(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MEADWESTVACO CORP., SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO
 

MEAD CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF 

REVENUE ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST 

DISTRICT
 

No. 06–1413. Argued January 16, 2008—Decided April 15, 2008 

A State may tax an apportioned share of the value generated by a 

multistate enterprise’s intrastate and extrastate activities that form

part of a “ ‘unitary business.’ ” Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax 

Bd. of Cal., 528 U. S. 458, 460. Illinois taxed a capital gain realized

by Mead, an Ohio corporation that is a wholly owned subsidiary of

petitioner, when Mead sold its Lexis business division. Mead paid

the tax and sued in state court. The trial court found that Lexis and 

Mead were not unitary because they were not functionally integrated 

or centrally managed and enjoyed no economies of scale. It nevertheless concluded that Illinois could tax an apportioned share of Mead’s

capital gain because Lexis served an operational purpose in Mead’s 

business. Affirming, the State Appellate Court found that Lexis

served an operational function in Mead’s business and thus did not 

address whether Mead and Lexis formed a unitary business. 

Held: 

1. The state courts erred in considering whether Lexis served an

“operational purpose” in Mead’s business after determining that 

Lexis and Mead were not unitary. Pp. 6–13. 

(a) The Commerce and Due Process Clauses impose distinct but 

parallel limitations on a State’s power to tax out-of-state activities,

and each subsumes the “broad inquiry” “ ‘whether the taxing power 

exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities

and benefits given by the state,’ ” ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax 

Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307, 315. Because the taxpayer here did business

in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State may 
 

 

 

 

2 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

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Syllabus 

tax to what it may tax. Under the unitary business principle developed to answer that question, a State need not “isolate the intrastate

income-producing activities from the rest of the business” but “may

tax an apportioned sum of the corporation’s multistate business if the

business is unitary.” Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 

504 U. S. 768, 772. Pp. 6–8.

(b) To address the problem arising from the emergence of multistate business enterprises such as railroad and telegraph companies—namely, that a State could not tax its fair share of such a business’ value by simply taxing the capital within its borders—the 

unitary business principle shifted the constitutional inquiry from the 

niceties of geographic accounting to the determination of a taxpayer’s 

business unit. If the value the State wished to tax derived from a 

“unitary business” operated within and without the State, the State

could tax an apportioned share of that business’ value instead of isolating the value attributable to the intrastate operation. E.g., Exxon 

Corp. v. Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U. S. 207, 223. But if the 

value derived from a “discrete business enterprise,” Mobil Oil Corp. 

v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 439, the State could 

not tax even an apportioned share. E.g., Container Corp. of America 

v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 165–166. This principle was extended to a multistate business that lacked the “physical unity” of 

wires or rails but exhibited the “same unity in the use of the entire

property for the specific purpose,” with “the same elements of value 

arising from such use,” Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, 

221; and it has justified apportioned taxation of net income, dividends, capital gain, and other intangibles. Confronting the problem

of how to determine exactly when a business is unitary, this Court 

found in Allied-Signal that the “principle is not so inflexible that as

new [finance] methods . . . and new [business] forms . . . evolve it 

cannot be modified or supplemented where appropriate,” 504 U. S., at

786, and explained that situations could occur in which apportionment might be constitutional even though “the payee and the payor

[were] not . . . engaged in the same unitary business,” id., at 787. In 

that context, the Court observed that an asset could form part of a 

taxpayer’s unitary business if it served an “operational rather than

an investment function” in the business, ibid.; and noted that Container Corp., supra, at 180, n. 19, made the same point. Pp. 8–11.

(c) Thus, the “operational function” references in Container Corp. 

and Allied-Signal were not intended to modify the unitary business

principle by adding a new apportionment ground. The operational

function concept simply recognizes that an asset can be a part of a 

taxpayer’s unitary business even without a “unitary relationship” between the “payor and payee.” In Allied-Signal and in Corn Products 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Syllabus 

Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 46, the conclusion that an asset 

served an operational function was merely instrumental to the constitutionally relevant conclusion that the asset was a unitary part of

the business conducted in the taxing State rather than a discrete asset to which the State had no claim. Container Corp. and AlliedSignal did not announce a new ground for constitutional apportionment, and the Illinois Appellate Court erred in concluding otherwise. 

Here, where the asset is another business, a unitary relationship’s 

“hallmarks” are functional integration, centralized management, and

economies of scale. See Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 438. The trial 

court found each hallmark lacking in finding that Lexis was not a

unitary part of Mead’s business. However, the appellate court made 

no such determination. Relying on its operational function test, it reserved the unitary business question, which it may take up on remand. Pp. 11–13.

2. Because the alternative ground for affirmance urged by the 

State and its amici—that the record amply demonstrates that Lexis

did substantial business in Illinois and that Lexis’ own contacts with 

the State suffice to justify the apportionment of Mead’s capital gain—

was neither raised nor passed upon in the state courts, it will not be

addressed here. The case for restraint is particularly compelling 

here, since the question may impact other jurisdictions’ laws. 

Pp. 13–14. 

371 Ill. App. 3d 108, 861 N. E. 2d 1131, vacated and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J., 

filed a concurring opinion. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–1413 

MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE MEAD CORPORATION, PETITIONER 

v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF
 

ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT
 

[April 15, 2008] 

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Due Process and Commerce Clauses forbid the 

States to tax “‘extraterritorial values.’” Container Corp. of 

America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 164 (1983); 

see also Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 

504 U. S. 768, 777 (1992); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner 

of Taxes of Vt., 445 U. S. 425, 441–442 (1980). A State 

may, however, tax an apportioned share of the value 

generated by the intrastate and extrastate activities of a

multistate enterprise if those activities form part of a 

“‘unitary business.’” Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax 

Bd. of Cal., 528 U. S. 458, 460 (2000); Mobil Oil Corp., 

supra, at 438. We have been asked in this case to decide 

whether the State of Illinois constitutionally taxed an

apportioned share of the capital gain realized by an out-ofstate corporation on the sale of one of its business divisions. The Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the tax and

affirmed a judgment in the State’s favor. Because we 

conclude that the state courts misapprehended the principles that we have developed for determining whether a 
 

2 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

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Opinion of the Court 

multistate business is unitary, we vacate the decision of 

the Appellate Court of Illinois. 

I 

A 

Mead Corporation (Mead), an Ohio corporation, is the

predecessor in interest and a wholly owned subsidiary of 

petitioner MeadWestvaco Corporation. From its founding

in 1846, Mead has been in the business of producing and

selling paper, packaging, and school and office supplies.1 

In 1968, Mead paid $6 million to acquire a company called 

Data Corporation, which owned an inkjet printing technology and a full-text information retrieval system, the 

latter of which had originally been developed for the U. S.

Air Force. Mead was interested in the inkjet printing

technology because it would have complemented Mead’s

paper business, but the information retrieval system

proved to be the more valuable asset. Over the course of 

many years, Mead developed that asset into the electronic 

research service now known as Lexis/Nexis (Lexis). In 

1994, it sold Lexis to a third party for approximately

$1.5 billion, realizing just over $1 billion in capital gain, 

which Mead used to repurchase stock, retire debt, and pay 

taxes. 

Mead did not report any of this gain as business income 

on its Illinois tax returns for 1994. It took the position

that the gain qualified as nonbusiness income that should 

be allocated to Mead’s domiciliary State, Ohio, under 

Illinois’ Income Tax Act (ITA). See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, 

§5/303(a) (West 1994). The State audited Mead’s returns 

and issued a notice of deficiency. According to the State, 

the ITA required Mead to treat the capital gain as busi­

—————— 

1See Prospectus of MeadWestvaco Corporation 3 (Mar. 19, 

2003), online at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1159297/

000119312503085265/d424b5.htm (as visited Apr. 1, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); App. 9. 
 

 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

ness income subject to apportionment by Illinois.2 The 

State assessed Mead with approximately $4 million in

additional tax and penalties. Mead paid that amount 

under protest and then filed this lawsuit in state court. 

