NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2006-3432

SYLVIA MOODY,

Petitioner,

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, Respondent.

Sylvia Moody , of Killeen, Texas, pro se. Calvin M. Morrow , Attorney, Office of General Counsel, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington, DC, for responden t. With him on the brief were B. Chad Bungard , General Counsel, Rosa M. Koppel , Deputy General Counsel, and Rosalyn L. Wilcots , Acting Associate General Counsel. Appealed from: United States Merit Systems Protection BoardNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2006-3432 SYLVIA MOODY, Petitioner,

v. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, Respondent.

__________________ _________ DECIDED: February 8, 2007

__________________ _________ Before MICHEL, Chief Judge , SCHALL, and RADER, Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM. The Merit Systems Protection Board (B oard) dismissed Ms. Sylvia Moody’s constructive removal claim. Sylvia Moody v. Gen. Servs. Admin. , MSPB Docket No. DC0752060280-I-1 (Initial Decision, April 5, 2006; Final Order, August 15, 2006). Because the Board properly dismissed Ms. Moody’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, this court affirms

. I The General Services Administrati on (GSA) employed Ms. Moody as a Supervisory Contract Specialist, GS-1102-14 (G S-14), effective July 25, 2004. The GS14 position required Ms. Moody to serve a one- year probationary period. On June 20,2005, GSA notified Ms. Moody of her demotion to Contract Specialist, GS-1102-13 (GS13), with an effective date of June 26, 2005. On August 5, 2005, GSA further placedMs. Moody on leave restriction. Approxim ately three months after her demotion and one month after receiving the notification of leave restriction, Ms. Moody submitted her resignation letter to GSA on Sept ember 13, 2005. On December 30, 2005, GSA issued a final decision that Ms. Moody w a s not constructively removed. Thereafter, on February 2, 2006, Ms. Moody sought review of GSA’s final decision by the Boar d. T he Board determined that it di d not have juris d iction and dismissed the appeal.
II The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, but rather limited to matters specifically entrusted to it by law, rule or regulation. See 5. U.S.C. § 7701(a); Schmittling v. Dep’t of the Army , 219 F.3d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Ms. M oody has the burden of establishing jurisdiction before the Board by a preponderance of the evidenc e . 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56( a)(2); Clark v. Unit ed States Postal Serv. , 989 F.2d 1164, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Jurisdiction is a question of law that this court reviews without deference. Fields v. Dep’t of Just ice , 452 F. 3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Th e Board enjoys n o jurisdiction to review voluntar y resignati ons. However, if shown inv o luntary, a resignation may amount to a constructive remo val within the Board’s jurisdiction. Shoaf v. Dep’t of Agric. , 260 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Board’s decis ion t o di smiss Moody’s appeal must be affirmed unless M oody establishes that the decision is (1) arbitrar y, capricious, an abus e of discretion, or otherwise not in accor dance wit h law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation hav ing been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Schmittling , 219 F.3d at 1335.

2006-3432 2The Administrative Judge st ated and thereaf ter followed t he prope r legal test and correctly examined the facts presented in the evidentiary record. Ms. Moody did not present any evidenc e showing t hat her resi gnation was due to coercion. This court follows a three-part test to determine wh en coercion causes a resignation to be involuntary. Coercion is show n by evidence establishing: “(1 ) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circ umstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party.” Middleton v. Dep’t of Def. , 185 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Christie v. United States , 518 F.2d 584, 587 (1975)). “This test is an objective, rather than subjective one; an employee’s subjective feelings ar e irre levant. The employee must present allegations of fact whic h, if proven, establis h that a reasonable employee confronted with the same circumstance woul d feel coerced into resigning.” Id. In this case, Ms. Moody’s dem otion to GS-13 and adherence to a strict leav e policy would not coerce a reasonable employee to resign. First, Ms. Moody submitted her resignation letter approximately three months after her demotion. Thus, the demotion did not pres ent Ms. Moody no alter native but to resign. I ndeed, a few months intervened between her demotion and her resignation. While the working environment may not have been pleasant a fter the demotion, an unpleasan t work environment doe s not present the employee no choice but to re sign. Further, Ms. Moody’s diss atisfaction with the leave policy, incl uding a choic e between c o mplianc e with the policy and potential disciplinary acti on for unauthoriz ed abs enc e, does not equate to forcing an employee to resign.

2006-3432 3Thus, the Board’s decision to dismiss Ms. Moody’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation. Accor d ingly, the Board’s deci sion dism issing Ms. Moody’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.

2006-3432 4