## In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________ No. 07 - 14 - 00245 - CR

________________________ STEVEN EDWARD BOYD , APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , APPELLEE On Appeal from the 47 th District Court Randall County, Texas Tri a l Court No. 24,143 -

A ; Honorable Dan Schaap , Presiding August 2 2 , 201 4 

### ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. By opinion and judgment dated August 1, 2014, this Court dismissed the appeal of Appellant, Steven Edward Boyd, based on the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right to Appeal . On August 7 , 2014, Appellant filed a pro se “ Notice of Appeal — Suppress ion Hearing ” in this Court. Appellant also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel on appeal and a motion for a reporter’s record of the suppression hearing. In the interest of justice, w e construe Appellant’s notice as a2

tim ely filed motion for re hearing wherein Appellant maintains he has the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling on a suppression hearing. R emaining convinced our original disposition was correct, we deny the motion for rehearing with these additional comments. According to the limited documents before this Court, Appellant and the State entered into a plea - bargain wherein he agreed to enter a plea of guilty to the offense of robbery in exchange for a recommended sentence of 30 years and dismissal of another charge pending in tri al court cause number 24,142 - A. On June 17, 2014, the trial court accepted Appellant’s plea and imposed sentence in accordance with that agreement. In a plea - bargain case, a defendant retains the right to appeal matters that have been raised by writt en motion filed and ruled on before trial , or after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal . T EX . R. A PP . P . 25.2(a)(2). A pre trial ruling on a motion to suppress is ordinarily one of those matters that may be appealed after sentencing in a plea - bargain case. Here, the Trial C

ourt’ s C ertification of Defendant ’ s R ight of Appeal reflects that , not only is this is a plea - bargain case , Appellant also waived his right of appeal. On June 18, 2014, Appellant filed a signed waiver, also executed by Appellant’s trial attorney, which provides that : after having been sentenced or punished by the Court in accordance with the terms of my plea bargain agreement with the State, and being fully aware of the sentence or punishment imposed . . . and after hav ing been fully informed by the Court of my right to appeal (including my right to have counsel appointed by the Court to represent me on appeal . . . and my right to have the Court furnish the appellate record without charge or expense to me . . . ), [I] do hereby voluntarily, knowingly, and intellig ently waive my right to appeal.3

A waiver of appeal made after sentence is imposed is sufficient to prevent a defendant from appealing , absent the trial court’s consent. Monreal v. State , 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Te x. Crim. App. 2003); Jamison v. State , No. 01 - 13 - 00360 - CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXI S 3734, *2 (Tex. App. — Houston [ 1st Dist.] April 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op . , not designated for publicati on). Because Appellant waived his right to appeal after sentence was imposed, he has no right of appeal pertai ning to the trial court’s pre trial ruling on his motion to suppress. Without a certification showing Appellant received the trial court’s permission to appeal, his appeal must be dismissed. T EX . R. A PP . P . 25.2( d); Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, Appellant’s m otion for rehearing is d enied . His motion s for appointment of counsel and a reporter’s record of the suppression hearing are rendered moot.

Patr ick A. Pirtle Jus tice Do not publish.