The case was tried to the bench. Although the court

admitted expert testimony, reports, and other exhibits into 

evidence, see App. D to Pet. for Cert. 29a–34a, the parties’ 

stipulations supplied most of the evidence of record regarding Mead’s relationship with Lexis, see App. 9–20.

We summarize those stipulations here. 

B 

Lexis was launched in 1973. For the first few years it

was in business, it lost money, and Mead had to keep it 

afloat with additional capital contributions. By the late

1970’s, as more attorneys began to use Lexis, the service

finally turned a profit. That profit quickly became substantial. Between 1988 and 1993, Lexis made more than 

$800 million of the $3.8 billion in Illinois income that 

Mead reported. Lexis also accounted for $680 million of 

the $4.5 billion in business expense deductions that Mead 

—————— 

2When the sale of Lexis occurred in 1994, the ITA defined “business 

income” as “income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer’s trade or business,” as well as “income from 

tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and

disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer’s 

regular trade or business operations.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, 

§5/1501(a)(1) (West 1994). This language mirrors the definition of 

“business income” in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes 

Act (UDITPA). See UDITPA §1(a) (2002); see also §9 (subjecting “[a]ll

business income” to apportionment). In 2004, the Illinois General 

Assembly amended the definition of “business income” to “all income

that may be treated as apportionable business income under the 

Constitution of the United States.” Pub. Act 93–840, Art. 25, §25–5 

(codified at Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, §5/1501(a)(1) (West 2004)); cf. 

Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U. S. 768, 786 

(1992) (declining to adopt UDITPA’s “business income” test as the 

constitutional standard for apportionment). 
4 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

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Opinion of the Court 

claimed from Illinois during that period. 

Lexis was subject to Mead’s oversight, but Mead did not 

manage its day-to-day affairs. Mead was headquartered 

in Ohio, while a separate management team ran Lexis out 

of its headquarters in Illinois. The two businesses maintained separate manufacturing, sales, and distribution 

facilities, as well as separate accounting, legal, human 

resources, credit and collections, purchasing, and marketing departments. Mead’s involvement was generally

limited to approving Lexis’ annual business plan and any 

significant corporate transactions (such as capital expenditures, financings, mergers and acquisitions, or joint

ventures) that Lexis wished to undertake. In at least one 

case, Mead procured new equipment for Lexis by purchasing the equipment for its own account and then leasing it

to Lexis. Mead also managed Lexis’ free cash, which was

swept nightly from Lexis’ bank accounts into an account 

maintained by Mead. The cash was reinvested in Lexis’ 

business, but Mead decided how to invest it. 

Neither business was required to purchase goods or

services from the other. Lexis, for example, was not required to purchase its paper supply from Mead, and indeed Lexis purchased most of its paper from other suppliers. Neither received any discount on goods or services

purchased from the other, and neither was a significant

customer of the other. 

Lexis was incorporated as one of Mead’s wholly owned 

subsidiaries until 1980, when it was merged into Mead

and became one of Mead’s divisions. Mead engineered the

merger so that it could offset its income with Lexis’ net 

operating loss carryforwards. Lexis was separately reincorporated in 1985 before being merged back into Mead in

1993. Once again, tax considerations motivated each

transaction. Mead also treated Lexis as a unitary business in its consolidated Illinois returns for the years 1988

through 1994, though it did so at the State’s insistence 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

and then only to avoid litigation.

Lexis was listed as one of Mead’s “business segment[s]” 

in at least some of its annual reports and regulatory filings. Mead described itself in those reports and filings as

“engaged in the electronic publishing business” and touted 

itself as the “developer of the world’s leading electronic

information retrieval services for law, patents, accounting,

finance, news and business information.” Id., at 93, 59; 

App. D to Pet. for Cert. 38a. 

C 

Based on the stipulated facts and the other exhibits and 

expert testimony received into evidence, the Circuit Court

of Cook County concluded that Lexis and Mead did not 

constitute a unitary business. The trial court reasoned 

that Lexis and Mead could not be unitary because they 

were not functionally integrated or centrally managed and 

enjoyed no economies of scale. Id., at 35a–36a, 39a. The 

court nevertheless concluded that the State could tax an 

apportioned share of Mead’s capital gain because Lexis 

served an “operational purpose” in Mead’s business: 

“Lexis/Nexis was considered in the strategic planning 

of Mead, particularly in the allocation of resources. 

