## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

Hascall v. William s , 2013 IL App (4th) 121131

Appellate Court Caption VI L MA HASCAL L
, Individually ; and C.H., a Minor, Th ro u g h Her Mother and Next Friend, Vilma Hasc all, Plaintiffs- Ap p ell ants, v. PRES TON L

. WI L L IAMS, J R., SANDY COOPER, and UR BA NA SCHOOL DI STRI CT NO. 116 BO ARD OF EDUCATI ON, DefendantsAppellee s.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-12-1131

Filed September 18, 2013

Held (Not e: This syl lab us

con st i t ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r t er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Section 2-201 of the To rt Immunity Act provided defe ndant school district and members of its staff wit h immunit y from liability for plaintiffs’ alleg ations that defe ndants failed to proper ly respond to plaintiff student, who wa s bullied by her classmates, and that immuni ty

was not subject to the willful and wanton conduct exception in section 2- 202 of the Ac t.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from t he C ircuit Court of C hampaig n County
, No. 12-L -16; the Hon. Michae l Q. J ones, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Ger ald W. Smit h (argu ed ), of Smit h L aw Firm, P.C., of Mahomet, for appellants.

Dennis L .Weedman and Be linda Be cker (ar gued), both o f Robbins Schwar tz Nicholas L ifton & Ta

ylor, of Collinsvil le, for a ppellees.

Panel J USTI CE HARRI S delivered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Steigmann and J ustice Knec ht conc u rr ed in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 In J uly

2012, plaintiffs, Vilma Hasc all (Ha scall), individually , and C.H., a minor, throug h her mother

and next friend, Vilma Ha scall, filed a n 11-count sec ond amende d complaint ag ainst defe ndants, Preston L . Wil liams, J r. (Williams), Sandy Cooper (Cooper) , and the Ur

bana School District No. 116 B oard of Education (Boa

rd). Plaintiffs alleg ed C.H. wa s bullied by classmates a

nd defe ndants failed to a

ppropriate ly

respond. Def endants filed a

motion to di smiss and the circuit cour t dismi ssed the complaint with prejudice . We affir

m.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On J uly

2, 2012, plaintiffs filed an 11- count sec ond amende d complaint ag ainst defe ndants for a lleg ed violations of the I llinois School Code (School Code) (105 IL CS 5/1-1 to 36-1 (West 2010)) ( counts I , I I , XI ); fra ud (counts I I I , I V, V); intentional infliction of emotional distress (counts VI , VI I , VI I I ); and re taliation (count X). Plaintiffs voluntarily

dismiss ed count IX. ¶ 4 Acc ordingto the complaint, C.H. was a f ourth-g rade student attendingThomas Paine Elementar

y School (Thomas Paine). O n August 18, 2011, Hasca ll reported to Cooper , the principal of T homas Paine, a “ bullying situation” involvingC.H. and cla ssmates M.J
., I .H., and A.M. A ccor ding to Ha scall, M.J ., I .H., and A.M. ha d bullied C.H. since kinderg arte n. Hasc all reque sted that C.H. be re assig ned to a diff ere nt fourth-grade classroom. In a letter

dated August 18, 2011, Cooper assure d Hasc all that “we take
repor ts of bully ing ve ry

seriously .” Cooper stated she would “ addre ss the situation with the g irls and notify

the par ents of the c onversation.” Cooper attac hed to the letter “the school district policy .” C.H. wa s not reassig ned to a diff ere nt fourth-grade classroom. ¶ 5 On August 20, 2011, Hasca ll requested a meetingwith school district superintendent

-2-Wil liams, Cooper, C.H.’s classr oom teache r, “the police,” a nd the par ents of M.J., I .H., and A.M. The followingday , Hasc all met with Wi lliams and Cooper, who a ssured Hasc all that they

would contac t the pare nts (“or w ords to that eff ect” ) of M.J., I .H., and A.M. ¶ 6 On Octobe r 14, 2011, M.J . and I .H. ver bally hara ssed C.H. when she withdrew f rom a g ame of tag . M.J ., I .H., and A.M. f ollowed C.H. into a school re stroom, blocking the exit and continuingto “har ass, intimidate, and threaten C.H.” C.H. reported the inc ident to Hasc all, who contac ted the police. T he followingday , Cooper telephone d Hasc all and advised she w ould contact the g irls’ pare nts and “take appropr iate disciplinary action.” ¶ 7 On Novembe r 21, 2011, I .H. appr oache d C.H. in the classroom, slappe d a book C.H. was holding , and “thr eate ned C.H.” M.J., I .H., and A.M. a g ain followed C.H. into the school restroom. C.H. e ntere d a stall and the g irls kicked open the door of the sta ll, injuring C.H. The g irls “threatened C.H. by stating, ‘ I ’m g oing to kill y ou’ or similar words.” C.H. r eporte d the incident to Hasc all, who contac ted the police. ¶ 8 On Novembe r 22, 2011, an inve stigating of fice r spoke to the pa

rents of M.J., I .H., and A.M. The pa

rents re ported ne ver ha

ving be en told their child had bullied a nother student prior to Novembe r 22, 2011. Cooper a lleg edly told the investigating of

fice r that she ha d no knowledg e of C.H. be ing bullied pr ior to October 2011. ¶ 9 On Novembe r 28, 2011, Ha scall ag ain re quested a meetingwith Wi lliams, Cooper, C.H.’s classroom tea cher , “the police ,” and the pare nts of M.J ., I .H., and A.M. Williams denied Ha scall’s re quest, stating, “ [w] e will handle this situation.” On Dec ember 6, 2011, Hasc all addre ssed the B oard r eg ardingbullying a t Thomas Paine. ¶ 10 C.H. alleg ed these incidents led to (1) diff iculty sleeping , (2) nig htmares, ( 3) phy sical injury , (4) phy sical illness, (5) stomacha ches, ( 6) hea dache s, (7) wor seningasthma, (8) mental anguish, and (9) e motional dist ress. Ha scall alleg ed these incidents led to (1)

sever e anxiety , (2) menta l anguish, and (3) “ signific ant emotional distress over the hea lth and saf ety of C.H. while at sc hool” and the ina ction by school personne l. ¶ 11 On Octobe r 4, 2012, def endants filed a

combined motion to dism iss plaintiffs’ complaint under se ctions 2-615 and 2- 619 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (Code) (735 I L CS 5/ 2-615, 2-619 ( West 2010)). Under section 2-615, de fenda

nts argued the se cond amende d complaint failed to state a cause of ac tion upon which relief could be grante d. Under section 2-619( a)( 9), def

endants a sserted the y

wer e immune from liability under sections 2-201 a

nd 2-109 of the L ocal Gove rnmental a nd Gover nmental Employ ees Tor

t Immunity Act (Tor t I mmunity

Act) ( 745 I L CS 10/ 2-201, 2-109 ( West 2010)). Def endants attache d aff

idavits of Wil liams and Cooper to a me morandum in support of their se ction 2-619 motion to dism iss. W illiams averre d, in part, as f ollows:
“3. As Superintendent I am responsible for deter mining school district p o li cy in many

are as, including that in the are as of student relations and student discipline; and I exercise discretion in the dete rmination and administration of such policie s. * * *
6. Boa rd Policy 7:180 define s prohibited bullying activities and re qu ires the development of a p ro gra m to implement the policy

. I have deter mined that eac h

-3-attendanc e cente r principal shall be responsible for implementing this policy at the building level so g rade level appropr iate prog rams can be more eff ectively develope d. ***
7. Gene rally
, when an alleg ation of student bullying surfa ces at my level, I must: 1)

asses s t h e cr edibi lity of the alleg ations; 2) assess the sever ity and fre quency of the actions; 3) assess the nature of the actions, i.e., phy sical and/or verba l; 4) assess the ag e, g rade level and maturity level of the students involved; 5) assess the disciplinary history of the students involved; 6) assess which building staff to appropr iately involve in the
proce s s; 7) assess whether to monitor the situation as neede d; 8) take appropr iate disciplinary action ag ainst students when nece ssary

. I followed this very proce ss during the 2011-2012 school year when a lleg ations conce rningC.H. surfac ed.” Cooper ave rre d, in part, as f ollows:

“ 3. As Principal I am responsible for deter mining school district policy in many are a s , including that in the are as of student relat i o n s an d student discipline; and I exercise discretion in the dete rmination and administration of such policie s. 4. Among my duties as Principal, I am re s ponsible for the overa ll operation of Thomas Paine School consistent with the mission and g oals of t h e Urbana School District. The scope of those duties includes instructional prog rams that span traditional

aca demics, fine arts, and social emotional lear ning. Ex amples of other signific ant duties include overse eing building maintenanc e, program evaluation, pe rsonnel manag ement, office operations, and emer g ency proce dures. My duties as Principal als o en t ail that I respond to alleg ations of student bullying and administer discipline to students within my attendanc e ce nter.

