40780 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 146 /Thursday, July 30, 1998 / Notices

ACTION: Amended notice of intent.

SUMMARY: The FHWA is issuing this

amended notice to advise the public

that an environmental impact statement

will not be prepared for a proposed

highway project in Los Angeles County,

California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

C. Glenn Clinton, Chief, District

Operations—South, Federal Highway

Administration, 980—9th Street, Suite

400, Sacramento, CA 95814–2724;

Telephone: (916) 498–5037.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: No federal

funding is proposed to be used by the

City of Santa Clarita to construct the

extension of Magic Mountain Parkway

(State Route 126) from west of San

Fernando Road to Via Princessa (2.5

miles) and to construct the extension of

Via Princessa from Magic Mountain

Parkway to Rainbow Glen Drive (1.7

miles). Since there is no federal action

for the proposed project, the preparation

of an environmental impact statement

(EIS) to satisfy the requirements of the

National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) of 1969 will not be needed.

Thus this amended notice is to rescind

the earlier notice which was published

in the Federal Register on February 24,

1998 (63 FR 9293).

Per the California Environmental

Quality Act (CEQA), a Notice of

Preparation on an Environmental

Impact Report (EIR) for this project was

published on February 12, 1997 and a

45-day public comment period followed

from February 12, 1997 to March 31,

1997, including a Public Scoping

Meeting held on March 5, 1997. In

addition to the comment period and

scoping meeting, three public meetings

were conducted by the City of Santa

Clarita in November 1996. The public

and review agencies have had the

opportunity to comment on the scope

and content of the project.

Issued on: July 9, 1998.

C. Glenn Clinton,

Chief, District Operations—South,

Sacramento, California.

[FR Doc. 98–20317 Filed 7–29–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–22–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA–97–3129; Notice 2]

Ford Motor Company; Grant of

Application for Decision of

Inconsequential Noncompliance

Ford Motor Company, Dearborn,

Michigan, has estimated that

approximately 853,000 of its 1995–1997

Ford Explorer and 1997 Mercury

Mountaineer multipurpose passenger

vehicles with console armrests fail to

comply with 49 CFR 571.302, Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)

No. 302, ‘‘Flammability of Interior

Materials,’’ and has filed an appropriate

report pursuant to 49 CFR Part 573,

‘‘Defect and Noncompliance Reports.’’

On September 11, 1997, Ford applied to

the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA) to be

exempted from the notification and

remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C.

Chapter 301—‘‘Motor Vehicle Safety’’

on the basis that the noncompliance is

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.

On November 25, 1997, NHTSA

published a notice of receipt of the

application in the Federal Register (62

FR 62798) and requested comments on

it. The agency received no comments.

FMVSS No. 302, Paragraphs S4.2 and

S4.3, specify that any portion of a single

or composite material which is within

1⁄2 inch of the occupant compartment air

space, when tested in accordance with

paragraph S5, shall not burn, nor

transmit a flame across its surface, at a

rate of more than 4 inches per minute.

Composite is defined as a material that

adheres to other material(s) at every

point of contact. FMVSS No. 302’s burn

rate testing requires a 4-inch wide by

14-inch long sample, wherever possible

(S5.2).

The Ford Explorer and Mercury

Mountaineer armrests have multi-layer

cover materials: a 1.5mm thick exterior

cover, a 2mm thick second layer

Ethylene Vinyl Acetate/Polyethylene

(EVA/PE), referred to in the application

as ‘‘plus pad,’’ a 13mm thick third layer

foam bun pad, and a 3mm

polycarbonate substratum. The subject

of Ford’s application is the 2mm thick

‘‘plus pad’’ layer.

Ford acknowledged that the ‘‘plus

pad’’ material does not adhere to its

1.5mm exterior cover material or the

13mm foam bun under it at every point

of contact. Therefore, as specified in

FMVSS No. 302, the ‘‘plus pad’’

material cannot be tested with other

materials as a composite material and

has to be tested separately. Ford

reported that when the ‘‘plus pad’’

material was tested separately, it

showed a burn rate range from 8 to 10

inches per minute—a noncompliance

with FMVSS No. 302. Ford stated that

all other affected materials in the

armrest satisfy the 4-inch per minute

maximum burn rate. Ford explained

that the supplier of the ‘‘plus pad’’

material only ‘‘certified’’ the raw

material for FMVSS No. 302 by testing

11mm thick samples, not the designed

2mm thickness.

