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Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

Chief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JUNE 20, 2003
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,
 

v No. 120437
 

CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS,
 

Defendant-Appellee.
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,
 

v No. 121698
 

MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF,
 

Defendant-Appellee.
 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
 

YOUNG, J.
 

We granted leave to appeal in these cases to consider
 
whether the lower courts properly applied the exclusionary
 

rule to evidence seized pursuant to (1) a search warrant that
 

was issued in violation of MCL 780.653 and (2) a bench warrant
 

that was issued in violation of MCR 3.606(A). 


Because we conclude that neither the statute nor the
 

court rule contemplates application of the exclusionary rule,
 

we reverse in both cases. In People v Hawkins (see
 

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
 

September 28, 2001 [Docket No. 230839]), we hold that evidence
 

of firearms and cocaine seized pursuant to a search warrant
 

should not have been suppressed on the ground that the warrant
 

was issued in violation of the affidavit requirements of MCL
 

780.653(b). In People v Scherf (see 251 Mich App 410; 651
 

NW2d 77 [2002]), we hold that evidence of marijuana seized
 

from defendant following his arrest should not have been
 

suppressed on the ground that the bench warrant pursuant to
 

which he was arrested was issued in violation of the affidavit
 

requirements of MCR 3.606(A).
 

I. FACTUAL1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
 

A. PEOPLE V HAWKINS
 

Detective Todd Butler of the Grand Rapids Police
 

1These cases have not yet been tried. Our statement of
 

facts is derived from the preliminary examination and motion


hearing transcripts and from the documentation contained in


the lower court records. 


2
 
Department received tips from two informants that illegal
 

controlled substances were being sold from a residence located
 

at 921 Humbolt, S.E., in Grand Rapids. On the basis of the
 

information provided by these sources, Butler sought a search
 

warrant to search the residence. Butler’s affidavit set forth
 

the following facts in support of the issuance of the warrant:
 

1. Your affiant received information from an
 

informant on 10/14/99 that the resident of 921


Humbolt S.E. was involved in the sale of narcotics.
 

The informant stated the residence [sic] is selling


the controlled substance crack cocaine. The
 

informant described the resident and seller of the
 

controlled substance as “Chris,” B/M, approx. 20,


5'8", 170 [lbs], medium build/complexion, short


hair.
 

2. Your affiant met with a reliable and
 

credible informant on 11/3/99. Your affiant was
 

advised that the informant had observed the
 

controlled substance cocaine available for sale
 

from the residence within the past 36 hours.
 

3. Your affiant was advised by the informant


the entry door to the suspects [sic] apartment has


been reinforced to delay a police entry. 


On November 3, 1999, a judge of the 61st District Court
 

issued the requested warrant, and the residence was searched
 

the same day. During the search, police seized two stolen
 

firearms, approximately 20 grams of cocaine, and other
 

contraband. Defendant, who was not present during the search,
 

was stopped by police while driving his vehicle. Defendant
 

was then arrested and later bound over for trial on several
 

3
 
charges.2
 

Defendant sought suppression of the evidence seized in
 

the execution of the search warrant, arguing that the
 

affidavit in support of the warrant was constitutionally
 

deficient in that it did not support a finding of probable
 

cause, the information it contained was stale, and it did not
 

clearly reveal whether one or two informants had supplied the
 

information. Defendant additionally contended that the
 

affidavit did not meet the requirements of MCL 780.653(B)
 

because it did not include information concerning the
 

credibility of the unnamed informants or the reliability of
 

the information they supplied.
 

The circuit court granted defendant’s motion to suppress
 

the evidence and dismissed the case on the grounds that the
 

affidavit was both constitutionally deficient and in violation
 

of MCL 780.653. The court declined the prosecutor’s
 

invitation to apply the federal “good-faith exception,” under
 

which the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not applicable
 

to evidence seized by officers acting in reasonable reliance
 

2Defendant was charged with possession with intent to


deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv);


maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(1)(d); possession of a


firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f; driving with a suspended


license, MCL 257.904(3)(b); and two counts of receiving and


concealing a stolen firearm, MCL 750.535b. Additionally,


defendant was charged with being a second-time drug offender,


MCL 333.7413(2), and a fourth-time felony offender, MCL


769.12. 


4
 
 

on a warrant that is subsequently adjudged constitutionally
 

deficient.3
 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit
 

court’s order to suppress evidence on the sole basis that the
 

affidavit supporting the search warrant did not meet the
 

requirements of MCL 780.653. Slip op at 3. The panel
 

concluded that People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160; 538 NW2d 380
 

(1995), in which this Court held that evidence obtained under
 

a search warrant issued in violation of § 653 must be
 

suppressed, was dispositive. Slip op at 2. Accordingly, the
 

panel declined to address the constitutionality of the warrant
 

or the prosecution’s argument that the good-faith exception
 

was applicable. Id. at 3.
 

We granted the prosecution’s application for leave to
 

appeal to this Court, limited to the issue whether the
 

exclusionary rule applies to a violation of § 653. 466 Mich
 

860 (2002). 


B. PEOPLE V SCHERF
 

In a prior case, defendant pleaded guilty of
 

manufacturing with intent to deliver between five and fortyfive kilograms of marijuana in violation of MCL
 

333.7401(2)(D)(ii) and was sentenced to probation. Defendant
 

3See Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed
 

2d 34 (1995); United States v Leon, 468 US 897; 104 S Ct 3405;
 

82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984).
 

5
 
allegedly moved out of Michigan without permission and
 

thereafter failed to report to his probation officer in
 

violation of two of the terms of his probation. Consequently,
 

defendant’s probation officer filed a standard form petition
 

requesting that a bench warrant be issued for his arrest. The
 

petition contained the following statements:
 

Petitioner requests that a bench warrant be


issued and Michael Brandon Scherf be arrested and
 

held in contempt of court for the following


reason(s): 


Violation of Rule Number 3: The defendant has
 

failed to report as ordered and his whereabouts are


unknown. Violation of Rule Number 4: Failure to
 

notify agent of change of address.
 

The petition contained the statement, “I declare that the
 

statements above are true to the best of my information,
 

knowledge, and belief,” and was signed by the probation
 

officer. The district court issued the requested bench
 

warrant.
 

Subsequently, police were interviewing defendant in
 

connection with an unrelated larceny complaint when they
 

discovered, via the Law Enforcement Information Network
 

(LEIN), the outstanding bench warrant for his arrest.
 

Defendant was arrested pursuant to the warrant. During a
 

search incident to the arrest, police seized several grams of
 

marijuana from defendant’s person. Thereafter, defendant was
 

charged with possession of marijuana in violation of MCL
 

6
 
333.7403(2)(d). 


Defendant sought suppression of evidence of the marijuana
 

on the ground that the bench warrant petition was technically
 

deficient in that it was not supported by affidavits as
 

required by MCR 3.606(A), which governs contempt offenses
 

committed outside the immediate presence of the court. The
 

prosecutor conceded that MCR 3.606(A) was violated because no
 

affidavit was submitted in support of the probation officer’s
 

petition. The prosecutor argued, however, that the district
 

court division of the Isabella County Trial Court should apply
 

the federal “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule.
 

The district court division denied defendant’s motion, holding
 

that the bench warrant petition was confirmed by oath or
 

affirmation and was therefore properly issued. Additionally,
 

the district court division noted that it found Arizona v
 

Evans, 514 US 1; 115 S Ct 1185; 131 L Ed 2d 34 (1995), which
 

reaffirmed and applied the good-faith exception, to be
 

persuasive authority.
 

Defendant appealed, and the circuit court reversed the
 

district court division’s order, granted defendant’s motion to
 

suppress the marijuana evidence, and dismissed the case. The
 

court held that although the failure to provide an affidavit
 

with the bench warrant petition was merely “technical,” it
 

rendered the warrant invalid. The court rejected the
 

7
 
prosecutor’s argument that the good-faith exception was
 

applicable, stating on the record that the exception was not
 

recognized in Michigan.
 

The prosecutor sought leave to appeal to the Court of
 

Appeals, asserting that the good-faith exception should be
 

applied under the circumstances. The Court granted the
 

prosecutor’s application and affirmed the circuit court
 

division’s order. 251 Mich App 410. The majority4 noted that
 

the bench warrant petition “was not supported by an affidavit
 

as required by MCR 3.606," id. at 411, and that “it is
 

undisputed that defendant’s arrest, and the resultant search
 

of defendant and seizure of evidence, were based on an invalid
 

bench warrant and, therefore, the arrest and consequential
 

search were unlawful,” id. at 415. The majority indicated
 

that it would have applied the good-faith exception to the
 

exclusionary rule and reversed the circuit court division’s
 

decision if it were not obligated under MCR 7.215(I)(1) to
 

follow People v Hill, 192 Mich App 54; 480 NW2d 594 (1991), in
 

which another panel of the Court specifically declined to
 

recognize the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.5
 

215 Mich App 415-416. 


4Judge Jessica R. Cooper concurred in the result only.
 

5The Court subsequently declined to convene a special


panel to resolve the potential conflict with Hill, supra.
 

People v Scherf, 251 Mich App 805 (2002).
 

8
 
This Court granted the prosecutor’s application for leave
 

to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 467 Mich 856
 

(2002).
 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
 

Questions of law relevant to a motion to suppress
 

evidence are reviewed de novo. People v Hamilton, 465 Mich
 

526, 529; 638 NW2d 92 (2002); People v Stevens (After Remand),
 

460 Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (1999).6
 

We must determine in these cases whether suppression of
 

evidence is required when MCL 780.653 or MCR 3.606(A) has been
 

violated. Where a state statute is involved, “whether
 

suppression is appropriate is a question of statutory
 

interpretation and thus one of legislative intent.” People v
 

Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694; 625 NW2d 764 (2001),
 

quoting Stevens, supra at 644, quoting People v Wood, 450 Mich
 

399, 408; 538 NW2d 351 (1995) (BOYLE, J., concurring).
 

Similarly, “[t]he interpretation of a court rule is a question
 

of law and is reviewed de novo.” Hinkle v Wayne Co Clerk, 467
 

Mich 337, 340; 654 NW2d 315 (2002); see also People v Petit,
 

466 Mich 624, 627; 648 NW2d 193 (2002).
 

6

See also People v Hudson, 465 Mich 932 (2001).
 

9
 
 

III. ANALYSIS
 

A. INTRODUCTION
 

First and foremost, it is important to understand what is
 

not before this Court in deciding the issues presented in
 

these cases. We are concerned solely with application of the
 

exclusionary rule to a statutory violation (People v Hawkins)
 

and to a court rule violation (People v Scherf). The judgment
 

of the Court of Appeals in Hawkins was based exclusively on
 

the conceded violation of MCL 780.653, and the Court
 

specifically declined to address the constitutional validity
 

of the search warrant affidavit or the good-faith exception to
 

the constitutional exclusionary rule. Likewise, in Scherf we
 

are not concerned with the constitutional validity of the
 

bench warrant or of the potential application of the goodfaith exception. Although the Court of Appeals majority in
 

Scherf indicated a willingness to apply the good-faith
 

exception in order to avoid suppression of the evidence for
 

the conceded violation of MCR 3.606(A), application of that
 

exception would have been wholly premature, given that neither
 

the circuit court division nor the Court of Appeals panel had
 

found a constitutional violation in the first instance.7
 

7

Moreover, defendant Scherf did not preserve for our


review any argument that the affidavit in support of the


issuance of the bench warrant was constitutionally deficient.


Rather, his sole argument in support of his motion to suppress


was that the affidavit did not meet the technical requirements


of MCR 3.606(A). 


10
 
With that in mind, we must determine whether the
 

statutory and court rule violations in these cases warrant
 

suppression of the evidence. 


B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
 

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that
 

originated as a means to protect the Fourth Amendment right of
 

citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
 

See Stevens, supra at 634-635; see also Weeks v United States,
 

232 US 383; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914), overruled on
 

other grounds in Elkins v United States, 364 US 206; 80 S Ct
 

1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960); Adams v New York, 192 US 585; 24
 

S Ct 372; 48 L Ed 575 (1904); Boyd v United States, 116 US
 

616; 6 S Ct 524; 29 L Ed 746 (1886). The exclusionary rule,
 

modified by several exceptions,8 generally bars the
 

introduction into evidence of materials seized and
 

observations made during an unconstitutional search. Stevens,
 

supra at 634, 636. However, application of the exclusionary
 

8For example, the “ good-faith exception,” which has been


asserted by the prosecutors in the cases at bar, permits


admission of evidence seized by police officers in reasonable


reliance on a constitutionally defective search warrant. See
 

Arizona, supra; Leon, supra. As noted, because of the


procedural posture of the instant cases, we do not reach the


constitutionality of the warrants at issue and, consequently,


we do not address the applicability of the good-faith


exception to a violation of Michigan’s counterpart to the


Fourth Amendment, Const 1963, art 1, § 11. We note that leave
 

has recently been granted in People v Goldston, 467 Mich 938


(2003), in which this Court will consider whether to adopt and


apply a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 


11
 
rule is not constitutionally mandated, and
 

[t]he question whether the exclusionary rule’s


remedy is appropriate in a particular context [is]


regarded as an issue separate from the question


whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party


seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police


conduct. [Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 223; 103 S


Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).]
 

Moreover, the exclusionary rule is not designed to “make
 

whole” a citizen who has been subjected to an unconstitutional
 

search or seizure. Rather, the aim of the rule is one of
 

police deterrence: 


The wrong condemned by the [Fourth] Amendment


is “fully accomplished” by the unlawful search or


seizure itself . . . and the exclusionary rule is


neither intended nor able to “cure the invasion of
 

the defendant’s rights which he has already


suffered.” . . . The rule thus operates as “a


judicially created remedy designed to safeguard


Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
 

deterrent effect, rather than a personal


constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” . . .


. [United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906; 104 S Ct


3407; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984).]
 

Irrespective of the application of the exclusionary rule
 

in the context of a constitutional violation, the drastic
 

remedy of exclusion of evidence does not necessarily apply to
 

a statutory violation.9 Whether the exclusionary rule should
 

9

The exclusionary rule is particularly harsh in that it


is neither narrowly tailored nor discerning of the magnitude


of the error it is intended to deter. By taking no cognizance


of the effect of a police error upon a particular defendant,


or of the actual guilt or innocence of a defendant, the


exclusionary rule lacks proportionality. Given these
 

characteristics, we decline to expand the use of this rule in


(continued...)
 

12
 
be applied to evidence seized in violation of a statute is
 

purely a matter of legislative intent. Hamilton, supra at
 

534.
 

“‘Because our judicial role precludes imposing


different policy choices from those selected by the


Legislature, our obligation is, by examining the


statutory language, to discern the legislative


intent that may reasonably be inferred from the


words expressed in the statute. . . . When a


statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial


construction or interpretation is unnecessary and


therefore, precluded.’” [Sobczak-Obetts, supra at
 

694-695 (citations omitted).]
 

Likewise, whether suppression of evidence on the basis of
 

the violation of a court rule is appropriate is controlled by
 

the language of the rule. “This Court applies principles of
 

statutory interpretation to the interpretation of court rules.
 

When the language is unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning
 

plainly expressed, and judicial construction is not
 

permitted.” Hinkle, supra at 340. 


C. PEOPLE V HAWKINS
 

At issue in Hawkins is whether evidence seized from a
 

residence pursuant to a search warrant was properly suppressed
 

because the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not
 

meet the requirements of MCL 780.653 in Michigan’s search
 

warrant act, MCL 780.651 to 780.659. MCL 780.653 provides, in
 

9(...continued)


the absence of an explicit constitutional or legislative


requirement.
 

13
 
pertinent part:
 

The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or


probable cause shall be based upon all the facts


related within the affidavit made before him or
 

her. The affidavit may be based upon information


supplied to the complainant by a named or unnamed


person if the affidavit contains 1 of the
 

following:
 

* * *
 

(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative


allegations from which the magistrate may conclude


that the person spoke with personal knowledge of


the information and either that the unnamed person


is credible or that the information is reliable.[10]
 

MCL 780.653(b) derives from the defunct “two-pronged test”
 

enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v
 

Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964), and
 

Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410; 89 S Ct 584; 21 L Ed 2d
 

637 (1969), for determining whether an anonymous informant’s
 

tip established probable cause for issuance of a search
 

warrant. See People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502, 509; 364 NW2d
 

658 (1984). Under the Aguilar-Spinelli formulation as it was
 

10Section 1 of the search warrant act, MCL 780.651,


provides in part: 


(1) When an affidavit is made on oath to
 

a magistrate authorized to issue warrants in


criminal cases, and the affidavit establishes


grounds for issuing a warrant pursuant to this


act, the magistrate, if he or she is satisfied


that there is probable cause for the search,


shall issue a warrant to search the house,


building, or other location or place where the


property or thing to be searched for and seized


is situated. 


14
 
 

generally understood, a search warrant affidavit based on
 

information supplied by an anonymous informant was required to
 

contain both (1) some of the underlying circumstances
 

evidencing the informant’s basis of knowledge and (2) facts
 

establishing either the veracity or the reliability of the
 

information. See Gates, supra at 228-229; Sherbine, supra at
 

509.11
 

This Court has previously held that a violation of the
 

affidavit requirements of MCL 780.653 warranted suppression of
 

evidence. Sloan, supra; Sherbine, supra. Because we are
 

unable to conclude that the Legislature intended application
 

of the exclusionary rule where the requirements of § 653 have
 

not been met, we overrule Sloan and Sherbine to the extent
 

that they so hold, and we conclude that defendant was not
 

entitled to suppression of evidence on the basis of the
 

statutory violation. 


In Sherbine, this Court held that suppression of evidence
 

11In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the


Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test in favor of a “totality of


the circumstances” approach. Accordingly, in determining


whether a search warrant affidavit that is based on hearsay


information passes Fourth Amendment muster, 


[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to


make a practical, common-sense decision whether,


given all the circumstances set forth in the
 

affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair


probability that contraband or evidence of a crime


will be found in a particular place. [Gates, supra


at 238.] 


15
 
was required where a search warrant affidavit violated a
 

previous version of § 65312 in that it did not make any showing
 

that an informant was a credible person and that he supplied
 

reliable information.13 Although this Court specifically
 

declined to decide whether satisfaction of the federal
 

Aguilar-Spinelli test is required under Const 1963, art 1, §
 

11—that is, whether the requirements of § 653 are rooted in
 

Michigan’s constitutional search and seizure provision—this
 

Court nevertheless applied the exclusionary rule to the
 

statutory violation. In so doing, this Court failed to
 

examine the language of § 653 to determine whether the
 

Legislature intended that such a drastic remedy be applied to
 

a violation of the statutory affidavit requirements. Rather,
 

this Court relied on People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691; 222 NW2d
 

12In 1984, § 653 provided:
 

The magistrate’s finding of reasonable or


probable cause shall be based upon all the facts


related within the affidavit made before him. The
 

affidavit may be based upon reliable information


supplied to the complainant from a credible person,


named or unnamed, so long as the affidavit contains


affirmative allegations that the person spoke with


personal knowledge of the matters contained
 

therein.
 

13We concluded in Sherbine that preamendment § 653


expanded the Aguilar-Spinelli test to require that the


affidavit set forth facts showing both that a confidential
 

informant was credible and that the information was reliable.
 

Sherbine, supra at 509-510. The current version of § 653, as


amended by 1988 PA 80, makes clear that a showing of either
 

credibility or reliability is required. 


16
 
 

749 (1974), in which this Court similarly applied the
 

exclusionary rule to a statutory violation without performing
 

the requisite examination of legislative intent.14 We
 

concluded, “The statutory violation here is clear. The
 

statute requires proof that the informant who supplied the
 

information be credible. The affidavit here failed to satisfy
 

this requirement. The evidence must therefore be suppressed.”
 

Sherbine, supra at 512.
 

Justice Boyle dissented, opining that preamendment § 653
 

required a showing of either reliability or credibility, and
 

that this Court had misconstrued the statute as an expansion
 

of Aguilar. Sherbine, 421 Mich 513-514. Additionally,
 

Justice Boyle questioned whether suppression of the evidence
 

was required under the circumstances: “I cannot conceive of
 

a reason why we should apply the exclusionary rule to the
 

supposed violation of a statute where the affidavit would pass
 

14In Dixon, this Court held that suppression of evidence


was required, and reversed the defendant’s conviction on the


ground that a search of the defendant at a police station was


in derogation of his right to bail under MCL 780.581. This
 

Court cited decisions from California and Oregon courts


suppressing evidence for similar statutory violations, but


noted that in several of those decisions the courts
 

specifically found Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 704,


n 18. Acknowledging that its decision was not premised on the
 

Fourth Amendment, id., this Court nevertheless concluded that
 

suppression of evidence obtained in derogation of the
 

statutory right to bail was required because “no other remedy


[was] as likely to assure its full enforcement,” id. at 705.
 

17
 
constitutional muster under either Const 1963, art 1, § 11, or
 

US Const, Am IV . . . .” Id. at 516.
 

In Sloan, this Court held that a violation of a different
 

provision in the current version of § 653 required application
 

of the exclusionary rule. A search warrant was issued to
 

obtain a blood test from the defendant, who was later charged
 

with manslaughter with a motor vehicle,15 operating a motor
 

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
 

causing death,16 and felonious driving.17 The portion of § 653
 

at issue was the provision that “[t]he magistrate’s finding of
 

reasonable or probable cause shall be based on all the facts
 

related within the affidavit made before him or her.” This
 

Court held that this provision was violated when the
 

magistrate looked beyond the affidavit, to unrecorded oral
 

testimony of a police officer, in issuing the search warrant.18
 

Relying on Sherbine, this Court further concluded that the
 

blood test evidence had to be excluded because of the
 

15MCL 750.321.
 

16MCL 257.625(4).
 

17MCL 752.191.
 

18As in Sherbine, the Sloan Court specifically stated that


it was not addressing whether the probable cause determination


was constitutionally defective. Sloan, supra at 183 n 17.
 

Indeed, this Court noted that the affidavit requirement of §


653 was not constitutionally mandated under either Const 1963,


art 1, § 11 or the Fourth Amendment. Id.
 

18
 
statutory violation: 


In Sherbine, we held that evidence obtained


specifically in violation of MCL 780.653 . . . must


be excluded. The Legislature appears to have


acquiesced in this particular construction of MCL


780.653 . . . . While the Legislature subsequently


amended MCL 780.653 . . . because it disagreed with


portions of our statutory analysis provided in


Sherbine, it is significant that the Legislature


when instituting such amendments did not alter our


holding that evidence obtained in violation of the


statute must be excluded. To change the law in


that regard would have been an easy and convenient


task for the Legislature. Neither the language in


the amendments, nor the legislative history


pertinent to the amendments provide a basis for


concluding that a sanction other than exclusion is


appropriate for the violation of MCL 780.653 . . .
 

. Clearly, the Legislature shares our view that no


remedy other than exclusion is as likely to assure


the full enforcement of all of the requirements


under MCL 780.653 . . .—a statute specifically


designed by the Legislature to implement the
 

constitutional mandate for probable cause under


Const 1963, art 1, § 11. [Sloan, supra at 183­

184.] 


Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Riley and Weaver,
 

dissented, arguing that the statute was complied with and
 

that, in any event, a violation of § 653 did not require
 

application of the exclusionary rule:
 

Application of the exclusionary rule to any


technical violation of our search warrant statute
 

that may have occurred in the present case is


unwarranted. Particularly where the magistrate is a


sitting judge, as are virtually all magistrates in


this state, I cannot conclude that the risk of


relying on after-the-fact allegations are [sic] so


substantial that we must suppress evidence. The
 

exclusionary rule is intended to serve a deterrent


purpose, and loses any useful force and effect when


applied to technical errors that do not rise to the


level of negligent or wilful conduct, serving then
 

19
 
only to deprive the trier of fact of relevant and


probative evidence. As explained by the United


States Supreme Court in Michigan v Tucker, 417 US


433, 446-447; 94 S Ct 2357; 41 L Ed 2d 182 (1974):
 

* * *
 

“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
 

rule necessarily assumes that the police have


engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent,


conduct which has deprived the defendant of some


right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a


result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill


in those particular investigating officers, or in


their future counterparts, a greater degree of care


toward the rights of an accused. Where the
 

official action was pursued in complete good faith,


however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its


force.” [Sloan, supra at 200 (BOYLE, J.,


dissenting).]
 

Justice Boyle additionally criticized the majority’s
 

invocation of the “legislative acquiescence” doctrine:
 

The majority’s assertion of legislative
 

acquiescence in the decision in Sherbine . . . to use of
 

the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained in


alleged violation of the statute before us is wholly


mistaken. In Sherbine, this Court’s majority


interpreted the former version of the statute as if it


imposed a more restrictive standard than the Fourth


Amendment and suppressed evidence on the basis of that


consideration. The swift reaction of the Legislature


was to amend MCL 780.653 . . . to make it clear that the
 

Court was incorrect in concluding that what had occurred


was a statutory violation. The Legislature had no need


to say what should not be excluded; it relied on the


Court’s word that were it clear that the Legislature had


authorized the warrant, suppression would not be
 

ordered.
 

Acting on our representation, the amended
 

legislation tracked the Fourth Amendment. Because “our
 

holding that evidence obtained in violation of the


statute must be excluded” . . . was wholly derived from


our narrow reading of MCL 780.653 . . . , the
 

legislative amendment of the statute is not an
 

20
 
 

acquiescence in, but rather a repudiation of, the view


in Sherbine that the evidence should be excluded.
 

[Sloan, supra at 202-203 (BOYLE, J., dissenting).] 


We agree with Justice Boyle and once again reaffirm that
 

where there is no determination that a statutory violation
 

constitutes an error of constitutional dimensions,
 

application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate unless
 

the plain language of the statute indicates a legislative
 

intent that the rule be applied. Hamilton, supra at 534;
 

Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 694. Moreover, we reject the Sloan
 

Court’s conclusion that the Legislature’s silence constituted
 

agreement with this Court’s application of the exclusionary
 

rule in Sherbine. As we have repeatedly stated, the
 

“legislative acquiescence" principle of statutory
 

construction has been squarely rejected by this Court because
 

it reflects a critical misapprehension of the legislative
 

process. See Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732,
 

760 n 15; 641 NW2d 567 (2002); Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm,
 

463 Mich 143, 177-178 n 33; 615 NW2d 702 (2000). Rather,
 

“Michigan courts [must] determine the Legislature’s intent
 

from its words, not from its silence.” Donajkowski v Alpena
 

Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).
 

The dissent asserts that “the majority [has] imposed its
 

own policy on the Legislature . . . .” Post at 10. 


Respectfully, we disagree and believe that it is not this
 

21
 
 

 

majority but the Sherbine and Sloan majorities that imposed
 

their own policy choices on the Legislature with respect to
 

the application of the exclusionary rule to a violation of §
 

653. Citing nothing in the text of the statute, the Sherbine
 

Court simply declared, without further analysis, that because
 

the statute was violated, “[t]he evidence must . . . be
 

suppressed.” Sherbine, supra at 512. Similarly, the Sloan
 

majority opined that “no remedy other than exclusion is as
 

likely to assure the full enforcement of all of the
 

requirements under MCL 780.653 . . . .” Sloan, supra at 184.
 

The dissent purports to apply a “contextual analysis” of
 

§ 653 in reaching the conclusion that the Legislature
 

intended the exclusionary rule to apply to a violation of
 

that statute. Yet, as the dissenters readily admit, the text
 

of § 653 is entirely silent in this regard. Post at 2-3,
 

generally. Clearly, there is no principled basis for the
 

contention that this Court’s injection of the exclusionary
 

rule in Sherbine and Sloan is grounded in the statutory text.
 

The dissent attempts to draw a distinction between
 

legislative silence and reenactment of a statute following
 

judicial interpretation. While we have no reason to contest
 

that the “reenactment doctrine” can sometimes be a useful
 

tool for determining legislative intent where the statutory
 

language is ambiguous, such a tool of construction may not be
 

22
 
utilized to subordinate the plain language of a statute.
 

This Court’s constitutional charge to interpret the laws does
 

not end merely because the Legislature reenacts a statute.19
 

In the absence of a clear indication that the Legislature
 

intended to either adopt or repudiate this Court’s prior
 

construction, there is no reason to subordinate our primary
 

principle of construction–to ascertain the Legislature’s
 

intent by first examining the statute’s language–to the
 

reenactment rule.20
 

19Taken to its logical conclusion, application of the


reenactment doctrine under circumstances such as those present


in the case at bar would undoubtedly lead to results never


anticipated or intended by the Legislature. For example,


suppose that the Legislature amends a statutory code to make


all pronouns gender-neutral, but otherwise reenacts the code


as originally written. It would be neither accurate nor
 

reasonable to presume, as the dissent would have us do, that


the Legislature intended to adopt in toto every appellate


decision construing or applying the code.
 

20Even the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged


that there has been no stable, consistent formulation of this


amorphous doctrine. Helvering v Griffiths, 318 US 371, 396;


63 S Ct 636; 87 L Ed 843 (1943). Under the broadest
 

formulation of the reenactment doctrine, there is no reason


why only judicial interpretations of statutes should be


incorporated by implication upon reenactment of a statute.


Indeed, even administrative interpretations of statutes have
 

been recognized as binding. See United States v Safety Car
 

Heating & Lighting Co, 297 US 88, 95; 56 S Ct 353; 80 L Ed 500


(1936).
 

Our point is not that the reenactment doctrine, properly


limited and applied, is without value as a statutory


construction aid, but that it cannot be employed


indiscriminately and without recognition of the fact that its


more expansive versions impose an unreasonable burden on the


(continued...)
 

23
 
The Legislature has stated its views on the construction
 

of its statutes, in part by providing that all words and
 

phrases that are not terms of art21 be given their “common and
 

20(...continued)


Legislature to affirmatively scan our appellate casebooks to


discern judicial constructions of statutes that the
 

Legislature desires for entirely other reasons to amend.
 

Applying the reenactment rule here would, in our view, be the


effective equivalent of imposing an affirmative duty on the
 

Legislature to keep abreast of all binding judicial


pronouncements involving the construction of statutes and to


revise those statutes to repudiate any judicial construction


with which it disagrees. For similar reasons, we have


rejected precisely such a duty in other contexts. See, e.g.,


Donajkowski, supra at 261-262.
 

To apply the reenactment doctrine under these
 

circumstances would not only likely fail to give effect to


legislative intent, but would also presumably violate
 

separation of powers principles. See Grabow, Congressional
 

silence and the search for legislative intent: A venture into
 

“speculative unrealites,” 64 BUL R 737, 759-761 (1984).


Accordingly, before we ignore the plain meaning of the text of


a statute, we reject formulations of the reenactment doctrine


involving circumstances that fail to demonstrate the
 

Legislature's conscious consideration of a judicial decision,


coupled with some compelling indication that the Legislature


intended to accept or reject that interpretation. As is
 

illustrated by Justice Boyle’s dissent in Sloan, supra,


discussed at pp 22-23, it is a perilous exercise to attempt to


discern legislative intent from the Legislature’s silence,


even when a statutory amendment responds to some portion of a
 

judicial decision. See Sloan, supra at 202-203. 


21We note that in the case of a term of art, application


of the “reenactment rule” would generally be appropriate
 

because such a term by definition carries with it the


construction accorded it by the courts. See People v Law, 459


Mich 419, 425 n 8; 591 NW2d 20 (1999). In contrast, in this
 

case we are confronted with the amendment of a statute
 

following the imposition of a judicially created remedy that


is grounded nowhere in the text of the statute. Our
 

dissenting colleagues opine that “the Legislature could have


(continued...)
 

24
 
approved” meanings. MCL 8.3a. Such is consistent with our
 

most fundamental principle of construction that there is no
 

room for judicial interpretation when the Legislature’s
 

intent can be ascertained from the statute’s plain and
 

unambiguous language. See Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich
 

611, 615; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). Accordingly, we decline to
 

apply the “reenactment rule” when the Legislature’s intent is
 

evidenced by the plain language of the statute and there is
 

no clear indication of any intent to adopt or repudiate this
 

Court’s prior construction.
 

Nothing in the plain language of § 653 provides us with
 

a sound basis for concluding that the Legislature intended
 

that noncompliance with its affidavit requirements, standing
 

alone, justifies application of the exclusionary rule to
 

evidence obtained by police in reliance on a search warrant.22
 

21(...continued)


easily modified the applicability of the exclusionary rule


when enacting 1988 PA 80,” post at 6-7, and that therefore the


Legislature must have intended to adopt, sub silentio, the


exclusionary rule. However, an equally plausible conclusion


is that, because the Legislature could easily have modified


the statute to expressly provide for the application of the


exclusionary rule, it must have intended to reject this


Court’s decision in Sherbine. This precisely illustrates one


of the reasons that the “legislative acquiescence” doctrine is


an untrustworthy indicator of legislative intent, as well as


why the “reenactment rule” should not be applied as an aid in


interpreting legislative silence.
 

22Any error concerning the search warrant in this case


rests squarely on the shoulders of the district court judge,


(continued...)
 

25
 
Moreover, application of the exclusionary rule is
 

particularly inappropriate under the circumstances of this
 

case, where the objective of the rule—to sanction police
 

misconduct as a means of deterrence—would not be served.23
 

See Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 712. Because we applied the
 

exclusionary rule to the statutory violations at issue in
 

Sherbine and Sloan without performing the requisite
 

examination of legislative intent, we are compelled to
 

overrule those decisions to the extent that they conflict
 

with today’s holding.24
 

22(...continued)


whose duty it is to ensure that warrants are issued in


compliance with state and federal law. There is no indication
 

in the record that the officer who applied for the search


warrant, or the officers who executed the warrant, acted


improperly. 


23Indeed, we note that the Legislature has specifically


provided for a sanction in the case of misconduct in the


execution or procurement of a search warrant. See MCL 780.657
 

(“[a]ny person who in executing a search warrant, wilfully


exceeds his authority or exercises it with unnecessary


severity, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned


not more than 1 year”); MCL 780.658 (“[a]ny person who


maliciously and without probable cause procures a search
 

warrant to be issued and executed shall be fined not more than
 

$1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year”). That the
 

Legislature has elected to deter police misconduct in the


manner indicated by MCL 780.657 and MCL 780.658 further


evidences the lack of any legislative intent that the


exclusionary rule be applied under the circumstances of this


case. 


24Our dissenting colleagues charge us with ignoring this


Court’s prohibition-era decisions in People v Knopka, 220 Mich


540; 190 NW 731 (1922), People v Moten, 233 Mich 169; 206 NW


(continued...)
 

26
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred
 

in holding that suppression of the evidence was required as
 

a remedy for the violation of § 653 in this case. Because
 

the Court of Appeals declined to address the prosecutor’s
 

additional arguments on appeal, we remand this matter to that
 

Court for further proceedings.
 

D. People v Scherf
 

The Court of Appeals held in Scherf that a bench warrant
 

issued in violation of a court rule was invalid and that
 

suppression of evidence obtained in connection with
 

defendant’s arrest pursuant to that warrant was therefore
 

24(...continued)


506 (1925), People v Bules, 234 Mich 335; 207 NW 818 (1926),


and People v Galnt, 235 Mich 646; 209 NW 915 (1926), all of


which involved search warrant requirements as set forth in §


27 of Michigan’s “liquor law,” 1922 CL 7079(27). As we
 

explained in Sobczak-Obetts, supra, Knopka involved a
 

violation of Const 1908, art 2, § 10, not merely a statutory


violation. The Moten and Bules Courts applied, without
 

analysis, the Knopka exclusionary rule to purely statutory


search warrant violations. The Galnt Court, similarly to the


Knopka Court, expressly found a constitutional violation. The
 

Moten and Bules decisions, which conclusorily applied the


exclusionary rule without determining that there was any


constitutional violation, are distinguishable in any event


because they did not involve the search warrant statute at


issue. See Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 700 n 11. Moreover, as
 

we noted in Sobczak-Obetts, supra at 707, the statutory
 

violations in Moten, Bules, and Galnt pertained to the warrant
 

form; in such a case, “the resulting search may be
 

constitutionally defective.” (Emphasis in original.) As we
 

have taken pains in this opinion to make clear, we are


reviewing only the Court of Appeals application of the


exclusionary rule to the alleged violations of a statute and


a court rule, and we do not address any claims that the


warrants at issue were constitutionally insufficient. 


27
 
 

 

required. We disagree. 


MCR 3.606(A) provides:
 

Initiation of Proceeding. For a contempt


committed outside the immediate view and presence


of the court, on a proper showing on ex parte


motion supported by affidavits, the court shall


either
 

(1) order the accused person to show cause, at


a reasonable time specified in the order, why that


person should not be punished for the alleged


misconduct; or 


(2) issue a bench warrant for the arrest of


the person.
 

Nothing in the wording of MCR 3.606(A) provides any
 

indication that the exclusionary rule should be applied to a
 

violation of its affidavit requirement.25 To engraft the
 

exclusionary rule—a harsh remedy designed to sanction and
 

deter police misconduct where it has resulted in a violation
 

of constitutional rights—onto the technical provisions of a
 

rule of court in this manner would extend the deterrent well
 

beyond its intended application. Indeed, the task of
 

scrutinizing the police papers submitted in support of a
 

warrant for technical compliance with the law falls squarely
 

with the judicial officer. In the absence of language
 

25In light of the prosecutor’s concession of error, we


need not address whether the issuance of the bench warrant was
 

actually violative of the affidavit requirement of MCR


3.606(A).
 

28
 
evincing an intent that suppression of evidence should follow
 

from the violation of MCR 3.606(A), we decline to infer one.
 

IV. CONCLUSION
 

The exclusionary rule was improperly applied to the
 

violations of the statutory and court rule affidavit
 

requirements at issue in these cases. We cannot conclude, on
 

the basis of the plain language of MCL 780.653, that the
 

Legislature intended that noncompliance with its terms should
 

result in suppression of evidence obtained by police acting
 

in reasonable and good-faith reliance on a search warrant.
 

Likewise, MCR 3.606(A) does not provide for suppression of
 

evidence on the basis of noncompliance with its affidavit
 

requirement, and we decline to infer an intent that the
 

exclusionary rule should apply under these circumstances. 


In Hawkins, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
 

Appeals and remand to that Court for further proceedings. In
 

Scherf, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
 

remand the matter to the district court division for further
 

proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. 


Robert P. Young, Jr.


Maura D. Corrigan


Clifford W. Taylor


Stephen J. Markman
 

29
 
 

____________________________________ 

 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,
 

v No. 120437
 

CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS,
 

Defendant-Appellee.
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellant,
 

v No.
 

121698
 

MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF,
 

Defendant-Appellee.
 

WEAVER, J. (concurring).
 

I concur in the majority’s holding that the violations
 

of MCL 780.653(b) and MCR 3.606(A) do not require suppression
 

of the evidence seized in these cases. I write separately to
 

note that I do not believe the reenactment rule can be relied
 

on in the present cases. As explained by Justice Boyle in
 

her dissent in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 202-203; 538
 

NW2d 380 (1995), in which I joined,
 
The [Sloan] majority’s assertion of
 

legislative acquiescence in the decision in
 

Sherbine,[1] to use of the exclusionary rule to


suppress evidence obtained in alleged violation of
 

the statute before us is wholly mistaken. In
 

Sherbine, this Court’s majority interpreted the


former version of the statute as if it imposed a


more restrictive standard than the Fourth Amendment
 

and suppressed evidence on the basis of that


consideration. The swift reaction of the
 

Legislature was to amend MCL 750.653; MSA
 

28.1259(3), to make it clear that the Court was


incorrect in concluding that what had occurred was


a statutory violation. The Legislature had no


need to say what should not be excluded; it relied


on the Court’s word that were it clear that the
 

Legislature had authorized the warrant, suppression


would not be ordered.
 

Acting on our representation, the amended


legislation tracked the Fourth Amendment. Because
 

“our holding that evidence obtained in violation of


the statute must be excluded,” ante at 183
 

(Cavanagh, J.), was wholly derived from our narrow


reading of MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3), the
 

legislative amendment of the statute is not an


acquiescence in, but rather a repudiation of, the


view in Sherbine that the evidence should be
 

excluded.
 

However, while I do not believe the reenactment rule
 

should be relied on in the present cases for the reasons
 

outlined by Justice Boyle, my opinion should not be construed
 

to mean that the rule may not be relied on in other cases
 

where it is appropriate.
 

Elizabeth A. Weaver
 

1 People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502; 364 NW2d 658 (1984).
 

2
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

v 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

No. 120437 

CHRISTOPHER LAMAR HAWKINS, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

___________________________________ 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 121698 

MICHAEL BRANDON SCHERF, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

___________________________________ 

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 

Today the majority discounts decades of precedent in
 

order to adopt its preferred policy of limiting application
 

of the exclusionary rule. Because contextual interpretations
 

of the statute and the court rule mandate use of the
 

exclusionary rule, and because the task of altering our
 

state’s policy concerning statutory remedies belongs to the
 

Legislature, I must respectfully dissent. 


MCL 780.653
 
 

 

Like the majority, I agree that a contextual analysis of
 

MCL 780.653 will determine the appropriate remedy for its
 

violation. However, I depart from the majority’s analysis
 

insofar as it neglects material rules of statutory
 

interpretation. 


Since its enactment in 1966, MCL 780.653 has codified
 

the requirement that search warrants issue only upon a
 

finding of probable cause, giving form to the constitutional
 

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
 

provision clarifies that information in support of a warrant
 

must be supplied by an individual who has personal knowledge
 

of the facts alleged. MCL 780.653, as amended by 1988 PA 80,
 

provides: 


The magistrate's finding of reasonable or
 

probable cause shall be based upon all the facts


related within the affidavit made before him or
 

her. The affidavit may be based upon information


supplied to the complainant by a named or unnamed


person if the affidavit contains 1 of the
 

following: 


(a) If the person is named, affirmative


allegations from which the magistrate may conclude


that the person spoke with personal knowledge of


the information. 


(b) If the person is unnamed, affirmative


allegations from which the magistrate may conclude


that the person spoke with personal knowledge of


the information and either that the unnamed person


is credible or that the information is reliable. 


Similarly to the federal and state constitutional
 

prohibition against the issuance of a warrant without
 

2
 
 

 

probable cause, the text of this subsection provides no
 

specific guidance about the requisite judicial response to
 

its violation. Statutory construction is, therefore,
 

required. In re MCI, 460 Mich 396; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
 

Although the consequence of an infraction is not prescribed,
 

1966 PA 189 does authorize a penalty for those who
 

intentionally exceed their authority when executing a
 

warrant, who exercise such authority with unnecessary
 

severity, or who maliciously procure a warrant. See MCL
 

780.657, 780.658.1 While I agree that these statutory
 

provisions must inform our understanding of MCL 780.653, I am
 

not persuaded that they mandate the result envisioned by the
 

majority. 


As an initial matter, the penalty provisions only
 

pertain to a small number of violations. Most violations of
 

1966 PA 189 are not caused by wilful misconduct. If the
 

criminal provisions are deemed the exclusive remedy for any
 

1 MCL 780.657 provides: 


Any person who in executing a search warrant,


wilfully exceeds his authority or exercises it with


unnecessary severity, shall be fined not more than


$1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year. 


MCL 780.658 provides: 


Any person who maliciously and without
 

probable cause procures a search warrant to be


issued and executed shall be fined not more than
 

$1,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 1 year. 


3
 
 

violation of this act, its directives would have no force.
 

Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that the presence of
 

criminal penalties for rare incidents of extreme misconduct
 

indicates a legislative intent to displace the exclusionary
 

rule. To so hold would assume the Legislature promulgated an
 

impotent (or ineffectual) statute.2 For this reason, I find
 

several other well-respected doctrines of interpretation more
 

compelling.
 

Among them is the strong presumption that a high court’s
 

construction of a statute should be given a heightened stare
 

decisis effect. As noted by the United States Supreme Court,
 

[the] reluctance to overturn precedents derives in


part from institutional concerns about the
 

relationship of the Judiciary to Congress. One
 

reason that we give great weight to stare decisis
 

in the area of statutory construction is that


"Congress is free to change this Court's
 

interpretation of its legislation.” Illinois Brick
 

Co v Illinois, 431 US 720, 736[; 97 S Ct 2061; 52


L Ed 2d 707] (1977). We have overruled our
 

precedents when the intervening development of the


law has "removed or weakened the conceptual


underpinnings from the prior decision, or where the


later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable
 

with competing legal doctrines or policies."


Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 173[;


109 S Ct 2363; 105 L Ed 2d 132] (1989) (citations


omitted). Absent those changes or compelling


evidence bearing on Congress' original intent, NLRB
 

v Longshoremen, 473 US 61, 84[; 105 S Ct 3045; 87


L Ed 2d 47] (1985), our system demands that we
 

2 See People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 713-716; 625


NW2d 764 (2001) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting); People v Stevens
 

(After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 648-666; 597 NW2d 53 (1999)


(Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
 

4
 
adhere to our prior interpretations of statutes.


[Neal v United States, 516 US 284, 295; 116 S Ct


763; 133 L Ed 2d 709 (1996) (emphasis added).]
 

Because this Court shares a similar relationship with
 

the Michigan Legislature, I find no reason to reject this
 

Court’s precedent in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160; 538 NW2d
 

380 (1995), or People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502; 364 NW2d 658
 

(1984), which clarify that evidence obtained in violation of
 

MCL 780.653 must be suppressed.
 

In Sherbine, this Court held that the exclusionary rule
 

is the proper remedy for a violation of MCL 780.653. In
 

support, the Court cited People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691; 222
 

NW2d 749 (1974), People v Chartrand, 73 Mich App 645; 252
 

NW2d 569 (1977), and State v Russell, 293 Or 469; 650 P2d 79
 

(1982). Sherbine, supra at 512 and ns 18-21. 


Ten years later, this Court affirmed the application of
 

the exclusionary rule for violations of MCL 780.653 (§ 653)
 

in Sloan, supra. In Sloan, this Court held that a magistrate
 

must base the probable-cause determination on the record
 

(i.e., an affidavit is necessary; sworn testimony is
 

insufficient), and that a violation of this statute requires
 

the exclusion of tainted evidence. The Court’s rationale was
 

based, in part, on the Legislature’s acquiescence to the
 

application of the exclusionary rule as expressed in
 

Sherbine. In 1988, the Legislature revised § 653 in response
 

5
 
 

to Sherbine, overruling by legislative enactment the
 

informant- reliability standard. In doing so, it approved
 

the use of the exclusionary rule to redress violations of §
 

653.
 

Though one might be tempted to dismiss the authoritative
 

value of Sloan on the basis of its stated reliance on the now
 

disfavored doctrine of legislative acquiescence, a close
 

examination reveals the Court utilized a related—but quite
 

distinct—rule of interpretation, i.e., the reenactment rule.
 

If a legislature reenacts a statute without modifying a high
 

court’s practical construction of that statute, that
 

construction is implicitly adopted. See Singer, 28 Statutes
 

and Statutory Construction (2000 rev), Contemporaneous
 

Construction, § 49:09, pp 103-112. The reenactment rule
 

differs from the legislative-acquiescence doctrine in that
 

the former canon provides “prima facie evidence of
 

legislative intent” by the adoption, without modification, of
 

a statutory provision that had already received judicial
 

interpretation. Id. at 107. As articulated by the United
 

States Supreme Court, a legislature “is presumed to be aware
 

of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute
 

and to adopt that interpretation when it [reenacts] a statute
 

without change . . . .” Lorillard, a Div of Loew’s Theatres,
 

Inc v Pons, 434 US 575, 580; 98 S Ct 866; 55 L Ed 2d 40
 

6
 
(1978). As I noted in Sloan, the Legislature could have
 

easily modified the applicability of the exclusionary rule
 

when enacting 1988 PA 80. By altering the text to renounce
 

the informant rule modified in Sherbine, while reenacting the
 

remaining text, the Legislature indicated its detailed
 

knowledge of Sherbine and approved the use of the 

exclusionary rule for violations of § 653.3 

Long before the Legislature incorporated the 

exclusionary rule into MCL 780.653, this Court adopted a
 

presumption in favor of utilizing the exclusionary rule for
 

statutory violations. Over eighty years ago, in People v
 

Knopka, 220 Mich 540, 545; 190 NW 731 (1922), the Court
 

suppressed evidence obtained by warrant issued without
 

3The majority’s attempt to diminish the value of the


reenactment doctrine is misguided. As noted above, the rule


merely provides prima facie evidence of legislative intent,


and a bill replacing male pronouns with neutral pronouns


throughout the code–as suggested in the majority opinion, ante
 

at 23 n 19–would not justify a strong presumption in favor of


its application because there would be no indication that the


Legislature thoughtfully familiarized itself with the
 

subsections modified. Application of the reenactment rule in


this case, by contrast, does shed light on the scope of the


Legislature’s familiarity with Sherbine, supra.
 

Further, unlike the majority, I have more faith in the


Legislature’s ability to competently execute its duties. To
 

assume the Legislature would not familiarize itself with the


whole of a particular case when revising one subsection of the


code in response to that very case does not, as the majority


suggests, “violate separation of powers principles.” Ante at
 

24 n 20. Rather, reference to the reenactment rule under such


circumstances simply acknowledges legislative competency.
 

7
 
probable cause:
 

It not appearing that the search warrant was


issued upon the constitutional and statutory


showing of probable cause, it must be held that the


evidence procured by it was inadmissible and should


have been suppressed and that, with such evidence


out, defendant should have been discharged.
 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused
 

exclusively on the statutes establishing search-warrant
 

requirements. Three years later, in People v Moten, 233 Mich
 

169; 206 NW 506 (1925), the Court again applied the
 

exclusionary rule to remedy a statutory violation, relying,
 

in part, on Knopka. See also People v Bules, 234 Mich 335;
 

207 NW 818 (1926) (reversing a conviction on the basis of
 

evidence obtained in violation of statutory warrant
 

requirements); People v Galnt, 235 Mich 646; 209 NW 915
 

(1926) (discharging the defendant where evidence obtained in
 

violation of statute required suppression). 


Although this Court has recently attempted to narrow the
 

import of Moten and its progeny, the distinction is
 

particularly inapposite here. In People v Sobczak-Obetts,
 

463 Mich 687; 625 NW2d 764 (2001), the majority distinguished
 

the Moten-Bules-Galnt trilogy because each analyzed
 

substantive warrant requirements, i.e., the sufficiency of a
 

warrant’s “form,” whereas the statute at issue in Sobczak-


Obetts concerned procedures relevant to warrant execution.
 

8
 
See also People v Hamilton, 465 Mich 526; 638 NW2d 92
 

(2002)(holding that an absence of statutory authority did not
 

warrant application of the exclusionary rule where the
 

statute was meant to protect the rights of autonomous local
 

governments); People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626;
 

597 NW2d 53 (1999) (holding that failure to comply with the
 

knock-and- announce rule did not warrant application of the
 

exclusionary rule). However, this distinction between
 

substantive and procedural interests collapses when applied
 

to defendant Hawkins, who challenged the warrant issued for
 

his arrest on substantive grounds, maintaining the affidavit
 

contained neither credible nor reliable allegations. The
 

trial court agreed: “The affidavit clearly does not conform
 

with Michigan statutory authority; namely, MCL 780.653(B).”
 

Regrettably, the majority today conflates substantive and
 

procedural concerns, ignores decades of precedent, and—in
 

spite of evidence to the contrary—disregards the
 

Legislature’s unambiguous approval of the application of the
 

exclusionary rule for violations of MCL 780.653. See 1988 PA
 

80.
 

Until the tide began to shift with Stevens (After
 

Remand), the use of the exclusionary rule to remedy statutory
 

violations was well settled. By dismissing the import of
 

this Court’s precedent, including Moten, Bules, Sherbine,
 

9
 
Sloan, et al., the majority has imposed a policy-based
 

doctrine that requires express statements to authorize
 

application of the exclusionary rule. Ante at 21. This runs
 

afoul of the Legislature’s approval of the rule’s application
 

to MCL 780.653 as articulated in Sherbine. 1988 PA 80. 


While I can appreciate the majority’s need to balance
 

important and competing interests, I take issue with its
 

attempt to ground the analysis in the text of MCL 780.653.
 

Moreover, shifting the focus to a “clear statement” policy
 

works a bait-and-switch on the Legislature. Not only has the
 

majority imposed its own policy on the Legislature, it has
 

displaced the controlling interpretive standard—on which our
 

Legislature has relied—under the guise of strict textualism.
 

MCR 3.606(A)
 

The majority concludes that the exclusionary rule is an
 

inappropriate remedy because the text of MCR 3.606(A) does
 

not specifically demand its application. Ante at 25. “When
 

called on to construe a court rule, this Court applies the
 

legal principles that govern the construction and application
 

of statutes. . . . Accordingly, we begin with the plain
 

language of the court rule.” Grievance Administrator v
 

Underwood, 462 Mich 188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000).
 

Applied here, the doctrine clarifies our rule’s rigorous
 

demands. MCR 3.606(A) provides:
 

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Initiation of Proceeding. For a contempt


committed outside the immediate view and presence


of the court, on a proper showing on ex parte


motion supported by affidavits, the court shall


either:
 

(1) order the accused person to show cause, at


a reasonable time specified in the order, why that


person should not be punished for the alleged


misconduct; or
 

(2) issue a bench warrant for the arrest of


the person.
 

As required by this rule, before contempt proceedings
 

may be initiated for any conduct outside of the court’s
 

“immediate view,” a party must provide “a proper showing on
 

ex parte motion supported by affidavits . . . .” A motion
 

alone is insufficient. An affidavit, i.e., “a signed
 

statement,” must be provided. Once this requirement is met,
 

the court must either order the accused person to prove why
 

punishment should not be inflicted or issue a bench warrant.
 

In the light of the potential peril, as well as the
 

substantive safeguards contained in MCR 3.606(A), I find it
 

particularly troublesome that the majority members suggest
 

such rules are mere “technical provisions.” This assertion
 

ignores their function as guarantors of procedural rights.
 

MCR 3.606(A) threatens punishment solely on the basis of
 

exclusive communications between an adversarial party and the
 

court. The procedure authorizes the exercise of police power
 

by judicial officers, which—contrary to the majority’s
 

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implication—may not be used to detain an individual without
 

probable cause. As an arm of the state, our actions must
 

respect the polity’s civil rights, and our court rules are
 

drafted to ensure that the exercise of judicial authority is
 

not arbitrary or unlawful. To deem such rules “technical”
 

distorts the substance of the rules and the role of the
 

judiciary.
 

Although the majority holds otherwise, the exclusionary
 

rule would be particularly appropriate in this instance. As
 

a tool to prevent the abuse of state power, this Court
 

promulgated the court rule to mark the boundaries of
 

acceptable judicial conduct.4 If the exclusionary rule
 

applied, magistrates and judges would surely take care to
 

4

 The majority claims that application of the
 

exclusionary rule to MCL 780.653 or MCR 3.606(A) would not


further the purpose of either because “the aim of the rule is


one of police deterrence . . . .” Ante at 12. While I agree


that we suppress evidence in an attempt to prevent police


misconduct, the exclusionary rule is also utilized to ensure


compliance with the law at an institutional level. The ease
 

with which we lose sight of this goal is apparent in People
 

v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550; 563 NW2d 208 (1997), where we


equated “good police practice” with violations of the Fourth


Amendment: 


While conceding that [the officer's] entry


into the mobile home might have been good police


practice, the district court held that,


nonetheless, it was not a proper search without a


warrant. [Id. at 554.]
 

One wonders how it can be "good police practice" to violate


the Fourth Amendment. 


12
 
confirm that warrants were issued on a proper showing of
 

probable cause. Such proof is all the court rule requires.
 

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE’S UTILITY
 

I agree that the exclusionary rule wields significant
 

power, but only because it is the sole efficacious method by
 

which to protect individuals from state misconduct, as
 

defined by our laws. If any other method of enforcement
 

worked so well, it, too, would be deemed disproportionate and
 

heavy- handed. Thus, our debate is not simply about which
 

remedy is appropriate, but how sacred we deem the right to be
 

free from unlawful state conduct. Whether codified in
 

federal or state constitutions, statutes, or court rules, the
 

judicial branch must enforce the laws that prescribe the
 

scope of state power and protect individuals from the
 

unreasonable exercise of that authority. 


In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, as our nation
 

struggles to secure its boundaries while protecting our
 

freedoms, the role of the judiciary–charged with maintaining
 

the delicate balance between state authority and individual
 

liberty–becomes increasingly vital. Our statutes and court
 

rules have been drafted to protect these freedoms. Because
 

both the statute, MCL 780.653, and the court rule, MCR
 

3.606(A), would be without force but for the exclusionary
 

rule, and because this Court should avoid overruling sound
 

13
 
precedent and imposing its policy upon the Legislature, I
 

must reject the majority’s analysis.
 

CONCLUSION
 

Though cloaked in a strict Textualism garb, the majority
 

attempts to justify its decision on the basis of its own
 

policy considerations. According to the majority, in the
 

absence of an express legislative statement indicating an
 

intention to invoke the exclusionary rule, the rule will not
 

be applied. However, a more legitimate analysis would
 

require an inference in favor of its application. In so
 

doing, it could be guaranteed that the well-settled and
 

authoritative interpretation of our statutes could be relied
 

upon, and that a statute’s purpose would be effectuated.
 

Moreover, without this tool, aggrieved individuals would have
 

no opportunity for redress. For these reasons, I would
 

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Hawkins. 


With regard to the proper remedy for a violation of MCR
 

3.606(A), I would also apply the exclusionary rule. The text
 

of the court rule evinces an intention to impose substantive
 

procedural safeguards into the warrant-authorization process.
 

To effectuate this end, the exclusionary rule is required to
 

remedy violations of MCR 3.606(A). Therefore, I would affirm
 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Scherf.
 

Michael F. Cavanagh


Marilyn Kelly
 

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