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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 7- 00 78 3- CV Manuela BELLI A , Appellant
v . David WEL LS , Appellee Fr om the 150th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2006-CI -13062 Honora ble Michae l Peden, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: Febr uary 11, 2009 AFF I RMED The trial c ourt rende red a

n amende d divorce decr ee, g ranting a divorc e to Manue la Bellia and David Wells. Howeve r, the trial c ourt dismissed the parties’ oth er cl ai m s – conser vatorship, possession and ac cess, c hild support, and proper ty division – on the g round the c ourt lacke d subject
ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n w ithre g a rd to t he se iss ue s. B e lli a

a pp e a ls, c on te ndingthe tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dismiss ing the se cla ims. W e af firm.04
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND Wells and Bellia mar

ried in 1989. They are the parents of one child. W ells filed a pe tition fo r d ivo rc e in B e xar

County , T e xas i n 2 00 6. Whe n We lls fi le d h is p e tit ion he wa s a n a c tiv e -d uty member of

the United States Navy and had decla red San Antonio, Be x ar County , Texas as his leg al residenc e and domicile, c ontending in his petition he had been a dom iciliary of Tex as for six months and a r esident of Be x ar County for ninety day s prec eding the filing of his petition. Bellia, an I talian citizen residing in I taly , filed a spe cial appe ara nce, but s u b s eq u en t l y

filed a c ounter pe tition for divorce . I n addition to seeking a divorc e, both par tie s s o u gh t deter

minations of conserva

torship,
acc ess and possession, and division of prope rty
. Af t e r a n o n - j u r y t r i a l , t h e t r i a l c o u rt r e n d e r e d a f i n a l d e c r e e o f d i v o r c e . T h e r e a ft e r, Wel ls filed a “ Motion to Dism iss Cl aims for Conservatorship, Possession and Acce ss, Child Support and Property Division.” Wells claimed the t rial court lacke d subject matter jur isdiction over their son and any issues relate d to him because the child is a re sident of I taly and has never lived within the jurisdiction of t he court. He further claimed t he trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the prope rty

division because the proper ty to be divided is not located w ithin the court’s jurisdiction. After a hea ring , the trial cour

t gr anted Wells’s m o t i o n an d signe d an Amende d Final De cre e of Divorce , which mer ely

g rante d a divorc e, and a n Orde r Dismi s s i n g C l aim s for Conserva torship, Possession and Acce ss, Chil d Support and Property Division. Bellia appe aled. A N A L Y SIS Rely ing on se ction 6.301 and 159.201(a) (2) of the Texas Family

Code, Be llia contends the trial court e rre d in rendering the orde r of dismissal. She arg ues the trial c ourt had jurisdiction beca use (1) divorce actions are based on domicile and W ells claimed to be domiciled in Te x as and04
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- 3- never disputed that Texas was his home state unti l the t rial cour t entere d a judg ment he did not like, and (2) Wells consented to the cour t’s jurisdiction by filing the divorce action in which he soug ht deter mination of the issues dismiss ed by the trial cour

t. See T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 6.301 (Ve rnon 2006) (stating divorce suit may not be maintained unless e ither petit ioner or r espondent ha s been ( 1) Te xas d omi c ili a ry

fo r s ix mon ths pr e c e din g su it, a nd (2 ) c ounty

re sid e nt i n c ounty in wh ic h s uit is bro ught f or 90 da y s p re c e din g su it) ; § 1 59 .2 01 (a )( 2) (V e rn on 20 08 ) ( statin g that in

pr oc e e din g to establish or enf

orce child support or deter mine pare ntag e court may exercise pe rsonal jurisdiction
over nonr esident if he c onsents by enter ing g ener al ap p ea rance or f iling re sponsive document eff ectively waiving contest to persona l jurisdiction). “A c ourt must possess both subj ect matter jurisdiction over a case and persona l jurisdiction
o v e r a p a rty to is s u e a b in d in g ju d g ment.” CSR Ltd. v. Li nk , 925 S.W .2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996). Subject matter juris d i ct i o n refers to the powe r of a court to hea

r a pa rticular ty pe of suit. Id. “Subject matter

jurisdiction ex ists when the nature of the c ase f alls within a g ener al categ ory of ca ses t h e court is empowered . . . to a djudicate.” In re Barne s , 1 2 7 S. W. 3 d

8 4 3 , 8 4 6 ( T e x. App.—San An t o n i o 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t
. ) ( q u o t i n g Mc Gu ire v . M c Gu ire , 1 8 S. W.3 d 8 01 , 8 04 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 2000, no pet.)). Subject matter jurisdiction “ exis ts by operation of law only , and ca nnot be conf

err ed upon any court by consent or w aiver .” In re A.D .D. , 97 4 S.W. 2d 29 9, 30 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 1 9 9 8 , n o p et
. ) ( qu o t i n g Fed. Unde rwrit ers Exc h. v. Pugh , 141 Tex. 539, 541, 174 S .W.2d 598, 600 (1943)) . Personal jurisdiction ref ers to a court’s power to bind a particular person or entity
. Link , 925 S.W .2d at 594. Unlike subjec t ma tter jurisdiction, pe rsonal jurisdiction c an, as a g ener al rule, be conferr ed by consent or waiver
. A.D.D. , 9 7 4 S
. W
. 2 d at 3 0 3 (c i t i n g Pugh , 174 S.W .2d at 600);

see T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 159.201(a) (2).04
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- 4- Wel ls’ s m ot io n to dismis s w a s b a se d o n a n a bs e nc e of su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n. I n it s finding s of fa ct and conclusions of law, the trial court found and conc luded it lacked subje ct matter jurisdiction over the issues of conservatorship, child support, and the division of property
. The issue of pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n ove r Wel ls wa s not ra ise d by the mot ion to dis mis s nor do e s it fo rm a ny ba sis for the trial court’s ruling
. On appe al, B ellia’s only argument rela tes to persona l jurisdiction over Wells. S he makes no eff

ort to disc uss the alleg ed existence of subje ct matter jurisdiction re levant to eac h claim that was dismissed. I t is not t he cour t’s place to make Bellia’s arg uments for her. See Robertson v. Sw. Bell Y

ellow Pages, Inc ., 190 S.W .3d 899, 903 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pe t.); see also Murray

v. De vco, Ltd. , 731 555, 557 (Tex. 1987) (holding appellant be ars bur den to show jud g me nt i s e rr on e ou s to ob ta in r e ve rs a l) ; T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(h). Be cause Be l l i a h as presented nothing for r eview on the issue of the e x istence of subject matter jurisdiction, we ove rrule he r issue and a ffirm the tria l court’s judg ment. I n h is c o n c lu s io n a n d p r a y e r , We ll s r e qu e s ts w e o r d e r B e ll ia to p a y h is a tt o r n e y ’s fe es for defe nding “ this frivolous appeal.” See T EX . R. A PP . P. 45 . Ru le 45 pr ov ide s: I f the c ourt of appe als deter mines that an appe al is frivolous it may –on motion of any party or on its own initiative, after notice and a r easona bl e o p p o rt u n ity

for response –awa

rd ea c h preva iling par

ty just damag es. I n deter

mining whe ther to aw ard dama g e s, the c ou rt

mus t not co ns ide r an y ma tte r that do e s n ot a pp e a r i n th e re c or ds , br ie fs , o r o the r p a

pe rs fi le d in

the c ourt of a pp e a ls. Id . “I t is withi n our discre tion to gra nt or deny appellate sanctions.” Sanchez v . Sanchez , No. 04-06- 00469-CV, 2007 WL 1888343, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antoni o J ul. 3, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.), cert. de nied , 129 S.Ct . 71 (2008). When exerc ising this discretion, we must act “with prude nce, caution, and a fter c are ful deliberation.” Id. (q u o t i n g Bake r Hughes Oilfield Operations , Inc. v

. Hennig Prod. Co. , Inc. , 164 S.W .3d 438, 448 (T ex. App.—Houston [ 14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).04
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- 5- Whil e we have de te rm ine d th a t B e lli a ’s a pp e llate c omp la i nts a re wi tho ut m e ri t, w e de c lin e to i mpo se sanctions and ther efor e deny Wells’s request for

attorney ’s fe es.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice