[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 17 (Tuesday, January 27, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3928-3929]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-1901]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-271]


Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Station; Exemption

I

    The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) is the 
holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-28, which authorizes 
operation of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The license 
provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all 
rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(the Commission) now or hereafter in effect. The facility consists of a 
single-unit boiling-water reactor located at the licensee's site in 
Windham County, Vermont.

II

    Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR 70.24), ``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each 
licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall 
maintain a criticality accident monitoring system in each area where 
such material is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and 
(a)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements 
that these monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that 
all areas subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by 
two detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to 
maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM 
is handled, used, or stored and also requires that (1) the procedures 
ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the 
sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures 
must include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, 
and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for 
determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey 
instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. 
Subsection (b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means 
for identifying quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads 
or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to 
maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements 
for the services of a physician and other medical personnel qualified 
to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the 
transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities 
outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 
50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for 
SNM used or to be used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 
states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause why he 
or she should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 
may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the 
reasons for the relief requested.

III

    The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at Vermont 
Yankee is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than 
fuel that is stored on site in any given location is small enough to 
preclude achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff 
has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the 
nuclear fuel at Vermont Yankee and has determined that it is extremely 
unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets the 
following seven criteria:
    1. Only three new fuel assemblies are allowed out of a shipping 
cask or storage rack at one time.
    2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level, in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the 
k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence 
level, in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with 
fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a

[[Page 3929]]

moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
    4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level, in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    5. The quantity of forms of SNM other than nuclear fuel, that is 
stored on site in any given area is less than the quantity necessary 
for a critical mass.
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 
(GDC) 63, are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect 
excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated December 16, 1997, the licensee requested an 
exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. The licensee's letter dated January 13, 
1998, provided additional information supporting the exemption. In the 
submittals, the licensee addressed criteria 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
Criterion 3 is satisfied because the licensee's submittal dated January 
13, 1998, states that the cycle 20 fuel will be channeled and stored in 
the spent fuel storage pool until it is loaded in the core and that the 
licensee has no plans to store new fuel in the new fuel storage vault. 
The Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals 
and has determined that Vermont Yankee meets the criteria for 
prevention of inadvertent criticality; therefore, the staff has 
determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality 
to occur in SNM handling or storage areas at Vermont Yankee.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate 
action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that 
such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation 
monitors that meet GDC 63 in fuel storage and handling areas. These 
monitors will alert personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow 
them to initiate appropriate safety actions. The low probability of an 
inadvertent criticality, together with the licensee's adherence to GDC 
63, constitutes good cause for granting an exemption to the 
requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

IV

    The Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corporation an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 
70.24.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the human 
environment (63 FR 2425).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of January 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-1901 Filed 1-26-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P