RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 23a0072p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BILLY LEMASTER and AMANDA LEMASTER dba 

Lemaster Towing and Recovery,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LAWRENCE COUNTY, KENTUCKY; PHILLIP L. CARTER, 

Lawrence County Judge Executive, in his individual 

and official capacities, 

Defendants-Appellees.

┐

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

┘

No. 22-5135

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Ashland.

No. 0:20-cv-00012—David L. Bunning, District Judge.

Argued: October 27, 2022

Decided and Filed: April 11, 2023

Before: McKEAGUE, WHITE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Laura Jane Phelps, WILHOIT LAW OFFICE, Grayson, Kentucky, for Appellants. 

Jeffrey C. Mando, ADAMS LAW, PLLC, Covington, Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: 

Laura Jane Phelps, William H. Wilhoit, WILHOIT LAW OFFICE, Grayson, Kentucky, for 

Appellants. Jeffrey C. Mando, Olivia F. Amlung, ADAMS LAW, PLLC, Covington, Kentucky, 

for Appellees.

>
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Billy and Amanda Lemaster run a towing business in 

Lawrence County, Kentucky. The County placed their business on its “rotation list” of 

companies to call when it needed to order a tow. Soon after Phillip Carter began managing the 

County, Billy Lemaster criticized his decision to fire an employee. According to the Lemasters, 

this criticism led Carter to orchestrate their removal from the County’s rotation list in violation 

of the First Amendment. But the district court held that the Lemasters did not produce enough 

evidence to get a jury trial over whether Lemaster’s criticism motivated Carter’s actions. We 

disagree and clarify the relevant causation rules in the process. Yet we agree with the district 

court’s other conclusion that the Lemasters could not hold the County liable for Carter’s actions 

because they did not tie the actions to any county policy. We thus reverse the court’s grant of 

summary judgment to Carter but affirm its grant of summary judgment to Lawrence County.

I

At this stage of the Lemasters’ suit, we must recite the facts in the light most favorable to 

them—whether or not they could convince a jury to believe their allegations. See Gambrel v. 

Knox County, 25 F.4th 391, 400, 404 (6th Cir. 2022).

The Lemasters live in Lawrence County, a rural Kentucky county bordering West 

Virginia. In 2018, they operated a small towing business, Lemaster Towing & Recovery. Billy 

(whom we will call Lemaster from here on) also served as the fire chief of the all-volunteer 

Cherryville Fire Department. Amanda, his wife, served as its treasurer.

Both in his role as fire chief and in his towing business, Lemaster sparred with Lawrence 

County’s incumbent “judge executive,” the elected head of its executive branch. As fire chief, 

Lemaster believed that the fire department’s crumbling building needed substantial repairs. But 

the judge executive would not commit to help.
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 3

As a tow-business operator, Lemaster disagreed with the County’s management of its 

“rotation list.” The County’s E-911 Center had several companies on a list to call when the 

center needed to order a tow (say, because of an accident). Under the County’s official policy, 

dispatchers needed to rotate through the companies on the list so that the companies received an 

equal share of the work. If the company at the top did not respond, dispatchers would notify the 

next company on the list until they reached one that could report to the scene. The Lemasters 

managed to get Lemaster Towing on this list, and Lemaster estimated that their business earned 

90% of its income from these calls. But Lemaster believed that the E-911 Center had not been 

“properly” rotating between companies. Lemaster Dep., R.41-1, PageID 232.

The judge executive was up for reelection in 2018. Phillip Carter, who had served in that 

role before, decided to run against the incumbent. Leading up to the election, Lemaster 

supported Carter by putting up yard signs and persuading citizens to vote for him. According to 

Lemaster, he did so because Carter promised to fix the rotation list and help repair the firedepartment building.

Carter won the election and took office in January 2019. He quickly fired the County’s 

emergency management assistance (EMA) director. This decision hurt Carter’s relationship with 

Lemaster. Lemaster believed that Carter had fired the EMA director because of Carter’s ongoing 

feud with the director’s father. In April, Lemaster wrote a Facebook post criticizing the decision 

and calling for the County to reinstate the director.

Although this Facebook post did not mention Carter by name, it did not sit well with him. 

The next day, Carter called Lemaster “cursing” about the post. Id., PageID 246. Lemaster began 

to record the call and threatened to post it on Facebook too. They discussed two things. Carter 

complained about Lemaster’s post. He reiterated that he had been the judge executive for just 

three months. He added: “don’t be putting that stuff on there and giving me a black eye, because 

it reflects on me.” Tr., R.41-2, PageID 297. Lemaster agreed to take the post down. Yet he 

complained that the rotation list still had not improved. Carter admitted that he had forgotten 

about the issue and promised to “go in the morning and tell 911 to make sure that they rotate 

everybody.” Id., PageID 299. After this conversation, Lemaster deleted his post.
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 4

Carter then appeared to fix the rotation list. According to Lemaster, his business received 

a “steady volume” of calls from the E-911 Center over the next few months. Lemaster Dep., 

R.41-1, PageID 248. Lemaster estimated that his company went from receiving no more than 

one call per month up to receiving six per month.

But Carter soon took other actions against Lemaster. By June, Carter began to disparage 

the Lemasters’ management of the Cherryville Fire Department. The Lemasters had spent public 

funds repairing a truck that they called the “dozer.” Id., PageID 250. Carter did not think that

the department owned a bulldozer. So he reported the Lemasters to the state fire commission, 

accusing them of fraud. After an audit, the fire commission told Lemaster that it did not “find 

anything” concerning. Id., PageID 255, 269.

Around the same time, Wilma McKenzie, a county resident who had once worked at the 

fire department, started to spread gossip about the Lemasters. Lemaster believed that McKenzie 

was doing Carter’s “dirty work” by telling everyone in their community that Lemaster was 

stealing from the fire department and had been indicted. Id., PageID 249. Lemaster also 

believed that McKenzie was circulating a “petition” to “remove [him] as fire chief and to build a 

new fire department[.]” Id. McKenzie later told Lemaster’s friend over the phone that she had 

been circulating a petition “for Phil Carter” to “get signers to build a new fire department.” Tr., 

R.41-11, PageID 334, 337.

Concluding that Carter was conspiring with McKenzie to incite the community against 

him, Lemaster again took to Facebook. On August 29, 2019, he posted: “Is Phillip L. Carter and 

Wilma Mckezie [sic] a couple now? Asking for a friend[.]” Post, R.42-2, PageID 572. 

According to Lemaster, he meant to humorously imply that the pair were “politically,” not 

“romantically,” involved. Lemaster Dep., R.41-1, PageID 260.

Five days later, the E-911 Center sent a terse email to dispatchers. The email’s subject 

identified Lemaster Towing and the Cherryville Fire Department. Its body stated in all caps: 

“Per Judge Carter do not tone them out on any fire calls[;] use nearest 

department[;] . . . Lemaster Towing is no longer on the rotation list[.]” Email, R.19-5, 

PageID 96.
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 5

Lemaster learned that Carter had told dispatchers not to call his fire department and had 

removed Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. On September 7, he confronted Carter over the 

phone. During their conversation, Carter complained about the Cherryville Fire Department’s 

failure to respond to emergency calls. But Carter denied telling the E-911 Center to ignore the 

department or to take Lemaster Towing off the rotation list. Carter alleged that the center must 

have misunderstood his instructions and promised to clear things up.

The same day, the center emailed the dispatchers again. The email explained that, at the 

direction of Carter, dispatchers should call the Cherryville Fire Department first and rely on 

other fire districts only if it did not respond. Yet the email said nothing about reinstating 

Lemaster to the rotation list. The E-911 Center’s calls to Lemaster Towing thus “dropped off 

tremendously.” Lemaster Dep., R.41-1, PageID 256.

The Lemasters sued Carter and Lawrence County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. 

They alleged that Carter violated the First Amendment by removing Lemaster Towing from the 

rotation list in retaliation for Lemaster’s criticisms. They sought to hold the County liable for 

Carter’s unconstitutional conduct under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 

(1978). The Lemasters also raised, among other state-law causes of action, a claim for tortious 

interference with economic relations against Carter.

The district court granted summary judgment to Carter and the County on the free-speech 

and Monell claims. See Lemaster v. Lawrence County, 2022 WL 257067, at *4–11 (E.D. Ky. 

Jan. 26, 2022). It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the tortious-interference 

claim. Id. at *11. We review the court’s decision de novo. See Gambrel, 25 F.4th at 399.

II

The Lemasters’ First Amendment claim against Carter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires 

them to prove: (1) that Lemaster engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment; (2) that 

Carter took an adverse action against him; and (3) that a causal connection exists between the 

speech and action. See DeCrane v. Eckart, 12 F.4th 586, 593 (6th Cir. 2021); Anders v. Cuevas, 

984 F.3d 1166, 1175 (6th Cir. 2021). As their “protected speech,” the Lemasters rely on two of 

Lemaster’s Facebook posts: his post from April 2019 criticizing the County for firing an 
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 6

employee and his post from August 2019 asking if Carter and McKenzie were a couple. As their 

“adverse action,” they allege that Carter took business away from Lemaster Towing. They lastly 

assert that plenty of evidence connects Carter’s decision to injure their business to the Facebook 

posts.

Adverse Action. We start with the easiest element at this stage: Could a reasonable jury 

find that Carter took an “adverse action” against the Lemasters? DeCrane, 12 F.4th at 593. The 

First Amendment protects against only those retaliatory actions that might silence an ordinary 

person. See Rudd v. City of Norton Shores, 977 F.3d 503, 514 (6th Cir. 2020). Under this test, 

we have long held that the removal of a tow company from a public “tow call list” would likely 

deter the ordinary company from speaking in order to avoid losing this government-generated 

business. Lucas v. Monroe County, 203 F.3d 964, 974 (6th Cir. 2000); see Anders, 984 F.3d at 

1176–77; cf. O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 715–16, 720 (1996).

This element thus turns on whether the Lemasters introduced enough evidence that Carter 

effectively, if not formally, removed their business from the E-911 Center’s rotation list. They 

did so. Among other evidence, an employee at the E-911 Center sent an all-caps email to 

dispatchers stating that, “per Judge Carter,” “Lemaster Towing is no longer on the rotation list.” 

Email, R.19-5, PageID 96. And the calls that Lemaster Towing received from the center 

“dropped off tremendously” from then on. Lemaster Dep., R.41-1, PageID 256.

Carter objects that he never removed Lemaster Towing from the rotation list and that the 

employee who sent this email “misunderstood” his directions. Carter Dep., R.42-1, PageID 443–

44. Carter allegedly intended for the email to convey only that the dispatchers should call 

another fire department if the Cherryville Fire Department did not respond. He did not mean for 

the email to remove the Lemasters’ business from the rotation list.

Yet a rational jury could disbelieve this “misunderstanding” defense. For instance, Carter 

asserts that he tried to fix the problem by instructing an employee to send a clarifying email. But 

this follow-up email referred only to the fire department. The email did not mention Lemaster 

Towing, let alone restore it to the rotation list. Other parties have also contradicted Carter’s 

claim. Barbara Howard, a dispatcher, testified that Carter “personally” told her not to call the 
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 7

Lemasters. Howard Dep., R.43-1, PageID 588–90. She gave a concrete example from May 

2020. After working her way through the rotation list without finding a tow, she announced over 

the radio that she did not have a tow company available. Hearing this statement, an incredulous 

Lemaster called Howard asking why she had not tried to call him. Howard responded: “Sir 

you’re gonna have to talk to the judge about that.” Tr., R.41-12, PageID 346. Howard’s 

supervisor likewise recalled hearing from dispatchers that Carter had “told” them not to call 

Lemaster Towing. Ellis Dep., R.57, PageID 793. For purposes of appeal, then, even Carter 

concedes that his communications with dispatch employees could constitute an adverse action. 

Appellees’ Br. 15 n.2.

Protected Speech. The next element presents a harder question (at least in part): Did the 

First Amendment protect Lemaster’s speech? See DeCrane, 12 F.4th at 593. The First 

Amendment applies differently to a claim that the government has denied a party a benefit due to 

the party’s speech as compared to a claim that the government has criminally punished the party 

for this speech. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675–76 

(1996). Plaintiffs who allege that their speech has deprived them of a benefit (like the placement 

on a tow rotation list) must show that the speech addressed “a matter of public concern.” Lucas, 

203 F.3d at 973 (citation omitted). And their interest in speaking must outweigh the 

government’s interest in limiting their speech under the “balancing test” from Pickering v. Board 

of Education of Township High School District 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 

678.

Applying this test, Carter does not dispute that the First Amendment protected 

Lemaster’s April 2019 Facebook post. See Lemaster, 2022 WL 257067, at *5; Appellees’ Br. 

15. Speech addresses a matter of public concern if it relates to a “matter of political, social, or 

other concern to the community.” Marquardt v. Carlton, 971 F.3d 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2020) 

(citation omitted). And speech that criticizes an elected official’s operation of the government 

relates to a matter of political and social concern. See Anders, 984 F.3d at 1176; Lucas, 203 F.3d 

at 973–74. Indeed, criticism of public officials falls at the First Amendment’s core. See Rudd, 

977 F.3d at 513–14. Lemaster’s post engaged in this type of speech because he criticized 
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 8

Carter’s decision to terminate the County’s EMA director. Carter also does not even try to 

suggest that he had any valid reason to restrict this speech under Pickering’s balancing test.

At the same time, the Lemasters disagree with Carter (and the district court) over whether 

the First Amendment protected Lemaster’s August 2019 Facebook post asking whether Carter 

and McKenzie were a “couple.” Post, R.42-2, PageID 572. Whether the First Amendment 

protects this rhetorical question raises a tougher issue. On the one hand, the district court took 

the post merely to pry into Carter’s and McKenzie’s “personal lives,” not into government 

operations. Lemaster, 2022 WL 257067, at *5. On the other hand, we must consider the post in 

“context” and against the “whole record.” Marquardt, 971 F.3d at 549 (citation omitted). 

Lemaster meant to convey that the pair had a “political[]” connection and that Carter had been 

using McKenzie as a private-citizen front to conceal government-engineered criticism. Lemaster 

Dep., R.41-1, PageID 249, 260. The small community in which Carter and Lemaster lived also 

may well have known of their disagreements and understood Lemaster’s innuendo.

But we need not resolve this difficult question. The Lemasters ask us to address it “only” 

if we reject their factual allegation that Lemaster’s earlier post in April caused Carter to remove 

Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. Reply Br. 1. As explained below, a jury must resolve 

that causation issue. And Carter testified that he had not even seen the later August post until his 

deposition in this lawsuit. Carter Dep., R.42-1, PageID 495. He thus could not claim at trial that 

he harmed the Lemasters’ towing business because of this second post rather than the first one. 

Our choice to avoid this question thus should not cause any undue trial complications.

Causal Connection. That resolution leads us to the final element: Could a reasonable 

jury find an adequate “causal connection” between Lemaster’s Facebook post in April and 

Carter’s removal of Lemaster Towing from the rotation list in September? DeCrane, 12 F.4th at 

593. Because the district court highlighted confusion in our caselaw on the governing causation 

rules, we take this opportunity to clarify things. See Lemaster, 2022 WL 257067, at *8; see also 

Spithaler v. Smith, 803 F. App’x 826, 829–30 (6th Cir. 2020). For a First Amendment plaintiff 

to recover under § 1983, protected speech “must be a ‘but-for’ cause” of a harmful action. 

Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 

(2006)). This test is met if a plaintiff would not have suffered the harm “but for” the speech. Id. 
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 9

It is not met if the plaintiff would have suffered the harm even if the plaintiff had stayed silent. 

See id.; see also Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 

1017 (2020).

When public employees or contractors allege that the government has retaliated against 

them because of their speech, the Court has implemented the required but-for test using a 

burden-shifting approach. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 

285–87 (1977); see also Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 675–78. A plaintiff must first show that “speech 

was ‘a substantial or motivating factor’ of” a harmful action. Anders, 984 F.3d at 1177 (quoting 

Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2010)). Some statements in our 

cases have (wrongly) equated this motivating-factor test with but-for causation. See Spithaler, 

803 F. App’x at 829. But this test does not require a but-for relationship. See Comcast, 140 

S. Ct. at 1017; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348–49 (2013). After all, 

speech sometimes may motivate a defendant’s harmful action even if the defendant would have 

taken the same action for another reason without the speech. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260.

If the plaintiff meets this lower causation standard, the burden shifts to the government 

defendants. See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722. They can avoid liability by proving that they would 

have taken the same action even if the plaintiff had not spoken. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 

287. In other words, they must prove the absence of but-for causation. See Massey v. Johnson, 

457 F.3d 711, 717 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2006); Wagner v. Wheeler, 13 F.3d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1993).

The Court’s burden-shifting approach adds complexity to our usual summary-judgment 

rules. When a defendant moves for summary judgment on an issue, the standard that the 

defendant must meet depends on who will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Pineda v. 

Hamilton County, 977 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2020). If the plaintiff will bear this burden, the 

defendant’s summary-judgment briefing need only show that the record lacks evidence from 

which “a rational trier of fact” could find for the plaintiff on the issue. See Viet v. Le, 951 F.3d 

818, 823 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–

23 (1986). Since a free-speech plaintiff must prove the motivating-factor test, see Mt. Healthy, 

429 U.S. at 287, this standard applies to the defendant’s claim that speech did not even motivate 

a harmful action.
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 10

If, by contrast, the defendant will bear the burden of proof (as when it seeks summary 

judgment on an affirmative defense), “its burden of production is greater” at the summaryjudgment stage. 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727.1, at 492 

(4th ed. 2016). The defendant must affirmatively introduce evidence of such weight that no 

rational jury could disagree with it. See Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2012); 

see also Leone v. Owsley, 810 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing cases). Since a freespeech defendant must prove the lack of but-for causation, see Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, this 

standard applies to any claim that it would have taken the same harmful action even if the 

plaintiff had not spoken, see Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056–57 (6th 

Cir. 2001).

This burden-shifting approach requires us to consider the nature of Carter’s summaryjudgment argument. Does he assert that Lemaster’s Facebook post did not even motivate any 

decision to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list (a question on which Lemaster bears 

the burden of proof)? Or does he assert that he would have removed Lemaster Towing anyway 

for another reason (a question on which he bears the burden of proof)? Carter seeks to show that 

Lemaster’s April Facebook post did not even partially motivate his decision to remove Lemaster 

Towing from the rotation list. We thus must consider whether the record would allow “a rational 

trier of fact” to find the contrary. Viet, 951 F.3d at 823 (citation omitted).

To answer this causation question in the free-speech context, our cases typically start by 

looking at the time gap between the protected speech and the harmful action. See, e.g., Anders, 

984 F.3d at 1177; Vereecke, 609 F.3d at 400. As a common-sense matter, the more time that 

passes between the two, the more evidence that a plaintiff must offer to show that the speech 

motivated the action. See Vereecke, 609 F.3d at 400. And vice versa. See id. at 401. So a total 

“lack of temporal proximity alone can” doom a claim that a plaintiff’s speech motivated a 

defendant’s act unless the plaintiff uncovers smoking-gun evidence of this motivation. Anders, 

984 F.3d at 1177 (citation omitted). At the other extreme, if the act occurs within “days or 

weeks” of the speech, the close proximity can sometimes (if rarely) permit an inference that the 

one motivated the other. George v. Youngstown State Univ., 966 F.3d 446, 460 (6th Cir. 2020); 

cf. Sensabaugh v. Halliburton, 937 F.3d 621, 630 (6th Cir. 2019); Vereecke, 609 F.3d at 401. 
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 11

In most cases, though, a plaintiff will show some moderate time gap—say, a matter of months. 

See Anders, 984 F.3d at 1177–78; Benison v. Ross, 765 F.3d 649, 661–63 (6th Cir. 2014). Our 

summary-judgment inquiry then asks whether the plaintiff has offered enough “other evidence of 

retaliatory conduct” apart from this temporal proximity. Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 

F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Bluegrass Dutch Tr. Morehead, LLC v. Rowan 

Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 734 F. App’x 322, 329 (6th Cir. 2018).

Here, about four and a half months separate Lemaster’s Facebook post and Carter’s order 

to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. This time difference does not permit 

Lemaster to rely on temporal proximity alone. Cf. Sensabaugh, 937 F.3d at 629–30. But the 

difference is not so large that it presumptively forecloses the Lemasters’ claim. Cf. Benison, 765 

F.3d at 661. Indeed, in another case involving a tow company, we held that a four-month gap 

could show that the company’s speech motivated its removal from a “towing list” if the company 

unearthed other evidence of a retaliatory motive in discovery. See Anders, 984 F.3d at 1177–78.

The Lemasters have unearthed this evidence. To begin with, they have shown that Carter 

was upset by Lemaster’s speech. On the day after Lemaster criticized Lawrence County for 

firing its EMA director, Carter called Lemaster up “cursing [him]” about this criticism and 

generally “being disrespectful[.]” Lemaster Dep., R.41-1, PageID 246. Far from “affirm[ing]” 

Lemaster’s right to criticize the government, Sensabaugh, 937 F.3d at 630, Carter all but asked 

Lemaster to stay quiet because his criticism made Carter “look bad,” Tr., R.41-2, PageID 301.

And while Carter appeared to fix the problems with the rotation list after Lemaster agreed 

to delete his post, the Lemasters offered evidence that Carter engaged in a “pattern of retaliatory 

mistreatment” from then on. Benison, 765 F.3d at 662. For one thing, a reasonable jury could 

find that Carter falsely accused the Lemasters of misconduct, forcing them to sit through a 

pointless audit over lawful expenses on a fire department truck. According to Lemaster, the state 

fire commission did not uncover any problematic activity. (Although Carter says that the 

commission recommended that the state police handle the matter, the jury must resolve this 

factual dispute.)
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 12

For another thing, a reasonable jury also could find that Carter convinced McKenzie to 

spread gossip about the Lemasters to try to force them out of the fire department. At Carter’s 

doing, McKenzie falsely said that the Lemasters had been stealing from the fire department and 

that Lemaster had been charged with crimes. Even if this conduct does not itself qualify as an 

“adverse” action under the First Amendment, it bolsters the Lemasters’ claim that the April 

criticisms of Carter had turned him against them. Benison, 765 F.3d at 661–62; see Eckerman v. 

Tenn. Dep’t of Safety, 636 F.3d 202, 208–09 (6th Cir. 2010).

The way that Carter removed Lemaster Towing from the rotation list also could lead a 

jury to find that he did so for an improper reason. According to the director of the E-911 Center, 

a county board must decide whether to add or remove a tow company from the rotation list. Ellis 

Dep., R.57, PageID 794. But Carter did not ask the board to remove Lemaster Towing. Id., 

PageID 794, 796. Nor did he publicly announce that he had done so himself. Instead, he 

instructed the E-911 Center to send an internal email stating—without explanation—that the 

County had removed Lemaster Towing from the list. Email, R.19-5, PageID 96. And Carter did 

not correct this notice even after it became public and Lemaster confronted him about it. Most 

telling, Carter continued to privately tell dispatchers like Barbara Howard that they should not 

call Lemaster Towing—again, without explanation—even after the E-911 Center director 

contradicted him and instructed dispatchers to “call [Lemaster].” Howard Dep., R.43-1, PageID 

589–92. As Howard noted, the director “would say, call him; the judge would say don’t.” Id., 

PageID 591–92. Howard added that Carter was “upset” with Lemaster but did not give a 

“reason” why. Id., PageID 589, 592.

Even during this litigation, moreover, Carter has not offered evidence of a valid reason 

why he would have told dispatchers to avoid Lemaster Towing. He has instead doubled down on 

his claim that he did not do so. Carter Dep., R.42-1, PageID 443–44; Appellees’ Br. 5–6. But a 

fact dispute exists on that question. And his failure to introduce evidence of a neutral reason for 

his removal of Lemaster Towing provides further proof that he harbored an improper motive. 

Indeed, under the well-known test for resolving Title VII claims, employers must articulate a 

“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” precisely because the absence of such a reason often 
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 13

permits an inference of invidious discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 

502, 507, 509–11 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–56 (1981).

Carter offers two counterpoints. He first notes that the E-911 Center’s calls to Lemaster 

Towing increased right after Lemaster’s Facebook post. Appellees’ Br. 18. Yet a jury could 

reasonably find that Carter remedied Lemaster’s rotation-list concerns only because Lemaster 

agreed to delete the post (and stay silent) during their ensuing phone conversation. And it could 

find that Carter switched to retaliating against Lemaster in other ways, such as by raising false 

claims about his management of the fire department. As Lemaster opined, Carter “couldn’t get 

me off rotation, so he was trying to find something else.” Lemaster Dep., R.41-1, PageID 269.

Carter next suggests that this fire-department dispute (not Lemaster’s Facebook post) 

could have led him to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. Appellees’ Br. 18–19. 

But Carter did not testify that the dispute undergirded his rotation-list decision. He only raises 

this speculation in briefing. And again, the Lemasters produced evidence that Carter’s firedepartment accusations “had no basis in fact.” Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 

879 (6th Cir. 2001). These accusations thus may instead represent additional retaliatory acts. 

Besides, the Lemasters needed to show only that Lemaster’s Facebook post motivated Carter’s 

actions; Carter bore the burden to prove that he would have taken the same actions anyway. See 

Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. And he did not introduce the “powerful” evidence required to 

obtain summary judgment over whether this fire-department dispute would have led him to 

remove Lemaster Towing from the County’s rotation list even without Lemaster’s post. Cockrel, 

270 F.3d at 1056 (citation omitted).

In short, this record would allow a rational jury to find that Lemaster’s April Facebook 

post motivated Carter’s decision to remove Lemaster Towing from the rotation list. Of course, a 

jury might well find that Carter did not intentionally harm Lemaster Towing. Even if it found 

that he did so, it might also find that the Facebook post did not motivate that decision or that 

Carter would have made it anyway for other reasons. But a jury must sort out all these factual 

issues.
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 14

III

Although the Lemasters have offered enough evidence to create a jury question over 

whether Carter violated the First Amendment, that fact alone does not suffice to seek damages 

from Lawrence County. The County may face liability under § 1983 only for its own actions, 

not for the actions of Carter on a respondeat superior theory. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To 

make the County liable for Carter’s conduct, they must show that this conduct arose from a 

county “‘policy’ or ‘custom.’” Gambrel, 25 F.4th at 408 (citation omitted). Yet the district court 

held that the Lemasters could not tie Carter’s “rogue” actions (unilaterally removing Lemaster 

Towing from the rotation list) to any such policy or custom. Lemaster, 2022 WL 257067, at *10.

The Lemasters argue on appeal that Carter’s actions automatically qualified as the 

County’s own policies given his high-level rank. They correctly note that a plaintiff may hold a 

municipality liable for an official’s decision if the municipality has delegated “authority” to 

make the decision to that official. Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 

2005); see Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 260–61 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 

But this route to establishing Monell liability requires proof that the employee exercised 

policymaking authority and that the employee’s decision was “final and unreviewable” and so 

unconstrained “by the official policies of superior officials.” Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 

803, 814 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 

1993)); see Tlapanco v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 658 (6th Cir. 2020).

And here, Carter lacked any final say over the rotation list. A county board instead had 

the “final authority” over whether to remove a tow company from the E-911 Center’s rotation 

list. Adair v. Charter County of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482, 493 (6th Cir. 2006). So the choice to 

remove Lemaster Towing “was not the judge’s decision to make.” Ellis Dep., R.57, PageID 796.

The Lemasters respond that Howard, the dispatcher, testified that she does not “question” 

Carter’s orders. Howard Dep., R.43-1, PageID 589. But this sole piece of evidence would not 

allow a reasonable jury to find that every instruction he gives represents the official (if informal) 

policy of Lawrence County. To the contrary, the director of the E-911 Center declared that 

Carter could not unilaterally remove tow companies from the rotation list. Ellis Dep., R.57, 
No. 22-5135 Lemaster v. Lawrence County Page 15

PageID 794. When he learned of Carter’s actions, then, he told dispatchers that they must 

continue to call Lemaster Towing. Id., PageID 797–98. The Lemasters thus did not present 

enough evidence that Carter lacked oversight from the board. See Miller, 408 F.3d at 814.

* * *

This conclusion leaves a final issue. The Lemasters allege that they produced enough 

evidence for a reasonable jury to find in their favor on their state-law claim against Carter for 

tortious interference with economic relations. But the district court did not even reach the merits 

of this claim. Rather, the court dismissed the claim without prejudice, declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over it under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Lemaster, 2022 WL 257067, at 

*11. When we reverse a district court’s dismissal of § 1983 claims, we typically also reverse the 

court’s discretionary dismissal of any accompanying state-law claims. See Gambrel, 25 F.4th at 

412. We see no reason to depart from our usual course here.

All told, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the grant of summary judgment 

to Lawrence County on the Lemasters’ Monell claim. But we reverse the grant of summary 

judgment to Carter on their free-speech claim. And we reverse the discretionary dismissal of 

their tortious-interference claim. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.