[Cite as State v. Cawthorne, 2024-Ohio-2258.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 112795

v. :

STEAVEN CAWTHORNE, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 13, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-21-665282-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Anna M. Faraglia and Eric Collins, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

Edward M. Heindel, for appellant. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:

Five days into a jury trial for the brutal killing of his girlfriend, Gina 

Lampton, defendant-appellant, Steaven Cawthorne, requested a plea agreement from 

the state. He agreed to plead guilty to Count 1, aggravated murder and the attendant 

firearm specifications, and the trial court sentenced him to 33 years to life in prison. 
Cawthorne now appeals, contending that he did not enter a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary plea because (1) he did not separately plead guilty to the firearm 

specification attendant to the aggravated murder charge; (2) the trial court incorrectly 

stated the maximum fine for the aggravated murder offense; and (3) the trial court 

recited his Crim.R. 11 trial rights in one run-on sentence. For the reasons that follow, 

we find that Cawthorne entered a valid plea and his convictions are affirmed.

Because a “guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional rights, a 

defendant’s decision to enter a plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” 

State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 10, citing 

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28-29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); State v. 

Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 25. “If the plea was 

not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, enforcement of that plea is 

unconstitutional.” Id.

The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11 is to convey certain information 

to a defendant so they can make a voluntary and intelligent decision regarding 

whether to plead guilty. State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 

115 (1981). The Ohio Supreme Court has stated:

[O]ur focus in reviewing pleas has not been on whether the trial judge 

has “[incanted] the precise verbiage” of the rule, State v. Stewart, 51 

Ohio St.2d 86, 92, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977), but on whether the dialogue 

between the court and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant 

understood the consequences of his plea, State v. Veney, 120 Ohio 

St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 15-16; Clark at ¶ 26; 

State v. Miller, 159 Ohio St.3d 447, 2020-Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617, ¶ 

19.
Dangler at ¶ 12. With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the appeal.

Cawthorne first contends that his plea is invalid because he did not 

separately plead guilty to the firearm specification attendant to the aggravated 

murder offense as required under Crim.R. 11(C)(3). He supports his contention with 

the first paragraph of Crim.R. 11(C)(3), which states:

With respect to aggravated murder committed on or after January 1, 

1974, the defendant shall plead separately to the charge and to each 

specification, if any. A plea of guilty or no contest to the charge waives 

the defendant’s right to a jury trial, and before accepting a plea of guilty 

or no contest the court shall so advise the defendant and determine that 

the defendant understands the consequences of the plea. 

(Emphasis added.) According to Cawthorne, under this paragraph, he was required 

to plead guilty to the aggravated murder offense, and then separately plead guilty to 

the firearm specification; otherwise his plea was invalid. 

In State v. Cramer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111509, 2023-Ohio-308, 

this court addressed this exact issue under the same factual scenario. In Cramer, 

the defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including noncapital aggravated 

murder with attendant one- and three-year firearm specifications. As part of the 

plea agreement, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to aggravated murder and the 

attendant three-year firearm specification. The Cramer Court noted that “[a]t the 

plea hearing, the trial court did not require [the defendant] to plead separately to 

the charges and the specifications.” Id. at ¶ 21. Nevertheless, it held that the trial 

court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(3)’s requirement that “the 

defendant shall plead separately to the charge and to each specification, if any,” 
because the court advised the defendant during the plea hearing, “[p]enalty wise, 

you’ll be pleading guilty to aggravated murder and a 3-year firearm specification in 

Count 1.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 22. 

Despite the holding in Cramer that the trial court had to and 

substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(3), this court disagrees with Cawthorne’s 

contention that in this case, the trial court was required to follow Crim.R. 11(C)(3) 

and accept a separate plea to the firearm specification. Because Cawthorne was not 

charged with capital aggravated murder, i.e., the grand jury did not charge him with 

a death specification under R.C. 2929.04, Crim.R. 11(C)(3) does not apply. 

The first paragraph of Crim.R. 11(C)(3) cannot be read in isolation but 

must be considered in total to be harmonious.

(3) With respect to aggravated murder committed on and after 

January 1, 1974, the defendant shall plead separately to the charge and 

to each specification, if any. A plea of guilty or no contest to the charge 

waives the defendant's right to a jury trial, and before accepting a plea 

of guilty or no contest the court shall so advise the defendant and 

determine that the defendant understands the consequences of the 

plea. 

If the indictment contains no specification, and a plea of guilty or no 

contest to the charge is accepted, the court shall impose the sentence 

provided by law. 

If the indictment contains one or more specifications, and a plea of 

guilty or no contest to the charge is accepted, the court may dismiss the 

specifications and impose sentence accordingly, in the interests of 

justice. 

If the indictment contains one or more specifications that are not 

dismissed upon acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest to the 

charge, or if pleas of guilty or no contest to both the charge and one or 

more specifications are accepted, a court composed of three judges 

shall: (a) determine whether the offense was aggravated murder or a 
lesser offense; and (b) if the offense is determined to have been a lesser 

offense, impose sentence accordingly; or (c) if the offense is determined 

to have been aggravated murder, proceed as provided by law to 

determine the presence or absence of the specified aggravating 

circumstances and of mitigating circumstances, and impose sentence 

accordingly.

Although the plain language of the first paragraph of Crim.R. 11(C)(3) 

requires the defendant to plead “separately to [aggravated murder] and to each 

specification, if any,” we find that when (C)(3) is read in total, it is clear that the 

“specification” referenced is a capital specification. To read it otherwise would 

require a trial court that did not dismiss “the specifications * * * in the interests of 

justice” to empanel three judges to determine whether the defendant actually 

committed aggravated murder. It seems nonsensical that the state would offer a 

defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to noncapital aggravated murder with a 

firearm specification, but risk that a subsequent three-judge panel would find him 

guilty of a lesser offense. 

Our conclusion is supported by case law where the defendant pled

guilty to aggravated murder and attendant death specifications, requiring the trial 

court to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(3). See State v. Belton, 149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-

Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 51 (process for entering a plea of guilty to charges of 

aggravated murder and related capital specifications is set forth in R.C. 2945.06 and 

Crim.R. 11(C)(3)); State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 

48, ¶ 93 (when the offense charged is a capital offense, R.C. 2945.06 and 

Crim.R. 11(C)(3) require the state to prove guilt of an aggravated-murder charge 
with death specifications even when an accused pleads guilty); State v. Green, 81 

Ohio St.3d 100, 103, 689 N.E.2d 556 (1998) (Crim.R. 11(C)(3) allows the trial court, 

at its discretion, to dismiss death-penalty specifications following a plea to aggravated 

murder); State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846

(appellee pled guilty to aggravated murder with a death-penalty specification; 

therefore, under R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3), regardless of the state’s 

agreement that it would not seek the death penalty, appellee was still charged with an 

offense that was punishable with death); State v. Kelley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 87324, 2006-Ohio-5432 (Crim.R. 11(C)(3) implicated; three-judge panel 

required to take testimony even though state indicated it would not recommend 

capital punishment but the defendant still pleaded guilty to aggravated murder with 

a death specification).

When a death specification is not charged in the indictment with the 

aggravated murder charge or when the state dismisses the death specification in a 

plea agreement, Crim.R. 11(C)(3) is not implicated. See State v. Reynolds, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98146, 2012-Ohio-4067 (defendant never charged with a violence 

specification; he was charged with aggravated murder with a gun specification; it

was never charged as a capital offense. R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3) are 

therefore not applicable herein, and there was no need for a three-judge panel); 

State v. West, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008554, 2005-Ohio-990 (Crim.R. 11(C)(3) 

and R.C. 2945.06 not implicated when all capital specifications were dismissed; 

appellant pleaded guilty to murder, felonious assault, kidnapping, and aggravated 
burglary); State v. Thomson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1213, 2006-Ohio-1224, ¶ 44-

45 (R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3) are inapplicable where appellant pled guilty 

only to aggravated murder with a firearm specification and to aggravated robbery).

In this case, Cawthorne was not charged with capital aggravated 

murder, i.e., the grand jury did not charge him with a death specification; thus 

Crim.R. 11(C)(3) was not implicated. Accordingly, the lack of a “separate” guilty plea 

to the firearm specification does not invalidate Cawthorne’s guilty plea because when 

he pleaded “guilty” to Count 1, his plea included both the aggravated murder offense 

and the firearm specification. 

Because we find that the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C)(3) were not 

required, the trial court was required to follow Crim.R. 11(C)(2) before accepting 

Cawthorne’s guilty plea. Those requirements include:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 

penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for 

probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the 

sentencing hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the 

court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and 

sentence. 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury 

trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory 

process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require 

the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a 

trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against 

himself or herself.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2).
We find that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b) when 

it informed Cawthorne that pleading guilty to Count 1, as indicted, would result in a 

life sentence with additional time for the firearm specification. Specifically, the court 

stated:

It’s a life sentence. Sentence is life. Then depending on what I hear as a 

Judge, I heard evidence here, I’ll also hear from both parties regarding 

sentencing, there are guidelines that I follow, according to the law and 

the State of Ohio, and then I make a ruling, whether it’s 20, 25, 30 years 

or life without parole, as the underlying opportunity for you to then be 

before a Parole Authority. * * * The gun specs merge, the one[-] and 

three-year gun specs, by law they run consecutive to that 20, 25 or 30. 

So that where [the prosecutor] and your lawyers have discussed the 23, 

28, and 33 years. * * * So do you understand that you’re accepting your 

responsibility to aggravated murder, as indicted, with the one- and 

three-year firearm specification and the sentence that I outlined for you?

(Tr. 15-16). Cawthorne responded, “Yes your honor.” Id. 

After additional dialogue with Cawthorne about his citizenship, 

education level, any medications, holds, warrants, or other government supervision, 

whether any promises or threats were made to him to change his plea, and his 

satisfaction with his attorneys, the following exchange occurred:

TRIAL COURT: So, Mr. Cawthorne, on Case 665282, sir, how do 

you now plead to the one count as indicted in Count 1, the aggravated 

murder, unspecified felony, again, with the sentence of life in prison 

with parole opportunities based on the one[-] and three-year gun specs. 

That’s 23, 25 — 23, 28, 33 years or life without parole. Sir, how do you 

plead to that count at this time; guilty or not guilty?

CAWTHORNE: Guilty, your Honor.

TRIAL COURT: I’ll accept your plea of guilty and find you guilty with 

respect to the Count as indicted. Counts 2 through 5 will be dismissed 

at this time. 

(Tr. 21-22.) 
Based on the foregoing, this court finds that the trial court complied 

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(b) because the record is clear that Cawthorne understood 

the “other ‘nonconstitutional’ aspects of the plea colloquy” — nature of the charges, 

the maximum penalties involved, and the effect of his guilty pleas, i.e., he knew his 

guilty plea was to both the aggravated murder offense and the attendant firearm 

specification. Accordingly, in order to invalidate his plea, Cawthorne must 

affirmatively show prejudice — “whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” 

Dangler at ¶ 14, 16.

We find that Cawthorne has not demonstrated any prejudicial effect 

such that he would not have otherwise entered into this plea agreement. During the 

middle of trial, Cawthorne requested a plea agreement from the state. This, alone, 

demonstrates that he voluntarily entered his guilty plea. And based on the entirety of 

the record, we find that he also entered a knowing and intelligent plea of guilty to

Count 1, aggravated murder and the attendant firearm specification. 

Cawthorne next challenges the validity of his plea based on the trial 

court’s misadvisement of the maximum fine. The right to be informed at the plea 

hearing of the maximum possible penalty that could be imposed upon conviction is a 

nonconstitutional right. State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94607, 2011-Ohio1918, ¶ 6, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). 

Because the trial court did not completely fail to advise Cawthorne of the maximum 

penalty as required under Crim.R. 11, Cawthorne must demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced by the trial court’s misadvisement. Dangler at ¶ 16. We find that he has 

not done so. 

Although the trial court incorrectly advised Cawthorne that the 

maximum fine was $20,000 when it is actually $25,ooo, the court declared him 

indigent and waived all costs and fines. Accordingly, he has suffered no prejudice and 

thus the error is harmless. State v. Simmons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 99513 and 

100552, 2013-Ohio-5026, ¶ 7 (trial court’s incorrect advisement of the maximum fine 

does not render a plea invalid when the trial court waives or does not impose a fine). 

Cawthorne’s final challenge to the validity of his plea pertains to the 

trial court’s alleged lack of meaningful dialogue with him prior to accepting his plea. 

He contends that the trial court’s run-on advisement of his Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) rights, 

without pausing or stopping to ensure understanding, renders his plea invalid. In 

support he cites State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). 

In Ballard, the Ohio Supreme Court explained, “[T]he best method of 

informing a defendant of his constitutional rights is to use the language contained in 

Crim.R. 11(C), stopping after each right and asking the defendant whether he 

understands the right and knows that he is waiving it by pleading guilty. We strongly 

recommend such procedure to our trial courts.” Id. at 479. However, the court stated 

that a trial court's failure to apply this procedure “will not necessarily invalidate a 

plea.” Id.

Our review of the record reveals that the trial fully complied with 

advising Cawthorne of his constitutional rights as required under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 
and thus no error was made. Although the court did not pause to ensure 

understanding after each individual right, the court explained in an effective way how 

Cawthorne was waiving or giving up the constitutional rights that he possessed and 

was exercising at this stage of the proceedings by pleading guilty. Those rights 

included, (1) the state’s burden of proof that “you’ve heard me read to the jury a 

number of times,” (2) that he opted for a jury trial that was currently in progress, 

(3) that the state had called two witnesses, and he had been exercising his right to 

cross-examine those witnesses and would continue to do so if trial continued, (4) his 

ability to present evidence and subpoena witnesses, and (5) his right to remain silent. 

(Tr. 13-15.) Cawthorne affirmed that he understood these rights that he would be 

waiving by entering into a plea agreement. Id. 

Regarding potential penalties, we find that the trial court complied

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), or if a misadvisement was made, it was harmless. The 

record reveals that Cawthorne understood that he was pleading guilty to an offense 

that carried a maximum penalty of life in prison, but that he could be eligible for 

parole after serving the mandatory minimum and the three-year firearm 

specification, for a total 23, 28, or 33 years. (Tr. 15-16.) Based on the record before 

this court, including that Cawthorne requested and accepted a plea agreement five 

days into a jury trial, we find that he entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea 

to the aggravated murder offense. He has not demonstrated error or prejudice to 

warrant reversal of his plea. The assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial 

court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR