Present: All the Justices

THE AES CORPORATION

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 100764 JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN

April 20, 20121

STEADFAST INSURANCE COMPANY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY

Benjamin N.A. Kendrick, Judge

In this appeal from a judgment in a declaratory judgment 

action, we consider whether the circuit court erred in ruling 

that a civil complaint filed against The AES Corporation (AES) 

did not allege an “occurrence” as that term is defined in AES’s 

contracts of insurance with Steadfast Insurance Company 

(Steadfast), and that Steadfast, therefore, did not owe AES a 

defense or liability coverage.

Background

AES is a Virginia-based energy company that holds 

controlling interests in companies specializing in the 

generation and distribution of electricity in numerous states, 

including California. Steadfast is an Illinois-based company 

and indirect subsidiary of Zurich Financial Services, a global 

insurance provider. AES paid premiums to Steadfast for 

 1 The prior opinion rendered September 16, 2011, reported 

at 282 Va. 252, 715 S.E.2d 28 (2011), was set aside and thus 

withdrawn by the Court after a petition for rehearing was 

granted by Order of the Court dated January 17, 2012.
2

commercial general liability (CGL) policies from 1996 to 2000 

and 2003 to 2008.

In February 2008, the Native Village of Kivalina and City 

of Kivalina (Kivalina), a native community located on an 

Alaskan barrier island, filed a lawsuit (the Complaint) in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of 

California against AES and numerous other defendants for 

allegedly damaging the village by causing global warming

through emission of greenhouse gases. See Native Vill. of 

Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 

2009). AES requested Steadfast provide a defense and insurance 

coverage, pursuant to the terms of the CGL policies, for the 

claims alleged in the Complaint. Steadfast provided AES a 

defense under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory 

judgment action, which is the subject of this appeal, in the 

Circuit Court of Arlington County.

In the declaratory judgment action, Steadfast claimed that 

it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage for damage 

allegedly caused by AES’s contribution to global warming based 

on three grounds: (1) the Complaint did not allege “property 

damage” caused by an “occurrence,” which was necessary for 

there to be coverage under the policies; (2) any alleged injury 

arose prior to the inception of Steadfast’s coverage; and (3) 
3

the claims alleged in the Complaint fell within the scope of 

the pollution exclusion stated in AES’s policies. 

The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary 

judgment, both claiming that whether Steadfast had a duty to 

defend AES against the Complaint could be decided by examining 

the “eight corners” of the Complaint and the CGL policies. The 

circuit court denied AES’s motion for summary judgment and 

granted Steadfast’s motion for summary judgment, holding that 

the Complaint does not allege an “occurrence” as that term is 

defined in the CGL policies, and thus, the allegations in the 

Complaint are not covered under those policies. 

The Insurance Policies

In each of the CGL policies AES purchased from Steadfast, 

Steadfast agreed to defend AES against suits claiming damages 

for bodily injury or property damage, if such damage “is caused 

by an ‘occurrence.’ ” The policies define “occurrence” as 

follows: “ ‘Occurrence’ means an accident, including 

continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same 

general harmful condition.” The policies specify that 

Steadfast has no duty to defend or indemnify AES against damage 

suits to which the policies do not apply.

The Complaint

Kivalina is located on the tip of a small barrier reef on 

the northwest coast of Alaska, approximately seventy miles 
4

north of the Arctic Circle. As pertinent to this appeal, in 

the Complaint, Kivalina alleges that AES engaged in energygenerating activities using fossil fuels that emit carbon 

dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and that the emissions

contributed to global warming, causing land-fast sea ice 

protecting the village’s shoreline to form later or melt 

earlier in the annual cycle. This allegedly exposed the 

shoreline to storm surges, resulting in erosion of the 

shoreline and rendering the village uninhabitable.

The Complaint alleges that AES “intentionally emits 

millions of tons of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 

into the atmosphere annually.” (Emphasis added.) The 

Complaint further alleges that AES “knew or should have known

of the impacts of [its] emissions” of carbon dioxide, but that 

“[d]espite this knowledge” of the “impacts of [its] emissions 

on global warming and on particularly vulnerable communities 

such as coastal Alaskan villages,” AES “continued [its] 

substantial contributions to global warming.” (Emphasis 

added.) Kivalina then dedicates sixteen pages and sixty-six 

paragraphs of its sixty-nine page Complaint to explaining 

global warming.

The Complaint alleges a civil conspiracy by power, coal 

and oil companies to mislead the public about the science of 

global warming. It states that “[d]espite the attempts by 
5

certain defendants to make the cause of climate change 

controversial in the popular media, there has been for many 

years an overwhelming scientific consensus that human activity 

that releases greenhouse gases is causing a change in the 

Earth’s climate.” The Complaint alleges that there is “a clear 

scientific consensus that global warming is caused by emissions 

of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide from fossil fuel 

combustion and methane releases from fossil fuel harvesting.”

The Complaint recounts published articles, books and 

testimony in which scientists have confirmed the existence of 

global warming, and discusses current and projected global 

warming impacts, stating that “[e]mpirical evidence underlies 

the scientific consensus that global warming has arrived.” It 

then discusses the special injuries to Kivalina’s property 

interests allegedly resulting from global warming.

The Complaint then states three claims for relief against 

AES. Two causes of action are for nuisance and the other is

for concert of action. The first claim for relief is entitled 

“Federal Common Law: Public Nuisance.” In support of its 

claims for federal common law public nuisance, Kivalina asserts

the following:

251. Defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions are a 

direct and proximate contributing cause of global 

warming and of the injuries and threatened injuries 

Plaintiffs suffer.
6

252. Defendants know or should know that their 

emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to global 

warming, to the general public injuries such heating 

will cause, and to Plaintiffs’ special injuries. 

Intentionally or negligently, defendants have 

created, contributed to, and/or maintained the public 

nuisance.

253. Defendants, both individually and 

collectively, are substantial contributors to global 

warming and to the injuries and threatened injuries 

Plaintiffs suffer.

. . . .

255. Defendants knew that their individual 

greenhouse gas emissions were, in combination with 

emissions and conduct of others, contributing to 

global warming and causing injuries to entities such 

as the Plaintiffs.

. . . .

261. Defendants are jointly and severally 

liable to Kivalina under the federal common law of 

public nuisance.

The second claim for relief asserted against AES is 

entitled “State Law: Private and Public Nuisance.” Kivalina

asserts as follows:

264. Defendants’ emissions of carbon dioxide, by 

contributing to global warming, constitute a 

substantial and unreasonable interference with public 

rights, including, inter alia, the rights to use and 

enjoy public and private property in Kivalina. . . .

265. Defendants have engaged and continue to 

engage in intentional or negligent acts or omissions 

that unreasonably interfere with the use and 

enjoyment of Plaintiffs’ properties, and/or work a 

substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to 

the public, and are therefore liable under the 

applicable state statutory and/or common law of 

private and public nuisance.
7

266. Defendants, individually and collectively, 

are substantial contributors to global warming and to 

the injuries and threatened injuries suffered by 

Plaintiffs. . . .

267. Defendants are jointly and severally 

liable to Plaintiffs under the applicable state 

statutory and/or common law of private and public 

nuisance.

The other claim for relief against AES is entitled 

“Concert of Action.” Kivalina alleges that the “[d]efendants 

have engaged in and/or are engaging in tortious acts in concert 

with each other or pursuant to a common design” in creating, 

contributing to and/or maintaining a public nuisance, 

specifically, global warming.

Analysis

We awarded AES an appeal on the following assignment of 

error:

The trial court erred in summarily ruling that the 

underlying complaint did not allege an “occurrence” 

covered by the insurance policies.

Both AES and Steadfast agree that it is a well-established 

principle, consistently applied in this Commonwealth, that only 

the allegations in the complaint and the provisions of the 

insurance policy are to be considered in deciding whether there 

is a duty on the part of the insurer to defend and indemnify 

the insured. See Brenner v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 240 Va. 

185, 189, 192, 397 S.E.2d 100, 102, 104 (1990); Reisen v. Aetna 
8

Life & Cas. Co., 225 Va. 327, 331, 302 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1983); 

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Obenshain, 219 Va. 44, 46, 245 S.E.2d 

247, 249 (1978); Norman v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 218 Va. 718, 

724, 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (1978); London Guar. & Accident Co. 

v. C. B. White & Bros., Inc., 188 Va. 195, 199-200, 49 S.E.2d 

254, 256 (1948); see also Town Crier, Inc. v. Hume, 721 F.Supp. 

99, 102 n.12 (E.D. Va. 1989) (“an insurer’s duty to defend is 

determined solely by the allegations in the pleadings”); 

American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Schs. in the Diocese of 

Virginia, 645 F.Supp. 628, 631 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1986). This 

principle is commonly known as the “eight corners rule” because 

the determination is made by comparing the “four corners” of 

the underlying complaint with the “four corners” of the policy, 

to determine whether the allegations in the underlying 

complaint come within the coverage provided by the policy. See

Copp v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 279 Va. 675, 682-83, 692 

S.E.2d 220, 224 (2010); America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul 

Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F.Supp.2d 459, 465-66 (E.D. Va. 2002).

“[A]n insurer’s duty to defend . . . is broader than [the] 

obligation to pay, and arises whenever the complaint alleges 

facts and circumstances, some of which would, if proved, fall 

within the risk covered by the policy.” Virginia Elec. & Power 

Co. v. Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 252 Va. 265, 268-69, 

475 S.E.2d 264, 265-66 (1996) (internal quotation marks and 
9

citation omitted); see also Copp, 279 Va. at 682, 692 S.E.2d at 

224. On the other hand, if it appears clearly that the insurer 

would not be liable under its contract for any judgment based 

upon the allegations, it has no duty even to defend. Travelers 

Indem. Co., 219 Va. at 46, 245 S.E.2d at 249.

The relevant policies provide coverage for damage 

resulting from an “occurrence,” and define an occurrence as “an 

accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 

substantially the same general harmful condition.” The terms 

“occurrence” and “accident” are “synonymous and . . . refer to 

an incident that was unexpected from the viewpoint of the 

insured.” Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 223 Va. 

145, 147, 286 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1982). We have held that an 

“accident” is commonly understood to mean “an event which 

creates an effect which is not the natural or probable 

consequence of the means employed and is not intended, 

designed, or reasonably anticipated.” Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. 

Irvin, 178 Va. 265, 271, 16 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1941). An 

accidental injury is one that “happen[s] by chance, or 

unexpectedly; taking place not according to the usual course of 

things; casual; fortuitous.” Fidelity & Guar. Ins.

Underwriters, Inc. v. Allied Realty Co., 238 Va. 458, 462, 384 

S.E.2d 613, 615 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10

Kivalina alleges that AES intentionally released tons of 

carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as part 

of its electricity-generating operations. We have held that 

“[a]n intentional act is neither an ‘occurrence’ nor an 

‘accident’ and therefore is not covered by the standard 

policy.” Utica Mut., 223 Va. at 147, 286 S.E.2d at 226; see

Reisen, 225 Va. at 331-32, 302 S.E.2d at 531 (duty to defend 

excused when insured’s act of intentionally striking plaintiff 

fell within exclusion in policy); Travelers Indem. Co., 219 Va. 

at 47, 245 S.E.2d at 249 (insurer had no duty to defend where a 

complaint alleged only intentional torts). If a result is the 

natural or probable consequence of an insured’s intentional 

act, it is not an accident. See Resource Bankshares Corp. v. 

St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 407 F.3d 631, 637 (4th Cir. 2005).

However, even though the insured’s action starting the 

chain of events was intentionally performed, when the alleged 

injury results from an unforeseen cause that is out of the 

ordinary expectations of a reasonable person, the injury may be 

covered by an occurrence policy provision. 20 Eric M. Holmes,

Appleman on Insurance 2d § 129.2(I)(5) (2002 & Supp. 2009). In 

such a context, the dispositive issue in determining whether an 

accidental injury occurred is not whether the action undertaken 

by the insured was intended, but rather whether the resulting 

harm is alleged to have been reasonably anticipated or the 
11

natural or probable consequence of the insured’s intentional

act. See id.; see also Fidelity & Guar. Ins., 238 Va. at 462, 

384 S.E.2d at 615. For coverage to be precluded under a CGL 

policy because there was no occurrence, it must be alleged that 

the result of an insured’s intentional act was more than a 

possibility; it must be alleged that the insured subjectively 

intended or anticipated the result of its intentional act or 

that objectively, the result was a natural or probable 

consequence of the intentional act. Thus, resolution of the 

issue of whether Kivalina’s Complaint alleges an occurrence

covered by the policies turns on whether the Complaint can be 

construed as alleging that Kivalina’s injuries, at least in the 

alternative, resulted from unforeseen consequences that were 

not natural or probable consequences of AES’s deliberate act of 

emitting carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases.

AES notes that the Complaint alleges that AES 

“[i]ntentionally or negligently” created the nuisance, global 

warming, and that the defendants’ concerted action in causing 

the nuisance “constitutes a breach of duty.” (Emphasis added.) 

AES maintains that this language shows that Kivalina alleged in 

the Complaint both intentional and negligent tortious acts. 

Citing Parker v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 222 Va. 33, 278 S.E.2d 

803 (1981), AES asserts that an insured is entitled to a 

defense when negligence is alleged.
12

AES further asserts that because the Complaint alleges 

that AES “knew or should know” that its activities in 

generating electricity would result in the environmental harm 

suffered by Kivalina, Kivalina alleges, at least in the 

alternative, that the consequences of AES’s intentional carbon 

dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions were unintended. AES 

reasons that the damage alleged by Kivalina is therefore 

accidental from the viewpoint of AES and within the definition 

of an “occurrence” under the CGL policies. In essence, AES 

argues that the damage to the village resulting from global 

warming caused by AES’s electricity-generating activities was 

accidental because such damage may have been unintentional. 

We disagree with AES. Applying the “eight corners” rule, 

we must consider the terms of the relevant insurance policies 

and the allegations in the Complaint. Unlike the policy at 

issue in Parker,2 the instant policies do not provide coverage 

or a defense for all suits against the insured alleging damages 

not caused intentionally. Likewise, the policies in this case 

do not provide coverage for all damage resulting from AES’s 

negligent acts. The relevant policies only require Steadfast 

 2 In Parker, the relevant policy, while excluding coverage 

for bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally, 

otherwise required the insurer to defend any suit against the 

insured alleging bodily injury or property damage. 222 Va. at 

34, 278 S.E.2d at 803.
13

to defend AES against claims for damages for bodily injury or 

property damage caused by an occurrence or accident.

In the Complaint, Kivalina plainly alleges that AES 

intentionally released carbon dioxide into the atmosphere as a 

regular part of its energy-producing activities. Kivalina also 

alleges that there is a clear scientific consensus that the 

natural and probable consequence of such emissions is global 

warming and damages such as Kivalina suffered. Whether or not 

AES’s intentional act constitutes negligence, the natural or 

probable consequence of that intentional act is not an accident 

under Virginia law.

Kivalina alleges that AES knew or should have known the 

damage that its activities would cause, that AES was negligent 

if it did not know, and that AES was negligent in acting in 

concert with other defendants in creating a nuisance.

However, allegations of negligence are not synonymous with 

allegations of an accident. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 

v. Overstreet, 568 F.Supp.2d 638, 651-52 (E.D. Va. 2008) (mere 

use of the word negligence does not compel a court to find that 

a claim was based on an “occurrence” under Virginia law); 16 

Holmes, Appleman on Insurance 2d § 116.4 (accident and 

negligence are not synonymous and not all negligent acts 

support a claim of accident). In this instance, the 

allegations of negligence do not support a claim of an 
14

accident. Even if AES were negligent and did not intend to 

cause the damage that occurred, the gravamen of Kivalina’s 

nuisance claim is that the damages it sustained were the 

natural and probable consequences of AES’s intentional

emissions.

The dissimilarity between the allegations in the Kivalina

complaint and those in most other tort actions for bodily 

injury or property damage is the relevant intentional or 

negligent act alleged in the complaint. Kivalina does not 

allege that AES’s intentional acts were done negligently.3

 The 

complaint alleges that AES was “negligent” only in the sense 

that it “knew or should have known” that its actions would 

cause injury no matter how they were performed.

 3 Accident and negligence are not mutually exclusive in 

most instances. See Fidelity & Guar. Ins., 238 Va. at 461, 384 

S.E.2d at 615 ("A loss resulting in part from an insured's 

negligence, however, may still come within the definition of a 

fortuitous loss."). To prevail in an action for negligence, a 

plaintiff must prove the existence of a legal duty, a breach of 

the duty, and that the breach of the duty proximately caused 

his injury. E.g., Atrium Unit Owners Ass'n v. King, 266 Va. 

288, 293, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (2003). For a breach of a legal 

duty to proximately cause the plaintiff's injury, the injury 

must be the "natural and probable consequence" of the breach. 

Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 808, 817, 51 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1949). 

In many instances the breach is the manner in which the act was 

done rather than the doing of the act. What one alleges 

constituted the breach is key in discerning whether there is 

negligence that led to an accident in a particular instance. 

Hypothetical examples unfettered by the eight corners rule are

not instructive concerning whether insurance coverage should or 

would be provided in a given situation.
15

Under the CGL policies, Steadfast would not be liable 

because AES’s acts as alleged in the complaint were intentional 

and the consequences of those acts are alleged by Kivalina to 

be not merely foreseeable, but natural or probable. Where the 

harmful consequences of an act are alleged to have been not 

just possible, but the natural or probable consequences of an 

intentional act, choosing to perform the act deliberately, even 

if in ignorance of that fact, does not make the resulting 

injury an “accident” even when the complaint alleges that such 

action was negligent.

Kivalina asserts that the deleterious results of emitting 

carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases are something that AES knew 

or should have known about. If an insured knew or should have 

known that certain results were the natural or probable 

consequences of intentional acts or omissions, there is no 

“occurrence” within the meaning of a CGL policy. See 1 Barry 

R. Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage 

Disputes § 8.03[c] (15th ed. 2011) (citing City of Carter Lake 

v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 

1979)); 20 Holmes, Appleman on Insurance 2d § 129(I)(5). Even

if AES were actually ignorant of the effect of its actions 

and/or did not intend for such damages to occur, Kivalina 

alleges its damages were the natural and probable consequence 

of AES’s intentional actions. Therefore, Kivalina does not 
16

allege that its property damage was the result of a fortuitous 

event or accident, and such loss is not covered under the 

relevant CGL policies.

Conclusion

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 

circuit court.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE MIMS, concurring.

I write separately because I believe the result reached in 

this case is dictated by our precedents but I disagree with the 

majority opinion that the reasoning can be limited to the four 

corners of the commercial general liability insurance (“CGL”) 

policies or the allegations of the complaint at issue here. 

Our jurisprudence, developed over more than a century, is 

leading inexorably to a day of reckoning that may surprise many 

policy holders.

The majority opinion observes both that the CGL policies 

cover damage resulting from an “occurrence,” which is 

synonymous with “accident,” and that we have defined accident 

in various ways. For example, an accident means “an incident 

that was unexpected from the viewpoint of the insured,” Utica 

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 223 Va. 145, 

147, 286 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1982), and “an event which creates an 

effect which is not the natural or probable consequence of the 
17

means employed and is not intended, designed, or reasonably 

anticipated.” Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Irvin, 178 Va. 265, 

271, 16 S.E.2d 646, 648 (1941).

But this creates a dichotomy. If the injurious 

consequence of an action is not the natural or probable 

consequence of the action, there can be no actionable 

negligence. To prevail in an action for negligence, a 

plaintiff must prove the existence of a legal duty, a breach of 

the duty, and that the breach of the duty proximately caused 

his injury. Atrium Unit Owners Ass’n v. King, 266 Va. 288, 

293, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (2003). For a breach of legal duty to 

proximately cause the plaintiff’s injury, the injury must be 

“the natural and probable consequence” of the breach. Scott v. 

Simms, 188 Va. 808, 817, 51 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1949); see also

Jordan v. Jordan, 220 Va. 160, 162, 257 S.E.2d 761, 762 (1979) 

(“To constitute actionable negligence, there must be a legal 

duty, a breach thereof, and a consequent injury which could 

have been reasonably foreseen by the exercise of reasonable 

care and prudence.” (Emphasis added)).

Thus the majority opinion is only half right when it 

states that “allegations of negligence are not synonymous with 

allegations of an accident.” In fact, under the reasoning of 

our precedents, allegations of negligence and allegations of 

accident must be mutually exclusive. The dichotomy is 
18

longstanding, appearing in a venerable 140-year-old definition 

of accident in which we said, “By the term accident is included 

not merely inevitable casualty or the act of Providence, or 

what is technically called vis major or irresistible force, but 

such unforeseen events, misfortunes, losses, acts or omissions 

as are not the result of any negligence or misconduct in the 

party.” Byrne v. Edmonds, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 200, 210 (1873) 

(final emphasis added).

Because “accident” is synonymous with “occurrence,” which

is what these CGL policies cover, I concur with the majority 

that our precedents require us to conclude that they do not 

provide coverage for AES’s allegedly negligent acts. However, 

there is no rationale to distinguish these policies from other 

CGL policies in which the insured risk is defined as an 

“occurrence.”1

 An “occurrence,” is “[t]he fundamental event 

covered by the vast majority [of CGL] policies.” Paul E.B. 

 1 This case is distinguishable from Parker v. Hartford Fire 

Insurance Co., 222 Va. 33, 278 S.E.2d 803 (1981), not because 

of a dissimilarity between the insurance policies but because 

of the dissimilarity between the causes of action. The 

tortious act in that case was a trespass. Id. at 35, 278 

S.E.2d at 804. One may commit actionable trespass without 

intention or negligence because “[n]either wilfulness nor 

negligence is necessary to make a trespass on real estate a 

tort.” Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Greaver, 110 Va. 350, 355, 

66 S.E. 59, 60 (1909). Trespass therefore is essentially a 

strict liability offense, unlike the actions at issue in this 

case, and a complaint for trespass need not allege any 

foreseeability, expectation, or anticipation of injury by the 

defendant.
19

Glad, William T. Barker & Michael Barnes, Nature of General 

Liability Coverage, in 3 New Appleman on Insurance Law Library 

Edition § 16.07[3][a] (Jeffrey E. Thomas ed., 2011).

Accordingly, while I agree with my colleagues that 

Steadfast had no duty to defend AES in the underlying action 

based on the CGL policies in this case, I also must acknowledge 

the broader effect that this conclusion, and the underlying 

case law that compels it, may have on other CGL policies in 

which the insured risk is defined as an “occurrence.”2

 Our 

precedents may have painted us into a jurisprudential corner.

 2 Because this case involves only a commercial general 

liability insurance policy, the question of whether the words 

“occurrence” and “accident” exclude liability for negligent 

acts in other contexts, such as automobile or homeowners’ 

insurance policies, is not before the Court today. However, 

the words “accident” and “occurrence” may have different 

meanings in those contexts. See Paul E.B. Glad, William T. 

Barker & Michael Barnes, Types of Liability Coverage, in 3 New 

Appleman on Insurance Law Library Edition § 16.02[3][f] 

(Jeffrey E. Thomas ed., 2011); Peter M. Lencsis, Scope: 

Homeowners Liability Insurance, in 2 New Appleman Law of

Liability Insurance § 13.01 (2011).