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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

NATHAN MURPHY-DUBAY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

August 18, 2015 

9:00 a.m. 

v No. 321380 

Court of Claims 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND 

REGULATORY AFFAIRS and DIRECTOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND 

REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 

LC No. 14-000019-MZ 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

NATHAN MURPHY-DUBAY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 321749 

Ingham Circuit Court 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND 

REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

LC No. 13-001164AA 

 

Before: SAWYER, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In Docket No. 321380, plaintiff appeals as of right from an opinion and order of the 

Court of Claims granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on plaintiff’s complaint 

for a writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment; plaintiff sought to compel the Department of 

Licensing and Regulatory Affairs to take action on his purported application for a limited license 

to practice medicine. In Docket No. 321749, plaintiff appeals as of right from a final order of the 

circuit court affirming the decision of the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, 

Bureau of Health Care Services, Professional Licensing Section, which rejected the application. 

We affirm. 
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I. FACTS 

 Plaintiff attended Saba University School of Medicine, located on the island of Saba in 

the Netherland Antilles. He completed two years of coursework, followed by two years of 

clinical rotations through Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, Canada. After his clinical 

rotations, plaintiff returned to Michigan and began seeking entrance into postgraduate clinical 

training programs (commonly known as “residencies”), but was unable to secure a position.1

 On June 18, 2013, plaintiff submitted an application on a form he created himself, 

seeking a “limited license” to practice medicine within the State of Michigan pursuant to MCL 

333.16182(1). On July 29, 2013, plaintiff sent defendants a follow-up letter, asking for a 

favorable response, or, in the event of a denial, for an opportunity to be heard pursuant to MCL 

333.16232. On September 23, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus and 

declaratory judgment in the Ingham Circuit Court seeking an order directing defendants to take 

action on his June 18, 2013 application and entry of a judgment declaring the rights of the parties 

regarding medical licensure under applicable constitutional, statutory, and administrative law. 

 On September 30, 2013, the manager of the Bureau of Health Care Services, Professional 

Licensing Section, sent plaintiff a letter explaining that the board of medicine does not issue 

limited licenses to individuals upon request and that limited licenses are “typically issued for a 

group of licensees who either have restrictions to the location in which they may physically 

practice such as with an educational limited license or for disciplinary purposes for someone who 

has previously held a full license.” In addition, the manager explained that MCL 333.16232 does 

not authorize a hearing for someone whose education or training does not meet the requirements 

for licensure as a physician, but applies to initial licensure applicants who meet the educational 

and training requirements, but are denied licensure for reasons related to past criminal 

convictions, previous disciplinary actions, or other issues that may impact or relate to their 

overall good moral character and ability to practice safely and legally in the State of Michigan, 

giving those individuals the opportunity for a hearing to demonstrate that, despite their history, 

they currently possess good moral character and can practice their profession safely. On October 

18, 2013, plaintiff filed an appeal in the Ingham Circuit Court seeking judicial review of 

defendants’ September 30, 2013 letter rejecting his application for a limited license and request 

for a hearing.2

 On October 28, 2013, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s 

complaint for a writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and 

 

1

 Plaintiff has also taken and passed “Step 3” of the United States Medical Licensing 

Examination (USMLE), which is typically taken after one has completed a residency. 

2

 Although plaintiff characterizes the agency’s action as “denying” him a license, the agency’s 

action is more accurately characterized as rejecting his application (again, the application form 

was created by plaintiff himself because the agency had not and does not recognize the type of 

license plaintiff believed he was entitled to under MCL 333.16182(1)). The agency refunded the 

application fee plaintiff included with his application. 
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(C)(10). On November 1, 2013, plaintiff filed a response. On January 23, 2014, due to statutory 

changes, plaintiff’s writ of mandamus and request for declaratory judgment claims were 

transferred to the Court of Claims pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3), while the appeal of the agency 

decision remained in circuit court. 

 On April 1, 2014, the Court of Claims issued an opinion and order granting defendants’ 

motion for summary disposition on plaintiff’s complaint for a writ of mandamus and declaratory 

judgment pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). On April 28, 2014, the Ingham Circuit Court issued a 

final order affirming the September 30, 2013 agency decision. 

II. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 333.16182 

 Plaintiff first asserts that defendants misinterpreted and misapplied the Public Health 

Code, 1978 PA 368, as amended, MCL 333.1101 et seq., when they failed to issue him a 

“limited license” to practice medicine, which he contended was permitted by MCL 

333.16182(1). We disagree.3

 MCL 333.16182 states as follows: 

 (1) A board may grant a limited license to an individual if the board 

determines that the limitation is consistent with the ability of the individual to 

practice the health profession in a safe and competent manner, is necessary to 

protect the health and safety of patients or clients, or is appropriate to promote the 

efficient and effective delivery of health care services. 

 (2) In addition to the licenses issued under subsection (1), a board may 

grant the following types of limited licenses upon application by an individual or 

upon its own determination: 

 (a) Educational, to an individual engaged in postgraduate education. 

 (b) Nonclinical, to an individual who functions only in a nonclinical 

academic, research, or administrative setting and who does not hold himself or 

herself out to the public as being actively engaged in the practice of the health 

profession, or otherwise directly solicit patients or clients. 

 (c) Clinical academic, to an individual who practices the health profession 

only as part of an academic institution and only in connection with his or her 

employment or other contractual relationship with that academic institution. For 

an individual applying for a limited license under this subdivision to engage in the 

 

3

 This issue of statutory interpretation presents a question of law reviewed de novo. Huron 

Behavioral Health v Dep’t of Community Health, 293 Mich App 491, 497; 813 NW2d 763 

(2011). 
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practice of medicine under part 170, “academic institution” means that term as 

defined in section 17001. 

Specifically, plaintiff asserts that part 1 of subsection (1), which authorizes a limited license 

when “consistent with the ability of the individual to practice the health profession in a 

competent manner,” is applicable here, and “[i]t is this provision that authorizes the Agency to 

issue Appellant a limited license which it refuses to do.” 

 Subsection (1) permits a limited license to be issued if any of its three criteria are met, 

including the “consistent with the ability” condition upon which plaintiff relies. However, the 

Legislature via the Public Health Code invested in the various medical boards broad discretion 

with respect to the licensing of applicants to practice medicine. It did not, as plaintiff asserts, 

unambiguously provide in subsection (1) that a board grant a limited license to practice medicine 

to someone in plaintiff’s particular situation. 

 For example, MCL 333.16174(1) permits a board to enact rules that promote safe and 

competent practice and informed consumer choice: 

 An individual who is licensed or registered under this article shall meet all 

of the following requirements: 

* * * 

 (c) Have a specific education or experience in the health profession or in a 

health profession subfield or health profession specialty field of the health 

profession, or training equivalent, or both, as prescribed by this article or rules of 

a board necessary to promote safe and competent practice and informed consumer 

choice. 

MCL 333.16141(3) makes it clear that it is the boards that set the standards: “The department 

may promulgate rules to promote the effective and consistent administration of this article. 

However, the department shall not promulgate rules that constitute the licensure, registration, or 

examination of health professionals.” Likewise, MCL 333.16148(1) provides that “a board may 

promulgate rules to establish standards for the education and training of individuals to be 

licensed or registered, or whose licenses or registrations are to be renewed, for the purposes of 

determining whether graduates of a training program have the knowledge and skills requisite for 

practice of a health profession or use of a title.” MCL 333.16146(2)(b) permits a board to 

“[r]eclassify licenses on the basis of a determination that the addition or removal of conditions or 

restrictions is appropriate.” And, MCL 333.16145(3) states that “[o]nly a board or task force 

shall promulgate rules to specify requirements for licenses, registrations, renewals, examinations, 

and required passing scores.” 

 In MCL 333.16175, the Legislature directed that a board or its task forces “consider” 

various factors in developing the standards: 

 In developing minimum standards of educational prerequisites for 

licensure or registration, a board and its task forces shall consider equivalency and 

proficiency testing and other mechanisms, and where appropriate grant credit for 
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past training, education, or experience in health and related fields. Standards may 

include those for formal education, practice proficiency, and other training, 

education, or experience which may provide equivalence to completion of formal 

educational requirements. 

This statute does not restrict a board in its decisions that follow the above considerations. 

Rather, it reflects a grant of power and discretion. 

 Finally, it is evident from viewing the entire regulatory scheme (rather than only looking 

at MCL 333.16182 in isolation), that subsection (1) was provided so that a board or task force 

may, in its discretion, issue limited licenses in disciplinary proceedings. See Nolan v Mich Dep’t 

of Licensing & Regulation, 151 Mich App 641, 653; 391 NW2d 424 (1986); MCL 333.16108 

(defining “reinstatement” as “the granting of a license or certificate of registration, with or 

without limitations or conditions, to an individual whose license or certificate of registration has 

been suspended or revoked,” and “reclassification” as “an action by a disciplinary subcommittee 

by which restrictions or conditions, or both, applicable to a license are added or removed.”); 

MCL 333.16106 (defining “limitation” as “an action by which a board imposes restrictions or 

conditions, or both, on a license,” and “limited license” as “a license to which restrictions or 

conditions, or both, as to scope of practice, place of practice, supervision of practice, duration of 

licensed status, or type or condition of patient or client served are imposed by a board.”); MCL 

333.16226 (instructing disciplinary subcommittees to order a limited license as a sanction for 

certain violations); MCL 333.16245(“an individual whose license is limited, suspended, or 

revoked under this part may apply to his or her board or task force for a reinstatement of a 

revoked or suspended license or reclassification of a limited license pursuant to section 16247 or 

16249.”); MCL 333.16247(1)(“A board or task force may reinstate a license or issue a limited 

license to an individual whose license has been suspended or revoked under this part if after a 

hearing the board or task force is satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant is 

of good moral character, is able to practice the profession with reasonable skill and safety to 

patients, has met the criteria in the rules promulgated under section 16245(6), and should be 

permitted in the public interest to practice.”); MCL 333.16249(“A disciplinary subcommittee 

may reclassify a license limited under this part to alter or remove the limitations if, after a 

hearing, it is satisfied that the applicant will practice the profession safely and competently 

within the area of practice and under conditions stipulated by the disciplinary subcommittee, and 

should be permitted in the public interest to so practice.”). 

 Plaintiff’s argument that defendants misinterpreted and misapplied the relevant portions 

of the Public Health Code fails. Plaintiff’s argument that the availability of medical care would 

be enhanced by issuance of the type of limited license he seeks should be directed to the 

Legislature and/or the appropriate agencies for consideration as a matter of policy. 

III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 

 Plaintiff next argues that if the licensing rules at issue do not authorize at least a limited 

medical license for individuals who have demonstrated competence through the testing process, 

i.e., passing “Step 3” of the USMLE, those rules should be declared an unconstitutional exercise 
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of the state’s authority to regulate the professions because they violate his due process and equal 

protection guarantees. We disagree.4

 “That the State through the legislature may provide for the licensure and regulation of 

professions, like the healing arts in which the public interest is very great, is not open to 

question.” Fowler v Bd of Registration in Chiropody, 374 Mich 254, 256; 132 NW2d 82 (1965). 

This is because the right to engage in business is subject to the state’s police powers to enact 

laws in furtherance of the public health, safety, welfare, and morals. Grocers Dairy Co. v. Dep’t 

of Agriculture Director, 377 Mich 71, 75, 138 NW2d 767 (1966). Accordingly, when legislation 

is challenged on due process and equal protection grounds because of its interference with 

economic or business activity, the challenger must establish either that no legitimate public 

purpose is served by the legislation or that there is no rational relationship between the 

provisions and a legitimate public purpose. Stanfield v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 128 

Mich App 207, 211-212; 339 NW2d 876 (1983). Thus, there is a two-step inquiry: (1) whether 

there is a legitimate public purpose, and if so, (2) whether there a rational relationship between 

the legislation and the public purpose sought to be achieved. 

 In this case, there is a legitimate public purpose served by the legislation: to protect the 

public by ensuring that medicine is practiced in a safe and competent manner. The real dispute is 

over whether there is a rational relationship between the postgraduate residency requirement and 

this legitimate public purpose. 

 We conclude that the Public Health Code’s requirement that a period of postgraduate 

education must be completed before a license may be issued is rationally related to ensuring that 

medicine is practiced in a safe and competent manner. The requirement that a residency must be 

completed before a person can be licensed to practice medicine is rationally related to this public 

purpose because it ensures that those who practice medicine possess a certain amount of medical 

education and training and that they have adequately demonstrated their fitness and capacity to 

practice medicine in a safe and competent manner by completing a residency. Although plaintiff 

may be correct that there is a physician shortage and extensive areas of the state are medically 

underserved, that fact is of little relevance. The legitimate public purpose that must be rationally 

related to the residency requirement is ensuring the safe and competent practice of medicine, not 

reducing physician shortage and eliminating medical underservice. The residency requirement 

helps ensure that all licensed physicians attain proficiency in the practice of medicine. Although 

eliminating this requirement may reduce physician shortage and medical underservice, it would 

also frustrate the board of medicine’s ability to ensure that all licensed physicians have attained 

the requisite proficiency. Accordingly, because the Public Health Code’s requirement that a 

period of postgraduate education must be completed before a license may be issued is rationally 

related to a legitimate public purpose, it neither violates due process nor constitutes a denial of 

equal protection and plaintiff’s constitutional claims fail. 

 

4

 This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo. In re Ayers, 239 Mich App 8, 10; 608 

NW2d 132 (1999). 
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IV. ACTS IN EXCESS OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND UNLAWFUL 

SUBDELEGATION 

 Plaintiff next argues that the board of medicine exceeded its authority under MCL 

333.17031(1) and that the Public Health Code’s regulatory scheme results in the improper 

subdelegation of the licensing decision. We disagree.5

 MCL 333.17031(1) states: “An applicant for a license must complete the requirements 

for the degree in medicine and must complete a period of postgraduate education to attain 

proficiency in the practice of the profession, as prescribed by the board in rules . . . .” (Emphasis 

added). Pursuant to this statute, the board of medicine adopted a rule requiring applicants to 

satisfactorily complete two years of postgraduate clinical training in a program approved by the 

board in a board-approved hospital or institution. Mich Admin Code, R 338.2316(4); R 

338.2317(4). Regarding approved programs and facilities, the board adopted the following 

standards: 

 (2) The board approves and adopts by reference the standards for 

accrediting hospitals which were adopted in April, 1986, by the joint commission 

on accreditation of hospitals and which were effective January 1, 1987. The 

board shall consider any hospital or institution that is accredited by the joint 

commission on accreditation of hospitals as a hospital or institution approved by 

the board. 

 (3) The board approves and adopts by reference the standards for 

approving postgraduate clinical training programs which were adopted in 1987 by 

the accreditation council for graduate medical education and which were effective 

July 1, 1987, entitled “The Essentials of Accredited Residencies in Graduate 

Medical Education,” and the board shall designate any program of postgraduate 

clinical training approved by the accreditation council for graduate medical 

education as a program approved by the board. [Mich Admin Code, R 338.2313.] 

 Plaintiff asserts that, in adopting the above rules, the board of medicine exceeded its 

statutory authority because the goal of MCL 333.17031(1) is “proficiency,” and the 

Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) has declared its purpose to be 

the preparation of physicians for practice in a medical specialty. Per plaintiff, while 

“specialization” in the medical profession may be viewed as a worthy goal, it is not an objective 

expressed in the Public Health Code. Thus, according to plaintiff, by adopting ACGME 

standards, the board enlarged its authority by requiring something that the Public Health Code 

does not. 

 

5

 Whether a decision by an agency is in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the 

agency is an issue of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law reviewed de novo. 

Huron Behavioral Health, 293 Mich App at 497. 
-8- 

 As discussed above, the flaw in plaintiff’s argument is that the Legislature, via the Public 

Health Code, invested in the board of medicine broad discretion with respect to the licensing 

requirements of applicants to practice medicine. Indeed, that the board has discretion to 

determine what satisfies the requirement of completing a period of postgraduate education to 

attain proficiency in the practice of the profession is evident in the text of MCL 333.17031(1) 

itself: An applicant for a license must complete the requirements for the degree in medicine and 

must complete a period of postgraduate education to attain proficiency in the practice of the 

profession, “as prescribed by the board in rules . . . .” (Emphasis added). Although plaintiff 

characterizes it as “exceeding statutory authority,” the real question is whether the board’s 

adoption of these standards conflicts with the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of 

the statute. Again, given that the Public Health Code invests broad discretion in the board, and 

MCL 333.17031(1) unambiguously instructs the board to exercise that discretion in setting the 

postgraduate education standards, we conclude that the board’s adoption of the above standards 

does not conflict with the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the language of the statute. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument is without merit. 

 Plaintiff also asserts that the regulatory scheme at issue, which requires admission to a 

postgraduate program to obtain a license, effectively enables the admissions committees of the 

programs to deny a license to practice medicine, and is thus an improper subdelegation of the 

licensing decision. “It is well settled that an administrative agency may not subdelegate the 

exercise of discretionary acts unless the Legislature expressly grants it authority to do so.” 

Edmond v Dep’t of Correction, 143 Mich App 527, 536; 373 NW2d 168 (1985). 

 Although it is true that the admissions committees of the programs determine the 

individuals who are admitted to the programs, which undoubtedly affects the likelihood of the 

ultimate goal of full licensure, such a decision is one of many indirect influences on the person’s 

ability to achieve the goal of licensure. Indeed, the same argument could be made concerning 

the admissions committees of medical schools. We find no impermissible subdelegation of 

authority. 

V. ANTITRUST ARGUMENTS 

 Plaintiff next argues that the postgraduate clinical training rule violates antitrust law. We 

disagree.6

 Michigan’s Antitrust Reform Act, MCL 445.771 et seq., makes it unlawful to engage in 

anticompetitive conduct in the marketplace: 

 The establishment, maintenance, or use of a monopoly, or any attempt to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in a relevant market by any person, 

 

6

 Whether the rule requiring the completion of two years of postgraduate clinical training in a 

program approved by the ACGME violates antitrust law presents a question of law reviewed de 

novo. Huron Behavioral Health, 293 Mich App at 497. 
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for the purpose of excluding or limiting competition or controlling, fixing, or 

maintaining prices, is unlawful. [MCL 445.773.] 

The act contains an exemption for state agencies and boards: 

 This act shall not apply to a transaction or conduct specifically authorized 

under the laws of this state or the United States, or specifically authorized under 

laws, rules, regulations, or orders administered, promulgated, or issued by a 

regulatory agency, board, or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or 

the United States.[MCL 445.774(4).] 

 Plaintiff’s argument fails because the challenged anticompetitive conduct he complains of 

(requiring the completion of two years of postgraduate clinical training in a program approved by 

the ACGME before a license may be issued), is undertaken pursuant to a regulatory scheme that, 

as discussed above, is authorized by the Public Health Code. Thus, the exemption in MCL 

445.774(4) applies. 

 Regarding federal antitrust law, plaintiff did not raise this issue in his complaint nor 

argue it before the trial court, and we could very well deem it waived. See Admire v AutoOwners Ins Co, 494 Mich 10, 17 n 5; 831 NW2d 849 (2013) (noting that Michigan generally 

follows the “raise or waive” rule of appellate review).7

 In any event, the policy complained of 

(again, requiring the completion of two years of postgraduate clinical training in a program 

approved by the ACGME before a license may be issued) is equally exempt from federal 

antitrust laws under the “state action” doctrine, because it is clearly articulated and affirmatively 

expressed as state policy, and the policy is actively supervised by the State. North Carolina 

State Bd of Dental Examiners v FTC, ___ US ___; 135 S Ct 1101, 1110; ___ L Ed 2d ___ 

(2015). 

VI. REGULATORY TAKING 

 Plaintiff next argues that denying him a license is a regulatory “taking” of private 

property in violation of state and federal law. We disagree.8

 “The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Michigan provide that 

private property shall not be taken without due process or just compensation.” In re Certified 

Question, 447 Mich 765, 787; 527 NW2d 468 (1994). “One who asserts an uncompensated 

taking claim must first establish that a vested property right is affected.” Id. at 788. “Without a 

property right, a plaintiff has no basis for challenging a statute on the ground that it constitutes a 

confiscatory taking without due process of law.” Id. A vested property right is an interest that is 

 

7

 Plaintiff asserts that he raised the federal antitrust issue in paragraph 48G of his complaint. He 

did not. All he did was cite a case from this Court and indicate in a parenthetical that this Court 

was citing the United States Supreme Court. The paragraph repeatedly refers to “Michigan law” 

and “Michigan’s antitrust act,” and never cites to or mentions any specific federal law. 

8

 This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo. In re Ayers, 239 Mich App at 10. 
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more than a mere expectation. Id. Rather, it requires a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” 

Berkowitz v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 127 Mich App 556, 563, 339 NW2d 484 (1983). 

 In this case, although plaintiff may have had an expectation that his education, 

examination results, and experience would enable him to obtain a residency and ultimately a full 

license to practice medicine, that is not a vested property right. See Berkowitz, 127 Mich App at 

562–563 (holding that appellant had no property interest protected by due process in obtaining a 

psychology license, because he did not have a legitimate claim to being licensed pursuant to the 

rules promulgated under the psychologists registration act); Nolan, 151 Mich at 655 (“We 

conclude that appellant’s expectation of obtaining a physician’s assistant license when his 

interim license expired was not an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”). Because 

plaintiff cannot establish that a vested property right is affected, his uncompensated taking claim 

fails. In re Certified Question, 447 Mich at 788. 

VII. DUE PROCESS OR STATUTORY RIGHT TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 

 Lastly, plaintiff argues that he was denied his due process and statutory right to an 

administrative hearing. We disagree.9

 No person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. US 

Const, Am V; US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. In this case, plaintiff did not have a 

due process right to an administrative hearing because, as discussed above, plaintiff cannot 

establish that a vested property right was affected, and thus he was not deprived, or at risk of 

being deprived, of a life, liberty, or property interest protected by due process. Due process 

protections are only required when a life, liberty, or property interest is at stake. 

 Plaintiff also asserts that he was entitled to a hearing pursuant to MCL 333.16232, which 

states: 

 (1) The department shall provide an opportunity for a hearing in 

connection with the denial, reclassification, limitation, reinstatement, suspension, 

or revocation of a license or a proceeding to reprimand, fine, order restitution, or 

place a licensee on probation. 

 (2) The department shall provide an opportunity for a hearing in 

connection with the denial, limitation, suspension, revocation, or reinstatement of 

a registration or a proceeding to reprimand, fine, order restitution, or place a 

registrant on probation. 

 

9

 This Court reviews constitutional questions de novo. In re Ayers, 239 Mich App at 10. 

Likewise, whether plaintiff had a right to an administrative hearing pursuant to MCL 

333.16232(1) is an issue of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law reviewed de 

novo. Huron Behavioral Health, 293 Mich App at 497. 
-11- 

 (3) A disciplinary subcommittee shall meet within 60 days after receipt of 

the recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law from a hearings 

examiner to impose a penalty. 

 (4) Only the department shall promulgate rules governing hearings under 

this article, article 7, or article 8 and related preliminary proceedings. 

 The statute does state that “the department shall provide an opportunity for a hearing in 

connection with the denial . . . of a license . . . .” MCL 333.16232(1). However, in the instant 

dispute, defendants did not actually deny plaintiff a license. Rather, they informed plaintiff that 

the “limited license” he sought did not exist and was not authorized by statute or rules, rejected 

his self-made “application” for the non-existent license, and refunded his money. This was not a 

“denial . . . of a license,” because no such license exists and no such license is authorized under 

the Public Health Code. Plaintiff did not have a right to a hearing under these circumstances, 

where he filed an application for a non-existent license. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ David H. Sawyer 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro