J-A28037-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

R.H.B. 

Appellant

v.

B.L.C.C.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1821 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered May 31, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Domestic Relations 

at No(s): No. 2010-14041

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 04, 2020

Appellant, R.H.B. (“Father”), files this appeal from the order dated and 

entered May 31, 2019, in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, 

with regard to custody of his child with B.L.C.C. (“Mother”), daughter E.G.C.B., 

born in December 2009 (“Child”). The order maintained shared legal custody 

and awarded resumption of shared physical custody on a week-to-week basis 

with exchanges on Fridays after school or at 5:00 p.m., as initially set forth in 

the Agreed Custody Order of August 1, 2013, and confirmed by Order of 

September 22, 2016. After review, we affirm the trial court’s order.

The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history as follows:

The case commenced on May 27, 2010, with Father’s 

Complaint for Custody. The [c]ourt entered an Interim Agreed 

Order of Custody on January 3, 2012, which provided that the 

parties with [sic] shared legal custody and Mother had primary 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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physical custody of [Child]. Father was provided alternate 

weekends from Friday at 6:00 P.M. to Sunday at 6:00 P.M. The 

Order further set forth a summer schedule which granted Father 

alternating weeks beginning Sunday at 6:00 P.M. to the following 

Sunday at 6[:00] P.M. 

On August 1, 2013[,] the parties entered into an Agreed 

Order providing the parties with equal physical custody of the child 

year-round. The custody schedule followed an alternating weekly 

schedule.

The [c]ourt issued Findings of Fact and an accompanying 

Custody Order on September 22, 2016, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[]

§ 5328, after hearings on February 3, 2016, August 22, 2016, and 

September 6, 2016, an in camera interview of the child on 

February 5, 2016, and after review of the transcripts of the 

proceedings before the Honorable Patricia E. Coonahan from April 

2, 2015.

Those Findings noted that Father filed three Emergency 

Petitions for Modification of the Agreed Order of January 3, 2012, 

all of which sought sole physical and legal custody of [Child]. Of 

note, this [c]ourt stated that, should Father be granted sole 

physical and legal custody, he would likely completely remove 

Mother as an influence from [Child]’s life. Moreover, Father has 

expressed no interest in maintaining the child’s relationship with 

her step-brothers or Mother’s extended family. On the other 

hand, Mother felt the child’s relationship with Father was 

important and that she would encourage continuing contact 

between Father and [Child]. This [c]ourt’s in camera interview of 

the child in 2016 revealed her desire for the 50/50 schedule to 

remain the same.

Almost six months later, on February 1, 2017, Father filed 

an Emergency Petition for Special Relief, which simply stated that 

Mother failed to respond to his request that she switch an 

aggregate of thirteen (13) days with him due to his need to seek 

immediate medical attention. That same day, an Order was

issued directing the parties to co-parenting counseling[,] where 

they resolved the matter.

Shortly after, however, on February 15, 2017, Mother filed 

a Petition for Contempt, in which she requested a shift in [Child]’s 

school from private to public school. Mother alleged that Father 

has repeatedly failed to transport [Child] to school and that he 

completely refuses to share any information or documentation 
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relating to [Child]’s medical, educational or extracurricular 

activities. Mother further alleged that Father has actively resisted 

all of her attempts to cooperate and co-parent, as directed in the 

[c]ourt Orders of February 4, 2016, April 22, 2016, September 22, 

2016 and February 1, 2017.

Following a Short List proceeding on June 5, 2017, the 

undersigned again directed the parties to co-parenting counseling 

to address the school issue, which was unsuccessful.

In the August 8, 2017, Agreed Order, following partial 

testimony, the parties agreed that Mother would have primary 

physical custody of [Child] due to Father’s abrupt decision to 

accept a teaching assignment in Poland for the 2017-18 academic 

year. The parties further agreed that [Child] would attend 

McKinley Elementary School in the Abington School District for 

2017-18 academic year. Father was also to provide Mother with 

[Child]’s CHIP card so that she could enroll [Child] under her 

medical insurance, and Mother was to notify Father upon obtaining 

a dentist for [Child]. The parties also agreed to find a mutually 

acceptable therapist for co-parenting counseling.

On November 29, 2017, Father filed yet another Petition to 

Modify, as he was abruptly returning from Poland on December 

21, 2017, and requested primary physical custody of [Child].

Following another Short List proceeding, the January 30, 

2018, Interim Order directed the parties to commence family 

therapy “FORTHWITH” to focus on enabling Father to have a 

gradually increased custodial schedule. The Order also provided 

Father with partial physical custody every Wednesday after school 

overnight through Thursday morning, as well as alternate 

weekends from Friday after school overnight through Sunday at 

6[:00 P.M.]

Rather than focus on resolving their issues, and despite 

being represented by counsel, Father personally filed three 

additional Petitions on February 14, 2018. The first was a Petition 

for Contempt, alleging that Mother has abused alcohol during her 

custodial time, that she has failed to follow through with 

contacting the co-parenting counselor, and that Mother

purposefully disabled [Child]’s cellphone (given to her by Father 

before leaving for Poland) so as to obstruct their ability to 

communicate. Father claimed that this interference was the main 

reason he returned early from his overseas teaching assignment.
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The second was yet another Emergency Petition to Modify 

Custody, requesting that the August 1, 2013, Agreed Order (which 

provided shared legal and equal physical custody) be reinstated.” 

His Petition, again, alleged Mother that [sic] disabled [Child]’s 

cellphone, and he pointed to specific instances where Mother has 

come in contact with law enforcement (yet notably, Father did not

provide actual police reports or records otherwise to substantiate 

these allegations).

Father’s third pleading was a Petition for Special Relief, 

which “demanded” the undersigned recuse himself based on 

perceived disrespect toward Father.

Following a Short List proceeding, the April 16, 2018,

Interim Order noted the parties had not yet commenced family 

therapy as directed in the numerous aforementioned Court Orders 

and directed the parties to select a therapist or to submit two 

names to the undersigned for selection.

Due to the parties’ inability to reach a consensus, the May 

1, 2018, Order was entered in which the [c]ourt appointed Harry 

Carl Amarnick and it was anticipated that at least four (4) joint 

therapy sessions would occur prior [to] the June 2018 Short List.

A few days later, the May 7, 2018, Order was entered which 

denied Father’s Motion for Recusal.

Following yet another Short List proceeding, the June 27, 

2018, Interim Order noted the parties had still not yet commenced 

family therapy and directed the parties to agree upon a 

replacement therapist for Harry Carl Amarnick; however, this 

never occurred.

The Order also specifically directed that a protracted hearing 

would be scheduled only upon the following: (i) the parties’ 

attendance of an aggregate of six (6) months’ of co-parenting 

sessions; (ii) Father’s verification that he provided Mother with

[Child]’s dental and CHOP medical records; and (iii) the parties’ 

utilization of the “Our Family Wizard” program as an exclusive 

means of communication.

Several months later, on January 18, 2019, Father filed 

another Emergency Petition to Modify, requesting sole legal and 

physical custody of [Child]. He alleged that he attempted to 

attend joint co-parenting sessions but that Mother interfered with 

scheduling future appointments after the second session. Once 
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again, Father also pointed to the same law enforcement contact 

Mother and household members have had, yet again still failed to 

provide any documentation of those alleged incidents.

The January 24, 2019, Order directed the parties to an 

expedited Custody Conciliation Conference, in which the February 

5, 2019, Conciliator’s Report summed up the dynamics of this case 

in a nutshell: “[t]hese parties require more than co-parenting 

counseling. Their joint inability to attempt to work together 

indicates fundamental issues that both parties need to work 

through. Mother believes that she is right. Father believes that

not only is he right, but that Mother is wrong. This child is caught

in their web of distrust.”

On March 4, 2019, Mother failed to appear for a Short List 

proceeding and an Order that day directed the parties to 

participate in one additional co-parenting session with Harry 

Amarnick prior to the protracted [h]earing.

On April 4, 2019, the undersigned presided over a 

protracted [h]earing on five (5) of Father’s [p]etitions and 

Mother’s Petition for Contempt (related to co-parenting).1 On 

April 10, the undersigned conducted an in[]camera interview of 

[Child].

After a review of the pleadings and consideration of all the 

testimony and Exhibits presented at the April 4th Hearing, as well 

as the [in camera] interview of [Child], the undersigned entered 

the May 31, 2019, Order which maintained shared legal custody 

and reinstated the alternating weekly physical custody schedule 

per the parties’ Agreed Order of August 1, 2013, and as later 

confirmed by the undersigned in the Court Order of September 

22, 2016.

Aside from the custodial schedule, the Order also delineated 

the parties’ need for co-parenting and individual therapy, as the 

large majority of the issues brought before this [c]ourt clearly 

stem from this underlying problem: their joint inability to attempt 

____________________________________________

1 Mother and Father were present and represented by counsel, and each 

testified on their own behalf. In addition, Mother presented the testimony of 

S.P., maternal aunt. 
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to work together which indicates fundamental issues that both 

parties need to work through.

In essence, the [c]ourt realized that little to nothing had 

changed since the issuance of its comprehensive September 22, 

2016, Findings of Fact. The parties simply refuse to cooperate 

and co-parent in the best interest of [Child], but rather continue 

to blame each other without seeing how their own refusal to work 

together has detrimentally affected [Child]. In the May 31, 2019,

Order, the undersigned provided that if the parties desired 

Findings of Fact, either could request so within five (5) days, and 

both parties timely did so. As a result, comprehensive Findings of 

Fact, consisting of twenty-five (25) pages, were issued on July 1, 

2019.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 7/23/19, at 1-7 (emphasis in original) 

(footnotes omitted).

Father, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal on June 21, 

2019, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the trial court erred in entering a custody order after 

a trial without issuing Findings of Fact?

B. Whether the trial court erred in entering a custody order after 

a trial without issuing an opinion setting forth a discussion of the 

sixteen factors required by 23 Pa.C.S.[] section 532[8] in the 

custody determination?

C. Whether the trial court erred in entering an order for shared 

legal and physical custody of the child?

D. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in 

requiring the child to remain in the Abington [S]chool [D]istrict 

despite evidence which favored private school for the child?

E. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in 

ordering that the child remain in [M]other’s home despite 
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evidence of drug use, neglect and truancy by household 

members?

F. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and demonstrated 

a clear bias against [Father] during the [c]ourt proceedings and 

in the Findings of Fact prepared by the trial judge?[2]

Father’s Brief at 2-3.

In custody cases under the Child Custody Act, (“the Act”), 23 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 5321-5340, our standard of review is as follows:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings 

of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of 

record, as our role does not include making independent factual 

determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility 

and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial 

judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. 

However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or 

inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether 

the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the

evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial 

court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in 

light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted); see 

also E.R. v. J.N.B., 129 A.3d 521, 527 (Pa.Super. 2015) appeal denied, 635 

Pa. 754, 129 A.3d 521 (2016).

____________________________________________

2 While Father did not raise his sixth issue related to bias in his Rule 1925 

concise statement, to the extent that Father’s issues are interconnected and 

the issue of bias was raised therein and in conjunction with his other issues, 

we find it preserved and address it below. See Krebs v. United Refining 

Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that a failure to preserve 

issues by raising them both in the concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal and statement of questions involved portion of the brief on appeal 

results in a waiver of those issues).
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This Court consistently has held:

[t]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters 

should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature 

of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on 

the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained 

by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding 

cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed 

record. 

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Jackson 

v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa.Super. 2004)). In addition,

[a]lthough we are given a broad power of review, we are 

constrained by an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating 

the court’s order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but if the court’s judgment is manifestly unreasonable 

as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is abused. An 

abuse of discretion is also made out where it appears from a 

review of the record that there is no evidence to support the 

court’s findings or that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence.

M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 18-19 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (citations

omitted).

The paramount concern in any custody case decided under the Act is 

the best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5328, 5338. Section 5323 

of the Act provides for the following types of awards:

(a) Types of award.—After considering the factors set forth in 

section 5328 (relating to factors to consider when awarding 

custody), the court may award any of the following types of 

custody if it is in the best interest of the child:

(1) Shared physical custody.

(2) Primary physical custody.

(3) Partial physical custody.
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(4) Sole physical custody.

(5) Supervised physical custody.

(6) Shared legal custody.

(7) Sole legal custody.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a).

Section 5328(a) sets forth the best interest factors that the trial court

must consider in awarding custody. See E.D. v. M.P., 33 A.3d 73, 79-80 n.2 

(Pa.Super. 2011). Specifically, Section 5328(a) of the Act provides as follows:

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody

(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and another 

party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can 

better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of 

the child. 

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and 

(2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with 

protective services). 

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf 

of the child. 

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.
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(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the 

other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where 

reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the child 

from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for 

the child’s emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special 

needs of the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability 

to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one 

another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by another 

party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with 

that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).

Further, with regard to the Custody Act, we have stated as follows:

. . . “All of the factors listed in [S]ection 5328(a) are required to 

be considered by the trial court when entering a custody order.” 
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J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa.Super. 2011) (emphasis 

in original). . . .The record must be clear on appeal that the trial 

court considered all the factors. Id.

Section 5323(d) provides that a trial court “shall delineate the 

reasons for its decision on the record in open court or in a written 

opinion or order.” 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 5323(d). Additionally, 

“[S]ection 5323(d) requires the trial court to set forth its 

mandatory assessment of the sixteen [Section 5328(a) custody] 

factors prior to the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice 

of appeal.” C.B. v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946, 955 (Pa.Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, [620 Pa. 727], 70 A.3d 808 (2013). . . .

In expressing the reasons for its decision, “there is no required 

amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all that is 

required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that 

the custody decision is based on those considerations.” M.J.M. v. 

M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, [620

Pa. 710], 68 A.3d 909 (2013). A court’s explanation of reasons 

for its decision, which adequately addresses the relevant factors, 

complies with Section 5323(d). Id.

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 822-23 (Pa.Super. 2014).

In its Findings of Fact, the trial court thoroughly addressed the custody 

factors pursuant to Section 5328(a). Findings of Fact, 7/1/19, at 1-24. Of 

particular importance to the trial court throughout its analysis of the custody 

factors was Father’s attitude towards Mother’s role in Child’s life. Id. By way 

of summary and conclusion, as to factor 16, the court stated:

(16) Another relevant factor.

The relevant factor that permeates this case above all else 

is the continuing concern by the [c]ourt regarding Father’s 

dismissal of Mother’s role in [Child]’s life. As stated in the 2016 

Findings, “Father fails to see that there can be other approaches 

to parenting issues and that rarely is there a “right way” or a 

“wrong way”.

Father’s disdain for Mother and Mother’s family, the very 

people in [Child]’s life that also love her, is so palpable as to 

influence [Child] as she begins to pick up on Father’s cues.
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Notably, Father is not close to any of his own family 

members. His negative attitude towards Mother’s family, and 

towards Mother, on a continuous basis lead to the very clear belief 

that Father desires to create a world where only he exists for 

[Child]: no one else is relevant, no one else is as competent to 

care for her, [Child] only needs Father. This worldview is severely 

misplaced and potentially damaging to a child if not reversed.

This type of behavior leads the [c]ourt to believe that Father 

has embarked on a pattern of conduct that is symptomatic of 

parent alienation.

Parent alienation involves the “programming” of a child by 

one parent to denigrate the other “targeted” parent. The 

alienation involves a set of strategies including, but not limited to, 

bad-mouthing the other parent, creating the impression that the 

other parent is dangerous or incompetent and belittling the 

targeted parent.

Every parent has a fundamental right to have a loving and

unthreatened relationship with their child (absent neglect or 

abuse). To be denied that right by the other parent, without any 

justification, is itself a form of child abuse. Unfortunately, Father 

is incapable of seeing the impact that his behavior is having on 

[Child]. The damage to a child in this situation can be life-long 

and irreversible if proactive measures are not implemented.

As indicated in the September 22, 2016, Order and the May 

31, 2019, Order accompanying these Findings, Father is 

encouraged to pursue individual therapy. If he is genuinely intent 

upon improvement, for his child’s benefit, he will do so (and 

provide copies of the 2016 Findings and these Findings to the 

professional).

The accompanying Order also, once again, strongly 

encourages co-parenting “which is vitally important to the ongoing 

best interest of [Child]”. The ability to work respectfully and 

collaboratively for [Child] going forward is essential.

A question remains as to whether Father will truly reflect 

upon these Findings, and address the issues that are identified, in 

the best interest of his child.

In the event the reinstatement of 50/50 custody is not 

successful, in the end, a shift of primary custody back to Mother 

may be necessary (or a more limited or even supervised custodial 
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schedule and/or a formal parental alienation program for the 

child).

Id. at 22-24 (emphasis in original).

Turning to Father’s issues raised on appeal, we address his first two 

issues together as they are interrelated and Father combines them in his brief. 

Father argues that the trial court failed to address the sixteen custody factors 

set forth by 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a) in its May 31, 2019, custody order. Father’s 

Brief at 3. Father further asserts that the court failed to issue Findings of Fact 

until July 1, 2019, the last day either party was able to file a timely appeal. 

Id. at 39-41.

As to these issues, the trial court reasoned as follows:

Here, Father’s first and second [i]ssues are both entirely 

moot, as the [c]ourt held a protracted [h]earing on April 4, 2019, 

conducted an in camera interview of the minor child on April 10, 

2019, and issued the May 31, 2019, Custody Order which 

delineated what it considered to be the most glaring issue in this 

ongoing custody litigation: the parties’ complete inability to

communicate and co-parent. The May 31st Order strongly 

encouraged the parties to participate in co-parenting counseling 

as well as individual counseling. As previously stated, little to 

nothing has changed within this family dynamic since the 2016 

litigation other than the need, now more than ever, for the parties 

to learn to work together in [Child]’s best interests.

The May 31st Order specifically noted that extensive Findings 

of Fact, consisting of thirteen (13) pages, accompanied the prior 

Custody Order of September 22, 2016 (which resulted after a 

three-day protracted Hearing and a previous in-camera interview 

of [Child]). In addition, the Order also provided that either party 

could submit a request for Findings of Fact within five (5) business 

days of the May 31st Order, which both parties timely did.

As a result, this [c]ourt issued its Findings of Fact on July 1, 

2019. These extensive Findings, at twenty-five (25) pages, fully 

delineated each of the custody factors as the [c]ourt’s rationale 

for maintaining the shared legal and reinstating the shared 
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physical custody schedule as set forth in the August 1, 2013,

Agreed Order (and confirmed by the undersigned in the

September 22, 2016 Order).

Notably, interspersed throughout the July 2019 Findings 

(and as previously noted in the May 31st Order) are references to 

the September 22, 2016, Custody Order and Findings of Fact, as 

almost every instant issue was analogous or identical to those 

discussed in 2016; in particular, again, the parties’ complete 

inability to communicate, even via email or the “Our Family

Wizard” program, which has clearly had an adverse effect on every 

aspect of their approach to custody of the minor child.

It cannot be overstated that the parties are stuck in an everrevolving [c]ourtroom door over the power dynamics in their 

relationship with [Child]. Although Mother attempts to co-parent

with Father, her efforts have been repeatedly and completely 

rejected by him as he sees himself as the “superior” or “better” 

parent. In this sense, Father appears directed at the complete

alienation of [Child] towards Mother, which is evident based on 

his pleadings alone, as well as his substantive testimony 

throughout multiple courtroom proceedings over a three (3) year 

time period.

In any event, Father’s first and second [i]ssues are entirely 

moot, as the [c]ourt timely issued extensive Findings of Fact, 

consisting of twenty-five (25) pages, which addressed each § 

5328 custody factor and fully delineated its reasoning for 

maintaining an equally shared legal and reinstatement of a shared 

physical custody schedule.

Accordingly, the within [i]ssue is without merit, is not 

supported by the facts in this matter, is deemed moot, and should, 

therefore, be dismissed.

T.C.O. at 9-11.

With this, we agree. For the reasons stated by the trial court, Father’s 

claims are without merit.

With the remainder of his issues, which we consider together as they 

are interrelated, Father further challenges the trial court’s determinations as 

to the Section 5328(a) factors and award of custody. Father’s Brief at 42-48. 
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In so arguing, Father highlights concerns as to Mother and her household. Id.

at 42-45. Specifically, Father indicates concern as to members of Mother’s 

household, including Mother’s boyfriend, and Mother’s son, Child’s halfbrother, and his girlfriend. Id. at 44-45. Additionally, Father asserts bias on 

the part of the trial court in its analysis of the custody factors.3 Id. at 46-53. 

Notably, Father concludes,

The tone of the [c]ourt’s Order, Findings of Fact, and 

Opinion is consistently anti-Father to the extent that the [c]ourt 

has difficulty with crediting Father with the few things even the 

Judge must admit favors [] Father’s request for custody. In 

discounting the chaos at Mother’s home, and failing to incorporate 

testimony that favored Father’s request for full custody, the Judge 

became a participant in this custody case rather than the arbiter. 

The fact that Father is retired, able to provide reliable 

transportation, willing to help [] Child with homework and 

transport and support [] Child in extracurricular activities are all 

discounted by the Judge as factors in Father’s favor. Instead[,]

the Judge views these facts as evidence of Father’s controlling 

nature. Meanwhile, [] Mother’s many difficulties and chaotic 

household are minimized wherever possible, allowing the Judge to 

feel justified in leaving her with 50% of the custodial time. . . .

Id. at 53-54.

With regard to the custody factors, we have stated that the trial court

is required to consider all of the Section 5328(a) factors in entering a custody 

____________________________________________

3 Father himself states in his brief, “Again, many of the matters complained of 

on appeal cross over into, and are intertwined with, others.” Father’s Brief at 

42. As such, Father addresses his third, fourth, and fifth issues together. Id.

at 42-46. While arguing bias throughout this discussion, he does, however, 

provide a separate discussion of his sixth issue of bias. Id. at 47-53. As we 

find this largely a challenge to the trial court’s analysis of the custody factors,

as are his challenges to his third, fourth, and fifth issues, we consider the 

remainder of Father’s issues together.
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order. J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa.Super. 2011). Although the 

court is required to give “weighted consideration to those factors which affect 

the safety of the child” pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a), we have 

acknowledged that the amount of weight a court gives any one factor is almost 

entirely discretionary. M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

Critically, as we stated in M.J.M.:

It is within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to 

determine which factors are most salient and critical in 

each particular case. See A.D. v. M.A.B., 989 A.2d 32, 35-36 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (“In reviewing a custody order . . . our role does 

not include making independent factual determinations. . . . In 

addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the 

evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed 

and assessed the witnesses first-hand.”). Our decision here does 

not change that.

Id. (emphasis added). Further, we have also noted that, while the primary 

caretaker doctrine is no longer viable, a court may still consider a parent’s role 

as primary caretaker in its consideration of the custody factors. 

We hasten to add that this conclusion does not mean that a trial 

court cannot consider a parent’s role as the primary caretaker 

when engaging in the statutorily-guided inquiry. As discussed 

above, a trial court will necessarily consider a parent’s status as a 

primary caretaker implicitly as it considers the [S]ection 5328(a) 

factors, and to the extent the trial court finds it necessary to 

explicitly consider one parent’s role as the primary caretaker, it is 

free to do so under subsection (a)(16).

Id.

As we construe this issue, we interpret the issue at its core as a dispute 

to the trial court’s findings of fact and determinations regarding credibility and 

weight of the evidence, as well as the weight attributed to certain factors. 
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Father, in essence, questions the trial court’s conclusions and assessments 

and seeks this court to re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and/or re-assess 

credibility to his view of the evidence. This we cannot do. Under the 

aforementioned standard of review applicable in custody matters, the trial 

court’s findings of fact and determinations regarding credibility and weight of 

the evidence are not disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See C.R.F., 45 

A.3d at 443; see also E.R., 129 A.3d at 527. As we stated in King v. King, 

889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005), “It is not this Court’s function to 

determine whether the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must 

consider whether, ‘based on the evidence presented, given [sic] due deference 

to the trial court’s weight and credibility determinations,’ the trial court erred 

or abused its discretion. . . .” (quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 878 A.2d 127, 

129 (Pa.Super. 2005)). After a thorough review of the record, we find no 

abuse of discretion. 

In the case sub judice, the trial court exhaustively and reasonably 

analyzed and addressed each factor under Section 5328(a). See Findings of 

Fact, 7/1/19, at 1-24. After careful review of the record, we determine that 

the trial court’s findings and determinations regarding the custody factors set 

forth in Section 5328(a) are supported by competent evidence in the record, 

and we will not disturb them. See C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443; see also E.R., 

129 A.3d at 527. As such, Father’s claims are without merit. 

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons we affirm the trial court’s order.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/4/20