Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A01-1504-CR-152 | August 10, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian J. Johnson

Danville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Paris V. Collins,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 10, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

32A01-1504-CR-152

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court 

The Honorable Stephenie LeMayLuken, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D05-1405-FD-424

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] On August 14, 2014, Appellant-Defendant Paris V. Collins pled guilty to Class 

D felony theft. Pursuant to the terms of his guilty plea, Collins was sentenced 

to 455 days to be served on work release through the Indiana Department of 

Correction (“DOC”). On February 10, 2015, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of 

Indiana (the “State”) filed a petition alleging that Collins had committed 

numerous violations of the terms and conditions of his work release placement. 

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the State’s petition on 

March 26, 2015, during which Collins admitted that he had violated the terms 

and conditions of his work release placement by committing the four violations 

alleged by the State. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

found that Collins had violated the terms and conditions of his work release 

placement and ordered Collins to serve the remainder of his 455-day sentence in 

the DOC.

[2] On appeal, Collins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering 

him to serve the remainder of his 455-day suspended sentence in the DOC. 

Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 23, 2014, the State charged Collins with Class D felony theft. In 

charging Collins, the State alleged that on or about May 21, 2014, Collins “did 

knowingly exert unauthorized control over the property of [another], to wit: 

One Ivy Tech Master Card Credit Card and iPod, with intent to deprive the 

owner of any part of its value or use.” Appellant’s App. p. 11.
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[4] On August 14, 2014, Collins pled guilty to Class D felony theft. Pursuant to the 

terms of his guilty plea, the parties stipulated that Collins would be sentenced to 

455 days to be served on work release through the DOC. Collins’s plea 

agreement was “offered conditionally upon [Collins’s] admittance of the 

probation violation under cause number 32D05-1311-FD-1157[1] and agreed 

sentence of 275 days on said violation, to be served consecutive to the sentence 

in the current case for a total combined sentence of 730 days Work Release.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 16. The trial court accepted Collins’s plea agreement and 

sentenced Collins pursuant to its terms. 

[5] On February 10, 2015, the State filed a petition alleging that Collins had 

violated the terms and conditions of his work release placement. Specifically, 

the State alleged that Collins had violated the terms and conditions of his work 

release placement in the following ways:

1. Since his arrival to the [work release] facility on 8/19/14, 

[Collins] has had a plethora of informal violations. He has had 

formal violations for disorderly conduct, threatening another 

with bodily harm and refusing to obey an order. He had 30 good 

time credit/15 actual days revoked as a sanction for one of the 

violations.

2. On 2/7/15, [Collins] was terminated from employment at 

McDonald’s due to them being tired of his erratic behavior and 

smart mouth.

3. [Collins] currently has a balance [of] $297.53 [ ] because he 

hasn’t been paying his fees or turning in his time-sheets as he is 

 

1

 Cause Number 32D05-1311-FD-1157 relates to Collins’s prior conviction for auto theft, for 

which he was on probation at the time he committed the underlying offense.
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supposed to.

4. Daily [Collins] is involved in disagreements with various 

residents because of his lack of self control. He is an antagonist 

and it is becoming too much for staff to maintain the safety and 

security of the facility and the residents within. He has failed to 

adjust despite all the modifications that have been put in place to 

try and allow him to remain within the facility.

Appellant’s App. p. 22. In light of Collins’s alleged violations, the State 

requested that Collins be removed from the work release facility. 

[6] The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the State’s petition on 

March 26, 2015. During the evidentiary hearing, Collins admitted that he had

violated the terms and conditions of his work release placement by committing 

the violations alleged by the State. In admitting that he had committed the 

violations, Collins claimed that he believed a factor in his behavior was that he 

was allegedly not receiving certain prescribed medication while in the work 

release facility. Collins however, stated that he was “not blaming [his actions] 

on his medication” and acknowledged that he was “fully responsible for every 

action that went forth there.” Tr. p. 7. Collins further acknowledged that the 

court had “granted [him] a second chance and [he] failed.” Tr. p. 8. Collins 

apologized for his failure but claimed that he believed the result could be 

different if he were given another chance and, while in the program, given his 

medications and access to counseling. 

[7] At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Collins 

had violated the terms and conditions of his work release placement and 
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ordered Collins to serve the remainder of his 455-day sentence in the DOC. 

The trial court awarded Collins credit for 169 days served and 139 days of good 

time credit. This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Collins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to 

serve the remainder of his 455-day sentence in the DOC. Specifically, Collins 

argues that the trial court should have ordered him to serve something “less 

than the entire suspended sentence.” Appellant’s Br. p. 4. For its part, the 

State contends that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing 

Collins.

I. Standard of Review

[9] “For purposes of appellate review, we treat a hearing on a petition to revoke 

placement in a community corrections program[2]the same as we do a petition 

to revoke probation.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999). 

Accordingly, 

[t]he standard of review of an appeal from the revocation of a 

community corrections placement mirrors that for revocation of 

probation. That is, a revocation of community corrections 

placement hearing is civil in nature, and the State need only 

 

2

 The term “community corrections program” means a program consisting of residential and 

work release, electronic monitoring, day treatment, or day reporting. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-

2. 
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prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. 

We will consider all the evidence most favorable to the judgment 

of the trial court without reweighing that evidence or judging the 

credibility of witnesses. If there is substantial evidence of 

probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a 

defendant has violated any terms of community corrections, we 

will affirm its decision to revoke placement. 

McQueen v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citations 

omitted). 

[10] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the similarities between the 

community corrections programs and probation dictate this approach as both 

serve as alternatives to commitment to the DOC and both are made at the sole 

discretion of the trial court. Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549. “A defendant is not 

entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a community corrections 

program.” Id. “Rather, placement in either is a matter of grace and a 

conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted).

[11] With respect to the potential penalties that a trial court may impose following a 

violation of the terms and conditions of an individual’s placement on work 

release, Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 provides that 

If a person who is placed under this chapter violates the terms of 

the placement, the community corrections director may do any 

of the following:
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(1) Change the terms of the placement.

(2) Continue the placement.

(3) Reassign a person assigned to a specific 

community corrections program to a different 

community corrections program.

(4) Request that the court revoke the placement and 

commit the person to the county jail or [DOC] for the 

remainder of the person’s sentence.

The community corrections director shall notify the court if the 

director changes the terms of the placement, continues the 

placement, or reassigns the person to a different program.

Further, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h), which relates to the penalties 

available following a determination that one has violated the terms of his 

probation, provides that

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any 

time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke 

is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one 

(1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or 

without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not 

more than one (1) year beyond the original 

probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that 

was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Finally, we have noted that a trial court is not required to balance aggravating 

or mitigating circumstances when imposing a sentence in a probation 
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revocation proceeding. Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), 

trans. denied.

II. Analysis

[12] In arguing that the court should have ordered him to serve something less than 

the remainder of his entire 455-day sentence, Collins asserts that he had (1) a 

limited criminal history and (2) behavioral problems which he was unable to 

address while in work release due to transportation issues. 

[13] With respect to his criminal history, the record reflects that Collins, who was 

approximately eighteen or nineteen years old at the time he committed the 

underlying offense, had both prior juvenile adjudications for theft and a prior 

adult conviction for auto theft. The record also reflects that a prior attempt at 

non-DOC placement had been unsuccessful as Collins was on probation for his 

auto theft conviction at the time he committed the underlying offense. In 

addition, the record is silent as to the nature of Collins’s claimed behavioral 

issues and it contained only Collins’s self-serving claim that he has previously 

met with, and feels it is necessary to continue to meet with, a counselor. 

Furthermore, in ordering that Collins serve the remainder of his 455-day 

sentence in the DOC, the trial court noted that Collins had not committed a 

non-personal theft such as shoplifting, but rather that Collins had committed 

what the trial court considered to be “very personal thefts.” Tr. p. 11.

[14] As we noted in Treece, the trial court was not required to balance the allegedly 

mitigating factors claimed by Collins when sentencing him following his 
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admission that he had violated the terms and conditions of his placement on 

work release. Accordingly, in light of the fact that, upon review, we treat 

violations of the terms of one’s placement in a community corrections program 

the same as violations of the terms of one’s probation, coupled with the plain 

language of Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5 and Indiana Code section 35-38-

2-3(h), we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering 

Collins to serve the remainder of his 455-day sentence in DOC. Collins’s claim 

to the contrary effectively amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the 

decision of the trial court, which we will not do. See McQueen, 862 N.E.2d at 

1242.

[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May, J., and Crone, J., concur.