Filed 7/12/21 R.I. v. Superior Court CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying 

on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). 

This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 

8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

R.I.,

Petitioner;

v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES et. 

al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

B309756

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

18CCJP03928

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS IN MANDATE; petition for 

extraordinary writ. Martha A. Matthews, Judge. Petition denied. 

Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers; Law Office of Thomas 

Hayes, Dominika Campbell and Charlie Chin for Petitioner.

Law Office of Amir Pichvai and Amir Pichvai for Real Party 

in Interest Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services.

Children’s Law Center, CLCLA2 and Stacey Hendrix for

Real Parties in Interest R.I., Jr., I.I., and B.I. 

No appearance for Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

In his petition for extraordinary writ, petitioner R.I. 

(father) argues the juvenile court erred by: (1) denying his 

request for a continuance of the twelve-month status review 

hearing concerning his three sons, R.I., Jr., I.I. and B.I., to hold a 

hearing under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden); 

and (2) terminating his reunification services and setting a 

permanency planning hearing for each of his children under 

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. As discussed 

below, we disagree with his contentions and deny the petition. 

BACKGROUND

Father and A.N. (mother)2 have three children together: 

R.I., Jr. (R.I.), I.I., and B.I. When this case was initiated in May 

2018, R.I. was six years old, I.I. was five years old, and B.I. was 

two months old. 

In May 2018, the Department of Children and Family

Services (Department) received a referral alleging the children 

were being neglected by their parents. The reporting party stated 

she had heard from her neighbors that the family was homeless 

and sleeping in their car. They had parked the car in front of her 

apartment building for the last 10 months to one year. She 

related “‘the family spends all day parked in the parking lot of 

her building[,]’” both parents “‘drink and smoke marijuana daily 

while caring for the children[,]’” and the “‘parents do not tend to 

the children.’”

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code. 

2 Mother is not a party to the petition.
3

In August or September 2018, father was arrested and 

charged with stealing a vehicle. Father denied the allegations 

leading to his arrest. 

In September 2018, the juvenile court sustained an 

amended petition filed under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) by 

the Department on the children’s behalf, and as to which the 

parents had pled no contest. In so doing, the juvenile court found 

true the Department’s allegations that the children were at risk 

of harm due to the parents’ marijuana use, “which renders [them] 

incapable of providing the children with regular care and 

supervision[,]” and their “failure . . . to seek out appropriate 

medical and educational related services for the children[.]” The 

children were released to their parents under Department 

supervision. Father’s court-ordered case plan required him to 

participate in weekly drug testing when released from custody, 

parenting classes, family preservation services, and individual 

counseling.

During the first six-month review period, father did not 

participate in court-ordered services while in custody, as 

educational programs were not available to him. He was released 

from custody on bond on December 25, 2018, and informed the 

Department of his release on January 9, 2019. A little over a 

week later, a Department social worker gave father a copy of his 

court-ordered case plan, reviewed the plan with him, and 

provided him with referrals for all required services. He was 

given another copy of his case plan and further referrals on 

February 7, 2019. On February 15, 2019, he enrolled in a 

substance abuse treatment program. Four days later, however, 

his bond was revoked and father was reincarcerated.
4

At the six-month review hearing held under section 364 in 

March 2019, the juvenile court found continued jurisdiction was 

necessary and the parents’ case plans remained necessary and 

appropriate. It therefore ordered the Department to provide 

further family maintenance services. 

In June 2019, the Department filed a supplemental petition 

under section 387 on behalf of all three children, alleging their 

prior placement was ineffective for their protection. Specifically, 

the petition alleged the children were at risk of serious physical 

harm due to: (1) mother’s failure to comply with her case plan 

and failure to ensure they received necessary medical, mental 

health, and Regional Center services; and (2) father’s failure to 

comply with his case plan. 

At the adjudication hearing on the supplemental petition 

held on July 16, 2019, the petition was amended by interlineation

and, among other revisions, the allegations pertaining to father 

were stricken. The parents pled no contest to the amended 

petition, which the juvenile court sustained. The juvenile court 

removed all three children from father, who was granted 

reunification services. While the juvenile court removed R.I. and 

I.I. from mother, B.I. was returned to her care under Department 

supervision. Father’s court-ordered case plan required him to 

participate in weekly drug testing upon his release from custody, 

a parenting class for special needs children, and individual 

counseling. Father was also granted monitored visitation, which 

was to be initiated when he was released from custody. 

On July 23, 2019, father was sentenced to 16 years in state 

prison for second degree robbery. His anticipated release is 

sometime in 2031, which is when he will be eligible for parole. 

Father was originally housed in North Kern County State Prison 
5

located in Delano. Sometime between October 2019 and January 

2020, he was transferred to California State Prison, Sacramento

located in Represa.

In October 2019, the Department filed a second 

supplemental petition under section 387 solely on B.I.’s behalf. 

The petition alleged B.I.’s previous disposition was ineffective for 

his protection, as mother continued to abuse marijuana, which 

“render[ed] [her] incapable of providing [him] with regular care 

and supervision[,]” and failed to submit to drug testing or enroll 

in a substance abuse treatment program as required by her 

court-ordered case plan. The petition further alleged that a week 

before it was filed, mother left B.I. with his maternal 

grandmother at her home without making proper arrangements 

for his care and supervision, and had yet to resume caring for 

him. 

The second supplemental petition was adjudicated in 

January 2020. There, the juvenile court sustained the second 

supplemental petition as pled, removed B.I. from both parents, 

and ordered the Department to provide reunification services to 

both parents.

On the same date it addressed the second supplemental 

petition, the juvenile court also held the six-month review 

hearing pertaining to R.I. and I.I., as required under section 

366.21, subdivision (e). It found continued jurisdiction was 

necessary, and that the parents had not made substantial 

progress in addressing the circumstances necessitating their two 

oldest children’s placement in foster care. It granted the parents 

reunification services for an additional six months. 

On September 21, 2020, the juvenile court held the twelvemonth review hearing for R.I. and I.I. as required under section 
6

366.21, subdivision (f), and the six-month review hearing for B.I., 

as required under section 366.21, subdivision (e).3 At the 

beginning of the hearing, however, the court acknowledged the 

Department filed its status review report late. Father’s counsel 

requested a continuance of 30-45 days in order to review the 

report with father and proceed accordingly. The juvenile court 

granted the request and continued the hearing to November 3, 

2020. 

At the November 3, 2020 twelve-month review hearing for 

all three children under section 366.21, subdivision (f), father’s 

counsel asked for another continuance, as the notice of hearing 

was sent to an incorrect address for father. Given the 

Department’s recommendation to terminate father’s reunification 

services as to all three children, the court granted the request for 

a continuance and reset the hearing for December 18, 2020. 

On December 18, 2020, the Department submitted a last 

minute information (LMI) to the court after father did not call in

to the hearing by phone despite arrangements having been made 

to do so. In the LMI, the Department social worker noted she 

spoke to a counselor at father’s correctional facility, who had 

frequent contact with him. The counselor related that when he

spoke to father about the December 18, 2020 hearing on 

December 3, 2020, “father stated that he did not want to 

participate unless he was able to hire his own private attorney 

prior to the hearing taking place. He stated that he had a bad 

experience with his [c]ourt appointed attorney, and did not feel 

3 The review hearings were initially set for July 20, 2020. In 

May 2020, however, the juvenile court continued the hearings to 

September 21, 2020 due to concerns over the COVID-19 

pandemic and the state of emergency declared by the Governor. 
7

comfortable proceeding with the attorney that had been assigned 

to him.” The counselor reported that when he followed up with 

father about a week later, “father stated that he had not made 

any progress with hiring his own attorney, and still did not plan 

to participate in the hearing if he was not able to do so in time.” 

Shortly thereafter, the counselor “confirmed father had refused to 

call in to participate in the hearing[.]” 

Subsequently, at the December 18, 2020 hearing, father’s 

counsel requested a third continuance on the grounds that: (1) 

father did not sign a written waiver of appearance for the 

hearing; and (2) the information in the LMI “might warrant a 

Marsden hearing,” which required father to be present. The 

juvenile court denied the request and proceeded with the review 

hearing. Ultimately, after hearing argument, the court 

terminated family reunification services for both parents and set 

a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 for all three 

children.

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of Request for Continuance to Conduct 

Marsden Hearing 

Pursuant to section 352, subdivision (a), the juvenile court

“may continue any hearing . . . beyond the time limit within 

which the hearing is otherwise required to be held[.]”

“Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good 

cause,” and if it would not be “contrary to the interest of the 

minor.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) “We review the denial of a 

continuance for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]” (In re Giovanni F. 

(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 605.) 
8

Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

denying his counsel’s request to continue the December 18, 2020 

hearing to hold a Marsden hearing, as both requirements of 

section 352, subdivision (a) were met in this case. Specifically, he 

contends: (1) his entitlement to a Marsden hearing constituted

good cause for a continuance; and (2) granting a continuance 

would not have been contrary to the children’s interest because

“the path to permanency desired for the children by the 

Department was only in the beginning stages, as a search was 

still to be initiated to find an adoptive home.” 

As discussed below, we conclude father did not establish 

good cause for a continuance as required under section 352

because, on the record in this case, the juvenile court was not

required to conduct a Marsden hearing. Consequently, we 

conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to 

grant a continuance.

“The legal principles governing a Marsden motion are well

settled. ‘“When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed 

counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate 

representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to 

explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances 

of the attorney’s inadequate performance. [Citation.] . . . .” 

[Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Lara (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 

139, 150.) A Marsden hearing is only required, however, “when 

[the] defendant requests substitution of appointed counsel[,]” and 

“‘when the defendant asserts directly or by implication that his 

counsel’s performance has been so inadequate as to deny him his 

constitutional right to effective counsel.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 

150-151.) These principles have been applied in juvenile 

dependency proceedings. (See In re V.V. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 
9

392, 398; see also In re James S. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 930, 935, 

fn. 13; In re Z.N. (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 282, 289.) 

Father contends the juvenile court was required to conduct 

a Marsden hearing based on the information in the Department’s 

December 18, 2020 LMI. As noted above, the LMI stated that on 

December 3, 2020, father told a counselor at his correctional 

facility “that he did not want to participate [in the December 18, 

2020 hearing] unless he was able to hire his own private attorney 

prior to the hearing taking place[,]” as “he had a bad experience 

with his [c]ourt appointed attorney, and did not feel comfortable 

proceeding with the attorney that had been assigned to him.” A 

week later, father informed his counselor that “he had not made 

any progress with hiring his own attorney, and still did not plan 

to participate in the hearing if he was not able to do so in time.” 

Father’s remarks to the counselor at his correctional 

facility were insufficient to trigger the juvenile court’s duty to 

hold a Marsden hearing. While father vaguely referred to having 

a “bad experience” with his court-appointed attorney, he did not 

provide, and the record does not otherwise contain, any 

information suggesting his discomfort with his attorney stemmed 

from concerns about the adequacy or effectiveness of his 

appointed counsel’s representation. Nor did father express any 

desire for the juvenile court to appoint new counsel to represent 

him. Instead, his comments to his counselor unequivocally 

demonstrated he desired to retain private counsel. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude father did not establish entitlement

to a Marsden hearing. (See People v. Lara, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 150-151.) Accordingly, father failed to demonstrate good 

cause for a continuance under section 352, and the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by denying his request to continue the 
10

December 18, 2020 hearing to hold a Marsden hearing.

4 (See In re 

Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 604 [discerning “no 

error” where father’s “request [for a continuance to hold a 

Marsden hearing] was based on [his] attempt to retain a new 

attorney, not on an assertion that his appointed counsel’s 

performance was inadequate. [Citation.]”].) Father did not need a 

Marsden hearing to hire private counsel. He was always free to 

do so.

II. Provision of Reasonable Reunification Services 

Father contends the juvenile court erred by terminating his 

reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing 

under section 366.26. Specifically, he argues the record lacks

substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that the 

Department offered and/or provided him reasonable reunification 

services while he was incarcerated. In support, father asserts the

Department did not make reasonable efforts to contact him

throughout the reunification period. 

When a parent has been granted reunification services, 

“[t]he [D]epartment must make a ‘“‘good faith effort’”’ to provide 

reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each 

family. [Citations.]” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 

4 Because we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying the request for a continuance based on 

father’s failure to show good cause as required under section 352, 

subdivision (a)(2), we need not consider his arguments regarding 

whether a continuance would have been against the children’s 

interest under section 352, subdivision (a)(1), or whether the 

juvenile court’s denial of the request was harmless.
11

Cal.App.4th 996, 1010 (Mark N.).) “The effort must be made to 

provide reasonable reunification services in spite of difficulties in 

doing so or the prospects of success. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1011.)

In general, “[s]ervices will be found reasonable if the Department 

has ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered 

services designed to remedy those problems, maintained 

reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the 

service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in 

areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re 

Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972-973.) Where a parent is 

incarcerated during the reunification period, “the [D]epartment 

should, at a minimum, . . . contact[ ] the relevant institutions to 

determine whether there [is] any way to make services available 

to the [parent]. [Citations.]” (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1013.) 

“The [juvenile] court’s finding reasonable reunification 

services had been offered or provided to the [parent] is subject to 

review for substantial evidence. [Citations.] We must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the [D]epartment and 

indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the 

order. [Citation.]” (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010.) 

Under this standard, “[w]hen two or more inferences can 

reasonably be deduced from the facts, we are without power to 

substitute our own deductions for those of the trial court.” (In re 

Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 598.) 

Father contends the Department’s “sparse contact” with 

him and his place of incarceration “f[ell] short of a good faith 

effort” to maintain reasonable contact with him during the 

reunification period. In considering his argument, we are mindful 

that “[i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could 
12

have been provided more frequently and that the services 

provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the 

services provided were the best that might be provided in an 

ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the 

circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) 

As set forth below, the record reflects that under the

circumstances in this case, the juvenile court could properly find 

the Department made reasonable efforts to provide father 

reunification services. Consequently, the challenged finding is 

supported by substantial evidence. 

Father was incarcerated during the entire reunification 

period, which began on July 16, 2019. Initially, he was housed at

North County Correctional Facility in Saugus. On July 23, 2019,

however, father was sentenced to 16 years in state prison. So far 

as we can tell, for all but one week of the reunification period, 

father was housed in state prison facilities located outside of Los 

Angeles County. As noted above, between July and October 2019, 

he was housed at North Kern County State Prison. Sometime 

between October 2019 and January 2020, he was transferred to 

California State Prison, Sacramento.

The Department social worker assigned to this case

contacted father by letter on September 26 and October 25, 2019.

The record does not reflect father responded to either of these 

letters. Subsequently, on December 17 and December 23, 2019, 

the social worker contacted the Education Based Incentives 

program to gather information regarding whether father was 

participating in services while he was incarcerated. The social 

worker, however, did not receive any responses to her inquiries. 

On February 2, 2020 and May 6, 2020, the social worker 

again contacted father by letter at his place of incarceration. 
13

Once more, the record does not indicate father responded to 

either letter. Then, on June 18, June 24, and June 30, 2020, the 

social worker contacted the Education Based Incentives program 

to ascertain whether father was participating in services while 

incarcerated. Once more, the social worker did not receive any 

responses to her inquiries. 

In August 2020, the children’s maternal grandmother 

informed the Department that father had been having positive 

phone visits with the children on the weekends for the last four to 

five months. Toward the end of July 2020, however, she reported 

she began “having issues with father speaking negatively 

about . . . her and mother to the children[,]” and told him to stop 

calling “if he could not stop bad mouthing them.” In response, the 

Department stated it would “attempt to set up calls between 

father” and the children through his older sons’ foster mother to 

facilitate further phone visits.

On December 2, 2020, the social worker scheduled a phone 

interview to speak with father to discuss his progress in 

participating in services while incarcerated. Father, however,

refused to take the phone call. Shortly thereafter, the social 

worker contacted father’s counselor at the correctional facility to 

inquire about his progress in services. The counselor responded 

that he was unable to disclose the information requested, as he 

did not have father’s consent to do so. Moreover, on several other 

occasions in December 2020, the social worker contacted the staff 

at father’s correctional facility to ensure they had the 

arrangements in place for father to appear telephonically at the 

December 18, 2020 hearing, and to confirm whether he intended 

to participate.
14

On this record, and considering the circumstances 

presented in this case, we conclude the juvenile court could 

reasonably find the Department made reasonable efforts to 

contact father and his place of incarceration to ascertain whether 

services were available to him. The juvenile court could also 

properly find the Department offered reasonable reunification 

services by taking steps to facilitate phone visits through the 

older children’s foster mother after their maternal grandmother 

no longer wanted to monitor the visits, and by ensuring father 

could appear telephonically at the December 18, 2020 hearing. 

Accordingly, the record contains substantial evidence to support 

the court’s finding that the Department offered reasonable 

reunification services to father and made reasonable efforts to 

maintain contact with him during the reunification period. 
15

DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. The 

temporary stay of the section 366.26 hearing is vacated. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, J. 

We concur: 

MANELLA, P.J. 

WILLHITE, J.