-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 26, 2016 

v No. 325290 

Kalamazoo Circuit Court 

ANTHONY RAMON TRICE, LC No. 2014-000243-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee. 

Before: SAAD, P.J., and BORRELLO and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 A jury convicted defendant of possession of less than 50 grams of cocaine with intent to 

deliver, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d). Defendant 

was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to two days in jail for each 

conviction, with credit for two days, and to 48 months’ probation in the Swift and Sure Sanctions 

program. Defendant appeals, and the prosecution cross-appeals. We affirm defendant’s 

convictions but remand for further sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 On appeal, defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him 

guilty of possession of less than 50 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. An appeal based on 

the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. People v Henderson, 306 Mich App 1, 8; 

854 NW2d 234 (2014). When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of 

fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 8-9. 

 The elements of possession of less than 50 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver 

include: (1) the substance is cocaine, (2) it weighs less than 50 grams, (3) defendant was not 

authorized to possess the cocaine, and (4) defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine with the 

intent to deliver. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 516-517; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), mod 441 

Mich 1201 (1992); see also MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). “The element of knowing possession with 

intent to deliver has two components: possession and intent.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 

600, 622; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). “Possession with intent to deliver can be established by 

circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence.” Wolfe, 440 Mich 

at 526. 
-2- 

 On appeal, defendant only challenges the jury’s finding that he knowingly possessed the 

cocaine. In this case, the police received a tip indicating that defendant would be selling cocaine 

and that the cocaine might be hidden in his pants. The evidence supported that while defendant 

was being transported to the police station, he was heard moving quite a bit and kicking in the 

back seat of the police car. Defendant was captured on the police car’s video making a gesture 

that was consistent with him putting something out of the window of the police car. Upon 

reviewing videos from his police car, the officer who transported defendant to jail concluded that 

defendant’s movement occurred at the same location where a baggie containing 28 grams of 

cocaine was found approximately one-half hour later. Furthermore, the cocaine was not visible 

in the road in the images captured by the dashboard camera of the car transporting defendant to 

jail, but was visible in the road in the images captured by the dashboard camera of a police car 

that followed approximately two minutes later. On the basis of this evidence, the jury could 

reasonably find that defendant had the cocaine hidden on his person when he was placed in the 

police car, and that he then tossed it out of the window of the police car on the way to the police 

station. Thus, although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s 

conclusion that defendant possessed the cocaine. See People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 423-

424; 646 NW2d 158 (2002); People v Chandler, 201 Mich App 611, 613; 506 NW2d 882 

(1993). 

 On cross-appeal, the prosecution claims that the trial court erred when it failed to state on 

the record substantial and compelling reasons for its departure from the sentencing guidelines. 

Subsequent to defendant’s sentencing, however, our Supreme Court held that Michigan’s 

sentencing guidelines were advisory only and struck down “the requirement in MCL 769.34(3) 

that a sentencing court that departs from the applicable guidelines range must articulate a 

substantial and compelling reason for that departure.” People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 364-

365; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). Thus, the prosecution’s claim that the trial court erred by failing to 

state substantial and compelling reasons for its downward departure is no longer viable under 

Michigan law. Id.; see People v Steanhouse, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No 

318329, issued October 22, 2015); slip op, p 21 n 14 (“Because a trial court is no longer required 

to provide a substantial and compelling reason for a departure from the sentencing guidelines 

under Lockridge, we need not review defendant’s argument specifically concerning whether the 

reasons articulated by the trial court were substantial and compelling.”) 

 In Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392, the Court stated that “[a] sentence that departs from the 

applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an appellate court for reasonableness.” 

However, in Steanhouse, this Court recognized that Lockridge did not set out the appropriate 

procedure for reviewing the reasonableness of a departure sentence. Steanhouse, ___ Mich App 

at ___ (slip op at 21). As a result, the Steanhouse Court adopted the “principle of 

proportionality” test that was in place under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 

(1990), and held “that a sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under Milbourn and 

its progeny constitutes a reasonable sentence under Lockridge.” Steanhouse, ___ Mich App at 

___ (slip op at 24). This Court later explained that 

[i]n a nutshell, Milbourn’s “principle of proportionality” requires a sentence “to 

be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense 

and the offender.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. [People v Masroor, ___ Mich 
-3- 

App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No 322280, issued November 24, 2015), slip 

op, p 7.]1

 This Court in Steanhouse set forth the following procedure that should be followed when 

reviewing a defendant’s departure sentence: 

 Given that Lockridge overturned the substantial and compelling reason 

standard, Lockridge, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 29, which was in place at the 

time of defendant’s sentencing, and given our conclusion that the principle of 

proportionality established under Milbourn and its progeny is now the appropriate 

standard by which a defendant’s sentence should be reviewed, we also find that 

the procedure articulated in Lockridge, and modeled on that adopted in United 

States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005), should apply here. Lockridge, ___ 

Mich at ___; slip op at 33-36. As recently stated by this Court in People v Stokes, 

___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW2d ___ ([Docket No. 321303, issued September 

8, 2015]); slip op at 11, “the purpose of a Crosby remand is to determine what 

effect Lockridge would have on the defendant’s sentence, so that it may be 

determined whether any prejudice resulted from the error.” While the Lockridge 

Court did not explicitly hold that the Crosby procedure applies under the 

circumstances of this case, we conclude this is the proper remedy where, as here, 

the trial court was unaware of and not expressly bound by a reasonableness 

standard rooted in the Milbourn principle of proportionality at the time of 

sentencing. 

 Under the Crosby procedure, which “offers a measure of protection to a 

defendant[,]” “a defendant is provided with an opportunity ‘to avoid resentencing 

by promptly notifying the trial judge that resentencing will not be sought.’ ” 

Stokes, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 11-12, quoting Lockridge, ___ Mich 

at___; slip op at 35. Given the possibility that defendant could receive a more 

severe sentence, defendant should be provided the opportunity to avoid 

resentencing if that is his desire. Stokes, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 12. 

Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court to follow the Crosby 

procedure outlined in Lockridge. Defendant “may elect to forego resentencing by 

providing the trial court with prompt notice of his intention to do so. If 

‘notification is not received in a timely manner,’ the trial court shall continue with 

the Crosby remand procedure as explained in Lockridge.” Stokes, ___ Mich App 

at ___; slip op at 12, quoting Lockridge, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 35-36. 

[Steanhouse, ___Mich App at ___ (slip op at 25).] 

 

1

 It should be noted that this Court in Masroor stated that it followed the decision in Steanhouse

only because it was required to do so under MCR 7.215(J)(1). Masroor, ___ Mich App at ___ 

(slip op at 1). The Masroor Court, if it were not bound by Steanhouse, would have applied the 

federal reasonableness standard described in Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 46; 128 S Ct 586; 

169 L Ed 2d 445 (2007). Masroor, ___ Mich App at ___ (slip op at 1). 
-4- 

 In this case, as in Steanhouse, when the trial court sentenced defendant, it “was unaware 

of and not expressly bound by a reasonableness standard rooted in the Milbourn principle of 

proportionality.” Id. (slip op at 25). Thus, as directed by Steanhouse, we remand this case to the 

trial court for a Crosby hearing. Because the prosecution is the party challenging the trial court’s 

departure from the sentencing guidelines, on remand the prosecution—not defendant—may 

“elect to forego resentencing” by providing the trial court with prompt notice of its intention to 

do so. See id. (slip op at 25). If such notice is not received by the trial court in a timely manner, 

it shall continue with the Crosby remand. Id. (slip op at 25). If resentencing occurs, the trial 

court must “specifically justify the extent of any departure sentence the court may elect to 

impose,” and “explain why the sentence imposed is proportionate to the seriousness of the 

convicted offenses, taking into account defendant’s background and any mitigating factors 

brought forward by counsel.” Masroor, ___ Mich App at ___ (slip op at 11). 

 We affirm defendant’s convictions but remand for further sentencing proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola