Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 1 of 11

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Robert A. Anderson

Hillary N. Buchler

Krieg DeVault LLP

Merrillville, Indiana

Libby Yin Goodknight

Krieg DeVault LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael E. Tolbert

Candace C. Williams

Tolbert & Tolbert, LLC

Gary, Indiana

Kevin C. Smith

Smith Sersic, LLC

Munster, Indiana

David W. Westland

Westland & Bennett, P.C.

Hammond, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Franciscan Alliance, Inc.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

City of Hammond, Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 30, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-PL-3085

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Bruce D. Parent, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45D11-2212-PL-707
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 2 of 11

Opinion by Judge Weissmann

Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

Weissmann, Judge. 

[1] Following years of financial losses, Franciscan Alliance, Inc. (Franciscan)

moved to close St. Margaret’s Hospital (the Hospital) in Hammond, Indiana, at 

the end of 2022. But little more than two weeks before the Hospital’s closure,

the City of Hammond (the City) sought a preliminary injunction to keep the 

Hospital open, relying on a purported promise made by Franciscan executives

17 months prior that Franciscan would not shut down the Hospital and its 

emergency room.

[2] Under a tight deadline to act, the trial court granted the injunction and ordered 

Franciscan to keep the Hospital open for nine more months. Because the 

looming loss of the Hospital’s licensure and accreditation at the end of the year 

would make it impossible to comply with the injunction, Franciscan filed an 

emergency motion to stay, which this Court granted on December 30, 2022.

[3] We now find the City lacks standing and, therefore, reverse and remand to the 

trial court to dismiss the City’s claim.

Facts

[4] The Hospital has operated in Hammond for over a century. Dwindling patient 

numbers, however, caused significant losses in recent years. To turn things 

around, Franciscan decided in May 2021 to downsize the Hospital to eight beds 

and an emergency department. A group of Franciscan executives met with the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 3 of 11

City’s Mayor, Joseph McDermott, Jr., and his executive team the next month

to discuss the downsizing plans. At the meeting, the Franciscan executives 

stated their intent to keep the Hospital’s emergency department open. The 

executives then reiterated this desire in a letter to Mayor McDermott the next 

day, writing:

Our Hammond hospital will continue to offer an emergency 

department staffed with board certified emergency medicine 

physicians and well-trained, experienced ER nurses. Eight shortstay beds will be open and another eight-bed area shelled for

expansion if volumes are sufficient to support them. As the 

downtown residential area grows, the hospital will grow with it.

Exhs. Vol. III, pp. 6, 22. 

[5] Despite the downsizing, the Hospital’s financial health continued to deteriorate, 

with an annualized operating loss exceeding $39 million in 2022. Recognizing

this bleak future, Franciscan decided to close the Hospital completely. On 

November 3, 2022—roughly 17 months after the June 2021 meeting with 

Mayor McDermott—Franciscan sent a letter to the Mayor informing him of 

Franciscan’s “plans for ceasing inpatient admissions in Hammond” by the “end 

of this year.” Id. at 23. Franciscan moved quickly to shut down the Hospital, 

terminating its employment and service provider contracts effective the last day 

of 2022.

[6] To Mayor McDermott, Franciscan’s actions were an “absolute betrayal” of

Franciscan’s statements at the June 2021 meeting. Tr. Vol. II, p. 34. And so, on 

December 19, 2022, a month and a half after receiving Franciscan’s letter, the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 4 of 11

City brought a claim for promissory estoppel against Franciscan and sought 

injunctive relief to keep the Hospital open. In its complaint, the City claimed 

that Franciscan had “renege[d]” on its “promise to keep the emergency 

department of [the Hospital] operational.” App. Vol. II, pp. 19-20. The City

alleged that Franciscan’s conduct would leave “approximately 80,000 residents 

without immediate access to emergency medical services” and that “people 

[would] die as a result of [the Hospital’s] closure.” Id. Facing dual time 

constraints with the Hospital set to close at the end of the year and the winter 

holidays, the trial court set a hearing on the City’s complaint for the following 

afternoon.

[7] Franciscan responded to the City’s complaint just before the hearing. 

Franciscan challenged the City’s standing to bring its claim and argued that it 

did not qualify for injunctive relief. Franciscan also argued that the City could 

not establish the elements of promissory estoppel, the only legal theory 

underlying its request for injunctive relief. 

[8] After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued its order granting the 

preliminary injunction on December 22. The injunction provided:

1. The Court hereby enjoins [Franciscan] from closing the 

emergency department presently operating in downtown 

Hammond.

2. The emergency department is to remain open and 

[Franciscan] is Ordered to take all steps necessary to 

ensure that the facility in downtown Hammond remains 

legally licensed and operational.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 5 of 11

3. [Franciscan] is prohibited, until further Order of this 

Court, from taking steps to diminish or in any way reduce 

the health care currently provided to patients at the 

downtown Hammond facility for a period of nine (9) 

months.

App. Vol. II, p. 15. 

[9] In granting the preliminary injunction, the trial court concluded that the City 

was “the proper party to bring this action” and that it had standing. Id. at 12. 

The trial court also determined that the City had met the requirements to obtain 

a preliminary injunction, including that it “demonstrated a reasonable 

likelihood of success on the merits of its promissory estoppel claim.” Id. at 13-

15.

[10] After the trial court denied Franciscan’s motions to stay the injunction, 

Franciscan appealed and filed an emergency motion to stay the proceedings and 

the preliminary injunction with this Court on December 28, 2022. Two days 

later, this Court’s motions panel granted Franciscan’s request, stayed the 

preliminary injunction, and required Franciscan to post a $100,000 appeal 

bond. After the resolution of Franciscan’s emergency motions, this appeal 

proceeded in due course to address the merits of the preliminary injunction. 

Discussion and Decision

[11] Franciscan raises two issues on appeal. It alleges that the City lacks standing to 

bring its claims and that the trial court erred in granting the preliminary 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 6 of 11

injunction. But because we find the standing issue dispositive, we do not reach 

the preliminary injunction’s merits.

I. Standing

[12] “Standing is a fundamental, threshold, constitutional issue that must be 

addressed by this, or any, court to determine if it should exercise jurisdiction in 

the particular case before it.” Doe v. Adams, 53 N.E.3d 483, 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016) (quoting Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984, 989 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003)). “The main purpose of standing is to insure that the party before 

the court has a substantive right to enforce the claim that is being made in the 

litigation.” Schulz v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

Standing is an issue of law that we review de novo. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 

N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022). 

[13] To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a personal stake in the 

outcome of the litigation and . . . show that they have suffered or were in 

immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-ofconduct.” Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 217 (Ind. 

2022) (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Union Cnty. v. McGuiness, 80 N.E.3d 164, 168 

(Ind. 2017)). The City has not made such a showing here. 

[14] In its initial complaint and at the evidentiary hearing, the City argued that the 

Hospital’s closure would “negatively impact” Hammond’s citizens by leaving 

“approximately 80,000 residents without immediate access to emergency 

medical services.” App. Vol. II, p. 10. And the City also alleged that the closure 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 7 of 11

would significantly damage the City’s reputation and its ability to attract 

businesses. Yet even if true, any alleged negative effects on Hammond’s citizens 

cannot sustain the City’s standing. As a municipality, the City may not assert 

claims on behalf of its citizens. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Union Cnty. v. McGuinness, 

80 N.E.3d 164, 167-68 (Ind. 2017) (holding county did not have standing to 

seek a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on behalf of its residents 

because it lacked a “personal interest” in the case). Additionally, damages for 

the loss of one’s reputation are not recoverable on a promissory estoppel claim.

Greives v. Greenwood, 550 N.E.2d 334, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (“Damages for 

loss of reputation are only available in actions for libel, slander, abuse of 

process, malicious prosecution and third-party contract interference.”).

Consequently, our analysis of City’s standing focuses on other grounds. 

[15] City officials testified that in the short time since Franciscan announced it 

would close the Hospital, discussions had taken place about increased costs that 

may result from the closure. These potential costs included new ambulances

(with a price tag of $300,000 each), costs associated with the search to find a 

new emergency healthcare provider, and the potential for increased legal 

liability stemming from delayed response times to medical emergencies. The 

City anticipated it would take around 18 months to adequately plan, approve a 

budget, and incur these costs. Because of this extended timeline, city officials 

blamed Franciscan for the “loss of an opportunity” to address these problems 

earlier when Franciscan first discussed its downsizing plans in June 2021. 

Appellee’s Br., p. 13. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 8 of 11

[16] The trial court agreed with these claims. In its order granting the preliminary 

injunction, the trial court noted that closing the Hospital would endanger 

Hammond’s citizens by delaying response times to medical emergencies. The 

court also noted the high cost of new ambulances to mitigate this danger and 

that the City’s officials quickly began discussing the need to buy new 

ambulances upon learning of the Hospital’s closure. Taken together, the trial 

court believed that Franciscan denied City an “opportunity to secure a 

substitute emergency care provider” and City was “in immediate danger of 

further suffering[] a direct injury as a result . . . .” App. Vol. II, pp. 12, 14.

[17] But in arriving at that conclusion, the trial court improperly focused on 

speculative and hypothetical damages. In particular, the City’s potential future 

purchases of new ambulances and allegations of lost time are “too remote and 

speculative” to constitute the “direct injury” necessary for standing. Solarize 

Ind., Inc., 182 N.E.3d at 220. For example, the following testimony between 

Franciscan’s counsel and the City’s Fire Chief highlights the extent of the City’s 

plans to buy new ambulances:

Q: You were asked about ambulances, and I only want to know 

about ambulances that you’re adding to increase capacity. Do 

you have ambulances under contract right now to increase your 

capacity due to the closing of the emergency room at [the 

Hospital]? 

A. What do you mean under contract? 

Q. Well, are you under contract to buy some additional 

ambulances or are you intending to buy additional ambulances, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 9 of 11

not to replace old ambulances but because [the Hospital] is 

closing its ER? 

A. It just recently came up in conversation December 13th 

because of what happened on December 12th. So, it’s been talked 

about.

Q. What was the result of that?

A. The talks aren’t done yet.

Q. What’s that?

A. We’re not done talking about it yet.

Q. Okay. So, it’s under discussion.

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 93-94.

[18] To Franciscan, this exchange proves the City had no immediate plans to buy

new ambulances and any alleged injury is correspondingly remote and 

speculative. At the same time, to the City, this conversation is proof that “[it] 

would be required to purchase new ambulances.” Appellee’s Br., p. 13 (emphasis 

added). We side with Franciscan’s reading. 

[19] First, the City has failed to show it “‘has sustained or was in immediate danger 

of sustaining’ a demonstrable injury.” Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 220 (quoting 

Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1029-30 (Ind. 1995)). The City does not 

contend that it suffered or sustained any injury at the time of this case. Rather, 

it alleged that the Hospital’s closure will lead to damages born out of new 

ambulances or the loss of prospective businesses moving to Hammond. But as 

city officials admitted to above, the City was not at any immediate risk of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 10 of 11

incurring costs from new ambulances, and any “possible effect[s] on ‘potential’” 

businesses moving to Hammond evidently “isn’t a demonstrable injury.”

Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 220.

[20] Nor has the City alleged a “direct injury” from Franciscan’s conduct. The direct 

injury required for standing is “an injury resulting directly from a particular 

cause, without any intervening causes.” Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 220 (quoting 

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). In Solarize, a company promoting the 

use of solar power in Indiana sought judicial review of an administrative 

decision by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) alleging that 

the decision would “result in fewer people entering the solar market” and 

thereby reduce the company’s funding. Id. But, as the Court noted, the IURC’s 

decision did not directly impact the company—its theoretical injury resulted 

from “market forces” on the company’s “potential customers and suppliers.” Id.

In essence, “this sort of ‘abstract speculation’” on the “indirect result of 

intervening causes” does not constitute direct injury. Id. (citing Pence v. State, 

652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995)). So too here. 

[21] The Hospital’s closure is not the direct cause of the City’s feared harms. Indeed, 

the City admits as much when it links the Hospital’s closure not to tangible 

costs or expenses, but to “a delay in response times for Hammond ambulances 

arriving to patients,” potentially resulting in avoidable injuries that increase the 

City’s legal liability. Appellee’s Br., p.12. Just as the “market forces” in Solarize

were an intervening cause, the potential increase in patient response times plays 

the same role here. The City merely fears that it will incur the cost of new 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3085 | June 30, 2023 Page 11 of 11

ambulances from the pressure of increased response times—which arises only 

indirectly from Franciscan’s decision to close the Hospital. Thus, there is no 

direct injury traceable to Franciscan’s conduct. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Educ. Ass’n 

v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ., 692 N.E.2d 902, 904 (Ind. 1998) (holding no direct injury 

suffered in challenge to a school board’s funding decisions that would “result in 

less money being available for other programs”). Without more, the City lacks 

standing. 

Conclusion

[22] The City of Hammond lacks standing to bring this case because any alleged 

injury is speculative and not directly traceable to Franciscan’s conduct. 

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s preliminary injunction and remand to 

the trial court with instructions to dismiss the City’s claim. 

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.