J-S43038-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

FRANCIS A. STRAUGHTERS, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 199 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 8, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-26-CR-0000423-2012

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2018

Appellant Francis A. Straughters, Jr. appeals from the amended 

judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for robbery, 

conspiracy, aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, 

terroristic threats, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and 

disorderly conduct.

1

 Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and its Pennsylvania 

counterpart, Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We 

affirm and grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw.

We set forth the facts of this case as follows:

During the night of February 3, 2012, Appellant and [coconspirator Edith Marie] Porterfield smoked crack cocaine at their 

apartment on East Green Street, Connellsville. Their drug dealer 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(i), 903, 2702(a)(4), 2701, 2705, 2706, 3921, 

3925, and 5503, respectively. 
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had refused to give them any more drugs on credit so, after 

consuming all the crack cocaine in their possession, they decided 

to obtain money by criminal means in order to purchase the drug. 

First, the two cohorts went to the home of Porterfield’s mother, 

stole about $150, purchased more crack cocaine, and returned to 

their apartment to consume it. 

Appellant and Porterfield then decided to rob a store to obtain 

more funds. To that end, they started to drive around Connellsville 

consuming their remaining crack cocaine. At around 4:00 a.m. 

on February 4, 2012, they went to a gas station known as the 

Honey Bear Sunoco, which was located on Memorial Boulevard in 

Connellsville. Porterfield entered that business wearing sunglasses 

and a white-hooded sweatshirt. She tried to open the cash 

register and demanded money from the store clerk, who denied 

her access to the register. In response, Porterfield threatened to 

shoot the clerk and left the gas station. 

After that unsuccessful attempt to gain money for drugs, at 

around 6:00 a.m. on February 4, 2012, Appellant and Porterfield 

robbed the Reddy Mart Gas Station (“Reddy Mart”), which also 

was located on Memorial Boulevard, Connellsville. Porterfield 

operated as a lookout and the getaway driver. She entered the 

establishment, purchased coffee, and left the Reddy Mart. During 

her stay, she spoke briefly with a regular customer, Zane Long. 

Nancy Miller was the only store employee on duty. 

Shortly after Porterfield left Reddy Mart, Appellant entered the 

convenience store carrying a long-handled crescent wrench. He 

screamed at Mr. Long that he was robbing the store, struck Mr. 

Long across the face with the wrench, and pushed him into a utility 

closet. Appellant then approached Ms. Miller and ordered her to 

give him the store money and not to summon the police. He stole 

about $500 in cash and several packs of cigarettes from the Reddy 

Mart. Next, Appellant returned to the utility closet and struck Mr. 

Long on the head with the wrench two or three more times. Mr. 

Long fell onto the ground, where Appellant, who was wearing 

boots, kicked him three times, including once in the head. Due to 

his injuries, Mr. Long received nine stiches and seventeen staples 

at a hospital. Porterfield and Appellant then purchased more crack 

cocaine with the robbery proceeds. 

During the ensuing investigation, Connellsville Police Officer 

Autumn Fike reviewed Reddy Mart’s surveillance footage of the 

incident, which was played for the jury. When watching the tape, 
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Officer Fike immediately recognized both Porterfield and 

Appellant. Porterfield had no facial covering, and a piece of cloth 

that Appellant used during the crime to cover his mouth and chin 

continually slid down so that Officer Fike was able to view 

Appellant’s entire visage. Officer Fike obtained a search warrant 

for Appellant’s residence, and, during its execution, she found 

clothing worn by the perpetrator of the Reddy Mart robbery,

including a bloodstained shirt. The shirt was submitted to a crime 

laboratory for DNA testing. Appellant’s DNA was on that item, and 

the blood on the shirt belonged to Mr. Long. 

As Officer Fike was executing the warrant, she saw Appellant 

outside. She exited the residence to arrest Appellant, but he 

entered his vehicle and fled the area with Porterfield. After being 

pursued by a nearby patrol car, Appellant and Porterfield 

surrendered to police. 

Based upon these events, Appellant was convicted of robbery, 

aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment, 

terroristic threats, conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking, theft by 

receiving stolen property, and disorderly conduct. He was 

acquitted of two counts of criminal conspiracy that were based 

upon the attempted robbery of Honey Bear Sunoco.

See Commonwealth v. Straughters, 1028 WDA 2015, 1-3 (Pa. Super. filed 

Jan. 5, 2016) (unpublished mem.), appeal denied, 138 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2016).

On September 4, 2012, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 5 to 10 

years’ incarceration for the robbery conviction and a consecutive 21⁄2 to 5 

years’ incarceration for the aggravated assault conviction.2 The aggregate 

sentence was 71⁄2 to 15 years’ incarceration, to run consecutive to Appellant’s 

prior sentence case in CP-26-CR-1771-20113 (Case No. 1771). The trial court 

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2 The trial court imposed no further punishment for the remaining convictions.

3 On July 11, 2012, at Case No. 1771, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated 

assault, simple assault, and harassment. The trial court sentenced Appellant 
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further stated that Appellant was not eligible for the Recidivism Risk Reduction 

Incentive (RRRI) program due to his aggravated assault conviction at Case 

No. 1771. On May 29, 2013, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on December 18, 2013.

On July 31, 2014, the PCRA court docketed Appellant’s first PCRA 

petition. The PCRA court appointed Counsel who filed an amended PCRA 

petition on November 25, 2014. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied 

Appellant’s petition on June 5, 2015. This Court affirmed on January 5, 2016, 

and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance 

of appeal on May 10, 2016.

On December 4, 2017, the trial court docketed Appellant’s pro se 

petition to recalculate guidelines and correct sentence. In his petition, 

Appellant alleged that on August 30, 2017, the Commonwealth nolle prossed

the charges at Case No. 1771 after Appellant filed a PCRA petition in that case. 

Mot. to Recalculate Guidelines and Correct Sentence, 12/4/17, at 3. He 

further alleged that his PCRA Counsel in Case No. 1771 failed to inform him 

of the dismissal of the charges. Id. Appellant claimed that this affected the 

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to 22 to 60 months’ incarceration on the aggravated assault conviction and 

imposed no further penalty on the remaining convictions. On August 30, 

2017, the trial court vacated Appellant’s sentence at Case No. 1771 after 

Appellant filed a Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546,

petition in that case.
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offense gravity score and prior record score used when calculating his 

sentence in the instant case and in determining he was not RRRI eligible. Id.4 

On December 13, 2017, the trial court scheduled a re-sentencing 

hearing.5 On January 8, 2018, following the resentencing hearing, the trial 

court amended Count 1—Robbery of Appellant’s sentence, providing in 

relevant part:

Paragraph 6 is amended as follows: The [c]ourt has determined 

that the Defendant is NOT eligible for the RRRI Program due to 

the Possession of Firearms conviction at Fayette County Case 

Number 596 of 2005.

Paragraph 7 shall read: The Defendant is given credit for time 

served from February 4, 2012 to September 4, 2012.

Paragraph 8 is RESCINDED as the Aggravated Assault conviction 

as Case No. 1771 . . . has been vacated.

Am. Sentence, 1/8/18, at Ct. 1 (reordered).

6

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4 Although Appellant alleged that he exercised due diligence in discovering 

new facts, the trial court apparently granted re-sentencing relief to correct a 

patent error based on the developments in Case No. 1771.

5 We note that while the trial court labeled the hearing as one for resentencing, it limited itself to correcting potential errors regarding the 

calculation of Appellant’s PRS and eligibility for the RRRI program. Thus, 

Appellant could only raise issues as to the calculation of his PRS and his 

eligibility for the RRRI program. We will address, however, the issues raised 

by Appellant in his pro se response to Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief.

6 Count 1–Robbery of the original sentence read in relevant part as follows:

6. The [c]ourt has determined that the Defendant is NOT eligible 

for the RRRI Program due to his Aggravated Assault conviction at 

[Case No. 1771];
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The trial court also amended Count 3–Aggravated Assault and provided 

in relevant part:

Paragraph 3 has previously been omitted per order of September 

14, 2012.

Paragraph 6 is RESCINDED as the Aggravated Assault Conviction 

at Case No. 1771 . . . has been vacated.

Id. at Ct. 3.7

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with a courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court filed a responsive 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Counsel has filed an 

Anders/Santiago brief and Appellant has filed a pro se response. We address 

Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief first.

Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief identifies the following issues on 

appeal:

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7. Defendant us given credit for time served from February 4, 

2012 to August 17, 2012;

8. This sentence shall run consecutive to [Case No. 1771].

Sentence, 9/4/12, at Ct.1.

7 Count 3–Aggravated Assault of the original sentence provided in relevant 

part as follows:

3. Make restitution in the amount of $400.00 to Reddy’s Sunoco 

A Plus;

* * *

6. This sentence shall run consecutive to [Case No. 1771].

Sentence, 9/4/12, at Ct.3.
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1. Whether the court erred by failing to recalculate [Appellant]’s 

sentence after [Appellant]’s sentence in Case No. 1771 of 2011 

was vacated[.]

2. Whether the court erred in determining that [Appellant] was 

not eligible for the RRRI program[.]

Anders/Santiago Brief at 2 (full capitalization omitted). 

Because Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to 

Anders/Santiago, we must first address Counsel’s petition before reviewing 

the merits of the appeal. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 

(Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc). To be permitted to withdraw, Counsel must: 

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel 

has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) 

furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise 

the defendant that he or she has the right to retain private 

counsel or raise additional arguments that the defendant 

deems worthy of the court’s attention. 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation omitted).

Here, Counsel has stated that after a thorough review of the record, he 

believes this appeal would be wholly frivolous. Pet. to Withdraw, 5/4/18, at ¶ 

14. Counsel furnished a copy of the Anders/Santiago brief to Appellant, as 

well as a letter advising Appellant of his right to “(1) retain new counsel to 

pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal [meaning without legal 

counsel]; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s 

attention in addition to the points raised by counsel.” Ltr. to Appellant, 
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4/16/18. We conclude that Counsel’s petition to withdraw complies with the 

procedural dictates of Anders.

We next address whether Counsel’s brief meets the requirements 

established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the 

record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; 

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that 

the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the 

relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or 

statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the 

appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Here, Counsel’s brief provided a summary of the procedural history and 

the relevant facts with appropriate citations to the record. Anders/Santiago

Brief at 3-4. Counsel’s brief states that he conducted a thorough review of 

the record and determined that any appeal would be frivolous, and set forth 

his reasons for that conclusion. Id. at 5-11, 28. Accordingly, Counsel has 

substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago. We 

therefore review the issues raised in the Anders/Santiago brief. 

Counsel first identifies Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred by 

failing to correct Appellant’s prior record score (PRS) in the instant case after 

the sentence at Case No. 1771 had been vacated. Anders/Santiago Brief at 

5.

As a prefatory matter, “we note that objections to the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence are waived if they are not raised at the sentencing 
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hearing or raised in a motion to modify the sentence imposed at that hearing.” 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citations omitted).

Here, Appellant did not preserve his discretionary sentencing claim at 

the resentencing hearing or in a subsequent post-sentence motion. 

Accordingly, Appellant has failed to preserve this claim. See id.

Next, Counsel sets forth Appellant’s claims that the trial court erred in 

determining that Appellant was not eligible for the RRRI program. 

It is well-settled that “where the trial court fails to make a statutorily 

required determination regarding a defendant’s eligibility for a[] RRRI 

minimum sentence as required, the sentence is illegal.” Commonwealth v. 

Robinson, 7 A.3d 868, 871 (Pa. Super. 2010). Accordingly, because RRRI 

eligibility “concerns a matter of statutory interpretation and is, thus, a pure 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 101 A.3d 56, 60 (Pa. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained that RRRI “seeks to create a program 

that ensures appropriate punishment for persons who commit crimes, 

encourages inmate participation in evidence-based programs that reduce the 

risks of future crime and ensures the openness and accountability of the 

criminal justice process while ensuring fairness to crime victims.” Id. at 57

(citing 61 Pa.C.S. § 4502). This program, however, requires the defendant to 
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meet several requirements. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503; see also Chester, 101 

A.3d at 57-58. Of relevance here is one requirement that the defendant: 

[h]as not been subject to a sentence the calculation of which 

includes an enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon as 

defined under law or the sentencing guidelines promulgated by 

the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing or the attorney for 

the Commonwealth has not demonstrated that the defendant 

has been found guilty of or was convicted of an offense 

involving a deadly weapon or offense under 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 

61 (relating to firearms and other dangerous articles) or the 

equivalent offense under the laws of the United States or one of 

its territories or possessions, another state, the District of 

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a foreign nation.

61 Pa.C.S. § 4503 (emphasis added).

In the instant case, Appellant had a 2005 conviction for possession of a 

firearm with an altered manufacturer’s number, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.2(a). See

N.T., 1/8/18, at 8. Further, the trial court fully explained to Appellant why he 

was not eligible for RRRI at the resentencing hearing. See id. at 9-10. Thus, 

because Appellant’s 2005 conviction involving a firearm is an enumerated 

offense under chapter 61 of the Crimes Code, the trial court correctly held 

that Appellant does not qualify as an eligible offender. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503.

Next, we address the two additional issues Appellant has raised in his 

pro se response. First, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. More specifically, he claims that (1) the trial court imposed a harsh 

sentence because it ordered that the sentences be consecutive; (2) the 

sentence is excessive because the prior criminal case was vacated; and (3) 
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the trial court did not state sufficient reasons on the record. Appellant’s Reply 

Brief to Counsel’s Pet. to Withdraw, 6/12/18, at ¶¶ 2-4. 

As discussed above, Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion or 

preserve any discretionary sentencing claims at the re-sentencing hearing. 

Accordingly, Appellant has waived these claims. See Anderson, 830 A.2d at 

1016. 

Second, Appellant claims that “there may be an issue of merger to the 

two offenses, where ‘inchoate crimes merge only when directed to the 

commission of the same crime, not merely because they arise out of the same 

incident.’”

8

 Appellant’s Reply Brief to Counsel’s Pet. to Withdraw, 6/12/18, at 

¶ 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Graves, 508 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1986) (per 

curiam)).

Initially, we note that whether convictions merge for sentencing 

purposes involves the legality of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 

985 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. 2009). Thus, our standard of review is de novo and 

our scope of review is plenary. Id. (citation omitted).

Section 9765 provides that:

[n]o crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes 

arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements 

of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other 

offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court 

may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

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8 Although Appellant does not specify the two offenses at issue, it is clear he 

is referring to robbery and aggravated assault, as these were the only 

convictions for which the trial court sentenced Appellant.
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42 Pa.C.S. § 9765.

Regarding robbery and aggravated assault, we have explained that 

it is clear that aggravated assault under § 2702(a)(1) requires an 

element that § 3701(a)(1)(i) robbery does not: namely, that the 

perpetrator act with a specific mental state when causing the 

“serious bodily injury.” As § 2702(a)(1) declares, before an 

individual may be convicted of aggravated assault, that individual 

must “cause . . . serious bodily injury to another . . . intentionally, 

knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i) simply does not require such a mental 

state when the “serious bodily injury” is inflicted. For robbery, it 

is enough that the perpetrator “inflicts serious bodily injury upon 

another” while “in the course of committing a theft.” 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3701(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added).

Commonwealth v. Payne, 868 A.2d 1257, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(emphasis omitted).

Although Payne discusses aggravated assault as defined in section 

2702(a)(1) and, here, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault under 

section 2702(a)(4), the underlying reasoning is the same. Section 2702(a)(4)

requires a defendant to intend to cause or knowingly cause bodily injury with 

a deadly weapon, while section 3701(a)(1)(i) requires the infliction of serious 

bodily injury in the course of committing the theft. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 

2702(a)(4), 3701(a)(1)(i). Therefore, because aggravated assault under 

subsection (a)(4) and robbery under subsection(a)(1) each have at least one 

element that other does not, these convictions do not merge for sentencing 

purposes. See Payne, 868 A.2d at 1263.
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Finally, our independent review of the record does not reveal any other 

non-frivolous issues.

Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/16/2018