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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NEIL ANAND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-1635 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(March 27, 2023)

This lawsuit arises from Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests made by pro se

Plaintiffs Neil Anand and Lesly Pompy to Defendants United States Department of Health and 

Human Services (“HHS”)’ Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) and Drug Enforcement 

Administration (“DEA”). Plaintiffs Anand and Pompy are physicians who were indicted on 

multiple criminal counts, including health care fraud and the distribution of controlled substances. 

See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8; Defs.’ Mot. at 1. To aid in defense of their criminal prosecutions, 

Plaintiff Anand submitted FOIA requests to both HHS and DEA, and Plaintiff Pompy submitted a 

FOIA request just to DEA. After the agencies conducted their searches and made numerous 

withholdings, Plaintiffs then filed a Complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel 

Defendants to produce certain records. See Compl. at 8, 11.

Before the Court is Defendants’ [59] Motion for Summary Judgment against both Plaintiffs 

Pompy and Anand. This Opinion addresses only Defendants’ Motion as against Plaintiff Anand. 

Plaintiff Anand opposes Defendants’ Motion but has not filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment.
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Upon review of the pleadings,1the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the 

Court will GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as 

against Plaintiff Anand. The Court will GRANT the Motion as to Anand’s FOIA request to OIG for 

“[a]ll information concerning data analytics algorithms used in the Pill Mill Doctor Project, all reports 

and work product generated by contractor Qlarant corporation concerning the Pill Mill Doctor Project, 

statement of work and official contract of Qlarant corporation... [and] all reports of OIG concerning 

Neil Anand or Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery,” having found OIG’s search to be 

adequate and withholdings justified. The Court will GRANT the Motion as to Anand’s FOIA 

request to DEA. However, the Court will DENY the Motion as to Anand’s FOIA request to OIG 

for “all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing 

of opiates by specific physicians” because OIG did not notify Anand that his request did not 

reasonably describe the records sought, as required by regulation or, alternatively, did not provide 

sufficient explanation as to why a search for this request would be burdensome.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 19, 2019, a grand jury indicted Plaintiff Neil Anand on multiple criminal 

counts, including health care fraud and the distribution of controlled substances. See Defs.’ Mot. at 

1; United States v. Anand, Crim. A. No. 19-0518 (E.D. Pa.). Anand thereafter filed two FOIA 

requests, described below.

A. Anand’s FOIA Request to HHS OIG

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following:

• Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 59 (“Defs.’ Mot.”);

• Plaintiffs’ Response and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 

64 (“Pls.’ Opp’n”);

• Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 69 

(“Def.’s Reply”).

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that holding oral argument in this action would not be

of assistance in rendering a decision. See LCvR 7(f).
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On April 17, 2021, Plaintiff Anand submitted a FOIA request to HHS’s Office of the 

Inspector General (“OIG”) seeking:

All information concerning data analytics algorithms used in the Pill Mill Doctor

Project, all reports and work product generated by contractor Qlarant corporation

concerning the Pill Mill Doctor Project, statement of work and official contract of

Qlarant corporation, all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield corporation to OIG

concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians, all reports of OIG 

concerning Neil Anand or Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery.

Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 1. Anand requested this information from October 1, 2015 to September 25, 2019. 

Id. OIG concluded that Anand’s request for “all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield corporation 

to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians” was too vague and 

therefore did not search for this material. Defs.’ Mot. at 2–3 (citing Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 4 (hereinafter 

“Brooks Decl.”) ¶ 10). OIG considered the remaining portions of Anand’s request and determined

that OIG’s Office of Investigations could possess responsive records; therefore, OIG sent the 

request to that Office. Id. at 3 (citing Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 10–11). The Office of Investigations located 

one case file where Anand was the subject of investigation and then reviewed all documents in that

electronic case file for documents pertaining to Anand’s request. Id. (citing Brooks Decl. ¶ 10). 

On April 23, 2021, OIG withheld all responsive documents in that case file under FOIA Exemption 

7(A). Id. (citing Brooks Decl. ¶ 13).

While this action was pending, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare, a separate 

component of HHS, located responsive records and released them to Anand on June 15, 2022 with 

certain portions withheld pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 3, 4, and 6. Id. at 4 (citing Brooks Decl. ¶ 

17). In June 2022, OIG conducted a supplemental search of its law enforcement database to locate 

any records that its initial search had excluded by using the term “the Pill Mill Doctor Project” 

instead of “Pill Mill Doctor Project.” Id. (citing Brooks Decl. ¶ 18). After locating responsive 

investigative reports, OIG released closed investigative reports with certain portions withheld 
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pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 3, 6, 7(C), and 7(E), and withheld open investigative reports entirely 

pursuant to Exemptions 5, 6, 7(A), and 7(C). Id. OIG also released sixty-one pages of publicly 

available documents from Anand’s case file in their entirety. Id.

B. Anand’s FOIA Request to DEA

The same day Anand submitted his request to OIG, he also submitted a FOIA request to the 

DEA seeking “all drug enforcement agency documents concerning Neil Anand, Institute of 

Advanced Medicine and Surgery, Anand Medical Investment, Paul Soccio.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. A. 

All DEA criminal law enforcement investigative records are maintained as part of the DEA 

Investigative Reporting and Filing System (“IRFS”), and DEA uses its Narcotics and Dangerous 

Drugs Information System (“NADDIS”) to locate records maintained as part of IRFS. Defs.’ Mot.

at 5 (citing Defs.’ Ex. 11 (hereinafter “Hertel Decl.” ¶¶ 6–7)). Upon receiving Anand’s FOIA 

request, DEA searched IRFS by querying NADDIS using the term “Neil Anand”, which resulted in 

the identification of three investigative case numbers. Id. (citing Hertel Decl. ¶ 14). Because of 

Anand’s ongoing criminal proceeding, DEA withheld in full all responsive records pursuant to 

Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemption 7(A), and also asserted FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, 

7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F) for information within those records. Id.

DEA also searched IRFS by querying NADDIS using the terms “Institute of Advanced 

Medicine and Surgery” and, separately, “Anand Medical Investment.” Id. (citing Hertel Decl. ¶

15). DEA located no records responsive to this request. Id.

As for Anand’s request for records concerning Paul Soccio, DEA did not conduct a search 

because it is standard practice to deny the request for investigative records about a third party. Id.

(citing Hertel Decl. ¶ 16). DEA therefore issued a Glomar response pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 

7(C). Id.
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C. Present Litigation

Plaintiff Lesly Pompy filed a separate FOIA request to the DEA in April 2021. See Defs.’ 

Mot. Ex. F. On June 11, 2021, Plaintiffs Anand and Pompy filed the Complaint in this action. See

Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs state that they are physicians interested in “all data analytics 

algorithms used in Pill Mill Doctor Project, Waste Fraud and Abuse, Medicare Opiate Risk Tool 

‘Pill Mill Risk Analysis’ software and other Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action 

Team... initiatives” as well as “all reports and work products generated by contractor Qlarant 

Corporation concerning the Pill Mill Doctor Project” and “all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield 

Corporation to [Office of the Inspector General] concerning improper prescribing of opiates by

specific physicians,” among other information. Compl. ¶ 4–5. The Court has twice denied 

Plaintiffs’ Motions for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. See Order, ECF No. 26; Mem. Op. & 

Order, ECF No. 38.

Defendants filed the pending [59] Motion for Summary Judgment. In their Motion, 

Defendants explain that throughout the course of this litigation, there has been confusion regarding 

which FOIA requests are at issue. Defs.’ Mot. at 1. The only FOIA request referenced in 

Plaintiff’s “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Addendum)” or discussed in the 

Complaint’s exhibits is the one submitted by Plaintiff Anand to HHS. Id. at 1–2 (citing Compl. at 

7–11, 19–22). Nevertheless, Defendants state that “[g]iven Plaintiffs’ pro se status and given that 

Plaintiffs did name DEA as a defendant, Defendants will address all three FOIA requests and agree 

to treat all three FOIA requests as at issue in the Complaint.” Id. at 2.

Defendants’ [59] Motion was then fully briefed for the Court’s consideration. This Opinion 

decides the Motion only as to Plaintiff Anand.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, to “pierce the veil of 
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administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of Air 

Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (citation omitted). Congress remained sensitive to the 

need to achieve balance between these objectives and the potential that “legitimate governmental 

and private interests could be harmed by release of certain types of information.” Critical Mass 

Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) 

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993). To that end, FOIA “requiresfederal agencies 

to make Government records available to the public, subject to nine exemptions for categories of 

material.” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1261–62 (2011). Ultimately, “disclosure, not 

secrecy, is the dominant objective of the act.” Rose, 425 U.S. at 361. For this reason, the 

“exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, and must be narrowly construed.” Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 

1262 (citations omitted).

“FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment.” 

Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009) (PLF) (citing

Bigwood v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 484 F. Supp. 2d 68, 73 (D.D.C. 2007) (PLF)). “The agency 

is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are genuinely in dispute and the agency

demonstrates that its search for responsive records was adequate, that any exemptions claimed 

actually apply, and that any reasonably segregable non-exempt parts of records have been disclosed

after redaction of exempt information.” Prop. of the People, Inc. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 330 F. 

Supp. 3d 373, 380 (D.D.C. 2018) (RC) (citation omitted). The burden is on the agency to justify

its response to the plaintiff’s request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). “An agency may sustain its

burden by means of affidavits, but only if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than

merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in 

the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., 515 F.3d

1224, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “If an agency’s affidavit describes the justifications
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for withholding the information with specific detail, demonstrates that the information withheld

logically falls within the claimed exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the 

record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then summary judgment is warranted on the basis

of the affidavit alone.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (citations omitted). “Uncontradicted, plausible affidavits showing reasonable specificity and 

a logical relation to the exemption are likely to prevail.” Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. Dep’t of 

State, 641 F.3d 504, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants HHS and DEA seek summary judgment against Plaintiff Neil Anand. The

Court concludes that Defendant HHS carried their burden of demonstrating that they conducted an 

adequate search for records responsive to certain parts of Plaintiff Anand’s FOIA request to HHS 

OIG––specifically, his request for “[a]ll information concerning data analytics algorithms used in the 

Pill Mill Doctor Project, all reports and work product generated by contractor Qlarant corporation 

concerning the Pill Mill Doctor Project, statement of work and official contract of Qlarant 

corporation... [and] all reports of OIG concerning Neil Anand or Institute of Advanced Medicine and 

Surgery.” The Court also concludes that OIG withheld responsive records appropriately.

However, the Court finds that Defendant HHS did not carry their burden of demonstrating 

that they conducted an adequate search for Anand’s request for “all reports from Blue Cross Blue 

Shield corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians.” 

OIG did not notify Anand that his request did not reasonably describe the records sought, as 

required by regulation or, alternatively, did not provide sufficient explanation as to why a search 

for this request would be burdensome.

As for Defendant DEA, the Court concludes that they carried their burden of demonstrating 

that they conducted an adequate search for Plaintiff Anand’s FOIA request to DEA and asserted
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proper withholdings. For these reasons, as explained further below, the Court will GRANT-INPART and DENY-IN-PART Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as against Plaintiff Anand. 

The Court first begins with a discussion of Plaintiff Anand and Pompy’s opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which they filed together. The Court then turns to 

addressing the merits of Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff Anand.

A. Plaintiffs’ Briefing

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

violates numerous rules and Court orders. Plaintiffs’ violative conduct has been a pattern 

throughout this entire litigation. See, e.g., Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No 79 at 2–6, 12–13 

(describing numerous motions and filings that have been in violation of Court order or rule or have 

otherwise been submitted in a frivolous or harassing nature). Although pro se litigants are held to a 

more lenient standard than those represented by counsel, they must nevertheless comply with the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Local Rules of Civil Procedure, and court orders. Moore v. 

Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted); Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (Penn, J.); Garlington v. D.C. Water 

& Sewer Auth’y, 62 F. Supp. 3d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2014) (BAH). The Court will now address 

numerous violations and deficiencies related to the Plaintiffs’ briefing.

1. Forty-Five Page Limit on Memorandum

First, Plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent the forty-five page limit on a responsive 

memorandum as imposed by Local Civil Rule 7(e) and the Court’s [44] Scheduling and Procedures 

Order. Local Rule 7(e) states that “[a] memorandum of points and authorities in support of or in 

opposition to a motion shall not exceed 45 pages... without prior approval of the Court.” LCvR 

7(e). The Court’s Scheduling and Procedures Order, which set forth requirements for the parties’ 

briefing on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, states that “[m]emoranda of points and 
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authorities filed in support of or in opposition to any motion may not, without leave of the Court, 

exceed forty-five (45) pages.” ECF No. 44. at 2.

Plaintiffs Anand and Pompy filed together a response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment. See generally Pls.’ Opp’n. Such filing includes numerous documents, including a 45-

page “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment.” In this Memorandum, Plaintiffs do not specifically address or respond to any of the 

arguments raised in Defendants’ Motion. Instead, Plaintiffs relitigate motions the Court has 

already decided, see, e.g., id. at 7–8, discuss irrelevant legal standards, see, e.g., id. at 12–13, and 

make conclusory remarks such as, among others, that they “have identified specific facts that would 

create a genuine material-fact dispute” without then enumerating such facts, id. at 10. They spend 

the vast majority of their briefing explaining their planned uses of the information they requested 

via FOIA: to aid in defense of their criminal prosecutions. See id. at 18–44; see also Defs.’ Reply 

at 1 (“Plaintiffs have filed a 45-page opposition that is little more than an airing of purported 

grievances with the criminal proceedings initiated against them”). The closest Plaintiffs come in 

their Memorandum to responding to Defendants’ Motion is when they claim that “DEA [] searches 

were unreasonable and legally insufficient,” Pls.’ Opp’n at 3; however, they then fail to explain 

why. In other words, Plaintiffs do not make any pertinent legal arguments or raise genuinely 

disputed material facts in their Memorandum.

Plaintiffs also include in their filing a 28-page section titled “Defendants’ Specific 

Statements of Material Fact That Are Opposed by Plaintiffs” (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiffs’ 

Opposing Responses”). See Pls.’ Opp’n at 53–80. In these pages, Plaintiffs include various 

excerpts from Defendants’ Motion and present an “Opposing Response” for each. It is in this 

section––not Plaintiffs’ Memorandum––that Plaintiffs finally address some of Defendants’ 

arguments. For example, in statement “E”, Plaintiffs include numerous citations to case law and 
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talk about “well settled” legal principles, Pls.’ Opp’n at 56, and in statement “J”, they outline and 

discuss requirements for a certain claimed exemption, id. at 60. In reply, Defendants contend that 

they “harbor serious concerns that Plaintiffs’ inclusion of legal arguments in their addendum that 

were omitted from Plaintiffs’ 45-page brief constitutes an improper attempt to circumvent the 45-

page limit for their brief.” Defs.’ Reply at 6. The Court agrees.

Courts in this Circuit have condemned briefing for comparable reasons. For example, 

where a pro se plaintiff “attempt[ed] to incorporate 129 pages of external documents to supply the 

factual information necessary to support her allegations, bringing her Opposition and its 

attachments up to a total of 173 pages in length,” the court found that to “violate the 45-page limit 

on briefs.” Spence v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No 19-1947 (JEB), 2022 WL 3354726, at *4 

(D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022). Where parties “respond[ed] to important substantive issues in footnotes,” 

the court held that “to be an attempt to circumvent the page limits set forth in the Local Civil 

Rules.” Ohio Head Start Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 873 F. Supp. 2d 335, 

344 (D.D.C. 2012) (CKK). In another instance, a plaintiff filed a responsive statement of facts as 

well as a separate statement of additional facts that together totaled 402 pages and included legal 

arguments; the court wrote that it “declines to permit Plaintiff to circumvent the page limit for 

responsive memoranda established in this Court’s [] Scheduling Order by way of the submission of 

such extensive statements.” Hajjar-Nejad v. George Washington Univ., No. 10-626 (CKK), 2013 

WL 12407402, at *1–*2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2013). And in a case where the defendant addressed 

plaintiff’s arguments in an unauthorized 44-page addendum rather than its memorandum, the court 

“warned” defendant that “it must strictly follow both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 

Local Civil Rules.” Meyer v. Panera Bread Co., 344 F. Supp. 3d 193, 211 n. 14 (D.D.C. 2018) 

(EGS/GMH).

Here, Plaintiffs present relevant and responsive legal arguments only in their filing titled 
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“Defendants’ Specific Statements of Material Fact That Are Opposed by Plaintiffs.” The Court 

finds that where Plaintiffs present such legal arguments only in attachments outside of their 

Memorandum, that constitutes an attempt to circumvent the 45-page limit imposed by Local Rule 

7(e) and affirmed by the Court’s [44] Order. Therefore, to the extent that the Court could consider 

incorporating Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses to be part of, or even an addendum to, Plaintiff’s 

Memorandum, such responses would be in violation of Local Rule 7(e) and the Court’s [44] Order.

2. Statement of Genuine Issues

Plaintiffs have also failed to comply with requirements governing their Statement of 

Genuine Issues. Local Civil Rule 7(h) requires “a separate concise statement of genuine issues 

setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to 

be litigated, which shall include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the 

statement.” LCvR 7(h)(1). The Rule continues that “[i]n determining a motion for summary 

judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of 

material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues 

filed in opposition to the motion.” Id. Courts have made clear that “when faced with a motion for 

summary judgment, a pro se plaintiff, just like a represented party, must comply with a court’s rules 

regarding responses to statements of material fact and the need to identify record evidence that 

establishes each element of his claim for relief.” MacLeod v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 15-

cv-1792 (KBJ), 2017 WL 4220398, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Grimes v. District of 

Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).

The Court emphasized in its Scheduling and Procedures Order that it “strictly adheres to the 

dictates of Local Civil Rule 7(h).” ECF No. 44 at 2. The Court continued that “[t]he party 

responding to a statement of material facts must respond to each paragraph with a correspondingly 

numbered paragraph, indicating whether that paragraph is admitted or denied.” Id. at 3. “The 
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responding party must include any information relevant to its response in its correspondingly 

numbered paragraph, with specific citations to the record. However, if the responding party has 

additional facts that are not directly relevant to its response, it must identify such facts in 

consecutively numbered paragraphs at the end of its responsive statement of facts.” Id. Finally, 

“[t]he parties must furnish precise citations to the portions of the record on which they rely; the 

Court need not consider materials not specifically identified.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(1)(A), (c)(3)).

The Court also reiterated some of these requirements in its [60] Order apprising pro se

Plaintiffs Anand and Pompy of the consequences of failing to respond to a dispositive motion. See

ECF No. 60 (citing Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). In the [60] Order, the Court 

included relevant portions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rules 56(c) and (e). Id.

at 2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e)). Rule 56(c) states that “[a] party asserting that a fact... is 

genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: [] citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record...; or [] showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a 

genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). According to Rule 56(e), “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion 

of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact... the court may... [] consider 

the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; [] grant summary judgment if the motion and 

supporting materials––including the facts considered undisputed––show that the movant is entitled 

to it.” Id. 56(e).

Here, Plaintiffs present a Statement of Genuine Issues titled “Plaintiffs’ Responses and 

Answers to Defendants’ ‘Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Dispute.’” 

See Pls.’ Opp’n at 53. Plaintiffs admit to eight of Defendants’ nine statements in their entirety. Id. 

Plaintiffs deny only Defendants’ final statement, in which Defendants state, before citing to two 
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affidavits, that “[t]hroughout the administrative processing of Plaintiffs’ FOIA request, Defendants 

carefully reviewed all the documents responsive to the request for reasonable segregation of 

nonexempt information and released all non-exempt information.” Defs.’ Mot., Statement of 

Material Facts. In response, Plaintiffs write: “Denied in whole. Plaintiffs vehemently disagree that 

Defendants carefully reviewed all the documents responsive to the request for reasonable 

segregation of non-exempt information, and in good faith, released all non-exempt information.” 

Pls.’ Opp’n at 53.

Plaintiffs’ denial fails to adhere to Local Rule 7(h), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the 

Court’s [44] Order, and the Court’s [60] Order because it does not include specific citations to parts 

of the record (or even vague references), nor does it set forth any facts to support this claim (or any 

evidence at all). Plaintiffs instead present only one conclusory sentence.

Plaintiffs’ deviation from Local Civil Rule 7(h) undermines the Rule’s purpose, which is to 

assist the Court in quickly determining if any facts are actually in dispute. See Jackson v. Finnegan, 

Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Without this Rule, 

courts would be “obligated to sift through hundreds of pages of [documents] in order to make 

[their] own analysis and determination of what may, or may not, be a genuine issue of material 

disputed fact.” Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2002). And that is the case here––

without any citations to the record nor suggested factual support, the Court is left with the task of 

weeding through Plaintiffs’ lengthy filings to identify any disputed facts and make sense of 

Plaintiffs’ briefing, which, as noted above, is devoid of responsive legal argumentation in the 

sections it should be present.

As Plaintiffs have failed to properly dispute Defendants’ assertion, the Court can take 

Defendants’ statement as undisputed. See LCvR 7(h)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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3. Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses

After its short Statement of Genuine Issues, Plaintiff includes a section titled “Defendants’ 

Specific Statements of Material Fact That Are Opposed by Plaintiffs,” to which the Court is 

referring as “Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses.” See Pls.’ Opp’n at 53–81. To the extent the Court 

could consider Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses to be part of its Memorandum, it would be wildly 

over the 45-page limit, as addressed above. To the extent the Court could generously consider 

Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses to be part of its Statement of Genuine Issues, such responses would 

also fail to comply with the relevant rules.

First, considering Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses to be part of its Statement of Genuine 

Issues, the responses impermissibly blend law with fact. As the Court explained earlier, it is in 

these pages that Plaintiffs present some legal arguments addressing Defendants’ Motion. For 

example, in statement “D”, they go so far as to write that “Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are 

acting in bad faith...”, thereby plainly making an argument rather than presenting facts. Pls.’ 

Opp’n at 55 (emphasis added). Adding to the confusion, some parts of Plaintiffs’ Opposing 

Responses contain legal arguments responsive to Defendants’ Motion, while others include legal 

arguments that are nonresponsive and irrelevant to the Motion before the Court. Per the strictures

of Local Rule 7(h), a statement of genuine issues should only include factual references. 

“[B]lending factual assertions with legal argument... does not satisfy the purposes of [Rule 7(h)].” 

Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses violate Local Rule 7(h) by 

blending facts with legal argument.

Second, Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses fail to include citations to particular parts of the 

record, as is required by Local Rule 7(h) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) as well as the 

Court’s [44] Order. For statements “A” and “D”, Plaintiffs generally reference “Joint Status 

Reports [f]iled... and... one hundred and twenty one (121) Exhibits” but do not cite to any specific 
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exhibits. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 53. 55. For statements “E”, “F”, “G”, “I”, and “N”, Plaintiffs cite to 

specific exhibits but do not provide citations to particular pages. See id. at 55–59, 65–67. Finally, 

for statements “B”, “H”, “J”, “K”, “L”, “M”, “O”, “P”, “Q”, “R”, “S”, “T”, Plaintiffs do not 

include any mention of exhibits or any other information in the record at all. See id. at 54–55, 58–

65, 67–80. Plaintiffs’ failure to provide specific citations to the record is plainly insufficient under 

the required standards. See, e.g., Sloan v. Urban Title Servs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 

(D.D.C. 2010) (CKK); Robertson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2002) (RMU).

Finally, Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses fail to adhere to the requirement of being concise, 

as required by Local Rule 7(h). The Court acknowledges that there is no page limit on a parties’ 

filings in responding to a motion, including for their statement of genuine issues. See Taylor v. 

Mills, 892 F. Supp. 2d 124, 135 n.16 (D.D.C. 2012) (BAH) (noting that the 45-page limit refers 

only to the “memorandum” of law and not any other attachments). And the Court does not take 

great issue with the fact that Plaintiffs offer twenty-eight pages of Opposing Responses in 

comparison to Defendants’ three-page Statement of Material Facts. However, the rules do require a 

“concise statement of genuine issues.” LCvR 7(h)(1) (emphasis added); see Hajjar-Nejad, No. 10-

626 at *1 (“While it is true that the Local Rules of this Court do not stipulate a page limit for the 

responding party's statement of facts, the rules do require that the statement be ‘concise’ and set 

forth only the ‘facts’ as to which it is contended there exists a ‘genuine’ issue necessary to be 

litigated.”). This statement is not an opportunity to flood the Court with facts or argumentation 

extraneous to the claims at issue in the case. See Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 553 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs or the record.”) 

(citation and internal quotes omitted). As noted above, these rules are in place to ensure that the 

Court is directed to any disputed or undisputed facts––easily identifiable based on citations to the 

record––upon which to make its ruling.
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Here, Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses are far from concise. Instead, they include long 

strings of addresses and phone numbers for government agencies, Pls.’ Opp’n at 54; musings on 

“[a] bedrock principle of our democracy,” id. at 56, and “core values of the Republic,” id. at 63; 

testimony from an unrelated criminal trial that does not respond to Defendants’ assertions, id. at 57, 

discussion of the Fourth Amendment, id. at 70, and much more.

All in all, Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses, whether considered part of Plaintiffs’ 

Memorandum or Statement of Genuine Issues, are in contravention of various rules. This supports 

the same outcome as reached above: because Plaintiffs have failed to properly dispute Defendants’ 

assertion that “[t]hroughout the administrative processing of Plaintiffs’ FOIA request, Defendants 

carefully reviewed all the documents responsive to the request for reasonable segregation of 

nonexempt information and released all non-exempt information,” the Court can take Defendants’ 

statement as undisputed. See LCvR 7(h)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

4. Plaintiffs’ “Affidavits”

Finally, Plaintiffs did not submit affidavits sufficient to rebut those offered by Defendants. 

The Court provided Plaintiffs with notice––using language written specifically for pro se litigants–

–explaining that they “must rebut the moving party’s affidavits with other affidavits or sworn 

statements.” ECF No. 60 at 1. The Court’s [60] Order further explains that “any factual assertions 

in the movant’s affidavits will be accepted by the district judge as being true unless [the opposing 

party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion.” Id.

(citing Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 

102 (7th Cir. 1982))). The Order also included relevant portions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56, including that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made 

on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant 

or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
17

Plaintiff Pompy and Anand both submitted filings titled as affidavits and to which they refer 

as affidavits. See Pls.’ Opp’n Exs. 2, 3. Pompy’s document is electronically signed by Pompy, Pls’ 

Opp’n Ex. 3 at 40, as well as in ink by a notary, id. at 41. The notary stated that “before me... 

personally appeared, Lesly Pompy, personally known to me, or proven on the basis of satisfactory 

evidence, to be Lesly Pompy. He has acknowledged to me to have executed, and that it is his 

signature on the instrument, the person who has executed the instrument.” Id. at 41. Anand’s 

document is signed in ink by both himself and a notary. Pls.’ Opp’n Ex. 2 at 36. The notary 

included a similar statement as to that in Pompy’s document. Id. The Court finds that these filings 

do not adhere to the requirements for an affidavit or any other sworn statement.

An unsworn declaration may be treated as an affidavit if the person, in writing, certifies 

under penalty of perjury that the allegations contained in the complaint are true and correct. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1746. Here, although captioned as “affidavits,” Plaintiffs’ statements are unsworn and 

contain no affirmation that they were offered under penalty of perjury. Other courts have found 

similar documents to not be considered affidavits nor any other form of sworn document for 

consideration at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Asia N. Am. Eastbound Rate Agreement v. 

Amsia Int’l Corp., 884 F. Supp. 5, 6 (D.D.C. 1995) (Harris, J.); Kirkland v. McAleenan, No 13-194 

(RDM), 2019 WL 7067046, at *19–*20 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2019).

As a result, Plaintiffs’ statements cannot aid them in rebutting Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment. More specifically, their failure to provide the proper affidavits bars them from 

disputing Defendants’ sworn affidavits. See Oviedo v. Wash. Metro. Area Transp. Auth., 948 F.3d 

386, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 

F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[L]ike the district court, we treat as admitted all facts not 

controverted in [the plaintiff’s] Verified Statement.”)). In other words, the Court may, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), consider any facts raised in Defendants’ affidavits to be 
18

undisputed because Plaintiffs failed to properly rebut them. The Court notes that because it 

provided notice of the potential repercussions to Plaintiffs in the [60] Order, it would be acting 

“perfectly within its authority” to do so without giving pro se Plaintiffs a second warning. Oviedo, 

948 F.3d at 398.

Finally, the Court notes that even if it could rely on Plaintiffs’ statements, the statements do 

not include information that rebuts or even casts into doubt the pertinent parts of Defendants’ 

affidavits. Instead, Plaintiffs’statements rehash and explain other topics, including Plaintiffs’ 

desire for the materials requested via FOIA, as is a recurrent theme throughout Plaintiffs’ briefing. 

See, e.g., Pls.’ Opp’n Ex. 3 at 13 (explaining that “[t]he plaintiff seeks to understand the compelling 

or legitimate interest of the government, whether the government primarily seeks opioid control 

first, and then pain control second”), 14 (stating that “Plaintiff Pompy needs the timely release of 

discovery” to assist him in his criminal trial).

* * *

The Court’s above discussion of Plaintiffs’ briefing lays important groundwork for the 

analysis that now follows. As explained numerous times, if a fact has not been properly supported 

or addressed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court can consider it undisputed

under Rule 56(e). See Grimes, 794 F.3d at 92. The United States Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia Circuit has explained that “for the evidentiary burden that Rule 56(c) places on 

nonmovant plaintiffs to function, a court must be able to evaluate an inadequately supported 

assertion of material fact and deem it not materially disputed, such that summary judgment is 

warranted in whole or in part.” Id. The Court moves forward with this in mind.

The Court now turns to the merits of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff 

Anand submitted two FOIA requests: one to HHS OIG and the other to DEA. The Court will 

consider each one in turn, beginning with Anand’s FOIA request to OIG.
19

B. Plaintiff Anand’s FOIA Request to HHS OIG

The Court finds that OIG satisfied its burden only for some parts of Anand’s FOIA request. 

Specifically, the Court finds that OIG’s search was adequate and withholdings justified for Anand’s 

FOIA request to OIG for “[a]ll information concerning data analytics algorithms used in the Pill Mill 

Doctor Project, all reports and work product generated by contractor Qlarant corporation concerning 

the Pill Mill Doctor Project, statement of work and official contract of Qlarant corporation... [and] all 

reports of OIG concerning Neil Anand or Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery.” However, 

OIG’s search was not adequate for Anand’s request for “all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield 

corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians” because

OIG did not notify Anand that his request did not reasonably describe the records sought, as 

required by regulation or, alternatively, did not provide sufficient explanation as to why a search 

for this request would be burdensome.

The Court begins by addressing the adequacy of the agency’s search before turning to 

withholdings.

1. Adequacy of Search

“An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material doubt 

that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Valencia-Lucena v. 

U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “At the summary judgment stage, where the agency has the burden to show that it acted in

accordance with the statute, the court may rely on ‘[a] reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the 

search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain 

responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.’” Id. at 326 (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also DiBacco v. U.S Army, 795 F.3d 178, 

188 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same). Summary judgment must be denied “if a review of the record raises 
20

substantial doubt, particularly in view of well defined requests and positive indications of

overlooked materials.” DiBacco, 795 F.3d at 188 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Defendants state––and, as explained thoroughly above, the Court can take as undisputed––

that “[t]hroughout the administrative processing of Plaintiffs’ FOIA request, Defendants carefully 

reviewed all the documents responsive to the request....” Defs.’ Mot., Statement of Material Facts

(emphasis added). In their Memorandum, Defendants contend that “HHS conducted a reasonable 

and legally sufficient search for records responsive to Plaintiff Anand’s FOIA request.” Defs.’ 

Mot. at 11. To support this contention, they include the sworn declaration of Robin Brooks, 

Director of the Freedom of Information Act Division of HHS OIG. See Defs.’ Ex. 4 (“Brooks 

Decl.”). Robin Brooks’ affidavit is “accorded a presumption of good faith.” SafeCard Servs., Inc., 

v. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Anand’s FOIA request to OIG can be separated into five categories: (1) “all reports of OIG 

concerning Neil Anand or Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery”; (2) “[a]ll information 

concerning data analytics algorithms used in the Pill Mill Doctor Project”; (3) “all reports and work 

product generated by contractor Qlarant corporation concerning the Pill Mill Doctor Project”; (4) 

“statement of work and official contract of Qlarant corporation”; and (5) “all reports from Blue 

Cross Blue Shield corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific 

physicians.

i. Anand’s Request for Documents About Pill Mill Doctor Project, Neil 

Anand, or Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery

For the purposes of analysis, the Court groups together categories (1), (2), and (3) as 

delineated above. Brooks explains that after receiving and reviewing Anand’s FOIA request, OIG 

determined that the OIG Office of Investigations (“OI”) was the only OIG office reasonably likely 

to possess responsive records regarding the Pill Mill Doctor Project, Neil Anand, and/or the 
21

Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery. Brooks Decl. ¶ 10. OIG therefore sent Anand’s 

FOIA request to OI. Id. ¶ 11. OI then conducted a search of its law enforcement database, which 

“houses all investigations conducted by OI, including complaints as well as documents related to 

civil and criminal cases.” Id.

An agency need only search the record system most likely to contain the requested 

information; it need not search every one of its record systems. Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 67; see also

Huntington v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 234 F. Supp. 3d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2017) (JEB). Therefore, OIG’s 

determinations that OI was the only office reasonably likely to possess responsive records

regarding the Pill Mill Doctor Project, Neil Anand, and/or the Institute of Advanced Medicine and 

Surgery was reasonable, as was the fact that OI confined its subsequent search to its law 

enforcement database, which houses all investigations conducted by OI.

OI searched its law enforcement database for records containing the terms “Anand,” the 

“Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery,” “Qlarant,” or “the Pill Mill Doctor Project.” 

Brooks Decl. ¶ 11. This search located one responsive case file, in which Anand was the subject of 

investigation (hereinafter referred as “Anand case file”). Id. OI then “reviewed all the documents 

in the electronic case file for documents pertaining to Mr. Anand, the Institute of Advanced 

Medicine and Surgery, Qlarant, or the Pill Mill Doctor Project.” Id. OI located records regarding 

Neil Anand and the Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery; however, they failed to locate any 

records regarding the Pill Mill Doctor Project nor any documents from Qlarant. Id. ¶ 12. OIG 

withheld the responsive records pursuant to FOIA exemptions, which will be discussed later. Id. ¶

13.

OIG conducted a supplemental search of its law enforcement database in June 2022 using 

the term “Pill Mill Doctor Project” instead of “the Pill Mill Doctor Project,” which was the search 

term used previously. Id. ¶ 18. This supplemental search yielded closed investigative reports 
22

comprising 774 pages; OIG released these pages with portions withheld pursuant to various FOIA 

exemptions, which will be discussed later. Id. The search also yielded open investigative reports

totaling 74 pages, which OIG fully withheld pursuant to exemptions discussed later. Id.

These descriptions, as sworn to in the Brooks affidavit, denote which files were searched, 

by whom, and what search terms were utilized, and reflect a systematic approach to locating 

potentially responsive documents, as is required. See Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 627 F.2d 

365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68.

Accordingly, the Court finds that OIG’s search related to these three categories of Anand’s 

request was adequate under the legal standard.

ii. Anand’s Request for Statement of Work and Official Contract of Qlarant 

Corporation

The Court next turns to category (4) as delineated above. Per Brooks’ affidavit, “a 

statement of work and/or contract with Qlarant, to the extent they exist, would be outside the scope 

of OIG’s investigative work.” Brooks Decl. ¶ 12. In other words, OIG determined that it would 

not be likely to have any records responsive to this part of Anand’s request.

In June 2022, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare (“CMS”)––a separate component of 

HHS and one to which Anand did not submit his FOIA request––located 151 pages related to the 

statement of work and official contract of Qlarant that it had previously released in response to 

unrelated FOIA requests. Id. ¶ 17. OIG released these pages to Anand with portions withheld 

pursuant to various FOIA exemptions, which will be discussed later. Id.

The Court finds that OIG’s initial determination regarding this category of Anand’s request 

was reasonable. FOIA requires only that the agency search for and produce documents in its 

possession, not search for records across the entire federal government. See, e.g., McGhee v. 

C.I.A., 697 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In other words, there is no “affirmative obligation to 
23

search for records in all agencies.” Ryan v. FBI, 113 F. Supp. 3d 356, 364 (D.D.C. 2015) (TSC).

iii. Anand’s Request Related to Blue Cross Blue Shield

Finally, the Court turns to category (5) as delineated above: “all reports from Blue Cross 

Blue Shield corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians’

was too vague and did not reasonably describe the records he sought.” The Court reads 

Defendants’ briefing as providing two different explanations for why OIG did not conduct a search 

for this information: first, that Anand’s did not reasonably describe the records sought; second, that 

Anand’s request would be too burdensome. The Court finds that neither explanation is sufficient.

First, Defendants claim that “[u]pon receiving the FOIA request, OIG concluded that [this 

part of Anand’s request] was too vague and did not reasonably describe the records sought.” Defs.’ 

Mot. at 2 (citing Brooks Decl. ¶ 10). It is well-established that “a request which fails to ‘reasonably 

describe [ ]’ the documents sought does not trigger a search of agency records.” Truitt v. Dep’t of 

State, 897 F.2d 540, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988)). “The linchpin 

inquiry” is “whether ‘the agency is able to determine precisely what records are being requested.’” 

Tereshchuk v. Bureau of Prisons, 67 F. Supp. 3d 441, 454 (D.D.C. 2014) (RCL) (quoting Yeager v. 

DEA, 678 F.2d 315, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). “Broad, sweeping requests lacking specificity are not 

sufficient.” Dale v. IRS, 238 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2002) (Bates, J.).

Plaintiff Anand requested “all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield corporation to OIG 

concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 1 (emphasis 

added). Courts in this Circuit routinely hold that similar requests seeking all documents or reports 

concerning a particular topic or person do not reasonably describe the records sought. For 

example, in Hunt v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 484 F. Supp. 47 (D.D.C. 1979) (Green, 

J.), the plaintiffs sought information that “concerned” them, id. at 51. The court found that 

“[p]laintiffs had the duty to specify more carefully the information they were seeking.” Id. 
24

Similarly, in Fonda v. CIA, 434 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1977) (Pratt, J.), the plaintiff sought 

documents that “concern her,” id. at 501. The court explained that “[t]he difficulties in such an 

open-ended search are apparent[] [because] [p]laintiff offers no criterion by which defendants can 

determine which documents ‘concern her.’” Id.

The same is true for requests seeking information “pertaining to” or “relating to” a person 

or topic. See Shapiro v. CIA, 170 F. Supp. 3d 147, 155 (D.D.C. 2016) (CRC) (considering FOIA 

requests “seeking records ‘pertaining to,’ ‘relating to,’ or ‘concerning’ [a specified person or 

topic]” to be similarly vague). In Sack v. CIA, 53 F. Supp. 3d 154 (D.D.C. 2014) (EGS), the 

plaintiff sought all “documents pertaining in whole or in part... to a list of closed Inspector General 

investigations and reports,” id. at 163 (emphasis added). The court held that because “a record may 

pertain to something without specifically mentioning it,” the request’s “lack of clarity leaves the 

agency to guess at the plaintiff’s intent.” Id. at 164. The agency “would [] have needed to devise a 

method to search for records that do not mention a list of closed Inspector General investigations 

and reports, but still somehow pertain to such a list,” which, the court found, “borders on the allencompassing fishing expedition on which a FOIA requester cannot embark.” Id. (quotation and 

citation omitted). There are numerous examples of courts coming to the same conclusions in like 

cases. See Shapiro, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 155 n.3 (compiling cases).

Finally, the Court believes there is latitude in what constitutes “improper prescribing of 

opiates” such that it would not allow HHS to identify the records sought. Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 1 

(emphasis added); see U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (when discussing 18 

U.S.C. § 1505, stating that a “[w]ord[] like... ‘improper’” is not specific); United Food & 

Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Bennett, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1213 (D. Ariz. 2013) (finding a 

state labor statute “unconstitutionally vague because of the phrase ‘improper purpose’”).

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s FOIA request for “all reports from Blue 
25

Cross Blue Shield corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific 

physicians” does not reasonably describe the records sought. However, OIG did not follow the 

proper protocol to notify Plaintiff of this deficiency. Although the Court has previously explained 

that it cannot consider Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses to be part of, or even an addendum to, 

Plaintiff’s Memorandum because the Responses would violate various local and civil rules, the 

Court does acknowledge that Plaintiff raises a meritorious legal argument therein. It does not 

matter that Plaintiff cannot be considered to have raised this argument, because Defendants bear the 

burden in a FOIA case to show that their search was reasonable

 Plaintiff claims that “[n]either... HHS nor OIG, nor any administrative appeal agency 

mention[ed] that Plaintiff[’]s requests were ‘vague and did not reasonably describe the records 

sought.’” Pls.’ Opp’n at 54. Defendants do not contest the fact that they did not inform Plaintiff 

that his request was too vague during the course of their processing of records. See Defs.’ Reply at 

7–8. Instead, they say that “Plaintiffs have pointed to no statute or regulation that prohibits HHS 

from arguing this issue in connection with its first motion for summary judgment” and that “HHS 

has timely raised this issue in its opening motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 8. The Court 

disagrees.

HHS’s processing of FOIA requests is governed by 45 C.F.R. § 5.24. As a component of 

HHS, the regulation also governs OIG. That regulation states, in part, that “[r]equests must 

reasonably describe the records sought and contain sufficient information to enable the FOIA office 

to contact you and transmit records to you. If we determine that a request does not meet these 

requirements, we will attempt to contact you if possible.” 45 C.F.R. § 5.24(b)(2) (emphasis added). 

This requirement to attempt to contact a FOIA requester is in place to ensure that the requester will 

have “an opportunity to cooperate with the agency to narrow the scope of [their] request” or 

otherwise tailor it so that it reasonably describes the records sought “without judicial intervention.” 
26

Wright v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 22-1378, 2022 WL 18024624, at *4 (RC) 

(D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2022).

However, despite this “clear procedure,” id. at *3, no one at OIG ever contacted Anand that 

his request did not reasonably describe the records sought. Instead, Defendants mentioned this for 

the first time in their Motion for Summary Judgment. Other courts faced with similar factual 

circumstances have found that “HHS’s failure to follow its own regulation is fatal to its motion.” 

Wright, 2022 WL 18024624, at *4. The same is true here. By neglecting the regulation and raising 

this issue for the first time in a dispositive motion, the Court cannot find that OIG’s search was 

adequate as to this part of Anand’s FOIA request.

Defendants offer what the Court interprets as a second reason for their failure to conduct a 

search for this information. Defendants explain that “[b]ecause OIG reports are indexed by the 

subject of the investigation, not submitter, OIG cannot retrieve all reports from Blue Cross Blue 

Shield Corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians.” 

Defs.’ Mot. at 12 (citing Brooks Decl. ¶ 10) (emphasis added). According to Brooks, “[a] search 

for ‘Blue Cross Blue Shield’ in the OIG database would have returned a voluminous amount of 

non-responsive claims information.” Brooks Decl. ¶ 10. Defendants claim that as a result,

“Plaintiff Anand’s request would effectively require HHS to review every single case file and 

identify whether any reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield Corporation exist within that case file.” 

Defs.’ Mot. at 12. The Court reads Defendants’ statements to be a claim that a search for “Blue 

Cross Blue Shield” would be unreasonably burdensome. Cf. Shapiro, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 156

(considering the agency’s argument that documents could not be “locate[d]... with a reasonable 

amount of effort” to “plainly [be] an argument that a satisfactory response would be too 

burdensome”).

Agencies are not required to conduct searches that would impose unreasonable burdens. 
27

Nation Mag., Washington Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

Searching through unindexed files could impose such a burden. See id. However, the agency 

“bears the burden to ‘provide [a] sufficient explanation as to why such a search would be 

unreasonably burdensome.’” Ayuda, Inc. v. FTC, 70 F. Supp. 3d 247, 275 (D.D.C. 2014) (RC) 

(quoting Nation Mag., 71 F.3d at 892). Courts have consistently found that “merely claiming that a 

search would be ‘costly and take many hours to complete’ is insufficient.” Anderson v. U.S. Dep’t 

of State, 661 F. Supp. 2d 6, 12 n.3 (D.D.C. 2009) (ESH) (quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Dep’t of 

Educ., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (ESH)). Instead, courts require a “substantial” 

showing,” Tereshchuk, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 455, that includes “a detailed explanation by the agency 

regarding the time and expense of a proposed search in order to assess its reasonableness,” Wolf v. 

CIA, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2008) (RJL). Where the agency does not produce any 

explanation of the time and expense of a proposed search, but rather relies on conclusory 

statements from a declarant, a court cannot conclude that such a search would be unduly 

burdensome. See, e.g., Prop. of the People, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 530 F. Supp. 3d 57, 64 

(D.D.C. 2021) (CJN); Shapiro, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 155–56.

Here, Defendants have not included any information regarding the time and expense of 

conducting this search, nor any additional details to support that it would be burdensome. Rather, 

they rely on Brooks’ conclusory statement that there would be a “voluminous amount” of nonresponsive records, Brooks Decl. ¶ 10, to argue that Plaintiff’s search “would effectively require 

HHS to review every single case file,” Defs.’ Mot. at 12. Based on these assertions, the Court 

cannot find that HHS’s search was adequate as to this part of Anand’s request on these grounds 

either.

* * *

In sum, the Court finds that OIG’s search was adequate as to Plaintiff’s request for “[a]ll 
28

information concerning data analytics algorithms used in the Pill Mill Doctor Project, all reports and 

work product generated by contractor Qlarant corporation concerning the Pill Mill Doctor Project, 

statement of work and official contract of Qlarant corporation... [and] all reports of OIG concerning 

Neil Anand or Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery.” However, the Court finds that OIG’s 

search was not adequate as to Plaintiff’s request for “all reports from Blue Cross Blue Shield 

corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians” and, 

therefore, the Court will deny in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to this part of 

Anand’s request.

The Court now moves on to discuss the withholdings asserted by OIG.

2. Withholdings

OIG withheld information under FOIA Exemptions 7(A), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(C), 7(E), and 7(F). 

The Court addresses each exemption separately.

i. FOIA Exemption 7(A)

OIG withheld all responsive documents in the Anand case file under Exemption 7(A). To 

determine if this was proper, judicial review of an agency’s withholding under FOIA Exemption 7 

“requires a two-part inquiry”: first, whether the relevant information was in fact compiled for law 

enforcement purposes, and second, whether it fits one of the enumerated standards, CBP v. 

Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982), which here is 7(A).

Regarding the first prong, to show that the disputed documents were “compiled for law 

enforcement purposes,” the agency need only “establish a rational nexus between the investigation 

and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties and a connection between an individual or incident 

and a possible security risk or violation of federal law.” Campbell v. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 

32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Keys v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
29

Defendants explain that “while HHS is not a law enforcement agency... it may [] assert 

Exemption 7 to protect records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes.” Defs.’ 

Mot. at 31. Per the Brooks Declaration, the Anand case file included witness statements and 

associated HHS-OIG agent notes, Medicare and Medicaid claims information, and information 

provided by Qlarant to HHS, all of which were prepared or the purpose of investigating possible 

health care fraud. Id. (citing Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 33–37). HHS had also compiled records including 

names and identifying information of case agents involved in the investigation, which was done for 

law enforcement purposes. Id. (citing Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 41–47). As HHS is “entitled to deference in 

its determination that the records were compiled for a law enforcement purpose,” Gilman v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (BAH)), the Court finds that the 

documents withheld were in fact compiled for law enforcement purposes. With this threshold 

matter addressed, the Court now turns to the second prong and discusses 7(A) specifically.

Under Exemption 7(A), “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” 

are exempt from disclosure under FOIA to the extent the disclosure of those materials “could 

reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). The 

principal purpose of this exemption is to “prevent disclosures which might prematurely reveal the 

government’s cases in courts, its evidence and strategies, or the nature, scope, and focus of 

investigations.” Maydak v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 218 F.3d 760, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2000). “Another 

recognized goal of Exemption 7(A) is to prevent litigants from identifying and intimidating or 

harassing witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).

To properly withhold records under 7(A), the government must first identify either “‘a 

concrete prospective law enforcement proceeding’” or an enforcement proceeding that is “pending 

or reasonably anticipated.” Boyd v. Crim. Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 386 (D.C.

Cir. 2007) (quoting Bevis v. Dep’t of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Defendants 
30

explain that Plaintiff Anand is subject to an ongoing criminal investigation that has not yet been 

resolved. Defs.’ Mot. at 17; see also Defs.’ [80] Notice (“Plaintiff Neil Anand’s criminal 

proceeding remains ongoing”); Defs.’ [81] Notice (providing update on criminal proceeding against 

Anand). Specifically, Anand is facing a criminal prosecution in United States v. Anand, Crim. A. 

No. 19-0518 (E.D. Pa.). The Court therefore finds this first requirement for 7(A) is satisfied.

Second, the government must show that disclosure “could reasonably be expected 

perceptibly to interfere” with the enforcement proceeding. North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d 1088, 1097 

(D.C. Cir. 1989). The agency is not required to make a “specific factual showing with respect to 

each withheld document that disclosure would actually interfere with a particular enforcement 

proceeding.” Agrama v. IRS, 282 F. Supp. 3d 264, 273–74 (D.D.C. 2017) (RMC) (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted). “Rather, federal courts may make generic determinations that, with 

respect to particular kinds of enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular kinds of 

investigatory records while a case is pending would generally interfere with enforcement 

proceedings.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Defendants contend that they “determined that disclosure of all records pertaining to 

Plaintiffs’ investigations could reasonably be expected to interfere with Plaintiffs’ criminal 

proceedings.” Defs.’ Mot. at 17. In particular, Brooks explains that the “premature disclosure of: 

evidence; witness information; prospective testimony; identification of the evidence likely to be 

relied upon by the government; the activity under continuing investigation during the litigation; the 

direction of the government so far; government strategy; the presence or absence of whistleblowers 

or other undisclosed sources; the scope and limits of the government’s investigation; and attorney 

work product; along with other confidential information” could interfere with these proceedings. 

Brooks Decl. ¶ 28. Brooks continues that “[d]isclosures concerning the details of the investigation 

risk witness intimidation and the possible silencing of other information sources,” and that 
31

“[d]isclosure of these records also risks the concealment of damaging evidence and the fabrication 

of false evidence.” Id.

Plaintiff Anand has provided no basis to doubt this representation, and the Court concludes 

that the agency has shown that the release of responsive documents in the Anand case file could 

reasonably be expected to interfere with the ongoing criminal proceedings against Anand. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the OIG’s withholding of all of the responsive materials in 

the Anand case file was properly justified on the basis of Exemption 7(A).

Not only did OIG assert FOIA Exemption 7(A) to shield disclosure of the Anand case file in 

its entirety, but they also asserted other FOIA exemptions for certain materials within the case file. 

Brooks Decl. ¶ 28. Having found that OIG’s withholdings under 7(A) were proper, the Court need 

not address any additional withholdings asserted for the Anand case file. Center for Nat’l Sec.

Stud. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, for a complete 

analysis, the Court discusses OIG’s additional justifications for withholding documents in the 

Anand case file where appropriate.

ii. FOIA Exemption 3

FOIA Exemption 3 applies to matters that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by 

[another] statute” if that statute “requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a 

manner as to leave no discretion on the issue” or “establishes particular criteria for withholding or 

refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).

OIG withheld Taxpayer Identification Numbers in the Qlarant statement of work and 

official contract pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6103. Brooks Decl. ¶ 21. OIG also withheld Tax 

Identification Numbers located in closed investigative reports that were responsive to its June 2022 

search for “Pill Mill Doctor Project” pursuant to the same statute. Id. ¶ 25. It is “beyond dispute” 

that 26 U.S.C. § 6103 “is the sort of nondisclosure statute contemplated by FOIA Exemption 3,” 
32

which “leave[s] [agencies] with no discretion to reveal those matters publicly.” Tax Analysts v. 

IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In addition, § 6103 provides that tax returns and return 

information “shall be confidential” and prohibits any “officer or employee of the United States” 

from disclosing such information, subject to certain exceptions. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 701 F.3d 379, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Court finds that OIG properly 

invoked Exemption 3 for these withholdings pursuant to § 6103.

OIG also withheld the Social Security Number of a deceased individual, located in closed 

investigative reports responsive to its June 2022 “Pill Mill Doctor Project” search, pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1306c. Brooks Decl. ¶ 25. That statute exempts from FOIA disclosure information 

contained in the Death Master File during the three-year period beginning on the date of that 

person’s death. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1306c. Brooks avers that said individual’s death 

occurred within the past three years. Brooks Decl. ¶ 25. The Court finds that OIG properly 

invoked Exemption 3 for this withholding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1306c.

Finally, although OIG withheld in full the Anand case file pursuant to Exemption 7(A), they 

also asserted Exemption 3 for grand jury material contained within that case file. Brooks Decl. ¶

30. Specifically, the material withheld included “the substance of what was said to the grand jury,” 

“any references to any particular witnesses who testified before the grand jury, “questions and 

answers to and from witnesses[,] as well as the surveillance reports and notes.” Id. Brooks 

explains that this grand jury material is subject to the disclosure restrictions of Rule 6(e) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was enacted by the Act of July 30, 1977, Pub L. No. 

95-78, 91 Stat. 319. Id. at ¶ 29.

As Rule 6(e) is a statute within the meaning of Exemption 3, grand jury information within 

the scope of Rule 6(e) would be exempt. Fund for Const. Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv., 

656 F.2d 856, 868 & n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Here, the information described by Brooks falls within 
33

the scope of 6(e), which is “necessarily broad” and “encompasses not only the direct revelation of 

grand jury transcripts but also the disclosure of information which would reveal ‘the identities of 

witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony, the strategy or direction of the investigation, the 

deliberations or questions of the jurors, and the like.’” Id. at 869 (quoting SEC v. Dresser Indus., 

Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The Court finds that OIG properly withheld grand 

jury material under FOIA Exemption 3.

iii. FOIA Exemption 4

FOIA Exemption 4 shields from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial 

information [that are] obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 

“Unlike many other types of information subject to an agency’s control, materials implicating 

Exemption 4 are generally not developed within the agency.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 

F.3d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Instead, the agency typically has procured the “information from 

third parties, either by requirement or by request.” Id. “If the requested documents constitute 

‘trade secrets,’ they are exempt from disclosure, and no further inquiry is necessary.” Pub. Citizen 

Health Rsch. Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But, where documents instead 

constitute “commercial or financial information,” records are exempt from disclosure only if they 

are “(1) commercial or financial, (2) obtained from a person, and (3) privileged and confidential.” 

Id. at 1289–90. 

OIG withheld certain information in the Qlarant statement of work and official contract 

under Exemption 4, specifically “contract amounts, including Total Estimated Costs, Total Award 

Fee, Costs, Base Fees, Award Fees, Billing Rate, and Indirect Cost Ceiling Rate.” Brooks Decl. ¶

22. According to Brooks, “[t]he bid amounts incorporated into the contract are commercial 

information that bidders submit to the agency but otherwise keep confidential.” Id. Because OIG 

withheld commercial information obtained from Qlarant that was confidential, see Defs.’ Mot. at 
34

24, the three requirements for exemption, as articulated above, are satisfied. The Court finds that 

OIG properly withheld this information under FOIA Exemption 4.

iv. FOIA Exemption 5

Exemption 5 protects “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would 

not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b)(5). It applies to materials that would be privileged in the civil discovery context, such as 

materials protected by the deliberative process privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the 

attorney work-product privilege. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975). In 

order to “justify nondisclosure under Exemption 5, an agency must show that the type of material it 

seeks to withhold is generally protected in civil discovery for reasons similar to those asserted by 

the agency in the FOIA context.” Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 87 F.3d 508, 517 

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

The deliberative process privilege “protects ‘documents reflecting advisory opinions, 

recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which government decisions 

and policies are formulated.’” Loving v. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting 

Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001)). The “privilege 

rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if 

each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its object is to enhance the 

quality of agency decisions, by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them 

within the Government[.]” Klamath, 535 U.S. at 8–9 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). The privilege “helps to prevent premature disclosure of proposed policies and protects 

against public confusion through the disclosure of documents suggesting reasons for policy 

decisions that were ultimately not taken.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. Supp. 

2d 252, 258–59 (D.D.C. 2004) (HHK).
35

“To fall within the deliberative process privilege, materials must bear on the formulation or 

exercise of agency policy-oriented judgment.” Petroleum Info. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 976 

F.2d 1429, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original). A record qualifies for withholding only if 

it is both “predecisional” and “deliberative.” Access Reports v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 

1192, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1991). “A document is predecisional if it is ‘generated before the adoption 

of an agency policy.’” McKinley v. FDIC, 744 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting 

Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). It is

“deliberative” if it reflects “the give-and-take of the consultative process.” Coastal States Gas 

Corp., 617 F.2d at 866; see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143–44 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[T]o 

come within the privilege and thus within Exemption 5, the document must be a direct part of the 

deliberative process in that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy 

matters.”). The key question in determining whether the material is deliberative “is whether 

disclosure of the information would ‘discourage candid discussion within the agency.’” Access 

Reports, 926 F.2d at 1195 (quoting Dudman Commc’ns Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 815 F.2d 

1565, 1567–68 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

To meet its burden, an “agency must establish ‘what deliberative process is involved, and 

the role played by the documents in issue in the course of that process.’” Senate of the 

Commonwealth of P.R. ex rel. Judiciary Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 585–86 

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 868). However, an agency need 

not “identify a specific decision in connection with which [materials were] prepared.” N.L.R.B. v. 

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 n.18 (1975). Rather, the agency must show that “the 

document was generated as part of a definable decision-making process.” Gold Anti-Trust Action 

Comm., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 762 F. Supp. 2d 123, 135–36 (D.D.C. 

2011) (ESH).
36

Here, OIG withheld HHS-OIG agent notes about witness statements under Exemption 5, 

claiming that such notes fell under the deliberative process privilege. Brooks asserts that these 

notes are “inter-agency, deliberative, and predecisional” and that they “represent the thoughts and 

impressions of the HHS-OIG agents as they built their case against Mr. Anand.” Brooks Decl. ¶

33. Brooks explains that “[r]eleasing these notes would reveal aspects of the government’s strategy 

in its case against Mr. Anand and would impede the government’s ability to prosecute him.” Id. 

The Court finds that OIG has satisfactorily shown that these notes were predecisional in that they 

were created before they began their case against Anand. OIG has also satisfactorily shown that 

the notes were deliberative, as they express “thoughts and impressions” on the government’s case

against Anand. Finally, the deliberative decision-making process of which these notes were a part 

was building the case against, and ultimately prosecuting, Anand. Therefore, this withholding was 

proper under Exemption 5. Cf. Abtew v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 47 F. Supp. 3d 98, 103–05

(D.D.C. 2014) (ABJ) (discussing the deliberate process privilege and upholding Exemption 5 

application to USCIS document containing author’s “personal thoughts about the merits of the 

asylum case”).

OIG also asserted Exemption 5 for Qlarant’s analysis of claims data and communications 

with Qlarant. Brooks Decl. ¶ 37. Brooks claims that because Qlarant served as a consultant to the 

Department, the inter-agency threshold of Exemption 5 is satisfied. Id. Certain communications 

between an agency and an outside consultant can be considered “inter-agency or intra-agency”

records under FOIA Exemption 5 if the records of communications were “created for the purpose 

of aiding the agency’s deliberative process.” Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 917 

F.2d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Here, Defendants assert that “Qlarant analyzed Medicare and 

Medicaid claims information to look for trends in billing information and to determine outlier 

providers that were potentially overbilling.” Brooks Decl. ¶ 37. The analysis that Qlarant 
37

conducted was certainly created for the purpose of aiding OIG in determining how to proceed with 

certain investigations; accordingly, the Court finds that these communications satisfy the

Exemption 5 threshold. Brooks then explains that this analysis was “part of OIG’s deliberations in 

deciding how best to use its resources” which, if disclosed, would “reveal aspects of the 

government’s strategy in its case against Mr. Anand and others and would impede the 

government’s ability to prosecute individuals who defraud the government.” Brooks Decl. ¶ 37. 

The Court finds that this satisfies the deliberative process privilege as well and therefore the 

withholding was proper under Exemption 5.

Lastly, OIG applied Exemption 5 to “deliberative and predecisional communications with 

[DOJ] and within OIG regarding the results of surveillance reports, bank records, and information 

gleaned from consensual monitoring” as well as “regarding the Anand case” more generally. 

Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 40, 45. According to Brooks, “[t]hese communications reflect the analytical stage 

of an investigation that precedes a decision to charge an individual with a crime” and “reflect 

deliberations as to the import and persuasiveness of individual pieces of evidence, the release of 

which would handicap the government’s ability to present its case against Mr. Anand at trial.” Id. ¶

40. The Court again finds that these communications fall squarely within the deliberative process 

privilege to justify withholding under Exemption 5. Brooks also notes that these withholdings also 

included attorney-client communications reflecting legal advice from DOJ and agency counsel 

about litigation theories and strategies, id. ¶ 45, which would be an additional layer of privilege.

v. FOIA Exemption 6

Exemption 6 protects information contained in “personnel and medical files and similar 

files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).

The term “similar files” is construed broadly and is “intended to cover detailed Government 
38

records on an individual which can be identified as applying to that individual.” U.S. Dep’t of State 

v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982) (citation omitted). “The threshold is fairly minimal, 

such that all information which applies to a particular individual is covered by Exemption 6, 

regardless of the type of file in which it is contained.” Concepcion v. FBI, 606 F. Supp. 2d 14, 35 

(D.D.C. 2009) (RMU) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Court finds that all information withheld by OIG under Exemption 6 constituted a 

“similar file.” The “similar files” qualification pertains not only to entire records, but also “bits of 

personal information, such as names and addresses,” the disclosure of which would create “a 

palpable threat to privacy.” Judicial Watch, Inc., 449 F.3d at 152–53 (quoting Carter v. Dep’t of 

Com., 830 F.2d 388, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). So, for example, even when the requested records do 

not themselves qualify as personnel or medical files, “[t]he names and contact information of 

federal employees are the type of information that is eligible for withholding under Exemption 6.” 

Long v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 279 F. Supp. 3d 226, 243 (D.D.C. 2017) (APM). The same can 

be true for the names and personal information of third parties, notes about individuals, or sensitive 

medical information that relates to specific individuals.

Next, in considering whether an agency has properly invoked Exemption 6 to those files, 

courts must balance the privacy interest in nondisclosure against the public interest in the release of 

the information. Lepelletier v. FDIC, 164 F.3d 37, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1999). “Ultimately, an agency’s 

justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.” Larson 

v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Pursuant to Exemption 6, OIG withheld names and identifying information of various 

individuals: the “Key Personnel” list under the task order in the the Qlarant statement of work and 

official contract, Brooks Decl. ¶ 23; the names and contact information of various case agents, id.

¶¶ 41, 46; and “names, dates of birth, contact information, and other Personally Identifiable 
39

Information [] of beneficiaries, federal agents, investigators, complainants, witnesses, and other 

investigation subjects” found in closed investigative reports that were responsive to its June 2022 

search for “Pill Mill Doctor Project,” id. ¶ 26. Defendants claim that the privacy interests in 

nondisclosure for each of these groups of information outweighed the public interest in disclosure. 

For example, as for the “Key Personnel” list, Brooks explains that the “disclosure of such 

information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Releasing the 

identities of individuals investigating possible Medicare/Medicaid fraud would invade their privacy 

by exposing them to harassment from the targets of their investigation.” Id. ¶ 23.2 Regarding the 

names and information of agents, Brooks avers that some “agents have received threats.” Id. ¶ 46. 

Brooks claims that the agents’ privacy interest in avoiding harassment outweighs any public 

interest in knowing the names of individuals serving in sensitive government positions. Id. ¶ 41. 

The Court finds that there is a significant privacy interest in nondisclosure of this 

information. See Judicial Watch, Inc., 449 F.3d at 153 (finding that individuals have a privacy 

interest in the nondisclosure of their names so as to avoid physical danger); Wash. Post Co., 456 

U.S. at 600 (“Information such as place of birth, date of birth, date of marriage, employment 

history, and comparable data... would be exempt from any disclosure that would constitute a 

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”); Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 

879 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he privacy interest of an individual in avoiding the 

unlimited disclosure of his or her name and address is significant, as several other circuits have 

held.”); Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 177 F. Supp. 3d 56, 83 (D.D.C. 2016) (RC) (“employee 

names may be properly withheld if there is no genuine public interest in such information or if the 

2

Instead of releasing these names, Defendants released the “titles of those individuals,” as Brooks 

determined that doing so would “satisfy[y] the public’s interest in knowing how the agency is 

maintaining the integrity of its programs” without jeopardizing those individuals’ privacy. Brooks 

Decl. ¶ 23.
40

information’s release will endanger a staff member’s safety”). On the other side of the balancing 

equation, courts have held again and again in similar circumstances that there is little public interest 

in disclosure of the names of certain individuals involved in an investigation as it would “reveal[] 

little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct.” Beck v. Dep’t of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1493 

(D.C. Cir. 1993). The Court finds the same is true here: there is little if any public interest in this 

personal information of the various individuals whose names and information OIG withheld. Even 

if looking at Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses, Plaintiff has failed to identify a significant public 

interest in the release of this specific information. Therefore, these withholdings under Exemption 

6 were proper.

OIG also withheld “witness statements and any references to witnesses in the HHS-OIG 

agent notes” under Exemption 6. Brooks Decl. ¶ 34. Brooks explains that while disclosure could 

lead to harassment of those individuals and therefore implicates a “significant privacy interest,” 

“there is no public interest in disclosure because [the statements and notes] do not shed light on the 

government’s actions.” Id. ¶ 35. For the same reasons as above, the Court finds these withholdings 

justified.

Finally, OIG withheld communications with Qlarant as well as Qlarant’s analysis of claims 

data under Exemption 6. Brooks Decl. ¶ 38. Brooks avers that the “claims information contains 

sensitive medical information about individuals that the Department compiled for purposes of its 

investigations.” Id. The release of this information “could cause embarrassment both independent 

and by virtue of a link to a criminal investigation,” and [t]he public does not have an interest in this 

sensitive medical information.” Id. Again, the Court finds for the same reasons that the privacy 

interests at stake far outweigh a public interest in disclosure and therefore OIG’s assertion of 

Exemption 6 was proper.

vi. FOIA Exemption 7(C)
41

Exemption 7(C) protects records compiled for law enforcement purposes if the disclosure of 

such records “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 

privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Judicial review of an agency’s withholding under FOIA 

Exemption 7 “requires a two-part inquiry”: first, whether the relevant information was in fact 

compiled for law enforcement purposes, and second, whether it fits one of the enumerated

standards, CBP v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982), which, here, is 7(C).

The Court already found the first prong to be satisfied when discussing Exemption 7(A) 

above. Next, when assessing an agency’s claim under Exemption 7(C), the district court must look 

to the balance of the privacy interests asserted and the public interest in disclosure. Voinche v. FBI, 

412 F. Supp. 2d 60, 68 (D.D.C. 2006) (RCL). Once an agency has shown a logical connection 

between the withheld information and this exemption, the only relevant question is “whether 

[plaintiff] has shown government misconduct sufficient to overcome Exemption 7(C)’s protection 

for personal privacy under the test outlined” in Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 

U.S. 157 (2004). Voinche, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 68.

Under the Favish test, a plaintiff “must show that the public interest sought to be advanced 

is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake” and that 

“the [withheld] information is likely to advance that interest.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 172. “It is well 

established that the only public interest relevant for purposes of Exemption 7(C) is one that focuses 

on ‘the citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to.’” Davis v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. 

for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)). When the requester advances revealing 

government misconduct as the relevant public interest, the requester must “produce evidence that 

would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have 

occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174. For the public interest to prevail, the requester must provide 
42

“compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity,” SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 

F.2d at 1205–06, far “more than a bare suspicion” of official misconduct, Favish, 541 U.S. at 174.

OIG withheld information regarding third parties––witness statements, as well as agency 

notes regarding those witnesses––under Exemption 7(C). Defendants contend that “[r]elease of the 

personally identifiable information of these individuals to the public could subject them to 

harassment or embarrassment, as well as undue public attention, resulting in potential professional 

and social repercussions.” Defs.’ Mot. at 34 – 35. As Brooks explains, these witnesses have a 

strong privacy interest in not being associated with possible health care fraud and there is no public 

interest in disclosure because the documents do not shed light on the government’s actions. Brooks 

Decl. ¶¶ 34, 36. The Court agrees that there are significant private interests at stake. As a general 

matter, the identification of a third party individual such as a witness “in a law enforcement file will 

engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.” Branch v. FBI, 658 F. 

Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1987) (Richey, J.); see also Isiwele v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., 85 F. Supp. 3d 337, 359 (D.D.C. 2015) (ABJ) (explaining that third parties include 

witnesses). Therefore, “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, the balance [of interests] categorically 

favors withholding the names... of third parties,” as such information is not probative of an 

agency’s performance of its statutory responsibilities. Mays v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 234 F.3d 1324, 

1327 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Lazaridis v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 934 F. Supp. 2d 21, 38 (D.D.C. 

2013) (RMC) (quoting Nation Mag. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 

Even if looking at Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses, Plaintiff does not present any argument that this 

withheld information regarding third parties would advance any public interest. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that the private interest outweighs any public interest and, therefore, OIG properly 

withheld this information under Exemption 7(C).

OIG also withheld “the names of the case agents as well as the agents involved in the digital 
43

analysis/examination of the digital devices” under Exemption 7(C). Brooks explains that the 

agents’ privacy interest in avoiding harassment outweighs any public interest in knowing the names 

of individuals serving in sensitive government positions. Brooks Decl. ¶ 41. It is well settled that 

law enforcement personnel and government employees have a substantial interest in anonymity. 

See Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 204, 216–17 (D.D.C. 2018) (RDM) 

(discussing Exemption 7(C) and noting that “government investigators and employees ‘have a 

legitimate interest in preserving the secrecy of matters that conceivably could subject them to 

annoyance or harassment in either their official or private lives’ ”) (quoting Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Adionser v. Dep’t of Justice, 811 F. Supp. 2d 

284, 299 (D.D.C. 2011) (RJL). Accordingly, where Plaintiff again does not present any argument 

as to why this withheld information would advance any public interest, and considering this 

significant privacy interest, the Court finds that OIG properly withheld the names of these agents 

under Exemption 7(C).

vii. FOIA Exemption 7(E)

Exemption 7(E) permits withholding of “records or information compiled for law 

enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or 

information... would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or 

prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if 

such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b)(7)(E). Per the D.C. Circuit, this “exemption looks not just for circumvention of the law, but 

for a risk of circumvention; not just for an actual or certain risk of circumvention, but for an 

expected risk; not just for an undeniably or universally expected risk, but for a reasonably expected 

risk; and not just for certitude of a reasonably expected risk, but for the chance of a reasonably 

expected risk.” Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Exemption 7(E) 
44

sets a relatively low bar for the agency to justify withholding: “Rather than requiring a highly 

specific burden of showing how the law will be circumvented, exemption 7(E) only requires that 

the [agency] demonstrate logically how the release of the requested information might create a risk 

of circumvention of the law.” Id. at 1194 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The Court again incorporates its analysis regarding the threshold for any Exemption 7, 

finding that the materials at issue were compiled for law enforcement purposes. OIG withheld 

DEA “registration numbers, which the government uses to regulate the prescription of controlled 

substances,” that were located in closed investigative reports responsive to its June 2022 search for 

“Pill Mill Doctor Project.” Brooks Decl. ¶ 27. Brooks explains that “the release of the numbers is 

reasonably expected to risk circumvention of law as individuals could use these numbers to forge 

prescriptions.” Id. The Court finds that these registration numbers fall within the scope of 7(E). 

See Ortiz v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 67 F. Supp. 3d 109, 123 (D.D.C. 2014) (TFH) (finding that 

NADDIS “violator identifier codes,” which are “multi-digit numbers assigned to drug violators and 

suspected drug violators” fall under 7(E)); Adionser v. Dep’t of Justice, 33 F.Supp.3d 23, 25–26

(D.D.C. 2014) (RJL) (withholding G–DEP codes that “identify priority given to narcotic 

investigations, types of criminal activities involved, and violator ratings” fall under under 7(E)). 

Brooks’ statements logically explain how this information could help others circumvent the law, 

which suffices to justify invocation of Exemption 7(E).

OIG also withheld information regarding investigational techniques under Exemption 7(E)

including questions and answers from witnesses, types of surveillance used, surveillance reports, 

types of software used to examine digital media, and more. Brooks Decl. ¶ 43. This information 

falls squarely within the scope of 7(E). Brooks explains that “[t]he methods by which HHS-OIG 

investigated Mr. Anand are not well-known to the public and revealing them could result in similar 

individuals purposely evading detection, thereby nullifying the effectiveness of those methods” and 
45

even “provid[ing] a roadmap for circumvention..” Id. The Court finds the same is true here as 

above, and this withholding was also appropriate.

viii. FOIA Exemption 7(F)

Finally, Exemption 7(F) protects from mandatory disclosure information compiled for law 

enforcement purposes to the extent that disclosure “could reasonably be expected to endanger the 

life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F). In general, this exemption has 

been interpreted to apply to names and identifying information of law enforcement officers, 

witnesses, confidential informants and other third persons who may be unknown to the requester. 

See Durham v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F. Supp. 428, 434 (D.D.C. 1993) (CRR); Pub. Emps. for 

Env’tal Resp. (Peer), Rocky Mountain Chapter v. U.S. E.P.A., 978 F. Supp. 955, 961 (D. Colo. 

1997) (citing cases). Moreover, “[d]isclosure need not definitely endanger life or physical safety; a 

reasonable expectation of endangerment suffices.” Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & 

Water Comm’n, 740 F.3d 195, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In reviewing claims under exemption 7(F), 

courts have inquired whether there is some nexus between disclosure and possible harm and 

whether the deletions were narrowly made to avert the possibility of such harm. Albuquerque Pub. 

Co. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 726 F. Supp. 851, 858 (D.D.C. 1989) (Pratt, J.). “Within limits, courts 

defer to the agency’s assessment of danger.” Pinson v. Dep’t of Justice, 236 F. Supp. 3d 338, 368 

(D.D.C. 2017) (RC) (citation omitted).

The Court again incorporates its analysis regarding the threshold for any Exemption 7, 

finding that the materials at issue were compiled for law enforcement purposes. Under Exemption 

7(F), OIG withheld “the names of the case agents,” the names of “agents involved in the digital 

analysis/examination of the digital devices,” and “names and contact information, including email 

addresses and phone numbers, of OIG agents.” Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 41, 46. Brooks explains that “OIG 

field agents have been subject to violent threats, and disclosing their identity could put them in 
46

harm’s way.” Id. ¶ 41; see also id. ¶ 46. The Court finds that there is a connection between 

disclosure and possible harm such that the information was properly withheld under Exemption 

7(F).

ix. Segregability

FOIA requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of [the] record shall be provided to 

any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b). An agency must provide a “detailed justification” and not just make “conclusory 

statements” to support its segregability determination. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air 

Force, 566 F.2d 242, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1977). At the same time, however, agencies, “are entitled to a 

presumption that they complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material,” 

which can be overcome by contrary evidence produced by the requester. Sussman v. U.S. Marshals 

Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

OIG withheld some records responsive to Anand’s FOIA request in their entirety under 

Exemption 7(A). See Brooks Decl. ¶ 13. “[A]n agency withholding documents under Exemption 

7(A) does not need to justify its segregability determination document by document, as the 

exemption allows agencies to justify withholding based on categories of documents.” Stein v. U.S. 

Secs. & Exchange Comm’n, 266 F. Supp. 3d 326, 353 (D.D.C. 2017) (JDB). OIG also released 

some information to Anand with portions withheld pursuant to various FOIA exemptions. See

Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 4, 18. Outside of the partially withheld records, Brooks avers that she “reviewed 

the records line by line” and, “[a]fter extensive review of the records at issue, [HHS OIG] has 

determined that there is no further non-exempt information that can be reasonably segregated and 

released without revealing exempt information.” Brooks Decl. ¶ 47. Courts in this Circuit have 

found that where the agency conducted a document-by-document review of all responsive records–

–or here, an even more specific line-by-line review––and determined that nothing within those 
47

records was reasonably segregable, the agency has demonstrated its compliance with FOIA’s 

segregability requirement. See, e.g., Center for Pub. Integrity v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 486 F. Supp. 

3d 317, 330 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2020) (CKK) (finding DOD’s segregability obligation satisfied after 

looking to DOD’s declaration regarding Exemption 3 that they conducted a page-by-page and lineby-line review and determined that non further segregation could be made); Manning v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, 234 F. Supp. 3d 26, 38 (D.D.C. 2017) (APM); Dillon v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 102 F.

Supp. 3d 272, 298–99 (D.D.C. 2015) (RBW) (finding the FBI’s segregability obligation satisfied 

when affidavit stated that the FBI could not segregate some materials because they were exempt in 

their entirety under 7(A) and the FBI “carefully reviewed” the remaining materials and determined 

that no additional nonexempt information could be released); DiBacco v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 

983 F. Supp. 2d 44, 65–66 (D.D.C. 2013) (CKK) (finding that agency met segregability 

requirement when it performed document-by-document review and Plaintiffs offered no evidence 

to rebut the assertion that it produced all reasonably segregable material), aff’d in part, remanded in 

part sub nom. DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2015). This Court finds the same 

here and that OIG complied with its segregability obligations.

* * *

In sum, the Court finds that all withholdings asserted by OIG were done so properly and 

with justification. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

as to Anand’s FOIA request to OIG for “[a]ll information concerning data analytics algorithms used 

in the Pill Mill Doctor Project, all reports and work product generated by contractor Qlarant 

corporation concerning the Pill Mill Doctor Project, statement of work and official contract of Qlarant 

corporation... [and] all reports of OIG concerning Neil Anand or Institute of Advanced Medicine and 

Surgery.”

As explained above, due to the deficiencies in OIG’s search for “all reports from Blue Cross 
48

Blue Shield corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific physicians,” 

the Court denies Defendants’ Motion as to this part of Anand’s FOIA request.

C. Plaintiff Anand’s FOIA Request to DEA

The Court now addresses Anand’s FOIA request to DEA. The Court finds that DEA’s 

search for records responsive to Anand’s request was adequate and they applied withholdings 

appropriately. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to 

Anand’s FOIA request to DEA.

The Court begins by addressing the adequacy of the agency’s search before turning to 

withholdings.

1. Adequacy of Search

The same standard articulated in Section III.B.1 regarding the adequacy of an agency’s 

search under FOIA applies here.

Defendants state––and, as explained thoroughly above, the Court can take as undisputed––

that “[t]hroughout the administrative processing of Plaintiffs’ FOIA request, Defendants carefully 

reviewed all the documents responsive to the request....” Defs.’ Mot., Statement of Material Facts

(emphasis added). Defendants contend that “DEA conducted a reasonable and legally sufficient 

search for records responsive to Plaintiff Anand’s FOIA request.” Defs.’ Mot. at 13. To support 

this contention, they include the sworn declaration of Angela D. Hertel, the Unit Chief of the Legal 

and External Affairs Sub-Unit, Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit, of the United States 

Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration. See Hertel Decl. ¶ 1.

Plaintiff Anand requested from the DEA “all drug enforcement agency documents 

concerning Neil Anand, Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery, Anand Medical Investment, 

Paul Soccio.” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. A. The DEA separated this request into the four categories. Hertel 

Decl. ¶ 13. The Court will consider the first three categories together before turning to the last 
49

request.

i. Anand’s Request for Documents About Neil Anand, Institute of Advanced 

Medicine and Surgery, and Anand Medical Investment

Hertel explains that all DEA criminal law enforcement investigative records are maintained 

as part of the DEA Investigative Reporting and Filing System (“IRFS”). Hertel Decl. ¶ 6. DEA 

locates records that are maintained as part of IRFS using the DEA Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs 

Information System (“NADDIS”), which is a centralized electronic data index system. Id. ¶ 7. 

Hertel states that “[a] NADDIS search is a worldwide, comprehensive search because all DEA 

intelligence and investigative records are indexed into NADDIS for purposes of being maintained 

as part of IRFS.” Id.

For the first category of Anand’s request, Defendants explain that the DEA searched IRFS 

by querying NADDIS using the term “Neil Anand.” Defs.’ Mot. at 13 (citing Hertel Decl. ¶ 14). 

This search resulted in the identification of three investigative case numbers; the DEA withheld in 

full all responsive records under exemptions that will be discussed later. Hertel Decl. ¶ 14.

As for the second and third categories, Anand requested “documents concerning... Institute 

of Advanced Medicine and Surgery [and] Anand Medical Investment.” The Institute of Advanced 

Medicine and Surgery and Anand Medical Investment are both owned by Anand. Defs.’ Mot. at 5 

(citing Indictment ¶ 2, United States v. Anand, Crim. A. No. 19-0518 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2019)). 

Defendants explain that in response to this request, the DEA searched IRFS by querying NADDIS 

first using the term “Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery” and then separately using the 

term “Anand Medical Investment.” Defs.’ Mot. at 13–14 (citing Hertel Decl. ¶ 15). Both searches 

resulted in a “no results found” response in NADDIS. Hertel Decl. ¶ 15. In other words, DEA 

located no records responsive to this part of Anand’s request.

The Court finds that the DEA conducted an adequate search in response to Anand’s FOIA 
50

request as to these three categories. An agency must provide a “reasonably detailed affidavit, 

setting forth the search terms and type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to 

contain responsive materials... were searched.” Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. Here, the DEA offered

Hertel’s sworn declaration, which is “accorded a presumption of good faith.” SafeCard Servs., 

Inc., 926 F.2d at 1200. The Hertel declaration avers that all files likely to contain responsive 

materials were searched: DEA searched NADDIS, the centralized system that indexes all records 

maintained in IRFS, which houses all of the DEA’s criminal law enforcement investigative records. 

Additionally, the Hertel affidavit explains the search terms that were utilized, reflecting a 

systematic approach to locating potentially responsive documents, as is required. See Weisberg, 

627 F.2d at 371; Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. The Court therefore finds that the DEA has satisfactorily 

demonstrated that they conducted an adequate search for responsive records for Anand’s request 

for “all drug enforcement agency documents concerning Neil Anand, Institute of Advanced 

Medicine and Surgery, Anand Medical Investment.”

ii. Anand’s Request for Documents About Paul Soccio

For the fourth category––Anand’s request for documents concerning “Paul Soccio”––

Defendants explain that the “DEA did not conduct a search because it is DEA standard practice to 

deny the request for investigative records about a third party, neither affirming nor denying the 

existence of records.” Defs.’ Mot. at 14 (citing Hertel Decl. ¶ 16).

Paul Soccio is Plaintiff Anand’s former business partner. Defs.’ Mot. at 4. According to 

Defendants the “two individuals appear to have a contentious relationship.” Id. (citing Anand v. 

Indep. Blue Cross, Civ. A. No. 20-6243, 2021 WL 3128690, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2021) 

(recounting Plaintiff Anand’s allegations against Mr. Soccio), aff’d in part, No. 21-2679, 2022 WL 

2339476 (3d Cir. June 29, 2022); see generally Soccio v. Anand, No. 201606395 (Bucks Cnty., Pa. 

Com. Pl.)).
51

Hertel explains that the “DEA had no evidence of Mr. Soccio’s death, nor did it have 

authorization from Mr. Soccio to disclose information to Mr. Anand.” Hertel Decl. ¶ 42. 

Furthermore, “[t]he disclosure of even the existence of DEA law enforcement records 

concerning... Mr. Soccio[] could reasonably be expected to subject him to unwarranted invasions

of personal privacy” because, among other reasons, “[m]embers of the public would draw adverse 

inferences about Mr. Soccio from the mere fact that he might be mentioned in the law enforcement 

investigative records.” Id. Therefore, in response to Anand’s request for documents concerning 

Mr. Soccio, the DEA issued a Glomar response pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Hertel 

Decl. ¶ 42; see also Defs.’ Mot. at 14.

A Glomar response is appropriate in “certain cases, [where] merely acknowledging the 

existence of responsive records would itself cause harm cognizable under a FOIA exception.” 

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. NIH (“PETA”), 745 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks and original alteration omitted); see Bartko v. United States Dep’t of 

Justice, 898 F.3d 51, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“A Glomar response to a FOIA request is permitted in 

that rare situation when either confirming or denying the very existence of records responsive to a 

request would ‘cause harm cognizable under an FOIA exception.’” (quoting Roth v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). “[T]o the extent the circumstances justify a 

Glomar response, the agency need not conduct any search for responsive documents or perform 

any analysis to identify segregable portions of such documents.” PETA, 745 F.3d at 540.

A Glomar response “is proper if the fact of the existence or nonexistence of agency records 

falls within a FOIA exemption.” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “When 

addressing an agency’s Glomar response, courts must accord ‘substantial weight’ to agency 

determinations.” Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y v. IRS, 208 F. Supp. 3d 58, 89 (D.D.C. 2016) 

(citing Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Consequently, in such cases, 
52

“courts may grant summary judgment on the basis of agency affidavits that contain reasonable 

specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into 

question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Elec. Privacy 

Info. Ctr. v. NSA, 678 F.3d 926, 931 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The 

supporting affidavit must justify the Glomar response based on general exemption review standards 

established in non-Glomar cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “an 

agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or 

‘plausible.’” Id. (citation omitted).

As stated above, DEA asserted this Glomar response pursuant to Exemptions 6 and 7(C). 

“When information is claimed to be exempt from disclosure under both provisions, courts ‘focus... 

on Exemption 7(C) because it provides broader privacy protection than Exemption 6 and thus 

establishes a lower bar for withholding material.’” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 854 F.3d 675, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Citizens for Responsibility & 

Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 746 F.3d 1082, 1091 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).

The Court discussed the 7(C) standard above in Section III.B.2.vi in the context of OIG’s 

withholdings, but repeats it now for reference. Exemption 7(C) protects records compiled for law 

enforcement purposes if the disclosure of such records “could reasonably be expected to constitute 

an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Judicial review of an 

agency’s withholding under FOIA Exemption 7 “requires a two-part inquiry”: first, whether the 

relevant information was in fact compiled for law enforcement purposes, and second, whether it fits 

one of the enumerated standards, CBP, 456 U.S. at 622, which, here, is 7(C). Regarding the first 

prong, to show that the disputed documents were “compiled for law enforcement purposes,” the 

agency need only “establish a rational nexus between the investigation and one of the agency’s law 

enforcement duties and a connection between an individual or incident and a possible security risk 
53

or violation of federal law.” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 32 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); see also Keys, 830 F.2d at 340. Here, Defendants write that “DEA meets the 

requirements of a law enforcement agency,” Defs.’ Mot. at 31, and that “[g]iven the nature and 

context of DEA’s investigative records, the disclosure of any information could potentially tip-off a 

criminal or drug trafficking organization that they are the subject of a DEA investigation, or 

potentially subject an individual to unwarranted attention,” Hertel Decl. ¶ 42. The DEA is “entitled 

to deference in its determination that the records were compiled for a law enforcement purpose.” 

Gilman, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 19. The Court finds that this first prong is satisfied and therefore turns to 

the second prong to discuss the DEA’s Glomar response under 7(C).

In assessing an agency’s claim under exemption 7(C), the district court must look to the 

balance of the privacy interests asserted and the public interest in disclosure. Voinche, 412 F. Supp. 

2d at 68. Once an agency has shown a logical connection between the withheld information and 

this exemption, the only relevant question is “whether [plaintiff] has shown government 

misconduct sufficient to overcome Exemption 7(C)’s protection for personal privacy under the test 

outlined” in the Supreme Court case Favish. Voinche, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 68.

Under the Favish test, a plaintiff “must show that the public interest sought to be advanced 

is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake” and that 

“the [withheld] information is likely to advance that interest.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 172. “It is well 

established that the only public interest relevant for purposes of Exemption 7(C) is one that focuses 

on ‘the citizens’ right to be informed about what their government is up to.’” Davis, 968 F.2d at

1282 (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 773). When the requester 

advances revealing government misconduct as the relevant public interest, the requester must 

“produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government 

impropriety might have occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174. For the public interest to prevail, the 
54

requester must provide “compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity,” 

SafeCard Servs., Inc., 926 F.2d at 1205–06, far “more than a bare suspicion” of official 

misconduct, Favish, 541 U.S. at 174.

Here, Hertel explains that “[t]he disclosure of even the existence of DEA law enforcement 

records concerning a third party, such as Mr. Soccio, could reasonably be expected to subject him 

to unwarranted invasions of personal privacy. Mr. Soccio has a substantial privacy interest in not 

being associated with a DEA law enforcement investigation.” Hertel Decl. ¶ 42. The Court agrees 

that there is a significant private interest at stake here. As a general matter, the identification of a 

third party individual “in a law enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries 

a stigmatizing connotation.” Branch, 658 F. Supp. at 209. Therefore, “[a]bsent exceptional 

circumstances, the balance [of interests] categorically favors withholding the names... of third 

parties.” Mays, 234 F.3d at 1327; see also Lazaridis, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (quoting Nation Mag., 

71 F.3d at 896). Even if looking at Plaintiffs’ Opposing Responses, Plaintiff does not present any 

argument that this withheld information would advance any public interest. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that no public interest outweighs Mr. Soccio’s privacy interests.

Therefore, because the existence or nonexistence of DEA records concerning Mr. Soccio 

falls within FOIA Exemption 7(C), see Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374, and because merely acknowledging 

the existence of responsive records could cause harm by invading this privacy interest, PETA, 745 

F.3d at 540, the Court holds that the DEA’s Glomar response was justified. As a result, the DEA 

was also justified in not conducting a search for materials responsive to Anand’s request for 

“documents concerning... Paul Soccio.” See PETA, 745 F.3d at 540.

* * *

The Court finds that the DEA has satisfactorily demonstrated that they conducted an 

adequate search for responsive records as for all of Anand’s FOIA request. The Court now turns to 
55

an analysis of DEA’s withholdings under FOIA.

2. Withholdings

Having found DEA’s search to be adequate, the Court now turns to their withholdings. The 

DEA found records responsive to Plaintiff’s request for “all drug enforcement agency documents 

concerning Neil Anand.”3 The DEA withheld responsive records in full under FOIA Exemption 

7(A) as well as 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j). Hertel Decl. ¶ 12.

The DEA explains that if the criminal proceedings against Anand ended and FOIA 

Exemption 7(A) was therefore no longer applicable, certain responsive records could be disclosed 

but would then be subject to FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C), 7(D), 7(E), and 7(F). Id. ¶¶ 12, 34. In 

Hertel’s affidavit, she explains those exemptions “briefly... for the purpose of preserving DEA’s 

ability to assert these exemptions should Exemption 7(A), which is temporal in nature, expire.” Id.

¶ 34. But unlike OIG, the DEA did not actually assert these other exemptions. Compare to Brooks 

Decl. ¶ 28. Therefore, the Court does not analyze any withholdings under these exemptions, as 

they have not actually been asserted by the DEA and, additionally, some of Hertel’s explanations 

are speculative. See, e.g., id. ¶ 35 (when discussing FOIA Exemption 5, stating that “DEA 

anticipates that when the pending criminal proceedings have resolved, [] Mr. Anand[’s]... 

investigative case records will include communications between DEA and the DOJ attorneys 

representing the United States in the criminal proceedings...”) (emphasis added).

The Court considers the withholdings that were in fact made under Exemption 7(A) and 5 

3 As explained above, the DEA found no records responsive to Plaintiff’s request for “all drug 

enforcement agency documents concerning... Institute of Advanced Medicine and Surgery” as well 

as “Anand Medical Investment.” The Court has already found that the DEA’s Glomar response 

regarding Plaintiff’s request for “all drug enforcement agency documents concerning... Paul 

Soccio” was appropriate. Accordingly, the only search that yielded responsive results was for

records about Neil Anand, and therefore the only withholdings at issue here are those asserted for 

that search.
56

U.S.C. § 552a(j).

i. FOIA Exemption 7(A)

The Court incorporates the standard for FOIA Exemption 7(A) articulated previously in 

Section III.B.2.i. The Court has already found the first part of the legal test to be satisfied––

whether the information withheld was compiled for law enforcement purposes––as the DEA is a 

law enforcement agency and has compiled investigatory documents for a law enforcement purpose. 

The Court again finds that Defendants have sufficiently shown that Plaintiff Anand is subject to an 

ongoing criminal proceeding. The Court now turns to whether DEA has established that disclosure 

would interfere with this proceeding.

Defendants contend that they “determined that disclosure of all records pertaining to 

Plaintiffs’ investigations could reasonably be expected to interfere with Plaintiffs’ criminal 

proceedings.” Defs.’ Mot. at 17. Hertel states that Anand’s “criminal proceedings involve alleged 

violations of the C[ontrolled] S[ubstances] A[ct], the enforcement of which is one of DEA’s 

primary law enforcement missions.” Hertel Decl. ¶ 40. Hertel continues that the release of DEA’s 

investigative case records “could reveal information that Mr. Anand... would not otherwise have 

access to and would undermine the United States’ prosecution in the pending proceedings as well 

as in any criminal appellate process.” Id.

Plaintiff Anand has provided no basis to doubt this representation, and the Court concludes 

that the agency has shown that the release of responsive documents could reasonably be expected 

to interfere with the ongoing criminal proceedings against Anand. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that the DEA’s withholding of all of the responsive materials requested by Anand is 

properly justified, in full, on the basis of Exemption 7(A).

ii. Withholdings Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)

The DEA also withheld information pursuant to Section (j)(2) of the Privacy Act. The 
57

Privacy Act “safeguards the public from unwarranted collection, maintenance, use and 

dissemination of personal information contained in agency records... by allowing an individual to 

participate in ensuring that his records are accurate and properly used, and by imposing 

responsibilities on federal agencies to maintain their records accurately.” Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 

1403, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1984). However, “like FOIA, the Privacy Act carves out exemptions from 

disclosure when a system of records meets certain criteria.” Mobley v. C.I.A., 806 F.3d 568, 586 

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

Section (j)(2) of the Privacy Act permits the head of an agency to promulgate rules to 

exempt any system of records within the agency from an individual right of access if the system of 

records is “maintained by an agency or component thereof which performs as its principal function 

any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws... and which consists of information

compiled for the purpose of” a criminal investigation. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2)(B). The Department 

of Justice has, by regulation, exempted information that is maintained as part of IRFS from such 

access. See 28 C.F.R. § 16.98(i); see also Djenasevic v. Exec. Off. of U.S. Att’ys, 319 F. Supp. 3d 

474, 484 (D.D.C. 2018) (RCL) (“DEA has exempted pursuant to Exemption (j)(2) investigative 

case files maintained in its Investigative Reporting and Filing System from access.”) (citing 28 

C.F.R. § 16.98(i)). Therefore, an individual who is the subject of an investigative case maintained 

as part of IRFS does not have an individual right of access to those records under the Privacy Act. 

See Defs.’ Mot. at 19.

Anand requested from the DEA investigative records about himself––specifically, “all drug 

enforcement agency documents concerning Neil Anand.” See Hertel Decl. ¶ 32. Because Anand is 

the subject of a criminal investigation and ongoing criminal proceedings, as discussed above, the 

Court finds that such documents in IRFS are therefore exempt from disclosure under the Privacy 

Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2)(B). The Court finds that DEA properly withheld information 
58

under this exemption.

iii. Segregability

As discussed earlier for Anand’s request to OIG, FOIA requires that “[a]ny reasonably 

segregable portion of [the] record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after 

deletion of the portions which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). The Court incorporates the more 

detailed explication of the standard explained in Section III.B.2.ix.

Here, DEA withheld all responsive records in full under 7(A), as well as 5 U.S.C. § 

552a(j)(e). See Hertel Decl. ¶ 12. “[A]n agency withholding documents under Exemption 7(A) 

does not need to justify its segregability determination document by document, as the exemption 

allows agencies to justify withholding based on categories of documents.” Stein v. U.S. Secs. & 

Exchange Comm’n, 266 F. Supp. 3d 326, 353 (D.D.C. 2017) (JDB). Nevertheless, Hertel avers that 

“[e]very effort is made to release all segregable information without disclosing law enforcement 

techniques or procedures. No additional information may be segregable for disclosure without 

revealing the protected information.” Hertel Decl. ¶ 43. The Court finds the DEA complied with 

its segregability obligations.

* * *

In sum, the Court finds that all withholdings asserted by DEA were done so properly and 

with justification. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

as to Anand’s FOIA request to DEA entirely.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as against Plaintiff Anand. The Court will GRANT the 

Motion as to Anand’s FOIA request to OIG for “[a]ll information concerning data analytics algorithms 

used in the Pill Mill Doctor Project, all reports and work product generated by contractor Qlarant 
59

corporation concerning the Pill Mill Doctor Project, statement of work and official contract of Qlarant 

corporation... [and] all reports of OIG concerning Neil Anand or Institute of Advanced Medicine and 

Surgery,” having found OIG’s search to be adequate and withholdings justified. The Court will also 

GRANT the Motion as to Anand’s FOIA request to DEA.

The Court will DENY the Motion as to Anand’s FOIA request to OIG for “all reports from 

Blue Cross Blue Shield corporation to OIG concerning improper prescribing of opiates by specific 

physicians” because OIG did not notify Anand that his request did not reasonably describe the 

records sought, as required by regulation or, in the alternative, OIG did not provide sufficient 

explanation as to why a search for this request would be burdensome. The Court shall order HHS

shall file a Status Report by no later than April 7, 2023, indicating how they intend to proceed such 

as, but not limited to, conducting a search or filing a renewed motion for summary judgment. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

/s/

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge