[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-13470

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cr-60073-WPD-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAYMOND ODIGIE UADIALE, 

a.k.a. Mike Roland, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(January 15, 2019)

Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Raymond Uadiale appeals his 18-month sentence, which the district court 

imposed after he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). On appeal, he argues that his sentence is 

procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the district court erred in 

applying a two-level sophisticated laundering enhancement under U.S.S.G. 

§ 2S1.1(b)(3) and denying his request for a downward variance. In response, the 

government contends that Uadiale’s appeal is barred by the sentence-appeal waiver 

in his plea agreement. After careful review, we agree and dismiss this appeal. 

Uadiale pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. As part of that agreement, 

he executed a sentence appeal waiver, in which he agreed to waive his right to 

appeal any sentence imposed, or the manner in which the sentence was imposed, 

unless the sentence imposed was (1) in excess of the statutory maximum, or (2) the 

result of an upward departure or variance from the advisory guideline range 

calculated by the district court at sentencing. The waiver also provided that, if the 

government appealed, Uadiale would be released from the waiver. At the changeof-plea hearing, the district court expressly addressed the appeal waiver and its 

limited exceptions. Uadiale confirmed that he understood both the waiver and the 

exceptions. After the district court accepted Uadiale’s guilty plea, it sentenced him 

to 18 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the applicable guidelines range, and 3 

years’ supervised release.

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“We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo.” United States 

v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). We will enforce a sentence 

appeal waiver if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 

997 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was made 

knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show either that (1) “the district 

court specifically questioned the defendant” about the waiver during the plea 

colloquy, or (2) the record makes clear that “the defendant otherwise understood 

the full significance of the waiver.” Id. at 1351. The district court must clearly 

convey to the defendant the circumstances under which he is giving up the right to 

appeal. See id. at 1352-53. “An appeal waiver includes the waiver of the right to 

appeal difficult or debatable legal issues or even blatant error.” United States v. 

Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). However, we have noted 

that “[i]n extreme instances—for instance, if the district court had sentenced [the 

defendant] to a public flogging—due process may require that an appeal be heard 

despite a previous waiver.” United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 n.5 (11th 

Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, “[w]e have consistently enforced knowing and voluntary 

appeal waivers according to their terms.” United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 

1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006). We apply “a strong presumption that [a defendant’s]

statements made during the [plea] colloquy are true.” United States v. Medlock, 12 

F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).

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We conclude that Uadiale knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 

appeal his sentence. See Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1066; Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350. 

Uadiale signed the plea agreement containing the sentence-appeal waiver, and the 

district court fully informed him about the waiver and its exceptions, after which 

Uadiale confirmed that he understood and agreed to the waiver and its exceptions. 

See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352-53. We apply a strong presumption that Uadiale’s

statements were true. See Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187.

Further, none of the exceptions to the waiver were satisfied here. Uadiale’s 

18-month sentence and 3-year term of supervised release were not an upward 

departure or variance above his guideline range, his sentence does not exceed the 

statutory maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, and the government has 

not appealed. Lastly, Uadiale’s 18-month sentence, imposed within his advisory 

guideline range, does not constitute the type of extreme due process violation that 

would necessitate review despite his valid appeal waiver. See Howle, 166 F.3d at 

1169 n.5.

Uadiale’s sentencing challenges are barred by his valid appeal waiver; we 

therefore dismiss his appeal. 

DISMISSED.

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