The Honor able Amul R . Thapa r, United States District Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0599n.06 No. 07-5825 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. DONALD R. WILSON, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE M ID DL E D ISTRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEFORE: CLAY and S UTTON, Circuit Judges; and THAPA R, Distric t Judge. * CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Def endant Dona ld R. W ilson appeals fr om a judg ment enter ed fo llo wi ng a jur

y tr ia l convic tin g him of on e c ount o f d e pr ivi nginm a te Joshu a Rob e rs on of his Ei g hth Amendment rig hts, resulting in bodily injury , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. On appea l, Wi lson argues that the district cour t erre d in denying his motion for a cquittal under Rule 29 of the F eder al Rul e s o f C ri min a l Pr oc e dure be c a us e the g ov e rnme nt pr e se nte d ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e fo r the jur y to find that Roberson sustained bodily injury . I n addition, Wi lson challeng es t he dis trict court’ s denial of his motion for sever ance , arguing that joinder was improper and that the f

ailure to seve r Wilson’s trial from that of his c o-def endant, Stanley C. H awkins, pre judiced his defe nse. F or the re asons set forth below, w e AF F IRM Wil son’s conviction and se ntence
. I. BACK GR OUNDUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

2 A. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound I n 2 00 2, Wils on

wa s a pp oin te d Jai l A dmi nis tr a tor and Chi e f o f Co rrect io ns of

the Whit e C o u n t y J a i l i nS p art a , T e n n e s s e e ( t h e “ J a i l ” )

. In t h a tp o s i t i o n , W i l s o nh a d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f

o r t h e d ayto-day operations of the J ail, as well as supervisory authority over the cor rec tions officer s working at t h e J ail. Wil son cre ated the position of cor rec tional serg eant to assist him in supervising the

corr ectional of

fice rs, and se lected H awkins for the position. On May 5, 2004, Roberson, an inmate at the J ail, was involved in an a ltercation with Officer Wel do n, a

nig ht- sh if

t c or re c tio ns of

fi c e r. Of fi c e r We ldo n te sti fi e d th a t Ro be rs on ha d r e fu se d to return to his ce ll at the conclusion of his re cre ation time and that, when Offic er Weldon informe d Roberson that h e h a d to r e tu r n to h is c e ll , Ro b e r s o n “ g o t ir a te
. . . an d c a me c h ar g in g up the stairca se” at Offic er W eldon. (Tr. Vol. I I at 208.) Roberson t hen “y elled” a nd “hit” Of

fice r Weldon and g rabbe d Offic er Weldon’s a rm, “try ing to pull [him ] down the stairs.” ( Tr. Vol. I Iat 209.) Af ter another office r arrived to assist Offic er W eldon, R oberson r eturne d to his cell. Offic er Weldon wa s not injured during the incident. The ne x t morning, a s part of the routine “pa ss down” fr om the night shift, night- shift office rs informed W ilson that Roberson had attacke d Offic er W eldon. Prior to May 6, 2004, Roberson wa s housed in one of the J ail’s isolation units, cell 139, which had a toilet, drain, and showe r inside of the cell. After

Wil son learne d of Roberson’ s attack, how ever , Wil son order ed Of fice r Weldon and

sever al other c orre ctions office rs to bring Roberson to the intake a rea of the Jail, place him in a straig htjacket, a

nd lock him in one of the intensive mana g ement or “ intake” c ells.United States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

3 Shortly afte r off icer s restra ined R oberson in the s traig htjacket in cell 107, R oberson ne eded to use the re stroom. Accor dingly , sever al officers r emoved Rober son from the stra ightjac ket and

e sc or te d h im t o th e re str oo m. Whe n Ro be rs on re tur ne d f ro m th e re str oo m, Wi lso n w a s p re se nt i n the intake are a, and “g estur[ed]” for Roberson to “ g et in [hi s] cell.” (Tr. V ol. VI Iat 70.) Rober son then threwhis breakf

ast tray on the floor and “g rabbe d [W ilson] and started hitting him” in the he ad. (Tr. V ol. VIat 141.) Eventually , sever al correc tions office rs restrained Rober son and helpe d Wil son

ou t of the c e ll. After office rs locked Robe rs o n

in h is c e ll , Wil son order ed Of fice r Ga rre tt to open Roberson’s cell door. W ilson then enter ed Roberson’ s cell and, a ccor ding to Of fice r Ga rre tt, “told [ Roberson] that he wa sn’t scar ed of him a nd that [R oberson was] g oing to f ucking pay” for

attackingWil son. (T r. Vo l. I I Ia t 21 .) Wils on a lso tol d Ro be rs on

tha t Ro be rs on

wo uld re ma in i n c e ll 1 07 “ un til he ll fre ezes over or

[R oberson] g [o] t out of jail.” ( Id. ) Af te r Wils on

le ft Rob e rs on ’s c e ll, Of

fi c e r F arr e ll

acc ompanied Wilson t o the hospital to rece ive medica l treatment for the cut on his ey e. Whil e at the hospital, Wilson tol d Offic er F arr ell to relay order s to the other cor

rec tions

o f f i c e r s t h a tR o b e r s o n b e k e p t i n c e l l 1 0 7 i n h i s b o x e r s h o rt s a n d a s t r a i g h t j a c k e t“ 2 3 h o u r s a

d ay” until W ilson said diff

ere ntly

. (Tr. V ol. VI Iat 76.) Wilson is sued similar order s when he returne d to the J ail later that day . For example, Office r Ga

rre tt tes t i fi ed that Wil son order ed cor rec tions of fi c e rs to k e e p Ro be rs on

“ in h is s kiv vie s in

the str a ig htj a c ke t” and

that “ [t]he on ly

tim e he wa s to be out of the stra ightjac ket was e ither whe n he show er ed o r wh en he ate or whe n he we nt to the bathroom.” ( Tr. Vol. I I Iat 47.) How ever , afte r “r ealiz[ ing]” that he could not ke ep Roberson in the str a ig htj a c ke t a ll d ay , Wil so n o rd e re d c or re c tio ns off

ice rs to ke e p h im i n th e str a ig htj a c ke t and toUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

Offic er D aniels t estified that Wil son specifie d initially that Roberson be in the stra ightjac ket 1 for f our hours, then out of the straig htjacket f or anothe r four

hours. Although on dir ect ex am i n at i o n Wil son denied that ther e wa s a shortag e of ma le offic ers 2 during any

of the shifts, he acknow ledg ed on cross-e x amination that he previously had told a local ne ws pa pe r r e po rt e r that he ha d sta ff ing pr ob le ms and , a s a re su lt, wa s una ble to s ta ff

his sh if ts w ith thr e e ma le of

fi c e rs . 4 re str a in h im whi le ou t of the str a ig htj a c ke t for e qu a l len g ths of tim e “ un til fu rt he r not ic e .” (T r. Vo l. 1 VI Iat 79.) Fur

ther, W ilson direc ted that Roberson be restra ined with handcuf fs and sha ckles during the time Roberson was not w ear ing the straig htjacket. Wil son also order ed that Roberson c ould not have a bla nk e t or a mattr e ss in his ce ll. I n ad dit ion , Wilso n’ s ord e rs re qu ir e d that thr e e ma le of fi c e rs , a t le a st o ne arm e d w itha

baton , b e pr e se nt whe n Robe rs on ’s c e ll wa s ope ne d. Wils on su bs e qu e ntl y po ste d a ha nd wr itt e n o rd e r d ir e c tin g c or re c tio ns of

fi c e rs to k e e p Wil so n in a str a ig htj a c ke t f ro m 6 p.m. to 6 a. m . an d re iteratingthe re quirement that thre e male of fice rs, at lea st one arme d with a baton, be pr esent to esc ort Roberson fr om his cell. At tr ia l, t he g ov e rnme nt e lic ite d s ub sta nti a l te sti mony

re g ard i n g t h e e f f e c t o f W i l s o n ’ s o r d e rs . Offic er Miller state d that there were not alway s three ma le offic ers wor king dur ing a

shift, which meant that Roberson w ould have to st ay in the cell throug hout the entire shift. Similarly , Offic er F e rr e ll t e sti fi e d th a t th e thr e e -m an rul e me ant Rob e rs on fr e qu e ntl y ha d to wa it l on g pe ri od s o f t ime to u se the bathr oo m, e a t, an d sho we r. B e c a us e the thr e e -m an rul e ma de it dif fi c ult fo r Jail s ta ff

to le t Ro be rs on

ou t of his c e ll d ur ingsh if ts, he of te n uri nate d o n h ims e lf

in h is c e ll. 2 Th e g overnm ent a lso pr e se nte d ev ide nc e re g ard ing the c on dit ion of Rob e rs on ’s c e ll. Ce ll 107 is located in the intake are a of the J ail, and g ener ally is used for sho rt -t er m co n fi nement ofUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

Th e re wa s exte ns ive te sti mony a bo ut the of

fi c e rs ’ tr a ini ng re g ard ing the us e of fo rc e a g a ins t 3 inmate s , in c lu d in g d e s c r ip ti o n s o f th e u s e o f

f o r c e . B e c a

u s e Wi ls o nd o e s n o t c h a ll e n g e the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence with respe ct t o willfulness or ot her elements of a § 242 violation, such testimony is not relevant to Wilson’s arg ument that the district court e rre d in denying his motion for jud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l. 5 violent inmates wh o re quire obser vation, or tempora

ry holding of

incoming pr isoners, but is not int e nd e d fo r lon g -t e rm se g re g a tio n. Ce ll 10 7 is a pp ro xima te ly six fe e t by e ig ht fe e t, wi th a sm all window, fluore scent lig ht, and conc rete bench. T he ce ll does not have a bathroom, sink, or shower

. Acc ording to the corr ections off icer s, the conc rete floors and vent cause d cell 107 to become c old. Se ve ra l w itn e sse s tes tif

ie d that, wh ile Rob e rs on wa s occ up ying the c e ll, the c e ll h a d a str on g sme ll of urine, f ece s, and body

odor. Correc tions off

icer s descr ibed the smell a s simil ar to “ the bottom of a septic ta nk” (Tr . Vol. I Iat 111; Tr. Vol. I I I at 173), a “pig sty ” (Tr. Vol. I I Iat 247), or a “sew er” (Tr. V ol. V at 104). At trial, corr ections off icer s testified that Roberson urinated and de fec ated on himself while in cell 107, and that his box ers were soiled with human waste. Wit nesses also stated that his straig htjacket wa s dirty an d smelled of body

odor, and that the straps we re staine d. Cor re c tio ns of

fi c e rs te sti fi e d th a t, a s a

re su lt o f h is c on dit ion s o f c on fi ne me nt, “ [Rob e rs on ] wa s ju st

so rt of lim p” and that he “ did

n’ t ha ve muc h li fe a t a ll. ” (T r. Vo l. I Ia t 11 6. ) R ob e rs on a lso “ be c a me pa le and thi n, ” “ wi thd

ra wn ” (T r. Vo l. Va t 105) , an d ap pe are d “ c on fu se d” and “ da zed ” (T r. Vo l. V-B at 66) while c onfined in ce ll 107. At trial, sever al cor

rec tions officer s stated that they expressed their c on ce rns reg arding Roberson’s c ell conditions to W ilson, informing Wilson that R oberson’ s conditions of confineme nt

wer e inhumane a

nd contra ry to Tennesse e Corre ction I nstitut e policies. No n etheless, W ilson 3United States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

After Hawkins learned of Roberson’s attack on Wil son, Hawkins re trieved a can of “Clear

4 Out,” a c hemical use d to subdue inmates in a riot situation, tossed the can into Roberson’ s cell, and stuffed a towel under

the door of the cell. Althoug h the intake area was evacuated due to the f umes from Clear -Out, Roberson r em ai n ed in his cell. Acc ording to severa l witnesses, Roberson wa s scre aming in pain. A witness also testified that he saw Ha wkins enter Robe rson’s ce ll after using Clear- Out and hit Rober son on his back with a baton. I t is these actions that for m the basis for the c ha rg e s a g a ins t H awk ins in c ount t wo of the ind ic tme nt. 6 expressed little interest in chang ing his order s and told the corr ections off icer s who had e x presse d

conce rn t hat R oberson would “just have to wait” when t here wer e not enoug h office rs to let him out of the c ell. (Tr. V ol. I I Iat 61-65.) Robe rson ultimately rema ined in cell 107 for

approximately

three

wee ks, after

which time he r eturne d to isolation cell 139. B. P roce dural Hi story On J une 5, 2006, a fede ral gra nd jury returne d a two-count indictment charg ing Wilson and Ha wk i n s wi t h s ep ar at e c o u n t s o f w i l l fu l l y d ep ri v i n g R o b er s o no f h i s co n s t i tu t i o n al ri gh t s in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 2 42 . Co un t on e c ha rg e d Wil so n w ithc on fi nin g Rob e rs on “ in c on dit ion s th a t w ill fu lly de pr ive d Josh

ua Rob e rs on

of the ri g ht .

. . to b e fr e e fr om c ru e l and un us ua l pu nis hme nt whil e in officia l custody

and dete ntion, resulting in bodily injury to J oshua R o b er s on.” (ROA 17.) Count t wo ch ar gedHa wk i n s wi t h v i o l at i n g 1 8 U. S

. C

. § 2 4 2 b y u s i n g “ach em i ca l age n t a n d b ea t [ i n g] Joshu a Rob e rs on

. . . a nd the re by wi llf ull y de pr iv[i ng ]” Rob e rs on of his Ei g hth Am e ndme nt r ig hts , “re sulting in bodily

injury . . . and including the use of a dang erous we apon.” (ROA 18.) 4 P ri o r t o t ri al , W i l s o nm o v edt o s ev er h i s t ri al fr o m t h at o f H a w k i n s . Fo l l o wi n g a h ea ri n g, the district court de nied the motion. At the close of the g overnme nt’s proof, Wilson’s counsel moved for a

judgme nt of ac quittal “based on the fac t of the complete posity [si c] of evidenc eUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

Counsel for Wilson st ated: “T hen I ’m g oing to move f or a se vera

nce.” (Tr. V ol. I X at 6.) 5 Ho we ve r, su

bs e qu e nt e xch ang e s b e tw e e n c ouns e l f or Wils on and th e c ourt

did no t ne c e ssa

ri ly understand he r to be moving for a sever ance : MS. CR I PPS : By

way of clarification, the C ourt stated a motion for se vera nce had neve r bee n filed by either defe ndant in this case , or something to that effe ct, and that’s not true. THE COURT: Was there a n ear ly sever ance motion? MS. CR I PPS : The re cord w ill reflec t that Defe ndant W il s o n d id f ile a motion fo r s e ve ra nc e , a nd that th e mot ion

wa s d e nie d. An d it

wa s a rgue d o n th e same date a s th e mot ion

fo r a bil l of pa rt ic ula rs , w hic h w a s g ra

nte d b y the Court in p art
. THE COURT: Thank you for co rre cting that. Howeve r the pe rson who’s squawkingabout this issue is Mr. Hawkins, and Mr. H awkins did not m o v e for a sever ance . M S

. C R IP P S : I u n d e r s t an d

. I w an t e d t o c l ar i f y. (ROA 16.) 7 respe cting bodily

injury .” (Tr . Vol. V-B at 71.) Counsel also ar g ued that ther e was no proof of willfulness. The dist rict court denied the motion for judg ment of ac quittal, concluding that, “taking the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t favo ra ble to t he pr os e c uti on [, a ] ratio na l juro r c ou ld f ind the e le me nts of bo dil y inj ur

y [an d] wi llf

uln e ss. ” (T r. Vo l. V -B a t 75 .) Af te r t he c los e of

a ll p ro of s, Wils on a g a in moved for a cquittal. The district cou rt d enied the motion, conc luding that the c ase should be submitt ed to the jury

