NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL 

CORP., AND CONSOLIDATED TELECOM, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________ 

2013-1181

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Texas in No. 11-CV-0071, Judge Ron 

Clark.

______________________ 

Decided: April 2, 2014

______________________ 

ADRIAN M. PRUETZ, Glaser Weil Fink Jacobs Howard 

Avchen & Shapiro, LLP, of Los Angeles, California, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were

ERICA J. VAN LOON, ANDREW Y. CHOUNG, and AVRAHAM 

SCHWARTZ. 

DARRELL G. DOTSON, Stevens Love, of Longview, Texas, argued for defendant-appellee Network Communications International Corp. With him on the brief were
2 HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

GREGORY P. LOVE and SCOTT E. STEVENS. Of counsel on 

the brief was TODD Y. BRANDT, of Houston, Texas.

K.A.D. CAMARA, Camara & Sibley LLP, of Houston, 

Texas, argued for defendant-appellee Consolidated Telecom Inc. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

HowLink Global LLC (“HowLink”) filed suit against 

Network Communications International Corp. (“NCIC”)

and Consolidated Telecom, Inc. (“CTEL”) (collectively, 

“Defendants”) alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 

7,876,744 B2 (“the ’744 patent”). The ’744 patent relates 

to collect calling using Voice over Internet Protocol 

(“VoIP”) technology. NCIC and CTEL provide VoIP-based 

collect call systems and services to various correctional 

facilities. After a magistrate judge construed numerous

disputed terms of the ’744 patent, the district court 

adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions. 

Based on these constructions, the parties stipulated to 

non-infringement of the ’744 patent. 

On appeal, HowLink challenges the construction of 

two terms: (1) “temporarily transmitting voice of a caller 

to the called terminal to identify the caller when the 

second communication link is established,” and (2) “prohibiting voice transmission until a collect call acceptance 

arrives after the temporary voice transmission.” The 

dispute over these claims is about whether the claims of 

the ’744 patent require that a caller be able to talk to the 

called party temporarily before a decision to accept the 

collect call is made. Because we find that the district 

court correctly construed the terms to require the transmission of a “live” voice, for this purpose, we affirm the 
HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 3

district court’s claim construction, and, hence, judgment

of non-infringement.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The ’744 Patent

HowLink is the exclusive owner by assignment of the 

’744 patent. The ’744 patent, which issued on January 25, 

2011, is titled “Method for Collect Call Service Based on 

VoIP Technology and System Thereof.” ’744 Patent, at 

[45], [54] (filed Apr. 4, 2005). The patent describes a

method and system for making collect calls over a VoIP

network using a collect call switch. Generally, the collect 

call system includes a calling terminal connected to a 

calling gateway. The calling gateway then communicates 

with a called gateway through a VoIP network. This

called gateway is connected to a collect call switch, and

the collect call switch communicates with the called 

terminal. When a calling party places a collect call 

through a calling terminal, the calling party initiates the 

collect call by dialing the called terminal. Next, the 

collect call switch establishes a first communication link

between the collect call switch and the called gateway, 

and a second communication link between the collect call 

switch and the called terminal. 

The patent describes several embodiments of the VoIP 

collect call system using these two communication links. 

For example, Figure 5, reproduced below, discloses a

flowchart of signaling on various collect call systems.
4 HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

The section of the written description corresponding 

to Figure 5 outlines several relevant steps: 

At step 310, the called gateway requests 

PSTN [(public switched telephone network)] link 

to the collect call switch. The collect call switch 

establishes PSTN link to the called gateway.

At step 315, the collect call switch calls the 

called terminal by use of the collect call number 

included in the collect call request. When the 

called terminal answers, the collect call switch establishes PSTN link to the called terminal, and at 

step 320, outputs voice announcement telling it is 

a collect call.

At step 325, after finishing voice announcement, the collect call switch connects temporarily 

the voice call link between the caller terminal and 

the called terminal so that the called party can 

recognize the caller. The step 325 may be omitted 
HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 5

according to the telecommunication service provider’s policy.

At step 330 to 340, after releasing voice call 

link, a voice announcement for request to accept 

the collect call is outputted to the called terminal.

’744 Patent col.8 ll.40–57. Figures 6 and 7 disclose identical steps for providing a voice announcement for a collect 

call, with a collect call switch temporarily connecting the 

caller terminal with the called terminal. See ’744 Patent 

col.8 ll.45–54, col.9 ll.37–38, col.10 ll.8–9.

Representative Claim 11 states:

1. A method of providing a collect call service 

based on a voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) system, the method comprising:

establishing a first communication link between a 

called gateway and a collect call switch, on receiving a collect call request from a caller terminal via 

a VoIP network located between i) a calling gateway being coupled to the caller terminal and ii) 

the called gateway being coupled to the collect call 

switch, wherein the caller terminal can access the 

called gateway by use of already known access information; 

1 The claim language of the other independent 

claims slightly differs from claim 1. In claims 9 and 23, 

the claim language states “temporarily transmit voice of a 

caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when 

the second communication link is established.” In claims 

9, 11, 13, 18, and 23, the claim language states “prohibiting the voice transmission until the collect call acceptance 

arrives after the temporary voice transmission.” These 

differences are not meaningful to our analysis, however.

 
6 HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

establishing a second communication link between the collect call switch and the called terminal;

temporarily transmitting voice of a caller to the 

called terminal to identify the caller when the second communication link is established, and then 

prohibiting voice transmission until a collect call 

acceptance arrives after the temporary voice 

transmission;

connecting the first communication link and the 

second communication link to initiate a billing 

process for the second communication link responsive to the collect call acceptance in the form of a 

dual tone multi-frequency (DTMF) signal from the 

called terminal; and

releasing the connected links to end the billing 

process responsive to a normal call end request 

from one of the caller terminal and the called terminal.

’744 Patent col.14 ll.6–10 (emphasis added). 

The original independent claims of the application 

that issued as the ’744 patent did not include the emphasized “temporarily transmit[ting] voice of a caller to the 

called terminal to identify the caller when the second 

communication link is established, and then prohibiting 

voice transmission until a collect call acceptance arrives 

after the temporary voice transmission” limitation. See, 

e.g., Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 366–373. Original dependent 

claims 4 and 10, however, claimed “temporarily permitting voice transmission which allows a called party to 

identify a caller . . . .” J.A. 367, 369.

During the prosecution of the ’744 patent, the examiner rejected numerous original claims under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 103 as obvious, in part over U.S. Patent No. 6,788,674 

(“Karamchedu”). Karamchedu discloses a collect call 
HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 7

system where a caller sends a request to a “Bridgeport” 

that then calls the called party, plays a message to announce the call, and connects the caller to the called party 

if the called party accepts the call. See U.S. Patent No. 

6,788,674 col.6 l.11–col.7 l.9 (filed July 20, 2001). The 

Karamchedu written description states that, “upon the 

callee answering the call from the Bridgeport, the Bridgeport may announce a message to the callee such as ‘Bob is 

attempting to make a collect call.’” Id. col.6 ll.20–23. The 

examiner stated that Karamchedu teaches the limitation 

included in dependent claims 4 and 10 that claim “temporarily permitting voice transmission which allows a called 

party to identify a caller when the second link is established, and then prohibiting voice transmission until the 

collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice 

transmission.” See J.A. 351, 356 (emphasis added). 

When, in response, HowLink offered amended claims 26, 

28, and 31, reciting “temporarily transmitting voice of a 

caller,” the examiner indicated that those claims would be 

allowed if rewritten in independent form to include the

express limitations of “temporarily transmit[ting] voice of 

a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when 

the second link is established, and then prohibiting the 

voice transmission until the collect call acceptance arrives 

after the temporary voice transmission.” J.A. 402–04. 

After the applicant amended the independent claims 

consistent with these directives, the examiner allowed the 

claims.

B. Procedural History

On February 15, 2011, HowLink filed a complaint asserting patent infringement of the ’744 patent against 

NCIC in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 

Texas.2 Compl., HowLink Global LLC v. Centris Info.

2 HowLink also asserted infringement of the ’744 

patent against Centris Information Systems, LLC, Con-

 
8 HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

Sys., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00071-RC-ALM (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 

2011), ECF No. 1. On April 18, 2011, HowLink filed a 

First Amended Complaint adding patent infringement 

claims against CTEL. First Am. Compl., HowLink Global 

LLC v. Centris Info. Sys., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00071-RCALM (E.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2011), ECF No. 16.3 The district 

court judge referred the case to a magistrate judge for 

claim construction. 

On June 28, 2012, the magistrate judge issued his 

Report and Recommendation construing numerous disputed claim terms, including the two terms at issue in 

this appeal. See Report and Recommendation of U.S. 

Magistrate Judge, HowLink Global LLC v. Centris Info. 

Sys., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00071-RC-ALM (E.D. Tex. June 28, 

2012), ECF No. 154 (“R&R”). 

First, the magistrate judge construed the “temporarily 

transmit[ting] voice of a caller” term as “for a limited 

time, transmitting the live voice of a caller so that the 

caller can speak to the called party and the called party 

can hear what the caller is saying when the second communication link is established.” Id. at 28 (emphasis 

added). In support, the magistrate judge pointed to the 

claim language itself as contemplating a “live voice,” 

explaining that “[t]he claim thus recites that the ‘prohibiting’ occurs after the ‘temporarily transmitting,’ as indiversant Technologies, Inc., JCW Electronics I Ltd., L.L.P., 

JCW Electronics I, L.P., JCW Electronics, Inc., Teletrust, 

Inc., Trio Communications, Inc., and Value-Added Communications, Inc. HowLink later voluntarily dismissed 

its claims against these Defendants.

3 HowLink also added Network Enhanced Telecom, 

L.L.P. and Network Operator Services, Inc. Eventually, 

HowLink also voluntarily dismissed its claims against 

these Defendants.

 
HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 9

cated by the word ‘then.’” Id. at 24. He then noted that 

the parties have not disputed this order of steps and 

concluded that, “what is ‘temporarily transmitt[ed]’ must 

be something that can then be ‘prohibit[ed].’” Id. at 25. 

As such, “if the step of ‘temporarily transmitting voice of a 

caller’ did not involve the live voice of the caller, the step 

of ‘then prohibiting voice transmission’ would be superfluous.” Id. The magistrate judge also concluded that, 

because of the grammatical structure of the claim language itself, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would 

readily understand that the antecedent basis for the ‘voice 

transmission’ recited in the ‘prohibiting’ step is the ‘voice 

of a caller’ recited in the ‘temporarily transmitting’ step.” 

Id. (citations omitted). “Based on this antecedent basis 

relationship, ‘voice of a caller’ and ‘voice transmission’ 

carry the same meaning throughout the claims.” Id. at 26 

(citing Digital-Vending Servs. Int’l, LLC v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 672 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). He also 

found that “[a]ny remaining doubt about the propriety of 

a limiting construction is eliminated by the prosecution 

history” exchange relating to the Karamchedu reference. 

Id. He noted that, because Karamchedu does not disclose 

transmission of a caller’s live voice, it implies that the 

caller’s name is either pre-recorded or computergenerated. The examiner noted in particular that “the 

patentee overcame Karamchedu by amending the claims 

in a fashion that ‘put the examiner and the public on 

notice of the invention’s crucial feature,’ insofar as the 

patentee relied upon that feature to overcome Karamchedu, namely the temporary transmitting of a ‘voice of a 

caller.’” Id. at 27. And, to give effect to this disclaimer, 

the magistrate judge found that the construction should 

require transmission of the “live voice” of the caller. See 

id. at 27–28.

Second, the magistrate judge construed the “prohibiting voice transmission” term as “preventing the called 

party from continuing to hear what the caller is saying 
10 HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

until after the collect call acceptance.” Id. at 30. In 

support, the magistrate judge referenced his supporting 

analysis regarding the “temporarily transmit[ting] voice 

of a caller” term. He also stated: 

While some embodiments might provide two-way 

communication during the temporary “voice 

transmission,” such a limitation is not recited by 

the claim language and is not clearly established 

in the specification. Instead, the temporary voice 

transmission is recited in the claims as “temporarily transmitting voice of a caller to the called terminal” and is disclosed as enabling the called 

party to recognize the caller, not vice versa.

Id. at 29. 

On July 12, 2012, HowLink filed its Objections to the 

Report and Recommendation with respect to the constructions of these two claim terms. Objection to Report and 

Recommendations Regarding Claim Construction, HowLink Global LLC v. Centris Info. Sys., LLC, No. 4:11-cv00071-RC-ALM (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2012), ECF No. 159. 

HowLink claimed that the magistrate judge improperly

limited the phrase, “voice of a caller,” to mean only the 

caller’s “live” voice, and excluded the caller’s “recorded” 

voice from the scope of the claims. Id. at 1.

On August 29, 2012, the district court issued an Order 

adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Order Adopting Report and Recommendation of 

U.S. Magistrate Judge, HowLink Global LLC v. Centris 

Info. Sys., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00071-RC-ALM (E.D. Tex. 

Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 167 (“Order Adopting R&R”). In 

addressing the claim language now on appeal, the district 

court found that “a person of ordinary skill in the art 

would read the claims to mean that ‘voice transmission’ 

refers to the same thing throughout the claims and that 

what is ‘prohibit[ed]’ is what was ‘temporarily transmit[ed],’ particularly in light of the use of the word ‘then’ 
HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 11

to introduce the ‘prohibiting’ step.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, 

he concluded that “what is ‘temporarily transmit[ed]’ is 

the ‘live’ voice of a caller because there would be no need 

to ‘prohibit’ a pre-recorded voice.” Id. The court also 

found that the patentee made a “clear and unmistakable” 

disavowal by amending the claim language from “temporarily transmitting voice transmission” to “temporarily 

transmitting voice of a caller” to overcome the examiner’s

rejection. Id. at 6.

Based on these claim constructions, HowLink agreed 

that it could not prevail on the issue of infringement. 

Consequently, the parties jointly filed a Motion for Approval of Stipulated Judgment of Noninfringement. On 

October 19, 2012, the district court granted the motion 

and entered judgment in favor of Defendants on HowLink’s claim for infringement of the ’744 Patent.

HowLink timely filed its Notice of Appeal on November 13, 2012. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). 

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, HowLink challenges the construction of 

two terms: (1) “temporarily transmit[ting] voice of a caller 

to the called terminal to identify when the second communication link is established” and (2) “prohibiting voice 

transmission until the collect call acceptance arrives after 

the temporary voice transmission.” HowLink argues that 

the district court incorrectly construed these terms to 

require the transmission of a “live” voice. We disagree, 

and find no error with the district court’s constructions.

This court reviews a district court’s claim construction 

de novo. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. 

Am. Corp., No. 2012-1014, 2014 WL 667499, at *1 (Fed. 

Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 

Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). To 

determine the scope and meaning of a claim, we can 
12 HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

examine the claim language, written description, prosecution history, and any relevant extrinsic evidence. Phillips 

v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 

(en banc). Generally, a claim term is given its ordinary 

and customary meaning as understood by a person of 

ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. Id. at 

1312–13. “[T]he claims themselves provide substantial 

guidance as to the meaning of particular claim terms,” 

and “the context in which a term is used in the asserted 

claim can be highly instructive.” Id. at 1314. In addition, 

we must read claims in view of the written description, 

which “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The 

written description “acts as a dictionary when it expressly 

defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms 

by implication.” Id. at 1321 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 

1582). “It is therefore entirely appropriate for a court, 

when conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the 

written description for guidance as to the meaning of the 

claims.” Id. at 1317.

