I N T H E SUPR EM E C O UR T O F M I SS I SS I PPI NO. 2 0 0 9 - CT - 0 2 0 3 3 - S CT BRET T J

ONES v. STATE OFM

I SS I SS I PPI ON W RI T OF CE RT I ORARI D A T E O F JU D G M E N T : 11/ 19/ 2009 T R IA L JU D G E : H O N . T H O M A S J. G A R D N E R , III COURT F ROM W HI CH APP EAL ED: LE E COUNTY CI RCUI T COURT AT T OR NE YS F OR AP P E L L ANT : S YL VI A S . OW E N T H O M A S H E N R Y F R E E L A N D , IV AT T OR NE Y F OR AP P E L L E E : OF F I CE OF T HE AT T OR NE Y GE NE RA L BY : J EFFR EY A . K LI N G FU SS NA TUR E OF THE C ASE: CI VI L - POST- CO NV I CTI ON RELI EF DI S P OS I T I ON: THE J UDGMENT OF T HE CO UR T OF AP P E ALS I S AF F I RMED I N P AR T AND REV ERSED I N PA RT. T HE J UDGMENT OF T H E C IR C U IT C O U R T O F L E E C O U N T Y IS A F F IR M E D IN P A R T A N D R E V E R S E D IN P AR T . T HE S E NT E NC E I S VAC AT E D, AND T HI S CA S E I S RE M ANDE D T O T HE CI RC UI T CO UR T OF L E E COUNT Y F OR R E SE N T E N C I N G - 07/ 18/ 2013 M OT I ON F OR RE HE AR I NG F I L E D: M ANDAT E I S S UE D: EN BA NC. RAN DO LPH, PRES I DI NG J UST I CE, FOR TH E COU RT: ¶1. B rettJo n es w as c o n v ict ed o f m u rde r f o r s tab b in g h is g ra n d fathe r t o d ea th. In ac co rda n ce w ith M issi ssip p i C o d e S ec ti o n 9 7 -3-2 1 , the tri al j u d g e se n tenc ed Jo n es to li fe i m pr i s onm ent . M i s s . C ode A nn. § 97- 3- 21 ( R ev. 2006) ( “Ever y per s on w ho s hal l be

### Mis si ss ippiCode Se ctions 97-3- 19 and 97-3- 21 have re ce ntly be en am ende d by the 1 

### Legi sl at ureto providefor thr eecl as si fi cati ons of murder : c api ta l, firs t- degr ee , and se conddeg ree. See2013 Mis s. Laws Ch. 555 ( S.B. 2377). 2 c o n v icte d o f m u rd e r sh a ll b e s e n te n c e d b y th e c o u rt to im p riso n m e n t fo r life in th e S tate P enit enti ary. ”). Jones’s co n v ict i on and sent ence w ere af fi rm ed b y the C ou rtof A pp eal s. 1 J o n e s v . S ta te ( “J

on es I”), 9 3 8 S o . 2 d 3 1 2 (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 6 ). ¶2. T hi s Courtgr ant ed J ones l eave t o s eek pos t - convi ct i on r el i ef i n the C i r cui tCourtof L ee Count y. I n hi s pet i t i on f orpos t - convi ct i on r el i ef bef or e t he ci r cui tcour t , Jones ar gued, in tera lia , that , becaus e he w as fi f t een yea r s ol d att he t i m e of t he m ur der , hi s l i f

e s ent ence vi ol at ed the Ei ghth A m endment ’ s pr ohi bi t i on agai ns tcruel and unus ual puni s hm ent . T he c irc u it co u rt d e n ied Jo n e s’s m o tio n fo r p o st-c o n v ic tio n re lief, a n d th e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls a ff ir m e d th a t ju d g m e n t. J

o n e s v . S ta te ( “J

on es II ”) , 2011 W L 3671890 ( M i s s . C t . A pp. A ug. 2 3 , 2 0 1 1 ), r eh’

g deni ed (A p r. 3 , 2 0 1 2 ). ¶3. Jo n es then p eti ti o n ed thi s C ou rtforw ri tof cer t i orar i , no t i ng that tw o cases w ere p e n d in g b e fo re th e U n ited S tate s S u p re m e C o u rt w h ich ra ise d th e iss u e o f w h e th e r th e E ig h th Am e n d me n tf

o rb i d s a s e n t e n c e o f

l i f e wi th o u tp a r o l e f

o rj u v e n i l e s c o n v i c t e d o f h o mi c i d e . On J un e 25 , 20 12 , the Sup r e me Courtde c i ded Mille rv. A la b a ma (and t he co m pan i on case Jacks on v. Hobbs ), __ U . S . __ , 13 2 S . C t. 24 5 5 , 18 3 L . E d . 2d 40 7 (20 1 2 ). T h is C o u rt gr ant ed J ones ’ s pet i t i on f orw r i tof cert i or ar i and orde r ed s uppl ement al br i ef i ng r egar di ng the ap p li ca ti o n o f Mil

ler . W e have l i m i t ed ourr evi ew t o thati s s ue.

A N A L Y S IS

### 3

¶4. W her e an app eal rai ses a q uest i on o f l aw , the appl i cabl e s t andar d of r evi ew i s de n o v o . L a m b e rt v . S ta te , 941 So. 2d 804, 807 ( M i s s . 2006) ( ci t i ng B ro w n v. S ta te , 731 So. 2d 5 9 5 , 5 9 8 (M is s . 1 9 9 9 )) . ¶5. I n Mil

ler , the U ni t ed St at es Supr eme C our thel d “thatthe Ei ghth A m endment f orbi ds a se n ten c in g sc h e m e th a t m andat es life in p riso n w ith o u t th e p o ss ib ili ty o f p a ro le f o r ju v e n ile off ender s . ” Mil

ler , 1 32 S. Ct . a t2 46 9 ( e mpha s i s a dd e d) . The Courtd e c l i ne d t o i m pos e a cat egor i cal baron s ent ence s of l i f e w i thoutpar ol e f

orj uven i l es, b ut“r equi r e[ d] [ the sent enci ng author i ty] t o t ake i nt o acc ounthow chi l dr en ar e di f f er ent , and how t ho se di f f er ence s couns el agai ns ti r r evoca bl y s ent enci ng them t o a l i f et i m e i n pr i s on. ” Id . T he Mil lerC ou rtident i fi ed m ult i ple j uv enil e ch aract eri st i cs and cir cum st ances w hich m ay ex i st thatar e pr ecl uded f

r om cons i der at i on by a mandat ory s ent enci ng s cheme: M a n d a to ry life w ith o u t p a ro le f o r a ju v e n ile p re c lu d e s c o n s id e ra tio n o f h is chr onol ogi cal age and i t s hal l m ark f eatur es — among t hem, i m m atur i ty, im p etuo sity , an d fail u re to a p p rec iat e risks a n d co n seq u en ce s. Itp rev e n ts t aki ng i nt o acc ountthe f a mi l y a ndho me envi r onm entthats urr ounds hi m — and f r om w hi ch he c annotus ual l y extr i cat e hi m s el f

— no m att erhow brut al or dys f unct i onal . I tne gl ect s the ci r cumst ance s of the homi ci de of

f ens e, i ncl udi ng the ext entof

hi s pa r t i ci pat i on i n the conducta nd the w ay f ami l i al and peer pres sure s m ay have af

f ect ed hi m . I ndeed, i ti gnor es thathe mi ghthave be en char ged and c onvi ct ed of a l es s erof

f ens e i f notf ori ncompet enci es as s oci at ed w i th youth— f

orexampl e, hi s i nabi l i ty t o deal w i th pol i ce of f i cer s or p r o s e c u t o r s ( i n c l u d i n g o n a p l e a a g r e e me n t ) o rh i s i n c a p a c i ty t o a s s i s th i s o wn a tto rn e y s . See, e. g. , G r aham , 560 U . S. a t__, 130 S. Ct . a t20 32 (“[ T ] he f eatur es thatdi s t i ngui s h j uveni l es f r om adul t s al s o putthem at a s i gni f i cant d isa d v a n tag e in c rim in a l p ro c e e d in g s” ); J. D . B. v. N or th Car ol

ina , 56 4 U. S. __, __, 131 S. C t . 2394, 2400- 2401, 180 L . E d. 2d 310 ( 2011) ( di s cus s i ng chi l dr en’ s r es pons es t o i nt err ogat i on) . A nd f i nal l y, thi s m andat ory puni s hm ent dis regar ds t he p ossi bil i ty of r ehab i l i t at i on even w hen the cir cum st ances m ost su g g e st it.See Teague v. Lane , 489 U . S. 288, 301, 109 S. C t . 1060, 103 L . E d. 2d 334 ( 1989) 2 ( “I n gener al . . . a c as e announce s a ne w rul e w hen i tbr eaks new gr ound ori m pos es a new o b li g ati o n o n the S tat es o r th e F ed era l G o v ern m en t. ”). 

### Miss. C od e Ann. § 47 -7-3 (1)(h ) (Rev . 20 11 ) (“N o p ersonshall b e eligib le for p arole 3 

### who i s c onvic te d exc ept

that an off

ende r c onvic te d of only nonviol ent crim es . . . ‘ nonviol ent crim es ’ m eans a

fe lony ot her than homi ci de . . . .” ). In instruc ting thetria l c ourt on re mand, this Court

st at ed: 4 

### Aft er consi deration of al l c ircum st anc es re quired by Mil ler , the tri alcourt m ay se nte ncePar

ker , de spi tehis age , t o “l if e i mpris onme nt. ” See Mil ler , 13 2 S . Ct. at 2 46 9 (“[W]e d o no t fo reclose a senten cer's ability to mak e that ju dg ment in homi ci de c as es . . . . ”) . Howe ver , i f the tri alcourt s hould de te rm ine , a ft er 4 Id . at2468. ¶6. W e r ece nt l y addr es s ed Mil leri n P a r k e r v . S ta te , 2013 W L 2436630 ( M i s s . J une 6, 2 0 1 3 ) ( m andat e not

is s ued) . Li ke J on e s , f

i f t een- year - ol d Par kerw as convi ct ed f orthe murde r o f h is g ra n d fa th e r a n d se n te n c e d to lif e im p ri s o n m e n t. Id . at*1. Pr el i m i nar i l y, w e f ound t hat “[ p] r i ort o Mil

ler , ourtr i al court s w er e notr equi r ed t o hol d an i ndi vi dual i zed s ent enci ng hear i ng f orj uveni l es bef

or e i m pos i ng a l i f

e s ent ence . ” Id . a t * 7 . T h u s , Mil leri m pos ed a ne w o b lig a tio n w ith w h ich th is S tate m u st c o m p o rt. Id . W e hel d that , a l though “murde rdoes not 2 carry a s peci f

i c s ent ence of

l i f e w i thoutpar ol e, ” the St at e’ s par ol e st atut e, Sect i on 47- 7- 3( 1) ( h) , r ender ed Par ker ’ s l i f e s ent ence “t ant amount t o l i f e w i thoutpar ol e. ” Id . T her ef or e, 3 o u r sen tenc ing an d p aro le sch em e “ co n tr av en e[d] th e d ict ates o f Mil ler , ” as i tm ade Parker in e lig ib le fo r p a ro le a b s e n t c o n s id e ra tio n o f h is y o u th b y th e s e n te n c in g a u th o ri ty . Id . W e vaca t ed Parker ’ s s ent ence and r emanded hi s cas e t o the ci r cui tco ur tf ora new s ent enci ng hear i ng. Id . at*10.

4

### cons ide rati on of a llcircum st anc es se t f orth in Mil

ler , that Par ker shoul d be eligib le for p arole, th e court shall enter a senten ce of “life impriso nment with eligibili ty f

or parol e notwithst anding thepre se nt provis ions of Mi ss is sippi Co de S ection47 -7-3 (1)(h ).”
5 ¶ 7 . P arkerw as pe ndi ng be f or e thi s Courton di r ectappea l w hen Mil ler w as announce d. T he Uni t e d St a t e s Su pr e me Cou r th a s s t a t e d, “ [ w ] he n a d e c i s i on o f thi s Courtr e s ul t s i n a

‘ new rul e, ’ thatrul e appl i es t o al l cr i m i nal cas es st i l l pendi ng on di r ectr evi ew . ” Schrir o v. S u m m e rlin , 542 U . S. 348, 351, 124 S. C t . 2519, 159 L . E d. 2d 442 ( 2004) ( quot i ng G riffith v. K entucky , 479 U . S. 314, 328, 107 S. Ct . 708, 93 L . E d. 2d 649 ( 1987) ) . A f t erdet erm i ni ng th a t Mil leri m pos ed a ne w obl i gat i on, ther e w as l i t t l e ques t i on a s t o w hetherthatobl i gat i on sh o u ld ap p ly if

this C o u rtfou n d that P ark er h a d re c eive d a m an d atory sen tenc e o f l if e w i thoutpa r ol e. I n c ontr as t , J ones ’ s c onvi ct i on and s ent ence beca m e f i nal i n 2006, m or e than f i ve yea r s bef

or e Mil ler . J ones i s bef

or e thi s C our ton col l at er al r evi ew . T hus , the i s s ue p rese n ted tod ay is w h ethe r Mil lerappl i es t o cas es w hi ch al r eady ha ve bec om e f i nal . St at ed d if feren tl y , w e m u st de term ine if Mil lera p p l i e s r e tr o a c t i v e l y t o c a s e s o n c o l l a t e r a l r e v i e w. I. ¶8. I n Teague , a plur al i ty decis i on , the U nit ed S t at es S up rem e C ou rt held that, “[ u] nles s they f al l w i thi n an exc ept i on to t he gener al rul e, new cons t i tut i onal rul es of cr i m i nal pr ocedur e w i l l notbe appl i cabl e t o thos e cas es w hi ch have become f i nal bef or e the new rul es ar e announc ed. ” Teague v. Lane , 489 U . S. 288, 310, 109 S . C t . 1 060, 103 L . E d. 2d 334

### 6

( 1989) . T he Teague C our ti dent i f i ed tw o exce pt i ons t o the gene r al baragai ns tr etr oact i vi ty. T he C our ts t at ed, Fi r s t , a new rul e s houl d be appl i ed r etr oact i vel y i f i t places cert ai n ki nds of pr i m ary, pr i vat e i ndi vi dual conductbeyond the pow erof the cr i m i nal l aw - m aki ng author i ty t o pr oscri be. Second, a new rul e s houl d be appl i ed retroac ti v ely if i t r eq u ir es th e o b serv an ce o f th o se p roc ed u res tha t . . . are i m pl i ci ti n t he conc eptof or der ed l i berty. Id . at307 ( i nt ernal ci t at i ons om i t t ed) . T hi s C our texpr es s l y has adopt ed Teague ’s “v ery l i m i t ed r etr oact i ve appl i cat i on s t andar d. ” Ma n n ing v. S tate , 92 9 S o. 2d 88 5, 90 0 (M i ss. 2 0 0 6 ). ¶9 . I n ens ui ng cas es , t he U ni t ed St at es Supr eme C our th a s e xp ou nded upon t he exce pt i ons art i cul at ed i n Teague . I n S u m m e rlin , the C o u rt d e ter m in e d th a t Teague ’s fi rs t exce pt i on encompas s ed rul es “more acc ur at el y char act er i zed a s subs t ant i ve rul es nots ubj ect t o the bar . ” S u m m e rlin , 542 U . S. at351-352 n. 4. T he C our ts t at ed, “[ n] ew s ubs t ant i ve rul es g e n e ra lly a p p ly re tro a c tiv e ly . . . b e c a u se th e y n e c e ss a rily c a rry a sig n ifica n t risk th a t a defend ant s t and s con vict ed o f an actthat the law do es not m ake cri m i nal orfaces a p u n is h m e n t t h a t t h e la w c a n n o t i m p o s e u p o n h im .” Id . at 35 1 -52 (i n terna l ci tat ion s o m itted). Mil ler so lel y ad d resse d the latt er. ¶10. A l though Mil

lerd i d no tim po se a c at ego ri cal b an on the pu nis hm ent that the s ubs t ant i ve l aw coul d i m pos e, i texpl i ci t l y forecl osed i m pos i t i on of a m an da t ory s ent ence o f l if e w ith o u t paro le on juv en il e o ffen d ers. B y p roh ibit ing the im p o sit ion o f a m an d atory sent ence, the n ew ob l i gati on preven t s “a si gn i fi cant r i sk t hat a [ j uv en i l e] . . . faces a puni s hm entthatthe l aw cannoti m pos e on hi m . ” Id .

### 7

¶ 1 1 . “ [S ]ub sta n tiv e ru les . . . in c lu d e [] d e c isio n s th a t n a rro w th e s c o p e o f a c rim in a l sta tu te b y in te rp re tin g its te rm s .” Id . at351- 52 ( ci t i ng B ousley v. U nited States , 523 U . S . 614, 620- 621, 118 S. C t . 1604, 140 L . E d. 2d 828 ( 1998) ) . Pr i ort o Mil ler , everyone convi ct ed of m ur deri n M i s s i s s i ppi w as s ent ence d t o l i f e i m pr i s onm entand w as i nel i gi bl e f orpar ol e. Fol l ow i ng Mil

ler , M i s s i s s i ppi ’ s c urr ents ent enci ng a nd par ol e s t atut es coul d notbe f ol l ow ed in h o m icid e c a se s in v o lv in g ju v e n ile d e fe n d a n ts. O u r se n ten c in g sc h e m e m a y b e a p p lied to j uv eni l es onl y af

t erappl i cabl e Mil

lercharacter i s t i cs and ci r cumst ance s have be en cons i der ed b y th e s e n te n c in g a u th o ri ty . A s s u c h , Mil lerm o d ified o u r su b sta n tiv e law b y n a rro w in g its app l i cat i on forj uv enil es. ¶12. T he Legi s l atur e i s the br anch of gove rnm entr es pons i bl e f orenac t m entof s ubs t ant i ve l aw , w hi ch i ncl udes both cr i m e and puni s hm ent . A s w e not ed i n P arker , “[t]he a u th o rity to s ay w hatcons t i tut es a cr i m e, and w hatpuni s hm entshal l be i nf l i ct ed i s i n i t s ent i r ety a l egi s l at i ve ques t i on. ” P arker , 2013 W L 2436630, at*9 (quot i ng W ill ia m s v . S ta te , 708 So. 2d 1358, 1361 ( M i s s . 1998) ) . H ow ever , i t s enac t m ent s m us tcomportw i th both the U ni t ed S ta te s a n d M is s is s ip p i C o n s titu tio n s . Mil lerexpl i ci t l y pr ohi bi t s s t at es f r om i m pos i ng a m an da t ory s e n te n c e o f l if e w ith o u t p a ro le o n ju v e n ile s . T h u s , Mil lerr ender ed ourpr es ent se n ten c in g sc h e m e u n c o n stitu tio n a l if, a n d o n ly if, th e s e n ten c in g a u th o rity fa ils to tak e in to account char act er i s t i cs and ci r cumst ance s uni que t o j uveni l es . W hen the Mil lerC o u rt a n n o u n c e d a n e w o b lig a tio n p ro h ib iti n g th e a p p lica tio n o f o u r e x istin g s u b sta n tiv e law , it mo d i f i e d M i s s i s s i p p i s u b s t a n t i v e l a w. II.

### 8

¶13 . T he d i ssentpo si t s that this C ou rtshou l d d ecl are Secti on 47 -7- 3(1)( h) un con st i tut i onal as appl i ed t o every j uveni l e. T hi s pos i t i on w as r ej ect ed by the P arkerC our taf t erf ul l and c a re fu l d e lib e ra tio n . See P arker , 2 0 1 3 W L 2 4 3 6 6 3 0 , n . 1 4 (“ Mil lerd o e s n o t re q u ire th is C o u rtto d ec lare S ec ti o n 4 7 -7-3 (1)(h ) per se uncons t i tut i onal as appl i ed t o j uveni l es . ”) D ecl ar i ng S ect i on 47-7- 3( 1) ( h) uncons t i tut i onal as appl i ed t o al l j uveni l es w oul d be an ino rdin ate e x p an sion o f Mil ler ’s h o ld in g . A p p lica tio n o f S e c tio n 4 7 -7 -3 (1 )(h ) to a ju v e n ile i s uncons t i tut i onal onl y abs entcons i der at i on of the cha r act er i s t i cs and ci r cumst ance s uni que t o j uveni l e def

endant s by the s ent enci ng author i ty. ¶ 1 4 . T o b e c lea r, n e ith e r th e se n ten c in g sta tu te, S e c tio n 9 7 -3 -2 1 , n o r th e a p p lica b le p a ro le pr ovi s i on, Sect i on 47- 7- 3( 1) ( h) , has been a br ogat ed, as pos i t ed by the di s s ent . Sect i on 97- 3- 21 does notvi ol at e the Mil lerm and at e. S ect i on 47 -7- 3(1)( h) cann ot be app l i ed in al l cases, b u t ca n b e ap p lied co n stitu tio n a lly to ju v e n iles w h o fa il t o c o n v in c e th e se n ten c in g a u th o rity th a t Mil lerc o n sid e ra tio n s a re su ffic ien t to p ro h ib it i ts a p p lica tio n . T h e re fo re , in o rd e r to compl y w i th the U ni t ed St at es C ons t i tuti on and t o m ake Mil lercons i der at i ons m or e than p e rfu n c to ry , w e p u t in p lac e a “ sto p -g a p m e c h a n ism ” w h ich a llo w s th e se n ten c in g a u th o rity “t o annul appl i cat i on of Sect i on 47- 7- 3( 1) ( h) . ” P arker , 2 0 1 3 W L 2 4 3 6 6 3 0 , at * 9 . T h is m echa ni s m enabl es the tr i al j udge t o nul l i f y a ppl i cat i on of

s ubs ect i on ( h) t o ens ur e pr ot ect i on of a j uv enil e’s E i gh th A m end m ent r i gh t s. ¶1 5. T hi s m echa ni s m do e s n ot , a s the d i s s e nts ugges t s , al l ow a j uveni l e def endant co n v ict ed o f m u rde r to b e sen tenc ed to li fe w ith o u t paro le. W h il e w e a ll rec o g n ize tha t a l if e se n ten c e fo r m u rd e r is ta n tam o u n t to life w ith o u t p a ro le, w e e x p re ss ly re jec ted th a t a ju v e n ile

### 9

c o u ld b e se n ten c e d to life w ith o u t p a ro le in P arker . See P arker , 2013 W L 2436630, atn. 21 (“[T ] o d ay ' s d ec isi o n o n ly g ran ts th e tri al c o u rtthe a u tho ri ty to se n tenc e a juv en il e to ‘li fe im p ri so n m en t’ – the m ax im u m sen tenc e a ll o w ed b y statu te. ”). ¶16. T he di s s entfur ther po si t s t hat declar i ng S ect i on 47- 7- 3( 1) ( h) uncons t i tut i onal as a p p lie d to a ll ju v e n ile s “ m in im iz e s o u r i n tru s io n in to a n y le g is la tiv e f u n c tio n .” D is s . O p . ¶ 2 4 . Y et, w h il e se ek ing n o t t o ap p rop ri ate this l eg isl ati v e fun cti o n , th e d issen t w o u ld d ec lare a val i d l egi s l at i ve enac t m entunconst i tut i onal , even though i tal r eady ha s been s how n t hat S ect i on 47 -7- 3(1)( h) can b e app l i ed co nst i tuti on al l y to cer t ai n juvenil es. ¶1 7. Fi nal l y, t he di s s e ntmi s c on s true s the a c tua l e f f e c to f the h ol di ng i n P ar ker , and s ugges t s that“the r evi s ed s ent ence w i l l have no ef f ect . ” D i s s . O p. ¶ 27. I doubtM r . J ones w o u ld ag ree , g iven that tod ay ’s de cisi o n g ran ts him an o p p o rtu n ity to b e re li ev ed o f a m andator y li fe s en tenc e. If the sen tenc ing a u tho ri ty co n clud es, after Mil lercons i der at i on, t hatJ ones ’ s e l i gi bi l i ty f orp a r ol e s ho ul d no tb e f or e c l os e d by the p a r ol e s t a tut e , h e i s t o be s e nt e nc e d t o “ 

### life im

pri sonm ent

with el igibil it

y for parolenotwi ths tanding t he pr es ent provi si ons of

Mis si ss ippi Co de Sec ti on 47-7- 3(1) (h) . ” See supra n .4 . In th a t ev e n t, su b se c tio n (h ) w ill h a v e b e e n a n n u lled b y th e se n ten c in g a u th o rity , an d Jo n e s w ill b e e lig ib le for p aro le su b

ject t o the g en era l pro v isi o n s o f S ec ti o n 4 7 -7-3 (1).

CO NC L US I ON ¶ 1 8 . W e ar e o f t h e o p in io n th a t Mil ler cr eat ed a new , s ubs t ant i ve rul e w hi ch s houl d be appl i ed r etr oact i vel y t o cas es on col l at er al re vi ew . W e af f i r m i n partand r ever s e i n par tthe C o u rt o f A p p e a ls’ ju d g m e n t a n d th e tria l c o u rt’s d e n ial o f p o st-c o n v ictio n re lief. W e v a c a teO ur di sposi t i on i n thi s case c omport s wi th the d i s po s i t i on of Mil ler’s compani on 5 c a s e , Ja ckson . Jacks on wa s b e f o r e th e Un i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e me Co u r to n c o l l a t e r a l r e v i e w. U pon r emand, the Supr eme C our tof A r kans as r emanded J acks on’ s cas e t o the tr i al courtf or re s e n te n c in g . 

### Jacks on , 2013 WL 1773087, at *2 (Ar k. Apr . 25, 2013) OnJuly8, 2 01 3, P arker fileda mo tionfo r reh earing n owp end ing b efore th e Co urt. 6 

### Mo t. for R eh’g , Parker , 20 11 -KA -01 15 8-S CT (Mo t. No . 20 13 -20 30 ). 10 J ones ’ s s ent ence and r emand t hi s cas e t o the C i r cui tC ourtof L ee C ou nty f ora new s ent enci ng hear i ng t o be conduc t ed cons i s t ent l y w i th thi s C our t ’ s opi ni on i n P arker . See 5 supra n. 4. ¶ 1 9 . THE J UDGM EN T OF THE COURT OF AP P EA LS I S AF F I RM ED I N P ART AND REV ERS ED I N PART. TH E J UDG M ENT OF THE CI RCU I T COU RT OF LEE COUNT Y I S AF F I RM ED I N PA RT AND RE VE RS ED I N P ART . THE S EN TE NCE I S V A C A T E D , A N D T HI S C A S E I S R E MAN D E D T O T HE C I R C U I T C OU R T OF L E E CO UN T Y F OR RE S E NT E NC I NG . W A L L E R , C .J ., D I C K I N S O N , P .J ., L A M A R , P I E R C E A N D C O L E M A N , J J ., CO NC UR . KI T CH E NS , J . , DI S S E NT S W I T H S E P AR AT E W RI T T E N O P I NI ON JO I N E D B Y C H A N D L E R A N D K I N G , JJ. KI T CH E NS , J US T I CE , DI S S E NT I NG : ¶20. Fort he r eas ons st at ed i n m y sepa r at e opi ni on i n P arker , I disag ree w ith the C o u rt ’s re m a n d in g th e p re s e n t c a s e to th e c ir c u it c o u rt fo r r e s e n te n c in g . P a rk e r v . S ta te , 2 0 1 1 - KA01158- SC T ( ¶¶ 31- 38) ( M i s s . June 6, 2013) ( K i t chens , J . , concurr i ng i n partand di s s ent i ng i n part , j oi ned by D i cki ns on, P . J . , C handl erand K i ng, JJ . ) . W hi l e capi t al m ur derm ay be 6 p u n ishe d b y a se n tenc e o f li fe w ith o u t pa role, Jo n es rec eive d a li fe se n tenc e fo r m ur der , t he on l y pu nis hm ent that our cou rt s ( i . e. , the “s ent enci ng author i ty”) m ay i m pos e f orthatcr i m e.

### The s ent enc ing s tatut e in ef fe ct at thetimeprovi ded: 7 

### Ever y per son who s hal l bec onvic te d of murde r sha llbe s ent enc ed by the c ourt to imp risonment fo r life in th e State P enitentiary. Ever y per son who s hal l beconvi ct ed of ca pit almurder

sha llbe s ent enc ed ( a) to de ath; (b) to i mpris onme nt f or l if e in theStatePeni te nti ar

y without parol e; or ( c) to impris onme nt f

or l if e in theStatePeni te nti ar y with el igibil it

y for paroleas provi ded in Sec ti on 47-7- 3(1) (f ). Mis s. Code Ann. § 97-3- 21 (Re v. 2006) . As note d by the maj ori ty, thi s s tatut e ha s be en am ende d, and, e ff

ec tive July 1, 2013, ther e wil l be threetypes of murder under Mis si ss ippi l aw: f i r s t - de gre e murde r , s e c on d- de gre e murde r , and c a pi t a lmurde r . 20 13 M i s s . L aws WL No. 269 ( S.B. 2377). Under the se2013 re vis ions , J ones ’s crim e woul d be de signate d as “f ir st -de gre e murde r. ” Theonly sent enc e for “firs t- degr eemurde r”– im pri sonm ent

for l if e – will be the same as th e senten ce currently p rov idedfor murder. T he co rrespo nd ing paro le statute w as no t amend ed. M iss. Co de Ann . § 4 7-7 -3 (R ev. 2 01 1). 11 See M i s s . Code A nn . § 9 7- 3- 21 ( 20 12 ) . Y e t , ou rpr ob a t i on a nd pa r ol e s t a tut es 7 autom at i cal l y forecl ose t he p ossi bil i ty o f par ole f or t ho se con vict ed of a viol ent cr i m e. M i ss. C ode A nn. § 4 7- 7- 3( 1) ( h) ( Rev. 20 11 ) . O urtr i a l c ou r t s c a n i mpos e on l y tho s e s e nt ence s al l ow ed by s t atut e, w her eas a uthor i ty ove rpa r ol e el i gi bi l i ty i s ve s t ed i n the exe cut i ve br anch, s p e c if ic a lly , th e S ta te P a ro le B o a rd . See M iss . C o d e A n n . § § 4 7 -7 -1 to 4 7 -7 -5 5 (th e P a ro le and Pr obat i on L aw ) . T hus , i ti s the par ol e s t atut e, M i s s i s s i ppi C ode Sect i on 47- 7- 3( 1) ( h) (R ev. 20 11 ), that vi olat es Mil ler ’s decl arat i on that “m and at ory l i fe w i tho ut parol e fortho se underthe age of

