J-S57042-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cour t. NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee

v. JASON JONES, Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 308 WDA 2016 Appeal from the PCRA Order February 5, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012677-1998

CP-02-CR-0013289-1998 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STRASSBUR GER,* JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2016 Jason Jones (Appellant) pro se appeals from the February 5, 2016 order which dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as an untimely-filed petition under the Post Convic tion Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. In 1999, following a jury trial, Appellant was con victed of, inter alia , third-degree murder for which he received an aggreg ate sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration. No direct appeal was file d. On May 15, 2000, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition. On behalf of Appellant, appointed counsel sought and received re instatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc . Appellant filed a notice of appeal, but this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal in November 2001 forJ-S57042-16

- 2 -

failure to file a brief. On March 10, 2005, Appella nt filed an application seeking to restore his direct appeal rights. This Court denied Appellant’s request on March 21, 2005. A subsequent petition f or reargument en banc was also denied. Since then, Appellant has filed t wo post-conviction petitions, both of which resulted in no relief. On August 21, 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in the civil division, which was later transferred to the criminal division. The trial court treated App ellant’s filing as a PCRA petition and determined that it was untimely filed. The trial court thus dismissed the petition without a hearing, and Appel lant timely filed a notice of appeal. We begin our review by noting the relevant legal p rinciples. “[T]he PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, inclu ding habeas corpus , to the extent a remedy is available under such enactment.” Commonwealth v.

West , 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Any PCRA petitio n, including second and subsequent petitions, must either (1) be filed within one year of the judgment of sentence becoming final, or (2) ple ad and prove a timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). “[A] defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas

corpus .” Commonwealth v. Taylor , 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013).J-S57042-16

- 3 -

However, “claims that fall outside the eligibility parameters of the PCRA may be raised through a writ of habeas corpus .” Commonwealth v.

Masker , 34 A.3d 841, 850 (Pa. Super. 2011) ( en banc ). Our Supreme Court has explained that “the boundaries of cogniza ble claims under the PCRA can only be extended so far as is consistent w ith the purposes of the

statute.” Commonwealth v. Judge , 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007) (holding habeas corpus , not the PCRA, “was available to adjudicate whethe r defendant Judge’s deportation from Canada to face t he death penalty in Pennsylvania... violated his rights under the Interna tional Covenant for Civil and Political Rights”). In his petition, Appellant alleges that (1) the le gislative definition of third-degree murder is too vague and (2) the trial court lacked statutory authorization to impose Appellant’s sentence. Peti tion for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, 8/5/2015, at 7-10. In his brief Appellant argues that because “none of the cases for relief [ sic ] under the PCRA address the unique situation presented in this case” he properl y petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus . Appellant’s Brief at 11. The trial court determined that Appellant had atte mpted to “remove himself from the time limitation provisions of the PCRA” by labelling his petition as a writ of habeas corpus and that the court properly treated the petition as a PCRA petition. Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/2016, at 3. InJ-S57042-16

- 4 -

proceeding to consider Appellant’s filing under the PCRA, the trial court found that his petition was untimely filed. Id . Because Appellant failed to plead a timeliness exception, the trial court dismi ssed the PCRA petition. It is not clear whether the relief Appellant seeks is cognizable under

the PCRA. Compare Judge , 916 A.2d at 520 (applying habeas corpus law instead of the PCRA where Judge’s claim had “no con nection to the truthdetermining process and [did] not render the underl ying adjudication of guilt or innocence... unreliable”); West , 938 A.2d at 1044 (determining that habeas corpus , rather than the PCRA, is the appropriate vehicle for a claim that “does not implicate the truth determining proc ess underlying his conviction and sentence, nor does it implicate the legality of the sentence imposed”) with Commonwealth v. Stout , 978 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super 2009) (“[A]ppellant’s allegations of constitutional defects in adoption of the present version of the Pennsylvania Constitution an d/or the Crimes Code, equate to a contention that the Court of Common Ple as lacked authority to prosecute him for the charge in question. As an at tack upon the court's authority, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction, it could have been addre ssed by the PCRA court. To the extent appellant could have sou ght the same relief under the PCRA, he was obligated to do so, and to d o so in a timely manner.”)J-S57042-16

- 5 -

What is clear is that Appellant cannot prevail und er either the PCRA or habeas corpus . If the PCRA applies, his petition is untimely fi led with no timeliness exception alleged. See , e.g. , Commonwealth v. Lewis , 63 A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chester , 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (“[I]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over th e petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal autho rity to address the substantive claims.”); Commonwealth v. Watts , 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) (“[T]he statute confers no authority upon thi s Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in additi on to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.”) (internal quotat ion omitted). Appellant’s claims also are ineligible for habeas corpus relief. “It is well settled that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus , which can be successfully invoked only in exceptional cases, is not a substitute for an appeal or a motion for a new trial, nor is it avail able for the correction of trial

errors.” Com. ex rel. Williams v. Myers , 162 A.2d 419, 420 (Pa. Super. 1960). See also Com. ex rel. Ashmon v. Banmiller , 137 A.2d 236, 238 (Pa. 1958) (“[A] habeas corpus petition is not available for the correction of

trial errors which could have been reviewed and cor rected on appeal; it is not a substitute for an appeal or for a writ of err or or for a motion for a new trial.”); Com. ex rel. Bey v. Myers , 152 A.2d 921, 922 (Pa. Super. 1959)J-S57042-16

- 6 -

(“The sufficiency of the evidence, and any trial er rors which could have been considered and corrected on appeal are not remediab le or the subject of relief by habeas corpus .”). Appellant could have raised his claims relate d to the trial court’s statutory authority to sentence A ppellant and the vagueness of the third-degree murder statute on direct appeal , but failed to do so. Accordingly, Appellant’s claims are not subject to habeas corpus relief. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Ap pellant’s petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 9/7/2016