2023 IL App (1st) 221273-U 

FIFTH DIVISION

May 19, 2023

No. 1-22-1273 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JET ACQUISITIONS, LLC, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.

 ) 

 v. ) No. 21 M1 104863 

 ) 

TIFFANY BROOKS, ) Honorable 

 ) Yvonne Coleman, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s judgment granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

affirmed. 

¶ 2 On March 2, 2021, the plaintiff-appellee, Jet Acquisitions, LLC (Jet Acquisitions) filed a 

complaint in assumpsit in the circuit court of Cook County against the defendant-appellant, Tiffany 

Brooks. On March 10, 2022, Jet Acquisitions filed its motion for summary judgment. On August 

11, 2022, the trial court granted Jet Acquisitions’ motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Ms. 

Brooks argues that the trial court erred by: (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Jet 
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Acquisitions when material issues of fact remained regarding the elements of assumpsit; and (2) 

quashing Ms. Brooks’ subpoena to Chicago Title Insurance Company. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Ms. Brooks is an attorney who sued her previous client for unpaid attorney fees pursuant 

to a representation contract. In that action, she obtained a judgment in her favor for $19,960.25. 

She then perfected a lien in that amount against the property of that client. That property is located 

at 6238 South Saint Lawrence Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Subsequently, the property went into 

foreclosure, and in 2019, was sold to Jet Acquisitions. The property remained subject to Ms. 

Brooks’ lien at the time of the sale. Jet Acquisitions is a business which routinely purchases 

property with the intent to repair and resell the acquired property. On June 25, 2020, Jet 

Acquisitions entered into a contract to sell the property for $360,000. On August 4, 2020, an 

attorney for Ms. Brooks informed Jet Acquisitions that Ms. Brooks’ lien remained an encumbrance 

on the title of the property as it had not been paid. 

¶ 5 On August 7, 2020, Jet Acquisitions cancelled the contract. On August 16, 2020, Jet 

Acquisitions entered into a new contract with the same prospective buyer for the amount of 

$380,000. In that contract, it stated that the seller, Jet Acquisitions, shall present evidence of 

marketable title to the buyer five days prior to the closing date. The contract went on to state that 

if there were any encumbrances on the title, the seller had 30 days to cure it after knowledge of its 

existence. On October 21, 2020, Ms. Brooks provided her payoff letter to Jet Acquisitions stating 

$33,053.87 was due. Ms. Brooks provided a breakdown of the amount as: judgment of $19,960.25, 

$5,920.50 as judgment interest; $6000.00 in attorney fees; $160.00 in third party citation costs; 
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$450.00 in appraisal fees; and a $50.00 recording fee for the filing of the memorandum of 

judgment. The post-judgment costs had not been reduced to a judgment. Jet Acquisitions’ attorney 

responded, via email, objecting to the amounts claimed and refusing to pay same. Jet Acquisitions 

asserted, in an affidavit of one of its employees, that it paid the demand and completed the sale of 

the property, which Ms. Brooks does not dispute. 

¶ 6 On March 2, 2021, Jet Acquisitions filed a complaint in assumpsit for money had and 

received based on Ms. Brooks’ demand and its subsequent payment. Jet Acquisitions sought 

$6,960.00, the amount in excess of the judgment and statutory interest that they paid. On April 7, 

2021, Jet Acquisitions filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court should 

grant its motion because there were no genuine issues of material fact as the law was clear that 

Ms. Brooks was only entitled to the lien amount plus accrued statutory interest. In her response to 

the motion for summary judgment, Ms. Brooks asserted that whether the payment made by Jet 

Acquisitions was forced or voluntary remained a genuine issue of material fact. She also argued 

that whether she was legally entitled to the money demanded was also a contested issue of fact. 

Since those issues had not been proven, she asserted that Jet Acquisitions had not met its burden 

of showing that no genuine issue of material fact remained and summary judgment was not proper.

¶ 7 After the parties’ oral arguments, the trial court requested that they submit final written 

arguments. The court then took the matter under advisement. On August 11, 2022, the court issued 

a written ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Jet Acquisitions and finding Jet 

Acquisitions was only obligated to pay the amount for the lien and accrued statutory interest. The 

court further found that Ms. Brooks owed Jet Acquisitions the difference between the amount paid 
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and the amount of the lien plus accrued statutory interest. On August 22, 2022, Ms. Brooks filed 

her notice of appeal.

¶ 8 ANALYSIS

¶ 9 We note that we have jurisdiction to consider this matter, as Ms. Brooks filed a timely 

notice of appeal following the trial court’s judgment. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 

303 (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 10 On appeal, Ms. Brooks argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor 

of Jet Acquisitions because genuine issues of material fact remained. Additionally, Ms. Brooks 

also appealed the trial court’s order quashing a subpoena she issued to the Chicago Title Insurance 

Company. 

¶ 11 Summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, 

and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018); Nine Group II, LLC v. Liberty 

International Underwriters, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 190320, ¶ 34. “A genuine issue of material 

fact exists where the facts are disputed or where reasonable minds could draw different inferences 

from the undisputed facts.” Nine Group II, LLC, 2020 IL App (1st) 190320, ¶ 34. In appeals from 

summary judgment rulings, our review is de novo, which means we perform the same analysis that 

a trial court would perform. Nine Group II, LLC, 2020 IL App (1st) 190320, ¶ 34. 

¶ 12 Section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2020)) 

states:

“Judgments recovered in any court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum 
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from the date of the judgment until satisfied or 6% per annum when the judgment 

debtor is a unit of local government, as defined in Section I of Article VII of the 

Constitution, a school district, a community college district, or any other 

governmental entity. When judgment is entered upon any award, report or verdict, 

interest shall be computed at the above rate, from the time when made or rendered 

to the time of entering judgment upon the same, and included in the judgment. 

Interest shall be computed and charged only on the unsatisfied portion of the 

judgment as it exists from time to time. The judgment debtor may by tender of 

payment of judgment, costs and interest accrued to the date of tender, stop the 

further accrual of interest on such judgment notwithstanding the prosecution of an 

appeal, or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the judgment.” 

To state a cause of action for “money had and received in assumpsit, a plaintiff must allege that 

(1) he was compelled to pay money to the defendant, (2) the defendant had no legal right to demand 

the money, and (3) payment was necessary in order to avoid an injury to his business, person or 

property.” Butitta v. First Mortgage Corporation, 218 Ill. App. 3d 12, 15 (1991).

¶ 13 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) “governs the form and content of 

appellate briefs.” McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12. The rule provides that an 

appellant’s brief must contain a statement of “the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, 

stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment,” and an argument “which shall contain 

the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the 

pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6), (7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Pursuant to the rule, 

a reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with “cohesive arguments” presented 
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and pertinent authority cited. Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993). “Arguments that 

do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal and may be rejected by 

this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 

141272, ¶ 43. 

¶ 14 While Ms. Brooks cites First Mortgage Corporation, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 15, for the 

elements of an assumpsit claim, she does not use any caselaw to support her allegation that a title 

indemnity loan would have made payment unnecessary. She also does not reference any authority 

to support her claim that Jet Acquisitions was not forced to pay the money or that she had a legal 

right to the money paid. As such, we need not consider the arguments raised by Ms. Brooks, and 

they are forfeited. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43; See also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. 

Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited.”).

¶ 15 However, if we were to consider Ms. Brooks’ appeal as to the assumpsit claim on the 

merits, it still fails. First, under Ms. Brooks’ theory, we must determine the existence of genuine 

issues of material fact which would have prevented the entry of summary judgment. Ms. Brooks 

tendered a payoff letter to Jet Acquisitions advising it that she would release her lien for 

$33,053.87. She acknowledges that Jet Acquisitions paid her $33,053.87, the amount contained in 

the payoff letter. However, she argues that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

she was entitled to that dollar amount and, since that was a matter best resolved by the trier of fact, 

Jet Acquisitions had not proven the elements of an assumpsit claim. Therefore, summary judgment 

was not proper.

¶ 16 As to the allegations that Jet Acquisitions was required to prove, first, Jet Acquisitions 

needed to show it was compelled to pay money to Ms. Brooks. Having established that the payment 
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of the contested funds was made, the question posed by Ms. Brooks is whether the payment was 

compulsory or “freely made.” In the contract that Jet Acquisitions entered into with a prospective 

buyer, the terms stated that the title needed to be clear of all encumbrances by 30 days after the 

discovery of any. Further, the affidavit and exhibits in support of the motion for summary judgment 

indicated that Jet Acquisitions objected to the payment amount, not the payment demanded.

Pursuant to Section 2-1303 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2020)), Ms. Brooks’ ownership 

of a properly perfected lien required Jet Acquisitions to pay the amount of that lien and any 

statutory interest that accrued.

¶ 17 Next, we look to whether Ms. Brooks had a legal right to demand the money. 

¶ 18 Section 2-1303 of the Code specifies that the debtor is not just responsible for the judgment 

and the accrued interest but also for costs associated with obtaining the payment of the judgment. 

Poliszczuk v. Winkler, 2011 IL App (1st) 101847, ¶ 26. However, we cannot determine those costs 

because she does not raise it in any of her pleadings. Moreover, for Ms. Brooks to collect the 

attorney fees and other fees requested in her demand letter, she would have needed to perfect them 

in a lien. See Tobias v. Lake Forest Partners, LLC, 402 Ill. App. 3d 484, 489 (2010) (stating the 

plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees incurred in the collection of the judgment since the 

plaintiff never reduced the claim to an enforceable judgment or lien). Failing to perfect her lien for 

the additional amount, the trial court properly determined the amount she was entitled to collect as 

$19,960.25 plus the statutory interest of $5,920.50. 

¶ 19 Turning to whether Jet Acquisitions was compelled to pay to prevent injury to the business, 

Ms. Brooks alleges that Jet Acquisitions did not need to render payment to avoid injury. Jet 

Acquisitions argued that it would incur unnecessary holding costs, payments on taxes and 
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insurance, and lose the value of the money it invested into the property in contemplation of sale. 

Jet Acquisitions was under contract for the purchase of the property. In the contract, Jet 

Acquisitions promised to give the buyer marketable title at least 5 days before closing and to 

resolve any issue with the title 30 days after becoming aware of it. They could not produce clear, 

marketable title, a title without encumbrances, without paying the amount demanded in the payoff 

letter. See Ableman v. Slader, 80 Ill. App. 2d 94, 99 (1967) (stating “a party cannot be required to 

purchase a lawsuit”). Jet Acquisitions is a business that buys and sells property. Forcing Jet 

Acquisitions to carry the property for an indeterminate time would injure the business, and the 

evidence supports that conclusion.

¶ 20 Ms. Brooks argued that Jet Acquisitions could have entered into a title indemnity 

agreement1 to allow the parties to close in spite of the lien and points to the fact that Jet 

Acquisitions already had entered into an indemnity agreement for “sold taxes.” She raised the issue 

that it would not cost Jet Acquisitions more money to enter into another title indemnity agreement 

for the first time on appeal. Since she raises it for the first time on appeal, that argument would be 

forfeited as well. Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st) 111464, ¶ 15 (arguments not raised before the 

circuit court are forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). As such, we find that

Jet Acquisitions showed that they had to pay the demand or suffer injury to their business, and 

thus, the trial court did not err in finding summary judgment for Jet Acquisitions.

¶ 21 She also argues that the court erred by quashing her subpoena to Chicago Title & Trust 

Insurance Company for the purpose of securing testimony regarding its policies pertaining to title 

1

If there is a lien or other unpaid item, which impairs the title of a property, a title company can 

enter into a title indemnity agreement wherein they hold funds to cover the unpaid amount. 
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indemnity escrows. Ms. Brooks does not cite any authority to support her argument that the trial 

court erred, and accordingly, her claim is forfeited. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43 

(stating contentions argued before the appellate court without authority violate Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 341(h)(7)). Ms. Brooks also makes an argument that Jet Acquisitions had unclean 

hands, without citation, which is also forfeited. Sanders, 2015 IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43. 

¶ 22 We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment and quashing 

the subpoena to Chicago Title & Trust Insurance Company. 

¶ 23 CONCLUSION

¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 25 Affirmed.