***
6. Boa rd Policy 7:180 define s proh i b ited bullying activities and require s the development of a prog ram to implement the policy

. In Urban a School District, eac h attendanc e cente r principal is responsible for implementing a bullying preve ntion
prog ram a

nd updatingit annually . ***

***
8. Gene rally
, when an alleg ation of student bullying surfa ces at my level, I must: 1)

assess the cre dibilit y of the alleg ations; 2) assess th e s ev er i t y and fre quency of the actions; 3) assess the nature of the actions, i.e., phy sical and/or verba l; 4) assess the ag e, g rade level and maturity level of the students involved; 5) assess the disciplinary history of the students involved; 6) assess which building staff to appropr iately involve in the
proce ss; 7) develop a specific plan for addressing t he si tuation; 8) continue to monitor the effec tiveness of the pl an and make necessa ry adjustments to the pl an as ne eded; 9) take appropr iate disciplinary action ag ainst students when nece ssary ; and 10) assess how
my decision may aff

ect the students. I followed this very proce ss during the 2011-2012 school y ear

when a lleg ations conce rningC.H. surfac ed.” ¶ 12 Following a hearing in November 2012, the trial court g rante d d efendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ sec ond amende d complaint with prejudice

.

-4-¶ 13 This appea l followed.

¶ 14 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 15 Plaintiffs argue the trial court err ed in g ranting defe ndants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second a mended c omplaint with prejudice. We disag ree

. ¶ 16 Section 2-619(a )(9) of the Code provides a defe ndant may file a motion for dismiss al of the action on the g rounds “the claim asser ted ag ainst defe ndant is barr ed by other aff irmative
matter avoiding the legal eff ect of or defe ating the claim.” 735 I L CS 5/2-619(a) (9) (West 2010). Section 2-619(a )’s purpose is to provide litigants with a method of disposing of issues of law and easily proved issues of fac t relating to the aff irmative matter ear ly in the litigation. Van Mete r v. Darien Park District , 207 I ll. 2d 359, 367, 799 N.E.2d 273, 278 (2003). ¶ 17 A motion for involunt ar y d i smissal under section 2-619(a )(9) of the Code admits the leg al sufficie ncy of the complaint, admits all well-plea ded fac ts and all rea sonable infere nces there from, and asser

ts an aff irmative matter outside the complaint bars or defe ats the cause of action. K

ea n v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc.
, 235 I ll. 2d 351, 361, 919 N.E.2d 926, 931-32 (2009); Smith v. W

aukegan Park District
, 231 I ll. 2d 111, 120, 896 N.E.2d 232, 238 (2008); Snyder v. Heidelbe rger , 2011 I L 111052, ¶ 8, 953 N.E.2d 415. In a section 2-619(a ) motion, the movant is essentially saying “ ‘Ye s, the complaint was leg al l y s u ff i cient, but an aff irmative matter exis ts that defe ats the claim.’ ” W inters v. W

angler
, 386 I ll. App. 3d 788, 792, 898 N.E.2d 776, 779 (2008). When ruling on the section 2-619(a )(9) motion, the court construes the pleading s “in the light most fa vorable to the nonmoving pa rty” ( Sandholm v. Kueck er , 2012 I L 111443, ¶ 55, 962 N.E.2d 418) and shoul d only g rant the motion “if the plaintiff can prove no set of fac ts that would support a cause of action” ( Snyder , 2011 I L 111052, ¶ 8, 953 N.E.2d 415). A section 2-619(a )(9) motion dismiss al is revie wed de novo

. Kean , 235 I ll. 2d at 361, 919 N.E.2d at 932. ¶ 18 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court err ed in finding defe ndants immune fr o m l i ab i l i t y under sections 2 -2 0 1 an d 2-109 the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/2-201, 2-109 (West 2010)). ¶ 19 The Tort Immunity Act adopted the g ener al principle “ ‘that local g overnme ntal units are liable in tort but limit ed this [l iability ] with an extensive list of immunit ies based on specific
governme nt functions.’ ” Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie
, 183 I ll. 2d 30, 43, 69 7 N. E

. 2 d 699, 707 (1998) (quoting Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights
, 139 I ll. 2d 501, 506, 565 N.E.2d 654, 658 (1990))

. The Tort Immunity Act is in derog ation of the c ommon law and, there fore
, must be st rictly construed ag ainst the publ ic entit ies involved. Aikens v . Morris
, 145 I ll. 2d 273, 278, 583 N.E.2d 487, 490 (1991). “ Unless an immunity provision applies, municipalities are liable in tort to the same extent as private parties.” Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d
at 368-69, 799 N.E.2d at 273. To bar plainti ff s ’ rec overy , g overnme ntal entities bear the burden of proper ly raising and proving that they are immune under the Tort Immunity Act. Van Mete r , 207 I ll. 2d at 368-69, 799 N.E.2d at 279. ¶ 20 The Tort Immunity Act gra nts only immunit ies and defenses; it does not cre ate duties. Rather, the Tort Immunity Act mere ly codifies exis tin g common-law duties, to which the delineate d immunit ies apply

. Arteman v. Clint on Community Unit School District No. 15
,

-5-1 9 8 I l l

. 2d 475, 479, 763 N.E.2d 756, 760 (2002); Village of Bloomingdale v. C DG Enterprises, Inc.
, 196 I ll. 2d 484, 490, 752 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (2001). Theref ore, whether

a local public entity owed a duty of car e and whether that entity enjoy ed immunit y are separ ate issues. Once a court deter mines that a duty exis ts, it then addre sses whether the Tort Immunity Act applies. Arteman
, 198 I ll. 2d at 480, 763 N.E.2d at 76 0 ; Village of Bloomingdale , 196 I ll. 2d at 490, 752 N.E.2d at 1096. ¶ 21 Section 2-201 of the T ort Immunity Act provide s: “Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employ ee servin g i n a position involvin g t he deter

mination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in deter mining policy whe n ac t ing in the exercise of

such discre tion even thoug h abused.” 745 I L CS 10/ 2-201 (West 2010). ¶ 22 In section 2-201, the leg islature immuniz ed “liability for both neg lige nce and willful a nd
wanton misconduct.” In re Chicago Flood Liti gation
, 176 I ll. 2d 179, 196, 680 N.E.2d 265, 273 (1997). Section 2-109 of the statute provides that “[a] local public entity is not liable for

an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee wher e the employee is not liable.” 745 I L CS 10/ 2-109 (West 2010). ¶ 23 Our supreme court has held that the T o rt I m m u n i t y Ac t s ets up a two-par t test to deter mine which em p l o y ees may be g rante d immunit y under section 2-201. First, an employ ee may qualify for immunit y “if he h o ld s e it her a position involving the deter mination of policy or a position involving the exercise of discretion.” (Emphase s in orig inal.) Harinek

v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership
, 181 I l l. 2d 335, 341, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (1998). Second, an employ ee who satisfies the first prong of the test must also have eng ag ed in both the determination of pol icy and the ex erc ise of discre tion when per formingthe ac t

or o m i s s i o n from which the plaintiff’s injury resulted. Harinek
, 181 I ll. 2d at 341, 692 N.E.2d at 1181. Plaintiffs admit defe ndants hold positions that involve the deter mination of policy or the e x erc ise of discre tion. Thus, we foc us on the second pr ongof the test. ¶ 24 Plaintiffs arg

ue that defe ndants’ duties wer e minist eria l acts to which immunit y did not attach. Spec ifically
, plaintiffs claim t hat defendants were mandated by Boa rd pol icy to act in response to the bullying inc idents, without reg ard to the e x erc ise of discre tion. ¶ 25 W e re

j ect plaintiffs’ claim. The acts or omissions of whi ch p l ai n t i ff s co m p l ai n constituted discretionar

y acts and policy deter

minations, not ministerial acts. Public policy decisions are “those that require the g overnme ntal entity or employ ee to balanc e competing interests and to make a judgme nt call as to what solutions will best serve eac h of those interests.” Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1
, 197 I ll. 2d 466, 472, 758 N.E.2d 848, 852 (2001); see also Albers v. Bree n , 346 I ll. App. 3d 799, 808, 806 N.E.2d 667, 675 (2004) (“A school principal dealing with a disciplinary matter must balanc e competing interests–the confide ntiality of his information source , th e appropriate level of punishment, the conce rns of all the children’ s pare n t s, the impact of his decision on the student body g ener ally

–and m ak e a j udg ment as to what balanc e to strike among them.”). Plaintiffs do not argue that defe ndants wer e not in a position involving the deter mination of
p o l i cy but only that defe ndants’ acts or omissions wer e minist eria l, and not discretion ar y

. “[D]i scre tionary acts are tho s e which are unique to a particula r public office
, while

-6-minist eria l acts are those which a person perfor ms on a g iven s tate of fac ts in a prescribe d

manner , in obedienc e to the mandate of leg al authority
, and without ref ere nce to the officia l’s discretion as to the pr opriety of the act.” Snyder v . Curran T ownship , 167 I ll. 2d 466, 474, 657 N.E.2d 988, 993 (1995)

. ¶ 26 Secti o n 2 7 -2 3

. 7 (d ) of the School Code require s that eac h school district “cr eate and maintain a policy on bullying .” (Empha sis added.) 105 IL CS 5/ 27-23.7(d) (West 2010). In this case , the school district cre ated Boa rd Policy 7:180, “Preve nting Bullying, Intimidation, and Har assment.” The policy on bullying provides that the superintende nt or a desig nee shall develop and maintain a program that fully implements and enfor ces the following Boa rd policies: (1) “Ha

rassment of Students Prohibited” (7:20), (2) “Student Discipline” (7:190), (3) “Restriction on Publications” (7:130), and (4) “Ac cess to Electronic Networ ks” (6:235). “F ull implementation” of t h e p o l i cy on bullying includes (1) “conduc ting a prompt and thoroug h investigation of alleg ed incidents of bullying, intimi dation, hara ssing behavior
, or simil ar conduct” and (2) “providing eac h student who violates one or more of these policies with appropr iate conseque nces and reme dial action.” Wil liams stated in his aff idavit that he desig nated to eac h attendanc e cente r principal the responsibility for implementing the Boa rd policy on bully ing at the building leve l. ¶ 27 Plaintiffs further r efe renc e an a dditional paragraph f ound in the policy , which states: “The Superintendent or desig nee shall develop an d m aint ain a prog ram that *** [a] ctively involves students’ pare nts/gua rdians in the re mediation of the behavior (s) of

co n cer n. This includes ensuring that all pare nts/gua rdians are notified, as require d b y State law, whe never

their child eng ag es in ag g ressive be havior.” ¶ 28 The Boa

rd policy assig ns resp o n s i b i l i t y to the superintende nt or his desig nee for the d e v e lop ment and maintenanc e of a prog ram that preve nts students from eng ag ing in bu ll y in g , intimi dation, or hara ssment. Although the policy imposes g ener al duties on the superintende nt, or his desig nee, in the d e velopment and maintenanc e of a prog ram, the policy does not mandate a particula r response to a specific set of circ umstances. The deter mination of whether bullying has occur red and the appropr iate conseque nces and reme dial action are discretionar

y acts under these fac ts. We find the acts or omissions of which plaintiffs complain constituted discre tionary acts. ¶ 29 This court has previously addre ssed whether a scho o l principal’s actions conce rninga bullied student were discretionar y . In Albers , this court stated:
“Certa inly the way that a principal handles an instance of bullying in his schoo l falls within the definition; any student who has been sent to the principal’s office could attest that he has broad discretion in how to handle such situations. Pla i n t i ff [ m o ther]

rec ognized the uniqueness of the principal’s function when her firs t re sponse to [her son’s] bullying problem was t o re p o rt it to [t he principal]. [The social worke r], too, repor ted the alleg ations to [t he principal] when she decide d that something neede d to be done to protec t [ the student].” Albers , 346 I ll. App. 3d at 808-09, 806 N.E.2d at 675.
See also Harrison
, 197 I ll. 2d at 474, 758 N.E.2d at 852 (principa l’s ref usal to l et s t u d ent leave school ear ly was a discretionar y act)

. We conclude that the acts and omissions of which plaintiffs complain constituted discretionar y acts and policy deter

minations and, there fore
,

-7-defe ndants are immune under sections 2-201 and 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS

10/2-201, 2-109 (West 2010)). ¶ 30 Plaintiffs next arg ue that section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act provides a willful a nd
wanto n ex ception to the immunit ies otherwise provided by section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 2-202 states that “[a ] public employ ee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enfor ceme nt of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct.” 745 I L CS 10/2-202 (West 2010). “The deter mination of whether an office r is executing or enfor cing a law is a fac tual one which must be made in light of t h e ci rcumstances in eac h case .” Aikens
, 145 I ll. 2d at 286, 583 N.E.2d at 493. Applying the fac ts of this case as alleg ed in plaintiffs’ second amende d complaint, it is clea r defe ndants wer e not executing or enfor cing any law. Plaintiffs a lleg e that C.H. was bullied by classmates and defe ndants failed to comply with the Boa rd’s policy on bullying. Plaintiffs have not alleg ed or show n h o w defe ndants’ actions or omissions can be considere d to be either the execution or enfor ceme nt of a law

. ¶ 31 Moreove r, no such exception for willful and wa nton misconduct is stated in the text of section 2-201 (745 I L CS 10/2-201 (West 2010)). Our supreme court has stated that when the leg islature intends to except willful and wanton misconduct from the provisions of an immunit y statute, it has “ ‘ “unambiguously done so.” ’ ” DeSme t v. County of Rock Island
, 219 I ll. 2d 497, 514, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1041 (2006) (quoting Village of B loomingdale
, 196 I ll. 2d at 491, 752 N.E.2d at 1096, quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District
, 171 I ll. 2d 378, 391, 6 6 5 N.E.2d 808, 814 (1996)) ; see also Chicago Flood Liti gation
, 176 I ll. 2d at 196, 680 N.E.2d at 273 (whe re the leg islature omitted an immunit y exception for willful and wanton conduct from the plain languag e of section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act, the leg islature
must have intended to immuniz e liability fo r b o th neg lige nce and willful and wanton mi s co n duct). Acc ording ly
, we reje ct plaintiffs’ arg ument that section 2-202’s immunit y exception for willful and wanton misconduct should be appli ed to narr ow the scope of defe ndants’ immunit

y u n d e r s e c ti o n 2

- 201, since the plain languag e of section 2-201 contains no such exception. ¶ 32 Plaintiffs relianc e on Murray v. Chicago Y outh Center
, 224 I ll. 2d 213, 864 N.E.2d 176 (2007), is misplaced. In Murray
, the supreme court explained that a statute that is particula r and relates to only one subject will preva il over one that applies to case s g ener ally

. Murray
, 224 I ll. 2d at 2 3 3
, 8 6 4 N. E .2d at 188. In Murray
, the 13-y ear -old plaintiff was rende red a quadripleg ic from a trampoline acc ident during an extracurr icular lunch period tumbling class. Murray
, 224 I ll. 2d at 217, 864 N.E.2d at 179. The supreme court deter mined that section 3

- 1 0 9 o f th e Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/3-109 (West 1992)), which specific ally

cover ed immunit y for a person’ s voluntary par t i cipation in hazardous rec reational activities–including trampolining–pr evailed over sections 2-201 (745 I L CS 10/2-201 (West 1992)) ( immunit y

for injuries r esulting f

rom ac t or omission i n deter mining policy

) and 3- 108(a) (745 I L CS 10/3-108(a) (W es t 1992)) (immunity for injuries cause d by failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public proper ty). Thus, the plaintiffs wer e entitled
to rely on section 3-109’s exception for willful and wanton misconduct, and the defe ndants could not rely on the more complete immunit y p ro v i d ed by sections 2-201 and 3-108(a ). Murray , 224 I ll. 2d at 234, 864 N.E.2d at 188-89.

-8-¶ 33 He re, there is no provision in the Tort Immunity Act direc tly addre ssing the s i t u at i o n

g iving rise to plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs wer e injured when C.H. was bullied by classmates and defe ndants failed to appropr iately respond. Unlike trampolining, bullying is not specific ally listed in any section of the Tort Immunity Ac t

. T h u s, in the case at bar, defe ndants’ immunit y from liability is not subject t o t h e willful and wanton conduct exception found in section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act. ¶ 34 Plaintiff

s al s o ar gue that section 24-24 of the School Code (105 I L CS 5/24-24 (West 2010)), and not the Tort Immunity Act, g overns the extent of the immunit y to which defe ndants are entitled. Section 24-24 provides that teac hers or other educational employ ees enjoy the same immunit y from suits by their students as a pare nt or guardia n enjoy s ag ainst suits by a child. 105 I L CS 5/24-24 (West 2010). Thus, plaintiffs argue, based on the School Code, educa

tors are not liable to their students for ordinary neg lige nt conduct but are liable for willful and wanton conduct. Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education
, 63 I ll. 2d 165, 173, 347 N.E.2d 705, 7 0 9 (1 9 76). Plaintiffs argue that section 24-24 of the School Code
preva ils over section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act and, conseque ntly
, defe ndants here are not immune from a cla im alleg ing w illful and wanton misconduct. We disag ree

. ¶ 35 We rely upon the rea soning of our supreme court in Henrich v. Libertyville High School
, 186 I ll. 2d 381, 712 N.E.2d 298 (1999). In Henrich
, a high school student had spine fusion
surg ery

. The student’s phy sician advised that he was perma nently restric ted from any contac t sports in phy sical education class. The high school knew of this restriction, but less than a
y ear afte r the surg ery , a substitut e instructor required t h e student to participate in a water basketba ll g ame during phy sical education class. The student was sever ely and perma nently injured. He lat er fi l ed a complaint alleg ing the school district was willful and wanton. Henrich
, 186 I ll. 2d at 384-85, 712 N.E.2d at 300-01. The district filed a motion to dismiss
, arguing that it enjoy ed absolute immu n i t y u n d er sections 3-108(a ) and 3-109 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 I L CS 10/3-108(a ), 3-109 (West 2002) ). The student responde d that the school distr i ct h ad only limit ed immunit y under sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code (105 I L CS 5/24-24, 34-84a (West 2002)). Henrich , 186 I ll. 2d at 385, 712 N.E.2d at 301. ¶ 36 T h e s up re m e court conclude d that the Tort Immunity Act shielded the school distric t from liability

. Henrich
, 186 I ll. 2d at 395, 712 N.E.2d at 306. Thoug h the student argued that the specific provisions of the School Code preva iled over the g ener al provisions of the Tort Immunity Act, that distinction was not dispositi ve: “[T] he plain languag e of section 3-108(a ) of t he Tort Immunity Act im muniz es a local publi c entity ’s fa ilure to supervise a n activity

on or the use of any public proper ty ***. The leg islature could not have made its intent any plainer.” Henrich
, 186 I ll. 2d at 3 9 1
, 712 N.E.2d at 304. Fur ther, construing the statutes toge ther, the court stated that eac h stood “in its own sphere .” Henrich
, 186 I ll. 2d at 392, 712 N.E.2d at 304. The School Code immunit y provision applies to both p ri v at e and public schools; the Tort Immunity Act immunit y provision applies only to public schools. Henrich
, 186 I ll. 2d at 392, 712 N.E.2d at 304. The court rea soned t h at the leg islature, there fore
, intended to g rant public schools and their employ ees g reater protec tion than private schools and their e mploy ees. Henrich , 186 I ll. 2d at 392, 712 N.E.2d at 304. See Arteman , 198 I ll. 2d at 487
, 7 6 3 N.E.2d at 764 (holding that sections 24-24 and 34-84a of the School Code

-9-provided no immunit y from the plaintiff’s alleg ations that the school district failed to provide

a student with safe ty equipment during phy sical education class, but that section 2-201 of the Tort I mmunity Act did). Pursuant to Henrich
, we conclude that section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act provides immunit y to d efe ndants for what is alleg ed here to be willful and wanton conduc t. ¶ 37 Plaintiffs nex t contend that the Tor t I mmunity

Act does not apply beca

use their c laims fall wi t h i n a specia l duty exception. Be cause we find that the Tort Immunity Act fully immuniz es defe ndants from plaintiff’s alleg ations, a discussion of the specia l duty exception is unnece ssary

. See Zimmerman
, 183 I ll. 2d at 46, 697 N.E.2d at 708 (“ t h e s p ec i al duty doctrine cannot, and was not intended to, contravene the immunit ies provi d ed to g overnme ntal entities under the T ort Immunity Act”) ; see a lso Harinek, 181 I ll. 2d at 347, 692 N.E.2d at 1183-84 (“the specia l duty doctrine may not operate to impose liability upon

a public entity afte r a court has found th at entity immune from liability under the Tort Immunity Act”)

. ¶ 38 Whil e we are sy mpathetic to plaintiffs’ claims and acknow ledg e the seemingharshne ss of the result, we are obligated to follow our supreme court’s interpr et at ion of the Tort Immunity Act and find defe ndants are immune to liability for the alleg ed acts or omissions

. Be cause we resolve the instant case on immunit y g rounds, we need not addre ss the additional issue of whether the trial court err ed in g ranting defe ndants’ motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code

.

¶ 39 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 40 For

the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the trial cour

t’s judgme nt.

¶ 41 Affir

med.

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