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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re L.T., P.S., and K.W.

No. 21-0059 (Raleigh County 19-JA-174-P, 19-JA-175-P, and 19-JA-176-P)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother C.S., by counsel Stanley I. Selden, appeals the Circuit Court of Raleigh

County’s December 14, 2020, order terminating her parental rights to L.T., P.S., and K.W.

1 The 

West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Patrick 

Morrisey and Katherine A. Campbell, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order and a 

supplemental appendix. The guardian ad litem (“guardian”), John F. Parkulo, filed a response on 

behalf of the children also in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, petitioner argues that 

the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In July of 2019, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that petitioner 

abused substances, including alcohol, and exposed the children to domestic violence. The DHHR 

had been involved with the family since December of 2018 when petitioner tested positive for 

opiates, amphetamine, and tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) upon giving birth to K.W. In April of 

2019, petitioner tested positive for cocaine, and in July of 2019, petitioner overdosed on narcotics 

and was revived with naloxone. After petitioner returned from the hospital, the DHHR followed 

up with a home visit, and a worker found visible bruises on petitioner as well as on P.S. 

Additionally, both P.S. and L.T. disclosed witnessing domestic violence in the home. Then fiveyear-old P.S. reported that petitioner grabbed her by her hair and threw her, and the worker 

observed a large knot and bruise on P.S.’s forehead. Then eleven-year-old L.T. confirmed the 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. 

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

FILED

October 13, 2021 

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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incident to the worker. The DHHR alleged that petitioner failed to take P.S. to seek medical care 

for the knot and bruise. During her interview concerning the July of 2019 incident, petitioner 

admitted to fighting with K.W.’s father about money and stated that she passed out after drinking 

a bottle of liquor. She told the worker that after she passed out, she woke up when paramedics 

revived her. According to the DHHR worker, petitioner had a visible black eye and other bruises. 

The circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing in September of 2019, wherein petitioner 

stipulated to the allegations contained in the petition. The circuit court accepted the stipulation and 

adjudicated petitioner as an abusing parent. The circuit court further granted petitioner a postadjudicatory improvement period, the terms of which included random drug screening, supervised 

visitations, domestic violence counseling, a forensic psychological evaluation, and parenting and 

adult life skills sessions. Petitioner completed her forensic psychological evaluation in November 

of 2019. According to the evaluation, petitioner’s prognosis for future attainment of minimally 

adequate parenting was “guarded,” which meant that “there [were] significant problems in the 

case” that could be barriers for petitioner. The circuit court held a review hearing upon petitioner’s 

progress in December of 2019. The DHHR voiced concerns with petitioner’s ongoing positive 

drug screens for alcohol and THC, and petitioner admitted to failing seventeen screens. The court 

stated to petitioner, “[c]ontinued failing at the rate you’re doing is ultimately going to lead to the 

termination of your parental rights.” Petitioner responded, “I know that.” The circuit court then 

ordered that petitioner’s post-adjudicatory improvement period continue. 

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the judicial emergency, the review hearing set for 

March of 2020 was cancelled and rescheduled for July of 2020. At the hearing, the DHHR 

indicated that petitioner tested positive for nonprescribed morphine in May of 2020 and continued 

to test positive for alcohol. Despite these positive drug and alcohol screens, the DHHR 

recommended that petitioner’s improvement period be extended. Petitioner proffered that she had 

completed all but four of her SAFE program classes, which address domestic violence and anger 

management. She also stated that her twelve-step program for drug counseling had been 

temporarily suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In light of certain services being 

suspended and petitioner’s progress in some aspects of her case plan, the court granted petitioner 

an extension of her improvement period. However, the court ordered petitioner to immediately 

enroll in inpatient treatment to address her alcohol and substance abuse if she tested positive for 

alcohol or illicit drugs in the future. The court noted that missed drug screens or administrative 

positives due to diluted samples would be considered as attempts to evade a positive drug or 

alcohol screen. 

The court held a final review hearing in October of 2020 to address petitioner’s progress 

made during her improvement period. Petitioner failed to appear, but counsel represented her. The 

record gives no explanation for petitioner’s absence. The court then set the matter for disposition. 

In December of 2020, the circuit court held a final dispositional hearing. The DHHR 

worker testified that petitioner stopped submitting to drug and alcohol screens on August 25, 2020, 

which resulted in the suspension of petitioner’s supervised visitations. Petitioner also stopped 

attending her SAFE program classes on August 29, 2020. The DHHR worker testified that the 

children had been in the DHHR’s custody for the previous seventeen months. He also stated that

despite learning that petitioner enrolled into a twenty-eight-day drug rehabilitation program on 
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November 17, 2020, he maintained his position that terminating petitioner’s parental rights was in 

the children’s best interests. On cross-examination by the guardian, the worker answered that 

petitioner’s improvement period and extension thereof had expired by its own terms. 

Petitioner testified that she relapsed in October of 2020, and then entered a fourteen-day 

drug detoxification program in Lewisburg, West Virginia. She stated that she missed the final

review hearing in October of 2020 because she was enrolled in this program. After completing that

program, petitioner stated that she stayed with her mother for a week and then entered into another 

program in Fairmont, West Virginia, on November 17, 2020. She stated that the estimated 

discharge date was December 15, 2020. On cross-examination, petitioner stated that she did not

tell her attorney that she would not be present for the October of 2020 hearing due to the drug 

detoxification in Lewisburg, West Virginia. When the court asked petitioner whether she had any 

documentation or further proof of her completion of drug detoxification and enrollment in her 

current program, she stated that she did not. 

Ultimately, the court found that petitioner failed to substantially comply with the terms of 

her case plan. Petitioner continued to test positive for drugs and alcohol throughout the proceedings 

and did not enroll in an inpatient drug rehabilitation program until faced with termination. The 

circuit court found that the children deserved permanency and could no longer wait on petitioner 

to address her drug and alcohol addiction. The court found that there was no substantial likelihood 

that petitioner could improve her parenting deficiencies in the near future and terminated her 

parental rights by order entered on December 14, 2020.2

 

The Court has previously established the following standard of review in cases such as this:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such 

child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing 

court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 

is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, 

a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided 

the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In 

Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

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L.T.’s father’s parental rights were terminated below. P.S.’s father’s parental rights remain 

intact, but respondents indicate that the father plans to relinquish his parental rights to P.S. The 

permanency plan for L.T. and P.S. is adoption by the maternal aunt. K.W. was reunified with his

father, who successfully completed an improvement period and was dismissed from the 

proceedings.
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On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court improperly terminated her parental rights 

when her post-adjudicatory improvement period and extension thereof had not been terminated. 

Petitioner cites West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(7), which provides that

[u]pon the motion by any party, the court shall terminate any improvement period 

granted pursuant to this section when the court finds that respondent has failed to

fully participate in the terms of the improvement period or has satisfied the terms 

of the improvement period to correct any behavior alleged in the petition or 

amended petition to make his or her child unsafe.

Although petitioner is correct that no party moved to terminate her improvement period, there was 

no need to do so as the improvement period expired. We disagree with petitioner’s logic that 

improvement periods are indefinite until and unless they are terminated by motion. A postadjudicatory improvement period is “not to exceed six months” and extensions are not to “exceed 

three months.” See W. Va. Code §§ 49-4-610(2) and (6). Additionally, West Virginia Code § 49-

4-610(9) places time limits on improvement periods. Instead, we agree with the circuit court’s 

finding that petitioner’s post-adjudicatory improvement period expired by its own terms and, 

therefore, did not need to be terminated. The court held a final review hearing in October of 2020—

the end of petitioner’s post-adjudicatory improvement period. Therefore, petitioner’s contention 

that a party was required to move to terminate her post-adjudicatory improvement period before 

the court could move forward with disposition is misplaced, and petitioner is entitled no relief in 

this regard. 

We next address petitioner’s argument that the circuit court erred in terminating her

parental rights when she was enrolled in drug treatment at the time of the dispositional hearing. 

Essentially, petitioner argues that she substantially complied with the terms and conditions of her 

case plan, as she completed five of its six goals. In her brief, petitioner states “[t]he last remaining 

goal, admittedly the most important goal, was for her to get herself off of drugs or alcohol.” 

Petitioner concedes in her brief that she relapsed in October of 2020 and stopped participating in 

services. Nonetheless, petitioner argues that the circuit court should have given her more time to 

complete the drug rehabilitation program before terminating her parental rights. 

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) provides that a circuit court may terminate a parent’s 

parental rights upon finding that “there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect 

or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future” and that termination of parental rights is 

necessary for the children’s welfare. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(3), a circuit 

court may determine that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse 

can be substantially corrected when

[t]he abusing parent or parents have not responded to or followed through with a 

reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts of social, medical, mental 

health, or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce or prevent the abuse or 

neglect of the child, as evidenced by the continuation or insubstantial diminution 

of conditions which threatened the health, welfare, or life of the child.
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As outlined above, the evidence demonstrates that petitioner failed to respond to or follow 

through with a reasonable family case plan. Although petitioner complied with several aspects of 

the case plan, including completing the forensic psychological evaluation and some SAFE classes 

and some counseling, petitioner ceased participation in services including drug screening in 

August of 2020. Petitioner concedes that she relapsed in October of 2020, however, petitioner 

failed to stay in contact with her counsel and the DHHR regarding this relapse and her alleged 

actions taken regarding drug rehabilitation. As noted by the circuit court, petitioner provided no 

confirmation that she completed drug detoxification and was actively enrolled in another drug 

rehabilitation program. Furthermore, the evidence supports the termination of petitioner’s parental 

rights as necessary for the children’s welfare, as the court found that they required permanency 

that could not be achieved due to petitioner’s refusal to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect 

at issue. 

Most importantly, petitioner’s argument that the circuit court should have allowed her 

additional time to address her substance abuse wholly disregards the children’s best interest as 

well as the statutory timeframes for child abuse and neglect matters. 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no combination of any 

improvement periods or extensions thereto may cause a child to be in foster care

more than fifteen months of the most recent twenty-two months, unless the court

finds compelling circumstances by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the

child’s best interests to extend the time limits contained in this paragraph.

W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(9). According to the record, by the time of the dispositional hearing in 

December of 2020, the children had been placed in the DHHR’s custody for more than seventeen 

months. Therefore, the children’s permanency was already delayed and outside the statutory 

timeframes. The children deserve permanency and stability and should not be forced to wait in 

perpetuity for petitioner to address her drug and alcohol addiction. We have previously held that 

“[c]ourts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement . . . 

where it appears that the welfare of the child[ren] will be seriously threatened.” Cecil T., 228 W. 

Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, Syl. Pt. 4, in part (citation omitted). As such, it is clear that that there 

was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and 

neglect and the children’s welfare required termination of petitioner’s parental rights. 

Furthermore, based upon these findings, petitioner was not entitled to a less-restrictive 

dispositional alternative. We have held that

“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive 

alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West 

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 

114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011).
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For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

December 14, 2020, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: October 13, 2021 

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Evan H. Jenkins 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice William R. Wooton