Note: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-7229

LEE E. JONES, Claimant-Appellant,

v. GORDON H. MANSFIELD, Acting Se cretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee. Lee E. Jones , of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, pro se. Tara J. Kilfoyle , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigat ion Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justic e, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler , Acting Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, and Steven J. Gillingham , Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were Michael J. Timinski , Deputy Assistant G eneral Counsel, and Y. Ken Lee , Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affair s, of Washington, DC. Appealed from: United States Cour t of Appeals for Veterans Claims Judge Mary J. SchoelenNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-7229

LEE E. JONES Claimant-Appellant,

v. GORDON H. MANSFIELD, Acting Secr etary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

__________________ _________ DECIDED: December 5, 2007

__________________ _________ Before GAJARSA, Circuit Judge , ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge , and PROST, Circuit Judge

. PER CURIAM. Lee E. Jones (“Mr. Jones”) appeals the Un ited States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“CAVC”) order affirming t he Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) decision not to reopen a claim for entitlement to benefits. Jones v. Nicholson , No. 05- 1175 (December 22, 2006). The CAVC det ermined that Mr. Jones failed to demonstrate error in the notice provided by t he Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). Id. For the reasons stated herein, we dismiss the appeal.BACKGROUND Mr. Jones served on active duty in the mili tary service in Vietnam. Personnel records show that he committed several o ffenses resulting in two Court-Martial convictions and two nonjudicial punishments. In 1968, Mr. Jones was discharged under other than honorable conditions. When he appl ied for disability compensation the following year, Mr. Jones learned that the character of his discharge precluded his eligibility for VA benefits. He subs equently received a clemency discharge for completion of alternate service pursuant to Presidential Proclama tion Number 4313. However, in a 1987 decisi on, the VA Regional Office det ermined that “[a] clemency discharge does not entitle or re instate entitlement to benefits. ” Mr. Jones did not appeal the 1987 decision and it became final. In 1995, Mr. Jones reapplied for disability compensation, which the VA Regional Office again denied based on the character of his original dischar ge. On appeal, the Board determined that Mr. Jones did not submit “new and material evidence” sufficient to reopen the 1987 decision. Due to a change in the law during the pendency of the appeal, the CAVC vacated t he Board’s decision and rem anded the issue pursuant to the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (“VCAA”). On remand, the Board determined that VA made reason able efforts to notify Mr. J ones of the information and evidence needed to substantiate his claim, and any error in the chronological implementation of the VCAA was harmless. Mr. Jones appealed to the CAVC. He pr esented “a single argu ment – that VA did not notify him of the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b).” The CAVC determined that Mr. Jones

2007-7229 2failed to identify with any specificity any pa rticular inadequacy in the notice provided. The CAVC therefore affirmed t he decision of the Board. Mr. Jones filed an appeal to this court. DISCUSSION We have limited jurisdiction to review a decision of the CAVC. Bonner v. Nicholson , 497 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We may only review with respect to the validity of a rule of law, statute, or regulation, or any interpretation thereof, which the CAVC relied on in making its decision. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). We may not review a challenge to a factual determination, nor ma y we review a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). On appeal, Mr. Jones argues that the CAVC considered the wrong military records. He alleges to have two sets of military records, only one of which includes an order that his discharge was under honorable conditions. Mr . Jones alleges that the order was not in the records considered by the Board and therefore not in the records considered by the CAVC. He also argues that the CAVC fail ed to consider his Purple Heart award. Mr. Jones’ arguments concern the character of his discharge, which was not an issue before the CAVC. The only issue be fore the CAVC was w hether VA complied with the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). Mr. Jones has not alleged any error in this determination, and we do not consider his arguments made for the first time on appeal. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Sturman Indus., Inc. , 387 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . Further, Mr. Jones’ ar guments concern factual issues over which we have no jurisdiction. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292( a), (d)(2).

2007-7229 32007-7229 4 CONCLUSION We conclude that this court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Jones’ appeal. It is therefore dismissed. No costs.