IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

Spring 2024 Term

_____________________

No. 23-ICA-345

_____________________

MEGAN MCKNIGHT and LUKE MCKNIGHT,

Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners,

v.

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF GLENVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY, 

GARY Z. MORRIS, and JASON P. BARR,

Defendants Below, Respondents.

___________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Gilmer County

Honorable Richard A. Facemire, Judge

Civil Action No. CC-11-2022-C-17

REVERSED AND REMANDED

_________________________________________________________

Submitted: May 21, 2024

Filed: June 11, 2024

Michael D. Crim, Esq.

Crim Law Office, PLLC

Clarksburg, West Virginia

Counsel for Petitioner

Allison B. Williams, Esq.

Amy M. Smith, Esq.

Kaitlin L.H. Robidoux, Esq.

Steptoe & Johnson PLLC

Bridgeport, West Virginia

Counsel for Respondents

JUDGE GREEAR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

FILED

June 11, 2024

released at 3:00 p.m.

ASHLEY N. DEEM, DEPUTY CLERK

INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
1

GREEAR, JUDGE:

Petitioners Megan McKnight (“Dr. McKnight”) and Luke McKnight (“Mr. 

McKnight”) (collectively “Petitioners”) appeal the July 6, 2023, order of the Gilmer

County Circuit Court, which granted Respondents Board of Governors of Glenville State 

University (“GSU”), Gary Z. Morris (“Morris”), and Jason P. Barr’s (“Barr”) (collectively 

“Respondents”) Motion to Dismiss.

1 On appeal, Dr. McKnight argues that the circuit court 

erred in evaluating her claims under a heightened pleading standard. Further, Dr. McKnight

contends the circuit court erred in concluding that she had failed to allege facts sufficient 

to constitute a constructive discharge claim, sex/gender discrimination claim, 

discrimination claim against Morris and Barr, and hostile work environment claim. Lastly, 

Mr. McKnight argues his loss of consortium claim should be remanded along with Dr. 

McKnight’s substantive claims. As discussed below, after review of the record and 

pleadings before this Court, we reverse the circuit court’s July 6, 2023, order and remand 

the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dr. McKnight received her Bluegrass Music Certificate in 2007 and her B.A. 

in Elementary/Early Education in 2011, both from Glenville State University. During the 

2006-2007 school year, Dr. McKnight began working for GSU under the supervision of 

Buddy Griffin in the school's Bluegrass Program, a position she maintained through the 

1 Glenville State University was dismissed by separate order not pending before this 

Court on appeal.
2

2009-2010 school year. On June 7, 2010, Dr. McKnight was employed to serve as the parttime Bluegrass Program Assistant. Dr. McKnight continued working for GSU in various 

positions until December 2021. GSU employed Dr. McKnight for the 2011-2012 school 

year in the position of Artist in Residence and Director of Bluegrass Programs. Dr. 

McKnight was employed by GSU for the 2012-2013 school year as the Director of 

Bluegrass Programs. Dr. McKnight received her Master of Education degree from Marshall 

University in May 2013, and her Doctor of Education degree from Walden University in 

April 2018.

After receiving her Master of Education degree, Dr. McKnight was 

employed by GSU for the 2013-2014, 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years in the 

position of Visiting Assistant Professor of Music and Director of Bluegrass Programs.

During the 2016-2017, 2017-2018, 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 school years, Dr. McKnight 

was employed by GSU as an Assistant Professor of Music and Director of Bluegrass 

Programs. Dr. McKnight helped create the Pioneer Stage Bluegrass Music Education 

Center and developed and oversaw the implementation of GSU's online Bachelor of Arts

in Music program. Dr. McKnight’s complaint alleges that, in or around the 2016-2017 

school year, GSU promised that she would be offered an expedited promotion and tenure 

upon completion of her Doctor of Education degree based on her length of employment, 

her commitment to GSU, and her extra efforts and service to the university and community. 
3

Dr. McKnight reportedly was not offered expedited promotion and tenure after receiving 

her Doctorate degree.2

During the 2017-2018 school year, Morris became the interim VicePresident of Academic Affairs for GSU. Morris became GSU’s Provost and Vice-President 

of Academic Affairs on February 4, 2020. Morris selected and appointed Barr to be GSU's 

Chair of the Fine Arts Department on or about June 22, 2019. Prior to Morris becoming 

Provost and Vice-President of Academic Affairs, Dr. McKnight had consistently received 

positive evaluations from GSU. 

