*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
CHRISTINA INGRAM v. BRIAN J. INGRAM

(AC 44392)

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Lavine, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

granting the plaintiff’s motion for modification of custody, seeking to

relocate with the parties’ minor child to Poughkeepsie, New York. Held

that the trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for modification of custody: contrary to the defendant’s contention that the trial

court ignored the parties’ informal agreement for alternating weekly

parenting time with the child for the seven to eight months leading up

to the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion, that court heard extensive

testimony from both parties as to that schedule, which the parties had

in place during the unique circumstances of the child’s remote learning

during the COVID-19 pandemic, and, now that in-person schooling had

resumed, neither party sought a continuation of that schedule, the court’s

previous ex parte order recognized that alternating weekly parenting

schedule, and the court’s statement that it was in the child’s best interests

to maintain the continuity of living with his mother and his brother

found support in the record as it reasonably could be construed as a

reference to the parties’ former parenting time schedule; moreover, the

court’s finding that the plaintiff had a more active role in the child’s life

was not clearly erroneous, as there was evidence in the record to support

that finding, including the plaintiff’s testimony that she primarily cared

for the child from his birth and throughout his childhood, and the

defendant’s testimony that he had, at times, missed the child’s doctor’s

appointments and parent-teacher conferences due to his work schedule;

furthermore, the defendant did not point to any evidence to support his

argument that the court prejudged the motion on the basis that the

plaintiff already had moved to Poughkeepsie, and, to the contrary, the

court applied the criteria set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b-56d)

to the evidence presented at the hearing in reaching its determination,

and there was sufficient evidence presented for the court’s consideration

of the educational component listed in § 46b-56d (b), as the plaintiff

provided testimony as to the educational plan for the child following

relocation.

Argued February 2—officially released March 29, 2022

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury, where the court, Eschuk, J., rendered

judgment dissolving the marriage and granted certain

other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation

agreement; thereafter, the court, Truglia, J., granted

the plaintiff’s postjudgment motion for modification of

custody, and the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Matthew D. Popilowski, for the appellant (defendant).

Lita M. Ward, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Brian J. Ingram, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court granting the postdissolution motion filed by the plaintiff, Christina Ingram,

for modification of custody, seeking to relocate the

parties’ minor child to Poughkeepsie, New York. On

appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in

granting the plaintiff’s motion. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s appeal. The parties were married

in 2012 and have one minor child together, who was

born in 2013. In 2017, the plaintiff commenced a dissolution action against the defendant. On December 19,

2017, the court, Eschuk, J., rendered a judgment of

dissolution, which incorporated a November 14, 2017

separation agreement executed by the parties (agreement). Both parties were self-represented at the time

of the dissolution. The agreement provided that the

parties would share joint legal custody of their child

and that the child’s primary residence would be with

the plaintiff. The plaintiff also lives with her older son,

who was sixteen years old at the time of the hearing

on the motion for modification, and the two children

have a close relationship. At the time of the dissolution,

the plaintiff relocated to Brookfield, and the defendant

lived in Bethel. The agreement also provided ‘‘[a]s to

visitation’’: ‘‘[s]hared visitation and will be mutually

agreed upon if any changes need to be made due to work

schedule change. Currently: with Mom Monday–Thurs,

with Dad Thurs evening until Sun.’’ The agreement provided that pick up and drop off would be ‘‘shared 50/

50,’’ and that the holiday and school vacation schedule

would be an ‘‘[a]lternating schedule.’’ The agreement

is silent as to possible relocation by either party.

On February 13, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for

modification in which she represented that she was

engaged, was moving to Poughkeepsie, and wished to

change the child’s school district.1 She requested that

the court order parenting time as follows: ‘‘Sun night–

Friday with mother. Fri eve–Sun night with father. Alternate weekends with parents.’’2 The court scheduled a

hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for March 23, 2020,

but the hearing did not proceed because of the public

health emergency declaration regarding the COVID-19

pandemic. In April, 2020, the plaintiff began living with

her fiance ́ in his home in Poughkeepsie.

After learning of the plaintiff’s move, the defendant

filed, on August 13, 2020, an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody, in which he sought

temporary custody of the child on the basis that the

plaintiff had moved to Poughkeepsie and the parties

did not have a ‘‘clear plan . . . for the start of the

school year . . . .’’ On the same day, he filed a motion
for modification of custody, in which he requested primary physical custody of the child and appropriate visitation with the plaintiff.

On August 27, 2020, the court, Truglia, J., entered

orders with respect to the defendant’s application for

emergency ex parte order of custody. The court ordered

the parties to register the child in school ‘‘in the Bethel

Public School District for the 2020-2021 school year,

and until further order of the court.’’ The court further

ordered: ‘‘If the Bethel Public School District is utilizing

all-remote instruction, then the parties will continue

the alternating weekly parenting schedule in effect

since the start of remote learning. If the school district

utilizes a partial in-person instruction model, or a hybrid

model consisting of some in-person and some remote

learning on back-to-back week days, the parties will

continue the alternating weekly schedule. If the school

district only offers a staggered weekly schedule, then

the defendant will provide the child with his primary

residence during the week and the plaintiff will have the

child from Friday afternoon through Monday morning.’’

On October 5, 2020, the court held a hearing on both

parties’ motions for modification. Both parties testified,

along with the plaintiff’s fiance ́ and the defendant’s

father. On October 7, 2020, the court issued an order

granting the plaintiff’s motion for modification, in which

it made the following findings of fact. The plaintiff currently is employed as an emergency room technician

at Danbury Hospital and takes undergraduate courses

toward a degree in nursing. Although she previously

had a fixed work schedule, she now has a more flexible

schedule. In December, 2019, the plaintiff became

engaged to Michael Mancari, a professional firefighter

employed by the city of Poughkeepsie. Because of his

employment, he is required to live in or near Poughkeepsie.3 Mancari owns a home, where the plaintiff lives,

and the two had planned to marry on October 10, 2020.

The defendant works full-time, beginning his shift at 4

a.m., at Costco in Norwalk. The defendant had lived in

his father’s house in Bethel since the dissolution but

recently had purchased a home in Bethel, where he

planned to live with his girlfriend.

In deciding the plaintiff’s motion, the court first set

forth General Statutes § 46b-56d, governing postjudgment relocation, which provides: ‘‘(a) In any proceeding

before the Superior Court arising after the entry of a

judgment awarding custody of a minor child and involving the relocation of either parent with the child, where

such relocation would have a significant impact on an

existing parenting plan, the relocating parent shall bear

the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the relocation is for a legitimate purpose,

(2) the proposed location is reasonable in light of such

purpose, and (3) the relocation is in the best interests

of the child.
‘‘(b) In determining whether to approve the relocation

of the child under subsection (a) of this section, the

court shall consider, but such consideration shall not

be limited to: (1) Each parent’s reasons for seeking or

opposing the relocation; (2) the quality of the relationships between the child and each parent; (3) the impact

of the relocation on the quantity and the quality of the

child’s future contact with the nonrelocating parent; (4)

the degree to which the relocating parent’s and the

child’s life may be enhanced economically, emotionally

and educationally by the relocation; and (5) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating parent and the child through suitable visitation

arrangements.’’

The court found that the plaintiff’s relocation was

for a legitimate purpose and that the proposed location

was reasonable, on the basis that she is getting married

and her future husband is required to live in the town

in which he works. The court stated that there was ‘‘no

basis in the evidence for [it] to find that the plaintiff’s

decision to remarry and move an hour away was

intended to limit the defendant’s parenting time with

his son or damage the relationship in some way.’’ The

court found that both parties ‘‘always had their son’s

best interests at heart and continue to do so,’’ and ‘‘overall, that the child’s life will be enhanced by the move.’’

The court further found that the plaintiff ‘‘has been

the child’s primary caregiver for most of his life. The

court does not by this statement imply that the defendant has not been actively involved in the child’s life

at every step. The evidence indicates that the defendant

has been as caring, loving and devoted to the child as

the plaintiff. However, the court finds that the plaintiff

has had a more active role than the defendant. The

court also finds that it is in the child’s best interest[s]

to maintain the continuity of living with his mother,

[brother], and pets, as much as possible. The strong

relationship between the child and his father can be

preserved and possibly strengthened, by giving the

father additional weekend quality time with the child.’’

The court ordered that the parties retain joint legal

custody of the child, with joint decision-making authority for all major decisions. The court issued the following orders: ‘‘Commencing November 1, 2020, the plaintiff will provide the child with his primary residence.

The child will reside with the plaintiff each week from

Monday through Friday. The child will attend school

in the Arlington School District for the 2020-2021 school

year and thereafter, until further order of the court.

The defendant will have parenting time with the child

three weekends per month, starting Fridays after school

until Sunday afternoon at 6:00 p.m. (or Monday afternoon at 6:00 [p.m.] if Monday is a legal holiday and

there is no school). Each parent will be responsible for

picking the child up at the start of his or her parenting
time. The parties will continue to alternate or share

holidays, birthdays, school vacations, and other special

occasions as before. Each party will have four uninterrupted weeks of vacation each summer, two of which

will be consecutive.’’4

The defendant thereafter filed motions: to reargue;

for the appointment of a guardian ad litem; for referral

to family relations; to open, set aside, or vacate the

judgment; and for stay. The plaintiff filed an objection

to the defendant’s motion to open, set aside, or vacate

the judgment. After oral argument on November 4, 2020,

the court denied the defendant’s motions. This appeal

followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred

in granting the plaintiff’s motion for modification and

permitting her to relocate to Poughkeepsie. ‘‘Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision regarding . . .

relocation orders is one of abuse of discretion. . . . It

is within the province of the trial court to find facts

and draw proper inferences from the evidence presented. . . . Further, [t]he trial court has the opportunity to view the parties first hand and is therefore in the

best position to assess the circumstances surrounding

a dissolution action, in which such personal factors as

the demeanor and attitude of the parties are so significant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tow v. Tow,

142 Conn. App. 45, 52, 64 A.3d 128 (2013).

‘‘Similarly, in a postjudgment relocation case following a dissolution of marriage action, the court is privy

to the history of the case, the parties’ respective situations and how the parties interact with one another.

Therefore, [w]hen reviewing a decision for an abuse

of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be

given in favor of its correctness.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Taylor v. Taylor, 119 Conn. App. 817,

821, 990 A.2d 882 (2010).

Moreover, ‘‘[a]ppellate review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s findings are binding

on this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light

of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a

whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when

there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or

when although there is evidence in the record to support

it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Emrich v. Emrich, 127 Conn. App. 691, 700–701, 15

A.3d 1104 (2011).

The defendant first argues that the court failed to

‘‘start from the correct reference point’’ in that it failed

to consider the parties’ informal agreement for alternating weekly parenting time with the child for seven to

eight months leading up to the hearing on the plaintiff’s
motion. He argues that the court’s determination that

it was in the best interests of the child to maintain the

continuity of living with his mother and brother ignores

the fact that the parties were equally sharing parenting

time at the time of the hearing.5

We disagree that the court ignored the parties’ informal agreement as to parenting time. Less than two

months earlier, the court had entered an ex parte order

that recognized the parties’ ‘‘alternating weekly parenting schedule in effect since the start of remote learning.’’

Moreover, the court, during the hearing on the motions

for modification, heard extensive testimony from both

parties as to the informal alternating weekly parenting

schedule the parties had in place during the unique

circumstances of remote learning. It is not surprising

that the court did not discuss that schedule in its order

granting the motion for modification, as neither party

sought a continuation of the schedule, now that inperson schooling had resumed. Both parties testified

that, prior to March, 2020, the defendant had parenting

time Tuesday overnight and alternating weekends, with

the plaintiff having parenting time the rest of the time.

Thus, the court’s statement that it was in the child’s

best interests to maintain the ‘‘continuity of living with

his mother,’’ brother, and pets, finds support in the

record, in that it reasonably can be construed as a

reference to the parties’ parenting time schedule in

place prior to March, 2020.

The defendant also argues that the court’s determination that the plaintiff had a more active role in the

child’s life ‘‘has no reasonable basis in the facts at the

time of the hearing.’’ He argues that he ‘‘was the one

who had taken steps prior to the start of the 2020-2021

school year to get the court to act so that the parties

could enroll their son in a school.’’ We conclude that

the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.

The plaintiff testified that she primarily cared for

the parties’ child from his birth and throughout his

childhood. Specifically, she testified: ‘‘I’m the one that

takes him to the doctor and makes those appointments

for well and sick visits. I’m the one that even knows he

needs to make his every six months dentist appointment

and I take him to the dentist. I take him to get all his

haircuts.’’ She testified that she has volunteered in the

child’s school. She testified that she primarily has

attended parent-teacher conferences and that she did

not see the defendant in attendance at the virtual open

house for the child’s new school.6

The defendant testified, with respect to his participation in the child’s medical care, that ‘‘depending on our

work schedules, you know, if I was working mornings

and she was at work and I was able to take [the child]

or [his older brother] to the doctor’s, I would take either

one as needed. When I was working nights there was

a couple times that I couldn’t leave early or I couldn’t
get the day off and she would have to assist with that.’’

He explained that the plaintiff would schedule parentteacher conferences when he was at work, or at times

they were in the evening and he would stay home with

the children so that the plaintiff could attend. On the

basis of this evidence, the court found that ‘‘the defendant has been as caring, loving and devoted to the child

as the plaintiff,’’ but also found that ‘‘the plaintiff has

had a more active role than the defendant.’’ On appeal,

‘‘we do not retry the facts or evaluate the credibility of

witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor

v. Taylor, supra, 119 Conn. App. 825. Because there is

evidence in the record to support the court’s finding,

we conclude that the court’s finding was not clearly

erroneous.

The defendant also argues that the court’s granting

of the plaintiff’s motion ‘‘acted as a ratification of the

plaintiff’s prior unauthorized relocation.’’ We disagree.

Although the court heard evidence that the plaintiff,

during the pendency of her motion for modification,

had moved to live with her fiance ́ in his home in Poughkeepsie, the defendant has not pointed to any evidence

that the court prejudged the motion on that basis. To

the contrary, the court applied the statutory criteria to

the evidence presented at the hearing in reaching its

determination.7

Lastly, the defendant contends that the plaintiff failed

to provide evidence as to the educational component

of one of the factors for the court’s consideration listed

in § 46b-56d (b), namely, ‘‘the degree to which the relocating parent’s and the child’s life may be enhanced

economically, emotionally and educationally by the

relocation . . . .’’ We disagree.8

Although the plaintiff recognizes that ‘‘there was no

indication or evidence . . . educationally that it was

better or worse being in the Arlington Central School

District than the Bethel School District,’’ the plaintiff

did provide testimony as to the educational plan for

the child following relocation. Specifically, she testified

that the child would attend Arlington Central School

District, which then was operating on a hybrid remote/

in-person schedule, and that the school was about five

minutes driving distance from the plaintiff’s home. She

testified that she would drive the child to school and

pick him up. After hearing the evidence with respect

to the three components listed in this factor, the court

found that ‘‘overall . . . the child’s life will be

enhanced by the move.’’ It thereafter ordered the parties

to enroll the child in the Arlington Central School District. On this record, we cannot conclude that there

was insufficient evidence for the court’s consideration

of the educational component of the fourth factor listed

in § 46b-56d (b).9

The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the plaintiff requested sole legal custody in her motion for

modification, she withdrew that request during the hearing on the motion

for modification and requested that the court make no change to the joint

legal custody in effect.

2

In her motion for modification, the plaintiff also requested that the court

order child support. She maintained in her motion that the agreement’s

language that the defendant would ‘‘fully financially support [the child]’’

was vague and needed clarification.

3 Mancari also had other business interests in the Poughkeepsie area,

including multifamily rental homes.

4 The court also ordered the defendant to pay ‘‘weekly child support in

the amount of $209, which is the presumptive weekly amount pursuant to

the child support guidelines . . . . The parties will share the cost of the

child’s unreimbursed medical expenses and work-related child care

expenses 57% by the defendant and 43% by the plaintiff.’’ (Citation omitted.)

See footnote 2 of this opinion.

5 The defendant additionally challenges the court’s finding that ‘‘[t]he

strong relationship between the child and his father can be preserved and

possibly strengthened, by giving the father additional weekend quality time

with the child.’’ The defendant argues that ‘‘[t]his finding of fact cannot be

sustained where the defendant at that time was enjoying spending two

weeks a month with his son.’’ He further emphasizes that he works from 4

a.m. to 1 p.m. on Sundays, and therefore the court’s conclusion that its

awarding parenting time from Friday after school until Sunday at 6 p.m. on

three weekends per month constituted ‘‘additional weekend quality time’’

‘‘has no basis in fact.’’ We disagree.

The parties have cooperated in establishing various parenting schedules

since the entry of the dissolution judgment. The alternating weekly parenting

schedule that the parties informally agreed to in March, 2020, was feasible

because of the remote schooling as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Prior to that point, as both parties acknowledged, the informal parenting

schedule between the parties was such that the defendant had parenting

time Tuesday nights overnight and alternating weekends, with the plaintiff

having parenting time the remainder of the time. When in-person school

resumed, the alternative weekly parenting schedule was no longer possible.

Thus, the court’s finding that the defendant was provided ‘‘additional weekend quality time,’’ made in the context of its awarding the defendant parenting time on three weekends per month, was not clearly erroneous, in light of

the parties’ testimony that prior to March, 2020, the defendant had weekend

parenting time on every other weekend.

6 The defendant testified that he was not able to participate in the virtual

open house because he was having issues with the Zoom platform.

7 To the extent that the defendant seeks to argue that the plaintiff’s move

to Poughkeepsie was unauthorized, he points to no court order that he

alleges her to have breached.

8 The defendant relies on Havis-Carbone v. Carbone, 155 Conn. App. 848,

869, 112 A.3d 779 (2015), a case in which the plaintiff seeking to relocate

with the parties’ child to Texas provided no evidence regarding the child’s

potential education there, and the court stated on the record that it was

‘‘not making this decision based on school . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Moreover, the court in that case improperly ‘‘granted the plaintiff

permission to go to Texas with the child prior to conducting a hearing.’’

Id., 867. Thus, Havis-Carbone is distinguishable.

9 The defendant argues in the alternative that, ‘‘[e]ven if the court had

considered educational enhancement as required, the evidence would not

have supported a finding that their son’s education would be enhanced.’’

He points to the evidence regarding the child’s ‘‘existing education’’ as

demonstrating that ‘‘there would be no enhancement.’’ Specifically, he argues

that ‘‘[t]he evidence before the court was that it had actually ordered the

parties to enroll their son in the defendant’s school district just one month

prior to the decision presently at issue. . . . The evidence was that their

son was enrolled in the same school system that he had been already . . .

attending in past years. . . . And the defendant’s school system had just

returned to full-time in-person learning the week prior to the hearing.’’

(Citations omitted.)

The defendant essentially requests that we reweigh the evidence in his

favor. As noted previously, ‘‘we do not retry the facts or evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Taylor,

supra, 119 Conn. App. 825.