United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 7, 2020*

Decided December 8, 2020

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3395

JEANETTE S.R. LIPINSKI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

YOLANDA CASTANEDA, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States 

District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 16 C 7153

Jorge L. Alonso,

Judge.

O R D E R

In this suit alleging an unreasonable arrest, Jeanette Lipinski lost at summary 

judgment because she failed to comply with a local rule, of which she had notice,

requiring her to cite evidence supporting her claim. After the defendants moved for 

summary judgment, the district court applied that rule to deem their facts admitted,

and based on those admissions it entered summary judgment. Because district courts 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19-3395 Page 2

may reasonably require that even pro se litigants strictly comply with local rules, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion, and therefore we affirm. 

Lipinski was charged in 2014 with poisoning her neighbors’ dog. According to 

the defendants, the neighbors called the police when they smelled bleach and saw dead 

grass in their yard after their dog had become sick. The two police officers who 

responded observed the dead grass and an “overwhelming” bleach smell. The 

neighbors told the officers that they suspected that Lipinski had poured bleach in their 

yard and that it had sickened their dog, who now had whitened paws. Lipinski 

admitted to an officer that she had poured bleach along the fence between her yard and 

the neighbors’. The officer then arrested her. She was later charged with knowingly 

poisoning a domestic animal, see 510 ILCS 70/6 (2002), but acquitted after a trial. 

After her acquittal, Lipinski brought this suit alleging two claims that she lost at 

summary judgment for lack of proof. The first count, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 

officers, alleges that they arrested her in violation of the Fourth Amendment; the second 

count is a state-law claim for malicious prosecution against the officers and the 

neighbors. (The district court dismissed Lipinski’s other claims, and she does not 

contest those dismissals.) The defendants moved for summary judgment and filed a 

joint statement of material facts. Lipinski’s response to that statement disputed several 

facts, but she cited no supporting evidence and did not offer facts of her own to show a 

genuine dispute. Because the defendants had supported their facts, which refuted 

liability, with admissible evidence and Lipinski offered no evidence to contest those 

facts, the court deemed each of the defendants’ facts admitted under Local Rule 56.1. 

See N.D. ILL. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) (non-movant’s response “shall contain ... specific 

references” to the record). The court also noted that, by not filing a memorandum of 

law opposing summary judgment, Lipinski had waived opposition. Based on the 

admitted facts, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. 

Within the time to do so, Lipinski moved for reconsideration, advancing two 

arguments. First, she contended that she had tried to file a brief opposing summary 

judgment, but the clerk’s office never docketed it. Second, she continued to dispute 

several of the defendants’ stated facts. The court denied the motion because Lipinski 

had not shown “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b) for failing to file a memorandum. 

In the court’s view, because she electronically filed her documents, she needed to check 

that her filings were properly docketed, and neglecting to do so was not “excusable.” In 

any event, the court continued, it rejected Lipinski’s purported factual disputes for the 
No. 19-3395 Page 3

same reason—her noncompliance with the local rule requiring her to cite evidence—

that it gave in its summary-judgment ruling.

Lipinski raises only one argument on appeal: the district court abused its 

discretion when it applied Local Rule 56.1 to deem admitted the defendants’ version of 

the facts. She points to her pro se status, asserts that by disputing the defendants’

statement of facts under penalty of perjury she acted in good faith, and concludes that

the court should have given her a chance to cure her defective response. Essentially, she 

argues that the district court erred by applying its local rule strictly. But “we have 

repeatedly held that district judges may strictly enforce local summary-judgment 

rules.” McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2019). And “pro 

se litigants are not excused from compliance with procedural rules.” Pearle Vision, Inc. v. 

Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008). In light of the “substantial deference” we give to 

a judge’s enforcement of local summary-judgment rules, McCurry, 942 F.3d at 787 n.2, 

Lipinski has given us no adequate reason to conclude that the district court abused its 

broad discretion. 

Furthermore, even if ignorance of the local rule might lead a district court in its 

discretion to excuse noncompliance, Lipinski was not ignorant. She does not dispute 

that she had twice received instructions of her obligations under the local rule and the 

consequences for failing to meet them. Both the neighbors and the officers served her

the required notices explaining that when a pro se litigant opposes a motion for 

summary judgment, the party must cite evidence disputing the defendants’ facts, and 

that failure to do so could lead the court to deem those facts admitted. See N.D. ILL. L.R.

56.2 (providing text for notice that must be served on pro se litigants opposing 

summary judgment motion); Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring 

that pro se litigants opposing summary-judgment motion receive notice with

consequences of inadequate response). Thus for this reason as well, the district court 

permissibly enforced Local Rule 56.1 after Lipinski had received notice of its 

requirements. See Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED