FILE 

IN CLERICS O,ICI 

llJII8E COURr, nn 01-..lllft:IM 

This oplnlcinwas filed for record 

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JOSEPH T. McENROE, 

Respondent. 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MICHELE KRISTEN ANDERSON, 

Respondent. 

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No. 88410-2 

(consolidated with 

No. 88411-1) 

En Bane 

Filed _SEP _0: 5 2013 

WIGGINS, J.-ln this direct review of the trial court's dismissal of notices of 

special death penalty sentencing proceedings, the King County prosecuting attorney 

asks us to decide whether he violated Washington's capital punishment statutes by 

considering the strength of evidence against respondents Joseph McEnroe and 

Michele Anderson when he determined to seek the death penalty for the shooting 

deaths of six people. We hold that the prosecuting attorney did not violate the 

statutory scheme. 
No. 8841 0-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

RCW 1 0.95.040(1) directs the prosecutor to "file written notice of a special 

sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be 

imposed when there is reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating 

circumstances to merit leniency." The prosecutor in this case complied with the 

statute in question by considering mitigating circumstances and determining that 

there was reason to believe that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficient to 

merit leniency. That the prosecutor also considered the strength of its case in 

making this determination is of no consequence. We therefore reverse the trial court 

and remand with instructions to reinstate the notices of special sentencing 

proceeding so that the cases against McEnroe and Anderson may proceed to trial. 

Because we resolve this case by interpreting RCW 1 0.95.040, we decline to 

address the delicate constitutional issue of separation of powers raised by the 

parties. Cmty. Telecable of Seattle, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 164 Wn.2d 35, 41, 186 

P.3d 1032 (2008) ("We will avoid deciding constitutional questions where a case may 

be fairly resolved on other grounds."). 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

I. Factual background 

In Carnation, Washington, on December 24, 2007, six members of the 

Anderson family were gunned down in their home: respondent Michele Anderson's 

parents, Judy and Wayne Anderson; respondent Anderson's brother, Scott, and 

sister-in-law, Erika Anderson; and respondent's five-year-old niece, Olivia Anderson, 

and three-year-old nephew, Nathan Anderson. All victims were shot at least once, 

and Judy, Scott, Erika, and Olivia were shot multiple times in the head and body. 

2 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

A friend of Judy Anderson's discovered this horrific scene two days later after 

Judy failed to show for work or respond to phone calls. Police quickly responded. 

During the investigation, McEnroe and Anderson arrived at the scene. McEnroe and 

Anderson initially told police that they had gone to Las Vegas to get married on 

December 24, but, upon police questioning, they changed their story and confessed 

to the murders. 

On December 28, 2007, the State charged Anderson and McEnroe with six 

counts of aggravated first degree murder. Under RCW 1 0.95.040, if the prosecuting 

attorney concluded that there were insufficient mitigating factors to merit leniency, he 

was required to file a notice of special sentencing proceeding to consider the death 

penalty no later than 30 days after charging Anderson and McEnroe. The trial court 

granted a motion to extend this time limit. In January 2008, the prosecutor wrote to 

defense counsel to extend the time frame for the consideration of mitigating 

circumstances and asking the defense to submit mitigation materials by April 10, 

2008. Following further extensions, in October 2008 the prosecutor filed a notice of 

special sentencing proceeding to determine whether he would seek the death 

penalty. At the same time, he released a statement in which he indicated that he was 

obliged to consider mitigating evidence, but that "[g]iven the magnitude of these 

alleged crimes, the slaying of three generations of a family, and particularly the 

slaying of two young children, [he] f[ou]nd that there [were] not sufficient reasons to 

keep the death penalty from being considered by the [jurors who] will ultimately hear 

these matters." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 48. 

3 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

II. Pretrial proceedings 

Following the prosecutor's notices of special sentencing proceeding, defense 

counsel began seeking information that formed the basis of the prosecutor's 

decision-making in this case and in other capital cases. Defense counsel brought 

numerous motions under various theories to probe the prosecutor's reasons for 

seeking the death penalty. This hotly contested issue culminated in respondents' 

November 2012 motion to dismiss notices of special sentencing proceeding, arguing 

that the prosecutor's consideration of the strength of the evidence against McEnroe 

and Anderson violated their rights to equal protection of the laws and due process. 

In January 2013, the trial court granted the respondents' motion and struck 

the notices of special sentencing proceeding on two grounds. First, the trial court 

concluded that the prosecutor violated RCW 10.95.040 by considering the strength 

of the evidence against McEnroe and Anderson in deciding to file notices of special 

sentencing proceeding. The trial court reasoned that the prosecutor could consider 

only the circumstances of the case and the mitigation information, but could not 

consider the strength of the State's case. Second, the trial court ruled that by 

considering the strength of evidence, the prosecutor violated equal protection of the 

law by "seek[ing] varying degrees of punishment when proving identical criminal 

elements." CP at 605. The trial court based its equal protection ruling on 

hypothetical defendants whose crimes and mitigating circumstances were identical 

but against only one of whom the State had strong evidence. Because the strength 

of the cases against these hypothetically identical defendants would comprise the 

only reason that one would face the possibility of the death penalty and the other 

4 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

would not, the trial court concluded that considering the strength of evidence 

violated equal protection. See id. at 609 ("In a scenario suggestive of Camus, a 

defendant's early confession and cooperation could become his downfall."). 

Ill. Discretionary and direct review 

The State promptly sought discretionary review of the trial court's ruling 

striking the notices of special sentencing proceeding. The State also moved for 

acc'elerated review and to consolidate the cases against each respondent. The 

Court of Appeals certified the cases for transfer to this court pursuant to RCW 

2.06.030(d)1 and RAP 4.4. 2 We consolidated the cases and granted discretionary 

review. 3 

ANALYSIS 

We hold that prosecutors may consider the strength of their cases in 

determining whether to file a notice of special sentencing proceeding seeking the 

death penalty pursuant to RCW 1 0.95.040. The statute does not prohibit 

consideration of the strength of the State's case and as long as prosecutors 

consider whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, they 

1 RCW 2.06.030 provides in pertinent part that the Court of Appeals "shall have exclusive 

appellate jurisdiction in all cases except: ... (d) cases involving fundamental and urgent issues 

of broad public import requiring prompt and ultimate determination .... " 

2 RAP 4.4 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he Supreme Court, to promote the orderly 

administration of justice may, ... upon certification by the Court of Appeals, transfer a case from 

the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court .... " 

3 While the motion for discretionary review was pending, the trial court denied the State's motion 

to stay the effective date of the order striking notices of special sentencing proceeding. The trial 

court also issued a follow-up ruling justifying its initial order striking the notices, struck the trial 

date, excused jurors, and stayed further proceedings pending the outcome of this discretionary 

review. The State made an emergency motion in this court requesting the stay of the trial court's 

ruling striking the notices, which our commissioner granted. 

5 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

fully comply with their statutory duties. We encourage holistic, individualized 

prosecutorial assessments in determining whether capital punishment is appropriate 

in order to fulfill equal protection guaranties and to promote sound public policy. 

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and remand this case with instructions to 

reinstate the notices of special sentencing proceeding. 

I. RCW 10.95.040 requires the prosecutor to determine only whether mitigating 

circumstances are insufficient to merit leniency 

Our '"fundamental objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and carry 

out the intent of the legislature."' State v. Veliz, 176 Wn.2d 849, 854, 298 P.3d 75 

(2013) (quoting State v. Morales, 173 Wn.2d 560, 567, 269 P.3d 263 (2012)). "'We 

construe the meaning of a statute by reading it in its entirety and consider the entire 

sequence of all statutes relating to the same subject matter."' /d. 

RCW 1 0.95.040(1) provides: 

If a person is charged with aggravated first degree murder as defined 

by RCW 1 0.95.020, the prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of 

a special sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death 

penalty should be imposed when there is reason to believe that there 

are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. 

This statute requires the prosecutor to make only one determination: whether "there 

is reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit 

leniency." /d. If the prosecutor believes that mitigating circumstances are insufficient, 

the prosecutor must file written notice of a special sentencing proceeding. 

RCW 1 0.95.040(1) does not define "mitigating circumstances" or provide any 

guidance as to when mitigating circumstances are sufficient to merit leniency. But 

reading the statutory scheme as a whole, we consider other provisions in chapter 

6 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

10.95 RCW, which also employ the term "mitigating circumstances" in relation to 

what the jury may consider in a special sentencing proceeding. RCW 1 0.95.060(4) 

requires a jury considering the death penalty to answer the question, '"Having in 

mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced 

beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to 

merit leniency?"' RCW 10.95.070 elaborates that, in answering this question, "the 

jury, or the court if a jury is waived, may consider any relevant factors" in addition to 

the eight enumerated factors contained in RCW 10.95.070.4 If the trier of fact "finds 

that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence 

4 These factors include: 

(1) Whether the defendant has or does not have a significant history, 

either as a juvenile or an adult, of prior criminal activity; 

(2) Whether the murder was committed while the defendant was under 

the influence of extreme mental disturbance; 

(3) Whether the victim consented to the act of murder; 

(4) Whether the defendant was an accomplice to a murder committed by 

another person where the defendant's participation in the murder was relatively 

minor; 

(5) Whether the defendant acted under duress or domination of another 

person; 

(6) Whether, at the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her 

conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of 

mental disease or defect. However, a person found to have an intellectual 

disability under RCW 1 0.95.030(2) may in no case be sentenced to death; 

(7) Whether the age of the defendant at the time of the crime calls for 

leniency; and 

(8) Whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to 

others in the future. 

RCW 10.95.070(1)-.070(8). 

7 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

shall be death." RCW 1 0.95.030(2). Thus, we interpret the term "mitigating 

circumstances" in chapter 10.95 RCW to mean the factors listed in RCW 10.95.070 

as well as any relevant factor. 

We may also resort to the dictionary definition of "mitigate." State v. Kintz, 169 

Wn.2d 537, 547, 238 P.3d 470 (201 0). The dictionary defines the verb "mitigate" as 

"to make less severe, violent, cruel, intense, painful." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW 

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1447 (2002). Thus, a mitigating circumstance is a 

circumstance that requires a less severe result. In the capital punishment context, it 

is reasonable to believe that the legislature intended "mitigating circumstances" to 

include the eight factors listed in RCW 10.95.070 and any other relevant factor, i.e., 

those circumstances that require a punishment less severe than death. 

II. The prosecutor complied with his statutory duty by making a determination 

based on whether mitigating circumstances were sufficient to merit leniency 

When he decided to seek the death penalty against McEnroe and Anderson, 

the prosecutor considered mitigation information and determined that there were not 

sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. After making this determination, 

he filed notices of special sentencing proceeding as the statute directed. 

Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor fulfilled his duties under RCW 1 0.95.040. 

The prosecutor made clear statements regarding his consideration of 

mitigating circumstances. In the press release announcing his plans to seek capital 

punishment, the prosecutor acknowledged that he "has the obligation in potential 

capital murder cases to consider all relevant information about the crime and to 

weigh that against any mitigating evidence favoring the charged defendants." CP at 

8 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

48. In performing this weighing exercise, the prosecutor did exactly as instructed by 

the statute: he found "that there [were] not sufficient reasons to keep the death 

penalty from being considered" by the jury. /d. Furthermore, in response to defense 

counsel's request for clarification regarding the information the prosecutor 

considered, the prosecutor indicated that he "considered the facts and 

circumstances alleged that form[ed] the basis for charging" the respondents and 

also "considered mitigation materials submitted by defense counsel." /d. at 52. Thus, 

we conclude that the prosecutor did as the statute directed: he considered whether 

the mitigating circumstances sufficed to merit leniency. 

Ill. Prosecutors may consider the strength of evidence when determining whether 

to file a notice of special sentencing proceeding 

Aside from considering reasons to believe that mitigating circumstances are 

not sufficient to merit leniency, RCW 1 0.95.040(1) neither requires nor precludes 

consideration of any other information. Logically speaking, in making the 

determination of the sufficiency of mitigating circumstances, prosecutors must 

realistically consider other factors that weigh against mitigation. Nothing in the 

statutory language suggests that the strength of the evidence cannot be one of 

these other factors. Indeed, in many respects it makes good sense for prosecutors 

to reflect on the strength of their cases before deciding to seek the ultimate 

punishment. 

