IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0103

Filed May 24, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL DEAN ROBERSON JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Henry W. Latham II, 

Judge.

Michael Roberson Jr. appeals his convictions for second-degree kidnapping 

while armed with a dangerous weapon and domestic abuse, third or subsequent 

offense, with an habitual offender status. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN 

PART, AND REMANDED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.

Michael Roberson Jr. appeals his convictions for second-degree kidnapping 

while armed with a dangerous weapon and domestic abuse assault, third or 

subsequent offense, with an habitual offender status. He challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support these convictions. We affirm in part, vacate 

in part, and remand to the district court for dismissal of the domestic abuse assault 

charge.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found the 

following: Michael Roberson Jr. and M.I. were involved in a relationship with a 

history of domestic violence precipitating the instant alleged kidnapping offense. 

By early 2021, Roberson had assaulted and caused injuries to M.I. on at least 

several occasions. 

On June 1 of that year, Roberson and M.I. were “out doinking around town” 

in downtown Davenport. Roberson was driving, and M.I. sat in the passenger seat. 

At some point, Roberson stopped to visit with an acquaintance for approximately 

ten minutes. Upon reentering the vehicle, Roberson became “upset” and 

“agitated,” accusing M.I. of performing oral sex on someone else during his tenminute absence from the vehicle. M.I. told Roberson the accusation was 

“ridiculous,” and she “tried to calm him down” with no success.

Instead of heading home as planned, Roberson drove past their apartment 

and “kept going” toward the outskirts of town. M.I. was “scared.” She asked 

Roberson “to pull over and let [her] out and he said no.” M.I. threatened to kick 

and scream if he did not let her out, to no avail. Roberson grabbed M.I.’s seatbelt 
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with his right hand to keep her “from getting out of the car,” while he used his left 

hand to steer and hold a knife to “intimidate” her. M.I. “didn’t want to get beat up,” 

and she “just wanted to get away.”

Eventually, Roberson turned down a dead-end country road, a fifteenminute drive past their apartment. When he stopped the car to turn around, M.I. 

“opened up the door and jumped out.” M.I. ran down the road to a farmhouse1;

she was “frightened,” “crying,” and “pounding on the door” “yelling that she had 

been stabbed.” The homeowners let M.I. in and called 911. M.I. was not wearing 

shoes, and she “had blood on her leg [from a stab wound] and blood on her toes” 

from a bite mark. Officers and medics arrived, and M.I. reported “she was 

assaulted” by Roberson. 

The State filed a trial information charging Roberson with second-degree 

kidnapping while armed with a dangerous weapon, assault while participating in a 

kidnapping, attempted burglary, and five counts of domestic abuse assault, third 

or subsequent offense. The case proceeded to trial. The jury found Roberson 

guilty on the second-degree kidnapping count and three of the domestic abuse 

assault counts,2 and not guilty on the remaining charges. Roberson appeals two 

of his convictions. 

1 As M.I. ran away, Roberson “turned around and left.”

2 Specifically, Roberson was found guilty on count 1 (second-degree kidnapping 

on June 1, 2021), count 3 (domestic abuse assault against M.I. on June 1, 2021), 

count 6 (domestic abuse assault against M.I. on May 7, 2021), and count 8

(domestic abuse assault against M.I. on January 24, 2021). 
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II. Standard of Review

We review the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law. 

See State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 2021). “Under this standard, the 

court is highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. We will affirm the jury’s verdict when 

the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Evidence is substantial if it 

may convince a rational person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. In making this determination, we view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the State. Id. 

The question is whether the evidence supports the finding the jury made, not 

whether it would support a different finding. Id.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Roberson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions for second-degree kidnapping while armed with a dangerous weapon 

and domestic abuse assault, third or subsequent offense, with an habitual offender 

status. With regard to Roberson’s domestic abuse conviction, which stems from 

an alleged assault on May 7, 2021, the State concedes “the evidence is insufficient 

to support conviction for any assault on [that count].”

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 Accordingly, we vacate 

Roberson’s conviction for domestic abuse assault on May 7, 2021, and we remand 

to the district court for dismissal of that charge with prejudice.

With regard to second-degree kidnapping, the jury was instructed the State 

had to prove the following elements:

1. On or about the 1st day of June, 2021, the defendant 

removed or confined [M.I].

3 This offense was charged under count 6 in the trial information.
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2. The defendant did so with the specific intent to inflict serious 

injury upon [M.I.] or to secretly confine [M.I].

3. The defendant knew he did not have the consent of [M.I.]

to do so.

4. The defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon at the 

time he removed or confined [M.I].

See Iowa Code §§ 710.1 (defining kidnapping), 710.3(1) (“Kidnapping . . . where 

the kidnapper is armed with a dangerous weapon . . . is kidnapping in the second 

degree.”), 902.7 (setting forth the dangerous-weapon sentencing enhancement).

On appeal, Roberson challenges the first element—that he removed or 

confined M.I. According to Roberson, “there was no showing” in this case that 

“any confinement or removal” of M.I. substantially increased the risk of harm to 

M.I., significantly lessened the risk of detection, or significantly facilitated his 

escape, as required by Iowa case law. See State v. Albright, 925

N.W.2d 144, 152–53 (Iowa 2019) (citing State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739, 745–46

(Iowa 1981)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 

194 (Iowa 2022). In other words, Roberson contends there was insufficient 

evidence to prove his confinement of M.I. “exceeded that which was incidental to 

the underlying offense.” See Rich, 305 N.W.2d at 742, 745; accord State v. Mead, 

318 N.W.2d 440, 442, 445 (Iowa 1982).

The jury was not fully instructed on the definition of confinement. The jury 

was instructed, “an intent to secretly confine means more than restricting the 

movement of [M.I]. It means an intent to conceal or hide [M.I.] or prevent her 

discovery.” But this instruction did not contain or require the jury to find the Rich 

“intensifiers” necessary to prove the confinement or removal element of 

kidnapping. See 305 N.W.2d at 745-46. Roberson failed to object to the 
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confinement instruction without the intensifiers or otherwise request such an 

instruction, so the jury instruction is the law of the case. See State v. Canal, 773 

N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009); accord State v. Denson, No. 22-0139, 2023 

WL 2906242, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2023). 

However, applying the Rich triparte test to the facts and circumstances of 

this case,4 we conclude the jury was presented with evidence that Roberson’s 

conduct substantially increased M.I.’s risk of harm and significantly lessened his 

risk of detection. See State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 740 (Iowa 1981)

(“[W]e are convinced that the confinement and removal here was such that it could 

not be considered merely incidental to the offense of sexual abuse. The victim 

was transported by automobile a distance several miles, from Davenport out into 

the countryside. This demonstrates the movement was calculated to detain her in 

isolation and secret, and was not only a means to facilitate the commission of 

sexual acts. Moreover, the asportation from the city to the country removed the 

victim to a more isolated area, thus decreasing the likelihood of any passersby 

coming upon the scene. The distance over which she was transported, along with 

the length of the detention (approximately two hours) further bolster our conclusion 

that the confinement and removal substantially increased the risk of harm to this 

victim.”); see also State v. Hardin, 359 N.W.2d 185, 187, 190 (Iowa 1984) 

(affirming kidnapping conviction where, after the victim drove the defendant home 

from a bar, the defendant “hit the victim in the face, dragged her out of the vehicle, 

and forced her inside where he raped her”); State v. Newman, 326 

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“The failure of the instructions to further elucidate what that term means does not 

prevent us from applying the correct law.” See Crawford, 974 N.W.2d at 521.
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N.W.2d 796, 801–02 (Iowa 1982) (concluding there was sufficient evidence of 

confinement when a student walking home from a friend’s house was enticed into 

the defendant’s truck, sexually assaulted, and then driven to a road where there 

were no houses).

Similarly, Roberson’s travel in the vehicle from downtown Davenport, past 

the turn to their apartment, and to a dead-end road near the countryside, on a dark 

night, provided the means to commit domestic assault in isolation and significantly 

lessened the risk of detection. Roberson’s actions also detained M.I. contrary to 

her demands. He refused to stop the vehicle and physically prevented M.I. from 

exiting the vehicle by holding onto M.I.’s seatbelt until he stopped due to the deadend road. Approximately two miles before M.I. was able to escape, Roberson put 

his knife in his hand. During M.I.’s effort to escape, Roberson stabbed her and bit 

her foot. The confinement in the vehicle and removal from beyond the center of 

the city substantially increased the risk of harm to M.I.

Considering the totality of the facts in the light most favorable to jury’s 

verdict, we find substantial evidence to support the second-degree kidnapping 

conviction.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.