petition will be considered. Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851. 

Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is 

warranted. Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 

840, 844 (2004). 

Because an appeal from the final judgment in an action is 

generally an adequate and speedy legal remedy, precluding writ relief, 

this court typically will not consider a writ petition challenging a district 

court order denying a motion to dismiss, unless no factual dispute exists 

and the district court was obligated to dismiss the action pursuant to clear 

authority or there is an important issue of law that needs clarification. 

Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197-98, 179 P.3d at 558-59. 

Having considered the parties' arguments and the record 

before us, we conclude that petitioner has not demonstrated that 

extraordinary relief is warranted in this matter. Initially, as to 

petitioner's argument that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction, while the parties' nonresidency would have prevented the 

district court from exercising jurisdiction over their divorce, see NRS 

125.020(2), no such residency requirement is found in the statute 

providing for a declaratory relief action to adjudicate the validity of a 

contract. See NRS 30.040; see also May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672, 

119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005) (recognizing that a marital "settlement 

agreement is a contract, [such that] its construction and enforcement are 

governed by principles of contract law"). 

Next, with regard to personal jurisdiction, the forum selection 

clauses in the parties' three marital agreements constituted evidence of 

petitioner's consent to jurisdiction in Nevada, sufficient to create a 

genuine issue of fact, and thus, overcome a motion for summary judgment 

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on this basis. See NRCP 12(b) (explaining that when matters outside the 

pleading are presented to the district court in support of a motion to 

dismiss, the motion will be treated as one for summary judgment); see also 

Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 731, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029, 1030- 

31 (2005) (providing that "when reviewing a motion for summary 

judgment, the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, 

must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party" and 

that, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present 

evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of fact); Tandy 

Computer Leasing v. Terina's Pizza, Inc., 105 Nev. 841, 843, 784 P.2d 7, 8 

(1989) (recognizing that a forum selection clause may be sufficient to 

subject a party to personal jurisdiction if it is freely negotiated and is not 

reasonable or unjust). To the extent that petitioner contends the 

agreements were not freely negotiated and were unreasonable, these are 

fact questions that should be determined by the district court after the 

evidentiary hearing as to the validity of the agreements. 

Additionally, petitioner argues that the district court should 

have dismissed the complaint under the pending action doctrine in light of 

the parties' marriage dissolution proceedings pending in California. In 

support of this argument, petitioner relies primarily on Public Service 

Commission v. Eighth Judicial District Court, in which this court stated 

that a court "will not entertain a declaratory judgment action if there is 

pending, at the time of the commencement of the action for declaratory 

relief, another action or proceeding to which the same persons are parties 

and in which the same issues may be adjudicated." 107 Nev. 680, 684, 818 

P.2d 396, 399 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). It is not clear, 

however, that the issues presented in the declaratory relief action may be 

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adjudicated in the California case. Indeed, while the California court 

made general recitals that it retained jurisdiction as to the issues 

remaining after bifurcation, nothing in the record indicates that the 

California court considered or made findings as to the specific issue of 

whether it could or would adjudicate the validity of the marital 

agreements. Thus, petitioner's argument in this regard does not compel 

the conclusion that the district court was required to dismiss this case, 

and writ relief is not warranted in this respect. Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. 

at 197-98, 179 P.3d at 558-59. 

Finally, petitioner contends that the district court should have 

dismissed the action based on judicial estoppel. In the California court, 

real party in interest made general statements regarding that court's 

retention of jurisdiction over the marital issues following bifurcation. 

Based on the documents provided to this court, it does not appear that 

these general statements were specific representations made in order to 

obtain a favorable order as to the bifurcation motion. Instead, these 

statements seem to indicate primarily that other marital issues beyond 

the status of the divorce remained pending in the California court after 

the bifurcation. Thus, they were not "totally inconsistent" with real party 

in interest's filing of the declaratory relief action in the district court, and 

we therefore conclude that the district court was not required by clear 

authority to dismiss this action based on judicial estoppel. See Marcuse v. 

Del Webb Cmtys., Inc., 123 Nev. 278, 287, 163 P.3d 462, 468-69 (2007) 

(explaining that judicial estoppel applies when a party successfully asserts 

a position in a judicial proceeding and then attempts to take a "totally 

inconsistent" position in a second such proceeding if the taking of the first 

position was not a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake). 

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In light of these considerations, we conclude that petitioner 

has not demonstrated that the district court was required to dismiss the 

action pursuant to clear authority or that an important issue of law needs 

clarification. See Int? Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197-98, 179 P.3d at 558-59. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

J. 

Hardesty 

Pat=4.01t 

Parraguirre 

cc: Hon. Gayle Nathan, District Judge 

Black & LoBello 

Jimmerson Hansen 

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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