IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CA-01441-COA
PATRICIA RUSH APPELLANT

v.
R & D PROPERTIES LLC APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOSEPH KILGORE COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: W I NSTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES H. ARNOLD JR. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: ROY GREGG ROGERS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/09/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ. CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This appeal c oncerns the W inston County Chancery Court’s denial of a petition to set
aside a tax sale of property owned by Patricia Rush, located in W inston County , M ississippi.
Patricia applied f

or a hom estead exem

p tion on the property in 2 012. Her com pleted and f

iled

a p plication shows P atricia a s the taxpay er, J am es H. Rush as her spouse, and P atrici a ’ s

m arital status as “m arried.” P a t r i c i a s igned the hom estead exem ption application and
certif i ed under penalty of p erjury that the inf orm ation it con t ained was c orrect. Patricia’s
2013 hom estead exem

ption w as subsequently denied due to a charge-back f or her ad valorem

taxes due t o J a m e s Rush’s outstanding state i ncom e tax liability

. Mississippi Code
Annotated section 27-33-63 ( 2 ) ( Rev. 2 010) establishes that no c l aim ant f o r hom esteadexem

ption is eligible f

or the exem

ption if the c laim ant or claim a n t’s spouse f ails to com

ply
with incom e tax laws of the State of Mississippi. W hen Patricia f ailed to pay the $551 in ad

v a l o r e m taxes assessed f

or y ear 2013 due t o t he hom estead exem p tion charge-back, Patri c i a ’ s property was auctioned to R & D Properties LLC, at an A u g u s t 2014 W inston County tax
sale. The record ref

lects that Patricia was duly notif ied of her delinquent ad valorem taxes,
the tax sale, and her r ight of rede mp t i o n , b u t s h e f ailed to redeem her property within the
tim e prescribed by

law. ¶2. A f t er e xpiration of the redem ption period, however, P atricia f iled a pe t i t i o n t o s e t
aside the tax sale in chancery c ourt. At the Septem ber 2 017 h earing on her petition, Patricia
f ocused on how she com

pleted her hom e stead a

pplication, instead of addressing the statutory requirem ents to obtain a n e xem ption f rom h er ad valorem taxes. She testif ied that when she
f iled f or h er hom estead exem

ption, she told the clerk i n the tax assessor’s of f ice that she was

m arried, but that she and Jam e s Rush were “ not together” b ecaus e h e h a d l ef t her f or her
cousin. Pa t r i c i a a r g u ed that because she was separated f rom Jam es R

ush, she was not responsible f

or his incom e tax liability

. According to Patricia, the clerk m istakenly m arked
her m arital status as “m arried” instead of “separated,” and this e rror allegedly caused the tax

assessor to wrongly deny her 2013 hom estead exem ption based on J am es Rush’s incom e tax liability

. Based o n these circum stances, Patricia argued t hat the t ax sale of her property was
invalid and should be set aside. ¶3. Observing that Patricia had certif ied the validity of the inf

orm ation in her hom estead

exem ption application under penalty of perjury , and that Patricia had b een notif ied of the tax

2sale as required by l aw, the chancery c ourt denied Patricia’s petition and conf irm ed the tax
sale as valid. P atricia appeals. Finding no error in the chancery court’s denial of Patricia’s petition and determ ination that the tax sale was valid, we af f irm

. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶4. P a t r i c i a R u s h o w n e d p r operty located at 3096 Highway 14 W e st in Louisville,

W i nston County , Mississippi. She acquired the property through a 1998 quitclaim deed f rom Leroy Triplett. At that tim e she was known as Patricia Triplett. 1 She subsequently m arried

Jam es H. Rush. 2 In March 2 012, Patricia applied f or a hom estead exem

ption on the property

. Her com pleted and f

iled hom e stead exem

ption application contains the f oll o w i ng
inf orm ation:
Patricia A. Rush and her social security num ber are ty ped on line 1 -Taxpay e r.
Jam es H. Rush and his social s ecurity num ber ar e t y p e d o n line 2 - Nam e of Spouse.
Line 5 - Marital S tatus lists f ive op t i o n s : Married, W idowed, Separated, Divorced, and Single. “Married” is checked on Patricia’s application. 3

Patricia signed the application, certif y ing that t he i nf

orm ation it contained was correct, as f

ollows:

I d o a t t e s t and af

f irm to the best of m y knowledge a nd belief , under penalty o f perjur y , that the s tatem ents m ade and the
answers given are true and correct a s of January 1 o f t h e y ear

1 T h e q u itclaim d e ed to th e p ro p e rty w as f r o m L e r o y T rip lett to P a tricia M

. T rip lett. T h e reco rd ref

lects th at P etitio n er, P atricia R u sh , is th e sam e p erso n as P a t ricia T rip lett.

2 T h e reco r d d o es n o t in d icate w h en th is m arriag e to o k p l ace.

3 R eg ard in g th e “S ep arated ” statu s o p tio n , th e f o r m i n c l u d ed th ree ad d itio n al q u estio n s th e ap p lican t m u st an s w er if

th e “S ep arated ” o p tio n w as ch o sen
. 3stated above.

The application was also notarized by Maxine Robertson, who attested:
The applicant herein has, IN PERSON, attested to and signed this application bef

ore m e, this the 19th day

of March, 2012. ¶5. Patricia’s property w as subsequently sold at a tax sale in August 2014 because she did

not pay $551 in 2013 ad valorem t axes on the property

. Patricia f iled a petition to set aside

t he tax s ale on July 12, 2017. R & D responded, and P atricia’s petition was h e a r d o n Septem ber 6, 2 017. The c ircum stances surrounding Patricia’s com pletion of her hom estead

exem ption application, the 2013 ad valorem tax assessm e n t , a n d t h e ensuing tax sale, are
addressed in detail below. ¶6. The c urrent W inston County Tax Collector/Assessor, Darl e n e Bane, testif ied about
Patricia’s hom estead exem ption appl i c a t i o n at the Septem ber 2017 h earing on Patricia’s petition. 4 Ms. Bane e xplained that m arried persons only need to f ile one a pplication. In this

case, Patricia’s hom estead exem ption application was f

iled on behalf of both Patricia Rush
and Jam es Rush. Both parties’ n am es and social security num b ers are required to com

plete
the application; however, only one signature is r e q u i red to certif y that all t he inf

orm ation

c o n tained in the application is true and correct. Ms. Bane testif ied that Patricia’ s f

i l e d
hom estead exem

ption application listed Patricia Rush as the taxpay er and Jam es Rush as her

spouse, and that the hom e stead e xem ption application indicated t hat P atricia was “m arried”

4 M s. B an e testif

ied th at sh e w as n o t th e tax co llecto r /assesso r in 2 0 1 2 w h en P atricia f iled h er h o m estead ex e m

p tio n a p p licatio n , o r in 2 0 1 4 w h en th e t ax sale to o k p lace, b u t sh e h ad research ed t h e s ale an d e x am in ed th e p a p erw o rk

. T h e tax co llecto r/assesso r a t th e t im e P atricia ap p lied f

o r h er h o m estead ex em

p tio n d id n o t testif

y at th e h earin g
. 4to Jam es Rush when she signed and f iled it. ¶7. The r ecord ref

lects that Patricia’s property was subsequently auctioned to R & D at

an August 24, 2014, W inston Co u n t y tax sale when Patricia did not pay $551 in 2013 ad
valorem taxes on the property

. The $551 was the a m ount P atricia had received in 2013 as

a credit u nder her hom e stead exem ption. She was subsequently denied her 2013 hom estead

exem ption, h owever, due to a hom estead c harge-back relating to Jam es R ush’s 5 outstanding
incom e tax liability

. 6 ¶8. Specif

i cally , Ms. Bane testif

i ed at the hearing that Pa t r i c i a l o s t h e r h o me s t e a d

exem ption when t he state discovered that Jam es Rush owed incom e taxes. At that point, Ms.
Bane testif

ied, “the state throws a charge-back because they ’re not going to give credit when
there’s m oney d

ue by the sam e p arty .” A s M s
. B a ne explained, “[ Patricia Rush’s 2013]
hom estead [ exem

p tion] was denied due to a hom estead charge-back which related to [ Jam es Rush’s] i ncom e t ax. So that’s w hat she w a s c h a r ged f or—
. . . the am ount that she had received as a [ hom estead] credit in the prior y ear.” ¶9. Regarding notice of the delinquent property taxes and the tax sale, Ms. Bane testif ied
that bef ore Patricia’s land was sold, notice of t h e d e l i n q u ent property taxes was p ublished

5 P a tricia’s ap p ellate b rief in g m istak en ly p r o v id es th at th e h o m estead ex em p tio n ch arg e-b ack o n th e p ro p e rty w as d u e to th e in co m e tax liab ility b elo n g i n g to L ero y T rip lett. T h e r eco rd a n d th e ch an cery co u rt’s o rd e r d en y in g P atricia’s p etitio n to set asid e th e tax sale, h o w e v er, ref

lect t h at t h e h o m estead ch arg e-b ack w as d u e t o Ja m es R u sh ’ s in co m e tax liab ility , w h o s e n a m e an d so cial secu rity n u m b er ap p ears o n lin e 2 (N am e o f S p o u se) o n P atricia’s 2 0 1 2 h o m estead ex em p tio n ap p licatio n
.
6 S e ctio n 2 7 -3 3 -6 3 (2 ) p ro v id es th at “[ n ] o claim a n t f o r h o m e stead ex em

p tio n sh all b e elig ib le f o r ex e m p tio n if th e claim an t o r th e claim an t' s sp o u se h as f ailed to co m

p ly w ith th e in co m e tax law s o f

th is state. . . .”
5twice in the local newspaper in the tim e and m anner requi r e d by law. Additionally , Julie

Cunningham , the W inston County Chancery Clerk, testif ied that Patricia was p rovided with

proper notice of the tax sale and h er right of r edem ption under the a p p l i c a b le statute. She
conf irm ed that the notice w as sent via certif ied m a il to Patricia at t h e a d d r e ss on the quitclaim deed, w hich m atched the address o n her h om estead application. Ms. C unningham
testif i ed that she had the return receipt signed by P atricia. Patricia o f f ered no evidence or
testim o ny contradicting the testim ony of Ms. Bane and M s. Cunningham t hat notice of her delinquent property

taxes and of

the tax sale were provided as required by law. ¶10. Patricia also testif

ied at the Septem

ber 2 017 hearing on her petition. In contrast to the
inf orm ation in h e r f

iled and c ertif

ie d 2012 h om estead exem ption application, Patricia
testif i ed at the 2017 hearing that she had been separated f rom Jam e s Rush since 2009; Jam es
Rush was not on the d eed to the subject property ; and she and Jam es had never f iled taxes togethe r
. Patricia also described what happened when she went to f ile her hom estead

exem ption application in 2012, as f ollows:
So when [ the c lerk in the tax assessor’s of f ice] said, “ A r e y ou m arried,” I said, “Yes, m a ’am , I’m m a rried, but we a r e not together.” She said, “W hat’s y o ur husband’s nam e,” and I told her. She said, “It doesn’t m ean any thing.” That’s the only w ay his nam e got on there

. . . . [ S]he said, “W ell, are y ou m arried,” and I said, “I’m going to be honest with y ou. Yes, I’m m arried, but we are not together. He lef

t m e—abandoned m e f

o r m y f irst cousin.” ¶11. As noted above, Patricia did not pay the taxes necessary to redeem h er p roperty , and
af ter the tax sale m atured on August 25, 2016, R & D r e c o r d e d i ts tax deed o n O ctober 4, 2016. In July

2017, Patricia f

iled her petition to set aside the tax sale. ¶12. A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t he pleadings, and the t estim ony and exhibits bef ore i t a t t h e

6Septem

ber 2017 hearing on P atricia’s petition, the chancery court d enied P atricia’s petition,
and conf i rm ed the tax sale as v alid. In its October 4 , 2017 order, 7 the chancery court f ound
that Patricia signed her 2 012 h om estead exem p tio n a p p l i c a t i o n “ under penalty of perjury , that
the statem ents m ade and the answers given are true and correct,” a nd t hat Patricia subm itted
that her m arital status was “ m a rried” rather than “separated.” The chancery court f ound that “[ i]t is u nknown what exact inf orm ation that [ P atricia] gave i n the tax of f ice, but she clearly
certif i ed that s he r eviewed the statem ent and c ertif ied i ts c ontents as true and correct.” The chancery court f

urther f ound that it was uncontradicted that the list of delinquent taxes was published in the l ocal newspaper in the tim e and m anner required by law and that Patricia had been properly

notif i ed of the tax sale in accordance with the statutory procedure. ¶13. Finding that the tax sale was valid, the chancery court held: Though [ Patricia Rush] now claim s t hat she and Jam es were separated since 2009 and they never paid taxes together, the responsibility was on Patricia to give accurate i n f

o rm ation to the county of f icials w ho cannot p ossibly keep track o f the relationship statuses and f ederal tax f

iling habits o f e very landowner in W inston County

. . . . Because the tax sale was conducted in the
m anner required b y law as to Patricia , 8 and w as done according to t he sworn

7 T h e o rd er in c o rp o r ated b y ref eren ce th e ch an cery co u rt’s S ep tem b er 1 9 , 2 0 1 7 letter
ru lin g
.
8 A t th e h earin g b ef o r e th e ch an cery co u rt, th e ch an cer y c l e r k a d mitted th at th e lien h o ld er o n th e p ro p erty w a s n o t n o tif ied o f th e tax sale. P atricia a r g u ed b e f o r e th e ch an cery co u rt th at b ecau se th e lien h o ld er w as n o t p ro v id ed n o tice, th e e n tire tax sale w as in v alid an d R & D ’s tax d eed w as v o id

. C itin g S K L In vestm e n t

s In c. v. A m erica n G en era l F i n a n ce In c ., 2 2 S o
. 3 d 1 2 4 7 (M iss. C t. A p p
. 2 0 0 9 ), t h e c h an cery co u rt rej ected th is arg u m en t, h o l d in g th at th e clerk ’s f ailu re to n o tif

y th e lien h o ld er ren d ered th e tax sale v o id
as to it, b u t th e t ax s ale w as v alid as to P atricia, w h o w a s p ro p erly n o tif ied

. S ee id

. at 1 2 5 0 (¶1 0 ) (“[ M ississ i p p i C o d e A n n o tated ] sectio n 2 7 -4 3 -1 1 [ (R ev
. 2 0 0 6 )] p ro v id es th at th e ‘f a ilu re to g iv e th e req u i red [ tax sale] n o tice to

. . . lien o rs [ o n th e su b j ect p ro p erty ] sh a ll
ren d er th e tax title v o id as to su ch lien o rs, an d a s to th em o n ly .’ We in terp ret th at p ro v isio n 7inf

orm ation she provided, the court has n o authority to set aside the valid tax sale as to Patricia. ¶14. Patricia a

ppeals, asserting one assignm ent o f error: t he tax sale w as void because she

was entitled to her 2013 hom estead exem ption. Patricia asserts that the c l e r k i n t h e tax
collector/assessor’s of

f ice erred in designating her as “m arried” rather than “separated” on
her hom estead exem

p tion application, and, theref ore, her h om estead exem

ption should not
have been denied due to Jam es Rush’s incom e tax l iability

. For t his reason, Patricia argues, the chancery

court erred in deny ing her petition to set aside the tax sale of her property

. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶15. “This Court em

ploy s a lim ited standard of review when reviewing t he decisions o f a
chancellor.” Little v

. Richey , 230 So. 3d 336, 338 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Powell

v. Meyer , 203 So. 3d 648, 652 (¶16) (Miss

. C t

. App. 2016)). “W e w ill only reverse a
chancellor’s determ inations i f ‘they were m a nif estly wrong, clearly erroneous, o r the chancellor applied an incorrect legal standard.’” Id. ; see SKL Invs. , 22 So. 3d at 1249 (¶4) (apply ing the sam e standard in a tax sale dispute).
DISCUSSION ¶16. Patricia claim s t hat in com pleting her hom estead exem ption a pplication in 2012, the
clerk asked if she was m arried to Jam es Rush, and she told the clerk, “Yes, I’m m arried, but

we a re not together. He lef t m e—abandoned m e f

o r m y f irst cousin.” Rely ing on cases in
which tax sales were invalidated based upon a c l erical error, Patricia a s serts that the tax sale

to m ean th at th e tax sale is co n f i rm ed as to all o t h ers ex cep t th o se lien h o ld ers w h o f ailed to receiv e th e statu to rily -req u ired n o tice.”). O n ap p e al, P atricia d o es n o t r aise th e issu e o f th e clerk ’ s f ailu re to serv e th e lien h o ld er. 8in this case should l ikewise be s e t a side because the clerk erred in f a iling to m ark “separated”
in the m a rital s tatus line of P atricia’s hom estead exem ption application. 9 Patricia’s a rgum ent
is m isplaced in asserting that the charge-back o ccurred due to c lerical error. She is not being
h e l d l i a b le f

or her estranged husband’s late incom e tax liability , a s she a sserts. She is

accou n t a b l e , however, f

or pay ing her ad v alorem property taxes, and, as established by
section 2 7-33-63(2), she loses the privilege of an e x em ption f r o m p a y i ng her ad valorem
taxes if she or her spouse f

ails to com

ply with state incom e tax laws. ¶17. The f

ollowing provision in section 2 7-33-63(2) provides no e x ception f or separated

or estranged spouses: “No claim an t f o r h o m estead e x em

p tio n sh all b e elig ibl e f

o r ex em p tio n
if th e claim an t o r t

h e cla im a n t’s sp o u s e h as f ailed to co m

p ly w ith th e in co m e tax l aw s o f th is

state

. . . .” (Em

phasis added). In short, the charge-back o f Patricia’s ad valorem taxes f or
2013 ref lects what she owed in property taxes f or her p roperty f

or 2013. It does not ref

lect liability f or her e stranged s pouse’s state incom e taxes. The record r ef lects that Patricia was duly n otif

ied of her d e linquent ad valorem taxes, her right to r edeem , and the tax sale. Accordingly , we af

f irm the chancery

court’s order conf

irm ing the validity

of the tax sale. ¶18. In s upport of her argum ent that the t ax sale of h er property should be set aside due to

a clerical error, Patricia relies p rim arily o n Carmadelle v. Custin , 2 08 So. 2d 51 ( Miss. 1968).

In t hat c ase, Mr. Custin, the l andowner, m ade an ef f ort to pay a l l his taxes and have the land

9 P atricia d o es n o t ex p l ain th at th e “S e p arated ” sta t u s o p tio n o n th e h o m estead ap p licatio n f

o rm in clu d ed th ree ad d itio n a l q u e stio n s th e a p p l i c a n t m u st an sw er if th e “S ep arated ” o p tio n w as ch o s en
. T h u s P atricia n o t o n l y f ailed to n o tice th e w ro n g statu s b o x w a s ch eck ed , b u t sh e a l s o f a iled to n o tice th at n o n e o f th e q u estio n s asso ciated w ith th e “S ep arated ” statu s o p tio n h ad b een ad d ressed

. 9records exam ined to detect any f laws in his t itle. Id. at 55. Mr. Custin, however, was prevented f

rom d iscovering a t ax deed o n his property due to an incorrect description in the

tax collector’s certif

i ed list of lands sold f

or taxes, w hich t hen c a u s e d t he t ax sale to be
im p roperly indexed. I

d. Though the indexing e rror was l ater corrected by t he chancery clerk,
the Custins were not notif ied; nor did the sherif

f serve them with the statutory tax sale notice, though t h e Custins were living on the property at the tim e. Id. at 52, 55. The Mississippi
S u p r e m e Court held t hat this com bination o f clerical errors supported the chancellor’s
decision to a llow t he C ustins to redeem their property

. Id

. at 55. In the other cases cited by Patricia, the tax s a le was set aside, or the landowners were a l lowed to redeem t heir property
af ter t he s tatutory redem

ption p eriod, based upon unilateral clerical errors in the statutory tax
sale notice procedure. 10 As acknowledged, lack of notice is not a n issue in t he instant case.
As t he c h ancery court d eterm ined, and as the record ref lects, Patricia was n otif

ied of the tax
sale o f her property in the t im e and m anner required by law. See Miss. Code Ann. § 27-43-1 (Rev. 2017) (setting f

orth the tim i ng requirem ents and f orm of t he statutory tax sale notice).

10 S ee R eed v. F

lo rim o n te , 9 8 7 S o
. 2 d 9 6 7 , 9 7 4 -7 5 (¶2 1 ) ( M i ss. 2 0 0 8 ) (af f irm i n g ch an cello r’s d e cisio n t o v o id a tax sa l e w h e r e th e c h an cery clerk d id n o t c o m p ly w ith th e “d u e d ilig en ce” req u i r em en ts o f lo catin g th e l an d o w n er to su p p l y th e statu to ry tax sale
n o tice); K ro n v. V a n C lea ve , 3 3 9 S o
. 2 d 5 5 9 , 5 6 2 (M iss. 1 9 7 6 ) ( af f irm in g th e ch an cello r’s d eter mi n a t i o n th at th e C ity o f P ascag o u la’s f ailu re to retriev e relev an t d ata f ro m Jack so n C o u n ty o n th e su b

j e ct tract o f lan d , so th a t

th e lan d o w n er d id n o t receiv e n o t ice o f th e tax sale, w as a su f

f icien t clerical erro r to allo w t h e lan d o w n er an o p p o rtu n ity to red eem th e p ro p erty af

ter t h e red em

p tio n p erio d h ad e x p ired ) ; M o o re v

. M a r a th o n A sset M

g m t. L L C , 9 7 3 S o
. 2 d 1 0 1 7 , 1 0 2 1 -2 2 (¶¶1 6 , 2 2 ) (M iss. C t. A p p
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( rev ersin g th e ch an cello r’s ref u s al to set asid e a tax sale w h ere th e ch an cery c l erk f ailed to c o m

p ly w ith th e statu to ry tax s a l e n o t i ce req u irem en ts); L a w r en ce v. R a n kin , 8 7 0 S o
. 2 d 6 7 3 , 6 7 6 (¶¶1 3

- 1 4 ) ( M iss. C t

. A p p
. 2 0 0 4 ) (af

f irm in g t h e c h an c ello r’s d ecisio n to can cel th e t ax d eed w h ere ch an cery clerk d id n o t f u rn ish an af

f i d av it d em o n stratin g d u e d ilig en ce in attem p t in g to serv e th e statu to ry tax -sale n o tice).
1 0¶19. The c ases Pat r i cia relies upon are wholly distinguishable f rom the circum stances here,
and d o n ot support setting a side the tax sale of her property in this c ase. Section 27-33-63(2)
does not allow the privilege of home s t e ad exem ption if either spouse f

a ils to com

ply with

state incom e laws

— regardless of w hether Patricia put on her h om e s tead exem ption application that she was m arried or separated. 11 ¶20. In sum , the r ecord r ef lects that the tax sale was c onducted in the m anner required by
law as to Patricia a nd was done ac c o rding to the sworn inf orm ation Patricia p rovided. Particularly under our lim i ted standard of review, the chancery

court’s decision to validate
the tax sale was not “ m a nif e stly wrong,” or “clearly e rroneous.” On the contrary , based upon

our review of the record and the applicable law , w e f i n d that the chancery c ourt was well
within its authority to deny Patricia’s petition a n d v alidate the tax sale of her property in
reliance upon the inf

o rm ation in Patricia’s certif ied hom e stead exem

ption application; and
the uncontradicted testim ony that (1) notice of Patricia’s deli n q u ent p roperty taxes was published as required by law, and (2) Patricia s he was provided with the statutorily -m andated
notice of the tax sale of

her property , and her right of redem ption by a date certain. ¶21. AFFIRMED.
LEE, C.J ., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, FAIR, WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.

11 “We ap p ly t h e p lain m ean i n g o f th e s t a t u t e w h e n th e statu t e is n o t am b ig u o u s.” A r m s tro n g v. E sta t e o f T h a m e s , 9 5 8 S o . 2 d 1 2 5 8 , 1 2 5 9 (¶5 ) (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 7 ).

1 1