COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Frank, Humphreys and Haley 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

WILLIAM JERRY WIMBISH 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2873-06-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

 APRIL 8, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 

G. Carter Greer, Judge 

 James W. Haskins (Scott C. Wall; Young, Haskins, Mann, Gregory, 

McGarry & Wall, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 William Jerry Wimbish appeals his conviction for driving a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated, in violation of Code § 18.2-266, and the mandatory ten-day jail sentence he received 

as required by Code § 18.2-270. Wimbish raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the 

admission of the “Certificate of Blood Alcohol Analysis” by the trial court violated his 

confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Second, he 

argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to ten days in jail as required by Code 

§ 18.2-270 because Code § 18.2-270 contains an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. For 

the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision. 

I. Background

 “Under familiar principles of appellate review, we view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

the party that prevailed below.” Banks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 539, 543, 586 S.E.2d 
- 2 - 

876, 877 (2003). So viewed, the evidence established that on the night of December 23, 2006, 

Virginia State Trooper Eric J. O’Connell (“O’Connell”) was on patrol in Henry County. While 

patrolling, he observed a 1984 Mercedes sedan make an unusually wide right turn onto T.B. 

Stanley Road, nearly running off of the left side of the road. O’Connell followed the Mercedes 

and observed the vehicle weave back and forth across the road’s center yellow lines several 

times. Suspecting that the driver might be driving under the influence, O’Connell initiated a 

traffic stop. 

 Standing at the Mercedes’ window, O’Connell asked the driver for his driver’s license 

and registration card. O’Connell immediately smelled alcohol on the driver’s breath. O’Connell 

also observed that the driver’s speech was slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, and he had a difficult 

time taking his driver’s license out of his pocket. The driver’s license identified him as William 

Jerry Wimbish (“Wimbish”). O’Connell asked Wimbish to step out of the vehicle. Wimbish 

stepped out of the vehicle and “swayed heavily” as he walked. He admitted that he had just left a 

party where he had consumed four beers and two margaritas, consuming the last drink an hour 

earlier. He stated that he felt intoxicated. Wimbish failed a field sobriety test and refused to take 

another stating: “There’s no need to do any more tests. You know I’ve had too much to drink.” 

O’Connell placed Wimbish under arrest and took him to the magistrate’s office. 

 At the magistrate’s office, O’Connell, a licensed breath test operator, conducted a breath 

test on Wimbish using the Intoxilyzer 5000. As part of his ongoing training as a breath test 

operator, O’Connell had recently completed a recertification course through the Department of 

Forensic Science (“the Department”). In conducting the test, O’Connell completed each step 

pursuant to a checklist (“the Checklist”) provided by the Department. The Checklist contains 

eleven steps for conducting a breath test. 
- 3 - 

 

 Following the test, the Intoxilyzer 5000 printed the results on a pre-printed form entitled 

“CERTIFICATE OF BLOOD ALCOHOL ANALYSIS” (“the Certificate of Analysis”). The 

Certificate of Analysis form contained a number of blank fields that were filled in by a printer 

attached to the Intoxilyzer 5000. Some of this information was entered by the machine operator, 

including 1) the name of the accused, 2) the name of the jurisdiction, 3) the name and license 

number of the breath test operator and the date the officer’s license expires, and 4) the name of 

the agency conducting the test. Other information printed upon the certificate by the Intoxilyzer 

5000 was generated by the machine itself, including 1) the test equipment’s number, 2) the last 

date on which the test equipment was tested, 3) the date and time the breath sample was taken, 

and 4) the sample’s alcohol content. The information provided by the Intoxilyzer on the 

Certificate of Analysis also indicated that Wimbish’s breath had an alcohol content of .22 grams 

per 210 liters of breath, which is over the statutory limit of 0.08 grams per 210 liters of breath. 

The Certificate of Analysis indicated that the Intoxilyzer had been tested on November 30, 

2005.1

 At the bottom of the Certificate of Analysis is an attestation clause that states: 

I certify that the above is an accurate record of the test conducted; 

that the test was conducted with the type of equipment and in 

accordance with the methods approved by the Department of 

Forensic Science; that the test was conducted in accordance with 

the department’s specifications; that the equipment on which the 

breath test was conducted has been tested within the past six 

months and found to be accurate; that prior to administration of the 

test the accused was advised of his right to observe the process and 

see the blood alcohol reading on the equipment used to perform the 

breath test, and that I possess a valid license to conduct such test, 

given under my hand this _______ day of _____________ , 20___. 

1

 O’Connell also testified that a logbook is kept with the Intoxilyzer 5000 that contains a 

record of every time the machine is tested for accuracy and that the log also indicated that the 

machine had been tested on November 30, 2005. 
- 4 - 

O’Connell wrote the date of the test in the blank spaces in the attestation clause and signed his 

name in the box beneath the attestation clause marked “BREATH TEST OPERATOR.” 

 Wimbish was subsequently convicted in general district court of driving while 

intoxicated, in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Wimbish appealed that conviction to the circuit 

court. Before trial, Wimbish made a motion asking the trial court to suppress the Certificate of 

Analysis, arguing that its admission would violate his right of confrontation under the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court denied his motion, holding that the 

Certificate of Analysis was not testimonial and therefore did not implicate the Sixth Amendment. 

The trial court subsequently found Wimbish guilty of driving while intoxicated, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-266. 

 After being found guilty, but prior to sentencing, Wimbish argued that the relevant 

sentencing provision of Code § 18.2-270 is unconstitutional because it contains an 

unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The trial court rejected his argument and sentenced 

him to the mandatory ten days in jail pursuant to Code § 18.2-270. This appeal follows. 

II. Analysis

A. The Constitutionality of Admitting the Certificate of Analysis

 In his first question presented, Wimbish argues that the admission of the Certificate of 

Analysis violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Specifically, Wimbish 

claims that the test results provided by the Intoxilyzer 5000 and certain statements made by 

O’Connell in the attestation clause are testimonial hearsay. 

 The admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and we review its 

decisions only for abuse of discretion. Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 

838, 842 (1988). However, whether the Certificate of Analysis violates the Sixth Amendment as 
- 5 - 

“‘testimonial hearsay’ [] is a question of law, reviewed de novo by this Court.” Michels v. 

Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 461, 465, 624 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2006). 

 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

mandates that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. That “bedrock procedural guarantee 

applies to both federal and state prosecutions.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) 

(citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)). 

 In Crawford, the Supreme Court of the United States set out to clarify its Confrontation 

Clause jurisprudence in order to ensure that it remained “faithful to the Framers’ understanding” 

of the confrontation right. Id. at 59. The Court noted that the Confrontation Clause targeted a 

specific “evil,” namely the “civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 

parte examinations as evidence against the accused.” Id. at 49. That historical concern centered 

on the admission of ex parte statements taken by government officials, serving “an essentially 

investigative and prosecutorial function,” at trial in lieu of live testimony. Id. at 43, 53. The 

Court held that, because the right of confrontation developed in response to those specific 

abuses, “[t]he Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with [that] focus in mind.” Id. at 50.

 For the first time, the Court in Crawford distinguished between “testimonial” and 

“non-testimonial” statements. The Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause protects against 

“testimonial” statements because, by its own language, it only “applies to ‘witnesses’ against the 

accused – in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’” Id. at 51 (quoting 1 N. Webster, An 

American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The Court held that the Confrontation 

Clause bars the “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial 

unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for 

cross-examination.” Id. at 53-54. By contrast, the Court held that “[w]here nontestimonial 
- 6 - 

hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility 

in their development of hearsay law,” even suggesting that such statements may be “exempted [] 

from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” Id. at 67. Although the Court explicitly “[left] 

for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial,’” it did provide 

that, “at a minimum,” the term applies “to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a 

grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id. 

 The issue in this case is whether portions of the Certificate of Analysis, namely the breath 

test results and the attestation clause, are “testimonial” and, thus, subject to the Confrontation 

Clause. Because the portions of the Certificate of Analysis that Wimbish complains of include 

“statements” from two different sources – O’Connell and the Intoxilyzer 5000 – we must address 

each separately. 

1. Breath Test Results

 Wimbish first challenges the results of the breath test produced by the Intoxilyzer 5000. 

In order to assess Wimbish’s argument, it is necessary first to understand the source generating 

the data or “statement” that Wimbish complains of and then determine whether that source is a 

“witness.” The “statement” that Wimbish’s breath-alcohol content was “.22 grams per 210 liters 

of breath” was generated by the Intoxilyzer 5000 indicating the device’s analysis of his breath. 

Thus, the Intoxilyzer 5000 was the purported “witness” making the alleged out-of-court 

“statement.” 

 The Confrontation Clause protects criminal defendants from the “admission of 

testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial.” Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added). 

“Only [testimonial statements] cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the 

Confrontation Clause.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006). Although there is 

much dispute over what specific types of evidence fall within the scope of the Confrontation 
- 7 - 

Clause, under even the broadest interpretation the clause applies only to out-of-court statements

made by witnesses. Thus, the right of confrontation does not affect the admissibility of evidence 

that is not a statement made by a witness. 

Although Virginia courts have not addressed whether a machine that analyzes the alcohol 

content of breath is a “witness” that can make “statements” for the purpose of the Confrontation 

Clause, we addressed a similar issue in Penny v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 494, 370 S.E.2d 

314 (1988). Penny involved the admissibility of a report produced by a “call trap” device that 

monitored telephone activity on a particular telephone line. Id. at 498, 370 S.E.2d at 316. We 

rejected the argument that the machine’s report was an out-of-court statement made by a witness 

and subject to the general rule preventing the admission of hearsay: 

With a call trap device, there exists no out-of-court declarant who 

could be subject to cross-examination. The scientific advances of 

modern technology have enabled the call trap device to make and 

record the occurrence of electronic events. No human entered into 

the call trap device the conclusion that the phone in Penny’s 

residence had completed a contact with the phone in Hamilton’s 

residence. 

Id. at 498-99, 370 S.E.2d at 317. 

 The Intoxilyzer 5000, like the call trap device in Penny, is not a witness or declarant 

capable of making statements. Here, as in Penny, no human entered into the Intoxilyzer 5000 the 

conclusion that Wimbish’s breath alcohol content was .22 grams per 210 liters of breath. 

Wimbish blew into the machine, the machine analyzed his breath and reported the results of its 

analysis. The machine was the sole source of the test results. Thus the result of the breath test 

was merely data produced by a machine, not a statement produced by a witness. See United 

States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7thCir. 2007) (“[D]ata are not ‘statements’ in any useful 

sense. Nor is a machine a ‘witness against’ anyone.”); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 

225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“‘[S]tatements’ made by machines are not out-of-court statements 
- 8 - 

made by declarants that are subject to the Confrontation Clause.”); Caldwell v. State, 495 S.E.2d 

308, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that printouts from a breath test machine “are not hearsay 

but rather the mechanically-generated reports automatically created by the machine. They do not 

constitute out-of-court statements by any person or the conclusion of a third party not before the 

court . . . .” (internal citations omitted)); State v. Van Sickle, 813 P.2d 910, 913 (Idaho Ct. App. 

1991) (a “printout from the Intoximeter is not a ‘statement’ for hearsay purposes . . . the printout 

is a test result produced by a machine”); see also People v. Jambor, 729 N.W.2d 569, 575 (Mich. 

Ct. App. 2007) (fingerprint cards containing only “objective information” and not “subjective 

statements” are not testimonial). Because the breath test result is not a statement made by a 

witness, the Confrontation Clause does not place any restrictions on its admission.2

2. Attestation Clause

 Wimbish claims that two of the assertions O’Connell made in the attestation clause are 

testimonial. The relevant portion of the attestation clause states: “I certify . . . that the test was 

conducted with the type of equipment and in accordance with the methods approved by the 

 2

 We acknowledge that courts in other jurisdictions have held certain types of scientific 

reports to be testimonial. However the reports in those cases were generally either produced or 

interpreted by a scientist or a technician. See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2006) 

(lab report prepared by a chemist is testimonial); Martin v. State, 936 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. Dist. 

App. 2006) (lab report prepared by a scientist is testimonial); State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367 

(Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (lab report prepared by a scientist is testimonial); People v. Lonsby, 707 

N.W.2d 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (scientist’s “subjective observations and analytic standards” 

regarding scientific testing results are testimonial); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 

2006) (lab report prepared by a scientist is testimonial); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. 

2007) (scientist’s “forensic analysis” of a substance is testimonial); State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626 

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (lab report prepared by a forensic scientist is testimonial). We 

do not decide today whether all scientific reports are nontestimonial because it is unnecessary for 

us to do so. See Magruder v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 283, 657 S.E.2d 113 (2008) (declining to 

unnecessarily address whether certain scientific reports are testimonial because the defendants 

waived their Sixth Amendment rights). Rather, we merely hold that information generated by a 

machine, and presented without human analysis or interpretation is not testimonial because the 

machine is not a witness in any constitutional sense and thus the data standing alone is not a 

testimonial statement under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
- 9 - 

Department of Forensic Science [and] that the equipment on which the breath test was conducted 

has been tested within the past six months and found to be accurate.” Wimbish claims that the 

Confrontation Clause barred admission of O’Connell’s assertions 1) that the test was conducted 

in accordance with approved methods and 2) that the machine had been tested in the past six 

months. We address each assertion separately. 

a. O’Connell’s Assertion That He Used Approved Methods

 Wimbish argues that O’Connell’s assertion that he conducted the breath test “with the 

type of equipment and in accordance with the methods approved by the Department” is hearsay 

because O’Connell could not answer certain questions about the Department’s methods on 

cross-examination. O’Connell explained that he was able to follow the Department’s approved 

methods because he had received training from Alka Lohman (“Lohman”), the Director of the 

Department’s Division of Forensic Science Breath Section. Wimbish claims that he had a right 

under the Sixth Amendment to confront Lohman because she had instructed O’Connell on the 

Department methods that he was purportedly testifying about. 

 “‘Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of 

court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, 

and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.’” Stevenson v. 

Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 465, 237 S.E.2d 779, 781 (1977) (quoting McCormick on 

Evidence § 246 (2d ed. 1972)). Said differently, hearsay is “testimony given by a witness who 

relates, not what he knows personally, but what others have told him, or what he has heard said 

by others.” Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 74, 77 S.E.2d 447, 453 (1953). Wimbish 

argues that, by claiming to have followed the proper methods, O’Connell is testifying to the 

content of the methods, and, because he could not testify as to all of the Department’s methods, 

that testimony is hearsay. We do not agree. 
- 10 - 

 In Oulds v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 210, 532 S.E.2d 33 (2000), the Supreme Court of 

Virginia held that a police officer’s testimony that he complied with certain municipal 

regulations was not hearsay. The Court held that testimony that the officer complied with the 

regulations “was not offered to prove the existence and content of such regulations” and, 

therefore, that testimony was not hearsay. Id. at 213, 532 S.E.2d at 35. 

 Likewise, O’Connell’s testimony in this case was not offered to prove the content of the 

Department’s breath analysis methods. Nor was his testimony offered to prove the content of the 

training that O’Connell received from Lohman. The attestation clause merely states his opinion 

that he complied with the Department’s approved methods. 

 Consequently, Wimbish’s argument that he was denied the right to cross-examine 

Lohman must fail. O’Connell’s statement that “the test was conducted with the type of 

equipment and in accordance with the methods approved by the Department of Forensic 

Science” is not hearsay. It is not “what others have told him, or what he has heard said by 

others.” Id. at 213, 532 S.E.2d at 35. It is simply his opinion that he followed the rules. 

O’Connell’s later admission that he was not familiar with all of the Department’s methods does 

not change his opinion testimony to hearsay. The extent of O’Connell’s knowledge of the 

Department’s methods goes only to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. As 

non-hearsay, O’Connell’s testimony did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See Davis, 547 

U.S. at 823 (holding that “the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay”). 

b. O’Connell’s Assertion That the Machine Had Been Tested in the Past Six Months

 O’Connell’s statement that “the equipment on which the breath test was conducted has 

been tested within the past six months and found to be accurate” is clearly hearsay, but that does 

not end the analysis. O’Connell admitted that he was not present when the machine was tested 

and that he only knew of the test because “that is what is in the sheet in the log book.” Wimbish 
- 11 - 

argues that the admission of O’Connell’s hearsay statement violated his rights under the 

Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial. We disagree. 

 Since Crawford was decided, several other jurisdictions have addressed the issue of 

whether similar maintenance logs are testimonial.3

 Those courts that have held that maintenance 

logs are nontestimonial have generally done so for one of two reasons. One line of cases holds 

that maintenance logs are not testimonial because they are business records “made and 

maintained in the ordinary course of business.” Boshancurt v. Eisenburg, 129 P.3d 471, 475 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); see e.g. State v. Godshalk, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 

2005) (inspection certificates are business records that Crawford “specifically excluded . . . from 

[its] scope”); Pierce v. State, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (maintenance certificates 

are admissible as business records and, therefore, not testimonial); State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15, 

19 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (test logs “are more akin to hearsay statements that were not considered 

testimonial in nature at common law, such as public or business records”). A second line of 

cases holds that maintenance logs are not testimonial because they are not evidence “against” 

any particular defendant. See, e.g., Rackoff v. State, 621 S.E.2d 841, 845 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) 

(Maintenance logs “are not made in anticipation of prosecution against any particular 

 3

 An overwhelming majority of those courts have held that such logs are not testimonial. 

See Abyo v. State, 166 P.3d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (records certifying the date that a 

breath test machine was tested are nontestimonial); Boshancurt v. Eisenburg, 129 P.3d 471, 480 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (same); Pierce v. State, 628 S.E.2d 235, 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (same); 

State v. Marshall, 163 P.3d 199, 205 (Haw. Ct. App. 2007) (same); Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 

144, 149-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (same); People v. Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006) (same); State v. 

Carter, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) (same); State v. Godshalk, 885 A.2d 969, 973 (N.J. 

Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005) (same); State v. Dedman, 102 P.3d 628, 636 (N.M. 2004) (same); 

People v. Kanhai, 797 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2005) (same); State v. Norman, 125 

P.3d 15, 18 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (same); see also State v. Fischer, 726 N.W.2d 176, 184 (Neb. 

2007) (document certifying the accuracy of the solution used to test a breath test machine was 

nontestimonial); State v. Shisler, 2006 Ohio 5265, P15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (same); but see

Shiver v. State, 900 So.2d 615, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (a record of the date that 

maintenance was performed on a breath test machine was testimonial). 
- 12 - 

defendant.”); State v. Carter, 114 P.3d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 2005) (“Certification reports are 

nontestimonial in nature in that they are foundational, rather than substantive or accusatory.”); 

People v. Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“[T]he evidence [in a maintenance 

certification] is not ‘against’ any particular defendant.”). We find the analysis supporting both 

lines of cases persuasive. 

Crawford explicitly excluded business records from its definition of testimonial. 

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55 (“Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their 

nature were not testimonial – for example, business records . . . .”). Although not specifically 

characterized as such in prior case law, Intoxilyzer 5000 maintenance logs are essentially 

business records for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The maintenance logs are created 

by state employees conducting tests of the machines as part of their routine ministerial duties. 

Tests of the Intoxilyzer 5000 are conducted because they are required by administrative rule, not 

in anticipation of any particular litigation. See 12 VAC 40-20-30 (“Breath tests shall be tested 

for accuracy by the [D]epartment at least once every six months.”). These logs, kept in the 

ordinary course of business by state employees, recording the completion of required tasks, are 

essentially business records and their admission does not resemble the type of civil law abuses 

that the Confrontation Clause was intended to protect against. 

 Furthermore, the Intoxilyzer 5000 maintenance logs do not pose a confrontation issue 

because they are not prepared “against” any particular defendant. This reasoning is consistent 

with our holding in Michels. In Michels, we held that certificates from the Delaware Secretary 

of State certifying that two entities were not licensed as limited liability companies in Delaware 

were nontestimonial. Michels, 47 Va. App. at 466, 624 S.E.2d at 678. We recognized that “the 

Confrontation Clause is aimed at protecting criminal defendants from those people making 

accusations against them.” Id. (emphasis added). We reasoned that “the certificates are not by 
- 13 - 

their nature accusatory and do not describe any criminal wrongdoing of appellant. Rather, they 

are a neutral repository of information that reflects the objective results of a search of public 

records.” Id. at 469, 624 S.E.2d at 680. We held that such “documents establishing the 

existence or absence of some objective fact, rather than detailing the criminal wrongdoing of the 

defendant, are not ‘testimonial.’”4

 Id. at 467, 624 S.E.2d at 678. 

 Likewise, in Anderson v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 704, 634 S.E.2d 372 (2006), we 

held that a certificate offered as evidence of the chain of custody pursuant to Code § 19.2-187.01 

is not testimonial. Again recognizing the Confrontation Clause’s protection against 

“accusatorial” statements, we held that “the chain of custody verification provides only 

foundation evidence that cannot be fairly characterized as accusatorial.” Id. at 715, 634 S.E.2d at 

377. Because it is not accusatory, “the chain-of-custody inference . . . constitutes nontestimonial 

evidence outside the protective ‘perimeter’ of the Confrontation Clause.” Id.

 The maintenance log at issue in this case is not evidence “against” any particular 

defendant. The logs are not created in anticipation of litigation against any one person and do 

not contain any accusations of criminal wrongdoing. As required by administrative rule, the 

Intoxilyzer 5000 would be tested and the log would be kept regardless of whether or not the 

machine is ever used. These logs are merely “documents establishing the existence or absence of 

some objective fact, rather than detailing the criminal wrongdoing of the defendant.” Michels, 

47 Va. App. at 467, 624 S.E.2d at 678. The maintenance log of the Intoxilyzer 5000 bears no 

resemblance to ex parte examinations, the “evil” that the Confrontation Clause was designed to 

guard against. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49. Because the maintenance log is not accusatory and is 

 4

 We recently reaffirmed Michels’ holding in Jasper v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 749, 

644 S.E.2d 406 (2007). In Jasper, we extended Michels’ holding that “a certification of an 

out-of-state official regarding an absence of a certain record” is nontestimonial, to hold that “the 

certification of an in-state official regarding the existence of certain records” is likewise 

nontestimonial. Id. at 757, 644 S.E.2d at 411 (emphasis in original). 
- 14 - 

essentially a business record, we hold that it is not testimonial and, therefore, does not implicate 

the Sixth Amendment. 

 In sum, we hold that none of the statements that Wimbish complains of in the Certificate 

of Analysis implicate the Confrontation Clause. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err 

in admitting the Certificate of Analysis into evidence. 

B. The Constitutionality of Code § 18.2-270

 Wimbish next argues that the mandatory minimum sentencing requirement contained in 

Code § 18.2-270 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution because it contains a mandatory presumption. Code § 18.2-270 states in 

pertinent part: 

any person violating any provision of § 18.2-266 shall be guilty of 

a Class 1 misdemeanor with a mandatory minimum fine of $250. 

If the person’s blood alcohol level as indicated by the chemical test 

administered as provided in this article was at least 0.15, but not 

more than 0.20, he shall be confined in jail for an additional 

mandatory minimum period of five days or, if the level was more 

than 0.20, for an additional mandatory minimum period of 10 days. 

Wimbish argues that the statute requires the fact finder to determine whether the accused’s blood 

alcohol level exceeded the statutory threshold of 0.15 or 0.20 at the time of the offense. From 

that premise, Wimbish reasons that the statute requires the fact finder to presume that, because 

an accused’s blood alcohol level exceeded the statutory threshold at the time of testing, it also 

exceeded the threshold levels at the time of the offense. 

 That is not the case. The accused’s blood alcohol level at the time of the offense is 

irrelevant for the purpose of whether or not the enhanced sentence applies under Code 

§ 18.2-270. For a defendant to be eligible for Code § 18.2-270’s enhanced mandatory 

sentencing, the Commonwealth must prove two elements: 1) that the accused violated a 

provision of Code § 18.2-266 and 2) that the accused’s “blood alcohol level as indicated by the 
- 15 - 

chemical test administered as provided in this article was at least 0.15.” Thus, sentencing 

pursuant to Code § 18.2-270 does not require proof of the accused’s blood alcohol level at the 

time of the offense. It simply mandates a minimum sentence if the accused has been convicted 

of driving while intoxicated and his blood alcohol level “as indicated by the chemical test” 

exceeded the threshold level. Therefore, Code § 18.2-270 does not require the fact finder to 

presume or infer anything. Thus, we hold that Code § 18.2-270 is constitutional and affirm the 

trial court’s decision to sentence Wimbish to a mandatory term of ten days in jail. 

III. Conclusion

 Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court’s admission of the Certificate of 

Analysis did not violate the Confrontation Clause and that Code § 18.2-270 does not contain an 

unconstitutional presumption. Therefore, we affirm Wimbish’s conviction. 

Affirmed.