J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ELLIOTT MORRISON CRENSHAW, JR. 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 49 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0002820-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEVIN RAY MCBRIDE 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 46 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0008685-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEVIN RAY MCBRIDE 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 50 WDA 2022
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 2 -

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0007367-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: June 20, 2023

These unrelated appeals by Elliott Morrison Crenshaw, Jr., and Kevin 

Ray McBride (collectively “Appellants”) present the same legal issue: whether 

the North Carolina statute proscribing taking indecent liberties with children is 

sufficiently similar to a registration-triggering Pennsylvania statute to have 

required Appellants to comply with the provisions of Subchapter I of 

Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.51-9799.75,1 such that they were properly convicted for 

failing to do so pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(1)(a).

2

 Following careful 

review of the implicated statutes, we agree that the offense is similar to 

offenses enumerated in Subchapter I and therefore affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

We glean the relevant factual and procedural history of these cases from 

the certified records, in particular from the affidavits of probable cause and 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 For the sake of brevity, in discussing statutes within Subchapter I, we 

hereafter omit the initial “9799.” and reference only the number that follows 

the decimal point. For example, rather than repeatedly stating “§ 9799.55” 

and “§ 9799.56,” we shall refer to “§ 55” and “§ 56.” 

2 Both Crenshaw and McBride were tried by the same judge. 
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 3 -

Megan’s Law packets compiled by the respective law enforcement agencies in 

the underlying cases.

3

 

A. Crenshaw

Crenshaw committed the offense of taking indecent liberties with 

children in North Carolina on July 30, 1993. See N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1(a) 

(enumerating a variety of conduct that is prohibited with children under the 

age of sixteen if the perpetrator is at least five years older than the child, as 

we discuss more fully infra). He was sentenced in September 1994 to three 

to ten years of imprisonment.

4 See N.T. Trial (Crenshaw), 12/8/21, at 7 

(Commonwealth Exhibit 2). Upon release in September 2002, Crenshaw 

became subject to North Carolina’s thirty-year sexual offender registration 

requirement. See N.C.G.S. §§ 14-208.6(4)(a), (5) (defining taking indecent 

liberties with children as a sexually violent offense that results in a reportable 

conviction); 14-208.7(a) (mandating that a resident with a reportable 

conviction register immediately upon release from confinement and maintain 

registration for at least thirty years unless successfully petitioning to shorten 

the period); 14-208.10 (identifying registration information regarding 

____________________________________________

3 The parties stipulated to the factual averments contained within the affidavits

of probable cause and Megan’s Law packets. See N.T. Trial (Crenshaw), 

12/2/21, at 7; N.T. Trial (McBride), 12/8/21, at 7-8. Thus, the underlying 

facts in these matters are undisputed.

4 Crenshaw was not found to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). See

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 (Out of State Registration/Tier Form, 5/11/18). 
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 4 -

offenders that is available for public inspection). See also Commonwealth’s 

Exhibit 1 (Out-of-State Registration Questions, 12/20/10).

Crenshaw subsequently relocated to Pennsylvania and first registered 

here in 2011 while housed as an inmate at the Allegheny County Jail. See 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 (Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Megan’s Law 

Section Offender Court Information at 6). In 2019, the Allegheny County 

Sheriff’s Office began investigating non-compliant sex-offenders, including 

Crenshaw, who last registered in 2017. In January 2020, Crenshaw was 

charged for failing to register in 2018 and 2019. Crenshaw filed an omnibus 

pretrial motion seeking to dismiss the charges on the basis that 

§ 4915.2(1)(a), which criminalizes the failure to comply with Subchapter I of 

SORNA, did not apply to him. The trial court denied the motion, Crenshaw 

elected to proceed to a trial without a jury, and the trial court found him guilty 

and sentenced him to two years of probation and eighteen months of 

electronic monitoring. This timely appeal followed, and both Crenshaw and 

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

B. McBride

In May 2011, McBride was convicted pursuant to North Carolina’s § 14-

202.1(a) for taking indecent liberties with children, sentenced to nineteen to 

twenty-three months of imprisonment, and, like Crenshaw, required to 

register for a thirty-year period under the North Carolina law referenced 

above. In August 2014, McBride moved to Pennsylvania and began to register 

as a sexual offender pursuant to Subchapter I of SORNA. He was initially 
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 5 -

registered at an address in Clairton, Pennsylvania, but in September 2020, 

deputies of the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office conducted a compliance 

check and discovered that McBride had vacated the property without reporting 

his change in circumstances to PSP. 

At Case No. 7367, McBride was charged with a violation of 

§ 4915.2(1)(a) for failing to report his change in address. Three days later,

McBride was arrested in connection with this charge and incarcerated at the 

Allegheny County Jail. On September 23, 2020, McBride’s registered address 

was changed to the Allegheny County Jail. He was released from confinement 

on the same day. On November 2, 2020, detectives of the Pittsburgh Police 

Department determined that McBride had not updated his residency 

information following his release from jail. At Case No. 8685, McBride was 

charged with a second violation of § 4915.2(1)(a).

His two cases were consolidated in the trial court and McBride filed an 

omnibus pretrial motion asserting that the charges should be dismissed 

because he was not subject to registration under Subchapter I. The trial court 

denied this motion and the case proceeded to a non-jury trial at which McBride

was found guilty in both cases and sentenced to an aggregate term of one 

year of probation. McBride filed a timely notice of appeal in each case, and 

both he and the trial court complied with their respective obligations pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. 

II. Issue and Applicable Law

Appellants raise the identical issue for our consideration:
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 6 -

Where Subchapter I of SORNA does not apply to [Appellants’] 

conviction[s] from North Carolina for indecent liberties with 

children because it was not “similar” under §§ 9799.55 and 

9799.56 to Pennsylvania’s indecent assault statute, was the trial 

court required to grant [their] motion[s] to dismiss?

Put another way, where an out-of-state statute is sufficiently 

different from Pennsylvania’s or, at the very least, is ambiguous, 

does Subchapter I not compel registration, particularly in light of 

the rule of lenity?

McBride’s brief at 5 (cleaned up, emphasis in original); Crenshaw’s brief at 4.5 

Since this is a question of statutory interpretation, our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth 

v. Finnecy, 249 A.3d 903, 913 (Pa. 2021). “The object of all interpretation 

and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the 

General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “The plain language of the statute 

is the best indicator of the legislature’s intent. To ascertain the plain meaning, 

we consider the operative statutory language in context and give words and 

phrases their common and approved usage.” Commonwealth v. 

Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 942 (Pa. 2021). 

Further, we must give effect and ascribe meaning to each word and 

provision chosen by our legislature, assuming none is mere surplusage. See, 

e.g., Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717, 734 (Pa. 2020) (“Some 

____________________________________________

5 Appellants are both represented by the Allegheny County Office of the Public 

Defender and raise the same appellate issue, resulting in briefs with nearly 

identical argument sections. We provide separate cites for each case where 

the briefs differ. A cite without designation of an Appellant indicates that the 

material is on the same page in both briefs.
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 7 -

meaning must be ascribed to every word in a statute . . . and there is a 

presumption that disfavors interpreting language as mere surplusage.”); 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) (“Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect 

to all its provisions.”). Finally, “we are to assume that the General Assembly 

does not intend an absurd result to flow from the construction of any statute.” 

Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 194 (Pa. 2005).

A. Criminal Liability for Failure to Comply with Subchapter I’s

Reporting Requirements

Mindful of the above principles, we turn to the statutes at issue. The 

criminal statute underlying Appellants’ convictions provides as follows:

An individual who is subject to registration under [§ 55](a), (a.1) 

or (b) (relating to registration) or who was subject to registration 

under former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9793 (relating to registration of certain 

offenders for ten years) commits an offense if the individual 

knowingly fails to:

(1) register with the Pennsylvania State Police as required 

under § [56] (relating to registration procedures and 

applicability);

(2) verify the individual’s residence or be photographed as 

required under § [60] (relating to verification of residence); or

(3) provide accurate information when registering under § [56]

or verifying a residence under § [60]. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a).6

____________________________________________

6 We note § 4915.2(f) indicates that the statute applies to people who 

committed a § 55 offense between April 22, 1996, and December 20, 2012, 

and whose registration requirements had not expired. Similarly, § 52 

(“Scope”) provides that Subchapter I applies to individuals convicted of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 8 -

Thus, in order to convict Appellants for violating § 4915.2, the 

Commonwealth was required to prove three elements, namely that 

Appellants: (1) were subject to registration under § 557 and (2) knowingly 

(3) either failed to follow a registration procedure specified in § 56 or § 60 or 

gave inaccurate information when they did follow the procedure. Appellants

do not dispute that the Commonwealth established the second and third 

elements of § 4915.2(a). Their contention is that § 55 did not subject them 

to registration. Accordingly, we examine that provision of Subchapter I.

B. Subchapter I’s Requirements

By way of background, Subchapter I of SORNA was enacted in 2018 to 

prescribe registration requirements for sexual offenders who, because they 

committed their offenses before December 20, 2012, could not be subject to 

the punitive requirements of the original version of SORNA that is now codified 

in Subchapter H.8 Within Subchapter I, § 54 (“Applicability”) indicates who 

____________________________________________

sexually violent offenses, or those required to register with the PSP under a 

prior sex offender law, between those dates. Crenshaw’s offense was 

committed in 1993 and he was convicted and sentenced in 1994. However, 

Crenshaw does not argue that the statutes’ date parameters negated their 

applicability to him. Therefore, our decision is not informed by the pre-1996 

date of Crenshaw’s offense.

7 Since the former sex-offender law, codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9793, was 

repealed in 2000, before either Crenshaw or McBride began residing in 

Pennsylvania, it cannot be the basis for the first element of § 4915.2 in these 

cases.

8 See Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 628 (Pa. 2020) (Wecht, 

J., concurring and dissenting) (explaining that, after our High Court ruled that 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 9 -

must register, § 55 (“Registration”) sets forth the offenses that trigger a 

reporting requirement, and § 56 (“Procedures and applicability”) details the 

timing and length of registration. All three statutes contain provisions specific 

to individuals whose offenses were committed outside of this Commonwealth. 

In particular, § 54 includes the following identification of individuals who 

must register: 

An individual who was convicted of an offense similar to an offense 

set forth in [§ 55] under the laws of the United States or one of 

its territories or possessions, another state, the District of 

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign nation or 

under a former law of this Commonwealth or who was court 

martialed for a similar offense and who, as of February 21, 2018, 

has not completed registration requirements. The period of 

registration shall be as set forth in [§ 56](b)(4) (relating to 

registration procedures and applicability) less any credit for time 

spent on a sexual offender registry of the United States or one of 

its territories or possessions, another state, the District of 

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign nation or 

with the Pennsylvania State Police prior to February 21, 2018.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.54(a)(4). Thus, the need for a person with an out-of-state 

conviction to register depends upon the similarity of the underlying offense to 

one enumerated in § 55. That statute provides as follows in relevant part:

(a) Ten-year registration.--Except as provided under 

subsection (a.1) . . . , the following individuals shall be required 

to register with the Pennsylvania State Police for a period of 10 

years:

____________________________________________

retroactive application of SORNA constituted an ex post facto violation, the 

General Assembly “bifurcated SORNA within the Sentencing Code into two 

distinct subchapters: Subchapter H and Subchapter I. Subchapter H governs 

offenders whose triggering crimes were committed on or after December 20, 

2012. Subchapter I applies retroactively to those whose offenses occurred 

before that date.” (footnote omitted)).
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 10 -

(1)(i)(A) Individuals convicted within this Commonwealth of 

any of the following offenses committed on or after April 22, 

1996, but before December 20, 2012:

. . . .

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (relating to indecent assault) where 

the offense is graded as a misdemeanor of the first 

degree or higher.

. . . .

18 Pa.C.S. § 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children).

18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (relating to unlawful contact with 

minor).

. . . .

(2) Individuals convicted of an attempt, conspiracy or 

solicitation to commit any of the offenses under paragraph 

(1)(i) or (ii)[.]

(3) Individuals who currently have a residence in this 

Commonwealth who have been convicted of offenses similar to 

the crimes cited in paragraphs (1)(i) or (ii) and (2) under the 

laws of the United States or one of its territories or possessions, 

another state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico or a foreign nation or under a former law of this 

Commonwealth.

(a.1) Exception to 10-year registration.—[Unless a lifetime 

registrant as indicated in (b)9], an individual considered to be an 

offender under [§ 56](b) (relating to registration procedures and 

____________________________________________

9 Subsection (b) of § 55 describes individuals who are subject to lifetime 

registration, such as SVPs and people convicted of rape, aggravated indecent 

assault, or incest with a victim under the age of thirteen. The Commonwealth 

advocated neither in the trial court nor in this Court that Appellants are subject 

to registration pursuant to § 55(b), and we have found nothing in the certified 

record to suggest that Appellants are subject to lifetime registration pursuant 

to that subsection. Hence, we focus our analysis upon subsections (a) and 

(a.1).
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 11 -

applicability) shall be required to register with the Pennsylvania 

State Police for a period less than life, the duration of which is to 

be determined under [§§ 54] (relating to applicability) and 

[56](b).

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55. 

Therefore, pertinent to these appeals, § 55 stipulates that people who 

in a different jurisdiction committed or attempted to commit offenses similar 

to those enumerated in § 55(a) are subject to a ten-year registration 

requirement unless § 56(b) classifies them as an offender with a different 

duration of registration. 

Pursuant to § 56(b), people who live, work, or go to school in 

Pennsylvania must register here if they have been convicted or sentenced “for 

a sexually violent offense or a similar offense” in another jurisdiction or they 

were “required to register under a sexual offender statute in the jurisdiction 

where convicted[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56(b)(4).10 The statute goes on to 

identify different subsets of such out-of-state offenders and mandates their 

compliance with certain portions of Subchapter I. Relevant to these appeals, 

§ 56(b)(4)(v)11 provides as follows:

____________________________________________

10 Subsection (4) is the only substantive provision of § 56(b), as subsections 

(1) through (3) are reserved.

11 The Commonwealth does not assert that Crenshaw or McBride falls within 

subsections (i) through (iv) of § 56(b)(4). Since we discern nothing in the 

certified records to suggest that either was designated an SVP, subject to 

active notification, or convicted of an offense “equivalent” to one enumerated 

in § 55(a) or (b), we do not discuss the specifics § 56(b)(4)(i)-(iv). As we 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 12 -

[I]f the individual is subject to passive notification in the other 

jurisdiction or subject to passive notification by reason of court 

martial, the individual shall, notwithstanding [§ 53,] be considered 

an offender and subject to this section and [§ 60 (relating to 

verification of residence)12] and [§ 63](c)(2) [(regarding 

information about offenders posted on an internet website)]. The 

individual shall be subject to this subchapter for a period of time 

equal to the time for which the individual was required to register 

in the other jurisdiction or required to register by reason of court 

martial, less any credit due to the individual as a result of prior 

compliance with registration requirements.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56(b)(4)(v). 

The trigger for being considered an offender under § 56(b)(4)(v), 

namely the fact that the individual is subject to “passive notification” in the 

other jurisdiction, is defined as follows:

Notification in accordance with [§ 63] (relating to information 

made available on Internet and electronic notification) or a 

process whereby persons, under the laws of the United States or 

one of its territories or possessions, another state, the District of 

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a foreign nation, 

are able to access information pertaining to an individual as a 

result of the individual having been convicted or sentenced by a 

court for an offense similar to an offense listed in [§ 55] (relating 

to registration).

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.53. 

____________________________________________

discuss infra, the issue is whether Appellants’ convictions were for “similar,” 

not “equivalent,” offenses to those enumerated in § 55.

12 Pertinent to the cases sub judice, §§ 56 and 60 required Appellants to inform 

the PSP within three business days of a change in residence, employment, or 

enrollment as a student, and to appear annually at a PSP-approved 

registration site. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.56(a)(2), 9799.60(b). 
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 13 -

In sum, the import of the above statutes is as follows. If Appellants’

convictions for taking indecent liberties with children are “similar to” any

offenses enumerated in § 55(a)(1) or (2), then § 55(a)(3) required them to 

register in Pennsylvania for ten years. If the information about Appellants

that was available to the public in North Carolina by the above-described 

passive means resulted from those “similar” convictions, then § 55(a.1) 

extended the duration of the registration to the thirty years imposed by North 

Carolina law.13, 14 However, if taking indecent liberties with children is not 

“similar to” any offenses included in § 55(a)(1) or (2), then Appellants had no 

duty to register in Pennsylvania under § 55, and their § 4915.2 criminal 

convictions for failing to register are invalid. Consequently, resolution of these 

appeals requires us to determine whether such similarity exists.

____________________________________________

13 See N.C.G.S. § 14-208.10 (identifying registration information regarding 

offenders that is available for public inspection). 

14 Appellants argue that the use of “is” in § 56(b)(4)(v) means that they could 

not be deemed offenders by virtue of that provision because they were “not 

subject to passive registration in North Carolina” after they left that state and 

began residing in Pennsylvania. See Crenshaw’s brief at 30; McBride’s brief 

at 31. We first note that § 56(b)(4)(v) references passive notification, not 

passive registration. Moreover, as the Commonwealth observes, Appellants 

did not raise this as a basis for dismissal in the trial court, they do not cite on 

appeal any provision of North Carolina law that suggests that the notification 

connected with their thirty-year registration ceased when they left the state, 

and, in any event, both Appellants still have entries on the North Carolina 

passive notification website on which their information is included. See

Commonwealth’s brief (Crenshaw) at 10-12 (citing 

https://sexoffender.ncsbi.gov); Commonwealth’s brief (McBride) at 11-12 

(same). Consequently, we reject Appellants’ contention that their absence 

from North Carolina removed them from the ambit of § 56(b)(4)(v).
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 14 -

III. Similarity of Offenses

A. Taking Indecent Liberties with Children

The North Carolina criminal statute underlying Appellants’ convictions

provides as follows:

(a) A person is guilty of taking indecent liberties with children if, 

being 16 years of age or more and at least five years older than 

the child in question, he either:

(1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any immoral, improper, 

or indecent liberties with any child of either sex under the age 

of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual 

desire; or

(2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any lewd or 

lascivious act upon or with the body or any part or member of 

the body of any child of either sex under the age of 16 years.

(b) Taking indecent liberties with children is punishable as a Class 

F felony.[15]

N.C.G.S. § 14-202.1. Hence, the elements of the crime are:

(1) the defendant was at least 16 years of age, and more than 

five years older than the victim, (2) the victim was under 16 years 

of age at the time the alleged act or attempted act occurred, and 

(3) the defendant willfully took or attempted to take an immoral, 

improper, or indecent liberty with the victim for the purpose of 

arousing or gratifying sexual desire.

____________________________________________

15 The statute was amended in October 1994 to make taking indecent liberties 

a Class F felony, punishable by up to twenty years of imprisonment. See 

State v. Lawrence, 667 S.E.2d 262, 264 (N.C.App. 2008). Prior to that, 

subsection (b) stated: “Taking indecent liberties with children is a felony

punishable by a fine, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.” 

State v. Elam, 273 S.E.2d 661, 664 (N.C. 1981). 
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 15 -

State v. McClees, 424 S.E.2d 687, 689 (N.C.App. 1993). The disjunctive 

subsections of § 14-202.1(a) do not identify separate offenses, but rather 

“two alternative means of proving one element of the offense of indecent 

liberties.”16 State v. Jones, 616 S.E.2d 15, 20 (N.C.App. 2005). 

North Carolina courts have explained that “indecent liberties” are “such 

liberties as the common sense of society would regard as indecent and 

improper.” State v. Every, 578 S.E.2d 642, 647 (N.C.App. 2003) (cleaned 

up). “Neither a completed sex act nor an offensive touching of the victim [is] 

required to violate the statute.” State v. McClary, 679 S.E.2d 414, 418 

(N.C.App. 2009). The broader protections of children contemplated by the 

statute criminalize such acts as having sexually explicit telephone 

conversations with a child while masturbating, see Every, supra; 

“photographing an unclothed child in a sexually suggestive position, 

masturbating in front of a child, . . . secretly videotaping a child who was 

undressing,” id. at 648 (citations omitted, collecting cases); sitting on a log 

twenty yards away from children on the opposite side of a creek engaging in 

the lewd act of masturbation and inviting the children to imitate him, see

State v. Strickland, 335 S.E.2d 74, 76 (N.C.App. 1985); and handing a child 

____________________________________________

16 Perhaps it is for this reason that the certified copies of Appellants’

convictions admitted at their respective trials did not specify a particular 

subsection of § 14-202.1(1)(a), but referenced § 14-202.1 generally. See

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2 (Crenshaw); Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2 (McBride).
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 16 -

“a letter containing sexually graphic language for the purpose of soliciting 

sexual intercourse and oral sex.” McClary, supra at 418. 

