IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 19 P A1 4 FILED 25 SEPTEMBER 2015 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. RANDY BENJAMIN BARTLETT

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 752 S.E.2d 2 37 (201 3 ), affirming an oral ruling rendered by Judge Abraham P. Jones on 18 December 2012 and a written order signed by Judge Orlando F. Hudson Jr. and entered on 22 February 2013, both in Super ior Court, Durham County. Hear d in the Supreme Court on 21 April 2015

. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph L. Hyde , Assistant Attorney General, for the State

- appellant

. Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by David W. Andrews , Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant

- appell ee .
MARTIN, Chief Justice.

When the s uperior c ourt conducts a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15 A

- 977 , only the judge who presides at the hearing may make findings of fact concerning the evidence presented

. When findings of fact are necessary to resolve a ma terial conflict in the evidence and the judge who presid es at the hearing does not make them , a new suppression hearing is required. In this case , a mat eri al conflict in the evidence arose from a disagreement between two expertS TATE V
. B ART LETT Opinion of the Court

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- witnesses , and a judge who did not hear the testimony of either expert resolved that conflict . Accordingly, a new suppression hearing is required

.
After the State c harged defendant with impaired driving in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20

- 138.1, defendant was found guilty in District Court, Durham County. Defendant appealed the judgment to the Superior Court, Durham County, where he also filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence obtain ed after his arrest

. In his motion , defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of his impairment to establish probable cause for the arrest. Defendant’s motion was heard before the Honorable Abraham P. Jones on 18 December 2012 . At the suppression hearing, the State called the arresting officer as its sole witness . A fter being qualified as an expert in field sobriety testing, the officer described defendant’s performance on a variety of field sobriety tests . The officer testified that , in his opinion, defendant’s performance indicated appreciable impairment. Defendant did not contradict the officer’s description of what happened during the field sobriety tests, but he did offer testimony from his own expert suggesting that defendant’s performance did not indicat e impairment. At the close of the hearing, Judge Jones orally granted defendant’s motion and asked counsel to prepare a written order reflecting his decision.

But Judge Jones was not able to si gn the proposed order before his te rm of office expired on 31 December 2012

. D efendant subsequently presented the proposedS TATE V
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- order to the Honorable Orlando F. Hudson Jr. , who was presiding at the 18 February
2013 c riminal s ession of the S uperior C ourt , Durham County

. Over the State’s objection, Judge Hudson signed the order granting defendant’s motion to suppress without hearing any evidence himself

. The order specifically found that defendant’s expert was credible, gave weight to the expert’s testimony, and used the expert’s testimon y to conclude that no probable cause existed to support defendant’s arrest.
The State appealed, contending that Judge Hudson was without authority to sign the order. T he Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to reach the State’s contention because the court considered the oral ruling by Judge Jones to be sufficient. State v. Bartlett , ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 752 S.E.2d 237, 239 (2013)

. Relying on the two

- part test that it had previously articulated in State v. Williams , 195 N.C. App. 554, 673 S.E.2d 3 94 (2009), the Court of Appeals observed that a trial
court must issue a written order “unless (1) the trial court provides its rationale from the bench, and (2) there are no material conflicts in the evidence at the suppression hearing.” Bartlett , ___ N. C. App. at ___, 752 S.E.2d at 239 (quoting Williams , 195 N.C. App

. at 555, 673 S.E.2d at 395). Applying this test, t he court determined that “there was no material conflict in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing ” because the evidence concerning defendant’s performance on the field sobriety tests was undisputed

. Id. at ___, 752 S.E.2d at 239. The court also stated that Judge Jones adequately “supplied the rationale for his ruling from the bench

. ” Id. at ___, 752 S.E.2d at 239. B ased on this application of Williams , the court affirmedS TATE V
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- the oral ruling rendered by Judge Jones. Id. at ___, 752 S.E.2d at 239. W e allowed discretionary review and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In determining whether evidence should be suppressed, the trial court “shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law which shall be included in the record.” N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 974(b) (2013); see also id

. § 15A

- 977(f) (2013) (“The judge must set forth in the record his findings of fact s and conclusions of law.”). A written determination setting forth the findings and conclusions is not necessary, but it is the be tter practice. State v. Oates , 366 N.C. 264, 268, 732 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2012). A lthough the statute’s direc tive is in the imperative form, only a m aterial conflict in the evidence

— one that potentially affect s the outcome of the suppression motion

— must be resolved by explicit factual findings that show the basis for the trial court’s ruling. State v. Salinas , 366 N.C. 119, 123

- 24, 729 S.E.2d 63, 66 (2012) ; State v. Ladd , 308 N.C. 272, 278, 302 S.E.2d 164, 168 (1983). W he n there is no conflict in the evidence, the trial court’s finding s can be i nferred from its decision. State v. Munsey , 342 N.C. 882, 885, 4 67 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1996). Thus, our case s require findings of fact only when there is a material conflict in the ev idence and allow the trial court to make these findings either orally or in writing. To the extent that cases such as Williams suggest otherwise , they are disavowed

.
At the su ppression hearing in this case, disagreement between two expert witnesses created a material conflict in the evidence . Although defendant did notS TATE V
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- dispute the officer’s testimony about what happened during the field sobriety tests, defendant’s expert sharply dis agreed with the officer ’s opinion on whether defendant’s performance indicated impairment. Expert opinion testimony is evidence, and the two expert opinions in this case differ ed from one another on a fact tha t is essential to the probable cause determination

— defendant’s apparent degree of impairment. Thus, a finding of fact, whether written or oral, w as required to resolve this conflict.
Here, Judge Jones made no such finding. Although he did attempt to explain his rationale for granting the motion, we cannot construe any of his statements as a definitive finding of fact that resolve d the material conflict in the evidence

. Without such a finding , there can be no meaningful appe llate review of the trial judge’s decision. See Salinas , 366 N.C. at 124, 729 S.E.2d at 66. Accordingly, t he oral ruling by Judge Jones d id not comply with N.C.G.S. §§ 15A

- 974 and 15A

- 977.

Because the oral ruling was inadequate , we now consider whether J udge Hudson had the authority to resolve the evidentiary conflict in his written order even though he did not conduct the suppression hearing. For the following reasons, w e conclude that Judge Hudson did not have this authority and that a new suppression hearing is required.

Section 15A

- 977 of the General Statutes prescribes the procedure that the

s uperior c ourt must follow to decide a motion to suppress evidence. Pursuant toS TATE V
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- subsection (d) of this statute , “[i]f the motion is not determined summarily the judge must make the determination after a hearing and finding of facts.” N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 977(d) (2013)

. Section 15A

- 977 contemplates that the same trial judge who hears the evidence must also find the facts

. The trial judge who presides
at a suppression hearing “sees the witnesses, observes their demeanor as they testify and by reason of his more favorable position, he is given the responsibility of discovering the truth

. ” State v. Smith , 278 N.C. 36, 41, 178 S.E.2d 597, 601 , cert. denied , 403 U.S. 934 , 91 S. Ct. 2266 (1971). For th is reason, our appellate courts treat findings of fact made by the trial court as “ conclusive on appeal if they are supported by the evidence. ” I d. at 41, 178 S.E.2d at 601 ; State v. Hughes , 353 N.C. 200, 207

- 08, 539 S.E.2d 625, 630

- 31 (2000); State v. Cooke , 306 N.C. 132, 134

- 35, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619

- 20 (1982). “The logic behind this approach is clear. In this setting, the trial judge is better able than we at the appellate level to gauge the

co mportment of the parties

. . . and to discern the sincerity of their responses to difficult questions.” In re Estate of Trogdon , 330 N.C. 143, 148, 409 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1991). But a trial court is in no better position than an appellate court to make fin dings of fact if it reviews only the cold, written record. See Smith , 278 N.C. at 41, 178 S.E.2d at 601. We therefore reject an interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 977 that would diminish the trial court’s institutional advantages in the fact

- finding proces s.

N otwithstanding the procedures set forth in s ection 15A

- 977, defendant contends that subsection 15A

- 1224(b) of the General Statutes permits Judge HudsonS TATE V
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- to sign an order on behalf of Judge Jones. Section 15A

- 1224 is part of the Criminal Procedure Act and is codified in Article 73, which is entitled “Criminal Jury Trial in Superior Court.” Subsection 15A

- 1224(b) allows a substitute judge to complete an ongoing criminal trial unless the substitute judge concludes that he cannot perform that function, in which case he must order a mistrial. N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 1224 (b) (2013). By its plain terms , subs ection 15A

- 1224(b) applies only to criminal trials, not suppression hearings

. Defendant’s contention that subs ectio n 15A

- 1224 (b) is dispositive of this matter is therefore without merit.
Accordingly, we hold that N.C.G.S. § 15A

- 977 requires the judge who presid es at the suppression hearing to make the findings of fact necessary to decid e the motion. In this case, t he testimon y of the experts at the suppression hearing created a material conflict in the evidence that the presiding judge did not resolve

. Although a second judge made the findings of fact necessary to resolve this conflict , he did so without hearing any evidence h imself. Under these circumstances , a new suppression hearing is required. We therefore reverse t he decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to that court for further remand consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.