IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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m 99-60191

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MOSSIE R. PHIPPS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER

and

CATHLEEN REID,

Individually and as a Superior and as an Official of

the University of Mississippi Medical Center,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(3:98-CV-186-BN)

_________________________

November 10, 1999

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and

BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mossie Phipps, a black female, seeks

reversal of a summary judgment entered

against her on her various claims of racial

discrimination brought under title VII and 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. We review

a summary judgment de novo. Freeman v.

City of Dallas, 186 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir.

1999). Because Phipps fails to raise a genuine

issue of material fact that her discharge was

motivated by race, we affirm.

Phipps was a registered nurse with

defendant University of Mississippi Medical

Center. One morning, she was being

supervised by defendant nurse Cathleen Reid

and attended to patient Nathaniel Barnes.

Although Barnes was discharged no later than

10:00 a.m., Phipps made entries in her

progress notes for Barnes claiming work at

7:55 a.m., 8:00 a.m., 10:00 a.m., and 12:00

p.m. That same day, the medical

centerSSthrough its Associate Director of

Human Resources, who also is

blackSSconcluded that Phipps had falsified a

patient’s medical records, and therefore

terminated her.

Phippsrespondsthat her conduct was either

“a mistake or at worse constitutes her

prognosis that the patient, who is a diabetic,

will remain a diabetic at 12 . . . and will

continue to show no signs and symptoms of

hypoglycemia or hyperglycemia.” Thus,

Phipps admits the fact of her misconduct and

 

*

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has

determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.
2

offers nothing more than a bare and

unsupported allegation that she did not intend

to mislead. She then claims that her discharge

was motivated by race. Of ten other Medical

Center employees who have been caught for

the same act of falsifying medical records,

however, all tenSSincluding five white

employeesSSwere also discharged.

Unable to find disparate treatment as

compared to thismostsimilarly-situated group

of whitesSSthe five also accused of falsifying

medical recordsSSPhipps attempts to contrast

her treatment with that of a group of white

employees who were charged with different

offenses and were not immediately fired.

Essentially, Phipps demands trial to determine

whether those other offenses were of equal,

less, or greater significance than her own

misconduct, in hopes of showing that those

white employees were situated similarly to (or

worse than) was she.

Phipps cannot show how the terms of her

discharge permit an inference of racism. Far

from irrational, the decision to discharge her

was premised on a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason. See Walton v.

Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir.

1997); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993); Texas Dep’t of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

252-55 (1981). 

The medical center apparently was acting

out of intolerance of an employee’s

misrepresentation and deception. An employer

is entitled to grade various forms of employee

misconduct to its own liking, so long asit does

not do so on account of race or some other

prohibited basis. See Bodenheimer v. PPG

Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993)

(holding that to win summary judgment, an

“employer need onlyarticulate a lawfulreason,

regardless of what its persuasiveness may or

may not be”). Applying our familiar burdenshifting analysis, see St. Mary’s, 509 U.S.

at 510-11, we conclude that, having failed to

make a sufficient evidentiary showing that the

stated nondiscriminatory purpose was

pretextual, Phipps cannot survive the motion

for summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.