COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

JAMES D. QUINN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0531-97-4 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 2, 1997 

VERONICA QUINN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Marcus D. Williams, Judge 

 (James McConville, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (Lawrence H. Bowen; Paula W. Rank; Byrd, 

Mische, Bevis, Bowen, Joseph & O'Connor, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 James D. Quinn (husband) appeals the circuit court's 

decision concerning equitable distribution and other issues. 

Husband contends the trial court erred by (1) incorrectly valuing 

certain assets awarded to Veronica Quinn (wife); (2) awarding 

spousal support to wife in light of her past employment and 

current status as a student; (3) requiring husband to pay a 

proportionate share of wife's survivor benefit received as part 

of his military pension; and (4) awarding wife attorney's fees. 

Wife contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in 

awarding her an insufficient percentage of husband's military 

retirement pay; and (2) erred in calculating the reimbursement of 

a portion of the pendente lite spousal support in the 

distribution of assets. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 Rule 5A:27. 

VALUATION

 Husband challenges the trial court's valuation of certain 

marital assets, including the marital residence, and alleges that 

the court failed to properly consider the statutory factors and 

to credit his specific expenditures. We find no error. 

 Husband contends that the court erroneously "split the 

difference" when valuing certain marital assets by assigning a 

value equal to the midpoint between the parties' alternative 

values. The valuations as determined by the trial court do not 

support husband's contention. Moreover, when parties present 

different evidence of value, the trial court is not required to 

accept either valuation, as long as the value is within a range 

supported by the evidence. 

 The parties and their experts valued the marital residence 

at a range of less than $250,000 to more than $300,000. One 

expert, a real estate salesperson familiar with the area, 

testified that the home was worth $300,000. Thus, credible 

evidence supported the trial court's valuation of the marital 

home at $300,000. As to the other real property, husband 

admitted purchasing the Florida condominium for $53,500 and 

admitted that additional improvements had been added. Thus, we 

find no error in the court's determination that the condominium 
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was worth $69,000, as testified to by wife, and not $45,140, as 

proffered by husband. 

 Although husband asserted that unspecified assets held in 

the safety deposit box were divided equally, wife gave a 

substantially more detailed listing of the contents. Husband's 

sister acknowledged that husband gave her gold jewelry and a 

kilogram of gold. Therefore, the trial court did not err in 

rejecting husband's proposed alternative values. 

 Husband also argues that the court failed to properly credit 

his side of the ledger when dividing the marital assets. In 

other words, husband challenges the distribution decision. 

"Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be set 

aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 

it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 

675, 678 (1990). The trial court expressly noted that it 

considered the statutory factors when reaching its equitable 

distribution decision and articulated its findings on the 

statutory factors prior to issuing its decision from the bench. 

A greater monetary contribution toward the acquisition of marital 

property accumulated by the parties during their marriage is only 

one of the factors to be considered by the court when making its 

equitable distribution decision. Code § 20-107.3(E). Husband 

used marital assets, including his current earnings during the 

marriage, to fund the individual retirement account in wife's 
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name and to purchase the Florida condominium for wife's parents. 

 There was no evidence that husband used his separate property to 

acquire these items. The trial court did not commit reversible 

error by failing to credit husband for these funds expended 

during the marriage for these assets. 

 Husband admits that the loans wife obtained by forging his 

name were not included in the final calculation of the marital 

estate. Two of these loans wife incurred to cover college 

expenses for two of the parties' sons. Under the terms of the 

final decree, wife was obligated to pay these loans in full upon 

receipt of the monetary award. We find no error. 

SPOUSAL SUPPORT

 Husband contends that the trial court erred by awarding 

spousal support to wife and by failing to impute sufficient 

income to wife. We disagree. 

 The determination whether a spouse is entitled to support 

and, if so, how much, is a matter within the discretion of the 

trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is 

clear that some injustice has been done. See Dukelow v. Dukelow, 

2 Va. App. 21, 27, 341 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1986). 

 In awarding spousal support, the chancellor 

must consider the relative needs and 

abilities of the parties. He is guided by 

the nine factors that are set forth in Code 

§ 20-107.1. When the chancellor has given 

due consideration to these factors, his 

determination will not be disturbed on appeal 

except for a clear abuse of discretion. 

Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829 
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(1986). It is clear from the trial court's ruling from the bench 

that it considered the statutory factors. The court noted that 

wife could earn more than she was currently earning and, while 

not expressly imputing to wife a specific amount of income, 

awarded only $1,000 in monthly spousal support. 

 The evidence proved that wife was unable to work night 

shifts and that she was seeking additional education so that she 

could obtain a daytime nursing position. While husband contends 

that wife earned more in the past while working in the District 

of Columbia area, that evidence was insufficient to establish 

that wife was significantly underemployed in her current 

geographic location. Although husband contends that wife could 

have taken advantage of educational opportunities in the past, 

"the court, in setting support awards, must look to current 

circumstances and what the circumstances will be 'within the 

immediate or reasonably foreseeable future,' not to what may 

happen in the future," or, alternatively, what could have 

happened in the past. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. at 735, 396 S.E.2d 

at 679. It is irrelevant to the current situation that years 

earlier, under different circumstances, wife did not obtain 

additional training. Therefore, husband has failed to 

demonstrate that the trial court erred in its award of spousal 

support to wife. 

 While husband contends that the trial court failed to 

consider Code § 20-107.1(8), "[t]he provisions made with regard 
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to the marital property," we find no indication that husband 

presented this argument below. Therefore, we will not consider 

it for the first time on appeal. See Rule 5A:18. 

 Wife contends that the trial court erred by overcrediting to 

husband the amount of pendente lite spousal support she received 

following the continuance of the hearing. The hearing originally 

scheduled for September 10, 1996 was continued until January. In 

the order granting the continuance, the trial court ruled that 

"any reduction in the amount of spousal support ordered to be 

paid by [husband] at a later proceeding shall be retroactive to 

September 10, 1996." After the continuance, husband made 

pendente lite bimonthly support payments of approximately $1,400 

for at least four months, for a total exceeding $12,000. In 

light of the court's decision to award permanent spousal support 

in the amount of $1,000, giving that award a fully retroactive 

effect would have resulted in a credit to husband of only 

approximately $8,000. Nevertheless, as wife had the use of the 

money throughout the period of the continuance, and as the credit 

was part of the larger distribution of the parties' various 

assets, debts and credits, we cannot say the court's decision to 

credit husband with $12,000 in payments made during this time 

amounted to reversible error. 

SURVIVOR'S BENEFIT

 Under Code § 20-107.3(G)(2), the trial court is authorized 

to order the designation of a former spouse as an irrevocable 
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beneficiary "of all or a portion of any survivor benefit or 

annuity plan . . . ." The statute further states that "[t]he 

court, in its discretion, shall determine as between the parties, 

who shall bear the costs of maintaining such plan." Id. The 

trial court ruled that the husband's military retirement pay 

subject to proportional distribution to the parties would first 

be reduced by the amount of wife's survivor benefit premium. 

Thus, the trial court made both parties bear a portion of the 

costs of this benefit, in the same proportion as they received a 

share of the military retirement pay. The trial court acted 

within its express statutory authority and we find no error in 

the court's decision to have the parties bear a proportional 

share of the costs of this benefit to wife. 

ATTORNEY'S FEES

 An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal 

only for an abuse of discretion. See Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. 

App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper 

award of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the 

circumstances. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 

338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). Husband's earnings were 

substantially greater than those of wife. Both parties pursued 

fault-based grounds for divorce, which, while rejected by the 

commissioner, were not without some factual support. Based on 

the number of issues involved and the respective abilities of the 
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parties to pay, we cannot say that the award was unreasonable or 

that the trial judge abused his discretion in making the award. 

WIFE'S SHARE OF RETIREMENT PAY

 Wife sought to receive approximately forty-four percent of 

husband's military retirement pay, which she claimed equaled 

fifty percent of the marital share. See Code § 20-107.3(G)(1). 

Husband asserted, and the trial court agreed, that fifty percent 

of the marital share to which wife was entitled was only 

forty-two percent of the retirement pay. Husband presented 

evidence that he had a year of Reserve service which was 

creditable service for pay and retirement purposes. The trial 

court's determination was supported by evidence. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.