SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5414-16T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TIEHEEN FLETCHER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted May 1, 2019 — Decided May 16, 2019

Before Judges Nugent and Mawla.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 97-10-4248.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. 

Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Tieheen Fletcher appeals from a June 30, 2017 order, which 

denied his second post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. We affirm for the 

reasons expressed in the thorough and well-reasoned written decision of Judge 

Mark S. Ali.

We take the following facts from the record. The underlying incident 

occurred on August 8, 1997. The victim, Gregory Brantley, was standing 

outside of a building he intended to purchase in Newark, discussing its 

rehabilitation. An eyewitness observed defendant, a known drug dealer, argue

with the victim. The witness saw the victim get into his car, heard several 

gunshots, and saw defendant walking away with a gun in his hand. The witness 

heard defendant state he "got his fat ass" and then saw him tuck the gun into his 

pants. Another eyewitness identified defendant as the man who shot at the 

victim's car from behind a tree. 

A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)

and (2); third-degree possession of a weapon without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(b); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). Defendant received a life sentence with a thirty-year 

parole disqualifier on the murder conviction. The sentencing judge merged the 

weapons possession convictions and sentenced defendant to a five-year 
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concurrent term. We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentences. State v. 

Fletcher, No. A-4398-98 (App. Div. Jan. 9, 2001), slip op. at 28.

Defendant filed his first PCR petition, which the PCR court denied. 

Defendant appealed and we affirmed in part and remanded in part for the PCR 

court to consider claims defendant had raised for the first time on appeal. State 

v. Fletcher, No. A-4155-07 (App. Div. May 21, 2010), slip op. at 32-33. On 

remand, the PCR court denied defendant's petition. On defendant's second 

appeal, we affirmed and summarized his claims as follows:

In this appeal, defendant has not challenged the 

remand court's decision denying his claims that his 

PCR counsel was ineffective. Rather, he argues that his 

trial counsel ineffectively represented him in four 

ways: by successfully moving to suppress a statement 

defendant gave to police, abandoning a theory of selfdefense, inadequately advising him about his right to 

testify, and failing to "seek appropriate relief" when 

hearsay testimony was introduced at trial. In 

defendant's previous appeal from the denial of his PCR 

petition, we rejected his arguments that trial counsel 

was ineffective for moving to suppress his statement 

and inadequately advising him about his right to testify. 

As to his new claims, counsel's decision not to pursue a 

claim of self-defense was a matter of trial strategy that 

we will not second-guess. . . . Thus, having exercised 

our discretion to consider this appeal, and having 

considered defendant's arguments in light of the record 

and controlling law, we affirm the denial of defendant's 

PCR petition.
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[State v. Fletcher, No. A-5720-11 (App. Div. Oct. 21, 

2014), slip op. at 2-3.]

On October 23, 2015, defendant filed a second PCR petition, re-asserting 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he had raised in the first PCR 

petition, and asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of PCR and appellate 

counsel for failing to argue his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to notify 

defendant she would not argue self-defense at trial. Judge Ali denied the petition 

without an evidentiary hearing. 

The judge concluded the second petition, as it related to the claims against 

both trial and PCR counsel, was time-barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(c) 

because it was not made within one year of the denial of the first PCR petition. 

Likewise, the judge concluded the claims against appellate PCR counsel were 

time-barred because they were not made within one year of our decision 

affirming the denial of the first PCR petition. 

Judge Ali also found the petition failed to present a prima facie case for 

relief on the merits. Specifically, the judge noted the claim of self-defense 

contradicted defendant's own testimony that he knew nothing about the 

shooting, and the fact his trial counsel advised him accordingly on five occasions 

and also in a letter before defendant rejected a plea and proceeded to trial. The 
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judge also noted the first PCR petition had already adjudicated this claim on its 

merits. This appeal followed.

Defendant raises the following points:

POINT I – THE DEFENDANT'S SECOND PCR 

PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TIMEBARRED.

POINT II – THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED 

FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE THE 

DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE

CASE OF PCR APPELLATE COUNSEL'S 

INEFFECTIVENESS FOR NOT PURSUING TRIAL 

COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADVISE THE 

DEFENDANT AS TO ABANDONING SELFDEFENSE PRIOR TO THE PLEA CUT-OFF DATE. 

When the PCR court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we "conduct a 

de novo review[.]" State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004). To show 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test 

of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 

N.J. 42 (1987). "The defendant must demonstrate first that counsel's 

performance was deficient, i.e., that 'counsel made errors so serious that counsel 

was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.'" State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 279 (2012) (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687). The defendant must overcome a "strong presumption that 

counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance." Ibid. Second, "a 
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defendant must also establish that the ineffectiveness of his attorney prejudiced 

his defense. 'The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.'" Id. at 279-80 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

A PCR court need not grant an evidentiary hearing unless "a defendant 

has presented a prima facie [case] in support of post-conviction relief." State v. 

Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Precoise, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992)). "To establish such a prima facie case, the 

defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will 

ultimately succeed on the merits." Ibid. The court must view the facts "in the 

light most favorable to defendant." Ibid. (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).

Rule 3:22-4(b)(1) provides that "[a] second or subsequent petition for 

post-conviction relief shall be dismissed unless: (1) it is timely under [Rule]

3:22-12(a)(2)[.]" In pertinent part, Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision in this rule, no 

second or subsequent petition shall be filed more than 

one year after the latest of:

. . . . 

(C) the date of the denial of the first or 

subsequent application for post-conviction relief 

where ineffective assistance of counsel that 

represented the defendant on the first or 
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subsequent application for post-conviction relief 

is being alleged.

"Neither the parties nor the court may . . . enlarge the time specified by . . . 

[Rule] 3:22-12[.]" R. 1:3-4(c); see R. 3:22-12(c) (2009); see also In re 

Rosenthal, 118 N.J. 454, 458 (1990). 

Having considered defendant's claims under the aforementioned 

standards, we affirm for the reasons set forth in Judge Ali's decision. Defendant 

simply presented no evidence of a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 

appellate PCR counsel, where such a claim was neither sustainable against trial 

counsel or PCR counsel nor meritorious in its own right. Moreover, because 

defendant's claims were untimely under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), they must be 

dismissed pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(b)(1).

Affirmed.