J-S65018-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANGELA L. DUPONT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 721 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered, April 2, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0002201-2018.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: MAY 11, 2020

Angela L. Dupont appeals from a judgment of sentence of one year of

probation, after a jury convicted her of fleeing the scene of a car accident.

1

 

She claims the trial court erred by not suppressing a witness’s identifications

of her from a photo array, which Dupont believes was so highly suggestive 

that it violated her due process rights. We affirm.

Dupont filed a pretrial motion to prohibit Beauabe Kibret from testifying 

that she was the person who ran a red light, crashed her car into his, and fled 

the scene. The court of common pleas conducted a hearing on that motion 

and related its findings of facts as follows:

On November 8, 2017, at approximately 4:30 p.m., 

Beauabe Kibret was driving home from work when the front 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743(a). The Commonwealth also charged Dupont with two 

summary offenses.
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driver’s side of his vehicle was struck by the front passenger 

side of another vehicle, a blue Saturn Vue. Mr. Kibret exited 

his vehicle and walked towards the vehicle that struck him. 

Mr. Kibret . . . observed the other driver, including 

both the profile and the front of their face, from a distance 

of between two to three feet for 15 to 30 seconds. . . . [T]he 

driver of the other vehicle made direct eye contact with him. 

Before Mr. Kibret could make verbal contact with the driver 

of the other vehicle, she backed the vehicle up and drove 

away. Mr. Kibret testified the driver of the other vehicle was 

a Caucasian, thin female in her late twenties or mid-thirties 

who, at the time of the accident, had straight, “blondish” or 

blonde hair and was wearing a black shirt. [He] gave that 

description to Officer Brennan Stamm when [the police] 

arrived at the scene of the accident.

Approximately two months [later], Officer Stamm 

arrived at the scene of a traffic stop involving a blue Saturn 

Vue with frontend damage consistent with the November 8, 

2017 accident. Officer Stamm testified that the driver and 

registered owner of the vehicle, [i.e., Dupont], was similar 

to the description provided by Mr. Kibret.

Using a program called C-Penn on J-NET, Officer 

Stamm created a black-and-white-photo lineup that 

included a photograph of [Dupont], as well as the 

photographs of seven other Caucasian females between the 

age of 20 and 30, similar in appearance to [Dupont’s] 

photograph. Officer Stamm . . . print[ed] the selected 

photographs as a group on a single sheet of paper [and] as 

individual eight by ten photographs. The women in the 

selected photographs all appear to have darker hair similar

to [Dupont’s] photograph, and . . . none of the women in 

the photo lineup appear to have blonde hair. Six of the eight

photographs in the lineup, including the photograph of 

[Dupont], depict women with curly hair.

Officer Stamm contacted Mr. Kibret by telephone on 

January 19, 2018 and asked him if he would look at some 

photographs and attempt to identify the driver who hit him. 

[The officer] went to Mr. Kibret’s place of employment and 

met with him in an office. Mr. Kibret first looked through 

the individual photos and testified that he was able to

narrow it down to three of those photographs. [He flipped]
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through the individual photos for a couple seconds and 

appeared to be having difficulty with not having the photos 

lined up side-by-side. [So] Officer Stamm then placed the 

group of photographs on the single sheet in front of Mr.

Kibret and told him to take his time. . . . after looking at the 

group of photographs on the single sheet for second or so, 

[Mr. Kibret] was able to identify [Dupont’s] photograph as 

the driver of the vehicle that hit him and subsequently 

signed and dated near her photograph. 

Mr. Kibret appeared to have some difficulty either 

recalling or relaying the details of the January 19, 2018 

lineup. He testified that two of the three photographs he 

initially selected from the individual photographs depicted 

women with blonde hair. However, Officer Stamm testified 

credibly that the individual photographs matched the 

photographs on the single sheet and that there were only 

eight. None of the women in those photographs appeared 

to have blonde hair. Mr. Kibret also testified inconsistently 

about whether he could recall [Dupont’s] photograph being 

one of the original three he selected. . . . [H]e stated clearly 

that [Dupont’s] photograph was one of the three he initially 

picked. But when questioned about whether those three 

initial photographs were also on the single sheet of 

photographs and whether the photograph he ultimately 

selected was among the initial three, Mr. Kibret stated that 

he could not recall.

Mr. Kibret . . . was confident in his identification 

despite [Dupont’s] dark, curly hair in the photograph, 

because it was her facial features that he recognized. After 

Mr. Kibret selected [Dupont’s] photograph, he noted to 

Officer Stamm that her hair was a different color, and Officer 

Stamm stated in reply that women often change their hair 

color. . . . The background of [Dupont’s] photograph is 

slightly lighter than the other photographs, the width of 

[her] photograph is slightly narrower than the other 

photographs, and [she] appears to be the only person 

photographed with an eyebrow piercing, although one of the 

other photographs depicts a woman with noticeable ear 

piercings.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/1/19, at 1-5 (footnotes omitted). 
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Based upon those facts, the suppression court concluded that the photo 

array was not unduly suggestive. Furthermore, even if the array was unduly 

suggestive, the court determined that other indicia of reliability in Mr. Kibret’s

identification outweighed any suggestiveness from the photo array. Thus, the 

suppression court denied Dupont’s motion to prevent Mr. Kibret from testifying 

that Dupont had hit him.

As mentioned, a jury convicted Dupont of fleeing the scene of a vehicle 

accident, because it credited Mr. Kibret’s recollection of the incident and 

rejected Dupont’s alibi. Next, the trial court convicted her of related summary 

offenses and sentenced her to one year of probation and to pay Mr. Kibret 

$2,232.60 in restitution damages, a $200 fine, and other court fees and costs. 

This timely appeal followed.

Dupont raises one issue. “Did the trial court err [by refusing] to 

suppress Mr. Kibret’s identification of her from a suggestive, photographic 

lineup, where said identification was unreliable and tainted by the officer’s 

interference in the identification . . . ?” Dupont’s Brief at 4. 

Under Dupont’s theory, the photo array was unduly suggestive, and, as 

a result, the trial court violated her state and federal, procedural due process 

rights by allowing Mr. Kibret to testify against her at trial. However, she does 

not claim that the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania affords 

any greater protection in this regard than the federal charter. Thus, we review

her state and federal claims together and analyze the respective safeguards 

of the two constitutions as coextensive.
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Our standard of review on whether a police officer conducted an unduly 

suggestive photo array is de novo. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kearney, 

92 A.3d 51, 65 (Pa. Super. 2014); United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 

130 (3rd Cir. 2014). Here, because the Commonwealth prevailed below, our 

scope of review includes “only the evidence of the prosecution and whatever 

evidence for the defense . . . remains contradicted on the context of the whole 

record.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 756 A.2d 957, 959-60 (Pa. Super. 

2000).

Under the federal Due Process Clause, defendants seeking to exclude

eyewitness-identification testimony must satisfy a two-step test. “The 

defendant has the initial burden of demonstrating the [photo array] procedure 

was impermissibly suggestive.” Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 259 (3rd

Cir. 1991). “Only if the defendant meets this initial step will the court consider 

the admissibility of the identification under the totality of the circumstances.” 

Id. (quoting United States v. L’Allier, 838 F.2d 234, 239 (7th Cir. 1988))

(some punctuation omitted). Because Dupont’s claim fails the first test, we 

need not consider the second.

Dupont contends that Officer Stamm created and showed a photo array 

that violated the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 

State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). Thus, although she does not 

directly say so, Dupont would have us apply New Jersey constitutional law to

overturn the legal conclusions of a Pennsylvania suppression court. She even

acknowledges that Henderson conflicts with the precedents of this Court, 
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expressly condoning the procedure Officer Stamm followed in compiling and 

displaying the photo array.

For example, she states, “Commonwealth v. Fulmore, [25 A.3d 340, 

346-347 (Pa. Super. 2011),] held that a photographic lineup that does not 

match the description provided by the eyewitness is a matter of credibility, 

not undue suggestiveness.” Dupont’s Brief at 24. “The Fulmore Court also 

held that it was not unduly suggestive to inform the witness that a photo array 

contains a picture of someone [the investigator] believed to have committed 

the offense. Fulmore at 347-348; see also Commonwealth v. Kubis, 978 

A.2d 391 (Pa. Super. 2009) (same).” Id. 

In Fulmore, this Court reasoned that an officer stating to a witness that 

he believes that the image of the suspect is in a photo array does not render 

the photo array unduly suggestive, because that belief is inferentially implied 

anytime an officer assembles and displays a photo array. “[W]hy else would 

a victim be shown a photo array unless the police believed the suspect’s photo 

was included?” Fulmore, 25 A.3d at 348. Hence, an officer saying that the 

suspect’s photo is, in his opinion, included in the array simply gives voice to

the obvious. If that obvious statement is unduly suggestive, then any photo 

or in-person lineup is, per se, unduly suggestive, because an officer’s use of

a photo or in-person lineup implies that he thinks the suspect is included.

Dupont’s view of what constitutes an unduly suggestive photo array 

therefore directly conflicts with the precedent of this Court. Indeed, she 

challenges our case law as being “at odds with what we now know about the 
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science of eyewitness identification, and with appropriate eyewitness

identification protocol.” Dupont’s Brief at 25 (citing Henderson, supra.) 

While it is unclear who she means by “we” or to what “science” Dupont refers, 

her reliance upon Henderson fails before this panel. 

“It is beyond the power of a Superior Court panel to overrule a prior 

decision of the Superior Court, except in circumstances where intervening 

authority by our Supreme Court calls into question a previous decision of this 

Court.” Commonwealth v. Pepe, 897 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(emphasis added). The Henderson Court is not “our” Supreme Court, and 

we therefore may not follow its precedent in violation of our own. Accordingly, 

the New Jersey court has no power to displace the settled jurisprudence of 

this Commonwealth. While Dupont’s claim that Officer Stamm’s photo array 

was unduly suggestive under Henderson might persuade this Court to 

reconsider its precedents en banc, three judges may not apply Henderson in 

the face of contrary, binding precedent. 

Additionally, in Henderson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey used its 

supervisor power over that state’s court system to appoint a special master 

who conducted an extensive Frye hearing.

2

 The master heard the testimony 

of various experts from across the nation to determine whether those courts’ 

acceptance of eyewitness identifications rested upon junk science. After 

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2 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding 

that, to be admissible in a court, scientific, expert evidence requires “general 

acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”), abrogated federally, 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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reviewing the master’s prolific record, the Henderson Court concluded that 

“[s]tudy after study revealed a troubling lack of reliability in eyewitness 

identification . . . the record proves that the possibility of mistaken 

identification is real.” Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877-78.

Unlike in Henderson, no Frye hearing took place in this case; thus, no 

comparable record of studies and experts is before us for appellate review. 

Nor did Dupont ask the suppression court to hold a Frye hearing on the 

science, so she could create an evidentiary record for our review. Any “claims 

not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 33 A.3d 122, 126 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (accord). To the extent Dupont attacks our acceptance of 

eyewitness identification as being scientifically unsustainable, she has waived 

that argument by failing to create a factual record to prove her premise and

by failing to request a Frye hearing on the question.

Lacking the insights and data that a Frye hearing could have provided, 

the suppression court concluded the photo array at bar was not unduly 

suggestive under existent, Pennsylvania law. That court opined as follows:

Suppression is only warranted . . . where the identification 

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise 

to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification. Commonwealth v. Kendricks, 30 A.3d 

499, 504 (Pa. Super. 2011). Allegations of incidental 

variations in appearance do not prove undue 

suggestiveness. Kearney, 92 A.3d at 66. Photographs in 

a lineup are not unduly suggestive if the suspect’s picture 

does not stand out more than the others and the people 

depicted all exhibit similar facial characteristics. 
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Commonwealth v. Fisher, 769 A.2d 1116, 1126-1127 

(Pa. 2001).

In the instant case . . . the photographic lineup was 

not unduly suggestive. . . . The women depicted in the 

photographs all exhibit very similar facial features and hair 

styles and [Dupont’s] photograph does not stand out among 

the others, despite her being the only one pictured with an 

eyebrow piercing. In fact . . . the large, dark ear piercings 

of a different women stand out more than the barely visible 

piercing on [Dupont’s] eyebrow. Furthermore, although it 

does appear as though the background of [Dupont’s] 

photograph is slightly lighter than the other photographs, 

the backgrounds remain similar, and the [suppression 

court] does not find that the slight variation causes it to 

stand out to a substantial degree. The most significant 

difference in the photographs is the slightly narrower width 

of [Dupont’s] photograph, which causes a slightly wider gap 

between [Dupont’s] photograph and the next photograph. 

While the gap is noticeable . . . it [is not] significant or 

unduly suggestive. Most importantly . . . there is no 

indication that the identification procedure was so 

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 

likelihood of irreparable misidentification.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/1/19, at 6-8. 

Our review of the photo array confirms these findings. The thorough, 

well-reasoned analysis by the learned Judge Howard F. Knisely dispenses with 

any claim that the photo array was unduly suggestive. We therefore adopt 

his analysis as our own and conclude that the suppression court’s decision to 

deny Dupont’s pretrial motion was constitutionally sound.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/11/2020