No. 89-267 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1989 

IN RE THE ADOPTION OF 

R.D.T., a/k/a R.D.E., 

a Minor. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, 

The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Leonard F. Thomas, pro se, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

J. Cort Harrington, Jr., Helena, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: July 13, 1989 

Decided: August 25, 1989 .Yd 
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This appeal involves a claim for sanctions pursuant to 

Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P. arising out of a petition for adoption. 

Respondent Leonard F. Thomas appeals from the judgment of the 

District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and 

Clark County, denying his motion to impose sanctions on 

petitioners Nancy J. Thomas, Mark A. Erler, and their 

attorney J. Cort Harrington, Jr. The court ruled that based 

on the law and the facts as presented at hearing, Rule 11 

sanctions were not proper. We affirm. 

Respondent Thomas raises only one issue on appeal: Did 

the District Court err by failing to impose such sanctions? 

R.D.T. was born to Nancy J. Thomas and Leonard F. Thomas 

on October 16, 1978 in Fairbanks, Alaska. The Thomases moved 

to Montana in 1979. Shortly afterward, Nancy and Leonard 

separated. That same year, Nancy and R.D.T. began living 

with Mark A. Erler in Basin, Montana and Leonard returned to 

Alaska. 

Leonard and Nancy dissolved their marriage on February 

14, 1983. The decree of dissolution provided that Nancy 

would have custody of R.D.T. and Leonard would have 

visitation upon request. No child support was requested. 

Mark and Nancy were married on August 20 of the same year. 

In February of 1988, the marriage of Mark and Nancy was 

dissolved. Mark moved into a guest house on the same lot as 

the family home where Nancy, R.D.T and J.E. the daughter of 

Mark and Nancy, resided. 

In August of 1988, Leonard began exercising his 

visitation rights with R.D.T. Shortly afterward, Nancy and 

Mark, now divorced, filed a joint petition for the adoption 

of R.D.T. by Mark. The proceeding was bifurcated into two 

issues. The first issue was whether Leonard's parental 
rights should be terminated for non-support of R.D.T. The 

second issue involved a determination of whether the adoption 

by Mark A. Erler was in R.D.T. 's best interests. A hearing 

on the first issue was held on November 16, 1988 in the 

District Court of the Fifth Judicial District. The court 

took under advisement Leonard's motion to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction and limited the hearing to the question of 

whether Leonard's consent was required to complete the 

adoption. After submission of additional briefs on the 

jurisdictional question, the court granted Leonard's motion 

to dismiss the petition. 

On January 16, 1989, Leonard filed a motion to impose 

sanctions on the petitioners Mark and Nancy and their 

attorney J. Cort Harrington for violation of Rule 11 of the 

Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. Leonard's motion alleged 

that a reasonable inquiry into the adoption statutes by a 

competent attorney would have resulted in the conclusion that 

the petition for adoption was not warranted by existing law 

and that the petition was filed for an improper purpose. 

Leonard's motion was denied after a hearing and the propriety 

of that denial is now before this Court on appeal. 

Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P., which is nearly identical to the 

federal rule, provides that: 

. . . Every pleading, motion, or other paper of a 

party represented by an attorney shall be signed 

by at least one attorney of record. . . . The 

signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 

certificate by him that he has read the pleading, 

motion, or other paper; that to the best of his 

knowledge, information, and belief formed after 

reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 

is warranted by existing law or a good faith 

argument for the extension, modification, or 

reversal of existing law, and that it is not 

interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 

increase in the cost of litigation. 

Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P. The Rule further provides for the 

imposition of sanctions on any party, the party's attorney, 

or both if a pleading is signed in violation of the Rule. 

Rule 11, M.R.Civ.P. Appellant Leonard first contends that a 

reasonable inquiry into the adoption statute by the 

petitioners' attorney, Mr. Harrington, would have indicated 

that the petition was not warranted by existing law. The 

applicable statute is 5 40-8-109 (1) , MCA, which provides as 

follows: 

40-8-109 Placement for adoption by parents. (1) No 

parent may make a placement of a child for adoption 

with an individual who is not a stepparent or a 

member of the child's extended family unless the 

parent files with the district court for the county 

in which the prospective adoptive parent or the 

parent making the placement resides: 

(a) a notice of parental placement; and 

(b) a relinquishment of parental rights to the 

prospective adoptive parents executed voluntarily 

and in accordance with 40-6-135 (2) through (4). 

As correctly noted in the District Court's Memorandum and 

Order granting Leonard's motion to dismiss the petition, Mark 

is neither the stepparent nor a member of R.D.T.'s extended 

family. Furthermore, Nancy did not relinquish her parental 

rights; rather, she specifically stated in the petition that 

she would retain her parental rights. The court dismissed 

the petition because the requirements of 5 40-8-109, MCA, 

were not met. 

Appellant argues that a reasonable inquiry into the 

meaning of S 40-8-109, MCA, by Mr. Harrington would have led 

to the conclusion that the adoption was not warranted by 

existing law, as evidenced by the ruling of the District 
Court on the motion to dismiss. However, to avoid sanctions 

under Rule 11 it is not necessary that a party be correct in 

their view of the law. The party need only make a good 

faith argument for their view of the law. Zalvidar v. City 

of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1986) 780 F.2d 823, 830-831. Thus 

the granting of a motion to dismiss against the pleader is 

not dispositive of the issue of sanctions. Zalvidar, 780 

F.2d at 830. 

The petitioners1 attorney Mr. Harrington argued that S 

40-8-109, MCA, did not apply because there had been no 

"placement for adoption." "Placement for adoption" is 

defined as "the transfer of physical custody of a child with 

respect to whom all parental rights have been terminated and 

who is otherwise legally free for adoption to a person who 

intends to adopt the child. " Section 40-8-103 (10) , MCA. 

Petitioners argued that because there was no intent to 

transfer physical custody of the child and there was no 

attempt to terminate the parentlchild relationship between 

Nancy and R.D.T. the petition did not constitute a "placement 

for adoption." While the District Court did not agree with 

this argument, it held that the argument was made in good 

faith. 

We agree. In judging the good faith argument the court 

must strive to avoid the wisdom of hindsight in determining 

whether a pleading was valid when signed, and any and all 

doubts must be resolved in favor of the signer. Eastway 

Construction Co. v. City of New York (2nd Cir. 1985), 762 

F.2d 243, 254. 

Leonard also relies on 8 40-8-125, MCA, to support his 

argument that the petition was not based upon a reasonable 

inquiry into the adoption statutes. The statute provides 

that the effect of a final decree of adoption is to terminate 

the rights of the natural parents, unless they are the 
adoptive parents or a spouse of an adoptive parent, and to 

vest those rights in the adoptive parents. If the District 

Court had proceeded with the petition and terminated 

Leonard's parental rights pursuant to the first portion of 

the bifurcated hearing, a final decree of adoption entered 

after the second portion would only have affected the 

parent/child relationship between Nancy and her daughter 

R.D.T. Thus, the appellant has no standing to raise the 

issue of the effect of § 40-8-125, MCA. 

Finally, Leonard contends that the petition for adoption 

was filed for an improper purpose, to delay and prevent 

visitation between Leonard and his daughter R.D.T. The 

petitioners contend that the purpose of the petition was to 

officially establish the parent/child relationship between 

Mark and R.D.T., a relationship petitioners argue had existed 

in fact for nine years. As noted in Schwarzer, Sanctions 

Under the New Federal Rule 11 (1985), 104 F.R.D. 181, when 

determining whether a pleading was filed for an improper 

purpose, the court, in its discretion, should objectively 

consider all the facts and circumstances in the case: 

In considering whether a paper was interposed for 

an improper purpose, the court need not delve into 

the attorney's subjective intent. The record in 

the case and all of the surrounding circumstances 

should afford an adequate basis for determining 

whether particular papers or proceedings caused 

delay that was unnecessary, whether they caused 

increase in the cost of litigation that was 

needless, or whether they lacked any apparent 

legitimate purpose. Findings on these points would 

suffice to support an inference of an improper 

purpose. The court can make such findings guided 

by its experience in litigation, its knowledge of 

the standards of the bar of the court, and its 

familiarity with the case before it. 
Schwarzer (1985), 104 F.R.D. 181, 195. The record and 

surrounding circumstances in this case provided the District 

Court with an adequate basis to determine if the petition was 

filed for an improper purpose. The District Court found that 

the petition was not filed for an improper purpose, and based 

on the record the District Court's findings are not clearly 

erroneous. 

The imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 lies 

within the discretion of the district court. Schmidt v. 

Colonial Terrace Assoc. (1986), 223 Mont. 8, 723 P.2d 954. We 

find no abuse of discretion in this case. 

We affirm the District Court. 

We concur: