NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 13

- 3225

_____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. GREGORY LAMONT CROSBY, Appellant

__________________________ On Appeal from the Unit ed States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. No. 1

- 12

- cr - 00044

- 001 ) District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin

__________________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

May 14, 2014 Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: June 05, 2014 )

______________ OPINION

______________ VANASKIE , Circuit Judge

. Appellant Gregory Lamont Crosby (“Crosby”) entered a conditional plea of guilty
to failing to register as a sex offender, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), Pub. L. No. 109

- 248, 120 Stat. 587, 590

– 611 (2006) (codified primarily at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (a) & 42 U.S.C. § § 16901

– 16962 ). Under the2

terms of the plea, Crosby reserved the right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss , which was predicated on the theory that § 113(d) of SORNA , 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d), violates the nondelegation doctrine

. Because that argument is foreclosed by our recent opinion in United States v. Cooper , No. 13

- 2324, 2014 WL 1386816, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr

. 10, 2014) , w e will affirm the District Court ’s den ial of Crosby ’s moti on . I. The facts essential to our decision can be briefly stated. In 2002 , in the S tate of New York , Crosby was convicted of attempted rape in the first degree

. (PSR ¶ 30

. ) Although this conviction preceded the enactment of SORNA in 2006, later administrative rules promulgated by the Attorney Gen er al applied SORNA’s requirements to individuals, such as Crosby , who se qualifying sex - offense convict ions predat ed the
statute. See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notific ation Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81 8 49

- 01 (Dec. 29, 2010)

. In July 20 08 , New York authorities learned that Crosby no longer resided at the address he had provided to them. (PSR ¶ 31

. ) In November 20 08 , police arrested Crosby in Pennsylvania , where he was then r es iding

. ( Id. ) Crosby , who had failed to re

- register as a sex offender in Pennsylvania at any point between 2002 and the date of that arrest,

was indicted by a federal grand jury for failure to register as a sex offender under SORNA. He pleaded guilty to that crime in September 2009 , and was sentenced to a3

term of incarceration followed by a period of supervised release. The validity of that

con viction is not at issue here. In June 2011, Crosby was released to federal supervision in New York. In May 2012 , law enforcement learned that Crosby had again moved out of New York without obtaining permission from supervision or re

- registering as a sex offender. (PSR ¶ 7

– 8

. ) On May 25, 2012, Crosby was arrested on an outstanding warrant in Erie, Pennsylvania , wh ere he had been living since April 2012 with various friends and relatives

. (PSR ¶ 8.) On August 21, 20 1 2 , a federal grand jury again i ndicted Crosby on one count of failing to register as a sex offender, in violation of 1 8 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Crosby file d a motion t o dismiss the indictment , which the District Court denied in an order filed January 8 , 2013

. On February 1 , 2013, Crosby entered a conditional p lea of guilty to the indictment. On July 1 , 2013 , the District Court imposed a sentence of 21 mont hs ’ imprisonment , 10 years of supervised release , and a $ 1 00 special assessment

. Crosby filed a timely not ice of appeal

. II. The Dis trict Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 . We have jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. We exercise plenary review over a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute

. United States v. Pendleton , 636 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2011)

. III.4

Crosby ’s sole argument on appeal is that § 1 13(d) of SORNA 1 violates the non

delegation doctrine, which requires Congress to provide, at a minimum, an “intelligible principle” to guide the Attorney Gen eral in the exercise of delegated rulemaking authority. Touby v. United States , 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States , 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))

. Like our sister circuits which have considered the issue, we have squar ely rejected this argument. See United States v. Cooper , No. 13

- 2324 , 2014 WL 1386816 , at *1, *9 n.6 (3d Cir. Apr

. 10, 2014) (citing United States v. Goodwin , 717 F.3d 511, 516

– 17 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied , __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 334 (2013) ; United States v. Kuehl , 706 F.3d 917, 919

– 20 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Parks , 698 F.3d 1, 7

– 8 (1st Cir. 2012) , cert. denied , __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2021 (2013) ; United States v. Felts , 674 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Rogers , 468 F. App’x 359 , 362 (4th Cir. 2012) (not precedential); United States v. Guzman , 591 F.3d 83, 92

– 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied , 130 S. Ct. 3487 (2010) ; United States v. Whaley , 577 F.3d 254, 263

– 64 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ambert , 561 F.3d 1202, 1213

– 14 (11th Cir. 2009) ). Crosby ag ree s that the Cooper case , which we had not yet decided at the time this case was briefed, presented the same non

- delegation challenge he advances here.

1 That provision states: “T he Attorney General shall have the autho rity to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before [ July 27, 2006 ] . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).5

Appellant’ s Br. at 3

. Because we rejected that challenge in Cooper , we will affirm the District Court ’s order denyin g Crosby’s motion to dismiss and affirm his conviction

. IV. For the foregoing reasons, w e will affirm the District Court’s judgment entered on July 1 , 201 3

.