The operational purpose allowed Mead to limit the

growth of Lexis/Nexis if only to limit its ability to expand or to contract through its control of its capital 

investment.” Id., at 38a–39a. 

The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed. Mead Corp. v. 

Department of Revenue, 371 Ill. App. 3d 108, 861 N. E. 2d 

1131 (2007). The court cited several factors as evidence 

that Lexis served an operational function in Mead’s business: (1) Lexis was wholly owned by Mead; (2) Mead had 

exercised its control over Lexis in various ways, such as 

manipulating its corporate form, approving significant 

capital expenditures, and retaining tax benefits and con­
6 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

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Opinion of the Court 

trol over Lexis’ free cash; and (3) Mead had described itself

in its annual reports and regulatory filings as engaged in

electronic publishing and as the developer of the world’s 

leading information retrieval service. See id., at 111–112, 

861 N. E. 2d, at 1135–1136. Because the court found that 

Lexis served an operational function in Mead’s business, it 

did not address the question whether Mead and Lexis

formed a unitary business. See id., at 117–118, 861 

N. E. 2d, at 1140. 

The Supreme Court of Illinois denied review in January 

2007. Mead Corp. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 222 Ill. 2d 

609, 862 N. E. 2d 235 (Table). We granted certiorari. 551 

U. S. ___ (2007). 

II 

Petitioner contends that the trial court properly found

that Lexis and Mead were not unitary and that the Appellate Court of Illinois erred in concluding that Lexis served

an operational function in Mead’s business. According to 

petitioner, the exception for apportionment of income from

nonunitary businesses serving an operational function is a 

narrow one that does not reach a purely passive investment such as Lexis. We perceive a more fundamental

error in the state courts’ reasoning. In our view, the state 

courts erred in considering whether Lexis served an “operational purpose” in Mead’s business after determining 

that Lexis and Mead were not unitary. 

A 

The Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause 

impose distinct but parallel limitations on a State’s power 

to tax out-of-state activities. See Quill Corp. v. North 

Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 305–306 (1992); Mobil Oil Corp., 

445 U. S., at 451, n. 4 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Norfolk & 

Western R. Co. v. Missouri Tax Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 

325, n. 5 (1968). The Due Process Clause demands that 
 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

there exist “‘some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,’” as well as a rational relationship 

between the tax and the “‘“values connected with the 

taxing State.”’” Quill Corp., supra, at 306 (quoting Miller 

Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344–345 (1954), 

and Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 273 (1978)).

The Commerce Clause forbids the States to levy taxes that

discriminate against interstate commerce or that burden

it by subjecting activities to multiple or unfairly apportioned taxation. See Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 170– 

171; Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 644 (1984). 

The “broad inquiry” subsumed in both constitutional 

requirements is “‘whether the taxing power exerted by the

state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and

benefits given by the state’”—that is, “‘whether the state

has given anything for which it can ask return.’” 

ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm’n, 458 U. S. 307, 315 

(1982) (quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 

435, 444 (1940)).

Where, as here, there is no dispute that the taxpayer

has done some business in the taxing State, the inquiry 

shifts from whether the State may tax to what it may tax.

Cf. Allied-Signal, 504 U. S., at 778 (distinguishing Quill 

Corp., supra). To answer that question, we have developed the unitary business principle. Under that principle, 

a State need not “isolate the intrastate income-producing

activities from the rest of the business” but “may tax an

apportioned sum of the corporation’s multistate business if 

the business is unitary.” Allied-Signal, supra, at 772; 

accord, Hunt-Wesson, 528 U. S., at 460; Exxon Corp. v. 

Department of Revenue of Wis., 447 U. S. 207, 224 (1980); 

Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 442; cf. 1 J. Hellerstein & W. 

Hellerstein, State Taxation ¶8.07[1], p. 8–61 (3d ed. 2001–

2005) (hereinafter Hellerstein & Hellerstein). The court 

must determine whether “intrastate and extrastate activi­
 

8 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

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Opinion of the Court 

ties formed part of a single unitary business,” Mobil Oil 

Corp., supra, at 438–439, or whether the out-of-state 

values that the State seeks to tax “‘derive[d] from “unrelated business activity” which constitutes a “discrete 

business enterprise.”’ ” Allied-Signal, supra, at 773 (quoting Exxon Corp., supra, at 224, in turn quoting Mobil Oil 

Corp., supra, at 439 (alteration in original)). We traced 

the history of this venerable principle in Allied-Signal, 

supra, at 778–783, and, because it figures prominently in

this case, we retrace it briefly here. 

B 

With the coming of the Industrial Revolution in the 19th 

century, the United States witnessed the emergence of its 

first truly multistate business enterprises. These railroad, 

telegraph, and express companies presented state taxing 

authorities with a novel problem: A State often cannot tax 

its fair share of the value of a multistate business by 

simply taxing the capital within its borders. The whole of 

the enterprise is generally more valuable than the sum of

its parts; were it not, its owners would simply liquidate it

and sell it off in pieces. As we observed in 1876, “[t]he

track of the road is but one track from one end of it to the 

other, and, except in its use as one track, is of little value.” 

State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 608. 

The unitary business principle addressed this problem 

by shifting the constitutional inquiry from the niceties of 

geographic accounting to the determination of the taxpayer’s business unit. If the value the State wished to tax 

derived from a “unitary business” operated within and

without the State, the State could tax an apportioned 

share of the value of that business instead of isolating the 

value attributable to the operation of the business within 

the State. E.g., Exxon Corp., supra, at 223 (citing 

Moorman Mfg. Co., supra, at 273). Conversely, if the 

value the State wished to tax derived from a “discrete 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

business enterprise,” Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U. S., at 439, 

then the State could not tax even an apportioned share of

that value. E.g., Container Corp., supra, at 165–166. 

We recognized as early as 1876 that the Due Process

Clause did not require the States to assess trackage “in

each county where it lies according to its value there.” 

State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., at 608. We went so far 

as to opine that “[i]t may well be doubted whether any 

better mode of determining the value of that portion of the

track within any one county has been devised than to 

ascertain the value of the whole road, and apportion the 

value within the county by its relative length to the

whole.” Ibid. We generalized the rule of the State Railroad Tax Cases in Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 (1897). There we held that apportionment could permissibly be applied to a multistate business 

lacking the “physical unity” of wires or rails but exhibiting

the “same unity in the use of the entire property for the 

specific purpose,” with “the same elements of value arising 

from such use.” Id., at 221. We extended the reach of the 

unitary business principle further still in later cases, when 

we relied on it to justify the taxation by apportionment of

net income, dividends, capital gain, and other intangibles. 

See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 

113, 117, 120–121 (1920) (net income tax); Bass, Ratcliff & 

Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm’n, 266 U. S. 271, 277, 

280, 282–283 (1924) (franchise tax); J. C. Penney Co., 

supra, at 443–445 (tax on the “privilege of declaring dividends”); cf. Allied-Signal, supra, at 780 (“[F]or constitutional purposes capital gains should be treated as no

different from dividends”); see also 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein ¶8.07[1] (summarizing this history). 

As the unitary business principle has evolved in step

with American enterprise, courts have sometimes found it

difficult to identify exactly when a business is unitary. We 

confronted this problem most recently in Allied-Signal. 
 

10 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

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Opinion of the Court 

The taxpayer there, a multistate enterprise, had realized

capital gain on the disposition of its minority investment 

in another business. The parties’ stipulation left little 

doubt that the taxpayer and its investee were not unitary.

See 504 U. S., at 774 (observing that “the question 

whether the business can be called ‘unitary’ . . . is all but 

controlled by the terms of a stipulation”). The record 

revealed, however, that the taxpayer had used the proceeds from the liquidated investment in an ultimately

unsuccessful bid to purchase a new asset that would have

been used in its unitary business. See id., at 776–777. 

From that wrinkle in the record, the New Jersey Supreme

Court concluded that the taxpayer’s minority interest had 

represented nothing more than a temporary investment of 

working capital awaiting deployment in the taxpayer’s 

unitary business. See Bendix Corp. v. Director, Div. of 

Taxation, 125 N. J. 20, 37, 592 A. 2d 536, 545 (1991). The 

State went even further. It argued that, because there

could be “no logical distinction between short-term investment of working capital, which all concede is apportionable, . . . and all other investments,” the unitary business principle was outdated and should be jettisoned. 504 

U. S., at 784. 

We rejected both contentions. We concluded that “the 

unitary business principle is not so inflexible that as new 

methods of finance and new forms of business evolve it 

cannot be modified or supplemented where appropriate.” 

Id., at 786; see also id., at 785 (“If lower courts have

reached divergent results in applying the unitary business

principle to different factual circumstances, that is because, as we have said, any number of variations on the 

unitary business theme ‘are logically consistent with the

underlying principles motivating the approach’” (quoting 

Container Corp., 463 U. S., at 167)).3 We explained that 

—————— 

3The dissent agreed that the unitary business principle remained 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

situations could occur in which apportionment might be

constitutional even though “the payee and the payor

[were] not . . . engaged in the same unitary business.” 504 

U. S., at 787. It was in that context that we observed that 

an asset could form part of a taxpayer’s unitary business if 

it served an “operational rather than an investment function” in that business. Ibid. “Hence, for example, a State

may include within the apportionable income of a nondomiciliary corporation the interest earned on short-term 

deposits in a bank located in another State if that income

forms part of the working capital of the corporation’s

unitary business, notwithstanding the absence of a unitary relationship between the corporation and the bank.” 

Id., at 787–788. We observed that we had made the same 

point in Container Corp., where we noted that “capital

transactions can serve either an investment function or an 

operational function.” 463 U. S., at 180, n. 19; cf. Corn 

Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U. S. 46, 50 

(1955) (concluding that corn futures contracts in the hands 

of a corn refiner seeking to hedge itself against increases 

in corn prices are operational rather than capital assets), 

cited in Container Corp., supra, at 180, n. 19. 

C 

As the foregoing history confirms, our references to 

“operational function” in Container Corp. and AlliedSignal were not intended to modify the unitary business 

principle by adding a new ground for apportionment. The 

concept of operational function simply recognizes that an

asset can be a part of a taxpayer’s unitary business even if 

—————— 

sound, 504 U. S., at 790 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), but found merit in 

New Jersey’s premise (and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusion) 

that no logical distinction could be drawn between short- or long-term 

investments for purposes of unitary analysis, id., at 793 (“Any distinction between short-term and long-term investments cannot be of 

constitutional dimension”). We need not revisit that question here. 
12 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

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Opinion of the Court 

what we may term a “unitary relationship” does not exist 

between the “payor and payee.” See Allied-Signal, supra, 

at 791–792 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Hellerstein, State

Taxation of Corporate Income from Intangibles: AlliedSignal and Beyond, 48 Tax L. Rev. 739, 790 (1993) (hereinafter Hellerstein). In the example given in AlliedSignal, the taxpayer was not unitary with its banker, but 

the taxpayer’s deposits (which represented working capital

and thus operational assets) were clearly unitary with the

taxpayer’s business. In Corn Products, the taxpayer was

not unitary with the counterparty to its hedge, but the 

taxpayer’s futures contracts (which served to hedge 

against the risk of an increase in the price of a key cost 

input) were likewise clearly unitary with the taxpayer’s

business. In each case, the “payor” was not a unitary part

of the taxpayer’s business, but the relevant asset was. 

The conclusion that the asset served an operational function was merely instrumental to the constitutionally relevant conclusion that the asset was a unitary part of the

business being conducted in the taxing State rather than a 

discrete asset to which the State had no claim. Our decisions in Container Corp. and Allied-Signal did not announce a new ground for the constitutional apportionment

of extrastate values in the absence of a unitary business. 

Because the Appellate Court of Illinois interpreted those

decisions to the contrary, it erred. 

Where, as here, the asset in question is another business, we have described the “hallmarks” of a unitary

relationship as functional integration, centralized management, and economies of scale. See Mobil Oil Corp., 445 

U. S., at 438 (citing Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 

501, 506–508 (1942)); see also Allied-Signal, supra, at 783 

(same); Container Corp., supra, at 179 (same); F. W. 

Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of N. M., 

458 U. S. 354, 364 (1982) (same). The trial court found 

each of these hallmarks lacking and concluded that Lexis 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

was not a unitary part of Mead’s business. The appellate

court, however, made no such determination. Relying on

its operational function test, it reserved judgment on 

whether Mead and Lexis formed a unitary business. The 

appellate court may take up that question on remand, and 

we express no opinion on it now. 

III 

The State and its amici argue that vacatur is not required because the judgment of the Appellate Court of

Illinois may be affirmed on an alternative ground. They

contend that the record amply demonstrates that Lexis 

did substantial business in Illinois and that Lexis’ own 

contacts with the State suffice to justify the apportionment of Mead’s capital gain. See Br. for Respondents 18–

25, 46–49; Brief for Multistate Tax Commission as Amicus 

Curiae 19–29. The State and its amici invite us to recognize a new ground for the constitutional apportionment of

intangibles based on the taxing State’s contacts with the

capital asset rather than the taxpayer. 

We decline this invitation because the question that the

State and its amici call upon us to answer was neither 

raised nor passed upon in the state courts. It also was not 

addressed in the State’s brief in opposition to the petition.

We typically will not address a question under these circumstances even if the answer would afford an alternative 

ground for affirmance. See Glover v. United States, 531 

U. S. 198, 205 (2001) (citing Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 

503 U. S. 638, 646 (1992)); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 

533 U. S. 525, 578 (2001) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part 

and concurring in judgment).

The case for restraint is particularly compelling here, 

since the question may impact the law of other jurisdictions. The States of Ohio and New York, for example, 

have both adopted the rationale for apportionment that

respondents urge us to recognize today. See Ohio Rev. 
 

14 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

 REVENUE 

Opinion of the Court 

Code Ann. §§5733.051(E)–(F) (West 2007 Supp. Pamphlet); N. Y. Tax Law Ann. §210(3)(b) (West Supp. 2008);

see also Allied-Signal Inc. v. Department of Taxation & 

Finance, 229 App. Div. 2d 759, 762, 645 N. Y. S. 2d 895, 

898 (3d Dept. 1996) (finding that a “sufficient nexus existed between New York and the dividend and capital gain

income” of the nondomiciliary parent because “the corporations generating the income taxed . . . each have their

own connection with the taxing jurisdiction”); 1 Hellerstein & Hellerstein ¶9.11[2][a]. Neither Ohio nor New 

York has appeared as an amicus in this case, and neither 

was on notice that the constitutionality of its tax scheme

was at issue, the question having been raised for the first 

time in the State’s brief on the merits. So postured, the 

question is best left for another day.4 

—————— 

4Resolving this question now probably would not spare the State a

remand. The State calculated petitioner’s tax liability by applying the

State’s tax rate to Mead’s apportioned business income, which in turn

was calculated by applying Mead’s apportionment percentage to its

apportionable business income. See App. 28; Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 35, 

§5/304(a) (West 1994). But if a constitutionally sufficient link between

the State and the value it wishes to tax is founded on the State’s 

contacts with Lexis rather than Mead, then presumably the apportioned tax base should be determined by applying the State’s fourfactor apportionment formula not to Mead but to Lexis. Naturally,

applying the formula to Lexis rather than Mead would yield a different

apportionment percentage. See Brief for Multistate Tax Commission as 

Amicus Curiae 18–19, and n. 9; see also Hellerstein 802–803. 

The Multistate Tax Commission seems to argue that the difference 

would not affect the result because application of the formula to Lexis 

would have yielded a higher apportionment percentage. See Brief for 

Multistate Tax Commission 18–19. Amicus argues, in other words,

that petitioner has no cause to complain because it caught a break in 

the incorrect application of a lower apportionment percentage. Amicus’ 

argument assumes what we are in no position to decide: that Lexis’ own 

apportioned tax base was properly calculated. Had petitioner been on 

notice that Lexis, rather than Mead, would supply the relevant apportionment percentage, it might have persuaded the state courts that

Lexis’ apportionment percentage should have been even lower than 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 

The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois is vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings 

not inconsistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

Mead’s. The State’s untimely resort to an alternative ground for

affirmance may have denied petitioner a fair opportunity to make that
 

argument. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–1413 

MEADWESTVACO CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE MEAD CORPORATION, PETITIONER 

v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF
 

ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT
 

[April 15, 2008] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 

Although I join the Court’s opinion, I write separately to

express my serious doubt that the Constitution permits us 

to adjudicate cases in this area. Despite the Court’s repeated holdings that “[t]he Due Process and Commerce 

Clauses forbid the States to tax ‘extraterritorial values,’” 

ante, at 1 (quoting Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 164 (1983)), I am not fully 

convinced of that proposition. 

To the extent that our decisions addressing state taxation of multistate enterprises rely on the negative Commerce Clause, I would overrule them. As I have previously explained, this Court’s negative Commerce Clause 

jurisprudence “has no basis in the Constitution and has

proved unworkable in practice.” United Haulers Assn., 

Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (THOMAS, J., concurring in 

judgment) (slip op., at 1)).

The Court’s cases in this area have not, however, rested 

solely on the Commerce Clause. The Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment may also limit States’ authority to tax multistate businesses. See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State 

Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 226 (1897) (concluding that be-
 

2 MEADWESTVACO CORP. v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF 

 REVENUE 

THOMAS, J., concurring
 

cause “[t]he property taxed has its actual situs in the State 

and is, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction, and . . . regulation by the state legislature,” the tax at issue did not 

“amoun[t] to a taking of property without due process of

law”). I agree that the Due Process Clause requires a 

jurisdictional nexus or, as this Court has stated, “some

definite link, some minimum connection, between a state 

and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” 

Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340, 344–345 

(1954); see ante, at 7. But apart from that requirement, I

am concerned that further constraints—particularly those 

limiting the degree to which a State may tax a multistate 

enterprise—require us to read into the Due Process Clause

yet another unenumerated, substantive right. Cf. Troxel 

v. Granville, 530 U. S. 57, 80 (2000) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (leaving open the question whether “our 

substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and 

. . . the original understanding of the Due Process Clause 

precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights”).

Today the Court applies the additional requirement that 

there exist “a rational relationship between the tax and

the values connected with the taxing State.” Ante, at 7 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Moorman 

Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 273 (1978) (requiring that

“the income attributed to the State for tax purposes . . . be 

rationally related to ‘values connected with the taxing 

State’” (quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Missouri Tax 

Comm’n, 390 U. S. 317, 325 (1968))). In my view, however, it is difficult to characterize this requirement as

providing an exclusively procedural safeguard against the 

deprivation of property. Scrutinizing the amount of multistate income a State may apportion for tax purposes comes

perilously close to evaluating the excessiveness of the 

State’s taxing scheme—a question the Fourteenth 

Amendment does not grant us the authority to adjudicate.

See, e.g., Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U. S. 550, 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

562 (1935) (“To condemn a levy on the sole ground that it 

is excessive would be to usurp a power vested not in the 

courts but in the legislature, and to exercise the usurped 

power arbitrarily by substituting our conceptions of public 

policy for those of the legislative body”). Indeed, divining

from the Fourteenth Amendment a right against disproportionate taxation bears a striking resemblance to our 

long-rejected Lochner-era precedents. See, e.g., Lochner v. 

New York, 198 U. S. 45, 56–58 (1905) (invalidating a state 

statute as an “unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary 

interference with the right of the individual . . . to enter

into those contracts . . . which may seem to him appropriate or necessary”). Moreover, the Court’s involvement in 

this area is wholly unnecessary given Congress’ undisputed authority to resolve income apportionment issues by

virtue of its power to regulate commerce “among the several States.” See U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.

Although I believe that the Court should reconsider its 

constitutional authority to adjudicate these kinds of cases, 

neither party has asked us to do so here, and the Court’s 

decision today faithfully applies our precedents. I therefore concur.