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[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3233 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3233

To support the implementation of the National Defense Strategy for the 
                 United States, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 12, 2019

Mr. Gallagher introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
   Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on 
  Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To support the implementation of the National Defense Strategy for the 
                 United States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``National Defense Strategy 
Implementation Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) According to the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), 
        ``China and Russia are developing advanced weapons and 
        capabilities that could threaten our critical infrastructure 
        and our command and control architecture'' and ``China and 
        Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, 
        attempting to erode American security and prosperity''. The NSS 
        sets the country's primary focus as sustaining favorable 
        regional balances of power in the key regions of the world, and 
        the use of our alliance and partnership architecture as the 
        mechanism for doing so.
            (2) The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) rightly 
        stresses that long-term, strategic competition with China and 
        Russia should be the top priority of the United States and the 
        Department of Defense and require both increased and sustained 
        investment, both because of the magnitude of the threats they 
        pose to United States security and prosperity today and the 
        potential for those threats to increase in the future.
            (3) To meet such challenges, the NDS states that the 
        strategy of the United States will be to expand the competitive 
        space while pursuing three distinct lines of effort, including 
        rebuilding military readiness to build a more lethal Joint 
        Force, strengthening alliances and attracting new partners, and 
        reforming the Department's business practices for greater 
        performance and affordability.
            (4) In the January 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the 
        United States Intelligence Community stated that ``Russia and 
        China seek to shape the international system and regional 
        security dynamics and exert influence over the politics and 
        economics of states in all regions of the world and especially 
        in their backyards''.
            (5) ``China and Russia will present a wide variety of 
        economic, political, counterintelligence, military, and 
        diplomatic challenges to the United States and its allies. We 
        anticipate that they will collaborate to counter U.S. 
        objectives, taking advantage of rising doubts in some places 
        about the liberal democratic model.''.
            (6) The December 2018 U.S. Government Accountability Office 
        (GAO) report to congressional committees on Long-Range Emerging 
        Threats Facing the United States as Identified by Federal 
        Agencies stated that, ``China is marshalling its diplomatic, 
        economic, and military resources to facilitate its rise as a 
        regional and global power. This may challenge U.S. access to 
        air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains. China's use of 
        cyberspace and electronic warfare could impact various U.S. 
        systems and operations. Russia is increasing its capability to 
        challenge the United States across multiple warfare domains, 
        including attempting to launch computer-based directed energy 
        attacks against U.S. military assets. Russia is also increasing 
        its military and political presence in key locations across the 
        world.''.
            (7) According to the 2018 Assessment and Recommendations by 
        the National Defense Strategy Commission (NDSC), ``the U.S. 
        military could suffer unacceptably high casualties and loss of 
        major capital assets in its next conflict. It might struggle to 
        win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia. The United 
        States is particularly at risk of being overwhelmed should its 
        military be forced to fight on two or more fronts 
        simultaneously. Additionally, it would be unwise for and 
        irresponsible not to expect adversaries to attempt debilitating 
        kinetic, cyber, or other types of attacks against Americans at 
        home while they seek to defeat our military abroad. U.S. 
        military superiority is no longer assured and the implications 
        for American interests and American security are severe.''.
            (8) As such, the NDSC states that ``DOD and the 
        Congressional committees that oversee national security must 
        focus current and future investments on operational challenges 
        such as protecting critical bases of operations; rapidly 
        reinforcing and sustaining forces engaged forward; assuring 
        information systems and conducting effective information 
        operations; defeating anti-access/area-denial threats; 
        deterring, and if necessary defeating, the use of nuclear or 
        other strategic weapons in ways that fall short of justifying a 
        large-scale nuclear response; enhancing the capabilities and 
        survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure; 
        and developing an interoperable joint command, control, 
        communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
        reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that supports the warfare 
        of the future.''.
            (9) Additionally, the NDSC states that ``Making informed 
        decisions about strategic, operational, and force development 
        issues requires a foundation of state-of-the-art analytic 
        capabilities. . . . Specifically, the Department needs a 
        rigorous force development plan that connects its investment 
        strategy with its key priorities of winning in conflict and 
        competing effectively with China and Russia.''.
            (10) The March 2019 GAO report on Defense Strategy: Revised 
        Analytic Approach Needed to Support Force Structure Decision-
        Making, found that ``The Department of Defense's (DOD) analytic 
        approach has not provided senior leaders with the support they 
        need to evaluate and determine the force structure necessary to 
        implement the National Defense Strategy.''.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress as follows:
            (1) The United States must be prepared to meet the 
        challenges of competitive nations that are seeking to diminish 
        the United States military advantage and threaten vital United 
        States interests, and China is the most significant such 
        challenge.
            (2) The National Defense Strategy provides the correct 
        framework to prepare for major-power competition and conflict, 
        but adequate resources are required and implementation across 
        the entire Department of Defense enterprise in line with the 
        focus of that strategy on readying the Joint Force for 
        competition and conflict against China and Russia.
            (3) The United States is committed to upholding a free and 
        open international order that promotes republican government 
        and governance in concert with collective security, 
        international laws, and human dignity while respecting the 
        sovereignty of other countries.
            (4) The Department of Defense should urgently and at scale 
        adapt the Joint Force's shape, posture, development vectors, 
        and employment models to maintain military advantage alongside 
        our allies and partners against China and Russia. To do this, 
        the Department of Defense should develop adapted, new 
        warfighting concepts at the operational level of war that allow 
        the United States to achieve its political objectives in 
        politically tenable ways. In concert, the Joint Force should 
        become more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready to deal with 
        Chinese and Russian strategies and theories of victory.
            (5) Investments should be focused on expanding United 
        States operational options while constraining those to 
        strategic competitors, such as China and Russia.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND PLANS TO DEFEAT CHINA AND 
              RUSSIA.

    Not later than February 1, 2020, and then biannually thereafter, 
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report on the Department of Defense's operational concepts 
and plans to defeat China and Russia in competition and war, including 
on key strategically significant scenarios identified in the National 
Defense Strategy that also addresses each of the following:
            (1) Ways of employing the force in peace time to 
        effectively compete and deter China and Russia below the 
        threshold of war while ensuring readiness for war.
            (2) Ways of adapting innovative, operational concepts 
        needed for strategically significant and plausible scenarios 
        related to China and Russia.
            (3) Ways of addressing operational challenges related to 
        achieving the strategic advantage against China and Russia 
        related to nuclear, space, cyber, conventional, and 
        unconventional means in warfighting doctrine.
            (4) The technologies, force developments, posture and 
        capabilities, readiness, infrastructure, organization, 
        personnel, and other elements of the defense program necessary 
        to enable these operational concepts and its implementation 
        listed in paragraphs (1) through (3).
            (5) The ability of the National Security Innovation Base to 
        support the operational concepts listed in paragraphs (1) 
        through (3).
            (6) The resources and defense investments necessary to 
        support the operational concepts and its implementation, 
        including budget recommendations.
            (7) The risks associated with the operational concepts, 
        including the relationship and tradeoffs between missions, 
        risks, and resources.
            (8) The likely needed boundaries of conflict needed to 
        achieve these operational concepts.
            (9) Measures and metrics to track the effectiveness of the 
        operational concepts and plans.

SEC. 5. ACTIONS TO INCREASE ANALYTIC SUPPORT.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall direct the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Director of the Joint Staff, and 
the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, in consultation 
with the head of each military service, to jointly develop and 
implement a plan to strengthen the analytic capabilities, expertise, 
and processes necessary to meet the National Defense Strategy.
    (b) Elements.--The plan under subsection (a) shall include--
            (1) an assessment of the decision support capability of the 
        Department of Defense, specifically the analytic expertise the 
        Department is using to link National Defense Strategy 
        objectives to innovative approaches for meeting future 
        challenges, including winning in conflict and competing 
        effectively against China and Russia;
            (2) an approach for comparing competing analyses and 
        conducting joint analyses for force structure to support senior 
        leaders in implementing the National Defense Strategy;
            (3) a determination of the analytic products and support 
        required to implement the National Defense Strategy, including 
        the ability to update these products to reflect current 
        strategy, intelligence assessments, and future threats; and
            (4) such other matters as the Secretary of Defense 
        determines to be appropriate.
    (c) Briefing Required.--Not later than March 1, 2020, the Secretary 
of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a 
briefing on the plan under subsection (a).

SEC. 6. EXTENSION AND ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 
              NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES.

    Section 942 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2367) is amended--
            (1) by amending subsection (f) to read as follows:
    ``(f) Annual Update on National Defense Strategy.--
            ``(1) In general.--On an annual basis during the covered 
        period, the chair and vice chair of the Commission, or their 
        designees, shall jointly submit to the congressional defense 
        committees a report that assesses whether, and to what extent, 
        the Department of Defense executed the National Defense 
        Strategy in the preceding fiscal year.
            ``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
        shall assess the performance of the Department of Defense with 
        respect to each of the elements described in sections 4 and 
        5(b) of the National Defense Strategy Implementation Act.
            ``(3) Covered period defined.--In this subsection, the term 
        `covered period' means a period that--
                    ``(A) begins not later than 180 days after the date 
                of the enactment of this subsection; and
                    ``(B) ends on the date on which the first National 
                Defense Strategy is submitted to Congress after such 
                date of enactment.''.
            (2) by striking subsection (g); and
            (3) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (g).

SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS AND GUIDANCE.

    (a) Congressional Defense Committees.--In this Act, the term 
``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given that term in 
section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
    (b) Operational Challenges.--In this Act, the term ``operational 
challenges'' means the principal operational challenges to meeting the 
defense objectives described in the most recent National Defense 
Strategy, as such challenges are defined by the Secretary of Defense in 
guidance issued to the Department of Defense. The guidance issued by 
the Secretary of Defense under the preceding sentence shall--
            (1) specifically identify operational challenges to the 
        Department's principal strategic priorities of winning in 
        conflict and competing effectively with China and Russia; and
            (2) be made available in unclassified and publicly 
        accessible form.
                                 <all>
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