40906 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 147 / Friday, July 31, 1998 / Notices

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION

[DA 98–1469; Report No. AUC–98–20–A

(Auction No. 20)]

156–162 MHz Public Coast Station

Spectrum Auction Scheduled for

December 3, 1998; Comment Sought

on Reserve Prices or Minimum

Opening Bids and Other Auction

Procedural Issues

AGENCY: Federal Communications

Commission.

ACTION: Notice seeking comment.

SUMMARY: The Commission announces

the auction of 42 VHF public coast

station licenses scheduled for December

3, 1998, and seeks comment on a

proposed formula for calculating

minimum opening bids and other

auction procedural issues.

DATES: Comments are due on or before

August 14, 1998. Reply comments are

due on or before August 21, 1998.

ADDRESSES: To file formally, parties

must submit an original and four copies

to the Office of the Secretary, Federal

Communications Commission, Room

222, 1919 M Street N.W., Washington,

D.C. 20554. In addition, parties must

submit one copy to Amy Zoslov, Chief,

Auctions and Industry Analysis

Division, Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau, Federal Communications

Commission, Room 5202, 2025 M Street

N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554.

Comments and reply comments will be

available for public inspection during

regular business hours in the FCC

Public Reference Room, Room 239, 1919

M Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob

Reagle, Jeff Garretson, or Anne Napoli,

Auctions and Industry Analysis

Division, Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau, at (202) 418–0660.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This

public notice was released on July 23,

1998 and is available in its entirety for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours in the FCC Reference

Center (Room 239), 1919 M Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C., and also may be

purchased from the Commission’s copy

contractor, International Transcription

Services, (202) 857–3800, fax (202) 857–

3805, 1231 20th Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20036.

Synopsis of the Public Notice

1. By this Public Notice, the Wireless

Telecommunications Bureau (‘‘the

Bureau’’) announces the auction of 42

VHF public coast station licenses, to

begin on December 3, 1998. These

licenses encompass the United States,

the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam,

American Samoa, the United States

Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

Specifically, one license will be

available in each of 42 geographic areas

known as VHF Public Coast Areas

(VPCs). There are two categories of

VPCs, maritime VPCs and inland VPCs.

Maritime VPCs, of which there are nine,

are roughly equivalent to U.S. Coast

Guard Districts, and include geographic

areas any part of which is within 100

miles of a major waterway. Inland VPCs,

of which there are 33, are smaller

geographic areas identical to the

Commerce Department’s Economic

Areas, no part of which is within 100

miles of a major waterway.

2. Future public notices will include

further details regarding application

filing and payment deadlines, seminars,

and other pertinent information. In this

Public Notice, the Commission seeks

comment on procedural issues relating

to the VHF public coast station auction.

I. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening

Bid

3. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997

calls upon the Commission to prescribe

methods by which a reasonable reserve

price will be required or a minimum

opening bid established when FCC

licenses are subject to auction (i.e.,

because they are mutually exclusive),

unless the Commission determines that

a reserve price or minimum bid is not

in the public interest. Consistent with

this mandate, the Commission has

directed the Bureau to seek comment on

the use of a minimum opening bid and/

or reserve price prior to the start of each

auction. The Bureau was directed to

seek comment on the methodology to be

employed in establishing each of these

mechanisms. Among other factors the

Bureau should consider is the amount of

spectrum being auctioned, levels of

incumbency, the availability of

technology to provide service, the size

of the geographic service areas, issues of

interference with other spectrum bands,

and any other relevant factors that

reasonably could have an impact on

valuation of the spectrum being

auctioned. The Commission concluded

that the Bureau should have the

discretion to employ either or both of

these mechanisms for future auctions.

4. Normally, a reserve price is an

absolute minimum price below which

an item will not be sold in a given

auction. Reserve prices can be either

published or unpublished. A minimum

opening bid, on the other hand, is the

minimum bid price set at the beginning

of the auction below which no bids are

accepted. It is generally used to

accelerate the competitive bidding

process. Also, in a minimum opening

bid scenario, the auctioneer generally

has the discretion to lower the amount

later in the auction.

5, In anticipation of this auction and

in light of the Balanced Budget Act, the

Bureau proposes to establish minimum

opening bids for the VHF public coast

station auction, and retain discretion to

lower the minimum opening bids. The

Bureau believes a minimum opening

bid, which has been utilized in other

auctions, is an effective bidding tool. A

minimum opening bid, rather than a

reserve price, will help to regulate the

pace of the auction and provides

flexibility.

6. Specifically, the Commission

proposes the following formula for

calculating minimum opening bids on a

license-by-license basis in Auction No.

20:

a. Maritime VPC Licenses: $.001 *

MHz * Pop (rounded up to the nearest

dollar) with a minimum of no less than

$2,500 per license.

b. Inland VPC Licenses: $.011 * MHz

* Pop (rounded up to the nearest dollar)

with a minimum of no less than $2,500

per license.

Comment is sought on this proposal.

If commenters believe that the formula

proposed above for minimum opening

bids will result in substantial numbers

of unsold licenses, or is not a reasonable

amount, or should instead operate as a

reserve price, they should explain why

this is so, and comment on the

desirability of an alternative approach.

Commenters are advised to support

their claims with valuation analyses and

suggested reserve prices or minimum

opening bid levels or formulas. In

establishing the formula for minimum

opening bids, the Commission

particularly seeks comment on such

factors as, among other things, the

amount of spectrum being auctioned,

levels of incumbency, the availability of

technology to provide service, the size

of the geographic service areas, issues of

interference with other spectrum bands

and any other relevant factors that could

reasonably have an impact on valuation

of the VHF public coast station

spectrum. Alternatively, comment is

sought on whether, consistent with the

Balanced Budget Act, the public interest

would be served by having no minimum

opening bid or reserve price.

II. Other Auction Procedural Issues

7. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997

requires the Commission to ‘‘ensure

that, in the scheduling of any

competitive bidding under this

subsection, an adequate period is

allowed * * * before issuance of

bidding rules, to permit notice and
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 147 / Friday, July 31, 1998 / Notices 40907

comment on proposed auction

procedures * * *’’ Consistent with the

provisions of the Balanced Budget Act

and to ensure that potential bidders

have adequate time to familiarize

themselves with the specific provisions

that will govern the day-to-day conduct

of an auction, the Commission directed

the Bureau, under its existing delegated

authority, to seek comment on a variety

of auction-specific issues prior to the

start of each auction. The Commission

therefore seeks comment on the

following issues.

A. Auction Sequence and License

Groupings

8. Because it is most administratively

appropriate, and allows bidders to take

advantage of any synergies that exist

among licenses, we propose to award

the 42 VHF public coast station licenses

in a single, simultaneous multipleround auction. The Commission seeks

comment on this proposal.

B. Structure of Bidding Rounds, Activity

Requirements, and Criteria for

Determining Reductions in Eligibility

9. The Commission proposes to divide

the auction into three stages: Stage One,

Stage Two and Stage Three. The auction

will start in Stage One. The Commission

proposes that the auction will generally

advance to the next stage (i.e., from

Stage One to Stage Two, and from Stage

Two to Stage Three) when the auction

activity level, as measured by the

percentage of bidding units receiving

new high bids, is below ten percent for

three consecutive rounds of bidding in

each Stage. However, the Commission

further proposes that the Bureau retain

the discretion to change stages

unilaterally by announcement during

the auction. In exercising this

discretion, the Bureau will consider a

variety of measures of bidder activity

including, but not limited to, the

auction activity level, the percentages of

licenses (as measured in bidding units)

on which there are new bids, the

number of new bids, and the percentage

increase in revenue. The Commission

seeks comment on these proposals.

10. In order to ensure that the auction

closes within a reasonable period of

time, an activity rule requires bidders to

bid actively on a percentage of their

maximum bidding eligibility during

each round of the auction rather than

waiting until the end to participate. A

bidder that does not satisfy the activity

rule will either lose bidding eligibility

in the next round or use an activity rule

waiver.

11. For the VHF public coast station

auction, the Commission proposes that,

in each round of Stage One of the

auction, a bidder desiring to maintain

its current eligibility is required to be

active on licenses encompassing at least

60 percent of its current bidding

eligibility. Failure to maintain the

requisite activity level will result in a

reduction in the bidder’s bidding

eligibility in the next round of bidding

(unless an activity rule waiver is used).

During Stage One, reduced eligibility for

the next round will be calculated by

multiplying the current round activity

by five-thirds (5/3). In each round of the

second stage of the auction, a bidder

desiring to maintain its current

eligibility is required to be active on at

least 80 percent of its current bidding

eligibility. During Stage Two, reduced

eligibility for the next round will be

calculated by multiplying the current

round activity by five-fourths (5/4). In

each round of Stage Three, a bidder

desiring to maintain its current

eligibility is required to be active on 98

percent of its current bidding eligibility.

In this final stage, reduced eligibility for

the next round will be calculated by

multiplying the current round activity

by fifty forty-ninths (50/49). The

Commission seeks comment on these

proposals.

C. Minimum Accepted Bids

12. Once there is a standing high bid

on a license, a bid increment will be

applied to that license to establish a

minimum acceptable bid for the

following round. For the VHF public

coast station auction, the Commission

proposes, as described immediately

below, to use an exponential smoothing

methodology to calculate minimum bid

increments. The Bureau retains the

discretion to change the minimum bid

increment if it determines that

circumstances so dictate. The

exponential smoothing methodology has

been used in previous auctions,

including the LMDS auction, and will

be used in the upcoming 220 MHz

auction. The Commission seeks

comment on this proposal.

Exponential Smoothing

13. The exponential smoothing

formula calculates the bid increment

based on a weighted average of the

activity received on each license in the

current and all previous rounds. This

methodology will tailor the bid

increment for each license based on

activity, rather than setting a global

increment for all licenses. For every

license that receives a bid, the bid

increment for the next round for that

license will be established as a

percentage increment that is determined

using the exponential smoothing

formula.

14. Using exponential smoothing, the

calculation of the percentage bid

increment for each license will be based

on an activity index, which is calculated

as the weighted average of the current

activity and the activity index from the

previous round. The activity index at

the start of the auction (round 0) will be

set at 0. The current activity index is

equal to a weighting factor times the

number of new bids received on the

license in the current bidding period

plus one minus the weighting factor

times the activity index from the

previous round. The activity index is

then used to calculate a percentage

increment by multiplying a minimum

percentage increment by one plus the

activity index with that result being

subject to a maximum percentage

increment. The Commission will

initially set the weighting factor at 0.5,

the minimum percentage increment at

0.1, and the maximum percentage

increment at 0.2.

Equations

Ai = (C * Bi) + ( (1–C) * Ai-1)

Ii = smaller of ( (1 + Ai) * N) and M

Where,

Ai = activity index for the current round

(round i)

C = activity weight factor

Bi = number of bids in the current round

(round i)

Ai-1 = activity index from previous

round (round i-1), A0 is 0

Ii = percentage bid increment for the

current round (round i)

N = minimum percentage increment

M = maximum percentage increment

Under the exponential smoothing

methodology, once a bid has been

received on a license, the minimum

acceptable bid for that license in the

following round will be the new high

bid plus the dollar amount associated

with the percentage increment (variable

Ii from above times the high bid). This

result will be rounded to the nearest

thousand if it is over 10,000 or to the

nearest hundred if it is under 10,000.

Examples

License 1

C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid = $1,000,000)

a. Calculation of percentage increment using

exponential smoothing:

A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1

The smaller of I1 = (1 + 1) * 0.1 = 0.2 or

0.2 (the maximum percentage increment)

b. Minimum bid increment using the

percentage increment (I1 from above)

0.2 * $1,000,000 = $200,000

c. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 =

1,200,000
40908 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 147 / Friday, July 31, 1998 / Notices

Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = 2,000,000)

a. Calculation of percentage increment using

exponential smoothing:

A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 0) = 1.5

The smaller of I2 = (1 + 1.5) * 0.1 = 0.25

or 0.2 (the maximum percentage increment)

b. Minimum bid increment using the

percentage increment is (I2 from above)

0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000

c. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 =

2,400,000

Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = 2,400,000)

a. Calculation of percentage increment using

exponential smoothing:

A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 0.5) = 0.75

The smaller of I3 = (1 + .75) * 0.1 = 0.175

or 0.2 (the maximum percentage increment)

b. Minimum bid increment using the

percentage increment (I3 from above)

0.175 * $2,400,000 = $420,000

c. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 =

2,820,000

D. Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each

Bidder

15. The Bureau has delegated

authority and discretion to determine an

appropriate upfront payment for each

license being auctioned, taking into

account such factors as the population

in each geographic license area, and the

value of similar spectrum. With these

guidelines in mind, the Commission

proposes to calculate upfront payments

on a license-by-license basis for

maritime VPC licenses and inland VPC

licenses using the following formulae:

a. Maritime VPC Licenses: $.0007 *

MHz * Pop (rounded up to the nearest

dollar) with a minimum upfront

payment of $2,500 per license.

b. Inland VPC Licenses: $.0075 * MHz

* Pop (rounded up to the nearest dollar)

with a minimum upfront payment of

$2,500 per license.

The Commission seeks comment on

these proposals.

16. The Commission further proposes

that the amount of the upfront payment

submitted by a bidder will determine

the initial maximum eligibility (as

measured in bidding units) for each

bidder. Upfront payments will not be

attributed to specific licenses, but

instead will be translated into bidding

units to define a bidder’s initial

maximum eligibility, which cannot be

increased during the auction. Thus, in

calculating the upfront payment

amount, an applicant must determine

the maximum number of bidding units

it may wish to bid on (or hold high bids

on) in any single round, and submit an

upfront payment covering that number

of bidding units. The Commission seeks

comment on this proposal.

E. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing

Eligibility

17. Use of an activity rule waiver

preserves the bidder’s current bidding

eligibility despite the bidder’s activity

in the current round being below the

required minimum level. An activity

rule waiver applies to an entire round

of bidding and not to a particular

license. Activity waivers are principally

a mechanism for auction participants to

avoid the loss of auction eligibility in

the event that exigent circumstances

prevent them from placing a bid in a

particular round.

18. The FCC auction system assumes

that bidders with insufficient activity

would prefer to use an activity rule

waiver (if available) rather than lose

bidding eligibility. Therefore, the

system will automatically apply a

waiver (known as an ‘‘automatic

waiver’’) at the end of any bidding

period where a bidder’s activity level is

below the minimum required unless: (1)

there are no activity rule waivers

available; or (2) the bidder overrides the

automatic application of a waiver by

reducing eligibility thereby meeting the

minimum requirements.

19. A bidder with insufficient activity

that wants to reduce its bidding

eligibility rather than use an activity

rule waiver must affirmatively override

the automatic waiver mechanism during

the bidding period by using the reduce

eligibility function in the software. In

this case, the bidder’s eligibility is

permanently reduced to bring the bidder

into compliance with the activity rules

as described above. Once eligibility has

been reduced, a bidder will not be

permitted to regain its lost bidding

eligibility.

20. A bidder may proactively use an

activity rule waiver as a means to keep

the auction open without placing a bid.

If a bidder submits a proactive waiver

(using the proactive waiver function in

the bidding software) during a bidding

period in which no bids are submitted,

the auction will remain open and the

bidder’s eligibility will be preserved. An

automatic waiver invoked in a round in

which there are no new valid bids will

not keep the auction open.

21. The Commission proposes that

each bidder in the VHF public coast

station auction will be provided five

activity rule waivers that may be used

in any round during the course of the

auction as set forth above. The

Commission seeks comment on this

proposal.

F. Information Regarding Bid

Withdrawal and Bid Removal

22. For the VHF public coast station

auction, the Commission proposes the

following bid removal and bid

withdrawal procedures. Before the close

of a bidding period, a bidder has the

option of removing any bids placed in

that round. By using the remove bid

function in the software, a bidder may

effectively ‘‘unsubmit’’ any bid placed

within that round. A bidder removing a

bid placed in the same round is not

subject to withdrawal payments.

23. Once a round closes, a bidder may

no longer remove a bid. However, in the

next round, a bidder may withdraw

standing high bids from previous

rounds using the withdraw bid function.

A high bidder that withdraws its

standing high bid from a previous round

is subject to the bid withdrawal

payment provisions. The Commission

seeks comment on these bid removal

and bid withdrawal procedures.

24. In the Part 1 Third Report and

Order, 63 FR 2315 (January 15, 1998),

the Commission recently explained that

allowing bid withdrawals facilitates

efficient aggregation of licenses and the

pursuit of efficient backup strategies as

information becomes available during

the course of an auction. The

Commission noted, however, that in

some instances bidders may seek to

withdraw bids for improper reasons,

including to delay the close of the

auction for strategic purposes. The

Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in

managing the auction, to limit the

number of withdrawals to prevent

strategic delay of the close of the

auction or other abuses. The

Commission stated that the Bureau

should assertively exercise its

discretion, consider limiting the number

of rounds in which bidders may

withdraw bids, and prevent bidders

from bidding on a particular market if

the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing

the Commission’s bid withdrawal

procedures.

25. Applying this reasoning, the

Commission proposes to limit each

bidder in the VHF public coast station

auction to withdrawals in no more than

two rounds during the course of the

auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw

bids in more than two rounds would

likely encourage insincere bidding or

the use of withdrawals for anticompetitive strategic purposes. The two

rounds in which withdrawals are

utilized will be at the bidder’s

discretion; withdrawals otherwise must

be in accordance with the Commission’s

rules. There is no limit on the number

of standing high bids that may be

withdrawn in either of the rounds in

which withdrawals are utilized.

Withdrawals will remain subject to the

bid withdrawal payment provisions

specified in the Commission’s rules.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 147 / Friday, July 31, 1998 / Notices 40909

The Commission seeks comment on this

proposal.

G. Stopping Rule

26. For the VHF public coast station

auction, the Bureau proposes to employ

a simultaneous stopping approach. The

Bureau has discretion ‘‘to establish

stopping rules before or during multiple

round auctions in order to terminate the

auction within a reasonable time.’’ The

Commission therefore has the discretion

to adopt an alternative stopping rule to

the simultaneous stopping rule if we

deem appropriate. Thus, unless

circumstances dictate otherwise,

bidding would remain open on all

licenses until bidding stops on every

license. The auction would close for all

licenses when one round passes during

which no bidder submits a new

acceptable bid on any license, applies a

proactive waiver, or withdraws a

previous high bid.

27. The Commission proposes that the

Bureau retain the discretion to keep an

auction open even if no new acceptable

bids or proactive waivers are submitted

and no previous high bids are

withdrawn. In this event, the effect will

be the same as if a bidder had submitted

a proactive waiver. The activity rule,

therefore, will apply as usual and a

bidder with insufficient activity will

either lose bidding eligibility or use a

remaining activity rule waiver.

28. Finally, the Commission proposes

that the Bureau, reserve the right to

declare that the auction will end after a

specified number of additional rounds

(‘‘special stopping rule’’). If the Bureau

invokes this special stopping rule, it

will accept bids in the final round(s)

only for licenses on which the high bid

increased in at least one of the

preceding specified number of rounds.

The Bureau proposes to exercise this

option only in circumstances such as

where the auction is proceeding very

slowly, where there is minimal overall

bidding activity, or where it appears

likely that the auction will not close

within a reasonable period of time.

Before exercising this option, the

Bureau is likely to attempt to increase

the pace of the auction by, for example,

moving the auction into the next stage

(where bidders would be required to

maintain a higher level of bidding

activity), increasing the number of

bidding rounds per day, and/or

increasing the amount of the minimum

bid increments for the limited number

of licenses where there is still a high

level of bidding activity. The

Commission seeks comment on these

proposals.

H. Information Relating to Auction

Delay, Suspension or Cancellation

29. For the VHF public coast station

auction, the Commission proposes that,

by public notice or by announcement

during the auction, the Bureau may

delay, suspend or cancel the auction in

the event of natural disaster, technical

obstacle, evidence of an auction security

breach, unlawful bidding activity,

administrative or weather necessity, or

for any other reason that affects the fair

and competitive conduct of competitive

bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its

sole discretion, may elect to: resume the

auction starting from the beginning of

the current round; resume the auction

starting from some previous round; or

cancel the auction in its entirety.

Network interruption may cause the

Bureau to delay or suspend the auction.

The Commission emphasizes that

exercise of this authority is solely

within the discretion of the Bureau, and

its use is not intended to be a substitute

for situations in which bidders may

wish to apply their activity rule waivers.

The Commission seeks comment on this

proposal.

Amy Zoslov,

Chief, Auctions and Industry Analysis

Division, Wireless Telecommunications

Bureau.

[FR Doc. 98–20524 Filed 7–30–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE

CORPORATION

Sunshine Act Meeting

Pursuant to the provisions of the

‘‘Government in the Sunshine Act’’ (5

U.S.C. 552b), notice is hereby given that

at 2:26 p.m. on Tuesday, July 28, 1998,

the Board of Directors of the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation met in

closed session to consider (1) matters

relating to the Corporation’s corporate,

supervisory, and resolution activities;

and (2) reports of the Office of Inspector

General.

In calling the meeting, the Board

determined, on motion of Vice

Chairman Andrew C. Hove, Jr.,

seconded by Director Ellen S. Seidman

(Director, Office of Thrift Supervision),

concurred in by Director Joseph H.

Neely (Appointive), Director Julie L.

Williams (Acting Comptroller of the

Currency), and Chairman Donna

Tanoue, that Corporation business

required its consideration of the matters

unless than seven days’ notice to the

public; that no earlier notice of the

meeting was practicable; that the public

interest did not require consideration of

the matters in a meeting open to public

observation; and that the matters could

be considered in a closed meeting by

authority of subsections (c)(2), (c)(4),

(c)(6), (c)(8), (c)(9)(A)(ii), (c)(9)(B), and

(c)(10) of the ‘‘Government in the

Sunshine Act’’ (5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(2),

(c)(4), (c)(6), (c)(8), (c)(9) (A)(ii),

(c)(9)(B), and (c)(10)).

The meeting was held in the Board

Room of the FDIC Building located at

550 17th Street, N.W., Washington, DC.

Dated: July 29, 1998.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

James D. LaPierre,

Deputy Executive Secretary.

[FR Doc. 98–20591 Filed 7–29–98; 10:54 am]

BILLING CODE 6714–01–M

FEDERAL EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT AGENCY

[FEMA–1230–DR]

Iowa; Amendment No. 5 to Notice of a

Major Disaster Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA).

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice

of a major disaster for the State of Iowa,

(FEMA–1230–DR), dated July 2, 1998,

and related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: July 20, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Madge Dale, Response and Recovery

Directorate, Federal Emergency

Management Agency, Washington, DC

20472, (202) 646–3260.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice

of a major disaster for the State of Iowa,

is hereby amended to include the

following areas among those areas

determined to have been adversely

affected by the catastrophe declared a

major disaster by the President in his

declaration of July 2, 1998:

Allamakee and Harrison Counties for

Individual Assistance (already designated for

Public Assistance).

Benton, Black Hawk, Buchanan, Butler,

Calhoun, Clarke, Crawford, Davis, Fayette,

Jefferson, Linn, Madison, Mahaska, Monona,

Ringgold, Sac, Story, Warren, and

Winneshiek for Individual Assistance.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic

Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used

for reporting and drawing funds: 83.537,

Community Disaster Loans; 83.538, Cora

Brown Fund Program; 83.539, Crisis

Counseling; 83.540, Disaster Legal Services

Program; 83.541, Disaster Unemployment

Assistance (DUA); 83.542, Fire Suppression

Assistance; 83.543, Individual and Family

Grant (IFG) Program; 83.544, Public

Assistance Grants; 83.545, Disaster Housing