PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/5/96 TENTH CIRCUIT
SHANE DUFFEE, minor, by and through guardian and next friend, ROSE THORNTON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MURRAY OHIO MANUFACTURING CO., WAL-MART STORES, INC., and SHIMANO AMERICAN, INC.,

Defendants - Appellees. Nos. 95-3055 and 95-3241

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (D. Ct. No. 94-CV-4022)
Mark W. Works, Topeka, Kansas, appearing for the Ap pellant. Donald Patterson, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith , appearing for Appellees Murray Ohio and Wal-Mart Stores.* David E. Larson, Larson & Larson, Kansas City, Miss ouri (Randall W. Schroer with him on the brief), appearing for Appellee Shim ano American.* *Appellees Murray Ohio, Wal-Mart Stores, and Shiman o American filed a joint brief.
Before TACHA, MCWILLIAMS, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judg es.- 2 -

TACHA, Circuit Judge.
On February 21, 1992, Shane Duffee was struck by a car while riding his bicycle. By and through his guardian and next of f riend Rose Thornton, Duffee sued Wal-Mart, Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company, and Sh imano American, Inc., alleging warning, design, and manufacturing defects under negligence, strict liability, and warranty theories. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of WalMart and Murray on all claims on February 8, 1995. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Shimano on all claims on July 24, 1995. After careful review of the record, we adopt the analysis of the distric t court’s February 8, 1995, and July 24, 1995, orders. In the February 8 order, the district court determi ned that testimony from Duffee’s expert regarding the safety of the brakes on Duffee’s bike was inadmissible under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The only issue that this court must reach is the questi on of which standard should be used to review decisions to exclude expert testimony und er Daubertthat result in summary judgment. Ordinarily we review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995). Evidentiary rulings, however, are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hinds v. General Motors Corp. , 988 F.2d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993). The Third and Eleventh- 3 -

Circuits, while acknowledging that evidentiary ruli ngs usually receive greater deference, have nonetheless held that “when the dis trict court’s exclusionary evidentiary rulings with respect to scientific opin ion testimony will result in a summary or directed judgment, we will give them a ‘ hard look’ (more stringent review) to determine if a district court has abusedits discretion in excluding evidence as unreliable.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Liti g. , 35 F.3d 717, 749-750 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see Joiner v. General Elec. Co. , 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying “a particularly stringent stan dard of review to the trial judge’s exclusion of expert testimony.”) The Seventh Circui t, on the other hand, has held that the trial judge’s decision to exclude evidence under Daub ertshould be reviewed for abuse of discretion, even when that decision result s in summary judgment. Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc. , 75 F.3d 290, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1996); see Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. , 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996). Daubertrequires district judges to act as gatekeepers to ensure that scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable. Daubert , 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. This entails two inquiries: whether the reasoning and methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid, and whether the reasoning and methodology can properly be applied to the facts. Id. at 2796. Like the Supreme Court, we “are confiden t that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake th is review.” Id. Their decisions, therefore, are properly reviewed under the traditio nal abuse of discretion standard.- 4 -

In this case, the district judge found that the tes timony of the plaintiff’s expert was not supported by appropriate validation, and theref ore was inadmissible under Daubert . After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding this testimony. We AFFIRM for substantially the reasons given by th e district court and ORDER both of the district court’s orders in this c ase to be published.