### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE GARY WAYNE WILLIAMS V. JU DITH MARIE WILLIAMS Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County No. 99-DR-1173 Hon. Samuel H. Payne, Circuit Judge

No. E1999-02750-COA-R3-CV - Decided June 23, 2000

Judgmentwas entered to be paid at a future d

ate. Judgment holde

r sought in

a later actionan award of interest on the judgment which the Trial Court denied.
Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgmen

t of the Circuit C

ourt Affirmed. F RANKS , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which S USANO , J., and S WINEY , J., joined.

Michael E. Richar

dson, Poole, Thornb

ury, Morgan & Richa

rdson, Chattanooga

, for Appellant. Traci Owen Vella, Chattanooga, for Appellee.

OPINION

The genesi s of this act ion was a divorce decree entered on April 15, 1991, and the father appeals from the Tr ial Jud ge’s denial of h is Petition filed in Au

gust 1999, to awa

rd postjudgment interest on an equity judgment entered in the divorce dec ree. In the Final Judgment of Divorce the wife was awarded the mar ital residence,

but a lien was impressed for the husband in the amount of $21,200.00 on the property . The home was to be sold n o later than the youngest child’s eighteenth birthday and then the lien would be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale of the residence.

Husband arg ues th at he should have been awarded post-judgment interest on the $21,200.00 judgment from the time of the 1991 decree

pursuant to

Tenn. Code Ann. §47-14-121 and-2-

Tenn. Code Ann. §47 -14-122. These st atutes read as f

ollows: § 47-14-121. Interest on judgments and decrees Interest on judgments, inc

luding decree

s, shall be computed at

the effective rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, exce p t as may be otherwise provided or permitted by statute; provided, that where a judgment is based on a note, contract, or other writing fi

xing a rate of inte

rest within the limits provided in § 47-14-103 for that particular category of

transaction, the judgment shal l bear interest a

t the rate so fixed. § 47-14-122. Interest on judgments and decrees; time from calculation Interest shall be computed on every judgment from the day on which the jury or the court, sitting without a jury, returned the verdict without regard to a motion for a new trial. Husband also cites the ca

se of Inman v. Inman , 840 S.W.2d 927, 932 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), wherein the Court stated that the right to post-judgment interest was statutory and “the failure of any court to expressly provide such interest in its judgment does not abrogate the statute.” Inman is distinguishable

from the instant case, because in Inman the wife had been awarded a judgment of $100,000.00 cash, which the hu sband withheld pay

ing until the appeal was heard. Id. In this case, husband was awarded a lien of $21 ,200.00 aga inst th e marital residence, which expressly did not have to be satisfied until the youngest child turns eighteen, and husband is not entitled to

collect the judgment until that time.

This issue has been

addressed numerous times both by this Court and by the Sup

reme Court, and the rule is that the statutory interest does not begin to accrue until the party awarded judgment becomes entitled to the money

. In Price v. Price , 472 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. 1971), the Supreme Court addressed a request for post-judgment interest on a divorce judgment which awarded the wife alimony in solido payable in installments. T he Court held that since the wife did not become entit led to use of the money until each installm

ent was due, she w

ould not be entitled

to interest. Id. The Court quoted with approval from Gibson’s Suits in Chancery (4 th Ed.) §564 , as follows: Hence, it is safe to say, that in all such cases interest should be allowed from the day

the complainant had a right to the money he sues for. Id. at 734. This rule has been followed repeatedly. See West American Ins. Co. v. Montgomery , 861 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1993); Staggs v. National Health Corp. , 924 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996); Whiteside v. Whiteside , 1998 WL 237715 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. May 7, 1998) and Pertew v. Pertew , 1999 WL 486917 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 1999).

In this case,

husband is not entitl

ed to use of the mone

y until the house

is sold, and to hold otherwise would be inequitable, as the father would be unjustly enriched at the mother’s-3-

expense. The fath

er’s issue reg

arding post-judg

ment interest is wit

hout merit. The wife appeals the failure of the Trial Judge to award he r attorney ’s fees in procuringadditional child support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103( c). The mother’s petition in the Trial Court asked for attorney’s fees, but the judgment does not award fees. No transcript of evidence was filed, and we must conclusively presume there was no abuse of discretion by the

Trial Judge in not awarding a

ttorney’s f

ees. The wife al

so requests

an award o f her attorney’s fees on appeal. We conclude from the record, that the wife is entitle

d to her costs

and expenses incur

red in defending this appeal, pursuant

to §27-1-122. It appears that the father’s appeal is frivolous and/or was taken for delay. Accordingly

, upon remand, the Trial Court will set reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in defending this appeal for the mother, pursuant to the statute.

The cost of the ap

peal is assessed t

o appellant.