Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 43(c) (2), Attorne y Gene ral Er ic H. * Holder, Jr. is automatically substitut ed for

former Attorney Gene ral Albe rto R. Gonzales and Secre tary of Homela

nd Security

J anet Na politano is automatically

substitut ed for

former Secre tary of Homela

nd Security

Michae l Chertoff a s responde nts in thi s case .

1 06 -34 32 -ag L anf er m an v . B oar d of

Im m ig ration A

ppea ls U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT

_______________________________ August Term, 2006 (Argued: May

30, 2007 Dec ided: August 5, 2009)

Docke t No. 06-3432-a g

_______________________________ RODERI CK L ANF ERMAN,

Petitioner,
v. BO ARD OF I MMI GRATI ON APPEAL S, EXECUTI VE OF FI CE FOR I MMI GRATI ON REVI EW, U.S. DEPAR TMENT OF J USTI CE, ERI C H. HOL DER, J R., BUREAU O F I MMI GRATI ON & CUSTOM ENFORCEMENT, a s succe ssor to the Immigration and Natura liz ation Service , DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURI TY, JANET NAPOL I TANO, *

Re sp on de nts
.

_________________________________________________ B e fo re : KEA RSE , ST RA UB , a nd POO L ER, Cir c uit

Judg e s.

_________________________________________________ Petitioner seeks re view of a decision of the B oard of

I mmigration Appeals (“ BIA”) , aff irming the decision of a

n I mmigration J udg e findingpetitioner re movable under Section 237(a) (2)( C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for havingcommitted a fire arm-r elated2

offe nse, to wit, menac ing in the se cond degree under Sec tion 120.14 of New Y ork Penal L aw. We r e je c t pe tit ion e r’ s argume nt t hat hi s p le a

of g uil ty to t he me na c ingc ha

rg e wa s o bta ine d in violation of his constitut ional rig hts, beca use it is a collater al attac k on his state court c onviction. Howeve r, bef

ore de cidingwhether

petitioner committed a re movable off ense, w e join another pa ne l of thi s c ourt , Jam e s v . M uk a se y , 5 22 F .3 d 2 50 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ), in r e mand ingto t he B I A t o deter mine whether

Section 120.14 of Ne w York Pena l L aw is divisible under the modified cate g orica l approa ch. Ac cording ly , we GRAN T the petition for re view, VACATE the orde r of the B I A, and REMAND to the ag ency for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion. J udg e Ke arse dissents in a separ ate opinion.

A DA M P A SKO FF , Paskoff & Tamber , L L P, New Yor k, N.Y., for Petitioner. P A U L N AMAN , Assistant United States Attorney , for Matthew D. Or wi g , U nit e d St ate s A tto rn e y fo r t he Ea ste rn

Di str ic t of

Te xas, B e a umo nt, T. X. , f

or Re sp on de nt.

_________________________________ PER CU RIAM : Petitioner Roderick L anfe rman, a native of Guy ana, se eks re view of a J une 22, 2006, decision of the B oard of

I mmigration Appeals (“ BIA”) , aff irming the Marc h 18, 2005, order of I mmigration J udg e (“ I J ”) Philip J . Montante, Jr., finding L anfe rman re movable under Section 237(a) (2)( C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“ I NA”) , 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (C), for h av in gc o mm itte d

a f ir e ar m- r e late d o f f e n s e . L an f

e r ma nma k e s tw o ar g u me n ts o na

p p e a l. We
re je c t th e fi rs t – t

hat hi s guil ty

ple a wa s o bta ine d in

vio latio n o f h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts – beca use it is a collater al attac k on his state conviction. Howe ver, a s to the second – that the g overnme nt has not established convic tion of a fire arm-r elated of fense by clea r and c onvincing3

evidenc e – we are bound by J ames v. Mukase y , 522 F.3d 250 ( 2d Cir. 2008), and ther efor e
rema nd to the BIA to decide the initial issue of whether Section 120.14 of Ne w York Pena l L aw is divisi ble under

the modified categ orica l approa ch. Ac cording ly , we grant the pe tition for revie w, vac ate the or der of the B I A, and r emand to the a g ency for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with this opi nion. BACK GR OUND L anfe rman a

rrived in the United States as a law ful perma nent re sident in 1990. On August 8, 1996, he was c onvicted in B ronx C riminal Court for the off ense of menac ing in the second de g ree in violation of Section 120.14 of New Y ork Penal L aw, a misdemeanor. T he
un de rl yingc omp la int

inc lud e s a

br ie f n arr ativ e de sc ri bin gthe e ve nts that le d to the c onvic tio n: i n the cour se of a

dispute with his wife, L anfe rman a lleg edly threatened he r with a loade d revolve r. L anfe rman wa s orig inally char g ed with seve ral fir ear m-related fe lonies in addition to t he
menac ing c ount, but the firea rm cha rg es we re later droppe d when L anfe rman, with the a ssistance of a L eg al Aid attorne y , pleade d g uilty to the menac ing c harg e. On Se pte mbe r 1 1, 20 01 , th e g ov e rnme nt c omm e nc e d r e mov a l pr oc e e din g s a g a ins t L anfe rman by

issuing a notice to appea r (“NTA” ). On Septembe r 26, 2002, the g overnme nt filed a super sedingNTA c harg ing L anfe rman with re movability under Sec tion 237(a)( 2)(C) of the I NA , 8 U. S.C. § 1 22 7( a )( 2) (C ), ba se d o n h is c onvic tio n f or me na c ing , whic h invo lve d a fi re arm . L anfe rman soug ht termination of re moval proce eding s and ca ncellation of r emoval under Section 240A(a ) of the I

NA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) . On May 29, 2003, the I J issued a dec ision denying L anfe rman’s motion to terminate a nd denying c ance llation of removal. L anfe rman a ppeale d that decision to the B I A, ar g uing that he pleade d g uilty to an offe nse under

Section 120.14 of Ne w4

York Pena l L aw, whic h has three subsections, and did not, as the I J found, plea d g uilty under Section 120.14(1) of

New Y ork Penal L aw, the only one of the three subsections that ref ers specific ally

to weapons, inc luding f

irea rms. On this gr ound, the B I A found that the I J ’s dec ision
wa s “ ina de qu ate fo r p ro pe r r e vie w” and re mand e d f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s. On Marc h 18, 2005, the I J issued a re vised dec ision reaf firminghis previous finding that L anfe rman wa s removable for ha ving c ommitt ed a f

irea rm offe nse. The I J explained that be c a us e Se c tio n 1 20 .1 4 o f N e w Y or k Pe na l L aw “ e nc omp a sse s a n o ff e ns e that c on sti tut e s a firea rm violation and offe nses that do not,” it is nece ssary to look to the recor d of convic tion – wh ic h in c lud e s th e c ri min a l c omp la int , p le a c oll oq uy , a nd c e rt if ic ate of dis po sit ion

– to deter mine whether

L anfe rman’s of

fense constitutes a fire arm violation under Sec tion 23 7( a )( 2) (C ) o f t

he I NA . T he I J obse rv e d th at th e state c omp la int c ha rg e s L anf e rm an w ith
menac ing in the se cond degree in violation of Section 120.14 of New Y ork Penal L aw, a nd specifie s that L anfe rman “ pulled out a Hopkins and Allen Armes Co. .32 s/w CAL . revolve r loa de d w ithfo ur

liv e ro un ds , a

nd po int e d th e re vo lve r at th e vic tim , p la c inghe r i n r e a so na ble fea r of phy sical injury , serious phy sical injury or death.” The I J also relied on the transcr ipt of th e p l eaco l l o quy , wh i ch i n cl u d es th e f o l l o wi n g: THE COURT: Do you admit on Aug ust 2, 1996, at approximately 12:10 a.m., y ou wer e at 654 Ea st 125th S tree t, County of the B ronx, S tate of N ew Yor k, and that y ou did c omm it the of

fe ns e of me na c ing , is that r ig ht? TH E D EF EN DA

NT : Y e s, Ma ’a

m. THE COURT: In that y ou did pull out a revolver a nd point the revolver

at the c omp la ina

nt, Ms. L anf

e rm an, and

me na c e he r w iththat w e a po n, is t hat r ig ht? TH E D EF EN DA

NT : Y e s, Ma ’a

m. Thus, the I J found L anfe rman “ remova ble as c harg ed under

[S ]ection 237(a)( 2)(C) by evidenc e that is clear , unequivoca l, and convincing .”5

On June 22 , 2 00 6, the B I A a ff ir me d th e I J’s d e te rm inatio n th at L anf e rm an w a s r e mov a

ble ba se d o n h is c onvic tio n f or a fi re arm of fe ns e . In r e a c hin gthi s c on c lus ion , th e B I A s pe c if ic a lly ref err ed to the fa ctual alleg ations in the criminal complaint and dire ctly quoted those portions of the plea c olloquy

relied on by

the I J . The B I A also upheld the I J ’s denial of canc ellation of
re mov a l. On J uly 21, 2006, L anfe rman pe titioned this court for revie w of the B IA dec ision. DI SCU SSIO N We ge nera lly

lack jurisdiction to revie w final orde rs of re moval based on a n alien’s conviction for c erta in crimes, includingfirea rm offe nses. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2)( C). Howeve r, we reta in jurisdiction to review “c onstitut ional claims or question of law ,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2)( D), includingwhether a par ticular c onviction constitutes a remova ble offe nse under the I NA, see Blake v. Gonzales, 481 F .3d 152, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2007). 1. The Guilty P lea On appe al, L anfe rman fir st argues that the a g ency err ed in re lying on his guilty plea, be c a us e that pl e a

wa s o bta ine d in

vio latio n o f c e rt a in c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts . T his “ c on te nti on is
no thi ngmor e tha

n a c oll ate ra l atta c k o n h is s tate c onvic tio n. Col late ra l atta c ks are no t ava ila ble in a . . . petition challeng ing the BIA’s re moval decision.” Abimbola v. Ashcrof t, 378 F.3d 173, 181 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Var g as v. De p’t of Homela nd Sec., 451 F .3d 1105, 1107 (10th Cir. 2006); Taylor v. United States, 396 F.3d 1322, 1330 ( 11th Cir. 2005); Mendes-Alc ara z v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 842, 844 n.14 ( 9th Cir. 2006); Drake s v. I NS, 330 F.3d 600, 606 (3d Cir.Col late ra l atta c k ma y be pe rm iss ibl e in r are c ir c ums tanc e s su c h a s w he re the re wa s a 1 failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Six th Amendment, as set f orth in Gideon v. Wainwrig ht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), see , e.g ., Drakes, 330 F .3d at 605, but no such er ror is alleg ed here
. That Section states: “A ny alien who at any

time after

admission is convicted under a ny 2 l aw o f p urc h as i n g, s el l i n g, o ff er i n g fo r s al e, ex ch an gi n g, u s i n g, o wn i n g, p o s s es s i n g, o r c arry i n g, or of attempting or c onspiring to pur chase , sell, offe r for sale, e x chang e, use, own, possess, or c arr y , a ny we a po n, pa rt , o r a c c e sso ry

wh ic h is a

fi re arm or de str uc tiv e de vic e (a s d e fi ne d in section 921(a ) of Title 18) in violation of a ny law is deporta

ble.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)( C). 6 20 03 ); Ma

ns oo ri v. I

NS, 32 F .3 d 1 02 0, 10 24 (7 th C ir . 1 99 4)
. Ac c or din g ly , L anf e rm an’ s f ir st 1
argume nt f

a ils
. 2 . C a t e g o r ic a l A na ly s is o f S e c t io n 1 2 0 . 1 4 o f N e w Y o r k P e na l L a w L anfe rman ne x t contends that the g overnme nt has not established convic tion of a fire arm offe nse by

clea r and c onvincingevidenc e. Pursuant to Section 237(a )(2) (C) of the INA, noncitizens who commit certain fire arm off enses a re de portable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (C). 2 Be cause the B I A is responsible for administering the I

NA, we g rant de fer ence to the Boa rd’s int e rp re tatio n o f t

his re mov a l pr ov isi on

un de r C he vr on

U. S.A . Inc . v . N atur a l Re so ur c e s D e fe ns e Council, I nc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) . See Kuha li v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 20 01 ). Thus , w e have sp e c if ic a lly up he ld a s r e a so na

ble the B I A’ s v ie w that Se c tio n 2 37 (a )( 2) (C ) “enc ompass[es] convictions of cr imes for whic h possessing or car rying f irea rms is an eleme nt.” I d. at 103. We owe no de fer ence , howeve r, “to the B oard in its interpre tation of criminal statutes that it does not administer.” I d. at 102. Ther efor e, we revie w de novo the B I A’s dete rmination “that an of

fense , as def

ined by a par ticular c riminal statute, falls within [ the] terms” of a r emoval provision of the I

NA. I d. In assessingan alien’ s removability , we have adopte d “a c ateg orica l approa ch that looksOur c ase la w provides that the “ rec ord of c onviction” includes “ a cha rg ing doc ument 3 (such a s an indictment), a sig ned plea ag ree ment, a ver dict or judg ment of convic tion, a rec ord of the sentenc e; a plea

colloquy transcr ipt, and jury

instructions,” Dulal-Whiteway , 501 F.3d at 129 (citing8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (3)( B) ), and doe s not include a Pre- SentencingReport or re stitut ion order , id. at 129-30. The Supre me Court’s re cent de cision in Nijhawan see ms to sugg est, in the context of determiningthe par ticular c ircumstance s in which a c rime wa s committed, that an imm ig ratio n ju dg e is p e rm itt e d to re vie w a br oa de r r ang e of

do c ume nts a s lo nga s a

n a lie n is g iven a “ fair oppor

tunity ” to dispute the per

tinent claim, and as longas the “ clea r and convincing ” standa

rd is met. 129 S. Ct . at 2303. The statute at issue here , by contra st, describe s a g ener ic cr ime, and does not re quire the “ particula r circ umstances” analy sis. See infra note 9. This issue in this case involves the divisibil ity of a statute. T he Supreme Court has explained that the documents that may be conside red unde r the divisibilit y analy sis serve a

“ver y differ ent purpose,” Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2303, from those that may be conside red f

or Nijhawa

n’s “par ticular c ircumstance s” ana ly sis, see id. at 2302-03. Nijhaw an does not c hang e the list of documents that may

be conside red in the divisibility analy sis, and we do not extend it to such a c on te xt. 7 to the elements of the offe nse as de fined by statute, rathe r than to the pa rticular f acts of the alien’s c riminal activity .” I d. at 103; see D ulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of H omeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 124- 27 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussingdevelopment of cate g orica l approa ch), a

brog ated on oth e r gro un ds by

Ni jha wa n v . H old e r, 12 9 S. Ct. 22 94 , 2 29 8 ( 20 09 ). In s ome ins tanc e s, howeve r, a statute ma

y be subjec t to what we have ter med the “modifie d cate g orica l approa ch,” which allows for

limit ed re view of the rec ord. See, e .g ., Dulal-Whiteway , 501 F.3d at 122. The mod if ie d c ate g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h c a lls fo r a

tw o- ste p in qu ir

y : “ fi rs t, w e de te rm ine if

the statut e is ‘d ivi sib le ,’ su c h th at so me c ate g or ie s o f p ro sc ri be d c on du c t r e nd e r a n a lie n r e mov a

ble and so me do not; second, we consult the rec ord of c onviction to ascer tain the categ ory

of conduc t of which the alien wa s convicted.” I d. at 126. When we re view the r ecor d of convic tion, “the [modi fied] 3
c ate g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h p e rm its inq

uir y int o th e fa c t of

c onvic tio n o f a

sp e c if ic of fe ns e but pr oh ibi ts ref ere nce to or

examination of the particular fac tual circ umstances unde rlying that conviction.”I t se e ms c e rt a in t hat th e omi ssi on

of the wo rd “ mod if ie d” is a n o ve rs ig ht s inc e thi s 4 statement in the opinion is made followingthe Court’s deter mination that the statute at issue was divisibl e under

the modified categ orica l approa ch and in discussingrevie w of the “ rec ord of conviction,” r efe renc e to which is only permitted under

the modified categ orica l approa ch. New Y ork Penal Code § 120.15, whic h criminalizes the crime of menac ing in the third 5 deg ree provides: “A pe rson is g uilty of mena cingin the third deg ree when, by phy sical mena ce, he or she intentionally

place s or attempts to place another person in fe ar of

death, imminent serious phy sical injury

or phy sical injury .” 8 Dickson v. Ashcr oft, 346 F.3d 44, 52 ( 2d Cir. 2003); see a lso Alsol v. Mukasey , 548 F.3d 207, 4 216 n.8 (2d Cir. 2008) (“ [E] ven under the modified categ orica l approa ch, the f ocus re mains on the ac tual offe nse of c onviction.”). In g iving his plea , L anfe rman stated only that he wa s pleadingg uilty to a violation of Se c tio n 1 20 .1 4 o f N e w Y or k Pe na l L aw. Th at Se c tio n s tate s: A per son is guilty

of mena cingin the second de g ree when: 1. He or sh e int e nti on a lly

pla c e s o r a

tte mpt s to pla c e ano the r p e rs on in r e a so na

ble fe ar o f p hy sic a l in

jur y , s e ri ou s p hy sic a l in

jur y or de ath b y dis pla yinga de a dly wea pon, dang erous instrument or what appe ars to be a pistol, revolver, rif

le, shotgun, ma chine gun or other f irea rm; or 2. He or she re peate dly

follows a per son or eng ag es in a c ourse of conduct or repe atedly

commits acts over a

period of time intentionally placingor attempting to place a nother pe rson in rea sonable fe ar of phy sical injury , serious phy sical injury or death; or 3. He or she commits the crime of menac ing in the third de g ree in violation of that part of a duly serve d order

of protec tion, or such orde r which the defe ndant has actua l knowledg e of be cause he or she was pre sent in court whe n such orde r wa s issued, pursuant to ar

ticle eig ht of the family

court a ct, sec tion 530.12 of the criminal proc edure law, or a n order of protec tion issued by

a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction in another state, ter ritorial or tribal jurisdiction, which dire cted the re sp on de nt o r d e fe nd ant t o s tay awa y fr om t he pe rs on or pe rs on s o n who se be ha lf the orde r wa s issued. [5] N.Y. Penal L aw § 120.14. As L anfe rman did not specif y the subsection to which he wasL anfe rman a rgues that the c omplaint revea ls a violation of subsection (3), be cause the 6 narr ative portion of that doc ument indicates that L anfe rman ha d violated a pr otective or der. Ho we v er , al th o u ghth e c o mp l ai n td o es i n cl u d e t h atfa ctu al al l ega t i o n , i td o es n o tch ar ge L anfe rman with a violation of subsec tion (3) or re cite the e lements of that provision. 9 pleading , and Section 120.14 (a nd indeed its three subsections) “e ncompass[] both acts that do and do not [constitut e a r emovable of fense ],” Michel v. I

NS, 206 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted), we next ask whether Sec tion 120.14 is subj ect to the modified
c ate g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h s uc h th at w e may loo k to the re c or d o f c onvic tio n. To do so we mus t f ir st
asce rtain whe ther Sec tion 120.14 is di visible. I f it is, then L anfe rman is re movable bec ause the complaint expli citly

char g es him under “ P.L . 120.14(1)” and re cites the e lements of subsec tion (1 ), a lle g ing“ that th e de fe nd ant d id:
. . . inte nti on a lly pla c e or atte mpt to p la c e ano the r p e rs on

in
re a so na ble fe ar o f p hy sic a l in

jur y , s e ri ou s p hy sic a l in

jur y or de ath b y dis pla yinga de a dly
wea pon, dang erous instrument or what appe ars to be a pistol, revolver, rif

le, shotg un, machine g un or oth e r f ir e arm .” An d, the ple a

c oll oq uy re ve a ls t hat L anf e rm an u se d a

re vo lve r i n 6 committing the off

ense. We “have expli citly

found statutes divisible only wher e the r emovable a

nd
no n- re mov a

ble of fe ns e s th e y

de sc ri be are lis te d in

dif fe re nt s ub se c tio ns or

c omp ri se dis c re te elements of a

disjunctive list of proscribed c onduct.” Dula l-Whit ewa y , 501 F.3d at 126. Neve rtheless, we rec ently made c lear

that the exact par ameter s of the divisibili ty inquiry have not been de termined, notingthat we ha ve neve r “e x plicitly

querie d whether

[di visibil ity ] ex tends to a statute . . . wher e only

one ty pe of g ener ic conduc t . . . is proscribed, but an a lien can c ommit t he conduct both in way s that would rende r him removable . . . and in way s that would not . . . .” I d. at 127; see a lso J ames, 522 F .3d at 255 (notingopen question); Ge rtsenshtey n v. U.S. Dep’t of10

J ustice, 544 F .3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (same). In Dulal-Whiteway , we outlined the thre e appr oache s that our Circuit might adopt, stating that w e might p e rm it d ivi sib ili ty : (1) whe re the alternative means of c ommitt ing a violation are e numerated as discrete alternatives, either by use of disjunctives or subse ctions, see 501 F .3d at 12 6- 27 ; (2) whe re e ither the a

bove appr oach pe rmits divis ibilit y or the statute of conviction or re movability provision “‘invite[s] inquiry into the fac ts underlying the conviction at issue,’ ” whe n, for e x ample, “‘ it ex presse s such a spe cificity of fac t that it almostbeg s an adjudica tor to examine the fac ts at issue,’” id. at 127- 28 (quoting Singh v. Ashc roft, 383 F .3d 144, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2004)) ; and (3) in “a ll statutes of conviction . . . reg ardle ss of their structur e, so longas they contain an e lement or e lements that could be satisfied either by removable or nonremova ble conduc t,” id. at 128. Fa ced w ith this same question in J ames, “we deem[ed] it the wis er and more prudent course to give the B I A a n op po rt un ity to c on sid e r, in t

he fi rs t in sta

nc e and in l ig ht o f o ur

re c e nt p ro no un c e me nts on this iss ue” when statutes are divisibl e. 522 F.3d at 256; see also Ge rtsenshtey n, 544 U.S. at 148 (re manding for deter

mination of divisibi lity). L ike the J ames panel, we rema nd to the BI A, b ut
c o m m e n tb r i e f

l y o nth e an a l ys i s o f

L an f e r m an ’ s r e m o v a

b i l i ty un d e r

e a c ha p p r o a c ht o d i v i s i b i l i ty. Th e fi rs t a pp ro a c h o utl ine d in

Du la l- Whit e wa

y wo uld re qu ir e tha

t Sec tio n 1 20 .1 4 e xplic itl y ref ere nce a class of wea p o n s that are cate g orica lly firea rms in order to be deeme d divisibl e. See,
e .g ., Va rg a s- Sarm ie nto , 4 48 F .3 d at 16 7 ( “ A c ri min a l st atut e is ‘ div isi ble ’ i f i t e nc omp a sse s mu lti ple cate g ories of offe nse conduct, some, but not all, of which would categ orica lly constitute ag g ravated felonies unde r the I

NA.” ( emphasis adde d)). Un d er this appr oach, L anfe rman c annot be f ound
re mov a ble be c a us e no ne of

the thr e e su

bs e c tio ns of

Se c tio n 1 20 .1 4 cat eg or ic a lly c on sti tut e s a firea rm offe nse under

Section 237(a) (2)( C) of the I NA. Subsections (2) a

nd (3 ) d o n ot describeNe w Y or k la w p ro vid e s th at th e “ ide nti ty” of a “ da ng e ro us ins tr

ume nt, ” or

a “ de a dly 7 wea pon” is not an ele ment of Section 120.14(1) . See People v. Ka id, 842 N.Y.S.2d 55, 60 (App. Div. 2d Dep’ t 2007) (conc luding that c ounts not dupli citous even thoug h more than one dang erous instrument alleg edly used by defe ndants bec ause the identity of a da ng erous instrument is not an element of e ither assa ult in the second degree pursuant to N.Y. Pena l L aw § 12 0. 05 (2 ) a

nd me na c ingin t

he se c on d d e g re e purs ua

nt t o N .Y . Pe na l L aw § 12 0. 14 (1 )) ; se e a lso People v. B artkow, 96 N .Y.2d 770, 772 (2001) ( “Mena cingsimply require s an intent to place another person in ‘r easona

ble fe ar of

phy sical injury ’ by

‘displaying’ a we apon or da ng erous instrument” (e mphasis omitt ed; quoting N .Y. Penal L aw § 120.14( 1)). Thus the de adly wea pon us e d in vio latio n o f S e c tio n 1 20 .1 4( 1) c ou ld b e a fi re arm , b ut t

he e le me nt i tse lf

is n ot l imi te d to fi re arm s. Of the thre e appr oache s, we note that this finds t he lea st support in our prec edent 8 beca use it does damag e to the notion of fixed categ ories, which our prior ca ses have embra ced. In many instances, it would per

mit the ex ception, the modified c ateg orica l approa ch, to er ase the rule, the c ateg orica l approa ch. 11 offe nses that categ orica lly involve firea

rms. Nor does subsection (1), which is itself divisible. See Canada v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 560, 567 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (notingthat enumer ated subsec tions are not a p re re qu i s i t e t o a f

i n d i n g o f d i v i s i b i l i ty

). T hu s , S ec t i o n 1 2 0
. 1 4 (1 ) p un i s h es th re e t y p es o f m en ac i n g: (i) with a “ deadly

wea pon,” (ii) with a “ dan g erous instrument,” a nd (iii) with “what a

ppear s to be
a p i s t o l , r e v o l v e r , r i f

l e , s h o t g un , m a c h i n e g uno r o th e r f i r e a r m . ” N
. Y
. P e n a l Law§ 1 2 0
. 1 4 ( 1 )
. In this reg ard, w e note that the B I A incorr ectly descr ibed a f

irea rm as an “e lement” of

subsection (1) of Section 120.14. None of the three cate g ories in subsection (1) can sustain a deporta bility finding 7 since e ach “ encompa sses both a cts that do and do not [constitut e a f irea rm offe nse].” Michel, 206 F.3d at 263. The sec ond approa ch desc ribed in Dulal-Whiteway , would permit divisibi lity in “all statutes of conviction
. . . reg ardle ss of t heir structure, so long as they contain an element or elements that
c ou ld b e satis fi e d e ith e r b y re mov a ble or no n- re mova

ble c on du c t.” 50 1 F .3 d at 12 8. Un de r t his 8 approa ch, Section 120.14(1) , which the c ri m i n al co mplaint denotes as the a pplicable subsec tion,Nijhawan, r ece ntly handed down by

the Supreme Court, doe s not require that we a dopt 9 any of the thre e appr oache s outlined in Dulal-Whit ewa y . Nijhawan involved the deportation of an alien f or commission of an ag g ravated fe lony . The I NA def ines an a g g ravated fe lony as inter alia, a f raud or dece it crime “in whic h the loss to the victim . . . ex cee ds $10,000.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43)( M)(i). Nijhaw an wa s convicted of conspirac y

to commit mail fraud and other crimes. Althoug h the jury made no f

indings a s to the loss amount, Nijhawan had stipulated at sentenc ing that the loss amount ex cee ded $100 million. S ee N ijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2298. Nijhawan a

rgued that, under

a categ orica l approa ch, ther e should be no inquiry into the particular circ umstances of

his crime and the ref

ore, be cause a loss amount was not an e lement of the c rimes he wa s convicted of

, he did not commit an ag g ravated fe lony and could not be r emoved. The Supreme Court re

jected this ar g ument, holding instea d that the loss amount “does not re fer to an element of

the fra ud or dec eit crime. Rathe r it ref ers to the pa

rticular c ircumstance s in which an offe nder c ommitt ed a ( more broa dly define d) fr aud or de ceit cr ime on a par ticular oc casion.” I d. Thus , whil e the Court

re je c te d th e c ate g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h o n th e fa c ts o f N ijh awa n, it d id n ot c a st doubt on the validity

of the a pproac h as a g ener al matter. See id. at 2298-99 (statingthat if the re mov a l st atut e re fe rr e d to a “ g e ne ri c c ri me ,” the statut e de fi nin gthe c ri min a l of fe nc e wo uld ne e d to have “ an a

pp ro pr iate mon e tary

thr e sh old ,” fo r N ijh awa

n to be re mov a

ble ). In c on tr a st, we ha ve alr eady

held that the statute he re, Sec tion 237(a)( 2)(C), f alls on the “g ener ic cr ime” side of the e quation, see K

uhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 103 ( 2001) (“ [I ]i n deter mining whe ther 12 would be divisible bec au s e a “dea dly wea pon” may or may not be a f

irea rm. Be cause the plea colloquy established that the “ deadl y we ap o n ” at issue wa s a fire arm, L anfe rman would be
remova ble. Th e thi rd a

pp ro a c h, de sc ri be d in

Du la l- Whit e wa

y wo uld pe rm it d ivi sib ili ty

wh e re the statut e of convic t i o n is phrased in the disjunctive or divided into subsections, or wher e the immigr ation statute invites inquiry

into the fac ts underlying the conviction at issue. See Singh, 383 F .3d at 148. The Third Circ uit, the proge nitor of t his approa ch, concluded that a statute invites such inquiry when “it expresses such a

specific ity

of fa ct that it almost beg s an adjudicator t o examine the fac ts at issue.” I d. at 161. Section 237(a )(2) (C) conta ins lang uag e that ca n be read both as invit ing a nd not inviting such inquiry beca use it c ontains terms of spec ificity but also unitary

conce pts. As we do not
ne e d to at th is j un c tur e , w e do no t de c ide wh e the r S e c tio n 2 37 (a )(2) (C ) m e e ts Si ng h’ s sp e c if ic ity require ments, but rather

think it m ore a dvisable to awa it the BIA’s dete rmination on remand. 9‘possessing ’ or ‘ car rying’ firea

rms is an eleme nt of these other crimes, the pla in lang uag e of I NA § 237(a) (2)( C) supports the adoption of a c ateg orica l approa ch that looks to the eleme nts of the offe nse as de fined by

statute, rathe r than to the pa rticular f acts of the alien’s c riminal activity .”), and fur ther, Sec tion 237(a)( 2)(C), unlike the statute in Nijhawan, doe s not contain words such a s “in which” that would modify the offe nse so as to indicate that the statute’s re fer ence to a fire arm i s ci rc u m s t an ce -s p ec i fi c, s ee Ni j h aw an , 1 2 9 S
. C t
. at2 3 0 1
. Ins u m , Ni j h aw an d o es n o tch an ge the conc lusion that S ection 237(a )(2) (C) re fer s to a crime unde r which L anfe rman “ is convicted under [a] law,” a

nd acc ording ly

is subject to the cate g orica l approa ch. I d. at 2298. Nor doe s the languag e in Nijhawa n to which the dissent cites a lter our a naly sis. See Dissent Op. at 4 . That languag e is dictum, see Nijhaw an, 129 S. Ct. at 2297 (“The question befor e us is whether

the italicized lang uag e re fer s to an eleme nt of the fr aud or de ceit ‘of fense ’ as set forth in the pa

rticular f raud or dece it statute definingthe offe nse of whic h the alien wa s previously

convicted.” ), and the Supreme Court did not pass on the question that is at the hea rt of thi s c a se – whe n c an a

statut e , whic h is su

bje c t to the c ate g or ic a l a

pp ro a c h, be de e me d d ivi sib le under the modified categ orica l approa ch. 13 CO NC LU SION In view of James, we r emand to the BIA t o al l o w it to consider in the first instance the qu e sti on of the div isi bil ity of Se c tio n 120 .1 4 in light o f t he le g a l f ra me wo rk e sta bli sh e d b y

our c a se s. For the fore g oing r easons, the pe tition for review is G RANTED, the order of re moval is VACATED, and the c ase is REMANDED to the BIA for pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s decision.