J-A27042-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: Z.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.M., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 942 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 019-ADOPT-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023

J.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the June 8, 2022 decree entered by the 

Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans’ Court (“orphans’ 

court”), which granted the petition filed by the Cumberland County Child and 

Youth Services (the “Agency”), terminating Mother’s parental rights to her 

son, Z.M. (“Child”), born in August 2020, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) 

and (b).1, 2 After careful review, we affirm.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother also appeals the decision of the dependency court to change the 

placement goal from reunification to adoption. That appeal is separately listed 

before this panel. See 933 MDA 2022. We dismissed that appeal as moot 

based on our determination to affirm the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights.

2 The court also terminated the parental rights of the natural father, Z.H., and 

the legal father, M.M., each of whom met with an Agency caseworker while 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We glean the relevant factual and procedural history from the orphans’ 

court’s August 3, 2022 opinion (“TCO”) and the record. The Agency received 

a referral regarding Mother in July 2020, while Mother was pregnant with Child 

and Child’s legal father was incarcerated, that she was mentally unstable and 

living in deplorable conditions. According to information the Agency received 

from Mother after Child’s birth, Mother intended, after her husband was out 

of jail, to move Child from the home of a friend where she and Child were 

living to a camper on her father’s property; however, the camper was sold in 

sheriff’s sale in September 2020. An initial family service plan was established 

in September 2020, but in October 2020, Child was adjudicated dependent 

and placed in the physical custody of the legal father and under the protective 

supervision of the Agency following reports raising concerns for Mother’s 

mental health and negligence in providing basic care for Child. See TCO at 2-

3; Court Appointed Special Advocate Program (“CASA”) Report, 6/6/22. The 

Agency removed Child from the custody of his legal father in May 2021 after 

Child sustained significant injuries consistent with non-accidental trauma 

while in his care. Child was placed in the foster home of his current foster 

parents, and by November 2021, Mother, who has epilepsy, was living with a 

new significant other, not working, and applying for disability; by January 

2022, she was no longer living with that significant other and in March 2022, 

____________________________________________

incarcerated at Cumberland County prison and executed a voluntary consent 

to adoption form. See N.T. at 19. Neither the natural father nor the legal 

father has appealed from the termination of his parental rights.
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she obtained independent housing that was deemed by the Agency to be 

inappropriate for Child.3 TCO at 4. 

Contemporaneously with the filing of the termination petition, which 

occurred on March 23, 2022, Mother had begun living with her grandfather. A 

goal change and termination of parental rights hearing was held on June 8, 

2022, at which Agency caseworkers, a clinical mental health counselor who 

had begun treating Mother, Child’s foster mother, and Mother herself testified.

Id. at 5.

Mother timely filed this appeal, and presents the following issues for our 

review:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and 

abuse[d] its discretion when it found, despite a lack of clear and 

convincing evidence that sufficient grounds existed for a 

termination of [Mother’s] parental rights to [Child], thus 

contravening section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §

2511(a).

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights 

when the conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

[Child] no longer existed or were substantially eliminated, thus 

contravening sections 2511(a) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), (b).

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3 As reported in a June 2022 CASA report, Mother was visited at this location 

on February 21, 2022. The dwelling was described as a one-room efficiency 

with no kitchen, “located in the back part of the Carriage House Tavern which 

is now closed. There was a large yard around the building that has a chemical 

container on the ground...The room itself was very small, just enough room 

for the bed and shelving.” CASA Report at 6. Mother reported that she doesn’t 

use the one cabinet in the bathroom because it is full of things from previous 

residents. Id. The Agency caseworker testified that the room is located in a 

building with known pedophiles and drug addicts. N.T. at 46. 
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3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and 

abused its discretion determining the best interests of [Child] 

would be served by terminating parental rights when [Mother] was 

ready, willing, and able to parent [Child] and provide for his 

needs, thus contravening section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Mother’s Brief at 4 (suggested responses omitted).

Our standard of review in appeals from orders terminating parental 

rights is deferential:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon determination of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

The burden is upon the Agency as petitioner to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009). The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as “testimony 

that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to 

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts 

in issue.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Here, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition is filed on the following grounds:

---

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, and 12 months or more have elapsed since the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

---

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of 

a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b). Under Section 2511, the court must engage in 

a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights, focusing initially on 

the conduct of the parent; only after determining that the parent’s conduct 

warrants termination of his or her parental rights must the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis: determination of the needs and welfare of the 

child under the standard of best interests of the child. In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 

1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must show three 

components: (1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent 

for at least 12 months; (2) that the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights 
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would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of 

J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018). Unlike other subsections, 

Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s 

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the placement of the 

child. In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 2017). “[T]he relevant 

inquiry” regarding the second prong of Section 2511(a)(8) “is whether the 

conditions that led to the removal have been remedied and thus whether 

reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In 

re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). Further, the Adoption Act prohibits 

the court from considering, as part of the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, “any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described [in the petition] which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Although Section 2511(a)(8) generally focuses on the behavior of the 

parent, the third prong of Section 2511(a)(8) specifically “accounts for the 

needs of the child.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(en banc). This Court has recognized that “the application of [Section 

2511(a)(8)] may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress 

toward resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children.” 

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led 

to removal of the child continue to exist after a year, the statute 

implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 
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subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. 

Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates 

only a short period of time, to wit [18] months, in which to 

complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child 

who has been placed in foster care.

Id. 

Here, Child has been removed from Mother’s care since September 2020 

and the termination hearing took place in June 2022, well over the 12-month 

requirement set forth in Section 2511(a)(8). At the June 2022 hearing, the 

Agency’s casework supervisor, who also acted as the direct caseworker for 

this case for a period of time due to staff shortages, testified that he had spent 

more time talking to Mother than to any other parent he has ever worked 

with, and that she was well-apprised of what steps she needed to be taking

and what would occur if she failed to do so in a timely manner; nevertheless, 

he stated, her employment had been inconsistent and in the two and one-half 

months prior to the termination hearing, Mother had made just minimal 

progress toward her goals. N.T. at 60, 71. The Agency caseworker 

acknowledged that since March 15, 2022, one week before the termination 

petition was filed, Mother has been working virtually with an outpatient

therapist at Laurel Life; however, Mother had refused to enter the inpatient or 

partial hospitalization program that had been recommended to her as part of 

her Family Assessment for Service and Treatment (“FAST”) evaluation

conducted by Alternative Behavior Consultants (“ABC”), which they deemed 

necessary in order for her to address her needs sufficiently. N.T. at 54; FAST 

Report, Exhibit 6 at 257-258.
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The therapist from Laurel Life, a clinical mental health counselor, 

testified that for the past two and one-half months, he has worked with Mother 

to address her post-traumatic stress disorder, grief processing and instability 

in her relationships, but that during their virtual sessions, they did not discuss 

parenting skills. N.T. at 10. He stated that although Mother is engaged in 

sessions, she has further to go to address her therapy goals. N.T. at 15.

 Mother completed the initial phase of Training for Improved Parenting 

Skills (“TIPS”) recommended by ABC, but her skills assessment score 

continued to demonstrate a high level of risk due to the continuation of issues 

regarding inadequate housing, mental health issues and possible cognitive 

defects, see TIPS Final Report, 2/18/21, and due to the fact that she had only 

recently moved into her grandfather’s trailer, she had not been able to begin 

the second phase of the TIPS skills program (“SKILLS”), which incorporates 

contact between the child and the parent in the home setting, until just prior 

to the termination hearing. Id. The Agency supervisor testified that the 

SKILLS program normally takes about six months, with an additional three 

months of reunification services. N.T. at 58.

Child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) filed a joint brief with the Agency, in 

which it was noted that Mother had obtained neither stable housing nor stable

employment by the date the termination petition was filed, and even her 

newly-found housing with her grandfather included a potentially hostile 

neighbor with whom she had had prior altercations. Joint Brief of Agency and 

GAL at 16.
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In finding the evidence sufficient under Section 2511(a)(8), the orphans’ 

court reasoned that any long-term consistency in Mother’s goals had yet to be 

seen, emphasizing that her efforts toward meeting her most pressing goals 

began “after or just days prior to the petition to termination being filed.” TCO 

at 12. The court stated:

[Mother] has not had appropriate or stable housing until either 

March or April of 2022 or full-time employment until April 2022 

though [Child] had been removed from her care for a year and a 

half at that time. [Mother] declined early attempts to get her into 

the recommended mental health treatment and only obtained 

regular mental health counseling in mid-March, a week before the 

termination petition was filed, again a year and a half into [Child’s] 

removal from her care.

Id. The orphans’ court further reasoned that the goal to maintain the parentchild bond and improve parenting skills, “which by all accounts is linked to 

[Mother’s] mental health,” continued to give it concern and that it did not find 

this condition remedied in any significant measure. Id. In sum, the orphans’ 

court found Mother not ready, willing, or able to parent Child, noting that 

projections for reunification, taking into account the period required for 

sustained consistency in her mental health treatment, housing, and the 

completion of the parenting skills program she had just begun, ranged from 

six to twelve months. Id. at 13.

Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s 

determination that the three components of Section 2511(a)(8) have been 

satisfied. Although Mother acknowledges that she has failed to meet her 
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parenting goals, she avers that she has met her housing, employment, and 

mental health goals, and she requests additional time to complete her 

parenting goals.4 Mother’s Brief at 13-15. We find, however, that the 

orphans’ court’s conclusions that the conditions that led to removal of Child 

from Mother one month following his birth continue to exist are supported by 

clear and convincing evidence and we will not disturb them on appeal.

We must turn then to subsection (b) of Section 2511, which requires the 

court to “give primary consideration to the development, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to 

include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has made clear that Section 2511(b) requires the orphans’ 

court to consider the nature and status of the bond between a parent and 

child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-85 (Pa. 1993). In addition to a 

consideration of a bond, if any, between a parent and child, the orphans’ court 

may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and “should also consider 

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4

In her brief, Mother appears to challenge the orphans’ court’s inability to 

consider, as part of the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, any of her efforts to 

remedy the conditions described in the termination petition which were first 

initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. See

Mother’s Brief at 17. She asserts, for the first time, that the orphans’ court 

failed to present evidence as to when she received notice that the termination 

petition had been filed, and presumably that she was not notified of its filing; 

this assertion is belied by the record, which includes her March 28, 2022 

signed and dated acknowledgement of receipt of the notice of the hearing on 

the termination petition. See Agency Exhibit 5 at 200. 
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the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa. Super. 

2014). Our Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ommon sense dictates that 

courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in 

a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

The orphans’ court heard the testimony of Child’s foster care specialist, 

an employee of the Bair Foundation; she testified as to her monthly visits with 

Child at his foster home. N.T., 23-27. She reported that Child’s foster family 

is interested in adopting him, and stated that Child is doing well, and is 

receiving occupational therapy for balance and strength three times a month 

as well as monthly physical therapy. Id. at 24, 27. Child’s foster mother also 

testified. She stated that Child is a part of their family, gets along well with 

the couple’s three-year old boy, and that she and her husband both love Child 

and consider him to be their son. Id. at 30, 32. The foster family lives on a 

farm, and Child loves animals and loves to play outdoors and participate in 

family outings. Id. She testified that Child is starting to become vocal, and 

calls her “Mom.” Id. at 31. Child’s foster mother also testified that Child 

refuses to go to the Agency supervisor during Mother’s visits with Child, and 

does not look forward to visits with his Mother; she reported that after visits 

with Mother, Child is usually “confused and upset, angry, mad” and needs to 

be snuggled and calmed down. Id. at 33, 36.
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The orphans’ court found that Child, who has spent all but the first 

month of his life outside of Mother’s custody, is clearly bonded most primarily 

with his foster family. TCO at 15. The court explained:

There are cases where a Child is bonded both to the biological 

parent or parents and his foster family, and we look to the totality 

of the circumstances to determine what detriment the Child might 

suffer if a parent’s rights are terminated or, for example, if the 

bond with the foster parents is strong enough to carry the Child 

through a period of the biological parent’s bond being tested or 

broken. Due to the [Child] spending only the first month of his 

life with [Mother], his young age, and his understanding that the 

foster family is his family, this is not such a case. We are confident 

that [Mother] loves [Child], just as we are confident that [Child] 

enjoys visits with [Mother] once they settle into a groove, but we 

are persuaded by voluminous testimony that [Child] considers his 

foster parents to be his parents, that he has difficulty at the start 

of visits tearing away from the foster parent, and that he has 

difficulty after visits at which point he requires significant attention 

to re-transition.

We also reiterate our concern with reports in the ABC visit 

summary that [Mother] has allowed her agitation with ABC to 

affect her interactions with [Child], including abruptly pulling 

items away from him when the supervisor attempted to redirect 

her, which is indicative to us of [Mother’s] lack of focus on her 

relationship with [Child] and the need for a significant amount of 

additional time to show consistent parenting skills and mental 

health stability. The [guardian] ad litem pointed to the Child’s 

“very strong bond” with his foster family to recommend 

termination. We are persuaded of this sentiment. 

TCO at 15. The orphans’ court also noted its agreement with the Agency 

caseworker who testified that the greatest detriment would result from pulling 

Child away from the only family he has ever known given Child’s young age, 

the brief time he has spent in Mother’s care, and the strength of his bond with 
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his foster parents, especially since an additional six months to a year would 

be required in order to re-examine reunification with Mother. Id. at 16.

 In sum, the record reflects that the orphans’ court appropriately 

considered the effect of the termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child 

pursuant to Section 2511(b), and did not abuse its discretion or commit an 

error of law in determining that termination of Mother’s rights is in Child’s best 

interest. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(8) 

and (b). 

Termination decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/07/2023