Filed 2/7/23 Kroenke Sports & Entertainment v. Salomon CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

KROENKE SPORTS & 

ENTERTAINMENT, LLC et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

NICOLAS A. SALOMON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B320536

(Los Angeles County 

Super. Ct. No.

18STCP02712, 

19STCP00654)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Dismissed.

Fish & Richardson and Jeremy D. Anderson for Defendant

and Appellant.

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Susan K. Leader and 

Will A. Ostrander for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
2

INTRODUCTION

Kroenke Sports & Entertainment, LLC and its affiliates, 

Outdoor Channel Holdings, Inc., SkyCam, LLC, and CableCam, 

LLC, (collectively, Kroenke) filed an arbitration demand against 

Nicolas Salomon, former president of SkyCam and CableCam, 

claiming he misappropriated confidential information. The 

arbitrator awarded Kroenke $440,126.48, plus interest, on its

claims. In March 2019 the trial court entered judgment 

confirming the award. The arbitrator then issued a second 

award, dismissing Salomon’s counterclaims against Kroenke. In 

March 2022 the court entered judgment confirming that award. 

Salomon appeals from the March 2022 judgment. 

Salomon challenges the March 2019 judgment on the 

ground the trial court lacked authority to confirm the arbitrator’s 

first award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.4.

1 He 

also challenges the March 2022 judgment, arguing the court 

should have vacated the arbitrator’s second award because the 

arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the case. 

Because the March 2019 judgment was a final judgment

from which Salomon did not timely appeal, we dismiss as 

untimely the portion of his appeal challenging that judgment. 

We dismiss the rest of Salomon’s appeal as moot because, in a 

separate lawsuit in Delaware, he has obtained the relief sought 

by his counterclaims in the arbitration and therefore reversing 

the March 2022 judgment would provide him no effective relief. 

1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Arbitrator Issues an Award, and the Trial Court

Enters a Judgment

In January 2018 Kroenke filed an arbitration demand 

against Salomon with Judicial Arbitration and Mediation 

Services, Inc. (JAMS). Kroenke asserted breach of contract and 

other claims, based on allegations Salomon had misappropriated 

confidential information from SkyCam and CableCam before they 

terminated his employment as their president in 2014. Kroenke 

filed the demand pursuant to a 2009 employment agreement with 

Salomon, which provided JAMS would administer arbitration 

between the parties.

In February 2018 Salomon filed a response to the demand

that included a request to dismiss the proceeding for lack of 

jurisdiction. Citing a 2011 employment agreement between the 

parties that provided the American Arbitration Association 

(AAA) would administer arbitration, Salomon argued AAA, not 

JAMS, had to conduct any arbitration between the parties.

Salomon did not assert any counterclaims in his response to 

Kroenke’s demand for arbitration, but “reserve[d] the right to 

assert . . . such Counterclaims as may be available to him” in the 

event his jurisdictional challenge did not succeed.

In a March 2018 email exchange with the arbitrator’s case 

administrator, Salomon indicated he was without counsel in the 

arbitration and asserted Kroenke was obligated to provide him 

counsel under an “Indemnification Agreement” between the 
4

parties.

2 Salomon wrote: “Can you please see if the arbitrator 

can address this lack of counsel issue? I would like to have 

counsel for the hearing.”

3 

Later in March 2018, the arbitrator held a telephonic 

hearing on Salomon’s jurisdictional challenge. Salomon 

participated without counsel and again claimed Kroenke was 

obligated to indemnify him in the arbitration proceeding. 

Kroenke argued that indemnification was “an issue to be resolved 

at the end of the case” and that Salomon’s request for 

indemnification was “not ripe.” The arbitrator told the parties 

“the issue of indemnification raised by Mr. Salomon was reserved 

and would be addressed at a later date” and urged Salomon to 

obtain counsel. The arbitrator issued a written order rejecting 

Salomon’s jurisdictional challenge and ruling the “arbitration 

properly is a JAMS arbitration.” The arbitrator observed that, at 

an earlier conference in the arbitration, he had ruled he would 

decide the jurisdictional issue before considering Kroenke’s 

request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 

injunction and Salomon’s request for “a determination of a right 

to indemnification for his attorneys’ fees in connection with this 

arbitration.’’ 

In May 2018 the arbitrator held a hearing on Kroenke’s

request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 

injunction, after which the arbitrator issued a written ruling 

2 Salomon, however, was represented at that time by counsel 

in an action he had filed against Kroenke in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 

3 It is not clear what hearing Salomon was referring to. 
5

granting the request. In his ruling the arbitrator stated that 

Salomon had participated in the hearing without counsel, that 

during the hearing the arbitrator advised him repeatedly to 

obtain counsel to represent him in the arbitration, and that

during the hearing the arbitrator also stated Salomon’s

“repetition of a right to indemnification or the like is no reason or 

excuse for a stay or further delay of this arbitration.” The 

arbitrator added that, after the hearing, Salomon submitted by 

email a request for a stay of any decision on Kroenke’s “request 

for injunctive relief,” which the arbitrator “denied or denied 

again—(A) because Mr. Salomon, . . . without specifics, said that 

he is close to retaining (unnamed) new counsel, but (again 

without specifics) is having difficulty because of ‘who Claimants 

are,’ and (B) he should not have to defend this arbitration unless 

and until Claimants are required to advance his legal fees.”

In July 2018 the arbitrator held a hearing in Los Angeles 

on the merits of Kroenke’s claims. Despite having agreed to the 

date and location of the hearing and having received notice of the 

hearing a month in advance, Salomon did not participate. At the 

hearing Kroenke presented extensive evidence in support of its 

claims. 

On September 6, 2018 the arbitrator issued a “Partial Final 

Award” (the “first arbitration award”), awarding Kroenke 

$440,126.28, plus interest, on its claims. The award also

provided: “This Partial Final Award does not cover 

Mr. Salomon’s claim for indemnification, which shall remain 

reserved for future resolution—subject to the express condition 

that Mr. Salomon shall file and serve a counterclaim in this 

arbitration, within ten (10) days of the issuance of this Partial 

Final Award, setting forth his claim for indemnification, 
6

including the basis or bases for that claim.” The award further

provided: “This Partial Final Award fully and finally determines 

all claims, remedies . . . and principal issues and contentions 

concerning Mr. Salomon’s liability to Claimants in this 

arbitration. [¶] Except for Mr. Salomon’s reserved claim for 

indemnification, all claims, issues and contentions which have 

not been granted—expressly or by necessary implication—in this 

Partial Final Award, are and shall be deemed denied.” 

On November 21, 2018, with Salomon not having filed or 

served any counterclaim in the arbitration, Kroenke filed a 

petition in Los Angeles County Superior Court to confirm the

first arbitration award. Salomon, represented by attorneys S. 

Michael Kernan and R. Paul Katrinak, opposed the petition. The 

court granted the petition, and on March 25, 2019 it entered 

judgment confirming the first arbitration award. Salomon did 

not file a notice of appeal within 60 days of the clerk’s serving

him with notice of entry of the March 25, 2019 judgment.4

B. The Arbitrator Issues a Second Award, Salomon Files

a Petition To Vacate It, and the Trial Court Denies the 

Petition

The day after the trial court entered its March 25, 2019 

judgment, the arbitrator issued an order titled “Order of March 

26, 2019.” In it the arbitrator stated that “earlier this month . . . 

JAMS added [Kernan] and his law firm as Mr. Salomon’s counsel 

in this arbitration.” The arbitrator also stated that, despite the 

4 In July 2019 a state court in Texas granted a petition by 

Kroenke to domesticate the judgment for purposes of 

enforcement. Salomon asserts his appeal of that ruling is 

pending. 
7

10-day deadline in the first arbitration award, Salomon still had 

not filed a counterclaim for indemnification in the arbitration. 

Nevertheless, “[a]s a last chance opportunity,” the arbitrator 

stated he was giving Salomon another 10 days (from the date of 

the order) to file and serve a counterclaim. 

On the (second) tenth day, Kernan, on Salomon’s behalf,

filed and served counterclaims in the arbitration for express 

indemnity, implied indemnity, equitable indemnity, and 

declaratory relief. Salomon alleged that, under the 2011 

employment agreement and a separate 2011 “Indemnification 

Agreement,” Kroenke “should have completely indemnified [him] 

in this action,” but refused to do so. Salomon sought to recover 

“all damages” he had suffered “as a result of the initiation of this 

arbitration” and “full and complete indemnity of [him] by 

[Kroenke] in this arbitration.” 

Kroenke moved to dismiss the counterclaims, arguing it

had no obligation to indemnify Salomon because he had engaged 

in “bad faith, intentional misconduct.” Kroenke also disputed

Salomon’s suggestion it “had certain obligations to him that arose 

prior to the final disposition of this matter” because “‘an 

indemnity claim does not accrue until the underlying action is 

resolved.’” Kroenke acknowledged that the 2011 Indemnification 

Agreement—specifically, a provision Salomon and the arbitrator 

referred to as “section 7”—provided Kroenke would “pay the 

expenses incurred by Indemnitee in defending any proceeding in 

advance of its final disposition, provided that, to the extent 

required by law, the payment of expenses in advance . . . shall be 

made only upon receipt of an undertaking.” Kroenke argued, 

however, Salomon “repeatedly refused to provide an undertaking[ 
8

] and indeed acknowledges in his Counter-Claim that none was 

provided.”

After Kroenke filed its motion to dismiss the counterclaims, 

Kernan withdrew as counsel for Salomon. Salomon, representing 

himself, filed an opposition to the motion, attaching numerous 

exhibits. He argued he was entitled both to indemnification and 

to “advancement for legal fees to defend himself,” the latter 

“without provision of an undertaking.” 

The day before the scheduled hearing on Kroenke’s motion 

to dismiss his counterclaims, Salomon engaged new counsel, 

Jeremy Anderson, who immediately wrote the arbitrator to

request a one-week continuance of the hearing. The arbitrator 

granted the request, on the condition Salomon and Anderson not 

do anything to “stay, delay, obstruct, or impede” the resolution of 

Kroenke’s motion to dismiss. The arbitrator prohibited all 

parties from filing any additional briefing, evidence, or written 

submissions relating to the pending motion. 

On August 5, 2019, one day before the rescheduled hearing 

on Kroenke’s motion to dismiss Salomon’s counterclaims, 

Anderson sent counsel for Kroenke an email that attached an

“Undertaking for Advancement of Fees and Expenses,” signed 

and dated that day by Salomon. This document stated that,

“[s]ubject to the terms of” section 7 of the 2011 Indemnification 

Agreement, Salomon was undertaking to repay Kroenke all 

attorneys’ fees and expenses paid by Kroenke on Salomon’s

behalf in advance of the final disposition of the arbitration 

proceeding, in the event it was ultimately determined Salomon

was not entitled to indemnification. Anderson also sent the 

arbitrator a copy of this email, including the attached 

undertaking by Salomon. 
9

The following day Anderson appeared for Salomon at the 

hearing on Kroenke’s motion to dismiss Salomon’s counterclaims. 

Conceding the counterclaims for indemnification lacked merit, 

Anderson focused on Salomon’s request for advancement of his 

attorneys’ fees and costs. He argued the undertaking Salomon 

had provided entitled him to the advancement under section 7 of 

the 2011 Indemnification Agreement. 

In September 2019 the arbitrator issued (and amended in 

no relevant respect) a “Partial Final Award No. 2” (the “second 

arbitration award”). In it the arbitrator dismissed with prejudice 

Salomon’s counterclaims for indemnification on the ground 

Salomon had “conceded or, at a minimum, failed to sustain any 

entitlement to any form of indemnification.” Construing

Salomon’s request for advancement of attorneys’ fees under 

section 7 of the 2011 Indemnification Agreement as a separate

counterclaim, the arbitrator ruled Salomon had “failed to sustain 

any entitlement to Section 7 advancement . . . .” This ruling 

rested on the arbitrator’s determination that under Delaware 

law, which the parties agreed applied, the undertaking Salomon 

had provided was not valid because he knew, when he provided 

it, he could not “meet his contingent performance obligation to 

repay” the advanced fees.5 The arbitrator dismissed with 

prejudice Salomon’s counterclaim “for Section 7 advancement of 

5 The arbitrator based this conclusion about Salomon’s 

inability to repay the advanced fees on, among other things,

(a) Salomon’s filing in the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fifth Circuit an “Indigent Financial Affidavit,” dated August 3, 

2019; (b) his recent statement to the arbitrator he was 

“consulting bankruptcy counsel”; and (c) the “more than 

$600,000” he already owed Kroenke as a result of, among other 

things, the earlier award on Kroenke’s arbitration’s claims. 
10

expenses incurred, if any, to and including the date of issuance of 

this Partial Final Award” and dismissed without prejudice “any 

claim(s) . . . for Section 7 advancement of expenses incurred or to 

be incurred after Mr. Salomon provides [a] valid and enforceable 

Section 7 undertaking.” 