We collectively address the district court’s constructions of the two disputed terms. The relevant language 

from representative claim 1 states, “[(1)]temporarily 

transmitting voice of a caller to the called terminal to 

identify the caller when the second communication link is 

established, and then [(2)]prohibiting voice transmission 

until a collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary 

voice transmission.” ’744 Patent col.14 ll.6–10. The 

magistrate judge construed the “temporarily transmitting 

voice of a caller” term as “for a limited time, transmitting 

the live voice of a caller so that the caller can speak to the 

called party and the called party can hear what the caller 

is saying when the second communication link is established.” See R&R at 28 (emphasis added). It also construed the “prohibiting voice transmission” term as

“preventing the called party from continuing to hear what 
HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 13

the caller is saying until after the collect call acceptance.” 

Id. at 30. 

The claim language itself requires a “live” voice. 

“[W]e look to the words of the claims themselves, both 

asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the 

patented invention.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582 

(citing Bell Commc’ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns 

Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). It is clear from 

the claim language that the “after the temporary voice 

transmission” limitation refers back to the earlier “temporary transmitting voice of a caller” limitation. Indeed, at 

oral argument before this court, Appellant’s counsel 

conceded that “temporary voice transmission” has the 

same meaning as “temporarily transmitting the voice of a 

caller.” Oral Arg. at 6:20–58, available at 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

13-1181.mp3; see also Appellant Reply Br. 19 (HowLink 

admits that “temporarily transmitting voice of a caller” 

and “temporary voice transmission” both refer to the same 

thing—“the temporary transmission for the collect call 

request.”). 

The claim language further states “then prohibiting 

voice transmission until a collect call acceptance arrives

after the temporary voice transmission.” See ’744 Patent 

col.14 ll.8–10 (emphases added). Again, Appellant’s 

counsel acknowledged that the “prohibited voice transmission” is a “live” voice. Oral Arg. at 6:58–7:07. Appellant’s counsel then admitted that the term “voice 

transmission” as found in “prohibited voice transmission” 

has the same meaning as “voice transmission” in “temporary voice transmission.” Id. at 7:07–8:03. Pulling all of 

these terms together into context, the claim language 

compels the conclusion that the term “temporary voice 

transmission” must refer to a “live” voice.

The structure of the claim language also implies “live” 

voice transmission. The phrase, “then prohibiting voice 
14 HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

transmission,” requires that the temporary voice transmission in the claims refer to a “live” voice. As the district court concluded, “if the step of ‘temporarily 

transmitting voice of a caller’ did not involve the live voice 

of the caller, the step of ‘then prohibiting voice transmission’ would be superfluous. Such a reading would be 

disfavored.” See R&R at 25 (citing Merck & Co., Inc. v. 

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (“A claim construction that gives meaning to all the 

terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do 

so.” (citations omitted)); Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 

F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[C]laims are interpreted 

with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim.”

(citations omitted))). To clarify, if the temporary voice 

transmission was a recording, there would be no need to

“then prohibit[ ]” voice transmission because the recording 

would end on its own. We agree with the district court’s 

conclusion; the temporary voice transmission is a “live” 

voice, as there is no need to prohibit the transmission of a 

pre-recorded voice. 

Appellant further asserts that the term “voice of the 

caller” is different than “voice transmission” since different terms are used. See Appellant Reply Br. 17 (citing 

Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d

1324, 1333 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he use of two terms in 

a claim requires that they connote different meanings” 

(emphasis in original))). We agree that the two terms

“voice of a caller” and “voice transmission” do not have the 

same exact scope, but conclude that they still refer to the 

same type of transmissions. The “temporarily transmitting voice of a caller” refers to the one way transmission of 

the voice from the caller to the callee, whereas “voice 

transmission” can broadly refer to voice transmissions 

from the caller or callee. Accordingly, “voice transmission” encompasses a broader subset of transmissions. 

Therefore, while the scope of the term “voice transmis-
HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 15

sion” is different than the “voice of a caller,” both of these

“voice transmissions” still refer to a “live” voice or voices. 

The written description supports the conclusion that 

the terms include a “live voice.” It specifically describes

temporarily transmitting the voice of a caller to the called 

terminal to identify the caller in a single section—the one 

describing step 325.4 Consistent with the claim language, 

the description of the embodiments points to a construction where “transmitting the voice of a caller” requires a 

“live” voice. Specifically, the key language states: “At step 

325, after finishing voice announcement, the collect call 

switch connects temporarily the voice call link between 

the caller terminal and the called terminal so that the 

called party can recognize the caller.” ’744 Patent col.8 

ll.49–52. This “voice call link” describes a connection to 

allow the temporary transmission of the “live” voice of the 

caller to the called terminal to identify the caller to the 

callee. 

Although HowLink argues that the written description explicitly states that the invention can omit step 325, 

all of the independent claims of the ’744 patent include 

this limitation. While a written description may describe 

multiple embodiments, the patent is still defined by the 

claims. See TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, 

Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“the mere fact 

that there is an alternative embodiment disclosed in the 

’828 patent that is not encompassed by district court’s 

claim construction does not outweigh the language of the 

claim, especially when the court’s construction is supported by the intrinsic evidence.”). Indeed, the claims track 

the disclosed steps, including step 325—where “the collect 

call switch connects temporarily the voice call link between the caller terminal and the called terminal.” ’744 

4 The specification refers back to the description of 

step 325 for identical steps 440 and 550.

 
16 HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

Patent col.8 ll.49–51. Notably, every independent claim 

requires “temporarily transmit[ting] voice of a caller to 

the called terminal to identify the caller.” And no disclosure is provided for pre-recording a message from a caller

for this temporary voice transmission. 

HowLink asserts that the written description does 

disclose a “voice announcement” that can include the 

recorded voice of a caller. HowLink contends that the 

invention may use the pre-recorded voice of a caller, 

stating that “[t]he key teaching here is that the calling 

party is identified to the called party using the caller’s 

voice.” Appellant Reply Br. 26. The written description, 

however, does not support Howlink’s assertions. For 

example, as described, step 320 “outputs voice announcement telling it is a collect call,” and step 330 is “a voice 

announcement for request to accept the collect call is 

outputted to the called terminal.” ’744 Patent col.8 ll.47–

48, 55–57. The written description provides no further 

description of any voice announcements, nor even mentions pre-recording the voice of a caller. As such, nothing 

in the patent dissuades us from the conclusion that the 

claims all require that the temporary transmission include a “live” voice.

The parties spend a significant portion of their briefs 

addressing whether prosecution disclaimer applies to 

remove the possibility of a “recorded” voice of a caller in 

lieu of a “live” voice. We need not reach the question of 

prosecution history disclaimer in this case, however. This 

is so because, the claims and written description so clearly point to the correct construction in this case. Thus, 

while we find that the prosecution history is consistent 

with our conclusion that the disputed claim terms require 

“live” voice transmission, we do not determine whether, 

standing alone, the prosecution history would support a 

finding of clear and unmistakable disavowal of an alternative claim scope. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (“[T]he 

prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the 
HOWLINK GLOBAL LLC v. NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS 17

claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited 

the invention in the course of prosecution, making the 

claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); 3M Innovative Props. 

Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 

2013) (“The meaning of the claim language is informed, as 

needed, by the prosecution history.” (citations omitted)).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and because we find that 

HowLink’s remaining arguments are without merit, we 

find that the district court correctly construed the terms 

“temporarily transmitting voice of a caller to the called 

terminal to identify the caller when the second communication link is established” and “prohibiting voice transmission until a collect call acceptance arrives after the 

temporary voice transmission.” Simply, the district court 

correctly concluded that, to practice the elements of the 

claims at issue, a caller must be able to talk to the called 

party temporarily before a decision to accept the call is 

made. Because HowLink admits that Defendants do not 

infringe under the district court’s constructions, we affirm 

the district court’s judgment of non-infringement of the 

’744 patent. 

AFFIRMED