CLD-010 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 12-2850

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LEROY T. MOORE,

Appellant

v.

MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE;

CHRISTOPHER KUBERIET;

JENNIFER SESSA, individually and in her official capacity;

BRUCE KAPLAN, in his official capacity

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-03879)

District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares

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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 12, 2012

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 2, 2012)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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PER CURIAM

On July 7, 2012, Leroy T. Moore, a state inmate confined at the Northern State 

Prison in Newark, New Jersey, filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey, alleging that the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, 

Middlesex County Prosecutor Bruce Kaplan, Assistant Prosecutor Christopher Kuberiet, 

and Prosecutor’s Agent Jennifer Sassa violated his civil rights in connection with his

prosecution on multiple drug charges in state criminal court.

Moore’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleged that Assistant Prosecutor Kuberiet 

violated his constitutional rights by continually deceiving the state criminal court by 

stating that Moore was in possession of “several grams of dope” when he was arrested in 

2009 and withholding exculpatory lab reports from both the court and Moore’s defense 

counsel showing that the actual weight of the drugs Moore was in possession of at the 

time of his arrest was less than one gram. The complaint further alleged that Prosecutor’s 

Agent Sassa conspired with Kuberiet to withhold exculpatory evidence by forwarding a 

discovery packet to Moore’s lawyer without including the exculpatory “lab reports as to 

the CDS & amount.” County Prosecutor Bruce Kaplan was named as a defendant for 

failing to adequately train and supervise Kuberiet and Sassa. Moore’s complaint sought

an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive monetary damages.

On May 10, 2012, the District Court granted Moore leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis but then sua sponte dismissed his complaint with prejudice as against all 

defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2). In an opinion 
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accompanying the order of dismissal, the District Court explained that Moore’s complaint 

must be dismissed because prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from claims based on 

their failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, provided that they did so while functioning 

in a prosecutorial capacity, and that Moore’s complaint did not contain allegations with 

respect to willful destruction or other aggravating circumstances sufficient to pierce the 

defendants’ absolute prosecutorial immunity. Moore timely filed this appeal.

We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, given the District 

Court’s dismissal of Moore’s complaint with prejudice. See Borelli v. City of Reading

State prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity from civil suit under § 1983 for 

the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions. 

, 

532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976). 

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 

431 (1976). Prosecutors also enjoy absolutely immunity for actions undertaken in 

preparation for judicial proceedings or for trial, provided those actions occur in the course 

of their role as a prosecutor. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). 

Although a prosecutor’s deliberate destruction of exculpatory evidence is not entitled to 

absolute immunity, the decision to withhold such evidence from the defense while 

functioning as an advocate for the state is protected by absolute immunity. Imbler, 424 

U.S. at 431-32 n.34; Yarris v. Cnty. of Delaware

Supervisory prosecutors are absolutely immune both from suits for acts 

undertaken in relation to an individual trial, and from suits charging that they failed to 

provide adequate training and supervision. 

, 465 F.3d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 2006).

Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 
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346-49 (2009). The employee of an attorney, including the employee or agent of a 

prosecutor, is also granted absolute immunity from § 1983 suits where the function of the

employee and the judicial process are closely allied. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 

206 (3d Cir. 1975). This Court has held, for example, that absolute immunity extends to 

employees of prosecutors who perform investigative work in furtherance of a criminal 

prosecution. Davis v. Grusemeyer

We agree with the District Court that Moore’s complaint seeks monetary relief 

from defendants who are absolutely immune from suit under § 1983, and that dismissal 

under sections 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2) was therefore proper. Moore sought 

money damages from a prosecutor, his supervisor, and his agent, each of whom is

immune from such relief under settled law. Moreover, we detect no abuse of discretion 

in the District Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint without offering leave to amend. 

, 996 F.2d 617, 631-32 (3d Cir. 1993).

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2002). For all of 

these reasons, we will therefore summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.