No. 89-376 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

LAWRENCE W. ERICKSON, 

plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vsDAIRYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: ~istrict Court of the ~ighteenth ~udicial ~istrict, 

In and for the County of Bozeman, 

The Honorable Joseph Gary, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Robert Kolesar, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Albert A. Frost, Bozeman, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on ~riefs: Nov. 21, 1989 

~~~id~d: January 18, 1990 
Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This appeal arises from an order by the District Court, 

Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, Montana, 

granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff 

appeals. We affirm. 

The issues presented for our review are: 

1. Did the District Court err in granting summary 

judgment in favor of defendant? 

2. Did the District Court err in denying costs to 

defendant? 

Mr. Erickson suffered injuries while riding his motorcycle in April 1988, in Bozeman, Montana. An automobile driven 

by Wanda Youngblood made a left turn in front of Mr. 

Erickson, striking him. Ms. Youngblood carried no liability 

insurance at the time. Mr. Erickson submitted a claim to his 

own insurance company, Dairyland Insurance Company 

(Dairyland), and it accepted liability. Dairyland paid Mr. 

Erickson $25,000 under the uninsured motorist provision, and 

also paid $5,000 for the loss of his motorcycle. Mr. 

Erickson demanded an additional $25,000 payment, contending 

that his policy provided coverage for his own bodily injuries. When Dairyland denied this claim, Mr. Erickson brought 

suit. Mr. Erickson moved for judgment on the pleadings, 

requesting court interpretation of his policy. Dairyland 
moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability, which 

was granted by the District Court. From this judgment, Mr. 

Erickson appeals. 

Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment 

in favor of defendant? 

Summary judgment is only appropriate when there are no 

genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) 

M.R.Civ.P. On appeal, this Court's standard of review is to 

determine if any genuine issues of material fact exist, which 

would preclude summary judgment. Kelly v. Widner (1989), 771 

P.2d 142, 144, 46 St.Rep. 591, 593. 

On October 15, 1987, Mr. Erickson purchased an insurance 

policy from Waite & Company, an agent of Dairyland, through 

Ms. Kimberly Jerome. On this insurance application, under 

item 5, "Coverage," two boxes are checked: the box indicating 

"Full Package" and the box indicating the motorcycle model 

group. Item 5 also states, "No coverage unless checked or 

premium shown below. " The boxes indicating coverage for 

uninsured motorists and medical payments are not checked. 

The application specifies that the "Full Package" includes 

25/50/5 bodily injury and property damage and comprehensive 

and collision. A physical damage deductible amount was 
filled in at $250. Mr. Erickson paid the total premium 

amount of $336. 

The application contained an "Uninsured Motorists Coverage Rejection Statement," which was left unsigned by Mr. 

Erickson. Mr. Erickson was subsequently billed for uninsured 

motorist coverage. He paid the additional premium, thereby 

obtaining the uninsured motorist coverage. 

Mr. Erickson was issued a policy entitled "Plain Talk 

Motorcycle Policy," with a declarations page. The declarations page lists coverages and limits of liability, and 

states, "We insure you only for the vehicle(s) described on 

this page, and only far those coverages which are shown 

below. The liability is limited by the terms of this page." 

Mr. Erickson's coverage is then listed as bodily injury 

liability, excluding passenger coverage; property damage 

liability; uninsured motorist; comprehensive; and collision. 

The limits of liability on each item are specified. The 

declarations page is expressly made a part of the policy. 

The policy itself is divided into ten sections, as 

follows: 

I. Definitions 

11. Insuring Agreement 

111. Motorcycles We Insure 

IV. What to do when an Accident Happens 
V. Liability Insurance 

VI. Medical Expense Insurance 

VII. Uninsured Motorist Insurance 

VIII. Collision Insurance 

IX. Comprehensive Insurance 

X. General Policy Provisions 

The first page of the policy states: 

Insuring Agreement 

Upon your payment of the premiums, 

we agree that this policy provides the 

various kinds of insurance you have 

selected as shown on the declarations 

page. The declarations page is a part of 

this policy. (Emphasis in original. ) 

Under Part V, "Liability Insurance," the policy states: 

We promise to pay damages for 

bodily injury or property damage for 

which the law holds you responsible 

because of a motorcycle accident involving a motorcycle we insure. (Emphasis in 

original. ) 

Under Part VI, "Medical Expense Insurance," the policy 

states, 

We promise to pay medical expenses 

for your bodily injury, sickness, disease 

or death suffered in a motorcvcle acci- .' 

dent while occupying a motorcycle or from 

havins been struck bv a motor vehicle. 

we ' 11- pay the - - medical expenses incurred 

within one year from the date of the 

motorcycle accident, within the limits 

and subject to a $50 deductible amount 

applicable to each person per accident. 

(~mphasis in original.) 
Mr. Erickson was also issued five endorsements with 

this policy, one of which was a "Named Insured Exclusion 

Endorsement." That endorsement stated: 

This endorsement modifies your policy in the following 

way : 

LIABILITY INSURANCE 

The liability insurance provided by 

this policy doesn't apply to injuries to 

the person named on the declarations 

page. It doesn't apply to the husband or 

wife of that person if they are living in 

the same household. 

An insurance policy is subject to the general rules of 

contract law. Hildebrandt v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co. 

(1979), 181 Mont. 231, 234, 593 P.2d 37, 39. When a contract 

is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to he 

ascertained from the writing alone if possible. Section 

28-3-303, MCA. A written contract supersedes a11 oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded 

or accompanied the execution of the instrument. Section 

28-2-904, MCA. Whenever the terms of an agreement have been 

reduced to writing by the parties, it is considered as containing all those terms. Section 28-2-905(1), MCA. 

Mr. Erickson contends that the language of the policy is 

ambiguous and should be construed against the drafter, 

Dairyland, to provide coverage for his bodily injuries. He 

contends the policy does not adequately differentiate between 
different types of bodily injury. He contends that his 

coverage for "bodily injury liability" should include all 

bodily injury. 

The District Court determined that the language of the 

policy was clear and unambiguous, and that by its language 

the bodily injury liability coverage which Mr. Erickson 

purchased only covered bodily injury damage for which Mr. 

Erickson could be held legally liable; it did not include 

coveraqe for Mr. Erickson's own bodily injuries. The court 

determined Mr. Erickson did not purchase medical expense 

coverage, which would have covered his own injuries. The 

court also considered depositions of Mr. Erickson and Ms. 

Jerome. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor 

of Dairyland on the issue of liability, concluding that no 

genuine issues of material fact existed. 

The plain language of the declarations page which is 

part of the policy, is not ambiguous in stating that Mr. 

Erickson's coverage was for "bodily injury liability." 

Reference to the "Liability" section of the policy further 

clarifies this coverage. It states, "We promise to pay 

damages for bodily injury. . . for which the law holds you 

responsible . . . " Under the definitions section the policy 

defines "damages" as the "cost of compensating those who 

suffer bodily injury . . . " Additionally, the commonly 

understood meaning of "liable" is " [blound or obliged in law 
or equity; responsible" Black's Law Dictionary 1060 (4th Ed. 

1968). "In interpreting and applying insurance contracts, 

the common rather than technical usage and meaning of definitional terms and policies should be used." Bauer Ranch v. 

Mountain W. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. (1985), 215 Mont. 153, 156, 

695 P.2d 1307, 1309. "If the language is unambiguous, and 

subject to only one meaning, there is no basis for the interpretation of policy coverage under the guise of ambiguity." 

Rauer Ranch, 695 P.2d at 1309, citing Nelson v. Combined Ins. 

Co. of America (1970), 155 Mont. 105, 467 P.2d 707. We 

conclude that the policy language was unambiguous in covering 

only bodily injury liability, which does not include Mr. 

Erickson's own injuries. Mr. Erickson's attempt to create an 

ambiguity is unpersuasive. 

Mr. Erickson also contends that the insurer failed in 

its duty to define any limitations or exclusions in clear and 

explicit terms. Mr. Erickson misapplies this requirement 

since the present case does not involve an exclusion. The 

insurance company is not required to expressly exclude coverage which is not purchased. Mr. Erickson's argument in this 

regard also fails since he received from Dairyland the named 

insured exclusion endorsement, which expressly informed him 

that coverage for his own bodily injuries was excluded. 
Mr. Erickson also urges that his election to purchase 

"Full Package" coverage led him to believe this included 

coverage for his own medical expenses. 

However, intent of the parties is only looked to 

when the agreement in issue is not clear on its 

face. Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc. 

(1979), 182 Mont. 389, 394, 184 Mont. 543, 547, 597 

P.2d 689, 692. Where the contractual language is 

clear and unambiguous on its face, it is this 

Court's duty to enforce the contract as drafted and 

executed by the parties. Wortman v. Griff (1982) , 200 Mont. 528, 536, 651 P.2d 998, 1002. 

Monte Vista Co. v. Anaconda Co. (Mont. 1988), 755 ~.2d 1358, 

1362, 45 St.Rep. 809, 814. As previously discussed, the 

language of the insurance contract is unambiguous and is 

enforceable as drafted. 

We conclude that Mr. Erickson failed to present any 

genuine issues of material fact regarding the extent of his 

insurance coverage. The District Court was correct in determining that according to the plain language of the policy, 

Mr. Erickson was not covered for his own medical expenses, 

and that he had failed to present any genuine issues of 

material fact in this regard. We affirm the District Court's 

grant of summary judgment in favor of Dairyland. 

Did the District Court err in denying costs to 

defendant? 
Defendant submitted a verified memorandum of costs and 

disbursements for a total amount of $432.60. This amount 

included deposition costs of Kimberly Jerome and Lawrence 

Erickson. The record contains no objection to these costs by 

plaintiff. The District Court denied these costs, however, 

without explanation. On appeal defendant contends these 

expenses should have been allowed, citing Frigon v. 

Morrison-Maierle, Inc. (Mont. 1988), 760 P.2d 57, 64, 45 

St.Rep. 1344, 1353; Roy v. Neibauer (1981), 191 Mont. 224, 

227-28, 623 P.2d 555, 557. 

Costs are generally allowable to the prevailing party 

pursuant to Rule 54 (d) , M.R.Civ.P., unless the court directs 

otherwise, except where expressly provided by statute. 

Carroccia v. Todd (1980), 189 Mont. 172, 178, 615 P.2d 225, 

228. 

In the present case, costs to defendant are statutory 

pursuant to § 25-10-102, MCA, which provides costs to defendant upon a judgment in his favor in actions mentioned in 

5 25-10-101, MCA. From the complaint of the plaintiff, it 

does not appear that this claim falls within any of the cases 

enumerated in 5 25-10-101, MCA. The District Court may in 

its discretion choose to allow costs or not allow costs. 

Section 25-10-103, MCA. In the absence of any showing of 

abuse of discretion by the District Court, we sustain the 

court's ruling. Swenson v. Buffalo Bldy. Co. (Mont. 1981), 
635 P.2d 978, 985, 38 St.Rep. 1588, 1596. We affirm the 

District Court's denial of costs to defendant. 

Affirmed. 

We Concur: p 

@@a&u Justices