Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Liszka, 2016 IL App (3d) 150238

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re MARRIAGE OF KATHLEEN LISZKA, Petitioner-Appellee,

and MICHAEL LISZKA, Respondent-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-15-0238

Filed

Modified upon

denial of rehearing

September 27, 2016

November 16, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 12-D-225; the 

Hon. Victoria M. Kennison, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

Counsel on

Appeal

Laura L. Malinowski and James A. Murphy (argued), of Mahoney, 

Silverman & Cross, LLC, of Joliet, for appellant.

Paul L. Feinstein (argued), of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justice Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice McDade concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Petitioner Kathleen Liszka filed a dissolution of marriage action against respondent 

Michael Liszka. Prior to trial, the court barred Michael’s expert from testifying as to the value 

of a corporation owned by the parties, ISP Painting Inc. (ISP), as a discovery sanction. In its 

judgment for dissolution, the court divided the marital estate equally between the parties, 

awarding ISP and the marital home to Kathleen and requiring her to pay Michael $673,785. 

The court denied Michael’s request for maintenance, imputed monthly income of $17,500 to 

him for child support purposes, and imposed a trust for child support payments. After ruling on 

the parties’ motions for reconsideration, the trial court reduced the amount Kathleen was to pay 

Michael to $84,007.50. 

¶ 2 Michael appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) barring his expert from testifying 

as to the value of ISP, (2) denying his motion to continue the trial, (3) imputing income to him, 

(4) valuing ISP, (5) not dividing ISP’s 2013 retained earnings, (6) assigning no value to 

another business owned by the parties, (7) failing to treat Kathleen’s attorney fees as advances 

from the marital estate, (8) valuing the marital home, (9) refusing to reopen the proofs to allow 

the introduction of ISP’s 2013 tax returns, (10) denying him rehabilitative maintenance, and 

(11) establishing a trust for his child support payments. We reverse those parts of the trial 

court’s order that bar Michael’s expert from testifying and that impute monthly income of 

$17,500 to him and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all 

other respects. 

¶ 3 FACTS 

¶ 4 Michael and Kathleen Liszka were married in 1993 and had three children together during 

their marriage. In 2002, Michael and Kathleen started a corporation together, ISP Painting, Inc. 

Kathleen owned 51% of ISP, and Michael owned 49%. They both served in various roles at 

ISP throughout their marriage. In 2011, Michael was the chief financial officer (CFO), and 

Kathleen was president of ISP. 

¶ 5 In 2011, Michael and Kathleen entered into a collaborative divorce process. As part of that 

process, they hired Christiana Zouzias, a certified public accountant, to value ISP. In 2012, the 

collaborative process broke down, and Kathleen filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. 

She sought sole custody of the parties’ children, who were 14, 12, and 10 years old at the time. 

In June 2012, Kathleen placed Michael on administrative leave from ISP but continued to pay 

him an annual salary of approximately $210,000. Both parties filed motions alleging 

dissipation of assets by the other party. 

¶ 6 In April 2013, the trial court set the trial for custody and property matters to take place on 

October 21, 2013. In April 2013, Kathleen sent Michael financial documents related to ISP. On 

May 20, 2013, Michael filed a motion to compel production of unredacted documents, arguing 

that the documents Kathleen sent him contained redacted data that interfered with his ability to 

determine the value of ISP. The trial court entered an order requiring Kathleen to provide the 

documents in unredacted form subject to a protective order. 

¶ 7 On August 12, 2013, Kathleen disclosed her trial witnesses, including Zouzias as her 

valuation expert. On August 14, 2013, Kathleen sent Michael some unredacted financial 

records. Soon thereafter, Michael disclosed Mary Lynn Hoffer as his ISP valuation expert but 
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did not provide any of her conclusions or opinions and indicated that her report would “be 

available prior to trial.” On that same date, Michael filed another motion to compel the 

production of unredacted documents, asserting that Kathleen failed to send him certain balance 

sheets, financial statements, and general ledgers for ISP. On August 29, 2013, Kathleen sent 

Michael unredacted copies of the financial statements and ledgers he requested. On September 

26, 2013, Kathleen sent Michael the 2012-13 balance sheets for ISP. 

¶ 8 On October 17, 2013, Michael provided Hoffer’s report to Kathleen. Kathleen filed a 

motion to bar Hoffer’s report and testimony because Michael did not provide her report or 

disclose her opinions by the discovery deadline. The trial court granted Kathleen’s motion. 

¶ 9 On October 21, 2013, Michael filed a “motion to continue property/financial portion of 

trial due to discovery abuses by petitioner.” At the hearing on the motion, Kathleen’s attorney, 

Paul Starkman, testified that he provided redacted financial records to Michael in October 

2012 and April 2013, including profit and loss statements and general ledgers. He testified that 

he redacted only the names of ISP’s customers, which he considered confidential. On August 

28, Starkman provided Michael with unredacted financial information, including general 

ledgers for 2011 and 2012, profit and loss statements, and some balance sheets. On September 

26, 2013, Starkman provided Michael with the unredacted balance sheets for 2012 and 2013. 

¶ 10 Phil McLawhorn, the accounting manager of ISP, testified that in August 2013, he 

provided financial documents to Michael, including a balance sheet and a profit and loss 

statement. On August 28, 2013, he provided Michael with general ledgers for 2011 and 2013. 

On September 26, 2013, McLawhorn provided Michael with the balance sheet for 2012, as 

well as the updated balance sheet for 2013. The trial court denied Michael’s motion to 

continue. 

¶ 11 Right before trial, the parties settled their custody dispute, leaving only property issues to 

be decided by the court. At trial, Michael testified that he is a healthy 44-year-old. He has a 

college degree with a major in financing. Before starting ISP, Michael started a local painting 

company, Illinois State Painters, in 1987. At ISP, Michael served as human resources manager, 

marketing director, finance director, president, chief executive officer (CEO), and CFO. 

¶ 12 In addition to ISP, Michael and Kathleen owned several other businesses, including 

Coreman Technologies. Coreman Technologies operates an extranet system that is used by ISP 

and two other customers. The extranet system was developed and paid for by ISP. ISP created 

Coreman to market the extranet to other companies. Coreman has no employees. Coreman 

does not file taxes. Coreman’s earnings are included in ISP’s earnings for tax purposes. 

Coreman’s earnings were $1320 in 2010, $21,718 in 2011, $4695 in 2012, and $3205 in 2013. 

Michael estimated that Coreman’s value was $500,000 based on its “possible future.” 

Kathleen testified that she did not know the value of Coreman. She testified that Coreman’s 

only assets are its name and its ability to use and sell extranet software. Coreman does not have 

any copyrights, patents, or trademarks for its software. Louis Miller, ISP’s Director of 

Financing, testified that Coreman does not have a bank account separate from ISP’s. 

According to Miller, Coreman is not separate from ISP. 

¶ 13 At trial, Zouzias testified that the value of ISP was $1,116,000 as of December 31, 2011. At 

Michael’s request, Zouzias looked at ISP’s 2012-13 financial information but did not perform 

a complete analysis for those years. The 2012-13 information confirmed Zouzias’s belief that 

her 2011 valuation was correct. She did not have an opinion regarding the value of ISP as of 

2012 or 2013 because she did not perform a complete business valuation for those years. 
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Michael testified that ISP’s value was $4,037,817 in 2012 and $5,047,902 in 2013 based on 

financial information from the first half of the year. He testified that he was offered $2,000,000 

for ISP in 2005 or 2006 and that it has substantially grown in value since then. 

¶ 14 Both parties provided evidence regarding the value of the marital home. Kathleen 

presented a copy of an appraisal, performed on August 5, 2011, stating that the home had a 

value of $565,000. Kathleen testified that she believed the fair market value of the home was 

$420,000. Michael presented an appraisal of the home performed on March 12, 2012, 

indicating that the value of the home was $615,000. Michael testified that he believed the value 

of the home at the time of trial was $691,000. 

¶ 15 Michael alleged that Kathleen dissipated marital assets, in part, by paying excessive 

attorney fees. Peggy Tracy, a forensic accountant hired by Michael, testified that Kathleen 

spent $228,400 more in attorney fees than Michael. Kathleen disputed Tracy’s testimony and 

testified that she spent only $78,982 more than Michael in attorney fees. 

¶ 16 The trial ended on January 24, 2014, at which time the court gave an oral ruling that 

grounds existed for dissolution of the parties’ marriage. The court reserved the issue of child 

support for six months. 

¶ 17 In March 2014, Michael filed a “motion to reopen proofs as to ISP, Inc. valuation and 

allocation of retained earnings.” Attached thereto was ISP’s 2013 tax return. The trial court 

denied the motion. 

¶ 18 On April 16, 2014, the trial court entered its written judgment for dissolution of marriage. 

The court found that the value of the marital home was $577,000 based on Kathleen’s 2011 

appraisal and improvements in the market. Kathleen was awarded the marital home and 

ordered to pay Michael for his share. The court accepted Zouzias’s business valuation of ISP, 

finding that the date of her valuation “is still reasonably close enough toward the time of trial 

that it is an acceptable amount.” The court awarded ISP to Kathleen and ordered her to pay 

Michael $558,000 for his interest. The court rejected Michael’s valuation of ISP, finding it 

“was fraught with errors.” The court awarded Coreman Technologies to Kathleen and ordered 

her to pay Michael $250,000 for his interest in it. 

¶ 19 The court denied both parties’ claims of dissipation. The court found that Kathleen’s 

attorney fees were more than Michael’s “but, because of the situation that we have here and 

how this started as a collaborative effort and with no requirement that there be an equalization 

as to attorneys’ fees, the Court is not going to equalize the attorneys’ fees.”

¶ 20 The court denied Michael’s request for maintenance after reviewing the applicable 

statutory factors. The court explained: “Both parties are walking away now with significant 

assets, some in property and some in cash. Both parties have significant earning capacity and 

they are both working people.”

¶ 21 The court divided the marital estate equally between the parties, awarding Michael two 

Hawaii timeshares, personal property, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and two vehicles. In 

order to accomplish the 50/50 split, Kathleen was required to pay Michael $673,785. 

¶ 22 On the same day the court entered its judgment, Kathleen terminated Michael from ISP. 

Michael then filed a petition for equitable maintenance, and Kathleen responded with a motion 

for a directed finding that Michael was not entitled to maintenance. At a hearing on his 

petition, Michael testified that he had expenses totaling $17,500 per month, including over 

$10,000 in living expenses and $7000 in attorney fees. He had been withdrawing money from 
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his 401(k) accounts to support himself since his termination from ISP. The trial court granted 

Kathleen’s motion and denied Michael’s petition for maintenance. 

¶ 23 In June 2014, Kathleen filed a petition to set child support. Michael responded to the 

petition by denying that he is “well able and capable of contributing to the support of the minor 

children.” Kathleen also filed a petition for imposition of a trust, pursuant to section 503(g) of 

the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/503(g) (West 2012)), 

for the benefit of the children. The trial court held a hearing on the petitions. At the hearing, 

Michael testified that since he was terminated from ISP in April 2014, he has been “trying to 

start [his] own company.” His new company was incorporated in October 2014, and, according 

to his business plan, he will be paying himself an annual salary of $40,000, plus bonuses. He 

asked the trial court to set child support based on that salary. 

¶ 24 In December 2014, the trial court issued its oral ruling on Kathleen’s petitions, finding that 

Michael is “voluntarily unemployed” and “unwilling to pay the necessary support for his 

children.” The trial court imputed income to Michael in the amount of “$17,500 per month 

which is the amount that he was living off of and using.” The trial court also granted 

Kathleen’s request for imposition of a section 503(g) trust.

¶ 25 In February 2015, the trial court entered a written order requiring Michael to pay $3765 in 

child support per month based on his imputed monthly income of $17,500. The order granted 

Kathleen’s request for a 503(g) trust, finding that Michael “has not acted in good faith, that he 

has in fact been trying to avoid meeting his obligations to fully support the children as 

necessary.” The court ordered that $200,000 of the amount Kathleen owed Michael be placed 

in the trust. 

¶ 26 Both parties filed motions to reconsider the judgment for dissolution. The court denied 

Michael’s motion but partially granted Kathleen’s motion, reassigning three bank accounts to 

ISP instead of the parties and ruling that Coreman had no value because it is part of ISP and its 

value, if any, was included in ISP’s value. The court also determined that it “double counted” 

certain assets and accounts. After the court’s modifications, the total value of the marital estate 

decreased by $1,179,553, and the amount Kathleen was required to pay Michael decreased 

from $673,785 to $84,007.50. 

¶ 27 ANALYSIS 

¶ 28 I. ISP’s Valuation

¶ 29 A. Barring Michael’s Expert and Refusing to Continue Trial

¶ 30 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f)(3) requires a party to disclose, for each controlled 

expert witness, “(i) the subject matter on which the witness will testify; (ii) the conclusions and 

opinions of the witness and the bases therefor; (iii) the qualifications of the witness; and (iv) 

any reports prepared by the witness about the case.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(f)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 2007). 

Information required by Rule 213 must normally be disclosed no later than 60 days before trial. 

Gee v. Treece, 365 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1036 (2006). 

¶ 31 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) authorizes the trial court to prescribe sanctions, 

including barring witnesses from testifying, when a party fails to comply with discovery 

deadlines. Ill. S. Ct. R. 219(c)(iv) (eff. July 1, 2002); Nedzvekas v. Fung, 374 Ill. App. 3d 618, 

620 (2007). The imposition of sanctions is within the discretion of the trial court and will not 

be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Fung, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 620-21.
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¶ 32 In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning a sanction, the 

reviewing court should consider (1) the surprise to the adverse party, (2) the prejudicial effect 

of the witness’s testimony, (3) the nature of the testimony, (4) the diligence of the adverse 

party, (5) the timeliness of the objection, and (6) the good faith of the party seeking to offer the 

testimony. Id. at 621. No single factor is determinative, and each case must be considered 

based on its unique facts. Id.

¶ 33 Disqualification of an expert is not the only sanction available when a party violates 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213. Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill. App. 3d 134, 141 (1991). In fact, 

barring a witness’s testimony is a drastic sanction and should be exercised with caution. 

McGovern v. Kaneshiro, 337 Ill. App. 3d 24, 37 (2003). In some circumstances, allowing the 

offended party the opportunity to depose the expert may be an appropriate response to a party’s 

failure to timely disclose. Marshall, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 141. 

¶ 34 Where a party has acted in good faith and has not engaged in abusive discovery practices, it 

is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to bar expert testimony that is not timely disclosed. 

See Vallejo v. Mercado, 220 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10 (1991). The proper remedy is to continue the 

trial date and revise the discovery schedule. Id.

¶ 35 Here, the record shows that Michael disclosed Hoffer as a controlled expert witness more 

than 60 days before trial but failed to disclose her opinions and report until just 4 days before 

trial. However, this late disclosure was not caused by Michael’s bad faith or abusive discovery 

practices. Rather, the late disclosure was the result of Kathleen’s failure to provide Michael 

and his expert with necessary financial information. 

¶ 36 In early 2013, Michael sought ISP’s financial documents from Kathleen. While Kathleen 

provided some documents to Michael in April 2013, many of them were redacted, requiring 

Michael to file a motion to compel Kathleen to provide unredacted documents. Kathleen 

provided unredacted documents to Michael in August 2013 but failed to send him 2012 

balance sheets, financial statements for part of the year, or general ledgers for any years, 

causing Michael to file another motion to compel. On August 29, 2013, Kathleen sent Michael 

the financial statements and ledgers he requested. However, it was not until September 26, 

2013, less than 30 days before trial, that Kathleen finally provided Michael with IPS’s 2012 

and 2013 balance sheets. Three weeks later, Michael provided Hoffer’s report to Kathleen.

¶ 37 Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in barring Hoffer’s 

testimony. The record establishes that Michael, and by extension Hoffer, did not receive all of 

the relevant financial information necessary to reach a conclusion regarding ISP’s value until 

September 26, 2013, less than a month before trial and more than a month after the August 22, 

2013 discovery deadline. Because it was Kathleen’s lack of diligence that caused Hoffer’s 

report to be untimely, Michael should not have been penalized. The proper remedy would have 

been for the trial court to grant Michael’s motion to continue and allow Kathleen time to 

depose Hoffer prior to trial. See Marshall, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 141; Vallejo, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 

10. 

¶ 38 B. Date of Valuation 

¶ 39 The trial court should value marital property of the parties as of the date of the judgment 

dissolving the marriage of the parties. In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496, ¶¶ 24, 30. 

Where there are adequate financial records to permit a valuation on or near the date of 
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judgment, the trial court should use that evidence in making its valuation. In re Marriage of 

Rubinstein, 145 Ill. App. 3d 31, 35 (1986). 

¶ 40 It is the obligation of the parties in a dissolution proceeding to present the court with 

sufficient evidence of the value of property. In re Marriage of Courtright, 155 Ill. App. 3d 55, 

59 (1987). A trial court can only reach its determination of value based on the evidence 

presented. Id. The valuation of assets in a dissolution of marriage action is to be resolved by the 

trier of fact. In re Marriage of Grunsten, 304 Ill. App. 3d 12, 17 (1999). As long as the court’s 

valuation is within the range testified to by the expert witnesses, it ordinarily will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

¶ 41 Determining market value of a closely held company is not unlike the valuation process for 

professional corporations. Id. The process is inherently subjective: 

“Placing a fair market value on the professional corporation is an art, not a science, 

and the court must rely on expert witnesses to assist it in this difficult task. There is no 

exact formula that can be applied, so the trial court must rely on experts who may differ 

significantly in both methodology and valuation. The trial court must consider the 

relevant evidence before it; determine the credibility of the experts, the reasonableness 

of their testimony, the weight given to each of them, and their expertise in the particular 

area of valuation; and then determine fair market value.” In re Marriage of Gunn, 233 

Ill. App. 3d 165, 183 (1992). 

¶ 42 Here, the trial court barred Michael’s expert from testifying and prohibited him from 

presenting expert testimony regarding the value of ISP. As a result, the court was left only with 

the expert testimony of Zouzias regarding the value of ISP. While Zouzias valued ISP as of 

2011, which was several years before the judgment of dissolution, it was not error for the trial 

court to rely on Zouzias’s valuation because it was the only expert valuation before the court. 

See Courtright, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 59. Nevertheless, on remand, the court should allow both 

Michael’s and Kathleen’s experts to present evidence to aid the court in determining the value 

of ISP on the date of dissolution. See Mathis, 2012 IL 113496, ¶¶ 24, 30; Rubinstein, 145 Ill. 

App. 3d at 35. 

¶ 43 II. Imputing Income to Michael 

¶ 44 Trial courts have authority to impute income to a voluntarily unemployed or 

underemployed noncustodial parent for child support purposes. Melamed v. Melamed, 2016 IL 

App (1st) 141453, ¶ 36; In re Marriage of Adams, 348 Ill. App. 3d 340, 344 (2004). In order to 

impute income to a party, the court must find that the payor is voluntarily unemployed, is 

attempting to evade a support obligation, or has unreasonably failed to take advantage of an 

employment opportunity. In re Marriage of Gosney, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1077 (2009). 

¶ 45 If a party is not making a good-faith effort to earn sufficient income, the court may set a 

support obligation at a level higher than the parent’s actual income, as long as the award is 

appropriate based on the party’s skills and experience. In re Marriage of Sweet, 316 Ill. App. 

3d 101, 107 (2000). “It is well established that courts have the authority to compel parties to 

pay child support at a level commensurate with their earning potential.” Gosney, 394 Ill. App. 

3d at 1077. In determining a party’s earning capacity, the court should examine (1) the work 

and earnings history of the parent, (2) the parent’s educational background, (3) the parent’s 

occupational qualifications, and (4) prevailing job opportunities in the geographic area. 
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Caplan v. Caplan, 864 A.2d 1108, 1117 (N.J. 2005); Claborn v. Claborn, 673 N.W.2d 533, 

540 (Neb. 2004). 

¶ 46 The amount of income imputed by the court must be supported by evidence showing that it 

is commensurate with the supporting parent’s skills and experience. See In re Parentage of 

M.M., 2015 IL App (2d) 140772, ¶ 44. In determining a party’s earning capacity, a court 

should only consider evidence presented, not mere speculation. See In re Marriage of Harlow, 

251 Ill. App. 3d 152, 159 (1993). A trial court may rely on the testimony of vocational experts 

regarding the amount of income the payor could reasonably be expected to earn based on 

education and experience. See In re Marriage of S.D., 2012 IL App (1st) 101876, ¶¶ 36-37. 

¶ 47 When calculating the amount of income to impute, the trial court may consider the 

supporting parent’s income from previous employment. See In re Marriage of Hubbs, 363 Ill. 

App. 3d 696, 706 (2006); In re Marriage of Carpel, 232 Ill. App. 3d 806, 819 (1992). 

However, a court should not base its income calculation on outdated data that no longer reflect 

prospective income. Carpel, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 819. Evidence that the obligor once earned a 

certain salary and presumably could again is an insufficient basis upon which to impute 

income. In re Marriage of Berger, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 774 (Ct. App. 2009). A trial court may 

not impute income in the amount of an obligor’s prior income where the obligor has been 

involuntarily terminated from his prior employment and there is no evidence that a job with the 

same salary is available to him. See Gosney, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1078. A trial court’s 

determination of income is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 1077. 

¶ 48 Here, the trial court imputed income to Michael after finding that he was “voluntarily 

unemployed” and “unwilling to pay the necessary support for his children.” The court imputed 

income in the amount of $17,500 per month to Michael because that was the “amount that he 

was living off of and using.” This was an abuse of discretion.

¶ 49 The amount of income imputed to a payor spouse must be based on his earning capacity. 

See id. Here, there was no evidence presented that Michael could obtain a job earning $17,500 

per month, or $210,000 per year. The only evidence presented was that Michael earned 

$210,000 while he was working as CFO at ISP. However, he was involuntarily terminated 

from that position. Without any evidence that Michael could earn that amount at another job 

based on his qualifications, the trial court erred in imputing that income to him. See id. at 1078; 

Berger, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 774. 

¶ 50 We reverse the trial court’s order imputing gross monthly income of $17,500 to Michael 

and remand for the trial court to determine how much income should be imputed to Michael. 

On remand, the court must consider the relevant factors to determine what Michael’s imputed 

income should be based on his earning capacity, not his spending habits. 

¶ 51 III. Division of Marital Property 

¶ 52 Michael argues that the trial court erred in its division of marital property. Specifically, he 

contends that the trial court (1) should have divided the 2013 retained earnings of ISP as a 

marital asset, (2) considered Coreman Technologies to be a separate entity and valued it as 

such, and (3) included Kathleen’s payment of attorney fees as advances from the marital estate.
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¶ 53 A. Retained Earnings 

¶ 54 Retained earnings are marital property. In re Marriage of Lundahl, 396 Ill. App. 3d 495, 

504 (2009). Here, the evidence showed that ISP had no retained earnings in 2011, the year of 

Zouzias’s valuation of ISP. However, ISP may have had retained earnings in 2013. On remand, 

when the parties present evidence of the value of ISP, they should also present evidence 

regarding the existence and amount of retained earnings of ISP in any year after 2011 until the 

date of dissolution. If retained earnings exist and are not included in the new valuations of ISP, 

they should be divided between the parties. 

¶ 55 B. Coreman Technologies 

¶ 56 It is the obligation of the parties in a dissolution proceeding to present the court with 

sufficient evidence of the value of the marital property. Courtright, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 59. The 

valuation of assets in a dissolution of marriage action is to be resolved by the trier of fact. 

Grunsten, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 17. A trial court may select a valuation between opposing values 

in evidence when the record contains conflicting evidence on valuation. In re Marriage of 

Cutler, 334 Ill. App. 3d 731, 736 (2002). However, a court’s valuation cannot be based on 

testimony that is not supported by a proper foundation. Id. at 737. 

¶ 57 The only evidence presented regarding the value of Coreman Technologies came from 

Michael, who testified that it was worth $500,000 based on its future potential. Kathleen 

testified that she did not know the value of Coreman. ISP’s Director of Financing testified that 

Coreman was not a separate entity but was part of ISP and had no value outside of ISP. 

¶ 58 The evidence presented at trial showed that Coreman Technologies had only two 

customers and gross sales of less than $5000 in three out of the four years prior to the trial. It 

had no existence separate from ISP, as it had no employees, no bank account, and no office, 

and all income attributable to Coreman was reported as ISP’s income. Based on this evidence, 

the trial court did not err in finding that Coreman Technologies was part of ISP and included in 

ISP’s value.

¶ 59 C. Kathleen’s Attorney Fees

¶ 60 Section 501(c-1)(2) of the Act states in pertinent part: “Unless otherwise ordered by the 

court ***, interim awards, as well as the aggregate of all other payments by each party to 

counsel ***, shall be deemed to have been advances from the parties’ marital estate.” 750 

ILCS 5/501(c-1)(2) (West 2012). This provision creates a presumption that attorney fees will 

be treated as advances, but a trial court may order otherwise. In re Marriage of Holthaus, 387 

Ill. App. 3d 367, 378 (2008). Nothing in section 501 or any other section of the Act requires a 

court to “equalize” attorney fees between the parties. In re Marriage of DeLarco, 313 Ill. App. 

3d 107, 113 (2000). 

¶ 61 Here, the evidence showed that Kathleen’s attorney fees for the dissolution proceedings 

were significantly higher than Michael’s. According to Michael’s witness, Kathleen spent over 

$200,000 more than he did. Kathleen testified that she actually spent less than $80,000 more 

than Michael. The trial court agreed with Kathleen’s testimony and found that her higher fees 

were at least partially incurred during the collaborative process. 

¶ 62 The trial court did not err in refusing to treat Kathleen’s attorney fees as advances against 

the marital estate. While there is a presumption under the Act that attorney fees will be treated 
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as advances, a trial court may order otherwise, as the court did in this case. See 750 ILCS 

5/501(c-1)(2) (West 2012); Holthaus, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 378. 

¶ 63 IV. Denial of Motion to Reopen Proofs 

¶ 64 In considering a motion to reopen proofs, the trial court should take into account whether 

(1) there is some excuse for the failure to introduce the evidence at trial, (2) the adverse party 

will be surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the new evidence, and (3) there are cogent reasons 

to deny the motion. In re Marriage of Suarez, 148 Ill. App. 3d 849, 858 (1986). It may be 

proper to reopen proofs to allow a party to present relevant evidence that was not available at 

the time of trial but became known before the judgment of dissolution was entered. Id. at 862. 

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen proofs where the 

evidence sought to be introduced is not of utmost importance and will not materially alter the 

trial court’s judgment. See In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 248 (1984). 

¶ 65 Here, the trial ended in January 2014, and the court issued its judgment on April 16, 2014. 

Two months after the conclusion of the dissolution proceedings, Michael filed his motion to 

reopen proofs so that he could submit evidence contained in ISP’s 2013 tax returns. The 

evidence Michael sought to introduce was not relevant, however, because a valuation of ISP 

had already been performed by Zouzias. The 2013 tax documents would not have assisted the 

court. Therefore, the court properly denied Michael’s request to reopen the proofs. 

¶ 66 As part of the valuation on remand, the experts and the court may consider ISP’s 2013 tax 

returns. 

¶ 67 V. Valuation of Marital Home 

¶ 68 It is the responsibility of the trial court to resolve conflicting evidence concerning the 

valuation of marital assets. In re Marriage of Heroy, 385 Ill. App. 3d 640, 663 (2008). As long 

as the trial court’s valuation is within the range provided by the parties, it will not ordinarily be 

disturbed on appeal. Id. 

¶ 69 Here, both parties submitted appraisals of the marital home. Kathleen’s appraisal, 

performed in August 2011, stated that the value of the home was $565,000. Michael’s 

appraisal, performed seven months later, stated that the home’s value was $615,000. Michael 

testified that he believed the value of the home at the time of trial was $691,000, and Kathleen 

testified that she believed the home’s value was $420,000. 

¶ 70 In its order, the trial court relied on Kathleen’s 2011 appraisal and found that conditions in 

the real estate market had improved since that appraisal was completed. As a result, the court 

decided that an upward adjustment from the value contained in Kathleen’s appraisal was 

appropriate. The $577,000 value that the trial court placed on the marital was within the range 

of valuations presented by the parties and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

See id.

¶ 71 VI. Denying Michael’s Request for Maintenance

¶ 72 Section 504(a) of the Act authorizes a trial court in dissolution proceedings to award either 

spouse maintenance in amounts and for periods of time as the court deems just. 750 ILCS 

5/504(a) (West 2012). Section 504 sets forth the factors the court should consider when 

determining whether to grant maintenance: 
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“(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned 

and non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance; 

 (2) the needs of each party; 

 (3) the present and future earning capacity of each party; 

 (4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking 

maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having forgone or 

delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage; 

 (5) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire 

appropriate education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to 

support himself or herself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a 

child making it appropriate that the custodian not seek employment; 

 (6) the standard of living established during the marriage; 

 (7) the duration of the marriage; 

 (8) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties; 

 (9) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic 

circumstances of the parties; 

 (10) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, 

training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse; 

 (11) any valid agreement of the parties; and 

 (12) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.” 750 

ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2012). 

¶ 73 The purpose of maintenance is to enable a spouse who is disadvantaged through marriage 

to enjoy a standard of living commensurate with that during the marriage. In re Marriage of 

Schuster, 224 Ill. App. 3d 958, 970 (1992). A spouse cannot use self-imposed poverty as a 

basis for claiming maintenance when he has the means to earn more income. Id. The Act 

creates an affirmative duty on a spouse requesting maintenance to seek and accept appropriate 

employment. Id.

¶ 74 We will not disturb a trial court’s award or denial of maintenance absent an abuse of 

discretion. In re Marriage of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522, ¶ 46. It may be an abuse of 

discretion to award maintenance to a spouse capable of improving his income. Schuster, 224 

Ill. App. 3d at 970. 

¶ 75 The record in this case does not support an award of maintenance to Michael. The trial 

court reviewed the applicable factors and found that both parties have “significant assets,” 

“significant earning capacity,” “no domestic duties,” and “no time needed for education, 

training or employment,” and that both are “young, able-bodied, and physically and mentally 

sound.” At the time of these proceedings, Michael was 44 years of age. He was in good health 

and possessed a college degree. He helped create ISP and has held many positions in the 

company, most recently serving as CFO. Michael testified that he is able to work and has 

already started another business of his own. He has proved capable of supporting himself 

without Kathleen’s assistance. The trial court properly denied Michael’s request for 

maintenance. 
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¶ 76 VII. Imposition of Trust 

¶ 77 Section 503(g) of the Act provides: “[t]he court if necessary to protect and promote the best 

interests of the children may set aside a portion of the jointly or separately held estates of the 

parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education, physical and mental 

health, and general welfare of any minor, dependent or incompetent child of the parties.” 750 

ILCS 5/503(g) (West 2012). A need for such protection arises when the noncustodial parent is 

unwilling or unable to make child support payments. Melamed, 2016 IL App (1st) 141453, 

¶ 41. We review the decision to impose a trust under section 503(g) of the Act under an abuse 

of discretion standard. Id.

¶ 78 Here, Michael responded to Kathleen’s petition for child support by asserting that he was 

not “well able and capable of contributing to the support of the minor children.” He later 

suggested that he pay child support based on a gross annual income of $40,000, which would 

require him to pay less than $1000 per month to support his children, while he was spending 

$17,500 per month on himself. Based on Michael’s testimony, the trial court found that 

Michael “has not acted in good faith” and “has in fact been trying to avoid meeting his 

obligations to fully support the children as necessary.” Because of Michael’s unwillingness to 

pay child support, the trial court’s imposition of a section 503(g) trust was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

¶ 79 CONCLUSION 

¶ 80 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and reversed and 

remanded in part. 

¶ 81 Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. 

¶ 82 JUSTICE McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

¶ 83 To the extent that the majority affirms the circuit court’s rulings on the issues Michael has 

raised on appeal, I concur with the decision. However, I believe that this appeal should be 

affirmed in its entirety, so I respectfully dissent from the majority’s rulings on the issues 

relating to the barring of Michael’s valuation expert and the imputation of Michael’s income.

¶ 84 I. The Barring of Michael’s Valuation Expert 

¶ 85 The majority’s decision places the blame on Kathleen for Michael’s late disclosure of 

Hoffer’s valuation and in doing so, assumes that the documents Michael was requesting from 

Kathleen were necessary. Supra ¶ 35 (“the late disclosure was the result of Kathleen’s failure 

to provide Michael and his expert with necessary financial information” (emphasis added)). I 

am unwilling to make that assumption. Zouzias’s valuation of ISP was as of December 31, 

2011. Michael did not attempt to compile a countering valuation for the same time period, even 

though he continued to serve as ISP’s chief financial officer until June 2012 and presumably 

had unfettered access to all of the financial data until his suspension on that date. The trial court 

found, and the majority apparently agrees, that the December 2011 valuation was recent 

enough to satisfy the statute. There was nothing preventing Michael from countering that 

valuation with expert testimony. 
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¶ 86 Instead, he sought to develop a more contemporaneous valuation—a decision that was 

consistent with the version of section 503(f) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of 

Marriage Act in effect during the pendency of this case, which stated, in relevant part, that the 

circuit court, “in determining the value of the marital and non-marital property for purposes of 

dividing the property, shall value the property as of the date of trial or some other date as close 

to the date of trial as is practicable.” 750 ILCS 5/503(f) (West 2012). To that end, he began 

seeking ISP’s more recent financial information. 

¶ 87 When the parties began the collaborative divorce process in 2011, they hired Zouzias to 

perform a valuation of ISP. After the collaborative process broke down, Kathleen filed the 

divorce petition in February 2012. It appears from the record that Michael’s former attorney 

requested financial information from ISP between October 2012 and into January 2013. Those 

disclosures were made, in redacted form, without objection from Michael. His trial attorney 

made additional requests for ISP’s current financial information in February 2013. In April 

2013, responsive disclosures were made by ISP, in redacted form. At trial, Kathleen’s attorney, 

Paul Starkman, testified to the reason that the April 2013 disclosures had been made in 

redacted form.1 While Michael’s primary objection in the trial court was that these redactions 

precluded him from compiling a timely valuation, 2

Starkman’s undisputed testimony of 

October 21, 2013, belied that objection: 

“The reason we were redacting, and the only thing we redacted were the names of key 

customers of ISP[,] is because we were concerned that Mr. Liszka may be about to start 

a competing business and had been either contacting them for that purpose or 

contacting them to try and interfere with the relationship with the ISP company. So we 

were concerned if we produced those, that kind of confidential information about what 

clients were doing what kind of business with ISP, that might enable him to facilitate 

his competitive activities, if he was doing that.” (Emphasis added.)

No evidence was presented to counter Starkman’s testimony. Thus, contrary to the majority’s 

analysis (supra ¶¶ 35-37), the redactions were not responsible for any delay in Michael 

producing a timely, more current valuation of ISP. In this regard, it should also be noted that 

Michael did not even retain Hoffer until July 10, 2013—roughly six weeks before the 60-day 

pretrial discovery deadline—long after he and Kathleen began the valuation process by 

retaining Zouzias in 2011 and long after the collaborative divorce process had broken down. 

Under all of these circumstances, I cannot see how Kathleen can be blamed for Michael’s 

untimely valuation. 

¶ 88 A circuit court’s ruling on discovery sanctions will typically not be disturbed absent an 

abuse of discretion. Locasto v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 113576, ¶ 26. The majority 

takes Michael’s argument regarding the redactions at face value—an argument that is 

contradicted by the record. I believe that the record supports the circuit court’s October 21, 

 

1

Pinpointing the exact dates of Michael’s discovery requests is challenging, as the record reflects 

that formal discovery requests were not made. As the circuit court noted on October 21, 2013, “[t]here 

is testimony and uncontroverted that all of these matters were done without subpoena and through 

cooperation.”

2

In essence, Michael argued in the circuit court that the redactions forced him to seek a court order 

requiring nonredacted documents, and that Kathleen and ISP were dilatory in responding to and 

complying with the court’s order.
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2013, finding that there was no evidence that Michael was unable to proceed with a valuation 

in a timely manner. Moreover, I would suggest that this issue does not warrant remand for 

another reason. Although Michael’s expert was barred, Michael himself, who had been ISP’s 

CFO for several years, was able to complete an assessment of the company’s value and he 

testified, placing the higher estimated value in evidence to be considered by the trial court. 

There has arguably been no prejudice even if the court erred in refusing to allow the expert to 

testify. Accordingly, I would find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it 

chose the sanction of barring Hoffer’s testimony.

¶ 89 II. The Imputation of Income to Michael 

¶ 90 With regard to Michael’s second argument, I disagree with the majority’s ruling that the 

circuit court abused its discretion when it imputed a yearly income of $210,000 to Michael. 

¶ 91 Initially, I note that the majority does not include a statement of Michael’s argument in its 

analysis of the income imputation issue. Supra ¶¶ 44-50. Michael’s brief on appeal actually 

presents a two-pronged attack on the circuit court’s decision: a very short argument 

challenging whether any of the three situations exist under which a court can impute income 

and, in a different section, an alternative argument that the court erred when it imputed income 

in an amount based solely on Michael’s stated monthly expenses of $17,500 per month. For the 

following reasons, I would affirm the circuit court on both prongs. 

¶ 92 With respect to Michael’s first prong, while the majority does state the trial court’s 

expressed justification for imputing income, it does not actually find whether or not the 

decision to impute was proper. It is unclear whether that decision was also deemed an abuse of 

discretion or only the amount. See supra ¶ 48. One may assume that part of the decision is 

being affirmed because remand is to determine the amount (supra ¶ 50). However, because the 

majority’s position is not totally clear, I address the argument raised.

¶ 93 A circuit court has the authority to impute income to a noncustodial parent if one of three 

situations exists: (1) he or she is voluntarily unemployed (2) he or she is attempting to evade a 

child support obligation or (3) he or she unreasonably failed to avail himself or herself of an 

employment opportunity. Gosney, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1077. The circuit court’s decision to 

impute income to a noncustodial parent is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.

¶ 94 Here, Michael’s first challenge to the income imputation fails. The circuit court found that 

Michael’s testimony was not credible regarding his attempts to secure employment post-ISP. 

The court also found that Michael had been attempting to evade his child support obligation. 

Michael has not alleged anything on this issue to show that the circuit court’s findings were 

erroneous. Accordingly, the circuit court unquestionably had the authority to impute income 

for Michael. See id.

¶ 95 Turning to Michael’s second prong, a review of Illinois case law reveals that the decision 

to impute income at a particular amount depends on the specific circumstances of the case. 

Courts have considered an individual’s past income when current income was uncertain. In re 

Marriage of Van Ness, 136 Ill. App. 3d 185, 190 (1985). When past income has fluctuated, 

courts have averaged past income to arrive at a certain amount. In re Marriage of Garrett, 336 

Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1025 (2003). Courts have also considered, inter alia, an individual’s 

education (In re Marriage of Evanoff, 2016 IL App (1st) 150017, ¶ 26 (involving the 

imputation of income for maintenance purposes)); an individual’s skills and experience (In re 

Marriage of Sweet, 316 Ill. App. 3d 101, 107 (2000)); the income of a new spouse (In re 
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Parentage of M.M., 2015 IL App (2d) 140772, ¶ 42 (involving the imputation of income for 

the purpose of contributing toward educational expenses)); and whether an individual’s 

financial circumstances had changed (In re Marriage of Pasquesi, 2015 IL App (1st) 133926, 

¶ 30 (affirming a circuit court’s ruling that upheld the status quo of paying child support at an 

income level of $60,000 when, even though the individual was still operating at a loss, his 

circumstances had actually improved because his losses had decreased now that he was 

self-employed)). 

¶ 96 In this case, unlike the majority, I would find that Michael’s alternative argument also fails. 

A review of the transcript from the circuit court’s ruling on December 2, 2014, reveals that the 

court did not impute income to Michael based solely on his monthly expenses. In pertinent 

part, the court stated: 

“During the hearing the Court heard various testimony again of the witnesses 

indicating that during the marriage the respondent, Mr. Liszka, had been the chief 

financial officer and chief executive officer of the marital business, ISP Painting, Inc., 

which was established again during the marriage created by both parties. At the time of 

this hearing it appears it was unrebutted that the respondent is still owner, part owner of 

ISP Painting. During the time that he worked for ISP he was in charge of the H-R 

department, accounting and marketing. He worked there for over 20 years.

 And as far as his educational background, he has a Bachelor’s in science and 

financing. He was placed on administrative leave in June of 2012 due to official 

misconduct and was during his period of administrative leave did in fact receive full 

compensation. He was paid his regularly salaried compensation of approximately 

$210,000.00 per year. That he received until the end of April 2014. Sometime again in 

June of 2014 he was officially terminated from ISP Painting. 

 At the time that the Court issued its decision in April of 2014 the judgment for 

dissolution of marriage was entered. It was contemplated that the respondent would 

require some time in which to become self-employed or obtain new employment, that 

he was given the six months additional time to do that. 

 The evidence was clear that the respondent as of the date of—of the first date of the 

hearing, September 4, was still unemployed—well, actually strike that. He was not 

working for any third party. According to his testimony he was in the process of trying 

to incorporate and start his own business, a new painting business, and the Court 

found his testimony to be incredible.

 He indicated that he had been spending months researching products, looking into 

incorporation, getting things set up. He indicated some difficulty in trying to 

incorporate, some problems with the name of the business all of which I found 

incredible based upon my own experience and knowledge of the Secretary of State 

incorporating the business. You can do that literally in one hour on line. That is not a 

month to month or two year process. It was clear from Mr. Liszka’s testimony that he 

firmly believes that the best use of his skills and time is to be an entrepreneur, and 

certainly if that’s what he wishes to pursue, he can pursue that understanding that he 

still has under the law an obligation, a continuing present obligation to support his 

children.

 * * *
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In his verified response to Ms. Liszka’s motion to set support and requesting a job 

search, he specifically denied the allegation that he was well able and capable of 

continuing or, I’m sorry, contributing to the support of the children. Then on his first 

day of testimony he again testified here in court to this Court that he was not able or 

capable of contributing to the support of the children to the full extent.

 Later on one of the subsequent days of the hearing he testified he was willing to pay 

child support but willing to pay based upon his very recent salary of $40,000.00. Again 

on the first day of hearing there was no salary set. He had no income coming in other 

than the income that he received through cashing in his 401K and other savings that he 

was using to maintain his standard of living which the Court finds was high.

After the judgment was entered he was still maintaining a rather high standard of 

living spending over $17,000.00 a month in living expenses, 10,500 of which was just 

in his living expenses, mortgage, rents, miscellaneous expenses, children’s expenses, 

credit cards and then $7,000 additional for attorney’s fees.

 At no time did I hear any evidence or see, hear any testimony to indicate that Mr. 

Liszka had done anything to further his education, so apparently he’s satisfied with his 

Bachelor’s. Given the 20 years experience that he has and the various things that he 

testified to, he had marketing and accounting, chief financial officer, chief executive 

officer, I believe that his skills said that he is very competent, is one in which he could 

have been able to find new employment at any time during the two and a half years that 

he was on administrative leave. 

Again I appreciate Mr. Liszka’s claim that during that two and a half years that he 

was on administrative leave he did not believe or at least he testified that he did not 

believe that he was free to work for another painting company because he felt that 

would be a breach of his fiduciary duty as owner of ISP Painting, however, again the 

evidence does not support that claim. The exhibit that was admitted that showed clearly 

when he was put on notice he was on administrative leave, he was specifically 

exempted from being barred from contacting potential competitors for this express 

purpose of seeking new employment. He chose not to do that. He chose 

apparently—again he just—he chose not to do any type of job search that I heard or am 

finding from this hearing.

 After the judgment was entered, and again he had the six months from January, he 

wants the Court to believe that it was reasonable and credible that it took him six 

months more than that because he didn’t have apparently his business incorporated 

until October 14 when he presented the corporate minutes, the initial minutes from his 

new company showing his as the sole president, the sole director, secretary and 

president of the new company, that it took him almost three years to get that company 

set up. And that I find again incredible given again he was very firm in his belief that 

the best use of his time was to be an entrepreneur, and so I can’t believe that as an 

entrepreneur during the two and a half years he would have sat idle and not been 

staying current on products and all the necessary things needed to start the new 

business. He should have had his business plan and everything all lined up and ready 

to go so that once that judgment was entered, he could have immediately hit the ground 

running. Again that’s giving him the best benefit—giving him the benefit of the doubt. 

 * * *
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 I find that the respondent is voluntarily unemployed, that he is in fact unwilling to 

pay the necessary support for his children, and I am going to impute income to him in 

the amount of $17,500.00 per month which is the amount that he was living off of and 

using.” (Emphases added.)

¶ 97 The majority, erroneously in my opinion, reads the court’s statement that “I am going to 

impute income to him in the amount of $17,500.00 per month which is the amount that he was 

living off of and using” in isolation. The court did not base its imputation solely on Michael’s 

stated monthly expenses. When the court’s statement is placed in its proper context, it is 

absolutely clear that in this long and complicated case, the court carefully considered all of the 

evidence presented. It specifically addressed Michael’s degrees in finance and business, his 

education, his entrepreneurial ability, his substantial and long-term professional experience in 

several different high-level capacities (including stints as CEO, as CFO, and in human 

resources and accounting) and the salary he was making at ISP, in addition to his claimed 

monthly expenses. As is evident from the cases cited above, these are factors that have been 

used by Illinois courts to determine the appropriate amount of income to impute. As shown in 

its oral ruling, the court did precisely what the majority has indicated above that it should do 

(supra ¶ 45). If a party is not making a good-faith effort to earn sufficient income (as the court 

found Michael was not), the court may set a support obligation at a level higher than the 

parent’s actual income as long as the award is appropriate based on the party’s skills and 

experience. Sweet, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 107. Also noteworthy here is the majority’s citation to 

Gosney3for the proposition that, “[i]t is well established that courts have the authority to 

compel parties to pay child support at a level commensurate with their earning potential.” 

(Emphasis added.) Gosney, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1077. The court’s oral ruling plainly, in my 

opinion, demonstrates compliance with these strictures. 

¶ 98 The majority’s additional requirement that there be opportunities for Michael to earn that 

wage in his geographic area appears to be derived solely from cases decided in New Jersey 

(Caplan, 864 A.2d at 1117) and Nebraska (Claborn, 673 N.W.2d at 540). Supra ¶ 45. 

Similarly, only a California decision (Berger, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 774) is cited as authority for 

foreclosing evidence that Michael once made $210,000, and presumably could again, as a 

sufficient basis for imputing income. Supra ¶ 47. No Illinois law is cited for these propositions. 

However, even if those cases are reflective of Illinois law, the entrepreneurial nature of the 

enterprise that provided Michael’s prior salary and the fact that he is attempting to set himself 

up once again in another, similar entrepreneurial painting business would seem to render such 

requirements and restrictions inapplicable to him. Quite simply, this record contains nothing to 

support a finding, based on Illinois law, that the circuit court abused its discretion when it 

imputed a yearly income of $210,000 to Michael, and I believe the majority’s ruling to the 

contrary is incorrect. 

 

3

I note separately that Gosney did not actually reach the challenge to the amount of income imputed 

to an individual. Rather, in Gosney, this court held that the circuit court abused its discretion, not 

because the imputed amount was incorrect but because none of the three situations in which a court has 

authority to impute income existed. Gosney, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1077-78. Gosney did not address the 

situation the instant case presents, namely, that at least one of the three situations existed such that the 

circuit court in fact had the authority to impute income and that the actual amount the court set is at 

issue. Thus, I question the propriety of the majority’s use of Gosney as stated in paragraphs 47 and 49, 

supra. 
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¶ 99 By way of postscript, I am also troubled by the majority’s statement that, “[w]ithout any 

evidence that Michael could earn that amount [$210,000] at another job based on his 

qualifications, the trial court erred in imputing that income to him.” Supra ¶ 49. Where does 

that evidence come from? Michael had earned that salary as the chief financial officer and as 

the chief executive officer of a private corporation valued at over $1 million. How could 

Kathleen obtain that type of private salary information from other private corporations? And, if 

Michael had access to such information, what would be his incentive to provide it to the court? 

While evidence regarding the salary one could make at a similar job for another company is 

relevant, and even necessary, in some cases, it is not necessary to the circuit court’s income 

imputation decision in the instant case. Michael is in the process of recreating the enterprise 

that he has demonstrated he had the education, vision, and business acumen to develop, along 

with the experience and additional skills to maintain and to command an annual salary of 

$210,000. It is neither unreasonable nor an abuse of discretion for the trial court to impute to 

him the ability to generate a similar income in such an enterprise. 

¶ 100 Lastly, I note that, in remanding this matter to the circuit court, the majority does not 

instruct the court to reconsider the entirety of the marital property distribution. The new 

valuation of ISP would surely impact the overall value and equitable distribution of the marital 

estate. 

¶ 101 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s rulings reversing the 

circuit court’s order barring the testimony of Michael’s valuation expert and imputing 

Michael’s income, and I concur in the affirmance of the other issues raised by Michael in this 

appeal. 

¶ 102 I further note that I would have granted the petition for rehearing filed by the petitioner, 

Kathleen Liszka.