IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 2, 2024

IN RE EZRA C.

1

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Putnam County

No. 2022-12-A Ronald Thurman, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. M2023-00927-COA-R3-PT

___________________________________

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. 

Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to 

establish the statutory ground of termination of abandonment by failure to visit. The court 

also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s 

termination decision.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD, 

P.J., W.S. and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined. 

Daniel P. Bryant, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Darrius C. 

Dana R. Looper, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Laura and Philip G. 

Casey D. Brown, Cookeville, Tennessee, guardian ad litem for the minor child, Ezra C. 

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

Ezra C. (“the Child”) was born to Laura G. (“Mother”) and Darrius C. (“Father”) in

June 2016. Mother has consistently maintained custody of the Child since birth. Father 

resides in Pinson, Alabama, with his wife, Victoria C. (“Stepmother”), while Mother 

resides in Baxter, Tennessee with her husband, Philip G. (“Stepfather”). Pursuant to 

 

1 This court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in parental rights termination cases 

by initializing the last name of the parties. 

07/12/2024
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agreement, Father exercised six weeks of consecutive co-parenting time in the summer 

months, one week during the Christmas holiday, five days in the Spring, and additional 

visitation when Father was in town, dependent upon him providing advanced notice to 

Mother. Father was also tasked with remitting child support on a monthly basis. 

The Child was under Father’s care and supervision when Mother retrieved him at 

their meeting spot in Chattanooga, Tennessee on July 17, 2021. Mother traveled with the 

Child to Nashville for an event. Upon their arrival, she noticed bruising on the Child’s 

buttocks and legs. The Child disclosed that Father spanked him with a belt. He also 

disclosed that one of his step-siblings touched his penis. 

Mother took the Child to a hospital in Nashville for a medical evaluation. The 

hospital documented the bruises, and Mother filed for an emergency protective custody 

order. The parties entered into an agreed order, dated September 1, 2021, whereby Father 

was limited to two weekly video calls and supervised visitation with the Child through 

Insightful, a Family Care Coordination and Advocacy program in Tennessee. Meanwhile, 

the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) investigated the allegations of 

abuse. On January 26, 2022, DCS notified Father that its investigation revealed that the 

allegations of child abuse were unsubstantiated. 

On February 16, 2022, Mother and Stepfather (collectively “Petitioners”) filed the 

instant action, petitioning for the Child’s adoption by Stepfather and the termination of 

Father’s parental rights based upon the following statutory grounds: (1) abandonment by 

failure to visit; (2) severe child abuse; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness 

to assume custody of the Child. 

The case proceeded to a hearing, held over the course of two days, beginning on 

December 21, 2022, and concluding on April 25, 2023. Father recalled that the Child 

arrived for visitation in May 2021 with a mark over his eye and some other small bruises 

he likely obtained from running and jumping around. He denied knowledge of the Child’s 

bruises on the morning of July 17, 2021, stating that he assisted him with a shower and did 

not notice any bruising at that time. He agreed that the Child shared a room with his stepbrother, who was seven years old in July 2021, but denied that the Child was ever touched 

inappropriately while in his care. 

Father described a loving relationship between himself and the Child, claiming that 

he has always been involved in the Child’s life, whether on a daily basis or through regular 

visitation. He sought to return to the original visitation schedule and to resume his 

relationship with the Child. Father acknowledged that he has not sought any treatment 

relevant to the allegations alleged against him and that he has also not sought to modify the 

visitation agreement. 
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Father did not visit the child between July 17, 2021, and October 25, 2022, despite 

the fact that he was present in Tennessee for court hearings and related matters on August 

10, 2021, and August 31, 2021. Father explained that the Child was in school during that 

time. He claimed that he visited via FaceTime at least five times during the pertinent time 

period, but he only provided documentation supporting one such visit in November 2021. 

Father was employed by the Tennessee Department of Corrections with a net 

monthly income of $2,500, from which he paid child support, leaving only $1,700 per 

month. He also started two businesses, a car rental company and an exotic animal business, 

purchased a home in May 2022, and an SUV for his wife in August 2022. He claimed that 

his businesses were not profitable and were no longer operational. He agreed that his wife 

also contributed income for the family to cover their expenses and that he had obtained a 

business loan in 2021 that was in excess of $20,000. He admitted that he included a $50 

per month gym membership in his expense report and allotted $100 per month to 

unspecified “recreation expenses.” He further agreed that he paid for the family, including 

the Child, to enjoy a vacation to an amusement park in Florida during his visitation in 2021. 

Father asserted that he was unable to afford the fees and related expenses for 

visitation. He provided that the visitation fee was $300 for a four-hour visit and that his 

related expenses included finding childcare for his other children, $200 for gas to and from 

the visitation, $160 for two nights in a hotel room because the visitation site was four hours 

away, and time away from work with lost daily wages of approximately $216. He 

estimated that each visit would cost approximately $876. 

Father testified that he visited the Child on October 25, 2022, eight months after the 

filing of the termination petition. He recalled that the Child referred to him as “Darrius 

stepdad” but that the visit was “smooth.” He stated that they talked, played games, and 

that the Child was having fun throughout the visit. 

Harli Langford, a DCS employee, testified that she received a referral for the Child 

in July 2021 for possible sexual abuse and physical abuse. She made initial contact with 

the Child on July 20, two days after the disclosure of abuse. Following the initial contact, 

the Child was referred for a forensic interview. He was unable to follow the model for the 

forensic interview. Ms. Langford then completed an additional interview sometime in 

August 2021 at the Child’s school. She stated that at that time, the Child did not disclose 

any allegations of sexual abuse. However, he disclosed that Father took his clothes off and 

spanked him with a belt while under Father’s care for summer visitation. She did not 

observe any bruising or marks on the Child at the time of the interview in August; however, 

she viewed the pictures provided by Mother that depicted bruising. She described the 

bruising as follows: 

The bruising on his legs and buttocks were in a linear shape, pretty defined, 

and did not appear to be [caused by] childhood play, you know, marks and 
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bruises that we commonly see on lower legs, usually below the knee, of 

playing. 

She continued by stating that she found the bruising “concerning.” 

Ms. Langford disclosed the physical abuse to the proper authorities in Alabama for 

a further criminal investigation. She classified the physical abuse as “substantiated” and 

the alleged sexual abuse as “unsubstantiated” for DCS for the purposes of her file. She did 

not file for emergency protective DCS custody because the Child was already in Mother’s 

custody due to a protective order. She agreed that she did not interview Father in her 

investigation of the case and that the photographs she observed did not show the Child’s 

face. She acknowledged that DCS later overturned her classification and marked the 

allegation of physical abuse as “unsubstantiated.” 

Mother confirmed her discovery of the bruising on July 17 after she retrieved the 

Child from Father’s care. She identified the photographs she took depicting the bruising. 

She stated that she then took the Child to the emergency room at Vanderbilt and that she 

later entered into an agreed order with Father limiting his visitation. Mother recalled that 

the Child was initially “okay” after his supervised visitation with Father in 2022 but that 

he “cried all the way home” and was worried that she would leave him. She testified 

concerning similar bouts of agitation following his subsequent visits with Father. 

Mother testified that she and the Child live with Stepfather and their son in a 3-

bedroom, 1-bath house on a 40-acre farm owned by her great-grandmother. She claimed 

that the Child was bonded with Stepfather, whom she described as follows: 

He plays the dad role in [the Child’s] life. He takes him to CrossFit. He 

plays basketball with him. [The Child] is in basketball now, so they go to 

practice. He [] helps him do boy things outside that I don’t enjoy doing. 

They’re building a play set right now or jungle gym for Christmas. 

She confirmed that she and Stepfather could provide for the Child financially. 

Stepfather expressed his love for the Child and his intent to adopt him should he 

become available for adoption. He described a loving relationship between himself and 

the Child. He acknowledged that he has two additional children from another relationship. 

He explained that he shares equal co-parenting time with their mother and that he speaks 

with them on the telephone when he is unable to visit because they live in Murfreesboro. 

Dreama Howard, a family specialist at Insightful Therapy, testified that she also 

serves as a social counselor with the Department of Health working with families and 

children. Prior to her current position, she worked for DCS as a case manager for eight 

years. As pertinent to this appeal, she supervised Father’s visitation in October 2022 and 
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again in January, March, and April 2023, for a total of four visits. She recalled that the 

Child was not responsive toward the Father at the beginning of their first visit in October 

2022, despite Father’s efforts at engaging with him. The Child became more relaxed once 

his siblings joined them for the latter part of the visit. 

Ms. Howard testified that the second visit in January 2023 was good. She recalled 

that the Child “was opening up a little more, conversing a little more” and was “engaging 

a little more” with Father. She stated that this improvement carried on into the third visit 

in March 2023 and that the Child appeared the most comfortable at the April 2023 visit 

with Father and only one sibling. She explained that Father was guiding and directing the 

Child in appropriate ways and that the visit went “really well.” She recalled that the Child 

interacted well with his sibling and that they had a very good time together. As to the 

Child’s relationship with Father, she believed that they had an established bond and that 

their bond was improving as visitation progressed. She did not observe any safety concerns 

between the Child and Father during visitation.

Ms. Howard testified that her supervision cost was $75 per hour and that the first 

visit in October 2022 was two hours, while the other three visits were only one hour in 

duration at Father’s request. She provided that visitation was scheduled by the noncustodial parent via telephone and that she worked to accommodate the visitor’s schedule. 

Stepmother testified that she lives with Father and their six children.2

 She and 

Father have full legal custody of her biological children, and Father maintains full custody 

of his two daughters. She described a loving home and a good relationship between Father 

and the Child. She claimed that the Child also enjoyed a loving bond with his siblings. 

She believed the visitation in Summer 2021 went well and could not recall anything 

happening to the Child during his time in their home. She denied ever observing any 

unusual bruising or anything out of the ordinary bumps and bruises that he would obtain 

from playing. She explained that they do not spank or use any type of corporal punishment. 

She did not observe Father engaging in that type of discipline with the Child during the 

pertinent time period. She described Father as follows: 

He is the most loving, patient, kind person I’ve ever met. He has so much 

grace in him for others. He teaches the kids and myself about life and how 

to enjoy life to the fullest every day. He’s strong and teaches our children 

how to be strong, independent and responsible. He’s a very honest man. 

Following the hearing, the court issued a final order in which it found that the 

evidence presented established the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to visit but 

was insufficient to sustain the remaining two grounds of severe child abuse and failure to 

 

2 Stepmother and Father share two children, while she has two children from a previous relationship 

and he has three children from a previous relationship. 
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manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Child. In so finding, the court 

explained that it did not find Father’s testimony credible that he was unable to afford 

visitation and that even if regular visitation was unaffordable, then Father still failed to 

avail himself of regular visitation via FaceTime. The trial court further found that the Child 

had been abused while in Father’s care but that the abuse was not severe for purposes of 

the statute. The court found that termination of Father’s rights was in the best interest of 

the Child. This appeal followed. 

II. ISSUES

We consolidate and restate the issues pertinent to this appeal as follows: 

A. Whether clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s 

finding of one statutory ground for termination. 

B. Whether clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s 

finding that termination was in the best interest of the Child. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children. 

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1988). This right “is among the oldest of the judicially recognized liberty interests 

protected by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.” In re M.J.B., 

140 S.W.3d 643, 652–53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). “Termination of a person’s rights as a 

parent is a grave and final decision, irrevocably altering the lives of the parent and child 

involved and ‘severing forever all legal rights and obligations’ of the parent.” Means v. 

