### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 29, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. SLED A R ICHA RD S, a.k .a. SLED A B RA GG

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty Nos. S47,508; S49,852 Phyllis H. Miller, Judge

No. E2005-00721-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Dece m ber 29, 2005

Th e de fe nd a nt, Sle da

Ric ha rd s, ple d g uil ty

to t wo c ou nts of re c kle ss ag g ra vate d ass a ult , a Cl a ss D felony , one count of

running a stop sign, a C l as s C misdemeanor, one count of driving under the inf lue nc e , a Cla ss Amis de mea no r, on e c ou nt o f dri vin g on a re vo ke d li c e ns e , a

Cla ss B misdemeanor, and one count of failure to appea

r, a Class E felony

. The Sullivan CountyCriminal Court sentence d her to a

total eff ective se ntence of six y ear s as a Rang e I , standard of fende r to be

serve d in the Depa

rtment of Correc tion. The defe ndant appea ls, c ontending that the trial court erre d in deny ing he r probation or alternative sentenc ing. We a ffirm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt Aff irm ed

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J

. , delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., joined.

Stephen M. Wallace, D istrict Publi c De fende r, and William A. Kennedy , Assistant Public De fende r, fo r t h e a p p el l an t , S l ed a R i ch ar d s , a. k

. a. S l ed a B ra gg.

Paul G. Summers, Att o rney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; J ane L . Be ebe, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; H. Gre eley Wells, J r., Dist rict Attorney Gene ral; and Ricky

A.W. Curtis , Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Th is c a se re la te s to the de fe nd a nt’ s d ri vin g un de r the inf lue nc e a ndhittin g tw o v ic tim s w ith her c ar. The Sulli van County g rand jury i n d i cted the de fenda nt in case numbe r S47,508 on five counts: two counts of re ckless ag g ravated assault, one c ount of running a s t o p sign, one count of driving under the influence , and one c ount of driving on a r ev o k ed l i ce n se. Afte r the de fenda nt failed to a ppear for her trial, the Sulli van County g rand jury filed a prese ntment a g ainst the def endant for one count of fe lony

failure to appea

r. The de fenda nt entere d g uilty p l eas to the indicte d and prese nted offe nses. I n case number S47,508, the trial court sentence d the defendant to four y ear s

on eac h count of rec kless ag g ravated assault, thirty day s for running a stop sig n, eleve n months and-2-

twenty -nine da y s for driving under the influence
, and six months for driving on a re voked license
, all counts to be serve d concur rently to eac h other. In case number S49,852, the trial court sentence d the def endant to two y ear s for fe lony failure to appea

r to be served conse cut i v el y t o ca s e number S47,508, for a total ef

fec tive sentenc e of six y ear s to be serve d as a Rang e I , standard of fende r in the Depa rtment of Corre ction.

At the g uiltyplea he aring , the state g ave the following acc ount of the crime: on September 25, 1999, King sport Police Offic er Kevin Hy att investigated a c ar a ccide nt at the Rockspring s Road exit off Interstate 181 in Sullivan County . Offic er H y att arrived at the sc ene and found three injured fema les. Wit nesses saw a g ray Honda CRX driven by the defe ndant run a stop sig n at the bottom of the e x it ramp, g o acr oss Rockspring s Road, and st rike two victims who had be en hang ing a y ard sale sig n on the tel ep h o n e p o l e. One victim had se rious injuries to her leg and hip, and the othe r vic tim ha d a c on c us sio n. Up on Of

fi c e r H y a tt’ s r e qu e st, the de fe nd a nt s ub mit te d to a blo odte st, which re veale d the def

endant’ s blood alcohol level at .24%. Off icer Hy at t d et ermined the defe ndant’s drive r’s lice nse had be en re voked.

At the se nte nc ing he a

ri ng , o ne of the vic tim s tes tif ie d tha t she ha d be e n ha ng ing a g ara g e sa le sign with he r back toward the road when she saw the defe ndant’s car from the corne r of her e y e. She

s a ids h e trie d to mo v e b u t w a s h it b y th e c ar a n d k n o c k e d u n c o n s c io u s

. Sh e s a idth a t a f te r the defe ndant’ s car

hit both her and the othe r victim, it pushed her mother’ s car twenty -one f

eet f rom wher e she pa

rked it. She said she was in the hos pital for twelve t o thirteen da y s and had thre e major

su rg e ri e s o n h e r l e g a nda nkle

. She sa id that she ha d be e n u na ble to w or

k o r t o s up po rt

he r f a mil y since the a ccide nt. She said s he could not stand on he r leg for more than one hour at a time. She

sa id s he did

no t be lie ve he r l e g wo ulde ve r i mpr ov e . Sh e sa id that sh e wa s tw e nty -f ive y e ars old at the time of the he aring and that befor e the a ccide nt she worke d in a nursing home. She said she lost her job beca

use of he r injuries.

No oth e r w itn e sse s te st if ied, bu t th e state e nte re d th e de fe nd a nt’ s p re se nte nc e re po rt int o evidenc e. The report states that the defe ndant had two prior convictions for ma rijuana posse ssion and prior c onvictions for public intox ication, driving under the influence
, possession of a c ontrolled substance, r eckle ss endang erme nt, leaving the scene of an acc ident, and a reg istration violation. The report states that she beg an drinking at ag e ninetee n and that she dr ank thre e times per w eek by the ag e of twe nty -five. T he re port also states that the de fendant beg an usi ng marijuana on wee kends at ag e ninetee n and continued to do so until 2002, when she w as forty -eig ht y ear s old. The re port ref lects that the de fenda nt had ea rned 444 day s jail credit.

After arg ument by

counsel, the trial court denied probation and alternative sentenc ing. T he trial court e x amined the e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s set forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sections 40-35-113 and -114 and found t he following enhanc ement fa ctors applied: ( 2) the de fenda nt had a previous history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior; (7) the per sonal injuries to one of the victims was g reat; (11) the def endant ha d no hesitation about committing the c rime when the ri sk t o h u m a n l i f

e w a s h i g h ; a n d ( 2 2 ) t h e d e f e n d a n tf a i l e d t o p a y

t h e a d m i n i s tr a t i v e f

e e f o r c ou rt

-W e n ot e t h at on Ju n e 7, 2005, t h e G en er al As s embl y ame n ded T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 35- 102, 1

- 1 1 4
, - 2 1 0
, and

- 401. Se e 2005 T en n

. Pub. Act s ch

. 353 §§ 1, 5, 6, 8. H owe v er , t h e ame n ded code s ec t i ons are ina p p lica b le to the d e fen d a n t’s ap p e a l.

-3- appointed counse l. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114 (2003). The trial court said it would give the def endant 1 “some c redit” if she had any remorse and some cre dit f or her reha

bilitative e fforts, but it a

pplied no oth e r mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt fo un d the de fe nd a nt ha d a his tory of dr ug a nda lc oh ol a

bu se and a poor

work history . I n deny ing pr obation and alternative sente ncing , the trial court stated:

Th e e nh a ncem ent fa c tor s f ar o utw e ig h th e mit ig a tin g fa c tor s. Spl it

c o n f i n e m e n th a s b e e n tr i e d
, p r o b a t i o n h a s b e e n tr i e d
, s e r v i n g 3 0 d a ys ha s b e e n trie d [a nd ] non e of it wo rk e d, so I do n’ t f indthat sh e wo uld be any better off, I don’t find that it would serve the ends of justice
, her or any one else to give her a lternative se ntencing . So alternative
sentenc ing is de nied.

On appe al, the def

endant c laims that the trial court err ed in deny ing pr obation or alternative
sentenc i n g. S pecif

ically , the def

endant c laims she does not have a long rec ord of c riminal convictions. The de fenda nt asserts she ha d only four prior misdemeanor

convictions and no prior fe lon ie s. Th e de fe nd a nt a sse rt s the se ri ou sn e ss of the of fe ns e s w ou ld n ot h a ve be e n d e pr e c ia te d if sh e ha d b e e n g rante d a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing be c a us e sh e ha d a lr e a dy se rv e d 44 4 da y s in c on fi ne me nt. The de fenda nt also asserts she ha d made strides in self -re habilitative eff

orts while in jail.

T h e s t at e c o n t en d s t h at t h e tri al co u rt p ro p er l y d en i ed p ro b at i o n an d al t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g. The state a sserts the trial c ourt corr ectly applied the e nhance ment fac tor for history of criminal

con v ic ti o n s a n d b e h a v io r a n d r e c o g n iz e d th a t a ll o f th e d e f e n d a n t’ s p r io r c o n v ic ti ons were misdemeanors. The state asse rt s the trial court also corr ectly applied the e nhance ment fac tors for serious i njuries to the victim and for f ailure to pa y

the administrative fe e for her c ourt appointed

co u n s e l

. T h e s t a t e a s s e r t s t h e o f f e n s e s a n d t h e v i c t i m ’ s i n

j u r i e s w e r e s u f

f i c i e n t l y “ v i o l e n t , h o rri fy i n g, shocking , repr ehensible, offensive, or otherwise of an ex cessive or exag g erated deg ree ” and support the trial court’s imposit ion of six y ear s in confinement.

Whe n a de fe nd a nt a

pp e a ls the ma nn e r of

se rv ic e of a se nte nc e imp os e d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt , th is
court c onducts a de novo revie w of the r ecor d with a pre sumption t hat the trial c ourt’s de te rm inatio ns are c or

re c t. T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ) ( 20 03 ). Ho we ve r, the pr e su mpt io nof c or re c tne ss is “conditioned upon the a ffirmative showing in the rec ord that t h e t ri al court considere d the
sentenc ing principles and all relevant f acts a nd circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)

. T h e b u rd en i s on the appe aling party to show that the sentenc e is improper. T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d) (2003), Sentencing Commi ssion Comments. This me ans that if the trial court fo llo we d th e statut ory

se nte nc ing pr oc e du re , ma de fi nd ing s of fa c t that are a de qu a te ly su pp orte d in the re cord, a nd g ave due considerat i o n and prope r we ight to the f actor s and principles that are rele vant to sentenc ing unde r the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, we may not disturb the sentence even if a differ ent re sult were pr efe rre d. State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).-4-

I n conducting a de novo r eview, w e m ust consider (1) the evidenc e, if a ny , rec eived at the tri al and sentencing hearing, ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port, (3) the principles of se ntencing and

arg ume nts a s to se nte nc ing a lte rn a tiv e s, (4 ) the natur e a nd c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f thec ri min a l c on du c t, (5) a ny mitigating or statutory

enhanc ement fa ctors, (6) any statement that the def endant made on his own behalf, and (7) the pote ntial f or reha bilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, - 103, -210 (2003); see Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 168.

When a def

endant is an e specia lly mitigated or standard offe nder c onvicted of a Class C, D, or E fe lony , the def

endant is pre sumed to be a f avora ble ca ndidate for

alternative sentenc ing. T .C.A. § 40-35-102( 6) (2003) . Howeve r, this presum p t i o n may be re butted upon a showing that (1) confine ment is neede d to protect socie ty by restra ining a d efe ndant who has a long history

of criminal conduc t, (2) confine ment is ne eded to a void de prec iating the seriousness of the offe nse or

c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ularl y su ite d to pr ov ide a n e ff

e c tiv e de te rr e nc e to p e op le lik e ly to c omm it simil ar of fense s, or (3) less restric tive measure s than conf inement have fre quently

or re cently

been applied uns u cc es s fu l ly

to the defe ndant. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169 (c iting T.C.A. § 40-35- 10 3( 1) (A )- (C )) . T he tr ia l c ou rt ma y a lso c on sid e r the mit ig a tin g a nde nh a nc ing fa c tor s se t f orth i n Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d sec tio ns 40 -3 5- 11 3 a nd-1 14 . T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (b )( 5) (2 00 3) ; State v. Boston, 938 S.W .2d 435, 438 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In addition, a trial court should consider

a defe ndant’s potential or lack of potential for reha bilitation when determining if an al t er n ative
sentenc e would be a

ppropriate . T.C.A. § 40-35-103( 5); Boston, 938 S.W.2d at 438.

Th e re c or d r e fl e c ts that the de fe nd a nt h a d b e e n c on vic te d o f m ari juana po sse ssi on s, pu bli c int oxic a tio n, drivi ng un de r the inf lue nc e , p os se ssi on of

a c on trol led su bs ta nc e , r e c kle ss endang erme nt, leaving the sce ne of a n acc ident, and a reg istration violation. I t also ref lects that she ha d a his tory of a lc oh ol anddr

ug abu se . Ba se d on the de fe nd a nt’ s cr imi na l histo ry , th e se ri ou sn e ss of the c urre nt offense s, and the de fenda nt’s history of drug and alc ohol abuse, we conclude the trial court did not err

in deny ing the defe ndant probation or other alternative sentencing and the de fenda nt is n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is i ssu e . We a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE