Opinion issued August 9, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-15-00989-CV

———————————

ARNOLD & ITKIN, L.L.P., BECK REDDEN LLP, ALBRITTON LAW 

FIRM, KURT ARNOLD, CORY ITKIN, JASON ITKIN, RUSSELL POST, 

FIELDS ALEXANDER, JAS BRAR, AND ERIC ALBRITTON, Appellants

V.

MARIA SANTOS LOPEZ DOMINGUEZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT 

FRIEND OF KAREN MARIEN ANDRADE LOPEZ, ET AL., Appellees

Proceeding on Petition for Permissive Appeal

and

————————————

NO. 01-15-00990-CV

———————————

IN RE ARNOLD & ITKIN, L.L.P., BECK REDDEN LLP, ALBRITTON 

LAW FIRM, KURT ARNOLD, CORY ITKIN, JASON ITKIN, RUSSELL 

POST, FIELDS ALEXANDER, JAS BRAR, AND ERIC ALBRITTON, 

Relators

Petition for Writ of Mandamus
2

O P I N I O N

In this appeal, we determine whether a claim for legal malpractice is ripe for 

adjudication. In the underlying state court action, the clients have sued their former 

lawyers for the lawyers’ alleged negligence in handling their federal court personal 

injury cases. The federal court dismissed the clients’ personal injury cases, ruling 

that Mexico was the proper forum for those suits. But the federal court conditioned 

its dismissal on a return jurisdiction clause, should the Mexican courts refuse to 

exercise jurisdiction over the personal injury claims when properly presented. By a 

petition for a writ of mandamus and a request for a permissive interlocutory appeal, 

the defendant lawyers challenge the trial court’s denial of their plea to the 

jurisdiction, in which they contended that the clients have not presented a legal injury

ripe for adjudication. We hold that the clients’ legal malpractice claims are not ripe 

for adjudication. We therefore grant mandamus relief. We dismiss the request for a 

permissive interlocutory appeal as moot.

BACKGROUND

In the federal court personal injury case, the clients, who are citizens of 

Mexico, sued several American companies and individuals for injuries and deaths

that occurred in an accident on a drilling rig in Mexican waters. The clients alleged 

various causes of action, including products liability and wrongful death, based on 
3

Texas state law, general federal and international maritime law, the Jones Act, and 

Mexican law. 

A. Proceedings in Federal Court and in the Mexican Courts

In the federal personal injury suit, the clients were represented by lawyers with 

the firm Arnold & Itkin, L.L.P. and the Albritton Law Firm, who are relators in this 

mandamus proceeding. The personal injury defendants in the federal suit moved to 

dismiss the federal action on the basis of forum non conveniens. They argued that 

Mexico is the proper forum for the clients’ personal injury claims because the clients 

are Mexican citizens who resided in Mexico and the accident occurred offshore of 

Mexico. Lawyers with relator Beck Redden L.L.P. were retained to assist the clients 

in federal court in opposing the motion to dismiss. In September 2010, the federal 

district court consolidated the personal injury lawsuits for the purpose of briefing 

and deciding the forum non conveniens issue and other issues common to each case.

The federal court then dismissed the clients’ state law claims with prejudice, 

ruling that any state law claims were preempted by the Jones Act. The federal court 

also dismissed the clients’ federal maritime claims, but without prejudice, because 

“[p]laintiffs failed to allege that there was no available remedy in Mexico, as 

required to pursue a federal maritime claim under the Jones Act.”1

 

1 The Jones Act provides that plaintiffs cannot maintain a civil action for death or other 

injury under the Jones Act or under any other maritime law of the United States if: (1) the 

individual suffering the injury or death was not a citizen or permanent resident alien of the 
4

The clients then amended their complaint and abandoned their federal 

maritime claims, but they continued to allege state law claims and claims under 

Mexican law. The federal court again dismissed the state law claims because they 

were preempted by the Jones Act. 

In April 2011, the federal court then conditionally granted the personal injury 

defendants’ motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.

2 As a condition to granting 

the dismissal, the court required the personal injury defendants to stipulate that they 

would “appear and submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a Mexican federal or 

state court, waiving any jurisdictional defenses they might normally possess” and

would “waive any statute of limitations defense that they did not possess as of the 

date each of the seven cases was originally filed.” The personal injury defendants 

complied by filing a stipulation in federal court in which they stipulated that they 

would agree to submit to jurisdiction in Mexico, waive any statute of limitations and 

 

United States at the time of the incident giving rise to the action; (2) the incident occurred 

in the territorial waters or waters overlaying the continental shelf of a country other than 

the United States; and (3) the individual suffering the injury or death was employed at the 

time of the incident by a person engaged in the exploration, development, or production of 

offshore mineral or energy resources. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30105(b). However, this prohibition 

does not apply if “the individual bringing the action establishes that a remedy is not 

available under the laws of (l) the country asserting jurisdiction over the area in which the 

incident occurred or (2) the country in which the individual suffering the injury or death 

maintained citizenship or residency at the time of the incident.” 46 U.S.C.A. § 30105(c).

2 The Honorable Ron Clark granted the motion on May 29, 2009. He subsequently recused 

himself. After the recusal, Judge Clark’s order was vacated and the consolidated case was 

assigned to the Honorable T. John Ward. Judge Ward subsequently granted the motion to 

dismiss on April 20, 2011.
5

laches defenses, agree to discovery in Mexico, and make all witnesses and 

documents available in Mexico. Accordingly, the federal court entered a final order 

conditionally dismissing the case. The court’s dismissal order included a return

jurisdiction clause, providing that:

Should the courts of Mexico refuse to accept jurisdiction of this 

case for reasons other than Plaintiffs’ refusal to pursue an action 

or to comply with the procedural requirements of Mexican 

courts, this Court may reassert jurisdiction upon timely 

notification of the same.

The clients did not appeal this May 4, 2011 order. 

Between February and May of 2013, the lawyers refiled in Mexico eleven of 

the more than eighty original cases. The Mexican courts rejected jurisdiction of the 

cases on the basis that the filings failed to comply with Mexican procedural 

requirements. In October 2013, the Lawyers filed a motion to reinstate the case in 

the federal court, arguing that Mexico had rejected jurisdiction over the cases.3In 

May 2014, the federal court denied this motion, observing that “[b]ecause counsel 

made no attempt to litigate those cases in Mexico in compliance with the court’s 

Memorandum and Order, there is no basis upon which to reopen them here.” With 

regard to the eleven cases that were refiled in Mexico, the federal district court found 

that the clients “did not prosecute the cases in good faith.” Specifically, the district 

 

3 Due to Judge Ward’s retirement, the reinstatement proceeding was heard by a third federal 

judge, the Honorable Marcia Crone.
6

court found that the clients failed to (1) inform the Mexican courts of the personal 

injury defendants’ stipulations consenting to jurisdiction; (2) inform the Mexican 

courts of the federal court’s orders granting dismissal based on forum non 

conveniens; and (3) translate copies of the stipulations and court orders for the 

Mexican court. Accordingly, the court denied the clients’ motion to reinstate their 

underlying lawsuits, and provided that the clients could “not seek reinstatement in 

[the federal district court] unless and until they have pursued their claims in Mexico 

with diligence and good faith, including seeking final appellate review of any 

Mexican dismissal order.” 

Several months after the federal court’s denial of the motion to reinstate the 

clients’ cases, Arnold & Itkin withdrew from representing the clients. In its letter 

withdrawing from representation, it noted that the federal court’s denial of the 

clients’ motion to reinstate “provided a possibility that the cases could be brought in 

the United States,” but expressed a belief that “the chances of the Court accepting 

jurisdiction for these cases even after following all steps is remote.” 

B. The State Court Malpractice Action

The clients did not re-file their claims in Mexico. Instead, alleging that any 

further action in Mexico would be futile, the clients filed this malpractice action in 

the Harris County District Court against the lawyers who represented them in the 

federal suit. In this suit, they seek the recovery of their personal injury damages from 
7

the lawyers based on the recovery they alleged they would have obtained had they 

successfully remained in federal court in the United States.

The clients’ malpractice claim rests on allegations that (1) “the [l]awyers 

negligently failed to allege that there was no available remedy in Mexico, as required 

to pursue a federal maritime claim under the Jones Act” and (2) the lawyers 

negligently failed to make meritorious arguments in support of their claim that 

Mexico was not an available forum and was not adequate for adjudicating their case.

Absent the lawyers’ negligence, the clients allege, the federal court would not have

conditionally dismissed the case and the clients would have been allowed to proceed 

in their chosen forum of the United States federal courts.

With respect to the ripeness of their malpractice action, the clients concede 

that they do not plan to further pursue their cases in Mexico, but assert that pursuit 

of the claims in Mexico would be futile, and thus the federal court’s return

jurisdiction clause is not an obstacle to their claim of immediate injury. In particular, 

the clients contend that, although the personal injury defendants agreed to stipulate 

to jurisdiction in Mexico and waive the statute of limitations, these stipulations and 

waivers are invalid. Alternatively, the clients claim that the lawyers should have 

appealed the federal court’s initial conditional dismissal order and that an appeal 

would have been successful.
8

The lawyers responded to the clients’ malpractice suit with pleas to the 

jurisdiction and, in the alternative, pleas in abatement. The lawyers argue that the 

clients’ legal malpractice claims are not ripe for adjudication because the clients had 

not suffered any injury and may not suffer any cognizable injury. They challenge the 

clients’ disregard of the federal court’s return jurisdiction clause, which the lawyers 

contend is an available remedy if Mexico truly is an unavailable forum, rather than 

merely an undesirable one. The lawyers argue that any harm suffered by the clients 

due to the lawyers’ alleged malpractice has not occurred and cannot be known 

without a resolution of the clients’ underlying personal injury claims.

The trial court denied the lawyers’ jurisdictional pleas. The lawyers then 

petitioned for mandamus relief and requested permission to file an interlocutory 

appeal pursuant to section 51.014(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 51.014(d) (West Supp. 2015); see also TEX.

R. APP. P. 28.3; TEX. R. CIV. P. 168. The clients have filed responses, including a 

motion to dismiss the permissive appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because the parties 

submitted briefing on the merits in connection with the petition for a writ of 

mandamus, we approach the resolution of this issue in the mandamus context.

DISCUSSION

The lawyers contend that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the malpractice 

suit because the clients’ claims against the lawyers are not ripe for adjudication. To 
9

be entitled to mandamus relief, a petitioner must show both that the trial court abused 

its discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Prudential 

Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004). In this context, however, “[a] trial 

court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the 

facts, even when the law is unsettled.” In re Brokers Logistics, Ltd., 320 S.W.3d 402, 

405 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, orig. proceeding) (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 

135).

I. The clients’ claims are not ripe because their alleged injury is based 

on purely hypothetical events.

In determining whether a case is ripe, courts consider whether the facts are 

sufficiently developed at the time a lawsuit is filed to show that an injury “has 

occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote.” Waco Indep. 

Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851–52 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Patterson v. 

Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)). 

A case is not ripe when an alleged injury “depends on contingent or hypothetical 

facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass.” Id. Thus, for a claim to be ripe 

for adjudication, a plaintiff must present an established injury that is not based upon 

hypothetical facts. See id.

The clients contend that they have suffered a concrete injury because (1) they 

have lost the ability to litigate their claims in their chosen forum of the United States;

(2) even if they can avail themselves of the return jurisdiction clause and reinstate 
10

their claims in the United States, they must incur the expense of litigating their 

claims in Mexico; and (3) the federal court also dismissed their federal maritime 

claims, which clients argue are now barred by statutes of limitations. We discuss 

these in turn.

A. The clients have not demonstrated a lost opportunity to litigate claims

in the United States as a legal injury.

The federal court dismissal order expressly allows the clients to seek 

reinstatement of their claims in the United States if the Mexican courts refuse 

jurisdiction of claims that are properly pursued in the Mexican courts. Given the 

dismissal order’s return jurisdiction clause, the clients’ claim that they have lost the 

opportunity to assert their claims in the United States relies upon an uncertain or 

contingent future event that may not occur—namely, the federal court refusing to 

reinstate those claims that may properly be brought in the United States. Although 

the clients argue that seeking further relief in Mexico would be futile, they 

admittedly have not sought that relief—and affirmatively state that they have 

decided not to seek it. But they claim injury based upon the supposed event that the

Mexican courts would bar their claims when properly presented as instructed by the 

federal court order. The clients fundamentally do not desire to proceed in Mexico,

where admittedly any pecuniary remedy is limited or non-existent under Mexican 

law. But without that effort, any injury from the conditional order of dismissal due 
11

to negligence (as opposed to the proper application of federal law) is purely 

hypothetical.

In the event that their claims are improperly barred in Mexico, the clients 

further contend, hypothetically, that the federal court would not reinstate the case.

Unlike other malpractice actions that are based on claims and defenses that are 

presented and ruled upon, the clients in this case have opted not to further pursue 

their suit in Mexico. Thus, they have not presented to the federal court a request for 

reinstatement that complies with the conditions established in that court’s orders.

Although the case at hand concerns whether the legal malpractice claims are 

ripe for adjudication, the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in In re Apex Towing Co.

and other limitations tolling cases like it are instructive. See 41 S.W.3d 118, 121 

(Tex. 2001). In Apex Towing, the Texas Supreme Court held that the statute of 

limitations for a legal malpractice action based on underlying litigation is tolled 

pending the ultimate outcome of that underlying litigation. Id. In Apex, the plaintiffs 

sued their law firm for mishandling the defense of a maritime personal injury 

lawsuit. See id. at 118. In holding that limitations for the malpractice legal claims 

were tolled, the court reaffirmed Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 

(Tex. 1991), in which it held that the tolling of the statute of limitations on a 

malpractice claim extends until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted or 

the litigation is concluded. Id. at 119. The Court explained that limitations are tolled 
12

because “the viability of [a legal malpractice] action depends on the outcome of the 

underlying litigation.” Id. at 121. 

The considerations in Apex are evident in this case: the viability of the legal 

malpractice claims alleged by the clients depends on the outcome of personal injury

litigation in Mexico and in federal court, where the only procedural progress has 

been the determination of a presumptive forum in Mexico. See id. The alleged 

injuries are intertwined with and dependent upon further hypothetical adjudication 

by both Mexican courts and the federal district court. 

Similarly, in the context of accounting malpractice, the Texas Supreme Court 

held that a cause of action for negligence based on the accountant’s use of the cash 

instead of the accrual method of accounting for tax purposes did not accrue until the 

Internal Revenue Service had assessed a tax deficiency. Atkins v. Crosland, 417 

S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tex. 1967) (holding that cause of action for malpractice “did not 

arise until the tax deficiency was assessed” because “[p]rior to assessment the 

plaintiff had not been injured.”); see also Street v. Honorable Second Court of 

Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1988) (liability in Stowers action accrued when 

final judgment was rendered in underlying suit regardless of pending appeals 

because final judgment placed insured at risk for paying it).

In addressing the ripeness question in the legal malpractice context, the Dallas 

Court of Appeals relied on Atkins to observe that “[w]here the misfeasance or 
13

nonfeasance is intertwined with an adjudicative process that is necessary to complete 

invasion of the protected interest, injury is not suffered until an adjudicative decision 

is made.” Rothrock v. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, 1994 WL 183318, at *7 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas May 11, 1994, no pet.) (citing Atkins, 417 S.W.2d at 153 (cause of 

action for accountancy malpractice did not accrue until tax deficiency was 

assessed)); see also Philips v. Giles, 620 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 

1981, orig. proceeding) (cause of action for legal malpractice arising from 

negligently rendered tax advice would not accrue, if at all, until deficiency assessed). 

In Rothrock, the court held that a debtor in bankruptcy had no cause of action for 

legal malpractice until the bankruptcy court denied discharge of his debts; thus, he 

had individual standing to bring the claims because they arose after he had filed 

bankruptcy. See Rothrock, 1994 WL 183318, at *9. We agree with our sister court’s 

analysis, which looks to determine whether the injury has been sustained rather than 

the possibility that it will be sustained based on hypothetical future rulings. See id.; 

Philips, 620 S.W.2d at 751; see also In re Tex. Collegiate Baseball League, Ltd., 

367 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, org. proceeding) (granting 

mandamus relief in legal malpractice action because fee claims, like malpractice 

claims, were not mature where underlying litigation was not resolved).

The two cases that the clients rely on in support of their argument presented 

an actual injury. In Vanderwyest v. Boudreaux, a judgment creditor filed a
14

negligence claim against a county clerk for approving an insufficient supersedeas 

bond. No. 01–02–00928–CV, 2003 WL 22255833, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] Oct. 2, 2003, pet. denied). The judgment creditor claimed the lost ability to

collect on the judgment from the surety as a concrete injury. See id. at *4. The county 

filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the judgment creditor’s negligence claim 

was not ripe. Id. at *2, *4. Our court held that the lost ability to execute on the 

judgment was an injury that was not contingent upon a future event—the judgment 

had been obtained at that point and the amount of the bond was insufficient to meet 

it. Id. The fact that the judgment might later be set aside did not undo the existing 

injury. Unlike the injury claimed in Vanderweyst, the clients in this case have 

forgone the opportunity to pursue their claims to a resolution due to the 

undesirability of a Mexican forum; they have not obtained an adjudicative decision 

on their personal injury claims, because the adjudication stopped with the 

determination of a forum. We reject the concept of a hypothetical adjudicative 

decision as a basis for demonstrating a cognizable injury in a malpractice case. See 

Rothrock, 1994 WL 183318 at *8. 

The clients’ second case, Rhodes v. Batilla, is similarly distinguishable. 848 

S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). There, the 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld a malpractice action against an attorney whose 

negligent handling of a tax matter resulted in an assessment by the Internal Revenue 
15

Service. Id. at 842. The court noted that “there was no requirement that [plaintiff] 

appeal the final assessment by the IRS in order to establish the open and obvious 

malpractice committed by appellant.” Id. In Rhodes, however, the injury arising 

from the alleged malpractice—a tax assessment—had occurred. See id. Here, in 

contrast, the clients’ claimed injury that they have lost the opportunity to pursue their 

claims in the United States has not and may never occur because the dismissal for 

forum non conveniens was subject to a return jurisdiction clause.

We agree with the clients that causation in legal malpractice cases may be 

established through expert testimony regarding what the outcome would have been 

but for the alleged malpractice. But expert testimony cannot establish a concrete 

injury in the first instance. No client has lost the personal injury case; rather, the 

adverse ruling in the underlying litigation is the determination between two forums, 

conditioned on further events that have not come to pass because complying with 

those conditions would require zealous advocacy in the less desirable forum.

Finally, the clients argue that “[e]ven if [their] claims are not barred in Mexico 

and a Mexican court would accept jurisdiction . . . then the Clients have still suffered 

some ‘concrete’ injury that is not contingent on any future events because, unlike 

the discovery and procedural rules available to the Clients in the United States, the 

courts in Mexico provide for very limited discovery and do not afford the Clients 

with procedural safeguards . . . .” The clients essentially claim an injury based upon 
16

Mexico being an inadequate forum to litigate their underlying claims. But the federal 

courts, like the federal district court in this case, have found Mexico to be an 

adequate forum, and the clients’ claimed injury is contrary to Texas Supreme Court 

authority similarly finding Mexico to be an adequate forum. See, e.g., In re Pirelli 

Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 678 (Tex. 2007) (holding Mexico to be available and 

adequate forum after rejecting arguments that forum was inadequate due to 

restrictions on discovery and damages); accord In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire 

Operations, LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 575-77 (Tex. 2015). To the extent that the

clients’ alleged injury is the fundamental inadequacy of Mexican law, this 

inadequacy has been rejected as a basis for commanding a forum in the United States 

and Texas courts. Accordingly, we hold that it cannot serve as a cognizable legal 

injury in a legal malpractice claim.

B. The clients’ alleged litigation expense injury is a contingent claim.

The clients further allege that, even if they eventually avail themselves of the 

return jurisdiction clause in the dismissal order, they are injured by the lost 

opportunity to pursue their claims in the United States without first litigating in 

Mexico. The clients argue that the lawyers caused this injury by their “failure to 

assert proper evidence and argument in response to the forum non conveniens motion 

or, alternatively, timely appeal the dismissal” which will cause the expenditure of 

“time, effort and money in the form of attorney’s fees and costs in exhausting their 
17

remedies in Mexico which the Clients allege (and prove) will be futile.” This alleged 

injury is hypothetical and speculative because the clients have not further pursued 

their claims in Mexico and thus have not—and may never—incur such expenses.

See Tex. Collegiate Baseball League, 367 S.W.3d at 468 (rejecting argument that 

fee claim was mature when underlying litigation was unresolved).

C. The claims relating to the inadequacy of the arguments advanced in 

the federal suit are not ripe given the federal court’s disposition.

Finally, the clients argue that, even if the return jurisdiction clause renders

their malpractice action unripe, they have alleged an injury resulting from the federal 

court’s dismissal of their federal maritime claims. The clients acknowledge that the 

dismissal of these claims was without prejudice to their refiling them, but argue that

(1) these claims are barred by statutes of limitations and cannot be re-filed, and (2) 

unlike the dismissal of the Mexican law claims on the basis of forum non conveniens, 

the dismissal of their claims was not subject to the return jurisdiction clause.

This aspect of the clients’ claim rests on their contention that their maritime 

claims are now barred by statutes of limitations and are not subject to the return 

jurisdiction clause. Both contentions present a hypothetical ruling by the federal 

court that the personal injury defendants’ limitations waivers apply to claims filed 

in Mexico only and are inapplicable to the claims that the clients brought in the 

United States before the federal court sent the case to Mexico. But the limitations 

waiver, on its face, contains no such limitation: the federal court stipulation provides
18

that “[the personal injury defendants] agree to waive any statute of limitations or 

laches defense that they did not possess as of the date this lawsuit was originally 

filed.” A return jurisdiction clause would be of little use if limitations ran in the 

United States while the clients pursued their claims in Mexico as required by the 

dismissal order. Because (1) a waiver of limitations is in place in the personal injury 

suit, and (2) no court has ruled that any of the clients’ personal injury claims are 

time-barred, the clients have failed to demonstrate a concrete injury based upon the 

dismissal without prejudice of the federal maritime claims.4

II. The lawyers are entitled to mandamus relief. 

Mandamus is available to resolve a denial of a plea to the jurisdiction when 

one court actively interferes with the exercise of jurisdiction by a court possessing 

dominant jurisdiction, see In re Puig, 351 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Tex. 2011), and when 

the size and complexity of the litigation indicate that it may be a prudent use of 

judicial resources to permit a preliminary resolution. See In re E.I. du Pont de 

Nemours & Co., 92 S.W.3d 517, 524 (Tex. 2002). An appellate remedy is adequate, 

 

4 We note, as the federal court did, that the Jones Act requires dismissal of claims brought 

by foreign nationals in these circumstances. Under the Jones Act, when foreign nationals 

sue for injuries sustained in a foreign territory, remedies under the Jones Act and United 

States maritime law are available only if neither the jurisdiction where the accident 

occurred nor the jurisdiction where the injured persons reside affords a remedy. See 46 

U.S.C.A. § 30105(b), (c); Stier v. Reading & Bates Corp., 992 S.W.2d 423, 431-33 (Tex. 

1999). Mexico is an acknowledged available forum. See Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, 

459 S.W.3d at 575-77; Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 677-78.
19

on the other hand, when the “benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the 

detriments.” Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136. The Texas Supreme Court favors 

mandamus review to:

preserve important substantive and procedural rights from 

impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and 

helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive 

in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the 

public the time and money utterly wasted enduring reversal of 

improperly conducted proceedings.

Id. Among other things, courts should consider “the impact on the legal system” in 

determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate. Id. at 137. The plea to the 

jurisdiction in this case addresses the central issue of whether there is an injury ripe 

for adjudication and involves yet a third forum for seeking a remedy for underlying 

personal injury claims that have never been fully adjudicated. A trial on the 

malpractice claims would require that the trial court determine whether (1) courts in 

Mexico would accept jurisdiction over the underlying personal injury claims when 

properly presented and (2) the federal district court would allow the claims to be 

reinstated under the return jurisdiction clause. Both constitute hypothetical rulings.

Because we hold that the malpractice claims are not ripe, a complex trial on these 

claims would be an unreasonable use of resources for both the judicial system and 

the parties. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 92 S.W.3d at 524; see also Tex. 

Collegiate Baseball League, 367 S.W.3d at 468 (granting mandamus relief in legal 

malpractice case where cause of action had not matured).
20

Finally, the trial judge has certified that the question presented in this 

mandamus and by the accompanying interlocutory appeal is one that is outcome 

determinative. Although we dismiss the petition for permissive appeal as moot, we 

note that the arguments in favor of accepting the permissive appeal similarly suggest 

that mandamus relief would be appropriate. Whether brought as a mandamus 

petition or as an interlocutory appeal, the issue of whether a dismissal for forum non 

conveniens with a return jurisdiction clause presents an injury ripe for adjudication 

has not been addressed by Texas courts and “is likely to recur.” In re Team Rocket, 

L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (noting in granting mandamus that petition 

involved legal issue “that is likely to recur”). Accordingly, we hold that mandamus 

relief is an available remedy for determining the question of ripeness in this case.

CONCLUSION

We conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate its 

order denying the lawyers’ plea to the jurisdiction and grant the plea. The writ will 

issue only if the trial court fails to comply with this order. We dismiss the petition 

for permissive appeal as moot.

Jane Bland

Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Bland, Brown, and Lloyd.