NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

MELANIE BLYTHE GREENHAM, 

Petitioner/Appellant, 

v.

JASON DOUGLAS HOPE, 

Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0263 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2011-093940

The Honorable Theodore Campagnolo, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Melanie Greenham, Mexico

Petitioner/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

FILED 3-20-2018
GREENHAM v. HOPE

Decision of the Court

2

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Melanie Blythe Greenham ("Mother") appeals the superior 

court's denial of her motion to vacate part of a child-support order. We 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Jason Douglas Hope ("Father") married in 1990 

and over the course of their marriage had three children. They divorced in 

South Carolina in 2011; the dissolution decree incorporated a settlement 

agreement. At the time, Mother lived in Arizona and Father, New York. 

The settlement agreement stated that Mother would be the primary 

residential parent and Father would pay child support.

¶3 Mother subsequently remarried and moved to Mexico with 

the children and her new husband. In 2011, Father filed the decree in 

Maricopa County Superior Court and sought custody of the children. 

Father was awarded sole custody, and in 2012 he petitioned the Arizona 

court to modify his child support. The court allowed Father to serve his 

petition on Mother by emails sent to her email address and the email 

address of her new husband. The court then set an evidentiary hearing, 

which it later continued, over Mother's objection, to November 5, 2012.

Mother moved for leave to appear at the hearing by telephone,

acknowledging in her motion that the court would consider the parties' 

child support obligations at that hearing. The record does not disclose 

whether the court ruled on Mother's motion, but she failed to attend the 

hearing, without explanation. After the hearing, the court adopted Father's 

child support proposal, which eliminated Father's responsibility to pay 

child support, required Mother to pay Father child support of $124.43 per 

month beginning May 1, 2012, and required Mother to pay back child 

support of $204.00 per month for the months between November 2011 and 

April 2012.

¶4 On appeal, we held it was unclear "whether South Carolina 

relinquished its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" under the Uniform 

Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), Arizona 

Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 25-1001 to -1067 (2018).

1 See Hope v. 

Hope, 1 CA-CV 13-0112, 2014 WL 860797, at *4, ¶ 23 (App. Mar. 4, 2014) 

("2014 Decision"). We therefore instructed the superior court to vacate the 

 

1 Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of a statute or rule.
GREENHAM v. HOPE

Decision of the Court

3

child support modification in accordance with Glover v. Glover, 231 Ariz. 1, 

7, ¶ 22 (App. 2012), and to determine whether the court had subject-matter

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. 2014 Decision at *6, ¶ 34.

¶5 On remand, Mother and Father stipulated that the South 

Carolina child support order was properly registered with the superior 

court by July 21, 2014, and thus the Arizona court had gained subject-matter

jurisdiction over child support. On June 9, 2015, and after conferring with 

the South Carolina court, see A.R.S. § 25-1033 (2018), the superior court 

entered an order finding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over both 

child custody and child support and personal jurisdiction over both Mother 

and Father. The court further found that Mother had had notice and an 

opportunity to be heard on the matter of child support modification, and 

accordingly adopted the child support arrangements Father had presented 

in 2012.

¶6 Mother again appealed; we held that the superior court had 

subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the child support order pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 25-1311(A)(2) (2018) and that Mother had waived any objection to 

personal jurisdiction by appearing in the action. See Hope v. Greenham, 1 

CA-CV 15-0548 FC and -1791 FC, 2016 WL 3773544, at *4, ¶¶ 24-27 (App. 

Jul. 12, 2016) ("2016 Decision"). 

¶7 On January 25, 2017, Mother moved the superior court to 

vacate its June 9, 2015 ruling, arguing the superior court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to modify child support because Father had not properly 

served her with his April 19, 2012 petition to modify child support. The 

superior court denied the motion, and Mother timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, 

and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) and -2101(A)(2) (2018). See In re 

Marriage of Dougall, 234 Ariz. 2, 5-6, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) (denial of a motion 

made pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 85(C) is 

appealable under § 12-2101(A)(2)). Father filed no answering brief. 

Although we may deem his failure to constitute a confession of reversible 

error, in our discretion, we will not do so but will consider the merits of 

Mother's appeal. See Bugh v. Bugh, 125 Ariz. 190, 191 (App. 1980).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Mother argues the superior court did not have jurisdiction to 

modify the child support order. Specifically, Mother claims Father failed to 

properly serve her with his April 19, 2012 petition to modify child support, 

which she contends divested the superior court of jurisdiction and rendered 
GREENHAM v. HOPE

Decision of the Court

4

its subsequent ruling void. She further argues she was deprived of due 

process because she was not given proper notice that the court was going 

to consider child support modifications at the hearing on November 5, 2012. 

We review de novo the superior court's denial of a motion under Rule 

85(C)(1)(d) to vacate a void judgment. See Ezell v. Quon, 224 Ariz. 532, 536, 

¶ 15 (App. 2010) (de novo review of denial of motion to vacate void 

judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(4)); Ariz. R. Fam. L. 

Proc. 85 cmt. (Rule 85 is analog of Ariz. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60).

¶9 Mother's argument that she was not properly served with the 

child-support petition amounts, at most, to a challenge to personal 

jurisdiction, not subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., N. Propane Gas Co. v. 

Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 525 (1980) ("The due process clause of the United States 

Constitution . . . limits the power of a state to achieve personal jurisdiction 

over a defendant.") (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978)). But 

Mother waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction by repeatedly 

appearing in court and making court filings in the child-support 

proceeding. See Shah v. Vakharwala, 1 CA-CV 17-0129 FC, ___ Ariz. ___, 2018 

WL 358214 at *2, ¶ 8 (App. Jan. 11, 2018). Indeed, we already have held that 

"Mother has waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction because she 

appeared in the matter and litigated it on the merits." 2014 Decision at *6, 

¶ 30.

¶10 In the event that Mother means to challenge the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the superior court, we held in the 2016 Decision at *4, 

¶ 26, that the Maricopa County Superior Court properly acquired subjectmatter jurisdiction when Father properly registered the South Carolina 

support order in July 2013 or July 2014. Accordingly, and because "the 

consent decree clearly designates Arizona as the minor children's home 

state and the state in which all future actions will be adjudicated," we held 

the superior court had subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the child 

support order. Id. at *4, ¶¶ 24-27. 

¶11 Finally, Mother contends that when the superior court ruled 

in June 2015, it failed to take into account the changes in Mother's 

circumstances since 2012. If Mother believes that she has had a substantial 

and continuing change in circumstances, she may ask the superior court to 

modify the order. See A.R.S. §§ 25-327(A) (2018), -503(E) (2018).
GREENHAM v. HOPE

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's 

denial of Mother's motion.