Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1295 | December 18, 2019 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joel M. Schumm

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Benjamin J. Shoptaw

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Domeneque Williams,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

December 18, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1295

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Stanley Kroh, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49G03-1803-F5-8574

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1295 | December 18, 2019 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] Domeneque Williams appeals his conviction for level 6 felony criminal 

recklessness. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the State 

presented sufficient evidence to support Williams’s conviction and to rebut his 

claim of self-defense. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 8, 2018, Williams and his girlfriend, Sariyah Stephens, were at 

Stephens’s Indianapolis apartment where they argued and were involved in a 

“tussl[e].” Tr. Vol. 2 at 149. When Stephens’s brother, John Buchanan, and 

his girlfriend, Daeja Pinkins, later arrived at the apartment, Buchanan noticed 

that his sister was crying and had scratches on her. After Williams left the 

apartment, Stephens told Buchanan that she and Williams had gotten into a 

fight. Buchanan was mad that Williams “put his hands on” his sister, so he 

went looking for Williams and located him outside the apartment. Id. The two 

men got “right in each other[

’

]

s face” and Buchanan twice asked Williams to 

fight. Id. Williams refused to fight, and neither man touched the other.

[3] At some point during this verbal altercation, Williams stepped back, pulled out 

a handgun, and cocked it behind his back. Stephens and Pinkins had come 

outside and tried to calm the men down. Buchanan, Stephens, and Pinkins 

began walking down a stairway, with Williams following behind them. 

Buchanan and Williams continued to exchange words. Buchanan said, “Bro, 

you just pulled a gun out on me,” and, “Well you should have used it if you 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1295 | December 18, 2019 Page 3 of 7

pulled it out, you should have used it, that’s what you got your gun for.” Id. at 

151. Williams replied, “Well, I will use [my gun].” Id. Williams then fired 

two shots into the air and left the apartment complex. Buchanan went back to 

Stephens’s apartment and called the police. Police found two 9-millimeter shell 

casings in the parking lot of the apartment complex.

[4] The State charged Williams with level 5 felony intimidation, level 6 felony 

strangulation, level 6 felony domestic battery, level 6 felony pointing a firearm, 

level 6 felony criminal recklessness, class A misdemeanor domestic battery,

class A misdemeanor battery, and class A misdemeanor theft. Following a jury 

trial, the jury found Williams guilty of level 6 felony criminal recklessness and 

not guilty on the other counts. The trial court sentenced him to 545 days, with 

365 days of community service and 180 days of probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The State presented sufficient evidence that 

Williams created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 

person.

[5] Williams first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Bell v. State, 31 N.E.3d 495, 

499 (Ind. 2015). We look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom that support the conviction, and will affirm if there is probative 

evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In short, if the testimony believed by the 
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trier of fact is enough to support the conviction, then the reviewing court will

not disturb it. Id. at 500.

[6] To prove level 6 felony criminal recklessness, the State was required to prove 

that, while armed with a deadly weapon, Williams recklessly, knowingly, or 

intentionally performed an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to 

another person. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(A). Williams challenges solely the 

State’s proof as to whether his actions creates a “substantial risk of bodily injury 

to another person.” Id.

[7] Williams concedes that he pulled out a handgun and “shot twice into the air

while in an apartment building parking lot.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. He further 

concedes that the evidence demonstrated that there were at least a few 

individuals in the vicinity, as well as five vehicles parked in the lot. Still, he

claims that the risk of bodily injury to another person here was “insubstantial.”

Id. We disagree.

[8] Williams likens his case to Elliott v. State, 560 N.E.2d 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 

In Elliott, another panel of this Court determined that the defendant’s 

celebratory act of firing shots “upwards at approximately a 10 degree angle”

toward uninhabited fields and woodlands adjacent to the edge of his used car 

lot located “on the outskirts of Greenfield” did not create a substantial risk of 

bodily injury to another person because the evidence demonstrated that “there 

were no people in or near his line of fire.” Id. at 1267. In contrast, the evidence 

here demonstrated that several people were in or near Williams’s line of fire. 
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Unlike in Elliott, Williams did not simply fire shots in the direction of an 

undisputedly uninhabited area; he fired shots up in the air while Buchanan, 

Pinkins, and Stephens were all nearby. A reasonable juror could infer that any 

one of the bullets could have come down and struck one of those individuals, or 

easily ricocheted off one of the parked vehicles or the two-story apartment 

building and struck one of those individuals. Indeed, officers found two shell 

casings in the parking lot next to vehicles. This evidence is sufficient to support

a conclusion that Williams’s behavior created a substantial risk of bodily injury 

to another person. See Woods v. State, 768 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002) (finding sufficient evidence of substantial risk of injury to others because 

shots were fired in residential area and not improbable that bullet could have 

ricocheted and struck nearby people). The State presented sufficient evidence 

to support Williams’s conviction for level 6 felony criminal recklessness.

Section 2 – The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut 

Williams’s self-defense claim.

[9] Williams maintains that, even assuming the State presented sufficient evidence 

to support his conviction, the conviction cannot stand because the State failed 

to rebut his self-defense claim. The standard of review for a challenge to the 

sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the 

standard for any sufficiency claim. Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 

2002). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. 

Id. If there is sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of 

the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed. Id.
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[10] Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. Bryant v. State, 

984 N.E.2d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Indiana Code Section 

35-41-3-2(c) provides that “[a] person is justified in using reasonable force 

against any other person to protect the person ... from what the person

reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” To prevail on 

his self-defense claim, Williams was required to show that he: “(1) was in a 

place where he had a right to be; (2) acted without fault; and (3) was in 

reasonable fear o[r] apprehension of bodily harm.” Richardson v. State, 79 

N.E.3d 958, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Moreover, the amount of 

force used by the defendant must be proportionate to the urgency of the 

situation. Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. 

denied (2015). Thus, when a person has used more force than necessary to repel 

an attack, the right to self-defense is extinguished, and the victim becomes the 

perpetrator. Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[11] When a claim of self-defense finds support in the evidence, the State bears the 

burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements. Id. The State may 

meet its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the 

defendant did not act in self-defense, or by relying on the sufficiency of the casein chief. Quinn v. State, 126 N.E.3d 924, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). If a 

defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, we will reverse only if 

no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Hollowell, 707 N.E.2d at 1021.
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[12] Here, the record indicates that although Buchanan had initially asked Williams 

to fight, the two men never touched each other and simply engaged in a verbal 

altercation. Indeed, the record indicates that the situation had deescalated and 

that, at the time Williams fired the shots, Buchanan was walking away from 

Williams. Under the circumstances, the jury could reasonably conclude that 

Williams was not in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm and/or 

that Williams’s use of force was disproportionate to the urgency of the 

situation. The State presented sufficient evidence to negate Williams’s selfdefense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams’s level 6 felony criminal 

recklessness conviction is affirmed.

[13] Affirmed.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.