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IRO B. ALTRAIDE v. IBIBIA ALTRAIDE

(AC 35409)

Gruendel, Alvord and Mihalakos, Js.

Argued April 24—officially released October 7, 2014

(Appeal from the Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Westbrook, J. [pendente lite order; judgment];

Bozzuto, J. [motions for contempt and to modify].)

Ibibia Altraide, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).

W. Anthony Stevens, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. The self-represented defendant,

Ibibia Altraide, appeals from the judgments of the trial

court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Iro B.

Altraide, and deciding certain postjudgment motions.

The defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by (1) ordering him to pay child support pendente

lite, (2) awarding the plaintiff alimony, child support,

attorney’s fees, and sole custody of their child in the

dissolution, and (3) deciding two postjudgment

motions, specifically, granting the plaintiff’s postjudgment motion for contempt1 and denying the defendant’s

postjudgment motion for modification.2 We dismiss as

moot the defendant’s claim regarding the pendente lite

order and affirm the judgments of the trial court in all

other respects.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and

the defendant were married in Port Harcourt, Nigeria,

in 2006. After moving to Connecticut, the couple had

a child in 2009. Throughout the marriage there were

several periods of separation and reconciliation, culminating in a complaint for legal separation filed by the

plaintiff on March 16, 2012.

On April 4, 2012, the court issued a pendente lite

order requiring, inter alia, the defendant to pay the

plaintiff $228 per week in child support until a final

judgment could be rendered. On January 24, 2013, a

trial was held and the court thereafter rendered a final

judgment dissolving the marriage and ordering, inter

alia, (1) the defendant to pay the plaintiff $200 per week

in alimony for a period of three years or until such time

as the plaintiff obtained full-time employment, (2) the

defendant to pay the plaintiff $228 per week in child

support, and (3) the plaintiff to receive sole custody of

the child.

Following the trial, the plaintiff filed several motions

for contempt alleging that the defendant had disregarded the court’s order to pay alimony. The court held

three contempt hearings in April, July, and September

of 2013. At each of the hearings, the court found that

the defendant had failed to pay alimony and determined

the amount in arrearage. The court later found the

defendant in contempt and, on September 17, 2013,

the defendant was ordered incarcerated for failure to

comply with the court’s alimony order. On that same

day, the defendant made a $1000 payment to the plaintiff

and was released from jail. This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review

governing all of the defendant’s claims. ‘‘The well settled standard of review in domestic relations cases is

that this court will not disturb trial court orders unless

the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its

findings have no reasonable basis in the facts.’’(Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228

Conn. 729, 739, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994). ‘‘[T]o conclude

that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find

that the court eitherincorrectly applied the law or could

not reasonably conclude as it did. . . . Appellate

review of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by

the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on

the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn.

App. 631, 634, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn.

908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).

I

The defendant first argues that the court abused its

discretion by awarding the plaintiff pendente lite child

support payments in the amount of $228. We do not

reach the merits of this claim, as the question presented

is moot.3

‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be

determined as a threshold matter because it implicates

[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .

Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a

resolution on the merits it must be justiciable.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367, 373–74, 944 A.2d 276 (2008).

Pendente lite orders are temporary orders of the court

that are necessarily extinguished once a final judgment

has been rendered. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193,

201, 856 A.2d 997 (2004). Once a final judgment has

been rendered, an issue with respect to a pendente lite

order is moot because an appellate court can provide

no practical relief. Id. As a result, an appellate court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a pendente lite

order after the trial court has rendered a final judgment. Id.

In the present matter, the pendente lite order was

issued on April 4, 2012. That order remained in effect

until January 24, 2013, when the marriage was dissolved

and a final judgment was rendered by the court. When

the final judgment was rendered, the pendente lite order

ceased to exist. Accordingly, the issue on appeal is

moot and, as a result, we do not address the merits of

the defendant’s claim. See Brown v. Brown, 69 Conn.

App. 209, 210, 794 A.2d 550 (2002).

II

The defendant next claims that the court abused its

discretion in awarding alimony, child support, attorney’s fees, and custody of the child to the plaintiff.

We disagree.

The law regarding financial orders in a marital disso-
lution action is well settled. ‘‘[G]reat weight is given to

the judgment of the trial court because of its opportunity to observe the parties and the evidence. Moreover,

the power to act equitably is the keystone to the court’s

ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a marriage.

