* This opinion is being initially released in typescript form. 

# In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seve

nth Circuit

No. 01-3448
NAVREET N

ANDA, Plaintiff- Appellee ,

v
. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, BELLUR PRABHAKAR, GERALD MOSS, et al., Defendants- Appellants

.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 00 C 4757-- Rebecca R. Pallmeyer , Judge.

ON MOTION TO STAY THE MANDATE

DECEMBE R 3, 2002 *No. 01-3448 Page 2

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge (in chambers). This matter is before
me on the application of the Trustee s of the Un iversity of Illinoi s for
a stay of t his cour

t’s manda

te pending

its petit i on for a

writ of certio rari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Fam ilia rit y withthis cour

t’s opinion

in the u nderlyin g litiga tion is pr esumed. See Nanda v. Bd. of

Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois , 303 F .3d 8 17 (7th Cir . 2002).
The appropriate judicial inquiry in considering an applica tion such as the on e before m e toda y has been set forth on numerous occasions. A party

seeking a stay of

mandate

pending the fili ng of
a petition for writ of certiorari must establish that the petition will present a substa

ntial qu estio n and that there is good cause for a stay. See Fed. R. App. P.41(d)(2)(A). We therefore ask whether the applica n t has a r easonable

probabil ity of suc ceeding on the meri

ts and whether the app licant will suffer irrepara ble injury. See Williams v. Chra ns , 50 F.3d 1358, 1360 (7th Cir. 1995 ) (per curiam).

To demonstrate a reasonable chance of success on the merits, the applica

nt must s how a re asonable probabili ty that at least four Justices will vote to grant certiorari and a reason able possibility that at least

five Ju stices wi ll vote to reverse t he judgment of this court. This t a sk requires that I view the case from a different perspective than I ordinarily would take in decid ing a case in the regular course of business . In deciding a case, a circuit judge mu st not anticipa

te futur e change s in jur ispruden tial co urse by the Supreme Court of

the United States; it is the task of a circuit judge to apply established doctrine. See State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997). The pres ent situa tion, by c ontrast, require s that I perform the predictive function of att empting to determine the future course of the Supreme Court’s jurispr udence.

Even taking

into account this different perspecti ve, I can not say that the University has met its burden. T he Supreme Court hasNo. 01-3448 Page 3

1 See, e.g., Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garre tt , 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Flo rida Bd . of Reg ents , 528 U.S. 62 (2000).

2 Theref ore, this is not a case, such as many of those cited by the Unive rs ity in support of its motion t o stay, w hich in volves or createsa conflict among the circuits. Cf. United States v. Holl

and , 1 F.3d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1993) (in chambers) (“A conflict among the circuits is an accepted basis for the granting of a writ of certiora

ri.”). held that various statutory schemes are infi rm because they ar e not premised

on an ap propria

te exercise

of Congr essional power und er Section 5 of the F ourteenth

Amendment

. 1 However, my collea gues and I, after careful study, ha ve concluded that Congres s’ exercise of its legislative power in enacting Title VII is base d on far f irmer footing. We have dete rmined t hat Title VII’s disparate treatment provision

is a leg islativ e measur e well-ta ilored to address the same sort of intent ional dis crimina tion that the Fourteenth Amendment itself forbids. Like our colleagues in th e Eighth Circuit, see Okruhlik v. Univ. of Arkansas, 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2001), we also determin ed that Congress h ad am ple eviden ce of discr iminati on when it enacted this legislation. 2 Indeed, in Varner v. Illinois State University , 226 F.3d 927 (7t h Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 533 U.S. 902 (2001), another

panel of this c ourt noted

that th is well-d ocumented histor y of dis crimination is embodied in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court itself.

Un der t hese circumstances, I cannot say that the Supreme Court, faced wi

th unan imity am ong the ci rcuits th at have decided the issu e , nevertheless will determine that this case is worthy of a gr ant of certiorari. Nor can I say that th ere is a reasona bl e possibili ty tha t the Supr eme Court ultimat ely would decide to reverse the judgment of this court.No. 01-3448 Page 4

Accordingly, the application for stay of mandate is denied.

APPLICATION FOR STAY DENIED