1

No. 125,992

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

ERIK NAHSHON DIXON,

Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

The Kansas Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, K.S.A. 

21-6327 et seq., is substantially similar to the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organization (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., both in its purpose and the specific 

conduct it proscribes.

2.

The Kansas RICO Act's definition of racketeering activity includes juvenile 

adjudications.

3.

A Kansas RICO offense is a continuing offense. Under the Kansas RICO Act, the 

State can charge the defendant as an adult when some of the alleged predicate 

racketeering activity occurred when the defendant was a juvenile provided that the final 

alleged predicate racketeering activity occurred when the defendant was an adult.
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4.

The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution and section 10 of 

the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights do not prohibit the use of the defendant's prior 

adjudications and convictions to prove a charge under the Kansas RICO Act.

5.

Under the Kansas RICO Act, the defendant's predicate offenses used to establish a 

pattern of racketeering activity are not lesser included crimes of the RICO offense.

6.

Under the Kansas RICO Act, the compulsory joinder rule does not require the 

State to bring the RICO charge when it brings the predicate cases used to establish the

pattern of racketeering activity in the RICO charge.

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; JEFFREY E. GOERING, judge. Oral argument held March 5, 

2024. Opinion filed March 29, 2024. Affirmed.

James M. Latta, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, 

attorney general, for appellee.

Before GARDNER, P.J., MALONE, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

MALONE, J.: Erik Nahshon Dixon began committing crimes with his street gang, 

the Insane Crips, as a juvenile, and he continued as he grew into adulthood. Eventually, 

the State charged Dixon with violating the Kansas Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organization (RICO) Act, K.S.A. 21-6327 et seq., due to his pattern of criminal activity, 

some of which was committed as a juvenile and some as an adult. A jury convicted 

Dixon as charged, and the district court sentenced him to 138 months' imprisonment.
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On appeal, Dixon raises statutory and constitutional arguments, including: (1) 

juvenile adjudications do not qualify as racketeering activities under the Kansas RICO 

statutes; (2) the State needed to charge him in juvenile court because his pattern of 

racketeering activities began when he was a juvenile; (3) the Double Jeopardy Clause 

prohibits the use of prior adjudications and convictions to prove a RICO offense, (4) the 

predicate offenses that established his pattern of racketeering activity were lesser

included crimes of the RICO offense, and (5) the compulsory joinder rule required the 

State to bring the Kansas RICO charge when it brought the predicate charges. Dixon also 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. This case raises 

issues of first impression in Kansas as no prior appellate court decision has addressed a

defendant's conviction under the Kansas RICO Act. For the reasons explained below, we 

reject Dixon's claims and affirm the district court's judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dixon, born in 1996, became a documented member of the Insane Crips in 2012

after he was arrested with other gang members six times and then self-identified as a 

member of the gang. Dixon continued to be involved in criminal activity associated with 

the gang over the next several years. Dixon turned 18 in 2014.

By 2016, the Wichita Police Department's gang unit began investigating Dixon 

and several others in connection with a series of gang related shootings that had occurred 

in the city. The investigation disclosed that Dixon's house had been the target of two 

shootings earlier that year. In between those two shootings, Dixon and several of his 

fellow gang members were suspected of being involved in a retaliatory shooting of a rival 

gang member's house. As part of the investigation, law enforcement obtained search 

warrants for Dixon's Facebook account and phones. These searches provided law 

enforcement with information suggesting that Dixon was looking to find and retaliate 

against those responsible for the shootings at his house.
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Within the Insane Crips organization, Dixon was considered by police to be at the 

top of the pecking order when it came to the business side of the enterprise, specifically, 

selling drugs. In November 2016, law enforcement executed a search warrant at Dixon's 

apartment, finding many drugs, a ledger, firearms, and cash. Another search warrant, 

executed in April 2017, yielded more drugs, firearms, and cash. These discoveries led to 

a federal case against Dixon, in which he pled guilty to possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and was sentenced to 120 months' incarceration.

In July 2019, the State charged Dixon and eight others with violating the Kansas 

RICO Act. The State alleged that Dixon, while a member of a criminal street gang, the 

Insane Crips, conducted or participated directly or indirectly in a pattern of racketeering 

activity. The State alleged that the pattern of activity included:

"Racketeering Activity A: Use of Guns

"1. Criminal Use of Weapons Pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(14)(b)(5)(A), 

adjudicated in the 18th Judicial District Court in 13JV1062 on 12/13/13;

"2. Criminal Use of Weapons Pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(14)(b)(5)(A), 

adjudicated in the 18th Judicial District Court in 14JV248 on 5/22/14;

"Racketeering Activity B: Distribution of Drugs

"1. Possession of Marijuana pursuant to K.S.A. 21-5706, convicted in the 18th 

Judicial District Court in 14CR3189 on 1/7/15;

"2. Carrying a Concealed Weapon pursuant to K.S.A. 21-6302, convicted in the 

18th Judicial District Court in 14CR3189 on 1/7/15; (left in distribution of drugs since 

same case and had 9 individual bags of marijuana, scale and money and the gun[.]"

Relevant to this appeal, two of the predicate offenses included in "Racketeering 

Activity A: Use of Guns" were juvenile adjudications. In 2013, Dixon pled guilty to one 

count of criminal use of a weapon in violation of K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(14). In 2014, Dixon 

pled guilty to another count of criminal use of a weapon under the same statute.
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Before trial, Dixon moved to dismiss the State's case on several grounds. First, he 

claimed that the Double Jeopardy Clause required dismissal because he had already been 

prosecuted for the predicate offenses listed in the charging document. Second, he asserted 

that the case should be dismissed under the compulsory joinder rule, as he alleged that the 

State "had to bring the RICO charge" when it prosecuted the predicate offenses. Finally, 

Dixon claimed that the State should not be allowed to use the two juvenile adjudications 

as predicate offenses, noting that the State had not moved to prosecute him as an adult in 

the juvenile cases. The State filed a detailed response addressing each claim.

The district court denied the motion to dismiss in a ruling announced from the 

bench. As to double jeopardy, the district court ruled that there was no unitary conduct 

because the "pattern offenses all stem from events that occurred at different dates in 

different locations" and that there was no "same offense" at issue because there are 

different elements in the Kansas RICO crime when compared to the prior adjudications 

and convictions. As to the compulsory joinder claim, the district court found that the 

State could not have presented evidence of any Kansas RICO violation at the prior 

proceedings. And lastly, the district court found that the State properly brought the 

Kansas RICO charge in adult court because the RICO charge was a continuing crime and 

at least one of Dixon's predicate offenses occurred when he was an adult.

Dixon's case proceeded to a jury trial and he was tried alone. The State offered 

into evidence, without objection from Dixon, the journal entries from Dixon's prior 

adjudications and convictions. The parties agreed that Dixon's two adult convictions in 

14CR3189 would count as one predicate offense and for that predicate offense the State 

would need to prove that Dixon carried a concealed weapon or possessed marijuana. The 

State presented testimony from many Kansas and federal law enforcement officers who 

had helped investigate Dixon and his gang as well as an informant from a rival gang. The 

State's witnesses also testified to Dixon's alleged involvement in several gang related 

shootings in Wichita and his arrests while in possession of guns and narcotics with fellow 
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gang members. The crux of the State's case centered on Dixon's involvement as a 

member of the Insane Crips and his participation in both drug dealing and violent crimes

for the gang. Dixon did not testify at trial and did not contest his membership in the 

Insane Crips. The theme of defense counsel's closing argument was that the predicate 

offenses were isolated incidents unrelated to gang membership and did not meet the 

statutory definition of a pattern of racketeering activity.

The jury found Dixon guilty as charged. The district court sentenced him to 138 

months' imprisonment. Dixon timely appealed the district court's judgment.

OVERVIEW OF THE KANSAS RICO ACT AND COMPARISON TO FEDERAL LAW

The Kansas RICO Act is substantially similar to the federal Racketeer Influenced 

and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., both in its purpose and 

the specific conduct it proscribes. Anti-racketeering statutes target organized crime and 

the individuals who participate in criminal enterprises in a broad spectrum of illegal 

activities. They present tools for law enforcement to combat the negative effects of 

patterns of criminal activities conducted by criminal groups. In enacting the federal RICO

Act, Congress stated: "It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized 

crime . . . by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by 

establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new 

remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, 

reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1073.

In 2013, the Kansas Legislature passed a similar antiracketeering statute, 

providing similar tools for Kansas law enforcement to combat organized crime. As 

explained in testimony presented to the Legislature when it considered enacting the 
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Kansas RICO Act, the successful use of the federal RICO Act by the federal government 

was a motivating factor for the Kansas Act's passage:

"[R]acketeering laws are based on the notion that with some criminal enterprises, the 

whole is greater than the sum of the parts—and, therefore, should be subject to greater 

penalties. A criminal street gang, for example, may commit numerous low-level crimes, 

but the pattern of criminal activity has a much greater negative effect on the community 

and on innocent residents than does any individual crime taken by itself. The federal 

government has successfully used the federal RICO statute to combat criminal street 

gangs, including those in Kansas. Giving Kansas law enforcement officials access to this 

tool at the state level would be a powerful step forward in our anti-gang efforts." 

Testimony of Attorney General Derek Schmidt, Senate Judiciary Committee, January 29, 

2013.

Beyond the fact that both the federal and Kansas RICO Acts were enacted for the 

same purpose, their elements are nearly identical, at least as to the charge against Dixon. 

The federal RICO Act provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise 

engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 

participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a 

pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

The Kansas RICO Act states: "[I]t is unlawful for any covered person: . . . 

employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to recklessly conduct or participate, 

directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or the 

collection of an unlawful debt." K.S.A. 21-6329(a)(3). The Kansas RICO Act defines 

"covered person" to include "a criminal street gang member." K.S.A. 21-6328(b)(1).

Although the Kansas RICO Act is not identical to its federal counterpart, the 

definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" closely mirrors the federal act—both 
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define the term as engaging in at least two predicate incidents or acts of racketeering 

activity. Compare K.S.A. 21-6328(e) with 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). But the Kansas statute 

goes a step further in specifying that the activities must have "the same or similar intents, 

results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission or that otherwise are interrelated 

by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents." K.S.A. 21-6328(e). That 

said, this additional language in the Kansas RICO Act generally tracks how the language 

in the federal act is construed. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 

229, 240, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1989) (noting that in the RICO context 

"'[c]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or 

similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise 

are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events'").

The similarities in purpose and structure between the Kansas RICO Act and the 

federal RICO Act on which it is based makes federal caselaw addressing similar 

challenges to those raised by Dixon particularly persuasive.

ARE JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITION OF

"RACKETEERING ACTIVITY" UNDER THE KANSAS RICO ACT?

Dixon contends that juvenile offenses, such as the two predicate adjudications the 

State included in the RICO offense he was charged with committing, are not included in 

the definition of "racketeering activity" under the Kansas RICO Act. Thus, he argues that

he was convicted of a nonexistent crime and either the district court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction or the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Dixon 

argues that the applicable statutes are unambiguous, but if there is any ambiguity he 

prevails under the rule of lenity. He urges this court to reverse his conviction, vacate his 

sentence, and dismiss the charge. The State maintains that Dixon's argument is contrary 

to the plain language of the Kansas RICO Act—that is, that the definition of 

"racketeering activity" in K.S.A. 21-6328(f)(1) encompasses juvenile adjudications.
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Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law subject to unlimited

review. State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 784, 375 P.3d 332 (2016). To the extent this court 

must interpret the statutory language of the Kansas RICO Act to address Dixon's claim, it 

will exercise unlimited review. State v. Betts, 316 Kan. 191, 197, 514 P.3d 341 (2022). 

The principles of statutory interpretation are well-established:

"The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the 

Legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. In ascertaining this intent, a court 

begins with the plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary 

meaning. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court should not speculate about the 

legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading something 

into the statute that is not readily found in its words. But if a statute's language is 

ambiguous, a court may consult canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity." State v. 

Eckert, 317 Kan. 21, Syl. ¶ 6, 522 P.3d 796 (2023).

Dixon's argument requires examination of several statutory provisions. First, the 

State charged Dixon under K.S.A. 21-6329(a)(3), which states that "it is unlawful for any 

covered person . . . employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to recklessly conduct 

or participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 

activity or the collection of an unlawful debt." (Emphasis added.) The definitional statute, 

K.S.A. 21-6328(e), provides that a

"'[p]attern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least two incidents of 

racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or 

methods of commission or that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics 

and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after the 

effective date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within five years, 

excluding any period of imprisonment, after a prior incident of racketeering activity."
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In turn, K.S.A. 21-6328(f)(1) states:

"'Racketeering activity' means to commit, attempt to commit, conspire to commit 

or to solicit, coerce or intimidate another person to commit any:

"(1) Felony or misdemeanor violation of [one of a number of listed Kansas 

criminal offenses]." (Emphasis added.)

Both parties agree that the language of the relevant statutes is unambiguous; they 

disagree on the meaning of the term "violation." Dixon argues that juveniles "cannot 

commit felony or misdemeanor violations as a matter of law," and therefore juvenile 

adjudications cannot be considered racketeering activities. He points out that the Kansas 

Supreme Court has explained that "'a juvenile adjudication is not a "criminal 

conviction."'" In re M.M., 312 Kan. 872, 875, 482 P.3d 583 (2021). Dixon is correct that 

a criminal conviction and a juvenile adjudication are distinct entities, a point well 

established in Kansas caselaw. See, e.g., State v. LaMunyon, 259 Kan. 54, 57, 911 P.2d 

151 (1996) ("[A] juvenile proceeding is considered a civil proceeding of a protective 

nature totally divorced from any criminal implication."); State v. Crawford, 39 Kan. App. 

2d 897, 901, 185 P.3d 315 (2008). But juvenile adjudications, while not convictions, are 

still classified as felonies or misdemeanors in determining an offender's criminal history. 

See K.S.A. 21-6811; K.S.A. 21-6810(a).

While an adjudication is not a conviction, the premise of Dixon's argument that a 

juvenile cannot commit a felony or misdemeanor violation is based on his conflation of

the terms "conviction" and "violation." The Kansas RICO Act does not utilize the word 

"conviction" in its definition of racketeering activity—the statute uses the phrase: any 

"[f]elony or misdemeanor violation." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-6328(f)(1). Thus, 

resolution of this issue turns on whether the term "violation" in K.S.A. 21-6328(f)(1)

encompasses both criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications or, as Dixon contends, 

only includes criminal convictions.
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As a starting point, we note that the terms "violation" and "conviction"—while 

related—are not interchangeable. A "violation" is defined as "[a]n infraction or breach of 

the law; a transgression" or "[t]he act of breaking or dishonoring the law." Black's Law 

Dictionary 1881 (11th ed. 2019). On the other hand, a "conviction" is defined as "[t]he act 

or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having been 

proved guilty" or "[t]he judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime." 

Black's Law Dictionary 422 (11th ed. 2019). These definitions show that the term 

"violation" as used in the Kansas RICO Act encompasses a broader meaning than 

"conviction." Whereas a conviction specifically signifies the legal process of having been 

found guilty, a violation simply means the contravention of some law.

Dixon points out that the Kansas RICO Act's definition of racketeering activity 

does not explicitly reference juvenile offenses or adjudications and asserts that this 

omission signifies that adjudications were purposefully not included in the definition. But 

the Act also omits the term "conviction." Had the Legislature referred to convictions in 

defining an instance of racketeering activity, a fair reading would be that it had intended 

to exclude juvenile adjudications. Accord State v. Boyer, 289 Kan. 108, 116, 209 P.3d 

705 (2009) (holding that a reference to convictions under a statute did not encompass 

juvenile adjudications). Instead, in drafting the Kansas RICO Act, the Legislature used 

the broader phrase: "Felony or misdemeanor violation." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-

6328(f)(1). The fact that the statute does not distinguish between adult convictions or 

juvenile adjudications suggests that racketeering activity is not limited to adult 

convictions but encompasses any violations of the listed offenses. Significantly, the State 

routinely charges juvenile offenders with violating many of the listed criminal offenses in 

K.S.A. 21-6328(f)(1).

In a final attempt to support this claim, Dixon points to K.S.A. 38-2302(s), which 

defines "juvenile offender" in relevant part as
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"a person who commits an offense while 10 or more years of age but less than 18 years of 

age which if committed by an adult would constitute the commission of a felony or 

misdemeanor . . . or who violates the provisions of K.S.A. 41-727, K.S.A. 74-8810(j) or 

K.S.A. 21-6301(a)(14), and amendments thereto."

