FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 12, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 09-2123

JOHN MIDDAGH,

Defendant - Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D.C. NO. 2:09-CR-00083-WJ-1)

John Van Butcher, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico,

for Defendant - Appellant.

Mary L. Higgins, Assistant United States Attorney, (Gregory J. Fouratt, United

States Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff -

Appellee.

Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

John Middagh pleaded guilty to theft of public money, see 18 U.S.C. § 641,

in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. He was

sentenced to two years’ probation, conditioned on 240 hours of community
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service. He appeals, contending that the imposition of so many hours of

community service was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Middagh, a Navy veteran of the Vietnam War, was a friend of Nick

Woods, who lived for several years at Mr. Middagh’s store in El Paso, Texas. At

Woods’s suggestion, in July 1983 the two men opened a joint bank account, into

which Woods’s Social Security benefits were automatically deposited. Despite

Woods’s death in September 1983, his Social Security benefits continued to be

deposited into the joint account until June 2006. By that time Mr. Middagh had

withdrawn $130,557 in Social Security benefits intended for Woods.

Mr. Middagh pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with

theft of $12,209.40 in public money arising from his withdrawals between

January 2004 and June 2006. Using money that she had received as an

inheritance, Mrs. Middagh, who supported the couple by working as a school

counselor, repaid the Social Security Administration the $130,557 stolen by her

husband. 

The presentence report (PSR) prepared by the Probation Office calculated

Mr. Middagh’s offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines at

eight. Because he had no prior offenses, his criminal-history category was I,

yielding an advisory sentence range of zero to six months’ imprisonment. See
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USSG Ch.5, Pt. A. The PSR recommended a sentence of probation with the

condition that Mr. Middagh perform 240 hours of community service. He filed a

written objection to the 240-hour recommendation, requesting that it be only 48

hours. He argued that he had already provided full restitution; that the 240-hour

requirement would interfere with his care of his mother, a neighbor (for whom he

was the primary caretaker), and his horses; that he was 63 years old and showing

signs of age; and that his community service would neither protect the public nor

provide him with educational or vocational training. In response, the Probation

Office continued to recommend 240 hours of community service, explaining that

this requirement would “hold[] Mr. Middagh responsible for his offense by

providing a service to the community.” R. Vol. 2 at 2. It noted that the entire

amount of restitution had been paid by his wife.

At the sentencing hearing on May 5, 2009, Mr. Middagh’s counsel asserted

that a 240-hour community-service requirement would be “arbitrary and

capricious” and would not further any purpose of sentencing. Id. Vol. 3 at 10.

Counsel repeated arguments made in the written objections to the PSR, noted his

client’s military service and his community service through his church, and

challenged the Probation Office’s view that the 240 hours of community service

was required to show a just respect for the law. He contended that there was no

possibility that Mr. Middagh would commit crimes in the future; and he

emphasized the burden on Mr. Middagh of the standard conditions of probation,
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focusing on the prohibition on possessing firearms (which would prevent him

from hunting). Counsel summed up by saying that 240 hours of community

service was greater punishment than necessary and that 40 hours would suffice. 

The prosecutor and Mr. Middagh also spoke briefly. Then the district court

stated:

I’ve reviewed the Presentence Report’s factual findings. I’ve

considered the sentencing guideline applications and the sentencing

factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1) through (7). The defendant’s offense

level is eight. His criminal history category is I. Under the

guidelines, that establishes an incarceration range of zero to six

months. 

I note the defendant knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully stole

public money from the Social Security Administration, and I’ll note

that the offense for which the defendant pled guilty, the United

States Congress has set a maximum term of incarceration of ten

years. Taking that into account, I find the guideline sentence for this

defendant to be a reasonable sentence, taking into account the

sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1) through (7); specifically,

the history and characteristics of this defendant.

Id. at 23. After addressing the mandatory and standard conditions of probation,

the court added: 

In terms of the special condition, I will approve the probation

officer’s recommendation of 240 hours of community service during

the probationary term as approved by the probation officer. Since

the defendant is involved in his church, I will recommend that

community service requirement be satisfied through volunteer work

with the defendant’s church. I cannot compel a defendant to do

community service through the church, but if a defendant is involved

or if the defendant wishes to do community service under the

auspices or through the church, then that’s fine with me. I’m going

to make that recommendation in this judgment.

Id. at 24–25. The court summed up: 
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The sentence of probation for a term of two years, along with

standard and mandatory conditions, excluding the requirement of or

striking the standard condition of prohibiting interstate travel, along

with the requirement of 240 hours of community service is sufficient

but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18

U.S.C. 3553(a)(2), and I will make that finding. 

Based on the defendant’s lack of financial resources, I will not

impose a fine. Part of the reasoning for—well, typically, on a case

like this, if there is no term of incarceration, I will oftentimes impose

a fine. I also believe that the community service hour requirement

would be better than imposing a fine, particularly based on this

defendant’s lack of financial resources.

Id. at 25.

Upon the district court’s announcement of the sentence, the following

exchange occurred:

[Mr. Middagh’s counsel]: Your Honor, in aid of an appeal,

there is one, and I talked with my

client. We believe the number 240

was arbitrary and capricious. It

was— 

THE COURT: If you wish to appeal it, that’s fine,

but I’ve made my ruling. I have

other defendants here, and I’m not

interested in hearing any further

argument. This matter is done. If

you don’t like the sentence, then

appeal it.

Id. at 26.

II. DISCUSSION
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On appeal Mr. Middagh argues that the requirement of 240 hours of

community service is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We

therefore limit our review to that portion of his sentence. 

A. Substantive Reasonableness 

“A sentence is substantively unreasonable if, considering the factors set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the sentence is unreasonable in length.” United

States v. Ellis, 525 F.3d 960, 964 (10th Cir. 2008). We review sentences for

substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See United

States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008). 

District courts are afforded broad discretion in imposing conditions of

probation. See United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995). But

any condition not required by 18 U.S.C § 3563(a) must be “reasonably related” to

the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2). See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). 

Those factors are (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history

and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) “the seriousness of the offense”; (3)

“promot[ing] respect for the law”; (4) “provid[ing] just punishment for the

offense”; (5) deterring criminal conduct; (6) “protect[ing] the public from further

crimes of the defendant”; and (7) “provid[ing] the defendant with needed

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in

the most effective manner.” Id. § 3553(a)(1) & (2). In addition, a condition must

“involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably
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necessary” for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2). Id. § 3563(b); cf. United

States v. Mitchell, 429 F.3d 952, 962 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting similar

requirements for terms of supervised release).

Although the length of a within-guidelines sentence is entitled to a

rebuttable presumption of reasonableness on appeal, see United States v. Kristl,

437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006), we have not had occasion to decide

whether this presumption applies to a probation condition imposed on a withinguidelines sentence. We need not decide that issue here. Even absent this

presumption, Mr. Middagh’s sentence is undoubtedly reasonable. He

acknowledged stealing $130,557 in Social Security benefits from the federal

government over a 23-year period. Yet he was not punished with any

imprisonment or fine. The restitution was no more than a repayment of his illgotten gains; and it was not even his efforts that accomplished the

repayment—the money came from his wife’s inheritance. It was eminently

reasonable for the PSR to recommend, and the district court to agree, that the

sanction for Mr. Middagh’s offense needed to be more than losing his right to

hunt. The court could properly decide that anything less than the communityservice requirement would devalue the rule of law. Mr. Middagh’s sentence was

substantively reasonable.

B. Procedural Reasonableness
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“A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court ‘failed to

calculate (or improperly calculated) the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines

as mandatory, failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors or failed to adequately

explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1101

(10th Cir. 2009) (brackets and ellipses omitted) (quoting Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).

Mr. Middagh argues that the imposition of community service was

procedurally unreasonable in two respects: (1) because the district court, contrary

to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, failed to rule on his objection that the community-service

requirement was arbitrary and capricious; and (2) because the court failed to

explain how the requirement was reasonably related to the sentencing goals laid

out in § 3553(a)(2). 

We review claims of procedural error for an abuse of discretion, see United

States v. Todd, 515 F.3d 1128, 1134 (10th Cir. 2008), evaluating factual findings

for clear error and legal determinations de novo, see id. at 1135. The government

contends that we should review Mr. Middagh’s claims under a plain-error

standard because Mr. Middagh did not raise any procedural objection in district

court. See United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007). But

there is an exception, a practical one, to the requirement that an appellate issue

must have been raised in district court. When a party had no opportunity to raise

the issue, we review it as if it had been presented. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b) (“If
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a party does not have an opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of

an objection does not later prejudice that party.”); United States v. UscangaMora, 562 F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir. 2009). That exception appears to apply

here. Mr. Middagh’s counsel started to speak after the district court imposed

sentence. Although the court may have assumed that counsel was merely

repeating an argument that he had already made several times, we cannot be sure

of counsel’s intent. The court cut counsel short, stopping him midsentence and

telling him that the “matter is done.” R. Vol. 3 at 26. We therefore choose to

treat the procedural-reasonableness argument as if it had been presented below.

Turning to the merits of that argument, we perceive no abuse of discretion. 

Mr. Middagh first argues that the district court violated Rule 32 by failing to rule

on his objection that the community-service requirement was arbitrary and

capricious. But this argument is based on a misconstruction of the rule. 

Rule 32(i)(3)(B) states: “At sentencing, the court . . . must—for any disputed

portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter—rule on the dispute

or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect

sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” The

rule addresses only factual disputes. As we have repeatedly stated, “Rule 32 is

not a vehicle for advancing legal challenges to sentencing, and the district court is

not obligated to make Rule 32(i)(3)(B) findings where the issues the defendant

raises do not involve factual inaccuracies in the report but, rather, legal objections
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to the district court’s determination of his sentence.” United States v. CereceresZavala, 499 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2007) (brackets, ellipses, and internal

quotation marks omitted). The district court thus had no obligation under the rule

to respond to Mr. Middagh’s contention that the community-service requirement

was arbitrary and capricious, a purely legal contention. 

Mr. Middagh’s second procedural-unreasonableness challenge is that the

district court failed to explain the rationale behind the 240-hour communityservice requirement. He relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), which provides: “The

court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its

imposition of the particular sentence . . . .” Here, the district court stated that it

had considered the sentencing factors of § 3553(a); noted that its sentence of

probation with a community-service requirement was “sufficient but not greater

than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2),” R. Vol. 3

at 25; and announced that it was “approv[ing] the probation officer’s

recommendation of 240 hours of community service during the probationary term

as approved by the probation officer.” Id. at 24–25. It also expressed its view

that “the community service hour requirement would be better than imposing a

fine, particularly based on [Mr. Middagh’s] lack of financial resources.” Id. at

25. 

Although the district court’s explanation may not have been expansive, a

court’s duty is to “provide only a general statement of the reasons for its
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imposition of the particular sentence.” United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d

1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The extent of

explanation necessary to satisfy § 3553(c) will depend on the circumstances. The

more obvious the reasons for the sentence, the less the need to announce them. 

That is why we require little explanation for a within-guidelines sentence. See id.

at 1199. And it is why the community-service condition in this case likewise

required little explanation. The Probation Office, whose recommendation was

adopted by the district court, merely stated the obvious when it said that the

requirement would “hold[] Mr. Middagh responsible for his offense by providing

a service to the community.” R. Vol. 2 at 2. What would have required

explanation would have been a sentence that rejected the recommendation of 240

hours of community service and imposed only 40 hours of service (as requested

by defense counsel) for engaging in a 23-year practice of stealing taxpayer

money. In short, Mr. Middagh’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable.

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM Mr. Middagh’s sentence.