J-A25025-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RALPH ANTHONY SAEZ 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 232 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 9, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-55-CR-0000208-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2020

Ralph Anthony Saez appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence 

entered after a jury found him guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude police 

officer.1 He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm. 

Saez proceeded pro se at trial where the Commonwealth presented the 

following evidence.2 Trooper Michael Palange stopped “a black pickup truck” 

after observing it did not have inspection stickers or a license plate. N.T., Trial, 

11/27/18, at 34, 35. After Trooper Palange activated his lights and siren, the 

vehicle pulled over. Id. at 35. When Trooper Palange approached the vehicle, 

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a).

2 Prior to trial, the court conducted an on-the-record colloquy with Saez and 

found that Saez had “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right 

to counsel.” N.T., Trial, 11/27/18, at 21. 
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Saez was in the driver’s seat; Helen Russell was in the front passenger seat. 

Id. at 35, 39. Saez asked Trooper Palange “[I]s there an emergency[?]” Id.

at 36. Trooper Palange told him that “the emergency was that [Saez] did not 

have a registration plate[,]” and Saez replied that “he did not need a 

registration plate.” Id. Trooper Palange told Saez “to stay put” and began 

walking back to his patrol car. Id. at 37-38. Saez told Trooper Palange “that 

if there’s no emergency then he was going to be on his way.” Id. at 38. 

Trooper Palange did not get a chance to respond because “[Saez] then placed 

the vehicle in drive and left the scene.” Id. at 39. 

Trooper Palange got back into his vehicle, “following Mr. Saez after he 

left the scene.” Id. Trooper Palange testified that his lights were activated as 

he followed behind Saez. Id. Trooper Palange also testified that Saez drove 

approximately 10 miles and eventually pulled into the driveway of his house. 

Id. at 40, 48. The Commonwealth also presented the dash board camera 

footage from Trooper Palange’s patrol car. Id. at 44. The court took judicial 

notice “that the Vehicle Code requires vehicles, such as [Saez’s] as portrayed 

in the video and through the testimony, to be properly inspected and 

licensed.” Id. at 54, 55.

During cross-examination, Trooper Palange testified that Pennsylvania 

law requires the registration of vehicles, including salvage vehicles. Id. at 57. 

He also testified that when he asked Saez for paperwork for the vehicle, Saez

“denied to give me it” and “upon a traffic stop, you are required to give . . . 
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your registration, insurance paperwork, and your photo ID or driver’s license.” 

Id. at 58. 

Saez testified in his own defense and presented the testimony of Russell

and his son. The jury returned a guilty verdict for fleeing or attempting to 

elude police officer. The trial court, sitting without a jury, also found Saez 

guilty of the numerous summary offenses: registration and certificate of title 

required, registration card to be signed and exhibited on demand, drivers 

required to be licensed, carrying and exhibiting driver’s license on demand, 

required finance responsibility, and operation of vehicle without official 

certificate of inspection.3 At a later date, the court imposed a sentence of six 

months’ reporting probation for the fleeing conviction and fines for the 

remaining convictions. N.T., Sentencing, 1/9/19, at 12. Saez did not file a post 

sentence motion. 

He did file a timely notice of appeal. Because Saez had done so pro se, 

this Court remanded for a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 

713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988). Upon remand, the trial court determined Saez 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel on appeal. 

Saez’s brief offers the following statement of questions involved: 

I. Did the [c]ourt err in finding [Saez] guilty of the 

charge of Fleeing or Eluding as the evidence was 

insufficient to show a command to stop or stay?

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3 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1301(a), 1311(b), 1501(a), 1511(a), 1786(f), and 4703(a), 

respectively. 
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II. Did the [c]ourt err in finding evidence to sustain the 

verdict of Fleeing or Eluding due to insufficient 

evidence?

III. Did the [c]ourt err in providing evidence to prove 

[Saez] was claiming to be a sovereign citizen to avoid 

the charges pertaining to Pa. C.S. Title 75?

IV. Did the [c]ourt err in proving evidence that Pa. C.S. 

Title 75 pertained to Ralph A. Saez’s personal property 

in which he was simply exercising his right of 

possession and use?

Saez’s Br. at 7. 

Saez’s first claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Our 

standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is de novo. 

Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420 (Pa. 2014). “[O]ur scope of 

review is limited to considering the evidence of record, and all reasonable 

inferences arising therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner.” Id. at 420-21. 

The crime of fleeing or eluding an officer requires the Commonwealth to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver of a vehicle “willfully fails or 

refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or...otherwise flees or attempts to elude 

a pursuing police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to bring the 

vehicle to a stop[.]” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a). A signal from the police officer 

“may be by hand, voice, emergency lights or siren.” Id. at § 3733(b). 

Saez claims that “the Commonwealth has failed to meet it’s [sic] burden 

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to show that a command not to leave 

would give rise to a crime of fleeing or eluding.” Saez’s Br. at 11. He alleges 
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that Trooper Palange “asked” him to stay and this did not amount to a 

“command” to stay. Id. at 10-11. He also claims that the dash board camera 

supports this argument. However, the dash board camera was not included in 

the certified record.

Here, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Trooper Palange 

gave an audible or visual signal to Saez to stop his vehicle and that Saez

willfully failed or refused to bring his vehicle to a stop or that he fled or 

attempted to elude Trooper Palange. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a). Trooper 

Palange testified that he told Saez to stay after pulling his vehicle over for lack 

of registration and a license plate. Despite being told to stay, Saez proceeded 

to leave the scene and drive for approximately 10 miles until he returned to 

his home. Trooper Palange testified that upon Saez leaving the scene, he got 

back into his patrol car, activated his lights, and followed Saez. Thus the 

evidence was sufficient to show that Saez willfully failed to stop his vehicle 

despite being given a visual signal to stop by a police officer. Furthermore, 

Saez’s personal interpretation of Trooper Palange’s telling him to remain at 

the scene has no impact on our conclusion. Even if Saez believed that he was 

free to leave the scene at that point, Saez had an obligation to stop his vehicle 

when Trooper Palange activated his lights for the second time.

Saez’s second claim, as stated in the statement of questions involved,

is also a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. As developed in his brief, 

it is a claim that the evidence was insufficient because Trooper Palange lacked

personal knowledge of the requirements of the Vehicle Code. Personal 
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knowledge is not a question of the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather the 

admissibility of the trooper’s testimony. This claim is therefore meritless. To 

the extent Saez directly challenges the admissibility of the trooper’s 

testimony, Saez waived the issue by failing to object at trial, raise the claim 

in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, or include it in his statement of questions 

involved. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), 1925(b)(4)(vii), and 2116(a); Commonwealth 

v. Lynn, 71 A.3d 247, 247 (Pa. 2013) (per curiam).

Saez’s third and fourth claims as stated in the statement of questions 

involved suggest evidentiary challenges. However, as developed in the brief, 

he raises different issues. The divergence amounts to waiver. Pa.R.A.P. 

2116(a); Lynn, 71 A.3d at 247. Even if preserved, the claims would not merit 

relief. We address each independently.

Saez’s third claim as argued in his brief is that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove that he was claiming to be a sovereign citizen. Saez 

waived this issue not only by not clearly including it in his statement of 

questions involved, but also by not placing it in his Rule 1925(b) statement. 

In any event, it is frivolous. The Commonwealth was not required to prove 

any such thing in order to convict him of any offense with which he was 

charged.

In his fourth claim, Saez seems to argue – it is not at all clear – that he 

is not subject to the provisions of the Vehicle Code because his vehicle “is not 

subject to a security interest because the Commonwealth does not have title 

and there is no certificate of title that would prove that there is a security 
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interest in the property, (alleged motor vehicle).” Saez’s Br. at 18. Like the 

preceding issue, Saez waived this issue two ways: he failed to place it in his 

statement of questions involved, and did not raise it in a post sentence motion. 

In any event, it is patently frivolous. We affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/18/2020