18 atthe t i m e of

thei rcr i m es vi ol at es the Ei ghth A m endment ’ s pr ohi bi t i on on ‘c ruel and unusua l puni s hm ent ’ . ” Mil le rv. A la b a ma , __U . S. __, 132 S. C t . 2455, 2460, 183 L . E d. 2 d 40 7 ( 20 12 ) ; U. S. Cons t . a mend . VI I I . A c c or di ng l y, I woul d a do ptt he a p p ro a c h tak e n b y the W y o m in g S u p re m e C o u rt w h e n ad d re ss in g the ir statu tes an d h o ld

### Sectio n 4 7-7 -3(1 ) pro vid es: 8 

### Eve ry pri s on e r

who h a s b e e n c onvi c t e d of anyo f f e ns e a gai ns t

the State of Mis si ss ippi , and is conf

ine d in t he exe cution of a

judgm ent of s uch c onvic ti on in t he Missis sippi Departm ent of Cor re ctions for

a de finit e t er

m or te rm s of one ( 1) ye ar

or ove r, or for the t er

m of his or he r naturalli fe , whos e r ec ord of con du ct show s that such priso ner has ob servedthe rules of the d ep artment, and who ha s s er

ved not les s than one-f

ourth (1/4) of the t ota l of

suc h te rm

or te rm s f or whi ch s uch pris oner

was se nte nce d, or , if

sent enc ed to se rvea t er

m or terms o f thirty(30 ) years o r more, o r, if se nte nce d for

thete rm of

the natural li feof s uch pri sone r, hass erve d not

less than te n (

10 ) years of such li fese nte nce, maybe releas ed on parole as herein after pro vid ed . . . . M i s s . C ode A nn. § 47- 7- 3( 1) ( R ev. 2011) 

### (e mpha si s a dded) . 12 Sect i on 47- 7- 3( 1) ( h) uncons t i tut i onal as appl i ed t o j uveni l es convi ct ed of m ur der , i n l i ghtof Mil ler . See BearCloud

v. W y om ing , 294 P. 3d 36 ( W yo. 2013) ( cons trued i n P arker , 2011- K A - 01158- SC T ) . T her ef or e, r atherthan r emandi ng the ca s e f orr es ent enci ng, I w oul d gr ant Jo n es’s p eti ti o n for p o st- co n v ict ion reli ef a s itrelates to h is sen tenc e, a n d I w o u ld d ec lare that , f orj uveni l e of

f ender s convi ct ed of

m ur der , t he par ol e author i t i es shal l appl y onl y t he g en era l paro le pro v isi o n o f S ec ti o n 4 7 -7-3 (1). 8 ¶21. I agr ee thatJ ones ’ s l i f e s ent ence f

orm ur deri s t ant amount t o a sent ence of l i f e w i thout par ol e. B ut , underSect i on 9 7-3-21, l i f e w i thoutpar ol e i s a s ent enci ng opt i on f orcapi t al m u rde r, b u t no t fo r m u rde r. Ind ee d , the S tat e re ce n tl y arg u ed that the im p o sit ion o f a sent ence of

l i f e w i thoutpar ol e f

orm ur derw as l egal l y perm i s s i bl e bec aus e Sect i on 47- 7- 3 (1 )( h ) f o re c lo s e d e lig ib ility fo r p a ro le . Fe rn a n do Ma rtin e z P a rk e r v . S ta te , 30 So. 3d 1222, 1227- 28 ( M i s s . 2010) . I n r ej ect i ng thatar gum ent , w e hel d thatSect i on 47- 7- 3 “does notaf f ecta j udge’ s s ent enci ng pr er ogat i ve underthe cr i m i nal s t atut es . ” I d. at122 8. B ecauseL i kew i se, i n B ro w n v. S ta te , 731 So. 2d 595 ( M i s s . 1999) , thi s C our tr ej ect ed the 9 def endant ’ s ar gum entt hathi s s ent enci ng or deramount ed t o a mandat ory m i ni m um s ent ence w i thoutpar ol e. T he C our te xpl ai ned that“ [ e] xcl us i ve pow erove rthe gr ant i ng and r evoki ng of pa r ol e i s ve s t ed i n thi s St at e’ s par ol e boar d. ” I d. a t 59 8 (cit ing M iss. C o d e A n n . § 4 7 -7-5 ( Supp. 1998) ) . T he opi ni on not ed that , w hi l e “c ert ai n s t atut es s peci f y thata tr i al courtm ay o r m u st im p o se a se n ten c e ‘w ith o u t th e p o ss ib ili ty o f p a ro le’ . . . this se n ten c in g a u th o rity is s epar at e and di s t i nctf

r om the par ol e boar d’ s author i ty t o gr antorr evoke pa r ol e. ” I d. ( ci t i ng M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 7 -3-2 1 (19 9 4 ) ( ca p it al m u rde r co n v ict ion p erm itti n g sen tenc e o f l if e w ith o u t p a ro le) ; Mitch e ll v. S ta te , 561 So. 2d 1037, 1039 ( M i ss. 1 99 0)) . C i t i ng Mitch e ll , 5 6 1 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 3 9 , the C o u rt re itera ted th a t “w h e re th e trial c o u rt h a s n o sta tu to ry a u th o rity t o l i m i tpar ol e, l anguage purpor t i ng t o do s o i s w i thoutl egal ef f ect . ” Mitch e ll , 561 S o. 2d 