Dixon asserts that the phrase "which if committed by an adult would constitute the 

commission of a felony or misdemeanor" indicates that only adults can commit felonies 

and misdemeanors, as he claims such language would be unnecessary if juveniles can 

commit such offenses. But when K.S.A. 38-2302(s) is read in its entirety, the statute is 

communicating a simple point: the term "juvenile offender" includes not only juveniles 

who commit any act that would be a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult, but 

also juveniles who commit certain acts (e.g., consumption of an alcoholic beverage under 

K.S.A. 41-727) that would not be illegal for adults.

The federal RICO Act's definition of "racketeering activity" does not use the 

language "felony or misdemeanor violation," but it defines the term to mean, in part, "any 

act . . . which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more 

than one year." (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Similar to the Kansas RICO Act, 

the federal act's definition of racketeering activity does not use the term conviction. As 

we will discuss more in the next section of this opinion, federal courts allow juvenile 

offenses to be included in the definition of racketeering activity. See, e.g., United States 

v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1364 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding defendant's RICO conviction 

when the pattern of racketeering activity included five acts, only one of which was 

committed when defendant was an adult).

A defendant's commission of, attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, or 

coercion of another person to commit any of the listed felony and misdemeanor offenses 

constitutes an instance of racketeering activity. K.S.A. 21-6328(f). As such, proof that a 

defendant breached any one of the listed felony or misdemeanor offenses, whether as an 
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adult or a juvenile, qualifies as racketeering activity. The plain language of K.S.A. 21-

6328(f)(1), specifically its use of the broad term "violation," demonstrates that the 

Legislature did not intend to limit the definition of "racketeering activity" to mean only 

adult convictions. We find that the Kansas RICO Act's definition of racketeering activity 

includes juvenile adjudications. Thus, we conclude the State did not charge Dixon with a 

nonexistent crime, and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Dixon's case.

Alternatively, Dixon briefly argues that because juvenile adjudications are not 

included in the definition of "racketeering activity" under the Kansas RICO Act, the State 

presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. This argument depends on his 

statutory argument that the State cannot prove racketeering activity through a juvenile 

offense—an argument we have just found unavailing. As a result, the sufficiency of the 

evidence claim fails as well. We observe that Dixon also makes a broader argument that 

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction if his predicate offenses are not 

considered unitary conduct under a double jeopardy analysis. We will address that 

argument later in this opinion.

DID THE STATE NEED TO CHARGE DIXON IN JUVENILE COURT BECAUSE HIS

PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY BEGAN WHEN HE WAS A JUVENILE?

Dixon next argues that assuming that juvenile adjudications may be used to 

establish a pattern of racketeering activity under the Kansas RICO Act, then the district 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because "the State failed to commence a juvenile 

case before seeking an adult criminal prosecution." He contends that because the State 

alleged that his two juvenile adjudications for criminal use of a weapon constituted 

"racketeering activities" in its RICO charge, the State needed to bring the RICO charge in 

juvenile court and then move to prosecute Dixon as an adult.
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The State counters that the RICO case against Dixon was properly brought 

because it was a continuing offense and at least one of the predicate racketeering 

activities occurred when he was an adult, not a juvenile. The State urges this court to 

follow federal caselaw analyzing and rejecting similar jurisdictional challenges under the 

federal RICO statute.

Dixon was 23 years old when the State filed its RICO case. The question this court 

must answer is whether the State must charge an adult defendant with a RICO offense in 

juvenile court when the alleged pattern of racketeering activity includes acts committed 

both as a juvenile and as an adult. Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question 

of law subject to unlimited review. Dunn, 304 Kan. at 784. Likewise, statutory 

interpretation is a question of law subject to unlimited review. Betts, 316 Kan. at 197.

In making his argument, Dixon mainly relies on caselaw and statutory authority 

for when the State may charge a juvenile as an adult. He emphasizes K.S.A. 38-2347, 

which contains the procedure the State must follow to prosecute a juvenile as an adult. 

Dixon does not contest that he was an adult when he committed some of the alleged acts 

of racketeering activity and when the State charged him with the RICO offense. He 

argues that because the RICO charge contained an element that included his prior 

juvenile offenses, the entire RICO charge should have been considered a juvenile offense.

The State asserts Dixon's argument is misplaced because a RICO offense is a 

continuing offense—that is, a crime committed over an extended time. The State urges 

this court to follow federal caselaw analyzing analogous challenges where a defendant 

was alleged to have committed a pattern of racketeering activity that encompassed both 

juvenile and adult offenses. Although the Kansas RICO Act does not directly mirror its 

federal counterpart, the definition a "pattern of racketeering activity" in the federal 

offense is instructive in considering whether the Kansas version of the crime is a 

continuing offense. Compare K.S.A. 21-6328(e) with 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Both the 
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Kansas RICO Act and the federal RICO Act define a "pattern of racketeering activity" as 

engaging in at least two incidents or acts of racketeering activity. The fact that the 

government must prove a "pattern" in at least two acts of racketeering activity to prove a 

RICO charge supports the State's claim that a RICO offense is a continuing offense.

Each of the federal cases the State cites found that a defendant may be held liable 

for committing a RICO offense as an adult if the pattern of racketeering activity includes 

some predicate offenses committed when the defendant was a juvenile and at least one 

offense was committed when the defendant was an adult. See United States v. Delatorre, 

157 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 1998); Wong, 40 F.3d at 1364-66. In Wong, the defendant 

was convicted of substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy violations—the pattern of 

racketeering activity included five acts, only one of which was committed when he was 

an adult. After he was convicted, Wong moved to dismiss, arguing the definition of 

"pattern of racketeering activity" would not support his convictions absent proof that he 

had committed two or more predicate acts as an adult because any juvenile acts were 

"outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts and could not constitute RICO predicate 

acts." 40 F.3d at 1364. The district court denied Wong's motion to dismiss, finding "that

substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy were 'continuing crimes,' and that Wong's 

commission of a single predicate act as an adult was sufficient to establish federal 

jurisdiction over Wong to be tried as an adult." 40 F.3d at 1364.

