### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 24, 200 6

TER REL L L. RO BINS ON v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty

No. 252337 Rebec ca Ster n, Jud ge

No. E2005-01544-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Janu ary 19, 2006

T h e p e t i t i o n e r , T e rr e l l L. R o b i n s o n , ap p e a l s t h e d e n i a l o f h i s p e t i t i o n f

o r p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f

. In this appeal of rig ht, he asserts that his g uilty plea was not knowing ly and volunt arily enter ed and that he did no t re c e ive the e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l. Th e jud g me nt of the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt is aff irmed

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P. J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Ste ve B ro wn (at tr ia l) , a ndDo nn a Rob ins on Mil le r ( on app e a l) , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t Pu bli c De fe nd e rs , for the a ppellant, Ter

rell L . Robinson.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; David E. Coenen, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; and Bates Bry an, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

On Fe bruary

23, 2004, the petitioner e ntere d a plea o f g uiltyto one count of voluntary

m a n s l a u g h t e r

. P u r s u a n tt o a p l e a a g r e e m e n tw i t h t h e s t a t e , t h e p e t i t i o n e r r e c e i v e d a

R a n g e II
sentenc e of e ight y ear s to be serve d in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. I n Dec ember of 2004, the petitioner filed a

petition for post-conviction relief alleg ing that his trial counsel was inef fec tive, that he wa s coer ced into entering the g uiltyplea, a nd that his sentence was illeg al. The post-c onviction
court a ppointed counsel a nd an ame nded petition was filed.

A t t h e e v i d e n t i ary h e ar i n g , t h e p e t i t i o n e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e w a s o r i g i n a l l y c h ar g e d w i th f ir st deg ree murder but a g ree d to ple ad g uilty to voluntary manslaug hter in e x chang e fo r a n eight-y ear sentenc e. The petitioner cla imed that he qualified as a Rang e I offe nder and first learned that he pled
g uilty as a Rang e I I

offe nder w hen he a

rrived at the Depa

rtment of Corre ction. The pe titioner stated that he then c o n t ac t ed trial counsel, who se nt him a copy of his file conta ining a

letter fr om the-2-

Assistant District Attorney confirming the offe r of a Rang e I I , eig ht-y ear sentenc e. The petitioner contende d that he had not se en the letter prior to e ntering his ple a and asse rted that his trial counse l did not discuss the applicable se ntencing rang es with him prior to the plea. He c laimed that if he ha d known that he wa s p l ea d i n g o u t s ide a Rang e I classification, he would not have pled g uilty . The
pe tit ion e r e mph a size d th a t he did no t wi sh to wi thd ra w his ple a bu t " wa s ju st c omi ng to g e t me my rig ht sentencing ."

During cross-e x amination, the petitioner a cknowledg ed that he might have signe d a " waiver of ra ng e enha nceme nt" but insis ted that he ha d no independe nt rec ollection of sig ning suc h a document. He claimed that beca use of his nervousne ss, he re membere d littl e fr om the g uiltyplea h ea ri n g.

Tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t he dis c us se d the c a se wi th the pe tit ion e r o n s e ve ra l oc c a sio ns bo th

a t hi s o ff ic e a nd a t the c ou rtho us e

. He state d th a t a lth ou g h th e pr ima ry de fe ns e wa s th a t th e vic tim

wa s th e fi rs t a g g re sso r, his inv e sti g a tio n e sta bli sh e d that the pe tit ion e r ha d sta bb e d the vic tim

so me thirteen times in the pre sence of t hree witnesses. Acc ording to trial counsel, " it was a ve ry strong second de g ree murder c ase." He stated that his strateg y prior to trial was to dete rmine whe ther the state would make an off

er of voluntary m an s l au gh t er. Trial counsel testified tha t the state wa s initiallyreluc tant to consider voluntary manslaug hter
, but eventually consente d, reduc ed the of fer
to w ri tin g , a ndse nt i t to tr ia l c ou ns e l.

Trial counse l confirmed that the written off er w as made in June of 2003, some e ight months prior t o th e e n try o f th e g u il ty p le a

. H e s tate d th a t h e d is c u s s e d th e o f f e r w ith th e p e titioner

on

sever al occa sions a nd that there was ample time f or the petitioner to c onsider the content

. T ri al

c ou ns e l te sti fi e d th a t th e pe tit ion e r " wa s o f the min d that he didno t w ish to g o to tr ia l w ith the ri sk of first deg ree murder pr osecution but he was adama nt that he was using self-de fense ." T rial counse l in s i s t e d t h a th e h a d i n f

o r m e d t h e p e t i t i o n e r

t h a th e w o u l d b e p l e a d i n g o u t s i d e t h e app lic a ble
sentenc ing r ang e and r emar ked that " the pape rwork w e sig ned wa s not something that wa s rushed throug h on the day of the plea." Acc ording to trial counsel, the petitioner wa s in court " two or three times prior to th e p l ea afte r this J une date in which we ir oned out all the deta ils." Tria l counsel testified that the trial court repe ated the waive r of r ang e during the plea submission hearing a nd that the petitioner " understood the elements of vol untary manslaug hter and he under stood [ the assistant district attorney ] would not come down a ny lower tha n eig ht y ear s. And i n order for us to . . . put the plea thr oug h, we ha d to ag ree to the rang e and that's w hat [the petitioner] wanted to do."

At the c on c lus ion of

the he ari ng, the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt de nie d r e lie f, sp e c if

ic a lly

acc rediting the testimony of trial counse l t h at h e h ad "a dequate ly explained to the [ petitioner] the

c on se qu e nc e of

. . . p le a din g a s a

Ra ng e I I of fe nd e r. " Al tho ug h the po st- c on vic tio n co urt fa ile d to file a w ritten order deny ing relief as require d by statute, see T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-111(b) (2003), it is our view that the record is otherwise adequate for our revie w, see State v. Swanson, 680 S.W .2d 487, 489 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that reve rsal was not require d when the rec ord included the post-conviction' s court basis for denial of r elief on a

particula r g round).-3-

I n th is a pp e a l, the pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t hi s g uil ty ple a wa s n ot kno wi ng ly

a ndvo lunt ari ly
enter ed bec ause he did not know that he was a g ree ing to a sentenc e outs ide the applica ble ra ng e. I n addition, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffe ctive by failing to inform hi m that he wa s pleading outside his rang e.

Un de r o ur statut ory la w, the pe tit ion e r be ars the bu rd e n of p ro vin g the a lle g a tio ns in h is p os tconviction petition by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ) (2003)

. Evidence is clear

and convinc ing w hen there i s no serious or substantial doubt about t he ac cura cy of the c onclusions drawn f rom the evidence. Hicks v. State, 983 S.W .2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). On ap p ea l
, t h e finding s of fa ct made by the trial court are conclusive a nd will not be disturbed unless the evide nce c ontained in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst them. Br ooks v. State, 756 S.W .2d 288, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) . The burden i s on the petitioner to show that the

e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate d a g a ins t th os e fi nd ing s. Clenny v. S tate, 57 6 S. W.2 d 1 2, 14 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1978).

I The pe titioner' s first claim is that his g uilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily

enter ed. The post-c onviction court spec ifically conclude d that the petitioner wa s informed by his trial counsel that he wa s pleading outside the applica ble sentenc ing r ang e.

I n Bo y k in v. Alabama, 395 U .S. 238 (1969), the United States Supreme Court ruled that defe ndants should be advised of certain constitutional rights bef ore e ntering pleas of g uilt. I ncluded
among those are admonitions reg arding the rig ht ag ainst self-incrimination, the right to conf ront witnesses, and the rig ht to tri al by jury . I d. at 243. " [T] he cor e re quirement of B oykin is 'that no
gu i l t y p l eab e a cc ep t ed wi t h o u tan af fi rm a t i v e s h o wi n g t h at i twa s i n t el l i gen tan d v o l u n t ar y

. '" Bla nkenship v. S t ate, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993) ( quoting F ontaine v. United States, 526 F.2d 514, 516 ( 6th Cir. 1975)). The ple a must repr esent a "voluntary and intellige nt choice a mong the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." North Carolina v. A lford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1 97 0) . I f the pr oo f e sta bli sh e s th a t th e peti ti on er wa s a wa re of his c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts , h e is entitled to n o relief . J ohnson v. State, 834 S.W .2d 922, 926 (Tenn. 1992) . A plea w hich is the
pr od uc t of

" ig no ra nc e , in c omp re he ns ion , c o e r c i o n , t e r r o r , i n du c e me nts , [or ] sub tle or blata nt thr e a ts" is not volunt ary . Boy

kin, 395 U.S. at 242-43.

I n this case, tria l counsel testified that he informed the petitioner of the applica ble sentenc ing

ra ng e a nde xpla ine d th a t in or de r to re c e ive the be ne fi t of the of fe r f ro m th e state , h e wo uldha ve to ag ree to a sentenc e outside his rang e. Contrary to the petitioner' s assertion that the plea was rushe d, trial counsel testified that the petit ioner had near ly eig ht months t o consider the state' s offe r and tha t the details of the ple a ag ree ment wer e " ironed out" during at least two meeting s with the state. The
transcript demonstrates that the post-conviction court spec ifically acc redited the testimonyof trial counsel that he had informe d the petit ioner that he wa s pleading outside his rang e and ha d explained the conse quence s of his doing so. Unde r these c ircumstance s, it is our view that the petitioner ha s f a i l e d t o e s t ab l i s h b y c l e ar a n d c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e t h a th i s p l e a w a s i n v o l u n t ar y.-4- II Th e pe tit ion e r a lso c on te nd s th a t hi s tria l c ou ns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ng to i nf

or m hi m that he wa s pleading outside the applica ble sentenc ing r ang e. When a p eti tioner see ks post-conviction relief on the basis of i neff ective assistance of counsel, he must first establish that the

s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d o r t h e a d v i c e g i v e n w e r e b e l o w " t h e r a n g e o f c o m p e t e n c e d e m a n d e d o f a t t o r n e ys in criminal ca ses." Ba x ter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Second, he must show that the de fi c ie nc ie s " a c tua lly

ha d a n a dv e rs e e ff

e c t on the de fe ns e ." Str ic kla ndv. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 66 8, 69 3 ( 19 84 ). Th e e rr or mus t be so se ri ou s a s to re nd e r a n u nr e lia ble re su lt. I d. a t 68 7. Sho uld the petitioner fa il to establish either fac tor, he is not entitled to relief. O ur supre me court describe d the sta nd ardof

re vie w a s f

oll ow s:

Be cause a petitioner must establish both prong s of the test, a fa ilure to prove either de ficienc y

or pre judice provide s a suffic ient basis to deny relief on the ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im. I ndeed, a court ne ed not addre ss the components in any particula r orde r or e ven addr ess bot h if the def endant make s an insufficie nt showing of on e c omp on e nt.

Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996).

When a petitioner c laims ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel in relation to a g uiltyplea, the
pe tit ion e r m us t pr ov e that c ou ns e l pe rf or me d d e fi c ie ntl y

a nd , " bu t f

or c ou ns e l' s e rr or s, he wo uld not have plea ded g uiltyand would have insisted on going to trial." H ill v. L ockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

On c la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l, the pe tit ion e r i s n ot e nti tle d to the be ne fi t of hindsight, may

not second-g uess a r easona bly based tria l strateg y , and ca nnot criticize a sound, but unsucce ssful, tactica l decision made during the course of the proc eeding s. Adkins v. State, 911 S.W .2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . Such defe renc e to the tac tical dec isions of counsel, howe ver, a

pplies only

if the choic es ar e made afte r ade quate pr epar ation for the c ase. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Claims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel are reg arde d as mix ed questions of law and fac t. State v. Honey cutt, 54 S.W .3d 762, 766-67 (Te nn. 2001); State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . When review ing the application of la w to the post-conviction court's f actua l finding s, our re view is de novo, a nd the post-conviction court's c onclusions of law a re g iven no
pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss. F ie lds v. Sta te , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 50 , 4 57 -5 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; se e a lso Sta te v. Eng land, 19 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2000).

Her e, the pe titioner testified that his trial counsel did not inform him that the plea
ag ree ment included a Ra ng e I I sentenc e. Tria l counsel testified that he discussed the state' s offe r with the petitioner on seve ral oc casions and e x plained to him that "in orde r to . . . put the plea th rou gh, we had to agree to th e ran ge." He st ate d t hat "th at's wha t [ th e pet it io ner] wan ted to do ." Ag ain, the post-convic tion court ac cre dited the testimony of trial counse l, finding tha t he-5-

explained the terms of the ple a ag ree ment to the petitioner. I n our view, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE