IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0019

Filed February 25, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TOBY RYAN RICHARDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Fowler, 

District Associate Judge.

The defendant maintains the district court abused its discretion by 

admitting prior bad acts evidence. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Alexandra Link, Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Elizabeth Cervantes, Assistant 

County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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DANILSON, C.J.

Toby Richards appeals from the judgment and sentence following his 

conviction for domestic abuse assault resulting in bodily injury, in violation of 

Iowa Code section 708.2A(2)(b) (2013). Richards maintains the district court 

abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his alleged prior bad acts at trial. 

Regarding the three alleged incidents of domestic abuse involving Trish Poell, we 

find they were relevant to a legitimate, disputed fact, there was clear proof 

Richards committed the prior bad acts, and the evidence was substantially more 

probative than prejudicial. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the evidence. Additionally, although we find the alleged altercation 

between Richards and Poell’s family was not relevant and the district court 

abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, we find the admission was 

harmless error. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On February 14, 2013, Richards was charged by trial information with 

domestic abuse assault resulting in bodily injury. Richards filed a self-defense 

notice.

On October 23, 2013, the State filed a notice of intent to offer evidence 

under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b). The State sought to admit evidence of 

prior uncharged acts of domestic violence perpetrated by Richards against the 

victim, Poell. Richards objected.

Before the hearing on the matter, Richards’ attorney questioned Poell 

about the alleged previous instances of abuse in a deposition. Poell testified 

about four previous incidents. Three of the allegations involved Richards 
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assaulting Poell. The fourth allegation involved an altercation between Richards 

and Poell’s family. During the deposition, Poell stated that Richards’ mother 

witnessed some of the events and was told about others. She also stated she 

had photographs of some injuries resulting from the abuse, two instances 

resulted in the police being called and police reports being prepared, and some 

of the instances were witnessed by members of her family.

A hearing was held on the matter on December 3, 2013. At the hearing, 

Richards’ attorney argued that it was not clear Richards had committed the 

alleged prior bad acts, arguing:

None of the incidents complained of here resulted in any prior 

convictions or adjudication of any kind. None of them resulted even 

in any formal police reports having been filed as far as we know, at 

least I haven’t gotten any kind of copies or anything that resulted in 

that. There’s no corroborating evidence. These are basically bare 

allegations at this time . . . .

Following the hearing and the court’s review of Poell’s deposition, the district 

court found “there is clear proof that prior acts occurred. In her deposition the 

alleged victim claims other family members witnessed these prior acts.” The 

court ruled that the prior uncharged instances of domestic abuse were relevant to 

the current charge because intent was “directly at issue.” To limit the possible 

prejudice, the court ordered that “the State will not be allowed to elicit endless 

details about the prior assaults and must limit their questioning to questions that 

will provide short, concise answers that will only inform the jury of the prior bad 

acts.”

At trial, Poell testified that she and Richards were in a relationship during 

2012 and early 2013. During part of their relationship, they lived together and 
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were in engaged. Over Richards’ objections that it was not relevant, the 

following line of questioning occurred:

Q. Now, on or about July, end of July, beginning of August, 

was there an incident between you and Mr. Richards where he 

slapped you? A. Yes.

Q. So there was an incident? A. Yes.

Q. And did you remain in a relationship with him after this 

incident? A. Yes.

Q. Now, in September was there an incident where he threw 

a cellphone at you? A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And did you remain in a relationship with him after 

that? A. Yes. Can I explain why or—

Q. Not at this point. On October 30 was there an altercation 

with Mr. Richards and your family at the home?

Q. I’m sorry. I didn’t hear your answer. A. Yes.

Q. Is this the incident where you asked him to leave your 

residence? A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. Okay. And in November was there an incident where Mr. 

Richards threw you up against a refrigerator? A. Yes.

Q. And did he throw you to the floor and kick you? A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And you remained in the relationship at that point 

as well? A. I took a couple weeks break, but yes.

Q. Okay. And there was no further incidences until [the 

incident in question], correct? A. Correct. 

The prosecutor did not reference the prior acts in the closing argument. The 

court provided a limiting instruction to the jury, which stated:

Evidence has been received concerning other wrongful acts 

alleged to have been committed by the defendant. The defendant 

is not on trial for these acts. This evidence must be shown by clear 

proof and can only be used to show motive or intent.

If you find other wrongful acts:

1) occurred;

2) were so closely connected in time; and

3) were committed in the same or similar manner as the 

crime charged, so as to form a reasonable connection between 

them, then and only then may such other wrongful acts be 

considered for the purposes of establishing motive or intent.

The jury found Richards guilty of domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury. 

Richards appeals. 
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II. Standard of Review.

The court reviews the district court’s evidentiary rulings regarding the 

admission of prior bad acts for abuse of discretion. State v. Reynolds, 765 

N.W.2d 283, 288 (Iowa 2009). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court 

exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an 

extent clearly unreasonable. Id. If an abuse of discretion occurred, reversal will 

not be warranted if the error was harmless. Id.

III. Discussion.

Richards contends the district court abused its discretion when it permitted 

the State to introduce evidence that Richards had assaulted either Poell or 

members of her family four times in the past. The court ruled that the evidence 

was admissible to prove intent. Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b):

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 

the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

“In determining whether to admit prior-bad-acts evidence, we rely on a three-step 

analysis.” State v. Putnam, 848 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2014). To be admissible, the 

evidence must be (1) relevant to a legitimate, disputed factual issue, such as 

identity, intent, or motive; (2) supported by clear proof the individual against 

whom the evidence is offered committed the bad act or crime; and 

(3) substantially more probative then prejudicial. Id. at 9–10. “Evidence is 

relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence.” Id. at 9 (citing Iowa R. Evid. 5.401). “In 
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assessing whether clear proof of misconduct exists, the prior act need not be 

established beyond a reasonable doubt, and corroboration is unnecessary.” Id. 

Testimony of a credible witness can satisfy the clear-proof requirement. See 

State v. Jones, 464 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 1990) (concluding the victim’s 

testimony of prior sexual abuse was “sufficiently credibly and detailed” to 

constitute clear proof of the acts without corroboration). Finally, in determining 

whether the evidence is substantially more probative than prejudicial, we weigh a 

series of factors:

[T]he need for the evidence in light of the issues and the other 

evidence available to the prosecution, whether there is clear proof 

the defendant committed the prior bad acts, the strength or 

weakness of the evidence on the relevant issue, and the degree to 

which the fact finder will be prompted to decide the case on an 

improper basis.

Putnam, 848 N.W.2d at 9–10. If the danger of the evidence’s prejudicial effect 

substantially outweighs its probative value, the evidence must be excluded. Id. 

at 10. Because weighing the factors “is not an exact science,” “we give a great 

deal of leeway to the trial judge who must make the judgment call.” Id. (citing 

State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 20–21 (Iowa 2006)). 

A. Incidents between Richards and Poell.

Our case law demonstrates that evidence of a defendant’s prior assaults 

on a victim is relevant to the issue of intent. In State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 

125 (Iowa 2004), our supreme court recognized:

[T]here is a logical connection between a defendant’s intent at the 

time of a crime, when the crime involves a person to whom he has 

an emotional attachment, and how the defendant has reacted to 

disappointment or anger directed at that person in the past, 

including acts of violence, rage, and physical control. In other 

words, the defendant’s prior conduct directed to the victim of the 
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crime, whether loving or violent, reveals the emotional relationship 

between the defendant and the victim and is highly probative of the 

defendant’s probable motivation and intent in subsequent situation.

As the defendant did in Taylor, Richards maintained he did not have the requisite 

intent to injure Poell, instead claiming he was acting in self-defense. See Taylor, 

689 N.W.2d at 124–25. We believe the alleged prior bad acts that involved 

Richards and Poell were relevant to a legitimate, disputed fact. See id. at 128 

(“The defendant’s prior acts of violence toward his wife, while certainly illustrative 

of a propensity to use violence, also reflect his relationship with his wife, which as 

our discussion shows, is a circumstance relevant to his motive and intent on the 

day in question.”). 

We next consider whether there was clear proof Richards committed the 

alleged assaultive behaviors towards Poell. “[P]roof of prior bad acts is clear if it 

prevents the jury from speculating or inferring from mere suspicion.” Putnam, 

848 N.W.2d at 13. A victim’s “sufficiently credibl[e] and detailed” testimony 

constitutes clear proof without corroboration. See Jones, 464 N.W.2d at 243. 

Here, Poell gave a detailed account of the three allegations, including timing and 

location. She also identified individuals who could corroborate her account. This 

constitutes clear proof.

Lastly, we consider whether the evidence was substantially more 

probative then prejudicial. Here, the need for the evidence regarding Richards’

intent was high, especially when we consider Richards’s claim of self-defense. 

Additionally, the court narrowly limited the testimony the State was allowed to 

present on the prior acts. Poell was only allowed to answer whether certain 

altercations took place and when they occurred. See Putnam, 848 N.W.2d at 15 
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(indicating “that concerns about prejudice to a defendant might be eased by 

narrowing the scope of the prior-bad-acts evidence presented to the jury”). The 

district court disallowed more-detailed testimony that was more likely to evoke

strong emotions in the jurors. See id. at 14 (“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it 

has an undue tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis commonly, 

though not necessarily, an emotional one.” (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted)). Also, the district court gave a limiting instruction, which informed the 

jury of the limited purpose for which the evidence could be used. See id. (“[I]n 

most cases a limiting instruction such as this is an antidote for the danger of 

unfair prejudice.”). After balancing the probative value of the evidence against 

the prejudicial impact, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion 

in admitting limited evidence of the three alleged incidents of domestic abuse 

involving Poell. 

B. Incident Involving Poell’s Family.

We next consider the admissibility of evidence regarding the altercation 

between Richards and Poell’s family. 

In adult abuse cases, a defendant’s history of threatening or violent 

conduct involving the same victim can be especially probative. 

Considered in isolation, a defendant’s outward conduct may be 

ambiguous or entirely lawful. Only by showing that history can the 

[S]tate establish the justifiable inference that a defendant’s charged 

conduct was in fact intended to engender fear on the part of the 

victim and that the defendant knew it was likely to do so.

Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 128 (citing State v. Andrich, 943 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Mo. Ct. 

App. 1997) (emphasis added)). Here, the allegation did not reference any 

assaultive behavior towards Poell, and we will not speculate that Richards’ anger 

was directed at her. We do not believe the altercation between Richards and 
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Poell’s family is relevant to show Richards’ intent towards Poell. Thus, admission 

of the evidence at trial was an abuse of discretion. However, reversal will not be 

warranted if the error was harmless. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d at 288.

In determining the prejudicial effect of evidence, we review the other 

evidence presented and weigh it against any prejudicial effect. State v. 

Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 243 (Iowa 2001). Here, admission of the evidence 

was harmless. The irrelevant testimony was very limited with only one reference 

to an “altercation” between Richards and Poell’s family. The prosecutor did not 

reference the alleged prior bad act in the State’s closing argument. Moreover, 

the evidence properly admitted at trial “overwhelmingly establishes the 

defendant’s guilt.” See Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d at 244.

IV. Conclusion.

Regarding the three alleged incidents of domestic abuse involving Poell, 

we find they were relevant to a legitimate, disputed fact, there was clear proof 

Richards committed the prior bad acts, and the evidence was substantially more 

probative than prejudicial. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the evidence. Additionally, although we find the alleged altercation 

between Richards and Poell’s family was not relevant and the district court 

abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, we find the admission was 

harmless error. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.