### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 4, 200 3 S es sio n



### STAT E O F T EN NE SSEE v. AN DRE W TH OMAS A ND

ANT HON Y B OND

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 00-03095 Joseph B. Dailey, Jud ge

No. W2001-02701-C CA-R 3-DD - F iled Fe bruary 27, 2004

De fe nd a nts An dr e w T ho ma s a ndAn tho ny B on d a pp e a l a s o f rig ht the ir

c on vic tio ns for th e fi rs t d e g r e e f e l o n y m u r d e r o f L o o m i s F ar g o e m p l o ye e , J a m e s D a y, d u r i n g t h e p e rp e t r a t i o n o f a r o b b e r y. Following a

s e p ar a te s e n te n c in g h e ar in g , th e ju r y f o u n d
, a s to e a c h d e f

e n d a n t, th a t th e p r oof supported one a g g ravating c ircumstance bey ond a re asonable doubt, that is, the defendant ha d been pr e vio us ly

c on vic te d of one or

mor e vio le nt f

e lon ie s. Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i )( 2) . With respe ct to Def

endant T h o mas, the jury further deter mined that the ag g ravating c ircumstance outweig hed any

mitigating circ umstances be y ond a rea sonable doubt, and se ntence d Def endant Thomas to death. As to De fendant B ond, the jury found that the ag g ravating c ircumstance did not outweig h the mitigating circ umstances a nd imposed a sentence of life without the possibilityof parole . The trial c ourt approve d the sent en cing verdic ts. I n this appeal a s of rig ht, Defe ndant Thomas ra ises the following issues for this Court’s revie w: (1) the suf ficienc y of the e vidence ; (2) whether the trial court erre d by

deny ing various pre-trial motions; (3) whether the trial court erre d by failing to continue the ca se af ter the e vents of S ep t ember 11, 2001; (4) whe ther the tria l court

err ed by excusing prospe ctive juror Panne ll for cause; (5) w hether the trial court erre d by

admitting photogr aphs of the vic tim; (6) whether the trial c o u rt err ed by

admitting items from De fenda nt’s prior fe dera l trial arising out of the robbe ry ; (7) whe ther t h e trial court err ed in re stricting the Def endant’ s impeachme nt of Ang ela Jackson; (8) whe ther the tria l court er red in failing to voir dire a prospe ctive witness re g arding her relationship with defe nse witness Russell Carpenter ; (9) whe ther the trial court err ed in s ustaining a n objection to the testimony of John Hibbl er; (10) whether the trial
court e rre d in pe rmitting testimony reg arding fing erprints de spite stipulation; (11) whether the trial

c ou rt e rr e d in the a dmi ssi on of e xpe rt te sti mon y ; ( 12 ) w he the r the tr ial c ou rt e rr e d b y fa ili ng to

c ha rg e le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s o f f e lon y mur de r; (1 3) wh e the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d by fa ili ng to char g e the jury with a n acc omplice instruction; ( 14) whether it wa s plain err or for the State to ref

er to Thomas and Bond as “Gree d and Evil ” in opening statement and closing arg ument; (15) whe ther the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in pe rm itt ing the Sta te to a rg ue that the jury

ha d a job to f indthe De fe nd a nts g uilty ; (16) whe ther the tria l court er red by not instructing on spe ci fi c mitigating fac tors; (17) whether the trial court erre d by

permitt i n g t h e S t ate to cr oss-examine the Def endant’ s mother reg arding disciplinary actions t aken ag ainst the Defenda nt while i n prison; (18) whe ther the ve rdict2

of the jury

was a g ains t t h e we i g ht of the evide nce; ( 19) whe ther the indictment fa iled to char g e a capital of fense ; (20) whe ther the de ath pena lty violates international tre aties ratified by the United States; (21) whe ther the Te nnessee death pe nalty scheme is unconstituti onal; and (22) whe ther the
sentenc e is proportionate . Def endant B ond raises the following issues: (1) whether it was e rror for the trial judg e to fa il to recuse h i m s el f fo r failure to follow L ocal Rule 4.01; (2) whether the trial
court e rre d by

overr uling B ond’s objection to the testimony of Dr. Smith; (3) whe ther the tria l court

err ed by decla ring Dr. Smit h an expert in fire arms identification; (4) whether the trial court erre d by permitting the prosec ution to e n g ag e in improper a rg ument; (5) whe ther the tria l court er red by pe rm itt ing the pr os e c uti onto e lic it t e sti mon y fr om A ng e la

Jac ks on re g ard ing he r atte nd a nc e a t tria l; and (6) whether the trial court err ed by failing to instruc t the jury as to lesser- included off

enses of felony murder. A fter revie w of the rec ord and the applicable law, we find no err ors of law requiring

reve rsal as to D efe ndant Thomas. Acc ording ly
, we aff irm the jury ’s verdic t f

indin g Def

endant Thomas g uiltyof first deg ree murder. Additionally
, we affirm the jury ’s impositi on of the sente nce of de a th as to D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s. Ho we ve r, wi th r e sp e c t to De fe nd a nt B on d, we are un able to conclude that the fa ilure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the lesser -included of fense s of felony murder was harmless bey ond a reasonable doubt. Acc ording ly , we va cate Def endant B ond’s conviction for f

elony murder a nd acc ompany ing se ntence of life without the possi b ilityof par ole. Wit h respe ct to Def

endant B ond, this matter is remande d to the trial court f or a ne w trial.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed as to De fend ant

Thom as ; R e ve r se d and R e m ande d as to De fend ant Bond

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J
., joined. J OE G. R I L EY , J., f ile d a n o pin ion c on c ur

ri ng in p art

a nddis se nti ng in p art

.

L orna S. M c Cl u s k y a n d H o w ar d M a n is
, M e mp h is
, T e n n e s s e e ( a t tria l a n d o n ap p e a l) , for the appellant, Anthony

Bond. Michae l E. Scholl and J eff ery Glatstein, Memphis, Tenne ssee (at trial), for the appe llant, Andrew Thomas. Rob e rt B ro ok s, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e (o n a pp e a l) , f or the app e llant, An dr e w T ho ma s.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt er; Al ic e B . L us tr e , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Amy Weirich and Jennifer Nic hols, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.3 

### OP INION

Guilt P hase Evid ence
On Monday , April 21, 1997, thirty -nine- y ear-old J ames Day , a g uard w ith L oomis Farg o, prepa red to g o to work. He instructe d his wife, F ay e, to g o to Sears that day and buy him a pair of work boots bec ause the boots were on sale. He then stated, “Now, y ou be a g ood littl e wife today ,” and lef t for wor k.

B e t t y G a y, a

c a s h i e r a t t h e W a l g r e e n s s t o r e l o c a t e d o n S u m m e r A v e n u e i n S h e l b y C o u n t y, went to the employ ee br eak r oom “[a] l ittle after 12:00 [noon]” to eat lunch. Upon re turning from lunch, Ms. Gay

rec og nized J ames Day “standing at the door wa iting for somebody

to open it up.” Ms. Gay clocke d back in to wor

k at 12:37 p.m., “g ot [ her] draw er,” and proce eded ba ck to the fr ont of the store

. M eanwhile, J ames Day visited the office , rec eived the store ’s deposits, and re turned to the front of the store. B eca use it was a Monday , the deposit included re ceipts fr om Saturday night and Sunday . The re ceipts for these two da y s, not including ch ec k s an d fo odstamps, totaled $18,843.01 in cash. W h en M r. Day was lea ving the store, Ms. Gay told him “Have a

g ood day .” Shortlythere afte r, Ms. Ga y hear d a g unshot. She “hollered a nd told them to call 911.” She then l o o k ed o u t o f t h e st o re an d s aw J am es Da y “l y i n g o n t h e co n cr et e, an d t h i s [ b l ac k ] m an wa s ru n n i n g, and he ha d a g un in his hand and a mone y bag in the other ha nd.”

Charles Young , the assistant manag er of the W algre ens store, r an outside the store and observe d J ames Day

“ly ing a lmost fa ce down. There was a puddle of blood on the ba ck coming out . . . behind him . . . .” Mr. Day was c onscious and aske d Mr. Young to “Call my wife.” Mr. Young ins tructed a

cashie r to retrieve a

blanket fr om inside the store for Mr. Day

. Mr. Day

rema ined

c og niza nt a ndc on tin ue d to talk to M r. Yo un g un til the a mbu la nc e arrive d. Mr . D a y su rv ive d h is de va sti ng inj ury

un til Oc tob e r 2 , 1 99 9, a

pe ri odof abo ut t wo a ndon e -h a lf

y e ars

.

Richard F isher, the owne r of Music Tow n, a near by business, was re turning from his lunch ho ur wh e n h e he ard the g un sh ot. Mr . F ish e r l oo ke d in the dir e c tio n o f the g un sh ot a ndsa w a wh ite

ca r “s p ee d ” in front of the Walgr eens a round the L oomis Farg o truck. T h e c ar c a m e w ith in approximately

four f eet of Mr. Fishe r, ena

bling him to g et a l o o k at the people inside the vehicle. Mr. Fishe r late r r e late d th a t th e c ar c o n ta in e d tw o b la c k ma le s ; h e s u b s e q u e n tl y id e n ti f ie d the passeng er a s Defe ndant Thomas.

Christ op he r S a ins , a

c omm e rc ia l drive r f

or the Coc a -C ola

Compa ny , mad e his de liv e ry to the S ummer Avenue W alg ree ns shortly befor e noon. Whil e unloading his delivery at the bac k dock

are a, Mr. Sains notice d that a “fa st-moving vehicle w as coming from ar ound inside of the Walg ree ns lot thr ou g h th e un de rp a ss to the ba c k .

. . are a wh e re I wa s. A f ou r- do or wh ite c ar .

. . abo ut t o lo se control. And I

saw two individuals in the car .” Mr. Sains th en o b s er v ed t wo African- Americ an males g et out of the white c ar a nd g et into a small red c ar. The m en headed north in the red car . The men left the w hite car

unattended.4

Gary Craig lived on Novar ese St ree t direc tly behind t he S ummer Avenue Walg ree ns store. Mr. Craig hear d the scre eching of bra kes outside his residenc e and w ent outside. He observe d a white ca r “pulling up this way , a re d car pulled in this way .” A “man g ot out of t he white c ar, r an over he re, la id [ back] in the front seat of the re d car

. They went bac kwar ds throug h the intersec tion of Tu tw ile r a ndNo va

re se a ndthe n w e nt u p T utw ile r g oin g that wa y .” Mr . Cra ig ide nti fi e d th e wh ite

car as a Pontiac B onneville and the r ed ca r as a Toy ota MR2.

The white Pontiac was ultimately towed for proce ssing. F inge rprints wer e “lifte d” fr om the vehicle. One of the fing erprints found on the Pontiac matched a fing erprint belonging to Defe ndant Anthony Bond. The car was identified as belong ing to Jack Wil son, a resident of t h e W es l ey Hig hland Towe rs, a r etireme nt home, at 400 South Highland. The vehicle had been reporte d stolen during the ea

rly morning hours of April 21, 1997.

Ang ela Jackson was D efe ndant Thomas’ g irlfriend. She te stified on beha l f o f the State at the tr ia l. In 1 99 7, Ms. Jac ks on re side d wi th her tw o c hil dr e n a t th e Pe nd le ton Pin e s A pa rt me nts

. De fe n d an tT h o m as wo u l d s o m et i m es s p en d t h e n i gh t t h er e, an d h e k ep ts o m e p er s o n al b el o n gi n gs at J ackson’ s apartment. Although De fenda nt Thomas did not own a ca r, Ms. J ackson drove a

red Suz uki Swift unti l it wa s repossesse d. Ms. J ackson r eca lled Def endant Thoma s’ desire for a car of his ow n. Al tho ug h T ho ma s w as une mpl oy e d, he ma de re mark s a bo ut b uy ing a

c ar. I n f

a c t, Def endant Thomas often commented to Ms. J ackson that he was g oing “to g et that money .” Such
comments wer e made while the couple was driving behind an a rmored tr uck.

On April 21, 1997, Ms. J ac k son was at he r re sidence beca use she wa s sick. Def

endant Th oma s w a s a lso a t he r a pa rt me nt. Th oma s le ft

the apar tm e nt b e tw e e n 8 :00 a .m. a nd8:3 0 a .m, telling Ms. Jackson that he wa s g oing to pick up A nthony Bond a nd that he would be right ba ck. Def e n d a n t T h o ma s le f

t d r iv in g Ja c k s o n ’ s r e d Su zu k i. D e f e n d a n t T h o ma s , a c c o mp anied by Def endant B ond, returne d to the apartment around noon. The two men w ere out of breath, and they appea red to be excited. When they enter ed the apartment, D efe ndant Bond unzipped his j acke t and some whi te enve lopes fell to the floor. Def endant Thoma s beg an opening the enve lopes and removing money . Def

endant Thoma s instructed Def endant Bond to “ g et rid of the g un.” Jackson the n no tic e d a “ sil ve r loo kin g ” g un on the fl oo r. De fe nd a nt T ho ma s in str uc te d M s. Jac ks on “ to b a ll the enve lopes up.” J ackson noticed that, in addition to the cash, the e nvelopes c ontained che cks and food stamps. Thomas and B ond split the m oney

. Def endant B ond took the g un with him when he l e f tt h e ap ar t m e n t

. A f

t e r B o n d l e f t , T h o m a s g a v e J a c k s o n h i s s h ar e o f t h e m o n e y.

Ms. J ackson te stified that s h e an d Def endant Thoma s then went to look for a car for D e f e n d a n t T h o ma s

. T h e c o u p le w e n t t o A u to A d d it io n s o n E lv is Pr e s le y B o u le v ar d. De fenda nt Thomas test drove a

hot pink box Chevy

. After Def endant Thomas drove it, the couple purc hased the car for $3,975.00 in ca sh. Be cause Thomas di d not have his lice nse, Ang ela Jackson’s name was place d on the bill of sale.

After purcha sing the new c ar a nd returning to J ackson’ s apartment, Defe ndant Thomas advised Jackson that they neede d to g o to a hotel. The c ouple, along with J ackson’ s children, we nt5

to a hotel on State L ine Road. On the news on television that evening , Ms. J ackson w atche d a re port that a g uard on an armored truck had been shot and wa s strug g ling f or his life. Def

endant Thoma s

rema rked that the newsc aster was “ly ing; that he did not strugg le for his life; he g rabbe d the nig g er by the throat a nd shot him.” The ne x t morning, Ms. Jackson returned to her apartment with her children.

Af te r l e a vin g An g e la Jac ks on ’s apa rt me nt, De fe nd a nt B on d, a c c omp a nie d b y Ke ith “ Ki Ki ” Echols, went to the r esidenc e of Tr eveous “ Tree Tree” Ga rrett sometim e af ter lunch. Bond’ s g irlfriend, Ta ny a Mong er, te stified that she noticed that Bond was i n a good mood, and he show ed Mong er some mone y

. The g roup went to the Southland Mall. At the mall, Defenda nt Bond ha nded “Tre eTre e” a nd Mong er some mone y

. D e f e n d a n tB o n d e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e m o n e y w a s “ d ru g m o n e y” and he did not wa nt to ge t robbed. He the n ma de nu me ro us pu rc ha se s, inc lud ing sh oe s f or him se lf and “KiKi,” “shorts sets,” and a ne cklac e. The ne cklac e cost approximately $1,100.00. The g roup then left the ma ll and drove dow n Elvis Pre sley Boule vard. Def

endant B ond saw a

white box C hevy at M cClain Motors and Bond instructed “KiKi” to pull over. Bond purcha sed the car with the money he ha d g ive n to Mo ng e r a nd“ Tr e e Tr e e ,” bu t a sk e d M on g e r t o p ut the c ar i n h e r n a me . T he ve hic le cost $4,800.00. B on d, Mo ng e r, “ Tr e e Tr e e ,” a nd “ Ki Ki ” the n p ro c e e de d to B on d’ s mo the r’ s h ou se so Bond c ould ge t more money

.

Af te r o bta ini ng mor e mon e y fr om a “ pil low ” a t hi s mothe r’ s ho us e , De fe nd a nt B on d a ndhis

c omp a nio ns pr oceeded to R a le ig h M a ll. Def endant B ond boug ht Monge r a pa ir of shoes. The foursome le ft the mall and got a room at t he Fairfie ld I nn on Sy camor e View . Def endant B ond and “KiKi” le ft the women at the room for a bout an hour. When they returne d, Bond took “ KiKi” and “Tre eTre e” to the Summer Motel.

T h e n ex tm o rn i n g, De fe n d an t Bo n d h ad a de n t i s t ap p o i n t m en t fo r t h e pu rp o s e of “ge t [ t i n g] some g olds,” that is, four g old teeth. B on d late r a sk e d Mo ng e r if sh e wo ulda lso lik e so me “ g old s” that spelled his name. Bond a nd Mong er spe nt the night of the 22 at the Summer Motel.

nd

On April 22, Ang ela Jackson opene d a saving s acc ount at First American Nat i o n al Bank. The a ccount ba lance as of April 22, 1997, was $2,401.48. By May 30, 1997, the ac count balanc e was 58 c ents. No fu rt

he r d e po sit s we re ma de

. On Ap ri l 24, 1 99 7, Da vidL itt le , th e ow ne r o f N orth Watkins P awn a nd J ewe lers, sold a Mossber g twelve- g aug e shotg un to Ang ela L avette Jackson. Def endant Thoma s had instructed Jackson to purcha se the shot gu n beca use they neede d it for protec tion. Defe ndant Thomas p u rc h ased w edding ring s for himself a nd Ms. J ackson. He a lso purcha sed a g old ne cklac e for himself. The c ouple married on May 7, 1997. Two months later the couple se parated and Ms. Jackson fi l ed for divorc e. During their sepa ration, De fenda nt Thomas

a d v i s e d M s

. J a c k s o n n o tt o g o t h e p o l i c e ab o u tt h e r o b b e r y.

Sometime during the following summer, Tany a Mong er and Def endant B ond wer e watching

an episode of “Cops,” when B ond rema rked tha t he had r obbed an a rmored tr uck. He late r re cante d, stating tha t he was just joking.6

Fr om the video surveillanc e tape rec orded by Walgr eens, the Memphis Poli ce D epartment

was a ble to produce sever al s till shots of the shooting of Mr. Day

. The video ta

pe re veale d that the g u n m a n ap p r o a c h e d M r

. D a y a n d e x t e n d e d h i s ar mp o i n t i n g d i r e c t l y t o w ar d t h e b a c k o f M r

. D a y. The tape also provided still photogr aphs showing Mr. Day falling to the g round afte r being shot, and the g unman taking something f rom Mr. Da y

and then r

unning a way

.

On November 5, 1997, Def endant Bond provided a statement to la w enfor cem en t o fficers in which he a dmitted to participating in the April 21, 1997, robbery of the L oomis Farg o armore d truck a t the Walgr eens store at 4522 Summer Avenue . Def endant B ond told the o ffice rs that the robbery had bee n planned “ the day befor e.” Def

endant Bond stated that the L oomis gua rd wa s shot in the head with a short-barre l chrome revolve r. He further stated that he w as not the shooter, r ather he wa s the dr ive r of the “ g e ta way c ar – a wh ite Pon tia c B on ne vil le fo ur -d oo r. ” De fe nd a nt B on d a lso admitted to rec eiving approximately half of the stolen money

.

To ny Ar vin , a n a ssi sta nt U nit e d St a te s Atto rn e y , tes tif ie d tha t A nth on y

B on d e nte re d a

g uil ty plea on Nove mber 4, 1998, to fe dera l char g es arising fr om the robbery of James Day

. During the g uiltyplea, Defe ndant B ond admitted that a fire arm wa s discharg ed during the cour se of the r obbery and that Mr. Day

had bee n seriously

wounded.

Also in November 1 9 9 8
, M r. Day (the victim) testified during f eder al proc eeding s arising from the r obbery . A transc ript of Mr. Da y ’s testimony was a dmitted at trial. Mr. Day had testified that he wa s employ ed as a g uard by L oomis Fa rg o in April 1997. He stated that he wore a dar k blue uniform, a g un belt and a bullet- proof ve st. Mr. Day also ca rried a g un. He re c a lle d th a t, o n A pr il 21, 1997, the Walgr eens store at 4522 Summer was on his route. He further reca lled arriving at the Walgr eens store at appr ox imately 12:30 p.m. Mr

. Day we nt i nto the sto re , p ro c e e de d to the c a sh office , retrie ved the de posit from the store manag er, and left. Upon e x iting the store , Mr. Day looked both w ay s befor e proce eding out of the store. Whe n h e we nt o ut the do or , “ [his ] le g s f e lt w e ak, so some way I fee l I had bee n shot, so I

started to g o on and try

to mak e i t t o t h e t ru ck
, b ut then I thought be tter bec ause it wa s an armored truc k. I didn’t want to fall on no truc k, so I just went down rig ht there.” Mr. Day was transporte d to the hospital w here he learned he had been shot in the bac k of his he ad. He never

hear d the g unshot nor did he see the g unman. As a re sult of the g unshot, Mr. Day lost the us e of his leg s and under went numer ous surg erie s. He wa s never ag ain able to wor

k.

At trial, Fay e Da y , the victim’s widow, explained that her husba nd J ames had been a g uard for L o o m i s Fa rgo Company

. Prior to April 21, 1997, J ames Day had bee n in excellent phy sical condition with the e x ception of a minor sinus problem. Mrs. Day rec alled that, on the da y

of the shooting, she completed her err ands and re turned home at approxim ately 1:00 p.m. At home, she

rec eived a

telephone c all from the e merg ency room at The Med advising that her husba nd had bee n sh ot. A f e w h ou rs a ft e r h e r a

rriva l a t th e tr a uma

un it
, Mrs

. Day

wa s to ld tha t he r h us ba ndwo uld have to have surg ery beca use fluid had built up. After the surg ery , J ames Day

was una ble to move his lower extremities. Mr. Day rema ined in the Med for thirty -eig ht day s

. Du ri n g his stay at the hospital, his “lungs kept collapsing . He ha d numerous surg erie s. He ha d pneumonia. The y trea ted him medically .”7

Upon being disc h ar ged from The Med, James Day was tra nsfer

red to He alth South, a

re ha bil itativ e ho sp ita l, b y a mbu la nc e . A c c or din g to M rs . D a y , h e r h us bandwa s u na ble a t th is t ime
to “do any thing for hi mself. He couldn’t walk. He c ouldn’t bathe himself. . . . Phy sically , J ames was like a

baby .” Mr. Day

was una b l e t o u s e t he bathr oom; he was for ced to we ar a diaper . He

rema ined at Hea lth South for thirty day s, during which time he unde rwe nt therapy

. The ther apy was

no t su c c e ssf

ul. Mr s. Day ha d to “c a th [he r] hus ba nd ” a nd us e su pp os ito ri e s a nde ne ma s d ur ing thi s time because of he r husband’ s bladder a nd bowel proble ms.

Mr . a ndMr s. Day

the n mo ved to S tu di o Pl us Ap art me nts in G e rm a nto wn , b e c a us e the ir home was not de signe d to acc ommodate Mr. Da y ’s phy sic a l d is abilities. Meanwhile, their home was be ing re no va te d to be ha nd ic ap-access ib le. A ft e r the y re tur ne d to the ir

ho me , M r. Day ’s wo rl d beca me re duced to one room in his home. T hat room wa s his livi ng room, bedroom, bathroom, and kitchen. Stripped of his role as husba nd and father, he beca me depr essed.

Mr. Day was under the supervision of four diff ere nt doctors, with whom he met at lea st once a month. I n late Se pte mbe r 19 99
, Dr . Sh e lto n, a ur olo g ist , in se rt e d a

“ le a ve -i n F ole y ,” a

ba g to collect urine, in a n attempt to a lleviate Mr. Day b ei n g wet. L ater that evening , Mr. Day

beg an

“ pa ssi ng blo od .” Ho we ve r, a c c or din g to Mr s. Day , it wa s “ no rm a l ro uti ne to pa ss a lit tle blo od ” wi th a “F oley .” This had oc curr ed bef ore a nd the doctor ha d advised Mrs. Day to “continue to give [Mr. Day ] fluid beca

use the more fluids y ou have the clea rer y our urine g ets.” Mrs. Day was “ conce rned beca use it se emed to be a little bit more [bl ood] t han norma l.” She immediately tried to contac t Dr. Shelton. Dr. Shelton was no longe r on duty
, but another phy sician advised her to “continue to g ive him plenty

of fluids, and it should clear up.” Howe v er , t h e b l o o d d id not clear up and Mrs. Da y made r epeated telephone calls to the doctors. Under the advice of t he doctor s, Mrs. Day continued to fee d Mr. Day

fluids, and the bleeding stopped at around 5:00 a .m. Howeve r, Mrs. Da y noticed that her husba nd was we aker than usual.

Dr. Shelton later c ontacted Mr s. Day and instructed he r to bring Mr. Day to the emer g ency room. She was una

ble to g et him into her vehicle , so she ca lled the ambulanc e ser vice f or assistance

. Mr. Day was pa ler than usua l and his blood pressure was low. Mrs. Day followed the a mbulance
t o M ethodi st Central. A tt h e e m e r g e n c y r o o m , s h e w a s i n f

o r m e d t h a tt h e d o c t o r s w o u l d h a v e to perf orm surg ery

beca use they found something abnorma l in Mr. Day ’s stomach. He was then pla ced on full life support. The surge ry reve aled that his “bladde r had burst, and sepsis had set in, and the first thing tha t went was his kidney s.” F ay e Day wa s i n fo rm ed that “it would jus t be a matter of time” befor e her

husband died. Hi s lung s start e d co lla ps ing , an d th e do c tor s “

jus t ke pt b ri ng ing him back.” Mr. Day

continued to wea

ken, and he finally

died on Octobe r 2, 1999.

On Octobe r 4, 1999, Dr. O .C. Sm ith, the medical ex aminer f or Shelby County , perf

ormed an autopsy

on J ames Day

. Dr. Smith testified that the ruli ng on this particular autopsy took longe r than usual bec ause of

the “c ircumstance s in w hich a pe rson re ceive d a g unshot wound to the back of the he ad about two a nd a half y ear s prior to the ir dy ing as a result of an infec tion f rom a ruptur ed bladder .” I n his final ruling , Dr. Smith opined that “Mr. Da y did, indeed, die a s a re sult of the8

infec tion from the rupture d bladder which could b e d i re ct l y rela ted bac k to his gunshot wound.” Acc ording ly , Dr. Smith determined that the “ manner of death” was a

“homicide.”

Dr

. S m i t h ’s ex am i n at i o n re v ea l ed t h at M r. Da y d i d n o t h av e an y “o l d o r b l i s t er ed o r h ea l i n g” bedsore s and the lac k of the pre sence of contra cture s in the muscles, joints and tendons indicated that “he w ould have [had] some sort of phy sical ac tivityapplied to his limbs.” Dr. Smit h located the scar resulting from the surg ery incident to the gunshot wound. I n rela tion to the scar on the ba ck of Mr

. Day ’s sc a lp, Dr . Smith , dur ing a n inte rn a l exam inatio n, fo un d a “ fo ur -b y -f

ou r- c e nti me te r d e fe c t in the occ ipital bone or the bone that’s rig ht in the back of the hea d . . . ; that are a showe d operative intervention.” An ex amination of the victim’s bra in reve aled that the c ere bellum, a portion of the brain, ha d suffe red da mag e in which tissue had be en destroy ed.

Th e e xami na tio n f

ur the r re ve a le d tha t Mr. Day ha d suf fe re d fr om he art

dis e a se in tha t a t le a st one of his corona

ry arte ries had about ni nety -per cent blockag e and the others had be tween f orty and ten percent blocka g e. Dr

. Smith op ine d that, du e to the e xten t of the blo c ka g e , th e c on dit ion c ou ld have e x isted prior to the g unshot wound. The color of Mr. Day ’s liver indica ted the pre sence of a fatty deposition. Also, the inflammation of the lining of t he cavity of the a bdomen was indicative of a condition know n as peritonitis. Of signific ance , howeve r, was the finding of a f our-c entimeter
tear in the victim’s bla dder that had been repa ired at surg ery

. Acc ording to Dr. Smith, t his finding was sig nificant be cause ,

in review ing both the autopsy finding s and the medical history
, it became clea r that Mr. Day had suff ere d the eff

ect of an over whelming infec tion of the body known as

se ps is w he re ba c te ri a

wi ll g e t in to the blo od str e a m a nd [be ] dis tr ibu te d .

. . e sse nti a lly throug hout the body

. When that c ondition occ urs, one trie s to the find the source of that infec tion, and Mr. Day ’s bladder was mar kedly distended. . . . It also showed the
te ar i n th e wa ll tha t ha d b othble e din g a nd the inf la mmatory

c ha ng e s c on sis te nt w ith the peritoniti s. There fore
, it’s logic al t o conclude that the rupture of the bladde r, . . . bec[a]me the source of an infe ction t h ro u gh o u t the body . . . . I t can be a very difficult proc ess to trea t and ca n certainly result in . . . death.

Dr. Smith continued,

[B]ecause of

Mr. Day ’s under ly ing c onditi o n o f h aving a neur og enic bladde r, he [was] very

susceptible to having a lar g e amount of ba cteria in his bladder. . . .

. . . A neur og enic bladde r is a condition in which a person has rec eived a n injury of the sp ina l c or d s o th a t t he ne rv e s th a t c on tr ol the abil ity of the bla dd e r t o e mpt y itself, either by rela x ing certain muscles and causing other muscles to c ontrac t - -that this process is no long er a coordina t ed fa s h ion. A person may have spa sms or a person may

have a very flac cid bladder , as a r esult of which, the pe rson no long er ha s bla dd e r c on tr ol.

. . .N ei t her of t he D ef endan t s was ch ar ged wi t h a r ob bery offens e i n t hi s ca s e. 1

9 [Mr. Day ] carrie d a diag nosis of neurog enic bladde r and loss of bowel control f rom the time that he suff

ere d his collapse following the g unshot wound to the head.

I n explaining the spinal-c ord injury , Dr. Smith ex plained:

Ba sically afte r Mr. Day rec eived the g unshot wound t o the head, there was a n

acc umulati o n o f

b lo o d in th e b a c k

o f th e h e a d w h ic h c a u s e d d a ma g e to the

c e re be llu m a nd pres sed on his - - the c e ntr a l po rt ion of his br a in w he re the br a in

e xits the sk

ull do wn the sp ina l c or d. As a re su lt o f tha t, h e wa sn ’t

able to c on tr ol h is blood pressure

.

. . . But when a person suffe rs a hypotensive episode, y ou don’t rea lly know the eff ects of that loss of blood pressure until they ’ve be en re suscitated a n d t he blood pressure comes back to normal. And at that point in time, y ou may find out that there had bee n, indeed, da mag e to portions of the centr al nervous sy stem, such of whic h is n ot u nc omm on fo r the sp ina l c or d to ha ve se le c te d a re a s o f d a ma g e a ft e r the los s of blood pressur e, and the person will t h en suff er the eff ects of that spinal-cord da ma g e ; in thi s c a se , lo ss o f b la dd e r a ndbo we l c on tr ol.

Dr. Smith commented that it was insignific ant that the g unshot wound did not penet ra t e t h e dura
, t h e m em b ra n e t h at s u rr o u n d s t h e b ra i n , b ec au s e i td i d p u s h t i s s u e f o rw ar d en o u gh t o ca u s e d am age to the cer ebellum and blood vesse ls. Dr. S mith conclude d that, if surg ery had not bee n perf

ormed on Mr. Day

on April 21, 1997, the day he wa s shot, Mr. Day

would have die d shortly

there afte r.

After closing arg uments, the jury retire d to delibera te on t he question of g uilt or innocence

a ndre turne d w ith a ver dic t f ind ing bo th D e fe nd a nts “ g uil ty of un la wf ull y a ndwi th the int e nt t o commit a robbery

killing J ames Day

during an attempt to per petra te robbe ry

as cha rg ed in the indictment.” 1

P enalty P hase Evid ence Th e Sta te pr e se nte d the te sti mon y of Joe War re n, a She lby Cou nty c ri min a l c ou rt

c le rk , to introduce the Def

endants’ prior convictions. The cler k’s files indicated that, on Dece mber 22, 1999, Anthony Bond w as convic ted in ind ic tm e n t 9 8

- 0 4 518 of ag g ravated robbe ry , in indictment 98-04520 of ag g ravated robbery , in indictment 98-04524 of ag g ravated robbery , and in indictment 98-04526 of ag g ravated robbe ry

. The files also ref lect a conviction entered J une 7, 1995, for De fenda nt Bond

ar i s i n g f r o mi n d i c t m e n t9 5

- 0 3 8 8 6 f o r a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y

. M r

. W arr e n e x p l a i n e d t h a t“ R a n d I” numbers, “r ec o rd and identification numbers,” ar e assig ned to per sons as they are arr ested. That number remains fore ver attached to that individual. Def endant B ond’s “R & I ” number is 219189. The “ R & I ” number

in case s 98-04518 throug h 98-04526 and 95- 03886 belong s to Def endant B ond. The indictments from these offe nses re veal that e ach c onviction involved a s epar ate victim and every offe nse involved the use of a handg un.10

The c lerk’s f

iles further

indicate that, on Septemb er 6, 1994, Def endant Thoma s was convicted in indictment 93-05155 o f agg ravated robbe ry , in indictment 93-05156 of ag g ravated robbery , in indictment 93-05157 of ag g ravated robbe ry , in indictment 93-051 5 8 of ag g ravated

ro bb e ry , in ind ic tme nt 9 3- 05 15 9 o f a g g ra va te d r ob be ry , in ind ic tme nt 9 3- 05 16 0 o f r ob bery , in indictment 93-05161 of ag g ravated robbe ry , and in indictment 93-05162 of ag g ravated robbery . The f i l e s f u r t h e r r e f l e c ta c o n v i c t i o n o n J a n u ar y 3 1
, 1 9 9 4
, i n i n d i c t m e n t9 3

- 0 9 2 6 7 o f a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. The indictments from these offe nses, with the exception of his conviction for simple robbe ry , reve al that eac h conviction involved the use of a handg un and involved sepa rate victims.

The victim’s widow
, Fa y e Da y , testified that, prior to the shooting on April 21, 1997, her husband worke d two jobs to supp o rt their fa mily

. Mrs. Day was una ble to work due to a lifethrea tening condition, thrombophlebitis. Mrs. Day ’s sole sourc es of income for he rself a nd the couple’ s six teen- y ear -old son, Cedric, a re her dis ability

benef its and the social sec urity

benef its that their son re ceive s as a r esult of Mr. Da y ’s death. Mrs. Day added that Cedric wor

ks at a f ast-food
restaur ant for a dditional income.

Mrs. Day expounded upon her re lationship with her husband:

Wel l, my hu sb a nd wa s my e ve rythi ng . H e wa s my

hu sb a nd , h e wa s my

be st friend, he was my

lover, he was my confida nt. When he g ot shot . . . it chang ed. He was not the same person. Our whole household c hang ed. .

. . I didn’t have a lover.

. . . I ha d to wa lk aro un d on c ott on be c a us e the le a st l itt le no ise wo uldjus t tu rn him into a fre nzy . So I

didn’t have tha t closeness – that hug g in g re l at ionship. Ididn’t have that person in my

life at a ll for those thirty

months that he survived[.]

Re g ard ing the vic tim ’s so n, Ce dr ic
, Mr s. Day state d th a t Ce dr ic wa s ju st t we lve y e ars oldwh e n h is fathe r wa s shot. The two used to ride motorcy cles toge ther and g o out to brea kfast toge ther. There

wer e no more fathe r-son da y s. Presently , Cedric ha s much “a ng er” over his fa ther’s de ath.

I n mitigation, Def

endant Bond called Memphis Police Offic er Chad Golden. Officer Golden

rea d Def endant B ond’s confe ssion in which he admitted participa tion as the driver in the robbery

of the L oo mis F arg o g ua

rdou tsi de of

the W algree ns sto re on Ap ri l 21 , 1 99 7. I n th e state me nt, De fendant Bond implicated D efe ndant Thomas as the shooter. A d d it io n a ll y , D e f e n d a n t B ond discussed the planning of the robbery

. Specifica lly , Bond state d that the robbe ry of an a rmored tr uck was De fenda nt Thomas’ i dea. He further admitted that he “g ot the [whit e] car f rom Poplar Plaza.” Def endant B ond described the eve nts of April 21:

Monday , [Defenda nt Thomas] came to pick me up

. . . in a li ttle red c ar tha t belong ed to his girlfriend, Ang ie. Th e n I g ot the sto le n c ar fr om Jac ks on a nd Ti llm a n a nd dr ov e it t o Wa lg re e ns

. We both got in t he st olen car, and we left the red car around the corne r fr om Wal g re e ns

.11 Then a [n] armore d truck pull ed up in front of Walgr eens. [Def

endant Thomas] got out and shot him – the g uard. [Def endant Thoma s] got the money and g ot b a c k in the c ar, a ndwe dr ov e aro un d th e c or ne r a ndsw itc he d c ars

. We drove to his g irlfriend’ s house . . . . W e went in the house and split the

mon e y up . I c a lle d a ri de a ndle ft

.

Bond de nied knowing of Thomas’ intent to shoot the g uard.

As sis ta nt U nit e d St a te s A tto rn e y To ny Ar vin te sti fi e d that De fe nd a nt B on d e nte re d a g uil ty p l e a i n 1 9 9 8 t o t h e r o b b e r y o f J a m e s D a y. Bond c oopera ted with fede ral authorities and testified ag ainst Defe ndant Thomas in his fede ral trial. At Def endant B ond’s sentenc ing hearing in fede ral court, Defenda nt Bond was provided the opportuni ty to addre ss the vi ctim and his wife. Def endant Bond a pologized to the victim, J ames Day , and ac cepte d responsibilityfor his ac tions.

J udy Sandlin, Defe ndant B ond’s fifth g rade teac her, r eca lled that Def endant B ond was “ a p l ea s an t y oung man and ba sically obedient.” Sh e s tate d th a t s h e c o u ld n o t r e me mb e r h im be ing disrespec tful or being a proble m.

Tommie Bond, Defe ndant Bond’s mother, st ated that she has alway s worke d, even w hen her son was in eleme ntary

school. This me ant that her pa rents would take him to and from school. She testified that Def

endant B ond was born in 1978; nine months later she bore a daug hter. The two children a re c lose and Mrs. B ond is close to her children. She ref lected that Defe ndant B ond was alway s obedient, until he was a bout seventee n or e i gh t ee n y ear s old. At ag e eig hteen, De fenda nt Bond “ g ot in trou b l e” and “g ot locked up.” H e wa s sent to prison in Tiptonvi lle. Whil e he w as imp ri so ne d, Mr s. B on d v isi te d h e r s on e ve ry vis iti ng da y . Sh e a lso a dmi tte d th a t he r s on fa ile d to finish hig h school. Whil e in prison, Def endant B ond did earn his GED. Mrs. Bond te stified that he r son no w re a lize s tha t he i s in “ se ri ou s tr ou ble .” She state d th a t “ he do n’ t w a nt n o p art of thi s. This is not a life for him.”

Shareda Pury ear , Def

endant B ond’s s i s t er , t estified that she a nd her br other ha d differ ent fathe rs. Until she was ten, he r father li ved with them, and then “his daddy ” lived with them. She stated that her brother was a norma l kid, but unti l the seventh g rade , he “didn’ t talk very much, and [oth e rs tho ug ht] h e wa s li ke g e e ky or so me thi ng .” Eve ntu a lly , D e fe nd a nt B on d ma de a c omp le te “turna round. He went fr om being quiet . . . to just l ike wild. . . .” On one oc casion, Ms. Pury ear saw he r brother

with “some white stuff. H e wa s putting in his nose.” De fenda nt Bo n d told her, “You know what this is, g irl. Ge t aw ay fr o m me.” Ms. Pury ear stated that De fenda nt Bond wa s

never close to his own fa ther, but they did have a

fat her- son relationship. She stated that, eve n tho ug h h e r b ro the r w a s in pr iso n, sh e sti ll m a int a ine d a re la tio ns hip wi th h im.

For his mit igation proof, Defe ndant Thom as re called Joe Warre n. Mr. Warre n explained that another Andre w Thomas, with a birthda te of 1949, a lso had multipl e criminal convictions.12

Def endant Thoma s’ brother , Andre Ba rber , testified that his biologica l fathe r i s Andrew L ee Thomas, Sr. He f

urther e x plained that Willi am B arbe r is his step-father. Prior to his brother being inc arc e rate d, An dr e sh are d a g oo d re la tio ns hip wi th De fe nd a nt Th oma s. He state d th a t he lov e s h is br oth e r, a ndthat D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s w a s “ a ll I g ot. ” Hea dd e d th a t he didno t kn ow the wh e re abo uts of his fathe r. The two brothers ma intain contact a nd talk about their mother’ s health and A ndre’ s school. Andre aver

red that Def

endant Thomas was the only man he had to look up to in his life. Furthermore , Def

endant Thoma s advises him not to do wrong

.

Luella B arbe r, De fenda nt Thomas’ mother, state d that Def endant Thomas was born in 1973. She testified that, when D efe ndant Thom as was born, hi s fathe r was only around f or about a y ear

. For about twelve y ear s, Mrs. Ba rber and De fe ndant Thomas lived with her mother-in-la w. De fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ fa

the r w a s in a nd ou t of jai l, b ut h e e ve ntu a lly c a me ba c k. Th e re la tio ns hip did not work betwe en the two a dults and they ended up separ ating due to his abusive beha vior. During thi s ti me pe ri od , M rs . B arb e r be c a me pr e g na nt with he r s e c on d c hil d, An dr e . Wh ile pr e g na nt, Mr s. Ba rber was phy sically

abused by

her husba nd and De fenda nt T h o m as wi tnessed the a buse. Def endant Thoma s’ fa ther a lso abused drug s. Shortlyafter h er s ep aration, Mrs. Ba rber met her second husba nd, Wil liam Ba rber . Thomas, howeve r, re mained upset that his re al fa t h er was not around.

Mrs. Ba rber obtained a job with the United States Postal Service and thing s looked g ood for a while. Then, she discovere d that Wil liam Ba rber was invol ved in drug s. Mrs. Ba rber lost her job. She wa s f or c e d to app ly fo r p ub lic a ssi sta nc e , in c lud ing fo odsta mps . M r. B arb e r b e g a n p hy sic a lly

abu sin g he r. Mr . B arb e r b e g a n g e tti ng arr e ste d a ndDe fe nd a nt T ho ma s w a s f or c e d to a ssu me the ro le of the man of

the house.

Mrs. Ba rber admitted that Def

endant Thomas started g etting in trouble when he was fourteen y ear s old. He was first ar rested f or stealing and then he stopped g oing to sc hool. Thomas’ mother acknow ledg ed that Thomas ha d a son, Devonte, and that Thomas loved his son. She also stated that De f e n d a n t T h o ma s h a d e ar n e d h is G E D th e la s t ti me h e w a s in ja il

. A d d it io n a ll y , h e e ar n ed a

certificate f

or “r esidential plumber he lper” while i ncar cer ated at Tiptonvill e. Mrs. B arbe r stated that Def endant Thoma s still play ed a big part in their da ily lives even thoug h he wa s incarc erated.

On cr oss-examination, Mrs. Bar ber ve rified that De fenda nt Thomas was last re lease d from prison on Fe bruary

24, 1997. The robbery and shooting of James Day occur red two months later

on April 21, 1997.

Al a c ia B old e n, the mother of D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ so n, te sti fi e d th a t th e ir so n, De vo nte , is

e ig ht y e ars olda ndis a n h on or ro ll s tud e nt at Grah amw oo d E le me nta ry . D e vo nte c on tin ue s to maintain a close rela tionship wit h his father

. Ms. B old e n a ve rr e d th a t sh e be lie ve d th a t e ve ry c hil d needs both a

mother and fathe r even if the father is in prison. She added that Defe ndant Thomas wa s a g ood fathe r to their son.13

Def endant Thoma s’ cousin, Stephanie Williams, testi fied that she a nd her c ousin maintained a close rela tionship. She state d th a t sh e lov e d D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s a ndsh e do e s n ot “ wa nt t o s e e him die.” Ta mara

Wee ks , a no ther co us in of Th oma s, te sti fi e d th a t sh e a ndhe r c ou sin we re on ly six months apart in ag e and have alway s maintained a close relationship. Ms. Weeks stated t hat her son is thre e months older that Def endant Thoma s’ son. She further acknow ledg ed that her cousin was prese ntly serving a life s en t en ce i n fede ral prison a nd he would neve r be c oming home a g ain. No tw ith sta nd ing
, Ms. Wee ks ma int a ine d th a t D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s r e ma ine d a n impo rt a nt m a le ro le model in his son’s life.

At the close of

the proof, the jury

was inst ru ct ed o n the following statutory ag g ravating

c ir c ums ta nc e :

Th e de fe nd a nts , A nthonyM. B on d a ndAn dr e w L . T ho ma s, we re pr e vio us ly convicted of

one (1) or more f

elonies, other tha n the pre s en t char g e, the statutory elements of w hich involve the use of violence to t he per son. The state is re ly ing upon the crimes of Agg ravated R obbery and R obbery
, which are fe lonies involving the use of violenc e to the per son.
See g ener ally

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 2). As to D e f e n d a n tB o n d
, t h e j u r y

w a s a l so ins truc te d th a t it

sh ou ld c on sid e r a s mi tig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s:
(1) Any testimony

that he wa s a loving child. (2 ) A n y t es t i m o n y

h e w as a l o v i n g s i b l i n g. (3 ) Any test imo ny

re g ard ing lov ing re latio ns hip s w ith g ra nd pa re nts a ndfa mil y

me mbe rs

. (4) Any testimony

showing that he wa s respe ctful to adults in childhood. (5) Any testimony

showing no known sig nificant issues until ag e 15. (6 ) A ny te sti mon y

sh ow ing la c k o f b on din g wi th p os iti ve ma le fi g ur e s. (7) Any testimony

showing immaturity

. (8 ) A ny te sti mon y

sh ow ing that he is e a sil y inf lue nc e d a ndle d b y

old e r p e e rs

. (9) Any testimony

showing no criminal convic tion committ ed alone

. (10) Any testimony

of a history

of substance abuse. (11) Any testimony

showing a lac k of a f

ormal educ ation. (12) Any testimony

showing he obtained a

GED while inc arc erated. (1 3) An y te sti mon y

he c oo pe rate d w ith a uth or iti e s. (1 4) An y te sti mon y

re g ard ing apo log y

e xpre sse d in F e de ra l Co urt. (1 5) An y te sti mon y

re g ard ing pr oo f that sh ow s that he ha s f a mil y me mbe rs that w ill provide him with love and support while in prison.

Wit h reg ard to De fenda nt Thomas, the trial court instructed the jury t o consider a s miti g ating

c ir c ums ta nc e s:14

(1) Whether

he wa s the product of

a dy sfunctional fa milysubject to abuse. ( 2 ) A n y h i s t o r y o f

f a m i l y i n s t ab i l i t y. (3) Any proof of abandonme nt by

a sig nificant fa milymember. (4 ) A ny e vid e nc e to s ho w tha t on e [of ] his pa re nts wa s a n a

bu se r o f d ru g s. (5 ) A ny dif fi c ult y wi th p are nts ’ d ivo rc e or

se pa ratio n o f p are nts

. (6 ) A ny a c tiv e re la tio ns hip that he ma y ha ve wi th h is c hil d a lth ou g h in ja il. (7) Any proof that shows that he has family members that will provide him with love and support while in prison. (8) Any proof that, a lthough he is in jail, he provi d es l ove and support to other

m e m b e r s o f

h i s f a m i l y. (9) Any positive relationship that he had w ith other adults and childre n. (10) Any other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidenc e produc ed by either the pr os e c uti on or

de fe ns e a t e ith e r the g uil t or se nte nc ing he ari ng ; th a t is , y ou sh a ll consider an yaspec t of the def endant’ s char acte r or r ecor d, or any aspec t of the circ ums t an ce s of the off

ense f avora ble to the def

endant whic h is supported by the evidenc e.

After deliberations, the jury

found that the State ha d proven t he ag g ravating c ircumstance (i)(2) , the def

endant wa s previously

convicted of one or more viol ent felonies other than the prese nt char g e, as to both De fe ndants. The jury further found, with reg ard to De fenda nt Bond, that the

a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e didno t ou tw e ig h a ny mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tan c e s b e y o n d a r e a s on able do ub t. I n acc ordanc e with this verdict, the jury sentenc ed De fenda nt Bond to a se ntence of life without the possibili ty

of par ole. Wit h re gard to Defenda nt Thomas, the jury found that the a g g ravating circ umstance did outwe igh any mitigating circ umstances bey ond a rea sonable doubt. I n acc ordanc e with this verdict, the jury sentenc ed De fenda nt Thomas to death for the murder

of James Day

.

Issues Raised b y Defendan t Thom as I. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence Def endant Thoma s asserts that the trial court erre d by failing to gr ant a motion for a direc ted
verdic t and judgment of acquittal following t he conclusion of t he S tate’s proof and at the end of the trial. The duty

of the trial judg e and the revie wing court on the de term i n at i o n of a motion for a judgme nt o f a c q u it ta l is th e s a me a s o n a mo ti o n f o r a d ir e c te d v e r d ic t. Se e St a te v

. T o rr ey , 880 S.W .2d 710, 712 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). This Court has obser ved that “[t]he standard by which the trial court de termines a motion for judgme nt of acquittal at the end of all the proof is, in esse nce, the same standa

rd which a

pplies on appea l in determining the suffic i en cyof the e vidence afte r a conviction.” State v. Thompson

, 88 S.W .3d 611, 614-15 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Moreove r, “[a] motion for a

judgme nt of ac quittal made at the c onclusion of the proof by the state is waive d when th e defe nd a nt e le c ts t o p re se nt e vid e nc e on his ow n b e ha lf .” Sta te v. B a ll

, 973 S.W .2d 288, 292 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 8 ). Ac co rd i n gl y , we wi l l ad d re s s t h e D ef en d an t ’s co m p l ai n t s as a c h al l en ge to the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence

.15

When a n acc used challeng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, the standa rd is whether , afte r

re vie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to the pr os e c uti on , a ny ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a rea sonable doubt. See J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. C t. 2781, 2789 (1979). I n its review of the evidenc e, an appellate court

mus t af ford the State “the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence as we ll as all rea sonable a nd leg itimate infere nces tha t may be dra wn there from.” Sta te v. Tu g g le

, 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Que stions conc erning the cre dibilit y of the witnesses, the weig ht a nd value to be g iven the

e vid e nc e , a s w e ll a s a ll f

a c tua l is su e s r a ise d b y

the e vid e nc e , ar e re so lve d b y the tr ie r o f f

a c t, n ot this court. See Sta te v. Mo rris

, 24 S.W. 3d78 8, 79 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . M or e ov e r, we no te that a g uil ty verdic t can be based upon direc t e vidence
, circ umstantial e vidence , or a c ombination of direct a nd circ umstantial evidence . See Sta te v. Pe nd e rg ra ss , 13 S.W .3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). F urthe rm or e , w hil e a

g uil ty ve rd ic t ma y

re su lt f ro m pu re ly

c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e , in or de r t o sustain the conviction the fa cts and c ircumstance s of the offe nse “must be so strong and cog ent as to exclude every

other re asonable hypothesis save the g uilt of the defe ndan t , an d that bey ond a

rea sonable doubt.” State v. Cra wford

, 470 S.W .2d 610, 612 (Tenn. 1971)

.

To obtain a c onviction for first de g ree felony murder, the State must p ro v e the “killing of another committed in the perpe tration of or attempt to pe rpetrate any first deg ree murder, a rson, ra pe, robbery , burg lar y , t h eft, kidnapping , ag g ravated child abuse , ag g ravated child neg lect or a ircra ft pirac y [.] ” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(a) (1997). In this case, the pr oof at trial e stablished that the victim, J ames Day , was shot in the back of the head during the commission of a robbe ry . The proof f urther e stablished that the injuries sustained by th e v i ctim as a dire ct re sult of the g unshot wound ultimately led t o the vi ctim’s death. There fore
, the crime of first deg ree felony murder w as established.

Def endant Thoma s’ cha lleng e to the sufficiency of t he evidence is three -fold. He asserts that (1 ) A ng e la

Jac ks on ’s te sti mon y

e sta bli sh ing the ide nti ty of

De fe nd a nt T ho ma s a s th e pe rp e tr a tor is not reliable; (2) the discre pancy in the testimony of the State’s medical experts as to the sourceof bacte ria whic h eventua lly cause d the death of the victim cre ates a rea sonable doubt as to the

causation of the victim’s death; and (3) witness Richard Fisher identified Bond a nd then Thomas
as t he pa s s e n g e r

in th e g e ta w a y

v e h ic le

. We w il l a d d r e s s th e f ir s t a n d th ir d o f

th e s e a s s e r ti ons toge ther, a nd then turn to Def endant Thoma s’ contention re g arding causation.

A. I dentifica tion of Defe ndant Thomas as the perpe trator

I dentifica tion of a def

endant a s the person w ho committed the offe nse for which he or she is on trial is a question of fac t for the jury ’s determination upon consideration of a ll competent proof. See State v. Strickland

, 8 8 5 S. W. 2 d 8 5
, 8 7 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 1 9 9 3 )

. T h is Co u r t mu s t a f f ord the State of Tenne ssee the strong est leg itimate vie w of the e vidence contained in the r ecor d, as we ll as all rea sonable inferenc es which may be drawn from the evidenc e. See State v. E vans , 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992). Be cause a verdict of guilt ag ainst a defenda nt remove s the presumption of16

innocenc e and r aises a pr esumption of g uilt, the convicted criminal defenda nt bear s the burden of showing that the evidenc e wa s leg ally insufficient to sustain a g uiltyverdic t. See id.

De fe nd a nt B on d a dmi tte d th a t he a nd a no the r p e rs on too k p art in the ro bb e ry

of the L oo mis Fa rg o truck a nd that J ames Day was shot during the robbe ry . I t is undisput ed that a c ar, ma tching the desc ription o f a vehic le belong ing to De fenda nt Thomas’ ex-wife, A ng ela Jackson, was se en parke d a short distance from the crime scene and that Def endant Thomas and another person we re observe d g etting into the ve hicle and driving a way

. I t is undisputed that Def endant Thoma s, who

wa s u n em p l o y ed at t h e t i m e, p u rc h as ed a v eh i cl e, j ew el ry , a s h o t gu n , cl o t h i n g, an d o p en ed a s av i n gs

acc ount within forty -eig ht hours of the robbe ry o f t he L oomis Farg o car rier. A ng ela Jackson identified her

ex-husband in stil ls t aken from the surve illance tape of the shooting . Ms. J ackson rela ted t h at , while watc hing a news re port on the robbe ry , Def endant Thoma s remar

ked that he “g rabbe d the nig g er by

the throat a nd shot him.”

Def endant Thoma s points to Ms. J ackson’ s testimonythat he and D efe ndant B ond returne d to her re sidence betwee n noon and 12:30 p.m. on the day of the robbe ry . Howeve r, the State prove d that Mr. Day was robbed and shot be tween 12:30 a nd 1:00 p.m. Thus, he arg ues, the same testimony identify ing him as the perpe trator a lso makes it “ fac tually impossibl e” f

or him to have c ommitt ed the crime. We are not convince d. Any discrepa ncy in Ms. J ackson’ s testimony rela ting to her report of the time that De fenda nt Thomas and Defenda nt Bond arrive d at her apartment with the proce eds from the r obbery

and the a ctual time of the r obbery is not fa t al to the identifica tion of Defe ndant Th oma s a s th e pe rp e tr a tor . T he c ho ic e of wh ic h wi tne sse s to be lie ve a ndwh ic h to dis be lie ve is a

ma tte r e ntr

us te d to the jury . Se e B oli n v . St a te , 405 S.W .2d 768, 771 (1966). F urthermor e, the jury is free to believe portions of a witness’ testimony and to disbelieve othe r portions. See Wilson v. Sta te , 574 S.W .2d 52, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) . Additionally , Ms. J ackson’ s testimonyas to the events immediately

following the robbe ry

wer e cor roborated by

other witnesse s.

Moreove r, while it is true that Mr. Fisher initially identified Defenda nt Bond a s the person he obser ved in the passe ng er side of the white getaway

car , Mr. Fishe r, upon re quest, ree x amined both defe ndants and c hang ed his identification to Def endant Thoma s. D e f

e n d an t T h o ma s c h a ll e n g ed the identifica tion on cross-e x amination. The jury was pre sent during the identifica tion and then the

re -i de nti fi c a tio n. Th e jury wa s in the be st p os iti on to det erm ine the c re dib ili ty of thi s w itn e ss. Moreove r, the identity

of the shooter

versus the driver is irre levant, conside ring the theory of criminal re sponsibili ty , for purposes of determining guilt of the off ense of felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 402. I rre g ardle ss of this identification, ther e was ample evide nce f rom which any rational trier

of fa ct could conc lude, bey ond a re asonable doubt, that Def endant Thoma s was g uiltyof first deg ree felony murder c ommitt ed during the perpetration of a robbery

. This issue has

no me ri t.17 B . Caus e of

vic tim ’s de a th
Def endant Thoma s claims that discrepa ncies be tween the testi m o n y of Drs. Smith and Gar dner m an d ate a reve rsal of his convic tion for fe lony murder. B oth Drs. Smith and Gardne r conclude d that the vi ctim died from sepsis due to a ruptur e of the bladder resulting from a g unshot wound to the hea d. The a lleg ed discre pancy in their testimony

arises in their disparate opinions as
t o h o w t h e b a c t e r i a

t h a tr e s u l t e d i n s e p s i s w a s i n t r o d u c e d t o t h e v i c t i m ’ s b o d y.

Dr. O.C. Smit h testified that he had no opinion as to whe re the bacte ria c ame f rom and that there wer e seve ral potential sourc es for the bacte ria. Dr . Smit h surmised that the bac teria le ading
to the i nfec tion could have exis ted prior to the rupture of the bladde r, could ha ve bee n a re sult of the

c a the te ri zat ion , o r c ou ld h a ve be e n th e re su lt o f a n in fe c tio n o f the ur ina ry tr act near th e sk in opening

. Howeve r, Dr. Smith concluded that the “neur og enic bladde r and . . . the fac t that he has problems with b l adder

control . . . combined w ith the require ment for c atheterization . . . predispose[d] [the vic tim]

. . . to ha ve a high risk of colonization and an incre ased risk of infec tion.” Dr

. C y n t h i a

G ar d n e r , D r

. S m i t h ’ s a s s i s t a n t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t“ [i ]t

p r o b ab l y w a s –I w o u l d s a y

w i th ninety -nine pe rce nt certainty , the bac teria w as introduce d into the bladder throug h cathe terization.” De fe nd a nt T ho ma s c on te nd s that thi s “ dis c re pa nc y ” ra ise s su ff ic ie nt d ou bt a s to the c a us e of de a th of the victim. We disag ree

.

Both doc tors testified as to the injuries sustained by t h e v i ct i m when he was shot and the impact of the injuries upon the victim d u ri n g t he interve ning pe riod until his death. Any alleg ed “con flict” a s to the source of the ba cteria is insignifica nt. From the te stimonyof both medica l examiners, it appear s to this C ourt that the infec tion would not have occ urre d but for the victim’s medical condition dir ectly cause d by the shooting of the victim on April 21, 1997. That i s , t he
uncontra dicted medica l testimonyestablished that the victim ev en tually died as a

result of the g un sh ot w ou ndinf

lic te d d ur ing the ro bb e ry . Ac c or din g ly , the e vid e nc e of c a us a tio n is suf fi c ie nt t o support the ver dict of g uilt and this i ssue is without merit.

II. P r e tr ial M ot ion s A. Motion to charg e jury with presumption of sentenc ing De fe nd a nt T ho ma s a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in re fu sin g to c ha

rg e the jury that it m us t presume tha t a li f

e s e n te n c e w o u ld b e s e r v e d o r th a t th e d e a th p e n a lt y w o u ld b e c arr ie d o u t. He

a rg ue s tha t a

b s e n ts u c h a n i n s t ru c t i o n t h e r e i s a “ s u b s t a n t i a l p r o b ab i l i t y ” t h a tj u r o r s w o u ld imp ro pe rl y

sp e c ulate on the c on se qu e nc e s o f the ir ve rd ic t.

This is not a novel issue. Our supreme court has held that the af ter-e ffe ct of a

verdic t is not

a proper consideration for the jury . See State v. Pay ne , 791 S.W .2d 10, 21 (Tenn.1990) , aff ’d

, 501 U. S. 8 08 , 1 11 S. Ct . 2 59 7 ( 19 91 ). Th e c ou rt ha s ru le d that it is no t e rr or fo r a tr ia l c ou rt

to r e fu se t o ch ar ge t h e j u rywi t h t h e v e r y i n s t r u ct i o n re q u es t ed b y De fe n d an tT h o m as

. S ee , e. g. , State v. Caug hron

, 855 S.W .2d 526, 543 (Tenn.) , cert. denied

, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S. Ct. 475 (1993); Pay ne, 791 S.W .2d at 21. Acc ording ly , Def endant Thoma s is entitled to no relief on this g round.18 B. Motion for pr ocedur e g overning jury composition
Def en d ant Thom as next contends that the trial court erre d when it denied his motion for separ ate juries for the g uilt and sente ncing phases of trial. We disag ree . The trial c ourt does not have any discretion to g rant a

motion for separ ate jurie s for the g uilt and sentencing phases of trial. See State v. Delling er

, 79 S.W .3d 458 app. at 478 n.1 ( Tenn.), c ert. de n. 537 U.S. 1090, 123 S.C t. 695 (2002). Indeed, T ennesse e law spe cifica lly require s that following a conviction for fi rst deg ree murder, a “s en t en cing hearing sha ll be conducte d as soon as pra cticable befor e the sa me jury that de te rm ine d g uil t.” Te nn . Co de An n. § 39 -1 3- 20 4( a ). Mo re ov e r, ou r su pr e me c ou rt ha s p re vio us ly reje cted this arg ument. See Delling er , 79 S.W .3d app. at 478- 79; State v. Har bison

, 704 S.W .2d 314, 318 (Tenn.) , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S. Ct. 2261 (1986) (rejec ting the a rg ument that

a de fe nd a nt i s deni ed a

fa ir tr ia l by the sy ste ma tic e xclu sio n o f j ur or s w ho are a g a ins t th e de a th pe na lty ); se e a lso Sta te v. Ha ll

, 958 S.W .2d 679 app. at 717 (Te nn.1997) (r ejec ting the a rg ument that the manner

of selec ting “ death qua lified” juror s results in juries that are prone to c onviction).

Def endant Th o ma s a ls o c o n te n d s th at a c riminal de fenda nt’s constitutional rights ar e violated by ex cusing pr os pe c tiv e jur or s f or c a us e wh e n th e ir

pe rs on a l be lie fs c on c e rn ing the de a th p e na lty

wo uldpr e ve nt o r s ub sta nti a lly imp a ir the ir pe rf or ma nc e a s a

jur or in a c c or da nc e wi th the ir instructions and their oath. This issue, similarly , has bee n decide d adver sely to the Def endant. See Delling er , 79 S.W .3d app. at 479 n.2; State v. Hutchison

, 89 8 S.W. 2d 16 1, 16 7 (T e nn .1 99 4) , c e rt

. de n. 51 6 U .S. 84 0, 11 6 S. Ct. 13 7 ( 19 95 ), (c iti ng Wai nw ri g ht v . Wit t , 46 9 U.S. 41 2, 42 4, 10 5 S. Ct. 84 4, 85 2 ( 19 85 )) . A c c or din g ly , D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s is e nti tle d to no re lie f o n th e se g ro un ds

.

C. Motion t o decla

re V ictim’s Rights Bill unconstitutional Def endant Thoma s asserts that Ten n esseeCode Annotated se ction 39-13-204( c), w hich allows the introduction at sentencing of “vic tim im pact” evidenc e, violates the c onstitut ional do c tr ine of sep aratio n o f p ow e rs . T his ide nti c a l arg ume nt i s r a ise d b y De fe nd a nt T ho ma s in his g e ne ra l c ha lle ng e to the c on sti tut ion a lit y of the Te nn e sse e de a th p e na lty statut e s. We r e

je c t th is claim. See infr a Section XVII (J).

D. Motion to dism iss indictment based on common law

“one y ear and one day

rule”

Def endant Thomas moved the trial c ourt to dismis s the indictment based upon the c ommon law y ear -and- a-day

rule be cause the victim’s death oc curr ed more than one y ear and one day

afte r the crime was c ommitt ed. The common law rule no longe r applies in Te n n es see. See State v. Rog e rs , 9 92 S.W. 2d39 3, 40 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . T his c la im i s w ith ou t me ri t.19 E. Mo tio n to us e jury

qu e sti on na ir e s in c lud ing sp e c if ic qu e sti on s

abo ut the de a th p e na lty

De fendan t T ho mas fi led a mo ti on fora ju ry qu est io nn air e sp eci fi cal ly inc lud ingde ath p e nalty qu e sti on s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt pe rm itt e d a jury qu e sti on na ir e to be us e d bu t de c lin e d to in clu de d e a th penalty questions. Defe ndant Thomas cla ims that, in so doi ng , the trial court erre d.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

c omm itt e d n o e rr or in d e ny ing De fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ re qu e st. A t ri a l c ou rt is vested with g reat discretion in d etermining how voir dire examination will be conduc ted, and the court’s de cision on how extensive a voir dire e x amination is require d will not be overturne d except for a n abuse of the discretion. See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tenn. 1993), c ert. de n. 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct

. 1339 (1994); S tate v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 65 (Tenn. 1992), ce rt. den. 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.C t. 1 3 6 8 (1 9 9 3 ). We find no abuse of discre tion in the method of voir dire employ ed in this case.

F. Motion to dismis s on double jeopar dy g rounds
Def endant Thoma s asserts that his t rial in state court violates the double jeopa rdy provisions of th e Fi ft h Am endment to the United States Constituti on, Article 1 se ction 10 of the Te nnessee Con sti tut ion , a ndArtic le 14 se c tio n 7 of th e I nt erna tio na l Co ve na nt o n Ci vil a ndPol iti c a l Rig hts beca use the De fenda nt’s fede ral c harg es arise from the sa me criminal event.

I t is a we ll- e sta

bli sh e d p ri nc ipl e that “ a

fe de ra l pr os e c uti on do e s n ot b a r a su bs e qu e nt s ta te prosec ution of the same pe rson for the same a cts, and a state prose cution does not bar a fede ral one

. . . [P]r os e c uti on s u nd e r the la ws of separ a te so ve re ig ns do no t, i n th e la ng ua g e of the F if th Amendment, ‘s u b

j ect [the defe ndant] for the same of fenc e to be twice put in jeopardy .’” U nited States v. Wheeler

, 43 5 U. S. 31 3, 31 7, 98 S. Ct. 10 79
, 10 82 -8 3 (1 97 8) . D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s a rg ue s, howeve r, that t he dual sovere ignty doctrine is violative of the Tenne ssee c onstitut ion and ar g ues for its a br og a tio n. Ho we ve r, ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s sp e c if

ic a lly up he ld a ndde te rm ine d to a dh e re to this do c tr ine of

du a l so ve re ig nty , r e a so nin g a s f oll ow s:

There is no que stion but that such a proce dure does not subje ct the def endant to double jeopar dy

insofar a s the g uara nty

of due pr ocess in the 14th amendment of the fe de ra l con sti tut ion is co nc e rn e d. B artku s v . I lli no is

, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. Ct. 676, 3 L .Ed.2d 684 (1959). While the rationale of this case - that the state and fe dera l g overnme nts are distinct sovere ignties, and thus the puni shment of a sing le ac t by ach is not double jeopardy

- has b ee n criticized, a similar appr oach ha s provided the basis for a more rece nt case , which would imply that Ba rtkus’ ana ly sis of the issue is stil l valid. See United States v. Wheeler

, 435 U.S. 313, 98 S. Ct. 1079, 55 L .Ed.2d 303 (1978). This court is bound bythe decisions of the U nited States Supreme Court

conce rning the proper i nterpre tation of t he federa l constituti on. Townsend v. Clover Bottom Hospital and School

, 560 S.W .2d 623 (Tenn. 1978)

.20 The double je opardy

provision of the Tennessee constituti on, Article I , § 10, aff ords the d ef

en d an t no gr eate r protec tion. I n the past, this provision has been interpreted to permit succe ssive state and f eder al prosec utions on the basis of the same “ dual sovere ignties” analy sis e mploy ed in B artkus, supra, and, g iven the nee d for stability

in constitutional interpre tation, we see i nsufficie nt cause to depart from that prec edent now.

L a vo n v . St a te , 586 S.W .2d 112, 113-14 (Tenn. 1979). The L avon court further explained that any

m o d i fi ca t i o n o r a b an d o n m en to f t h e d u al s o v er ei gn t y d o ct ri n e m u s tb e a cc o m p l i s h ed t h ro u gh leg islative action. See id. a t 115. Such leg islative action has y et to take plac e; thus, the doctrine of du a l so ve re ig nty

re ma ins in e ff

e c t.

Additionally , Def

endant Thoma s asserts that the State’ s p r o s e c u ti o nv io la te s th e In tern ati o nal Covenant on Civil a n d P o l i t i cal Rig hts (I CCP R), which is an international treaty of g overning nations. This Court addressed a nd reje cted this identical claim in State v. Carpenter , 69 S.W .3d 568, 578-579 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2001), ce rt. den. 535 U. S. 995, 122 S.C t. 1557 (2002). De fenda nt Th oma s h a s n ot c on vin c e d th is C ou rt to s way fr om this de c isi on . T his c la im i s w ith ou t me ri t.

III. Continu ance of Case Due to Events of Septem ber 11, 2001 On September 12, 2001, the t rial court continued the trial in thi s matter until September 17, 2001. Def

endant Thoma s maintains that the trial court e rre d by failing to continue the matter for a longe r period of time following the events of Septe mber 11, 2001.

Th e g ra nti ng of

a c on tin ua nc e re sts wi thi n the so un d disc re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt . Se e Sta te v. Russell, 10 S .W.3d 27 0
, 2 7 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) . We will reverse the denial of a

co n ti n u a n c e o n ly if th e tria l c o u r t ab u s e d it s d is c r e ti o n a n d th e d e f e n d a n t w a s p r e

ju d ic ed bythe de nia l. S e e id. “ An abu se of dis c re tio n is de mon str a te d b y sh ow ing that th e fa ilu re to g ra nt a continuance denied de fenda nt a fa ir trial or that it could be r easona bly conclude d that a diffe rent result would have followed ha d the continuanc e been g rante d.” State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1995)

.

I n the present case , the trial court’s denial of a continuance was not er

ror. The trial was

sc he du le d to be g in o n Se pte mbe r 1 0, 20 01 . O n Sep te mbe r 10, 20 01 , ele ve n jur or s we re te ntativ e ly selec ted and the matter continued to September 11 for a sec ond day

of jury selec tion. Although not

e vid e nc e d b y

the re c or d, Se pte mbe r 1 1, 20 01 , is the da te of the te rr or ist

a tta c ks on Ne w Y or

k Ci ty and W ashing ton, D.C. On September 11, 2001, e ighte en jurors w ere tentatively selec ted. At

so me po int on that day , d e fe ns e c ou ns e l mo ve d f or a c on tin ua nc e

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt c on tin ue d th e tr ia l un til September 17. While the eve nts of September 11, 2001, w ere of unquestionable national importance , Def

endant Thoma s fails to e x plain how those eve nts affe cted his trial. Nothing in the

rec ord bef

ore us indicates that those eve nts had any eff ect on the pr ocee dings othe r than to dela y them for one wee k. Thus, Def endant Thomas has failed to show how he was prejudice d by the trial court’s r efusa l to gr ant a c ontinuance for a long er pe riod of time. We find neither e rror nor abuse of21

dis c re tio n. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

IV . J ur orP anne ll Def enda n t T h o ma s c o n te n d s th a t th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d b y e xc u s in g Pr o s p e c ti v e Ju r o r Gar y Pannell for cause based upon his view re g arding the death penalty . During voir dire, the f ollowing colloquy occur red:

MS. WEI RI CH: Mr. Pannell, same ques t i o n t o y o u , i f t h e S tate of Te nn e sse e pr ov e s th e a g g ravatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s, bey ond a re asonable doubt, and prove s that they weig h more than the mitigato rs, aga in, bey ond a

rea sonable doubt, ca n y ou sentenc e one or both of the defe ndants to death?

PROS PECTI VE JUR OR: I rea lly don’t think so.

. . .

PROS PECTI VE J UROR: I had a hard time dea l i n g wi t h i t l as t n i ght, soul

sear ching and eve rything

.

MS. WEI RI CH : Al l r ig ht.

PRO SPEC TIVE JURO R: An d th e re hav e been art icl es in the pa pe r re c e ntl y

abo ut p la nte d e vid ence andstu ff lik e that, tha t it makes it hard f

or me to say

that I wo uld ag ree to a death se ntence on something I didn’t witness my self.

MS. W EI RI CH: That’s fine

.

P R O S P E C T I V E JU R O R : Or to he a r the pe rs on c ha rg e d w i t h t h e c r i me to persona lly

admit to it hi mself.

MS. WEI RI CH : Al l ri g ht. So y ou c ou ldn ’t fo llo w the la w in the Sta te of Tenne ssee if w hat I have told y ou would be the law that y ou would have to f oll o w ac cording to [J udg e] Da ile y ’s ins truc tio ns ?

PRO SPEC TIVE JURO R: Wel l, y ou kn ow y ou ha ve to l ist e n to wi tne sse s.

MS. W EI RI CH: Yes, sir.22

P R O S P E C T I V E JU R O R : Ok a y

. A n d t h a t ’ s w h e r e I w o u l d h a v e a p r o b l e m, i s taking what they

are say ing, a nd say ing, “ Okay , what they are say ing is true ,” which I don’t know–

MS. WEI RI CH : Al l r ig ht.

P R OS P E C T I VE J UR OR : An d t o m e, d ea t h i s –i t ’s a p er m an en tt h i n g.

MS. W EI RI CH: Yes, sir. Tha nk y ou.

PRO SPEC TIVE JURO R: Yo u d on ’t c ome ba c k w ith it.

MS. W EI RI CH: Thank y ou.

TH E CO UR T: An y qu e sti on s, Mr . M a nis ?

MR. MANI S: No questions, Your Honor

.

TH E CO UR T: Mr . Sc ho ll?

MR. SC HOLL : I do, Your Honor

. Sir , let me a sk y ou thi s: Ar e the re c ir c ums ta nc e s wher e y ou fee l y ou could g ive the death penalty ? You

me nti on e d y ou wo uld n’ t f e e l c omf orta bl e do ing it unless y ou actua l l y saw it or unless y ou hear d someone admit to it. Are there circ umstances whe re y ou c ou ld g ive that pu nis hme nt?

PROS PECTI VE JUR OR: That’s the only two that I

can thin[k] of rig ht now.

M R

. S C H O LL : So the re a re so m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h e r e y o u c ou ld g ive that punishment if it ac t ually showed; is that

c or re c t?

PRO SPEC TIVE JURO R: Th a t’ s r ig ht.

MR. SC HOLL : I have no f urther que stions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So y ou’re not fore closing the possibili ty of g iving the de a th p e na lty . I s th a t c or

re c t, M r. Pa nn e ll?

PRO SPEC TIVE JURO R: Th a t’ s c or re c t.23

THE COURT: You’re j u s t s t at i n g t h at y o u wo u l d h av e t o see

s u ff icient proof to sa tisfy

y ou that the ag g ravating

c ir c ums ta nc e s o u t w e i g hth e m i t i g at ing c ir c ums ta nc e s.

PROS PECTI VE JUR OR: Sufficient proof in my ey es would be what I witnessed my se lf or wh a t the pe rs on c ha rg e d w ith the c ri me – if the y sa id tha t th e y

didit, y e s, I c ou ld g o alo ng wi th i t.

T H E CO U RT : L et m e ask y o u th is : I f y o u f e lt th a t th e s tate had p ro v en t h e a ggra v at i n g ci rc u m s t an ce t h at t h eyal l ege – y ou’re satisfied that they have pr oven that and that it o u tw e ig h e d th e mi ti g a ti o n –th e mi ti g a ting circ u ms ta n c e s –b u t n e ith e r o f th e s e c r it e r ia

th a t y ou set forth e x isted, are y ou say ing, the n, that even tho ug h y ou fe lt tha t th e state hadpr ov e n th e ir ag g ravating c ircumstance s, y ou still could not follow
t h e l a w a n d i m p o s e t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y?

PROS PECTI VE JUR OR: (No audible response )

[ T HE C OU R T : ] Do y o u fo l l o w w h at I ’m s ay i n g?

PROS PECTI VE JUR OR: (No audible response )

[THE COURT:] You set up two criteria that y ou say are the on l ytwo by wh ic h y ou c ou ld c on sid e r v oti ng for the de a th penalty , and I ’m say ing w hat happe ns if, in y our mind, i f y o u determine that the state ha s proven, be y ond a

re a s o n ab le d o u b t, th e e xis te n c e o f th e a g g r a v a ti ng circ umstance they alleg e, and y ou further find, in y our mind, that that a g g r a v ati n g c ircumstance does, indee d, outweig h, bey ond a re asonable doubt, any mitigating circ umstances that ha ve bee n prese nted – if y ou find that the law had been satisfied in that reg ard a s it’s set up by t h e leg islature, but y ou find that these two

c ir c ums tances that y ou se t f orth a re n’ t pa rt of thi s pro c e s s

– d o n ’ t e xis t in th is p r o c e s s , ar e y o u say ing that beca use of that, y ou could not go forwa rd an[d] i m p o s e t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y?

PR O SP E CT I V E JU RO R: Iwo u ld h a v e a h ar d ti me ta k in g w h a t I

would hear coming from witnesses’ acc ounts and eve rything beca use, just like I

said, ju s t last wee k in the paper about some incidents down in F lorida —24

T H E CO U RT : Well, w e w o u ld n ’ t w a n t to g e t in to w h a t w a s in the paper b ec ause we don’t try case s in the paper

or on TV.

PROS PECTI VE JUR OR: Okay . I t’s planted evide nce –

TH E CO UR T: Wel l–

P R OS P E C T I VE J UR OR : –p eo p l e c an s ayan y t h i n g —

THE COURT: Okay . Thank y ou, Mr. Pannell . . .

Th e t r i a l c o u r t t h e n a s k e d t h e p ar t i e s t o ap p r o a c h t h e b e n c h
, a t w h i c h t i m e t h e S t a t e r e n e w e d it s challeng e for cause

. After considering arg ument by counsel for Def endant Thomas, the trial court

ex cu s ed P ro s p ec t i v e J u ro r P an n el l fo r c au s e, fi n d i n g:

I think that his responses, in their totality – he, at be st, ha s gi v en some sort of qualified sta tement that he could, under his ow n perc eived limited circ umstances follow the law; a nd under the law, that’s not g ood enoug h. He conce ded that if the
state pr ov e d w ha t th e y

we re re qu ir e d to pr ov e un de r the statut e bu t it did n’ t me e t hi s self-a ppointed criteria, t hen he couldn’t go forward a nd follow the law. A nd I don’t thi nk that’ s w ha t ou r s y ste m re qu ir e s of a jur or

. An d I – th a t’ s ju st the way

he fe e ls,

a ndthat’ s f

ine ; bu t I ’l l note y ou r exc e pti on

. I ’m g oin g to g o ah e a d an d e xcu se him

.

I n determining whe n a prospe ctive juro r m ay b e excused for c ause be cause of his or her vie ws on the de a th pe na lty , the sta nd ard is wh e the r the jur or ’s vie ws wo uldpr e ve nt o r s ub sta nti a lly impair the per formanc e of his or her duties as a juror in accorda nce w ith his or her instructions and his or he r oa th. Se e Sta te v. Au sti n , 87 S.W .3d 447, 472-73 (Tenn. 2002), cert. den. 71 USL W 3679, 12 3 S. Ct. 18 99 (2 00 3) , ( c iti ng Wai nw ri g ht v . Wit t , 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852 (1985))

. Moreove r, this standard doe s not require that a juror’ s biases be proved w ith “unmistakable cla rity .” See id. at 473. Howe ver, the trial judg e must have the definite impression that a prospective jur or could not f

ollow the law. See H utchison

, 89 8 S.W.2 d at 167 (c iti ng Wai nw ri g ht v . Wit t , 46 9 U .S. at 425-26, 105 S. Ct. at 853). Finally
, the trial court’s finding of bias of a juror bec ause of

his or her views co n cerning the death penalty are acc orded a

presumption of cor

rec tness, and the de fenda nt must establish byconvincing evidenc e that the tria l court’s de termination was e rrone ous befor e an appellate court will overturn that decision. See S tate v. Alley

, 776 S.W .2d 506, 518 (Tenn. 1989)
, cert. denied

, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S. C t. 1758 (1990).

After revie wing the answe rs of Prospec tive J uror Panne ll, we conclude that his answer s left

no le e way fo r re ha

bil itatio n. Se e Sta te v. Str ou th

, 620 S.W .2d 467, 471 (Tenn. 1981) , cert. denied

, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S. Ct. 1491 (1982). Both the tria l court and the prosec utor extensively questioned th is pros pe c tiv e jur or

a s to wh e the r h e c ou ld a

pp ly thela w t o th e e vid e nc e a ndc on sid e r a ll f or ms of punishment in this case

. J uror Pannell was c onsistent in responding that he would not impose the25

death pe nalty

unless his own criteria wer e satisfied. This prospe ctive juror me t the standard f or dismiss al. See Hutchison

, 898 S.W .2d at 167. We see no e rror

.

V. P hot og r aphs of V ic ti m A. Photogr aph of V ictim W hile Alive Def endant Thoma s submits that it was err or for the trial court to permit introduction o f a ph o to g r ap h o f th e v ic ti m w h il e a li v e

. A t tria l, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l o b

je c te d to in tr o duction of the ph oto g ra ph . T he ph oto g ra

ph wa s ta ke n a ft e r the Ap ri l 19 97 sh oo tin g bu t pr ior to the vic tim ’s de a th in October

1999. T h e t ri al co u rt o v er ru l ed t h e o b j ec t i o n s t at i n g:

I think it’s, first of all, releva nt in that the sta te, of course , has the burde n of proving that an individual – a living, br eathing , human being was killed in these e vents. And the photog raph, itself, is ag ain, a ve ry neutra l one. I t ’s black a nd white. I t doesn’t have f amily members a

round. He’ s not in a choir robe or a scout uniform or milit ary uniform o r any thing of

that sort. This is a very neutra l sort of photog raph – no wh e e lc ha ir

– n oth ing that w ou ld b e de sig ne d to e lic it sy mpathy

. . . . I ’l l allo w i t to be used.

During the g uilt phase of the tria l, the photogr aph of the victim wa s introduced throug h the testimony of B etty Gay , an employ ee of

Walgr eens. On appea l, Def endant Thoma s contends that admission of an 8 by 10 black a nd white photog raph of the victim taken during his lifetime was introduce d for th e s o le p u rp o s e o f in v o k in g th e s y mp a th y o f th e ju r y a n d w a s e rr o r

. T h e St a te r e s p o n ds that the photogr aph wa s releva nt to rebut Def endant Thoma s’ def

ense that it was Mr. Day ’s phy sical hea lth, including obe sity , that cause d his death, rather than the g unshot.

The a dmission o f photog raphs is g ener ally discretionary

with the trial court a nd absent a n abuse of that discretion, will not result in the g rant of a new trial. See State v. B anks

, 564 S.W .2d 94 7, 94 9 (T e nn

. 19 78 ). I n Sta te v. Ne sb it

, 97 8 S.W.2 d 872 a t app . 901 -0 2 & n. 2 (T e nn . 1 99 8) , c e rt

. den. 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1359 (1999)
, a capital c ase involving almost the identical issue, our

su pr e me c ou rt

a do pte d th is Cou rt ’s c on c lus ion that, a lth ou g h th e re qu ir e me nt o f a re a so na ble

c re a tur e in b e ing ha s b e e n re mov e d fr om the c ur re nt crimi na l cod e , ad mis sio n o f a fa mil y po rt ra it of the vic tim

wa s n ot e rr or

be c a us e it w a s r e le va nt to est abl is h the c or pu s d e lic ti

, including the id e n ti ty o f th e p e r s o n a ll e g e d to h a v e b e e n k il le d

. I n B o ld e n v

. St a te , 1 4 0 T e n n

. 1 1 8
, 1 2 0
, 2 0 3 S. W. 75 5 ( Te nn . 1 91 8) , o ur

su pr e me c ou rt

he ld tha t the e vid e nc e ne c e ssa ry “ to es ta bli sh the c or

pu s d e lic ti in case s of homicide must show that the life of a human being h as been ta ken, which que stion involves the subordinate inquiry as to the identity of the per son char g ed to have been killed . . . .” (e mph a s i s a d d e d )

. T h u s , t h e p h o t o g r ap h w a s r e l e v a n t a n d w e f i n d n o r e v e r s i b l e e rr orin i ts

a dmi ssi on du ri ng the g uil t ph a se of the tr ia l.

B. Photog raphs of

Victim Post -Mortem During the re -direc t examination of Fay e Da y , the victim’s widow, the State introduced two post-mortem photog raphs de picting the victim’s fac e and ba ck re spectively

. The State a sserted tha t the photog raphs we re r eleva nt in light of Mrs. Day ’s testimony describing how her husband “ble w up” shortly

befor e his dea th and i n l i gh t o f questions by defe nse counse l reg arding the victim’s26

obesity . The trial c ourt, ref lecting upon Mrs. Day ’s testimony , permitted i ntroduction of the p h o t o gra p h s , fi n d i n g:

I think in li g ht of her te stimonyreg arding his condition those last couple of day s, I think they ’re rele vant at this point – the p robative va lue clea rly outweig hs whateve r pre

judicial eff

ect ther e would be. T here ’s nothing g raphic or bloody [.]

Def endant Thoma s now contends that admission of these photog raphs wa s err or. Wit hout refe renc e to the sp e c if

ic ph oto g ra

ph s c ompl ain ed o f a ndwi tho ut a rg ume nt t o th os e ph oto g ra ph s a c tua lly introduced, D efe ndant Thomas complains that the “g ruesome photogr aphs of the victim violates the Def endant’ s rig hts under the f eder al and state constitutions. . . .” The Stat e p ro p er l y ar g ues that De fe nd a nt T ho ma s h a s w a ive d th is i ssu e fo r f a ilur e to o ff

e r c itatio n to the re c or d. Se e Te nn . Ct

. Crim. App. R. 10(b). Notwithstanding pr ocedur al waive r of this issue for nonc ompliance with the Rul e s o f this Cou rt , w e e le c t to a dd re ss the iss ue on its me ri ts.

As previously

stated, Tennessee courts have liberally allowed the admission of photogra phs in both civil and criminal ca ses. See Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d at 949. Acc ording ly
, the admissibilit y of photogr aphs l ies within the di scre tion of t he trial c ourt whose r uling will not be overturned on a ppeal except upon a clea

r showing of an a

buse of discr etion. See id.; see a lso St ate v. Ha ll, 8 S.W .3d 593, 602 (Tenn. 1999), ce rt. denied, 531 U .S. 837, 121 S. C t. 98 (2000). Howe ver, a photogr aph must be rele vant t o an is sue t hat t he jury must decide befor e it may be admitted into evidenc e. See State v. Va nn , 97 6 S.W. 2d 93
, 10 2 (T e nn

. 19 98 ), c e rt

. de nie d, 52 6 U .S. 10 71 , 1 19 S. Ct . 1 46 7 ( 19 99 ); Sta te v. Br aden, 867 S.W.2d 7 5 0
, 7 5 8 (Tenn. Crim. App.1993) ; see a lso Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. Photogra phs of a c orpse a

re a dmissibl e in mur der prosec utions if they are rele vant to the issues at trial, notwithstanding their g ruesome and horrify ing char acte r. S ee B anks, 964 S.W.2d at 950-51.

No tw ith sta nd ing thi s b ro a d in te rp re ta tio n of admi ssi bil ity , e vid e nc e that is no t r e le va nt t o prove some pa

rt of t h e p ro s ec u t i on’s ca se should not be admitted solely to inflame the jury

and p re j u d i ce t h e d ef

en d an t

. S ee i d

. Ad d i t i o n al l y , t h e p ro b at i v e v al u e o f t h e p h o t o gra p h m u s to u t we i gh any unfair pr ejudicial ef

fec t that it may have upon the trier of fac t. See Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 102-03;

see a lso Tenn. R. Evid. 403 (“Although re l ev ant, evidence may be excluded if its probative va lue is substantiallyoutweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ej u d i ce [ .]”). I n this respec t, we note that photogr aphs of a

murder vic tim ar e prejudicia l by their very nature . Howeve r, pre

judicial evidenc e is n ot p e r s e e xclu de d; ind e e d, if thi s we re true , a ll e vid e nc e of a c ri me wo uldbe e xclu de d a t tria l. Rather, what is e x cluded is e vidence which is unf airly prejudicia l, in other words, evide nce w hich h a s a n u n d u e t e n d e n c y t o s u g g e s t a d e c i s i o n o n a n i m p r o p e r b a s i s , f r e q u e n t l y, t h o u g h n o tn e c e s s ar i l y, an emotional one. See Ba nks

, 564 S.W .2d at 951.

T h e De fenda nt asserts that post-mortem photog raphs of the victim should not have bee n admitted beca

use they wer e espe cially

g ru es o m e and inflammatory . The purpose for introduc ing photogr aphs into evidenc e is to assist t h e t ri er o f fact. “As a g ener al rule, the introduction of ph oto g ra ph s h e lps the tr ie r o f f

a c t se e fo r i tse lf

wh a t is de pic te d in the ph oto g ra ph .” Sta te v. Grif

fi s, 964 S.W .2d 577, 594 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . The trial c ourt ulti m at el y d et ermined that the photogr aphs we re r eleva nt to support Mrs. Day ’s t estimony reg arding the vi ctim’s condition during27

the la st d a y s o f h is l if

e . D r. Ga

rd ne r, lik e wi se , u se d th e ph ot ograph s du ri ng he r t e sti mon y to illust rate that the victim suffer ed fr om ext ensive fluid retention at the time of his death. The ph oto g ra ph s f urthe r r e fu te d th e the ory

of the defe ns e that th e vic tim ’s de a th w a s th e re su lt o f h is obesity . We conclude that the photogr aphs we re r eleva nt to supplement the testimonyof the victim’s wife a nd the medica l examiner. Althou gh t h e photog raphs a re not pa rticularly pleasa nt to view, neither a re the y particula

rly g ruesome. We f

ind that the probative value of the photog raphs is not

ou tw e ig he d b y

the ir pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt

didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in a llo wi ng the ir admission. See Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d at 949. Def endant Thoma s is not entitled to relief on this issue.

VI. Evidence from F ederal P roce edings Def endant Thoma s raises severa l claims of er ror a rising f rom the admission of evidenc e that

was a lso used in his prior fede ral trial. First, Def endant Thomas complains that the trial court erre d in overruling his objection conce rning the exhibit stickers plac ed on exhibits used in Def endant Th oma s’ pr ior fe de ra l tria l and fu rthe r er re d by no t pro vid ing the jury a c ur a tiv e ins truc tio n. Ne xt, he asse rts as er

ror that the trial court e rre d by permitting introduc tion of the video of the crime e ven though the prosec ution had failed to provide a prope r foundation or chain of c ustody for the admission o f th e v id e o ta p e

. T h ir d
, D e f

e n d a n t T h o ma s c o n te n d s th a t th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d by permitting the jury to rea d a tra nscript of Mr. D ay ’s pre vious testimonyas Assistant United States Attorney Tony Arvin read the transcript aloud. Next, Def endant Thomas contends that the date of Def endant B ond’s g uiltyplea and the l ater date of Mr. Day ’s t estimony provided the infe renc e that
t h e f e d e r a l p r o c e e d i n g w e n tf

o r w ar d a g a i n s t D e f

e n d a n tT h o m a s w i t h o u tD e f e n d a n tB o n d

. F i n a l l y, Def endant Thoma s complains that the trial cour t erre d by overr uling his objec tions to Defenda nt B on d’ s c ou ns e l asking qu e sti on s re g ard ing B on d’ s g uil ty ple a in f e de ra l c ou rt . A s a

rg ume nt o n th e se claims, Def

endant Thoma s makes the g ener al assertion that this evidenc e wa s not releva nt. The Sta te a sse rt s th a t D e fe nd a nt Th oma s has wa ive d the se c la ims fo r fa ili ng to m ake pr op e r a rg ume nt. See Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b). Additionally , the State conte n d s that Defe ndant Thomas has failed to de monstrate that the tria l court abuse d its discr etion with respec t to the admission of any of this evidence . The State’s position is well-taken. N onetheless, we elec t to review the admission of the c ontested evide nce on its merits.

Rulings on the admissibilityof evide nce ba sed on its releva nce ar e en trusted to the sound discretion of the trial court a nd will not be overturne d absent a n abuse of that discretion. See Sta te

v. Du B os e , 953 S.W .2d 649, 65 2 (T en n

. 1 997). “[A]n appellate c ourt should find an abuse of discretion whe n it a

ppear s that a trial court applied an incor rec t leg al standar d, or re ache d a dec ision which is ag ainst logic or reasoning that cause d an injustice to the party complaining .” State v. Shuck

, 953 S.W .2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997)

.

A. E v i d en ce s t i ck er s fr o mfe d er al p ro ce ed i n g. I nitially , we note that Defe ndant Thom as fails to refer ence the re cord r eg arding objections made to the introduc tion of exhi bits that had been pr eviously used during his fede ral trial. The State, noting this omission, also fails to cite to the objections, if any , made. De spite the ref ere nce ma de at the motion for new trial hea ring that this issue was thoroug hly addre ssed at trial, this Court has been una ble to locate any objections to these ex hibits, although examples of the trial c ourt’s cur ative

measure s are found. I

rre g ardle ss, Defe ndant T h o mas claims that the exhibits wer e pre judicial28

beca use they contained exhi bit stickers from the previous trial. Numerous exhibit s contain sticker s ind ic a tin g that th e y

ha d p re vio us ly be e n e xhibi ts. No oth e r i nf or ma tio n is pr ov ide d o n th e e xhibi t ta g s. As sis ta nt U nit e d Stat e s A tto rn e y Ar vin te sti fi e d th a t th e re we re pr oc e e din g s in fe de ra l c ou rt

. Wit h reg ard to De fenda nt Thom as , t he jury did not know where or how the e x hibits were use d prev i o u s l y , t he name of any other de fenda nt, or the outcome of any hearing. In short, even if any pr e jud ic e re su lte d f

ro m th e us e of

the se e xhibi ts, su c h p re

jud ic e wa s sl ig ht a nddidno t su bs ta nti a lly outweig h the proba tive value of this evidence . See Te nn. R. Evid. 403.

B . V ide ota

pe of the c ri me A videotape of the incident was rec orded by Walgr eens’ security came ra a nd was introduce d at trial throug h the testimony o f C h ar les Young . Def endant Thoma s objected, a sserting lack of foundation and la ck of c hain of c ustody . The trial c ourt found:

Well, chain of custody

is not rele vant. I t’s just li ke with a photog raph; if the wi tne ss c a n s ta te that he ’s vie we d th is f ilm , a nd it ac c ur a te ly re fl e c ts wh a t it pu rp orts to s h o w the[n] there is no chain of c ustody problem like there would be if y ou had dr ug s o r s ome thi ng that y ou ne e de d to ma int a in – pr e se rv e the int e g ri ty

of the ite m. As far as foundation is c oncerned, [C harle s Young ] is the assistant manag er o f t he store. He said he wa s familiar with the came ras a nd how they wer e pointed and how they operated, so I ’ll note y our exception.

We a g re e wi th the tr ia l c ou rt . T his iss ue ha s n o me ri t.

C. Providing jurors with transc ript During the State’s ca se-in-c hief, Assist ant Unit es S ates Attorne y Tony Arvin re ad to the jury

a tr a ns c ri pt o f M r. Day ’s te sti mon y g ive n o n N ov e mbe r 9 th d ur ing the fe de ra l pr oc e e din g s. Simul taneously , the jurors we re e ach pr ovided a c opy of t he transcript to rea d. Although D efe ndant Thomas conceded that the reading of Mr. Day ’s prior testim ony was pe rmissible, he objecte d to the handing of the transcript to the jury

. The trial court responde d, “this is not Mr. Day testify ing; it’s

a bit ha rd e r f or jur or s, I thi nk , to fo llo w b e c a us e it’ s so me so rt of ne utr a l pr e se ntatio n of w ha t is otherwise te stimony ; and so I think it will aid - in my opinion, it wil l aid the jury in following w hat is being rea d.” Thus, the t rial court overrule d Def endant Thoma s’ objection. Howe ver, the trial
court fu rt h er determined that the jury was not to have a written copy with them in the jury

room

“ b e c a u s e t h a tw o u l d g i v e u n d u e w e i g h tt o a w r i t t e n d o c u m e n tw h i c h i s , i n e s s e n c e , t e s t i m o n y – nothing more nothing less.”

We find no abuse of

discretion in t he trial court’s ruling on this matter. This issue is without

me ri t.

D. Date of B ond’s g uiltyplea a nd later date of Day ’s testimony , and29 E. Questioning by

Bond’ s counsel re g arding g uiltyplea Def endant B ond pled g uilty in f eder al court on November 4, 1998, to the robbery of James Day . Mr. Day

subsequently

testified about the robbery on November 9, 1998. At trial, Def

endant Thomas was c oncerned that the e vid en ce o f t he two date s would lead to the infe renc e that, as of November

9, 1998, “the [fede ral] proceed i n g went for war d ag ainst [Defenda nt] Thomas without [Defenda nt] Bond.” Following arg ument by defe nse counse l, the trial court found, “So long a s y ou

– a s lo ng a s [it] is ind ic a te d to the jury ; tha t up unti l Nov e mbe r the 4, [B on d] w a s, ind e e d, a pa rt y to the [fe de ra l] pr oc e e din g

. At that time he e nte re d a g uil ty ple a to the se e ve nts

. An d so at the tim e that Mr . D a y

te sti fi e d o n N ov e mbe r the 9 , in lig ht o f the fa c t th a t [B on d] e nte re d a g uil ty ple a to th the se ve ry e ve nts fi ve da y s e arl ie r, he wa s n ot, a t th a t ti me , a n a c tua l pa rt y to the pr oc e e din g s. ” With ref ere nce to an objection lodge d by Def endant Thomas that this ruling “g ives the i ndication t hat they

wer e tog ether

in t h at p ro cee ding a nd that [Defenda nt Bond] was able to plead g uiltyand that [Defenda nt Thomas] poss ibly disputed something,” the trial court further found:

First of a ll, the fac t that the transcript contains ref ere nces to the jury

and even the court, I can only say that we made an ef

fort . . . t o av o i d ref

erring to the pr evious p roceeding as a tria l or what the outc ome might ha ve bee n, who the ac tual parties

wer e, what the sentenc e mig ht have be en that these men re ceive d. The re fer ence s to jury

and court in the transcript . . . could have be en addre ssed and c ould have be en dele ted. The en t ry of this testimonycomes a s no surprise to any one in this courtroom. You a ll have had, of course , the transc ript for
y ear s now, and we ad dresse d the issue of the state ’s desire to enter Mr . Day ’s
te sti mon y

. . . . So the re ’s be e n ti me fo r y ou a ll t o r e vie w a ndre qu e st that tho se matters – t hose re fer ence s be dele ted had y ou felt . . .that it was unduly prejudicia l to leave the m in. I do n’ t th ink

it’ s a s p re

jud ic ia l for th em to ha ve be e n in be c a us e we ’r e sti ll not refe rring to prec isely what the pr ocee dings [ we re ] , what the r esults were , or anything of

that sort. . . . W i t h reg ard to what [ Def endant B ond] i s asking to be allowed to a sk, it’s alre ady in the rec ord at this point.

. . . Mr. Arvin has alre ady testified to the date on which Mr. B ond enter ed his g uilty plea to these events, not to a specific trial that was about to beg in. . . . He’s e ntere d a guilty plea .

. . on the 4 of Nove mber. . .a nd that th Mr. Day ’s testimony

. . . occur red on the 9 of Nove mber.

th

. . . And so,

. . . he’s asking to

. . . re- ask what’s alre ady in the rec ord and a lrea dy be fo re the jury

. . . a ndI do n’ t kn ow that th e re is a ny re a l pr e jud ic e to y ou r c lie nt.

The trial c ourt then l imited the m anner in which Defenda nt Bond could make inquiry as to Def endant Bond’ s status in the procee ding at the time of Mr. Da y ’s testimony

. Ag ain, we s ee no abuse of discretion in the trial c ourt’s ruling on this matter. Def endant Th oma s is no t e nti tle d to re lie f a s to the se c la ims

.30 VII. Restr iction on Impeac hm ent of Angela Jackson De fe nd a nt T ho ma s c omp la ins that it wa s e rr or

fo r the cou rt to r e fu se to a llo w R us se ll Carpente r and William Upchu rc h t o testify that Ang ela Jackson had told them that she wa s g oing
t o m ak e s u r e t h a t D e f

e n d a n t T h o m a s w e n t t o j a i l

. T h e S t a t e r e s p o n d s t h a t t h i s a l l e g a tio n is unsupported by

the re cord.

A revie w of the direc t e x amination of Russell Car penter reve als that counsel f

or De fenda nt T h o m a s q u e s t i o n e d M r

. C arp e n t e r a s t o t h e s t a t u s o f t h e T h o m a s /J a c k s o n r e l a t i o n s h i p

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, the following questions were posed of Mr. Ca rpente r:

Q: Mr. Carpe nter, . . . Did [A n gela J ackson] threa ten . . . say she wa s g oing to pa y

Andre w Thomas bac k?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was she ang ry

about their bre akup?

A: Yes, sir. Q: Di d s he make a

c omm e nt tha t if

sh e c ou ld n’ t ha ve him , n o o ne e lse would?

A: Yes, sir.

L ikewise, a

revie w of the testimony of Wil liam U pchurc h reve als that counsel for De fenda nt Th oma s q ue sti on e d M r. Up c hu rc h as to the status of theTh oma s/Ja c ks on re la tio ns hip

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, the following colloquy

occur red:

Q: Did y ou ever

hear Ms. J ackson make any statements re g arding An dr e w T ho ma s?

A: Ye s.

Q: Wha t st a te me nts ?

A: Say ing she wer e g onna pay him back.

The only objection noted in the rec ord is the State’s objec tion to the open-ende d questions

a sk e d b y de fe ns e c ounsel to R us se ll Ca rp e nte r, that is , “ Di d y ou

. . . h a ve a ny oc c a sio n to ta lk t o A n g e l a J a c k s o n ?” a n d “ W h a td i d s h e s a y t o y o u ?” To the latter obje ction, the trial court stated,

I ’m g oing to l et y ou lead if he ’s g oing to sa y the same thing , basica lly , that others said; that she said she’s going to pay him back. B ut to just ask an ope n-ende d q u e s t i o n , “ W h a t d i d s h e s a y ?”

– w e m i g h t b e h e r e f o r t h r e e h o u r s l i s t e n i n g to a ll

so rt s o f .

. . thi ng s a

bo ut a re la tio ns hip that wo uld n’ t be re le va nt. B ut w ith re g ardto31

that one nar

row a nd specific comment that rebuts – or is pur ported to r ebut what she
te sti fi e d to , I ’l l a llo w y ou to l e a d a ndg e t r ig ht t o th a t.

No question was pose d by defe nse counse l reg arding J ac k s o n ’s allege d threa ts to send Defe ndant Th oma s to ja il a ndthe tria l c ou rt didno t li mit

thesa me . A ny

te sti mon y

of thi s n a tur e wa s o nly br ie fl y tou c he d o n b y

de fe ns e c ou ns e l on re c ro ss- e xami na tio n o f A ng e la Jac ks on . Ca lle d in re bu tta l, Ang ela J ackson denied ever threa tening to ge t Andrew Thomas. On re c ro ss- e xami na tio n, de fe ns e counsel spec ifically

asked Ms. J ac k s o n re garding threa ts by Ms. J ackson tha t she would see that Def endant Thoma s went to jail.

Th e re c or d d oe s n ot s up po rt De fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ c la im tha t th e tr ia l cour t impr op e rl y restric ted his attempt to elicit impeachment e vidence ag ainst Ms. J ackson. This c laim is without

me ri t.

VI II. Re fusal to Vo irDi r e Jur orRe ga r ding Re lat ion ship with Wit ne ss After the jury returne d its verdicts but prior to the pena lty phase, D efe ndant Thomas ale rted
t h e t ri al co u rt t h at o n e of t h e ju ro rs wo rk ed wi t h d ef en s e wi t n es s R u s s el l C ar p en t er

. T h e t ri al j u d ge responde d that he

[did no t] thi nk that the de fe ns e wi tne sse s w e re me nti on e d d ur ing vo ir dir e in t e rm s of a sk ing the jur or s w he the r the y kn e w p ote nti a l w itn e sse s.

. . . An d s o th a t c e rt a inl y c a n’ t be he ld a g a ins t the jur or

. I me a n s he did n’ t r e fu se to re ve a l a ny kn ow le dg e of a re la tio ns hip to a ny of y ou r wi tne sse s becaus e those witnesses we re never [i dentified] during voir dire.

. . [f] or them to r espond to. And if it’s just a matter of her having worke d with this wit ness, who wa sn’t actua lly a fa ct wi tne ss. Hi s r ole wa s v e ry min ima l.

The following colloquy

then occ urre d: MR. SC HOLL : Every body stop just for a sec ond. Not my client, the juror and

on e of the wi tne sse s k no w e a c h o the r. Tha t c a me to m e throug h my

client – the information.

MS. NI CHOL S: Have y o u t al k ed t o M r. Carpe nter – how he found out or

so me thi ng that –

M R. SC H O LL : Ev id e n tl y M r

. B o n d a n d M r

. T h o mas both talked to Mr.

Carpente r, and Mr. C ar p enter said that he kne w this person. An d th a t’ s th e e xten t of

it.

T H E C O U R T : Ok a y . Justfo r th e r e c o r d, tho ug h, be c a us e I c le a rl y

mis un de rs too d y ou wh e n y ou fi rs t –

M R

. S C H O LL : I’ ms o rr y.32

THE COURT: I

though t y o u r cl i en t k n ew h i m

. I thought y our client’s rela tives knew t h em , I thought ther e wa s an ac tual rela tionship t here

. But none of that’s true. The sole statement is that y our witness, Russell Carpenter , who was the final witness for the de fense . . . [w] orked w i t h t h i s juror at one time.

MR. SC HOLL : Right, and know s her.

TH E CO UR T: An d k no ws he r a nddidn ’t part icul arl y g e t a lon g we ll wi th her.

MR. SCH OL

L : Rig ht.

. . .

M S

. M C C L U S K E Y : An tho n y B o n d t a l k e d t o M r

. C arp e n t e r o n the ph on e la st

night, a nd Mr. Carpe nter said he ’s appa re n t ly seen tha t woman bef

ore b ec ause one day

when Mr. Ca

rpente r wa s be in g d r o p p e d o f

f a t w o rk o r d r o p p e d o f

f f r o m w o rk
, M r. Bond w as t here . And Mr. Carpe nter wa s say ing, “ That woman doesn’ t like me, and she sa w me with y ou befor e.”

THE COURT: Well, that’s – there ’s no mention, there ag ain, of the witnesses

during voir dire. The re’ s n othing to sug g est that this juror cannot be , has not be en totally fair a nd impartial in this case, and so I ’ll note y our statements for the re cord, but Idon’t think it has any

bearing or

eff ect, whatsoever, on this ca se.

Def endant Thoma s now claims that the trial court e rre d in failing to conduct a voir dire of this juror. S p ec i fi ca l l y , Thomas alleg es that this juror should have be en individually voir dired

re g ard ing he r kno wl e dg e of the de fe ns e wi tne ss a nd he r abil ity to be imp art ia l. T he Sta te re sp on ds : fi rs t, the iss ue is w a ive d b e c a us e De fe nd a nt Th oma s nev e r re qu e ste d tha t th e jur or be ind ivi du a lly voir dired, se e Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a); sec ond, the issue is waived for failing to pre serve the issue in the motion for new tria l, see Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ); a ndthi rd , th e iss ue is w a ive d f or fa ili ng to

make a n o ff

e r of pr oo f thr ou g h the te sti mon y of Rus se ll Carp e nte r, se e Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 6( a ); Sta te v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 415 n.5 (Tenn. 2003).

Th e Sta te ’s po sit ion re g ard ing wa ive r i s w e ll- take n. Ad dit ion a lly , D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s, wh ile stating g ener al propositions of law re g arding voir dire, f ails to relate to this C o u rt wh y the trial court’s f ailure to individually

voir dire this juror is er ror. See T enn. R. App. P. 27(a) (7). Notwithstanding w aiver
, there is nothing in the record to indi cate that the juror withheld information fr om the c ou rt

re g ard ing a n a lle g e d re la tio ns hip wi th wit ne ss Carp e nte r. Mo re ov e r, the re la tio ns hip

re ma ins jus t th a t, a n a lle g a tio n. De fe nd a nt T ho ma s f a ile d to make a n of

fe r of pr oo f s up po rt ing his alleg ation. This issue is without merit.33 IX. Testim ony of

John H ibb ler During its case- in-chief

, the State called John Hibbler as a witness. Mr. Hibbler is the owne r of the c ar lot whe re D efe ndant Thomas purc hased his pink box C h ev y immediately following the robbery and s h o o t i n g o f James Day

. On c ro ss- e xami na tio n, De fe nd a nt T ho ma s so ug ht t o e lic it inf or ma tio n r e g ard ing pr ob le ms h e a ndAn g e la Jac ks on we re ha vin g in the ir mar ri age. The Sta te objected a nd Def

endant Thoma s responde d that the testimony was re levant to rebut the anticipate d testimonyof Ang ela Jackson. The tria l court found t h at , should Mr. Hibbler re call De fenda nt Thomas mentioning ma

rital difficulties with Ms. J ackso n , that testimonywould be hea rsay . The following questioning the n occur red:

Q: Mr. Hibbler, a s I

was a sking be fore , y ou had conve rsations with Mr. Thomas

a ft e r the sa le of

thi s c ar. I s th a t r ig ht?

A: Ye s. I

ha d c on ve rs a tio ns wi th h im.

Q: And the conve rsations with Mr. Thomas, he a sked y ou if he c ould g et a ne w title for t hat ca

r bec ause he was ha ving pr oblems with the titl e. I s that

c or re c t?

M S

. W E IR IC H : O b j e c t , Y o u r

H o n o r , t o h e ar s a y.

THE COURT: Sustained. I sn’t that what we just discussed?

A b en ch co n fe re n ce en s u ed
, d u ri n g w h i c h t h e t ri al co u rt s u s t ai n ed i t s p ri o r r u l i n g t h at k n o wl ed ge of marital diff

iculties betwee n Def

endant Thoma s and A n g e la Ja c k s o no b ta

in e d d u ring Mr . Hibbler’s d i s c u s s i o n w i t h T h o m a s c o n s t i t u t e d h e ar s a y.
On appeal, Defenda nt Thomas complains t hat the trial c ourt err oneously conclude d that Mr. Hi bb ler’s t est im on y

abo ut Th om as’ mar it al p rob lem s w it h M s. J acks on was hear say . T ho mas a ssert s that such statements we re not off ere d for the tr

uth of the mat t er asserted but mere ly to show the subject of the c onversation. The S t ate r esponds that, if the testimony was off ere d to show the subject of the conver sation, such statement was not r eleva nt to any issue reg arding the robbe ry and

m u r d e r o f J a m e s D a y.

Ou r Rul e s of Ev ide nc e pr ov ide that “ [h]e ars a y is no t a dmi ssi ble e xce pt a s p ro vid e d b y the se rules or othe rwise by

law.” T enn. R. Evid. 802. Hea rsay is defined a s “a state ment, other than one

ma de by the de c lara nt w hil e te sti fying a t th e tr ia l or he ari ng , o ff

e re d in e vid e nc e to p ro ve the truth of t he matter

asserted.” Te nn. R. Evid. 801(c). I f an out-of -court statement is not offer ed to prove
t h e t ruth of the matter

asserted, such a s a statement of fer ed for impeachme nt purposes, it is not hear say . See Sta te v. Ho we ll

, 86 8 S. W.2 d 2 38 , 2 52 (T e nn . 1 99 3) , c e rt . d e n. 51 0 U .S. 12 15 , 1 14 S.Ct

. 13 39 (1 99 4) . “ Th e de te rm inatio n o f w he the r a state me nt i s h e ars a y

a nd whe ther

it i s a dmi ssi ble thro u g h a n e xc e p ti o n to th e h e ar s a y ru le is le f t to th e s o u n d d is c r e ti o n o f th e tr ia l c o u r t. ” State v. Stout

, 46 S.W .3d 689, 697 (Tenn. 2001) . Acc ording ly
, t h i s Court will not reve rse a trial court’ s34

ruling reg arding the admission or exclusion of hear say evidenc e abse nt a clea r showing that it abused its discretion. See id.

Testimony

reg arding possible bias of a witness is admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Ev ide nc e 61 6 w hic h p rov id es that “ A p art y ma y of fe r e vid e nc e by

c ro ss- e xami na tio n, e xtri ns ic evidenc e, or both, that a witness is biased in favor of or prej u d iced a g ainst a party or anothe r witness.” Tenn. R. Evid. 616. Howe ver, a lthough e x trinsic evidenc e is admissible to prove bias or prejudice , Def

endant Thoma s cites no ca ses from any jurisdiction, and we ha ve found none , holding that w itn e ss b ia s may

be pr ov e n by

he ars a y . I f the te sti mon y

of Mr . H ibb le r w a s o ff

e re d to e sta

bli sh Ms. J ackson’ s prejudice ag ainst Defe ndant Thomas, it was hearsa y . Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discre tion by

ref usin g to permit introduction of hea rsay testimonyreg arding marital difficulties betwe en De fenda nt Thomas and Ang ela Jackson.

X. F ing e r pr int

Te st im ony As his next claim of e rror , Def endant Thomas asserts tha t the trial court err ed in permitting Of f ic e r Si ms to te s ti f

y d e s p it e s ti p u lati o n th a t th e f in g e rp r in t f

o u n d o n th e s to le n g e ta way car matched D efe ndant Bond. Thomas asserts that, after the stipulation, any

testimonyby

the fing erprint expert was cumulative. The State responds that Def endant Thomas has wa ived this issue by failing
to enter a contempora neous objection to Office r Sims’ testimony . See Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a). The State further

contends that, a lthough De fenda nt Bond did objec t to Office r Sims offering any testimony in lieu of t he agr eed upon stipul ation, the objection by a co- defe ndant fa ils to preserve the iss ue on app e a l f

or De fe nd a nt T ho ma s. See State v. Steve B radf ord

, No. 03C01-9607-CR-00278, 1998 WL 24417, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, J an. 20, 1998)

. Although the State’s position is w e ll- take n, we e le c t to re vie w the iss ue on its me ri ts.

The trial c ourt, in response to the e x presse d objections of De fenda nt Bond, found: I think that the state has a de finite interest in demonstra ting to the jury not only the specific fac ts involved here – that the print does b el o n g t o y our client, but also the larg er f act that – who the police office rs wer e that worke d on the ca se, the fa ct that the police we re w orking on the ca se, the fa ct that all of this was a c oordinated e ffort by police of fi cer s, lest some sugg estion be made , in final arg ument, that the police dropped the ball. . . . I

think the state has an intere st in putt ing on pr oof to satisfy the jury that things we re done and done right b y t he prope r per sonnel. And so to that

ex ten t, I th in k t here is an i nt eres t .

. . in at l east pu tt in g a face w i t h a n ame . By ha vin g Mr

. Sims take the sta nd
, the jury c a n s e e that Se rg e a nt H ull e y wa s a c c ur a te when she stated it wa s forwa rded on to latent prints, a nd he can sta te – identify the exhibi t as the one he examined. And then the stipulation can kick in, a nd he doesn’ t ha ve to g o a ny

fu rthe r tha n th a t.

After the stipulation wa s introduced, O ffice r Sims testi fied brie fly to expl ain the natur e of a latent print and the process by which he rec eives prints for review. H e further re lated that not all prints that

are lifted have value in the se nse that they can be matched.35

As previously

indicated, “ [t ]he admissibi lityof evide nce is g ener ally within t he broa d discretion of the trial court; abse nt an abuse of that discre tion, the trial court’s de cision will not be

reve rsed.” State v. Edison

, 9 S.W .3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999) . We review this iss ue, ther efor e, under an abuse of discre tion standard.

De fe nd a nt T ho ma s c omp la ins that Off ic e r Sims ’ te sti mon y wa s cum ulativ e wi th r e g ardto the stipulation as to Defe ndant B ond’s fing erprint s

. T o the extent that Si ms’ testimonywas cumulative, if a t all, we ca nnot conclude that the testimonywas unfairly prejudicia l to Defe ndant Thomas. Acc ording ly , the t rial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting introduction of the
t e s t i m o n y.

XI. F ailure to Charge Acc om plice of An gela Jackson Next, Defenda nt Thomas complains that the trial court erre d by failing t o i n s t ru ct the jury wi th a n ins truc tio n c on c e rn ing a c c omp lic e te sti mon y wi th r e g ardto A ng e la

Jac ks on . A t th e c los e of pr oo f, de fe ns e c ou ns e l re qu e ste d tha t an a c c omp lic e ins truc tio n b e pr ov ide d w ith re g ardto A ng e la J ackson. The trial court de nied the re quest, finding that An gel a J ackson f ailed to fit the leg al definition of an acc omplice, in that there was no proof that she united with Def

endant Thoma s in the commission of the crime. Although the court re cog nized that Ms. J ackson d i d p ar t i ci pate in the spending of the money afte r t he fact, t he court noted t hat t his was not enoug h to elevate Ms. J ackson
to acc omplice status.

“An a ccomplice is one who knowing ly , voluntarily , and with common intent unites with the pr inc ipa l of

fe nd e r i n th e c omm iss ion of a c ri me .” Sta te v. Al le n, 97 6 S.W.2 d 661 , 6 66 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1997). The test g ener ally applied in determining whe ther a witness is an ac complice is whe ther the alleg ed accomplice could be indi cted for t he same offe nse cha rg ed ag ainst the defe ndant. See id. I n this state, if the offe nse in question was not committed by the per s o n ’s o wn conduc t, the pe rs on ma y , n on e the le ss, be c ri min a lly re sp on sib le a s a

pr inc ipa l to the of

fe ns e if the pe rs on so lic its
, direc ts, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 402(2)

. T h e p r o o f

inth is c a s e f

a il s to e s ta

b li s h th a t A n g e la

Ja c k s o n s o li c it e d
, d ir e c te d
, a id e d
, or

a tte mpt e d to a id the De fe nd a nt i n c omm itt ing mur de r a nd /or a g g ra va ted rob be ry . H e r a c tio ns in allowing th e D e f

e n d a n t i n to h e r

h o me a f te r th e c r im e s w e r e c o mm it te d
, g o in g s h o p p in g w ith the stolen money an d rec eiving part of the proce eds for herse lf, do not make he r a principal to the offe nse of murde r or robbery of the victim. Thus, the De fenda nt’s arg ument that it was err or for the trial court not to submit an acc omplice instruction to the jury is without m erit, bec ause the fac ts do not demonstrate that Ang ela Jackson was a n acc omplice.

XII. F ailure to Instruct on Specific Mitigators Next, Defenda nt Thomas complains that the trial court declined to instruct the jury as to the following non-statutory

mitigating circ umstances: (1) residual doubt as to the defenda nt’s g uilt; (2) the def endant wa s the product of a dy sfunctional fa milysubject to abuse; ( 3) t h e d ef endant had a his tory of fa mil y ins ta bil ity ; ( 4) the de fe nd a nt h a d a fu nd a me nta l la c k of a sta ble re la tio ns hip wi th his pa re nt o r s te p- pa

re nt; (5 ) his pa

re nts we re div or c e d; (6 ) an y re g re t for his pa st a c ts; (7 ) h is f

a mil y could not fee d itself on its own; and (8) any positive influence he may have ha d on others. A r eview36

of the c harg e submitted to the jury reve als that the trial court instructed the jury as to the following mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s:

(1) Whether

he wa s the product of

a dy sfunctional fa milysubject to abuse. ( 2 ) A n y h i s t o r y o f

f a m i l y i n s t ab i l i t y. (3) Any proof of abandonme nt by

a sig nificant fa milymember. (4 ) A ny e vid e nc e to s ho w tha t on e [of ] his pa re nts wa s a n a

bu se r o f d ru g s. (5 ) A ny dif fi c ult y wi th p are nts ’ d ivo rc e or

se pa ratio n o f p are nts

. (6 ) A ny a c tiv e re la tio ns hip that he ma y ha ve wi th h is c hil d a lth ou g h in ja il. (7) Any proof that shows that he has f amily members that will provide him with love and support while in prison. (8 ) An y proof that, a lthough he is in jail, he provides love and support to other

m e m b e r s o f

h i s f a m i l y. (9) Any positive relationship that he had w ith other adults and childre n. (10) Any other mitigating f

actor which is raised by

the evidenc e produc ed by either the pr os e c uti on or

de fe ns e a t e ith e r the g uil t or se nte nc ing he ari ng ; th a t is , y ou sh a ll consider a ny

aspec t of the def

endant’ s charac t er or

rec ord, or a ny

aspec t of the circ umstances of

the offe nse fa vorable t o t h e def endant whic h is supported by the evidenc e.

The char g e reve als that five out of the eig ht reque sted instructions were provided to the jury . The fac tors not specifica lly

included in the cha

rg e ar e: (1) r esidual doubt, (2) the family ’s inabilityto fee d its e lf, a nd(3 ) the De fe nd a nt’ s r e g re t f or pa st a c ts.

Wit h respe ct to the first of these fac tors, the Eig hth Amendment of the U nited States C o n s t i t u t i o n d o es n o tre q u i re a l i n ger i n g o r re s i d u al d o u b t i n s t ru ct i o n

. S ee Fr an k l i n v

. L y n au gh

, 487 U.S. 164, 173-74, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2326-28 (1988). I n Fr anklin, the Unit ed States Supreme Court
state d: Our de cisions mandati n g jury consideration of miti g ating circ umstances provide no support for petitioner’s claim because “r esidual doubt” a bout guilt is not a mitigating c ircumstance . We have defined mitigating c ircumstance s as fa cts about
t h e defe ndant’s cha

rac ter or ba ckg round, or the c ircumstance s of the particular offe nse, that may

call for a pena lty less than death. “R es idual doubt” is not a fac t about the d ef

endant or the circ umstances of

the crime. I t is inst ead a linge ring

uncertainty

about fa cts, a state of

mind that ex ists som ewhe re be tween “ bey ond a

rea sonable doubt” a nd “absolute c erta inty .” . . . Nothing in our ca ses m an d ates the imposit ion of this heighte ned burde n of proof at ca pital sentencing

.

I d. at 188 (O’ Connor, J ., concur ring ) (c itations omi tted). S ee also State v. Big bee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 81 3 (T e nn

. 19 94 ). Ac c or din g ly
, the tr ia l c ou rt did no t c omm it a fe de ra l c on sti tutio nal erro r in de ny ing De fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ re qu e st f or a n in str uc tio n o n li ng e ri ng or

re sid ua l do ub t.O n Apr i l 29, 1997, e i g h t da y s a f t er D ef en dan t T h omas s h ot M r

. D ay , t h i s s t at u t e wa s a men ded t o pr ov i de 2
tha t t h is C o u rt “sh a ll n o t se t as id e a se n te n c e o f d e a th . . . o n the gr o u n d tha t t h e trial c o u rt d id no t sp e c ifi c a lly i n s t r u ct t h e j u r y a s t o a r equ es t ed mi t i g at i n g f ac t or t h at i s n ot e n n u mer at ed i n s u bs ec t i on ( j )

. ” T en n

. Code An n

. § 39- 1 3

- 2 0 4 (e)( 1 ) ( 1 9 9 7 ); s ee al so S t at e v. H al l
, 95 8 S.W

. 2 d 67 9
, 69 4

- 9 5 (T enn. 19 9 7 ).

37 De fe n d a n t T h o m a s ar g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t w a s r e q u i r e d t o g r a n t h i s r e q u e st f orthi s instruction under state law. Our supreme court has dete rmined that re sidual doubt is a nonstatuory mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e . Se e Sta te v. Mc Ki nn e y , 7 4 S .W .3 d 29 1, 30 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; State v.Hartman, 42 S.W

. 3 d 4 4 , 55-56 (Te nn. 2001). Our c riminal code pr ovides, in releva nt part, that

The trial judg e shall also include in the instruc tions for the jury to weig h and consider any mitigating circ umstances raised by the evidence at either the g uilt or sentencing hearing, or

both, w hich shall include, but not be limit ed to, those circ umstances se t forth in subsection (j).

Tenn

. C o d e An n

. § 39-13-204( e)( 1). Thus, wher e the issue of residual doubt is raise d by the 2

ev i d en ce, a

jury instruction is appropriate . See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 30 (Tenn. 1996). Such evidenc e “ma y

consist of proof . . . tha t indicates the de fenda nt did not commit the offe nse,

no tw ith sta nd ing the jury ’s ve rd ic t fol low ing the g uil t pha se .” Mc Ki nn e y , 74 S.W.3 d at 3 07 . I n th is

case , Def endant Thoma s testified that he did not commit the murder of J ames Day . There fore , the trial court should have provided the jury an instruction on re sidual doubt.

Our supre me cour

t has conc luded that a c onvicted def endant’ s righ t t o have the jury instructed on nonstatutory mitigating circ umstances is statutory rathe r t han constitutional in nature and thus, the failure t o instruct the j ury on nonstatutory mitigating circ umstances whe n raised by the evidenc e is subject t o harmless error analy sis. See State v. Hodg es , 944 S.W .2d 346, 351-52 (Te nn.),
cert . d e n. 52 2 U .S. 99 9, 11 8 S. Ct. 56 7 ( 19 97 ). “ A c ha rg e sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d p re jud ic ia lly

err oneous if it fails to fairly submit the l eg al i ssues or if it misleads the jury as to the applica

ble law.” I d. at 352. Howe ver, if “by their brea dth, the instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circ umstances

e nc omp a sse d a ll the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d by the de fe ns e ,” the omi ssi on of a n in str uc tio n o n a

sp e c if ic mitigating circ umstance is harmless. I d. at 356.

Her e, the tria l co u rt instructed the jury to consider “ any

aspec t of the circ umstances of the offe nse fa vorable to the defe ndant which i s s u p p orted by the evidenc e.” T his broad instruction

e nc omp a sse d D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ de nia l of g uil t a nd se rv e d to g ive the jury the op po rtun ity

a nddu ty to consider a ny

residual doubts abou t h i s cu l p ab ility . Acc ording ly , we a re c onfident that the trial court’s f ailure to g ive a spe cific instruction on residual doubt had no e ffe ct on the jury ’s ver dict, and De fe nd a nt T ho ma s is the re fo re e nti tle d to no re lie f o n th is c la im.

Wit h reg ard to De fenda nt Thomas’ re g ret for past ac ts and his family members’ alleg ed inabilityto fee d themselves, the tria l court found that the te stimonydid not demonstrate re g ret for pa st a c ts. Ra the r, De fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ mothe r t e sti fi e d that he ha d a po log ize d f

or br ing ing his fa mil y down. Additionally , when a sked whe ther Thomas ha d ever s p o k en o f bring ing dow n Fa y e Da y ’s family , Ms. Ba

rber responde d, “The only

thing - he told me that he wa s char g ed with this armored38

d r i v e r a n d t h a t a m a n d i e d f

r o m i t

. ” T h e t r i a l j u d g e c o n c l u d e d
, “ I d o n ’ te v e n r e a l l y r e m e m b e r a n y - any statements by

the mother that he’s shown a ny rea l reg ret for

any past ac ts. . . . I

didn’t hear

any inkling of r emorse a

bout any of those [prior ag g ravated robbe ry convictions].” Reg arding the fa ct that hi s f a mil y me mbe rs are un able to f

e e d th e mse lve s, the tr ia l c ou rt fo un d the re wa s no pr oo f t o support this inst ruction. Acc ording ly
, these c ircumstance s were not raised by the proof a nd the trial court did not err

by failing to so instruct. Even assuming err or, any such er ror wa s harmless g iven that th e tr ia l c ou rt

didpr ov ide the jury

wi th the c a tc h- a ll i ns truc tio n a s to mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s. I t is clear that the trial court’ s ref usal to instruct the jury

as to Def endant Thomas’ a lleg ed re g ret for past ac ts and his family

members’ alleg ed inability to fee d themselves did not result i n an instruction that failed t o fairly

submit t he leg al issues or misled the jury as to the applica

ble law. De fenda nt Th oma s is no t e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is c la im.

XIII. Im proper Cr oss-Exam ination of Defend ant’s Mother Du ri ng the pe na lty

ph a se of the tr ia l, the Sta te so ug ht t o c ro ss- e xami ne De fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ mother, L uella B arbe r, re g arding a disciplinary writ e-up he rec eived while in jail. The trial court permitted the que stioning, finding , “I think that’s appropriate be cause that has a dir ect be aring on wh a t sh e ’s te sti fi e d to wi th r e g ardto h im b e ing a g oo d p e rs on or wh a te ve r.

. . . I ’l l a llo w y ou to a sk about the jail incident.” T he State proc eede d with the following questioning of Luella B arbe r:

Q: Okay

. Are y ou awa re of an incident that oc curr ed in the jail bac k on J une 7 th

o f 2 0 0 1 o f t h i s y e ar ?

A: An inc ide nt –

Q: I nv olv ing An dr e w T ho ma s?

A: No , I ’m

no t.

Q: W h er e h e wa s part of a strip searc h that they

do to the inmates, and they fo un d a six- a nd -a -h a lf

-i nc h s ha nk

on him

.

A: I don’t work he re, so I

don’t know.

Q: Yo u d idn ’t

kn ow a nythi ng abo ut tha t?

A: No one e ver notified me about that[.]

Mrs. Ba rber testified that knowledge o f t h i s incident would not chang e her opinion as to her son. Def endant Thoma s complains that this li ne of que stioning wa s err or bec ause it wa s more pre judicial than proba tive.

Our c riminal code pr ovides that the rules of ev i d ence do not limi t the admissibili ty of

e vid e nc e in a

c apit a l se nte nc ing pr oc e e din g . See Te nn . Code An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 04 (c ). Se e a lso Sto ut, 46 S.W .3d at 702. The supreme court has interpr eted se ction 39-13-204( c) a s permitting tria l judge s39

wider discr etion than would normally be allowed under the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce in r uling on the admissibilit y

of evide nce at a ca

pital sentencing hearing. See State v. Sims , 45 S.W .3d 1, 14 (Tenn.) , cert. den. 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct . 357 (2001). As the Sims court stated,

Th e Rul e s o f Ev ide nc e sh ou ld n ot b e app lie d to pr e c lud e int ro du c tio n o f o the rw ise reliable evidenc e that is r eleva nt to the issue of punishment, as it relates to mitigating or ag g ravating c ircumstance s, the nature and cir cumstance s of the particular c rime,

or the char acte r and backg round of the individual de fenda nt. As our case h i s t o ry

re ve a ls, ho we ve r, the dis c re tio n a llo we d jud g e s a nd a tto rn e y s du ri ng se nte nc ing in first deg ree murder c ases is not u n fe t t er ed. Our constitutional standards re quire inq u iry into the reliability , rele vance , value, a nd prejudicia l effe ct of sente ncing evidenc e to pre serve fundame ntal fairne ss and protec t th erights of both the de fenda nt and the victim’s fa mily . The rule s of evidenc e ca n i n some instances be helpful g uid e s in r eachi ng the se de te rm inatio ns of a dmi ssi bil ity . T ri a l ju dg e s a re no t, howeve r, re q u i re d t o adher e strictly to the rules of e vidence . These r ules are too

re s t ri ct i v e a n d u n wi el d y

i n t h e a re n a o f c ap i t al s en t en ci n g.

45 S.W. 3d at 14 . T he qu e sti on ing wa s r e le va nt t o r e bu t te sti mon y abo ut D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s’ po sit ive c ha

ra c te r tr a its , inc lud ing a lle g a tio ns by Mr s. B arb e r that De fe nd a nt Th oma s a tte mpt e d to imp ro ve him se lf

wh ile inc arc e rate d. Th us , D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s is no t e nti tle d to re lie f on thi s c la im.

XIV. F ailure to Ac t as 13 Juror th
Def endant Thoma s also arg ues that the verdic t w as contra ry to the weig ht of the evide nce a nd the trial court, acting as thirteenth juror , shoul d have ove rturned the verdic ts. Tennessee Rule of Criminal P ro cedure 33(f

) provides tha t “[t] he trial c ourt may g rant a new tria l following a

verdic t of g uiltyif it disagr ees w it h t h e j ury about the we ight of

the evidenc e.” O ur supre me court has explained that “ Rule 33(f) imposes upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty t o s er v e a s the thirteenth juror in e very

criminal ca se . . . .” State v. Carter , 896 S.W .2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995)

. When the trial judg e simply overr ules a motion for new tria l, this C ourt may presume that the trial judge has ser ved as the thirteenth juror a nd approve d the jury ’s ver dict. See id.

I n the instant ca s e, t h e trial court simplyoverr uled the De fenda nt’s motion for new tria l wi tho ut makin g a ny

c omm e nts re g ard ing a

dis sa tis fa c tio n w ith the we ig ht o f the e vid e nc e . T hu s, thi s C o u r tp r e s u m e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r ta c t e d a s t h i r t e e n t h j u r o r a n d ap p r o v e d t h e v e r d i c t s o f t h e j u r y. Be cause the re cord c ontains no s t at em en t s by the trial court expressing dissatisfac tion or disag ree ment with the weig ht of the evide nce or the jury ’s ver dict, or indicating that the trial court mis un de rs too d it s r ole a s th irte e nthjur or , thi s Cou rt wi ll no t g ra nt the de fe nd a nt a ne w t ri a l on thi s basis. See State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 435-36 (Tenn. 1998).“ T h i s Cons t i t u t i on [ of t h e U n i t ed St at es of

Amer i ca ]
, a n d t h e l aw s of t h e U n i t ed St at es w h i ch s h al l be 3

m ad e in p ursu an ce t he reo f ; an d all t rea t i es m ad e, o r wh i ch shall b e m ad e, und er the a utho rit y of t he U nit ed S t ates, shal l be t he suprem e l aw o f t he l and ; and t he judges i n every s t at e shal l be bo und t hereb y , any t hi ng i n t he C o nst i t ut i o n or l aws of any s t at e t o t he co nt rary notwi t hst and i ng. ” U

. S.C o nst

. A rt

. 6[2

. ].

40 XV . I ndic tm e nt

F ail e d t o C har ge Ca pit al O ffens e

Def endant Thomas asserts that, pursua nt to Apprendi v. Ne w J erse y , 53 0 U. S. 4 66 , 1 20 S. Ct. 23 48 (2 00 0) , th e ind ic tme nt a g a ins t hi m di d n ot c ha rg e a c apit a l of

fe ns e and that he c a nn ot, there fore , be sente nced to more than lif e i mprisonment. Defe ndant’s ar g ument is based upon the pr e mis e that fi rs t de g re e mur de r is no t a c apit a l of fe ns e un le ss a c c omp a nie d b y a g g ra va tin g fa c tor s. Essentially , Def

endant Thoma s complains that the indictment returne d by the g rand jury

ch ar ges

non-ca pital first deg ree murder be cause the g rand jury did not find any

capital a g g ravating circ umstances. That is, Defenda nt Thomas alleg es that to satisfy the re quirements of A pprendi, the ind ic tme nt m us t in c lud e la ng ua g e of the statut ory a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s to e le va te the of fe ns e to capital murde r. B eca

use of this omiss i o n in the indictment, he ar g ues that the State wa s then pr e c lud e d f

ro m f ili ng a Rul e 12 .3 no tic e of

int e nt t o s e e k th e de a th p e na lty , w hic h pro vid e s th a t a notice of intent to see k the death penalty may be filed “ [w] here a ca

pital o ff en s e is charg ed in the indictment or prese ntment.” Tenn. R. C ri m

. P. 12.3(b). Def endant Thoma s asserts that, since a cap i t al offe nse wa s not charg ed in the indictment, the State could not then r ely upon ag g ravating fac tors to enhanc e his sentenc e to death.

Ou r s up re me c ou rt

ha s r e c e ntl y

ru led that

“ the pr inc ipl e s o f A pp re nd i do no t app ly to Tenne ssee’ s capital sente ncing proce dure. Neither the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion nor the Te nnessee Constit ution requires tha t the State char g e in the indictment the ag g ravating factors to be relied upon by the State during sentenc ing in a first deg ree murder prosec ution.” Delling er, 79 S.W .3d at 467. Thus, Def endant Thoma s is not entitl ed to re lief on this gr ound.

XVI. Tennessee’ s Death P enalty Schem e Violate s International Treaties

Def endant Thoma s next asserts that Tennessee’ s i mpositi on of a de ath pena lty violates United States treaties and henc e the f eder al constitution's Suprema cy Clause. Def

endant Thoma s 3 claims that the Supremac y Clause was v i o l ated whe n his rights unde r treaties and customary international law to which the United St ates is bound wer e dis reg arde d. Specifica lly , his arg ument is based upon two primary g rounds: (1) c ustomary

international law and spec ific international
trea ties prohibit capital punishm ent, and (2) customary international law and spec ific international
trea ties prohibit reinstatement of the death pe nalty by a g overnme ntal unit once it has be en abolished. This identical arg ument has recently been rejec ted bypanels of this Court in State v. Richard Odom

, No . W2 00 0- 02 30 1- CCA -R 3- DD , 2 00 2 WL 31 32 25 32 , a t ** 32 -3 5 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. , Jac ks on , O c t. 15, 2002), and State v. Robert Faulkner, No. W2001-02614-CCA-R3-DD, 2003 WL 22220341, at *3 1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , Jac ks on , Se pt. 26
, 20 03 ). We s e e no via ble re a so n to re so lve thi s is su e in a diffe rent manne r in the pre sent ca se. De fenda nt Thomas is not entitl ed to re lief on this issue.41 XVII. Tennessee’s D eath P enalty Schem e is Unconstitutional

Th e De fe nd a nt r a ise s n ume ro us c ha lle ng e s to the c on sti tut ion a lit y of Ten ness e e ’s de a th penalty provisions. I ncluded within his claim that the Tenne ssee death pena lty statutes violate the F i f t h
, S i x t h
, E i g h t h a n d F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d A r t i c l e I, S ec t i o n s 8
, 9
, 1 6
, an d 1 7
, an d Ar t i cl e II
, S ec t i o n 2 o f t h e T en n es s ee C o n s t i t u t i o n , ar e t h e f o l l o wi n g:

A. Te nn e sse e ’s de a th p e na lty statut e s f a il t o me a nin g fu lly

na rr ow the c la ss o f d e a th

e lig ibl e de fe nd a nts . Sp e c if ic a lly , th e statut ory

a g g ra va tin g c ir c ums ta nc e se t fo rth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 39-2-203( i)(2), (i)(5), (i)(6), a nd (i)(7) have be en so broadly

interpre ted whether viewed singly or collectively
, that they fail to provide

a mea ningf

ul basis for narrowing the population of those convic ted of fir st deg ree murder to those e ligible f or the sente nce of

death.

We note that fac tors (i)(5) , (i)(6) and (i)( 7) do not perta in to this case a s they wer e not found by the jury . Thus, any

individual claim with respec t to these fact o rs is without merit. See, e.g
., Ha ll, 95 8 S. W.2 d a

pp . a t 71 5; Sta te v. B ri mme r, 87 6 S.W.2 d 75, 87 (T e nn .) , c e rt . d e nie d, 51 3 U .S. 1020, 115 S. Ct . 585 (1994)

. Also, this arg ument has been reje cted by our supre me court. See Vann, 976 S.W .2d app. at 117- 118; State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 742 (Tenn. 1994)

.

B. The death se ntence is imposed capric iously and ar bitrarily in that

(1) Unlimited discre tion is vested in the prosec utor as to whether or not to seek the death pe nalty

.

Th is a rg ume nt h a s bee n re

je c te d. Se e Sta te v. Hi ne s, 91 9 S.W.2 d 573 , 582 (T e nn .1 99 5) , c e rt

. denied, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S. Ct. 133 (1996).

(2) Th e d eath penalty

is imposed in a discriminatory manner based upon r ace , g eog raphy , and g ender

. This arg ument has bee n reje cted. See State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 268 (Tenn. 1994)
,

cert. den. 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct . 743 (1995).

C. There are no uniform standar ds or proc edure s fo r j u ry s el ection to insure ope n inquiry conce rning potentially

prejudicia l subject matter.

This arg ument has bee n reje cted. See Cazes, 875 S.W .2d at 269.

D. The de ath qualif

i cation proc ess skews the ma ke-up of the jury and re sults in a rela tively prosec ution-prone, g uilt-prone jury

.42

This arg ument has bee n reje cted. See State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247 app. at 313 ( Tenn. 2002),

cert. den. 72 USL

W 3236, 124 S .Ct. 56 (2003), and c ases c ited there in.

E. Def endants a re pr ohibited from addr essing misconceptions about matte rs re levant to sentencing

. This arg ument has bee n reje cted. See id.

F . Re qu ir ing the jury to a g re e un a nim ou sly to a lif e ve rd ic t vi olate s Mc Ko y

v. No rth Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227 (1990) and Mills v. Mary land, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct . 1860 (1988).

This arg ument has bee n reje cted. See Reid, 91 S.W .3d app. at 313.

G. Ther e is a reasonable likelihood that jurors believe they must unanimouslyag ree as to the ex istence of mitigating circ umstances because of t he failure to instruct the jury on the meaning and func tion of miti g ating circ umstances.

This arg ument has bee n reje cted. See id.

H. The jury

is not required to make the ultima t e d et er m i n at ion that death is the appropriate pena lty

. This arg ument has bee n reje cted. See id.

I . The de fenda nt is denied final closing arg ument in the penalty phase of the trial.

This arg ument has bee n reje cted. See id.

J . Mandatory

introduction of victim impact evidenc e and ma ndatory introduction of other crime evidence upon the prosecutor’s request vi olates separation of power s and injects arbitra

riness and c apric iousness into capital sentenc ing.

This arg ument has been reje cted by a pane l of this Court. See State v. Robert Fa ulkner, No. W20 01 -0 26 14 -C CA -R 3- DD , 2 00 3 WL 22 22 03 41 , a t ** 36 -3 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. , Jac ks on , Se pt. 26, 2003).

K. The a

ppellate r eview pr ocess in death penalt y ca s es , including c ompara tive proportionality

revie w, is constitutionallyinadequate.43

Th is a rg ume nt h a s b e e n r e

je c te d. Se e Re id, 91 S.W. 3dapp . a t 31 3. Mo re ov e r, ou r s up re me court has held that, while important as an additional safe g uard ag ainst arbitra ry o r c ap ricious
sentenc ing, c ompara tive proportionality revie w is not constituti onally require d. See State v. B land, 958 S.W .2d 651, 663 (Tenn. 1997) , cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S. Ct. 1536 (1998).

XVIII. Revie w Pursuant to Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 39-13-206(c )

For a re viewing court to a ffirm the imposit ion of a de ath sentenc e, our c riminal code r equire s

a de te rm inatio n th a t:

(1) the se ntence was not imposed in an ar bitrary fashion; (2) the e vidence supports the jury ’s finding of statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance (s); (3) the evidenc e supports t he jury ’s finding that the ag g ravating c ircumstance s outweig h any mitigating circ umstances; and (4) the sentenc e is not e x cessive or disproportionate to the pe nalty imposed in simi lar

c a se s.

See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c) (1). The sentencing phase in the present case was c onducted pursuant t o t h e p roce dure e stablished in the applicable statutory provisions and rules of c riminal p r o c e d u r e

. We c o n c lu d e th a t th e s e n te n c e o f d e a th
, th e r e f o r e , w a s n o t imp o s e d in an arbitrary fashion. More over, the evidenc e indisputably supports ag g ravating circ umstance ( i)(2) ( Def endant Thomas was pr eviously

convicted of

one or more felonies whic h involve d the use or thr eat of violence to the pe rson), a nd further supports the jury ’s determination that this ag g ravating circ umstance outwe ighs a ny mitigating circ umstances.

Additionally , thi s Court is required by section 39-13- 206(c) (1)( D), Te nnessee Code Annotated, a nd under th e m an d ates of B land, 958 S.W.2d at 661-674, to consider whe ther the De fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e of

de a th i s d isp ro po rt ion a te to the pe na lty imp os e d in sim ila r c a se s. Se e Sta te v. Go ds e y , 6 0 S. W.3 d 7 59 , 7 81 -8 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) . T he c omp arativ e pr op ortio na lit y re vie w i s

“ de sig ne d to ide nti fy

abe rr a nt, arb itr ary , o r c apr ic iou s se nte nc ing by de te rm ini ng wh e the r the de a th penalty i n a given c ase is ‘disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicte d of the

sa me c ri me .’ ” Sto ut, 46 S.W. 3da t 70 6 ( qu oti ng B la nd , 9 58 S.W. 2da t 66 2 ( qu oti ng Pul le y v. Ha rris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43, 104 S. Ct. 871, 875 (1984))). “I f a c ase is ‘pla inly lacking in circumstanc es

c on sis te nt w ith tho se in c a se s w he re the death pe na lty ha s b e e n impo se d, ’ the n th e se nte nc e is disproportionate.” Stout, 46 S .W.3d at 706 (citation omitt ed).

I n c ondu cti ng ou r p ro po rt ion a lit y re vie w, thi s Co urt mu st c omp are the pr e se nt c a se wi th

c a se s in vo lvi ng sim ila

r d e fe nd a nts a nd sim ila

r crime s. Se e id. We se le c t only fr om tho se c a se s in wh ic h a c apit a l sen te nc ing he ari ng wa s ac tua lly c on du c te d to de te rm ine wh e the r the se nte nc e sh ou ld be life imprisonment, life imprisonmen t wi t h o u t the possibili ty of par ole, or de ath. See State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d 516, 570 (Te nn. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001). We b e g in w ith the pr e su mpt ion that th e se ntenc e of de a th i s p ro po rt ion a te wi th the c ri me of fi rs t de g re e mur de r. Se e Te rry v. Sta te , 4 6 S.W.3 d 147 , 163 (T e nn .) , ce rt . de n. 53 4 U .S. 10 23 , 1 22 S.Ct

.44

553 (2001), ( citing H all, 958 S.W .2d at 699). This pre sumption applies o nly if the sentenc ing proc ed u res f

ocus discre tion on the “‘pa rticularized natur e of the crime a nd the particularized char acte ris t i cs o f t h e individual defe ndant.’” See Te rry , 46 S.W .3d at 163 (c iting McCleske y v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987) (quoting Gre g g v. Geor g ia, 428 U.S. 153, 206, 96 S. Ct . 2909 (1976)) ).

Apply ing this appr oach, the Court, in comparing t h i s ca s e t o other c ases in which the defe ndants wer e convicted of the s ame or simil ar crimes, looks at the fa cts and c ircumstance s of the crime, the char acte ristics of the def endant, a nd the ag g ravating a nd mitigating fac tors involved. See Terry , 46 S.W .3d at 164. Rega rd i ng the circ umstances of the crime itself, numerous fa ctors ar e considere d including: ( 1) the mea ns of death, (2) t h e m an n er of death, (3) the motivation for the killing, (4) the place of death, (5) the victim’s a g e, phy sical condition, a nd psy cholog ical condition, (6) the ab s e n c e o r p r e s e n c e o f p r o v o c a ti o n , ( 7 ) th e ab s e n c e o r p r e s e n c e o f p r e me d it a ti o n , ( 8) the absenc e or pr esenc e of justifica tion, and (9) the injury to and ef fec t on non-dec edent victims. See Sto u t , 4 6 S .W.3d at 706 (citing B land, 958 S.W.2d at 667); see also Ter ry , 46 S.W .3d at 164. Contemplated within the review are numerous fac tors reg arding the defe ndant, including: (1) prior

c ri min a l re c or d, (2 ) a g e , r a c e , a ndg e nd e r, (3 ) m e nta l, e mot ion a l, a ndph y sic a l c on dit ion , ( 4) ro le in the m u rd er , (5) c ooperation with authorities, (6) level of remorse , (7) knowle dg e of the victim’s helplessness, and ( 8) potential for reha bilitation. S ee Stout, 46 S.W .3d at 706; T erry , 46 S.W .3d at 164.

I n completing our re view, we rema in cog nizant of the fac t that no two case s involve identical circ umstances. See g ener ally Terry , 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d at 164. M oreove r, we do not attempt to employ mathematica l or scientific me thodology

. See Bland, 958 S.W .2d at 668. Thus, our func tion is not to limi t our comparison to those case s wher e a de ath sentenc e is perf ectly sy mmetrical, but rather, our objec tive is onlyto identify and to invalidate the a

berr ant death se ntence

. See Te rry , 46 S.W .3d at 164 (c iting B land, 958 S.W.2d at 665).

In th is c a se , th e jur

y c on vic te d th e tw ent y -se ven -y ear-o ld Afri can- Am eri can d efen dan t of f ir st deg ree felony

murder. It i m p o s ed a death sente nce ba sed on the sing le statutory ag g ravating circ umstance tha t the defe ndant had a prior violent felony conviction. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204( i) (2). The proof e stablished that the then twenty -four -y ear -old Thomas shot the thirty -nine-y ear

old Africa n-American victim, J ames Day , in the back of the hea d. Da y , a uniformed g uard f or L oomis Farg o, had just picked up the de posit from the Walgr eens store on Summer Avenue . As Mr. Day left the store, Def

endant Thomas approa ched from behind, and, without demanding the money

or mee ting r esistance from Mr. Day , place d the g un to th e b ac k o f M r. Day ’s hea d and fire d. Evidence was int roduce d establishing that Def endant Thomas and Defenda nt Bond had planned the

ro b b er y t h e p re v i o u s d ay

. E v i d en ce al s o es t ab l i s h ed t h at i m m ed i at el y af t ert h e r o b b er y

an d s h o o t i n g, the t wo defendants divi ded their pr ocee ds and we nt shopping. Ea ch def endant pur chase d a new car within hours of the incident. While w at ching a ne ws report of the incident, De fenda nt Thomas exclaimed that he “g rabbe d the nig g er by the throat a nd shot him.”

Def endant Thomas’ criminal history includes eig ht prior convictions for ag g ravated robbe ry and one prior conviction for simple robbery . Def

endant Thomas was rele ased f rom prison less than45

two months prior to this offe nse. During the pe nalty phase, D efe ndant Thomas pre sented e vidence that his mother was a

bused by his father and then her second husband. His fathe r was rar ely prese nt in his li fe a nd he had a n extensive criminal rec ord. Wit h the exception that he wa s sorry for bringing down his family , there is no evidence of any remorse on the part of the Def endant for the loss of Mr

. Day ’s life. As f

or a pote ntial for re habilitation, the Defe ndant did earn his GED while in prison and did find employ ment following his incar cer ation but had been released f or only a short time bef

ore

c omm itt ing the c ur

re nt o ff e ns e . T he De fe nd a nt’ s f

a mil y ind ic a te d a

be lie f tha t th e De fe nd a nt c ou ld contribute to their lives, e ven if inca rce rate d.

Con sid e ri ng the na tur e of thi s c ri me a ndthe De fe nd a nt’ s c ha ra c te r, Te nn e sse e ’s app e llate courts h av e approved the death penalty in case s that have ma ny simil arities with this case. O ur supreme c ourt has upheld the de ath pena lty in n u m er o u s cases wher ein the def endant shot the

unarme d victim from close ra ng e and with no provoca tion. See, e.g ., State v. McKinney , 74 S.W .3d 29 1, 29 9 ( Te nn .) , c e rt . d e n. 53 7 U .S. 92 6, 12 3 S.Ct. 32 1 (20 02 ), (d e fe nd a nt s ho t un arm e d v ic tim in back of neck f rom close r ang e); Sims
, 45 S.W .3d at 19 (def endant shot una

rmed victim in bac k of head w ith no provocation); State v. He nderson, 24 S.W.3d 307, 316 ( Tenn.), c ert. de n. 531 U.S. 934, 12 1 S. Ct. 32 0 ( 20 00 ), ( defe nda nt s ho t un arm e d a ndun c on sc iou s d e pu ty sh e ri ff in h e a d a t c los e rang e); Bl and, 958 S .W.2d at 670 (defe ndant shot unarmed vic tim); S tout, 46 S.W .3d at 707 (d e fe nd a nt sho t vic tim in ba c k of he a d with no pr ov oc a tio n) . The de a th s e nte nc e ha s b e e n u ph e ld based on the sole ag g ravating circ umstance of a prior violent fe lony conviction, Tenn. Code A nn. § 3 9 -1 3 -2 0 4 (i )( 2 ). S ee , e. g. , McKinney , 74 S.W .3d at 291 (prior conviction for a g g ravated robbe ry ); St a te v

. Ch a lmers

, 2 8 S.W .3d 913 (Tenn. 2000) , cert. den. 532 U.S. 925, 121 S.Ct . 1367 (2001), (prior c onvictions for attempted e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

and attempted first de g ree murder) ; State v. Ke o u g h, 18 S.W .3d 175 (Tenn.) , cert. den. 531 U.S. 886, 121 S.Ct . 205 (2000), ( prior convictions for a ssault to commit vol untary manslaug hter a nd manslaug hter). T he prior violent felony fac tor is an ag g ravating c ircumstance that our suprem e co u rt has desc ribed a s “‘more qualitatively

persua sive and objec tivel y reliable than others.’” McKinney , 74 S.W .3d at 313 (q uo tin g Sta te v. Ho we ll

, 868 S.W .2d 238, 261 (Tenn. 1993) ). F inally , the death sentence has bee n af fi rm ed wh er e t h e d ef

en d an t s we re o f ap p ro x i m at el y t h e s am e a ge a s De fe n d an tT h o m as

. S ee , e. g. , Sta te v. Cart e r, 11 4 S. W.3 d 8 95 , 9 09 (T e nn . 2 00 3) (d e fe nd a nt twent y -fo ur y e ars old ); Smith

, 993 S.W. 2da t 6 ( tw e nty -thr e e -y e ar- oldde fe nd a nt) ; State v. Burns , 97 9 S.W.2 d 276 (T e nn .1 99 8) , c e rt

. de n. 52 7 U .S. 10 39 , 1 19 S.Ct . 2 40 2 ( 19 99 ), (t we nty -thr e e -y e ar- old de fe nd a nt sho t and kil le d v ic tim during robbery ); State v. Cribbs

, 967 S.W .2d 773 (Tenn.)
, cert. den. 525 U.S. 932, 119 S.Ct . 343 (1998) ( twenty -three -y ear -old defe ndant shot victim once in the hea d).

Upon our re view of the above a nd other c ases, we conclud e that this murder pla ces D efe ndant Thomas in the class of

defe ndants for whom the death penalty is a n appropriate punishment and that the death sentence imposed by the j ury in this case is proportionate to the penalty imposed in simi lar

case s. I n so concluding , we ha ve conside red t h e en t i re recor d and re ach the decision that the
sentenc e of de ath was not imposed ar bitrarily , that the e v i d ence supports the finding of the (i) (2) ag g ravator, that the evide nce supports the jury ’s findin g th at t h e a g g ravating c ircumstance outweig hs mitiga ti n g c ir c u ms ta n c e s b e y o n d a r e a s o n ab le d o u b t, a n d th a t th e s e n te n c e is n o t e xc e s s ive or disproportionate.46 Iss ue s R ais e d by D e fend ant Bond I. Testim ony of

Angela Jackson The State c alled Ang ela J ackson as a rebuttal witness at the close of the De fenda nts’ proof. During rebuttal, the pr osecution aske d Ms. J ackson w hether Ms. J ackson had contac ted t he District Atto rn e y ’s Of

fi c e ir a te be c a us e he r n a me ha d b e e n in the ne ws pa pe r d ue to h e r b e ing a

wi tne ss during this trial. The prose cution ultimatel y el i ci t ed t est imony that Ms. J ackson w as af raid of Def endant Thoma s. Th e qu e sti on ing wa s in re sp on se t o Defen dan t T ho ma s’ c ha lle ng e to M s. Jac ks on ’s mo ti vat io n for te sti fying a g a ins t D e fe nd a nt T ho ma s. Def endant B ond complains that
te sti mon y of Ms. Jac ks on ’s fr

us tr a tion wi th her name be ing in the ne ws pa pe r i s ir re le va nt t o establish her f

ear of De fenda nt Thomas. As the State points out, Defenda nt Bond fa iled to object to this t estimony

at trial. More over, althoug h Def endant Thoma s did ex press c oncern as to the

c on te nt o f the ne ws pa

pe r artic le , he a lso fa ile d to ob je c t a s to the re le va nc y

of the te sti mon y . T hu s, any alleg ed er

ror is wa ived. See Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a).

Notwithstanding w aiver , there was no mention of D ef en d an t Bond during Ms. Jackson’s rebuttal testimony . The testimon y wa s l i m i t ed in scope a nd duration. Any assertion that the jury would attribute Ms. J ackson’ s fea r of Thomas to D efe ndant Bond is unfounde d in the rec ord. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitti ng this li ne of que stioning. More over, D efe ndant Bond has failed to e stablish that he was prejudice d by the admission of such testimony

. Def endant Bond is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

Iss ue s J oin tl y R ais e d by B ot h De fend ant Thom as and D e fend ant Bond I. Unconstitutional Select ive P rosec ution The major violator s unit, MVU, was cr eate d by fede ral g rant in the 1970s in re sponse to a need in Shelby County to targ et re peat of fende rs. The judg es of the Shelby CountyCriminal Court ag ree d that MVU ca ses s h o u l d b e h andled by a spec ific judg e in a spe cific c ourtroom. Once an of fe nd e r is de sig na te d MV U by the Di stric t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, the c a se is auto ma tic a lly a ssi g ne d to Division V of the Shelby CountyCrimi nal Court. This prog ram g ives the District Attorney discretion to desig nate a ny defe ndant with mu l t i p l e fe lony convictions an MVU c ase, a fter w hich one prose cutor is desig nated to re main with the case throug h final di sposition. Rather than dividing the manag ement and r esponsibilityfor a case among numerous prosecutors as it m oves throug h pretrial and tri al
, t h i s vertica l method of prosec ution avoids ex cessive de lay and promotes the mor e

e ff ic ie nt p ro se c uti onof

repeat o ffen ders . Un der LEAA(L aw En for cem ent As si st ance A ge nc y ) g ra nts in th e 1 9 7 0 s , o n e c o u r tr o o m w a s e s ta b li s h e d to h a n d le M V U c a s e s

. O n e c o u r t w a s to handle the M V U c a s e s f

o r e x p e d i e n c y a n d p u rp o s e s o f j u d i c i a l e c o n o m y.

Def endants Thomas a nd Bond r aise sever al complaints arising from their desig nation as an MVU ca se. Specific ally , Def en d ant Thom as asse rts that, beca use his case was c lassified by the of fi c e of the Di stric t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l as a maj or

vio la tor , mu lti ple vio la tor , o r M VU c a se pr ior to ind ic tme nt, the pr os e c uti on , in e ff e c t, d ir e c te d th e She lby

Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt Cle rk ’s Of fi c e to assig n this case to Division V of the Criminal Court. Acc ording ly , h e all eg es that the District Attorney eng ag es in unconstitutional se lective prosec ution a nd is in violation of Rule 4 of the Rules of Practice and Proce dure in the Criminal Courts of Shelby County . Def

endant B ond claims that the trial court’ s failure to require assig nment under Rule 4.01, L ocal Rules of Shelby CountyCriminal47

Court, violated his constituti onal rig hts. At the trial level, De fenda nt(s) soug ht relief in the f orm of (1) dismissal of the indictment due to unconstitutional selective pr osecution, (2) rec usal of the trial court due to acquiesc ence in the prosec ution’s disreg ard of Rule 4.01, and (3) remova l of the District At torne y Ge ne ra l fo r the 30 Judic ia l Di stric t. Th e tr ia l c ou rt , in ru lin g on the De fe nd a nts ’ m oti on s, th fo un d, in r e le va nt p art :

I just truly believe that even taking all of the defe ndant’s fac tual assertions as being completely

true, that their motions are without merit, they ’re not w ell-take n, and that the r e ’ s n o p u rp o s e to b e s e r v e d b y ta k in g p r o o f in th is c a s e

. I ’ ll a c c e p t ever y thing they say as being true with reg ard to the procedure s that are followed – in terms of desig nating case s for MVU in te rms of having the g rand jury funnel the MVU case s to D ivi sio n V . Bu t eve n with a ll of tho se fa c ts be ing the c a se , I thi nk the la w i s st ill

ve ry we ll s e ttl e d tha t that pro c e du re do e s not v iol a te e qu a l pr ote c tio n o r d ue pr oc e ss in any reg ard.

. . . But the sa me principle – so y ou don’t have prosec utors running t o t en or twelve differ ent courts, prosecutors tha t handled [ certain types of case s] can go to one or two courts. Those judg es can familiarize themselves with sente ncing alternatives. And it’s that type of pr

inciple, I think, that has been in e x istence w ith reg ard to major violators since its inception in the mid to late 70s; and I think there a re sound r easons for it, sound public-policy rea sons, sound leg al re asons; and abse nt any showing of specific denial of due proce ss or equa l p rotec tion, any specific prejudice resulting from the f

act that these i n d i v iduals are in this di vision of court set for trial, the proce ss itself, I

don’t t h i n k
, can be assailed g iven the ca se law tha t allows it and supports it and states that there is no constituti onal depri v at i on with this t ype of sy ste m.

L oc a l Ru le 4. 01 , Ru le s o f the She lby Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt, p ro vid e s:
The following method will be employ ed by the Criminal Court Cl erk’ s Offic e for the initial assig nment of cases t o the t en divi sions of Court. The f ollowing ty

pes of ca ses will be assigned to the t en divi sions of court in numerical orde r beg inning wi t h Di v i s i o n I

t h ro u gh X as t h e i n d i ct m en t s ar e f i l ed i n t h e C ri m i n al C o u rt C l er k 's Offic e. This proce dure shall be used in the foll owing types of case s: Murder in the F ir st D e g re e , A tte mpt

Mu rd e r i n th e F ir st D e g re e , Co ns pir a cy to C omm it F ir st De g re e Mu rd e r, Se c on d D e g re e Mu rd e r, Ag g ra va te d K idn apping , E sp e c ia lly A g g r a v a t e d R o b b e r y, A g g r a v a t e d R ap e , A g g r a v a t e d A r s o n , A g g r a v a t e d R o b b e r y, Rape, Ag g ravated Sexual Battery
, Voluntary Manslaug hter, Ve hicular H omicide, Kidnapping , Robbery , Spousal Rape and Incest. All other c ases will be divided equally among the ten divisions of t h e Court. All salary petitions filed by

the Criminal Court C lerk a nd the Sheriff will be hear d by

the Administrative J udg e.

Rul e 4. 05 , Ru le s o f the She lby Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt, p ro vid e s:48 The judg es may

transfe r ca ses among themselves by mutual consent. It is not

nece ssary that the parties or their c ounsel consent to such transf er. A party

reque sting

a transfe r of a case from one division to another division shall obtain an orde r fr om the Court to which the ca se is assig ned, tra nsfer ring the ca se to another

division.

Def endants c ontend that the MVU classification viol ates Rul e 4.01. We conclude othe rwise. Rule 4.05 specific ally permits judge s of t he Shelby CountyCriminal Court to t ransf er c ases a mong themselv es b y m u t u al consent. I t appea rs from the f

indings of the trial court that the judg es of Shelby Countyby

mutual consent have had in place a sy stem for more than twe nty y ear s in which MV U d e fe nd a nts wo uldbe tr ie d in on e pa rt ic ular di vi si on of th e c ou rt . T he re is n o r ig ht, constitutional or otherwise, be stowed upon a c riminal defe ndant by Rule 4.01. I ndeed, a

defe ndant does not have the rig ht to have his ca se hea rd by a particular judg e, see Sinit o v. United States

, 750 F.2d 512, 515 ( 6 Cir. 1984), neither doe s he have the rig ht to any particula r proc edure for the th selec tion of a hearing judge , see Cruz v. Abbate , 812 F.2d 571, 574 ( 9 Cir. 1987), nor does he enjoy th the ri g h t t o h a v e a j u d g e s e l e c t e d b y a r a n d o m d r a w , s e e S i n i t o , 7 5 0 F

. 2 d a t 5 1 5

. R a t h e r , t h e ru le appea rs t o be an administrative rule cre ated to ensure an even di stribution of cases among the va rious div isi on s o f the She lby

Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt.

Pr a c tic a l r e a lit ie s d ic ta te the a llo c a tio n o f l imi te d pub lic re so ur c e s. Ac c or din g ly , “ ou r c ou rt s

mus t a ff or d pu bli c of

fi c ia ls s ub sta nti a l di sc re tio n w ith re g ard to l a w e nf

or c e me nt d e c isi on s. ” Sta te v. Harton , 108 S.W .3d 253, 261 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Bor denkirc her v. Hay es , 43 4 U .S. 35 7, 36 4, 98 S. Ct. 66 3 (1 97 8) ). We r e c og nize , h ow e ve r, that th e c la ssi fi c a tio n o f a de fe nd a nt a s a major viol at o r and the subsequent assig nment of MVU c ases to one division of court impli cate s issues of selec tive prosec ution and due proc ess on the judicial assig nment phase of adjudication.

The Due Process Clause impose s s t ri ct neutra lityrequire ments on officia ls performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195, 102 S. C t. 1665 (1982). Those require ments are not applicable to those acting in a prosec utorial or plaintiff- like capa city

. See Marshall v. J errico, I nc ., 446 U.S. 238, 248, 100 S. C t. 1610 (1980). “In an adve rsary sy stem, [prosecutors] are ne cessa rily permitted to be zealous in their enfor ceme nt of the law.” I d. Whe n p ro se c uto ri a l r a the r tha n ju dic ia l f un c tio ns are inv olv e d, th e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i n t e re sts in a c c ur a te finding of fa cts and a

pplication of law, a nd in preser ving a fair a nd o p en process for decision, ar e not to the same deg ree implicated. See id.

I n light of the role that prose cutors play as advoc ates, at least two state courts have c oncluded that ju dic ia l a ssi g nme nt s y ste ms a llo wi ng pr os e c uto rs to s e le c t th e jud g e a ssi g ne d to a pa rt ic ula r c a se violate due pr ocess. In State v. Simps on , 551 So.2d 1303 (L a. 1989) ( per curiam), the defe ndant filed an a pplication for a

supervisory writ seeking rea ssignment of his case to another judg e. Noting that the prosec utor and the defe nse attorney had stipulated that in the L ouisiana district at issue, the prosec ution was allowed to sele ct the judg e who pr esided ove r criminal cases, the L ouisiana Sup re me Cou rt

g ra nte d th e writ. Th e c ou rt re a so ne d:T he Se vent h C i rcui t did no t e, how ever, t hat ‘ [t ]he pract i ce o f al l o wi ng t he p rosecut o r t o cho o se t he grand 4 j u r y a n d h en ce t h e t r i al j u dg e i s c er t ai n l y u n s i g h t l y ” an d “ l ac k [ s ] t h e appe ar an ce of i mpar t i al i t y

. ” 50 F. 3d a t 442.

49 To meet due proce ss require ments, capital and other fe lony case s must be allotted for
t r i a l t o t h e v ar i o u s d i v i s i o n s o f t h e c o u r t , o r t o j u d g e s a s s i g n e d c r i m i n a l c o u r td u t y,

on a ra ndom or rotating basis or under some other pr ocedur e adopte d by t he court wh ic h d oe s n ot v e st the dis tr ic t a tto rn e y wi th p ow e r t o c ho os e the jud g e to w ho m a particula r ca se is assig ned.

I d. at 1304 (footnotes omitted). The Simps on court based this conclusion on the conce pt that “[d] ue proce ss of law re quires funda mental fa irness, i.e., a fair trial in a fa ir tribunal.” I d. (citing Turner v. L ouisiana

, 37 9 U .S. 46 6, 85 S. Ct . 5 46 , 1 3 L .E d. 2d42 4 ( 19 65 ); Sta te v. Me jia

, 250 L a. 518, 197 So.2d 73 (1967)). The court noted de cis i o n s fr o m o t her jurisdictions conc luding that c ourts may utiliz e diffe rent methods of assig ning criminal case s to judge s, but observed that these dec isions do not stand for the pr oposition t hat the prose cutor may assig n case s to the judge of his or her choice

. I d. at 1304 n.3.

I n an ea rlier de cision, a Ne w York state court t o o k a simil ar a pproac h. I n McDona ld v. Go lds te in

, 191 Misc. 863, 8 3 N. Y.S .2d 620 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948), the court rejec ted a district attorney ’s cha lleng e to an or der dive sting his offic e of its long -ac cepte d au thority to select judg es for c riminal case s. See id. at 622 ( noting that “ [t ]he District Attorney for some time pa st has selec ted the judge i n eac h caseby moving indictments for

trial direc tly

to the sever al parts of the court.”). Th e c ou rt ba se d it s ruli ng on g e ne ra l pr inc ipl e s of jud ic ia l in de pe nd e nc e , n oti ng that ju dg e s sh ou ld be free fr o m o u tside control, espe cially by any of the litigants. See id. at 625 (“It is the people’s p r e r o gat i v e, n o tt h e D i s t ri ct At t o rn ey ’s t o s aywh o wi l l p re s i d e o v ert h e C o u n t y C o u rt o f K i n gs County .”).

I n c on tr a st to Simp so n a ndMc Do na ld

, most feder al courts tha t ha ve addre ssed the issue of prosec utorial involvement in judicial assig nments have not found due proce ss violations. I n Ty son

v

. T ri gg , 50 F.3d 436, 439- 42 (7th Cir. 1995), ce rt. den. 516 U.S. 1041, 116 S.Ct . 697 (1996), ( Ty son I I ), the most rec ent and thoroug h of these fede ral decisions, the Seventh Circuit r ejec ted an a rg ument raised in a

habea s corpus proc eeding that the ca se assig nment sy s t em i n an I ndiana state court violated the def

endant’ s due proc ess rig hts. The sy stem in question allowed the pr osecutor to se lect one of six gra nd ju ri es t o whi ch a pr oposed indictment would be pre sented. Ea ch g rand jury was assig ned to a spe cific judge
, and thus, by selec ting the g rand jury
, prosec utors implicitl y chose the judge to which t he case would be assigned. The habeas petitioner in Ty son I I did not arg ue that the assig ned judg e wa s prejudice d ag ainst him. I nstead, he asserted t hat to allow the prose cutor to pick the judge so g reatly stacks the dec k ag ainst the defe ndant as to make the trial unfa ir -- so unf air a s to deny due proc ess of law

. I d. at 439.

The Seve nth Circuit r ejec ted that arg ument. First, it noted a lac k of pre cede nt holding that 4
prosecu t orial steering c ould constitute a due proc ess violation warr anting the re versa l of a50

co n v i ct i o n

. Ad d i t i o n al l y , i tco n cl u d ed t h at t he fa ct t h at t h e p ro s ec u t o r m i gh tgai n a c er t ai n ad v an t age over the defe ndant in being allowed to se lect the judge did not render the trial funda mentally

unfair. See id. at 440-41. It rea s o n ed t h at t h e American sy stem of criminal procedur e is not balanc ed

e qu a lly be tw e e n th e pr os e c uti on a nd the de fe ns e a t e ve ry sta g e , bu t r a the r r e pr e se nts a n a g g re g a te of imbalanc es. I d. at 440. Thus, prosec utors have certain advanta g es in the investigative stag e and in impeaching witnesses, while the r ules on burdens of

proof f avor de fenda nts. See id. Absent any alleg ation that the jud ge s el ected by the prosec utor was a ctually biased a g ainst the defe ndant, the imb a la nc e c a us e d b y

the I nd ia na

sy ste m w a s n ot s o e g re g iou s a s to a ff e c t th e fa ir ne ss o f the tr ia l.

Severa l other fe dera l courts have held that, i n order to establish a due proce ss violation for prosec utorial judg e-shopping , a def endant must demonstrate actua l prejudice by the assig nment of

a pa rt ic ula r j ud g e to h is c a se . F or

e xamp le , in Un ite d St a te s v . G a llo

, 763 F.2d 1504, 1532 ( 6th Cir. 1985), ce rt. den. 474 U.S. 1068, 106 S.Ct 826 (1986), the Six th C i rc u i t re j ec ted the def

endant’ s arg u me n t th a t h e w a s e n ti tl e d to a n e w tria l b e c a u s e th e p r o s e c u to r s h a d e n g a g e d in a pattern of steering signific ant criminal case s to the judge s of their c hoice. See id. The court relied on its ear lier decision i n Sinit o v. United States

, supra, in w hich it ha d held that due pr ocess c oncerns were not imp lic a te d b y

a c le ri c a l error r e su lti ng in the a ssi g nme nt o f a c a se to a dif fe re nt j ud g e tha n w ou ld have sat absent the e rror . See Ga llo

, 763 F.2d at 1532. The Sinito panel had co n cl u d ed t h at “a defe ndant does not ha ve the rig ht to have his c ase hear d by a particular judg e,” doe s not “have the rig ht to have his judg e sele cted by a ra ndom d ra w, ” an d “is not denied due pr ocess [when the

se le c tio n p ro c e ss i s n ot o pe rate d in com pl ian ce w ith loc a l rule s] . . . u nle ss h e c a n p oin t to so me

re su lti ng pr e

jud ic e .” Sin ito

, 750 F.2d at 515. The Ga llo panel found this rea soning dispo sitive, reje cting the def

endant’ s arg ument beca

use he ha d no t al l ege d t h at t he trial judg e wa s in any way disqualified to hear

his case. 763 F .2d at 1532. Sever al other de cis i o n s have similarly require d a

s h o wi n g o f p re

j u d i ce

. S ee , e. g. , Un ite d St a te s v . E rw in

, 155 F.3d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 1998), ce rt. den. 525 U.S. 1123, 119 S.C t. 906 (1999); United States v. Osum

, 943 F.2d 1394, 1401 ( 5th Cir. 1991).

Althou g ha ll of these dec isions offer he lpful and re levant ana ly sis, they differ from the instant

case . First, we hesitate to conc lude that the desig nation of a criminal defe ndant as a major violator by the District Att orney Gene ral a nd his Assistants constit utes judg e-shopping . Once a def endant is d e te rm ine d to qu ali fy a s a ma jor vio la tor , th e Di stric t A tto rn e y do e s n ot s e le c t w ha t di vis ion to which the c ase w ill be assigned. Rather, it appea rs t hat t he judges of the Shelby CountyCriminal Cou rt sp e c if ic a lly de sig na te d D ivi sio n V to h e ar s uc h c a se s. No tw ith sta nd ing , ev e n if we we re to consider this proc ess judg e-shopping , we a re a lso cog nizant that the judge assig ned to MV U ca ses has bee n sworn to upho l d t h e law a nd defe nd the Constitut ion, and his or her conduct c an be scrutinized through ap pellate r eview. We pr esume hone sty and integ rity

in those acting as

a dju dic a tor s. Se e With ro w v. L arkin, 42 1 U.S. 35 , 47, 95 S. Ct. 145 6 (19 75 ). Th us , we re fu se to p r e s u m e t h a t t h e j u d g e a s s i g n e d t o M V U d e s i g n e e s a c t s a s a n a g e n t o f t h e p r o s e c u t o r

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, it d oes no t appea

r t o th is C ou rt

that th e de sig na tio n o f D ivi sio n V a s th e MV U c ou rt ne c e ssa ri ly results in a court in which the determination of g uilt or innocence cannot r eliably be made

.I n h i s r epl y bri ef
, D ef endan t T homas makes va gu e r ef er enc es t o hi s equa l prot ect i on r i gh t s ha vi ng been 5

v io la te d up o n his c a se ’s M V U d e sig n a tio n . H e c ites u s to no c a se s in su p p o rt o f t h is p ro p o sitio n , ho w e v e r. A cco rdingl y , t hi s “i ss ue” i s waived. See T enn. C t

. C ri m

. A p p

. R

. 10 (b).

51 Finally , Def

endants ha ve fa iled to establish that they wer e pre judiced by

the assig nment of their ca se to Division V. Acc ording ly , we c annot conc lude that the De fenda nts were deprive d of a fa ir tr ia l by a ssi g nme nt t o D ivi sio n V no r do we c on c lud e that by a ssi g nin g MV U d e fe nd a nts to Division V, the S h el b yCountyCourts are in violation of L ocal Rule 4.01. This issue is without

me ri t. 5

II. P ropriet y of S tate ’s Argum ent to Jury

Th e Te nn e ss e e Sup re me Cou rt ha s r e c og nize d th a t “ arg ume nt o f c ou ns e l is a va lua ble pr ivi le g e that shou ld not be un du ly re stric te d. ” Smit

h v . St a te , 527 S.W .2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1975)

. At torne y s h a ve g re a t le e way in a rg uin g be fo re a

jury , a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt ’s br oa d dis cret io n in controlling their arg uments will be reve rsed only upon an abuse of discretion. See Te rry , 46 S.W .3d at 156. Howeve r, closing arg ument must be temperate, must be predic ated on e vidence introduced du ri ng the tr ia l of the c a se a nd mus t be pe rt ine nt to the iss ue s bei ng tr ie d. Se e Rus se ll v . St a te , 532 S.W .2d 268, 271 (Tenn. 1976) . The S tate is more limited in its prerog ative due to the pr osecutor’ s role a s a seek er o f j u s tice, rather than a mere advocate. See Coker v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357, 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overr uled on other grounds, St ate v. West, 19 S .W.3d 753 (Tenn. 2000).

“ Th us , th e state mus t re fr a in f ro m arg ume nt d e sig ne d to inf la me the jury

a ndsh ou ld r e stric t it s commentary

to mat t er s i n ev i d ence or issues at tria l.” I d. Prosecutoria l misconduct during arg ument does not constitute reve rsible err or unless it a ppear s that the outcome was a ffe cted to the defe ndant’s pre

judice. See State v. B ane , 57 S.W .3d 411, 425 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Both De fenda

nts contend that the prose cu t o r’ s o p en i n g s t at em en tan d cl o s i n g ar gu m ents were

so marre d by misconduct as to r equire a new trial. We note first, howeve r, that De fenda nt Thomas and De fenda nt Bond’s f ailure to objec t to openin g an d closing arg ument at trial wa ives our consideration of this issue on appea l. See Tenn. R. A pp. P. 36( a) (providing that relief i s n ot require d for a

party who fa iled to t ak e re asonablyavailable action to pre vent or nullify an er ror) ; Sta te v. L itt le

, 854 S.W .2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that the def endant’ s failure to object to the State’s alleg ed misconduct during closing arg ument waives that issue). Thus, wher e a pr o s e c u ti n g a tt o r n e y ma k e s a ll e g e d ly o b

je c ti o n ab le r e ma

rk s d u r in g c lo s in g ar g u me n t, b ut no contemp o ra n eo us objection is made, the c omplaining de fenda nt is not entit led to relief on appea l unless the re marks consti t u te “plain e rror .” See T enn. R. App. P. 36(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b); S t a t e v. Smit h

, 2 4 S .W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000). I n determining whe ther a n alleg ed trial e rror constitutes “plain er

ror,” we c onsider five fac tors: 1) the re cord must clea rly establish what occ urre d at trial; 2) a c lear

and unequivoc al rule of

law must have be en bre ache d; 3) a substantial rig ht of the defe nd ant must have be en adve rsely aff ecte d; 4) the def

endant did not waive the issue for ta ctical

rea sons; and 5) consider ation of the e rror is “nec essary

to do substantial just ice.” See State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Ultimately , the er ror must have “had an unfa ir prejudicia l impact which undermined the funda mental fa irness of the trial.” I d. at 642.52 A. Gr e e d a ndEv il The prose cutor for the S tate who made opening statement in this case beg an, “You can’ t hide fr om g re e d a nde vil

. Jame s D a y le arn e d th a t le sso n o n A pr il 2 1 , 1 99 7 .

. . .” She c on tin ue d: st “James Day

learned y ou can’ t hide from g ree d and evil,” and “He walked i nto the path of gr eed a nd evil.” Throug hout opening statement, the prose cutor re fer red collectively to Defe ndant Thomas and Def endant B ond as “g ree d and evil.” This theme was r epeated during closing arg ument, in which both prosecutor s made re fer ence s that “James D ay couldn’t hide from g ree d and evil,” “ther e wa s no hiding from or e scaping the circ le of g ree d and evil,” a nd “g ree d and evil re ally didn’t car e that day whether he lived or die d.” The prosecutors refe rre d to the Def endants a s “g ree d and evil” a total of t wenty

- o n e ti me s d u r in g th e o p e n in g s tate me n t a n d c lo s in g ar g u me n ts o f th e g u il t p h a s e o f

the trial. Def

endant Thoma s an d De fenda nt Bond, ne ither of whom e ntere d a conte mporane ous ob je c tio n to the se state me nts , ask thi s Co urt to fi nd pla in e rr or

in the Sta te ’s c on du c t. S e e Te nn . R. Crim. P. 52(b).

I t is imp ro pe r f

or the pr os e c uto r t o u se e pit

he ts to ch ara c te ri ze a

de fe nd a nt. Th e pr os e c uto rs ’ repe ated r efe renc es to Def endant Thomas and Defenda nt Bond as “g ree d and evil” was improper

. See, e.g ., Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d at 737 (evil one ) ; State v. Bates , 804 S.W .2d 868, 881 (Tenn. 1991) (ra bid dog) ; State v. L adonte Montez Smith, No. M1997-00087-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1210813, at *12 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, Dec

. 17, 1999) (g uilty dog ); State v. J oel Guilds, No. 01C01- 9804-CC-00182, 1999 WL 333368, at * 5 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, May 27, 1999) (this clown). When a prosec utor eng ag es in improper a rg ument, we m ust also consider the c urative me asure s take n b y the c ou rt a nd /or the pr os e c uti on ; the pr os e c uto r’ s in te nt i n ma kin g the imp ro pe r r e mark s; the cumulative e ffe ct of the e rrone ous statements and a ny other e rror s in the rec ord; and the re lative streng th or wea

kness of the c ase. See Big bee, 885 S.W.2d at 809; State v. Buc k, 670 S.W .2d 600, 609 (Tenn. 1984)

.

Her e, we find the prose cutors’ c omments unse emly but ha rmless in the context of the entire arg ument. No cur ative instruction was pr ovided primarily beca use neither

Def endant Thoma s nor Def enda n t Bo n d o bjected to the c hara cterization. M oreove r, the State’s c ase w as strong and the eff ect of the err or was insignifica nt. I n short, the State’s improper arg ument did not undermine the fundame ntal fairne ss of the trial, and we ther efor e conc lude that this issue ga ins the Defe ndants no relief

.

B . D on ’t Gi ve De fe nd a nts a

F re e bie During opening s t at em en t of the pe nalty phase, c ounsel for D efe ndant Thomas stated, “[Defe ndant] Thomas will never g et out of jail. He’ ll be in there, at the ear liest, until he’s e ighty .” I n response to this st atement, the pr osecutor be g an her closing arg ument with,

I ’m g oin g to sta

rt of f thi s mor nin g by apo log izin g

. . . f or wa sti ng y ou r t ime this week be cause y ou hear d it, they ’re both doing a lot of time alre ady . “Why in the53

world ar e we down here? L et’s jus t forg et t his murder. I ’m sorry , Ms. Day , J ames Day ’s death should be a fr eebie . I mean, they ’re alre ady

doing a lot of time.”

Def endants contend that it was improper to a rg ue that a de fenda nt should be sentence d to death as

a dd iti on a l pu nis hme nt f

or a pr e vio us c on vic tio n. Th e Sta te c on te nd s th a t th is w a s a pr op e r r e sp on se to Defe n d an t T h o ma s’ attempt to minimi ze the curr ent crime by emphasizing the pe nalties he a lrea dy fac ed.

Whil e c o mm u n it y c o n s c ie n c e ar g u me n ts ar e g e n e r a ll y imp r o p e r , a

p r o s e c u to r ’ s c lo s ing arg ument must be evalua ted in light of t h e d ef en s e arg ument that prec eded it. See D arde n v. Wainwrig ht

, 477 U.S. 168, 179, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2470 (1986). Her e, both Defe ndants ig nore tha t it wa s defe nse counsel who f irst invoked community

conscie nce by

telling the jur ors that Def endant Thomas had a lrea dy

been se ntence d to a leng thy period of c onfinement. Obviously the prosec utor’s

c omm e nt w a s a

re sp on se to tha t st a te me nt.

I n Dar den

, supra

, the Supreme Court c onsidered the following fac tors in determining that
the pr os e c uto rs ’ c los ing arg ume nt d id n ot d e pr ive the de fe nd a nt o f a fa ir tr ia l:

Th e pr os e c uto rs ’ a

rg ume nt d id n ot m a nip ulate or mis state th e evi den c e , n or didit implicate other specific rig hts of the ac cused suc h as the rig ht to counsel or the right to remain silent. M uch of the obj ectionable content wa s invited by or wa s responsive
to the op e nin g su mmatio n o f the de fe ns e

. . . . [ T] he ide a of “ inv ite d r e sp on se ” is used not to excuse improper comments, but to determine the ir eff ect on the trial as

a wh ole . T he tr ia l c ou rt

ins truc te d th e jur or s se ve ra l tim e s th a t th e ir de c isi on wa s to be made on the basis of the evidenc e alone, and that the ar g uments of counse l were not evidence . The we ight o f t h e evidence ag ainst petitioner was he avy ; the

“ ov e rw he lmi ng e y e wi tne ss a nd c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e to su pp ort a fi nd ing of

g uil t on all char g es,” r educe d the likelihood that the jury ’s dec ision was i n fl uence d by

arg ume nt.

. . . “ Da

rden’s tr ia l w a s n ot p e rf e c t- -f e w a re

-- bu t ne ith e r w a s it fundame ntally

unfair.”

I d. at 181-83 (c itations omi tted). Simil ar f actor s are prese nt here . Doub t l es s the testimony of the

n u merous witnesses and the admission by Def endant Bond did f

ar more to se al their fate than a single abbre viated comment by the prosec utor during closing arg ument. As in Darde n , the trial may not have be en per fec t, but it was fair a nd no reve rsible er ror c an be pr edicated on the prose cutor’s

c los ing arg ume nt.
III . A dm iss ion of Ex pe r t T e st im ony Def endant Thoma s complains that the t rial court committed sever al errors with re g ard to the

a dmi ssi on of e xpe rt te sti mon y

. Spe c if ic a lly
, De fe nd a nt T ho ma s c omp la ins (1 ) D r. Ga rd ne r s ho uld

no t ha ve be e n p e rm itt e d to te sti fy a nd make c omm e nts re g ard ing the vic tim ’s the ra py , ( 2) Dr . Sm ith54

sh ou ld n ot h a ve be e n p e rm itt e d to pr ov ide op inion s as to the tr e a tme nt o f the vic tim imm e diate ly afte r the shoo t i n g, (3) Dr . Smit h should not have bee n qualified a s a ballistics expert, and (4) D r. Smit h should not have been permitted to testify about events in the hospital immediately afte r the victim was shot. Defe ndant B ond joins Defenda nt Thomas’ complaints re g arding (1) Dr . Smit h’s
te sti mon y re g ard ing the dia g no sis a ndtr e a tme nt of the vic tim

a s a liv ing pa tie nt a nd(2 ) D r. Smith be ing qu a lif

ie d a s a n e xpe rt

in b a lli sti c s.

A witness qualified a s an expert by knowledg e, skill, experienc e, tra ining, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or ot herw ise, provided the scientific, tec hnical, or othe r spec ialized knowledg e will substantially assist the trier of fac t to understand the e vidence or to determine a fa ct in issue. See Tenn. R. Evid. 702. An e x pert may base his or he r opinion upon fac ts or data imparted to or perc eived by

the expert prior to or at a hearing; the f acts or data nee d not be admissible if they

are the ty p e o f fa ct s o r data rea sonably

relied upon by

experts. See Tenn. R. Evid. 703. I f the underly ing f

acts or data l ack trustworthiness, the court shall disallow expert testimony based upon them. See id. Evidence and expert testimony reg arding scientific theory must be both releva nt and reliable befor e it may be admitted. See McDa niel v. CSX Transp., I nc. , 955 S.W .2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 19 97 ). Th e tr ia l c ou rt

ha s b ro ad disc re tio n in re so lvi ng qu e sti on s c on c e rn ing the qu a lif ic a tio ns , admissibili ty , rele vance , and competency of ex pert testim ony

. See State v. Stevens

, 78 S.W .3d 817, 83 2 (Tenn. 2002) . An appe llate court should not overturn a trial c ourt’s dec ision in admit ting or

e xclu din g a

pr op os e d e xpe rt ’s te sti mon y un le ss it f ind s th e tr ia l c ou rt

abu se d it s d isc re tio n. Se e Sta te v. Ba llard

, 855 S.W .2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993)

.

A. Dr. Cy nthia Gar dner
Def endant Thoma s complains that Dr. Gardner ’s testimony conce rning the victim’s thera py should not have bee n allowed a s it was outside her field of ex pertise. During Dr. Ga rdner ’s direc t testimony , she wa s questioned as to t h e d ai l y re gi m en of c are for James Day by his wife. An objection was ma de on the ba sis that Dr. Gardner is “not a health-c are provider, she’s not a phy sical thera pist, she’s not — doesn’t have any expertise in any

of these are as.” The trial court sustained the objection, and instruc ted the prosecutor to re phrase the line of que stioning. No other objections

wer e made to this line of questioning. The State submits that Def endant Thomas h as , t h er ef ore, waived a ny

challeng e to Dr. G ardne r’s testimony on this iss ue.

Dr. Gardner is a license d medical doc tor in Tennesse e and is c urre ntly employ ed as a n assistant medical examiner for Shelby County

. Dr. Ga

rdner is also an instructor in patholog y for the medical sc hool. Dr. Ga

rdner completed he r residenc y in a natomic and clinical patholog y following

me dic a l sc ho ol, the n c omp le te d a fe llo ws hip in f

or ens ic pat ho log y . B a se d u po n h e r t ra ini ng a s a

me dic a l do c tor , D r. Ga

rd ne r w a s qual if

ied t o te sti fy

re g ard ing c a the te ri zat ion . T he tr ia l c ou rt did

no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in a dmi tti ng thi s te sti mon y . T his c la im i s w ith ou t me ri t.55 B . D r. Smith
De fe nd a nt T ho ma s c la ims that “ the tr ia l c ou rt fu rthe r e rr e d b y

a llo wi ng Dr . O. C. Smi th t o g ive opinions in severa l are as of medic ine of whic h he wa s not an expert [,] [i ]i ncluding , but not limit ed to, g iving his opinion as t o whether trea tment was prope r af

ter the vic tim was shot.” To the extent that De fenda nt T homas fails to delinea te spec ific g rounds of e rror , those claims ar e wa ived. See Te nn R. A pp. P. 27( a); Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b). Spec ifically , Def endants Thomas a nd Bond ass e r t t w o c h a ll e n g e s to D r

. Sm ith ’ s te s ti mo n y : ( 1 ) D r

. Sm ith is n o t q u a li f ie d to r e n der op ini on s a s to a

liv ing pe rs on , a nd(2 ) D r. Smith s ho ul d not h a ve be e n q ua lif ie d a s a n e xpe rt

in ballistics.

(1) Living pe rson Dr. Smith was asked to rende r an opinion a s to the cause of death of the victim and whethe r it related to the gunshot fired by Def endant Thomas two and one-half y ear s ear lier. De termining the

cause of death is the type of opinion a medical ex aminer is called upon to make. Dr . Smit h’s re view of the tre atment re cords, including assessmen t s o f James Day ’s injuries, was ne cessa ry to the formation of tha t opinion. I n t h i s re gar d
, Dr. S mith is a license d medical doc tor in the State of T e n n e s s e e a n d b o ar d c e r t i f i e d i n f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g y, a n a t o m i c a l p a t h o l o g y, a n d c l i n i c a l p a t h o l o g y. Ba sed upon his training as a me dical doctor , Dr. Smith was qualified to te stify reg arding the g unshot

wo un d in fl ic te d u po n th e vic tim , th e lik e ly re su lts of su c h an inj ury , an d the c ou rs e of tr e a tme nt t o the vic tim . T he tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in a dmi tti ng th is te sti mon y . T his c la im i s wi tho ut m e ri t.

(2) B allistics ex pert During voir dire of

Dr. Smith, Dr. Smit h stated that he ha s previously testified as a

ballistics expert. Def

endant Bond obj ecte d, stating that the testimonyof a ba llist ics expert was not re levant to the victim’s cause o f d ea t h

. T h e objec tion was overr uled. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

de te rm ine d th a t a ba lli sti c s e xpe rt

c ou ld “ sh e d s ome lig ht o n th e guns ho t w ou nd ,” re c og nizi ng that “ the state is attempting .

. . to de monstrate that the g unshot is the cause – the initial event that cause d his death; and to that end, I

think if this wit ness can be qualified as a ballistics e x pert, his opinion may be very helpful in shedding some light on the f acts of the case [.] ” Dr . Smit h then continued to explain the role of a ballistics ex pert an d t h e tra ining ne cessa ry to become a

fore nsic fire arms examiner. He stated that he r ece ived training in fore nsic firea rms examination by R.A. Sti ndler. Objection wa s ag ain made by

both Defe ndant B ond and Def endant Thomas, on the basis that such testimony was not releva nt. On appea l, Defe ndants complain that the qua lifications of Dr. Smith as a ba l l i s tics expert were irrele vant i n that no knowledg e of f irea rms identification and a naly sis was introduced with his opini on as to the cause and ma nner of death.

Def endants a re c orre ct that there was no dire ct cha lleng e to the fa ct t h at t h e v ictim was wounded by

a bullet. Howe ver, the eff ect of the shot was cruc ial to the defe nse and the State had the burde n of proving bey ond a re asonable doubt that the victim’s death was the re sult of a g unshot wound inflicted during the robbe ry . Dr. Smith’s training in f ore n sic fire arm identification,B ec au s e D ef en dan t B on d w as n ot c h ar g ed wi t h a r obber y of fen s e i n t h i s c as e, t h i s r equ es t w as u n f ou n ded. 6

S inc e the trial in th is m a tter , t h e leg islatu re ha s a m e n d e d se c tio n 4 0 -1 8 -1 1 0 to p ro v id e tha t f o r a ll tria ls 7

co nd uct ed on o r af

t er January 1, 20 0 2
, t he f ai l ure of t he d efend ant t o request , i n wri t i ng, an i nst ruct i o n on any l ess eri ncl ud ed off

ense s hal l co nst i t ut e a wai ver of t hat i nst ruct i o n. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 1 8

- 1 1 0 (c) (R ep l

. 20 0 3 ).

56 specific ally

his mil itary

training i nvolving traumatic injuries, permitted him t o make the determination as to whether the shot was li kely to be fa tal. We cannot conc lude that the trial c ourt

abu sed it s di scr etion in pe rm itt ing Dr . Sm ith to b e qu a lif ie d a s a fi re arm s e xpe rt . T his c la im i s wi tho ut m e ri t.

IV. Lesser- includ ed Of fenses of F elony Murder At the close of

proof, De fenda nt Bond a sked that the jury be instructed a s to th e lesserincluded offenses of first deg ree murder, those being second de g ree murder, r eckle ss homicide, and criminally

neg lige nt homicide. Defendant Bond also aske d for a n instruction on fac ilitation of a

r o b b e r y. De fe nd a nt T ho ma s r e qu e ste d in str uc tio ns on se c on d d e g re e mur de r an d the app ro pr ia te 6 lesser- included off

enses of murder or

homicide. The trial c ourt denied a ll requests for instructions on lesser- included o ff

en s es of first deg ree felony murder. I n deny ing the reque sts, the trial court found that, “f

actua lly , . . . this case [is not] appropriate for the cha rg ing of an y lesser of

fense s.” Specifically , the court noted the exist ence of a vide otape of the robbe ry

/murder, r evea ling “ an individual steps out from behind the building, be hind Mr. Day , p u t s a gu n to the back of his head and, in essenc e, executes him eve n though his final demise is two and a half y ear s later.” The trial court noted tha t “ there ’s nothing shaky about this shooting ,” “[t] here ’s no confr onting Mr. Day fac e on,” there is no evidenc e that “the g un misfire[d] or the gu n [ we n t ] o ff accidentally .” On app e a l, b o t h De fe n d an t s ch al l en ge t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g.

The rig ht to jury

instructions on lesser- included offenses is based, in larg e mea sure, upon the

c on st it ut io nal ri ght to tr ia l by jury . Se e Te nn . Co ns t. a rt . I , § 6; S ta te v. El y

, 48 S.W .3d 710, 727 (Tenn. 2001) . The question of whether a g iven offense should be submitted to the jury as a le sserinc lud e d o ff

e ns e is a mixe d q ue sti on of

la w a ndfa c t. S e e Sta te v. Rus h

, 50 S.W .3d 424, 427 (Tenn. 2001). “The standard of

revie w for mixed questions of l aw and fac t is de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness.” I d. The trial court has a duty to g ive a complete charg e of the l aw applicable to the fac ts of a ca se. See State v. H arbison

, 70 4 S.W. 2d
, 31 4, 31 9 (T e nn

. 19 86 ); se e a lso Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 30. I n ad d i t i o n , the trial court has a statutory duty to instruct the jury

on all applicable lesserincluded off

enses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 18-110. 7

I n State v. Burns, our supreme court a dopted a modified ve rsion of the Model Penal Code
in o rd e r t o d e te rm ine wh a t c on sti tut e s a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e :

An of fe ns e is a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e if : (a) al l of its statutory

elements a

re inc luded within the statutory elements of the57

offe nse cha

rg ed; or (b ) i t f a i l s t o m e e t t h e d e f

i n i t i o n i n p ar t ( a ) o n l y i n t h e r e s p e c t t h a t i t c o nta ins a

s t at u t o ryel em en to r e l em en t s es t ab l i s h i n g (1) a differ ent mental state indicating a lesser kind of c ulpability ; and/or (2) a less serious harm or risk of harm to the s ame person, property or publ ic interest; or (c) it consists of (1) f acilitation of the offe nse cha rg ed or of an off ense tha t otherwise mee ts the definition of lesser -included of fense in part (a ) or ( b); or (2 ) an a tte mpt to co mmi t the of fe ns e c ha rg e d or an of

fe ns e that othe rw ise me e ts the def inition of lesser-include d offe nse in part ( a) or (b); or (3) solicitation to commit the offe nse char g ed or an off ense tha t otherwise meets the de finition of lesser-inc luded offe nse in part ( a) or (b).

6 S.W .3d 453, 466-67 (Te nn. 1999). Utiliz ing this ana ly sis, our supreme c ourt has determined that second de g ree murder, r eckle ss homicide, and cr i m i n al l y neg lige nt homicide are lesser- included

o f f e n s e s o f f e lo n y mu r d e r u n d e r p ar t ( b ) o f

th e B u r n s te s t. Se e El y , 48 S.W .3d at 721-22. Additionally , under pa

rt (c) of the B urns test, fac i l i t at i o n o f felony murder is a

lesser- included of fe ns e of fe lon y mur de r. Se e id. a t 720. Ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s a c kn ow le dg e d th a t f

a c ili ta tio n “ is not an immediately

lesser of fense of fe lony

murder . . . [ b u t ] i s a s ep arate and distinct theory of liabilityfrom that of a principal offe nder or someone who is c riminally responsible for the c onduct of anothe r.” State v. L ocke, 90 S.W.3d 663, 672 (Tenn. 2002)

.

The trial c ourt has a duty to instruct t h e j u ry as t o a l esser -included of fense if: (1) any evidenc e exists t hat re asonable minds could acc ept as to the lesse r-include d offe n s e, an d (2 ) the evidenc e is leg ally

sufficie nt to support a conviction of the le sser-included offe nse. See B urns, 6 S.W. 3d a t 469. Th is d uty

app lie s w he the r o r n ot a

de fe nd a nt r e qu e sts su c h a n in str uc tio n. Se e Sta te v. Rush, 50 S.W .3d 424, 428 (Tenn. 2001) ; but see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110( c) ( Repl. 2003). Moreove r, our supre me court has held that trial courts must provide an i n s t ru ction on a lesser

included off

ense supported by

the evidenc e eve n if such i nstruction is not consistent with t he theory of the State or of

the def ense. S ee S t at e v. Allen

, 69 S.W .3d 181, 187-88 (Te nn. 2002). The evidenc e, not the parties, controls whethe r an instruc tion is required. See id. at 188. Our hig h court observe d that the jury is not require d to believe any evidenc e off ere d by the State, and he ld that the authority of the jury

to convict on a lesser-include d offe nse may not be taken a way , even w hen proof supporting the element disting uishing the g reater off ense from the lesser offe nse is uncontroverted. See id. at 189.
A. Def endant Thoma s We turn now to whethe r t h e ev i d ence supported a jury instruction on any

of the lesse rincluded offe nses of felony murder w ith respec t to Defe ndant Thomas. Second de g ree murder is the “knowing killing of another .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210( a)( 1). A defendant kil ls another pe rson knowing ly

when he eng ag es i n conduct that he is awa re is rea sonably

certain to cause death. See id. § 39-11-302( b). De liberate ly shooting someone in the back of the hea d satisfies the def inition of“ T h e r i s k mu s t be of s u ch a n at u r e an d de g r ee t h at t h e f ai l u r e t o pe r ce i v e i t c on s t i t u t es a g r os s de v i at i on 8
f rom t he st and ard o f

care t hat an ord i nary pe rs o n wo ul d exerci se under al l t he ci rcum st ances as vi ewed f rom t he

ac cu s ed per s on ’ s s t an dpoi n t

. ” T en n

. Code An n

. § 39- 11- 302( d)

58 knowing co n duct. I n this case, a surveillance videotape f rom a store security

came ra showe d Def endant Thoma s approa ch the a rmored car g uard from behind, shoot him in the back of the hea d,
ta k e th e mo n e y b a g , a n d f

le e w ith o u t ma

k in g a n y d e ma n d f

o r mo n e y o r e n g a g ing in anykind of strug g le. J ames Day

survived the initial shooting, but wa s para ly zed as a re sult thereof a nd require d
constant ca

re f rom his wife, including reg ular c atheterization due to the neurog enic bladde r re sulting fr om the g un sh ot. B othDr . Sm ith a ndDr . G ard ne r t e sti fi e d tha t the se ps is caus ing the vic tim ’s de a th

wa s a direct res ul t of

the g un sh ot w ou ndinf

lic te d b y De fe nd a nt T ho ma s o n A pr il 2 1, 19 97 . T his evidenc e supported a n instruction on second de g ree murder a s to Defe ndant Thomas.

The “ next” lesser-include d offe n s e of f elony murder is re ckless homicide, whic h is the “re ckless killing of

another .” I d. § 39-13-215( a)

. A re ck l ess killing is committed when the de fe nd a nt e ng a g e s in c on du c t w hic h h e is a wa re c re a te s a

su bs ta nti a l a ndun

jus tif ia ble ri sk of de a th to the victim, but consciously disreg ards that risk. See id. § 39-11-302(c ). De liberate ly sh ooting

so me on e in the ba c k o f the he a d f ro m c los e ra ng e c e rt a inl y

c re a te s a su bs ta nti a l a nd un

jus tif ia ble ri sk of de a t h
, a n d t h e j u r y w a s t h e r e f o r e a l s o e n t i t l e d t o a n i n s t ru c t i o n o n r e c k l e s s h o m ic ide a s to Def endant Thoma s. Sim ilarly
, the evidence just ified an instruction on neg lige nt homicide, which

re qu ir e s tha t the de fe nd a nt e ng a g e d in c ri min a lly ne g lig e nt c on du c t r e su lti ng in d e a th o f the vic tim

. S ee i d. § 39-13-212( a). Criminal neg lige nce oc curs whe n the def endant e ng ag es in conduc t that

cre ates a substantial and unj ustifiable risk that the vi ctim will be kil led, but fails t o perc eive the risk. 8 Ag a in, the ev id ence in this c a se su pp orte d a n in str uc tio n o n th is l e sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e a s to Def endant Thoma s. Acc ording ly , the trial court erre d in refusing to char g e the jury on these lesse rincluded off

enses of felony murder.

Fa cilitation of felony

murder is a

lesser- included off

ense unde r part (c) of t he Burns t est. An instruction on fac ilitation of felony murder is re quired whe re the proof de monstrates that (1) a killing was commit ted i n the per petra tion of one of the f

elonies enume rate d in the statute defining felony murder, ( 2) t he defenda nt knew that another person intende d to commit the underly ing f elony , but he did not have the intent to promote or a s s i s t the commission of the offe nse or to bene fit in the proce eds or r esults of the off ense, ( 3) the de fenda nt furnished substantial assistance to that person in the commission of the felony , and (4) the def endant f urnished such a ssistance kno wing ly . See Ely , 48 S.W .3d at 719-20. The proof in this case demonstrated that Defe ndant Thomas appr oache d the vic tim fr om b e hin d, sh ot h im in th e ba c k o f the he a d, g ra bb e d th e mon e y

c arrie d b y

the vic tim
, and ra n to the g etaway car

. Thomas’ theory of def ense w as twofold: (1) he was not involved in the robbery and (2) an interve ning f

acto r, an d n ot the g unshot wound, was the c ause of the victim’s death. Thomas did not defe nd on the g round that he simply fac ilitated someone else in c ommitt ing this crime. Moreove r, there is no proof in the re cord to support a jury instruction on fac ilitation of felony murder w ith respec t to Thomas. Accor dingly , the trial court committed no error in refusing to char g e the jury

on this lesser-include d offe nse.59

We must now determine wh et h er the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser

incl u ded off

enses of second de g ree murder, r eckle ss homicide and criminallyneg lige nt homicide

was re versible e rror

as to Def endant Thoma s. I n State v. Wil liams, 977 S.W .2d 101, 105 (Tenn. 1998), our supre me court held that the erroneous failure to instruct on lesser- included off enses may be harmless under c erta in circumstanc es. The supr eme c ourt re- examined the standard to be applied when a s s es s i ng whether a trial c ourt’s fa ilure to provide lesse r-include d offe nse instructions constitu t ed h ar m l es s er ror in Ely , 48 S.W .3d at 710. I n Ely , our supre me court held that “whe n de te rm ini ng wh e the r a n er ro ne ou s fa ilu re to ins truc t on a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e re qu ir e s r e ve rs a l,

. . . th e pr op e r i nq uiry

fo r a n a pp e llate cou rt is w he the r t he e rr or is h arm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.” I d. at 727. I n conducting this inqui ry , “the r eviewing court must d et er m i n e wh et her a

rea sonable jury

would have c onvicted the de fenda nt of the lesser -included of fe n s e instead of the char g ed off

ense.” Richmond, 90 S.W .3d at 662. That is, “the r eviewing court must deter mine whether it appear s bey ond a re asonable doubt that the trial court’ s failure to instruct on the lesserincluded off

ense d id not affe ct the outcome of the trial.” I d. “I n making this determination, a revie wing court should conduc t a th o ro u gh ex amination of the re cord, inc luding the e vidence prese nted at trial, the defenda nt’s theory of def ense, a nd the ver dict returne d by the jury .” Allen, 69 S.W .3d at 191.

I n the prese nt c ase, the proof overw helmingly established De fenda nt Thomas’ participation in the ro bb e ry

of Jame s D a y

a ndhis sh ari ng in the pr oc e e ds the re of . T he pr oo f o ve rw he lmi ng ly established that De fenda nt T homas employ ed a firea rm to execute the robbe ry . I t is uncontested that during the robbery
, J ames Day was shot in the back of t he head wit h the weapon. The victim, J ames Day , died over

two y ear s after

the incident as a

result of sepsis cause d by the nee d for c atheterization due to a ne urog enic bladde r which w as the re sult of the g unshot. Def endant Thoma s defe nded on two g rounds: (1) he was not involved in the robbery at all and ( 2) an inter vening fac tor, and not the g unshot wound, was the cause of the vi ctim’s death. Under the “ it wasn’t me” the ory , the Def endant was g uiltyof no off

ense a nd the cha

rg ing of lesser- included off

enses would ha ve had no impact on the ver dict. L ikewise, unde r the theory of the inter v en ing f

actor causing J ames Day ’s death, no homi cid e wh a tso e ve r o c c ur re d. Th e jury

fo un d a nd

the e vid e nc e ov e rw he lmi ng ly su pp orts i ts fi nding that Defe ndant Thomas is g uiltyof first deg ree murder c ommitt ed during the per petra tion of a ro bb e ry . Jam e s D a y

wa s r ob be d a ndsh ot a ndhe ult imate ly die d as a res ul t of that in c ide nt. Although le sser off

enses a s to othe r forms of homicide e x ist and, if found, ca n be supported by the evidenc e, the jury in this case would not ha ve rea sonably conclude d that anything less than a murde r in the pe rp e tr a tio n o f a rob bery oc c ur re d. We the re fo re c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fa ilu re to ins truc t on the le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s d id n ot a ff

e c t th e ou tc ome of

the tr ia l. Th us , a ny

e rr or a s to the ins truc tio ns on se c on d d e g re e mur de r, c ri min a lly ne g lig e nt h omi c ide , a nd re c kle ss hom ic ide is harmless bey ond a rea sonable doubt a nd Def endant Thomas is entitled to no relief on this g round.

B. D efe ndant B ond
We turn now t o the i ssue of lesser- included offenses with respe ct t o Def endant Bond. Ther e is no proof in the re cord be fore us that Bond shot and killed James Day . Rather, the State a dduced proof that B ond was a n active pa rticipant in the under ly ing felony of robbery , driving the g etawayLike D efend ant T ho m as, D efend ant B o nd de fend ed on t he b asi s t hat an i nt erveni ng f act o r, and not t he 9

g u n s h ot w ou n d, c a u s e d t h e v i c t i m’ s de a t h

. Bon d d i d n ot de fe n d o n t h e g r ou n d t h a t h e w a s n ot i n v ol v e d i n t h e c r i me

a t all.

60 c ar a ndsp lit tin g the sto le n mo ne y wi th T ho ma s. Ne ve rthe le ss, B on d may be he ld c ri min a lly

lia ble for the victim’s death to the same extent as Thomas under the theory of criminal responsibilit y for the c on du c t of a no the r. Se e Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 3 9- 11 -4 02 (2 ) ( A d e fe nd a nt i s c ri min a lly re sp on sib le for a n offe nse committed by the conduc t of another

if, ac ting with intent to prom o t e o r assist the commission of the offe n s e, or to bene fit in the proce eds or r esults of the off ense, the defe ndant solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to a id a nother person to c ommit the offe nse). Thus, be cause the pro of su pp orte d ju ry

ins tr uc tio ns on se c on d d e g re e mur de r, re c kle ss h omi c ide a ndc ri min a lly neg lige nt homicide with respect to Defe ndant Thomas, the sa me instructions should have bee n issued with respec t to Bond. I n re fusi ng to give these instructions, the trial c ourt err ed. Ne ve rthe le ss, fo r the sa me re a so ns that w e fi ndthe e rr or ha rm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t a s to Thomas, we f

ind the err or harmless bey ond a re asonable doubt as to Bond. 9

Our n ex t i n q u iry

is whether the trial court should have instructed the jury that Def endant Bond f acilitated the f

elony murder of

J ames Day . As set forth above, an i nstruction on fac ilitation is require d wher e the pr oof demonstra tes that (1) a killing was committed in the perpe tration of one of the fe lonies enumerated in the statute def ining felony murder, (2) the defe ndant knew that another pe rs on int e nd e d to c omm it the un de rl y ing fe lon y , bu t he didno t ha ve the int e nt t o p ro mot e or a ssi st the commission of the offe nse or to bene fit in the proce eds or r esults of the off ense, ( 3) the de fenda nt furnished substantial assistance to that person in the commissi on of the fe lony , and (4) the def endant furnished suc h assistance knowi n gl y

. See Ely , 48 S.W .3d at 719-20. The proof at trial reg arding Bo n d ’s p ar t i ci p at i o n i n t h e r o b b er y co n s i s t ed o f t h e f

o l l o wi n g: (1) his fing erprint was found on the g etaway car ; (2) a n ey ewitness identified him as the driver of the g etaway car ; (3) he car ried the envelopes c ontaining mone y from the r obbery

into Ange la J ackson’ s home; (4) he left Jackson’s home with the g un; (5) he rema

rked during a

television show that he had r obbed an a rmored tr uck; (6) he admitted his involvement in the robbery to law enf

orce ment office rs; and ( 7 ) h e p l e d g u i l t y t o f

e d e r a l c h ar g e s ar i s i n g f

r o mt h e r o b b e r y. This proof is ce rtainly

sufficie nt to sustain Defenda nt Bond’s c onv iction of the fe lony murder of J ames Day . Howeve r, with respe ct to determining whether an instruction on f acilitation of fe lony murder w as wa

rra nted, we must view this evidenc e “liber ally in the light most fav o ra b l e to the exis tence of the lesse r-include d offe nse without making any judgme nts on the cre dibilit y o f such evidenc e.” Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 469. Moreove r, our supreme court ha s instructed us that “the jury is free to rejec t an y

evidenc e off

ere d by the State, no matter how uncontrove rted or unc ontested a particula r fa ct or element may appea r.” Richmond, 90 S.W .3d at 660. So long as there is evidence61

sufficie nt such that a jury

could convict on that lesser- included off ense, no ma tter how improbable
, the lesser -included of

fense must be char g ed to the jury . See id. at 662.

Kee ping the se principles in mind, we c onclude that the pr oof wa rra nted a f

acilitation instruction as to Bond. Bond took no active part whatsoever in the attack upon J ames Day . Bond

wa s no t arm e d du ri ng the ro bb e ry a ndwa s n ot e ve n p re se nt at th e a c tua l c ri me sc e ne . Rathe r, his participa tion wa s limit ed to a ssisti ng Thomas depart f rom the crime scene . This evidence could have justified a jury

in concluding that Bond kne w that Thomas intended to c ommit the robbe ry , drove Th oma s a way

fr om the sc e ne ou t of

a wa rp e d s e ns e of

fe llo ws hip rath er th an ou t of a n in te nt t o actively assist Thomas in his criminal activity
, and did not form the intent to share in the proce eds of the robbe ry

until after the c rime had be en complete d. Certainly , had the jury been give n an instruction on fac ilitation of felony murder a s to B ond, and returne d with a g uilty verdic t a s to that char g e, this Court would uphold the conviction on a challeng e to the sufficie ncy of the proof. Given that the evidenc e supported a jury instruction on fac ilitation of felony murder a s to Bond, we f

ind that the trial court erre d in refusing to provide one.

Ou r r e ma ini ng inq uiry is wh e the r thi s e rr or wa s ha rm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t; tha t is
, whether a re asonable jury

would have c onvicted De fenda nt Bond of the lesser- included off ense of fac ilitation of felony

murder inst ea d o f t he cha rg ed off ense of felony murder. See Richmond, 90 S.W. 3da t 66 2. B on d’ s g uil t of fe lon y mur de r wa s pre dic a te d sole ly up on his c ri min a l r e sp on sib ili ty for the a ctions of Thomas. S ignif icantly in this case , the j ury was g iven only two choice s: convict Bond of felony murder just like Thomas or find him not g uilty of any crime at all. Given the pr oof b ef o re i t , n o re as o n ab l e j u ry wa s go i n g t o s i m p l y ac q u i t Bo n d an d s et h i mfr ee

. Ho we v er , al t h o u gh the jury c on vic te d b othDe fe nd a nt Th oma s a nd De fe nd a nt B on d of fe lon y mur de r, the jury

c ho se to impose the dea th penalty

only on Thomas. The jury

sentenc ed De fenda nt Bond to life without the possi b il it y o f p ar o le

. Cl e ar ly
, s in c e th e tw o D e f e n d a n ts h a v e v e r y s im il ar b a c k g r o u n d s a n d very simil ar c riminal histories, the j ury determined that Bond w as less culpa ble in J ames Day ’s murder tha n w a s T ho ma s. Th e jury ’s ve rd ic ts at th e g uil t a ndse nte nc ing ph a se s o f this tr ia l, c omb ine d w ith the e rr on e ou sly lim ite d alt e rn a tiv e s g ive n to it, p re c lud e s u s f ro m c on c lud ing be y on d a re a so na ble doubt that, had the jury also been instruc ted on fa cilitation of felony murder, it would have esche wed this lesser-include d offe nse and c onvicted Defenda nt Bond of felony murder. Stated dif

fer ently , we cannot c onclude be y ond a rea sonable doubt that the jury , if g iven the opportunity , would not have convicted B o n d o f fa cilitation of felony murder. See Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 191. “Be cause we a re unable to conc lude bey ond a re asonable doubt that the omission o f an instruction [ on fac ilitation] did not affe ct the outcome of the trial, we must hold t hat the err or was not ha rmless.” I d. at 191-92. Acc ording ly , we must re v e r se De fenda nt Bond’s c onviction of felony murder a nd rema nd this matter for a new tria l on this charg e.62 Conclusion
Defendan t Thom as Having fully

review ed t he re cord, the briefs a nd the applica ble authority , we a ffirm Def endant Thomas’ conviction for f irst deg ree felony

murder. A dditionally , in acc ordanc e with the mandate of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-206(c )(1) , and the principles adopted in prior decisions of the Tenne ssee Supreme Court, we have c onsidered the entire r ecor d in this cause and find, with reg ard to De fenda nt Thomas, that the sentenc e of death was not imposed in any arbitra ry fashion, that the e vidence supports, as pre viouslydiscussed, the jury ’s fi n d ing of the statutory ag g r a v a ti n g c ir c u ms ta n c e , a n d th e ju r y ’ s f in d in g th a t th e a g g r a v a ti n g c ir c u ms ta n c e o u tw e ig hed mit ig a tin g c ir c ums ta nc e s b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. F urthe rm or e , our c omp arativ e pr op ortio na lit y revie w, considering both the na ture of the crime and the defe ndant, convince s us that the sentenc e of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the pena lty imposed in simil ar c ases. See id. § 39 -1 3 -206(c )(1) (D). A ccor dingly , we a lso affirm the se ntence of death imposed on Defe ndant Th oma s.

De fend ant Bond
We have de termined that the tria l court’s fa ilure to proper ly char g e the jury as to the lesser

inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of fa c ili ta tio n o f f

e lon y mur de r w a s no t ha

rm le ss be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t w ith

r e s p e c tt o D e f

e n d a n t B o n d

. T h e r e f

o r e , D e f e n d a n tB o n d i s e n t i t l e d t o a n e w t r i a l

. A c c o r d i n g l y, Def endant B ond’s conviction for the murder of J ames Day is vaca ted and this matter is re manded for a new tria l on the char g e of f irst deg ree felony

murder in the de ath of James Day

.

DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE