This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-1679

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Tawnja Rene Wallace,

Appellant.

Filed July 14, 2014

Affirmed

Hooten, Judge

Polk County District Court

File No. 60-CR-12-2679

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Gregory A. Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica Surges Shacka, 

Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reyes, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HOOTEN, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of her request for a downward 

dispositional departure, arguing that the district court abused its discretion because 
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substantial and compelling factors support a departure and because the district court 

failed to fully consider those factors. We affirm.

FACTS

In January 2013, appellant Tawnja Wallace pleaded guilty to second-degree 

assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2012). The district court accepted 

Wallace’s guilty plea, ordered the completion of a presentence investigation (PSI), and 

scheduled a sentencing hearing. The PSI revealed that Wallace had several felony 

convictions, including four from when she lived in Illinois. The PSI also established that 

Wallace had a criminal-history score of four. The presentence investigator recommended 

that the district court sentence Wallace to 45 months’ imprisonment. 

At the sentencing hearing, the state requested the district court to impose and 

execute a 39-month sentence of imprisonment, the low end of the presumptive range for 

second-degree assault for someone with a criminal-history score of four. See Minn. Sent. 

Guidelines 4.A, 5.A (2012). Wallace requested a downward dispositional departure and 

asserted a number of reasons in support of a departure, including her ongoing mentalhealth and chemical-dependency treatment, her willingness to attend a long-term 

inpatient treatment center, and her need for dual residential mental-health and chemicaldependency treatment. Wallace personally addressed the district court and explained that 

the Illinois felony convictions occurred over a decade ago while she was in a gang, she 

has since left the gang, she has reunited with her daughter and grandchildren, she has 

sought support for anger and sobriety issues which alter her frame of mind, and she has 

achieved sobriety in the past. 
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The district court denied Wallace’s request for a downward dispositional departure 

and sentenced her to 39 months’ imprisonment. Wallace appeals.

D E C I S I O N

Wallace challenges the district court’s decision denying her request for a 

dispositional departure. “Whether to depart from the sentencing guidelines rests within 

the district court’s discretion, and the district court will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

that discretion.” State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). “This court 

will not generally review a district court’s exercise of its discretion to sentence a 

defendant when the sentence imposed is within the presumptive guidelines range.” State 

v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). 

Only in a “rare” case will this court reverse the imposition of a presumptive sentence. 

State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Wallace to 39 months’ 

imprisonment. Wallace does not dispute that she has a criminal-history score of four and 

that she pleaded guilty to second-degree assault, which carries a severity level of six. See 

Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.A. Under these circumstances, the presumptive sentence is 

imprisonment between 39 and 54 months. Id. 4.A.

Wallace contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying her 

request despite the fact that there were substantial and compelling reasons to justify a 

dispositional departure. We disagree. 

“The district court must order the presumptive sentence provided in the sentencing 

guidelines unless substantial and compelling circumstances warrant a departure.” Pegel, 
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795 N.W.2d at 253 (quotation omitted). But “the presence of factors supporting 

departure does not require departure.” State v. Abrahamson, 758 N.W.2d 332, 337 

(Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). “The district court does not 

abuse its discretion by refusing to dispositionally depart from a presumptively executed 

prison sentence, even if there is evidence in the record that the defendant would be 

amenable to probation.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Minn. App. 2009). Thus, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion merely because Wallace can point to 

mitigating factors.

Wallace contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to fully 

consider the substantial and compelling reasons justifying a dispositional departure. A 

district court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider reasons for departing from the 

presumptive sentence. State v. Curtiss, 353 N.W.2d 262, 264 (Minn. App. 1984). “If the 

district court has discretion to depart from a presumptive sentence, it must exercise that 

discretion by deliberately considering circumstances for and against departure.” State v. 

Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 

2002).

Wallace notes that the district court failed to consider her age, prior record, 

remorse, cooperation with the district court, support from family and friends (including 

the victim), and previous success on probation. Wallace correctly identifies these as 

factors that the district court may consider when determining whether a defendant is 

amenable to individualized treatment in a probationary setting. See State v. Trog, 323 

N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (listing factors). But a district court does not abuse its 
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discretion by failing to address every mitigating factor presented. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 

254. And we “may not interfere with the [district] courts [sic] exercise of discretion, as 

long as the record shows the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and 

information presented before making a determination.” State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 

77, 80–81 (Minn. App. 1985).

After Wallace presented her arguments justifying a dispositional departure, the 

district court stated on the record:

[O]n the one hand we have a victim who supports you and 

does not want you in custody. And the injuries are relatively 

minor, when you think about other injuries that could have 

occurred with this kind of crime. On the other hand, you 

can’t consider things like, you know, addictions, those kinds 

of things. Those are not mitigating factors. Mental health 

can be a mitigating factor.

So I’m thinking about all of these issues that come 

about and, you know, what sticks out to me the most is really 

the criminal history because there’s so much of it. And that 

to me, when I think about this criminal history, I don’t think 

counsel really had an idea about it because they thought there 

would be one criminal history point. And I look at the 

felonies. . . .

We’ve got felonies into 2008, 2006, you know, two of 

them in 2005. There’s enough there that I’m not going to 

presume to get into the head[s] of the probation agents, but 

they are recommending an executed sentence even before 

there was an issue of breach of the plea agreement. And in 

light of that relatively recent criminal history, I don’t find that 

there is enough of a mitigating factor to support departing 

from the guidelines.

So I appreciate everything you’ve said. I agree that 

you do need treatment and I hope you are able to address it 

and I think a dual diagnosis is the way to go. But I am not 

finding that to be a compelling enough reason to depart. So 
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legally we stay with the guidelines. I’m going to do that. I 

am going to go to the bottom of the box that was suggested by 

[the state].

(Emphases added.)

The record reflects that the district court carefully considered Wallace’s arguments 

for a dispositional departure alongside arguments against a departure. The district court 

did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Wallace to the presumptive disposition as 

provided in the guidelines. 

Affirmed.