In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2799

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN MAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 00257 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.

ARGUED MARCH 5, 2014 — DECIDED APRIL 8, 2014

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit

Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. John May appeals his ten-year

sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, and challenges in particular the district court’s (1) assessment of an

adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for his aggravating role in

the offense and (2) refusal to award safety-valve relief. But

May’s large role in coordinating his co-conspirator’s activities
2 No. 13-2799

supportedthe court’s application of the § 3B1.1 adjustment and

disqualified him from the safety valve. We affirm. 

The following facts are undisputed. May and his cousin,

Valdemere Collier, sold crack cocaine to an FBI informant on

three occasions. Before the first sale, May instructed Collier to

deliver a sample of the cocaine to the informant and to tell the

informant the price for larger amounts. Three cocaine sales

then took place between December 2008 and March 2009. For

each sale, May and the informant discussed the quantity of

drugs to be sold and the price, and May told the informant to

pick up the cocaine at Collier’s house. May instructed Collier

to accept the informant’s payment and ensure that the informant took possession of the cocaine. According to the government at sentencing, during these transactions May waited in

another room or outside until each sale was complete. After

each sale Collier turned the money over to May, who then gave

Collier a share of the profits but kept a larger portion for

himself.

After his arrest, May pleaded guilty to conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine, see 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 846. The plea agreement noted that the parties

disagreed on whether May had acted as a supervisor warranting a two-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. With regard

to May’s eligibility for safety-valve relief under § 3553(f), the

agreement stipulated that May satisfied four of the five

requirements, but noted the parties’ disagreement over the

remaining element: whether May was an “organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor of others in the offense.”
No. 13-2799 3

In May’s presentence investigation report, the probation

officer recommended against imposing the § 3B1.1 adjustment

because May was only an “average participant” in the offense

and had involved Collier to “insulate himselffrom the transactions ... in the most minimal way,” as “more of an afterthought

than a calculated element of the offense scheme.” And because

May did not warrant the § 3B1.1 adjustment, the probation

officer reasoned, he qualified for the safety-valve reduction, see

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4), and should not be subject to the ten-year

statutory minimum, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The

presentence report recommended that the applicable sentencing guideline range was 70 to 87 months in prison.

At sentencing, the government argued for the § 3B1.1(c)

adjustment on grounds that May was an organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor. May was more culpable than Collier,

the government contended, because he had access to the

cocaine supply, negotiated the price and quantity, told Collier

what to do, and kept most of the sales’ profits. May countered

that he was collaborating with Collier, not supervising him,

and did not deserve the adjustment. Because he did not act as

a supervisor, May asserted, he satisfied the remaining element

for safety-valve relief and the district court could sentence him

without regard to the statutory minimum.

The district court accepted the government’s position that

May held a supervisory role in the offense and applied the

§ 3B1.1 adjustment. According to the court, May told Collier

what to do, decided whether and how much Collier was paid,

and tried to distance himself from the sales by using Collier to

handle the transactions. Without further explanation, the court

concluded that May did not qualify for the safety-valve
4 No. 13-2799

provision and therefore was subject to the ten-year statutory

minimum.

On appeal May first contends that the district court erred

by imposing the § 3B1.1 adjustment for playing an aggravating

role in the offense. He maintains that he and Collier were equal

partners and collaborated in the offense, and neither held a

higher position than the other. According to May the facts are

“equally consistent” with the view that he was not a supervisor.

May’s bald assertion about “equally consistent” facts is a

non-starter, given our deferential standard of review.

See United States v. Doe, 613 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2010). If two

possible conclusions can be drawn from the evidence, then the

choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States

v. Hatten-Lubick, 525 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2008). And the facts

here support the district court’s conclusion that May supervised Collier: May set the price and quantity, obtained the

cocaine from his supplier, instructed Collier to deliver a

sample and oversee the sales, and May distributed the proceeds from the sales, always keeping more for himself. See

United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2013)

(defendant gave drugs to co-conspirator, told co-conspirator

where to meet buyer, and co-conspiratorturned profits over to

defendant); United States v. Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir.

2012) (defendant paid and directed co-conspirator to obtain

and deliver drugs).

May next asserts that notwithstanding the § 3B1.1 adjustment, the court erred in determining that his supervision of

just one person disqualified him from safety-valve relief under
No. 13-2799 5

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4). He focuses on the reference in the safetyvalve provision to the plural “others”: a defendant is not

eligible for the safety valve if he was “an organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor of others.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4)

(emphasis added); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(4). May interprets this

provision to mean that the safety valve remains available to a

defendant who supervised only one person, and he supervised

only Collier.

But under the rules of construction for the United States

Code, “words importing the plural include the singular”

unless the context indicates otherwise. 1 U.S.C. § 1; see also

Rowland v. Calif. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council,

506 U.S. 194, 200–01 (1993) (courts may depart from § 1's

presumptive definitions to avoid “forcing a square peg into a

round hole”); United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 448 (7th

Cir. 2011). Further support for denying the safety valve to a

supervisor of a single person appears in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4),

which disqualifies a defendant from the safety valve if he was

a “supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the

sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4) (emphasis added).

The plain language of § 3553(f)(4) conditions safety-valve relief

on whether the defendant is characterized as a supervisor

anywhere in the guidelines, see id.; U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(4); Doe,

613 F.3d at 690, and the commentary to § 3B1.1 authorizes the

two-level adjustment as long the defendant supervised “one or

more” participants. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. (emphasis added);

see also United States v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 584 F.3d 726, 728–29

(7th Cir. 2009) (§ 3B1.1 adjustment for defendant’s supervision

of one co-conspirator foreclosed argument for safety-valve
6 No. 13-2799

relief). Because May properly received the two-level adjustment under § 3B1.1, he is not eligible for safety-valve relief.

AFFIRMED.