UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 95-5806 HENRY H. DINGER, JR., Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, District Judge. (CR-92-8) Submitted: June 20, 1996 Decided: July 16, 1996 Before HALL, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSELHunt L. Charach, Federal Public Defender, C. Cooper Fulton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Miller A. Bus hong III, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________ OPINION
PER CURIAM: Henry H. Dinger, Jr., appeals the 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. He contends that the districtcourt did not consider the Revocation Table contained in the Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 7 policy statements, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual , § 7B1.4(a), p.s. (Nov. 1994), as required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e) (West Supp. 1996). We affirm. Dinger began serving a three-year term of supervised release in April 1995. In June 1995, after a hearing requested by the probation officer, the district court found that Dinger had violated a condition of his supervised release by drinking to excess on several occasions.The court modified Dinger's supervised release conditions by imposing a curfew. In July 1995, after Dinger twice failed to comply with the curfew, the district court again modified his supervised release conditions to include, among other things, electronic monitoring ofhis curfew, weekly meetings with a probation officer, a daily breathalyzer test, and intensive outpatient counseling for his alcohol problem. In August 1995, Dinger was ten minutes late getting home on one occasion, tested positive for alc ohol use on two o ccasions, and was arrested on state charges of public intoxication, disorderly conduct, obstructing an officer, and destruction of property.* At a hearing in October 1995, Dinger offered explanations for each of his violations. Through counsel he requested a sentence within the revocation range, but he also stated that he needed inpatient treatment for his alcohol problem. The government asked for a two-year sentence for the safety of the community because of Dinger's failure to control his drinking and history of alcohol-related violence. The district court revoked Dinger's supervised release and imposed a sentence of 24 months.

_________________________________________________________________ *Dinger pled guilty to destruction of property, resisting arrest, and obstructing an officer. The other charges were dismissed.
2Before revoking a term of supervised release, the district court should consider certain factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1996), one of which is the applicable Chapter 7 policy statements governing the revocation of supervised release terms. See18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a)(4)(B), 3583(e). However, the Chapter 7 policy statements are not binding. United States v. Davis , 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). Having considered the relevant factors and the applicable policy statements, the court has the discretion to impose a sentence outside the ranges set out in the Revocation Table. Id. Here, the district court expressly considered the four-to-ten month sentencing range set out in the relevant Chapter 7 policy statement, as well as the factors set out in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553, and decided thatthe statutory maximum sentence of two years would be of most benefit to the public and to Dinger. The court stated that, because no further term of supervised release could be imposed once Dingerfinished serving the revocation sentence, a two-year sentence provided the best opportunity for him to r eceive intensive alc ohol treatment. Dinger contends that the district court's reasons for imposing the maximum term were legally flawed and therefore the court cannot be said to have considered the Chapter 7 policy statements. Dinger points out that rehabilitation or the provision of medical care is not an appropriate reason for imposing a particular sentence under the guidelines. See18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988). However, both protection of the public and the provision of needed medical care to the defendant are factors which the court is directed to consider under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C) before requiring a defendant to serve all or part of his term of supervisedrelease in prison. In sum, we find that the district court properly exercised its discretion in this case. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentionsare adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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