. . . For that reason, we allow every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the correctness of [the trial

court’s] action.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350,

366, 710 A.2d 717 (1998).

A

The defendant claims that the court erred in awarding

the plaintiff alimony. Specifically, the defendant argues

that the alimony order was excessive and unsupported

by the facts. We disagree.

General Statutes § 46b-82 governs the court’s ability

to award alimony. It provides in relevant part that a

court, in deciding whether to award alimony, ‘‘shall

consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the

annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and

sources of income, vocational skills, employability,

estate and needs of each of the parties and the award

[regarding the assignment of property] . . . and, in

the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor

children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent’s securing employment.’’ General Statutes § 46b-82

(a). Although the court must consider all of the factors,

an express finding on each is not necessary. Cushman

v. Cushman, 93 Conn. App. 186, 191, 888 A.2d 156

(2006). The trial court must, however, indicate a basis

for the amount and the duration of the award, and show

facts that logically support it. Nashid v. Andrawis, 83

Conn. App. 115, 122–23, 847 A.2d 1098, cert. denied,

270 Conn. 912, 853 A.2d 528 (2004).

In the present case, the court properly considered

the alimony factors and articulated facts that logically

supported its decision to award alimony of $200 per

week to the plaintiff. After considering the evidence

presented by both parties, the court made several findings, all of which support the basis for the award. First,

the court considered the station, occupation, amount

and sources of income of the parties. The court heard

testimony that the defendant had an established career

as an engineer, while the plaintiff had only recently

finished graduate school and was employed on a parttime basis. In fact, financial affidavits confirmed that

the defendant earned a weekly income that was greater

than four times the amount earned by the plaintiff.

The court also found that the defendant had earned

additional income from a rental apartment located

above his residence.

Next, the court considered the needs of parties, and
the desirability and feasibility of the plaintiff securing

employment after she was awarded sole custody of the

parties’ minor child. There was evidence before the

court that the plaintiff’s expenses, although modest,

greatly exceeded her income. Finally, the court considered the length of the marriage and the causes of its

dissolution. The plaintiff testified at the trial that the

defendant once reacted to a domestic violence incident

involving the parties by shutting off the utilities at the

plaintiff’s residence. The plaintiff also testified that, on

a separate occasion, the defendant caused the couple’s

child to stop receiving government aid. The court credited this testimony and found that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff has

suffered great financial hardship largely because of the

acts of the defendant.’’ These findings of fact adequately

support the court’s decision to award alimony.

The alimony order was limited to a period of three

years or until such time as the plaintiff obtained fulltime employment. ‘‘Underlying the concept of time limited alimony is the sound policy that such awards may

provide an incentive for the spouse receiving support

to use diligence in procuring training or skills necessary

to attain self-sufficiency.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Hopfer v. Hopfer, 59 Conn. App. 452, 460, 757

A.2d 673 (2000). In the present case, the court heard

testimony that the plaintiff had recently completed

graduate school in 2012, and had been actively pursuing

full-time employment while also caring for a young

child. The court therefore properly found that three

years was a reasonable timeframe to encourage the

plaintiff’s self-sufficiency. Accordingly, we conclude

that awarding time limited alimony under these circumstances does not constitute an abuse of discretion by

the court.

B

Next, we turn to the child support order. The defendant argues that the court erred by not considering the

plaintiff’s receipt of social security assistance, pendente

lite payments, and alimony payments in setting the

award for child support. We disagree.

General Statutes § 46b-84 governs the court’s power

to award child support. The statute requires in relevant

part that, upon divorce, parents will continue to be

responsible for ‘‘maintain[ing] the child according to

their respective abilities . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b84 (a). Section 46b-84 (d) provides: ‘‘In determining

whether a child is in need of maintenance and, if in

need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide

such maintenance and the amount thereof, the court

shall consider the age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of income, estate,

vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources of

income, vocational skills, employability, estate and
needs of the child.’’

Similar to the order for alimony, the court reviewed

the positions of both parties and determined that the

defendant had the respective ability to contribute $228

per week to support the child.4 Additionally, the court

considered testimony from the plaintiff regarding the

child’s age and health.5 Finally, the court found that

the child support order was consistent with the child

support guidelines, as set forth in § 46b-215a-1 et seq.

of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, for a

person with a similar weekly income as the defendant.6

The defendant argues that the court should have considered additional factors when setting the child support order, including the plaintiff’s receipt of social

security assistance, the pendente lite payments, and the

alimony order. The defendant has not demonstrated,

however, that the court failed to consider the factors

in § 46b-84 (d), and ‘‘we presume that the court, in

rendering its judgment . . . undertook the proper analysis of the law and the facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Brett Stone Painting & Maintenance, LLC v.

New England Bank, 143 Conn. App. 671, 681, 72 A.3d

1121 (2013). Therefore, we conclude thatthe court properly reviewed the statutory factors and did not abuse

its discretion.

C

The defendant argues that the court improperly

ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s

fees even though he could not afford to retain his own

counsel. We disagree.

In this case, the plaintiff’s counsel, Attorney Ronald

T. Scott, represented the plaintiff pro bono and

requested, at the conclusion of the trial, that attorney’s

fees be awarded because of the unexpected effort

required to respond to the defendant’s numerous

motions. In the period of time between the original

divorce filing and the final judgment, the defendant filed

thirty-four motions with the court.7

The law regarding an award of attorney’s fees is well

settled. General Statutes § 46b-62 governs the award of

attorney’s fees in dissolution proceedings and provides

in relevant part that ‘‘the court may order either spouse

. . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other

in accordance with their respective financial abilities

and the criteria set forth in [§] 46b-82.’’ Additionally, a

court may order the full amount of reasonable attorney’s fees, even when the attorney was providing representation for free or at a reduced cost. See Benavides v.

Benavides, 11 Conn. App. 150, 156, 526 A.2d 536 (1987).8

As discussed in part II A of this opinion, the court

considered the statutory factors under § 46b-82 and

determined each party’s financial capacity. The court

had before it evidence that the plaintiff was of little

means and did not have the resources to retain counsel,
whereas the defendant was employed full-time and

earned a substantial salary. Given the large disparity in

the respective income of the parties and the plaintiff’s

lack of resources, we conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney’s fees.

D

The defendant further argues that the court’s order

awarding the plaintiff sole custody of the child was

arbitrary and lacked a basis in fact. We do not agree.

General Statutes § 46b-56 provides the legal standard

for determining child custody issues. The statute

requires that the court’s decision serve the child’s best

interests. Wilson v. Wilson, 38 Conn. App. 263, 269, 661

A.2d 621 (1995). ‘‘In determining what is in the best

interests of the child, the court is vested with a broad

discretion. . . . [W]e are not privileged to usurp that

authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial court.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lederle v. Spivey,

113 Conn. App. 177, 185, 965 A.2d 621, cert. denied, 291

Conn. 916, 970 A.2d 728 (2009).

Although the court did not state a specific factual

basis in its memorandum of decision before awarding

the plaintiff sole custody, the record is sufficient to

support the custody order. During the trial, the court

heard the testimony of Attorney Seon Bagot, the guardian ad litem assigned to represent the interests of the

parties’ child. Bagot testified that he had met with the

parents and the child, conducted home visits, and contacted the child’s pediatrician and teacher. Additionally,

he reviewed state records and monitored e-mail communications between the parties. After reviewing this

information, Bagot concluded that the plaintiff should

receive sole custody of the child. This recommendation

was based on several factors, including: (1) the defendant’s intention of moving to Nigeria, (2) the defendant’s inconsistent availability due to his work

schedule, and (3) the defendant’s short and infrequent

visits with the child. This record sufficiently supports

the court’s decision to award sole custody to the plaintiff, and that decision does not constitute an abuse

of discretion.

III

Finally, the defendant challenges two of the court’s

postjudgment orders. The defendant argues that the

court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and in denying the defendant’s motion for modification. We disagree.

A

The defendant argues that the court improperly found

him in contempt on July 30, 2013. In particular, he

argues that the court’s finding of contempt was based

solely on ‘‘mere representations from the plaintiff.’’ We
do not agree.

‘‘Recently, our Supreme Court clarified the standard

of review applicable to civil judgments of contempt in

In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).

