1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INDIA PATRICIA GIBSON , Plaintiff,

v. No. 1: 21
- cv - 660
- ZMF KILOLO KIJAKAZI , Acting Commissioner of Social Security , Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff, India Patricia Gibson , moves for reversal of Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ’ s decision adopting the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and denying Gibson’s application for Supplemental Security Inco me and Disability Insurance Ben efits. See Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (“Pl.’s Mot.”) 1, ECF No. 18. On September 29, 2021, by consent of the parties, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan referred this matter to a M agistrate J udge for all purposes

. See Min

. Order ( Sept. 29, 2021 )

. Pending before this Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and Defendant ’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance

. See Pl.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mot. J. Affirmance (“Def.’s Mot.”) , ECF No. 20. After considering the parties’ submissions and the Administrative Record, 1 the undersigned DEN IES Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and GRANT S Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance in an accompanying order.

1 The Administrative Record consists of thirty exhibits. See Administrat ive R., ECF No. 13. For ease of reference, citations to the Administrative Record will refer to the “AR” and cite to the consecutive page numbers provided in the lower right-hand corner of each page.2 I. BACKGROUND Statutory Framework T he Social Security Act entitles an individual to disability benefits if she is unable to engage in “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months .” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (2022 ). The Social Security Admi nistration (“ SS A” ) uses a five

- step process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (2022) . The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps. See Butler v. Barnhart , 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2004). First, a claimant must show that she is not presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” § 416.920(a)(4)(i). Second, sh e must demonstrate that she has a “severe impairment” that “significantly limits [her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). Third, the claimant must show that her impairment or combination of impairmen ts “meets or equals” one of the listings at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App

. 1. § 416.920(a) (4)(iii). If it does, then the claimant is deemed disabled and the inquiry ends. See §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If not, the ALJ must proceed to step four , which requires the ALJ to determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity ( “ RFC ” ) and consider whether, in light of the RFC, the claimant can still perform any past work. See § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At step five , if the RFC indicates that the claimant cannot engage in past work, then “ the burden shifts to the Commissioner ” to prove that the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work experience indicate that she is “ able to perform ‘ other work ’ ” that exists in the national economy. Butler , 353 F.3d at 997 ( ci ting §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f)).3 Factual Background 1. Gibson’s Testi mony Gibson ’s alleged disability began on January 31, 2017, at which time she stopped working. See AR 180 . The alleged disability followed an injury to her back, neck, and shoulder while working as a bus driver. See AR 296, 483

. She testified at the hearing and in her adult function reports that she cared for her p ersonal needs

— including dressing, bathing, laundry, caring for hair, feeding herself, using the toilet, and cleaning

— but sometimes needed help getting dressed or caring for her hair. See AR 65–66, 237. She reported that she generally prepared her mea ls twice per week

. See AR 65, 238. She sometimes shopped for food and completed light household chores, but other times needed help from her children, her mo ther , or a friend

. See AR 66, 238–39. She testified that she generally attended church once a week and reported going to doctor’s appointments. See AR 67, 240. She typically drove herself when leaving the house, but occasionally needed assistance. See AR 239–40. 2. Medical Evidence On February 1, 2017 , Dr. Polo- Zisa examined Gibson at Concentra Medical Center (“Concentra”)

. See AR 970. Dr. Polo- Zisa concluded that Gibson’s lumbosacral spine had no tenderness and a full range of motion; her thoracic spine was tende r with painful, but full , range of motion; and she ambulated with a normal gait. See AR 970. Gibson’s straight

- leg raise test was negative bilaterally. See AR 970. On February 16, 2017, Dr. Pickett examined Gibson at Concentra

. See AR 916. Gibson had a negative straight -leg rais e test and ambulated with a normal gait. See AR 916

– 17. On March 7, 2017, Dr. Shah examined Gibson at Concentra. See AR 910. Her cervical and thoracic spine showed no tenderness with a full range of m otion. See AR 911. On May 4, 201 7 , Dr. Raizman4 concluded that an April 2017 MRI of Gibson’s cervical spine showed a malformation and multilevel herniated disks. See AR 39, 1052. O n July 18, 2017, Nurse Practitioner Hockman and Dr. Silverio evaluated Gibson’s back pain. See AR 702. They observed lumbar spine tenderness, but a normal range of motion and ambulat ion with a normal gait

. See AR 702. On November 15, 2017 and January 11, 2018, Dr. Onyewu examined Gibson and observed spine tendernes s, but a normal range of motio n. See AR 488, 767, 769. Gibson ambulated with an antalgic gait. 2 See AR 488, 767, 769. Gibson’s straight

- leg raise test was negative bilaterally during both examinations. See AR 488 , 769. On April 5, 2018, D r. Onyewu examined Gibson again and reviewed an MRI of her cervical spine. See AR 751 , 753 . The MRI showed disc herniations; however, motor strength was normal. See AR 752

– 54. Gibson’s straight

- leg raise test was positive at th irty degrees and she ambulated with an antalgic gait. See AR 75 4

– 5 5

. On May 29 , 2018, Dr. Nolte examined Gibson. See AR 786. Dr. Nolte observed that s he ambulated with a slow gait, but had a normal stance and could “ walk on [ her ] hee ls and toes without difficulty , ” get up and out of a chair without difficulty, and needed no help getting on and off the exam table. AR 788. Gibson had moderate limitations in bending and squatting, and a mild limitation in walking. See AR 790. On J une 21, 2018, Dr. Raizman examined Gibson again and observed that she had decreased cervical spine range of motion and that her straight

- leg raise test was positive bilaterally. See AR 1116. From Aug ust 2018 t o November 2019, G ibson continued to visit several doctors regarding her back pain. These doctors concluded that her back exam s and range of motion were normal, see AR 421

– 22 , and that she ambulated with a normal gait, see AR 1355 . Dr. V enkataram, a state

2 An antalgic gait o ccurs when a person walks with a limp because of pain. See Cheryl Whitten, What I s an Antalgic Gait? , W EB MD , ht tps://www.webmd.com/pain

- management/what

- is

antalgic

- gait (last visited Nov. 21, 2022)

.5 agency consulting physician, opined that Gibson could perform work at a light exertion level, consistent with objective evidence of her back pain, and found her not disabled

. See AR 92–94 , 97–98. However, in September 2018 and March 2019, Dr. Onyewu examined G ibson and made

some contrary findings. See A R 822, 1475

. Dr. Onyewu observed that Gibson ambulated with an antalgic gait, but his examination of her spine showed a normal range of motion, with pain. See AR 826, 1475

– 77. Dr. Onyewu also noted that there was evidence of spinal tenderness, see AR 826, and that Gibson’s straight- leg raise test was positive at thirty degrees, see AR 826, 1477. On May 22, 2020, Dr. Onyewu examined her again. See AR 16. Dr. Onyewu concluded that Gibson suffered from chronic lower back pain

. See AR 21. Dr. Onyewu advised her to avoid activities such as “lifting, prolonged standing, walking ,” and climbin g. AR 21. Procedural Background O n December 20, 20 17, Gibson applied for dis ability benefits. See AR 31, 180 . On July 27, 2018, the SSA denied her claim

. See AR 118. On November 5, 2018, the SSA denied her request for reconsideration

. See AR 31, 127. On November 26, 2019, ALJ Raghav Kotval held a hearing on Gibson’s claim. See AR 31, 53. On January 16, 2020, the ALJ ruled Gibson was not disabled. See AR 47 . At step one, the ALJ determined that Gibson had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity si nce the disability onset date. See AR 33. At step two, the ALJ found that Gibson had severe impairments of “spine disorders (cervical and lumbar)” among others. AR 33

. At step three, the ALJ determined that Gibson did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equa l ed the criteria of Li sting 1.04 (disorders of the spine ). See AR 34 –35. At step four, the ALJ found that Gibson had the RFC to perform light work with some limitations

. See AR 37. Specifically, she6 could “lift, carry, push, and pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She [could] sit for 6 hours in an 8

- hour workday. She [could] stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8

- hour workday.” AR 37. Gibson could “only occasionally climb ra mps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. ” AR 37. Thus, the ALJ limited Gibson to “ simple, routine tasks, not at a production pace, performed in two

- hour increments” before needing a break. AR 37. T he ALJ concluded that Gibson’s sev ere impairments did not lead to debilitating effects on her functional abilities. See AR 38. At step five, the ALJ determined that there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Gibson could perform. See AR 46. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ relied on the testimony o f a vocational expert (“VE”). See AR 46

– 47, 78

– 80. The ALJ asked the VE to

assume a hypothetical individual of Gibson’s age and education who could perform a full range of light work with the above

- referenced limitations

. See AR 76. The VE responded t hat such an individual could make a successful adjustment to a significant number of jobs in the national economy, such as a greeter/usher, hostess, or information clerk. See AR 46 , 79. Gibson appealed the ALJ’s decisio n, which the Appeals Council declined to review. See AR 4

– 6. Gibson now seeks review of the ALJ’s decision

. See Pl.’s Mot. She argu es that the ALJ committed reversible error at step three because her impairments satisfied Listing 1.04A

. 3 See i d

. at 2 , 5

– 1 2

.

3 Th e Court pauses briefly to note t hat on A pril 2, 2 021, the SSA updated the musculo skeletal listings

. Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Musculoskeletal Disord ers Final Rules Questions and Answers , SSA, https://www.ssa.gov/thirdparty/materials/pdfs/21

- 489_Musculoskeletal_FAQs.pdf (last visiting Nov. 22, 202 2). Listing 1 .04 became Listing 1.15 , with additional requirements. See 1.00 Musculosk eletal Disorders

– Adult , SSA , https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bl uebook/1.00

- Musculoskeletal

- Adult.htm#1_15 (last visited Nov. 2 2, 2022). For consi stency, the Court will continue to refer to Listing 1.04 in accor dance with the part ies ’ briefing refers to Listing 1.0 4. S ee Pl. ’ s Mot.; Def. ’ s Mot

. 3 Gibson only cla ims to meet the criteria of Paragraph A. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2

.7 II. LEGAL STANDARD Upon review, “ [t] he court must uphold the [ALJ’s] determination if it is supported by substantial evidence and is not tainted by an error of law.” Smith v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “ Substantial e vidence is ‘ such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. ’” Butler , 353 F.3d at 999 (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). This standard “requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisf ied by something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Po wer Agency v. Fed. E nergy Regul. Com m’n , 315 F.3d 362, 365

– 66 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ( cleaned up )

. “Substantial

evidence review is highly deferential to the agency fact

- finder.” Ro s sello ex rel. Ro s sello v. Astrue , 529 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2008). On review, the “plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s decision [was] not based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied.” Settles v. Colvin , 121 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2015) ( cleaned up). The reviewing court may not replace the ALJ’s judgment “concerning the credibility of the evidence with its own.” Goodman v. Colvin , 233 F. Supp. 3d 88, 104 (D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up)

. Rather, “[ t]he credibility determination is solely within the realm of the A LJ.” Grant v. Astrue , 857 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2012 ). III. ANALYSIS A. Evaluation of Spinal Disorder Under Listing 1.04 at Step Three 1. Legal Standard The criteria of the listings in step three “are more restrictive than the statutory disability standard” because they describe impairments that are “severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity,” not just substantial gainful activity. Sullivan v. Zebley , 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990) (quoting § 416.925(a)). “For a claimant to show that h[er] impairment matches a8 listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify. ” Id. at 530 (emphasis in original)

. The claimant bears the burden of proving a presumptively disabling impairment. See id. at 525. Listing 1.04 requires Gibson to show that she had a disorder of the spine and that she met

a n additional criterio n contained in paragraphs A, B, or C

. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, 1.04

. Paragraph A requires “nerve root compression characterized by neuro

- anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy wit h associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory loss or reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight

- leg raise test (sitting and supine).” 4 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, 1.04

. In evaluating the ALJ’s decision at step three, “th[is] Court is not confined to the ALJ’s analysis at step three and instead must consider the reasoning provided by the ALJ in the decision in its entir ety.” Al Hulais v. Comm ’r

. of Soc. Sec. Admin

. , No. 18

- cv - 118, 2018 WL 6704756, at

* 6 (D. Md. Dec. 20, 2018) ; see also Colter v. Kijakazi , No. 20

- cv - 632, 2022 WL 715218, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2022) ( the ALJ “provid[ed] a suff icient basis for this Court to understand his reasonin g when viewing the decision as a whole”). For example, an ALJ’s reasons why a claimant was not disabled at step four may “provide [a ] rationale that is sufficient for [a court] to determine the basis fo r the finding about [no] medical equivalence at step 3.” S S R 1 7

- 2p , 2017 WL 3928306 , at *4 (Mar . 27. 2017)

. 5

4 Gibson only cla ims to meet the criteria of Paragraph A. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2

. 5 “Although Soc ial Sec urity Rulings

. . . do not have the force of law, they are entitled to deference so long as they are consistent with the [SSA] and regulations.” Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admi n. , No. 19

- cv - 788, 2021 WL 1207753, at *4 (citing Fair v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1994)).9 2. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Determination that Plaintiff’s Impairment Did Not Meet Li sting 1.04A T he ALJ “specifically identifie[d] Listing [1.04], describe[ d his] reasons for concluding that Plaintiff’s condition d[id] not meet or medically equal that Listing, and [went] on to discuss the evidence in the record in significant detail.” Co nway ex rel. Tolen v. Astrue , 554 F. Supp. 2d 26, 3 5 (D.D.C. 2008 ) ; see AR 34, 38

– 45. T here was no requirement “that the ALJ provide an exhaustive point

- by

- point breakdown of every listed impairment. Rather, the ALJ [satisfied his obligation] to provide a coherent basis for his step

- three determination” by discussing the medical evidence, disability report, and consultative examiner reports. Keene v. Berryhill , 732 F. App’x 174, 177 (4 th Cir. 2018) ; s ee AR 34

– 35. First , “ [d] uring h[is] step three analysis, the ALJ explained why Gibson failed to meet the requirements of Listing 1.04A ” based on the medical evidence. Al Hulais , 2018 WL 6704756, at *7 ; see AR 35 . Sp ecifically, the A LJ explained: The record contains evidence of cervical and lumbar spine degeneration, which led to reduced range of motion and back pain (Ex. 26F). The claimant’s lower extremity strength was slightly decreased. However , o n examination by Dr. Nolte, the st raight

- leg raising test was negative bilaterally. The claimant’s gait was slow, but she could walk on her heels and toes without difficulty. Her stance was normal. She used no assistive devices. She needed no help changing for the exam or getting on and of f the exam table. She was able to rise from a chair without difficulty. This evidence is inconsistent with an inability to ambulate effectively. AR 35. The ALJ thus identified Listing 1.04A and described his “reasons for concluding that Plaintiff’s condi tion d[id] not mee t

. . . that Listing” before going “on to discuss the evidence

. . . in significant detail” at step four. Conway , 554 F. Supp. 2d at 3 5 ; see AR 34, 38

– 45. In his step four “discussion of [Gibson ’ s] relevant medi cal evidence, the ALJ cited substantial evidence in the record demonstrating that Plaintiff did not meet all of the requirements for Listing 1.04A.” Al Hulais , 2018 WL 6704756, at *8; see AR 38

– 45

. T reatment reports ,10 including those of Dr. Onyewu, indicated some spinal tenderness ; however, those reports also showed that Gibson retained a range of motion within normal limits

— if not a full range of motion

. See AR 39, 437, 767

– 69, 970, 1475

– 77. Treatment records from this period indicate d there was

no sciatic tenderness , s ee AR 38 , 916

– 17 , 752

– 54 , despite Gibson’s diagnosis of a malformation and claims of significant p ain

. , ” AR 39, 1051

. The medical evidence also indicated that Gibson did not exhibit significant lumbosacral spine tenderness and her lumbar range o f motion was within normal limits

. See AR 38, 702, 970. Gibson’s motor strength was normal on several occasions. See AR 38

– 43, 488, 752

– 54, 911, 970. H er neurovascular function was also intact. See AR 39 , 916

– 17. Additionally, d uring the May 2018 consultative examination, Gibson had a normal stance and could “walk on her heels and toes, get u p and out of a chair without difficulty, and needed no help getting on and off the exam table.” AR 24; s ee AR 35, 41, 788. These “repeated findings

. . . of full strength

. . . preclude a finding of ‘motor loss

. . . accompanied by sensory or reflex l oss. ” Knight v. Kijakazi , No. 20

- cv - 2734, 2022 WL 1746963, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar

. 28, 2022) (cleaned up)

. Thus, “there [ was ] elsewhere in the ALJ’s opinion an equivalent di scussion of the medical evidence relevant to the [s]tep [t] hree analysis which allows this C ourt readily to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ ’ s [s]tep [t] hree conclusion. ” Schoofield v. Barnhart , 220 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 (D. Md. 2002)

. Additionally, “ t he regulation ’ s text is clear that where, as here, ‘there is i nvolvement of the lower back,’ the claimant must produce evidence of positive [straight

- leg raise ] testing [

. ] ” Watlington v. Berryhill , No. 16

- cv - 46, 2017 WL 7053988, at *9 (W.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2017) (cleaned up) ; s ee 20 C.F.R Part 404 Subpart P, App. 1, 1.04

. “The absence of positive findings from

. . . straight

- leg raising tests is enough to prevent [a plaintiff] from meeting Listing 1.0 4(A) [

. ] ” Watlington , 2017 WL 7053988, at *9

. Gibson provide d some evidence of positive11 straight

- le g raise test s and antalgic gait

. See AR 488, 752

– 54, 767, 769, 1116, 1475

– 77. However, multiple examinations contr adicted that evidence

. See AR 38

– 44. I n two examinations in February 2017, Gibson ambulated wi th a normal gait, and her straight

- leg raise test was negative bilaterally. See AR 38, 916

– 17, 970 . In July 2017, Gibs on again ambulated with a normal gait. See AR 39, 702. In both November 2017 and January 2018, the straight

- leg raise t est was negative bilaterally. See AR 40 , 488, 769. Finally, i n November 2019, Gibson again ambulated with a normal gait. See AR 43, 1355. The lack of uncontradicted evidence of positive straight

- leg raise tests and substantial defects in Gibson ’ s gait indicates that “ the Listing 1.04A requirement of motor loss

. . . was [] not met

. ” Peters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , No. 17

- cv - 2371, 2018 WL 4223155, at * 6 (D. Md

. Sept. 5, 2018) ; see Al Hul ais , 2018 WL 6704756, at *8 ; AR 35

– 45. “Therefore, in light of the evidence in the medical record

. . . , the Court con cludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that [Gibson ’ s] impairments do not meet or equal Listing 1.04A.” Al Hulais , 2018 WL 6704756, at *8 ; see AR 35

– 45. Second , “ [ although] the ALJ need not articulate his reasons for reject ing every pie ce of evidence, he must at least minimally discuss a claimant ’ s evidence that contradicts the Commissioner ’ s position.” Lane

- Rauth v. Barnhart , 437 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Godbey v. Apfel , 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000) )

. The amount of contradictory evidence the ALJ must consider depend s on the case and strength of evidence

. See Demetria R. v. Kijakazi , No. 20

- cv - 3227, 2022 WL 3142376, at *21 (D.D.C. June 30, 2022)

. Ultimately, t he ALJ should consider whether the opinion is supported b y “objective medical evidence” and whether it is consistent with “the evidence from other medical

. . . and nonmedical sources.” Id. (finding ALJ’s consideration of two contrary medical reports sufficient since substantial evidence

su pported his evaluation of the “supportability” and “consistency” of the reports ) ; see Abigail R.12 v. Kijakazi , No. 21

- cv - 13, 2022 WL 19676, at *8 (D. Neb. Jan. 3, 2022) (same); O’Brien v. Saul , No. 18

- cv - 12634 , 2020 WL 1169459, at *7 (D. Mass. March 11, 202 0) (finding ALJ’s

cons ideration of one contrary medical report sufficient since it was “inconsistent with the overall weight of the evidence” and supported by “substantial evidence”)

. Here, the ALJ indicated not only “what evidence was credited, but also whether other evidence was rejected,” rather than simply ignored. Brown v. Bowen , 794 F.2d 70 3, 708 (D.C. C ir. 1986) ; see AR 44

– 45. The ALJ explained that Gibson’s positive back findings contradicted other medical evidence that did not indicate motor loss or an inability to ambulate effectively , s ee AR 35, a nd his explanation was supported by substantial evidence , s ee AR 437, 970, 788; Broyles v. Astrue , 910 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2012) . Specifically, the ALJ no ted treatment records wherein Gibson’s straight

- leg raise tests were negative, see AR 35 , and she ambulated with a normal gait, s ee AR 44, 437, 970, 1355. Indeed, Dr. Nolte’s examination revealed that Gibson had a normal stance and co uld “walk on her heels and toes, get up and out of a chair without difficulty, and needed no help getting on and off the exam table.” AR 34 , 788. This contradicted examinations by Dr. Onyewu and Dr. Raizman, wherein Gibson ambulated with an antal gic gait, and had positive straight

- leg raise tests and slightly decreased motor strength. See AR 752

– 54, 767

– 769, 1116, 1475

– 77.

“ [E] ven if [Dr. Onyewu and Dr. Raizman’s] opinion[s] [were] persuasive in some respects, the Court must defer to the contrary finding of the ALJ so long as it is supported by substantial evidence [

. ] ” Demetria R. , 2022 WL 314 2376, at *22. T he ALJ considered at least four other medical reports inconsistent with those of Dr. Onyewu and Dr. Raizman

. See AR 39

– 45. “Tha t is substantial evidence [

. ] ” Demetria R. , 2022 WL 3142376, at *22 (ALJ’s consideration of two medical reports showing Plaintiff did not meet a listing constituted substantial evidence to support13 ALJ’s conclusion that reports which supported Plaintiff’s po sition were properly discounted as contrary evidence ) ; see also Broyles , 910 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (ALJ’s consideration of contradictory evidence sufficient because the ALJ explained why such evidence conflicted with other medical

ev idence). The Court cannot “reweigh the evidence ” in [ Gibson’s favor

. Id. at 60 ( internal citations omitted)

. Thus, t he ALJ “ provided an adequate basis, supported by substantial evidence, for finding the re ports of [Dr. Onyewu and Dr. Raizman] less

- than

- totally

- persuasive.” Demetria R. , 2022 WL 3142376, at *21; see AR 39

– 44. Third, an ALJ need not “ spell out every aspect of what a listing includes

. . . as long as his discussion of the evidence is not perfun ctory. ” Mangan v. Colvin , No. 12

- cv - 7203, 2014 WL 1908937, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2014)

. For example, an ALJ’s analysis to taling “thr ee sentences” to dismiss “ the possibility that [a claimant met ] or medically equal [ed] Listing 1.04’s criter ia ” was inadequate. Watson, Jr., v. Berryhill , No

. 16

- cv - 089, 2018 WL 3434711, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 17, 2018)

. Unlike in Watson , the ALJ here “discuss [ed] the listing by name” and spent three pages detailing why Li sting 1.04 did not apply. Barnett v. Barnhart , 381 F. 3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004); s ee AR 34

– 36. This “reasoning was not perfunctory or inadequate.” Keys v. Colvin , No. 14

- cv - 250, 2016 WL 447519, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 5, 2016)

. 3. Medical Equivalence

a. Step s Four and Five Analysis Rebutted Medical Equivalence I f an ALJ “believes that the evi dence already received in the record does not reasonably support a finding that the individual’s impairment(s) medica lly equals a listed impairment, the [ ALJ] is not required to articulate specific evidence supporting his or her finding that the individual ’s impairment(s) does not medically equal a listed impairment.” S S R 1 7

- 2p , 2017 WL 3928306 , at *4 (Mar . 27. 2017 )

. Instead, “a statement that the individual’s impairment(s) does not14 medically equal a listed impairment constitutes sufficient articulation for this finding ” because the ALJ’ s “articul ation of the reason(s) why the individual is or is not disa bled at a later step in the sequential evaluation process will provide rationale that is sufficient for a subsequent reviewer or court to determine the basis for the finding about medical equivalen ce at step [three] .” Id. The ALJ’s analysis at step s four an d five demonstrated no medical equivalence. S ee AR 37. “The ALJ was aware of the medical records showing the existence of Plaintiff’s [impairments], as he found those impairments to be severe

. . . . But a reasonable reading of his decision shows that he fou nd that the records did not support a finding of functional limitations from Gibson ’ s impairments] , much less severe limitations .” Coscarelli v. Saul , No

. 19

- cv - 1219, 2021 WL 8053621, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2021) ; see AR 33, 3 7

. Indeed, the ALJ found that Gibson had the RFC to perform light work. See AR 3 7

. S he could “lift, carry, push, and pull 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She [could] sit for 6 hours in an 8

- ho ur workday. She [could] stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8

- hour workday.” AR 37. The ALJ also “ noted that

. . . the consultative examination indicated a lack of functional limitations.” Coscarelli , 2021 WL 8053621, at *9; AR 41, 44

– 45. Additionally, the AL J determined at step five that there were job s that Gibson could perform

. See AR 46 . He concluded that Gibson could make a successful adjustment to a significant number of light, unskilled jobs in the national economy, such as a greeter/usher, ho stess, or information clerk. See AR 46, 79. “ [ The ALJ’s] discussion at step[s] four [and five] provide [] a sufficient rationale and substantial evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff does not meet [or medically equal] Listing [1.04A].” Coscarelli , 2 021 WL 8053621, at *9; AR 37

– 4 7. b. Evidence of Daily Living Rebutted Medical Evidence15 T he ALJ also considered substantial evidence that Gibson did “not have marked difficulties in daily living.” Meador v. Colvin , No. 13

- cv - 214, 2015 WL 1477894, at *4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2015); see AR 37 , 237. Gibson’s “ability to perform daily activities, such as taking personal care, preparing simple meals, and shopping in stores . . . provide substantial evidence for the ALJ[’s]” finding that Gibson was not disabled. Magee v. Berryhill , No. 17

- cv - 1922, 2019 WL 329571, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2019); see AR 37

– 38, 65

– 67

. That is, Gibson’s “ activities of daily living confirmed that she was not as func tionally limited as she contended

. ” Goodman , 233 F Supp. 3d at 112. This independently supports the ALJ’s finding that Gibson did medically equal a Listing 1.04A impairment

.
c. Physician Reports Rebutted Medical Equivalence

“ [Although] the A LJ

. . . makes the ultimate decision on medical equivalence

. . . ‘ the judgment of a physician designated by the Commissioner on the issue of equivalence

. . . must be received into the record as expert opinion evidence and given appropriate weight.” ’ Mitc hell v. Colvin , No

. 12

- cv - 1573, 2016 WL 509281, a t * 3 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2016) (quoting S S R 96

- 6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34466, 34468 (July 2, 1996 ))

. The signed opinions of several state agency physicians finding that Gibson “ was not disabled constitute [ d ] p robative evidence of a lack of equivalence.” Phelps v. Astrue , No. 10

- cv - 240, 2011 WL 2669637, at * 5 (D. N

. H

. July 7, 2011); AR 82

– 124. The ALJ not only discussed the state agency physicians’ opinions on the record , but also found them “highly pers uasive.” AR 44 . In so doing, the ALJ fulfilled his obligation “to adequately explain his reasoning, including which evidence is credited and which is rejected.” Mitchell , 2016 WL 509281, at *3

. Contrary to Gibson ’ s argument, the ALJ was not compelled to seek additional expert evidence

. See Pl.’s Mot. at 11

– 12. ALJs “ may ask for and consider evidence from medical16 experts.” S S R 1 7

- 2p , 2017 WL 3928306 , at * 3 (Mar . 27. 2017 ). Howe ver, because the ALJ believed that the “evidence [did] not reasonably support a finding that [ Gibson’s] impairment(s) medically equal[ed]” Listing 1.04A, the ALJ was not required “to obtain ME (Medical Expert) evidence

. . . prior to making a step [three] f inding that [ Gibson’s impairment(s) [did] not medically equal [Listing 1.04A].” S S R 1 7

- 2p , 2017 WL 3928306 , at *4 (Mar . 27. 2017 ). ; see AR 34. IV. CONCLUSION T here was substantial evidence that the ALJ did not err in concluding that Gibson did not meet or medically equal the listing criteria for a 1.04A

. Therefore, as set out in an accompanying order, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal will be denied , and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance will be granted.

Date: November 23, 2022

___________________________________ ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGIS TRATE JUDGE