1 Comparison of Ford’s or igi nal pet it ion wi th hi s appel lat e bri efs i ll ustr ates t hat t he for mer contai ns

mo re clai ms than addressed in the l atter . I n other words, he does notco ntend t ha t al l of the cl aims rai sed below we re im prop erly dis mis sed . Give n this, w e co nsid er w heth er the trial cou rt abused i ts di scr etio n in dism issing only th ose claim s m entio ned in his a ppe llate brie f and sup plem ent to it. NO. 07-03-0355-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D AUGUST 9, 2005

______________________________ KENNETH D. FORD, Appellant

v. TEXAS D EPARTME NT OF CR IMINAL JU STICE, e t al., Appellees

_________________________________ FROM THE 411 th DISTRICT COURT OF POLK COUNTY; NO. CIV20,483; HON. ROBERT HILL TRAPP, PRES IDING

_______________________________ Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ. Appe llant, Kenneth D. Ford, an indigent inmate, appeals from the d ismissal of his lawsuitagainst the Texas Department of Crimi nal Justi ce (the D epartment ) and ten of its employees for damages and for declaratory and injunctive relief. Dismissa l occurred withoutthe court holding an evidentiary hearing. A ppellant now asserts that the trial co urt abused i ts discre tion in d ismissin g his sui t. We affi rm the judg ment of th e trial court. 12 In his o ri ginal peti ti on, Ford al leged t hat he was depr ived of pro perty witho ut du e pro ces s of law . Yet,

he no w i nf

or ms us that “[i]n the relief of appe llants’ [sic] Original Pe tition reflect [sic] that he neither [ sic ] clai med depri vati on of propert y under § 1983" but

that “he di d clai m Indemnif icat ion of Propert

y under §§104.001 [and] 104 .002, Te x. Civ. Pra c. & R em . Cod e aga inst Defe ndan t TDC J.” We inter pretthi s stat ement as his c oncessi on that he no l onger wi shes to pursue t he clai ms invol ving t he depri vati on of proper ty wi thout due proc ess . 2 Initially, Ford contends that the trial cour t ’s failure to provide written reasons explaining whyit dismi ssed the action was error. We disa gree for s everal re asons. F irst, the trial court specified why it dismissed the suit; that i s, the action was dismissed “a s frivolous. ” Second, Ford cites us to no authority requiring it to do more. Third, nor does the statute permitting the trial court to dismiss a frivolous cause mandate that reasons be given explaining why it h eld the a ction ba seless. Statute me rely exp resses th at the “co urt maydismiss a claim, either before or after service of process, if . . . [it] finds that . . . the cl aim is frivo lous or m aliciou s . . . .” T EX . C IV . P RAC
. & R EM . C ODE A NN . §14.003( a)( 2 ) (Vernon 2002); see also id. §14.01 0 (a) (stating that the “court may enter an order dismissing the enti re claim or a porti on” of it)

. A nd, we have no authority to amend the statute by incl uding a requireme nt that th e legisl ature omitted. Consequently, the first issue is overruled. Next, Ford asserts that he “did cl aim Indemnification of Property under §104.001 [and] 104.002" of the Texas Civil Practiceand Reme dies Cod e for the property allegedly taken by the prison guards. 2 Section 104.001 describe s the cate gory of persons entitled to indemnification from the State while §104.002 describe s the conduct for whi ch th e person will be indemnified. Yet, neither provisi on includes an inmate with the Texa s Departmentof Criminal Justice or the co nduct by such an i ndividu al. Thus, we overrule this issue aswell.3

As to the al legation regardin g the abi lity of one to directly sue a State agency under 42 U.S.C. §1983, we note that neither a stat e nor its agencies are “persons” as contemplated in §198 3. Retzlaff v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice , 135 S.W.3d 731, 743- 44 (Tex. App.–Houston [1 stDist.] 2003, no pet.); Denson v. Texas Dep’t of Crimi nal Justice , 63 S.W.3d 454, 461 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1999 , pet. denied). Thus, and as a matter of law, Ford cannot successfully pursue a claim founded upon §1983 against the Department of Criminal Justice, and the issue is overruled. Regarding the allegation that the prison guards engaged in a civil conspiracy to take his property, authority holds that the Department of Criminal Justice and i ts employees who actwithin the scopeof their employme nt comprise a single legal entity. As such, it is incapable of

conspiri ng with i tself. Hockaday v. Tex. D ep’t of Crimin al Justi ce, 914 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 (S. D. Tex. 1 996); see also Lyons v. Lindsay

Morden C

laims M anagem ent, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 86 , 92 (Tex . App.–El Paso 19 98, no pe t.) (holding that the acts of an agent and
a princip al are th e acts of a single entity and cannot constitute a conspiracy). So, because the guards cannot conspire with themselves or with the Department, we hold that the trial court did not err i n dismis sing thi s claim e ither. To illustrate that his c lai ms arising under the Texas Tort Claims Act ha d arguable merit, Ford argues that

the guards used a “sizing bin” to determinethe amou nt of prop erty he was enti tled to keep in h is cell. Th e excess was purportedly confiscated, and it is the confiscated property for which Ford sought recompense viathe Tort Claims Act. The latter however permits the recovery

of damag es to pers onal pro perty only when those damages resultfrom the use or operation of a motor driven vehicle or motor driven equipme nt. T EX . C IV . P RAC
. & R EM . C ODE A NN . §101.021 (1)(A) (Ve rnon 200 5); Ford v. Texas Dep’t of4

Criminal Justice , No. 09-98-0509-CV, 1999 Tex . App. L EXIS 2623 at 3-4 (Te x. App.–BeaumontApril 8 , 1999, p et. denie d); Wheat v. Texas Dep’t of Corrections , 715 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. App.–Houston [1 stDist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (involving the loss of
a prisoner’s law books, watch, and radio). Since Ford does not claim that the operation of
a motor dri ven vehi cle or mo tor drive n equipm ent was i nstr u mental in the loss of his personalty, th e Texas T ort Clai ms Act is of no ben efit to hi m. Wheat v. Texas Dep’t of Corrections , supra . Thus, we overrule this issue too. Lastly, we are asked to hold that the trial court erred becauseFord asserted a viable
cause of action for declaratory relief. We disagree and overrule theissue fo r the dis pute does not fall within the scope of the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act. According to the latter, a person “interes ted unde r a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting
a contract or whose rights . . . are affected by a statute, municipal ordi nance, contract, or franchise may h ave determin ed any question . . . arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franch ise . . . .” T EX . C IV . P RAC
. & R EM . C ODE A NN . §37.004(a) (Vernon 1997). Ford did n ot allege that his claims implicate or arise und er a deed, will, written contract, statute, ordinance, or franchise. At most, they involve the application of
a rule ena cted by th e TexasDepartme nt of Crim inal Jus tice. Yet, not even that entitles him to declara tory reli ef. See Bohanna n v. Texa s Board o f Crimi nal Justi ce, 942 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tex. App.–Austin 1997, writ denied) (holding that an inmate m ay not use the DeclaratoryJudgment

s Act toobtain a declaration regarding the validity of a rule applicable to an inm ate). Having overruled each of Ford’s issues, we affirm the order of dismissal.5 Brian Quinn Chief Justice