****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service andinthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************PETER SZYNKOWICZ v. LINDA BONAUITO-O’HARA (AC 38198)
DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Pellegrino, Js.
Submitted on briefs October 19, 2016—officially released January 10, 2017(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Zemetis, J. [motion to strike]; BrazzelMassaro, J. [summary judgment].)
Steven P. Kulas filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).
Elizabeth S. Bennett filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).Opinion DiPENTIMA, C. J. The plaintiff, Peter Szynkowicz, appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Linda Bonauito-O’Hara, doing business as Linda’s Team, William Raveis. The underlying dispute
arosewhentheplaintiffandtheseller, EdwardDevelopment Company, LLC, entered into a dual agency agreement1 naming Brenda Hanley, a realtor who worked for the same real estate company as the defendant, to act astheirdual agentin connectionwithlocating, purchasing and developing the property known as Lot 7MeadowBrookDriveinEastHaddam. Afterenteringintothe dualagencyagreement, theplaintiffentered into a real estate contract with the seller to develop a single-family home on the property, which was subsequently cancelled when the seller was unable to complete construction. Theplaintiffcommencedthis action against the defendant, whom the plaintiff alleges was also apartytothe dualagencyagreement, forthe return of his deposited moneys advanced to the seller upon the advice of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims thatthe court erred in granting (1) the motionto strike countfive ofhiscomplaintbecausehe adequately had alleged an action for breach of an oral contract against the defendant, and (2) the motion for summary judgment because genuine issues ofmaterial fact exist
as to the defendant’s liability under counts one, two, three andfourofhis complaint. We affirmthejudgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our determination of this appeal. On October 5, 2012, the plaintiffcommenced this action against the defendant with a five count complaint. In ruling on the motion to strike, the court, Zemetis, J., succinctly set forththe factual allegations ofthe complaint: Theplaintiff alleged that he ‘‘and the defendant entered into a dual agency agreement on May 2, 2008, in connection with the defendant aiding the plaintiff in locating, purchasing and developing apiece ofreal property known
as Lot 7 Meadow Brook Drive, East Haddam, Connecticut

. . . . The defendant and its employees knew or should have known that the seller ofthe property was having financial difficulties when the dual agency agreementwas enteredinto because the defendantwas the seller’s exclusive broker. The defendant failed to disclose the seller’s financial difficulties to the plaintiff, despitethe dutyto do so. Afterenteringthe dual agency agreement, the plaintiff entered into a [purchase agreement] with the seller to develop a single family home on the property. After signing the purchase agreement, the defendantrepeatedlyrepresentedtothe plaintiff that the defendant would be able to obtain financing for the plaintiff and failed to disclose the seller’s shaky financial condition. The defendant encouraged the plaintiff [to] remain in the deal after hehad offered to withdraw. Based on his reliance on the defendant’s representations that the seller was in good financial condition, the plaintiffadvanced moneyto the seller in connection with the construction project. On November 25, 2008, the [dual agency] agreement was cancelled because the seller was unable to complete construction. The defendant, although having a duty to disclose the seller’s financial difficulties, never did so.’’
Theplaintiff’scomplaintcontainedfivecounts. Count
oneallegedthatthedefendant’sfailuretodiscloseinformation aboutthe seller’s financial difficulty constituted
a breach of the defendant’s contract with the plaintiff. Counttwo allegedthatthe defendant’s actions in entering a dual agency agreement, i.e., a contract, with the plaintiffandfailingto disclosethe seller’sfinancialdifficulty constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Count three alleged that the defendant’s actions in representing that she could obtain financingfortheplaintiff, encouragingthe plaintiff to stay in the deal when he offered to withdraw, and failing to disclose the seller’s financial difficulty
were fraudulent in connection with her duty to represent the plaintiff. Count four alleged that the defendant’s actions in stating that she could obtain financing for the plaintiff, encouraging the plaintiffto stay in the dealwhenhe offeredtowithdrawandfailingto disclose the seller’s financial difficultyviolated General Statutes § 42-110b, a provision ofthe Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Count five alleged that the defendant’s actions in failing to secure the purchase and the development of the real property violated an oral agreement between the defendant and the plaintiff.
On April 8, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts one, two and five on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts to support the existence ofa contract between himselfand the defendant. OnJuly 26, 2013, the court denied the defendant’s motion to strike counts one and two, but granted the defendant’s motion as to count five. In granting the defendant’s motionto strike count five, the court noted that it could not ‘‘find that the plaintiff

. . . sufficiently pleaded that the defendant breached an oral contract in count five. First, [the] plaintiff has insufficiently alleged the existence of an oral contract because the plaintiff failed to allege facts pertaining to scope or terms of an oral agreement. Additionally, in count five the plaintiff has alleged no specific contractual obligation that has not been met.’’ Accordingly, the court concludedthatbecause ‘‘the plaintiffhas failedto sufficiently allege facts implying the existence of a privity ofcontract between the parties and has merely alleged misrepresentations and omissions by the defendant

. . . count five has failed to sufficiently allege a breach of a term of that alleged oral contract

. . . [and] [t]he defendant’s motion to strike count five is granted.’’Judgment was subsequently rendered in favor of the defendantonthiscount.2Thereafter, the defendantfiled
an answer specifically denying the allegation that she had entered into a contract with the plaintiff.
On February 13, 2014, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to counts three and four of the complaint. The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion for summaryjudgment. On May 5, 2014, the court denied the motion ‘‘withoutprejudice.’’
One year later, on February 13, 2015, the defendant filed another motion for summary judgment as to all the remaining counts of the complaint. In its July 16, 2015 memorandum of decision granting the motion for summary judgment, the court, Brazzel-Massaro, J., stated: ‘‘[T]he defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to counts one and two of the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that there [was] no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant further [sought] summary judgment as to count three on the ground that it [was] barred by General Statutes § 52-577, and count four on the ground that it [was] barred by General Statutes § 42-110g (f). The defendant filed a memorandum [oflaw] in support of the motion and the [dual agency agreement], the ‘Exclusive Rightto Represent Buyer orTenantAuthorization’ form, and the partial deposition transcript of the plaintiff. On March 18, 2015, the plaintiff filed an objection and a memorandum [of law] in support of the objection, as well as an affidavit of the plaintiff.’’
The courtfurtherstated: ‘‘Inthe memorandum oflaw in support of the motion, the defendant argues that summaryjudgment as to count one and two is proper because there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. In particular, the dual agency agreement on which the plaintiff is basing his claims is actually a form consenting to Brenda Hanley acting as a dual agent, to which the defendant is not a party. The plaintiff counters that the actions of the parties raise factual issues as to whetherthe defendant
wasactingonbehalfoftheplaintiffandthattheplaintiff believed at the time that the defendant was acting on his behalf. The defendant further argues that summary judgmentshouldbegrantedastocountthree [andcount four] because the plaintiff filed his lawsuit outside the three year statutes of limitations as outlined in [§§ 52- 577 and 42-110g (f)] and that the statutes oflimitations [are] not tolled. The plaintiff again counters that the statutes of limitations [were] tolled by a continuing
course ofconduct. The defendant contends inresponse thatthe continuing course ofconduct doctrine requires the existence ofa special relationship between the parties giving rise to a continuing duty and no special relationship exists because there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant.’’
Ingrantingthe defendant’smotionforsummaryjudg-ment on counts one and two, the court stated: ‘‘The defendant has met her burden of showing that there is
no genuine issue of material fact that there [was] no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant [and] [t]he plaintiff has provided no evidence [to rebut this].’’ In granting the motion for summaryjudgment on counts three and four, the court also stated that: ‘‘The defendant has met her burden of showing that there [was] no genuine issue of material fact that count three and count four are barred by the statutes of limitations under § 52-577 and § 42-110g (f)

. . . [and] [t]he plaintiff has provided no evidence to rebut this finding.’’ This appeal followed.
I
We decline to review the plaintiff’s claim that the court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to strike count five because this claim is inadequately briefed.3 We first note that the plaintiff has devoted less than
one page to his argument on this claim. The plaintiff’s analysis of this claim consists of a statement that ‘‘[a] review ofcount [five] ofthe Plaintiff’s complaint, which incorporated by reference the allegation ofcount [one] of the Plaintiff’s complaint, indicates that the Plaintiff adequately alleged an action for a breach of an oral contract against the Defendant.’’ Where a claim is simply asserted but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. See Bicio v. Brewer, 92 Conn. App. 158, 172, 884 A.2d 12 (2005); seealsoBrahamv.Newbould, 160 Conn.App. 294, 312 n.15, 124 A.3d 977 (2015) (claim abandoned that was not properly briefed). We conclude that the plaintiff’s claim is inadequately briefed and, therefore,
we decline to review it.
II
The plaintiffnext claimsthatthe court erredin granting the motion for summaryjudgment because genuine issues ofmaterial fact exist regarding counts one, two, three and four ofthe complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly granted summary judgment because (1) there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the parties were in privity of contract, which is required to establish count one ofthe plaintiff’s complaint, alleging breach ofcontract, and count two, alleging breach ofthe covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing, and (2) he presented sufficient evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statutes of limitations
were tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrineapplicabletocountthree, allegingfraud, andcount four, alleging a CUTPA violation. We disagree.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the well established standard of review. ‘‘Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be renderedforthwithifthepleadings, affidavitsandanyotherproof submitted showthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A party moving for summary judgment is held to a strict standard.

. . . To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clearwhat the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence ofany genuine issue of material fact.

. . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent.

. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of
some disputed factual issue.

. . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact

. . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45].

. . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summaryjudgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Capasso v. Christmann, 163 Conn. App. 248, 257, 135 A.3d 733 (2016). ‘‘We therefore must decide whether the court’s conclusions were legally and logically correct and find support in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Brownv. Otake, 164 Conn. App. 686, 701, 138 A.3d 951 (2016).
A
We first consider the plaintiff’s claim that the court erred in rendering summary judgment on count one, alleging breach of contract, and count two, alleging breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiffargues that genuine issues ofmaterial fact exist as to whether the parties were in privity of contract. We disagree.
We beginbysettingforththe legalprinciples relevant to the issue before us. ’’[T]he obligation of contracts is limited to the parties making them, and, ordinarily, only those who are parties to contracts are liable for their breach.

. . . In other words, [a] person who is not a party to a contract (i.e., is not named in the contract and has not executed it) is not bound by its terms.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) FCM Group, Inc. v. Miller, 300 Conn. 774, 797, 17 A.3d 40 (2011). ‘‘It is axiomatic that the

. . . duty of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a contractual relationship.

. . . The covenant of good faith and fair dealing presupposes that the terms and purpose ofthe contract are agreed upon by the parties and that what is in dispute is a party’s discretionary application or interpretation of a contract term.

. . . In accordance with these authorities, the existence of
a contract between theparties is a necessary anteced-ent to any claim of breach of the [covenant] ofgood faith andfair dealing.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Macomberv. TravelersProperty & Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 638, 804 A.2d 180 (2002).
In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that summary judgment was warranted on the breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing counts because ‘‘[t]he defendant has met her burden of showing that there is no genuine issue ofmaterialfactthat’’thepartieswerenotinprivity of contract, i.e., there is no contractual relationship. The court expressly noted that because ‘‘[t]he plaintiff hasprovidednoevidencetoshowthatthereisagenuine issue of material fact’’ regarding whether there was privity of contract between the parties, he could not assert a claim for breach of contract against the defendant on the basis of the contract. The court further observed that ‘‘[s]ince a duty to act in good faith is dependent on the existence of a contract and there is not contractual privity between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff also cannot bring a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against the defendant.’’ In addition, the court emphasized: ‘‘[T]he fact that the defendant worked closely with

. . . Hanley or aided in the performance of the alleged [dual agency] agreement does not bring the defendant, individually, into contractualprivitywiththe plaintiff

. . . [and] [w]here the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms.

. . . Therefore, the plaintiff’s subjective belief that the defendant was a party to the alleged [dual agency] agreement does not alter the clear terms naming

. . . Hanley, alone, as the single agentto representboth [the] sellerand [theplaintiff].’’ (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, the plaintiffclaims that the court improperly concluded that he had failed to provide sufficient evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of materialfact asto whethertheparties were inprivity of contract because at the time he signed the dual agency agreement, he was under the belief that the defendant
was representing him in the real estate transaction. In turn, the defendant argues that the court properly granted hermotion for summaryjudgment because she submitted sufficient evidence to show that there was
no genuine issue of material fact that the parties were notinprivityofcontract, andtheplaintifffailedto meet his burden of providing evidentiary support to refute this. We agree with the defendant.
The plaintiff’s breach of contract and breach of the covenant ofgood faith and fair dealing counts indisputably rest on the allegation that the defendant was a party to the dual agency agreement to create the required privity of contract. ‘‘Contract obligations are. . . owed only to the specific individuals named in the contract.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaccaro

v. Shell Beach Condominium, Inc., 169 Conn. App. 21, 36, A.3d (2016); see also FCM Group, Inc. v. Miller, supra, 300 Conn. 798 (it is axiomatic that an action ‘‘for breach of contract may not be maintained against a person who is not a party to the contract’’ [internalquotationmarks omitted]); seeBrunov. Whipple, 138 Conn. App. 496, 510, 54 A.3d 184 (2012) (‘‘a person cannot be held liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing without being
a party to a contract’’).
The defendant’sdocumentationattachedtohermemorandum of law in support of the motion included a copyofthedualagencyagreement,the‘‘ExclusiveRight to Represent Buyer orTenantAuthorization’’ form, and the partial deposition transcript of the plaintiff. The dual agency agreement provides in relevant part that: ‘‘[The plaintiff] and [the] Seller having previously consented to William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., acting as dual agents, hereby consent to: Brenda Hanley [sales associate] [a]cting as a single agent represent[ing] both [the plaintiff] and [the] Seller with negotiation of sale ofLot 7MeadowbrookEstates.’’Accordingtotheterms of the dual agency agreement, the plaintiff consented to Hanley, his real estate agent, and not the defendant, to actas adual agentonbehalfofhimselfandthe seller. The only parties named in the dual agency agreement
were the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s tenant, the seller and Hanley, all ofwhom are the only parties to have signed the dual agency agreement.
The dual agency agreement did not purport to bind the defendant nor did it refer to the defendant, who
was neither a signatory to the dual agency agreement
nor a title holder to the property. The defendant also submitted the ‘‘Exclusive Right to Represent Buyer or Tenant Authorization’’ form, which appoints William Raveis RealEstate astheplaintiff’s exclusive realestate Broker. ThisformwassignedbytheplaintiffandHanley acting on behalf of William Raveis Real Estate. The defendant was neither named in nor a signatory to this form. In addition, the defendant offered the partial deposition transcript ofthe plaintiff, wherein the plaintiff acknowledged that he never had entered into a contract with the defendant, nor was the defendant his real estate agent.4
As the court properly concluded, the documentary evidence attached to the defendant’s motion for summaryjudgmentdemonstratedthattherewasno genuine issue ofmaterialfactthattheparties were not inprivity of contract, and, therefore, the burden was shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate that his allegations were supportedbyatleastsomeproof. SeeMarinosv.Poirot, 308 Conn. 706, 715, 66 A.3d 860 (2013). To meet his burden by showing a genuine issue of material factexisted as to whether the parties were in privity of contract, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion and an affidavit that purportedly supported the allegations in his complaint.
In his affidavit, the plaintiff averred that at the time he signed the dual agency agreement, he believed that the defendant was in control of the real estate office and would supervise his real estate agent, Hanley; at
one meeting, the defendant conducted all negotiations, which concerned the contract dispute between the plaintiff and the seller; the plaintiff’s agent had to run everything by the defendant; and the defendant made affirmative representations concerning the seller’s financial status to him.5 In his objection to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that, as alleged in his complaint and supported by his affidavit, the circumstances surrounding the signing of the dual agency agreement and the actions of the defendant subsequent to the plaintiff’s signing the dual agency agreement raised the same factual issue as to whether the defendant was acting on behalf of the plaintiff in the real estate transaction.6
The plaintiff’s submissions, however, fail to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the parties were in privity of contract. ‘‘After the [defendant’s] submission, the plaintiff’s [m]ere assertionoffactbecame insufficientto establish the existence of a material fact, and, therefore, [could] notrefute [the] evidenceproperlypresentedtothecourt bythe [defendant].’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.) Id. Therefore, the courtproperlygrantedsummaryjudgment on these two counts.
B
We next considerwhetherthe court erred in granting the defendant’smotionforsummaryjudgmentoncount three, alleging fraud, and count four, alleging a CUTPA violation. The plaintiffclaims that the court improperly granted summary judgment on counts three and four because he presented sufficient evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statutes of limitations were tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine.7 We disagree.
We beginbysettingforththe legalprinciples relevant to the issue before us. ‘‘Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.’’ Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996). With respect to count three, alleging fraud, and count four, alleging a CUTPA violation, the applicable statutes oflimitations are three years pursuant to §§ 52-5778 and 42- 110g (f),9 respectively. See Krondes v. Norwalk Savings Society, 53 Conn. App. 102, 113, 728 A.2d 1103 (1999). As a general rule, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the act or omission complained of or when the conduct ofthe defendantoccurs. Certain Underwriters atLloyd’s, London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 408, 957 A.2d 836 (2008). ‘‘Nonetheless, [w]hen the wrong sued upon consists ofa continuing course ofconduct, the statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed.

. . . [I]n order [t]o support a finding of a continuing
course ofconductthatmaytollthestatute oflimitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission ofthe original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong.

. . . Where [our Supreme Court has] upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the act or omission relied upon, there has been evidence ofeither
a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Haas v. Haas, 137 Conn. App. 424, 433, 48 A.3d 713 (2012).
The plaintiff claims that the court erred in failing to consider the evidence presented in his affidavit that supports his contention that the wrong committed by the defendant consisted of a continuing course of conduct, which tolled the statutes of limitations until he discovered the true facts ofthe seller’s financial situation. The wrong alleged by the plaintiffin counts three and four arises from statements of the defendant that she could obtainfinancingfortheplaintiff, encouraging the plaintiff to stay in the deal when he expressed a desire to withdraw and failing to disclose the seller’s financial difficulty. We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s claim.
In concludingthat counts three and fourwere barred by the applicable three year statutes oflimitations, the court expressly noted: ‘‘In his deposition transcript, the plaintiff admits that the last time he spoke to the defendantwas in ameeting inJuly of2008. The plaintiff failed to provide any evidence showing that he had contact with the defendant after the meeting in July, 2008.’’ Also there was ‘‘no allegation in the complaint
nor [was] there any evidence provided by the plaintiff that the defendant committed some wrongful act after July, 2008.’’ ‘‘Based on these undisputed facts, the tortious conduct must have occurred in or before July, 2008. The latestthe plaintiffcould have brought afraud claim and a CUTPA claim against the defendant, therefore, was in July, 2011. The plaintiff did not file this action until October 5, 2012, more than a year outside the three year statutes of limitations.’’
In considering whether the statutes of limitations
were tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine, we agree with the court that the defendant made the requiredshowingthatthepartieswere notinprivityofcontract.10 We also agree with the court’s conclusion that there was ‘‘no evidence of a special relationship between the plaintiffand the defendant that would toll the statutes of limitations under the continuing course ofconduct doctrine.’’11 In the absence ofa special relationship between the parties, the statutes oflimitations
were not tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine. Accordingly, counts three and four were barred by the three year statutes of limitations. We, therefore, conclude that the court properly granted summary judgment on these two counts.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Pursuant to the website for the Department of Consumer Protection: ‘‘If

a real estate agent working on the sale ofaparticular home also represents

a client who might be interested in buying that home, by law, the agent must provide both the seller and the potential buyer with a ‘Dual Agency Consent Agreement’ form to sign.’’ Department of Consumer Protection, ‘‘DualAgency,’’ (lastmodifiedApril 12, 2012), available athttp://www.ct.gov/ dcp/cwp/view.asp?q=502404 (lastvisitedDecember29, 2016); see also Regs., Conn. StateAgencies § 20–325d–2 (b) (i) (‘‘[a] realestatebrokerorrealestate salesperson, when acting as a dual agent, shall make awritten disclosure of dual agency to all parties by using the dual agency consent agreement’’).

2 Aftertheplaintiffdidnotfile anewpleading, the defendantfiledamotion for judgment requesting that judgment be rendered in her favor upon the stricken fifth count ofthe complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10-44. On September 8, 2015, the court, Brazzel-Massaro, J., granted the defendant’s motion for judgment.

3 We note with approval the trial court’s determination that count five failed to set forth sufficiently abreach ofcontract action because it ‘‘merely alleged that ‘[t]he actions of the [d]efendant’ constituted a breach of the oral contract. Count five, therefore, included no allegation specifying what provision ofthe oral contract was violated.’’ As established by our case law, ‘‘[m]ere conclusions of law, without factual support, are not enough to survive a motion to strike.’’ Kellerv. Beckenstein, 117 Conn. App. 550, 565, 979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009).

4 The following exchange occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant’s counsel at the plaintiff’s deposition: ‘‘Q.

. . . Did you ever enter into a contract with [the defendant]? ‘‘A. In light of you right now today going over this with me, her name is not on here, so I don’t have a contract with [the defendant], based on these two documents.

* * * ‘‘Q. But we agreed before that you don’t actually have a contract with [the defendant]? ‘‘A. Right. We agreed after you brought to my attention [that the defendant’s] name is not on there, therefore, I wouldn’t have a contract with [the defendant].’’

5 Specifically, theplaintiffassertsthatthedefendantcontactedtheplaintiff to persuade him to finance the property through a construction loan. After declining to take out aconstruction loan, the plaintiffasked the defendant if the sellerhad sufficientresourcesto complete theprojectandthe defendant replied that the seller had no financial issues. In reliance on the defendant’s statement, the plaintiffadvanced moneys and materials to the seller. Shortly thereafter, the seller failed to complete the contract and caused the plaintiff to lose all the moneys and materials he had advanced to the seller. The plaintiff contends, therefore, that the defendant’s affirmative actions imposed an obligation to keep the plaintiff informed of the seller’s financial situation.

6 As discussedpreviously, the plaintiffidentified two actions ofthe defendant to support his contention that the parties were in privity of contract. First, the court found that, at the time the plaintiff signed the contract, he believed that ‘‘the defendant was in control of the real estate office, in control of the agent that represented the plaintiff, and that the defendant

was also acting on behalf of the plaintiff.’’ Next, the plaintiff argues that the actions ofthe defendant, in conducting negotiations at one meeting thatconcerned the contract dispute between the plaintiff and the seller and the fact that the plaintiff’s agent had to run everything by the defendant, raised factual issues as to whether the defendant was acting on behalf of the plaintiff.

7 The plaintiff does not claim that the continuing course of conduct doctrine applies due to some laterwrongful conductrelatedto the initialwrongful act or omission. Therefore, we limit our review to whether the court properlygrantedsummaryjudgmentinconcludingthatthe statutes oflimitations were not tolled by the continuing course of conduct doctrine because there was no special relationship between the parties. Brusby v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn. App. 638, 662, 127 A.3d 257 (2015).

8 General Statutes § 52-577 provides: ‘‘No action founded upon atort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.’’

9 General Statutes § 42-110g (f) provides: ‘‘An action under this section maynotbe broughtmore thanthreeyears afterthe occurrence ofaviolation of this chapter.’’

10 As best as we can discern, all of the plaintiff’s claims as to the tolling of the statutes of limitations rest on a theory that a continuing duty arose from the special relationship between the parties, thus creating a privity of contract between the parties. We have concluded in part IIA ofthis opinion that the court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether privity of contract existed between the plaintiff and the defendant.

11 To the extent that the plaintiff referenced other claims that he and the defendant were in a special relationship, his brief does not support this contention. ‘‘It is well settled that [w]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed.

. . . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, ratherthanmere abstractassertion, is requiredin orderto avoid abandoning

an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.

. . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal

. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed.

. . . The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited. Assignments of error which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a mere statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Lucarelliv. Freedom ofInformation Commission, 136 Conn. App. 405, 407 n.1, 46 A.3d 937, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 907, 53 A.3d 222 (2012). Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff has inadequately attempted to challenge the court’s determination that no special relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant that wouldtollthe statutes oflimitations underthe continuing course ofconduct doctrine, we deem such claims abandoned and decline to review them

on appeal.