[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10656

____________________

MOMS FOR LIBERTY - BREVARD COUNTY, FL, 

AMY KNEESSY, 

ASHLEY HALL, 

KATIE DELANEY, 

JOSEPH CHOLEWA, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

BREVARD PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

MISTY HAGGARD-BELFORD, 

Chair, Brevard County School Board 

in her individual capacity, 

MATT SUSIN,

Vice Chair, Brevard County School Board

in his official and individual capacities,

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CHERYL MCDOUGALL, 

Member, Brevard County School Board

in her official and individual capacities, 

KATYE CAMPBELL,

Member, Brevard County School Board

in her official and individual capacities, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees, 

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-01849-RBD-DAB

____________________

Before WILSON, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

For many parents, school board meetings are the front lines 

of the most meaningful part of local government—the education 

of their children. And sometimes speaking at these meetings is the 

primary way parents interact with their local leaders or 

communicate with other community members. No one could 

reasonably argue that this right is unlimited, but neither is the 

government’s authority to restrict it. 

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A group called Moms for Liberty brought this lawsuit on 

behalf of members who say their speech was chilled and silenced 

at Brevard County School Board meetings. According to the 

Board’s presiding officer, their comments were “abusive,” 

“personally directed,” “obscene,” or some combination of the 

three. Because the first prohibition was viewpoint based, the 

second was both unreasonable and vague, and the application of 

the third was (at a minimum) unreasonable, these policies are 

unconstitutional. The district court erred by granting summary 

judgment to Brevard Public Schools. 

I.

The Brevard County School Board, recognizing “the value 

to school governance of public comment,” allows members of the 

public to speak for up to three minutes during designated portions 

of its meetings. During the events leading up to this lawsuit, the 

Board enforced a variety of other rules too, a few of which are 

relevant here. The first was that “no person may address or 

question Board members individually,” so speakers were allowed 

to direct their comments only “to the presiding officer.”1 Another 

policy barred statements that were “too lengthy, personally 

1 While this litigation was pending, the Board revised the policy banning “personally directed” comments. Now “public speakers may address their comments to the Board as a whole, the presiding officer, or to an individual Board 

member.” Brevard Sch. Bd. Policy Manual § 0000 Bylaws, Code po0169.1 ¶ E

[https://perma.cc/27TZ-93XN]. But the presiding officer may still interrupt 

remarks that are personally directed to anyone outside these three categories. 

Id. ¶ H(1). All other relevant policies remain unchanged. 

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directed, abusive, obscene, or irrelevant.” Then-Board Chair Misty 

Haggard-Belford enforced these rules, and she testified that their 

general purpose was to maintain decorum and prevent “the 

incitement of other audience members in a manner that would 

create an unsafe situation or one that may adversely impact 

children.” 

For their part, the plaintiffs assert that Belford’s pattern of 

enforcement was confusing at best, with the same kinds of speech 

silenced on some days but not on others, and some speakers 

interrupted for reasons that did not match up with what they were 

saying. Belford seldom gave speakers a contemporaneous 

explanation for why she interrupted or silenced them, at least not 

one that was tethered to the language in the participation policies. 

Rather, in preparation for this litigation Belford provided 

retrospective explanations for her enforcement decisions. Even 

still, her reasoning often relied on a combination of the policies. 

Because of the uneven and unpredictable enforcement history, 

these parents contend that they have been pressured to self-censor 

their comments or avoid speaking at all. 

Moms for Liberty, along with several individual members, 

filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, along with 

nominal damages, against the Brevard Public Schools and members 

of Brevard County School Board.2 These plaintiffs assert that the 

2 For ease of reference, we will collectively refer to the plaintiffs as Moms for 

Liberty and the defendants as “the Board.” 

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prohibitions against personally directed and abusive speech violate 

the First Amendment, both facially and as applied. They also 

challenge the prohibition on obscene speech as applied. And they 

say all three categorical prohibitions are void for vagueness. Moms 

for Liberty moved for a preliminary injunction against the policies’ 

enforcement, which the district court denied. The group then 

moved to stay further proceedings pending the outcome of its 

appeal from that denial. That request was also denied. In an 

unpublished decision, this Court summarily affirmed the denial of 

the preliminary injunction. Moms for Liberty v. Brevard Pub. Schs., 

No. 22-10297, 2022 WL 17091924 (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2022)

(unpublished). 

The district court ultimately granted the Board’s motion for 

summary judgment. It first concluded that Moms for Liberty did 

not have standing because neither the organization nor its 

members could show that they had suffered an injury that was 

“actual or imminent.” The Board’s rules did not objectively chill 

their protected speech, the court held, because some members 

continued to speak at meetings and the Board Chair’s interruptions 

were of minimal consequence to them.3 Ordinarily that is where 

things would (and should) have ended, at least as far as the district 

court was concerned—if a party lacks standing, the court has no 

jurisdiction to decide the merits. See Murthy v. Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 

1972, 1985 (2024). Even so, the district court here went on to 

3 The district court did not consider whether the plaintiffs had standing for 

harms they had already suffered. 

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conclude that the Board’s policies and enforcement practices were 

constitutional. This appeal followed. 

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Smith v. 

Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when, drawing all inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Del Castillo v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Health, 26 F.4th 

1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). 

III.

We first consider standing. As it did below, the Board 

contends that Moms for Liberty lacks standing to challenge the 

Board’s policies because its members do not have a credible threat 

of impending injury—their fear, the Board says, is not “objectively 

reasonable.” Any threat of interruption or removal from meetings 

on account of these policies, the Board argues, is too minimal to 

really have had a chilling effect. And, the Board says, Moms for 

Liberty has failed to show any past injuries from the Board’s 

enforcement actions. We disagree. 

To begin, we recognize that Moms for Liberty has requested 

both retrospective relief in the form of nominal damages and 

prospective relief in the form of an injunction against future 

enforcement of the challenged policies against its members. 

Because “standing is not dispensed in gross,” Moms for Liberty 

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must demonstrate standing for each of these forms of relief. 

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021).4 

As for its claims for nominal damages, this requirement is 

easily satisfied. Under § 1983, the provision under which Moms for 

Liberty has brought this suit, nominal damages are available when 

a plaintiff alleges that its constitutional rights were violated. See 

Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1177 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Because several members have alleged that they were 

unconstitutionally censored at meetings by the enforcement of the 

Board’s policies, Moms for Liberty and its members have standing 

to seek nominal damages to redress those violations. 

When it comes to standing for prospective relief in First 

Amendment cases like this one, the “injury requirement is most 

loosely applied” because of “the fear that free speech will be chilled 

even before the law, regulation, or policy is enforced.” Hallandale 

Pro. Fire Fighters Loc. 2238 v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 760 (11th 

Cir. 1991). So long as plaintiffs are “chilled from engaging in 

4 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, Moms for Liberty as an organization 

has standing to vindicate the rights of its members when: “(a) its members 

would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 

seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the 

claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual 

members in the lawsuit.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows 

of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 199 (2023) (quotation omitted). The Board does 

not challenge the latter two requirements, so to determine whether Moms for 

Liberty has standing, the question is whether any individual Moms for Liberty 

members would have standing to sue on their own. Of course, several individual members have also sued here. 

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constitutional activity,” they have suffered a discrete harm that 

meets Article III’s injury requirement. Speech First, Inc. v. 

Cartwright, 32 F.4th 1110, 1120 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). 

When there is a danger of self-censorship, “harm can be realized 

even without an actual prosecution.” Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 

Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quotation 

omitted). So the plaintiffs have standing to seek prospective relief 

if the “operation or enforcement” of the Board’s policies “would 

cause a reasonable would-be speaker to self-censor.” Speech First, 

32 F.4th at 1120 (alteration adopted and quotations omitted). 

The Board’s argument that Moms for Liberty—not to 

mention the individual plaintiffs—cannot meet this standard is 

borderline frivolous. Several members who are individual plaintiffs 

have credibly alleged that they have already self-censored their 

speech at Brevard County School Board meetings because of the 

Board’s policies, and that a reasonable person in their shoes would 

have done the same. After all, the consequences could be severe. 

As Belford herself warned attendees prior to meetings, those who 

“cause a disruption” could be subject to criminal sanctions, “up to 

60 days in jail and a $500 fine.” The plaintiffs also claim that they 

have witnessed the Board interrupt and berate speakers—including 

other Moms for Liberty members—for violating the policies. 

Joseph Cholewa asserted that he writes his speeches on “pins and 

needles” because he knows he needs to be “very selective” with his 

words to avoid interruption or removal; in fact, he has been 

prevented from finishing his comments several times. Ashley Hall 

said that she is “more careful” about what she says at meetings 

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because she is “afraid that criticizing Defendants will be deemed a 

‘disruption,’” and that she “will be prosecuted.” And Amy Kneessy 

revealed that she avoids speaking altogether because she wishes to 

speak about individual staff members and the programs they are 

implementing in Brevard Public Schools, but she fears that these 

comments would lead to her being “chastised, criticized, or 

silenced.” At least one member has even been expelled from a 

Board meeting. We have no trouble concluding that the operation 

of the Board’s policies governing participation in the public 

comment portions of their meetings objectively chills expression. 

We also need to address two other antecedent issues—both 

relating to the scope of the record. The Board insists that we must 

confine our review to the five occasions during the relevant time 

period when Moms for Liberty members themselves were 

interrupted or removed from meetings. We reject that 

contention—the Board’s proposed limitation is artificial and 

unwarranted. Enforcement acts against similarly situated speakers 

are relevant, both to whether the policies will be applied to Moms 

for Liberty members and to whether their speech is chilled as an 

effect. See 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 581–83, 588 (2023). 

We decline to limit our review based on the identity of the 

thwarted speaker. 

We do, however, limit the record in a different respect. 

Moms for Liberty’s briefing points out several episodes from 2022. 

A few involved restricting speech—one speaker was interrupted 

before she could begin reading an excerpt from a sexually 

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suggestive library book, and another was interrupted for personally 

directed speech relating to a former teacher showing his penis to a 

student. The third example went in the other direction—Belford 

allowed a teacher to speak without interruption despite addressing 

school administrators by name. But however probative these 

examples may have been, the district court struck them from the 

amended complaint, saying they postdated the filing of the 

litigation and would inappropriately broaden the scope of the case. 

Because Moms for Liberty did not appeal that decision, the 

additional evidence is outside the scope of our review and we do 

not consider it. 

IV.

We now turn to the merits of the appeal. We agree with the 

parties that the school board meetings here qualify as limited public 

forums because they are created “for certain groups or for the 

discussion of certain topics.” McDonough v. Garcia, --- F.4th ---, No. 

22-11421, 2024 WL 4195557, at *3, *6–7 (11th Cir. Sept. 16, 2024) 

(en banc) (quotation omitted). The Brevard County School Board 

meetings are for parents and community members to “express 

themselves on school matters of community interest.” In a limited 

public forum, the government’s restrictions on speech “must not 

discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint,” and “must 

be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.” Good 

News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (quotation 

omitted). 

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The First Amendment generally “forbids the government to 

regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the 

expense of others.” Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 864 

(11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Members of the City 

Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)). Indeed, 

though the Supreme Court has never categorically prohibited 

restrictions based on viewpoint, it has come close: “Discrimination 

against speech because of its message is presumed to be 

unconstitutional.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of 

Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995); see also Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 

U.S. at 804. Viewpoint discrimination is thus “the greatest First 

Amendment sin.” Honeyfund.com Inc. v. Governor, Florida, 94 F.4th 

1272, 1277 (11th Cir. 2024). That constitutional constraint holds in 

limited public forums, meaning that the “government must abstain 

from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or 

the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the 

restriction.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 

The reasonableness inquiry, on the other hand, is more 

flexible and context specific, and will depend on the nature and 

purpose of the forum. McDonough, 2024 WL 4195557, at *6; 

Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1231 (11th Cir. 2011). To pass 

muster, such purpose-based restrictions must be “wholly consistent 

with the government’s legitimate interest in ‘preserving the 

property for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,’” and 

prohibited speech must be “‘naturally incompatible’ with the 

purposes of the forum.” Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Florida 

High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 942 F.3d 1215, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2019) 

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(alterations adopted and ellipsis omitted) (first quoting Perry Educ. 

Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 50–51 (1983); and 

then quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 

672, 690–91 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). So what is 

reasonable in one forum may not be reasonable in another. “[T]he 

purpose of a university,” for example, “is strikingly different from 

that of a public park.” Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1233–34. And a speech 

restriction in a limited public forum “need not be the most 

reasonable” or even “the only reasonable limitation.” Christian 

Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the L. v. 

Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 692 (2010) (quotation omitted). But flexible 

is not the same thing as nonexistent—though reasonableness is a 

“forgiving” test, it is not a blank check. Minnesota Voters All. v. 

Mansky, 585 U.S. 1, 17 (2018). 

In fact, even restrictions that pursue legitimate objectives 

can be unlawful if their enforcement cannot be “guided by 

objective, workable standards.” Id. at 21. After all, an 

“indeterminate prohibition carries with it the opportunity for 

abuse,” particularly when that prohibition “has received a virtually 

open-ended interpretation.” Id. (alteration adopted and quotation 

omitted). So a policy is unreasonable if it “fails to define key terms, 

lacks any official guidance, and vests too much discretion in those 

charged with its application.” Young Israel of Tampa, Inc. v. 

Hillsborough Area Reg’l Transit Auth., 89 F.4th 1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 

2024). At the very least, the government “must be able to articulate 

some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what 

must stay out.” Mansky, 585 U.S. at 16. But a “grant of 

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unrestrained discretion to an official responsible for monitoring 

and regulating First Amendment activities is facially 

unconstitutional.” Atlanta J. & Const. v. City of Atlanta Dep’t of 

Aviation, 322 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003). The government, in 

short, must avoid enforcement that is “haphazard and arbitrary.” 

Cambridge Christian Sch., 942 F.3d at 1243.5 

Moms for Liberty challenges each of the policies as applied 

to its members, and it challenges the prohibitions on “abusive” and 

“personally directed” speech as facially invalid too. An as applied 

challenge is just what it sounds like—we ask whether the policy 

was or can be constitutionally applied to the plaintiffs’ protected 

activity. See Jacobs v. Florida Bar, 50 F.3d 901, 906 (11th Cir. 1995); 

CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1270–71 

(11th Cir. 2006). In a facial challenge, by contrast, the plaintiff 

“seeks to invalidate a statute or regulation itself.” United States v. 

Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000). Facial challenges are 

ordinarily disfavored and are generally harder to win. See Moody v. 

NetChoice, LLC, 144 S. Ct. 2383, 2397 (2024). In First Amendment 

facial challenges, the question is whether “a substantial number of 

the law’s applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the 

statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. (alteration adopted and

quotation omitted). 

5 Moms for Liberty also argues that the prohibitions on “abusive” and “personally directed” speech are unconstitutionally vague. Because we find that 

these policies are unconstitutional on other grounds, we have no need to reach 

that issue. 

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In the context of the “reasonableness” analysis specifically, 

our Court has explained that a law or policy found to be 

constitutionally unreasonable “due to lack of standards and 

guidance is by definition facially invalid.” Young Israel, 89 F.4th at 

1350. That is because whether a policy is “incapable of reasoned 

application” does not depend on the speaker’s identity or the 

message they wish to convey, but on “the vagueness and 

imprecision” of the policy “in a vacuum.” Id. at 1351 (quotation 

omitted). Thus, a policy that is invalid for those reasons is 

necessarily invalid in all of its applications. 

In sum, in a First Amendment case like this one—involving 

a limited public forum—the government’s rules must be viewpoint 

neutral and reasonable. 

V.

Moms for Liberty challenges three Board policies: the rule 

against “abusive” speech, the rule against “personally directed” 

speech, and the rule against “obscene” speech. For each one, a 

simple look at the written policy yields an incomplete picture. But

the Board’s explanation of its policies, as well as its record of 

enforcement, fill in the blanks—revealing serious constitutional 

problems.

A.

We start with the policy permitting the Board’s presiding 

officer to interrupt speech seen as “abusive.” The way that Board 

Chair Belford interprets and enforces the rule diverges from the 

common understanding of the word “abusive.” As enforced, the 

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policy bars using terms that people generally agree are 

“unacceptable.” 

Because the Board’s policies for public participation do not 

offer any meaning for the term “abusive,” we start by looking at 

dictionaries, which define it to mean “using harsh, insulting 

language,” and “habitually cruel, malicious, or violent; esp., using

cruel words or physical violence.” Abusive, Merriam-Webster, 

[https://perma.cc/B9RH-TFWC]; Abusive, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2019). Belford initially explained “abusive” in a way that 

was at least directionally similar to these definitions: “yelling, 

screaming, profanity, those sorts of things.” 

Fair enough—but that is not where she landed. When asked 

to give her own definition, the one used to enforce the policy in 

Board meetings, Belford could not do so. At least at first—she 

eventually elaborated on her initial definition, explaining that 

speech would be abusive if “someone were yelling, screaming, 

cussing, you know, calling people names.” Expanding on that last 

element, Belford said the policy would prohibit calling people 

“names that are generally accepted to be unacceptable.” That 

definition is constitutionally problematic because it enabled Belford 

to shut down speakers whenever she saw their message as 

offensive. 

The record of enforcement supports the contention that this 

was the operative definition. At one meeting, for example, she 

interrupted a speaker who criticized the Board’s Covid-19 masking 

policy as a “simple ploy to silence our opposition to this evil 

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LGBTQ agenda.” Belford quickly stopped the speaker, who had 

not yelled, screamed, or otherwise caused a disruption. In her 

affidavit, Belford explained that she interrupted him because his 

“characterization of people as ‘evil’ was abusive.” 

Belford interrupted another speaker who was criticizing the 

Board’s policies on gender in school bathrooms and schoolsponsored sports. According to Belford, the speaker had engaged 

in abusive “name-calling” by referring to the “liberal left.” Yet 

another speaker was interrupted for repeating insults leveled at her 

by protestors outside the Board meeting. In stopping her, Belford 

contended that the speaker had improperly repeated words that 

were abusive to the speaker herself. 

No one likes to be called evil, but it is not “abusive” to use 

that term. Restrictions that bar offensive or otherwise unwelcome 

speech are impermissible, regardless of the forum in which the 

government seeks to impose them. A prohibition on all offensive—

or “unacceptable,” as Belford put it—speech may appear neutral. 

After all, it prohibits a speaker from saying anything offensive 

about any person or any topic. But “[g]iving offense is a 

viewpoint.” Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017) (plurality 

opinion); see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 588 U.S. 388, 396 (2019). And a 

restriction barring that viewpoint effectively requires “happy-talk,” 

permitting a speaker to give positive or benign comments, but not 

negative or even challenging ones. Matal, 582 U.S. at 246 (plurality 

opinion); id. at 249 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment). And if the only ideas that can be communicated 

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are views that everyone already finds acceptable, why have the 

school board meetings in the first place? A state cannot prevent 

“both willing and unwilling listeners from hearing certain 

perspectives,” because “for every one person who finds these 

viewpoints offensive, there may be another who welcomes them.” 

Honeyfund.com, 94 F.4th at 1282. 

To say that a government may not burden speech simply 

because some listeners find it unacceptable is nothing new. Indeed, 

it is “firmly settled” under our Constitution that “the public 

expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas 

are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street v. New 

York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 

414 (1989). The government has no authority to curtail the sphere 

of acceptable debate to accommodate “the most squeamish among 

us.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). Instead, we expect 

listeners to judge the content of speech for themselves. The 

government is ill-equipped in any event to decide what is or is not 

offensive. Id. Enduring speech that irritates, frustrates, or even 

offends is a “necessary cost of freedom.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 

564 U.S. 552, 575 (2011).6 

6 The only other circuit court to consider a similar policy has reached the same 

conclusion. Considering another school board policy prohibiting “abusive” 

speech, the Sixth Circuit likewise concluded that the term “abusive”—at least 

as defined by the Board—operated to “prohibit speech purely because it disparages or offends,” in violation of the longstanding principle that “the government may not censor speech merely because it is ‘offensive to some.’” Ison 

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To be sure, a different policy—one prohibiting viewpointneutral characteristics of speech, for example, or explicitly and 

narrowly defining “abusive”—could be constitutional. But here, 

the ban on “abusive” speech is an undercover prohibition on 

offensive speech. Because the government “may not burden the 

speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred 

direction,” the Board’s policy on “abusive” speech is facially 

unconstitutional. Id. at 578–79. 

B.

We next consider the Board’s prohibitions on “personally 

directed” speech. Both policies were in effect during all of the 

events relevant to this lawsuit. Now, one has been changed and one 

remains on the books. The first disallowed addressing or 

questioning Board members individually, requiring instead that all 

statements be directed to the presiding officer; this restriction was 

repealed shortly after this appeal was filed. The other rule, which 

remains in effect, allows the presiding officer to stop a speaker 

when her remarks are “personally directed” at anyone not on the 

Board. We consider each policy. 

1.

We start with the first—the policy that prohibited speakers 

from addressing Board members individually. The Board argues 

that all of Moms for Liberty’s arguments against the personally 

v. Madison Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 3 F.4th 887, 894 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Matal, 582 U.S. at 244 (plurality opinion)). 

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directed prohibition are moot because the old policy is gone. No 

such luck. Though prospective relief barring enforcement of the 

pre-amendment policy is no longer available, nominal damages for 

past harms are. That means the claim is still live: “a request for 

nominal damages saves a matter from becoming moot as 

unredressable when the plaintiff bases his claim on a completed 

violation of a legal right.” Keister v. Bell, 29 F.4th 1239, 1251 (11th 

Cir. 2022); see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 292 

(2021). 

With that out of the way, we consider whether the policy 

prohibiting speakers from addressing individual Board members 

was viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the meetings’ 

purpose. Mansky, 585 U.S. at 13. Based on the record here, we do 

not see evidence of viewpoint-based discrimination. So the only 

question is whether the policy was reasonable. It was not. 

The reasonableness test, as we have explained, asks in part 

whether a restriction on speech is enforced in an arbitrary or 

haphazard way. Cambridge Christian Sch., 942 F.3d at 1240. Asking 

if the Board’s approach to this policy was “haphazard” is like asking 

if the sky is blue—enforcement was so inconsistent that it is 

impossible to discern the standard used to assess which speech was 

permitted at any given meeting. 

At some meetings, speakers were allowed to address Board 

members by name to give them thanks and praise. Offering 

thanks, however, was not always a shield; one speaker was 

interrupted when she tried to thank a Board member for his 

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-10656

positive impact on her daughter. And at another meeting, Belford 

cut off a Moms for Liberty member who tried to personally thank 

a Board member. 

On yet another occasion, Belford said nothing when a local 

high school student addressed one Board member by name while 

advocating for her theater group to rehearse in the school’s indoor 

facilities. But when a Moms for Liberty member questioned how 

he, as a parent, could “stand up for District Two” while having to 

watch the Board member for that district “behind a plastic prison” 

(referring to a plexiglass barrier in place during the Covid-19 era), 

Belford and another Board member interrupted him for calling out 

one of the Board members and informed him that he could not talk 

to or about his specific representative. 

This kind of inconsistent enforcement is exactly what this 

Court and the Supreme Court have warned against. See Mansky, 

585 U.S. at 16–22; Young Israel, 89 F.4th at 1347–49. Permitting 

certain speech on some days and not on others without “any 

credible explanation of what may have changed is the essence of 

arbitrary, capricious, and haphazard—and therefore 

unreasonable—decisionmaking.” Cambridge Christian Sch., 942 F.3d 

at 1244. For that reason, we agree with Moms for Liberty that the 

now-repealed prohibition against addressing individual Board 

members was unconstitutionally applied. 

2.

Turning to the current policy, we consider whether 

disallowing speech that is “personally directed” can stand as 

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23-10656 Opinion of the Court 21

reasonable. As with the prohibition on “abusive” speech, the 

Board’s policy does not define “personally directed.” Belford first 

described it as “[a]nything that’s directed at a person.” But when 

pressed for more, she suggested that the policy prohibited speech 

naming an individual, possibly (but not always) coupled with some 

sort of personal information about that person. One refrain that 

Belford repeated in her testimony was that the applicability of the 

policy “would depend on the circumstances.” 

Belford followed up with various examples. She explained 

that “if someone is saying to me, ‘My friend Susie’s son has an IEP 

for this,’ yes, I’m going to stop them because they’re sharing 

someone else’s information that shouldn’t be public information.” 

But if the speaker just said “‘my daughter’s friend said that this 

occurred in school,’ and there’s no name, that’s a different 

situation.” Just mentioning a name, however, might not be 

enough: “So if you’re saying your wife’s name and you’re just 

mentioning her name, I don’t know that I could consider that 

personally directed. If you’re saying, ‘My friend John was raped by 

someone or my’—you know what I mean?” Respectfully, we do 

not. 

Belford’s own inability to define the policy that she was 

tasked with enforcing speaks volumes. The track record of this 

policy’s enforcement mirrors Belford’s muddled definition. 

Sometimes just mentioning someone’s name was enough to 

provoke interruption, but other times using a name was met with 

no resistance. At one meeting, for example, speakers advocating 

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-10656

for the rehiring of two coaches were interrupted for naming the 

coaches and were told to refer to them as “these coaches” instead. 

But at another meeting, multiple speakers were allowed to address 

and thank the Superintendent by name throughout the meeting. 

Even though Belford’s definition seemed to require, at least 

as a baseline, that a speaker use someone’s name to violate this 

policy, the record reflects several times when speakers were 

interrupted for personally directed speech even though they did 

not name anyone—at all. Nor did they direct their speech toward 

anyone in particular. At one meeting, for example, Belford 

interrupted a speaker who gestured toward one side of the room 

and said “I keep hearing this side talk about freedom and their 

choices.” This reference, Belford said, violated the policy against 

personally directed speech. And at yet another meeting, Belford 

interrupted yet another comment she said was “personally 

directed”: “The sad fact is that all children do not live with 

accepting and affirming families. Can you imagine the LGBTQ 

student who may live with families such as those who were here at 

the last meeting?” Again, no names. 

As these examples illustrate, enforcement of this policy was 

as inconsistent as the definitions offered to support it. The Board 

has not articulated any “sensible basis for distinguishing what may 

come in from what must stay out.” Mansky, 585 U.S. at 16. Such 

unpredictable and haphazard enforcement is not reasonable. 

Instead, it reflects no boundaries beyond the presiding officer’s realUSCA11 Case: 23-10656 Document: 86-1 Date Filed: 10/08/2024 Page: 22 of 44
23-10656 Opinion of the Court 23

time judgment about who to silence. See Cambridge Christian Sch., 

942 F.3d at 1243–44. 

In part because of the unsettled boundaries of the policy 

purportedly banning personally directed comments, we also find it 

difficult to discern what ends it might serve. The Board claims that 

the policy’s purposes include ensuring “that speakers can share 

their perspectives, regardless of viewpoint, while preventing 

disruption or interference with the Board’s ability to conduct its 

business.” It also asserts that the policy is meant to “maintain 

decorum and avoid inciting audience members in a manner that 

would create an unsafe situation.” But even a charitable reading of 

the policy does not obviously (or even indirectly) advance these 

goals. For example, would using someone’s name—even in a 

positive comment and whether or not the person is there—

“disrupt” or “incite” audience members, or create an “unsafe 

situation”? We do not see how. 

Not only does this policy against personally directed speech 

not advance the goals that the Board claims it serves, it actively 

obstructs a core purpose of the Board’s meetings—educating the 

Board and the community about community members’ concerns. 

If a parent has a grievance about, say, a math teacher’s teaching 

style, it would be challenging to adequately explain the problem 

without referring to that math teacher. Or principal. Or coach. 

And so on. Likewise when a parent wishes to praise a teacher or 

administrator. Such communications are the heart of a school 

board’s business, and the ill-defined and inconsistently enforced 

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24 Opinion of the Court 23-10656

policy barring personally directed speech fundamentally impedes 

it without any coherent justification. 

To be sure, sometimes meetings can get tense—no one 

enjoys being called out negatively, and some may even dislike 

public praise. But that is the price of admission under the First 

Amendment. Rather than curtail speech, as “a Nation we have 

chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public 

issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.” Snyder v. 

Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011). Because the policy’s contours are 

undefined and the record of enforcement only casts a shadow over 

the school board meetings’ purposes, the Board’s prohibition on 

personally directed speech is unreasonable and thus facially 

unconstitutional. See Young Israel, 89 F.4th at 1350–51. 

C.

Last, we turn to the policy prohibiting “obscene” speech. 

Once again, the Board did not define its terms, but Belford did. 

Obscene speech, she said, includes “things that are not appropriate 

for young children. Language that is generally accepted to be 

profane.” Profanity, in turn, includes “things that are sexually 

explicit” and “words that are typically considered to be 

inappropriate for use in school.” Moms for Liberty challenges this 

part of the policy not on its face, but as applied—specifically as 

applied to reading a book from an elementary school library. 

Again, it seems clear that at least some iterations of an 

obscenity policy would be constitutional—obscenity is one of the 

few unprotected categories of speech under the First Amendment. 

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23-10656 Opinion of the Court 25

Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011). But that 

constitutional standard is exceptionally narrow: material is obscene 

when (1) “the average person, applying contemporary community 

standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 

the prurient interest”; (2) “the work depicts or describes, in a 

patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 

applicable state law”; and (3) “the work, taken as a whole, lacks 

serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Miller v. 

California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quotation omitted). So if the 

Board were to use this part of the policy to prohibit true obscenity, 

that action would survive under even the strictest review. We do 

not, however, decide whether or how the school board could 

properly prohibit other profane or explicit speech at school board 

meetings, even if it does not rise to the level of true obscenity—

that question is not before us. 

Instead, the Board used its obscenity policy to bar protected 

speech, and it did so in a way that impeded the purpose of a school 

board meeting. During the incident Moms for Liberty cites, a 

member shared her concern that her child’s elementary school 

library contained inappropriate books. She began reading one, 

which detailed an in-school sexual encounter: 

I tiptoed toward the door, peering through the 

window at the boy’s pants around his ankles squeezed 

between April’s straddled legs as she lay on the 

teacher’s desk. I swung the door open letting a soft 

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26 Opinion of the Court 23-10656

light from the hallway shine a spotlight on them. 

‘Shit!’ he muttered. 

Belford quickly interrupted the speaker when she got to the word 

“shit.” 

That word, though not polite, is also not obscene. Nor is the 

book’s other content, no matter how objectionable it may be as 

early childhood reading material. Moreover, the content of books 

in school libraries is a matter of serious community interest. It 

would be difficult, if not impossible, for speakers to adequately air 

their concerns about a particular book without informing both the 

Board and the community about what that book says. Describing 

the content of a book is not as potent as reading its words—nor is 

it as informative. And it is remarkable for the Board to suggest that 

this speech can be prohibited in a school board meeting because it 

is inappropriate for children when it came directly from a book that 

is available to children in their elementary school library. 

Because this prohibition on obscenity is not about obscenity, 

and frustrates the purpose of the forum, it is an unreasonable 

policy, at least as it applies to reading portions of books from 

school libraries. It is therefore unconstitutional as applied here. 

* * *

The government has relatively broad power to restrict 

speech in limited public forums—but that power is not unlimited. 

Speech restrictions must still be reasonable, viewpoint-neutral, and 

clear enough to give speakers notice of what speech is permissible. 

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23-10656 Opinion of the Court 27

The Board’s policies for public participation at Board meetings did 

not live up to those standards. The district court court’s judgment 

is therefore REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 1

WILSON, Circuit Judge, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part:

I join the majority in its judgment to reverse and remand regarding the Brevard Public School (BPS) Board Policy on abusive 

and obscene speech. As the majority outlines, the Policy’s restrictions on abusive and obscene speech were imprecise prohibitions that impermissibly chilled speech. Similarly, the past prohibition on personally directed speech was inconsistently enforced in 

an unreasonable way given the purpose of the forum. However, I 

dissent from the majority in Part V.B.2 of the judgment. I would 

find the present prohibition on personally directed speech facially 

constitutional given its viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness in 

light of the forum. 

Further, I write separately to contextualize several of the 

comments that appear in the majority opinion, along with additional examples to illustrate the tenor of comments and interruptions at BPS meetings. By including links to video recordings of 

each interaction discussed below, I hope to shed some light upon 

the difficulties of enforcing these policies in real time during heated 

meetings. 

I. Background

The BPS1 Policy includes a section titled “Public Participation at Board Meetings.” This Policy aims to ensure “orderly 

1 The BPS members mentioned in the complaint were Misty Haggard-Belford, 

Matt Susin, Cheryl McDougall, Katye Campbell, and Jennifer Jenkins. Only 

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2 WILSON, J., Dissenting in Part 23-10656

conduct or proper decorum” during meetings. To achieve this 

goal, the Policy allows the presiding officer to “interrupt, warn, or 

terminate a participant’s statement when the statement is too 

lengthy, personally directed, abusive, obscene, or irrelevant.” The 

presiding officer can expel any individual who “does not observe 

reasonable decorum” and request law enforcement assistance to remove “disorderly” individuals. During the months when the meetings at issue occurred, the Policy required speakers to direct comments “to the presiding officer; no person may address or question 

board members individually.”2 The BPS Policy did not define “abusive,” “obscene,” or “personally directed.” 

All instances at issue in this case occurred between January 

19, 2021, and October 26, 2021. Within that window, at least thirtyfour people identified themselves as Moms for Liberty (M4L) members and collectively spoke at BPS meetings at least 109 times.3 Of 

the claim against Belford survived the motion to dismiss because she was the 

only one who enforced the Policy.

2 In March 2023, the BPS Board altered the policy to allow speakers during 

public comment periods to “address their comments to the Board as a whole, 

the presiding officer, or to an individual Board member” but “[s]taff members 

or other individuals shall not be addressed by name during public comment.” 

Further, the Policy now states that the presiding officer may “interrupt, warn, 

or terminate a participant’s statement when the statement is too lengthy, personally directed (except as allowed above), abusive, obscene or irrelevant.” 

3 Four M4L members—Ashley Hall, Joseph Cholewa, Amy Kneessy, and Katie 

Delaney—brought this lawsuit in their individual capacities along with M4L 

as an organization. Ashley Hall was the founding chair of Brevard County’s 

chapter. Joseph Cholewa and Amy Kneessy are M4L members. Katie Delaney 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 3

those 109 instances, M4L identify four times when their members 

were interrupted. Of the four interruptions, only one escalated to 

a M4L member being asked to leave a meeting for violating the 

Policy. Hall spoke thirteen times during the relevant period and 

was interrupted once when she violated the Policy by thanking a 

specific school board member. Delaney spoke thirteen times with 

zero interruptions. Kneessy, a former school board member, did 

not speak at any meetings during the relevant window. Cholewa 

spoke five times and was interrupted twice, and based on comments he made after continuing to speak after one of those interruptions, he was asked to leave one meeting. The record also indicates interruptions of speakers with viewpoints that differ from 

those of M4L members.

II. Applicable Law4

Parents and community members can speak at BPS meetings to “express themselves on school matters of community 

was an M4L member but left in March 2022. Additional speakers whose interruptions are discussed in the majority opinion include Thomas Jefferson and 

Lois Lacoste. 

4 Before reaching the merits, I note that I concur with the majority in finding 

that M4L and its individual members have standing for prospective relief by 

meeting our liberal standard to show that enforcing the Board’s policy “would 

cause a reasonable would-be speaker to self-censor.” Speech First, Inc. v. Cartwright, 32 F.4th 1110, 1120 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted 

and alteration adopted). They also have standing to challenge the past iteration of the policy barring personally directed speech because “a request for 

nominal damages satisfies the redressability element of standing where a 

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4 WILSON, J., Dissenting in Part 23-10656

interest.” Doc. 20 at 113. Like the majority, I agree that school 

board meetings are limited public forums because they are created 

“for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 

Government restrictions on speech in a limited public forum must 

be (1) “viewpoint neutral” and (2) “reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose.” Barrett v. Walker Cnty. Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 

1225 (11th Cir. 2017). Reasonable restrictions do not need to “be 

the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.” Bloedorn v. 

Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1231 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). 

Our circuit has recognized “a significant governmental interest in 

conducting orderly, efficient meetings of public bodies,” Rowe v. 

City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 803 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Restrictions to further this interest must remain reasonable. See Barrett, 872 F.3d at 1224–25. 

Both the Supreme Court and our circuit have been imprecise 

and inconsistent when conducting forum analyses. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (first delineating limited public forums as 

their own category); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 

666, 677–78 (1998) (seeming to change the definition of a limited 

public forum); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 

(2001) (reaffirming the categories recognized in Rosenberger); Minn.

Voters All. v. Mansky, 585 U.S. 1, 11 (2018) (only listing three types of 

forums rather than the four previously recognized); Rowe, 358 F.3d 

plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right.” Uzuegbunam 

v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 802 (2021). 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 5

at 802 (applying a narrowly tailored to a significant government interest test to a limited public forum); Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1225–26, 

1231 (applying the viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness test to 

a limited public forum). Perhaps given the considerable overlap 

between a limited public forum analysis and nonpublic forum analysis, the majority almost exclusively relies on nonpublic forum 

precedent. Nonetheless, I am concerned by the dearth of limited 

public forum cases in the majority’s opinion. 

Speech restrictions in both nonpublic forums and limited 

public forums must be both viewpoint neutral and reasonable in 

light of the forum’s purpose. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 

U.S. 460, 470 (2009) (discussing limited public forums); Mansky, 585 

U.S. at 11 (discussing nonpublic forums). Although both types of 

forums use the same legal test, limited public forum cases provide 

closer factual analogues to BPS meetings. Because a limited public 

forum analysis requires a reasonableness inquiry, finding a close 

factual analogue matters even more than in other contexts. Limited public forum cases that involve school board or municipal 

meetings will often have similar purposes and set out similar 

speech parameters to meet those purposes, which makes them valuable data points for our analysis. 

III. Analysis 

Although I concur in judgment with all but part V.B.2 of the 

majority opinion, I write separately to provide additional context 

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6 WILSON, J., Dissenting in Part 23-10656

for the statements at issue in this case and to elaborate on where 

my analysis departs from that of the majority.5 

A. Abusive Speech 

I concur in the judgment finding the BPS Policy’s ban on 

abusive speech facially unconstitutional, but I struggle to see the 

ban on abusive speech as “an undercover prohibition on offensive 

speech.” Maj. Op. at 18. When viewed in context, the interruptions mentioned by the majority seem rooted in the difficulties of 

conducting orderly school board meetings when confrontational 

speakers make contentious comments.6 Further, the record reflects numerous arguably offensive statements that went uninterrupted and do not appear in the majority’s analysis. 

First, I agree with the majority that as written, the Policy’s 

ban on abusive speech could be weaponized and used in a 

5 The facial challenges are being appealed from the motion to dismiss and the 

as-applied challenges are being appealed from the motion for summary judgment. We apply a de novo standard of review to both types of appeals. Chabad 

Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. Of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229 (11th Cir. 2022) 

(regarding motions to dismiss); King v. King, 69 F.4th 738, 742 (11th Cir. 2023) 

(per curiam) (regarding motions for summary judgment).

6 Item K from the July 29 meeting shows how heated BPS meetings could become. Jenkins spoke about the threats she had received because of her stance 

on the mask mandate. Jenkins’s remarks about masks begin at about 15:15. 

The video recording indicates yelling and jeering from the audience at about 

15:50, which resulted in one audience member being escorted out at about 

16:24. BPS, July 29, 2021 School Board Meeting. See Item K. Board Member 

Reports/Discussion. https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/257590. 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 7

viewpoint discriminatory way.7 The Policy does not define “abusive,” and Belford struggled to articulate a clear definition during 

her deposition. In the abstract, this enables the BPS chair to censor 

offensive speech, which triggers the dual problems of chilling potential speech and enabling viewpoint discrimination. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.” Matal v. 

Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 243 (2017) (describing limited public forums in a 

trademark case). The majority concedes that a more narrow or 

explicit definition for “abusive” could survive a facial challenge, and 

I agree. See Maj. Op. at 18. 

In addition to analyzing the policy as written, we also must 

engage with the facts as they appear in the record. Therefore, I 

include direct quotes from BPS meetings to provide additional context for the interruptions mentioned by the majority. 

First, the majority mentions that Belford interrupted a 

speaker, Thomas Jefferson, who frequently attends BPS meetings. 

At the March 23 meeting, he characterized the COVID-19 mask 

policy as “a simple ploy to silence our opposition to this evil 

7 Because I concur in judgment to find the ban on “abusive” speech facially 

invalid for allowing impermissible viewpoint discrimination, I do not reach 

whether the prohibition on “abusive” speech is void for vagueness or overbroad. 

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8 WILSON, J., Dissenting in Part 23-10656

LGBTQ agenda.”8 After that interruption, Jefferson continued and 

was able to express the following views without interruption:

You are elected to represent the majority of our constituents not the minority of our constituents. And 

the majority of the people in Brevard County oppose 

any and all LGBTQ policy changes or implement [sic] 

in our schools. There may be a minority, possibly 

three percent that would support such a policy. However, the three percent will not get you reelected. 

There are some people out there that like to label us 

as a hate group. However, I want to make it perfectly 

clear here and now we hate the sin not the sinner. . . . 

We hate the sin not the sinners. We are the Christians 

of Brevard county and all over the world and will not 

sit silent and allow you to put your evil, sinful policies 

on our children. . . . We will make sure that all members that do not take a stand against these anti-Christ, 

LGBTQ agenda policies, that we will vote you out the 

next election cycle. This is God’s country, and God 

will [sic] be done. We the people have spoken. To 

God be the glory.

Immediately after Jefferson finished speaking, a board member stated: “I just want to throw this out there. I am concerned that 

8 BPS, Mar. 23, 2021 School Board Meeting. See Item E (Part 2 of 2). Public 

Comment. Jefferson’s remarks begin at approximately 13:23, https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/03232021-1098. 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 9

we’re allowing comments that our students can hear and are probably watching at home that are calling them sinners.” 

Next, the majority points to an interruption during a 

speaker’s criticism of BPS efforts to support transgender children. 

Lois Lacoste stated:9

If you have students who are not sure if they are a boy 

or a girl, please let me help you in knowing that God 

created us with one or the other chromosome, which 

makes us male or female. But the liberal left, who 

seem to rely so heavily on “science,” . . . .

She was interrupted for her use of “liberal left,” but was permitted 

to proceed. Lacoste finished her remarks with the following: 

[T]he issue is not about equity or equality. It’s about 

the end of decency in America. The citizens of Brevard County are watching you. More importantly, 

God Almighty is watching you. How will each one 

of you answer to Him? 

Although the interruption came after the “liberal left” reference, I 

hesitate to isolate the phrase from the entire comment. 

Then, the majority discusses a speaker who was interrupted 

for repeating language that was “abusive to the speaker herself.” 

Maj. Op. at 16. But the majority omits critical context that this 

9 BPS, Mar. 9, 2021 School Board Meeting. See Item E (Part 1 of 2). Public 

Comment. Lacoste’s remarks begin at approximately 9:30, https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/03092021-1009. 

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10 WILSON, J., Dissenting in Part 23-10656

speaker was a student who spoke about feeling unsafe as she 

walked into a BPS meeting. This student recounted walking into 

the meeting as parents outside “screamed at [her], called [her] a 

bitch, a whore, a prostitute.”10 I am hesitant to sanitize these facts 

by removing them from the context of parent protestors calling a 

BPS student these explicit names. 

Beyond the examples included by the majority, I include others to demonstrate the general tenor of the interruptions when 

they occurred. Cholewa, a party to this case, often spoke at BPS 

meetings. On September 21, 2021, he opened his remarks by stating the following:11

“It’s not about freedom.” That’s a direct quote from 

the current president of the United States of America, 

who’s a Democrat and a bully. It’s definitely about 

politics, but it’s not about science or freedom. I wonder what it was about for any of those who fought 

against slavery or discrimination, or anyone who has 

ever fought and died serving our military. It’s always 

been about freedom.

10 BPS, Mar. 9, 2021 School Board Meeting. See Item E (Part 2 of 2). Public 

Comment. The student’s remarks begin at approximately 1:40:15, 

https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/03092021-1009. 

11 BPS, Sept. 21 2021 School Board Meeting. See Item E. Public Comment. 

Cholewa’s remarks begin at approximately 1:05:02, https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/09222021-781. 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 11

Although arguably already offensive, Cholewa’s remarks were not 

interrupted. He continued until he said the following: “Let’s look 

at some of the other leftist ideologies we’re fighting. We’re talking 

about the party that accepts the murder of full-term babies with 

abortion. The party that says babies, white babies are born racist 

and oppressive.” At this point, Belford interrupted to say, “Joey, 

you, you’re pushing the limit. Please be respectful, okay?” The 

recording indicates that Cholewa’s comments led to disruption, including yelling and disorder in the room. Amidst this disruption, 

Belford asked audience members to stop yelling and asked 

Cholewa to be respectful. However, Cholewa was asked to leave 

during the following exchange: 

Cholewa: And I will fight you. I’ll be here every weekend, and I will be yelling at you and screaming at you 

and telling you things that you don’t want to hear, and 

that’s right, because this is America. I know you don’t 

like freedom, I know you don’t like liberty, you don’t 

like the Constitution—

Belford: All right.

Cholewa: Guess what. I’m going to keep talking.

Belford: Leave please. Have a good night.

Finally, the record reflects numerous instances where speakers made offensive comments without interruption. For example, 

one mother of BPS students expressed frustration with the district’s mask mandate: “Our freedoms are worth something. It is 

worth fighting for. And it starts with a yellow star on your chest. 

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12 WILSON, J., Dissenting in Part 23-10656

These masks are the yellow star on our chests.”12 Another example 

came from another set of comments from Jefferson who referred 

to the BPS board as a “board of dictators” and said, “This is America, not Nazi Germany. However, each day in America it seems we 

are getting closer to Nazi Germany.”13 

If the ban on abusive speech were an undercover prohibition 

on offensive speech, comments like these would have been categorically interrupted. Rather, the ban on “abusive” speech was an imprecisely worded prohibition, which impermissibly chilled speech 

by allowing viewpoint discrimination. However, as the above examples illustrate, I do not believe the record reflects it was weaponized. Therefore, I concur in the judgment but go no further. 

B. Personally Directed Speech

Although I concur in judgment with respect to Part V.B.1 to 

find the previous policy prohibiting personally directed speech unconstitutional as applied to M4L, I dissent from Part V.B.2 finding 

the present policy facially unconstitutional.14 

12 BPS, May 21 2021 School Board Meeting. See Item E6. Public Comment. 

Relevant comments begin at approximately 49:07, https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/05212021-941. 

13 BPS, July 29 2021 School Board Meeting. See Item E (Part 2 of 2). Public 

Comment. Jefferson’s remarks begin at approximately 2:43, https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/257590. 

14 This ban on personally directed speech does not meet our circuit’s standard 

for vagueness. See Tracy v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 980 F.3d 799, 807 (11th 

Cir. 2020). Individual speakers do not need to guess as to what speech is barred 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 13

1. Past Policy

As I acknowledged above, I believe M4L has standing to pursue nominal damages related to past enforcement of the old restriction against personally directed speech. Rather than truly banning “personally directed” speech, I believe the old ban functioned 

as an inconsistently enforced ban on naming people. Both parties 

acknowledge that this was viewpoint neutral. That is not enough 

to protect the policy, which must be reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose. See Barrett, 872 F.3d at 1225. One core purpose of 

school board meetings is to provide feedback about people and programs in the district. As applied to M4L (and others) as essentially 

a ban on naming people, the restriction does not meet our reasonability requirement. Therefore, I concur in judgment as to Part 

V.B.1. 

2. Present Policy

I dissent from the majority as to Part V.B.2 because I would 

find the new Policy facially constitutional. Presently, the Policy allows speakers to “address comments to the Board as a whole, the 

presiding officer, or to an individual board member.” I read this 

text to suggest that these are the only people speakers can address, 

not the only people speakers may mention. This appears to me to 

by the ban. Further, the restriction does not “cover[] substantially more 

speech than the First Amendment allows.” Speech First, 32 F.4th at 1125. 

Therefore, it is not impermissibly overbroad. 

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14 WILSON, J., Dissenting in Part 23-10656

be both viewpoint neutral and reasonable given the purposes of a 

school board meeting. 

The new Policy bans speakers from directing comments at

particular people. But, for example, a parent addressing the entire

board may comment about particular teachers or coaches. In addition to remaining viewpoint neutral, I would find this restriction 

reasonable given the feedback purpose of a school board meeting. 

We acknowledge a municipal body’s interest in conducting orderly 

meetings. See Rowe, 358 F.3d at 803. Footage from the meetings 

indicates the most disruptive comments being those that seemed 

directed at members of the audience, such as when Jenkins discussed a person who lurked around her home being present in the 

board room or when people in the crowd began yelling at Jenkins 

during her same report.15 We do not require a limited public forum 

to have the only reasonable or even the most reasonable restriction 

on speech, but only a reasonable restriction, given the purpose of 

the forum. See Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1231. As written, the new restriction on personally directed speech is a viewpoint neutral restriction reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose. I dissent from 

the majority finding otherwise. 

15 BPS, July 29 2021 Regular/Tentative Budget Hearing Meetings. See Item K. 

Board Member Reports/Discussion Points. She speaks about the man at 

about 18:40, which leads to some disruption. Members of the audience begin 

yelling at Jenkins again at about 19:40. This commotion continued until Belford called for a brief recess. https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/257590. 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 15

C. Obscene Speech

I agree with the majority that a ban on “some iterations of 

an obscenity policy would be constitutional” because obscenity is 

not protected speech. Maj. Op. at 24; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 

15, 24 (1973). Because obscenity is not protected speech, M4L 

could not bring a facial challenge to the BPS Policy’s obscenity ban. 

Instead, M4L brought an as-applied challenge to this portion of the 

policy as an obscenity ban. Because the prohibition was not applied 

to obscenity as used as a term of art in the First Amendment context, I concur in judgment. 

Like the majority, I agree that this case does not present a 

question of “whether or how the school board could properly prohibit other profane or explicit speech at school board meetings.” 

Maj. Op. at 25. I would not reach the purposes of the forum for 

this analysis and would remain more rooted in the record. 

Again, the rendition of facts in Part V.C. of the majority’s 

opinion removes them from both the immediate context of the 

speaker’s surrounding speech and the broader context of confrontational speakers at a school board meeting. 

Here, Michelle Beavers, another M4L member who is not a 

party to the case, read an alleged excerpt of a book16. After beginning her remarks by discussing masks, she mentioned not having 

16 BPS, October 26, 2021 School Board Meeting. See Item E10. Public Comment. Beaver’s remarks begin at approximately 47:48. She pivots about 50:02. 

https://brevardpublicschools.new.swagit.com/videos/257590.

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16 WILSON, J., Dissenting in Part 23-10656

much time to talk about books. Abruptly, she pivoted, without 

prefacing that the following remarks were from a book and not her 

own:

I tiptoed toward the door, peering through the window at the boy’s pants around his ankles squeezed between April’s straddled legs as she lay on the teacher’s 

desk. I swung the door open letting a soft light from 

the hallway shine a spotlight on them. “Shit!” he muttered.

After Belford stated, “Ma’am, I need for you to keep your language 

clean,” Beavers continued “[o]h this was our schoolbooks.” However, Beavers never mentions what book this quote allegedly came 

from, the school in which this alleged book was purportedly located, or the age of the students who had access to the book. Later, 

she claims to quote from a different book found in libraries for second graders. Based on the record, I hesitate to make definitive 

statements about the language repeated by Beavers as coming “directly from a book that is available to children in their elementary 

school library.” Maj. Op. at 26. 

Finally, M4L only challenges restrictions on speech at BPS 

board meetings and does not raise any challenges related to alleged 

obscenity in books.17 Though I concur in judgment based on 

17 I would refrain from labeling text in any schoolbooks “obscene.” M4L and 

its members have made statements regarding the contents of books in BPS 

schools, but this case relates to speech at BPS meetings. This case does not 

involve books, and I would refrain from discussing the contents of books. 

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23-10656 WILSON, Jr., Dissenting in Part 17

obscenity’s definition as a term of art in First Amendment jurisprudence, I believe the majority goes further than necessary in its analysis.18 

* * *

Overall, I find it imperative to contextualize the comments 

and interruptions at issue within the contentious conversations 

that occurred at BPS meetings. School board meetings are limited 

public forums. As such, school boards may restrict speech so long

as their restrictions are reasonable in light of the purpose of the 

forum and maintain viewpoint neutrality. Several of the restrictions used by BPS did not meet these requirements. Therefore, 

I concur in judgment to all but Part V.B.2 of the majority’s opinion. 

18 Because I concur in judgment to find the obscenity ban unconstitutional as 

applied, I do not reach the vagueness or overbreadth challenges to this portion 

of the policy raised by M4L. 

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