alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R.

47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-30421

KERRY VILLARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, on behalf of

UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(96-CV-2353)

- - - - - - - - - -

March 8, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges

Per Curiam: *

In this contest for lien priority between (1) PlaintiffAppellant Kerry Villard, as a judgment creditor against WhitehallWindermere Company, Inc ., the alter ego of Ms. Villard’s exhusband, Joseph Villard, Jr., and (2) the Internal Revenue Service

(IRS), as federal tax lien holder against “White-Hall Windermere,

Company, Inc.” [sic], for federal taxes owed by Mr. Villard, Ms.

Vil lard asserts that the government’s mis-hyphenation of the2

corporation’s name produced an error in the index to the applicable1 See 28 C.F.R. § 301.6323(f)-1(d)(2).

2 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4); 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(f).

3 public records of Rapides Parish, Louisiana, identifying the tax

lien debtor as “White-Hall Wi ndermere, Company, Inc., Nominee of

Joseph Villard, Jr.” rather than Whitehall-Windermere Company, Inc.

This, she urges, caused the failure of the IRS to meet its own test

for determining whether a prior recorded federal tax lien primes a

subsequently recorded judgment lien. Specifically, Ms. Villard

insists that the name differences and the resulting mis-indexing of

the tax lien does not satisfy 26 U.S.C. § 6323(f)(4), which

requires the IRS to file a Form 668 1 in the office designated under

state law for the filing of liens “in such a manner that a

reasonable inspection of the inde x would reveal the existence of

the lien.” 2 The IRS, of course, insists that the misplaced hyphen

produced an indexing discrepancy that was not so extreme as to

evade a reasonable inspection.

We have carefully reviewed the opinion of the district court

(which agrees with the position of the IRS), have familiarized

ourselves with the operable facts of this case (which are

essentially undisputed) and have studied the arguments and

applicable law as advanced by able counsel for the parties in their

respective ap pellate briefs and in their oral arguments to this

court. As a result, we conclude that the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the IRS and adverse to Ms. Villard is

correct, essentially for th e reasons set forth in the court’s1 We do not address Villard’s alternative argument grounded

in retroactivity of the judgment against the tax debtor’s alter

ego corporation as we find it to be unmeritorious under the

established jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and this court.

4 opinion. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is, in all

respects,

AFFIRMED. 1
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Kenneth S. Ord, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|            |  |  |  |                                                     
|----------- |  |  |  | ----------------------------------------------------
|            |  |  |  |                                                     
|            |  | 
|May 6, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/ KENNETH S. ORD                                  
|            |  |  |  | Kenneth S. Ord                                      
|            |  |  |  | Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|            |  |  |  | (Principal Financial Officer)
# C_2013359EN.01001801.xml

| 7.12.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 359/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.12.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 359/18

---

Action brought on 8 October 2013 — Al Matri v Council

(Case T-545/13)

2013/C 359/35

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Fahed Mohamed Sakher Al Matri (Doha, Qatar) (represented by: M. Lester, Barrister, and G. Martin, Solicitor)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul Council Implementing Decision 2013/409/CFSP (1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 735/2013 (2), insofar as they apply to the applicant; and |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul Council Implementing Decision 2013/409/CFSP (1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 735/2013 (2), insofar as they apply to the applicant; and

1

2

| — | Order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the defendant has manifestly erred in its assessment that the criteria for listing in the contested measures were fulfilled as regards the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant has manifestly erred in its assessment that the criteria for listing in the contested measures were fulfilled as regards the applicant.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence and to effective judicial protection. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence and to effective judicial protection.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging failure to give adequate reasons. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging failure to give adequate reasons.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging an unjustified and disproportionate restriction of the applicant’s right to property and to conduct his business. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging an unjustified and disproportionate restriction of the applicant’s right to property and to conduct his business.

---

(1)  Council Implementing Decision 2013/409/CFSP of 30 July 2013 implementing Decision 2011/72/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ 2013 L 204, p. 52)

1

(2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 735/2013 of 30 July 2013 implementing Regulation (EU) No 101/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Tunisia (OJ 2013 L 204, p. 23)

2

---
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Elie S. Akilian, certify that:

 

1.               I have reviewed this Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q of Inet Technologies, Inc.;

 

2.               Based on my knowledge, this report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;

 

3.               Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

 

4.               The registrant’s other certifyingofficer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a)          Designed such disclosurecontrols and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures tobe designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

 

(c)          Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(d)         Disclosed in this reportany change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.               The registrant’s other certifyingofficer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation ofinternal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions):

 

(a)          All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

 

(b)         Any fraud,whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 
| Date:  April 21, 2004 | By:    | /s/ Elie S. Akilian                   |   |
|---------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|                            |   | Elie S. Akilian                       |
|                            |   | President and Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
II 

Calendar No. 302 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3144 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER 17, 2019 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

NOVEMBER 7, 2019 

Reported by Mr. JOHNSON, without amendment 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 8520 Michigan Avenue in Whittier, California, 

as the ‘‘Jose Ramos Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. JOSE RAMOS POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 8520 Michigan Avenue in Whit6 tier, California, shall be known and designated as the 

7 ‘‘Jose Ramos Post Office Building’’. 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3144 RS

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Jose Ramos Post Of5 fice Building’’. 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS

lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 302 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3144 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostOffice Building’’. Whittier, California, as the ‘‘Jose Ramos Post al Service located at 8520 Michigan Avenue in 

NOVEMBER 7, 2019 

Reported without amendment 


lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
_

but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. 

### Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

First, Duke argues that the district court erred by denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate. Duke claims that an investigation would have revealed that the owner of the vehicle that he was driving when arrested had a long history of prior drug convictions, and because Duke was arrested in the owner's neighborhood, counsel could have argued that Duke was acting only as a transporter for the owner. Duke claims that this theory could have been supported by evidence that the owner was subsequently arrested on drug trafficking charges. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Duke was not prejudiced because, even if counsel had investigated further, the investigation would not have revealed any information that would have changed the result at trial. The district court also concluded that because Duke testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was not acting as a transporter for the vehicle owner and he told counsel the same, counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate a defense contradictory to his client's story. We conclude that the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Second, Duke argues that the district court erred by denying his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his dual convictions for transportation of a controlled substance and trafficking in a controlled substance violated double jeopardy. The district
court determined that this claim lacked merit. Because neither statute expressly allows for or prohibits multiple convictions, see NRS 453.321, NRS 453.3385, and each offense, as charged, requires proof of an element that the other does not, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated. See

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A 2

### ibbons

J. Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. „ P.3d (2012) (Adv. Op. No. 55, December 6, 2012). Therefore, appellate counsel was not deficient and the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Third, Duke argues that the district court erred by denying his petition because counsels' ineffectiveness denied him equal protection. Because trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective, we conclude this claim is without merit.

Having considered Duke's contentions and concluded that they lack merit, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

1R DIA-21 Douglas Saitta

cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge Matthew D. Carling Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A .; 

### 3
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<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-03-1996             FEB-03-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-29-1995             OCT-29-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               FEB-03-1996             FEB-03-1996
<CASH>                                          59,323                  59,323
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0                       0
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<INVENTORY>                                     32,383                  32,383
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               103,762                 103,762
<PP&E>                                         146,460                 146,460
<DEPRECIATION>                                  77,114                  77,114
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 187,782                 187,782
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           30,521                  30,521
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                         1,584                   1,584
<OTHER-SE>                                     151,352                 151,352
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   187,782                 187,782
<SALES>                                        119,689                 344,881
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               119,689                 344,881
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   49,767                 157,857
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                38,384                 137,415
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 31,538                  49,609
<INCOME-TAX>                                    11,826                  18,694
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             19,712                  30,915
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                    19,712                  30,915
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .42                     .66
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .41                     .65
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK>    0000033656
<NAME>       ETHYL CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           20148
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   177788
<ALLOWANCES>                                      2375
<INVENTORY>                                     210602
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                427165
<PP&E>                                          764145
<DEPRECIATION>                                  333268
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1095169
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           180911
<BONDS>                                         325480
<COMMON>                                        118444
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                      321456
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1095169
<SALES>                                        1149651
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1149651
<CGS>                                           804623
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   979972
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (361)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               24268
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 145772
<INCOME-TAX>                                     52800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              92972
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     92972
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .78
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .78
        

</TABLE>
MATTER OF G—
In EXCLUSION Proceedings

A-8250353 Decided by Board January 21, 1959
Waivers of excludability—Section 211(b), Immigration and Nationality Act, may be exercised in conjunction with sections 5 and 7 of the Act of September 11, 1957. Waiver of visa requirement under section 211(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act may be granted concurrently with waivers under sections 5 and S of the Act of September 11, 1957, to authorize admission of returning resident alien.

KNCLUDABLE : Act of 1952—Section 212(a) (9)—Convicted of crime involving

moral turpitude. to wit : Forzery in violation of section 207. German Criminal Code,

•

BEFORE THE BOARD Discussion: This case comes before us by certification. The applicant, a 39-year-old married male, is a native of Poland andis now allegedly stateless. He was admitted for permanent residence on March 2, 1952. Shortly thereafter he went to Germany where his affairs detained him for several years. In Germany he was convicted on February 12, 1954, for forgery. He served a short prioon term. Whon it came time to return to the United Statee heapplied for a visa and was found qualified to receive one as a returning resident. He did not reveal that he had been convicted orarrested. The visa was issued on November 1, 1955, and the applicant applied for admission on December 7, 1955. After a series of hearings he was found excludable on the ground contained in the caption. The special inquiry officer granted a waiver of the ground of inadmissibility resulting from the conviction of crime under section 5 of the Act of September 11, 1957, and ordered the applicant'sadmission. Ave believe that this action is proper. However, because of the wording of section 5, it cannot be used to make valid a visa issued prior to September 

### 11, 1957. The action of the specialinquiry officer, therefore, does not eliminate the inadmissibility resulting from the applicant's lack of a valid visa.. This lack of 

### a valid document will be waived under section 211(b) of the Immi
### 249
962713-61-18

### gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1181(b)). We shall also waive any grounds of inadmissibility which may have arisen out of the obtaining of the visa on November I, 1955, without revealing 

### the facts concerning his arrest and conviction for forgery.Order: It is ordered that the applicant's readmission be authorized as a returning 

### resident without his being required to obtaindocuments, under the authority of section 211(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. it dofurther ordered 

### that any 

### grounds of inadmissibility arising out of the applicant's failure to reveal his arrest and conviction for forgery when he applied for the visa issued on November 1, 1955, be and the same is hereby waived under sections 5 

### and 7 of Public Law 85-316. 

### It isfurther ordered that the order of the special inquiry officerpermitting the applicant's admission to the United States as a returning resident be and the same is hereby approved.

250