In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-2669

RICKEY COLEMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EARL DUNLAP, Transitional Administrator of the

Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 C 2388—James F. Holderman, Chief Judge.

ARGUED MARCH 26, 2012—DECIDED AUGUST 22, 2012

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

WOOD, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Rickey Coleman was fired

from the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention

Center in 2007. Coleman was told that his position

had been eliminated because of budget cuts; he

contends that his politics were the real cause for his

discharge and a later decision not to rehire him. Most
2 No. 11-2669

adverse actions based on a public employee’s speech

violate the first amendment, and no one contends that

Coleman’s job is in the category for which politics is

a legitimate consideration. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.

347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Rutan

v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).

Coleman seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against

a number of people, including Earl Dunlap, the Transitional Administrator of the Center. He also invokes the

Shakman consent decrees, which allow parties aggrieved by

certain kinds of patronage in Cook County to seek redress

through civil contempt proceedings. See, e.g., O’Sullivan

v. Chicago, 396 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2005); Shanahan v.

Chicago, 82 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 1996).

Dunlap filed a motion to dismiss, asserting among

other things that absolute immunity shields him from

Coleman’s claims. The district judge dismissed the

claim under §1983, ruling that Dunlap is a federal rather

than a state actor, but declined to dismiss the Shakman

claim. The court held that Dunlap is not protected by

absolute immunity. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66543 (N.D. Ill.

June 22, 2011). Dunlap filed this interlocutory appeal on

the immunity question; the rest of the judge’s rulings

are not before us. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§1291. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).

In 2002 the Juvenile Detention Center and a group of

inmates settled a case that we call the “2002 Litigation.”

The district court retained jurisdiction over implementation of the settlement—which the parties to both the

2002 Litigation and this case treat as a consent de-
No. 11-2669 3

cree—and in 2007 appointed Dunlap as the Transitional

Administrator of the Center. Although the 2002 Litigation concerned prison conditions, the 2007 order gave

Dunlap plenary authority to “oversee, supervise, and

direct all management, administrative, financial, contractual, personnel, security, housing, custodial, purchasing,

maintenance, technology, health services, mental health

services, food and laundry service, recreational, educational, and programmatic functions relating to the operation of the [Center] consistent with the authority vested in the position of Superintendent of

the [Center]”. Doe v. Cook County, No. 99 C 3945 (N.D. Ill.

Aug. 14, 2007). The order also stated that Dunlap

would be immune from suit for any action he took as

Administrator. It originally provided for “absolute immunity from liability”; on Dunlap’s motion the

language was amended to read: “[Dunlap] and his

staff shall have the status of officers and agents of

this Court and as such shall be vested with the same

immunities as vest with this Court.”

 In response to Coleman’s suit, Dunlap asserted that

the language in the 2007 order provided him with

absolute immunity and that he also is entitled to “quasijudicial immunity” because he had exercised authority

granted to him by a court. The district judge rejected

both lines of argument, holding that Dunlap’s decisions

were administrative rather than judicial (or “quasi”

judicial). 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66543 at *9–23. Even

if Dunlap could have relied on the broader pre-amendment immunity language, he would have fared no better;

judges do not have the authority to grant immunity for
4 No. 11-2669

unlawful acts. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922–23

(1984).

The doctrine of absolute immunity protects the

integrity of the judicial process by ensuring that timorous

judges can act on their best view of the merits, rather

than trying to limit harassment by disappointed litigants.

See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). Immunity

also allows all judges to conserve (for the benefit of

other litigants) time that otherwise would be spent

dealing with those harassing suits. Parties who,

although not judges, engage in adjudication (such as

private arbitrators or administrative tribunals) or execute

the orders of judges (such as police officers executing

a bench warrant, or a party executing a judiciallyordered sale) also enjoy absolute immunity. See

Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 286–87 (7th Cir. 2004).

Dunlap believes that, had the district judge in the

2002 Litigation maintained direct control of the Center

and approved Coleman’s firing, the judge would

have been entitled to immunity. Dunlap argues that

he should be entitled to absolute immunity as well

because he was acting in the judge’s stead.

In support of his position Dunlap invokes cases

where federal judges “[found] it necessary to administer

a business, or a school district, or an entire prison

system to effectively remedy a wrong.” Holloway v.

Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985) (a judge who

took control of an oil business is absolutely immune).

Dunlap asserts that no one has questioned the immunity of judges when exercising managerial authority
No. 11-2669 5

and that this case is the same (except for the fact that

Dunlap is not a judge).

Unfortunately for Dunlap, one body has questioned

this line of cases: the Supreme Court of the United

States. In Forrester a judge fired a probation officer. The

officer sued, alleging that the judge had engaged in sex

discrimination; the judge responded by asserting

absolute immunity. The Court held that judges have

immunity only for the decisions they make as adjudicators, not the decisions they make as administrators; firing someone is an administrative act, so the

judge was not protected by absolute immunity. 484 U.S.

at 229–30.

Forrester involved a judge’s administration of his

court, rather than a judge’s administration of some

other institution. Dunlap contends that Forrester does

not apply to administrative acts taken “in connection

with a case”. But Forrester is not as narrow as Dunlap

contends; we must “draw the line between truly

judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and

acts that simply happen to have been done by judges”.

Id. at 227. Dunlap concedes that none of his duties is

judicial in nature and that employment decisions are

not “adjudication”. What’s more, the question whether

a complaining party had “dealt with the judge [or his

agent] in his judicial capacity” was important even

before Forrester. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362

(1978). Dunlap concedes that the decisions about

which Coleman complains were not made by anyone

acting in a judicial capacity. This means that he is not

entitled to absolute immunity.
6 No. 11-2669

Suppose the judge had maintained control of the

2002 Litigation rather than appointing Dunlap as a substitute warden. The judge would not have issued

an order firing Coleman. The 2002 Litigation concerned

conditions encountered by prisoners, not who filled

which position in the prison’s bureaucracy. Dunlap

therefore cannot say that he was just doing something

that the judge might have done. It is conceivable that

a judge could have determined that employees’ qualifications affect inmates’ conditions of confinement and

issued an order that employees must meet some requirement such as having a college degree, completing a

certain level of training, or achieving a certain score on

a test. Had Dunlap proceeded to fire any employees

who failed to meet a requirement in such an order,

he would be entitled to immunity unless a reasonable

person would have recognized that the order was invalid. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345–46 (1986). Thus

if a judge had set a political test for employment as

a prison guard or clerk, an administrator implementing

that order would be liable, because the Supreme Court

held more than a generation ago that no public official

can use politics to hire and fire workers for such positions, and a district judge’s order to the contrary would

be transparently invalid. Coleman’s complaint alleges

that Dunlap held his politics against him; since Dunlap

could not have done that even with judicial permission,

he cannot be entitled to immunity when he made

the decision on his own.

Dunlap relies on Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474 (7th

Cir. 1980). In Ashbrook the district judge ordered a
No. 11-2669 7

partition sale and appointed commissioners to conduct

it. The plaintiffs sued the commissioners, alleging that

they had mismanaged the sale, to plaintiffs’ financial

detriment. We held that the commissioners’ acts in connection with the sale received absolute immunity

because those acts were “intimately related to the

judicial process”. Id. at 476, 477 & n.4. Dunlap argues

that his actions as Administrator likewise were

“intimately related to the judicial process”. There is

doubtless a relation, though whether it is an “intimate”

one is debatable. But the idea that any claim based on

an act “intimately related to the judicial process” is

barred by absolute immunity did not survive Forrester.

See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,

435 (1993).

After Forrester some of the commissioners’ actions in

Ashbrook may have been protected by the rule in Malley:

the commissioners were, after all, ordered to conduct

the sale. But only the ends of the order—not the

means used to execute the order—are protected by

an order to sell (unless the order directs the commissioners to use specific means). See Richman v. Sheahan,

270 F.3d 430, 437 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that immunity is available only to the extent necessary to

protect compliance with a judicial order, and that an

order not specifying the means of implementation does

not protect a person who uses means that violate

some other rule of law).

Dunlap falls on the wrong side of the Richman line. It

is true that the appointment order granted Dunlap the
8 No. 11-2669

power to “establish personnel policies; to create, abolish,

or transfer positions; and to hire, terminate, promote,

transfer, and evaluate management and staff of the

[Center].” The order did not, however, direct Dunlap to

adopt any particular personnel plan, and it certainly

did not direct Dunlap to make any specific employment decisions or use political criteria. So any employment decision was, at best, a means to the courtordered end of improving inmates’ welfare.

Any doubt on this point is stilled by one of Dunlap’s

defenses on the merits. He argued in the district court

that he had no role in the decision to fire Coleman

(which occurred before his appointment) and that he

did not act “knowingly or with deliberate or reckless

disregard concerning Coleman’s inability to be rehired

at the [Center]” but simply ratified decisions by his

subordinates. If Dunlap was not personally involved

with the employment decisions, or was a cat’s paw of

someone else who held a political grudge, cf. Staub v.

Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011), that would be a

substantive problem with Coleman’s claim against

Dunlap—for there is no vicarious liability for a subordinate’s acts, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77

(2009)—but it also means that Dunlap was not just

carrying out judicial orders.

Dunlap asserts that receivers are protected by absolute

immunity as long as they act within the scope of the

order creating the receivership, and he maintains that

he is entitled to the same protection because the Juvenile

Detention Center is essentially under receivership. See,
No. 11-2669 9

e.g., Property Management & Investments, Inc. v. Lewis,

752 F.2d 599 (11th Cir. 1985). All but one of the cases he

relies on for this proposition—New Alaska Development

Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1989)—predate

Forrester. New Alaska Development arguably adopted

Dunlap’s reading of Forrester, see 869 F.2d at 1303 n.6,

though the ninth circuit has limited New Alaska to situations in which an owner contests the very appointment

of a receiver. See Medical Development International v.

California Department of Corrections, 585 F.3d 1211, 1222

(9th Cir. 2009). Some cases after Forrester have stated that

receivers are protected by absolute immunity without

dealing with the distinction between adjudication and

administration. One such case, Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367

(5th Cir. 1995), did not cite Forrester. See also In re

Cedar Funding, Inc., 419 B.R. 807, 823 (9th Cir. BAP 2009);

Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994); Teton

Millwork Sales v. Schlossberg, 311 Fed. App’x 145, 150 (10th

Cir. 2009). Forrester tells us that Dunlap’s administrative acts are not protected by absolute immunity

even though Dunlap was acting within the scope of his

authority. Accord, Medical Development International,

585 F.3d at 1119–22.

Unqualified language to the effect that receivers are

immune from liability was not accurate even before

Forrester. Bankruptcy trustees, for example, can be held

personally liable for willful breaches of fiduciary duty.

See, e.g., In re Chicago Pacific Corp., 773 F.2d 909, 915

(7th Cir. 1985). If a trustee were entitled to absolute

immunity for his administrative acts, a debtor-in-possession would be too. See 11 U.S.C. §1107(a). But the
10 No. 11-2669

managers of a private company in Chapter 11 would

not be immune from claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, Title VII, or any other provision of law.

Nor would the administrators of a municipality that has

filed for reorganization under Chapter 9 be immune

from claims under §1983 if they engaged in patronage

hiring. Dunlap is not entitled to greater protection.

There may be many problems with Coleman’s complaint against Dunlap, but absolute immunity is not one

of them. The district court’s decision is

AFFIRMED.

8-22-12