Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A04-1705-CR-1132 | September 28, 2017 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald E.C. Leicht

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sean A. Landrum,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

34A04-1705-CR-1132

Appeal from the Howard Superior 

Court

The Honorable William C. 

Menges, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

34D01-0706-FA-457

Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Sean A. Landrum appeals the trial court’s sentencing order on a petition to 

revoke his suspended sentence. Landrum raises one issue for our review, which 

we restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced Landrum to a sentence that included supervised 

probation instead of unsupervised probation. 

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

declined to apply credit time to Landrum’s sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 26, 2007, the State charged Landrum with four counts of dealing in 

cocaine, as Class A felonies (Counts I, III, IV, and V) and also alleged that he

was a habitual offender (Count II) in cause number 34D01-076-FA-457 (“FA457”). On February 17, 2009, the parties filed a recommendation of plea 

bargain, and, on March 18, the parties filed an amended recommendation of 

plea agreement. During the hearing, Landrum pleaded guilty to Count V,

dealing in cocaine, as a Class A felony. The trial court accepted Landrum’s 

plea and entered judgment of conviction accordingly. Pursuant to the plea 

agreement, the trial court sentenced Landrum to twenty-five years with the 

Indiana Department of Correction, with twenty years executed and five years 

suspended to unsupervised probation. 
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[4] On November 30, 2010, Landrum filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On 

May 16, 2012, the post-conviction court granted Landrum’s petition for postconviction relief and held a hearing. After the hearing, the court found 

Landrum guilty of Count V, dealing in cocaine, as a Class B felony, and entered 

judgment of conviction accordingly. The court then sentenced Landrum to 

twenty years in the Indiana Department of Correction, with fifteen years 

executed and five years suspended to supervised probation. As a specific 

condition of probation, Landrum was required to attend and complete the 

Howard County drug re-entry program. 

[5] On October 6, 2014, the Indiana Department of Correction filed a notice of 

eligibility into the community transition program. On November 6, the trial 

court approved Landrum’s participation in the program and Landrum was 

placed on probation. On June 3, 2015, Landrum signed the re-entry program 

participation agreement in which he agreed to participate in the program and to 

abide by all rules and conditions of the program. Landrum further agreed “to 

waive his right to earn credit time for any time spent in jail or otherwise 

confined to which he would otherwise be entitle[d] pursuant to Indiana law 

during participation in the Reentry Program.” Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 36. 

[6] On June 10, 2015, the State filed a notice of violation, and Landrum appeared 

in person before the trial court. The court found that he had violated the terms 

of the re-entry program, found him to be in indirect contempt of court, and 

ordered that he be taken into custody. On August 12, the court held a hearing

on the notice of violation. Landrum appeared in person, and the trial court 
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reiterated the same conclusions and again ordered that he be taken into 

custody. On August 19, Landrum failed to appear before the court as ordered, 

and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. On August 23, 2016, Landrum 

was arrested under cause number FA-457. On the same day, he was also 

arrested under cause number 34D01-1508-F4-777 (“F4-777) and charged with 

possession of a narcotic, as a Level 6 felony. 

[7] On August 31, 2016, the Howard County re-entry court case manager filed a 

notice that the program planned to terminate Landrum’s participation because 

he had absconded. Landrum denied the allegations in the notice of termination 

and entered a plea of false. At a hearing on September 28, Landrum withdrew 

that plea of false and entered a plea of true. The trial court then found that 

Landrum had violated the terms of the re-entry court program and terminated 

his participation. On October 3, the State filed a petition to revoke his

suspended sentence, and, on October 12, Landrum entered plea of false to the 

allegations contained in the petition to revoke his suspended sentence. 

[8] On March 16, 2017, the parties filed a recommendation of plea agreement. In 

the recommended plea agreement, Landrum agreed to plead guilty in cause 

number F4-777 and to enter a plea of true to the allegations contained in the 

petition to revoke suspended sentence in cause number FA-457. The agreement 

further recommended as follows:

[F4-777]: Defendant shall be sentenced to the Indiana 

Department of Correction for a period of one (1) year, all of 

which shall be executed. Overlapping credit time, up to one (1) 
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year, shall be first applied to this cause to satisfy the executed 

sentence with any excess applied to cause number [FA-457]. The 

sentence imposed in this cause shall be served concurrently [sic]

with any sentence imposed in the Defendant’s Illinois case and 

consecutively [sic] to the sentence in [cause number FA-457].

* * * 

[FA-457]: Sentencing shall be left to the Court after the parties 

have the opportunity to present evidence and argument. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 57. 

[9] At a hearing on April 27, pursuant to the plea agreement, Landrum withdrew 

his plea of false and entered a plea of true to the allegations contained in the 

petition to revoke suspended sentence in cause number FA-457, and he pleaded 

guilty in cause number F4-777. The trial court found him guilty in cause 

number F4-777 and entered judgment of conviction accordingly. During the 

hearing, the trial court stated that Landrum would serve his sentence for cause 

number F4-777 “concurrently [sic] with the sentence being served in Illinois 

that was committed for a weapons charge apparently while he was a fugitive in 

connection with these two cases . . . .” Tr. at 8. 

[10] The following conversation then occurred between the trial court and 

Landrum’s counsel to determine the amount of credit time from cause number 

F4-777, if any, that would be applied to Landrum’s sentence in cause number 

FA-457:
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THE COURT: Ok. Now let’s just make sure I’m understanding 

this. As I read it, it says he’s entitled to credit from the time he 

arrives in Indiana. 

[Landrum’s counsel]: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Which was August 23, 2016?

[Landrum’s counsel]: (Inaudible) there should be a carry over to 

the [petition to revoke] case. 

THE COURT: Well, there would be a little bit, yes. 

[Landrum’s counsel]: It has to be consecutive[] so there 

shouldn’t be any carry over because he’s still (inaudible) the 

Illinois stuff through—

THE COURT: Hang on a minute. Let me figure this. August 

23rd through today is 247 actual days, 494 days credit, so there’s 

129 extra days there that would apply to the Petition to Revoke. 

[Landrum’s counsel]: No.

THE COURT: No, it wouldn’t because he’s running into 

consecutive. 

[Landrum’s counsel]: Correct.

THE COURT: So the bottom line is that 129 is just gone,—

[Landrum’s counsel]: Yes.
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THE COURT: —days is gone other than he’s getting credit for it 

in [Illinois1].

[Landrum’s counsel]: Correct. 

Id. at 9-10. 

[11] The court found that Landrum had violated the terms of his probation and 

entered judgment accordingly. The trial court sentenced Landrum to one year

with the Indiana Department of Correction in cause number F4-777, which the 

court found had been satisfied. For cause number FA-457, the trial court issued 

a sentencing order on the petition to revoke the suspended sentence. In that 

order, the trial court ordered Landrum to serve the balance of his previously 

suspended sentence, which the court determined to be 1,825 days, as an 

executed term in the Department of Correction. The trial court also ordered 

that Landrum “shall receive no jail time credit while awaiting disposition in this 

matter.” Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 59. This appeal ensued. 

Discussion and Decision

[12] Landrum contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 

him. Specifically, Landrum asserts that the trial court abused its discretion

when it subjected him to supervised probation with a condition that he

complete a drug re-entry program instead of unsupervised probation. Landrum 

 

1

 The trial court references a sentence in Michigan, but it is clear from the record that the trial court is 

referring to a sentence Landrum served in Illinois. 
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further argues that the trial court failed to apply credit time to his sentence after 

it revoked his probation. We address each argument in turn. 

Issue One: Supervised Probation

[13] Landrum first claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it subjected 

him to supervised probation with a condition that he participate in the Howard 

County drug re-entry program. Landrum was first sentenced in 2009, pursuant 

to a plea agreement, to twenty-five years with the Department of Correction,

with twenty years executed and five years suspended to unsupervised probation. 

On May 16, 2012, the post-conviction court granted Landrum’s petition for 

post-conviction relief and set aside the original judgment. Instead, the postconviction court found Landrum guilty of dealing in cocaine, as a Class B 

felony, and sentenced him to twenty years, with fifteen years executed and five 

years suspended to supervised probation. As a specific condition of probation, 

the court ordered Landrum to attend and successfully complete the Howard 

County drug re-entry program. Landrum now asserts that the court erred when 

it entered that sentencing order because the amended plea agreement filed on 

March 18, 2009, and the original sentencing order issued on May 25, 2009,

called for unsupervised probation. 

[14] Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 9, “[a] party initiates an appeal by

conventionally filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk . . . within thirty (30) 

days after the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case 

Summary.” Further, Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(5) provides that the right to 

appeal is “forfeited” unless an appeal is initiated within thirty days of final 
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judgment, or a criminal appellant obtains permission to file a belated appeal 

under Post–Conviction Rule 2. A sentencing order is a final judgment from 

which a defendant only has thirty days to appeal. See e.g. Dillman v. State, 16 

N.E.3d 445, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 

[15] Here, the trial court issued its order sentencing Landrum to twenty years with

the Indiana Department of Correction, with five years suspended to supervised 

probation on May 16, 2012. On May 24, 2017, Landrum filed his Notice of 

Appeal challenging, among other things, the trial court’s order sentencing him 

to supervised probation. Landrum waited five years after the trial court issued 

the May 16, 2012, sentencing order before he disputed it. Further, there is 

nothing in the record to indicate that Landrum obtained permission to file a 

belated appeal under Post-Conviction Rule 2. 

[16] Because Landrum failed to file his notice of appeal within thirty days after the 

trial court’s May 16, 2012, order was noted in the Chronological Case 

Summary, Landrum has forfeited his right to appeal that sentencing order. 

Issue Two: Credit Time

[17] Landrum also asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to apply seventyfour days of credit time to his sentence in cause number FA-457 and when it 

failed to apply excess credit time from cause number F4-777 to his sentence in

cause number FA-457. 
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Credit for Seventy-Four Days

[18] Landrum contends that the trial court erred when it failed to credit him with 

seventy-four jail days between his June 10, 2015, arrest in cause number FA457 and his August 23, 2016,

2 arrest in cause number F4-777. We do not reach 

the merits of Landrum’s claim. We find, instead, that Landrum has waived this 

issue by his failure to present a record showing any abuse of discretion by the 

trial court. “It is the appellant’s burden to present the reviewing court with a 

record complete enough to sustain his argument.” McGuire v. State, 617 N.E.2d 

548, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). “Where he fails to do so, the issue is deemed 

waived.” Thompson v. State, 761 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting 

Jackson v. State, 496 N.E.2d 32, 33 (Ind. 1986)). In particular, this court has 

previously held that “a defendant may waive a claim of entitlement to credit 

time served by failing to present us with sufficient information to determine the 

issue.” Brattain v. State, 777 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 

[19] On June 10, Landrum appeared in person before the trial court. The court 

found that he had violated the terms of the re-entry program, found him to be in 

indirect contempt of court, and ordered that he be taken into custody. On 

August 12, Landrum appeared in person before the trial court and the trial court 

again ordered that he be taken into custody. On August 19, Landrum failed to 

 

2

 In his brief, Landrum cites August 23, 2015, as his arrest date for cause number F4-777 and calculates the 

time owed to him between June 10, 2015, and August 23, 2015, as seventy-four days. The Chronological 

Case Summary for cause F4-777 was not included in the record before the court, but the record indicates that 

Landrum was arrested for that cause on August 23, 2016. 
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appear before the trial court and the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. 

On August 23, 2016, Landrum was arrested on both cause number FA-457 and 

cause number F4-777. 

[20] In his brief, Landrum states that “[b]etween June 10, 2015, and his August 23, 

2015[,] [sic] arrest on the companion case, there are 74 jail days that apply to 

this case only. It is error to deny him (at least) these 74 jail days.” Appellant’s 

Br. at 14. The trial court ordered that Landrum be taken into custody on June 

10, 2015. The trial court then again ordered that he be taken into custody on 

August 12. However, Landrum does not present any documentation of the 

actual time he served with the Department of Correction between those dates. 

As such, we have no indication in the record of his actual time served, if any. 

[21] Further, it is clear from the record that Landrum was not in custody between 

August 19, 2015, when a warrant was issued for his arrest, and August 23, 

2016, when he was arrested. During the April 27, 2017, hearing, the trial court 

stated that Landrum, while in Illinois, was serving a sentence in connection 

with a charge committed “apparently while he was a fugitive in connection with 

these two cases . . . .” Tr. at 8 (emphasis added). Landrum was clearly not in the 

custody of the Department of Correction while he was a fugitive between 

August 19, 2015, when he failed to appear before the trial court, and August 23, 

2016, when he was returned to Indiana and arrested. 

[22] Because Landrum failed to present us with sufficient information to determine 

the actual time, if any, that he was in the custody of the Department of 
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Correction between June 10, 2015, and August 23, 2016, Landrum has waived 

this issue. See e.g. Brattain, 777 N.E.2d at 776. 

Excess Credit Time

[23] Landrum further contends that the trial court should have applied the excess 

credit time he earned while he waited to be sentenced in cause number F4-777

to his sentence in cause number FA-457. Landrum was arrested in cause 

number F4-777 on August 23, 2016, and he was sentenced on April 23, 2017. 

This amounts to 247 actual days that Landrum spent with the Department of 

Correction, which equates to 494 credit days. Landrum was sentenced to one 

year, or 365 days, under cause F4-777, so he earned an excess of 129 days. 

Landrum argues that, pursuant to his May 16, 2017, plea agreement, those 129 

days should have been applied to Landrum’s sentence in cause number FA-457. 

[24] We cannot agree. At the sentencing hearing on April 27, the trial court 

expressly asked Landrum’s counsel how to apply the 129 days. Landrum’s 

counsel then informed the court that Landrum was not entitled to that credit 

time in light of the Illinois offenses. The court relied on that representation 

when it sentenced Landrum. Thus, we agree with the State that Landrum has 

invited any error in the court’s assessment of those 129 days. The invited error 

doctrine forbids a party from taking advantage of an error that he “commits, 

invites, or which is the natural consequence of [his] own neglect or 

misconduct.” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 975 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Wright 

v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 907 (Ind. 2005)). 
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[25] Landrum’s counsel agreed that the excess credit time from cause number F4-

777 was gone and would not be applied to the petition to revoke the suspended 

sentence in cause number FA-457. As such, any error that may exist in the trial 

court’s failure to apply the excess days was invited error, which Landrum may 

not take advantage of on appeal. See e.g. Wright, 828 N.E.2d at 907. Therefore, 

we decline to reverse on this basis. 

[26] In sum, we hold as follows: Landrum has forfeited his right to appeal the trial 

court’s order of supervised probation issued on May 16, 2012; Landrum has 

waived the issue of credit time for his claimed seventy-four days of actual credit; 

and Landrum invited any error in the court’s decision to not award the 129 

excess credit days. As such, we affirm the trial court’s April 27, 2017, 

sentencing order on the petition to revoke the suspended sentence. 

[27] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.