NO. 82-279
INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1983

ST. PAUL FIRE and MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. KEVIN E. CUMISKEY, JOHN E. CUMISKEY, STEPHANIE S. CUMISKEY, and K.S.J., INC., a Montana corporation, Defendants and Appellants, and ELIZABETH M. BRADLEY, Defendant and Cross Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin Honorable Joseph B. Gary, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: LarryW. Moran argued, Bozeman, Montana For Cross-Appellant: Landoe, Brown, Planalp, Kommers & Lineberger,

Bozeman, Montana Randy K. Dix, argued, Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings,

Montana James L. Jones argued, Billings, Montana

Submitted: March 1, 1983 Decided: 

### June 10, 1983 ~iled:

## JUN10

# 1983

Clerk

### Mr. Chief Justice Frank 

### I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Cumiskeys and Bradley appeal a judgment upon a Gallatin County jury verdict which set the cost of repairs of fire damaged property, which determined the parties' liabilities to one another and which awarded and set attorney fees. We affirm inpart and reverse inpart. In early 1978, Kevin Cumiskey contacted Elizabeth Bradley in order to leaseWest Yellowstone property owned by Bradley as the site of a Mexican restaurant. They entered into a lease agreementprepared by Cumiskey's attorney which required that Cumiskey insure the property to protect Bradley's interest and which specified that fixtures and alterations added by Cumiskey would remain his property. Kevin opened the restaurant, "Chiripa's," for a short 1978 tourist season, closed it for the winter, and then reopened it for summer 1979. From September 1978 to September 1979, the property was insured in the name of Kevin Cumiskey, d/b/a "Chiripa's." During that period, Kevin improved the premises with fundsborrowed from his father, John Cumiskey. At no time was Bradley's interest insured. From September 1979 to June 1980, the property was not insured at all. In 1979 the restaurant business was incorporated as K.S.J., Inc. (for Kevin, Stephanie, and John Cumiskey), and the lease was assigned to the corporation. Kevin and his mother, Stephanie, each owned 49 percent of the stock. John owned 2

### percent. Kevin is president, John isvice president and Stephanie is secretary. Kevin decided to stay inNew York to work for the summer of 1980, so John and Stephanie Cumiskey agreed to spend the summer in West Yellowstone operating the restaurant.

### Upon their arrival, the Cumiskeys contacted a Bozeman insurance agency to arrange for reissuance of the prior insurance coverage. Again, the insured on the policy was listed as Kevin Cumiskey, d/b/a "Chiripass." John and Stephanie ran the restaurant, which had consistently lost money since its opening, until, on August 10,1980, a series of explosions accompaniedby fire damaged thepremises. The fire investigation revealed that the blazes had been intentionally set. Extensive circumstantial evidence focused on John Curniskey as the alleged arsonist. That evidence included serious burns sustained by Cumiskey, a series of inconsistent and uncorroborated stories told by Cumiskey to explain his burns and his actions after the fire,and the fact thathis keys to the restaurantand other objects owned by Cumiskey were found in the street outside Chiripassafter the explosions. Once the investigation established that the fire had been intentionally set, St. Paul requested that Cumiskeys produce the financial records of the business. John Cumiskey refused to do so for some sixteenmonths after the August 1980 fire. In October 1980, Kevin Cumiskey filed a claim with St. Paul seeking recovery under the policy. St. Paul was told both that the destroyed property belonged to Kevin Cumiskey and that it was the property of K.S.J., 

### Inc. St. Paul also became aware of the Bradley lease, which required that Bradley's interestbe insured. John Cumiskey was charged with arson and criminal mischief in connection with the fire and was tried in November 1980. The business records were not apart of the criminal trial. Cumiskey's defense was that he was a

### wealthy man, that the business was profitable, and that he 

### had no motives for arson. He

### was acquittedof both charges. Two months after John Cumiskey's acquittal, St. Paul filed this action for declaratory judgment. In its 

### complaint, St. Paul asked the court to declare Kevin Cumiskey the proper recipient of any policy proceeds, to determine the rights and other legal relationships of the parties, to determine the specific amount of recovery to which Kevin Cumiskey was entitled, and torequire that John E. 

### Cumiskey subrogate any claim paid by St. Paul. K.S.J., Inc., was later added tothe actionby 

### stipulationof theparties. Bradley cross-claimed against Kevin Cumiskey and M.S.J., 

### Inc., for failure to insure her interest in the building. She also brought a tort claim against John Cumiskey for deliberate destruction of the 

### property. Cumiskeys and K.S.J., Inc., brought counterclaims against St. Paul for the company's breach of both statutory and common-law duties to settle 

### the insurance claims in good faithand for libeland slander. A 

### number of issues raisedwere disposed of before the

case was given to the jury. Before trial, the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Bradley on the issue of Kevin Cumiskey's failure to insure Bradley's interest in the premises. K.S.J., Inc., dropped its 

### claim to the insurance proceeds on the day before trial. At 

### the outset of trial, the District Court dismissed Cumiskeys' statutorycounterclaim for failureto statea proper claim. It 

### also dismissed Cumiskeys' claim of libel and slander, which was based upon St. Paul's filing of this action for declaratory judgment. At 

### the close of evidence, the trialcourt entered a directed verdict in favor of St. Paul on Cumiskeys' common-law counterclaim for bad faith. The jury returned a special. verdict which determined: (1)St. Paul and Bradley had proved by a preponderance of the evidence thatJohn E. Cumiskey caused the fire; (2) the cost to repair the main building of the restaurant was 

### set at $12,300.00; (3) that Kevin Cumiskey was entitled to

recover $19,910.00 under the policy; and, (4) that Bradley

was entitled to recover $25,000.00 in punitive damages from John E. Cumiskey. The parties stipulated in the pretrial order that the fire had been 

### set intentionally. The jury

was so informed and was instructed that if it found that John E. Cumiskey 

### set the fire, St. Paul was entitled to

recover from him the amount it must pay to Kevin Cumiskey under thepolicy. Cumiskeys and K.S.J., Inc., moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. The motions were denied. Cumiskeys now appeal and Bradley cross-appeals. Appellants, in their shotgun approach, barrage this Court with issues. We will address only two of those issues. We will also address cross-appellant's claim. We have considered the other errors advanced by appellantsand find them tobe withoutmerit. Wewillnot concern ourselves with these arguments since they willnot change the outcome of this appeal. We also note in passing that appellants' briefs, which contain more vitriol than substance, fail to substantiate their claims with references to the record pursuant toRule 23(a)and (e),f4.R.App.Civ.P. The issues

### we addressare:

### I. Whether the District Court properly directed a verdict on Cumiskeys' counterclaims for bad faith; 2. Whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment infavor of Bradley; and, 3. Whether the District Court correctly calculated the attorney fees awarded toBradley. Kevin Cumiskey first challenges dismissal of his bad faith counterclaims against St. Paul. He contends that St. Paul violatedboth statutoryand common-law dutiesto

### settle the insurance claims ingood faith. The statutory claim 

### is based upon section33-18-201(6) and (13),MCA, of theUnfair TradePracticeChapter of the InsuranceCode. Itprovides: "Unfair claim settlementpracticesprohi- bited. No personmay, with such frequency



# - astoindicate a general business practice, do any of the following:

"(6)neglect to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability hasbecome reasonablyclear;

"(13)fail topromptly 

### settle claims, if liability has become reasonably clear, under oneportion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurancepolicycoverage;" (Emphasisadded.) The statutory claim was struck by the District Court prior to trial on the basis that Kevin Cumiskey had not pleaded and was not going topresent evidence that St. Paul failed to settle claims "with such frequency to indicate a general business practice." Dismissal of the statutory claim on that basis was proper. Klaudt v. Flink (1983), Mont

# . , 658 P.2d 1065, 40 St.Rep. 64; Harris v. American General Life Insurance Company of Delaware (1983),

### The common-law bad faithclaimwas disposed of with 

### a directed verdict atthecloseof evidence. We 

### firstrecognized that an insurance company has a duty independent of statute or of insurance contract to settle 

### claims in good faith with its 

### insureds in Lipinksi v. The Title

### Insurance Company (1982), Mont

# . , 655 

### P.2d 970, 39 St.Rep. 2283. The District Court here properly allowed Kevin Cumiskey to present evidence in support of his claim that St. Paul acted in bad faith and breached that duty. Conflicting evidence was introduced on whether agents of St. Paul had represented that the insurer would settle 

### the claim. Kevin primarily based his claim on the assertion that the filing of the declaratory judgment action was in bad faith since the claim should have been paid and since the action served to destroy the business relationship between Cumiskeys and Bradley. At 

### the close of the evidence, however, the court dismissed that claim with the following statement: "I'm going toreversemyself. I 

### am going to grant the motion for a directed verdicton the question of punitive damages to the insurance company on their counterclaim and let 

### you go on your actual damages 

# . . . There was a legitimate question inthiscaseon thebasisof who set the fire, how the fire was set, 

### who the claimwas in, and the insurance company came in and asked for a declaratory judgment, and the only alternative 

### is to make the insurance company pay in any respect, and then attempt togetit

### back, and they used the process of the courts and within reasonable time, 

### and so you are, however, entitled to go on your actualdamages on your claim." The DistrictCourtproperly granted a directedverdict in favor of St. 

### Paul on those grounds. The court shouldvlew a motion for a directed verdict in the light most favorable to the party against whom themotion 

### is directed. Dleruf v. Gollaher (1971), 156 Mont. 440, 481 P.2d 322. Here, even viewed in the light most favorable to Kevin Cumiskey, the court found that St. Paul's decision tobring this action for declaratory judgment was appropriate. We agree.An action for declaratoryjudgment may be brought for the purpose of settling and affording "relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Section 27-8-101 etseq., MCA. The action, in order to terminate the controversy as to all parties, should include as parties all persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Goodman (1966), 147 Mont. 396, 412 P.2d 569. If otherwise appropriate, an action for declaratory judgment 

### is not precluded by the existence of another adequate remedy. Rule 57, I4.R.Civ.P. In a proper case, an insurer may use thisprocedural device inorder toobtain a determination of the validity, continuance, or coverage of

an insurance policy; 

### a determination of the extent 

### of liability; or a determinationof the insurer's duties under the policy. 6A Moore's Federal Practice, l(57.19 at57-195 through 57-198. We hold that in this case, St. Paul properly filedan action for declaratoryjudgment. While Kevin Cumiskey fileda claimforproceeds asthe named insured, a potential for liability to other parties also existed. Bradley's interest should have been insured pursuant to the lease agreement and was not. There was thepossibility that she would attempt to claim all or part of the insuranceproceeds. 

### K.S.J., Inc., insisted throughout most of the lawsuit that it was the named insured since St. Paul's agents had been informed of the incorporation of the business. Not until the day before trial was that claim dropped. John Cumiskey's possible culpability in regard to the fire also raised questions on the insurer's liability. Where an officer

## , director, stockholder, and managing agent of a corporation 

### is responsible for intentionally settinga fire, the insurer has a valid defense to the claim. 18 Couch on Insurance, 2d, 

### S 74:671; 5 Appleman Insurance Law and Practice, 

### S 3113 (1970). St. Paul had 

### a sufficient basis before the filingof thisactiontoraise thatdefense. John Cumiskey argues that section 33-24-102, MCA, requires payment of the policy limitwhere the property is considered a total loss and where no criminal fault 

### is established on the part of the insured or his assigns. Therefore, he contends that his acquittal on the arson and criminal mischief charges required the insurer to pay the policy 

### limitsrather than bringing this action. He ignores the complete contradiction inhis stanceon the issueof the amount of the loss. Cumiskeys testified at trial that St. Paul's agents had stated that the building was a total loss and the claim would be paid in full. The agent denied making that statement. No other evidence indicated that the building was a total loss. In fact, while Bradley's estimateon repairs to the building 

### set the cost atapproximately $12,500, CumisKeys presented the affidavitof their contractor and 

### a brief

### inopposition toBradley's motion for summary judgment that set 

### the repair costs at$8,500. At

### no time throughout the

course of this action did Cumiskeys agree to settle 

### Bradley's claim in an amount thatwould repay her for total lossof thebuilding. Nor did Cumiskeys introduce evidence to demonstrate the loss to the business itself. 

### The jury relied upon evldence introduced by St. Paul: the business income tax returns and expert testimony by the business's accountant. No evidence was presented that suggested the business was a total loss other than John Cumiskey's statement that an adjustor had stated: "Well, 

### as far as I 

### can see, it's 

### a total loss." St. Paul also faced a question on the extent it 

### was liable to Kevin Cumiskey as the named insured since the property insured in his name had been assigned to K.S.J., Inc. This creates an issue on the extent of Kevin's right to recover as stockholder. See, 3 

### Couch on Insurance, 

### S 24:92; 

### Annot., 39 

### ALR2d 714; 4 

### Appleman on Insurance, 

### S 2145. 

### The factsof thiscase presented a justiciable controversy, existing and genuine. The action for declaratory judgment was appropriately brought to determine the legal rightsand relationshipsof theparties. The District

### Court properly directedaverdicton theissueof bad faith. Cumiskeys next argue that the District 

### Court erred in grantlng summary judgment in favor of Bradley on the issue ot breach of the lease agreement. They contend that the provisions of the lease allowed Cumiskeys and K.S.J., 

### Inc., to retain any fixtures or other improvements added to the property. Therefore, Bradley was not entitled to summary

### judgment on the issue of liability for failure to insure becauseBradley's losswas unclear. We

### disagree. Bradley's motion for partial summary judgment requested theDistrictCourt tofind liabilityfor Bradley's damages or losson the basis of the failuretoinsure. The amount of damages were undetermined and were tobe included

as an issue at trial. Cumiskeys and K.S.J., 

### Inc., argued that they had made extensive improvements to the property which, under the terms of the contract, remained their property. Therefore, their contract liability to Bradley under the terms of the 

### agreement was unclear and should be left for a jury determination. This argument is 

### without merit.

### The lease agreement clearly required that Kevin Cumiskey or hisassigns insureBradley's interest. They did not. The District 

### Court properly found that the terms on improvements were ambiguous and used an appropriate rule of constructiontointerpretthose clauses. The lease provided that "ALTERATIONS" were to remain thepropertyof thelessees: "The Lessees will

### be entitledtomake, or will 

### suffer to be made, any alterations which they in their solediscretion deem necessary. Any additions to, or alterations of, attached to the said leased property shall not become part of the realty but will 

### remain the sole and separate property of the Lessees. The Lessees 

### agree toadvise Lessors inwriting of the date upon which such alterations will 

### commence in order to permit the Lessors topost notice of nonresponsibility. The Lessees shall keep the demised premises free from any and all liens arising out of any work performed, materialsfurnished, or other obligations incurredby theLessees." It 

### also provided that "FIXTURES1' 

### were to remain theproperty of the

### lessees: "It 

### is hereby expressly agreed between the parties to this Lease that any counters, tables, chairs, stoves, ovens, grills, icemachines, sinks, or anyother personal property belonging to the Les

### sees which 

### is brought upon the demised premises and attached thereto, shall not become a fixture and part of the realty. The Lessor hereby expressly grants permission to the Lessees to remove any and all personal property which they bring upon saiddemised premises. Lessees agree to repair any damage to the premises which 

### is caused by removal of said personalproperty.

### " The DistrictCourt found thattheprovision on alterations was unclear in that 

### it did not specify what type of a1 terations were included. The court therefore found that the specific "FIXTURES" clause controlled the general "ALTERATIONS" clause and that such an interpretation was in conformance with the general practice of Montana landlords and tenants and withMontana statutes. Weagree. Where additions arebuiltor affixed toproperty by 

### a tenant without an agreement to allow him to remove those additions or fixtures, they may not be removed if their removal 

### willdamage thepremises. Section 70-18-102, MCA; Sanders v. Butte Motor Co. (1963), 142Mont. 524, 385 P.2d 263. 

### Here, an agreement existstoallowremoval of fixtures and alterations. It 

### is unclear what was contemplated by 

### its terms, however. The contractwas prepared by an attorney on behalf of Kevin Cumiskey. Kevin presented it toBradley for signature. She did not take part in preparation of the terms. The record alsodemonstrates Kevin Cumiskey's intention to use these clauses to coerce Bradley into renewing the leaseor sellingher property. Bradley testified that she had told Kevin Cumiskey on

### severaloccasionsthatshewas not interestedinsellingthe property and had no intention of doing so. He 

### testified at hisdepositionthatBradleyhad agreed toallowhim tobuild additions on skids so thathe could "pick them up and carry them away." He

### was then asked about things that could not be carried away: "Q. 

### Those things you could not pick up and carryaway I 

### assume you were going to leaveon thepremises. A. 

### No, I 

### was not. "Q. 

### What were you going todo with the things you couldn't pick up and move away? A. I 

### was going touse them asa lever for a new lease. "Q. 

### Could you explain what you mean by that? A. 

### Well, in my lease, all the improvements are mine, and if 

### Mrs. Bradley didn't want to issue me a new lease or give me a fixtures fee, then I 

### would take them out." It

### was clear fromKevin's depositiontestimony that if Kevin "could build in a 'manner where we 

### could pick it 

### up and carry it 

### away,

## ' it

### was finewith [Bradley]

# ." The DistrictCourt found ambiguity and conflict inthe lease provisions and ruled that those 

### items specifically nained in the "FIXTURES" clause (the counters, tables, chairs, 

### etc.) 

### belonged to Cumiskeys and everything else belonged to Bradley. Kevin Cumiskey argued that any improvements or alterations, including wiring in the roof, should belong tohim under the "ALTERATIONS" clause. He

### has failed to demonstrate that the parties intended such an interpretation 

### of the clauses or that an agreement actually existed that would allow damage to the property to remove those alterations. The specific "FIXTURES" clause clearly indicated that any damage tothe premises caused by removal of fixtureswould be repaired. There is 

### no indication thatthe parrles concernplated allowing a removal of a1 terations thatmight result indamage tothepremises. Where an ambiguous 

### term is used, the parties' intent will govern 

### its construction and extrinsic evidence can be used todiscover thatintent. Adams 

### v. Chilcott (1979), 182 Mont. 511, 517, 597 P.2d 1140, 1144. A court should look to the whole contract and 

### its purpose in determining intent and 

### is not bound by any single provision or expression. Gropp v. Lotton (1972), 160 Mont. 415, 421, 503 P.2d 661, 664-665. Repugnant provisions should be interpreted in a way to give them some effect, subordinate to the general intent and purpose of the entire contract. Riis v. Day (1980)I Mont

# . , 613 P.2d 696, 698, 37 St.Rep. 1093, 1096. Where uncertainty ina written instrument exists, the provisions should properly be construed against the party causing the uncertainty. Parkhill v. Fuselier (1981), Mon

### t

# . ,632 P.2d 1132, 1135, 38 St.Rep. 1424, 1427. Here, the parties' intent 

### was unclear. It 

### is not certain that Bradley intended to allow Kevin Cumiskey to damage the premises in removing alterations. Cumiskey prepared the lease agreement and was responsibile for the ambiguity that existed. The District Court properly interpreted the provisions to give some effect to each and to conform with general landlord tenantpractices. Cumiskeys thenhad theopportunity topresent evidence ot their loss of business fixturesand todisputeBradley's claimfor the cost of repairs. They failed todo so. They may notnow argue thatthejury may have limited an award to Kevin Cumiskey tothe amount of Bradley's cost of repairs. It is apparent that the jury did not. Kevin Cumiskey 

### was

### awarded 519,910, while the cost to repair the building was set at only $12,300. Further, the lease agreement remained in effect until the end of its term inApril 1983. At that time, the building was to be returned to Bradley in its original condition. The effect of the District Court's ruling was simply to remove from the jury an issue not properly before it at that time.

Attorney fees were awarded pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. Cross-appellant challenges the calculation of those fees. Bradley's attorneys filed affidavits in support of awarding attorney fees that computed time expended: (1) solely relating to pretrial matters concerning Bradley's claims against Kevin Cumiskey and K.S.J., Inc., and excluding all time spent in preparation of the tort claim against John Cumiskey (39.4 hours at $60 = 

### $2,364); (2)for the entire six days of trial time actually expended (6 days at $750per day = 

### $4,500); and, (3)for services rendered in connection with the preparation, briefing and attendance at the hearing on the claim for attorney fees ($348). The aggregate amount requestedwas $7,212. The District Court granted attorney fees for the pretrial preparation, for the work in preparing for the hearing on attorney fees 

### and for one-third of the trial time. In its supporting memorandum, the District Court noted that possibly less than one-third of trial time was actually occupled with Bradley's claim against Kevin Cumiskey and that most of her effort was against JohnCumiskey forwrongful settingof thefireand destructionof thepremises. Wehold thattheDistrictCourt erred inboth the calculationof theattorneyfeesand inthereductionof feesfor trial

### timetoone-third of therequest. In 

### its order, the District Court awarded $2,636, "which representsone-third (1/3) of the attorneys' feesfor the entire trial" and awarded $348 for presentation of the hearing on attorney fees plus an additional brief. The sum of $6,864 does not represent the fees for the entire trial. That figure 

### is the total of both the pretrial preparation work directly relating to the claim against Kevin Cumiskey and the sixfulldays of trial. The DistrictCourt erred in reducing both figures

### by two-thirds where thepretrialwork allrelated specificallytotheKevin Cumiskey claim. Ata minimum, the award should have included $2,364 for the pretrial work, $1,500 for two days of trial, and $348 for the attorney fees hearing, for a total of $4,212. We further hold, however, that it erred in reducing fees awarded for thetrial

### timeby two-thirds. Bradley was forced to pursue her claim against Kevin Cu~niskeythrough the trial. She attempted to resolve the damages issue stemming from Kevin's breach of the lease agreement through a motion for summary judgment. Kevin Cumiskey successfully resisted that motion on the basis of

an affidavit provided by his contractor that disputed the Bradley repair estimates. Bradley and her counsel were therefore forced to attend a six-day trial. She presented damages testimony that went unchallenged. Kevin Cumiskey introduced no evidencewhatsoever indisputeof her claim. Here, the record reveals that the trial schedulerequired thatcounsel for Bradley be present throughout the six days in order to pursue the claim against Kevin Cumiskey. The entire firstday of trialwas spent in jury selection. On the morning of the second day of trial, Bradley's counsel gavehisopening statement. On thefourth day, a witness offered by Cumiskeys required extensive cross-examination on Bradley's behalf toestablishthateven Cumiskey's evidence supported the amount of damages she claimed. On the flfthday, counsel was required to object to Kevin Cumiskey's attempt to testify to the building's condition prior to acquisition of the lease. Kevin attempted to introduce this matter in spite of a pretrial ruling thatthe evidencewas improper. Much of thelastday of trial was spent in settlement of instructions, presentatlonof Bradley's case-in-chief, and closing arguments. In this instance it is not possible to clearly segregate the trial 

### timeduring which Bradley pursued her claims against Kevin Cumiskey into one-third of the timeexpended. 

### We reversetheDistrictCourt's order on attorneyfeesdated March 18, 1982, and hold that Bradley 

### is entitled to attorney fees intheamount of $7,212 inconnectionwith the proceedings below and an additional $1,500 for the efforts expended on appeal. 

### We remand this matter to the 

### District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Affirmed inpart and reversed inpart. 

# 7444, 

# c;bQe Chief JusticeWe 

### concur:

### Mr. JusticeJohnC. Sheehy,concurring inpart and dissenting inpart:

I dissent from that portion of the foregoing opinion which affirms the District Court's dismissal of Kevin Cumiskey's bad-faith action against St. PaulFire and Marine InsuranceCompany. Under our recent spate of decisionson the point of bad faith,Kevin's cause of action should have been submitted to the jury. SeeKlaudtv. Flink, 658P.2d 1065 40 St.Rep. 64; Lipinski v. The Title Insurance Company (1982) Montana



## ,655P.2d 970,39 St.Rep. 2283. I am also of the opinion that theDistrict Court should have submitted the question of total loss to the jury to determine if the valued policy law, Section 33-24-102,MCA,

was applicable to Kevin's claim against St. Paul. The DistrictCourt's interpretationof the valued policy lawwas disadvantageoustoKevin,and wouldmakenodifferenceto St. Paul, since it, under the verdict, would be subrogated for anything itpaid toKevin fromJohnCumiskey. Otherwise, I concur in the judgment entered in the DistrictCourt.