IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 11–1262

Filed January 25, 2013

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

KAREN SUE HUSTON,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, 

John G. Linn, Judge.

Defendant appeals the judgment and sentence following her 

conviction for child endangerment causing serious injury. COURT OF 

APPEALS DECISION AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART;

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE REVERSED, AND 

CASE REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL. 

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Samuel S. Berbano, 

Student Legal Intern, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant State Appellate 

Defender, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, 

Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Short, County Attorney, and 

Clinton R. Boddicker, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice. 

Defendant, Karen Sue Huston, was one of several adult caregivers 

for a five-year-old girl suffering from malnutrition. This appeal presents 

the question whether the district court committed reversible error in 

Huston’s criminal jury trial by allowing a caseworker for the Iowa 

Department of Human Services (DHS) to testify that a child abuse report

against Huston was administratively determined to be “founded.”

Huston objected to this testimony as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

The jury found Huston guilty of child endangerment causing 

serious injury. The district court sentenced Huston to a term of fifteen 

years in prison. Huston appealed, contending the evidence was 

insufficient to prove a “serious injury” and that the district court erred by 

allowing testimony on the DHS administrative finding. The court of 

appeals affirmed, and we granted Huston’s application for further review. 

We exercise our discretion to limit our review to the evidentiary 

ruling on the founded child abuse report. See State v. Marin, 788 N.W.2d 

833, 836 (Iowa 2010). Division III of the court of appeals decision shall 

stand as the final opinion in this appeal on the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support Huston’s conviction. For the reasons explained 

below, we hold it was reversible error to allow testimony that DHS had 

determined the child abuse complaint against Huston was founded.

Accordingly, we vacate Division II of the decision of the court of appeals, 

reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand the case for a new 

trial. 
3

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

The victim, T.H., was born in January 2005 to Brandon Holmes 

and Christie Polhans. Brandon is now married to Mandy Holmes, who 

has four children. Mandy is the daughter of Karen and Fred Huston.1 

In November 2008, T.H. began living with Brandon and his wife, 

Mandy, in Fort Madison, Iowa, after DHS removed T.H. from the care of 

her mother. Approximately one month later, Brandon, Mandy, T.H., and 

Mandy’s four children moved into the Hustons’ two-bedroom home, 

where they all stayed until April or May 2010. Mandy was T.H.’s primary 

caregiver during this time. In April of that year, shortly before Brandon 

and Mandy moved out, Huston returned home from serving a ten-month 

federal prison sentence in Texas for passing money orders in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 500. 

Although Karen and Fred initially denied that T.H. lived with them, 

Huston admitted at trial that when Brandon and Mandy moved out T.H. 

remained at the Hustons’ home. During this eight-month period, Karen, 

Fred, and Mandy were all involved in caring for T.H. Fred would 

occasionally make breakfast or dinner for T.H., but was otherwise gone 

most of the day. Mandy would come over daily and sometimes would 

prepare T.H.’s breakfast or lunch. Mandy was also the one who would 

bathe T.H. 

Huston is disabled and confined to a wheelchair. She weighs 395 

pounds, and her right hip socket is “broke off.” She suffers from COPD

and asthma. She is unable to climb stairs and, for that reason, sleeps 

on a bed in the dining room. In light of her limited mobility, Huston

could only prepare sandwiches and other quick meals for T.H.

 1References to “Huston” throughout this opinion are to Karen Huston.
4

Dr. Frank Artinian, T.H.’s pediatrician, first became concerned 

about T.H.’s weight in November 2009. T.H. had lost approximately five 

pounds or twelve percent of her body weight since her last doctor’s visit

in May. Dr. Artinian tested T.H. for various medical conditions that 

could be at the root of her failure to thrive, but all the tests came back 

negative. Dr. Artinian wished to have T.H. admitted to the hospital at 

that time for further testing and evaluation, but Mandy lacked authority 

to consent to T.H.’s hospitalization, and DHS declined to force T.H.’s 

hospitalization. In lieu of hospitalization, Mandy brought T.H. in for 

weekly weight checks for the next month. T.H.’s weight remained stable 

during this time period. 

Dr. Artinian did not see T.H. again until ten months later when 

Mandy brought T.H. in at the request of DHS. DHS caseworker, Sharon 

Andrusyk, had received a report that T.H. was not wearing the glasses 

prescribed for her to correct her crossed eyes. Andrusyk contacted 

Mandy, and she brought T.H. into the DHS office a day later on 

October 20, 2010. During this meeting, Andrusyk immediately noticed 

that something was wrong with T.H. Andrusyk noted that T.H.’s skin 

was “pale and gray,” her affect was flat, and the hair on the top of her 

head was extremely thin. Andrusyk asked Mandy to take T.H. to see a 

doctor. 

Mandy took T.H. in to see Dr. Artinian. Dr. Artinian determined 

T.H. was failing to thrive. Failure to thrive is not a diagnosis but, rather,

“a description of what’s going on with a child.” There are numerous 

potential causes for failure to thrive. Dr. Artinian described T.H.’s failure 

to thrive as “very serious” and noted that he “was actually worried about 

her life at that point in time” because T.H. had not gained any weight in 
5

nearly a year. Dr. Artinian was unable to identify an illness or disease 

that could account for T.H.’s condition. 

After examining T.H., Dr. Artinian wrote Andrusyk a letter 

expressing his concerns regarding T.H.’s condition. Dr. Artinian wrote: 

“[T.H.] had not grown or gained any weight in 10 months. Her hair is 

thinning, she is emaciated and has a wasted appearance. [T.H.]’s skin is 

dry and loose. Her affect is flat.” Dr. Artinian told Mandy that he was 

“profoundly concerned about [T.H.]’s medical and psychological health.” 

Nevertheless, Mandy remained unconcerned. Dr. Artinian, therefore, 

urged DHS to compel T.H.’s hospitalization. He noted: “As a pediatrician, 

I have grave concerns regarding the physical and mental health of [T.H.].

I am very concerned that she is undergoing abuse/neglect in her home. 

DHS absolutely needs to take action to help this child.” 

After receiving Dr. Artinian’s letter, Andrusyk obtained 

authorization to remove T.H. from the Hustons’ home, to admit her to the 

hospital, and to place her in foster care thereafter. On November 2, 

Andrusyk went to Brandon and Mandy’s home to remove T.H., but she 

was not there. Brandon told Andrusyk that T.H. was with Mandy at an 

appointment, but refused to tell Andrusyk where they were. Eventually, 

Andrusyk found Mandy, but T.H. was not with her. Mandy took 

Andrusyk to the Hustons’ home and went inside the home and removed

T.H. Andrusyk noted the following about T.H.’s condition that day:

She was very dirty. Her clothing was dirty. Her hair 

was matted. She, again, would not make eye contact, would 

not talk, except to repeat some things. She did state she 

was hungry. Her skin was very gray and loose appearing, 

again, very flat affect. She just didn’t talk hardly.

Andrusyk took T.H. to the hospital, where she was admitted by 

Dr. Christopher Youngman. T.H. stayed in the hospital for five days. 
6

Andrusyk returned to the hospital the day after T.H. was admitted and 

took photographs of T.H, including some bruising that appeared after 

she was rehydrated. Andrusyk noted T.H.’s skin tone and affect had 

improved markedly since her admission to the hospital the previous day. 

During T.H.’s hospitalization, Dr. Artinian and Dr. Youngman 

ruled out a number of medical causes for T.H.’s failure to thrive. While 

in the hospital, T.H. ate everything presented to her and sometimes 

asked for more to eat. On the last day of her hospitalization, T.H. ate a 

lot of food and vomited. By the time T.H. was released from the hospital, 

she had gained nine pounds. 

Dr. Artinian testified it was his opinion, to a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty, that 

the reason why [T.H.] was failing to grow properly and gain

weight over time was that she was not receiving an adequate 

amount of calories, meaning she was not getting enough 

food. This was—this was determined by ruling out the other 

problems that could cause it, but more than that, by 

hospitalizing her for five days, we were able to control her 

environment and control her caloric intake, and when given 

calories, she gained weight. We did no other intervention for 

her. We gave her no other medicine or therapies that would 

cause weight gain, and during that five days, [T.H.] came 

into the hospital at 34 pounds and was discharged at 43 

pounds, which is a nine pound weight gain in five days, 

which is—just speaks to the fact that when given calories, 

she was able to grow.

Dr. Youngman similarly concluded, to a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty, that the cause of T.H.’s failure to thrive was “inadequate 

caloric intake . . . she just was not receiving enough calories to grow.” 

Dr. Youngman also noted that if left untreated, “people can die of 

malnutrition,” and even short of death, they can suffer “[n]eurological 

consequences . . . and other organ damage as well.” 
7

After T.H.’s release from the hospital, she was placed in foster care. 

Apart from another episode of vomiting, T.H. has thrived in her new 

environment. T.H. has continued to gain weight since her release from 

the hospital and, as of her last appointment, was between the 50 and 75 

percentiles on the growth chart for weight. In addition to these 

improvements, the hair on the top of T.H.’s head has filled in, and she 

has grown two inches. 

Leslie Boyer, a caseworker with DHS, was assigned to investigate 

the allegations brought against Karen and Fred regarding T.H.’s care. 

Boyer interviewed Karen and Fred at their home as part of this 

investigation. During both interviews, Karen and Fred denied that T.H. 

was living with them at the time DHS intervened. They later admitted at 

trial that, after Brandon and Mandy moved from their home, T.H. stayed 

behind with them. 

During these interviews, Huston also reported that she had seen 

T.H. overeat and vomit several times. At trial, Fred and Mandy testified 

to similar behavior. Huston also told Boyer that T.H. would eat more 

than any of the other children and that she believed T.H. had an eating 

disorder. Moreover, Huston and Mandy testified that they thought T.H.’s 

failure to thrive may have resulted from the stress she experienced when 

Brandon cut ties with his own mother and prevented T.H. from seeing 

her siblings and maternal grandparents. 

On December 27, 2010, the State charged Karen and Fred each

with two counts of child endangerment. Count I alleged they knowingly 

acted in a manner creating a substantial risk to T.H. or willfully 

depriving T.H. of food, causing serious injury in violation of Iowa Code 

sections 726.6(1)(a), 726.6(1)(d), and 726.6(5) (2009). Count II alleged 

Karen and Fred intentionally used unreasonable force, torture, or cruelty
8

on T.H. causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 

726.6(1)(b) and 726.6(6). The cases against Karen and Fred were 

consolidated for trial. 

The three-day trial began on June 20, 2011. Nine witnesses 

testified, including Karen and Fred, who were the defendants’ only 

witnesses. One of the State’s witnesses, DHS caseworker Boyer, testified 

regarding her investigation of the child abuse allegations against Karen 

and Fred and her conclusions following that investigation. Boyer and the 

county attorney had the following exchange:

Q. As a result of your investigation, were you, as part 

of your work, able to reach a conclusion—you talked earlier 

about founded, not confirmed, so forth. Did you reach a 

conclusion with respect to that? A. Yes. 

. . . . 

Q. And what was your conclusion? 

MR. DIAL: Objection. Relevancy and lower burden of 

proof, Your Honor. 

MR. ORT: Same objection. 

THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 

[BOYER]: My outcome of my report was a founded 

child abuse report, two separate, actually, reports: One on 

Karen Huston and one on Fred Huston. It was founded on 

denial of critical care, failure to provide adequate 

supervision, also on physical abuse, and failure to provide 

adequate food. 

Boyer had previously testified that a report would be founded if there was 

a preponderance of evidence. The county attorney then asked Boyer 

whether there was a process for appealing a founded child abuse report. 

The court, over defense counsel’s objection, permitted Boyer to explain 

the appeal process. The county attorney next asked Boyer whether 

either Karen or Fred had appealed the founded reports against them. 

Before Boyer was allowed to answer, the court sustained the objections 

of defense counsel. 
9

At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel for Karen and Fred 

moved for a judgment of acquittal on both counts. The court granted the 

motions for both defendants as to count II, but denied the motions as to 

count I. 

At the close of the defendants’ case, the court denied defendants’ 

renewed motions for judgment of acquittal on count I. The court 

submitted the case to the jury. The jury found Huston guilty on the 

felony charge of child endangerment causing serious injury. Fred was 

found guilty of a lesser included misdemeanor—child endangerment 

causing no injury, in violation of Iowa Code sections 726.6(1) and 

726.6(7). Huston admitted she had at least two prior felonies, making 

her a habitual offender eligible for an enhanced sentence under Iowa 

Code sections 902.8 and 902.9(3). The court denied the defendants’

motions for a new trial on August 5. The court sentenced Huston to a 

term not to exceed fifteen years. 

Huston appealed, alleging the district court erred in admitting DHS 

caseworker Boyer’s testimony that the child abuse report against Huston

was founded and describing the process for appealing an administrative 

finding of child abuse. Huston also contends her trial counsel was 

ineffective when he failed to move for judgment of acquittal after the 

State failed to prove T.H. suffered serious injury. Fred did not appeal the 

judgment or sentence entered against him. We transferred the case to 

the court of appeals. 

A three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed Huston’s 

conviction and sentence for child endangerment causing serious injury. 

The court of appeals concluded the district court acted within its 

discretion by admitting Boyer’s testimony as relevant:
10

Boyer’s testimony regarding the report described T.H.’s 

weight loss, failure to grow, and poor condition—evidence 

consistent with intentional abuse or neglect, an essential 

element the State needed to prove. The testimony explained 

the investigatory and protective steps taken by DHS to 

determine whether evidence supported the initial information 

DHS received, and how the investigation resulted in a 

“founded” report. The testimony explained why further 

action was taken against Huston and what measures were 

taken to protect T.H. 

The court of appeals further held Boyer’s testimony was not unfairly 

prejudicial: 

[T]he probative value of the evidence outweighed any danger 

of unfair prejudice to Huston [because] . . . [u]nder these 

facts, evidence of a founded child abuse report is hardly the 

type of information that would arouse horror or surprise in 

the jury or lure the jury into declaring guilt on a ground 

different from proof specific to the offense charged. 

The court of appeals also found that any error in admitting Boyer’s 

testimony was harmless. 

We granted Huston’s application for further review. 

II. Scope of Review. 

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. 

Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001); McClure v. Walgreen Co., 

613 N.W.2d 225, 235 (Iowa 2000) (“We reverse a ruling that the district 

court makes in the balancing process under rule 403 only if the district 

court has abused its discretion.”). 

III. Analysis. 

We must decide whether the district court committed reversible 

error by allowing the DHS caseworker to testify that the child abuse 

report against Huston was determined to be founded. Huston argues 

“the danger here was that the jury would find [her] guilty because DHS 

found her to have committed child abuse.” The State contends testimony

that the abuse report was deemed founded was admissible to explain the 
11

actions taken by DHS to remove T.H. from Huston’s care and that any 

error in admitting this testimony was harmless. 

We recognize that a DHS caseworker may need to provide some 

context when she testifies in a child endangerment case as to her 

personal observations of the victim or home environment and when she 

recounts the statements made by the defendant during interviews. But,

we have also cautioned “ ‘the line of inadmissibility’ ” may be crossed 

when an investigator’s testimony goes “ ‘beyond the point of merely 

explaining why certain responsive actions were taken.’ ” State v. Elliot, 

806 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Iowa 2011) (quoting State v. Doughty, 359 N.W.2d 

439, 442 (Iowa 1984)). Here, T.H.’s removal for hospitalization and the 

interviews of Karen and Fred Huston all occurred before the DHS’s 

determination that the child abuse allegations were founded. Boyer 

could have simply testified that she acted in response to a report of child 

abuse to provide the context necessary for this testimony, without telling 

the jury that DHS determined the abuse report to be founded. 

Huston argues any probative value of the fact DHS deemed the 

abuse report against Huston to be founded was substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice. We agree. Even relevant evidence is 

inadmissible “ ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice.’ ” McClure, 613 N.W.2d at 235 (quoting Iowa 

R. Evid. 5.403). Rule 5.403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 

by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence. 

We employ a two-part test to decide whether evidence should be excluded 

under rule 5.403. See State v. Cromer, 765 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2009). 
12

First, we “consider the probative value of the evidence.” Id. Second, we 

balance the probative value “ ‘against the danger of its prejudicial or 

wrongful effect upon the triers of fact.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Harmon, 

238 N.W.2d 139, 145 (Iowa 1976)). 

“[T]he purpose of all evidence is to sway the fact finder.” State v. 

Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d 295, 301 (Iowa 2001) (Neuman, J., dissenting). In 

child abuse cases, much evidence will be “at least somewhat prejudicial. 

Exclusion is required only when evidence is unfairly prejudicial [in a way 

that] substantially outweighs its probative value.” Id. “ ‘Unfair prejudice’ 

is the ‘ “undue tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis, 

commonly though not necessarily, an emotional one.” ’ ” McClure, 613 

N.W.2d at 235 (quoting State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 

1988)). 

We see no probative value to the DHS determination the abuse 

report against Huston was founded. Whether or not the abuse report 

was deemed founded is irrelevant to any issue for the jury to decide.

Additionally, we see a real danger the jury will be unfairly influenced by 

that agency finding, which gives the “imprimatur” of a purportedly 

unbiased state agency on a conclusion that Huston was guilty of child 

abuse. A federal court recently applied the same balancing test under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude from evidence a fire department 

report on the cause of a fire. EMK, Inc. v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 677 

F. Supp. 2d 334, 338 (D. Me. 2010). The court concluded,

Because . . . the report . . . carries the imprimatur of 

municipal government, the jury could well place undue 

emphasis on its summary causation conclusion on the 

assumption that it reflects the considered opinion of a fire 

investigator, who is cloaked with governmental objectivity 

and expertise.

Id. We see the same danger here. 
13

Other courts have recognized the danger a jury will be unfairly 

influenced by an administrative agency finding. In Rambus, Inc. v. 

Infineon Technologies, AG, 222 F.R.D. 101, 110 (E.D. Va. 2004), the court 

held that Rule 403 required exclusion of a decision by an administrative 

law judge. The court surveyed the authorities as follows:

First, the jury, when confronted with the Initial 

Decision, likely would give undue weight to the findings of 

the ALJ. See Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 

1358 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding trial court’s decision under 

Fed. R. Evid. 403 to exclude report of state agency because 

“jury would have placed undue weight on such evidence”) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted); accord Williams 

v. Nashville Network, 132 F.3d 1123, 1129 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A 

strong argument can made that a jury would attach undue 

weight to this . . . agency determination.”). Similarly, the 

jurors’ ability to reach their own determinations respecting 

the facts at issue in this case would be undermined by the 

admission of the Initial Decision. United States v. 

MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding 

trial court’s decision under Fed. R. Evid. 403 to exclude 

executive branch investigator’s findings and conclusions 

because report “tend[ed] to undermine the exclusive province 

of the jury”); see also Steven P. Grossman & Stephen J. 

Shapiro, The Admission of Government Fact Findings Under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C): Limiting the Dangers of 

Unreliable Hearsay, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 767, 778–779 (1990) 

(“Jurors learning that a presumably objective public official 

has reached a certain conclusion after hearing evidence 

similar to what they have heard may have difficulty reaching 

an opposite conclusion. Further, the jury is likely to 

deliberate on the correctness of the previous fact finding, 

rather than retaining the open-minded, first impression 

approach to the issues our system prefers.”). 

Rambus, Inc., 222 F.R.D. at 110.

Other courts have applied the Rule 403 balancing test to exclude 

evidence of administrative agency determinations in employment 

discrimination cases. One such court pointedly observed, “presenting 

the administrative findings with respect to plaintiff’s charge of 

discrimination is ‘tantamount to saying “this has already been decided 

and here is the decision.” ’ ” Brom v. Bozell, Jacobs, Kenyon & Eckhardt, 
14

Inc., 867 F. Supp. 686, 692 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (quoting Tulloss v. Near N. 

Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 154 (7th Cir. 1985)). The Eighth 

Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling to exclude from evidence in a jury 

trial the EEOC’s administrative determination of racial discrimination. 

Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 734 F.2d 1304, 1309–10 (8th Cir. 

1984). The Johnson court observed that to allow the agency finding into 

evidence 

would amount to admitting the opinion of an expert witness 

as to what conclusions the jury should draw, even though 

the jury had the opportunity and the ability to draw its own 

conclusions from the evidence presented regarding disparate 

treatment.

Id. at 1309; see also Jones v. Cargill, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 989, 992–93 

(N.D. Iowa 2007) (excluding evidence of finding by Cedar Rapids Civil 

Rights Commission of no probable cause as to race discrimination). 

These cases are persuasive. Telling the jury the DHS determined 

the child abuse complaint against Huston was founded was unfairly 

prejudicial due to the risk the jury would substitute the DHS 

determination for its own finding of guilt or would give the determination 

undue weight. 

The State argues the risk of prejudice was mitigated by testimony 

from the DHS caseworker as to the lower burden of proof to establish a 

child abuse complaint as founded by the agency. The district court gave 

no curative or limiting instruction to the jury regarding the DHS 

determination. Other courts have allowed testimony as to administrative 

findings with a curative or limiting instruction. See, e.g., United States v. 

W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1207 (D. Mont. 2006) (allowing 

evidence of EPA environmental risk assessment because the jury is 

capable of “[d]ifferentiating between the different standards” with the 
15

help of a limiting jury instruction); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 615 

A.2d 1337, 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (affirming conviction for sexual 

abuse of minor when trial court gave cautionary instruction “that only 

the jury was the factfinder . . . and [that] it ‘must not and may not accept 

any standard adopted by DHS’ ”). We do not believe it would have been 

proper in this case to allow testimony that the child abuse report was 

determined to be founded even with a limiting instruction. In any event, 

we conclude Boyer’s testimony as to the lower burden of proof was 

insufficient to cure the unfair prejudice. 

The risk of unfair prejudice to Huston was exacerbated by further 

testimony as to the right to appeal the DHS determination, followed by 

the district court’s evidentiary ruling preventing testimony as to whether 

Huston appealed. The jury could improperly infer Huston’s guilt from 

the absence of a successful appeal overturning the DHS finding that the 

child abuse complaint against her was founded. 

For all these reasons, we hold the district court abused its 

discretion by allowing the jury to hear testimony the child abuse 

complaint against Huston was founded. Nor are we persuaded the error 

was harmless. Prejudice is presumed, and the State bears the burden of 

showing lack of prejudice. State v. Howard, ___N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 

2012). The evidence against Huston was strong, but not overwhelming. 

Huston shared responsibility for feeding T.H. with several other 

caregivers. Huston’s own mobility was limited. The child–victim had 

problems vomiting in the hospital and with her new foster parents. The 

seriousness of the child’s injury from malnutrition and Huston’s intent 

and role in the victim’s endangerment were disputed issues. We cannot 

conclude the record affirmatively establishes that Huston was not 
16

prejudiced by the erroneous admission of evidence that the child abuse 

complaint against her was founded. She is entitled to a new trial. 

IV. Conclusion. 

We hold the district court abused its discretion by allowing the 

DHS caseworker to testify the child abuse report against Huston was 

founded. That evidentiary error was not harmless, and accordingly, 

Huston is entitled to a new trial. We therefore vacate Division II of the 

court of appeals decision and reverse the judgment and sentence of the 

district court. We remand the case for a new trial. 

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AFFIRMED IN PART AND 

VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 

REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.