39360 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

Safety’’ on the basis that the

noncompliance is inconsequential to

motor vehicle safety.

This notice of receipt of an

application is published under 49

U.S.C. 30118 and 30120 and does not

represent any agency decision or other

exercise of judgement concerning the

merits of the application.

FMVSS No. 213, S5.4.3.5(b), requires

that after the dynamic buckle release

test prescribed in S6.2 of the standard,

any buckle in a child restraint system

belt assembly designed to restrain a

child using the system shall release

when a force of not more than 71

Newtons (N) (16 pounds) is applied,

provided that the conformance of any

child restraint to this requirement is

determined using the largest of the test

dummies specified in S7 for use in

testing that restraint when the restraint

is facing forward, rearward, and/or

laterally. Additionally, S5.4.3.5(d)

requires that the buckle latch of a child

restraint system shall not fail, nor gall

or wear to an extent that normal

latching and unlatching is impaired

when tested in accordance with the

buckle latch test requirements in S5.2(g)

of FMVSS No. 209, ‘‘Seat Belt

Assemblies.’’

Four Cosco Touriva T-shields, Model

02–096, were tested as part of the

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration’s (NHTSA) fiscal year

(FY) 1996 child restraint testing

program. When tested with the 3-yearold dummy in the upright position, the

plunger pin of the buckle assembly was

sheared, and the buckle released during

the dynamic test. In a retest conducted

using the same configuration, the posttest buckle release force exceeded 71 N

(77.8 N, or 17.5 lb). Units tested with

the infant dummy and with the 3-yearold dummy in the reclined position

were in compliance. NHTSA notified

Cosco of the test failures noted above, as

documented in Calspan Report Number

213–CAL–96–013. In its own

investigation, Cosco was able to obtain

results in isolated tests similar to those

in the FY96 NHTSA tests. Accordingly,

Cosco has confirmed that it has

manufactured and distributed a limited

number of Touriva convertible child

restraint systems that may not comply

with the above requirements. The units

potentially exhibiting noncompliance

are those Touriva T-shield models

manufactured from May 1, 1996,

through November 26, 1997, as follows:

Touriva Convertible Safe T-Shield, Full

Wrap Fabric Cover (Model 02–084, 5/96

to 11/97, quantity: 11,018); Touriva

Convertible Safe T-Shield, Partial Wrap

Fabric Cover (Model 02–094, 5/96 to 11/

97, quantity: 7,202); Touriva Convertible

Safe T-Shield, Full Wrap Fabric Cover

with Pillow (Model 02–096, 5/96 to 10/

97, quantity: 1,411); Touriva Convertible

Safe T-Shield, Partial Wrap Vinyl Cover

(Model 02–404, 5/96 to 5/97, quantity:

682); Touriva Convertible Safe T-Shield,

Partial Wrap Fabric Cover (Model 02–

821, 5/96 to 11/97, quantity: 186,040).

Cosco supports its application for

inconsequential noncompliance with

the following:

Cosco was able to obtain units

manufactured both on and near the dates in

question as well as subsequent production

units. After extensive in-house dynamic

testing and analysis, units were sent to

Calspan for testing. Cosco made repeated

trips to Calspan in an attempt to understand

and resolve this potential noncompliance.

Cosco was able to obtain results in isolated

tests similar to that of the FY96 NHTSA tests.

Cosco was not able to attribute the potential

noncompliance to the design or manufacture

of any particular component. We ran dozens

of in-house tests and spent hundreds of hours

in an effort to determine the reason isolated

units manufactured on or after 5/10/96 were

inconsistently exhibiting high post-test

buckle release pressure and shearing of the

plunger pin. The results have been

inconsistent. The T-shield units involved in

NHTSA’s FY97 test program tested

successfully, but were of identical

construction and design to those which failed

the FY96 testing.

Since the Touriva T-shield models were

first introduced in 1994, Cosco has required

the vendor who is molding the housing and

plunger pin and assembling the buckle

assembly housing, spring and plunger pin to

perform a pretest buckle release pressure on

each assembly. No buckle assembly

exhibiting a pretest buckle release pressure of

over 13 lb nor under 10 lb has ever been used

in the production of any Touriva convertible

child restraint, including the T-shield units

in question. In searching for possible

explanations for the isolated deficiencies,

Cosco made a material change to the housing

of the buckle assembly and the material of

the plunger pin. This material change has

resulted in eliminating any potential

noncompliance related to both the high posttest buckle release pressure and the shearing

of the plunger pin, although the minimal

differences in properties between the

materials does not adequately or conclusively

explain the test results. All T-shield units

manufactured after November 27, 1997 have

a housing manufactured using 30% glass

filled nylon instead of ABS and a plunger pin

using Delrin 100P versus Delrin 500. The Tshield units supplied for NHTSA FY98

testing had the new materials incorporated

into the buckle assembly.

In its Part 573 Report to the agency,

Cosco stated that it:

. . . does not believe that any defect or

repeatedly discernable noncompliance exists

with the subject child restraint * * * While

a small percentage of the Calspan tests

performed on the subject units did exhibit

noncompliance results, a vast majority of

identical child restraints manufactured

during the same period produced complying

test results. Cosco concludes from this testing

and our exhaustive analysis of the subject

child restraints and testing procedures that

the noncompliance test results are not the

result of the design, materials, or

manufacturing processes involved in the

production of the subject child restraints, but

rather test variables and anomalies that are

inherent in the 213 test procedures.

In the summary of its application for

inconsequential noncompliance, Cosco

stated that it ‘‘does not believe the

inconsistent deficiency exhibited by a

few of the tested units warrants a

recall.’’ Cosco concluded that

‘‘reasonable evaluation of the facts

surrounding this technical

noncompliance will result in the

decision that no practical safety issue

exists.’’

Interested persons are invited to

submit written data, views, and

arguments on the application of Cosco

described above. Comments should refer

to the docket number and be submitted

to: U.S. Department of Transportation

Docket Management, Room PL–401, 400

Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC

20590. It is requested, but not required,

that two copies be submitted.

All comments received before the

close of business on the closing date

indicated below will be considered. The

application and supporting materials,

and all comments received after the

closing date, will also be filed and will

be considered to the extent possible.

When the application is granted or

denied, the notice will be published in

the Federal Register pursuant to the

authority indicated below.

Comment closing date: August 21,

1998.

(49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120; delegations of

authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8)

Issued on: July 16, 1998.

L. Robert Shelton,

Associate Administrator for Safety

Performance Standards.

[FR Doc. 98–19427 Filed 7–21–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs

Administration

[Docket No. RSPA–98–4029; Notice 1]

Pipeline Safety: Implementation of

One-Call Systems Study

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs

Administration (RSPA); Office of

Pipeline Safety (OPS).

ACTION: Notice of public meeting.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices 39361

SUMMARY: This notice announces

RSPA’s intent to establish a team of

government, industry, and public

representatives to study best practices in

damage prevention to underground

utilities. The team will evaluate the

effectiveness of various existing one-call

notification systems in protecting the

public, individuals engaging in

excavation activities, and the

environment, and in preventing

disruptions to public services and

damage to underground facilities like

pipelines, telecommunications, electric,

water and sewer lines. This notice also

announces a public meeting to solicit

views and recommendations on the

direction of this study of one-call

system best practices and to identify

sources of information which should be

considered as part of the study. RSPA

invites interested parties to attend this

public meeting, and to make

presentations on views and areas of

investigation which should be

considered in the study, and to identify

persons and organizations who should

participate on the study team.

DATES AND LOCATION: The public

meeting will be held on August 25–26,

1998, at the Ritz Carlton, Pentagon City,

1250 South Hayes Street, Arlington,

Virginia.

ADDRESSES: Comments on the subject

matter of this notice should be sent to

the Dockets Facility, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Plaza 401, 400 Seventh

Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590–

0001, or you can E-Mail your comments

to ops.comments@rspa.dot.gov.

Comments should identify the docket

number RSPA–98–4029. The Dockets

facility is open from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00

p.m. Monday through Friday, except on

Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Eben M. Wyman, (202) 366–0918, or by

e-mail (eben.wyman@rspa.dot.gov),

regarding the subject matter of this

Notice. Further information can be

obtained by accessing OPS’ Internet

Home Page at: ops.dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Excavation damage is the leading

cause of pipeline failures and a leading

cause of service interruptions for other

underground facilities; it is usually

preventable. Excavation damage affects

vital services and products delivered

through all underground facilities:

telecommunications, electricity, cable

television, fiber optics, water and sewer

lines, and petroleum and natural gas

pipelines. These accidental dig-ins can

result in loss of life, injuries, severe

property damage and loss of vital

services for homes and businesses.

At the heart of damage prevention is

better communications between

excavators and operators of

underground facilities. One-call systems

provide a mechanism for excavators to

notify facility operators of planned

excavation, so that underground utilities

can mark where their equipment and

facilities are located to prevent damage.

The approach to improving protection

need not be costly or complicated.

Study of Best Practices

RSPA’s Office of Pipeline Safety

(OPS) is planning to study damage

prevention practices associated with

existing one-call notification systems.

The purpose of the study is to gather

and assess hard factual data in order to

determine which existing one-call

notification systems practices appear to

be the most effective in protecting the

public, excavators, and the environment

and in preventing disruptions to public

services and damage to underground

facilities. The findings of the study will

inform state agencies and one-call

system operators about practices,

technologies and methods that can

improve overall system performance.

Subsequent to the completion of the

study in FY 1999, OPS and other

organizations planning implementation

expect to provide financial assistance to

States as an incentive for one-call

systems to implement those practices,

technologies and methods which best

can improve overall one call system

performance.

Damage Prevention Quality Action

Team

In recent years, when OPS needed to

bring diverse parties together for

problem-solving on approaches to risk

management, mapping, and damage

prevention, the Quality Action Team

(QAT) model has been an effective

process for data gathering, determining

options and collecting and addressing

issues. Most recently, OPS has used this

approach to address damage prevention

education. The peer joint government/

industry Damage Prevention Quality

Action Team (DAMQAT), was

established in October 1996.

DAMQAT’s mission is to increase

awareness of the need to protect

underground facilities, including

pipelines, and to promote safe digging

practices.

DAMQAT is composed of

representatives from federal and state

government agencies, gas and hazardous

liquid pipeline trade associations, a

contractor, a one-call systems

association, and the insurance and

telecommunications industries. The

team launched a nationwide damage

prevention public education campaign

in May, 1998, that is currently being

pilot tested in three states. The

campaign instructs professional

excavators and the public on

underground damage prevention,

including use of one-call systems, and

effective ways to locate underground

facilities at excavation sites. The goals

are to emphasize damage prevention

measures beyond one-call and enhance

communication among all parties at an

excavation site. The team will evaluate

the pilot findings to adapt the materials

before launching the nationwide

campaign.

The team described in this notice will

work in parallel with the DAMQAT, but

will focus on the range of damage

prevention issues beyond education.

The new team will be drawn from the

key players in damage prevention, with

experience in best practices for

operating one call systems and centers,

and developing and using new

technologies for communications,

locating and marking underground

facilities, and monitoring excavation

activities.

Scope of the New Study

Numerous factors affect the

effectiveness and efficiency of one call

system operations. Improving system

efficiency is expected to reduce the risk

of damage to underground facilities in

numerous ways by increasing the

number of excavators who call, by

improving the accuracy of the marking

and locating process, and improving

communications between the operator

and the excavator. Area for

improvements that will be considered

include, but are not limited to:

(1) Encouraging participation by all

parties concerned with underground

facility damage prevention;

(2) Promoting awareness;

(3) Receiving and distributing

information;

(4) Verifying system effectiveness;

(5) Mapping and locating

underground facilities;

(6) Preventing damage through

notification;

(7) Rapid response to emergency

situations;

(8) Marking accuracy and timeliness;

(9) Risk to personnel;

(10) Other characteristics relative to

effective damage prevention

notification; and

(11) Encouraging compliance through

effective enforcement.
39362 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 140 /Wednesday, July 22, 1998 / Notices

Composition of the New Quality Action

Team

OPS seeks to identify organizations

who are interested in contributing to the

study as a working member of this joint

government/industry team. OPS plans

to establish a core team of 12–15

representatives of diverse organizations

concerned with damage prevention

systems. Subteams will be formed to

devote attention to in-depth assessment

of particular subject areas.

In conducting the study, it is

important to include the broadest

possible representation of parties who

are concerned about damage prevention

to comprehensively investigate all

aspects of the notification, locating,

marking and excavation process. Among

the organizations who have expressed

interest in participating in the study

process are:

• Association of Oil Pipelines; • American Gas Association; • American Petroleum Institute; • Interstate Natural Gas Association

of America;

• American Public Gas Association;

• American Road and Transportation

Builders Association; • Associated General Contractors; • National Utility Contractors

Association;

• Competitive Telecommunications

Association;

• Edison Electric Institute;

• Gas Processors Association;

• American Public Works

Association;

• One Call Systems International;

• National Cable Television

Association;

• United States Telephone

Association;

• UTC, the Telecommunications

Association;

• National Association of Regulatory

Utility Commissioners;

• National Association of Pipeline

Safety Representatives; and

• Office of Pipeline Safety.

OPS wishes to identify other

organizations who wish to contribute as

well as any members of the public who

want to be considered and are willing to

work on the study team. Specifically,

OPS would like to hear from:

• other Federal government agencies

(i.e. Federal Communications

Commission;

• State government agencies, such as

State DOTs, planning organizations, etc;

• underground public utility

organizations (water, sewer, electric,

fiber optics, etc.;

• representatives from the railroad

industry;

• representatives from the insurance

industry

• agencies and organizations

representing environmental interests;

• other organizations representing

excavators; • organizations representating other

transportation interests; and • representatives from the public.

In order for OPS to effectively

identify, consider and assemble all

parties interested in participating on the

team, it is important that actual

representatives of the constituencies

attend the public meeting to express

their interest and qualifications.

Criteria for Study Participants

1. To assure the broadest possible

data, OPS seeks participation from

individuals who represent organizations

with defined missions and objectives

related to preventing damage to

underground utilities. Their

organizations should have the means

and ability to communicate to their

membership throughout the study

process.

2. To provide for timely and efficient

assessment of one-call system methods,

individuals interested in contributing

should have existing knowledge of the

factors, factual data, history and aspects

affecting one-call system performance

either nationally, regionally or locally,

and/or in-depth understanding of a

particular method or process for

improving the performance of the 11

factors listed above.

3. To conduct the review of methods

and complete and produce a final

report, individuals interested in

contributing should have abilities to

work both individually and in a group

environment.

4. To benefit from public perspective

on one-call services, OPS would like for

members of the public to participate in

the public meeting, and serve on the

team. These individuals should be

capable of assessing the issues of onecall systems and damage prevention

techniques, and ideally would be

affiliated in some capacity with an

organization(s) affected by, or concerned

with, damage prevention programs.

Information Sharing

OPS would like interested parties to

propose topics that they feel the team

should address, including best practices

of one-call systems, locating and

marking techniques, data collection, and

other technological advances that the

team should assess and evaluate during

the course of the study. OPS plans to promote information

exchange between the team and

interested public parties, and to provide

current information regarding the study

group proceedings. We will

communicate about issues the team is

considering and the study progress by

numerous means including electronic

and newsletter/print media. Details

regarding communication will be

provided at the public meeting.

Schedule for Implementation

Following the meeting, OPS and

organizations who have expressed an

interest in participating will synthesize

the information presented at the

meeting and select a group of

representatives to serve on the core team

and the subteams. OPS believes the

team will meet about every four to six

weeks once the group has been

established for up to a year in duration.

Contract support will also be addressed

at the post-meeting gathering, including

discussion of appropriate parties to

assist the team with facilitation,

recording meeting notes, providing

technical assistance, and report writing.

The planning organizations will also

discuss how the team will produce the

final report that identifies those

practices of one-call systems that are the

most successful in preventing damage to

underground facilities, and that provide

effective and efficient service to

excavators and underground facility

operators.

Meeting Agenda

For planning purposes, RSPA requests

that parties interested in joining the

team, or commenting on the team’s

focus, should be prepared to:

• make a presentation at the meeting

about their qualifications, or necessary

qualifications for one to serve on the

team or subteam to represent an

organization;

• or express their views and

recommendations on issues or practices

that should be considered.

Interested persons should notify Eben

Wyman on (202) 366–0918 by August

17, 1998, with name, organization or

interest, and type of presentation so that

an agenda can be planned and all

parties can be accommodated. In the

event parties cannot attend, they can

send a presentation in writing to OPS

and we will present a summary during

the meeting.

RSPA anticipates attendance and

participation by government, the public,

and a broad range of interested parties

in the excavation and public utility

communities, and representatives of

other underground facility

organizations.

Issued in Washington, DC on July 16, 1998.

Stacey L. Gerard,

Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline

Safety.

[FR Doc. 98–19428 Filed 7–21–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–60–P