NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0736n.06 No. 09-5448 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. RO CK Y B RU M M ETT , Defendant-

Appellant
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PE A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AS TE RN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

O P I N I O N

BEF ORE: KEN NE DY , C OLE a nd R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. COLE, Circuit Jud ge . D e fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt R oc ky B rumme tt a

pp e a ls o ne a sp e c t of

his 240-m o n th

s e n te n c e u n d e r

2 1 U
. S. C. § § 8 4 1 , 8 4 6 an d 8 5 1 f o r c o n s p ir a c y

to ma nu f a c tu re met h am phetamine: the district cour t’s decision to deny

Br ummett’s U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manu a l ( “ Gu ide lin e s” or

“ U. S.S. G. ” ) § 5G 1. 3( c) mo ti on to i mpo se his fe de ra l se nte nc e pa rt ia lly
concur rently with his undischarg ed state se ntence . Br ummett argues spec ifical l y that the district court did not addre ss the fac to rs i n the commentar y to § 5G1.3(c) in concludingthat his feder al sentenc e should run conse cutively to his state sentence . Fo r t h e re asons below, we AF F IRM Br ummett’s sentence
. I. F ro m June 17 , 2 00 5 unti l Jan ua ry 11 , 20 07 , B rumme tt w a s invo lve d in a c on sp ir a c y

to
manu fa c tur e a t le a st f

if ty g ra ms o f met ham phe tamin e . O n Se pte mbe r 1 4, 20 06 , B rumme ttNo. 09-5448

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- 2 - committed the state off

ense of promoting c ontraba

nd in the first deg ree when he broug ht marijuana into the L aure l County

Detention Center

while servingtime there f or an unr elated o ffense. On J anuar y 11, 2007, Br

ummett committ ed the state offe nse of r ece iving stolen prope rty of the va lue of $300 or more when he rec eived a stolen al l -t errain vehicle (“A TV”) in exchang e for methamphetamine. O n Fe bruar y 14, 2007, a jury

convicted B rummett of the promoting -contra band offe nse, and he rec eived a sentenc ing e nhance ment for bei n g a p er sistent felony offe nder in the second de g ree (base d on a 2002 convic tion for possession of contra band). B rummett was sente nced in stat e co u rt t o t en y ear s in prison for this offense and enha nceme nt, with a minimum term expiration date of Apr il 17, 2014. Meanwhile, B rummett was sentenced to five y ear s in prison for the re ceiving -stolen-prope rty offe nse, to run conc urre ntly with his promoting-c ontraba nd offe nse. He re , B rumme tt p le a de d guil ty to co ns pir ing to manu fa c tur e me tha mph e tamin e in t

he U. S. District Court for the Ea stern District of K entucky . Prior to Brummett’s plea , the g overnme nt filed a noti ce that it would seek to incre ase Brummett’s mi nimum period of incar cer ation to no less than tw e nty y ears be c a

us e he po sse sse d “ a

pr ior c on vic tio n f

or a fe lony dr ugof fe ns e .” 21 U. S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(A) (vii). The pr ior felony drugconviction was in 2002 for first-deg ree possession of a controlled substanc e. On Marc h 27, 2009, Br

ummett moved under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c ) to reque st that his federa l
s en tence run par

tially concur rently with his state sentence , for whic h he wa s incarc erated until at least Apr il 1 7 , 2 0 1 4
. A t B r u mm e tt ’ s f

e d e r a l s e n te n c in g o nAp r il 7 , 2 0 0 9 , th e d is tr ic t c o urt h e ard argument on the § 5G1.3(c ) motion and dec ided to impose a 240-month mandator y -mi n i m um sentenc e c on se c uti v e ly

to Brummett’s state sentenc e. B rummett timely appea led.No. 09-5448

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- 3 - II. B o thp art i e s a g r e e th a t § 5 G 1
. 3 ( c ) a p p l i e s . S e c t i o n5 G 1
. 3 ( c ) o f t h e G u i d e l i n e s p r o v i d e s : “ In
any oth e r c a se inv olv ingan und isc ha rg e d te rm of imp ri so nme nt, the se nte nc e fo r t he ins tant o ff

e ns e may be imposed to run concu rr en t l y , partially concur rently , or conse cutively

to the prior undischarg ed ter

m of imprisonment to achieve a re asonable punishment for the instant offense.” Id. (2008). The c ommentary to the section explains further: In order to achieve a re asonable incre mental punishment for the instant offense a nd av o i d un wa rr an t edd i s p ar i ty , th e c o urt s h o u l d co n s i d er th e f o l l o wi n g: (i ) th e fa c tor s se t f

or th i n 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 84 (r e fe re nc ing18 U. S.C. § 3553(a) ); (ii) the ty pe (e.g ., deter

minate, indeterminate /parolable ) and le ng th of the prior undischa

rg ed sente nce; (i ii) the tim e se rv e d on the un dis c ha rg e d s e nte nc e and

the tim e lik e ly to be serve d befor e re lease ; (iv) the f act that the pr ior undischar g ed sente nce ma y have be en imp os e d in

state c ourt

ra the r t ha n f e de ra l c ourt , or a

t a dif fe re nt t ime befor e the same or diff

ere nt fede ral c ourt; and (v) a ny other c ircumstance rele vant to the deter mination of an appropr iate sente nce f

or the instant offe nse. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) c mt. n.3(A) (2008)
. W e re view a district c ourt’s dete rmination that sentence s should run consec utively or
concur rently under § 5G 1.3(c) for a

bus e of discr etion. Un ite d S tates v . B e rry , 565 F.3d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 2009). When a district cour t imposes consecutive se ntence s, it does not abuse its discre tion so long a s it “‘makes g ener ally clea r the rationale under

which it has imposed the conse cutiveNo. 09-5448

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- 4 - sentenc e and se ek s t o en sure a n appropr iate incr emental pe nalty for the instant off

ense.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g U

n ite d S ta te s v. Owens , 1 5 9 F.3d 221, 230 ( 6th Cir. 1998)). Howe ver, the district court does not enjoy “unfe ttered discretion[, a nd] the rec ord on appea l should show that the district c ourt turned its attention to § 5G1.3(c) and the r eleva nt commentary

in [ making ] i ts determination.” Un ite d S tates v . Co v e rt , 117 F.3d 940, 945 ( 6th Cir. 1997). B rumme tt a

rgue s th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a dd re ss t he fa c tor s li ste d in

the c omm e nta

ry to § 5G1.3(c ). He char acte rizes the district court’s c onsideration as solely focuse d “on . . . whe ther B rumme tt’ s r e c e ivi ngsto le n p ro pe rt y ov e r $ 30 0. 00 se nte nc e wa s su ff ic ie ntl y re late d to his conviction for ma

nufac turing methamphetamine[,] which was the subjec t of his f eder al sentenc ing.” (B rummett Br . 16.) B rummett acknowl ed ges t hat the district cour t ge nera lly

considere d the 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s, a s su

bs e c tio n ( i) of the c omm e nta ry to § 5G 1. 3( c ) r e qu ir e s, but c la ims it did no t do so “ in a dd

re ssi ngwh e the r B rumme tt’ s [ fede ra l] se nte nc e sh ou ld r un c on c ur re ntl y wi th his undischarg ed state se ntence .” ( Id. at 17.) T h e g overnme nt responds that the district cour t adequately

addre ssed these factor s in rea chingits § 5G1.3(c) de cision and in imposing B rummett’s sentenc e. In Be rry , we f

ound a district court’s § 5G1.3( c) discussion ade quate whe re the district court identified t hat Guidelines provision, “re cog nized the Section 3553(a ) fa ctors and disc ussed B err y ’s ag e, the pattern of c rime over his lifetime, his prior convictions and concluded that it ‘did not find
a rationale for de partingfrom those guidelines or for a var iance .’” 565 F .3d at 342-43 (quotingthe
rec ord). Ana ly

zing the district cour

t’ s l an gu age , we f

ound the statement, “ [t ]hough brief ,” to be “suff icient to demonstrate the imposit ion of the conse cutive sente nce w as re asonable ” whe n viewedNo. 09-5448

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- 5 - “in conjunction with the [district] court’s invo ca t ion of Section 3553(a) ,” as w ell as his criminal history
. Id. a t 343. We e xpla ine d: “ We h ave ne ve r h e ld t hat a dis tr ic t c ou

rt is r e qu ir e d to re pe a t a Section 3553(a) analy sis in its consideration of t he consecutive or c oncurr ent nature of a se ntence when the sa

me re asons for r ejec ting a

downwar d varia

nce also support the decision for a consec utive
s e n te n c e . ” Id. We then held: “Requiringdistrict courts to conduct a separ ate Sec tion 3553(a) analy sis for the concur re n t or consec utive nature of the sente nce w ould be re petitious and
unwar rante d, and we hold that district courts have no suc h distinct obli g ation.” Id. Simi larly , in Un ite d S

tates v . W

atf or d , the district c ourt stated that it “ consi d er ed the g uid e lin e g uid anc e in 5 G1 .3 (c ) a nd the fa c tor s se t f

or th i n th e c omm e nta

ry , as we ll as 35 84 of

Ti tle 18 and 35 53 (c )- 35 53 (a ), ” but g ro un de d it s d e c isi on to i mpo se the fe de ra l se nte nc e c on se c uti ve ly larg ely on the fa ct that “[t] he conduc t in this case has absolutely nothing to do with any

t h i n g that happene d in [connection to the s tate conviction]
. . . , [and thus] the conduc t in this case stands apar t and is separ able f

actua lly , temporally and in any other fa shion.” 468 F.3d 891, 916 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (quoting the re cord) . Reviewingthat deter min at i o n , we he ld that the district court’s e x planation, “while somewhat cur sory ,” wa s not an abuse of discretion, beca use “it is clear

that the District Court considere d the re commendations of the Guidelines and the pe rtinent policy statement.” Id. at 917; see also United States v . Harmon , 607 F.3d 233, 239-40 (6th Cir. 2010) (findingno plain err or whe re t h e district cour

t did not mention § 5G1.3(c) but was “ awa re of the leng th and par olability of [the defe ndant]’s undischarg ed state se ntence ,” discussed c oncer n r e g a r d ing know ing pr ecise ly

how long the def endant would be incarce rate d on his state conviction, and stated that § 3553(a) f actor s drove its sentence pr onounceme nt, including, “ in part, .
. . its prior denial of [ the defendant’s] reque st forNo. 09-5448

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- 6 - a c on c ur re nt s e nte nc e ” ); Un ite d Sta te s v . Ca mp be ll , 309 F.3d 928, 931 (6th Cir. 2002) (findingno abuse of discretion whe re “[t] he re cord . . . shows that the district court imposed a c onsecutive sent ence bec ause it wa s rea sonable in lig ht of the fa ctors listed § 3553(a) ,” and where the district court c oncluded that “ ‘a se ntence at the low end of the ra ng e wou l d n o t satisfy

most of the
se nte nc ingob

je c tiv e s se t out in

§ 3 55 3( a )’ ” (q

uo tin g the re c or d) ); Cov e rt , 1 17 F .3 d at 946 (“ I n th is instance w e do not believe the district court a bused its discretion even thoug h it did not, on t he
rec ord, per form the spe cific c alculations s u ggest ed by the guidelines. The totality of the re cord makes c lear

that th e d i strict court prope rly turned its attention to § 5G1.3(c) and the r eleva nt commentar

y befor e imposing a

consec utive sentenc e.”)
. Her e, the r ecor d reve als that the district c ourt rec eived detailed argument on the § 5G1.3(c ) i s s u e fr o m both parties, bef ore turningto the issue itself and holding that Br ummett’s fede ral sentenc e should run conse cutively to his undischarg ed state se ntence
. Def ense counsel arg ued that
a conc urre nt sentence was appropr iate beca use “B rummett’s rec eipt of the stolen ATVwas re lated to the underlying cha rge o f conspira cy to manufac ture methamphetamine.” ( Br ummett’s Supp. Sentenc in g M e m. o n§ 5 G 1
. 3 ( c ) , D is t. Ct
. D o c k e t N o . 1 7 9 , a t 2
. ) A t s e n te n c in g , d e f e n s e c ounsel continued to point t o t h e re lationship between the rec eiving -stolen-prope rty offe nse and the
me tha mph e tamin e co ns pir a c y

a s g ro un ds fo r i mpo sin g a pa rt ia lly c on c ur re nt f e de ra l se nte nc e to B rummett’ s st a te se nte nc e . T he g ov e rnme nt r e sp on de d th a t, whil e the re c e ivi ng -s tol e n- pr op e rt y offe n s e b roadly

related to the methamphetamine conspirac y , the forme r convic tion punished something e ntirely

separ ate. The gove rnment also emphasiz ed that “[t]he 2001 conviction, which

. . . f or m[e d] th e ba sis fo r h is [2 1 U .S. C. §] 85 1 e nh anc e me nt, wa s w e ll b e fo re the tim e pe ri od of thi sNo. 09-5448

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- 7 - conspirac y , [and] was not encompa ssed by this conspiracy .” (Sente ncingHr’gTr., Dist. Ct. Docket No. 206, at 24.) Subsequently , the di strict court discussed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac tors, including the need to protect the public a

nd provide de t er renc e, B rummett’s drugaddiction issues, and his nee d for vocational tra ining. The court then c o n s i d ere d “whe ther this sentenc e should be c oncurr ent or partially concur rent unde r 5G1.3,” ( id. at 29-30): An d I c e rt a inl y un de rs tand

the argume nts tha

t ha ve be e n r a ise d a s to the va ri ou s st a te t erm s t h ath av e b ee ni mp o s ed , an d I d o u n d e r s t an d th e a rgu m en tth at th e c h ar ge re fl e c te d in

pa ra g ra ph 96 [the po sse ssi on -o f- c on tr a ba nd c on vic tio n], Ibe lie ve it w a s, would be the c harg e that would be used as an enha nceme nt under 851, but that is too tenu o u s f o r th e Co urt t o u s e th a t a s a r e a s o nto im

p o s e a p arti a ll y c o n c ur rent se nte nc e . I do un de rs ta

nd that the Court

c a n c on sid e r a ll i nf

or matio n in the c a se in deter mining whe ther a

concur rent or pa

rtially concur rent sen t en ce would be appropr iate, but under

the circ umstances of

this particul ar case and for the re asons that I explained dur ing my questions and my

discussion with counsel, Idon’t believe it would be appropr iate in this particular case . And, quite frankly , I don’t believe that the ot her c harg e for

which Mr. B rummett rec eived a five-year sentenc e would be sufficie ntly connec ted. While he was de aling with the co-de fenda nt [ for the stolen ATV], . . . he was c onvicted for re ce i v i ng stolen proper ty , which is a sepa

rate and independe nt crime [from conspiracy to manufa cture methamphetamine].
. . . And the oth e r c ha rg e tha t f or ms the ba sis fo r t

he 85 1 e nh anc e me nt i s e ve n mo re te nu ou s. And so the Court doesn’t be lieve that it would be appropriate [to run the sente nces c on c ur re ntl y or pa rt ia lly c on c ur re ntl y ], but I

c e rt a inl y do un de rs tand

and a pp re c iate the ar g ument in that reg ard that has bee n made. ( Id. at 30-31.) Ex amination of the district cour t’s discussion, especia lly

in light of it s colloquies with the pa rt ie s, re ve a ls that it a de qu a te ly “ tur ne d its a tte nti on to § 5G 1. 3( c ) and the re le va nt c omm e nta

ry in [m aking ] i ts determination.” Cov e rt , 117 F.3d at 945. I n Be rry , we he ld that a district court ne ed not g o throug h the § 3553(a) fac tors separ ately in the context of § 5G1.3(c) , 565 F.3d at 343, and theNo. 09-5448

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- 8 - district court her e ade quately discussed t he § 3553(a) fac tors befor e turning to the § 5G1.3(c ) issue. Moreove r, her e the district court expli citly ref err ed to § 5G1.3(c )—albe it not the commentary —and dis c us se d it s d isc re tio n th e re un de r to run B rumme tt’ s f e de ra l se nte nc e c on c ur

re ntl y , p art ia lly
concur rently , or conse cutively
. Compare United States v. Coleman , 15 F.3d 610, 613 (6th Cir. 1994) (vac ating a conse cutive fe dera l sentence when the district judg e “did not expressly turn his attention to § 5G1.3(c) and Application note 3 of the commentary ” an d t h e revie wing court c ould not deter mine “whe ther the district c ourt’s f ailure to e x pressly

addre ss the g uideline and c ommentary resulted in an incorrec t application of the SentencingGuidelines”) , with Se nte nc ingHr ’gTr ., Di st. Ct. Do ck et No
. 206, at 29-30 (spe cifica lly addre ssing “ whether

[t he fe dera l] sentenc e should be
concur rent or pa rtially concur rent unde r 5G1.3” to Brummett’s undischa rg ed state se ntence ). And though the district c ourt did not specifica lly discuss the fac tors in the commentar y , “the totality

of the re c or d s ho ws that the [dis tr ic t] c ourt c on sid e re d ea c h of the fa c tor s c on ta ine d in a pp lic a tio n n ote 3(A) a nd thus committ ed no er

ror.” Harmon , 607 F.3d at 239. The district c ourt and B rummett’s counsel h ad an ex t ensive discussion about the nature a nd leng th of the sentenc es for both of Br ummett’s state convictions, ( seeSentencingHr’gTr., Dist . Ct. Docket No. 206, at 13-15), demonstratingthat thed is tric t c o u r t c o n s id ere d the “ty

pe (e .g ., deter

minate, indeter

minate/parola

ble)
and le ng th o f [B rumme tt’ s] pr ior un dis c ha rg e d s e nte nc e ,” U. S.S. G. § 5 G1 .3 c mt. n. 3( A) (i i) ; se e als o W atf or d , 4 68 F .3 d at 91 7. F ur

the rm or e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fo c us on the re late dn e ss o f t

he fa c ts underlying the state and f eder al sentenc es is appropr iate, se e W atf or d , 468 F.3d at 9 17, and
un de rs tand a

ble g ive n th a t de fe ns e c ouns e l c on c e ntr a te d a lmo st e xclusi vel y on thi s is su e in h is §No. 09-5448

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- 9 - 5G1.3( c ) ar g u me n t. T h e r e c o r d th u s d e mo n s tr a te s th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o urt a d e qu a te ly e xami n e d

the fac tors in § 5G1.3(c) and the c ommentary in rea chingits decision. III . For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM B rumme tt’ s c on se c uti ve se nte nc e of 24 0 mo nth s.