In short, it is not a particular set of acts the North Carolina legislature 

sought to criminalize with § 14-202.1, but rather the actor’s purpose in 

seeking sexual gratification by exposing a child of fifteen or younger to 

lewdness and indecency:

[T]he evil the legislature sought to prevent in this context was the 

defendant’s performance of any immoral, improper, or indecent 

act in the presence of a child for the purpose of arousing or 

gratifying sexual desire. Defendant’s purpose for committing such 

act is the gravamen of this offense; the particular act performed 

is immaterial. 

Jones, supra at 20 (cleaned up).

B. Indecent Assault

The Commonwealth and trial court proffered Pennsylvania’s indecent 

assault statute as the enumerated offense to which Appellants’ convictions 

were similar. That statute provides as follows as pertains to the issues in 

these appeals:

A person is guilty of indecent assault if the person has indecent 

contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have 

indecent contact with the person or intentionally causes the 

complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine or feces 

for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the 

complainant and:

. . . .

(7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age; or
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 17 -

(8) the complainant is less than 16 years of age and the person 

is four or more years older than the complainant and the 

complainant and the person are not married to each other.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a). 

Indecent contact is defined as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other 

intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual 

desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101. Intimate parts are not solely 

sexual organs, but any “body part that is personal and private, and which the 

person ordinarily allows to be touched only by people with whom the person

has a close personal relationship, and one which is commonly associated with 

sexual relations or intimacy.” Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 

313–14 (Pa. 2022) (holding the neck is an intimate body part). 

As indicated above, Subchapter I requires registration following 

conviction for committing an indecent assault, or attempting to do so, only if 

it is graded as a first-degree misdemeanor or higher. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A). The grading portion of the indecent assault statute 

states the following:

Indecent assault shall be graded as follows:

(1) An offense under [18 Pa.C.S. § 3126](a)(1) or (8) is a 

misdemeanor of the second degree.

. . . .

(3) An offense under [18 Pa.C.S. § 3126](a)(7) is a

misdemeanor of the first degree unless any of the following 

apply, in which case it is a felony of the third degree:

(i) It is a second or subsequent offense.
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 18 -

(ii) There has been a course of conduct of indecent assault 

by the person.

(iii) The indecent assault was committed by touching the 

complainant’s sexual or intimate parts with sexual or 

intimate parts of the person.

(iv) The indecent assault is committed by touching the 

person’s sexual or intimate parts with the complainant’s 

sexual or intimate parts.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(b). Second-degree misdemeanors are punishable by up to 

two years of imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(2). Five years is the 

statutory maximum for a misdemeanor of the first degree. See 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1104(1). A person convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to 

up to seven years of imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3). 

C. Analysis 

In determining whether taking indecent liberties with children is “similar 

to” § 55(a)’s enumerated offenses, we start by defining the word “similar.” 

Nearly a century ago, our High Court examined the meaning of the word in In 

re Bonsall’s Estate, 135 A. 724 (Pa. 1927), as follows:

In the New Standard Dictionary, “similar” is defined as “bearing 

resemblance to something else; being like in quality, nature, 

degree, purpose, or other characteristics, but not the same or 

identical.” According to the Oxford Dictionary, it means “having a 

marked resemblance or likeness; of a like nature or kind.” In 

Webster’s International Dictionary the definition is “nearly 

corresponding; resembling in many respects; somewhat like; 

having a general likeness.” . . . 

Judicially, ‘similar’ has been defined as “nearly corresponding, 

resembling in many respects; somewhat alike; having a general 

likeness;” not “precisely alike” but “with more or less 
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 19 -

resemblance.” . . . “[S]imilarity is not identity, but resemblance 

between different things.”

Id. at 725 (cleaned up).17 The meaning of the term has not changed over 

time. See, e.g., https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/similar (last 

visited May 26, 2023) (defining similar as “having characteristics in common 

: strictly comparable”). 

Also important to clarify at the outset is that, when comparing the 

foreign offense at issue to those in Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code, “[t]he focus 

is not on the facts underlying the conviction, but rather on the statute that 

triggered the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 241 A.3d 398, 405 

(Pa.Super. 2020) (examining whether an out-of-state conviction was 

equivalent to a Pennsylvania crime of violence for purposes of application of a 

mandatory minimum sentence). Consequently, we do not consider whether 

the specific conduct that resulted in Appellants’ convictions would meet the 

elements of any of the enumerated Pennsylvania offenses. Instead, we look 

at the respective jurisdictions’ legislative enactments to discern whether they 

“more or less” resemble each other, “have characteristics in common,” or are 

____________________________________________

17 In contrast, “equivalent,” the term used in portions of § 56(b)(4) not at 

issue in this appeal, means “having equal or corresponding import, meaning 

or significance; what is virtually the same thing; identical in effect. . . . 

[E]qual in worth or value, force, power, defect, import and the like; alike in 

significance and value; of the same import or meaning.” In re Bonsall’s 

Estate, 135 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1927).
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 20 -

“like in quality, nature, degree, purpose, or other characteristics, but not the 

same.” 

With this in mind, we turn to the trial court’s ruling and the parties’

arguments. The trial court held, without much elaboration, that it was “clear 

to the [court] that while the North Carolina offense of taking indecent liberties 

with a child and the Pennsylvania offense of indecent assault are not identical, 

they are sufficiently similar to require [Appellants] to register under SORNA 

Subchapter I.”18 Trial Court Opinion (McBride), 3/9/22, at 8; Trial Court 

Opinion (Crenshaw), 3/22/22, at 7. The Commonwealth provides additional 

detail to the argument for similarity as follows:

The similarities between the two statutes are obvious. Both 

prohibit sexual acts in which minor children are involved. Both 

prohibit these acts for the purpose of arousing sexual gratification 

in the offender. Both prohibit this conduct being done 

intentionally (or, as the taking indecent liberties statute puts it, 

“willfully”). And both statutes are triggered when the action by 

the offender involves the physical touching of the victim.

Commonwealth’s brief at 7.

Appellants, on the other hand, argue that both the mens rea and actus 

reus elements of the offenses are too different to fall within the definition of 

____________________________________________

18 The trial court alternatively opined that, even if the offenses were not 

similar, Appellants were required to register pursuant to the reciprocity 

provision of § 56. See Trial Court Opinion (McBride), 3/9/22, at 8; Trial Court 

Opinion (Crenshaw), 3/22/22, at 7. As detailed above in Part II.B. of this 

writing, § 56(b)(4)(v)’s reference to unexpired passive notification in another 

jurisdiction incorporates a similarity requirement. Therefore, the trial court’s 

alternative analysis cannot support its ruling if the offenses in question are 

not similar to a Subchapter I enumerated offense. 
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 21 -

“similar.” Regarding the former, Appellants contend that “only one theory of 

culpability for the North Carolina statute includes a mental state of arousal or

sexual desire. The second theory of culpability in the North Carolina statute 

therefore proscribes much more conduct, as that additional specific 

requirement is missing.” Crenshaw’s brief at 17; McBride’s brief at 18-19. 

Appellants further assert that the offense of taking indecent liberties 

“encompasses much more conduct than the [indecent assault] statute.” 

Crenshaw’s brief at 18; McBride’s brief at 19. They argue that the North 

Carolina enactment includes “many types of behavior, drawing a variety of 

acts within its sweep, creating a broad category of things that could be 

considered indecent liberties.” Id. For example, Appellants note that indecent 

liberties include the non-contact offense that Pennsylvania prohibits with its 

indent exposure statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3127(a), an offense not enumerated in 

§ 55 (a) of Subchapter I. Id. Appellants also observe that taking indecent 

liberties includes any touching “upon or with the body part or any part or 

member of the body” of a child, while the indecent assault statute only 

encompasses the touching of sexual or intimate body parts. See Crenshaw’s 

brief at 18-19; McBride’s brief at 19-20.

The Commonwealth counters that Appellants’ “argument is overlytechnical.” Commonwealth’s brief (Crenshaw) at 7; Commonwealth’s brief 

(McBride) at 8. The Commonwealth maintains that “[w]hat is punishable as 

an indecent assault in Pennsylvania is also punishable under the same set of
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 22 -

facts as taking indecent liberties in North Carolina.” Id. (cleaned up). 

However, the North Carolina statute also prohibits conduct that our General 

Assembly decided to proscribe in separate statutes, such as corruption of 

minors.19 Id. The Commonwealth argues that concluding that Appellants did 

not have to register pursuant to Subchapter I just because they were 

convicted under a broader statute would lead to the absurd result of requiring 

neither North Carolinians who performed acts that would be considered 

indecent assault nor those who engaged in the corruption of minors to register 

upon relocating to Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth’s brief (Crenshaw) at 

8; Commonwealth’s brief (McBride) at 9. The Commonwealth’s position is 

that allowing offenders to avoid registering in Pennsylvania for offenses 

triggering registration in North Carolina simply because our General Assembly 

opted not to combine offenses into one statute “cannot possibly have been 

the intent of the legislature.” Id. 

Upon careful review of the language of the at-issue statutes, we agree 

with the Commonwealth. The discrepancies between the statutes noted by 

____________________________________________

19 That statute includes the following provision concerning sexual offenses:

Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any course 

of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses) 

corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 

years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages any such 

minor in the commission of an offense under Chapter 31 commits 

a felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 23 -

Appellants certainly establish that they are not “equivalent” offenses. Indeed, 

Appellants are correct that the North Carolina statute encompasses some 

sexual conduct outside the scope of the definition of indecent assault that 

Pennsylvania criminalizes by separate statutes, such as corruption of minors, 

that do not trigger reporting under Subchapter I.20 

Nevertheless, despite their differences, we are convinced that 

Pennsylvania’s offense of indecent assault and North Carolina’s offense of 

taking indecent liberties with children have sufficient general likeness and 

characteristics in common to qualify as “similar” for purposes of triggering 

Subchapter I’s reporting requirements. Both seek to criminalize obtaining 

____________________________________________

20 We observe that some of the conduct that falls within the definition of taking 

indecent liberties, but does not qualify as indecent assault, is separately 

penalized in Pennsylvania by Subchapter-I-triggering statutes. For example, 

photographing a naked child for sexual gratification constitutes both taking 

indecent liberties and the enumerated offense of sexual abuse of children. 

See Every, supra at 647; 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(b)(2), (g) (making it a crime to 

photograph or videotape a child under the age of eighteen engaging in a 

prohibited sexual act, such as nudity “depicted for the purpose of sexual 

stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such depiction”). 

Likewise, the Pennsylvania offense of unlawful contact with a minor makes it 

a crime to intentionally contact a minor for the purpose of, among other 

things, engaging in open lewdness. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(2); Pa.C.S. 

§ 5901 (“A person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree if he does any 

lewd act which he knows is likely to be observed by others who would be 

affronted or alarmed.”). This crime “focuses on communication, verbal or 

non-verbal, and does not depend upon the timing of the communication. . . . 

[O]nce the communicative message is relayed to a minor, the crime of 

unlawful contact is complete.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 225 A.3d 582, 587 

(Pa.Super. 2019) (emphasis in original). This conduct qualifies in North 

Carolina as taking indecent liberties. See, e.g., Strickland, supra at 76 

(holding indecent liberty was taken when defendant masturbated in public and 

invited children to come imitate him).
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 24 -

sexual gratification through indecently exposing children to inappropriately 

intimate interaction with an older person.21 Both require an intentional, rather 

than less culpable, mental state. Both are sexual offenses that the respective 

legislatures deemed worthy of a substantial term of imprisonment followed by 

sex offender registration and the availability to the public to access 

information about their whereabouts. Moreover, a significant amount of the 

conduct proscribed by the broader North Carolina statute that falls outside the 

reach of the physical-contact-based indecent assault statute nonetheless is 

encompassed by other Pennsylvania offenses that trigger registration 

pursuant to Subchapter I. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not err in 

ruling that Appellants were required to register as sexual offenders pursuant 

to Subchapter I of SORNA.

IV. Conclusion

Upon a de novo review of the plain language of the implicated legislative 

enactments, we conclude that our General Assembly intended to mandate that 

Appellants, by virtue of their North Carolina convictions for taking indecent 

liberties with children, comply with §§ 55, 56, and 60 of Subchapter I for the 

duration of their North Carolina registration period. Since it is undisputed that 

____________________________________________

21 Contrary to Appellants’ assertion, as we indicated earlier, the North Carolina 

courts have made it clear that both subsections of the taking indecent liberties 

statute seek to prevent the “performance of any immoral, improper, or 

indecent act in the presence of a child for the purpose of arousing or gratifying 

sexual desire.” State v. Jones, 616 S.E.2d 15, 20 (N.C.App. 2005) (cleaned 

up).
J-A02020-23

J-A02030-23

- 25 -

they did not, they were properly convicted for violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2. 

Accordingly, we affirm their judgments of sentence.

Judgments of sentence affirmed at 49 WDA 2022, 50 WDA 2022, and 

46 WDA 2022. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/20/2023