COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

CHRISTOPHER IAN O’BRIEN , Appellant,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee. § § § § § § No. 08

- 14

- 00221

- CR

Appeal from the County Court at Law of Terrell County, Texas (TC# 1877 )

O P I N I O N Appellant Christopher O’Brien, his brother Jacob O’Brien, and their friends Seth Winkler and Tyler Bumpers went on a successful hunting trip and returned home with the head s of two aoudad sheep. They posted pictures of their bounty on Facebook. Unfortunately, their hunting trip occurred on the property of Nathan Pickett, who, Appellant admitted, had not given them
pe rmission to h unt

. Appellant claim ed Seth Winkler told him Seth’s father owned the property and had given them p ermission to hunt. T he jury disbelieved Appellant’s as sertion and found him guilty of hu nting an exotic animal on Pickett’s land without his express consent, and guilty of criminal trespass and criminal trespass while carrying a deadly weapon. 1 The trial court

1 Jacob O’Brien was al so charged with these offenses , and the cases against the brothers were prosecuted in a single2

sentenced Appellant to 180 da ys’ in jail and imposed a $1,000 fine and $2,000 in re stitution. Appellant con tends on appeal that that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence two photographs from a game camera showing Appellant, his brother, and his friends on Pickett’s
prope rty. He also contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdic t . We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs into evidence and that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. W e affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND Nathan Pickett purchased a 300

- acre parcel o f land in Terrell County from Joan Winkler in April 2011

. The property included a cabin, r unning water, multiple deer blinds, and motorized game feeders

. Aoudad sheep had been found on the property since 2012. The property lies more than 20 miles from the nearest highway . T he final 10 miles is across a private road, which is guarded by a closed gate marked with a “no trespassing” sign

. Pickett’s property in particular is guarded by fencing and a locked front gate bearing a “no trespa ssing” sign t hat is marked with the name “Pickett.” Numerous other signs also warn against trespass ing or hunting on the property, some of which also colorfully warn: “Trespassing may induce lead poisoning,” “Security provided by Ruger,” and “Trespassers will be shot

. Survivors will be shot again.”
Pickett visit ed his property about once a month. D uring a Mem orial Day weekend trip to the property in 2013 , Pickett installed a game camera

. During a subsequent visit in August , Pickett discovered the lock on the entry gate had been shot and was inoperable . Pickett discovered tire tracks heading around the gate and found that someone had moved the tire spikes and the boulders that had been installed to prevent vehicles from driving around the gate

. Because it was impo ssible to open the gate, Pickett was forced to drive around the gate, following

trial.3

the new ly

- discovered tire tracks , in order to travel the remaining quarter mile to his cabin

. As soon as his cabin came into view, Pickett discovered the carport gate and gate post had been knocked down

. He also discover ed that a striped retractable sun awning had been crudely cut
away with a knife. Pickett found drink bottles and empty food cans on the patio and saw that the patio furniture had been moved and firewood had been used . In the fire pit, Pickett located spent shell casings from a 30.06 rifle and a

. 45 caliber automatic colt pistol , which are not guns he own s . Pickett had his son retrieve the data card from the game camera and began reviewing the

c aptured images. Pickett found two image s depicting four unknown men. Both photographs

we re date stamped July 6, 2013, and were admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively. Pickett testified he did not know Christopher O’Brien, Jacob O’Brien, Set h Winkler, or Tyler Bumpers , and that he had not given them p ermission to be on his property or to hunt exotic animals or a oudad sheep on his property. Pickett shared the game camera photographs with Joan Winkler , Seth’s mother, in the hope that she may recognize the men in the images

. Joan Winkler informed Pickett that her son Seth was among the men in the photographs , and ac cording to Pickett, told him that Seth knew that the property had been sold. Pickett provided the photographs from th e game camera to Texas Parks and Wildlife Game Warden Arnold Pinales and reported that photographs depicted trespassers who had been poachin g on his property without his consent. Warden Pinales testified that aoudad sheep are considered exotic game , and a regular hunting license is required to legally hunt an exotic animal

. In an effort to identify the offenders, the photo graphs were posted online in hunting and fishing forums and on Fa cebook. Pickett gave Warden Pinales the name of Seth Winkler as a possible suspect

. Warden Pinales eventually determined that Appellant , Jacob O’ Brien, Seth Winkler, and Tyler4

Bumpers were the four men depicted in the photographs from Pickett’s game camera . Warden Pinales found a Facebook account for Appellant tha t displ ayed images of Appellant and Seth Winkler at Pickett’s cabin posing with the aoudad heads. Appellant’s Facebook images matched his image found i n the game camera photos . Both sets of images showed the distinctive tattoos on Appellant’s arm s as wel l as Appellant wearing a white shirt bearing the phrase “Follow the Leader

. ” Warden Pinales was also provided three photos from an
anonymous source . The first image depicts two aoudad heads laying on the striped sun awning cut down from Pickett’s property , the second image shows Appellant wearing the white “Follow the Leader” shirt a nd holding an aoudad head, and the third image shows a hand

- made poster beari ng the message: Hunting on “Dad’s” property. $$ Wanted $$ Seth Winkler and Chris O’Brien

. Appe llant admitted at trial that he had hunted and killed an aoudad on Pickett’s property
without his consent

. He also admitted that he was one of the individuals in the game camera photos and th at everything shown in the photographs was “completely true

. ” B ut Appellant asserted Seth Winkler had informed him that the property belonged to Winkler’s father. 2 Appellant claimed that if Seth had informed him that his father did not own the prope rty, he would have never gone hunting on the property. Appellant testified that after driving six or seven hours in Appellant’s truck with Seth navigating, they arrived at the property late at night. Appell ant testified that they accessed the property f r o m its south east corner along the rugged “ back drive , ” w hich Seth said was the original

2 Appellant’s mother testified that she was presen t when Seth and Appellant were planning the hunting trip and Seth informed her that the property belonged to Seth’s father and that he had p ermission to hunt on the property at any time

.5

drive used when they were building the cabin. Appellant denied that there were any fence s, gate s,

or “no trespassing” signs on the south si de of the property , and claimed he never saw a ny sign s bearing Pickett’s name

. Appe llant said he was convinced from the moment he set foot on the property that it was Seth’s father ’s property, because it was exactly as Seth had described. Appellant admitted, however, that “I was a little uncertain because, you know, a story c ould be too

– you know, too good to be true at times.” According to Appellant, the following day after the hunt , they drove out of the property the opposite way to ward the front gate . When they reached the front gate, Appellant for the first time noticed a “no tresp assing” sign, but he did not believe the sign had Pickett’s name on it. Appellant testified that Seth Winkler ha d told him before they left on the hunting trip that he had a set of keys to the front gate

. But when they arrived at th e front gate, Seth informed him they would have to drive around it because he didn’t have the keys to open the gate. Appellant concluded “after the fact” that “there were never any keys.” Appellant claimed that to get out, he drove his truck around and over the boulders by the front gate and did not move them, noting that his truck had a six

- inch lift kit and went right over the boulders

. Appellant admitted that they left trash on the property

. He also admitted that the carport gate had been moved and that he was “accounta ble” even though he did not touch the gate but merely backed up his truck into the carport to unload gear. He also s tated that when they were loading the aoudad heads in to the back o f his truck, Seth pulled or cut down th e striped sun awning because, Seth said , his father was going to replac e it anyway . He denied that the striped sun awning was used to cover the aoudads’ heads to prevent their detection on the return trip , but rather Seth did not want Appellant ’s truck bed t o get bloody

. Appellant testified that he had borrowed6

the 30.06 and a 9 millimeter pistol for the hunt. Appellant acknowledged that an exotic aoudad hunt would normally cost approximately $1,500 or more, but he did not see any problem with hunting at no cost on what he believed was the property of Seth’s father

. Appellant admitted that he had posted a photograph on Facebook of himself and Seth holding two aoudad heads with the caption, “Got ‘em

. ” After learning that there were warrants out for his arrest, Appellant turned hims elf in and informed the game warden that Seth was in possession of the heads. A ppellant asserted that Seth kept both aoudad heads after the hunt, but could not explain why only one head was found at Seth’s house.
Pickett testified on rebuttal that there i s a gate on the southeast side of his property that is always locked . He also explained that it would have been impossible for a vehicle to reach his cabin from the southeast due to a massive, 200

- foo t deep canyon located between the southeast gate and the cabin. DISCUSSION Admission of the Photographs In Issue One, Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the two game camera photographs showing his presence on the property (State’s Exhibits 1 and 2) because they were not properly authenticated and because their admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We conclude that later

- admitted evidence authenticated the photographs and rendered any error in their admission harmless, and that Appellant failed to preserve his argument that their admission violated his right to confrontation. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility of evidence. Tienda v. State , 3587

S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)

. To properly aut henticate evidence, “ the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. ”
T EX
. R. E VID
. 901 (a). The trial court decides the threshold question whether the proponent has supplied sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic. Tienda , 358 S.W.3d at 638; T EX
. R. E VID
. 104(a) (whether to admit evidence is a preliminary question to be decided by the court). In performing its gate

- keepin g f unction, the trial court need not be persuaded that the proffered item of evidence is authentic. Tienda , 358 S.W.3d at 638. The trial court must only decide wheth er the proponent has supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination tha t the evidence is authentic. Id. The ultimate question whether an item of evidence is what i ts proponent claims is a question for the jury. Id

. We revie w a trial court ’ s ruling on the preliminary question of admissibility for abuse of discretion. Id. We will not interfere with a trial court’s ruling that a jury could reasonably find
the proffered evidence is authentic if the ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id

. Analysis Appellant contends the trial court abused its discreti on because the photographs were not properly authenticated prior to admission. The photographs were offered through Warden Pinales who admitted that Pickett had retrieved the images from the game camera and provided them to him and that he was not present when the pictures were taken or subsequently developed. Appellant argues that Warden Pinales had no personal knowledge of how the photographs were taken, what equipment was used to take them , whether that equipment was in good

- working order, whether the photographs were a true and correct depiction of what came from the camera’s digital8

information card , or whether the photographs had been manipulated in any m anner. T here is no requirement , however, that t he individual authenticating a photograph have be e n the photographer

or present when the photograph was taken or developed

. Pena v. State , 467 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. App.

– San Antonio 2015 , no pet. ) . All that is required for authentication is testimony that the photograph accurately represents the person, object, or scene depicted in the photograph. See Delacerda v. State , 425 S.W.3d 367, 393 (Tex. App.

– Ho uston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’ d) ; see

a lso Huffman v. State , 746 S.W.2d 212, 221

- 22 ( Tex.Crim. App. 1988)

. Appellant correctly points out that Warden Pinales did not testify that the photographs accurately represented the persons, ob jects, or scene depicted before the photographs were admitted i nto evidence. E vidence prematurely admitted in error , however, may become admissible or be rendered harmless by subsequent evidence

. James v. State, 102 S.W.3d 162, 175 (Tex.App.

– Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref ’ d). “A conviction will not be reversed for err or in receiving evidence that was not admissible when received but which became admissible at a subsequent stage.” Romo v. State, 700 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex.App.

– Hou ston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet. ). A ny error in admitting photograph into evidence without proper authentication is cured when a witness later testifies that he was present when photograph was taken

. Davis v. State , 687 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Tex.App.

– Dallas 1985, pet. ref ’ d). After the trial court had admitted the photographs depicting Appellant ’s presence on Pickett’s property , Appellant admitted that he was present and had hunted on Pickett’s property without his consent in July 2013 and that everything shown in the photographs was “completely true.” These subsequent admissions by Appellant9

both provided the necessary evidence to authenticate the photographs and render ed any error in their admission harmless. 3 Appellant also contends, for the first time on appeal, that the Sixth Amend ment’s Confrontation C lause barred admission of the photograph s. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of out

- of

- court testimonial statements by a declarant whom the criminal defendant has been unable to confront. Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 50

- 51, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1364, 1374, 158 L. Ed.2d 177 (200 4) . Appellant argues the photographs are testimonial because Warden Pinales’s knowledge of the photographs was based solely on information supplied by Pickett. Both Warden Pinales and Pickett testified at trial, however. They were therefore available to be confronted at trial, and were in fact cross

- examined by defense counsel. In any
event, a photograph is not an out

- of

- court testimonial statement , and thus its admission cannot violate the Confrontation Clause. Herrera v. State, 367 S.W.3d 762, 773 (T ex.App.

– Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ( autopsy photog raph is not a testimonial statement); Wood v. State, 299
S.W. 3d 200, 214

- 15 (Tex.Ap p.

– Austin 2009, pet. ref’ d); T EX
. R. E VID
. 801(a) (a “statement” is an oral or w ritten verbal expression, or nonverba l conduct intended by the person as a su bstitute for verbal expression ). More importantly, Appellant has waived any error by failing to raise a Confrontation Clause objection at trial. Appellant objected to admission of the photographs solely bas ed on the lack of proper authentication under the rules of evidence. An objection based on the R ules of E vidence does not preserve error on Confrontation Clause grounds. Reyna v.
State , 168 S.W. 3d 173, 179 (Tex. Crim.App. 2005). When the legal basis of a trial objection

3 There was also other circumstantial evi dence showing that State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 accurately depicted Appellant and the property. Pickett testified that State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 were taken by the game came ra he had installed and sh owed a date stamp of July 6, 2013. Also Warden Pinales testified that he had had taken photographs of Pickett’s property from the same vantage point as State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 and that his photographs fairly and accurately depicted Pickett’s property.10

differs from that on appeal, the issue is not preserved for our consideration. See Lovill v. State , 319 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009); see Clark v. State , 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012) ; see also Yazdchi v. State , 428 S.W .3d 831, 844 (Tex. Cr im. App. 2014), cert. denied , 135 S.Ct. 1158 (2015) (f ailure to object at trial may waive even errors of constitutional magnitude). We overrule Issu e One. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for direct ed verdict because the State failed to prove the elements necessary to support his conviction for hunting an exotic animal on Pickett’s land without his express consent and for criminal trespass while ca rrying a deadly weapon . 4 A challenge to a trial court’ s ruling on a motion for directed verdict is actually a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Madden v. State, 799 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Standard of R eview We review sufficiency complaints under the legal

- sufficiency standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia. Fernandez v. State, 479 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Tex.Crim.App. 2016); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). The relevant inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fernandez, 479 S.W.3d at 837

– 38 (citing J ackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). If a rational fact finder could have so found, we will not disturb the verdict on appeal. Id . at 838; see also Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013).

4 The information also charged A ppellant with simple criminal trespass. The jury found Appellant guilty of all the charges. But t he trial court set aside the verdict regarding the simple crim inal trespa ss allegation

.11

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014). The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses. Id. at 170 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defe r to that determination. Id .; see also Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 n.12 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (observing that it is the fact finder ’ s duty “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from ba sic facts to ultimate facts”).
The State’s Burden We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Miles v. State, 357 S.W.3d 629, 631 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011) (citing Malik v. State, 9 53 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)). A hypothetically correct jury charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not u nnecessarily increase the State’ s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State ’ s theories of lia bility, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id. The Texas Parks and Wildlife Code provides that: “ No person may hunt on the land of another for an exotic animal without the express consent of the owner of the land to hunt for exotic animals. ” T EX
. P ARKS & W ILD
. C ODE A NN
. § 62.015(c) (West 2002)

. The first count of the information alleges Appellant “ did then and there intentionally and knowingly hunt an exotic animal on the land of another, to

- wit: Nathan Pickett in Terrell County, Texas, without the express consent of Nathan Pickett. ” Under a hy

pothetically correct charge, the State was required to prove beyond a12

reasonable doubt that Appellant int entionally and knowingly hunted an exotic animal on Nathan Pickett’s land without his express consent. The Texas Penal Code provides that a person commits criminal trespass if the person enters or remains on or in property of another without e ffective consent, and the person had notice that the entry was forbidde n . T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 30.05 ( a)(1) (West Supp. 2016). Criminal Trespass is a Class B misdemeanor but is elevated to a Class A misdemeanor if the person carries a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Id . at § 30.05 ( d) (1), (3 ) (B) (West Supp. 2016). Notice that the entry was forbidden can be given by fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders or to contain livestock , or a sign or signs posted on the property indicating that entry is forbidden that are reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders.
T EX
. P EN AL C ODE A NN
. § 30.05(b)(2)(B, C) (West Sup p. 2016). The second count of the information alleged that A ppellant “ did then and there intentionally and knowingly enter on property of another, to

- wit: Nathan Pickett, without the effective consent the owner, Nathan Pickett, and the said Defendant had notice that the entry was forbidden, and during the commissio n of the offense of criminal trespass, the said Defendant carried a deadly weapon. ” Under a hy pothetically correct charge, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant int entionally a nd knowingly entered on Pickett’s property w ithout his consent and with notice that the entry was forbidden, and carried a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Analysis Appellant’s argument in his brief on sufficiency of the evidence simply sets out verbatim what he argued to the tria l court in his motion for directed verdict. Appellant ’s brief f ails to13

present any analysis of exactly how the evidence was insufficient. 5 Although the briefing is deficient , we will liberally construe Appellant’s brief as attacking the sufficiency of al l the elements of the two offenses. Pickett’s testimony established t hat he owned the property and that he had not given Appellant permission to enter or to hunt an exotic animal on his property. And Appellant admitted at trial that he entered Pickett’s property, and hunted , shot, and killed an aoudad sheep on Pickett’s property , without his permission. A oudad sheep are statutorily defined as exotic animals

. T EX
. P ARKS & W ILD
. C ODE A NN
. § 62.015(a) (West 2002 ) . Appellant ’s position a t trial was that his entry and hunting on Pickett’s property without consent was not done intentionally or knowingly 6 because Seth Winkler had misinformed him that the property belonged to Winkler’s
father. Appellant’s position on intent was buttressed by his mother’s testimony that Seth Winkler told her that the property belonged to Seth’s father and that he had permission to hunt on the property at any time

. Appellant claimed that if Seth had informed him that his father did not own the property, he woul d have never gone hunting on the property. While this testimony constitutes some evidence tha t Appellant may have lacked the necessary intent or knowledge , the mere existence of a reasonable alternative hypothesis does not render the evidence factually insufficient. Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Here, the jury heard other

5 Concerning the first count, Appellant argues only that there was no evidence that he had taken an exotic animal from Pickett’s property and broadly states that “the State has failed to prove each element.” As to the criminal trespass coun t, Appellant argues only that the State failed to prove that he intentionally or knowingly entered the property without Pickett’s consent or that he possessed a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. 6 A person acts intentionally, or with inte nt, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge , with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 6.03(b) (West 2011).14

circumstantial evidence of mens rea from which they cou ld reasonably conclude that Appellant knew that the property was not owned by Seth Winkler’s father and had knowingly and intentionally entered and hunted for an exotic animal on Pickett’s property without his consent. Appellant claimed that they entered t he property at night from the southeast corner and did not encounter any fences, locked gates, or “no trespassing” signs that would have alerted him that Pickett owned the property. But Pickett testified that entry and access to his cabin was impossible
f rom the southeast and that his property was protected by fencing, locked gates, and numerous no trespassing signs, some of which

— like the front gate

— were marked with the name “Pickett.” Pickett testified not only that access was impossible from the southe ast corner but also that the lock on the front gate had been shot in an attempt to gain entry and that the rock barriers had been moved to gain access around the gate. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that the entire hunting part y entered not from the southeast, but from the front gate, and knowing the property did not belong to Seth’s father, attempted to destroy the lock to gain access,
and then moved the barriers in order to drive aro und the front gate. Appellant also admitted that he and his companions left trash around the cabin, knocked down the carport gate and gatepost, and cut down the distinctive sun awning

— actions the jury could have reasonably concluded were inconsistent with a claimed belief that the property was owne d by Seth Winkler’s father. The jury could have also concluded that the awning was used to cover up the aoudad heads from detection on the return trip, showing knowledge that the aoudad had been illegally hunted. From all this evidence, the jury could ha ve rejected Appellant’ s assertion that he thought he had permission to enter the property and reasonably concluded that Appellant intentionally and knowingly entered and hunted an exotic animal on the property knowing it was not o wned by Seth Winkler’s fat her.15

Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies upon circumstantial evidence. Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Knight v. State , 457 S.W.3d 192, 199 (Tex. App.

– El Paso 2015 , pet. ref’d )

. Ordinarily, proof of a culpable menta l state must be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. Ledesma v. State, 677 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Knight , 457 S.W.3d at 199

. And the jury was not required to b elieve Appellant’ s claims that he mistakenly believed that the property was owned by Seth’s father and not by Pickett. The jury was free to believe some, all, or none of the testimony and other evidence presented. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 496 (Tex.Crim.App

. 1996). In sum, t he e vidence was sufficient to negate Appellant ’ s defensive theory of mistake and to show that Appellant ’s entry and hunting an exotic animal on Pickett’s property without his
consent was done both knowingly and intentionally

. Likewise th e evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant enter ed the property with noti ce that the entry was forbidden

. First, t he property was protected by fencing and a locked front gate, giving notice that entry was forbidden, and the jury could have reas onably concluded that Appellant and his companions entered the property through the front

- gate and not from the southeast as claimed, and that after unsuccessfully attempting to shoot the lock off the front gate, they moved the ro ck barricades to gain entr y. Second, t he evidence also demonstrated that the property was protected by numerous “no trespassing” signs that were reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders , some of which were marked with the “Pickett” name. U nder the criminal trespass statute , e ither was sufficient to demonstrate that entry was forbidden. See Jackson v. State , 3 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex.App.

– Dallas 1999, no pet.) (fencing around house was sufficient to provide notice that entry was forbidden); Matter of D.L.K. , 690 S.W.2d 654, 65516

(Tex.App.

– Eastland 1985, no pet.) (fencing and locked gates were sufficient to provide notice that entry was forbidden); Leal v. State , 736 S.W.2d 907, 913 (Tex.App.

– Corpus Christi 1987), pet. dism’d , 773 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (per curiam) (entry on ranch through locked gate bearing a “ No T respass ing ” sign, by cutting chain securing the gate, “was a clear violation of Texas’ criminal trespass statute”). The evidence was also sufficient to show Appellant carried a deadly weapon duri ng the commission of the criminal trespass

. Appellant himself testified that h e borrowed two firearms for the hunt and admitted that he shot and killed an aoudad sheep while on Pickett’s property, establishing that he carried a deadly weapo n when he entered the property. In sum, t he e vidence was sufficient to negate Appellant’ s defensive theory of mistake and to show that Appellant knowingly and intentionally entered and hunted an exotic animal on Pickett’s property without his consent , and entered with notice that the entry was forbidden, and carried a deadly weapon duri ng the commission of his trespass

. Having considered all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational juror could have found the essential elements of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule Appellant’s
second issue. CONCLUSION We affirm t he trial court’s judgment

.
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice January 25, 2017 Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ. Hughes, J., not participating (Do Not Publish)