J-A28002-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: J.L.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.L.S., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1513 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree April 18, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2015-A0140

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 29, 2016

T.L.S. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered on April 18, 2016, 

granting the petition filed by A.S.L. (“Maternal Aunt”); E.S.L.,1the husband 

of A.S.L.; and R.S. (“Maternal Grandfather”) (collectively, “Petitioners”) for 

the involuntary termination of his parental rights to J.L.S., (“Child”), born in 

February 2011, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (2).2

In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case, which we incorporate herein. See

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 While the trial court opinion, filed 6/16/16, refers to Maternal Aunt as A.S., 

and her husband as L.L., a review of the trial court record reveals that the 

correct initials for Maternal Aunt are A.S.L., and her husband is E.S.L. 

2

L.S. (“Mother”) filed her consent to termination. 
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/16, at 1-5. On July 21, 2015, Petitioners filed a 

petition seeking the involuntary termination of the parental rights of Father 

to Child. A hearing on the petition was held on April 13, 2016. The trial court 

heard testimony from Father, and Stephen Miksic, Ph.D., a licensed 

psychologist. On April 18, 2016, the trial court entered a decree terminating 

Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and 

(b).

Father timely appealed. He has duly complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Our standard of review is well-settled:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, governs 

termination of parental rights. That section requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 
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evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). We need only agree with the trial 

court as to any one subsection of (a), as well as subsection (b), to affirm. 

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We 

choose to analyze the court’s decision to terminate under subsections (a)(1) 

and (b), which provide as follows.

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 
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furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

This Court has found, concerning review of the statutory requirements 

that 

[t]o satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 

termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish 

parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be 

terminated pursuant to [S]ection 2511(a)(1) if the parent 

either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental 

duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of 

inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of 

termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

[S]ection 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted).

Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated:
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There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has 

held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional 

needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Furthermore,

[a]lthough it is the six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition that is most critical to the analysis, the court must 

consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically 

apply the six-month statutory provision. The court must examine 

the individual circumstances of each case and consider all 

explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his 

parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the 

totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination.

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
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We can address Father’s first two and final issues together. Father 

argues that the trial court erred when it failed to consider evidence of the 

history of the case as to his efforts beyond the six-month period of time 

preceding the filing of the petition to terminate his parental rights to Child; 

that the trial court erred in mechanically applying the six-month period; and 

that there was insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights under § 

2511(a). See Appellant’s Brief, at 6.

The trial court considered the case in its entirety; it did not 

mechanically focus solely on the six-month statutory period. 

At the hearing, Father testified that, while he did not know where Child 

went to school, he never attempted to learn what school Child attended. 

See N.T., 4/13/16, at 28. Father further testified that he never contacted 

Petitioners to ask how he could help raise Child. See id. at 40. Father stated 

that he has not sent Child any cards, presents, letters, or requests for 

pictures since February 1, 2016. See id. at 50. 

The trial court found that “by his actions within the six months prior to 

the filing of the instant [p]etition and beyond, [Father] has exhibited a 

settled intent to relinquish a parental claim to [Child], as well as failed to 

perform his parental duties to [Child].” Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/16/16, at 

8. Further, the trial court stated, “Father repeatedly accused Petitioners of 

obstructing his visits with Child. Yet other than enlisting the aid of his sister, 
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Father made no affirmative efforts to address or remedy the perceived 

obstacles.” Id.

After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the 

trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by 

competent evidence in the record. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s determinations 

regarding § 2511(a)(1) are supported by sufficient, competent evidence in 

the record. 

While Father does not discuss § 2511(b) in the argument section of his 

brief, we will nonetheless consider this issue, as our case law requires us to 

engage in such an analysis. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1010 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc) (considering § 2511(b) despite the appellant’s 

failure to challenge the trial court’s analysis). 

The trial court must also consider how terminating Father’s parental 

rights would affect the needs and welfare of Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). Pursuant to § 2511(b), the trial court is specifically directed to 

engage in a consideration of whether termination of parental rights would 

best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the child. 

See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into 

the needs and welfare of the child.” Id., at 1287 (citation omitted). We have 

instructed that the court must also discern the nature and status of the 
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parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing that bond. See id.

Here, the trial court found

[]a bond has developed between Petitioners and [Child] that has 

been described as healthy and in [Child’s] best interests due to 

the stability it provides. Based on the evidence and testimony 

presented at trial, termination of the parental rights of [Father] 

will best serve the needs and welfare of [Child] and will not 

irreparably harm him. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/16, at 10. 

Our review of the record reveals no evidence of a bond between Father 

and Child. We have stated, “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa.Super. 2008). At the hearing, Dr. 

Miksic testified that Child refers to A.S.L. and E.S.L. “mama and daddy” and 

that Child indicated that they provide him with the most affection and 

comfort. N.T., Hearing, 4/13/16, at 146. Dr. Miksic further testified when he 

asked Child if he wanted to see Father, Child said no. Id., at 147. Dr. Miksic 

opined “there isn’t any basis for [Child] to have any concept of a relationship 

with [Father], let alone any type of emotional attachment to [Father] that 

would affect [Child] if his contact with [F]ather was to continue as it is, 

basically no contact.” Id., at 151. 

We find that the competent evidence in the record supports the trial 

court’s determination that there was no bond between Father and Child 

which, if severed, would be detrimental to Child, and that the termination of 
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Father’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Child. 

Thus, we will not disturb the trial court’s determinations. See In re M.G., 

855 A.2d at 73-74. 

In his third issue, Father contends that the court abused its discretion 

“when it excluded evidence of the Maternal Grandfather’s actions and 

prospective adoptive parents’ actions in creating obstacles to Father’s 

contacts with the subject minor child, vis-à-vis the custody with the Paternal 

Aunt.” Appellant’s Brief, at 6. This, however, is not what he argues in his 

brief. Instead, in the argument section of his brief, he focuses on the trial 

court’s refusal to permit inquiry into how Child came to live with the 

prospective adoptive parents. See id., at 20. 

The section of the transcript from the hearing that Father cites is 

during his cross-examination of the bonding expert, Stephen Miksic, Ph.D. 

Father, through counsel, sought to ask why a change in custody resulted in 

his placement in the prospective adoptive parents’ home. See N.T., Hearing, 

4/13/16, at 171. There was an objection from opposing counsel that such 

inquiry “has nothing in the world to do with the connection, the attachment, 

the bond....” Id., at 171-172. The trial court sustained the objection, 

observing, “We are not concerned – my understanding of this whole bonding 

thing with the [prospective adoptive parents] and [Child] does not involve 

how he got there, but what is there now, what bond there is now.” Id., at 
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172. The trial court’s sustaining of the objection was eminently proper for 

the reasons it articulated. Father’s question sought irrelevant evidence.

Father also argues that the trial court sustained an objection by 

opposing counsel when his counsel attempted to ask Paternal Aunt why she 

had not seen Child. See Appellant’s Brief, at 21. Father, however, fails to 

provide a citation to the notes of testimony. We refuse to comb through the 

record to find the trial court’s alleged error. Accordingly, we find this claim 

waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c); Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 822 A.2d 747, 

765 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

In his fourth issue, Father maintains that the trial court deprived him 

of his due process rights when it did not permit him to present witnesses to 

testify on his behalf. Father, however, provides no citation to the record 

where he sought to present such witnesses and the trial court refused to

allow their testimony. He alludes to this throughout his brief, but fails to 

provide any concrete citation to the record. This claim is, therefore, waived. 

See id.

After a careful review, we affirm the decree terminating Father’s 

parental rights on the basis of § 2511(a)(1) and (b). 

Decree affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/29/2016