1

Filed 6/30/14

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

DEPARTMENT OF FAIR 

EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HARVEY OTTOVICH, Individually and 

as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A136607

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG08368372)

The Department of Fair Employment and Housing (the Department) brought this 

action against defendant Harvey Ottovich1alleging he engaged in housing discrimination. 

After Ottovich engaged in abusive discovery tactics, the trial court sanctioned him by 

striking his answer to the complaint and entering a default judgment. The trial court later 

vacated the default, but continued to treat the answer as stricken. Treating the 

unanswered allegations of the complaint as judicially admitted, the trial court granted 

summary judgment to the Department on the issue of liability. A jury then assessed 

damages at $8,705. Ottovich has appealed the ensuing judgment. His primary contention 

is that the trial court was required to reinstate his answer at the time it vacated the default 

judgment. We shall affirm the judgment.

 

*

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for publication with the exception of part II.B.

1

The named defendant is Harvey Ottovich, as an individual, as the trustee of the 

Harvey G. Ottovich Revocable Living Trust, and as beneficiary of the Harvey G. 

Ottovich Revocable Living Trust. We shall refer to defendant as “Ottovich.” 
2

I. BACKGROUND

In this action, the Department alleged that Ottovich owned or managed an 

apartment building in Fremont, California. He posted an advertisement for an apartment 

available for rent, and real party in interest Diane Coleman2called him and expressed 

interest in the apartment. He asked who would be living in the apartment, and she told 

him she, her husband, and their young daughter would live there. Defendant responded 

that he would not rent the apartment to her. Coleman told defendant, “That’s 

discrimination.” He replied that he did not have to show her the apartment or rent it to 

her, and he hung up. 

The complaint alleged Ottovich’s actions violated Government Code 

section 19255, under which it is unlawful for the owner of a housing accommodation to 

discriminate against anyone based on, inter alia, familial status. In its prayer for relief, 

the Department asked the court to order Ottovich to pay damages to compensate real 

parties “in an amount to be proven at trial,” as well as treble damages pursuant to the 

Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51) “in no case less than four thousand dollars.”

The record on appeal does not include the original complaint. Ottovich answered 

the complaint on September 25, 2008. The Department filed its first amended complaint 

on November 26, 2008. It appears that Ottovich did not answer the first amended 

complaint.3 Instead, Ottovich moved to dismiss the complaint as a Strategic Lawsuit 

Against Public Participation (SLAPP) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure4

 

2

The real parties in interest are Diane Coleman, individually and as guardian ad 

litem for Ronnaia Coleman, and Ronald Coleman. 

3 Ottovich avers in his opening brief on appeal that he assumed his answer to the 

original complaint would also serve as an answer to the first amended complaint, and that 

the Department did not alert the court to the omission or seek a default on that basis. The 

Department acknowledges that the trial court implicitly treated the initial answer as the 

answer to the first amended complaint as well, and does not suggest this omission has any 

effect on the outcome of this appeal. 

4 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
3

section 425.16. The trial court denied this anti-SLAPP motion, found it was frivolous, 

and awarded plaintiff $2,500 pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c).

The Department propounded discovery requests to Ottovich. In November 2008, 

the trial court granted the Department’s motion to compel responses to form 

interrogatories and requests for production of documents, awarded sanctions of $375, and 

advised Ottovich that “failure to comply with this Order or further discovery abuse may 

result in further sanctions, including monetary, evidentiary, issue, and terminating 

sanctions.” In April 2009, the court granted the Department’s motion to compel 

responses to its request for production of documents, and awarded sanctions of $250. 

The Department moved for terminating sanctions in June 2009 on the ground that 

Ottovich had committed discovery abuses. In support of the motion, the Department

submitted evidence that Ottovich had failed to comply with discovery requests, had 

violated the court’s orders compelling discovery, and had been found in contempt for 

failing to attend a case management conference. The court granted the motion, ordering: 

“Defendant’s Answer filed September 25, 2008 is STRICKEN, and Defendant Harvey 

Ottovich is DEFAULTED from this action.”

The Department filed a Statement of Damages (§ 585) in September 2009, 

claiming $55,000 in damages for emotional distress, trebled pursuant to the Unruh Act

($165,000 total), $5,588.53 for the costs of hotel stays, restaurant meals, and storage, 

trebled pursuant to the Unruh Act ($16,765.59 total), and $100,000 in punitive damages. 

After a default prove-up hearing in October 2009, the trial court awarded total damages 

of $242,354.12, and ordered judgment entered accordingly. 

Ottovich moved to vacate the judgment in December 2010. As he argued, section 

425.11 requires a plaintiff in an action for personal injury or wrongful death to serve a 

statement of damages on a defendant before a default may be taken. (§ 425.11, subd. 

(c).) Because the Department had failed to do so, he contended, the default judgment was 

void. The Department did not oppose the motion, and the trial court granted it on January 

20, 2011, ruling: “The Court HEREBY VACATES the October 13, 2009 Default 
4

Judgment . . . and the portion of the July 23, 2009 Order Entering Default against 

Defendant pursuant to CCP § 2023.030(d).” 

Ottovich did not seek to reinstate his original answer or file an answer to the first 

amended complaint. In July 2011, the Department moved for summary judgment, 

arguing that Ottovich’s failure to answer the allegations of the complaint acted as a 

judicial admission of the truth of those allegations. (§ 431.20, subd. (a).) In his 

opposition to the motion, Ottovich argued in part that when the trial court vacated the 

default, his answer was reinstated as a matter of law. In the alternative, Ottovich 

requested leave to file an answer and for a continuance of the hearing on the summary 

judgment motion. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. In doing 

so, the court stated that in its order setting aside the default, it had “specifically declined 

to set aside its order striking the Answer of Defendant Ottovich due to the pattern of 

discovery misuse shown in the Motion for Terminating Sanctions.” The court entered an 

“Interlocutory Judgment Establishing Defendants’ Liability Pending Determination of 

Damages.” 

Ottovich moved for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment. He 

argued that, as a matter of law, his answer to the complaint was reinstated when the 

default judgment was vacated, and, in the alternative, that his attorney’s mistake in 

believing the answer would be considered reinstated was the result of mistake or 

excusable neglect. The motion included a declaration of Ottovich’s attorney stating that 

by the time the trial court vacated the default judgment in January 2011, he had forgotten 

that no answer to the first amended complaint had been filed, that he believed the court’s 

order necessarily reinstated the previously filed answer, and that he would have filed an 

answer if he had believed it was necessary. The trial court denied the motion for 

reconsideration, ruling that Ottovich had not shown any new or different facts, 

circumstances, or law, and—even if such facts existed—had not shown that he could not 

have brought them to the court’s attention before the initial order granting summary 

judgment in the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
5

A jury trial was held on the amount of the real parties’ damages. The jury found 

the damages totaled $8,705, and judgment was entered accordingly. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Reinstatement of Answer

Ottovich contends that when the trial court vacated his default, it also implicitly 

reinstated his answer. The order granting terminating sanctions read in its entirety: “The 

tentative ruling is affirmed as follows: Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for Terminating 

Sanctions is GRANTED, based on Defendant’s failure to comply with, inter alia, the 

Court’s Orders entered November 26, 2008 and April 16, 2009. Defendant’s Answer 

filed September 25, 2008 is STRICKEN, and Defendant Harvey Ottovich is 

DEFAULTED from this action.” We agree with the trial court that its January 20, 2011 

order vacating the default judgment, “and the portion of the July 23, 2009 Order Entering 

Default against Defendant” by its terms left intact the portion of the earlier order striking 

Ottovich’s answer. 

Ottovich argues in the alternative that the trial court erred by failing to reinstate 

the answer when it vacated the default. He argues, relying on Matera v. McLeod (2006) 

145 Cal.App.4th 44 (Matera) that vacating the default without reinstating the answer 

failed to provide meaningful relief. We conclude Matera does not control on the facts 

presented here.

Section 2023.030 authorizes a court to impose sanctions for misuse of the 

discovery process. In addition to authorizing monetary sanctions and issue sanctions 

(§ 2023.030, subds. (a) & (b)), it provides in part: “(d) The court may impose a 

terminating sanction by one of the following orders: [¶] (1) An order striking out the 

pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery 

process. [¶] . . . [¶] (4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party.”

It is well settled that a plaintiff may not take a default against a defendant without 

giving the defendant actual notice of the amount of damages claimed. (Schwab v. Rondel 

Homes, Inc. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 428, 430.) In general, this notice is found in the complaint 

or cross-complaint. (§ 425.10, subd. (a).) However, where, as here, an action is brought 
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to recover damages for personal injury, the amount of damages claimed may not be stated 

in the complaint. (§ 425.10, subd. (b).) Instead, the defendant “may at any time request a 

statement setting forth the nature and amount of damages being sought. (§ 425.11, subd. 

(b).) If the defendant does not make such a request, “the plaintiff shall serve the 

statement on the defendant before a default may be taken.” (§ 425.11, subd. (c).) Thus, 

“[n]ot only is a default judgment for an amount greater than that specifically demanded 

void, but when a statement of damages is required but not served, the underlying entry of 

default is invalid also and is subject to set-aside.” (Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 

Cal.App.4th 1495, 1521.) 

For purposes of this rule, a default taken after the answer to a complaint is stricken 

as a discovery sanction is treated the same way as a default taken after the defendant fails 

to answer the complaint. (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 824–829

(Greenup).) The question before the court in Greenup was “whether a default judgment 

entered as a discovery sanction is excepted from the general rule that ‘if there be no 

answer’ filed, the plaintiff’s relief ‘cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in 

his complaint . . . .’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 580.)”5 (Id. at p. 824.) The court concluded: 

“The rationale . . . that striking the answer renders it a nullity [citation], applies equally 

when the answer is stricken [as a discovery sanction]. It is true that sections 586, 585, 

and 580, which together govern default judgments, do not explicitly list answers stricken 

pursuant to [former] section 2034 as proceedings in which default judgment is rendered 

‘as if the defendant had failed to answer . . . .’ (§ 586.) Yet unless and until the 

Legislature specifically provides a separate procedure for defaults after discovery 

 

5

Section 580 currently provides in pertinent part: “The relief granted to the 

plaintiff, if there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint, in the 

statement required by section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by section 425.115 

[regarding punitive damages]; but in any other case, the court may grant the plaintiff any 

relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.” At 

the time of the Greenup opinion, it provided: “The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there 

be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but in 

any other case, the Court may grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the 

complaint and embraced within the issue.” (Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 824, fn. 1.)
7

sanctions, these sections remain the sole statutory procedures for default judgments. . . .

We conclude that the damages awarded must be limited by the terms of the same section: 

when an answer is stricken as a sanction for the defendant’s obstruction of discovery, it is 

as if no answer had been filed in the first instance.” (Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 

p. 828.) 

Here, the Department did not file a statement of damages before default judgment

was entered; recognizing the impropriety of this procedure, the trial court later vacated 

the default while leaving intact its order striking Ottovich’s answer. The question before 

us is whether the trial court was required to reinstate the answer as a matter of law. 

Ottovich contends this question is governed by Matera, supra, 145 

Cal.App.4th 44. As a sanction for abusive discovery practices, the trial court there 

ordered the defendants’ answer stricken, entered their defaults, held a prove-up hearing, 

and entered a default judgment. (Id. at pp. 52–53.) On appeal, the defendants argued that 

the default judgment was void because plaintiffs had failed to provide actual notice of the 

amount of damages they sought a reasonable time before the entry of defaults. (Id. at 

p. 59.) The plaintiffs did not allege any amount of damages in their complaint, and first 

served their statement of damages two days before the hearing on the motion for 

terminating sanctions and entry of default. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal concluded this 

short notice did not comport with due process, and the default judgment was therefore 

void. (Id. at pp. 60–62.) The Matera court went on: “The striking of a defendant’s 

answer as a terminating sanction leads inexorably to the entry of default. [Citations.] To 

vacate the defaults without reinstating defendants’ answer would be an empty gesture. 

We therefore conclude that the order striking the answer must be vacated and the answer 

reinstated.” (Id. at p. 62.)

The Department distinguishes the rule of Matera, arguing that, in practice, a 

default “need not follow immediately upon the heels of the striking of an answer. Rather, 

as here, the striking of the answer may simply resolve liability issues, while the defendant 

retains the right to litigate damages.” This procedure, the Department argues, was 
8

approved in Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613 

(Johnson). 

In Johnson, as a sanction for discovery abuses, the trial court struck the 

defendant’s answer except as to the issue of damages. (Johnson, supra, Cal.App.4th at. 

p. 621 & fn. 8.) The court then granted summary adjudication of the defendant’s liability 

on each cause of action, and a jury trial on the issue of damages was held. (Id. at pp. 

621–622.) The complaint had sought damages “in excess of Twenty-Five Thousand 

Dollars [] according to proof”; the jury awarded $4.9 million in damages. (Id. at pp. 617, 

622.) Relying on Greenup, the defendant contended that, rather than compelling it to 

litigate the damages issue, the trial court should have ordered a default prove-up hearing 

and limited the plaintiffs’ recovery to the $25,000 jurisdictional limit pleaded in the 

complaint. (Id. at p. 623.) 

The Court of Appeal rejected this contention. It found Greenup “inapt” because 

the trial court there not only struck the answer but also entered a default judgment in an 

amount exceeding the prayer in the complaint. The Supreme Court granted review “ ‘to 

consider whether a default judgment entered as a discovery sanction is excepted from the 

general rule that “if there be no answer” filed, the plaintiff’s relief “cannot exceed that 

. . . demanded in [the] complaint . . . .” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 623, 

citing Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 824.) The rule of Greenup, the Johnson court 

concluded, was limited to cases of default. (Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 623–

624.) The court went on to note that the defendant “was in no different position than any 

defendant who admits liability, but disputes damages; who answers the allegations 

concerning damages, but fails to answer the liability allegations; or who has suffered an 

adverse summary adjudication of the issue of liability. In none of those instances is there 

a default—or a default prove-up hearing. Here, where there was no entry of default, a 

default prove-up hearing would have been not only inappropriate, but unauthorized. The 

court could not have excluded [the defendant] from proceedings to determine plaintiff’s 

damages. It therefore correctly conducted an adversarial jury trial on the only issue 

remaining, i.e., the extent of plaintiffs’ damages.” (Id. at pp. 624–625.) 
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The procedural posture of this case lies somewhere between Johnson and Matera. 

The trial court’s January 20, 2011 order vacating the default left intact the portion of the 

order striking Ottovich’s answer to the complaint (not, as in Johnson, only a portion of 

the answer). But, as in Johnson, the court also kept alive the issue of damages, and 

Ottovich was able to defend that issue fully—so successfully, in fact, that rather than the 

damages of nearly a quarter of a million dollars originally awarded at the default proveup hearing, the jury awarded total damages of less than $9,000.6

A close reading of Greenup suggests this result comports with due process. In 

arguing that defaults entered as a discovery sanction should not be subject to the same 

rules as those entered as a result of a failure to answer a complaint, the plaintiff relied on 

federal cases upholding judgments that exceeded the demand of the complaint. 

(Greenup, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 828.) Our high court rejected this argument, stating, 

“Plaintiff overlooks a crucial difference between state and federal procedures in default 

judgments: . . . federal defendants who default are entitled to a minitrial on the sole issue 

of damages. [Citations.] Unlike the ex parte hearing provided for by section 585 

[citation], the hearing in federal court is a full-fledged adversarial contest. [¶] It is here 

that plaintiff’s analogy to federal law . . . breaks down: under section 585 there is no 

contest whatever once a defendant defaults. [Citation.] We conclude that due process 

requires notice to defendants, whether they default by inaction or by willful obstruction, 

of the potential consequences of a refusal to pursue their defense. Such notice enables a 

defendant to exercise his right to choose—at any point before trial, even after discovery 

has begun—between (1) giving up his right to defend in exchange for the certainty that 

he cannot be held liable for more than a known amount, and (2) exercising his right to 

defend at the cost of exposing himself to greater liability.” (Id. at pp. 828–829.) Here, of 

course, Ottovich was entitled to a full-fledged adversarial proceeding on the issue of 

 

6 We also note that this result was exactly what Ottovich asked for in his motion to 

vacate the judgment. He argued that the default judgment was void, and that “[t]he 

proper procedure would have been for Judge True to strike Harvey Ottovich’s answer, 

and then for plaintiff to serve a Statement of Damages.” 
10

damages, thus obviating our Supreme Court’s due process concerns where such a trial 

was not available. 

This result is also consistent with the statutory scheme. Section 2023.030, 

subdivision (d) authorizes a trial court to impose various types of terminating sanctions, 

including “[a]n order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party 

engaging in the misuse of the discovery process” (§ 2023.030, subd. (d)(1)) and “[a]n 

order rendering a judgment by default against that party” (§ 2023.030, subd. (d)(4)). 

Thus, the statute does not appear to treat an order striking a party’s pleadings as 

equivalent to a default. 

Here, as in Johnson, defendant remained able to appear in the action and protect 

his interests in the trial on damages. In effect, Ottovich was in the same position as he 

would have been if the trial court had ordered issue sanctions; that is, his liability was 

established, but he remained able to participate in the proceedings and contest the issue of 

damages. In these circumstances, we conclude the trial court was not required to 

reinstate his answer when it vacated the default judgment.7

B. Denial of Motion for Reconsideration

Ottovich also contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant relief 

under section 473. This argument appears to challenge the denial of his motion for 

reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment, in which Ottovich argued, inter 

alia, that his failure to amend his answer was due to his attorney’s excusable mistake in 

believing the answer had automatically been restored when the trial court set aside the 

default and vacated the default judgment. In support of his motion, Ottovich submitted 

his counsel’s “declaration of fault” stating that after the motion to vacate the judgment 

was granted, both he and Ottovich had forgotten that no answer to the first amended 

 

7 Ottovich contends in his reply brief that section 2023.030 authorizes a trial court 

to impose only one terminating sanction, not more than one in the same case. He also 

argues in his reply brief that the trial court created an “impermissible [c]onditional 

[t]erminating sanction.” We will not consider contentions raised for the first time in a 

reply brief. (Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523, 548.)
11

complaint had been filed, that he believed the trial court had necessarily reinstated 

Ottovich’s answer to the original complaint, and that if he had believed it was necessary 

to amend the answer on file in order to protect Ottovich from a motion for summary 

judgment, he would have done so. 

In denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court ruled that reconsideration 

was not warranted under section 1008, subdivision (a), because Ottovich had not shown 

either that new or different facts, circumstances, or law existed or that he could not have 

brought any such circumstances to the court’s attention by the exercise of reasonable 

diligence prior to the initial order granting summary judgment.8 As explained in New 

York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212, “Section 1008, 

subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different 

facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a 

satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. 

[Citation.] A trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration is reviewed under the 

abuse of discretion standard.” Ottovich makes no attempt to show on appeal that new or

different facts or law existed, that he could not have brought any such changes to the 

court’s attention before it ruled on his motion for summary judgment, or that he met the 

requirements of section 1008 in any other way. Accordingly, he has failed to meet his 

burden on appeal to show error.

Even if we were to treat Ottovich’s motion for reconsideration as a request under 

section 473 for leave to file an answer, we would reject his contention. Section 473, 

subdivision (b), provides in pertinent part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be 

just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order or 

other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, 

surprise, or excusable neglect. . . . Notwithstanding any other requirements of this 

 

8

Section 1008, subdivision (a) provides that a party may seek reconsideration of 

an order “based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law,” and that the party 

must state by affidavit “what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to 

be shown.” 
12

section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six 

months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s 

sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate 

any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will 

result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal 

entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was 

not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” 

We are unpersuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing

Ottovich to file a new answer under the first part of this subdivision, which provides for 

discretionary relief. (See Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 681.)9 Ottovich 

argues that the requisite “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” can be 

found in his belief that his answer was automatically reinstated when the trial court 

vacated the default. He argues that between the time the trial court lifted the default and 

the time the Department brought its motion for summary judgment, both the trial court 

and the Department proceeded as if the matter were going to trial, and thus “lulled” him 

into believing the answer had been implicitly revived; if he had realized that was not the 

case, he contends, he would have applied earlier to reinstate the answer. However, he has 

made no attempt to show either that the trial abused its discretion in striking his answer in 

the first place or that this discovery sanction was imposed as a result of his “mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) Nor has he shown that 

his counsel’s mistake in failing to seek leave earlier to file a new answer prejudiced 

him—that is, that the trial court would have lifted that discovery sanction, allowed him to 

file an answer, and denied the motion for summary judgment if he had made the request 

earlier—and we see no basis for such a conclusion. 

Finally, we reject Ottovich’s argument that the interests of justice require the 

reversal of the judgment because he has a valid defense to the action and because public 

 

9

The second part of this subdivision—providing for mandatory relief from default 

upon a proper showing—is inapplicable here because the trial court vacated the default it 

originally entered against Ottovich.
13

policy favors the resolution of disputes on their merits. Our Legislature has authorized 

trial courts to issue terminating sanctions for discovery abuses (§ 2023.030), and the very 

nature of such sanctions is that a defendant will be precluded from asserting otherwise 

legitimate defenses. (See Johnson, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 627, fn. 19 [“an issue 

sanction can implicitly preclude a defendant from presenting an otherwise perfectly 

legitimate defense that is inextricably intertwined with the issue which the defendant is 

prohibited from contesting.”].)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Rivera, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Ruvolo, P.J.

_________________________

Reardon, J.
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Trial court: Alameda County

Trial judge: Hon. John M. True, III

Attorneys:

Harvey Ottovich for Defendant and Appellant

Law Offices of Randall B. Schmidt, Randall B. Schmidt for Defendant and Appellant

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Angela Sierra, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Antoinette Benita Cordero, Deputy Attorney General, John M. 

Appelbaum, Deputy Attorney General, and Department of Fair Housing and 

Employment, Megan Elizabeth Elsea, for Plaintiff and Respondent