. At the cha

rg e conf ere nce, both counsel for Hawkins and c ounsel for Wilson indicated that the y did no t wa nt an ins tr uc tio n on the le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e of de pr ivatio n o f r ig hts wi tho ut b od ily injury . Howeve r, in a be nch conf ere nce be fore the cour

t instructed the jury , Hawkins re quested that the cour t give the lesser- included-of fense instruction. At that time, counsel for Wil son moved for

a se ve ra nc e , w hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d. Th e jur

y fo un d Wils on

g uil ty of vio latin g 18 U. S.C. 5United States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

8 § 2 4 2 i na m an n e r t h a t r e s u l t e d i n b o d i l y i n j u r y, an d t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt

s e n t e n c e d

W i l s o nt o a

t h i rt ythr e e -m on th t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt. Wils on

fi le d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l. II. MOTION F OR SEVERANCE A. Stand ard of Review Th is C ourt

re vie ws a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of a moti on to s e ve r d e fe nd ants ’ t

ri a ls f or a bu se of discre tion. United States v. Cody , 498 F.3d 582, 586 ( 6th Cir. 2007). To establish an abuse of discretion, a defe ndant must make “‘ a strongshowing of pre judice.’” United States v. Hang Le- Thy Tran , 4 3 3 F. 3 d

4 7 2 , 4 7 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . G allo , 7 63 F .2 d 1 50 4, 15 25 (6 th Cir. 1985)). A de fenda

nt “must prove that joi nder would compromise a specific trial rig ht or preve nt the jury from making a reliable judgme nt a bout guilt or innocenc e.” Id. (q u o t i n g Zafir o v. United States , 50 6 U. S. 53 4, 53 9 (1 99 3) ). Whe re a de fe nd a nt f a ils to r e ne w a

mot ion to s e ve r at th e c los e of all the evidenc e, howeve r, this Court reviews the district cour t’s decision for

plain err or. United Sta te s v . W all s , 293 F.3d 959, 966 ( 6th Cir. 2002). B. Ana lys is I n the district court, Wilson filed a motion for sever ance pursuant to Rule 14(a) of the F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedure , as k i n g that Wil son be “trie d separ ate a nd apar t from . . . Haw kins.” The district cour

t denied Wilson’s mot ion. I n challeng ing this ruling on appea l, Wi lson argues that evidenc e introduced with r espec t to the pain cause d by Hawkins’ actions was “ improperly imputed” to Wi lson. Additionally , for the f irst time, Wil son contends that “the two de fenda nts should not have been joined tog ether to be g in w ith” beca use joinder wa s improper unde r Rule 8 of the F eder al Rules of Criminal Procedur e. (D ef.’ s Br . 29.) The g overnme nt contends that Wilson has waived his rightUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

9 to challeng e the joinder

of Wilson and Hawkins in the indictment under Rule 8 be cause Wil son

ne ve r m a de thi s argume nt i n th e dis tr ic t c ourt
. I n the district court, Wilson fil ed a m o t i o n for se vera nce “ pursuant to Rule 14(a) .” (ROA 44 .) Wils on

did no t ba se his mot ion for sev e ra nc e on the g ro un ds that th e ind ic tme nt i mpr op e rl y joined Wil son and Ha

wkins, and Wilson ’s m o t i o n never cited Rule 8(b) . As a re sult, W ilson has failed to pre serve his misj oinder a rg ument for a

ppea l

. “A Rule 14 seve ranc e motion does not prese rve a Rule 8 misjoi nder obje ction.” United States v. W einer , 988 F.2d 629, 634 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (finding the def

endant’ s misjoi nder a

rg ument waive d fo r fa ilure to raise the issue in the district

c ourt ); ac c or

d Ga llo , 7 6 3 F. 2 d

at 1 5 2 7 (f

ai l i n g t o “c l ai m a R

u l e 8 (b ) m i s

j o i n d er i nt h e p ro ce ed i n gs below” c onstitut es a “ fail[ure] to preserve th[ e] claim on appea l”). Wit h respe ct to Wil son’s sever ance motion, the g overnme nt argues that Wilson also failed to preser ve the issue of

sever ance by

failing to move for severa nce at the close of a ll proofs. “[A]

sever ance motion will be dee med waive d if it is n ot rene wed at the end of the evidenc e.” United Sta te s v . S wift , 809 F.2d 320, 323 ( 6th Cir. 1 9 8 7 ). Wil son’s counsel did not file a motion for

sever ance at the close of the e vidence

. I nstead, after counsel for Hawkins requested an instruction on the lesser

included off

ense of deprivation of constitutional rights without bodily injury , counsel fo r Wilso n sta te d that she wa s “g oin g to mov e fo r a se ve ra nc e ,” bu t pre se nte d no f

ur the r a rgume nt. (Tr. V ol. I X at 6.) L ikely beca use the c ourt did not understand he r to be moving for a sever ance , the district court neve r ruled on the motion. Reg ardle s s o f whether

Wil son proper ly

prese rved his ar g ument for a ppeal or plain err or revie w applies, se e W

all s , 293 F.3d at 966, the di strict court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ingUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

10 Wil s o n ’ s mo ti o nto s e v e r . “ A s a g e n e r a l r u le , p e r s o n s jo in tl y

in d ic te d s h o u ld b e tr ie d to g e th er beca use ‘ther e is almost alway s common evidenc e ag ainst the joined defe ndants that allows for the

ec o n o m y of a sing le trial.’” United States v. Lopez , 3 0 9 F

. 3 d 9 6 6 , 9 7 1 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 2 ) (quoting United States v. P h i bbs , 9 99 F .2 d 1 05 3, 10 67 (6 th C ir . 1 99 3) ); ac c or d Za fir o , 506 U.S. at 537 (“The re is a pr efe renc e in the fe dera l sy stem for joint trials o f d efendants who ar e indicted toge ther.” ). Nonethele ss, Rule 14(a) “ rec og nizes that joi nder, e ven whe n proper under Rule 8( b), may prejudice either a

defe ndant or the G overnme nt.” Zaf iro , 506 at 538. Rule 14(a) provides that “[i] f the joinder of

. . . defe ndants in an indictment . . . appe ars to pre judice a defe ndant or the g overnme nt, the court may order separ ate trials of counts, sever the de fenda nts’ trials, or provide a

ny other re lief that justice re quires.” F ed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). In interpre ting Rule 14, the Supre me Court has held that wh e n de fe nd ants pr op e rl y have be e n jo ine d und e r R ule 8( b) , a

dis tr ic t c ourt

sh ou ld g ra nt a se ve ra

nc e un de r R

ule 14 on ly

if the re is a se ri ou s r isk

that a joi nt t ri a l w ou ld compromise a spe cific trial rig ht of one of t he defenda nts, or pre vent the jury

from making a re liable judg ment about g uilt or innocence

. Zaf iro , 506 U.S. at 539. Wil son argues t h at t h e d istrict court er red in de nying the motion to s ever beca use “it wa s eff ectively impossibl e for the j ury to
. . . distinguish evidenc e conc erningthe diffe rent proof for e ach defe ndant re g arding. . . bodily injury and pain.” (De f.’s B r. 36.) While at t rial the g overnme nt might have attempted, as Wilson arg ues, to impute Hawkins’ use of Clear -Out to Wil son for p u r p o s e s o f p r o v i n g b o d i l y i n

j u r y, c o u n s e l o b

j e c t e d t o t h e f i r s ti n s t an c e o f

s u c h t e s t i m o n y. F o l l o w i n g t h e o b

j e c t i o n , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtg a v e ane x t e n s i v e c a u t i o n ar y i n s t r u c t i o nt o t h e j u r

y:United States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

11

Me mbe rs of

the jur y , M r. Wils on

and Mr . Hawki ns are c ha

rg e d s e pa ra te ly wi th d if fe re nt c ri me s. Th e y

are no t c ha

rg e d w ithpa

rt ic ipatin g in a

c on sp ir a c y

wi th on e ano the r. Th e y

are no t c ha

rg e d w itha idi ng and a

be tti ng e a c h o the r i n th e c ri me that is charg ed ag ainst the other one . They are not char g ed with i n any way car rying out the other pe rson’s cri me. . . . [Y] ou must separate the evide nce he re a nd find wh e the r M r. Wils on

is guil ty of wh a t he is c ha rg e d wi th

. . . a

nd /or Mr . H awk ins is g uilty of what he is char g ed with. And so Iwant to make t h at ver y clea r to y ou that the g overnme nt has not char g ed them with conspira cy or helping ea ch o t h er car ry out eac h other’s a lleg ed c r i m e . O k ay? Sometimes in a case it’s a lit t l e h arde r to kee p it separate than in others. I do n’ t th ink

thi s w ill be a

dif fi c ult ta sk

. . . . Mr . Wil so n is c ha

rg e d in Count O ne wi th one crime; Mr. Hawkins is c harg ed in Count Two with a nother crime. Mr. Haw kins is c ha rg e d w ithdo ingso me thi ng on on e pa rt ic ula r d ay . M r. Wils on

is c ha rg e d w ith a c ours e of c on du c t ov e r s e pa

ra te da y s. . . . A ll r ig ht. (Tr. V ol. I Iat 60-61.) Simi larly , in instructing the jur y afte r the close of evidenc e, the court emphasized to the jury that “[their] decision on one defe ndant, whethe r it is guilty or not g uilty , should not influence [their] decision on the other

defe ndant.” (ROA 271.) L ater in its i nstructions, the court a g ain re minded the jury that “ea ch def

endant is only

on trial for t h e p ar t i cu l ar c rime cha rg ed ag ainst him in t he I ndictment. Your job is limit ed to dec iding whe ther the g overnme nt ha s proved the crime c harg ed as to either de fenda

nt.” (ROA 296.) Consequent ly , the district court c lear ly instructed the jury

that it was to consider e ach defe ndant sepa

rate ly . The Supreme Court has noted that “limiting instructions . . . often will suffice to cure any

risk of pre

judice” that is present whe n defe ndants are tried tog ether

. Zaf iro , 506 U.S. at 539. I n light of this direc tion from the Supreme Court, w e have aff irmed the de nial of a motion for

severan ce wh er e “the tria l judge was ve ry car eful to instruct the jury on its duty

to consider

s e p ar a te ly th e e v id e n c e a g a in s t e a c h d e f e n d an t.” Un i ted States v. Lloyd , 1 0 F .3 d 1 19 7, 12 16 (6 thUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

12 Cir . 1 99 3) . M or e ov e r, “ [j]ur ie s are pr e sume d to be c a pa ble of fo llo wi ngins tr

uct io ns , like tho se g ive n in thi s c a se , r e g ard ingthe so rt ingof evi den c e and the se pa rate c on sid e ra

tio n o f m ult ipl e defe ndants.” W

all s , 293 F.3d at 966. I n this case, the jur

y ’s v erdicts with respect to Ha wkins and Wilson demonst rate that the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tions we re e ff

e c tiv e . T he jur

y fo un d th a t Wils on

de pr ive d Ro be rs on

of his constitutional rights, and that the deprivation resulted in bodily injury . I n contra st, although the jury fo un d H awk ins g uil ty

of de pr ivi ngRob e rson of

his c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts , it c on c lud e d th a t bo dil y inj ur y did no t re su lt fr om Ha

wk ins ’ ac tio ns . Th e dif

fe re nt ve rd ic ts de mon str a te that th e jur y c ou ld “compa rtmentalize and distinguish betwe en the e vidence ag ainst eac h defe ndant,” a nd there fore Wil son cannot show that prejudice resulted from the joint trial. Lloyd , 10 F. 3d a t 12 15 ; see Phibbs , 999 F.2d at 1067-68 (noting that, beca use the jury acquitted some defe ndants but not other s, the “jury was plainly

able to view [the multiple defe ndants] as di stinct individuals in rende ring its verdicts,” and ther e wa s no abuse of discretion in deny

ing the motion for severa

nce)

. We theref

ore c onclude that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing Wilson’s motion for sever ance . III. MOTION F OR ACQUITTAL A. Stand ard of Review Wil son next argues that the district cour t e rre d in de nying his motion for a cquittal on count

o n e, wh i ch charg ed him with violating Roberson’ s Eighth Ame ndment rig hts in viol ation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. “I n order

to appea l a jury ’s verdict on the basis of insuffic ient evidenc e, the de fenda nt must have moved for acquittal in the di strict court pursuant to Rule 29.” United States v. Mc Bride , 36 2 F .3 d 3 60 , 3 68 (6 th Cir

. 20 04 ). B e c a us e Wils on ma de su c h a mot ion a t the c los e of a ll p ro of s,United States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

13 we r eview the district court’s de cision to deny Wil son’s motion de novo

. United St ates v. Budd , 496 F .3 d 5 17 , 5 30 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7). I n re vie wi ngthe su ff ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e , th e re le va

nt i nq uir y is “‘w hether , afte r re viewing the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fac t could have found t he essential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt.’” Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Me yer , 3 59 F .2 d 8 20 , 8 26 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ); J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 307, 319 (1979). B. Ana lys is Th e re le va

nt p or tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 24 2 p ro vid e s: Who e ve r, un de r c olo r of any law, statut e , or din anc e , re g ulatio n, or c us tom , w ill fu lly subjects any

person in an y S t at e . . . to the deprivation of any rig hts, privilege s, or immunit ies secur ed or protec ted by the C onstitut ion or l aws of the United States . . . s ha ll b e fi ne d und e r t

his tit le or imp ri so ne d n ot m or e tha n o ne y e ar, or

bo th; and if bo dil y inj ur y re su lts fr om t

he a c ts c omm itt e d in

vio latio n o f t

his se c tio n . . . , s ha ll be fine d under this title or imprisoned not more than ten y ear s, or both . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 242. To convict W ilson on count one, the j ury had to find beyond a re asonable doubt that Wils on

a c te d “ (1) ‘wil lf

ull y ’ a nd (2 ) u nd e r c olo r o f l a

w ( 3) to d e pr ive a

pe rs on of ri g hts protec ted by

the Constitut ion or laws of the United States.” United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S. 259, 26 4 ( 19 97 ); se e Un ite d S

tates v . Co te , 544 F.3d 88, 98 (2d C ir. 2008). B eca use Wilson was charg ed with a fe lony offe nse under § 242, the j ury also had to find that Roberson suffe red bodily injury as

a re sult of the deprivation. See United States v. Perk ins , 470 F.3d 150, 153 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (“ To convict Perkins of a felony under § 242, the jury had to f ind that ( 1) Perkins deprive d Koonce of a rig ht secure d by

the Constitut ion or laws of the United States, in this ca se the F ourth Amendment rig ht to b e f

r e e f r o m t h e u s e o f u n r e a s o n a

b le f o r c e ; ( 2 ) Pe r

k in s a c te d

w il lf u ll y ; ( 3 ) Pe r

k in s acte dUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

“B odily injury ” is not an ele ment of the fir st crime describe d in 18 U.S.C. § 242. I nstead, 6 the eleme nt of bodily

injury relates to whether W i l s o n wa s gu ilty of a f elony , and thus could be sentenc ed for more than one y ear as a r esult of his conviction. See 18 U. S.C. § 2 42 (n oti ngthat “ if bodily injury results from the a cts committed in violation of this section,” the d efendant “sha ll be fi ne d und e r t

his tit le or imp ri so ne d not mor e tha n ten y e ars , or bot

h” ). As e xpla ine d b y

the Te nth Cir c uit : Se c tio n 2 42 make s “ it c ri min a l to a c t ( 1) ‘w ill fu lly ’ and (2 ) un de r c olo r of law ( 3) to deprive a person of rig hts pr otected by the Constit ution or laws of the U nited States.” I f these e lements are met, and if bodily injury (but not death) r esults from the willful deprivation of the constitution al ri ght, the defe ndant is subject to a sente ncing e nh anc e me nt o f u

p to te n y e ars . United States v. LaVallee , 439 F.3d 670, 687 (1 0 t h Cir. 2006). Wil son did not request that the dis tr ict cou rt g ive an in str uc tio n a s to the le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e of de pr ivatio n o f c ivi l r ig hts w i t h o u tb o d i l y i n

j ur y. 14 under c olor of law; a

nd (4) Koonc e suff

ere d bodily

injury as a r es u l t o f P erkins’s c onduct.”) On 6 appea l, Wi lson challeng es t he denial of hi s motion for acquittal solely on the g rounds that there was insufficient e vidence to show that Roberson suffe red “ bodily injury .” Section 242 does not define the term bodily injury . Howeve r, as se vera l other circ uits have

re c og nize d, the te rm

“ bo dil y inj ur y ” is “d e fi ne d ide nti c a lly in fo ur oth e r p ro vis ion s o f T itl e 18 ” a s: “(A ) a c ut, abra sion, bruise, burn, or di sfig ureme nt; (B ) phy sical pain; (C) ill ness; (D) impair ment

o f [ a/ t h e ] f u n c t i o no f

a b o d i l y m e mb e r , o r g an , o r m e n t a l f a c u l t y; o r ( E ) an y o t h e r

i n j u r y t o t h e b o dy,

no matter how temporary .” Perkins , 470 F.3d at 161 (noting that 18 U.S.C. §§ 831(f)(5) , 1365(g )(4) , 15 15 (a )( 5) , an d 186 4( d) (2 ) c on ta in i de nti c a l de fi nit ion s o f t he te rm “ bo dil y inj ur y ” ); ac c or

d United States v. Gonzales , 436 F.3d 560, 575 ( 5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bailey , 40 5 F .3 d 10 2, 11 1 ( 1s t Cir . 2 00 5) ; Un ite d S

tates v . M y e rs , 9 72 F .2d 15 66 , 15 72 (11t h Ci r. 19 92 ); cf. United States v. Di Sa nti s , 565 F. 3 d 3 54, 362 (7th Cir. 2009) (a pproving jury

instruction based on this definition). Consist ent wit h this definition, the di strict court inst ructe d the j ury that “bodily injury includes anyUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

15 injury to the body

including phy sical pain or a phy sical injury , such as a cut, ab rasion, bruise, fra cture or di sfig ureme nt. The inj ury need not be si g nificant, severe or permanent.” (Tr. Vol. IX at 41-42, 53.) Wilson does not disput e thi s definition of bodi ly injury

. I nstead, Wilson arg ues that the g ov e rnme nt f

a ile d to int

ro du c e e vid e nc e de mon str a tin g that Ro b e r s o n a c t u a l l y s u f f e r e d ph y sic a l pa in

o r i n j u r y. V ie w in g th e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d a t tr ia l in th e li g h t mo s t f a v o r a b le to th e g o v e r

n me nt, a

r a t i o n a l j u r o r

c o u l d f i n d t h a tR o b e r s o ns u f

f e r e d p h ys i c a l i n

j u r y or phy s i ca l p ai n, both of which qualify as “bodily

injury ” for

purposes of § 242. See Perkins , 4 70 F .3 d at 16 1. F ir st, Of fi c e r D e nn is te sti fi e d th a t Ro be rs on

ha d w e lts in h is g ro in a re a —n e ar whe re the str a ig htj a c ke t’ s st ra p w ou ld be —th a t lo ok e d li ke the y we re “ re d a

nd ra w” fr om “ ru

bb ing .” (T r. Vo l. V- B a t 65, 69. ) Wel ts i n the g roin are a would qualify as a “ phy sical injury ,” as the y are simil ar to a “cut, a brasion, or br

uise.” See P erkins , 470 F.3d at 161. Although Wilson does not contest t hat t he we lts would constitut e a phy sical i njury , Wil son argues t hat Officer Dennis’ testim ony did not establish the date that he sa w the welts, or whe n the injury occur red. He also maintains that there is insuff icient evidenc e that the straig htjacket c aused the welts. Howe ver, it i s clea r from Offic er Dennis’ t estimony that he esc orted Roberson fr om cell 107 during the three -we ek per iod in which Roberson wa s re s t ra i ned in the str a ig htj a c ke t. A t tr ia l, s e ve ra l w itn e sse s te sti fi e d that Ro be rs on wa s in a str a ig htj a c ke t at le a st twelve hour s per da

y for thre e we eks. The jury was entitled to inf er that Roberson was we aringthe straig htjacket in the da

y s befor e Of

fice r De nnis saw the welts on Roberson. The jury also could infer that the straig htjacket’ s g roin strap cause d the welts based on the long periods of time that Wilson order edR o b er s o nre s t ra i n edi nt h e s t ra i gh t j ac k et , R o b er s o n ’s l ac k

o f c l o t h i n g, an d

R o b erson’s soiledUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

16 box ers. Thus, while t here was no direc t testimony from R oberson that the stra ightjac ket ca used the welts, the g overnme nt presente d substantial evidence from which the jury could infer

that Wil son’s

or de rs c a us e d th e we lts , and the re fo re c a us e d ph y sic a l in

jur y fo r p ur po se s o f t he e le me nt o f “ bo dil y injury .” Moreove r , th e f

a c t t h a t o th e r w it n e s s e s te s ti f

ie d th a t t h e y d id n o t s e e an y

ma r k s o r b r u is es on Roberson’s body

g oes to the cr edibility

of t he various witnesses who testified at trial, not whether there was suff

icient evidenc e to support the jury ’s finding that Roberson sustained bodily injury as

a re sult of Wilson’s actions in de priving Roberson of his c onstitut ional rig hts. Fur ther, many

of the wi tne sse s w ho de nie d s e e ingbr uis e s o r m ark s o n Ro be rs on ’s bo dy wi tne sse d him sittin g in his c e ll rathe r than using the bathroom or showering as Officer Dennis di d. We theref ore c onclude that the g overnme nt pr esente d sufficie nt e vidence for a rational juror to find bey ond a re asonable doubt that Roberson suffe red phy sical injury —and ther efor e “bodily

injury ”—under

§ 242. W e a l s o c o n c l u d e t h a tt h e j u r y c o u l d h a v e f o u n d t h a tR o b e r s o ns u s t a i n e d

“ b o d i l y i n

j u r y” beca use he suf

fer ed “phy sical pain.” The g overnme nt identifies four a spects of Rober son’s confine ment that could s upport a finding of phy sical pain. First, the g overnme nt argues t hat Wils on

su ff e re d p a in i n th e fo rm of dis c omf or t wh ile wa iti ng fo r thr e e ma le of fi c e rs to b e pr e se nt t o ta

ke him to t he re str oo m. T he g ov e rnme nt a lso a sse rt s th a t Ro be rs on su ff e re d th e re late d p a in o f s ic kn e ss when he was e x posed to his own urine a nd fec es as a

result of not being escor

ted to the bathroom soon enoug h. Emphasizing the cold c onditions of the cell and the f act that Rober son sometimes went without food for

long pe riods of time, the g overnme nt argues t hat the jury could infer

that Roberson suffe red pa in from cold and hung er. Finally , the g overnme nt points t o the straig htjacketUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

17 as anothe r sourc e of pa in. Wi lson argues on appea l that “the gove rnment’s proof of ‘pain’ ca lled for the jury to speculate that Mr. Roberson suff ere d pain by

wea ring the straig htjacket,” and that the fa ct that Roberson wa s kept in a cold cell cannot e stablish that Roberson suffer ed phy sical pain. (D ef.’ s Br . 23-24.) Roberson did not testify

at trial re g ardingthe pain he f elt as a result of his conditi ons of

c on fi ne me nt. F ur

the r, c or re c tio ns of

fi c e rs a c kn ow le dg e d that Rob e rs on ne ve r c omp la ine d o f p a in to t he m. N on e the le ss, a

ra tio na l jury c ou ld c on c lud e that Ro be rs on su ff e re d p hy sic a l pa in a s a

re su lt of his conditions of confine ment. First, while Wil son argues that, in the absenc e of a ny testimony that wea ring a st raig htjacket is painful t he jury was force d to “spec ulate,” a j ury is permitted t o rea ch

re a so na ble c on c lus ion s b a se d o n th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d— the g ov e rnme nt wa s not re qu ir e d to c a ll Roberson to tes t i fy t h at he wa s, in fact, in pain. See G onzales , 436 F.3d at 575 (rely ing on the testimony of off icer s that the inmate was in pa in to conclude that the inmate suffe red bodily injury). Th e jur y he ard su bs tanti a l te sti mony

re g ard ingRob e rs on ’s c e ll c on dit ion s. Th e c e ll c on ta ine d o nly

a c on c re te be nc h, bu t Ro be rs on ha d n o b lank et or mat to sle e p o n. I n a dd iti on , Ro be rs on ’s c e ll smelled of urine, body odor, and f ece s and, at times, also conta ined urine a nd fec es. B eca

use Wilson

or de re d thre e ma le of

fi c e rs to e sc or

t Rob e rs on to the bathr oo m, Rob e rs on wa s fo rc e d to wa it to u se the bathroom due to a shortag e of ma le offic ers on c erta in shifts. Ba sed on this testimony , a re asonable juror could c onclude that Rober son suffer ed “phy sical pain” f rom wea ring a straig htjacket f

or twelve hours at a time for t hree wee ks, while forc ed to sleep

on a conc rete bench. Cf. United States v. Cunningham , 54 F.3d 295, 299 ( 7th Cir. 1995) (finding that “bodily

injury ” for

purposes of 18 U .S.C. § 1515(a)(5) —one of the four statutes c ontaining theUnited States v. W ilson No. 07-5825

18 definition of “bodily

injury ” relied on to define the term under § 242—“enc ompasses pra ctically any adver se impact on the vic t i m , including simple phy sical pain or a n extremely

transitory

injury ”). Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the evidenc e pre sented by the g overnme nt at trial was suff icient for

a rational juror t o find Wil son g uilty bey ond a reasonable doubt of ca using phy sical pain a

nd thus bodily injury for pur poses of 18 U.S.C . § 242. We theref ore a ffirm the district c ourt’s denia l of Wils on ’s mot ion

fo r j ud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l. IV . CO NC LU SION For the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM Wil son’s conviction and se ntence
.