This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

39522

Vol. 63, No. 141

Thursday, July 23, 1998

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

RIN 3150–AF98

Reporting Requirements for Nuclear

Power Reactors

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed

rulemaking.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission is considering amending

the event reporting requirements for

nuclear power reactors: to update the

current rules, including reducing or

eliminating the reporting burden

associated with events of little or no

safety significance; and to better align

the rules with the NRC’s current needs,

including revising reporting

requirements based on importance to

risk and extending the required

reporting times consistent with the need

for prompt NRC action. This advance

notice of proposed rulemaking invites

public comment on issues related to

such an amendment.

The Commission is also interested in

evaluating other current regulations to

identify areas where reporting

requirements can be simplified and/or

modified to a less burdensome, more

risk-informed approach, and this

advance notice of proposed rulemaking

invites public comment on

identification of other reporting

requirements that are potential

candidates for such modification.

DATE: Submit comments by September

21, 1998. Comments received after this

date will be considered if it is practical

to do so, but the Commission is able to

assure consideration only for comments

received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: The

Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20055–0001, Attention:

Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff.

Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville

Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30

a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays.

Electronic comments may be provided

via the NRC’s interactive rulemaking

web site through the NRC home page

(http://www.nrc.gov). From the home

page, select ‘‘Rulemaking’’ from the tool

bar at the bottom of the page. The

interactive rulemaking website can then

be accessed by selecting ‘‘Rulemaking

Forum.’’ This site provides the ability to

upload comments as files (any format),

if your web browser supports that

function. For information about the

interactive rulemaking web site, contact

Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415–5905; email CAG@nrc.gov.

Certain documents related to this

rulemaking, including comments

received, may be examined at the NRC

Public Document Room, 2120 L Street

NW., (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

These same documents also may be

viewed and downloaded electronically

via the interactive rulemaking website

established by NRC for this rulemaking.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dennis P. Allison, Office for Analysis

and Evaluation of Operational Data,

Washington DC 20555–0001, telephone

(301) 415–6835, e-mail dpa@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Section 50.72 has been in effect, with

minor modifications, since 1983. Its

essential purpose is ‘‘* * * to provide

the Commission with immediate

reporting of twelve types of significant

events where immediate Commission

action to protect the public health and

safety may be required or where the

Commission needs timely and accurate

information to respond to heightened

public concern.’’ (48 FR 39039; August

29, 1983). Events defined in § 50.72 are

currently required to be reported, by

telephone, in the following time frames:

(1) Declaration of an emergency class

is reported immediately after

notification of appropriate State or local

agencies and not later than 1-hour after

declaration.

(2) Non-emergency, 1-hour events are

reported as soon as practical and in all

cases within 1 hour of occurrence.

(3) Non-emergency, 4-hour events are

reported as soon as practical and in all

cases within 4 hours of occurrence.

(4) Followup notification is made

immediately during the course of the

event for: further degradation in the

level of plant safety, other worsening

plant conditions, declaration of an

emergency class, changes in an

emergency class, termination of an

emergency class, results of ensuing

evaluations of plant conditions,

effectiveness of response or protective

measures taken, or information related

to plant behavior that is not understood.

Section 50.73 has also been in effect,

with minor modification, since 1983. Its

essential purpose is to identify ‘‘* * *

the types of reactor events and problems

that are believed to be significant and

useful to the NRC in its effort to identify

and resolve threats to public safety. It is

designed to provide the information

necessary for engineering studies of

operational anomalies and trends and

patterns analysis of operational

occurrences. The same information can

be used for other analytic procedures

that will aid in identifying accident

precursors.’’ (48 FR 33851; July 26,

1983). Events defined in § 50.73 are

reported, in writing, within 30 days of

discovery. Most of these events are

initially reported under § 50.72.

However, for two categories of events

the initial report is the 30-day LER.

These categories are: (1) Operation or

condition prohibited by the plant’s TS

and (2) failure of independent

components due to a common cause.

Experience has shown a need for

change in several areas. Specific

proposals under consideration are

discussed below.

State Input

Many States (Agreement States and

Non-Agreement States) have agreements

with power reactors to inform the States

of plant issues. State reporting

requirements are frequently triggered by

NRC reporting requirements.

Accordingly, the NRC seeks State input

on issues related to amending power

reactor reporting requirements.

Appropriate State agencies will be

requested by letter to provide comments

on this advance notice of proposed

rulemaking.

Specific NRC Proposals for Amending

10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73

Objectives: The objectives of

contemplated amendments would

include the following.

(1) To better align the reporting

requirements with the NRC’s current

reporting needs. Examples would
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 141 /Thursday, July 23, 1998 / Proposed Rules 39523

include: (a) extending the required

reporting times, consistent with the

need for timely NRC action and (b)

revising the reporting requirements

based on importance to risk, such as by

adding reports related to actuation of

systems that are risk-significant and

dropping reports related to actuation of

systems that are not risk-significant.

(2) To reduce the reporting burden,

consistent with the NRC’s reporting

needs. Examples include: (a) reducing

or eliminating the reporting burden

associated with events of little or no

safety significance, provided reporting

is not otherwise needed to support NRC

regulatory programs, and (b) simplifying

the reporting effort, such as by

redesigning the LER form to employ a

‘‘check the box’’ approach to the extent

feasible.

(3) To clarify the reporting

requirements where needed. The

principal example would be clarifying

which events involving design or

analysis defects or deviations must be

reported.

Issues and contemplated

amendments: The issues under

consideration and the contemplated

amendments include the following.

(1) Required initial reporting times. In

the contemplated amendments, the

required initial reporting times would

be as follows.

(a) Emergencies: Declaration of an

emergency class would continue to be

reported immediately after notification

of appropriate State or local agencies

and not later than 1-hour after

declaration. Emergency actions taken

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(x) would

continue to be reported as soon as

practical and in all cases within 1 hour

of occurrence.

(b) Follow up notifications: Follow up

notifications during the course of an

event would continue to be made

immediately.

(c) Loss of capability to perform safety

function: An event or condition that

could prevent fulfillment of the safety

function of a structure or system [as

described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and

50.73(a)(2)(v)] would be reported

promptly (e.g., within 8 hours) if the

plant is in a mode where the affected

structure or system is required to be

operable. Otherwise, the initial report

would be required in writing within 30

days. It should be noted that an event

or condition that could prevent

fulfillment of a safety function includes

design and analysis defects and

deviations. For example, if there is a

defect in an analysis and as a result of

that defect a system is not capable of

performing its specified safety

functions, that is a reportable event or

condition under this criterion. In

addition, reportable events or

conditions can result from factors such

as: personnel errors; procedure

violations; procedural errors; equipment

failures; inadequate maintenance; or

deficiencies in fabrication, construction

or equipment qualification.

(d) Partial loss of capability to

perform a safety function: An operation

or condition prohibited by the plant’s

TS [as described in 10 CFR

50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)] would continue to be

reported in writing within 30 days. It

should be noted that an operation or

condition prohibited by the plant’s TS

results from any operation or condition,

including a design or analysis defect or

deviation, that results in one train of a

multiple-train safety system being

incapable of performing its specified

safety function for a period of time

longer than allowed by the TS.

(e) No loss of capability to perform a

safety function: Conditions, including

design or analysis defects or deviations,

that do not result in a structure, system,

or train being incapable of performing

its specified safety function would no

longer be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72

and 50.73, unless they meet one of the

other reporting criteria discussed below.

However, other regulatory requirements

such as 10 CFR 50.59, 10 CFR 50.71(e),

or Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 may be

applicable.

(f) Other non-emergency events: Other

non-emergency events that are currently

reported in 1 hour would be reported in

8 hours, except for a condition outside

the coverage of procedures, which

would be deleted as discussed further in

Item (7) below. Thus, the remaining

events in this category, which would be

reported in 8 hours, are summarized as

follows:

(i) Initiation of shutdown (S/D)

required by (TS);

(ii) Serious degradation of plant

including its principal safety barriers;

(iii) Plant in unanalyzed condition,

significantly compromising plant safety;

(iv) External condition that poses an

actual threat or significantly hampers

site personnel in the performance of

duties necessary for safe operation of

the plant;

(v) Valid Emergency Core Cooling

System (ECCS) initiation signal that

results (or should have resulted) in

discharge to the reactor coolant system;

(vi) Internal event that poses an actual

threat or significantly hampers site

personnel in the performance of duties

necessary for safe operation of the plant;

and,

(vii) Major loss of capability for

emergency assessment, offsite response,

or communication.

Unplanned actuation of the reactor

protection system (RPS), which is

currently reported in 4 hours, would be

reported in 8 hours when the reactor is

critical. Otherwise, it would be reported

in writing within 30 days. Unplanned

actuation of an engineered safety feature

(ESF) other than the RPS, which is

currently reported in 4 hours, would be

reported in 8 hours if it resulted from (a)

intentional manual actuation or (b) a

valid signal (i.e., a signal in response to

actual plant conditions that warrant ESF

actuation). Otherwise, it would be

reported in writing within 30 days.

Other non-emergency events that are

currently reported in 4 hours would be

reported in 8 hours. These are

summarized as follows:

(i) Airborne radioactive release that

results in concentrations over 20 times

allowable levels in an unrestricted area;

(ii) Liquid effluent in excess of 20

times allowable concentrations released

to an unrestricted area;

(iii) Radioactively contaminated

person transported to an offsite medical

facility for treatment;

(iv) News release or other government

agency notification related to the health

and safety of the public or onsite

personnel, or protection of the

environment;

(v) Defect in a spent fuel storage cask

structure, system, or component which

is important to safety or significant

reduction in the effectiveness of a spent

fuel storage cask confinement system.

Failure of independent components

due to a common cause would continue

to be reportable in writing within 30

days.

(2) Clarification of requirement for

reporting an event or condition that

could prevent fulfillment of the safety

function of a structure or system. The

current rules require reporting ‘‘Any

event or condition that alone could have

prevented the fulfillment of the safety

function of structures or systems that

are needed to:

(A) Shut down the reactor and

maintain it in a safe shutdown

condition;

(B) Remove residual heat;

(C) Control the release of radioactive

material; or

(D) Mitigate the consequences of an

accident.’’ [Emphasis added.]

In the contemplated amendments, in

order to eliminate any potential for

misunderstanding the requirement, the

wording would be revised to require

reporting any event or condition that

alone or in combination with other

existing condition(s) could have

prevented the fulfillment of the safety

function of structures or systems that

are needed to * * *
39524 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 141 /Thursday, July 23, 1998 / Proposed Rules

(3) Reporting of design issues: In the

contemplated amendments there would

be no specific criterion to require

reporting conditions outside the design

basis of the plant. However, depending

on whether they result in loss or partial

loss of capability to perform a safety

function, design or analysis defects or

deviations would be reported as

discussed in Items (1)(c) and (1)(d)

above.

There has been some confusion and

controversy about the meaning of the

current requirement to report conditions

outside the design basis of the plant. For

instance, in one case the Final Safety

Analysis Report (FSAR) characterized a

building design basis as follows:

pressure relief panels will relieve at

about 45 psf in order to ensure that

building pressure does not exceed its

design pressure of 80 psf. When it was

found that the panels would not relieve

at 45 psf but would still relieve well

below 80 psf, controversy ensued

between the NRC staff and the licensee

regarding whether a report was

required.

Under the contemplated amendments,

the pressure relief panel example,

discussed above, would not be

reportable because the structure

(building that houses the potentially

affected safety systems) remains within

its design capabilities so that the

systems within the building would still

be capable of performing their specified

safety functions. The event would be

reportable if the pressure relief panels

would not prevent the building from

exceeding its design capabilities such

that the systems housed within the

building would not be considered

capable of performing their specified

safety functions because of potential

building collapse.