Petitioners filed their complaint in this matter on December 16, 2022. In their 

complaint, Dr. McKnight and Mr. McKnight asserted the following counts: 1) 

discrimination based on sex/gender; 2) discrimination by Morris and Barr, 3) gender based 

hostile work environment; and 4) loss of consortium. 

2 On August 27, 2021, Dr. McKnight entered into a revised contract for the 2021-

2022 school year that promoted her to Associate Professor of Appalachian Studies and 

granted her tenure. While the complaint does not reference this revised contract, it was 

considered by the circuit court for purposes of analyzing the motion to dismiss. At oral 

argument, counsel for petitioners conceded that such consideration was not improper under 

the circumstances of this case. While the complaint does not allege that Dr. McKnight 

eventually received a promotion and tenure, we find the same to be true based upon the 

record. However, we note that the parties dispute whether the promotion and tenure were 

granted on an expedited basis.
4

In her complaint, Dr. McKnight alleged that GSU, Morris, and Barr subjected 

her to the following adverse employment actions: constructive discharge; denial of 

opportunity to seek tenure on an expedited basis following receipt of doctorate; denial of 

the opportunity to serve on committees; denial of the opportunity to have a full slate of 

student advisees; denial of the opportunity to provide instruction to students in GSU's 

Bluegrass Program which she was hand-selected to lead; denial of the opportunity to teach 

core classes in Appalachian Studies; denial of the opportunity to teach a Recording and 

Engineering course that she had taught for the previous ten years which was given to a

male instructor; denial of the opportunity to run the Pioneer Stage Bluegrass Music and 

Education Center which she had established; denial of the stipend she was to receive for 

running the Pioneer Stage which GSU had agreed to provide through 2023; denial of the 

opportunity to teach a full course load as required by GSU; compensation at a rate less than 

similarly situated male employees; and, that GSU, on more than one occasion, improperly 

withheld from Dr. McKnight the compensation to which she was entitled.

Additionally, Dr. McKnight alleged that the adverse decisions were made 

based on her gender. Specifically, Dr. McKnight’s complaint alleges: while denying Dr. 

McKnight the opportunity to advise students in the Appalachian Studies program, GSU

and Morris hired a new male instructor to teach the Appalachian Studies courses and advise 

students in the Appalachian Studies program; while denying Dr. McKnight a full course 

load to teach, GSU and Morris hired a new male instructor to teach history courses that she 

was qualified to teach; while denying Dr. McKnight the opportunity to teach a full course 
5

load, GSU assigned a male instructor to teach the Recording and Engineering course that 

she had taught for the previous ten (10) years; after Barr became Chair of the Fine Arts 

Department, Dr. McKnight attended a meeting in which Barr was discussing the promotion 

of a female colleague and made a comment suggesting that the female colleague must have 

been sleeping with someone to get the promotion; Morris attended an emergency meeting 

of the Board of Governors and in referring to Dr. McKnight, commented that "this girl" 

should not be on the faculty, she should only be staff; Morris actively lobbied the 

promotion and tenure committee to deny Dr. McKnight’s promotion and tenure; and Morris 

misrepresented to GSU's President that Dr. McKnight did not have the academic 

credentials to teach either Music or Appalachian Studies, even though she was currently 

serving as an Assistant Professor of Music and had served in that capacity since 2013.

Furthermore, the complaint makes the general allegation that all the actions and conduct of 

the Respondents would not have occurred but for Dr. McKnight’s gender.

On February 13, 2023, GSU, Morris, and Barr filed their motion to dismiss 

and memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was 

heard on May 22, 2023. The circuit court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss 

and dismissed the case in its entirety on July 5, 2023. It is from this order that Dr. McKnight 

and Mr. McKnight appeal.
6

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Appellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a 

complaint is de novo.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex. rel McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, 

Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995). The West Virginia Supreme Court instructs 

that "motions to dismiss are viewed with disfavor," and it has "counsel[ed] lower courts to 

rarely grant such motions." Forshey v. Jackson, 222 W. Va. 743, 749, 671 S.E.2d 748, 754 

(2008). Moreover, “[t]he trial court, in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Syl. Pt. 3, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., Inc., 160 W. Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977). 

On appeal of a dismissal based on granting a motion pursuant to West Virginia Rules of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true. Syl. Pt. 1, 

Wiggins v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 178 W. Va. 63, 357 S.E.2d 745 (1987). 

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, the Petitioners argue six assignments of error as to the underlying 

final order granting the motion to dismiss which we will address in turn. First, Petitioners

assert that the circuit court erred in evaluating Dr. McKnight’s substantive claims on a 

heightened pleading standard.

It is unclear what standard the circuit court actually utilized in evaluating 

Petitioners’ complaint in its July 6, 2023, order. The order contains discussion of a 
7

heightened pleading standard when qualified immunity is at issue. However, the circuit 

court did not specify whether it viewed the complaint at issue here under a heightened 

pleading standard or under the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a) of the West Virginia 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Regardless, the correct pleading standard for complaints alleging 

violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act (“WVHRA”) only requires the plaintiff 

to plead facts, taken as a whole, sufficient to show they are entitled to relief on any possible

theory. See Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va., 244 W. 

Va. 508, 522, 854 S.E.2d 870, 884 (2020). “Moreover, a party is not required to establish 

a prima facie case at the pleading stage.” Id. “Before discovery has unearthed relevant facts 

and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the required prima 

facie case in a particular case. Given that the prima facie case operates as a flexible 

evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard.” Id. (citing 

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)).

In addressing the question of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court of 

Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has stated “a government entity has no qualified 

immunity where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the government entity's discretionary 

‘acts or omissions are in violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 

or laws of which a reasonable person would have known[.]’” Judy v. Eastern West Virginia 

Community and Technical College, 246 W. Va. 483, 488, 874 S.E.2d 285, 290 (2022)

(citing Syl. Pt. 3, in part, W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 236 W. Va. 654, 657, 783 S.E.2d 

75, 78 (2015)). In Judy, the respondent, Eastern West Virginia Community and Technical 
8

College, contended that it was entitled to qualified immunity because, as a public college, 

it was a state agency or a political subdivision. In response, the SCAWV stated 

“[r]espondent cannot reasonably argue that the WVHRA [...] does not constitute clearly 

established statutory law of which it should have known.” Id. at 488, 874 S.E.2d at 290. 

Here, as with Judy, Petitioners “pled facts demonstrating a violation of this clearly 

established law [WVHRA], so, per Marple, [GSU] is entitled to no qualified immunity 

here.” Id. Thus, whatever standard was used by the circuit court, it is clear that a heightened 

pleading standard does not apply to claims alleging violations of the WVHRA. See Id.

In her second assignment of error, Dr. McKnight alleges that the circuit court 

erred in concluding that she had failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a constructive 

discharge.

3 A constructive discharge is sufficiently alleged when the employee claims that 

because of age, race, sexual, or other unlawful discrimination, the employer created a 

hostile working climate which was so intolerable that the employee was forced to leave his

or her employment. Syl. Pt. 5, Burns v. West Virginia Department of Education and Arts, 

242 W. Va. 392, 836 S.E.2d 43 (2019). In order to prove a constructive discharge, a 

plaintiff must establish that working conditions created by or known to the employer were 

so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to quit. It is not necessary, 

3 We note that constructive discharge was not a specific count pled in petitioner’s 

complaint. However, constructive discharge could conceivably be found to be an adverse 

employment decision in connection with Dr. McKnight’s WVHRA discrimination claims.
9

however, that a plaintiff prove that the employer's actions were taken with a specific intent 

to cause the plaintiff to quit. See Id. at 394, 836 S.E.2d at 45.

As discussed above, the standard for assessing a motion to dismiss requires 

the circuit court to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take 

all allegations as true. See Wiggins, 178 W. Va. at 63, 357 S.E.2d at 745. See also 

Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC, 244 W. Va. at 520, 854 S.E.2d at 882 (the task 

of a court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the 

complaint, not assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof).

