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*********************************************** 
JAMES E. WALKER v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 38946)

Sheldon, Keller and Elgo, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel

had provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, the petitioner alleged

that trial counsel’s prior relationship with D, a witness for the state in

the criminal case, created an actual conflict of interest and that his right

to due process had been violated by his exclusion from an in-chambers

conference regarding trial counsel’s alleged conflict of interest. The

habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition, concluding that

there was insufficient evidence to establish an actual conflict of interest

and that the petitioner had abandoned his due process claim. Thereafter,

the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court.

Held:

1. There was no merit to the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court improperly concluded that he failed to establish that trial counsel’s prior relationship with D had created an actual conflict of interest with respect

to his representation of the petitioner; there was no indication in the

record that trial counsel simultaneously represented the petitioner and

D, the petitioner failed to identify any specific instances in the record

that suggested that trial counsel’s limited interaction with D impaired

or compromised the petitioner’s interests for the benefit of D, and the

record supported the habeas court’s findings that trial counsel had

advocated strenuously on the petitioner’s behalf and that counsel’s performance had contributed significantly to the jury’s finding the petitioner

not guilty of one of the charged offenses.

2. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner had abandoned

his due process claim that he was denied his constitutional right to be

present at an in-chambers conference regarding trial counsel’s alleged

conflict of interest; the petitioner abandoned his due process claim as

a result of his failure to brief it before the habeas court, as he did not

address the claim in his posttrial brief and posttrial reply brief, nor did

he attempt to amend his posttrial brief or otherwise seek to have the

court reconsider its decision not to address the claim.

Argued June 1—officially released October 3, 2017

Procedural History

Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Tolland and tried to the court, Oliver, J.; judgment

denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the

granting of certification, appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Stephanie L. Evans, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Nancy L. Walker, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Patrick Griffin, state’s

attorney, and Rebecca Barry, assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

ELGO, J. The petitioner, James E. Walker, appeals

from the judgment of the habeas court denying his

amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On

appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly

concluded that (1) his defense counsel did not have an

actual conflict of interest at the time of his representation of the petitioner and (2) he abandoned his due

process claim that he was denied his right to be present

at an in-chambers conference. We affirm the judgment

of the habeas court.

In the underlying criminal proceeding, the petitioner

was charged with two counts of assault in the first

degree by means of the discharge of a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (5) and 53a-8, and

one count of conspiracy to commit assault in the first

degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and

53a-59 (a) (5). State v. Walker, 147 Conn. App. 1, 6, 82

A.3d 630 (2013), aff’d, 319 Conn. 668, 126 A.3d 1087

(2015). The charges arose from the nonfatal shooting

of two persons. Id., 4.

Following a trial, the jury found the petitioner guilty

of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree and

not guilty of assault in the first degree, either as an

accessory or as a principal. Id., 6. The court thereafter

sentenced the petitioner to a total of nineteen years

incarceration, and the petitioner appealed to this

court. Id.

On direct appeal, this court determined, inter alia,

that the record was inadequate to review the petitioner’s

conflict of interest claim and affirmed the judgment of

conviction. Id., 15–16. Our Supreme Court thereafter

affirmed our judgment. State v. Walker, 319 Conn. 668,

126 A.3d 1087 (2015).

The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. At the habeas trial, the petitioner

alleged that defense counsel, Attorney Richard Silverstein, provided him with ineffective legal representation based on a conflict of interest and alleged due

process violations.1

In its detailed and thorough memorandum of decision, the habeas court rejected those

claims, concluding that there was insufficient evidence

in the record to establish an actual conflict of interest

on the part of defense counsel. In addition, the court

determined that the petitioner’s due process claim had

been abandoned. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and this certified

appeal followed.

I

The petitioner first claims that the court improperly

concluded that he failed to establish an actual conflict of

interest.2 Specifically, he argues that defense counsel’s

prior relationship with James Dickerson, one of the
state’s witnesses in its case against the petitioner, created an actual conflict of interest. The respondent, the

Commissioner of Correction, contends that the court’s

conclusion was proper because the petitioner failed to

satisfy his burden of proof. We agree with the

respondent.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our discussion of this claim. In his direct appeal,

our Supreme Court noted a discussion that occurred

on the record during jury selection in the underlying

criminal trial about Dickerson and defense counsel:

‘‘The Court: Good morning, everybody. We are back

to jury selection in [the present case]. The attorneys

have brought a matter to the court’s attention this morning which should be put on the record. [Assistant State’s

Attorney Stacey] Haupt [the prosecutor], I don’t know

if you want to go first or—

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: . . . It was brought to my attention late Friday by [Assistant State’s] Attorney Jack

Doyle [regarding] the [plea offer] between . . . Dickerson and the state’s attorney’s office. I asked Attorney

Doyle to write a memo about how exactly that went

down and what promises had been made to [Dickerson]

and in looking at his file attempting to prepare the

memo, Attorney Doyle realized that [defense counsel]

. . . had spoken to [Dickerson] at the request of Attorney Jamie Alosi to try to talk to him about taking some

type of deal. However, it was prior to [Dickerson] cooperating in this case. I don’t believe that deal came to

fruition, but I just thought it should be brought to the

court’s attention that . . . [defense counsel] in some

respect had conversations with one of the state’s witnesses.

‘‘The Court: Let me flush that out a bit. Apparently,

[Dickerson], and it’s already a matter of knowledge and

public [record] in this case, is going to testify against

[the petitioner]. [Dickerson], and I think you put this

on the record earlier, and if not, it should be. [Dickerson] was on trial in front of this court, represented

by Attorney Alosi. At some point, he entered a plea

upstairs, and I had nothing to do with the plea. I had

nothing to do with the sentencing. My involvement was

picking a jury up to the point where the matter was

resolved. Apparently, [defense counsel], you can add

to that factual situation. Listen up, Mr. Walker, I just

want to make sure you understand this.

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: [Dickerson] was brought in to

begin jury selection in a matter which he eventually

[pleaded] guilty to and is seeking to have consideration

for based on his testimony or anticipated testimony in

this case. I happen[ed] to be on the sixth floor. He

was in the bull pen upstairs with his attorney, and his

attorney, who I know, had told me about the case he

was proceeding to trial on. . . .
‘‘Defense counsel then went on to explain that Dickerson’s attorney had told him about the evidence against

Dickerson relating to the sale of narcotics, which

included a videotape of the purported transaction and

a still photograph from that videotape that appeared to

show Dickerson making the sale, and the fact that the

state had offered Dickerson a plea agreement. Because

defense counsel knew Dickerson, he was asked, or may

have volunteered, to speak with Dickerson about the

sentence that could be imposed in light of the evidence

and Dickerson’s past history. In summarizing the discussion that ensued, defense counsel noted that Dickerson had told him about the plea offer as well as what

the plea agreement was that he could accept short of

going to trial. Defense counsel then explained: I said,

in my opinion, the evidence was substantial. Then again,

I didn’t spend more than five or six minutes with him,

nor did I, other than the layout, which he probably

already heard from his attorney, have anything that

would impact on [the] decision he made. Then he proceeded to come down here and begin jury selection

with Your Honor.

‘‘Subsequent to that, it would appear, and I didn’t

know until, let’s say, a month to six weeks after, that

he had given that statement because it wasn’t being

handled by [the prosecutor] at that time . . . .

‘‘[The petitioner] was incarcerated, having not made

bond, and, at some point . . . I became aware that

Dickerson had made a statement. As soon as I became

aware, I asked [the prosecutor] to send me a copy of

that statement. I spoke to [Assistant State’s Attorney]

Doyle. . . . I spoke to them about the parameters of

the new plea agreement that [Dickerson] had entered

into based on his cooperation, and I was told essentially

what happened. I was given a copy of the statement,

and that’s where we are today. [The petitioner] is aware

I had a limited interaction with [Dickerson] prior to

him giving inculpatory evidence or [an] anticipated

statement that inculpates him, and I explained to [the

petitioner] that this in no way would impede my crossexamination of [Dickerson]. I don’t think that that conversation is probably relevant to the deal he eventually

entered into, and I would probably not, in my crossexamination, unless it came out that we knew each

other, but we had known each other prior to me speaking to him up in court, and I wouldn’t get into any

details of the conversation. I don’t think that would

hamper my cross-examination of him at all. [The petitioner] has indicated to me that he wants me to continue

to represent him.

‘‘The Court: You heard that, Mr. Walker? You’re comfortable with that?

‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, yes.

‘‘The Court: Let me tell you what I’m concerned about
to protect your rights. As your lawyer, [defense counsel]

owes you a duty of undivided loyalty. He can’t represent

two people at the same time that have any kind of

conflict. From what I’ve heard here today, I haven’t seen

any. Whatever he did with [Dickerson] was unrelated

to whatever deal [Dickerson] now has going, and he

can go after that deal hand and claw, and there’s nothing

that I can see in his prior contact with [Dickerson] that

is even relevant to the situation that developed after

he spoke to [defense counsel]. I don’t see any conflict.

I don’t see any violation of the law by [defense counsel],

and I want to make sure you’re comfortable with it so

we can get on with the trial, and you’ve got to let me

know. Are you okay with it?

‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Good, all right, then we’ll pick it up. Let’s

bring the panel out. Thank you.’’ (Emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walker,

supra, 319 Conn. 670–74.

Following the habeas trial, the court found in its

memorandum of decision that defense counsel’s conduct ‘‘during the trial, including his blistering and thorough cross-examination of . . . Dickerson, showed no

indication that his prior contact with and knowledge of

. . . Dickerson adversely affected his representation

of the petitioner. Further, the court found that the petitioner ‘‘failed to allege or establish what additional

meaningful cross-examination could have been conducted by . . . counsel at trial [and that] . . . counsel’s representation of the petitioner and crossexamination of . . . Dickerson contributed mightily

. . . to the petitioner’s acquittal on two of the three

charges.’’

On appeal, the petitioner challenges the propriety of

that determination. As a preliminary matter, we set forth

the following guiding legal principles and standard of

review governing ineffective assistance of counsel

claims based on an actual conflict of interest. ‘‘[I]t is

well established that [a] criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance of

counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings.

. . . This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth

amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. . . . It is

axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the

effective assistance of counsel.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306 Conn. 664, 677–78, 51 A.3d

948 (2012). ‘‘As an adjunct to this right, a criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by an attorney free

from conflicts of interest.’’ Phillips v. Warden, 220

Conn. 112, 132, 595 A.2d 1356 (1991).

In order to establish an actual conflict of interest,

the petitioner ‘‘must establish (1) that counsel actively
represented conflicting interests and (2) that an actual

conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Parrott, 262 Conn. 276, 287, 811 A.2d 705 (2003); Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn. App. 568,

583, 867 A.2d 70, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 873 A.2d

997 (2005). To demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, ‘‘the petitioner must be able to point to specific

instances in the record which suggest impairment or

compromise of his interests for the benefit of another

party. . . . A mere theoretical division of loyalties is

not enough.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 584.

‘‘[A] petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of

counsel must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice to the defense.’’

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Once the petitioner

establishes an actual conflict of interest, the ‘‘prejudice

[prong of Strickland] is presumed because counsel

[has] breach[ed] the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most

basic of counsel’s duties. Moreover, it is difficult to

measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests.’’ Id., 692. ‘‘Prejudice is presumed . . . if the [petitioner] demonstrates

that counsel actively represented conflicting interests

and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected

his lawyer’s performance.’’ Id.

On appeal, ‘‘facts found by the habeas court may not

be disturbed unless they were clearly erroneous . . . .

When . . . those facts are essential to a determination

of whether the petitioner’s sixth amendment rights have

been violated, we are presented with a mixed question

of law and fact requiring plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hedge v. Commissioner of Correction, 152 Conn. App. 44, 51, 97 A.3d 45 (2014), cert.

denied, 321 Conn. 921, 138 A.3d 282 (2016).

At its essence, the petitioner’s claim is that defense

counsel, due to his prior relationship with Dickerson,

actively represented competing interests while representing the petitioner. We do not agree.

An actual conflict of interest usually arises in the

context of counsel’s representation of multiple codefendants where counsel adduces evidence or advances

arguments on behalf of one defendant that are damaging

to the interests of the other defendant. See Santiago

v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 87 Conn. App.

583. In this case, Dickerson and Walker were not codefendants. An actual conflict of interest, however, also

arises ‘‘if trial counsel simultaneously represents the

defendant and another individual associated with the

incident and that representation inhibits counsel’s ability to represent the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Goodrum v. Commissioner of Correction, 63 Conn. App. 297, 317, 776 A.2d 461, cert. denied,

258 Conn. 902, 782 A.2d 136 (2001); see also State v.

Martin, 201 Conn. 74, 80–81, 513 A.2d 116 (1986) (enumerating various types of conflicts of interest); Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 583.

On our review of the record, the evidence in this

case does not support a finding that defense counsel

simultaneously represented Dickerson and the petitioner. At the habeas trial, defense counsel testified

about his relationship to Dickerson and described it as

a ‘‘brief’’ and ‘‘limited contact.’’ The record indicates

that he had a brief discussion with Dickerson that did

not last more than five or six minutes and the discussion

consisted of ‘‘lay[ing] out’’ information ‘‘which he probably already heard from his attorney . . . [and did not

include] anything that would [have an] impact on [the]

decision he made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Walker, supra, 319 Conn. 672. The petitioner

has not identified anything in the record that suggests

impairment or compromise of his interests for the benefit of Dickerson. In our view, this limited encounter

alone does not give rise to an actual conflict of interest.

Moreover, the conversation between Dickerson and

defense counsel occurred prior to Dickerson’s giving

the state any evidence against the petitioner.

As the habeas court emphasized in its memorandum

of decision, defense counsel’s blistering and thorough

cross-examination of Dickerson gave no indication of

his prior contact with, or knowledge of, Dickerson,

which further underscored the lack of an actual conflict

of interest. The lack of an actual conflict is further

supported by the underlying trial transcript, which

included an accusation that Dickerson lied to the police

and falsely implicated the petitioner. In his closing argument, defense counsel criticized Dickerson by characterizing his testimony as ‘‘bought and paid for.’’ In our

view, counsel’s cross-examination of Dickerson and his

closing argument suggest that he energetically advocated on behalf of the petitioner. There is no suggestion

that he was hampered by his prior limited interaction

with Dickerson. Furthermore, the jury found the petitioner not guilty of assault in the first degree, convicting

him only on the conspiracy charge. The habeas court

noted that defense counsel’s performance ‘‘contributed

mightily’’ to this outcome. On our review of the record,

we concur with that assessment.

In sum, it is clear to this court that defense counsel’s

relationship with Dickerson did not create an actual

conflict between him and the petitioner. The record

substantiates the court’s finding that he strenuously

advocated on the petitioner’s behalf, unburdened by

any conflict of interest. Accordingly, there is no merit

to this claim.

II
The petitioner next claims that the habeas court

improperly concluded that he abandoned his due process claim that he was denied his right to be present at

an in-chambers conference. In response, the respondent

argues that this court should not review this claim

because the habeas court correctly concluded that it

was abandoned. We agree with the respondent.3

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this claim. Among the issues raised on direct

appeal, the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to

a new trial because his constitutional right to be present

at all critical stages of the prosecution had been violated. State v. Walker, supra, 147 Conn. App. 7. The

factual basis for this claim was the petitioner’s alleged

exclusion from an in-chambers discussion regarding

defense counsel’s possible conflict of interest. Id., 7–8.

The petitioner sought review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or the

plain error doctrine. State v. Walker, supra, 8.

In his direct appeal, this court emphasized that the

record revealed ‘‘no information as to whether a meeting occurred in chambers or whether there was a discussion in court off the record in the presence or absence

of the [petitioner], whether or how counsel alerted the

court clerk’s office that something needed to be put on

the record that morning, or whether the attorneys did

something else in the presence or absence of the [petitioner] to alert the court that there was an issue that

needed to be put on the record.’’ Id., 15. We thus held

that the failure of the petitioner to request a hearing

before the trial court to establish a factual predicate

for appellate review of the conflict of interest claim

rendered the record inadequate for any meaningful

review. Id.

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged in relevant part that ‘‘[p]ursuant to State

v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724, [859 A.2d 898] (2004), the

confrontation clause of the sixth, and due process

clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the

United States constitution, [the petitioner] was denied

his constitutional right to be present at a critical stage

of his own prosecution, namely an in-chambers conference between defense counsel, the trial court, and the

state’s attorney, whereby defense counsel’s potential

conflict of interest in this case was discussed. [The

petitioner’s] absence thwarted a fair and just hearing

in the matter, and his presence had a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to

defend against the charges.’’

At the conclusion of the habeas trial, the court

inquired as to whether the parties would be submitting

posttrial briefs or closing oral arguments. The parties

agreed to submit posttrial briefs. The petitioner subsequently filed both a posttrial brief and a reply brief with
the habeas court. Those briefs did not address the due

process claim alleged in his petition. In its memorandum of decision, the court deemed that claim abandoned, stating: ‘‘In his posttrial brief and his posttrial

reply brief, the petitioner analyzes and develops only

the Brady and Adams4 claims related to . . . Dickerson and the alleged conflict of interest thereto. The

court, therefore, deems the remaining claims abandoned.’’ (Footnote added.)

It is well settled that ‘‘[w]e are not required to review

issues that have been improperly presented to this court

through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than

mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid

abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement

of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention

in the brief without substantive discussion or citation

of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . .

These same principles apply to claims raised in the

trial court.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power

Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108,

120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003).

‘‘[T]he idea of abandonment involves both a factual

finding by the trial court and a legal determination that

an issue is no longer before the court, [therefore,] we

will treat this claim as one of both law and fact. Accordingly, we will accord it plenary review.’’ Solek v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn. App. 473, 479, 946

A.2d 239, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 902, 957 A.2d 873

(2008).

At his oral argument before this court, the petitioner

argued that the failure to address a claim in a posttrial

brief does not constitute abandonment and stated that

the habeas judge did not explicitly request briefing of

all of his claims. It nevertheless ‘‘is not the responsibility

of the trial judge, without some specific request from

a petitioner, to search a record, often, in a habeas case,

involving hundreds of pages of transcript, in order to

find some basis for relief for a petitioner.’’ Id., 480.

In Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, 156 Conn.

App. 402, 408, 114 A.3d 168, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 904,

114 A.3d 1220 (2015), the petitioner included in his

amended petition a claim ‘‘that his trial counsel failed

to adequately and effectively . . . advise [the] petitioner as to the applicable law, prior to the petitioner’s

decision to be tried to a jury, which prejudiced the

petitioner . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

This court rejected the petitioner’s attempt to pursue

that claim on appeal, noting that ‘‘the present claim was

not distinctly raised in the petitioner’s lengthy posttrial

brief and was not addressed by the court in its decision

denying the petition. The petitioner thus abandoned the

claim as a result of his failure to brief it before the

habeas court.’’ Id.
Although the petitioner in the present case included

a due process claim in his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, his posttrial brief and posttrial reply brief did

not address the claim. Further, the record does not

reflect that the petitioner attempted to amend his posttrial brief or otherwise seek to have the court reconsider

its decision not to address the claim.

In light of the petitioner’s failure to brief the due

process claim, we conclude that the habeas court properly deemed it abandoned. Moreover, the claimed issue

on appeal was not ruled upon and decided by the habeas

court. It is well settled that ‘‘this court is not bound to

consider any claimed error unless it appears on the

record that the question was distinctly raised at trial

and was ruled upon and decided by the court adversely

to the appellant’s claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. We therefore conclude that the habeas

court properly determined that the petitioner’s due process claim was abandoned.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In his petition, the petitioner also alleged Brady violations. See Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). The

habeas court’s disposition of this claim is not at issue in this appeal.

2 The petitioner also appears to assert a claim of insufficient inquiry by

the trial court into a potential conflict of interest. The petitioner did not

raise this issue in his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and,

as a result, the habeas court did not address it. ‘‘It is well established that

[w]e do not entertain claims not raised before the habeas court but raised

for the first time on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hankerson

v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn. App. 362, 369, 90 A.3d 368, cert.

denied, 314 Conn. 919, 100, A.3d 852 (2014). ‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that a petitioner

is bound by his petition . . . . While the habeas court has considerable

discretion to frame a remedy that is commensurate with the scope of the

established constitutional violations . . . it does not have the discretion to

look beyond the pleadings and trial evidence to decide claims not raised.

. . . Having not raised [an] issue before the habeas court, [a] petitioner is

barred from raising it on appeal. . . . This court is not compelled to consider

issues neither alleged in the habeas petition nor considered at the habeas

proceeding . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 367; see also

Hedge v. Commissioner of Correction, 152 Conn. App. 44, 59, 97 A.3d 45

(2014), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 921, 138 A.3d 282 (2016). Accordingly, we

decline to review that claim.

3 The petitioner also argues that the alleged due process violation qualifies

as a structural error and is not subject to harmless error analysis. See, e.g.,

State v. Latour, 276 Conn. 399, 411, 886 A.2d 404 (2005) (‘‘[Structural error]

cases do not involve trial error occurring during the presentation of the

case to the jury but involve extrinsic factors not occurring in the courtroom.

. . . These cases recognize that violation of some constitutional rights, such

as the right to a trial by an impartial jury, may require reversal without

regard to the evidence in the particular case.’’) Because we conclude that

the habeas court properly deemed the petitioner’s due process claim abandoned, we need not consider that contention. See State v. Apodaca, 303

Conn. 378, 383, 33 A.3d 224 (2012).

4 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215

(1963) and Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, 309 Conn. 359, 71 A.3d

512 (2013).