We have acknowledged the importance of the strength of evidence in the 

prosecutorial decision to seek the death penalty before. Recently, in State v. Davis, 

we noted, "Mitigating evidence is not the only reason a prosecutor might decide not 

9 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

to seek the death penalty. The strength of the State's case often influences that 

decision." 175 Wn.2d 287, 357, 290 P.3d 43 (2012) (emphasis added). Less 

recently, we "assume[d] that prosecutors exercise their discretion in a manner [that] 

reflects their judgment concerning the seriousness of the crime or insufficiency of 

the evidence." State v. Rupe, 101 Wn.2d 664, 700, 683 P.2d 571 (1984) (emphasis 

added). Davis and Rupe demonstrate that although we have never squarely decided 

whether prosecutors can weigh the strength of evidence against mitigating 

circumstances when deciding to file a notice of special sentencing proceeding, we 

have certainly assumed that they can. 

Respondents assert that RCW 10.95.040 mandates that prosecutors consider 

only mitigating circumstances in making the determination to seek the death penalty. 

The trial court too indicated that the prosecutor should not weigh the strength of the 

State's case against the mitigating circumstances because mitigation is focused 

solely on the moral culpability of the defendant. Essentially, these arguments boil 

down to a requirement that prosecutors consider mitigating circumstances in a 

vacuum. Such a requirement is illogical for several reasons. 

First, as discussed, RCW 1 0.95.040(1) contains no prohibition on what the 

prosecutor can consider in making his or her determination to file a notice of special 

sentencing proceeding. The only statutory requirement is that the prosecutor file the 

notice when mitigating circumstances are not sufficient to merit leniency. The trial 

10 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

court and respondents point to no textual prohibition against considering the 

strength of evidence in deciding whether to seek the death penalty. 5 

Second, the trial court determined and respondents concede that prosecutors 

may consider the facts and circumstances of the case alongside mitigation 

evidence. This concession contradicts respondents' theory that the statute mandates 

that only mitigation evidence be considered. After all, RCW 1 0.95.040(1) provides no 

textual authority for the consideration of the facts and circumstances or the strength 

of evidence. Moreover, the strength of a particular case might very well be a fact or 

circumstance of the case. In short, if prosecutors can consider the facts and 

circumstances of the case, it would be anomalous to preclude them from 

considering the strength of their evidence. 

Third, as the State argues, the determination whether to seek the death 

penalty should require an elected prosecutor "to inform him- or herself as thoroughly 

and completely as possible." Opening Br. of Pet'r at 34. We agree. Prosecutors, in 

exercising their executive functions, better serve the public by holistically 

considering all facts and circumstances related to the crime, which, realistically, 

include the strength of evidence, rather than forcing tunnel vision. Given the time 

and expense it takes to prepare and try a capital case, it makes good sense for a 

prosecutor to seek the death penalty only when the prosecutor believes there is a 

good chance of obtaining a conviction. 

5 Respondents and the trial court believe Washington's capital punishment scheme is unique 

because it directs prosecutors to consider mitigating circumstances rather than aggravating 

circumstances in coming to a decision on seeking capital punishment. Yet it remains unclear 

why the uniqueness of the statute should effect a different statutory interpretation. 

11 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

We hold that Washington prosecutors may consider the strength of evidence, 

along with the facts and circumstances of the crime, when they determine whether 

there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. 

IV. RCW 10.95.040 does not grant prosecutors unfettered discretion or violate 

the principles of equal protection 

Since the inception of the current Washington capital sentencing scheme, we 

have upheld the statutes' constitutionality despite equal protection challenges that 

they provide prosecuting attorneys with too much discretion. Today we reaffirm our 

jurisprudence that prosecutors who make individualized assessments in deciding 

whether to seek capital punishment do not violate these constitutional principles. 

The first "unfettered discretion" challenge came in State v. Campbell, 1 03 

Wn.2d 1, 24,691 P.2d 929 (1984). There, we noted that "equal protection of the laws 

is denied when a prosecutor is permitted to seek varying degrees of punishment 

when proving identical criminal elements." !d. at 25. But '"no constitutional defect 

exists when the crimes [that] the prosecutor has discretion to charge have different 

elements."' /d. (quoting State v. Wanrow, 91 Wn.2d 301, 312, 588 P.2d 1320 (1978)). 

Because prosecutors must consider mitigating circumstances and because only in 

the absence or insufficiency of such circumstances may prosecutors seek death, we 

held that RCW 1 0.95.040(1) was constitutional. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d at 25. 

We have since expanded on the Campbell analysis, requiring prosecutors to 

"perform individualized weighing of the mitigating factors" and noting that "an 

inflexible policy is not permitted." State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 642, 904 P.2d 245 

(1995); see also In re. Pers. Restraint of Harris, 111 Wn.2d 691, 693, 763 P.2d 823 

12 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

(1988). Thus, in order for a prosecutor to constitutionally exercise discretion when 

deciding to file notices of special sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor must 

engage in an individualized weighing of mitigating factors. Because individualized 

weighing enables prosecuting attorneys to come to a decision tailored to the unique 

circumstances of every case, there is not standardless discretion and therefore no 

equal protection violation. See, e.g., State v. Cross, 156 Wn.2d 580, 625, 132 P.3d 

80 (2006); State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631, 671, 845 P.2d 289 (1993); State v. 

Bartholomew, 104 Wn.2d 844, 848-49, 710 P.2d 196 (1985); Rupe, 101 Wn.2d at 

700. 

In striking the notices of special sentencing proceeding on the basis of equal 

protection, the trial court did not engage in the above analysis based in our case law, 

but instead set forth the following hypothetical: 

Consider two defendants who separately commit identical offenses in 

King County, Washington. The first defendant commits his offense in a 

jurisdiction that has ample resources and an excellent investigation 

unit. As a result, the evidence in that case is substantial and the case 

against that defendant is strong on the merits. The second defendant, 

however, commits his offense in a jurisdiction that has fewer resources 

and an undertrained, overtaxed police force. The evidence in that case 

is comparatively sparse, and the case against that defendant is weak 

on the merits. Both defendants are subsequently charged with 

aggravated murder in the first degree. Both defendants submit identical 

evidence of mitigation to the prosecutor. The prosecutor declines to file 

the notice of intent as to the second defendant but does file the notice 

as to the first. The difference in the result has nothing whatsoever to do 

with individual moral culpability of the respective defendants but hinges 

rather on the wholly unrelated factor of the strength of the evidence in 

the State's case as to guilt. In this hypothetical, insufficiency of proof of 

mitigation was clearly not the consideration guiding the prosecutor's 

discretion .... 

13 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 88411-1) 

CP at 622. This hypothetical unrealistically assumes that there are two identical 

crimes and two identical defendants and thereby forecloses the possibility of an 

individualized assessment by asking us to assume everything is equal except for the 

strength of the evidence at hand. Thus, the hypothetical does not illustrate a realistic 

equal protection violation but demonstrates exactly why we require individualized 

determinations from our prosecuting attorneys. In reality, prosecutors must make 

individual assessments by looking at the crime, the mitigation packet, the strength of 

evidence, the desires of surviving family members, and many other factors 

governing the ultimate decision to seek capital punishment. Only by 

engaging in such a multifaceted, individualized consideration do prosecuting 

attorneys comply with the equal protection clause. 

CONCLUSION 

The King County prosecuting attorney followed the statutory requirements 

when he considered whether mitigating circumstances merited leniency and when 

he determined that they did not. The fact that he also considered the strength of the 

case is inconsequential. Indeed, holistic assessments that take into account various 

mitigating circumstances, the facts of the case, and the strength of evidence are just 

the type of individualized determinations we require of our prosecutors. Without a 

flexible weighing of various factors, prosecutors likely would make standardless 

decisions that violate equal protection principles. For these reasons, we reverse the 

trial court and remand this matter with instructions to reinstate the notices of special 

sentencing proceeding so that the capital prosecutions against McEnroe and 

Anderson may finally proceed to trial. 

14 
No. 88410-2 (consolidated with No. 8841'1-1) 

WE CONCUR 

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