Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JENNIFER GOODWIN SCHLEGELMILCH GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Hulse, Lacey, Hardacre & Austin, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana

Anderson, Indiana

CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

TONY LAMAR THOMPSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 48A05-1311-CR-546

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT III

The Honorable Thomas Newman Jr., Judge

Cause No. 48D03-1006-FA-248

June 12, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

SULLIVAN, Senior Judge 
2

Tony Lamar Thompson appeals from the trial court’s order revoking his probation, 

contending that the trial court’s decision was not supported by sufficient evidence, and that 

the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the entirety of his previously suspended 

sentence upon finding the violation. Concluding that there is no error here, we affirm the 

trial court’s decision. 

On June 9, 2010, the State charged Thompson with five counts of dealing in cocaine, 

each as a Class A felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Thompson pleaded guilty to five 

counts of dealing in cocaine, each as a Class B felony. On January 5, 2011, the trial court 

sentenced Thompson to concurrent terms of twenty years with six years executed and 

fourteen years suspended. The trial court ordered Thompson to serve a ten-year period of 

probation after his initial term of imprisonment.

Thompson was released from prison in early 2013 and was placed on six months of 

house arrest, which ended on July 29, 2013. The State filed a notice of violation of 

probation/suspended sentence on August 23, 2013. Jaclyn Allen testified during the final 

portion of the evidentiary hearings

1 held concerning the allegation. She testified that on 

August 18, 2013, she and her friends were gathered at her house that evening “chilling” 

and barbequing. Tr. p. 77. Thompson and two other men arrived in a green van at Jaclyn’s

house on that date and asked for Jaclyn’s cousin, Dustin, whose street name was “Gold 

Mouth.” Id. Sharika Allen, Jaclyn’s cousin and Dustin’s sister, was also present and saw 

that two of the men, including Thompson, were armed with guns. Id. at 33. Thompson 

 

1 Additional facts about the course of the evidentiary hearings will be supplied later. 
3

and the others asked for “Gold Mouth” to come outside, and when told that Dustin was not 

there, said that he, meaning Dustin, needed to “quit hiding behind bitches.” Id. 

When police approached Jaclyn’s house, the two men who had come with 

Thompson fled the scene. Thompson had returned to the green van where Daisy Fletcher

was waiting, and was observed trying to give the gun to Fletcher, who appeared to be 

reluctant to accept the gun from him. The exchange of the gun between the two was 

described as “like a hot potato.” Id. at 38. In the end, Thompson placed the gun in the van, 

and he and the woman started to walk away from the scene.

Anderson Police Officer Chris Hoyle was one of the officers who arrived at Jaclyn’s 

house. Jaclyn approached Officer Hoyle, told him that Thompson had placed a gun in the 

green van, and pointed toward Thompson, who continued to walk away from the scene. A 

subsequent inventory search of the van revealed the presence of a Llama .45 caliber gun 

behind the van’s front passenger seat. 

The evidentiary hearing concluded after testimony was heard on October 7, 2013, 

at which time the trial court found that Thompson had committed the alleged violations of 

his probation. The court then revoked Thompson’s previously-suspended sentence of 

fourteen years, ordering the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. 

Thompson now appeals.

Thompson claims that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he violated 

the conditions of his probation because there was insufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s conclusion. We begin with the premise that “[p]robation is a matter of grace left to 

trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 
4

878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). “[C]ourts in probation revocation hearings may consider 

any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability.” Cox v. State, 706 

N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999). It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the 

conditions of a defendant’s probation and to revoke probation if the conditions are violated. 

Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. In a sense, all probation requires “strict compliance” because 

probation is a matter of grace, and once the trial court extends this grace and sets its terms 

and conditions, the probationer is expected to comply with them strictly. Woods v. State, 

892 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ind. 2008). If the probationer fails to do so, then a violation has 

occurred. Id. But even in the face of a probation violation, the trial court may nonetheless 

exercise its discretion in deciding whether to revoke probation. Id. (citing Clark Cnty. 

Council v. Donahue, 873 N.E.2d 1038, 1039 (Ind. 2007) (“The probationary scheme is 

deliberately designed to give trial judges the flexibility to make quick, case-by-case 

determinations.”)). 

Violation determinations and sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. An 

abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d 

at 188. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing 

that evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses. Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639 (citing 

Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995)). If there is substantial evidence of 

probative value to support the trial court’s decision that a defendant has violated any terms 

of probation, the reviewing court will affirm its decision to revoke probation. Id. at 639–

40.
5

Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual 

determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Beeler v. State, 

959 N.E.2d 828, 829–30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Second, if a violation is found, then the trial 

court must determine the appropriate sanction for the violation. Id. A probation revocation 

hearing is civil in nature, and the State’s burden is to prove the alleged violations only by 

a preponderance of the evidence. Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ind. Ct. App.

2010). Violation of a single term or condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. 

Washington v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). When reviewing an 

appeal from the revocation of probation, the reviewing court considers only the evidence 

most favorable to the judgment, and does so without reweighing the evidence or 

reassessing the credibility of the witnesses. Piper v. State, 770 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2002).

The basis for the alleged probation violation was Thompson’s commission of 

another criminal offense, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a 

Class B felony. Because Thompson had been convicted, pursuant to the plea agreement, 

of multiple counts of dealing in cocaine, each as a Class B felony, his possession of a 

firearm was prohibited by statute. Ind. Code §35-47-4-5(b)(23) (2012). Although the trial 

court withheld the reading of the probation rules at the time of Thompson’s sentencing for 

his underlying convictions, and the written probation order containing the specific 

conditions of his sentence do not explicitly state as much, “[i]t is not necessary to advise a 

defendant to avoid committing an additional crime as a condition of probation because 

such a condition is automatically included by operation of law without specific provision 
6

to that effect.” Wilburn v. State, 671 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); see also Ind. 

Code §35-38-2-1(b)(23) (2012). 

Both Thompson and the State experienced difficulty in having their respective 

witnesses honor their subpoenas. At the initial setting of the evidentiary hearing, only one 

witness, Sharika, appeared to testify. While both Thompson and the State discussed having 

the hearing reset in order to secure the presence and testimony of their witnesses, the State 

proceeded with Sharika’s testimony in order to save her the trouble of reappearing at a later 

date. Sharika testified that she had seen Thompson with a handgun. After the completion 

of her testimony, the trial court continued the proceedings to afford Thompson and the 

State the opportunity to secure their witnesses’ presence.

On October 7, 2013, the State presented testimony of law enforcement officers 

involved in the investigation of the incident at Jaclyn’s house. It was then that Officer 

Hoyle testified about being approached by Jaclyn and informed about Thompson putting a 

handgun in the green van. Thompson responded by producing Daisy Fletcher’s testimony 

that Thompson was not armed that day and Thompson’s own testimony to the same effect. 

At the conclusion of that testimony, the trial court stated that the evidence did not establish 

by a preponderance of the evidence that Thompson possessed a handgun as alleged. During 

the trial court’s comments along this vein, Jaclyn appeared in the courtroom, at which time 

the State requested permission to have her testify. The trial court allowed her testimony, 

which included her statements that she had seen Thompson at her house on August 18, 

2013, and that he had a handgun, which she saw him place in the green van. Thompson 

availed himself of the opportunity to cross-examine Jaclyn, but never challenged her 
7

testimony described above. Instead, Thompson’s focus was on determining if Jaclyn or 

someone else had posted comments on her Facebook page. Thus, Jaclyn’s testimony was 

uncontradicted. The trial court stated after Jaclyn’s testimony, “I’m now convinced that 

he possess[ed] that handgun.” Tr. p. 85. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial 

court’s finding that Thompson violated the conditions of his probation by possessing a 

handgun.

Thompson also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the 

entire fourteen-year suspended sentence upon Thompson’s violation of the conditions of 

his probation. A trial court’s sentencing decisions for a probation violation are reviewable 

under an abuse of discretion standard. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. Our Supreme Court 

offered the following reasoning in support of that standard:

Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than 

incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to 

proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences 

were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to 

order probation to future defendants.

Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the 

logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. “As long as the proper procedures have 

been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing, ‘the trial court may order 

execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the 

evidence.’” Wilkerson v. State, 918 N.E.2d 458, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Goonen 

v. State, 705 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). 

The record before us shows that the trial court was familiar with Thompson’s 

criminal history, noting that at sentencing for a prior conviction Thompson was not ready 
8

to rehabilitate himself, but that Thompson might be capable of rehabilitating himself now. 

To that end, the trial court observed that although Thompson’s current offenses required 

the imposition of an executed sentence, if Thompson obtained his GED while serving that 

sentence, that term could be reduced. While announcing that a period of probation would 

be imposed as part of Thompson’s sentence, the trial court withheld reading the terms and 

conditions of probation, holding that task in abeyance until such time that Thompson’s 

behavior in the Department of Correction could be reviewed, and the appropriateness of 

Thompson’s candidacy for Drug Court could be evaluated. 

Thompson responded to those potential opportunities by committing the offense of 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon less than eight months into his 

ten-year probation period and days after the completion of his house arrest. He arrived at 

Jaclyn’s house in the company of Daisy Fletcher, a convicted felon. Thompson informed 

the trial court that while he was aware he was not to be in the company of convicted felons, 

he was with her anyway. Thompson further admitted to the trial court that he had taken a 

hydrocodone pill he had received from a friend and had received marijuana from that same 

friend. Thompson went to Jaclyn’s house with others, at least one of whom was armed,

for the purpose of confronting “Gold Mouth” for his alleged mistreatment of the mother of 

Thompson’s child. Thompson was angry and the scene could have escalated into more 

violent behavior save for the absence of “Gold Mouth” at Jaclyn’s house and the arrival of 

police. 

In reaching its probation sentencing decision, the trial court remarked that 

Thompson’s period of incarceration had not changed Thompson’s lifestyle upon his 
9

release. Also unpersuasive is Thompson’s argument that he remained on the premises after 

the police arrived. Jaclyn and Sharika each testified that after Thompson placed the gun in 

the green van, he and Daisy Fletcher began walking away. Thompson did not run away 

from the scene like his companions, but he did not remain at Jaclyn’s residence to await 

the arrival of the police officers. Rather, he was stopped by police officers after Jaclyn 

pointed toward him. 

Reviewing the evidence before the trial court, we cannot say that the trial court’s 

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. The trial 

court was within its discretion to impose the entirety of Thompson’s sentence upon finding 

that Thompson had violated the terms of his probation.

In sum, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

Thompson violated the terms of his probation by committing an additional offense. 

Further, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing its order that 

Thompson serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence.

Affirmed. 

FRIEDLANDER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.