate without the threat of ha rassinglitigation, Connecticut policy may favor g iving 14 relatively

less protec tion for attorne y s appointed for conser vatee s than for those f

or minor 15 children. Cf. Carrubba , 274 Conn. at 541-42 (notingthat prosec utors in Connecticut are entitled 16 to a

bs olute immun ity

but pu bli c de fe nd e rs are e nti tle d to on ly qu a lif ie d immun ity

). As wi th 17 Donovan, the Conne cticut Supreme Court mig ht inform us that there a re strongproce dural 18 safe g uards in plac e (the second f actor ), but that these a

re unde rcut by

the fa ct that probate judg es 19 in Connecticut are elec ted (the third f actor). The Cle av inge r analy sis is also affec ted by the fa ct-37- 1 that N e wm an h a s some r o l e a s ana dv o c a t e , m ak i n g h i mc o m m e n s ur a t e l y le ss of an “ arm of the 2 court.” 3 There fore , as to Gross’s f eder al claims ag ainst Newma n, we c ertify

a question to the 4 Conne c tic ut S up re me Court . We a sk the c ourt to e xpla in t

he ro le and

fu nc tio n o f a

c ourt

5 a pp ointe d atto rn e y

fo r a c on se rv ate e , in

the c on te xt of

Conne c tic ut’ s p ro bate c ourt sy ste m, i n 6 l i g h to f

th e f a c t o r s s e tf

o rthb y Cleavinger v. Sax ner , 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985). Upon r ece iving 7 the Conne c tic ut S up re me Court ’s re sp on se , w e wi ll d e c ide wh e the r q ua si- jud ic ia l immun ity 8 extends to court-appointed attorney s for c onservatees a s a matter of fede ral law , and if so, the 9 second- order

question of what the pr ecise scope of that immunit y

is. 10 As to t

he state c la ims a g a ins t N e wm an, we sim ply c e rt if y the qu e sti on

of wh e the r c ourt

11 appointed attorne y s for c onservatees a re e ntitled to quasi-judicial immuni ty . As to the state law 12 c la ims , th e Conne c tic ut S up re me Court ’s de te rm inatio n w ill be fi na l. 13 D. Gro v e M a n o r N u rs i n g H o me 14 Gross pled six claims aga inst Grove Manor : two civil rights conspira cy claims pursuant 15 to § 1985, two statutory violations (conce rningthe Omnibus Budg et Reconc iliation Act of 1989 16 and the Patients’ B ill of Rights), and e motional dist ress (intentional a nd neg lige nt). Of these , the 17 civil rig hts claims are prese rved on a ppeal a nd the re mainder a

re w aived. How ever , as to the 18 e mot ion a l di str e ss c la ims , d ism iss a l w a s w ith out pr e jud ic e and

the se c la ims may

be re a sse rt e d in 19 the future

. 20 1 . Ci v i l Ri g h ts Cl a i ms 21 Th e c ivi l r ig hts c la ims a g a ins t G ro ve Ma no r r ise and

fa ll w iththe de te rm inatio n o f q ua si--38- 1 judicial immunit y . I f the c onservator and attorney have qua si-judicial immunit y , then the nursing 2 home may

as we ll, at least to the extent that itwas mer ely car rying out their

order s. I f they

do 3 no t, t

he n th e nurs ingho me lik e ly do e s n ot. F or

the re a so ns dis c us se d a

bo ve in c onne c tio n w ith 4 Donovan a

nd Newma

n, we c ertify

questions reg ardingthe nursinghome’s immunity as we ll. 5 Howeve r, we note that the ca se for derivative immunit y

is weake st with reg ard to the nur sing 6 ho me . G ro ve Mano r w a s f ur the st r e mov e d f

ro m th e jud ic ia l pr oc e ss. Mo re ov e r, no c ourt c a se 7 that we ha

ve found e x tends judicial immunit y to an instit ution (as oppose d to an individual). 8 Once ag ain, our a naly sis is gover

ned by the Cle av inge r fac tors. We will not rehash them 9 here , but we note that, a s with Donovan and N ewman, the application of those f actor s to Grove 10 Manor implicates Connec ticut probate la w. B eca use Grove Manor is more r emoved f rom the 11 judicial proce ss than Donovan or Newma n, it may have a weaker c ase f

or immunity . Howeve r, 12 despite this fac t, the policy considera

tions may exis t that mili tate towar d finding Grove Manor 13 immun e , p art ic ula rl y if Do no va n a nd Ne wm an a

re immun e . T he Conne c tic ut S up re me Court is 14 in the best position to address these que stions in t he first instance . There fore , as to Gross’s 15 fede ral c laims ag ainst Grove Ma nor, we cer

tify a question to the Connecticut Supre me Court. 16 We ask the cour

t to ex plain the role a

nd function of a

nursing home in the context of 1 7 C o n n e c t i c u t ’ s p r o b at e c o urts ys t e m , i nl i g h to f th e f a c t o r s s e tf

o rthb y Cleavinger v. Sax ner , 474 18 U. S. 1 93 , 2 02 (1 98 5) . Upo n r e c e ivi ngthe Conne c tic ut S up re me Court ’s re sp on se , w e wi ll 19 decide whether

quasi-judicial immunity

extends to nursing homes as a matter of f

eder al law, a

nd 20 if so , th e se c on d- or de r q

ue sti on of wh a t th e pr e c ise sc op e of that immun ity

is. 21 2 . S ta tu to ry a n d T o rt Cl a i ms-39- 1 The District Court dec lined to gr ant Grove Manor qua si-judicial immunit y as to the 2 statutory

claims and the tort c laims. The District Court rea soned that these c auses of action we nt 3 to Grove Ma

nor’s de cision to assign G ross to a par ticular room, to assig n him a particula r 4 roommate, a

nd to keep him in the room with the roommate a fter the roommate attacked him. 5 The District Court conc luded that these de cisions were discretionar y and not spec ifically

called 6 fo r b y

c ourt or de r; thu s, e ve n if

immun ity

a pp lie d to Gr ov e Ma

no r, it w ou ld n ot a

pp ly to t he se 7 dis c re tio na

ry a c ts. 8 The District Court we nt on to dism iss plaintiff’s statutory claims bec ause he did not 9 discuss them in his opposi tion to Grove Manor ’s motion to dis miss. W e af firm the dismissal of 10 these c laims beca use they wer e wa ived below a

nd are not discussed in the plaintiff’s ope ning 11 brief on a

ppeal ( other than in c onnection with whethe r Grove Manor ha s quasi-judicial 12 immunit y

). 13 Th is l e ave s th e int e nti on a l and ne g lig e nt i nf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss c la ims a g a ins t 14 the nursinghome. As noted a bove, these claims survived the D istrict Court’s quasi-judicial 15 immun ity

ana ly sis . Ro ug hly

thr e e we e ks late r, the Di str ic t Co ur t he ld a te le ph on e c on fe re nc e to 16 g e t f

ur the r b a c kg ro un d o n th e c a se and de te rm ine iss ue s f

or dis c ov e ry

and the su bs e qu e nt c ours e 17 of litigation. Then, at the ve ry end of that conver sation, the following transpire d: 18 [THE COURT:] So with respect to the ombudsman the pe riod of 19 no n- e c on omi c dama g e s w ou ld n ot e xce e d tw o mo nth s[, t he tim e 20 from Ewa ld rec eiving the complaint and Gr oss being rele ased]. 21 An d w ithre sp e c t to the nurs ingho me the pe ri od of no n- e c on omi c 22 damag es would not exceed f our day s[, t he time af

ter Gr oss ge tting 23 attacke d and the nur sing home rea ssigninghim to a differ ent 24 room]. I s that inacc urate ?-40- 1 MR. PETERS [, counsel for Gr oss] : Wi th the fac ts before me I 2 can’ t say that it is, y our Honor. 3 4 THE COURT: All rig ht. Given that, of c ourse you understand that 5 in order to sustain an a ction in district court there has to be a 6 showing by y ou, the plaintiff, that your dama g es ar e $75,000 or 7 g reater. And to be honest with y ou, I ’m at a loss to see how that 8 could possibly be the c ase on the se fa cts. Idon’t believe Ihave 9 [subj ect- matter] jurisdiction. 10 11 Th at’ s n ot t o s ay that if Idis mis s th is c a se y ou

wo uld no t be a ble to 12 file it in superior cour t. But I don’t believe y ou have F eder al Court 13 jurisdiction any longe r g iven the re maining c laims and the extent 14 of the dama g e s a sso c iate d w iththo se re ma ini ngc la ims

. 15 16 MR. PETERS : We all – we would like to – Imean, we would not 17 op po se that ana ly sis wh ic h w ou ld c a ll f or y ou dis mis sin g the c a se 18 be c a us e the n w e c ou ld a

pp e a l. 19 20 THE COURT: That you could. All rig ht. 21 22 Do y ou want to withdrawthe ca se? 23 24 MR. PETERS : No. 25 26 THE COURT: Do you object to the dismissal of the ca se? 27 28 MR. PET ERS : N o, Ido no t. 29 30 THE COURT: All rig hty , I ’ll enter the order

. 31 32 Gross does not addr ess this issue in his principal brief. This constitutes waive r. See, e .g. , 33 Zhang v. Gonzalez , 4 26 F .3 d 5 40 , 5 41 n. 1 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 5) . G ro ss r e fe rs to t he e mot ion a l di str e ss 34 claims in his reply brief a nd points out t hat his arguments about them wer e ra ised at the District 35 Court. Howeve r, this is also insufficient to proper ly prese nt an issue on appe al. See M cCarthy v. 36 S. E. C. , 406 F.3d 179, 186 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (“[A]rg uments not raised in an a ppellant’s openingUnlike Donovan a nd Newma

n, no state-law

claims rema in as to Grove Ma nor. 13 There fore , we ne ed not ce rtify a sepa rate question as to whether , as a matter of state law, nursing homes may

enjoy quasi-judicial immunity . Howeve r, bec ause dismissal was without prejudice , the re is a po ssi bil ity

of that qu e sti on

ari sin g in t

he fu tur e . We no te thi s o nly

to p oint out th a t th is posture may

aff ect the Conne cticut Supreme Court’s ha ndling of the ce rtified question. -41- 1 br ie f, but on ly

in h is r e ply

br ie f, are no t pr op e rl y

be fo re an a

pp e llate c ourt eve n when the same 2 ar gu me nts we rera ise d in thetri al c ou rt .”) ( emphasis adde d). Mer ely mentioning the r eleva

nt 3 issue in an openingbrief is not enough; “[i] ssues not sufficiently argued ar e in g ener al dee med 4 waived a

nd will not be considere d on appea l.” Frank v. U nited States , 78 F.3d 815, 833 ( 2d Cir. 5 1996), vacate d on other grounds , 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). “[S] imply stating a n issue does not 6 c on sti tut e c omp lia nc e wi th [F e de ra l Ru le of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure ] 28( a ): an a pp e lla nt o r c ro ss7 appellant must state the issue and advanc e an a rgument.” Id. Be cause Gross did not advanc e 8 any

argument until the reply

brief, the issue is waived. 9 Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the dismissal of the statutory and tort cla ims ag ainst Grove 10 Manor. The tort claims may be re asser

ted in the future as they

wer e dismissed without 11 prejudice

. 13 12 E. Sanctions O ther Than Civil L iabil ity 13 In Carrubba , th e Conne c tic ut S up re me Court re c og nize d th a t, e ve n th ou g h a c ourt

14 appointed attorne y for a minor child might be a

bsolutely immune from suit, he or she, “ just as 15 any

other attorney , is subject to discipline for violations of the Code of Prof essional Conduct.” 16 See 274 Conn. at 543. Sim ilarly , even if Br unnock, Donova

n, Newma

n, and Gr ove Manor

wer e 17 immune from suit, they may be subjec t to discipli ne for violations of their respe ctive prof essionalGross pled both intentional and ne g lige nt infliction of emotional distress ag ainst Ewald, 14 but she enjoy s immuni ty

for ne g lige nt (but not intentional) torts under state law , C ONN . G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 4-165. We a ff ir m th e Di str ic t Co ur

t’ s d ism iss a l of

that c la im. -42- 1 ethics rules a

nd/or licensingrequire ments. The question of whe ther de fenda nts violated such 2 obligations is not befor e us. Howe ver, w e note this fac t beca use the possibility

of such discipline 3 may

aff ect the Conne cticut Supreme Court’s a naly sis. Moreover , ref

err al to disciplinary 4 authorities, if any , would be a matter of state , not fede ral, law

. 5 IV . G ov e r norM . J odiRe ll a nd Om budsm an M ag gie Ewald 6 Gross alleg ed that Rell violated the Ame rica ns Wi th Disabiliti es Ac t, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 7 et seq. , and neg lige ntly inflicted emotional distress. He alleg es that Ewa ld violated Section 504 8 of the Reha

bilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the First Amendme nt, and that she 9 int e nti on a lly

and ne g lig e ntl y

inf lic te d e mot ion a l di str e ss. 10 Gr os s d oe s n ot d isc us s th e se c la ims in h is o pe nin g br ie f. (T he AD A, F ir st A me ndme nt, 11 and

Re ha bil itatio n A c t c la ims are no t me nti on e d at a ll a nd the e mot ion a l di str e ss c la ims are on ly 12 me nti on e d in

c onne c tio n w ithDo no va n a nd Ne wm an. ) R e ll a

nd Ew a ld a rgue that th e se c la ims 13 should be dee med waive d. Gross has now e x plicitly abandone d all claims ag ainst Rell and the 14 Re ha

bil itatio n A c t c la im a g a ins t E wa ld, and do e s n ot d isc us s th e F ir st A me ndme nt c la im i n 15 either his openingor re ply brief. H oweve r, he a

rgues in his reply

brief that the dismiss al of the 16 int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss c la im a g a ins t E wa ld i n h e r i nd ivi du a l c a pa c ity sh ou ld 17 be vac ated. 14 18 Howeve r, we will not consider this argument beca use it is waived for

the re asons-43- 1 discussed above with reg ard to Gr ove Manor . There fore , we a ffirm the D istrict Court’s dismi ssal 2 of the ne g lig e nt i nf

lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss c la im a g a ins t E wa ld. Ag a in, we no te that th is 3 claim was dismissed without prejudice for f ailing to e x cee d the jurisdictional minimum . I f the 4 Connecticut Supreme Court c oncludes that qua si-judicial immunit y does not apply

to Donovan, 5 Ne wm an, and

/or Gr ov e Mano r, the c la im a g a ins t E wa ld m ay be re a sse rt e d. Mo re ov e r, the c la im 6 may

be re asser

ted in a sepa

rate action in any

event. 7 CO NC LU SION 8 For

the re asons discussed a

bove, the District Court’s de cision is AFF I RMED in part and 9 CER TI F I ED in p art to t he Conne c tic ut S up re me Court . We a ff ir m th e g ra nt o f j ud ic ia l immun ity 10 as to Br

unnock and the dismiss al of the c laims ag ainst Rell and Ewald. We also af firm the 11 dismiss al of the e motional dist ress c laims ag ainst Grove Ma nor. 12 Howeve r, bec ause the re is no contr olling appe llate dec ision, constitut ional provision, or 13 statute in Connecticut that explains whether c onservators and cour t-appointed attorney s for 14 conser

vatee s enjoy

quasi-judicial immunity , we c ertify the followingquestions to the 15 Conne c tic ut S up re me Court : 16 1. Un de r C onne c tic ut l aw, do e s a bs olute qu a si-

jud ic ia l immun ity

e xten d to 17 c on se rv ator s a pp ointe d b y

the Conne c tic ut P ro bate Cou rt s? 18 1 9 2

. U n d e r C o n n e c t i c u tl aw , d o e s a

b s o l u t e qu a s i

-

j u d i c i a l i m mun i ty e x t e n d t o a t t o r n e ys 2 0 a

p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n tr e s p o n d e n t s i nc o n s e r v a t o r s h i p p r o c e e d i n g s o r

t o a t t o r n e ys 2 1 a

p p o i n t e d t o r e p r e s e n tC o n s e r

v a t e e s ? 22 23 In a

ns we ri ngthe se tw o q

ue sti on s, the Conne c tic ut S up re me Court may , if ne c e ssa ry , a lso 24 define the scope and contour s of any such immunity . The Connec ticut Supreme Court’s-44- 1 pronounce ment as to these state law questions will be final. 2 Gross has a lso pled fede ral lawclaims ag ainst Donovan, Ne wman, and G rove Ma nor. 3 Wit h reg ard to these claims, we must dec ide if the fe de ra l de fe ns e of qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity 4 applies to a c onservator, court- appointed attorne y for a conser vatee , or nursinghome. Howe ver, 5 our dete rmination of this question impl icates que stions of Connecticut law and policy

. 6 Th e re fo re , w e c e rt if y an a dd iti on a l qu e sti on

to t he Conne c tic ut S up re me Court , a sk ingfo r i ts 7 g uidance in connec tion with the Cleavinger fa c tor s: 8 What is t he role of conse rvators, c ourt-appointed attorney s for c onservatees, a nd 9 nursing homes in the Connecticut probate cour t sy stem, in light of the six factors 10 for de termining quasi-judicial immunity outlined in Cleavinger v. Sax ner , 474 1 1 U

. S

. 1 9 3 , 2 0 1

- 0 2 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ? 12 13 The c ertified que stions may be dee med modified to cove r any further pertinent que stions 14 of

Conne c tic ut l aw i nv olv e d in thi s a pp e a l th a t th e Conne c tic ut S up re me Court c ho os e s to 15 ans we r. Th is p ane l r e ta ins jur isd ic tio n a nd wi ll d e c ide the fe de ra l qu a si- jud ic ia l immun ity 16 question as well as a ny issues that may

rema in on appea l once the Conne cticut Supreme Court 17 has either

provided us with its guida nce or declined c ertification. 18 I t is therefor e orde red that the Clerk of this Court transmit to the Cl erk of the Connecticut 19 Sup re me Court

a Ce rt if ic ate , a s se t f

or th b e low , to g e the r w itha

c omp le te se t of

the br ie fs , 20 a pp e nd ic e s, and

re c or d f ile d in thi s Co ur t by the pa rt ie s. 21 Th e pa

rt ie s sh a ll b e ar e qu a lly

any c os ts o r f e e s im po se d b y the Conne c tic ut S up re me 22 Court

. 23-45- 1 CE RT IF IC AT E 2 The for eg oing is he reby cer tified to the Connecticut Supreme Court, pursuant to C ONN . 3 G EN . S TAT . ANN . § 51-199b and 2d Cir. R. 0.27, as orde red by the United States Court of 4 Ap pe a ls f

or the Se c on d Ci rc uit

.