# cSuprttttt <trnurf CORRECTED: NOVEMBER 2, 2017 RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2017 TO BE PUBLISHED

SAINT AUGUSTINE SCHOOL; DIOCESE OF COVINGTON APPELLANTS



### v. ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. 2014-CA-001518

. BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-00024

JANET CROPPER APPELLEE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON AFFIRMING AND REMANDING Janet Cropper was dismissed from herjob as the lay administrator of SaintAugustine School, an elementary school affiliated with the Roman Catholic Diocese of**Coving~on.** She then brought this action against the diocese, the school, and the pastor ofthe SaintAugustine Churchl, claiming damages for, among other theories ofrecovery, breach ofher**~mployment** contract. On discretionary review, we hold that the trial court**~d** the Court of Appeals panel did not err when they ruled-for·different reasons-that Cropper is

i The appellants are collectively referred to as SaintAugustine in this opinion.not barred from asserting her breach-of-contract claim. In affirming the result reached by the Court ofAppeals panel, we reject the argument from the diocese that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine' bars this breach ofcontract claim. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. The Roman Catholic Diocese ofCovington employed- Janet Cropper to be the lay administrator ofSaintAugustine School for the 2011-12 academic year. Near the ·end ofthe 2011-12 school tehn, the diocese renewed Cropper's employment**contra~t** for the following academic year. But on the eve ofthe opening ofthe school term, Father Gregory Bach, SaintAugustine's Pastor, informed Cropper that herjob as lay administrator was eliminated and her employment with the diocese was terminated, stemming from the school's declining enrollment and dwindling operating**fu~ds.** Cropper then sued SaintAugustine 'for, among other theories ofrecovery, breach ofher employment contract. Both Cropper and SaintAugustine filed motions for summaryjudgment. The trial courtruled in favor ofCropper that her claims were not barred by the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine but ultimately ruled in favor ofSaintAugustine that, as a matter of**~aw,** Cropper

·could not show a breach ofher employment contract. Cropper appealed the

trial

### court'~ decision, and the Court ofAppeals reversed the trial court's determination that Cropper could not prove a breach ofcontract and remanded

- .

. the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The appeals panel rejected

2· the application ofthe ministerial-exception doctrine without mentioning.the· application ofthe ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine.
·II. ANALYSIS. A. Standard ofReview. We review a trial court's granting ofa party's summaryjudgment motion de novo.2 "On appeal, '[t]he standard ofreview
...ofa summru:yjudgment is whether the circuitjudge correctly found that there were no issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to ajudgment as a matter · oflaw."'3 B. Substantive Analysis. SaintAugustine argues that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine bars Cropper from asserting a claim for damages for breach ofher employment contract. As a matter ofclarification, both the ecclesiastical-abstention and ministerial-exception doctrines operate as affirmative**defens~s.** not as jurisdiCtional bars, that the party asserting the defenses bears the burden of proving.4 We note that SaintAugustine not only did notargue 1;hat the ministerial-

' ' exception doctrine applies in its defense, but**~pecifically** asserted that it is not arguing for the application ofthis**doctri~e** to the facts ofthis case:

2 Caniffv. CSX Transp.,**Inc.~** 438 S.W.3d 368, 372 (Ky. 2014). s Id. (quoting Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat'l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002)). 4 Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 607-08 (Ky. 2014) ("ministerial exception is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved");

.SaintJoseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727, 737 (Ky. 2014) ("ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine is an affirmative defense"). 3"
...Appellants are not pursuing their ministerial exception defense
...Instead, Appellants are taking their stand solely on [the] broader abstention

. doctrine
...."5 So we will not analyze the ministerial exception and**it~** possible

application to this case and confine our analysis to the ecclesiasticalabstention doctrine. 1. Ecclesiastical-Abstention Doctrl.ne. The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits secular courts from adjudicating predominantly religious issues, such as disputes relating to faith, doctrine, and denominationalgovernance because doing so violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses ofthe FirstAmendment.6 We recognized the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine in Kentucky law in Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary: At bottom, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is primarily interested in preventing any chilling effect on church practices as a result ofgovernment intrusion in the form of sec:ular courts. But when the case merely involves 

### a church, or even a minister, but does not require the interpretation ofactual church doctrine, courts need not invoke the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. No entanglement concern arises as a result ofthe mere inference of religion. Courts must "look not at the label placed on the action but at the actual Issues the court has been asked to decide."7 This court in SaintJoseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards also expounded
. on the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine: But churches are not the only [beneficiaries] ofecclesiastical abstention. All religious organizations are entitled to protection under the FirstAmendment, so all suits that present an ecclesiastical character, those "which concern theological

s Brieffor Appellant at 31. 6 SaintJoseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727 (Ky. 2014); 133 Am. Jur. Trials 379, § 7 (2014). 1 426 S.W.3d 597, 619 (Ky. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 4controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity ofthe members ofthe church to the standard ofmorals

.required ofthem" fall within the scope ofthe ecclesiasticalabstention doctrine.a ·**Und~r** the .ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, the question at the heart of whether Cropper's contract claim should be allowed is "whether [Cropper's] breach ofcontract claim can be decided without wading into doctrinal waters."9 Simply stated, deciding Cropper's breach ofcontract claim does not require application ofchurch law or doctrine. In fact, SaintAugustine's justification for the Cropper's dismissal stems from declining student enrollment and shrinking revenues. No matter the extent ofCropper's involvement in the religious life of SaintAugustine, adjudicating her damages claim for breach ofher employment contract does not require the secular court's "wading into doctrinal waters"; it is simply the termination ofthe lay administrator at a parochial school. Even ifCropper had beena prominent actor in the religious life ofthe community, unless SaintAugustine fired her for
reasons associated with the application ofchurch doctrine or governance, the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine would not apply. This case mirrors the factual circumstances of Kirby almost perfectly. In Kirby, this court held the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine not to apply to a breach-of-contract claim raised by a tenured professor, Kirby, who taught Christian social ethics at the Lexington Theological Sem.inary.10 The Seminary

a 449 S.W.3d at 739. 9 Id. at 620. 10 Kirby v. Le'xington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Ky.**2~14).** 5terminated Kirby's position because ofa "tsunami ofeconomic disasters" causing the Seminary's budgetto**shri~k** dramatically.11 In this case, Cropper
·was the lay administrator-the principal-ofSaintAugustine School, which

. . terminated her position because enrollment was dropping and money was tight. We follow this Court's rejection ofthe Lexington Theology Seminary's ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine**defen~e** in Kirbyby rejecting Saint Augustine's ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine defense today. Therefore, we hold that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine affirmative· defense does not apply in this case because Cropper's "breach-of-contract

. . claim requires no inspection or evaluation ofchurch doctrine. Neutral principles oflaw can be applied. According, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply
...."12 III. CONCLUSION. We affirm the result-reached by the Court ofAppeals panel and hold that the ecclesiastical abstention do?trine does not apply to the facts ofthis case." Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. All sitting. All concur.

11 Id. at 603. · 12 Id. at 619. 6COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
. Richard G. Meyer Nicholas Charles Birkenhauer Dressman Benzinger Lavelle PSC COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Gail Marie Langendorf Busald, Funk & Zevely, PSC

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# ciupr:em:e filnurf nf**~:enfurku** 2016-SC-000243-DG

SAINT AUGUSTINE SCHOOL; DIOCESE OF COVINGTON



### v. ON**R~VIEW** FROM COURT OFAPPEALS CASE NO. 2014-CA-001518 BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-00024

JANET CROPPER
ORDER CORRECTING APPELLANTS

APPELLEE

The Opinion ofthe Court rendered November 2, 2017 is corrected on its face by substitution ofthe attached Opinion in lieu ofthe original Opinion. Said correction does not affect the holding ofthe original Opinion ofthe Court. ENTERED: November 2, 2017