In January 2020 Salomon (from then on represented by 

counsel) filed a petition in Los Angeles County Superior Court to 

vacate the second arbitration award. Salomon argued the court 

should vacate the award because the arbitrator refused to hear 

evidence material to the controversy, including when, in granting 

the one-week continuance of the hearing on Kroenke’s motion to 

dismiss Salomon’s counterclaims, the arbitrator prohibited the 

parties from submitting further briefing or evidence relating to 

the motion. Salomon argued that, had the arbitrator allowed him 

to submit additional “legal and factual evidence,” he “would have 

been able to demonstrate [his] right to advance indemnification.” 

Kroenke opposed the petition to vacate the award, arguing that 

Salomon had sufficient opportunity to present his counterclaims 

in the arbitration and that the arbitrator did not improperly 

refuse to hear evidence. On July 7, 2020 the trial court denied

Salomon’s petition to vacate the second arbitration award. 

C. Meanwhile, in Delaware . . . 

In October 2019—i.e., after the arbitrator issued the second 

arbitration award, but before Salomon filed his petition to vacate

it—Salomon filed a “Verified Complaint for Advancement of 

Legal Expenses and Attorneys’ Fees” in the Delaware Court of 

Chancery. Salomon alleged in that action that, under the 2011 

Indemnification Agreement, he was entitled to advancement of 

legal expenses incurred in connection with the arbitration
11

proceeding, including any appeal from judgments confirming the 

first or second arbitration awards, as well as expenses incurred in 

connection with the Delaware action. 

In February 2020 the Delaware Court of Chancery granted 

summary judgment in favor of Salomon. Finding Salomon’s 

August 5, 2019 undertaking sufficient under Delaware law, the 

court ordered Kroenke to advance Salomon attorneys’ fees and 

other legal expenses incurred from August 5, 2019 in connection 

with the arbitration and the Delaware proceeding. 

D. After We Dismiss an Earlier Appeal by Salomon, He

Files This One

On September 4, 2020 Salomon filed a notice of appeal, 

purporting to appeal from (1) the trial court’s March 25, 2019 

judgment, which he argued was “‘not appealable [sic]’ because it

was interlocutory,” and (2) the trial court’s July 7, 2020 order 

denying his petition to vacate the second arbitration award. In 

March 2022 we dismissed the appeal on the ground Salomon had 

not timely appealed from an appealable order or judgment. 

(Kroenke Sports & Entertainment, LLC v. Salomon (Mar. 15, 

2022, B307451) [order of dismissal] (Kroenke I).) Regarding 

Salomon’s attempt to appeal from the March 25, 2019 judgment, 

we observed that, “if Salomon is right that the March 25, 2019 

judgment is not appealable, he can’t appeal from it. If, on the 

other hand, Salomon is wrong and the judgment is appealable, 

his appeal from it is untimely because, as he concedes, he filed 

his notice of appeal more than 60 days—indeed, more than a year 

and a half—after the court clerk served him with notice of entry 

of the judgment. [Citation.] Either way, Salomon’s appeal from 

the March 25, 2019 judgment must be dismissed.” (Kroenke I.) 
12

Nor, we held, could Salomon appeal from the July 7, 2020 

order denying his petition to vacate the second arbitration award,

because an order denying a petition to vacate an arbitration 

award is not appealable, but is instead reviewable on appeal from 

a judgment confirming the award. As we explained, quoting from 

Law Offices of David S. Karton v. Segreto (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 

1, at pages 8-9, “‘“once a petition to confirm, correct, or vacate is 

filed, the trial court has only four choices: It may (1) confirm the 

award, (2) correct the award and confirm it as corrected, (3) 

vacate the award, or (4) dismiss the proceedings.’” [Citation.] ‘If 

a trial court dismisses the petition, it results in an appealable 

order. [Citation.] If the trial court which does not dismiss the 

petition also does not correct or vacate an arbitration award, it

must confirm the award. Entry of judgment in conformity 

therewith is required [citation], resulting in an appealable 

judgment under . . . section 1294, subdivision (d). Similarly, if 

the nondismissing trial court does not confirm the award (or 

confirm [i]t as corrected), the court must vacate it, resulting in an

appealable order under . . . section 1294, subdivision (c).’” We 

then observed: “None of the parties here, including Salomon, 

asked the court to confirm the arbitrator’s second award and 

enter judgment (although presumably Salomon still could, if he 

wanted to obtain a judgment against himself).” (Kroenke I, 

supra.) 

Which is what Salomon did next. And on March 17, 2022 

the trial court entered a judgment confirming the second 

arbitration award, from which Salomon (this time) timely 

appealed. 
13

DISCUSSION

A. Salomon Cannot Challenge the March 25, 2019 

Judgment Because It Was a Final Judgment from 

Which He Did Not Timely Appeal

Salomon argues the trial court lacked authority to enter its 

March 25, 2019 judgment confirming the first arbitration award

because the latter was not an “award” under section 1283.4.

6

Salomon can no longer challenge the March 25, 2019 judgment, 

however, because it was a final judgment from which he did not 

timely appeal. 

“A judgment is final, and therefore appealable, when it 

embodies ‘the final determination of the rights of the parties in 

an action or proceeding’ [citation]. A judgment constitutes the 

final determination of the parties’ rights ‘“where no issue is left 

for future consideration except the fact of compliance or 

noncompliance with [its] terms . . . .”’” (Kaiser Foundation 

Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1125, 

1138; see ibid. [“It is a judgment’s substance, not its form or 

label, which determines whether it is final.”].) If a judgment is 

final, and therefore appealable, “an aggrieved party must file a 

6 Salomon argues the first arbitration award was not an 

award under section 1283.4 because it left his “advancement 

claims . . . undecided.” (See § 1283.4 [an award must, among 

other things, “include a determination of all the questions 

submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in 

order to determine the controversy”].) We do not decide whether 

the first arbitration award was an “award” within the meaning of 

section 1283.4 because, as we explain, Salomon may no longer 

obtain review of the March 25, 2019 judgment confirming that 

award. 
14

timely appeal or forever lose the opportunity to obtain appellate 

review.” (Reyes v. Kruger (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 58, 67, italics 

and quotation marks omitted; see § 906 [reviewing court lacks 

authority “to review any decision or order from which an appeal 

might have been taken” but was not]; Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 

186 Cal.App.3d 959, 967 [“If the ruling is appealable, the 

aggrieved party must appeal or the right to contest it is lost.”].)

The March 25, 2019 judgment disposed of the only issue 

before the trial court: whether to grant Kroenke’s petition to 

confirm the first arbitration award. (See EHM Productions, Inc. 

v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1058, 

1063 [“Once a petition to confirm an award is filed, the superior 

court must select one of only four courses of action: It may 

confirm the award, correct and confirm it, vacate it, or dismiss 

the petition.”].) In granting the petition, the court decided that 

issue in favor of Kroenke, and no issue remained for the court to 

consider. The March 25, 2019 judgment was therefore final and 

appealable. And by failing to file a timely notice of appeal from 

that judgment (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)), Salomon 

lost his right to contest it. 

Salomon argues that, because the arbitrator had not 

resolved all claims between the parties, the arbitration award 

was not a final award and that therefore the March 25, 2019 

judgment was “interlocutory” and “not appealable.” (See Kirk v. 

Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1064-1066; Judge v. Nijjar 

Realty, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 619, 633-636.) He relies on 

the provision in the first arbitration award stating the arbitrator 

“reserved decision on Salomon’s counterclaim for advance 

indemnification.” Which is true, as far as it goes. But the 

arbitrator did not reserve decision on Salomon’s counterclaim 
15

indefinitely. Rather, the award conditioned that reservation on 

Salomon’s filing and serving the counterclaim within the next 10 

days, which Salomon did not do. At that point (i.e., Day 11),

Salomon’s counterclaim was no longer reserved for decision, but

came within the ambit of the award’s provision that “all claims, 

issues and contentions which have not been granted . . . in this 

Partial Final Award[ ] are and shall be deemed denied.” Thus—

and notwithstanding the arbitrator’s eventual decision (on March 

26, 2019) to give Salomon another chance to file a counterclaim—

when the trial court entered judgment on March 25, 2019

confirming the award, Salomon had no counterclaim of any kind 

pending or reserved in the arbitration, the first arbitration award 

was final, and the trial court had jurisdiction to confirm it. 

Because the March 25, 2019 judgment was a final and appealable 

judgment from which Salomon did not timely appeal, we dismiss 

that portion of his appeal that challenges it.

B. The Rest of Salomon’s Appeal Is Moot 

Salomon next argues the trial court erred in not vacating

the second arbitration award, specifically, in failing to conclude 

the arbitrator wrongly refused to hear evidence material to 

Salomon’s claim for “advancement rights.” Had the arbitrator 

considered that evidence, Salomon argues, the arbitrator “would 

have understood that Salomon’s undertaking was sufficient 

under Delaware law” and “reached the same correct conclusion 

that the Delaware Court of Chancery reached: that Salomon was 

entitled to advancement.” The Delaware Court of Chancery 

decision to which Salomon refers and in which he prevailed, 

however, renders this portion of his appeal moot.
16

“Appellate courts generally will not review matters that are 

moot. ‘A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court 

“can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual 

relief. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “When no effective relief can be 

granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.”’” (Mercury 

Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78; see 

Calleros v. Rural Metro of San Diego, Inc. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 

660, 667 [“An appeal will be dismissed if a reversal would have 

no practical effect.”]; Noergaard v. Noergaard (2020) 

57 Cal.App.5th 841, 852 [“‘“Generally, an appeal will be 

dismissed as ‘moot’ when, through no fault of respondent, the 

occurrence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate 

court to grant appellant any effective relief.”’”].) 

Salomon does not dispute that, in its February 2020 ruling,

the Delaware Court of Chancery gave him what he seeks in this 

action in connection with his arbitration counterclaim for 

“advancement rights”: an order directing Kroenke to advance him 

legal expenses incurred from August 5, 2019 (i.e., the date of 

Salomon’s undertaking), as provided by section 7 of the 2011 

Indemnification Agreement. Nor does Salomon dispute Kroenke 

has complied with the Delaware order or argue a California 

judgment would give him anything more than the Delaware order 

gives him. Because Salomon has obtained the relief sought in his 

arbitration counterclaim for advancement of his legal expenses, a 

decision in his favor here would not provide him any effective 

relief or have any practical effect on this case. Salomon has won 

this issue; he presents no reason he needs to win it again.

Salomon argues his appeal is not moot because the second 

arbitration award included supposedly “disparaging statements” 

about him—such as that his undertaking was “‘not given in good 
17

faith’” and was “‘worthless’”—and he “has a right to have the 

record . . . corrected.” But he cites no legal authority suggesting

he has any such “right.” He also argues his appeal is not moot 

because “correcting the record will expunge the reputational 

damage the arbitrator has caused, which will ultimately help 

Salomon’s future employment prospects.” But that proposed 

relief is too vague, abstract, and speculative to require a decision 

here on the merits. (See Eye Dog Foundation v. State Bd. of 

Guide Dogs for Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [a court’s duty “‘is 

to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried 

into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or 

abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law 

which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it”]; see 

also In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164, fn. 5

[speculative arguments do not “justify appellate review of an 

otherwise moot case”].) Seeking to clear one’s name or correct the 

record in a civil case, unlike a criminal case,7 does not justify 

hearing an otherwise moot appeal. Because Salomon’s appeal 

from the trial court’s March 17, 2022 judgment confirming the 

second arbitration award is moot, we dismiss it.8

7 See, e.g., People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 646, fn. 2; 

People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 790; People v. Delong

(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 484.

8 Courts have recognized “three discretionary exceptions to 

the rule that an appeal must be dismissed if no effective relief 

can be granted to an appellant: ‘“(1) when the case presents an 

issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; 

(2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between 

the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains 
18

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Kroenke is to recover its costs on 

appeal. 

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J. 

FEUER, J.

for the court's determination [citation].”’” (Rudick v. State Bd. of 

Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 88-89; accord, Golden Door 

Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 

864.) Salomon does not argue any of these exceptions applies

here.