SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4652-17T1

ARVIND BHUT,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

ALUMINUM SHAPES,

Respondent-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted January 17, 2019 – Decided June 10, 2019

Before Judges Simonelli and O'Connor.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Labor 

and Workforce Development, Division of Workers' 

Compensation, Claim Petition No. 2017-23357.

Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, PC, 

attorneys for appellant (Walter F. Kawalec, III, on the 

briefs).

Kotlar, Hernandez & Cohen, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (Timothy P. Search, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-4652-17T1

Respondent Aluminum Shapes appeals from a May 14, 2018 Division of 

Workers' Compensation order granting petitioner Arvind Bhut medical and 

temporary disability benefits of $15,583.54, as well as $300 in costs. After 

reviewing the record and applicable legal principles, we affirm.

In 2014, petitioner was hired by respondent as a technician to fix 

manufacturing equipment at its plant. In 2017, petitioner injured his shoulder 

at respondent's facility during his shift. Petitioner filed an employee claim 

petition with the Division of Workers' Compensation against respondent, and 

subsequently filed a motion for medical and temporary disability benefits. 

Because the manner in which petitioner was injured was disputed, an evidentiary 

hearing was conducted. We recite the salient evidence adduced during that 

hearing.

Petitioner testified as follows. On May 21, 2017, he entered an employee 

locker room, where co-worker John Stevens was sitting with his feet up on a 

bench. Petitioner twice asked Stevens to move his legs so petitioner could pass 

by, but Stevens refused. Petitioner jumped over Stevens's legs but petitioner's 

feet "caught" Stevens's leg as petitioner did so. Stevens became angry and threw 

a cup of soda at petitioner. To calm himself down, petitioner left the room. 
3

A-4652-17T1

Minutes later, petitioner decided to return to the locker room because he 

needed to wash his hands. However, he encountered Stevens outside of the 

locker room in a narrow walkway only four to six feet wide. Stevens was 

holding a pizza box and, when petitioner attempted to pass him, Stevens 

"pushed" the pizza box at petitioner. To keep the box away from him, petitioner 

swung his arm toward Stevens and, in doing so, hit a hat Stevens was wearing. 

Stevens reacted by throwing petitioner to the floor, injuring petitioner's 

shoulder. Petitioner testified that he was not trying to strike Stevens when he 

swung at him. 

Stevens testified that his feet were on a bench when petitioner entered the 

locker room. Petitioner did not ask Stevens to remove his feet from the bench 

but, instead, petitioner pushed and kicked them off the bench. Moments later, 

Stevens stood up and petitioner stepped in front of him, causing Stevens to spill 

Coke on petitioner. The "conversation" between them became "heated" and two 

other co-workers separated them. Petitioner left the room and, minutes later, 

Stevens also left the room, holding a box in his hand. Stevens saw petitioner 

walking toward him. Stevens's description of the ensuing events was as follows:

I'm holding onto this box, and I get to him and he's still 

coming at me and he's like – I don't know what to do, 

and I just kind of side-stepped with this box around 

him, to let him go, and the next thing I'm hit in the back 
4

A-4652-17T1

of the head. . . . I grab[bed] his arm and we kind of 

bounce[d] off of that locker and we land[ed] on the 

floor . . . . I ended up on top of him. I don't – I don't 

know if we bounced off of two cabinets or what, but 

we're on the floor and I got his arm, and I'm standing 

up and Kevin grabs me and pulls me off of him, and Zac 

– I believe it was Zac had Arvind, and everything got 

separated.

Stevens specifically denied pushing the box at petitioner just before Stevens was 

hit on the back of the head. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge of compensation issued an oral 

decision from the bench and, after respondent filed a notice of appeal, issued a 

written decision pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(b). In the latter decision, the judge 

found there was a causal connection between the subject incident and petitioner 

and Stevens's employment with respondent. The judge stated:

In the instant case the altercation between [petitioner 

and Stevens] occurred within the period of employment 

and at a place the employee may reasonably be to wit: 

the foreman's locker room and while they were 

reasonably fulfilling the duties of their employment or 

doing something incidental thereto to wit: eating lunch. 

I therefore find a causal connection between the 

altercation and petitioner[']s employment.

. . . . 

In the instant case I find that the work of the 

participants brought them together and created the 

relations and conditions which resulted in the clash. 

The record before the [c]ourt is devoid of any contact 
5

A-4652-17T1

between Stevens and the [p]etitioner outside their place 

of employment.

. . . .

[T]he instant case[] is devoid of any personal 

nonwork animus between the petitioner and Mr. 

Stevens. 

The judge specifically determined that neither petitioner nor Stevens had 

a willful intent to injure the other. In her oral decision, she stated, "[t]he 

reactions of both Mr. Stevens and the petitioner were in response to what each 

felt was aggressive behavior." In her written decision, the judge also noted that 

petitioner was credible when he testified he did not intend to strike Stevens when 

he pushed the pizza box away from himself. Concluding petitioner's injury arose 

out of and during the course of his employment, the judge entered an order on 

May 14, 2018 directing that respondent pay petitioner's medical expenses and 

temporary disability benefits in the amount of $15,583.54, as well as costs of 

$300. 

On appeal, respondent primarily contends the judge's factual findings are 

not supported by the record. Respondent's interpretation of the facts is that 

petitioner intentionally struck Stevens on the back of the head. Thus, respondent 

argues, because petitioner's injury was the result of his aggression, he is not 
6

A-4652-17T1

entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -

146. 

We give substantial deference to the factual determinations of workers'

compensation courts, limiting our review to "whether the findings made could 

reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the 

record, considering the proofs as a whole, with due regard to the opportunity of 

the one who heard the witnesses to judge . . . their credibility." Lindquist v. City 

of Jersey City Fire Dep't, 175 N.J. 244, 262 (2003) (quoting Close v. Kordulak 

Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). "Deference must be accorded the factual 

findings and legal determinations made by the Judge of Compensation unless 

they are 'manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent relevant and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Ibid. (quoting 

Perez v. Monmouth Cable Vision, 278 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 1994)).

In accordance with N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, an employee may be eligible for 

workers' compensation benefits if injured in an "accident arising out of and in 

the course of employment . . . ." "[T]o trigger coverage under workers' 

compensation there must be a causal connection between the accident and the 

employment." Mule v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 356 N.J. Super. 389, 397 (App. Div. 

2003). "An accident arises 'in the course of' employment when it occurs (a) 
7

A-4652-17T1

within the period of the employment and (b) at a place where the employee may 

reasonably be, and (c) while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of the 

employment, or doing something incidental thereto." Crotty v. Driver Harris 

Co., 49 N.J. Super. 60, 69 (App. Div. 1958).

Guided by these legal principles, we affirm substantially for the reasons 

stated by the judge of compensation, whose decision was supported by sufficient 

credible evidence on the record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We add only 

the following comments. 

The judge of compensation found as fact that neither petitioner nor 

Stevens intended to hurt the other when they encountered each other outside of 

the locker room. Stevens's and petitioner's actions were merely self-protective. 

Petitioner swung his arm toward Stevens because he believed Stevens was 

pushing the pizza box into him, and Stevens grabbed petitioner's arm because 

he believed petitioner intended to hurt him. As the judge succinctly stated, 

"[t]he reactions of both Mr. Stevens and the petitioner were in response to what 

each felt was aggressive behavior." Because petitioner was injured as a result 

of an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment, his injury 

is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. See N.J.S.A. 34:15-1. 

Affirmed.