The court explained: ‘[O]ur analysis of a judgment of

contempt consists of two levels of inquiry. First, we

must resolve the threshold question of whether the

underlying order constituted a court order that was

sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a

judgment of contempt. . . . This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. . . . Second, if we conclude

that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear

and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the

trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing

to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a

review of the trial court’s determination of whether the

violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute

or misunderstanding.’ ’’ Behrns v. Behrns, 124 Conn.

App. 794, 808, 6 A.3d 184 (2010).

In analyzing the defendant’s claim on appeal, some

additional facts and procedural history are helpful. On

January 24, 2013, the court rendered a dissolution judgment that, in part, ordered the defendant to pay $200

in alimony to the plaintiff each week for three years or

until she obtained full-time employment. On April 30,

2013, the court found that the defendant had failed to

make a single alimony payment, resulting in an arrearage of $2600. The court ordered the arrearage to be

paid at a rate of $20 per week until it was paid in full,

but did not find the defendant in contempt. On July 30,

2013, the court found that the defendant had still not

made any payment towards either the current alimony

order orthe arrearage. Upon concluding thatthe ‘‘defendant willfully violated the court’s order dated January

24, 2013,’’ the court held the defendant in contempt.

We begin by reviewing the alimony order to determine whether it is sufficiently clear. The alimony order

from January 24, 2013, required, in relevant part, that

‘‘[t]he defendant shall pay the plaintiff $200 a week in

alimony forthree years or until such time as the plaintiff

attains full-time employment.’’ Although the defendant

argues that this order was ‘‘vague,’’ this argument is

without merit. The court order required the defendant

to pay the plaintiff a definite amount of money at specified intervals. We therefore conclude that the alimony

order was clear and unambiguous, and that the defendant was properly placed on notice that he was required

to pay the aforementioned amount of alimony to the

plaintiff.

Next, we turn to whether there was a proper factual

basis for the court’s finding that the defendant had

wilfully refused to comply with the court order. ‘‘[I]f

a finding of wilful [contempt] is based on a court’s

determination of the credibility of relevant testimony

at trial, we will overturn it only if the record demon-
strates a manifest abuse of discretion.’’ LaBossiere v.

Jones, 117 Conn. App. 211, 224, 979 A.2d 522 (2009). In

this case, the court heard the following relevant testimony from the defendant. On July 30, 2013, the defendant testified that he earned a weekly income of $1160

per week. This is essentially the same weekly income

that was reported on his financial affidavit during the

dissolution proceedings.9 The court also heard from the

plaintiff’s counsel, who asserted that the defendant had

‘‘not paid one penny of alimony or arrearage payment.’’

After hearing from both the plaintiff and the defendant,

the court found that, despite the defendant’s unchanged

weekly income since the initial order, he had steadfastly

refused to make even partial payment in compliance

with the alimony order.10 In conclusion, the court did

not abuse its discretion by finding the defendant in

wilful contempt of the court’s order.

B

The defendant last argues that his postjudgment

motion for modification was erroneously denied. We

disagree.

Modification of orders for alimony or child support

is governed by General Statutes § 46b-86. Section 46b86 (a) requires that the moving party demonstrate that

one of the parties had sustained a ‘‘substantial change

in . . . circumstances . . . .’’ This change in circumstances must be one that arose afterthe original dissolution judgment was rendered. Borkowski v. Borkowski,

supra, 228 Conn. 736. This requirement avoids giving a

party an opportunity to relitigate an already settled

issue. Id., 735–36.

In the present case, the defendant was given an

opportunity to establish a substantial change in circumstances during a two day hearing on September 17 and

18, 2013. At that hearing, the defendant argued that

(1) the plaintiff had increased her income since the

dissolution, (2) he had since become engaged to be

married, (3) he had suffered a reduction in income due

to a change in his tax filing status, and (4) he had high

expenses due to a large residential mortgage. The court

addressed each claim separately. First, the court found

that the plaintiff’s income had not increased since the

marital dissolution because her temporary job ended

in April and she had not yet found full-time employment.

Second, the court found that the defendant’s recent

engagement was not a factor that altered his ability to

pay alimony. Third, the defendant’s change in tax filing

status was not a proper ground for modification. Finally,

the court held that the mortgage expenses could not

be considered because they were part of the property

settlement in the judgment of dissolution and not a

substantial change since the final judgment. The defendant therefore failed to carry the burden of showing that

a substantial change in circumstances had occurred.

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for

modification.

The defendant’s appeal regarding the pendente lite

order is dismissed as moot. The judgments are affirmed

in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant additionally argues that the court refused to rule on a

contempt motion filed against the plaintiff. The record, however, contains

no indication from the court that it would not consider the motion for

contempt or that the defendant was barred from seeking a hearing and

adjudication of his motion. On the record before us, we thus conclude that

the defendant has not appealed from a final judgment. See Ramin v. Ramin,

281 Conn. 324, 337 n.7, 915 A.2d 790 (2007); Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243

Conn. 471, 478–80, 706 A.2d 960 (1998). We therefore dismiss the defendant’s

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ahneman v. Ahneman,

supra, 478–79.

2 The defendant also argues that the court lacked jurisdiction over this

case because a prior divorce action had been filed in Nigeria. The test for

jurisdiction over marital actions is domicile. Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn.

540, 545, 295 A.2d 519 (1972). The record confirms, based on the testimony

of the plaintiff and the defendant, that both parties were residents of Connecticut for twelve months prior to the filing of the complaint. Jurisdiction

in this state is therefore proper.

The defendant makes a bevy of other arguments which can be generally

categorized as allegations of prejudice and bias by the trial judge. This court

declines to review these claims that are improperly briefed and lack any

legal support. See Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 503 n.4, 72 A.3d 367

(2013) (claims asserted without citation to legal authority not reviewed).

3 Although it is well established that a pendente lite child support order

is an immediately appealable final judgment; Gong v. Huang, 129 Conn.

App. 141, 148, 21 A.3d 474, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 907, 23 A.3d 1247 (2011);

it is unclear from the record in the present case whether the defendant

appealed from the pendente lite order. We need not resolve this ambiguity

in light of our conclusion that his claim is moot.

4 See part II A of this opinion for a discussion of the court’s consideration

of the financial affidavits of both parties, as well as the testimony regarding

the parties’ educational background and current employment status.

5 The plaintiff testified that their child was born on August 6, 2009. Additionally, the plaintiff testified that the child was born ‘‘almost five months

premature’’ and therefore required physical and occupational therapy for

about two years.

6 The defendant’s financial affidavit states that he earns approximately

$1100 in weekly income. The Commission for Child Support Guidelines

advise that a person with one child and weekly income of $1100 should pay

$241 per week in child support.

7 Several of these motions appear to serve no other purpose than to delay

the proceedings or harass the plaintiff. For example, on June 25, 2012, the

defendant filed a motion for counsel fees even though he was a pro se party.

On August 24, 2012, he filed a motion for an immediate hearing followed

by a September 4, 2012 motion for continuance, which was followed by a

September 21, 2012 motion for an immediate hearing.

8

In Benavides, this court reversed the trial court’s decision to reduce an

award of attorney’s fees on the basis that the plaintiff had been represented

by a nonprofit organization. Benavides v. Benavides, supra, 11 Conn. App.

156. This court stated: ‘‘It would be unreasonable to allow a losing party in

a family relations matter to reap the benefits of free representation to the

other party. A party should not be encouraged to litigate under the assumption that no counsel fee will be awarded in favor of the indigent party

represented by public legal services . . . .’’ Id., 154.

9 On January 24, 2013, the defendant signed a financial affidavit which

stated a weekly income of $1148.85. The court used this information in

setting the initial alimony order of $200 per week. At the motion for contempt

hearing, the defendant failed to assert any change in his income that would

have negatively impacted his ability to comply with the order.

10 The defendant additionally argued before the trial court that he was

unable to pay the alimony due to weekly expenses of almost $2000. We

acknowledge that ‘‘[t]he inability of a party to obey an order of the court,

without fault on his part, is a good defense to the charge of contempt. . . .
The contemnor must establish that he cannot comply, or was unable to

do so.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v.

Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 532, 710 A.2d 757 (1998). A party may not, however,

choose ‘‘to prioritize the payment of his own nonessential expenses over

the payment owed to the plaintiff.’’ Brody v. Brody, 145 Conn. App. 654,

664, 77 A.3d 156 (2013). The defendant’s claimed nonessential personal

expenses are not a proper basis for his failure to comply with the court’s

alimony order.