NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

ANNE-MARIE ELIZABETH MEEGAN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0575

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-001328-001

The Honorable John R. Doody, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Joel M. Glynn

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 3-21-2019
STATE v. MEEGAN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

B E E N E, Judge:

¶1 This appeal was timely filed in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969) 

following a disposition hearing for probation violation by Anne-Marie 

Elizabeth Meegan (“Meegan”) related to her conviction for attempted

stalking. Meegan’s counsel searched the record on appeal and found no 

arguable question of law that is not frivolous. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 

530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999). Meegan was given the opportunity to file a 

supplemental brief in propria persona, and she did so. Counsel now asks us 

to search the record for fundamental error. After reviewing the entire 

record, we affirm Meegan’s convictions and sentences.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Between June 2015 and January 2016, Meegan 

inappropriately and repeatedly contacted B.C. at his office, and Meegan 

was charged with one count of stalking and three counts of aggravated 

harassment. In exchange for the dismissal of the aggravated harassment 

counts, Meegan pled guilty to one count of attempted stalking, a Class 5 

felony. At sentencing, the superior court suspended the imposition of 

sentence and placed Meegan on supervised probation for five years.

2 As a 

condition of probation, Meegan was required “not [to] have contact with 

the victim(s) in any form, unless approved in writing by the [Adult 

Probation Department].” This condition “include[d] indirect contact which 

extend[ed] to family members and employees of the victim as well as 

 

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

convictions with all reasonable inferences resolved against the defendant.” 

State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 404, ¶¶ 2-3, n.2 (App. 2015) (citation omitted).

2 For the stalking offense, statute provides for lifetime probation. See

Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-902, -2923.
STATE v. MEEGAN

Decision of the Court

3

phone, email, or any other type of electronic means of communication 

whether direct or indirect.”

¶3 In February 2017, Meegan attempted to contacted B.C. at his 

office by phone. The conversation was intercepted by B.C.’s office staff, 

placed on a speaker phone, and the audio of the conversation was captured 

on video. Multiple witnesses testified the caller’s voice was that of Meegan, 

and, according to caller ID, the phone call originated from Meegan’s home 

phone number. The superior court found Meegan had contacted B.C. in 

violation of the terms of her probation and sentenced Meegan to a 10-day 

jail term and placed her on lifetime probation.

¶4 The superior court conducted a Donald hearing3 and ensured 

Meegan was apprised of the possible sentencing range that she faced at trial 

and the impact of a plea agreement upon her constitutional rights. Further, 

Meegan admitted her “attempt to engage in a course of conduct directed 

toward [B.C.] which would reasonably cause a person to fear for [his] 

safety” and that she did so via phone calls and letters. Thus, the superior 

court found that Meegan knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 

consented to the plea agreement and accepted the plea.

¶5 Meegan timely appealed the finding of the probation 

violation and disposition hearing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 

6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes 

sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 The record reflects no fundamental error in the proceedings. 

Meegan was represented by counsel at all critical stages in both the original 

conviction and probation violation proceedings. Meegan underwent 

multiple independent competency evaluations and was provided 

court-ordered mental health treatment to ensure she was competent to aid 

in her defense.

¶7 At the disposition hearing, Meegan admitted that her 

conditions of release prohibited her from having contact with B.C., his 

family, or his staff, but she also denied contacting B.C. Over Meegan’s 

objection, the court admitted in evidence the video that proved Meegan’s 

contact with B.C.

 

3 State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406 (App. 2000).
STATE v. MEEGAN

Decision of the Court

4

¶8 At sentencing, the superior court received presentence 

reports, accounted for aggravating and mitigating factors, and provided 

Meegan an opportunity to speak. Considering all the evidence, the superior 

court found Meegan had contacted B.C. in violation of her probation and,

consistent with the terms of her plea agreement, placed Meegan on lifetime 

probation and ordered her to serve 10 days in jail as a term of probation.

CONCLUSION

¶9 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none; therefore, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

¶10 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligation 

pertaining to Meegan’s representation in this appeal will end. Defense 

counsel need do no more than inform her of the outcome of this appeal and 

her future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds “an issue appropriate 

for submission” to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. State 

v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). On the Court’s own motion, 

Meegan has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if she wishes, 

with a pro per motion for reconsideration. Further, she has 30 days from the 

date of this decision to proceed, if she wishes, with a pro per petition for 

review.