QUARTERMASTER ACTIVITIES 

of 

II CORPS THROUGH ALGERIA, TUNISIA, AND SICILY 

and 

FIRST ARMY THROUGH EUROPE 

BY 

ANDREW T. McNAMARA 

Brigadier General, U. S. Army 

as compiled by 

RAYMOND F. McNALLY 

Colonel, USAR 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter Page 

I Overseas Movement 1 

II England, 1942 5 

I III Algeria 15 

IV Tunisia 41 

V Sicily 77 

VI Interim Resolves 87 

VII England, 1943 93 

VIII Overlord 123 

I 

1 
Indiantown Gap 

I 

OVERSEAS MOVEMENT 

Everything commenced on Tuesday June 23, 1942. On that day 

the personnel of Headquarters II Corps had been ordered to report to Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, there to be prepared 

for shipment overseas to an unknown destination. 

The II Corps Headquarters had undergone a complete reorganization. On June 15, Major General Lloyd Fredendall had 

relinquished command to Major General Mark Clark, Coincidental 

with this change of command all of the chiefs of sections of the 

general staff, and all but a very few newly appointed chiefs of 

sections of the special staff were transferred from the Headquarters. Most of the new chiefs, together with the few staff 

officers and the handful of assistants who had previously served 

in the Headquarters, all converged on this day to become 

Headquarters II Army Corps (reinforced). 

The Commanding General, the members of his general staff, 

and several members of the special staff had been flown to 

England at this time. In the latter category was the new Corps 

Quartermaster, Colonel Thomas H. Ramsey. Being a Lieutenant 

Colonel at the time, I was Executive Officer designate of the 

Quartermaster section. This section was complemented by two 

Majors, three Captains, three Lieutenants and approximately 

40 enlisted men. 

Corpe Headquarters was intended to be merely a group of 

passengers in a transient role awaiting shipment overseas. 

1 
Be that as it may, the supply sections of the staff were soon 

confronted with a problem they had not anticipated -- to wit: 

the issuance of individual equipment to the personnel of 

headquarters. Previously, organizational equipment had either 

been packed or been requisitioned for shipment overseas and the 

troops had received their full allowances of clothing. However, the individuals in the headquarters were an ill-assorted 

group as far as uniformity of being equipped was concerned, 

At that time, Army Regulations required that all troops being 

shipped overseas be fully equipped as far as individual equipment was concerned. This meant that helmets, leggings, gasmasks, canteens, snelter-halves, pistols, etc., were required 

to be in the possession of everyone. . Although every individual had some article of equipment in 

n

(

an 

He 

su: 

it 

WhE 

WOl 

sle 

qua 

sin 

his possession, no individual was equipped with all of the articles, Pos 

and as the post supply agencies had announced a policy of issuing 0 

to the headquarters as a unit only, some degree of coordination sty 

as well as organization was necessary. and 

Just at this somewhat awkward juncture the supply officer off: 

of the Headquarters Company, whose administrative responsibility to 1 

would ordinarily have included the performance of this duty, took 

occasion to enter the state of matrimony. At the same time he shif 

was well attended by his brothers-in-arms, who comprised the other nigr 

officers of Headquarters Company. the 

Please let it be understood that I have no objection to as a 

matrimony. Nevertheless, there is a time and place for everything and when a newly formed corps headquarters supply officer 

and his colleagues take time out for a marriage and a honeymoon 

2 

time 

the 

( 
while in the equipment phase of overseas staging, time does not 

necessarily suspend itself, 

The acting Corps G-4 then announced that the Supply Staff 

(i.e., Quartermaster, Ordnance Officer, Chemical Warfare Officer, 

and Surgeon) would themselves see to it that each member in the 

Headquarters was fully equipped with his particular items of 

supply. 

We were somewhat thankful for this statement inasmuch as 

it gave us something to do; it also gave us some assurance that 

when we arrived at our destination -- wherever it might be -- we 

would at least have blankets to sleep on and shelter-halves to 

sleep under. Accordingly, we had the entire personnel of Headquarters line up and give us their sizes, measurements and 

similar details, following which we made up requisitions on the 

Post Quartermaster, accepted shipment of the articles requisitioned, and served them up in the best retail department store 

style. Some three days later everyone had his 8 tent pegs 

and 2 extra pairs of shoe laces, the Headquarters Company 

officers had all returned to their duties, and we were ready 

to go. 

On the following Tuesday, June 30th, we were alerted for 

shipment (which meant that no one left the Reservation). That 

night we drew our pay for the month of June, and at 6:00 AM 

the following morning we entrained for Jersey City. Inasmuch 

as all of the post facilities had been closed between the 

time we were paid and the time of our departure, we all boarded 

the train, well-healed with currency which we were no longer 

3 
able to spend and which we·would carry.'with us to wherever 

we might go. 

On that afternoon, we left the train at Jersey City for 

the ferry (each of us wishing that our individual equipment had 

never been issued, as it was a hot day) and then crossed New 

York harbor to Brooklyn, where we embarked on the good ship 

Monterrey. 

Atlantic Crossing 

At daybreak on the following morning we found ourselves 

heading out to sea, our convoy consisting of 8 troop ships, 

including the Monterrey, and the u.s.s. Texas, a battleship 

whose appearance must have struck terror into the heart of 

many a Spaniard in 1898, but whose presence next to. us was most 

reassuring. 

Around us was a screen of 12 destroyers, destroyer-escorts, 

and corvettes; we were never close enough to any of them to 

know Just what they were, other than friendly. 

4 . 

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Tidworth Barracks 

II 

ENGLAND, 1942 

Twelve days and some 4,000 miles later the S.S. Monterrey 

sailed up the Clyde River to the village of Grenoch. There we 

boarded a train, which took us through the night and into the 

next afternoon to the Southern English town of Tidworth. 

Tidworth was no metropolis, but it was quaint, neat, and exactly 

what one would imagine a town in Southern England to be. The 

major industry was Tidworth Barracks, a cavalry post on the edge 

of the village. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe 

the village as a settlement outside the post limits. In any case, 

we were gl~d to be at Tidworth Barracks, if for no better reason 

than to get on with the war. 

When we arrived at Tidworth Barracks on July 13, 1942, there 

were very few u. S. Army units in England, although two divisions 

and a corps headquarters had been sent in this direction and were 

garrisoned ±n Northern Ireland. There being no theater troop 

organization of any size, the U.S. Army depots were necessarily 

still in the formative stage. Although they were operating in 

certain localities, Tidworth Barracks was not within these 

fortunate areas, and for the next several months we had the 

benefit of eating His Majesty's best Royal Army Service Corps 

rations. These rations were developed largely upon such staples 

as brown bread, marmalade, tea, brussels-sprouts, and mutton, 

and were designed to eradicate obesity and any other symptoms 

accompanying undue corpulence, Indeed, whatever our sins might 

5 
~ave been against the laws of calories and starches, they were 

more than atoned for by our spartan use of fats, vitamins and 

sugars. However, at this time we had no supply responsibilities 

and no Quartermaster units. The only function of the Corps 

Quartermaster was the dissemination of information as to where 

the incoming units could draw their rations and "petrol" from the 

British and as to the location of the U. s. Army Quartermaster 

depot where they would find class II and IV supplies. 

Salisbury 

During the course of a few weeks the Headquarters moved 

gradually from Tidworth Barracks to the vicinity of Salisbury, 

approximately 25 miles distant. In Salisbury we divided into 

several groups and occupied Longford Castle (for the general 

staff) and three other country estates (for the special staff). 

The Quartermaster section was ensconced in a lovely country 

home called Cowsfield House; in the American idiom it was referred 

to as "Moo Manor". By any name it was seven miles from Salisbury 

and equally far from any distractions, and soon we began to get 

the feel of living in the English countryside. Since everyth.tng 

was normal and because the supply functions were so abbreviated, 

we adopted a training schedule for the enlisted men of the 

Quartermaster section, predicated largely upon map problems and 

weights and cubic capacities for supply movements. 

It was during this summer that the responsibility of motor 

vehicle supply and maintenance was transferred from the 

Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance Corps. This meant the loss of 

two of our officers, and a handful of our enlisted clerks. We 

had already lost one officer on a hospital transfer and another 

6 

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and 

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were 

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that 

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theat 

were 

POst 

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~o Headquarters Company, leaving us with a balance of six. 

Meanwhile, the various sections of Corps Headquarters were 

becoming impatient in what they considered the slowness in 

receiving supplies. The fact that requisitions often took two 

or three days to be filled, occasioned some pressure from G•4 to 

designate a purchasing and contracting officer. Accordingly, one 

of our Quartermaster officers was honored by such a designation 

and forthwith the demands for such things.as colored pins for 

maps, pencils, typewriter ribbons, automobiles, and fancy 

dressers were voiced with increasing degrees of urgency., Doubt• 

less the most urgent was the demand of the Finance Officer for 

postage stamps. Under Army Regulations all Finance Officers 

were required to submit monthly statements to the Office of the 

Chief of Finance. These statements were to be shipped by parcel 

post. The Finance Officer of II Corps adopted the somewhat 

literal attitude that "parcel post" meant parcel post both in 

British postal service and U. s. mail. Therefore, he insisted 

that he needed to be supplied with both British and American 

postage stamps. Our suggestion that the APO service and the 

theater courier service might be adequate for his purposes 

were futile. He said that his report should be made by parcel 

post and parcel post it had to be -- requiring both British and 

American postage stamps. Just how he reasoned that the 

Quartermaster was responsible for the supply of postage stamps, 

we never quite understood. In any case our idea was to give 

service and service it was? · We bought him his stamps. 

7 
Norfolk House 

It was in the early part or August or that summer that 

Colonel Ramsey was mysteriously transferred from Cowsfield House 

to London. The message came late one evening and on the following 

morning he was on his way. ApproXimately two days later, a 

telephone call in the night info~ed me that I would report to 

Norfolk House in London as early as possible on the following 

afternoon. Th~s ended my days in Southern England and I drove 

to London 1n anticipation of the secrets of Norfolk House. I 

never returned to Salisbury. 

In Norfolk House the British Arrrry had organized a planning 

staff, which was supplemented by a group,of U.S. Army officers. 

The object or all the planning was "Operation Torch", which 

historians refer to as the invasion of North Africa. The matter 

was highly secret and each individual, officer or enlisted, who 

knew of it was required to be first classified for security 

purposes as "Bigot". As a result, special identity cards were 

shown at the entrance of the building, and everyone who entered was 

required to give the number of the room he was to visit and the 

name of the person he expected to see. The enlisted men 

stationed there not only ate and slept in the building, but were 

not permitted to leave it. The British were in charge of the 

planning and they left nothing to chance in the matter of security. 

The need for this secrecy was obvious. For two years the 

Allies had talked of a cross-channel invasion but never had a 

public word been uttered about an amphibious operation in the 

Mediterranean. Above all it would have been awkward if the Fr.ee 

8 

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French had learned of the project, inasmuch as an attack on 

their own countrymen might have become personalized. 

We were in a position in which we were required to plan 

an amphibious operation some 1500 miles distant, to be mounted 

and initially supplied from England and to be thereafter 

maintained by equipment and supplies that had not as yet left 

the United States. 

It was at that time that the Supreme Headquarters for 

the entire operation was formed from both the British and 

American sides and was designated "Allied Force Headquarters", 

commanded by Lieutenant General Eisenhower. General Clark 

was transferred from the command of the II Corps to be named 

as Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces. Gen~ral Fredendall 

was brought from the United States to assume command again 

of the II Corps. During this shuffle Colonel Ramsey became 

Quartermaster, Allied Forces, and I succeeded him as Quartermaster of the Corps. 

Torch 

Neither I nor any of my officers had seen any of the 

troop units that I was to command in the forthcoming operation. 

Indeed, security regulations denied me the right even to 

discuss the matter with the other officers and enlisted men of 

the Quartermaster Section, save only two officers who had 

become classified "Bigot" and had participated in the planning 

of the operation. The mission of the II Corps was to seize and 

occupy Oran, in French North Africa, The striking force for 

the Oran operation was to consist of the lat Infantry Division, 

9 
operating in three combat teams, and Combat Command "B" of the 

1st Armored Division. These units plus the 20th Engineer Regiment 

(combat) and a few tank-destroyer units were to comprise the 

initial assault force. All units were to land on D-Day with 

12 days of supply. From a Quartermaster sense this meant the 

following: 

Class I 

Each individual was to carry 2 "C" rations and 2 "D" rations 

on his person. Each unit kitchen was to carry 1 day's "B" ration, 

and 7 days of cased rations for the entire force would be shipped 

as cargo. These cased rations consisted of the "C" rations and 

the British "compo" rations (food for lll- men for one day). 

Class III 

Gasoline, oils and greases for 12 days for each vehicle in the 

force was to accompany the convoy, and T/O&E 5 gallon cans of 

gasoline were to be carried on each vehicle. The planning factors 

were 50 gallons per day per tracked vehicle and 5 gallons per day 

per wheeled vehicle. All 5 gallon cans, whether on vehicles or 

shipped as cargo, were marked for identification with wire strands 

about the handles: 1 strand meant 80 octane (for wheeled vehicles; 

Quai 

--.: 

r 

L .ap, 

that 

Never 

supply 

SUpply; 

Th 

approx.:1.1 

schedule 

approxim, 

With the 

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( 

Compan)es 

the exc1u~ 

Quartermas 

tration. 

By Oct 

2 strands, 87 octane (tracked·vehicles); and 3 strands, 100 octane Planning th, 

(airplanes). 

After computing the weights and cubages of these cargo 

requirements we tui"Iled them over to the British Transportation 

Office, which then found space for it in the 5ll- ships that were 

to comprise the assault convoy. 

10 

we had not l 

to the few t 

as I a.ta ted l 

However , on t 

advanced eche. 

one of Which E 

C 
Quartermaster Troops 

In Quartermaster Units we were restricted. There were 

comparatively few Quartermaster troops in England and those 

that were there were needed for normal depot operations. 

Nevertheless, we ultimately had assigned to us the following 

units to participate in the D-Day landing force: 

Company B - 205th Quartermaster Battalion (gasol,ine, 

supply), and One platoon, 85th Quartermaster Company (depot 

supply). 

This was our Quartermaster troop-list, numbering 

approximately 175 troops. On D-Day plus 4, ,,another convoy wal;! 

scheduled to arrive in Oran. This convoy was to bring 

approximately 18 days of supply for the entire f,orce together 

with the 93rd Quartermaster Company (railhead) and the 1st 

Battalion for the 28th Quartermaster Regiment (truck), less,. 

6

l Companies Band C. However, these truck units were to be under 

the exclusive control of the Corps G-4 ,and I, as Corps 

Quartermaster, had no responsibility for their use or adminisls 

,s) ; 

11e 

tration. 

By October 25th, we had done what we could in the way of 

planning the invasion of Oran. I felt dissatisfied because 

we had not been permitted to give any inkling of their missions 

to the few troop units that would be under our command, and, 

as I stated before, to my own assistants on the Corps staff. 

However, on that evening we entrained for Glasgow, where the 

advanced echelon of Corps Headquarters was split into two parts, 

one of which embarked on the "SS Orbita~ and the other of 

11 
which went on the "SS Letitia". Both of these ships were White 

Star passenger liners of approximately 15,000 ton capacity. 

General Fredendall and the chiefs·of the General Staff 

sections were on an especially equipped headquarters ship, and 

we did not see them until after debarking at Oran. 

In the D-Day convoy I was permitted to take two assistant 

Quartermaster officers and four enlisted men. We all embarked 

on the Letitia, on which there was also quartered the personnel 

of the gasoline supply company. 

We embarked at Glasgow on the afternoon of October 26th. 

It was a miserable and dreary day, but we had the satisfaction 

of knowing that there was nothing further in our power that 

could be done. As I meditated upon this satisfactiqn I 

suffered a rude shock, We had shipped tons of all kinds of 

supplies, but there was not a medal in the convoy. To complicate 

matters, the ships were all under radio silence. Fortunately, I 

was able to have a "blinker" message sent to the Port Commander, 

asking'him to forward to the main body of Corps Headquarters, 

still at Salisbury, a request to bring medals by the case with 

them on the D+l3 convoy. 

On the afternoon of November 6th our convoy met with convoys, 

which had come from the United States, at a rendezvous point not 

far from Gibraltar. At midnight that night we went through the 

Straights·, with the lights of Tangiers on our right and the 

massive darkness of the Rock on our left. We did not realize at 

the time how long it would be until we would again see the lights 

of a city at night. On the following day we were headed east 

12 

WithJ 

Malta 

( 

lie .i's 

1:00 , 

r 

• 

Mers-e 

Oran, 

to the 
·s' 

.t 

within sight of Spain, following the conventional ship route to 

Malta. By afternoon the land had completely fallen away and the ~ 

hours before the landing had become few. "H" hour was to be at 

1:00 A. M. on November 8th. 

The attack was three-pronged, two forces going in at 

Mers-el-Kebir and Los Andalouses, respectively, to the west of 

Oran, and one column landing at the little fishing town of Arzeu, 

to the east. 

13 
Invasion 

III 

ALGERIA 

The landing at Los Andalouses was made by Combat Command "B", 

of the 1st Armored Division, Brigadier-General Lunceford Oliver 

commanding. The landing at Mers-el-Kebir was made by the 

26th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division, under 

the command of Brigadier-General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. The 

main landing was made at the Port of Arzeu, where the balance of 

the 1st Division, went in, commanded by Major General Terry Allen 

and supported by the 20th Combat Engineer Regiment. Inasmu?l;l.as 

none of these three landings was aimed at taking over the immediate , 

harbor facilities at Oran, there was scheduled a special force, 

consisting of two companies of the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment, 

which was to invade directly the port area at three o'clock in the 

morning. These two companies were on two cutters, both 9f which 

were without armor. 

The three main landings were made without undue incident; 

opposition had been expected and opposition there was. Nevertheless, the assaults on the beaches were on the whole successful 

and the Los Andalouses and Arzeu columns commenced their march to 

the south. The plan had been that, after going 5 or 10 miles 

to the south, they would come up toward the north again and take 

the city of Oran from a southerly direction. Meanwhile, General 

Roosevelt's force attacked from the west. Unfortunately, the 

successes of the three main forces did not extend to the two 

15 
cutters full of infantrymen which sailed directly into the Oran 

harbor. By the time they reached there, the French Naval forces 

had had approximately two hours' notice of the fact that there 

was an invasion in operation. Consequently, the French were 

fully alert to the situation, not only with their eyes, but also 

with their machine-guns. These weapons were turned onto the 

two cutters and the unfortunate Americans in them were butchered 

as they stood below-decks in the ships. We afterwards buried 

most of them in the cemetery at Oran. 

Arzeu 

It was about six o'clock on that morning of November 8th 

when I realized that at long last daybreak was on its way and I 

looked with searching eyes at the land at Arzeu. Right next to 

the little harbor in that town there was a good sized hill, on 

the top of which was· a French fort. As the morning mists were 

clearing, the first sight that met my eyes was a column of 

prisoners--the French garrison of the fort--marching down the 

hill toward Arzeu, guided by members of our 1st Ranger Battalion. 

The Rangers had landed with the mission of taking that fort, 

and they had done so very effectively; not intending to belittle 

in the least the efforts of the Rangers, we must recall that 

this landing had taken place at one o'clock on a Sunday morning 

and the French have never believed in any equivalent of the 

Volstead Act. 

Next I observed a small narrow gauge freight train pulling 

from the east along the Mediterranean Coast into its terminus 

Arzeu. I was glad to see it, as it appeared that this rail line 

16 

.ms sti 

us in m 

LCT•s ai 

harbor , 

landing 

landing 

The 

cargo al 

Corps He 

school-h 

the troo: 

of D/1, 1 

concludec 

use 

freighter 

the shore 

were used 

which cciu. 

there uni, 

were eminE 

Beach SUP.f 

There 

and moor a 

were neede 

as that op, 

C 
.,as still intact and I had hoped that it would be helpful to 

us in moving supplies. 

By this time, the little Gulf of Arzeu had become busy with 

LCT's and LCP's darting back and forth between the ships in the 

harbor and the land itself. The LCT's were supposed to mean 

landing craft, transport; while the LCP's were supposed to mean 

landing craft, personnel. 

These LCT's and LCP's kept discharging troops, vehicles, and 

cargo all day. Late that afternoon I went ashore with the II 

Corps Headquarters, and we set up our temporary command post in a 

school-house two blocks from the beach. However, the balance of 

the troops were not completely unloaded until the afternoon 

of D/1, while discharge of the vehicles and the supplies was not 

concluded until D/4. 

One of the interesting features of the operation had been the 

use of two ships called maracaibos. These were ordinary 

freighters, with bows that fell down as ramps when they aJached 

the shore line. Obviously, they were shallow draft ships. They 

were used to transport tanks, half-tracks, and heavy vehicles 

which could thus be brought virtually to the beach itself and 

there unloaded right through the bow of the ship. These maracaibos 

were eminently successful on their performance at Oran. 

Beach Supply 

There were two piers at Arzeu, either of which could take 

and moor a good sized ocean-going vessel. However, the piers 

were needed for the discharge of the landing-craft, and as long 

as that operation was going on, they could not be used for the 

17 
mooring or discharge, direct from ship to dock, of any of the 

freighters. Inasmuch as three-fourths or more of the troop 

strength had come in at Arzeu, three-fourths or more of the 

supplies were discharged there also. These supplies, whether 

Quartermaster, Ordnance, Chemical, Engineer, or Medical, were all 

handled by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. The function of 

this Brigade, which was composed of two shore regiments and one 

boat regiment, was to unload and carry cargo from the ships to 

the shore, where it would be picked up at the water line by the 

shore detachments and placed in appropriate dumps. Each of the 

several supply services had its own dump area. We had one Quartermaster dump for Class I supplies, which was operated just a few 

blocks from the piers in a little park; our troops operating it 

consisted of the one platoon of the 85th Quartermaster Company 

(depot supply), the balance of the company being scheduled to 

arrive on the D/4 convoy. Our other dump for Class III supplies 

was operated by Company "B" of the 205th Quartermaster Battalion 

(gasoline supply). This gasoline dump was slightly to the west 

of Arzeu and behind the hill at the top of which had been the 

French fort. 

and un 

operat r· 

\ Thi8 f; 

we had 

office! 

fact ha 

Brigade 

fortuna 

dumping 

were ger 

that the 

itself. 

of' all t 

wandered 

the vr 'i< 

t 

·- ,~erves 

There waf 

supply ar 

delivered 

supply co: 

and these 

ships or 1 

dump of'f'ic 

pool f'or 0 

stacks alo 

Unquestionably someone had had in mind the appropriate idea 

that the trucks of the Engineer Special Brigade would carry the 

supplies, of whatever type they might be, to the dump for which 

they were intended, where the trucks in turn would be discharged 

and the supplies properly sorted and stacked. Unfortunately, 

this obvious instruction had apparently not reached the Brigade. 

The troops of this command, both officers and men, worked hard 

.and with 0 , 

18 
rl. 

,d 

l • 

and untiringly. They did their best to do a good job, but their 

operation had simply not been coordinated with the other serviceg, 

This failure was certainly not that of the Engineer Brigade. When 

we had been planning the operation, we had been assured by G-4 

officers that the Engineers would take care of everything. This 

fact had simply not been revealed to the Engineer Special 

Brigade. As the result of this lack of coordination, two unfortunate practices developed. One was that the Engineers were 

dumping the cargo at the spots most convenient to them, which 

were generally right at the water's edge, and the other was 

that they exercised no prerogative control over the landing area 

itself. That is, the docks and the beaches were open to visitors 

of all types and descriptions; French, Arabs, anQ Americans 

wandered among the stacks of supplies. The supply officers from 

the various American units had a field day laying in substantial 

reserves of rations and whatever else might be handy at the time. 

There was simply no discipline of any type evidenced in the 

supply area along the beach, and only a few truckloads were 

delivered to our Quartermaster dumps. Fortunately, our gasoiine 

supply company had a comparatively heavy complement of trucks, 

and these were all used in hauling gasoline directly from the 

ships or the landing areas to the Class III dump. The Class I 

dump officer was resourceful enough to draw on the Corps motor 

pool for one truck, which he used to haul supplies from the 

stacks along the water's edge. With the use of this one truck 

and with occasional other trucks which some way or other found 

19 
their way to the dump, he managed to gain a little stock. 

Vnfortunately, he was in competition with the 1st Infantry 

Division Quartermaster and with the respective supply officers 

of the other units which were then ashore. 

The importance of this is in the fact that, as 1 have 

previously pointed out, the troops all went ashore with five 

days of supply, while another seven days was accompanying the 

force as cargo. This meant that a total of twelve days of 

supply for 40,000 men was coming across the beaches. At first, 

SU 

of 

ma, 

In 

the 

Fo1 

1ni 

The 

it would seem that this twelve days of supply, which was only day 

supposed to last until the reinforcements came on D/4, would have D;{]c 

been more than adequate. The fact is that when the D/4 convoy 

began to discharge on the day it was due, the Class I dump at 

Arzeu was empty. Twelve days of supply had been exhausted in 

the course of four days. This did not mean that there had been 

bad planning. The overdraw--and overdraw it was--simply reflected a total lack of supply discipline which was aggravated 

by the sloppy control over the dump areas. Supply officers 

could go down to the beach and take whatever they wanted. That 

they did, inspired with the knowledge that only seven days 

supply was coming in as cargo, and, therefore, "getting while the 

getting was good" prevailed. 

Oran 

Meanwhile, all was going well tactically. The air-fields 

to the south of Oran had been taken at once by Combat command 

"B", and on D/3 the French commander surrendered to General 

Fredendall and all hostilities ceased. Immediately upon the 

20 

and 

aal)q 

per, 

.nj 

>in Er. 

· than 1 

. . ,' .. -,.,, 

~ranotBil 

i},Theii~1 

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C 

surrender, I mounted my Jeep and drove into Oran. The purpose 

of my trip was far from that of a sightseer; it was a very real 

one, namely, to choose depot sites for the mountains of Quartermaster supplies that I knew were going to be unloaded there. 

In this connection, I might point out that our plan had been that 

the Oran Task Force, which had also been known as the Center Task 

Force, would be supplied directly by or from depots in England 

initially, and subsequently by shipments from the United States. 

The logistical plan for the operation had called for a fourteen 

day level of Quartermaster supplies to be on hand and ashore by 

D/3O; by D/6O, there was to be a thirty day level of supply ashore, 

and by D/9O there was to be a forty-five day level for all troops 

ashore. 

In Class I supply, we had simply figured a ration per man 

per day. In Class II and IV supply, I had worked up some 

maintenance factors with a group of SOS Quartermaster officers 

in England. Class III particularly gasoline, required some more 

elaborate thinking, as previously stated. However our factors 

of 5 gallons of gasoline per day per wheeled vehicle and 

59 gallons of gasoline per day per tracked vehicle proved more 

than adequate for that particular operation. 

The supply plan had called for a follow-up convoy to 

arrive in Oran on D/4 with a second follow-up convoy arriving on 

D/13. The D/4 convoy would bring the strength of the force up 

to approximately 60,000, while the D/13 convoy would bring in 

another 20,000 troops, for a total strength of 80,000 men. 

Thereafter administrative convoys would bring in more troops 

;and supplies in cycles of every six or seven days. 

21 
Storage Sites 

For these reasons, the importance of choosing good and 

adequate depot sites in Oran was obvious. I had given this matter 

considerable thought prior to the landings. We had obtained some 

very fine maps of the city, and also some photographs of it taken 

both from the sea and from the sky. Readily seen on the 

photographs were some large gasoline refinery-type tanks which had 

belonged to the Shell 011 Company. They were located right near 

the harbor area and I made my first call there. The managers were 

most cooperative, with the result that on D/4 we began to discharge 

a tanker of gasoline into the Shell tanks. This was a considerable 

relief, as it meant that at least we had a receiving and storage 

point for the important item of gasoline, 

My next call was somewhat unusual on a bull-ring in the 

southwest corner of the City. In both the maps and the aerial 

photographs that I had seen this bull-ring appeared to be a 

substantial structure, and I had anticipated that the spaces under 

the seats would be adequate and.convenient for the storage of 

rations. Naturally the structure was on a good traffic net with 

plenty of parking space around, and it seemed like a splendid 

bet for a Class I storage point. 

w 

second' 

sh(., 

they WE 

Commise 

bouleva 

where t. 

making < 

of' an ur 

owner ara 

house. 

later. 

claimed 

street ir 

business• 

.· ( . l>th 

Quarterma: 

the balanc 

'ict6gether \\ 

'

0f' the Med 

;,::icheduled 

Unf'ortunately, appearances had been deceiving. The bullring was there all right and the site was fine, but there was no 

space whatsoever under the stands. What would have been space 

:/:future da ti 

. Also C 

t?sth Quarte 

there in an American football stadium was filled up with stones, ~iii'ilhead Coi 

bricks, debris, and junk of such consistency that cleaning it {f~th Qu.artei >,,'/,,,,,, ,, 

out would have been impossible. Further, the bull-ring smelled ffas,t unit wci 

like bulls. ~'orps G-{' 

22 i' ' 
While driving the streets of Oran I gradually suffered a 

second disillusionment. On the. maps we had seen, the streets were 

shown as broad, well-paved boulevards. I have never doubted that 

they were intended some day to be such by the City Planning 

Commission. That day had not yet come; what had appeared to be 

boulevards were in fact streets; streets were alleys; and alleys, 

where they existed at all, were donkey-paths. Finally, after 

making queries at the "Hotel De Ville" (City Hall to us) I learned 

of an unused warehouse at 66 Rue du Tetre. I went there, saw the 

owner and claimed it as the Quartermaster Class II and IV Warehouse. I knew that it was inadequate, but hoped to do better 

later. I found a park on the southeast side of the City and proclaimed it to be the Class III dump site. A vacant lot on a good 

street intersection became the Class I dump. We were set up for 

business! 

I then drove down to the docks at Mers-el-Kebir and met the 

Quartermaster troops arriving on the D/4 convoy. These included 

the balance of the officers in the II Corps Quartermaster Section, 

together with two officers attached from the Quartermaster Section 

of the Mediterranean Base Section. This latter organization was 

scheduled to take over Quartermaster functions from us at a 

future date • 

Also on this convoy there arrived the balance of the 

85th Quartermaster Depot Supply Company, the 93rd Quartermaster 

Railhead Company, and the 1st Battalion (less 2 companies) of the 

28th Quartermaster Regiment (truck). As previously mentioned this 

':last unit was not to be under me, but operated directly under the 

23 
I quickly directed the depot supply company to No. 66 Rue du 

Tetr'e , and sent the railhead company to the location that I had 

chosen for the Class I dump. Meanwhile, I had moved the gasoline 

supply company (less a small detachment) into Oran from Arzeu, 

and rations, gasoline, clothing and equipment at once commenced 

to roll into the three dumps. 

The Port Commander for Oran had assigned to his staff an 

extremely aggressive and effective officer named Captain Franklin 

Kreml. Captain Kreml had been an instructor in traffic engineering 

at Northwestern University before the war, and upon arrival in 

Oran on D/4 he was assigned as traffic officer of the Port. In 

this capacity he had been carefully indoctrinated with the fact 

that the mission of the Port was to unload as many ships as 

Daily T 

On 

but s 

suburb ~ 

over a r 

ample tr 

·railroad 

thought 1 

were avaj 

of the ra 

feeling. 

TherE 

t'headquartE 

possible in as short a time as possible. Therefore, as soon as he "daily tra 

stepped on dry land he visited every truck owner in Oran and 

signed them up on contracts whereby their drivers and trucks, 

which were fueled with alcohol, worked solely for the Port 

Commander. Simultaneously, he ascertained the location of our 

?He further .. ( 

This direc 

:Eymer, the 

~(been in the 

dumps, placed signs leading to them from the docks, and in no fwhich there 

time had his hundreds of civilian trucks hauling to our installa- '3⁄4.of.supplies 

tions • In gi v: 

Meanwhile, the Arzeu phase was still going on. When the 

D/4 convoy arrived at Oran, several of its ships were discharged I~l.\§rtermaste 

at Arzeu. The dock facilities were sufficient for only a few ships!f/!:Sistants c 

at a time, but time was important and the unloading operation 

went on night and day. 

24 

ireJght ca.rs 
ps 

Daily Train 

On D/2 the 1st Infantry Division had entered the City of Oran, 

but its supply area was near a suburb called Sidi Chamy. This 

was on the narrow-gauge rail line that ran south from Arzeu, 

range of hills, and then down into Oran. The Division had 

ample trucks with which to haul its supplies, but existence of the 

railroad caused many supply-minded individuals to wince at the 

thought that trucks were being used when civilian rail facilities 

were available. The fact that no one had made a reconnaissance 

of the rail line did not detract from the strength of this 

Therefore, on D/3, the Corps G-4, from his office on the 

J1eadquarters ship, ordered that before sundown on that day a 

?"daily train" be dispatched to the ls t Di vision at Sidi Chamy. 

,He further ordered that the train carry supplies of all types, 

not questioned, although Lt. Colonel Clarence 

,:&ymer, the Division G-4, accompanied by a column of trucks, had 

beach area for several hours that morning, after 

which 

,,, there was noted a marked decrease in the number of stacks 

I~f' supplies • 

/>C',' 

"> 

In giving his order the Corps G-4 indicated that, of course, 

responsibility for the shipment would be that of the 

With that mission in mind, one of my officer 

.sistants conferred with the Engineer Brigade Commander and with 

stationmaster, with the result that a train of 

was actually made up, the cars containing gasoline, 

1£is and ;;r•Gases, rations, ammunition of all kinds, and fresh 

25 
water in 55 gallon drums. The cars, loaded with this variety of 

supplies, had just happened to be lying there on the railroadtracks by the dock at the time they were coupled together, so 

that it was simply accidental as to how and with what assortment 

of items each car had been loaded. Several hours later the 

train actually departed, the Quartermaster officer ensconced in 

the caboose. 

{ ~eiemed to:i 

f.!J~ ;€fu'.e!J.u/ai 

h'W:&B,a:il r1: 

The distance from Arzeu to Sidi Chamy is approximately 30 milesi;l¥e ,the ei 

by rail, and slightly less by highway. The rail line goes over 

the hills for most of the distance, and then descends into the 

,~ntend. fui 

0tlnt:tJankful 

{';-:_:,{:. . . 

valley that surrounds Oran. There was a town approximately every (*~Ille that n 

2 miles on the line, and the train stopped faithfully at each 

station, while the locomotive crew discussed the events of the 

day with the local villagers. At each stop the Quartermaster 

officer noted the shooting-gallery complexion of the signs, 

semaphores, and the inevitable water-tower, all of which had 

received the attention of the Division's riflemen. 

In due course, the train arrived at the village of St. Cloud. 

ib,acked back 

j~han 

G~;: · · Three. c 

~-'-·"•".•.· 

;'1~,Corpa Hea 

,Orcen, · leC,in 

. 

tair•~ , .. ,, ,.;:;. rzeu-Or 

~~~~ade, 

It was now nearing twilight, and the locomotive crew again greeted Jq'Irl(~ By this 

their friends with the latest news from Arzeu, relaxed a few 

minutes, and then inspected the engine. Suddenly, a burst of 

conversation was heard over the snorts and pants of the steam 

and even to the non-gallic ear of the Quartermaster officer it 

noticeable that all was not well. The fact seemed to be that, in 

order to continue the uphill trip to the crest of the hills, the 

locomotive simply had to have more water. Moreover, the riflemen 

of the 1st Division had not lost any of their accuracy as they 

26 

~:i 

'f 1 otr! 

( . . . . . ' ' 

' 
d 

as 

n 

'passed through St. Cloud. Even without the use of syllogisms 

ppeared the frustrating conclusion that the train would go no \'', 

further-up hill, that is. 

The Assistant Corps Quartermaster came forward with what 

'seemed to be a plausible thought. "Pourquoi ne utilisez pas 

/'' 

les vingt-vingt gallon boi tes?" No, this wa te.r 

to drink, but the only kind of water that would 

run was water from the tower) At a loss to 

with such unreasonable determination, but not 

'ill!lthankful to know that he would probably get to bed at some 

'!l:me that night, the Ame•rican re-boarded his caboose and the train v, ,, 

back to Arzeu, nonstop and toute suite. 

Three days later, on D/6, the balance of the Arzeu contingent 

,0:Corps Headquarters and of the QM troops in the area moved ;into 

'.n., leaving the operation of the Port of Arzeu (as well as of 

\j;;;Arzeu-Oran rail line) exclusively to the 1st Engineer Special 

By this time Corps Headquarters was ensconced in and about 

Hotel D'Oran. My QM Section had its office in what 

a few days previously been a gambling-casino of some 

we commenced to face the problems of storing the 

anticipating the tremendous build-up that was scheduled 

cpmmence at once. 

<>,The most pressing problem was that of burial. Although I 

,requested that at least a Quartermaster Graves Registration 

ioon (1 officer, 24 enlisted men) accompany the force, this 

27 
was rejected by G-3 on the ground that only combat troops were · 

important. Due primarily to the slaughter in Oran Harbor, we 

had~to bury more than 400 American soldiers. I selected a site ,·. ·:<L:.. 

near a civilian cemetery on the outskirts of the City, obtained 

some Engineer troops with digging equipment, and then turned this, 

serious operation over to one of my Assistant Corps Quartermasters, 

There he organized and laid out the cemetery, buried the dead, and 

reported the burials. 

However, two more lasting problems that each day continued to 

grow were those of storage space and operating personnel. As the 

month of November wore on, the rains became more frequent, and 

the ground softer. Covered storage was simply nowhere to be 

found. We did locate an unused French Army cavalry barracks, 

complete with stables. The buildings were clean and in good 

condition; but as soon as I requested the use of the site, 

our City Hall liaison staff, the French insisted that they 

it. Had they been an enemy nation, we might properly have requisitioned the installation; being friendly, we could only use what 

they did not want. One of the few sites that no one seemed to 

want at all was a winery that had met with reverses owing to 

war. It had large, paved storage yards, was surrounded by a 

cement wall, was on a good road, and, most important, was separa 

from a railroad side-track only by t.hat wall. Further, the 

proprietor, doubtless not unmindful of a fair rental for the 

of his premise.s in the future, was quite willing for us to 

in. Move in we· did with the 93rd QM Railhead Company, and the 

winery became the Class I Depot. The Engineers blew down the 

28 
'S • 

;o 

.t 

cement wall by the railroad tracks with dynamite and we had a 

loading track at our disposal. We continued to use the old 

Class I dump, keeping it in operation as a truckhead for local 

issues only; the new site was our depot. This division of 

functions was good, as unit supply trucks and personnel were 

thus kept away from the depot. Our Class II & IV Depot remained 

at Number 66 Rue du Tetre, where we were badly confined; we were 

find any place in which to expand these facilities, 

and the walls and the ceilings (if not the floors) fairly bulged 

with clothing and equipment. 

In operating personnel the problem was difficult although 

'inot without some solution. As I have pointed out 1 we only had 

'Jhree Quartermaster companies in the II Corps. On about D/6, 

)lied Force Headquarters ordered one platoon of the depot supply 

'ornpany to Constantine, where it was to operate a Quartermaster 

epot for Air Force units in eastern Algeria. This weakened our 

strength, leaving approximately 260 QM troops for 

force. One week later the D/12 convoy brought 

'other 20,000 tro~ps, but it also brought a second QM depot 

pply company, a QM mobile bakery company, and a QM salvage reWhile all three of these units were assigned to 

e Mediterranean Base Section, Colonel McMasters, the Quarterter of that command, kindly turned them over to us for our 

purposes upon their arrival. 

We placed the new depot supply company in the Class I 

thus freeing the balance of the 93rd QM Railhead Co. 

the Class I Depot. The salvage repair company was 

29 
placed in a vacant block, where it went into immediate operation· 

repairing shoes, clothing, and equipage, as well as operating a 

QM Salvage Dump. The bakery company set up shop in another field, 

and fresh bread immediately augmented the canned rations that we 

were eating. 

However, before and after the arrival of these companies, 

we needed more QM troops. I had predicted this during the 

planning phase, but had been told that there was plenty of 

labor available in Oran. 

Civilian Labor 

Indeed, there was a surfeiture of labor available in Oran, 

but it was largely of an unsatisfactory calibre. The Arab race 

is one of the most populous in the world. In its numerical 

strength, there is--as there is in all races--a not unsubstantial 

fraction of useless, worthless, illiterate, dishonest, and 

people who will do or promise to do anything for an honest franc 

(or a dishonest franc). These people were the labor market from 

whence we were compelled to draw. 

In filling gasoline cans they were fairly satisfactory. 

There was nothing but gasoline in the hose they used, and there 

were no cans to fill but gasoline cans. However, in stacking 

cases of food their performance was not as adequate. They were 

reasonably good in knowing what side of the case was "up", but 

the fact that "C" Rations were arriving in five different menus 

at that time utterly failed to impress them, They were uninhibited by any restraints of personal modesty. Such freedom may 

30 

exis 

On 
reflect cleanliness of heart, although I doubt it. However, it 

very definitely reflects a low degree of sanitation for a ration 

dump. 

This labor problem became more and more urgent as Captain 

Kreml's civilian trucks lined up outside our dumps for unloading. 

He complained to us of delays in freeing those vehicles, and I 

thought then and think now that his complaints were justified 

and rea·sonable. However, they emphasized the need for personne 1. 

Subsistence 

In an attempt to make the most of an undesirable situation, 

we divided the Class I depot into two parts. In one part was the 

flour, dried beans, and any other foods which were not packaged 

in impervious·ly sealed ·cans or containers. The native laborers 

were not adrni tted to this part, nor did they handle any food 

items that belonged there. Their work was limited to handling the 

cases of food that could not physically be exposed to the air. 

Meanwhile, the mountains of food had grown and grown. In 

addition to the "C", 11D11 and British "compo" rations, vast 

quantities of "B" rations had commenced to arrive on D/4. On 

D/18 we commenced to issue "B" rations to all units, and we remained on this basis the balance of our time in Oran. 

The 11B11 ration was well augmented with fresh meat. In requisitioning the initial shipment of rations from England, I had 

been careful not to ask for either perishable foods or foods that 

required refrigerated storage. We had known that a refrigerated 

warehouse existed in Oran; but we had no knowledge as to its 

capacity. On my first day in the City I had been directed to 

31 
it by the Prefet, but I found it loaded with meat belonging to 

the French Navy. I thereupon called upon the French Admiral, who 

had that day surrendered to General Fredendall. Through an 

interpreter I told him that I wanted to use some space in the 

warehouse. He assumed a cavalier attitude toward me, obviously 

forgetting that he had surrendered to~- I then said that I 

had observed seven rooms in the cold-storage plant and that in 

24 hours I would expect one of them to be vacant, and a second 

room empty on the following day, following which I would notify 

him of our future needs. He made a counter-offer that I issue 

out their meats and then replace it with the first meats that 

we received. Knowing nothing of their veterinary standards, I 

declined. However, by the next day one room was vacated, 

a second room by the following day, and by the end of the 

shared half and half. 

The proprietor of the plant was M. Armand Toledano, who most 

graciously received me into his home and subsequently invited me 

and my officers to frequent and lavish dinners. 

M. Toledano's cold-storage plant was found none too soon. 

Regardless of the fact that I had asked for no fresh meat, the 

D/13 convoy brought with it one refrigerated ship with an entire 

cargo of frozen beef, frozen pork and chilled hams, bacon, and 

legs of lamb. A few days later a second refrigerated ship 

arrived, with more meat and tons of frozen turkey. We had no 

room in which to store these. delicacies, and we certainly were 

not Joing to re-consign them back to the United States; therfore, 

steaks, chickens, roasts and lamb abounded on our menus, and for 

32 
e 

re, 

or 

{: 

·tthanksgiving Day, November 26, 1942, we issued the frozen turkeys 

Ii,ight from the ship's side. These food i terns, together with the 

~akery company's fresh white bread ( which we had not seen in 

;_;, 

the delicious Algerian oranges that we purchased at 

one cent (US) per orange from a local fruitgrowers' 

;:?c'ooperative, well augmented our ration to a point where it was a 

"'strong morale factor among the troops. 

One unexpected augmentation was made on a fine November day 

•iwhen approximately twelve thousand gross of fresh eggs arrived 

~at the cold storage plant. Our officer in charge there protested 

lthat there was no room to store them, but the truck drivers--as 

turn protested that their trucks had to be unloaded at 

that they wanted no nonsense about it. We were 

advised of the situation, but we had no alternative 

order the crates unloaded and issued that day as a forced 

Thia was done, and on the following morning every American 

vicinity of Oran had a brace of fresh eggs for breakfast--

•'dish that we had nearly forgotten about. It was several hours 

~ter that a telephone call from Port Headquarters shed some light 

.ri the situation, but the light was too late in shining. The eggs 

•,d arrived via a French ship and had been consigned to the 

We do not doubt that a charge was later made on our 

lend-lease ledger to pay for the eggs. 

It was while we were compelled to store our rations out in 

· e open in Oran that a serious deficiency displayed itself 

the labels on our subsistence, The moisture of the 

caused them to peel right off the containers. A crate 

33 
of food, with a label off, is a mystery that challenges anyone, 

and especially an Arab who can't read English in the first place. 

The unremitting weather stimulated the destruction of these labels, 

and piles of "unknown" rations grew around the Class I depot. 

While I understand that they were ultimately identified and did 

go to waste, this lesson in food identification caused the manner 

of labeling subsistence to be modified so that the descriptive 

words were stamped into the containers. 

Railheads 

Our forces grew in numbers. A battalion of the 20th Combat 

Engineer Regiment was stationed near the Moroccan border at 

Tlemcen, guarding the Casablanca-Oran rail line. To supply them 

we shipped a car of rations and a car of Class III supplies 

everyday. These daily shipments were made from the rail-siding 

at our Class I depot. Moreover, the rain and mud had made 

travel from the Tafarui Airfield (south of Oran) more and more 

difficult, so that the same train was used to drop off cars of 

rations and gasoline at that station also. 

As stated, I had been apprised months in advance of the 

large quantities of Quartermaster supplies and of the high 

reserve that would be discharged in Oran. In order to meet 

situation, I had decided to activate depots outside of Oran 

along the two railroad lines that ran to the east and to the 

west, respectively. It was too much to assume that Oran itself 

could supply sufficient depot space for the storing of large 

reserves within the city limits. Therefore, within ten days 

after our arrival there, I dispatched teams of officers to 

34 
to survey depot sites along both railroad lines from Orleansville 

in the east to Oujda in the west. Through Lt. Colonel William 

Carter, Assistant Mediterranean Base Section Engineer in charse of 

construction, we had arranged to have covered storage platforms 

constructed at several of these stations. Shortly his Headquarters 

took-over ~he operations from us, the Quartermaster of Mediterranean 

Base opened such a depot in the town of Perregaux, about 50 miles 

south and east of Oran. 

In the initial phase of the invasion, while we were subsisting entirely on "C" and "Compo" rations, we used the cigarettes 

that were included therein. Subsequently, when we adopted the 

"B" ration, these items ceased to be included. Accordingly, 

coincidental with the adoption of the "B" ration, we opened a 

sales store in Oran, where unit sales of: cigarettes , candy, and 

post exchange i terns, were made and where officers ' and nurses 1 

clothing were sold. 

Nurses 

Speaking of nurses' clothing reminds me that there was 

none. They simply had to wear the clothes that they had or 

the GI uniform. This· was a most unfortunate oversight which was 

corrected by our first cable to the U.S.; it nevertheless took 

two months before the first shipment of nurses' clothing could be 

unloaded in the Mediterranean Theater. 

Laundry 

It was fortunate for us that the II Corps had available 

the facilities of Oran, inadequate as they were. We had no 

laundry service of our own. However, the French civilians for 

35 
a small bar· of soap would gladly do a soldier's laundry for him. 

The hospitals presented a more urgent need, and our one QM 

Laundry P;Latoon (which had four la;ridry uil.its) was divided 

among them as soon as it arrived in Oran. 

Class II & IV supply 

During this time our Class II and IV supply operation was 

causing comparatively little problem, other than that of storage, 

which we have already discussed. We had ordered, as I have 

stated before, maintenance plus a build-up. Nevertheless, even 

the build-up was intended primarily as force main~~~ a.nd not 

for initial issue. Unfortunately, during the phasing of troops 

into the Mediterranean Theater, many units were separated from 

their vehicles and T/O&E equipment. This was not accidentally 

done but happened by design. Of course, it is always planned 

that the troops and the equipment will immediately meet with 

.. each other upon landing. Nevertheless, in spite of the best 

plans, these happy reunions did not always transpire. The result was that the troops--who are virtually useless without their 

equipment--needed to draw, as initial issue, from the maintenance 

stocks. This need had an extemely weakening effect on those 

stocks. The fact that ultimately the troop units might receive .. 

their own T/O&E equipment should have meant that they would 

return the equipment that they had drawn to tide them over; unfortunately, this very seldom happened. In a new theater supply 

discipline is characteristically somewhat relaxed in the early 

stages of an operation, and unit supply officers as well as 

commanders realize that they are not likely to have 
r 

e 

r 

tieneral's inspection while living in tents in a field or on a 

beach. Therefore, there is no particular impet,us, other than that • 

,!, -

of honor, to return the equipment tha!t they have drawn from 

maintenance stocks. Regardless of,the psychology of the situation, 

the fact was that the equipment was not returned. Around D/21, we 

had a substantial number of replacement troops, casuals, loose 

ends, and units arriving in the Mediterranean area without their 

T/O&E equipment. Inasmuch as these units were unable to provide 

for themselves, the _Corps G-4 directed that a certain area on the 

outskirts of Oran be set aside for them, an,d also that it be set 

up, manned and equipped for their housekeeping. The name of this 

location was Camp Myers. It was up to the Quartermaster to see 

that Camp Myers was equipped with sufficient supI:lies to handle 

,a figure of approximately 10,000 casuals. This we did, but with 

feeling that we were mis-using the maintenance stocks that we 

in the theater. In any case, it simply had to be done, as 

the troops would have gone w:1:-thout hot meals, dry 

sleep, and other basic comforts of life. 'Please underin the least criticizing the point of making 

as bearable as possible for our own troops with our own 

equipment; my point is that it is not expedient at any time 

from their T/O&E equipment, and that 

;ever saving is made in transportation is more than overloss of the usefulness of the troops as well as 

aste of maintenance equipment sidetracked for their initial 

37 
On D/3O the supply operations .at Oran were relinquished by 

the II Corps to the Mediterranean Base Section. All our Quartermaster troops, installations, and supplies were turned over as 

a going concern, The Corps Quartermaster Section took a 

and prepared to relax. We had completed our first job. 

Mediterranean Base Section 

In planning the invasion of Oran I had worked closely with 

Major General Robert M. Littlejohn, Chief Quartermaster of the 

European Theater of Operations, and his staff in London. It was 

from the Quartermaster officers who were assigned to the Services 

of Supply in the ETO, and who at that time were under General 

Littlejohn, that the officer personnel for Mediterranean Base 

Section would be supplied. Further, the Quartermast~r units 

which would be assigned to Mediterranean Base Section were in 

England prior to the mounting of Torch. As has been in~icated, 

the plan was that Mediterranean Base Section, as soon as it became organized in and around Oran, would take over from the II 

Corps all supply and administrative installations and services. 

While we were in England, we had no idea as to what use 

would be made of the II Corps, or its troops, after the landing 

had been made in Oran. Specifically, we had no idea as to 

whether we would continue to stay in that area, or whether we 

would be moved to another vicinity. I felt a natural concern to 

effectuate as smooth a transfer of depots and other installations 

from Corps command to Mediterranean Base Section command as 

would be possible. With this thought in mind, I requested 

General Littlejohn to arrange for two of his officers who would 

38 

'?be as 

Cc 
be assigned to Mediterranean Base Section Headquarters to 

accompany my Quartermaster Section on the D/4 convoy arriving 

at Oran. I also requested that a further movement of officers 

be made on the D/13 convoy, and that some of his Quartermaster 

units also be shipped on this latter convoy. 

Consequently, by the time the tu..-·n-owr Jf control tock 

place, which was on D/30, there were a number of Mediterranean 

Base Section QM officers who had been with the II Corps 

Quartermaster Section contlnmusly for at least several weeks 

previously, and there were as many, if not more, Quartermaster 

units working in the installations in and around Oran which were 

assigned to Mediterranean Base Section as there were Quartermaster units assigned to the II Corps. As a result of these 

attachments, when the take-over did transpire, it was without 

incident or .confusion. 

Nevertheless, it is with some degree of humility that I 

look back upon this operation. Virtually no coordin~tion or 

,advanced thinking had preceded or accompanied the Oran 

Our Quartermaster units had no concepts of their 

:: ssions until we met them on a pier and told them where to go, 

hat to do, and, often, how to do it. The enlisted men were 

' ysically overburdened with food, ammunition, and accoutrements. 

e two "C" rations that he carried on his person as he went into 

an alone weighed 10 pounds. The bandoliers of ammunition, the - . 

othing, gas-masks, weapon, and other incidentals that the 

bat troops carried on their persons weighed an additional 

pounds, making an aggregat e of 132 pounds per man. This 

39 
simply represents about 110 pounds too many for a combat soldier 

to carry and enough to make anyone else utterly useless, Moreover, 

each man had (either carried by him, or for him) two barrack-bags, 

each full of more equipment and clothing. Because the men actually 

used much of this equipage, after approximately D/10, when Oran 

became a city in which only Class A uniforms were permitted, I 

shall not discuss this topic further at this time. 

40 
IV 

TUNISIA 

,,ext Mission 

On the afternoon of December 31, 1942, I received a long 

distance telephone call which SlLJJlll1oned me to Algiers at once, 

Arriving there late that night, I met several other staff 

officers from II Corps, some of whom had preceded me there. On 

the following morning we were called to conference with General 

Fredendall, the Corps Commander. He outlined the next mission 

of the II Corps. 

At the time of the invasion of North Africa, the British 

under General Montgomery, was engaged with the 

Axis forces, under General Rommel, in the vicinity of Tripoli. 

miles to the northwest, was a city of no 

•Uitary potentiality or importance as of that time. It had 

been a part of the over-all plan of Allied Force Headquarters 

that immediately upon the consolidation of the landings, a force 

rorn the British First Army, which had landed in Algiers, would 

east and seize the c_i ty and port facilities of Tunis. 

move was obviously designed so that German supply would be 

enied through this port when and if the advance of the Eighth 

a point at which no other means of supply was 

Unfortunately, the merits of this plan were as obvious to the 

rwans as they were to Allied Force Headquarters. In fact, they 

41 
were even more obvious, inasmuch as the Germans moved much faster 

and within a week after our la~ding were sending troops by air from 

Sicily to Tunis at an estimated rate of 500 men per day. 

Accordingly, by the time the British First Army got around to 

moving towards Tunis, the Germans had a reSoUJ;'ceful and tough 

handful of troops With which to hold them off. It was only a 

week after we landed in Oran that Combat Command "B" of our 1st 

Armored Division was ordered to move overland from the Oran area 

to support the British in their move against Tunis. This move 

was one which was very nearly successful. In fact, it was so 

nearly successful that our troops arrived within sight of Tunis. 

Unfortunately, the lack of a supply line and the lack of 

sufficient infantry with which to support our armor compelled 

this force to withdraw to an area some sixty miles west of Tunis. 

As the German strength increased in this vicinity, skirmishes be-

- came more and more frequent and our potential for reaching the 

sea, either at the Gulf of Tunis or the Gulf of Gabes, became 

more and more reduced. 

However, in January, 1943, the British Eighth Army was about 

to launch an all-out attack against the Axis Mareth Line, and 

Allied Force Headquarters directed that the British First Army 

and the U. s. II Corps would launch an attack on or about 

January 19, 1943, from Southern Tunisia to the City of Sfax, 

where a line would be established to cut off the Rommel Forces 

from the Tunis-Bizerte port facilities. 

While back in Norfolk House in London, I had discussed 

this possibility from a supply viewpoint with one 

42 
C 

Jpposite numbers", who was to be stationed on Malta. We had 

speculated as to the feasibility of such a move and had concluded 

that it could best be supplied by a coordinated seaborne shipment 

from Malta into the port of Sfaxo Here the point of our force 

1,1ould receive the shipment, and then the force would withdraw to 

the hills in the west. The mission we were now to accomplish was 

tactically the same in substance; however, there would be no 

subsequent withdrawal. 

Plan 

The group of II Corps officers in Algiers immediately moved 

to the old Roman city of Constantine, approximately 200 miles to 

the southeast. There we organized into a planning headquarters. 

At first the plan appeared to be relatively simple. The strength o: 

the Corps would consist of the 1st Armored· Division and the 20th 

Engineer Regiment (combat), plus supporting tank-destroyer, 

anti-aircraft, and service troops, for an aggregate troop strength 

of only 40,000 thousand men. The axis of our advance would be 

through Sbeitla and Faid to Sfax, On our left flank there was 

already in place a division of lightly armed French infantry; 

Sbeitla, directly in front of us and which would be on our 

jumping-off line, was held by Combat Command "B" of the 1st 

Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier-General Paul M. Robinett; 

and on our right, in the city of Gafsa, Colonel Edson Raft, USA, 

commanded a mixed garrison of paratroopers and infantrymen, and 

some supporting French troops. Col. Raft's force plus the 

mountains would protect our flank from any enemy maneuver, 

43 
Transportation 

With this over-all plan in mind, the site of our supply base 

was designated to be in the vicinity of Tebessa, an old walled 

city that (like most of those in this area) had been founded by 

the Romans circa the third century. Tebessa is located approximately 125 miles east of Constantine, with which it is connected 

by a good vehicular road and a one-track narrow-gauge railroad. 

This meant that every rail shipment to us from Oran or Algiers, 

both of which cities are on standard-gauge tracks, would necessarily be trans-shipped onto narrow-gauge cars at Ouled Rhamoun, a 

few miles east of Constantine. 

Tebessa was also connected by highway and narrow-gauge rail 

with the city of Souk-Ahras, some eighty miles to the North. 

Souk-Ahras was only sixty miles southeast of Bone, a minor port 

from which shipments would be made to us, but here, also, the rail 

"' line to the north was standard-gauge. It was estimated that the 

maximum supplies that could be moved into Tebessa by rail per 

day would be 250 tons. There were no trucks available in 

of us to increase· this estimate materially. 

Supply 

Considering the facts that the campaign was scheduled for a 

date only a few weeks away, and that it would probably be for a 

short duration, and in view of the severely tight supply picture, 

a command decision was made that the operation would be performe 

with Class I, III, and V supplies, only, excluding Class 

IV supplies of all services, A ten day reserve of these three 

classes of supply was to be stocked at Tebessa before January 17 

44 
( 

/ 

( 

' 

On the basis of the same reasoning, it was further decided 

that, unlike the classic concept of supply whereby the troops move 

into bivouac and then receive the supply build-up while being 

maintained, on this occasion the build-up would first be established 

in the Tebessa ara, following which the troops would move through 

this region to the east and attack the enemy. 

QM troops 

Needless to say, the numbe~ of service troops for the campaign 

was to be left to a minimum. Accordingly, the following list of 

QM units was assigned to us: 

1 Railhead Company 

1 Depot Supply Company 

1 Gasoline Supply Company 

1 Mobile Bakery Platoon 

l Service Company 

1 Laundry Platoon (only two hospitals were scheduled) 

l Fumigation and Bath Platoon 

1 Salvage Collecting Company 

l Truck Battalion (less 2 companies) 

1 Graves Registration Platoon 

The numerical strength of this Quartermaster Command 

according to the T/O's as they existed at that time, would have 

approximate 1100 men. However, it was thought at thi'lt time that 

the width of the Corps front would be app.roximately 110 miles, 

whereas the initial distance from the front to the Corps rear 

boundary would be approximetely 60 miles. Considering that I 

had the responsibility of operating the Quartermaster depot as 
well as forward supply points 'for all the_· troops in• the area, 

whether they be British, American or French, a command of eleven 

hundred Quartermaster troops was very small for the mission. 

The supply impetus would be provided by the British First 

Army. Because the entire Eastern Algerian-Tunisian Sector was 

primarily conceived as their resp·onsibility, they had already 

organized the civilian railroads, had established movementcontrol points on both rail and road nets, and had organized 

ration, gasoline and ammunition dumps in the Tebessa area. 

Movement 

Meanwhile, the Corps headquarters had been reduced in size 

to fit a "type corps" TO&E. The surplus officers and enlisted 

men were transferred to the Mediterranean Base Section Headquarters in Oran. The balance of the Headquarters left Oran by 

motor convoy on January 3rd., to make the 500 mile journey to ,.. 

Constantine in 4 days. Leaving their warm beds and hotel rooms 

behind them, the officers were quick to sense that these comforts wer'e ended for a highly indefinite future, in which 

conjecture they were not mistaken. 

The first night out from Oran the Headquarters camped in a 

field outside the town of Orleansville. There, although guards 

were posted about the camp, they acquired a deeper appreciation 

for the resourcefulness of the ubiquitous Arabs. Colonel Damon 

Gunn, the Corps Judge Advocate General and a brilliant and ale 

officer, had gone to sleep that night in a tent with his suitcase next to him. In the morning it had disappeared. This 

experience was multiplied six or eight times around the camp. 

46 
t 

C 

The following night was spent at Blida, a short distance 

south of Algiers. On the third night camp was made at Setif, 

and on the afternoon of the fourth day they arrived outside 

Constantine, where a temporary headquarters was set up in tents. 

Tebessa 

Only briefly was the Headquarters together again. On the 

following morning a detachment commanded by Lt. Colonel Samuel L. 

Corps G-4, and consisting of one officer and 

two enlisted men from each of the Engineers, Ordnance, Quarter01118.ster and Artillery Sections, left by a convoy of jeeps for 

ebessa, 125 miles distant. There they moved into a halfderground hut that they bought from an Arab family for the 

ited States equivalent of $10.00, and set up their office in 

adjacent race-track grand-stand office. Telephone lines were 

~,t.alled by both the British and United States Signal Corps, 

the group -- naturally enough -- thereafter became known as 

e race-track crowd". 

ration dump had already been opened by the Royal Army 

in a good sized theater from which the seats had 

removed. Gasoline and ammunition had also been stacked 

,,the roadways by the British. As soon as our serv:l ce troops 

~cl, they relieved the British from the operation of the 

ations, although the latter for the next two months 

railroad station, particularly the unof freight cars. We left the ration dump in the theater, 

oved our Class III dump off the roadside into the only 

47 
cover nearby, which was in a wooded ravine approximately seven 

miles east of Tebessa. 

Operations 

Our own troops commenced to arrive on the evening of 

January 8th. On this night the 85th Quartermaster Depot Supply 

Company moved in and took over the operation of the ration 

dump; simultaneously, Company "B" of the 205th Quartermaster 

Gasoline Supply Battalion moved in and opened up the new Class 

dump, and the 200th Quartermaster Service Company moved into a 

bivouac area from whence they supplied details of labor to both 

the Class III dump and the Ammunition dump. At the same time, 

first battalion of the 28th Quartermaster Truck Regiment (less 

Companies "B" and "C") arrived and became the Corps Motor Pool. 

On the following day they commenced to shuttle ammunition from 

the British supply point of Souk-el-Arba down to Tebessa. C" 

Class V items included Engineers' demolition items as well as 

Ordnance ammunition. 

On the next day a detachment of one officer and fifteen 

enlisted men from the service company was sent to Sbeitla, where 

they opened a Class I and III railhead in support of Combat 

Command "B" and all other troops in that area. The daily 

was made up by the simple process of reconsigning cars of 

rations and of gasoline as they arrived in Tebessa. 

from Tebessa to Sbeitla was about 40 miles by air, 60 miles 

automobile, and 100 miles by rail. The explanation is that 

rail line went first northeast from Tebessa to Thala, thence 

south to Kasserine, which is south and east of Tebessa, and 

thence again northeast to Sbeitla. 

48 
( 

( 

Build-Up 

The supply build-up was underway and our reserves of Class III 

began to increase. Reserves in Class I also increased, but this 

increase was in tonnage rather than in the number of balanced 

rations. We were receiving substantial quantities of "B" Ration 

components. I havG never doubted that at some point in their 

travels these shipments were balanced according to a master-menu 

of some kind. However, the failure to send us that menu or any 

other documentation on the shipment, the failure to guard trains 

against pilferage, and the failure to keep trains intact when they 

were carrying rations combined to make a maximum effort in the 

direction of unbalanced rations. The result was that the use of 

the "B" Ration was curtailed in Southern Tunisia. While the 

clerks of the Depot Supply Company exercised much resourcefulness 

in the compiling of several menus per day in order to issue 

balanced "B" Rations, the number of balanced rations were so few 

that the only units that ate them with any regularity were those 

which were sufficiently close to Tebessa that they could draw 

directly from the ration dump. 

Corps C .P. 

On about January 17th Corps Headquarters moved from Constantine 

to an olive grove approximately 6 miles east of Tebessa - just up 

the road from our gasoline dump. On the following day the attack 

scheduled for January 19th was postponed. On January 22nd the 

168th Combat Team of the 34th Infantry Division was added to the 

Corps, One week later the 1st Infantry Division was also assigned, 

49 
.Th~se 'increases and those of other supporting artillery, 

tank, and tank-destroyer units· were splendid from a tactical viewpoint, but by the end of January we had a force of 60,000 men to 

supply on the same two narrow-gauge rail lines. 

Railheads 

At that time we had sent half of the railhead company to 

Gafsa, 90 miles southeast, to operate a Class I and III railhead 

for the 1st Armored Division and other units in that area. The 

other half of the company was sent to Maktar, in the 0usseltia 

Valley, where elements of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored 

Division were in contact with the enemy. These moves gave us 

Class I and III railheads at three places simultaneously, all 

which were supplied from Tebessa, itself a major railhead. 

Command 

An unusual command situation was prevailing in the Corps 

at that time. Divisions were not operating as such other than 

from an administrative viewpoint. The entire force was broken 

into task forces and regimental and battalion combat teams, all 

of which were under direct Corps Colllllland. Further, the Corps 

Collllllander was subject.to the colllllland of the British First 

Commander, even for the disposal of these elements within the 

Corps. 

Withdrawal 

In any case, on February 14th, 1943, a large number of 

German and Italian tanks and half-tracks were observed approac 

Gafsa from the east. The evacuation of the town was ordered a 

was carried out that night without the loss of any Quartermast 

50 
troops or equipment. The railhead was withdrawn to Ferianna, 

45 miles from Tebessa. All of our supplies were evacuated by rail. 

However, there was some uncertainty as to the success of this 

evacuation by train, inasmuch as the rail line went from Gafsa 

toward the northwest and then curved back northeast again. As it 

made this triangular path westward it went through a fairly long 

tunnel. The proximity and speed of the German advance convinced 

the crew of the train, which composed of civilians, that they· 

would be very discreet if they were to leave the train in that 

tunnel and leave themselves in any place other than within the 

scope of the German advance all of which they did. 

Logistic Support 

On the day after the Gafsa evacuation, the 2nd.Battalion of 

the 168th Infantry Combat Team walked into an ambush in that 

area, as a result of which they lost practically all of their 

equipment. They were pulled out of the line after suffering 

heavy casualties. and with the troops having nothing more than 

what they had on their backs. The Corps Chief of Staff gave 

immediate instructions to one of my Assistant Quartermaster 

officers that this battalion was to be completely equipped not 

later than the following day and made it very definite that this 

was what was to be done. This order in itself was a reflection 

upon the staff-work that had been done in the preparation for the 

operation. To begin with, the entire campaign, as we have noted 

before, was based on the assumption that there would be no 

maintenance for loss replacements of any Class II and IV equipment. 

51 
As the weeks wore on, units would go back to SOS bases towards 

the west and would there present requisitions. Some of these 

depots would fill them, and others would not. The stated 

policy of Colonel Vere Painter, Quartermaster of the Eastern 

Base Section, whose principal depot and headquarters were in 

Constantine, was that he would fill only requisitions submitted 

by the II Corps Quartermaster, and they were to be consolidated 

and submitted on a weekly basis. I think that Colonel Painter 

was absolutely right in his position; on the other hand, the 

tightness of the transportation situation was such that G-4 

denied me any priority for Class II and IV supplies, It took 

at least 24 hours to move a narrow-gauge train from Constantine, 

to Tebessa, although the same trip could be made. by truck in a· 

few hours. Neither truck nor rail transportation was made avai 

able to us for this purpose. Consequently, our troops as well 

as I were all at an impasse in drawing Class II and IV 

from the Eastern Base Section. Occasionally (I think more 

accident than by design) stray shipments of miscellaneous 

Class II and IV items arrived. How they happened to get that 

far, I do not know. I do know that during the 90 days from 

January 7, 1943 to April 7, 1943, we had a total receipt of 

6000 chocolate candy bars, for a force whose minimwn strength 

at any time was 40,000 men. I also know that during this sa 

three-month period we received fresh meat shipments on four 

different occasions; on not one of these occasions was 

sufficient quantity to make any issue to the entire troop 

strength of the Corps. On the contrary, the largest shipmen 

52 
was one which meant an issue of ,35 lbs. of fresh beef to every 

infantryman in the Corps. I might add that by infantryman I mean 

the members of each infantry regiment in the Corps. Four issues, 

partial issues if you please, of fresh meat in a three months 

period of time emphasized the tightness of the transportation 

situation. 

In any case, as to the needs of the 2nd Battalion of the 

168th Combat Team, it was impossible to meet this request without 

spending at least three or four days. The request was met, but 

it took just about this long in which to gather the supplies by 

truck from the rear and deliver them to this battalion. With 

the slightest degree of advance planning this situation would 

never have prevailed. By that I mean that had a sysj;em of resupply been designed either in advance of the operation or during 

the operation, it would have been simple to re-equip one battalion. 

At no time was any such system ever organized or left to any 

other medium than chance, guess, or accident. 

Kasserine 

On 17 February 1943, the enemy gathered increased strength in 

the area south of the Kasserine Valley. Inasmuch as all indications 

pointed towards a thrust to the northwest through Kasserine Gap, 

a withdrawal of our forces from Sbeitla and from the ThelepteFerianna area was ordered to take place that night. 

The evacuation of Sbeitla caused a considerable problem because of the single rail line and ro<1d that went west from there. 

The problem was accentuated because the telephone lines were out 

at Sbeitla. Luckily, the railhead commander had gone to the 

53 
nearby city of Kasserine to telephone the race-track as to 

whether he would receive any supplies the following day, and he was 

then instructed to move his men and supplies from Sbeitla back to 

Tebessa immediately. The supply part of the order was easy for 

him to fill, because he had already issued to the 1st Armored 

Division everything that he had, and had nothing left. In any 

event, he was able to obtain trucks to accomplish his move, 

arriving in Tebessa by daybreak. 

In Ferianna, however, our railhead had issued all of its 

rations, but did have approximately 55,000 gallons of gasoline and 

diesel fuel lying on the ground. There was not time to send 

them additional trucks, so their orders were simply to take what 

they could and to destroy the rest. They were able to obtain 

very little in the way of transportation, and were required to 

destroy approximately 50,000 gallons of gasoline, which was done 

by firing tracer ammunition into the drums and cans. Thia was 

the only occasion during my campaigns when any supplies for 

which I was responsible were destroyed. 

Meanwhile, the truckhead at Maktar had been withdrawn, 

not owing to any enemy activity, but because of the fact that 

the troops that it was supplying were moved to the south to 

bolster our forces in the Kaaserine Valley. All of our Quartermaster troops were again in Tebeaaa. 

By this time, we had acquired a bakery platoon in Tebeasa, 

which had gone into operation on February 8, 1943. As usual 

the fresh bread was a great favorite with everybody. Also, a 

54 
( 

( 

fumigation and bath platoon had come in and had been set-up in 

a stream in the vicinity of our gasoline dump, where it was doing 

a good business. Bath-tubs were extremely rare anywhere in North 

Africa, and were actually unknown in that part of the country, 

Fortunately, there were some old Roman natural hot baths back in 

a town called Youks-les-bains, 10 miles west of Tebessa, and 

these received a lot of use from any of us who could take an hour 

or so off and get back there for a bath. Other than those facilities, and that of our fumigation and bath platoon, it was simply 

use the outer part of your helmet or no bath at all. 

On February 16th, after all these withdrawals had been made, 

we had on hand in Tebessa 1,000,000 rations, plus a number of 

unbalanced "B" Ration components. We also had 500,000 gallons 

of gasoline in our dump 7 miles southeast of the city. In brief, 

we were in a favorable supply position, Unfortunately, of all 

the times in my life when I did not want to be in a favorable 

supply position, this period heads the list. 

Although we were protected by mountains on the south and, to 

some extent by mountains toward the east, the fact was that 

there were passes and roads over those mountains which would 

have been passable to Tebessa. The principal threat was posed 

when the Germans successfully broke through the Kassarine Pass 

and then marched northwest thru the Kassarine Valley. This 

force was composed of German and Italian infantry and armor, 

supported by the excellent German artillery. Although we had 

barbed-wire entanglements and mine-fields laid out at the entrance 

of Kasserine Valley and before Kassarine Gap, they were not 

55 
sufficiently protected by our own artillery fire to make them 

effective against the enemy. -Therefore, the latter was delayed 

very little. Our infantry and combat engineers fought valiantly 

from positions on either side of Kassarine Gap, but they also 

were insufficient to hold off the advancing enemy. In any event, 

in only a day or two, the Germans were through the Gap and well 

up into the Valley, headed toward the northwest and Tebessa. 

On the 19th, 20th and 21st of February the 9th Division 

Artillery arrived on the scene. Prior to that time they had been i 

the Vicinity of Casablanca, having participated in the invasion of 

that city the previous November. The infantry regiments of that 

division had already been brough~ to the eastern front, where 

they had been deployed piecemeal under British or American 

command from time to time. ~he fire of this artillery and 

some British battalions with their "25 pounders", plus an attack 

from the north by a British brigade known as the Derbyshire 

Yeomanry, were sufficient to blunt the force of the German attack 

Meanwhile, all the effective combat strength of the II Corps was 

turned on the German force in the Kassarine Valley, and on the 

afternoon of February 22nd, the enemy's withdrawal therefrom 

commenced, 

However, we had not been able to anticipate that such a 

happy result would come of the Kassarine Valley battle. I had 

several days previously given orders that no further shipment 

of Quartermaster supplies should be made to the Tebessa area; 

in addition thereto, I had requested unlimited numbers of empty 

freight cars in Tebessa, and we had used all of our available 

56 
l 

trucks to shuttle gasoline in 5 gallon cans from the dump to 

the railroad station, from whence the trains were moved to the 

west. In a few days time, this retrograde movement, plus the 

consumption that was being continued, had reduced the gasoline 

down to a figure below 100,CDO 6allons. I had emphasized the 

evacuation of the gasoline, rather than the food. While a 

million rations would have been a lot of food to lose, it was my 

judgment that its loss would not nearly have been as serious as 

that of the gasoline, which, if captured, might have permitted 

the Germans to make a far more substantial advance to the north, 

to the extent that they might possibly have separated us from 

Algiers and the supply ports on the Mediterranean. So serious 

was this threat on February 22nd, that Corps Headq~arters had 

previously been removed from the Tebessa area first to a place 

called El Kouif, some 20 miles north, with the rear echelon in 

a town called Morsott, about 15 miles west of El Kouif; 

subsequently, the CP was moved from these two towns to a city 

some 30 miles west of Tebessa called Ain Beda. Our bakery 

company had been moved bac~ there, and also whatever Class II 

and IV supplies we had on hand were also evacuated to this 

area. Similarly, our fumigation and bath platoon was also 

withdrawn to Ain Beda. However, by the morning of February 23rd, 

the skys were cleared both literally and figuratively. It was 

a beautiful morning, and to us it looked even better, the enemy 

was withdrawing from the Kassarine Valley, and we realized that 

the tide had turned and that we would not be likely to feel the 

strength of the German power again in the North African phase 

of World War II. 

57 
Aftermath 

The Germans withdrew back to the Faid Pass area from whence 

many of them had come, and also down to Gafsa in the southeast. 

During the next three weeks the position of both sides remained 

substantially unchanged, during which time we returned to the 

Tebessa area our Quartermaster service units and also opened 

another Class I and III railhead at Ferianna. As we re-entered 

this latter town, we received quite a set-back. The singletrack rail line from Gafsa up to Thelepte and Ferianna went over 

a relatively high bridge just between the two latter named towns. 

Either before we had evacuated those towns, or after they had 

fallen into the hands of the Germans, this bridge had been destroyed. My best judgment in the case leads me to believe that 

the decision to destroy it was that of a United States commander; 

I have never been able to learn definitely by whose authority it 

was destroyed. In any case, it was a costly destruction as far a 

we were concerned. The bridge was so high, that it would have 

impossible to have replaced it without the passing of several 

months, and the terrain was such as to make it impossible to have 

built a spur-line around it. 

Salvage 

Meanwhile, on March l, 1943, Lieutenant General George S. 

Patton, Jr., became Corps Commander, relieving General 

Prior to the arrival of General Patton, I had received a 

salvage collecting company, with which I opened a salvage dump 

Just north of the city of Tebessa. We had this salvage collecti 

company, in addition to its other duties, patrol the roads and 

pick up gasoline cans. Supply discipline had become quite 

58 

1 

'%~he po 

".1 .... •·r·· .. r· ',,,',''-';, ( 

f'ur 
( 

( 

l 

vhis latter regard, and the sloppiness had been accentuated by 

the policy of expediency which had been permitted during the 

withdrawals from Gafsa, Sbeitla, Ferianna and Thelepte, In any 

case, we did everything that we could do to police up the roads 

and to retrieve discarded or abandoned materiel, whether our own 

or the enemy. 

In this salvage operation, I have always believed that we 

went further in our endeavors than we should have. It was a 

common concept .that the Quartermaster was responsible for salvage; 

this is true, he was then and he is now. The difference in 

understanding is as to Just what salvage is. The mere fact that a 

vehicle becomes worn out or a gas-mask gets a hole in it does not 

necessarily mean that it automatically becomes salvage. No item 

of supply becomes salvage until it has been declared useless for 

any purpose by the appropriate service in question. Then, when 

it is relegated to a junk-heap, it becomes salvage and becomes a 

Quartermaster responsibility. In any case, we did the scavenging 

for all the services, brought back all types of items of supply 

to our own salvage dump, and then they sent their representatives 

there to go thru the items that we had collected. They took what 

they wanted and what they left was ours to send back to the rear. 

Reorganization 

When General Patton assumed command of the Corps, its 

strength had increased to four Divisions. I've already mentioned 

the 1st Infantry, lat Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions; we had 

gradually acquired elements of the 34th Infantry Division and, 

after the Kassarine Pass Battle, the entire division was assigned 

59 
to Corps command. The divisions were immediately reorganized, 

so that each division commander resumed control of his own 

troops - something that he had not had since arriving in the 

Combat Zone. General Patton's first project was an attack on 

the city of Gafsa. This attack was finally made on March 17th, 

but the Germans had withdrawn immediately prior thereto and the 

city was taken without any fighting. General Patton immediately 

moved his Corps Headquarters into Gafsa and we opened up a 

truckhead at what had formerly been the railroad station. I say 

"truckhead", because, as I have already pointed out, rail 

communications had been cut. After Gafsa was taken, General 

Patton ordered three simultaneous attacks. The 9th Infantry 

Division moved toward the south, to mop up any enemy resistance, 

whereas the 1st Infantry Division moved south and east to the 

city of El Guettar. Lastly, the 1st Armored Division was 

east to take the city of Maknassy. Further north in the 

vicinity of Fondouk the 34th Division was to launch an attack 

the east with the British. None of these attacks was especially 

successful. 

Shoes 

One day General Patton suddenly noticed that the shoes of 

the troops were in bad condition, owing to the rocky and sandy 

terrain, That night the G-4 relayed to me his message that the 

General wanted 80% of the troops in new shoes by the following 

night. This meant 80,000 pairs of shoes, and we had none in 

small depot stock. Thanks to a few good friends in Quartermaster echelons behind us, this was done in 24 hours. However, 

60 
( 

had the command channels allowed us transportation priority 

for Class II and IV supplies, the situation would never have 

arisen. 

El Guettar 

Meanwhile, the British Eighth Arrrry was approaching from 

the south, and a juncture between its westerly forces and our 

forces on the south end of our line was expected almost any day. 

In order to prevent such a juncture, a strong and well executed 

counter-attack was made by German armored forces against the 

1st Infantry Division at El Guettar. Although this attack met 

with some initial success, the superiority in numbers was in our 

favor, and our artillery and tank-destroyers destroyed most of 

the attacking forces before any substantial damage was done to 

our lines. 

The failure of this attack cost the Germans nearly 5,000 

prisoners of war, and immediately thereafter the junction was 

made between the British Eighth Army and our own forces. 

Immediately after this meeting, the Germans withdrew their 

forces to the north. This withdrawal permitted the British 

Eighth Arrrry to advance in pursuit of the Germans and in doing 

so they crossed our front and we were out of the conflict for 

that time. 

During the battle of El Guettar a tremendous artillery 

concentration had been developed in support of the 1st Infantry 

Division. Obviously, this concentrated artillery power meant 

a heavy expenditure of ammunition. In order to meet this 

situation, our strength in truck units had increased from 

61 
the 2 companies that we had had the previous January up to a 

force of 22 companies. While these companies were not under my 

command, they were under my control. Many of them had been 

from the three Engineer regiments that had made up the 1st 

Engineer Special Brigade back at Oran. These troops made good 

truck-drivers and the companies were well run and well administere 

They were also welcome, The truck supply of artillery ammunition 

was rendered more difficult, inasmuch as there was no other means 

of supply beyond Ferianna. In order to save time, it was hauled 

by truck from Tebessa for the 90 mile journey to El Guettar. 

ration and gasoline shipment to Gafsa had to be re-handled at 

Ferianna, which became a combination railhead and trans-shipment 

point. 

Supply Exaggeration 

It was during the Battle of El Guettar that I experienced 

a conference which made a lasting impression upon me. General 

Allen, Commanding the 1st Infantry Division, had complained to 

General Patton, the Corps Commander, as to the desperate supply 

state of his Command, Accordingly, General Patton directed 

Colonel R. W. Wilson, The Corps G-4, to invite the Division G-4 

a conference for the purpose of ascertaining just how serious 

situation might be. Lt, Colonel Clarence Eymer, the Division 

G-4, called at Colonel Wilson's office and displayed a stack of 

unfilled requisitions. Inasmuch as a lengthy one of these was f 

Quartermaster Class II and IV supplies, Colonel Wilson called me 

and requested that I report to his office immediately, which I 

did, Colonel Eymer stated in my presence that his Division was 

62 
no longer combat worthy because of the bad supply situation, 

and that it should be removed from the line in the El Guettar 

battle. Colonel Wilson asked me for my view on the matter, and 

I replied that I doubted very much that the Quartermaster supply 

situation within the Division was serious enough as to affect 

its combat worthiness. I further added, that I knew that this 

Division was probably better equipped with Quartermaster items than 

any other unit within the Corps command. Colonel Eymer flourished 

his unfilled Quartermaster requisitions and said that every item on 

them was desperately needed, without which his troops were unfit to 

fight. I asked Colonel Eymer a direct question, "Are you saying 

that every item on this requisition is so essential that its 

absence will render the Division incapable of performing its 

mission?" He replied in the affirmative. I then asked "Will 

you permit me to make any substitutions?" He answered that every 

item listed on the requisition was so essential that it would 

be impossible for substitutions to be made if the Division was to 

continue to be a combat unit. 

This was not the first experience I had had with requisitions 

for Quartermaster Class II and IV supplies from the 1st Division. 

It had been characteristic of them that they were not numbered, 

nor did they.cover any given period of time; each was simply marked 

"special". Moreover, each requisition appeared to have been 

prepared simply by copying the Quartermaster items from the tables 

of equipment, as well as from tables of individual allowances, 

upon the Form 400 . 
I then turned the pages of the requisition down to the 

letter "T". Near the bottom of the T's was listed the following 

item "Trumpet, with slide from F to G". Pointing to this item, 

(and I have forgotten how many of them were so desperately 

needed by the Division) I said "now, Colonel Eymer, are you 

insisting that the trumpets that you requisitioned must have a 

slide from F to ,Q, or will not a slide from E to F be adequate 

in order for your Division to remain in combat?" Colonel Eymer 

replied "I do not appreciate humor at the expense of my men"; butthe drama of the meeting was gone, the bubble of urgency had been 

pricked, and the lightning-oolts that he had appeared ready to 

hurl had fizzled while in his hands. At the request of Colonel 

Wilson, Eymer accompanied him into the Office of the Chief of 

Staff, where they explained the "misunderstanding". 

Burial 

All during this time, we were operating an army cemetery 

at Tebessa. This cemetery had been opened as a II Corps cemetery 

in early January, when one of our combat engineers was killed 

a rifle grenade fired during a training program. This had 

happened before. any he·avy fighting had taken place in that 

vicinity, and before more than a 'few troops had been moved into 

the area, Accordingly, he was buried in a grave on the side of 

a hill over-looking the city of Tebessa. During that first 

funeral a bugler had blown ·

11 taps", a guard of honor had fired 

its volleys, and a chaplain had given the burial service of the 

man's religious faith. It was the only formal military funeral 

64 
that I know to have taken p1a·ce in a cemetery in a forward area, 

and in itself served to be the dedication of the cemetery at 

Tebessa. 

By mid-April the work of the graves registration platoon 

was far from finished. Although the fighting was ended in 

Southern Tunisia, search parties from this platoon and from the 

salvage collecting company were required to comb the battlefields 

and the roads leading thereto, in an effort to remov~ all dead, 

enemy or friendly, and all materiel abandoned therecn. 

While these operations were going on, Major General Omar N. 

Bradley assumed command of the Corps, relieving General Patton. 

The latter went back to his I Armored Corps, which had been redesignated as the u. s. Seventh Army and was then in the planning 

stage of the invasion of Sicily. 

North 

At this time the British First Army, the Briti~h Eighth 

Army, and the U.S. II Corps, together with the French XXX Corps, 

_were under General Alexander; the commanding general of the 

Eighteenth Army Group. In his position he amounted to General 

Eisenhower's supreme ground force commander in the North African 

II Corps had not been under the British First Army since 

early March, but had been directly under the Eighteenth Army 

the interim. General Bradley immediately requested 

given a part and a sector in the c·oncluding 

the campaign against the Axis forces in North Africa. 

as there were no Axis forces left in our vicinity, the 

of his request would have meant a movement. His request 
was granted, and the American II Corps was given the nothernmost sector of the allied line, from Cape Serrat on the 

Mediterranean Coast south for a distance of some 60 miles to a 

point approximately 25 miles east of Beja. Beja was on the 

sector line dividing the U, S. II Corps from the First British 

Army, and was the site of our first command post in Northern 

Tunisia, 

This assignment meant that the entire Corps, 

of approximately 100,000 troops with accompanying vehicles, would 

be moved from Southern Tunisia up to the northern flank of the 

Allied lines. Further, this movement would necessarily 

supply lines of the British First Army. A system of excellent 

coordination was worked out between the British Movement Control 

officers, our own G-3, and my Assistant Quartermaster in charge o 

transportation, with the result that the entire troop movement 

done with our organic transportation and with our 22 truck 

companies in four days. This move I have always considered 

one of our outstanding contributions to the successful conclusio 

of the Tunisian campaign. When it was concluded we were in 

position for our final attack to the east, 

Transportation Net 

In the new Corps sector there were only two 

from the west. It needs no saying that whatever supply bases 

would support us would necessarily be in that direction. It 

appeared that the plan of the Eastern Base Section was that all 

of our Class II and IV supplies would come from Algiers, whereas 

Class I would come from the port of Bone, and Class III would 

66 
come from the small port of La Calle. However, even though 

there were two roads which ran from the west to our sector, the 

southerly road, which entered Beja directly, was denied to us and 

was reserved for the British First Army. As a matter of fact, 

that particular road ran approximately on the sector line between 

the British and American forces. This decision left just one 

road, which was a northerly road from Algiers, Philippeville, 

Bone, La Calle, and Tabarka, to Beja, thence going east in the 

direction of Mateur, The rail-net was equally simple. One railline ran from Tabarka to Djebel Abiod and then to Mateur, However, this line was never in use during our time, so no further 

mention of it need be made, The other line was very much in use 

and ran from the port of Bone to Souk-Ahras, to Souk-el-Arba, to 

Souk-el-Khemis, to Beja and thence to Mateur. This latter railroad was to supply us and the British forces. We were told that 

we could expect full maintenance in Class I and III from the 

Eastern Base Section, and that all Class II and IV supplie~, 

although being supplied from the Algiers-Bone area, would be 

shipped by train so that they might be delivered with the rations 

and gasoline. 

Logistical Support 

Inasmuch as we had no opportunity whatsoever to take-over 

the situation but were simply moving in to the area with orders 

that we would be supported by the Eastern Base Section, we were in 

a position in which we had to rely implicitly upon the assurances 

of that organization. I recall very definitely a discussion 

with the Eastern Base Section G-4, wherein I stated that one high67 
way and partial use of one railroad for the supply of a Corps of 

100,000 men, especially when large quantities of ammunition were 

likely to be used, was a somewhat slender thread. Nevertheless, 

I was assured that our supply needs would be met satisfactorily. 

Fortunately, we had the continued use of a substantial 

number of the truck companies. This Corps pool helped out 

magnificently in bringing our own supplies mainly of gasoline 

from the La Calle area forward for use by our own divisions. 

We initially commenced the campaign with Class I and III truckheads at DJebel Abiod on~he north, and with another pair of 

distribution points at a railroad station immediately east of 

Beja on our south sector line. These truckheads and railheads 

served the units of the Corps from the time of their arrival 

in the area on April 14--16th, and until after the final attack 

started on April 22nd. 

It was early in this time that a famous "daily train" 

arrived at the Class I Railhead near Beja; it was the first one 

which had been scheduled to arrive on the track, and was to have 

rations for 50,000 men. The train did carry a substantial tonnage 

of food; indeed, it had sixteen carloads of peanut-butter and one 

carload of crackers. This, together with a case of grapefruit 

Juice and a sack of flour equalled rations for 50,000 men. 

Fortunately, we were able to use Corps trucks to go back to 

Tabarka and to draw on the Eastern Base Section Depot there for 

more rations. Otherwise, the only good feature of this particular 

daily train was to impress upon the Eastern Base Section that 

68 

17 cax 

As 

.Ply po 

s1(.d 

baker, • 

Of i 

cor 

exc 
17 carloads of food did not necessarily mean 17 carloads of 

rations. In fairness it must be said that from that time on, 

all shipments of rations were in well balanced quantities. 

Railheads 

As the attack progressed, we looked for more advanced 

railhead and truckhead sites, along the two roads going in the 

direction of Mateur. However, approximately ten days later, 

and_ before we were able to effect a move of any of our 

distribution points to a good location, all Quartermaster units 

under my command were transferred to Eastern Base Section. 

However, they remained in our area for the purpose of servicing 

our troops. On our recommendation, Colonel Vere Painter, 

Quartermaster of Eastern Base Section, established a row of 

supply points on the road from Mateur north to Bizerte. These 

consisted of a ration dump and a gasoline dump, together with 

the bakery, all of which were located near Michaud, a town 5 miles 

north of Mateur. This was the final location of our Quartermaster 

installations, at the time that the Germans surrendered on 

Also, in the Michaud Area was a salvage dump 

operated by the Salvage Collecting Company. The final cemetery 

site was at El Auina, near the air-field that serviced Tunis 

_and Bizerte. 

Surrender 

Therefore, when the campaign ended, I had no installations 

command, However, the Quartermaster service at this 

time was excellent and, although we had no substantial stocks on 

69 
hand, the fact was that the Class I and III supply did come in 

regularly and requisitions for Class II and IV items were promptly 

filled, 

Prisoners 

The only troops that did remain under my command were the 

truck companies. The Quartermaster of Eastern Base Section was 

not responsible for transportation; therfore our truck companies 

remained under me. I was very thankful for this, inasmuch as at 

the time of the surrender we found ourselves with 26,000 German 

and Italian prisoners on our hands in one day. Prior to 

we had been moving them back to Eastern Base Section just as fast 

as possible, but 26,000 prisoners in one day was simply a figure 

too great to be reckoned with. Moreover, the Chief Cf Staff gave 

orders that not more than 25 prisoners would be loaded per 21⁄2 ton 

truck. This meant more than 1,000 21⁄2 ton truckloads of prisoners 

to be moved. They were put in an enclosure outside of Michaud, a 

the Engineers constructed barbed-wire fences around 

they were. The Signal Corps was asked for the loan of its posthole diggers to quickly and effectively provide latrines. We 

discovered a German ration dump near Ferryville, in which I 

estimated that there were approximately 1 million rations. I 

might add that this estimate did not allow for the careful 

balancing that we required for our own rations; nevertheless 

was enough food there to keep 1,000,000 men going for one day. 

hauled this food from Ferryville to the enclosure, where the 

Germans had their own camp organization. We simply turned the 

food over to the camp commander or to his designated officer, an 

70 

ha 

Thi 

xgood I 

two, 

e: 
they had so organized their camp that they were able to cook and 

distribute it to their fellow prisoners themselves. I might add 

that we had also found a number of German field kitchens, all of 

which were delivered to the prisoner of war enclosure and thereby 

facilitated the feeding problem. 

This captured German subsistence dump provided the basis for 

a humorous story on me. We had been moving so rapidly that our 

supplies of soap had deteriorated. The Germans had what appeared 

to me to be cellophane packages of dehydrated soap in quantity at 

this dump. I made a forced issue of it immediately to our troops 

in order that our mess kits could be cleaned after each meal. 

This was important in this hot and dusty area. 

A few days later a mess sergeant asked me what.it was. I told 

him, dehydrated soap. He said he was glad to know because when he 

put it in the G.I. can full of hot water in which the mess kits 

were to be dipped after meals, it smelled just like pea soup. I 

immediately had my good sergeant Tannenbaum translate the German 

description on the package. It turned out to be pea soup: 

The problem of water supply for the 26,000 Jrisoners was 

more difficult. They were entitled to water to drink and water 

in which to wash both themselves and their cooking and eating 

utensils. Fortunately, the Algerian-Tunisian agriculture makes 

for a good development of the grape. The Algerian grape makes 

an excellent and saleable wine. Wineries used vats, and 

wineries there were with vats in Mateur. The vats were in the 

form of huge hogs-heads, approximately 20 feet in diameter, but 

cut ln two. That is, they were actually in the form of halfbarrels, open at the center. We were able to move a number 

71 
of these vats over to the prisoner of war enclosure, where 

the Engineers faced their problem of water supply. This they 

solved by hauling water in 750 gallon tank-trucks, and then 

draining the water from the trucks into the wine-vats. 

I must add that the prisoners of war in this case demonstrated a philosophy that made them very easy to please. For 

three days after the surrender, the roads to the east of 

Michaud were clogged with German and Italian prisoners walking 

or riding on bicycles, automobiles, or motorcycles, either 

singly or in large numbers, all headed towa~ds wherever it was 

were supposed to go. Having no idea as to the latter, they were 

completely docile; the only thing they wanted from anyone was the 

knowledge as to where the prisoner-of-war enclosure was. They 

made no bones about the fact they were delighted to be out of the 

war. Accordingly, once in custody, they were well disciplined 

and no unfortunate incidents of any kind took 

Mules 

Now that all of our installations had been taken over by the 

Eastern Base Section, all of our Quartermaster troops had been 

assigned to that headquarters, and the prisoner of war problem 

was fait accompli as far as the Quartermaster was concerned, there 

remained but one loose end in Tunisia. In mid-April, shortly 

prior to the final attack, a number of our combat units were in 

highly rugged and even mountainous terrain. In these areas they 

had not the benefit of roads of any kind or description, and were 

forced to rely entirely upon pack-animals in order to be 

within their own uni ts. Acco·rdingly, we were forced to send 

officers out to requisition mules from the native population. 

72 
The latter was extremely cooperative in this regard, and the 

procedure was simple; the officer would simply call on the local 

caid in a given city, and he would round-up all spare mules, 

following which he would order their turn-over to our representative. The mules were used with success for the balance of the 

campaign. Nevertheless, when the end came, it was necessary that 

they be returned to their rightful owners. 

Physically this presented very little problem, inasmuch as 

we simply put the mules on trucks and drove the trucks back to 

their original localities, where they were turned over to their 

aimers. Fiscally it was a problem. Unfortunately, whereas to 

us a mule is a mule, to an Arab a mule is a personality, and 

returning Just any mule to a former mule-owner was an inadequate 

completion of the contract. While there was some small demurrer 

to this disappointing end of the bargain, the fact was that they 

had not been paid; the contemplation of handsome profits of 

$1,00 a day per mule was enough to keep the several mule-owners in 

a state of mind which induced them to be reasonable with us. Then, 

literally, came the pay-off. After the surrender, two of my 

officers were detailed to draw from the Finance Officer sufficient 

cash, in French francs, with which to pay for the rent of these 

mules. The drawing of the cash was simple, but the stashing of it 

was something else, These thousands of franc-notes made a pile 

Large enough to displace an ordinary Jeep seat cushion and one of 

them was obliged to sit on it in the Jeep in order to hold it down 

all the way from the Michaud area to the various areas in which 

it was distributed. 

73 
They went to the five or six cities from whence the mules 

had been drawn and in each case located the~ and paid him off 

with no difficulty. However, in the City of Souk-el-Arba 

cation arose. The mules had been paid for at the rate of 

per mule per day, which was our contract price, This amounted to, 

as I said previously, $1.00 U. s. per day. We were fortunate in 

being able to return the same number of mules that we had requisitioned. (Luckily, there had been no losses owing to disease, 

or anything else.) In this particular locality we had taken 

19 mules at 50 francs per day for a total of 24 days. A fair 

arithmetical answer to the aggregate cost of this transaction woul 

have been 22,800 francs. This amount was tendered in script of 

the realm to the~- He, however, was not a purist in his 

thinking. He magnanimously advised our officers that they could 

call it a flat 22,000 francs. The latter, having visions primar11 

of explaining for some months to come to the Finance Officer why 

they were able to turn back 800 francs in change on a 22,800 

contract, and secondarily of the legal possibility of our 

Government being embarrassed by settling a contract which called 

for a liquidated sum for an amount less than that sum, stood pat. 

The Caid explained that, after all, to his people what did the 

800 francs mean? When our officers replied that from the appearance of his city it looked as though they would mean a good deal, 

said that his people didn't understand arithmetic anyway and 

·would take whatever he gave them and accept it as 

they were entitled to. He also added that they were getting 

money than they had ever seen in their lives anyway. In any 

74 
( 

event, after much haggling and some 30 minutes of bickering ::,a·}i.< 

and forth, our own officers refused to accept any change and 

finally succeeded in getting the Caid's receipt for the full 

amount of cash. ~o this day I have speculated as to just how much 

cash per mule per day any mule-owner in Souk-el-Arba realized 

net from that transaction. 

75 
Relizane 

V 

SICILY 

While this mule paying-off was going on, the II Corps 

Headquarters personnel mounted their trucks and vehicles and 

moved off towards the west, arriving finally in the city of 

Relizane. Relizane was located on a highway approximately 60 miles 

south and east of Oran and about 20 miles south of the Mediterranean 

coast. It was a pleasant and clean town, after the unattractive 

vistas in Eastern Algeria and Tunisia, and represented a certain 

breath of civilization to us. However, we had no sooner found 

our quarters before we were informed of our next op~ration --

Sicily. It was then May 20, 1943. The Sicilian invasion was 

scheduled to take place some seven weeks later, on July 10, 1943. 

However, in this operation, for the first time, we were to be 

under a higher headquarters for administrative as well as tactical 

control. The Seventh Army, formerly the I Armored Corps General 

Patton commanding, was in charge of the operation for all purposes. 

The Sicilian operation was to be undertaken by the British 

Eighth Army under General Montgomery and the United States Seventh 

Army under General Patton. Over both of these Armies was the 

reorganized Fifteenth Army Group, under General Alexander. As a 

practical matter, the Fifteenth Army Group was a redesignation 

with an enlargement in personnel of what had formerly been the 

Eighteenth Army Group during the Tunisian campaign. The British 

Eighth Army was to be composed of both British and Canadian 

77 
divisions. The United States Seventh Army was to be divided into 

two principal commands, namely the II Corps, commanded by General 

Bradley (whose promotion to Lieutenant General had just been 

announced at the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign) and what 

was called the Provisional Corps, commanded by Major General 

Geoffrey Keyes. 

Divisions 

For the operation, the II Corps was initially to be composed 

of the 1st and 45th Infantry Divisions, the lat Ranger Battalion,. 

the 13th Field Artillery Brigade, and the 19th and 39th Engineer 

Combat Regiments, together with supporting troops, The Provisio 

Corps was to be organized on similar lines, with its main 

being in the 3rd Infantry Division and Combat Co~nd "B" 

2nd Armored Division. At sea in floating reserve would 

Force Kool", composed of the balance of the 2nd Armored 

In addition, the 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to make an 

airborne assault on the Island on the night of D-Day, following 

which it would be in Army reserve. 

Supply Plan 

The tactical plan of the operation called for the British 

Eighth Army to land along the southeast tip of the Island 

vicinity of Siracusa and on Beaches both to the north and 

thereof. Meanwhile, the II Corps was to make simultaneous 

landings along the southern side of the Island with two task 

forces. The 45th Division, commanded by Major General Troy 

Middleton, was to land in the vicinity of Scoglitti. This was 

to be our easterly force, whereas, the 1st Infantry Division, 

78 

I 

7 

<iBase 

J 
( 

( 

( 

under the command of Major General Terry Allen, was to land 

at Gela. Meanwhile, the Provisional Corps was to make landings 

in the vicinity of Licata and Agrigento. 

Upon learning the tactical nature of the operation, I 

visited Seventh Army Headquarters at Mostagnam, which was only 

about 30 miles from where we were located in Relizane. Colonel 

Clyde Massey was the Army Quartermaster, and he explained to 

me that all units would land in Sicily with 4 days• rations in 

their possession. These rations were to consist of at least 

1 day's individual ration, that is "c" or "K;" ration, and the 

balance could be drawn of a type at the option of the unit 

commander. Seven days' of cased operational rations were to 

accompany the assault troops as cargo; that is, a &even day 

supply for all troops in the assault. On D/4, another 7 days' 

rations for all troops ashore were to be landed, and on D/8, a 

third shipment of 7 days' rations for all troops ashore were to 

be landed. All of these rations were to be either 10-in-l rations 

or "C" rations. 

Regarding Class III, a contemplated 7 days' supply of 

gasoline for all vehicles ashore was to be landed in 5 gallon 

cans on D-day, and, similarly, another shipment of 7 days' supply 

for all troops ashore would be landed on D/4, and a third shipment of 7 days' supply for all vehicles ashore on D/8. Subsequently thereafter all supplies would be shipped by Mediterranean Base Section as requested by Seventh Army through Headquarters Fifteenth Army Group. Quartermaster Class II and IV 

supplies would commence to arrive on D/4 in modified balanced 

79 
lots of clothing and equipment, for beach dump distribution, 

Previously to D/4 the only Quartermaster Class II and IV shipments 

would be what were called "combat-packs". These consisted of a 

water-proof bag about the size of a barracks-bag, in which was a 

,45 caliber pistol with 3 clips of ammunition, a pistol-belt, a 

helmet complete with liner, a·set of clothing with extra socks, 

a carton of cigarettes and, in general, the clothing and QM 

equipment for one man. 

After this Quartermaster plan for the invasion had been 

explained to me, it was pointed out that in eight days• time 

they would have 21 days• supply landed on the far shore. I 

suggested that according to my own arithmetic, 7 days• supply 

thoae ashore on D-Day plus another 7 day supply fo.r those ashore 

on D/4, plus a third 7 days• supply for those ashore on D/8 did 

not equal 21 days• of supply at any time. I suggested that 

possibly a greater quantity of both rations and gasoline might 

be requisitioned if shipping permitted, and pointed to my own 

experience at Arzeu where we had exhausted our 7 days• supply of 

rations within 4 days. My comment, offered simply as a suggestio 

was ignored. 

Consequently, I had no planning responsibilities whatsoever 

for the Sicilian operation, the entire administrative duties 

having been assumed by Seventh Army. My own responsibility would 

be to disseminate the logistical data from a Quartermaster viewpoint thru normal channels and to report on our situation thru 

Quartermaster channels to Seventh Army. 

Needless to say, there were no troops assigned to us. 

80 
( 

·• 

Embarkation 

Toward the end of June, ships and LST's were loaded with 

troops, vehicles, and supplies -at the ports of Oran, Algiers, 

Philippeville, Bone, and Bizerte, and assembled in the Gulf of 

Tunis. There they waited for approximately a week, prepared 

to make the 24 hour trip to the beaches of Sicily. On the 

afternoon of July 9th they moved out and that evening went into 

a storm that was severe enough to cause the Force Commander to 

question whether or not the invasion should go according to plan 

or should be postponed. Nevertheless, the decision to invade 

was not changed, and the operation went off on schedule. 

Enemy 

At that time there were approximately six Italian divisions 

in Sicily, together with elements of four German divisions. The 

Italian divisions were largely of the "coast defense" type, 

which meant that they were not mobile, and that their personnel 

were not of the healthiest type. On the other hand, the German 

troops on the Island were of a decidedly different caliber in 

every way. For one thing, they were mobile; secondly, they did 

not appear to be lacking anything in the way of health and physical 

stamina; and thirdly, they were trained to fight until the end 

and were definitely not surrender-minded. 

Assault 

While the actual landings were accomplished with considerable 

success and very little difficulty, ,the mobility of the German 

armor showed itself just a few hours later on a plain just north 

of the town of Gela. Here the 1st Infantry Division received 

81 
a first class counter-attack from tanks of the Herman Goering 

Panzer Divison, which counter-attack was stopped by the most timel 

arrival ashore and speedy going into-action of the 1st Division 

Artillery. 

The landings along all of the beaches having been consolidate 

the troops established liaison along their flanks and 

ward. On the night of D-Day, the airborne attack was scheduled 

to take place. Our C-47 planes, loaded with paratroopers, came 

over at about midnight that night, and I watched them with the 

greatest of interest from the beach. Their arrival along the 

shoreline followed a raid by Luftwaffe planes, which had stirred 

the anti-aircraft defenses both on land and sea to considerable 

nervousness. Although it was well known among the Staff that the 

airborne invasion was to take place at this time, 

information had not been disseminated to a degree where our own 

gunners were expecting our own planes at that time and place. 

The result was unfortunate, inasmuch as it was my sad 

experience to watch twenty-seven of our own planes shot down by 

our own anti-aircraf-t fire on tl).at night. The survivors of 

d.isaster were unable to accomplish much in the way of good, although several days later sufficient of their number were reorganized so as to be used as a holding force on the 

of the Seventh Army line. 

Engineer Brigade Supply 

The principal beach dumps established ashore 

Army sector were at Gela and at Licata. Although the Quartermaster dumps at those locations were operated by Quartermaster 

82 

Su 
, 

( 

units, the control and command of the dumps was exercised by 

the commanding officer of the 1st Engineer Brigade, This was not 

unanticipated, as it had all been announced prior to the invasion, What I had not anticipated was that this command and 

control over supplies would continue to be vested in the Brigade 

Commander throughout the entire Sicilian operation. The G-4 and 

chiefs of supply services of Seventh Army had simply delegated 

their complete operational responsibilities to this officer. 

Such a plan had, I know, worked with considerable success in 

the island campaigns of the Pacific Ocean prior to that time and 

subsequently thereto. However Sicily is not Just a small atoll 

by any means. It is an Island of some 30,000 square miles in 

area, but except for certain areas bordering the c-0astline, it 

is almost entirely mountainous. Indeed, it is so mountainous that 

brand-new pairs of Quartermaster shoes were wearing out on 

infantrymen in as short a time as a few days, Hill-crests, defiles, 

valleys, and ridges make up virtually the entire terrain of the 

Island. While distances were short by a straight line, this factor 

meant nothing in supply operations. I have in mind an example 

of one unit whose trucks took 26 hours to make a 60 mile supply 

haul, 

Subsequently, the Engineer Brigade began to ship supplies by 

a rail line that covered the Island in a general way. Nevertheless, 

the task of supplying all of the U.S. Forces on Sicily was 

simply too much for the Brigade; our strength at the time the 

operation ended was approximately 150,000 troops, too many for a 

brigade of a few thousand men to maintain. The fact was that the 

83 
trains simply didn't arrive -- no matter how good the intention 

had been in deciding to use them. Fortunately, after the initia 

beach phase on Sicily, the Seventh Army Quartermaster attached 

two truck companies to me as II Corps Quartermaster. 

I used myself to go back and haul supplies from the Army beach 

dumps to the Army truckheads. Had they not been used in this 

manner, I have no doubt that some of our units might not have 

able to accomplish their tactical missions because of lack of 

essential supplies. 

Conclusion 

The Sicilian campaign lasted 37 days, at the end of which t 

the Island had been secured and whatever Germans had been on it 

were either killed or captured, or had evacuat~d themselves onto 

the Italian mainland. Corps Headquarters were moved to a deligh 

ful town on the northern coast of Sicily called "Termini Imerese 

where we lived in an olive grove again, went swimming regularly 

the warm waters of the Mediterranean, and relaxed and wondered 

what our next assignment would be. 

Critique 

In looking back upon the Sicilian campaign, I am again fore 

to the conclusion that I had reached at the end of the Tunisian• 

campaign, namely, that there was lacking any organized system 

of supply coordination. The principal function of the 

Army: G-4•s seemed to be to initiate and publish administrative 

paragraphs for the field orders. No more than that was done by 

the Technical Services, including my own. The result was that 

the staffs on these levels were in the position of mere liaison 

84 
( 

( 

officer. Further, there was not enough work to do for the 

other members of the Quartermaster Section, or of any other supply 

section on Corps or Army level. On the other hand, the personnel 

of the 1st Engineer Brigade were overworked to a point wherein 

they were unable to accomplish their mission. This I do not 

consider to be their fault in the least, as their mission was 

simply far too large and far too great in its scope for any 

brigade, as I have already pointed out. They were attempting to 

do the jobs that the Corps and Army Staffs themselves should 

have done, and this attempt was unsuccessful. 

Meanwhile, the extreme confidence shown by the Army Staff 

in the Engineer Brigade permitted the Staff to lose control of 

the supply picture as it progressed. Specifically, 0n two 

occasions within the first fourteen days of the operation, 

emergency requests were sent by Seventh Army Headquarters to 

Mediterranean Base Section for the shipment of more rations from 

Africa. Within~these first two weeks several million rations 

were shipped to Sicily by the Mediterranean Base Section ports 

for a force which did not exceed 150,000 men -- all shipments 

being over and above what had been requisitioned. This was 

simply a reflection of the fact that the Army Staff had not 

followed the arrival, storage, and distribution of these supplies, 

and the Brigade Staff itself had been numerically incapable of 

doing so. The result was that the Class I operation had gone out 

of hand, and, had not the North African parts been as near as they 

were, a far more serious situation might have existed. 
I mention these facts as background for a converse that 

became very strongly fixed in my mind and that influenced my 

plans to a substantial extent in the future. The converse was 

that, in order for a supply operation to work effectively, the 

technical service responsible for each particular type of supply 

must keep its finger on it and must follow it closely in all of 

its ramifications. Inasmuch as the responsibility is that of 

the chief of technical service on the tactical force staff, he 

cannot delegate it to a subordinate command, but must face it 

himself either personally or through his own assistant staff 

officers. 

86 

·.· Lt. 

Lt. 

· .. Lt. 

···we J 
( 

( 

' 

( 

VI 

INTERIM RESOLVES 

In early September General Bradley was notified of his 

transfer to England, where he would take command of the 

United States First Army for the European campaign. 

The General had transferred with him approximately 

25 officers and 60 enlisted men from II Corps Headquarters. 

This group was from all services and staff sections, and 

was designed to be a nucleus of experience which would be 

seeded within the First Army Headquarters. 

Among those with us who later were to serve on the staff 

of the First Army Commander were: 

Colonel Benjamin Dickson Assistant Chief of staff, G-2 

Colonel Truman Thorsen Assistant Chief of Staff, 

Colonel Robert w. Wilson Assistant Chief of Staff, 

Colonel Damon Gunn Assistant Chief of Staff, 

Colonel Samuel L. Myers Deputy Chief of Staff 

Colonel c. E. Hart Artillerr Officer 

Lt. Colonel William Carter Engineer 

Lt. Colonel Grant Williams Signal Officer 

Lt. Colonel J.B. Medaris Ordnance Officer 

With me to the Quartermaster Section I was permitted to bring 

2 officers, l warrant officer, and 3 enlisted men. 

G-3 

G-4 

G-5 

We left Sicily by plane for Algiers on September 12, 1943. 

Our morale was very high. General Bradley and Brigadier General 

w. B. Kean, his Chief of staff, had flown back to the United 

States for conferences in Washington and for further 

87 
implementation of the First Army Headquarters. The rest of us 

anticipated a few weeks of leisure in Algiers, followed by a 

comfortable boat-ride (we hoped) back to England. All of us 

were proud to have been chosen for this new assignment and 

looked forward to it with the greatest enthusiasm. Upon reporting at Algiers we found that there would be no water-borne 

transportation to England available for two weeks, so that 

was nothing for us to do except rest and meditate. During these 

two weeks, I was able to review in my mind my experiences in 

functioning as a field force Quartermaster during the 11 months 

last past. In thinking of the future, all I knew that it held 

in store for me was that I was to be designated the Quartermaster of the First Army, which would be the Ameri,can invasion 

force across the Channel into France; beyond that I lalew not. 

Nevertheless, I realized, after having reviewed the experiences 

of the last year, that this was the time to do my thinking. 

It would be in abstract terms perhaps, but it would also be 

my planning for the future to as far an extent as possible. 

In this period of reflection, as well as of thinking for the 

future, there were five conclusions to which my reasoning 

pointed. These were as follows: 

(l) I was extremely hopeful that the organization 1n 

our rear, that is, the organization to which we would look for 

support, would be strong, responsive, and one which would have 

confidence in my own organization. I realized that I would 

have little to say about this organization itself, but I well 

knew how extremely important it would be to our own operation 

that it be one in which my entire confidence could be well plac 

88 

ar. 

""' 

;,f\:rmy 
(2) I would be the individual who would be personally 

responsible for the success of the operation of the First Army 

from a Quartermaster viewpoint. Whereas any personnel failure 

might be the fault of people other than myself, either directly 

under me or in support of me, nevertheless I would be the one to 

answer for it to the Army commander. Therefore, I determined 

that whatever happened of a QM nature within the Army area would 

be under my direct control, I did not wish any other command, 

or any troops other than those who were under my command, to 

have any part in the Quartermaster operation within the First Army. 

Specifically, I did not wish any other echelon of command to 

operate First Army QM installations. These installations would 

be opera~ed by troops under my own command, for whom I would be 

completely responsible. Further, it was my concept that the 

supply agency supporting us would have the duty of laying down 

its ·supplies in bulk in our area for the entire Army. It would 

be my responsibility to see that they were distributed within 

the Army area to all units whether they be divisions, corps 

troops, Army troops, or Air Force or Communication Zone units. 

(3) Under existing TO&E, an Army Quartermaster Section 

was allowed 24 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 57 enlisted men. 

This heavy numerical strength had been allowed the Quartermaster 

Section for a definite purpose, and this purpose could only be 

fulfilled satisfactorily in the event that the officers, in 

particular, be given certain designated responsibilities with a 

minimum of interference from anyone. The responsibility of 

supervising Quartermaster service for a field army was far more 

89 
than any 1, 2, or 3 men could share within themselves. I was 

determined that as long as we had 24 officers 1n the Quartermas 

Section, these responsibilities would be shared in 24 several 

separate fractional interests. 

(4) I was determined that the relationship between 

the Army Quartermaster and the Quartermasters of the several co' 

and divisions, respectively, within that Army would be as pleas' 

ant and congenial as possible, but would nevertheless be relati 

in which not only would the Army Quartermaster have exclusive 

responsibility for Quartermaster service, but also the Quartermasters in subordinate commands would be unable to challenge 

his meeting of those responsibilities. I was particularly 

determined that under no circumstances.would any division or 

corps Quartermaster go around the Army Quartermaster in any 

supply problem. For example, it had happened on numerous 

occasions in North Africa that a division Quartermaster would 

send his trucks hundreds or miles to the rear without the 

knowledge or the Corps Quartermaster and without any authority. 

whatsoever, other than his own initiative, for the purpose or 

attempting to draw fresh meats or some other luxury - or necess 

ties - for his troops. Even though I could excuse the division 

Quartermasters for the urgency of some situations in Africa, 

I was not able to excuse a system or supply which permitted 

them to be 1n these positions. After pursuing this thought, 

I could see no reason why any corps Quartermaster should have 

an operational part in an Army supply picture. It seemed to 

90 
;er 

,ns 

:ime that with the Quartermaster facilities and services being 

under Army control, a corps Quartermaster's part should be 

advisory within his own command, as well as toward the Army 

Quartermaster. Moreover, if the corps Quartermaster were 

to operate, it would merely lead to conflict in conceptions 

of duties, and therefore, in the executions thereof. 

(5) The practice of supply discipline seemed to me 

as being of paramount importance. In Tunisia, where clothing 

and equipment were never in copious supply and were frequently 

in short supply, I remember seeing one division Quartermaster 

move 9 truckloads of shoes at one time. It was simply a 

division reserve, none of which had been authorized by any 

headquarters. I recall another division Quartermaster who had 

to borrow 14 trucks from the corps motor pool in order to 

help move his Quartermaster Class II and IV "depot". Here 

again, no such depot, stock, or reserve had been authorized 

the divisions by any echelon of command. 

I was also extremely conscious of the tendency of division 

Quartermasters and of unit supply officers to ignore the 

meaning of a ration. Specifically, I had in mind that the 

ordinary over-draw of rations within the II Corps was at 

least 15%. That is, to 100,000 troops we generally issued 

115,000 rations or more per day. At worst, this meant that 

a substantial amount of food that civilians at home are 

standing in ration lines to buy was going to waste, or, at 

best, it meant that some units were eating 15% per man more 

than other units who might be doing the same work or engaged 

91 
1n the same combat. In any case, it clearly meant a sloppily, 

if not dishonestly, administered system of supply within the 

units of the command. 

Having come to these conclusions, my meditations were 

punctuated by the receipt of a cable which summoned the Corps 

Engineer, Signal Officer, Ordnance Officer, and myself to 

England by air immediately. We departed at once, flying to 

Ma.rrakech, 1n French Morocco. Here the weather compelled us 

to wait for three days before our journey could be resumed. 

Of all the places in Africa where it would be desirable 

to be stranded for three days, I can imagine no place more 

suitable than Ma.rrakech. The hotel ordinarily used by itinerant members of our armed services was filled. With many 

apologies to us, we were relegated to the Villa Taylor, a 

rented palace lifted from the context of "A Thousand and One 

Nights." A private swimming pool, sun baths, good books, and 

good food made those three days all too few. 

92 

UNIT: 
Overlord 

VII 

ENGLAND, 1943 

On the fourth day we arrived in London, where we returned 

to reality with considerable abruptness. We were given the plan 

for "Overlord" to study. At the same time we were given to 

understand that the First Army would consist of three corps, 

and of six infantry divisions and two armored divisions, making 

a total of eight divisions. Upon this premise, we were directed 

as a first step in a formation of the Army to outline our own 

troop requirements for each service. 

QM Troop Requirements. 

The reqUired QM troop list, as I saw it, based upon the 

capacities •Of the units according to tables of organization 

and based upon my own experience as to these capacities, was 

as follows: 

UNITS 

Railhead Companies. 

Gasoline Sup-ply Companies 

Service Companies 

Truck Companies 

Troop Transport Companies 

Laundry Companies (SM} 

Bakery Companies (M} 

Tanlt-Truck Companies 

Fumigation and Bath Companies 

ARMY 

7 

5 

16 

28 

9 

5 

5 

4 

2 

93 

EACH CORPS TOTAL 

0 7 

l 8 

l 19 

2 34 

0 9 

0 5 

0 5 

0 4 

0 2 
UNITS 

Salvage Collecting Companies 

Salvage Repair Companies 

Sales Company (M) 

Refrigeration Companies (M) 

HQ and HQ Det. QM Group 

HQ and HQ Det. QM Battalion (M) 

Petroleum Products Laboratory 

HQ and HQ Det. QM Battalion 

~ 

3 

3 

l 

2 

3 

9 

l 

2 

EACH CORPS TOTAL 

O 3 

0 

0 

0 

0 

l 

0 

0 

3 

l 

2 

3 

12 

l 

2 

The total number of troops in such a command would approximate 22,000 officers and men. My theory in developing this 

troop-list was that there would be one large Quartermaster Army 

Depot, together with a number of Class I and Class III distributing points, be they railheads or truckheads, in support of 

the several corps. One large group would operate this depot 

as well as the truck transportation to the truckheads. In 

addition, there would be an Army motor pool, consisting of two 

groups of truck companies. In this connection, I should mention 

that a troop transport company was a truck company by another 

name. 

Further, for each corps I had contemplated one Quarterma.ste 

battalion, consisting of two truck companies, one service compa 

and one gasoline supply company. The truck companies and the 

service company were for the purpose of permitting the corps 

Quartermaster to meet what I know would be daily demands for 

trucks and labor, without necessitating his referral of these 

94 
demands to the Army Quartermaster. I tentatively added the one 

gasoline supply company to each corps Quartermaster battalion, 

because I .considered that each armored division should have at 

least one such company in its direct support, although the 

company would ranain an Army unit. In order to discount the 

advance of these gasoline supply companies from the 

strength, I thought it well to have the three 

asoline supply- companies serving under the several Corps 

rtermasters, thus also becoming acquainted with the corps 

termaster officers and procedure. My justification for 

s troop-list was accepted by the First Army G-4 and the 

of Staff; it was then up to me to arra:nge to 

troop units assigned to us by the Theater Quartermaster. 

Major General Robert M. Littlejohn, who, together with his 

ff, had 'been so helpful to me during the planning of "Torch" 

-- remained as Chief Quartermaster of the European Theater of 

Immediately upon having been designated for this 

•- gnment in early 1942; General Littlejohn had planned the 

ly of' the US Forces in the United Kingdom from Washington, D. C., 

hen took with him to Europe a group of carefully selected 

ers who became the nucleus about which he built his organiThey had initially organized their headquarters in the 

Cheltenham, a resort that had been fashionable for hot 

al baths during the Victorian Era. They also organized a 

ng headquarters in London, and it was from this headquarters 

uch of' our planning in connection with Operation "Torch" 

95 
had been done. Specifically, it was in this headquarters that I 

had worked out with General Littlejohn's officers the maintenance 

factors for Class II and IV supplies that would be used during 

the early phases of the operation. [i say "early phases" because 

after the first few weeks following the landings, all supply for 

North Africa was scheduled to come from the United State~ Though 

most of General Littlejohn's officers had only arrived in England 

at about the same time I had, in early July, 1942, they had not 

only organized a system of operating depots in England that 

summer, but had also been able to mount successfully the "Torch" 

Operation. DUring the period of nearly a year while 

Mediterranean 'rheater, this organization had expanded and 

to a point where they were prepared to supply and~service the 

force of nearly-one and one-half million American troops who 

were scheduled to be shipped to England prior to and during the 

early stages of the invasion of France. 

The detail of this planning was such that as each unit 

arrived in England, it received its initial issue 

equipment (under Tables of Organization and Equipment) as soon 

as it reached i~s home station. Full maintenance in all types 

of Quartermaster supplies was at all times available upon 

requisition. Inasmuch as the normal time between the submissi 

of a requisition upon the Quartermaster of the New York Porto 

Embarkation and the actual delivery of the supplies 

tioned to troops within a theater was approximately 

nothing could b~ left to guess; details of a most meticulous 

nature had to be envisioned, considered, worked out, and just 

fied before any requisitions were sent back to the United sta:. 

96 

sCff 

I 
ntenance 

ur1ng 

. d not 

t 

Torch" 

5rown 

; the 

rmaster 

oon 

1sion 

of' 

.uisiths1 

ttes. 

By this time, General Littlejohn had built-up his planning 

staff in London. As a result of their imagination, deep-thinking, 

responsibility, they were able then, some eight 

the scheduled time of the invasion, to give me a 

for their support to us on any invasion and follow-up 

Communications Zone Coordination • 

It was to General Littlejohn that I took my proposed 

•· Quartermaster troop-list for First Army. General Littlejohn' s 

acceptance of this list was not without some demurrer inasmuch 

as he expressed the opinion that he considered I was usurping 

responsibilities. I explained to him the operational 

plan that I had in mind and especially emphasized the fact that 

I would be looking to his Quartermaster organization in our rear 

· for alert and com1tlete responsiveness to all of our requiremen'cs. 

I pointed out that within the Army area I would be fully responsible for the distribution of Quartermaster supplies as well 

as for the performance of QM service. I explained to General 

Uttlejohn that in my experiences in North Africa and in Sicily 

I had been obliged to work on a shoe-string, and that, in my 

opinion, I had not been able to give the troops the Quartermaster 

service to which I felt they were entitled. Further, I had not 

been able to have adequate supervisory personnel for the troop 

units that I had, having had only one battalion headquarters at 

any time, and that was used for the administration of our few 

truck companies. It was my intention that in a prolonged 

97 
continental campaign full use should be made of salvage 

companies, salvage repair companies, and fumigation and bath 

companies within the Army area. Further, I considered that the. 

baking of fresh bread should be done as close to the 

as possible. One thing I especially did not wish to see was 

valuable shipping space used for the movement of loaves of bread 

a distance of possibly several hundred miles from the Connnunications Zone to the using units, while a shipment of flour and 

other bread ingredients would consume much less space if made 

bakery companies in the Army area. Moreover, the bakery 

companies could supply-bread that much fresher to the troops. 

I also contemplated that it was my responsibility to see that 

items of officers' clothing should be made available for sale 

to officers of the First Army through a Quartermaster Sales 

Store located in the Army Depot Area, implemented by mobile 

units visiting the corps and division headquarters from time 

to time. 

Most important, @ie topic of Graves Registration had always 

been one of particular concern to me. I considered that it was 

exclusively an administrative responsibility of the Army, and, 

specifically, of the Army Quartermaste~ This responsibility was 

not merely to see that our own dead and those of the enemy or 

Allied troops were in fact buried, but also to see that faithful 

and accurate records were kept of these burials not only as to 

their locations, but also as to the identities and causes of death 

in each instance. This was a matter concerning which I felt that 

98 
s 

as 

nothing less than a perfectionist's viewpoint would be suitable. 

It was not that I felt that under the supervision of Colllll1unications 

Zone it would be done to any less degree, but I did feel that from 

Army Headquarters the responsibility and the performance of the 

same could be far better supervised and administered than from 

elsewhere. 

I also explained to General Littlejohn my concept as to the 

use of corps and division Quartermasters, and stressed the fact 

that my plan for Quartermaster operation would exclude them from 

these responsibilities. Conversely, according to my theory, he 

and his staff would be dealing directly with me and I, in turn, 

would deal with the corps and division Quartermasters, thus 

eliminating direct dealings between the communications Zone and 

multiple Quartermaster collll!1ands within the Army area. 

General Littlejohn agreed to accept both my proposed troop 

list on a tentative basis, as well as my modus operandi. These 

basic fundamentals having been agreed upon, I and my fellow 

staff members then moved to Bristol, in southwestern England; 

here the First Army Headquarters was to be housed in the buildings 

of Clifton College. By 11 housed" I mean that the offices and 

rooms actually to be occupied by headquarters would be in the 

College, while we would be billeted individually in houses 

surrounding the College grounds. 

Reorganization of Army HQ. 

On October 8th, the balance of the officers and enlisted men 

from the II Corps arrived in Liverpool by ship. There they were 

99 
met by General Kean, the Chief of staff, and they immediately 

boarded a train which took them to Bristol. 

In moving into Clifton College, had it not been for the 

commendable state of army discipline, an eviction suit would 

have been necessary in order to oust the personnel of Headquarters V Corps. This Headquarters had been here for nearly 

a year, and had acted as the senior Army ground force headquarters in England. During this time they had, understandably 

enough, taken some root in that area, particularly in the 

vicinity of Clifton College. Therefore, it was not without 

some degree of personal disappointment that they departed 

this pleasant city upon our arrival; but depart they did, and 

on October 18th the main body of First Army Headquarters 

arrived by ship (at Grenoch), from where they traveled by train 

down to Bristol. Thus there was formally constituted the 

Headquarters, First U. s. Army, in the European Theater of 

Operations. 

QM Units. 

The next task for us was the reception and meeting of the 

Quartermaster units which were coming into the Theater and whic 

themselves were to comprise the Q,M comnand of the First u. s. 

The actual reception and housing of these units was done by 

the Commanding General of Services of Supply, through his 

appropriate base section commanders. However, as soon as 

possible after their arrival I had individual officers of my 

Section call upon them formally. 

100 
.n 

,h 

rmy. 

Upon the occasion of these calls, the comrnanding officer of 

the unit would be briefed as to the administrative and supply 

cedure in England, following which he would be instructed to 

prepare at once a training program for his unit. This training 

program would then be submitted weekly to my office for approval 

by me, Needless to say, where a unit was i.mder a battalion or 

group headquarters, training programs at battalion or group 

'level, when appropriate, were submitted for the entire command. 

Meanwhile, I made it a policy to have one officer from my 

section inspect units on every day of the week. This assignroster system, and after each inspection 

.a detailed check-list; was submitted to me as to the status of 

training of each unit. The check-list further included comment 

as to the respective abilities of the officers of the company, 

Md the general over-all proficiency of the unit. I instructed 

my officers to be particularly circu.,1spect on these inspection 

trips and to make their calls in an effort to do everything 

possible to assist the unit in any problems that it might have. 

Very often my officers were able to be of considerable help, 

especially in assisting or• expediting the obtaining of needed 

unit equipment;. 

In the case of those Quartermaster battalions that were 

with the several corps, the Army Quarter-master officers inspected 

them after clearing with the corps Quartermaster in each instance. 

I lmow that these particular units were inspected far more frequently by the cor-ps Quartermaster and his assistants, the corps 

QJ,l having command over those units for all practical purposes. 

101 
Although assigned to First Army, these battalions were attach 

to the several corps and customarily wore the shoulder patch o 

the corps to which they were attached. 

Rankin "C" 

In the fall of 1943, the First Army Staff was briefed on 

what was then a TOP SECRET plan :known as "RANKIN c". 

the German reverses in Africa and Sicily that summer and, considering the pressure being exerted in Italy by the Fifteenth 

Army Group, considering the tremendous losses the Germans had 

suffered in their Russian compaign, and, lastly, considering 

the tremendous beating the German cities and industries were 

taking from our daily air raids, there appeared to be reasonable grounds to anticipate, at least as an enemy capability, 

the collapse of Germany. Inasmuch as there was this definite 

capability, appropriate thought had to be given as 

be done in the event that that happy ending should take place, 

• 

Accordingly, RANKm Chad been prepared by the Combined Chiefs 

of Staff as the over-all plan for the peaceful invasion of the 

European continent. 

From a humane point of view, RANKIN C was ideal. From a 

logist,ical point of view, it was strictly a nightmare. It 

called for shipment to the continent of some nine United States 

divisions, through the Port of Le Havre, following which the 

divisions would deploy first across France and then, as simultaneously as possible, into Germany. The Zone of Occupation 

for the United States forces was to have been substantially 

the same as it was in 1945 after our troops were withdrawn 

102 
• 

3 

s 

The extreme difficulty of fulfilling the 

ns envisioned by this plan was in the field of transportaWe had to assume that the continental railroads would not 

perational for at least thirty days. On the other hand, we 

'that we did not have sufficient trucks in the theater to 

divisions about Europe suddenly, and, at the same time, to 

Another material difficulty in having to put the 

into effect on a short notice was that instead of having 

.'e United States divisions in the British Isles, there were 

}'that time only three; one of which (the 29th Infantry) was 

England, and the other two (the 5th Infantry and 8th Infantry, 

er Headquarters XV Corps) being in Northern Ireland. 

Ours not having been to reason why, the two officers and 

ant officer who had come with me from the Mediterranean and 

frwent to work and implemented Plan RANKIN C from an Army 

We spent days and hours working out necessary tonges of Class I, III, and II and I:V supplies that would be 

.. needed to maintain this operation and also made our recollllllenda-

. tions as to the order in which our Quartermaster troops should 

be lifted to the continent. The fact that most of these troops, 

90% of them, had not yet arrived in England did 

,not deter us in the least from facing the reality of the 

However, once this arithmetic was done, the plan was 

simply put on file. 

The existence of the RANKIN C Plan in the Quartermaster 

Section, meant that we had TOP SECRET papers and maps in our 

possession. Under theater regulations we were required to keep 

103 
these documents in a separate room, to which only persons classi 

fied for TOP SECRET information had access. An armed guard was 

required to be posted at the door of this room 24 hours per day, 

every day of the week. This TOP SECRET room was in my own office 

which I shared with the other officers who were also classified 

as TOP SECRET. I did not like this division of our Quartermaster 

Section, because the majority of the officers were not 

as TOP SECRET and, therefore, were denied the right to call at 

my office. However, we were shortly to need this room 

ect far more serious than RANKIN c. 

Shortly before Christmas of 1943, G-2 reported that launching 

platforms had been observed along the French shoreline and that 

they indicated that some type of a rocket or self-propelled missil 

would be launched therefrom. Further, the sighting of' these plat-. 

forms made it appear the principal targets of these missiles would 

be the two cities•of London and Bristol, respectively. Up to this 

time, no such weapons had been used during World War II. While 

these launching platforms received the immediate attention of 

our Air Force, General Bradley considered that the matter was 

serious enough to merit reconnaissance for an alternate site 

for an Army command post to be used in the event that enemy activity should make the City of Bristol impracticable for that purpose, 

Accordingly, I was detailed to make this reconnaissance and spent 

several days traveling about southern and western England, exam~ 

ining the capabilities of the numerous cities for use as possible 

104 

M
C :si,-

.s 

.y, 

'ice, 

d 

ter 

ied 

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Neptune 

It was during my absence that a staff meeting was called one 

night by the Chief of Staff• to be attended by the chiefs of the 

general staff sections and of the supply services. One of my 

officers attended this meeting as my representative. It was 

truly a historic meeting inasmuch as on this night General Bradley 

personally outlined the First Army part in the invasion of Normandy 

(called Operation "Neptune"). The General explained that "V" beach 

(subsequently known as Utah Beach) and "O" beach (subsequently 

!mown as Omaha Beach), would be the two immediate objectives 

of the U. s. Forces. 

He went on to describe the huge naval armada which would 

carry the troops across the Channel 1 and the operations of the 

Air Force in preparing the Normandy Peninsula for our landings. 

He pointed out the drop locations of the 82nd and 101st Airborne 

Divisions, which were scheduled to take place on the night before 

D-Day, and were designed to cut-off the Cherbourg Peninsula. 

General Bradley pointed out that on the morning of 

June 5, 1944, the beaches would be assaulted by an Allied force 

consisting of the British Second Army and the First u. s. Army, 

under a combined headquarters to be known as the Twenty-First 

Army Group. This headquarters would be commanded by General 

Montgomery. The British Forces, which would consist of both 

British and Canadian divisions, would be to the lef.t of the 

United States Forces. 

The larger of the two u. s. beaches was 11 0" Beach, which 

would be assaulted by the V Corps, which, in turn, would use the 

105 
1st Infantry and 29th Infantry Divisions as its assault forces, 

Meanwhile, "U" Beach would be assaulted by the VII Corps which, 

in turn, would use the 4th Infantry Division as its striking 

force. General Bradley pointed out that for the first time 

the use of "DD" tanks would take place and explained that 

were ordinary Sherman tanks in what appeared to be canvas bathtubs thru which propellers were mounted. He explained that they 

would be able to be floated in from a landing-craft to the 

without requiring the landing-craft to come to the beach. 

General Bradley further explained the construction and use 

of the "Mulberries", which was the code name for the two large 

artificial docks. Each was to be made of large blocks of concrete, which were to be towed across the Channel in sections 

and then assembled, one on Omaha Beach and one in the British 

sector. He also explained the use of the proposed "Gooseberry" 

on Omaha Beach. This was another code name for an artificial 

breakwater that would be formed by a number of old freighters. 

They would go to Normandy, discharge cargo, and then form in 

line approximately a mile from the Beach, where their crews 

would be evacuated and their sea-cocks would be opened. Because 

of the shallow depth of the water at that point, their hulls 

would rest on the bottom and enough of each ship would be above 

the surface so as to form an artificial breakwater for the 

protection of the beaches. 

General Bradley further stated his own minimum requirements 

for combat troops, including artillery, antiaircraft, tanks, 

106 
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, 

e 

tank-destroyers, chemical warfare units and barrage-balloon units • 

These were to fill out the assault divisions as the minimum troops 

tobe landed on D-Day or D/1, as the case might be. He further 

explained that he would permit the Corps Commanders to use their 

discretion as to the priority of the lifting of these units, but 

that they represented his own minimum ideas. He also explained 

that Engineer Shore Brigades would be used on the beaches for 

the off-loading of the lighters and landing-craft, and also, by 

the use of DUKW's, for the off-loading of ships themselves. {iie 

added that for the first day or two, supplies would simply be 

dumped right on the beaches, and no more elaborate logistical 

plans would be required for that brief periodd With these 

premises in mind, General Bradley requested the supply services 

to state the minimum troops of each service to be lifted to the 

beaches on D-Day. The Quartermaster representative replied that 

his suggestion would be for 1 graves registration platoon to be 

landed on each beach, and for 2 truck companies to be landed on 

Utah Beach for each of the two Airborne Divisions. This of 

course would mean four truck companies going in on Utah Beach. 

General Bradley's reply was that the truck companies would take 

up a good deal of space, and that he had already turned down 

tentatively a comparable recommendation by the Army G-4 for 

truck companies to go across the beaches on D-Day. The Quartermaster officer invited the General's attention to the fact that 

s the two Airborne Divisions had absolutely no transportation of 

~- their own, other than jeeps. And that, unless some transport 

were provided for them, they would be without any trucks whatso107 
ever, unlike other divisions. General Bradley stated 

that explanation, he would do everything in his power 

these truck companies would be carried on the D-Day list. 

initial troop requirements from each of these 

alone having been submitted that evening, the meeting was concluded. 

Planning 

Innnediately after January 1st, a First Army planning staff' 

was organized in London, in a row of buildings known as Bryanst 

Court. This was a row of identical looking houses, built wallto-wall, with no side-yards or walks between them, all of dark 

red stone construction. There were about ten of these houses 

in this row, and from the outside, the block appeared to be 

just another middle class residential street. What no outside 

observer would have known was that the entire row of houses were. 

all connected by a corridor that ran right thru from one end to 

the other. 

In Bryanston Court, General Bradley had two planning staffs. 

One was our own -- that or First Army Headquarters -- while the 

other was the planning staff of what was then called the First 

A:rrrry Group. This latter organization subsequently was redesignated as Headquarters Twelfth Army Group. The Army Group was to 

be General Bradley's Headquarters when the time came that more 

than one United States army would be operational on the Continent 

of Europe. Its part in the planning of the invasion of Normandy 

and of the operation NEPTUNE was, at this time, largely that or an 

observer. 

108 
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ent 

In any event., I went to London, together with one of my 

officers and two of the enlisted men who had come from the 

Mediterranean Theater. There our initial problem had to do with 

tonnage. Naturally, the entire logistical plan for the operations on both Omaha and Utah Beaches was to be the responsibility 

of the First Army -- both in its concept and in its fulfillment. 

this problem was in connection with the shipping 

tMt would be required to lay on the Normandy Beaches two days' 

Class I and III supplies by the night of D-Dayl Our assumptions 

were to be that the landing force on Omaha Beach as of D-Day 

would be 50,000 troops, whereas the Utah Beach force would 

number 30,000. Corps and Division Commanders were authorized 

to strip down strengths of the forces both as to units and as 

to their vehicles. Therefore, we knew that all T/0&:E vehicles 

would not go ashore on D-Day on either Beach. Nevertheless, 

we were to assume that all vehicles would move 25 miles per day 

for the first 14 days, and 50 miles per day thereafter. 

Regardless of the probabilities as we saw them, it would 

be necessary for us to have this two day supply for the full 

force. We were not able to bank on probabilities, but only on 

certainties as well as we could see them. However, we were 

not permitted to use such convenient round numbers as 50,000 

and 30,000 troops. On the contrary, we were given a list of 

units by designation and, referring to T/0&:E strengths both 

of vehicles and men, were obliged to use these figures, which 

aggregated substantially less than the 50,000 and 30,000 

estimates that I have already mentioned. Referring then to 

109 
\ 

the master plan for the support of Overlord and Neptune, which 

had been prepared by the Office of the Chief, Quartermaster, 

we were able to obtain the factors that they had used as to 

weights of appropriate rations and Class III supplies. 

these weight and cubage factors to the troop lists, as 

able to determine them by the use of T/o&E's, we arrived at the 

tonnage figures by arithmetic. The difficulty with the problem' 

was that, inevitably, hardly more than 24 hours went by when 

there was not some change, and I mean a substantial change, in 

the projected troop-lists for D-Day. Almost always the change 

would be in the form of an increase in the troops going ashore. 

Therefore, as relatively simple as this problem in arithmetic 

had initially appeared to be, the changing figures necessitated 

a daily practice session in arithmetic on the part of myself 

and my group. 

To furthe~ stimulate our practice in multiplication and 

division as the days wore on, the G-4 of the Army was able to 

obtain more and more "lift" in the way of freighters, landingcraft, coasters, and barge~ including literally almost anything 

that could float across the Channel. And as each one of these 

"bottoms" was made available to us, that meant a further 

re-shuffling of the figures as to the amount of tonnage that 

would be shipped across the Channel for D-Day. Thus was spent 

the month of January, concentrated on the initial tonnages for 

the assault forces and illD'llediate follow-up. After a few weeks 

spent in attacking the problem in this manner, the planning 

directive became stabilized to the extent that by D/14 a four 

110 

re
lg 

eserve of all Quartermaster supplies was scheduled to be 

ded and on hand on each Beach. Further, this reserve was 

increased to a fourteen day level by D/41. Requisitions 

Jan troops on the continent up thru D/14 were to be pred and submitted by the Quartermaster, First Army. Requisi-

' s for all First Army units to the exclusion of all other 

'ps from the period from D/15 thru D/41 were to be prepared and 

tted again by the Quartermaster, First Army; meanwhile, 

ing this same period, requisitions for all other troops ashore, 

ther they be Communications Zone, those of the Third u. s. Army, 

.Air Force, were to be prepared and submitted by the Quarterter of the Advanced Section Communications Zone, who would 

mit his requisitions directly upon the Chief Quartermaster, 

Needless to say, the requisitions of the 

rst Army Quartermaster were also to go to the Chief, Quarterster, Communications Zone, but thru the Quartermaster of the 

dvanced Section Communications Zone. 

A detailed account and narrative of this planning is published 

the First United states Army Report of Operations from 

20 October 1943 to l August 1944, in Annex No. 14, pertaining 

o the Quartermaster Section. This is particularly set forth 

on pages 125 thru 131 of this Annex, together with the appropriate Appendices therein referred to. 

As we have previously stated,~ off-loading of cargo and 

reception of the supplies on the Beaches had been the assigned 

responsibility of the Engineer Special Brigadesl On Utah Beach 

111 
the First Engineer Shore Brigade would operate, while on 

Beach the Fifth and Sixth Engineer Shore Brigades, under the 

Provisional Engineer Brigade Group, were charged with the 

operations. Each of these Brigades had their own organic 

Quartermaster railhead and gasoline supply companies, 

had their organic truck companies and Quartermaster battalion 

headquarters·for the administration of their Quartermaster troo 

Inasmuch as the Army Quartermaster Depots for Class I and III 

supplies, respectively, would initially be in these beach dumps 

of the Brigades, I had a very genuine interest in the training 

of their Quartermaster troops. I might add that this posed a 

problem of some delicacy in our understanding with the several 

Brigade Commanders. These officers very naturally were jealous 

of their command prerogatives over their own troops. It was at 

no time my intention to interfere with those prerogatives. On 

the other hand, I had a definite responsibility in the manner 

in which those depots were to be operated. After conferences 

with the several Brigade Commanders and their appropriate staff 

officers, we worked out an arrangement whereby their own units 

would operate our dumps and would be subject to Brigade Command 

for all administrative purposes, but would be under our instructions as far as the policy and management of the dumps might be 

concerned. This was a satisfactory procedure as far as I was 

concerned, but it still left undone the training of the Brigades' 

Quartermaster Units. Accordingly, we arranged with each Brigade 

Commander that we would have a Quartermaster battalion headquarters attached to his brigade during the initial stages of 

112 
t 

i 

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e 

e operation, and that this battalion commander would act as 

my liaison officer. The mission of the Quartermaster battalion 

headquarters in each case would be to transmit training data 

from my Headquarters to the Quartermaster units of the brigades 

in advance of the operation, and, after the landings, to receive 

the numerous Quartermaster units which were scheduled to arrive 

and to assign them to bivouac areas. In addition to these 

the battalion commanders were to act as my representaany other contingencies which might reasonably be 

to arise. 

These Battalion Headquarters were selected with much care 

on our part, and left to join the Brigades in their training 

areas at once. 

SOP's 

At this time, the uniformity of training of all QM units 

of a similar kind that would participate in the First Army 

operations became self-apparent. To attain this end, we prepared and disseminated a series of standard operating procedures 

for Quartermaster units. These are referred to and described on 

pages 128 of Annex No. 14 to the First Army Report of Operations 

during the period above referred to, and are therein duplicated 

as appendices. 

In this connection, neither of the Engineer Brigades had 

assigned to them a Quartermaster depot supply company. Because 

I felt that only this type of a Quartermaster company could 

receive and issue Class II and IV supplies properly, I made 

arrangements with each of the Brigade ColD!llanders to move all 

113 

I 

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1 

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Class II and IV supplies to a Class II and IV depot inland from 

each beach, which depots would be operated by our Army Quartermaster depot supply companies, In order to alleviate this 

problem, and, because I felt that the first few days of an 

operation was no time when Class II and IV supplies should be 

handled over a beach, we requisitioned no supplies of this 

class during the first four days of the invasion. (Even then 

only the Beach Maintenance Sets referred to in the Annex No, 

of the First U. s. Army Operational Report were ordered,) 

Nevertheless, this timing proved to be good, and when the 

II and IV supplies did arrive they were received directly by 

our depot supply companies. 

Amphibious Training 

During the early spring of 1944 amphibious exercises were 

being held as a matter of routine practice off the southern 

coast of England. During these exercises, troops would embark 

from the southern English ports onto LST's and other transports, 

on which they would be carried out to sea for a day or so and 

then would be brought back off the English coast and unloaded 

into landing-craft, which would then carry them ashore. In the 

case of the LST's, they themselves would come to the beach and 

drop their noses. In order to stimulate training and also to 

increase the awareness of QM troops as to what they might expect 

in a cross-Channel operation, I instructed my Operations and 

Training Officer to make arrangements for certain Quartermaster 

units to undergo this type of exercise. As I have previously 

stated, most of our Quartermaster units of a supply type were 

114 
t 

ating in the depots in Southern and Western England for 

Therefore, any unit which could receive 

,benefit of these landing exercises would necessarily be 

Accordingly, arrangements were made and several Quarterster units did go through these exercises. on one particular 

ercise a salvage repair company was participating and, while 

ships were out at sea, a fleet of German "E Boats", the 

me used for high-powered torpedo-carriers, swarmed in and 

our convoy, sinking one troop-carrying ship. This 

in the death of approximately 30 men of the salvage 

By mid-April 1944 the planning phase for operation 

eptune was concluded. It was at this time that we realized 

so that nothing more could be done in 

he way of anticipating what might happen after the landings 

Demolition Charges 

It was at this time, that I was able to be -of small 

assistance to one of the other supply services. Colonel 

William Carter, the First Army Engineer, came to me with a 

problem, which was of importance to the entire landing operaFrom intelligence sources, we knew of underwater 

obstacles the Germans had placed along the beaches. These, 

for the 1arge part, were huge steel burrs, shaped like large 

models of the jacks with which children play. The purpose 

of these obstacles was, of course, to wreck or to.obstruct 

115 
the path of any ship or landing-craft as it approached the 

beaches. So formidable were they that the very first body of 

troops scheduled to go ashore was an Engineer demolition group, 

whose sole mission was to destroy them. 

In any case, Colonel Carter told me that he was able to 

find no suitable containers for the explosives that would be 

used by his demolition men, and he inquired as to whether there 

might be anything in Quartermaster lines which would be suitabl 

I suggested that he try some salvage socks. We had a shipment 

of salvage socks sent to us from one of the Quartermaster depots 

in England, and they worked most satisfactorily as containers 

for the charges of explosion. Some time later, Colonel Carter 

accused me of having given him socks with holes in the feet, 

but we were able to dispose of that complaint by explaining 

that unless a sock had a hole at each end no Engineer would 

be able to put it on anyway. 

staging Areas 

Meanwhile, large areas in southern England, near the sea 

coast and port facilities, had been turned into camps as a 

staging area. A tremendous operation was undertaken in order 

to effect this change and to maintain the staging area according to the plans that had been made for its use. This entire 

mission was done by the Connnanding General of Southern Base 

Section. Needless to say, one of the most responsible elements 

of the operation was that of the Quartermaster. The Chief 

Quartermaster of the European Theater of Operations had assigned 

Colonel F. Chapin Weed as Quartermaster of the staging Area. 

116 
Colonel Weed, a most capable officer at all times, was meticulous 

and imaginative in his planning and thorough and energetic in his 

performance of those plans. The result was a magnificent job in 

preparing units and troops for shipment across the Channel. 

Probably one item that impressed the troops more than anything else that they experienced in the staging Area was the 

menu, The Chief Quartermaster of the Theater had directed 

Colonel Weed that, inasmuch as the feeding facilities on the 

far shore might be somewhat irregular for a while, the troops 

that passed thru the Staging Area were to eat well. As a result, 

fried chicken, steaks, and apple pie ala mode were staples in 

the diet as long as the troops were in the area. 

The First Army Staff prepared its own Administrative 

Instructions Preliminary to Mounting, in which the Quartermaster 

Appendix filled in the QM details. These instructions are . mentioned 1n Annex No. 14 of the First u. s. Army Report of 

Operations from 20 October 1943 to 1 August 1944, on page 131, 

and the QM Sections are set forth as Appendix No. 12 from 

pages 207 thru page 215 of said volume. 

Barrack-Bags and Duffle-Bags 

In these Quartermaster paragraphs for the Administrative 

Instructions it was clearly specified that troops of Infantry, 

Field Artillery, Tank, Tank-Destroyer, and Reconnaissance units 

would not be equiped with duffle-bags; instead, they were to 

have what were called blanket-rolls, in which only a very few 

small items of personal clothing would be carried (i.e., socks, 

handkerchiefs, a suit of underwear, etc.). (Reference Annex 

117 
No. 14 to First Army Report of Operations 20 October 1943 to 

1 August 1944, page 209.) This decision had been made by me as 

a result of observation as to what had happened to the old 

barrack-bags {the predecessors of the duffle-bags) in Oran, 

Tunisia, and Sicily. 

As I have earlier pointed out, every man going into Oran 

had two barrack-bags. If he did not carry them per'sonally, 

they had to be carried on vehicles for him. Thus, many 

trucks were used for this purpose when they might otherwise 

have been carrying more valuable cargo. 

I could not disagree with the fact that these bags may 

have served some useful purpose in the vicinity of Oran, 

because that city quickly became one in which only Class A 

uniforms might be worn. However, when the movement to Tunisia 

was made, there was nothing Class A about any of the towns 

along the East.Algerian-Tunisian border. In fact, no field 

duty ever came closer to being field duty, Consequently, the 

blouse, wool, o. D., the neckties, the extra trousers, the 

caps, service, etc., became utterly useless appendages for 

everyone. Had the troop-units retained their barrack-bags, 

and at the conclusion of the campaign distributed them again 

so that the original clothing contained therein would be 

delivered to the individual to whom it had originally been 

issued, still in good condition, even then the use of these 

bags might very well have been justified. However, this was 

not the case; as soon as they reached the Tunisian area, the 

combat units immediately asked for a place in which to store the 

118 
Inasmuch as there were no storehouses, warehouses, 

other accommadations, in the entire Tunisian area, we were 

them back to Constantine, Algiers, or Oran. 

e in storage, the barrack-bags became anonymous casualties 

the Tunisian Campaign. In most cases, the units that had 

red them never again resumed interest in them, and they were 

ply left in storage indefinitely; in the cases of those few 

its which actually did take the trouble to go back at some 

e, and get them out of storage, the contents of the bags 

ere so damaged by mildew and dampness that very little was 

therefrom. In brief, no good had come of the barrackIn 1943 and 1944, troops crossing the Atlantic for England 

equiped with duffle-bags, the successor to the barrack-bags 

d an improvement thereon. Nevertheless, the duffle-bags 

ere still heavy baggage as far as combat troops were concerned. 

herefore, because (1) of the transportation problem presented, 

(2) of the fact that I knew that there would be no storage 

facilities available on the Normandy Beaches, or in any city in 

close approximation thereto, and (3) of the fact that experience 

had shown that a slow but sure manner of changing clothing from 

the classification "serviceable" t.o "salvage" was to store them 

in duf;f'le•ba·gs" (or barrack-bags,) for any appreciable period of 

time, I had written·:t_hes.e provisions into my Quartermaster Plan, 

in tUl'!l; _ had been incorp.or~ted into the administrative 

and, as such, approved. by the Army commander thru his 

Chief of Staff. 

119 
However, when the First Army's "Administrative Instruction' 

Preliminary to Mounting" were published and disseminated in the 

spring of 1944, they left no doubt that we were very serious 

about this matter of duffle-bags for combat troops; indeed, 

provided expressly that the items which would ordinarily be 

carried in a duffle-bag would, in the case of these five types 

of combat units, be turned in without replacement while 

were in the staging areas. Some surprise was expressed over 

these provisions by some combat commanders; however, at no time 

thereafter did I regret having inserted them into the First Army' 

administrative policies. 

Departure 

In the early morning of May 30, 1944, certain individuals 

were up and stirring unusually early around Clifton College in 

Bristol. At five o'clock that morning, some 15 officers met 

for breakfast in the mess, although the conversation at the 

breakfast table was somewhat sparse. On the night before we 

had packed our foot-lockers and suit-cases, the former to be 

placed in storage and the latter to go with the main part of 

Army Headquarters as baggage. We had also packed our beddingrolls and musette-bags, thus disposing of all our worldly 

belongings. The bedding-rolls were picked up to go with our 

motor transportation, and by the time we had had breakfast all 

that any of us had 1n the way of personal baggage was a 

mussete-bag, a filled canteen, a gas-mask, and the other 

accouterments worn on our pistol-belts. 

120 

1 

i
.e 

. Inunediately after breakfast, we, together with a similar 

er of enlisted men in the Army Headquarters, mounted sedans 

'command cars and drove in a convoy to the city of Falmouth 

. ,Southwest England. 

Here at Falmouth we were divided into three groups, each 

of which embarked on an I.ST. I and one or my enlisted clerks 

another Quartermaster officer and a clerk were 

·· a second, and a Quartermaster Warrant officer and a clerk 

These I.ST's were to be our homes until D/1, 

twhich time we were scheduled to debark and organize Army 

· eadquarters ashore. 

Although we were fully conscious of the awful responsibility 

ahead of us, the time on the I.ST's made for a fine 

rest. Our last days in England had been lived under 

some pressure, but aboard those ships we had nothing to do but 

eat good Navy food, supplied by the Quartermaster Corps of the 

ETO, get plenty of sleep, read novels and play cards. The weather 

in Southern England was delightful, and the days passed most 

pleasantly under the circumstances. 

121 
English Channel 

VIII 

OVERLORD 

On the afternoon of June 6th the I.ST's commenced to move. 

They headed south and then turned to the east when they were 

several miles off-shore. In turning to the east we found ourselves a part of a steady and endless precession of ships. The 

ships around us were I.ST's, ICI's, headquarters ships, cargo 

ships, and hospital ships, with destroyers, cruisers, and 

carriers in the distance in every direction in which we looked •. 

When darlmess fell that night, we were midway out in the Channel 

( and several hours later were well aware that we were in a 

l 

war, inasmuch as the German Luftwaffe ca.me overhead on a 

bombing raid agafnst us. Anti-aircraft guns of all calibers 

fired at the planes from positions about us, with the result 

that the air became full of falling fragments and spent 

bullets. One of the Headquarters Company lieutenants on our 

LST was struck in the back of his calf by one of these falling 

bits, and had to be transferred to a hospital ship on the 

following day. 

Omaha Beach 

Daybreak the following day found us off Omaha Beach, 

~ watching our Naval guns pound the beach fortifications as they 

fired over our heads. It was plain that the attack had not ,i: 

been as successful as it had been planned. Indeed, geysers of 

sand and smoke were arising all along the beach; at first I 

123 
thought that these were caused by our own troops touching off 

enemy mines. Then I realized that there were no troops in the 

areas in which these explosions were taldng place. No amount 

of wishful thinking could alter the fact that the Germans were 

shelling the beach. I then noticed spouts of water occasionally 

rising out among the ships, and the further realization came to 

me that the Germans were also doing their best to shell us at 

sea. There was very little that we could do about this, and 

all day the IST's moved up and down the coast from Omaha Beach 

to Utah Beach, and back. 

Meanwhile, landing-craft and DUK.W's were scurrying back 

and forth from the ship to the shore, moving troops and supplies 

as fast as they could. Long lines of troops could be observed 

moving from the beaches themselves inland along the very few 

beach exits. overhead our planes patrolled constantly, and it 

• 

was with much sadness that we noted one of them falling into 

the sea, and another plummeting to earth just beyond the beaches 

after having made a strafing run. The fact that our planes were 

strafing just a few hundred yards beyond the bluffs which overlooked the beaches, indicated clearly that the enemy was not 

far inland. 

[inasmuch as the enemy was that close to the beach, the area 

that had been selected as the site of the First Army CP would 

necessarily still be in enemy hands. Consequently, our plan 

to go ashore on that morning was suspended. Later on the afternoon of D/1, I sent a message to one of our other IST's and 

instructed the Quarterlllaster officer aboard to go ashore at 

124 

tot 

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Qua: 

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Cl 

we 
daybreak on the following day, to survey the situation, and then 

to return and report to me on my LST before nightfall. I was 

particularly alarmed over unconfirmed reports that heavy casualties 

had been afflicted on the Quartermaster troops ashoreJ 

At about five o'clock that afternoon of D/2 he reported 

tome on my LST, and informed me that he had visited both the 

· VCorps Quartermaster and the Quartermaster of the 29th Infantry 

Division, but that neither of them had any information about any 

Quartermaster casualties. Inasmuch as they were 1ri contact with 

all Quartermaster activities ashore, I was understandably 

relieved to hear this. 

He reported further that our own artillery was firing from 

• positions just beyond the beaches, which meant that the front 

line was not far away. He had estimated 500 dead lying on the 

beach. ~ecause of t;.he difficulty of digging decent graves in 

sand, I had instructed the Quartermasters of the invasion Divisions 

and Corps, as well as the graves registration platoons that 

accompanied them during the early days of the operation, that no 

burials were to be performed on the beachl 

He also reported la~ge numbers of prisoners of war being 

evacuated out to ships at sea, and that the treating and evacuation of our own casualties was proceeding well. Supplies of 

both Class I and Class III were coming ashore and, although not 

~ in large quantities, the latter Class appeared to be sufficient 

to keep the vehicles moving temporarily. We had planned that the 

Class I dumps would not open until D/2, and the troops ashore 

were so busy on D/1 that they were subsisting on the individual 

125 
rations that they carried or the reserve rations that were 

brought ashore in the organizational kitchens. It was reassuring to know that our plans were being followed at least 

in this early and moat critical stage. 

Debarkation 

On the afternoon of D/3 the First Army Headquarters at 

sea went ashore. By this time, the Germans had been cleared 

from some fields near the little French town of Grand Campe, 

which had been designated in advance as the first location of 

our CP. Shortly before our LST's commenced to move, a few 

German planes had come overhead at a high altitude. Regardless of' their altitude and the fact that they dropped no bombs, 

they drew a terrific a.mount of anti-aircraft fire. 

Consequently, there was the usual falling flak and dropping 

of spent bullets. One of the latter, probably of incendiary 

type, had struck a stack of cans of some kind of lubricant in 

an Ordnance motor shop on the beach where vehicles were being 

de-waterproofed. Whatever was in the cans connnenced to burn, 

and the burning caused smoke, and the smoke smelled. As the 

breeze wafted this odor up and down the beach area, some nervous individual did not recognize the smell, and growing panicky, 

cried "gas". By this time our three LST's had dropped their 

ramps and were approached by what were known as "Rhino" f~rries. 

These Rhinos looked like long pieces of structural steel bound 

together, but, strangely enough, they floated. They were just 

broad enough to accom~e a truck or a passenger vehicle of' 

126 

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standard wiqth, and at the sterns they had diesel engines mounted. 

As each one of these ferries approached the ramp of an LST it was 

made fast, following which the vehicles on the LST were driven 

onto the Rhino, which in turn propelled them right up and onto the 

beach itself. 

We had been watching the proceedings ashore with much interest 

as we were going thru this process, and, upon reaching the beach, 

we were amazed to see American soldiers running for their gas-masks 

and putting them on. Although we were skeptical about the entire 

thing, we donned our gas-masks, mainly because the military police 

stationed at the beach exits told us to do so. We noted that the 

splotches of yellow paint on the hoods of our motor vehicles had not 

changed in color, which they would have done had they been exposed 

to poison gas • 

Once ashore, our vehicles from First Army Headquarters followed 

the prearranged road net from the beach exits to the site of our 

CP at Grand Campe. On reaching there we dug slit trenches for 

ourselves, ate our K-rations, and spent our first night ashore. 

Beach Operations 

On the following day, I went back to the beach and inspected 

the several Class I and Class III dumps that were in operation. 

As I knew would be the case, all of the rations were of the 

C, D, K, 1O-in-l and 5-in-l types, with some hospital supplement 

• packs. I had requisitioned no other kind of rations for the first 

, sixteen days. In any case, the piles were growing larger and 

larger, and the issues were not heavy enough to detract from the 

reserve that was being piled up. A similar situation existed in 

127 
Class III, and ther~ were several tidy stacks of cans of gasoline, 

oils and greases. The troops operating these dumps were the railhead companies and gasoline supply companies of the Fifth and 

Sixth Engineer Special Brigades. It was heartening to note that 

the efforts we had spent in preparing them with SOP's were reflected by the organization that they had in their areas, plus a 

high degree of enthusiasm that was being shown by officers and men 

alike. 

I visited the V Corps Headquarters, and observed that the 

309th Quartermaster Railhead Company, which had been scheduled 

to land on D/2, was ashore and its members were being used by the 

V Corps Quartermaster for the purpose of collecting and burying 

the dead. I had not understood why the Quartermaster of that 

Corps had phased a railhead company ashore at that early date, but 

did not question pim, as it was the Corps' prerogative to phase 

whatever troops they wanted ashore during those early days. In 

any case, I was willing to acknowledge that, although a railhead 

company was not intended for this purpose, I was glad that they 

were getting on with the important work of burying our dead. 

~ then went down to the beach itself, and, contrary to all 

my instructions, I found a cemetery started by the graves registration platoons that were attached to the Engineer Brigades. I was 

not able to countermand the orders given by the General who commanded the Provisional Brigade Group. However, they buried 

487 American dead in the sands of the beaches, and each body was 

disinterred by us just three days later and buried inland in the 

cemetery that had been started by the V Corps~ 

128 

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However, I well remember some French civilians laying flowers 

on the graves of those American soldiers even at that early date. 

By this time, the landing-craft and the DUKW's were coming 

ashore in swarms, and the beach area was alive with trucks, tanks, 

and long files of troops. Overhead were the barrage balloons• and 

as far as we could see out to sea were the transports and ships of 

~n the u. s. and British Navies. 

Beachmaster 

I located the office of the Beachmaster for Omaha, in a large 

concrete gun emplacement that until a few days before had been 

~ used by the Germans. There were present three or four American 

officers, one of whom was the Beachmaster. I knew that it was 

his function to keep in touch with both the ships at sea off-shore 

1t and the G-4 of First Army• for the purpose of effecting landing 

priorities and coopdinating arrivals of troops,· vehicles, and 

cargo. As I observed the room, it became apparent to me that, 

although their liaison with the Army G-4 was good, I could not 

see what coordinating influence was being exerted on the ships 

off-shore. I do not doubt that there was some kind of a liaison 

between the Beachmaster thru the u. s. Navy to the ships, but it 

•a- was difficult to be perceived. 

This observation on my part is probably predicated largely 

upon a conversation that I overheard in that office between the 

~ Beachmaster and Lt. Colonel James Matthews, who commanded an 

Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division. Colonel Matthews' Regiment had been landed on that day, but it had been separated from 

its heavy weapons. I am sure that this separation would never 

129 
have taken place had anyone surmised that the Regiment would go 

into the line on its first day ashore. However, Colonel Matthews• 

Regiment had been ordered to go into the line that night, and he 

was pleading for assistance from the Beachmaster in his efforts 

to find his heavy weapons. Matthews knew the numbers of the 

in which the vehicles with these guns were. In spite of his 

and persistent, although patient, pleading, the Beachmaster kept 

repeating that there was nothing that he could do to help him. 

Knowing what the mission of the Beachmaster was, I was surprised 

to hear this admission of helplessness. I could see nothing more 

important than landing those weapons at once, but not one thing 

was done to achieve this end. Matthews• Regiment was collllllitted 

against the enemy that night and a few days later he was killed 

1n action. 

Army Control 

On D/7, I, as Army Quartermaster, took over the operation of 

all Quartermaster installations ashore on Omaha Beach. On the 

previous day, another detachment of the first echelon of Arrrry 

Headquarters had arrived ashore, and our original group was augmented by a dozen more of the officers of the Quartermaster 

Section. In taking over the installations, there was no change, 

as the Class I and III dumps of the Engineer Brigades became in 

effect the Army Quartermaster Class I and III depots. The troops 

operating them remained under brigade command, as had been 

months previously; meanwhile the dumps had always been under our 

direct control regarding policies and operations. 

130 
>NS' 

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ips 

rm 

t 

Utah Beach 

Meanwhile, we had very little information as to developments 

on Utah Beach. Colonel Paul Warfield was the Quartermaster of 

VII Corps, and we had unlimited confidence in his ability and good 

Judgment. Nevertheless, some 6,000 Army Quartermaster troops 

together with vast quantities of' Quartermaster supplies were coming 

in over this Beach, and we were anxious to effect a very close 

liaison with the operations there. 

Only on D/6 had contact been made between the troops on 

Utah Beach and Olllaha Beach when the V corps and VII Corps were 

linked together. Therefore, on D/"r I ordered two Assistant 

Quartermaster officers and one enlisted man to proceed to Utah 

( Beach, where they were to take over all Quartermaster operations 

as my representatives. Meanwhile, the Army G-4 had advised the 

G-4 VII Corps tha~ the Army Headquarters would assume control of' 

>i' all supply operations on that day. 

,s 

,ed 

l 

The trip by jeep from Ol!laha to Utah Beach was not without 

incident on that morning. The road from one beach to the other 

crosses the Douve River at a little town called carentan. As 

their jeep approached this River, they found the northbound 

traffic congested by a column of tanks of the 2nd Armored 

Division. These tanks were standing motionless on the roadway. 

Undaunted, they passed the column and came to the bridge 

• across the River. It was at that moment that they heard sounds 

overhead which reminded them of the days that they had spent ➔ 

in the target pits on rifle ranges. The column of tanks was there 

for the purpose of attacking the town, and with an alertness that 

131 
was something more than characteristic, the officers• jeep 

turned around and sped off in the direction from whence it 

came. Jeeps were not constructed to lead tank attacks. However, 

they were able to cross the River on a pontoon bridge some 

2000 yards to the northeast, although this detour cost about 

45 minutes in time. The main bridge at Carentan remained 

under enemy artillery fire for the next three weeks and was 

the scene of many deaths. 

On reaching Utah Beach, they reported to the Corps Quartermaster, and then went to the Beach Maintenance.Area, where they 

had a tent pitched (as their CP) in the QM Class II and IT 

Depot. Nearby were Class I and Class III dumps, and immediately 

adjoining the Class II and IT dump was the salvage dump. 

The Quartermaster units operating these installations were 

all bivouaced in fields nearby, and other fields were reserved . for the use of those Quartermaster units which would soon be 

arriving ashore in that area. A telephone line was installed 

in the CP tent, and inspections of the installations were made, 

following which they reported to the VII Corps Quartermaster 

that they were in business. 

Truckheads 

The VII Corps Quartermaster requested them to open up 

Class I and III Truckheads at two points inland from the Beach. 

This was done with railhead and gasoline supply companies on 

D/8, and on that day the Army Quartermaster officer called a 

meeting or all Quartermaster troop commanders on Utah Beach. 

At this meeting, the orders for shipment of rations and gasoline 

132 
r 

from the respective Class I and Class III dumps to be made on 

the next day were issued, detachments from the truck companies 

were ordered to report and to be loaded at a given hour the 

following morning, and then to haul the supplies to the several 

truckheads. The truckhead commanders being present• they knew 

just what to expect in the way of receipts on the following day. 

These meetings were continued on a daily basis at five o'clock 

each afternoon, and were eminently successful in coordinating 

the Quartermaster activities in the Utal). area. They were 

continued throughout the European Campaign. A few days later 

two more truckheads were opened, and a string of four Class I 

and Class III distribution points was thus spread across the 

( Cherbourg Peninsula. An accurate history of all of these operations is contained in the First United states Army Report of 

Operations from 2~ October 1943 to l August 1944, in Annex No. 14, 

from page 132 thru page 1476 together with the Appendices thereto. 

As the First Army Q;Uartermaster opened these installations, 

there was no need for the gasoline supply companies to be 

attached to the several Corps Quartermasters any further. 

Accordingly, these companies were transferred from the Corps to 

the Army. Although the Corps Quartermasters had known that this 

transfer would be made, they demurred mildly when it happened; 

upon reminding them that there would be no corps supply points 

• for Quartermaster supplies, and that no such supply points had 

~ been intended at any time, as these Quartermaster knew, they 

withdrew whatever objections they may have felt to the transfer 

of these units. 

133 
Beach Communications 

Although there was telephone commimication to our Quartermaster CP on Utah Beach, the line was heavily used for Beach 

to Beach and it was very difficult to make contact between my 

two CP's. The necessary daily reports which were made by the 

Utah Beach CP to me were carried every evening by officer 

The heavy traffic along the road which connected Omaha and Utah 

made this a somewhat lengthy trip from a viewpoint of time, 

although I was anxious to obtain these reports as soon as 

possible each evening. 

At that time Colonel Grant Williams, the First Army Signal 

Officer, had brought to the Continent some carrier pigeons, which 

he was anxious to have used. However word of the availability 

of these carrier pigeons had been received with some lack of 

enthusiasm, the telephone still being a much preferred instrument. 

As a step towards facilitating my communications with 

Utah Beach, and also as a favor to the Army Signal Officer, I 

agreed to use carrier pigeons from Utah Beach to my own Headquarters on Omaha Beach. Accordingly, a cote of pigeons was 

delivered to my Quartermaster officers on Utah, and on one 

historical afternoon a report as to the status of the supplies 

in the dumps was prepared on rice paper and rolled up into a 

capsule, which in turn was fastened to the leg of one of the 

pigeons. Army Signal Corps photographers were on hand to 

preserve the scene for posterity, and the Quartermaster officer 

in command released the pigeon from his hand, and watched the 

134 
bird take off thru the sky in the general direction of Omaha 

The photograph of the occasion shows in faithfulness 

the ~ook of extreme disgust on the officer's face; while the 

pictures were being taken, the bird -- unnerved by the fact that 

it was making history -- had badly abused his outstretched hand 

on which it had perched. 

Ler. Much to the surprise of everyone (except the Army Signal 

1 Officer) the pigeon actually arrived on Omaha Beach and the 

message was delivered to me. 

Cherbourg 

On June 26, 1944 the City of Cherbourg fell to the 

L u. s. 4th Infantry Division. This was the first major city 

.oh to be taken by our forces, and our victory was largely sign:lf-

( icant ..>ecause of the fact that Cherbourg had been a large 

port. Unfortunately, the German command was all too conscious 

mt. of this fact, and they had done everything within their power 

to sabotage the port facilities and the harbor itself. Floating mines and sunken ships were all over the harbor, and it 

took our Engineers several months to make it usable. 

The capture of Cherbourg is memorable for another reason. 

The German garrison in that city, as was characteristic of the 

German Army wherever it might have been, had adopted a philosophy 

that nothing was too good for themselves. So that their digestive 

tracts might not suffer from lack of stimulation, they had a 

• vast warehouse which was stocked entirely with the best of wines 

and liquors. It was reported that the troops of the 4th Division 

who had located this cache had used it to a considerable extent 

that night, with the result that on the following morning their 

135 
efficiency was something less than normal. However, by that 

time, ·the word had spread and G-4•s, supply officers, and 

aides-des-campe were attracted to this bonanza like ants after 

sugar. 

Class "X" 

General Bradley, quick to grasp the situation, gave personal orders that I as Army Quartermaster would take over the 

custody of these "Class X" supplies forthwith, and would divide 

the same equally among every soldier ashore in Normandy as of 

the date of the fall of Cherbourg. 

I responded to this order first by requesting the VII Corps 

Quartermaster to have a tight MP guard kept on the building at 

all times. I then went to Cherbourg and satisfied myself as to 

the security as I witnessed the MP private politely but firmly 

denying admission to a Major General • . Then, I asked the Army G-1 for a list of all units ashore 

on D/26, together with their strength as of that date. While 

this list was being assembled, I had a team of officers go to 

the warehouse and take an inventory. The inventory and the 

troop strength ashore as of D/20 was in such proportion that 

there were two bottles of wine and three bottles of liquor for 

every man ashore. I then sent thru channels a letter to each 

unit connnander, which would authorize him to present the same 

and to draw the proportionate bottles of liquor and wine for 

his unit. This was done in a few days• time, the warehouse was 

emptied, and the problem was licked. 

136 
Another important find 1n Cherbou~g was a large civilian 

bakery installation, which had been left intact by the Germans. 

I might add that it was a German Army bakery, as distinguished 

from one which had been in the civilian economy. I notified 

Major Jack McMa.nus, Assistant to General Littlejohn, in charge 

of baker:l.es and bakery companies, and he immediately took over 

these facilities and used them as an integral part of the bakery 

supply system for the Connnunications Zone. 

Bakeries 

One week later, on July 3, 1944, while 1n my office-van 

s at our Headquarters (then at La Cambe), I noticed a convoy of 

trucks approaching on the road, and as it grew closer, I recog-

( nized that there were large canvas signs on its lead vehicles. 

As the convoy passed, I was able to read them; they said 1n 

substance "L1ttle~ohn-McManus Secret Weapon!" -- and under 

another line, "Courtesy 3029th QM Mobile Bakery Company". 

This was followed by another convoy bearing similar signs, all 

of which was owing to the courtesy of the 3028th Quartermaster 

Bakery Company. I sent for the two Company Commanders and they 

reported shortly thereafter. After making it clear that neither 

the contrivances of Messrs. Littlejohn and McManus nor the 

courteousness of either Company or its members would be further 

advertised openly within the First Army area, I asked the two 

Connnanders how soon their bakeries could go into operation. 

, They replied cheerfully that they would have their first batch 

of bread ready for issue 1n 48 hours. The following day was the 

4th of July, and I was determined that the American troops in 

137 
Europe know that the Quartermaster Corps had not forgotten 

the importance of this date. I explained to the two officers 

that our Class I truckheads on Omaha Beach would commence 

issuing rations on the following morning at approximately 

8 o'clock, and that the rations for issue on that day would 

include fresh bread. This was done; some bakers may have 

worked overtime that night, but the troops ate fresh bread 

on July 4th. 

While we had been in England we had used the brown bread 

that food conservation had required to be in exclusive production in the British Isles. It was nutritious, but not 

nearly as good as plain white bread. When you haven't seen 

white bread - fresh white bread - for a long time, it not 

only looks good and smells good, but it tastes good. Therefore, 

I went to the bakery companies on that first morning and asked 

for the first sheaf of loaves to be cooled. I took this sheaf 

over to the nearest hospital, and presented it to the co.mmanding officer for his patients• m~als that day. I kept one loaf 

and asked him to arrange for me to see a wounded soldier whose 

morale might be bucked a little by the loaf of warm bread. 

He took me to such a man, to whom I presented the loaf and a 

certificate saying "This is the first loaf of bread baked by 

the United States Army on the Continent of Europe. Certified 

to this 4th day of July, 1944". This certificate was signed 

"Omar N. Bradley, Lieutenant General, u. s. Army". 

The soldier smelled the bread, fondled it with his hands, 

and over the oxygen tubes fastened to his nose murmured "Boy, 

138 
if we could eat like this all the time, everything would be all 

right". Leaving him with the loaf of bread clutched to his 

chest, I departed from the hospital with the knowledge that 

certainly one American would think well of the Quartermaster 

Corps on that day. It wa.s with sadness that I learned several 

days later that the man had died. 

Force Expansion 

Within the next three weeks our strength grew. to a force 

'!l of 18 Di visions • '.:\1 

~ 

These did not include the 82nd and 101st 

'?, 

; Airborne Divisions, which had been moved from the Continent 

{ 

' i back to England, where they were held in Theater Reserve. 

! These divisions were divided among the V, VII, XIX and VIII Corps. l The VIII Corps was designated to be a part of the Third Army. 

1 That Army's Headquarters was on the Continent of Europe, as 

R 

1 were most of its troops and all of its divisions. However, -a l Third Army was not operational at that time. 

:1 j With this vastly expanded force; all Quartermaster service 

1 'was being rendered with the same number of units that had been :i 

"j 

~ requested for the service of an army of eight divisions and 

1 

1 ,, 

-j 

three corps. On August 1, 1944 the breakthrough had been made 

in the vicinity of St. Lo, the Third Army became operational 

and no longer had any connection with First Army, the Twelfth 

Army Group went into operation, General Bradley commanding, 

Lt. General Courtney Hodges having succeeded to command of the 

First Army, and Communications Zone took over from us all depot 

operations on the Beach. Some time previously, on approximately 

D/ 23, Communications Zone had taken over the operation of the 

139 
Quartermaster installations on Utah Beach. First Army, however, 

continued to operate the installations on Omaha Beach and did so 

until relieved by Connnunications Zone as aforesaid. 

Breakthrough 

After the breakthrough had been made the Third Army proceeded south and then turned towards the east. The First Army 

wheeled towards the east, and 1n this movement there was a time 

when our left flank was considerably exposed to the enemy. It 

was at this point tha~ the Germans rallied their forces which 

had been sent down to Normandy from the vicinity of Calais, and 

with these forces they launched a counter-attack aimed to cut 

our lines in th~ vicinity of Avranches. This counter-attack 

was commended with some degree of success, but Gener~l Bradley 

ordered the 30th Infantry Division out of its advance to meet 

it. OUr maneuver was successful and the enemy's edge was blunted 

at Mortain. Meanwhile, to the east of Mortain a large German force 

had been surrounded in all directions but the east as our troops 

proceeded in that line of advance. The British and Canadians were 

on the north and our main forces were holding in the west and 

moving eastward along the south of this ellipse. On the south 

a large concentration of American artillery was arrayed and 

fired interdicting fire in conjunction with the British artillery 

in the north, upon the road over which the Germans were moving 

from the trap. The enemy forces which escaped were to remain 

ineffective until they had reorganized behind the safety of the 

Siegfried Line. It was with some concern that I viewed the 

responsibility of cleaning up the destruction on the road, 

140 
( 

ce 

particularly having in mind the problem of burials. The French 

2nd Armored Division had already been designated by General 

Bradley to mop up the area, and it was with some feeling of 

relief that I learned that their sector had been broadened to 

take in the entire length of the road through Falaise. Thereafter the French referred to that road as the "Avenue de Mort". 

While the 30th Division was committed at Mortain one of 

its regiments became seriously engaged with the German forces 

in that vicinity. One afternoon the situation was so critical 

that a battalion was surrounded by the enemy and, therefore, 

was cut off from its supplies. Air supply was indicated and 

this was called for by the Army G-4. Pursuant to a prearranged 

plan, a squadron of P-38 combat planes flew over the area to 

rec.onnoiter for drop zones. In one of the planes was Major 

William Cullinane, GSC, Assistant Army G-4, who was riding 

"piggy back" behind the pilot. He had arranged for the drop 

and was going along so that he might observe that the supplies 

were received. I had had dinner with him on the evening before, 

and I never saw him again. His plane was seen while spiraling 

to earth, and one parachute was reported to have mushroomed 

from it. He was never found, and his wife received the Distinguished Service Cross for him. 

In exploiting this breakthrough, the strain on our supply 

lines became terrific. The numerous moves of our depot area 

from Omaha Beach on to the south and then to the east is recorded in the First United States Army Report of Operations 

from 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945 in Annex 10, on pages 45 

141 
thru 47. One factor that helped us at this time was the use 

of the Cub planes. These were assigned to us by the First Army 

Artillery Officer and enabled us to observe traffic conditions 

on the roads, especially to watch and look for truck convoys 

which might be carrying gasoline; they also permitted us to 

move quickly from our own Army area back to Communications 

Zone Headquarters in the rear. 

Supply Problems 

Between 1 August and 16 September our Quartermaster Depot 

moved six times, These moves, which meant that 1n effect we 

would have the Depot operating in two, three, or four locations 

at one time, taxed considerably the personnel resources of our 

471st Quartermaster Depot Group. Nevertheless, that Group was 

able to handle the matter with elasticity, and the Quartermaster 

operation remaiqed orderly at all times. Meanwhile, the gasoline 

supply problem was the one that was most critical. On one day, 

August 11, 1944, our receipts of gasoline from the rear were 

only 15,000 gallons, barely enough to supply one infantry division. On another day, shortly afterwards, we received only 

25,000 gallons. 

It was 1n the latter part of August, 1944, that General 

Hodges summoned me to his command tent and asked me "how far can 

I go from here", At that time we had scarcely been receiving 

maintenance in gasoline each day, and I had sent back to Oma.ha 

a convoy of 150 trucks for the purpose of returning loaded with 

gasoline. 

142 
y 

This convoy was due to reach the La Loupe area that evening, 

and I knew that the trucks would be overloaded with gasoline so 

as to give us approximately 175,000 gallons of fuel in the shipment. I told General Hodges that he could go as far as he 

wished within France and Belgium without running out of gasoline 

again. I realized as I spoke that nothing must happen to the 

gasoline convoy on its way to ~s from the Beach. By that, I 

mean that we had been hearing rumors that people Americans, 

not from First Army -- were "high-jacking" gasoline shipments 

and taking them for themselves. I do not know whether or not 

these rumors were true; nevertheless, I was determined that this 

convoy of my trucks was not going to be high-jacked. Therefore, 

(~ I sent one of my Army Quartermaster officers of sufficient rank 

to meet on equal level the officer whom I heard had been doing 

the high-jacking, and he escorted the convoy up to the VII Corps 

Quartermaster at Melun, southeast of Paris. We never ran out 

,i 

of gasoline again, although we had some close days. I need not 

say that I am glad that I did not feel obliged to apologize to 

General Hodges for the prediction and assurance that I had given 

him. 

A few days later, I again called on General Hodges at his 

corrnnand tent and was discussing the gasoline supply situation 

with him, when he was telephoned by Major General J. Lawton 

Collins, Commanding General of the VII Corps. General Hodges 

"scrambled" his telephone so that he could discuss secret 

matters freely with General Collins. The latter asked for 

permission to attack at the city of Mons; looking at the map. 

143 
General Hodges told Collins to hold his ground. At the same 

time, he said that he would make arrangements with "G" (Major 

General Leonard Gerow), Connnanding General of V Corps, and that 

he would have the latter attack from one direction while 

Collins attacked from another. Accordingly, the coordinated 

attach was made by both Corps on the following morning, with 

the result that 20,000 German prisoners of war were taken. We 

were glad to have bagged the prisoners of war when we did, 

rather than have them wandering as individual _stragglers thru 

our dump areas. 

This was the last enemy stand of any consequence west of 

the Siegfried Line. This entire period is accurately described 

in the First United States Army Report of Operations from 

1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945, Annex No. 10, from pages 

45 thru 54 thereof • 

• 

During this time, as we were approaching Belgium the 

rations and gasoline were arriving regularly in the Army 

area, although we were not building up any reserve. However, 

Class II and IV items became sadly neglected. We did not 

have transportation to move our Class II and IV depot at any 

time, although small amounts of sUpplies -- expendables 

were moved from time to time to Arpajohn, La Loupe and 

La Capelle. We were expected to report our arrivals by 

Classes of supplies in tons. We were actually showing receipts 

of a few tons of Class II and rv supplies a day, but it became 

necessary to emphasize that it was "items" of supplies that 

counted as distinguished from~-

144 
t 

Supply Improvement 

Fortunately, some six weeks after the St. Lo Breakthrough, 

on or about September 16, 1944, we organized our Quartermaster 

Depot for all classes of supplies in the Belgian City of 

Herbesthal. It was a fortunate move, as we never again experienced a dearth of Quartermaster supplies or services in the 

Army area. By this time the French railroads had been repaired 

and were in regular operation from Cherbourg all the way up to 

Belgium. The Chief Quartermaster had planned for us to have a 

ten day reserve of rations in our own Army area. This ten day 

supply was very quickly built up at Herbesthal, where trains 

were arriving and being unloaded day and night. From Herbesthal, 

the supplies were hauled by truck and by rail to forward 

truckheads. It was a highly suitable and satisfactory depottruckhead-railhead operation • . At the same time, gasoline was arriving by railroad tank-car, 

tank-trucks, and airplanes., and was being kept in dumps as Army 

reserve or moved by truck or by rail to the forward distribution 

points. The details of this operation are set out in the First 

united States Army Report of Operations, l August 1944 to 

22 February 1945, in Annex No. 10, on pages 60 and 61. 

Also, we were building up a reserve of post exchange 

supplies. These articles had necessarily been relegated to 

the role of luxuries during the breakthrough and march across 

France. However, upon reaching Belgium, they arrived in large 

quantities, and we were able not only to make gratuitous issues 

of those items permitted in a combat zone by Army Regulations, 
but also to sell to unit Exchange Officers a broad line of 

supplies for their respective post exchanges. 

Captured Materiel 

As we advanced into Belgium and Luxemburg, increased reports reached me as to the over-running of enemy warehouses 

and supply bases. Indeed, these sources of enemy materiel 

became so numerous that the problem outgrew our regular salvage operation. Accordingly, I formed a special unit in my 

office which I called the "Captured Materiel Branch." At 

the same time I authorized the officer in charge of this unit 

to utilize in his discretion two of our salvage collection 

companies and one of our service companies which had in the 

past performed very well as a depot guard company. With these 

units he then proceeded to locate, guard, inventory, and dispos~ of the enemy materiel that our forces had over-run, An 

account of our operations in Captured Materiel is in Annex 

No. 10 of the First u. s. Army Report of Operations from 

l August 1944 to 22 February 1945, P. 64-65, and also in 

Annex No. 10 to the same report from 22 February 1945 to 

8 May 1945. 

Of especial interest in this connection were the intelligence teams that were used to locate the enemy stores. These 

teams consisted largely of officers "borrowed" from the replacement center in support of the First Army. These officers were 

from the supply services (where the casualties had been few), 

and we used them with the understanding that they would be 

returned to the replacement center upon twenty-four hours• 

146 

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b 

II 

( 

1 
L 

Nevertheless; the individual officers were delighted to 

be fully occupied, and they performed their duties in a most 

enthusiastic and thorough manner. 

Winter Clothing 

It was in mid-September 1944, while living in a field of 

mud at Verviers, BelgiU!ll, that I received a personal call from 

General Littlejohn. He knew that we had not brought along woolen 

underwear nor had we ever issued it in First Army. Further, 

anticipating that long underwear would be in demand by the end 

of September, he had vast quantities of it available at Cherbourg. 

Unfortunately, the transportation system was still tight, and 

it appeared that it might take some time -- that is, several 

weeks -- to move the clothing by truck or by rail from Cherbourg 

to Belgium. General Littlejohn's solution was excellent. He 

knew that, as a prelude to our planned crossing of the Rhine, 

several hundred DUKWs had been assembled at Cherbourg and were 

to be moved up to the First Army area in the immediate future. 

With this information, he had obtained clearance from the 

Theater G-4 to load these vehicles with long woolen underwear 

for the shipment. Owing to this exercise of foresight on his 

part, we had hundreds of thousands of suits of heavy underwear 

1n our depot stocks within the next seven days. 

Simultaneously, General Littlejohn had moved woolen overcoats onto the Continent. Fortunately, the First Army G-4 

gave us priority on transportation for the purpose of bringing 

up these garments, and they had been issued and were being 

worn by the troops by the time cold weather set in. 

147 
f 

Special Winter Clothing 

In the spring of 1944 -- several months before the invasion 

of Normandy -- I had been asked by Major Morris Bryan, Assistant 

Quartermaster under General Littlejohn, whether the First Army 

would need overshoes and special winter clothing. I immediately 

wrote a note to our G-3, in which I inquired whether we would be 

spending the winter months in a cold climate zone and explained 

the reason for my question; the note was returned with a negative 

answer. Accordingly, I notified Major Bryan that we could see 

no need for overshoes or special cold weather clothing, but that 

he might make arrangements to have overshoes available when and 

if the need for them arose. 

This answer did not particularly impress General Littlejohn, 

who nevertheless submitted requisitions upon the New York Port of 

Embarkation for vast quantities of special winter clothing, 

sufficient for·a11 infantrymen in the First Army. 

This cold weather clothing arrived in Europe on schedule, 

but the delivery of it was delayed because of the congestion in 

shipping at the Port of Antwerp, and also by the fact that the 

German V-1 weapons had badly hindered port activities. Antwerp 

had been slow in the taking, and considerable work had to be 

done on its installations before ships could unload in quantity. 

unfortunately, we were in a northerly sector with extreme cold 

temperatures and the cold weather clothing was not distributed 

to our troops until the end of December 1944. Had it not been 

for the imagination and foresight of the Chief Quartermaster 

and his staff, we would not have had it then., 

148 
n 

t 

re 

Further, accepting our statement that we might need overshoes, 

General Littlejohn and his staff arranged to provide them for 50% 

of the troops in the First Army. I do not know how he went about 

this, but I do know that at his instigation the Air Force troops 

in England voluntarily turned in their overshoes so that they might 

be used by our infantrymen and the other foot troops. 

Spa 

On October 25a 1944 First Army Headquarters moved into Spa, 

Belgium, a delightful resort city which had been popular for 

centuries. It had also been Von Hindenburg's field headquarters 

during World War I. Here (again) the First Army Quartermaster 

Section was located in a former gambling casino. It was postively 

the most luxurious office I have ever seen. The walls and windows 

f were draped, carpeting covered the entire floor, chandeliers and 

crystal-ware hung from the ceilings, and a small but adequate 

(also unstocked) bar adjoined the main room. This was my office. 

We hauled out the roulette tables and chemin-de-fer tables and 

moved in our own simple field-desks, but even they did not 

detract in the least from the luxury of the room. 

Gasoline Fires 

Also at Spa we had on the out-skirts of the City some large 

dumps of Class III supplies. If there is anything that horrifies 

a Quartermaster,it is the thought of a fire in a gasoline dump. 

We had had our first experience of this type on Omaha Beach, about 

a month after the landings. While decanting some bulk gasoline 

one evening, the gasoline-motored pumping machine had backfired, 

and the backfire in turn had ignited some gaijoline vapors over the 

149 
empty cans. A fire had followed, as a result of which we lost 

some 17,000 gallons of gasoline. We would have lost substantially 

more than this, had it not been for an Air Force Engineer fire 

fighting unit which came over to our dump from a nearby combat 

air-strip. This detachment, using foam, -- and also using much 

in the way of physical courage -- put out the fire in a matter 

of a few minutes. 

In the latter part of October 1944, we had our second fire, 

this time at Bastogne, Belgium. There a railroad track entered 

our gasoline dump, and one evening an engine within the dump 

area unloaded its coals. The live coals ignited some gasoline 

fumes, and we lost 7,000 gallons of gasoline. 

However, our most serious gasoline dump fire took place 

at Spa in mid-November. There a 21⁄2 ton cargo truck loaded with 

5 gallon cans of gasoline was being driven under a railroad 

bridge Just at a."moment when some welding was being done on 

the bridge. A spark from the welders fell into the rear of 

the truck and ignited some gasoline cans, The driver, oblivious 

to the fact that a fire was going on in his vehicle, drove 

nonchalantly into the Class III dump and backed the truck up 

to a stack of gasoline cans for discharge. We lost 20,000 gallons 

of gasoline that night. 

However, we never again had a gasoline fire, the three 

fires that we had experienced having so impressed our gasoline 

personnel that extreme caution became characteristic in handling 

this dangerous item. 

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.ly 

Class I Supply 

By Thanksgiving Day in 1944 we had our ten-day reserve of 

Class I supplies in our depot at Herbesthal, and had become 

accustomed to eating fresh meat for at least two meals per day. 

Steak, leg of lamb, fresh bacon, ham and sausages, and fried 

chicken were commonplace items on our menu. Approximately a 

week before Thanksgiving, we were advised by the Quartermaster 

of Advance Section Connnunications Zone that Lt. Colonel Jack 

McManus of General Littlejohn•s office had been designated to 

see that all troops had a Thanksgiving dinner. Sure enough, 

shortly before Thanksgiving we received a shipment by truck 

of turkeys (at the rate of one pound per man in the Army), 

cranberries, sage, and other special vegetables and fruits 

about which the Thanksgiving Day menu would be planned. Every 

man 1n First Army had a fine Turkey dinner on that day. 

Battle of the Bulge 

On December 16, 1944 the famous counter-attack of Field 

Marshal Von Rundstedt was made. Better known as the "Battle 

of the Bulge", this counter-attack became a personal matter 

with me, inasmuch as I sensed that the immediate objective of 

the enemy in this maneuver was to seize as much as possible of 

our supplies -- especially gasoline. 

Butgenbach 

I first became aware of it in view of the fact that we had 

a truckhead in support of the V Corps in a town called Butgenbach. 

On the afternoon of December 16th I cancelled further shipments 

of rations or gasoline to this truckhead, and directed the units 

that would ordinarily use its facilities to go instead to another· 

151 
truckhead. It appeared from our maps that the Germans were 

approximately 10 miles away. On the next morning, we still had 

unknown quantities of gasoline and rations on the ground at the 

Butgenbach. I dispatched some trucks from Eupen in the north 

to go down and evacuate the troops and supplies. Unfortunately, 

communications with Butgenbach were out, inasmuch as the 

99th Division Headquarters, which had been there until that 

morning, had moved, leaving no telephones behind. Feeling 

some concern about the situation at this truckhead, I dispatched one of my officers, a warrant officer, and two enlisted 

men to go to Butgenbach and to survey the situation there, 

expediting the evacuation of supplies if possible. 

Several hours later I was telephoned by the officer in 

charge of the detail, who reported that there were then about 

50,000 gallons of gasoline and several thousand rations at 

Butgenbach, whi<fu were being shipped out to the north, but 

that they needed more trucks in order to complete the evacuation, 

He also mentioned that the 26th Infantry Regiment had marched 

into the town while he was there, and had gone into the line. 

to defend against any attack from the south. I ordered more 

trucks to Butgenbach and the truckhead was evacuated completely 

by nightfall. 

My concern, however, was unfounded, inasmuch as the 

Germans never did take the town. Nevertheless, their artillery 

was a very short distance away and I had always made it a policy 

never to have any Quartermaster supplies within ten miles of the 

front lines; there was no advantage in such a close proximity 

of supplies to enemy lines, 

152 
Gasoline Evacuation 

," jj j By this time the major force of the German counter-attack 

'j was only too apparent. Equally apparent was the danger that 

-i 

,, 

J existed in the fact that we had over 3,000,000 gallons of ); 

l 

gasoline on the ground at Spa, with the Germans moving our way. 

This presented a problem with far more danger than the one that 

I had just successfully met at Butgenbach, I was determined 

to get that gasoline out of Spa just as soon as possible, and, 

to this end, marshalled some 600 trucks and sent them down 

to the dump, There I had a service battalion loading the 

trucks, which in turn shuttled the gasoline to rail stations 

along the Meuse Valley. In three days time the 3,000,000 gallons 

of gasoline were moved, and were hauled by rail back to western 

Belgium and France. All the gasoline was in 5-gallon cans, 

so that we had no bulk gasoline with which to contend, On 

the last day of the evacuation, my Quartermaster troops were 

loading trucks out in front of our infantry lines, and-, on 

occasion, a German tank poked its nose over a hill-crest, to 

be pinned back by the fire of our 90mm anti-aircraft guns 

with barrels lowered. I regret to say that approximately 

120,000 gallons of this gasoline was lost, when one of our 

artillery officers ordered it ignited so as to form a roadblock against the Germans. I regarded it as being a somewhat 

expensive roadblock -- although_ I did not question its effectiveness, 

Re-equipping 

Meanwhile, we had a Quartermaster problem presented to us 

by the 106th Infantry Division, This Division was the newest 

153 
one of the Continent and had been in the line only two days in 

northern Luxemburg when the Von Rundstedt thrust was made. The 

attack landed virtually in the lap of the Division; two regimental 

combat teams were surrounded by the enemy and, several days 

later, surrendered. The other regimental combat team and 

Division Headquarters survived. However, they lost virtually 

all of their clothing and equipment. Fortunately, their 

casualties had not been heavy, 

Prior to this time, Advance Section Connnunications Zone 

had opened and stocked a Class II and IV Quartermaster Depot 

in the Belgian city of Huy, At the time I regarded the depot 

as being somewhat close to the front, anticipating the possibility 

of a counter-attack with an ensuing retrograde movement of our 

troops. My misgivings to the contrary, I was now very thankful 

for the existence of this depot at Huy. The 106th Division 

Quartermaster was able to have the remaining elements of his 

Division re-equipped completely with Quartermaster items of 

supply within 24 hours. Further, with their new stoves and 

kitchen utensils, the balance of the Division was able to 

enjoy a Christmas dinner only a few days later, 

Ciney 

A few days after the Battle of the Bulge commenced, I had 

ordered that some of our gasoline trains from Spa go to a city 

in southwestern Belgium named Ciney. There they were to be 

unloaded and the gasoline put into a temporary dump. On the day 

that the first train was scheduled to arrive, I drove to Ciney 

and was inspecting the railroad station area as a likely dump-site 

154 
when two of our trains rolled in. There were no sounds of 

shooting or other indications of combat in the area, but in all 

my life I had never felt more lonely. Purely on a hunch, I 

directed the train crews to move those trains further to the 

west, across the Meuse River and not to stop them until they 

were in France. The train crews obliged with some apparent 

degree of pleasure, as their sensibilities to the German advance 

must have been as delicate as my own. Nevertheless, that night 

the Germans entered Ciney. That was one time that a hunch paid 

off. 

In the early days of the Battle of the Bulge the u. s. 

7th Armored Division did a heroic job holding off the German 

counter-attacks. It was an organization comparatively new in 

the Theater and 'it had been ordered transferred from Ninth Army 

to First Army when.the attack first connnenced. Making a forced 

march from the north down into our sector, they held off the 

Germans in the vicinity of St. Vith. In any case, they were 

ultimately overwhelmed by superior numbers of Germans and were 

forced to withdraw. In their withdrawal from st. Vith they left 

behind them some 50,000 gallons of gasoline. This to my knowledge was the only u. s. gasoline in any amount which was taken 

by the Germans, either in Africa or in Europe. 

V-l's 

On the day after the Battle of the Bulge commenced, our 

Headquarters were moved from Spa to Chaudfontaine, a city on 

the Vesdre River southeast of Liege. Chaudfontaine appeared 

to be an attractive city, but we soon became conscious of the 

155 
fact that it was on "Buzz Bomb Alley", The route of the V-1 

weapons from Germany to Liege passed directly overhead, and it 

was disturbing, to say the least, to hear the loud noise of a 

buzz-bomb suddenly cut out, which meant that the power had failed 

and that the missile was coming down to do its destruction. 

Actually they would cut out over Chaudfontaine to descent on 

Liege, some 5 miles distant. Nevertheless, a near-miss was 

not a comfortable thought. Fortunately, we moved three days 

later back to the town of Tongres, also known as·"Tongeren". 

There we set up our Headquarters in a former Germany Army 

barracks, 

While at Chaudfontaine, we had watched one night as a 

buzz-bomb cut out overhead and then descended into Liege, We 

were able to see and to hear the explosion but, to our dismay, 

there appeared a ~right flame around its site, It took no more 

to tell us that the V-1 had struck a Class III dump maintained 

by the Quartermaster of Advance Section Communications Zone, 

We knew that gasoline dump to have had some 6,000,000 gallons 

of gasoline in 5-gallon cans on hand, and it was painful to 

watch this valuable fuel destroy itself, I have never learned 

just how much gasoline was lost that night, but I watched the 

fire long enough to know that it was substantial. 

89th w,'I Company 

The Battle of the Bulge taxed our Quartermaster resources 

in many ways, but it is with great pride that I look back upon 

the performance of one of our units, the 89th Quartermaster 

Railhead Company, Captain Leslie T. Cox, Commanding. This 

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Company of four officers and 180 men was operating a Class I 

railhead for us in the Belgian city of Gouvy. Two days after 

the German counter-attack commenced, on December 18, 1944, 

Gouvy was surrounded by the enemy. Captain Cox reported to 

the commanding officer of a local anti-aircraft unit, whose 

name was Colonel Stone, and the railhead company, together 

with platoons and detachments of various sizes and numbers 

also in the vicinity of Gouvy, were organized into a holding 

force. The result was that the railhead troops were in the 

line defending the City of Gouvy for six days, during which 

time it suffered casualties of two men missing in action and 

several others wounded. However, when it was pulled out or 

the line and relieved on December 24th, I must say that I have 

never seen officers and men whose morale could have possibly 

been higher. I was extremely proud of this Company and the 

manner 1n which its members had conducted themselves when 

suddenly confronted with a dangerous situation. I might add 

that at the time that they found themselves surrounded, they 

had 70,000 rations in their truckhead. They issued these 

rations to the other troops 1n their force, and thus performed 

Quartermaster functions at the same time that they were in combat. 

Strong Supply Support 

By the 17th of January 1945, the Bulge had been straightened 

out and our headquarters returned to Spa, More important to me, 

our depot was returned to the Herbesthal area. Tremendous 

quantities of Class I and II and IV supplies immediately began 

to roll in, and we had a better supply of the latter items than 

157 
we had had at any time in the past. Indeed, the impetus from 

Communications Zone was so strong that never again did we have 

any problems in Quartermaster supply, other than within our own 

Army area. Specifically, at all times thereafter, we had more 

than ample quantities of all classes of supplies. There were 

certain shortages of a few critical items such as: stoves, 

one burner; heaters, water immersion type; and lanterns, electric, 

The reason for the shortages in these items was manifest: 

they were all extremely useful and, therefore, popular items 

of supply, with the result that TO&E 1 s were ignored in requisitioning for them. Many a sin of false certification was committed 

in the drawing of these items; it is no wonder if from time to 

time the theater supply ran on the short side. 

On March 10, 1945, General Littlejohn asked me just what 

our needs were in these three items. I estimated them to be 

2000 lanterns, 4500 stoves, and 1500 heaters. He immediately 

established depot credits for us in these quantities, and never 

again were we to know a critical shortage of any QM items of 

supply. 

For the period from late January until March, our supply 

system within the Army functioned as smoothly as any operation 

could function. The details of the operation are set forward 

in the First United States Army Report of Operations, 23 February8 May 1945, Annex No. 10, from pages 39 through 45. Suffice it 

to say that our rations were moved promptly and regularly from 

our depot to our truckheads, as was our gasoline, on both trucks 

and railroads. Meanwhile, the depot issued Class II and r:v 

158 

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supplies immediately upon requisition, our bakeries were performing at the truckheads, and our bath-points were daily 

receiving battalions of troops, who would turn in their soiled 

clothing and then receive fresh clean clothing after they had 

taken their hot showers. Our laundries were accommodating the 

hospitals as well as the bath-points, and would do the laundry 

for any unit in the Army area that would request the service. 

Our salvage collecting companies were patrolling the roads and 

operating our salvage dump, together with our salvage repair 

companies. In captured materiel, we were processing more and 

more tons as our front lines grew closer to the Rhine River. 

The entire operation was a satisfactory and satisfying experience. 

Rhine Crossing 

On March 5, 1945 the City of Cologne was taken by the 

VII Corps. Just two days later, on March 7th, the famous 

Von Hindenburg Bridge was found intact at Remagen. This latter 

unanticipated opportunity was the beginning of the end of the 

war. On the following day, elements of three divisions had 

crossed the Bridge and a firm foothold had been gained on the 

far side of the Rhine. The traffic problem became most 

acute, and only one way (i.e. eastbound) traffic was permitted 

on the bridge. However, in a few days time, additional pontoon 

bridges had been laid across the Rhine River, thus permitting 

two-way vehicular traffic. Ten days after its capture the 

Hindenburg Bridge collapsed, but our pontoon bridges were there 

to stay. 

159 
Needless to say, this bridgehead meant an increased problem 

in Quartermaster operation. There was no rail bridge anywhere on 

the Rhine River, and the speed with which our units progressed 

east of the Rhine was such that our supply lines rapidly began 

to expand again. Because it was represented to me that a pontoon 

bridge would be laid across the River in the vicinity of Andernach, 

I ordered our Quartermaster depot to be moved to that city. 

Andernach had excellent rail and road connections. Unfortunately, 

the nearest bridge was thrown across the Rhine, not at Andernach, 

but at a point 25 miles to the north. This meant that our supply 

convoys had to travel up the river 25 miles before they could 

even cross it. 

On March 31, 1945, our Headquarters moved to Bad Godesberg. 

This was a resort town which had been a favorite of Adolph Hitler, 

This is one instance in which I am forced to agree with "der 

Fuehrer"; it wi:ts a lovely city. We had our Quartermaster section 

in a house right close to the banks of the Rhine in which 

Ludwig von Beethoven had once lived. Every room in the house 

had in it a grand piano. 

Class III Supply 

On the following day, Easter Sunday, April 1st, we opened 

up a Class III dump approximately 50 miles east of the Rhine River 

in the City of Giessen. There we had gasoline trucked initially 

from the west bank of the Rhine, but we also had an air-strip, 

where the U.S. Air Force sent its older bombers with their 

bomb-bays loaded with cans of gasoline. In order to keep in 

touch with the operation at Giessen I had to borrow two radio160 
equipped command cars from the Signal Officer, One of these was 

stationed on a hill-top at a point halfway from Bad Godesberg to 

Giessen, the other one being in Giessen. I was able to communicate with the officer in connnand of the dump at Giessen by these 

radios. Unfortunately, those reports which showed the issues and 

stocks on hand of gasoline were necessarily classified "SECRET", 

and the coding and decoding of the messages took considerable 

time. Nevertheless, we had to have the communications and they 

proved to be excellent. 

The problem of supplying our fast moving troops was becoming 

more and more acute. We had already surrounded a force of some 

300,000 German troops in the Ruhl;' pocket, which operation had 

prevented our forces from going as fast as they might otherwise 

have traveled. However, after these 300,000 prisoners had been 

taken, there was no holding our forward elements. Meanwhile a . particularly astute and far-sighted project had been prepared by 

Colonel Jack Persons, Assistant to the Theater Engineer in charge 

of pipeline construction. Anticipating a Rhine crossing, Colonel 

Persons had three separate pipelines loaded on trucks and a 

pipeline construction company standing by. In response to a call 

from me on this Easter Sunday, he came to Bad Godesburg, after 

having started his company and one pipeline on the road. The 

Army G-3 had refused to permit a gasoline line across the River 

on any of the vehicular pontoon bridges. I did not question 

the wisdom of this decision, but the need for bulk gasoline 

across the Rhine was becoming more and more self-evident. 

161 
Accordingly, Colonel Persons, with an Engineer Company borrowed 

from the VII Corps, constructed a special pontoon bridge at 

Mehlem for the sole purpose of carrying across the Rhine our 

gasoline pipeline. Over this bridge his ·construction company 

laid the pipe and on Thursday it was in use. This enabled tank 

cars of gasoline to be shipped down the west bank of the Rhine 

River to the pipeline where they were drained of their gasoline, 

which in turn was pumped across the river to Strollberg, where 

Colonel Persons had also constructed some gasoline storage tanks. 

Here at Strollberg this bulk gasoline was decanted into 

5-gallon cans or into tank-trucks, in which it was shipped to the 

forward truckheads. As fast as our troops advanced on the east 

side of the Rhine River, we had no trouble in the supply of gasoline. This fortunate situation all stenuned from the fact that 

Colonel Persons had arranged to have his pipeline in readiness 

months in advance of the Rhine crossing and was able to put it 

across the River in just a few days after~ telephoned him. 

Although the length of our hauls from the west bank of the 

Rhine to our truck-heads became more and more exhausting as 

far as Class I supply was concerned, our problems in Class III 

supply remained small. However, Colonel James Wright, Assistant 

Theater Quartermaster (formerly Quartermaster of the 1st Infantry 

Division) had under his control two gasoline supply companies. 

These units ordinarily had 3 officers and 125 enlisted men. 

Colonel Wright, thru means known only to him, had procured a 

number of ten ton semi-trailers, with prime-movers to haul them. 

162 
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He equipped his gasoline supply companies with these large cargo 

vehicles and "attached" the two companies to our connnand. Neither 

the Army G-4 nor anyone else who did not actually see these 

vehicles would have suspected that the two gasoline supply companies 

actually were in effect simply heavy truck companies, with large 

hauling capacities. Consequently, they assisted materially 1n 

the movement of canned gasoline from Stollberg to the forward 

areas, and, together with the other trucks that G-4 allowed us 

for Class III movements from the Army Motor Pool, they were more 

than sufficient to keep our supplies of this type in good 

shape at all points within the Army area. 

Prisoners of War 

After crossing the Rhine River, we soon learned that for 

the rest of the war we would have many mouths to feed other than 

those of the troops in the First Army. We were taking many 

prisoners of war, and by the end of April we had a daily population of approximately 100,000 prisoners of war in our cages 

within the Army area, although we were moving them back to 

Advance Section Communications Zone as fast as possible. 

Displaced Persons 

Further, we had a tremendous number of displaced persons. 

These poor individuals were civilians from Russia, the Balkan 

countries, France, Italy, Poland, etc., who had been placed in 

labor camps wherever they were needed in Germany, As our forces 

advanced, they of course were free to go where they wanted to, 

but they had no transportation and very little food. Our civil 
affairs officers organized camps for them, where they were housed 

and fed. This was a very humane act, as some of them were in 

bad physical condition. In any case, by the end of that month 

we had an average of 500,000 DP's to feed each day. This figure 

together with 100,000 prisoners of war and 350,000 United States 

troops, gave us a total ration requirement of nearly a million 

per day. 

Repatriates 

Another complicating factor was that of the prisoner of 

war camps which were overrun by our forces. We found few American 

personnel in these but we did find numerous Russian and Polish 

prisoners. The policy of the Germans had been to keep the prisoners 

from eastern Europe in the western part or Germany, and to keep 

the American, British and French prisoners in stalags in the 

eastern part of Ge,rmany. 

Regardless of the fact that there were few Americans in 

these stalags that we overran, we still wished to do as much as 

possible for the physical rehabilitation of these unfortunate 

men. Accordingly, DDT powder, fumigation and bath facilities, 

and hospital care were provided for them whenever they were 

overtaken. 

Captured Subsistence 

By the end of April, our Captured Materiel Section was fully 

engaged in the locating and guarding of captured enemy supplies. 

Most important of these were the supplies of subsistence that we 

found. With 950,000 some odd people to feed each day, these food 

items were very helpful. It was an announced policy at that time 

164 

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in the Eastern Theater of Operations that American Army rations 

were not to be used for the feeding of prisoners of war or displaced persons. On the contrary, they were to eat the food that 

was in the overrun warehouses. Actually, the captured food was 

in most cases very good, and consisted largely of fine cheeses 

and both fresh and canned meats, which had been denied to the 

civilians for the sole use of the German Army. I am sure that 

those DP 1 s had "never had it so good before" for some years until 

they found themselves in our sector. 

Subsistence Problems 

In any case, the problem of feeding these large numbers of 

people plus our own lack of supply discipline in over-drawing 

rations, focused considerable attention from higher Headquarters 

on the subsistence operation within First Army. Every evening 

we received a telegram signed "Eisenhower" in which we were instructed to report at once as to how many rations by types were 

issued to troops, prisoners of war, displaced persons, etc., 

during the past 24 hours. We, of course, made our replies 

accordingly, as the purpose of these special reports was to 

implement and to control the stated Theater policy that only 

capti1red enemy food items would be used for the feeding of 

prisoners of war and displaced persons. It would have been an 

unfortunate note had the excellent American food, for which our 

families had stood in ration lines at home, been misdirected 

into the feeding of these other people, as long as their own 

food was available for them. 
I have mentioned the lack of supply discipline on our part 

in drawing rations. At this time, every day we were issuing 

118,000 rations for every 100,000 troops in the Army. This, 

obviously, represented an overdraw of 18%, Certain divisions 

were drawing the same number of rations day-in and day-out, such 

as 20,000 per day or, I recall, the 9th Infantry Division on 

every day was drawing 19,000 rations. When these facts would 

be mentioned to the Division Quartermasters, they would simply 

say that they had other troops attached to them •. We knew that 

the normal troops attached to a Division approximated a strength 

of 3,000 men. These together with the organic strength of the 

division, would make a total of approximately 18,000 men. However, the roundness of the figures, plus the liberality of the 

difference between rations drawn and number of troops attached, 

indicated that no one was much concerned as to the meaning of a 

ration and that far more rations were being drawn by the division 

than there were men therein to be fed. This meant that one of 

two things was happening; either food was being wasted, -- or 

some units were eating more food and were having more meals per 

day than were other units. Either alternative was unfair and 

wrong. We had repeatedly mentioned these discrepancies to G-4, 

and, finally, when the Theater interest in stringency on supply 

discipline became more pronounced, the G-4 advised the Commanding 

General of the situation. The Commanding General, in turn, 

referred the matter to his Inspector General, who conducted a 

somewhat brief and cursory investigation. 

166 
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We showed The Inspector General the records on the more 

serious offenders who had ignored their true strengths in order 

to draw rations. The Inspector General asked us for an opinion 

as to what could be done to stop it. We replied that if one 

division commander were ordered to survey his ration overdraw 

for just one day, the overdrawing habit in First Army and on the 

Continent would come to an end very quickly. The Inspector 

General reported the facts -- they were simply arithmetic --

to the Army Commander, who wrote a letter to all First Army 

units to the effect that in the future overdrawing of rations 

would be obviated. Nothing happened to the division commanders 

or the division Quartermasters. 

This investigation might have gone much further. Consequently, the overdrawing of rations was only reduced slightly. 

The problem was accentuated by the fact that we had, as I 

have previousl~ pointed out, nearly a million persons to feed 

in the First Army sector. A good store of u. s. Army rations 

was on hand in our depot at Herzfelt, but, as previously mentioned, 

they were for U. s. troops exclusively. On the other hand, by 

the end of April, 1945, in estimating the entire stock of captured enemy subsistence, it appeared likely that we would have 

sufficient quantities to maintain our prisoners of war and 

displaced persons until approximately May 20, 1945. After that 

time, I did not see how we could possibly feed these numerous 

other people without using to some extent American ration 

components. Of course, the displacement of prisoners of war 

to the rear would alleviate the situation to some extent. 

167 
Similarly, any movement of the displaced persons out of the Army 

area would be extremely helpful. Not being able to count 

definitely on either of these two contingencies, I was forced 

to accept the worse alternative, namely, that they would remain 

with us, and, on the basis of that surmise, I was forced to the 

conclusion that after May 20th we would have no captured subsistence with which to feed them. 

Withdrawal 

Fortunately, on May 4, 1945, First Army Headquarters was 

notified of its impending move back to the United States from 

whence it would be sent to the Philippines. Just a few days 

later, a detachment of officers from Ninth Army Headquarters 

visited us for the purpose of arranging a take-over on their 

part of all of our QM troops and installations. It was with 

regret that I was forced to foist this problem in subsistence 

on the Ninth Army Quartermaster; nevertheless, the problem had 

not been of our doing and I knew that it would be handled 

competently by him and his excellent starr. 

Communications Zone QM Support 

on May 15, 1945, First Army Headquarters departed by motor 

convoy from Weimar, Germany, the location of our last CP, to 

the Port or La Havre. By direction of our Chief or Starr, I 

traveled by plane to Paris, where I had my final interview with 

General Littlejohn. It was with deep sincerity that I expressed 

to him my appreciation for making possible all that I had been 

able to do in providing Quartermaster service within the First ( 

Army. The fact that the supplies and the troops had been 

168 
available in Europe to be assigned or attached to the First Army, 

did not happen by accident. On the contrary, it happened because 

of the vision and imagination, as well as the intelligent planning, 

of General Littlejohn and the splendid staff of officers with 

which he had surrounded himself. 

In the fall of 1943, after my arrival in England from the 

Mediterranean, it was easy for me to place my demand upon General 

Littlejohn for the QM troop i.mits that I considered necessary to 

support the First Army. However, I was asking that he give me 

the troop units that he had already planned for the entire theater. 

Unless he had made it possible by his foresight that the units be 

available in the European Theater for the Continental Operation, 

I would never have been able to obtain them for use in the First 

Army. Similarly, the fresh bread, the fresh meat, the fresh eggs, 

the cigarettes and cigars, new razor blades, and other items that . were characteristically in demand and relished by the troops, 

would never have been available had they not been considered and 

thought of months in advance by this same staff. 

The fact that we had laundry service in the field, the 

fact that our combat troops when pulled out of the line would go 

by battalions towards bath points where, after hot showers, they 

would exchange their dirty clothing for clean clothing, the fact 

that in our system of burials less than two per cent of our own 

dead were required to be marked "unknown", and the fact that by 

our salvage operations hundreds of tons of clothing and equipment were repaired and were kept in circulation among our own 

169 
troops, were all reflections upon the ability and providence of 

the Chief Quartermaster of the Theater. 

Our QM Soldiers 

There were other people to whom I would have liked to express 

my thanks, had it been physically possible to do so. I was thinking of the truck drivers, who often carried our supplies and 

troops past a point of human physical endurance but who nevertheless kept going because they felt it their duty to do so; I 

was thinking of the officers and men of the 89th Quartermaster 

Railhead Company, who with enthusiasm had accepted their role as 

combat troops during the Battle of the Bulge; and I was thinking 

of those men who had stood out between our own infantry and the 

enemy tanks in the gasoline dumps at Spa while loading the cans 

of gasoline on our trucks, with the result that not one ol.Ulce of 

gasoline was lost.to the enemy. It was this impetus, this enthusiasm 

and spirit on the part of these suboromate officers and enlisted 

men which had made it possible to accomplish the Quartermaster 

mission within the First Army. 

QM Command 

And lastly, I thought of the responsibility and the resiliency 

that had typified our Quartermaster groups, battalions and companies. 

All during the campaign we had been operating the First Army with 

a Quartermaster troop command that I had thought appropriate for 

an Army of 8 divisions and 3 corps. The minimum number of divisions that we had had within First Army after the Normandy operations( 

were 12, divided into 3 corps. Most of the time, we had 15 or 

more divisions within the First Army; during the early phase of 

170 
Lasm 

y 

es. 

:ms 

~~.k-CckkC .• •• •••• 

;-(:-:;:f;/:,_\}f/i~?{i:}tt::s:::i:::f \:;(}]~tf <t) :? :-r / 

the Bulge, we had 22 ~Jllf JJA[ .... ,,, the Quartermaeter 

units of First Army Jat1~i~j1 ::.e'ea"~cl'f'tll~iI' capacities as the same 

are noted on the app:t':off~ . . . ~'~f. opga.n:lzation and equipment. 

OUr multiple movement~•£·~~ {i~l~ ,fi~~~J however, placed even a 

higher strain upon th~~~ {~~gqJl:ll:.~,~~;'tmarveled then, as I do 

now, that at no time d.i:~ -~,:.~~J~~~~rider ever tell me or any 

of my staff officeI's -t~~-,~~i~it!:tgt)lilent, plan, or ordeI' would 

be impossible in its e~~~fiiJJ~2./ 

that ti,;~.JI ,aetm>,, name>,, the fareightedSummation 

I consider , ,, '>.':,,,-:<,' 

ness of the Chief Q,tia.it'~~;t!~~?!J;r.'the Theater, the individual 

spirit of our Quarte~~;l~rif~Mci£irl;., and the ingenuity and 

ability of our troop Jd~~~r"st)tqgether combined to make possible 

the Quartermaster ser,,~~~tf{~tJ J$~iven in First Army. It is my 

further opinion that t~J•~•i~:~f&~i~as of such nature as to have 

reflected credit upon fr~~•:Q'%J£e~ster Corps. 

7 Inclosures 

171 
C 7 Inclosures: 

Inclosure I -

C 

Inclosure II -

Inclosure III -

First Army Headquarters - Organization 

and Functions - an extraction from Combat 

Operations Data First Army Part III 

Section V - The QM Section 

Mission 

Organization 

Functioning 

Staff Procedures 

Historical Examples of Functioning of the 

Section 

Brief Summary - Class I Rations Issued 

- Consumption of POL 

- Transportation 

An attempt by QM First Army to establish 

uniform Quartermaster operational procedures 

within Armies, Corps and Divisions - written 

in Germany at Bad Willogen and submitted there 

to Colonel "Lobo" Wolfe, Office of the 

Quartermaster General who visited me. 

Part II, Logistical Data extracted from 

Combat Operations Data First Army Pages 67 - 96 -

Service Troops Organic to an Army 

Traffic Headquarters, Troop Movements, and 

the Movements of Supplies 

Supply - Area needed and various average 

tonnages 

- Levels of Supply in Army Area 

173 
Inclosure IV - Annex No. 14 Quartermaster Section First 

u. s. Army Report of Operations 

20 October 1943 - l August 1944 

I. Initial Period 1n the United Kingdom 

II. The Planning Phase 

III. The Operation 

List of 31 Appendices 

l. QM Section Allocation of Duties 

2. Transportation Dispatch Form; Traffic 

Control 

3. 011 and Grease Factors in Proportion 

to Gasoline 

4. S. o. P. For Class I Truckhead 

5. s. o. P. For Class III Truckhead 

6. s. o. P. For Quartermaster Depot 

7. s. O. P. For Quartermaster Bakeries 

8. s. o. P. For Quartermaster Truck Companies 

9. Quartermaster Units to Arrive on Far Shore 

10. Extract of Rations Requisitioned D to D/41 

11. Extract of POL Requisitioned 

12. Quartermaster Annex to Administrative 

Instructions Preliminary to Mounting 

13. Quartermaster paragraphs to Administrative 

Order No. 1 

14. Class I Consumption Record 

15. Class III Consumption Record 

16. Memorandum to Corps QM's re responsibilities 

17. Circular, re Shoe and C&E Repair 

174 

C 
C 

Inclosure V -

18. statistics on salvage Collected to 

1 August 1944 

19. Statistics on Salvage Repaired to 

1 August 1944 

20. Statistics on laundry Done to 1 August 1944 

21. Statistics on Bath Done to 1 August 1944 

22. Letter from First u. s. Army 

23. Statistics of QM Sales Store to 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

1 August 1944 

Bakery Statistics to 1 August 1944 

QM Troop Assignment List 

QM Transportation Tonnage Report June 

QM Transportation Operational statistics 

Class II Beach Maintenance and Follow-up 

Maintenance Sets 

29. Extract of Maintenance Sets Requisitioned 

Class II and rv Supplies 

30. layout of QM Class II and r:v Depot 

31. Photographs - Figures 1 to 97 inclusive 

(only in the printed books of official 

history) 

Annex 10 Report of Operations First 

u. s. Army 1 August 1944 - 22 February 1945 

I. Exploitation of St. Lo Break thru 

1 August - 12 September 1944 

II. The Battle of Germany 13 September -

15 December 1944 

175 
III. The German Counter-Offensive 16 December 1944 

22 February 1945 

Note for each of these three periods 

coverage is made under the following headings 

A. General 

B. Depot Operations 

c. Class I Supplies 

D. Class II and rv Supplies 

E. Class III Supplies 

F. Transportation 

G. Graves Registration 

C 

An additional coverage of Captured Materiel ( 

is added to II and III. 

There is a list of 41 Appendices covering 

the three Sections under these headings 

1. QM Troop Assignment List for Period 

2. Class I Consumption Record for Period 

3. Bakery Statistics for Period 

4. Salvage Statistics for Period 

5. Salvage Repair Statistics for Period 

6. Laundry Statistics for Period 

7. Bath Statistics for Period 

8. Class III Consumption for Period 

9. POL Analysis Record for Period 

10. Transportation Tonnage Report for Period ( 

'---

11. Transportation Operational Statistics 

for Period 

176 
144 

Inclosure VI -

12. Status of Cemeteries as of 

12 September 1944, 15 December 1944, 

22 February 1945 

In the last two Sections appendices have 

been added on 

25. s. o. P. for Captured Materiel 

26. Procedure for Distribution of 

Captured Materiel 

27. Analysis of Captured Materiel for 

Period 

28. Letter to Units re Captured Equipment 

and Supplies 

Annex No. 10 - Quartermaster Report of 

Operations 23 February 8 May 1945 First 

U.S. Army 

Section I - The Attack of the Roer 

23-28 February 1945 

II - Drive to the Rhine 1-24 March 1945 

III - Exploitation of the Remagen 

Bridgehead 25 March - 18 April 

r:v - Final Operation 19 April - 8 May 

Each of these Sections have coverage on 

A. General 

B. Operations 

c. Class I Supplies 

D. Class II and r:v Supplies 

E. Class III Supplies 

177 
Inclosure VII -

F. Transportation 

G. Graves Registration 

H. Captured Materiel 

In addition there are 28 Appendices 

covering the four Sections under 

1. Quartermaster Troop Assignment List 

2. Class I Consumption Record and Bakery 

Statistics 

3. Salvage Collected, Salvage Repaired, 

Laundry and Bath Statistics 

4. Class III Consumption and POL 

Analysis Record 

5. Transportation Tonnage Report and 

Operational statistics 

6. Status of Cemeteries 

7. Analysis of Captured Materiel 

War Department Observer Board Reports to 

Army Ground Forces for QM Activities in First 

U. S. Army - Colonel C. C. Wilson, QMC -

A Report on QM Troop Employment, Supply, 

Clothing and Equipment, and Administration 

in First u. s. Army dated 22 May 1945 contains -

1. s. o. P. QM Truck and Troop Transport 

Companies 

2. s. o. P. Captured Enemy Materiel 

3. Circular on Graves Registration and 

Disposition of Effects 

178 

l 

> 

I 

l 
4. s. o. P. Mobile Field Bakery Companies 

and Sample Production Schedule -

British Mobile Equipment 

5. s. o. P. Class III Truckheads 

6. Employment and Operation of QM Troops 

7. S. o. P. Class I Truckheads 

8. Letter of Instructions to Commanding 

Officer, 534 QM Group 

9. As of l January 1945 List of Officers 

Assigned to QM Section First Army 

179 Army-Fort Lee,va-4606-13-Aug-58-100