(4) Reporting of errors in and

corrections to ECCS analyses: Reporting

of errors in and corrections to ECCS

analyses would continue to be governed

by 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) when it

applies, as is currently the case. As

required by that section, failure to meet

the ECCS acceptance criteria (i.e., peak

clad temperature [PCT] greater than

2200 °F, excessive cladding oxidation,

etc.) would be reported pursuant to 10

CFR 50.72 (e.g., within 8 hours) and

50.73. Errors where PCT increases by

more than 50 °F but remains below 2200

°F would be reported in writing in 30

days. Lesser errors would be compiled

and reported annually.

(5) Reporting of information with a

significant implication for public health

and safety or common defense and

security: In connection with the

contemplated amendments, no changes

would be made with regard to the

requirement in 10 CFR 50.9(b) to report

‘‘* * * information identified by the

applicant or licensee as having for the

regulated activity a significant

implication for public health and safety

or common defense and security.’’

(6) Reporting of missed or late

equipment surveillance tests. Section

50.73 requires reporting a condition or

operation prohibited by the plant’s TS.

In some cases, this leads to reporting

events that consist of late surveillance

tests where the oversight is corrected

and the equipment is tested. These

events have proven to be of little or no

risk-significance when the equipment is

found to be functional or, alternately,

the requirements of the TS are

implemented (i.e., any applicable action

statements are carried out) and no

systematic breakdown of compliance

with the TS is involved.

In the contemplated amendments, the

reporting requirement would be

eliminated for events that consist of late

TS required surveillance tests where

there is no systematic breakdown of

compliance with the TS, the oversight is

corrected, the testing is performed, and

the equipment is still functional or,

alternately, the requirements of the TS

are implemented.

(7) Reporting of a condition outside

the coverage of procedures. The current

requirement is to report when the plant

is in ‘‘a condition not covered by the

plant’s operating and emergency

procedures.’’ Experience indicates that

this criterion does not result in needed

reports. In addition, this criterion is

redundant since the other reporting

criteria capture events of safety

significance.

In the contemplated amendments, the

requirement to report a condition

outside the coverage of procedures

would be deleted.

(8) Reporting of events that result in

actuation of an ESF. The current

requirement is to report ‘‘Any event or

condition that results in a manual or

automatic actuation of any Engineered

Safety Feature (ESF), including the

Reactor Protection System (RPS) except

when * * *.’’ This leads to confusion

and variability in reporting because

there are varying definitions of what

constitutes an ESF. It also leads to

reporting for systems of lesser risksignificance, such as reactor water clean

up system (RWCU) isolation.

In the contemplated amendments,

instead of using the term ESF, the rules

would specify the systems for which

reporting is required. Systems with

lesser risk-significance would be

dropped and systems with greater risksignificance would be added. The result

would be similar to the discussion in

the NRC staff’s reporting guidelines.

(See NUREG–1022, Revision 1, ‘‘Event

Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and

50.73,’’ January 1998, Page 60.) These

changes would result in the following

list:

(a) Reactor Protection System (reactor

scram, reactor trip).

(b) Engineered Safety Features

Actuation System (general actuation

signals affecting numerous components

such as: safety injection actuation

signal, containment isolation signal, or

recirculation actuation signal).

(c) Emergency Core Cooling Systems

(ECCS) for Pressurized Water Reactors

(PWRs) including: high-, intermediate-,

and low-head injection systems and the

low pressure injection function of

residual (decay) heat removal systems.

(d) ECCS for Boiling Water Reactors

(BWRs) including: high-and lowpressure core spray systems; highpressure coolant injection system,

feedwater coolant injection system, the

low pressure injection function of the

residual heat removal system; and

automatic depressurization system.

(e) BWR Isolation Condenser System

and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling

System.

(f) Containment Systems including:

containment and reactor vessel isolation

systems (general containment isolation

signals affecting numerous valves, main

steam isolation valve [MSIV] closure

signals in BWRs); and containment heat

removal and depressurization systems,

including the containment spray and

the fan cooler system.

