Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed April 26, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D23-0682

Lower Tribunal No. F22-15401

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Liliana Francisca Vanegas,

Petitioner,

vs.

The State of Florida, 

Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.

The Law Office of Lance Joseph, and Lance Joseph (Dade City), for 

petitioner. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kseniya Smychkouskaya, 

Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before LOGUE, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ. 

MILLER, J.
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Petitioner, Liliana Francisca Vanegas, seeks a writ of habeas corpus, 

ordering her immediate release from the county jail, where she is being held 

without bond on the basis that she violated her probation by committing the 

offense of interference with child custody, in violation of section 787.03(1), 

Florida Statutes (2022). She contends she is being illegally detained 

because she did not commit a criminal act. For the reasons that follow, we 

are constrained to deny relief. 

BACKGROUND

Given the procedural posture, the facts are undisputed. Petitioner is 

married to Juan Gayle, and the couple shares a three-year-old son. While 

she was on felony probation for one count of grand theft, Gayle filed an ex 

parte petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence pursuant 

to section 741.30, Florida Statutes (2022). The domestic violence court 

entered a temporary injunction the same day. Under the terms of the 

injunction, petitioner was prohibited from having any contact with Gayle or 

the minor child. Petitioner moved to modify the terms of the injunction, and 

the court granted petitioner supervised visitation through Family Court 

Services. 

After the court entered the supervised visitation order, Gayle dropped 

the child off at Angel Speech and Therapy (“AST”) for a speech and 
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occupational therapy appointment. Petitioner then retrieved the child from 

Elisa Matos, his speech pathologist, bought him ice cream, and returned him 

to the therapy center. Shortly thereafter, Gayle picked up the child and 

learned of the outing. He contacted law enforcement, and some months 

later, petitioner was arrested. The State filed a misdemeanor information

charging her with one count of violating a domestic violence injunction, in 

violation of section 741.31(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2022). The Department 

of Corrections filed a probation violation affidavit alleging she violated her 

probation. 

Petitioner was taken into custody and held without bond pending a 

probation revocation hearing. She subsequently moved to dismiss the 

information, but prior to a hearing, the State filed a superseding felony

information charging her with one count of interference with child custody, in 

violation of section 787.03(1). The information reads as follows:

LILIANA FRANCISCA VANEGAS, on or about March 24, 2022, 

in the County and State aforesaid, did without lawful authority, 

knowingly or recklessly take or entice or aid, abet, hire, or 

otherwise procure another to take or entice, a minor, to-wit: D.G., 

from the custody of the minor’s parent, guardian, public agency 

having the lawful charge of the minor or incompetent person, or 

any other lawful custodian, to-wit: ELISA MATOS, in violation of 

[section 787.03(1)], contrary to the form of the Statute in such 

cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of 

the State of Florida.1

1 Gayle’s name does not appear in the information.
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Petitioner again filed a motion to dismiss. Distilled to its essence, her 

argument was two-fold: (1) section 787.03(1) does not apply to a natural 

parent whose parental rights remain intact; and (2) a violation of a supervised 

timesharing order does not constitute a criminal offense. The State filed a 

demurrer and argued that petitioner committed a crime because she 

interfered “with Juan Gayle’s 100% timesharing,” and section 787.03(1) is 

equally applicable to natural parents. The trial court denied the motion, and 

the instant petition ensued. 

ANALYSIS

Article I, section 13 of the Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he writ 

of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost.” Art. I, 

§ 13, Fla. Const. “By way of the writ, courts are afforded a speedy method 

of conducting a ‘judicial inquiry into the cause of any alleged unlawful 

custody of an individual or any alleged unlawful, actual deprivation of 

personal liberty.’” Parks v. State, 319 So. 3d 102, 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)

(quoting Porter v. Porter, 53 So. 546, 547 (Fla. 1910)). This court and others 

have repeatedly tested the legality of a detention premised upon a pending 

probation revocation hearing through habeas corpus. See, e.g., Baroulette 
5

v. McCray, 904 So. 2d 575, 576–77 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); McCarthy v. Jenne, 

861 So. 2d 99, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Similarly, “[w]here an indictment or 

information entirely fails to charge a criminal offense[,] the accused may test 

the sufficiency thereof in habeas corpus proceedings.” Kittleson v. State, 9 

So. 2d 807, 807 (Fla. 1942).

As with any statutory analysis, we adhere to the cardinal rule that to 

ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature, courts must give the 

words found in the statute their plain and ordinary meaning and, in the 

absence of ambiguity, refrain from resorting to canons of construction. See

Anderson v. State, 87 So. 3d 774, 777 (Fla. 2012). We therefore “begin ‘with 

the language of the statute,’ and, here, because that ‘language provides a 

clear answer, [our analysis] ends there as well.’” Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade 

Cnty. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 329 So. 3d 784, 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 

525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)). 

Section 787.03 sets forth two separate third-degree felonies, both of 

which constitute “interference with custody.” Petitioner was charged with 

violating the first offense, which is described as follows:

Whoever, without lawful authority, knowingly or recklessly takes 

or entices . . . any minor . . . from the custody of the minor’s . . . 

parent, his or her guardian, a public agency having the lawful 
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charge of the minor[,] . . . or any other lawful custodian commits 

the offense of interference with custody . . . .

§ 787.03(1), Fla. Stat. The second part of the statute criminalizes parental 

interferences with custody in the following manner:

In the absence of a court order determining rights to custody or 

visitation with any minor[,] . . . any parent of the minor . . . who 

has custody thereof and who takes . . . or entices away that 

minor . . . within or without the state with malicious intent to 

deprive another person of his or her right to custody of the minor 

. . . commits a felony of the third degree . . . .

§ 787.03(2), Fla. Stat. 

Petitioner contends that, in the absence of a termination of parental 

rights, a natural parent may only be charged under the latter portion of the 

statute. She posits that to find otherwise would be to allow the State to do 

an improper end-run around the malicious intent scienter requirement, 

diluting the burden of proof.

This argument is persuasive. The statute is hardly a model of clarity 

and contains no definition section. A cursory reading might suggest that 

parental interference cases are uniquely relegated to the second part of the 

statute. Indeed, this court and a sister court have observed in passing that 

“[s]ection 787.03(1) prohibits interference with parental custody by a person 

who is not a parent or lawful custodian of the minor child in question.”

Lindemuth v. State, 247 So. 3d 635, 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018); see also State 
7

v. Earl, 649 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Although very poorly 

written, it appears that subsection (2) of section 787.03, added in 1987, is 

designed to govern the crime of interference with custody by a parent.”). 

This perspective is reinforced by the fact that another statute, section 

787.04(1), Florida Statutes (2022), criminalizes taking a child “beyond the 

limits of this state” or concealing “the location of a minor” in violation of a 

court order. 

But, upon closer reading, section 787.03(1) is extraordinarily broad in 

scope. By its plain language, the statute targets “[w]hoever” interferes with 

custody. This word necessarily has a comprehensive meaning and does not 

lend itself to any restrictive interpretation. As there is no explicit parental

exemption, any person, including a parent, falls within the ambit of the 

statute. 

Consistent with this view, our research has revealed several published

opinions involving parental prosecutions commenced under section 

787.03(1). None, of course, involve an act as inconsequential as that

forming the basis for prosecution in this case. See Khan v. State, 704 So. 

2d 1129, 1130–31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (reversing father’s conviction for 

interfering with custody of child under section 787.03(1) but affirming 

conviction under section 787.04(1) where father removed minor from state 
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when he moved to Pakistan with daughter in violation of court order); Arroyo 

v. State, 705 So. 2d 54, 56–57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (reversing and 

remanding mother’s conviction under section 787.03(1) where State 

presented no evidence of mother’s participation in taking her children from 

lawful custodian where evidence demonstrated only mother’s presence in 

vehicle at the time her husband drove their children to Mexico). Relying upon 

the plain language, we conclude that the statute is applicable, and the mere 

fact that two alternative statutory provisions contain heightened proof 

requirements does not render the instant charge invalid.2 

Further, we are compelled to reject the contention that an award of 

shared parental responsibility and supervised timesharing renders the State 

incapable of proving petitioner acted “without lawful authority” within the 

meaning of the statute.

3 By court order, petitioner was only authorized to

2 It requires little imagination to envision the “parade of horribles” likely to 

result from criminalizing negligible and inadvertent deviations from court 

ratified timesharing agreements in high-conflict family disputes. 

3 Although courts have long distinguished between temporary and 

permanent custody awards under common law principles, this is a case of 

pure statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 126 S.E.2d 624, 

625–26 (Ga. 1962) (“The parental rights of the parties are not adjudicated by 

the award of temporary custody. A temporary award of custody differs from 

a permanent award as the latter is a final adjudication of the rights of the 

parties . . . . No such finality exists as to a judgment awarding temporary 

custody.”); People v. Fields, 300 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), 

superseded by statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.350 (1983) (“We disagree 
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access the child at visitation appointments supervised by Family Court 

Services. Retrieving the child from therapy and taking him on an outing 

appears to have been in derogation of those conditions.

Lastly, to the extent that the State is alleged to have stretched the 

acceptable boundaries of prosecutorial discretion and the case more 

properly belongs in family court, at least one court has embraced that view. 

In State v. Wengatz, 471 N.E.2d 185, 186 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984), the 

government filed criminal charges after a mother defied an existing custody 

order and traveled to Walt Disney World Resort with her young children for 

two weeks. The Ohio appellate court observed: “a more appropriate method 

of handling the father’s complaint would have been by a contempt 

proceeding in domestic relations court. To put a mother in jail for two years 

for giving her children a vacation is a gross miscarriage of justice and totally 

senseless.” Id. at 187. Here, the mother has been jailed for over nine 

months for a substantially less egregious deviation.

with the people’s position that it is the very existence of a court order rather 

than the temporary or permanent nature of the order which determines 

whether a kidnapping has in fact occurred. There is a crucial difference 

between a parent who has temporarily lost custody of a child and one who 

has permanently lost parental rights. A parent whose rights remain 

undecided at the time of the taking may not have any right to custody, but 

we are of the opinion that temporary loss of physical possession of the child 

is not the proper basis for decision.”). 
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Nonetheless, it is well-settled that “[p]rosecutorial discretion is by its 

very nature exceedingly broad,” In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328, 331 n.2 (D.C. 2011)

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 342 A.2d 27, 30 

(D.C.1975)), and the judiciary is powerless in habeas proceedings to 

interfere in the decision to charge an individual for a de minimis offense. But 

see, e.g., People v. Page, 353 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360–61 (N.Y. Town Ct. 1974)

(holding accusatory portion of information sufficient but factual portion of 

information defective for failure to contain evidentiary matter to show intent 

of crime of custodial interference); State v. Switzer, 157 N.E.2d 466, 467–68

(Ohio Mun. 1956) (dismissing complaint and discharging defendant father 

where evidence was insufficient to establish father’s intent to unlawfully 

detain child). Accordingly, we are obliged to deny relief.

Petition denied.