AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed October 11, 2022 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00957-CR No. 05-21-00958-CR JUSTIN LLOYD STRICKLIN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 366- 83893-2021, 366-83894-2021 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Reichek, and Goldstein Opinion by Justice Schenck Appellant Justin Lloyd Stricklin appeal s his convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 and indecency with a child by contact. In a single issue, appellant asserts the trial court erred in overruling his objections to certain statements the prosecutor made during closing argument in the guilt–innocence phase of trial. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s objections, we affirm the judgmen ts against him. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. T EX

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. P. 47.4.–2– B ACKGROUND The State charged appellant with conti nuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 and indecency with a child by contact, alle ging that, during a period that was 30 days or more in duration, appe llant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against L.O. and D.J. T EX

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. §§ 21.02; 21.11. Appella nt pleaded not guilty to both offenses elected a jury trial. At trial, the State presented evidence th at appellant, through the course of his employment as an x-ray technician at an imaging center, had unlawfully touched two female patients w ho were then under the age of 14. More particularly, the State established that on December 10, 2015 , L.O., who was then 8 years’ old and accompanied by her mother, went to the im aging center for a chest x-ray due to suspected pneumonia. Appellant performed the x-ray. Appellant was alone in the x-ray room with L.O. After he placed L.O. in various posi tions in front of the x-ray machine, he unlawfully touched her. Upon leaving the imaging center, L.O. told her mother what had occurred. They returned to the center and told the manager what had transpired. Later that day, they repor ted the incident to the police and L.O. was interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center. Following L.O.’s disclosure, the im aging center put appellant on administrative leave. At the request of the manager, appellant was reinstated and returned to work in March 2016. On November 17, 2016, D.J., who was then 11 years’ old, went to the imaging center for x-rays of her knees. Her father–3– accompanied her, but appellant told him to wait outside during the imaging session. As appellant completed the process of taki ng x-rays of D.J.’s knees, he unlawfully touched her. D.J. did not te ll her father what had happene d but told her mother later that night. The next day, D.J.’s parent s took her to the poli ce. She was then interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center . Appellant was arrested and resigned from his position at the imaging center. At the punishment phase of trial, the State presented the testimony of a third child, A.J., who claimed also to have be en unlawfully touched by appellant. A.J. went to the imaging center in December 2015 for x-rays of her foot. A.J. was 11 years’ old at the time. Appellant performed the x-rays. A.J.’s mother did not go into the x-ray room because she was pregnant at the time. Appellant unlawfully touched A.J. Initially, A.J. told only a young friend what had happened a nd later disclosed it to D.J., who she knew from participati ng in cheer, when she learned something similar had happened to D.J. at the same imaging center. In his own defense, appellant testifie d to a difficult upbringing, denied he assaulted anyone, and suggested the complainants and A.J. were lying. He also stated he did not think he had a problem and wanted to become a physician’s assistant. As to his charac ter, appellant calle d two male friends. Neither of them believed appellant would sexua lly abuse young girls. Las tly, appellant offered the opinion of a licensed sex-offender treatment provider. Based on tests administered to appellant, she opined that he posed a lo w risk for violence, crime, and sexual re-–4– offense. This witness was not aware of A.J.’s allegations and did not take appellant’s alleged abuse of her into account in forming her opinions. The jury found appellant guilty of the charged offenses and assessed punishment at 50 years’ confinement in th e continuous sexual abuse of a child case and 5 years’ confinement in the inde cency case. This appeal followed.
D ISCUSSION Appellant contends the tr ial court abused its di scretion in overruling his objections to the following arguments the pr osecutor made at the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase of trial. This defendant is a predator. If you let him go, he will be unstoppable. He was already caught once.

. . . . He was caught once, he was put back to work, and he must have thought he was unstoppable then because you know what happened next, he violated [D.J.]. He will be unstoppabl e. It stops with you. I can’t do anything, Defense can’t do anything, the Judge can’t do anything. It’s up to you to keep our community safe. Find the defendant guilty, hold him accountable, keep us all safe. As to the first statement, appellant objected “improper closing argument.” As to the second statement, appellant obj ected “community safety.” Here, appellant contends these arguments fell outside the scope of permissible arguments and improperly characterized appe llant as a predator who will certainly molest other children. The State asserts appellant failed to preserve his complaint–5– because his objections were too general and, if his complaint is reviewable, it is meritless. Assuming, without deciding, appellant preserved his complaint for review, we review the trial court’s ruling on an alle gation of improper jury argument for abuse of discretion. Garcia v. State , 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Permissible jury argument falls within on e of four areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable de ductions from the evidence; (3 ) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement. Darden v. State , 629 S.W.2d 46, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Appellant acknowledges that this Cour t and others have condoned arguments similar to the ones complained about here 1 but, citing Milton v. State and Ex parte
Lane , he contends the court of criminal appeals has held otherwise. See Milton v.
State , 572 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); Ex parte Lane , 303 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Appellant’s reliance on Milton andLane is misplaced. In Milton , the court found the State should not have played a video of a lion trying to eat a baby as a demonstrative aid during closing argument at the punishment phase of trial in a

1 See, e.g. , Shields v. State , No. 05-97-01958-CR, 1999 WL 289220, *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding State ma y argue in guilt–innocence phase that jury should not allow defendant to be freed or returned to community); Martinez v. State , 715 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref’d) (holding statement “Do you want him out there cruising in his silver ’76 Oldsmobile in your neighb orhood tonight? And a not guilty says he can do just that” was proper plea for law enforcement).–6– robbery case because in doing so the State improperly invited the jury to view the appellant’s crime as more brutal than it was. Milton , 572 S.W.3d at 244. In Lane , the court found the prosecutor went beyo nd making reasonable deductions from the admitted evidence. In that case, the prosecutor referred to a wholly new and unsubstantiated allegation that “people” sell methamphetamine to children who in turn use the methamphetamine and become addicts. Lane , 303 S.W.3d at 711. Neither scenario exis ts here. Here, the prosecutor’s characterization of appellant as uns toppable and as a “predator” accurately descri bed his actions and the evidence presented at trial. Appellant was charged with an offense that is predatorial in nature. See, e.g. , Ramos v. State , 636 S.W.3d 646, 655–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The State presented evidence appellant assaulted L.O. and D.J . when they were 8 and 11 years’ old respectively. Moreover, appellant assau lted them under the guise of an imaging process for medical diagnosis when they were both in vulnerable states. Thus, describing appellant as a predator was a proper characterization of his actions. See Graham v. State , No. 05-12-01568-CR, 2014 WL 1512476, at *7–8 (Tex. App.— Dallas Apr. 17, 2014, pet. re f’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding State’s argument referring to defendant as “a predator” was proper deduction from evidence showing defendant waited for vi ctim to die from methamphetamine overdose and then went through victim’s house taking valuables, set house on fire, and fled); Collins v. State , 2 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tex. App.—H ouston [1st Dist.] 1999,–7– pet. ref’d) (holding argument characterizing defendant as “a predator who preyed on women with small children” was prope r where it was both a summation and reasonable deduction from the evidence). With respect to the State’s characteri zation of appellant as “unstoppable,” the State presented evidence appellant assa ulted L.O. in December 2015 and D.J. in November 2016, after he had already been accused of assaulting L.O. and having been placed on administrative leave. No twithstanding the fact that appellant had been previously caught, he subsequently assaulted a young girl under the same or similar circumstances. A logical deduction fro m the evidence is th at appellant would continue this unlawful behavior unless stopped. This is a proper plea for law enforcement. See Kirkpatrick v. State , 515 S.W.2d 289, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (holding argument jury should convict defenda nt so he would not engage in further looting constituted proper pl ea for law enforcement); Martinez v. State , 822 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg 1991, no pet.) (concluding statement suggesting the accused would mole st other children ab sent conviction was proper plea for law enforcement); see also Amaro-Solis v. Lumpkin , No. H-21-1634, 2022 WL 748490, at *7 (S.D. Te x. Mar. 11, 2022) (prosecutor’s argument jury should consider future dangerousness of de fendant considered proper plea for law enforcement if substantiated by evidence). The complained-of arguments in this case were reasonable deductions from the evidence as well as pleas for law enforcement. Thus, the trial court acted within–8– its discretion in overruling a ppellant’s objections to the complained of arguments. We resolve appellant’s so le issue against him.
C ONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

D O N OT P UBLISH T EX

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210957F.U05 /David J. Schenck / DAVID J. SCHENCK JUSTICE–9– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JUSTIN LLOYD STRICKLIN, Appellant

No. 05-21-00957-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 366-83893- 2021. Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. Justices Reichek and Goldstein participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 11t h day of October, 2022.–10– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JUSTIN LLOYD STRICKLIN, Appellant
No. 05-21-00958-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 366-83894- 2021. Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. Justices Reichek and Goldstein participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this da te, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 11t h day of October, 2022.