Here, in assessing the legal feasibility of the complaint and viewing the 

allegations in a light most favorable to the Petitioners, we hold that the complaint makes 

sufficient allegations to survive a motion to dismiss. With respect to her working 

conditions, Dr. McKnight alleged she was not paid for any service she provided to the 

Pioneer Stage during the 2021-2022 school year despite GSU’s agreement to provide the 

same through 2023;she was denied the opportunity to serve on committees; she was denied

the opportunity to have a full slate of student advisees; she was denied the opportunity to 

provide instruction to students in GSU's Bluegrass Program which she was hand-selected 

to lead; she was denied the opportunity to teach core classes in Appalachian Studies; she 

was denied the opportunity to teach a Recording and Engineering course that she had taught 

for the previous ten years which was given to a male instructor; she was denied the 

opportunity to run the Pioneer Stage Bluegrass Music and Education Center which she had 
10

established; she was denied the opportunity to teach a full course load as required by GSU;

she was compensated at a rate less than similarly situated male employees; and, that GSU, 

on more than one occasion, improperly withheld from Dr. McKnight the compensation to 

which she was entitled. Further, Dr. McKnight alleged that after filing her grievance, 

Morris instructed one or more of Dr. McKnight’s colleagues to have no contact with her. 

These allegations, along with the allegations in the complaint alleging gender-based hostile 

work environment and unlawful gender-based discrimination, taken as a whole, support

Dr. McKnight’s ability to prove some set of facts that would entitle her to relief. If Dr. 

McKnight was able to produce evidence supporting all the allegations contained in her 

complaint, a finder of fact could justifiably conclude that a reasonable person would be 

compelled to quit under such circumstances. Accordingly, Dr. McKnight alleged sufficient 

facts to survive a motion to dismiss the constructive discharge claim.

In Dr. McKnight’s third assignment of error, she argues that the circuit court 

erred in finding she that she had failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a gender 

discrimination claim. We agree.

The SCAWV has stated that allegations which would constitute a prima facie 

case of employment discrimination are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Judy,

246 W. Va. at 489, 874 S.E.2d at 291. Further, 

[i]n order to make a prima facie case of employment 

discrimination ... the plaintiff must offer proof of the 

following: (1) That the plaintiff is a member of a protected 
11

class. (2) That the employer made an adverse decision 

concerning the plaintiff. (3) But for the plaintiff's protected 

status, the adverse decision would not have been made.

Id. (citing Syl. Pt. 3, Conaway v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 178 W. Va. 164, 358 S.E.2d 

423 (1986)). “The ‘but for’ test of discriminatory motive in [Conaway], is merely a 

threshold inquiry, requiring only that a plaintiff show an inference of discrimination.” Id.

(citation omitted). 

Dr. McKnight’s complaint sufficiently alleges she is a member of a protected 

class. Paragraph ninety (90) of Petitioners’ complaint alleged that the actions and conduct 

of the Respondents would not have occurred but for Dr. McKnight’s gender.

Dr. McKnight also alleges that GSU made adverse decisions concerning her 

employment. Specifically, Dr. McKnight’s complaint alleges that: 1) after completing her 

degree in Appalachian Studies, GSU denied her the opportunity to teach any core classes

within the Appalachian Studies Program with the exception of Traditions of Appalachian 

Music; 2) GSU refused to continue to provide a contract or stipend to operate the Pioneer 

Stage Bluegrass Music Education Center for the 2021-2022 school year despite agreeing 

to provide such through 2023; and 3) she was constructively discharged due to the unlawful 

discrimination and related working conditions. While Respondents argue that mere 

changes to an employee’s duties do not constitute an adverse action, allegations of 

constructive discharge and loss of the Pioneer Stage stipend satisfy the adverse decision 

element of an employment discrimination claim at the motion to dismiss stage.
12

Finally, Dr. McKnight’s complaint satisfied the “but for” requirement. Dr. 

McKnight alleged that GSU hired a male instructor to teach and advise all Appalachian 

Studies courses. Dr. McKnight further contends that she was paid less than similarly 

situated males and was denied opportunities of employment as similarly situated males.

Additionally, Dr. McKnight alleged that all the actions of the Respondents were due to her 

gender. While perhaps not a model of clarity, Dr. McKnight’s complaint, taken as a whole, 

alleges facts sufficient to state a prima facie claim of unlawful gender discrimination.

In her fourth assignment of error, Dr. McKnight argues that the circuit court 

erred in determining she failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a discrimination claim 

against Morris and Barr. Once again, we agree.

Dr. McKnight’s complaint alleges that the actions of Morris and Barr violate 

West Virginia Code § 16B-17-9(7).4 The WVHRA states that it shall be unlawful for any 

employer to 

[e]ngage in any form of threats or reprisal, or to engage in, or 

hire, or conspire with others to commit acts or activities of any 

nature, the purpose of which is to harass, degrade, embarrass 

or cause physical harm or economic loss or to aid, abet, incite, 

compel or coerce any person to engage in any of the unlawful 

discriminatory practices defined in this section.

4 West Virginia Code § 5-11-1 et seq. was recodified into West Virginia Code § 16B17-1 et seq. effective February 8, 2024.
13

See West Virginia Code § 16B-17-9(7)(A). The SCAWV has held that the language of the 

statue is clear and unambiguous. Based on this language it is an unlawful discrimination 

practice for any person to: 1) engage in any form of threat or reprisal; 2) engage in, or hire, 

or conspire with others to commit acts or activities of any nature, the purpose of which is 

to harass, degrade, embarrass or cause physical harm or economic loss; or 3) aid, abet, 

incite, compel or coerce any person to engage in any of the unlawful discriminatory 

practices defined in this section. See Michael v. Appalachian Heating, LLC, 226 W. Va. 

394, 401, 701 S.E.2d 116, 123 (2010). Dr. McKnight’s complaint makes clear allegations 

that Morris and Barr engaged in acts with the purpose to harass, degrade, embarrass, or aid 

and abet unlawful discriminatory practices. 

Dr. McKnight’s complaint specifically alleges that Morris actively lobbied 

the promotion and tenure committee to deny Dr. McKnight’s tenure due to her gender. She

alleges that both Morris and Barr prevented her from having a full slate of student advisees; 

that Morris hired male teachers to teach the courses she was qualified to teach; and after 

filing a grievance, Morris instructed colleagues of Dr. McKnight to have no contact with 

her. These allegations, in conjunction with the complaint taken as whole and the adverse 

employment decisions alleged by Dr. McKnight, are sufficient factual allegations to 

provide notice pleading to the defendants of the claim alleged against them. Additionally, 

this Court, as discussed above, has determined that Petitioners have pled sufficient facts to 

make a prima facie case of gender discrimination against GSU. Thus, the allegations 
14

against Morris and Barr are sufficient to state a claim of aiding and abetting GSU’s alleged 

gender discrimination.

Further, Dr. McKnight contends the circuit court erred in its finding that she 

only named Morris and Barr as defendants in their individual capacity, while all allegations 

concern their official capacities. 

The term “person,” as defined and utilized within the context 

of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, includes both 

employees and employers. Any contrary interpretation, which 

might have the effect of barring suits by employees against 

their supervisors, would be counter to the plain meaning of the 

statutory language and contrary to the very spirit and purpose 

of this particular legislation.

See Syl. Pt. 5, St. Peter v. Ampak-Division of Gatewood Products, Inc., 199 W. Va. 365, 

484 S.E.2d 481 (1997). The Human Rights Act establishes a cause of action against an 

individual person who participates in unlawful discrimination. Id. at 373, 484 S.E.2d at 

489. While the complaint may be unartfully crafted in this respect, it is clear that Dr. 

McKnight named Morris and Barr as individuals under the WVHRA. As stated in her 

complaint, Dr. McKnight’s allegations regarding Morris and Barr are based on their 

individual actions taken as agents of GSU. The circuit court erred in dismissing the 

complaint against Morris and Barr on this basis.

In her fifth assignment of error, Dr. McKnight asserts the circuit court erred 

in concluding she failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a hostile environment claim. 

We agree.
15

An employee may state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment if 

unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 

conduct of a sexual nature have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 

individual's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 

environment. See Syl. Pt. 3, Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 226 W. Va. 214, 700 S.E.2d 183 

(2010).

To establish a claim for sexual harassment under the West 

Virginia Human Rights Act based upon a hostile or abusive 

work environment, a plaintiff-employee must prove that: (1) 

the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the 

sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive 

to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and create an 

abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputable on some 

factual basis to the employer. 

Syl. Pt. 6, Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC v. Griffith, 235 W. Va. 538, 775 

S.E.2d 90 (2015). Further, knowledge of work place misconduct may be imputed to an 

employer by circumstantial evidence if the conduct is shown to be sufficiently pervasive 

or repetitive so that a reasonable employer, intent on complying with the West Virginia 

Human Rights Act, would be aware of the conduct. See Syl. Pt. 5. Conrad v. ARA Szabo, 

198 W. Va. 362, 480 S.E.2d 801 (1996).

In the July 6, 2023, order, the circuit court dismissed Dr. McKnight’s claim 

of gender based hostile work environment due to the lack of severity and pervasiveness of 

the alleged conduct. Dr. McKnight alleged two specific instances of workplace sexual 

harassment. First, she alleges that when she attended a meeting with Barr, he was 
16

discussing the promotion of a female colleague and suggested that she must be sleeping 

with someone to get the promotion. Next, Dr. McKnight alleges that Morris, in a meeting 

with GSU, referred to Dr. McKnight as “this girl” when suggesting she should be staff, not 

faculty. The allegations further state that GSU was on notice and failed to stop or remedy 

the hostile work environment. 

In Conrad, the circuit court also focused on the perceived lack of

pervasiveness and severity of the alleged harassment and granted summary judgment for 

the defendant. See Conrad at 372, 480 S.E.2d at 811. The circuit court in Conrad looked 

at the alleged sexual harassment conduct separate and apart from the discriminatory actions 

of a non-sexual nature. Id. at 371, 480 S.E.2d at 810. On appeal, the SCAWV reversed the 

grant of summary judgment and stated, “[s]uch incidents [...] cannot be viewed in isolation 

of the mistreatment that did not have an overt sexual component. Rather, the plaintiff’s 

environment must be considered under all the circumstances, taken as a whole.” Id. at 372, 

480 S.E.2d at 811. Dr. McKnight alleges sexually discriminatory remarks directed at her 

and female employees; acts of Morris and Barr meant to embarrass, and aid unlawful 

discrimination against Dr. McKnight; and gender discrimination regarding compensation 

and job opportunities. “Whether sexual harassment at the workplace is sufficiently severe 

and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well being of employees is a question 

to be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 373, 480 S.E.2d at 

812. “Assuming evidence of a prima facie case of sexual harassment has been shown, we 

noted in [Conrad] that unless ‘only one conclusion could be drawn from the record in the 
17

case,’ the case presents factual issues which require a jury to resolve.” Akers v. Cabell 

Huntington Hosp., Inc., 215 W. Va. 346, 352, 599 S.E.2d 769, 775 (2004). Taken as a 

whole, Dr. McKnight’s allegations are sufficient to place defendants on notice of gender 

based hostile work environment for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. 

Undeniably, the Petitioners must still develop sufficient facts to ultimately 

prevail on their claims, but it does not appear beyond doubt to this Court that the Petitioners 

can prove no set of facts in support of their claims which would entitle them to relief.

Accordingly, we find the circuit court erred in its determination that Dr. McKnight’s 

complaint failed to sufficiently plead her substantive claims.

Regarding the sixth assignment of error, Petitioners argue that Mr. 

McKnight’s loss of consortium claim should be remanded with the substantive claims as it 

is derivative of the discrimination claims. Respondents argue that Mr. McKnight’s loss of 

consortium claim was properly dismissed as it is derivative of the substantive claims which 

were dismissed below. As discussed above, this Court finds that Dr. McKnight sufficiently 

pled her substantive claims, meriting reversal of the circuit court’s order. As dismissal of 

the substantive claims is hereby reversed, then it is appropriate that Mr. McKnight’s 

derivative claim also be reversed and reinstated.
18

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court reverses the Circuit Court of Gilmer 

County’s order dated July 6, 2023, in its entirety and remands the case for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and Remanded.