UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ GEORGE F. KLECAN, Plaintiff Counter Defendant - Appellant,

v. JANET SANTILLANES, as Trustee of the Eugene E. Klecan and Jane F. Klecan Revocable Trust dated March 11, 1999 as Amended, Defendant Counter Plaintiff - Appellee. No. 15-2171 (D.C. No. 1:15-CV -00016-WJ-KBM) (D. N.M.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , PORFILIO , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ George F. Klecan filed this action agains t his sister, Janet Santillanes, who is the Trustee of the Eugene E. Klecan and Ja ne F. Klecan Revocable Trust (“Trust”), a conventional gift trust create d by their parents. Mr. Kl ecan asserted breach-of-trust claims and sought declarative and injunctive relief and damages. After the Trustee

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 25, 2016 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 moved for partial summary j udgment, the court held th at Mr. Klecan had, by his conduct, absolutely forfeited his one-ei ghth share of the Trust property under the express terms of the Trust. The court fu rther held that its ruling on the forfeiture issue necessarily dispensed with Mr. Kl ecan’s other claims, which the court dismissed. The court then entered judgment disposing of the case in its entirety. Mr. Klecan appeals the district court’s judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. I. Background Mr. Klecan’s parents, E ugene and Jane Klecan (“Gran tors”), created the Trust in 1999 under New Mexico law. Grantors designated Ms. Santill anes to serve as Trustee of the Trust after their deaths. The Trustee, Mr. Klecan, and their six siblings are the named beneficiaries of th e Trust, and each is entitled to receive a one-eighth share of the Trust property. The primary asset in the Trust was an apartment complex in Fort Worth, Texa s, known as La Plaza Apartments, where Mr. Klecan lived and worked as th e apartment manager for 30 years. The Trust originally provided in § 8.1 for the formation, upon the death or incapacity of the Grantors, of a Trust A dvisory Committee (“TAC”) made up of all eight beneficiaries. The Trust granted the TAC the power to direct the Trustee regarding the sale of real property held in the Trust, with one exception: if Mr. Klecan was residing in and managing La Plaza Apartments, he had the right to veto any sale of the apartment complex for five years after the death of both Grantors. In 2005, however, Gran tors amended the Trust (the “Second3 Amendment”), limiting the TAC to three members: the Trustee and two of Mr. Klecan’s other siblings. The Sec ond Amendment also deleted the original provision granting Mr. Klecan a five-year veto power over the sale of La Plaza Apartments. The Trust includes what is commonly re ferred to as a no-contest provision. Section 14.5 (“Contestability Clause”) pr ovides as follows, in relevant part: 14.5 Contestability A. The beneficial provisions of this trust agreement . . . are intended to be in lieu of any other right s, claims, or interests of any nature, whether statutory or otherwise, except bonafide predeath debts, which any beneficiary of this trust may have against or in . . . the properties in this trust. Accordingly, if any beneficiar y of this trust . . . asserts any claim whatsoever (except bonafide predeath debts), statutory election, or other right or interest against or in . . . a ny properties of this trust, other than pursuant to the express terms hereof . . ., directly or indirectly contests, disputes, or calls into question, befo re any tribunal, the validity of this instrument . . ., then such beneficiar y shall thereby absolutely forfeit any beneficial interests which such benefi ciary might otherwise have under this instrument . . . and the interests of the other beneficiaries hereunder shall thereupon be appropriately and proportio nately increased. In addition, all of the provisions of this instrument, to the extent that they confer any benefits, powers, or rights upon su ch claiming, electing or contesting beneficiary, shall thereupon become absolutely void and revoked . . . . B. Subparagraph A shall not ap ply to any beneficiary who (i) either contests this trust agreemen t . . . or institutes other proceedings relating to a governing instrument . . . if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings, (ii) participates solely as a witness in any proceeding involving a governing instrument . . . or (iii) appears in any capacity in any proceeding solely for the constr uction of a governing instrument. Aplt. App., Vol. I at 48. The Trust was revocable in its entirety until Eugene Klecan died in February 2007. After Jane Klecan died in 2013, the TAC began efforts to sell La Plaza4 Apartments. The TAC hired the Trustee’ s husband, Abraham Sa ntillanes, to oversee repairs and improvements at the apartment complex. The Grantors had previously hired Mr. Santillanes to do simi lar work at other apartmen t properties. Because the TAC believed that Mr. Klecan was interfe ring with the work needed to prepare La Plaza Apartments to be sold, the Trus tee terminated his pos ition as apartment manager and asked him to vacate the manager’s apartm ent and move to another apartment in the complex. Mr. Klecan refused to move a nd, according to the Trustee, interfered with the business of running the apartmen t complex. The Trustee caused La Plaza Apartment Partnership (“Partnershi p”), an entity created to own La Plaza Apartments, see id. at 143, to file an eviction pro ceeding against Mr. Klecan in Texas state court (“Eviction Action”). Mr. Klecan filed an answer in the Eviction Action challenging the Partnership’s standing to bring the action on the ground that the Second Amendment to the Trust “had no legal ef fect because it sought to amend an irrevocable Trust B controlling the La Plaza Apartments.” Id. , Vol. III at 281. He maintained that, “[b]ecause the Second Amendment had no le gal effect, the only way to authorize [his] eviction [was] a ma jority vote of the eight benefici aries, including [Mr. Klecan], constituting the ‘Trust Advisory Committ ee’ in Section 8.1 of the Trust.” Id. Thus, Mr. Klecan contended in the Eviction Action that the Second Amendment was invalid and that the original § 8.1 of the Trust, which provided fo r his five-year veto power over the sale of La Plaza Apartm ents and his member ship in the TAC, remained in effect.5 The Partnership prevailed in the Evicti on Action. After Mr. Klecan appealed that ruling, the parties settl ed the dispute when Mr. Kl ecan agreed to move into another apartment at La Plaza Apartments. Following the sale of La Plaza Ap artments for $2.9 million in 2014, the Trustee prepared a proposed schedule of distribution for each beneficiary, setting forth his or her one-eighth share of th e Trust property minus any advances the beneficiary had received. All beneficiar ies but Mr. Klecan appr oved the distribution schedules and signed releases of claims against the Trust. Upon signing a release, the Trustee distributed to each beneficiary a one-eighth shar e of the proceeds from the sale of La Plaza Apartments less an amount held in re serve for legal and other expenses related to the claims that Mr. Kle can had asserted and th reatened to assert. At the time of these distributions, th e Trustee believed that, by his conduct, Mr. Klecan had forfeited any beneficial right or intere st in the Trust under the Contestability Clause. The Tr ustee informed Mr. Klecan of her contention regarding his forfeiture, but nonethele ss provided him with a pr oposed distribution deducting $70,000 in advances he ha d received on his one-eighth share, plus an additional deduction for costs that Mr. Kl ecan had caused the Trust to incur, including the cost of the Eviction Action. Mr. Klecan objected to this proposed distribution and refused to sign a release of claims to obtain his distribution. Mr. Klecan instead filed this action ag ainst the Trustee, a lleging that she had breached her duties of good faith and loya lty by threatening his disinheritance; refusing to unconditionally distribute his one-eighth share of the Trust property;6 distributing Trust shares to other beneficiaries but not to him; threatening him with legal action; and engaging in self-dealing w ith other family memb ers. Mr. Klecan asked the district court to remove Ms. Santillane s as Trustee or, alternatively, to order the Trustee to distribute his share of the Trust property, provide an accounting, and stop holding Trust property in reserve for a legal defense fund. He also sought a declaration that he had not triggered the Trust’s Contestability Clause. The Trustee filed a counterclaim asking the district court to declare th at Mr. Klecan had forfeited his interest in the Trust, or alternatively, to declar e the amount that the Trustee should distribute to Mr. Klecan under the terms of the Trust. The Trustee moved for partial summar y judgment, arguing that Mr. Klecan had forfeited his share of the Trust assets under the terms of the Contestability Clause by disputing the validity of the Trust or as serting a claim agains t properties of the Trust. The district court held, based on the undisputed facts, that Mr. Klecan had forfeited his inheritance under the Trust. It construed th e Contestability Clause as providing that a beneficiary’s one-eighth share of the Trust property is in lieu of any other claim, right, or interest of any nature that a benefici ary might have against or in the Trust property. The court reasoned that the Trust created an either/or option for a beneficiary: he could accep t his allotted one-eighth sh are and give up any and all other claims, rights, or interests in the Trust property, or he could give up his one-eighth share and pursue ot her claims. But a benefici ary “cannot have it both ways.