THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Interest of Kevin R., A Juvenile Under the Age of 

Seventeen, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2012-212655 

Appeal From Richland County 

The Honorable Robert E. Newton, Family Court Judge 

The Honorable Gwendlyne Y. Smalls, Family Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27430 

Heard April 16, 2014 – Filed August 6, 2014 

AFFIRMED 

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of South 

Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, 

for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein, Nichols, Thompson & 

Delgado, L.L.C., of Columbia; John D. Elliott, of Law 

Offices of John D. Elliott, P.A., of Columbia; and Bert G. 

Utsey, III, of Peters, Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth & 

Detrick, P.A., of Walterboro; for Amici Curiae, South 

Carolina Association for Justice, South Carolina 

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Lawyers 
 

Committee for Children's Rights. 

JUSTICE BEATTY: In a juvenile petition, the State charged Kevin R. 

("Appellant") with possessing a weapon on school grounds in violation of section 

16-23-430 of the South Carolina Code.1

 Prior to his adjudicatory hearing before a 

family court judge, Appellant moved for a jury trial on the ground the United 

States Constitution2

 and the South Carolina Constitution3 guaranteed him the right 

to a jury trial. The judge denied the motion and proceeded to hear Appellant's case 

in a bench trial. Ultimately, the judge adjudicated Appellant delinquent and 

deferred sentencing until an evaluation of Appellant was completed. The 

sentencing hearing was conducted before a second family court judge, who 

sentenced Appellant to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his twenty1

 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-430(A) (Supp. 2013) ("It shall be unlawful for any 

person, except state, county, or municipal law enforcement officers or personnel 

authorized by school officials, to carry on his person, while on any elementary or 

secondary school property, a knife, with a blade over two inches long, a blackjack, 

a metal pipe or pole, firearms, or any other type of weapon, device, or object which 

may be used to inflict bodily injury or death."). 

2

 U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district 

wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 

previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 

accusations; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel 

for his defense."); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or 

naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 

of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 

enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 

protection of the laws."). 

3

 S.C. Const. art. I, § 14 ("The right of trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate. 

Any person charged with an offense shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 

trial by an impartial jury; to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the 

accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 

process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to be fully heard in his defense by 

himself or by his counsel or by both." (emphasis added)). 
 

first birthday. The judge then suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on 

probation until his eighteenth birthday. 

On appeal, Appellant contends the family court judge erred in denying his 

motion for a jury trial. Recently, this Court held a juvenile does not have a 

constitutional right to a jury trial in adjudication proceedings. In re Stephen W., 

Op. No. 27413 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 16, 2014) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 28 at 

29). ("Stephen W."). However, our decision in that case is not dispositive as we 

have now been presented with additional arguments raised by Appellant and the 

Amici Curiae. After consideration of these issues, we adhere to our decision in 

Stephen W. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the family court. 

I. Factual / Procedural History 

On October 4, 2011, Richland County Deputy Milton Clark, the school 

resource officer at Olympia Learning Center, received a call from an employee of 

the school. Based on this call, Deputy Clark removed Appellant, a sixteen-yearold student at the school, from a classroom and took him to a secure area to 

question him regarding his alleged possession of a weapon. Appellant admitted 

that he had a pocketknife in his sock. Deputy Clark then searched Appellant and 

found a pocketknife with a three-inch retractable blade. 

On October 24, 2011, Deputy Clark filed a juvenile petition in Richland 

County family court, alleging Appellant was a delinquent for carrying a weapon on 

school grounds. The Honorable Robert E. Newton held an adjudicatory hearing on 

July 24, 2012. At the beginning of the hearing, Appellant's counsel moved for a 

jury trial on the ground Appellant was entitled to have a jury adjudicate his case 

based on the federal and state constitutions. Judge Newton denied Appellant's 

motion and proceeded with the bench trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge 

Newton adjudicated Appellant to be delinquent for possessing a weapon on school 

grounds. Because Appellant was currently being evaluated at the Midlands 

Evaluation Center, Judge Newton delayed sentencing until the evaluation was 

completed. 

On August 1, 2012, the Honorable Gwendlyne Y. Smalls held a hearing and 

ultimately sentenced Appellant to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his 

twenty-first birthday. She then suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on 

probation, subject to certain conditions, until his eighteenth birthday. Appellant 

appealed to the Court of Appeals. This Court certified the case pursuant to Rule 

204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. 
 

II. Discussion 

A. Arguments 

1. Appellant 

Appellant contends section 63-3-590 of the South Carolina Code,4

 which 

provides in part that "[a]ll cases of children must be dealt with as separate hearings 

by the court and without a jury," violates the clear mandate of the South Carolina 

Constitution that "any person" charged with an "offense" shall be entitled to a jury 

trial. In support of this contention, Appellant asserts a juvenile is guaranteed the 

right to a jury trial because (1) a "child" is a "person" as defined throughout the 

 

4

 Section 63-3-590 provides in full: 

All cases of children must be dealt with as separate hearings by the 

court and without a jury. The hearings must be conducted in a formal 

manner and may be adjourned from time to time. The general public 

must be excluded and only persons the judge finds to have a direct 

interest in the case or in the work of the court may be admitted. The 

presence of the child in court may be waived by the court at any stage 

of the proceedings. Hearings may be held at any time or place within 

the county designated by the judge. In any case where the 

delinquency proceedings may result in commitment to an institution 

in which the child's freedom is curtailed, the privilege against selfincrimination and the right of cross-examination must be preserved. 

In all cases where required by law, the child must be accorded all 

rights enjoyed by adults, and where not required by law the child must 

be accorded adult rights consistent with the best interests of the child. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-590 (2010) (emphasis added); see Rule 9(a), SCRFC ("All 

hearings in the family courts shall be conducted by the court without a jury. 

Hearings shall be conducted in a judicial atmosphere, with the judge wearing a 

black judicial robe."). 
 

 

 

 

 

South Carolina Code,5 and (2) a juvenile petition charges a child with an 

"offense."6 

As to the United States Constitution, Appellant acknowledges the United 

States Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 

(1971), in which a plurality of the Court determined that juveniles are not 

constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in adjudication proceedings. However, 

Appellant challenges the propriety of McKeiver because "[i]n the forty years since 

McKeiver, the purposes and consequences of delinquency proceedings have 

changed." Specifically, Appellant asserts the South Carolina juvenile justice 

system is now much like the adult criminal justice system as the focus is 

punishment of the juvenile offender rather than rehabilitation. For example, 

Appellant notes that juveniles, who are adjudicated delinquent for enumerated sex 

offenses, must register for life as sex offenders.7

 Thus, Appellant maintains that 

5 See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 63-1-40(1) (2010) (generally defining "child" as a 

"person under the age of eighteen" in the context of the South Carolina Children's 

Code); id. § 63-19-20(1) (defining "child" or "juvenile" to mean "a person less than 

seventeen years of age" in the context of the South Carolina Juvenile Justice 

Code). 

6 See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-360(4) (2010) (providing for juvenile 

detention services for "juveniles charged with having committed a criminal offense 

who are found, after a detention screening or detention hearing, to require 

detention or placement outside the home pending an adjudication of delinquency or 

dispositional hearing"); id. § 63-19-810(B)(1) (requiring officer who takes a child 

into custody for violating a criminal law or ordinance to include in his or her report 

"the facts of the offense"). 

7 See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(A) (2007) (stating, in part, "Any person, 

regardless of age, residing in the State of South Carolina who in this State has 

been convicted of, adjudicated delinquent for, pled guilty or nolo contendere to an 

offense described below, or who has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent, pled 

guilty or nolo contendere, or found not guilty by reason of insanity in any 

comparable court in the United States, or a foreign country, or who has been 

convicted, adjudicated delinquent, pled guilty or nolo contendere, or found not 

guilty by reason of insanity in the United States federal courts of a similar offense, 

or who has been convicted of, adjudicated delinquent for, pled guilty or nolo 

contendere, or found not guilty by reason of insanity to an offense for which the 

person was required to register in the state where the conviction or plea occurred, 

shall be required to register pursuant to the provisions of this article" (emphasis 
 

 

"[l]ittle distinguishes delinquency proceedings from criminal prosecutions except 

the absence of a jury." 

2. Amici Curiae 

An amicus brief was filed on behalf of the South Carolina Association for 

Justice, the South Carolina Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the 

Lawyers Committee for Children's Rights. In this brief, the Amici Curiae reiterate 

Appellant's arguments that a juvenile should be "allowed to demand" a trial by jury 

in family court because: (1) a juvenile was entitled to a jury trial at the time of the 

adoption of the South Carolina Constitution in 1868;8

 and (2) a "child" is a 

"person" as defined throughout the South Carolina Code and a juvenile petition 

charges a child with an "offense." 

The Amici Curiae supplement Appellant's arguments with policy 

considerations that were raised during the oral argument of Stephen W. Initially, 

they contend the availability of a trial by jury for a juvenile will "result in more 

reliable verdicts" because there are several deficiencies in family court bench trials. 

Specifically, they claim juvenile adjudications are not always accurate or reliable 

because a family court judge, who is the sole fact-finder, may: (1) be inclined to 

find guilt due to his or her "professional bias" that "fault must be found and the 

youngster punished"; (2) apply an erroneous legal standard in determining whether 

an offense was committed; and (3) reach "erroneous conclusions based on 

insufficient evidence." Given the significant collateral consequences a juvenile 

faces as the result of an adjudication of guilt, they maintain a jury trial is necessary 

to ensure accuracy in fact-finding and to create a complete record for appellate 

review. 

Although the Amici Curiae concede there would need to be certain 

procedural and logistical changes to accommodate a juvenile's request for a jury 

trial, they assert these changes are not insurmountable as evidenced by the states 

added)); id. § 23-3-490(D)(1) (Supp. 2013) (providing for public disclosure of the 

identity of juvenile offenders who have been adjudicated delinquent for 

enumerated sex offenses).

8 See Verenes v. Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 15, 690 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2010) ("The right 

to trial by jury is guaranteed in every case in which the right to a jury was secured 

at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1868." (quoting Mims Amusement 

Co. v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 366 S.C. 141, 149, 621 S.E.2d 344, 348 

(2005))). 
 

 

 

 

that currently provide jury trials for adjudication proceedings.9 For several 

reasons, they believe South Carolina family courts could join these jurisdictions 

with minimal disruption to the state's court system. They contend there would be 

few jury trials conducted as contested adjudications occur infrequently. In 

addition, they state the venue for conducting these trials "should be relatively 

simple" as the family court in each judicial circuit has access to a courtroom, either 

in circuit court or magistrate's court, which contains a jury box. Finally, they posit 

that assembling a venire for jury selection would not be difficult as the clerks of 

court throughout the state routinely summon jurors for jury duty in Common Pleas 

or General Sessions. Thus, jurors could be selected from these jury pools to serve 

on family court jury trials. 

B. Analysis 

1. Implication of In the Interest of Stephen W. 

Recently, this Court held that neither the federal nor the state constitution 

requires a jury trial in juvenile adjudication proceedings. In re Stephen W., Op. 

No. 27413 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 16, 2014) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 28 at 29). 

As noted in Stephen W., the United States Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver 

definitively resolves Appellant's argument with respect to the federal constitution. 

Id. at 31. Moreover, "[m]ost jurisdictions that have dealt with the issue of the 

continued viability of McKeiver have determined that it is still settled law; that is, 

jury trials in juvenile proceedings may be provided if a State chooses to do so, but 

it is not a mandated right required by concerns of fundamental fairness under the 

Federal Constitution." In the Interest of A. C., 43 A.3d 454, 461 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 

2012) (emphasis added). See generally B. Finberg, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial 

in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 100 A.L.R.2d 1241, § 2[a] (1965 & Supp. 

2014) (collecting state and federal cases discussing whether a juvenile is entitled to 

a jury trial in juvenile court proceedings; recognizing that "the individual charged 

with being a delinquent has no right, under the pertinent state or federal 

constitution, to demand that the issue of his delinquency be determined by a jury"). 

9

 A minority of states have enacted statutes that provide jury trials for juvenile 

adjudication proceedings. See Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 119, § 55A (2010); Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 712A.17(2) (2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-1502(1) (2011); N.M. 

Stat. Ann. § 32A-2-16(A) (2011); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10A, § 2-2-401 (2011); Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 54.03(c) (2009); W. Va. Code § 49-5-6 (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 14-6-223(c) (2011) (amended on Mar. 10, 2014 regarding juror selection). 
Furthermore, as analyzed in Stephen W., the General Assembly has created a 

system for juveniles that is distinctly different from adult offenders based on the 

premise that "South Carolina, as parens patriae, protects and safeguards the 

welfare of its children." Harris v. Harris, 307 S.C. 351, 353, 415 S.E.2d 391, 393 

(1992); see State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144 (2007) (noting state's 

continued recognition of parens patriae in juvenile proceedings). The continued 

recognition of the parens patriae doctrine distinguishes South Carolina from those 

jurisdictions that have found a juvenile is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. 

For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that juveniles have a 

constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile offender proceedings. In the Matter of 

L. M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008). In so ruling, the court premised its analysis by 

stating that "the Kansas Legislature has significantly changed the language of the 

Kansas Juvenile Offender Code (KJOC)." Id. at 168. Specifically, the court noted 

these changes negated the rehabilitative purpose set forth in the KJOC, replaced 

nonpunitive terminology with criminal terminology similar to the adult criminal 

code, aligned the sentencing provisions with the adult sentencing guidelines, and 

removed "the protections that the McKeiver Court relied on to distinguish juvenile 

systems from the adult criminal systems." Id. The court explained that "[t]hese 

changes to the juvenile justice system have eroded the benevolent parens patriae 

character that distinguished it from the adult criminal system." Id. at 170. Unlike 

Kansas, South Carolina has retained the doctrine of parens patriae in juvenile 

proceedings. Thus, Appellant's reliance on In the Matter of L. M. is misplaced. 

Moreover, the collateral consequences claimed by Appellant do not entitle a 

juvenile to a jury trial as the General Assembly has specifically stated that 

adjudication is not the equivalent of a conviction. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-

1410(C) (2010) ("No adjudication by the court of the status of a child is a 

conviction, nor does the adjudication operate to impose civil disabilities ordinarily 

resulting from conviction, nor may a child be charged with crime or convicted in a 

court, except as provided in Section 63-19-1210(6). The disposition made of a 

child or any evidence given in court does not disqualify the child in a future civil 

service application or appointment." (emphasis added)). 

Additionally, any assertion that juveniles should be entitled to a jury trial 

because they are subject to registering as a sex offender if they are adjudicated 

delinquent for certain sex offenses is without merit as our appellate courts have 

held that registering as a sex offender is a civil, non-punitive consequence. See In 

re Justin B., 405 S.C. 391, 747 S.E.2d 774 (2013) (affirming juvenile's guilty plea 

in family court for criminal sexual conduct with a minor, first degree and 
 

concluding imposition of lifetime electronic monitoring was a civil obligation and 

not a punishment), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1496 (2014); In re Ronnie A., 355 S.C. 

407, 585 S.E.2d 311 (2003) (holding requirement that a juvenile, who is 

adjudicated delinquent for committing criminal sexual conduct with a minor, first 

degree, to register as a sex offender is non-punitive and does not violate due 

process).10 Accordingly, we reaffirm the analysis in Stephen W. that addressed the 

issues raised by Appellant in the instant case. 

Our decision in Stephen W., however, is not dispositive as we have now 

been presented with arguments raised by the Amici Curiae. Initially, we are not 

persuaded by the assertions of the Amici Curiae regarding the lack of reliability in 

family court juvenile proceedings and the changes that would be needed to 

accommodate jury trials in family court. Significantly, they offer no objective 

evidence that family court bench trials in juvenile proceedings are somehow less 

reliable than other family court proceedings or proceedings conducted as bench 

trials in the circuit or probate courts. In all of these contexts, a judge presides as 

the sole fact-finder regarding cases that implicate a person's liberty interest. See, 

e.g., S.C. Code § 43-35-45(E) (Supp. 2013) (outlining procedure for family court's 

determination that someone qualifies as a "vulnerable adult"); id. § 44-17-580(A) 

(outlining procedure for probate court's determination regarding a person's 

involuntary commitment to a mental health facility).11 Thus, in the absence of any 

10 Although the issue is not before the Court, we note the inconsistent positions of 

the General Assembly to limit the negative civil parameters of adjudication 

proceedings but permit the consequences of an adjudication to continue for the 

lifetime of one who is adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses. If this state retains 

the doctrine of parens patriae in juvenile proceedings, then the consequences of 

these proceedings should expire when the individual reaches the age of twenty-one 

years old. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1410(A)(5) (2010) (providing that 

commitment "must be for an indeterminate period but in no event beyond the 

child's twenty-first birthday"). 

11 Some proceedings in probate court may be tried before a jury; however, these 

cases are extremely limited. See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-306(a) (Supp. 2013) ("If 

duly demanded, a party is entitled to trial by jury in any proceeding involving an 

issue of fact in an action for the recovery of money only or of specific real or 

personal property, unless waived as provided in the rules of civil procedure for the 

courts of this State. The right to trial by jury exists in, but is not limited to, formal 

proceedings in favor of the probate of a will or contesting the probate of a will."). 
 

fundamental distinction,12 we discern no basis on which to find that a jury trial is 

warranted in juvenile proceedings. 

Moreover, judges are presumed impartial and if a juvenile believes a family 

court judge has "professional bias," the juvenile may move to recuse that particular 

judge. See Patel v. Patel, 359 S.C. 515, 524, 599 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2004) ("It is not 

sufficient for a party seeking disqualification to simply allege bias; the party must 

show some evidence of bias or prejudice."); Reading v. Ball, 291 S.C. 492, 494, 

354 S.E.2d 397, 398 (Ct. App. 1987) ("When no evidence is presented other than 

claimed 'adverse' rulings by the judge, the judge is not required to recuse 

himself."); see also Canon 3(B)(5) of Rule 501, SCACR ("A judge shall perform 

judicial duties without bias or prejudice."). 

Furthermore, a juvenile who objects to the adjudication procedure or ruling 

has several avenues of recourse as he or she may file an appeal, an application for 

post-conviction relief, or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See S.C. Code 

Ann. § 63-3-640 (2010) ("Post conviction proceedings, including habeas corpus 

actions, shall be instituted in the court in which the original action was concluded; 

provided, however, that the family courts shall also have original jurisdiction of 

habeas corpus actions if the person who is the subject of the action would 

otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the family court."); id. § 63-3-650 ("Any 

judge shall have the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to produce any person 

under the age of seventeen in court where necessary."). 

As to the changes that would be necessary to implement a juvenile's right to 

a jury trial, the Amici Curiae oversimplify what would be required. They contend 

jurors for a family court trial could be selected from a jury pool that has been 

summoned for the Court of Common Pleas or the Court of General Sessions. This 

procedure would defeat the General Assembly's intent to keep juvenile proceedings 

separate and distinct from adult proceedings. It would also create an inefficient 

and overlapping system where a circuit court judge qualifies a jury panel and then 

jurors are selected before a family court judge to serve on a juvenile case. 

Additionally, this procedure would result in increased expenditures for counties as 

more jurors would need to be compensated and staff employed. 

12 Arguably, the difference in the burdens of proof in the proceedings, i.e., beyond 

a reasonable doubt versus clear and convincing, constitutes a fundamental 

distinction. However, this distinction is not dispositive as bench trials are routinely 

conducted in the Court of General Sessions where the burden of proof is beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 
 

 

 

Based on the foregoing, we hold that Appellant has not met his burden to 

prove that section 63-3-590 violates either the federal or state constitution.13 See 

43 C.J.S. Infants § 134 (Supp. 2014) ("Although a jury trial in a juvenile 

delinquency proceeding may not be a federal nor a state constitutional requisite, in 

the adjudicative stage of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding, if, in its 

wisdom, any state feels that a jury trial is desirable, there is no impediment to its 

installing a system embracing that feature, but such is the State's privilege and not 

its obligation."). Consequently, we adhere to our decision in Stephen W. 

2. Constitutional Concerns Beyond Adjudication Proceedings 

While we find a decision to affirm the family court is correct as Appellant's 

arguments are confined to challenging a juvenile's inability to request a jury trial in 

adjudication proceedings, we recognize a state constitutional conundrum. Under 

the plain terms of our state constitution, a juvenile charged with a criminal offense 

has an absolute right to a jury trial. Although the General Assembly may prohibit 

a juvenile from exercising this right in juvenile adjudications, it cannot 

legislatively eliminate the right in its entirety. 

As the law currently stands, the General Assembly has authorized only the 

State and the family court to initiate the transfer of a juvenile into a court where the 

case could be tried by a jury. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1210(4)-(10) (2010) 

(providing circumstances transferring jurisdiction of a juvenile from family court 

to a "court which would have trial jurisdiction of the offenses if committed by an 

adult" based on determination by family court either on its own decision or 

following the State's request); 21 S.C. Jur. Children & Families § 102 (Supp. 

2014) (discussing circumstances involving "transfer of a juvenile to adult court"). 

This procedure is arguably unconstitutional as a juvenile should be able to 

affirmatively exercise the right to have a jury trial if charged with an offense for 

which the family court could waive jurisdiction. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d Juvenile 

Courts § 94 (Supp. 2014) ("There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in 

13 See State v. Ross, 185 S.C. 472, 477, 194 S.E. 439, 441 (1937) ("A court should 

not declare a statute unconstitutional unless its invalidity is manifest beyond a 

reasonable doubt, and the burden to show its unconstitutionality rests upon the one 

making the attack. It does not require citation of authorities to sustain this 

proposition, for our court has so often announced this principle, in cases which it 

has been called upon to decide the question of the constitutionality of certain 

statutes, that this principle has become axiomatic."). 
juvenile delinquency proceedings and such right is purely statutory. Some 

authority, though, holds that a juvenile has a state constitutional right to a jury trial, 

or that a juvenile has a right to a jury trial if accused of an act which would be a 

crime if committed by an adult." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)).14 

Without question, the South Carolina Children's Code and its adjudication 

procedure emanate from the State's power and responsibility as parens patriae. 

The State's status as parens patriae is substantial and should not be easily 

dismissed. Concomitant with this status is the responsibility not to arbitrarily 

abandon it without articulable good cause. Given the significance of abdicating 

this role, this Court has adopted factors for a family court to evaluate before 

transferring a juvenile's case to the Court of General Sessions.15 Nonetheless, the 

 

14 Although a juvenile may not initiate the waiver of jurisdiction, we note that he 

or she may appeal the waiver order or consent to the transfer. See State v. Rice, 

401 S.C. 330, 737 S.E.2d 485 (2013) (affirming juvenile's plea of guilty in general 

sessions court and finding that juvenile, by pleading guilty, waived any 

constitutional challenge to the family court waiver of jurisdiction); State v. Lamb, 

374 S.C. 346, 649 S.E.2d 486 (2007) (affirming juvenile's conviction for murder 

and concluding court of general sessions had subject matter jurisdiction to try 

juvenile after the family court accepted juvenile's consent to transfer jurisdiction). 

However, these procedures do not equate to an absolute right to affirmatively 

request a jury trial. 

15 This Court has stated that "[u]pon a motion to transfer jurisdiction, the family 

court must determine if it is in the best interest of both the child and the 

community before granting the transfer request." State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 

558, 647 S.E.2d 144, 160 (2007). "The family court must consider eight factors, as 

approved by the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 

541 (1966), in making this determination." Id. at 558-59, 647 S.E.2d at 160. The 

factors are: 

(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense. 

(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, 

violent, premeditated, or willful manner. 

(3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against 

property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons 

especially if personal injury resulted. 
 

State's status as parens patriae cannot supplant a juvenile's immutable state 

constitutional rights. 

The apparent tension between the State's power as parens patriae and a 

juvenile's state constitutional right to a jury trial must be reconciled. 

Reconciliation is found by recognizing that the two are not mutually exclusive and 

that they are in fact dual tracks for handling juvenile transgressions. Although a 

juvenile is not entitled to a jury trial in an adjudication proceeding, the juvenile 

should be permitted to remove his case from the family court to a court of 

competent jurisdiction where a jury trial may be conducted. However, when this 

election is made, the juvenile forfeits the benevolent treatment of the parens 

patriae adjudication proceeding. 

III. Conclusion 

After consideration of the issues raised by Appellant and the Amici Curiae, 

we adhere to our decision in Stephen W. Accordingly, we affirm the family court's 

denial of Appellant's motion for a jury trial in his adjudication proceedings. 

(4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint. 

(5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one 

court. 

(6) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by 

consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude 

and pattern of living. 

(7) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous 

contacts with law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other 

jurisdictions, prior periods of probation, or prior commitments to 

juvenile institutions. 

(8) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the 

likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to 

have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, 

services and facilities currently available. 

Id. at 559, 647 S.E.2d at 160. 

 

AFFIRMED. 

HEARN, J., concurs. TOAL, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part in a separate opinion. PLEICONES, J., concurring in part and dissenting 

in part in a separate opinion in which KITTREDGE, J., concurs. 
 

CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: I join the well-reasoned lead opinion as to 

Sections I; II(A)(1); II(A)(2); II(B)(1); and III. I decline to join Section II(B)(2) of 

the lead opinion and dissent therefrom. 
 

JUSTICE PLEICONES: I concur in part and dissent in part. First, I agree that 

our decision in Stephen W,

16 is dispositive of the only issue properly before this 

Court: whether a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial in a family court delinquency 

proceeding. To the extent that the majority addresses matters raised only by the 

amicus curiae, I dissent. See Rule 213 SCACR. I also disagree with any 

suggestion that a juvenile's "immutable right to a jury trial" requires the Court sua 

sponte create a right allowing the juvenile to waive his case from family court to 

general sessions. The purported "constitutional conundrum" results from the 

equation of a juvenile delinquency petition with a criminal charge, a 

misunderstanding that is wholly at odds with our analysis in Stephen W. Further, 

were this new procedure indeed constitutionally mandated, then I do not 

understand why we would not remand this appeal to allow Appellant the 

opportunity to exercise his right to a jury trial in general sessions. 

In my opinion, this case is controlled in its entirety by Stephen W. Accordingly, I 

respectfully dissent from any discussion beyond the issue raised by the Appellant, 

and would hold only that the family court order should be affirmed. 

KITTREDGE, J., concurs. 

16 In re Stephen W., Op. No. 27413 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 16, 2014).