### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 22, 2007 S e s s i on

STA TE OF TEN N ESSEE V


### . MARK DE W AY NE CUL B E RT S ON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sevier County No. 9589-II Re x Henry Ogle, Judge

No. E2006-01572-CC A-R3- CD 

### - F i l e d J a nua r y 7, 2008

A Sevier County

jury convicted the Defendant, Mar k Dewa y ne Culbertson, of possession of a controlled su b s t an ce i n a penal instit ution, a class C felony . The trial c ourt sentenc ed the Def endant, a Rang e I Ioffe nder, to e igh t y ea rs an d s ix months in prison. On appeal, the De fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d w he n it : ( 1) den ied his mot ion to s up pr e ss h is statement; (2) de nied hi s m o t i on for judg ment of ac quittal; (3) denied his motion for a ne w trial b ec au s e h e w as n o tn o t i fi edp re t ri al t h at t h e c o n tro l l eds u b s t an ce wa s d es t ro y e d d u r i n g t es t i n g; (4) de nied his motion for new trial ba sed upon prose cutorial misconduct; (5) failed t o o rder a
n ew t ri al beca

use of ne wly

discovere d evidenc e; and ( 6) improper ly sentenc ed the De fenda

nt. F ind ingthat th e re e xists no e rr or , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H AY ES and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

Robert L . Vog el, Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee ( on appea l) and James Gree nlee, Sevier ville, Tennesse e (at trial) for the A

ppellant, Mark Culber

tson.

Robe rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l E . M oo re , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; L esl ie E. Pr ic e , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; A l Sc hmutze r, Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Je re my Ba ll, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION I. F acts A. Trial

The Sevier

County Gra nd J ury indicted the De fenda

nt o n o n e co u nt of possession of a controlled substanc e in a pe nal institut ion. At the Def en d ant’s trial on this char g e, the f ollowing-2-

evidenc e wa s prese nted: Br ian Smith, a corre ct i o n s o ff i cer at the Sevier

County J ail, testified that, on November 26, 2002, he searche d the Defenda nt befor e admitt ing him into jail. W hen the Def endant e ntere d the jail, Offic er Smith asked the De fenda nt to place e very

thing tha t h e had on his pe rson

on the c ounte r s o th a t he c ou ld l ogit i nto the ja il’ s p ro pe rt y fi le s. Of

fi c e r S mith specific ally

asked the Def

endant if the Def

en d an t p o s s essed a

ny needle s, drug s, or tobacc o, and the Def end an t responde d neg atively . Offic er Smith patted down the De fenda nt and did not find any thi n g. He then a sked the De fenda nt to have a se at and to re move his shoes. I n the Def endant’ s rig ht shoe, the off icer found a p l as t ic bagcontaininga white substanc e. The office r descr ibed the shoes a s simil ar to ten n is shoes. The De fenda nt asked the of

fice r if the of

fice r wa s g oing to “ char g e him with it,” and the off icer said that dec ision was not his.

Offic er Smith took th e Def endant to Serg eant Ma

y s, who said the substance must be sent to the crime la

boratory for testing . The off

icer then broug ht the Def

endant to a de tective at the S h e r i f f ’ s O f f i c e

. O f f i c e r S m i t h t e s t i f

i e d t h a tth e D e f

e n d a n tb e c a m e u

p s e ta f t e r S e r g e an tM ays de c id e d th a t th e o f

f ic e r s h o u ld c o n ta c t th e d e te c ti v e s a t th e Sh e r if f ’ s O f f ic e

. T h e De fenda nt made state ments that the offic ers did not have to contact de tectives a nd “thing s of that nature .”

On cr oss-examination, the Off icer Smit h testified that he de scribed this eve nt in an inc ide nt r e po rt . O ff

ic e r S mith s a id t

here wa s n o p os sib ili ty

the De fe nd ant’ s sh oe s w e re bo ots

. He a g ree d that immediately afte r he f ound the substance he w ent t o his serg eant be cause Offic er Smit h could not ide ntify the substance. The office r and the serg eant returne d t o t h e Defenda nt shortly there afte r to “s ee i f he w ould acknowle dg e wha t the substance w as.” The office rs did not of fe r t he De fe nd ant Miranda war nings but still asked h i m about the substance . The De fenda nt asked the office rs “not to cha rg e him fo r i t

. ” T h e o ffice r said that “the first time” the De fenda nt asked that he not be cha

rg ed wa s in response to this inquiry

.
J eff McCarte r, a de tective with the Sevier Co u n ty Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment, testified that on No ve mbe r 2 6, 20 02 , O ff ic e r S mith c a me to h is o ff ic e be c a us e the of

fi c e r c on fi sc a te d s ome contra band fr om a man he booke d into jail. The det ec t ive sent the substanc e to the Te nnessee Bur eau of I nvestig ations (“TB I ”) c rime laboratory for e x amination.

J acob White, a spe cial ag ent with the TB I , testified that he a naly zed the substance f

o u nd in this case and de termined that the substanc e conta ined psilocin, a hallucinog enic substanc e c on ta ine d in

so me va ri e tie s o f m

us hr oo ms. He sa id t

hat ps ilo c in i s a con tr ol led su bs tanc e in T e n n e s s e e

. A g e n tW h i t e d e t e r m i n e d t h a tt h e s u

b s t an c e w e i g h t e d

0

. 6 g r a m s

. O nc ro ssexamination, the ag ent testified that the substanc e wa s consum ed by the ana ly sis, meaning that the entire sample wa s n ecessary to make an ide ntification of the c ontrolled substance contained in t he mate ri a l. T he a g e nt d e sc ri be d the su bstanc e a s “ po ro us ” and sa id t he sampl e wa s r ou g hly the size of a half

dollar.

F or the De fe nd ant, Th oma s Ca rr te sti fi e d th a t he us ed to liv e wi th t he De fe nd ant i n Gatlinburg . When they

moved i n t o the apa

rtment, there was a

pair of boots Car

r desc ribed a s ste e l- toe d, brown , and a

bo ve the ank le . H e sa id t hat he le t th e De fe nd ant w e ar t ho se bo ots in November o f 2 0 0 3. On cr oss-examination, Carr testified that he kne w the De fenda nt beca use he and the De fenda

nt both worked for

J ohn Tate’ s construction compa ny . Carr e x plained that the-3-

boots were siz e 10 or 101⁄2 a nd that he neve r saw the Def endant we aringthem.

J ohn Tat e testified that he kne w the De fenda nt beca use his cabin r ental compa ny previously

employ ed the De fenda

nt as a maintena

nce ma n. Tate te stified the Def endant wa s workingfor him the day

that he wa s arr ested. He noticed that the De fenda nt wore da

rk-c olored, steel-toed boots. The Def endant ha d previously

told Tate that the boots had be en lef t at Carr’ s cabin. Tate testified he tr usted the De fenda n t wi t h the key s to approxim ately 120 cabins, a

nd he
never suffe red a

loss as a re sult of the Def endant having those key s. Tate de scribed the Def endant a s having a re putation in the community for hone sty

.
On cr oss-examination, Tate re called the Def en d an t was a

rre sted in November

2002, shortly befor e Tha

nksg iving. Tate knew of the Def endant’ s previous convic tions and that he
se rv e d time i n ja il, bu t he did no t kn owof

the De fe nd ant’ s sp e c if

ic c on vic tio ns fo r c la ss C felony t h ef

t , cl ass D fe lony

theft, two counts of c lass E felony theft, ag g ravated burg lary , and misdemeanor the ft. Tate sa id he fe lt the Defe ndant was honest from workingwith him, but he ag ree d he did not take into ac count his previous convic tions.

The De fenda

nt testified that, the day

h e wa s ar re s t ed , he wa s wea ring a pair

of boots that he bo rr ow e d f

ro m hi s r oo mmate , Carr. He sa id t hat th e of fi c e r p ull e d o ut t

he ins ole s o f h is b oo ts and found “ some substance ” in a c lear l i t t l e b ag g ie. The ja iler aske d him what the substance was, a nd the Def

endant sa id, “I

don’t know . . . . I ’ve ne ver s ee n i t b ef o re

. ” The Def

endant denied tel l i ng the jailer that the jailer did not have to “cha rg e [him] .” The Def

endant sa id he was not give n a cha

nce to e x plain that the boots were not his, and he did not knowing ly put the substance in his boot.

On cr oss-examination, the Defe ndant said that the jailer took the boots from him aft er intake bec ause “y o u are not allowed to wea r steel- toed boots” in the jail, and he did not rece ive the bo ots ba c k unti l he le ft the ja il. F ur

the r, he sa id h e did

no t own a

pa ir of Ai rw a lk t e nn is shoes, but he had a

pair of N ike tennis sh o es

. T h e De fenda nt conce ded he ha d previous convictions, and the S t at e we n t throug h eac h of those convic tions. The Def endant c larified that he usually

wo re t en n i s shoes to work a nd only wore boots the day

he wa s arr ested be cause he
wa s p re ssu

re wa sh ingand

ne e de d b oo ts.

Ba sed upon this evidence , the jury convicted the Def

endant o f introducinga contr olled substance into a pe nal institut ion.

B. Se nt e nc ing He ar ing

At the sentenc ing he aring , the State prese nted evidenc e that the De fenda nt had seve ral felony convictions. On F ebrua

ry 1, 1994, the Def

endant p l ed g uilty

to two counts of fe lony

theft and two counts of a g g ravated burg lary . He wa s convicted of ag g rava t ed burgla

ry in 1995 and of felony rec kless endang erme nt on April 28, 1997. Furthe r, t h e De fe ndant had be en convic ted of
sever al misdemeanor s, for a total of fourte en prior c onvictions. The State ar g ued that the tria l court should sentenc e the De fenda nt, a Rang e I Ioffe nder, to the top of the six to ten y ear ap p li c a b le r an g e

. T h e D e f

e n d an t te s ti f

ie d th a t h e h a s tr ie d to b e a g o o d c it iz e nsince he g ot out-4-

of prison, and he did not intend to int roduce co n t ra b an d i n to the jail. The De fenda nt ag ree d he had seve ral pa

role a nd probation violations but stated that those v i o lations were for not pay ing all of his fines.

The trial c ourt found that ther e we re no a pplicable mitigating fa ct ors and that two
en h an c e me n t f

a c to r s a p p li e d : th a t th e D e f

e n d an t h a d an e xte n s iv e c r im in a l h is to r y ; and that he had pre viously

failed to c omply

with the term s o f p robation. B ased upon this evidenc e, the tria l court sente nced the Def

endant a s a Rang e I Ioffe nder to e ight a nd a half y ear s in prison.

II. Ana lys is

On a pp e a l, t he De fe nd ant c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d w he n it : ( 1) de nie d h is mot ion to s up pr e ss h is s tate me nt; (2 ) d e nie d h is m oti on fo r j ud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l; ( 3) de nie d h is moti o nf o r a n e w tr ia l b e c a

u s e h e w a s n o t n o ti f

ie d p r e tr ia l t h a t t h e c o n tr o ll e d

s u b s ta n c e w as destroy ed duringtesting; (4) denied his motion for newtrial based u p o n prosec utorial misc o n d u c t; ( 5 ) f

a il e d to o r d e r a n e w tr ia l b e c a u s e o f n e w ly d is c o v e r e d e v id e n c e ; and (6) improperly

sentenc ed the De fenda

nt.

A. M ot ion to Suppr e ss
The De fenda

nt contends that the trial c o u rt err ed whe n it admitted the Defe ndant’s statement into evidenc e. He asser ts that for Miranda pu

rp os e s, he g a ve thi s st a te me nt whil e in
c us tod y , a nd tha t hi s st a te me nt w a s th e re su lt o f a n il le g a l in ter rogat ion and no t vo lun tari ly g iven. The State c ounters that the De fenda nt was in jail being booked on unre lated cha rg es and that he wa s not in custody for Miranda purposes.

At trial, the office r first testified that immediately afte r he found the substance in the De fe nd ant’ s sh oe , th e De fe nd ant t ol d the of fi c e r t hat th e of fi c e r d id n ot h a ve to c ha

rg e him wi th “it.” On c ross-examination, the office r testified di ff er ently , stating that immediately afte r he found the substanc e he w ent to his serg eant be cause he could not identify t h e s u b stance . The of fi c e r a nd the se rg e ant r etu rned to the De fe nd ant s ho rt ly the re a ft e r t o “ se e if

he wo uld
a c kn ow le dg e wh a t th e su bs tanc e wa s. ” Th ey

did no t g ive the De fe nd ant Miranda war nings, but the y a sk e d h im a

bo ut t he su bs tanc e . T he De fe nd ant r e sp on de d by ask ingthe of fi c e rs “ no t to char g e him for i t

. ” The off icer said that “the f

irst time” the Def

endant a sked that he not be char g ed wa s in respon s e t o t h is inquiry . The De fenda nt’s attorney

reque sted a side ba

r with the trial court dur ing which he a sserted that the statement wa s inadmissible because the Def endant had no t be e n g ive n h is Miranda war nings. The trial court disag ree d, finding that the offic er ha d pr e vio us ly

te sti fi e d th a t th e Defendant s po nta ne ou sly ma de the state me nt a

nd that it wa s, there fore , an issue that af fec ted the off

icer ’s cr edibility . At the hea ring on the Def

endant’ s motion for new tria l, the trial court state d:

Th e state me nt o f [the De fe nd ant] t o th e of fi c e r at th e jail , I a m satis fi e d in my mind that he made it, that h e k n ew i t was ther e, I am satisfied of that. Iwas [here ] th e d ay o f th e tr ia l an d a s I s ay , I w o u ld n ’ t b e li e v e h im o n a s ta c k o f Bibles as hig h as t h i s co u rt house. B ut whether a jury does or not, ag ain, that’s up for1 In M i r anda , t h e S u p re m e c o u rt sta te d :

W h e n a n ind ivid u a l i s in cu sto d y o n p ro b a b le c a u se , the p o lice m a y, o f c o u rs e , se e k o u t ev id e n c e in t he f i el d t o be us ed at t r i al ag ai ns t hi m. Suc h i nv es t i gat i on may i ncl ude i nqui r y of per s ons not un der

r es t r ai nt

. G ene r al on- t he- s cen e que s t i oni ng as t o f act s s ur r oundi ng a cri me or ot her ge ner al qu es t i on i n g of

c i t i ze n s i n t h e f

ac t

- f i n di n g pr oce s s i s n ot a f f ec t ed b y ou r h ol di n g

. I t i s a n a ct of -5- them to decide.

The F ifth Amendment to the United States Constituti on provides in p ar t t h at “no pe rson .

. . s h a ll b e c o mp e ll e d in an y c r im in a l c a s e to b e a w it n e s s a g a in s t h im s e lf

. ” U

. S. Co nst. amend. V. Simil arly , article I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Constitut i o n s t ates that “ in all criminal prosec utions, the acc used . . . shall not be c o mpelled to g ive evidenc e ag ainst himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I , § 9. The United States Supre me Court has held that the pr otections aff orded by the Fifth Ame ndment require that prec autions be take n befor e stateme nts obtained throug h custodial interro gat i o n ar e allowed a s evidenc e ag ainst an ac cused. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1964). Gene rally , when state ments made by an ac cused a

re the product of a

custodial interrog ation by law enfor ceme nt of fice rs, the statements may not be admitted i n t o evidenc e un le ss t he a c c us e d is : Warned prior

to any questioning that he has the ri gh t t o rema in silent, that
any thi nghe say s can be us e d a g a ins t hi m in a c ourt of law, that he ha s th e ri g ht t o the pre s e n c e o f an a tt o r

n e y , an d th a t if h e c an n o t a f f o r d an a tt o r

n e y o n e w il l be
a pp ointe d f

or him pr ior to a ny qu e sti on ingif

he so de sir e s.
Id. Only when the suspe ct is informed of his rights via the Miranda war ni n gs may

a suspec t be deeme d to knowingly

and intellige ntly

waive the rig ht to rem ai n s i l en t and the r ight to an attorney

. Id. Moreove r, any statement obtained afte r a waiver of this rig ht mu s t b e v o l u n t ary and n o t b e ex t ra ct ed by

“any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by

any direc t or implied p ro m ises, howeve r slight, nor by the exertion of any

improper influe nce.” B r a m v

. U n ited States , 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
The prote ctions provided under Miranda do not apply in ever y instance where a police of fi c e r qu est ions a

su sp e c t; r a the r, the se pr ote c tio ns on ly a pp ly “ wh e n th e de fe nd ant i s in custody and is subjected to que stioning or its functional e quivalent.” W alton , 41 S.W .3d at 82. Miranda war

nings a re r equire d only

when a person is s u b

j ec t to custodial interrog ation by law
e nf or c e me nt. “ Cus tod ia l” me ans that the su bje c t of qu e sti on ing is in “ c us tod y or o ther wi se d ep ri ved of his fr eedom by the authorities in any

signific ant way .” Miranda 384 U.S. at 479.

“ I nte rr og a tio n” h a s b e e n inte rp re te d to re fe r t o q ue sti on s th a t la

w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs sh ou ld know ar e re asonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response

. R h o d e I s l a n d v . I nn is , 446 U .S. 2 9 1 , 3 0 1 (1980). In order for Miranda to a

pp ly , th e su sp e c t’ s st a te me nts mus t be in r e sp on se to interrog ation by

law enf orce ment personne l, S

ta t e v . B ro wn , 66 4 S.W.2 d 3 18 , 3 21 (T e nn . Cr im. App. 1983), or the suspect must know that he is beinginterrog ated by an ag ent of the State. Il l inois v. Perkins , 496 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1990). “ Absent either one of the se pre requisites, the requ i re m en ts of Miranda are not impli cate d.” Id. For instance, on- the-sce ne questioning does not require Miranda w arning s. Mi r a n da , 3 84 U. S. at 47 7; Sta te v . G os s , 995 S.W .2d 617, 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

. 1r es po ns i bl e c i t i zen s hi p f o r ind i vi dual s t o gi ve wha t eve r i nf ormat i on t hey may ha ve t o ai d i n l aw
en f or ce men t

. I n s u ch s i t uat i o ns t h e compe l l i n g a t mos ph er e i n h er en t i n t h e pr oce s s of i n
- cu s t ody inte rr o g a tio n is no t ne c e ssa rily p re se n t.

I d. a t 477- 78

. -6- The Miranda standards are modified, howeve r, when the suspect subjected to q u est ioning is alre a dy

in c u s to dy b e c a u s e h e is in c ar c e r a te d

. I nT e n n e s s e e , th e s ta n d ar d to d e termine whether Miranda war

nings must pre cede ques t i o n i n g i n a prison setting wer e set out in State v. Go ss

. 9 9 5 S

. W .2d at 629. In Go ss , th is C ourt he ld t hat a pr iso ne r i s n ot a

uto matic a lly

“ in custody ” within the meaningof Miranda ; th e r e mu s t b e an a d d it io n a l im p o s it io n o n the inmate’s fre edom of moveme nt. Id. Relevant to this determination is (1) the la ng uag e used to summon the inm a te , ( 2) the ph y sic a l surr ound ing s of th e in terro g a tio n, (3 ) t he e xten t to wh ic h th e inm a te is confronte d with evidence o f h i s gu ilt, and (4) the a dditional pressure e x erte d to detain the inma te. Id. These f

actor s are also the appr opriate c onsideration whe n deter mining whe ther a defe ndant, who is beingbooked into jail on an u n re l at ed charg e, is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda when the de fenda nt give s statements rele vant to another offe nse.

I n the ca se under

submissi on, if the De fenda nt’s statement wa s made spontane ously and imm e diate ly

a ft e r t he ja ile r f ound th e su bs tanc e , th e state me nt i s c le arl y a dmi ssi ble . U nd e r t

ho se circ umstances, it would not be the r esult of any q u es t i o n , i

. e., interr og ation, at all. The c loser ques ti o no c c u r s if

th e s tate me n t w a s ma d e in r e s p o n s e to th e ja il e r ’ s in qu ir y o f th e n a tu r e o f the substance. Even in that sc enar io, thoug h, we conclude that the statement is a dmissibl e. The mushroom substan ce wa s uncover ed in the cour se of a routine sea

rch, a nd the jailer w as unsure of th e su bs tanc e ’s natur e , w hic h, a s a mus hr oo m, w a s n ot r e a dil y a pp are nt. Th e ja ile r w e nt t o his s u p er v i s o r t o see if the supervisor c ould identify the substance and dete rmine whe ther it was contra band. The supervisor, a l s o u n s u re of the nature of the substance, a sked the De fenda nt wha t t he substance was. This questioning took place in the sa me jail intake ar ea where the Def endant wa s being booked on unre l at ed char g es. Unde r these c ircumstance s, we c onclude that thi s q ue sti on oc c ur re d d ur ingthe fa c t f

ind ingpr oces s whe n the o ff ic e rs we re a tte mpt ingto deter mine whether

the substance wa s co n t ra b and. As such, this question amounted to an on-thescene , i n v es t i gatory

question. “‘Response s to ge nera l on-the-sc ene que stioning by an off icer during the fa ct finding proce ss as fac ts surrounding the cr ime are admissible ev idence .’” Go ss , 9 9 5 S

. W

. 2 d

at 6 2 9 (q u o t i n g State v. Johnson , 685 SW .2d 301, 306 (T enn. C rim. App. 1984)). We hold that the trial court prope rly admitted this statement.

B. Motion f

or Judgm ent of Acquittal

The De fenda

nt contends t h at t he trial c ourt err ed whe n it denied his motion for judgme nt of a c qu itt a l and

that th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o s us ta in h is c on vic tio n. He ass erts th a t, beca use his statement wa s inadmissibl e and c ould not properly be conside red b y t h e j u ry , the State did not prove the e lements of the c rime. The D efe ndant asser ts that the office r contradicted himself and “a dmission of the [ De fe ndant’s] statement violated the substantial rig hts of the [D]e f e n d an t

. ” F i n a l l y , h e a s s e rt s t h a t t h e S t a t e d i d n o t p r o v e t h a t h e a c t e d kn o w i ng ly a s is require d for this offe nse.-7-

W e ap p l y t h e s am e s t an d ar d

wh en re v i ew i n g wh et h er a t ri al co u rt erre d

i nd en yi n g a mot ion fo r j ud gment o f a c qu itt a l a s w he n r e vie wi ngwh e the r t he e vid e nc e wa s su ff

ic ie nt t o sustain a conviction. See St at e v . B all , 9 73 S.W. 2d 28 8, 29 2 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); State v. Adams , 916 S .W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). When an a ccuse d challeng es the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence , this Court’s standard of r eview is wh et h er , afte r consider ing the evide n ce in the light most favora ble to the State, “a

ny rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential el em en t s of the cr ime bey ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 31 9 ( 19 79 ); see Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) , Sta te v . G oo dwin , 143 S.W .3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (c i t i n g Sta te v . R e id , 9 1 S.W.3 d 2 47 , 2 76 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ). Th is r ule a pp lie s to fi nd ing s o f guil t based upon dire ct evidenc e, cir cumstantial evidenc e, or a combinatio n of both direc t and circ umstantial evidence

. S ta t e v

. P e nd

e rg ra ss , 13 S.W .3d 389, 392-93 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1999). A c on vic tio n ma

y be ba se d e nti re ly

on c ir c ums tanti a l e vid e nc e wh e re the f a c ts a re “ so c le arl y interw o v en an d connec ted that the fing er of g uilt is pointed unerr ingly at the De fenda

nt and the Def endant a lone.” Sta te v. S mith , 868 S.W .2d 561, 569 (Tenn. 1993) . The jury decide s the weig ht to be g iven to circ umstantial evidence , and “[ t ] h e i n fer ence s to be drawn from such evidenc e, and the extent to whic h the circ umstances a re c onsistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence , are questions primarily for the j ury .” State v. Rice , 184 S.W .3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (c itations omi tted).

I n deter mining the suff

i ci en cy of the e vidence , this Court shoul d not re-w eig h or re

evaluate the evide nce. Sta te v. Ma tthe ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) . Nor may this Court subs titute its infere nces f or those dra

wn by the trier of

fac t fro m t h e evide nce. State v. Buggs , 9 95 S.W. 2d 10 2, 10 5 (Ten n. 19 99 ); Lia k as v . S tate , 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956). “Q uestions conce rning the cr edibility of t h e wi t n es s es, the we ight a nd value of

the evidenc e, as w ell as all fa ctual issues ra ised by the ev i dence are resolved by the trier of

fac t.” S ta te v

. Bland , 95 8 S.W. 2d 65 1, 65 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; Liakas , 286 S.W .2d at 859. “A guilty verdic t by th e ju r y , a p p r o v e d b y th e tr ia l j u d g e , a c c r e d it s th e te s ti mo n y o f th e w it n e s s e s f o r th e St a te and

r e s o lv e s a ll c o n f

li c ts in f av o r o f th e th e o r

y o f th e St a te .” S t a t e v. C abbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (T e nn . 1 97 8) ; State v. Grac e , 493 S.W .2d 474, 479 (Tenn. 1973) . The Te nnessee Supreme Court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound f oundation. The trial judge an d t h e jury see the witnesses fa ce to f

ace , hear their testimony

and obser

ve their de meanor

on the sta nd . T hus th e tr ia l ju dg e and jur y are the pr ima

ry ins tr ume nta lity

of jus tic e to d e t e r m i n e t h e w e i g h tan d

c r e d i b i l i t y

t o b e g i v e nt o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f w i t n e s s e s

. In the trial for

um alone is there human atmosphere and the t o t al i t y of the e vidence
c ann ot b e re pr od

uc e d w itha

wr itt e n r e c or d in

thi s Co ur t.

Bo lin v . S

tate , 4 0 5 S

. W

. 2 d

7 6 8 , 7 7 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Car ro ll v . S tate , 370 S.W

. 2d 523 (Tenn. 1963) ). This Court must afford the State of Tenne ssee the s t ro n ges t l egit imate view of the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord, a s well as all re aso n able infe renc es which ma y be dra wn from the e vidence

. Go od win , 1 4 3 S

. W

. 3 d

at 7 7 5 (c i t i n g Sta te v . S mi th , 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 274, 279 (Tenn. 200 0 ))

. Be cause a ver dict of guilt aga inst a defe ndant re moves the pre sumption of innocenc e and r aises a pr esumption of g uilt, the convict ed criminal def endant be ars the bur den-8-

of show i n g t h at t he evide nce w as leg ally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdic t. State v. Car ru the rs , 35 S.W .3d 516, 557-58 (Te nn. 2000).

I n order to sustain a conviction for introduc ing c ontraba nd into a pena l instit ution, the State must prove that the def endant, knowingly and with unl awf ul intent, did take, send or otherwise c ause c ontraba nd, such as a

controll ed s u b stance , to be taken into a pe nal institut ion wher e prisoner s are quarte red or are under c ustodial supervision. SeeT.C.A. § 39-16 -2 0 1 (a )(1) (2006).

We c on c lud e tha

t th e e vid e nc e , v ie we d in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he State , is
su ff ic ie nt t o s us ta in th e Defen da nt’ s c on vic tio n, and

the tr ia l c ourt , th e re fo re , d id n ot e rr wh e n it denied the D efe ndant’s motion for judg m ent of acquittal. The De fenda nt was ar rested on a

n unrelated matt er an d t ransported to the jail. Per jail intake proc edure s, the jailer a sked the Def endant if the Def

endant ha d any

contra band on his person, and the De fenda nt responded
ne g a tiv e ly . T he ja ile r the n s e arc he d th e De fe nd ant, fi nd ingan il le g a l su bs tanc e loc a te d in

his shoe. The D efe ndant stated that the ja iler d i d not have to cha rg e him for having the substance. At tri al , t h e De fe n dant contende d that the boots were borrowe d, and he ha d no knowledg e that the mushroom was loc at ed i n t h e b oot. The jury discredited this testimony , and the tria l court also found the De fenda

nt not cred i b l e. W e co nclude that a rational trier

of fa ct could have found th e ess ent ia l e le me nts of thi s c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. A c c or din g ly , th e De fe nd ant i s not entitled to relief on this issue.
C. Testing of th e Evidence

The De fenda

nt next contends that the State’ s failure to disclose the “f orensic inter

view summary ,” which inc luded information that the r ecove red substanc e wa s destroy ed during te sti ng , v iol a te d Ru le 16 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ri mi nal P rocedure . T he De fe nd ant a sse rt s that the State, on direc t examinat i o n o f t h e TBI fore nsic ag ent, offe red into evide nce a bagthat purportedly

contained the contra

band substance

. T h en , o n cross-e x amination, the ag ent admitted that the bagwas e mpty beca use all of th e s u b s t an ce was c onsumed during testing. The De fe n d an t asser

ts that the fac t that all of the substance had bee n destroy ed should have been dis c los e d to him

pr ior to t ri a l. H e a sse rt s th is p re

jud ic e d h im b ecaus e , h a d h e be e n p ro pe rl y notified, he c ould have a sked that his own expert either pa rticipate in or b e p ermitted to observe the testing

.
Tenne ssee R u le of Criminal Procedur e 16 desc ribes the pr ocedur e for the State’s disclosure of e vidence : (a) Disc losure of E vidence by the State.
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.

. . . . (F ) D o c u m e n t s an d

O b j e c t s

. Up o na

d e f e n d an t ’ s r e qu e s t , t h e s t a te-9- shall permit the def

endant to insp ec t an d copy or photog raph bo ok s, pape rs , doc ume nts , pho tog ra ph s, t an g i b l e ob

je c ts, bu ild ing s, or

pla c e s, or

c op ie s o r p or

tio ns the re of

, if the ite m is within the state’s possession, custody , or control a nd: (i) the item is materia l to prepar ing the defe nse; (i i) the g ov e rnme nt i nte nd s to us e the i te m in its
case -in-chie f at trial; or (iii) t h e item was obta ined from or belong s to the de fe nd ant. (G) Reports of Ex aminations and Tests. Upon a defenda nt’s reque st, the state shall permit the def endant to ins p ec t an d copy or photogr aph the r esults o r re p o rts of phy sical or menta l examinations, and of scientific tests or e x periments if: ( i ) t h e i t e m i s w i t h i nt h e s t a t e ’ s p o s s e s s i o n , c u s t o dy, or c on tr ol; (i i ) t h e d i s t ri ct at t o r n ey

gen er al k

n o ws
-- o r t h ro u gh due dilige nce c ould know-- that the item e x ists; and (iii) the item is material to pre paringthe def ense or th e s tate inte n d s to u s e th e it e m i nit s c a s e
- in

- c h ief
a t tr ia l.

To enfor ce the rule, Rule 16(d) (2), pr ovides that if there has bee n noncompliance , t h e t ri al court may order the offe nding pa

rty to permit the discover y or inspection, g rant a

continuance, prohibit the introduction of the evidenc e not disc losed or enter such other order as t h e c o u rt deems j u s t u nder the circ umstances. See State v. Leon Goins , No. W1999-01681-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 1531111, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, D ec. 27, 1999) , perm. app. de nied (Tenn. July

17, 2000). “Thus, it is clea r that the c ourt has wide disc retion to fashion a reme dy that is appropriate for the circ umstances of eac h case and the sa

nction must fit the circumstance s of that ca se.” Id. (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see S ta tev.Jam es , 6 8 8 S.W .2d 463, 466 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 84 ). Whe the r a

de fe nd ant h a s b e e n p re

jud ic e d b y

the State ’s fa ilure t o di sclose inf or matio n is
a s i gnificant fa ctor in dete rmining a n appropr iate re medy

. Sta te v . S mi th , 9 2 6 S. W. 2 d 2 67, 270 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) . The De fenda nt bear s the burden of

showing “the degre e t o wh i ch the impediments to discovery hindere d t ri al preparation and defe nse at trial.” Sta te v . B ro wn , 836 S.W .2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993)

.
I n the ca se under

submissi on, our first inquiry is whether the State violated Te nnessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Th e t ec h n i ca l rec ord does not conta in a Rule 16 motion for disco v er y fi led by

the Def endant, a nd the re cord doe s not refle ct that the trial c ourt ruled upon a motion for discovery . I t is the duty of the a ppellant to p re pare a re cord that convey s a fa ir,
acc urate , and complete acc ount of what tra nspired in the trial c ourt with respect to the issues that fo rm the ba sis fo r t

he a pp e a l. T e nn

. R. A

pp . P. 24 (b ); State v. Thompson , 36 S.W .3d 102, 108 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Stat e v

. Mi ller , 737 S.W .2d 556, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) . When the re c or d is in com pl ete and do e s n ot c on ta in i nf

or matio n r e le va

nt t o a pa rt ic ula r i ssu e , th is Court may

not make a r

uling. State v. Gibson , 973 S

. W

. 2 d 2 3 1 , 2 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; State v. Cooper , 7 36 S.W. 2d 12 5, 13 1 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ). I n th e a bs e nc e of an a de qu a te-10-

rec ord, this Court must presume th e co rrectness of the trial court’ s ruling. State v. Bibbs , 806 S.W .2d 786, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . Appellate c ourts may only revie w wh at i s in the
rec ord and not what might have been or should have be en included. D e a r b o rn e v

. S ta te , 575 S.W .2d 259, 264 (Tenn. 1978)

.
I t was only

during the trial, whe n he l ea rn ed t h at t he substance had bee n consumed during testing, that the De fe n d an t objected, a rguing that the failure to disclose this consumption prejudice d him. The Def endant ne ver soug ht to obtain the subs t an ce fo r t est ing be fore trial, nor did he see k to have a

n expert p re sent when the substance w as tested. The Def endant ha s not shown any

prejudice . He is not entitled to relief on this iss ue. D. Alleged P rosec utorial Misconduct

Th e De fe nd ant n e xt co nte nd s tha t th e State c omm itt e d p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t w he n it attempted to enter

an emp t y ev i d en ce baginto evidence . I n order to preva il on a claim of prosec uto ri al m isconduct, the de fenda nt must demonstrate that the conduc t committed by the pr os e c uti on wa s so inf

lammator y or imp ro pe r that it a ff e c te d the ve rd ic t to hi s d etr ime nt. Ha rri ng ton v . S

tate , 2 15 Te nn . 3 38 , 3 85 S.W. 2d 75 8, 75 9 ( 19 65 ); State v. Gray
, 960 S.W .2d 598, 609 (Tenn. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 97). In making this determination, this Court i s g uided by five fa c tor s:
1. The c onduct complained of viewed in c ontext and in light of the fa cts and circ umstances of

the ca se. 2. The c urative me asure s undertake n by the cour t and the prose cution. 3. Th e int e nt o f t

he pr os e c uto r i n ma

kin g the imp ro pe r s tate me nt. 4. The c umulative eff

ect of the improper c onduct and a ny other er rors in t he
rec ord. 5. The re lative streng th or wea kness of the c ase.

J ud gev . S tate , 5 39 S.W. 2d

34 0, 34 4 ( Tenn. Cr im . App . 1 97 6) ; see State v . Buck, 670 S.W .2d 600, 609 (Tenn. 1984)

. We conclude that the State ’s ac t i ons were not improper. I t appea rs from the tr ial tr ans c ri pt t

hat th e State qu e sti on e d th e sp eci al age nt a bo ut t he te sti ngof

the su bs tanc e . I t a lso
a sk e d th e a g e nt a

bo ut h is p ro c e dure s a ft e r t e sti ngthe su bs tanc e , a

nd the agent re sp on de d th a t, afte r he f inished his analy sis, he rese aled the ba g and initialed t h e sea l. The State then a sked the
a g e nt t o uns e a l th e bag an d v e ri fy that it c on ta ine d th e same su

bs tanc e he re c e ive d. On c ro ssexamination the ag ent tes t i fi ed that the ba g was e mpty beca use the substanc e had be en co n s u me d d

u r in g an a ly s is

. T h e D e f

e n d an t ma d e n o o b

je c ti o n

. We c o n c lu d e th a t th e r ecor d does not show that the State ac ted improperly . I t does not appea r that the State attempted to hide from the Def endant the f

act that the substan ce wa s co n s u med. The D efe ndant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue. E. Newly Discovered Evidence-11-

The De fenda

nt next contends that he should be g rante d a new trial beca

use he pr ovided the trial cour

t with newly

di s co vere d evidenc e that anothe r per son claimed to have owned the boots and the illeg al mushroom contai n ed t h er ein. At the motion for new trial hea ring , Rocky Wol f e nb ar g e r te s ti f

ie d th a t h e w a s in c ar c e r a te d in th e Se v ie r Co u n ty Ja il

. H e s a id th at he lived in the apar

tment before th e De fe n d an t , and he le ft in that apar tment a pair of

boots in which he stored an illeg al mushroom. He sa id that he did n o t come f orwa rd bef ore be cause he did not know that the De fenda

nt was b eing prosec uted for this off ense. Wolfenba

rg er the n met the Def endant in jail and lea

rned that he had be en prose cuted f or the mushroom i n Wolfenbarg er’ s bo ots

. On cros s-e xami natio n, Wolf e nb arg e r t e sti fi e d h e did

no t kn owthe mus hr oo m w a s in his boots, and he did not tell the Def endant that he h i d t h e m u s h room in the boot. He said that he
c ou ld h a ve hid

the mus hr oo m in

the bo ot. Th e State the n a sk e d Wo lf enb arger if “to [his] knowledg e, [the Defe ndant aske d people in jail] to come and test i fy for him, that it was in fac t their mushroom.” Wolfenbar g er r esponded, “ I ’m , I ’m n ot sure. L ike I said, we w [ere] in there may be thre e we eks tog ether .” Wolfenbar g er the n said that the Defenda nt asked one other pe rson to testify that the mushroom belong ed to them.

The trial c ourt found:

Th is C ourt , a

ny tim e tha t y ou have a sit uatio n s uc h a s th is, a

Co urt has t o look at it and to make the e valuation about t h e, ce rtainly the due dilig ence aspec t of it. That’s proba

bly been me t

. Although f rom the testimony

of Mr. W o l f e nb ar g e r i t ’ s h ar d t o s ay. It ’ s h ar d

t o s ay. Certainly , based on his testimony that it was his [ b oot] would have
c or ro bo rate d th e te stimo ny

of [the De fe nd ant]. An d I wi ll b e jus t e xtre me ly h o n es twi t h y o u

. I w o u l dn ’t b el i ev e [ t h e D ef en d an t ] o na s t ac k

o f B i b l es as h i gh as this courthouse. B eca use the truth I

don’t t h i n k i s i n h i m, he’s a thief from h ea d t o t o e, n o two rt h y

o f b el i ef o nan y t h i n g.

Ithink he lied i n fr ont of the jury , they thought he lied. But that’s not the iss ue thi s Co ur

t ha s to deci de. Th is m an h a s ju st, he ’s jus t g ot a re c or d a mil e long, a thief and a

burg lar.
Now, looking at Mr. Wolfenbar g er’ s testimony , dependingon which version of his testimony here t o day

a jury believed, it could support [the D e f e n d an t ’ s ] t e s t i m o n y. Quite ca n d i d ly

as it relate s to my self, I think it’s very

dubious that Mr. Wolfenbarg er w alk in here afte r the Statute o f L i m i tations has long longexpired and at one p o i n t say

it’s his, at one point he say s he doesn’ t know. At one point he say s it c ou ld h ave be e n. Ag a in, Iwo uld n’t be lie ve him , I

wo uld n’ t be lie ve him at all.

Itend to think this is contrive[d] , not by the attorney s, but Itend to think that this has been a

contrive[d story ] by

[t he De fenda

nt] and Mr. Wolfenba

rg er.-12- But on the othe r hand, just bec ause I wouldn’t b elieve him or [the De fe nd ant] e ith e r o ne do [es n’ t] me an a jur y wo uld n’ t.

. . . .
Ev e n if [the jur y we re to ] bel ie ve the te sti mony on [Mr . Wo lf

e nb arg e r’ s] A f f i d av i ti n2 0 0 3 , t h a t ’ s s i x m o n t h s a f t e r t h i s e v e no c c u r

r e d

. . . . E v e ni f

t h [ e j u r y] believe what he swor [e] to in t h i s Af fidavit he said on c ross examination today that h e wa s s u re that that was the y ear , Marc h of ’03, throug h the latter pa rt of ’03, t h at h e l i v ed there . That wa s . . . sever al months after [t he De fenda

nt] was taken into jail and this event oc curr ed.

So even t ak i n g the Aff

idavit as completely

true, it is after

this event eve n occur red.

The De fenda

nt’s attorney

then told the trial co u rt that the date on the aff idavit was a mistake, and the c orre ct date w as bef ore the events in this case occur red. The trial court then f ound:

This Co u rt , b ec ause the Court has to pass upon the cr edibility of the te sti mony of Mr . Wo lf

e nb arg e r, that is a

c ru c ia l e le men t of wh a t th e Cou rt ha s to decide

. Th e Court

qu ite cand idly , a s I

sa id e arl ie r, ha s g re a t di ff ic ult y , a nd he re a ll of a su dd e n a

man w ho no w f

a c e s n o c ri mi nal res po ns ibi lity , c ome s in to t his Court and say s u ltima tel y , I su ppos e , if y ou wa nt t o p ut i t th a t w ay , th a t it wa s h is
mus hr oo m.

I n one sense , the issue of the ownership of the shoes is not that controlling . I n fac t, that was the d ef en s e, t h at [ they

wer e not] his s hoes. The [D] efe ndant say s beca

use of that that he could not have be en re sponsible.

Th e Court no te s that the te sti mony in thi s c a se , thi s wa s no t po w[d] er, t his
wa s n ot f ra g me nts of

a mus hr oo m, t

his wa s a mus hr oo m. Mr. Wolfenbarg er state d that those had b ee n h is shoes. Well, he hadn’t be e n in c on ta c t w iththe m f

or a lo ng tim e . T he Court is t ro ub le d th a t du

ri nghis testimony Mr. Wolfenbarg er ma de bas ically three differ ent statements, if you inc lud e th e Affi davit

he ’s ma de fo ur

dif fe re nt s tate me nts . T he Af fi davit its e lf
wa s n ota ri zed by so me on e that di dn ’t

se e the wi tne ss s ig n it

. This Court is of the opinion that based, and i ts basing its dec ision on the
cre dibilit y

of Mr. Wolfenbar g er, that the Court does n o t b el ieve Mr. Wolfenbarg er’ s Affidavit because of the inconsistenc y of his testimony

. That the Court fe els like that this is a sham that is attempted to be-13-

perpe trated on the Court. Not by t h e attorne y s, the Court is not accusingthe attorney s of any

thing imprope r.
But the Co u rt f

in d s an d s o h o ld s th a t b a s e d u p o n h is te s ti mo n y , the contra dictions in his t estimony and in his Affidavit that Mr. Wol fenba rg er’ s te sti mony , t o pu t it mi ldly , is sk e pti c a l, a nd that th e Court

mus t f ind in o rd e r t o order a new trial that it in fact would have m ad e a differ ence . That it might have made a differ ence is not the question.

To be e nti tle d t o a new tr ia l on the ba sis of

ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e , a

de fe nd ant m

us t show: (1) that he or she use d rea sonable dil ige nce in se ekingthe newly discovere d evidenc e; (2) that the new e vidence is material; and (3) that the new evidenc e will likely

chang e the r esult of the trial. Se e Sta te v . Ni c ho ls , 877 S.W .2d 722, 737 (T en n

. 1 9 94). Whether to g rant a new tria l on the basis of ne wl y d i scover ed evide nce lies w ithin the sound discretion of the trial c ourt. See Sta te v . Ca ldw e ll , 9 77 S.W. 2d 11 0, 11 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 19 97 ). Ac c or din g ly , w e re vie w this issue for a

n abuse of

discretion. See State v . Meade , 942 S.W .2d 561, 565 (T en n

. C ri m

. App. 1996).

I n the ca se under

submis s ion, we conc lude that the trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion when it found that the D efe ndant was no t en titled to a new trial be cause the newly discovere d evidenc e would not likely change t h e result of the tria l. As the trial cour t noted, Wolfenbarg er’ s aff i d av i t l i s t ed the incorr ect date, stating that he re nted the same apar tment as the De fenda

nt aft er t h es e eve nts. Further , the af fidavit was not prope rly

notarized. Ag ain, as the tria l court
no te d, Wolf

e nb arg e r’ s te sti mony

a t th e he ari ngwa s in c on sis te nt d urin g d ir e c t and

c ro ssexaminations and it was inconsistent with his aff idavit. Wol fenba

rg er c laimed t h at t he boots and the mushroom wer e his, then that the boots wer e his but the mushroom was not, and the n that the bo ots we re his so the mus hr oo m in the m mu st h a ve be e n h is . He ma int a ine d th a t he le ft his boots in the apartment. B oth t h e jury and the tria l court found that the D efe ndant was not
cre d i b l e. Under these cir cumstance s, we a g ree with the trial court that the D efe ndant has not pro ven that Wol fe nb arg e r’ s te sti mony wo uld lik e ly c ha ng e the re su lt o f h is tri a l. H e is, there fore , not entitled to relief on this issue.

F . Se nt e nc ing
Finally , the Def

endant c ontends that the trial cour t erre d when it sentenc ed him. The De fe nd ant a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt impr op e rl y

us e d h is p ri or

c on vic tio ns to e nh anc e his sentenc e wh en t h o se convic tions were a lso used to establish him as a Rang e I Ioffe nder. The Def endant a lso compl ains that the trial cour t did not create an a dequate rec ord bec ause it fa iled to make finding s of fa ct supporting his sentence

. When a def

endant c halleng es the leng th and manner of ser vice of a sente nce, it is the duty of this court to conduc t a de novo r eview o f t h e record with a pr esumption that “the deter minations m ad e b y the cour t from which the a

ppeal is take n are corr ect.” T.C.A. § 40-35-W e no te tha t o n J u n e 7 , 2 0 0 5 , t h e G e n e ra l A sse m b ly am e n d e d T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n s 4 0 -3 5 -1 0 2 (6 ), - 2 1 1 4 , - 2 1 0 , - 4 0 1

. See 2 0 0 5 T e n n . P u b . A c ts c h . 3 5 3 , § § 1 , 5 , 6 , 8

. H o w e v e r, the a m e n d e d c o d e se c tio n s a re ina p p lica b le to the D e fen d a n t’s ap p e a l. E ff e c tive J u n e 7 , 2 0 0 5 , T e n n e sse e C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n s 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 a n d 4 0 -3 5 -2 1 0 w e re re w ritten in the ir 3

e n tire ty. See T enn. P ub

. A ct s, ch. 35 3 , §§ 5, 6. T hese s ect i o ns were replaced wi t h l anguage rend eri ng t he enhancem ent fac to rs a d v iso ry o n ly an d a b a n d o n ing a sta tuto ry m inim u m se n te n c e

. See T .C .A . § § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 (2 0 0 5 ) (“ [t]h e c o u rt sh a ll

co nsi d er, but i s no t b o und b y , t he f o l l o wi ng ad vi sory f

act o rs i n d et erm i ni ng whether t o enhance a d ef end ant ’ s sent ence”);

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 (c) (“ In i m p o si ng a s p eci f i c sent ence wit hi n t he range of punis hm ent , the co urt shal l c o nsi d er, b ut is no t bo und b y , t he f o l l o wi ng ad vi sory s ent enci ng gui d el i nes. ”). -14- 401(d) ( 2003). This presumption is “conditioned upon the a ffirmative showing in the rec ord that 2 the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and all rele vant fac ts a nd circumstances.” Sta te v . R os s , 4 9 S. W.3 d 8 33 , 8 47 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; State v. Pe ttus , 986 S

. W

. 2 d 540, 543 (Tenn. 19 99 ); S t a t e v. Ashby , 8 23 S.W. 2d 16 6, 16 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . T he pr e sumpt ion do e s n ot a

pp ly to the leg al conc lusions reac hed by the trial cour

t in sentencinga def

enda n t o r t o the deter

minations made by the trial cour

t that are predic ated up o n uncontrove rted fa cts. State v. De an , 76 S.W .3d 35 2, 37 7 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); S ta tev

. B u tl er , 9 0 0 S

. W

. 2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 94 ); Sta te v . S

mi th , 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . I f our r eview r ef l ects that the trial cour

t followed the statutory

sentenc ing pr ocedur e, imposed a la wful sentenc e af

ter having g iven due c onsidera t i on and prope r we ight to the f actor s and principles se t out under the
s en t en ci n g law, and ma de finding s of fa ct that ar e ade quately supported by

the re cord, the n we may not modify

the sentenc e, eve n if we wo u ld have pr efe rre d a diffe rent re sult. State v. Fletche r , 805 S.W .2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . We will uphold t he sente nce imposed by the trial cour

t if the following are met: (1) the se ntence complies with the purposes a nd principles of the Sentenc i n g Ac t; and (2) the tr ial court’s f indings a re a dequate ly

supported by the re cord. Se e Sta te v . A rn e tt , 4 9 S. W.3 d 25 0, 25 7 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T he burd e n o f s ho wi ngthat a sentenc e i s i m p ro per is upon the a ppealingparty

. SeeT.C.A. § 40-35-401, Sentenc ing Comm’n Cmts .; Ar ne tt , 49 S.W .3d at 257.

I n conductinga de novo r eview of a sent en ce , we must consider the following : (a) a ny evidenc e re ceive d at the trial a nd/or sentenc ing he aring ; (b ) t he pre sentenc e re port; (c) the principles of se ntencing ; (d) the a rguments of counsel re lative to sentenc ing a lternatives; (e ) the nature and c h ar ac t er i s tics of the off ense; (f ) any mitigating or enha

nceme nt fac tors; (g ) any statements made by

the def endant on his or he r o wn b eh al f; and (h) the def endant’ s potential or lack of potential for r ehabilitation or trea tment. See T.C.A. § 4 0 -3 5-210 (1997 & Supp. 2002); S t a te v. Taylor , 6 3 S. W. 3 d 4 0 0 , 4 1 1 ( T e n n

. Cr im

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 )

. T h e p arty c h a ll e n g in g a sente nce 3 imposed by

the trial cour

t has the burde n of establishing that the sentenc e is err oneous. T.C.A. § 40 -3 5- 40 1 ( 20 06 ), Se nte nc ing Co mm’nCmts . T o f a c ili tate a pp e llate re vie w, the tr ia l c ourt is require d to place on the rec ord its rea sons for im p o s i n g the spec ific sentenc e, including the identification of the mitig ating and enha nceme nt fac tors found, the spec ific fa cts supporting eac h enhanc ement fa ctor found, a nd the method by

which the mitigating a

nd enhanc ement fa ctors have be en eva luated and ba lance d in determining the sentenc e. S ee St at e v. Sa mu e ls , 44 S.W .3d 489, 492 (Tenn. 2001)

.
I n th e c a se un der submi ssi on , th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d w he n s e nte nc ingthe De fe nd ant,

“ b a s e d u p o n y o u r lo n g , e xte n s iv e h is to r y , b a s e d u

p o n th e f a c t th a t y o u h a v e

. . . been r evoked on pr ob a tio n o r p aro le se ve ra l ti me s, the Court is g oin g to g iv e y ou

81⁄2 y e ars a s a

se nte nc e in t

his-15-

case .” This does not ad equate ly show that the trial cour t properly

considere d all rele vant sentenc ing pr inciples. Acc ording ly we a pply no presumption of cor

rec tness to t he trial c ourt’s sentenc ing de terminations. See T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d).

At the Def

endant’ s sentencing hearing , the evidenc e showe d that the Def endant ha d fourtee n prior convic tions, at least four of which we re f

elony convict ions. The Def

endant admitted under oath that he had se vera l parole violations. The D ef en d an t d i d not offer

proof of any mitigating fac tors. His attorney stated “his prior r ecor d , y ou know, ce rtainly could justify may be a one or two y ear

enhancem en t ” an d t h en arg ued that the De fenda nt should not be give n the maxim um sentence

. Th e De fend ant’ s c on vic tio n in thi s c a se is a

c la ss C fe lony . In o rd e r t o b e c la ssi fi e d a s a Rang e I I , multipl e off

ender , a def

endant mu s t h ave: (1) a minimum of two (2) but not more than f o u r ( 4 ) p r io r f e lo n y c o n v ic ti o n s w it

h in th e c o n v ic ti o nc la s s , a

h igh e r cl a s s , o r w it h in th e n e xt two ( 2 ) lo w e r f

e lo n y c la s s e s , w h e r e a

p p li c a b le

. . . . ” T

. C. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2003). The De fe nd ant h a s b e e n c on vic te d o f f e lony the ft of pr op e rt y va lue d o ve r $ 1, 00 0, a

c la ss D fe lony , in 19 9 4 ; a g g r a v a t e d

b u r g l ar y , a c l a s s C f

e l o n y , i n1 9 9 4 ; a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l ar y , a c l a s s E f e l o n y , in 1 9 9 5 ; an d r e c k le s s e n d an g e r me n t, a c la s s E f

e lo n y , in 1 9 9 7

. A n y tw o o f th e s e c o n v ic ti ons are su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shthe De fe nd ant a s a Rang e I Iof

fe nd e r, and

he wa s, the re fo re , p ro pe rl y c la ssi fi e d a s a Ra ng e I I , mu lti ple of fe nd e r. Th e a

pp lic a ble se nte nc ingra

ng e fo r h is c on vic tio n is six to ten y ear s. See T.C.A. § 40-35-112.

The De fenda

nt is a R an ge I I offe nder ba sed upon two of his four prior fe lony convictions. Fur

ther, he has ten o t h er prior convic tions, which makes applica ble enha nceme nt fac tor (2), that the Def

endant ha s a p re v i o u s history of cr iminal convictions or criminal beha vior in addition to thos e nec essar y to establish the appropr iate ra ng e. SeeT.C.A

. § 40-35-114( 2) (1 99 7 & S up p. 20 02 ). Th e State su bmi tte d c op ie s o f f

ourt e e n c ri min a l c on vic tio ns , w hic h is sufficie ntly more than nece ssary to e stablish the Def endant as a Rang e I I offe n d er

. W e c o n clude that enhanc ement fa ctor (2) justifies increa sing the De fe n d an t ’s s entenc e fr om six y ear s to eig ht and one- half y ear s. Th er e ar e no applica ble mitigatingfac tors. As such, we ag ree with the trial court’s s e n te n c in g o f th e D e f e n d an t to e igh t an d o n e
- h a lf y e ar s

. H e is n o t e n ti tl e d to relief on this iss ue.

III. Conclusi on

Be cause we c onclude that the t ri al co u rt committed no error in the judgme nt, and base d on the fore g oing r easoningand author ity , we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE