COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Raphael, Lorish and Callins

Argued at Lexington, Virginia

DANIEL KEON WOODY

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 1282-22-3 JUDGE LISA M. LORISH

AUGUST 22, 2023

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG

J. Frederick Watson, Judge

Rebecca Wetzel (Wetzel Legal, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.

Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, 

Attorney General; Justin B. Hill, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee.

The trial court convicted Daniel Keon Woody of unlawfully wounding his former girlfriend 

and assaulting and battering her ten-year-old son. Both of the victims testified at trial. Woody, 

relying heavily on his own differing testimony at trial, argues the court erred by rejecting his 

self-defense arguments for both offenses. Because weighing competing evidence is a task for the 

trial court, we affirm the convictions. 

BACKGROUND

On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the 

prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires us to “discard the 

evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

UNPUBLISHED
- 2 -

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” 

Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323-24 (2018)).

After a cookout with family, Woody and his then-girlfriend, Atia Austin, argued at Woody’s 

home. They both were drinking alcohol during the cookout. Woody asked Austin for her car keys 

so he could go to the store, but Austin could not find them. While Austin was searching, she asked 

Woody if he knew where they were located because he had used them earlier. Woody told Austin 

to get out and called her younger son “all types of faggots and bitches and stuff like that,” so she 

began gathering her things to leave. As Austin left the room, Woody spit in her face. Austin’s 

younger son was crying, and she went out the back door to continue looking for the keys. 

Austin still could not locate her keys. She went back inside the house through the laundry 

room. As she tried to close the door, Woody pushed her to the ground and pinned her down. 

Austin attempted to push Woody off her so she could get up. Austin’s younger son went upstairs 

crying and her older son, D.A., who was ten years old at the time, walked downstairs to investigate 

what was happening. After walking into the laundry room, D.A. wrapped his arms around Woody’s 

chest to pull him off Austin. In response, Woody bit D.A.’s forearm, causing it to bleed. Austin 

grabbed Woody’s hair, pulled his head off D.A.’s arm, and told her son to run upstairs. Austin 

testified that Woody then bit her thigh three times. After Austin freed herself from Woody, she 

found her keys, collected her belongings, and drove to her grandmother’s house a few blocks away. 

Police arrived at the scene as the altercation ended and called emergency medical technicians, who

treated D.A.’s arm. 

Austin and D.A. went to the hospital and saw a nurse, who photographed and documented 

their injuries. The nurse documented ten “significant” injuries on Austin, including abrasions to her

chest, arms, and elbows. The nurse also observed “red bruise[s] with scab formation” on her thighs. 

These injuries did not exist before the altercation with Woody. 
- 3 -

Woody moved to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence, arguing that it failed to prove he 

possessed the specific intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill. Alternatively, he argued that the 

evidence failed to prove malice. Woody maintained that even in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, this was a two-way mutual-combat situation. The trial court denied Woody’s 

motion. 

Woody then testified in his defense and told a different story. He explained that he and 

Austin had a family cookout at his home and had both been drinking. Woody stated that the 

drinking “open[ed] up old wounds,” and Austin started “stomping” and knocked down picture 

frames, so he told her to leave. Austin refused to leave without her keys despite being only two 

blocks from her grandmother’s house and began “trashing” the house. Woody claimed that he 

called to his neighbor and told them to call the police. 

Woody testified that Austin went to the backyard and began pulling up grass, then came 

back inside, throwing stools and a table, and “going crazy.” Woody said Austin grabbed him and 

they fell in the laundry area. As they were both trying to get up, Austin grabbed his hair and used 

her weight to push his head as someone else had their forearm around his “throat.” Woody thought 

he was being “jump[ed],” so he bit the forearm around his neck and “[e]verything stopped.” Once 

Woody was released, he ran past everyone out of the house and saw the police arriving, so he 

shouted for help. Woody denied spitting on, biting, or fighting Austin but acknowledged biting 

D.A. Woody said that his hair was pulled out and that he had knots on his head from the incident. 

In rebuttal, Lynchburg Police Officer Reid testified that when he arrived on the scene, 

Woody smelled like alcohol and appeared “very escalated,” emotional, and disheveled. Woody told 

Officer Reid that he had been “jumped” by a ten year old and Austin. Woody admitted that he had 

bitten the child but claimed that he was just defending himself. 
- 4 -

In his renewed motion to strike and closing argument, Woody contended that he was acting 

in self-defense and lacked the requisite intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill, or actual malice. 

He argued that his testimony was more consistent with the physical evidence, including the 

photographs of the injuries, than Austin’s. He asked the trial court to credit his testimony and acquit 

him based on self-defense. After closing arguments, the trial court convicted Woody of assault and 

battery of Austin, and unlawful wounding of D.A. The trial court found that Woody had bitten D.A. 

but found that there was a reasonable doubt, based on the photographic evidence, whether he had 

also bitten Austin’s thigh. Woody appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Woody argues that the trial court erred by rejecting his self-defense claims on both offenses. 

He maintains that he had a right to use reasonable force to dispel the attacks on his person and 

escape the house. He relies exclusively on his own testimony at trial, which he asserts was credible 

and corroborated by the physical evidence. He emphasizes that the trial court rejected part of 

Austin’s testimony by finding that there was a reasonable doubt regarding whether he had bitten her 

thigh. Woody also suggests that the trial court’s failure to make explicit factual findings about the 

witnesses’ demeanor shows that it arbitrarily rejected his testimony in favor of Austin’s. These 

arguments fall short because of our standard of review and the deference we must give to a trial 

court as the fact finder.

“Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the [fact 

finder], which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they 

testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (first alteration in original) 

(quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “[T]he conclusions of the fact 

finder on issues of witness credibility may be disturbed on appeal only when we find that the 

witness’ testimony was ‘inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it 
- 5 -

unworthy of belief.’” Ragsdale v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 421, 429 (2002) (quoting Ashby 

v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548 (2000)). “Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is ‘so 

manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or 

things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Gerald v. 

Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 487 (2018) (quoting Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 

(2006)). Moreover, “a fact finder’s evaluations of credibility” often include “choosing between 

competing accounts offered by different witnesses.” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 22 

(2011).

Here, Woody points to nothing that renders Austin and D.A.’s testimony inherently 

incredible, and we can find nothing either. Austin and D.A. consistently testified that Woody had 

Austin pinned to the ground in the laundry room. They also consistently testified that when D.A. 

attempted to remove Woody from Austin, Woody bit his forearm. In addition, their testimony 

describing Woody’s aggressive attack was corroborated by the photographs that demonstrated 

the bite mark on D.A.’s arm and ten “significant” injuries on Austin’s person. Indeed, Woody’s

admission that he bit D.A.’s arm provided even more corroboration of their testimony. See 

Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 760 (2019) (holding that, although corroboration is 

not necessary, a witness’s testimony was not inherently incredible when it was corroborated by 

other evidence).

Although the trial court found that there was reasonable doubt regarding whether Woody 

had bit Austin’s thigh, that finding does not render all of Austin’s testimony inherently 

incredible. To the contrary, it is well-established that the fact finder “[i]s free to believe or 

disbelieve, in part or in whole, the testimony of any witness.” Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 42 

Va. App. 203, 213 (2004). 
- 6 -

We also reject Woody’s contentions that the trial court’s failure to explicitly comment on 

the witness’s demeanor or credibility proves that it arbitrarily credited Austin’s testimony over 

his. A “trial court has no common law duty to explain in any detail the reasoning supporting its 

judgments. Absent a statutory requirement to do so, ‘a trial court is not required to give findings 

of fact and conclusions of law.’” Pilati v. Pilati, 59 Va. App. 176, 180 (2011) (quoting 

Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 627 (1982)). To be sure, “when no specific 

explanation is given by a trial court, we presume the court followed the governing legal 

principles . . . and resolved all factual contests favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. at 181 

(emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). We will not accept Woody’s invitation to ignore 

these well-established principles and conclude based on the trial court’s lack of an express 

finding that the trial court acted arbitrarily.

“When the law says that it is for triers of the facts to judge the credibility of a witness, the 

issue is not a matter of degree.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 711, 718 (2010) (quoting 

Swanson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 376, 379 (1989)). Even if the fact finder had doubts 

regarding some parts of the witness’s testimony, “[s]o long as a witness deposes as to facts [that], 

if true, are sufficient to maintain [the fact finder’s] verdict,” and “[i]f the trier of the facts sees fit 

to base the verdict upon that testimony[,] there can be no relief in the appellate court.” Id. at 

718-19 (quoting Swanson, 8 Va. App. at 379). Austin and her son testified to facts that were 

sufficient, along with the physical evidence, to sustain Woody’s convictions. After the 

opportunity to see and hear all the witnesses and consider the evidence, the trial court accepted 

that testimony and rejected Woody’s claims of self-defense. Thus, there can be no relief in this 

Court. The Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, not inherently incredible, and sufficient 

to sustain Woody’s convictions.
- 7 -

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.