Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39343

Air Carriers and foreign air carriers

may submit copies of written comments

previously provided to Walla Walla

Regional Airport, under section 158.23

of Part 158.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mary Vargas, (425) 227–2660; Seattle

Airports District Office; SEA–ADO;

Federal Aviation Administration; 1601

Lind Avenue, S.W., Suite 250; Renton,

Washington 98055–4056. The

application may be reviewed in person

at this same location.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA

proposed to rule and invites public

comment on the application 97–02–U–

00–ALW to use only PFC revenue at

Walla Walla Regional Airport, under the

provisions of 49 U.S.C. 40117 and Part

158 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR Part 158).

On July 14, 1998, the FAA determined

that the application to use only the

revenue from a PFC submitted by Port

of Walla Walla, Walla Regional Airport,

Walla Walla, Washington, was

substantially complete within the

requirements of § 158.25 of Part 158.

The FAA will approve or disapprove the

application, in whole or in part, no later

than October 13, 1998.

The following is a brief overview of

the application.

Level of the proposed PFC: $3.00

Proposed charge effective date:

November 1, 1993

Proposed charge expiration date:

November 1, 2014

Total requested for use approval:

$1,187,280

Brief description of proposed project:

31,000 square foot passenger terminal

building with all associated

infrastructure.

Class or classes of air carriers which

the public agency has requested not be

required to collect PFC’s: None.

Any person may inspect the

application in person at the FAA office

listed above under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT and at the FAA

Regional Airports Office located at:

Federal Aviation Administration,

Northwest Mountain Region, Airports

Division, ANM–600, 1601 Lind Avenue

S.W., Suite 315, Renton, WA 98055–

4056.

In addition, any person may, upon

request, inspect the application, notice

and other documents germane to the

application in person at the Walla Walla

Regional Airport.

Issued in Renton, Washington on July 14,

1998.

David A. Field,

Manager, Planning, Programming and

Capacity Branch, Northwest Mountain

Region.

[FR Doc. 98–19419 Filed 7–21–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[FRA Docket No. 87–2, Notice. No. 7]

RIN 2130–AB20

Automatic Train Control and Advanced

Civil Speed Enforcement System;

Northeast Corridor Railroads

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final order of particular

applicability.

SUMMARY: FRA issues an order of

particular applicability (order) applying

to certain trains operating on the track

controlled by the National Railroad

Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on the

Northeast Corridor (NEC) between

Washington, DC, and Boston,

Massachusetts. The order requires all

trains operating between New Haven,

Connecticut and Boston (NEC-North

End) to be controlled by locomotives

equipped to respond to a new advanced

civil speed enforcement system (ACSES)

in addition to the automatic train

control (ATC) system currently required

on the NEC. On the NEC between

Washington, DC and New York, New

York (NEC-South End), where access to

the high-speed track is prevented by

switches locked in the normal position

and a parallel route to the high-speed

track is provided at crossovers from

adjacent tracks, and where no junctions

providing direct access exist, ACSESequipped trains may operate to a

maximum speed not to exceed 135

miles per hour (mph). This order also

contains performance standards for the

cab signal/ATC and ACSES systems on

the NEC, and authorizes increases in

certain maximum authorized train

speeds and safety requirements

supporting improved rail service.

DATES: This order becomes effective on

August 21, 1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: W.E.

Goodman, Staff Director, Signal and

Train Control Division, Office of Safety,

FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, DC, 20590 ((202) 632–

3353), Paul Weber, Railroad Safety

Specialist, Signal and Train Control

Division, Office of Safety, FRA, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC,

20590 ((202) 632–3354), or Patricia V.

Sun, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC

20590 ( (202) 632–3183).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Statutory Authority

FRA has both discrete and plenary

legal authority to require all trains

operating on the NEC to be equipped

with automatic train control devices.

FRA has broad legal authority to

‘‘prescribe regulations, and issue orders

for every area of railroad safety * * *’’

49 U.S.C. 20103. Section 20502 of Title

49, United States Code specifically

provides that ‘‘[w]hen the Secretary of

Transportation decides after an

investigation that it is necessary in the

public interest, the Secretary may order

a railroad carrier to install * * * a

signal system that complies with the

requirements of the Secretary.’’ As

originally enacted and prior to formal

codification, this provision referred to

‘‘automatic train stop, train control,

and/or other similar appliances,

methods, and systems intended to

promote the safety of railroad operation

* * .’’ This authority has been

previously invoked to require the

installation of signal systems on 49

specific railroads and to require all

railroads desiring to operate at high

speeds to install signal systems of

varying degrees of sophistication

consonant with those higher speeds.

Proceedings to Date

On November 20, 1997, FRA

published a Proposed Order of

Particular Applicability (proposed

order) that would require all trains

operating on the NEC-North End to be

controlled by locomotives equipped to

respond to a new advanced civil speed

enforcement system in addition to the

automatic train control system currently

required on the NEC (62 FR 62097).

The proposed order called for written

comments to be received by January 20,

1998, and requests for a public hearing

to be received by December 22, 1997.

On February 17, 1998, FRA held a

public hearing at the request of several

commentators.

Background—Development of the NEC

Amtrak provides service over the NEC

from Washington, DC, to Boston,

Massachusetts. Amtrak owns or

dispatches most of the NEC, which it

shares with several commuter

authorities and freight railroads. Current

speeds on the NEC-North End range up

to 110 mph.
39344 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

Amtrak is currently undertaking a

major improvement project on the NEC,

with particular emphasis on completion

of electrification, installation of concrete

ties and high-speed turnouts,

elimination of some remaining highwayrail crossings, and other modifications

concentrated between New Haven and

Boston. These improvements are

designed to facilitate service utilizing

high-speed trains (HSTs) at speeds up to

150 mph. During 1999, Amtrak will

begin taking delivery of HSTs expected

to qualify for operation through curves

at higher levels of unbalance (and thus

higher speeds) than conventional trains.

Through this order, FRA ensures that

planning for high-speed service will not

occur in isolation from measures that

could reasonably address increased

traffic densities, and drive future

innovative technology.

Regulatory Approvals Required

In general, new signal and train

control systems must comply with

FRA’s Rules, Standards and Instructions

Governing the Installation, Inspection,

Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and

Train Control Systems, Devices, and

Appliances (49 CFR Part 236). FRA will

implement any exceptions on a case-bycase basis through the waiver process as

provided by 49 CFR Part 235. Train

operations in excess of 110 mph must be

authorized by FRA after examination of

pertinent safety considerations in

accordance with 49 CFR 213.9(c)

(operating speed limits). Metroliner

service on the NEC is already conducted

in accordance with such an

authorization.

In addition, NEC operations are

subject to special requirements of the

Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988,

which mandated that all NEC trains be

equipped with ‘‘automatic train control

systems designed to slow or stop a train

in response to external signals.’’ Sec. 9,

Pub. L. No. 100–342, implemented at 52

FR 44510 (Nov. 19, 1987), 53 FR 1433

(Jan. 19, 1988), and 53 FR 39834 (Oct.

12, 1988).

Summary of the Proposed Order

The proposed order would implement

ACSES on the NEC-North End by

October 1, 1999, allowing Amtrak to

increase its maximum operating speed

on this segment of the NEC from 105

mph to 150 mph. In addition to Amtrak,

the Connecticut Department of

Transportation (ConnDOT),

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail),

the Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority (MBTA), and the Providence

and Worcester Railroad Company

(P&W), which also operate on this

territory, would be required to equip

their locomotives and cab cars with

ACSES. (On July 23, 1998, the Surface

Transportation Board is expected to

approve the division of Conrail between

the Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)

and the CSX Corporation (CSX); NS and

CSX have yet to announce a date for this

division. NS and CSX, as successors to

Conrail, will be subject to this order to

the extent that they operate on this

segment of the NEC.)

FRA initially discussed the features

and functions of ACSES with the

Northeast Corridor Safety Committee in

September of 1994, and Amtrak

continued to brief the affected railroads

as system development proceeded.

ACSES would enforce permanent speed

restrictions caused by curves, bridges

and other factors, positive stops at

interlocking home signals and control

points, work limits, and temporary slow

orders, through transponders similar to

those used by European railroads.

Transponders are devices containing

encoded information on such factors as

location and distance to the beginning

of a speed restriction, type of speed

restriction, target speed, average grade,

distance to the next transponder, and

message verification information.

Transponders would be installed at all

approaches to interlockings within high

speed territory, including those where

trains could mistakenly pass an

interlocking signal and encroach onto

high speed track, as part of a train

control system which would be

independent of the on-board cab signal/

automatic train control system, but

would interface with it to provide

displays to train crews on factors such

as civil speed restrictions, trains located

ahead, and interlocking conditions. A

data radio network would be used to

download temporary movement

restrictions, among other functions.

Equipped rail vehicles would

continuously transmit a signal which,

when received by a transponder, would

cause the transponder to transmit back

its encoded message. Those messages,

including speed and braking conditions,

would be received in the train’s cab,

interpreted by an on-board computer,

and passed along to the train’s engineer

for appropriate action. If necessary,

automatic braking would take place.

Amtrak would also expand its

existing 4-aspect cab signal system,

which provides for ‘‘restricted speed’’,

30 mph, 45 mph, and the maximum

authorized speed for the equipment on

which it is installed, to a 9-aspect

system, which provides for additional

aspects of 60 mph, 80 mph, 100 mph,

125 mph, and 150 mph. The current 4-

aspect system employs a 100 Hz carrier

frequency coded at the rates of 75, 120,

and 180 pulses per minute; the 9-aspect

system would employ an additional

carrier frequency of 250 Hz, and an

additional code rate of 270 pulses per

minute. Amtrak developed this 9-aspect

system to provide four independent

functions: (1) Operation of high-speed

trainsets at a new maximum speed of

150 mph; (2) higher speed diverging

signal aspects, upgrading the previous

45 mph diverging aspect; (3) an

enforced 30 mph diverging aspect; and

(4) closer headways by adding three

enforced speeds between the existing 45

mph and 125 mph enforced speeds.

On the NEC-South End, the proposed

order would require ACSES wherever

speeds exceeded 125 mph (the current

maximum speed), with only high speed

trains equipped where crossovers could

be locked to avoid incursion. The

proposed order contemplated, but did

not require, implementation of ACSES

by all NEC users (except possibly the

Metro-North Commuter Railroad

Company), including Amtrak, commuter

railroads, and freight carriers. To

minimize the impact on users, ACSES

would be implemented incrementally as

funding became available, so that

operational benefits could begin

immediately as each portion of line and

each vehicle became equipped.

Summary of Modifications to the

Proposed Order

In response to comments and

technical changes in the proposed order

FRA has made modifications in this

final order, the more significant of

which are highlighted below. The

proposed order stated that comments

received after the close of the comment

period would be considered to the

extent possible. Amtrak has continued

to refine and adapt its design

specifications, as proposed in Amtrak’s

February 17, 1998 supplemental

comments, May 8, 1998 letter (copies of

both are in the docket), and subsequent

conversations with FRA

(memorializations of which are also in

the docket). This order contains

modifications responsive to Amtrak’s

proposed design specification changes,

which are discussed below. A detailed

analysis of the comments appears

elsewhere in this order.

Major Modifications

(1) Use of Temporary Transponders in

Lieu of Loading Temporary Restrictions

Under ACSES, temporary restrictions

flow directly from the computer assisted

dispatch center into the data radio

channel and thus into the on-board

computer, virtually eliminating errors in

transmission or recordation and
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39345

ensuring that information is acted upon.

Were train crew members to enter this

data, they could make errors and then

be tempted to rely on the ‘‘system’’ to

provide the required speed reductions

on the cab display in lieu of relying on

a paper copy.

In a letter dated May 8, 1998, Amtrak

requested permission to use temporary

transponders (placed in the gage of the

rail) as an alternative to inputting

temporary restrictions by direct data

radio link into the on-board computer.

Typically, Amtrak would place these at

locations approaching work zones and

other slow order zones. Although FRA

considers temporary transponder

placement acceptable for last minute

slow orders in emergencies where

reliable communication to the en route

train cannot be assured, FRA believes

the better practice is to require

temporary restrictions to be

automatically loaded into the on-board

computer. FRA will allow Amtrak to use

temporary transponders as an

alternative routinely for the first 12

months after implementation of this

order in order to ease transition to this

new system. After this period,

temporary transponders may be

deployed only on an emergency basis

unless they are being used as an

additional safety measure.

(2) Availability of Data Radio Release at

Interlockings

FRA proposed to require, and Amtrak

expects to provide, a capability that

would automatically permit movement

of a train past an interlocking signal

displaying a stop and proceed or

restricting aspect without the necessity

of the engineer leaving his or her normal

position in the cab to press a release

button. To ensure that this capability is

in place and fully operational, FRA

requires data radio transmitters to be

located at interlockings and interfaced

with interlocking controllers not less

than 12 months following activation

(cut in) of ACSES.

Elimination of recurring

acknowledgment. Amtrak’s original plan

included a recurring 15 second audible

alarm and a 20 second acknowledgment

while operating at restricted speed. In a

May 8, 1998 letter, Amtrak proposed to

modify this ATC feature, disliked by

many locomotive engineers. The

modified feature would sound a

warning immediately and require

acknowledgment within 5 seconds

whenever initial movement is detected

while the cab signal displays

‘‘restricting,’’ in order to prevent a

penalty brake application. (FRA

assumes that the one-time

acknowledgment would be required on

downgrade to restricting as well.)

Through the use of data radio at the

interlockings, this feature would

automatically permit movement of a

train past an interlocking signal

displaying a stop and proceed or

restricting aspect without the necessity

of the engineer leaving his or her normal

position in the cab to press a release

button. FRA has agreed to this proposed

feature, which Amtrak suggests would

be particularly useful when a train is

starting from a stop at a station close to

an interlocking home signal.

(3) Speeds Over Highway-Rail Crossings

In the proposed order, FRA suggested

a speed limit over any highway-rail

crossing of 80 mph, for the following

reasons:

Speeds over highway-rail crossings will be

limited to 80 mph, the maximum speed

planned under the NEC program until very

recently. This limit is lower than the 110

mph cap included in current guidelines for

high-speed corridors (absent barrier and

presence detection systems tied into the

signal system), because of the density of NEC

operations and the increased possibility that

a collision with a motor vehicle might cause

a secondary collision between trains

operating at very high combined closing

speeds. FRA reserves the right to allow

higher speeds over individual highway-rail

crossings after demonstration by Amtrak that

appropriate safety measures have been

implemented.

Dense operations on the NEC-North

End present special safety concerns,

particularly since both intercity and

commuter trains will be operating with

improved acceleration as electric

locomotives and HSTs are deployed—

driving up average speeds. This is a

two-track railroad throughout its length,

with 13 crossings between New Haven

and Boston. Although the crossings in

question are generally low-volume, most

are subject to the movement of large

vehicles such as flatbed trucks carrying

boats, garbage trucks, fire trucks, and

other substantial vehicles known to be

capable of derailing a train. The

likelihood of a derailment may increase

to some extent, even in the case of

collision with a relatively light vehicle,

if the crossing in question is on a curve

and Amtrak is successful in qualifying

its HSTs for levels of unbalance up to

9 inches, as provided in a previously

issued waiver.

Therefore, in this order, FRA sets a

maximum operating speed of 80 mph

over any highway-rail crossing where

only conventional warning systems are

in place, and a maximum operating

speed of 95 mph where 4-quadrant gates

and presence detection are provided

and tied into the signal system. FRA

also requires Amtrak to submit for

approval plans for site-specific

improvements with timetables for each

of the 13 crossings on the NEC-North

End by January 1, 1999.

(4) Signal and Train Control

Enhancements

Providing signalization for high-speed

intercity service requires

implementation of an enhanced cab

signal/speed control system that allows

for higher train speeds while providing

sufficient gradations of intermediate

speeds to allow efficient movement of

other scheduled trains operating in the

conventional speed range. Reasonable

interoperability of existing and upgraded on-board equipment is also

necessary to allow for the continued use

of existing on-board equipment at

conventional speeds only.

9-Aspect Cab Signal System. The cab

signal/ATC portion of the upgraded

system will employ two carrier

frequencies, 100 Hz, compatible with

existing equipment, and 250 Hz. Both

frequencies will be coded at standard

rates of 75, 120, 180, and 270 cycles per

minute. Upgraded equipment will be

able to take advantage of the 150 mph

code rate for maximum authorized

speed, the 80 mph code rate for high

speed diverging moves, and separate 45/

40 and 30 mph speed commands for

limited and medium speed turnouts.

ACSES. In contrast to the modified

cab signal system, ACSES will provide

new safety functions that, with limited

exceptions, are not currently provided.

For purposes of civil speed control,

permanent wayside transponders will

be placed in sets (normally two to a set)

at convenient, accessible locations in

the center of the track approaching

speed restriction zones. Most of these

transponders will be passive devices

requiring no energy source other than

that transmitted from a passing train.

Each permanent transponder set will

contain encoded information about

speed restrictions ahead, including: (i)

The distance to the beginning of the

speed restriction; (ii) The target speed;

(iii) The type of speed restriction; (iv)

The average grade between the location

where the speed reduction must begin

and the location where the reduced

speed must be reached; (v) The distance

to the next permanent transponder set

location; and (vi) Necessary sync and

check bytes to allow for message

verification.

Improvements that Amtrak will gain

with the new systems are:

• Train speeds of up to 150 mph;

• A high speed diverging aspect (80

mph);

• The efficient handling of both high

speed and conventional trains;
39346 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

• New intermediate speeds between

45 mph and 150 mph;

• The capability for headway

improvement in congested commuter

areas; and

• Practical staging from present

wayside and on-board equipment.

Commuter and freight railroads will

both benefit from enhanced safety of

Amtrak operations, given the common

operating environment, since Amtrak’s

implementation of the 9-aspect cab

signal system will provide increased

flexibility to schedule high speed

intercity service in a way that does not

conflict with commuter operations. In

addition, as ACSES is implemented on

commuter and freight trains, the safety

of those operations will be enhanced by

ensuring that those trains do not pass

absolute stop signals or operate at

excessive speed approaching stations or

bridges. To the extent equipment design

permits, commuter operators may take

advantage of higher speeds on curves

without diminished safety margins with

the new flexibility for operation at

higher cant deficiencies in FRA’s

revised Track Safety Standards (63 FR

33992; June 22, 1998).

Amtrak will phase-in installation in

order to obtain the maximum benefit

from the positive stop and civil speed

enforcement system prior to its

installation on the Amtrak-dispatched

portions of the NEC. The initial

installations will protect entry to and

operations along the high speed

territory. During this initial phase,

transponders will not be installed on

non-high speed tracks where flanking

protection protects against possible

encroachment into adjacent high speed

tracks. The transponder system will be

extended to the balance of the NEC after

all installations are in place on high

speed tracks and on adjacent tracks

where flanking protection does not

exist. (This description in no way predecides the issue of whether trains of

other operators on other portions of the

NEC will be required to be equipped.)

(5) Nighttime Operations

As an interim measure to allow for

gradual equipping of a railroad’s

locomotive fleet, FRA had proposed to

allow unequipped freight operations to

enter the NEC-North End during lowvolume night hours. After considering

the comments (discussed in more detail

below), FRA is not adopting this

proposal for two reasons. First, train

delays could cause fast trains to invade

the window or unequipped trains to fail

to clear the window in time. Second,

Amtrak expects to conduct most

production track work at night, and

unequipped trains would not be

prevented from entering work zones or

passing work groups at excessive speed,

resulting in reduced safety benefits.

Instead of the proposed time window,

FRA will handle any exceptions to this

order through waivers or spot

amendments to the order.

Proceedings on This Order

FRA sought public comment on the

proposed order and related matters,

including any authorization that may be

required for Amtrak to implement a

modified cab signal system on the NEC.

FRA has placed in the docket of this

proceeding copies of Amtrak’s program

description for the ACSES system,

proposed operating rules for use in

conjunction with the system, and other

related information, including current

Amtrak projections for operating speeds

over highway-rail crossings on the NECNorth End. FRA has reviewed the

comments and hearing testimony,

which have been extremely helpful in

resolving these issues.

The following parties testified at the

February 17 hearing: The American

Public Transit Association (APTA), the

Brotherhood of Locomotive EngineersAmerican Train Dispatchers Division

(BLE–ATTD), ConnDOT, Conrail,

MBTA, P&W, and Southeastern

Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

(SEPTA).

In addition, written comments were

submitted by the following: Amtrak,

APTA, Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers (BLE), ConnDOT, Conrail,

Long Island Railroad (LIRR), MBTA,

Metro-North Commuter Railroad

Company (Metro-North), National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or

Board), P&W, Representative Patrick J.

Kennedy, Senator Edward M. Kennedy,

Senator Jack Reed, and SEPTA.

The following also submitted

comments in support of P&W’s

concerns:

Arnold Lumber Co., Atlantic Wire,

BB&S Treated Lumber of New England,

Colfax Inc., Dominion Rebar, Fortune

Plastics Inc., The Narragansett Bay

Commission, Seaview Transportation

Company, Inc., Ring’s End, and

Unilever.

While many commentators spoke or

wrote on more than one issue, and

while most of the comments supported

the position(s) of at least one other

commentator, the issues themselves

were grouped around a few key points,

which are discussed below.

General Issues

(1) Scope of Order

Several commentators stated that the

proposed order did not define its

applicability clearly. SEPTA

commented that the proposed order did

not specify its applicability south of

New Haven, and APTA also requested

additional clarification on the order’s

scope and applicability on the NECSouth End.

As proposed by Amtrak,

implementation of the ACSES system

would impact all NEC users including

Amtrak, commuter railroads, and freight

carriers, with the exception of the NEC

segment operated by the New York

Metropolitan Transportation Authority

(MTA) and Metro-North. ACSES would

be implemented incrementally as

funding becomes available, so that

operational benefits would begin

immediately as each portion of line and

each vehicle becomes equipped.

At this time, FRA mandates that all

trains operating on the NEC-North End

be equipped with operative on-board

equipment that responds to ACSES, as

proposed. This order also authorizes

higher speeds for such equipped trains

on high-speed tracks on the NEC-South

End, but other trains utilizing those

tracks or adjacent tracks are not required

to be equipped. FRA will continue to

study the reliability and safety benefits

of ACSES as implementation on the

NEC-North End is completed, and may

later propose to require ACSES on the

rest of the NEC as traffic densities

increase.

ConnDOT commented that the

proposed order contained errors

regarding the ownership of the New

Haven, Connecticut-New Rochelle, New

York section of NEC track. FRA agrees

that Metro-North does not own any

segment of the NEC, that ConnDOT

owns the track between New Haven and

the Connecticut-New York border, and

that MTA owns the track between that

border and New Rochelle. Thus, this

order does not address the territory

owned by MTA between the

Connecticut/New York State line and

New Rochelle, or the area owned by

ConnDOT between the Connecticut/

New York State line and New Haven,

both of which are dispatched by MetroNorth.

(2) Implementation Schedule

Several commentators felt that the

proposed implementation date of

October 1, 1999 did not provide

sufficient time for financing and

equipment installation. MBTA

recommended a longer time period to

provide sufficient time for responsible

design, engineering and prototyping.

MBTA also commented that

modifications to safety critical systems

should not be made on a high speed

schedule, and that the proposed
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39347

implementation date was unrealistic

and would impose premium costs.

Conrail commented that the proposed

order failed to indicate any target dates

or deadlines, which are necessary to

determine the migration plan. ConnDOT

requested to be removed from the scope

and applicability of the order unless full

funding is provided and compliance is

delayed until 2001. P&W commented

that compliance with the proposed

October 1999 implementation deadline

would be impossible unless Amtrak

supplied substitute power and

assistance in accomplishing the

required retrofits.

The NTSB, however, while

recognizing the need for an interim

period to allow equipping of

locomotives, strongly urged that FRA set

a fixed time for compliance.

FRA recognizes that completion of all

steps required to implement ACSES by

October 1, 1999 depends upon Amtrak

rigorously adhering to a well-crafted

timetable that allows adequate time for

installation of on-board units on all

affected operators without depriving

those operators of equipment necessary

to provide normal service. This should

be achievable by combining required

inspections and tests with the

installation process, provided

production runs of on-board equipment

commence in a timely way and

deliveries are sequenced properly.

However, thus far Amtrak has provided

FRA with a very limited amount of

information concerning its test program

and key milestones. Accordingly, this

order requires early delivery of a very

specific timetable for initial testing and

qualification, for installation of onboard equipment on Amtrak, ConnDOT,

MBTA, and P&W locomotives, and for

final acceptance testing for the system.

FRA will evaluate this timetable for

reasonableness. To the extent the

timetable indicates unacceptable

impacts on third parties, or to the extent

milestones in this schedule slip, FRA

will defer the implementation date as

necessary. FRA will keep open the

docket of this proceeding to receive any

petitions for adjustment of the

compliance date.

(3) Financial Responsibility

Commentators expressed the most

concern about the overall cost of

ACSES, and the related issue of who

would bear the cost of equipping nonAmtrak equipment. In addition to the

implementation costs of locomotive

retrofitting, passive transponders and

other related expenses, commentators

were concerned about maintenance,

equipment down-time, schedule

disruptions, and life-cycle expense.

Many commentators submitted

preliminary estimates of their

anticipated costs. MBTA, for instance,

has already budgeted the estimated $11

million cost of retrofitting its

locomotives with the 9-aspect system

into its current locomotive procurement

and planned overhaul.

P&W commented that the final order

should require the High Speed

Passenger Project (Project) to assume the

costs of retrofitting locomotives since

ACSES is a fundamental component of

the Project. P&W indicated that as a

small private sector freight operator, it

is not subsidized (unlike Amtrak and

commuter rail operations), and would

not stay competitive with trucking

operations on the I–95 corridor if it

passed ACSES implementation costs

onto its customers. Although P&W

objected to paying for ACSES

implementation to realize the proposed

150 mph speeds on the NEC-North End,

P&W pledged to work with Amtrak to

develop an implementation schedule

once a retrofit design is available for

review.

Senators Edward M. Kennedy and

Jack Reed, and Representative Patrick J.

Kennedy wrote in support of P&W’s

views. In his comments, Senator

Kennedy reiterated his support for the

Project, and agreed with P&W’s

recommendation that the Project assume

P&W’s implementation costs.

MBTA also objected to the proposed

order, commenting that it would impose

unfunded mandates on state authorities.

MBTA also recommended that the

proposed order be amended to require

funding by the Project, and, in addition,

to hold MBTA harmless from right of

way construction costs.

ConnDOT commented that FRA and

Amtrak should provide full funding for

ACSES implementation, since this

investment in equipment and

infrastructure is necessitated by

Amtrak’s new HST service. ConnDOT

indicated that it does not have access to

funding required to comply with the

order on its Shore Line East operation.

Moreover, the tenuous viability of Shore

Line East commuter service and the

concurrent funding needed for doublesided high speed platforms could force

this line of commuter rail service to

close. ConnDOT requested that FRA

pledge to provide full funding for any

mandated conversion to ACSES.

SEPTA commented that NEC

commuter railroads have undergone a

number of mandatory retrofits in recent

years (e.g., speed control, event

recorders, ditch lights, and emergency

door access), and expect additional

required retrofits even though separate

funding has never been provided for

this work. Since SEPTA capital is

limited, requiring commuter railroads to

fund systems such as ACSES would

force tradeoffs with other safety

improvements. SEPTA proposed that

the proposed modifications and civil

speed enforcement system be funded by

Amtrak, as the beneficiary of these

proposed requirements.

Conrail commented that the proposed

order’s purpose is to enable higher

speed passenger operations through

improved train control systems. Conrail,

however, has already invested in the

Locomotive Speed Limiter (LSL) system,

to provide train control compatible with

the NEC cab signal system. While

Conrail has a vested interest in

improving safety and reducing risk, the

additional risks caused by higher speed

passenger operations are being

introduced by other parties and should

not be borne by Conrail. Like other

commentators, Conrail urged FRA to

structure the final order to provide relief

from the cost burden, arguing that

ACSES will provide no quantifiable

benefits beyond Conrail’s current LSL

system.

Metro-North requested that its

territory be excluded from the final

order, stating that it will not operate at

high speeds since the catenary and

signal systems on the territory between

New Rochelle and New Haven are

designed for a maximum of 100 mph.

The NTSB, on the other hand,

strongly supported the proposed order,

since Positive Train Separation (PTS) is

one of the Board’s ‘‘Most Wanted’’

safety measures. The Board

recommended that FRA require

implementation of PTS for ‘‘all trains

where commuter and intercity

passenger railroads operate,’’ including

the South End.

Allocation of financial responsibility.

FRA appreciates that resolving the issue

of which organizations bear the ultimate

financial responsibility for this safety

system is not a simple or

straightforward matter. The Project with

which this safety enhancement is

associated has been aggressively

advocated by the Coalition of

Northeastern Governors for many years

and supported by most members of the

northeast congressional delegations.

While the Project has national

significance, a large share of the benefits

will accrue to the region, including

potential avoidance of major costs

associated with improvement of

aviation and highway facilities. As a

result of careful planning and aggressive

advocacy, the region will enjoy many

related improvements to its

transportation infrastructure, including

the opening of rail access for double
39348 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

stack intermodal service to the site of

the former U.S. Navy facilities at

Quonset Point and Davisville, Rhode

Island, at a cost to the Federal taxpayer

estimated at $55 million.

Amtrak has recognized its stake in

this Project by budgeting 100% of

wayside costs of ACSES, even though

much of the territory involved is

actually owned by other public

authorities. In addition, Amtrak will

bear the cost for equipping its own

trains, high-speed and conventional.

Since issuance of the notice of

proposed order, Amtrak has

communicated with ConnDOT, MBTA,

and P&W regarding the logistics of this

Project. Although FRA has not been

privy to the details of these

conversations, copies of letters provided

for the docket of this rulemaking affirm

that Amtrak has secured an option with

its vendor for a sufficient number of onboard equipment sets to the benefit of

these other railroads. Amtrak has

offered to complete installation at a cost

of $40,000, split between approximately

$27,000 for the equipment and $13,000

for installation. Amtrak has also offered

to assist these railroads by supporting

their ‘‘efforts to find a source of

funding.’’

FRA is concerned that parties to the

rulemaking may have hesitated to make

reasonable financial arrangements for

this work with the anticipation that FRA

would spare them the necessity by

allocating that responsibility in this

final order. From the point of view of

staging the work, FRA has confidence

that Amtrak will ensure interim

financing to complete equipping of

ConnDOT, MBTA, and P&W

locomotives. Conrail and its successors

(NS and CSX) are major Class I railroads

fully capable of handling their own

financing. The remaining issue is who

will bear the ultimate financial burden,

and the considerations pertaining to this

question are far more complex than

could be developed within the scope of

this proceeding.

It seems reasonable to expect that

Conrail or its successors will shoulder

the cost of this safety improvement and

equip as many locomotives as may be

appropriate for optimum power

utilization over its system. FRA has

provided funding under a cooperative

agreement with Conrail, NS and CSX for

development of an on-board platform

capable of providing interoperability

among various train control systems,

including ACS, ATC, and ACSES. This

innovation may help hold down the cost

of ACSES compliance.

FRA has carefully considered P&W’s

comments regarding its role in this

safety improvement. FRA appreciates

P&W’s willingness to cooperate and its

concerns regarding the timing of the

necessary retrofits (further addressed

below), and accepts P&W’s

representation that at least 22

locomotives will need to be equipped

with ACSES and that nighttime

operation is not a viable option.

However, FRA had not identified from

P&W’s submission a basis for becoming

more directly involved in deciding the

matter of financial responsibility.

P&W operates on the NEC largely as

a result of an expedited supplemental

transaction effected under section 1155

of the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981

(NERSA) (45 U.S.C. 745). Pursuant to

that statute, and under an order of the

Special Court established by the

Regional Rail Reorganization Act of

1973, Conrail was compelled to

surrender certain properties and service

rights to a successor railroad that would

commit to providing at least 4 years of

service on the properties transferred.

P&W aggressively pursued that

opportunity, with the full knowledge

that public planning from the 1960’s

forward had focused on dramatic

passenger service improvements on the

NEC between New York and Boston. As

recently as the past year, P&W has

sought to extend its service rights

farther west into Connecticut based

upon P&W’s claim that the proposed

acquisition of Conrail by NS and CSX

constitutes a termination of Conrail’s

residual franchise and activation of

rights P&W enjoys under the Special

Court’s order. As noted above, as an

adjunct to the current improvement

project, P&W will be the beneficiary of

construction of a third track on the NEC

between Davisville and ‘‘Boston

Switch’’ that will provide the new

doublestack access that otherwise

would not exist.

MBTA and ConnDOT are also

realizing considerable benefits from the

improvement project. MBTA is already

implementing plans to utilize electric

locomotives which will provide

improved accelerations, reduced trip

times and reduced emission of polluting

gases and particulates. ConnDOT and

MBTA benefit substantially from

Amtrak’s substantial investments in the

track structure associated with highspeed operations.

All of the operators over the affected

territory will enjoy benefits from

ACSES, such as the following:

(1) Reduction of risk related to

collisions at junctions. This feature may

help avoid a collision with a high-speed

or conventional passenger train that

could result in massive liability.

(2) Reduction of the risk of derailment

on curves and secondary collisions

following such derailments. Although

principally a benefit to high-speed

trains, this feature may benefit other

passenger operators that wish to take

advantage of higher levels of unbalance

to achieve improved trip times (which,

without ACSES, might be imprudent).

Even freight operators may benefit

under conditions where cab signals

must be cut out due to en route

malfunction.

(3) Reduction of risk related to

incidents involving roadway workers

and their equipment. This benefit

should accrue to all operators very

nearly in direct proportion to the

number of trains they operate.

(4) Improved scheduling and

execution of roadway inspections and

maintenance associated with the ability

to load temporary movement

restrictions into the on-board units of

trains en route through data radio

facilities along the route. This benefit,

which may be realized over a period of

several years, should help hold down

costs and increase efficiency for all

operators. If the data radio network is

fully exploited, dispatching may also be

enhanced through access to real-time

train location information.

FRA is aware of contrary arguments

for allocation of financial responsibility

based upon the institution of high-speed

service and the timing of requirements

for compliance. These arguments may

be worthy of consideration within the

full context of the commercial

relationships involved, including

existing arrangements for allocating

costs of operation over the affected NEC

segments, contractual arrangements for

operation of commuter service, and any

relationships established for executing

the obligations imposed by this order.

Forums such as the Surface

Transportation Board, arbitration panels

referenced in existing agreements, and

courts of appropriate jurisdiction may

have a role in determining the ultimate

allocation of financial responsibility for

implementation of ACSES, should the

parties fail to come to mutually

acceptable accommodations.

In summary, the arguments related to

financial responsibility are complex;

and various forums are available to

resolve them. It is neither necessary nor

appropriate for those determinations to

be made in this order, and FRA does not

intend by this order to govern the

ultimate allocation of financial

responsibility for equipping non-Amtrak

locomotives and cab cars. However,

FRA does require that trains be

equipped within a fixed time frame as

a condition of operating over the subject

territory. This approach is consistent

with prior orders of the Interstate
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39349

Commerce Commission and FRA

actions pertaining to train control,

including prior train control orders for

the NEC, which have generally required

that all trains operating in a designated

territory be equipped, without regard to

ownership.

(4) ACSES and the Railroad Safety

Advisory Committee

In 1996, FRA established the Railroad

Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC or

the Committee) to implement a more

consensual approach to rulemaking.

RSAC is comprised of 48 representatives

from 27 member organizations,

including railroads, labor groups,

equipment manufacturers, state

government groups, public associations,

and two associate non-voting

representatives from Canada and

Mexico. To address specific tasks, RSAC

formed working groups, comprised of

knowledgeable persons from the

organizations represented on RSAC.

Among the current working groups is a

group on positive train control (PTC),

which was tasked on September 30,

1997, and met for the first time in

November. This group is considering

three tasks related to development of

performance standards for new train

control systems, evaluation of costs and

benefits of PTC, and consideration of

issues related to implement.

Both APTA and Conrail commented

that the proposed order contained no

input from the PTC working group.

Since the final order would define and

implement PTC on the NEC-North End,

both recommended that FRA not issue

the final order until the PTC working

group has completed its task. Conrail

also commented that the proposed order

would impose similar costs for

functions that duplicate PTC.

Although FRA and Amtrak have

briefed the RSAC PTC Working Group

on ACSES and the proposed order in

this proceeding, FRA has not tasked the

PTC Working Group with development

of this order, which pertains to a

specific territory already equipped with

ACS and ATC (in contrast to most of

remainder of the general rail system).

ACSES is intended to supplement the

existing train control system on the

NEC, completing positive train control

functions in a manner that is cost

effective and capable of execution

within the time period necessary to

support enhanced service associated

with electrification and the delivery of

new HSTs.

Though not required to do so, FRA

utilized the Northeast Corridor Safety

Committee to develop issues related to

ACSES at a meeting in September of

1994, and Amtrak has proceeded since

that time to bring ACSES to a high state

of maturity. The ACSES system is

specifically designed to support dense

passenger operations at up to 150 mph.

Its architecture provides a particularly

suitable approach for NEC and related

operations (as illustrated by New Jersey

Transit’s use of a similar approach to

rapidly implement a positive stop

system on its own lines).

ACSES uses components and

strategies already extensively employed

in European train control and other

applications. ACSES will be applied to

equipment that—with the exception of a

small number of freight locomotives on

the NEC at any given time—is largely

dedicated to NEC operations.

By contrast, the RSAC PTC Working

Group is considering the potential for

train control systems that would be

applied principally in non-electrified

territory, over most of which freight

operations predominate and shared

power arrangements permit locomotives

to range extensively. For most of the

National rail system, there is presently

no ACS/ATC infrastructure on the

wayside, and many locomotives are not

equipped with responsive apparatus.

PTC systems for most of the general rail

system will likely utilize a much

different architecture that the

combination of ACS, ATC and ACSES

provided in this and related orders. In

concert with a train control project

sponsored by the State of Illinois and

the FRA, the Association of American

Railroads’ Transportation Technology

Center Inc. is just now commencing

work on criteria for interoperability of

such systems that is expected to extend

past the actual cut-in date for ACSES.

The extent to which PTC systems

designed for general applications may

be capable of supporting train speeds

above 110 or 125 miles per hour is not

currently known, and widespread

deployment of these systems will not be

possible until test and demonstration

projects now underway reach fruition.

In short, awaiting the results of the

RSAC PTC Working Group would defer

important safety enhancements for

territory where the chosen strategy is

ready to implement and particularly

appropriate. The PTC Working Group

was formed to accelerate movement

toward implementation of PTC safety

functions, not to impede it. FRA looks

forward to institution of high-speed

service on the NEC-North End late next

year, and implementation of ACSES is

necessary to ensure the safety of that

service within the context of dense

passenger and freight operations.

(5) Nighttime operations

P&W commented that it would not be

feasible to limit its train operations to

night time, the window within which

the order proposed to permit nonequipped trains to run on the NEC,

since nighttime switching service would

result in a dramatic increase in costs,

cause operational disruptions for P&W

customers, disrupt neighborhoods, and

raise serious safety issues. Conrail

commented that while the order was

unclear as to whether Conrail would be

permitted to operate non-equipped

trains using time separation from high

speed passenger schedules, mandatory

time separation is not an acceptable

business solution since Conrail already

operates during lightly scheduled

passenger periods for efficiency.

Although the proposed order properly

anticipates potential increases in

operation by Conrail or its successors,

Conrail commented that operations

would be adversely impacted if time

separations are mandated for trains not

equipped with ACSES.

As discussed above, after considering

the comments, FRA is not allowing a

window within which non-equipped

trains could operate during early

morning hours when high-speed trains

are not on the territory. Any exceptions

will be handled through waivers or spot

amendments to the order.

Technical Issues

(1) Flanking Protection

BLE–ATTD asked for an

interpretation of the term ‘‘flanking

protection,’’ and a description of how

such protection would work. BLE–

ATTD also requested clarification as to

how flanking protection would work on

the NEC-South End, on whether electric

lock derails would be used instead of

flanking protection in two-track areas,

and on who would enter information

into the mobile communication

package.

Flanking protection is inherent in

interlockings where there are parallel

tracks. On a four track railroad, for

example, with high speed middle tracks,

lower speed outer tracks, and crossovers

across all four tracks, a train could not

overrun a signal on an adjacent track

and encroach onto the path of a high

speed train if the signal was lined up for

the high speed track straight down one

of the middle tracks. Flanking

protection is not a new concept

designed to work with ACSES since it

is already in place at interlockings

where there is a parallel route to the

track being protected in the event of a

signal overrun.
39350 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

(2) Interoperability With Existing

Systems

Several commentators were

concerned about the impact of the new

ACSES system on current signal

systems. Conrail questioned whether its

existing 4-aspect system would be

compatible with the new 9-aspect

system, and whether ACSES would

interfere with an ongoing Conrail/CSX/

NS project to develop an on-board

platform to support multiple system

configurations. LIRR also questioned

how ACSES would interfere with

existing ATC systems, and how the

proposed order would impact those

railroads sharing track with Amtrak at

speeds over 100 mph. APTA wanted to

review Amtrak’s equipment

specifications because of concerns about

the reliability and maintainability of

untested equipment. APTA also

questioned ACSES’ impact on existing

ATC systems and commuter rail outside

the NEC. ConnDOT questioned the

benefits of the proposed system, and

SEPTA expressed concern about how

ACSES would affect operations outside

of the areas where wayside equipment

is installed.

In Amtrak’s proposed system, the

brake and propulsion interface between

the ACSES and the locomotive would be

similar to that utilized in conventional

cab signal/ATC systems. The interface

would be separate and distinct from the

interface used by the cab signal/ATC

system. The failure of either the cab

signal/ATC system or the ACSES would

not prevent the remaining functioning

system from performing its intended

operation and displaying the proper onboard aspect. Both the signal speed and

the civil speed would be displayed with

the lower of the two speeds to be

enforced.

FRA questioned the need or prudence

of displaying both speeds and requested

comment on the appropriate means of

displaying system information to the

locomotive engineer. Amtrak submitted

the only response on this issue. In a

January 16, 1998 letter, Amtrak clarified

that the 9-Aspect Cab Signal/ATC

system and the ACSES system are

independent systems that share a

common display. The 9–ACS/ATC

system will continuously display the

‘‘signal’’ speed, dependent upon routes

opening up in front of the approaching

train, and supported by eight simple

codes supplied continuously to the train

through the rails. The ACSES system, on

the other hand, will enforce the track

(civil) maximum authorized speeds,

supported by more complex codes

received at intermittent intervals from

transponders located along the track

structure. The ‘‘signal’’ speed is actually

part of the cab signal aspect (e.g.,

‘‘CLEAR 150,’’ ‘‘CLEAR 125,’’ ‘‘CAB

SPEED 80’’), with discrete aspects

displayed in accordance with Part 236.

The ‘‘track’’ speed will be carefully

coordinated with the cab signal aspect,

and highlighted to clearly indicate

which speed (always the lower) governs.

The lower speed will always be

enforced. Thus, merging the two digital

‘‘speed’’ displays into one ‘‘window’’

would seriously complicate and

undermine the stand-alone capability of

each system if the other should fail, and

would compromise the viability of the

redundancy or ‘‘back-up’’ capability

envisioned for the total system.

(3) 60 mph Turnouts

Amtrak had proposed, as an interim

measure, to install #26.5 straight-frog

turnouts at those crossovers where there

is insufficient space to install the #32.7

turnouts needed for diverging moves at

80 mph. Since these #26.5 straight-frog

turnouts could be used only for

diverging moves at 60 mph, ACSES

passive transponder sets approaching

such locations would enforce a 60 mph

civil speed restriction for all routes

through the interlocking where the #

26.5 turnout is located. The 60 mph

speed restriction would also be backed

up by a site specific instruction and an

appropriate reflectorized sign on the

distant signal.

NTSB, however, remained concerned

about how this system would work

when a train’s on-board ACSES system

was cut out, since the train would then

be unable to read the speed restrictions

transmitted by the temporary

transponders. In a June 4, 1998

conversation with FRA (memorialized

in the docket), Amtrak stated that

implementation of this proposed

interim system was unlikely. While

long-range planning may eventually

require the installation of some 60 mph

turnouts on the NEC, none are currently

planned for the territory between New

Haven and Boston. If such installations

become necessary in the future, Amtrak

intends to restrict passenger train

speeds at these locations to 45 mph, or

request a site specific waiver for each

location.

Section-by-Section Analysis

The section-by-section analysis below

discusses the modifications made from

the proposed order in response to

comments or technical considerations.

Each section of the final order is printed

in small type and followed by its

analysis. The final order is reprinted in

its entirety at the end of this preamble

discussion.

Effective Date

As discussed above, this order

becomes effective on the date proposed,

October 1, 1999. FRA will defer the

implementation date if necessary and

keep open the docket of this proceeding

to receive any petitions for adjustment

of the compliance date.

Scope and Applicability

This order supplements existing

regulations at 49 CFR Part 236 and existing

orders for automatic train control on track

controlled by the National Railroad Passenger

Corporation (Amtrak) on the Northeast

Corridor (NEC) between Washington, D. C.,

and Boston, Massachusetts. This order

applies in territory where Amtrak has

installed wayside elements of the Advanced

Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES),

permitting high-speed operations under the

conditions set forth below.

All railroads operating on high-speed

tracks in such equipped territory between

Boston, Massachusetts and New Haven,

Connecticut (NEC-North End), or on tracks

providing access to such high-speed tracks,

shall be subject to this order, including the

following entities operating or contracting for

the operation of rail service—

Amtrak;

Connecticut Department of Transportation;

Consolidated Rail Corporation and its

successors;

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority;

and

Providence and Worcester Railroad

Company.

The requirement that all trains be equipped

with operative on-board ACSES applies as

specified in paragraph (2) from milepost 73.2

at New Haven, Connecticut, to South Station,

Boston, Massachusetts, but applies only to

high-speed trains operating on NEC highspeed tracks between Washington, D.C., and

New York, New York (NEC-South End), as set

forth in paragraph 9(b).

Explanation and Analysis. Amtrak

has undertaken the planning and

installation of the ACSES as part of its

capital program for intercity service on

the NEC, consistent with legislation

providing for improved rail service in

the region. This order requires all

carriers operating in ACSES territory to

equip their controlling locomotives with

operative on-board equipment,

consisting of a transponder scanner, an

on-board computer, a display unit for

the locomotive engineer, and

appropriate interface with the cab

signal/train control apparatus. The final

order clarifies that trains other than

HSTs must be equipped on the NECNorth End but not on the NEC-South

End.

Over time, the ACSES system may be

completed and used by all operators

throughout the NEC for routes where

speeds exceed 110 mph on any segment,

enhancing safety throughout the NEC.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39351

For example, New Jersey Transit Rail

Operations (NJT) intends to equip its

controlling locomotives with an

Advanced Speed Enforcement System

(ASES), deriving safety advantages both

on the NEC and on certain of its lines

where the ASES system can be used as

an intermittent train stop system. As

Amtrak, NEC-North End operators and

NJT demonstrate the benefits and

reliability of the system, progress

toward universal upgrading of the NEC

signal and train control system will be

fostered. At a later date, FRA may

propose to amend this order to require

more extensive use of this new safety

technology, as determined by increases

in traffic and types of equipment used

on the NEC.

Definitions. Unless otherwise provided

terms used in this order have the same

definitions contained in Part 236. For

purposes of this order—

ACSES means a transponder based system

that operates independent of the cab signal

system, and provides enforcement of

permanent speed restrictions, temporary

speed restrictions, and stop signals at

interlockings.

High-speed train means a train operating in

excess of 125 miles per hour (mph) on the

NEC-South End, and 110 mph on the NECNorth End.

High-speed track means (1) a track on the

main line of the NEC-South End, where the

authorized train speed for any class of train

exceeds 125 mph, or (2) a track on the main

line of the NEC-North End where the

maximum authorized train speed for any

class of train is in excess of 110 mph.

Immediately adjacent track means a track

within 30 feet of a high-speed track when

measured from track center to track center.

Signal and train control system means the

automatic cab signal/automatic train control

system (cab signal/ATC) in effect on the NEC

at the date of issuance of this order, as

supplemented by ACSES, together with such

modifications as Amtrak shall make

consistent with this order.

Explanation and analysis. In its

comments, BLE–ATTD suggested that

FRA define the terms ‘‘civil speed

enforcement system’’ (ACSES), ‘‘offpeak operating times,’’ and ‘‘repair

facilities.’’ As explained above, the term

‘‘off-peak operating times’’ is no longer

relevant since FRA does not adopt its

proposed window for nighttime

operations. Similarly, FRA believes it

unnecessary to define ‘‘repair facilities’’

considering the limited scope of this

order. FRA has added a definition for

‘‘ACSES’’ that is derived from Amtrak’s

performance specifications.

The proposed order had suggested

requiring ACSES on tracks immediately

adjacent to (within 30 feet of) highspeed tracks. In this order, FRA extends

the requirements for ACSES to trains

operating on immediately adjacent

tracks where the maximum authorized

speed exceeds 20 mph, since such

tracks are located within the effective

operating envelope of high-speed tracks

where derailments could endanger highspeed operations.

Operations are already highly dense

on the NEC-North End, with projected

increases in both freight and passenger

traffic. Track curvature on the NECNorth End also exceeds the average

curvature on the NEC-South End,

resulting in greater potential concern for

compliance with civil speed

restrictions. Accordingly, FRA

distinguishes between the two

operations for purposes of determining

applicability of the new performance

requirements.

Performance standards. Effective October

1, 1999, the following performance standards

and special requirements shall apply:

1. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b),

the signal and train control system shall

enforce both permanent and temporary civil

speed restrictions (e.g., track curvature,

bridges, and slow orders) on all high-speed

tracks and immediately adjacent tracks where

the maximum authorized speed exceeds 20

mph. Permanent restrictions shall be loaded

into the onboard computer by direct data

transfer from a verified database. Temporary

restrictions shall be loaded into the onboard

computer by direct data transfer from the

computer-aided dispatching system. (For not

to exceed 12 months following cut-in of the

system, use of temporary transponders

programmed with appropriate speed

restrictions will be deemed to satisfy this

paragraph. Thereafter, use of temporary

transponders alone shall be acceptable only

in the case of an emergency restriction for

which transfer of the restriction into the

onboard computers of all affected trains is

not practicable.)

Explanation and analysis. As

discussed above, the existing signal

system does not enforce temporary

speed restrictions, such as slow orders

over defective track or protections for

roadway workers. Amtrak had proposed

to use temporarily placed transponders,

and entry of restrictions into the onboard computer by milepost, to protect

train movements and workers and

equipment on or adjacent to live highspeed tracks. BLE–ATTD commented

that this proposed use of temporary

transponders would be insufficient to

enforce temporary speed restrictions,

and recommended as a failsafe that FRA

also require the train dispatcher to enter

these restrictions into the on-board

computer by milepost.

FRA agrees with BLE–ATTD that

temporary transponders should not be

routinely used to enforce temporary

speed restrictions. Rather, the

dispatcher will automatically load

temporary restrictions into the on-board

computer, through the computer-aided

dispatching system and a data radio

network, to avoid the possibility of data

entry errors by the train crew. Amtrak

may use temporary transponders as an

alternative routinely for the first 12

months after implementation of this

order, and only on an emergency basis

thereafter. Data entry by train crews is

not an acceptable alternative.

FRA also clarifies that permanent

restrictions will also be loaded by direct

data transfer from a verified database.

FRA is not specifying a method for

verifying the database, but expects that

Amtrak will utilize appropriate reviews

and field verifications to ensure a high

level of accuracy.

Nothing in this order excuses

compliance with current Amtrak

requirements for creating and issuing

appropriate authorities or for providing

protection for roadway workers. Amtrak

has represented to FRA that these

protections will remain, supplemented

by the additional layer of safety

provided by the ACSES. FRA will

reopen consideration of this order

should Amtrak undertake any

substantial revision of current

procedures that may have the effect of

diminishing safety on the NEC.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 9(b), all

trains operating on high-speed track,

immediately adjacent track where the

maximum authorized speed exceeds 20 mph,

or track providing access to high-speed track

shall be equipped to respond to the

continuous cab signal/speed control system

and ACSES.

Explanation and analysis. The

benefits of equipping conventional

speed trains that operate on

immediately adjacent tracks providing

access to high-speed tracks may derive

primarily from enforcement of positive

stop features. If a train is prevented from

inappropriately proceeding through a

junction and onto a high-speed track,

the safety of the subject train and the

safety of the oncoming high-speed train

are equally assured. FRA believes that

most equipped trains will make use of

high-speed tracks. (See the discussion in

paragraph 9(b) below.)

As discussed above, FRA does not

adopt its proposed nighttime operations

window and accordingly removes the

proposed language from this section.

3. No conflicting aspects or indications

shall be displayed in the locomotive cab.

Explanation and analysis. As

explained above, FRA believes that

Amtrak’s dual display (details of which

are contained in the program

description placed in the docket of this

proposed order) is appropriate for a

hybrid system such as this. The order
39352 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

requires consistent information to be

displayed to the locomotive engineer.

Amtrak plans to implement this

principle, while providing information

from both the cab signal/ATC system

and ACSES, by displaying both of the

resulting maximum speeds, with the

lower speed to be identified and

enforced.

4. The system must enforce the most

restrictive speed at any location associated

with either the civil/temporary restriction or

cab signal aspect.

Explanation and analysis. As

discussed above, the most restrictive of

the limitations indicated by the cab

signal/ATC or ACSES system will be

enforced.

5. At interlocking home signals and control

points on high-speed tracks or protecting

switches providing access to high-speed

tracks, the signal and train control system

shall enforce a positive stop short of the

signal or fouling point when the signal

displays an absolute stop. The system shall

function such that the train will be brought

to a complete stop and cannot be moved

again until the first of the following events

shall occur: (1) the signal displays a more

permissive aspect; or (2) in the event of a

system malfunction, or system penalty, the

train comes to a complete stop, the engineer

receives verbal authority to proceed from the

dispatcher, and the engineer activates an

override or reset device that is located where

it cannot be activated from the engineer’s

accustomed position in the cab. The train

may then only travel at restricted speed until

a valid speed command is received by the onboard train equipment. For not to exceed 12

months following cut-in of ACSES, release of

the positive stop feature, under conditions

where the signal displays an aspect more

favorable than stop, but not less favorable

than restricting, may be accomplished by use

of the reset device; thereafter, this function

shall be accomplished automatically so that

it is not necessary for the engineer to leave

his or her accustomed position in the cab.

Explanation and analysis. As

originally conceived by Amtrak, ACSES

would enforce a positive stop through

an active transponder near the distant

signal which would recognize that the

home signal is capable of displaying an

absolute stop, and enforce a positive

stop even if the home signal actually

displayed a restricting indication. FRA

requested that Amtrak redesign this

feature to better coordinate with the

wayside signals. Amtrak agreed to

accelerate the development of the

ACSES data radio feature to reduce the

need to operate the ‘‘stop override’’

button to only those instances where a

system failure requires the train to be

moved. The Mobile Communication

Package (MCP), a data radio feature

located at the interlocking, will

broadcast a track specific, direction

specific, and location specific message

to the approaching train which

automatically releases the stop-override

feature without the engineer having to

operate the ‘‘stop override’’ button when

the home signal displays ‘‘stop and

proceed.’’ This message will only be

transmitted and only be effective when

the train is between the distant signal

and the home signal of the interlocking.

If the signal displays ‘‘restricting,’’ the

MCP data radio will broadcast a similar

message to the approaching train

relieving the train from actually having

to stop. Over the past year, Amtrak has

consistently advised FRA that MCP data

radios may not be installed at all

interlockings for some time following

cut-in of the system. Amtrak has not

been able to specify when this element

of the system would be completed. To

resolve this concern, FRA has added

language to the order requiring that this

element of the system be completed not

less than 12 months following cut-in.

