J-S26041-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MANUEL A. CINTRON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 869 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 22, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001486-2017, 

CP-51-CR-0007199-2015, CP-51-CR-0007242-2015, 

CP-51-CR-0007244-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2019

Appellant, Manuel A. Cintron, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his jury conviction of rape, kidnapping, sexual assault, 

attempted kidnapping, unlawful restraint, possessing an instrument of crime, 

false identification to law enforcement, and intimidation of a witness. The court 

sentenced him to an aggregate term of not less than forty-five years nor more

than ninety years of incarceration, followed by five years’ probation. Appellant 

challenges the admission of certain evidence. He asserts the evidence was 

insufficient to prove the charge of false identification to law enforcement. He 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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claims his sentence was excessive. We vacate the conviction for false 

identification. In all other respects, we affirm. 

We derive the facts of the case from the trial court opinion and our 

independent review of the certified record. The trial court set forth the facts 

of the case as follows:1

The facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as the verdict-winner, show that at 4:10 AM on

May 1, 2015, [R.C.] was walking to catch the bus in the area of

12th and Ruscomb Streets in Philadelphia on the way to work.

Manuel Cintron approached her, brandished a black 

semiautomatic pistol, pulled the slide back and threatened [R.C. 

with] “Come with me” and “Don't do anything stupid or I’ll shoot 

you in the head.” Cintron then pulled [R.C.] towards his old blue

minivan. A struggle ensued and Cintron covered this victim’s

mouth when she attempted to scream. Fortunately, [R.C.] was

able to fight her way out and escape. Running toward Broad

Street, she managed to jump on a bus and get to her workplace

in Center City, where she informed her boss and then the police

about what had occurred, providing a detailed description of the

defendant, his clothing, the van as well as the gun.

About an hour after attacking [R.C.], Cintron approached 

[J.Q.] on the 2000 block of East York Street, again brandished the 

black semi-automatic hand gun, pointing it at [J.Q.], telling her 

“Do what I say and nothing bad will happen.” Cintron ordered 

[J.Q.] into the van, which was without rear seating. The defendant 

drove around the area for a short period of time before stopping 

near a factory. Cintron ordered [J.Q.] into the back of the van and 

told her to undress. The victim asked if he was serious, began 

shaking and struggled to remove her clothing. Cintron took his 

prey’s shoes and pulled down her pants, then took down his own 

pants demanding that [J.Q.] “Suck me off” and to “put this 

condom on me.” She attempted to put the condom on Cintron but 

she was shaking with fear. This defendant tried to force his penis 

into this victim’s vagina, but was unable as [J.Q.] was clenching 

____________________________________________

1 To protect the privacy of the victims we have substituted initials for their full 

names. 
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her legs. Cintron flipped her over and vaginally raped this victim 

from behind. Following the rape, Cintron demanded [J.Q.]’s 

identification which he photographed with his cell phone - warning 

his victim that if anything happened to him, the defendant’s 

brother would come after her and her family. He then returned 

her driver’s license. Cintron drove the victim around, telling her 

what to say if stopped by the police. The defendant eventually 

dropped [J.Q.] off on the 2600 block of East York Street. [J.Q.] 

was hysterical when she arrived at work. A co-worker called her 

family and her uncle and brother picked her up and took her to 

the hospital where they flagged down a police officer to report the 

crime. This victim gave a detailed description of the defendant, 

his clothing, the van and the gun. Episcopal Hospital does not 

admit sexual assault victims so [J.Q.] was transported to the 

Sexual Assault Response Center.

Surveillance video was obtained from the area, the van 

identified and composite sketches created. Early morning plain 

clothes surveillances were conducted and a similar van observed. 

The registered owner of the van admitted this defendant had paid 

for the van but put it in her name because the defendant did not 

have a valid drivers’ license. [J.Q.] positively identified the 

defendant from a photo array, however [R.C.] was unable to do 

so. Mr. Cintron was arrested on May 18, 2015, in an apartment in 

the 700 block of Princeton Street in Philadelphia. Upon being 

confronted by the police, the defendant gave the name of “Omar 

Rivera”.

On Christmas Day, 2016, [J.Q.] was at home with her 

family, when her brother retrieved the mail. There was a letter 

from the defendant in prison, addressed to his victim at her house. 

The intent of the letter was clear - to intimidate this victim.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/6/18, at 3-4 (record citations omitted).

We also note that Noah Brophy was the sexual assault nurse examiner 

(“SANE nurse”) who performed the examination on the victim. When Nurse 

Brophy was not available for trial, the court permitted the Commonwealth to 

present the testimony of Dr. Ralph Riviello, as an expert, over the initial 

objection of Appellant. See N.T. Trial, 10/10/17, at 28. 
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Dr. Riviello was the founder and Medical Director of the Philadelphia

Sexual Assault Response Center (sometimes referred to as “PSARC” in the 

record). He testified as an expert in sexual assault examination, and 

emergency medicine.2 Ultimately, Cintron’s counsel stipulated to Dr. Riviello’s 

expertise. See N.T. Trial, 10/10/17, at 34. Dr. Riviello based his testimony 

on the patient records of the victim as prepared by SANE nurse Brophy, 

photographs taken by Brophy, as well as his own professional experience.

The trial court permitted the Commonwealth to publish to the jury one 

color photograph of three taken by Brophy, showing micro tears in the vaginal 

area not visible with the naked eye, as highlighted by a diagnostic blue dye,

toluidine. The trial court gave the jury a cautionary instruction before they 

saw the photograph. 

Cintron’s defense was that the sex was consensual.3 J.Q. denied 

consent, both on direct examination and on cross-examination. See N.T. 

Trial, 10/05/17, at 129, 155. Notably, Dr. Riviello testified that the 

photograph of the injury presented to the jury could not establish whether the 

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2 Dr. Riviello testified that in addition to serving as the medical director of 

PSARC, he was employed as a professor of emergency medicine at Drexel 

University, and as an attending physician in the Emergency Department at 

Hahnemann University Hospital. See N.T. Trial, 10/10/17, at 39. 

3 Appellant exercised his constitutional right not to testify. See N.T. Trial. 

10/11/17, at 5. The defense rested without presenting any witnesses. See

N.T. Trial, 10/11/17, at 16. Therefore, there was no evidence supporting the 

claim of consent. It was defense counsel who raised and argued the claim of 

consensual sex. See e.g., N.T. Trial, 10/05/17, at 38. 
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sex was consensual or non-consensual. See N.T. Trial, 10/10/178, at 52 

(“Nobody can do that.”). He did testify that the injuries to the victim were 

consistent with J.Q.’s report of sexual assault. See N.T. Trial 10/10/17, at 

54. 

We also highlight that when the police came to arrest Cintron he denied 

his identity, claiming to be “Omar Rivera Morales” and offering a driver’s 

license in that name as proof. See N.T. Trial, 10/10/17, at 129. However, 

the police recognized Cintron from his description, most notably a large, 

distinctive tattoo on his neck, even though he had dyed his hair, shaved off 

his goatee, and begun wearing glasses. The police arrested him. 

At the close of its case, the Commonwealth moved a number of exhibits 

into evidence, including the SANE report, before it rested. The following 

exchange occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL] Your Honor, we have no objection. 

However, the majority of those exhibits were admitted for very

limited purposes. We would have an objection for those limited 

purposes.

THE COURT: That’s fine. They are admitted for the record.

N.T. Trial, 10/11/17, at 15.

The jury convicted Cintron of all charges. When polled, the jury 

confirmed that the verdict was unanimous. After reviewing the pre-sentence

investigation report, sentencing memoranda and other evidence, the court 

imposed an aggregate sentence of not less than forty-five nor more than 

ninety years of incarceration in a state correctional institution, as 
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recommended by the Commonwealth, followed by five years of reporting 

probation. This timely appeal followed the denial of Cintron’s motion for 

reconsideration.4 

Cintron presents five questions on appeal:

A. Is a forensic sexual assault examination report testimonial, 

implicating the state and federal Confrontation Clauses, and if so, 

did the trial court violate appellant’s right of confrontation under 

Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution in permitting the 

use of and reading into the record the contents of that report by 

another expert as the basis of his own opinion?

B. Although Rule of Evidence 703 allows an expert to use 

inadmissible evidence to form an opinion, when the testifying 

expert’s opinion has relevance and probative value only if the 

report he relied on is true, did the trial court err in permitting Dr. 

Riviello to testify to the contents of a report by a non-testifying

employee?

C. Did the trial court err in permitting the introduction of a graphic, 

close up color photograph of the complainant’s vagina as the 

probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial 

effect and was otherwise cumulative?

D. Is the evidence insufficient to prove the charge of false 

identification to law enforcement where there was no evidence 

that Appellant was informed that he was the subject of an official 

investigation?

E. Did the trial court impose a manifestly excessive and grossly

disproportionate sentence where it imposed a de facto life 

sentence in that the sentences were well beyond the aggravated 

range, they were applied consecutively without sufficient basis, 

and the court failed to consider the proper factors specified in 

Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code?

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4 Both Cintron and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

In his first issue, Cintron contends that the report of J.Q.’s examination 

by the SANE nurse, Noah Brophy, was testimonial in nature and, therefore, 

its use at his trial violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the 

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution. We disagree. 

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all 

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him.” See U.S. Const. amend. VI. The United 

States Supreme Court has held that “this bedrock procedural guarantee 

applies to both federal and state prosecutions.” Crawford v. Washington, 

541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (citation omitted). Article I Section 9 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused 

hath a right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . .”

Whether the admission of the SANE report violated an appellant’s rights 

under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law, for which the appellate 

standard of review is de novo. Our scope of review is plenary. See

Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 544 (Pa. 2013).

In Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S. Ct. 1354, the [United States 

Supreme] Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a 

defendant’s right to confront those “who ‘bear testimony’ ” against 

him, and defined “testimony” as “[a] solemn declaration or 

affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 

fact.” The Confrontation Clause, the High Court explained, 

prohibits out-of-court testimonial statements by a witness unless 
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the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 

opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 53–56, 124 S. Ct. 1354.

Yohe, 79 A.3d at 531 (footnotes omitted). 

The [United States Supreme] Court described the class of 

testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause as 

follows:

Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” 

statements exist: “ex parte in-court testimony or its 

functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, 

custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant 

was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements 

that declarants would reasonably expect to be used

prosecutorially;” “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in 

formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 

depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;” “statements 

that were made under circumstances which would lead an 

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 

would be available for use at a later trial.”

Id. at n.11, quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (citation omitted).

Here, Cintron maintains that the SANE report is testimonial, such that 

the trial court violated his constitutional right to confrontation by “permitting 

the use of [the report] and reading into the record the contents of that report 

by another expert as the basis of his own opinion[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 4. 

Cintron’s claim does not merit relief. 

Preliminarily, we note that Cintron’s repeated assertion that Dr. Riviello 

simply read the report into the record is belied by the trial transcript and 

substantially mischaracterizes Dr. Riviello’s testimony. It is true that Dr. 

Riviello referred to the report. It is also true that he testified based on his 

own experience and expertise about how a SANE examination is conducted. 
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Moreover, Cintron’s mischaracterization does not support his assumption that 

the report was testimonial. 

In any event, Cintron fails to establish that Riviello’s testimony deprived 

him of his right to confrontation. With respect to Riviello’s testimony, Cintron 

can only claim to have been denied the right to confront two witnesses. First, 

he could argue he was denied the right to confront J.Q., whose statements 

were included in Brophy’s report. 

However, J.Q. (as well as R.C.) accused Cintron of multiple violent 

crimes. As noted previously, Cintron conceded that had sexual intercourse 

with J.Q. The primary factual issue at trial was therefore whether the 

intercourse was consensual.

J.Q. vigorously testified at trial that it was not. See N.T., 10/5/17, at 

114-124. Cintron availed himself of the opportunity to cross-examine J.Q. at 

trial. See id., at 147-156. He therefore could not, and indeed does not, argue 

that he was deprived of his right to confront J.Q. 

Cintron maintains that “the issue is not with what J.Q. said to Nurse 

Brophy, but what Nurse Brophy says he saw and heard, and then documented 

and relayed in a report.” Appellant’s Brief, at 31. However, he never specifies 

what Nurse Brophy reported that he claims is objectionable. 

Our independent review of the SANE report confirms that Nurse Brophy 

only reported the information J.Q. gave him. He offered no opinions, made 
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no assessments of credibility or anything beyond the fact-based answers 

provided by J.Q. 

A careful reading of Dr. Riviello’s testimony confirms that aside from a 

factual recitation of the general procedures for a SANE examination, as 

implemented in the examination of J.Q., nothing in his testimony conveys 

what Nurse Brophy “saw and heard” beyond the objective facts of the 

examination itself as related to him by J.Q. (Appellant’s Brief, at 31). In the 

end, Dr. Riviello opined that the physical observations, as opposed to J.Q.’s 

statements, contained in Brophy’s report were consistent with consensual 

intercourse. See N.T., 10/10/17, at 67.

As a result, Cintron has failed to establish that he was entitled to 

confront Brophy. The inculpatory nature of Brophy’s report was entirely due 

to the statements of J.Q. As Cintron concedes, he had the opportunity to 

confront J.Q. over her accusations. His failure to identify how any statement 

of Brophy was used against him at trial is fatal to his claim.

Additionally, this case is distinguishable from the line of cases cited by 

Cintron, which found their respective reports testimonial and surrogate (i.e., 

non-author) testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Importantly to 

the High Court, the reports in those cases proved “one fact necessary for [ ]

conviction.” Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 651 (2012) (report 

which confirmed blood alcohol content in DWI case was testimonial); see also 

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009) (analyst’s 
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affidavit certifying suspect substance as cocaine was testimonial, implicating 

Confrontation Clause); Commonwealth v. Brown, 185 A.3d 316, 318 (Pa. 

2018), Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, (autopsy report 

concluding manner of death from gunshot wounds to be homicide was 

testimonial in nature, but admission was harmless error).

5

 Compare Yohe, 

79 A.3d at 543 (testimony of forensic toxicologist who analyzed test results of 

appellant’s blood, determined blood alcohol content by comparing results, and 

authored Toxicology Report, satisfied appellant’s right to confrontation).

As noted above, the factual issue at trial here was whether J.Q. 

consented. By Dr. Riviello’s testimony, Brophy’s physical observations of J.Q. 

during the SANE examination were consistent with both parties’ positions.

Brophy’s out-of-court statements were not used to establish any element of 

the crimes the Commonwealth sought to prove. Cintron is due no relief on his 

first issue.

In his second issue, Cintron claims that the trial court erred in permitting 

Dr. Riviello to testify based on the Brophy SANE report. In an argument which 

frequently overlaps the arguments already made in his first claim, Cintron 

maintains the report “and its contents” should have been excluded. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 22. He asserts that Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 703 

____________________________________________

5 We note for the sake of clarity and completeness that Cintron confuses 

Bullcoming with Melendez-Diaz and mis-cites the facts of the case. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 25. 
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(explicitly permitting an expert to rely on non-admissible facts or data) was 

improperly used to supersede his confrontation rights, with Dr. Riviello acting 

as a mere conduit. See id. at 32, 35-36. We disagree.

Preliminarily, on this issue, Cintron failed to raise this objection with the 

trial court. Instead, as previously noted, defense counsel made only a vague, 

generalized objection to “the majority” of the Exhibits moved into evidence by 

the Commonwealth. N.T. Trial, 10/11/17, at 15.6

“A party complaining, on appeal, of the admission of evidence in 

the court below will be confined to the specific objection there 

made.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 231, 928 A.2d 

1025, 1041 (2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035, 128 S. Ct. 2429, 

171 L.Ed.2d 235 (2008). If counsel states the grounds for an 

objection, then all other unspecified grounds are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. 

Arroyo, 555 Pa. 125, 142, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (1999); 

Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 60, 337 A.2d 873, 881 

(1975) (stating: “It has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that 

if the ground upon which an objection is based is specifically 

stated, all other reasons for its exclusion are waived, and may not 

be raised post-trial”); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 832 A.2d 1132, 

1136 (Pa.Super.2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 694, 845 A.2d 816 

(2004) (stating party must make timely and specific objection to 

preserve issue for appellate review).

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6 As noted, supra at 5:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL] Your Honor, we have no objection. 

However, the majority of those exhibits were admitted for very 

limited purposes. We would have an objection for those limited 

purposes.

THE COURT: That’s fine. They are admitted for the record.

N.T. Trial, 10/11/17, at 15.
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Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81–82 (Pa. Super. 2012) (emphasis 

in original). 

In this case, Cintron failed to raise the objection he now proposes on 

appeal in the trial court. Accordingly, his claim is waived. 

Moreover, it would not merit relief. The trial court properly determined 

that, to the extent that the nurse’s SANE report incorporated statements by 

J.Q. herself when seeking medical treatment, those statements were either 

not hearsay or fell within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. (See

N.T. Trial, 10/10/17, at 28; see also Pa.R.E. 803 (4) (A, B) (Statement Made 

for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.). Additionally, Rule 703 plainly permits 

an expert to base an opinion on facts or data even if that data would not be 

independently admissible. See Pa.R.E. 703. Cintron’s second issue is waived 

and would not merit relief. 

Cintron’s third issue is that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to 

view one color photograph of the victim’s vagina, stained with a diagnostic 

blue dye, toluidine, to show tears or abrasions not visible to the naked eye. 

Cintron asserts that the display of the photograph was inflammatory, with the 

probative value out-weighed by the prejudicial effect. (Appellant’s Brief, at 

39. We disagree.

Our standard of review for Cintron’s claim is for an abuse of discretion.

A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence 

is admissible and a trial court’s ruling on an evidentiary issue will 

be reversed only if the court abused its discretion. Accordingly, a 

ruling admitting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
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that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly 

erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 966 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

quotation and citations omitted).

When considering the admissibility of photographs of a crime scene or 

victim, which by their very nature can be unpleasant, disturbing, and even 

brutal, the trial court must engage in a two-step analysis:

The trial court must apply a two-part test prior to admitting 

photographs into evidence over objection by a party. First, the 

court must determine whether the photograph is inflammatory. 

This Court has interpreted inflammatory to mean the photo is so 

gruesome it would tend to cloud the jury’s objective assessment 

of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Next, if the trial court 

decides the photo is inflammatory, in order to permit the jury to 

view the photo as evidence, it must then determine whether it [ ]

has essential evidentiary value. 

Commonwealth v. Funk, 29 A.3d 28, 33 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

Here, we need not decide if the photograph was inflammatory. The trial 

court, in its discretion, decided that the photo was inflammatory, and we 

decline to disturb that finding. However, the court also concluded that the 

photograph had essential evidentiary value in confirming the vaginal injury 

sustained by J.Q. The photograph furnished the foundation for Dr. Riviello’s 

testimony that the injury shown was consistent with J.Q.’s report of sexual 

assault. The trial court explained the procedures it followed after concluding 

that the photograph was inflammatory: 
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The jury was only permitted to view the one photo, one time, for 

a very brief moment, and not permitted to take the photograph 

into the deliberation room. The jury was cautioned prior to the 

photograph being exhibited in an attempt to partially sanitize the 

inflammatory nature of the picture. Clearly the court did not abuse 

its discretion in allowing a single photograph of the victim’s vaginal 

area where its probative value clearly outweighed the prejudice. 

