alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                5


<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                  JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                          1,657
<SECURITIES>                    18,875
<RECEIVABLES>                   0
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                22,107
<PP&E>                          2,500
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  24,607
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           0
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        605,840
<OTHER-SE>                      (288,706)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    24,607
<SALES>                         0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                0
<CGS>                           0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   10,240
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (10,237)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (10,237)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (10,237)
<EPS-BASIC>                   (.00)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (.00)



</TABLE>
<PAGE>
                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                      EMERSON RADIO CORP. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                              EXHIBIT TO FORM 10-K
                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT




<Table>
<Caption>
                                        JURISDICTION OF        PERCENTAGE OF
NAME OF SUBSIDIARY                       INCORPORATION           OWNERSHIP
------------------                  ----------------------   -----------------
<S>                                 <C>                      <C>
EMERSON RADIO (HONG KONG) LIMITED                HONG KONG               100.0%*
EMERSON RADIO INTERNATIONAL LTD     BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS               100.0%
SPORT SUPPLY GROUP, INC                           DELAWARE                53.2%
</Table>



* One share is owned by a resident director, pursuant to local law.
# C_2013207EN.01005301.xml

| 20.7.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 207/53 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.7.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 207/53

---

Action brought on 24 May 2013 — Husky CZ/OHIM — Husky of Tostock (HUSKY)

(Case T-287/13)

2013/C 207/87

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Husky CZ s.r.o. (Prague, Czech Republic) (represented by: L. Lorenc, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Husky of Tostock Ltd (Woodbridge, United Kingdom)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the contested decision of OHIM’s First Board of Appeal of 14 March 2013; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the contested decision of OHIM’s First Board of Appeal of 14 March 2013;

| — | Order OHIM and Husky of Tostock Limited to pay all costs and expenses. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order OHIM and Husky of Tostock Limited to pay all costs and expenses.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Registered Community trade mark in respect of which an application for revocation has been made: The word mark ‘HUSKY’ for goods in classes 3, 9, 14, 16, 18 and 25 — Community trade mark No 152 546

Registered Community trade mark in respect of which an application for revocation has been made:

Proprietor of the Community trade mark: The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Proprietor of the Community trade mark:

Party applying for revocation of the Community trade mark: The applicant

Party applying for revocation of the Community trade mark:

Decision of the Cancellation Division: Partially revoked the Community trade mark registration

Decision of the Cancellation Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissed the appeal

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 51(1)(a) of Council Regulation No 207/2009.

Pleas in law:

---
No. 10-1395.

#### United Air Lines, Inc., Petitioner v. Constance Hughes.

565 U.S. 818, 132 S. Ct. 103,

181 L. Ed. 2d 30,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 6627.

October 3, 2011.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 634 F.3d 391.
FAA -;ZOIO~011iJ

Contacts. Wrth whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed?

Organization PersonContacted

National Business Aircraft Association Eli Cotti

Regional Airline Association

Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association

AT.'\.

Da\"e Lottcrer

Rohert Hackman

Craig Fabian

Date Response
No. 11-5563.

#### Nina Shahin, Petitioner v. Delaware, et al.

565 U.S. 807, 132 S. Ct. 386,

181 L. Ed. 2d 8,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 6584.

October 3, 2011.

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed. See Rule 39.8.
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3105 

To establish an annual fee applicable to opioid manufacturers. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 5, 2019 

Ms. BONAMICI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To establish an annual fee applicable to opioid 

manufacturers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Opioid Treatment 

5 Surge Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ANNUAL FEE. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—For each of the 10 calendar years 

8 immediately proceeding the date of enactment of this Act, 

9 the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall assess 

10 a fee against each prescription drug manufacturer that, 

11 at any time during the period beginning on January 1, 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3105 IH

1 1999, and ending on the calendar year immediately pre2 ceding the year in which the fee is assessed, manufactured 

3 any opioid drug (other than a drug described in subsection 

4 (b)). Such fee, with respect to such a manufacturer, shall 

5 be in an amount, as determined by such Secretary, that 

6 bears the same relationship to $2,000,000,000 as the mar7 ket share of any such opioid drugs manufactured by such 

8 manufacturer during the period for which the fee is being 

9 assessed bears to the total market for opioid drugs (ex10 cluding such drugs described in subsection (b)) during 

11 such period. 

12 (b) EXCEPTIONS.—The fee described in subsection 

13 (a) shall not apply with respect to any opioid drug used 

14 exclusively for the treatment of— 

15 (1) opioid addiction, as part of a medically as16 sisted treatment effort; or 

17 (2) cancer or hospice patients. 

18 (c) TRANSFERS TO BLOCK GRANT PROGRAMS.—For 

19 each year that the Secretary of Health and Human Serv20 ices assesses fees under subsection (a), the Secretary of 

21 the Treasury shall transfer from the general fund of the 

22 Treasury to the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

23 an amount equal to the amount of such fees, for purposes 

24 of carrying out the substance abuse prevention and treat25 ment block grant under subpart II of part B of title XIX 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3105 IH

1 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300x–21 et 

2 seq.). 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

STEVEN TOGNOLI, as Personal Representative for the Estate of LYNDA

TOGNOLI
, Appellant,

v.

PHILIP MORRIS USA INC.
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 16

- 224

[ April 25, 2018 ]

Appeal and cross

- appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; John J. Murphy III , Judge; L.T. Case

No s

. 08

- 80000 (19) and 2008

- CV

- 045898 (19)

.

Thomas J. Seider, Celene H. Humphries and Maegen Peek Luka of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa; Alex Alvarez of The Alvarez Law Firm, Coral Gables; Randy Rosenblum of Dolan, Dobrinsky, Rosenblum, LLP, Miami; Philip Freidin of Freidin Brown P.A., Miami; and Maria P. Sperando of the Law Office of Maria P. Sperando, P.A., Stuart, for appellant.

Scott D. Kai ser of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Kansas City, Missouri; and Geoffrey J. Michael of Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC, for appellee.

ON REMAND FROM

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

P ER C URIAM

.

This matter is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of Florida. In a decision rendered June 28, 2017, we per curiam affirmed the trial court’s final judgment, which reduced the plaintiff’s damages by the percentage of fault that the jury attributed to Mrs. Tognoli, based on

our then

- binding precedent in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Schoeff , 178 So. 3d 487, 488 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). The Florida Supreme Court then quashed our Schoeff decision and held that “the comparative fault statute does not apply to Engle progeny cases in which the jury finds for2 the plaintiff on the intentional tort claims.” Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co ., 232 So. 3d 294, 304 (Fla. 2017). Consequently, o ur decision in the instant case was also quashed.

The parties do not assert issues with the jury’s findings of intentional torts and have agreed on the remedy that we likewise deem proper. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand with instru ctions for the trial court to enter judgment for the entire amount of damages found by the jury.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

D AMOORGIAN
, C IKLIN and L EVINE
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely file d motion for rehearing.
##### 



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63
OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE
  1.
    
    The Quarterly Report Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 on Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period ended June 30, 2006 fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Quarterly Report Under Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on Form 10-Q for the Quarterly Period ended June 30, 2006
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Electric City Corp. and its subsidiaries.
 /s/ David R. AsplundDavid R. AsplundChief Executive OfficerAugust 14, 2006
 - 37 -
#### *State, Respondent, v. Torrescano-Hernandez, Petitioner,*

No. 91690-0.

Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, No. 70546-6-1, March 9, 2015, 186 Wn. App. 1016. *Denied*September 30, 2015.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-11425

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SERGIO OSORIO-SANCHEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:01-CR-197-2-L

--------------------

June 19, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sergio Osorio-Sanchez appeals the sentence imposed following

his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United States

after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. OsorioSanchez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2) define separate offenses. He argues that the

aggravated felony conviction that resulted in his increased

sentence is an element of the offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)

that should have been alleged in his indictment. Osorio-Sanchez

maintains that he pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged
No. 01-11425

-2-

only simple reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues that his

sentence exceeds the two-year maximum term of imprisonment which

may be imposed for that offense. 

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Osorio-Sanchez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1202 (2001). This court

must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court

itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of

the district court is AFFIRMED.

In lieu of filing an appellee’s brief, the Government has

filed a motion asking this court to dismiss this appeal or, in

the alternative, to summarily affirm the district court’s

judgment. The Government’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. The

motion for a summary affirmance is GRANTED. The Government need

not file an appellee’s brief. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED; MOTION FOR SUMMARY

AFFIRMANCE GRANTED.
EXHIBIT 31.1

             CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                    SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a-14(a)

      I, Dr. John J. McGrath, certify that:

      1. I have reviewed this quarterly report of EVCI Career Colleges Holding
Corp.;

      2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

      3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

      4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

            (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

            (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

            (c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially effect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

      5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

            (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

            (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting.



Date: May 12, 2005                  /s/ Dr. John J. McGrath
                                    -----------------------
                                    Name:  Dr. John J. McGrath
                                    Title: Chief Executive Officer and President
# C_2016454EN.01000701.xml

| 5.12.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 454/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.12.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 454/7

---

Order of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 13 September 2016 — Raffinerie Heide GmbH v European Commission

(Case C-564/14 P) (1)

((Appeal - Environment - Directive 2003/87/EC - Article 10a - Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading - Transitional rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances from 2013 - Decision 2011/278/EU - National implementation measures submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany - Rejection of the registration of certain installations on the lists of installations receiving free allocations of emission allowances - Provision relating to cases of ‘undue hardship’ - Implementing powers of the Commission))

(2016/C 454/14)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Raffinerie Heide GmbH (represented by: U. Karpenstein and C. Eckart, Rechtsanwälte)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: C. Hermes, E. White and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents)

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The appeal is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The appeal is dismissed.

| 2. | Raffinerie Heide GmbH is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Raffinerie Heide GmbH is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

---

(1)  OJ C 33, 2.2.2015.

---
No. 10-10604.

#### Jin Rie, Petitioner v. Superior Court of California, San Bernardino County, et al.

565 U.S. 841, 132 S. Ct. 153,

181 L. Ed. 2d 69,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 5937.

October 3, 2011.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, denied.
#### RCI Plumbing Corp., Respondent, v Turner Towers Tenant Corp., Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[58 NYS3d 923]—

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract and to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, the defendant Turner Towers Tenant Corp. appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.), dated July 1, 2015, as, in effect, denied those branches of its motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (4), and (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff’s contention that the defendant Turner Towers Tenant Corp. (hereinafter the defendant) is not aggrieved by the order appealed from is without merit *(see Matter of Stateway Plaza Shopping Ctr. v Assessor of City of Watertown,*87 AD3d 1359, 1360 [2011]; *Scharlack v Richmond Mem. Hosp.,*127 AD2d 580, 581 [1987]; *cf. Alberi v Rossi,*117 AD2d 574 [1986]).

Pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), a defendant may move to dismiss a cause of action on the ground that “there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States; the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires” (CPLR 3211 [a] [4]). The Supreme Court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed on the ground that there is another action pending *(see Morgan Barrington Fin. Servs., Inc. v Nahzi,*85 AD3d 1135 [2011]). Under the circumstances of this case, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and joining this action with a previously commenced action for discovery and trial *(see Viafax Corp. v Citicorp Leasing, Inc.,*54 AD3d 846 [2008]; *Gutman v Klein,*26 AD3d 464 [2006]; *Reckson Assoc. Realty Corp. v Blasland, Bouck & Lee,*230 AD2d 723 [1996]; *Stewart-Scott Constr. Corp. v Schaefer Brewing Co.,*41 AD2d 788 [1973]).

The Supreme Court also correctly concluded that the complaint sufficiently stated causes of action to recover on an account stated and to recover damages in quantum meruit and for unjust enrichment so as to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) (see *Environmental Appraisers*
      *724
      *& Bldrs., LLC v Imhof,*143 AD3d 756 [2016]; *AHA Sales, Inc. v Creative Bath Prods., Inc.,*58 AD3d 6, 19 [2008]). Moreover, the documentary evidence submitted by the defendant in support of its motion did not utterly refute the complaint’s factual allegations and conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law *(see*CPLR 3211 [a] [1]; *Vertical Progression, Inc. v Canyon Johnson Urban Funds,*126 AD3d 784, 786-787 [2015]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendant’s motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (4), and (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Mastro, J.P., Hall, Austin and Barros, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-1083
EULA DANCE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ELIZABETH CITY-PASQUOTANK BOARD OF EDUCATION; JOSEPH W. PEEL, Doctor; CLEVELAND HAWKINS, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 96-1287
EULA DANCE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ELIZABETH CITY-PASQUOTANK BOARD OF EDUCATION; JOSEPH W. PEEL, Doctor; CLEVELAND HAWKINS, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge. (CA-94-44-2-H2) Submitted: July 23, 1996 Decided: July 30, 199623 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Eula Dance, Appellant Pro Se. John David Leidy, HORNTHAL, RILEY, ELLIS & MALAND, Elizabeth City, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:Appellant appeals from the district court's orders denying relief on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) complaint and granting in part the Appellees' motion for costs. We have reviewed the record andthe district court's opinions and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Dance v. Elizabeth City-Pasquotank Bd. of Educ. , No. CA-94-44-2-H2 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 6, 1995; Feb. 5, 1996). We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
McGladrey & Pullen
                           Casper, Wyoming


Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C. 20549

Gentlemen:

We were previously the independent accountants for EMC Energies, Inc. and on
September 26, 1990 we reported on the financial statements of EMC Energies,
Inc. as of and for the years ended June 30, 1990 and 1989. We have not
preformed any audit services for EMC Energies, Inc. since 1990. On November
29, 1999, we were notified that other auditors were engaged as independent
accountants of EMC Energies, Inc. for 1998 and 1999. We have read EMC
Energies, Inc's statements included under Item 8 of its Form 10-KSB for June
30, 1998 and we agree with such statements.


Casper, Wyoming
December 3, 1999