6. Failure modes of the system will allow

for train movements at reduced speeds, as

follows:

a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System: In the

event of failure of the cab signal/ATC system

on board a train, the cab signal/ATC system

will be cut out; however, ACSES shall remain

operative and enforce the 79 mph speed

limit. If intermediate wayside signals are

provided, the train will continue to operate

at speeds not exceeding 79 mph subject to

indications of the wayside signal system. In

territory without fixed automatic block

signals, the train will receive information

approaching the home signal, through the

MCP radio, with the information actually

derived from the ‘‘flashing lunar signal with

the letter ‘‘C’’ displayed at the home signal.’’

When failure occurs after a train has entered

such a block, the train will proceed at

restricted speed to the next interlocking and

may not pass the home signal, regardless of

the aspect displayed, until the flashing lunar

‘‘Clear to Next Interlocking’’ signal is

displayed. The train may then pass the signal

and proceed at a speed not to exceed 79 mph.

This speed limit shall be enforced by ACSES.

Explanation and analysis. As

proposed, the cab signal/ATC portion of

the system will be cut out under

operating rules meeting 49 CFR

§ 236.567 requirements. When the cab

signal/ATC portion of the system fails

and/or is cut out, ACSES will still be in

operation, with the central processing

unit (CPU) receiving a message from the

cab signal/ATC CPU through a vital link

that the cab signal/ATC is cut in and not

failed. If ACSES does not receive this

message, a speed of 79 mph will be

locked in and the display will be dark,

other than the 79 mph displayed in the

civil speed portion, which will be

enforced. ACSES will continue to

enforce temporary and permanent speed

restrictions and positive stop at home

signal locations.

b. ACSES failure. If the on-board ACSES

fails en route, it must be cut out in a similar

manner to the cab signal/ATC system. The

engineer will be required to notify the

dispatcher that ACSES has been cut out.

When given permission to proceed, the train

must not exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End)

or 110 mph (NEC-North End). All trains with

cut out ACSES will operate at conventional

train speeds.

Explanation and analysis. Amtrak’s

comments to the proposed order

recommended modifications in the

proposed failure modes because the

phrase ‘‘* * * unless a flashing lunar

signal with the letter ‘‘N’’ reflected

Amtrak’s previous plan, which would

present the ‘‘clear to next interlocking’’

information to the train at the distant

signal through an active transponder at

the location. Under Amtrak’s current

plan, with the implementation of MCP

radio at the interlocking, the train will

receive the information as it approaches

the home signal, with the information

derived from the ‘‘flashing lunar signal

with the letter ‘‘C’’ displayed at the

home signal.’’

FRA received no other comments on

this proposed design standard, which

requires trains to fall back to existing

maximum speeds when the ACSES

must be cut out on a train. However,

this approach cannot provide positive

stop capability or compensate for higher

curving speeds that may be allowed

using tilt HSTs. All trains with a cut out

ACSES will operate at conventional

train speeds whether they are tilt train

equipment or conventional equipment.

The vital link between CPUs mentioned

in 6(a) above will inform the signal CPU

that the civil speed CPU is cut out or has

failed. The signal speed enforcement

system will enforce a default speed limit

when ACSES has failed and/or is cut

out, with a maximum speed of 110 mph

on the NEC-North End and 125 mph on

the NEC-South End if ACSES is cut out.

This places a premium on compliance

with operating rules developed

specifically for this purpose (copies of

which are available in the docket).

c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure. If the

cab signal/ATC system and ACSES both fail

en route, the systems shall be cut out and the

train shall proceed as provided in 49 CFR

§ 236.567.

Explanation and analysis. FRA

received no comment on its proposal to

follow the procedures and restrictions

in § 236.567 whenever the signal and

train control system fails and/or is cut

out en route. Accordingly, this section

applies as follows whenever the signal

and train control system fails and/or is

cut out en route:

Where an automatic train stop, train

control, or cab signal device fails and/
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39353

or is cut out enroute, train may proceed

at restricted speed or if an automatic

block signal system is in operation

according to signal indication but not to

exceed medium speed, to the next

available point of communication where

report must be made to a designated

officer. Where no automatic block signal

system is in use train shall be permitted

to proceed at restricted speed or where

automatic block signal system is in

operation according to signal indication

but not to exceed medium speed to a

point where absolute block can be

established. Where an absolute block is

established in advance of the train on

which the device is inoperative train

may proceed at not to exceed 79 miles

per hour.

These procedures, which are used

with present train control systems on

the NEC and throughout the nation,

have proven to be a reliable and safe

method of operating whenever the

signal and train control system fails

and/or is cut out.

d. Wayside signal system failure. If the

wayside signal system fails, train operation

will be at restricted speed to a point where

absolute block can be established in advance

of the train. Where absolute block is

established in advance of the train, the train

may proceed at speeds not to exceed 79 mph.

Explanation and analysis. FRA

received no comment on its proposal to

allow the carrier’s operating rules to

effect these requirements. If a wayside

signal system failure occurs, ACSES will

continue to function, by enforcing the

79 mph speed, civil and temporary

speed restrictions, and positive stops,

but an absolute block and proceed not

to exceed 79 mph must still be

established.

e. Missing transponder. If a transponder is

not detected where the equipment expected

to find the next transponder, the train must

not exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End) or 110

mph (NEC-North End) until the next valid

transponder is encountered. The 125/110

mph speed restriction will be enforced by the

system and ‘‘—’’ will be displayed to indicate

that the civil speed is unknown. The audible

alarm for civil speeds will sound and must

be acknowledged. Speed restrictions

previously entered into the system, whether

temporary or permanent, will be displayed at

the proper time and continue to be enforced.

If the missing transponder is a positive stop

enforcement transponder at the distant signal

to an interlocking, then the system will treat

the missing transponder as if it were present

and a stop will be required. Since the

previous transponder will have transmitted

the distance to the stop location, the stop

shall be enforced unless a cab signal is

received that indicates the interlocking signal

is displaying an aspect more favorable than

‘‘Stop,’’ ‘‘Stop & Proceed,’’ and ‘‘Restricting.’’

The 125/110 mph speed restriction will also

be enforced regardless of whether the cab

signal aspect is being received.

Explanation and analysis. As

proposed, permanent transponders will

be programmed with information that

includes distance to the next

transponder. Wheel rotations will be

logged to determine train position

between transponders. If a transponder

is missing (or is not successfully read),

speeds will be slowed to 125 or 110

mph, depending upon the territory

involved, until the next valid

transponder is detected.

7. When it becomes necessary to cut out

the cab signal/ATC system, ACSES, or both,

these systems shall be considered inoperative

until the engine has been repaired, tested and

found to be functioning properly. Repairs

shall be made before dispatching the unit on

any subsequent trip.

Explanation and analysis. FRA

received no comment on this section,

which is adopted as proposed.

8. Other requirements applicable to the

system are as follows:

a. Aspects in the cab shall have only one

indication and one name, and will be shown

in such a way as to be understood by the

engine crew. These aspects shall be shown by

lights and/or illuminated letters or numbers.

b. Entrances to the main line can be

protected by electrically locked derails if the

speed limit is 15 mph or less. A transponder

set shall cut in ACSES prior to movement

through the derail and onto the main line. If

the speed limit is greater than 15 mph, a

positive stop will be required. At entrances

from a signaled track, ACSES shall be cut in

prior to the distant signal and a positive stop

enforced at the home signal.

Explanation and analysis. FRA

received no comment on these sections,

which are adopted as proposed.

c. An on-board event recorder shall record,

in addition to the required functions of

§ 229.5(g) [of FRA’s Railroad Locomotive

Safety Standards (49 CFR Part 229)], the time

at which each transponder is encountered,

the information associated with that

transponder, and each use of the positive

stop override. These functions may be

incorporated within the on-board computer,

or as a stand alone device, but shall continue

to record speeds and related cab signal/ATC

data, even if ACSES has failed and/or is cut

out. The event recorder shall meet all

requirements of § 229.135.

Explanation and analysis. The NTSB

supported requiring the on-board event

recorder to record the time each

transponder is encountered, any

associated information, and each use of

the positive stop override. At a

minimum, the event recorder

specifications submitted by Amtrak

require the recorder to log with time

stamps the following data: speed,

distance traveled, location by milepost

in miles and tenths, track number, brake

pipe pressure (for penalty applications),

on/off status of ACSES, driver input to

ACSES/system acknowledge on/off,

transponder messages received, and

data from ACSES sent to the driver’s

display unit and the diagnostic serial

port of the driver’s diagnostic panel.

9. The following maximum speeds apply

on the NEC in territory subject to this order:

a. In ACSES territory where all trains

operating on high-speed tracks, adjacent

tracks where speeds exceed 20 mph, and

tracks providing access to high-speed tracks

are equipped with cab signal/ATC and

ACSES, qualified and ACSES-equipped

trainsets otherwise so authorized may

operate at maximum speeds not exceeding

150 mph. The maximum speed over any

highway-rail crossing shall not exceed 80

miles per hour where only conventional

warning systems are in place. Train speeds

shall not exceed 95 mph over any highwayrail crossing where arrangements approved

by the Associate Administrator for Safety

incorporating four-quadrant gates and

presence detection are provided and tied into

the signal system, such that a train will be

brought to a stop should the crossing be

determined to be occupied following descent

of the gates. Amtrak shall submit for approval

of the Associate Administrator for Safety

plans for site-specific improvements with

timetables for each of the 13 NEC crossings

remaining on the NEC-North End by January

1, 1999.

Explanation and analysis. As

discussed above, FRA extends the

requirements for ACSES to trains

operating on immediately adjacent

tracks where the maximum authorized

speed exceeds 20 mph. Speeds are

permitted to 95 mph, rather than 80

mph as proposed, provided 4-quadrant

gates with presence detection are

provided and tied into the train control

system. FRA may consider amendment

of this order to allow alternative secure

arrangements at one or more private

crossings following submission of a

required crossover safety plan. This

section is otherwise adopted as

proposed.

b. In ACSES territory on the NEC-South

End, where access to any high-speed track is

prevented by switches locked in the normal

position and a parallel route to the highspeed track is provided at crossovers from

adjacent tracks, and where no junctions

providing direct access exist, qualified and

ACSES-equipped trainsets otherwise so

authorized may operate to a maximum speed

not exceeding 135 mph on such track; and

provisions of this order requiring other tracks

and trains to be equipped with the ACSES do

not apply.

Explanation and analysis. FRA

received no comment on this section,

which is adopted as proposed. Currently

maximum speeds for trains on the

general rail system are limited to 110

mph. Under a waiver, Amtrak operates
39354 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

Metroliner service on the NEC-South

End at speeds up to 125 mph. This order

allows Amtrak to increase its speeds on

the NEC-South End to 135 mph by

installing the ACSES transponders on

the wayside and by equipping new

high-speed trainsets with on-board

scanners and computers. Other users of

Amtrak’s NEC-South End high-speed

tracks are not required to be equipped

for the present, but will benefit from the

higher level of safety associated with

Amtrak operations. On the NEC-North

End, maximum speeds currently top out

at 110 mph, with no waiver for highspeed service. This order authorizes

operation of qualified trainsets at up to

150 mph in territory where Amtrak has

installed ACSES on the wayside,

provided Amtrak and other users are

equipped.

The phrase ‘‘otherwise authorized,’’

as applied to trains, refers to equipment

qualified for higher speeds under the

track/vehicle interaction limits adopted

in the recent revisions to the Track

Safety Standards. Metroliner equipment

is currently authorized to operate up to

125 mph. FRA anticipates that the new

American Flyer trainsets will be

qualified to operate up to 150 mph.

Other equipment presently operating on

the NEC may also qualify to operate at

higher than conventional speeds under

the revised Track Safety Standards.

10. Schedule and acceptance

requirements.

a. This order is effective August 21, 1998.

b. Not later than 45 days following

publication of this order, Amtrak shall

deliver to the Associate Administrator for

Safety, FRA, a final program and timetable

for completion of pre-qualification tests,

submission of final production

specifications, availability of on-board

equipment from Amtrak’s vendor, staging of

installation of on-board equipment for which

Amtrak takes responsibility, and testing of all

wayside and on-board equipment prior to

cut-in.

c. Contingent upon FRA’s acceptance of

the final program and timetable, and FRA’s

acceptance of the results of pre-qualification

and pre-service tests, compliance with

requirements of this order for use of ACSES

on the NEC-North End is required on and

after October 1, 1999.

d. Amtrak may commence operations

under paragraph 9(b) of this order utilizing

equipment qualified under 49 CFR Part 213,

as revised, following FRA’s approval of the

elements of the final program, timetable and

test results pertinent to the subject territory

and operations.

Explanation and analysis. Several

commentators noted concerns regarding

the ability of Amtrak, its vendor and

other railroads to stage installation and

testing of ACSES within the remaining

time available. FRA shares this concern,

but believes sufficient time remains

prior to scheduled initiation of

electrified operations and high-speed

service to address these needs if Amtrak

and its vendor move briskly, but

deliberately, to complete final

specifications and tests.

FRA also has noted the need to ensure

the quality of pre-service testing of this

new system. Although the various

elements of the ACSES system have

been routinely used in train control

applications internationally, integration

of the system remains a challenge.

Although Amtrak has extensive

experience and an excellent record in

implementing train control technology,

oversight is appropriate to verify that

safety remains the first priority in this

undertaking.

Accordingly, FRA has included a

requirement for submission of a

program and timetable for staging the

implementation of this system in a

manner that does not impair the ability

of other railroads to provide quality

passenger and freight service. FRA will

expect that this timetable reflect

consultation with other parties, as

necessary and appropriate, and describe

how adverse impacts on other parties

will be prevented. FRA will cooperate

with this process by providing one or

more program monitors, who will

oversee pre-qualification and preservice testing of all aspects of the

system, advising the Associate

Administrator for Safety regarding the

readiness of the system as measured

against the requirements of this order.

FRA will continue to evaluate the

ability of the parties subject to this order

to meet the technical requirements

specified without disruption of normal

rail service and may amend the order as

necessary to avoid any such disruptions.

Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated this final order of

particular applicability under its

procedures for ensuring full

consideration of the potential

environmental impacts of FRA actions,

as required by the National

Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.

4321, et seq.) and related directives.

This order meets the criteria for

classification as a non-major action for

environmental purposes.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

(5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) was enacted by

Congress to ensure that small entities

are not unnecessarily and

disproportionately burdened by

Government regulations. Only one small

entity is affected by this order, P&W.

Their annual revenues are about

$22,000,000, and this order will cost

them about $1,100,000 in total

discounted costs over twenty years. The

twenty-year cost is thus about 5% of one

year’s revenue. This is a substantial

impact on that one entity. This order is,

however, only one part of a much larger

infrastructure improvement, and much

of the benefit of that improvement

accrues to P&W, including the opening

of rail access for double stack

intermodal service to the site of the

former U.S. Navy facilities at Quonset

Point and Davisville, Rhode Island, at a

cost to the Federal taxpayer estimated at

$55 million. Also, as an adjunct to the

current improvement project, P&W will

be the beneficiary of construction of a

third track on the NEC between

Davisville and ‘‘Boston Switch’’ that

will provide the new doublestack access

that otherwise would not exist. P&W is

the only freight railroad operating over

those tracks. While the one-time cost of

ACSES is a significant fraction of one

year’s revenue for P&W, the other

projects will add far more than that to

P&W’s net worth, enabling them to

compete effectively against other modes.

They do not at present face rail

competition.

As noted above, P&W operates on the

NEC largely as a result of an expedited

supplemental transaction effected under

section 1155 of the Northeast Rail

Service Act of 1981 (NERSA) (45 U.S.C.

745). Pursuant to that statute, and under

an order of the Special Court established

by the Regional Rail Reorganization Act

of 1973, Conrail was compelled to

surrender certain properties and service

rights to a successor railroad that would

commit to providing at least 4 years of

service on the properties transferred.

P&W aggressively pursued that

opportunity, with the full knowledge

that public planning from the 1960’s

forward had focused on dramatic

passenger service improvements on the

NEC between New York and Boston. As

recently as the past year, P&W has

sought to extend its service rights

farther west into Connecticut based

upon P&W’s claim that the proposed

acquisition of Conrail by NS and CSX

constitutes a termination of Conrail’s

residual franchise and activation of

rights P&W enjoys under the Special

Court’s order.

FRA has sought to identify means to

mitigate the impact of this order on

P&W. The proposed order would have

permitted operations of unequipped

trains during nighttime hours when

high-speed trains were not running.

P&W commented that it would not be

feasible to limit its train operations to

night time, the window within which

the order proposed to permit nonequipped trains to run on the NEC,
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39355

since nighttime switching service would

result in a dramatic increase in costs,

cause operational disruptions for P&W

customers, disrupt neighborhoods, and

raise serious safety issues. P&W has thus

explained that the means suggested in

the proposed order would not be

helpful, but has not suggested any

alternate means of mitigating the

impacts that are compatible with early

realization of reasonable returns from

public investments in improved rail

service in the region. As a result of those

investments, P&W will be provided

access to a third main track over a key

route, and with improved clearances, at

a cost to the Federal Government almost

50 times greater than the cost to P&W of

installing ACSES on its equipment.

Further, it is clear that P&W (like all

operators on the subject territory) will

realize substantial benefits from ACSES.

Under these circumstances, FRA is

unable to determine that P&W is unduly

disadvantaged by the mandate of this

order.

Most importantly, FRA believes that

there is no alternative that could meet

the safety concerns which are FRA’s

primary mission without imposing

similar costs on P&W. The Regulatory

Flexibility Act makes clear that

concerns about small entities are not to

take precedence over the government’s

responsibility for public safety. Further,

it is not the purpose of railroad safety

regulations and orders to allocate

societal costs among parties with shared

interests in transportation

improvements. Nevertheless, FRA states

unequivocally that it does not by

issuance of this order intend to deprive

P&W of any claim it may have against

Amtrak related to the assignment of

responsibility for the cost of these safety

improvements.

Paperwork Reduction Act

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act

of 1995 (PRA), Pub. L. No. 104–13,

§ 2,109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as

revised at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3520), and

its implementing regulations, 5 CFR Part

1320, the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) does not need to approve

information collection requirements that

affect nine or fewer respondents. FRA

has determined that information

collection requirements in this order

will affect fewer than nine railroads,

and that therefore OMB approval is not

required.

Regulatory Impact

Executive Order 12866 and DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures

This rule has been evaluated in

accordance with existing policies and

procedures, and has been determined to

be non-significant under both Executive

Order 12866 and DOT policies and

procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26,

1979). FRA has prepared and placed in

the docket a regulatory analysis

addressing the economic impact of the

rule. Document inspection and copying

facilities are available at 1120 Vermont

Avenue, 7th Floor, Washington, DC,

20590. Photocopies may also be

obtained by submitting a written request

to the FRA Docket Clerk at Office of

Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad

Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW,

Washington, DC 20590.

Even though full implementation of

ACSES would cost about $200 million,

FRA is not ordering that here, nor does

FRA plan to require it at present. For the

portion of ACSES ordered here, FRA

estimates that the direct safety benefits

will exceed $44 million, discounted to

present value over a 20-year period,

through prevention of collisions,

overspeed derailments, and incidents

involving harm to roadway workers.

Additional benefits are expected to

include avoidance of other public

investments in transportation

infrastructure in the region. The

allocated cost for installation and

maintenance of ACSES on the segments

affected by this order is expected to be

$36 million for the same period,

yielding a net benefit to society of at

least $8.5 million, exclusive of nonsafety benefits. Of this amount, costs of

installation on the right-of-way and on

equipment will be about $33 million,

which is expected to be spread over

three calendar years.

FRA has based its analysis on many

assumptions, which yield a great deal of

uncertainty. The projected accident

rates may be significantly lower without

ACSES, in which case the analysis

would overstate benefits. FRA believes

it is equally likely that the analysis

underestimates the accident rate

without ACSES, in which case the

analysis would understate benefits.

There are several reasons for the

uncertainty. The track safety standards

have recently been modified, and will

permit railroads to set maximum speeds

on curves according to a performance

standard which will likely permit

higher maximum speeds on curves on

the affected segments. This will leave

less of a margin for error should the

engineer permit the train to exceed the

civil speed restriction for a curve on

which the maximum speed has been

increased. At the same time the corridor

will be electrified. This will allow the

use of electric locomotives which are

capable of more rapid acceleration, and

therefore are capable of violating civil

speed restrictions more often, for longer

durations and by greater speeds. FRA

realizes that traffic on the affected

segments will increase (as did A. D.

Little, the firm that analyzed the risks of

high speed service for Amtrak), but the

consequences of this increase can only

be estimated, and this estimate is itself

based on uncertain volume estimates.

The largest uncertainty, however,

comes from the fact that the root cause

of the kinds of accidents which ACSES

may prevent is human failure. Human

failure occurs somewhat randomly, and

is very difficult to predict. FRA is aware

that the more opportunities for human

failure exist, the greater the likelihood

of such failure, but there is no way to

say with certainty that so many human

failures will occur within such a period.

If one accident like the 1996 Silver

Spring, Maryland accident (11 killed, 24

injured) is prevented, this rule will

more than pay for itself. That accident

was a relatively low speed collision

between an Amtrak train and a

commuter train, not on the affected

segments. Higher speed accidents could

easily have costs many times the total

cost of the order (for example, the

Chase, Maryland accident in 1987

which left 16 killed, 228 injured). Even

accidents where a collision is not the

first event can be severe. In 1990, an

Amtrak train derailed because of

overspeed on a curve in Boston, and

struck a train on an adjacent track (451

injured). In June 1998, a German highspeed train derailed and struck a bridge,

killing approximately 95 people.

Although that train was not derailed

because of overspeed and did not have

crash-energy management systems (as

far as we now know), it was travelling

at 125 mph, a lower speed than trainsets

will be capable of on this corridor, and

may be illustrative of what a high-speed

derailment could cause.

FRA has already taken steps to see

that high-speed trains on this corridor

will have crash-energy management

systems, but avoiding derailments and

collisions with conventional passenger

trains is extremely desirable. While it is

impossible to know whether this will

prevent something which may never

happen, or multiple events, preventing

just one major accident in twenty years

will make the system pay for itself.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated in

the preamble, FRA issues the following

Final Order:

Final Order of Particular Applicability

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20501–

20505 (1994); and 49 CFR 1.49(f), (g), and

(m).
39356 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

Scope and Applicability

This order supplements existing

regulations at 49 CFR Part 236 and

existing orders for automatic train

control on track controlled by the

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

(Amtrak) on the Northeast Corridor

(NEC). This order applies in territory

where Amtrak has installed wayside

elements of the Advanced Civil Speed

Enforcement System (ACSES),

permitting high-speed operations under

the conditions set forth below.

All railroads operating on high-speed

tracks in such equipped territory

between Boston, Massachusetts and

New Haven, Connecticut (NEC-North

End), or on tracks providing access to

such high-speed tracks, shall be subject

to this order, including the following

entities operating or contracting for the

operation of rail service—

Amtrak;

Connecticut Department of

Transportation;

Consolidated Rail Corporation and its

successors;

Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority; and

Providence and Worcester Railroad

Company.

The requirement that all trains be

equipped with operative on-board

ACSES applies as specified in paragraph

(2) from milepost 73.2 at New Haven,

Connecticut, to South Station, Boston,

Massachusetts, but applies only to highspeed trains operating on high-speed

tracks between Washington, DC, and

New York, New York (NEC-South End),

as set forth in paragraph 9(b).

Definitions

Unless otherwise provided terms used

in this order have the same definitions

contained in Part 236. For purposes of

this order—

ACSES means a transponder based

system that operates independent of the

cab signal system, and provides

enforcement of permanent speed

restrictions, temporary speed

restrictions, and stop signals at

interlockings.

High-speed train means a train

operating in excess of 125 miles per

hour (mph) on the NEC-South End, and

110 mph on the NEC-North End.

‘‘High-speed track’’ means (1) a track

on the main line of the NEC-South End,

where the authorized train speed for any

class of train exceeds 125 mph, or (2) a

track on the main line of the NEC-North

End where the maximum authorized

train speed for any class of train is in

excess of 110 mph.

Immediately adjacent track means a

track within 30 feet of a high-speed

track when measured from track center

to track center.

Signal and train control system refers

to the automatic cab signal/automatic

train control system (cab signal/ATC) in

effect on the NEC at the date of issuance

of this order, as supplemented by

ACSES, together with such

modifications as Amtrak shall make

consistent with this order.

Performance Standards

Effective October 1, 1999, the

following performance standards and

special requirements shall apply:

1. Except as provided in paragraph

9(b), the signal and train control system

shall enforce both permanent and

temporary civil speed restrictions (e.g.,

track curvature, bridges, and slow

orders) on all high-speed tracks and

immediately adjacent tracks. Permanent

restrictions shall be loaded into the

onboard computer by direct data

transfer from a verified database.

Temporary restrictions shall be loaded

into the onboard computer by direct

data transfer from the computer-aided

dispatching system. (For not to exceed

12 months following cut-in of the

system, use of temporary transponders

programmed with appropriate speed

restrictions will be deemed to satisfy

this paragraph. Thereafter, use of

temporary transponders alone shall be

acceptable only in the case of an

emergency restriction for which transfer

of the restriction into the onboard

computers of all affected trains is not

practicable.)

2. Except as provided in paragraph

9(b), all trains operating on high-speed

track, immediately adjacent track where

the maximum authorized speed exceeds

20 mph, or track providing access to

high-speed track shall be equipped to

respond to the continuous cab signal/

speed control system and ACSES.

3. No conflicting aspects or

indications shall be displayed in the

locomotive cab.

4. The system must enforce the most

restrictive speed at any location

associated with either the civil/

temporary restriction or cab signal

aspect.

5. At interlocking home signals and

control points on high-speed tracks or

protecting switches providing access to

high-speed tracks, the signal and train

control system shall enforce a positive

stop short of the signal or fouling point

when the signal displays an absolute

stop. The system shall function such

that the train will be brought to a

complete stop and cannot be moved

again until the first of the following

events shall occur: (1) the signal

displays a more permissive aspect; or (2)

in the event of a system malfunction, or

system penalty, the train comes to a

complete stop, the engineer receives

verbal authority to proceed from the

dispatcher, and the engineer activates

an override or reset device that is

located where it cannot be activated

from the engineer’s accustomed position

in the cab. The train may then only

travel at restricted speed until a valid

speed command is received by the onboard train equipment. For not to

exceed 12 months following cut-in of

ACSES, release of the positive stop

feature, under conditions where the

signal displays an aspect more favorable

than stop, but not less favorable than

restricting, may be accomplished by use

of the reset device; thereafter, this

function shall be accomplished

automatically so that it is not necessary

for the engineer to leave his or her

accustomed position in the cab.

6. Failure modes of the system will

allow for train movements at reduced

speeds, as follows:

a. Failure of Cab Signal/ATC System:

In the event of failure of the cab signal/

ATC system on board a train, the cab

signal/ATC system will be cut out;

however, ACSES shall remain operative

and enforce the 79 mph speed limit. If

intermediate wayside signals are

provided, the train will receive

information approaching the home

signal, through the MCP radio, with the

information actually derived from the

‘‘flashing lunar signal with the letter

‘‘C’’ displayed at the home signal.’’

When failure occurs after a train has

entered such a block, the train will

proceed at restricted speed to the next

interlocking and may not pass the home

signal, regardless of the aspect

displayed, until the flashing lunar

‘‘Clear to Next Interlocking’’ signal is

displayed. The train may then pass the

signal and proceed at a speed not to

exceed 79 mph. The speed limit shall be

enforced by ACSES.

b. ACSES failure. If the on-board

ACSES fails en route, it must be cut out

in a similar manner to the cab signal/

ATC system. The engineer will be

required to notify the dispatcher that

ACSES has been cut out. When given

permission to proceed, the train must

not exceed 125 mph (NEC-South End) or

110 mph (NEC-North End). All trains

with cut out ACSES will operate at

conventional train speeds.

c. Cab signals/ATC & ACSES failure.

If the cab signal/ATC system and

ACSES both fail en route, the systems

shall be cut out and the train shall

proceed as provided in 49 CFR

§ 236.567.

d. Wayside signal system failure. If

the wayside signal system fails, train
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39357

operation will be at restricted speed to

a point where absolute block can be

established in advance of the train.

Where absolute block is established in

advance of the train, the train may

proceed at speeds not to exceed 79 mph.

e. Missing transponder. If a

transponder is not detected where the

equipment expected to find the next

transponder, the train must not exceed

125 mph (NEC-South End) or 110 mph

(NEC-North End) until the next valid

transponder is encountered. The 125/

110 mph speed restriction will be

enforced by the system and ‘‘—’’ will be

displayed to indicate that the civil

speed is unknown. The audible alarm

for civil speeds will sound and must be

acknowledged. Speed restrictions

previously entered into the system,

whether temporary or permanent, will

be displayed at the proper time and

continue to be enforced. If the missing

transponder is a positive stop

enforcement transponder at the distant

signal to an interlocking, then the

system will treat the missing

transponder as if it were present and a

stop will be required. Since the previous

transponder will have transmitted the

distance to the stop location, the stop

shall be enforced unless a cab signal is

received that indicates the interlocking

signal is displaying an aspect more

favorable than ‘‘Stop,’’ ‘‘Stop &

Proceed,’’ and ‘‘Restricting.’’ The 125/

110 mph speed restriction will also be

enforced regardless of whether the cab

signal aspect is being received.

7. When it becomes necessary to cut

out the cab signal/ATC system, ACSES,

or both, these systems shall be

considered inoperative until the engine

has been repaired, tested and found to

be functioning properly. Repairs shall

be made before dispatching the unit on

any subsequent trip.

8. Other requirements applicable to

the system are as follows:

a. Aspects in the cab shall have only

one indication and one name, and will

be shown in such a way as to be

understood by the engine crew. These

aspects shall be shown by lights and/or

illuminated letters or numbers.

b. Entrances to the main line can be

protected by electrically locked derails

if the speed limit is 15 mph or less. A

transponder set shall cut in ACSES prior

to movement through the derail and

onto the main line. If the speed limit is

greater than 15 mph, a positive stop will

be required. At entrances from a

signaled track, ACSES shall be cut in

prior to the distant signal and a positive

stop enforced at the home signal.

c. An on-board event recorder shall

record, in addition to the required

functions of § 229.5(g) [of FRA’s

Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards

(49 CFR Part 229)], the time at which

each transponder is encountered, the

information associated with that

transponder, and each use of the

positive stop override. These functions

may be incorporated within the onboard computer, or as a stand alone

device, but shall continue to record

speeds and related cab signal/ATC data,

even if ACSES has failed and/or is cut

out. The event recorder shall meet all

requirements of § 229.135.

9. The following maximum speeds

apply on the NEC in territory subject to

this order:

a. In ACSES territory where all trains

operating on high-speed tracks, adjacent

track where the maximum authorized

speed exceeds 20 mph, and tracks

providing access to high-speed tracks

are equipped with cab signal/ATC and

ACSES, qualified and ACSES-equipped

trainsets otherwise so authorized may

operate at maximum speeds not

exceeding 150 mph. The maximum

speed over any highway-rail crossing

shall not exceed 80 mph where only

conventional warning systems are in

place. Train speeds shall not exceed 95

mph over any highway-rail crossing

where arrangements approved by the

Associate Administrator for Safety

incorporating four-quadrant gates and

presence detection are provided and

tied into the signal system, such that a

train will be brought to a stop should

the crossing be determined to be

occupied following descent of the gates.

Amtrak shall submit for approval of the

Associate Administrator for Safety plans

for site-specific improvements with

timetables for each of the 13 NEC

crossings remaining on the NEC-North

End by January 1, 1999.

b. In ACSES territory on the NECSouth End, where access to any highspeed track is prevented by switches

locked in the normal position and a

parallel route to the high-speed track is

provided at crossovers from adjacent

tracks, and where no junctions

providing direct access exist, qualified

and ACSES-equipped trainsets

otherwise so authorized may operate to

a maximum speed not exceeding 135

mph on such track; and provisions of

this order requiring other tracks and

trains to be equipped with ACSES do

not apply.

10. Schedule and acceptance

requirements.

a. This order is effective August 21,

1998.

b. Not later than 45 days following

publication of this order, Amtrak shall

deliver to the Associate Administrator

for Safety, FRA, a final program and

timetable for completion of prequalification tests, availability of onboard equipment from Amtrak’s vendor,

staging of installation of on-board

equipment for which Amtrak takes

responsibility, and testing of all wayside

and on-board equipment prior to cut-in.

c. Contingent upon FRA’s acceptance

of the final program and timetable, and

FRA’s acceptance of the results of prequalification and pre-service tests,

compliance with requirements of this

order for use of ACSES on the NECNorth End is required on and after

October 1, 1999.

d. Amtrak may commence operations

under paragraph 9(b) of this order

utilizing equipment qualified under 49

CFR Part 213, as revised, following

FRA’s approval of the elements of the

final program, timetable and test results

pertinent to the subject territory and

operations.

Issued in Washington, D.C. on July 10,

1998.

Jolene M. Molitoris,

Federal Railroad Administrator.

[FR Doc. 98–19431 Filed 7–21–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

Safety Performance Standards and

Research and Development Programs

Meetings

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of NHTSA Industry

Meeting.

SUMMARY: This notice announces a

public meeting at which NHTSA will

answer questions from the public and

the automobile industry regarding the

agency’s vehicle regulatory program.

DATES: The Agency’s regular, quarterly

public meeting relating to its vehicle

regulatory program will be held on

September 17, 1998, beginning at 9:45

a.m. and ending at approximately 12:30

p.m., at the Tysons Westpark Hotel,

McLean, VA. Questions relating to the

vehicle regulatory program must be

submitted in writing with a diskette

(Wordperfect) by Tuesday, September 1,

1998, to the address shown below or by

e-mail. If sufficient time is available,

questions received after September 1

may be answered at the meeting. The

individual, group or company

submitting a question(s) does not have

to be present for the question(s) to be

answered. A consolidated list of the

questions submitted by September 1,

1998, and the issues to be discussed,