In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-14-00245-CR 

________________________

STEVEN EDWARD BOYD, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the 47th District Court 

Randall County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 24,143-A; Honorable Dan Schaap, Presiding 

 

August 22, 2014 

 

ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. 

By opinion and judgment dated August 1, 2014, this Court dismissed the appeal 

of Appellant, Steven Edward Boyd, based on the Trial Court’s Certification of 

Defendant’s Right to Appeal. On August 7, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se “Notice of 

Appeal—Suppression Hearing” in this Court. Appellant also filed a motion for the 

appointment of counsel on appeal and a motion for a reporter’s record of the 

suppression hearing. In the interest of justice, we construe Appellant’s notice as a 
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timely filed motion for rehearing wherein Appellant maintains he has the right to appeal

the trial court’s ruling on a suppression hearing. Remaining convinced our original 

disposition was correct, we deny the motion for rehearing with these additional 

comments.

According to the limited documents before this Court, Appellant and the State 

entered into a plea-bargain wherein he agreed to enter a plea of guilty to the offense of 

robbery in exchange for a recommended sentence of 30 years and dismissal of another 

charge pending in trial court cause number 24,142-A. On June 17, 2014, the trial court 

accepted Appellant’s plea and imposed sentence in accordance with that agreement. In 

a plea-bargain case, a defendant retains the right to appeal matters that have been 

raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, or after getting the trial court’s 

permission to appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). A pretrial ruling on a motion to 

suppress is ordinarily one of those matters that may be appealed after sentencing in a 

plea-bargain case. 

Here, the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal reflects that, 

not only is this is a plea-bargain case, Appellant also waived his right of appeal. On 

June 18, 2014, Appellant filed a signed waiver, also executed by Appellant’s trial 

attorney, which provides that:

after having been sentenced or punished by the Court in accordance with 

the terms of my plea bargain agreement with the State, and being fully 

aware of the sentence or punishment imposed . . . and after having been 

fully informed by the Court of my right to appeal (including my right to have 

counsel appointed by the Court to represent me on appeal . . . and my 

right to have the Court furnish the appellate record without charge or 

expense to me . . .), [I] do hereby voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 

waive my right to appeal. 
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A waiver of appeal made after sentence is imposed is sufficient to prevent a defendant 

from appealing, absent the trial court’s consent. Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Jamison v. State, No. 01-13-00360-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 

3734, *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] April 8, 2014, no pet.)(mem. op., not 

designated for publication).

Because Appellant waived his right to appeal after sentence was imposed, he 

has no right of appeal pertaining to the trial court’s pretrial ruling on his motion to 

suppress. Without a certification showing Appellant received the trial court’s permission 

to appeal, his appeal must be dismissed. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Dears v. State, 154 

S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, Appellant’s motion for rehearing

is denied. His motions for appointment of counsel and a reporter’s record of the 

suppression hearing are rendered moot.

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice

Do not publish.