[Cite as Reid v. Shaffer, 2020-Ohio-5448.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Sarah A. Boyer Reid (nka Red), : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 19AP-765 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 15JU-217)

Christopher B. Shaffer, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 25, 2020 

 

On brief: Battisti & Ansbro, Eugene F. Battisti, Jr., and 

Mary C. Ansbro, for appellant. Argued: Mary C. Ansbro. 

On brief: The Nigh Law Group, LLC, Joseph A. Nigh, and 

Courtney A. Zollars, for appellee. Argued: Courtney A. 

Zollars. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch 

NELSON, J. 

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Sarah A. Boyer Reid (nka Red), contends the trial court 

erred both in refusing to give her more time to file a transcript in support of her objections 

to a magistrate's decision and in not conducting a proper independent review of her 

objections to justify overruling them. She has not shown that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying her request for more time to file the transcript: she filed her motion 

after the date the transcript was due and did not demonstrate that her neglect—including 

not requesting or paying the deposit on the transcript—was "excusable" in the 

circumstances here. Nor has she demonstrated that the trial court mishandled her 

objections, which mainly stated in very general terms that the magistrate's decision was 

"contrary to the facts" and to a statute and/or unspecified "caselaw." July 3, 2019 
No. 19AP-765 2 

Objections at 1-4. Ms. Boyer Reid fails to convince us that the trial court "committed 

reversible error," Appellant's Brief at ix-x, and we will affirm the trial court decision. 

{¶ 2} This appeal grows out of extensive litigation over child custody and support. 

The case began in October 2014 when defendant-appellee, Christopher B. Shaffer, filed in 

Fairfield County, Ohio a request for recognition of a foreign decree pertaining to a child 

custody order issued in North Carolina. The case was transferred to the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, in January 2015. 

An initial round of motions concerning custody of the parties' minor child, contempt, and 

fees were considered by a magistrate over a 21-day trial during 2015 and 2016. A magistrate 

issued a decision in 2017 terminating the parties' joint custody order, designating Mr. 

Shaffer as sole residential parent and legal custodian of the minor child, issuing a 

comprehensive order relating to Ms. Boyer Reid's parenting time, and ordering Ms. Boyer 

Reid to pay child support, attorney fees, and litigation expenses. After granting Ms. Boyer 

Reid leave to file objections out of time, the trial court overruled those objections and 

adopted the magistrate's decision in January 2018. 

{¶ 3} Another round of motions followed. Ms. Boyer Reid filed 18 motions, Mr. 

Shaffer filed eight motions, and the guardian ad litem ("GAL") appointed for the minor 

child filed one motion. A magistrate considered the motions over a seven-day hearing in 

November 2018 and issued a decision on June 19, 2019 ordering that Mr. Shaffer maintain 

his custodial status, that Ms. Boyer Reid receive supervised parenting time and pay child 

support, and that each party pay one-half of the GAL fees incurred. The magistrate also 

held Ms. Boyer Reid in contempt for failure to pay attorney fees. On July 2, 2019, 

Mr. Shaffer filed a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A) asserting the magistrate had made a 

clerical error in the reallocation of GAL fees. 

{¶ 4} The day after Mr. Shaffer filed his Civ.R. 60(A) motion, July 3, 2019, 

Ms. Boyer Reid filed eleven objections to the magistrate's decision, stating in full: 

First, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Plaintiff's Motion To 

Modify Parental Rights, filed April 5, 2018 is contrary to the 

facts. Additionally, the Magistrate's Decision regarding 

Plaintiff's Motion To Modify Parental Rights, filed April 5, 2018 

is contrary to O.R.C. 3109.04 and Ohio caselaw. Accordingly, 

the Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 2019, should be 

reversed to increase Plaintiff's parenting time and remove the 
No. 19AP-765 3 

requirement of supervision if not return the parties to shared 

parenting. 

Second, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Defendant's 

Motion To Modify Parental Rights, filed February 6, 2018 is 

contrary to the facts. Additionally, the Magistrate's Decision 

regarding Defendant's Motion To Modify Parental Rights, filed 

February 6, 2018 is contrary to O.R.C. 3109.051 and Ohio 

caselaw. Accordingly, the Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 

2019, should be reversed to increase Plaintiff's parenting time 

and remove the requirement of supervision. 

Third, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Plaintiffs Motions 

for Contempt, filed March 31, 2016 and March 30, 2017 is 

contrary to the facts. Additionally, the Magistrate's Decision 

regarding Plaintiffs Motions for Contempt, filed March 31, 

2016 and March 30, 2017 is contrary to Ohio caselaw. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 2019, 

should be reversed and Defendant should be found in 

Contempt of the North Carolina Decree and this Court's prior 

orders concerning telephone contact. 

Fourth, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Plaintiffs Motions 

for Contempt, filed August 29, 2016 is contrary to the facts 

pertaining to the additional missed telephone calls and viewing 

of a deceased. Additionally, the Magistrate's Decision 

regarding Plaintiffs Motions for Contempt, filed August 29, 

2016 is contrary to Ohio caselaw. Accordingly, the Magistrate's 

Decision, filed June 19, 2019, should be reversed in part to find 

Defendant in Contempt. Plaintiff does not allege any error with 

the Magistrate find[ing] Defendant in Contempt pertaining to 

Defendant's failure to notify Plaintiff regarding the emergency 

room visit. 

Fifth, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Plaintiffs Motions 

for Contempt, filed January 19, 2017 is contrary to the facts 

pertaining to the certified mailers, the child's physical 

appearance, and telephone calls. Additionally, the Magistrate's 

Decision regarding Plaintiffs Motions for Contempt, filed 

January 19, 2017 is contrary to Ohio caselaw. Accordingly, the 

Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 2019, should be reversed 

in part to find Defendant in Contempt. Plaintiff does not allege 

any error with the Magistrate find[ing] Defendant in Contempt 

pertaining to Defendant's transfer of the minor child's primary 

care physician. 

Sixth, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Defendant's 

Motions for Contempt, filed March 1, 2018 is contrary to the 
No. 19AP-765 4 

facts pertaining to Plaintiffs ability to pay attorney fees when 

Defendant was not complying with his financial obligations to 

Plaintiff. Additionally, the Magistrate's Decision regarding 

Defendant's Motions for Contempt, filed March 1, 2018 is 

contrary to Ohio caselaw. Accordingly, the Magistrate's 

Decision, filed June 19, 2019, should be reversed to find that 

Plaintiff is not in contempt. The penalty for Plaintiffs Contempt 

is not comparable to the penalties leveled against Defendant 

and there is no legal or factual basis for the discrepancy. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 2019, 

should be reversed [and] should be reduced to be 

commensurate with Defendant's penalty of $25.00 per 

incident. 

Seventh, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Plaintiffs Motions 

for Contempt, filed October 17, 2017 is contrary to the facts. 

According to the Magistrate's Decision, Defendant blatantly 

stated that he would not be complying with the Court's Order. 

Additionally, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Plaintiffs 

Motions for Contempt, filed October 17, 2017 is contrary to 

Ohio caselaw. That the Court is sympathetic to Defendant's 

reason for denying the visit does not excuse Defendant's failure 

to comply. Accordingly, the Magistrate's Decision, filed 

June 19, 2019, should be reversed to find Defendant in 

Contempt. 

Eighth, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Plaintiffs Motions 

for Contempt, filed February 14, 2018 is contrary to the facts 

pertaining to Branch I, II, and IV. According to the Magistrate's 

Decision, Defendant blatantly stated that he would not be 

complying with the Court's Order. Additionally, the 

Magistrate's Decision regarding Plaintiffs Motions for 

Contempt, filed February 14, 2018 is contrary to Ohio caselaw. 

That the Court is sympathetic to Defendant's reason for 

denying the visit does not excuse Defendant's failure to comply. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 2019, 

should be reversed in part to find Defendant in Contempt as set 

forth in Branch I, II and IV of Plaintiffs Motion. 

Ninth, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Child Support is 

contrary to the facts. According to the Magistrate's Decision, 

neither party presented evidence regarding Defendant's selfemployed income; nor, was evidence presented that 

demonstrated that Plaintiff was capable of working the number 

of hours the Court imputed to Plaintiff, that Plaintiff was 

voluntarily underemployed, and that Plaintiff could find 

employment at the rate specified previously earned. 
No. 19AP-765 5 

Additionally, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Child 

Support is contrary to Ohio caselaw. Accordingly, the 

Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 2019, should be returned 

for further hearing pertaining to child support. 

Tenth, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Tax Exemptions is 

contrary to the facts. According to the Magistrate's Decision, 

neither party presented evidence regarding his/her net tax 

savings from claiming the minor child. The court also did not 

consider the significant tax savings that Defendant's status as a 

self-employed individual enabled him to claim. Additionally, 

the Magistrate's Decision regarding Child Support is contrary 

to Ohio caselaw. Accordingly, the Magistrate's Decision, filed 

June 19, 2019, should be reversed to designate that Plaintiff 

claim the tax exemption so long as she is substantially current 

on her child support. 

Eleventh, the Magistrate's Decision regarding Mother's motion 

for reallocation of GAL fees, filed August 14, 2018 and Mother's 

motion to reallocate supervision fees, filed August 7, 2018, is 

contrary to the facts. Additionally, the Magistrate's Decision 

regarding Mother's motion for reallocation of GAL fees, filed 

August 14, 2018 and Mother's motion to reallocate supervision 

fees, filed August 7, 2018 is contrary to Ohio caselaw. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 2019, 

should be returned for further hearing pertaining to allocation 

of GAL and supervision fees consistent with the allegations of 

error outlined above. Wherefore, Plaintiff requests that this 

Court reverse the Magistrate's Decision, filed June 19, 2019, or 

remand it for further hearings as set forth above. 

July 3, 2019 Objections at 1-4. Ms. Boyer Reid reserved "the right to supplement these 

assignments of error upon receipt and review of the transcript." July 3, 2019 Objections at 

5. 

{¶ 5} Over a month later, Mr. Shaffer on August 6, 2019 filed a motion to dismiss 

the objections and for attorney fees asserting that, although Ms. Boyer Reid had filed her 

objections on time, she had failed to file a transcript or affidavit within 30 days of filing the 

objections, as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii), and had failed to request the transcript 

within three days of filing the objections as required by local court rules. Mr. Shaffer asked 

the court to dismiss the objections due to the rule violations and in light of "the extensive 

length of litigation in the above captioned matter, and the need for the minor child at issue 

to have resolution to this matter[.]" August 6, 2019 Motion to Dismiss at 3. 
No. 19AP-765 6 

{¶ 6} The following day, August 7, 2019, Ms. Boyer Reid filed a "motion for leave 

to file transcript untimely," which cited Civ.R. 53(D)(3) and asked for "leave for an 

extension to file the transcript" due to "the uncertainty surrounding the actual terms of the 

Magistrate's Decision [referring to Mr. Shaffer's pending Civ.R. 60(A) motion on allocation 

of GAL fees], the excusable neglect by counsel, [and] the length and expense of the 

transcript[.]" August 7, 2019 Motion for Leave at 2. The motion stated that court reporters 

indicated that they required at least 45 days to complete the transcript, and submitted that 

Ms. Boyer Reid "has been unemployed due to injury" and required additional time to raise 

the funds necessary to pay for the transcripts. August 7, 2019 Motion for Leave at 2. The 

unverified motion was not accompanied by affidavits or other supporting documents. 

{¶ 7} The trial court held a hearing on August 13, 2019 to address Ms. Boyer Reid's 

objections and motion for leave to file an untimely transcript and Mr. Shaffer's motion to 

dismiss the objections. With a transcript of the hearing unavailable due to a problem with 

the recording system, Mr. Shaffer proposed, and the trial court issued pursuant to 

App.R. 9(C)(1), a statement of the August 13, 2019 hearing. According to the App.R. 9(C)(1) 

statement, counsel for both parties presented oral arguments relating to their respective 

pleadings; no testimony was taken and neither side submitted additional evidence. 

Ms. Boyer Reid did not attend the hearing, but her counsel stated that on July 3, 2019, "they 

had called the wrong [c]ourt [r]eporter's [o]ffice in their request for a transcript but did not 

receive a message in return" and when Ms. Boyer Reid's "counsel learned of the issue, they 

contacted the proper [c]ourt [r]eporter's [o]ffice to inquire into the cost and timeframe to 

complete the transcript." App.R. 9(C)(1) Statement at 1. Ms. Boyer Reid's counsel stated 

that the transcript cost was over $8,000.00, that Ms. Boyer Reid "was disabled and unable 

to return to work," and that Ms. Boyer Reid could pay half of the transcript cost at the time 

of the hearing and the remaining half in two weeks. App.R. 9(C)(1) Statement at 1. 

According to Ms. Boyer Reid's counsel, after the court reporter received payment in full, the 

office would need 45 days to prepare the transcript. At the time of the hearing, Ms. Boyer 

Reid had not made any deposit for the transcript. Finally, the GAL "opined that her ward 

needs the voluminous litigation to end" and that "this is completely the wrong way for the 

child to start a school year." App.R. 9(C)(1) Statement at 2. 
No. 19AP-765 7 

{¶ 8} On August 29, 2019, the trial court denied Mr. Shaffer's Civ.R. 60(A) motion 

to correct the allocation of GAL fees. 

{¶ 9} On October 8, 2019, the trial court filed its Decision and Judgment Entry 

addressing Ms. Boyer Reid's motion for leave to file transcript out of time, Ms. Boyer Reid's 

objections and Mr. Shaffer's motion to dismiss those objections, and the magistrate's 

June 19, 2019 decision. The trial court disagreed with Ms. Boyer Reid's argument that the 

Civ.R. 60(A) motion to correct the GAL fee allocation extended or tolled the time for her to 

request a transcript to support her objections and also disagreed that Ms. Boyer Reid 

demonstrated good cause to extend the time to file the transcript by way of excusable 

neglect of her counsel, who contacted the incorrect court reporter's office. "[T]he request 

and deposit should have been submitted to the Court Reporter's office on * * * July 8, 2019 

(Monday). Yet, Plaintiff's request for leave was at least an entire month later with still no 

record of a request or deposit, or until after August 7, 2019." October 8, 2019 Decision and 

Judgment Entry at 7. "Further [under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii)] * * * [t]hirty days to file from 

Plaintiff's objection date (to file the transcript) would have been August 2, 2019. Not only 

was the transcript not filed by this date, it was neither requested nor is there any record of 

a deposit paid." October 8, 2019 Decision and Judgment Entry at 7. "[L]eft with * * * a 

request for leave to request, pay for, and file a [t]ranscript when the request is already 

untimely and past the time that the transcript would have been required to be filed," the 

trial court declined to find good cause to support the extension. October 8, 2019 Decision 

and Judgment Entry at 9. (Emphasis in original.) 

{¶ 10} Citing Juvenile Rule 40(D)(3)(b)(iii) and Local Rule 8 of the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, the trial court 

then found that each of Ms. Boyer Reid's "general" objections to the magistrate's decision 

as "contrary to the facts" required support from a transcript or affidavit, or would be subject 

to dismissal. October 8, 2019 Decision and Judgment Entry at 10. The trial court added that 

further deficiencies plagued Ms. Boyer Reid's objections. For example, Ms. Boyer Reid 

never requested findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii) 

even though the magistrate made "little to no findings" on an objected-to issue. October 8, 

2019 Decision and Judgment Entry at 9. "Considering the procedural deficiencies" stated 

by the trial court, "and the necessity for [the trial court] to review a transcript regarding 
No. 19AP-765 8 

[Ms. Boyer Reid's] Objections," the trial court did not find Ms. Boyer Reid's eleven 

objections "well taken." October 8, 2019 Decision and Judgment Entry at 11. "After an 

independent review of the entire court file, magistrate's decision, evidence, pleadings, and 

available record," the trial court denied and dismissed Ms. Boyer Reid's motion for leave to 

file transcript, overruled her objections, approved and adopted the magistrate's decision, 

and granted Mr. Shaffer's motion to dismiss. October 8, 2019 Decision and Judgment Entry 

at 12. On October 14, 2019, the trial court issued an amended decision and judgment entry 

pursuant to Civ.R. 60(A) to correct the date of the adopted magistrate's decision. 

{¶ 11} On November 6, 2019, and having filed a 60(B) motion for relief from 

judgment five days earlier, Ms. Boyer Reid filed a notice of appeal from the October 8, 2019 

trial court judgment. She asserts eight assignments of error: 

[1.] The Trial Court committed reversible error when it denied 

Plaintiff-Appellant an Extension of Time to File the Transcript 

* * *[.] 

[2.] The Trial Court committed reversible error when it 

Dismissed and Denied Plaintiff-Appellant's Objections based 

upon a mischaracterization of the nature of the Objections[.] 

[3.] The Trial Court committed reversible error when it 

Dismissed and Denied Plaintiff-Appellant's Objections without 

conducting an independent review considering the arguments 

and objections of Plaintiff-Appellant[.] 

[4.] The Trial Court committed reversible error when it 

Dismissed and Denied Plaintiff-Appellant's Objections and 

adopted a Magistrate's Decision filed June 19, 2019 that the 

Court found deficient in findings of fact required by R.C. 

3109.04[.] 

[5.] The Trial Court committed reversible error when it 

Dismissed and Denied Plaintiff-Appellant's Objections and 

adopted a Magistrate's Decision filed June 19, 2019 that the 

Court found deficient in findings of fact required by R.C. 

3109.051[.] 

[6.] The Trial Court committed reversible error when it 

Dismissed and Denied Plaintiff-Appellant's Objections and 

adopted a Magistrate's Decision filed June 19, 2019 that ruled 

contrary to Ohio caselaw based upon the facts found by the 

Court concerning the conduct of the parties[.] 
No. 19AP-765 9 

[7.] The Trial Court committed reversible error when it 

Dismissed and Denied Plaintiff-Appellant's Objections and 

adopted a Magistrate's Decision filed June 19, 2019 that ruled 

contrary to Ohio caselaw based upon the lack of evidence found 

by the Court concerning the financial condition of the parties[.] 

[8.] The Trial Court committed reversible error when it 

Dismissed and Denied Plaintiff-Appellant's Objections and 

adopted a Magistrate's Decision filed June 19, 2019 that ruled 

contrary to Ohio caselaw based upon the lack of evidence found 

by the Court concerning the tax benefit of the parties[.] 

Appellant's Brief at ix-x (with assignment designations changed from letters to numbers). 

{¶ 12} Ms. Boyer Reid's assignments of error encompass three main issues: 

(1) whether the trial court erred in denying her an extension of time to file a transcript; 

(2) whether the trial court erred in handling her objections; and (3) whether the trial court 

erred in its review and adoption of the magistrate's decision. Ms. Boyer Reid has not 

demonstrated reversible error in these respects. 

{¶ 13} As to the transcript, there is no dispute that Ms. Boyer Reid failed to comply 

with the timelines set forth in Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii), Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii), Local Juv.R. 

8 and 12, which collectively require a party who objects to a magistrate's factual findings to 

request a transcript and file a deposit for the transcript within three days after filing 

objections and then file the transcript within thirty days after filing objections, unless the 

trial court provides an extension. Ms. Boyer Reid requested an extension in this case, but 

did so only after the time a transcript was due. She argues that her delay was due to 

"excusable neglect" under Civ.R. 6(B), and that the trial court therefore abused its 

discretion in denying her an extension of time to file the transcript. 

{¶ 14} " 'Civ.R. 6(B) governs motions for extension of time, including a motion to 

extend the time to file a transcript.' " Bahgat v. Kissling, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-641, 2018-

Ohio-2317, ¶ 20, quoting Bayview Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. Likely, 9th Dist. No. 28466, 

2017-Ohio-7693, ¶ 18. Civ.R. 6(B) states: 

When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order 

of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 

specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its 

discretion * * * (2) upon motion made after the expiration of 

the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure 

to act was the result of excusable neglect * * *. 
No. 19AP-765 10 

Juv.R. 18(B) similarly states a trial court may, in its discretion, permit an extension "after 

expiration of the specified period if the failure to act on time was the result of excusable 

neglect or would result in injustice to a party." Ms. Boyer Reid has not argued that 

"injustice" under Juv.R. 18(B) supports an extension in this case. 

{¶ 15} "The determination of whether neglect is excusable or inexcusable must take 

into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances" of the case. Hillman v. 

Edwards, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-58, 2010-Ohio-3524, ¶ 10. This court has described 

inexcusable neglect under Civ.R. 6(B) in terms of "a complete disregard for the judicial 

system," Accu-Check Instrument Serv., Inc. v. Sunbelt Business Advisors of Cent. 

Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-505, 2009-Ohio-6849, ¶ 14, and of conduct that "falls 

substantially below what is reasonable," Hillman, citing Scarefactory, Inc. v. D&B Imports, 

Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-607, 2002-Ohio-200, ¶ 29. At the same time, we have emphasized 

that "excusable neglect does not exist if the party or his attorney could have controlled or 

guarded against the event that led to the untimely [filing]." Hillman. The trial court's 

determination of excusable neglect should not be disturbed on appeal unless the appealing 

party demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion. Hillman; In re Malone, 10th 

Dist. No. 03AP-489, 2003-Ohio-7156, ¶ 27-28. 

{¶ 16} At the outset, although Ms. Boyer Reid points to "uncertainty" surrounding 

the magistrate's decision in light of Mr. Shaffer's Civ.R. 60(A) motion, Appellant's Brief at 

10, 13, Ms. Boyer Reid provides, and we find, no authority stating that a Civ.R. 60(A) motion 

to correct a purported clerical error in a magistrate's decision either suspends an objecting 

party's duty to request, put a deposit on, and file a transcript to support his or her filed 

objections as a matter of law or otherwise obligates a trial court to excuse an appellant's 

neglect in filing a timely transcript under Civ.R. 6(B). The general rule—that a trial court's 

Civ.R. 60(A) entry to correct a clerical, non-substantive error relates back to the date of the 

prior final judgment, Daniels-Rodgers v. Rodgers, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-202, 2015-Ohio1974, ¶ 12-19—undermines Ms. Boyer Reid's position that the Civ.R. 60(A) motion excuses 

her inability to file a timely transcript within 30 days of her objections. Furthermore, her 

argument that the Civ.R. 60(A) motion could have affected a substantive rather than 

clerical issue is unpersuasive: she did not seek a pre-deadline extension on this basis, and, 

as noted by Mr. Shaffer, the subject of the Civ.R. 60(A) motion (the GAL fee reallocation) 
No. 19AP-765 11 

was something opposed by Ms. Boyer Reid and that required a transcript or affidavit under 

the applicable rules. 

{¶ 17} Ms. Boyer Reid's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in 

otherwise refusing to find excusable neglect so as to extend the time limit is also without 

merit. Ms. Boyer Reid contends she was "not inactive" at least in the sense of not having 

"completely disregarded the judicial system." Appellant's Brief at 12, Reply at 12. Her 

support of this argument, however, cites to information that she provided in her postjudgment Civ.R. 60(B) motion: information that was not before the trial court when it 

issued the decision now appealed. Because "[a]ppellate review is limited to the record as it 

existed at the time the trial court rendered judgment," we are precluded from considering 

this evidence on appeal. Fifth Third Mtge. Co. v. Salahuddin, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-945, 

2014-Ohio-3304, ¶ 13, citing Paasewe v. Wendy Thomas 5 Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-510, 

2009-Ohio-6852, ¶ 15 ("a reviewing court cannot consider evidence that a party added to 

the trial court record after that court's judgment, and then decide an appeal from the 

judgment based on the new evidence."). Blevins v. Blevins, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-175, 2014-

Ohio-3933, ¶ 14. 

{¶ 18} The information before the trial court—that contained in her motion and the 

arguments made at the hearing by her counsel—is not enough to establish the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying leave to file a transcript in this case. Ms. Boyer Reid did not 

explain why her motion for an extension was filed after the 30-day deadline to submit the 

transcript. Her motion did not provide any evidence of her effort to secure the transcript, 

and she provided only her counsel's unsworn statements—about calling the wrong court 

reporter's office (with no sufficient follow-up), her client being unable to afford the 

transcript for another two weeks (there was no assertion of indigency), and the reporter not 

being able to prepare the transcript for another 45 days after receiving the full deposit. As 

noted by the trial court, this case involves lengthy litigation in which Ms. Boyer Reid already 

had been through the process of objecting to a magistrate's decision before and yet still did 

not appear to diligently pursue filing the transcript in support of her objections to the 

magistrate's decision. 

{¶ 19} Ms. Boyer Reid's citations to cases that granted extensions do not command 

the same result here. Several of those cases shed no light on whether the trial court abused 
No. 19AP-765 12 

its discretion under the facts and circumstances at play here. The remaining cases cited by 

Ms. Boyer Reid tend to support the trial court's determination. In Oliver v. Oliver, 5th Dist. 

No. 2014-AP-04-0014, 2014-Ohio-5230, ¶ 19-23, the appellate court found that the trial 

court there did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to extend time to 

file the transcript based on her failure to secure funds to pay for it since the appellant filed 

her motion 50 days after her timely objections, the trial court did not rule on the objections 

until over 50 days after appellant filed her objections, and she had ample time to file or 

request leave to file the transcript before this time but failed to do so. Similarly, in Bayview 

Loan Servicing, LLC at ¶ 13-18, the appellate court found that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying the appellants' motion for an extension of time to file the transcript 

where the appellants filed their motion after the 30-day deadline and failed to adequately 

articulate excusable neglect, including "specific facts to establish that they had been 

diligently attempting to secure the transcript[.]" Finally, contrary to Ms. Boyer Reid's 

position, the trial court's citations in this matter do not support her position but rather 

emphasize that Ms. Boyer Reid did not ask for an extension until after the 30-day deadline.

{¶ 20} Considering appellant's delay in requesting both the transcript and an 

extension and then her failure to demonstrate excusable neglect to the trial court in the 

context of this case, we cannot say the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or 

unconscionably in denying Ms. Boyer Reid an extension to file the transcript. Because Ms. 

Boyer Reid did not demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in this regard, her first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 21} Lacking a transcript, Ms. Boyer Reid next argues that the trial court based its 

conclusion that the objections were not "well taken" on the "mischaracterization" of the 

objections as seeking simply to find the magistrate's decision "contrary to the facts." 

Appellant's Brief at 14. Each objection in this case does expressly assert the magistrate's 

decision was decided "contrary to the facts," July 3, 2019 Objections at 1-4. The additional 

bald (or at least balding) assertions within each objection, such as the magistrate's decision 

being contrary to case law or a statute, could arguably be premised on those allegedly wrong 

findings of fact. The objections are general, in violation of Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(ii) and 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii), and provide further no guidance in this regard. We cannot say the 

trial court abused its discretion in assessing the fact-based nature of the objections and 
No. 19AP-765 13 

concluding that a transcript was needed to resolve them. See A.A. v. F.A., 5th Dist. No. 17 

CAF 12 0078, 2018-Ohio-3376, ¶ 35 (standard for determining impact of lack of transcript 

on determining an objection to a magistrate's decision is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion). We overrule the second assignment of error. 

{¶ 22} Ms. Boyer Reid next argues that, regardless of not having a transcript before 

it, the trial court committed reversible error by dismissing and denying her objections 

"without conducting an independent review considering the arguments and objections of 

plaintiff." Appellant's Brief at 16, 18. The first part of this argument asserts that the trial 

court did not permit the parties to address the substance of the objections. This argument 

is not supported by the record: the App.R. 9(C)(1) statement states the objections came 

before the court at the August 13, 2019 hearing, and there is no evidence that the parties 

were not permitted to address what Ms. Boyer Reid believes to be the substance of the 

objections. We further note that Ms. Boyer Reid was required by Local Juv.R. (8)(1) to 

submit a supporting memorandum with the objections. She did not do so. 

{¶ 23} Ms. Boyer Reid next argues the trial court "created a requirement that [she] 

request [f]indings of [f]act and [c]onclusions of [l]aw before being able to object to the facts 

contained in the [m]agistrate's [d]ecision," which she asserts is contrary to Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(a)(iii) that "clearly contemplate[s] that parties may object to factual findings 

'whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact under Civ. R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii).' " 

Appellant's Brief at 16. The trial court did not curtail her ability to object under Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(a)(iii) but instead commented on her failure to request findings of fact and 

conclusions of law for the magistrate's general decision pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii). 

{¶ 24} She additionally alludes to the trial court adopting the magistrate's 

"presumptive and prejudicial conclusions totally unsupported by the law," contrary to its 

duty to independently review the magistrate's legal conclusions as set forth in Juv.R. 

40(D)(4)(d) and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Liggins, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-242, 2016-

Ohio-3528, ¶ 14, fn. 1. Appellant's Brief at 17. We note this assignment of error challenges 

the trial court's dismissal and denial of her objections, not the ultimate adoption of the 

magistrate's legal conclusions (which we address below in reviewing Ms. Boyer Reid's sixth, 

seventh, and eighth assignments of error). Here, Ms. Boyer Reid simply takes issue with 

the magistrate's observation that matters described did not reflect a change in 
No. 19AP-765 14 

circumstances, but even if they had would not show modification of custody to be in the 

child's best interests. Appellant's Brief at 18, citing June 19, 2019 Magistrate's Decision at 

8. We think that she probably misreads what the magistrate was saying. In any event, her 

unreasoned argument does not demonstrate reversable error and we decline to try to 

expand this argument on her behalf. Miller v. Johnson & Angelo, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1210, 

2002-Ohio-3681, ¶ 2 ("The burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on appeal rests 

with the [appellant]"); see also App.R. 9 and 16(A)(7). Cook v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family 

Servs., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-852, 2015-Ohio-4966, ¶ 40, quoting Bond v. Canal Winchester, 

10th Dist. No. 07AP-556, 2008-Ohio-945, ¶ 16 (" 'It is the duty of the appellant, not the 

appellate court, to construct the legal arguments necessary to support the appellant's 

assignments of error.' "). 

{¶ 25} Moreover, we have already found the substance of the objections were tied to 

factual findings in need of a transcript to review: appellate courts, including this one, have 

found that a trial court acts within its discretion in overruling or dismissing the objections. 

Pallone v. Pallone, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-779, 2016-Ohio-7066, ¶ 16 (stating a trial court is 

justified in overruling an objection that is unsupported by a transcript); White v. Davia, 7th 

Dist. No. 11HA4, 2012-Ohio-2820, ¶ 14 (finding trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

overruling objections based on the failure to file a transcript of the magistrate's hearing 

where the transcript was necessary to review the factual basis of the magistrate's decision). 

See also Aicher v. Aicher, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-859, 2009-Ohio-1268, ¶ 14 ("When the 

actions or inactions of counsel have made it impossible for a trial court judge to address the 

merits of objections to a magistrate's decision, we cannot say that a judge abuses her 

discretion by dismissing the objections for failure to prosecute"); Huffer v. Huffer, 10th 

Dist. No. 12AP-883, 2013-Ohio-1575, ¶ 10 (finding the trial court's decision to dismiss 

appellant's objections to be reasonable where the appellant did not file a transcript 

necessary to review the objection and did not argue plain error); Local Juv.R. 8(1) 

("[f]ailure to file a transcript when one is required by [Local Rule 8(1)] is a basis for 

dismissal of the Objections."). We overrule the third assignment of error. 

{¶ 26} Ms. Boyer Reid's fourth and fifth assignments assert reversible error 

premised on the trial court not being able to properly review the objections and magistrate's 

decision after having found the magistrate's decision to be "deficient in findings of fact." 
No. 19AP-765 15 

Appellant's Brief at ix. Contrary to Ms. Boyer Reid's interpretation, we do not understand 

the trial court to have found that the magistrate's decision necessarily was "deficient" in 

findings, Appellant's Brief at ix-x, but instead to have noted, perhaps somewhat awkwardly, 

that if Ms. Boyer Reid wanted findings or further findings on parenting time, for example, 

under R.C. 3109.051 (the trial court did not mention R.C. 3109.04), she could have 

requested them. See October 8, 2019 Decision and Judgment Entry at 9-10. Having 

reviewed the magistrate's decision in the context of the trial court's further opinion, we do 

not find it insufficiently detailed or unintelligible. See Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(iii)("Subject to the 

terms of the relevant reference, a magistrate's decision may be general unless findings of 

fact and conclusions of law are timely requested by a party or otherwise required by law"); 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii)(stating the same). 

{¶ 27} No party requested further findings of fact or conclusions of law in this case, 

and the authorities cited by Ms. Boyer Reid, R.C. 3109.051(A), R.C. 3109.04(C), and Civ.R. 

52, do not support her position. R.C. 3109.051(A) requires a trial court to journalize 

findings of fact and conclusions of law when it determines that "it would not be in the best 

interest of the child to permit [the nonresidential] parent to have parenting time with the 

child," which did not occur here. See June 19, 2019 Magistrate's Decision at 8, 30-31 

(permitting shared parenting time under certain conditions). While the magistrate was 

required to "consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051(D) and then determine 

[parenting time] that is in the best interest of the child" to modify the parenting time, 

Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 45 (1999), in this context the magistrate was not 

required to issue written finding of fact or conclusions of law absent a request to do so. See 

Id., citing R.C. 3109.051(F)(1); In re J.L.C., 7th Dist. No. 18 JE 0026, 2019-Ohio-2721, ¶ 33-

34, citing Braatz ("the Braatz decision does not require the trial court to issue findings of 

fact and conclusions of law absent such request") and Civ.R. 52 ("Pursuant to Civ.R. 52, 

when questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury, a judgment may be a general 

one for the prevailing party unless one of the parties files a request for findings of fact and 

conclusions of law."). 

{¶ 28} Ms. Boyer Reid then cites State ex rel. Thompson v. Spon, 83 Ohio St.3d 551 

(1998), to argue that "R.C. 3109.04(C) requires findings of fact and conclusions of law in 

final decrees allocating parental rights and responsibilities or subsequent modification of 
No. 19AP-765 16 

final decrees." Appellant's Brief at 19. But, as Spon makes clear, the requirement for 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in R.C. 3109.04(C) applies only where the trial court 

decides to designate a parent as the residential parent or issue a shared parenting decree 

despite that parent's conviction of certain criminal offenses or a finding in an adjudication 

that the parent perpetrated abusive acts. R.C. 3109.04(C) is not implicated in this case. 

Ms. Boyer Reid additionally cites Nolan v. Nolan, 4th Dist. No. 11CA3444, 2012-Ohio-3736, 

¶ 42, to argue that "[f]ailure to follow the mandates of R.C. 3109.04[] is reversible error, 

even where the trial court has made a thoughtful and conscientious decision." However, the 

remainder of that paragraph runs counter to her to position. Nolan continues: 

here, we cannot presume the regularity of the proceedings 

below because [the appellant] requested findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. Compare Mann v. Mann, 4th Dist. No. 

09CA38, 2011-Ohio-1646, ¶ 11 ("When a party fails to request 

findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must presume the 

regularity of the trial court proceedings."). 

Nolan at ¶ 42. Ms. Boyer Reid's fourth and fifth assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶ 29} The remainder of Ms. Boyer Reid's objections assert error in the trial court's 

adoption of the magistrate's legal conclusions in three specific respects. She asserts the trial 

court ruled contrary to Ohio caselaw based upon: "the facts found by the [c]ourt concerning 

the conduct of the parties"; "the lack of evidence found by the Court concerning the 

financial condition of the parties"; and "the lack of evidence found by the Court concerning 

the tax benefit of the parties[.]" Appellant's Brief at 22-31. "Without a transcript of the 

hearing a trial court is required to accept all the magistrate's findings of fact as true and 

only review the legal conclusions drawn from those facts." Bahgat at ¶ 20-21, citing 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. at ¶ 14, fn. 1; Bayview Loan Servicing at ¶ 12. "Generally, the 

decision to adopt, reject, or modify a magistrate's decision lies within the discretion of the 

trial court and should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Barlow v. 

Barlow, 9th Dist. No. 08CA0055, 2009-Ohio-3788, ¶ 5. 

{¶ 30} In this case, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision in its entirety 

"[a]fter an independent review of the entire court file, Magistrate's Decision, evidence, 

pleading, and available record[.]" October 8, 2019 Decision and Judgment Entry at 12. 

Ms. Boyer Reid's challenges to the magistrate's legal conclusions here do not demonstrate 

the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. 
No. 19AP-765 17 

{¶ 31} Ms. Boyer Reid's reference to the conduct of the parties in her sixth 

assignment of error takes issue with many of the magistrate's findings and holdings in a 

variety of contempt motions. She asserts she provided (within her six motions) clear and 

convincing evidence of Mr. Shaffer's contempt, but "the [c]ourt simply determined that 

because the [c]ourt found [Ms. Boyer Reid's] behavior unpleasant, that [Mr. Shaffer] was 

excused from complying with the Court Orders." Appellant's Brief at 25-26. Our review of 

the June 19, 2019 Magistrate's Decision at 9-20, which considers the parties' agreements 

and Ms. Boyer Reid's unclean hands, does not support this contention. Ms. Boyer Reid also 

contends the trial court judgment must be reversed "[b]ecause the [c]ourt's conditions [for 

purging] are not reasonable under Ohio caselaw[.]" Appellant's Brief at 27. This argument 

does not support the assignment of error, which asks us to review whether the trial court 

ruled contrary to Ohio caselaw based upon "the facts found by the [c]ourt concerning the 

conduct of the parties." Compare Appellant's Brief at 22 with Huntington Natl. Bank v. 

Burda, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-658, 2009-Ohio-1752, ¶ 21, citing App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) (stating 

that "a court of appeals shall * * * [d]etermine the appeal on its merits on the assignments 

of error set forth in the briefs"). In any event, we are not persuaded by the ipse dixit. 

{¶ 32} Ms. Boyer Reid next asserts the trial court committed reversible error in 

adopting the magistrate's decision since the magistrate ruled contrary to Ohio caselaw 

based upon "the lack of evidence found by the Court concerning the financial condition of 

the parties." Appellant's Brief at 27. Ms. Boyer Reid specifically contends the magistrate 

modified Ms. Boyer Reid's child support obligation after the magistrate "did not find any 

error with the calculation of the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency's 

calculation," Appellant's Brief at 28, but this contention is against the implication of the 

record: the magistrate stated that "[p]ursuant to R.C. 3119.03, the resulting support 

amount is presumed to be correct, but subject to rebuttal." June 19, 2019 Magistrate's 

Decision at 21. Ms. Boyer Reid does not contend this statement of the law is wrong.

Ms. Boyer Reid also contends the magistrate "did not cite to any evidence that supported 

the number of hours she imputed [Ms. Boyer Reid] to working, that a nursing job existed 

with both the hourly rate and number of hours that the Magistrate imputed, or why it was 

appropriate to use a three (3) year old income for [Mr. Shaffer] but not [Ms. Boyer Reid]." 

Appellant's Brief at 29. The magistrate did cite evidence to support her finding on Ms. Boyer 
No. 19AP-765 18 

Reid's income: the parties stipulation prior to trial, Ms. Boyer Reid's current 

underemployment (a finding of fact unreviewable at this juncture) based on Ms. Boyer 

Reid's exhibit showing she works 24 hours a week, her 2017 tax return, paystubs, and 

testimony of the parties. While Ms. Boyer Reid disagrees with the stated income, she has 

not provided the asserted "case law" that would undermine the magistrate's decision. 

Appellant's Brief at 27. 

{¶ 33} Finally, Ms. Boyer Reid contends the trial court ruled contrary to Ohio 

caselaw based upon "the lack of evidence found by the Court concerning the tax benefit of 

the parties," but again cites no case law that demonstrates a legal error to support reversal. 

Appellant's Brief at 29. Appellant misstates the holding in Singer v. Dickerson, 63 Ohio 

St.3d 408, 415 (1992): it does not hold that tax exemption "should" be awarded to a noncustodial parent under the best interest of the child when there is a net tax savings to the 

parent, but rather holds that "allocation of the dependency exemption provided by Section 

152(e), Title 26, U.S. Code may be awarded to the noncustodial parent when that allocation 

would produce a net tax savings for the parents, thereby furthering the best interest of the 

child." Appellant's Brief at 29; Singer at 415. Regardless, Singer is immaterial because "no 

party presented evidence of net tax savings, that either party was eligible for the earned 

income tax credit, or, if eligible, what financial benefit would be had." June 19, 2019 

Magistrate's Decision at 24. This statement by the magistrate did not, as Ms. Boyer Reid 

suggests, amount to a finding that "there was insufficient evidence to determine pursuant 

to R.C. 3119.82 the best interest of the minor child in allocating the tax exemption." 

Appellant's Brief at 30. Rather, it addressed the specific, statutorily-required 

considerations that must inform the determination of which parent may claim a minor 

child for tax purposes. R.C. 3119.82 ("In cases in which the parties do not agree which 

parent may claim the children as dependents, the court shall consider, in making its 

determination, any net tax savings, the relative financial circumstances and needs of the 

parents and children, the amount of time the children spend with each parent, the eligibility 

of either or both parents for the federal earned income tax credit or other state or federal 

tax credit, and any other relevant factor concerning the best interest of the children."). We 

find no error in the trial court's adoption of the magistrate's decision in this regard. 
No. 19AP-765 19 

{¶ 34} Finding no merit to Ms. Boyer Reid's asserted legal errors, we conclude that 

the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision. We accordingly overrule 

Ms. Boyer Reid's sixth, seventh, and eighth assignments of error. 

{¶ 35} Having overruled all eight assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of 

the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile 

Branch, adopting the magistrate's decision. 

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and DORRIAN, JJ., concur.