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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Rockingham

No. 2018-0602

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

v.

BRUCE MOORE

Argued: October 23, 2019

Opinion Issued: June 10, 2020

Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Stephen D. Fuller, senior 

assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Sean R. Locke, assistant attorney 

general, orally), for the State.

Thomas Barnard, senior assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the 

brief and orally, for the defendant.

BASSETT, J. The defendant, Bruce Moore, pled guilty to burglary. See

RSA 635:1, I (2016). Following his plea, the Superior Court (Wageling, J.) 

ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the owners of the home that he had 

burglarized. A portion of the ordered restitution was for the cost of a home 

security system that the homeowners had installed in their home after the 

burglary. The specific question that we now decide is whether the cost of the 

security system installed by the homeowners is an “economic loss,” as defined 

by RSA 651:62, III(a), and is therefore a compensable expense under New 
2

Hampshire’s restitution statute. See RSA 651:61-a, :62, :63 (2016) (amended 

2018). Because we conclude that the cost of the system is not an “economic 

loss,” we reverse.

The pertinent facts are as follows. In December 2017, the defendant pled 

guilty to the February 2016 burglary of a residence owned by a married couple 

in Stratham. During his plea and sentencing hearing, the defendant and the 

State disputed the amount of restitution that the defendant would be required 

to pay to the homeowners. The defendant agreed to pay $1,250, which is the 

uninsured loss that the homeowners sustained for the stolen property. The 

defendant, however, challenged the trial court’s authority to order him to pay

for the cost of the homeowners’ new security system: $2,123.64. Without 

conceding that the cost of the security system was compensable as restitution, 

the defendant pled guilty on condition that he would pay a “maximum . . . of 

$3,373.64,” which is the total of the uninsured loss and the cost of the system. 

RSA 651:63, I, provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny offender may be 

sentenced to make restitution in an amount determined by the court.” RSA 

651:63, I. “Restitution” is defined, in pertinent part, as “money or service 

provided by the offender to compensate a victim for economic loss.” RSA 

651:62, V. In turn, “economic loss” means

out-of-pocket losses or other expenses incurred as a direct result 

of a criminal offense, including: 

(a) Reasonable charges incurred for reasonably needed 

products, services and accommodations, including but not 

limited to charges for medical and dental care, rehabilitation, 

and other remedial treatment and care including mental health 

services for the victim or, in the case of the death of the victim, 

for the victim’s spouse and immediate family;

(b) Loss of income by the victim or the victim’s dependents;

(c) The value of damaged, destroyed, or lost property;

(d) Expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining ordinary and 

necessary services in lieu of those the injured or deceased 

victim would have performed, if the crime had not occurred, for 

the benefit of the victim or the victim’s dependents;

(e) Reasonable expenses related to funeral and burial or 

crematory services for the decedent victim.

 

RSA 651:62, III. 
3

Following the plea and sentencing hearing, the State filed a 

memorandum of law regarding restitution, arguing that the cost of the security 

system was compensable as an “economic loss” under RSA 651:62, III. The 

trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing to “determine if the installation . . .

was a ‘direct result’ of Defendant’s burglary; and, if so, whether the legislature 

intended RSA 651:62, III(a) to include restitution payments for security 

systems.” During the hearing, one of the homeowners, the husband, testified 

that, following the burglary, he and his wife felt unsafe in their home, and that 

the security system helped them to feel safer. The husband testified that the 

burglary was the only reason that he and his wife had considered purchasing a 

security system. The defendant, however, argued that the cost of the system

was not an “economic loss” as defined by RSA 651:62, III(a). 

Following the hearing, the trial court found that the expense was an 

“economic loss” under RSA 651:62, III(a), reasoning that the homeowners had

purchased the security system as a direct result of the burglary, and that the

system was “comparable to a victim’s receipt of mental health counseling.” The

court ordered the defendant to pay for the cost of the system. This appeal 

followed.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that 

the cost of the system was compensable as restitution because: (1) the cost of 

the security system does not qualify as an “economic loss” under RSA 651:62, 

III(a) and reimbursement of that cost is a windfall for the homeowners; (2) the 

homeowners did not purchase the system as a direct result of his offense; and 

(3) the homeowners’ purchase was motivated by a “generalized feeling of 

insecurity,” rather than a credible threat of future harm by the defendant. The 

State counters that the cost of the system is a compensable “economic loss”

because the burglary was a “but-for” cause of the homeowners’ purchase of the 

system, and, given the burglary, the system was, under RSA 651:62, III(a), a 

“reasonably needed product[], service[] [or] accommodation[].” RSA 651:62, 

III(a). The State also argues that allowing the reimbursement advances the 

statute’s purpose of “increas[ing], to the maximum extent feasible, the number 

of instances in which victims receive restitution.” RSA 651:61-a, II. We are not 

persuaded by the State’s arguments.

Determining the appropriate restitution amount is within the discretion 

of the trial court. See State v. Schwartz, 160 N.H. 68, 71 (2010). If the factual 

basis for restitution is disputed, however, the State must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the victim’s loss or damage is causally 

connected to the offense and bears a significant relationship to the offense. Id. 

In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we accept its factual findings unless they 

lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous. Id. Our review of the trial 

court’s legal conclusions is de novo. Id.
4

Resolution of the question of whether the cost of the security system is a 

compensable “economic loss” requires that we engage in statutory 

interpretation. “We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo.” 

Franciosa v. Hidden Pond Farm, 171 N.H. 350, 355 (2018). The restitution 

statute is part of the Criminal Code; therefore, we construe it “according to the 

fair import of [its] terms and to promote justice.” RSA 625:3 (2016). “In 

matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the 

legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” 

Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013). “We first look to the language of 

the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain 

and ordinary meaning.” Id. “We interpret legislative intent from the statute as 

written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add 

language that the legislature did not see fit to include.” Id. “The legislature is 

not presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions and whenever 

possible, every word of a statute should be given effect.” Garand v. Town of 

Exeter, 159 N.H. 136, 141 (2009) (quotation omitted). “We construe all parts of 

a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or 

unjust result.” Carrier, 165 N.H. at 721. “Moreover, we do not consider words 

and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a 

whole.” Id. “This enables us to better discern the legislature’s intent and to 

interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be 

advanced by the statutory scheme.” Id.

Restitution is meant to compensate a victim only for “losses” directly 

arising from a crime. See RSA 651:61-a, I. The restitution statute’s statement 

of purpose includes a legislative finding that “victims of crimes often suffer 

losses through no fault of their own and for which there is no compensation,” 

and a presumption that victims “will be compensated by the offender who is 

responsible for the loss.” Id. (emphases added). For an expense to be 

compensable as restitution, the State must prove that the expense represents

“loss or damage” to the victim that was caused by the defendant. Schwartz, 

160 N.H. at 71-72 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Gibson, 160 N.H. 445, 

450 (2010). When a defendant causes a victim to suffer a loss, the restitution

statute creates an “obligation to make the victim whole.” State v. Burr, 147 

N.H. 102, 104 (2001).

Here, the cost of the security system is not a “loss” to the homeowners

because they are not replacing a preexisting system. Although installation of

the system may have lessened the homeowners’ post-burglary anxiety,

reimbursing them for the expenditure would not merely restore them to the 

position they were in before the crime; rather, it would leave the homeowners

better off — owning a new asset of considerable value.

The State argues that the cost of the security system is compensable 

because it is similar to the types of expenditures that are compensable under 

RSA 651:62, III(a): “reasonably needed products, services and accommodations, 
5

including but not limited to charges for medical and dental care, rehabilitation, 

and other remedial treatment and care including mental health services for the 

victim.” RSA 651:62, III(a). The trial court ruled that “the phrase ‘including 

but not limited to’ as it is used in section III(a) means exactly what it says—

restitution in this matter is not limited to the types of items specifically 

enumerated.” The trial court found that “on the unique facts of this case,” the 

homeowners’ installation of the security system “is comparable to a victim’s 

receipt of mental health counseling.” The defendant counters that the trial 

court erred because the security system is “not of the same type as the 

examples listed in RSA 651:62, III.” We agree with the defendant.

Although we agree with the trial court that the term “including” indicates 

that items listed are not exhaustive, we conclude that the trial court’s 

interpretation of the statute is too broad. As we have often observed, “[w]hen 

the legislature uses the phrase ‘including, but not limited to’ in a statute, the 

application of that statute is limited to the types of items therein 

particularized.” In the Matter of Clark & Clark, 154 N.H. 420, 423 (2006). 

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, “when specific words in a statute follow 

general ones, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar 

in nature to those enumerated by the specific words.” State v. Proctor, 171 

N.H. 800, 806 (2019) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we construe the words 

“reasonably needed products, services and accommodations” listed in RSA 

651:62, III(a) to embrace only items similar in nature to those enumerated by

the specific words that follow: “medical and dental care, rehabilitation, and 

other remedial treatment and care including mental health services.” RSA 

651:62, III(a). We conclude that the purchase and installation of the new

security system is not sufficiently similar in nature to the types of “remedial

treatment and care” listed in RSA 651:62, III(a). Unlike medical, dental, and 

mental health care, a security system is not an individualized treatment 

provided by a healthcare professional intended to restore the health of the 

victim. While the types of treatment and care enumerated in the statute are

remedial healthcare services, a security system is an object not at all 

associated with the healthcare profession.

In addition, in this case, no mental health counselor or other medical 

provider recommended that the homeowners purchase and install the security

system. Accordingly, we need not decide whether the cost of a security system 

might be compensable if the system is recommended as treatment by a medical 

provider. Cf. State v. Pumphrey, 338 P.3d 819, 824 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (finding 

that cost of obtaining police reports about defendant from a different incident 

in a different city was compensable as restitution because victim’s counselor 

recommended that victim review those reports as part of treatment for panic 

attacks arising from the defendant’s crime); State v. Higley, 253 P.3d 750, 754 

(Idaho Ct. App. 2010) (ordering defendant to pay lost wages to victim who quit 

his job because victim’s counselor recommended victim do so to relieve 

symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress caused by the defendant’s 
6

crime). That is an issue for another day. Under these circumstances, and

absent a recommendation from a medical professional, we conclude that the

security system installed by the homeowners is not sufficiently similar in 

nature to the “products, services and accommodations” enumerated in RSA 

651:62, III(a) to be compensable as restitution. See Clark, 154 N.H. at 423; 

Proctor, 171 N.H. at 806.

The dissent states that “ejusdem generis should not be employed to 

further limit the types of charges for which a defendant may be required to 

reimburse a victim.” Although the legislature could have defined “economic 

loss” simply as “[r]easonable charges incurred for reasonably needed products, 

services and accommodations,” it used the phrase “including but not limited 

to,” and listed specific examples of “products, services and accommodations.” 

RSA 651:62, III(a). Accordingly, based on the language chosen by the 

legislature, we find that the application of the statute is limited to the types of 

items particularized. See Clark, 154 N.H. at 423. 

Nor do we agree with the dissent’s contention that our construction 

renders the phrase “other expenses incurred as a direct result of a criminal 

offense” superfluous. RSA 651:62, III. That phrase itself is limited by the word 

“including,” and by the specific examples of “economic loss” set forth in

paragraphs III(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e). If we were to adopt the dissent’s broad

construction of “other expenses incurred as a direct result of a criminal 

offense,” paragraphs III(a) through (e) would be rendered mere surplusage. See

Garand, 159 N.H. at 141 (providing that “whenever possible, every word of a 

statute should be given effect” (quotation omitted)).

The State also argues that “economic loss” under RSA 651:62, III(a) 

should be construed to allow reimbursement for the cost of the security 

system, because doing so would be consistent with the statutory purpose of 

“increas[ing], to the maximum extent feasible, the number of instances in 

which victims receive restitution.” RSA 651:61-a, II. Although we agree that

ordering reimbursement would be consistent with the statutory purpose, a 

broad statutory purpose does not “override the specific language chosen by the 

legislature.” Appeal of Town of Lincoln, 172 N.H. 244, 251 (2019). As 

discussed above, RSA 651:62 and :63 provide that victims may receive 

restitution only for expenses that meet the definition of “economic loss.” RSA 

651:62, III, V. In addition, RSA 651:61-a, I, provides that restitution is 

intended only to compensate a victim for “losses.” RSA 651:61-a, I; Schwartz, 

160 N.H. at 71-72. Under the State’s construction, there would be virtually no 

limit to the expenses that could be compensable as restitution, as any payment 

from a defendant to a victim, no matter how tenuous the connection with the 

crime, would “increase, to the maximum extent feasible, the number of 

instances in which victims receive restitution.” RSA 651:61-a, II. 
7

Likewise, although restitution is intended, in part, as the dissent 

stresses, to “rehabilitate the offender” and “reinforce the offender’s sense of 

responsibility,” these goals “must be read in the context of other language set 

forth in the statement of [purpose] and in the statute itself.” Franciosa, 171 

N.H. at 356. Here, the legislature restricted restitution to compensating 

victims only for “losses,” RSA 651:61-a, I, and included specific examples of 

“products, services and accommodations.” RSA 651:62, III(a). Any payment to 

a victim could arguably serve to rehabilitate an offender, but the statute 

requires more than the mere advancement of this goal in order for an expense 

to be compensable. 

The State next urges us to adopt the reasoning employed by the

Wisconsin Court of Appeals in State v. Queever, 887 N.W.2d 912 (Wis. Ct. App. 

2016), and the Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Christy, 383 P.3d 406 (Or. 

Ct. App. 2016), when those courts affirmed the payment of restitution to the 

victims as reimbursement for the cost of security systems. We decline to do so,

however, as those cases are distinguishable on their facts. In Queever, the 

defendant burglarized the victim’s home several times over a period of months,

and was ordered to pay restitution for the cost of the victim’s security system 

because the victim purchased the system during the series of burglaries, and 

used the system to catch the burglar. See Queever, 887 N.W.2d at 914-18. 

The court reasoned that the cost of the security system was compensable in 

part because the system was a necessary expense to prevent additional 

burglaries by the same defendant. Similarly, in Christy, the defendant was

ordered to pay the cost of a security system that the victim installed after a 

burglary in part because of “the likelihood that [the defendant] would repeat” 

his act of burglarizing the victim’s home. Christy, 383 P.3d at 408. As in 

Queever, the security system was deemed necessary to protect the victim from 

the same defendant. See id. 

In contrast, there is no evidence in this case that the homeowners

believed that the defendant was likely to commit another burglary, nor does the

record suggest that the defendant is likely to again burglarize their residence. 

Unlike in Queever and Christy, the security system in this case merely helps 

protect the homeowners against the same general risk of crime faced by other 

members of the public.

Finally, we observe that our analysis and conclusion that the cost of the 

security system is not compensable as restitution are in accord with the 

reasoning employed by a majority of courts in states that have addressed the 

same issue. Although the language of our restitution statute differs to some 

degree from the statutory language employed in other states, the rationale 

underlying the decisions is sound. See, e.g., State v. Forant, 719 A.2d 399, 

403 (Vt. 1998) (finding that, although victim was afraid of future harassment 

by husband after domestic assault, victim’s expenses for changing locks and 

obtaining new phone number were not compensable as restitution); Howell v. 
8

Com., 652 S.E.2d 107, 108-09 (Va. 2007) (finding that victims’ purchase of 

security system following burglary was not compensable, where restitution 

statute covered “damages or losses caused by the offense” (quotation omitted)); 

TPJ v. State, 66 P.3d 710, 711-12 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that victim’s purchase 

of new car alarm after car break-in was not compensable, where restitution 

statute covered “damage or loss”); People v. Fitzgerald, 728 N.E.2d 1271, 1272, 

1275 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (finding that cost of security system installed in 

woman’s home was not compensable, even though she installed the system 

because her ex-boyfriend had broken into her home and attacked her); People 

v. Reyes, 166 P.3d 301, 302-03 (Colo. App. 2007) (finding that victim’s 

purchase of new interior locks following burglary was not compensable, where 

restitution statute covered “losses or injuries proximately caused by an 

offender’s conduct” (quotation omitted)); Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 51-52 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that “[t]he fact that the victims expended money 

on a security system in response to [a burglary] does not make such an

expenditure compensable through restitution” because “another burglary 

victim could purchase dogs; another, firearms; and another home-owner could 

be unnerved to the point that he or she moves to a different neighborhood”);

State v. Chambers, 138 P.3d 405, 414-15 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that 

victim’s purchase of security system following burglary was not compensable, 

where restitution statute covered “damage or loss caused by the defendant’s 

crime” (quotation omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the cost of the homeowners’ 

security system is not an “economic loss” within the meaning of RSA 651:62, 

III(a), and therefore is not compensable as restitution. 

Reversed.

DONOVAN, J., concurred; ABRAMSON, J., retired superior court justice, 

specially assigned under RSA 490:3, concurred; HICKS, J., with whom HANTZ 

MARCONI, J., joined, dissented. 

 

HICKS, J., dissenting. Respectfully, I dissent from the court’s holding 

that the Superior Court (Wageling, J.) erred by ordering the defendant, Bruce 

Moore, to reimburse the victims, a married couple, for a home security system 

installed after he burglarized their residence. 

The trial court found, or the record supports, the following facts. The 

victims have lived in the same Stratham residence for the past decade. On 

February 17, 2016, the defendant burglarized their residence and stole items of 

both monetary and sentimental value. The burglary traumatized the victims. 

As a result of the burglary, the husband no longer felt safe in his home and 

was unable to fall asleep at night. Although he replaced the locks on his home, 

doing so did not quell his anxiety. As a result, he signed a contract with 
9

American District Telegraph (ADT) to install a security system in the home. 

Installing the system made the husband feel more secure. According to the 

husband, he signed the contract with ADT approximately three weeks after the 

burglary, after having requested quotes from multiple companies.

In December 2017, the defendant pled guilty to the burglary charge. The 

State requested that, as part of the defendant’s sentence, he be ordered to pay 

restitution to the victims in the amount of $3,373.64. $2,123.64 of this 

amount represented the cost of the home security system. The defendant 

objected to the request pertaining to the security system, arguing that 

installing a security system “to prevent future crime is not an economic loss 

suffered due to damage [he] inflicted,” and, therefore, is not a reimbursable 

expense under the restitution statute. 

After reviewing the parties’ memoranda of law on the issue, the trial 

court found “the record insufficient to decide whether the . . . installation of a 

security system, in this particular case, occurred as a ‘direct result’ of [the] 

Defendant’s criminal conduct,” as is required by the restitution statute. See

RSA 651:62, III, V, VI (2016). The court, therefore, held an evidentiary hearing 

on that issue. Thereafter, the trial court ruled that the cost of the security 

system was a reimbursable expense under the restitution statute, and found 

that the State had met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the security system was a reasonable charge, incurred for a 

reasonably needed product, as a direct result of the defendant’s criminal 

offense. This appeal followed.

In reviewing a trial court’s restitution order, we accept its factual findings 

unless the record does not support them or they are clearly erroneous. See

State v. Schwartz, 160 N.H. 68, 71 (2010). We review the trial court’s legal 

conclusions de novo. Id. 

We also review its statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Proctor, 171 

N.H. 800, 805 (2019). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final 

arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute 

considered as a whole. Id. We first look to the language of the statute itself, 

and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary 

meaning. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and 

will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the 

legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We must give effect to all words in a 

statute, and presume that the legislature did not enact superfluous or 

redundant words. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in 

isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Petition of 

Second Chance Bail Bonds, 171 N.H. 807, 811 (2019). This enables us to

better discern the legislature’s intent and to interpret statutory language in 

light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. 

Id. “[W]e do not consider legislative history to construe a statute that is clear 
10

on its face.” State v. Surrell, 171 N.H. 82, 85 (2018). “We do not strictly 

construe criminal statutes, but rather construe them according to the fair 

import of their terms and to promote justice.” State v. Paige, 170 N.H. 261, 

264 (2017) (quotation omitted); see RSA 625:3 (2016).

In reversing the trial court’s restitution order, the majority narrowly 

construes the restitution statute. Doing so is inconsistent with legislative 

intent.

The legislature has directed that the restitution statute is to apply 

broadly. The statute, enacted in 1996, establishes “a presumption that the 

victim will be compensated by the offender who is responsible for the loss.” 

RSA 651:61-a, I (2016); see Laws 1996, 286:6. “Any offender may be sentenced 

to make restitution in an amount determined by the court,” and if the court 

does not order restitution, it must state its reasons for not ordering it on the 

record or in a sentencing order. RSA 651:63, I (2016). The restitution statute 

is intended to “increase, to the maximum extent feasible, the number of 

instances in which victims receive restitution.” RSA 651:61-a, II (2016). 

Restitution is not “contingent upon an offender’s current ability to pay or upon 

the availability of other compensation.” Id. “[T]he overall purpose of the 

restitution statute . . . is to rehabilitate the offender,” not as the majority 

implies, to make the victim whole. State v. Burr, 147 N.H. 102, 104 (2001); see

RSA 651:61-a (2016).

Accordingly, the legislature has broadly defined what constitutes 

“restitution” under the statute. Restitution is not limited to a victim’s out-ofpocket losses. Rather, restitution is statutorily defined as “money or service 

provided by the offender to compensate a victim for economic loss, or to 

compensate any collateral source subrogated to the rights of the victim, which 

indemnifies a victim for economic loss under this subdivision.” RSA 651:62, V. 

The term “economic loss” is not limited to “out-of-pocket losses,” but includes

“other expenses incurred as a direct result of a criminal offense.” RSA 651:62, 

III (emphasis added). The majority’s construction renders the phrase “other 

expenses incurred as a direct result of a criminal offense” superfluous. 

The term “economic loss” is itself broadly defined to include:

(a) Reasonable charges incurred for reasonably needed products, 

services and accommodations, including but not limited to charges 

for medical and dental care, rehabilitation, and other remedial 

treatment and care including mental health services for the victim 

or, in the case of the death of the victim, for the victim’s spouse 

and immediate family;

(b) Loss of income by the victim or the victim’s dependents;
11

(c) The value of damaged, destroyed, or lost property;

(d) Expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining ordinary and 

necessary services in lieu of those the injured or deceased victim 

would have performed, if the crime had not occurred, for the 

benefit of the victim or the victim’s dependents;

(e) Reasonable expenses related to funeral and burial or crematory 

services for the decedent victim.

Id. 

Thus, to be compensable as restitution under RSA 651:62, III(a), a 

charge incurred for “products, services and accommodations” must be 

“reasonable” and the products, services and accommodations must be 

“reasonably needed.” The only other legislatively-imposed limitations are that: 

(1) the charges must have been incurred “as a direct result” of the defendant’s 

“criminal offense”; and (2) the restitution ordered must not “compensate the 

victim more than once for the same injury.” RSA 651:62, III(a), :63, I. 

Nothing in this statutory scheme requires that the “reasonably needed 

products, services and accommodations” replace a victim’s prior products, 

services and accommodations. Nor does the statutory scheme require that 

such products, services and accommodations be recommended by a mental 

health counselor or other medical service provider before they are 

compensable. The legislature did not include such limitations in RSA 651:62, 

III(a), and we should not add language to the statute that the legislature did 

not see fit to include. State v. Gilley, 168 N.H. 188, 189-90 (2015); see State v. 

Labrie, 171 N.H. 475, 484 (2018). 

In construing the restitution statute and deciding whether an expense 

incurred to purchase a home security system is reimbursable under it, both 

the majority and the defendant rely upon the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The 

defendant contends, and the majority holds, that because a security system is 

not “of the same type” as the examples of “[r]easonable charges incurred for 

reasonably needed products, services and accommodations” listed in RSA 

651:62, III(a), it is not a reimbursable expense. (Quotation omitted.) 

“Ejusdem generis means of the same kind, and is a variation of the 

maxim noscitur a sociis.” 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 

Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.17, at 364 (7th rev. ed. 2014) 

(quotation omitted). We have articulated the principle of ejusdem generis in 

two ways. Proctor, 171 N.H. at 806. We have said that it provides that “where 

general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a 

particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in 

their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of 
12

the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). We have also stated that the doctrine “provides that, when specific 

words in a statute follow general ones, the general words are construed to 

embrace only objects similar in nature to those enumerated by the specific 

words.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Under either articulation, the general words 

are construed to apply only to persons or things that are similar to the specific 

words.” Id. 

Applying ejusdem generis to RSA 651:62, III(a) is inconsistent with 

legislative intent. Contrary to the implication of the majority opinion, 

ejusdem generis “‘is, like other canons of statutory construction, only an aid to 

the ascertainment of the true meaning of the statute. It is neither final nor 

exclusive.’” 2A Singer & Shambie Singer, supra § 47.22, at 401-02 (quoting 

Helvering v. Stockholms &c. Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934)); see In the Matter of 

Regan & Regan, 164 N.H. 1, 9 (2012). The doctrine “is always subject to the 

qualification that general words will not be used in a restricted sense if the act 

as a whole demonstrates a different legislative purpose in view of the objectives 

to be obtained.” Regan, 164 N.H. at 9 (quotation omitted); see State v. Small, 

99 N.H. 349, 350 (1955) (“As an aid in determining legislative intent, the rule 

has been employed in this state unless a broader construction is necessary to 

give effect to the legislative meaning.” (citation and quotation omitted)). “The 

crux of the matter is that the rule of ejusdem generis is only a constructionary 

crutch and not a judicial ukase in the ascertainment of legislative intention.” 

Small, 99 N.H. at 351. 

Given that the objective of the restitution statute is to “increase to the 

maximum extent feasible, the number of instances in which victims receive 

restitution,” RSA 651:61-a, II, ejusdem generis should not be employed to 

further limit the types of charges for which a defendant may be required to 

reimburse a victim. For all of the above reasons, therefore, I agree with the 

trial court that its restitution order complied with the restitution statute.

To the extent that the defendant argues that the security system 

purchase had too attenuated a causal connection to his criminal offense to be 

reimbursable under the statute, I disagree. We have held that to prove that the 

loss or expense was incurred by the victim as a “direct result” of the offender’s 

crime, the State must “prove that the loss is causally connected to the offense 

and bears a significant relationship to [it].” State v. Gibson, 160 N.H. 445, 451 

(2010). We have not “develop[ed] a test for determining the outer limits of the 

connection that must exist between harm or loss, on the one hand, and 

criminal conduct, on the other, to support an order of restitution.” State v. 

Pinault, 168 N.H. 28, 32 (2015). However, we have explained that “[t]he plain 

language of the restitution statute clearly and unambiguously requires a 

causal connection between the criminal act and the economic loss or damage.” 

Id. 
13

Here, the trial court found that the purchase of the security system was 

causally connected, and bore a significant relationship, to the defendant’s 

criminal offense (unauthorized entry for the purpose of theft), and this finding 

is supported by the evidence. The husband testified that the only reason that 

he purchased the security system is because the defendant burglarized his 

home. Although the husband has lived in the home for a decade, he testified 

that he had never before felt the need to purchase such a system because he 

had never before felt unsafe in his own home. The husband testified that the 

defendant’s criminal offense, burglary, caused him to feel unsafe, and the 

purchase of the security system made him feel safer. As the trial court found, 

and the record supports, the husband’s purchase of the security system 

“helped remediate the anxiety and trauma that was inflicted upon him as a 

result of Defendant’s criminal conduct.” 

The husband also testified that his purchase of the security system and 

the defendant’s burglary of his home were temporally proximate: the burglary 

occurred on February 17, 2016, and the husband purchased the security 

system on March 3, 2016. The temporal proximity of the two events supports 

the trial court’s finding that they are causally connected. Because the record 

supports the trial court’s finding that the purchase of the security system was 

causally connected, and bore a significant relationship, to the defendant’s 

criminal offense, and because I cannot say that this finding is clearly 

erroneous, I would uphold it. 

The defendant contends that finding the husband’s purchase of the 

security system to be a “direct result of” the defendant’s burglary is “unjust.” 

He asserts that “there is no logic to holding a defendant responsible for security 

measures taken by the victim to protect against the risk that another 

individual will commit an unrelated future crime,” and that absent evidence 

that the husband purchased the system because he “feared a future crime 

connected specifically to [the defendant] or his accomplice,” the trial court 

should not have found the purchase reimbursable. 

However, nothing in the restitution statute precluded the trial court from 

finding that the husband’s purchase of a security system is causally connected 

to the defendant’s crime of burglary under the facts of this case. Cf. State v. 

Oakes, 161 N.H. 270, 286 (2010) (concluding that the trial court did not violate 

the restitution statute by ordering the defendant to pay restitution to the victim 

in the future for counseling costs occasioned by his crime because nothing in 

that statute “precludes a trial court from ordering a defendant to pay 

restitution for future economic losses caused by his or her crime”). The 

defendant’s remaining arguments regarding whether the purchase of the 

security system was a “direct result” of the burglary are based upon case law 

developed in other jurisdictions construing other restitution statutes, which are 

of little help in construing New Hampshire’s restitution statute. Because I 

would interpret the restitution statute according to its plain meaning, I do not 
14

consider the defendant’s arguments regarding its legislative history or the rule 

of lenity. See Surrell, 171 N.H. at 88. For all of the above reasons, therefore, I 

would affirm the trial court’s restitution order. 

HANTZ MARCONI, J., joins in the dissent.