[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 20 (Friday, January 30, 1998)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 4572-4580]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-1955]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

32 CFR Part 147

RIN 0790-AG54


Personnel Security Policies for Granting Access to Classified 
Information

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Interim final rule.

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SUMMARY: This rule is published to streamline security practices 
throughout the government, uniform adjudicative guidelines, 
investigative standards and guidelines for temporary access are being 
established. This initiative will simplify security processing and 
allow the deserving public to obtain a security clearance in a faster, 
more efficient manner.

DATES: This rule is effective March 24, 1997. Comments must be received 
by March 31, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Forward comments to the Security Policy Board Staff, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1101, Arlington, VA 22202.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. T. Thompson, 703-602-9969.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review

    It has been determined that this interim rule (32 CFR part 147) is 
not a significant regulatory action. The rule does not:
    (1) Have an annual effect to the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy; a section of the 
economy; productivity; competition; jobs; the environment; public 
health or safety; or State, local, or tribal governments or 
communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an 
action taken or planned by another Agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, 
user fees, or loan programs, or the rights and obligations of 
recipients thereof; or

[[Page 4573]]

    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal 
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in 
this Executive Order.

Public Law 96-354, Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601)

    It has been certified that this rule is not subject to the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601) because it would not, if 
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities. This part will streamline personnel security 
clearance procedures and make the process more efficient.

Public Law 96-511, Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)

    It has been certified that this part does not impose any reporting 
or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 147

    Classified information, Investigations, Security measures.

    Accordingly, Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 
I, subchapter C is amended to add part 147 to read as follows:
PART 147--ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR 
ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Subpart A--Adjudicative Guidelines

Sec.
147.1  Introduction.
147.2  Adjudicative process.
147.3  Guideline A--Allegiance to the United States.
147.4  Guideline B--Foreign influence.
147.5  Guideline C--Foreign preference.
147.6  Guideline D--Sexual behavior.
147.7  Guideline E--Personal conduct.
147.8  Guideline F--Financial considerations.
147.9  Guideline G--Alcohol consumption.
147.10  Guideline H--Drug involvement.
147.11  Guideline I--Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.
147.12  Guideline J--Criminal conduct.
147.13  Guideline K--Security violations.
147.14  Guideline L--Outside activities.
147.15  Guideline M--Misuse of information technology systems.

Subpart B--Investigative Standards

147.18  Introduction.
147.19  The three standards.
147.20  Exception to periods of coverage.
147.21  Expanding investigations.
147.22  Transferability.
147.23  Breaks in service.
147.24  The national agency check.

Subpart C--Guidelines for Temporary Access

147.28  Introduction.
147.29  Temporary eligibility for access.
147.30  Temporary eligibility for access at the CONFIDENTIAL AND 
SECRET levels and temporary eligibility for ``L'' access 
authorization.
147.31  Temporary eligibility for access at the TOP SECRET levels 
and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization. For 
someone who is the subject of a favorable investigation not meeting 
the investigative standards for access at those levels.
147.32  Temporary eligibility for access at the TOP SECRET and SCI 
levels and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization: For 
someone who is not the subject of a current, favorable personnel or 
personnel-security investigation of any kind.
147.33  Additional requirements by agencies.

    Authority: E.O. 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p 391).

Subpart A--Adjudication


Sec. 147.1  Introduction.

    The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all 
United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, 
contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders 
or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require 
access to classified information. They apply to persons being 
considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to 
classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information 
and special access programs and are to be used by government 
departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.


Sec. 147.2  Adjudicative process.

    (a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient 
period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the 
person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to 
classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these 
personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful 
weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. 
Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, 
favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a 
determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, 
the adjudicator should consider the following actors:
    (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
    (2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include 
knowledgeable participation;
    (3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
    (4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
    (5) The voluntariness of participation;
    (6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent 
behavioral changes;
    (7) The motivation for the conduct;
    (8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;
    (9) The likelihood of continuation of recurrence.
    (b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final 
determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or 
agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is 
clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of 
the national security.
    (c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or 
continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly 
consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall 
common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the 
following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole 
person, as explained further below:
    (1) Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States.
    (2) Guideline B: Foreign influence.
    (3) Guideline C: Foreign preference.
    (4) Guideline D: Sexual behavior.
    (5) Guideline E: Personal conduct.
    (6) Guideline F: Financial considerations.
    (7) Guideline G: Alcohol consumption.
    (8) Guideline H: Drug involvement.
    (9) Guideline I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.
    (10) Guideline J: Criminal conduct.
    (11) Guideline K: Security violations.
    (12) Guideline L: Outside activities.
    (13) Guideline M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems.
    (d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may 
not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may 
be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring 
pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally 
unstable behavior. Notwithstanding, the whole person concept, pursuit 
of further investigations may be terminated by an appropriate 
adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, 
disqualifying, adverse information.
    (e) When information of security concern becomes known about an 
individual who is currently eligible for access to classified 
information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
    (1) Voluntarily reported the information;
    (2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;

[[Page 4574]]

    (3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where 
appropriate;
    (4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security 
concern;
    (5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
    (6) Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending 
final adjudication of the information.
    (f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the 
adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to 
warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security 
clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning 
that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of 
access.


Sec. 147.3  Guideline A--Allegiance to the United States.

    (a) The concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance 
to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified 
information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an 
individual's allegiance to the Untied States.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) Involvement in any act of sabotage, 
espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to 
overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of 
government by unconstitutional means;
    (2) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to 
commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
    (3) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that 
advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or 
subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;
    (4) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice 
the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from 
exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States or of any state.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or 
organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
    (2) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or 
humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
    (3) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short 
period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
    (4) The person has had no recent involvement or association with 
such activities.


Sec. 147.4   Guideline B--Foreign influence.

    (a) The concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's 
immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or 
she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not 
citizens of the Untied States or may be subject to duress. These 
situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could 
result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with 
citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries 
are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual 
potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) An immediate family member, or a person to 
whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a 
citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;
    (2) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign 
influence or duress exists;
    (3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with 
any foreign government;
    (4) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign 
nationals;
    (5) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator 
or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
    (6) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, 
exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
    (7) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign 
country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to 
possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;
    (8) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any 
foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual 
vulnerable to foreign influence.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) A 
determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, 
mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or 
associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a 
position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force 
the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and 
the United States;
    (2) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official 
United States Government business;
    (3) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and 
infrequent;
    (4) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency 
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats 
from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
    (5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to 
affect the individual's security responsibilities.


Sec. 147.5  Guideline C--Foreign preference.

    (a) The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to 
indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, 
then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions 
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (1) The exercise of dual citizenship;
    (2) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
    (3) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign 
country;
    (4) Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as 
retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
    (5) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship 
requirements;
    (6) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business 
interests in another country;
    (7) Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
    (8) Voting in foreign elections;
    (9) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise 
acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in 
preference to the interests of the United States.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a 
foreign country;
    (2) Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign 
military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
    (3) Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
    (4) Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual 
citizenship.


Sec. 147.6  Guidance D--Sexual behavior.

    (a) The concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it 
involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional 
disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or 
duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion.\1\ Sexual 
orientation or

[[Page 4575]]

preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in 
determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.
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    \1\ The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining 
to criminal conduct (Guideline J) and emotional, mental and 
personality disorders (Guideline I) in determining how to resolve 
the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.
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    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, 
whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
    (2) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is 
unable to stop a pattern or self-destructive or high-risk behavior or 
that which is symptomatic of a personally disorder;
    (3) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to 
coercion, exploitation, or duress;
    (4) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects 
lack of discretion or judgment.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no 
evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
    (2) The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of 
subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
    (3) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, 
irresponsibility, or emotional instability;
    (4) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, 
exploitation, or duress.


Sec. 147.7  Guideline E--Personal conduct.

