NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0097n.06 F iled: F ebruary 8, 2007 No. 05-3782 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, Plaintif f-Appellant , v. JOHN A. F USON, Defendant-

Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PE A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO URT FORTHE NORTH ERN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO O P I N I O N

BEFORE: DAUG HTREY, COLE , and GIBBO NS , Ci r c uitJudg e s. R. GU Y COLE, JR., Circ u i t J udge. The Gove rnment appe als the sentenc e the district court imposed on John Fuson after he plea ded g uilty to one count of being a felon in possession of
a fi re ar m u n d er 18 U .S.C. § 922(g) (1). The rec ommended sente nce unde r the United States SentencingGuidelines wa s twenty -four to t hirty months in prison. The district court sentenc ed Fuson to five y ear s of probation (six months of which require d home confine ment) and imposed a fine of $2000. O n appea l, the Gover nment argues that (1) the district court incor rec tly applied the SentencingGuidelines’ departure criter ia i n rea ching this sentenc e, and (2) e ven if view ed as anonGuidelines depa

rture unde r 18 U.S.C. § 35 5 3 (a ) (in which c ase the district court has g reater discretion), the sentenc e is both proce durally and s u b s t anti vely

unrea sonable. F or the followingNo. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

Some of this backg round information is di scussed in this Court’s prior dec ision in t his case, 1 United States v. Fuson (

Fuson I ), 116 F . App’x 588 (6th Ci r. 2004).

- 2 - re a so ns , w e c on c lud e that th e se nte nc e is a no n- Gu ide lin e s d e pa

rt ure u nd e r § 35 53 (a ) t

hat is proce durally

and substantively

rea sonable. We there fore AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACKG ROUND 1 I n September 2001, F uson’s wife purchase d a seventy -five- y ear -old handg un at an antique sh owwi th t

he int e nt t o re se ll the g un fo r p ro fi t. S ho rt ly a ft e r s he purc ha se d th e g un , F us on a lle g e dly
e xpre sse d h is o bje c tio n to it a nd me nti on e d th a t he wa s no t su pp os e d to have we a

po ns in t he ho us e due to his prior fe lony

convictions. The gu n nonetheless r emained in the house for the ne x t four months. I n Jan ua ry 20 02 , p oli c e fo un d th e g un wh ile se arc hin g F us on ’s re sid e nc e in co nn e c tio n w ith
a wa rra nt unrelate d to the antique we apon. When the g un was found, it wa s in a closet and in the
same c as e t h at i t wa s in when F uson’s wife pur chase d it. The g un was not loade d, but there w as ammunition else wher e in the house. F uson told authorities that neither he nor his family

members had eve r fire d the g un. A bac kg round che ck re veale d that Fuson was a convicted felon. He had previously pleade d g uilty to the following three counts of drug traff icking under O hio law: (1) se lling a ha lf ounce of marijuana for $90 to a c onfidential informa nt on Aug ust 3, 1 9 9 6 ; (2 ) exchang ing 0.69 g rams of marijuana for thre e ca

rtons of cig are ttes (worth about $75) with a conf idential informant on Oc tober 23 , 1 99 8; a

nd (3 ) e xch ang ingon e -e ig hth of an o un c e of

mari jua na fo r thr e e c art on s of c ig are tte s w ithNo. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 3 - a conf idential informant on Oc tober 24, 1998. Additionally , Fuson ha d pleade d g uilty to driving under the influence on two occa sions, once in 1993 and onc e in 1994. The Government charg ed F uson under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) for be ing a felon in possession of a fi re arm , a

nd he ple a de d guil ty

on July 22 , 2 00 3. Af

te r h is p le a

bu t be fo re beg in ni nghis sentenc e, F uson voluntarily soug ht drug -abuse treatment at his own expense. The district cour

t held a sente ncing hearing on Dec ember 12, 2003. The Pre- Sentence I nvestig ation Report (PSR) c oncluded that under the Sentencing Guidelines Fuso n ’s C riminal History Categ ory was I Iand his base of

fense level wa s seventee n. This calculatio n re s u l ted in a sentenc ing r ang e of twe nty -seve n to thirty -three months. The parties did not object to the PSR , but the district court de parte d downwar d from thi s rang e, invoki ng Guidelines departure provisions and
e xpla ini ngthat it

re lie d o n th e fo llo wi ngba se s f or depar tur e : F us on

is a pr od uc tiv e c iti zen

in business with his daughte r’s boy friend; he supports his wife and thre e children; he voluntarily soug ht drug -abuse treatment at his own ex pense and has not had a r elapse since he beg an tre atment; the g un
wa s a n a nti qu e , h a d n e ve r be e n fir e d, and wa s pur c ha se d for c oll e c tio n p ur

po se s o nly ; and

a sma ll amount of marijuana

formed the basis for h i s predicate fe lony offe nses. Althoug h the cour t ga ve t h es e re as o n s o ra l l y , t h e wr i t t en s t at em en to f r ea s o n s fo r t h e d ep ar tu re co n t ai n edo n l y t h e f o l l o wi n g: “Ove r the objec tions of the g overnme nt, the court determined that the defendant’s Criminal History Ca te g or y wa s o ve rs ta te d. F ur

the r, the c ourt

de pa rt e d e ig ht l e ve ls b a se d up on the fi nd ingthat hi s c a se is o uts ide the he art land

of the g uid e li nes, pu

rs ua nt t o U .S. S.G . 4 A1 .3 .” Af te r a c c ounti ngfo r t

his depar ture, the c ourt sentenc ed F uson to five y ear s of probation (with the first six months to be served throug h home detention) a nd fined him $2000. The Gove rnment timely appea led.No. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 4 - On No v em b er

1 6 , 2 0 0 4 , t h i s C o u rt v ac at edt h e s en t en ce an d re m an d edfo r r e- s en t en ci n g, holding that ( 1) the district cour t’s written orde r neither

adequately

explained nor justified the depar ture a nd there fore violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2); and (2) the court’s oral explanation did not support the depa

rture be cause (a) the cour

t’s deter mination that the P SR overstate d Fuson’s c riminal history would allow for only a one-level downward departure from C ateg ory I I to I , not an eig ht-level downwar d depar

ture in off

ense le vel; (b) many

of th e co u rt ’s re asons for de parture under the Guidelines’ depar

ture provisions w ere fore closed by this Circuit’s case s or t h e G u i d el ines the mse lve s; a

nd (c ) t he c ourt c on sid e re d f

a c tor s that the Gu ide lin e s de e m “ no t or din ari ly re le va nt” (e
. g. , employ

ment history) but did not ex plain, as it was re qui re d t o do, how these f actor s were “pre sent to an ex ce p t i onal deg ree or in some other w ay made the c ase diff

ere nt from the ordina

ry
case wher e the f

actor is present.” See F

uson I , 116 F. App’x at 590- 91. Shortly afte r this decision, but b ef ore the district court re -sentenc ed F uson, the United States Supreme Court de cided United States v. Booke r , 5 43 U. S. 2 20 (2 00 5) , w hic h h e ld t hat th e Gu ide lin e s are no t mand a tor y bu t on ly advisory
. On May 16 , 2 00 5, the dis tr ic t court c on du c te d a

no the r s e nte nc inghe ari ng . T he c ourt a g a in considere d the orig inal PSR , which conc luded that Fuson’ s Criminal History Categ ory was I Iand h i s o f f e n s e l e v e l w a s s e v e n t e e n . T h e c o u rta g a i nc o n c l u d e d t h a tC r i m i n a l H i s t o r

y C a t e g o r y II overstate d Fuson’s c riminal history and dete rmined it should be Categ ory I . Fuson’s of

fense level and Criminal History

Categ ory corr elated to a Guidelines rang e of twenty -four to thirty months. The Gover nment ag ree d that a sente nce in this ra n ge wo u l d b e re asonable , and it reque sted such a sentenc e. The co u rt then stated it believe d “it would be appr opriate to de viate fr om the g uidelineNo. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

