J-A27032-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEVIN LEE STILLMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3354 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 20, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002267-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY COLINS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 1, 2020

Appellant, Kevin Lee Stillman, appeals from the aggregate judgment of 

sentence of nine to eighteen years of confinement, which was imposed after 

his convictions at a bench trial for two counts of illegal sale or transfer of 

firearms, four counts of recklessly endangering another person, two counts of 

terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, two counts of simple 

assault, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of manufacture, 

delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or to deliver a controlled 

substance by a person not registered.

1

 We affirm on the basis of the trial 

court opinion.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6111(g)(1), 2705, 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(3), and 2702(a)(6) 

and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), respectively.
J-A27032-20

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In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant

facts and procedural history of this case. See Trial Court Opinion, dated 

May 13, 2020, at 1-7. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.2

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in finding there was sufficient 

evidence to convict Appellant of two counts of Unlawful Sale or 

Transfer of Firearms1 where evidence adduced at trial supported 

that there was only a single transfer.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(g)(1)

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

3

This Court’s standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence 

claims is as follows:

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when 

viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier 

of fact to find every element of the crime has been 

established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of 

the evidence claim must fail.

Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 806 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations 

omitted).

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2 On November 22, 2019, Appellant filed this timely direct appeal. Appellant 

filed his statement of errors complained of on appeal on December 9, 2019. 

The trial court entered its opinion on May 13, 2020.

3 Appellant had raised an additional claim before the trial court that, assuming 

that there were two transfers and two separate criminal acts, these 

convictions should merge for sentencing. Appellant has dropped this 

argument on appeal. Appellant’s Brief at 13 n.4.
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As Appellant’s challenge also requires interpretation of the statutory 

language of 18 Pa.C.S. § 611(g)(1), we further note:

In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our 

standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining 

whether the trial court committed an error of law. In 

making this determination, we are guided by the Statutory 

Construction Act, which dictates: . . .

(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of

statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of 

the General Assembly. Every statute shall be 

construed, if possible, to give effect to all its 

provisions.

(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free 

from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be 

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. As a general rule, the best indication of 

legislative intent is the plain language of a statute.

In re Steele, 177 A.3d 328, 333 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal quotation marks 

and some citations omitted).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable

Thomas C. Branca, we conclude Appellant’s issue merits no relief. The trial 

court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of that

question. See Trial Court Opinion, dated May 13, 2020, at 8-14 (finding: as 

a matter of Pennsylvania law, the sale of two firearms even though in a single

transaction constitutes a first and second offense under 18 Pa. C.S. 

§ 6111(g)(1); the language of Section 6111(g)(1) is unambiguous, as its use 

of the article “a” before “a firearm” plainly means “a single firearm”; case law 
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has interpreted similar phrasing of “a firearm” in another section of the 

Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act to refer to a single firearm; thus, 

Appellant’s two convictions for illegal sale or transfer of firearms constitute a 

first and second offense for grading purposes; accordingly, Appellant’s first 

conviction (Count 1) was properly graded as a misdemeanor of the second 

degree, while his second conviction (Count 2) was appropriately graded as a 

felony of the second degree). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial 

court’s opinion. The parties are instructed to attach the opinion of the trial 

court in any filings referencing this Court’s decision.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/01/2020