39114 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 139 /Tuesday, July 21, 1998 / Notices

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY BOARD

Sunshine Act Meeting

‘‘FEDERAL REGISTER’’ CITATION OF

PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT: Vol. 63, No.

134/Tuesday, July 14, 1998.

PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED TIME AND DATE:

9:30 a.m., Tuesday, July 21, 1998.

CHANGE IN MEETING: A majority of the

Board Members determined by recorded

vote that the business of the Board

required amending the agenda to delete

the following item:

6808A: Pipeline Accident Summary

Report: National Gas Pipeline Rupture

and Fire During Dredging, Tiger Pass,

Louisiana, October 23, 1996.

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT: Rhonda

Underwood, (202) 314–6065.

Dated: July 17, 1998.

Rhonda Underwood,

Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 98–19511 Filed 7–17–98; 3:32 pm]

BILLING CODE 7533–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–387 and 50–388]

Pennsylvania Power and Light

Company; Susquehanna Steam

Electric Plants, Units 1 and 2

Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–

14 and NPF–22, issued to Pennsylvania

Power and Light Company, (the

licensee), for operation of the

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station

(SSES), Units 1 and 2, located in

Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The Environmental Assessment has

been prepared to address potential

environmental issues related to the

licensee’s application dated August 1,

1996, as supplemented by letters dated

November 26, 1997, January 6, March 2,

April 24, and June 18, 1998. The

proposed amendments will replace the

SSES, Units 1 and 2, Current Technical

Specifications (CTSs) in their entirety

with Improved Technical Specifications

(ITSs) based on Revision 1 to NUREG–

1433, ‘‘Standard Technical

Specifications-General Electric Plants

BWR/4’’ dated April 1995.

The Need for the Proposed Action

It has been recognized that nuclear

safety in all plants would benefit from

improvement and standardization of

Technical Specifications (TS). The

Commission’s ‘‘NRC Interim Policy

Statement on Technical Specification

Improvements for Nuclear Power

Reactors,’’ (52 Fed. Reg. 3788, February

6, 1987), and later the Commission’s

‘‘Final Policy Statement on Technical

Specification Improvements for Nuclear

Power Reactors,’’ 58 FR 39132 (July 22,

1993), formalized this need. To facilitate

the development of individual

improved TSs, each reactor vendor

owners group (OG) and the NRC staff

developed standard TS (STS). For

General Electric plants, the STS are

published as NUREG–1433, and this

document was the basis for the new

SSES, Units 1 and 2 TSs. The NRC

Committee to Review Generic

Requirements (CRGR) reviewed the STS

and made note of the safety merits of the

STS and indicated its support of

conversion to the STS by operating

plants.

Description of the Proposed Change

The proposed revision to the TSs is

based on NUREG–1433 and on guidance

provided in the Final Policy Statement.

Its objective is to completely rewrite,

reformat, and streamline the CTS.

Emphasis is placed on human factors

principles to improve clarity and

understanding. The Bases section has

been significantly expanded to clarify

and better explain the purpose and

foundation of each specification. In

addition to the NUREG, portions of the

CTS were also used as the basis for the

ITS. Plant-specific issues (unique design

features, requirements, and operating

practices) were discussed at length with

the licensee, and generic matters with

the OG.

The proposed changes from the

existing CTS, can be grouped into four

general categories, as follows:

1. Non-technical (administrative)

changes, which were intended to make

the ITS easier to use for plant operators

personnel. They are purely editorial in

nature or involve the movement or

reformatting of requirements without

affecting technical content. Every

section of the SSES, Units 1 and 2 CTS

has undergone these types of changes.

In order to ensure consistency, the NRC

staff and the licensee have used

NUREG–1433 as guidance to reformat

and make other administrative changes.

2. Relocation of requirements, which

includes items that were in the SSES,

Units 1 and 2 CTS. The CTS items that

are being relocated to licenseecontrolled documents are not required

to be in the TSs under 10 CFR 50.36 and

do not meet any of the four criteria in

the Commission’s Final Policy

Statement for inclusion in the TSs. They

are not needed to obviate the possibility

that an abnormal situation or event will

give rise to an immediate threat to the

public health and safety. The NRC staff

has concluded that appropriate controls

have been established for all of the

current specifications, information, and

requirements that are being moved to

licensee-controlled documents. In

general, the proposed relocation of

items in the SSES, Units 1 and 2, CTS

to the Final Safety Analysis Report

(FSAR), appropriate plant-specific

programs, procedures and ITS Bases

follows the guidance of the General

Electric STS (NUREG–1433). Once these

items have been relocated by removing

them from the CTS to licenseecontrolled documents, the licensee may

revise them under the provisions of 10

CFR 50.59 or other NRC staff-approved

control mechanisms, which provide

appropriate procedural means to control

changes.

3. More restrictive requirements,

which consist of proposed SSES, Units

1 and 2 ITSs items that are either more

conservative than corresponding

requirements in the SSES, Units 1 and

2, CTS or are additional restrictions that

are not in the SSES, Units 1 and 2, CTS,

but are contained in NUREG–1433.

Examples of more restrictive

requirements include: placing a

Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO)

on plant equipment that is not required

by the CTS to be operable; more

restrictive requirements to restore

inoperable equipment; and more

restrictive surveillance requirements.

4. Less restrictive requirements are

relaxations of corresponding

requirements in the SSES, Units 1 and

2, CTS that provide little or no safety

benefit and place unnecessary burdens

on the licensee. These relaxations were

the result of generic NRC actions or

other analyses. They have been justified

on a case-by-case basis for SSES, Units

1 and 2, as will be described in the

staff’s Safety Evaluation to be issued

with the license amendment, which will

be noticed in the Federal Register.

In addition to the changes described

above, the licensee proposed certain

changes to the CTS that deviated from

the STS in NUREG–1433. These

additional proposed changes are

described in the licensee’s application

and in the staff’s Notice of

Consideration of Issuance of

Amendment to Facility Operating

License and Opportunity for a Hearing

(61 FR 56972) published in the Federal
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 139 /Tuesday, July 21, 1998 / Notices 39115

Register on November 5, 1996. Where

these changes represent a change to the

current licensing basis for SSES, Units

1 and 2, they have been justified on a

case-by-case and will be described in

the staff’s safety evaluation to be issued

with the license amendment.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

The Commission has completed its

evaluation of the proposed action and

concludes that the proposed TS

conversion would not increase the

probability or consequences of accidents

previously analyzed and would not

affect facility radiation levels or facility

radiological effluents.

Changes that are administrative in

nature would have no effect on the

technical content of the TSs and are

acceptable. The increased clarity and

understanding these changes bring to

the TSs are expected to improve the

operator’s control of the plant in normal

and accident conditions.

Relocation of requirements to

licensee-controlled documents would

not change the requirements

themselves. Future changes to these

requirements may be made by the

licensee under 10 CFR 50.59 or other

NRC-approved control mechanisms,

which ensures continued maintenance

of adequate requirements. All such

relocations have been found to be in

conformance with the guidelines of

NUREG–1433 and the Final Policy

Statement, and, therefore, are

acceptable.

Changes involving more restrictive

requirements would be likely to

enhance the safety of plant operations

and are acceptable.

Changes involving less restrictive

requirements have been reviewed

individually. When requirements have

been shown to provide little or no safety

benefit or to place unnecessary burdens

on plant operations, those requirements

have been relaxed in an overall effort to

enhance safety. The changes will not

increase the probability or consequences

of accidents, no changes are being made

in the types of any effluents that may be

released offsite, and there is no

significant increase in the allowable

individual or cumulative occupational

radiation exposure. Accordingly, the

Commission concludes that there are no

significant radiological environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

action.

With regard to potential

nonradiological impacts, the proposed

action does involve features located

entirely within the restricted area as

defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not

affect nonradiological plant effluents

and has no other environmental impact.

Accordingly, the Commission

concludes that there are no significant

nonradiological environmental impacts

associated with the proposed action.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded

there is no measurable environmental

impact associated with the proposed

action, any alternatives with equal or

greater environmental impact need not

be evaluated. The principal alternative

to this action would be to deny the

request for the amendment. Such action

would not reduce the environmental

impacts of plant operations.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use

of any resources not previously

considered in the Final Environmental

Statement related to the operation of the

SSES, Units 1 and 2, dated June 1981.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy,

on June 19, 1998, the staff consulted

with the Pennsylvania State official, Mr.

M. Mangi of the Pennsylvania

Department of Environmental Protection

Bureau, Division of Nuclear Safety,

regarding the environmental impact of

the proposed action. The State official

had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental

assessment, the Commission concludes

that the proposed action will not have

a significant effect on the quality of the

human environment. Accordingly, the

Commission has determined not to

prepare an environmental impact

statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to the

proposed action, see the licensee’s letter

dated August 1, 1996, as supplemented

by letters dated November 26, 1997,

January 6, March 2, April 24, and June

18, 1998, which are available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, The Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington DC, and

at the local public document room

located at the Osterhout Free Library,

Reference Department, 71 South

Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day

of July 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Robert A. Capra,

Director, Project Directorate I–2, Division of

Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–19364 Filed 7–20–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Potential for Degradation of the

Emergency Core Cooling System and

the Containment Spray System After a

Loss-of-Coolant Accident Because of

Construction and Protective Coating

Deficiencies and Foreign Material in

Containment; Issue

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Issuance.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) has issued Generic

Letter (GL) 98–04 to all holders of

operating licenses for nuclear power

reactors, except those who have

permanently ceased operations and

have certified that fuel has been

permanently removed from the reactor

vessel, to alert licensees to the fact that

foreign material continues to be found

inside operating nuclear power plant

containments. During a design basis

loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), this

foreign material could block the

emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

or safety-related containment spray

system (CSS) flow paths or damage

ECCS or safety-related CSS equipment.

In addition, construction deficiencies

and problems with the material

condition of ECCS structures, systems,

and components (SSCs) inside the

containment continue to be found.

Design deficiencies also have been

found which could potentially degrade

the ECCS or safety-related CSS. No

actions or information are requested

regarding these issues. The NRC has

issued many previous generic

communications on this subject and

expects licensees to have considered

possible actions at their facilities to

address these concerns.

The NRC is also issuing this generic

letter to alert licensees to the problems

associated with the material condition

of protective coatings inside the

containment and to request information

under 10 CFR 50.54(f) for the purpose

of evaluating their programs for

ensuring that protective coatings do not

detach from their substrate during a

design basis LOCA and interfere with

the operation of the ECCS and the

safety-related CSS. The NRC intends to

use this information to assess whether

current regulatory requirements are

being correctly implemented and

whether they should be revised.

The NRC expects addressees to ensure

that the ECCS and the safety-related CSS

remain capable of performing their

intended safety functions. The NRC will

conduct inspections to ensure