No. 92-108 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1992 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

ANNE ECCLESTON LANDERS, 

now known as ANNE ECCLESTON, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

PATRICK RILEY LANDERS, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Park, 

The Honorable Byron L. Robb, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Brenda Riley Cole, Swandal, Douglass, ~razier & 

Cole, Livingston, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Karl Knuchel, Attorney at Law, Livingston, Montana " ~ v ad* 

A UG 6 - 7992; Submitted on Briefs: June 4, 1992 

Filed: ~~~p&(, 

CLERK OF SUPHErfiE COURT 

STATE OF MONTANA 

Decided: August 

f Clerk 
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court. 

On August 24, 1990, Anne Eccleston Landers petitioned the 

Sixth Judicial District Court in Park County for legal separation 

from Respondent, Patrick Riley Landers. On January 10, 1992, the 

District Court dissolvedthe marriage and entered its final decree. 

From that judgment, Anne appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in 

part, and remand for further proceedings. 

This appeal raises two issues. 

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it 

modifiedthe inheritance provision of an oral separation agreement? 

2. Was there a factual basis for the District Court's 

evaluation of the husband's estate? 

In its Findings of Fact, the Court found that the parties 

stipulated in open court that Patrick "will designate the parties1 

children as beneficiaries of one-half of his estate held at the 

time of his death. All stipulations except this one were adopted 

by the court. The court modified this stipulation by finding that: 

8. [Tlhe father's obligation to leave at least 

one-half of his estate to said children should be limited 

to one-half of his present net estate and not one-half of 

everything he acquires in the future. The court finds 

one-half of respondent's present net worth as about 

$75,000.00, so that he should be required to leave only 

a minimum of $25,000.00 to each of the three children. 

The terms of the agreement were read into the record at a 

property settlement hearing on November 4, 1991. The Court 

directed the parties to reduce the terms of the agreement to 

writing, and informed both parties that they would be directed to 

carry it out after the parties signed it and presented it to the 
Court. At the close of the property settlement hearing, the court 

stated: 

There's liable to be something you haven't thought of 

maybe that hasn't been mentioned here today or may come 

up in the future. . . . you can return to court if need 

be and file a petition and the Court would hear it if 

necessary. 

On January 7, 1992, the parties returned to Court for a 

further hearing after Patrick refusedto sign the agreement because 

of the aforementioned inheritance provision. He testified that he 

misunderstood the stipulation. He thought it required him to 

provide for his children in his will only until the children were 

eighteen. This was based on his understanding that the court had 

no jurisdiction after the children reached adulthood. Moreover, he 

intended to leave only half of the ranch not half of his estate. 

Patrick intended the inheritance provision to substitute for a life 

insurance policy in order to provide funding for the children's 

college education. 

Anne contends that the District Court cannot alter the 

agreement without finding unconscionability pursuant to 40-4-201, 

MCA. Next, she argues that the Court cannot modify the agreement 

under ordinary principles of contract law. Finally, Anne contends 

that public policy requires that separation agreements should be 

upheld by the courts. 

All three arguments ignore the fact that the agreement was 

never signed. All separation agreements, to be binding, must be in 

writing and executed by the parties before they are enforceable. 

55 40-2-303, -312, and 40-4-201, MCA. 
Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse 

its discretion when it modified that portion of the oral settlement 

agreement which pertained to Patrickls estate. The trial judge 

held Patrick to the stipulation by requiring him to leave one-half 

of his current estate to the children at the time of his death, not 

one-half of the ranch as he requested. The only modification is 

that Patrick is required to leave one-half of his current estate, 

not his future estate. 

This modification takes into account Anne's intent that 

one-half of what she built with Patrick during their marriage be 

passed on to the children. Anne argues that she compromised her 

claim against the ranch in exchange for the provision for the 

children's inheritance. The Court's order guarantees that the 

children will receive at least one-half of the current estate. In 

essence, the children will receive Anne's half of the current 

marital estate upon Patrick's death. 

We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 

when it settled a dispute regarding the inheritance provision of an 

unsigned separation agreement which was orally stipulated to in 

court. 

However, we find no evidence in the record upon which to base 

the District Court's finding that Patrick's estate has an 

approximate value of $150,000. Therefore, we reverse that part of 

the District Court's judgment which provides that Patrick is to 

leave each child at least $25,000 and remand for further 
evidentiary proceedings so that evidence can be offered regarding 

the value of Patrick's estate. 

Following that hearing, judgment should be entered consistent 

with the evidence and this opinion. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as 

precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document 

with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its result 

to Montana Law Week, State Reporter and West Publishing Company. 

We concur: 

~hkf Justice