    (a) The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that 
the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The 
following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or 
administrative termination of further processing for clearance 
eligibility:
    (1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security 
processing, including medical and psychological testing;
    (2) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or 
provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of 
investigators, security officials or other representatives in 
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying also include: (1) Reliable, unfavorable information 
provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other 
acquaintances;
    (2) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of 
relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, 
personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct 
investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or 
status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or 
award fiduciary responsibilities;
    (3) Deliberately providing false or misleading information 
concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security 
official, competent medical authority, or other representative in 
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;
    (4) Personal conduct or concealment of information that may 
increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or 
duties, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the 
person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the 
person susceptible to blackmail;
    (5) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation 
of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and 
the agency;
    (6) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination 
of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
    (2) The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and 
the individual has subsequently provided correct information 
voluntarily;
    (3) The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the 
falsification before being confronted with the facts;
    (4) Omission of material facts was caused or significantly 
contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized 
personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and 
fully provided;
    (5) The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce 
or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
    (6) A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel 
or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with 
security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the 
requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
    (7) Association with persons involved in criminal activities has 
ceased.


Sec. 147.8  Guideline F--Financial considerations.

    (a) The concern. An individual who is financially overextended is 
at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. 
Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially 
profitable criminal acts.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) A history of not meeting financial 
obligations;
    (2) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, 
employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, 
filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial 
breaches of trust;
    (3) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
    (4) Unexplained affluence;
    (5) Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, 
alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
The behavior was not recent;
    (2) It was an isolated incident;
    (3) The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely 
beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business 
downtrun, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or 
separation);
    (4) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the 
problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being 
resolved or is under control;
    (5) The affluence resulted from a legal source;
    (6) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue 
creditors or otherwise resolve debts.


Sec. 147.9  Guideline G--Alcohol consumption.

    (a) The concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the 
exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control 
impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information due to carelessness.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, 
such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse 
abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
    (2) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work 
or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the 
job;
    (3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., 
physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or 
alcohol dependence;
    (4) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed 
clinical social worker who is a staff

[[Page 4576]]

member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;
    (5) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of 
impaired judgment;
    (6) Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism 
by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an 
alcohol rehabilitation program.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
    (2) The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no 
indication of a recent problem;
    (3) Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
    (4) Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the 
individual has successfully completed impatient or outpatient 
rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates 
frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar 
organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12 
months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical 
professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member 
of a recognized alcohol treatment program.


Sec. 174.10  Guideline H--Drug involvement.

    (a) The concern. (1) Improper or illegal involvement with drugs 
raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to 
protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair 
social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
    (2) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and 
include:
    (i) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and 
listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., 
marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and 
hallucinogens),
    (ii) Inhalants and other similar substances.
    (3) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug 
in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) Any drug abuse (see above definition);
    (2) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, 
manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
    (3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., 
physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or 
drug dependence;
    (4) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed 
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug 
treatment program;
    (5) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program 
prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug 
involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance, 
or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably 
result in an unfavorable determination.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
The drug involvement was not recent;
    (2) The drug involvement was an isolated or aberration event;
    (3) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;
    (4) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, 
including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence 
of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical 
professional.


Sec. 147.11   Guideline I--Emotional, mental, and personality 
disorders.

    (a) The concern: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can 
cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social 
and occupation functioning. These disorders are of security concern 
because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or 
stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical 
psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to or approved 
by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially 
disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and 
particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care 
provider.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) An opinion by a credentialed mental health 
professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may 
indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;
    (2) Information that suggests that an individual has failed to 
follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, 
e.g., failure to take prescribed medication;
    (3) A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social 
or emotionally unstable behavior;
    (4) Information that suggests that the individual's current 
behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
There is no indication of a current problem;
    (2) Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional 
that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality 
disorder is cured, under control or in remission and has a low 
probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
    (3) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., 
one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has 
been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.


Sec. 147.12  Guideline J--Criminal conduct.

    (a) The concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates 
doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) Allegations or admissions of criminal 
conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;
    (2) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
The criminal behavior was not recent;
    (2) The crime was an isolated incident;
    (3) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and 
those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;
    (4) The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the 
factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
    (5) Acquittal;
    (6) There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.


Sec. 147.13  Guideline K--Security violations.

    (a) The concern. Noncompliance with security regulations raises 
doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability 
to safeguard classified information.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include. (1) Unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information;
    (2) Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to 
negligence.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include 
actions that: (1) Were inadvertent;
    (2) Were isolated or infrequent;
    (3) Were due to improper or inadequate training;
    (4) Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of 
security responsibilities.


Sec. 147.14  Guideline L--Outside activities.

    (a) The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment 
or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an 
individual's

[[Page 4577]]

security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or 
employment with: (1) A foreign country;
    (2) Any foreign national;
    (3) A representative of any foreign interest;
    (4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person 
engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on 
intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does 
not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;
    (2) The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the 
activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her 
security responsibilities.


Sec. 147.15  Guideline M--Misuse of Information technology systems.

    (a) The concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, 
or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise 
security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, 
and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and 
information. Information Technology Systems include all related 
equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, 
manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include: (1) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any 
information technology system;
    (2) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation 
or denial of access to information residing on an information 
technology system;
    (3) Removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any 
information technology system without authorization, when specifically 
prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
    (4) Introduction of hardware, software, or media into any 
information technology system without authorization, when specifically 
prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) 
The misuse was not recent or significant;
    (2) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
    (3) The introduction or removal of media was authorized;
    (4) The misuse was an isolated event;
    (5) The misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to 
correct the situation.

Subpart B--Investigative Standards


Sec. 147.18  Introduction.

    The following investigative standards are established for all 
United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, 
contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders 
or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require 
access to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented 
Information and Special Access Programs, and are to be used by 
government departments and agencies as the investigative basis for 
final clearance determinations. However, nothing in these standards 
prohibits an agency from using any lawful investigative procedures in 
addition to these requirements in order to resolve any issue identified 
in the course of a background investigation or reinvestigation.


Sec. 147.19  The three standards.

    There are three standards (Attachment D to this subpart part 
summarizes when to use each one):
    (a) The investigation and reinvestigation standards for ``L'' 
access authorizations and for access to confidential and secret 
(including all secret-level Special Access Programs not specifically 
approved for enhanced investigative requirements by an official 
authorized to establish Special Access Programs by section in 4.4 of 
Executive Order 12958) (60 FR 19825, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 33);
    (b) The investigation standard for``Q'' access authorizations and 
for access to top secret (including top secret Special Access Programs) 
and Sensitive Compartmented Information;
    (c) The reinvestigation standard for continued access to the levels 
listed in paragraph (b) of this section.


Sec. 147.20  Exception to periods of coverage.

    Some elements of standards specify a period of coverage (e.g. seven 
years). Where appropriate, such coverage may be shortened to the period 
from the subject's eighteenth birthday to the present or to two years, 
whichever is longer.


Sec. 147.21  Expanding investigations.

    Investigations and reinvestigations may be expanded under the 
provisions of Executive Order 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 
391) and other applicable statutes and Executive Orders.


Sec. 147.22  Transferability.

    Investigations that satisfy the requirements of a given standard 
and are current meet the investigative requirements for all levels 
specified for the standard. They shall be mutually and reciprocally 
accepted by all agencies.


Sec. 147.23  Breaks in service.

    If a person who requires access has been retired or separated from 
U.S. government employment for less than two years and is the subject 
of an investigation that is otherwise current, the agency regranting 
the access will, as a minimum, review an updated Standard Form 86 and 
applicable records. A reinvestigation is not required unless the review 
indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive 
Order 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 391); (Attachment D to 
this subpart, Table 2).


Sec. 147.24  The national agency check.

    The National Agency Check is a part of all investigations and 
reinvestigations. It consists of a review of;
    (a) Investigative and criminal history files of the FBI, including 
a technical fingerprint search;
    (b) OPM's Security/Suitability Investigations Index;
    (c) DoD's Defense Clearance and Investigations Index;
    (d) Such other national agencies (e.g., CIA, INS) as appropriate to 
the individual's background.

Attachment A to Subpart B--Standard A--National Agency Check With Local 
Agency Checks and Credit Check (NACLC)

    (a) Applicability. Standard A applies to investigations and 
reinvestigations for;
    (1) Access to CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET (including all SECRET-
level Special Access Programs not specifically approved for enhanced 
investigative requirements by an official authorized to establish 
Special Access Programs by sect. 4.4 of Executive Order 12958) (60 
FR 19825, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 333);
    (2) ``L'' access authorizations.
    (b) For Reinvestigation: When to Reinvestigate. The 
reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion 
of, but not later than ten years (fifteen years for CONFIDENTIAL) 
from the date of, the previous investigation or reinvestigation. 
(Attachment D to this subpart, Table 2, reflects the specific 
requirements for when to request a reinvestigation, including when 
there has been a break in service.)
    (c) Investigative Requirements. Investigative requirements are 
as follows:

[[Page 4578]]

    (1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86, 
including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
    (2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency 
Check.
    (3) Financial Review: Verification of the subject's financial 
status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where 
the subject has resided, been employed, or attended school for six 
months or more for the past seven years.
    (4) Date and Place of Birth: Corroboration of date and place of 
birth through a check of appropriate documentation, if not completed 
in any previous investigation; a check of Bureau of Vital Statistics 
records when any discrepancy is found to exist.
    (5) Local Agency Checks: As a minimum, all investigations will 
include checks of law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction where 
the subject has lived, worked, and/or attended school within the 
last five years, and, if applicable, of the appropriate agency for 
any identified arrests.
    (d) Expanding the Investigation: The investigation may be 
expanded if necessary to determine if access is clearly consistent 
with the national security.

Attachment B to Subpart B--Standard B--Single Scope Background 
Investigation (SSBI)

    (a) Applicability. Standard B applies to initial investigations 
for;
    (1) Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access 
Programs) and Sensitive Compartment Information;
    (2) ``Q'' access authorizations.
    (b) Investigative Requirements. Investigative requirements are 
as follows:
    (1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86, 
including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
    (2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency 
Check.
    (3) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if 
applicable): Completion of a National Agency Check, without 
fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant.
    (4) Date and Place of Birth: Corroboration of date and place of 
birth through a check of appropriate documentation; a check of 
Bureau of Vital Statistics records when any discrepancy is found to 
exist.
    (5) Citizenship: For individuals born outside the United States, 
verification of US citizenship directly from the appropriate 
registration authority; verification of US citizenship or legal 
status of foreign-born immediate family members (spouse, cohabitant, 
father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters).
    (6) Education: Corroboration of most recent or most significant 
claimed attendance, degree, or diploma. Interviews of appropriate 
educational sources if education is a primary activity of the 
subject during the most recent three years.
    (7) Employment: Verification of all employments for the past 
seven years; personal interviews of sources (supervisors, coworkers, 
or both) for each employment of six months or more; corroboration 
through records or sources of all periods of unemployment exceeding 
sixty days; verification of all prior federal and military service, 
including discharge type. For military members, all service within 
one branch of the armed forces will be considered as one employment, 
regardless of assignments.
    (8) References: Four references, of whom at least two are 
developed; to the extent practicable, all should have social 
knowledge of the subject and collectively span at least the last 
seven years.
    (9) Former Spouse: An interview of any former spouse divorced 
within the last ten years.
    (10) Neighborhoods: Confirmation of all residences for the last 
three years through appropriate interviews with neighbors and 
through records reviews.
    (11) Financial Review: Verification of the subject's financial 
status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where 
subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six 
months or more for the last seven years.
    (12) Local Agency Checks: A check of appropriate criminal 
history records covering all locations where, for the last ten 
years, the subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended 
school for six months or more, including current residence 
regardless of duration.

    Note: If no residence, employment, or education exceeds six 
months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed 
appropriate.

    (13) Public Records: Verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and 
other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the 
subject.
    (14) Subject Interview: A subject interview, conducted by 
trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. 
During the investigation, additional subject interviews may be 
conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant 
inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations 
may be taken whenever appropriate.
    (15) Polygraph (only in agencies with approved personnel 
security polygraph programs): In departments or agencies with 
policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security 
purposes, the investigation may include a polygraph examination, 
conducted by a qualified polygraph examiner.
    (c) Expanding the Investigation. The investigation may be 
expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able 
to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not 
limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, 
other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may 
be conducted.

Attachment C to Subpart B--Standard C--Single Scope Background 
Investigation Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR)

    (a) Applicability. Standard C applies to reinvestigation for;
    (1) Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access 
Programs) and Sensitive Compartmented Information;
    (2) ``Q'' access authorizations.
    (b) When to Reinvestigate. The reinvestigation may be initiated 
at any time following completion of, but not later than five years 
from the date of, the previous investigation (see Attachment D to 
this subpart, Table 2).
    (c) Reinvestigative Requirements. Reinvestigative requirements 
are as follows:
    (1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86, 
including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
    (2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency Check 
(fingerprint cards are required only if there has not been a 
previous valid technical check of the FBI).
    (3) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if 
applicable): Completion of a National Agency Check, without 
fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant. The National Agency 
Check for the spouse or cohabitant is not required if already 
completed in conjunction with a previous investigation or 
reinvestigation.
    (4) Employment: Verification of all employments since the last 
investigation. Attempts to interview a sufficient number of sources 
(supervisors, coworkers, or both) at all employments of six months 
or more. For military members, all services within one branch of the 
armed forces will be considered as one employment, regardless of 
assignments.
    (5) References: Interviews with two character references who are 
knowledgeable of the subject; at least one will be a developed 
reference. To the extent practical, both should have social 
knowledge of the subject and collectively span the entire period of 
the reinvestigation. As appropriate, additional interviews may be 
conducted, including with cohabitants and relatives.
    (6) Neighborhoods: Interviews of two neighbors in the vicinity 
of the subject's most recent residence of six months or more. 
Confirmation of current residence regardless of length.
    (7) Financial Review:--Financial Status: Verification of the 
subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering 
all locations where subject has resided, been employed, and/or 
attended school for six months or more for the period covered by the 
reinvestigation;
    (ii) Check of Treasury's Financial Data Base: Agencies may 
request the Department of the Treasury, under terms and conditions 
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, to search automated 
data bases consisting of reports of currency transactions by 
financial institutions, international transportation of currency or 
monetary instruments, foreign bank and financial accounts, and 
transactions under $10,000 that are reported as possible money 
laundering violations.
    (8) Local Agency Checks: A check of appropriate criminal history 
records covering all locations where, during the period covered by 
the reinvestigation, the subject has resided, been employed, and/or 
attended school for six months or more, including current residence 
regardless of duration. (Note: If no residence, employment, or 
education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be 
performed as deemed appropriate.)
    (9) Former Spouse: An interview with any former spouse unless 
the divorce took place before the date of the last investigation or 
reinvestigation.

[[Page 4579]]

    (10) Public Records: Verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and 
other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the 
subject since the date of the last investigation.
    (11) Subject Interview: A subject interview, conducted by 
trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. 
During the reinvestigation, additional subject interviews may be 
conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant 
inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations 
may be taken whenever appropriate.
    (d) Expanding the Reinvestigation: The reinvestigation may be 
expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able 
to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not 
limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, 
other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may 
be conducted.

Attachment D to Subpart B--Decision Tables

                                    Table 1.--Which Investigation to Request                                    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    And the person      Based on this    Then the investigation                 
   If the requirement is for       has this access      investigation          required is        Using standard
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Confidental Secret; ``L''......  None..............  None..............  NACLC.................  A              
                                                     Out of date NACLC                                          
                                                      or SSBI.                                                  
                                 Conf, Sec; ``L''                                                               
Top Secret, SCI; ``Q''.........  None..............  None..............  SSBI..................  B              
                                 None; Conf, Sec;    Current or out of                                          
                                  ``L''.              date NACLC                                                
                                                     Out of date SSBI                                           
                                 TS, SCI; ``Q''....                      SSBI-PR...............  C              
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                     Table 2.--Reinvestigation Requirements                                     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Type required if there has been a break in 
                                           And the age of the                        service of                 
      If the requirement is for             investigation is       ---------------------------------------------
                                                                          0-23 months         24 month's or more
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Confidential........................  0 to 14 years. 11 mos.......  None (note 1)..........  NACLC              
                                      15 yrs. or more.............  NACLC..................                     
Secret; ``L''.......................  0 to 9 yrs 11 mos...........  None (note 1)..........                     
                                      10 yrs. or more.............  NACLC                                       
Top Secret, SCI; ``Q''..............  0 to 4 yrs. 11 mos..........  None (note 1)..........  SSBI               
                                      5 yrs or more...............  SSBI-PR................                     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: As a minimum, review an updated Standard Form 84 and applicable records. A reinvestigation (NACLC or SSBI-
  PR) is not required unless the review indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive   
  Order 12968.                                                                                                  

Subpart C--Guidelines for Temporary Access


Sec. 147.28   Introduction.

    The following minimum investigative standards, implementing section 
3.3 of Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, are 
established for all United States Government and military personnel, 
consultants, contractors, subcontractors, employees of contractors, 
licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and 
other individuals who require access to classified information before 
the appropriate investigation can be completed and a final 
determination made.


Sec. 147.29   Temporary eligibility for access.

    Based on a justified need meeting the requirements of section 3.3 
of Executive Order 12968, temporary eligibility for access may be 
granted before investigations are complete and favorably adjudicated, 
where official functions must be performed prior to completion of the 
investigation and adjudication process. The temporary eligibility will 
be valid until completion of the investigation and adjudication; 
however, the agency granting it may revoke it at any time based on 
unfavorable information identified in the course of the investigation.


Sec. 147.30   Temporary eligibility for access at the confidential and 
secret levels and temporary eligibility for ``L'' access authorization.

    As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the 
Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation, 
favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority, 
and submission of a request for an expedited National Agency Check with 
Local Agency Checks and Credit (NACLC).


Sec. 147.31   Temporary eligibility for access at the top secret levels 
and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization: For someone 
who is the subject of a favorable investigation not meeting the 
investigative standards for access at those levels.

    As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the 
Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation, 
favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority, 
and expedited submission of a request for a Single Scope Background 
Investigation (SSBI).


Sec. 147.32   Temporary eligibility for access at the top secret and 
SCI levels and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization: 
For someone who is not the subject of a current, favorable personnel or 
personnel-security investigation of any kind.

    As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the 
Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation, 
favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority,

[[Page 4580]]

immediate submission of a request for an expedited Single Scope 
Background Investigation (SSBI), and completion and favorable review by 
the appropriate adjudicating authority of relevant criminal history and 
investigative records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of 
information in the Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII) and 
the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII).


Sec. 147.33   Additional requirements by agencies.

    Temporary eligibility for access must satisfy these minimum 
investigative standards, but agency heads may establish additional 
requirements based on the sensitivity of the particular, identified 
categories of classified information necessary to perform the lawful 
and authorized functions that are the basis for granting temporary 
eligibility for access. However, no additional requirements shall 
exceed the common standards for background investigations developed 
under section 3.2(b) of Executive Order 12968. Temporary eligibility 
for access is valid only at the agency granting it and at other 
agencies who expressly agree to accept it and acknowledge understanding 
of its investigative basis. It is further subject to limitations 
specified in sections 2.4(d) and 3.3 of Executive Order 12968, Access 
to Classified Information.

    Dated: January 22, 1998.
L.M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 98-1955 Filed 1-29-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-M