J

- S21010

- 18

NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON P. LLOYD

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 869 WDA 2017 Appeal from the Order May 31, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 02

- CR

- 0004118

- 2008

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 3, 2018
Appellant, Aaron P. Lloyd, appeals pro se from the May 31, 2017 order
denying his motion to enforce a negotiated plea agreement. We affirm.
As our disposition is based on the procedural posture of this case, we decline to set forth the factual background. On August 25, 2008, Appellant
pled guilty to aggravated assault 1 and several charges at a different docket
number. Appellant was immediately sentenced to an aggregate term of four

and one

- half to nine years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct
appeal.
On June 19, 2009, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546 . Counsel was
appointed and filed an amended petition. The P CRA court denied Appellant’s

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.J

- S21010

- 18

- 2

-

PCRA petition. This Court affirmed , and our Supreme Court denied allowance
of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lloyd , 11 A.3d 1040 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 14 A.3d 825 (Pa. 2011).
Thereafter, A ppellant was released on parole. Appellant violated the

terms of his parole and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
(“P BP P ”) revoked Appellant’s parole and imposed backtime

. On March 15,
2017, Appellant filed a document he titled a motion to enforce his negotiated

p lea agreement arguing that the application of 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(2)
violated the terms of his plea agreement

. 2 On May 31, 2017, the trial court

denied the motion. This timely appeal followed. 3
Appellant presents two 4 issues for our review:

1. [Did the trial court err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s motion?

2. Is the Commonwealth barred from applying 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(2) to Appell ant because of the terms of his plea agreement? ]

2 That section provides that
If the parolee’ s recommitment is so ordered, the parolee shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which the parolee would have been compelled to serve had the parole not been granted and, except as provided under paragraph (2.1), shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole.
61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(2).

3 Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

4 Appellant lists three issues; however, his second and third issues raise nearly identical claim s . Hence, we have combined them into one issue.J

- S21010

- 18

- 3

-

Appellant’s Brief at 5.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to
consider his motion to enforce his plea agreement. “Whether a court has
subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law, making our standard of

review de novo and the scope of our review plenary.” Hendricks v.

Hendricks , 175 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

The Commonwealth inco rrectly argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over Appellant’s motion because it was an untimely PCRA petition.
Appellant’s motion , however, was not an attempt to attack his judgment of

sentence entered in the above

- captioned matter. Moreover, his claim was not
cognizable under the PCRA. Cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2) (listing claims
cognizable under the PCRA). H is motion was properly construed as a collateral

attack on PBPP’s order revoking his parole and imposing bac ktime because he

attacked PBPP’s application of section 6138(a)(2) in his case. Hence, the trial
court correctly concluded that the Commonwealth Court had exclusive
jurisdiction over Appellant’s claim. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 761 and 763; Moore

v. Roth , 331 A.2d 509, 510 ( Pa. Super. 1974) ; see also McGriff v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole , 809 A.2d 455, 458 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2002), aff'd , 838 A.2d 564 ( Pa. 2003) , citing Davis v. Pennsylvania Bd. of

Prob. & Parole , 398 A.2d 992 ( Pa. 1979) (“ Jurisdiction over complaints
sounding in mandamus against State agencies administering the parole
system, where the complaint is not a direct or collateral attack on theJ

- S21010

- 18

- 4

-

conviction or sentence, is vested exclusively in the Commonwealth Court .”).

As the tr ial court lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s motion, we need not
address Appellant’s second issue.

Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 7/3/2018