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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 47979 & 47980

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KAYLA DIANNE HANCHEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: August 31, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Eric J. Wildman, District Judge. 

Orders revoking probation, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Brian R. Dickson argued. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kacey L. Jones argued. 

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LORELLO, Judge 

In these consolidated appeals, Kayla Dianne Hanchey appeals from orders revoking her 

probation in two separate cases. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hanchey pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine,

I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), in Docket No. 47979 and concealment of evidence, I.C. § 18-2603, in Docket 

No. 47980. The district court sentenced Hanchey to concurrent, unified, five-year terms, with 

minimum periods of confinement of two years; suspended the sentences; and placed Hanchey on 

probation for three years. Two months later, the State moved to revoke Hanchey’s probation. 

After Hanchey admitted violating various terms of her probation, the district court revoked her
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probation, imposed the underlying sentences, and retained jurisdiction. At the conclusion of the 

period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Hanchey back on probation for another 

three years. Two and one-half years later, the State again moved to revoke Hanchey’s probation,

alleging she tested positive for drugs on two occasions, failed to appear for “approximately” seven 

other drug tests, and failed to “make herself available for supervision.” Hanchey then absconded

to Arizona.

While in Arizona, Hanchey was convicted of a drug offense and incarcerated for a year. 

After being released, Hanchey returned to Idaho. Hanchey subsequently became aware of an 

active warrant for her arrest related to the State’s second motion for probation violation and 

voluntarily appeared in court and admitted the alleged violations. The district court released 

Hanchey to the supervision of her probation officer pending disposition of the State’s motion to 

revoke probation. During the probation violation disposition hearing, the district court asked if 

Hanchey or the State had any “additions or corrections” to the updated presentence investigation 

report (PSI). Hanchey identified two such “additions or corrections.” First, Hanchey stated that 

the PSI indicated she violated her probation by twice failing to report full-time employment 

without clarifying that she was in Arizona when the latter instance occurred. Second, Hanchey 

asserted that the PSI indicated six of the seven drug tests she submitted to were positive without

also indicating that all but one of the tests occurred prior to her absconding to Arizona. The district 

court responded to Hanchey’s proffered additions by saying, “Give me a minute here” and then 

sought disposition recommendations from the State. After hearing both parties’ disposition 

recommendations, the district court revoked Hanchey’s probation and imposed the underlying 

sentences. Hanchey appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision whether to strike information from a PSI is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. See State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961, 231 P.3d 1047, 1058 (Ct. App. 2010). A

decision to revoke probation is also discretionary. State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 

326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 

appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly 

perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; 
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(3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and 

(4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 

149, 158 (2018). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Hanchey argues the district court erred by failing to redline her PSI after accepting her 

proposed “corrections.” Hanchey also argues that the district court abused its discretion by 

revoking her probation and ordering her underlying sentences executed. The State responds that 

Hanchey has not preserved her redlining arguments and that, even if she did, she failed to establish 

that any information in her PSI should be stricken. The State further contends that Hanchey has 

not shown an abuse of discretion in the revocation of her probation or the execution of her 

underlying sentences. We conclude that Hanchey has not shown reversible error. 

A. Error Preservation 

Initially, we address the State’s preservation arguments. The State contends that 

Hanchey’s argument that the district court erred by failing to redline her PSI is not preserved. We 

first address the State’s contention that Hanchey’s claim is unpreserved because she “never 

requested that the district court reject any information” in her PSI. We decline to conclude that 

Hanchey’s claim is unpreserved on this basis. 

This Court has held that a trial court’s oral request for and apparent acceptance of 

“additions or corrections” to a PSI during sentencing can trigger the trial court’s duty to redline 

information in a PSI in the absence of a formal motion to strike. State v. Golden, 167 Idaho 509, 

512, 473 P.3d 377, 380 (Ct. App. 2020) (holding that a formal motion to strike is unnecessary 

when the trial court “specifically requests counsel to identify additions or corrections to the PSI 

for the record”). In Golden, the trial court, during the sentencing hearing, orally requested 

additions or corrections to Golden’s PSI. When Golden indicated he had some suggested additions 

or corrections, the district court responded: “All right. Just let me know which page so I can note 

the changes on the record.” Id. Golden then proposed numerous additions and corrections, 

including corrections to his criminal history, employment history, and reported level of alcohol 

consumption. As Golden identified each proposed addition or correction, the district court 

responded “all right” to each while apparently looking at a copy of the PSI. Id. On appeal, despite 
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not making a formal motion to strike, Golden argued that the trial court abused its discretion 

because “it did not redline any section of the PSI contained in the record on appeal.” Id. at 511, 

473 P.3d at 379. Because the trial court specifically requested additions or corrections to the PSI,

we held Golden was not required to make a formal motion to strike. Id. at 512, 473 P.3d at 380. 

At the outset of Hanchey’s disposition hearing, the district court orally requested “additions 

or corrections” to the PSI. In response, Hanchey indicated she had two proposed corrections or 

additions. Accordingly, Hanchey’s failure to formally move to strike information from her PSI 

does not render her redlining arguments unpreserved for appeal. See id. 

We next address the State’s contention that Hanchey’s redlining arguments are unpreserved 

because she failed to obtain an adverse ruling from the district court. It is well settled that for an 

issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the basis for 

assignment of error. State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 585, 199 P.3d 155, 160 (Ct. App. 2008);

State v. Amerson, 129 Idaho 395, 401, 925 P.2d 399, 405 (Ct. App. 1996). According to Hanchey, 

the State’s argument “is meritless under Golden” because we held in that case that “a response to 

the [trial] court’s request for additions or corrections was sufficient to justify relief.” There are, 

however, important factual distinctions between Golden and this case.

As discussed above, the trial court in Golden solicited additions and corrections to the PSI 

from the parties, indicated that it would “note the changes on the record,” and responded to each 

of Golden’s proposed additions with an “all right.” Notably, after Golden’s comments, the 

prosecution acknowledged Golden’s PSI erroneously indicated he had been charged with and 

acquitted of attempted murder. On appeal, Golden argued that the trial court abused its discretion 

because “it did not redline any section of the PSI contained in the record on appeal.” Golden, 167 

Idaho at 511, 473 P.3d at 379. Ultimately, this Court remanded the case to “ensure that the [trial] 

court’s additions or corrections are reflected on Golden’s PSI and that the corrected PSI is the one 

distributed per I.C.R. 32(h).” Golden, 167 Idaho at 512-13, 473 P.3d at 380-81. 

As previously noted, the district court solicited additions or corrections from the parties at 

the beginning of Hanchey’s disposition hearing. After hearing Hanchey’s proposed changes to the 

PSI, the district court responded by saying, “Give me a minute here. Okay.” Hanchey interprets 

the district court’s response to that solicitation as indicating the district court’s acceptance of her 

proposed revisions. However, unlike Golden, where the trial court responded to each of the 
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solicited additions and corrections in a manner reasonably indicating acceptance, or at least a 

willingness to note the changes on the record, the district court’s response to Hanchey’s proposed 

additions and corrections was, at best, ambiguous. More importantly, and also unlike Golden, the 

State did not acknowledge that Hanchey’s PSI contained any inaccurate or unreliable information, 

nor did Hanchey offer any evidence indicating such. Rather, Hanchey’s counsel merely asked that 

additional information be included in the PSI to reflect Hanchey’s explanation regarding her 

failure to report full-time employment and to reflect the timing of her failed drug tests relative to 

absconding. 

Moreover, in light of the district court’s request for disposition recommendations from the 

State immediately after saying “Okay,” that statement is most reasonably interpreted as a means 

of transitioning to a different topic--not an express acceptance of Hanchey’s proposed additions. 

In short, under the circumstances, we will not infer from the district court’s response that it 

accepted Hanchey’s proposed additions to her PSI. Thus, we lack any determination by the district 

court subject to appellate review. Accordingly, Hanchey’s argument that the district court erred 

by failing to redline her PSI is unpreserved due to her failure to obtain a ruling from the district 

court regarding the acceptance of her proposed additions. 

B. Additions to PSI

Even if Hanchey had obtained a sufficiently clear ruling from the district court regarding

her proposed additions, her redlining argument would fail on the merits. Hanchey argues that the 

district court abused its discretion by failing to redline her PSI after accepting her proffered 

additions to the document. The State responds that Hanchey failed to show she is entitled to have 

any information added to the PSI in order to prevent future prejudice. 

The rules of evidence do not apply to a PSI or in probation revocation proceedings. 

I.R.E. 101(e)(1); see State v. Peters, 119 Idaho 382, 382, 807 P.2d 61, 61 (1991) (observing that 

the rules of evidence do not apply to probation revocation proceedings); Golden, 167 Idaho at 511, 

473 P.3d at 379 (observing that the rules of evidence do not apply to a PSI). Trial courts have the 

discretion to consider information in a PSI believed to be reliable that would otherwise be 

inadmissible at trial so long as the defendant receives an opportunity to present favorable evidence 

and explain or rebut the adverse information. Molen, 148 Idaho at 961, 231 P.3d at 1058. Two 

distinct obligations limit this discretion. Not only must a trial court reject inaccurate, unfounded,
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or unreliable information contained in a PSI, such information must also be “redlined”1 from the 

document. Golden, 167 Idaho at 511, 473 P.3d at 379. The trial court must then forward a copy 

of the redlined PSI to the Idaho Department of Correction. Id. This procedure ensures a clear 

record for review and protects the defendant against future misuse of the unreliable information. 

Molen, 148 Idaho at 961, 231 P.3d at 1058. A trial court need not, however, strike or disregard 

any information in a PSI that a defendant disputes. State v. Carey, 152 Idaho 720, 722, 274 P.3d 

21, 23 (Ct. App. 2012). If disputed portions of the PSI are not facially unreliable, the defendant 

must supply a sufficient basis for the trial court to make an independent determination on the 

reliability of the disputed information. Id. at 722-23, 274 P.3d at 23-24. 

 Hanchey faults the district court for failing to redline two aspects of her PSI. After ensuring 

that both parties had received copies of the PSI, the district court solicited additions and corrections 

to the PSI. In response to that request, the following exchange occurred: 

[Court]: Okay. Were there--I note that [the PSI] was one issued in an

older case, but then there was also new commentary on [the PSI]. 

So were there any additions or corrections to that?

[Counsel]: There were just a couple that Ms. Hanchey brought to my 

attention. The first one is on page three. It does say that--well, I 

guess part of her violations were that she didn’t report full-time 

employment in February of 2018 or May of 2019. In May of 2019 

she was still in Arizona and in custody. No, she was out on parole. 

So I don’t know. Anyway, so she was still in Arizona at that point.

And then on the last page of the report, page eighteen, it 

states that out of seven drug tests that she provided, six resulted in 

positives for an illegal substance. Those were all before she went to 

Arizona, so initially in the probation violation. Those were not new 

tests. She just had the one on January 16th. 

[Court]: Give me one minute here. Okay. I’ll hear comments and 

recommendations from the State.

The PSI in the appellate record does not reflect that the district court modified the document to 

include Hanchey’s proffered additions. The absence of modifications is unsurprising, however, as 

the file stamp on the version of Hanchey’s PSI included in the record on appeal indicates that the 

 

1 “Redlining” refers to a process by which a trial court “physically notes” the excluded 

portions of a PSI on the document. Id. at 961, 231 P.3d at 1058. This process includes the physical 

notation of both additions and corrections on a PSI. Golden, 167 Idaho at 512-13, 473 P.3d at 380-

81. 
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document was filed prior to the disposition hearing.2 However, under somewhat similar 

circumstances, this Court has remanded to ensure that the version of a PSI distributed per 

I.C.R. 32(h) contained a trial court’s additions and corrections to a PSI. See Golden, 167 Idaho at 

512-13, 473 P.3d at 380-81. 

Assuming that the district court accepted Hanchey’s proposed additions to the PSI, 

Hanchey argues on appeal that, “when the district court accepts a proffered correction, its duty to 

redline the PSI kicks in.” Hanchey’s argument misapprehends the scope of a trial court’s 

obligation to redline a PSI. A trial court’s obligation to redline a PSI has consistently been 

identified with the prohibition against the inclusion of conjecture and speculation in a PSI and the 

trial court’s duty to disregard such information. See I.C.R. 32(e)(1) (“conjecture and speculation 

should not be included in the presentence report”); Golden, 167 Idaho at 511, 473 P.3d at 379

(observing that trial courts must disregard inaccurate, unfounded, or unreliable information in a 

PSI). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that facially speculative and unreliable information in a 

PSI should be stricken absent an explanation from the presentence investigator indicating why the 

information was deemed reliable. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183, 824 P.2d 109, 114 (1991).

But see State v. Sivak, 127 Idaho 387, 390, 901 P.2d 494, 497 (1995) (holding that the inclusion 

of hearsay statements in a PSI implied that the presentence investigator found the statements 

reliable). The only information that this Court has indicated should be redlined from a PSI is

information found to be inaccurate or unreliable. See Molen, 148 Idaho at 961, 231 P.3d at 1058; 

State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262, 971 P.2d 327, 328 (Ct. App. 1998). Although Golden

involved “additions and corrections” to a PSI, the proffered additions and corrections that the trial 

court ostensibly accepted in that case remedied inaccurate information in the PSI. For example, 

the trial court in Golden changed the restitution section of the PSI to correctly reflect Golden’s 

employment status, and the trial court revised comments about Golden’s criminal record that 

misstated his pending charges. In short, a trial court has an obligation to redline a PSI only to 

eliminate speculation and conjecture or to remedy inaccuracies. See Carey, 152 Idaho at 722-23, 

274 P.3d at 23-24. A trial court need not revise a PSI, however, to incorporate all information 

 

2 Hanchey’s appellate brief asserts “[a]ppellate counsel inquired of the district court clerk 

whether there was a copy of the new PSI with these corrections marked on it and was informed 

there was not.” 
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proffered by a defendant. See I.C.R. 32(b) (describing required content of presentence 

investigation reports). 

The critical question then is not, as Hanchey contends, whether the district court found her

proffered additions reliable. Rather, we must address whether Hanchey triggered the district 

court’s obligation to redline her PSI by disputing facially unreliable information or by presenting

sufficient information for the district court to independently determine the reliability of the 

challenged information. See id. As Hanchey did not argue that her PSI contained any facially 

unreliable information, our review is limited to whether she presented sufficient information for 

the district court to determine that the disputed portions of her PSI were inaccurate or unreliable. 

As described above, the first portion of the PSI that Hanchey addressed during her 

disposition hearing was a section reciting the official version of her alleged probation violations. 

Specifically, Hanchey commented on a statement in that section indicating that she violated her 

probation by, among other things, “not reporting full-time viable employment in February 2018 

and May 2019.” During the disposition hearing, Hanchey did not expressly dispute that she had 

not reported full-time employment in May 2019. Instead, Hanchey asserted only that she “was 

still in Arizona at that point” on parole. 

On appeal, Hanchey contends that the State conceded this portion of her PSI contains 

inaccurate information. In support of this argument, Hanchey cites a section of the State’s brief 

on appeal indicating that her objection to the PSI arose from an apparent typographical error in her 

probation officer’s original report of violations that was reiterated in the PSI.3 However, 

Hanchey’s objection to the PSI during the disposition hearing did not bring the alleged 

typographical error to the district court’s attention, nor did she dispute that she failed to report 

full-time employment in 2019. Moreover, Hanchey’s proffered addition, which would have added 

information about when she was on parole in Arizona, would not have eliminated or corrected the

inaccurate information she now contends was included in her PSI. Thus, Hanchey failed to present 

 

3 The original report of violations, dated June 5, 2018, states that Hanchey reported she was 

employed during a May 22, 2019, office visit. The report goes on to state that the employer 

indicated Hanchey had not returned after her first day of employment. The State’s appellate brief 

asserts that the date listed for Hanchey’s office meeting with her probation officer is a 

typographical error as the report was drafted and filed with the district court in 2018. 
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sufficient information to the district court to facilitate an independent determination that the 

information indicating she failed to report employment in 2019 was unreliable or inaccurate. 

Consequently, Hanchey’s proffered addition did not trigger the district court’s obligation to redline 

the PSI. 

The second portion of the PSI Hanchey addressed was a comment by the presentence 

investigator that, “out of the seven drug tests [Hanchey] has provided, six have resulted positive 

for an illegal substance.” Hanchey did not dispute during the disposition hearing that six of her 

seven drug tests indicated she had used controlled substances. Rather, Hanchey merely noted that 

only one of the seven tests had occurred since she returned from Arizona. However, another 

section of Hanchey’s PSI indicated that the seven drug tests occurred between May 2018 and 

February 2020. The special progress report from Hanchey’s probation officer included in the PSI 

indicates that she tested positive for drugs only once after returning to Idaho. Thus, even if the 

presentence investigator’s comment (considered in isolation) could be interpreted as suggesting

Hanchey had tested positive for drugs six times since returning from Arizona, a fair reading of the 

entire PSI belies such an interpretation. Accordingly, Hanchey did not present information to the 

district court indicating that the presentence investigator’s comments were inaccurate or unreliable

such that the district court had a duty to redline that portion of the PSI. 

In sum, Hanchey’s proffered additions did not trigger the district court’s obligation to 

redline the PSI. Accordingly, even if the district court found Hanchey’s proffered additions 

reliable and the version of her PSI distributed per I.C.R. 32(h) does not contain the additions, 

Hanchey has not shown error. 

B. Probation Revocation

Hanchey contends that the district court erred by revoking her probation and imposing her 

underlying sentences. It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms 

and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 

Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 

P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 

1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a trial court must examine whether the 

probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation while protecting society. State v. Upton, 127 

Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 
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327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been 

established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is 

authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 

327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also 

order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601. 

A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the 

trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the 

propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial 

court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. 

App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant 

to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id.

On appeal, Hanchey does not challenge her admission to violating her probation. Thus, 

our review will focus on the district court’s decision to revoke probation. During Hanchey’s

disposition hearing, the district court indicated that her lengthy history of poor performance on 

probation rendered her an unsuitable candidate for probation. The district court stated:

The first thing that pops up is these are both very old cases, and you have been 

given multiple opportunities to turn your life around. You’ve had inpatient 

treatment. You’ve had an opportunity at drug court. You’ve had an opportunity at 

a retained jurisdiction, and the indications to me are that you haven’t changed.

You’re pregnant, and you’re using while you’re pregnant. You’re definitely 

not a suitable candidate for probation in that regard. In fact, even with my 

probationers with drug court who are pregnant and continue to use, I’m hesitant to 

put them in drug court. 

Considering the age of the cases and opportunities Hanchey received to rehabilitate, the district 

court revoked her probation in an exercise of discretion.

Hanchey contends that the two grounds the district court articulated for revoking her 

probation “do not demonstrate that probation could not achieve the goal of rehabilitation in [her] 

case.” Despite a lengthy history of drug use and noncompliance with probation, Hanchey asserts 

that “prior treatment efforts were not wholly ineffective, and that, with proper supervision, 

probation could achieve the goals of sentencing.” Hanchey’s argument is unpersuasive and does 

not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Two months into Hanchey’s first probationary term, she

was terminated from drug court and admitted multiple probation violations, resulting in revocation 
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of her probation and a period of retained jurisdiction. During a second term of probation following 

the period of retained jurisdiction, Hanchey absconded when the State moved to revoke her 

probation again after several positive drug tests, failed to appear for other such tests, and missed

appointments with her probation officer. While absconding from her Idaho probation, Hanchey 

was incarcerated in Arizona after being convicted of another drug crime. Once under supervised 

release after returning to Idaho, Hanchey tested positive for marijuana on one occasion, admitted

using the drug on another occasion, and changed her address without first informing her probation 

officer. Moreover, even if Hanchey was unaware of her pregnancy when she used marijuana after 

returning to Idaho, as she claimed during the disposition hearing, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion by considering the possibility that she may continue using drugs while pregnant in 

light of her prior history of drug use and noncompliance. 

Applying the relevant legal standards, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion 

by revoking Hanchey’s probation and ordering execution of her underlying sentences. The district 

court expressly recognized the decision to revoke probation was discretionary and exercised that 

discretion to revoke Hanchey’s probation and order her sentences executed. In doing so, the 

district court acted consistently with applicable legal standards and within the boundaries of its 

discretion after determining that Hanchey was not a suitable candidate for probation. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Hanchey has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by failing to redline 

her PSI or by revoking her probation and ordering her sentences executed. Accordingly, the 

district court’s orders revoking Hanchey’s probation are affirmed. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.