Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, 

Hassell, and Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

LORENZO DEMONTE JAMES 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 961294 June 6, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we consider whether a criminal 

defendant was entitled to ask a physician whether a witness, 

who had suffered brain injuries, was "capable of lying" at 

trial. 

 Lorenzo Demonte James was tried before a jury and 

convicted of: first-degree murder, malicious wounding, use 

of a firearm in the commission of a murder, and use of a 

firearm in the commission of a malicious wounding. The jury 

fixed his punishment as follows: life imprisonment for the 

first-degree murder conviction and sentences totaling 23 

years' imprisonment for the remaining convictions. The 

trial court confirmed the jury's verdict and entered 

judgment thereon. The Court of Appeals denied the 

defendant's petition for appeal by unpublished order. We 

awarded the defendant an appeal. 

 On July 6, 1994, Terrence Hicks and Randall Thomas were 

"hanging out" next to Hicks' car which was parked in an 

apartment complex parking lot on Jefferson Davis Highway in 

Richmond. Both men were shot some time late that morning. 

Hicks died at the scene, and Thomas was taken to the Medical 

College of Virginia Hospitals. 
 Richmond Police Detective C. T. Woody, Jr., questioned 

Thomas at the hospital five days later. Thomas identified 

James as the individual who shot him and Hicks. Thomas gave 

the following version of events to Detective Woody. Thomas, 

Hicks, and James had driven from the apartment complex to a 

convenience store to purchase beer. They returned to the 

apartment complex parking lot, and an argument ensued 

between James and Hicks. The two men argued because the 

"music was too loud" and someone had been "selling drugs." 

Hicks "pulled" a pistol and James left. Hicks then placed 

the pistol in his car. James returned, armed with two 

pistols, shot Hicks and Thomas, and then ran away. 

 During the trial, Thomas gave the following testimony 

which differs in some respects from the statements he had 

made to Detective Woody. Thomas and Hicks drove to the 

apartment complex on the morning of July 6, 1994, to "hang 

out, [and] drink some beer." James approached Thomas and 

Hicks and complained about noise. An argument ensued 

between James and Hicks. Thomas walked alone to a 

convenience store to purchase beer. When he returned to 

Hicks' car, which was parked in the apartment complex 

parking lot, Hicks was seated in the front passenger seat. 

Thomas entered the car and sat in the rear seat. James, 

armed with two pistols, approached the car. James entered 

the car, sat in the driver's seat, shot Hicks in the head, 

and shot Thomas several times as he tried to flee from the 

car. Thomas denied that Hicks had a pistol in his car. 
 Dr. David X. Cifu, medical director of the brain injury 

rehabilitation program at the Medical College of Virginia 

Hospitals, treated Thomas for brain injuries he sustained 

when he was shot. Dr. Cifu was qualified to testify as an 

expert witness knowledgeable about the subject of brain 

injury rehabilitation. During his direct examination, Dr. 

Cifu stated that Thomas sustained certain brain injuries, 

including "problems with thinking, memory [and] judgment." 

Dr. Cifu testified that a person, like Thomas, who had 

sustained traumatic brain injuries, would have problems with 

acute memory, "which is acute short term memory being what 

happened the last hours, the last couple of days, immediate 

recall, recalling what you were just told. In addition you 

commonly have what's called retrograde amnesia. What that 

implies is that in the acute period after a brain injury, a 

couple of weeks to months, it would be very unusual to 

recall immediate events of the injury, whether it is a car 

accident [or] gunshot wounds." 

 Dr. Cifu also testified that Thomas was still in 

recovery, but "his memory . . . cognitive, and . . . 

thinking skills are to the point where he is completely 

aware of his situation, where he is and what is going on. 

And . . . [Thomas] has had recovery of his immediate memory 

and probably about 90 percent recovery from his short term 

memory deficit. So, he is probably again about 90 percent 

recovered from his thinking deficit . . . ." 

 The defendant asked Dr. Cifu the following question 
during cross-examination: "Is Mr. Thomas capable of lying 

today?" The Commonwealth objected, and the trial court 

sustained the objection. The court stated: "I don't think 

the doctor can testify as to the truth and veracity of this 

particular [witness] unless his brain is so damaged or he is 

so confused that he is incapable of understanding the 

difference between truth and untruth." 

 On appeal, James essentially argues that the trial 

court erred by refusing to permit him to cross-examine Dr. 

Cifu on the subject whether Thomas was "capable of lying." 

Continuing, James claims that the trial court's failure to 

permit him to cross-examine Dr. Cifu on this subject 

contravened his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We 

disagree with James. 

 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the 

Constitution of the United States grants a criminal 

defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses called by the 

prosecution. Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 376, 337 

S.E.2d 729, 733 (1985); Shanklin v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 

862, 864, 284 S.E.2d 611, 612 (1981). "[T]he main and 

essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 

opponent the opportunity of cross-examination." Delaware v. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986) (quoting Davis v. 

Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974)). The Confrontation 

Clause, however, does not grant a defendant an unlimited 

right to cross-examination. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 

held that "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the 
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable 

limits on such cross-examination." Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 

679. 

 It is well settled in this Commonwealth that the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their 

testimony are questions exclusively for the jury. Barker, 

230 Va. at 373, 337 S.E.2d at 732; Coppola v. Commonwealth, 

220 Va. 243, 252, 257 S.E.2d 797, 803 (1979), cert. denied, 

444 U.S. 1103 (1980); Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 

870, 55 S.E.2d 24, 29 (1949); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 142 

Va. 639, 640, 128 S.E. 456, 456 (1925). The settled law of 

this Commonwealth simply does not permit a defendant to ask 

a witness to opine whether another witness is "capable of 

lying." The finder of fact, in this instance the jury, must 

determine a witness' veracity. 

 We hold that James' Confrontation Clause rights were 

not violated. The trial court explicitly gave James an 

opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Cifu on the subject whether 

Thomas' brain damage affected his ability to distinguish 

right from wrong. We note that Thomas took advantage of 

this opportunity and pursued this line of cross-examination 

in the presence of the jury. The trial court's refusal to 

permit Dr. Cifu to speculate on Thomas' veracity was a 

reasonable limitation on the scope of that crossexamination. 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 

of Appeals. 
Affirmed.