39912 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 142 / Friday, July 24, 1998 / Notices

consolidated net utility plant, as

recorded on Applicant’s books of

account, and (2) should the

restructuring of Applicant not be

completed by July 19, 1999, this Order

shall become null and void, provided,

however, on application and for good

cause shown, such date may be

extended.

This Order is effective upon issuance.

IV

By August 19, 1998, any person

adversely affected by this Order may file

a request for a hearing with respect to

issuance of the Order. Any person

requesting a hearing shall set forth with

particularity how that interest is

adversely affected by this Order and

shall address the criteria set forth in 10

CFR 2.714(d).

If a hearing is to be held, the

Commission will issue an order

designating the time and place of the

hearing.

The issue to be considered at any

such hearing shall be whether this

Order should be sustained.

Any request for a hearing must be

filed with the Secretary of the

Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, Attention: Rulemakings and

Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered

to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15

p.m. Federal workdays, by the above

date. Copies should be also sent to the

Office of the General Counsel, and to the

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555,

and to Ms. Ellen Ahearn, Corporate

Secretary, Central Hudson Gas &

Electric Corporation, 284 South Avenue,

Poughkeepsie, NY 12601–4879.

For further details with respect to this

Order, see the application for approval

dated April 8, 1998, as resubmitted

under cover of a letter dated June 8,

1998, and supplemented by letters dated

April 22, June 8, and July 9, 1998,

which are available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

and at the local public document room

located at the Reference and Documents

Department, Penfield Library, State

University of New York, Oswego, New

York 13126.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day

of July, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–19803 Filed 7–23–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251]

Florida Power and Light Company

(Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4);

Exemption

I.

Florida Power and Light (the licensee)

is the holder of Facility Operating

License Nos. DPR–31 and DPR–41, for

the Turkey Point Plant (TPP), Units 3

and 4. The licenses provide, among

other things, that the licensee is subject

to all rules, and orders of the

Commission now or hereafter in effect.

This facility consists of two

pressurized water reactors located in

Dade County, Florida.

II.

Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.71

‘‘Maintenance of records, making of

reports’’, paragraph (e)(4) states, in part,

that ‘‘Subsequent revisions [to the

updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(FSAR)] must be filed annually or 6

months after each refueling outage

provided the interval between

successive updates [to the FSAR] does

not exceed 24 months.’’ The two units

at the TPP site share a common FSAR;

therefore, this rule requires the licensee

to update the same document annually

or within 6 months after each unit’s

refueling outage (approximately every 9

months).

III.

Section 50.12(a) of 10 CFR, ‘‘Specific

exemptions,’’ states that

The Commission may, upon application by

any interested person or upon its own

initiative, grant exemptions from the

requirements of the regulations of this part,

which are—(1) Authorized by law, will not

present an undue risk to the public health

and safety, and are consistent with the

common defense and security. (2) The

Commission will not consider granting an

exemption unless special circumstances are

present.

Section 50.12(a)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR states

that special circumstances are present

when ‘‘Application of the regulation in

the particular circumstances would not

serve the underlying purpose of the rule

or is not necessary to achieve the

underlying purpose of the rule * * *.’’

The licensee has proposed updating the

unified TPP FSAR 6 months after each

Unit 4 refueling outage. With the

current length of fuel cycles, FSAR

updates would be submitted

approximately every 24 months. The

underlying purpose of the rule was to

relieve licensees of the burden of filing

annual FSAR revisions while assuring

that such revisions are made at least

every 24 months. The Commission

reduced the burden, in part, by

permitting a licensee to submit its FSAR

revisions 6 months after refueling

outages for its facility, but did not

provide in the rule for multiple unit

facilities sharing a common FSAR.

Rather, the Commission stated that

‘‘With respect to * * * multiple

facilities sharing a common FSAR,

licensees will have maximum flexibility

for scheduling updates on a case-by-case

basis’’ 57 FR 39355 (1992).

The TPP units are on an 18-month

fuel cycle. As noted in the staff’s Safety

Evaluation, the licensee’s proposed

schedule for TPP FSAR updates will

ensure that the FSAR will be

maintained current for both units within

24 months of the last revision. The

proposed schedule satisfies the

maximum 24-months interval between

FSAR revisions specified by 10 CFR

50.71(e)(4). Revising the FSAR 6 months

after refueling outages for each unit,

therefore, is not necessary to achieve the

underlying purpose of the rule.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that special circumstances

are present as defined in 10 CFR

50.12(a)(2)(ii). The Commission has

further determined that, pursuant to 10

CFR 50.12, the exemption is authorized

by law, will not present an undue risk

to the public health and safety and is

consistent with the common defense

and security, and is otherwise in the

public interest. The Commission hereby

grants the licensee an exemption from

the requirement of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) to

submit updates to the TPP FSAR within

6 months of each unit’s refueling outage.

The licensee will be required to submit

updates to the TPP FSAR within 6

months after each Unit 4 refueling

outage, not to exceed 24 months

between subsequent revisions.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that

granting of this exemption will have no

significant effect on the quality of the

human environment (63 FR 36276).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day

of July 1998.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 142 / Friday, July 24, 1998 / Notices 39913

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–19802 Filed 7–23–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–397]

Washington Public Power Supply

System; Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration

Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

21, issued to Washington Public Power

Supply System (Supply System or the

licensee), for operation of the Nuclear

Project Number 2 (WNP–2) located in

Benton County, Washington.

This technical specification (TS)

change authorizes the licensee to

conduct TS Surveillance 3.8.4.8

(performance test) in lieu of TS

Surveillance 3.8.4.7 (service test) for the

WNP–2 Division 2 Class 1E 125 VDC

battery on a one-time basis. The change

to the TS is authorized until the licensee

can perform the sevice test during the

next scheduled refueling outage or

during the next unplanned outage of

sufficient duration. This amendment

has been requested in accordance with

the notice of enforcement discretion

granted to the licensee on July 17, 1998.

This amendment needs to be

processed on an exigent basis to

promptly bring the plant into literal

compliance with the technical

specifications due to an inadvertent

missed surveillance. Without this

amendment the licensee would be

required to shut down the plant and

create an unnecessary plant transient.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for

amendments to be granted under

exigent circumstances, the NRC staff

must determine that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards

consideration. Under the Commission’s

regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means

that operation of the facility in

accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve

a significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated.

The safety function of the Battery E–B1–2

is to provide 125 VDC power to the Division

2 safety-related loads including: RCIC

Turbine Exhaust Valve, CAC Isolation

Valves, Diesel (DG–2) Engine Backup Lube

and Fuel Oil Pumps, Critical Switchgear

control power, Critical Instrument Power

Supply Inverter, NSSS Instrument and

Control Board power, and control power to

the Remote Shutdown Panel. This establishes

the Division 2, 125 VDC Power system as an

accident mitigation system, and is not an

individual precursor of an evaluated

accident. Battery E–B1–2 has no role in the

initiation of design basis accidents (DBAs) or

transients identified in the FSAR.

The proposed change entails a one time

relief from verbatim compliance with SR

3.8.4.7 by permitting the performance test in

SR 3.8.4.8 to suffice for performance of the

SR 3.8.4.7 service test. Improved Technical

Specifications (ITS) SR 3.8.4.7 presently

allows the ‘‘modified’’ performance test in SR

3.8.4.8 to be performed in lieu of the service

test in SR 3.8.4.7. The difference between the

modified performance test short duration

load of 400 amperes for six seconds and the

performance test load of 350 amperes is small

when compared to the 922 ampere oneminute rating of the battery. Testing at the

levels defined in either situation provides a

satisfactory battery performance

demonstration. Additionally, documented

test results since the date of manufacture

(1994) of Battery E–B1–2 substantiate the

battery’s capability to perform its intended

safety functions. The performance test

completed in April of 1997 demonstrated a

battery capacity of 104.7% which is above

the battery replacement criteria of 80%

capacity. The performance test performed

when the battery was new as part of

acceptance testing in May of 1994

documented a capacity of 104.17%.

Comparing the 1994 and 1997 performance

test results indicates that the battery has not

degraded during the 4 years since it was

manufactured and installed. Based on the

substantial battery capacity demonstrated by

these performance tests and the short

duration peak load required by the service

test (400 amps) as compared to the oneminute rating of the battery (922 amps), the

battery is fully capable of meeting the

requirements of the modified performance

test and the service test.

Regular battery surveillances are routinely

performed which include specific gravity and

battery terminal voltage measurements. As a

compensatory measure, in addition to the

visual corrosion inspection, the Supply

System will measure Battery E–B1–2

connection resistance on a 92 day interval

and verify that the intercell connector

resistance is ≤ 24.4 E–6 ohms. These

surveillance measures will ensure that

Battery E–B1–2 remains operable.

The probability of an evaluated accident is

derived from the probabilities of the

individual precursors to that accident. The

consequences of an evaluated accident are

determined by the operability of plant

systems designed to mitigate those

consequences. Since Battery E–B1–2 is

operable and will remain in service, this

action will not change the availability of any

safety related equipment and no individual

precursors of an accident are affected.

Therefore, this change does not increase the

probability of an accident previously

evaluated. In addition, since the functions

and capabilities of systems designed to

mitigate the consequences of an accident

have not changed, the consequences of an

accident previously evaluated are not

expected to increase. Therefore, there is no

significant increase in the probability or

consequence of an accident previously

evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

The service test requires a discharge rate of

400 amps for the first six seconds and drops

to less than 250 amps for a duration of two

hours. The performance test requires a

constant 350 amps throughout the test.

Therefore, a difference of 50 amps for the

first six seconds is not enveloped by the

performance test. The service test

requirement of 400 amps is small compared

to the manufacturer’s one-minute discharge

rating of the battery (922 amps). The 50

amperes for six seconds difference in the

testing profiles of the SR 3.8.4.7 service test

and the SR 3.8.4.8 performance test was

confirmed by the manufacturer as

insignificant relative to demonstration of the

battery capacity and its short duration

discharge rate.

Creation of the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident would require the

creation of one or more new precursors of

that accident. New accident precursors may

be created by modifications to the plant

configuration. No modifications to plant

configuration will result from this proposed

one time surveillance test change.

Documented test results demonstrate that

Battery E–B1–2 is capable of performing its

intended safety function. Since Battery E–

B1–2 has not been modified and will remain

in operation during Operational Modes 1, 2,

and 3 as required by the Technical

Specifications, no new failure modes of the

125 VDC Distribution System are introduced.

Therefore, this change will not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve

a signficant reduction in a margin of safety.

The basis for the margin of safety for the

Division 2, 125 VDC battery is the two hour

operating time defined in the DC System