NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHARON NEIDLINGER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-16141 

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02423-DB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Deborah L. Barnes, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 12, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: TASHIMA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and BATAILLON,***

District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for 

the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.

FILED

SEP 8 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-16141 

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff Sharon Neidlinger’s (hereinafter 

“Neidlinger”) appeal of the denial of widow’s benefits under Title II of the Social 

Security Act. The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) issued an 

unfavorable ruling against Neidlinger. The Appeals Council likewise denied 

Neidlinger’s request for review. Neidlinger then filed her complaint in federal 

district court and requested summary judgment be granted in her favor. On crossmotions for summary judgment, the district court denied Neidlinger’s motion and 

granted the Commissioner’s motion. 

Neidlinger argues that the ALJ erred when determining that (1) she was not 

married to the insured worker for at least nine months before he died; (2) that the 

claimant did not meet the nine-month durational requirement as the death was not 

accidental; (3) the claimant was not the biological mother of a biological child of the 

insured; (4) the claimant was not the unmarried widow of the deceased insured 

worker; and (5) the claimant was not under a disability under the Social Security Act 

from October 1, 2010, through the date of this decision. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(c). 

We review the district court’s decision de novo and therefore must 

independently determine whether the Commissioner's decision (1) is free of legal 

error and (2) is supported by substantial evidence. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601

(9th Cir. 1989). “On judicial review, an ALJ’s factual findings . . . ‘ [are] 
3 19-16141 

‘conclusive’ if supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 

1148, 1153 (2019) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). As the Supreme Court has 

indicated, the substantial evidence threshold “is not high” and “it defers to the 

presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” Id. at 1154, 1157; see also 

Valentine v. Comm. Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)

(substantial evidence “is a highly deferential standard of review”). Where evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation “more than a mere scintilla” 

“It means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting 

Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In social security 

cases, federal courts “are not triers of fact” and a court “may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Fair, 885 F.2d at 604; Flaten v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).

The ALJ determined that the claimant did not meet the durational requirement 

for marriage prior to the insured’s death. The ALJ also decided that the insured’s 

death was not accidental and rejected plaintiff’s claim that her miscarriage qualified 

her as a biological mother of a child. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s findings, 

determining that plaintiff did not meet the exceptions to the nine-month marriage

durational requirement. The district court determined that the insured’s death was 

not accidental, and Neidlinger was not the biological or adoptive mother of a child 
4 19-16141 

during the marriage. The district court found that the death was a result of a 

voluntary and intentional suicide.

The decision of the district court is affirmed as substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s decision that the claimant is not entitled to widow’s insurance benefits 

because (1) she does not meet the durational requirement for marriage, and (2) no

exceptions apply to her claim. In addition, the district court’s conclusions of law are 

free of legal error. 

AFFIRMED.