COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Fulton, Ortiz and Raphael

D’NIQUA KESHAE WILLIAMS

MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0869-21-1 PER CURIAM

MAY 17, 2022

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS

Bryant L. Sugg, Judge

(Scott Michael Ehrenworth, on brief), for appellant. Appellant 

submitting on brief.

(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Justin B. Hill, Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Appellant, D’Niqua Keshae Williams, appeals from the decision of the Circuit Court of the 

City of Newport News revoking and resuspending a portion of her previously suspended sentence. 

Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing four months of her ten-year 

suspended sentence because “the absconding amounted to simple confusion on [her] part, [she] 

maintained steady employment, and she avoided incurring any new criminal charges.” Appellant 

waived oral argument but the Commonwealth did not. After examining the briefs and record in this 

case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly 

without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm the decision of the trial court.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

UNPUBLISHED
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BACKGROUND

On May 31, 2019, the trial court convicted appellant of burglary and imposed a sentence of 

ten years’ imprisonment, with all time suspended.1

 Appellant’s suspended sentence was 

conditioned on one year of supervised probation, which included appellant “comply[ing] with all 

rules and requirements set by the Probation Officer, to include drug testing/treatment and an anger 

management program.” 

Approximately nine months later, appellant’s probation officer filed a major violation report 

and requested that a capias be issued because appellant had not complied with the conditions of 

probation. Appellant had tested positive for illegal substances, had failed to report for color code, 

had failed to report for intake appointments with South Eastern Family Project, and had not yet 

begun or completed anger management. The trial court issued a rule to show cause. Appellant 

appeared before the court, and the matter was continued. Appellant’s probation officer 

subsequently filed an addendum, reporting that appellant had absconded from supervision. After 

appellant did not appear at the continued hearing, the trial court issued a capias. Appellant was 

arrested and released on bond. Appellant’s probation officer then informed the trial court that 

appellant had failed to report and maintain contact as instructed. 

At the revocation hearing, the trial court received into evidence the probation officer’s major 

violation report and addenda. Appellant acknowledged that she had failed to maintain contact with 

her probation officer for several reasons. Appellant stated that she was “confused” because of the 

various court dates and the changes with her probation officer. Appellant further offered that she 

had broken her foot and was dealing with the death of her sister from coronavirus. She stated that 

she had problems with her mail and had “just recently got the letter” from her probation officer 

1 The trial court also convicted appellant of misdemeanor assault and battery and imposed 

a sentence of twelve months’ incarceration, with all time suspended.
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about a missed meeting. And appellant explained that she had failed to contact her probation officer 

because she was preoccupied with her job and her children. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, the Commonwealth emphasized that it was appellant’s 

“duty to follow up [with her probation officer] and follow the terms and conditions of the [c]ourt.” 

The Commonwealth argued that probation “was not a priority for her, and she needs to face some 

consequences for not making it a priority.” The Commonwealth noted that the guidelines 

recommended an active sentence between three months and one year. It asked the trial court to 

revoke appellant’s previously suspended sentence and impose an active sentence of “at least 3 

months.” Although appellant acknowledged that she did “need to face consequences,” she 

emphasized that she had not “pick[ed] up” any new charges and that she had a job. Appellant asked 

the trial court to deviate downward from the guidelines or sentence her at the low end of the 

guidelines. In allocution, appellant asked the trial court to consider that she was a single mother of 

four “small children,” ranging from one to seven years of age. 

After hearing the evidence and arguments, the trial court advised appellant that she needed 

to stay in contact with her probation officer or to ask her attorney for help. The trial court found 

appellant in violation of her probation, revoked her previously suspended sentence, and resuspended 

all but four months. This appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked her previously 

suspended sentence and imposed an active sentence of four months. After suspending a sentence, a

trial court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that 

occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the 

court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “When a defendant fails to comply with the terms and conditions of a 

suspended sentence, the trial court has the power to revoke the suspension of the sentence in whole 
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or in part.” Alsberry v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 314, 320 (2002). “In revocation appeals, the 

trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of 

abuse of discretion.’” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)). “The evidence is considered in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below.” Id.

Appellant acknowledges that the trial court had the authority to revoke her suspended 

sentence for failure to comply with the terms of probation. Nevertheless, appellant maintains that 

the trial court’s sentence was “excessively harsh” and “unwarranted under the totality of the 

circumstances.” Appellant argues that although she “undoubtedly violated the conditions of her 

probation by failing to maintain contact with her probation officer, [she] didn’t simply disappear 

and live life on the lam.” Appellant notes that she had “maintained employment . . . , supported her 

four young children as a single parent, and did not incur any new criminal charges, aside from the 

probation violation charge.” 

“The statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the 

trial court valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of 

all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740 

(2007). By continuing to disregard the terms of her suspended sentence, appellant demonstrated 

that she was not amenable to rehabilitation. “When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation 

represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and 

sentenced to a term of confinement.’” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) 

(quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). Appellant failed to make 

productive use of the grace that had been extended to her.

The uncontroverted evidence establishes that appellant violated the conditions of her 

probation by failing to maintain contact with her probation officer. At the revocation hearing, the 
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trial court heard appellant’s testimony about her family circumstances and why she failed to 

maintain contact with her probation officer. Appellant testified that she was “confused . . . [about 

who her] probation officer was” and that she was not receiving her mail. Appellant also expressed 

that she had several personal reasons that kept her preoccupied and unable to contact her probation 

officer, including an injury, her job, caring for her children, and the loss of her sister. It was within 

the trial court’s purview to weigh any mitigating factors appellant presented. Keselica v. 

Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000). The record establishes that the trial court had 

sufficient cause to revoke appellant’s suspended sentence. Accordingly, we hold that the sentence 

the trial court imposed represents a proper exercise of discretion. See Alsberry, 39 Va. App. at 

321-22 (finding that the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the defendant’s previously 

suspended sentence in its entirety “in light of the grievous nature of [the defendant’s] offenses 

and his continuing criminal activity”).

Moreover, to the extent that appellant argues that her sentence was disproportionate, this 

Court declines to engage in a proportionality review in cases that do not involve life sentences 

without the possibility of parole. Cole v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 642, 653-54 (2011). We 

noted in Cole that the Supreme Court of the United States “has never found a non-life ‘sentence 

for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual 

punishment’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 653 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 

U.S. 370, 372 (1982) (per curiam)). Cf. Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 243 (2016) 

(rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 133-year active sentence because the sentence was 

imposed for “eighteen separate crimes”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

Affirmed.