On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed. The Wong court noted that under the 

Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq., the relevant act for 

determining jurisdiction is the crime charged in the indictment—i.e., Wong's age at the 

time of the RICO offenses charged in the indictment, not his age when he committed 

some of the predicate acts contained within the RICO charge. 40 F.3d at 1365. To bolster 

its conclusion, the Wong court analogized Wong's situation with that of a defendant 

charged with conspiracy—another continuing offense—that began when a defendant was 

a minor but was completed as an adult. 40 F.3d at 1365-66. In the conspiracy context, 
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federal courts have held that a defendant may be tried as an adult even if the conspiracy 

began as a minor, so long as they continued to participate in the conspiracy after reaching 

adulthood. See United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 238-39 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also 

United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 754 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that substantive 

RICO offense is a continuing offense analogous to conspiracy).

In another case reaching the same result, Delatorre, 157 F.3d at 1209, the Tenth 

Circuit held that the government could bring a RICO case against the adult defendant 

without complying with the JDA even though one of the predicate acts supporting the 

RICO charges occurred before the defendant became an adult. Because of the continuing 

nature of the offense, the court found that as long as the government could show some

participation in racketeering activity as an adult, it did not need to bring a juvenile case 

under the JDA. 157 F.3d at 1209. The court noted: "No circuit has applied the JDA to an 

adult conspiracy or racketeering prosecution simply because defendant's participation in 

the crimes began prior to his eighteenth birthday." 157 F.3d at 1209-10.

We agree with the federal caselaw that a RICO offense is a continuing offense. A 

continuing offense is defined as "[a] crime (such as a conspiracy) that is committed over 

a period of time, so that the last act of the crime controls when the statute of limitations 

begins to run." Black's Law Dictionary 1300 (11th ed. 2019). The Kansas RICO statute 

that Dixon was convicted under, K.S.A. 21-6329(a)(3), supports a finding that it should 

be treated as a continuing offense. The statutory language of the offense requires the 

State to prove a pattern of racketeering activity—two or more acts that occurred over 

time. Because the criminal conduct the State must prove to secure a conviction under the 

RICO Act must occur over time, the offense is continuing.

Dixon began committing the RICO offense he was charged with committing as a 

juvenile, but he continued to participate in racketeering activities after he became an 

adult. By the time the State charged Dixon with the RICO offense, he had participated in 
17

racketeering activities both as a juvenile and an adult. Because he was an adult at the time

he was charged and when he committed the final racketeering activity, the State could 

charge Dixon as an adult—even though the charge contained two alleged predicate 

racketeering activities he committed as a juvenile. As a result, the State was not required 

to bring its case in juvenile court. We conclude that the district court did not lack subject 

matter jurisdiction and that Dixon was properly charged as an adult.

DOES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE PROHIBIT THE USE OF PRIOR

ADJUDICATIONS AND CONVICTIONS TO PROVE A RICO OFFENSE?

Dixon contends that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States 

Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights prohibit the use of

his prior adjudications and convictions to prove a RICO offense. He claims the State 

cannot use prior convictions or adjudications to prove a pattern of racketeering activity 

because doing so effectively forced him to face successive prosecutions for the same 

conduct. The State asserts that because Dixon's RICO offense constitutes a separate, 

distinct act from his predicate offenses, his double jeopardy argument fails.

The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights prohibit the State 

from securing multiple convictions on multiplicitous charges. State v. Sprung, 294 Kan. 

300, 306, 277 P.3d 1100 (2012). The Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against: (1) a 

second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the 

same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense." State

v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 463, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). Appellate courts exercise 

unlimited review when determining whether convictions are multiplicitous. State v. 

Davis, 306 Kan. 400, 419, 394 P.3d 817 (2017).
18

In Schoonover, the Kansas Supreme Court provided a framework to determine 

whether convictions subject a defendant to double jeopardy. "[T]he overarching inquiry 

is whether the convictions are for the same offense." 281 Kan. at 496. This inquiry is 

broken into two components, both of which must be met for there to be a double jeopardy 

violation: (1) Do the convictions arise from the same conduct and, if so, (2) by statutory 

definition, are there two offenses or only one? 281 Kan. at 496.

As for the first prong of the analysis, if the convictions are not based on the same 

conduct, the analysis ends. 281 Kan. at 496-97. To determine whether the convictions are 

based on the same conduct, courts look to:

"(1) whether the acts occur at or near the same time; (2) whether the acts occur at the 

same location; (3) whether there is a causal relationship between the acts, in particular 

whether there was an intervening event; and (4) whether there is a fresh impulse 

motivating some of the conduct." 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 16.

Only if this court determines that Dixon's actions constituted unitary conduct 

should it proceed to consider whether, by statutory definition, his conduct constituted one 

offense or two. See Sprung, 294 Kan. at 306-08. Under the second prong of the analysis

the test to be applied depends on whether the convictions arise from a single statute or 

from multiple statutes. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497-98. If, as here, the convictions are 

based on different statutes, the convictions are multiplicitous only when the statutes on 

which the convictions are based contain an identity of elements.

Dixon argues that he faced successive prosecutions because the predicate 

adjudications and convictions and the RICO charge itself constitute unitary conduct. He 

asserts that the "Kansas RICO charge completely subsumes all alleged racketeering 

activities in this case." At trial, the State introduced evidence of Dixon's prior 

adjudications and convictions as evidence of the requisite predicate acts constituting a 
19

pattern of racketeering activity. Dixon objected to the use of these prior violations before, 

during, and after trial to no avail. The district court explained that the State's use of the 

adjudications and convictions as predicate offenses in the RICO charge did not implicate 

double jeopardy concerns because there was no unitary conduct and the elements of the 

RICO charge and the prior adjudications and convictions were different.

We agree with the district court that Dixon's RICO offense and the predicate 

adjudications and convictions do not constitute unitary conduct. Granted, the RICO 

offense requires that the predicate acts amounting to a pattern of racketeering activity are 

"interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents." K.S.A. 21-

6328(e). But this does not mean that the activities are a singular course of conduct. The 

acts underlying Dixon's adjudications and convictions occurred on different dates and at 

different locations. The first predicate act occurred in 2013 and the final one occurred in 

2015. The common characteristic of these predicate acts was Dixon's gang membership, 

but the individual crimes were separate acts, motivated by fresh impulses, over an 

extended period of time. The commonality between these acts—their intents, results, 

Dixon's accomplices, etc.—shows a pattern of racketeering activity, but it does not 

establish that Dixon's actions were unitary conduct for double jeopardy purposes.

Our analysis could end here. But even if we were to find that the predicate acts

and the RICO offense constituted unitary conduct, Dixon is entitled to no relief because 

the offenses arose from different statutes and there is no identity of elements. The RICO 

offense requires the State to prove that Dixon committed multiple acts of racketeering. 

Whereas the RICO statute criminalizes racketeering activities, the predicate offenses the 

State used to establish the pattern of activity are intended to deter weapons and narcotics 

violations. As explained in more detail below in the discussion of Dixon's lesser included 

offense-based argument, there is no identity of elements between the offenses.
20

Federal courts have rejected identical double jeopardy-based challenges to the 

federal RICO statutes on which the Kansas RICO Act is based. For example, in United 

States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1986), the court found that successive 

prosecutions for a RICO offense and its underlying predicate offenses did not violate the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. The court observed that federal courts had "uniformly" held that 

"Congress intended separate convictions or consecutive sentences for a RICO offense and 

the underlying predicate offense." 795 F.2d at 283. The Grayson court noted:

"'There is nothing in the RICO statutory scheme which would suggest that 

Congress intended to preclude separate convictions or consecutive sentences for a RICO 

offense and the underlying or predicate crimes which make up the racketeering pattern. 

The racketeering statutes were designed primarily as an additional tool for the prevention 

of racketeering activity, which consists in part of the commission of a number of other 

crimes. The Government is not required to make an election between seeking a 

conviction under RICO, or prosecuting the predicate offenses only. Such a requirement 

would nullify the intent and effect of the RICO prohibitions.'" 795 F.2d at 283 (quoting 

United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 [9th Cir. 1979]).

The Kansas RICO Act was crafted with the intent to provide Kansas law 

enforcement with tools much like those provided under the federal act. See Testimony of 

Eric B. Smith, Legal Counsel, League of Kansas Municipalities, Senate Judiciary 

Committee, January 29, 2013. Additional testimony in support of the Kansas RICO Act 

presented to the Kansas Legislature by the Attorney General and the Kansas Association 

of Chiefs of Police underscores that an express purpose of the Act was to provide 

enhanced penalties for members of enterprises that engage in patterns of criminal 

activity. See Testimony of Attorney General Derek Schmidt and Ed Klumpp, Kansas 

Association of Chiefs of Police Legislative Committee Chair, Senate Judiciary 

Committee, January 29, 2013. As with the federal RICO Act, the legislative history of the 

Kansas RICO Act demonstrates a legislative intent to permit prosecution for both 

predicate offenses and the RICO offense to deter criminal enterprises.
21

In sum, the RICO offense Dixon was charged with committing and the predicate 

offenses used to establish a pattern of racketeering activity are not the "same" offense; 

they are all based on different statutes and are intended to deter different kinds of activity.

Dixon cannot establish (1) that his RICO conviction and his predicate adjudications and 

convictions were based on the same conduct or (2) that these offenses contained an 

identity of elements. As a result, Dixon's double jeopardy-based argument under the 

federal and Kansas Constitutions must fail.

WERE THE PREDICATE OFFENSES THAT ESTABLISHED DIXON'S PATTERN OF 

RACKETEERING ACTIVITY LESSER INCLUDED CRIMES OF THE RICO OFFENSE?

Along with Dixon's double jeopardy argument, he separately brings a statutory 

claim that the predicate offenses constituted the "'same offense' as the Kansas RICO 

conviction because the prior adjudications and convictions are lesser included crimes of 

the Kansas RICO conviction under K.S.A. 21-5109(b)(2)." Dixon argues: "Because 

Kansas RICO law requires proof of other crimes (racketeering activity) to prove a Kansas 

RICO crime, the other crimes (racketeering activity) are necessarily lesser included 

crimes by definition. . . . [E]very element of the other crimes (racketeering activity) are 

identical to some of the elements of the Kansas RICO conviction."

A lesser included crime is defined, in relevant part, as "a crime where all elements 

of the lesser crime are identical to some of the elements of the crime charged." K.S.A. 

21-5109(b)(2). Whether a crime is a lesser included offense is a question of law subject to 

unlimited appellate review. State v. Alderete, 285 Kan. 359, 361-62, 172 P.3d 27 (2007).

"The proper analysis to determine whether a crime is a lesser included offense of 

another crime applies a strict elements test and is limited to a comparison of the abstract 

elements of the offenses charged. The test no longer takes into account the factual 

nuances of a specific case as they may bear on satisfaction of the statutory elements of 

both crimes under examination." 285 Kan. 359, Syl. ¶ 2.
22

Dixon's assertion that the predicate offenses were lesser included offenses of the 

RICO offense is misplaced. The State presented four violations to establish Dixon's 

pattern of racketeering activity: two adjudications for criminal use of a weapon in 

violation of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6301(a)(14), one conviction for criminal carrying of a 

weapon under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6302(a)(4), and one conviction for possession of 

marijuana under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5706(b)(3). Each of these offenses contains 

elements that are not present in the RICO offense, which states that it is unlawful for any 

covered person "employed by, or associated with, any enterprise to recklessly conduct or 

participate, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 

activity." K.S.A. 21-6329(a)(3).

In applying the statutory test for lesser included offenses, we examine strictly the

statutory elements of the crimes. Although each of the predicate offenses have different 

elements, they all require proof that a defendant possessed or carried weapons or drugs—

the RICO offense has no such element. While Dixon is correct that there is some 

intersection between the predicate offenses and the RICO charge because the predicate 

offenses must show a pattern of activity, this does not make those offenses lesser 

included crimes of the RICO charge. The definition of racketeering activity encompasses 

committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting, coercing, or 

intimidating another person to commit any of the listed felony or misdemeanor violations.

K.S.A. 21-6328(f). As a result, the State could secure a conviction for the overarching 

RICO offense without proving that Dixon was in actual or constructive possession of 

weapons or drugs—an element necessary to establish each of his prior adjudications and 

convictions. Thus, not all the elements of the lesser crime are identical to some elements 

of the crime charged, as contemplated under K.S.A. 21-5109(b)(2).

Dixon makes three separate claims related to his argument that his predicate 

offenses were lesser included crimes of the RICO charge, so we will address them here. 

First Dixon claims that K.S.A. 21-5109(c), part of the statute addressing lesser included 
23

crimes, prevented the State from offering as evidence at trial the journal entries showing 

his pleas to his predicate offenses. K.S.A. 21-5109(c) states in full:

"Whenever charges are filed against a person, accusing the person of a crime 

which includes another crime of which the person has been convicted, the conviction of 

the lesser included crime shall not bar prosecution or conviction of the crime charged if 

the crime charged was not consummated at the time of conviction of the lesser included 

crime, but the conviction of the lesser included crime shall be annulled upon the filing of 

such charges. Evidence of the person's plea or any admission or statement made by the 

person in connection therewith in any of the proceedings which resulted in the person's 

conviction of the lesser included crime shall not be admissible at the trial of the crime 

charged. If the person is convicted of the crime charged, or of a lesser included crime, the 

person so convicted shall receive credit against any prison sentence imposed or fine to be 

paid for the period of confinement actually served or the amount of any fine actually paid 

under the sentence imposed for the annulled conviction." (Emphasis added.)

The State asserts that this court should not reach this issue because Dixon did not 

object to the evidence when the journal entries were offered at trial. Dixon readily admits 

that he failed to object to the admission of the journal entries when they were offered at 

trial, but he asserts this court should address this issue because it involves only a question 

of law arising on admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case. See, e.g., State v. 

Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 493, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014) (listing commonly recognized 

exceptions courts apply to consider unpreserved claims).

K.S.A. 60-404 provides: "A verdict or finding shall not be set aside . . . by reason 

of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record objection to the 

evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of 

objection." As the State notes, Kansas courts have long stressed the importance of the 

legislative mandate contained in K.S.A. 60-404, which, under its plain language, requires 

a contemporaneous objection for an evidentiary claim to be reviewed on appeal. State v. 

King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 204 P.3d 585 (2009). In State v. Carter, 312 Kan. 526, 535, 477 
24

P.3d 1004 (2020), the Kansas Supreme Court explicitly stated: "Exceptions exist for 

raising issues on appellate review without expressing an objection to the trial court, but 

K.S.A. 60-404 does not allow those exceptions to come into play in the context of the 

admissibility of evidence." Because Dixon did not make a timely and specific objection 

to the admission of the evidence as required by K.S.A. 60-404, and there are no 

exceptions to this rule, we cannot address Dixon's evidentiary claim on appeal.

Second, Dixon claims that this court must "annul" the prior adjudications and 

convictions that were lesser included offenses of the RICO charge. Dixon again points to 

K.S.A. 21-5109(c) which mandates that "the conviction of the lesser included crime shall 

be annulled upon the filing of such charges." Dixon's argument on this point depends on

his assertion that his prior adjudications and convictions that established his pattern of 

racketeering activity were lesser included crimes of the RICO offense. But because 

Dixon's prior adjudications and convictions were not lesser included crimes of the RICO 

offense, Dixon's annulment argument under K.S.A. 21-5109(c) fails.

Third, Dixon claims that he is entitled to jail credit for any time he spent 

incarcerated for his prior adjudications and convictions that established his pattern of 

racketeering activity. He again refers to K.S.A. 21-5109(c) which states: "If the person is 

convicted of the crime charged, or of a lesser included crime, the person so convicted 

shall receive credit against any prison sentence imposed . . . for the annulled conviction."

This argument once again depends on Dixon's assertion that his prior adjudications and 

convictions were lesser included crimes of the RICO offense—they were not. Moreover, 

Dixon's claim is speculative because he merely asserts that it is likely that he served a 

period of confinement for his prior adjudications and convictions—but there is no settled 

record to determine the amount of jail credit he would theoretically receive.
25

WAS THE STATE REQUIRED UNDER THE COMPULSORY JOINDER RULE TO BRING THE 

KANSAS RICO CHARGE WHEN IT BROUGHT THE PREDICATE CHARGES?

Dixon contends, under the compulsory joinder rule, that the State was required to 

bring its RICO charge against him when it brought the cases used to establish the pattern 

of racketeering activity in the RICO charge. Dixon acknowledges that his claim must fail 

under State v. Wilkins, 269 Kan. 256, 7 P.3d 252 (2000), but he contends that case was 

wrongly decided and should be overturned. This court exercises unlimited review when 

analyzing compulsory joinder issues and interpretation of the statute where the rule is set 

forth, K.S.A. 21-5110. State v. Jordan, 303 Kan. 1017, 1018, 370 P.3d 417 (2016).

"'Under the compulsory joinder rule, if evidence is admitted of an offense not 

contained in the charge, later prosecution of that offense is barred if it could have been 

included as an additional count in the first prosecution.'" 303 Kan. at 1019. The rule seeks 

to prevent the State from proving a crime that it did not charge in a first trial and then 

prosecuting the defendant again in a later trial using the same evidence that was presented 

in the earlier trial. Wilkins, 269 Kan. 256, Syl. ¶ 2. Three elements must be established for 

a prosecution to be barred under the compulsory joinder rule: "(1) The prior prosecution 

must have resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal; (2) evidence of the present crime 

must have been introduced in the prior prosecution; and (3) the present crime must be one 

which could have been charged as an additional count in the prior case." 269 Kan. at 260;

Jordan, 303 Kan. at 1020.

Relevant here, the second element requires the defendant to "show that the 

evidence presented at the first trial, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 

defendant, would lead a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of the crimes in the second trial." (Emphasis added.) Wilkins, 269 Kan. 

at 263. The Kansas Supreme Court later modified this test in Jordan, 303 Kan. at 1021-

22, requiring the defendant to simply show that the evidence at the first trial could lead a 
26

rational fact-finder to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes in the second

trial. Dixon admits he cannot satisfy this element. Dixon argues that Jordan and Wilkins

are "clearly erroneous based on the plain language of [K.S.A. 21-5110(b)(1)]," but 

acknowledges that this court is duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent 

absent some indication that the court is departing from its previous position. See State v. 

Rodriguez, 305 Kan. 1139, 1144, 390 P.3d 903 (2017). Dixon has not provided any 

specific argument to establish any such departure.

Dixon cannot show that a rational fact-finder could find him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of the RICO charge based on the evidence presented at the trials for his 

predicate offenses. Under Kansas Supreme Court precedent that this court is duty bound 

to follow, Dixon's claim under the compulsory joinder rule fails.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Dixon argues that if this court finds that his "pattern of racketeering activity" did 

not constitute unitary conduct—as addressed in his double jeopardy-based argument 

above—the State must have presented insufficient evidence to support his RICO 

conviction because his predicate offenses were necessarily isolated, and not a pattern of 

activity. The State asserts that Dixon's sufficiency of the evidence claim fails because it is 

based on the incorrect premise that separate criminal acts under a double jeopardy 

analysis cannot be part of a pattern of racketeering activity.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support their 

conviction(s), an appellate court examines the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

State and determines whether a trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

charge beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sieg, 315 Kan. 526, 530-31, 509 P.3d 535 

(2022). In conducting this review, the appellate court will not reweigh evidence, resolve 

evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. State v. Zeiner, 316 
27

Kan. 346, 350, 515 P.3d 736 (2022). To the extent this court must engage in statutory 

interpretation, its review is unlimited. Betts, 316 Kan. at 197.

Dixon argues that "[w]e either have a double jeopardy problem . . . or we have a 

sufficiency [of the evidence] problem." He asserts that "a finding of non-unitary conduct

means, automatically, that Dixon's racketeering activities were isolated incidents, which 

isn't a Kansas RICO crime." In other words, Dixon argues the evidence was insufficient 

because separate criminal acts cannot be part of a pattern of racketeering activity. This 

argument misses the mark. A determination that a defendant committed separate criminal 

acts under a double jeopardy analysis does not necessarily mean that those acts were not 

part of a pattern of racketeering activity.

The definitions of pattern of racketeering activity under the Kansas RICO Act and 

unitary conduct for double jeopardy purposes are not interchangeable. As noted above, 

under K.S.A. 21-6328(e), a "'[p]attern of racketeering activity' means engaging in at least 

two incidents of racketeering activity that have the same or similar intents, results, 

accomplices, victims or methods of commission or that otherwise are interrelated by 

distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents." On the other hand, conduct 

maybe considered unitary for double jeopardy purposes when actions arise from the same 

act or transaction or from a single course of conduct. To show unitary conduct courts 

look to whether the acts occur at or near the same time or location, whether there was a 

causal relationship or an intervening event between or a fresh impulse motiving the acts. 

Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, Syl. ¶ 16. Contrary to Dixon's assertions, a determination that 

a defendant committed separate acts for double jeopardy purposes does not mean that the 

State presented insufficient evidence to support the RICO conviction.

The requisite nexus between individual acts of racketeering activity forming a 

pattern is that the acts share similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of 

commission. The State provides an excellent example of the distinction: If a defendant 
28

committed a murder of a rival gang member in retaliation for a prior shooting and then, at 

some later time, assaulted a different person who had stolen drugs from the gang, those 

two acts would constitute a pattern of racketeering activity because both acts had a 

similar intent—to protect or defend the criminal enterprise. This pattern would exist even 

though the two criminal acts would not constitute unitary conduct for double jeopardy 

purposes. In other words, whether a defendant's predicate offenses were unitary under a 

double jeopardy analysis is irrelevant to whether the State can prove a pattern of 

racketeering activity to sustain a RICO conviction.

Dixon does not challenge the evidence the State presented at his trial. His 

argument is more of a legal one: that the instances of racketeering activity cannot be 

considered a pattern if this court concludes that those instances were not unitary under a 

double jeopardy analysis. We reject that claim. The State presented evidence that Dixon 

committed four instances of racketeering activity that, when considered together, could 

be found to collectively constitute a pattern because each was committed with a similar 

intent and with similar accomplices in furtherance of his gang activity. Therefore, the

State presented sufficient evidence to support Dixon's RICO conviction.

Affirmed.