United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 4, 2013*

Decided November 4, 2013

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

    MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

    ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 12‐1467

T. G., et al.,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

MIDLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT 7,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 09‐1392

Joe Billy McDade,

Judge.

O R D E R

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. The appeal is thus submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 12‐1467 Page 2

Terry and Gloria Giosta, with their daughter, T.G. (a minor when the case

began), appeal the entry of summary judgment against them in their claim for

attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). Because the Giostas prevailed only on minor items at the

earlier proceedings, we uphold the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and affirm.

T.G.’s parents filed an administrative complaint, alleging that T.G.’s school,

Midland High School in Varna, Illinois, failed to provide her with a free, appropriate

public education for seventh through ninth grades (from 2006 to 2008). See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(1). At Midland, T.G. (who had been assessed as mentally impaired with severe

language deficits) received special education. The complaint charged, among other

inadequacies, that the individualized education plan the school developed for T.G. was

deficient (lacking research‐based instructional programs and occupational therapy) and

that the school had not fully implemented T.G.’s plan (by neglecting to record lectures

and allow T.G. access to computers for writing assignments). The parents requested

findings in their favor on those issues, as well as compensatory education including

speech and occupational therapy, independent educational evaluations at public

expense, and a minimum of $10,000 worth of assistive technology devices (to help T.G.

communicate).

After receiving evidence and conducting a hearing, an independent hearing

officer (appointed by the Illinois State Board of Education) concluded that the school

“largely succeeded” in providing T.G. with an appropriate education, and denied the

majority of T.G.’s parents’ requests. The hearing officer did find, however, that during

T.G.’s ninth grade the school failed to determine appropriate goals to address her

reading and writing deficits or to administer an appropriate vocational evaluation, and

accordingly ordered additional reading and writing instruction (three hours per week)

and a new vocational evaluation.

T.G. and her parents sought review of the hearing officer’s decision in the district

court, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), primarily asserting that the hearing officer “ignored

substantial evidence” and ordered an “arbitrary and unexplained” amount of

additional services. They also asked for attorneys’ fees, because, they asserted, they

were a prevailing party at the hearing. See id. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

The district court granted the school’s motion for summary judgment, concluding

that the hearing officer’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court

acknowledged that the plaintiffs were technically prevailing parties but declined to
No. 12‐1467 Page 3

award attorneys’ fees because their success was merely “de minimis.” See Farrar v.

Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). According to the court, the goals that the parents set but

failed to achieve were ambitious: findings that T.G.’s education plans were both

inadequate and improperly implemented for all three years as well as an award of

thousands of dollars of evaluations and assistive technology devices, among other

requests.

On appeal T.G. and her parents challenge the district court’s application of Farrar

(which, they urge, does not concern the IDEA) and ruling that their victories in the

administrative proceeding were de minimis. But Farrar does correlate the size of fee

awards with the degree of success obtained; for minor successes the appropriate award

is zero. 506 U.S. at 114; see also, e.g., Linda T. ex rel. William A. v. Rice Lake Area Sch. Dist.,

417 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (IDEA case applying Farrar); Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25

v. George L. ex rel. Brock L., 102 F.3d 895, 907 (7th Cir. 1996) (same). And we agree with

the district court’s application of Farrar here. Though T.G.’s parents charged that

Midland failed to give T.G. an appropriate education, the hearing officer found that the

school “largely succeeded.”

T.G. and her parents also appear concerned that T.G. purportedly did not receive

notice that special‐education rights would transfer from her parents to her when she

turned 18 (in 2010). See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(m); 105 ILCS 5/14‐6.10(b). But they do not

explain how this argument relates to the education T.G. received from 2006 to 2008 or

why they did not raise the issue in the district court. Arguments made for the first time

on appeal are waived. See, e.g., Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905, 918 (7th

Cir. 2013).

AFFIRMED.