# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 10, 2020 *

Decided April 13, 2020

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 19

‐ 2761

KEVIN L. MARTIN,

Petitioner

‐ Appellant

,

v

.

J OHN GALIPEAU,

Respondent

‐ Appellee

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:18

‐ cv

‐ 00429

‐ JMS

‐ DLP

J ane Magnus

‐ Stinson,

Chief Judge

.

O R D E R

Kevin Martin, an Indiana prisoner, was charged with making a threat. A

disciplinary hearing officer found him guilty and revoked 60 days of good

‐ time credit.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Martin filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings did not comport

with due process because his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs

and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument

would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp

. P. 32.1No. 19

‐ 2761 Page 2

he was wrongly denied evidence. The district court denied Martin’s petition. Because

some evidence supports Martin’s disciplinary conviction, and the evidence he requested

could not have helped his defense, we affirm.

Correctional officer M. Foster (whose full name is not in the record) issued a

conduct report to Martin, alleging that she heard him make a threat, in violation of the

prison’s disciplinary rules. Foster reported that at approximately 1:20 p.m., roughly ten

minutes after she had spoken to Martin about property he had requested, he began

kicking his cell door and yelling for a sergeant. Foster wrote that she “stepped out onto

the Range” and heard Martin yell, “Wait until I get my hands on one of you punk ass

bitches.” According to Foster, she then asked Martin if he knew that what he had said

was a threat, and Martin responded that he was “damn sure” it was. Foster attached to

the conduct report a handwritten statement from a caseworker, Jerricha Meeks, who

wrote that from her office, she had heard Martin yell: “Wait until I get my hands on you

punk ass bitches.” Later Meeks also typed up a “case note” (the context in which it was

prepared is unclear) that essentially restates Foster’s account of the incident.

When informed of the charge, Martin pleaded not guilty and requested evidence

to defend his case. He asked for four witnesses: two other prisoners, to corroborate his

story, one officer to explain “why he did not give me my property,” and a sergeant to

explain “what this whole situation was about”—that is, why he had been yelling.

Martin also requested that the disciplinary hearing officer review the video recording of

the range—the common area into which the cell doors open—from 1:05 p.m. to

1:30 p.m. on the date of the incident.

The hearing officer reviewed the portion of the video from 1:16 p.m. to 1:29 p.m.

It is unknown why the hearing officer did not begin reviewing the video at 1:05 p.m., as

Martin requested. The video, which did not include sound, did not depict Foster

interacting with Martin. It also did not show that Foster “stepped out onto the range”

other than to pass through six times, escorting inmates with another correctional officer.

The two prisoners who provided witness statements asserted that Martin had

been “talking to the range,” “not referring” to Foster, and “yelling for the control room

to get assistance for his situation.” Martin was not allowed to call as witnesses the two

officials he identified, neither of whom had been present when he was yelling, but they

gave short witness statements in the pre

‐ hearing investigation. The sergeant stated that

he spoke with Martin after the incident and was told “it was all over him not getting his

[allowed] property on time,” and the officer stated that Martin had received his

property on the day of the incident.No. 19

‐ 2761 Page 3

At the disciplinary hearing, Martin argued that Foster’s conduct report and

Meeks’s statement were false. This evidence, he argued, had been fabricated as

retaliation for his prior grievances filed against Meeks. The hearing officer considered

Martin’s testimony, Foster’s report, Meeks’s statement, the other prisoners’ statements,

and the video. Crediting Foster’s and Meeks’s statements over Martin’s denial, the

hearing officer found Martin guilty. Among other sanctions, Martin lost 60 days of

good

‐ time credit.

After losing his internal appeals, Martin filed this petition under § 2254. He

argued that he had been deprived of due process in three ways: First, the evidence

supporting his disciplinary conviction was insufficient because the video showed that

no officer entered the range at the time of the alleged threat and Foster’s and Meeks’s

statements had been fabricated as retaliation for prior grievances filed against Meeks.

Second, he had been wrongly denied evidence—in particular, the earlier segment of the

video recording. Third, Martin’s witnesses gave written statements but were not

permitted to testify. (Martin does not renew this argument on appeal, so we say no

more about it.)

The district court denied Martin’s petition. The court deemed Foster’s conduct

“problematic” because the video does not match her account that she stepped onto the

range and spoke to Martin in response to his yelling; Meeks’s separate case note, which

repeats Foster’s story, was flawed for the same reason. But Meeks’s handwritten

statement (attached to Foster’s conduct report) states that, from her office, she heard

Martin yell a threat. The district court concluded that this statement was enough to

support Martin’s conviction for making a threat. Further, Martin did not explain how he

was prejudiced by the hearing officer viewing less of the video than he requested. The

court reasoned that, at best, the video recording would have shown more of the same

(that Foster did not interact with Martin). And if it supported Foster’s account, Martin

was worse off.

On appeal, Martin first argues that neither Foster nor Meeks can be credited

because the video contradicts their reports that Foster stepped onto the range to speak

with Martin and because Meeks provided evidence against him in retaliation for a

grievance he had previously filed against her. Second, Martin insists that the hearing

officer’s failure to review the first 12 minutes of the video recording prejudiced his

defense because it would have confirmed that he never interacted with Foster.

We review the denial of Martin’s § 2254 petition de novo. Scruggs v. Jordan

,

485 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2007). In Indiana, a prisoner has a liberty interest in hisNo. 19

‐ 2761 Page 4

earned good

‐ time credits, so the state must follow the appropriate procedures before

revoking these credits. Montgomery v. Anderson

, 262 F.3d 641, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2001). In

the prison

‐ disciplinary context, due process requires, among other things, that a

conviction be supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v.

Hill

, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Webb v. Anderson

, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000). This

standard requires no more than a “modicum of evidence.” Webb

, 224 F.3d at 652

(quoting Hill

, 472 U.S. at 455). We ask “whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. (quoting Hill

,

472 U.S. at 455–56). The evidence must be sufficiently reliable, Meeks v. McBride

, 81 F.3d

717, 720 (7th Cir. 1996), but it need not “logically preclude[]” conclusions other than the

one the hearing officer reached. Hill

, 472 U.S. at 457.

Under this standard, sufficient evidence supported the finding that Martin yelled

a threat, even though the video does not support Foster’s entire account. Foster

reported that she heard Martin yell, “Wait until I get my hands on one of you punk ass

bitches,” and Meeks’s same

‐ day handwritten statement corroborates that report: She

said she heard the same remark from her office, off of the range. The two other

prisoners corroborated that Martin was yelling and upset; they simply denied that

Martin directed his remarks at Foster. But that is not relevant to the violation he was

charged with: communicating a threat against anyone

. Martin himself did not deny

yelling (though he stated that he was calling for a specific officer to deliver his property

and that Foster was not there). Thus, even ignoring the contradicted portions of Foster’s

and Meeks’s accounts, there is at least “some evidence” of Martin’s guilt.

Martin argues, however, that the video discredits Meeks and Foster entirely, and

so the hearing officer could not rely on any evidence originating with them. But it was

up to the hearing officer to weigh the witnesses’ credibility—we do not reweigh the

evidence presented at the hearing. Webb

, 224 F.3d at 652. Meeks’s uncontradicted

statement about what she heard was sufficiently reliable for the hearing officer to deem

credible. Meeks

, 81 F.3d at 720.

Further, Martin’s assertion that Meeks provided evidence out of a retaliatory

motive is irrelevant to whether he received due process. Wolff v. McDonnell

, 418 U.S.

539, 558 (1974); McKinney v. Meese

, 831 F.2d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 1987). The due process

protections set forth in Wolff —advance written notice of violation, a written explanation

of the decision, the right to present witnesses and evidence, and a decision by an

impartial body—shield prisoners from arbitrary actions. McPherson v. McBride

, 188 F.3d

784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999). Once those procedures are followed, our only function is toNo. 19

‐ 2761 Page 5

determine if the disciplinary hearing officer’s decision was based on “some facts.” Id.

(citation omitted). Here, as explained above, the decision had some factual basis. A

§ 2254 petition to recover lost good

‐ time credit is not the way to bring a claim that a

prison official retaliated against an inmate for the protected activity of filing a

grievance. See Gomez v. Randle

, 680 F.3d 859, 866–67 (7th Cir. 2012) (prisoner’s retaliation

claim actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Finally, Martin argues that he was prejudiced by the disciplinary hearing

officer’s failure to review the additional 12 minutes of video Martin requested. But he

does not explain how this evidence could have undermined or contradicted the

evidence supporting the finding that he yelled a threat. See Jones v. Cross

, 637 F.3d 841,

848 (7th Cir. 2011). As the district court reasoned, the first 12 minutes of the video could

have shown nothing more helpful to him than the latter half: that Foster did not directly

interact with Martin. And if it did show that Foster approached him, he would have

been worse off. Either way, without sound, the additional portion of the video could

not prove that Martin was not yelling or did not make the alleged threat. Therefore,

Martin was not prejudiced by its absence.

AFFIRMED