UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4706

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL SHANE SATTERFIELD, a/k/a Michael Shane Gellispie,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:03-cr-00246-NCT-1)

Submitted: May 10, 2013 Decided: June 24, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Todd Allen Smith, LAW OFFICE OF TODD ALLEN SMITH, Graham, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Michael Shane Satterfield appeals the district court’s 

judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 

eleven months’ imprisonment and a new two-year term of 

supervised release. Satterfield’s attorney has filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting 

that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

questioning whether the district court abused its discretion in 

refusing to allow Satterfield to enter a rehabilitation program 

he desired, and instead giving him an active prison sentence. 

Satterfield was notified of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, but has not done so. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

Satterfield was originally sentenced to 160 months of 

imprisonment for three counts of bank robbery. His sentence was 

later reduced to 109 months. He was released and began serving 

his term of supervised release in November 2011. Satterfield 

subsequently violated the conditions of his supervised release 

by testing positive for cocaine and absconding from the 

residential re-entry center where he was residing. At the 

revocation hearing, Satterfield admitted these two violations. 

The district court sentenced him to an active sentence of eleven 

months and a second term of twenty-four months’ supervised 

release. Satterfield appealed his sentence. On March 18, 2013, 
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while this appeal was pending, Satterfield was released from 

incarceration and began serving his new term of supervised 

release.

First, we may address sua sponte whether an issue on 

appeal presents “a live case or controversy . . . since mootness 

goes to the heart of the Article III jurisdiction of the 

courts.” Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 17 (4th Cir. 

2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Satterfield 

has already served his term of imprisonment, there is no longer 

a live controversy regarding the length of his confinement. 

Therefore, his challenge to the district court’s decision to 

impose an active prison sentence is moot. See United States v. 

Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2008). However, because 

Satterfield is serving a new term of supervised release and 

because his attorney filed an Anders brief, we retain 

jurisdiction to review the district court’s decision to revoke 

Satterfield’s supervised release and to impose a new term of 

supervised release. 

A district court’s decision to revoke supervised 

release is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke 

supervised release, a district court need only find a violation 

of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance of the 

evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West Supp. 2013); United 
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States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). Here, 

Satterfield admitted committing two violations of the conditions 

of his supervised release. Therefore, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking 

Satterfield’s supervised release. 

This court will affirm a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release if it is within the governing 

statutory range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). “When reviewing 

whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, [the 

court] must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” 

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010); 

see United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). 

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter 

Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440, and has 

adequately explained the sentence chosen, though it need not 

explain the sentence in as much detail as when imposing the 

original sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is 

substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper 

basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the statutory 

maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. If, after considering the 

above, the sentence is not unreasonable, we will affirm. Id. at 
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439. Only if we find the sentence unreasonable, must we decide 

whether it is “plainly” so. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657. 

Satterfield’s new term of supervised release was both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. Eleven months was 

within the limit prescribed in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(h) (West Supp. 

2013). The district court did not explicitly discuss the 

§ 3553(a) factors; however, the probation officer’s 

recommendation, which the parties accepted and the court 

implicitly adopted, addressed Satterfield’s history and 

characteristics, § 3553(a)(1), and the need to deter future 

criminal conduct by him and protect the public. See

§§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C), 3583(d). The court specifically addressed 

Satterfield’s need for “correctional treatment,” 

§ 3553(a)(2)(D), which in this case meant drug treatment. 

We recently held that a district court is not 

permitted to rely on the need for substance abuse treatment in 

announcing a revocation sentence of imprisonment. United 

States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 197-99 (4th Cir. 2012) (relying 

on Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385, 2389 (2011)), 

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506 (2013). However, the rationale 

used in Bennett and Tapia–that imprisonment is not an 

appropriate way to promote a defendant’s rehabilitation–does not 

prohibit a district court from relying on a defendant’s 
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rehabilitative needs in choosing to impose a supervised release 

term or in determining the length or manner of supervision. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment, but 

dismiss the appeal as moot to the extent that Satterfield seeks 

to challenge his sentence of incarceration. This court requires 

that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on the client. Finally, we dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART,

DISMISSED IN PART