M arch 31, 1977

Authority of Bureau of Prisons Physicians to

Perform Autopsies

This is in response to your memorandum requesting our opinion on 

whether wardens of Federal prisons can be empowered to authorize 

autopsies of deceased inmates without regard to State laws requiring 

consent of next of kin or approval by State officials. We have examined 

the question, and we conclude that legislation is necessary for this 

purpose. In addition, we suggest the lines that a proposed statute might 

follow.

The rights of a surviving spouse or next of kin in a dead body derive 

from the common law. While the details vary among the States, a 

survey of the law of the District of Columbia and a geographically 

diverse sample of State law (California, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, and Texas) shows agreement on general principles. The surviving 

spouse, if any, and otherwise the next of kin have only a right to the 

reasonably prompt possession on the intact body for purpose of burial 

or cremation. Although this right is not considered a property right, 

damages may be awarded for unauthorized interference with the body, 

including an unauthorized autopsy. See, e.g., Steagall v. Doctors’ Hospital, 171 F. 2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Pollard v. Phelps, 56 Ga. App. 408 

(1937); Weingast v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 824, 254 N.Y.S. 2d 952 (1954); 

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Love, 132 Tex. 280, 121 S.W. 2d 986 

(1939). See, generally, Annotation, 83 A.L.R. 2d 956 (1961).

The right, however, is subject to public necessity as defined by State 

statute. As a general rule, if the proper State administrative or judicial 

officer determines in good faith that the statutory grounds for an 

autopsy exist, he or she may proceed without the consent of the spouse 

or next of kin. See, e.g., California Health & Safety Code §7113; 

California Government Code §27491.4; Code of Georgia § 21-203(3); 

Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, Ch. 38, § 6; New York Public 

Health Law §4210; Gahn v. Leary, 318 Mass. 425, 61 N.E. 2d 844, 

(1945); Gray v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 90, 114 S.W. 635 (1908).

77-16 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE

DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS

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State statutory grounds for autopsy vary, but generally include any 

sudden, violent, unexplained, or otherwise possibly criminally caused 

death. See, e.g., California Government Code § 27491; Code of Georgia 

§21-205; New York Public Health Law §4210; Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 49.01. Three of the States surveyed (California, 

Georgia, and Texas) specifically provide for autopsies in the case of 

any death in prison, and New York authorizes the Commissioner of 

Corrections to procure an autopsy at his discretion. California Government Code §24791; Code of Georgia §21-205(2); New York Public 

Health Law §4210; Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 49.01.

Our partial examination of State law leads us to conclude that the 

right of the spouse or next of kin to control the disposition of a dead 

body is subject to public necessity as defined by one with authority to 

do so. The statutory power of local officials to order autopsies is given 

in the furtherance of a state interest, usually the investigation of crime 

or the protection of public health.

Because the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons are responsible for the custody, discipline, and welfare of Federal prisoners, 18 

U.S.C. §§4001, 4042(3), Congress can, of course, confer on them the 

specific authority to conduct autopsies without consent when reasonably necessary to perform these functions.1 See, generally, Ex parte,

Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383-86 (1879); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 

316, 408-17 (1819). By analogy with California, Georgia, New York, 

and Texas law, a statute can provide autopsy authority for any death 

occurring in prison.

More circumscribed authority might be desired to preclude autopsies 

for scientific or medical reasons unrelated to prison administration. If 

so, a statute could appropriately authorize an autopsy in the event of 

homicide, suicide, fatal illness or accident, or other unexplained death 

of an inmate if the Bureau determines one is necessary to detect crime, 

maintain discipline, protect the health or safety of the inmates, remedy 

official misconduct, or defend the United States or its employees from 

tort liability arising from the administration of a Bureau institution.

You have suggested that the authority to perform autopsies without 

consent might be equally permissible by regulation promulgated pursuant to the authority conferred by 5 U.S.C. §301.2 Such regulations

■Under 49 U.S.C. § 1441(c), for example, the National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB) is em powered to conduct an autopsy o f any person w ho was aboard an aircraft 

involved in a fatal crash. Congress concluded that although autopsies w ere a valuable 

tool in air crash investigations, their use had been hindered by the provisions of various 

State laws. Accordingly, the legislation was enacted to enable the NTSB to “proceed 

prom ptly with autopsies . . . with a minimum of delay and thus to overcom e difficulties 

w here autopsy information is dependent upon the consent o f next o f kin o r compliance 

with state procedure . ...” H.R. Rep. No. 2487, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962).

’ T hat section provides, in pertinent part:

The head o f an Executive . . . departm ent may prescribe regulations for the government of his department,' the conduct o f its employees, the distribution and perform ­

ance of its business, and the custody, use and preservation o f its property.

It has been in substantially this form since its origin as § 161 o f the Revised Statutes.

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have the force of law if within the scope of the relevant statute. Georgia

v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536 (1973); Smith v. United States, 170 

U.S. 372, 377-78 (1898). However, § 301 does not confer authority to 

change the substantive rights of persons not connected with the Government. Regulations purporting to do so are valid only if consistent 

with independent statutory authority. Compare United States v. Morehead, 243 U.S. 607 (1917), with United States v. George, 228 U.S. 14 

(1913); see, Georgia v. United States, supra-, 36 Op. A.G. 21, 25 (1929); 

17 Op. A.G. 524, 525 (1883). It is therefore unlikely that a regulation 

relying solely on § 301 could legally alter the State law rights of third 

persons.

The only pertinent substantive statute here is 18 U.S.C. §4001.3 

Subject to constitutional limits, this section authorizes the Attorney 

General to restrict access of third parties to prisoners in the interest of 

prison management. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 

843 (1974); Carter v. United States, 333 F. 2d 354 (10th Cir. 1964). It 

can be argued that the power to operate the prison system includes the 

power to retain and perform an autopsy on the body of a deceased 

prisoner without consent when necessary to preserve discipline or protect the health and safety of surviving prisoners. The Armed Forces, 

which exercise a similar degree of authority over their members, conduct nonconsensual autopsies without express statutory authority.4

On the other hand, we believe that the weight of authority speaks 

against the validity of such a regulation premised on 18 U.S.C. §4001. 

As your request points out, no other Federal civilian agency performs 

autopsies without consent unless authorized by statute. Congress has 

specifically provided for autopsies of prisoners without consent in one 

limited situation.5 As noted above, it has also empowered the National 

Transportation Safety Board to conduct autopsies without consent.® It 

can be inferred from these precedents that statutory authority is required to override a claimant’s right to the body of a prisoner. Moreover, the consensus of State decisions is that consent is necessary unless

3 In pertinent part, it provides:

T h e control and management o f Federal penal and correctional institutions . . . shall 

be vested in the Attorney G eneral, w ho shall prom ulgate rules for the government 

th e re o f. . .

4 F o r example. A rm y Reg. 40-2, para. 4-4, em pow ers the com m ander to have an 

autopsy perform ed on any member o f the armed forces who dies on active duty “w hen it 

is considered necessary for the protection of the military comm unity to determine the 

true cause o f death . . . The authority for this regulation is 10 U.S.C. §3012, which 

authorizes the Secretary of the A rm y to prescribe regulations for its governm ent, and the 

D epartm ent o f Defense A ppropriation A ct of 1977, § 740, w hich authorizes the A rm y to 

provide m edical care.

5 18 U.S.C. § 3567 permits the court, as part o f a death sentence, to order the dissection 

o f the body o f a prisoner convicted o f first degree m urder or rape.

«See 49 U.S.C. § 1441(c).

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an explicit statute is to the contrary.7 Finally, as stated above, several 

States have found it necessary to provide specifically for autopsies 

without consent in prison deaths. We conclude therefore that 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4001 does not provide the authority you desire and that legislation is 

required to authorize nonconsensual autopsies.

In addition, it would appear that legislation is needed to resolve two 

technical difficulties. First, it could provide the clear authority to 

employ outside medical personnel instead of Bureau personnel hired 

under the authority of 18 U.S.C. §4001 or Public Health Service (PHS) 

doctors detailed under 18 U.S.C. §4005. Second, it could limit the tort 

liability of Bureau personnel or other persons for any wrongful autopsy 

by restricting claimants to the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Finally, it should be noted that certain religions forbid an autopsy of 

their adherents. Any statute that dispenses entirely with consent may be 

attacked by a claimant of a body as an infringement on the free exercise 

of religion. In such a case, the constitutionality of the regulation would 

turn on the balance between the claimant’s First Amendment rights and 

the Federal interest in conducting the autopsy. See, Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205, 213-15 (1972); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972). 

The governmental interests in the discipline, safety, and health of prisoners are probably stronger than the incidental offense to the claimant’s 

beliefs. See, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Winters v. 

Muller, 306 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (D. N.Y. 1969); Jehovah's Witnesses in

the State o f Washington v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1, 278 F. 

Supp. 488, 503-05 (D. Wash. 1967), prob. juris, declined, 390 U.S. 598 

(1968); cf, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-30 (1905). But cf,

Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra. It would be advisable to minimize the problem, however, by providing by statute or regulation that religious 

scruples will be respected when investigative needs permit. See, e.g., 49 

U.S.C. § 1441(c).8

J o h n M . H a r m o n

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

7 E.g„ Donnelly v. Guion, 467 F. 2d 290 (2d Cir. 1972); Crenshaw v. O ’Connell, 235 Mo. 

App. 1085, 150 S.W. 2d 489 (1941); Darcy v. Presbyterian Hospital, 202 N.Y. 259, 95 N .E. 

695 (1911); Gurganious v. Simpson, 213 N.C. 613, 197 S.E. 163 (1938); Frick v. McClelland, 384 Pa. 597, 122 A. 2d 43 (1956); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Love, 132 Tex. 280, 

121 S.W. 2d 986 (1939). See, generally. Annotation, 83 A.L.R. 2d 956.

* 42 U.S.C. § 233 provides this protection to Public Health Service employees. Similar 

protection for private physicians w ho might perform autopsies and for Bureau personnel 

w ho authorize them may be desirable.

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