### at 599. 13 a s ent ence of

l i f e w i thoutpa r ol e “exc eede d the s t atut ory maxi m um , ” w e vaca t ed the s ent ence and r emanded “f

orr es ent enci ng w i thi n the s t atut ory gui del i nes . ” I d. at1228, 1235. 9 ¶2 2. T he C our t ’ s ha vi ng e xp l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d the no t i on tha t , i n M i s s i s s i pp i , a s e nt e nc i ng co u rtha s th e au tho ri ty t o de term ine p aro le el igibil ity for th o se co n v icte d o f m u rde r, m and at ory l i fe w i tho ut paro le is a produ ctof M i ssi ssi pp i ’s parol e and probati on st atutes , s pe c i f i c a l l y Se c t i on 47 - 7- 3( 1) ( h) . W he n r ece nt l y i nt erpr et i ng Mil leru n d e r a sim ilar st atuto ry sc h e m e , the W y o m in g S u p re m e C o u rt h e ld th a t th e lea st in tru siv e a p p ro a c h w o u ld b e to l eave the s ent enci ng s t atut e undi s turbed and hol d the s t atut es w hi ch barr ed par ol e f or of f ender s s ervi ng l i f

e s ent ence s “uncons t i tut i onal as appl i ed t o j uveni l e of fenders . ” B ear Cloud , 294 P. 3d 3 6. T his s ol ut i on i s s i m pl e, pr es erves j udi ci al r es our ces , r es pect s the l egi s l at i ve author i ty t o pr es cr i be the bounds of s ent ence s , and does not enc r oach on the e x e c u tiv e b ra n c h ’s s ta tu to ry a u th o ri ty o v e r p a ro le m a tte rs . ¶23. A l though the P arkerm aj or i ty r eas oned t hati t s w as “chart [ i ng] t he sa m e cour s e” a s BearCloud , 2 9 4 P . 3 d 3 6 , it c le a rl y d id n o t. P arker , 2011- K A - 01158- SC T a t¶ 24. U nl i ke

### The de fe ndant s in Mil ler , 132 S. Ct. 2455, a ls o wer e c onvic te d of c api ta l m urde r. 10 F o r a d u lt o ffe n d e rs, th e d e a th p e n a lty is a th ird o p tio n , b u t th e sta tu te s p e c ifica lly 11 pr ohi bi t s a dea th s ent ence “f orany murde rc om m i t t ed bef or e the def

endanta t t ai ned the age of ei ght een ( 18) year s . ” Id . 

### 14 Par ker , ( and B r ettJ ones ) , the BearCloud cas e, 294 P. 3d 36, i nvol ved a j uveni l e convi ct ed of “murde ri n the f

i r s tdegr ee, ” i . e. , the equi val entof capi t al m ur deri n M i s s i s s i ppi . T he 10 W yom i ng Supr eme C our texpl ai ned that , underthe “c l earand unambi guous ” l anguage of t he sen tenc ing statu te, the p erm issi b le sen tenc es fo r fi rst -de g ree m u rd e r in W y o m ing are “li fe i m pr i s onm entw i thoutpar ol e orl i f e i m pr i s onm entacc or di ng t o l aw . ” I d. at44 ( ci t i ng W yo. S tat . A n n . § 6 -2-1 0 1 (b ) ( 2 0 0 9 )). A lth o u g h the d efe n d an t w as se n tenc ed to “lif e 11 i m pr i s onm entacc or di ng t o l aw , ” tw o others t atut es pr ohi bi t ed W yom i ng’ s par ol e boar d f r om gr ant i ng hi m par ol e. T he BearCloud opi ni on hel d thatthe l eas ti ntrus i ve app r oach unde r Mil ler w as t o l eave the s ent enci ng s t atut e undi sturbed and hol d the s t atut es w hi ch barr ed p a ro le fo r o ff

e n d e rs s e rv in g lif

e se n ten c e s “ u n c o n stitu tio n a l as a p p lied to ju v e n ile o ff e n d e rs .” BearCloud , 2 9 4 P . 3 d a t 4 5 -4 6 . T h e W y o m in g S u p re m e C o u rt e x p lain e d th a t: W e fin d th is s tatu to ry in terp re tatio n m o st a p p ro p ria te f o r tw o re a so n s. F irst, i tm i ni m i zes ouri ntrus i on i nt o any l egi s l at i ve f unct i on w hi l e al l ow i ng tr i al court s t o i m pos e the exi s t i ng pos s i bl e s t atut ory s ent ence s f orf i r s t - degr ee m u rde r i n a co n sti tuti o n all y pe rm issi b le w ay . S ec o n d , i t sep ara tes “ li fe im p ri s o n m e n t w ith o u t p a r o le ” fr o m “ lif e im p ri s o n m e n t a c c o rd in g to la w ,” m aking them trul y dis cret e, i nd i vidual pun i shm ents w hen app l i ed to j uv enil es. I d. a t 4 6 . ¶24. I n contr as t , the maj or i ty r ej ect s thi s vi ew and hol ds thatj uveni l es convi ct ed of m ur der s houl d be r es ent ence d, f ol l ow i ng a c i r cui tc our the ar i ng, t o e i therl i f e or“l i f e i m pr i s onm ent

### Othe rwi se , the rei s no di stinc ti on betwee n a s ent enc e of li feand “ li feim

pri sonm ent 12 

### no twith stand ing the p rov ision s of M issi ss ip p i Co de S ection47 -7-3 (1)(h ), as it presently provi des .” 15 n o tw ith sta n d in g th e p ro v isio n s o f M iss iss ip p i C o d e S e c tio n 4 7 -7 -3 (1 )(h ), as it p re se n tly pr ovi des . ” D es pi t e i t s i ns i s t ence t o t he contr ary, t he m aj or i ty hol ds thata j uveni l e convi ct ed of m ur derm ay now be s ent ence d t o l i f e orl i f e w i thoutpar ole. T hi s deci s i on i gnor es t he 12 cl eardi s t i nct i ons betw een c api t al m ur derand murde r . B y expl i ci t l y providi ng har s her se n ten c in g o p tio n s fo r c a p ital m u rd e r (o n e o f w h ich is d e a th if th e o ffe n d e r is a n a d u lt), it cannotbe doubt ed thatthe M i s s i s s i ppi l egis l atur e vi ew s capi t al m ur deras a more hei nous crim e th an m u rde r. T h u s, rathe r th an o u r disturb ing “the ex ist ing p o ssible statutory se n ten c e ” fo r m u rd e r u n d e r M is s iss ip p i C o d e S e c tio n 9 7 -3 -2 1 , fin d in g th e p a ro le s tatu te u n c o n stitu tio n a l as a p p lied to ju v e n iles c o n v icte d o f m u rd e r “ m in im ize s o u r in tru sio n in to an y legislat ive fu n cti o n , ” w h il e p rese rvin g dist inct sen tenc es fo r m u rde r an d ca p it al m u rde r. BearCloud , 294 P. 3d at46. U nderthi s appr oach, s ubs ect i on ( 1) ( h) i s i nappl i cabl e, and the ju v e n ile w o u ld b e su b

je c t to th e g e n e r a l p r o v is io n s , i . e. , su b se c tio n (1 ) o n ly , o f th e p a ro le st atute, w hich perm i t s r el ease o n parol e aft er the serving o f t en years of a l i fe s entence. M i ss. C o d e A n n . § 4 7 -7 -3 (1 ). ¶25. N ot abl y, thi s appr oach w as advoca t ed by t he St at e i n P arker , 2 0 1 1 - KA- 0 1 1 5 8 - S CT at¶ 27. T he P arkerm a jo r it y r e je c te d th is v ie w . I

d. T he maj or i ty deci s i on i n the pr es ent ca se ren d ers th e sam e resu lt , fi n d in g th a t Mille r r equi r es ourtr i al court s “t o hol d an

### 16

i ndi vi dual i zed s ent enci ng hear i ng” w hi ch m ay r es ul ti n a s ent ence of l i f e w i th el i gi bi l i ty f

or par ol e orl i f

e w i thoutpar ol e. M aj . O p. ¶ 6. ¶2 6 . Y et, the m ain h o lding o f Mil ler i s that“mandat ory l i f e w i thoutpar ol e f

orthos e under the age of

18 atthe t i m e of

thei rcr i m es vi ol at es the Ei ghth A m end m ent ’ s pr ohi bi t i on on

‘ cruel a nd unus ual puni s hm ent ’ . ” Mil ler , 1 3 2 S . C t. at 2 4 6 0 ; U .S . C o n st. a m e n d . V III. T h is r equi r es ourC ourtt o appl y Mil ler t o M i s s i s s i p p i ’ s r e l e v a n ts t a tu t e s i n l i g h to f o u ro wn p re c e d e n t. A se n ten c in g h e a rin g m ig h t b e w a rra n ted if life w ith o u t p a ro le w e re a p e rm iss ib le s ent ence ; but , bas ed on ourcas e l aw and t he i nt erpl ay betw een M i s s i s s i ppi ’ s s ent enci ng sta tu te a n d its p a ro le s tatu te, it is c lea r th a t Mil ler r equi r es t hi s C our tt o fi nd Sect i on 47- 7- 3 (1)(h ) un co n sti tuti o n al as a p p li ed to juv en il es c o n v ict ed o f m u rde r. T h e m ajority , h o w ev er, a b ro g a te s b o th th e p a ro le s ta tu te a n d th e a p p lic a b le s e n te n c in g s ta tu te . M is s . C o d e A n n . § 9 7 -3 -2 1 ; M is s . C o d e A n n . § 4 7 -7 -3 (1 )( h ). ¶27. Fi nal l y, I fi nd t he m aj or i ty’ s hol di ng t o be a pur el y pr ocedur al pr onouncementt hat fail s to p ro v id e a n y m ea n ing ful so luti o n . If, o n rem an d , the tri al co u rtim p o ses “ li fe i m pr i s onm entnotw i ths t andi ng the pr ovi s i ons of M i s s i s s i ppi C ode Sect i on 47- 7- 3( 1) ( h) , ” the re v ise d se n ten c e w ill h a v e n o e ffe c t. ¶28 . O ur ci rcui tcou rt s ( i . e. , the “sent encing au tho ri ty”) h av e n o au tho ri ty to i m po se anythi ng otherthan a l i f e s ent ence upon a convi ct i on of m ur der . M i s s . C ode A nn. § 97- 3- 21 ( R ev. 2006) . Y et , t he m aj or i ty adds a n addi t i onal s ent enci ng opt i on of l i f e w i thoutpar ol e. T hi s hol di ng i s i n c l earc onf l i ctw i th the l egi s l atur e’ s c l eara nd una m bi guous decl ar at i on that the Par ol e B oar d “s hal l have exc l us i ve re s pons i bi l i ty fort he gr ant i ng of par ol e as pr ovi ded

### 17

b y S ec ti o n [] 47 -7-3 . . . . ” M iss. C o d e A n n . § 4 7 -7-5 (3) (R ev . 20 1 1 ) ( em p h asis ad d ed ). B eca us e the exe cut i ve br anch, notthe j udi ci ary, h as j ur i s di ct i on overpar ol e mat t er s , any l anguage r egar di ng par ol e i n a s ent enci ng or derf orm ur dercons t i tut es “s urpl us age a nd i n no w ay bi nds the par ol e boar d . . . . ” B ro w n v. S ta te , 7 3 1 S o . 2 d 5 9 5 , 5 9 9 (M iss. 1 9 9 9 ). T her ef or e, t o gi ve any e f

f ectt o Mil

ler ’ s prohi bi t i on on m andat ory s ent ence s of l i f e w i thout par ol e f orj uveni l es convi ct ed of hom i ci de of

f ens es , thi s C our ts houl d decl ar e M i ssi ssi ppi C ode Sect i on 47- 7- 3( 1) ( h) unc ons t i tut i onal as appl i ed t o j uveni l es and l eave the s ent enci ng s t atut e undi s turbed. A ccor di ngl y, I di s s entand w oul d gr antand r enderpos t - convi ct i on r el i ef t o Jon es r egardi ng his Mil lerc l a i m. CHANDL ER AND KI NG, J J . , J OI N T HI S OP I NI ON.