* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is

not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

August 5, 2010

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE L. MOTHERSHED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel.

Oklahoma Bar Association,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-6067

(D.C. No. 5:10-CV-00199-F)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HOLMES, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and EBEL,

Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff George L. Mothershed appeals the district court’s order dismissing

his complaint in which he sought to vacate and set aside the Oklahoma Supreme

Court’s order disbarring him from the practice of law. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm for substantially the same reasons stated by the

district court in its order dated March 10, 2010. 
1 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

-2-

Mr. Mothershed’s first federal district court complaint was filed on

November 6, 2009, and was dismissed on February 10, 2001, as barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1

 Undeterred, on February 25, 2010, just two weeks

following the district court’s order dismissing his complaint, Mr. Mothershed

filed a second complaint. Once again he asked the court to vacate and set aside

the state-court disbarment order, tweaking his previous claims to allege that the

disciplinary panel lacked jurisdiction, that he was denied equal protection, due

process, and the presumption of innocence during the proceedings, and that 

Oklahoma’s disciplinary rules are vague and overbroad. And once again, the

court dismissed the complaint. In doing so, the court rejected Mr. Mothershed’s

legal arguments in his seventy-nine-page complaint that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine did not apply. 

“We review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction de novo.” Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2007). 

We have reviewed Mr. Mothershed’s complaint and conclude that the district

court properly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the

lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by
2 Mr. Mothershed mistakenly relies on England v. Louisiana State Board of

Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), and similar cases for his argument that

the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. These cases concern the

doctrine of abstention – not subject matter jurisdiction. 

-3-

“state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments”). As the court explained, and we

agree, Mr. Mothershed’s “complaint . . . seeks to set aside and vacate the . . .

order of disbarment. . . . This is precisely the type of claim encompassed by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Aplt. App. at 3-4. The court also correctly held that

it lacked jurisdiction over the constitutional claims under Rooker-Feldman

because they “are inextricably intertwined with disbarment order.” Aplt. App. at

4, citing Mann, 477 F.3d at 1147; Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Court, 528 F.3d

785, 790 (10th Cir. 2008).2

 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mr. Mothershed’s

motion to modify the record is DENIED. 

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel

Circuit Judge