Although the rec ord is not clear on this comment, we presume it to mean F uson could not 2 be prosec uted for possessing an antique fire arm unde r 18 U.S.C. § 921. The Gove rnment does not dis pu te the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c omm e nt. - 5 - rang e.” T he cour

t indicated that it planned to impose the s ame sentence it imposed befor e, and the probation off

ic e r s ta te d th a t t h e c o r r e s p o n d in g Guidelines off ense le vel for that sentence (consider ing
a Cr imi na l H ist or

y Ca te g or y I ) wo uld be te n. Th e c ourt re sp on de d th a t “ the a

pp ro pr ia te se nte nc e in this case is at the le vel 10.” The c ourt then provided its re asons for imposing the lesser sentenc e, noting that “the nature and cir cumstance s of this particular offe nse justify , if indeed they do not c ompel, a result that is more lenient t han the g uidelines would mandate.” Simi lar to Fuson’s first sentenc ing, the court re counted
cer tain fac tors, including that Fuson’s wife bough t t h e gun, it was not boug ht to further c riminal conduct, a

nd it was kept in a c loset. Th e co u rt further noted that althoug h “a f air amount of ammunition at some point . . . had been a cquire d by someone,” had the g un been a y ear older, “ we would not be her e.” 2 The c ourt turned ag ain t o the nature of t he particular offense : “I think of all these kinds of
case s, this is one whe re the nature and the circumstance s of how the offense occurr ed and the fac t that this was essentially

constructive posse ssion justify a deviation or va rianc e fr om the g uidelines.” At this point, the court noted t hat Fuson’s rec ord wa s “unblemished” sinc e his marijuana -traf ficking conviction seve n y ear s ear lier, and no c o n t ra b an d was found in his house during the sear ch that turned up the gun. The c ourt furthe r noted that F uson “is working , supporting the famil y ,” and
a lth ou g h th e c ourt

re c og nize d “ that no rm a lly is n ot a ba sis fo r a

de pa rt ur e or de viatio n, ” it at le a stNo. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 6 - “sug g ests . . . a lenient se ntence is appropriate.” The court nex t explained that the punishment was jus t; that th e re pr ob a

bly wo uld be a g e ne ra l de te rr e nt e ff

e c t on tho se wh o kn ow the se nte nc ingri sk to which Fuson w as exposed; and that the public wa s never in dang er. The court a cknowledg ed that althoug h Fuson’s se ntence “will have t h e ef fect of cr eatingsome disparity betwee n the def

endant and other people c onvicted of this offe nse,” the court b el ieved this disparity was justified her e beca use of “the nature and circ umstances of this offense in c omparison with those and other case s of this sort being broug ht by the Government.” F inally , the cour t noted there was no issue of restitution. The court ultimately imposed the orig inal sentenc e of f ive y ear s of probation (including six months of home confine ment) and a $2000 fine. The Gover

nment now appe als. II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Stand ard of Review After Booke r , w hic h r e nd e re d th e Se nte nc ingGu ide lin es adv is or y fo r a ll c ri min a l c a se s, district courts have enhanc ed discre tion when sentenc ing c riminal defe ndants. United States v. Jack son , 408 F.3d 301, 304 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omit ted). Ultimately , howeve r, Booke r require s t h at t he sente nce the district court imposes be re asonable
. Id. B o th d is tr ic t c o u rts im

posing sentenc es and a

ppellate c ourts revie wing sentenc es ar e to be guided by the f ac t ors set for

th in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. Section 3553(a) instructs a district cour t to impos e “a

sentenc e suff

icient, but not g reater than nece ssary , to comply with the purposes set f

orth in [§ 3553(a)(2)].” United States v. Collington , 461 F.3d 805, 807 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Under § 3553( a), the district court should consider the serio u s n ess of the offense , deter renc e of f uture c rimes, protec tion of the public from futur e
c ri me s o f t

he de fe nd ant, and

pr ov idi ngthe de fe nd ant w ithne e de d tr a ini ng or c or re c tio na l tr e a tme nt.No. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 7 - Id. (citing § 3553(a) (2)) . The co urt should also consider the nature and cir cumstance s of the defe ndant, the kinds of sentences available, the sentencingGuideline ra ng e, policy

statements from the SentencingCommi ssion, the need to avoid se ntencingdisparities, and the ne ed to provide restitution t o t h e v i ctims. Id. at 807 n.1 (c iting § 3553(a )(1) , (3)- (7))
. Thus, under this new
s en t en ci n g s ch em e, d i s t ri ct co u rt s ar e re qu i re d t o co n s i d er t h e ap p l i cab l e Gu i d el i n e s en t en ci n g ra n ge when a rriving at a de fenda

nt’s sentenc e, see § 3553(a) (4), but as only one fac tor of seve ral laid out in § 3553(a). Jack

son , 4 08 F .3 d at 30 4; see also United States v. McBride , 4 34 F .3 d 4 70 , 4 76 (6 th Cir. 2006) (“O nce the appropr iate advisory Guideline ra

ng e is ca lculated, the district c ourt throws this ingre dient into the section 3553(a) mix .”). We re view a district c ourt’s imposition of a sentence for r easona

bleness with an e y e towar d those same § 3553( a) f actor s. Jack

son , 408 F.3d at 304. B. “Non-G uid elines Departure ” Under § 3553(a) Be fore Booke r , under the mandatory Guideline sy stem, a defe ndant’s only hope of a lesser sentenc e wa s a Guideline- based dow nwar d depar ture. McBride , 434 F.3d at 476. These G uidelinebased de parture s were very limit ed. See id. (“I

n co n t ra s t t o the sentenc ing sc heme be fore Booke r wh e n a se nte nc e ou tsi de the mand a tor y g uid e lin e ra

ng e wa s pe rm itt e d on ly on ve ry lim ite d g ro un ds , there are now more se ntencing varia bles.”) (citation omitted). The Gover nment argues that Fuson’s sentenc e “a

ppear s to be the product of a de parture under the SentencingGuidelines,” ( Appellant’s Br . 19-20), a s opposed to a “non-G uidelines sentenc e under § 3553(a) ,” ( id. 26). In short, acc ording to t he Go ve rnme nt, the dis tr ic t c ourt de pa rt e d und e r t

he Gu ide lin e s and

wa s th e re fo re re qu ir e d to depar t in the limited way s enumer ated in the Guide lines. Thus, the Gover nment argues, the districtNo. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 8 - court “ rec ommitt ed the same Guidelines errors it committed when it initially sentenc ed F uson.” (

Id. 19-20.) We conclude, how ever , that Fu s o n ’s s en tence was not the re sult of a Guideline- based dep artu r e ; r a th e r , it

w a s a n o w - ty p ic a l § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) s e n te n c e , a ls o k n o w na s a

“ n o n - G u id e li ne depar ture,” “deviation,” or “va rianc e.” See, e .g., United States v. Cousins , 4 69 F .3 d 5 72 , 5 77 (6 th Cir. 2006) (“We often ref er to N on-Guideline de parture s as ‘va rianc es.’” ); Un ite d S

tat es v . D av is , 4 5 8 F
. 3 d 4 9 1 , 4 9 7 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( n o ti n g th a t a

f a c to r th e d is tr ic t c o u rt c o n s id e r e d “ d id n o t a u th o r iz e a “ do wnw ar

d d e pa rtu re ” under the Guidelines, but se parately addre ssing whether t h e f ac tor authorizes a “ variance ” un der § 3 55 3( a )) . A s d isc us se d f ur the r b e low , th e dis tr ic t c ourt pla inl y imposed Fuson’s se ntence by consideringthe § 3553(a ) fa ctors and n o t s i m ply the Guideline depar tures. The district c ourt even stated that Fuson’s sentenc e amounted to a “ varia nce” from the Guidelines. ( See, e .g., J .A. 98 (“I think of all these kinds of ca ses, this is one where the nature and the circ umstances of

how the off

ense oc curr ed .
. . j u s tify a deviation or variance from the g uid e l i n e s . ” ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d ) )
. ) A n d a l t h o u g h t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtr e m ar k e d t h a t“ t h e a

p p r o pr ia te sentenc e in this c ase is at the le vel 10,” ( id. 96 ), we c on c lud e the c ourt wa s me re ly

ind ic a tin g (a lbe it
unnece ssarily

) where the sentence would fall if it wer e der ived from the G uidelines. The c ourt was
no t, a s th e Go ve rnme nt c on te nd s, “ re c omm itt ing ” the same Gu ide lin e -d e pa rt ur e e rr or s we fo un d in Fuson I
. C. Re as ona ble ne ss The g overnme nt f

urther contends that even as a non- Guidelines sentenc e under § 3553(a) , Fuson’s se ntence is unreasona ble, both proce durally

and substantively . We disag ree .No. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 9 - 1. Pr oc e dura l Re a so na ble ne ss A s e n te n c e ma

y b e p r o c e d

u r a ll y u n r e a s o n a

b le if th e d is tr ic t c o u rt f a il s to c onsider the applicable Guidelines ra

ng e or ne g lects to consider the ot her factor s listed in § 3553(a) and instea d simply selec ts what the cour

t deems an a

ppropriate sentenc e. Colli ngton , 461 F.3d at 808 (citi ng United States v. W

ebb , 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6 t h C i r. 2 005)). He re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt c or re c tly calc ulated the Guide lines rang e of twenty -four to thirty months, and the Government c oncede d that this rang e wa s rea sonable. The court then inde pendently considere d and faithfully applied the § 3553(a) fac tors , s p ec i fi cally discussing the nature and cir cumstance s of the off ense a nd Fuson’s his tor y and c ha ra cte ri st ics ( see § 3 55 3( a )( 1) ); the ne e d f or the se nte nc e imp os e d to pr ov ide jus t punis hme nt (see § 3553(a) (2)( A)), to a ffor d adequa te deter renc e ( see § 3553(a) (2)( B) ), and to p r o te ct th e public ( see § 3 55 3( a )( 2) (C )) ; th e ne e d to a vo id u nw arr ante d s e nte nc ingdis pa ri tie s ( see § 3553(a) (6)) ; a

nd the need to pr ovide restitution ( see § 355 3( a )( 7) ). F or pr oc e dura l r e a so na

ble ne ss, this is all t hat we r equire
. Se e Da v is , 458 F.3d at 495 (noting that sentenc e “satisfies eac h of [the] proce dural re quirements and inde ed ca n fairly be desc ribed as a t h o ro u gh application of the § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s” whe re th e jud g e us e d th e a pp ro pr ia te ve rs ion

of the Gu ide lin e s a

nd c or re c tly calc ulated the Guide lines rang e, considere d the ava ilability of Guidel i n es departure s, and ind e pe nd e ntl y

c on sid e re d a

nd fa ith fu lly a pp lie d e a c h o f t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s) ; see also Coll ington , 46 1 F .3 d at 809 (s e nte nc e wa s p ro c e dura lly re a so na ble e ve n th ou g h d istri c t c ourt did no t e xplic itl yNo. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 10 - name e ach of

the § 3553(a ) fa ctors it used to arr ive at the se ntence ). We there fore conclude the district court imposed a pr ocedur ally rea sonable sente nce. 2. Sub sta

nti ve Re a so na

ble ne ss Whe n a dis tr ic t c ourt

c on sid e rs the re le va

nt § 35 53 (a ) f

a c tor s in de pth and re a c he s it s deter mination that the appropriate sentenc e var ies from the a dvi s o ry Gu i d elines ra ng e, we are reluc tant to find the sentenc e unre asonable
. Id. at 811. Nonethele ss, a sentenc e may be conside red substantively

unrea sonable whe n the district court sele cts the sentence arbitrar ily , bases the se ntence
on imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, fa ils to c on sid e r pe rt ine nt § 35 53 (a ) fa c tor s, or g ive s an un reason a ble
amoun t o f we i gh t t o any pertinent fa ctor. Id
. at 8 0 8 (c i t i n g W ebb , 403 F.3d at 383). When the district court indepe ndently chooses to deviate from the advisory Guidelines rang e (w hether above
or be low it) , w e a pp ly a fo rm of pr op or

tio na lity re vie w: “ [T]he fa rt he r the jud g e ’s se nte nc e de pa rt s from the guidelines sentence
. . . the more c ompelling the justification based on fa ctors in sec tion 3553(a) ” must be. Da v is , 458 F.3d at 496 (citations omitted). Da v is and Colli ngton g uide our de cis i o n h er e. I n Da v is , we he ld that a district court’s downwar d varia

nce f rom the Guidelines wa s substantively unrea sonable. Id. at 500. There , a jury convicted the defe ndant of bank fraud, and the di strict court de termined the G uidelines sentenc ing rang e to be thirty

to thirty -seve n months. Id. at 494. Under § 3553(a) , the district court imposed a lower se ntence , relying he avily on three fac tors: the defe ndant was se venty y ear s old, fourtee n y ear s had ela psed since he committed the offense, and the offense was a white- collar c rime. See id. The sentenc e amounted to one day in prison, three y ear s of supervise d rele ase ( including one y ear of home conf

inement) a

nd 100 hours of c ommunity service
. Id. at 495.No. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 11 - This Court vacate d the sentenc e, conc luding it was substantively unrea sonable. The Court noted that the one- day

prison sentenc e amounted to an extraordinary varia nce from the Guide lines
ra ng e of thi rt

y to thi rt y -s e ve n mont

hs and that th e c ir c ums tanc e s d id n ot j us tif y that va ri anc e . F ir st, the Court e x plained that the fourtee n-y ear g ap betwe en convic tion and sentenc e did not support such
a dr a ma tic a lly

re du c e d s e nte nc e “ and ind e e d ma y no t su pp or t a va ri anc e a t a ll” be c a

us e “ [t]ime intervals of this sort appe ar now here in” the list of § 3553(a) fac tors. Id. at 497. Second, the Court noted that al t houg h Booke r g ives the district court “ a fr eer hand to ac count for [disfavore d sentenc ing f

actor s such as] the defe ndant’s ag e in its sentenc ing calc ulus unde r § 3553(a) than it had befor e Bo ok

e r, ” the de fenda

nt’s ag e did no t warr ant the one- day sentenc e whe re the defe ndant’s fra ud cause d over $900,000 in losses, he did not re pay the l o s t m o ney , he did not acc ept responsibility

for his cr ime, and he ha d y et to show rem o rs e. The Court also expl ained that the sentenc e lef

t no room to ma

ke rea soned distinctions between the de fenda nt’s sentenc e and se ntence s
more wor thy defe ndants may

deser ve. See id. at 499. Third, the Court re jected the district court’s relianc e on the white- collar nature of the crime to re duce the sentenc e, explaining that “[o]ne of the centr al re asons for c reating the se ntencingg uidelines
. . . was to ensur e stiffe r pena lties for whitecollar c rime and to e liminate disparities betwee n white-c ollar sentenc es and se ntenc es for other
c r im e s .” Id . Thus, althoug h the Court rec og nized that the district court “re tains ample discre tion to gra n t [t he def

endant] a var iance on this recor d,” the one -day sentenc e on these “less-thanextraordinary

fac ts” was unr easona

ble. Id. at 500. I n Colli ngton , on the other hand, we upheld a district c ourt’s downwa rd var iance from the Guidelines. There , the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of over f

ifty g rams of c rac k coca ineNo. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 12 - with intent to dis tribute; being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm; and unla wfu l possession of a
ma c hin e g un . 461 F .3 d at 806
. Th e dis tr ic t court de te rm ine d th e Gu ide lin e se nte nc ingra ng e wo uld be 188 to 235 months. Id. at 807. The district c ourt then var ied downwa rd fr om this rang e base d
on the de fe nd ant’ s ( 1) c ri min a l hi sto ry (h e ha d be e n impr iso ne d for on ly se ve n mont hs be fo re thi s
c ri me and thi s in c ide nt w a s th e fi rs t ti me thi s q ua nti ty of dr ug s a nd g un s h a d b een f

ound in h is possession); (2) fa

mily history (his fathe r was murdere d when the def endant wa s nine y ear s old, and t h e d ef en d an t ’s m o t h er

d i edo f c an ce r t wo y ea rs l at er ); an d (3 ) age (t h e d ef en d an twa s y o u n g en o u gh that he might re form and le ad a pr oductive life w hen re lease d from prison in his mid-thirties). Id.
a t 80 9. Con sid e ri ngthe se fa c tor s, the dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc e d th e de fe nd ant to 12 0 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt w ithfi ve y e ars of su pe rv ise d r e le a se . Not ing that the dis tr ic t c ourt “ c ou c he d a ll o f i ts
re as o n s fo r [ t h e d ef

en d an t ’s ] s en t en ce i nt h e f ac t o rs l i s t edi ns ec t i o n3 5 5 3 (a )” an d d i d n o t“a s s i gn
an unre asonable amount of weig ht to any of the fac tors it considered,” this Court upheld the sentence as substantively

rea sonable. We conclude F uson’s sentenc e is substantively rea sonable. I n contra st to the district court in Da v is , which relied heavily (and nearly exclusively) on disfavor ed or imprope r sentenc ing f actor s (time lapse be fore sentenc e, age o f t h e d efendant, and the white-c ollar nature of the c rime), the dis tr ic t c ourt here rel ie d mo re on the “ natur e and

c ir c ums tanc e s” of

the of fe ns e and pr op e rl y
c on sid e re d “ his tor

y and c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f t

he de fe nd ant” un de r § 35 53 (a )( 1) , n oti ngc e rt a in particula rly unique fa ctors: Fuson’ s wife boug ht the g un, which wa s an antique; it was not boug ht fo r any cri mi na l pu

rp os e ; and

F us on ’s c ri min a l r e c or d, c omp ri se d o f r e la tiv e ly min or pr e dic a te offe nses, was unble mished for the pa st seven y ear s. The cour t’s application of the § 3553(a) fa ctorsNo. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 13 - here was thus akin to the district cour t’s rea sonable sente nce in Colli ngton . And although the district court re marke d that Fuson wa s working and supporting hi s family , the cour t did not rely

heavily on thi s fa ctor, even noting that it was disfavore d. The district cour t retains discre tion to give suc h dis fa vo re d f a c tor s some weig ht. Se e, e .g ., Da v is 458 F.3d at 498 (district court ha s a “f ree r hand” to c on sid e r d isf

a vo re d f a c tor s) ; Jack

son , 408 F.3d at 305 n.3 (“To the extent that the district court in resente ncing relies o n an y fac tors [t hat] are de emed by the Guidelines to be pr ohibited or dis c oura g e d .
. . , th e dis tr ic t c ourt wi ll n e e d to a dd

re ss t he se pr ov isi on s and

de c ide wh a t w e ig ht, if any , to a ffor d them in lig ht of Booke r .”). H ad the c ourt relied he avily on improper f

actor s, such as F us on ’s fa

mil y sit uatio n, our t a sk

wo uld be mor e dif

fi c ult
. I n sum, a lth ou g h we de e m this ca se to approa ch the bounda

ry of the district c ourt’s broa der se ntencingdiscretion under Booke r , it does not cross the line. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the sentenc e imposed by district court.No. 05-3782

USA v. Fuson

- 14 - J UL I A SMI TH GI BB ONS, Circuit J udg e, conc urring . Wh i le deter mining that F uson’s
se nte nc e is p ro c e dura lly

re a so na ble is r e la tiv e ly

e a sy , it is f ar l e ss o bv iou s th a t the se nte nc e is
s u b s ta n ti v e ly r e a s o n a

b le
. N e v e rth e le s s , a f

te r mu c h c o n s id e r a ti o n , I jo in th e ma jo r it y opinion’s
c on c lus ion

tha t th e se nte nc e sh ou ld be a ff ir me d. In r e a c hin g thi s r e su lt, an im po rt ant p oin t f

or me is that six months home confinement wa s imposed as a c ondition of probation; another is that Fus o n ’ s p e r io d o f s u

p e r v is io n is th e maxim

u m p e r mi tt e d b y s tatute
. Y e t, o th e r f a c to rs counse l
a g a ins t a de te rm inatio n o f sub sta

nti ve re a so na

ble ne ss i n my

min d. Many

de fe nd ants c ha

rg e d w ith violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ) evide nce no intent to use the wea pon in a violent manner , support the ir fa mil ie s, and

have no t be e n in

tr ou ble fo r a lon g tim e . I t is hard

fo r m e to s e e wh y

thi s defe ndant was de servingof a ve ry lenient sentenc e, whi le others similarly situated have serve d pr iso n s e nte nc e s. Imus t a c kn ow le dg e , h ow e ve r, that distr ic t c ourt s p os t- Booke r have se ntencing dis c re tio n th a t in so me c ir c ums tanc e s pe rm its su c h dis pa ri ty . A nd Ia g re e wi th t

he ma jor ity that th is
c a se dif fe rs fr om Da v is , in which our court found a one- day sentenc e base d on the def endant’ s ag e, white-c olla

r o f f e n s e , an d th e p a s s a g e o f

ti me s u b s ta n ti v e ly u n r e a s o n a

b le
. Ith e r e f

o r e c o n c u r, ag ree ing that the sentenc e does not cross the boundary line of a district court’s broader sentenc ing discretion under Bo ok

e r.