SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4139-17T3

 A-5085-17T3

 A-5677-17T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHAQUILLE JOHN, a/k/a

JOHN SHAQUILLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL ATKINSON, 

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-4139-17T3

v.

JAHID T. WATSON, a/k/a

JAHAD T. WATSON, 

JAHID T. WATTSON, 

JIHAD WATSON, and

JAHID GREEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted (A-4139-17/A-5677-17) and

Argued (A-5085-17) December 1, 2020 –

Decided December 15, 2020

Before Judges Haas and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 15-03-

0210.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant Shaquille John (Michael A. Priarone, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent in A-4139-17 (Sarah C. Hunt, Deputy 

Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

Michele E. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant Michael 

Atkinson (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Michele E. Friedman, of counsel and on the 

briefs).

Catlin A. Davis, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent in A-5085-17 (Gurbir S. Grewal, 
3

A-4139-17T3

Attorney General, attorney; Catlin A. Davis, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Appellant Michael Atkinson filed a pro se 

supplemental brief.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant Jahid T. Watson (Amira R. Scurato, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent in A-5677-17 

(Meredith L. Balo, Special Deputy Attorney 

General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and 

on the briefs).

Appellant Jahid T. Watson filed a pro se supplemental 

brief.

PER CURIAM

In these three appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for 

purposes of this opinion, defendants Shaquille John, Michael Atkinson, and 

Jahid Watson appeal from the Law Division's order denying their motion to 

suppress evidence seized in a police search of a motel room. Having 

considered defendants' arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we 

affirm.

I.

On March 13, 2015, a Union County grand jury returned a ten-count 

indictment charging defendants with first-degree robbery in violation of 
4

A-4139-17T3

N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b) (count one); second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery 

in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and/or (2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b) (count 

two); first-degree murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and/or (a)(2) 

(count three); first-degree felony murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) 

(count four); first-degree attempted murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-

1(a)(1)/N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count five); second-degree unlawful 

possession of a handgun in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count six); 

second-degree unlawful possession of an assault firearm in violation of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f) (count seven); fourth-degree possession of a large capacity 

ammunition magazine in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (count eight); and 

second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose in violation of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count nine). The indictment also charged Watson 

separately with first-degree promoting organized street crime in violation of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(a) (count ten).

In January 2016, John filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized 

during the search of the motel room, and the other defendants joined the 

motion. Following a multi-day hearing, Judge Regina Caulfield denied the 

motion and rendered a thorough forty-page written decision explaining the 

bases for her rulings.
5

A-4139-17T3

On March 15, 2018, defendants each pled guilty to first-degree

aggravated manslaughter in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) under an 

amended count three. 1 Judge Caulfield sentenced: (1) John to twenty-two 

years in prison, subject to the 85% parole ineligibility provisions of the No 

Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2; (2) Atkinson to eighteen 

years in prison, subject to NERA; and (3) Watson to an aggregate twelve-year 

term subject to NERA. The judge also required each defendant to complete a 

five-year period of parole supervision upon release. These appeals followed.

On appeal, John raises the following contentions:

[POINT] I

THE ASSAULT RIFLE WAS SEIZED DURING AN 

ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO THE MOTEL ROOM AND 

IN THE COURSE OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH OF 

THE ROOM AND ARREST OF THE OCCUPANTS 

WITHOUT A WARRANT AND WITHOUT 

PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS THE RIFLE.

Atkinson presents the following arguments:

POINT I

THE MOTION COURT COMMITTED 

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION 

1

 Watson also pled guilty to a charge of third-degree aggravated assault under 

a separate indictment.
6

A-4139-17T3

TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED IN THE 

MOTEL ROOM, BECAUSE ANY EXIGENCY WAS 

TOO ATTENUATED TO EXTEND TO THE 

MOTEL. MOREOVER, BECAUSE POLICE 

TRAVELED TO, AND ENTERED THE MOTEL 

ROOM WITH THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF 

INVESTIGATING A SHOOTING, THEY DID NOT 

DISCOVER THE GUN INADVERTENTLY.

A. No Exigency Existed With Respect to the Spring 

Lane Motel Room.

B. The Plain View Doctrine is Inapplicable 

Because the Officer's Discovery of the Gun Was Not 

Inadvertent; the Police Specifically Went to the Motel 

to Investigate a Gun Offense.

POINT II

UNDER STATE V. KING[, 44 N.J. 36 (1965)] AND 

THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, . . . 

[CO-DEFENDANT SNEED] DID NOT 

VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF 

THE HOME AND MOTEL ROOM.

Watson raises these contentions:

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS A RIFLE SEIZED AFTER 

OFFICERS CONDUCTED A WARRANTLESS 

SEARCH OF A MOTEL ROOM. U.S. CONST., 

AMENDS. IV, XIV; N.J. CONST., ART. I, PAR. 7.

A. The Legal Standard for a Motion to Suppress.
7

A-4139-17T3

B. No Probable Cause, Exigency, or Inadvertence 

Existed Under These Facts.

C. The Consent to Search was Invalid as no Basis 

Existed to Seek Consent and the Consent Given was 

Involuntary.

Finally, Atkinson and Watson have each filed virtually identical pro se 

supplemental briefs, in which they raised the following argument:

POINT [I] 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

BY DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING A WARRANTLESS 

SEARCH OF A MOTEL ROOM WITHOUT 

PROBABLE CAUSE, WHICH VIOLATED THE 

FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED 

STATES CONSTITUTION, AND THE GREATER 

PROTECTIONS AFFORDED UNDER THE STATE 

CONSTITUTION, THEREFORE THE CONVICTION 

SHOULD BE REVERSED.

II.

The essential facts of this case are set forth in detail in Judge Caulfield's 

comprehensive opinion and we incorporate her recitation of that history. 

Therefore, we need only summarize the most salient facts here.

At approximately 9:00 p.m. on December 5, 2014, Detective Alfonso 

Colon received a telephone call from an anonymous citizen, who reported 

hearing multiple shots fired in a home on Bond Street. The caller reported 
8

A-4139-17T3

seeing two or three individuals carrying another person out of the house. The 

citizen also saw a man and a woman taking duffel bags or suitcases from the 

house and placing them in a shed. Detective Colon passed this information 

along to dispatch, which informed him that Sergeant Julian Hilongos was 

investigating the report and that a shooting victim had been brought to the 

hospital.

About ten or fifteen minutes later, the citizen called Detective Colon a 

second time. She told the detective a cab had come to the house on Bond 

Street and a man and woman carrying large bags got into it and left the 

premises. Detective Colon forwarded this information to Sergeant Hilongos.

At the hospital, two police officers attempted to interview the shooting 

victim, but he was not cooperative. However, the victim's mother and his 

former girlfriend both identified the victim as defendant Watson. The 

girlfriend reported that Watson called her after he was shot, and she picked 

him up near the home on Bond Street and drove him to the hospital. Another 

individual, later identified as co-defendant Myles Sneed, accompanied Watson 

to the hospital, but he jumped out of the car as soon as it arrived and left the 

scene.
9

A-4139-17T3

Sergeant Hilongos directed the two officers to go to Bond Street to 

locate the house where the shooting occurred. When they were not able to do 

so, they returned to the station. Once there, the officers learned that a taxi had 

been at a home on that street, and called to get the address. The taxi company 

confirmed that one of its drivers had picked up a man and a woman at a 

specific home on Bond Street and had taken them to a motel on Routes 1 and 

9, and then to the Spring Lane Motel.

Because he was concerned that the bags the couple were carrying might 

contain additional victims or weapons, Sergeant Hilongos called for additional 

units, including four members of the Emergency Services Unit (ESU), to check 

for victims or suspects at the Bond Street home and at the Spring Lane Motel. 

He held a briefing for the team around 12:15 a.m. The sergeant and the ESU 

went to the Bond Street home, while another group of officers, including 

Officer Eduardo Andino, went to the motel.

At the Bond Street home, the ESU found a large amount of blood on the 

bottom panel of the screen door. The police knocked, announced their 

presence, and entered the home. The police did not locate any victims or other 

individuals in the home, but found blood on the kitchen floor and on the last 
10 A-4139-17T3

step before the second-floor landing. The officers then secured the home so 

they could obtain a search warrant.

Meanwhile, Officer Andino and the other members of his team had 

arrived at the motel about thirty minutes after the briefing. They went to the 

front office and the night manager allowed them to watch about twenty 

minutes of surveillance footage. From the video, the officers learned that a 

man and a woman matching the description given by the citizen had arrived at 

the motel in a taxi around 10:40 p.m. They carried bags they took from the 

cab into the motel room. The officers shared this information with Sergeant 

Hilongos. 

Believing that these individuals had been present at the scene of the 

shooting and might be carrying weapons, Sergeant Hilongos instructed the 

ESU to report to the motel. The team arrived about seven minutes later. Once 

at the motel, the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence. 

After a couple of minutes, the woman opened the door. The police arrested the 

woman, later identified as co-defendant Nicole Robbins, and the man she was 

with, who was later determined to be co-defendant Sneed. The ESU conducted 

a protective sweep of the room and, in the bathroom, the officers found a rifle. 
11 A-4139-17T3

The officers then secured the room in anticipation of applying for a search 

warrant.

Sneed later consented to a search of the motel room which he had rented, 

and of the house on Bond Street, where he had been staying for some time. 

After Sneed signed the written consent form, the police searched the motel 

room and found "an extended magazine clip," some marijuana, the key and 

receipt for the room, and approximately $900 in cash.

Sometime thereafter, the State was able to connect the rifle found in the 

motel bathroom to an armed robbery of a bodega that occurred on October 19, 

2014. During the robbery, three individuals had entered the store, and two of 

the robbers began shooting their weapons. As a result, the robbers killed one 

victim and wounded another. Shell casings found at the scene matched the 

rifle's shell casings.

After Judge Caulfield denied their motion to suppress the rifle from 

being admitted in evidence at trial, each defendant pled guilty to one count of 

aggravated manslaughter. In their plea colloquies, John and Atkinson testified 

they carried and shot their weapons during the robbery. Watson admitted he 

"planned and participated in" the robbery.
12 A-4139-17T3

III.

In her well-reasoned decision, Judge Caulfield first found that the police 

properly entered the home on Bond Street without a warrant under the officers' 

community-caretaking and emergency aid doctrines. Under the communitycaretaking doctrine, "[c]ourts have allowed warrantless searches . . . when 

police officers have acted not in their law enforcement or criminal 

investigatory role, but rather in a community[-]caretaking function." State v. 

Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009). "In performing these tasks, typically, there is 

not time to acquire a warrant when emergent circumstances arise and an 

immediate search is required to preserve life or property." State v. Edmonds, 

211 N.J. 117, 141 (2012). Our Supreme Court has held, however, that the 

community-caretaking doctrine prohibits "the warrantless entry into or search 

of a home in the absence of some form of exigent circumstances" or 

"objectively reasonable emergency." State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 305, 321 

(2013).

The Court also made clear that "[p]olice officers serving in a 

community-caretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into a 

home under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." Id. at 

323. The emergency-aid doctrine, first enunciated in State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 
13 A-4139-17T3

586 (2004), and later modified in Edmonds, "is derived from the commonsense 

understanding that exigent circumstances may require public safety officials, 

such as the police, . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for the purpose of 

protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury." State v. Hathaway, 

222 N.J. 453, 469 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 

598).

Courts apply a "two-prong test" that considers "the totality of the 

circumstances" to determine whether the emergency-aid doctrine justifies a 

warrantless search of a home. Id. at 470, 472. To that end, the State must 

show that "(1) the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an 

emergency require[d] that he provide immediate assistance to protect or 

preserve life, or to prevent serious injury and (2) there was a reasonable nexus 

between the emergency and the area or places to be searched." Id. at 470 

(alteration in original) (quoting Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 132). The doctrine does 

not require "certitude" of danger but only reasonable belief that immediate 

action is required. Ibid. (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599). Reasonableness 

turns on the circumstances at the time and "does not depend on whether it is 

later determined that the danger actually existed." Ibid.
14 A-4139-17T3

If an emergency exists, "[t]he emergency-aid doctrine, particularly when 

applied to the entry of a home, must be 'limited to the reasons and objectives 

that prompted' the need for immediate action." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 134 

(quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599). "Therefore, police officers looking for an 

injured person may not extend their search to small compartments such as 

'drawers, cupboards, or wastepaper baskets.'" Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470 

(quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599). "If, however, contraband is 'observed in 

plain view by a public safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is 

not exceeding the scope of the search,' that evidence will be admissible." Ibid.

(quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599-600). "When the exigency that justifies 

immediate action dissipates, the rationale for searching without a warrant is no 

longer present." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 134.

Applying these principles, Judge Caulfield found 

that the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that 

there was an injured person at [the Bond Street home]. 

As Sergeant Hilongos testified, blood was visible on 

the door to the home. A concerned citizen had 

reported hearing shots fired from or near the house. 

Thus, the officers had a reasonable and objective basis 

to believe that there might have been an injured 

person or persons inside the home. For those reasons, 

they were permitted to enter the house under the 

emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. 

Once inside, the officers conducted a limited search 
15 A-4139-17T3

during which they found more blood, confirming that 

someone had been injured inside the home.

The judge then turned to the search of the motel room that occurred 

shortly after the police cleared the house on Bond Street. After reviewing all 

of the circumstances surrounding the search, Judge Caulfield concluded that 

the police properly entered the room without a warrant because they had 

probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found in the room, and there 

were exigent circumstances supporting the need to immediately enter the 

room.

It is well established that "[p]robable cause is a flexible, nontechnical 

concept" requiring the "balancing of the governmental need for enforcement of 

the criminal law against the citizens' constitutionally protected right of 

privacy." State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 116 (1968). Generally, probable 

cause is understood to mean "less than legal evidence necessary to convict 

though more than mere naked suspicion." State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 210-

11 (2001) (citation omitted). "When determining whether probable cause 

exists, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, and they must 

deal with probabilities." Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361 (2000) 

(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 238 (1983)). 
16 A-4139-17T3

As Judge Caulfield noted, the police here relied upon two reports 

received from a concerned citizen. Our Supreme Court has noted that an 

ordinary citizen reporting a crime to the police is not viewed with suspicion, 

and courts assume that a further demonstration of reliability is not necessary to 

justify a stop of the person identified in the citizen's report. State v. Basil, 202 

N.J. 570, 586 (2010) (citing State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 212 (2008)). 

"Thus, an objectively reasonable police officer may assume that an ordinary 

citizen reporting a crime, which the citizen purports to have observed, is 

providing reliable information." Ibid. (citing State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 

362 (2002)). "There is an assumption grounded in common experience that 

such a person is motivated by factors that are consistent with law enforcement 

goals." State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 506 (1986).

After considering these factors, the judge found that the citizen's reports, 

which the police were able to corroborate, provided the officers with

probable cause to believe that a shooting had occurred 

at [the Bond Street home] and that the room at the 

motel contained evidence of that shooting. Given the 

concerned caller's information, it was reasonable for 

the officers to believe that the two individuals at the 

motel were potential suspects in the shooting. 

Moreover, it appears that these two individuals may 

have taken evidence from the [Bond Street home] 

crime scene to the motel room. Indeed, the concerned 

caller observed two individuals removing possible 
17 A-4139-17T3

evidence from [the Bond Street home] shortly after the 

shooting. Based upon the above, there was clearly a 

"fair probability" that evidence of the shooting would 

be found in the motel room.

In addition to concluding that the police had probable cause to search the 

motel room, Judge Caulfield also determined that the exigent circumstances 

that existed the night of the shooting fully supported their choice to proceed in 

the absence of a warrant. In determining that exigent circumstances were 

present, the judge considered the following factors as required by our Supreme 

Court's decision in State v. Walker:

the degree of urgency and the amount of time 

necessary to obtain a warrant; the reasonable belief 

that the evidence was about to be lost, destroyed, or 

removed from the scene; the severity or seriousness of 

the offense involved; the possibility that a suspect was 

armed or dangerous; and the strength or weakness of 

the underlying probable cause determination.

[State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 292 (2013) (quoting 

State v. Deluca, 168 N.J. 626, 632-33 (2001)).]

In finding that the circumstances confronting the officers were exigent, 

the judge pointed to the fact that "the officers were investigating a serious 

crime involving a shooting." At that point, "[t]he gunman was still at large 

and the gun used in Watson's shooting was missing. Thus, the police had an 
18 A-4139-17T3

immediate and urgent need to locate the shooter and the weapon before other 

members of the public were harmed."

In addition, the judge observed that "the officers had reason to believe 

that the two individuals in the motel room were armed" and ample "reason to 

be concerned about the welfare of other occupants of the motel." The judge 

found that the police were also concerned the individuals in the room were 

attempting to conceal contraband. Under these circumstances, Judge Caulfield 

ruled "that there was sufficient exigency to justify the warrantless search of the 

motel room."

The judge rejected defendants' argument that too much time had passed 

since the shooting at the Bond Street home to permit the situation at the motel 

room to be deemed exigent. The judge noted that Officer Andino did not 

arrive at the motel until 12:45 a.m. The officers then watched the surveillance 

video and called for the ESU team to come to the motel. The officers entered 

the room at approximately 1:30 a.m. Thus, Judge Caulfield held that "[t]he 

limited time between the shooting at the house on Bond Street and the 

warrantless entry into the motel room created a substantial likelihood that the 

motel occupants were still armed and potentially dangerous."
19 A-4139-17T3

Judge Caulfield also found that due to the exigent circumstances, the 

police were not required to obtain a telephonic warrant before entering the 

motel room. As the judge explained:

[T]he officers were only able to confirm that the 

individuals in the Spring Lane Motel were somehow 

involved in the shooting late at night. Securing a 

telephonic warrant would certainly have required 

additional time after midnight which would have had 

the potential to create a safety risk to the police or 

public . . . . Waiting for a warrant might have alerted 

the occupants of the motel room to the officers' 

presence which could have created a dangerous 

situation for both the police and the public.

The judge ruled that the protective sweep the police conducted after 

entering the motel room was properly limited in scope. Police officers are 

allowed "to conduct a limited 'protective sweep' of a residence when necessary 

for safety reasons." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 426 (2014) (citation 

omitted). A protective sweep is "a quick and limited search of premises, . . . 

and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others[,] . . . narrowly 

confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might 

be hiding." Ibid. (alteration in original).

Thus, Judge Caulfield found that the police properly checked the 

bathroom to see if anyone was hiding there. Once they entered the bathroom, 
20 A-4139-17T3

the officers saw the rifle in plain view. The plain view exception to the 

warrant requirement has three elements:

(1) "the police officer must be lawfully in the viewing 

area"; (2) "the officer has to discover the evidence 

'inadvertently,' meaning that he did not know in 

advance where evidence was located nor intend 

beforehand to seize it"; and (3) "it has to be 

'immediately apparent' to the police that the items in 

plain view were evidence of a crime, contraband, or 

otherwise subject to seizure."[2]

[State v. Reininger, 430 N.J. Super. 517, 535-36, 

(App. Div. 2013) (quoting State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 

210, 236 (1983)).]

Judge Caulfield found that prongs one and three of the plain view 

exception were met because the police properly entered the motel room to 

conduct a protective sweep due to the exigent circumstances confronting them. 

In addition, it was "immediately apparent" that the rifle was contraband.

Defendants argued that the discovery of the rifle was not inadvertent 

because the police entered the motel room to determine whether it contained 

evidence of the shooting on Bond Street. However, Judge Caulfield found that 

"the discovery of the assault rifle was inadvertent as the officers had no 

advance knowledge that a weapon would be in the bathroom."

2

 On November 15, 2016, our Supreme Court held prospectively "that an 

inadvertent discovery of contraband or evidence of a crime is no longer a 

predicate for a plain-view seizure." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 82 (2016).
21 A-4139-17T3

Finally, the judge rejected defendants' contention that Sneed did not 

knowingly and voluntarily consent to the search of the Bond Street home and 

the motel room. As Judge Caulfield explained, in State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 

352 (1965), our Supreme Court set forth various non-exhaustive factors to 

guide the analytical framework, and concluded that in order for a search "[t]o 

be voluntary, the consent must be 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and 

intelligently given.'" (Citation omitted). In her written decision, the judge 

considered all of the King factors and found "that the atmosphere surrounding 

Sneed's consent was not inherently coercive."

IV.

On appeal, defendants raise the same arguments they unsuccessfully 

presented to Judge Caulfield. Defendants again assert that the police 

improperly entered the motel room without probable cause to do so. They 

contend that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to permit the 

police to look for victims of the shooting, weapons, or other evidence of the 

crime. Defendants also repeat their argument that the rifle was not found 

"inadvertently" under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 

Finally, they allege that Sneed's written consent to the search of both the home 

and the motel room was not voluntary.
22 A-4139-17T3

As discussed above, however, Judge Caulfield considered each and 

every one of these contentions and rendered a thoughtful written decision fully 

explaining all of her rulings. When reviewing an order denying a motion to 

suppress evidence, we accept a trial judge's findings of fact if they are 

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Gamble, 218 N.J. at 

424 (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). Deference should be 

afforded to a trial judge's findings when they are "substantially influenced by 

his [or her] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of 

the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 

146, 161 (1964). If the trial court's decision is based upon a legal conclusion, 

"we conduct a de novo, plenary review." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 

(2013) (citations omitted).

Applying these principles, we conclude that Judge Caulfield's factual 

findings are fully supported by the record and, in light of those facts, her legal 

conclusions are unassailable. We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons 

set forth in the judge's forty-page written decision.3

3

 We note that the State has argued in all three appeals that defendants lacked 

standing to challenge the admissibility of the rifle because they did not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room. However, as Judge 

Caulfield stated in her opinion, the State consented to defendants' participation 
23 A-4139-17T3

Affirmed.

at the suppression hearing. Therefore, we need not address the State's 

argument.