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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM BECKWITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant, and

JOHN CORRION and JAMES DAYSON,

Plaintiff, UNPUBLISHED February 18, 2016

v No. 323990 Ingham Circuit Court STATE TREASURER, LC No. 14-000593-AW

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: H OEKSTRA , P.J., and M ETER and M. J. K ELLY , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Plaintiff, William Beckwith, appeals by right the trial court’ s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, State Treasurer. Because th e trial court did not err when it granted the State Treasurer’s m otion for summary disposition, w e affirm.

Beckwith was imprisoned in 2008. In 2009, the State Treasurer learned that Beckwith had assets that might be subject to seizure under the state cor rectional facility reimbursement act (the Reimbursement Act), see MCL 800.401 et seq ., including bank accounts and a certificate of deposit. Beckwith’s assets totaled $130,000. The State Treasu rer sued to obtain 90 percent of these assets. According to the State Treasurer, William J. Bec kwith and Stanley Bogus were “joint signers” on the CD and “named parties” in the case. Bot h alleged that they were owed money out of Beckwith’s CD. The S tate Treasurer alleged that B eckwith was served with a copy of the complaint and that he se nt correspondence regarding that case. Beckwith, however, claimed that he “was not allowed to participate in any way, sha pe or form.” He alleges that he sent two letters to the trial co urt asking “to be present or ha ve legal representation” but received no response. According to the Sta te Treasurer, it eventually a greed to accept approximately 60 percent of the assets. William J. Beckwith and Bogus also rece ived portions of the CD.

Thereafter, Beckwith sued the State Treasurer and asked the tr ial court to issue a writ of mandamus. He alleged that the a ppropriation of his assets was improper because he was entitled to keep 10 percent of his assets under MCL 800.403(3), and beca use the trial court neglected to-2- consider the needs of his depe ndents, as required under MCL 800 .404(5). The State Treasurer moved for summary disposition, arguing that Beckwith’s suit was barred by res judicata and that he had failed to identify a legal duty that would make a writ o f mandamus appropriate. The trial court agreed with both arguments a nd granted the State Treasure r’s motion.

Beckwith then appealed the trial court’s order in this Court.

We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for sum mary disposition. Tenneco Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co , 281 Mich App 429, 443; 761 NW2d 846 (2008). We also review de novo the trial court’s interpretation and application of a statute. State Treasurer v Snyder , 294 Mich App 641, 645; 823 NW2d 284 (2011).

With the Reimbursement Act, the Legislature imposed “a civil, statutory duty on prisoners to reimburse the state for the cost of their incarcer ation.” Id . The act “grants the state a statutory right to reimbursemen t of up to 90 percent of the v alue of a prisoner’s assets.” Id . To effect this right, the state ma y file “a complaint in the circu it court to secure reimbursement, from the assets of a prisoner, for t he expenses incurred by the stat e for the cost of care of the prisoner during the entire period of his incarceration.” Id . (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Assets” include “property, tangi ble or intangible, real or per sonal, belonging to or due a prisoner or former prisoner includ ing income or payments to suc h prisoner from so cial security, worker’s compensation, veteran’s compensation, pension benefits , previously earned salary or wages, bonuses, annuities, retirement benefits, or from any oth er source whatsoever . . . .” MCL 800.401a(a).

Beckwith first argues that he was statutorily entitled to reta in 10 percent of his assets. MCL 800.403(3) provides that “[n]ot more than 90% of the value of the assets of the prisoner may be used for purposes of securing costs and reimbursement un der” the Reimbursement Act. The court in the previous cas e distributed $129,000 of the $130 ,000 in assets; the state received approximately 61.5 percent of the $130,000, and William J. Beck with and Bogus received 34.6 and 3.1 percent, respectively. The crux of Beckwith’s argument is that, because the state cannot recoup more than 90 percent, it must follow that the prisoner i s entitled to retain 10 percent, which did not occur in his case.

In interpreting statutes, this Court’s goal “is to ascertain a nd effectuate legislative intent.” Michigan Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State , 489 Mich 194, 217; 801 NW2d 35 (2011). In doing so, we must first look to the language employed in the statute. United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On Rehearing) , 484 Mich 1, 13; 795 NW2d 101 (2009). “Because the Legislatu re is presumed to have inten ded the meaning it plainly expressed, the fair and natural import of the terms employed, i n view of the subject matter of the law, governs.” Hughes v Region VII Area Agency on Aging , 277 Mich App 268, 274; 744 NW2d 10 (2007) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citations omitted).

Beckwith’s contention that he was entitled to keep 10 percent of his assets is without merit. The statute states only that the state is entitled to no more than 90 percent of a prisoner’s assets. It establishes a ceil ing, not a floor. And that ceili ng covers only the state. The statute does not insulate a prisoner’s a ssets from his creditors, such as William J. Beckwith and Bogus.-3- Consequently, because the state took less than the permissible amount, there was no statutory violation.

Citing MCL 800.404(5), Beckwith also argues that because the c ourt in the 2009 case failed to consider the needs of his dependents, he is entitled to a writ of mandamus and damages. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision o n a request for mandamus. Coal for a Safer Detroit v Detroit City Clerk , 295 Mich App 362, 367; 820 NW2d 208 (2012). However, whether the elements required for issuance of a writ o f mandamus are present is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id

. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and the primary purpose o f a writ of mandamus is to enforce duties required by law.” Stand Up v Secretary of State , 492 Mich 588, 618; 822 NW2d 159 (2012). To obtain a writ of mandamus, the plaintiff b ears the burden of establishing that he or she “has a clear legal right to the performance of t he duty sought to be compelled,” the defendant “has a clear legal duty to perform” the act, “the act is ministerial in nature,” and “the plaintiff has no other adequate legal or equitable remedy.” Barrow v City of Detroit Election Comm , 301 Mich App 404, 412; 836 N W2d 498 (2013).

MCL 800.404(5) states that before the circuit court can order reimbursement, it must “take into consideration any lega l obligation of the defendant to support a spouse, minor children, or other dependents and any moral obligation to suppo rt dependents to whom the defendant is providing or has in fact provided support.” The s tatute plainly imposes a burden on the circuit court, not the state. Because the statute does not impose a duty on the State Treasurer, Beckwith has not established an essential element of his claim. Barrow , 301 Mich App at 412. Consequently, the trial court did not err when it determined th at Beckwith was not entitled to a writ of mandamus as a matter of law and dismissed his claim. G iven our resolution of these issues, we decline to address whether res judicata was applicab le.

Affirmed.

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra /s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Michael J. Kelly