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******************************************************IRO B. ALTRAIDE v. IBIBIA ALTRAIDE (AC 35409)
Gruendel, Alvord and Mihalakos, Js. Argued April 24—officially released October 7, 2014 (Appeal from the Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Westbrook,J. [pendentelite order;judgment]; Bozzuto, J. [motions for contempt and to modify].)
Ibibia Altraide, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
W. Anthony Stevens, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion GRUENDEL, J. The self-represented defendant, Ibibia Altraide, appeals from thejudgments ofthe trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, Iro B. Altraide, and deciding certain postjudgment motions. The defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by (1) ordering him to pay child support pendente lite, (2) awarding the plaintiff alimony, child support, attorney’s fees, and sole custody of their child in the dissolution, and (3) deciding two postjudgment motions, specifically, granting the plaintiff’s postjudgmentmotionforcontempt1 and denyingthe defendant’s postjudgment motion for modification.2 We dismiss as moot the defendant’s claim regarding the pendente lite order and affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, in 2006. After moving to Connecticut, the couple had
a child in 2009. Throughout the marriage there were several periods ofseparation and reconciliation, culminating in a complaint for legal separation filed by the plaintiff on March 16, 2012.
On April 4, 2012, the court issued a pendente lite order requiring, inter alia, the defendant to pay the plaintiff $228 per week in child support until a final judgment could be rendered. On January 24, 2013, a trial was held and the court thereafter rendered a final judgment dissolving the marriage and ordering, inter alia, (1) the defendanttopaytheplaintiff$200perweek in alimonyfor aperiod ofthree years oruntil such time
as the plaintiff obtained full-time employment, (2) the defendant to pay the plaintiff $228 per week in child support, and (3) the plaintiffto receive sole custody of the child. Following the trial, the plaintifffiled several motions for contempt alleging that the defendant had disregarded the court’s orderto pay alimony. The court held three contempt hearings in April, July, and September of 2013. At each of the hearings, the court found that the defendanthadfailedtopayalimonyanddetermined the amount in arrearage. The court later found the defendant in contempt and, on September 17, 2013, the defendant was ordered incarcerated for failure to comply with the court’s alimony order. On that same day,thedefendantmadea$1000paymenttotheplaintiff and was released from jail. This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review governing all of the defendant’s claims. ‘‘The well settled standard of review in domestic relations cases is that this court will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its findingshavenoreasonablebasisinthefacts.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)Borkowskiv.Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 739, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994). ‘‘[T]o conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find thatthe courteitherincorrectlyappliedthelaworcould not reasonably conclude as it did.

. . . Appellate review of a trial court’s findings offact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review.

. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 634, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).
I
The defendant first argues that the court abused its discretion by awarding the plaintiffpendente lite child support payments in the amount of $228. We do not reachthemerits ofthis claim, asthe questionpresented is moot.3
‘‘Mootness is a question ofjusticiability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction

. . . . Because courtsare establishedtoresolve actualcontroversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367, 373–74, 944 A.2d 276 (2008). Pendente lite orders are temporary orders ofthe court that are necessarily extinguished once afinaljudgment hasbeenrendered. Sweeneyv. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193, 201, 856 A.2d 997 (2004). Once a final judgment has been rendered, an issue with respect to a pendente lite order is moot because an appellate court can provide
no practical relief. Id. As a result, an appellate court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a pendente lite order after the trial court has rendered a final judgment. Id.
In the present matter, the pendente lite order was issued on April 4, 2012. That order remained in effect untilJanuary24, 2013, whenthemarriagewas dissolved and a finaljudgment was rendered by the court. When thefinaljudgmentwasrendered, thependenteliteorder ceased to exist. Accordingly, the issue on appeal is moot and, as a result, we do not address the merits of the defendant’s claim. See Brown v. Brown, 69 Conn. App. 209, 210, 794 A.2d 550 (2002).
II
The defendant next claims that the court abused its discretion in awarding alimony, child support, attorney’s fees, and custody of the child to the plaintiff. We disagree.
The law regarding financial orders in a marital disso-lution action is well settled. ‘‘[G]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because of its opportunityto observe the parties and the evidence. Moreover, the powerto act equitablyis the keystone to the court’s ability to fashion reliefin the infinite variety ofcircumstanceswhicharise out ofthe dissolution ofamarriage.

. . . For that reason, we allow every reasonable presumption

. . . in favor of the correctness of [the trial court’s] action.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 366, 710 A.2d 717 (1998).
A
The defendantclaimsthatthe courterredinawarding the plaintiffalimony. Specifically, the defendant argues that the alimony order was excessive and unsupported by the facts. We disagree.
General Statutes § 46b-82 governs the court’s ability to award alimony. It provides in relevant part that a court, in deciding whether to award alimony, ‘‘shall consider the length ofthe marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution ofthe marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award [regarding the assignment of property]

. . . and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability ofsuchparent’s securing employment.’’ General Statutes § 46b-82 (a). Although the court must consider all ofthe factors,
an express finding on each is not necessary. Cushman

v. Cushman, 93 Conn. App. 186, 191, 888 A.2d 156 (2006). The trial court must, however, indicate a basis forthe amountandthe duration ofthe award, andshow facts that logically support it. Nashid v. Andrawis, 83 Conn. App. 115, 122–23, 847 A.2d 1098, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 912, 853 A.2d 528 (2004).
In the present case, the court properly considered the alimony factors and articulated facts that logically supported its decision to award alimony of $200 per week to the plaintiff. After considering the evidence presented by both parties, the court made several findings, all ofwhich supportthe basis forthe award. First, the court considered the station, occupation, amount and sources of income of the parties. The court heard testimony that the defendant had an established career
as an engineer, while the plaintiff had only recently finished graduate school and was employed on a parttime basis. In fact, financial affidavits confirmed that the defendant earned aweekly income thatwas greater than four times the amount earned by the plaintiff. The court also found that the defendant had earned additional income from a rental apartment located above his residence. Next, the court considered the needs ofparties, andthe desirability and feasibility of the plaintiff securing employment after she was awarded sole custody ofthe parties’ minor child. There was evidence before the court that the plaintiff’s expenses, although modest, greatly exceeded her income. Finally, the court considered the length of the marriage and the causes of its dissolution. The plaintiff testified at the trial that the defendant once reactedto adomesticviolence incident involving the parties by shutting off the utilities at the plaintiff’s residence. The plaintiffalso testified that, on
a separate occasion, the defendant caused the couple’s child to stop receiving government aid. The court credited this testimony and found that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff has suffered great financial hardship largely because ofthe actsofthe defendant.’’Thesefindingsoffactadequately support the court’s decision to award alimony.
The alimony order was limited to a period of three years or until such time as the plaintiff obtained fulltime employment. ‘‘Underlying the concept oftime limited alimony is the sound policy that such awards may provide an incentive for the spouse receiving support touse diligence inprocuringtraining orskillsnecessary to attain self-sufficiency.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hopferv. Hopfer, 59 Conn. App. 452, 460, 757 A.2d 673 (2000). In the present case, the court heard testimony that the plaintiff had recently completed graduate schoolin2012, andhadbeenactivelypursuing full-time employment while also caring for a young child. The court therefore properly found that three years was a reasonable timeframe to encourage the plaintiff’s self-sufficiency. Accordingly, we conclude thatawardingtime limitedalimonyunderthese circumstances does not constitute an abuse of discretion by the court.
B Next, we turn to the child support order. The defendant argues that the court erred by not considering the plaintiff’sreceiptofsocialsecurityassistance, pendente lite payments, and alimony payments in setting the award for child support. We disagree.
General Statutes § 46b-84 governs the court’s power to award child support. The statute requires in relevant part that, upon divorce, parents will continue to be responsible for ‘‘maintain[ing] the child according to their respective abilities

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b84 (a). Section 46b-84 (d) provides: ‘‘In determining whether a child is in need of maintenance and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide such maintenance and the amount thereof, the court shall considerthe age, health, station, occupation, earning capacity, amount and sources of income, estate, vocational skills and employability of each of the parents, and the age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate andneeds of the child.’’
Similar to the order for alimony, the court reviewed the positions of both parties and determined that the defendant had the respective ability to contribute $228 per week to support the child.4 Additionally, the court considered testimony from the plaintiff regarding the child’s age and health.5 Finally, the court found that the child support order was consistent with the child support guidelines, as set forth in § 46b-215a-1 et seq. ofthe Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, for a person with a similarweekly income as the defendant.6
The defendant arguesthatthe courtshouldhave considered additional factors when setting the child support order, including the plaintiff’s receipt of social securityassistance, thependente litepayments, andthe alimony order. The defendant has not demonstrated, however, that the court failed to consider the factors in § 46b-84 (d), and ‘‘we presume that the court, in rendering itsjudgment

. . . undertook the proper analysis ofthe law andthe facts.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) BrettStonePainting & Maintenance, LLCv. New England Bank, 143 Conn. App. 671, 681, 72 A.3d 1121 (2013). Therefore, weconcludethatthecourtproperly reviewed the statutory factors and did not abuse its discretion.
C
The defendant argues that the court improperly ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees even though he could not afford to retain his own counsel. We disagree.
In this case, the plaintiff’s counsel, Attorney Ronald T. Scott, represented the plaintiff pro bono and requested, at the conclusion ofthe trial, that attorney’s fees be awarded because of the unexpected effort required to respond to the defendant’s numerous motions. In the period of time between the original divorcefilingandthefinaljudgment, the defendantfiled thirty-four motions with the court.7
The law regarding an award ofattorney’s fees is well settled. General Statutes § 46b-62 governs the award of attorney’s fees in dissolution proceedings and provides in relevantpartthat ‘‘the court may order either spouse

. . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the criteria set forth in [§] 46b-82.’’ Additionally, a court may order the full amount of reasonable attorney’s fees, evenwhenthe attorneywasproviding representationforfree oratareduced cost. SeeBenavidesv. Benavides, 11 Conn. App. 150, 156, 526A.2d 536 (1987).8
As discussed in part II A of this opinion, the court considered the statutory factors under § 46b-82 and determined each party’s financial capacity. The court had before it evidence that the plaintiff was of little
means and didnothave the resourcesto retain counsel,whereas the defendant was employed full-time and earned a substantial salary. Given the large disparity in the respective income of the parties and the plaintiff’s lack of resources, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney’s fees.
D
The defendant further argues that the court’s order awarding the plaintiff sole custody of the child was arbitrary and lacked a basis in fact. We do not agree. General Statutes § 46b-56provides the legal standard for determining child custody issues. The statute requires that the court’s decision serve the child’s best interests. Wilson v. Wilson, 38 Conn. App. 263, 269, 661 A.2d 621 (1995). ‘‘In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court is vested with a broad discretion.

. . . [W]e are not privileged to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lederle v. Spivey, 113 Conn. App. 177, 185, 965 A.2d 621, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 916, 970 A.2d 728 (2009). Although the court did not state a specific factual basis in its memorandum of decision before awarding the plaintiff sole custody, the record is sufficient to support the custody order. During the trial, the court heard the testimony ofAttorney Seon Bagot, the guardian ad litem assigned to represent the interests of the parties’ child. Bagot testified that he had met with the parents and the child, conducted home visits, and contactedthe child’spediatricianandteacher. Additionally, he reviewed state records and monitored e-mail communications between the parties. After reviewing this information, Bagot concluded that the plaintiff should receive sole custody ofthe child. This recommendation
was based on several factors, including: (1) the defendant’s intention of moving to Nigeria, (2) the defendant’s inconsistent availability due to his work schedule, and (3) the defendant’s short and infrequent visits with the child. This record sufficiently supports the court’s decision to award sole custody to the plaintiff, and that decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
III Finally, the defendant challenges two of the court’s postjudgment orders. The defendant argues that the court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for contemptandindenyingthe defendant’smotionformodification. We disagree.
A
Thedefendantarguesthatthecourtimproperlyfound him in contempt on July 30, 2013. In particular, he argues that the court’s finding of contempt was based solely on ‘‘mere representations from the plaintiff.’’ Wedo not agree. ‘‘Recently, our Supreme Court clarified the standard of review applicable to civiljudgments of contempt in In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007). The court explained: ‘[O]ur analysis of a judgment of contempt consists of two levels of inquiry. First, we must resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt.

. . . This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review.

. . . Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear andunambiguous, wemustthendeterminewhetherthe trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a review ofthe trial court’s determination ofwhetherthe violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute
or misunderstanding.’ ’’ Behrns v. Behrns, 124 Conn. App. 794, 808, 6 A.3d 184 (2010).
In analyzing the defendant’s claim on appeal, some additional facts and procedural history are helpful. On January 24, 2013, the court rendered adissolutionjudgment that, in part, ordered the defendant to pay $200 in alimony to the plaintiff each week for three years or until she obtained full-time employment. On April 30, 2013, the court found that the defendant had failed to make a single alimony payment, resulting in an arrearage of $2600. The court ordered the arrearage to be paid at a rate of $20 per week until it was paid in full, but did not find the defendant in contempt. On July 30, 2013, the court found that the defendant had still not made any payment towards either the current alimony orderorthearrearage. Uponconcludingthatthe ‘‘defendant willfully violated the court’s order dated January 24, 2013,’’ the court held the defendant in contempt.
We begin by reviewing the alimony order to determine whether it is sufficiently clear. The alimony order from January 24, 2013, required, in relevant part, that ‘‘[t]he defendant shall pay the plaintiff $200 a week in alimonyforthreeyears oruntilsuchtime astheplaintiff attains full-time employment.’’ Although the defendant argues that this order was ‘‘vague,’’ this argument is without merit. The court order required the defendant to paythe plaintiffa definite amount ofmoney at specified intervals. We therefore conclude that the alimony order was clear and unambiguous, and that the defendantwasproperlyplacedonnoticethathewasrequired to pay the aforementioned amount of alimony to the plaintiff. Next, we turn to whether there was a proper factual basis for the court’s finding that the defendant had wilfully refused to comply with the court order. ‘‘[I]f

a finding of wilful [contempt] is based on a court’s determination of the credibility of relevant testimony at trial, we will overturn it only if the record demon-strates a manifest abuse of discretion.’’ LaBossiere v. Jones, 117 Conn. App. 211, 224, 979 A.2d 522 (2009). In this case, the court heard the following relevant testimony from the defendant. On July 30, 2013, the defendant testified that he earned a weekly income of $1160 per week. This is essentially the same weekly income that was reported on his financial affidavit during the dissolutionproceedings.9 The courtalso heardfromthe plaintiff’s counsel, who assertedthatthe defendanthad ‘‘not paid one penny ofalimony or arrearage payment.’’ Afterhearing from both the plaintiffand the defendant, the courtfoundthat, despitethe defendant’sunchanged weeklyincomesincetheinitialorder, hehadsteadfastly refused to make even partial payment in compliance with the alimony order.10 In conclusion, the court did not abuse its discretion by finding the defendant in wilful contempt of the court’s order.
B
The defendant last argues that his postjudgment motion for modification was erroneously denied. We disagree.
Modification of orders for alimony or child support is governed by General Statutes § 46b-86. Section 46b86 (a) requires that the moving party demonstrate that
one of the parties had sustained a ‘‘substantial change in

. . . circumstances

. . . .’’ This change in circumstancesmustbe onethataroseaftertheoriginaldissolutionjudgment was rendered. Borkowski v. Borkowski, supra, 228 Conn. 736. This requirement avoids giving a party an opportunity to relitigate an already settled issue. Id., 735–36.
In the present case, the defendant was given an opportunityto establishasubstantial change in circumstances during a two day hearing on September 17 and 18, 2013. At that hearing, the defendant argued that (1) the plaintiff had increased her income since the dissolution, (2) he had since become engaged to be married, (3) he had suffered a reduction in income due to a change in his tax filing status, and (4) he had high expenses due to alarge residential mortgage. The court addressed each claim separately. First, the court found that the plaintiff’s income had not increased since the marital dissolution because her temporary job ended inAprilandshehadnotyetfoundfull-timeemployment. Second, the court found that the defendant’s recent engagement was not a factor that altered his ability to pay alimony. Third, the defendant’s change in tax filing statuswasnotapropergroundformodification. Finally, the court held that the mortgage expenses could not be considered because they were part of the property settlement in the judgment of dissolution and not a substantial change since the finaljudgment. The defendantthereforefailedtocarrytheburdenofshowingthat
a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuseits discretion by denying the defendant’s motion for modification.
The defendant’s appeal regarding the pendente lite orderis dismissed as moot. Thejudgments are affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant additionally argues that the court refused to rule on a contempt motion filed against the plaintiff. The record, however, contains

no indication from the court that it would not consider the motion for contempt or that the defendant was barred from seeking a hearing and adjudication of his motion. On the record before us, we thus conclude that the defendanthas notappealedfrom afinaljudgment. SeeRaminv.Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 337 n.7, 915 A.2d 790 (2007); Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 478–80, 706A.2d960 (1998). Wetherefore dismissthe defendant’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ahneman v. Ahneman, supra, 478–79.

2 The defendant also argues that the court lacked jurisdiction over this

case because a prior divorce action had been filed in Nigeria. The test for jurisdictionovermaritalactions is domicile.Litvaitisv.Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 545, 295 A.2d 519 (1972). The record confirms, based on the testimony of the plaintiff and the defendant, that both parties were residents of Connecticut for twelve months prior to the filing ofthe complaint. Jurisdiction in this state is therefore proper. The defendant makes a bevy of other arguments which can be generally categorized as allegations ofprejudice and bias bythe trialjudge. This court declines to review these claims that are improperly briefed and lack any legal support. See Barros v. Barros, 309 Conn. 499, 503 n.4, 72 A.3d 367 (2013) (claims asserted without citation to legal authority not reviewed).

3 Although it is well established that a pendente lite child support order is an immediately appealable final judgment; Gong v. Huang, 129 Conn. App. 141, 148, 21 A.3d 474, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 907, 23 A.3d 1247 (2011); it is unclear from the record in the present case whether the defendant appealed from the pendente lite order. We need not resolve this ambiguity in light of our conclusion that his claim is moot.
4 See part II A ofthis opinion for a discussion ofthe court’s consideration ofthe financial affidavits ofboth parties, as well as the testimony regarding the parties’ educational background and current employment status.
5 The plaintifftestified that their child was born on August 6, 2009. Additionally, the plaintiff testified that the child was born ‘‘almost five months premature’’ and therefore required physical and occupational therapy for about two years.
6 The defendant’s financial affidavit states that he earns approximately $1100 in weekly income. The Commission for Child Support Guidelines advise that aperson with one child and weekly income of$1100 should pay $241 per week in child support.
7 Several ofthese motions appearto serve no otherpurpose than to delay the proceedings or harass the plaintiff. For example, on June 25, 2012, the defendant filed amotion for counsel fees eventhough he was apro se party. On August 24, 2012, he filed a motion for an immediate hearing followed by a September 4, 2012 motion for continuance, which was followed by a September 21, 2012 motion for an immediate hearing.

8 In Benavides, this court reversed the trial court’s decision to reduce an award ofattorney’s fees on the basis that the plaintiffhad been represented by a nonprofit organization. Benavides v. Benavides, supra, 11 Conn. App. 156. This court stated: ‘‘It would be unreasonable to allow a losing party in

a family relations matter to reap the benefits of free representation to the other party. Aparty should not be encouraged to litigate under the assumption that no counsel fee will be awarded in favor of the indigent party represented by public legal services

. . . .’’ Id., 154.

9 On January 24, 2013, the defendant signed a financial affidavit which stated a weekly income of $1148.85. The court used this information in settingtheinitialalimonyorderof$200perweek. Atthemotionforcontempt hearing, the defendant failed to assert any change in his income that would have negatively impacted his ability to comply with the order.

10 The defendant additionally argued before the trial court that he was unable to pay the alimony due to weekly expenses of almost $2000. We acknowledge that ‘‘[t]he inability of a party to obey an order of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense to the charge of contempt.

. . .The contemnor must establish that he cannot comply, or was unable to do so.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 532, 710A.2d 757 (1998). Apartymaynot, however, choose ‘‘to prioritize the payment of his own nonessential expenses over the payment owed to the plaintiff.’’ Brody v. Brody, 145 Conn. App. 654, 664, 77 A.3d 156 (2013). The defendant’s claimed nonessential personal expenses are not a proper basis for his failure to comply with the court’s alimony order.