J-A02027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RICHARD L. WILLIAMSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 101 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003173-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 13, 2023

Richard Williamson (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after the trial court convicted him of invasion of privacy and 

disorderly conduct.

1

 We affirm.

The trial court detailed the underlying facts as follows:

At the trial the Commonwealth offered testimony from the 

victim, K.Z., that on October 19, 2018, she entered the Wendy’s 

restaurant located on Rodi Road in Penn Hills. As confirmed 

through the business video surveillance footage, K.Z. immediately 

proceeded to the restroom after entering the restaurant. Seconds 

later, Appellant is observed walking towards the restroom, when 

he then paused, turned in the direction of the men’s room, and 

then looked behind himself before he walked into the women’s 

restroom. K.Z. testified that while seated in a stall and partially 

undressed while using the toilet, she heard someone enter the 

bathroom. The bathroom housed only two bathroom stalls and 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7507.1 and 5503(a)(4).
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K.Z. observed the person enter the adjoining stall. She could see 

a pair of black shoes and the bottom of the person’s pants facing 

the toilet. This caught her attention as it was a woman’s restroom 

and feet would be facing the front of the stall. She then watched 

as both feet disappeared from her sight, which caused her to look 

up. At this time she saw Appellant looking down at her over the 

wall of the adjoining stall. She attempted to cover herself as her 

front and buttock were exposed while screaming at Appellant to 

“Get out of here.” and “What the fuck are you doing?” She 

described that Appellant[] appeared to be shocked as she was 

looking up at him and mumbled what sounded like an apology. 

She then jammed her foot up against the door, and did not exit 

the bathroom until after she heard the door closed. She 

approached the front of the restaurant asking for the manager and 

screaming that a man was in the bathroom. During this time, she 

witnessed Appellant exit the men’s room and confronted him 

about what happened. Appellant denied that he had done 

anything and remained inside the Wendy’s while he ordered food. 

K.Z. left the restaurant and after returning home called the Penn 

Hills police to report the incident. At no time did K.Z. observe 

Appellant gratify himself during the incident in the woman’s 

bathroom. The court also heard from Detective William Skweres 

from the Penn Hills Police Department who became involved a few 

days after the October 19, 2018 incident. As part of his 

investigation, he obtained the surveillance footage from inside the 

Wendy’s which was admitted as an exhibit by the Commonwealth. 

Additionally, he interviewed Appellant on December 13, 2018. 

While questioning Appellant regarding the events of October 19,

2018, Appellant admitted that he entered the woman’s room while 

at this Wendy’s location. However, he explained that he 

attempted to enter the men’s room but the door was locked, and 

feeling like he could not wait to use the bathroom, he entered the 

women’s restroom. He denied looking into the adjoining stall and 

left the bathroom after K.Z. screamed.

During his testimony Appellant confirmed the events as they 

appeared on the surveillance video, but his testimony diverged 

from that offered by K.Z. regarding the events not captured on 

video. As captured by the video surveillance, Appellant admitted 

entering the women’s restroom, but denied that he ever looked 

over the stall. Contrary to Detective Skweres’ testimony, 

Appellant also offered that he mistakenly entered the woman’s 

restroom because he did not pay attention to the signs on the 
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doors because he had consumed alcohol and marijuana prior to 

entering Wendy’s on that day. Moreover, he testified that he did 

not recall telling the Detective Skweres that he first attempted to 

enter the men’s room, but it was locked. After entering the 

women’s room, he explained that after he entered a stall and 

unzipped his pants [and] he heard a woman scream for him to get 

out. Appellant then exited and immediately entered the men’s 

room, whereupon leaving, he was confronted by K.Z. He 

explained that despite being confronted by K.Z. he did not 

immediately leave Wendy’s, but stayed and ordered food.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 3-5 (footnotes omitted).

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with invasion of privacy and 

disorderly conduct. On September 30, 2021, the trial court held a non-jury 

trial and convicted Appellant of both charges. The trial court deferred 

sentencing for the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report. On 

December 20, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate oneyear of probation. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. This timely 

appeal followed.2

Appellant presents the following issues:

A. Whether 18 Pa.C.S. § 7507.1 (Invasion of Privacy) is 

unconstitutional and void for vagueness ─ due to ambiguity 

where the word “arousing” is not defined thereunder ─ because 

it fails in its definitiveness or adequacy of expression and does 

not provide reasonable standards by which a person may 

gauge his future conduct[?]

B. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction 

for Invasion of Privacy?

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2 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant first contends the invasion of privacy statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

7507.1, is unconstitutionally vague. Appellant’s Brief at 10-12. Appellant 

asserts “the word ‘arousing’ is not defined, resulting in the statute being 

constitutionally vague and ambiguous because a person of common 

intelligence must guess its meaning and differ as to its use.” Id. at 9. 

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law; therefore, our 

review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Crawford, 24 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. 

Super. 2011). “The constitutional validity of duly enacted legislation is 

presumed. The party seeking to overcome the presumption of validity must 

meet a formidable burden.” Id. “A statute will not be declared 

unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the 

Constitution; all doubts are to be resolved in favor of a finding of 

constitutionality.” Id. 

Here, the trial court found:

Appellant failed to preserve this issue by filing the proper motion 

before the trial court. “The law is clear that ‘issues, even those of 

constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial court. 

A new and different theory of relief may not be successfully 

advanced for the first time on appeal.’” Commonwealth v. 

Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2017) citing 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659,666 (Pa. Super. 

2009). Based on the holding in Cline, [this claim is] waived.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 5.

The Commonwealth agrees the issue is waived, stating:
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[Appellant’s c]onstitutional claim is waived because he never 

raised it in the court below. See Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 

884 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa. Super. 2005), citing Commonwealth v. 

Lawson, 789 A.2d 252, 253 (Pa. Super. 2001) (even claims of 

constitutional dimension are waived when raised for the first time 

on appeal). Because the issue was not properly preserved for 

review, it cannot be addressed here.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 17.

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and agree with the trial court 

and Commonwealth. Appellant failed to preserve this claim because he raised

it for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement.3 Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal, 2/17/22, at 2 (unnumbered). It is wellsettled that issues raised for the first time in a Rule 1925(b) statement are 

waived. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. 

2011); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Because Appellant waived his constitutional 

challenge to the invasion of privacy statute, we decline to address it. See 

Cline, 177 A.3d at 927; see also Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 256 A.3d 

1242, 1261 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (Bowes, J., concurring) (“Likewise, it 

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3 The record indicates Appellant did not file any pre- or post-trial motions. 

Also, Appellant did not challenge the statute’s constitutionality in closing 

arguments. See N.T., 9/30/21, at 80-88 (arguing K.Z. and the police were 

not credible). 
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has long been true that failure to raise an issue in the trial court, even one of 

constitutional dimension, results in waiver of the issue on appeal.”).

4

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his conviction for invasion of privacy. Appellant’s Brief at 13-15. 

Appellant claims the evidence “was insufficient that [Appellant] knowingly 

viewed [K.Z.] for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of 

any person.” Id. at 13. 

We again address whether Appellant preserved this claim. To “preserve 

a sufficiency claim, the Rule 1925(b) statement must specify the element or 

elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.” Commonwealth v. 

Widger, 237 A.3d 1151, 1156 (Pa. Super. 2020) (emphasis added). If the 

appellant does not specify such elements, the sufficiency claim is deemed 

waived. Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Appellant presented a boilerplate challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence in his Rule 1925(b) statement; he failed to specify the element or 

elements for which the evidence was insufficient. See Concise Statement of 

Matters Complained of on Appeal, 2/17/22, at 2 (unnumbered) (stating, 

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4 Were we to address Appellant’s claim, we would not grant relief. While there 

appear to be no published decisions addressing the constitutionality of 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 7507.1, this Court rejected a constitutionality claim in 

Commonwealth v. Kent, 415 MDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Jan. 12, 2017) 

(unpublished memorandum). The decision is non-precedential but instructive. 

Id. at *3-5. 
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“Whether the conviction was against the weight of the evidence and there was 

insufficient evidence presented to support the conviction regarding Invasion 

of Privacy.”). Because of this deficiency, the trial court declined to address 

the issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 8 

(trial court stating, “In light of the historical precedent of our appellate courts, 

the claim that the conviction for Invasion of Privacy was not supported by 

sufficient evidence is waived for vagueness.”). We agree.

However, in the absence of waiver, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge 

would lack merit.

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court 

must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, and we must determine if the 

evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. This Court may not substitute its judgment for 

that of the factfinder. If the record contains support for the 

verdict, it may not be disturbed. Moreover, a jury may believe all, 

some or none of a party’s testimony.

Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations 

omitted). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence[.]” Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 

(Pa. Super. 2012).

The invasion of privacy statute provides:

(a) Offense defined.--Except as set forth in subsection (d), a 

person commits the offense of invasion of privacy if he, for the 

purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any 

person, knowingly does any of the following:
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(1) Views, photographs, videotapes, electronically depicts, 

films or otherwise records another person without that 

person’s knowledge and consent while that person is in a 

state of full or partial nudity and is in a place where that 

person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7507.1(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Appellant argues

the evidence was insufficient that [Appellant] knowingly viewed 

the complainant for the purpose of [] arousing or gratifying the 

sexual desire of any person. First, there was no testimony from 

[K.Z.] or [Appellant] that when he entered and left the ladies room 

that anyone was even remotely sexually aroused or gratifying 

themselves. [K.Z.] never testified she saw [Appellant] aroused 

and gratifying himself in any manner, nor did she ever tell the 

police that [Appellant] saw her naked or her buttocks.

Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (record citations omitted).

Appellant improperly relies on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth 

v. Dinell, 270 A.3d 530, 535 (Pa. Super. 2022). Id. at 13. In Dinell, the 

Commonwealth charged the defendant with invasion of privacy for taking nude 

and partially nude photographs of residents at the care home where he 

worked. Dinell, 270 A.3d at 532. The defendant entered an open guilty plea, 

admitted to taking the photographs, but stated during his colloquy “there was 

nothing sexual about” his taking the pictures. Id. at 534. 

His attorney then incorrectly advised him that acting with a sexual intent was 

“not an element” of invasion of privacy, and the defendant pled guilty. Id. 

The trial court nonetheless proceeded to sentence Appellant, who 

subsequently sought to withdraw his plea on the basis that he had denied an 
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element of the offense, i.e., sexual desire. Id. at 534-35. The trial court 

denied the defendant’s request to withdraw his plea. This Court reversed. We 

held the plea colloquy was inadequate because the defendant was not properly 

informed of the elements of the offense and he specifically denied one of the 

elements. Id. at 535-36. Thus, we determined there was not a sufficient 

factual basis for the plea. Under Dinell, a defendant must be correctly 

informed of the elements of the offense and admit to all of the elements for a 

guilty plea to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Id. at 536-37. Thus, 

Dinell is both procedurally and factually inapposite.

In Commonwealth v. Knouse, 1290 MDA 2021 (Pa. Super. July 5, 

2022) (unpublished memorandum)5, this Court declined to expand the holding 

in Dinell to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

6

 A jury found the 

defendant in Knouse guilty of indecent assault based on his touching and 

rubbing a clothed 11-year-old girl’s vagina. Knouse, 1290 MDA 2021, at *1. 

Indecent assault, like invasion of privacy, requires a finding that the defendant 

had “indecent contact with the complainant ... for the purpose of arousing 

sexual desire ....” Id. at *2; see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a). Relying on 

Dinell, the defendant in Knouse argued the evidence was insufficient to 

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5 Non-precedential memoranda of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, 

may be cited for persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

6 President Judge Emeritus Bender authored the Dinell and Knouse decisions.
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sustain his conviction because “the intent behind the act is a separate element 

from the act itself,” and thus “the Commonwealth must prove an intent to 

induce sexual arousal as a separate element from the act of contact.” Id. at 

*4. We disagreed. This Court expressly “reject[ed] Appellant’s interpretation 

of Dinell as suggesting that there must always be other evidence in addition 

to the defendant’s act of touching to prove that he had the intent to arouse or 

gratify sexual desire.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Instantly, we reject Appellant’s claim that his intent to arouse or gratify 

sexual desire cannot be inferred from the circumstances presented at trial. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the 

record supports a finding that Appellant acted to arouse or gratify sexual 

desire. 

Video showed Appellant follow K.Z. as she walked toward the ladies’

restroom. N.T., 9/30/21, at 28. The video further depicted Appellant looking 

around before entering the ladies’ restroom. Id. at 28, 30, 66-68. K.Z. 

testified that she heard someone enter the stall next to her, noticed a pair of 

shoes facing the toilet seat, and then saw Appellant staring at her from above 

the adjacent stall. Id. at 17-18, 33-34. K.Z. testified that her buttocks and 

genitals were exposed at the time. Id. at 18. When she began screaming, 

Appellant fled. Id. at 18-19, 35-36. Appellant subsequently told police that 

he entered the ladies’ room because the door to the men’s room was locked. 

Id. at 44. Appellant denied viewing K.Z. Id. at 43-45. At trial, when 
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confronted with video showing that the mens’ restroom door subsequently 

opened for Appellant, Appellant claimed he was drunk and high at the time 

and entered the ladies’ room by mistake. Id. at 26-30, 57, 59-60, 64-65, 69, 

72. Appellant denied that he climbed the toilet seat to look at K.Z. Id. at 26-

30, 57, 59-60, 64-65, 69, 72.

After hearing the evidence (and view the video) the trial court credited 

the testimony of K.Z. and the police and exercised its discretion in convicted 

Appellant of invasion of privacy. Therefore, even if Appellant had not waived 

this claim, he would not have prevailed on his sufficiency challenge. See 

Knouse, supra at *4; see e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 863 A.2d 1172, 

1177 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding defendant’s touching of victim’s breast and 

vagina sufficient to establish indecent contact to arouse or gratify sexual 

desire); Commonwealth v. McClintic, 851 A.2d 214 (Pa. Super. 2004), 

rev'd on other grounds, 909 A.2d 1241 (Pa. 2006) (holding burglar’s 

intentional grab and pinch of victim’s breast was sufficient for fact finder to 

conclude touching was for the purpose of sexual gratification).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/13/2023