N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS INTER NATIONAL CORP. , AND CONSOLIDATED TELECOM , INC., Defendants

- Appellees.

______________________

2013

- 1181

______________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in No. 11

- CV

- 0071, Judge Ron Clark.

______________________

Decided: April 2, 2014

______________________

A DRIAN M. P RUETZ , Glaser Weil Fink Jacobs Howard Avchen & Shapiro, LLP, of Los Angeles, California, a rgued for plaintiff

- appellant. With h im on the brief were E RICA J. V AN L OON , A NDREW Y. C HOUNG , and A VRAHAM S CHWARTZ

.

D ARRELL G. D OTSON , Stevens Love, of Longview, Te xas, argued for defendant

- appellee Network Communic ations International Corp

. With him on the brief wereHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 2

G REGORY P. L OVE and S COTT E. S TEVENS

. Of counsel on the brief was T ODD Y. B RANDT , of Houston, Texas.

K.A.D. C AMARA , Camara & Sibley LLP, of Houston, Texas, argued for defendant

- appellee Consolidated Tel ecom Inc

.

______________________

Before L OURIE , B RYSON , and O’M ALLEY , Circuit Judges.

O’ M ALLEY , Circuit Judge.
HowLink Global LLC (“HowL ink”) filed suit against Network Communications International Corp. (“NCIC”) and Consolidated Telecom, Inc. (“CTEL”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging in fringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,876,744 B2 (“the ’744 patent”). The ’744 patent relates to collect calling using V oice over I nternet Protocol (“VoIP”) technology. NCIC and CTEL provide VoIP

- based collect call systems and services to various correctional facilities. After a magistrate judge construed numerous disputed terms of the ’744 patent, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions. Based on these construction s , the parties stipulat ed to

non

- infringement of the ’744 patent.
On appeal, HowLink ch allenges the construction of
two terms : (1) “ temporarily transmitting voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when the second communication link is established,” and (2) “ pr ohibiting voice transmission until a collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission .” The dispute over these claims is about whether the claims of the ’744 patent require that a caller be able to talk to the called party temporarily before a decision to accept the collect call is made

. Because we find that the district court correctly construed the term s to require the tran smission of a “live” voice

, for this purpose, we affirm theHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 3

district court’s claim construction, and

, hence

, judgment of non

- infringement.

I. B ACKGROUND

A. The ’744 Patent

HowLink is the exclusive owner by assignment of the ’744 patent. The ’744 patent , which issued on January 25, 2011, is titled “Method for Collect Call Service Based on VoIP Technology and System Thereof.” ’744 Patent, at [45], [54] (filed Apr. 4, 2005). The patent describes a method and system for making collect calls over a VoIP network using a collect call switch

. Generally, the collect call system includes a calling terminal connected to a calling gateway. The calling gateway then communi cates with a calle d gate way through a VoIP network. This called gateway is connected to a collect call switch, and
t he collect call switch communicates with the called terminal. When a calling party places a collect call through a calling terminal, the calling party initiates the collect call by dialing the called terminal . Next, t he collect call switch establishes a first communication link between the collect call switch and th e called gateway, and a second communication link between the collect call switch and the called terminal

. The patent describes several embodiments of the VoIP collect call system using these two communication links

. For example, Figure 5 , reproduced be low, disclose s a flowchart of signaling on various collect call systems.HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 4

The section of the written description corresponding to Figure 5 outlines several relevant steps : At step 310, the called gateway requests PSTN [(public switched telephone network) ] link to the collect call switch. The collect call switch establishes PSTN link to the called gateway.
At step 315, the collect call switch calls the called terminal by use of the collect call number included in the collect call request. When the called terminal answers, the collect call switch e stablishes PSTN link to the called terminal, and at step 320, outputs voice announcement telling it is a collect call.
At step 325, after finishing voice announc ement, the collect call switch connects temp orarily the voice call link between the caller terminal and the called terminal so that the called party can recognize the caller. The step 325 may be omittedHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 5

according to the telecommunication service pr ov ider’s policy.
At step 330 to 340, after releasi ng voice call link, a voice announcement for request to accept the collect call is outputted to the called terminal.

’744 Patent col .8 ll. 40

– 57

. Figures 6 and 7 disclose ident ical steps for providing a voice announcement for a collect call , with a collect call switch temporarily connec t ing the caller terminal with the called terminal. See ’744 Patent col.8 ll.45

– 54, col.9 ll.37

– 38, col.10 ll.8

– 9.
Representative Claim 1 1 states: 1. A method of providing a collect call service based on a voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) sy stem, the method comprising:
establishing a first communication link between a called gateway and a collect call switch, on recei ving a collect call request from a caller terminal via a VoIP network located between i) a calling gat eway being coupled to the caller terminal and ii) the called gateway being coupled to the collect call switch, wherein the caller terminal can access the called gateway by use of already known access i nformation;

1 The claim language of the other independent claims slightly dif fers from claim 1

. I n c laims 9 and 23

, the claim language states “temporarily transmit voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when the second communication link is established.” In c laims 9, 11, 13, 18, and 23, the claim language states “prohibi ting the voice transmiss ion until the collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission.” These differences are not meaningful to our analysis, however.HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 6

establishing a second communication link between the collect call switch and the called term inal;
temporarily transmitting voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when the se cond communication link is established, and then prohibiting voice transmission until a collect ca ll acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission;
connecting the first communication link and the second communication link to initiate a billing process for the second communication link respo nsive to the collect call acceptance in the form of a dual tone multi

- frequency (DTMF) signal from the called terminal; and
releasing the connected links to end the billing process responsive to a normal call end request from one of the caller terminal and the called te rminal.

’744 Patent col. 14 ll.6

– 10 (e mphasis added)

. The original independ ent claims of the application that issued as the ’744 patent did not include the emph asized “temporarily transmit [ ting ] voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when the second communication link is established, and then prohibiting voice transmission until a collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission ” limitation. See

, e.g. , Joint Appendix (“ J.A. ”) 366

– 373. Original dependent claims 4 and 10, however, claimed “temporarily permi tting voice transmission which allows a called party to identify a caller .

. . .” J.A. 367, 369.
During the prosecution of the ’744 patent, the exa miner rejected numerous original claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious

, in part over U.S. Patent No. 6,788,674 (“Karamchedu”)

. Karamchedu discloses a collect callHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 7

system where a caller sends a request to a “Bridgeport” that then calls the called party, plays a message to a nnounce the call, and connects the caller to the called party if the called party accepts the call

. See U.S. Patent No

. 6,788,674 col.6 l.11

– col.7 l .9 (filed July 20, 2001). The Karamchedu written description states that , “ upon the call ee answering the call from the B ridgeport, t he B ridg eport may announce a message to the callee s uch as ‘Bob is attempting to make a collect call. ’ ” Id. col.6 ll. 20

– 23. The examiner stated that Karamchedu teaches the limitation included in dependent claims 4 and 10 that claim “temp orarily permitting voice transmission which allows a called party to identify a caller when the second link is esta blished, and then prohibiting voice transmission until the collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission.” See J.A. 351, 356 (emphasis added)

. When, in response, How Link offered amend ed claims 26, 28, and 31, reciting “temporarily transmitting voice of a caller,” t he examiner indicated that those claims would be allowed if rewritten in independent form to include the

express limitation s of “ temporarily transmit [ting] voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when the second link is established, and then prohibiting the voice transmission until the collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission. ” J.A. 402

– 04. After t he ap plicant amended the independent claims consistent with these directives , the examiner allowed the claims.

B. Procedural History
On February 15, 2011, HowLink filed a complaint a sserting patent infringement of the ’7 44 patent against NCIC in the U.S. Distri ct Court for the Eastern District of Texas. 2 Compl.

, HowLink Global LLC v. Centris Info.

2 HowLink also asserted infringement of the ’744 patent against Centris Information Systems, LLC, Co n-HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 8

Sys. , LLC

, No. 4:11

- cv

- 00071

- RC

- ALM (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2011), ECF No. 1. On April 18, 2011 , HowLink filed a First Amended Complaint adding patent infringement claim s against CTEL. First Am. Compl., HowLink Global LLC v. Centris Info. Sys., LLC , No. 4:11

- cv

- 00071

- RC

ALM (E.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2011 ), ECF No. 1 6. 3 T he district court judge referred the c ase to a magistrate j udge for claim construction.
On June 28, 2012, the magistrate j udge issued his Report and Recommendation construing numerous di sput ed claim terms, including the tw o terms at issue in this appeal. See Report and Recommendation of U .S. Magistrate Judge, HowLink Global LLC v. Centris Info. Sys., LLC , No . 4:11

- cv

- 00071

- RC

- ALM (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2012), ECF No. 154 (“R&R”)

. First, t he magistrate judge construed the “temporarily transmit[ting] voice of a caller” term as “for a limited time, transmitting the live voice of a caller so that the caller can speak to the called party and the called party can hear what the caller is saying when the second co mmunication link is established.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added)

. In support, the magistrate judge pointed to the claim language itself as contemplating a “live v oice

, ” explaining that “[t]he claim thus recites that the ‘prohibi ting’ occurs after the ‘temporarily transmitting,’ as ind iver sant Technologies, Inc., JCW Electronics I Ltd., L.L.P., JCW Electronics I, L.P., JCW Electronics, Inc., Teletrust, Inc., Trio Communications, Inc., and Value

- Added Co mmunications, Inc. HowLink later voluntarily dismissed its claims against these Defendan ts.

3 HowLink also added Network Enhanced Telecom, L.L.P. and Network Operator Services, Inc. Eventually

, HowLink also voluntarily dismissed its claims against these Defendants.HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 9

cated by the word ‘then.’” Id. at 24. He then noted that the parties have not disputed this order of steps and concluded that

, “what is ‘temporarily transmitt[ed]’ must be something that can then be ‘prohibit[ed].’” Id. at 25. As such, “if the step of ‘temporarily transmitting voice of a caller’ did not involve the live voice of the caller, the step of ‘ then prohibiting voice t ransmission’ would be superfl uous.” Id. The magistrate judge also concluded that

, because of the grammatical structure of the claim la nguage itself, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would readily understand that the antecedent basis for the ‘voice transmission’ recited in the ‘prohibiting’ step is the ‘voice of a caller’ recited in the ‘temporarily transmitting’ step.” Id. (citations omitted). “Based on this antecedent basis relationship, ‘voice of a caller’ and ‘voice tr ansmission’ carry the same mean ing throughout the claims.” Id. at 26 (citing Digital

- Vending Servs. Int’ l, LLC v. Univ. of Pho enix, Inc. , 672 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ). He also found that “[a]ny remaining doubt about the propriety of a limiting construction is eliminated by the prosecution history” exchange relating to the Karamchedu reference. Id

. He noted that

, because Karamchedu does not disclose transmissi on of a caller’s live voice, it implies that the caller’s name is either pre

- recorded or computer

generated. The examiner noted in particular that “t he patentee overcame Karamchedu by amending the claims in a fashion that ‘put the examiner and the public on notice of the invention’s crucial feature,’ insofar as the patentee relied upon that feature to overcome Ka ra mchedu, namely the temporary transmitting of a ‘voice of a caller.’” Id. at 27. And, to give effect to this disclaimer, the magistrate judge found that the construction should require transmission of the “live voice” of the caller. See id. at 27

– 28.

S econd, t he magistrate judge construed the “prohibi ting voice transmission” term as “preventing the called party from continuing to hear what the caller is sayingHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 10

until after the collect call acceptance.” Id. at 30

. In support, the magistrate judge referenced his supporting analysis regarding the “temporarily transmit[ting] voice of a caller” term

. He also stated : While some embodiments might provide two

- way communication during the temporary “voice transmission,” such a limitation is not recited by the claim language and is not clearly established in the specification. Instead, the temporary voice transmission is recited in the claims as “tempora rily transmitting voice of a caller to the called te rminal” and is disclosed as enabling the called party to r ecognize the caller, not vice versa.

Id. at 2 9. On July 12, 2012, HowLink filed its Objections to the Report and Recommendation with respect to the constru ctions of the se two claim terms. Objection to Report and Recommendations Regarding Claim Construction, How Link Global LLC v. Centris Info. Sys., LLC , No. 4:11

- cv

00071

- RC

- ALM (E.D. Tex. Jul y 12, 2012), ECF No. 159. HowLink claimed that the magistrate judge improper ly limit ed the phrase, “voice of a caller,” to mean only the caller’s “live” voice

, and exclud ed the caller’s “recorded” voice from the scope of the claims. Id. at 1. On August 29 , 2012, the district court issued an Order

a dopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recomme ndation

. Order Adopting Report and Recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge, HowLink Global LLC v. Centris Info. Sys., LLC , No. 4:11

- cv

- 00071

- RC

- ALM (E.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 167 (“Order Adopting R&R”)

. In addressing the claim language now on appeal

, the district
court found that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would read the claims to mean that ‘voice transmission’ refers to the same thing throughout the claims and that what is ‘prohibit[ed]’ is what was ‘temporarily tran smit[ed],’ particularly in light of the use of the word ‘then’HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 11

to introduce the ‘prohibiting’ step.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, he concluded that “what is ‘temporarily transmit[ed]’ is the ‘live’ voice of a caller because there would be no need to ‘prohibit’ a pre

- reco rded voice.” Id. The court also found that the patentee made a “clear and unmistakable” disavowal by amending the claim language from “temp orarily transmitting voice transmission” to “temporarily transmitting voice of a caller” to overcome the examiner’s rejection. Id. at 6.

Based on these claim constructions, HowLink agreed that it could not prevail on the issue of infringement. Consequently, t he parties jointly filed a Motion for A pproval of Stipulated Judgment of Noninfringement. On Octo ber 19, 2012, the district court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Defendants on How Link ’s claim for infringe ment of the ’744 Patent.

HowLink timely filed its Notice of Appeal on Nove mber 13, 2012. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) ( 1)

. II. D ISCUSSION On appeal, HowLink challenges the constru ction of
two terms: (1) “ temporarily transmit[ting] voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify when the second co mmunication li nk is established” and (2) “ prohibiting voice transmission until the collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission.” HowLink argues that the district court incorrectly construed these terms to require the transmission of a “live” voice. We disagree

, and find no error with the district court’s constructions.

This court reviews a district court’s claim construction de novo

. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. , No. 2012

- 1014, 2014 WL 667499, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.

, 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). To determine the scope and meaning of a claim, we canHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 12

examine the claim language, written description, prosec ution history, and any relevant extrinsic evidence. Phillips v. AWH Corp. , 415 F.3d 1303, 1315

– 19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Gene rally, a claim term is given its ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. Id. at 1312

– 13. “[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms,” and “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. at 1314. In addition,

w e must read claims in view of the written description

, which “is the single best guide to th e meaning of a dispu ted term.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitr onics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The written description “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Id. at 1321 (quoting Vitronics , 90 F.3d at 1582). “It is therefore entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to the meaning of the claims.” Id. at 1317.
We collectively address the district court’s co nstru ctions of the two disputed term s. The relevant language from representative claim 1 states, “[(1)] temporarily transmitting voice of a caller to the called terminal to i dentify the caller when the sec ond communication link is established, and then [(2)] prohibiting voice transmission until a collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission .” ’744 Patent col.14 ll.6

– 10. The magistrate judge construed the “temporarily transmitting voi ce of a caller” term as “for a limited time, transmitting the live voice of a caller so that the caller can speak to the called party and the called party can hear what the caller is saying when the second communicat ion link is esta blished.” See R&R at 28 (emphasis added)

. It also co nstrued the “prohibiting voice transmission ” term as “preventing the called party from continuing to hear whatHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 13

the caller is saying until after the collect call ac ceptance.” Id. at 30. The claim language itself requires a “ live” voice. “[W] e look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention.” Vitronics Corp. , 90 F.3d at 1582 (citing Bell Comm c’ ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Comm c’ ns Corp. , 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ). It is clear from
t he claim language that the “after the temporary voice transmission” limitation refers back to the earlier “temp orary transmitting voice of a caller” limitation. Indeed, at oral argument before this c ourt
, Appellant’s counsel conceded that “temporary voice tr ansmission” has the same meaning as “temporarily transmitting the voice of a caller.” Oral Arg. at 6:20

– 58, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20 13

- 1181.mp3 ; see also Ap pellant Reply Br. 19 (HowLink admits that “temporarily transmitting voice of a caller” and “temporary voice transmission” both refer to the same thing

— “the temporary transmission for the collect call request.”).
The claim language further states “ then pro hibiting voice transmission until a collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission .” See ’744 Patent col. 14 ll.8

– 10 (emphases added). Again, Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that the “prohibited voice tran smission” is a “live” voi ce. Oral Arg

. at 6:58

– 7:07. Appe llant’s counsel then admitted that the term “voice transmission” as found in “prohibited voice transmission” has the same meaning as “voice transmission” in “temp orary voice transmission.” Id. at 7:07

– 8:03. Pulling all o f these terms together into context , the claim language compels the conclusion that the term “temporary voice transmission” must refer to a “live” voice.

The structure of the claim language also implies “live” voice tra nsmission

. The phrase

, “ then prohibit ing voiceHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 14

transmis sion ,” requires that the temporary voice tran smission in the claims refer to a “live” voice. As the di strict court concluded , “i f the step of ‘temporarily transmitting voice of a caller’ did not involve the live voice of the caller, the step of ‘then prohibiting voice transmi ssion’ would be superfluous. Such a reading would be disfavored.” See R&R at 25 (citing Merck & Co. , Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. , 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A claim construction that gives mean ing to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.” (citations omitted)) ; Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co. , 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[C]laims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim.” (ci tations omitted) )). To clarify

, if the temporary voice transmis sion was a recording, there would be no need to

“ then prohibit [ ]” voice transmission because the record ing would end on its own. W e agree with the district court’s conclusion ; the temporary voice transmission is a “live” voice, as there is no need to prohibit the transmission of a pre

- recorded voice.
Appellant further asserts that the term “voice of the call er” is different t han “voice transmission ” since diffe rent terms are used. See Appellant Reply Br. 17 (citing Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp ., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in a claim requires that they connote different meaning s ” (emphasis in original) )). We agree that t he two terms

“ voice of a caller” and “voice transmission” d o not have the same exact scope, but conclude that they still refer to the same type of transmission s . The “temporarily transmi tting voice of a caller” refers to the one way transmission of the v oice from the caller to the callee

, whereas “voice transmission” can broadly refer to voice transmission s from the caller or callee . Accordingly

, “ voice transmi ssion ” encompasses a broader subset of transmissions. Therefore, w hile the scope of the term “ voice transmi s-HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 15

sion” is different than the “v oice of a caller,” both of these “voice transmis sion s” still refer to a “live” voice or voices

. The written description supports the conclusion that
t he terms include a “live voice.” It specifically describes temporarily transmitting the voice of a caller to the called terminal to identi fy the caller in a single section— the one describing s tep 325. 4 Consistent with the claim language,
t he description of the embodiments points to a construction where “transmit ting the voice of a caller” requires a “live” voice. Specifically, the key language states: “At step 325, after finishing voice announcement, the collect call switch connects temporarily the voice call link between the caller terminal and the called termi nal so that the called party can recognize the caller.” ’744 Patent col.8 ll.49

– 52. This “voice call link” describes a connection to allow the temporary transmission of the “live” voice of the caller to the called terminal to identify the caller to the

c allee

. Although HowLink argues that the written descri ption explicitly states that the invention can omit step 325

, a ll of the independent claims of the ’744 patent include this limitation. While a written description may describe multiple embodiments, th e patent is still defined by the claims

. See TIP Sys

. , LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc. , 529 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“the mere fact that there is an alternative embodiment disclosed in the ’828 patent that is not encompassed by district court’s claim construction does not outweigh the language of the claim, especially when the court’s construction is suppor ted by the i ntrinsic evidence.”)

. Indeed, the claims track the disclosed steps, including step 325

— where “the collect call switch connects temporarily the voice call link b etween the caller terminal and the called terminal .” ’744

4 The specification refers back to the description of step 325 for identica l steps 440 and 550.HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 16

Patent col.8 ll.49

– 51. Notably, eve ry independent claim requires “temporarily transmit[ting] voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller .” And n o discl osure is provided for pre

- recording a message from a caller for this temporary voice transmission

. H owLink a ssert s that the written description does disclos e a “ voice announcement ” that can include the recorded voice of a caller. HowLink contends that the invention may use the pre

- recorded voice of a caller

, stating that “[t]he key teaching here is that the calling party is identified to the called party using the caller’s voice.” Appellant Reply Br. 26. The written description

, however, does not support Howlink’s assertions. For example, as described, ste p 320 “outputs voice announc eme nt telling it is a collect call, ” and step 330 is “a voice announcement for request to accept the collect call is outputted to the called terminal.” ’744 Patent col.8 ll.47

– 48

, 55

– 57. The written description provides no fur ther description of any voice announcements, nor even me ntions pre

- recording the voice of a caller

. As such, nothing in the patent dissuades us from the conclusion that the claims all require that the temporary transmission i nclude a “live” voice.

T he par ties spend a significant portion of their briefs addressing whether prosecution disclaimer applies to remove the possibility of a “recorded” voice of a caller in lieu of a “live” voice. We need not reach th e question of prosecution history disclaimer in t his case , however

. This is so because, the claims and written description so clea rly point to the correct construction in this case. Thus, while we find that the prosecution history is consistent with our conclusion that the disputed claim terms require “live” voice transmission , we do not deter mine whether, standing alone, the prosecution history would support a finding of clear and unmistakable disavowal of an alte rnative claim scope. See Phillips , 415 F.3d at 1317 (“[T]he prosecution history can often inform the meaning of theHOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIO NS 17

claim language by demonstrating how the inventor u nderstood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be .” (e mphasis added) (citations omitted)); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp. , 725 F.3d 1315, 1321

– 22 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The meaning of the claim language is informed, as needed, by the prosecution history.” (citations omitted)).

III. C ONCLUSION For the foregoing reaso ns, and because we find that HowLink’s remaining arguments are without merit, w e find that the district court correctly construed the terms

“ temporarily transmitting voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when the second commun icat ion link is established ” and “prohibiting voice tran smission until a collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission .” Simply, the district court correctly concluded that

, to practice the elements of the claims at issue, a caller mu st be able to talk to the called party temporarily before a decision to accept the call is made. Because HowLink admits that Defendants do not infringe under the district court’s constructions, we affirm the district court’s judgment of non

- infringement o f the ’744 patent.

AFFIRMED