4572 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

approaches that maximize net benefits

(including potential economic,

environmental, public health and safety,

and other advantages; distributive

impacts; and equity). The agency

believes that the final rule is consistent

with regulatory philosophy and

principles identified in the Executive

Order. In addition, the final rule is not

a significant regulatory action as defined

by the Executive Order and so is not

subject to review under the Executive

Order.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act

requires agencies to analyze regulatory

options that would minimize any

significant impact of a rule on small

entities. Because the final rule involves

a minor procedural change that

primarily affects FDA and has no direct

effect on small companies, the agency

certifies that the final rule will not have

a significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.

Therefore, under the Regulatory

Flexibility Act, no further analysis is

required.

V. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

This final rule contains no additional

information collection requirements

which are subject to review by the

Office of Management and Budget under

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

(Pub. L. 104–13).

List of Subjects in 21 CFR Part 814

Administrative practice and

procedure, Confidential business

information, Medical devices, Medical

research, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

Therefore, under the Federal Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act and under

authority delegated to the Commissioner

of Food and Drugs, 21 CFR part 814 is

amended as follows:

PART 814—PREMARKET APPROVAL

OF MEDICAL DEVICES

1. The authority citation for 21 CFR

part 814 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 21 U.S.C. 351, 352, 353, 360,

360c-360j, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 379, 379e,

381.

2. Section 814.44 is amended by

revising paragraph (d) to read as

follows:

§ 814.44 Procedures for review of a PMA.

* * * * *

(d)(1) FDA will issue to the applicant

an order approving a PMA if none of the

reasons in § 814.45 for denying approval

of the application applies. FDA will

approve an application on the basis of

draft final labeling if the only

deficiencies in the application concern

editorial or similar minor deficiencies in

the draft final labeling. Such approval

will be conditioned upon the applicant

incorporating the specified labeling

changes exactly as directed and upon

the applicant submitting to FDA a copy

of the final printed labeling before

marketing. FDA will also give the public

notice of the order, including notice of

and opportunity for any interested

persons to request review under section

515(d)(3) of the act. The notice of

approval will be placed on FDA’s home

page on the Internet (http://

www.fda.gov), and it will state that a

detailed summary of information

respecting the safety and effectiveness

of the device, which was the basis for

the order approving the PMA, including

information about any adverse effects of

the device on health, is available on the

Internet and has been placed on public

display, and that copies are available

upon request. FDA will publish in the

Federal Register after each quarter a list

of the approvals announced in that

quarter. When a notice of approval is

published, data and information in the

PMA file will be available for public

disclosure in accordance with § 814.9.

(2) A request for copies of the current

PMA approvals and denials document

and for copies of summaries of safety

and effectiveness shall be sent in

writing to the Dockets Management

Branch (HFA–305), Food and Drug

Administration, 12420 Parklawn Dr.,

rm. 1–23, Rockville, MD 20857.

* * * * *

3. Section 814.45 is amended by

revising paragraph (d) to read as

follows:

§ 814.45 Denial of approval of a PMA.

* * * * *

(d)(1) FDA will give the public notice

of an order denying approval of the

PMA. The notice will be placed on the

FDA’s home page on the Internet (http:/

/www.fda.gov), and it will state that a

detailed summary of information

respecting the safety and effectiveness

of the device, including information

about any adverse effects of the device

on health, is available on the Internet

and has been placed on public display

and that copies are available upon

request. FDA will publish in the Federal

Register after each quarter a list of the

denials announced in that quarter.

When a notice of denial of approval is

made publicly available, data and

information in the PMA file will be

available for public disclosure in

accordance with § 814.9.

(2) A request for copies of the current

PMA approvals and denials document

and copies of summaries of safety and

effectiveness shall be sent in writing to

the Freedom of Information Staff (HFI–

35), Food and Drug Administration,

5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD

20857.

* * * * *

Dated: January 22, 1998.

William B. Schultz,

Deputy Commissioner for Policy.

[FR Doc. 98–2263 Filed 1–29–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4160–01–F

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

32 CFR Part 147

RIN 0790–AG54

Personnel Security Policies for

Granting Access to Classified

Information

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Interim final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule is published to

streamline security practices throughout

the government, uniform adjudicative

guidelines, investigative standards and

guidelines for temporary access are

being established. This initiative will

simplify security processing and allow

the deserving public to obtain a security

clearance in a faster, more efficient

manner.

DATES: This rule is effective March 24,

1997. Comments must be received by

March 31, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Forward comments to the

Security Policy Board Staff, 1215

Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1101,

Arlington, VA 22202.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. T. Thompson, 703–602–9969.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Order 12866, Regulatory

Planning and Review

It has been determined that this

interim rule (32 CFR part 147) is not a

significant regulatory action. The rule

does not:

(1) Have an annual effect to the

economy of $100 million or more or

adversely affect in a material way the

economy; a section of the economy;

productivity; competition; jobs; the

environment; public health or safety; or

State, local, or tribal governments or

communities;

(2) Create a serious inconsistency or

otherwise interfere with an action taken

or planned by another Agency;

(3) Materially alter the budgetary

impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,

or loan programs, or the rights and

obligations of recipients thereof; or
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 4573

(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues

arising out of legal mandates, the

President’s priorities, or the principles

set forth in this Executive Order.

Public Law 96–354, Regulatory

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601)

It has been certified that this rule is

not subject to the Regulatory Flexibility

Act (5 U.S.C. 601) because it would not,

if promulgated, have a significant

economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. This part will

streamline personnel security clearance

procedures and make the process more

efficient.

Public Law 96–511, Paperwork

Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)

It has been certified that this part does

not impose any reporting or

recordkeeping requirements under the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 147

Classified information, Investigations,

Security measures.

Accordingly, Title 32 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, Chapter I,

subchapter C is amended to add part

147 to read as follows:

PART 147—ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES

FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR

ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Subpart A—Adjudicative Guidelines

Sec.

147.1 Introduction.

147.2 Adjudicative process.

147.3 Guideline A—Allegiance to the

United States.

147.4 Guideline B—Foreign influence.

147.5 Guideline C—Foreign preference.

147.6 Guideline D—Sexual behavior.

147.7 Guideline E—Personal conduct.

147.8 Guideline F—Financial

considerations.

147.9 Guideline G—Alcohol consumption.

147.10 Guideline H—Drug involvement.

147.11 Guideline I—Emotional, mental, and

personality disorders.

147.12 Guideline J—Criminal conduct.

147.13 Guideline K—Security violations.

147.14 Guideline L—Outside activities.

147.15 Guideline M—Misuse of information

technology systems.

Subpart B—Investigative Standards

147.18 Introduction.

147.19 The three standards.

147.20 Exception to periods of coverage.

147.21 Expanding investigations.

147.22 Transferability.

147.23 Breaks in service.

147.24 The national agency check.

Subpart C—Guidelines for Temporary

Access

147.28 Introduction.

147.29 Temporary eligibility for access.

147.30 Temporary eligibility for access at

the CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET levels

and temporary eligibility for ‘‘L’’ access

authorization.

147.31 Temporary eligibility for access at

the TOP SECRET levels and temporary

eligibility for ‘‘Q’’ access authorization.

For someone who is the subject of a

favorable investigation not meeting the

investigative standards for access at

those levels.

147.32 Temporary eligibility for access at

the TOP SECRET and SCI levels and

temporary eligibility for ‘‘Q’’ access

authorization: For someone who is not

the subject of a current, favorable

personnel or personnel-security

investigation of any kind.

147.33 Additional requirements by

agencies.

Authority: E.O. 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR

1995 Comp., p 391).

Subpart A—Adjudication

§ 147.1 Introduction.

The following adjudicative guidelines

are established for all United States

Government civilian and military

personnel, consultants, contractors,

employees of contractors, licensees,

certificate holders or grantees and their

employees and other individuals who

require access to classified information.

They apply to persons being considered

for initial or continued eligibility for

access to classified information, to

include sensitive compartmented

information and special access programs

and are to be used by government

departments and agencies in all final

clearance determinations.

§ 147.2 Adjudicative process.

(a) The adjudicative process is an

examination of a sufficient period of a

person’s life to make an affirmative

determination that the person is eligible

for a security clearance. Eligibility for

access to classified information is

predicated upon the individual meeting

these personnel security guidelines. The

adjudicative process is the careful

weighing of a number of variables

known as the whole person concept.

Available, reliable information about the

person, past and present, favorable and

unfavorable, should be considered in

reaching a determination. In evaluating

the relevance of an individual’s

conduct, the adjudicator should

consider the following actors:

(1) The nature, extent, and

seriousness of the conduct;

(2) The circumstances surrounding

the conduct, to include knowledgeable

participation;

(3) The frequency and recency of the

conduct;

(4) The individual’s age and maturity

at the time of the conduct;

(5) The voluntariness of participation;

(6) The presence or absence of

rehabilitation and other pertinent

behavioral changes;

(7) The motivation for the conduct;

(8) The potential for pressure,

coercion, exploitation, or duress;

(9) The likelihood of continuation of

recurrence.

(b) Each case must be judged on its

own merits, and final determination

remains the responsibility of the

specific department or agency. Any

doubt as to whether access to classified

information is clearly consistent with

national security will be resolved in

favor of the national security.

(c) The ultimate determination of

whether the granting or continuing of

eligibility for a security clearance is

clearly consistent with the interests of

national security must be an overall

common sense determination based

upon careful consideration of the

following, each of which is to be

evaluated in the context of the whole

person, as explained further below:

(1) Guideline A: Allegiance to the

United States.

(2) Guideline B: Foreign influence.

(3) Guideline C: Foreign preference.

(4) Guideline D: Sexual behavior.

(5) Guideline E: Personal conduct.

(6) Guideline F: Financial

considerations.

(7) Guideline G: Alcohol

consumption.

(8) Guideline H: Drug involvement.

(9) Guideline I: Emotional, mental,

and personality disorders.

(10) Guideline J: Criminal conduct.

(11) Guideline K: Security violations.

(12) Guideline L: Outside activities.

(13) Guideline M: Misuse of

Information Technology Systems.

(d) Although adverse information

concerning a single criterion may not be

sufficient for an unfavorable

determination, the individual may be

disqualified if available information

reflects a recent or recurring pattern of

questionable judgment, irresponsibility,

or emotionally unstable behavior.

Notwithstanding, the whole person

concept, pursuit of further

investigations may be terminated by an

appropriate adjudicative agency in the

face of reliable, significant,

disqualifying, adverse information.

(e) When information of security

concern becomes known about an

individual who is currently eligible for

access to classified information, the

adjudicator should consider whether the

person:

(1) Voluntarily reported the

information;

(2) Was truthful and complete in

responding to questions;
4574 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

1The adjudicator should also consider guidelines

pertaining to criminal conduct (Guideline J) and

(3) Sought assistance and followed

professional guidance, where

appropriate;

(4) Resolved or appears likely to

favorably resolve the security concern;

(5) Has demonstrated positive changes

in behavior and employment;

(6) Should have his or her access

temporarily suspended pending final

adjudication of the information.

(f) If after evaluating information of

security concern, the adjudicator

decides that the information is not

serious enough to warrant a

recommendation of disapproval or

revocation of the security clearance, it

may be appropriate to recommend

approval with a warning that future

incidents of a similar nature may result

in revocation of access.

§ 147.3 Guideline A—Allegiance to the

United States.

(a) The concern. An individual must

be of unquestioned allegiance to the

United States. The willingness to

safeguard classified information is in

doubt if there is any reason to suspect

an individual’s allegiance to the Untied

States.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Involvement

in any act of sabotage, espionage,

treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act

whose aim is to overthrow the

Government of the United States or alter

the form of government by

unconstitutional means;

(2) Association or sympathy with

persons who are attempting to commit,

or who are committing, any of the above

acts;

(3) Association or sympathy with

persons or organizations that advocate

the overthrow of the United States

Government, or any state or subdivision,

by force or violence or by other

unconstitutional means;

(4) Involvement in activities which

unlawfully advocate or practice the

commission of acts of force or violence

to prevent others from exercising their

rights under the Constitution or laws of

the United States or of any state.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) The

individual was unaware of the unlawful

aims of the individual or organization

and severed ties upon learning of these;

(2) The individual’s involvement was

only with the lawful or humanitarian

aspects of such an organization;

(3) Involvement in the above activities

occurred for only a short period of time

and was attributable to curiosity or

academic interest;

(4) The person has had no recent

involvement or association with such

activities.

§ 147.4 Guideline B—Foreign influence.

(a) The concern. A security risk may

exist when an individual’s immediate

family, including cohabitants and other

persons to whom he or she may be

bound by affection, influence, or

obligation are not citizens of the Untied

States or may be subject to duress.

These situations could create the

potential for foreign influence that

could result in the compromise of

classified information. Contacts with

citizens of other countries or financial

interests in other countries are also

relevant to security determinations if

they make an individual potentially

vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or

pressure.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) An immediate

family member, or a person to whom the

individual has close ties of affection or

obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or

present in, a foreign country;

(2) Sharing living quarters with a

person or persons, regardless of their

citizenship status, if the potential for

adverse foreign influence or duress

exists;

(3) Relatives, cohabitants, or

associates who are connected with any

foreign government;

(4) Failing to report, where required,

associations with foreign nationals;

(5) Unauthorized association with a

suspected or known collaborator or

employee of a foreign intelligence

service;

(6) Conduct which may make the

individual vulnerable to coercion,

exploitation, or pressure by a foreign

government;

(7) Indications that representatives or

nationals from a foreign country are

acting to increase the vulnerability of

the individual to possible future

exploitation, coercion or pressure;

(8) A substantial financial interest in

a country, or in any foreign owned or

operated business that could make the

individual vulnerable to foreign

influence.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) A

determination that the immediate family

member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons,

daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant,

or associate(s) in question are not agents

of a foreign power or in a position to be

exploited by a foreign power in a way

that could force the individual to choose

between loyalty to the person(s)

involved and the United States;

(2) Contacts with foreign citizens are

the result of official United States

Government business;

(3) Contact and correspondence with

foreign citizens are casual and

infrequent;

(4) The individual has promptly

complied with existing agency

requirements regarding the reporting of

contacts, requests, or threats from

persons or organizations from a foreign

country;

(5) Foreign financial interests are

minimal and not sufficient to affect the

individual’s security responsibilities.

§ 147.5 Guideline C—Foreign preference.

(a) The concern. When an individual

acts in such a way as to indicate a

preference for a foreign country over the

United States, then he or she may be

prone to provide information or make

decisions that are harmful to the

interests of the United States.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include:

(1) The exercise of dual citizenship;

(2) Possession and/or use of a foreign

passport;

(3) Military service or a willingness to

bear arms for a foreign country;

(4) Accepting educational, medical, or

other benefits, such as retirement and

social welfare, from a foreign country;

(5) Residence in a foreign country to

meet citizenship requirements;

(6) Using foreign citizenship to

protect financial or business interests in

another country;

(7) Seeking or holding political office

in the foreign country;

(8) Voting in foreign elections;

(9) Performing or attempting to

perform duties, or otherwise acting, so

as to serve the interests of another

government in preference to the

interests of the United States.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) Dual

citizenship is based solely on parents’

citizenship or birth in a foreign country;

(2) Indicators of possible foreign

preference (e.g., foreign military service)

occurred before obtaining United States

citizenship;

(3) Activity is sanctioned by the

United States;

(4) Individual has expressed a

willingness to renounce dual

citizenship.

§ 147.6 Guidance D—Sexual behavior.

(a) The concern. Sexual behavior is a

security concern if it involves a criminal

offense, indicates a personality or

emotional disorder, may subject the

individual to coercion, exploitation, or

duress, or reflects lack of judgment or

discretion.1 Sexual orientation or
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 4575

emotional, mental and personality disorders

(Guideline I) in determining how to resolve the

security concerns raised by sexual behavior.

preference may not be used as a basis

for or a disqualifying factor in

determining a person’s eligibility for a

security clearance.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Sexual

behavior of a criminal nature, whether

or not the individual has been

prosecuted;

(2) Compulsive or addictive sexual

behavior when the person is unable to

stop a pattern or self-destructive or

high-risk behavior or that which is

symptomatic of a personally disorder;

(3) Sexual behavior that causes an

individual to be vulnerable to coercion,

exploitation, or duress;

(4) Sexual behavior of a public nature

and/or that which reflects lack of

discretion or judgment.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) The

behavior occurred during or prior to

adolescence and there is no evidence of

subsequent conduct of a similar nature;

(2) The behavior was not recent and

there is no evidence of subsequent

conduct of a similar nature;

(3) There is no other evidence of

questionable judgment, irresponsibility,

or emotional instability;

(4) The behavior no longer serves as

a basis for coercion, exploitation, or

duress.

§ 147.7 Guideline E—Personal conduct.

(a) The concern. Conduct involving

questionable judgment,

untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of

candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to

comply with rules and regulations could

indicate that the person may not

properly safeguard classified

information. The following will

normally result in an unfavorable

clearance action or administrative

termination of further processing for

clearance eligibility:

(1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate

with required security processing,

including medical and psychological

testing;

(2) Refusal to complete required

security forms, releases, or provide full,

frank and truthful answers to lawful

questions of investigators, security

officials or other representatives in

connection with a personnel security or

trustworthiness determination.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying also include: (1) Reliable,

unfavorable information provided by

associates, employers, coworkers,

neighbors, and other acquaintances;

(2) The deliberate omission,

concealment, or falsification of relevant

and material facts from any personnel

security questionnaire, personal history

statement, or similar form used to

conduct investigations, determine

employment qualifications, award

benefits or status, determine security

clearance eligibility or trustworthiness,

or award fiduciary responsibilities;

(3) Deliberately providing false or

misleading information concerning

relevant and material matters to an

investigator, security official, competent

medical authority, or other

representative in connection with a

personnel security or trustworthiness

determination;

(4) Personal conduct or concealment

of information that may increase an

individual’s vulnerability to coercion,

exploitation, or duties, such as engaging

in activities which, if known, may affect

the person’s personal, professional, or

community standing or render the

person susceptible to blackmail;

(5) A pattern of dishonesty or rule

violations, including violation of any

written or recorded agreement made

between the individual and the agency;

(6) Association with persons involved

in criminal activity.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) The

information was unsubstantiated or not

pertinent to a determination of

judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;

(2) The falsification was an isolated

incident, was not recent, and the

individual has subsequently provided

correct information voluntarily;

(3) The individual made prompt, good

faith efforts to correct the falsification

before being confronted with the facts;

(4) Omission of material facts was

caused or significantly contributed to by

improper or inadequate advice of

authorized personnel, and the

previously omitted information was

promptly and fully provided;

(5) The individual has taken positive

steps to significantly reduce or

eliminate vulnerability to coercion,

exploitation, or duress;

(6) A refusal to cooperate was based

on advice from legal counsel or other

officials that the individual was not

required to comply with security

processing requirements and, upon

being made aware of the requirement,

fully and truthfully provided the

requested information;

(7) Association with persons involved

in criminal activities has ceased.

§ 147.8 Guideline F—Financial

considerations.

(a) The concern. An individual who is

financially overextended is at risk of

having to engage in illegal acts to

generate funds. Unexplained affluence

is often linked to proceeds from

financially profitable criminal acts.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) A history of

not meeting financial obligations;

(2) Deceptive or illegal financial

practices such as embezzlement,

employee theft, check fraud, income tax

evasion, expense account fraud, filing

deceptive loan statements, and other

intentional financial breaches of trust;

(3) Inability or unwillingness to

satisfy debts;

(4) Unexplained affluence;

(5) Financial problems that are linked

to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or

other issues of security concern.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) The

behavior was not recent;

(2) It was an isolated incident;

(3) The conditions that resulted in the

behavior were largely beyond the

person’s control (e.g., loss of

employment, a business downtrun,

unexpected medical emergency, or a

death, divorce or separation);

(4) The person has received or is

receiving counseling for the problem

and there are clear indications that the

problem is being resolved or is under

control;

(5) The affluence resulted from a legal

source;

(6) The individual initiated a goodfaith effort to repay overdue creditors or

otherwise resolve debts.

§ 147.9 Guideline G—Alcohol

consumption.

(a) The concern. Excessive alcohol

consumption often leads to the exercise

of questionable judgment, unreliability,

failure to control impulses, and

increases the risk of unauthorized

disclosure of classified information due

to carelessness.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Alcoholrelated incidents away from work, such

as driving while under the influence,

fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other

criminal incidents related to alcohol

use;

(2) Alcohol-related incidents at work,

such as reporting for work or duty in an

intoxicated or impaired condition, or

drinking on the job;

(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed

medical professional (e.g., physician,

clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of

alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;

(4) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or

alcohol dependence by a licensed

clinical social worker who is a staff
4576 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

member of a recognized alcohol

treatment program;

(5) Habitual or binge consumption of

alcohol to the point of impaired

judgment;

(6) Consumption of alcohol,

subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism

by a credentialed medical professional

and following completion of an alcohol

rehabilitation program.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) The

alcohol related incidents do not indicate

a pattern;

(2) The problem occurred a number of

years ago and there is no indication of

a recent problem;

(3) Positive changes in behavior

supportive of sobriety;

(4) Following diagnosis of alcohol

abuse or alcohol dependence, the

individual has successfully completed

impatient or outpatient rehabilitation

along with aftercare requirements,

participates frequently in meetings of

Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar

organization, has abstained from alcohol

for a period of at least 12 months, and

received a favorable prognosis by a

credentialed medical professional or a

licensed clinical social worker who is a

staff member of a recognized alcohol

treatment program.

§ 174.10 Guideline H—Drug involvement.

(a) The concern. (1) Improper or

illegal involvement with drugs raises

questions regarding an individual’s

willingness or ability to protect

classified information. Drug abuse or

dependence may impair social or

occupational functioning, increasing the

risk of an unauthorized disclosure of

classified information.

(2) Drugs are defined as mood and

behavior altering substances, and

include:

(i) Drugs, materials, and other

chemical compounds identified and

listed in the Controlled Substances Act

of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or

cannabis, depressants, narcotics,

stimulants, and hallucinogens),

(ii) Inhalants and other similar

substances.

(3) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a

drug or use of a legal drug in a manner

that deviates from approved medical

direction.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Any drug

abuse (see above definition);

(2) Illegal drug possession, including

cultivation, processing, manufacture,

purchase, sale, or distribution;

(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed

medical professional (e.g., physician,

clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of

drug abuse or drug dependence;

(4) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug

dependence by a licensed clinical social

worker who is a staff member of a

recognized drug treatment program;

(5) Failure to successfully complete a

drug treatment program prescribed by a

credentialed medical professional.

Recent drug involvement, especially

following the granting of a security

clearance, or an expressed intent not to

discontinue use, will almost invariably

result in an unfavorable determination.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) The drug

involvement was not recent;

(2) The drug involvement was an

isolated or aberration event;

(3) A demonstrated intent not to abuse

any drugs in the future;

(4) Satisfactory completion of a

prescribed drug treatment program,

including rehabilitation and aftercare

requirements, without recurrence of

abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a

credentialed medical professional.

§ 147.11 Guideline I—Emotional, mental,

and personality disorders.

(a) The concern: Emotional, mental,

and personality disorders can cause a

significant deficit in an individual’s

psychological, social and occupation

functioning. These disorders are of

security concern because they may

indicate a defect in judgment,

reliability, or stability. A credentialed

mental health professional (e.g., clinical

psychologist or psychiatrist), employed

by, acceptable to or approved by the

government, should be utilized in

evaluating potentially disqualifying and

mitigating information fully and

properly, and particularly for

consultation with the individual’s

mental health care provider.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) An opinion by

a credentialed mental health

professional that the individual has a

condition or treatment that may indicate

a defect in judgment, reliability, or

stability;

(2) Information that suggests that an

individual has failed to follow

appropriate medical advice relating to

treatment of a condition, e.g., failure to

take prescribed medication;

(3) A pattern of high-risk,

irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or

emotionally unstable behavior;

(4) Information that suggests that the

individual’s current behavior indicates a

defect in his or her judgment or

reliability.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) There is

no indication of a current problem;

(2) Recent opinion by a credentialed

mental health professional that an

individual’s previous emotional,

mental, or personality disorder is cured,

under control or in remission and has a

low probability of recurrence or

exacerbation;

(3) The past emotional instability was

a temporary condition (e.g., one caused

by a death, illness, or marital breakup),

the situation has been resolved, and the

individual is no longer emotionally

unstable.

§ 147.12 Guideline J—Criminal conduct.

(a) The concern. A history or pattern

of criminal activity creates doubt about

a person’s judgment, reliability and

trustworthiness.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Allegations or

admissions of criminal conduct,

regardless of whether the person was

formally charged;

(2) A single serious crime or multiple

lesser offenses.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) The

criminal behavior was not recent;

(2) The crime was an isolated

incident;

(3) The person was pressured or

coerced into committing the act and

those pressures are no longer present in

that person’s life;

(4) The person did not voluntarily

commit the act and/or the factors

leading to the violation are not likely to

recur;

(5) Acquittal;

(6) There is clear evidence of

successful rehabilitation.

§ 147.13 Guideline K—Security violations.

(a) The concern. Noncompliance with

security regulations raises doubt about

an individual’s trustworthiness,

willingness, and ability to safeguard

classified information.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include. (1) Unauthorized

disclosure of classified information;

(2) Violations that are deliberate or

multiple or due to negligence.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include actions that:

(1) Were inadvertent;

(2) Were isolated or infrequent;

(3) Were due to improper or

inadequate training;

(4) Demonstrate a positive attitude

towards the discharge of security

responsibilities.

§ 147.14 Guideline L—Outside activities.

(a) The concern. Involvement in

certain types of outside employment or

activities is of security concern if it

poses a conflict with an individual’s
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 4577

security responsibilities and could

create an increased risk of unauthorized

disclosure of classified information.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include any service,

whether compensated, volunteer, or

employment with: (1) A foreign country;

(2) Any foreign national;

(3) A representative of any foreign

interest;

(4) Any foreign, domestic, or

international organization or person

engaged in analysis, discussion, or

publication of material on intelligence,

defense, foreign affairs, or protected

technology.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1)

Evaluation of the outside employment

or activity indicates that it does not pose

a conflict with an individual’s security

responsibilities;

(2) The individual terminates the

employment or discontinues the activity

upon being notified that it is in conflict

with his or her security responsibilities.

§ 147.15 Guideline M—Misuse of

Information technology systems.

(a) The concern. Noncompliance with

rules, procedures, guidelines, or

regulations pertaining to information

technology systems may raise security

concerns about an individual’s

trustworthiness, willingness, and ability

to properly protect classified systems,

networks, and information. Information

Technology Systems include all related

equipment used for the communication,

transmission, processing, manipulation,

and storage of classified or sensitive

information.

(b) Conditions that could raise a

security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Illegal or

unauthorized entry into any information

technology system;

(2) Illegal or unauthorized

modification, destruction, manipulation

or denial of access to information

residing on an information technology

system;

(3) Removal (or use) of hardware,

software, or media from any information

technology system without

authorization, when specifically

prohibited by rules, procedures,

guidelines or regulations;

(4) Introduction of hardware,

software, or media into any information

technology system without

authorization, when specifically

prohibited by rules, procedures,

guidelines or regulations.

(c) Conditions that could mitigate

security concerns include: (1) The

misuse was not recent or significant;

(2) The conduct was unintentional or

inadvertent;

(3) The introduction or removal of

media was authorized;

(4) The misuse was an isolated event;

(5) The misuse was followed by a

prompt, good faith effort to correct the

situation.

Subpart B—Investigative Standards

§ 147.18 Introduction.

The following investigative standards

are established for all United States

Government civilian and military

personnel, consultants, contractors,

employees of contractors, licensees,

certificate holders or grantees and their

employees and other individuals who

require access to classified information,

to include Sensitive Compartmented

Information and Special Access

Programs, and are to be used by

government departments and agencies

as the investigative basis for final

clearance determinations. However,

nothing in these standards prohibits an

agency from using any lawful

investigative procedures in addition to

these requirements in order to resolve

any issue identified in the course of a

background investigation or

reinvestigation.

§ 147.19 The three standards.

There are three standards (Attachment

D to this subpart part summarizes when

to use each one):

(a) The investigation and

reinvestigation standards for ‘‘L’’ access

authorizations and for access to

confidential and secret (including all

secret-level Special Access Programs not

specifically approved for enhanced

investigative requirements by an official

authorized to establish Special Access

Programs by section in 4.4 of Executive

Order 12958) (60 FR 19825, 3 CFR 1995

Comp., p. 33);

(b) The investigation standard for‘‘Q’’

access authorizations and for access to

top secret (including top secret Special

Access Programs) and Sensitive

Compartmented Information;

(c) The reinvestigation standard for

continued access to the levels listed in

paragraph (b) of this section.

§ 147.20 Exception to periods of coverage.

Some elements of standards specify a

period of coverage (e.g. seven years).

Where appropriate, such coverage may

be shortened to the period from the

subject’s eighteenth birthday to the

present or to two years, whichever is

longer.

§ 147.21 Expanding investigations.

Investigations and reinvestigations

may be expanded under the provisions

of Executive Order 12968 (60 FR 40245,

3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 391) and other

applicable statutes and Executive

Orders.

§ 147.22 Transferability.

Investigations that satisfy the

requirements of a given standard and

are current meet the investigative

requirements for all levels specified for

the standard. They shall be mutually

and reciprocally accepted by all

agencies.

§ 147.23 Breaks in service.

If a person who requires access has

been retired or separated from U.S.

government employment for less than

two years and is the subject of an

investigation that is otherwise current,

the agency regranting the access will, as

a minimum, review an updated

Standard Form 86 and applicable

records. A reinvestigation is not

required unless the review indicates the

person may no longer satisfy the

standards of Executive Order 12968 (60

FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 391);

(Attachment D to this subpart, Table 2).

§ 147.24 The national agency check.

The National Agency Check is a part

of all investigations and

reinvestigations. It consists of a review

of;

(a) Investigative and criminal history

files of the FBI, including a technical

fingerprint search;

(b) OPM’s Security/Suitability

Investigations Index;

(c) DoD’s Defense Clearance and

Investigations Index;

(d) Such other national agencies (e.g.,

CIA, INS) as appropriate to the

individual’s background.

Attachment A to Subpart B—Standard A—

National Agency Check With Local Agency

Checks and Credit Check (NACLC)

(a) Applicability. Standard A applies to

investigations and reinvestigations for;

(1) Access to CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET

(including all SECRET-level Special Access

Programs not specifically approved for

enhanced investigative requirements by an

official authorized to establish Special

Access Programs by sect. 4.4 of Executive

Order 12958) (60 FR 19825, 3 CFR 1995

Comp., p. 333);

(2) ‘‘L’’ access authorizations.

(b) For Reinvestigation: When to

Reinvestigate. The reinvestigation may be

initiated at any time following completion of,

but not later than ten years (fifteen years for

CONFIDENTIAL) from the date of, the

previous investigation or reinvestigation.

(Attachment D to this subpart, Table 2,

reflects the specific requirements for when to

request a reinvestigation, including when

there has been a break in service.)

(c) Investigative Requirements.

Investigative requirements are as follows:
4578 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

(1) Completion of Forms: Completion of

Standard Form 86, including applicable

releases and supporting documentation.

(2) National Agency Check: Completion of

a National Agency Check.

(3) Financial Review: Verification of the

subject’s financial status, including credit

bureau checks covering all locations where

the subject has resided, been employed, or

attended school for six months or more for

the past seven years.

(4) Date and Place of Birth: Corroboration

of date and place of birth through a check of

appropriate documentation, if not completed

in any previous investigation; a check of

Bureau of Vital Statistics records when any

discrepancy is found to exist.

(5) Local Agency Checks: As a minimum,

all investigations will include checks of law

enforcement agencies having jurisdiction

where the subject has lived, worked, and/or

attended school within the last five years,

and, if applicable, of the appropriate agency

for any identified arrests.

(d) Expanding the Investigation: The

investigation may be expanded if necessary

to determine if access is clearly consistent

with the national security.

Attachment B to Subpart B—Standard B—

Single Scope Background Investigation

(SSBI)

(a) Applicability. Standard B applies to

initial investigations for;

(1) Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP

SECRET Special Access Programs) and

Sensitive Compartment Information;

(2) ‘‘Q’’ access authorizations.

(b) Investigative Requirements.

Investigative requirements are as follows:

(1) Completion of Forms: Completion of

Standard Form 86, including applicable

releases and supporting documentation.

(2) National Agency Check: Completion of

a National Agency Check.

(3) National Agency Check for the Spouse

or Cohabitant (if applicable): Completion of

a National Agency Check, without fingerprint

cards, for the spouse or cohabitant.

(4) Date and Place of Birth: Corroboration

of date and place of birth through a check of

appropriate documentation; a check of

Bureau of Vital Statistics records when any

discrepancy is found to exist.

(5) Citizenship: For individuals born

outside the United States, verification of US

citizenship directly from the appropriate

registration authority; verification of US

citizenship or legal status of foreign-born

immediate family members (spouse,

cohabitant, father, mother, sons, daughters,

brothers, sisters).

(6) Education: Corroboration of most recent

or most significant claimed attendance,

degree, or diploma. Interviews of appropriate

educational sources if education is a primary

activity of the subject during the most recent

three years.

(7) Employment: Verification of all

employments for the past seven years;

personal interviews of sources (supervisors,

coworkers, or both) for each employment of

six months or more; corroboration through

records or sources of all periods of

unemployment exceeding sixty days;

verification of all prior federal and military

service, including discharge type. For

military members, all service within one

branch of the armed forces will be considered

as one employment, regardless of

assignments.

(8) References: Four references, of whom at

least two are developed; to the extent

practicable, all should have social knowledge

of the subject and collectively span at least

the last seven years.

(9) Former Spouse: An interview of any

former spouse divorced within the last ten

years.

(10) Neighborhoods: Confirmation of all

residences for the last three years through

appropriate interviews with neighbors and

through records reviews.

(11) Financial Review: Verification of the

subject’s financial status, including credit

bureau checks covering all locations where

subject has resided, been employed, and/or

attended school for six months or more for

the last seven years.

(12) Local Agency Checks: A check of

appropriate criminal history records covering

all locations where, for the last ten years, the

subject has resided, been employed, and/or

attended school for six months or more,

including current residence regardless of

duration.

Note: If no residence, employment, or

education exceeds six months, local agency

checks should be performed as deemed

appropriate.

(13) Public Records: Verification of

divorces, bankruptcies, and other court

actions, whether civil or criminal, involving

the subject.

(14) Subject Interview: A subject interview,

conducted by trained security, investigative,

or counterintelligence personnel. During the

investigation, additional subject interviews

may be conducted to collect relevant

information, to resolve significant

inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements

and unsworn declarations may be taken

whenever appropriate.

(15) Polygraph (only in agencies with

approved personnel security polygraph

programs): In departments or agencies with

policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph

for personnel security purposes, the

investigation may include a polygraph

examination, conducted by a qualified

polygraph examiner.

(c) Expanding the Investigation. The

investigation may be expanded as necessary.

As appropriate, interviews with anyone able

to provide information or to resolve issues,

including but not limited to cohabitants,

relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other

medical professionals, and law enforcement

professionals may be conducted.

Attachment C to Subpart B—Standard C—

Single Scope Background Investigation

Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI–PR)

(a) Applicability. Standard C applies to

reinvestigation for;

(1) Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP

SECRET Special Access Programs) and

Sensitive Compartmented Information;

(2) ‘‘Q’’ access authorizations.

(b) When to Reinvestigate. The

reinvestigation may be initiated at any time

following completion of, but not later than

five years from the date of, the previous

investigation (see Attachment D to this

subpart, Table 2).

(c) Reinvestigative Requirements.

Reinvestigative requirements are as follows:

(1) Completion of Forms: Completion of

Standard Form 86, including applicable

releases and supporting documentation.

(2) National Agency Check: Completion of

a National Agency Check (fingerprint cards

are required only if there has not been a

previous valid technical check of the FBI).

(3) National Agency Check for the Spouse

or Cohabitant (if applicable): Completion of

a National Agency Check, without fingerprint

cards, for the spouse or cohabitant. The

National Agency Check for the spouse or

cohabitant is not required if already

completed in conjunction with a previous

investigation or reinvestigation.

(4) Employment: Verification of all

employments since the last investigation.

Attempts to interview a sufficient number of

sources (supervisors, coworkers, or both) at

all employments of six months or more. For

military members, all services within one

branch of the armed forces will be considered

as one employment, regardless of

assignments.

(5) References: Interviews with two

character references who are knowledgeable

of the subject; at least one will be a

developed reference. To the extent practical,

both should have social knowledge of the

subject and collectively span the entire

period of the reinvestigation. As appropriate,

additional interviews may be conducted,

including with cohabitants and relatives.

(6) Neighborhoods: Interviews of two

neighbors in the vicinity of the subject’s most

recent residence of six months or more.

Confirmation of current residence regardless

of length.

(7) Financial Review:—Financial Status:

Verification of the subject’s financial status,

including credit bureau checks covering all

locations where subject has resided, been

employed, and/or attended school for six

months or more for the period covered by the

reinvestigation;

(ii) Check of Treasury’s Financial Data

Base: Agencies may request the Department

of the Treasury, under terms and conditions

prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury,

to search automated data bases consisting of

reports of currency transactions by financial

institutions, international transportation of

currency or monetary instruments, foreign

bank and financial accounts, and transactions

under $10,000 that are reported as possible

money laundering violations.

(8) Local Agency Checks: A check of

appropriate criminal history records covering

all locations where, during the period

covered by the reinvestigation, the subject

has resided, been employed, and/or attended

school for six months or more, including

current residence regardless of duration.

(Note: If no residence, employment, or

education exceeds six months, local agency

checks should be performed as deemed

appropriate.)

(9) Former Spouse: An interview with any

former spouse unless the divorce took place

before the date of the last investigation or

reinvestigation.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 4579

(10) Public Records: Verification of

divorces, bankruptcies, and other court

actions, whether civil or criminal, involving

the subject since the date of the last

investigation.

(11) Subject Interview: A subject interview,

conducted by trained security, investigative,

or counterintelligence personnel. During the

reinvestigation, additional subject interviews

may be conducted to collect relevant

information, to resolve significant

inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements

and unsworn declarations may be taken

whenever appropriate.

(d) Expanding the Reinvestigation: The

reinvestigation may be expanded as

necessary. As appropriate, interviews with

anyone able to provide information or to

resolve issues, including but not limited to

cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists,

psychologists, other medical professionals,

and law enforcement professionals may be

conducted.

Attachment D to Subpart B—Decision Tables

TABLE 1.—WHICH INVESTIGATION TO REQUEST

If the requirement is for And the person has this

access Based on this investigation

Then the investigation required

is

Using

standard

Confidental Secret; ‘‘L’’ ................................................ None ................................. None ................................. NACLC ............. A

Out of date NACLC or

SSBI.

Conf, Sec; ‘‘L’’

Top Secret, SCI; ‘‘Q’’ ................................................... None ................................. None ................................. SSBI ................. B

None; Conf, Sec; ‘‘L’’ ........ Current or out of date

NACLC

Out of date SSBI

TS, SCI; ‘‘Q’’ ..................... SSBI–PR .......... C

TABLE 2.—REINVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS

If the requirement is for And the age of the investigation is

Type required if there has been a

break in service of

0–23 months

24

month’s

or more

Confidential .............................................................. 0 to 14 years. 11 mos ............................................. None (note 1) ................. NACLC

15 yrs. or more ........................................................ NACLC.

Secret; ‘‘L’’ ............................................................... 0 to 9 yrs 11 mos .................................................... None (note 1).

10 yrs. or more ........................................................ NACLC

Top Secret, SCI; ‘‘Q’’ ............................................... 0 to 4 yrs. 11 mos ................................................... None (note 1) ................. SSBI

5 yrs or more ........................................................... SSBI–PR.

Note: As a minimum, review an updated Standard Form 84 and applicable records. A reinvestigation (NACLC or SSBI–PR) is not required unless the review indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive Order 12968.

Subpart C—Guidelines for Temporary

Access

§ 147.28 Introduction.

The following minimum investigative

standards, implementing section 3.3 of

Executive Order 12968, Access to

Classified Information, are established

for all United States Government and

military personnel, consultants,

contractors, subcontractors, employees

of contractors, licensees, certificate

holders or grantees and their employees

and other individuals who require

access to classified information before

the appropriate investigation can be

completed and a final determination

made.

§ 147.29 Temporary eligibility for access.

Based on a justified need meeting the

requirements of section 3.3 of Executive

Order 12968, temporary eligibility for

access may be granted before

investigations are complete and

favorably adjudicated, where official

functions must be performed prior to

completion of the investigation and

adjudication process. The temporary

eligibility will be valid until completion

of the investigation and adjudication;

however, the agency granting it may

revoke it at any time based on

unfavorable information identified in

the course of the investigation.

§ 147.30 Temporary eligibility for access at

the confidential and secret levels and

temporary eligibility for ‘‘L’’ access

authorization.

As a minimum, such temporary

eligibility requires completion of the

Standard Form 86, including any

applicable supporting documentation,

favorable review of the form by the

appropriate adjudicating authority, and

submission of a request for an expedited

National Agency Check with Local

Agency Checks and Credit (NACLC).

§ 147.31 Temporary eligibility for access at

the top secret levels and temporary

eligibility for ‘‘Q’’ access authorization: For

someone who is the subject of a favorable

investigation not meeting the investigative

standards for access at those levels.

As a minimum, such temporary

eligibility requires completion of the

Standard Form 86, including any

applicable supporting documentation,

favorable review of the form by the

appropriate adjudicating authority, and

expedited submission of a request for a

Single Scope Background Investigation

(SSBI).

§ 147.32 Temporary eligibility for access at

the top secret and SCI levels and temporary

eligibility for ‘‘Q’’ access authorization: For

someone who is not the subject of a

current, favorable personnel or personnelsecurity investigation of any kind.

As a minimum, such temporary

eligibility requires completion of the

Standard Form 86, including any

applicable supporting documentation,

favorable review of the form by the

appropriate adjudicating authority,
4580 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 20 / Friday, January 30, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

immediate submission of a request for

an expedited Single Scope Background

Investigation (SSBI), and completion

and favorable review by the appropriate

adjudicating authority of relevant

criminal history and investigative

records of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and of information in the

Security/Suitability Investigations Index

(SII) and the Defense Clearance and

Investigations Index (DCII).

§ 147.33 Additional requirements by

agencies.

Temporary eligibility for access must

satisfy these minimum investigative

standards, but agency heads may

establish additional requirements based

on the sensitivity of the particular,

identified categories of classified

information necessary to perform the

lawful and authorized functions that are

the basis for granting temporary

eligibility for access. However, no

additional requirements shall exceed

the common standards for background

investigations developed under section

3.2(b) of Executive Order 12968.

Temporary eligibility for access is valid

only at the agency granting it and at

other agencies who expressly agree to

accept it and acknowledge

understanding of its investigative basis.

It is further subject to limitations

specified in sections 2.4(d) and 3.3 of

Executive Order 12968, Access to

Classified Information.

Dated: January 22, 1998.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison

Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 98–1955 Filed 1–29–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5000–04–M

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

32 CFR Part 148

RIN 0790–AG55

National Policy on Reciprocity of

Facilities and Guidelines for

Implementation of Reciprocity

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Interim final rule.

SUMMARY: This rule is published to

make physical facilities available for

reciprocal use in the storage of classified

information. Once a facility has been

certified as suitable for classified use by

one organization, it may also be used by

another for like purposes. No impact on

the public is foreseen.

DATES: This rule is effective September

16, 1997. Comments must be received

by March 31, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Forward comments to the

Security Policy Board Staff, 1215

Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1101,

Arlington, VA 22202.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. T. Thompson, 703–602–9969.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Order 12866, Regulatory

Planning and Review

It has been determined that this

interim rule (32 CFR part 148) is not a

significant regulatory action. The rule

does not:

(1) Have an annual effect to the

economy of $100 million or more or

adversely affect in a material way the

economy; a section of the economy;

productivity; competition; jobs the

environment; public health or safety; or

State, local, or tribal governments or

communities;

(2) Create a serious inconsistency or

otherwise interfere with an action taken

or planned by another Agency;

(3) Materially alter the budgetary

impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,

or loan programs, or the rights and

obligations of recipients thereof; or

(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues

arising out of legal mandates, the

President’s priorities, or the principles

set forth in this Executive Order.

Public Law 96–354, Regulatory

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601)

It has been certified that this rule is

not subject to the Regulatory Flexibility

Act (5 U.S.C. 601) because it would not,

if promulgated, have a significant

economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. This part will

streamline personnel security clearance

procedures and make the process more

efficient.

Public Law 96–511, Paperwork

Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)

It has been certified that this part does

not impose any reporting or

recordkeeping requirements under the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 148

Classified information, Investigations,

Security measures.

Accordingly, Title 32 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, Chapter I,

subchapter C is amended to add part

148 to read as follows:

PART 148—NATIONAL POLICY AND

IMPLEMENTATION OF RECIPROCITY

OF FACILITIES

Subpart A—National Policy on Reciprocity

of Use and Inspections of Facilities

148.1 Interagency reciprocal acceptance.

148.2 Classified programs.

148.3 Security review.

148.4 Policy documentation.

148.5 Identification of the security policy

board.

148.6 Agency review.

Subpart B—Guidelines for the

Implementation and Oversight of the Policy

on Reciprocity of Use and Inspections of

Facilities

148.10 General.

148.11 Policy.

148.12 Definitions.

148.13 Responsibilities.

148.14 Procedures.

Authority: E.O. 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR

1995 Comp., p. 391.)

Subpart A—National Policy on

Reciprocity of Use and Inspections of

Facilities

§ 148.1 Intergency reciprocal acceptance .

Interagency reciprocal acceptance of

security policies and procedures for

approving, accrediting, and maintaining

the secure posture of shared facilities

will reduce aggregate costs, promote

interoperability of agency security

systems, preserve vitality of the U.S.

industrial base, and advance national

security objectives.

§ 148.2 Classified programs.

Once a facility is authorized,

approved, certified, or accredited, all

U.S. Government organizations desiring

to conduct classified programs at the

facility at the same security level shall

accept the authorization, approval,

certification, or accreditation without

change, enhancements, or upgrades.

Executive Order, Safeguarding

Directives, National Industrial Security

Program Operating Manual (NISPOM),

the NISPOM Supplement, the Director

of Central Intelligence Directives,

interagency agreements, successor

documents, or other mutually agreed

upon methods shall be the basis for

such acceptance.

§ 148.3 Security review.

After initial security authorization,

approval, certification, or accreditation,

subsequent security reviews shall

normally be conducted no more

frequently than annually.

Additionally, such reviews shall be

aperiodic or random, and be based upon

risk management principles. Security

reviews may be conducted ‘‘for cause’’,

to follow up on previous findings, or to