2014 IL App (2d) 140071 

No. 2-14-0071 

Opinion filed November 6, 2014 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

) of Du Page County. 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 13-MR-958 

) 

JOHN E. ZARUBA, as Sheriff of Du Page ) 

County, ) Honorable 

) Terence M. Sheen, 

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Birkett and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Better Government Association (BGA), appeals from the dismissal of its 

complaint seeking production of certain records from defendant, John E. Zaruba, as sheriff of Du 

Page County (the sheriff), pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et 

seq. (West 2012)). Specifically, BGA requested records disclosing the vehicles and persons 

who were the subjects of Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) inquiries conducted 

by Patrick Zaruba, the sheriff’s teenage son. The trial court concluded that this information was 

exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(a) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2012)) and 

that a FOIA response to BGA’s inquiries was not possible. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.
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¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On June 28, 2012, BGA filed in the circuit court of Cook County its verified complaint 

for declaratory and injunctive relief against the sheriff. The case was subsequently transferred 

to the circuit court of Du Page County on the sheriff’s motion. 

¶ 4 BGA alleged that on May 29, 2012, it submitted FOIA requests to the sheriff, seeking the 

following: 

“1) Copies of any and all documents relating to Patrick Zaruba’s access to 

LEADS or other law enforcement databases. (Examples of such documents are Patrick 

Zaruba’s LEADS application and other supporting materials.) 

2) Copies of documents sufficient to show the names of any and all persons who 

because of their affiliation with the Du Page County Sheriff’s office have become 

certified to use LEADS even though they’re not sheriff’s office employees, from Jan. 1, 

2010, to present. (Examples of such persons are interns, Explorer scouts and ride-along 

participants.) 

3) Copies of documents sufficient to show any and all written communication 

between the Illinois State Police and the Du Page County Sheriff’s office relating to 

LEADS and/or Patrick Zaruba, from May 21, 2012, to present. (Examples of such 

communication include emails and letters.)” 

On May 31, 2012, BGA submitted another FOIA request for “[c]opies of documents sufficient to 

show the vehicles and persons that were the subjects of LEADS inquiries conducted by Patrick 

Zaruba, from November 2010 to present.” 

¶ 5 On June 4, 2012, the sheriff responded as follows to BGA’s requests: 
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“I am unable to supply any information that is responsive to your Freedom of 

Information request. LEADS is a system controlled by [the] Illinois State Police. You 

would need to contact them for information/confirmation of any certified user. You will 

also need to contact ISP for documentation of what persons/vehicles were the subjects of 

inquires [sic] made by any certified user. As for written communication between ISP 

and the Du Page County Sheriff’s Office related to LEADS and or Patrick Zaruba from 

5/21/12 to 5/29/12, I do not have information responsive to that request.” 

¶ 6 According to the complaint, in violation of section 9 of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/9 (West 

2012)), the sheriff’s response failed to state any statutory basis for denying the first, second, and 

fourth categories of requests; identify any FOIA exemption; include a detailed factual basis for 

the application of any exemption; or inform BGA of its rights to judicial review and review by 

the Public Access Counselor. BGA alleged that it contacted the sheriff’s FOIA officer 

regarding these purported deficiencies in the sheriff’s response, but was told that the sheriff

declined to revisit his position. In count I, BGA sought a declaration of its right to the 

requested documents, a declaration that the sheriff’s actions were willful, intentional, and done in 

bad faith, and an award of civil penalties. BGA sought injunctive relief in count II. 

¶ 7 On October 2, 2013, the sheriff filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 

section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 

2012)). The sheriff argued that he was “not able to legally comply” with BGA’s requests, 

invoking section 7(1)(a) of the FOIA, which exempts public bodies from producing 

“[i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and 

regulations implementing federal or State law.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2012). The sheriff

represented that, in addition to his June 4, 2012, response to BGA’s requests, on July 19, 2012, 
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an assistant State’s Attorney had forwarded to BGA copies of (1) an agreement dated March 3, 

2008, between the Illinois Department of State Police (Department) and the Du Page County 

sheriff’s office regarding LEADS access (the Agreement) and (2) Patrick’s certificate of 

completion for a course entitled “LEADS Less Than Full Access.” Although neither the 

Agreement nor the certificate is included in the record on appeal, the sheriff represented in his 

motion to dismiss that section VI of the Agreement provided: 

“All data supplied through LEADS is strictly forbidden to be used for personal reasons. 

It is strictly forbidden to sell any information obtained to any individuals, organization, 

government agency or corporation. It is strictly forbidden to disseminate any 

information obtained through LEADS to any individual organization that is not legally 

authorized to have access to that information.” 

The sheriff insisted that he would breach the Agreement if he were to provide the requested 

records to BGA. Moreover, he argued that disclosure was prohibited by the Department’s

regulations, which are codified in the Illinois Administrative Code and provide that “LEADS data 

shall not be disseminated to any individual or organization that is not legally authorized to have 

access to the information” (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.80(d) (1999)) and that a violation may result in 

suspension of LEADS service (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.110 (1999)). The sheriff supported his 

motion with the affidavit of Darlene A. Jacobs, the LEADS statewide coordinator for the 

Department. She asserted that the information BGA requested, “should it exist,” could not be 

released by the sheriff in light of the Administrative Code and the Agreement. 

¶ 8 In its response to the motion, BGA argued that none of the requests sought either 

information “obtained through LEADS” or “LEADS data” so as to implicate the Agreement or 

the Administrative Code. BGA noted that the regulations define “LEADS data” as “all data 
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available through the LEADS computer” (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.30(b)(3) (1999)), emphasizing

that it was “seeking requests made by Patrick to the LEADS system, not personal information or 

data obtained from the LEADS system.” (Emphases in original.) Accordingly, BGA 

attempted to distinguish between the results of Patrick’s searches, which it recognized would 

constitute “LEADS data,” and the subjects of Patrick’s LEADS inquiries, which it argued would 

not. Additionally, BGA argued that the Agreement was not a basis for an exemption under 

section 7(1)(a) of the FOIA, because the Agreement was neither a law nor a rule or regulation 

implementing the law. Moreover, BGA argued, the Agreement and the Administrative Code 

did not specifically prohibit the sheriff from disclosing public records relating to unauthorized 

LEADS inquiries. In BGA’s words, “[t]he Sheriff cannot hide behind agreements or 

administrative regulations designed to prevent unauthorized access to the LEADS system in 

order to conceal such unauthorized access.” (Emphases in original.) 

¶ 9 In his reply brief in support of the motion to dismiss, the sheriff apparently abandoned his 

argument premised on the Agreement, but continued to insist that he properly withheld “LEADS 

data” as that term is used in the regulations. He submitted a second affidavit from Jacobs, in 

which she asserted the following:

“That on November 22, 2010, Patrick Zaruba successfully completed the course 

entitled ‘LEADS Less Than Full Access’ through the [Department’s] Learning 

Management System (LMS). As a result of his completion of this course, Patrick 

Zaruba was LEADS operator certified and authorized to access LEADS through 

November 22, 2012. 

That in order to inquire on a person through the LEADS system, the LEADS 

operator will submit inquiry identifiers of last name, first name, middle initial, sex, and 
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date of birth and/or their driver’s license number into the LEADS System. Once this 

information is submitted into the LEADS system it is LEADS data and part of the 

complete LEADS record maintained by the Illinois State Police.

That through LEADS 2000, the Illinois State Police can only identify a device 

accessing the LEADS system by its assigned Call Directing Code (CDC) and not the 

unique identifiers of a certified user accessing the system.

That the Illinois Administrative Code Title 20, Part 1240.80 prohibits the 

dissemination of LEADS data to any individual and/or organization that is not legally 

authorized to have access to the information and the Better Government Association is 

not legally authorized to receive LEADS data.” 

Accordingly, the sheriff argued, “the Illinois State Police does not distinguish between 

information input into the LEADS system and any other information contained in the system.” 

(Emphasis in original.) The sheriff insisted that he could not provide the requested information 

to BGA without “intentionally violating the Illinois Administrative Code and thereby subjecting 

[himself] to a potential suspension of all or a portion of LEADS services.” 

¶ 10 The sheriff also contended that Jacobs’ affidavit demonstrated that “the Illinois State 

Police is not able to confirm what, if any, inquiries were made by Patrick Zaruba,” because “the 

Illinois State Police can only identify what device the request comes from and not who is using 

the device.” Finally, the sheriff emphasized that there was no evidence that Patrick had used 

the LEADS system, let alone for an improper purpose, noting that the Department had not 

restricted Patrick’s access to the system or suspended the sheriff’s office’s use of the system due 

to any violation. 
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¶ 11 On December 18, 2013, the parties appeared before the court for its ruling on the motion 

to dismiss. During the brief hearing, BGA suggested that there was a question of fact as to 

whether any of the records responsive to the FOIA requests qualified as “LEADS data.” It also 

argued that, because Jacobs averred in her second affidavit that the LEADS system could not 

link specific inquiries to Patrick, BGA did not seek information “available through the LEADS 

computer.” Therefore, BGA argued, it was entitled to discovery to determine whether there 

were any responsive records available from the sheriff rather than through the LEADS computer. 

¶ 12 In a written order, the court granted the sheriff’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the 

Administrative Code prohibited the sheriff from disseminating the requested information. The 

court reasoned that the “broad terms” of the regulations “indicate intent to limit all information 

in the LEADS system to people with the proper authorization.” Additionally, the court 

described as “a fallacy” BGA’s argument that Patrick’s input information was not “LEADS 

data.” The court noted that, according to Jacobs’ second affidavit, “once inquiry identifier 

information is submitted to LEADS, it is LEADS data and part of the complete LEADS record 

maintained by the Illinois State Police.” Furthermore, the court explained, interpreting 

“LEADS data” to include input information was consistent with the intent of the regulations, 

because the “expansive” definition of “LEADS data” is “not limited to data that can be drawn 

from the system about a particular subject,” but, instead, is “all data available through the 

LEADS computer.” The court added: “Assuming it is possible to query who Patrick Zaruba 

looked up in the system (which no evidence has been submitted to prove this is even possible), 

one would presumably need to obtain this information by going to a LEADS computer and 

accessing the system.” Accordingly, the court found that such information was “made available 

‘through the LEADS computer’ ” (quoting 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.30(b)(3) (1999)). 
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¶ 13 The court also addressed BGA’s argument that the court’s interpretation would lead to an 

absurd result. The court explained that, while it was “true that the regulation at issue was 

created, in part, to prevent use of the LEADS system for personal purposes,” there was “nothing 

to prevent the appropriate body, properly authorized to access the LEADS system, from 

investigating any alleged improper uses.” Under the court’s interpretation, “entities such as the 

BGA are not the proper organizations to undertake such an investigation because the 

investigation requires access to sensitive information to which the legislative body saw fit to 

restrict access.” Moreover, the court found that there was “no evidence to suggest that Patrick 

Zaruba utilized LEADS for an improper purpose,” so “it would be difficult to argue that denying 

BGA access to the requested records allows the [sheriff] to protect Patrick’s abusive practices by 

using anti-abuse regulations.” 

¶ 14 Finally, the court found that it was not possible for the sheriff to produce records 

reflecting Patrick’s LEADS inquiries: 

“One final salient point noted by the [sheriff] is that the information sought by 

BGA does not exist. *** According to Darlene Jacobs, the Illinois State Police can 

only use the LEADS system to identify a device accessing the LEADS system by its 

assigned Call Directing Code and not the unique identifies [sic] of a certified user 

accessing the system. *** That is, even if the applicable regulations did not operate to 

deny BGA’s access, the Illinois State Police would not be able to determine which 

inquiries, if any, were submitted by Patrick Zaruba. As such, a FOIA response to 

BGA’s inquiries is not possible.” 

¶ 15 BGA timely appeals. 

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 17 On appeal, BGA argues that only LEADS records maintained by the Department, not the 

sheriff’s public records, are exempt from disclosure. BGA also contends that the term “LEADS 

data,” as used in the Department’s regulations, encompasses only data available through the 

LEADS computer, not inquiries submitted to the LEADS computer. Additionally, BGA 

suggests that the trial court’s interpretation of the regulations had the absurd effect of allowing 

the state law designed to prevent abuse of the LEADS system to be used to shield such abuses 

from disclosure. Finally, BGA argues that the court erred in concluding, without allowing 

BGA to conduct discovery, that the requested records did not exist. 

¶ 18 At the outset, we note that BGA has specifically challenged on appeal the trial court’s 

ruling only as it relates to the request for “[c]opies of documents sufficient to show the vehicles 

and persons that were the subjects of LEADS inquiries conducted by Patrick Zaruba, from 

November 2010 to present.” Accordingly, we will not consider the propriety of the trial court’s 

order as it relates to any of BGA’s other FOIA requests. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 

2013) (points not argued in the appellant’s brief are forfeited). 

¶ 19 The purpose of the FOIA is “to open governmental records to the light of public scrutiny.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Watkins v. McCarthy, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632, ¶ 13. 

Under the FOIA public records are presumed to be open and accessible (Heinrich v. White, 2012 

IL App (2d) 110564, ¶ 8), and courts liberally construe the act to achieve the goal of “provid[ing] 

the public with easy access to government information” (Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois 

Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 416 (2006)). While “[t]he FOIA may not be used to 

violate individual privacy rights or disrupt the proper work of a governmental body beyond its 

responsibilities under the Act,” a public body “must comply with a valid request for information 

unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions set forth in section 7 of the FOIA applies.”
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Watkins, 2012 IL App (1st) 100632, ¶ 13. It is the public body’s burden to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the requested records fall within any claimed exemption. 5 ILCS 

140/11(f) (West 2012). The public body meets this burden by providing “a detailed justification 

for its claimed exemption, addressing the requested documents specifically and in a manner 

allowing for adequate adversary testing.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Day v. City of Chicago, 388 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74 (2009). 

¶ 20 This appeal requires us to interpret the term “LEADS data” as defined in section

1240.30(b)(3) of Title 20 of the Administrative Code. We interpret administrative regulations in 

the same manner that we would interpret a statute. Arellano v. Department of Human Services, 

402 Ill. App. 3d 665, 673 (2010). “[O]ur primary aim is to give effect to the drafters’ intent, and 

the best indicator of that intent is the regulations’ language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” 

Arellano, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 673. Construction of a regulation presents a question of law, 

which we review de novo. Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 22. De novo review 

is also appropriate because the trial court dismissed BGA’s complaint pursuant to section 

2-619(a)(9) of the Code. Nelson, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 22. “[A] section 2-619 motion admits the 

legal sufficiency of the claims but raises defects, defenses, or other affirmative matter, appearing 

on the face of the complaint or established by external submissions, that defeats the action.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lucas v. Prisoner Review Board, 2013 IL App (2d) 110698, 

¶ 13. In reviewing the trial court’s order, we consider the pleadings and the affidavits in the 

light most favorable to BGA, as the nonmoving party. Lucas, 2013 IL App (2d) 110698, ¶ 14. 

¶ 21 The sheriff relies exclusively on section 7(1)(a) of the FOIA, which exempts from 

disclosure “[i]nformation specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules 

and regulations implementing federal or State law.” 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2012). This 
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court has held that, even if a statute does not specifically provide that records are exempt from 

disclosure under the FOIA or otherwise contain an explicit prohibition against public disclosure,

records are nevertheless exempt “where the plain language contained in a State or federal statute 

reveals that public access to the records was not intended.” Kibort v. Westrom, 371 Ill. App. 3d 

247, 256 (2007). On the other hand, section 7(1)(a) does not apply “where a State or federal 

statute is ambiguous or silent in regard to the disclosure of public records.” Kibort, 371 Ill. App. 

3d at 256. 

¶ 22 LEADS is “a statewide, computerized telecommunications system designed to provide 

services, information, and capabilities to the law enforcement and criminal justice community in 

the State of Illinois.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.10(a) (1999). “To connect to LEADS, an agency 

must have computer hardware and computer software, and be connected to a communications link 

to the LEADS Data Center in Springfield.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.40(a) (1999). “The Director 

of the State Police (Director) is responsible for establishing policy, procedures, and regulations 

consistent with State and federal rules, policies, and law by which LEADS operates.” 20 Ill. 

Adm. Code 1240.10(b) (1999). 

¶ 23 The regulations contemplate either “ ‘[f]ull access’ ” or “ ‘[l]ess than full access’ ” to 

“LEADS data and services.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.30(b)(2), (b)(5) (1999). “LEADS data” is 

defined as “all data available through the LEADS computer” (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.30(b)(3) 

(1999)), and “LEADS services” refers to “A) providing access to LEADS files; B) processing 

messages through LEADS; C) providing training and technical support to LEADS users; and D) 

other LEADS-related services that may become available from the Department” (20 Ill. Adm. 

Code 1240.30(b)(4)(A)-(D) (1999)). In order to have full access, which is defined as “direct 

access to all LEADS data and services” (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.30(b)(2) (1999)), the candidate 
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organization must qualify under one of the subsections of section 1240.30(c)(1) and enter into a 

LEADS interagency agreement reflecting the rights and duties of the parties (20 Ill. Adm. Code 

1240.30(c)(1), (c)(2) (1999)). In contrast, less than full access refers to “limited access to some 

LEADS data and services.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.30(b)(5) (1999). LEADS agency personnel 

with either full access or less than full access must undergo mandatory LEADS-user certification 

administered by the Department. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.90(b)(1), (b)(2) (1999). 

¶ 24 Additionally, “[e]ach LEADS participating agency shall comply with the LEADS access 

security standards established by the Department.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.50(a) (1999). The 

regulations specify certain personnel-security requirements, including a “[t]horough background 

screening” for “terminal operators, programmers, and other persons employed or utilized to 

effectuate access to or initiate transmission of LEADS and National Crime Information Center 

(NCIC) information.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.50(b)(1) (1999). Persons who are not of good 

character or who have been convicted of a felony are not permitted LEADS access and may not 

provide maintenance or technical services at or near LEADS equipment. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 

1240.50(b)(2), (b)(3) (1999). The regulations provide that “LEADS operators shall use the 

terminal only for those purposes for which they are authorized” and that “[t]he individual 

receiving a request for criminal justice information must ensure the person requesting the 

information is authorized to receive the data.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.50(b)(4) (1999). 

Furthermore, “[e]ach LEADS agency must ensure that all LEADS computer devices are placed in 

a location under the direct control and supervision of authorized criminal justice personnel and are 

inaccessible to the public or persons not qualified to either operate, view, or possess LEADS 

and/or NCIC transmitted or received data.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.50(c) (1999). “The 

computer site and/or terminal area must have adequate physical security to protect against any 
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unauthorized personnel gaining access to the computer equipment or to any of the stored data.” 

20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.50(c) (1999). 

¶ 25 Section 1240.80 regulates the dissemination of data obtained through LEADS and 

provides as follows: “a) The LEADS network and LEADS data shall not be used for personal 

purposes[;] b) Personal or unofficial messages shall not be transmitted[;] c) LEADS data shall not 

be sold[;] [and] d) LEADS data shall not be disseminated to any individual or organization that is 

not legally authorized to have access to the information.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.80(a)-(d) 

(1999). The regulations provide that “[u]ser certification may be suspended or revoked by the 

Department for violation or non-compliance with laws, rules, regulations, or procedures.” 20 Ill. 

Adm. Code 1240.90(b)(9) (1999). The Department also periodically audits each LEADS 

terminal agency and provides “a written analysis detailing the findings, recommendations, 

discussions, and requirements for compliance generated by the audit.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 

1240.100(a), (c) (1999). The available sanctions and the required procedures depend on the 

severity of the violations. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.110 (1999). 

¶ 26 BGA argues that the sheriff is not specifically prohibited from disclosing information 

regarding the subjects of Patrick’s LEADS searches, because such information is not “LEADS 

data.” BGA focuses primarily on section 1240.30(b)(3), which defines “LEADS data” as “all 

data available through the LEADS computer.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.30(b)(3) (1999). From 

this definition, BGA extrapolates that there is a meaningful difference between search input 

information (inquiry identifiers) and substantive information available through the system (the 

results of those inquiries). According to BGA, the Department’s regulations do not specifically 

prohibit the sheriff from disclosing records falling into the former category. BGA proposes that, 

had “LEADS data” been intended to encompass inquiries to the LEADS computer, the 
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Department could have defined the term as information “submitted to or available through the 

LEADS computer.” 

¶ 27 Nothing in the regulations suggests that the Department intended to draw such a 

distinction, and we hold that the regulations specifically prohibit the sheriff from disclosing 

information regarding the inquiries performed by LEADS users. Even if BGA’s interpretation of 

“LEADS data” is plausible when considering section 1240.30(b)(3) in isolation, it does not hold 

up when viewing the regulations as a whole. “A fundamental principle of statutory construction 

is to view all provisions of a statutory enactment as a whole. Accordingly, words and phrases 

should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of 

the statute.” Southern Illinoisan, 218 Ill. 2d at 415. Another provision of the regulations, which 

the parties do not address, indicates that the Department does not distinguish between information 

transmitted through LEADS and information stored in the system. Specifically, section 

1240.50(c) provides: 

 “Each LEADS agency must ensure that all LEADS computer devices are 

placed in a location under the direct control and supervision of authorized criminal 

justice personnel and are inaccessible to the public or persons not qualified to either 

operate, view, or possess LEADS and/or NCIC transmitted or received data. The 

computer site and/or terminal area must have adequate physical security to protect 

against any unauthorized personnel gaining access to the computer equipment or to 

any of the stored data.” (Emphases added.) 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.50(c) 

(1999).

The regulations make clear that the public is not entitled to view or possess data that is transmitted 

through, received through, or stored in LEADS. BGA insists that inquiry identifier information is 
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not “available through” the LEADS computer, because Jacobs’ second affidavit established that 

“the Illinois State Police can only identify a device accessing the LEADS system by its assigned 

Call Directing Code *** and not the unique identifiers of a certified user accessing the system.” 

However, even if Patrick’s personal search history is not presently stored in the LEADS 

computer, it was, by its very nature, data that was transmitted through the system. Section 

1240.50(c) makes clear that the Department intended for such information to be treated in the 

same manner as information received through or stored in the system. 

¶ 28 Another provision of the regulations, which the parties likewise do not address, renders

BGA’s interpretation of the definition of “LEADS data” questionable. Section 1240.50(b) 

provides certain personnel-security requirements, including that “[t]he individual receiving a 

request for criminal justice information must ensure the person requesting the information is 

authorized to receive the data.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.50(b)(4) (1999). The regulations do not 

define “criminal justice information.” However, information about which people or vehicles

have been the subjects of LEADS inquiries would seem to fall naturally within the scope of that 

term. That the Department requires a showing of authority to receive “criminal justice 

information”—a rather broad and undefined phrase—cuts against BGA’s argument that, by 

defining “LEADS data” as it did in section 1240.30(b)(3), the Department intended to make

LEADS search histories accessible to the public. 

¶ 29 The regulations, viewed in their entirety, reflect the Department’s intent to create a law 

enforcement resource that is not open to public inspection. We cannot agree with BGA that, by 

defining “LEADS data” as it did in section 1240.30(b)(3), the Department intended to allow the 

public to know which suspects have been investigated by particular law enforcement officers. 

Such a construction of “LEADS data” is neither necessary nor reasonable in the context of 
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regulations designed to prohibit rather than promote public access to the LEADS system. It is 

readily apparent that public access to inquiry identifier information was not intended and that the 

regulations do not treat such information differently from other information stored in or accessible 

through the system. 

¶ 30 BGA additionally argues that only LEADS records maintained by the Department, not the 

sheriff’s public records, are exempt from disclosure as “LEADS data.” BGA claims that, because 

Jacobs’ second affidavit established that Patrick’s search history cannot be identified by means of

the LEADS computer, such information is not “LEADS data.” We disagree with BGA’s 

assessment. As we have previously explained, the information that BGA seeks—the identities of 

the subjects of Patrick’s LEADS inquiries—is inherently “LEADS data” prohibited from 

disclosure. The regulations do not distinguish between information transmitted or received 

through LEADS and information stored in the system. Nor has BGA brought to our attention any 

authority that would require a different result. BGA is not entitled to Patrick’s search history, 

irrespective of whether such information is accessible through the LEADS system or from records

that the sheriff possesses.

¶ 31 The reasoning in at least one federal case supports by analogy that LEADS inquiry 

identifier information is not subject to public disclosure. In Vazquez v. United States Department 

of Justice, 887 F. Supp. 2d 114, 117 (D.D.C. 2012), the plaintiff filed an action under the federal 

FOIA, seeking a log of NCIC transactions concerning himself. The Department of Justice (DOJ) 

issued what is known as a “Glomar response,” refusing to confirm or deny the existence of any 

responsive records, because doing so would cause harm cognizable under an exception to the 

federal FOIA. Vazquez, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 116. The DOJ based its response on 5 U.S.C. § 

552(b)(7)(E), which exempts law enforcement records from disclosure to the extent that 
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production “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or 

prosecutions ... if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vazquez, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 116. The DOJ filed a motion 

for dismissal and summary judgment, supported by the affidavit of Kimberly Del Greco, who 

described the NCIC as a compilation of “nineteen separate databases, all of which contain material 

compiled for law-enforcement purposes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vazquez, 887 F. 

Supp. 2d at 117. She stated that “NCIC transactions [are] performed[ ] in response to queries 

made by law enforcement agencies regarding an individual” and that “while the public generally 

knows and understands that law enforcement utilizes the NCIC databases to perform background 

checks and/or other related checks ... the details of those queries—including how they are 

executed, what search terms are used, what[ ] passwords and clearances are required, and who has 

authorization to run such queries[—]are not known to the public.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Vazquez, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 117. The district court found that Del Greco’s affidavit 

“established the threshold requirement that the responsive records be compiled for law 

enforcement purposes” and showed that “utilization of the NCIC database constitutes a 

‘procedure[] for law enforcement investigations’ covered by exemption 7(E).” Vazquez, 887 F. 

Supp. 2d at 117 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2006)). 

¶ 32 Del Greco additionally explained the nature of the harm from having to confirm or deny the 

existence of the requested records:

“[P]ublic confirmation of NCIC transactions would alert individuals that they are the 

subject of an investigation as well as reveal[ ] the identity of the investigative agency. 

With this information, individuals could modify their criminal behavior, thereby

preventing detection by law enforcement agencies and risking circumvention of the law. 
2014 IL App (2d) 140071 

 

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*** In other words, persons knowing that they are being investigated by a law 

enforcement entity, which the requested information would reveal, could reasonably be 

expected to use the information to circumvent the law. Conversely, a person with 

knowledge that there have been no NCIC checks run against him, and hence, that he is not 

on law enforcement’s radar[,] could reasonably be expected to continue to engage in 

unlawful endeavors with renewed vigor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vazquez, 

887 F. Supp. 2d at 117-18. 

Based on this affidavit, the district court found that the DOJ justified its assertion of harm from

confirming or denying the existence of the requested records, and the court granted summary 

judgment in favor of the DOJ. Vazquez, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 118. The court of appeals summarily 

affirmed in an unpublished order, concluding that the district court “properly granted the 

government’s renewed motion for summary judgment with respect to information withheld under 

Freedom of Information Act exemption 7(E) [citation] and did not abuse its discretion in denying 

reconsideration of that judgment.” Vazquez v. United States Department of Justice, No. 13-5197, 

2013 WL 6818207, ¶ 1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 2013). 

¶ 33 According to the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority’s website

(http://www.icjia.state.il.us/iijis/public/index.cfm?metasection=strategicplan&metapage=sjis_lea

ds (last visited Oct. 6, 2014), LEADS users are able to access NCIC through LEADS. See also 

20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.50(b)(1) (1999) (requiring background checks for “terminal operators, 

programmers, and other persons employed or utilized to effectuate access to or initiate 

transmission of LEADS and National Crime Information Center (NCIC) information”). As

federal courts have determined that the public is not entitled to information regarding NCIC
2014 IL App (2d) 140071 

 

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inquiries, it makes sense that this same type of information is not accessible to the public through 

LEADS. 

¶ 34 Furthermore, we reject BGA’s argument that our interpretation creates an absurd result 

by allowing the state law designed to prevent abuse of the LEADS system to be used to shield such 

abuses from disclosure. The regulations indeed establish, in no uncertain terms, that LEADS 

users may not use the network or data for personal purposes (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.80(a) (1999)) 

and that such misuse may result in sanctions (20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.90(b)(9) (1999)). However, 

as previously explained, the Department periodically audits LEADS terminal agencies, and the 

Department has implemented sanctions and procedures for addressing noncompliance with its 

policies. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1240.110 (1999). As the trial court aptly noted: “There is nothing to 

prevent the appropriate body, properly authorized to access the LEADS system, from investigating 

any alleged improper uses. The aforementioned construction merely finds that entities such as 

the BGA are not the proper organizations to undertake such an investigation because the 

investigation requires access to sensitive information to which the legislative body saw fit to 

restrict access.” 

¶ 35 Finally, BGA argues that the trial court erred in concluding that “a FOIA response to 

BGA’s inquiries is not possible” because Jacobs’ second affidavit showed that the Department

“would not be able to determine which inquiries, if any, were submitted by Patrick.” We need 

not address BGA’s argument on this point in light of our holding that BGA is not entitled to 

disclosure of the subjects of Patrick’s LEADS searches. 

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

¶ 38 Affirmed.