J-S21010-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON P. LLOYD 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 869 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order May 31, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004118-2008

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 3, 2018

Appellant, Aaron P. Lloyd, appeals pro se from the May 31, 2017 order 

denying his motion to enforce a negotiated plea agreement. We affirm.

As our disposition is based on the procedural posture of this case, we 

decline to set forth the factual background. On August 25, 2008, Appellant 

pled guilty to aggravated assault1 and several charges at a different docket 

number. Appellant was immediately sentenced to an aggregate term of four 

and one-half to nine years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct 

appeal.

On June 19, 2009, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the PostConviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Counsel was 

appointed and filed an amended petition. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.
J-S21010-18

- 2 -

PCRA petition. This Court affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied allowance 

of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 11 A.3d 1040 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 825 (Pa. 2011). 

Thereafter, Appellant was released on parole. Appellant violated the 

terms of his parole and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole 

(“PBPP”) revoked Appellant’s parole and imposed backtime. On March 15, 

2017, Appellant filed a document he titled a motion to enforce his negotiated 

plea agreement arguing that the application of 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(2) 

violated the terms of his plea agreement.

2

 On May 31, 2017, the trial court 

denied the motion. This timely appeal followed.3

Appellant presents two4issues for our review:

1. [Did the trial court err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to 

consider Appellant’s motion?

2. Is the Commonwealth barred from applying 61 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6138(a)(2) to Appellant because of the terms of his plea 

agreement?]

 

2 That section provides that 

If the parolee’s recommitment is so ordered, the parolee shall be 

reentered to serve the remainder of the term which the parolee 

would have been compelled to serve had the parole not been 

granted and, except as provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be 

given no credit for the time at liberty on parole.

61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(2).

3 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925.

4 Appellant lists three issues; however, his second and third issues raise nearly

identical claims. Hence, we have combined them into one issue. 
J-S21010-18

- 3 -

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to 

consider his motion to enforce his plea agreement. “Whether a court has 

subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law, making our standard of 

review de novo and the scope of our review plenary.” Hendricks v. 

Hendricks, 175 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

The Commonwealth incorrectly argues that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction over Appellant’s motion because it was an untimely PCRA petition. 

Appellant’s motion, however, was not an attempt to attack his judgment of 

sentence entered in the above-captioned matter. Moreover, his claim was not 

cognizable under the PCRA. Cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) (listing claims 

cognizable under the PCRA). His motion was properly construed as a collateral 

attack on PBPP’s order revoking his parole and imposing backtime because he 

attacked PBPP’s application of section 6138(a)(2) in his case. Hence, the trial 

court correctly concluded that the Commonwealth Court had exclusive

jurisdiction over Appellant’s claim. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 761 and 763; Moore 

v. Roth, 331 A.2d 509, 510 (Pa. Super. 1974); see also McGriff v. 

Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 809 A.2d 455, 458 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2002), aff'd, 838 A.2d 564 (Pa. 2003), citing Davis v. Pennsylvania Bd. of 

Prob. & Parole, 398 A.2d 992 (Pa. 1979) (“Jurisdiction over complaints 

sounding in mandamus against State agencies administering the parole 

system, where the complaint is not a direct or collateral attack on the 
J-S21010-18

- 4 -

conviction or sentence, is vested exclusively in the Commonwealth Court.”). 

As the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s motion, we need not 

address Appellant’s second issue.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/3/2018