SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4305-18

ARCHANNA RANA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY

PROPERTY & CASUALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 

Defendant-Respondent.

Argued February 1, 2021 – Decided March 22, 2021

Before Judges Currier and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1722-17.

Salomao Nascimento argued the cause for appellant 

(Epstein Ostrove, LLC, attorneys; Salomao 

Nascimento, on the briefs).

Ryan J. Gaffney argued the cause for respondent 

(Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, PC, 

attorneys; John V. Mallon, of counsel and on the brief; 

Ryan J. Gaffney, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

In this personal injury claim arising out of an automobile accident, 

plaintiff Archanna Rana appeals from a May 2, 2019 order for final judgment 

granted in favor of defendant Allstate New Jersey Property & Casualty 

Insurance Company following a three-day jury trial. We affirm.

We derive the facts from the testimony elicited at trial. Plaintiff was

involved in an automobile accident with another vehicle in March 2016. 

Because the other car left the accident scene, plaintiff pursued a claim for 

uninsured motorist benefits against Allstate. She also applied for personal injury 

benefits (PIP) through Allstate.

Several weeks after the accident, plaintiff sought care from a chiropractor. 

She was experiencing pain in her neck and low back as well as her shoulders.

After several months of treatment, the chiropractor referred plaintiff to an 

orthopedic surgeon, who sent plaintiff for MRI scans and an EMG, and 

recommended physical therapy. Plaintiff testified she completed her treatment

in October 2016.

In June 2018, plaintiff consulted with Dr. Sheref Hassan for a second 

opinion regarding her continuing pain in her neck and shoulders. In his 

subsequent report, he diagnosed plaintiff with bilateral partial rotator cuff tears 
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and rotator cuff tendinosis and bursitis. Because the condition was worse in her

left shoulder, the doctor recommended left shoulder arthroscopy with a potential 

need for a similar surgery on the right shoulder. The doctor opined: "[T]he 

estimated cost of such future treatments including the planned arthroscopic 

surgery, anesthesia, medications, injections, physical therapy and facility fees is 

approximately $100,000 per shoulder." 

Prior to trial, the parties preserved Dr. Hassan's testimony in a de bene 

esse videotaped deposition. Defense counsel objected to the doctor's description 

of the surgery and to his estimation of the surgery costs and requested the court 

edit the videotape prior to playing it for the jury. 

In considering defendant's editing requests, the trial judge stated:

First and foremost, as far as the doctor talking about his 

recommendation being that the patient would need or 

he would recommend surgery on the shoulder, I don't 

have any problem with that, and I think that . . . can be 

dealt with by cross, which has, in fact, taken place, and 

he gave at one point a very brief description of the 

procedure that he apparently provided to the patient.

However, I have a great deal of difficulty accepting his 

testimony that talks about this very detailed description 

of what this surgery would entail, including anchoring.

Now, that's one thing. If the surgery took place, 

obviously, the doctor can testify to all of that. But the 

mere fact that he has recommended surgery should not 
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give him the opportunity to tell this jury all of the 

details of what the surgery would entail.

First and foremost, we don't know what would happen 

at surgery until the surgery is performed. Anything 

could happen.

Second of all, it's highly speculative in nature. We 

don't even know if this person is, in fact, going to have 

surgery. She saw the doctor one time, has never been 

back to see him again. . . . And I have no problem with 

his saying that [he] would recommend . . . surgery. I 

have no problem with that and no problem with the very 

beginning where he gives a very brief description of 

what the surgery would entail. But once he starts going 

into all of the details . . . concerning anchoring and 

things of that sort, whatever probative value that would 

have, which would be highly questionable at this point, 

simply because it's so speculative in nature as to 

whether there is even going to be surgery, would be 

certainly outweighed by the prejudicial impact. 

Because if the jury starts hearing all of this, it makes 

the injury sound a lot more severe than it might 

otherwise be. We don't know what's going to happen.

Now, if the surgery had taken place, that's a totally 

different story, then he certainly would be permitted to 

testify to everything that occurred during the surgical 

procedure. But when you have a doctor who sees the 

patient one time, has not treated her in any sense of the 

word, has done nothing, she's never gone back for 

follow-ups, there is no indication that she is even 

intending [to] have surgery, for him to go into that kind 

of detail . . . I have difficulty with that.

I also have difficulty with, and I feel it should not go 

before the jury, what the cost of this particular surgical 

procedure would be. It comes out to about $100,000. 
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Well, number one, we don't know if it's going to 

happen. Number two, we don't know what the actual 

bill is going to be if it were to happen. Number three, 

we don't even know what would be boardable. I don't 

know what would be boardable. Maybe it's going to be 

covered, maybe it's not going to be covered. But to 

throw out a figure like that to the jury, at this point, 

again, for something that may never happen, I think is 

highly prejudicial, and that should not come in.

In addition, because plaintiff did not have a claim for economic damages, the 

judge found the cost of the surgery was not relevant.

During the discussion, plaintiff requested the court prohibit references to 

a prior 2010 motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff sustained injuries and 

sought medical treatment. According to plaintiff, all of her injuries had resolved 

prior to the 2016 accident and no doctor attributed any or all of her current 

injuries to the prior accident. The judge responded:

Here is the interesting point. And this may go to 

credibility. When you say no doctor has done it, it's 

because nobody ever bothered to get the records of the 

prior accident. Don't you think that that's something 

that a jury should consider?

I mean, this woman had a prior accident, okay? And on 

issues of credibility, if she's asked, . . . what kind of 

treatment did you receive, how long was that treatment? 

You don't think that a jury has a right to know that?

Now, I understand that you're in a position where 

nobody can give an analysis here of a breakdown, but 

here is the problem: The problem is, there are no 
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records, there is no analysis, because none were ever 

provided. This doctor never sought them.

And in fact, I think on cross examination there was 

some question to the effect that you didn't think you 

would ask for this stuff? Wouldn't you want to see it? 

Wouldn't you want – I mean, it's almost unheard of that 

as a treating doctor you're not going to even ask for 

prior records. But don't you think that that goes to 

weight and credibility that a jury should be permitted to 

at least consider that?

In addition, defense counsel informed the judge that her medical expert, Hervey 

Sicherman, M.D., had reviewed records from the prior accident and included a 

discussion of them in his report. The judge denied plaintiff's motion and ruled 

that the parties could refer to the 2010 accident. 

During her trial testimony, plaintiff told the jury that Dr. Hassan 

recommended surgery for both of her shoulders. When plaintiff's counsel 

inquired whether plaintiff had undergone the surgeries, defense counsel 

objected. 

During the sidebar, the judge asked plaintiff's counsel if plaintiff was 

going to tell the jury she had not undergone surgery because of the cost. The 

judge said plaintiff could not give cost as a reason because she had not made a 

claim for economic damages and there was no evidence whether the surgery 

would be covered by insurance or PIP. Outside the presence of the jury, 
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plaintiff's counsel instructed plaintiff not to refer to the potential cost of the 

surgery.

In front of the jury, plaintiff's counsel again asked plaintiff why she had 

not had surgery. She said she was "scared." "There is a lot of stuff that can

happen, go wrong and I'm just not ready for that surgery right now." 

When questioned about the prior 2010 accident, plaintiff stated she injured 

her neck and shoulders and treated with a chiropractor and physical therapist.

She told the jury she treated for those injuries for approximately a year but then 

"got . . . back to . . . normal." 

During the direct examination of Dr. Sicherman, defense counsel 

questioned him about his review of plaintiff's MRI films and asked if the doctor 

had the films with him. The doctor said he did not. At sidebar, defense counsel 

stated she had sent the films to the courthouse. No one knew if the films had 

arrived. Plaintiff's counsel stated he did not have a copy with him. The judge 

told counsel they should have worked the issue out before trial began and they 

would have to proceed with what they had. Dr. Sicherman then testified 

regarding his findings on the MRI films consistent with what was written in his 

report. There was no objection to the testimony. 
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Dr. Sicherman reviewed MRI films taken of plaintiff's neck and back after 

the 2010 accident. He testified they showed degenerative changes. In his review 

of 2016 MRI films, Dr. Sicherman stated they showed continuing degenerative 

changes. The expert opined plaintiff had not suffered any permanent injury in 

the 2016 accident.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant and the court entered an 

order for final judgment.1

On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred: (1) in barring Dr. Hassan's 

testimony regarding the details and costs of the recommended shoulder surgery; 

and (2) in allowing references to the prior 2010 motor vehicle accident. Plaintiff 

also asserts the admonishment of her counsel deprived her of a fair trial. 

In reviewing allegations of error in a trial court's evidential ruling, we are 

"limited to examining the decision for abuse of discretion." Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 

194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008) (citing Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31 (2007)). In 

other words, "[i]n light of the broad discretion afforded to trial judges, an 

appellate court evaluates a trial court's evidentiary determinations with 

substantial deference." State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 449 (2017) (citing State v. 

1 The case proceeded only on the issue of damages. The jury found plaintiff 

had not proven she sustained a permanent injury proximately caused by the 

March 2016 motor vehicle accident. 
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Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 385 (2015)). "Thus, [this court] will reverse an 

evidentiary ruling only if it 'was so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of 

justice resulted.'" Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016) 

(quoting Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492 (1999)).

Plaintiff argues the testimony Dr. Hassan attempted to offer regarding a 

recommended arthroscopic surgery was necessary as it would have helped the 

jury understand the nature and complexity of the shoulder injury. We disagree. 

Plaintiff went to Dr. Hassan on one occasion. She testified at trial that she did 

not plan to undergo the recommended surgery because she was afraid of it. A 

description of a surgery plaintiff did not undergo, and furthermore, one which 

she did not plan to have, is not relevant to any analysis of the permanency of her 

injuries.

Plaintiff had the burden to show she had a permanent injury resulting from

the 2016 accident. A description of a surgical procedure did not "have[] a 

tendency in reason to prove or disprove" whether plaintiff sustained permanent 

injuries that required surgery. See R. 401. The jury was apprised of Dr. Hassan's 

diagnoses of plaintiff's injuries, his opinion that she sustained a permanent 

injury, his recommended treatment, including the arthroscopic procedure, and 
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his opinion that even with surgery, plaintiff might not return to her pre-accident 

functionality.

Even if the details of the recommended procedure were determined 

relevant, the trial judge found any probative value was outweighed by the risk 

of prejudice under N.J.R.E. 403 as the jury would hear about a surgery that 

plaintiff did not intend to have. Therefore, the "trial court's weighing of 

probative value against prejudicial effect 'must stand [because] it can[not] be 

shown that the trial court palpably abused its discretion, that is, that its finding 

was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'" Cole, 229 

N.J. at 449 (quoting State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106 (1982)).

The same reasoning applies to the testimony regarding the costs of the 

proposed surgery. Plaintiff argues before this court that she did not have 

sufficient PIP coverage to pay the surgical costs and the jury should have been 

informed of that fact. She states this is another reason why she did not have the 

surgery and the jury should have considered it as a future economic claim.

However, plaintiff did not plead a claim for economic damages. Nor did 

she tell the judge during the discussion of the editing of Dr. Hassan's videotaped 

testimony that she did not have the surgery because she could not afford it. In 

addition, the surgery was speculative; as stated, plaintiff did not intend to have 
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it. Therefore, the court properly denied the testimony under its Rule 403 

balancing analysis. Without any information as to the true costs, and whether 

some portion of the costs might be covered by PIP benefits or health insurance, 

any proffered figure was not grounded in fact nor could it be subject to crossexamination. 

We discern no error in the references to plaintiff's prior motor vehicle 

accident. She told the jury she had injured her neck and back in that accident.

During a defense medical examination conducted for the prior accident, she 

described injuring her neck and shoulder in the 2010 incident. Here, plaintiff 

informed the jury she hurt her neck, back and shoulders in the 2016 accident. 

However, plaintiff stated she had fully recovered from her prior injuries.

Dr. Sicherman provided testimony that imaging studies done in 2010 and 

2016 showed plaintiff had degenerative changes in her neck and back in 2010 

and 2016. Therefore, there was testimony before the jury that plaintiff's 

condition was not caused solely or at all by the 2016 motor vehicle accident but 

instead, partially or wholly, from a degenerative condition. Defendant 

established a sufficient logical connection between the injuries sustained in the 

two accidents for the jury to hear of the prior accident, alleged injuries and 
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medical treatment. See Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enters., 266 N.J. Super. 662 

(App. Div. 1993); Paxton v. Misiuk, 34 N.J. 453 (1961).

We are unpersuaded by plaintiff's contention that her counsel was 

admonished by the judge before the jury, resulting in an unfair trial. The record 

reflects that the discussion regarding the MRI films occurred at sidebar. The 

judge did not single out plaintiff's counsel; to the contrary, the judge stated 

during the sidebar conversation that both counsel should have resolved the issue 

of production of the films before trial. That ended the discussion. Plaintiff has 

not demonstrated any error, much less an accumulation of errors that deprived 

her of a fair trial. 

Affirmed.