November 8, 1948 

Han’. James C. Martin, 

County Attorney 

J%q 

Nueces county 

eJ-a”p+. 

Corpus Christi, Texas Opinion Ho. V-714. 

all ruJad 61 

3 

Re: Whether Section 51 of 

the Uniform Traffic 

Code of 1947 prohibits 

reckless driving as a 

criminal offense. 

Your letter of September 20, 1948, asks our 

opinion as to whether Section 51 of the Uniform Traffic 

Code OS 1947, codified as Article 6701d, Vernon’s Civil 

SMtutes, do~flnes a criminal offense. We held in our 

Oplnlom No. V-413, dated October 24, 1947, that the 3ectlon In question was not unconstltut$onal a8 against’ the 

objection of Its being! lndel’lhlte in its description of 

the offense of reckless driving. 

You have inquired as to whether Sectiom $1 ,of 

the Uniform Traffic Code of 1947 makes the act of reckleas driving, as therein defined, unlawful or a crime. 

Your position Is that since the Section In question does 

mot exnreasly forbid such drlvlag, or exnresrly make such 

driving tin bffense, It does ‘not create the crime or the 

offense af reCkless driving. 

are : 

The pertinent provisions of the Act in ques tlom 

“ARTICLE II--0REDIERCE TO AND EFFECT OF 

TRAFFIC LAW3 

” 

. . . 

“Sec. 22. Required Obedience to Traffic 

Laws. It is unlawful and unless’ ot=rmclared in this Act wlXh respect to particular 

offenses, It is a misdemeanor for any person 

to. do any act forbidden or fail to perform any 

act required in this Act. 
Hon. James C. Martin, Page 2, V-714. 

‘I 

. . . 

"ARTICLE V--DRIVING WHILEUIVDER TRE IKFLUERCE OF DRUGS AIVD RECKLESS DRIVING 

II 

. . . 

"Sec. 51. Reckless Drlvin 

-73' 

Every person who drives am vehicle n Ye lfull or wanton 

disregard of the Eights or safety of others oP' 

without due caution or circumspection, and at ,, 1' 

a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be 

likely to endanger a person or property shell 

.be guilty, of r>eckless driving. 

such 

this 

(b) 

” 

. . . 

'ARTICLE XVI--PERALTIES AND DISPOSITIOB 

OF FINES AND FORFEITURE3 

"Sec. 143. Penalties for Misdemeanors. 

It 1,s a misdemeanor forny~person to vloany of the provisions, of this Act unless 

violation is by this Act or other law of 

State declared to be 8 felony.~ 

Every person convicted of a misdemeanor 

for a violation of any of the provisions of 

this Act for which another penalty is aot provided shall be unished by a fine of not less 

than One ($l.OOp Dollar nor more than Two Hundred,($200.00) Dollars,." 

The exact point was before the Supreme Court of 

Texas in Queens Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 9. .W. 

397, 22 L. R. A. 483, reversing the'court of Civil Appeals 

in 22 s. w. 1048. That case Involved a consideration of 

en anti-trust statute which defined a 'trust" but felled 

to prohibit expressly such act. The Court of Civil Appeals at Austin held that: ,, 

"It commands nothing and prohibits nothing. . . 

!'Th& act does not prohibit a trust, or 

declare it Illegal. It does not declare it 

en offense, or propose to punish It. It defines a trust, but does not denounce l,t. The 

act provl.des.for penelties and forfeitures 

for any violations of its provisions, but 

these penalties cannot be incurred, because 
, 

Hon. James C. Martin, Page T,, V-714. 

there Is no provision that can be Infracted 

or violated. ., . . These sections, as well as 

every other, proceed upon the assumption that 

a trust is ll~lega~~, and that It had been so 

declared, which is not the case. There is en 

important omlssFon In the act. . . . ,We must 

hold that it Is not a law, and that .no suit 

or prosecution can be maintained under It.’ 

The Supreme Court, however, after deciding 

that the case must be reversed on other grounds, end 

noting that a decision on the point was not necessary, 

disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals, and said: 

“Confining ourselves to the letter of 

the law, there Is a clear hiatus, a lack of 

connection in its provisions. . . . There 

Is no express declaration. that trusts are 

unlawful, -- the acts which are declared to 

constitute a trust are not expressly made 

punishable, nor Is any act expressly declared to be a violation of the provisions 

of the statute; yet the language Is sufflcient, .we think, to manifest unmistakably 

the intention. of the legislature to punish 

as offenses some of the acts defined In the 

first section, end it is but reasonable to 

conclude that the purpose was to subject 

them all to a like punishment. The intention of the legislature is the aim of stetutory construction, end where, though not expressed, it is clearly manifested by lmpllcation from the language used,, we cannot say 

that it should .not have effect. That which 

Is not expressed in, words IUELL be lplalnly imported’ by implication. . . 

This case is a leading case in Texas on stetutory construction, and the language of the Court on 

this point has been quoted as. authority. See Storrie 

v. Houston City St. Ry. Co. (Sup. Ct.), 46 S. W. 796, 

802. 

The Act In question Is for the purpose of 

regulating traffic. Such regulation is Impressed with 

penal consequences throughou,t the Act. Reckless driving and driving while under the Influence of drugs,,vhlch 

letter act is expressly made unlawful In the Section defining such actlon, e.re the two subjects of Article V 
Hon. James C. Martln, Page 4,, V-714. 

of the Act, and this would suggest parallel trea,tment 

in so far as crlmlnellty Is concerned. In fact, Section 

51, In defining reckless driving, is replete with deflnitlve references which are incompatible with any ,lnterpretatlon other than that reckless driving Is prohibited. 

Such language as “vilfull or wanton”, “without due caution or circumspection”, 

“guilty” -- 

“endanger a person or property”, 

all connote prohibition and not condonation 

or casual definition. 

It will be observed that Section 51 concludes 

that a ‘person committing en action within the definition 

~herelnnprescrlbed shall be “guilty of reckless driving”. 

Guilty Is defined in Webster’s Dictionary as: 

%avlng committed a breech or breaches 

of conduct; justly chargeable with, or responslbl$ for, a delinquency, crime, or sin 

. . . . 

Unless Section 51 be given the effect’ of prohibiting the activity of reckless driving, es therein defined, the Section Is superfluous, inoperative and nugetory. Such e construction violates a cardinal rule that 

all of the language and every part of a statute should 

be given effect, if reasonably possible. 

208, Section 112. 

39 Tex. Jur. 

Words may be supplied, or one word substituted for another in order to give effect ‘to the clear 

intent of a statute. 

225 3. W. 532. 

Davis v. State,,88 Tex. Cr. R. 183, 

Finally, es stated in Oliver v. State, 65 

Tex. Cr. R. 150, 144 S. W. 601, 612: 

!‘A thing which is within the intention 

of the makers of a statute 1s 8s much within the statute es if it were within the let-, 

ter, . . .’ 

You are, therefore,’ respectfully advised that 

the activity defined In Section 51 of the Uniform Traffic,Code of 1947, es reckless driving, is prohibited end 

Is a criminal offense within the comprehension of Section 

143 of the Act. 

SUMMARY 

The activity defined in Section 51 of 

the Uniform Traffic Code of 1947 (Article 

6701d, V. C. S.), being, reckless driving, 
Bim. Jamem C . Martin, Page 5, V-714. 

is prohibited within the meaning of Section 22 oi the Act, and is a crlmlnal oftense within tha comprehension of Sections 

143 of the Aot. 

Your8 very truly 

ATTORNEY @EN&AL OF TEXAS 

JGtt%~ / 

BY 

Red HcRmlel 

Assistant