Trial Court Opinion, at 13. A jury is presumed to follows the trial court’s 

instructions. Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 721 (Pa. 1998).

On independent review, we conclude that the trial court acted well within 

the bounds of its discretion, and we decline to disturb its ruling. Cintron’s 

third issue does not merit relief. 

Cintron’s fourth claim is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 

guilty verdict for false identification to a law enforcement officer. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 41-44. The Commonwealth does not oppose vacating 

Cintron’s concurrent probationary sentence. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 

20. The trial court maintains that “under these specific circumstances” the 

evidence was sufficient to affirm the conviction. See Trial Court Opinion, at 

17. On independent review, we conclude that under controlling authority, we 

are constrained to vacate the conviction. 

Our Crimes Code defines the offense of false identification to law 

enforcement authorities as follows: 

(a) Offense defined.−A person commits an offense if he 

furnishes law enforcement authorities with false information about 

his identity after being informed by a law enforcement 

officer who is in uniform or who has identified himself as a 

law enforcement officer that the person is the subject of an 

official investigation of a violation of law.
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(b) Grading.−An offense under this section is a misdemeanor of 

the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4914 (emphasis added).

Our standard of review of insufficiency claims is well settled:

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of 

law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict 

when it establishes each material element of the crime charged 

and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in 

contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human 

experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient 

as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim[,] the court 

is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (internal 

citations omitted).

On appeal, Cintron does not deny that he gave the police false 

information. Nevertheless, he maintains that the police who came to arrest 

him did not inform him that he was the subject of an official investigation for 

violation of law. See Appellant’s Brief, at 41-42. 

Cintron cites In re D.S., 39 A.3d 968, 974–75 (Pa. 2012) (holding that 

information must be provided to the individual by the law enforcement 

officer). An implication from surrounding circumstances is not enough. See 

Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 181 A.3d 337, 345 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc)

(holding “Commonwealth must prove that individual was told by police that 

he or she was under investigation, and that must occur prior to the individual’s 
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presentment of false identity information”); see also Commonwealth v. 

Barnes, 14 A.3d 128, 132 (Pa. Super. 2011) (declining to condone provision 

of false identification information to police officers, but applying “the explicit 

language of the statute”). 

Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse Cintron’s conviction for this 

offense only. Because the associated sentence was for a term of probation, 

remand for re-sentencing is unnecessary. See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 

A.2d 552, 570 (Pa. Super. 2006) (finding no need for remand because 

vacating assault sentence did not disturb sentencing scheme where assault 

sentence was concurrent with other terms and did not increase aggregate 

length of incarceration). We grant relief on Cintron’s fourth issue. 

In his fifth and final issue, Cintron claims his sentence was manifestly 

excessive. We disagree.

We review a sentencing court’s determination for an abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be found merely 

because an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as 

to be clearly erroneous. When reviewing sentencing matters, this 

Court must accord the sentencing court great weight as it is in 

best position to view the defendant’s character, displays of 

remorse, defiance or indifference, and the overall effect and 

nature of the crime. 

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1133-34 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citations omitted). 

It is well-settled that the right to appeal a discretionary aspect of 

sentence is not absolute. Rather, where an appellant challenges 
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the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant’s appeal 

should be considered as a petition for allowance of appeal. 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant's 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about 

the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on 

a case-by-case basis. 

* * *

We have found that a substantial question exists when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing 

judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the 

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process. 

We cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and 

the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to determine whether a 

substantial question exists. . . .

When we examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to 

determine whether a substantial question exists, our inquiry must 

focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to 

the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to 

decide the appeal on the merits. . . . A Rule 2119(f) statement is 

inadequate when it contains incantations of statutory provisions 

and pronouncements of conclusions of law. 

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 467–68 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(emphasis added) (citations, footnote and other punctuation omitted). 
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“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to 

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being 

imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to 

the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Cintron asserts in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the sentencing 

court “failed to consider all relevant factors as set forth in Section 9721(b) of 

the Sentencing Code (Title 42).” Appellants Brief, at 19. 

Instead of developing a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code, or contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process, in support of a substantial question, he opts for a catchall recitation 

of numerous, undeveloped, frequently repetitive claims resembling the 

incantations and conclusory pronouncements disapproved in Radecki: e.g.

“relevant sentencing criteria,” Appellant’s Brief, at 19, failure to consider “all 

relevant factors” (id.), “all relevant factors” (id. at 20); consecutive 

sentences, (id. at 20), “stacked enhancements” / consecutive sentences 

above guideline (id. at 21), and so forth. Cintron complains the trial court’s 

sentence only paid “lip service” to mitigation. (Id. at 19). 

The trial court correctly notes that mere assertions of excessiveness do 

not raise a substantial question. See Trial Court Opinion, at 19 (collecting 
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cases). It concludes that here Cintron failed to raise a substantial question on 

his primary claim of excessiveness. See Trial Court Opinion, at 19. The 

Commonwealth suggests a similar conclusion, citing Radecki, 180 A.3d at

468-470. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 20. We also conclude that, under 

Radecki, Cintron has failed to raise a substantial question. 

Moreover, even if we were to determine that Cintron’s discretionary 

aspects of sentencing claim raised a substantial question, we still would 

conclude that he is not entitled to relief. 

Cintron faults the sentencing court for not properly considering his 

troubled childhood, the impact of deaths in the family, and older siblings who 

led him into a life of crime. However, where, as here, the sentencing court 

had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report, we can properly 

assume the court was aware of the defendant’s character and weighed it along 

with mitigating statutory factors. See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 

912, 919 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Cintron notes his relatively young age (twenty-four when the crimes 

were committed; twenty-five at trial) in connection with the length of his 

sentence. The trial court notes that Appellant was adjudicated delinquent five 

times, arrested as an adult sixteen times, and incarcerated after five 

convictions. See Trial Court Opinion, at 20. One of his arrests that did not 

result in a conviction involved a sexual assault at gunpoint on a prostitute. 

Charges were dismissed when the victim failed to appear for trial. The trial 
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court notes that Cintron has failed repeated efforts at rehabilitation and

absconded from supervision. 

Here, Cintron attempted to rape two women, both strangers to him, at 

gunpoint, off the street in pre-dawn hours while they were on their way to 

work, within an hour of each other. He threatened murder. The first victim 

managed to escape, but he succeeded the second time. Most but not all of 

Cintron’s sentences were consecutive. He is not entitled to a “volume 

discount.” See Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1050 (Pa.

Super. 2011).

Under our standard of review, an abuse of discretion may not be found 

unless the trial court’s decision is “clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. 

Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). “The rationale behind 

such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate 

review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to determine the 

proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the 

individual circumstances before it.”(Id.) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted).“Although Pennsylvania’s system stands for individualized 

sentencing, the court is not required to impose the ‘minimum possible’ 

confinement.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, at 171 (citation 

omitted). 

Here, the trial court concluded that “[t]he sentence imposed properly 

took into consideration the nature of the crime, the defendant’s character, and 
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the defendant’s rehabilitative needs and the obligation to protect the public.”

Trial Court Opinion, at 23. Under our deferential standard of review, we 

discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentence, and we decline to 

disturb it. Cintron’s fifth claim merits no relief. 

Appellant’s conviction for false identification to law enforcement is 

reversed and the associated sentence vacated. In all other respects, we affirm 

the judgment of sentence. 

President Judge Emeritus Gantman joins the majority.

Judge Pellegrini files a concurring/dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/28/19