*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 29, 2005*

Decided June 29, 2005

Before

 Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

 Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-1222

IN RE: DONNA S. RING,

Debtor-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin

No. 03-C-470-S

John C. Shabaz,

Judge.

O R D E R

After Donna Ring filed for bankruptcy, the trustee proposed to settle a suit

that she had pending in Wisconsin state court. Ring objected, but the bankruptcy

court approved the settlement. The district court affirmed that decision, as do we.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-1222 Page 2

In February 2002, Ring petitioned a Wisconsin court to award her a share of

Ralph Wrezic’s estate; she claimed to be a nonmarital daughter mistakenly omitted

from his will. See Wis. Stat. § 853.25(2). The court granted summary judgment for

the estate and interested parties, including Wrezic’s widow, reasoning that Ring, who

is over 50, had missed a statute of limitations requiring paternity suits to be brought

before the plaintiff’s nineteenth birthday. See Wis. Stat. § 893.88. The court also

concluded that Ring, who was pro se, had failed to meet her evidentiary burden

because she never responded to the motion for summary judgment. Ring appealed to

the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.

That appeal was still pending when Ring filed for bankruptcy in October 2002. 

Ring listed the state litigation on her Chapter 7 property schedules but valued it at

zero. She objected, however, when the trustee sought approval to settle the matter

for $12,000. After the settlement was proposed, she also amended her bankruptcy

schedules to list the inheritance claim as exempt property, which she now valued at

$7,374. Ring chose that amount because it was the remainder available to her under

the “wild card” exemption of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5).

Before approving the settlement in January 2003, the bankruptcy court heard

testimony from the trustee, who characterized the inheritance claim as frivolous

based on his understanding of the statute of limitations and his reading of the trial

court’s decision and the pro se brief Ring had filed with the appellate court. Counsel

for Wrezic’s widow testified, too, adding that at summary judgment Ring produced no

evidence of paternity anyway. The court agreed with the trustee that the

bankruptcy estate should not be squandered on “long shot” litigation, a conclusion

shared by the district court when Ring appealed. Ring received a discharge in

January 2003 immediately after the bankruptcy court approved the settlement. The

state appeal, she says, is stayed pending the outcome of her appeal to this court.

Bankruptcy courts may approve a trustee’s proposal to compromise claims of

the estate, including legal claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); W.J. Servs. v.

Commercial State Bank of El Campo, 990 F.2d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam);

In re Holywell Corp., 913 F.2d 873, 881 (11th Cir. 1990), subject to review by the

district court and, in turn, this court, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (d); see In re Weinhoeft, 275

F.3d 604, 604 (7th Cir. 2001). Ring argues, however, that the bankruptcy court

lacked jurisdiction to approve the settlement due to the “probate exception” to federal

jurisdiction and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The latter theory is groundless since

Rooker-Feldman, see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), precludes lower federal courts

from reviewing state-court civil judgments, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
No. 04-1222 Page 3

Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22 (2005); Holt v. Lake County Bd. of Comm’rs, 408

F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), which is not what the bankruptcy court

did.

Nor is the probate exception relevant. That rule precludes a federal court

from administering a decedent’s estate or probating a will, see Markham v. Allen,

326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2003), or

interfering with probate proceedings by contradicting a state court’s judgment,

Golden ex rel. Golden v. Golden, 382 F.3d 348, 358–59 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2004). We

have not decided whether the exception applies in bankruptcy cases, although that

question divides our sister circuits. Compare Goerg v. Parungao, 844 F.2d 1562,

1565 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that probate exception applies only to diversity

jurisdiction) with In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying

exception to bankruptcy proceedings that resulted in conflicting state and federal

judgments). And we need not answer the question here because the exception has no

possible relevance to this appeal. The bankruptcy court did not interfere with the

probate matter; all the bankruptcy court did was decide that the inheritance claim

belonged to the bankruptcy estate, and that the trustee’s proposed settlement was in

that estate’s best interests.

Alternatively, Ring argues that her inheritance claim was not property of the

bankruptcy estate. A debtor’s legal claims are presumptively part of the bankruptcy

estate administered by the Chapter 7 trustee. In re Polis, 217 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir.

2000); Cable v. Ivy Tech State Coll., 200 F.3d 467, 472–73 (7th Cir. 1999); see Martin

v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (right to appeal

adverse judgment legal cause of action belonging to bankruptcy estate). Like other

property, though, a legal claim may remain outside the estate if the debtor utilizes

an available exemption, 11 U.S.C. § 522, or the claim may revert back to the debtor if

the trustee chooses to abandon it as estate property, id. § 554. Ring insists that the

trustee abandoned her inheritance claim by promising not to pursue it during a

telephone conversation with her bankruptcy lawyer, but Ring waived this contention

by not asserting it in the bankruptcy court, see In re Kroner, 953 F.2d 317, 319 (7th

Cir. 1992). Regardless, a trustee cannot abandon property of the estate without

notice to creditors, which was not given here. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6007(a). Ring

also contends that the inheritance claim was exempt property. Ring successfully

exempted $7,374 of the settlement proceeds because no one objected, Taylor v.

Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992), but to the extent the value of the inheritance

claim exceeded that amount it remained estate property under the trustee’s control. 

Polis, 217 F.3d at 903; In re Salzer, 52 F.3d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 1995); Cable, 200 F.3d

at 473.
No. 04-1222 Page 4

Last, Ring maintains that even if the claim was part of the bankruptcy estate,

the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by confirming the settlement based on the

trustee’s mistaken belief that the action was time-barred. She explains—citing a

Wisconsin case decided after the hearing—that the statute of limitations for

paternity suits would not have prevented her from establishing in the probate

proceedings that Wrezic was her father. See Wis. Stat. § 893.88; In re Estate of

Thompson, 661 N.W.2d 869, 881 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). In a bankruptcy case, a court

measures the value of settlement by asking whether it was in the estate’s best

interests. In re Energy Coop., 886 F.2d 921, 927 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Am. Reserve

Corp., 841 F.2d 159, 161–62 (7th Cir. 1987). This inquiry requires the court to weigh

the advantages of settlement, the probable costs and benefits of pursuing litigation,

and the likelihood of wasting assets. Depoister v. Mary M. Holloway Found., 36 F.3d

582, 585–88 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Energy Coop., Inc., 886 F.2d at 927. Here, the

bankruptcy court concluded that the inheritance claim had a negligible chance of

success and that settlement was a good deal for the estate, and we agree. Even if we

assume that Ring is correct about the statute of limitations, she has pointed to no

admissible evidence of her purported relation to Wrezic. In the state court she

offered only her aunt’s unsworn statement claiming that Ring’s mother had said

Ring was Wrezic’s daughter, along with DNA evidence that by Ring’s own account

shows only that she and her brother are half-siblings. The bankruptcy court did not

abuse its discretion, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.