[Cite as Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-2141.]

COURT OF APPEALS

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

OLENTANGY LOCAL SCHOOL 

DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION

Plaintiff-Appellant

-vsDELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF 

REVISION, ET AL.

Defendants-Appellees

JUDGES:

Hon. Andrew J. King, P. J.

Hon. John W. Wise, J.

Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 23 CV F 10 0789

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 4, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee Powell

MARK H. GILLIS LAUREN M. JOHNSON

KELLEY A. GORRY NICHOLAS RAY

RICH & GILLIS LAW GROUP, LLC STEVEN SMISEK

5747 Perimeter Drive VORYS SATER SEYMOUR & PEASE

Suite 150 52 East Gay Street

Dublin, Ohio 43017 Columbus, Ohio 43216

For Appellees BOR and Auditor

MICHAEL P. CAVANAUGH

ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR

145 North Union Street, 3rd Floor

P. O. Box 8006

Delaware, Ohio 43015
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 2

Wise, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Olentangy Local School Board of Education appeals the

decision of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas dismissing its Complaints 

challenging the 2022 tax value of certain real property.

{¶2} Defendants-Appellees are Delaware County Auditor, Delaware County 

Board of Revision, and property owner Powell Grand Communities, LLC.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶3} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:

{¶4} In 2022, Olentangy Local School District Board of Education filed numerous

original valuation Complaints with the Delaware County Board of Revision for tax year 

2022, challenging the true value of certain real property and seeking an increase in the 

value of properties owned by the Property Owners Appellees herein. 

{¶5} The Board of Revision did not hold a hearing on the Board of Education's 

Complaints and issued decisions dismissing the Board of Education's complaints “due to 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction” for noncompliance with R.C. §5715.19(A)(6)(a)(i). 

{¶6} The Board of Education appealed these decisions to the Delaware County 

Common Pleas Court as an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. §2506.01.

{¶7} Shortly after commencing its appeals to the Common Pleas Court, the 

Board of Education moved the court to stay its appeals based on an action pending before 

the Board of Tax Authority in a related appeal by a third-party taxpayer complainant, and

a declaratory judgment action pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2721 pending in the Franklin 

County Common Pleas Court.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 3

{¶8} Appellee Property Owners filed a Motions to Dismiss, arguing a lack of 

jurisdiction.

{¶9} The trial court denied Appellant's motions for a stay and granted the 

Property Owners’ motions to dismiss, finding that Appellant lacked statutory standing to 

file an appeal with the Common Pleas Court under R.C. §2506.01.

{¶10} On April 29, 2024, and May 8, 2024, subsequent to the briefing in this case, 

Appellant Olentangy Local School District Board of Education filed Notices of Additional 

Authority. 1

{¶11} On May 17, 2024, Appellee Powell Grand Communities, LLC filed a Notice 

of Additional Authority.2

{¶12} Appellant Olentangy Local School District Board of Education raises the 

following assignments of error:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶13} “I. THE DELAWARE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN 

HOLDING THAT R.C. 2506.01 DOES NOT CREATE AN INDEPENDENT STATUTORY

RIGHT OF APPEAL, IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 

THE STATUTE AND LONG-STANDING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT.

1 Appellant’s Notice of Additional Authority directed this Court's attention to House Bill 

187, as passed by the Ohio Senate on December 6, 2023, and House Bill 344, as 

introduced in the Ohio House on November 29, 2023, and R.C. 931.03, effective 

November 2, 2018.

2 Appellee’s Notice of Additional Authority also directed to this Court’s attention to House 

Bill 344, accepted and approved by the House Ways and Means Committee on April 30, 

2024, in addition to Olentangy Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, 2024-Ohio-1566 (April 23, 2024), Marysville Exempted Village School Bd. of 

Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-1629 (April 29, 2024), and Bedford City 

Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2024-Ohio-1894 (May 16, 2024).
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 4

{¶14} “II. THE DELAWARE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT COMMITTED 

LEGAL ERROR IN CITING JRB HOLDINGS, LLC V. STARK CTY. BD. OF REVISION, 

5TH DIST. STARK NO. 2021CA00144, 2022-OHIO-1646, HAMER V. DANBURY TWP. 

BD. OF ZONING APPEALS, 2020-OHIO-3209, 155 N.E.3D 218 (6TH DIST.), AND 

NKANGINIEME V. OHIO DEP'T OF MEDICAID, 2015-OHIO-656, 29 N.E.3D 281 (10TH 

DIST.) AS SUPPORT FOR ITS HOLDING THAT R.C. 2506.01 DOES NOT CREATE AN 

INDEPENDENT STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL. 

{¶15} “III. THE DELAWARE COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN 

HOLDING THAT A BOARD OF EDUCATION LACKS STATUTORY STANDING TO 

APPEAL A DECISION OF A COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION TO THE COMMON 

PLEAS COURT AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL PURSUANT TO R.C. 2506.01.”

I., II., III.

{¶16} The issue before this Court is whether the Delaware County Common Pleas 

Court erred in holding that a board of education lacks statutory authority to appeal a 

decision of a county board of revision to the common pleas court as an administrative 

appeal pursuant to R.C. §2506.01. 

Statutory Background

{¶17} This appeal presents an issue of statutory construction occasioned by the 

passage of H.B.126, which took effect on July 21, 2022. H.B. 126 imposed severe 

restrictions on the participation of boards of education in ad valorem real property tax 

proceedings and enacted a series of new procedural and substantive requirements for 

boards of education filing valuation complaints. See R.C. §5715.19(A)(6). Among the 

most severe of the new restrictions, the General Assembly eliminated the right of boards 
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 5

of education (and other public entities and political subdivisions authorized to participate 

in board of revision cases) to appeal decisions of boards of revision to the Board of Tax 

Appeals (BTA) pursuant to R.C. §5717.01. 

{¶18} Previously, R.C. §5717.01 allowed boards of education to appeal board of 

revision decisions to the BTA:

An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken 

to the board of tax appeals ... Such an appeal may be taken by the county 

auditor, the tax commissioner, or any board, legislative authority, public 

official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to 

file complaints against valuations or assessments with the auditor.

{¶19} In its relevant part, the revisions to R.C. §5717.01 read:

An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken 

to the board of tax appeals *** Such an appeal may be taken by the county 

auditor, the tax commissioner, or any board, legislative authority, public 

official, or taxpayer authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to 

file complaints again valuation or assessments with the auditor, except that 

a subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-complaint under that 

section with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease may 

not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to that original 

complaint or counter-complaint. R.C. §5717.01, amended by H.B. 126.

{¶20} It is undisputed that H.B. 126's elimination of a board of education's right to 

appeal to the BTA applies to boards of education filing "original complaints" and "counter-
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 6

complaints" as those terms are now defined by newly enacted R.C. §5715.19 after the 

effective date of H.B. 126.

{¶21} It is also undisputed that H.B. 126 did not amend R.C. §5717.05 which 

provides an additional avenue for an appeal of a board of revision decision to the county 

common pleas court "as an alternative to the appeal provided for in section 5717.01" to 

the BTA "by the person in whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed for 

taxation" (i.e. the property owner). See R.C. §5717.05. The General Assembly has not 

amended R.C. §5715.05 since its enactment in 1989. See R.C. §5717.05.

{¶22} Appellant herein concedes that prior to the amendment of R.C. §5717.01 

by H.B. 126, the Board of Education did not have a statutory right to appeal a decision of 

a board of revision to the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. §2506.01 because R.C. 

§2506.01(C) specifically provides that an appeal is not available from a "decision from 

which an appeal is granted by *** statute to a higher administrative authority if a right to 

a hearing on appeal is provided ***” and because an appeal to the BTA pursuant to R.C.

§5717.01 routinely provides for a hearing on appeal, R.C. §5717.01 precluded an appeal 

under R.C. §2506.01. Appellant argues, however, that when H.B. 126 removed the Board 

of Education's right of appeal to the BTA pursuant to R.C. §5717.01, it opened up an 

avenue for the Board of Education to appeal to the Common Pleas Court pursuant to R.C. 

§2506.01.

Standing

{¶23} It is well established that before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a 

legal claim, the person seeking relief must establish standing to sue. Ohio Contractors 

Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320 (1994).
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 7

{¶24} “The right to appeal an administrative decision is neither inherent nor 

inalienable; to the contrary, it must be conferred by statute.” Midwest Fireworks Mfg. Co. 

v. Deerfield Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 91 Ohio St.3d 174, 177, 743 N.E.2d 894, 897 

(2001), citing Roper v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, Richfield Tp., Summit Cty., 173 Ohio St. 

168, 173, 180 N.E.2d 591 (1962). 

{¶25} “Because one cannot appeal an administrative order absent statutory 

authority, the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a case unless authority to appeal is 

granted by statute.” Alesi v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Commrs, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2013-

12-123, CA2013-12-124, CA2013-12-127, CA2013-12-128, CA2013-12-131, and 

CA2013-12-132, 2014-Ohio-5192, ¶17. Therefore, standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite 

that cannot be waived. Id.

{¶26} “The burden of proof to establish standing lies with the party seeking to 

appeal and therefore that party must ensure that the record supports his or her claim of 

standing.” Safest Neighborhood Assn. v. Athens Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 4th Dist. Athens 

Nos. 12CA32 thru 12CA35, 2013-Ohio-5610, ¶ 20; Kurtock v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning 

Appeals, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100266, 2014-Ohio-1836, ¶10; Alexis Entertainment, 

L.L.C. v. Toledo, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1028, 2013-Ohio-3946, 2013 WL 5210309, ¶

9, citing Kraus v. Put-In-Bay Tp. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-04-

011, 2004-Ohio-4678, 2004 WL 1949428, ¶12.

{¶27} Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court 

is a question of law, which we review de novo. Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 

2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 20, citing Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 

112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 8

Analysis

{¶28} The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires a court to first look at 

the specific language of the statute itself and, if the meaning of the statute is unambiguous 

and definite, further interpretation is not necessary and a court must apply the statute as 

written. State v. Jordan, 89 Ohio St.3d 488, 492 (2000), quoting State ex rel. Savarese v. 

Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545 (1996). Ambiguity exists 

only if the language of a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, 

and the facts and circumstances of a case do not permit a court to read ambiguity into a 

statute. Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, ¶ 16. “ ‘[W]here the 

language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce the 

statute as written, making neither additions to the statute nor subtractions therefrom.’ ” 

State v. Knoble, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009359, 2008–Ohio–5004, ¶ 12, quoting 

Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002–Ohio–6718, ¶ 14. 

“Thus, inquiry into legislative intent, legislative history, public policy, the consequences of 

an interpretation, or any other factors identified in R.C. 1.49 is inappropriate absent an 

initial finding that the language of the statute is, itself, capable of bearing more than one 

meaning.” Dunbar at ¶ 16.

{¶29} “It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that ‘the General Assembly is 

not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a statute 

it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.’ ” State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 

336, 673 N.E.2d 1347 (1997), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid, 

169 Ohio St. 476, 479, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959); See also New Albany-Plain Local Schools 
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 9

Bd. of Education v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-732, 2023-Ohio3806, 226 N.E.3d 1035, ¶ 35.

{¶30} As set forth above, revised R.C. §5717.01 provides that school boards of 

education are prohibited from filing appeals from a decision by the board of revision with 

the BTA regarding property the school boards neither own nor lease. Further, the 

legislature made no changes to R.C. §5717.05 which allows an appeal by the property 

owner from the board of revision to the common pleas court.

{¶31} We find no ambiguity in either R.C. §5717.01 or R.C. §5717.05.

{¶32} Appellants concede that they no longer have a right to appeal to the BTA 

but argue instead that because of said changes, they now have a right to appeal to the 

common pleas court under R.C. §2506.01.

{¶33} R.C. Chapter 5717 does provide a right to appeal to the common pleas 

court under R.C. §5717.05, however this right is granted only to property owners, not 

boards of education.

{¶34} R.C. Chapter 5717 could not be clearer in expressing the intent that the 

right to appeal to the common pleas court under R.C. 5717.05 resides solely with the 

property owner. 

{¶35} “All statutes relating to the same subject matter must be read in pari materia,

and construed together, so as to give the proper force and effect to each and all such 

statutes.” (Emphasis sic.) In re K.J., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1050, 2014-Ohio-3472, 2014 

WL 3936867, ¶ 21, citing State v. Cook, 128 Ohio St.3d 120, 2010-Ohio-6305, 942 N.E.2d 

357, ¶ 45.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 10

{¶36} Upon review, we find that the General Assembly expressed its intent to deny 

boards of education a right to appeal a decision of a board of revision by removing said 

right under R.C. §5717.01 and by not modifying R.C. §5717.05 to include said boards of 

education.

R.C. §2506.01

{¶37} Appellant herein argues that it now has a right to appeal under R.C. 

§2506.01.

{¶38} R.C. §2506.01 establishes the right to appeal an administrative decision of 

a political subdivision that determines “rights, duties, privileges, benefits or legal 

relationships of a person * * *.” R.C. §2506.01(C).

{¶39} We look to the language of Revised Code §2506.01, which provides:

(A) Except as otherwise provided in sections 2506.05 to 2506.08 of 

the Revised Code, and except as modified by this section and sections 

2506.02 to 2506.04 of the Revised Code, every final order, adjudication, or 

decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, 

department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be 

reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal 

office of the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505. of 

the Revised Code.

(B) The appeal provided in this section is in addition to any other 

remedy of appeal provided by law.

(C) As used in this chapter, “final order, adjudication, or decision” 

means an order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights, duties, 
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 11

privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person, but does not include 

any order, adjudication, or decision from which an appeal is granted by rule, 

ordinance, or statute to a higher administrative authority if a right to a 

hearing on such appeal is provided, or any order, adjudication, or decision 

that is issued preliminary to or as a result of a criminal proceeding.

{¶40} This Court recognizes that R.C. §2506.01 “ ‘does not address the question 

of who has standing to bring such an appeal.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Myers v. Clinebell, 6th 

Dist. Sandusky No. S-98-048, 1999 WL 300620, (May 14, 1999), quoting Willoughby Hills 

v. C. C. Bar's Sahara, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 24, 26, 591 N.E.2d 1203 (1992). We construe 

the plain, clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 2506.01 its usual and customary 

meanings. Medcorp, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 121 Ohio St.3d 622, 2009-

Ohio-2058, 906 N.E.2d 1125, ¶ 9. “ ‘[I]t is the duty of the court to give effect to the words 

used, not to delete words used or insert words not used.’ ” Westgate Shopping Village v. 

Toledo, 93 Ohio App.3d 507, 517-18, 639 N.E.2d 126 (6th Dist.1994), quoting Cline v. 

Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991). 

{¶41} R.C. §2506.01 does not create a cause of action where none otherwise 

exists. Regarding administrative appeals under R.C. §2506.01, Ohio courts require a 

party to identify a statutory provision that expressly authorizes the filing of an appeal. 

Yanega v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 156 Ohio St.3d 203, 2018-Ohio-5208, 124 

N.E.3d 806, ¶ 10 ("there is no inherent right to appeal an administrative decision; rather, 

the right must be conferred by statute"). This statutory permission cannot come from R.C. 

§2506.01 itself. JRB Holdings, LLC v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Revision, 5th Dist. Stark No. 
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 12

2021CA00144, 2022-Ohio-1646, ¶11-18, (looking beyond R.C. Chapter 2506 to 

determine whether an appeal from a board of revision is permitted).

{¶42} Rather, that authority must arise from another statutory provision. See also

Hamer v. Danbury Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1210, 2020-

Ohio-3209, 155 N.E.3d 218, ¶ 10 (“jurisdiction over an administrative appeal is improper

unless granted by R.C. 119.12 or other specific statutory authority”), quoting Nkanginieme 

v. Ohio Dept. of Medicaid, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-596, 2015-Ohio-656, 29 N.E.3d 

281, ¶ 15.

{¶43} R.C. §2506.01 is a general statute dealing with appeals from various 

bodies. R.C. §5717.01, on the other hand, is a special statute specifically dealing with 

board of revision property valuations and rights of appeal therefrom. Under such 

circumstances, R.C. §5717.01 prevails and is exclusively applicable. As set forth by the 

Ohio Supreme Court in Acme Engineering Co. v. Jones (1948), 150 Ohio St. 423, 83 

N.E.2d 202 (1948):

A special statutory provision which applies to a specific subject 

matter constitutes an exception to a general statutory provision covering 

other subjects as well as the specific subject matter which might otherwise 

be included under the general provision. (State, ex rel. Steller et al., 

Trustees, v. Zangerle, Aud., 100 Ohio St. 414, 126 N.E. 413, and paragraph 

one of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Elliott Co., v. Connar, Supt., 123 Ohio 

St. 310, 175 N.E. 200, approved and followed.)

{¶44} See also Ruprecht v. City of Cincinnati, 64 Ohio App.2d 90, 92–93, 411 

N.E.2d 504, 507 (1st Dist.1979).
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 13

{¶45} We further find that the Supreme Court of Ohio's holdings in Nuspl v. City 

of Akron and Anderson v. City of Akron, 61 Ohio St.3d 511 (1991), Sutherland–Wagner 

v. Brook Park Civil Service Commission, 32 Ohio St.3d 323 (1987) and Walker v. Eastlake

(1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 273, 275, 400 N.E.2d 908, 909-910, provide that “an appeal is 

available from a final order of a commission of a political subdivision of the state unless 

another statute, enacted subsequent to the enactment of R.C. 2506.01, clearly prohibits 

the use of this section.” The Nuspl court specifically held R.C. §2506.01 “provides an 

aggrieved party an additional avenue of relief that is not expressly prohibited by a 

subsequently enacted statute.” Id. at 515.

{¶46} Here, we find that R.C. §5717.01 (and R.C. §5717.05) was enacted 

subsequent to R.C. §2506.01 and that such statute, through its newly enacted revisions, 

prohibits an appeal from a decision of the board of revision by a board of education to 

either the BTA or the common pleas court.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 11 0101 14

{¶47} Having found Appellant is without standing to appeal pursuant to R.C. 

§2506.01, we find no error by the lower court in granting Appellees’ motions to dismiss.

{¶48} Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware 

County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By: Wise, J.

King, P. J., and

Baldwin, J., concur.

JWW/kw 0603