Ashby, 130 S.W.3d 48, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(I)(1)). “‘[F]ew consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural 

family ties.’” M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119 (1996) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 

U.S. 745, 787 (1982)).

Although parental rights are superior to the claims of other persons and the 

government, they are not absolute and may be terminated upon appropriate statutory 

grounds. See In Re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); Blair v. Badenhope, 77 

S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tenn. 2002). Due process requires clear and convincing evidence of the 

existence of the grounds for termination. In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d at 97. A parent’s 

rights may be terminated only upon

(1) [a] finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds 

for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and
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(2) [t]hat termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best 

interest[ ] of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). “[A] court must determine that clear and convincing 

evidence proves not only that statutory grounds exist [for the termination] but also that 

termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 

2002). The existence of at least one statutory basis for termination of parental rights will 

support the trial court’s decision to terminate those rights. In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 

473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 

838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

The heightened burden of proof in parental termination cases minimizes the risk of 

erroneous decisions. In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d at 474; In re M.W.A., Jr., 980 S.W.2d 620, 

622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “Evidence satisfying the clear and convincing evidence 

standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable and eliminates 

any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the 

evidence.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861 (citations omitted). It produces in a factfinder’s mind a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be 

established. In re A.D.A., 84 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Ray v. Ray, 83 

S.W.3d 726, 733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d at 474.

In 2016, the Tennessee Supreme Court provided guidance to this court in reviewing 

cases involving the termination of parental rights:

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in termination 

proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Under 

Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on the record 

and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence 

preponderates otherwise. In light of the heightened burden of proof in 

termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own 

determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and 

convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. 

The trial court’s ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports termination of

parental rights is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de novo 

with no presumption of correctness. Additionally, all other questions of law 

in parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de novo 

with no presumption of correctness.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 523–24 (Tenn. 2016) (citations omitted); see also In 

re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 680 (Tenn. 2017).

Lastly, in the event that the “resolution of an issue in a case depends upon the 
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truthfulness of witnesses, the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the 

witnesses and their manner and demeanor while testifying, is in a far better position than 

this Court to decide those issues.” In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2016) (citing McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1995); Whitaker v. 

Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). “Thus, this court gives great 

weight to the credibility accorded to a particular witness by the trial court.” In re 

Christopher J., No. W2016-02149-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 5992359t, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Dec. 4, 2017) (citing Whitaker, 957 S.W.2d at 837).

IV. DISCUSSION

A.

As indicated above, the trial court granted the termination petition based upon the 

statutory ground of abandonment by failure to visit. The trial court rejected the two 

additional grounds alleged by Mother, namely severe child abuse and failure to manifest 

an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Child. Mother offers argument 

suggesting that the trial court erred in its rejection of the two additional grounds. However, 

she does not request reversal of the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we will simply 

consider the one ground of termination applied by the trial court as required by our 

Supreme Court. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525–26 (“[T]he Court of Appeals 

must review the trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether 

termination is in the child’s best interests.”). 

Abandonment by failure to visit

Parental rights may be terminated for abandonment when a parent fails to visit a 

child for a period of four consecutive months immediately before the filing of a petition to 

terminate parental rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). A failure to visit “means 

the failure, for a period of four (4) consecutive months, to visit or engage in more than 

token visitation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(E). The statute requires that parents 

offer their children more than “token visitation,” defined as visitation that “under the 

circumstances of the individual case, constitutes nothing more than perfunctory visitation 

or visitation of such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish 

minimal or insubstantial contact with the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(C).

A parent may assert as an affirmative defense pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8.03 that his or her failure to visit was not “willful.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

102(1)(I). The burden is on the parent asserting the affirmative defense to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that his or her failure to visit was not willful. Id.; In re 

Kolton C., No. E2019-00736-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 6341042, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 

26, 2019).
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Here, the petition was filed on February 16, 2022. The relevant four-month period 

is from October 16, 2021, through February 15, 2022. See In re Jacob C.H., No. E2013-

00587-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 689085, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2014) (statutory 

four-month period covers four months preceding the day the termination petition was filed 

and does not include the day petition was filed). The trial court found that Father had 

abandoned the Child by his failure to visit, having not seen the Child during the pertinent 

time period and only providing evidence of one FaceTime visit. 

There is no dispute that Father did not visit the Child in the four months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition to terminate his parental rights. Father did not plead a 

lack of willfulness in his answer to the petition; however, the trial court permitted evidence 

of Father’s alleged inability to afford the supervised visitation. Father claimed a cost in 

excess of $800 for supervised visitation. The record simply does not support this claim. 

We find no reason to expense two nights in a hotel for one, four-hour visit. Further, Ms. 

Howard testified that she was willing to work with any client’s schedule, thereby obviating 

the need for Father to take time off work or to find childcare for the remaining children. 

While we agree that a four-hour visit would cost $300, Father was not required to pay for 

four hours. Indeed, he never visited for a full four hours once he did finally find time to 

visit the Child. The record further reflects that Father and Stepmother were employed 

during the time period and had various streams of income. We, like the trial court, find his 

testimony unconvincing that he was unable to afford visitation. Father also did not request 

a visit when he was already present in Tennessee for court proceedings on two separate 

days in August 2021. Moreover, Father was also permitted to visit via FaceTime, an 

avenue of visitation he only exercised once during the pertinent time period. With all of 

these considerations in mind, we affirm the trial court’s determination on this ground of 

termination. 

B.

Having concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence supporting at least 

one statutory ground of termination, we must now consider whether termination of Father’s 

parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2); In 

re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 860. After a court finds that clear and convincing evidence 

exists to support a termination ground, “the interests of the parent and the child diverge” 

and the court focuses on the child’s best interest. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 877. A 

finding that at least one ground for termination of parental rights exists does not necessarily 

require that a parent’s rights be terminated. Id. Because some parental misconduct is 

redeemable, Tennessee’s termination of parental rights statutes recognize “that terminating 

an unfit parent’s parental rights is not always in the child’s best interests.” Id. The facts a 

court considers in the best interest analysis “must be proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 555

(Tenn. 2015). After making the underlying factual findings, the court “should then 
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consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they amount to clear and 

convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.” Id.

The statutory best interest factors applicable to this action are as follows:

(i)(1) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights 

is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider all relevant and 

child-centered factors applicable to the particular case before the court. 

Those factors may include, but are not limited to, the following:

(A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical 

need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s 

minority;

(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to 

have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;

(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting 

the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;

(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental 

attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the 

parent can create such attachment;

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with 

the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive 

relationship with the child;

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household 

trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic 

symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another 

person or persons in the absence of the parent;

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons 

other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and 

the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and 

the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of 
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circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the 

child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there 

is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol, 

controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render 

the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable 

manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services, 

or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of 

circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent 

in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of 

the department;

(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing 

paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the 

circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe 

and not in the child’s best interest;

(N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the 

home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or 

psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;

(O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child 

or any other child;

(P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and 

specific needs required for the child to thrive;

(Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to 

creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific 

needs and in which the child can thrive;

(R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and 

safe for the child;

(S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial 

support for the child; and

(T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be 

detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and 

effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.
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(2) When considering the factors set forth in subdivision (i)(1), the prompt 

and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to 

be in the child’s best interest.

(3) All factors considered by the court to be applicable to a particular case 

must be identified and supported by specific findings of fact in the court’s 

written order.

(4) Expert testimony is not required to prove or disprove any factor by any 

party.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). “This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require 

a trial court to find the existence of each enumerated factor before it may conclude that 

terminating a parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of a child.” In re M.A.R., 183 

S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The General Assembly has also stated that “when 

the best interest[ ] of the child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall 

always be resolved to favor the rights and the best interest[ ] of the child, which interests 

are hereby recognized as constitutionally protected.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d); see 

also White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that when 

considering a child’s best interest, the court must take the child’s perspective, rather than 

the parent’s). We will group our discussion of the best interest factors “based on the 

overarching themes within the list of twenty factors” under the circumstances of the case

because many of these factors touch on similar factual predicates and involve similar 

issues. In re Chayson D., No. E2022-00718-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3451538, at *14 

(Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2023).

We consider first the Child’s emotional needs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(i)(1)(A) (concerning the need for stability), (B) (concerning how changes in caretakers 

affect wellbeing), (D) (concerning the parent-child attachment), (E) (concerning 

visitation), (H) (concerning attachment to others), (I) (concerning relationships with 

others), (T) (concerning the parent’s fitness and its corresponding impacts). With respect 

to these factors, the Child is bonded with Mother, Stepfather, and his half-sibling. Father 

did not engage in visitation between July 17, 2021, and October 25, 2022, approximately 

15 months. While Father visited prior to the termination hearing, his efforts were simply 

too little, too late. The record reflects that the Child expressed agitation following the visits 

and that additional time would be needed to fully cultivate the bond between them. Father’s 

refusal to acknowledge the injury that occurred while in his care evidenced a lack of 

concern for the Child and his parental role. The trial court concluded, and the record 

supports, that termination of Father’s parental rights would not negatively affect the Child’s 

emotional or psychological condition. The Child’s relationships with Father and Stepfather 

are such that he refers to Stepfather, not Father, as “Dad,” which the trial court noted was 

organic and not a product of any coaching.
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We turn next to the Children’s physical environment and well-being. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(O) (involving the parent’s prior provision of safe and stable 

care to any child), (Q) (involving the parent’s commitment to having a home that meets the 

Child’s needs), (R) (involving the health and safety of the home). With respect to these 

factors, Mother has fulfilled the primary parent role since birth, with only occasional 

involvement from Father. The court found that the evidence supported a finding that 

physical abuse had occurred while the Child was in Father’s care but that the abuse did not 

rise to the level of severe. The trial court concluded a traumatic event involving abuse 

occurred at Father’s home that damaged the Child’s relationship with Father. We agree 

with the trial court. Father’s blatant denial of the injury and failure to take action to prevent 

future reoccurrence is concerning. Questions remain as to the safety of Father’s home. 

Next, we consider Father’s efforts. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(C) 

(involving the parent’s continuity in meeting the Child’s needs), (J) (involving the parent’s 

lasting adjustment of circumstances), (K) (involving the parent’s use of available 

resources), (L) (concerning efforts made by DCS); and (M) (concerning the parent’s sense 

of urgency in addressing the circumstances that led to removal). Many of these factors are 

inapplicable because DCS was not fully involved. Father’s failure to acknowledge the 

injury that occurred while in his care and to either accept responsibility or attempt to locate 

the source of the injury evidenced a lack of effort on his part to meet the Child’s needs. 

With regard to support and knowledge of the Child’s needs, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-

1-113(i)(1)(S) (addressing the parent providing more than token support), (P) (addressing 

the parent’s understanding of their needs), the record reflects that Father remitted child 

support during the custodial episode and was able to financially provide for the Child while 

in his care. 

The trial court considered all the evidence, weighed the credibility of the witnesses, 

and concluded that the best interest factors supported termination by clear and convincing 

evidence. Upon our review of the evidence, we agree with the trial court’s assessment and 

findings. Accordingly, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence in the record 

supports a determination that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best 

interest.

V. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The case is remanded for such further 

proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal are taxed to the appellant, Darrius 

C.

_________________________________ 

JOHN W. McCLARTY, JUDGE