Filed 2/7/23 K roenke Sports & Entertainment v. Salomon CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

KROENKE SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT, LLC et al.

,

Plaintiff s and Respondents

,

v.

NICOLAS A. SALOMON

,

Defendant and Appellant

. B 3 20536

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 18STCP02712, 19STCP00654 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County

, David Sotelo , Judge. Dismissed

. Fish & Richardson and Jeremy D. Anderson for Defendant
and Appellant

. W ilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Susan K. Leader and Will A. Ostrander for Plaintiffs and Respondents

.2 INTRODUCTION

Kroenke Sports & Entertainment, LLC and its affiliates, Outdoor Channel Holdings, Inc., SkyCam, LLC, and CableCam, LLC, (collectively, Kroenke) filed an arbitration demand against Nicolas Salomon, former president of SkyCam and CableCam, claiming he misapp ropriated confidential information . Th e arbitrator awarded Kroenke $440,126.48

, plus interest

, on its
claims . I n March 2019 the trial court entered judgment
confirm ing the award. The arbitrator then issued a second award, dismissing Salomon’s countercla ims against Kroenke . I n March 2022 the court entered judgment confirming that award. Salomon appeals from th e March 2022 judgment. Salomon challenges the March 2019 judgment on the ground the trial court lacked authority to confirm the arbitrator’s
first award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.4

. 1 He
also challenges the March 2022 judgment , arguing t he court
should have vacated the arbitrator’s second award because the
arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the c ase

. Because t he March 2019 judgment was a final judgment
from which Salomon did not timely appeal

, we dismiss as untimely the portion of his appeal challenging th at judgment.
We dismiss the rest of Salomon’s appeal as moot becaus e, in a separate lawsui t in Delaware , he has obtained the relief sought by his counterclaims in the arbitration and therefore reversing the March 2022 judgment would provide him no effective relief

.

1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.3 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Arbitrator Issues an Award, and the Trial C ourt Enters a Judgmen t In January 2018 Kroenke filed an arbitration demand against Salomon with Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS) . Kroenke asserted breach of contract and
other claims

, based on allegations Salomon h ad misappropriated
confidential information from SkyCam and CableCam before they
terminated his employment as their president in 2014. Kroenke
filed the demand pursuant to a 2009 employment agreement with
Salomo n , which provided JAMS would administer arbitration between the parties. In February 2018 Salomon filed a response to the demand
that included a request to dismiss the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. Citing a 2011 employment agreement between the parties that provi ded the American Arbitration Association (AAA) would administer arbitration, Salomon argued AAA , not JAMS, had to conduct any arbitration between the partie s

. Salomon did not assert any counterclaims in his response to
Kroenke’s demand for arbitration , bu t “reserve[d] the right to

assert

. . . such Counterclaims as may be available to him” in the

event his jurisdiction al challenge did not succeed

. In a March 2018 email exchange with th e arbitrator’s case administrator , Salomon indicated he was without counsel in the
arbitration and asserted Kroenke was obligated to provide him counsel under an “Indemnification Agreement” between the4

parties

. 2 Salomon wrote: “Can you please see if the arbitrator
can address this lack of counsel issue ? I would like to have counsel for the hearing. ” 3
Later i n Ma rch 2018
, the arbitrator held a telephonic hearing on Salomon’s j urisdictional c hallenge

. Salomon participated without counsel and again claimed Kroenke was obligated to indemnify him in the arbitra tion proceeding.
Kroenke argued that indemnification was “an issue to be resolved
at the end of the case” and that Salomon’s request for indemnification was “not ripe.” The arbitrator told the parties “the issue of indemnification raised by Mr. Salomon w as reserved and would be addressed at a later date” and urged Salomon to
obtain counsel. T he arbitrator issued a written order rejecting
Salomon’s jurisdictional challenge and ruling the “arbitration properly is a JAMS arbitration. ” T he arbitrator observed that, at

a n earlier conference in the arbitration

, he had ruled he would
decide the jurisdictional issue before considering Kroenke ’s
request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and Salomon’s request for “ a d etermination of a right to indemnification for his attorneys’ fees in connection with this
arbitration .’’ In May 2018 the arbitrator held a hearing on Kroenke’s request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction , after which t he arbitra tor issued a written ruling

2 Salomon

, however, was represented at that time by counsel in an action he had filed against Kroenke in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

.

3 It is not clear what hearing Salomon was referring to.5

granting the request. In his ruling the arbitrator stated that
Salomon had participated in the hearing without counsel, that during the hearing the arbitrator advised him repeatedly to obtain counsel to represent him in the arb itration, and that during the hearing the arbitrator also stated Salomon’s “repetition of a right to indemnification or the like is no reason or excuse for a stay or further delay of this arbitration.” The
arbitrator added that

, after the hearing, Salomon submitted by
email a request for a stay of any decision on Kro e nke’s “request for injunctive relief

,” which the arbitrator “ denied or denied again

— (A) because Mr. Salomon,

. . . without specifics, said that he is close to retaining (unnamed) new co unsel, but (again without specifics) is having difficulty because of ‘ who Claimants

are, ’ and (B) he should not have to defend this arbitration unless
and un til Claimants are required to advance his legal fees.” In July 2018 the arbitrator held a hearing in Los Angeles on the merits of Kroenke’s claims. Despite having agreed to the date and location of the hearing and having received notice of the hearing a month in advance, Salomon did not participate. At the hearing Kroenke presented extensive evidence in support of its
claims. On September 6, 2018 the arbitrator issued a “Partial Final
Award” (the “ f

irst a rbitration a ward”), awarding Kroenke $440,126.28

, plus interest

, on its claims. The award also provided: “This Partial Final Award does n ot cover Mr. Salomon’s claim for indemnification, which shall remain
reserved for future resolution

— sub j ect to the express condition
that Mr. Salomon shall file and serve a counterclaim in this arbitration, within ten (10) days of the issuance of this Partial Final Award, setting forth his claim for indemnification,6

including the basis or bases for that claim.” The award further provided: “Thi s Partial Final Award fully and finally determines all claims, remedie s

. . . and principal issues and contentions concerning Mr. Salomon’s liability to Claimants in this arbitration. [¶] Except for Mr. Salomon’s reserved claim for indemnification, all c laims, issues and contentions which have not been granted

— expressly or by necessary implication

— in this Partial Final Award, are and shall be deemed denied.”
O n November 21, 2018 , with Salomon not having filed or served any counterclaim in the arbitration

, Kroenke filed a petition in Los Angeles County Superior Court to confirm the
first arbitration a ward. Salomon, represented by attorneys S. Michael Kernan and R. Paul Katrinak, opposed the petition. T he court granted the petition

, and on March 25, 2019 it entered judgment confirming the first arbitration a ward. Salomon did

not file a notice of appeal within 60 days of the clerk’s serving him with notice of entry of the March 25, 2019 judgment. 4

B. The Arbitrator Issues a Second Award

, Salomon Files a Petition To Vacate It, and t he Trial C ourt Denies the
Petition
T he day after the trial court entered its March 25, 2019 judgment

, the arbitrator issued an order titled “O rder of March 26, 2019.” In it the arbitrator stated that “earlier this month

. . . JAMS added [ Kernan ] and his law firm as Mr. Salomon’s counsel
in this arbitration .” The arbitrator also stated that , despite the

4 I n Jul y 2019 a state court in Texas granted a petition by Kroenke to domesticat e the judgment for purposes of enforcement. Salomon asserts his appeal of that ruling is pending.7

10

- day deadline in the first arbitration a war d, Salomon still had
not filed a counterclaim for indemnification in the arbitration. Nevertheless, “[a]s a last chance opportunity,” the arbitrator stated he was giving Salomon an other 10 days ( from the date of
th e order ) to file and serve a counterclaim

. On the (second) tenth day, Kernan , on Salomon’s behalf

, filed and served counterclaims in the arbitration for express indemnity, implied indemnity, equitable indemnity, and declaratory relief

. Salomon alleged that , under the 2011

e mployment a greement and a separate 2011 “ Indemnification Agreement

, ” Kroenke “should have completely indemnified [him]
in this action

, ” but refused to do so. Salomon sought to reco ver “all damages” he had suffered “as a result of the initiation of this
arbitration” and “full and complete indemnity of [him] by [Kroenke] in this arbitration.”
Kroenke moved to dismiss the counterclaims , arguing it had no obligation to indemnify Salom o n because he had engaged in “bad faith, intentional misconduct.” Kroenke also disput ed Salomon’s suggestion it “had certain obligations to him that arose prior to the final disposition of this matter ” because “‘an indemnity claim does not accrue until the underlying action is resolved.’” Kroenke acknowledged that the 2011 Indemnification Agreement

— specifically, a provision Salomon and the arbitrator referred to as “section 7”

— provided Kroenke would “pay the expenses incurred by Indemnitee in defending any proceeding in advance of its final disposition, provided that, to the extent required by law, the payment of expenses in advance

. . . shall be made only upon receipt of an undertaking.” Kroenke argued

, however, Salomon “repeatedly refused to provide an undertaking [8

] and indeed acknowledges in his Counter

- Claim that none was provided.”
After Kroenke filed its motion to dismiss the counterclaims

, Kernan withdrew as counsel for Salomon

. Salomon, r epresenting himself, filed an opposition to the motion , attaching numerous
exhibits

. He argued he was entitled both to in demnification and

to “ advancement for legal fees to defend himself,” the latter “without provision of an undertaking.”
The day before the scheduled hearing on Kroenke’s motion
to dismiss hi s counterclaims, Salomon engaged new counsel, Jeremy Anderson , who immediately wrote the arbitrator to
request a one

- week continuance of the hearing. The arbitrator granted th e request
, on the condition Salomon and Anderson not do anything to “stay, delay, obstruct, or impede” the resolution of
Kroenke’s motion to dismi ss. The arbitrator prohibited all parties from filing any additional briefing, evidence, or written submissions relating to the pending motion. On August 5, 2019, one day before the re scheduled hearing on Kroenke’s motion to dismiss Salomon’s counterclaims

, Anderson sent counsel for Kroenke a n email that attached an “Undertaking for Advancement of Fees and Expenses

, ” signed and dated that day by Salomon. This document stated that

, “[s]ubject to the terms of” section 7 of the 2011 Indemnification Agreement

, Salomon was undertaking to repay Kroenke all attorneys’ fees and expenses paid by Kroenke on Salomon’s behalf in advance of the final disposition of the arbitration proceeding , in the event it was ultimately determined S alomon
was not entitled to indemnification

. Anderson also sent the arbitrator a copy of this email, including the attached undertaking by Salomon.9 The following day Anderson appeared for Salomon at the hearing on Kroenke’s motion to dismiss Salomon’s cou nterclaims

. C onceding the counterclaims for indemnification lacked merit,
Anderson focused on Salomon’s request for advancement of his attorneys’ fees and costs . He argued th e undertaking Salomon
had provided entitled him to the advancement under section 7 of the 2011 Indemnification Agreemen t. In September 2019 the arbitrator issued (and amended in no relevant respect) a “Partial Final Award No. 2” (the “second arbitration award”). In it the arbitrator dismissed with prejudice Salomon’s counterclaims for indemnification on the ground
Salomon had “conceded or, at a minimum, failed to sustain any entitlement to any form of indemnification.” C onstru ing Salomon’s request for advancement of attorneys’ fees under
section 7 of the 2011 Indemnif ication Agreement as a separate
counterclaim , the arbitrator ruled Salomon had “failed to sustain any entitlement to Section 7 advancement

. . . .” This ruling
rested on the arbitrator’s determination that under Delaware
law

, which the parties agreed appl ied

, the undertaking Salomon had provided was not valid because he knew

, when he provided it, he could not “meet his contingent performance obligation to repay” the advanced fees. 5 The arbitrator dismissed with prejudice Salomon’s counterclaim “for Secti on 7 advancement of

5 The arbitrator based this conclusion about Salomon’s inability to repa y the advanced fees on, among other things, (a) Salomon’s filing in the United State s Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit an “Indigent Financial Affidavit

, ” dated August 3, 2019; (b) hi s recent statement to the arbitrator he was “consulting bankruptcy counsel”; and (c) the “more than $600,000” he already owed Kroenke as a result of , among other things, the earlier award on Kroenke’s arbitration’s claims

.10

expenses incurred, if any, to and including the date of issuance of this Partial Final Award” and dismissed without prejudice “any claim(s)

. . . for Section 7 advancement of expense s incur red or to
be incurred after Mr. Salomon provide s [a] valid and enforceable
Section 7 undertaking.” In January 2020 Salomon ( from then on represented by counsel) filed a petition in Los Angeles County Superior Court to
vacate the second arbitration award

. Salomon argued the court
should vacate the award because the arbitrator refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, including when , in granting
the one

- week continuance of the hearing on Kroenke’s motion to dismiss Salomon’s counterclaims, the arbitrator prohibite d the parties from submitting further briefing or evidence relating to
the motion

. Salomon argued that, had the arbitrator allowed him to submit additional “legal and fa ctual evidence,” he “would have been able to demonstrate [his] right to advance indemn ification

. ”
Kroenke opposed the petition to vacate the award , arguing that
Salomon had sufficient opportunity to present his counterclaims
in the arbitration and that the arbitrator did not improperly
refuse to hear evidence. On July 7, 2020 the trial co urt denied Salomon’s petition to vacate the second arbitration award

.

C. Meanwhile, in Delaware . . .
In October 2019

— i.e., after the arbitrator issued the second
arbitration award , but before Salomon filed his petition t o vacate it

— Salomon filed a “Verified Complaint for Advancement of Legal Expenses and Attorneys’ Fees” in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Salomon alleged in that action that , under the 2011
Indemnification Agreement, he was entitled to advancement of legal expenses incurred in connection with the arbitration11

proceeding , including any appeal from judgments confirming the first or second arbitration awards, as well as expenses incurred in
connection with the Delaware action

. In February 2020 the Delaware Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of Salomon. Finding Salomon’s August 5, 2019 undertaking sufficient under Delaware law, t he

court ordered Kroenke to advance Salomon attorneys’ fees and other legal expenses incurred from August 5, 2019 in connection
with the arbitration and the Delaware proceeding

.

D

. After W

e Dismiss an Earlier Appeal by Salomon

, He
Files This One
On September 4, 2020 Salomon filed a notice of appeal

, purporting to appeal from (1) the trial court’s March 25, 2019 judgment, which he argue d was “ ‘ not appealable [ sic ] ’ because it was interlocutory, ” and (2) the trial court’s July 7, 2020 order denying his petition to vacate the second arbitration award

. In
March 2022 w e dismissed the appeal on the ground Salomon had not timely appealed from an appealable order or judgment. ( Kroenke Sports & Entertainment, LLC v. Salomon (Mar. 15, 2022, B307451) [o rder of d ismissal ] ( Kroenke I

).) Regarding Salomon’s attempt to ap peal from the March 25, 2 019 judgment, we observed that, “if Salomon is right that the March 25, 2019 judgment is not appealable, he can’t appeal from it. If, on the other hand, Salomon is wrong and the judgment is appealable, his appeal from it is untime ly because, as he concedes, he filed his notice of appeal more than 60 days

— indeed, more than a year
and a half

— after the court clerk served him with notice of entry of the judgment. [Citation.] Either way, Salomon’s appeal from the March 25, 2019 judgme nt must be dismissed.” ( Kroenke I .)12 Nor, w e held , could Salomon appeal from the July 7, 2020 order denying his petition to vacate the second arbitration award

, because an order denying a petition to vacate an arbitration
award is not appealable , but is instead reviewable on appeal from a judgment confirming the award. As we explained, quoting from Law Offices of David S. Karton v. Segreto (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th

1
, at pages 8

- 9
, “‘ “ once a petition to confirm, correct, or vacate is filed, the trial court has only four choices: It may (1) confirm the award, (2) correct the award and confirm it as corrected, (3) vacate the award, or (4) dismiss the proceedings.’” [Citation.] ‘ If
a trial court dismisses the petition, it results in an appealable
order. [Citation.] If the trial court which does not dismiss the petition also does not correct or vacate an arbitration award, it

must confirm the award. Entry of judgment in conformity
therewith is required [ citation ], resulting in an appealable judgment under . . . section 1294, subdivision (d). Similarly, if
the nondismissing trial court does not confirm the award (or
confirm [i]t as corrected), the court must vacate it, resulting in an appealable order under

. . . section 1294, subdi vision (c)

. ’ ” W e then observed : “None of the parties here, including Salomon,
asked the court to confirm the arbitrator’s second award and enter judgment (although presumably Salomon still could, if he wanted to obtain a judgment against himself).” ( Kroenke I

, supra .)
Which is what Salomon did next

. And o n March 17, 2022
the trial court entered a judgment confirming the second
arbitration award , from which Salomon (this time) timely appealed.13 DISCUSSION

A. Salomon Cannot Challenge t he March 25, 2019 Judgment Because It Was a Final Judgment from
Which He Did Not Timely Appeal
Salomon argues the trial court lacked authority to e nter it s March 25, 2019 judgment confirming the first arbitration a ward
because the latter was not an “award” under section 1283.4

. 6
Salomon can no longer challenge t he March 25, 2019 judgment, however, because it was a final judgment from which he did not
time ly appeal. “A judgment is final, and therefore appealable, when it embodies ‘the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding’ [citation]. A judgment constitutes the final determination of the parties’ rights ‘“where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with [its] terms

. . . .”’ ” ( Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1138; see ibid. [“ It is a judgment’s substance, not its form or label, which determines whether it is final.” ].) If a judgment is final, and therefore appealable, “an aggrieved party must file a

6 Salomon argues the first arbitration a ward was not an award under section 1283.4 because it left his “advancement claims

. . . undecided.” (See § 1283.4 [an award must, among other things, “include a determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy ” ].) We do not decide whether the first arbitration award was an “award” within the meaning of section 1283.4 because, as we explain, Salomon may no longer obtain review of the March 25, 2019 judgment confirming that award

.14

timely appeal or forever lose the opportunity to obtain appellate review.” (

Reyes v. Kruger (2020) 55 Cal. App.5th 58, 67

, italics and quotation marks omitted; see § 906 [ reviewing court lacks authority “ to review any decision or order from which an appeal might have been taken” but was not]; Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 959, 967 [“If the ruling is appealable, the aggrieved party must appeal or the right to contest it is lost.”].) The March 25, 20 19 judgment disposed of the only issue
before the trial court : whether to grant Kroenke’s petition to
confirm the first arbitration a ward. ( See EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1063 [“Once a petition t o confirm an award is filed, the superior court must select one of only four courses of action: It may confirm the award, correct and confirm it, vacate it, or dismiss the petition.”].) In granting the petition, the court decided that
issue in favor of K

roenke, and no issue remained for the court to
consider. The March 25, 2019 judgment was therefore final and appealable . And b y failing to file a timely notice of appeal from that judgment ( s ee Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) ) , Salomon lost his rig ht to contest it.
S alomon argues that , because the arbitrator had not resolved all claims between the parties, the arbitration award
was not a final award and that therefore the March 25, 2019 judgment was “interlocutory” and “not appealable .” (See Kirk v.
Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052 , 1064

- 1066 ; Judge v. Nijjar Realty, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 619 , 633

- 636 .) He relies on the provision in the first arbitration a ward stating the arbitrator “reserved decision on Salomon’s counterclaim for advance indemnification.” Which i s true
, as far as it goes. But the
arbitrator did not reserve decision on Salomon’s counterclaim15

indefinitely. Rather, the award conditioned that reservation on Salomon ’s filing and serving the counterclaim within the n ext 10 days

, which Salomon did not do. At that point (i.e., Day 11)

, Salomon’s counterclaim w as no longer reserved for decisio n, but
came within the ambit of the a ward’s provision that “ all claims,
issues and contentions which have not been granted

. . . in this Partial Final Award[ ] are and shall be deemed denied.” Thus

— and notwithstanding the arbitrator’s eventual decision (on March 26, 2019) to give Salomon another chance to file a counterclaim

— when the trial court entered judgment on March 25, 2019 confirming the award

, Salomon had no counter claim of any kind pending or reserved in the arbitration , the first arbitration award
was final

, and the trial court had jurisdiction to confirm it.
Because th e March 25, 2019 judgment was a fina l and appealable judgment from which Salomon did not timely appeal, we dismiss that portion of his appeal that challenges it.

B. The Rest of Salomon’s Appeal Is Moot
Salomon next argues the trial court erred in not vacat ing
the second arbitration award

, specifically, in failing to conclude
the arbitrator wrongly refused to hear evidence material to
Salomon’s claim for “advancement rights.” Had the arbitrator considered that evidence, Salomon argues, the arbitrator “would
have understood that Salomon’s un dertaking was sufficient
under Delaware law” and “reached the same correct conclusion that the Delaware Court of Chancery reached: that Salomon was
entitled to advancement.” T he Delaware Court of Chancery
decision to which Salomon refers and in which he prevailed, however, renders this portion of hi s appeal moot.16 “Appellate courts generally will not review matters that are moot. ‘A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court “can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.”’” ( Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 78; see Calleros v. Rural Metro of San Diego, Inc. (2020) 5 8 Cal.App.5th 660, 667 [“An appeal will be dismissed if a reversal would have no practical effect.”] ; Noergaard v. Noergaard (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 841, 852 [“‘“Generally, an appeal will be dismissed as ‘moot’ when, through no fault of respondent, the

occur rence of an event renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief.”’”] .)
S a lomon does not dispute that

, in its February 2020 ruling

, the Delaware Court of Chancery gave him what he seek s in this
action in connection w ith his arbitration counterclai m for “advancement rights”: an order directing Kroenke to advance him legal expenses incurred from August 5, 2019 ( i.e., the date of
Salomon’s undertaking)

, as provided by section 7 of the 2011 Indemnification Agreement

. Nor does Salomon dispute Kroenke has complied with the Delaware order or argue a California judgment would give him anything more than the Delaware order gives him. Because Salomon has obtained the relief sought in his arbitration counterclaim for advancement of his legal expenses, a decision in his favor here would not pro vide him any effective relief or have any practical effect on this case. Salomon has won this issue; he present s no reason he needs to win it again.
Salomon argues his appeal is not moot because the second
arbitration award included supposedly “disparagin g statements”
about him

— such as that hi s undertaking was “‘not given in good17

faith’” and was “‘worthless’”

— and he “has a right to have the
record

. . . corrected.” But h e cites no legal authority suggesting he has any such “right.” He also argues his app eal is not moot because “correcting the record will expunge the reputational damage the arbitrator has caused , which will ultimately help Salomon’s future employment prospects. ” But th at proposed
relief is too vague , abstract, and speculative to require a decision here on the merits. ( See Eye Dog Foundation v. State Bd. of Guide Dogs for Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [a court’s duty “‘is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot que stions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it”] ; see also In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 , fn. 5 [speculative arguments do not “justify appellate review of an otherwise moot case”] .) Seeking to clear one’s name or correct the
record in a civil case , unlike a criminal case, 7 does not justify hearing an otherwise moot appeal. Because Salomon’s appea l
from the trial court ’s March 17, 2022 judgment confirming the
second arbitration award is moot, we dismiss it. 8

7 See, e.g., People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 646, fn. 2 ; People v. Succop (1967) 6 7 Cal.2d 785, 790 ; People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 484

.

8 Courts have recognized “three discretionary exceptions to the rule that an appeal must be dismissed if no effective relief can be granted to an appellant: ‘“(1) when the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur [citation]; (2) when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties [citation]; and (3) when a material question remains18 DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Kroenke is to recover its costs on appeal.

SEGAL

, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS

, P. J.

FEUER , J.

for the court's determination [citation].”’” ( Rudick v. S tate Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 88

- 89; accord, Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733
, 864 .) Salomon does not argue any of these exceptions applies here

.