I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3233 

To support the implementation of the National Defense Strategy for the 

United States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 12, 2019 

Mr. GALLAGHER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To support the implementation of the National Defense 

Strategy for the United States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘National Defense 

5 Strategy Implementation Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 

8 (1) According to the 2017 National Security 

9 Strategy (NSS), ‘‘China and Russia are developing 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3233 IH

1 advanced weapons and capabilities that could threat2 en our critical infrastructure and our command and 

3 control architecture’’ and ‘‘China and Russia chal4 lenge American power, influence, and interests, at5 tempting to erode American security and pros6 perity’’. The NSS sets the country’s primary focus 

7 as sustaining favorable regional balances of power in 

8 the key regions of the world, and the use of our alli9 ance and partnership architecture as the mechanism 

10 for doing so. 

11 (2) The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) 

12 rightly stresses that long-term, strategic competition 

13 with China and Russia should be the top priority of 

14 the United States and the Department of Defense 

15 and require both increased and sustained invest16 ment, both because of the magnitude of the threats 

17 they pose to United States security and prosperity 

18 today and the potential for those threats to increase 

19 in the future. 

20 (3) To meet such challenges, the NDS states 

21 that the strategy of the United States will be to ex22 pand the competitive space while pursuing three dis23 tinct lines of effort, including rebuilding military 

24 readiness to build a more lethal Joint Force, 

25 strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3233 IH

1 and reforming the Department’s business practices 

2 for greater performance and affordability. 

3 (4) In the January 2019 Worldwide Threat As4 sessment, the United States Intelligence Community 

5 stated that ‘‘Russia and China seek to shape the 

6 international system and regional security dynamics 

7 and exert influence over the politics and economics 

8 of states in all regions of the world and especially in 

9 their backyards’’. 

10 (5) ‘‘China and Russia will present a wide vari11 ety of economic, political, counterintelligence, mili12 tary, and diplomatic challenges to the United States 

13 and its allies. We anticipate that they will collabo14 rate to counter U.S. objectives, taking advantage of 

15 rising doubts in some places about the liberal demo16 cratic model.’’. 

17 (6) The December 2018 U.S. Government Ac18 countability Office (GAO) report to congressional 

19 committees on Long-Range Emerging Threats Fac20 ing the United States as Identified by Federal Agen21 cies stated that, ‘‘China is marshalling its diplo22 matic, economic, and military resources to facilitate 

23 its rise as a regional and global power. This may 

24 challenge U.S. access to air, space, cyberspace, and 

25 maritime domains. China’s use of cyberspace and 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
4 

•HR 3233 IH

1 electronic warfare could impact various U.S. systems 

2 and operations. Russia is increasing its capability to 

3 challenge the United States across multiple warfare 

4 domains, including attempting to launch computer5 based directed energy attacks against U.S. military 

6 assets. Russia is also increasing its military and po7 litical presence in key locations across the world.’’. 

8 (7) According to the 2018 Assessment and Rec9 ommendations by the National Defense Strategy 

10 Commission (NDSC), ‘‘the U.S. military could suf11 fer unacceptably high casualties and loss of major 

12 capital assets in its next conflict. It might struggle 

13 to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Rus14 sia. The United States is particularly at risk of 

15 being overwhelmed should its military be forced to 

16 fight on two or more fronts simultaneously. Addi17 tionally, it would be unwise for and irresponsible not 

18 to expect adversaries to attempt debilitating kinetic, 

19 cyber, or other types of attacks against Americans 

20 at home while they seek to defeat our military 

21 abroad. U.S. military superiority is no longer as22 sured and the implications for American interests 

23 and American security are severe.’’. 

24 (8) As such, the NDSC states that ‘‘DOD and 

25 the Congressional committees that oversee national 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
5 

•HR 3233 IH

1 security must focus current and future investments 

2 on operational challenges such as protecting critical 

3 bases of operations; rapidly reinforcing and sus4 taining forces engaged forward; assuring information 

5 systems and conducting effective information oper6 ations; defeating anti-access/area-denial threats; de7 terring, and if necessary defeating, the use of nu8 clear or other strategic weapons in ways that fall 

9 short of justifying a large-scale nuclear response; en10 hancing the capabilities and survivability of space 

11 systems and supporting infrastructure; and devel12 oping an interoperable joint command, control, com13 munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 

14 and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that sup15 ports the warfare of the future.’’. 

16 (9) Additionally, the NDSC states that ‘‘Mak17 ing informed decisions about strategic, operational, 

18 and force development issues requires a foundation 

19 of state-of-the-art analytic capabilities. . . . Specifi20 cally, the Department needs a rigorous force devel21 opment plan that connects its investment strategy 

22 with its key priorities of winning in conflict and 

23 competing effectively with China and Russia.’’. 

24 (10) The March 2019 GAO report on Defense 

25 Strategy: Revised Analytic Approach Needed to SupVerDate Sep 11 2014 20:29 Jun 17, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3233.IH H3233

jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
6 

•HR 3233 IH

1 port Force Structure Decision-Making, found that 

2 ‘‘The Department of Defense’s (DOD) analytic ap3 proach has not provided senior leaders with the sup4 port they need to evaluate and determine the force 

5 structure necessary to implement the National De6 fense Strategy.’’. 

7 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

8 It is the sense of Congress as follows: 

9 (1) The United States must be prepared to 

10 meet the challenges of competitive nations that are 

11 seeking to diminish the United States military ad12 vantage and threaten vital United States interests, 

13 and China is the most significant such challenge. 

14 (2) The National Defense Strategy provides the 

15 correct framework to prepare for major-power com16 petition and conflict, but adequate resources are re17 quired and implementation across the entire Depart18 ment of Defense enterprise in line with the focus of 

19 that strategy on readying the Joint Force for com20 petition and conflict against China and Russia. 

21 (3) The United States is committed to uphold22 ing a free and open international order that pro23 motes republican government and governance in con24 cert with collective security, international laws, and 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
7 

•HR 3233 IH

1 human dignity while respecting the sovereignty of 

2 other countries. 

3 (4) The Department of Defense should urgently 

4 and at scale adapt the Joint Force’s shape, posture, 

5 development vectors, and employment models to 

6 maintain military advantage alongside our allies and 

7 partners against China and Russia. To do this, the 

8 Department of Defense should develop adapted, new 

9 warfighting concepts at the operational level of war 

10 that allow the United States to achieve its political 

11 objectives in politically tenable ways. In concert, the 

12 Joint Force should become more lethal, resilient, 

13 agile, and ready to deal with Chinese and Russian 

14 strategies and theories of victory. 

15 (5) Investments should be focused on expanding 

16 United States operational options while constraining 

17 those to strategic competitors, such as China and 

18 Russia. 

19 SEC. 4. REPORT ON OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND PLANS 

20 TO DEFEAT CHINA AND RUSSIA. 

21 Not later than February 1, 2020, and then biannually 

22 thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 

23 congressional defense committees a report on the Depart24 ment of Defense’s operational concepts and plans to defeat 

25 China and Russia in competition and war, including on 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
8 

•HR 3233 IH

1 key strategically significant scenarios identified in the Na2 tional Defense Strategy that also addresses each of the 

3 following: 

4 (1) Ways of employing the force in peace time 

5 to effectively compete and deter China and Russia 

6 below the threshold of war while ensuring readiness 

7 for war. 

8 (2) Ways of adapting innovative, operational 

9 concepts needed for strategically significant and 

10 plausible scenarios related to China and Russia. 

11 (3) Ways of addressing operational challenges 

12 related to achieving the strategic advantage against 

13 China and Russia related to nuclear, space, cyber, 

14 conventional, and unconventional means in 

15 warfighting doctrine. 

16 (4) The technologies, force developments, pos17 ture and capabilities, readiness, infrastructure, orga18 nization, personnel, and other elements of the de19 fense program necessary to enable these operational 

20 concepts and its implementation listed in paragraphs 

21 (1) through (3). 

22 (5) The ability of the National Security Innova23 tion Base to support the operational concepts listed 

24 in paragraphs (1) through (3). 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
9 

•HR 3233 IH

1 (6) The resources and defense investments nec2 essary to support the operational concepts and its 

3 implementation, including budget recommendations. 

4 (7) The risks associated with the operational 

5 concepts, including the relationship and tradeoffs be6 tween missions, risks, and resources. 

7 (8) The likely needed boundaries of conflict 

8 needed to achieve these operational concepts. 

9 (9) Measures and metrics to track the effective10 ness of the operational concepts and plans. 

11 SEC. 5. ACTIONS TO INCREASE ANALYTIC SUPPORT. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall di13 rect the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Direc14 tor of the Joint Staff, and the Director of Cost Assess15 ment and Program Evaluation, in consultation with the 

16 head of each military service, to jointly develop and imple17 ment a plan to strengthen the analytic capabilities, exper18 tise, and processes necessary to meet the National Defense 

19 Strategy. 

20 (b) ELEMENTS.—The plan under subsection (a) shall 

21 include— 

22 (1) an assessment of the decision support capa23 bility of the Department of Defense, specifically the 

24 analytic expertise the Department is using to link 

25 National Defense Strategy objectives to innovative 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
10 

•HR 3233 IH

1 approaches for meeting future challenges, including 

2 winning in conflict and competing effectively against 

3 China and Russia; 

4 (2) an approach for comparing competing anal5 yses and conducting joint analyses for force struc6 ture to support senior leaders in implementing the 

7 National Defense Strategy; 

8 (3) a determination of the analytic products 

9 and support required to implement the National De10 fense Strategy, including the ability to update these 

11 products to reflect current strategy, intelligence as12 sessments, and future threats; and 

13 (4) such other matters as the Secretary of De14 fense determines to be appropriate. 

15 (c) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than March 1, 

16 2020, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the con17 gressional defense committees a briefing on the plan under 

18 subsection (a). 

19 SEC. 6. EXTENSION AND ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE COM20 MISSION ON THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRAT21 EGY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 

22 Section 942 of the National Defense Authorization 

23 Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 

24 2367) is amended— 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
11 

•HR 3233 IH

1 (1) by amending subsection (f) to read as fol2 lows: 

3 ‘‘(f) ANNUAL UPDATE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

4 STRATEGY.— 

5 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis during 

6 the covered period, the chair and vice chair of the 

7 Commission, or their designees, shall jointly submit 

8 to the congressional defense committees a report 

9 that assesses whether, and to what extent, the De10 partment of Defense executed the National Defense 

11 Strategy in the preceding fiscal year. 

12 ‘‘(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted under 

13 paragraph (1) shall assess the performance of the 

14 Department of Defense with respect to each of the 

15 elements described in sections 4 and 5(b) of the Na16 tional Defense Strategy Implementation Act. 

17 ‘‘(3) COVERED PERIOD DEFINED.—In this sub18 section, the term ‘covered period’ means a period 

19 that— 

20 ‘‘(A) begins not later than 180 days after 

21 the date of the enactment of this subsection; 

22 and 

23 ‘‘(B) ends on the date on which the first 

24 National Defense Strategy is submitted to Con25 gress after such date of enactment.’’. 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS
12 

•HR 3233 IH

1 (2) by striking subsection (g); and 

2 (3) by redesignating subsection (h) as sub3 section (g). 

4 SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS AND GUIDANCE. 

5 (a) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.—In 

6 this Act, the term ‘‘congressional defense committees’’ has 

7 the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(16) of title 

8 10, United States Code. 

9 (b) OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES.—In this Act, the 

10 term ‘‘operational challenges’’ means the principal oper11 ational challenges to meeting the defense objectives de12 scribed in the most recent National Defense Strategy, as 

13 such challenges are defined by the Secretary of Defense 

14 in guidance issued to the Department of Defense. The 

15 guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense under the 

16 preceding sentence shall— 

17 (1) specifically identify operational challenges to 

18 the Department’s principal strategic priorities of 

19 winning in conflict and competing effectively with 

20 China and Russia; and 

21 (2) be made available in unclassified and pub22 licly accessible form. 

Æ 


jspears on DSK30JT082PROD with BILLS