* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion shoul d not be published and is not precedent except for the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. REVISED MARCH 23, 2000

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-30258

WESTLY WEST; DENNIS LYNCH; ROBERT POLITO;

HENRY JAUME; BRUCE VERRETTE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

NICK A. CONGEMI, Chief of Police; CITY OF KENNER,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Lower Court No. 98-CV-1654-T

March 21, 2000

Before JONES, DUHÉ, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Having carefully considered this appeal in light of the

briefs, oral arguments, and pertinent portions of the record, we

agree with the district court’s analysis of the issues and affirm

largely for the reasons stated in its opinion entered November

23, 1998.

The issue is whether the concededly constitutional

“Little Hatch Act” of Louisiana, LA. R. S. 33:2504, may be enforced

against police officers who, acting as representatives of a police1 Appellants’ brief states: “The issue involved here is rather whether

associations and unions of civil service employees may be made a target for

attack and prevented from making political endorsements in their own name by the

strategy of terminating union officers who carry out the official acts of the

organization in private and without identifying themselves publicly in any way

as civil servants.” One might think that the association, rather than the police

officers is the appellant.

But the association could -- and did -- notice an appeal only from

the denial of interventi on, a point which was not briefed and is therefore

waived.

2 officers’ association in Kenner, communicated the association’s

endorsement of and support for a political candidate. Police Chief

Congemi fired the appellants according to the direct command of the

statute.

On appeal, counsel for appellants has been less than

forthright in distinguishing between his individual clients’

interest and that of the association, which was not permitted to

intervene in the district court. 1 Notwithstanding the confusion,

we construe appellants’ complaint to be that although they were

legitimately forbidden by the Little Hatch Act from personally

engaging in political ac tivities covered by that statute while

employed as civil servants, the statute may not constitutionally be

applied to them when they act as officers of the association. To

do so, appellants claim, violates their First Amendment speech and

associational rights.

Acting as officers of their association and through it,

the appellants caused a political contribution to, and an3

endorsement of, Candidate Stagni’s campaign to be made. Such

activities, undertaken “directly or indirectly,” violate the plain

language of Section 2504. Appellants contend, however, that when

they act as association officers, their conduct is shiel ded from

the prohibitions of the Little Hatch Act. We disagree. Like the

district court, we conclude that this court’s decision in Wachsman

v. City of Dallas

, 704 F.2d 160, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) is

controlling:

One further problem deserves our attention

before we address the restrictions on

contributions. The district court’s

invalida tion of section 16(b)(1) regarding

endorsements presented at nonpolitical

gatherings applied only to individual

employees, and not to their organizations.

The Committee asserts that this ruling ignores

its first amendment rights. These rights are

derived from the individual memb ers’

associational and speech rights, see Citizens

Against Rent Control, and from the public’s

right to free and uninhibited comment on

political issues. S ee Bellotti

. Although the

district court failed to state why it reached

different conclusions regarding Wachsman and

the Committee, we perceive an appropriate

distinction that justifies its order.

[3] The Committee must act through a

spokesman. Regarding individual employees,

the court was obviously concerned with

limiting an employee’s right to endorse a

candidate at a private and/or nonpolitical

gathering ( e.g. , a Kiwanis Clu b meeting or a

neighborhood barbecue). Such a setting

suggests a public employee acting as a private

citizen. T his suggestion, however, does not4 fit a situation in which an official spokesman

for an organization of city employees

announces in that capacity the organization’s

endorsement of a particular city council

candidate. The latter carries with it all the

pernicious possibilities inherent in allowing

individual employees to so address political

gatherings. The arrival of an official

spokesman bearing such an endorsement largely

imbues a gathering with a political flavor.

Indeed, the appellant Committee here is the

avowedly political arm of the city employee

police and firefighters organizations. Thus,

the City’s interests in prohibiting

endorsements will be present in any situation

in which an organization *173 of city

employees desires to make an endorsement.

Therefore, the trial court’s order in this

regard is affirmed. (footnote omitted/emphasis

added).

Wachsman and the dis trict court also relied on the

Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l

Ass’n of Letter Carriers

, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880 (1973),

upholding similar restrictions on political activity by civi l

servants.

Because Chief Congemi’s enforcement of the Little Hatch

Act’s ban on “direct or indire ct” political activity by these

appellants was constitutional, we need not reach the other issues

raised on appeal. The judgement of the district court in favor of

appellees is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

.