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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-18-00314-CV

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IN THE ESTATE OF JAMES E. FARMER A/K/A PETE FARMER

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On Appeal from the 356th District Court

Hardin County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 57314

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

This is a probate proceeding involving a petition for declaratory relief and 

demand for an accounting. On July 24, 2018, the trial court signed an order granting 

in part and denying in part the motion for partial summary judgment of plaintiffs 

Angela Khalil and Ryan Farmer, granting in part and denying in part the motions for 

summary judgment of defendants Lisa Ann Farmer Hunt and Lorraine Farmer, 

ordering that plaintiffs take nothing on their claims to the extent those claims seek 

to recover non-probate property or assets, and rendering declaratory judgment as to 

a joint will and characterization of non-probate assets. On August 21, 2018, Angela 
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Khalil and Ryan Farmer filed a notice of appeal asserting that the trial court’s order 

disposed of all issues in the case. Lisa Ann Farmer Hunt and Lorraine Farmer filed 

notices of appeal subject to motions to dismiss the appeal.

Hunt filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. She contends that the trial court’s 

order neither disposed of plaintiffs’ claims, demand for accounting, and petition for 

declaratory judgment as to probate assets, nor disposed of defendants’ claims for 

attorneys’ fees. Hunt alleges that the language in the order stating that all other relief 

requested and not therein granted is denied does not make the order a final order 

because it follows a summary judgment proceeding rather than a trial on the merits. 

No response has been filed.

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har–

Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). In probate proceedings, however, 

“multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete 

issues.” Id. at 192. 

If there is an express statute, such as the one for the complete heirship 

judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and 

appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of 

which the order in question may logically be considered a part, but one 

or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise issues or parties not 

disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory.

Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995). The order is interlocutory 

and not subject to immediate appeal if it “does not end a phase of the proceedings, 
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but sets the stage for the resolution of all proceedings[.]” De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 

S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. 2006).

None of the appellants or cross-appellants have identified a statute that makes 

the order appealable at this time. See, e.g., Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 32.001(c) (West 

2014). The order does not dispose of claims relating to probate assets or attorneys’ 

fees. We conclude the trial court’s order is interlocutory and not subject to immediate 

appeal because it does not dispose of all issues in a particular phase of the 

proceedings below. We grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal for lack 

of jurisdiction without reference to the merits.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

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STEVE McKEITHEN

 Chief Justice

Submitted on October 31, 2018

Opinion Delivered November 1, 2018

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.