Ford supported its application for

inconsequential noncompliance with

the following:

A. Ford stated that the FMVSS No.

302 burn rate testing requirement of

cutting a sample from the ‘‘normal

configuration and packaging in the

vehicle’’ is conservative in regard to the

actual fire spreading potential of the

tested material.

B. The 2mm ‘‘plus pad’’ failed the

FMVSS No. 302 test requirements when

tested as a single material. However, a

series of further testing demonstrates

that the noncompliance does not

adversely affect occupant safety because

it does not increase the burn rates of the

assembly or the adjacent materials in

the assembly to levels higher than

specified by FMVSS No. 302.

C. The ‘‘plus pad’’ accounts for less

than 10 percent of the armrest material

and is an insignificant percentage of the

vehicle’s remaining materials. All other

flammable interior materials of the

subject vehicles complied with FMVSS

No. 302. Therefore, the noncompliance

of the ‘‘plus pad’’ offers an insignificant

portion of interior materials that could

potentially support an interior fire.

Ford attached the following summary

results of several alternative tests,

including a ‘‘worst case scenario’’ test:

1. FMVSS No. 302 type tests (cover,

plus pad, and foam)—treated the

assembly materials as a composite

material.

2. FMVSS No. 302 type tests (cover,

plus pad, and foam)—added simulations

of cut and torn of the materials:

a. Cut the cover layer longitudinally,

b. Cut a hole in the cover layer, and

c. Cut through the cover layer and the

‘‘plus pad’’ longitudinally.

3. FMVSS No. 302 type tests (plus pad

and foam)—with the cover layer

completely removed to simulate a worst

case scenario.

4. Cut a complete armrest assembly in

half along the lateral-vertical plane:

a. Exposed the opposite of the cut end

to the flame, and

b. Exposed the cut cross-section to the

flame.

All test results were less than FMVSS

No. 302’s maximum permissible 4-inch

per minute burn rate, thereby meeting

the standard.

In conclusion, Ford requested NHTSA

to grant the inconsequentiality petition

since the ‘‘plus pad’’ complied with

FMVSS No. 302’s requirements in every

other test except that when tested by

itself. Ford’s request was based on the

fact that the ‘‘plus pad’’ represents an

insignificant adverse effect on interior

material burn rate and the potential for
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 146 /Thursday, July 30, 1998 / Notices 40781

occupant injury due to interior fire and

that the noncompliance presents no

reasonably anticipated risk to motor

vehicle safety.

On October 30, 1997, NHTSA wrote

Ford for additional information about

the tests described in the application.

Ford responded to the request on

November 20, 1997. Following an

evaluation of the information provided

by Ford, on December 4, 1998, the

agency requested Ford to conduct an

additional ‘‘composite’’ test, i.e., with

the cover, plus pad, and foam bun. The

additional test would simulate another

possible ‘‘worst case scenario’’ different

from the one Ford performed. Ford did

not conduct the additional test

requested by the agency and requested

to be provided with an opportunity to

explain its position. On February 19,

1998, NHTSA and representatives from

Ford met at the agency. The Ford

representatives explained why they

believed that sufficient data were

already provided to NHTSA for

reviewing the application. Subsequent

to the meeting, Ford sent a letter to

NHTSA on March 12, 1998, formally

responding to the agency’s December 4,

1997, request. The March 12, 1998,

letter explained that the term ‘‘worst

case scenario’’ used in the Ford

application was intended to describe its

‘‘functional composite’’ test results

which simulate long term vehicle use

conditions (durability performance). All

the above-mentioned correspondence

has been placed in the docket.

NHTSA has thoroughly evaluated the

data Ford provided and carefully

considered its subsequent explanations

about the data. It agrees with Ford. The

agency has concluded that the ‘‘plus

pad’’ in the noncompliant Ford Explorer

and Mercury Mountaineer vehicles is

unlikely to pose a flammability risk due

to the unlikelihood of its exposure to an

ignition source, if the exterior cover is

not present in the first instance.

NHTSA’s evaluation of the

consequentiality of this noncompliance

should not be interpreted as a

diminution of the agency’s safety

concern for the flammability of interior

materials. Rather, it represents NHTSA’s

assessment of the gravity of this specific

noncompliance based upon the likely

consequences. Ultimately, the issue is

whether this particular noncompliance

is likely to create a risk to safety.

NHTSA is not aware of any occupant

injuries to date in vehicle post-crash

fires that were caused by burning of

console armrests in the Ford Explorer

and Mercury Mountaineer vehicles.

Based on the foregoing, NHTSA has

decided that Ford Motor Company has

met its burden of persuasion that the

noncompliance herein described is

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.

Accordingly, the application is granted,

and Ford Motor Company is exempted

from providing the notification of the

noncompliance that is required by 49

U.S.C. 30118, and from remedying the

noncompliance, as required by 49

U.S.C. 30120.

(49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120; delegations of

authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8)

Issued on: July 27, 1998.

L. Robert Shelton,

Associate Administrator for Safety

Performance Standards.

[FR Doc. 98–20383 Filed 7–29–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA–98–4008; Notice 1]

Application for Decision of

Inconsequential Noncompliance

General Motors Corporation (GM) has

determined that certain 1998 GMC

Sonoma pickup trucks, GMC Jimmy and

Oldsmobile Bravada sport utility

vehicles are equipped with daytime

running lamps (DRLs) that fail to meet

the spacing requirements of Federal

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)

108—Lamps Reflective Devices and

Associated Equipment. Pursuant to

section 30118 and 30120 of Title 49 of

the United States Code, GM applied to

the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration (NHTSA) for a decision

that the noncompliance is

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.

Concurrently, in accordance with 49

CFR 556.4(b)(6), GM has submitted a 49

CFR 573.5 noncompliance notification

to the agency.

This notice of receipt of an

application is published under 49

U.S.C. 30118 and 30120 and does not

represent any agency decision or other

exercise of judgment concerning the

merits of the application.

The DRLs on the noncompliant

vehicles are provided by the upper

beam headlamps operating at reduced

intensity, with a maximum output of

approximately 6,700 candela per lamp.

As such, FMVSS 108 requires the DRL

be located ‘‘so the distance from its

lighted edge to the optical center of the

nearest turn signal lamp is not less than

100 mm.’’ (The DRLs on the

noncompliant vehicles are not

deactivated when the turn signal or

hazard flashers are activated. If they

were deactivated under those

conditions, they would comply with the

spacing requirements of FMVSS 108

(see S5.5.11(a)(4)(iv))). In this case, the

122,455 vehicles involved provide less

than the requisite 100 mm clearance

between the DRL and the turn signal. As

a result, they fail to meet the

requirements of FMVSS 108.

GM believes that this noncompliance

is inconsequential to motor vehicle

safety for the following reasons:

1. The subject vehicles meet all

requirements of Canadian Motor Vehicle

Safety Standard No. 108 (CMVSS108)

and the identical DRL requirements

found in FMVSS 108 prior to October 1,

1995.

2. CMVSS 108 requires turn signals

that are located less than 100 mm from

a DRL to have increased intensities of

21⁄2 times the minimum photometric

values to help assure the turn signals are

readily visible. The subject vehicles

have turn signals that are much brighter.

When photometered, the turn signals on

the noncompliant vehicles were actually

more than four times brighter than the

minimum required intensities. This

increased brightness helps to assure the

turn signals are not masked by the DRL.

3. The method for determining the

optical center of the turn signal is open

to some interpretation. Traditionally,

automobile manufacturers have used the

filament axes as the determining factor.

Transport Canada has supported this

methodology. More recently, some

manufacturers have used the centroid of

the lamp as the optical center.

Depending on the method used, the turn

signal of the noncompliant vehicles is

either 71 mm (using centroid) or 85 mm

(using filament axes) away from the

DRL. Therefore the condition is within

15 percent, or using the more

conservative figure, within 30 percent of

the requirement. (For the purposes of

the application all other references to

optical center of the turn signal will be

based on the centroid, which generates

a more conservative estimate of the

distance between the turn signal and

lighted edge of the DRL.)

4. Regardless of the whether the

distance is within 15 percent or 30

percent of the 100 mm requirement, the

turn signal and the DRL diagonal to

each other. Therefore, the closest lighted

edge of the DRL is the corner of the

lamp (see figure 1). This portion of the

lamp does not significantly contribute to

the DRL beam pattern, and therefore

does not have a significant potential to

mask the turn signal.

5. Photometric values of the turn

signal 71 mm from the DRL, are not

significantly different than a turn signal

100 mm from the DRL. To demonstrate

this, on-vehicle evaluations of the turn