IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01280-COA KAPPI SAGET JEFFERS APPELLANT

v. KORRI SAGET APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/29/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARIE W ILSON COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: W A RREN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DAVID M. SESSUMS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: W R EN CARROLL W AY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - W ILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: DENIED APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR RECOVERY/COLLECTION OF ESTATE ASSETS AND THE COUNTER-CLAIM TO SET ASIDE CONVEYANCE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND FOR RECOVERY ASSETS DISPOSITION: APPEAL DISMISSED - 03-21-2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ. BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Kappi Saget Jef

f ers contested the validity of her late m other’s w ill and the convey ance of assets r elated to investm ent-f und accounts. The will contest, bef or e a jury , ended i n a

m istrial, but the chancellor, as f inder of f act, d enied Jef

f ers’s petition a nd counterclaim to

recover assets, specif

i cally the investm ent accounts. On appeal, we f i nd that the chancellor’s entry of j udgm ent regarding the investm ent a ccounts was not a f inal, appealable j udgm ent under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Theref ore, we m ust dism iss the appeal f

or lack of jurisdiction.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Rae Saget died on January 6, 2014, survived by two daugh t e r s , J e f f e r s a nd Korri Saget. Prior to her death, Rae had executed three wills. In a 2004 will, she lef t a diam ond ring to Saget, a ruby ring t o J ef f e rs, and her rem aining property t o b e equally d istributed between Saget and Jef

f ers. In 2008, Rae executed a second will, again leaving the bulk of
h e r estate to be divided equally between her daughters. However, Rae’s m ost recent will, executed o n August 23, 2012, bequeathed all her p roperty to Saget, e xcept f o r one diam ond ring, which she bequeathed to Jef f ers. ¶3. R a e a l s o had investm ent accounts with M organ S tanley

. From 2006 to 2012, b o t h daughters were designated as equal benef iciaries of the a ccounts. However, on A ugust 22, 2012, Rae appeared alone at the Morgan Stanley of f ices and signed f

orm s m aking Saget the sole benef

iciary of the accounts. ¶4. Af ter Rae’s death, J ef

f e rs f iled a Caveat Against Probate (Cause No. 2014-008-PR)

on February 7 , 2 0 14, a rguing t hat Rae’s A u g u s t 2 3, 2012 last will and testam ent was a product of undue inf

luence and should be declared void. On February 18, 2014, S aget f iled

a p etition to open the estate and f or appointm ent of an executrix (Cause No. 2 014-010-PR).
An o r d e r o p e n i ng the estate was entered, and Saget was appointed as executrix. Jef f ers subsequently f

iled a m otion to set aside the order and consolidate t he ca u s e s a n d a m otion to f r eeze assets. ¶5. On March 11, 2014, Jef f ers f iled a p etition f

o r letters o f adm inistration a nd f or the
recovery /coll e c t i o n of estate assets in Cause No. 2014-008-PR. The petition s pecif ically

2ref

erenced the Morgan Stanley investm e nt accounts and argued that Rae lacked capacity to put Saget’s nam e on the a ccount. The chancery court c onsolidated the two cases into Cause
No. 2014-008-PR, appointed both Jef f e rs and Saget a s c o - a d m instratrixes, and granted Jef f ers’s m otion to f

reeze t he assets. Then, on March 31, 2014, Jef f ers f iled an a nswer to the petition to probate the will and a c o u n t e rclaim to contest the will and set aside the
convey ance of

personal property and to recover assets. In the petition, she argued that the

m ost recent will, and the docum ent changing the b enef iciary of the Morgan Stanley accounts, were void. ¶6. On May 27-30, 2015, jury p roceedings were h eld in chancery court regarding the will

c o n t e s t

. T h e proceedings ended in a m istrial. Although the claim regarding the Morga n Stanley accounts was not subm itted to the jury , the chancellor discussed whether to enter an order regarding t he accounts. As both attorney s had no additional e vidence to present, they agreed to the entry of an o rder, a lthough Jef f ers’s attorney did express concern as to whether the entry o f such an order could result in “inconsistent” holdings. The chancellor entered a “Final Judgm ent” on August 4, 2015, deny ing Jef f ers’s p etition f

or the recovery

/collection of assets a n d t he counterclaim t o set aside the convey ance of personal property and f or
recovery of assets. The order noted that the issue of t he will’s validity was still pending. ¶7. Because the judgm ent was not certif ied pursuan t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , w e f i nd that the chancer y c ourt judgm ent was not a f inal, appealable judgm e nt, a nd this C o urt lacks jurisdiction to consider Jef f ers’s appeal.
DISCUSSION

3¶8. As noted, the chancellor entered a f inal judgm ent a nd order, deny i ng Jef f ers’s petition
f or t he recovery

/collection of assets and the countercom plaint t o set aside the convey ance of personal property and f

or r ecovery of assets. However, regarding t he issue o f whether the August 2 3 , 2 0 1 2 will was void, the c hancery court sim ply stated: “The question of the validity of the last will w as subm i tted to a jury which resulted in a m istrial. It is not an issue present l y b e f

o r e the court.” Although the p arties have not raised t he issue, “ this Court is required t o note its own lack of jurisdiction.” W alters v. W

alters , 956 So. 2d 1 050, 1053 (¶8) (Miss. C t. App. 2007) ( citing M ichael v. Michael , 650 So. 2 d 469, 471 (Miss. 1995)). Rule 54(b) states:
W h en m o re t han o n e claim f or relief is presented in an a ction, whether as a claim , counterclaim , cross-claim , o r t h i r d

- p a r t y c l a i m , or when m

ultiple parties are involved, the court m ay direct t he entry o f a f inal judgm ent as to one or m ore b ut f

ewer than all of the c l a i ms o r parties only upon an expressed determination t

hat there is no just reason for delay a n d u p on an expressed direction f

o r the entry of the judgm ent. In the absence of such determ ination and d i r e c t i on, a ny order or other f orm of decision, however designated[ ,] which adjudicates f

ewer than all of the c laim s o r the rights an d l i a b i l i t ies of f ewer t h an all the parties shall not term inate the action as t o any of the claim s or parties[ ,] and the order or other f orm of decision is subject to revision at any tim e b ef ore the entry of

judgm ent adjudicating all the claim s and t he r ights and liabilities of

all the parties. (Em phasis added). “A f

i nal, appealable judgm ent is o n e t h a t a djudicates the m erits of the controversy which s ettles all issues as to all t he parties and r equires no f urther action by the [ chancery ] court.” W

alters , 956 So. 2d at 1053 (¶8) (citation om itted). W i thout a Rule 54(b) certif i cation, a n interlocutory order “is only appealable if the Mississippi Suprem e Court grants perm ission under Rule 5 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure; this Court has no jurisdiction to hear it otherwise.” Hoffman v. Hoffman , 200 So. 3d 465, 4 68 (¶12)

4(Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Jackson v. Lowe , 65 So. 3d 879, 881-82 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App.

2011)). ¶9. Jef f ers acknowledges in h er appella n t ’ s b r ief that the i ssue of the w ill c ontest “rem a ins pending on t he t rial docket o f the lower court.” At t rial, during t he discussion as to whether the chancellor should enter an order addressing the Morgan Stanley accounts, the chancellor asserted that the c laim s were s eparate a nd t he burden of proof w a s d if f erent. But Saget’s counsel noted that the claim s were both asserted i n t h e p leadings, and stated: “W ell, they

m ade a n issue of it so the issue i s joined.” Eventually , both attorney s agreed that they wanted the chancery

court to rule on the issue. ¶10. However, the chancery court did not certif

y the judgm ent under R

ule 54(b). “For a j u d g m ent adjudicating f

ewer than all of t he c l aim s to be m ade f inal and appeala b l e u n d e r Rule 5 4(b), the trial court m u st m ake an expressed d irection f or the entry of f

i nal j udgm ent and a n expressed determ ination that there is n o just reason f or delay .” W

a lters , 956 So. 2d at 1054 (¶12). Here, while the chancellor directed the entry of a f inal judgm ent, satisf

y ing the f irst requirem ent, nowhere in the order does the chancellor state that t here is no reason f or delay . Theref

ore, we f ind the judgm ent was not a f inal, appealable order. ¶11. T H I S A P P E A L I S D I S M I S S E D . A L L C O S T S OF THIS A PPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
L E E , C . J . , I R

V I N G A N D G R I FFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE , C A R L T O N , F A I R , W I L S O N , GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.

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