J-S57042-16 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

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JASON JONES, 

 Appellant 

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 308 WDA 2016 

 

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 5, 2016 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012677-1998 

CP-02-CR-0013289-1998 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2016 

 Jason Jones (Appellant) pro se appeals from the February 5, 2016 

order which dismissed his petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 

as an untimely-filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

 In 1999, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of, inter alia, 

third-degree murder for which he received an aggregate sentence of 25 to 

50 years’ incarceration. No direct appeal was filed. 

 On May 15, 2000, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition. On behalf of 

Appellant, appointed counsel sought and received reinstatement of 

Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed a notice of 

appeal, but this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal in November 2001 for 
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failure to file a brief. On March 10, 2005, Appellant filed an application 

seeking to restore his direct appeal rights. This Court denied Appellant’s 

request on March 21, 2005. A subsequent petition for reargument en banc 

was also denied. Since then, Appellant has filed two post-conviction 

petitions, both of which resulted in no relief. 

 On August 21, 2015, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus ad subjiciendum in the civil division, which was later transferred to 

the criminal division. The trial court treated Appellant’s filing as a PCRA 

petition and determined that it was untimely filed. The trial court thus 

dismissed the petition without a hearing, and Appellant timely filed a notice 

of appeal. 

 We begin our review by noting the relevant legal principles. “[T]he 

PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral relief, including habeas corpus, to the 

extent a remedy is available under such enactment.” Commonwealth v. 

West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). Any PCRA petition, including 

second and subsequent petitions, must either (1) be filed within one year of 

the judgment of sentence becoming final, or (2) plead and prove a 

timeliness exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). “[A] defendant cannot escape 

the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas 

corpus.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013). 
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 However, “claims that fall outside the eligibility parameters of the 

PCRA may be raised through a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. 

Masker, 34 A.3d 841, 850 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc). Our Supreme 

Court has explained that “the boundaries of cognizable claims under the 

PCRA can only be extended so far as is consistent with the purposes of the 

statute.” Commonwealth v. Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007) 

(holding habeas corpus, not the PCRA, “was available to adjudicate whether 

defendant Judge’s deportation from Canada to face the death penalty in 

Pennsylvania... violated his rights under the International Covenant for Civil 

and Political Rights”). 

 In his petition, Appellant alleges that (1) the legislative definition of 

third-degree murder is too vague and (2) the trial court lacked statutory 

authorization to impose Appellant’s sentence. Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, 8/5/2015, at 7-10. In his brief Appellant argues 

that because “none of the cases for relief [sic] under the PCRA address the 

unique situation presented in this case” he properly petitioned for a writ of 

habeas corpus. Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

 The trial court determined that Appellant had attempted to “remove 

himself from the time limitation provisions of the PCRA” by labelling his 

petition as a writ of habeas corpus and that the court properly treated the 

petition as a PCRA petition. Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/2016, at 3. In 
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proceeding to consider Appellant’s filing under the PCRA, the trial court 

found that his petition was untimely filed. Id. Because Appellant failed to 

plead a timeliness exception, the trial court dismissed the PCRA petition. 

 It is not clear whether the relief Appellant seeks is cognizable under 

the PCRA. Compare Judge, 916 A.2d at 520 (applying habeas corpus law 

instead of the PCRA where Judge’s claim had “no connection to the truthdetermining process and [did] not render the underlying adjudication of guilt 

or innocence... unreliable”); West, 938 A.2d at 1044 (determining that

habeas corpus, rather than the PCRA, is the appropriate vehicle for a claim 

that “does not implicate the truth determining process underlying his 

conviction and sentence, nor does it implicate the legality of the sentence 

imposed”) with Commonwealth v. Stout, 978 A.2d 984, 987 (Pa. Super 

2009) (“[A]ppellant’s allegations of constitutional defects in adoption of the 

present version of the Pennsylvania Constitution and/or the Crimes Code, 

equate to a contention that the Court of Common Pleas lacked authority to 

prosecute him for the charge in question. As an attack upon the court's 

authority, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction, it could have been addressed by the 

PCRA court. To the extent appellant could have sought the same relief 

under the PCRA, he was obligated to do so, and to do so in a timely 

manner.”) 

 
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 What is clear is that Appellant cannot prevail under either the PCRA or 

habeas corpus. If the PCRA applies, his petition is untimely filed with no 

timeliness exception alleged. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 63 

A.3d 1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chester, 

895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (“[I]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this 

Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without 

jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the 

substantive claims.”); Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 

2011) (“[T]he statute confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc

equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions 

expressly delineated in the Act.”) (internal quotation omitted). 

 Appellant’s claims also are ineligible for habeas corpus relief. “It is 

well settled that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, which can be 

successfully invoked only in exceptional cases, is not a substitute for an 

appeal or a motion for a new trial, nor is it available for the correction of trial 

errors.” Com. ex rel. Williams v. Myers, 162 A.2d 419, 420 (Pa. Super. 

1960). See also Com. ex rel. Ashmon v. Banmiller, 137 A.2d 236, 238 

(Pa. 1958) (“[A] habeas corpus petition is not available for the correction of 

trial errors which could have been reviewed and corrected on appeal; it is 

not a substitute for an appeal or for a writ of error or for a motion for a new 

trial.”); Com. ex rel. Bey v. Myers, 152 A.2d 921, 922 (Pa. Super. 1959) 
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(“The sufficiency of the evidence, and any trial errors which could have been 

considered and corrected on appeal are not remediable or the subject of 

relief by habeas corpus.”). Appellant could have raised his claims related to 

the trial court’s statutory authority to sentence Appellant and the vagueness 

of the third-degree murder statute on direct appeal, but failed to do so. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s claims are not subject to habeas corpus relief. 

 Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s petition. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/7/2016