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 376.7 In holding that Mr. Klecan had forfeited his share of the Trust property, the district court identified the following actions as triggering the Contestability Clause: (1) Mr. Klecan challenged the validity of the Second Amendm ent to the Trust in the Eviction Action; (2) he alleged willful mi sconduct, negligence, and breach of trust against the Trustee in this action, seeking damages of at least $453,000, which is more than his one-eighth share of the Trus t; (3) he asserted other rights outside the express terms of the Trust, su ch as a right to control or veto the sale of La Plaza Apartments, essentially disputing the valid ity of the Second Amendment; and (4) he contested the Grantors’ selection of Ms. Santillanes as the Trustee. Having decided the forfeiture issue in the Trustee’s favor and granted her summary judgment on two of Mr. Klecan’s counts, the court dism issed the remainder of his claims with prejudice. It then entered a final judgme nt disposing of the case in its entirety. II. Discussion “We review the district court’s gran t of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard employed by the district court.” Wetherill v. Bank IV Kansas, N.A. , 145 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any ma terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgm ent as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]o defeat a summary judgment motion, the nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Wetherill , 145 F.3d at 1191 (internal quota tion marks omitted). “In a pplying this standard, we8 must examine the fact ual record and reasonable infere nces therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-m oving/opposing party. If no dispute exists concerning a genuine issue of material fact, we then de termine whether the dist rict court correctly applied the substantive law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A. No-Contest Provisions Under New Mexico Law The New Mexico Supreme Court has stat ed that no-contest clauses “serve to protect estates from costly and time-consum ing litigation and they tend to minimize family bickering over the competence and capacity of testators, and the various amounts bequeathed.” Seymour v. Davis (In re Seymour) , 600 P.2d 274, 278 (N.M. 1979)

. 1 No-contest provisions “are valid and enforceable in New Mexico, but they are not effective to disinherit a beneficiar y who has contested a will in good faith and with probable cause to believe that the will was invalid.” Id

. Under New Mexico law, no-contest clau ses are generally construed narrowly and strictly against forfeiture. See Redman-Tafoya v. Armijo , 126 P.3d 1200, 1211 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005). But “the paramount ru le” is still to asce rtain and effectuate the intent of the Grantor. See id. at 1211. “Whether there ha s been a ‘contest’ within the meaning of a particular no-contest clau se depends upon the circumstances of the particular case and th e language used.” Id. at 1212 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

1 The parties do not dispute that New Mexico case law concerning the construction of no-contes t clauses in wills also applies to no-contest clauses in trusts.9 Under the no-contest clause at issue in Redman-Tafoya , a beneficiary forfeited her share of the estate by contesting or atta cking the will or any of its provisions “in any manner.” Id. at 1202. The trial court broadl y construed this provision, holding that a beneficiary’s actions, including he r refusal to cooperate with the personal representative and certain clai ms that she filed in litigati on, constituted attacks on the validity of the will. See id. at 1205. In reversing these findings on appeal, the appellate court set forth a “default cons truction for relativel y general no-contest clause language” like that found in the will in Redman-Tafoya

. Id. at 1215. It said that such clauses should be read as penalizing only bene ficiaries who, in the absence of good faith and probable cause, seek through a legal proceeding to invalidate a will or to invalidate a provision of a will on grounds such as lack of testamentary capacity, fraud, undue infl uence, improper execution, forgery, or subsequent revocation by later document, or on grounds that effectively nullify a material provision in the will. Id. at 1212. The court adopted this defaul t construction to promote predictability because “[l]egal proceedings to invalid ate a will or to invalidate or nullify a provision in a will are more easily recogni zable than other conduct or actions that might be perceived as thwa rting some less clear or unexpressed intent of the testator.” Id. at 1213. But the court stressed that “[ a] testator is sti ll free to disinherit beneficiaries on any ground th at does not violate public po licy and that clearly and specifically expresses what type of legal proceedings, or what type of other conduct and actions, the testator inte nds to discourage through the threat of disinheritance.” Id. at 1215.10 Applying its default cons truction of the no-contest clause at issue in Redman-Tafoya , the court held that none of th e beneficiary’s c onduct could be considered a contest of or an attack on the will. Id. at 1214. It noted that she did not “outright seek to invalidate the Will or to invalidate any provision of the Will.” Id. at 1211. More specifically, her lack of c ooperation was not an attack on the will. See id. at 1214. Nor did the claims she asse rted in litigation trigger the no-contest clause. She had filed a counter claim in a quiet-title action seeking to disinherit other beneficiaries, and she had a ttempted in the probate proceed ing to remove the personal representative. The court held that these claims were authorized by the will, rather than an attack on the validity of any provision of the will. See id. Against this legal back-drop, Mr. Klecan argues that the district court erred in holding that, by his conduct, he forfe ited his share of the Trust under the Contestability Clause. He asse rts that he did not trigger that clause by defending the Eviction Action or by bringing th is action. He further argue s that the district court ignored subparagraph B of the Contestabil ity Clause and New Mexico law, which preclude a forfeiture if the beneficiary acte d in good faith and with probable cause. Mr. Klecan asks us to reve rse the district court’s forf eiture ruling and remand with instructions to determine his rights under the Trust and his claims against the Trustee. B. By Asserting the Invalidity of the Second Amendment in the Eviction Action, Mr. Klecan Forfei ted his One-Eighth Share of the Trust Property The Contestability Clause provides that a beneficiary “shall . . . absolutely forfeit any beneficial interests which su ch beneficiary might otherwise have under11 this instrument” if he “directly or indirectly cont ests, disputes, or ca lls into question, before any tribunal, the valid ity of this instrument.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 48. Mr. Klecan advances several theories wh y he did not trigger the Contestability Clause when he asserted in the Eviction Action that the Second Amendment to the Trust was invalid. 1. Mr. Klecan did not Institute Legal Proceedings Mr. Klecan maintains th at, according to New Mexico law and under the specific language of the Contestab ility Clause, a no-contest provision is only triggered when the beneficiar y institutes the legal proceedi ngs in which he contests the validity of a trust. Because he was the defendant in the Eviction Action, he therefore contends that he did not forfeit his inheritan ce by asserting in that action that the Second Amendment was invalid. Mr. Klecan first points to the holding in Redman-Tafoya that the beneficiary’s counterclaim in a quiet-ti tle action, by which she sought to disinherit other beneficiaries, was not a “contest” unde r the no-contest clause in a will. See 126 P.3d at 1214. We disagree that the holding in Redman-Tafoya supports the proposition that Mr. Klecan asserts. Th e court held that the benefi ciary’s disinheritance claim did not trigger the no-contest clause becau se the claim was authorized under the will and did not attack the validity of the will. See id. The court also emphasized that the disinheritance claim “n ever approached adjudication” because the beneficiary did not ultimately pursue that claim. Id. (“We hold that Tafoya’s short-lived and untested disinheritance claim . . . do[es ] not constitute [a] contest[]. ”). Thus, the court did not12 conclude, as Mr. Klecan asserts, that the beneficiary had not tr iggered the no-contest clause because she was the coun terclaimant, rather than the plaintiff, in the quiet-title action. Here, Mr. Klecan admittedly did attack the validity of a provision of the Trust in the Eviction Action by arguing that the Second Amendment was invalid because it was executed after the Trust became irre vocable. Thus, unlike the petitioner in Redman-Tafoya , and consistent with the language of the Contestability Clause, he contested, disputed, and ca lled into question the validity of an amendment to the Trust before a tribunal. And Mr. Klecan ha s not argued or shown that his contention was “untested” in the Eviction Action. Mr. Klecan alternatively argues that the language of the Contestability Clause limits the type of “contest” that triggers a forfeiture to affirmative rather than defensive actions by a benefici ary. He points to subparagr aph B of the clause, which provides an exception to the forfeiture language in subparagraph A under certain circumstances. Subparagraph B provides, in relevant pa rt, that “[s]ubparagraph A shall not apply to any beneficiary who (i) e ither contests this trust agreement . . . or institutes other proceedings relating to a governing instru ment . . . if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings .” Aplt. App. Vol. I at 48 (emphasis added). Based on subparagraph B’s reference to “institutin g proceedings,” Mr. Klecan argues that a forfeiture can only occur under subparagra ph A if the beneficiary instituted proceedings to contest the validity of the Trust.13 This contention ignores the language of subparagraph A, which is not so limited. It provides that a bene ficiary forfeits his interest in the Trust if he “directly or indirectly contests , disputes, or calls in to question, before a ny tribunal, the validity of this instrument.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 48. Although the Grantors here chose to require that a contest be advanced “directly or indire ctly . . . before any tribunal,” they did not specify th at, for forfeiture to result, the contesti ng beneficiary must be the party who filed the action. In Redman-Tafoya , the court stated that “limited proscriptions in a no-contes t clause specifica lly describing conduct intended by the testator to trigger disinher itance can be enforced.” 126 P.3d at 1213. We are not persuaded that the language in subparagraph B has the limi ting effect that Mr. Klecan asserts on the forfeiture language Granto rs chose to use in subparagraph A. 2. Mr. Klecan did not Seek to Expand his One-Eighth Share of the Trust Property in the Eviction Action Mr. Klecan next claims that his defens e in the Eviction Action did not trigger the Contestability Clause because he did no t seek to expand his one-eighth share of the Trust property in that action. He main tains that the princi pal issues in that action—whether he could avoid eviction a nd what rent he owed—were “largely peripheral to the trust.” Aplt. Opening Br . at 14. But as Mr. Klecan acknowledges, see id. at 13, the Contestability Clause is tri ggered by asserting certa in claims against the Trust property or by contesting the validity of the Trust instrument. His attempt to invalidate the Second Amendment triggere d the latter prohibi tion regardless of whether he asserted a claim to expand hi s one-eighth share of the Trust property.14 3. Mr. Klecan did not Contest the Validity of the Original Trust Instrument Mr. Klecan also contends that, because the Contestability Clause refers only to challenges to the validity of “this instrument,” i.e., th e Trust, and does not mention later amendments, he did not trigger the clause by contesting the validity of the Second Amendment in the Ev iction Action. The Truste e argues, and Mr. Klecan admits, that he did not make this argument in the district court. “An issue is preserved for a ppeal if a party al erts the district court to the issue and seeks a ruling.” Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distribs., Inc. , 686 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will reverse based on a new issue raised for the fi rst time on appeal only if the appellant satisfies the plain-error standard of review. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011). In a civil case, th is burden is “extraordinary” and “nearly insurmountable.” Id. Mr. Klecan fails to acknowled ge the applicability of th is review standard. In his reply brief he argues that the Truste e has not shown any prejudice from his failure to raise this contention in the district cour t; he urges us not to uphold the district court’s ruling on the basis that he forfeit ed an argument; and he responds to the Trustee’s argument why the Co ntestability Clause applie s to amendments to the Trust, disputing her reliance on a New Mexico statute and citing Ca lifornia case law. Because Mr. Klecan fails to show “the presen ce of (1) error, (2) th at is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously a ffects the fairness, integrity, or15 public reputation of judicial proceedings” id. at 1128, we do not reach this contention, see Somerlott , 686 F.3d at 1151-52 (declining to reach argument where appellant did not carry her burde n to demonstrate plain error). 