# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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# . , P E T IT IO N E R 

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. 

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# H O N D O 

# W A T E R 

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## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## R E V I E W F R O M T H E 

## C O U R T O F 

## A P P E A L S F O R T H E 

## T H I R T E E N T H 

## D I S T R I C T O F 

## T E X A S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued Mar ch 22, 2017

J U S T I C E 

## D E V I N E 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court.

Chapter 150 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code g ener ally require s t h at a s wo rn
“ce rtificate of merit” acc ompany a plaintiff’s “complaint” in a case that “ar is[ es] out of the provision
of profe ssional service s by a licensed or reg istered profe ssional” named in the statute. See T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 1 5 0

. 0 0 2 (a). The sworn cer tificate or aff

idavit must be from a simil arly
licensed profe ssional who meets cer tain qualifica tions and attests to the lawsuit ’s m er it. Id. § 150.002(a) , (b). I f the plaintiff fails to file a compliant cer tificate of merit, the statute direc ts the complaint’s dismiss al. Id. § 150.002(e)

. And the “orde r g ranting or deny ing a motion for dismiss al
is imm ediately

appea lable as a

n interlocutory

order .” Id. § 150.002(f)

.

## I n this interlocutory appea l, the defe ndant, an eng ineer ing firm to which the statute applies,

contends that the trial court err ed in not dismiss ing the plaintiff’s complaint beca use the cer

tificate
of merit’s author was unqualified and his aff idavit’s content inadequa te. The court of appea ls disag ree d and aff

irmed the trial court’s order deny ing the defe ndant’s motion. 511 S.W .3d 743, 745,
750 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2015). Be cause we ag ree that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in deter

mining the cer

tificate of merit sufficie nt for the plaintiff’s case to proce ed, we
aff irm as well.

I

E a s t Ri o H ondo Water Supply Corp., a member- owned, n o n - p r o f it , w a te r - s u p p ly c o r p o r a ti o n ,
contra cted with Melden & Hunt, I nc., to provide eng ineer in g - d e s ig n a n d p r o je c t- supervision service s
for a new water- trea tment plant in S an Be n i t o , Texas. After the project’s substantial completion,

East Rio complained about the water ’s quality , eventua lly attributing the water -quality issues to the plant’s desig n and construction. East Rio subsequently s u ed the projec t’s eng ineer s (her eaf ter
ref err ed to as “Melden”) and others involved with the construction, asser ting claims for breac h of

contra ct, bre ach of

express and implied warr anties, neg lige nce, a nd neg lige nt misreprese ntation.

To comply wi t h the cer tificate- of-mer it statute, East Rio filed the aff idavit of Dan

L ey endec ker, P.E., with i t s o ri gi n al petit ion in the case. L ey endec ker holds a bachelor of scienc e degr ee i n civil eng ineer ing from Texas A& M University , is a reg istered profe ssional eng ineer in

Texas and eig ht oth er s t at es, is the president and principal of L NV Eng ineer ing, and claims
twenty -three y ear s’ experience in “master planning , detailed desig n and construction manag ement.”

He further swea

rs he has experience desig ning and analy zing water -treatment plants like East Rio’s

2

## and is familiar with the standard of car e an eng ineer of ordinary knowledg e and skill should employ

when de signing such a pr oject. Melden objec ted to L ey endec ker’ s aff idavit, complaining tha t the aff idavit did not comply
with the statute’s require ments and that L ey endec ker did not meet the statute’s qualifica tions. After
the court of appea ls aff

irmed the trial court’s order reje cting these same complaints, 511 S.W .3d at 745, Melden filed its petition for revie w, complaining ag ain about L ey endec ker’ s qualifica tions and
the affidavit’s fa ilure t o provide the fac tual basis require d by the s tatute. Simi lar challeng es are a

rec urring theme u n d er ch ap t er 150, so we g rante d Melden’s petition for revie w to consider these
issues. 1



## I I Chapter 150 applies to “ any action or arbitra tion pr ocee ding for damag es arising out of the provision of profe ssional service s” by arc hitects, eng ineer s, land surv e y o r s , a n d la n d s cape arc hitects,

as well as the firms in which they prac tice. T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## §§ 150.001(1-a ), .002(a)

. I t require s that a cer

tificate of merit acc ompany the initiation of a lawsuit ag ainst these named desig n profe ssionals. Id. § 150.002(a)

. A cer tificate of merit is an aff

idavit from a third-par

ty profe ssional
who is competent to testify , holds the same license or reg istration as the d ef en d an t , and is knowledg eable in the defe ndant’s prac tice are a. Id. The aff iant must also be licensed or reg istered
in Texas and actively eng ag ed in the prac tice. Id. § 150.002(b); see also Levinson Alcoser Assocs.,

W e h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l s i n w h i c h t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s “ h o l d s d i f

f e r e n t l y f r o m a p r i o r 1 d e c i s i o n o f

” t h i s C o u r t o r o f a n o t h e r c o u r t o f a p p e a l s , m e a n i n g “ t h e r e i s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n t h e [ ] r e s p e c t i v e d e c i s i o n s t h a t
s h o u l d b e c l a r i f

i e d t o r e m o v e u n n e c e s s a r y u n c e r t a i n t y i n t h e l a w a n d u n f a i r n e s s t o l i t i g a n t s
. ” T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2 2

. 2 2 5 ( c ) , ( e )

. M e l d e n a s s e r t s t h a t i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s w i t h p r i o r p r e c e d e n t e x i s t h e r e
. S e e n
. 3 i n f r a
. 

### 3

## L.P. v. El Pistolón II, Ltd. , 513 S.W .3d 487, 492 (Tex. 2017) (listing the q u al i fi ca tions for a

cer tificate- of-mer it ex pert).

I n this case , the defe ndant desig n profe ssional is an eng ineer ing firm. The cer tificate of merit
there fore must come from a competent and qualified third-par ty eng ineer who can attest to the
fac tual basis of the plaintiff’s underly ing complaint. T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 150.002(a)

- (b). L ey endec ker’ s aff

idavit states t hat he “hold[s] the s ame e ng ineer ing lice nse as [the eng ineer ]
who desig ned the Plant and draf ted the construction documents,” and Melden does not dispute that

L ey endec ker is a Texas-licensed profe ssional eng ineer

. But Melden questions whether L ey endec ker
is “ac tively

eng ag ed in the pra ctice” and “know ledg eable ” about Me lden’s pra ctice a rea
. Id. First, Melden observe s that L ey endec ker never states he is a ctively eng ag ed in eng ineer ing
and arg ues that neither L ey endec ker’ s position as president and principal of an eng ineer ing firm nor
his statements about past eng ineer ing experience demons t ra t e L ey endec ker’ s active eng ag ement. Next, Melden contends that L ey endec ker’ s aver ments of many y ear s o f ex p er i en ce “in master planning , detailed desig n and construction manag ement” and of “educ ation and experience in the desig n and ana ly sis of

water trea tment plants, including c larifier s, pumps, filters, piping, c ontrols,
and chemica l fee d sy stems” are conclusory and thus n o evidenc e that L ey endec ker is “knowledg eable ” in its prac tice are a. Finally , Melden submits that L ey endec ker’ s opinions should
be judge d like any other expert witness for competenc y and adm i s s i b i l ity beca use the statutory require ments here mirror those in our rules of evidenc e. Compare id. § 150.002(a) (3) with T E X



## . R.

E V I D 

## . 702.

4

## Our courts of appea ls have g ener ally reje cted the notion that chapte r 150 imposes the same

level of scrutiny as that i m p o s ed o n the admissibili ty of expert-opinion testimony for summary judgme nt or trial purposes. See, e.g. , Benc hmark Eng’g Corp. v. S a m Ho u s t on Race Park , 316
S.W .3d 41, 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2010, pet. g rante d, judgm’ t vacated w.r.m.) (contra sting statutory require ments for cer tificates of merit with sta

ndards g overning admissibili ty
of trial and summary -judg ment evidenc e); see also Gaertner v. Langhoff , 509 S.W .3d 392, 398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (holding that the statute’s foc us is on providing the t rial

court a basis to judge the lawsuit’s potential rathe r than on the potential admissibili ty of expert testimony ); Hardy v. Matter , 350 S.W .3d 329, 333 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. dism’d) (noting that the statute require s only that the aff iant hold the specifie d qualifica tions and is silent on
how and wh en the expert’s qualifica tions must be established). The Third Court of Appea ls has interpre ted the statute similarly :
What c hapter 150 require s, with r espec t to subject-a rea expertise, is that the aff iant

“ is knowledg eable in the are a of prac tice of the defe ndant.” T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## AN N



## . § 150.002(a) (empha sis added)

. Chapter 1 5 0 d oes not require that an aff iant establish his or her knowledg e throug h testimony that would be competent or admissible as ev i dence , or even that the affiant ex plicitly establish or address s uch knowledg e within the fac e of the cer tificate—inde ed, it imposes no particula r require ments or limit ations as to how the trial court asce rt ains whether the aff iant possesses the re quisite knowledg e. M-E Eng’ rs, Inc. v . City of T emple , 365 S.W .3d 497, 503 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. denied).
The trial court, of course , cannot mere ly assume the exis tence of such knowledg e. Thus, we

rec ently held an arc hitect unqualified to provide a cer tificate beca

use nothing in the rec ord indicated
he wa s knowledg eable in the defe ndant’s area of practice. Levinson Alcoser , 513 S.W .3d at 494.

5

## T h e plaintiff arg ued such knowledg e could rea sonably be inferr ed from other stat u to r y q u a li f ic a ti o n s , such as the arc hitect’s active eng ag ement in the prac tice under a state-issued license. Id. at 493. We disag ree d that the statute’s knowledg e require ment was sy nony mous with i t s l icensure or activeeng ag ement require ments and conclude d that “some a d d it io n a l expli cation or evidenc e ref lecting the expert’s familiarity or experience with the prac tice are a at issue in the litigation” was require d. Id.
at 494. And bec ause no e x planation or statement of the ex pert’s knowledg e existed in the recor d,

we conclude d the trial court abused its discretion by deny ing the defe ndant’s motion to dismiss

. Id.

Her e, the explanation of the expert’s rele vant knowledg e or experience that was missing in Levinson
Alcoser is present.
The court of appea ls conclude d that L ey endec ker’ s aver ments about h i s ed u cation and experience “including the ‘desig n and analy sis of water trea tment plants, inclu d in g clar ifiers, pumps, filters, pi p i n g, controls, and chemica l fee s sy stems’” wer e “fa ctual statements” supporting the
conclusion t hat L ey endec ker was “knowledg eable in Medlen’s are a of prac tice and competent to testify .” 511 S.W .3d at 747. We ag ree
. Other courts have held simil ar fac tual statements sufficie nt. 2


## The court of appea ls also conclude d that L ey endec ker’ s aff idavit included information indicative of

S e e , e

. g

. , D u n h a m E n g ’ g , I n c

. v

. S h e r w i n
- W i l l i a m s C o

. , 4 0 4 S

. W

. 3 d 7 8 5 , 7 8 8 , 7 9 5 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n 2 [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 3 , n o p e t

. ) ( e x p e r t ’ s c e r t i f i c a t e i n d i c a t e d h e h e l d a P h

. D

. i n c i v i l e n g i n e e r i n g , w a s l i c e n s e d a s a p r o f e s s i o n a l c i v i l e n g i n e e r , c u r r e n t l y s e r v e d a s a c i v i l

- e n g i n e e r i n g p r o f e s s o r a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f T e x a s , a n d , t h a t t h r o u g h p r a c t i c e , r e s e a r c h , a n d t e a c h i n g , h e w a s f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e l e g a l r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d i n d u s t r y c u s t o m s r e g a r d i n g c o m p e t i t i v e b i d d i n g o n p u b l i c - w o r k s p r o j e c t s l i k e t h o s e a t i s s u e ) ; C B M E n g ’ r s , I n c

. v

. T e l l e p s e n B u i l d e r s , L

. P

. , 4 0 3 S

. W

. 3 d 3 3 9 , 3 4 2 , 3 4 6 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 3 , p e t d e n i e d ) ( b e y o n d a f f i d a v i t , e x p e r t ’ s r e s u m e d e m o n s t r a t e d h e h a d b a c h e l o r ’ s d e g r e e s i n b o t h a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d a r c h i t e c t u r a l e n g i n e e r i n g , t h a t h e w a s a l i c e n s e d p r o f e s s i o n a l s t r u c t u r a l
e n g i n e e r , a n d d e s c r i b e d h i s t w e n t y - s e v e n y e a r s o f e x p e r i e n c e i n d i v e r s i f i e d a s p e c t s o f s t r u c t u r a l e n g i n e e r i n g a n a l y s i s , d e s i g n , a n d m a n a g e m e n t ) ; M

- E E n g ’ r s , 3 6 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 0 1 , 5 0 3 ( e x p e r t a v e r r e d t h a t h e p r a c t i c e d i n t h e s a m e d e s i g n o f h e a t i n g , v e n t i l a t i n g , a i r c o n d i t i o n i n g s y s t e m s , a n d p l u m b i n g s y s t e m s a s t h e d e f e n d a n t , b u t c o u r t a l s o n o t e d o t h e r f a c t s t e n d i n g t o c o n f

i r m t h e e x p e r t ’ s k n o w l e d g e s u c h a s h i s d e s c r i p t i o n s a n d a n a l y s i s o f e l e v e n s e t s o f

i d e n t i f i e d p r o b l e m s i n t h e b u i l d i n g ’ s H V A C s y s t e m )

. 

### 6

## an active eng ineer ing prac tice and that the t ri al court there fore did not abuse its discretion in

deter mining L ey endec ker qualified. Id. at 748. Ag ain, we ag ree and conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in deter mining L ey endec ker qualified to provide a cer tificate of merit in the

case
. I I I
The statute does not expressly require that the expert’s qualifica tions appea r in the aff

idavit
itself. Cf. Levinson Alcoser , 513 S.W .3d at 494 (obser ving that qualifica tions may be established by rec ord source s other than the expert’s aff idavit). Neve rtheless, the aff idavit is a rea sonable place

to provide this information—as L ey endec ker has done here

. The statute does require , howeve r, that
the expert’s aff

idavit addre s s t h e l aw s u it’s “fa ctual basis.” T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 150.002(b). The parties disag ree about what the aff idavit must include to satisfy this require ment.
Melden arg ues the fac tual-basis require ment obliga ted L ey endec ker to provid e fa ct ual
support for the el ements of eac h theory or cause of action pled by the plaintiff. Melden contends that, in this respe ct, the cer tificate of merit is simil ar to the preliminary expert rep o rt require d for
h ea l t h car e liability claims under the Medica l L iability Act, chapte r 74 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. See id. § 74.351. Melden submits that this C ourt has re peate dly used cha pter 74

to inform its construction of chapte r 150 and that we should continue the prac tice here by essentially 3

M e l d e n c i t e s t h r e e e x a m p l e s o f t h i s C o u r t ’ s “ i m p l i c i t d i r e c t i v e ” t h a t c h a p t e r 1 5 0 b e i n t e r p r e t e d i n l i g h t o f 3

c h a p t e r 7 4

. J

a s t e r v

. C o m e t I

I C o n s t r

. , 4 3 8 S

. W

. 3 d 5 5 6 , 5 6 7

- 6 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 4 ) ; C r o s s t e x E n e r g y S e r v s

. , L

. P

. v

. P r o P l u s , I n c

. , 4 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d 3 8 4 , 3 8 8

- 8 9 , 3 9 3 , 3 9 5 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 4 ) ; C T L / T h o m p s o n T

e x

. , L L C v

. S t a r w o o d H o m e o w n e r ’ s A s s ’ n , 3 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 9 , 3 0 0 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 3 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

. M e l d e n c o m p l a i n s f u r t h e r t h a t t h e c o u r t o f

a p p e a l s ’ f

a i l u r e t o r e a d t h e t w o c h a p t e r s t o g e t h e r , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s C o u r t ’ s a p p r o a c h , c r e a t e s a n i n c o n s i s t e n c y t h a t r e q u i r e s c l a r i f i c a t i o n , w h i c h p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f

o r o u r j u r i s d i c t i o n
. S e e , e

. g

. , T E X

. G O V ’ T C O D E § 2 2

. 2 2 5 ( e ) ( d e f i n i n g “ c o n f

l i c t s j u r i s d i c t i o n ” ) ; C o y o t e L a k e R a n c h , L L C v

. C i t y o f L u b b o c k , 4 9 8 S

. W

. 3 d 5 3 , 5 8 n
. 1 2 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 6 ) ( n o t i n g t h e L e g i s l a t u r e ’ s c h a n g e s t o t h i s C o u r t ’ s p r i o r m o r e r e s t r i c t i v e v i e w o f “ c o n f l i c t s j u r i s d i c t i o n ” )

. M e l d e n a l s o s u b m i t s t h a t t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s ’ c o n c l u s i o n



### 7

## importing chapte r 74’s expe rt repor t into the cer

tificate- of-mer it statute. Chapter 74 define s an expert repor

t to include “a fair summary of t h e ex p er t ’s opinions as of the date of the repor t

reg arding applicable standards o f ca re , the m anner in which the car e rendere d by the phy sician or
health car e provider failed to meet the standards, and the causa l rela tionship betwee n that failure and
the injury , harm, or damag es claimed.” Id. § 74.351(r) (6) (def ining “expert repor

t” for purposes of
the Medica l L iability

Act).

East Rio responds that the Court has not used chapte r 74 as a substanti v e gu i de when interpre ting chapt er 1 5 0

. C h apter 74 is not rele vant, East Rio submits, beca use the meaning of
section 150.002(b)’ s unambig uous text is at issue here rathe r than an ambig uous term or analog ous
proce dural question as in previous case s. East Rio conclude s that the statute require s only that the 4 

## expert’s aff

idavit include the fac tual basis for the expert’s claims of neg lige nce or other profe ssional

err ors or omissions

. The statute d o es not require the expert to addre ss the leg al elements of eac h

cause of action, nor does the statute expressly or impliedly identify chapte r 150’s cer tificate of merit
with chapte r 74’s expert-re port definition. See, e.g. , Benc hmark Eng’g. , 316 S.W .3d at 47 (re jecting

t h a t t h e f a c t u a l

- b a s i s r e q u i r e m e n t d o e s n o t o b l i g a t e t h e e x p e r t t o r e c i t e t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
o t h e r d e c i s i o n s t h a t c o n c l u d e “ t h e c e r t i f i c a t e o f m e r i t m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y a d d r e s s t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e
. ” C r i t e r i u m
- F a r r e l l E n g ’ r s v

. O w e n s , 2 4 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 9 5 , 4 0 0 ( T e x
. A p p
. — B e a u m o n t 2 0 0 8 , n o p e t )

.

E a s t R i o d i s t i n g u i s h e s o u r p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r 1 5 0 c a s e s
. F o r e x a m p l e , i n J a s t e r , t h e t e r m “ c l a i m a n t ” w a s n o t 4 d e f i n e d i n c h a p t e r 1 5 0 a n d i t s m e a n i n g w a s u n c l e a r , s o t h e C o u r t c o n s u l t e d c h a p t e r s 9 a n d 7 4 f o r t h e i r d e f

i n i t i o n s o f

t h e t e r m
. J a s t e r , 4 3 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 6 7

- 6 8

. U s i n g c h a p t e r 7 4 a s a n a i d i n d e f i n i n g a n u n d e f

i n e d t e r m i n c h a p t e r 1 5 0 d o e s n o t
s u b s t a n t i v e l y t i e t h e t w o c h a p t e r s t o g e t h e r
. I n C r o s s t e x E n e r g y , t h e C o u r t c o m p a r e d t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l s a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e r e s p e c t i v e c h a p t e r s , n o t i n g d i s t i n c t i o n s b u t a l s o r e c o g n i z i n g c h a p t e r 7 4 a s “ a u s e f u l , i f i m p e r f

e c t , a n a l o g u e ” i n t h i s i n s t a n c e
. C r o s s t e x , 4 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 8 8

. A n d i n C T L / T h o m p s o n , t h e C o u r t a g a i n f o u n d a p r o c e d u r a l l y s i m i l a r c a s e i n v o l v i n g a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l u n d e r c h a p t e r 7 4 u s e f u l b e c a u s e i t a d d r e s s e d a n i s s u e i d e n t i c a l t o t h e o n e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t : w h e t h e r a p l a i n t i f f c o u l d m o o t a n i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l b y t a k i n g a n o n s u i t

. F o l l o w i n g Vi l l a f a n i v

. T r e j o , 2 5 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 6 , 4 6 7

- 6 8 ( T e x
. 2 0 0 8 ) , a c h a p t e r 7 4 i n t e r l o c u t o r y a p p e a l i n v o l v i n g t h e s a m e i s s u e , w e h e l d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ’ s n o n s u i t d i d n o t m o o t t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s p e n d i n g a p p e a l b e c a u s e t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s u n d e r l y i n g m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s s o u g h t
a f f i r m a t i v e r e l i e f i n t h e f

o r m o f a d i s m i s s a l s a n c t i o n
. C T L / T h o m p s o n , 3 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 0 0

. 

### 8

## defe ndant eng i n ee r’ s relianc e on expert-re port require ments under the “ver y expli cit” Medica l

L iability Act). Chapter 150 descr ibes the cer tificate of merit as an aff

idavit from a simil arly licensed, thirdparty expert who is direc ted to provide a fac tual b as i s fo r t h e lawsuit. The statute provides, in
rele vant par

t, that the expert’s aff

idavit set forth spec ifically

for e ach the ory of rec overy for which damag es are soug ht, the neg lige nce, if any , or other action, err or, or o mission of the licensed or reg istered profe ssional in providing the profe ssional service , including any err or or o mission in providing advice , judgme nt, opinion, or a simil ar profe ssional s k i l l claimed to exis t and the factual basis for each such claim

. T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 150.002(b) (empha sis added)

. Melden interpre ts the fac tual-basis require ment as modify ing “ea ch theory of rec overy ” such that the require ment app l i es to the
elements of e ach cause of action pled. East Rio interpr ets the fac tual-basis re quirement to re fer to
the “neg lige nce, if any , or other action, err or, or omission” of the profe ssional in providing advice , judgme nt, opinion, or simi lar prof essional skill.
The issue is one of statutory const ru ct i on, a leg al question we revie w de novo. State v.
Shumake , 199 S.W .3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). When statutory text is clea r, we do not resor

t to rules
of construction or ex t ri n s i c aids to construe the text beca use the truest measure of what the

L eg islature int ended is what it enac ted. Sullivan v. Abraham , 488 S.W .3d 294, 299 (Tex. 20 1 6 ).
And we endea

vor t o rea d statutes contextually to g ive effec t to ever y word, clause, and sentenc e.
In re Office of Attorney Gen. , 422 S.W .3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013). We also ty pically g ive s tatutory

terms their ordinary or common meaning unless context or a supplied definition indicates that a
differ ent meaning was intended. Gree ne v. Farmers Ins. Exc h. , 446 S.W .3d 761, 765 (Tex. 2014).

9

## Be cause “fa ctual basis” has no specia l, technica l, or acquir ed meaning and is not otherwise

define d in the cer

tificate- of-mer it statute, we interpre t the term acc ording to its ordinary meaning

. Id. ; see also T E X



## . G O V 

## ’ T 

## C O D E 

## § 312.002(a) (stating the gene ral rule that “wor ds [] be g iven their ordinary meaning ”). Thus, in Benc hmark Engineering , the court consulted Webster’s and Bla ck’s

L aw Dictionary

to conclude tha t “ fac tual basis” ref err ed to the events or circ umstances g iving rise

to the profe ssional err ors or omissions identified by the third-par ty expert as distinguished from their legal effect. See 316 S.W .3d at 48 (quoting dictionary definitions). The Benc hmark court was interpre ting the s t at u t e’ s 2 005 version, howeve r, and we are conce rned here with the statute as
amende d in 2009. Melden sug g ests that this latter amendment broade ned the exis ting fac tual-basis require ment.
The certifica te-of- merit statute has been amende d three times since it s enac tment in 2 0 0 3,
twice in 2005 and ag ain in 2009. See S& P Consulti ng Eng’rs PLLC v. Bake r , 334 S.W .3d 390, 394-
95 (Tex. App .—Austin 2011, no pet.) (en banc) (discussing the statute’s history ). As orig inally

enac ted, the statute require d plaintiffs, filing complaints of profe ssional neg lige nce ag ainst licensed

eng ineer s and reg istered arc hitects, to file an aff idavit from a simil arly licensed or reg istered thirdparty profe ssional with the complaint. Act of J une 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 204, § 20.01, 2003

Tex. Gen. L aws 847, 896–97. The orig inal version provided that the aff idavit “set forth specific ally

at least one neg lige nt act, err or, or omission claimed to exis t an d t h e fa ct u al basis for eac h such
claim.” Id.

I n 2005, the statute was amende d to add reg istered profe ssional land survey ors to the list of

cover ed desig n profe ssionals and ostensibly broade ned to app l y to “any action or arbitra tion

1 0

## proce eding fo r damag es arising out of the provision of profe ssional service s by a desig n

profe ssional” named in the statute. See Act of May 27, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 20 8 , § 2 , 2 0 05

Tex. Gen. L aws 369, 370; see also Act of May 12, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch

. 1 8 9 , § 2, 2005 Tex.
Gen. L aws 348, 348. The statute, howeve r, continued to provide that the aff idavit was to “set forth specific ally at least one neg lige nt act, err or, or omission claimed to exis t and the fac tual basis for

eac h such claim.” Id. Courts continued to interpre t this lang uag e as limit ing the cer tificate- of-mer it

statute to profe ssional-neg lige nce claims even afte r the 2005 amendment. See, e.g

. , J J W D e v ., L.L.C

. v. Str and Sys. Eng’g, I

nc. , 378 S.W .3d 571, 577-79 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2012, pe t. denied) (citing
simil ar cases) ; but see S& P Consulti ng Eng’rs , 334 S.W .3d at 40 3-04 (overruling prior prece dent
limit ing the scope of

the 2005 amendme nt).

I n 2009, the statute was amende d and clar ified t o p rovide additional detail. See S& P
Consu l t i n g Eng’rs , 334 S.W .3d at 395 (discussing chang es). As rele vant here , the amendment
moved the part of the statute perta ining to the cer tificate of merit’s content to its own subsection and

cea sed to tie the ce rtificate to “at lea st one neg lige nt act, er ror, or omission” as ref

lected be low:
The aff idavit shall s et forth specific ally for each theory of recov ery for which damages are sought, the negligence , if any, or other action, error, or omission of the licensed or registered professional in providing the professional service , including any error or omission in providing advice , judgment, opinion, or a similar professional skill [] claimed to exist and the fac tual basis for e ach suc h claim.”
Act o f M ay 29, 2009, 81st L eg ., R.S., ch. 789, § 2, 2009 Tex. Gen. L aws 1991, 1992 (codifie d as
T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## § 150.002(b))

. The 2009 amendment thus c larified that the statute

wa s n ot to be limit ed to profe ssional-neg lige nce claims. As one court explained, the amendment
“ser ved to eliminate any continuing debate or uncer tainty as to whether prior versions of the

1 1

## cer

tificate- of-mer it require ment wer e trig g ere d by damag e claims predic ated on profe ssional err ors

or omissions that wer e couche d in theories other than neg lige nce.” M-E Eng’rs , 365 S.W .3d at 506.

M e ld e n , howeve r, interpre ts the 2009 amendments to have broade r implications. Rather th a n simply clar ify ing the statute’s application to a ny action arising out of the provision of profe ssional
service s, reg ardle ss of the leg al theory , Melden interpre ts the new l an gu age— for each theory of

recov ery for which damages are sought —as expanding the fac tual-basis require ment to include the
various elements of eac h underly ing theory alleg ed by the plaintiff. We, howeve r, do not interpre t
the 2009 amendme nt as enlar g ing the fac tual-basis require ment or otherw ise cha ng ing its existi ng
rela tionship wit hin the statute.
After considering a sim i l ar d ispute involving the 2009 amendment, the Third Court of Appea ls rea ched the same conclusion. Id. The court’s analy sis in that case co rr es p o n ds with our
view of the statute:
Read as a whole, section 150.002, subsection (b), reve als a core focus on asce rtaining and verify

ing the exis tence o f er rors or omissions in the profe ssional service s provided by a “license d or reg istered profe ssional.” I n particula r, the L eg islature has require d that the cer

tificate of merit “set forth specific ally

. . . the negligence , if any , or other action , error, or omission of the licensed or reg istered profe ssional in p r o vi d ing the professional service .” T E X



## . C I V



## . P R A C



## . & R E M



## . C O D E 

## A N N



## . § 150.002(b) (empha ses added)

. And this stat em ent of the defe ndant’s acts or omissions “in p ro v i d i n g the profe ssional service ” must “includ[e] any error or omission in providing advice , judgment, opinion, or a similar professio n a l s ki l l claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim .” Id. § 150.002(b) (empha ses added)

. Whil e appellants ascr ibe broade r implications to the concluding phrase “fa ctual basis for eac h s u ch cl aim,” in context “ each such claim ” plainly ref ers to the immediately prec eding “any err or or omission i n p roviding advice , judgme nt, opinion or a simil ar profe ssional skill claimed to exist ” (empha ses added) , which is simply the information that a cer tificate must provide reg ardin g err ors or omissions in the profe ssional service s at issue. See id.

1 2

## This core focus on err ors and omissions in profe ssional service s is not altere d

by the first portion of subsection (b), which require s a cer tificate to provide these fac ts “for eac h theory of rec overy for which damag es are soug ht.” See id. The eff ect of this phra se, which was amende d to its curr ent form in 2009, is to emphasize that the cer tificate m u s t identify and verify the exis tence of any profe ssional err ors or omissions that are elements or opera tive fac ts under any leg al theory on which the plaintiff intends to rely to re co v er damag es. I t thus serve d to eliminate any continuing debate or uncer tainty as to whether prior versions of the
cer tificate- of-mer it require ment we re trig g ere d by damag e claims predic ated on profe ssional err ors or omissions that wer e couche d in theories other than neg lige nce.
Id. at 505-06 (e mphasis in origina l). Although the ce rt i fica te-of- merit statute has evolved and in some respe cts expanded s ince
its enac tment in 2003, the fac tual-basis require ment’s core purpose h as n o t chang ed. Be fore the 5



## 2009 amendmen t , “the fac tual basis for eac h such claim” ref err ed to the “neg lige nt act, err or, or
omission” the expert claimed to exis t. After the amendment, “the fac tual basis for eac h such claim”
ref err ed to the “ne g lige nce, if any , or other a ction, err or, or omission” the expert cla imed to exi st.
We acc ording ly reje ct Melden’s interpre tation of the statut e, wh i ch would require the expert’s aff

idavit to addre ss the elements of the plaintiff’s various theories or cause s of action. The

S e e , e

. g

. , C o u c h m a n v

. C a r d o n a , 4 7 1 S

. W

. 3 d 2 0 , 2 6 ( T e x
. A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 s t D i s t

. ] 2 0 1 5 , n o p e t

. ) 5 ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e c e r t i f i c a t e t o a d d r e s s e v e r y e l e m e n t b u t r a t h e r t o p r o v i d e a f a c t u a l b a s i s f

o r t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f p r o f

e s s i o n a l e r r o r s o r o m i s s i o n s ) ; D u n h a m E n g ’ g , 4 0 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 9 6 ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e ’ s p l a i n m e a n i n g r e q u i r e s t h e a f f i a n t t o d e s c r i b e t h e f

a c t s g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e c l a i m ) ; M o r r i s o n S e i f e r t M u r p h y , I n c

. v

. Z i o n , 3 8 4 S

. W

. 3 d 4 2 1 , 4 2 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. — D a l l a s 2 0 1 2 , n o p e t

. ) ( s a m e ) ; M

- E E n g ’ r s , 3 6 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 0 6 ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t “ r e q u i r e t h a t a c e r t i f i c a t e a d d r e s s o p e r a t i v e f a c t s o t h e r t h a n t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l e r r o r s a n d o m i s s i o n s t h a t
a r e t h e f o c u s o f t h e s t a t u t e ” ) ; N

a n g i a v

. T

a y l o r , 3 3 8 S

. W

. 3 d 7 6 8 , 7 7 2 ( T e x
. A p p
. — B e a u m o n t 2 0 1 1 , n o p e t

. ) ( n o t i n g t h a t
s t a t u t e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e e x p e r t t o “ e x p l a i n t h e l a w t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ” ) ; B e n c h m a r k E n g ’ g , 3 1 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 8 ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e ’ s p l a i n m e a n i n g r e q u i r e s t h e a f f i a n t t o d e s c r i b e t h e f

a c t s g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e c l a i m ) ; b u t s e e L e v i n s o n A l c o s e r A s s o c s

. , L

. P

. v

. E l P i s t o l ó n I I , L t d

. , 5 0 0 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 1 , 4 3 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. — C o r p u s C h r i s t i 2 0 1 5 ) ( d i s m i s s i n g c o n t r a c t c l a i m b u t n o t n e g l i g e n c e c l a i m s b e c a u s e a f f i d a v i t d i d n o t d i s c u s s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n t r a c t o r i t s b r e a c h ) , r e v ’ d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , 5 1 3 S

. W

. 3 d 4 8 7 ( T e x
. 2 0 1 7 ) ; P a c k a r d E n g ’ g A s s o c s

. v

. S a l l y G r p

. , L

. L

. C

. , 3 9 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 8 9 , 3 9 5 ( T e x
. A p p
. — B e a u m o n t 2 0 1 3 , n o p e t

. ) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t e x p e r t ’ s a f f i d a v i t o f p r o f e s s i o n a l ’ s e r r o r s , o m i s s i o n s , a n d m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w a s s u f f i c i e n t f o r b r e a c h

- o f

- c o n t r a c t a n d D T P A c l a i m s b u t n o t f r a u d b e c a u s e t h e a f

f i d a v i t d i d
n o t a d d r e s s c e r t a i n e l e m e n t s ) ; G a r z a v

. C a r m o n a , 3 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d 3 9 1 , 3 9 7

- 9 8 ( T e x
. A p p
. — C o r p u s C h r i s t i 2 0 1 2 , n o p e t

. ) ( n o t i n g t h a t t h e a f

f i d a v i t d i d n o t a d d r e s s t h e e l e m e n t s o f s e v e r a l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n )

. 

### 1 3

## statute instead obliga tes the plaintiff to g et an aff idavit from a t h i rd-pa

rty expert attesting to the
defe ndant’s profe ssional err ors or omissions and their fac tual basis. The trial court then deter mines 6


## whether the expert’s aff

idavit sufficie ntly demonstra te s th a t th e p la in ti f f ’ s c o mplaint is not frivolous.
See CTL /Thompson , 390 S.W .3d at 301 (noting that statute provides for dismiss al as a sanction “to
deter meritless claims and br ing the m quickly to an end” ).

I n this case , L ey endec ker swore to “23 y ear s experience in master planning , detailed desig n
and construction manag ement.” More specific ally , he ave rre d to his “educ ation and experience in
the desig n and analy sis of water trea tment plants, including clar if ie r s , p u mp s , f il te r s, piping, controls,
and chemica l fee d sy stems.” He further stated that he was familiar with the standard of car e an “eng ineer of ordinar

y knowledg e and skill should employ in the design of water

trea tment plants”
such as the one at issue in the litigation. After noting his revie w of available documents, including the enginee ring plans , construction documents, and equipment specific ations of t he plant, and his
on-site inspections and tests, he conclude d that Melden failed to use ordinary car e in the perf ormanc e
of its profe ssional duties rela ting to the plant’s desig n an d fi ltration sy stem. L ey endec ker then
identified Melden’s neg lige nce a nd other e rror s to include (1) the failure “to provide and design a

water trea tment plant without cross conn ec t i o n s ,” (2) the failure “to selec t and desig n a proper ly functioning solids contac t clar ifier,” (3) the failure “to desig n a filtration sy stem that can be proper ly
backw ashed and safe ly broug ht into opera tion without dang erous turbidity spikes, (4) the failure “to

S e e M

- E E n g ’ r s , 3 6 5 S

. W

. 3 d a t 5 0 6 ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e f l e c t s “ l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t i f a p l a i n t i f f 6

s e e k s d a m a g e s u n d e r a l i a b i l i t y t h e o r y t h a t i s p r e d i c a t e d u p o n a l i c e n s e d o r r e g i s t e r e d p r o f e s s i o n a l ’ s a l l e g e d e r r o r s o r o m i s s i o n s i n p r o v i d i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l s e r v i c e s , t h e p l a i n t i f f m u s t o b t a i n a c e r t i f

i c a t e o f m e r i t v e r i f

y i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e e r r o r s o r o m i s s i o n s i n o r d e r t o p r o c e e d u n d e r t h a t t h e o r y ” )

. 

### 1 4

## provide adequate assistance an d support,” and (5) the failure “to desig n a proper air filter scour

sy stem.”

L ey endec ker explained eac h of these “fa ilures” in g rea ter detail. For example, he explained
that cross connec tions can lead to inadver tent contamination of trea ted water , posing health risks and
rela ted reg ulatory issues, and that Melden’s plant desig n improperly incorporated multipl e cross

connec tions. L ey endec ker also explained that the plant’s filtration sy stem was desig ned to “oper ate
in a re g ulatory

non-compliant manne r”:
Melden & Hunt and Booe desig ned the Filter- to-Wa s te p iping , associate d valves and 7 

## control scheme to opera te in a reg ulatory non-compliant manner
. When the Filter- toWaste proce ss is eng ag ed, it cre ates a hy draulic shock in the filter bank, distorting the filter media, and cre ating dang erous turbidity spikes in alre ady filtered and t rea ted water

. Fur

ther, the air fi l t er s co ur sy stem fails t o perf orm as i ntended. The whole point of the Filter- to-Waste proce ss is to ease the transition betwee n the filter backw ash cy cle and the water t rea tment proce ss. The Plant is not operating in this
manner and this is due to Melden & Hunt’s and Booe ’s neg lige nt desig n of the Filterto-Waste proce ss, including the a ssociated piping , valves, a nd controls.
The court of appea ls connec ted L ey endec ker’ s claims of profe ssional err ors or omissions to eac h of East Rio’s pled theories. 511 S.W.3d at 749-50.
Melden contends, howeve r, that L ey endec ker’ s aff idavit u l t i mately fails to provide an
appropr iate fac tual basis beca use it equivoca tes i n t he end, “re serv[ing] the rig ht to modify my opinions if additional information is made available or if additional inspection opportunities reve al
additional information.” East Rio responds that this closing statement is included mere ly to confirm
the source s L ey endec ker consulted in forming his opinions. I n this respe ct, L ey endec ker states that

A l a n B o o e w a s t h e e n g i n e e r w h o d e s i g n e d t h e p l a n t a n d d r a f t e d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n d o c u m e n t s o n b e h a l f o f 7 M e l d e n & H u n t

. 

### 1 5

## he revie wed the eng ineer ing plans and construction documents prepa red by Melden, toge ther with
the equipment cutshee ts, specific ations, opera t i o n s and maintenanc e manuals. L ey endec ker also
mentions that he and his staff inspected the Plant, conducted tests, and interviewe d East Rio staff.
Rather than e quivocation, we view L ey endec ker’ s rese rvation mere ly as re cog nition of the preliminary nature of the cer tificate of merit, which, as the court of appea ls observe d, must be “filed

ear ly in the litigation, befor e discovery and befor e other dispositi ve motions may be available .” 511
S.W .3d at 749 (quoting Couchman , 471 S.W .3d at 26) (interna l quota tions omi tted). Chapter 150 require s only that a simil arly licensed profe ssiona l , knowledg eable of the defe ndant’s are a of

prac tice, provide a sworn written statement cer tify ing that the defe ndant’s profe ssional actions or
omissions wer e neg lige nt or otherwise err oneous and the fac tual basis for such claims. See Dunham Eng’g , 404 S.W .3d at 795 (noting that “at the cer tificate- of-mer it stag e, befor e discovery and befor e
other dispositi ve motions ar e available , the plaintiff is not require d to f ully marshal his e vidence ”) (interna l quotations omitted); CBM Eng’rs , 403 S.W .3d at 346 (noting that statute does not require

a plaintiff to marshal his evidenc e or provide the full range of information that the defe ndant is
enti t l ed t o o b tain throug h formal discovery ); M-E Eng’rs , 365 S.W .3d at 504 (noting that statute
“re flec ts a leg islative g oal of requ i ri n g m erely that plaintiffs make a threshold showing that their
claims have merit”).
* * * * *
The court of appea ls held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deny ing Melden’s
motion to dismiss based on the cert i fi cate of merit’s sufficie ncy
. We ag ree that no abuse of
discretion has be en shown. The court of a ppeals’ judg ment is acc ording ly aff irmed.

1 6

## _______________________________ J ohn P. Devine J ustice
OP INION DELIVERED: J une 9, 2017

1 7