Filed 5/23/24 P. v. Tallman CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MYLES TALLMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B332008

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. MA082799)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.

James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A. 

Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________
2

In 2015, appellant Myles Tallman was convicted of felony 

residential burglary. In 2023, after Tallman was convicted of two 

counts of evading a peace officer while driving recklessly, and one 

count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the trial court 

sentenced him to seven years and four months. The sentence 

consisted of three years for one count of evading a peace officer—

doubled to six years because Tallman had a prior “strike”1—eight 

months for the second count of evading a peace officer, and eight 

months for being a felon in possession of a firearm. While 

Tallman had made a motion under People v. Superior Court 

(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss the prior strike as to 

all counts, the court granted the motion only as to one of the 

counts of evading a peace officer and as to the count of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm.

On appeal, Tallman contends the trial court abused its 

discretion in refusing to dismiss the prior strike as to the other 

count of evading a peace officer because the refusal to dismiss the 

strike “was not based on any articulated grounds;” because the 

prior strike was eight years old and Tallman’s criminal history 

was “related almost exclusively to controlled substance use”; and 

because the facts of the current conviction were “not egregious.” 

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion and therefore 

affirm.

1 “We use the term ‘strike’ to describe a prior felony 

conviction that qualifies a defendant for the increased 

punishment specified in the Three Strikes law.” (People v. 

Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 932, fn. 2.)
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Tallman’s Prior Criminal History

In February 2013, Tallman was convicted of misdemeanor

possession of a dangerous weapon and sentenced to three years of 

probation. In April 2013, he was charged with being under the 

influence of a controlled substance, and in June 2013, he was 

charged with possession of a controlled substance for sale. He 

was convicted on both charges in June 2013 and sentenced to a 

total of 110 days in jail and three years of probation. 

In April 2015, Tallman was charged with violating Penal 

Code section 459 (residential burglary). He was convicted in 

October 2015, sentenced to five years in prison, and paroled in 

August 2017. 

In February 2019, Tallman was charged with evading a 

peace officer, violating parole, and misdemeanor driving under 

the influence. He was convicted and sentenced to 180 days in 

jail. He was released to Postrelease Community Supervision in 

July 2020 and discharged in July 2021.

B. Tallman Is Charged

In March 2022, Tallman was charged by felony complaint

with one count of assaulting a peace officer (count 1), two counts 

of fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving 

recklessly (counts 2 and 3), one count of possession of a firearm 

by a felon (count 4), and one count of false imprisonment (count 

2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history 

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
4

5).

3 It was further alleged that, in June 2013, Tallman was 

convicted of the felony of violating Health and Safety Code 

section 11351 (possession or purchase of controlled substance for 

sale); in October 2015, he was convicted of the felony of violating 

Penal Code section 459 (residential burglary); and in March 2019, 

he was convicted of the felony of violating Vehicle Code section 

2800.4 (fleeing a peace officer by driving on the wrong side of a 

highway).

4 Tallman pleaded not guilty. A preliminary hearing 

was held in April 2022, Tallman was held to answer on all 

counts, and an information was filed two weeks later in May 

2022, alleging the same counts. In April 2023, an amended 

information was filed, alleging the same counts, but also alleging 

circumstances in aggravation as set forth in California Rules of 

Court, rule 4.421(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(5).5 Tallman again 

pleaded not guilty and denied all special allegations. 

3 On the second day of trial, the prosecution dismissed 

count 5. 

4 It was also alleged that the felony conviction for violating 

Penal Code section 459 was for a “serious and/or violent” felony 

that made Tallman subject to the “Three Strikes” law. 

5 California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 [“Circumstances in 

aggravation include factors relating to the crime and factors 

relating to the defendant. [¶] . . . [¶] (b) [¶] . . . [¶] Factors 

relating to the defendant include that: [¶] (1) The defendant has 

engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to 

society; [¶] (2) The defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or 

sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are 

numerous or of increasing seriousness; [¶] (3) The defendant has 

served a prior term in prison or county jail under section 1170(h); 

[¶] . . . [¶] (5) The defendant’s prior performance on probation, 

(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
5

C. Trial

During pretrial motions, the court granted a request to 

bifurcate both the circumstances in aggravation as well as the 

strike allegation. Tallman also agreed to admit to a felony 

conviction for purposes of count 4 (possession of a firearm by a 

felon). Several witnesses testified at trial for the prosecution; 

none for the defense.

1. Samuel Goldstein

Goldstein testified that, in March 2022, he had been a 

sheriff’s deputy at Lancaster Station for six years. He had been 

asked to assist in a “sting” operation for catalytic converter 

thefts. As part of that task, he was on duty the morning of March 

3, 2022, wearing a uniform, and in a marked police car, when he 

attempted to pull over a silver pickup truck in a parking lot in 

the city of Lancaster. Instead of stopping, the pickup truck drove 

away from Goldstein, then made an “abrupt U-turn” without

slowing, and accelerated directly toward Goldstein’s vehicle, even 

though it did not need to come near Goldstein to exit the parking 

lot. The pickup truck swerved away within two or three feet of 

Goldstein’s vehicle, missing it, and then proceeded to exit the 

parking lot. As the vehicle passed, Goldstein was able to see the 

driver—in court, he identified him as Tallman. The pickup truck 

fled from Goldstein at a high rate of speed, failing to stop while 

driving through four stop signs, and driving on the wrong side of 

the road at times. The chase proceeded through both commercial 

and residential areas. At one point, the pickup truck “jumped the 

mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or 

parole was unsatisfactory.”
6

curb,” drove through a desert field, returned to a paved street; it 

was eventually able to escape from Goldstein. 

Goldstein was again on patrol in uniform in a marked 

police car the night of March 7, when he caught sight of the same 

silver pickup truck that had eluded him on March 3, again being 

driven by Tallman. Goldstein followed the vehicle, requesting 

that two vehicles be dispatched to assist him before he attempted 

to pull it over. After one police vehicle had arrived, the pickup 

truck “swerved into lanes of traffic and began accelerating very 

rapidly.” Goldstein gave chase and the pickup truck weaved in 

and out of traffic, including into the bike lane, at speeds of up to 

70 miles per hour on city streets; the pickup truck then shut off 

its lights. Because Goldstein needed to account for the safety of 

the other cars on the road and did not want to drive into 

oncoming traffic or down the center median, the pickup truck was 

able to pull farther away from him. At one point, the pickup 

truck approached a red light driving at approximately 70 miles 

per hour and, although it was “kind of a blind intersection,” the 

pickup truck “did not stop or slow down” but “continued straight 

through without stopping.” The pickup truck was again able to 

escape Goldstein, and he ceased his pursuit. 

Later that night, Goldstein received a call regarding a 

crashed vehicle—the silver pickup truck. Goldstein found a 

handgun on the floorboard of the driver’s side of the vehicle. 

2. Aaron Tanner

Tanner testified that, in March 2022, he was a sheriff’s 

deputy assigned to a task force targeting catalytic converter 

theft. On the morning of March 3, he was inside a furniture 

warehouse. Based on previous thefts at the location, Tanner 

suspected there could be an attempt to steal the catalytic 
7

converter from the store owner’s truck parked outside. Around 

5:30 a.m.—several hours before the business was open—Tanner 

saw a black sedan and a silver pickup truck park next to the 

owner’s truck. The occupant of the black sedan exited his vehicle, 

went to speak with the driver of the silver pickup, opened the 

back of the store owner’s truck, and then returned to converse 

again with the driver of the silver pickup truck, who was about to

park his pickup next to the store owner’s truck. Tanner’s partner 

notified patrol units in the area to stop both cars. The black 

sedan stopped but the silver pickup truck sped off. 

Tanner and his partner later drove in an unmarked vehicle 

around a neighborhood where they suspected the pickup truck 

might be. After spotting it, Tanner followed the truck to a 

residence and requested additional units to the scene; Goldstein 

was one of the units requested. While watching the car, Tanner 

saw Tallman go in and out of the car several times. After a few 

hours, Tanner saw Tallman get in the pickup truck and drive 

away. Over his police radio, Tanner heard that Goldstein was in 

pursuit of the vehicle but then the pursuit ended. Approximately 

20 minutes later, Tanner was called to another location where he 

saw the pickup truck in a ditch. 

3. Trevor Kirk

Trevor Kirk testified that, on March 7, 2022, he was a 

sheriff’s deputy and was called to a location and saw an 

“abandoned truck with an outstanding suspect.” Inside the truck 

was a pink firearm. Kirk later determined it was a functional 

firearm. 
8

D. Conviction and Sentencing

After the jury had retired to deliberate, Tallman waived his 

right to a jury trial on his prior conviction as well as the alleged 

factors in aggravation. The jury deliberated for one and a half 

days before finding Tallman not guilty on count 1 (assault on a 

peace officer), but guilty on counts 2 and 3 (fleeing a pursuing 

peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly). The court 

accepted the jury’s statement that it was hopelessly deadlocked 

on count 4 and declared a mistrial as to that count.6 Two months 

after the prosecution indicated it intended to retry count 4, 

Tallman pleaded no contest to the count.7

In a June 2023 court trial, the court found the prosecution 

had proven the truth of the prior strike conviction—that Tallman

had been convicted of violating Penal Code section 459 in August 

2015—as well as all four circumstances in aggravation. 

Turning to sentencing, the prosecution requested the court 

sentence Tallman to seven years and four months, consisting of 

the high-term of three years for count 2—doubled to six years due 

to the prior strike—and an additional 16 months (one-third of the 

6 After the mistrial was declared, it was revealed that the 

jury deadlocked 11 to 1 in favor of conviction. 

7 As part of accepting Tallman’s plea, the court explained to 

him that he could be sentenced to eight months for count 4, which 

could potentially be doubled under the Three Strikes law. The 

court also explained to Tallman that it was “aware of caselaw 

that allows your attorney to argue that the court should either 

strike the strike as to all of the counts, or as to some.” The court 

informed Tallman that it would consider such an argument. 
9

midterm for either count 3 or 4).8 The prosecution added that if 

the court was disinclined to sentence Tallman to the high term 

for count 2, it would request instead that the court sentence 

Tallman to the midterm for both counts 3 and 4, to be served 

consecutively. Acknowledging that the prior strike conviction 

occurred in 2015, the prosecution argued that since that time, 

Tallman “has spent basically the last 7 years . . . either 

incarcerated or committing crimes within the community.” 

Tallman’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the prior 

strike conviction given its age, and to sentence Tallman to the 

midterm on count 2, the midterm on count 3, and one-third of the 

midterm on count 4, for a total of four years and eight months. 

The court sentenced Tallman to the high term of three 

years for the conviction on count 2—doubled to six years because 

of the prior strike—finding that Tallman was a “serious danger to 

society” because he had “prior convictions that are numerous and 

of increasing seriousness” that were of “repetitive conduct that 

puts society at risk,” and because he had “served a prior prison 

term and did not perform successfully on probation and parole in 

the past.” 

As to counts 3 and 4, the court indicated that it had 

discretion to dismiss the prior strike as to those counts, and that 

“[e]ven if the court feels that it’s appropriate to double the term of 

the base term, it’s not necessarily required to double the 

consecutive terms that follow.” The court subsequently granted 

8 The midterm for both counts 3 and 4 is two years. Onethird of two years is 8 months. We presume when the 

prosecution asserted that 16 months was one-third of the 

midterm for either count 3 or 4, she was including the doubling 

required under the Three Strikes law.
10

Tallman’s request to dismiss the prior strike for counts 3 and 4

and sentenced him to eight months for each count, to be served 

consecutively. Tallman’s aggregate sentence totaled seven years 

and four months. Tallman timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law

“ ‘[A] trial court may strike or vacate an allegation or 

finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has 

previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony . . . “in 

furtherance of justice” pursuant to . . . [Penal Code] section 

1385(a).’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) “[I]n 

ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent 

felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes 

law, . . . the court in question must consider whether, in light of 

the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior 

serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of 

his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be 

deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence 

should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted 

of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. 

Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)

“[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a 

prior conviction allegation under [Penal Code] section 1385 is 

subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Carmony, 

supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.) “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, 

we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘ “[t]he burden 

is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the 

sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the 

absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have 

acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its 
11

discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will 

not be set aside on review.” ’ [Citation.] Second, a ‘ “decision will 

not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. 

‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in 

substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ 

[Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial 

court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so 

irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with 

it.” (Id. at pp. 376–377.)

B. Tallman Fails to Demonstrate Error

The trial court refused to dismiss Tallman’s prior strike as 

to count 2. Tallman contends this was an abuse of discretion 

because: (1) the court’s failure to articulate the grounds for 

denying the motion meant the denial “was not supported by 

informed discretion”; (2) the prior strike was eight years old, and 

Tallman’s criminal history was “related almost exclusively to 

controlled substance use”; and (3) the facts of the current 

conviction were “not egregious.” We conclude the court acted 

within the bounds of reason.

1. The Court Was Aware of Its Discretion

We reject Tallman’s contention that the court’s failure to 

articulate why it was refusing to dismiss the strike as to count 2 

indicated the refusal was unsupported by informed discretion. 

Penal Code section 1385 “does not require a court to ‘explain its 

decision not to exercise its power to dismiss or strike’ ” a prior 

strike. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 376; People v. 

Gillispie (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 429, 433 [“The trial court is not 

required to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion 

under section 1385”].) Tallman cannot demonstrate the trial 
12

court was unaware of its discretion by complaining the court did 

not do something it was not required to do.

Moreover, the record indicates the court was aware of its 

discretion to dismiss the prior strike. When it discussed with 

Tallman the consequences of his no-contest plea to count 4, and 

the fact that the sentence could be doubled under the Three 

Strikes law, it also explained that Tallman’s attorney would be 

permitted to argue that the court should dismiss the prior strike, 

and that the court would entertain that argument. Additionally, 

it exercised its discretion to dismiss the prior strike as to counts 3 

and 4.9 Thus, it is clear that the court acted with informed 

discretion. (See People v. Langevin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 520, 

524 [“Where the Legislature establishes a sentencing norm and 

requires the court explicitly to justify a departure therefrom, and 

9 Tallman argues that the court’s decision to strike the 

strike as to counts 3 and 4, but not as to count 2, “indicate[d] that 

the court may not have been fully aware of the scope of its 

sentencing authority on which count or counts it was exercising 

its discretion.” But our high court has expressly stated that “[a]

trial judge, applying the factors we enumerated in Romero and 

Williams, may find adequate justification for striking one or more 

prior conviction allegations, but may deem appropriate the 

sentence that results from striking the prior conviction 

allegations as to only some counts. When a proper basis exists 

for a court to strike prior conviction allegations as to at least one 

current conviction, the law does not require the court to treat 

other current convictions with perfect symmetry if symmetrical 

treatment would result in an unjust sentence.” (People v. Garcia

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500.) Thus, that the trial court dismissed

the prior strike as to counts 3 and 4, but not count 2, does not 

indicate that the court was unaware of the scope of its sentencing 

authority.
13

the court sentences in conformity with the legislative standard, 

all that is required on the appellate record is a showing that the 

court was aware of its discretion to select an alternate 

disposition”].)10

2. The Age of Tallman’s Previous Conviction 

Is Not Dispositive

While the age of the prior strike is a factor for the court to 

consider, it is not dispositive. “In determining whether a prior 

conviction is remote, the trial court should not simply consult the 

10 Tallman contends in his reply brief that, because the 

court stated it would grant Tallman’s Romero motion “as to 

Count 2 and Count 3 in this case”—when the motion was actually 

granted as to counts 3 and 4—this meant “the trial court may not 

have actually fully understood the scope of its discretionary 

sentencing powers and the consequences of its exercise of those 

powers.” 

This argument is forfeited because Tallman failed to raise 

it in his opening brief. (People v. Gonzalez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 

960, 978 [it is “well established that arguments may not 

ordinarily be raised on appeal for the first time in a reply brief”].)

In any case, Tallman’s contention lacks merit. Immediately prior 

to this statement, the court indicated it was sentencing Tallman 

to the high-term of three years for “count 2,” and that this term 

would be “doubled, pursuant to Penal Code sections 1170.12 and 

667 subdivisions (b) through (j).” Then, after stating it was 

granting the Romero motion as to counts 2 and 3, the court 

proceeded to sentence Tallman on counts 3 and 4, and stated that 

“those subordinate terms will not be doubled.” On this record, it

is clear the court simply misspoke when it stated it was granting 

the Romero motions as to “counts 2 and 3” instead of “counts 3 

and 4.” Indeed, Tallman made the same mistake in his opening 

brief.
14

Gregorian calendar with blinders on. To be sure, a prior 

conviction may be stricken if it is remote in time. In criminal law 

parlance, this is sometimes referred to as ‘washing out.’ 

[Citations.] The phrase is apt because it carries the connotation 

of a crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation after a 

defendant has had the opportunity to reflect upon the error of his 

or her ways. Where, as here, the defendant has led a continuous 

life of crime after the prior, there has been no ‘washing out’ and 

there is simply nothing mitigating about a 20-year-old prior.” 

(People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813.)

Tallman was convicted of possession of a dangerous weapon 

in February 2013 and sentenced to three years of probation.

Two months later—i.e., while still on probation—he was 

charged with being under the influence of a controlled substance. 

Two months after that—i.e., with a charge pending and while 

still on probation—he was charged with possession of a controlled 

substance for sale. He was sentenced to 110 days in jail and 

three years of probation. 

In April 2015—i.e., while still on probation from the drug 

charges—Tallman was charged with felony residential burglary. 

He was convicted, sentenced to five years in prison, and paroled 

in August 2017.

Eighteen months later, in February 2019—i.e., while still 

on parole—Tallman was charged with evading a peace officer, 

violating parole, and misdemeanor driving under the influence. 

He was convicted and sentenced to jail, released to Postrelease 

Community Supervision in July 2020, and discharged in July 

2021.
15

Eight months later, the current charges were brought. 

They again included evading a peace officer and illegally 

possessing a dangerous weapon.

While the court did not explicitly state its reason for 

declining to dismiss the strike for count 2, immediately prior to 

doubling the sentence for count 2, the court reviewed the 

circumstances in aggravation and found that, in looking at 

Tallman’s criminal record, he was a “serious danger to society”; 

that he had “prior convictions that are numerous and of 

increasing seriousness,” which seemed to be of “repetitive conduct 

that puts society at risk”; and that he “did not perform 

successfully on probation and parole.” 

Tallman argues that People v. Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th 

490 (Garcia) supports his contention that the trial court abused 

its discretion in refusing to dismiss the strike. Garcia is 

inapposite. There, our Supreme Court was asked to consider 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a prior 

strike and concluded that it did not. (Id. at p. 503.) But, as our 

high court also established, “a trial court does not abuse its 

discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no 

reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony, 

supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377.) Thus, a holding that the trial 

court in Garcia did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a strike 

in no way indicates that the trial court would have abused its 

discretion in declining to dismiss the strike.

Nor do we find the facts of the cases comparable. In 

Garcia, there was evidence that the defendant “grew up in foster 

homes and was addicted to heroin by age 12” and “had a history 

of burglarizing homes and then trading stolen property for 

drugs.” (Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 494.) Moreover, the trial 
16

court in Garcia “noted that all defendant’s prior serious felony 

convictions arose from a single period of aberrant behavior for 

which he served a single prison term. The court commented that 

defendant had cooperated with police both in 1991 and when they 

arrested him for the current offenses.” (Ibid.) Here, there is no 

evidence that Tallman was addicted to drugs by a young age, that 

he committed crimes to support a drug habit, or that he suffered 

only a “single period of aberrant behavior.”11 Further, rather 

than cooperating with the police, he twice led them on a 

dangerous, high-speed chase.

On this record, the trial court acted well within the bounds 

of reason in concluding the age of Tallman’s felony conviction was 

insufficient to overcome the more-or-less continuous criminal 

activity he exhibited.

3. The Facts of the Current Convictions Did 

Not Require the Court to Strike the Strike

Finally, we reject Tallman’s contention that his current 

convictions were not “egregious” because they did not result in an 

accident or injury. Tallman led the police on two separate highspeed chases, running through multiple stop signs, driving on the 

wrong side of the road, driving in traffic without lights at night, 

11 While Tallman contends his criminal history “was related 

almost exclusively to controlled substance use,” the only support 

in the record for this claim is the speculation of the probation 

officer in his report that “the multiple arrests and convictions for 

narcotics-related charges indicate that the defendant may have a 

substance abuse problem.” There is no other evidence of such a 

problem in the record and, in particular, there is no evidence that 

Tallman’s felony conviction for residential burglary—the strike 

he wanted dismissed—had anything to do with substance abuse.
17

and plowing through a blind intersection at 70 miles per hour 

when the light was red. While no one appeared to have been 

injured by Tallman’s actions, his behavior demonstrated a callous 

disregard for the safety of others.

We conclude the trial court did not exceed the bounds of 

reason in declining to dismiss the prior strike as to count 2.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.