14-4436 

Farland v. United States

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 10th day of November, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

PETER W. HALL,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

Circuit Judges,

CHRISTINA REISS,*

Chief District Judge. 

_____________________________________ 

Janie Marie Farland, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 14-4436 

United States of America, 

Defendant-Appellee.

_____________________________________ 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: JANIE MARIE FARLAND, pro se, 

Farmingdale, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: JAMES H. KNAPP and Varuni Nelson, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, for

Kelly T. Currie, Acting United States 

 

* The Honorable Chief Judge Christina Reiss, of the United States District Court for the District of 

Vermont, sitting by designation. 
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Attorney for the Eastern District of 

New York, Central Islip, NY.

 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York (Feuerstein, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Appellant Janie Marie Farland, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of the United States on her medical malpractice claim under the 

Federal Tort Claims Act. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

Farland has abandoned appellate review of her medical malpractice claim by explicitly 

disavowing that claim in her brief. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 

1995). However, because “the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and 

interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of 

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted) (emphasis omitted), we construe Farland’s filings in the district court to raise a battery 

claim. 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that 

“[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine 

issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Lane Capital 

Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc., 192 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1999)). We are required to 

resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. 
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Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is 

appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for 

the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 

(1986). 

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in 

favor of the United States. Farland failed to produce any evidence to suggest the examining 

physician had an intent to cause bodily contact that a reasonable person would find offensive, an 

element required to make out a battery claim. See Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Brookdale 

Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 425 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2005). She also failed to submit competent 

medical testimony that would allow a trier of fact to find that her examination breached the 

applicable standard of care. See Sitts v. United States, 811 F.2d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1987). 

Accordingly, even were we to consider Farland’s medical malpractice claim, we would affirm for 

substantially the same reasons stated in the district court’s thorough order. 

 We have considered all of Farland’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

merit. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk