COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

RAYMOND JAMES NIGH 

v. Record No. 0409-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

HELEN P. NIGH NOVEMBER 14, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Thomas S. Kenny, Judge 

 (Raymond J. Nigh, pro se, on briefs). 

 (Cheryl M. New; Sandground, Barondess & West, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Raymond James Nigh (husband) appeals the circuit court's 

equitable distribution award to Helen P. Nigh (wife). Husband 

raises three arguments on appeal: (1) that the trial court 

lacked authority under Code § 20-107.3 to order him to transfer 

his interest in the marital residence; (2) that the trial court 

erred in awarding spousal support contrary to the terms of an 

agreement signed by the parties; and (3) that the trial court 

erred in its equitable distribution award. Upon reviewing the 

record and briefs of the parties, we find that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Authority to Transfer Interest

 At the time husband filed his bill of complaint, Code 

§ 20-107.3(C) (1990) provided, in pertinent part, that "[t]he 

court may, based upon the factors listed in subsection E, order 

the division or transfer, or both, of jointly owned marital 

property, or any part thereof." The marital residence was 

jointly owned. Therefore, the court had authority to order the 

transfer of the jointly owned marital property. 

Prior Written Document

 During the divorce proceeding, husband presented a 

handwritten document which contained the following language above 

the wife's signature: 

 I agree that if [the husband] will pay my 

full . . . tuition & cost of books as well as 

any other school related expenses . . . of 

$2,000 per semester for a total of 5 

semesters & gasoline not to exceed [$]1,200 

per semester . . . , then I agree to waive my 

right to alimony. 

Beside the husband's signature on the document is the sentence, 

"I agree to these terms." 

 Wife testified that husband paid her college tuition for two 

semesters and paid additional expenses for her but did not 

fulfill the terms written on the document. Husband testified 

that he did not pay tuition for wife as called for under the 

written document, but testified that the parties had orally 

modified the terms. Husband claimed he honored the terms as 

orally modified. 

 The trial court found the evidence insufficient to prove 

that the parties had orally modified the written document. "To 

be valid and enforceable, the terms of an oral agreement must be 

reasonably certain, definite, and complete to enable the parties 

and the courts to give the agreement exact meaning." Richardson 

v. Richardson, 10 Va. App. 391, 395, 392 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1990). 

 While there was evidence that the parties had conducted 

additional settlement negotiations, the evidence supports the 

trial court's finding that the parties had not entered into an 

enforceable oral modification. Thus, we rely only on the terms 

within the handwritten document. 

 "Property settlement and support agreements are subject to 

the same rules of construction and interpretation applicable to 

contracts generally." Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173, 180, 

355 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1987). In a unilateral contract, one party 

makes an offer in the form of a promise to do an act upon the 

fulfillment of certain conditions by the other party. Nicely v. 

Bank of Virginia Trust Co., 221 Va. 1084, 1089, 277 S.E.2d 209, 

211-12 (1981); Pitts v. City of Richmond, 235 Va. 16, 19-20, 366 

S.E.2d 56, 58 (1988). If the conditions precedent are not 

satisfied, the contract offer becomes void. Id. See also Smith 

v. McGregor, 327 Va. 66, 75, 376 S.E.2d 60, 65 (1989). 
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 The signed document required the husband to make certain 

payments in exchange for the wife's waiver of alimony. The 

husband's failure to satisfy the conditions contained in the 

document voided the offer in the unilateral contract. Thus, the 

trial court did not err in refusing to incorporate the document 

into the decree by reference, see Code § 20-109.1, and did not 

err in awarding spousal support to the wife without regard to the 

terms of the document. See Code § 20-109. 

Equitable Distribution Award

 "Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the 

sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be 

set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 

S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). If the trial court has considered the 

factors set out in Code § 20-107.3(E) and the evidence supports 

the trial court's conclusions, we will not disturb the trial 

court's equitable distribution award merely because it is 

unequal. Artis v. Artis, 10 Va. App. 356, 362, 392 S.E.2d 504, 

508 (1990). 

 Husband asserts that the trial court failed to consider the 

statutory factors. The record does not support that assertion. 

The trial court found that husband had made the majority of the 

monetary contributions, but had exposed the family to risk by 

borrowing heavily against the equity in the family homes: 

 [T]hat constant borrowing drained a huge 

amount of equity out of the family and 

basically required the family to give up the 

house on West Boulevard Drive and has yielded 

an enormous capital gain problem for them 

that may be worse than that . . . . There 

have also been some imprudent investments 

resulting in the Tweed loan . . . and then he 

also failed to pay employment taxes for his 

corporation for three years back in the early 

1980s at a time that he was driving a 

Mercedes automobile at $900 a month. I think 

those negative monetary contributions need to 

be taken into account. 

The trial court found that wife had made most of the nonmonetary 

contributions. The trial court expressly addressed the parties' 

respective debt situations and the tax consequences, noting the 

large capital gains tax facing wife. 

 Thus, the record shows that the trial court considered the 

statutory factors in making the equitable distribution award. 

We cannot say the trial court's decision was plainly wrong or 

unsupported by the evidence. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.