[Cite as In re A.Y., 2022-Ohio-739.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

IN RE: A.Y. : 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NOS. C-210182 

 C-210183 

 C-210184 

TRIAL NOS. 20-1216 

 20-1217 

 20-3364 

 O P I N I O N.

 

Appeals From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court 

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 11, 2022 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex Scott Havlin, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, Joshua A. Thompson, 

Assistant Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, Assistant Public Defender, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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MYERS, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant A.Y. appeals the trial court’s judgments adjudicating him 

delinquent of aggravated robbery with accompanying firearm specifications, having a 

weapon while under a disability, and robbery. In three assignments of error, A.Y. 

argues that the trial court erred by considering testimony from a state’s witness that 

he had exercised his right to remain silent during police questioning and used that 

silence against him, that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that he 

possessed an operable firearm, and that his adjudications were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. We find A.Y.’s arguments to be without merit and affirm the 

trial court’s judgments. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶2} On February 24, 2020, a masked person entered Sam’s Corner Grocery 

and held owner Mohammad Karazon at gunpoint while demanding money. Karazon 

told responding officers that A.Y. was the masked gunman, and he identified A.Y. in 

a photographic lineup. 

{¶3} A.Y. was charged with several offenses related to this event. In the 

case numbered 20-1216, the state filed a complaint alleging that A.Y. was a 

delinquent child for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would have 

constituted the offense of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01. The 

complaint also contained two accompanying firearm specifications. In the case 

numbered 20-1217, the state filed a complaint alleging that A.Y. was a delinquent 

child for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted 

the offense of having a weapon while under a disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13. 
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And last, in the case numbered 20-3364, the state filed a complaint alleging that A.Y. 

was a delinquent child for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would 

have constituted the offense of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02. This complaint 

also contained an accompanying firearm specification. 

{¶4} At a trial before a juvenile court magistrate, Karazon testified that A.Y. 

entered the store, held the door open, pointed a gun at Karazon, and told Karazon to 

give him the money out of the cash register. As Karazon started to walk behind the 

counter, he retrieved his own weapon and fired at A.Y. The bullet struck a container 

of cheese dip, and the dip splattered on A.Y. and the surrounding areas of the store. 

A.Y. immediately fled from the store. The robbery was captured on the store’s 

surveillance cameras, and a video of the robbery was played during Karazon’s 

testimony. 

{¶5} Karazon called 911, and when the police responded he identified A.Y. 

as the person who had robbed the store. He recognized A.Y. because A.Y. and his 

brother had frequented the store for many years. Although A.Y. wore a mask during 

the robbery, Karazon testified that A.Y.’s eyes were not covered and were very 

notable. In addition to the mask, Karazon testified that A.Y. wore a vest and a gray 

shirt during the robbery. Karazon also identified A.Y. in a photographic lineup. 

{¶6} Karazon initially testified that A.Y. carried a gray handgun, but 

conceded on cross-examination that he told the 911 operator that the gun was black. 

Based on the gun’s appearance, Karazon “believed, a hundred percent” that A.Y. 

possessed a real gun. 

{¶7} Detective Charles Zopfi testified that he responded immediately to the 

store after receiving a broadcast about the robbery. Upon entering, he noticed a 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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yellow and orange substance on the floor, cooler cases, and counter. Detective Zopfi 

spoke with Karazon who told the detective that he could identify his assailant. Based 

on the information provided by Karazon, Detective Zopfi requested that a 

photographic lineup be prepared. He also obtained a search warrant for A.Y.’s home. 

{¶8} Detective Zopfi found a brown nylon vest lying on the front porch of 

A.Y.’s home that matched the vest worn by the suspect during the robbery. And in a 

bedroom, he recovered two light blue button-up long-sleeved shirts, a pair of black 

jeans, and a pair of tasseled slippers that all matched the type of clothing worn by the 

suspect during the robbery. One of the shirts had an orange or yellow stain on it in 

several locations. Detective Zopfi believed that the stains were consistent with the 

cheese dip that splattered during the robbery. 

{¶9} In another bedroom, officers recovered what appeared on first 

inspection to be a Glock handgun, but was later determined to be a lookalike BB or 

airsoft gun. Both the label on the gun and its weight were consistent with that of a 

real Glock handgun. Detective Zopfi testified that the barrel of the gun was also 

consistent with the size of a nine millimeter .240-caliber round, in contrast to most 

airsoft or BB guns, which have a much smaller tip. Officers discovered that the gun 

was a BB or airsoft gun once they took out the magazine and saw that it did not hold 

a bullet. Officers also found a Powerline Daisy BB gun, which resembled a Beretta 

style pistol, in a trunk in the living room. 

{¶10} No real firearms were found in the home. Detective Zopfi could not 

conclusively state that the airsoft gun he recovered was the gun used in the robbery, 

but he testified that it matched the physical characteristics of the gun depicted in the 

video. 
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{¶11} During his testimony, the state asked Detective Zopfi what steps he 

took after executing the search warrant. He stated that “I had attempted to question 

[A.Y.], but that was to no avail,” and “he basically just denied any involvement and 

then refused to answer any more questions.” 

{¶12} The magistrate adjudicated A.Y. delinquent of aggravated robbery and 

the accompanying firearm specifications, and she dismissed the offenses of having a 

weapon while under a disability and robbery. In her findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, the magistrate found with respect to the aggravated-robbery offense and the 

firearm specifications that: 

In this case, Det. Zopfi testified that he did not find a real firearm in 

Defendant’s house when he executed the search warrant. He did, 

however, find two aerosol or BB guns. Det. Zopfi testified that they 

both appear[ed] to be very real guns, and it was not until he inspected 

both guns up close that he realized they were not real. Det. Zopfi 

testified that Defendant did not make any statements to him about 

whether or not he was involved in this offense. As such, the Court 

cannot determine whether one of the BB guns found in Defendant’s 

house was the weapon used during the Robbery of Mr. Karazon’s store. 

The Court is therefore relying on the testimony of Mr. Karazon that he 

saw Defendant point what he believed to be a real gun at him and that 

Defendant used this gun to commit/facilitate the offense. The Court 

finds Mr. Karazon’s testimony credible. 

{¶13} With respect to the robbery offense, the magistrate found that it was 

based on the same set of facts as the aggravated-robbery charge, and she dismissed it 
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because A.Y. was adjudicated delinquent for aggravated robbery. The magistrate 

explained that she was dismissing the weapon-under-disability offense because the 

state failed to prove that A.Y. possessed a real firearm. 

{¶14} A.Y. filed objections challenging his adjudication for aggravated 

robbery and the firearm specifications. He argued that the state failed to prove both 

that he possessed an operable firearm and his identity as the perpetrator of the 

offense. He additionally argued that the magistrate violated his right to remain silent 

by using his failure to make a statement against him. The trial court overruled A.Y.’s 

objections. It found that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish that A.Y. 

was the perpetrator of the offense and that he possessed an operable firearm. With 

respect to the allegation that the magistrate used his right to remain silent against 

him, the trial court found that A.Y.’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated. It 

stated that “[t]he Magistrate admittedly used a poor word choice, but it did not 

appear from the Magistrate’s Decision that the Magistrate relied on Juvenile’s 

decision not to testify against him. The Magistrate appeared to simply be pointing 

out she may only rely on the evidence that was before her.” The trial court did not 

consider A.Y.’s silence or use it against him in adjudicating him delinquent. 

{¶15} The state also filed objections challenging the magistrate’s dismissal of 

the robbery and having-a-weapon-while-under-a-disability offenses. It argued that it 

had proved the offense of having a weapon while under a disability beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and that the magistrate erred in dismissing the robbery offense 

based on her determination that it was a lesser-included offense of the aggravatedrobbery offense. The trial court sustained the state’s objections. It held that the state 

proved the offense of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the offense should 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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not have been dismissed prior to adjudication, but rather merged with the 

aggravated-robbery offense at disposition. It further found that the state proved the 

elements of having a weapon while under a disability beyond a reasonable doubt. 

{¶16} A.Y. was sentenced for the offense of aggravated robbery and the 

firearm specifications. The offenses of having a weapon under a disability and 

robbery were merged at sentencing. A.Y. now appeals. 

Use of A.Y.’s Silence 

{¶17} In his first assignment of error, A.Y. argues that the trial court 

adjudicated him delinquent in violation of his due-process rights under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 

of the Ohio Constitution by considering Detective Zopfi’s testimony that he exercised 

his right to remain silent and by using that silence against him when determining 

whether he used an operable firearm in commission of the offense. 

{¶18} A violation of the Due Process Clause occurs when 

“through Miranda warnings, the state promises that an arrestee’s silence will not be 

used against him and then breaches that promise by later using his silence as either 

substantive evidence of guilt, or as impeachment evidence.” State v. Robinson, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton No. C-170147, 2019-Ohio-387, ¶ 3o. Similarly, use of a defendant’s 

prearrest, pre-Miranda silence and postarrest, post-Miranda silence as substantive 

evidence of guilt also results in a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, which provides that no person “shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Id. at ¶ 31. 

{¶19} In this case, Detective Zopfi testified that he had attempted to question 

A.Y. to no avail, and that A.Y. denied involvement and refused to answer any 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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additional questions. No objections were raised to this testimony. The magistrate 

twice referenced A.Y.’s refusal to speak to Detective Zopfi in her findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. When setting forth the facts of the case, the magistrate found 

that “Det. Zopfi attempted to interview Defendant, however, Defendant refused to 

make a statement.” A.Y.’s silence was again referenced in the magistrate’s discussion 

of the aggravated-robbery offense. The magistrate first generally noted that a 

defendant may mitigate a victim’s testimony that the defendant possessed what the 

victim believed to be a real firearm by admitting that the weapon used was a BB gun 

or other type of aerosol gun. The magistrate then applied that law to the facts of the 

case before her. She referenced Detective Zopfi’s testimony that he recovered two 

very realistic looking aerosol or BB guns in A.Y.’s home, that no real firearms were 

recovered, and that A.Y. made no statements about his involvement in this case. The 

magistrate then stated that she could not determine whether one of the BB guns 

found by Detective Zopfi was the weapon used in the offense, and that she was 

relying on Karazon’s credible testimony that A.Y. pointed what Karazon believed to 

be a real gun at him. 

{¶20} As set forth above, A.Y. filed objections with the trial court, contending 

that the magistrate violated his right to remain silent by using his failure to make a 

statement against him. While recognizing that the magistrate could have used a 

better word choice, the trial court found that the magistrate did not use A.Y.’s 

decision not to testify against him. We agree with the trial court. The magistrate’s 

language was arguably ill-advised. But the magistrate was not relying on A.Y.’s 

invocation of his right to remain silent as substantive evidence of guilt that he 

possessed an operable firearm. Rather, read in context, the magistrate’s comments 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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referenced the fact that although two BB or aerosol guns had been found in A.Y.’s 

home, there was no evidence that these were the weapons used in the robbery. 

Rather, there was only testimony that their appearance was similar. On the other 

hand, testimony from the victim established that he believed the weapon to be a real 

gun. 

{¶21} A.Y. was not adjudicated delinquent in violation of any of his dueprocess rights. The first assignment of error is overruled. 

Operability of Firearm 

{¶22} In his second assignment of error, A.Y. argues that the state failed to 

present sufficient evidence that he possessed an operable firearm. A.Y. argues that 

his adjudications for aggravated robbery, the accompany specifications, and having a 

weapon while under a disability must be reversed for this reason. 

{¶23} In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is 

whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶24} A.Y. was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated robbery in violation of 

R.C. 2911.01, which provides that “[n]o person, in attempting or committing a theft 

offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately 

after the attempt or offense, shall * * * [h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the 

offender’s person or under the offender’s control and either display the weapon, 

brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it.” The term deadly 

weapon is defined in R.C. 2923.11(A) as “any instrument, device, or thing capable of 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, 

carried, or used as a weapon.” 

{¶25} A.Y. was additionally found guilty of two firearm specifications for 

having a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the 

offense and for “display[ing] the firearm, brandish[ing] the firearm, indicat[ing] that 

[he] possessed the firearm, or us[ing] it to facilitate the offense.” R.C. 2941.145(A). 

The term firearm is defined in R.C. 2923.11(B)(1) as “any deadly weapon capable of 

expelling or propelling one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or 

combustible propellant. ‘Firearm’ includes an unloaded firearm, and any firearm 

that is inoperable but that can readily be rendered operable.” 

{¶26} And he was adjudicated delinquent for having a weapon while under a 

disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), which provides that “no person shall 

knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any firearm” if the person “has been 

adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by 

an adult, would have been a felony offense of violence.” 

{¶27} “[T]o establish both the firearm specification and the deadly-weapon 

element of aggravated robbery [when the weapon is a gun], the state must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender possessed an operable firearm.” State 

v. Brown, 2019-Ohio-3349, 141 N.E.3d 661, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.). Where a firearm is not 

recovered, this element may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. Such 

circumstantial evidence may include the representations and actions of the person 

with control of the firearm. R.C. 2923.11(B)(2). “A witness’s belief that the accused 

possessed a gun, coupled with evidence of the accused’s intent to create and use that 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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belief for his own criminal purpose, is sufficient to prove a firearm specification.” In 

re D.W., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-180644 and C-180654, 2020-Ohio-2707, ¶ 19. 

{¶28} In this case, Karazon testified that A.Y. entered the store, pointed a 

gun at him, and told Karazon to give him money. Based on the weapon’s appearance, 

Karazon “believed, a hundred percent, it was a real gun.” The weapon used during 

the robbery was not recovered. Detective Zopfi found a BB gun in A.Y.’s home that 

resembled the physical characteristics of the weapon used in the commission of the 

offense, but he could not conclusively say that it was, in fact, the actual gun used. 

{¶29} A.Y. argues that possession of the weapon was insufficient to establish 

that it was operable. But in this case, A.Y. did more than merely possess the weapon. 

He brandished the weapon, pointing it at Karazon while demanding money. Viewed 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution as we are required to do in an analysis 

of the sufficiency of the evidence, A.Y.’s actions, coupled with Karazon’s belief that 

the weapon was real, established sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact 

could find that the firearm was operable. See id. 

{¶30} This case is distinguishable from Brown, 2019-Ohio-3349, 141 N.E.3d 

661, a case in which we recently found that the state failed to establish that the 

defendant possessed an operable firearm during the commission of a robbery. In 

Brown, the offender entered a video game store with a bag over one of his hands. He 

extended the bagged arm like he was holding a weapon, instructed everyone in the 

store to get down on the ground, and demanded money. No witness saw an actual 

weapon, but Brown threatened to harm them and they believed that he possessed a 

gun. Id. at ¶ 13. But video surveillance evidence clearly indicating that there was no 

gun in the bag negated this circumstantial evidence. The video evidence showed the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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offender transferring the bag from one hand to the other. He also opened the bag 

and demanded that money be put into it. No weapon was ever seen in Brown’s hand 

or in the bag. Id. at ¶ 14. We held that there was not sufficient evidence to establish 

that Brown possessed an operable firearm. Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶31} Unlike Brown, the weapon in this case was brandished and pointed 

directly at the victim, who believed it was real. There was no question as to the 

presence of the weapon. 

{¶32} A.Y. further argues that he did not explicitly threaten to use the 

weapon. He argues that in the absence of an express threat, the state has failed to 

prove operability. We reject his argument that words are necessary for a threat to be 

explicit. A.Y. cites to State v. Green, 117 Ohio App.3d 644, 691 N.E.2d 316 (1st Dist.), 

State v. Jeffers, 143 Ohio App.3d 91, 757 N.E.2d 417 (1st Dist.), and State v. Obsaint, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060629, 2007-Ohio-2661, in support of his argument. All 

three of these cases, however, support a finding that there was sufficient evidence of 

operability. In Green, we found sufficient evidence that a defendant possessed a 

deadly weapon where the defendant, after entering a bank, approached a teller with 

an envelope wrapped around his hand, told the teller it was a stickup, and threatened 

to “blow your brains out.” Green at 651. In Jeffers, we held that the defendant’s act 

of threatening to blow the victim’s head off after demanding money was sufficient to 

establish that the defendant possessed an operable firearm. Jeffers at 94-95. And in 

Obsaint, we held that a note from the defendant to a bank teller stating that he had a 

gun and threatening to shoot the teller was sufficient circumstantial evidence to 

establish that the defendant possessed an operable firearm. Obsaint at ¶ 19. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶33} Contrary to A.Y.’s assertion, these cases do not support an argument 

that he did not possess an operable firearm. While A.Y. did not explicitly threaten 

verbally or in writing to shoot Karazon like the defendants in Green, Jeffers, and 

Obsaint, he pointed his weapon at Karazon and demanded money. In our view, his 

actions constituted an explicit threat. 

{¶34} Because A.Y.’s actions, coupled with Karazon’s belief that the weapon 

was real, established sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could find that 

the firearm was operable, we overrule the second assignment of error. 

Manifest Weight 

{¶35} In his third assignment of error, A.Y. argues that his adjudications 

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶36} When considering a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the court 

must examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the court clearly lost its way and created a manifest 

miscarriage of justice. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 

(1997). 

{¶37} A.Y. first argues that the weight of the evidence establishes that one of 

the BB or airsoft guns found in his home was the weapon used during the offense. 

He points out that the recovered BB or airsoft guns matched the gun used in the 

robbery and that the guns were found in the same house as clothing matching that 

worn by the offender. The trial court addressed this argument in its ruling on the 

parties’ objections, stating “[t]he magistrate also did not err by finding the discovery 

of two BB or airsoft guns in the home of Juvenile did not prove that one of those 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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guns was what Juvenile used in committing the offense. While Detective Zopfi said 

either BB or airsoft gun could have been the gun used, there was no evidence that 

either was the gun used. Particularly, neither gun was found in the room where the 

clothes were discovered.” 

{¶38} The trial court’s finding is supported by the weight of the evidence. 

The trial court was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and 

on this record we cannot find that it lost its way in resolving conflicts in the evidence 

and committed a manifest miscarriage of justice in determining that neither of the 

BB or airsoft guns found in A.Y.’s home was the weapon used during the robbery. 

{¶39} A.Y. also argues that the weight of the evidence did not establish that 

he was the perpetrator of the aggravated robbery. We are not persuaded. Karazon 

identified A.Y. as the offender when the police responded to the crime scene. He was 

familiar with A.Y., who had frequented his store for many years, and he recognized 

A.Y. even though he was wearing a mask, as A.Y.’s eyes remained visible. Karazon 

also identified A.Y. in a photographic lineup. Further, clothing matching that worn 

by the offender was recovered from A.Y.’s home. And the clothing contained a stain 

consistent with that caused by the cheese dip that splattered during the robbery. 

{¶40} A.Y. contends that the clothing found in his home could have been 

worn by his brother to commit the robbery, rather than by A.Y. But again, the trial 

court was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. State v. 

DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. It 

was entitled to believe Karazon’s testimony identifying A.Y. as the offender. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶41} A.Y.’s adjudications were not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. The third assignment of error is overruled, and the judgments of the trial 

court are, accordingly, affirmed. 

Judgments affirmed. 

BERGERON and WINKLER, JJ., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.