COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bray and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

COREY ANTON JOHNSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1487-99-3 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JULY 11, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge 

Joseph A. Sanzone (Sanzone & Baker, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Corey Anton Johnson was indicted for possession of cocaine 

with the intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. 

In a bench trial, the court found him guilty as charged and 

sentenced him to 10 years in prison and imposed a $2,500 fine. 

Five years of the sentence and the entire fine were suspended. 

Johnson appeals his conviction, contending the evidence was not 

sufficient to convict him. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm the conviction. 
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FACTS

 On appeal, the evidence is reviewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable 

inferences which may fairly be drawn from it. See Archer v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997). 

Johnson occupied a house that was the subject of a search by the 

Lynchburg Police Department on September 29, 1998. When 

Investigator J.L. Hise and a group of his fellow officers 

arrived, they found Johnson in a room he rented for $200 a month 

on the upper floor of the house; he was clad only in a pair of 

shorts, and three other men were present with him. The four men 

were individually searched and brought downstairs. According to 

Hise, Johnson appeared "extremely anxious" to retrieve a pair of 

shoes from his room, asking ten or twelve times to be allowed to 

retrieve the shoes. The officers searched the upstairs room and 

found several pairs of shoes there, among which was a pair of 

Nike tennis shoes in which the officers found a plastic bag 

containing off-white chunky substances weighing over six grams, 

later determined to be cocaine. The street value of cocaine was 

between $100 and $125 per gram. Hise presented the shoes to 

Johnson, who acknowledged they were his. 

 Johnson denied knowing about the cocaine found in the 

shoes, and denied being a cocaine user. He stated that he was 

unemployed and that the $150 found in his pocket pursuant to a 
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consensual search was money he had saved. When asked about the 

$75 found scattered on the floor of the room, he stated it was 

from the gambling the men were engaged in before the police 

arrived. The police also found a working pager on Johnson's 

person. The three men found in Johnson's room denied putting 

the cocaine in Johnson's shoe. 

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION

Possession may be actual or constructive. 

Constructive possession may be established 

by evidence of acts, statements, or conduct 

of the accused or other facts or 

circumstances which tend to show that the 

defendant was aware of both the presence and 

the character of the substance and that it 

was subject to his dominion and control. 

Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 444, 452 S.E.2d 364, 

368-69 (1994) (en banc) (citations omitted). Constructive 

possession may be established by circumstantial evidence 

provided such evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence that flows from the evidence. See Tucker v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 141, 143, 442 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1994); 

Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 

29 (1993). Whether a hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a 

question of fact. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 

290, 373 S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988). 

Ownership or occupancy of . . . premises 

where illicit drugs are found is a 

circumstance that may be considered together 

with other evidence tending to prove that 

the owner or occupant exercised dominion and 
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control over the items . . . on the premises 

in order to prove that the owner or occupant 

constructively possessed the contraband 

. . . . Furthermore, proof that a person is 

in close proximity to contraband is a 

relevant fact that, depending on the 

circumstances, may tend to show that, as an 

owner or occupant of property . . . the 

person necessarily knows of the presence, 

nature, and character of a substance that is 

found there. 

Burchette v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 432, 435, 425 S.E.2d 81, 

83 (1992) (citations omitted). 

 Johnson was found in a room that he rented, in which 

illegal drugs were found in a pair of his shoes. Johnson 

acknowledged the shoes as his and was anxious to retrieve a pair 

of shoes before leaving the room. The other individuals found 

in the room when the police arrived denied putting the cocaine 

in the shoes, and the trial court accepted their testimony as 

credible. "The credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who 

has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is 

presented." Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 

S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). Furthermore, the trier of fact need not 

accept an accused's statements and may credit them in whole or 

in part, or not at all. See Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 

Va. App. 535, 547, 399 S.E.2d 823, 830 (1991). An accused's 

claims of innocence may be considered mere fabrications to 

conceal guilt. See id. at 548, 399 S.E.2d at 830. Thus, the 
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trial court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, based on 

this circumstantial evidence, that Johnson was aware of the 

presence and nature of the drugs and that he possessed them. 

INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE

 Proof of the intent to distribute drugs may also be 

established by circumstantial evidence, including the quantity 

of drugs and cash possessed and whether the accused is a drug 

user. Large sums of money, particularly in small denominations, 

and the absence of drug paraphernalia supporting personal drug 

use, have been commonly accepted as factors indicating intent to 

distribute. See Welshman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 37, 

502 S.E.2d 122, 130 (1998) (en banc). Pagers have also been 

considered a factor in establishing an accused's involvement in 

the drug trade. See White v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 662, 

668, 492 S.E.2d 451, 454 (1997) (en banc). 

 Johnson claimed he was not a drug user, yet was found in 

possession of over six grams of cocaine. He had a pager and 

$150, although he was unemployed. We find the evidence was 

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was 

guilty of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, and 

affirm his conviction. 

 Affirmed. 
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Fitzpatrick, C.J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part. 

 I concur with the majority that the evidence presented 

supports a finding of guilt for possession of cocaine. However, 

I do not find the evidence sufficient to prove the intent to 

distribute cocaine. 

 The only evidence of intent to distribute was the 

possession of a pager, approximately $150 in cash found on the 

appellant, not a "large amount of cash," and appellant's 

testimony that he did not use drugs. While it is true that 

intent to distribute may be shown by circumstantial evidence, it 

is unreasonable to use as the sole basis ordinary items used by 

people who do not distribute drugs. 

 This Court has addressed this specific issue in Burchette 

v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 432, 425 S.E.2d 81 (1992). 

 Initially, we address the issue whether 

the nature of the items in the vehicle, the 

handgun and cellular telephone, and the fact 

that these items frequently are used by drug 

dealers proves that the marijuana belonged 

to Burchette. The argument advanced in 

support of this hypothesis is that because 

an officer who stops a suspected drug dealer 

can conduct a limited "pat-down" search for 

weapons and because police officers know 

that drug dealers frequently carry handguns, 

. . . the fact that a person owns a handgun 

found in his vehicle is evidence that drugs 

found in his vehicle belong to him also. It 

does not follow, however, that because 

police officers know that drug dealers 

frequently own guns, cellular telephones, or 

beepers, Burchette, who owned a handgun and 

cellular telephone, was a drug dealer. . . . 

In essence, the Commonwealth asks us to hold 
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that since most drug dealers carry handguns 

[or pagers], most people who carry handguns 

[or pagers] are drug dealers. We reject the 

hypothesis. 

Id. at 437, 425 S.E.2d at 84-85 (citations omitted) (emphasis 

added). Accordingly, I dissent in part.