## In the



# U n ited S ta tes Co urt o f Ap p ea ls

F o rth eS e v e n th C ir cu it

N o. 11

- 2669 R ICK EY C OLE MAN, P la intif f-A pp ellee, v. E ARL D UNL AP, Tr an si ti o na l Adm i ni st r at o r o fthe C ook C ou nt y Juven il e Te m p orary D eten tion C en ter, D e f e ndan t

-Appe l l ant
.
A pp eal from the United S t ates Di strictC our t fo r the N o rthernDi stricto f Illino is, Eas tern Div isi on. No . 10 C2388

—Jam es F. H old erm an, Chief Ju dge
.
A RG UE D M AR CH 26, 2012

— D ECI DE D A UGUS T 22, 2012

Befo re E A S T E RB R OO K, Chief Judg e, a nd B AUERa nd W OO D , C ircu it Judges . E A S T E RB R OO K, C h i e

f Judg e . Ri ckeyCol em an was fi re d f ro m the Cook County J uveni l e Tem pora ryDete n ti on Center i n 200 7. Col em an was to l d that hi s pos i tio n ha d b ee n e l i m i na te d b ec au se o fbudg etc ut s; he c on te n d s t h at h is p ol i t i c s w er e t h e re al c au se for h is disc harg e a nd a l ate r deci si on notto r ehire hi m . M ost2 N o. 11

- 2669 advers e a cti ons base d on a p u b l i c em plo yee ’ s s peech v i o l a t e the fi r s t a men dme nt, a nd no o ne c o nt e nd s t hat C ole m an ’s job i s i n th e c at eg or y for w h ich p olit ics is a l egi ti m ate co nsi derat i on. S ee E lr od v

. Bur ns , 427 U
. S. 34 7 (1 97 6); B ran ti v. Fin k el , 445 U .S. 50 7 (1 98 0); R ut an v. R epubl ican Pa rty of Ill inois , 4 97U. S

. 6 2 ( 19 90)

. Col em an se eks dam age s under 42 U
. S. C. §19 83 ag ai nst a n u m b er of p eo p l e, in c lu d in g E ar l D u n lap , th e T ra n siti o na l Adm i ni st r at o r of th e Cen te r . He a l so i nv o k es the Shak m an co nsent decree s, wh i ch al l ow p ar ti es agg ri eve d by cer tain ki nd s o fpatr onag e in Cook County to se ek re dress th ro u gh civ il con te m p t p ro c ee d in gs . See , e.g., O ’Sul l i van v. Chi cago , 396 F.3d 84 3 (7 th C ir. 20 05 ); Shanahan v. Chic ago , 82 F. 3d 776 (7th C ir. 1996). Dunl ap fi l ed a m o ti o n to di smi ss , as se r ting a m o ng o the r thing s tha t ab s o l ut e i mm un i t y s hi e l ds hi m f ro m Col eman’s cl ai m s. The di st r i ctj udg e di smi ss ed th e cl ai m under §1 983, ru l i ng tha t Dunlap i s a federa l r ather th an a sta te acto r, but decl i ned to dism i ss the S h a km an cl ai m. Th e c o ur t he l d tha t Du nl a p i s no t pr o t e c t ed by ab so lu te im m u n ity . 201 1 U .S. D ist . L EXIS66 54 3 (N .D . I ll. J une 22, 20 11)

. Dun l ap fil ed thi s inter l ocuto ryappealo n the i m m unity q u es tion; the re st ofthe j ud ge’ s r ulings a r e n o tb e f o r e u s . We ha v e j ur i s di c t i on un de r 2 8 U. S

. C. §129 1. S ee M it chel l v. Fors yth , 472 U
. S. 511 (1985). I n 200 2 the J uveni l e Dete nti on Centera n d a gr oup of in m at es se tt led a c as e t h at w e c all th e “ 20 02 L itig at ion .” The dis tr i ct c ourtr eta i ned j uri sdic ti on o veri m ple m en tati o n o fthe se tt l ement

— whi chthe pa r ti es t o b o ththe 2002 Li ti gat i on a nd thi s ca se tr eat as a conse nt de-N o. 11

- 2669 3

cre e

— and i n 200 7 a pp oi n ted Dunlap as the Transi ti onal A dm i ni str ato r of the Center. A l though the 2002 L itigati on co ncer ned p rison co nd i ti ons, the 2007o rderga ve Dunl ap pl en ar y au th o r i ty to “o ve r se e, su per vi se, an d dir ect al l m anage m ent, adm i ni str ati ve, fi nanci al, contr actu al, per sonnel, se curi ty, housi ng, custo dial, purchasing, m ai ntenance, te chnol ogy, heal th se rv i ces, m entalheal th ser vi ces, f oo d and la und ryse rv i ce, r ecr eat i onal, educat i o na l, a nd p r o g r a mm a t i c fun c t i o ns r e l a t i ngt o the o per at i o n o ft he [ C e n t e r ] c o n s i s t e n t wi th t he a uthor i ty vest ed i n the posi ti on o fS up er in te n d ent o f th e [C en te r]”

. D oe v. Co ok C ounty, N o. 99 C 39 45 (N .D . I ll. A ug. 14 , 20 07)

. T h e or der a l so sta ted thatDun l ap w oul d be i m m une fro m s u it forany acti on he too k a s Ad mi n i s t r a t o r . I to r i g i na l l y p r o v i d e d f o r “ ab s o l u t e i mm uni t y f r o m l i ab i l i t y ” ; o n Dun l ap’ s m o ti o n t he lan g u ag e w as am en d ed to rea d : “[D u n lap ] an d h is s t a ff s ha l l ha v e the s t a t us o f o ffi c e r s a nd age nts o f th i s C o u r ta n d a s s u c h s h a l l b e v e s t e d w i th th e s a me im m u n itie s a s v es t w ith th is C ou rt .” In r es p onse to Col em an’ s s uit, Dun l ap ass er ted that the l anguage i n the 2 007 or der pr ovi ded hi m with ab so lu te im m u n ity an d th at h e als o is e n tit led to “q u as ij ud i ci ali m m unity” bec au se he had exer ci sed autho ri ty gr anted to hi m bya cour t. The di str i ct j ud ge rej ecte d bo thl ines o fa r g um en t, ho l di ngtha t Dunl ap’ s dec i si o ns w er e a dm i ni str ati ve ra therthan j ud i ci al( or“quas i” j u d icia l ). 201 1 U .S. D ist . L EXIS66 543 at * 9–23
. Even i fDu nl a p c o ul d h a v e r e l i e d o n the b r o a de r p r e - a men dm en t im m un ity l an gu age, he w ou ld h ave fa r e d n o better; j ud ges d o not have the a uthor i ty to gr ant i m m unity for4 N o. 11

- 2669 unlawfulact s. S ee To w er v. G lo ver, 46 7 U
. S. 91 4, 92 2–23 (1984). The do ctrine o fabs o l ut e i m m uni typr o te ct s th e i nt eg r i tyo fthe j udi ci alpr o ce ss b y e ns ur i ngtha t ti m o r o us j ud ges can act on thei r best vi ew of the m er i ts, rather than tryi ng to l i m i t har ass m ent b y di sappoi nted l i ti gants. Se e Forrester v . White, 48 4 U.S

. 21 9, 22 5 ( 1988 )

. I m m unity al so al l ow s al l j ud ges to co nser ve ( f orthe benefi t o f o th erl i ti g an ts ) t i m e th ato th er wi se woul d b e spe nt deal i ng with those har ass i ng sui ts. Par ti es w ho, al though no t j u d ges , enga ge i n adj ud i cati on ( such as pri va te arbi tr ato rs o r adm i ni str ati ve tr ibunal s) o r execute th e o r der s o fj udg es ( su cha s po l i ce offi ce r s ex ec ut i ng a be nch w ar ra nt, o r a p ar ty executi ng a j ud i ci al l yor dered sa l e) al so enj oy abso l ute im m unity. S ee Sn yd er v. No len , 380 F.3d 279 , 286–8 7 (7th C ir. 2004). Dunlap b el i ev es tha t, ha d the di st r i ctj udg e i n the 2002 Li ti gat i on m ai ntained di re ct c ontr olo fthe Center an d a p p r o ve d C ole m an ’s firin g, th e jud ge w ou ld have been enti tl ed to i m m unity. Dun lap ar gues that h e s h ou ld be en t i t l e d to ab so lu te im m u n ity as w ell b e c a us e h e wa s a c t i ngi n the j ud g e ’ s s t e a d. I n supp or t o fhi s pos i ti on Dunlap i n vokes case s w here federa l j ud ges “[ f ound ] i t nec ess ar y t o adm i ni ste r a business, o r a s chooldi str i ct, o r an enti re pri son sys tem to effecti vel y r em edy a w ro ng. ” Hol l oway v. Wa lk er, 7 65 F
. 2d 51 7, 5 25 ( 5th Ci r. 19 85 ) ( a j udg e who t ook con trol of an oilbu siness i s absolu tely i m m un e). D u n l a p a s s e r t s th a tn o o n e h a s qu e s t i o n e d th e i mm unity of j ud ges wh en exer ci si ng m anage ri alautho ri tyN o. 11

- 2669 5 and that thi s ca se i s the sa m e ( exce p t forthe f act that D un lap is not a j ud ge). U nfo rtunatel y forDun l ap, o ne bo dy has questi oned thi s lin e o fcas es: the Suprem e Cour t o fthe U ni ted S ta te s. In Fo rrestera j udg e fi r ed a pr o ba ti on o ffi ce r . The offi cer sued, al l eging tha t the j ud ge had engag ed i n sex di sc r i m ination; the j udg e r es po nde d b y a ss er ting abso l ute i m m unity. The Courthel d th at judges hav e i mm un i t y o nl y f o r the de ci s i o ns the y ma k e a s a dj udi ca to r s, no t th e dec i si o ns the y make a s admi ni st r ato r s; fi r i ngs o m eo ne i s ana dm i ni st r at i ve a ct, s o the j ud ge w as no t prot ecte d by absolu te im m u n ity. 484 U
. S. at 229–30. Fo rresterin v o lve d a j u d ge ’s a d m in ist ra tio n of h is c o u r t, r a th e r th a n a j u d g e ’ s a d mi n i s t r a t i o n o fs o me othe r i nsti tuti on . D unlap co ntends that Fo rresterdoes not apply to adm i ni strat ive act s t ake n “i n connect i on w i th a c as e” . But Fo rresteri s no t a s nar ro w as Dun l ap c on te n d s; w e m u s t “ d ra w th e lin e b et w ee n tru ly j udi ci ala ct s, f o r whi chi m m uni tyi s appr o pr i at e, a nd acts thats im plyhappen to have been done by j ud ges ”. Id . at 2 27 . D u n lap co n c ed es th at n on e o f h is d u tie s is j ud ici al in n a tu re and that em p loym en t d ecisions are not “adj ud i cati on”. W hat’ s m or e, the quest i on wh ether a c om pla i ni ng par ty had “deal t with the j ud ge [ orh is age nt ] i n hi s j ud i c i a l c a pa c i t y ” wa s i mpo r t a ntev en bef or e Fo rrester
. S ee St um p v . Sp arkm an , 4 35 U
. S. 34 9, 36 2 ( 19 78 )

. Dunl ap co nc ede s th at th e dec i si ons abo ut whi chCo l eman co m plai ns wer e no t m ade b y a ny o ne acting i n a j ud i ci alcapacit y. T h i s m eans that he i s no t enti tl ed to abs ol ute i m m unity.6 N o. 11

- 2669 S uppo se the j udg e ha d m aint aine d c o nt r o l o fthe 2 0 0 2 Li t i g a t i o n r a the r tha n a pp o i nt i ng Du nl a p a s a substi tute w ar den. The j ud ge w ou ld n ot have i ssued an o rderfi ring Col em an. The 20 02 L iti gat i on co ncer ned condi ti ons encounter ed by pri son er s, not w ho fi l l ed w hi ch posi ti on in the pr ison’s bure aucra cy. Dun l ap there f o r e ca nno t sa y tha t he was j us t do i ngs o m ethi ng that the j u d ge m i ght ha ve done. I t i s co ncei vabl e that a j ud ge coul d have dete rm i ned that em plo yee s’ qual i fi cati o ns a ffec t i nm at es ’ c o ndi ti o ns o fc o nfi ne m en t an d i ssued an o rderthat e m plo yee s m ust m eetso m e r equi re m en t s uc h a s ha v i ng a c o l l e g e de g r e e , c o mpl e t i ng a cer tain l eve l o ftr ai ni ng, o r achi ev in g a cer tai n sco re o n a t est. H ad Du nl ap proc eeded to fi re any em plo yee s w ho fail ed to m eet a requ irem en t in su ch an ord er, h e w ou ld be en tit led to im m u n ity u n l e ss a re as on ab le per so n wo ul d ha ve r ec o g ni ze d tha t th e o r derwas i nval i d. Se e M al l ey v. Br iggs , 4 75 U. S

. 3 35 , 3 45 –4 6 ( 19 86 )

. Thu s i fa j ud ge had se t a p oli ti calte st f orem plo ym ent a s a pr i so n gua r d o r c l er k, a n a dm i ni st r at o r i m pl em en ting th at ord er w ou ld be li able, bec au se th e Sup rem e C ou rt hel d m or e than a gener ati on ago that no pu bl ic o ffi ci al c an u se p olit ics to h ire an d fire w or ke rs for s u c h p os itio n s, an d a d ist ric t jud ge ’s o rd er to th e c on tr a r y w ou ld be t ra nsparent l y inval i d. Col em an’ s co m pla i nt alleges that Du nl ap h eld hi s pol i ti cs a gainst hi m ; since Dunlap co ul d no t ha ve do ne tha t ev enw ith j udi ci alpe r m i ss i o n, he c a nn ot be e nt i t l e d t o i mm un i t y wh e n he ma de th e dec i si o n o n h i s o wn. Dunl ap r el i es o n Ash b r ook v. H o ffm an , 61 7 F
. 2d 474 ( 7th C ir. 1 98 0)

. In Ash b r ook th e d i s t r i c t j u d g e o r d e r e d aN o. 11

- 2669 7 parti ti on s al e a nd appo in te d com m i ssi oner s t o conduct i t
. Th e pl a i nt i ff s s ue d the c o mm i s s i o ne r s , a l l e g i ngthat they had m i sm an aged the sa l e, to pl ai nti ff s’ fi nanci al det r i m en t. W e he l d tha t th e co m m iss i o ne r s’ a ct s i n c o nnecti on with the sal e r ecei ved absol ute i m m unity be ca us e th o se a ct s wer e “int i m at ely r el at ed to the j u d icia l p ro c es s”

. Id

. at47 6, 47 7 & n. 4. Dun l ap ar gues th at his action s a s A d m in is t r a t o r l ik e w is e w ere “in tim at ely rela te d to th e jud ici a l p ro c es s” . Th er e is doubtl ess a re l ati on, t h ou gh wh etheri t i s a n “i nti m ate ” one i s debat abl e. But t h e i dea thatany cl ai m bas ed on an ac t “ in tim at ely rela te d to th e jud icia l p ro c es s” is bar re d by ab so lute i m m unity di d not s urvi ve Fo rrester
. Se e Ant oi nev. Bye rs & Ande rs on, Inc . , 508 U .S. 4 29, 435 (1993 ). A ft e r Fo rresterso m e o f th e c om m iss ion er s’ a c tio n s in Ash b r ookmay ha ve b ee n pr o te ct ed bythe r ul e i n M a lley : the c om m i ssi oner s were, afteral l, o rder ed to co nd uct the s al e. But onl y the end s o fthe or der

— no t th e m eans used to exec ute the o rder

— ar e pr ote cted by an o rderto se l l ( u n les s th e o rderdi re cts the c om m i ssi oner s t o use s peci fi c m eans)

. S ee Ric hm an v. Sh eah an , 2 7 0 F
. 3 d 4 3 0 , 4 3 7( 7 th C i r . 2 0 0 1 ) ( h o l d i n gth a ti mmuni t y i s a v a i l ab l e o nl y t o the e xt e nt ne c e s sar y t o p ro te ct c om pli ance with a j ud i ci alo rder, and that an or der no t s peci fyi ng the m eans ofi m ple m entat i on does not prot ect a per son w ho use s m eans that vi ol ate som e othe r rule ofl aw ). Du nl ap f al l s o n the w ro ng si de ofthe Ric hm an line . I t i s true that the a ppo i nt m en t o r derg r an te d Dunl ap th e8 N o. 11

- 2669 po werto “ es tabl i shpe r so nne l po l i ci es ; t o c r ea te , abo l i sh, ortr ansferposi ti ons; and to hi re , te rm i nate, p ro m ote , tr an sfer, a nd e va l ua te mana g ementa nd st affo fthe [ Center]

. ” The o rderdi d not, h ow eve r, di re ct Dunla p to ad op t a n y p ar tic u lar p er so n n el p lan , an d it ce rt ain ly did notdi re ct Dunla p to m ak e any speci fi c em plo yme n td e c i s i o n s o r u s e p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i a . S o a n y e mplo ym ent deci si on was, atbes t, a m eans to the c ourt
or dered end ofi m proving i nm ate s’ welf ar e. A ny dou bt on th is p oint is stil led by on e of D un lap’s d ef en se s o n th e m er i ts
. H e ar g ue d i n th e di st r i ct court that he had no ro le in the deci si on t o fi re Col em an ( whi cho cc ur r ed be f o r e hi s appo i nt m en t) a nd tha t he d id n ot act“know i ngl y o r w i th del iber ate o r re ckl ess disr ega rd concerni ng Col em an’ s i nabi l i ty to b e rehir ed at th e [C en te r]” bu t s im p ly ra tifie d d ec isio n s b y h is subor dinat es. I fDun l ap w as not perso nal l y involve d w i th the em plo ym ent deci si ons, o r w as a ca t’ s paw of so m eo n e e lse w h o h eld a p olit ica l gru d ge , cf. St aub v. Proc t orHos pi t al , 13 1 S

. Ct. 11 86 ( 2011 ), t h at would be a substa nti ve probl em with Col em an’ s cl aim ag ai nst Du nl ap

— for th er e is n o v ica riou s liab ility for a su b or d inate’ s a cts, se e Ash crof tv. Iq b al , 55 6 U.S

. 66 2, 67 6–77 ( 2009 )

—but i t a l so m ea n s th at Du nl ap w as not j ust car ry i ng o ut j ud i ci alo rder s. Du nl ap as ser ts that re cei ver s a re pro tect ed by abso l ute i m m uni tya s l o nga s th eya ctwi th i n the s co pe o fthe or der cre ating the re cei ver shi p, and he m ai ntai ns that h e i s en tit led to th e s am e p ro te c tio n be c au se th e Ju ve n ile Detenti on Centeris ess enti al l y under re cei ver shi p. S ee,N o. 11

- 2669 9 e.g ., P roper ty M ana gem ent& Invest m ents, Inc. v. Le w is , 75 2 F
. 2d 599 (1 1th Ci r . 1 98 5)

. Al l b uto ne o fthe c as es he re l i es on f orthi s p ro posi ti on

— Ne w Alas ka Deve l opm e nt Corp
. v. Gue t s ch ow , 86 9 F
. 2d 1298 ( 9th C ir. 19 89)

— predate Fo r r e s ter
. Ne w Alas ka Deve l opm e ntar guabl y a dopted D un lap’s read ing o f Fo rrester, se e 8 69 F. 2d at 1303 n. 6, though the ni nth ci rcui t has l im ited Ne w Alas ka to si tuati o ns i n whi cha n o wnerc o nt es ts the v ery a ppo i nt m en t ofa re cei ver . S ee M e di ca l D e velo pm e ntInt e r nat i onal v. Cali f or ni a D epar t m e nt o

f C o rre ct i ons , 58 5 F
. 3d 1211 , 12 22 (9th C ir. 2009). Som e cases after Fo rresterhave st ate d that r ec eivers a r e pr o te ct ed byabs o l ut e i m m uni tywi th o ut dea l i n gwi th th e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t we e n a dj u d i c a t i o n a nd ad m in ist ra tio n . O n e su c h ca se , D a vis v . B a yless , 70 F. 3d 367 ( 5th Ci r. 19 95) , di d not ci te Fo rrester
. Se e a l so In re Ced arFu ndi ng, Inc ., 419 B

. R
. 807, 823 (9th Cir. BA P 20 09); Rolan d v. P hil l ips , 19 F .3d 55 2, 55 5 (1 1t h C ir. 19 94 ); Tet on M illw o rk S a les v. Sch lo ssberg, 31 1 F ed. A pp ’ x 145 , 15 0 ( 10th C ir. 20 09 ). Fo rresterte l l s us that Du nl ap’s adm i ni str ati ve acts ar e no t pr ote cted b y abso l ute i m m unity ev en th ou gh D u n lap w as ac tin g w ith in t h e sc op e o f h is a utho r i t y . Ac c o r d, M e di ca l D e ve l opm e ntInt e r nat i onal, 585 F. 3d at 1119 –22. U nq ual i fi ed l an g ua g e to the e ffec t th atr ec ei ve r s are im m un e from l iabil ity w as no t accu rate even before Fo rrester . B an kr u p tc y t ru st ee s, for ex am p le, ca n be h eld personal l y l i abl e forwil l ful bre aches offi du ci ar y duty. Se e, e.g ., In re C hic ago P a cific C o rp . , 77 3 F
. 2d 909, 91 5 ( 7th Cir

. 1985 )

. I f a tr ustee w er e enti tl ed to abs ol ute i m m unity forhi s a dm i ni str ati ve acts , a debtor

- i n-posses si o n wo ul d b e to o . S ee 1 1 U. S

. C. § 1107 ( a)

. Butthe10 N o. 11

- 2669

m an ag er s o f a p riv at e c om p an y in C h a p t e r 11 w ou ld not be i m m une fro m cl ai m s under the Am er i cans with Di s ab i l i t i e s Ac t, T i t l e V I I, or any o th e r p r o v i s i o n o fl a w. N orwould the adm i ni str ato rs o f a m unici pal i ty that has fi l ed f o r r eo r g an i za ti o n un derCha pte r 9 b e imm une f ro m cl ai m s under §198 3 i ftheyenga ged i n patr onag e hi r i ng . Dunl ap i s no t en ti tl ed to g r ea te r pr o te ct i o n. T h e r e m a y b e ma n y p r o b l e ms w i th C o l e ma n ’ s c o mpl ainta g ai nstDunl ap, b utabs o l ut e i m m uni tyi s no t o ne of t h em . Th e d ist ric t c ou rt ’s d ec isio n is AFFI RMED .

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