4. Mr. Klecan’s Contention that he Challenged the Validity of the Second Amendment in Good Faith and with Probable Cause Lastly, Mr. Klecan argues that the distri ct court ignored the probable-cause exception to forfeiture in subparagraph B of the Contestability Cl ause, as well as the good faith/probable-cause excep tion under New Mexico law, see Seymour , 600 P.2d at 278 (holding no-contest provisions “are not effective to disi nherit a beneficiary who has contested a will in good faith and with probable cause to believe that the will was invalid”); see also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-5 17 (codifying probable-cause exception to no-contest provisions). Mr. Kl ecan argued in the district court that, by relying on the advice of his counsel, he ac ted in good faith and with probable cause in challenging the validity of the Second Amendment in the Eviction Action. The district court noted his asse rted reliance on counsel’s advi ce, but concluded that he was nonetheless bound by his counsel’s challenge to the Second Amendment. Mr. Klecan contends that the di strict court failed to addre ss the merits of his claim of good faith and probable cause. Mr. Klecan argues these issues raise que stions of fact for the jury, citing Hamel v. Hamel , 299 P.3d 278, 290 (Kan. 2013) (“Wh ether probable cause exists is a question of fact.”); see also In re Estate of Gibbons , 451 S.W.3d 115, 122 (Tex. App. 2014) (“The trial evidence raised genuine fact issues regarding [good faith and16 probable cause], and the trial court did not err in submitting th ese issues to the jury.”); Haley v. Pickelsimer , 134 S.E.2d 697, 701 (N.C. 1964) (noting lack of factual determination whether a will contest was instituted in good faith and with probable cause). We assume for purposes of his appeal argument that New Mexico courts would likewise treat good faith and prob able cause as que stions of fact. Probable cause exists when “there was evidence that would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that ther e was a substantial likelihood that the challenge would be succes sful.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Donative Transfers) (“Restatemen t”) § 8.5 cmt. c. To avoid summary judgment, Mr. Klecan was required to come forward with evid ence demonstrating a genuine dispute whether he challenged the validity of the Second Amendment in the Eviction Action in good faith and with probable cause. Mr. Klecan asserts that he has always acted in good faith and with probable cause. Regarding his assertion in the Eviction Action that the Second Amendment was invalid because it was ex ecuted after the Trust becam e irrevocable, he maintains that he relied on his counsel’s advice and argues that he cannot be faulted for any legal error. See Aplt. App., Vol. III at 331 (disclai ming his counsel’s legal argument, while asserting that he was defending himself from an unlawful eviction and was strictly following his counsel’s advice). Mr. Klecan fails, howev er, to point to any evidence that would lead a reasonable person, who was properly informed and advised, to conclude that his challenge to the Second Amendment on that basis would be successful.17 Mr. Klecan further avers that his counsel “may have had reason . . . to believe that the Second Amendment to the Trust might be invalid possibly due to [his] father Eugene Klecan having been diagnosed with Dementia and Alzheimer’s prior to signing it.” Id. at 352. He does not say how “may ,” “might,” and “possibly” add up to probable cause. Mr. Klecan’s noncommitt al statement fails to demonstrate that either he or his counsel could have c ontested the Second Amendment in good faith and with probable cause based on his father’s incapacity. Nor is there any indication that he ever asserted this basis for challenging the validity of the Second Amendment in the Eviction Action. III. Conclusion We agree with the district court’s decl aration, based on an absence of disputed fact issues, that Mr. Klecan forfeited his one-eighth shar e of the Trust property by contesting the validity of the Second Am endment in the Eviction Action. We therefore affirm the court’s grant of partia l summary judgment to the Trustee without addressing the Trustee’s ot her forfeiture contentions. 2 Because Mr. Klecan does not

2 In addition to Mr. Klecan contesting the validity of the Second Amendment in the Eviction Action, the Trustee argues th at his other actions, including the claims he raised in this action, also triggered a forfeiture under the Contestability Clause. We need not and do not reach these contentions.18 challenge the district court’ s dismissal of his remaining claims based on its forfeiture ruling, we affirm the district court’ s judgment disposing of the entire case.

Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge