I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2949 

To provide for oversight of North Korea policy, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 23, 2019 

Mr. ENGEL (for himself and Mr. WILSON of South Carolina) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be 

subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 

of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To provide for oversight of North Korea policy, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘North Korea Policy 

5 Oversight Act of 2019’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

5 Committee on Armed Services, and the Com6 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep7 resentatives; and 

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

9 the Committee on Armed Services, and the 

10 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. 

11 (2) DENUCLEARIZATION.—The term 

12 ‘‘denuclearization’’ refers to the complete, verified, 

13 and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nu14 clear weapons programs and programs related to the 

15 delivery mechanisms for nuclear weapons, including 

16 ballistic missile programs. 

17 (3) GOVERNMENT OF NORTH KOREA.—The 

18 term ‘‘Government of North Korea’’ means the Gov19 ernment of North Korea and its agencies, instru20 mentalities, and controlled entities. 

21 (4) NORTH KOREA.—The term ‘‘North Korea’’ 

22 means the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

23 (5) NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.— 

24 The term ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ means 

25 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 


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1 Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow 

2 July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483). 

3 (6) SOUTH KOREA.—The term ‘‘South Korea’’ 

4 means the Republic of Korea. 

5 (7) VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RE6 LATIONS.—The term ‘‘Vienna Convention on Diplo7 matic Relations’’ means the Vienna Convention on 

8 Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 

9 1961. 

10 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

11 Congress makes the following findings: 

12 (1) The North Korean nuclear weapons pro13 gram is the culmination of the Government of North 

14 Korea’s illegal efforts over six decades to acquire a 

15 nuclear weapons program capable of threatening 

16 both the United States and United States critical al17 lies in the Indo-Pacific region. 

18 (2) North Korea maintains a robust ballistic 

19 missile arsenal that includes a diverse array of deliv20 ery systems capable of striking targets throughout 

21 the Indo-Pacific region, including short- and me22 dium-range missiles that hold regional countries, in23 cluding some United States allies, at risk, and inter24 continental ballistic missiles that are potentially ca25 pable of targeting the United States mainland. 


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1 (3) North Korea has flagrantly defied the inter2 national community by continuing to illicitly develop 

3 its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation 

4 of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 

5 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 

6 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 

7 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017). 

8 (4) United States law, including the North 

9 Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 

10 2016 (Public Law 114–122; 22 U.S.C. 9201 et seq.) 

11 authorizes sanctions in response to North Korea’s 

12 pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, 

13 and ballistic missiles, and its human rights abuses. 

14 United States law also specifies the conditions under 

15 which sanctions may be removed or waived, includ16 ing that North Korea takes meaningful and 

17 verifiable actions toward denuclearization and ad18 dresses human rights concerns. 

19 (5) International economic and diplomatic sanc20 tions applied since the passage of the North Korea 

21 Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, in22 cluding by the United States and the United Na23 tions, when enforced, have intensified pressure on 

24 North Korea and degraded North Korea’s ability to 

25 advance it’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 


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1 (6) The United States has applied sanctions 

2 against North Korean individuals and entities, in3 cluding on Kim Jong Un, for their complicity in 

4 human rights abuses against the North Korean peo5 ple and citizens of other countries, including the 

6 United States, South Korea, and Japan. 

7 (7) For decades, the Government of North 

8 Korea has failed to live up to its diplomatic commit9 ments, rejecting good faith efforts by United States 

10 and international negotiators, and leveraging talks 

11 to extract concessions such as sanctions relief. 

12 (8) On January 1, 2018, in a New Year’s Day 

13 address, Kim Jong Un signaled an interest in under14 taking diplomatic engagement, which led to direct 

15 bilateral talks between Kim Jong Un and the leaders 

16 of the South Korea, China, and the United States. 

17 (9) On April 22, 2018, Kim Jong Un asserted 

18 that North Korea had completed its quest for nu19 clear weapons, stating that ‘‘under the proven condi20 tion of complete nuclear weapons, we no longer need 

21 any nuclear tests, mid-range and intercontinental 

22 ballistic rocket tests, and that the nuclear test site 

23 in northern area has also completed its mission’’. 

24 (10) The Panmunjom Declaration released fol25 lowing the Inter-Korean summit meeting on April 


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1 27, 2018, and the joint declaration by President 

2 Trump and Kim Jong Un at the June 12, 2018, 

3 summit between the United States and North Korea 

4 in Singapore reaffirmed that North Korea ‘‘commits 

5 to working toward the complete denuclearization of 

6 the Korean Peninsula’’. 

7 (11) On June 13, 2018, Secretary of State 

8 Pompeo said, ‘‘President Trump has been incredibly 

9 clear about the sequencing of denuclearization and 

10 relief from the sanctions. We are going to get com11 plete denuclearization; only then will there be relief 

12 from the sanctions.’’. 

13 (12) The Secretary of State confirmed on July 

14 25, 2018, in testimony before the Senate Foreign 

15 Relations Committee, that North Korea does ‘‘con16 tinue to produce fissile material’’ and, according to 

17 open source analysis, North Korea has enough fissile 

18 material for at least 30 to 60 nuclear weapons. 

19 (13) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy 

20 Enhancement Act of 2016 provides that certain 

21 sanctions terminate when North Korea has ‘‘made 

22 significant progress toward— 

23 (A) ‘‘completely, verifiably, and irreversibly 

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1 ing all programs for the development of systems 

2 designed in whole or in part for the delivery of 

3 such weapons’’; and 

4 (B) accounting for and repatriating the 

5 citizens of other countries abducted or unlaw6 fully held captive, releasing political prisoners 

7 including those in political prison camps, and 

8 accepting and abiding by internationally recog9 nized standards for the distribution and moni10 toring of humanitarian aid. 

11 (14) A robust military posture, including reg12 ular training and exercises, by the United States, 

13 South Korea, and Japan, has contributed to peace 

14 and stability in Northeast Asia. 

15 (15) South Korea has contributed heavily to its 

16 own defense and to the defense of the United States 

17 military forces in South Korea, including by pro18 viding $10 billion of the $10.8 billion toward the 

19 Camp Humphreys project to build and relocate 

20 United States military forces to a new base in South 

21 Korea. 

22 (16) United States military forces, pursuant to 

23 international law, are lawfully deployed on the Ko24 rean Peninsula. 


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1 (17) The nuclear and ballistic missile programs 

2 of North Korea are clear and consistent violations of 

3 international law. 

4 (18) The long-stated strategic objective of au5 thoritarian states, such as China, Russia, and North 

6 Korea, has been the removal of United States mili7 tary forces from the Korean Peninsula. 

8 (19) On September 18, 2018, the Pyongyang 

9 Declaration between President Moon of South Korea 

10 and Chairman Kim Jong Un of North Korea clari11 fied that North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize 

12 was conditioned on unspecified United States or 

13 international concessions stating, ‘‘The North ex14 pressed its willingness to continue to take additional 

15 measures, such as the permanent dismantlement of 

16 the nuclear facilities in Yeongbyeon, as the United 

17 States takes corresponding measures in accordance 

18 with the spirit of the June 12 U.S.–DPRK Joint 

19 Statement.’’. 

20 (20) On December 31, 2018, President Trump 

21 signed into law the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 

22 of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), which states that— 

23 (A) it is the policy of the United States 

24 that the objective of negotiations with respect to 

25 the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the 


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1 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea be the 

2 complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantle3 ment of such programs; 

4 (B) it is the policy of the United States to 

5 continue to impose sanctions with respect to ac6 tivities of the Government of the Democratic 

7 People’s Republic of Korea, persons acting for 

8 or on behalf of such government, or other per9 sons in accordance with applicable United 

10 States law; 

11 (C) the Secretary of State shall submit 

12 regular reports to the appropriate congressional 

13 committees that describe actions taken by the 

14 United States to address the threats posed by, 

15 and the capabilities of, the Democratic People’s 

16 Republic of Korea; and 

17 (D) the Secretary of State, in consultation 

18 with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit 

19 justifications to the appropriate committees not 

20 later than 30 days after terminating any sanc21 tion with respect to the activities of the Govern22 ment of the Democratic People’s Republic of 

23 Korea, or a person acting for or on behalf of 

24 such government. 


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1 (21) On December 20, 2018, North Korean 

2 state media reiterated North Korea’s longstanding 

3 nuclear policy, stating ‘‘if we unilaterally eliminate 

4 our security guarantees against a U.S. nuclear pre5 emptive strike, it would not be considered 

6 denuclearization’’, and further defined 

7 ‘‘denuclearization of the Korean peninsula’’ as ‘‘re8 moving all nuclear threats, not only from North and 

9 South Korean territory, but also from the sur10 rounding area aimed at the Korean Peninsula’’. 

11 (22) On January 1, 2019, in his New Year’s 

12 Day address, Kim Jong Un stated, ‘‘Given that the 

13 North and South committed themselves to advancing 

14 along the road of peace and prosperity, we maintain 

15 that the joint military exercises with foreign forces, 

16 which constitute the source of aggravating the situa17 tion on the Korean Peninsula, should no longer be 

18 permitted and the introduction of war equipment in19 cluding strategic assets from outside should be com20 pletely suspended.’’. 

21 (23) On January 1, 2019, in his New Year’s 

22 Day address, Kim Jong Un further stated, ‘‘But if 

23 the United States does not keep the promise it made 

24 in the eyes of the world, and of the miscalculation 

25 of our people’s patience, it attempts to unilaterally 


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1 enforce something upon us and persists in imposing 

2 sanctions and pressure against our Republic, we may 

3 be compelled to find a new way for defending the 

4 sovereignty of the country and the supreme interests 

5 of the state and for achieving peace and stability of 

6 the Korean Peninsula.’’. 

7 (24) On January 29, 2019, Director of Na8 tional Intelligence Coats testified before the Select 

9 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that ‘‘we 

10 currently assess that North Korea will seek to retain 

11 its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) capabilities 

12 and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear 

13 weapons and production capability because its lead14 ers ultimately view nuclear weapons as critical to re15 gime survival’’ and that the United States intel16 ligence agencies are observing ‘‘activity that is incon17 sistent with full denuclearization’’. 

18 (25) On February 28, 2019, a second United 

19 States-North Korea summit ended without a joint 

20 statement or agreement, and Secretary of State 

21 Pompeo has said that ‘‘I am confident there will be’’ 

22 a third summit between President Trump and 

23 Chairman Kim Jong Un, adding ‘‘We came out of 

24 Hanoi with a deeper understanding of each other. 

25 The positions that the two sides had, the two leaders 


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1 were able to make progress in that respect. We 

2 didn’t get as far as the world is demanding. These 

3 are global sanctions that are on North Korea today 

4 . . . We’re determined. I’m convinced the North Ko5 reans are determined as well. Chairman Kim has 

6 promised me, he’s promised President Trump, he 

7 will denuclearize. Now it’s the mission of my team 

8 to make sure that happens.’’. 

9 (26) On May 5, 2019, North Korea tested three 

10 missile systems at ranges of up to 240 kilometers, 

11 including a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), a 

12 300mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL), and a 

13 240mm multiple rocket launcher. 

14 (27) On May 9, 2019, the Department of Jus15 tice announced the filing of a civil forfeiture com16 plaint against a bulk carrier ship registered in North 

17 Korea, which according to the complaint, ‘‘was used 

18 to illicitly ship coal from North Korea and to deliver 

19 heavy machinery to the DPRK’’, in violation of 

20 ‘‘longstanding U.S. law and United Nations Security 

21 Council resolutions’’. 

22 SEC. 4. STATEMENTS OF POLICY. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 

24 States— 


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1 (1) to pursue all credible diplomatic means to 

2 achieve the denuclearization of North Korea, includ3 ing— 

4 (A) the complete abandonment of all North 

5 Korean nuclear weapons, fissile material, and 

6 existing nuclear programs; and 

7 (B) North Korea returning to, and at an 

8 early date coming into compliance with, the Nu9 clear Nonproliferation Treaty and International 

10 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; 

11 (2) to seek the complete and verifiable dis12 mantlement of all North Korean nuclear weapons-re13 lated facilities, including for— 

14 (A) the production and processing of fissile 

15 material; and 

16 (B) scientific research related to the pro17 duction of nuclear weapons; 

18 (3) to seek appropriate inspections, verification, 

19 and compliance measures, including full-scope safe20 guards, to assure the complete denuclearization of 

21 North Korea; 

22 (4) to seek the complete and verifiable dis23 mantlement of— 

24 (A) all North Korean ballistic missiles, of 

25 any range; and 


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1 (B) all infrastructure and facilities related 

2 to the production, testing, and fielding or de3 ployment of ballistic missiles; 

4 (5) to seek the complete and verifiable dis5 mantlement of all North Korean programs related to 

6 weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and 

7 biological weapons and the industrial and scientific 

8 facilities to support such programs; 

9 (6) to affirm that the United States has no in10 tention to undertake any military action against 

11 North Korea that is contrary to the United States 

12 Constitution and international law; 

13 (7) until such time as denuclearization is 

14 achieved— 

15 (A) to deter North Korea from using weap16 ons of mass destruction or leveraging those 

17 weapons to coerce United States allies; 

18 (B) to contain attempts by North Korea to 

19 proliferate such weapons and technologies; 

20 (C) to sustain United States and multilat21 eral efforts to reduce the risk of conflict on the 

22 Korean Peninsula; and 

23 (D) to continue to exert economic pressure 

24 against North Korea in cooperation with the 


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1 United Nations and the international commu2 nity; 

3 (8) should diplomacy and deterrence fail to re4 sult in the denuclearization of North Korea, to re5 serve the right to utilize all available options pursu6 ant to the United States Constitution to protect and 

7 defend United States national security interests and 

8 meet United States treaty obligations; and 

9 (9) to uphold the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

10 Treaty and not recognize North Korea as a legiti11 mate nuclear weapons state. 

12 (b) DIPLOMACY.—It is the policy of the United 

13 States— 

14 (1) to pursue diplomatic engagement with the 

15 Government of North Korea for the purposes of— 

16 (A) advancing meaningful negotiations re17 garding denuclearization, including the Govern18 ment of North Korea abandoning and disman19 tling its missile and nuclear weapons programs, 

20 ceasing its proliferation activities, and coming 

21 into compliance with international agreements 

22 and United Nations Security Council resolu23 tions; 

24 (B) reducing the risks of military mis25 calculation; and 


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1 (C) creating opportunities for the develop2 ment of confidence-building measures; 

3 (2) to formulate and carry out policy affecting 

4 the Korean Peninsula in close cooperation with 

5 United States allies, particularly South Korea; 

6 (3) to encourage those countries that maintain 

7 diplomatic relations with North Korea to take all 

8 necessary steps to ensure that North Korean diplo9 matic missions are not used for any activities incon10 sistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 

11 Relations, international law governing the operation 

12 of diplomatic missions, United States and United 

13 Nations sanctions, and accepted norms of behavior 

14 for diplomats and diplomatic missions; 

15 (4) to encourage all countries to fully imple16 ment and enforce United Nations sanctions commit17 ments with respect to North Korea, including ending 

18 the practice of hosting overseas North Korean work19 ers; 

20 (5) to increase the effectiveness of United 

21 States sanctions by seeking to work through the 

22 United Nations and with other like-minded countries 

23 to ensure a multilateral approach to sanctions; 

24 (6) to provide unmistakable assurance to Japan 

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1 mitted to fulfilling its treaty obligations if they are 

2 attacked; 

3 (7) to provide support for North Korean refu4 gees and asylum seekers in accordance with United 

5 States and international law; 

6 (8) to promote the human rights and dignity of 

7 the North Korean people, including through the 

8 United Nations and other multilateral institutions; 

9 and 

10 (9) to seek opportunities for humanitarian ac11 tions, such as family reunification and the return of 

12 human remains of United States servicemembers 

13 missing in action and killed in action on the Korean 

14 Peninsula. 

15 (c) ECONOMIC PRESSURE.—It is the policy of the 

16 United States to sustain and calibrate economic pressure 

17 on North Korea until North Korea undertakes meaningful 

18 and verifiable actions toward denuclearization, including 

19 by— 

20 (1) encouraging all countries to implement and 

21 enforce existing United Nations sanctions; 

22 (2) leveraging the strength of the United States 

23 financial system to deny access by the Government 

24 of North Korea and those with whom such govern25 ment facilitates illicit financial transactions to the 


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1 United States and global markets, including through 

2 the use of secondary sanctions; 

3 (3) encouraging all countries, in accordance 

4 with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to 

5 end the practice of hosting North Koreans as guest 

6 workers, recognizing that such workers are dem7 onstrated to constitute an illicit source of revenue 

8 for the Government of North Korea and its nuclear 

9 program; 

10 (4) working with the international community 

11 on interdiction of shipments to and from North 

12 Korea, including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent 

13 with United Nations Security Council resolutions 

14 that have banned nearly every major export from 

15 North Korea; and 

16 (5) enforcing United States laws with respect to 

17 sanctioning entities, including Russian and Chinese 

18 entities, that knowingly engage with sanctioned enti19 ties from North Korea or trade in items prohibited 

20 under United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

21 (d) PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND MISSILE

22 TECHNOLOGY.—It is the policy of the United States— 

23 (1) to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, 

24 missile technology, or related material to or from 

25 North Korea and other states or non-state actors; 


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1 (2) to support the efforts of the international 

2 community to detect, interdict, and prevent the 

3 transfers of nuclear or missile technology or related 

4 items to or from North Korea; 

5 (3) to prioritize coordination with global part6 ners, including through technical assistance and ca7 pacity building, to enhance the ability of the global 

8 community to monitor, interdict, and prosecute enti9 ties that engage in transfer of nuclear weapons, mis10 sile technology, or related material to or from North 

11 Korea; and 

12 (4) to abide by United States obligations under 

13 the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty— 

14 (A) not to assist any country in the devel15 opment of nuclear weapons; and 

16 (B) to encourage all countries to abide by 

17 their commitments under such Treaty and 

18 International Atomic Energy Agency agree19 ments. 

20 (e) ALLIANCES AND MILITARY POSTURE.—It is the 

21 policy of the United States— 

22 (1) to reaffirm the importance of the United 

23 States-Japan and United States-South Korea alli24 ances for maintaining peace and stability in the 

25 Indo-Pacific region and beyond; 


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1 (2) to reaffirm that the United States commit2 ments to South Korea and Japan, as codified under 

3 the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 

4 States and the Republic of Korea (1954) and the 

5 Mutual Security Treaty between the United States 

6 and Japan (1951), are not contingent on the state 

7 of the United States’ relations with North Korea or 

8 any progress that may be made towards North Ko9 rea’s denuclearization; 

10 (3) to reaffirm United States extended deter11 rence commitments to Japan and South Korea, in12 cluding through maintaining forward-deployed 

13 United States military forces; 

14 (4) to reaffirm the importance of the forward15 deployed presence of United States military forces in 

16 Japan and South Korea that continues to play a 

17 critical role in safeguarding the peaceful and stable 

18 rules-based international order that benefits all 

19 countries; 

20 (5) to reaffirm close alliance coordination on 

21 any adjustment of United States military posture in 

22 the region; 

23 (6) to strengthen United States efforts to con24 front emerging or asymmetric challenges, including 

25 in the cyber and space domains; 


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1 (7) to safeguard maritime security and ensure 

2 freedom of navigation, commerce, and overflight in 

3 the region; 

4 (8) to cooperate with allies and partners in the 

5 provision of public goods to the region, including hu6 manitarian relief and disaster response; and 

7 (9) to ensure any action to curtail or remove 

8 United States military forces in South Korea shall 

9 include regular consultation with Congress regarding 

10 the implications of proposed changes on United 

11 States readiness to meet our commitments in the re12 gion. 

13 (f) DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE MEASURES.—It is 

14 the policy of the United States— 

15 (1) to keep United States security commitments 

16 to United States allies and take necessary actions 

17 for United States self-defense and the defense of 

18 United States allies, including joint military exer19 cises, the modernization of weapons systems de20 ployed in the Indo-Pacific region, and counter-provo21 cation planning by the United States and Republic 

22 of Korea Combined Forces Command, as well as to 

23 negotiate full and equitable Special Measures Agree24 ments for alliance burden sharing with South Korea 

25 and Japan; 


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1 (2) to develop and deploy antiballistic missile 

2 capabilities to defend the United States homeland, 

3 United States military forces in the region, and 

4 United States allies Japan and South Korea; 

5 (3) to formulate and carry out military plan6 ning and operations impacting the Korean Peninsula 

7 in close cooperation with United States allies, par8 ticularly South Korea and Japan; 

9 (4) to deter North Korea in a manner that bol10 sters the force posture and military strength of 

11 United States alliance and partner networks in the 

12 region; and 

13 (5) to maintain, as necessary and appropriate, 

14 credible and overwhelming military options to be 

15 used in a manner consistent with the United States 

16 Constitution against the Government of North 

17 Korea, to deter the Government of North Korea 

18 from use of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and 

19 related technology. 

20 (g) HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the policy of the United 

21 States— 

22 (1) to promote human rights for the North Ko23 rean people; 

24 (2) to revisit and explore new opportunities for 

25 coordinating efforts to plan for humanitarian needs 


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1 in North Korea, in accordance with United States 

2 and international law and with appropriate measures 

3 in place to discourage the diversion of humanitarian 

4 assistance to the North Korean military or other un5 intended recipients; 

6 (3) to press for access for the Special 

7 Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 

8 North Korea and the United Nations High Commis9 sioner for Human Rights; 

10 (4) to continue to seek cooperation from foreign 

11 governments on the resettlement of North Korean 

12 refugees overseas; 

13 (5) to urge China to halt forcible repatriation of 

14 North Koreans; 

15 (6) to promote democracy, human rights, and a 

16 market economy in North Korea; and 

17 (7) to appoint a Special Envoy on North Ko18 rean Human Rights Issues in accordance with sec19 tion 107 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 

20 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7817). 

21 (h) INFORMATION DISSEMINATION EFFORTS.—It is 

22 the policy of the United States— 

23 (1) to increase the availability of information 

24 not controlled by the Government of North Korea in25 side North Korea; 


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1 (2) to continue to prioritize expanding access to 

2 information in North Korea by exploring the use of 

3 new and emerging technologies, including digital 

4 media, and expanding nongovernmental radio broad5 casting to North Korea, including news and informa6 tion, to increase information dissemination in North 

7 Korea; and 

8 (3) to fulfill all requirements under United 

9 States law, including the North Korea Sanctions and 

10 Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, with regard to 

11 providing resources for freedom of information ef12 forts into North Korea, and to regularly consult with 

13 Congress regarding such efforts. 

14 (i) STRATEGY AND BRIEFINGS REQUIRED.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit 

16 to the national security committees a detailed strat17 egy, which may include a classified annex, for the 

18 implementation of policies outlined in subsections (a) 

19 through (h), augmented by briefings to the national 

20 security committees on a quarterly basis or as re21 quested. 

22 (2) NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEES DE23 FINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘national secu24 rity committees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

2 Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma3 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

4 House of Representatives; and 

5 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

6 the Committee on Armed Services, and the Se7 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 

8 SEC. 5. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY REPORT. 

9 Section 210(d)(2) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative 

10 Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) is amended— 

11 (1) in subparagraph (B)— 

12 (A) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

13 end; 

14 (B) in clause (ii), by striking the period at 

15 the end and inserting a semicolon; and 

16 (C) by inserting after clause (ii) the fol17 lowing: 

18 ‘‘(iii) how diplomatic negotiations with 

19 the Government of the Democratic Peo20 ple’s Republic of Korea are expected to 

21 proceed; and 

22 ‘‘(iv) United States efforts to continue 

23 to exert economic pressure, in coordination 

24 with United States allies, with respect to 


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1 the Democratic People’s Republic of 

2 Korea;’’; and 

3 (2) in subparagraph (C)— 

4 (A) in clause (iii), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

5 end; and 

6 (B) by inserting after clause (iv) the fol7 lowing: 

8 ‘‘(v) an assessment of credible diplo9 matic engagement by the Democratic Peo10 ple’s Republic of Korea; and 

11 ‘‘(vi) an assessment of the threat 

12 posed by the nuclear and ballistic missile 

13 programs of the Democratic People’s Re14 public of Korea;’’. 

15 SEC. 6. BRIEFINGS. 

16 (a) MEMBER BRIEFINGS.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 legislative 

18 days after each visit for the purposes of diplomatic 

19 talks between the United States and North Korea at 

20 the Secretary of State level or above, including any 

21 meeting between the respective heads of state, the 

22 Secretary of State or the Secretary’s designee, in co23 ordination with appropriate officials, shall brief the 

24 national security committees (as such term is deVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:18 Jun 04, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2949.IH H2949

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1 fined in section 4(i)(2)), briefings on the diplomatic 

2 talks. 

3 (2) CLASSIFICATION.—The briefings required 

4 under paragraph (1) shall be held in a classified for5 mat. 

6 (b) STAFF BRIEFINGS.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after 

8 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant 

9 Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Af10 fairs shall hold quarterly briefings for appropriately 

11 cleared staff members of the national security com12 mittees (as such term is defined in section 4(i)(2)). 

13 (2) CLASSIFICATION.—The briefings required 

14 under paragraph (1) shall be held in a classified for15 mat. 

16 (3) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not 

17 apply when diplomatic talks described in subsection 

18 (a)(1) have not taken place within the prior 60-day 

19 period and will not take place within the next 30 

20 days. 

21 SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONGRESSIONAL HEAR22 INGS. 

23 It is the sense of Congress that regular congressional 

24 oversight through hearings is important while diplomatic 

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1 tinue, and as such the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

2 the House of Representatives and the Committee on For3 eign Relations of the Senate should, as appropriate, hold 

4 such hearings, including with participation of official wit5 nesses, and otherwise obtain information in order to fully 

6 review the negotiations. 

7 SEC. 8. OVERSIGHT OF AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA. 

8 (a) TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS OF NUCLEAR

9 AGREEMENTS WITH NORTH KOREA AND VERIFICATION

10 ASSESSMENT WITH RESPECT TO SUCH AGREEMENTS.— 

11 (1) TRANSMISSION OF AGREEMENTS.—Not 

12 later than 5 days after entering into an agreement 

13 with North Korea relating to the nuclear and missile 

14 program of North Korea, the President shall trans15 mit to the chairmen and ranking members of the 

16 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep17 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela18 tions of the Senate, the Speaker, majority leader, 

19 and minority leader of the House of Representatives 

20 and the majority and minority leader of the Sen21 ate— 

22 (A) the agreement, including all related 

23 materials and annexes; and 


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1 (B) a verification assessment report pre2 pared by the Secretary of State in accordance 

3 with paragraph (2). 

4 (2) VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT REPORT.— 

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 

6 shall prepare, with respect to an agreement de7 scribed in paragraph (1), a report assessing— 

8 (i) the extent to which the Secretary 

9 will be able to verify that North Korea is 

10 complying with its obligations and commit11 ments under the agreement, including how 

12 North Korea might attempt to conceal its 

13 program; 

14 (ii) whether North Korea has made a 

15 complete, transparent, and verifiable dec16 laration of all facilities and infrastructure 

17 materially relevant to North Korea’s nu18 clear and ballistic missile programs; 

19 (iii) the adequacy of the safeguards 

20 and other control mechanisms and other 

21 assurances contained in the agreement 

22 with respect to North Korean nuclear and 

23 missile programs to ensure North Korea 

24 activities are limited to the subset of activi25 ties permitted under the agreement; and 


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1 (iv) the capacity and capability of the 

2 United States and international organiza3 tions, such as the International Atomic 

4 Energy Agency, to effectively implement 

5 the verification regime required by or re6 lated to the agreement, including whether 

7 the United States or international organi8 zations will have— 

9 (I) sufficient access to— 

10 (aa) all nuclear facilities 

11 that span the entire nuclear fuel 

12 cycle; 

13 (bb) facilities associated 

14 with the nuclear weaponization 

15 program; 

16 (cc) facilities associated with 

17 its missile program; and 

18 (dd) declared and 

19 undeclared sites; and 

20 (II) the ability to investigate sus21 picious sites or allegations of covert 

22 nuclear-related activities. 

23 (B) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—The report re24 quired under subparagraph (A) shall be trans25 mitted in unclassified form, but shall include a 


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1 classified annex prepared in consultation with 

2 the Director of National Intelligence, summa3 rizing relevant classified information. 

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NORTH KOREA FINAL

5 AGREEMENT.—It is the sense of Congress that any bind6 ing agreement between the United States and North 

7 Korea should be submitted to the United States Congress 

8 as a treaty and subject to the advice and consent of the 

9 Senate in accordance with article II, section 2, clause 2 

10 of the Constitution of the United States. 

11 SEC. 9. VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE. 

12 (a) VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS.— 

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

14 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

15 of State, in coordination with appropriate cabinet16 level officials, shall submit to the appropriate con17 gressional committees a report on North Korea’s 

18 record of verification and compliance. 

19 (2) CLASSIFICATION.—The report required 

20 under paragraph (1)— 

21 (A) may be submitted in classified form; 

22 (B) shall contain an unclassified executive 

23 summary; and 

24 (C) may contain an unclassified annex. 


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1 (b) SEMIANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days 

2 after entering into an agreement with North Korea, and 

3 not less frequently than once every 180 days thereafter, 

4 the President shall submit to the appropriate congres5 sional committees a report on North Korea’s nuclear and 

6 missile program and the compliance of North Korea with 

7 the agreement during the period covered by the report, 

8 which shall include— 

9 (1) a description of any action or failure to act 

10 by the Government of North Korea that breached 

11 the agreement or is in noncompliance with the terms 

12 of the agreement; 

13 (2) a description of the status and activities of 

14 any North Korea nuclear facilities related to the nu15 clear fuel cycle, including mining and exploration, 

16 milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, re17 actors, reprocessing, and storage; 

18 (3) a description of the status and activities of 

19 any North Korea nuclear facilities related to the 

20 North Korean nuclear weaponization program, in21 cluding research and development, education and 

22 training, and testing; 

23 (4) a description of the status and activities of 

24 any North Korea missile facilities, including research 

25 and development, production, testing, and basing; 


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1 (5) a description of any delay by the Govern2 ment of North Korea of more than 1 week in pro3 viding inspectors access to facilities, people, and doc4 uments in North Korea as required by the agree5 ment; 

6 (6) a description of any covert nuclear activities 

7 undertaken by the Government of North Korea, in8 cluding any covert nuclear weapons-related activities, 

9 covert fissile material activities, covert missile activi10 ties, or research and development activities; and 

11 (7) a description of any transfer or diversion by 

12 the Government of North Korea of its nuclear mate13 rials, components, technology, or equipment to state 

14 or non-state actors. 

15 SEC. 10. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS. 

16 Any reports required to be submitted to the appro17 priate congressional committees under this Act or any 

18 amendments made by this Act that are subject to a dead19 line for submission consisting of the same unit of time may 

20 be consolidated into a single report. The consolidated re21 port shall contain all information required under this Act 

22 or any amendment made by this Act with respect to the 

23 reports comprising such consolidated report. 

Æ 


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