(g) Electrical Systems including:

emergency ac electrical power systems,

including emergency diesel generators

(EDGs) and their associated support

systems; the hydroelectric facilities used

in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station;

safety related gas turbine generators;

BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs and

their associated support systems; and

station blackout diesel generators (and

black-start gas turbines that serve a

similar purpose and are started from the

control room and included in the plant’s

and emergency procedures).

(h) Anticipated Transient Without

Scram (ATWS) Mitigating Systems.

(i) PWR Auxiliary Feedwater Systems.

(j) Service Water (actuation of

standby, emergency service water

systems only).

(k) Reactor Building and Containment

Annulus Filter Systems.

(9) Shutdown events. The current rule

requires providing the ‘‘Status of

structures, components, or systems that

were inoperable at the start of the event

and that contributed to the event’’ and

‘‘An assessment of the safety

consequences and implications of the
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 141 /Thursday, July 23, 1998 / Proposed Rules 39525

event. This assessment must include the

availability of other systems or

components that could have performed

the same function as the components

and systems that failed during the

event.’’ In some cases, this does not

provide enough information to estimate

the risk associated with important

shutdown events.

In the contemplated amendments,

these requirements would be clarified to

better indicate information required on

the status of systems that are included

in the operating or emergency

procedures that could have been used in

recovering from the event to support

risk assessment of the event.

(10) Human performance. The current

rule requires reporting the following

information regarding human

performance as a part of the narrative

description of the event contained in the

written 30 day report:

‘‘(1) Operator actions that affected the

course of the event, including operator

errors, procedural deficiencies, or both,

that contributed to the event.

(2) For each personnel error, the

licensee shall discuss:

(i) Whether the error was a cognitive

error (e.g., failure to recognize the actual

plant condition, failure to realize which

systems should be functioning, failure

to recognize the true nature of the event)

or a procedural error;

(ii) Whether the error was contrary to

an approved procedure, was a direct

result of an error in an approved

procedure, or was associated with an

activity or task that was not covered by

an approved procedure;

(iii) Any unusual characteristics of the

work location (e.g., heat, noise) that

directly contributed to the error; and

(iv) The type of personnel involved

(i.e., contractor personnel, utilitylicensed operator, utility non-licensed

operator, other utility personnel).’’

Human performance information is

needed to support analysis of human

error probabilities used in risk

assessments. This helps in making riskinformed decisions regarding human

performance issues in areas such as

inspection program development,

evaluation of licensing actions,

preparation of generic communications

and resolution of generic issues.

Consistent with the advanced incident

reporting system of the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy

Agency (NEA) Committee on the Safety

of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the

International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), the contemplated amendments

would require information on how the

human performance factors listed below

affected the event to the extent they

apply. (See NEA/CSNI/R(97)15, PART I,

‘‘Improving Reporting and Coding of

Human and Organizational Factors in

Event Reports,’’ April 1998, Page 15 and

Page 16.)

(a) Personnel errors and human

performance related issues in the areas

of procedures, training, communication,

human engineering, management, and

supervision.

(b) In the area of procedures, errors

due to missing procedures, procedures

which are inadequate due to technical

or human factors deficiencies, or which

have not been maintained current.

(c) Training errors due to a failure to

provide training, having provided

inadequate training, or training (such as

simulator training or on-the-job training)

that does not provide an environment

comparable to that in the plant.

(d) Communications errors due to

inadequate, untimely, misunderstood,

or missing communication or due to the

quality of the communication

equipment.

(e) Human engineering issues related

to the interface or lack thereof between

the human and the machine (such as

size, shape, location, function or content

of displays, controls, equipment or

labels) as well as environmental issues

such as lighting, temperature, noise,

radiation and work area layout.

(f) Management errors due to

management expectations, corrective

actions, root cause determinations, or

audits which are inadequate, untimely

or missing.

(g) In the area of supervision, errors

due a lack of supervision, inadequate

supervision, job staffing, overtime,

scheduling and planning, work

practices (such as briefings, logs, work

packages, team work, decision making,

and housekeeping) or because of

inadequate verification, awareness or

self-checking.

(h) The department for which key

personnel work and the type of work or

activity being performed.

This information is already being

captured in the narrative section of most

LERs submitted under the current rule,

as discussed in the NRC staff’s reporting

guidelines. (See NUREG–1022, Revision

1, ‘‘Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR

50.72 and 50.73,’’ January 1998, Page

110.) The amended rule would

explicitly recognize the information

discussed in the guidelines.

In the amended rule, such human

performance information would be

provided using a ‘‘check the box’’

approach added to the LER form, to

minimize the reporting burden.

(11) LER form. The current LER form

relies heavily on a narrative to provide

information such as the human

performance information discussed

above, equipment that was not

available, and equipment that was

actuated. It appears that the reporting

effort could be reduced by adopting a

‘‘check the box’’ approach to the extent

practical. A narrative would still be

required to convey an understanding of

the event. However, data regarding

human and equipment performance, for

example, would be included in the

narrative only if they are pertinent to

understanding the event.

In conjunction with the contemplated

amendments, the LER form would be

redesigned to reduce the reporting

effort. To the extent practical, this

approach would be compatible with

equipment failure reporting in the

industry’s Equipment Performance and

Information Exchange (EPIX) program.

(12) Electronic reporting. The NRC

staff is currently planning to implement

an electronic reporting program, known

as the Agency-wide Document Access

and Management System (ADAMS), that

will in general provide for electronic

submittal of many types of reports,

including LERs. Accordingly, no

separate rulemaking effort to provide for

electronic submittal of LERs is

contemplated.

(13) Enforcement. Since the criteria

for reporting arising from this

rulemaking would focus on matters of

safety significance and be more risk

informed, the reporting criteria may be

a relevant consideration in determining

the severity level of a violation under

the Enforcement Policy. The staff

intends to consider the reporting criteria

in its ongoing review of the severity

levels in the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Contemplated Schedule: The

contemplated schedule for the

rulemaking is as follows:

• 8/21/98, Conduct public workshop

to discuss ANPR

• 9/18/98, Receive public comments

on ANPR

• 10/16/98, Provide proposed rule

package to NRC staff working group for

comment

• 11/27/98, Provide proposed rule

package to formal concurrence chain

• 1/8/99, Provide proposed rule

package to CRGR and ACRS

• 2/5/99, Complete briefing of CRGR

and ACRS

• 2/26/99, Provide proposed rule

package to Commission

• 4/2/99, Publish proposed rule

• 5/2/99, Initial public comments due

to OMB (with copies to NRC), 30 days

after publication

• 6/1/99, Receive OMB approval, 60

days after publication

• 6/15/99, Public comments due to

NRC, 75 days after publication
39526 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 141 /Thursday, July 23, 1998 / Proposed Rules

• 7/2/99, Provide final rule package

to NRC staff working group for comment

• 8/13/99, Provide final rule package

to formal concurrence chain

• 9/17/99, Provide final rule package

to CRGR and ACRS

• 11/5/99, Complete briefing of CRGR

and ACRS

• 11/26/99, Provide final rule package

to Commission

• 1/7/00, Publish final rule

Comments requested: The

Commission invites advice and

recommendations from all interested

persons regarding changes to the event

reporting requirements for nuclear

power reactors contained in 10 CFR

50.72 and 50.73. Comments and

supporting reasons are particularly

requested on:

(1) the objectives;

(2) the contemplated amendments,

including:

(a) the clarity and specificity of the

contemplated criteria for reporting

design and analysis defects and

deviations; and

(b) the proposed initial reporting time

of 8 hours for events that warrant

prompt telephone notification but do

not involve emergencies;

(3) the contemplated schedule.

To the extent feasible, commenters are

requested to address the following

factors.

(1) Identify a specific reporting

requirement.

(2) Describe the problem with that

requirement.

(3) Describe the proposed resolution.

(4) Estimate the change in resource

burden as a result of the proposed

resolution.

In order to support meaningful

consideration, comments on resource

burden should provide the basis for the

burden estimate in sufficient detail to

allow specific identification of what

causes the burden and how particular

changes might affect the burden.

Other Reactor Reporting Requirements

Objectives: The NRC is also interested

in evaluating other reactor reporting

rules (beyond 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73)

to identify areas where reporting

requirements can be risk-informed and/

or simplified. For example, the time

limit for reporting could be adjusted

based on the safety significance of the

event or issue and the need for NRC’s

immediate action. The burden

associated with reporting events,

conditions or issues with little or no

safety or risk significance should be

minimized.

Comments requested: Public

comments are requested to identify and

propose changes to other reactor

reporting requirements (beyond 10 CFR

50.72 and 50.73) that are potential

candidates for modifying to a

simplified, less burdensome, more riskinformed approach. This issue will be

included in the agenda for the public

meeting to discuss this ANPR, which is

identified in the schedule provided

above.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50

Antitrust, Classified information,

Criminal penalties, Fire protection,

Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear

power plants and reactors, Radiation

protection, Reactor siting criteria,

Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

The authority citation for this

document is: 42 U.S.C. 2201; 42 U.S.C.

5841.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day

of July, 1998

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

L. Joseph Callan,

Executive Director for Operations

[FR Doc. 98–19637 Filed 7–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 72

RIN 3150–AF93

Expand Applicability of Regulations to

Holders of, and Applicants for,

Certificates of Compliance and Their

Contractors and Subcontractors

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is proposing to

amend its regulations to expand the

applicability of its regulations to holders

of, and applicants for, Certificates of

Compliance and their contractors and

subcontractors. This amendment would

enhance the Commission’s ability to

take enforcement action against these

persons when legally binding

requirements are violated. The intent of

this action is to emphasize the safety

and regulatory significance associated

with violations of the regulations.

DATES: The comment period expires

October 6, 1998. Comments received

after this date will be considered if it is

practical to do so, but the Commission

is able to assure consideration only for

comments received on or before this

date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be sent to:

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, Attn: Rulemakings and

Adjudications Staff. Hand deliver

comments to 11555 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, MD, between 7:45 am and

4:15 pm on Federal workdays.

You may also provide comments via

the NRC’s interactive rulemaking web

site through the NRC’s home page

(http://www.nrc.gov). This site provides

the availability to upload comments as

files (any format) if your web browser

supports that function. For information

about the interactive rulemaking site,

contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415–

5905; e-mail CAG@nrc.gov.

Certain documents related to this

rulemaking, including comments

received by the NRC, may be examined

at the NRC Public Document Room,

2120 L Street NW., (Lower Level),

Washington, DC. These same documents

also may be viewed and downloaded

electronically via the interactive

rulemaking website established by NRC

for this rulemaking.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Anthony DiPalo, telephone (301) 415–

6191, e-mail, ajd@nrc.gov, or Philip

Brochman, telephone (301) 415–8592,

e-mail, pgb@nrc.gov, of the Office of

Nuclear Materials Safety and

Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The Commission’s regulations at 10

CFR Part 72 were originally established

to provide specific licenses for the

storage of spent nuclear fuel in an

independent spent fuel storage

installation (ISFSI) (45 FR 74693;

November 12, 1980). Later, Part 72 was

amended to include the storage of highlevel waste (HLW) at a monitored

retrieval storage (MRS) installation. In

1990, the Commission amended Part 72

to include a process for approving the

design of spent fuel storage casks by

issuance of a certificate of compliance

(Subpart L) and for granting a general

license to reactor licensees (Subpart K)

to use NRC-approved casks for storage

of spent nuclear fuel (55 FR 29181; July

18, 1990). In the past, the Commission

has noted performance problems with

holders of, and applicants for, a

certificate of compliance under Part 72.

When the NRC identifies a failure to

comply with Part 72 requirements by

these persons, the enforcement

sanctions available under the current

NRC Enforcement Policy have been

limited to administrative actions.