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CORRECTED: NOVEMBER 2, 2017 

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 2, 2017 

TO BE PUBLISHED 

SAINT AUGUSTINE SCHOOL; 

DIOCESE OF COVINGTON 

APPELLANTS 

v. 

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS 

CASE NO. 2014-CA-001518 

. BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-00024 

JANET CROPPER APPELLEE 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE MINTON 

AFFIRMING AND REMANDING 

Janet Cropper was dismissed from her job as the lay administrator of 

Saint Augustine School, an elementary school affiliated with the Roman 

Catholic Diocese of Coving~on. She then brought this action against the 

diocese, the school, and the pastor of the Saint Augustine Churchl, claiming 

damages for, among other theories of recovery, breach of her ~mployment 

contract. On discretionary review, we hold that the trial court ~d the Court of 

Appeals panel did not err when they ruled-for·different reasons-that Cropper is 

i The appellants are collectively referred to as Saint Augustine in this opinion. 
not barred from asserting her breach-of-contract claim. In affirming the result 

reached by the Court of Appeals panel, we reject the argument from the diocese 

that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine' bars this breach of contract claim. 

Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 

The Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington employed-Janet Cropper to be 

the lay administrator of Saint Augustine School for the 2011-12 academic year. 

Near the ·end of the 2011-12 school tehn, the diocese renewed Cropper's 

employment contra~t for the following academic year. But on the eve of the 

opening of the school term, Father Gregory Bach, Saint Augustine's Pastor, 

informed Cropper that her job as lay administrator was eliminated and her 

employment with the diocese was terminated, stemming from the school's 

declining enrollment and dwindling operating fu~ds. 

Cropper then sued Saint Augustine 'for, among other theories of recovery, 

breach of her employment contract. Both Cropper and Saint Augustine filed 

motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of Cropper that 

her claims were not barred by the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine but 

ultimately ruled in favor of Saint Augustine that, as a matter of ~aw, Cropper 

· could not show a breach of her employment contract. Cropper appealed the 

trial court'~ decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 

determination that Cropper could not prove a breach of contract and remanded 

- . 

. the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The appeals panel rejected 

2 
· the application of the ministerial-exception doctrine without mentioning.the· 

application of the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine. 

·II. ANALYSIS. 

A. Standard of Review. 

We review a trial court's granting of a party's summary judgment motion 

de novo.2 "On appeal, '[t]he standard of review ... of a summru:y judgment is 

whether the circuit judge correctly found that there were no issues as to any 

material fact and that the moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter · 

of law."'3 

B. Substantive Analysis. 

Saint Augustine argues that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine bars 

Cropper from asserting a claim for damages for breach of her employment 

contract. As a matter of clarification, both the ecclesiastical-abstention and 

ministerial-exception doctrines operate as affirmative defens~s. not as 

jurisdiCtional bars, that the party asserting the defenses bears the burden of 

proving.4 

We note that Saint Augustine not only did not argue 1;hat the ministerial-

' ' 

exception doctrine applies in its defense, but ~pecifically asserted that it is not 

arguing for the application of this doctri~e to the facts of this case: 

2 Caniffv. CSX Transp., Inc.~ 438 S.W.3d 368, 372 (Ky. 2014). 

s Id. (quoting Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat'l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 

2002)). 

4 Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 607-08 (Ky. 2014) 

("ministerial exception is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved"); 

. Saint Joseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727, 737 (Ky. 2014) 

("ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine is an affirmative defense"). 

3 
" ... Appellants are not pursuing their ministerial exception defense .. .Instead, 

Appellants are taking their stand solely on [the] broader abstention 

. doctrine .... "5 So we will not analyze the ministerial exception and it~ possible 

application to this case and confine our analysis to the ecclesiasticalabstention doctrine. 

1. Ecclesiastical-Abstention Doctrl.ne. 

The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits secular courts from 

adjudicating predominantly religious issues, such as disputes relating to faith, 

doctrine, and denominational governance because doing so violates the 

Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.6 We 

recognized the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine in Kentucky law in Kirby v. 

Lexington Theological Seminary: 

At bottom, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is primarily 

interested in preventing any chilling effect on church practices as a 

result of government intrusion in the form of sec:ular courts. But 

when the case merely involves a church, or even a minister, but 

does not require the interpretation of actual church doctrine, 

courts need not invoke the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. No 

entanglement concern arises as a result of the mere inference of 

religion. Courts must "look not at the label placed on the action 

but at the actual Issues the court has been asked to decide."7 

This court in Saint Joseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards also expounded . 

on the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine: 

But churches are not the only [beneficiaries] of ecclesiastical 

abstention. All religious organizations are entitled to protection 

under the First Amendment, so all suits that present an 

ecclesiastical character, those "which concern theological 

s Brief for Appellant at 31. 

6 Saint Joseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727 (Ky. 2014); 133 

Am. Jur. Trials 379, § 7 (2014). 

1 426 S.W.3d 597, 619 (Ky. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 

4 
controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the 

conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals 

. required of them" fall within the scope of the ecclesiasticalabstention doctrine.a · 

Und~r the .ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, the question at the heart of 

whether Cropper's contract claim should be allowed is "whether [Cropper's] 

breach of contract claim can be decided without wading into doctrinal waters. "9 

Simply stated, deciding Cropper's breach of contract claim does not 

require application of church law or doctrine. In fact, Saint Augustine's 

justification for the Cropper's dismissal stems from declining student 

enrollment and shrinking revenues. No matter the extent of Cropper's 

involvement in the religious life of Saint Augustine, adjudicating her damages 

claim for breach of her employment contract does not require the secular 

court's "wading into doctrinal waters"; it is simply the termination of the lay 

administrator at a parochial school. Even if Cropper had been a prominent 

actor in the religious life of the community, unless Saint Augustine fired her for 

reasons associated with the application of church doctrine or governance, the 

ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine would not apply. 

This case mirrors the factual circumstances of Kirby almost perfectly. In 

Kirby, this court held the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine not to apply to a 

breach-of-contract claim raised by a tenured professor, Kirby, who taught 

Christian social ethics at the Lexington Theological Sem.inary.10 The Seminary 

a 449 S.W.3d at 739. 

9 Id. at 620. 

10 Kirby v. Le'xington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 601 (Ky. 2~14). 

5 
terminated Kirby's position because of a "tsunami of economic disasters" 

causing the Seminary's budget to shri~k dramatically.11 In this case, Cropper 

·was the lay administrator-the principal-of Saint Augustine School, which . . 

terminated her position because enrollment was dropping and money was 

tight. We follow this Court's rejection of the Lexington Theology Seminary's 

ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine defen~e in Kirby by rejecting Saint 

Augustine's ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine defense today. 

Therefore, we hold that the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine affirmative· 

defense does not apply in this case because Cropper's "breach-of-contract 

. . 

claim requires no inspection or evaluation of church doctrine. Neutral 

principles of law can be applied. According, the ecclesiastical abstention 

doctrine does not apply .... "12 

III. CONCLUSION. 

We affirm the result-reached by the Court of Appeals panel and hold that 

the ecclesiastical abstention do?trine does not apply to the facts of this case." 

Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

All sitting. All concur. 

11 Id. at 603. · 

12 Id. at 619. 

6 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: . 

Richard G. Meyer 

Nicholas Charles Birkenhauer 

Dressman Benzinger Lavelle PSC 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 

Gail Marie Langendorf 

Busald, Funk & Zevely, PSC 

7 
ciupr:em:e filnurf nf ~:enfurku 2016-SC-000243-DG 

SAINT AUGUSTINE SCHOOL; 

DIOCESE OF COVINGTON 

v. 

ON R~VIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS 

CASE NO. 2014-CA-001518 

BRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-00024 

JANET CROPPER 

ORDER CORRECTING 

APPELLANTS 

APPELLEE 

The Opinion of the Court rendered November 2, 2017 is corrected on its 

face by substitution of the attached Opinion in lieu of the original Opinion. 

Said correction does not affect the holding of the original Opinion of the 

Court. 

ENTERED: November 2, 2017