J-S57041-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHAMAL SONY GRANDOIT,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 190 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 7, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002472-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 27, 2019

Shamal Sony Grandoit (“Grandoit”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of possession with intent to 

deliver a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, 

possession of drug paraphernalia, and criminal use of a communication 

facility.

1

 Additionally, Grandoit’s counsel, Matthew P. Kelly, Esquire (“Attorney 

Kelly”), has filed a Petition to Withdraw as counsel and an accompanying brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant 

Attorney Kelly’s Petition to Withdraw and affirm Grandoit’s judgment of 

sentence.

On May 13, 2016, a Kingston Borough Police Department officer 

observed Grandoit engage in what the officer believed to be a hand-to-hand 

drug transaction, which occurred behind a restaurant. Grandoit then got into 

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1 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (16), (32); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a).
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a vehicle and drove away, after which the police stopped the vehicle, and 

placed Grandoit in custody. Shortly thereafter, the police returned to the 

restaurant in an attempt to locate the person who, the police suspected, had

purchased drugs from Grandoit. The police encountered and questioned

Derek Lewis (“Lewis”), who was employed at the restaurant. Lewis confessed 

that he had purchased ten bags of heroin from Grandoit, and identified 

Grandoit in a police photograph. Lewis also showed the police text messages 

between him and Grandoit concerning the transaction (hereinafter, the “text 

message evidence”). The Commonwealth subsequently charged Grandoit 

with the above-mentioned crimes.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial, at the close of which the jury found 

Grandoit guilty of the above-mentioned crimes. On June 7, 2017, the trial 

court sentenced Grandoit to an aggregate term of 35 to 70 months in prison. 

Grandoit did not initially file a direct appeal. However, Grandoit’s direct appeal 

rights were subsequently reinstated, nunc pro tunc. The trial court appointed 

Attorney Kelly to represent Grandoit. Attorney Kelly filed a timely Notice of 

Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters 

complained of on appeal. In response, the trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) 

Opinion. Thereafter, Attorney Kelly filed, with this Court, an Anders Brief and 

a Petition to Withdraw as counsel.2 

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2 Grandoit neither filed a pro se brief, nor retained alternate counsel for this 

appeal.
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Before addressing Grandoit’s issues on appeal, we must determine 

whether Attorney Kelly has complied with the dictates of Anders and its 

progeny in petitioning to withdraw from representation. See

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes that an appeal is frivolous and 

wishes to withdraw from representation, he or she must 

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw[,] stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record and

interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the appeal 

would be frivolous, (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the 

record of arguable merit, and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to 

defendant and advise him of his right to retain new counsel or to 

raise any additional points that he deems worthy of the court’s 

attention. The determination of whether the appeal is frivolous 

remains with the court.

Commonwealth v. Burwell, 42 A.3d 1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted). 

Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that a 

proper Anders brief must

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).
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In the instant case, our review of the Anders Brief and the Petition to 

Withdraw reveals that Attorney Kelly has complied with all of the requirements 

of Anders/Santiago. The record further reflects that Attorney Kelly has (1) 

provided Grandoit with a copy of both the Anders Brief and Petition to 

Withdraw, (2) sent a letter to Grandoit advising him of his right to retain new 

counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points that he deems worthy 

of this Court’s attention, and (3) attached a copy of this letter to the Petition 

to Withdraw, as required under Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 

751-52 (Pa. Super. 2005). Accordingly, we must next examine the record 

and make an independent determination of whether Grandoit’s appeal is, in 

fact, wholly frivolous. 

Attorney Kelly presents the following issues, on behalf of Grandoit, for 

our review: 

I. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 

[introduction of the] ... text message evidence at trial[?]

II. Whether the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Grandoit] sold drugs to the 

Commonwealth’s witness[?]

III. Whether the use of a single picture to identify [Grandoit] at 

trial was proper[?]

IV. Whether the traffic stop of [Grandoit] was illegal[?]

Anders Brief at 1. 

Grandoit first argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to object to the introduction of the text message evidence 
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at trial. Id. at 5. It is well-settled that ineffectiveness claims may not be 

raised in the first instance on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 

A.3d 562, 563 (Pa. 2013) (reaffirming the general rule of deferral to Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) collateral review of ineffectiveness claims set 

forth in Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002)). Consequently, 

we deny relief, without prejudice to Grandoit’s right to challenge counsel’s 

effectiveness in a timely-filed PCRA petition.

In his second issue, Grandoit challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions, contending that “the Commonwealth failed to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Grandoit] sold drugs to [Lewis].” 

Anders Brief at 5.3 

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3 Preliminarily, we note that Grandoit does not specify the convictions, or the 

elements thereof, that he challenges as not being supported by sufficient

evidence. This Court has explained that 

when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the 

[a]ppellant’s [court-ordered Rule 1925(b) concise] statement 

must specify the element or elements upon which the evidence 

was insufficient in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Such 

specificity is of particular importance in cases where ... the 

[a]ppellant was convicted of multiple crimes[,] each of which 

contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted). If the appellant does not specify such 

elements, the sufficiency claim is deemed waived. Id. Accordingly, we could 

determine that Grandoit waived his sufficiency challenge. Nevertheless, we 

will briefly address the merits of the claim, as the trial court discussed it in its

Opinion.
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Our standard of review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well 

settled: 

Our standard of review is whether the evidence admitted at trial, 

and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, were sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude 

that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 71 A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and 

brackets omitted).

The trial court addressed and rejected Grandoit’s sufficiency challenge

in its Opinion as follows:

Detective John Anthony [(“Detective Anthony”)] of the 

Kingston Borough Police Department testified that on May 13, 

2016, he observed what his training suggested to him was a 

hand[-]to[-]hand drug transaction between two men[,] later 

identified as [Grandoit] and [] Lewis. N.T. 4/25/17 at 22, 24-25. 

After the transaction occurred, [Grandoit] drove away in a vehicle 

that was later stopped by police. Id. at 29, 41. The police then 

made contact with [] Lewis, who admitted that he bought heroin 

from [Grandoit,] and turned over the ten packets that were the

subject of the transaction. Id. at 30, 77. At trial, Lewis identified 

[Grandoit] as the person from whom he purchased heroin on the 

day in question. Id. at 52. Additionally, Lewis testified that at 

the time, he was a drug user, and that he purchased heroin from

[Grandoit] after communicating with him through text messages. 

Id. at 52, 54-57, 60-61. The [p]olice investigation confirmed the 

existence of this text conversation between the cell [phone]

number associated with the cell phone seized from [Grandoit] on

May 13, 2016, and the phone provided to police by [] Lewis. Id.

at 53, 58. 

Based on the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, we 

suggest that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner[,] and giving the 

prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence, establishes each material element of the 
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crime[s] charged and the commission thereof by [Grandoit], 

beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, the evidence is sufficient to 

support the [] conviction[s] [].

Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/19, at 4-5. The trial court’s analysis is supported by 

the law and the record, and we thus affirm on this basis in concluding that 

Grandoit’s sufficiency challenge is frivolous. See id.

In his third issue, Grandoit “contends that the use of a single picture to 

identify him as the perpetrator was improper.” Anders Brief at 6.

In its Opinion, the trial court determined that Grandoit failed to preserve 

this issue:

[Grandoit’s Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) Statement does not cite to the 

location in the record where trial counsel objected to the use of a 

single picture to identify [Grandoit], and our own review of the 

record indicates that no such objection was made. As such, any

challenge to the use of a single picture to identify [Grandoit] is 

waived for failure to raise it before the trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) ([providing that] “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); 

Commonwealth v. Cole, 167 A.3d 49, 64 (Pa. Super. 2017), 

appeal denied, 186 A.3d 370 (Pa. 2018); Commonwealth v. 

Douglass, 701 A.2d 1376, 1378 (Pa. Super. 1997) ([holding that] 

appellant waived claim that identification evidence should be 

suppressed because the procedure was impermissibly 

suggestive[,] where appellant failed to move to suppress the 

identification; and such failure precludes its litigation for the first 

time at trial, in post-trial motions or on appeal).[FN 1]

[FN 1] Even if preserved, a challenge to the use of a “single 

picture” would not appear to provide [Grandoit] relief, 

since the record is clear that [Grandoit] was identified in 

person by Detective Anthony and by [] Lewis.
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Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/19, at 5 (footnote in original). We agree with the 

trial court’s analysis and determination, which is supported by the law and the 

record. Accordingly, this claim entitles Grandoit to no relief.

In his fourth and final issue, Grandoit baldly argues that “the traffic stop 

was illegal.” Anders Brief at 6. 

The trial court determined that Grandoit also failed to preserve this 

claim, stating as follows:

As with the previous issue, [Grandoit’s] Rule 1925(b) Statement 

does not cite to the location in the record where trial counsel 

objected to the legality of the traffic stop,[FN 2] and our own review 

of the record indicates that no such objection was made. Also as 

noted above, no suppression motion was filed in this case, and at 

no time did [Grandoit] argue before the trial court that the traffic 

stop was “illegal” in any respect. Because [Grandoit] did not raise 

this alleged error before the trial court, it does not entitle[] him to

relief on direct appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

[FN 2] The Rule 1925(b) Statement does not specify the 

manner in which the traffic stop was allegedly illegal.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/19, at 6 (footnote in original and location moved). 

The trial court’s analysis is supported by the record, and we likewise conclude 

that this claim is waived.

Finally, because our independent review of the record discloses no 

additional non-frivolous issues that Grandoit could raise on appeal, we grant 

Attorney Kelly’s Petition to Withdraw and affirm Grandoit’s judgment of 

sentence.

Petition to Withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/27/2019