# C_2013129EN.01002201.xml

| 4.5.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 129/22 |
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4.5.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 129/22

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Appeal brought on 21 February 2013 by Cornelia Trentea against the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of 11 December 2012 in Case F-112/10 Trentea v FRA

(Case T-107/13 P)

2013/C 129/45

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Appellant: Cornelia Trentea (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: L. Levi and M. Vandenbussche, lawyers)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)

Other party to the proceedings

Form of order sought by the appellant

Form of order sought by the appellant

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | Set aside the Civil Service Tribunal’s judgment of 11 December 2012 in case F-112/10; |
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Set aside the Civil Service Tribunal’s judgment of 11 December 2012 in case F-112/10;

| — | Consequently, annul the decision of the authority responsible for concluding contracts of employment of 5 June 2010 rejecting the appellant’s candidature for post (ref. TA-ADMIN-AST 4-2009) and the decision appointing another candidate; order the FRA to compensate the appellant’s material prejudice corresponding to the difference between her current salary and the AST 4 salary, until retirement age, including all allocations and indemnities and compensation of pension rights; and order the FRA to compensate the appellant’s moral prejudice evaluated ex aequo et bono at 10 000 Euro; and |
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Consequently, annul the decision of the authority responsible for concluding contracts of employment of 5 June 2010 rejecting the appellant’s candidature for post (ref. TA-ADMIN-AST 4-2009) and the decision appointing another candidate; order the FRA to compensate the appellant’s material prejudice corresponding to the difference between her current salary and the AST 4 salary, until retirement age, including all allocations and indemnities and compensation of pension rights; and order the FRA to compensate the appellant’s moral prejudice evaluated ex aequo et bono at 10 000 Euro; and

| — | Order the FRA to pay the costs in the first instance and appeal. |
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Order the FRA to pay the costs in the first instance and appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on five pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging a violation of the rules concerning the admissibility of the pleas: admissibility of the submissions put forward at the hearing at first instance regarding the absence from the Selection Committee of a Staff Committee representative — violation by the first judges of the duty to state reasons. The appellant considers that the CST, first, infringed the first paragraph of Article 43 of the Rules of Procedure of the CST by failing to take account of the fact that the submissions at issue were based on documents and information which the FRA produced only in the course of the proceedings before the CST and, second, failed to recognise that the submissions at issue must be held to be admissible on the ground that they were closely connected with other pleas submitted in the written procedure. Third, and in any event, the CST erroneously concluded, without any motivation, that the plea was not among the pleas which the Tribunal may raise of its own motion. |
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1.

First plea in law, alleging a violation of the rules concerning the admissibility of the pleas: admissibility of the submissions put forward at the hearing at first instance regarding the absence from the Selection Committee of a Staff Committee representative — violation by the first judges of the duty to state reasons. The appellant considers that the CST, first, infringed the first paragraph of Article 43 of the Rules of Procedure of the CST by failing to take account of the fact that the submissions at issue were based on documents and information which the FRA produced only in the course of the proceedings before the CST and, second, failed to recognise that the submissions at issue must be held to be admissible on the ground that they were closely connected with other pleas submitted in the written procedure. Third, and in any event, the CST erroneously concluded, without any motivation, that the plea was not among the pleas which the Tribunal may raise of its own motion.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging a factual inaccuracy regarding the written tests leading to a violation by the CST of the principle of equal treatment and a distortion of evidence. The appellant considers that the Tribunal made a mistake when it held that it had not been established or even alleged that the questions asked in the written test were identical for all the candidates, since the defendant confirmed it in his statement of defence. This inaccuracy affected the Tribunal’s conclusion in law as the principle of equal treatment requires written tests to take place at the same time for all candidates, and not on different days as it was the case in the appellant’s selection procedure. Moreover, the judges at first instance rejected the appellant’s plea regarding the lack of anonymity of the written test, based on a mere allegation by FRA which she had contested. |
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2.

Second plea in law, alleging a factual inaccuracy regarding the written tests leading to a violation by the CST of the principle of equal treatment and a distortion of evidence. The appellant considers that the Tribunal made a mistake when it held that it had not been established or even alleged that the questions asked in the written test were identical for all the candidates, since the defendant confirmed it in his statement of defence. This inaccuracy affected the Tribunal’s conclusion in law as the principle of equal treatment requires written tests to take place at the same time for all candidates, and not on different days as it was the case in the appellant’s selection procedure. Moreover, the judges at first instance rejected the appellant’s plea regarding the lack of anonymity of the written test, based on a mere allegation by FRA which she had contested.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging the irregular composition of the selection committee, distortion of evidence and violation by the CST of its duty to state reasons. The appellant considers that the Tribunal erred in law and distorted the evidence when it considered, without any further motivation, that the Head of the Administration department of the FRA and the Financial Manager of the FRA had in depth knowledge and experience in the area of procurement, based on mere allegations of FRA contested by the appellant. This lack of expertise also affected the results of the selection. |
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3.

Third plea in law, alleging the irregular composition of the selection committee, distortion of evidence and violation by the CST of its duty to state reasons. The appellant considers that the Tribunal erred in law and distorted the evidence when it considered, without any further motivation, that the Head of the Administration department of the FRA and the Financial Manager of the FRA had in depth knowledge and experience in the area of procurement, based on mere allegations of FRA contested by the appellant. This lack of expertise also affected the results of the selection.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging a violation of the duty to state reasons, unreasonable time to issue the judgment. The appellant considers that the judges at first instance erred in law when deciding the defendant had satisfied its obligation to state reasons since the appellant did not know, until the procedure at first instance, which criteria had been used for the assessment of her candidature, was not informed of which qualifications she did not fulfil and did not receive a breakdown of the global marks received until the hearing. The Tribunal also illegally relied on a document submitted by the defendant at the hearing to reach the conclusion that the defendant had satisfied its obligation to state reasons, without justifying of any exceptional circumstances. Moreover, firstly, if the appellant had received this document during the administration phase as she requested, she would have been able to better understand the reasons for her non-selection and challenge this decision more effectively. Secondly, the length of the procedure before the CST would have been more reasonable. |
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4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging a violation of the duty to state reasons, unreasonable time to issue the judgment. The appellant considers that the judges at first instance erred in law when deciding the defendant had satisfied its obligation to state reasons since the appellant did not know, until the procedure at first instance, which criteria had been used for the assessment of her candidature, was not informed of which qualifications she did not fulfil and did not receive a breakdown of the global marks received until the hearing. The Tribunal also illegally relied on a document submitted by the defendant at the hearing to reach the conclusion that the defendant had satisfied its obligation to state reasons, without justifying of any exceptional circumstances. Moreover, firstly, if the appellant had received this document during the administration phase as she requested, she would have been able to better understand the reasons for her non-selection and challenge this decision more effectively. Secondly, the length of the procedure before the CST would have been more reasonable.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging a violation of Article 87(2) and 88 of the Rules of Procedure of the CST regarding the costs, violation of the duty to state reasons. The appellant considers that the Tribunal illegally ordered the appellant to bear her own costs and those of the defendant. |
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5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging a violation of Article 87(2) and 88 of the Rules of Procedure of the CST regarding the costs, violation of the duty to state reasons. The appellant considers that the Tribunal illegally ordered the appellant to bear her own costs and those of the defendant.

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