[Cite as In re H.C.W., 2019-Ohio-757.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WARREN COUNTY 

IN THE MATTER OF: : 

CHANGE OF NAME OF CASE NO. CA2018-07-069 

 : 

 H.C.W. O P I N I O N 

 : 3/4/2019 

 

APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

PROBATE DIVISION 

Case No. 2018-9073 

Joshua R. Langdon, 810 Sycamore Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for appellant 

 M. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Applicant-appellant, S.L.W., appeals a decision of the Warren County Court of 

Common Pleas, Probate Division, denying her application for a name change for her minor 

child. 

{¶ 2} S.L.W. ("Mother") and K.W. ("Father") are the parents of H.C.W. On April 24, 

2018, Mother filed an application to change her child's name from H.C.W., the child's female 

birth name, to E.J.W., a male name.1 Mother requested the name change because "the child 

picked name to suit gender identity." The application was accompanied by consents from 

both Mother and Father. A hearing on the application was held before the probate court on 

June 18, 2018. During the hearing, the parents and H.C.W. appeared, and all testified under 

 

1. In this opinion, the child will be referred to as H.W.C., the child's current legal name; however, male pronouns 

will be used in accordance with his preferred gender identity. 
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oath in a freewheeling discussion with the probate judge.2

{¶ 3} H.C.W. was 15 years old at the time of the hearing and attended a public high 

school. H.C.W. expressed to the probate court that he had experienced a "feeling of distress 

* * * from as far back as I can remember" which he could not attribute to anything in 

particular. But upon learning he could be transgender, "it kind of clicked, and you know * * * 

that's what I was upset * * * about. That I wanted to be a boy, but I couldn't." Sometime after 

this revelation and approximately a year prior to the hearing, H.C.W. informed his parents. 

About this same time, H.C.W. began presenting himself as an adolescent boy by sporting a 

male haircut and wearing masculine clothing. H.C.W. also spoke with his school counselor 

about the issue. Thereafter, and beginning with the last school year completed prior to the 

hearing, teachers at school referred to him by his preferred male name of E.J.W. H.C.W. is 

also referred to by his family as E.J.W. 

{¶ 4} Upon being informed by H.C.W. that he wanted to be a boy, his parents were 

concerned about whether his desire to be a boy "was real" and not "a trend or a fad" or a 

"passing phase." The probate court inquired whether H.C.W. had friends in school that were 

dealing with gender identity issues, presumably to explore whether H.C.W.'s preference for 

the name change was the result of peer pressure or similar influences. H.C.W replied that he 

knew of maybe three other students that had gender identity issues, but that they were just 

"acquaintances." 

{¶ 5} Father noted that before they sent H.C.W. to a therapist, H.C.W. displayed 

anxiety and was using anti-depressants. Consequently, H.C.W.'s parents engaged a 

therapist to counsel with H.C.W. concerning these various issues. The first therapist 

recommended that they see another therapist who specializes in transgender issues. Based 

 

2. Although the probate court's judgment entry reflects that only Mother and the child testified, the transcript of 

the hearing reflects that Father appeared and testified. 
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upon that recommendation, H.C.W. began counseling with Marcy Marklay at the Lindner 

Center. H.C.W. was subsequently diagnosed with gender dysphoria.3

{¶ 6} At the time of the hearing, H.C.W. had completed approximately 20 hour-long 

sessions with Marklay. The parents intend to continue H.C.W.'s counseling with Marklay for 

as long as recommended. Father provided the probate court with a letter from Marklay 

releasing H.C.W. for male hormone therapy.4

{¶ 7} The parents and H.C.W. have had four consultations with Dr. Conard at 

Children's Hospital concerning testosterone therapy. Based upon these consultations, the 

parents understand that mental health outcomes are better the earlier hormone therapy is 

begun. The parents and H.C.W. also understand that testosterone therapy would result in 

several physical changes, including facial hair, male Adam's apple, and voice change. 

Essentially, testosterone therapy would result in H.C.W. experiencing male puberty. 

Although hormone therapy is a lifelong treatment, some of the changes resulting from the 

therapy are permanent. As of the date of the hearing, H.C.W. had provided a blood sample 

to the hospital to establish his baseline hormone levels. Mother told the probate court that 

beginning hormone therapy was not "something that we are treating lightly" and that after "a 

lot of discussion about it" the testosterone therapy was scheduled to begin about a month 

after the hearing date. 

{¶ 8} The probate court confirmed that H.C.W. understood that he had a common 

law right to "go by whatever name you want to," and questioned "[w]ho won't agree to that?" 

and "what's the need to have it done legally?" H.C.W. replied that while he is referred to as 

 

3. Gender dysphoria is defined as "[a] marked incongruence between one's experienced/expressed gender and 

assigned gender[.]" American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders

451-453 (5th Ed.2013). The medical condition "is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in 

social, occupational or other important areas of functioning." Id. 

4. The record reflects the gist of the Marklay letter, however, the letter itself was not admitted into evidence. 
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E.J.W. at school, the school's official records reflect his name as H.C.W. Thus, substitute 

teachers refer to him by the female name reflected in his school records, causing him 

distress. H.C.W. also stated that other legal documents and his prescriptions refer to him as 

H.C.W. Father addressed this issue and advised the probate court that 

[E.J.W.] is fifteen (15), soon will be fifteen and a half (15 1/2 ), 

and we'll be applying for driver's permits, and, then driver's 

license, and, then eventually passports, and, college, and, um, 

for this I, I practically wanted the name changed to happen if 

that's what he wants. Um, for my insurance uh, again for college 

applications, uh, for emergency situations, and, things I wanted 

him uh, to be legally known as [E.J.W.]. And, that's why we're 

going through this process. 

{¶ 9} Based upon their consultations with therapists and Dr. Conard and extensive 

discussion among the three of them, the parents were convinced that the name change was 

in H.C.W.'s best interest. As Mother stated, "we have been going to therapy for about a year 

now, and * * * we've been to Children's Hospital and * * * gone through all of the * * * things 

that we feel like we should go through, and, we're convinced that it's in [E.J.W.'s] best 

interest to change his name." 

{¶ 10} The probate court took the matter under advisement. By judgment entry filed 

on June 22, 2018, the probate court denied the name change, finding it was not "reasonable 

and proper and in the child's best interest at this time." In so holding, the probate court cited 

the best interest factors applicable to name change for minors set forth in In re Willhite, 85 

Ohio St.3d 28 (1999), and Bobo v. Jewel, 38 Ohio St. 3d 330 (1988). 

{¶ 11} In denying the name change, the probate court focused upon H.C.W.'s youth 

and noted that "[a] name change request today by a child could be motivated by short-term 

desires or beliefs that may change over the passage of time as the child matures. The Court 

recognizes the reality that [H.C.W.'s] brain is still growing and changing and is simply not 

ready to make this life-altering decision." The probate court stated that it was not saying "no" 
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to the name change but was simply saying "not yet" to give H.C.W. the time to "Age," 

"Develop," and "Mature." The probate court reiterated that the child could exercise his 

"common-law right to use the name [E.J.W]" and reapply for a name change upon becoming 

an adult. 

{¶ 12} Mother now appeals the probate court's denial of the name change application, 

raising three assignments of error. 

{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 

APPLICATION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MINOR BECAUSE THE DENIAL WAS 

ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, UNCONSCIONABLE, AND BASED SOLELY UPON THE 

TRANSGENDER STATUS OF APPLICANT'S CHILD.

{¶ 15} "It is universally recognized that a person may adopt any name he may choose 

so long as such change is not made for fraudulent purposes." Pierce v. Brushart, 153 Ohio 

St. 372, 380 (1950). "In Ohio, names may be changed either by resorting to a judicial 

proceeding or by the common-law method of simply adopting a new name, so long as the 

change is not made for fraudulent purposes." Bobo, 38 Ohio St.3d at 333. 

{¶ 16} The general procedure for a statutory name change is set forth in R.C. 

2717.01(A). The statute requires that the applicant have been a resident of the county for at 

least a year immediately prior to the filing of the application, and that the application set forth 

both the reason for the name change and the requested new name. Publication in a 

newspaper of general circulation is required for at least 30 days prior to the hearing on the 

application. The probate court may grant the application upon proof of a "reasonable and 

proper cause" for the name change. 

{¶ 17} R.C. 2717.01(B) governs name changes for minors. The procedure for 

changing the name of a minor is the same as that set forth in R.C. 2717.01(A), with the 
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exception that the application be filed by the "parents, a legal guardian, or a guardian ad 

litem" of the minor, and that the application be accompanied by the minor's parents' consent 

to the name change or that notice of the hearing be given to any non-consenting parent. The 

standard for deciding whether to permit a name change for a minor pursuant to R.C. 

2717.01(B) remains "proof that * * * the facts set forth in the application show reasonable and 

proper cause for changing the name of the applicant." R.C. 2717.01(A); In re Willhite, 85 

Ohio St. 3d at 30. 

{¶ 18} R.C. 2717.01(C) sets forth certain factors disqualifying a person from obtaining 

a name change. None of the factors are applicable. Pursuant to R.C. 2717.01(B), Mother 

had the right to request the name change for H.C.W., Mother and Father each consented to 

the name change, and notice is not otherwise an issue in this case. H.C.W. is therefore 

eligible to have his name changed and all procedural requisites of R.C. 2717.01 have been 

satisfied. Thus, the sole issue before the probate court concerned whether Mother sought 

the name for a "reasonable and proper cause." 

{¶ 19} "[W]hen deciding whether to permit a name change for a minor child pursuant 

to R.C. 2717.[01], the trial court must consider the best interest of the child in determining 

whether reasonable and proper cause has been established." In re Willhite, 85 Ohio St.3d at 

32. This necessarily involves a broader inquiry than that applicable to an adult name change. 

We will only reverse a probate court's determination of whether a proposed name change is 

in a child's best interest if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re Crisafi, 104 Ohio App. 

3d 577, 581 (8th Dist.1995). An abuse of discretion "connotes more than an error of law or 

judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶ 20} In Bobo, the Ohio Supreme Court first recognized several factors courts should 

consider in determining whether a name change serves a child's best interest. The supreme 
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court revisited the issue in In re Willhite, and with the addition of two factors, reaffirmed the 

Bobo factors. Since In re Willhite, the best interest factors are as follows: 

[T]he effect of the change on the preservation and development 

of the child's relationship with each parent; the identification of 

the child as part of a family unit; the length of time that the child 

has used a surname; the preference of the child if the child is of 

sufficient maturity to express a meaningful preference; whether 

the child's surname is different from the surname of the child's 

residential parent; the embarrassment, discomfort, or 

inconvenience that may result when a child bears a surname 

different from the residential parent's; parental failure to maintain 

contact with and support of the child; and any other factor 

relevant to the child's best interest. 

In re Willhite, 85 Ohio St.3d at 32.

{¶ 21} The Bobo/Willhite best interest factors were adopted by the supreme court to 

assist courts in "determining the best interest of the child concerning the surname to be used 

when parents who have never been married contest a surname." Bobo, 38 Ohio St.3d at 

334-335. Bobo and Willhite each involved surname changes for children whose parents 

were not married to each other, maintained separate households, and disagreed as to 

whether the child's surname name should be changed. In other words, the enumerated 

Bobo/Willhite best interest factors applied where family/parental identification issues were 

implicated by a name change. This case does not involve family/parental identification 

issues and differs from Bobo and Willhite in other significant respects. Specifically, this case 

involves a name change to promote the child's gender identity and is sought by an intact 

family in which both parents have consented to the name change and agree that it serves the 

child's best interest. Thus, many of the enumerated Bobo/Willhite best interest factors are illsuited to a name change such as this and other best interest factors must be considered. 

{¶ 22} As of this writing, there are no reported Ohio opinions addressing specific and 

appropriate best interest factors applicable to gender name changes for transgender minors. 

Mother directs our attention to Sacklow v. Betts, 450 N.J.Super. 425, 163 A.3d 367 (2017), in 
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which the New Jersey Superior Court considered a name change consistent with a 

transgender child's gender identity. The superior court stated 

[T]he court finds that the best interest of the child standard 

should govern the court's decision and that the following factors 

should be considered when determining whether a name change 

is in the minor child's best interest, where the minor child is 

transgender and wishes to assume a name they believe 

corresponds to the gender they identify with: (1) The age of the 

child; (2) The length of time the child has used the preferred 

name; (3) Any potential anxiety, embarrassment or discomfort 

that may result from the child having a name he or she believes 

does not match his or her outward appearance and gender 

identity; (4) The history of any medical or mental health 

counseling the child has received; (5) The name the child is 

known by in his or her family, school and community; (6) The 

child's preference and motivations for seeking the name change; 

(7) Whether both parents consent to the name change, and if 

consent is not given, the reason for withholding consent. 

Id. at 427. 

{¶ 23} We believe the Sacklow factors, with minor modification, are appropriate best 

interest factors to be considered in a case such as this, pursuant to the Bobo/Willhite "any 

other factor relevant to the child's best interest." Thus, in considering a gender name change 

for a transgender child, the factors a court should consider in determining whether the name 

change serves the child's best interest, in addition to the relevant, enumerated Bobo/Willhite 

factors, shall include (1) the age of the child; (2) the child's motivations regarding the name 

change; (3) the length of time the child has used the preferred name; (4) any potential 

anxiety, embarrassment, or discomfort that may result from the child having a name he or 

she believes does not match his or her outward appearance and gender identity; (5) the 

history of any medical or mental health counseling the child and parents have received; (6) 

the name the child is known by in his or her family, school, and community; and (7) the 

wishes and concerns of the child's parents. 

{¶ 24} In denying the name change application, the probate court relied primarily upon 
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H.C.W.'s maturity to express a meaningful preference to change his name to E.J.W. The 

probate court denied Mother's application based upon its assessment that H.C.W. "is simply 

not ready to make this life-altering decision." The probate court incorrectly characterized its 

consideration of Mother's application as being "faced with a request from a 15-year-old who 

lacks the age, maturity, knowledge, and stability to make this decision." The probate court's 

fixation upon H.C.W.'s maturity to express a meaningful preference resulted in its failure to 

consider other significant factors relating to H.C.W.'s best interest. 

{¶ 25} First, the probate court failed to recognize that it was H.C.W.'s mother, and not 

H.C.W., who sought the name change. In doing so, the probate court neglected to consider 

the preferences of H.C.W.'s parents and their assessment of H.C.W.'s best interest. In a 

plurality opinion, the United States Supreme Court recognized that "so long as a parent 

adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the 

State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that 

parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." Troxel v. 

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). The Supreme Court further stated, "if 

a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court 

must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination." Id. at 70. In 

2005, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the plurality view expressed in Troxel and held that 

"Ohio courts are obligated to afford some special weight to the wishes of parents of minor 

children when considering petitions for nonparental visitation." Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio 

St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 26} However, the presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their 

children is not unlimited: 

[The] presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their 

children * * * is [not] irrefutable. The trial court's analysis of the 

best interests of a child need not end once a parent has 
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articulated his or her wishes. By stating in Troxel that a trial court 

must accord at least some special weight to the parent's wishes, 

the United States Supreme Court plurality did not declare that 

factor to be the sole determinant of the child's best interest. 

Moreover, nothing in Troxel suggests that a parent's wishes 

should be placed before a child's best interest. 

Id. at ¶ 44. 

{¶ 27} Although Troxel and Collier involved non-parental visitation with a child, those 

cases were broadly based upon the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 

concerning the care, custody, and control of their children as guaranteed by the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Just as a court order respecting who may visit with a 

child touches upon the fundamental, constitutional right of a parent to the care, custody, and 

control of his or her child, so does a court order respecting the name by which the child shall 

be known. Thus, H.C.W.'s parents' preference for the name change and their determination 

that it serves H.C.W.'s best interest should have been considered by the probate court and 

accorded some special weight. 

{¶ 28} Instead of giving "some special weight" to H.C.W.'s parents' preferences 

regarding the name change, the probate court summarily dismissed them. In its sole 

reference to the parents' preferences, the probate court discounted them as simply a "desire 

to assuage their child." However, in contrast to "assuaging" H.C.W.'s preference to change 

his name, the record plainly shows that the parents engaged a therapist specializing in 

transgender issues, kept H.C.W. in therapy for a year, consulted with the therapist, consulted 

with Dr. Conard of Children's Hospital concerning testosterone therapy, associated with a 

support group, and had extensive discussions among themselves before seeking the name 

 

5. The concurring opinion seeks to distinguish Collier from the instant case on the ground it involved R.C. 

3109.051(D)(15), which provides for consideration of parental wishes and concerns, whereas there is no similar 

statute here. However, it is clear from Troxel and Collier that the source of a parent's fundamental liberty interest 

in the care and custody of the parent's children is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution, not a state's statutes. Troxel and Collier apply when, as in this case, a court 

intervenes "into the private realm of the family." 
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change. The parents undertook efforts to satisfy themselves that H.C.W.'s feelings about his 

gender identity were "real," and based upon all of the foregoing, were satisfied that H.C.W. 

did not want the name change as part of a "fad," "trend," or "passing phase." The probate 

court erred in failing to consider the parents' assessment of H.C.W.'s best interest and 

accord that assessment some special weight when it ruled upon the name change 

application. 

{¶ 29} The probate court's discussion in the "Decision" section of its judgment entry 

does not reveal any consideration of H.C.W.'s mental health counseling and his upcoming 

testosterone therapy. The probate court discounted this evidence, speculating that 

"[w]hether [H.C.W.] is experiencing Gender Dysphoria or is just not comfortable with her body 

is something that only time will reveal. Is [H.C.W.'s] distress brought about by confusion, 

peer pressure, or other non-transgender issues - or is it truly a mismatch between her gender 

identity and her body?" However, the uncontroverted evidence revealed that H.C.W. has 

counseled with his transgender therapist approximately 20 times in hour-long sessions as of 

the time of the name change hearing. H.C.W. was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. Based 

upon those sessions, H.C.W.'s therapist released H.C.W. for testosterone therapy. 

Preliminary testing has been completed and testosterone therapy, which will result in some 

permanent physical changes, was scheduled to begin just a few weeks after the hearing. 

These actions of mental health and medical professionals legitimize and corroborate 

H.C.W.'s parents' assessment that H.C.W.'s feelings about his gender identity are not a 

"fad," "trend," or "passing phase," but are "real." 

{¶ 30} The probate court further overlooked the practical aspects of H.C.W.'s male 

gender identity. In the year preceding the hearing, H.C.W. has presented himself as an 

adolescent boy, sporting a male haircut and wearing masculine clothing. H.C.W. has been 

known at school and by his family as E.J.W., his preferred male name. H.C.W. experiences 
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distress when referred to by his female birth name by persons relying upon his official 

records. The timing of the name change is in part motivated by the need to have H.C.W.'s 

driver's license, passport, college applications, and similar documents reflect a name 

consistent with his male gender identity. Finally, unlike the permanent physical changes 

H.C.W. will experience from testosterone therapy, if the probate court's expressed concerns 

are borne out, the name change is reversible. All of the foregoing are important 

considerations in the determination of whether the name change promotes H.C.W.'s best 

interest. 

{¶ 31} Considering all of the foregoing, we find that the probate court abused its 

discretion by failing to consider appropriate best interest factors before it denied the name 

change application. 

{¶ 32} Mother's first assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶ 33} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 34} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S APPLICATION FOR 

CHANGE OF NAME OF MINOR BECAUSE THE DENIAL INFRINGED UPON THE 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. 

{¶ 35} Assignment of Error No. 3: 

{¶ 36} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S APPLICATION FOR 

CHANGE OF NAME OF MINOR BECAUSE THE DENIAL INFRINGED UPON THE FIRST 

AMENDMENT'S FREE SPEECH CLAUSE. 

{¶ 37} In her second and third assignments of error, Mother argues that the probate 

court's denial of the name change application violated the parents' substantive due process 

right to the care, custody, and control of their child and violated H.C.W.'s rights under the 

First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Based upon our resolution of the first 

assignment of error, these assignments of error are rendered moot. 
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{¶ 38} We hereby reverse the probate court's denial of the name change application 

and remand the matter to the probate court to reconsider the application for change of name 

pursuant to the best interest factors recognized herein and based upon the record or after 

such further proceedings as the probate court deems necessary. 

{¶ 39} Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

RINGLAND and PIPER, JJ., concur. 

PIPER, J., concurring separately. 

{¶ 40} I concur with the reversal of the probate court's decision. However, I would not 

remand, but would instead enter judgment as a matter of law pursuant to App.R. 12(B). I 

write separately because the rationale of my colleagues is both unnecessary and 

inappropriately applied. We need only examine the record as it exists to determine the 

testimony demonstrates the requested name change application established a reasonable 

and proper cause and was in the young person's best interest. R.C. 2717.01. 

{¶ 41} The majority sua sponte argues that "parental preferences" must be given 

"special weight," citing Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334. Substantive 

due process is also sua sponte raised and incorporated into the mix by the majority to impose 

their rationale upon a probate court name change proceeding, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 

U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). 

{¶ 42} Unfortunately, the majority misinterprets and then misapplies Collier. In Collier, 

the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed specific statutes that pertain to non-parental visitation 

rights. In doing so, the Ohio Supreme court found that, "in fact, special weight is required by 

R.C. 3109.051(D)(15), since the statute explicitly identifies the parents' wishes regarding the 

requested visitation * * * as a factor that must be considered * * *." (Emphasis added). Id. at 
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¶ 43. 

{¶ 43} There are no statutes in a minor name change request even remotely similar to 

the statutes discussed in Collier. The Collier decision contained an examination of "Ohio's 

non-parental-visitation statutes under the strict scrutiny standard." Id. Without any 

supportive authority, the majority extends the constitutional principles discussed in that 

specific statutory analysis to a probate court's proceedings in a request for a minor's name 

change. The majority, in my opinion, blazes unchartered territory in holding "special weight" 

must be given to parental preferences when ruling on a request to change a young person's 

name. Such mandates are better left to the legislature or the Ohio Supreme Court. While a 

parent's concerns and preferences are always factors to be considered, no statute or 

authority directs the amount of weight any one factor is to be given.6 

{¶ 44} Despite the majority's criticism of the probate court, it is easily observed from 

the record that the probate court appropriately undertook its responsibilities to analyze the 

circumstances by engaging in dialogue with the applicant and her family. Counsel's brief, 

quite incorrectly, suggests the probate court was attempting to supplant what it personally 

thought was "wise." The probate court, in fact, was developing the record in an effort to 

determine what was "reasonable and proper cause" and in the young person's best interest. 

Contrary to the majority's criticism, and counsel's arguments, the probate court's 

development of the record only benefitted the applicant in demonstrating a name change was 

appropriate to take place. 

{¶ 45} Significant information is derived from the probate court's discussion with 

Mother, Father, and H.C.W. However, while the probate court correctly engaged in dialogue 

and developed the record, the probate court simply erred in its conclusion. Additionally, 

 

6. Since name change proceedings do not require any "fact finding," it is impossible to know what factors were 

considered or how much weight was attributed to various factors considered. 
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contrary to the majority's opinion, it would be better to draw our conclusions using Ohio 

statutory and common law, rather than engaging in a legal analysis which was never raised 

by appellant. 

{¶ 46} The issue is a simple one: what does the record indicate when analyzing 

whether the name change was reasonable and proper and in the best interest of the young 

person? The answer lies directly within the facts contained in the record as they relate to the 

factors set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in Bobo v. Jewell, 38 Ohio St.3d 330 (1988), 

paragraph two of the syllabus, and later in In re Willhite, 85 Ohio St.3d 28 (1999). As the 

Ohio Supreme Court has stated, "although Bobo and Willhite arose in differing context, they 

set out general guidelines that apply in any name change determination involving a minor 

child." (Emphasis added.) D.W. v. T.L., 134 Ohio St.3d 515, 2012-Ohio-5743, ¶ 17. The 

factors set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court that apply to any name change, including the 

case sub judice, include: 

1) the effect of the change on the preservation and development 

of the child's relationship with each parent, 

2) the identification of the child as part of a family unit, 

3) the length of time that the child has been using a surname, 

4) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient maturity to 

express a meaningful preference, 

5) whether the child's surname is different from the surname of 

the child's residential parent, 

6) the embarrassment, discomfort, or inconvenience that may 

result when a child bears a surname different from the residential 

parent's, 

7) parental failure to maintain contact with and support of the 

child, and 

8) any other factor relevant to the child's best interest. 

Bobo at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
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{¶ 47} Whether the name change request is for a forename or surname is a difference 

of no consequence. Furthermore, common sense reveals it will always be the case that not 

all factors are specifically relevant to all circumstances. The majority opinion marginalizes 

the application of Bobo/Willhite because the circumstances of those cases were different, yet 

the Ohio Supreme Court was aware that different circumstances will arise and thus made the 

factors comprehensive and inclusive. Ohio courts would never prohibit a relevant factor from 

being considered when determining the best interest of a young person. 

{¶ 48} Based on an examination of the record, there were no negative factors 

portrayed. With the circumstances comprehensively discussed, when applying the 

Bobo/Wilhite factors, there is no choice than to find that the name change was reasonable 

and proper. The record indicates that H.C.W. had been using the male name for over a year 

before the hearing occurred. Specifically, H.C.W. met with a school counselor to address 

using the male name and instituted the name change among teachers and H.C.W.'s peers. 

School administration has also honored H.C.W.'s request to use the male name. Thus, 

H.C.W. had already shown a commitment to, and comfort with, the name for over a year 

before petitioning the court to legalize the name change. H.C.W.'s public presentation for 

over a year as a gender different than the one from birth is no small step. 

{¶ 49} H.C.W.'s parents spoke of H.C.W.'s history of, and commitment to, living life as 

a male and taking the necessary steps to make the transition a mentally and physically 

healthy one. H.C.W. participated in over 20 hours of therapy with the adolescent therapist 

who specialized in gender dysphoria and saw a physician multiple times to discuss the 

physical transformation. Only after this extensive counseling did the therapist give approval 

for H.C.W.to begin the physical transformation to parallel H.C.W.'s choice to live as a male. 

Beyond consulting experts, a few signs of H.C.W.'s commitment are short hair, wearing male 

clothing, and self-identification using a male name. 
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{¶ 50} The record also indicates that the steps H.C.W., Mother, and Father have taken 

regarding the transitioning process have been by design and methodical. Mother and Father 

specifically initiated medical and psychological involvement to identify and diagnose H.C.W.'s 

gender dysphoria, and then continued with therapy for over a year to ensure that H.C.W.'s 

identification as male was permanent. 

{¶ 51} Only then did the family begin preparation for H.C.W.'s physical transformation 

from female to male. H.C.W. has already received medical consent to begin the physical 

transformation, and Mother and Father have investigated and confirmed the existence of 

insurance coverage for necessary procedures. Medical doctors have drawn H.C.W.'s blood 

to determine baseline hormone levels, and the family has already scheduled the first 

hormone therapy treatment. The family is resolute in their commitment. 

{¶ 52} Mother expressed to the court that the name change and transitioning was not 

"something that we are treating lightly. There's been a lot of discussion about it." After the 

lengthy process, and with comprehension of the complexities involved, H.C.W.'s parents 

expressed their full support for H.C.W.'s name change. The record makes it obvious 

H.C.W.'s parents have a medical understanding for the direction in which their child is 

proceeding. 

{¶ 53} H.C.W. has shown maturity regarding gender dysphoria and gender 

transitioning and is knowledgeable about the processes associated with the name change 

and the reason for such. H.C.W.'s therapist described H.C.W. as "stable," "very engaged," 

and "compliant with therapy."7 H.C.W. showed awareness of the consequences of hormonal 

therapy and knowledge that some aspects of hormonal therapy may be "permanent in nature 

and are irreversible." 

 

7. The letter is not file stamped, but is included in the case file. During the hearing, Father specifically 

references the letter multiple times and asks the probate court if it would "like a copy of the letter." The probate 
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{¶ 54} Moreover, the name change will alleviate the embarrassment and discomfort 

H.C.W. suffers by not being identified with the male name. H.C.W. expressly confirmed that 

when people use the birth name, it "drudg[es]" up anxiety, and the probate court, itself, 

recognized that granting the name change "will help resolve some of the feelings of distress 

that accompanies" use of H.C.W.'s birth name. 

{¶ 55} For example, H.C.W. explained to the court that the name change would allow 

the school to permanently change names so that substitute teachers would know what name 

to use rather than using the birth name otherwise not publicly used. H.C.W. also addressed 

the importance of having legal documents, prescriptions, and other identification reflect the 

male name. Father also reiterated the importance of H.C.W.'s male name being used on 

H.C.W's future driver's license, passport, college application, in the case of emergency 

situations, and in regard to insurance information. 

{¶ 56} Mother and Father have supported H.C.W. in every aspect of transitioning 

gender and in the name-change process. Mother petitioned the court to legally change the 

name and Father signed the petition in support. The record indicates that both parents gave 

great consideration to the name- 

{¶ 57} change process and, as Mother expressly told the probate court, she and 

Father are "convinced that it's in [H.C.W.'s] best interest to change his name." 

{¶ 58} The majority generates a holding of "special weight" to impose upon the 

probate court on remand when in reality we need only look to the record to ascertain the 

judgment that must be entered. However, we should refrain from mandating the amount of 

weight any one factor must always receive in every case. When the factual information from 

the record is applied to the factors to be considered pursuant to Bobo/Willhite, denying the 

requested name change is eliminated as a reasonable option. Therefore, remanding the 

 

court replied, "please." Thus, this exchange indicates that the trial court viewed the letter during the hearing. 
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matter only causes the court and parties further inconvenience, which should be avoided. 

{¶ 59} I commend the probate court for taking the time to appropriately develop the 

record; yet, that same record reveals the probate court simply erred in drawing its conclusion. 

For these reasons, which are drawn exclusively from the record, I would enter judgment as a 

matter of law in favor of the name change according to App.R. 12(B).