# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 7 , 20 20 * Decide d December 8 , 20 20

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION
, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE
, Circuit Judge

No. 19

- 3395

JEANETTE S.R. LIPINSKI
, Plaintiff

- Appellant
,

v

.

YOLANDA CASTANEDA
, et al

. , Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois , Eastern Division

.

No. 16 C 7153

Jorge L. Al o nso , Judge

.

O R D E R

In this suit alleging an unreasonable arrest, Jeanette Lipinski lost at summary judgment because she failed to comply with a local rule
, of which she had notice
, requiring her to cite evidence supporting her claim. After t he defendants moved for summary judgment, t he district court a ppl ied that rule to deem th eir facts admitted
, and based on th ose admission s it entered summary judgment

. Because district courts

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C)

. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 19

- 3395 Page 2

may reasonably require that even pro se litigants strict ly compl y with local rules
, the district court did not abuse its discretion
, and therefore we affirm

. Lipinski was charged in 2014 with poisoning her neighbors ’ dog. According to the defendants, t he neighbors called the police when they smelled bleach and saw dead
grass in their yard after the ir dog had become sick. The t wo police officer s who responded observed the dead grass and an “overwhelming” bleach smell. The neighbors told the officers that they suspected that Lipinski had poured bleach in their yard and that it had sickened their dog , who now had whitened paw s . Lipinski admitted to an o fficer that she had poured bleach along the fence between her yard and the neighbors ’. The officer then arrested her. She was later charged with knowingly poisoning a domestic animal
, see 510 ILCS 70/6 (2002), but acquitted after a trial.

After her acquittal, Lipinski brought this suit alleging two claim s that she lost at summary judgment for lack of proof. T he first count , under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers , alleges that they arrest ed her in violation of the Fourth Amendment ; the second
count is a state

- law claim for malicious prosecution against the officers and the neighbors

. ( The district court dismissed Lipin ski’s other claims
, and she does not contest those dismissals

. ) The defendants moved for summary judgment and filed a joint statement of material facts. Lipinski ’s response to that state ment disputed several facts
, but she cited no supporting evidence and did not offer facts of her own to show a genuine dispute

. Because the defendant s had supported their facts , which refuted liability, with admissible evidence and Lipinski offered no evidence to contest those facts, the court deemed each of the defendants’ facts admitted under L ocal R ule 56.1

. See N.D. I LL

. L. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) (non

- mov ant’s response “shall contain ... specific references” to the record) . The court also noted that, by not filing a memorandum of law opposing summary judgment, Lipinski had waived opposition

. Based on the admitted facts, t he court granted summary judgment for the defendants.

Within the time to do so
, Lipinski moved for reconsideration, advancing two arguments. First, she contended that she had tried to file a brief opposing summary judgment
, but the clerk’s office never docketed it. Second, s he continued to dispute several of the defendants’ stated fact s . The court denied the motion because Lipinski had not shown “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b) for failing to file a memorandum

. In the court’s view, because she electronically filed her docume nts, she needed to check that her filings were properly docketed , and neglect ing to do so was not “ excusable .” In any event , the court continued, it re jected L ipinski ’s purported factual disputes for theNo. 19

- 3395 Page 3

same reason

— her noncompliance with the local rule requiring her to cite evidence

— that it gave in its summary

- judgment ruling

. Lipinski raises only one argument on appeal : the district court abused its discretion when it applied Local Rule 56.1 to deem admitted the defendants’ version of the facts. S h e points to her pro se status
, asserts that by disputing the defendants’ statement of facts under penalty of perjury she acted in good faith , and concludes that the court should have given her a chance to cure her defective response

. Essentially, she argues that the district court erred by appl ying its local rule strictly. But “ w e have repeatedly held that district judges may strictly enforce local summary

- judgment rule s .” McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC , 942 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2019 )

. And “pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural rules.” Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm , 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008). In light of the “substantial deference” we give to a judge’s enforcement of local summary

- judgment rules, McCurry , 942 F.3d at 787 n.2, Lipinski has given us no adequate reason to conclude that the district court abuse d its broad discretion

.
Furthermore, even if ignorance of the local rule might lead a district court in its discretion to excuse noncompliance, Lipinski was not ignorant. S he does not dispute that she had twice received instructions of her obligations under the local rule and the consequences for failing to meet them. B oth the neighbors and the officers served her the required notices explaining th at when a pro se litigant oppos es a motion for summary judgment, the party must cite evidence disputing the defendants’ facts , and that failure to do so c ould lead the court to deem th ose facts admitted

. See N.D. I LL

. L. R. 56.2 (providing text for notice that must be served on pro se litigants opposing summary judgment motion) ; Timms v. Frank , 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring that pro se litigants opposing summary

- judgment motion receive notice with consequences of inadequate response)

. Thus for this reason as well, t he district court permissibly enforc ed Local Rule 56.1 after Lipinski had received notice of its
req uirements

. See Outlaw v. Newkirk , 259 F.3d 833, 841

– 42 (7th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED