Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 133 / Monday, July 13, 1998 / Notices 37601

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, by the above date. A

copy of the petition should also be sent

to the Office of the General Counsel,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and to

John O’Neill, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts

and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20037, attorney for the

licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

The Commission hereby provides

notice that this is a proceeding on an

application for a license amendment

falling within the scope of Section 134

of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982

(NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 10154. Under

Section 134 of the NWPA, the

Commission, at the request of any party

to the proceeding, must use hybrid

hearing procedures with respect to ‘‘any

matter which the Commission

determines to be in conroversy among

the parties.’’ The hybrid procedures in

Section 134 provide for oral argument

on matters in controversy, preceeded by

discovery under the Commission’s

rules, and the designation, following

argument, of only those factual issues

that involve a genuine and substantial

dispute, together with any remaining

questions of law, to be resolved in an

adjudicatory hearing. Actual

adjudicatory hearings are to be held on

only those issues found to meet the

criteria of Section 134 and set for

hearing after oral argument.

The Commission’s rules

implementing Section 134 of the NWPA

are found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K,

‘‘Hybrid Hearing Procedures for

Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear

Power Reactors’ (published at 50 FR

41670, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR

2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any

party to the proceeding may invoke the

hybrid hearing procedures by filing with

the presiding officer a written request

for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109.

To be timely, the request must be filed

within 10 days of an order granting a

request for hearing or petition to

intervene. (As outlined above, the

Commission’s rules in 10 CFR Part 2,

Subpart G, and 2.714 in particular,

continue to govern the filing of requests

for a hearing or petitions to intervene,

as well as the admission of contentions.)

The presiding officer shall grant a

timely request for oral argument. The

presiding officer may grant an untimely

request for oral argument only upon

showing of good cause by the requesting

party for the failure to file on time and

after providing the other parties an

opportunity to respond to the untimely

request. If the presiding officer grants a

request for oral argument, any hearing

held on the application shall be

conducted in accordance with the

hybrid hearing procedures. In essence,

those procedures limit the time

available for discovery and require that

an oral argument be held to determine

whether any contentions must be

resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no

party to the proceedings requests oral

argument, or if all untimely requests for

oral argument are denied, then the usual

procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G,

apply.

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated March 20, 1998, as

supplemented by letter dated May 28,

1998, which is available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

and at the local public document room

located at the Callaway County Public

Library, 710 Court Street, Fulton,

Missouri 65251.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day

of July 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Kristine M. Thomas,

Project Manager, Project Directorate IV–2,

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–18545 Filed 7–10–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–482]

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating

Corporation; Notice of Consideration

of Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration

Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

42 issued to Wolf Creek Nuclear

Operating Corporation (the licensee) for

operation of the Wolf Creek Nuclear

Generating Station, Unit No. 1 located

in Coffey County, Kansas.

The proposed amendment would

support a modification to the plant to

increase the storage capacity of the

spent fuel pool and increase the

maximum nominal fuel enrichment to

5.0 nominal weight percent U–235.

Before issuance of the proposed

license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended

(the Act) and the Commission’s

regulations.

The Commission has made a

proposed determination that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration. Under

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR

50.92, this means that operation of the

facility in accordance with the proposed

amendment would not (1) involve a

significant increase in the probability or

consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of

a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or

(3) involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR

50.91(a), the licensee has provided its

analysis of the issue of no significant
37602 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 133 / Monday, July 13, 1998 / Notices

hazards consideration, which is

presented below:

1. The proposed change does not

involve a significant increase in the

probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated.

In the analysis of the safety issues

concerning the expanded Spent Fuel

Pool storage capacity, the following

previously postulated accident

scenarios have been considered:

a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the

Spent Fuel Pool

b. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling flow

c. A seismic event

d. Misloaded fuel assembly

The probability that any of the

accidents in the above list can occur is

not significantly increased by the

modification itself. The probabilities of

a seismic event or loss of Spent Fuel

Pool cooling flow are not influenced by

the proposed changes. The probabilities

of accidental fuel assembly drops or

misloadings are primarily influenced by

the methods used to lift and move these

loads. The method of handling loads

during normal plant operations is not

significantly changed, since the same

equipment (i.e., Spent Fuel Pool Bridge

Crane) and procedures will be used. A

new offset handling tool will be

required to assess some storage rack

cells located adjacent to the pool walls.

The grapple mechanism, procedures,

and fuel manipulation methods will be

very similar to those used by the spent

fuel handling tool. Therefore, this tool

does not represent a significant change

in the methods used to lift or move fuel.

Since the methods used to move loads

during normal operations remain nearly

the same as those used previously, there

is no significant increase in the

probability of an accident.

During rack removal and installation,

all work in the pool area will be

controlled and performed in strict

accordance with specific written

procedures. Any movement of fuel

assemblies required to be performed to

support the modification (e.g., removal

and installation of racks) will be

performed in the same manner as during

normal refueling operations. Shipping

cask movements will not be performed

during the modification period.

Accordingly, the proposed

modification does not involve a

significant increase in the probability of

an accident previously evaluated.

The consequences of the previously

postulated scenarios for an accidental

drop of a fuel assembly in the Spent

Fuel Pool have been re-evaluated for the

proposed change. The results show that

the postulated accident of a fuel

assembly striking the top of the storage

racks will not distort the racks

sufficiently to impair their functionality.

The minimum subcriticality margin, Keff

less than or equal to 0.95, will be

maintained. The structural damage to

the Fuel Building, pool liner, and fuel

assembly resulting from a fuel assembly

drop striking the pool floor or another

assembly located within the racks is

primarily dependent on the mass of the

falling object and the drop height. Since

these two parameters are not changed by

the proposed modification, the

structural damage to these items

remains unchanged. Cycle specific

calculations, using core specific

parameters continue to ensure that the

radiological dose at the exclusion area

boundary remain within the limits

documented in the WCGS [Wolf Creek

Generating Station] Updated Safety

Analysis Report. Dose levels remain

well within the levels required by 10

CFR 100, paragraph 11, as defined in

Section 15.7.4.II.1 of the Standard

Review Plan. Thus, the results of the

postulated fuel drop accidents remain

acceptable and do not represent a

significant increase in consequences

from any of the same previously

evaluated accidents that have been

reviewed and found acceptable by the

NRC.

The consequences of a loss of Spent

Fuel Pool cooling have been evaluated

and found to have no increase. The

concern with this accident is a

reduction of Spent Fuel Pool water

inventory from bulk pool boiling

resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies.

This situation would lead to fuel failure

and subsequent significant increase in

offsite dose. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool

cooling at WCGS is mitigated in the

usual manner by ensuring that a

sufficient time lapse exists between the

loss of forced cooling and uncovering

fuel. This period of time is compared

against a reasonable period to reestablish cooling or supply an

alternative water source. Evaluation of

this accident usually includes

determination of the time to boil. The

time allowed for operator action is

much less than the onset of any

significant increase in offsite dose, since

once boiling begins it would have to

continue unchecked until the Spent

Fuel Pool surface was lowered to the

point of exposing active fuel. The time

to boil represents the onset of loss of

Spent Fuel Pool water inventory and is

commonly used as a gage for

establishing the comparison of

consequences before and after a

refueling project. The heat up rate in the

Spent Fuel Pool is a nearly linear

function of the fuel decay heat load. The

fuel decay heat load will increase

subsequent to the proposed changes

because of the increase in the number

[of] assemblies and higher fuel burnups.

The methodology used in the thermalhydraulic analysis determined the

maximum fuel decay heat loads which

are allowed by maintaining the current

time allowed for operator action (i.e.,

more than two hours to boil during

complete loss of forced cooling).

Therefore, the allowed operator action

time remains unchanged from the

previous design basis. In the unlikely

event that all Spent Fuel Pool cooling is

lost, sufficient time will still be

available subsequent to the proposed

changes for the operators to provide

alternate means of cooling before the

onset of pool boiling. Therefore, the

proposed change represents no increase

in the consequences of loss of Spent

Fuel Pool cooling.

The consequences of a design basis

seismic event are not increased. The

consequences of this accident are

evaluated on the basis of subsequent

fuel damage or compromise of the fuel

storage or building configurations

leading to radiological or criticality

concerns. The new racks have been

analyzed in their new configuration and

found safe during seismic motion. Fuel

has been determined to remain intact

and the storage racks maintain the fuel

and fixed poison configurations

subsequent to a seismic event. The

structural capability of the pool and

liner will not be exceeded under the

appropriate combinations of dead

weight, thermal, and seismic loads. The

Fuel Building structure will remain

intact during a seismic event and will

continue to adequately support and

protect the fuel racks, storage array, and

pool moderator/coolant. Thus, the

consequences of a seismic event are not

increased.

Fuel misloading accidents were

previously postulated occurrences. The

consequence of this type of accident has

been analyzed for the worst possible

storage configuration subsequent to the

proposed modification and the

consequences were found to be

acceptable because the reactivity in the

Spent Fuel Pool remained below 0.95.

After the proposed modification, the

worst case postulated accident

condition, for the Mixed Zone Three

Region configuration, occurs when a

fresh fuel assembly of the highest

possible enrichment is inadvertently

loaded into a Region 2 storage cell.

Further, after the proposed

modification, the worst case postulated

accident condition, for the checkerboard

configuration, occurs when a fresh fuel

assembly of the highest possible
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 133 / Monday, July 13, 1998 / Notices 37603

enrichment is inadvertently loaded into

an empty storage cell. In both postulated

accident scenarios, credit is allowed for

soluble boron in the water, and the

Spent Fuel Pool reactivity is maintained

below 0.95. Therefore, there is no

increase in consequences due to the

modification.

Therefore, it is concluded that the

proposed changes do not significantly

increase the probability or consequences

of any accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not

create the possibility of a new or

different kind of accident from any

accident previously evaluated.

To assess the possibility of new or

different kind of accidents, a list of the

important parameters required to ensure

safe fuel storage was established. Safe

fuel storage is defined here as providing

an environment which would not

present any significant threats to

workers or the general public. In other

words, meeting the requirements of 10

CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20. Any new

events which would modify these

parameters sufficiently to place them

outside of the boundaries analyzed for

normal conditions and/or outside of the

boundaries previously considered for

accidents would be considered a new or

different accident. The criticality and

radiological safety evaluations were

reviewed to establish the list of

important parameters. The fuel

configuration and the existence of the

moderator/coolant were identified as

the only two parameters which were

important to safe fuel storage.

Significant modification of these two

parameters represents the only

possibility of an unsafe storage

condition. Once the two important

parameters were established, an

additional step was taken to determine

what events (which were not previously

considered) could result in changes to

the storage configuration or moderator/

coolant presence during or subsequent

to the proposed changes. This process

was adopted to ensure that the

possibility of any new or different

accident scenario or event would be

identified.

Due to the proposed changes, an

accidental drop of a rack module during

construction activity in the pool was

considered as the only event which

might represent a new or different kind

of accident.

An installation accident of a rack

dropping onto stored spent fuel or the

pool floor liner is not a postulated event

due to the defense-in-depth approach to

be taken, as discussed in detail within

Section 3.5 of the Licensing Report

[Enclosure I to the March 20, 1998

letter]. This approach is similar to that

taken previously for lifting a pool gate

with the Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane.

A new temporary hoist and rack lifting

rig will be introduced to lift and

suspend the racks from the bridge of the

Cask Handling Crane. These temporary

lift items have been designed in

accordance with the requirements of

NUREG–0612 and ANSI N14.6 with

respect to redundancy in load path or

safety margin. The postulated rack drop

event is commonly referred to as a

‘‘heavy load drop’’ over the pools.

Heavy loads will not be allowed to

travel over any racks containing fuel

assemblies, thus a rack drop onto fuel is

precluded. A rack drop to the pool liner

is not a postulated event, since all of the

lifting components (except for the Cask

Handling Crane) either provide

redundancy in load path or are designed

with safety margins greater than a factor

of ten. Nevertheless, the analysis of a

rack dropping to the liner has been

performed and shown to be acceptable.

However, the question of a new or

different type of event is answered by

determining whether similar heavy

loads have been carried over the pool.

As stated above, pool gates have been

previously lifted within the Spent Fuel

Pool. The pool gate and the storage

racks are both designated as ‘‘heavy

loads’’ and the safeguards taken to

preclude these accidents are similar. All

movements of heavy loads over the pool

will comply with the applicable

administrative controls and guidelines

(i.e., plant procedures, NUREG–0612,

etc.) Therefore, the rack drop does not

represent a new or different kind of

accident.

The proposed change does not alter

the operating requirements of the plant

or of the equipment credited in the

mitigation of the design basis accidents.

The proposed change does not affect

any of the important parameters

required to ensure safe fuel storage.

Therefore, the potential for a new or

previously unanalyzed accident is not

created.

3. The proposed change does not

involve a significant reduction in a

margin of safety.

The function of the Spent Fuel Pool

is to store the fuel assemblies in a

subcritical and coolable configuration

through all environmental and abnormal

loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel

assembly drop. The new rack design

must meet all applicable requirements

for safe storage and be functionally

compatible with the Spent Fuel Pool.

WCNOC has addressed the safety

issues related to the expanded pool

storage capacity in the following areas:

1. Material, mechanical and structural

considerations

2. Nuclear criticality

3. Thermal-hydraulic and pool cooling

The mechanical, material, and

structural designs of the new racks have

been reviewed in accordance with the

applicable provisions of the NRC

Guidance entitled, ‘‘Review and

Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and

Handling Applications’’. The rack

materials used are compatible with the

spent fuel assemblies and the Spent

Fuel Pool environment. The design of

the new racks preserves the proper

margin of safety during abnormal loads

such as a dropped assembly and tensile

loads from a stuck assembly. It has been

shown that such loads will not

invalidate the mechanical design and

material selection to safely store fuel in

a coolable and subcritical configuration.

The methodology used in the

criticality analysis of the expanded

Spent Fuel Pool meets the appropriate

NRC guidelines and the ANSI standards

(GDC 62, NUREG–0800, Section 9.1.2,

the ‘‘OT Position for Review and

Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and

Handling Applications,’’ Regulatory

Guide 1.13, and ANSI ANS 8.17). The

criticality analysis for the Mixed Zone

Three Region and/or checkerboard

configuration confirms that the Keff is

maintained less than 0.95 without credit

for the soluble boron in the Spent Fuel

Pool. Calculations show that for the

most severe accident condition, a

soluble boron concentration of 500 ppm

boron, in addition to the Boral

contained in the racks, would be

adequate to maintain the Keff less than

0.95. In accordance with NRC

guidelines, the soluble boron in the

Spent Fuel Pool may be credited in

accident conditions. A minimum boron

concentration of 2000 parts-per-million

(ppm) is maintained in the Spent Fuel

Pool. The soluble boron in the Spent

Fuel Pool will ensure that Keff is

maintained substantially less than the

design limitations under all conditions.

The margin of safety for subcriticality is

maintained by having the neutron

multiplication factor equal to, or less

than, 0.95 under all accident conditions,

including uncertainties. This criterion is

the same as that used previously to

establish criticality safety evaluation

acceptance and remains satisfied for all

analyzed accidents.

The thermal-hydraulic and cooling

evaluation of the pool demonstrated that

the pool can be maintained below the

specified thermal limits under the

conditions of the maximum heat load

and during all credible accident

sequences and seismic events. The bulk

pool temperature will not exceed 207°F

during the worst single failure of a
37604 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 133 / Monday, July 13, 1998 / Notices

cooling pump. Localized pool boiling is

predicted to occur in the worst single

failure of a cooling pump in the

hypothetical worst case storage cell,

immediately following the completion

of a full-core discharge. This cell is very

conservatively modeled to contain the

hottest spent fuel assembly, with

maximum flow resistance including

50% blockage of both the inlet and

outlet flow areas. However, bulk pool

boiling will not occur, nor will fuel

cladding experience DNB [departure

from nucleate boiling] or excessive

thermal stresses. The fuel will not

undergo any significant heat up after an

accidental drop of a fuel assembly on

top of the rack blocking the flow path.

A loss of cooling to the pool will allow

sufficient time (2 hours) for the

operators to intervene and line up

alternate cooling paths and the means of

inventory make-up before the onset of

pool boiling. Therefore the allowed

operator action time remains unchanged

from the previous design bases. In the

unlikely event that all pool cooling is

lost coincident with the completion of

a full-core discharge, sufficient time will

still be available subsequent to the

proposed changes for the operators to

provide an alternate means of cooling

before the onset of bulk pool boiling.

Therefore, the accepted margin of safety

remains the same.

Thus, it is concluded that the changes

do not involve a significant reduction in

the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s analysis and, based on this

review, it appears that the three

standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff

proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public

comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received

within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be

considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not

issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period.

However, should circumstances change

during the notice period such that

failure to act in a timely way would

result, for example, in derating or

shutdown of the facility, the

Commission may issue the license

amendment before the expiration of the

30-day notice period, provided that its

final determination is that the

amendment involves no significant

hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public

and State comments received. Should

the Commission take this action, it will

publish in the Federal Register a notice

of issuance and provide for opportunity

for a hearing after issuance. The

Commission expects that the need to

take this action will occur very

infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted

by mail to the Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of

Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, and should cite the publication

date and page number of this Federal

Register notice. Written comments may

also be delivered to Room 6D59, Two

White Flint North, 11545 Rockville

Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30

a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Copies of written comments received

may be examined at the NRC Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and

petitions for leave to intervene is

discussed below.

By August 12, 1998, the licensee may

file a request for a hearing with respect

to issuance of the amendment to the

subject facility operating license and

any person whose interest may be

affected by this proceeding and who

wishes to participate as a party in the

proceeding must file a written request

for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a

petition for leave to intervene shall be

filed in accordance with the

Commission’s ‘‘Rules of Practice for

Domestic Licensing Proceedings’’ in 10

CFR Part 2. Interested persons should

consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714

which is available at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the Emporia

State University, William Allen White

Library, 1200 Commercial Street,

Emporia, Kansas 66801 and Washburn

University School of Law Library,

Topeka, Kansas 66621. If a request for

a hearing or petition for leave to

intervene is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or

petition; and the Secretary or the

designated Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board will issue a notice of hearing or

an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) the nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, a petitioner shall file a

supplement to the petition to intervene

which must include a list of the

contentions which are sought to be

litigated in the matter. Each contention

must consist of a specific statement of

the issue of law or fact to be raised or

controverted. In addition, the petitioner

shall provide a brief explanation of the

bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert

opinion which support the contention

and on which the petitioner intends to

rely in proving the contention at the

hearing. The petitioner must also

provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the

petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish

those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

must provide sufficient information to

show that a genuine dispute exists with

the applicant on a material issue of law

or fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 133 / Monday, July 13, 1998 / Notices 37605

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, by the above date. A

copy of the petition should also be sent

to the Office of the General Counsel,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and to Jay

Silberg, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and

Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20037, attorney for the

licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

The Commission hereby provides

notice that this is a proceeding on an

application for a license amendment

falling within the scope of Section 134

of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982

(NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 10154. Under

Section 134 of the NWPA, the

Commission, at the request of any party

to the proceeding, must use hybrid

hearing procedures with respect to ‘‘any

matter which the Commission

determines to be in controversy among

the parties.’’ The hybrid procedures in

Section 134 provide for oral argument

on matters in controversy, preceded by

discovery under the Commission’s

rules, and the designation, following

argument, of only those factual issues

that involve a genuine and substantial

dispute, together with any remaining

questions of law, to be resolved in an

adjudicatory hearing. Actual

adjudicatory hearings are to be held on

only those issues found to meet the

criteria of Section 134 and set for

hearing after oral argument.

The Commission’s rules

implementing Section 134 of the NWPA

are found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K,

‘‘Hybrid Hearing Procedures for

Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear

Power Reactors’’ (published at 50 FR

41670, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR

2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any

party to the proceeding may invoke the

hybrid hearing procedures by filing with

the presiding officer a written request

for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109.

To be timely, the request must be filed

within 10 days of an order granting a

request for hearing or petition to

intervene. (As outlined above, the

Commission’s rules in 10 CFR Part 2,

Subpart G, and 2.714 in particular,

continue to govern the filing of requests

for a hearing or petitions to intervene,

as well as the admission of contentions.)

The presiding officer shall grant a

timely request for oral argument. The

presiding officer may grant an untimely

request for oral argument only upon

showing of good cause by the requesting

party for the failure to file on time and

after providing the other parties an

opportunity to respond to the untimely

request. If the presiding officer grants a

request for oral argument, any hearing

held on the application shall be

conducted in accordance with the

hybrid hearing procedures. In essence,

those procedures limit the time

available for discovery and require that

an oral argument be held to determine

whether any contentions must be

resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no

party to the proceedings requests oral

argument, or if all untimely requests for

oral argument are denied, then the usual

procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G,

apply.

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated March 20, 1998, as

supplemented by letter dated May 28,

1998, which is available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

and at the local public document room

located at the Emporia State University,

William Allen White Library, 1200

Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas

66801 and Washburn University School

of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 66621.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day

of July 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Kristine M. Thomas,

Project Manager, Project Directorate IV–2,

Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–18544 Filed 7–10–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–271]

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power

Corporation, Vermont Yankee Nuclear

Power Station; Receipt of Petition for

Director’s Decision Under 10 CFR

2.206

Notice is hereby given that by Petition

dated May 27, 1998, Mr. Jonathan M.

Block, on behalf of the Citizens

Awareness Network, Inc. (CAN or

Petitioner), requested that the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

take immediate action with regard to the

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station.

The Petitioner requested that the NRC

take immediate enforcement action by

suspending the operating license for

Vermont Yankee until the entire facility

has been subjected to an independent

safety analysis review similar to the one

conducted at the Maine Yankee Atomic

Power Station. As an alternative, the

Petitioner requested that the NRC

immediately act to modify the operating

license for the facility by requiring that,

before restart (1) Vermont Yankee

management certify under oath that all

backup safety systems and all security

systems are fully operable, and that all

safety systems and security systems

meet and comply with NRC

requirements; (2) Vermont Yankee be

held to compliance with all of the

restart criteria and protocols in the NRC

Inspection Manual; (3) Vermont Yankee

only be allowed to resume operations

after the NRC has conducted a ‘‘vertical

slice’’ examination of the degree to

which the new design-basis documents

(DBDs) and FSAR accurately describe at

least two of the primary safety systems

for the Vermont Yankee reactor; (4) once

operation resumes, Vermont Yankee

only be allowed to continue operation

for as long as it adheres to its schedule

for coming into compliance and

completing the DBD and FSAR project;

and (5) the NRC holds a public hearing

before restart to discuss the changes to

the torus, Vermont Yankee DBD and

FSAR projects, and Vermont Yankee’s

scheduled completion of these projects

in relation to operational safety.

As the basis for this request, the

Petitioner raised concerns about the

operation of the Vermont Yankee