COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Willis and 

 Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

TRACEY ANNE RICHARDSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 3011-99-4 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 FEBRUARY 6, 2001 

COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

Frank A. Hoss, Jr., Judge 

 Mark Thomas Crossland for appellant. 

 D. Scott Bailey, Assistant Commonwealth's 

Attorney (Paul B. Ebert, Commonwealth's 

Attorney; Mary Grace O'Brien, Assistant 

Commonwealth's Attorney, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated, second 

or subsequent offense. On appeal, appellant contends that the 

trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Appellant 

argues that the officer did not have a reasonable articulable 

suspicion to stop her. We disagree and affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

 At approximately 1:05 a.m. on December 17, 1998, 

Officer S. Vago observed a vehicle travelling in the right lane of 

two westbound travel lanes. Vago observed the right-side tires of 
the vehicle cross the solid white line marking the boundary of the 

travel lane, just inside the edge of the road surface, for a 

distance of seventy to eighty feet. There was a curve in the road 

where the tires crossed the solid white line. Vago, an 

experienced officer who had made over one hundred arrests for 

driving under the influence of alcohol in the prior year, 

suspected that the driver was impaired and stopped the vehicle. 

Vago conducted field sobriety tests and arrested appellant for 

driving under the influence. 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

 "In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to 

suppress, 'the burden is upon [the defendant] to show that the 

ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the 

Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.'" McGee v. 

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) 

(en banc) (citation omitted). While we are bound to review de

novo the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause, we "review findings of historical fact only for clear 

error1 and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those 

facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." 

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (footnote 

added). 

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 "In Virginia, questions of fact are binding on appeal 

unless 'plainly wrong.'" McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198 n.1, 487 

S.E.2d at 261 n.1 (citations omitted). 

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 "If a police officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion 

that a person is engaging in, or is about to engage in, criminal 

activity, the officer may detain the suspect to conduct a brief 

investigation without violating the person's Fourth Amendment 

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures." McGee, 

25 Va. App. at 202, 487 S.E.2d at 263. "When a court reviews 

whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to make an 

investigatory stop, it must view the totality of the 

circumstances and view those facts objectively through the eyes 

of a reasonable police officer with the knowledge, training, and 

experience of the investigating officer." Murphy v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989). 

"'[A] trained law enforcement officer may [be able to] identify 

criminal behavior which would appear innocent to an untrained 

observer.'" Freeman v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 658, 661, 460 

S.E.2d 261, 262 (1995) (citation omitted). "[W]eaving within a 

single traffic lane is an articulable fact which may give rise 

to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity." Neal v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 239, 498 S.E.2d 422, 425 (1998). 

 In the early morning hours, an experienced police officer 

saw the right-side tires of appellant's vehicle cross the solid 

white line near the edge of the road surface. The officer saw 

the vehicle being driven in this manner for seventy to eighty 

feet. Under these circumstances, the officer had a reasonable 

and articulable suspicion that the driver was impaired, which 

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justified a stop to investigate further. The trial court did 

not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress. 

Affirmed.

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