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Defense National Stockpile Center: America’s 

Stockpile: An Organizational History

Or

An Organizational History of the Defense 

National Stockpile Center: America’s 

National Stockpile

Clifton G. Chappell, Senior History Consultant, Roderick Gainer, Associate Historian, 

and Kristin Guss, Editor
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CHAPTER ONE: How Stockpiling Began

Mission of DNSC

The Administrators of DNSC have expanded upon the dictionary definition of 

stockpiling to include the following four distinct mission statements, which still remain 

relevant although written 55 years ago:

1. The National Stockpile is a physical reserve of definite quantities of materials, 

owned by the United States government, stored mostly on government-owned 

property and in government warehouses. Currently, there are 40 different 

commodities stockpiled nationwide.

2. The Stockpile is an inventory of raw materials with a cash value. Today, that 

market value is approximately $1.5 billion (2005 value). These are recoverable 

assets owned by the people of the United States. In this sense, the Stockpile acts 

like an insurance policy with an outlay return of many-folds over the original 

costs should the stockpile be used, and yet until used, it retains indefinite value 

(at current market value).

3. DNSC is a basic element and an integral part of the national defense 

structure. However, it is not solely a military element: it is intended for all 

essential civilian and military uses in times of emergencies. This function is 

closely linked to military and civilian national security requirements, of course 

while taking into account the formulation of DNSC objectives. There is a direct 

relationship with industrial mobilization planning and the disposition of the 

Stockpile in time of national emergency.

4. DNSC provides a tremendous reserve of commodities for use during a national 

emergency. In the final analysis, materials are stockpiled on the basis not of the 

manpower required to produce them, but of the manpower that is required in 

wartime if these materials are not available.

As the stockpile legislation requires, one of the primary mandates for the 

National

Defense Stockpile as an organization is to eliminate, or reduce a dangerous and costly 

dependence on foreign nations. Thus, DNSC requires that stockpiled materials meet 

three distinct criteria:

1. They must be essential for the common defense (whether to industry or to the 

Armed Services).
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2. Materials must be insufficiently available in the United States.

3. All materials must have the distinct capability of actually being

Stockpiled. (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1950, pages 15-17)

Now that DNSC has been explained, a look back in time will help to more fully 

understand the necessity of maintaining stockpiles of rare and vital materials prior to 

modern times. Before looking back, below is a current list (as of 2006) of the materials 

considered strategic and critical, by DNSC. At an earlier time, this list contained 93 

different commodities, but by 2006 many of these had been completely sold off through 

the disposal programs. Keep this list in mind for comparison to earlier versions. 1

A National Minerals Plan and National Stockpile

Soon after World War I, leading American scientists sought to educate 

industrialists and those in government on the necessity of having a national minerals 

plan in hope that America would not return to its old isolationist thinking. In fact, one of 

the country’s leading geologists and professor, Charles K. Leith, promoted a novel idea. 

Leith had accompanied President Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference after the 

Armistice as the President’s minerals expert. He also worked for Baruch in the War 

Industries Board during the recent war. He proposed a world institute to manage raw 

materials, in an “internationalist” approach of control. Leith teamed up with leading 

experts of the period such as Josiah E. Spurr, who had become President of the Mining 

and Metallurgical Society of America, H. Foster Bain, then Director of the U.S. Bureau 

of Mines, and George Otis Smith, Director of the U.S. Geological Survey (serving more 

than 20 years in this capacity). Spurr also served as the President of the Mining and 

Metallurgical Society of America, and from 1919-1927, edited the Engineering and 

Mining Journal. These learned experts established what became a blue-ribbon panel to 

research and write a minerals plan by first inventorying all domestic minerals resources. 

Leith and his associates intended to draw enough attention to establish a policy 

that ensured the adequate raw materials dissemination to the entire industrial world. 

They saw the quest for raw materials as a world problem and sought solutions as such. 

Still, they wanted to protect American companies from other countries that might use 

embargoes, or other such protectionist policies, which would hurt the domestic mining 

industry. They saw their plan through the eyes of free-trade advocates and not through 

the interests of pro-tariff supporters. They did believe in some form of “tariff” controls 

for the major strategic raw materials of copper, manganese, chromium, and tungsten 

since all but copper had to come from foreign markets. The report they put together 

came in the early 1920s soon after the war and in the same timeframe that ANMB began 

to study strategic materials. It also came at a time that the mining companies blasted 

Congress for tariff protection against cheaper foreign imports. The miners had real 

concerns centered on staying in business. Importantly, Leith and his colleagues urged 

the formation of a national stockpile that would include antimony, chromium, and 

manganese, because of the large dependency on foreign suppliers. Although against 

major tariffs, they believed that legislation, especially for antimony, should receive a 

domestic tariff benefit. From the monetary proceeds of this moderate protectionist 
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legislation the government could build a stockpile of some 4,000 tons of antimony, 

which at that time came to a six-month supply for American industry. Yet, they 

hesitated to back more stringent protectionist legislation for other materials believing it 

would actually lead to depleting reserves of vital materials like chromium, which in turn 

would guarantee future dependence upon foreign sources. (Eckes, The United States 

and the Global Struggle for Minerals, page 38-40, hereafter referred to as Struggle) 

Leith and his colleagues also advocated the establishment of another permanent 

stockpile of 600,000 tons of high quality ferromanganese, which they estimated could 

take up to nine years to develop. They had determined this amount would last about two 

years in the production of steel at the rate of consumption during World War I. This 

stockpile would contain a very high-quality ferromanganese between 78-82 percent pure, 

which the United States could not produce domestically. In the 1930s, the United States 

could only buy this quality ferromanganese ore from foreign sources, like Russia (the 

Soviet Union), India, the Gold Coast of Africa, and Brazil. Cuban deposits had just been 

discovered that contained large amounts of manganese ores measuring in at 20 percent 

pure, but without the phosphorous contained in the Russian manganese ores. Even 

though lower in percentage than the foreign ores, it became cheaper to process the 

Cuban ore to the concentrated ferromanganese level because it contained fewer 

impurities to eliminate. This held especially true in the case of American mined lowgrade manganese ores, which had high amounts of impurities. Plus, the Cubans worked 

cheaper, and the mined ore traveled a shorter distance than Russian or other such 

foreign-based ores. Both the Cuban and foreign mined ores cost less and had higher 

percentages of ferromanganese quality than those domestically produced. Also, the 

American steel manufacturers preferred the higher percentage foreign ores. In 1934, 

Russian ferromanganese grade ore cost $22.50 per ton to import (with a 100 percent 

tariff duty attached), and American mined ores cost $30.00 per ton by the time they 

received adequate concentration processing into the ferromanganese quality. (Struggle, 

page 41; Lecture Series, L34-015, “Strategic Commodities,” by LTC Charles T. Harris, 

Jr., Ordnance Department, Chief, Commodities Division, Planning Branch, OASW, 

March 26, 1934, page 5 of 12, Report Number: http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic7/L34-

015.pdf)

Congress never enacted the minerals policy, which Leith and his experts 

envisioned. This stemmed from America remaining somewhat ignorant of the mineral 

problem, and those who knew something about it believed in a phenomenon then being 

forwarded based on the idea that America had become a dominant power in the world 

because of American individualism, which ran counter to establishment of many 

national policies. This concept saw incorporation in what became known to historians 

and social scientists as the Frontier Thesis, advanced in a paper presented by Dr. 

Frederick Jackson Turner, titled The Significance of the Frontier in American History at 

a meeting of the American Historical Association at the World’s Columbian Exposition 

in 1893. Turner carried his theory even further in his book titled The Frontier in 

American History published in 1921. Simplistically speaking Turner believed that 

American institutions had been shaped by the rugged frontiersman going forth to 

conquer the American frontier. Other historians picked up the mantle from Turners’ 
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thesis like Walter Prescott Webb, who attempted to show that most of Western 

Civilization had been developed by earlier frontier-concurring “individuals,” and 

establishing societal institutions from this experience. Webb introduced America to this 

ideal through his works like The Great Plains (1931) and The Great Frontier (1952). 

Americans took to this Frontier Theory based on many of the heroes average citizens 

identified with like Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, and latter nineteenth-century 

personages like Kit Carson and Buffalo Bill Cody. Through his wild-west show, Cody 

sold many citizens on the idea that the exploits of a single American individual going 

into the wilderness could come out successfully concurring the inhabitants and nature 

itself. Thus, in the early twentieth-century, many Americans believed in the premise that 

institutions had been shaped because of individualism. If this theory held true, then why 

did America need any national policy that would only constrain the individual in 

developing America to its fullest potential? Establishing a national minerals policy, 

therefore, held little chance in being formed during this period. If American experts 

could not agree or accept a national policy, they certainly could not think beyond the 

borders in terms of a global solution! In Congress the idea of “self-sufficiency” and 

protecting American mining industries through tariffs continued to dominate thinking. 

Scientists like Leith believed this to be based on a false ideal, as later historians 

disproved the Frontier Theory, but in 1922 Congress passed protective measures through 

the Fordney-McCumber Tariff. This legislation placed a duty on several imported raw 

materials that had previously been duty-free. Protection legislation won out over the 

free trade of raw materials, and international agreements. Congress hoped the tariff 

would prod domestic producers to increase production, but by the 1930s this had not 

happened. On the eve of World War II, the tariff on manganese had produced no 

increase in domestic supplies. In fact, in the decade before World War II, the tariff, 

which approximated 100 percent on some materials, did not produce an increase in 

domestic mining of strategic materials even though its original advocates proclaimed 

that it would. (Struggle, page 42; Roush says on page 60 that in from 1929 to 1939, the 

tariff approximating 100 percent did not increase the development of domestic materials 

to any great extent)“ 

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Significance_of_the_Frontier_in_American_History, 

for Turner’s thesis (accessed 27 September 2007); for Webb, The Great Plains, Preface, 

by Walter Prescott Webb, the University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1931, 

First Bison Book Printing, 1981, 525 pages) 

During the 1930s, the idea of establishing a national stockpile continued to have 

advocates, and some went so far as to raise the issue in Congress. By this time, the 

Industrial Mobilization Plans sponsored by ANMB had been disseminated throughout 

top governmental levels—along with the Army Industrial College—and this spurred 

studies of mobilization. In this turbulent decade, totalitarianism and militarism arose 

from the ashes of the First World War. These ideas became especially prominent in

Germany, Italy, and Japan, three nations with grandiose ambitions, but lacking in several 

vital minerals to fuel their ever-growing war machines. In there view, the former Allied 

nations monopolized the world’s raw materials sources. Since the disgruntled countries 

could not acquire many raw materials, they turned to violently expansionistic policies. 

To Leith and his associates this came as no surprise. They held that geography and 
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history pointed to the instability of Europe. Thus, war looked almost inevitable. Those 

like Leith, who had accompanied President Wilson to Paris, believed nothing but strife 

would mark the desire of nations for raw materials in the industrialized twentiethcentury. 

Many in the U. S. who backed the mining lobby’s idea of self-sufficiency did not 

grasp that world conditions had changed radically after World War I. Technology and 

the expansion of trade became evermore intertwined in the new national economies—

making them much more internationalist than before. However, even those countries at 

the Paris Peace talks began to fall away from the peace accord in the 1930s. A rise of 

nationalism saw nations once again competing for raw materials in fervor to obtain selfsufficiency. This rapid change wound around those with militarism and a quest for more 

power set the stage for the next world war. Leith believed that too much had been left 

undecided at the Paris Peace Conference, and most nations seemed bent on self 

sufficiency, leading them away from the original concept of a the League of Nations. He 

correctly believed this would result in another conflict down the road. (Struggle, page 

10, 25-27)

In the early 1930s, Colonel Edward M. House, former Special Assistant to 

President Woodrow Wilson, also a member of Wilson’s Peace Delegation after World 

War I, referred to nations in terms of “Haves” and “Have Nots,” in reference to raw 

materials. The “have” nations either contained deposits of strategically important 

materials, or could procure these materials from friendly nation-partners and colonies. 

In turn, they reconstituted these minerals, materials, chemicals, and other such natural 

resources into more quantities of foods, essential supplies, housing, medicines and of 

course military weaponry. The “have not” countries often had more population than 

food supplies and had difficulty employing all of their population to the point of 

maintaining a comfortable standard of living. Some of these “have not” nations made 

decisions during the interwar years to “correct” such material deficiencies and this 

threatened the peace of the world. (National Defense University Lecture Series, L38b016, “Strategic and Critical Materials,” by LTC H.D. Rogers, U.S. Army Medical 

Corps, Chief, Commodities Division, Planning Branch, O.A.S.W., February 19, 1938, 

page 2, of 22, Report Number: http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic7/L38b-016.pdf) 

The future Axis powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, began devising ways of 

securing badly needed raw materials, and attempting to deprive other nations like Great 

Britain, France, and the United States from supplies of such necessary materials. By the 

mid 1930s, Germany had launched a massive rearmament program, Italy had invaded 

Ethiopia, and Japan had launched a largely unprovoked invasion of China. The war 

planners on the Army General Staff and procurement planners in OASW began to 

categorize nations in terms of mineral reserves. Naturally, having sufficiently trained 

military forces and sophisticated weapon systems became a necessity too. The 

American military forces envisioned by the war planners during the interwar years 

reflected the traditional maximum of a 4 million-man army well into the 1930s (the 

rough total of the military during World War I). Materials needed for the sustenance of 

the general populous, which helped make the weaponry, also became critically 
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important. This became especially so for the United States as the nation relied more and 

more on foreign sources for supplies of strategic and critical items. (Lecture Series, 

L38b-016, “Strategic and Critical Materials,” page 2, of 22; http://home.u-shistory.com/pages/h1051.html, “Politics and Public Service, Edward M. House, 1858-

1938,” (accessed 27 September 2007) 

Despite the troubling world events, the United States concentrated on the 

problems associated with the Great Depression. President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted 

nothing to do with war preparation activities, which he thought to be an extravagance in 

the midst of a Great Depression. Old preparation agitators like Bernard M. Baruch 

began once again applying pressure on the government to at least start addressing these 

threats. However, the United States would make no overt attempt to expand military 

preparations for fear of arousing those isolationists within the nation, or of antagonizing 

other world powers. Once again, the American president would play the neutrality card, 

and this frustrated those who saw the inevitability of war coming. (Bullis, L. Harold and 

James E Mielke, Strategic and Critical Materials, page 165)

In 1935, Herbert Feis, an economist in the State Department, suggested the 

establishment of a reserve of strategic materials while he served on a governmental 

interdepartmental committee. This stance resulted from fear of war when Italy invaded 

Ethiopia. Feis believed the United States could purchase $25 million worth of materials 

per year through domestic and foreign markets, and he further suggested the bartering of 

surplus agricultural products as payment for the materials. Still, Congress did not act 

even in light of naked Italian aggression towards world peace. 

During the 1930s, the War Department had prepared suggestions for the nation 

should a national stockpile be established. These included acquiring materials through 

the government, or through private industry under some form of governmental control. 

In February 1934, the military planners in OASW prepared studies to establish a 

strategic stockpile plan under direction of the Assistant Secretary of War, and then 

staffed it through the War Department. That year the planners publicly approved a plan 

settling the lingering war debts from World War I by exchanging strategic materials for 

payment. They even suggested bartering surplus agricultural products in exchange for 

strategic materials. Nothing came of establishing a stockpile, but the importance lies in 

the consideration of the idea. ((Struggle, page 74-76); Lecture Series, L34-015, 

“Strategic Commodities,” pages 4 and 12)

First Stockpile

The Honorable Charles I. Faddis, Congressman from Pennsylvania sponsored 

legislation beginning in 1936 to obtain strategic materials, but nothing became of the 

measure until 1938. The Faddis legislation became law (House Resolution (H.R.) 1608), 

through the Naval Appropriations Act of 1938. Through the Act the Navy received a 

small appropriation of $3.5 million for the first stockpile of strategic and critical 

materials accumulated by a United States military service in preparation for a national 

emergency. The Navy quickly purchased a small stockpile of tin, ferromanganese, 
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tungsten, chromite, optical glass, and manila fibers. In the next two fiscal years, the 

Navy received additional installments of $500,000 for its stockpile. (Gutchess, Selling 

Defense Materials, page 5-6)

After graduating from Pennsylvania State College in 1915, Faddis served as a 

sergeant in the Tenth Infantry, Pennsylvania National Guard when President Wilson 

activated the guard for duty along the Mexican Border in the Punitive Expedition of 

1916. Sergeant Faddis rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel during his service in World 

War I and received the Purple Heart medal for being wounded in battle. After serving in 

Congress from 1933 to 1942, Faddis resigned on 4 December 1942 to once again accept 

an appointment as a colonel in the Army. He received a second Purple Heart, along with 

a Bronze Star for his services during World War II. (Lecture Series, L38-016, 

“Strategic and Critical Materials,” page 7; Info Please: All the Information You Need. 

http://www.infoplease.com/biography/us/congress/faddis-charles-isiah.html, “Faddis, 

Charles Isiah, 1890-1972,” (accessed 27 September 2007); Struggle, pages 75-76; 

Stockpiling Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-1 for the exact materials 

purchased by the Navy)

In the late 1930s, legislation to establish a complete national stockpile received 

consideration by Congress, like the Faddis legislation, which had endorsement of the 

War Department. However, the War Department did not believe it had jurisdiction to 

comment on those bills dealing with stockpiles for “private interests,” or not specifically 

pertaining to national defense. This gives an indication of how much interest existed 

then in establishing some sort of stockpile of strategic and critical materials—both 

private and public. The one bill most appropriate to the military services, and which had 

the endorsement of the other branches of the government known as the “Thomas Bill,” 

(Senate (S.) 4012) held the most promise of all the stockpile legislation as of 1937 (75th

Congress, First Session). Significantly, it gave the U.S. Bureau of Mines (BOM) 

responsibility for continuing studies of strategic materials, and for developing existing 

domestic reserves of materials. This pleased the procurement planners in OASW since 

BOM had rendered valuable assistance to the agency on studying strategic materials for 

some years. (Lecture Series, L39-039, “The Commodities Division,” pages 13, and page 

3 of 5 on the enclosed Discussion Appendix)

With legislative initiatives concentrating on a National Stockpile coming and 

going in Congress, the 1936 Industrial Mobilization Plan sponsored by ANMB 

recommended the formation of four hypothetical civilian-controlled super-agencies to be 

established by the President once a national emergency occurred. These four agencies 

would each manage (1) industrial production in a war scenario, (2) selective service, (3) 

public relations, and (4) the national labor force. The first and largest of these, originally 

titled the War Industries Administration, later renamed the War Resources 

Administration, would control war finance, trade, labor, and price controls. The War 

Resources Administration had powers superseding those of the War Industries Board in 

World War I, controlling everything but the selective service and public relations. 

Importantly, to the history of stockpiling, the War Resources Administration had the 

responsibility for acquiring analyzing, and controlling strategic and critical materials in a 
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war setting. Although the plan failed to consider control over the allocation of materials, 

such as steel, copper, and aluminum, this put stockpiling squarely within the context of a 

government-established agency designed for war preparation and national defense. As 

such, the 1936 Industrial Mobilization Plan served planners well as a precursor for 

establishing separate stockpiling activities, which began before the United States entered 

World War II. (Schubert, Mobilization, P 7). 

World Distribution of Raw Materials and Causes of World War II

The Great Depression helped drive the aggressive powers of Germany, Italy, and 

Japan faster in their imperialist quests to obtain what they perceived to be their rightful 

place in world affairs. Instrumental in this struggle to gain world dominance lay the 

reality that each of these nations had limited supplies of raw materials hindering them 

from gaining an advantage over the other industrialized nations of the world. In fact, 

they saw nations like Great Britain and its vast Commonwealth, rich in raw materials, 

and the United States with similar abundances of natural resources with a network of 

partnering nations, as two of the world’s obstacles preventing them from access to the 

raw materials they needed for advancement. In this analysis they happened to be 

correct. The possessions of Great Britain and the United States combined equaled about 

75 percent of the world’s essential raw materials. Scientists like Charles K. Leith 

pointed out that a primary objective for the aggressive moves made by the Nazi German 

government had to do with obtaining what it deemed ‘adequate’ raw materials. 

Naturally, what Chancellor Adolph Hitler meant by an ‘adequate’ quantity included 

those materials necessary to supply its rapidly expanding military forces in a quest for 

world dominance—proven during the years just prior to World War II. (Struggle, page 

75 for the 75 percent figure; Leith, World Minerals and World Peace, pages 2 and 4)

Having, or not having, raw materials could make or break a modern nation, but it 

takes much more than just possessing such ingredients. Nation’s needed the 

infrastructure to extract, or acquire the materials, and then they needed the abilities to 

turn these into industrial products. They also needed to have an educated and skilled 

labor force to work the factories and businesses vital to making industrialized nations 

strong. Certainly it also took a government compatible with the economic system of a 

country, such as a democratic and flexible form like that of the United States. As a 

“have” nation, America encompassed all of these ingredients and more. The United 

States could more fully reach the level of self-reliance than all of the other leading 

industrial nations of the 1930s. It contained the materials required to give its citizenry a 

comfortable and high standard of living. Unfortunately, with all of its natural 

endowments, even the United States could not be totally self-sufficient for its peacetime 

industrial needs then, and certainly not for its wartime requirements. Even then a few 

experts, like Leith, worried, as experts do now, that the United States used raw materials 

in such large quantities that someday and perhaps sooner than later, the nation would run 

out of these vital resources. Leith believed the nation should preserve much of the 

domestic resources as a last resort “reserve.” Further, he and other mineral experts 

believed the best solution for protecting these reserves lay in the use of natural resources 
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procured from other nations if they could be purchased cheaper and safely. The debate 

to protect the nation’s natural domestic reserves for the future, or to develop them for the 

immediate need, is still a continuing issue, but from World War I onward the United 

States has relied more and more upon foreign supplies of many raw materials including 

those classified as strategic and critical. This is not a new concept, and the minerals 

policies of each Presidential administration since that timeframe have wrestled with the 

perplexities of a nation dependent upon vast amounts of raw materials coupled with an

ever-larger role in world affairs. (Lecture Series, L38-016, “Strategic and Critical 

Materials,” page 3; Struggle, Pages 38-40)

By 1934, mineral experts, including Leith, suggested through a Planning 

Committee for Mineral Policy, set up by a Presidential Natural Resources Board in 1933, 

that in preparation for the possibility of another war the United States should establish 

reserves, or a stockpile of the most essential materials of manganese, chromium, 

tungsten, nickel, and tin. Others also suggested establishing reserves of these materials. 

One particular author, Brooks Emeny, concluded a study on the subject called The 

Strategy of Raw Materials, working closely with the War Department, which advocated 

establishing reserves of important materials. In fact, in 1934 the Commodities Division 

of the Planning Branch in OASW prepared a study for ANMB containing data on all 

strategic materials to determine the quantities needed if war came. This study included 

the quantities of strategic materials suggesting the building up of a reserve, or a 

stockpile, kept ready to sustain the country for a 24-month conflict once M-Day began. 

The Commodities Division had submitted this study to the War Department in January 

1934, where it remained. These initiatives never got much consideration in the 

Roosevelt administration. (Struggle, pages 74-75; Lecture Series, L34-015, “Strategic 

Commodities,” page 4) 

Conclusion of War Plans and the Beginning of Victory in World War II 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and ANMB worked harmoniously 

and continually on the requirements in Section 5a of the National Defense Act of 1920 in 

the years before World War II to prepare the military for the next war emergency. 

However, the closer World War II came, the more criticism the agencies received within 

government circles. For one, the military planners never had the budgetary means to 

fully work with a large segment of industry partners in planning a war emergency. 

Much of what they did had to be done in a vacuum and by too few planners involved. 

The planners could not work out comprehensive modern war procurement plans that 

“fit” all of the types of war contingencies of the twentieth-century magnitude. The 

Industrial Mobilization Plans of the 1930s used World War I as a model and they 

remained too rigid in this respect. This rigidity had to give way to more flexibility that 

took into account additional contemporary circumstances. Likewise, the general war 

plans that coincided with the Industrial Mobilization Plans, from the War Plans Division 

of the Chief of Staff’s General Staff (called Protective Mobilization Plans), began to fall 

to the wayside although they too proved to be an effective tool to help train war planners 

in the critical aspects necessary to fighting in the context of a single-front war like World 
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War I. These plans continued to be based on a predominantly naval conflict engaged 

with Japan. Not until the latter 1930s did this concept begin to change, whereby the 

Army would need to build up a massive ground force to fight such countries as Germany 

and Italy, in addition to the naval war with Japan. 

IV. World War II and Stockpiling

In the summer of 1941, General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, 

directed the War Planning Division of his General Staff, to produce a joint plan with the 

Navy that would show the production estimates of the services in their war needs in the 

event of total war. This became known as the Victory Plan. He gave this task to then 

LTC Albert C. Wedemeyer, who had attended the German Kriegsakademie in Berlin 

1934-1936, as an exchange student, studying mobile warfare. While in Germany, 

Wedemeyer read the various works of Maj. Gen. J. F.C. Fuller, noted British military 

strategist and authority on German strategy. Wedemeyer’s analytical approach to 

victory launched his career and helped lead the Allies to victory. He helped plan the 

Allied invasion of Normandy, which eventually led to Germany’s surrender. He became 

a general officer during the war rising to command American forces in China. After the 

war, he supported Gen. Lucius D. Clay’s plan called the Berlin Airlift, in 1948, which 

successfully supplied the people in West Berlin with food and medicines when the 

Soviet Union cut-off all supplies to that region of the city. He retired in 1951, but 

received a promotion to full general in 1954. (GEARING UP FOR VICTORY: American 

Military and Industrial Mobilization in World War II, Colloquium on Contemporary 

History, June 25, 1991, No. 5, Navy Historical Center Department of the Navy, 

Washington, D.C., 1992, 75 pages; “Computing the Requirements for War: The Logic of 

the Victory Plan of 1941,” by Maj. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, USA, US Army Center of 

Military History, hereafter referred to as Kirkpatrick; Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia, 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Coady_Wedemeyer biographical information on 

Wedemeyer (accessed 27 September 2007) 

General Marshall referred to the Victory Plan as a study of production 

requirements for national defense, and that it estimated equipment necessary for certain 

strategic assumptions. It amalgamated the political and military goals of the American 

military command structure through military attention to the manpower needs of the 

civilian war economy and in an understanding that the American economic system itself 

contained extraordinary power—in fact a considerable military weapon. The Victory 

Plan further delineated military objectives that most suited the national goals in the war. 

The so-called “Wedemeyer Victory Plan” contributed in many ways to preparing the 

country for World War II, and it showed a keen intellect that grasped the ambiguity of 

politics through policy, strategy and in practical military applicability. It reflected those 

concepts often commonly held but hard to articulate in a strategic plan produced by 

wartime military leaders. Most importantly, the Victory Plan replaced the last Protective 

Mobilization Plan of 1939. Lieutenant Colonel Wedemeyer based the plan on 

assumptions that the major war effort would be concentrated against Europe first and 
12

maximum personnel strengths would be achieved in July 1943. Thus, procurements, and 

supplies would receive calculations based on this assumption. His plan proved effective 

in dealing with an international crisis, which by all stretching of imagination had not 

existed within the earlier plans, and it dealt specifically with fighting a war not only 

overseas, but also on more than one front. Another assumption made correctly 

determined that after Pearl Harbor the focus of the war would no longer be on defensive 

measures but would concentrate predominantly on offense to defeat the enemy. 

By early 1942, ANMB became part of a newly formulated organization called 

the Services of Supply within a reorganized Army staff (however it also remained 

theoretically within the President’s grasp in his executive office). Priorities and 

allocations of strategic and critical materials had transferred from ANMB, much earlier 

when the President established the Office of Production Management (OPM) in early 

January 1941 (part of his progressive march towards establishing super-agencies). The 

OPM transitioned into the War Production Board (WPB) beginning in early 1942, the 

equivalent of the World War I War Industries Board, but approximately ten times larger. 

The Army continued to reorganize through 1941 and 1942, and one of these involved 

replacing the Office of Assistant Secretary of War with that of the Under Secretary of 

War. The Services of Supply combined the procurement activities that had served the 

Army within the Office of Assistant Secretary of War since 1921, with those of a G-4, or 

supply organization. The Services of Supply reorganization occurred under the skilled 

hands of LTG Brehon B. Somervell, who became General Marshall’s right-hand man for 

all combined procurement and supply services. Somervell’s first organization became 

the Directorate of Procurement and Distribution, but later changed to the Army Service 

Forces (March, 1943). The G-4 concept is still used in the Army structure today. 

(Kirkpatrick, pages 35-38; Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy, page 342)

The Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act of 1939 (Public Law 117, 76th

Congress) 

Although the Roosevelt administration had shown scant interest during 

the depression years for establishing a National Stockpile, some activity toward this end 

did occur in the years before World War II as mentioned earlier. In 1933, the President 

appointed the National Resources Board to study natural resources. Under this Board, 

the Planning Committee for Mineral Policy, the committee that Charles K. Leith served 

on, recommended the stockpiling of materials of a deficient nature. Armed with this 

information, the President directed the War and Navy Departments for detailed 

recommendations on stockpiling of certain materials. After 1936, the two military 

services recommended that the United States should stockpile certain materials for a war 

emergency, and that such a stockpile would be “in the best interest of the nation.” In 

1938, the executive branch and Congress once again pushed Roosevelt to establish a 

National Stockpile. The interdepartmental committee chaired by Herbert Feis, again 

urged a program that would spend $25 million for strategic and critical materials, and 

another $500,000 for domestic exploration. This could only be considered a rather 

small, or minimal, stockpile. The military and the Department of State backed a bill 
13

called the “Thomas Bill,” after Senator Elbert Thomas (D), from Utah who introduced 

the stockpiling legislation in Congress—Utah being a pro-mining state. Roosevelt 

remained reluctant to establish a stockpile. He still believed at this time, as many people 

in the United States, that somehow the country could avoid a war with the Axis Powers. 

In March 1939, Roosevelt warmed a little to the idea of a stockpile, and decided not to 

block the initiative this time if one came across his desk. (Selling Defense Materials, P 

5; Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, Part I, page I-1; Struggle, page 77)

However, even with the President’s reluctant approval for a law, it became quite 

another to get him to approve adequate funding. Instead of Feis’ recommendation of 

$25 million for the program, Roosevelt settled on a smaller sum of $10 million. To Feis 

this seemed hardly a funding beginning, but at least the President would not block a 

stockpile bill, and in politics this could be measured as a major victory for the advocates 

of a National Stockpile. (Struggle, page 77) 

As mentioned briefly before, the milestone legislation for a National Stockpile 

occurred on 7 June 1939, passed by the 76th Congress, and signed by the President called 

the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1939 (Public Law 117). The 

President never totally warmed to having a National Stockpile, but this did not stop him 

from signing the legislation. The final Act came after the culmination of various studies 

and recommendations made by the War Department, through the ANMB in 1938 and 

1939, and those from the Departments of State and the Interior along with other 

interested agencies. It truly represented a product of an interagency agreement. In part, 

the Act stated that as Congressional policy it would:

“...provide for the acquisition of stocks of certain strategic and 

critical materials of which the natural resources of the United States were 

deficient or insufficiently developed to supply the industrial, military, and 

naval needs of the country for common defense and to encourage the 

development of mines and deposits of these materials within the United 

States.” (Selling Defense Materials, May 1969, page 6 of 488) 

Significantly for the military services, ANMB became the primary proponent of 

the stockpile program in conjunction with the Department of the Interior, which played 

an instrumental and required function for enabling the legislation. Interior would 

continue its association with the National Stockpile into modern times. (Selling Defense 

Materials, pages 5-6; Struggle, P 76-78)

As a consensus piece of legislation, the Stock Piling Act of 1939 included several 

provisions acceptable to all those who had an interest in stockpiling. The basic 

provisions included the following: 

a. The determination of materials to be classified as strategic and critical

b. Determining the quality and quantity of each stockpiled material 

(necessary for Interior’s acceptance)

c. Procurement of stockpiles within funding authorized by the Act
14

d. The necessary storage, care, and handling of stockpiled materials, and the 

rotation of materials when necessary

e. The release of the stocked materials for use only when ordered by the 

President in time of war, or the threat of war (This kept the stockpile only 

for national defense uses acceptable for the military’s approval)

f. The “Buy American” Act would be applicable to purchases (this pleased 

the domestic producers).

g. Appropriations amounting to a total of $100 million for stockpiling 

purposes for the fiscal years 1940 through 1943---No limit was set on 

time these funds could be expended (this small appropriation pleased no 

one except perhaps the President)

h. Exploration and development of domestic resources by the Interior 

Department, with an authorization for the appropriation of $500,000 for 

these activities in each fiscal year 1940-1943 (Stockpile Report to the 

Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-1)

On 28 May 1941, Congress enacted Public Law 76, 77th Congress, which 

amended Section 6 of the Stock Piling Act of 1939. This became necessary after 

Congress realized that money from releases did not revert back into the stockpile. So, 

the amendment established within the Department of Treasury a revolving fund to retain 

money from disposal of all materials coming out of the National Stockpile. (Stockpile 

Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-1)

The Stock Piling Act gave ANMB authorization, with the approval of the 

Secretaries of War, Navy, and Interior, to decide which materials should receive 

strategic and critical status, and to establish qualities and quantities of the materials to be 

purchased by the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department. Further, 

designation of representatives from the State, Treasury, and Commerce Departments 

cooperated with the Secretaries of War, Navy, and the Secretary of the Interior in 

determining the materials to be purchased. The Secretary of the Treasury had 

responsible for not only purchasing the materials, but for their storage and maintenance. 

When necessary the Treasury ensured preventive measures to keep the materials from 

deteriorating by using a rotation system. This meant that materials showing signs of 

deterioration could be sold and fresh new materials could replace the old by using 

purchase contracts. Only through this “obsolescence” clause could materials be sold 

without going through Congress for approval. Of course the legislation contained 

authority that by order of the President of the United States in time of war (a national 

emergency), or the possibility of a threat of war, materials could be released. (Selling 

Defense Materials, page 488; (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page 

I-1)

Congress authorized the amount of $100 million for stockpile materials from the

fiscal year beginning on 1 July 1939 to the fiscal year ending on 30 June 1943. 

However, after the appropriations committees acted, taking direction from Roosevelt, the 

program only received the $10 million Roosevelt had agreed to originally. This came by 

way of Public Law 361-76th Congress, on 9 August 1939. Acting quickly, ANMB 
15

allocated these funds by 22 August 1939, buying eight different materials. On 11 

August 1939, Congressed enacted the law allowing the Commodity Credit Corporation 

(CCC) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, to exchange surplus agricultural goods 

from the United States for those strategic and critical materials coming from foreign 

markets. Under this agreement Great Britain exchanged rubber for agricultural products, 

but this law did not pertain to the National Stock Piling Act of 1939 at that time (it 

would later be used for national stockpile purposes). After the Nazi German army had 

marched against Scandinavia and France in June 1940, Roosevelt allowed additional 

funding for the stockpile program. On 25 March 1940, through Public Law 442-76th

Congress, the program received an additional $3 million, which ANMB used on 9 April 

1940 to purchase more quantities of three of the above eight materials (the three are not 

known). In the next fiscal year, Congress approved $9.5 million and another $47.5 

million through Public Law 667-76th Congress, on 26 June 1940. ANMB also quickly 

used this funding on 28 June 1940 to purchase five additional amounts of the original 

eight materials, and to purchase three new materials. By 10 October 1943, the stockpile 

held thirteen materials, and Congress had appropriated a total of $70 million for the 

program. By this time, ANMB had directed the Procurement Division of the Treasury to 

purchase the following materials: cadmium, chrome ore, industrial diamonds, 

manganese ore, manila fiber known as abaca, mercury, mica (muscovite block and 

splittings), monazite sand, optical glass, quartz crystals, quinine (hydro bromide and 

sulfate), pig tin, and tungsten ore. (Selling Defense Materials, pages 6-7; Struggle, page 

78; Stockpile Report to the Congress, 1946, Part II, page II-1; and Stockpile Report to 

the Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-2)

The other $30 million authorized for stockpile purchases never came to the 

stockpile because Roosevelt began to use funding for purchasing strategic materials 

through various other agencies with escalation of the World War II efforts. Presumably, 

the ANMB did not feel inclined to request the amount at that time. During World War 

II, by order of the President six of the above materials received release notices worth a 

total of $8,845,792.00. Materials included: cadmium, manila fiber, muscovite block 

mica, optical glass, quartz crystals, and quinine sulfate. (Selling Defense Materials, 

pages 6-7; Struggle, page 78; Stockpile Report to the Congress, 1946, Part II, page II-1)

Stockpiling and War Production Activities during World War II 

With the declaration of war on 8 December 1941, the national stockpile program

became somewhat ignored, and through a consensual agreement with the war agencies 

established by this time, contract purchases remained at the previously mentioned levels 

including funding. The war needs far surpassed what the National Stockpile had been

set up to handle, and activities of purchasing strategic and critical materials passed to 

such super-agencies as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which had 

originally been formed in 1932 (in the Hoover administration), and additionally to the

War Production Board (WPB) formed in 1942. Before declaration of the war, Public 

Law 664-76th Congress, enacted on 2 June 1940, gave RFC tremendous powers and 

authority to produce, acquire, and transport strategic and critical materials in place of 

ANMB. This gave the President the power to create, through subsidiary corporations to 
16

the RFC, the Rubber Reserve Company and the Metals Reserve Company, established 

on 28 June 1940, for such purposes. Consecutively, on 22 and 29 August 1940, the RFC 

created the Defense Plant Corporation and the Defense Supplies Corporation assisting 

with the production of war supplies made from the large purchases of strategic and 

critical raw materials authorized in the legislation. RFC’s subsidiary corporations 

made the large purchases of strategic and critical materials that transferred to superagencies established by executive orders that handled the vast industrial mobilization 

efforts. These included the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board (SPAB), which 

Roosevelt established after NDAC, and the Office of Production Management (OPM), 

which replaced SPAB. In this progression as mentioned previously, Roosevelt replaced 

the OPM with the War Production Board (WPB), which handled most of the World War 

II defense production responsibilities that turned America into what Roosevelt had 

dubbed “the Arsenal of Democracy.” The WPB had a division for every conceivable 

supply and product necessary for war production. This agency handled all war 

production activities similar to the War Industries Board during World War I, but as 

mentioned before, on a much larger scale. In fact, the Director of the WPB, Mr. Donald 

Nelson is the person stating that swamped the WIB by ten times over. Nelson used 

Bernard M. Baruch as an adviser on many occasions for working out many of the 

difficulties associated with managing America’s vast economic war effort during World 

War II. (Arsenal of Democracy, page 342; Stockpile Report the Congress, 1946, page II2; EH.Net Encyclopedia: 

http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/butkiewicz.finance.corp.reconstruction, 

“Reconstruction Finance Corporation,” James Butkiewicz, (accessed 27 September 

2007) 

When allocation problems arose concerning what industries should receive 

strategic and critical materials, Nelson first set up a “horizontal” system that allowed raw 

materials to pass from a government agency directly to contractors and subcontractors. 

However, the system, known as the Production Requirements Plan (PRP), did not fully 

solve the gigantic problems associated with controlling the powerful American industry, 

as a whole, for war production. In 1942, this led to a new system that measured more 

accurately the demand against supply, and set up better allocation and priority controls 

for the smoother flow of raw materials into the necessary industries. The solution came 

after the head of the Office of Economic Stabilization, the Honorable James Byrne 

(Roosevelt’s confidante), and the Secretaries of Army and Navy agreed with Nelson to 

adopt a system designed by the Executive Director of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, 

Ferdinand Eberstandt. Called the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP), Eberstandt’s 

brainchild used a vertical approach in controlling the materials. Nelson brought 

Eberstandt into WPB in order to specifically manage the CMP controls of raw materials 

and to smooth out production difficulties through administration of the program. 

Eberstandt had a tremendous depth of experience at handling military munitions 

programs, and through meetings with Nelson he began to realize that civilian 

requirements also needed a set of priorities right along with military requirements. The 

CMP developed a balance between the two within industry. This outstanding 

development successfully worked out most of the supply, allocation, and priority system 

bottlenecks that had caused much frustration among industrialists and the military 
17

customers alike, and WPB used it throughout the remainder of the war. The CMP made 

a direct and positive contribution to managing the strategic and critical raw materials of 

the nation that ultimately helped bring a swifter end to the war. The CMP helped the 

United States to pull out of the gigantic slump beginning to affect war production in the 

early part of 1942, when the Axis Powers seemed to be winning the war. According to 

Nelson, the Allies came dangerously close to losing the war in this early stage of World 

War II although much of this information did not surface fully for public consumption. 

In this respect, WPB and the CMP benefited from the experiences of the War Industries 

Board and by having Bernard M. Baruch ever ready to lend a hand as an advisor during 

the war. (Arsenal of Democracy, Pages 342 and 364 and others; (GEARING UP FOR 

VICTORY: American Military and Industrial Mobilization in World War II, Colloquium 

on Contemporary History, June 25, 1991, No. 5, Navy Historical Center Department of 

the Navy, Washington, D.C., 1992, 75 pages; “Fighting on Our Own Ground: The War 

of Production, 1920-1942, by Dr. Thomas C. Hone, Pages 1-17; Morgan, The Domestic 

Mining Industry of the US in WW II, page 230) 

Although the CMP worked out the allocation crisis brewing in the middle of 

World War II over strategic and critical materials, there still remained shortages of these 

materials for many industries. The limited supplies of raw materials never caused a total 

shortage of end products during the war, even though in the case of rubber, and some 

other end products, modifications took place to keep the shortages at bay through the use 

of synthetic substitutes. In 1940, through urging of the Advisory Commission of the 

Council of National Defense (NDAC), the government began looking at building 

synthetic rubber plants. The Japanese had captured the Asian countries, which provided 

practically all of the rubber used in the United States. Through quick research and 

development procedures, synthetic rubber substitutes became available early on in the

war. Thus, as a direct result of the war, a new industry became available to America 

enlarged upon in the postwar years. In fact, 98 percent of tires in the United States relied 

on synthetics in 1946. (Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on 

Armed Services, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session. Stockpiling of 

Strategic and Critical Materials; National Defense University, Lecture Series L48-40, 

Raw Materials (Ores, Semi-Processed “B” Products), LTC Manfred Hass, 20 

November 1947, page 2; Arsenal of Democracy, Page 290 and 295)

During World War II, industrial problems surfaced more as a direct result of 

poor estimations of the required raw materials essential to industry in making the end 

products than attributed to outright shortages of materials. Additionally, problems arose 

in the intermediary levels associated with production estimates in the planning stages 

caused, in part, by military planners who never received peacetime training in various 

areas such as forge capacity and gear-cutting capacities necessary in plants that made 

gears for transmissions used in heavy trucks, and in axles used by these same trucks. In 

industry, difficulties arose in understanding that this lack of training by military planners 

even existed, and this miscommunication resulted in shortage issues. In their normal 

peacetime practices industrial personnel could easily order gears and other such 

necessities from other firms. Unfortunately, they learned that with wartime controls, no 

such option existed as an alternative. (Lecture Series L48-40, “Raw Materials (Ores, 
18

Semi-Processed “B” Products),”; 

(http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ATO/Admin/WarProgram/WarProgram-2.html page 2 

of 8, accessed 27 September 2007; The United States at War: Development and 

Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government, Chapter II, “Preparing 

for Defense”)

The years 1940-1945 saw the largest increase in industrial and military 

procurements made by the United States in the history of the world. Strategic and 

critical materials came into this country from all areas of the world and in every 

conceivable domestic mining industry in the country. Procurement of materials, war 

munitions, equipment, factories, manpower, and military installations progressed beyond 

anyone’s imagination in the build-up years of 1942 and 1943. Prior to the war, in 1939, 

President Roosevelt called for increasing the number and the types of new aircraft the 

Army and Navy would need to improve and modernize the military services. All told, 

the United States produced 5,865 aircraft in 1939, the largest single production year to 

that time. In 1940, Roosevelt again called for increases not only in aircraft, but all 

military equipages such as tanks and ships. When he announced the need to produce 

50,000 aircraft annually, not many people in the government, or in the country believed 

such numbers even possible. Certainly, the Axis Powers did not think a democracy 

could produce at such levels. Yet, between 1 January 1940 and 14 August 1945, the 

American workers produced 303,317 military aircraft. Even at that astounding number, 

the United States aircraft industry never reached its full potential in reference to quality 

or quantity, because the war ended the need for further production. During the war 

production of strategic and critical materials increased dramatically, especially in the 

three most essential of materials; steel, aluminum, and copper. In fact, the production of 

strategic and critical materials increased by 60 percent. (Arsenal of Democracy, page 

354-355; HyperWar: Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, 

Department of State Bulletin, vol. II, p. 529, “Address Delivered by President Roosevelt 

to the Congress, May 16, 1940,” http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Dip/PaW/156.html; 

pages 527-532, (accessed 27 September 2007)

In 1941, because of the problems associated with gaining accurate estimates, 

steel became severely short and threatened the production of ships. To solve this 

problem, the government ordered dramatic increases in the production of “plate” steel 

within existing steel facilities that had previously produced sheet steel for automobiles. 

With new equipment immediately installed for manufacturing of plate steel, the 

production levels increased to 1,200,000 tons annually. Otherwise, the country had to 

rely on newly built factories for plate production and these did not get finished until 

1943 and 1944. Using plate steel helped ease the problem, but only after WPB acquired 

the services of Hiland G. Batcheller, the President of Allegheny Ludlum Steel 

Corporation, as the so-called “steel czar,” who got a handle on the steel problem and its 

control. (Arsenal of Democracy, Page 355-356)

In regard to aluminum, expansion of private facilities through government aid 

increased production, along with the government building its own plants. Plants in 

Canada increased annual capacities also. This brought the total annual production up 
19

from 327 million pounds in 1939, to a whapping 2,250,000,000 pounds by October of 

1943. (Arsenal of Democracy, page 353-354)

The last of the three most critical of strategic materials, copper, presented a more 

difficult situation than steel or aluminum. The government searched every foreign 

source available and also increased domestic production. Much came from Mexico and 

Chile, but the price came high. Nelson and his associates set up a premium price plan 

that included an incentive for producers if they exceeded production quotas. The 

government even opened up, through finances, new mines, and helped expand existing 

mines, but there remained a constant problem of never enough copper. All told, 270 

mines operated domestically, but they only produced 1.5 percent of the copper needed 

for the war effort. The rest came from substituting, scrap, and from foreign sources. As 

a result, silver became a huge substitute for copper. At that time silver had no real 

strategic use as a war material. By using it as a substitution silver became a strategic 

material with value in war production. (Arsenal of Democracy, page 354-355)

According to Nelson, no other industry in America did more to help the war 

effort than the automobile manufacturers. In early 1942, the “big” three companies of 

Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler Corporation, if combined together, amounted to the 

third largest industry in the United States. They held over 1,000 factories between them 

with 850 vehicle and parts companies. They controlled literally thousands of 

subcontractors located across the country in 1,375 cities and 44 states. The car 

companies had a half-million employees, producing products from many of the raw 

materials classified as strategic and critical. In particular they used some of the most 

essential materials to the war effort including steel, aluminum, copper, chrome, and 

rubber. 

However, the most important aspects of the car industries lay in their 

sophisticated assembly-line processes and standardization unequalled anywhere else on 

earth. When the last civilian automobile rolled off the assembly line in February 1942, 

during the war, WPB managed to get the services of all the manufacturers to convert 

from peacetime production to using their vast expertise in making war goods. Nelson 

praised their competitive spirit, which carried over from peacetime competition, and 

each company’s army of technicians redirected this energy into ways to out produce the 

others through developing new techniques and equipment that sped up the mass 

production of all types of war goods. They set a high example of results in turning 

strategic and critical materials into these war products. (Arsenal of Democracy, pages

212-213)

V. Origins of New Stockpile Legislation

How the United States dealt with shortages of strategic and critical materials 

during World War II contributed to the ever-growing belief that maintaining a National 

Stockpile at the end of the war remained a necessary step towards securing America’s 

peace in the postwar years. Congress held hearings on these issues that eventually 

resulted in legislation that successfully determined how America’s economy and 
20

industry should be shaped after lifting war-related economic controls. Industrialists, and 

men like Bernard M. Baruch, feared that surpluses, such as after World War I, would be 

vastly devastating to the post-World War II return to a peacetime economy. So, 

Congress held debates and commissioned reports centered on what to do with such 

surpluses. Should there be a permanent governmental instrumentality to control these 

surpluses? Should the United States assist its war-torn allies, and the economies of the 

defeated Axis Powers by providing surplus property to help them back onto their feet? 

If the United States did this, would there be sufficient surpluses of raw materials for the 

American economy to transition from defense production to those industries providing 

housing, and jobs for the thousands of American military personnel returning to the 

civilian sector? While Congress debated these and many other issues relating to the 

postwar transition, the idea of continuing a stockpiling program remained strong. The 

questions that arose from 1943 to the end of the war had to do with who would run the 

stockpile, how would it get materials, what would it contain, and how much of each 

strategic and critical material did the nation need for adequate national defense. 

Congress Debates Surplus Property and New Stockpile Legislation

Even as early as 1943, the United States Congress began debating the 

circumstances surrounding the successful conclusion of World War II. However, the 

largest problem they saw ahead had to do with downsizing the gigantic war economy. 

The economy then stood at $194 billion worth of goods and services being produced per 

year, with a GNP of $98 billion. This amounted to doubling the GNP since the year 

1940. In regard to personnel then serving in the military they believed the numbers 

would peak at 11.3 million men and women, and most of these would need jobs after the 

war along with the eight million civilian workers then employed—with women making 

up a large segment. Congress estimated that half of America’s economy related 

specifically to war production, and if so, when the war terminated, how would industry 

handle the influx of military personnel all with the same desire to return to civilian 

employment, or if already a civilian employee, where would their next jobs be 

generated? Congress had its hands full. (Source: Senate subcommittee Report No. 2, 

Report of the War Contracts Subcommittee to the Committee on Military Affairs, 

Pursuant to S. Res. 198: “A Resolution to Investigate War Contracts the Termination of 

War Contracts and Related Problems,” March 1944, pages 14-15 (GPO, 1944, 17 pages; 

Biographical Directory of the U.S. Senate: 

http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000196 , “Scrugham, James 

G.” (accessed 27 September 2007). 

With this as a backdrop, Congress debated and passed a War Surplus Act in 

1944, (Public Law 457-78th Congress). This legislation had a profound affect upon 

stockpiling in the United States. For instance, Section 22 of the Act provided for the 

transfer of government owned surpluses of strategic and critical materials to those 

already procured under the first stockpiling Act, Public Law 117, still held by the 

Procurement Division of the Treasury Department. Thus, Congress fixed the means by 

which surpluses would be transferred to the nation’s stockpile under Public Law 117 to 

help it grow. By doing this Congress gave recognition, and set a precedent, that 
21

materials acquired by Public Law 117 would be the nucleus of the post-World War II 

stockpiling activities. The War Surplus Act gave industry protection from one of their 

greatest postwar fears that too much of everything would be dumped onto the economy 

just as after World War I. The War Surplus Act had a provision that protected the 

minerals industries against such sudden dumping, and this strengthened the outlook of 

these industries after the war. While this helped gain industry support, another provision 

gave industry a priority over the stockpile program in the purchasing of materials, which 

might be in short supply after the war. In this manner, the reconversion program assured 

the economy would get first priority of materials over the stockpiling program. This 

provision led to the stockpile program coming up short on many of its materials listed as 

strategic and critical in the postwar years. Instead of huge surpluses of materials after 

the war, as industry experts feared, a shortage of many materials actually occurred, in

addition to a critical shortage of transportation for these materials. The stockpile 

program had to wait until materials became available in excess of the needs of the 

American economy. (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-1)

New Stockpiling Legislation for the Postwar Period

Debates began during World War II concerning a possible revision of the Stock 

Piling Act of 1939. This entailed about a two-year period when legislative initiatives 

received consideration from all of the players in the stockpile program with vested 

interests. This period began around the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military 

services informed the War Production Board in a letter dated 17 September 1943, that 

they wished to maintain a stockpile of strategic and critical materials upon the 

conclusion of the war. In their judgment, this stockpile would prohibit future 

embarrassment like the country had just gone through in the early years of the war of 

having far too many shortages. They further advised WPB to inform American industry 

that a stockpile would be for reserving materials for “future national emergencies only.” 

Donald Nelson who still remained in charge of WPB, also agreed with the concept of a 

National Stockpile. The military services went even further by having MG Lucius D. 

Clay (later a full general), then serving as the Director of Requirements for the Army 

Service Forces, report to Congress that the Army and the Navy, both wanted an 

established stockpile of strategic and critical materials after the war. Some of what Clay 

wanted came in passage of the Surplus Property Act in 1944. (Morgan, Domestic 

Mining, pages 368-369)

The military had concluded that a postwar National Stockpile at least for military 

resources would be extremely important. In their somewhat limited viewpoint, the 

military never envisioned a stockpile also available for civilian industry, and this became 

a much debated political point in establishment of the eventual stockpile program. The 

Armed Forces believed that a reserve of essential materials established well in advance 

of a future war would remove much of the dependence of the industrial community upon 

the domestic mining producers. The reason a stockpile had been needed in the first 

place in their view, resulted from the United States not having the necessary materials 

for military war requirements; coming from foreign sources. The military experts 

argued that a National Stockpile should contain only those materials needed by the 
22

military to achieve military requirements. They believed that for the stockpile to be 

anything else, such as one used for civilian purposes, or for aid programs in the future 

would require a separately legislated governmental program. (Snyder, page 9)

The physical form in which the materials would be stored also could save 

manpower, transportation, smelting services, and refining expenditures. Consequently, 

some mineral experts advocated even after the war that storage of metal bars offered a 

more efficient material to be stockpiled over the cheaper and less processed stockpiling 

of ores. The bars would have a small mass volume, but also have a high-value quality 

that could immediately be put to use and thereby minimize the requirements on such 

cost-induced activities like smelting, refining, and transportation. Shipping in World 

War I and World War II had become critical for importing the minerals not produced by 

the domestic mining industry. Thus, to reduce the transportation vulnerabilities and to 

guarantee supplies of materials not available in North America, experts in and out of the 

military then believed that a “pre-war stockpile” (meaning before the next war) met the 

minimum needs in providing a remedy for any possible lack of transportation. The 

stockpile would provide an investment with monetary value as it grew in peace time, and 

would have immense value in the next war by saving time, smelting, refining, and 

transportation vulnerabilities just to name a few of the advantages. (Morgan, Domestic 

Mining, page 412)

Others cautioned against overproducing supplies in the postwar years that could 

not be contained in a stockpile that would send the economy spiraling downward. The 

champion of this philosophy remained the ubiquitous Bernard M. Baruch and an 

associate John M. Hancock, who had been charged to write a report on War and PostWar Adjustment for James F. Byrnes, the Director of the Office of War Mobilization. 

Baruch and Hancock believed in controlling the economy as the first priority for the 

government. Their report came during a prematurely optimistic period (as it turned out) 

prior to the Battle of the Bulge (December 1944-January 1945). Many believed the war 

would soon be over in Europe with what appeared to be an imminent collapse of 

Germany, and the United States had to be ready with a postwar economy plan while 

simultaneously finishing the war with Japan. The Battle of the Bulge halted the 

premature optimism of an end of the war in Europe, and it also instigated another 

production increase in war goods. The war in Europe lasted another five months after 

the Battle of the Bulge. 

However, in their report, Baruch and Hancock figured that many of the returning 

military personnel needing jobs could be absorbed by such measures as women leaving 

the workforce, older men retiring, and others returning to educational institutions. In 

regard to the stockpile, they believed that shortsighted people would push for unneeded 

overproduction in order to ‘borrow’ employment for the immediate short-term need to 

reemploy returning veterans. This overproduction would lead to possible unemployment 

in the future, and hang over the postwar market, leading to the depression of future 

production, and unemployment and lower than break-even prices. Too much of a 

surplus, they believed, would only lead to stockpile troubles in the future. Still, they did 

believe in a “strategic reserve,” just not a large one. This stockpile would be made up of 
23

materials not easily procured in this country for use in future wars. Since the price of 

materials at the time of their report remained excessive because of the war, they 

recommended waiting before buying large stocks of material until the prices fell. This 

would allow for reserves, albeit small, but which would be a safety net for the future, 

and they felt that deferring purchases to later years would be beneficial in stimulating 

international trade at a more appropriate and advantageous time. (Baruch and Hancock, 

War and Postwar Adjustment, pages 2-3, 20, 73) 

Questions concerning the postwar stockpile remained to be resolved as to what 

agency, or agencies would be responsible for stockpile operations. The military services 

expected to maintain possession of the stockpile since the ANMB had continued to be 

responsible for those materials purchased by the Treasury Department and maintained in 

military depots throughout the war. The agency continued to do so even after the RFC 

took over the majority of buying strategic and critical materials for the war effort. After 

passage of the Act of June 1940, giving RFC broad powers of financial authority for the 

war effort, RFC and the ANMB agreed that RFC would be responsible for the huge war 

procurement activities, and ANMB would continue operating the much smaller stockpile 

program and activities associated with Public Law 117-76th Congress. As a result, the 

military services never requested the remaining $30 million authorized by Congress for 

stockpile purchases, but which had not been appropriated for the Stock Piling Act of 

1939. (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-2; Snyder, pages 8-9 

on control) 

The Department of the Interior also wanted the stockpile operations, as did a few 

other agencies. From the very beginning, the Department of Interior had contributed 

significantly in the development of original legislation, and particularly through its 

Bureau of Mines (BOM) and the Geological Survey, which kept data collection on all of 

the strategic and critical materials, including source data and domestic development 

information. The Bureau of Mines had worked interchangeably with ANMB even 

before the Stock Piling Act of 1939, which allowed for the closeness of the stockpile 

program within the Department of the Interior. The Interior, through its mandates as a 

federal agency, had partnered with the mining industries of the country and its decisions 

often favored the interests of the domestic mining industry. Through trade associations, 

the mining industry had considerable lobbying interests in Washington. The Department 

of State also had a vested interest in stockpiling and so did the Department of Commerce 

to a lesser degree. The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion also claimed 

responsibility for the stockpile since in its view the program should be controlled by a 

civilian agency associated with war mobilization activities. All the interested agencies 

voiced their intentions about stockpile policy best suited to their respective agencies. 

(Snyder, page 2-4 and 8-9; For a definitive understanding of the struggle over control of 

the stockpile program during this period, read Snyder’s Chapter One, “The Stockpiling 

Act of 1946”)

Revision of the Stock Piling Act of 1939, Public Law 117-76th Congress
24

Early in 1945 identical bills came before the House of Representatives and the 

Senate regarding a new stockpile program. On 15 March 1945, the House introduced 

H.R. 2624, and the next day the Senate introduced S. 752. Afterwards, respective 

Committees of Military Affairs received the bills for discussion. The Senate Committee 

on Military Affairs sent S. 752 to other government agencies for comments and 

suggestions. When this happened, the Bureau of Budget sent its own stockpiling bill to 

the Senate, S. 1481 that had differences from S. 752 and H.R. 2624. Apparently, the 

Bureau of Budget’s bill contained changes wanted by the Harry S. Truman’s new 

Presidential administration (Vice President Truman became president upon Roosevelt’s 

untimely death in early 1945). Each bill introduced in the Legislature would only revise 

the existing Stock Piling Act of 1939, not create a whole new concept. Of particular 

note, each of these proposals would replace the Secretaries of War, Navy, and the 

Interior as the primary controllers of the stockpile as administered through the ANMB. 

Instead they envisioned using a Stockpile Board for administrative control of the 

program. On 30 October 1945, Congress held a hearing on both S. 752 and S. 1481 by 

the Subcommittee on Surplus Property of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. 

This resulted in further deliberations on 29 November 1945, to further revise S. 752, 

producing a compromise bill between S. 752 and S. 1481. This compromise passed the 

Senate on 20 December 1945, and then headed to the House of Representatives the next 

day, where it received consideration from the House Committee on Military Affairs. 

Hearings lasted through February 1946, and on 4 April 1946 the House reported the bill 

with an amendment. This amendment represented a completely rewritten bill. The 

House amendment put the control of the stockpile back into the hands of the original 

agencies responsible in the first Stock Piling Act of 1939. The House then passed the 

revision without any further changes. However, the Senate did not accept the amended 

House version, and referred the bill to another Committee of Conference, which then 

revised this version of the bill. In June 1946, both Houses took up consideration of this 

version of the bill. This bill retained the control approved by the House’s rewritten 

version, but gave up some aspects of fiscal arrangements. The House of Representatives 

rejected the bill because of the fiscal arrangements put in by the Senate Bill, which had 

to do with nonpayment of duty on foreign materials placed in the stockpile. So, a second 

Conference Report on 3 July 1946 dropped the Senate proposal to eliminate the dutyfree provision. Finally, both Houses passed this legislation on 9 July 1946. On 23 July 

1946, this final form of S. 752, the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 

1946, became Public Law 520-79th Congress, when President Truman signed it. 

(Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-3)

In the end, the Armed Forces won out due to their popularity being at an all-time 

high after winning the war, and too, because of the precedence set prior to the war with 

ANMB managing the original stockpiling act. Many believed the natural place for a 

stockpile of strategic and critical materials fit more correctly within the military 

establishment, but others believed that because the stockpile also handled civilian 

industrial defense materials, the military would be too restrictive and narrow in its 

management. The latter predicted correctly in the end. Still, similarly to the original 

Act, ANMB would work with the Department of Interior equally with the Secretaries of 

War and Navy in administration and policy decisions regarding what would be 
25

stockpiled, the quantities to be stockpile, and in setting the qualities of materials in the 

stockpile. Also, along with the Department of Agriculture, Interior had research and 

development responsibilities that helped find new sources of domestic materials and in 

development of substitutes and synthetics. Still, the military considered it a great victory

to remain in control of the stockpile. (Selling Defense Materials, pages 9) (Snyder, page 

10)

World War II Stockpiling Activities Prior to Public Law 520-79th Congress

While the debates continued within Congress on a new stockpile program, the 

existing stockpile program continued in operation—it did not go away during World 

War II. Even though the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and other war agencies 

did most of the bulk buying of raw materials for the war effort, ANMB continued to 

manage the stockpiles purchased prior to 1943, and between the Purchase Branch of the 

Procurement Division of Treasury, the Interior, and other such agencies, ANMB fulfilled 

its obligations under the 1939 Act throughout the war period. In fact, much good work 

came out of the activities during this period prior to the new stockpiling legislation 

passed in 1946. Through the ANMB, and with the advice and assistance of the above 

agencies delineated within the Stock Piling Act of 1939, a post-World War II stockpiling 

program began to take shape in the latter part of 1943. Within this group the ANMB 

also included the War Production Board (later called the Civilian Production 

Administration (CPA) after the war) and the Department of Agriculture. The ANMB 

reconstituted a former mechanism it had used called the Strategic Materials Committee 

for this interagency planning organization. The Committee first tackled the specific 

definitions of what strategic and critical materials meant in relation to the times (always 

a nebulous activity). With ANMB approval the Strategic Materials Committee adopted 

the following definitions: 

“Strategic and critical materials are those materials required for 

essential uses in a war emergency, the procurement of which in adequate 

quantities, quality and time is sufficiently uncertain for any reason to 

require prior provision for the supply thereof.”

Further, in defining necessary materials, the Strategic Materials Committee 

placed the emphasis on the term “prior provision,” and recognized that the act of 

physically stockpiling actually constituted but one of several possible meanings to assure 

an ample supply of strategic and critical materials in the context of an emergency. This 

led to further classifications of strategic and critical materials into an additional three-tier 

corollary definition:

Group “A” comprised those strategic and critical materials for which stockpiling 

remained the only satisfactory means of insuring an adequate supply for a future 

emergency.

Group “B” comprised additional strategic and critical materials to which 

stockpiling remained practicable. The Army and Navy Munitions Board recommended 
26

their acquisition only to the extent they might be made available for transfer from 

government agencies because adequacy of supply could be insured whether by 

stimulation of existing North American production or by partial or complete use of 

available substitutes.

Group “C” comprised those strategic and critical materials, which ANMB did 

not then recommend for permanent stockpiling because in each case difficulties of 

storage remained sufficient to outweigh the advantages to be gained by stockpiling. 

Along with a few minor definitions of what constituted additional materials these 

definitions stood only for a short time when, again, the definitions changed slightly on 

20 November 1944. The ANMB included the revision in its report to Congress 

submitted on 2 January 1945, as part of the requirements of Section 22 of the Surplus 

Property Act of 1944. The framers of these categories cautioned against them remaining 

static with new developments constantly improving substitutes, and conservation 

measures. Plus, the war emergency at hand also made a profound affect upon what 

constituted a strategic and critical material. As a result, this list of definitions did not 

remain constant. (Brief History of Defense Materials Service (DMS P 3200.1 CHGE 1, 

24 February 1970, page 1 (for Purchase Branch input); Stockpile Report to the Congress, 

23 January 1947, Page II 3-4)

Along with the listed definitions and the lists of materials, ANMB included what 

constituted the minimum quantities of Group “A,” as of 31 December 1946, with the 

admonitions that the agency had based the minimum quantities on the best possible 

“assumptions” made by the military, which should be purchased and maintained “to 

provide for the security of the United States in event of a future war emergency.” They 

further warned Congress that failure to maintain these minimum assumptions could 

endanger the national security as a result of shortages that could arise within a relevantly 

short timeframe if a major war broke out. The ANMB called for higher quantities of 

materials than just those recommended as minimum objectives, of course within 

practicable limits (probably based on the policy formulating in Congress then of 

allowing industry a priority in buying materials in the reconversion period). (Stockpile 

Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page A-1)

No transfers of surplus materials came to the stockpile until after 1 January 1946, 

but long before this, stockpilers made plans for such transfers when and if they became 

available. They worked on several other measures that included estimates for 

transferring of materials, general plans for storage, and the important work of preparing 

material specifications. ANMB employed numerous military officers and civilian 

employees who had technical expertise and industrial backgrounds specific to raw 

materials. Additionally, the Departments of Interior and Agriculture rendered invaluable 

assistance. With these experts, compromises of different viewpoints between the 

government and the consumer industry representatives affectively worked out material 

specifications. (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page II-4) 
27

In the months just prior to passage of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock 

Piling Act of 1946, ANMB employees worked on acquisition plans for surplus materials 

as authorized by the Surplus Property Act of 1944, Section 22. As of 31 December 

1945, there still remained an amount of $24.1 million of the initial $70 million 

appropriation for the original Stock Piling Act of 1939. Prior to this on 5 November 

1945, The Army and Navy made a request proposal to the Secretary of the Treasury to 

spend $22,370,000 of the remaining funding on thirteen additional strategic and critical 

materials for the stockpile. However, because of the instability of the market at that 

time, no commitments could be made. This did not stop the ANMB from making further 

proposals. On 1 April 1946, they approved a request by the Strategic Materials 

Committee to establish under it a Subcommittee to Study Current Supplies and Industrial 

Requirements of Strategic Materials, chaired by the Civilian Production Administration 

(succeeding WPB). The subcommittee included members from the Departments of the 

Interior, State, Commerce, and Agriculture. They also included representatives of the 

RFC. Based on findings of this subcommittee, ANMB cancelled the 5 November 1945 

request for thirteen materials, and on 17 June 1946, presented another proposal with 

sixteen materials listed, nine of which had never been placed in the stockpile program. 

The ANMB expected delivery in Fiscal Year 1947, and before 31 December 1946, but 

only if purchasing of the materials did not interfere with the economic needs of the 

country. (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page III-1)

In regard to funding and transfers from the Surplus Property Act of 1944, AMNB 

prepared and then revised estimates of each of the strategic and critical materials that 

would be available to the stockpile under the Surplus Act. This took place only after the 

conclusion of World War II, officially referred to as “V-J Day” when Japan became the 

last of the Axis Powers to surrender. (Victory in Japan, 15 August 1945, but President 

Truman declared 2 September 1945 V-J Day since on that date Japan formally signed 

the surrender terms on the USS Missouri; some still celebrate 14 August 1945 as V-J 

Day since that is the date Americans heard of the surrender because of the time zone 

difference with Japan). Funding for these transfers could not come from the funds left 

over from the original Stock Piling Act of 1939. So, the Procurement Division of the 

Treasury Department calculated the funding necessary to make the transfers and the 

necessary costs associated with converting the materials (processing and beneficiation) 

in these other agencies into the forms most desirable for the new stockpiling program. 

They submitted this budget request to the Bureau of Budget, which amounted to $90 

million. In turn, the Bureau of Budget negotiated with the Reconstruction Finance 

Corporation, who owned the majority of transferable materials in its Metal Reserve 

Corporation. Through this arrangement the RFC budgeted for expenses associated with 

the conversion of these materials for the National Stockpile. This further brought down 

the budget estimate submitted by the Procurement Division to $19 million. The Bureau 

of Budget sent this budget to the Congress with an attached request for the funds still 

available under the original Stock Piling Act of 1939 to be carried forward for handling 

purposes of the surplus property. In addition, the request also included a stipulation to 

use the remaining sum from the original law, dwindling to about $22 million by this 

time, for the purposes of purchasing materials as intended in the Act of 1939. 

Unfortunately for the stockpile program, Congress had stipulated in the Reconstruction 
28

Finance Corporation Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1947 that RFC could not 

perform work on behalf of another agency without being reimbursed. This came late in 

the fiscal year, April 1946, and as a result, it brought most of the RFC transfers to a halt. 

Some transfers did occur as a result of the urgent necessity of moving materials from 

their original location and in an effort to save the government from paying double 

handling expenditures while being offloaded at points of entry from foreign sources. 

(Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 July 1947, page I-4; Stockpile Report to the 

Congress, 23 January 1947, page III-3; Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia: 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-J_Day , “Victory Over Japan,” (accessed 27 September 

2007)

The Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946 (Public Law 

520-79th Congress)

The new Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946 (SCM) 

continued to use the Department of Treasury’s Procurement Division, Purchase Branch 

for purchasing the necessary materials and to provide storage, security, maintenance, 

refining and processing if necessary, and rotation of obsolete, or deteriorating materials. 

The division also had disposal authority for those ‘obsolescent’ or deteriorating 

materials. However, the Procurement Division only acted upon the direction of the 

Secretaries of War and Navy concerning these issues. (Selling Defense Materials, pages 

8-9)

The new SCM contained a clause “so far as practicable,” which became in later 

years a point of contention in regard to purchases made of materials which came from 

supplies in excess of the current industrial needs of the country. Requirements contained 

in the new stockpile legislation forbid the purchase of materials needed by industry in 

the reconversion period. This came as a precautionary so the American economy could 

get a jump-start through quick industrial development with having a priority on the 

surplus materials left over from the war. The stipulation also caused the stockpile to 

limit the intake of certain materials, and certain established quantities of other materials 

predetermined by the ANMB to be strategic and critical. (Selling Defense Materials,

page 9; Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House 

of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2d Session, “Stockpiling of Strategic and Critical 

Materials,” GPO, Washington: 1950, pages 7471-7691, page 7574, mentions activities 

associated with the Bureau of Mines research and development data)

Then too, the Congress required the new Stockpile Act to abide by the 1933 

“Buy American Act,” which meant that materials must come from domestic sources by 

preference with one exception—Stockpilers could disregard the stipulation in the Buy

American legislation that purchases must be advertised first. Still the stipulation to buy 

American first became extremely controversial. It resulted from the American Mining 

lobbying interests, and it caused President Truman to make a public statement against 

the mandate when he signed the stockpile legislation into law (See complete text in sidebar of Truman statement). The President and the military services believed that the 
29

requirement to abide by the Buy American Act circumvented the original purpose of 

establishing a National Stockpile—to have on-hand those materials which could not be 

acquired domestically in large enough amounts to be used in a national emergency. 

They further believed that domestic materials should remain available as a “reserve” 

outside of the stockpile program. Parts of the Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act of 

1946 seemed counter to this objective to the President, and that to abide by the Buy 

American Act would impede the enlargement of the stockpile in the long run of those 

supplies of essential materials so badly needed from foreign sources expected to be 

housed on American soil in time of a national emergency. (Selling Defense Materials,

page 9; Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House 

of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2d Session, “Stockpiling of Strategic and Critical 

Materials,” GPO, Washington: 1950, pages 7471-7691, page; Snyder, page 77)

SIDE BAR: Statement by the President Upon Signing the Strategic and 

Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, July 23, 1946

I HAVE TODAY signed the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act 

because it is important to the national interest that this Government have the 

power to acquire stockpiles.

It is only because of the overriding importance of this purpose that I am 

able to overcome my reluctance to signing a bill which reaffirms the application to 

stockpile purchases of the provisions of Title III of the Act of March 3, 1933 (47 

Stat. 1520), known as the Buy American Act. Those provisions will not only 

materially increase the cost of the proposed stockpiles but will tend to defeat the 

conservation and strategic objectives of the bill by further depleting our already 

inadequate underground reserves of strategic materials. Furthermore, there can be 

a serious conflict between those provisions and the foreign economic policy which 

this Government is actively pursuing. It also seems to me that the application of the 

Buy American Act may frequently hamper the effective achievement of the essential 

purpose of the legislation which is to enlarge the stock of vital raw materials 

available within our borders in time of possible emergency.

The Buy American Act requires that only articles produced or 

manufactured from materials originating in the United States shall be purchased 

for public use. However, the Act also provides that exceptions to this rule may be 

made when Buy American purchases are determined "to be inconsistent with the 

public interest or the cost to be unreasonable." This provision clearly indicates 

that the stockpiling program should not be used as a means of generally 

subsidizing those domestic producers who otherwise could not compete 

successfully with other domestic or foreign producers. Furthermore, to ensure that 

the necessary stockpiles are accumulated as rapidly as deemed advisable and with 

a minimum cost to the public, this Act should not be used as a device to give 

domestic interests an advantage over foreign producers of strategic materials 

greater than that provided by the tariff laws.
30

It is the policy of this Government to work for international action to 

reduce trade barriers. We have proposed to other countries a set of principles 

governing trade, and look forward to the successful conclusion of broad 

international arrangements embodying the essential principles of these proposals. 

Pending the conclusion of such arrangements, it is the policy of this Government to 

avoid taking measures that will raise barriers to trade or prejudice the objectives 

of the forthcoming discussions. We are asking other countries to follow similar 

policies.

The United States is opposed to governmental policies fostering autarchy, for itself 

as well as for others. Encouragement of uneconomic domestic production and 

unjustified preferential treatment of domestic producers destroys trade and so 

undermines our national economic strength. A large volume of soundly based 

international trade is essential if we are to achieve prosperity in the United States, 

build a durable structure of world economy and attain our goal of world peace and 

security. 

(Harry S. Truman Library and Museum: Public Papers of the President No. 

174: “Statement by the President Upon Signing the Strategic and Critical Materials 

Stockpiling Act,” 23 July 1947:

http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=1671, accessed 27 

September 2007)

Disposals of materials through the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling 

Act (SCM) had to receive Congressional approval except for those materials considered 

obsolescent. Obsolescent materials have throughout the history of the stockpile included 

those that lose value through deterioration, or those that have lost their value as strategic 

and critical materials because other and better materials became replacements. The Act 

required that disposed materials be advertised as such in the Federal Register six months 

prior to any disposal sales, but only after Congress had received notification of the 

disposal, through the Military Affairs Committees of each Congressional House. In the 

disposal report, Stockpile administrators had to give the reasons for the materials 

disposal, or release, and a detailed plan of the disposition including the expected date the 

materials would become available for disposition. In order to protect producers, 

processors, and the consumers against possible market disruptions, the predetermined 

date set in the report for the disposal remained unchanged. (DMS Selling Defense 

Materials, pages 10) 

Those materials falling outside of the obsolescence and rotation (disposal) arena, 

as described above, could only be released by two methods: 1) by order of the President 

if he determined that the release justified the purpose of common defense, and 2) during 

a time of war or a national emergency so proclaimed by the President. An agency 

designated by the President for such authority could also issue the release order, but with 

the understanding that it would be for national defense purposes only. (Selling Defense 

Materials, pages 10)

The Act also stipulated that transfers of materials from other government 

agencies could take place if required by the stockpile in order to fill stockpile objectives 
31

set for those materials, but with the qualifier that only after the need by industry had 

been fulfilled and directed by the Civilian Production Administration (CPA). Those 

agencies wishing to transfer materials could not charge for the transaction, or expect 

reimbursement. (Selling Defense Materials, pages 11)

As stated earlier, scientific, technical, and economic research of materials that 

might become part of the National Stockpile became the responsibilities of the 

Departments of the Interior and Agriculture. Also especially helpful, funding 

appropriated for stockpile purposes could be made available with no time limit attached. 

However, the Treasury Department’s general fund received the other money generated 

by disposals, with the exception of money derived from rotation of materials. With 

some modifications through the years, these general policies continued to govern the 

stockpile, particularly relating to disposals and releases through the late 1960s. 

However, organizationally, the stockpile saw many changes over the years, which began 

soon after the enactment of the law. (Selling Defense Materials, page 11)

Soon, Congress held hearings on the funding issue in relation to the original 

Stock Piling Act of 1939 (Public Law 117), the new Stock Piling Act of 1946, and the 

Surplus Property Act as requested by the Bureau of Budget. This led to a new law 

stipulating how the funds remaining from Public Law 117 had to be used—designated as 

Public Law 521-79th Congress. Funds could only be used for the transfers and 

maintenance of surplus materials only. Any leftover funding from these activities had to 

be returned to the General Treasury. No new funding for Public Law 520, SCM, would 

be made available for use towards purchases of materials until Congress acted again for 

this specific purpose. (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-5; 

Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1949, page 37)

The Procurement Division of the Department of Treasury acted quickly after 

Congress enacted Public Law 520 for the explicit purpose of obtaining funding for the 

new stockpile. The Bureau of Budget received this request in the amount of $270 

million, and of course, this amount precluded any amount necessary for meeting the 

handling expenditures covered in Public Law 521 for surplus property. The budget for 

SCM became a joint effort between the Departments of War and Navy, which covered 

purchases and expenditures for establishment of the new stockpile program beginning in 

Fiscal Year 1947, and extending into early 1948, depending upon commitments made 

contractually in FY 47. Once received, the Bureau of Budget cut the Procurement 

Division’s request to $250 million. Congress further cut the amount to $100 million by 

a joint resolution, and President Truman signed the legislation on 8 August 1946 (Public 

Law 663-79th Congress). (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, page I-5; 

Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1949, page 37)

Conclusion

The process of stockpiling materials dates back many thousands of years. In the United 

States the need for industrial stockpiling emerged from the impact of industrialization 

and the lessons learned beginning in World War I. This led to the classification of 
32

specific materials as strategic and critical to sustain the United States for national 

defense purposes. Organizations developed during the interwar years to make these 

classifications and to maintain a growing bank of information surrounding vital 

materials. The idea of establishing a National Stockpile originated during these years, 

which led to establishment of the Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act of 1939 (Public 

Law 117-76th Congress, 7 June 1939). The approaching possibility of going to war with 

the Axis Powers significantly impacted President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to 

sign the Stock Piling Act into law. World War II greatly shifted the balance of 

maintaining a National Stockpile, and for the duration of the war strategic and critical 

materials procurements came under control of the various super-agencies ran by civilians 

appointed by the President. The war years through 1946 saw a tremendous upheaval in 

the United States. The world marveled at the industrial might of the United States as it 

came on line practically at full strength by 1943, truly becoming the “arsenal of 

democracy,” so labeled by Roosevelt. Those raw materials coming from all parts of the 

earth to build the weaponry and equipment needed to swing the pendulum of World War 

II victory into the hands of the Allies took the forms and shapes of guns, aircraft, tanks, 

ships, clothing, and thousands of other related items. Not only guns, but also the United 

States philosophically speaking, produced the “butter” that fed the multitudes of citizens 

and soldiers alike all across the world. With victory in Europe and then in Japan, the 

war effort had to swing back into a reconversion mode of peacetime economics. 

Through the efforts of many citizens, the world once again marveled at the flexibility of 

the economic mechanization that soon returned the United States to “normalcy” in the 

postwar years. For the first time, the leaders of the country, and in no small part, the 

citizens of the country did not return to the isolationist sentiment that had prevailed after 

World War I. This time, America helped establish institutions that would, ideally, lead 

the country and the world into better relations. The idea prevailed to make the United 

States safer through a more unified national defense structure. Within this apparatus, 

came the revised Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act of 1946, composed of 

materials mostly from foreign sources of supply. In fact, the stockpile defined “foreign 

origin” materials as those mined or grown outside of the United States, which often 

became processed in the United States following importation and delivery to the 

stockpile. Materials mined, or grown, in the United States received the designation 

“domestic origin.” By stockpiling these rare but necessary materials the United States 

became better prepared for the next war in the years ahead. And after World War II very 

few people naively believed in the World War I concept of a war to end all wars, 

although the atomic bomb would add a whole new frightening dimension to this theory. 

So, the National Stockpile began to grow as the economy of the country rebuilt into a 

stronger, more powerful world force than ever before. The standard of living in America 

continued to grow as the nation grew in strength and in posture in its new world position. 

No other country could match the industrial capability of the United States at the end of 
33

World War II, but there continued to be those powers with intentions of gaining world 

dominance if possible. The new stockpile organization faced this reality in the postwar 

years. (Stockpile Report to the Congress, 23 January 1947, Part II, page II-2

APPENDIX ONE

STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS STOCK PILING ACT

(50 U.S.C. 98 et seq.)

As Amended by the National Defense Authorization Act

For Fiscal Years 1988-1989

(The First Year After Transferring to the Defense Logistic Agency)

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the “Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling 

Act.”

FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

SECTION 2. (a) The Congress finds that the natural resources of the United States in 

certain strategic and critical materials are deficient or insufficiently developed to supply 

the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the Untied States for national 

defense. 

(b) It is the purpose of this Act to provide for the acquisition and retention of stocks of 

certain strategic and critical materials and to encourage the conservation and 

development of sources of such materials within the United States and thereby to 

decrease and to preclude, when possible, a dangerous and costly dependence by the 

United States upon foreign sources for supplies of such materials in times of national 

emergency. 

(c) In providing for the National Defense Stockpile under this Act, congress establishes 

the following principles:

(1) The purpose of the National Defense Stockpile is to serve the interest of 

national defense only. The National Defense Stockpile is not to be used for 

economic or budgetary purposes.

(2) The quantities of materials to be stockpiled under this Act should be 

sufficient to sustain the United States for a period of not less than three years 

during a national emergency situation that would necessitate total 

mobilization of the economy of the United States for a sustained conventional 

global war of indefinite duration.

MATERIALS TO BE ACQUIRED: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND 

GUIDELINES

SECTION 3. (a) Subject to subsection (c), the President shall determine from time to 

time,(1) which materials are strategic and critical materials for the purposes of this Act, 

and (2) the quality and quantity of each such material to be acquired for the purposes of 
34

this Act and the form in which each such material shall be acquired and stored. Such 

materials when acquired, together with the other materials described in section 4 of this 

Act, shall constitute and be collectively known as the National Defense Stockpile 

(hereinafter in this Act referred to as the “stockpile.”)

(b) The President shall make the determinations required to be made under subsection 

(a) on the basis of the principles states in section 2(c). 

(c) (1) The quantity of any material to be stockpiled under this Act, as in effect on 

September 30, 1987, may be changed only as provided in this subsection or as otherwise 

provided by law enacted after the date of enactment of the National Defense Stockpile 

Amendments of 1987.

(2) If the President proposes to change the quantity of any material to be stockpiled 

under this Act, the President shall include a full explanation and justification for the 

change in the next annual material plan submitted to the Congress under section 11(b).

(3) If the proposed change in the case of any material would result in a new requirement 

for the quantity of such material different from the requirement for that material in effect 

on September 30, 1987, by less than 10 percent, the change may be made by the 

President effective on or after the first day of the first fiscal year beginning after the 

explanation and justification for the proposed change is submitted pursuant to paragraph 

(2).

(4) In the case of a proposed change not covered by paragraph (3), the proposed change 

may be made only to the extent expressly authorized by law.

(5) If in any year the reports required by sections 11(b) and 14 are not submitted to 

Congress as required by law (including the time for such submission), then during the 

next fiscal year no change under paragraph (3) may be made in the quantity of any 

material to be stockpiled under this Act.

MATERIALS CONSTITUTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE

SECTION 4. (a) The stockpile consists of the following materials:

(1) Materials acquired under this Act and contained in the national stockpile on 

July 29, 1979

(2) Materials acquired under this Act after July 29, 1979

(3) Materials in the supplemental stockpile established by section 104(b) of the 

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (as in effect 

from September 21, 1959, through December 31, 1966) on July 29, 1979.

(4) Materials acquired by the United States under the provisions of section 303 

of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S. C. App. 2093) and 

transferred to the stockpile by the President pursuant to subsection (f) of such 

section.
35

(5) Materials transferred to the United States under section 663 of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2423) that have been determined to be 

strategic and critical materials for the purposes of this Act and that are 

allocated by the President under subsection (b) of such section for stockpiling 

in the stockpile. 

(6) Materials acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation and transferred to 

the stockpile under section 4(h) of the Commodity Credit Corporation 

Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714b(h)).

(7) Materials acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation under paragraph 

(2) of section 103(a) of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for greater 

stability in agriculture; to augment the marketing and disposal of agricultural 

products; and for other purposes,” approved August 28, 1954 (7 U.S. C. 

1743(a)), and transferred to the stockpile under the third sentence of such 

section.

(8) Materials transferred to the stockpile by the President under paragraph (4) of 

section 103(a) of such Act of August 28, 1954.

(9) Materials transferred to the stockpile under subsection (b).

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any material that (1) is under the 

control of any department or agency of the United States, (2) is determined by the head 

of such department or agency to be excess to its needs and responsibilities, and (3) is 

required for the stockpile shall be transferred to the stockpile. Any such transfer shall be 

made without reimbursement to such department or agency, but all costs required to 

effect such transfer shall be paid or reimbursed from funds appropriated to carry out this 

Act.

AUTHORITY FOR STOCKPILE OPERATIONS

SECTION 5. (a) (1) Except for acquisitions made under the authority of paragraph (3) or 

(4) of section 6(a), no funds may be obligated or appropriated for acquisition of any 

material under this Act unless funds for such acquisition have been authorized by law. 

Funds appropriated for such acquisition (and for transportation and other incidental 

expenses related to such acquisition) shall remain available until expended, unless 

otherwise provided in appropriation Acts.

(2) If for any fiscal year the President proposes certain stockpile transactions in the 

annual materials plan submitted to Congress for that year under section 11(b) and after 

that plan is submitted the President proposes (or Congress requires) a significant change 

in any such transaction, or a significant transaction not included in such plan, no amount 

may be obligated or expended for such transaction during such year until the President 

has submitted a full statement of the proposed transaction to the appropriate committees 

of Congress and a period of 30 days has passed from the date of the receipt of such 

statement by such committees. In computing any 30-day period for the purpose of the 

preceding sentence, there shall be excluded any day on which either House of Congress 

is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain.
36

(b) Except for disposals made under the authority of paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of 

section 6(a) or under section 7(a), no disposal may be made from the stockpile (1) unless 

such disposal, including the quantity of the material to be disposed of, has been 

specifically authorized by law, or (2) if the disposal would result in there being an 

unobligated balance in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund in excess of 

$100,000,000. 

(c) There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to 

provide for the transportation, processing, refining, storage, security, maintenance, 

rotation, and disposal of materials contained in or acquired by the stockpile. Funds 

appropriated for such purposes for which appropriated for a period of two fiscal years, if 

so provided in appropriation Acts.

STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT

SECTION 6. (a) The President shall—

(1) acquire the materials determined under section 3(a) to be strategic and critical 

materials;

(2) provide for the proper storage, security, and maintenance of materials in the 

stockpile;

(3) provide for the refining or processing of any material in the stockpile when necessary 

to convert such material into a form more suitable for storage and subsequent 

dispositions;

(4) provide for the rotation of any material in the stockpile when necessary to prevent 

deterioration of such material by replacement of such material with an equivalent 

quantity of substantially the same material;

(5) subject to the notification required by subsection (d)(2), provide for the timely 

disposal of materials in the stockpile that (A) are excess to stockpile requirements, and 

(B) may cause a loss to the Government if allowed to deteriorate; and 

(6) subject to the provisions of section 5(b), dispose of materials in the stockpile the 

disposal of which is specifically authorized by law.

(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), acquisitions of strategic and critical 

materials under this Act shall be made in accordance with established Federal 

procurement practices, and, except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) and in section 

7(a), disposal of materials from the stockpile shall be made by formal advertising or 

competitive negotiation procedures. To the maximum extent feasible—

(1) Competitive procedures shall be used in the acquisition and disposal of such 

materials;
37

(2) efforts shall be made in the acquisition and disposal of such materials to 

avoid undue disruption of the usual markets of producers, processors, and consumers of 

such materials and to protect the United States against avoidable loss; and 

(3) disposal of such materials shall be made for domestic consumption.

(c) (1) The President shall encourage the use of barter in the acquisition of strategic and 

critical materials for, and the disposal of materials from, the stockpile when acquisition 

or disposal by barter is authorized by law and is practical and in the best interest of the 

United States.

(c)(2) Materials in the stockpile, the disposition of which is authorized by law, shall be 

available for transfer at fair market value as payment for expenses (including 

transportation and other incidental expenses) of acquisition of materials, or of refining, 

processing, or rotating materials, under this Act.

(c)(3) To the extent otherwise authorized by law, property owned by the United States 

may be bartered for material needed for the stockpile.

(d)(1) The President may waive the applicability of any provision of the first sentence of 

subsection (b) to any acquisition of material for, or disposal of material from, the 

stockpile. Whenever the President waives any such provision with respect to any such 

acquisition or disposal, or whenever the President determines that the application of 

paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of such subsection to a particular acquisition or disposal is not 

feasible, the President shall notify the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 

House of Representatives in writing of the proposed acquisition or disposal at least thirty 

days before any obligation of the United States is incurred in connection with such 

acquisition or disposal and shall include in such notification the reasons for not 

complying with any provision of such subsection.

(d)(2) Materials in the stockpile may be disposed of under subsection (a)(5) only if the 

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives are notified 

in writing of the proposed disposal at least thirty days before any obligation of the 

United States is incurred in connection with such disposal.

(e) The President may acquire leasehold interests in property, for periods not in excess of 

twenty years, for storage, security, and maintenance of materials in the stockpile.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE MANAGER

SECTION 6A. (a) The President shall designate a single Federal office to have 

responsibility for performing the functions of the President under this Act, other than 

under sections 7, 8, and 13. The office designated shall be one to which appointment is 

made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) The individual holding the office designated by the President under 

subsection (a) shall be known for purposes of his functions under this Act as the 

“National Defense Stockpile Manager.”
38

(c) The President may delegate functions of the President under this Act (other 

than under section 7, 8, and 13) only to the National Defense Stockpile Manager. Any 

such delegation made by the President shall remain in effect until specifically revoked 

by law or Executive order.

(d) During any period during which there is no officer appointed by the 

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, serving in the position 

designated by the President under subsection (a) or during which the authority of the 

President under this Act (other than under sections 7, 8, and 13) has not been delegated 

to that position, no action may be taken under section 6(b) or 6(d).

SPECIAL DISPOSAL AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT

SECTION 7. (a) Materials in the stockpile may be released for use, sale, or other 

disposition—

(1) on the order of the President, at any time the President determines the release 

of such materials is required for purposes of the national defense; and 

(2)in time of war declared by the Congress or during a national emergency, on 

the order of any officer or employee of the United States designated by the President to 

have authority to issue disposal orders under this subsection, if such officer or employee 

determines that the release of such materials is required for purposes of the national 

defense.

(b) Any order issued under subsection (a) shall be promptly reported by the President, or 

by the officer or employee issuing such order, in writing, to the Committees on Armed 

Services of the Senate and House of Representatives.

MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH

SECTION 8. (a) (1) The President shall make scientific, technologic, and economic 

investigations concerning the development, mining, preparation, treatment, and 

utilization of ores and other mineral substances that (A) are found in the United States, 

or in its territories or possessions, (B) are essential to the national defense, industrial, and 

essential civilian needs of the United States, and (C) are found in known domestic 

sources in inadequate quantities or grades.

(2) Such investigations shall be carried out in order to—

(A) determine and develop new domestic sources of supply of such ores 

and mineral substances;

(B) devise new methods for the treatment and utilization of lower grade 

reserves of such ores and mineral substances; and

(C) develop substitutes for such essential ores and mineral products.

(3) Investigations under paragraph (1) may be carried out on public lands and, 

with the consent of the owner, on privately owned lands for the purpose of exploring and 

determining the extent and quality of deposits of such minerals, the most suitable 

methods of mining and beneficiating such minerals, and the cost at which the minerals or 

metals may be produced.
39

(b) The President shall make scientific, technologic, and economic investigations 

of the feasibility of developing domestic sources of supplies of any agricultural material 

or for using agricultural commodities for the manufacture of any material determined 

pursuant to section 3(a) of this Act to be a strategic and critical material or substitutes 

therefore.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE TRANSACTION FUND

SECTION 9. (a) There is established in the Treasury of the United States a separate fund 

to be known as the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund (hereinafter in this 

section referred to as the “fund”).

(b)(1) All moneys received from the sale of materials in the stockpile under 

paragraphs (5) and (6) of section 6(a) shall be covered into the fund.

(2) Subject to section 5(a)(1), moneys covered into the fund under paragraph (1) 

are hereby made available (subject to such limitations as may be provided in 

appropriations Acts) for the following purposes:

(A) The acquisition of strategic and critical materials under section 

6(a)(1).

(B) Transportation, storage, and other incidental expenses related to such 

acquisition.

(C) Development of current specifications of stockpile materials and the 

upgrading of existing stockpile materials to meet current specifications 

(including transportation, when economical, related to such upgrading).

(D) Testing and quality studies of stockpile materials

(E) Studying future material and mobilization requirements for the 

stockpile.

(3) Moneys in the fund shall remain available until expended.

(c) All moneys received from the sale of materials being rotated under the 

provisions of section 6(a)(4) or disposed of under section 7(a) shall be covered 

into the fund and shall be available only for the acquisition of replacement 

materials.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES

SECTION 10. (a) The President may appoint advisory committees composed of 

individuals with expertise relating to materials in the stockpile or with expertise in 

stockpile management to advise the President with respect to the acquisition, 

transportation, processing, refining, storage, security, maintenance, rotation, and disposal 

of such materials under this Act.

(b) Each member of an advisory committee established under subsection (a) while 

serving on the business of the advisory committee away from such member’s home or 

regular place of business shall be allowed travel expenses, including perdiem in lieu of 

subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United States Code, for persons 

intermittently employed in the Government service.
40

REPORTS TO CONGRESS

SECTION 11. (a) The President shall submit to the Congress every six months a written 

report detailing operations under this Act. Each such report shall include—

(1) information with respect to foreign and domestic purchases of materials 

during the preceding 6-month period;

(2) information with respect to the acquisition and disposal of materials under 

this Act by barter, as provided for in section 6(c) of this Act, during such period;

(3) a statement and explanation of the financial status of the National Defense 

Stockpile Transaction Fund and the anticipated appropriations to be made from the fund 

during the next fiscal year; and 

(4) such other pertinent information on the administration of this Act as will 

enable the Congress to evaluate the effectiveness of the program provided for under this 

Act and to determine the need for additional legislation.

(b) Not later than February 15 of each year, the President shall submit to the appropriate 

committees of the Congress a report containing an annual materials plan for the 

operation of the stockpile during such fiscal year and the succeeding four fiscal years. 

Each such report shall include details of planned expenditures for acquisition of strategic 

and critical materials during such period (including expenditures to be made from 

appropriations from the general fund of the Treasury) and of anticipated receipts from 

proposed disposals of stockpile materials during such period.

DEFINITIONS

SECTION 12. For the purposes of this Act:

(1) The term “strategic and critical materials” means materials that (A) would be 

needed to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs of the United States 

during a national emergency, and (B) are not found or produced in the United States in 

sufficient quantities to meet such need.

(2) The term “national emergency” means a general declaration of emergency 

with respect to the national defense made by the President or by the Congress.

IMPORTATION OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS

SECTION 13. The President may not prohibit or regulate the importation into the United 

States of any material determined to be strategic and critical pursuant to the provisions 

of this Act, if such material is the product of any foreign country or area not listed as a 

Communist-dominated country or area in general headnote 3(d) of the Tariff Schedules 

of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202), for so long as the importation into the United 

States of material of that kind which is the product of such Communist-dominated 

countries or areas is not prohibited by any provision of law.

ANNUAL REPORT ON STOCKPILE REQUIREMENTS
41

SECTION 14. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress an annual report on 

stockpile requirements. Each such report shall be submitted with the annual report 

submitted under section 11(b) and shall include—

(b) Each report under this section shall set forth the national emergency planning 

assumptions used in determining the stockpile requirements recommended by the 

Secretary, based upon total mobilization of the economy of the United States for a 

sustained conventional global war for a period of not less than three years. Assumptions 

to be set forth include assumptions relating to each of the following: 

(1) Length and intensity of the assumed emergency.

(2) The military force structure to be mobilized.

(3) Losses from enemy action.

(4) Military, industrial, and essential civilian requirements to support the national 

emergency

(5) Budget authority necessary to meet the requirements of total mobilization for 

the military, industrial, and essential civilian sectors.

(6) The availability of supplies of strategic and critical materials from foreign 

sources, taking into consideration possible shipping losses.

(7) Domestic production of strategic and critical materials

(8) Civilian austerity measures.

(c) The President shall submit with each report under this section a statement of the 

plans for the President for meeting the recommendations of the Secretary set forth in the 

report.

United States Code Citations
42

Section 2—50 U.S.C. 98a

Section 3—50 U.S.C. 98b

Section 4—50 U.S.C. 98c

Section 5—50 U.S.C. 98d

Section 6—50 U.S.C. 98c

Section 6A—50 U.S.C. 98e-1

Section 7—50 U.S.C. 98f

Section 8—50 U.S.C. 98g

Section 9—50 U.S.C. 98h

Section 10—50 U.S.C. 98h-1

Section 11—50 U.S.C. 98h-2

Section 12—50 U.S.C. 98h-3

Section 13—50 U.S.C. 98h-4

Section 14—50 U.S.C. 98h-5

(Stockpile Report to Congress, Oct-1987-March 1988, pages 25-32)