DA 18-0671

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2021 MT 17N

STATE OF MONTANA,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

LEONARD VILLA,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Glacier, Cause No. DC 17-51

Honorable Robert G. Olson, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Kristen L. Peterson, Assistant Appellate 

Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant 

Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Terryl T. Matt, Glacier County Attorney, Joseph Sherwood, Deputy County 

Attorney, Cut Bank, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: December 30, 2020

 Decided: January 26, 2021

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

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01/26/2021

Case Number: DA 18-0671
2

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports. 

¶2 Defendant and Appellant Leonard Villa (Villa) appeals from the Findings of Fact, 

Conclusions of Law & Judgment entered May 17, 2018, and the subsequent sentencing 

Judgment filed October 3, 2018, by the Ninth Judicial District Court, Glacier County. We 

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for correction of the typographical error 

contained in the Judgment finding Villa guilty of Count One rather than Count Five;

removal of conditions 1 through 34 applying conditions to any suspended portion of Villa’s 

sentence; and to establish a record as to whether the time served noted in the Judgment is 

correct, or alternatively, to create a record and properly determine the correct credit for 

time served. 

¶3 Villa was charged with eight felony offenses in connection to the theft of two Ford 

trucks and other items from Fugle Welding in Cut Bank. Count One alleged theft of a 2014 

Ford F-450 pickup in violation of § 45-6-301(1), MCA. Count Five alleged an identical 

theft charge of a 2009 Ford F-350 pickup. Kenneth Salois was also charged in a companion 

criminal matter. Without objection, Villa’s and Salois’s criminal cases were jointly tried 

via a bench trial. 
3

¶4 Following the bench trial on April 3, 2018, the District Court issued its written 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Judgment. The court’s Findings of Fact detailed 

the evidence which the court used to find Villa guilty of the theft of the 2009 Ford F-350 

pickup. In Conclusion of Law 1, the District Court concluded, “The State of Montana has 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Villa purposely or knowingly obtained or exerted 

unauthorized control over property of the owner with the purpose of depriving the owner 

of the property. Said property was of a value in excess of $1,500, to-wit: 2009 Ford F-350 

Super Duty Pickup VIN#1FDWW37R19EB02742.” The District Court adjudged, “It is 

the Judgment of this Court that the Defendant, Leonard Villa, is GUILTY of Count I [sic]

1

, 

THEFT, a felony. The Court finds him NOT GUILTY of the remaining offenses.” 

¶5 Villa asserts his conviction for Count One—theft of the 2014 Ford F-450 pickup—

should be overturned based on insufficiency of the evidence and the District Court’s 

determination that Villa was not guilty of Count Five—theft of the 2009 Ford F-350 

pickup—remain such that the sentencing Judgment should be vacated and the case 

remanded to the District Court for dismissal. Villa asserts he was acquitted of Count Five 

and, citing Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013), contends such

acquittal cannot be reviewed without violating his constitutional right against double 

jeopardy. 

 

1 The District Court erroneously stated Villa was convicted of Count One—theft of the 2014 Ford 

F-450 pickup—rather than Count Five—theft of the 2009 Ford F-350 pickup. 
4

¶6 The State asserts this case should be remanded for entry of an amended judgment 

fixing the clerical error to reflect Villa’s conviction to Count Five, rather than Count One. 

Based on the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, Villa was not acquitted—

meaning a finding that the State’s proof was insufficient to establish criminal liability for 

the offense—of the Theft of the Ford F-350 pickup, but rather the District Court merely 

made a typographical error in the written judgments referring to the theft of the Ford F-350 

pickup as Count One rather than its proper designation as Count Five. The State asserts 

Villa’s reliance on Evans is misplaced as Villa was not “acquitted” of the theft of the Ford 

F-350 pickup—there was not a finding by the District Court of insufficient evidence to 

establish criminal liability for this theft and indeed the District Court made findings Villa 

was guilty of committing this offense. The State seeks issuance of an amended judgment 

which reflects the facts and law that the District Court already decided which does not 

violate Villa’s right against double jeopardy. We agree with the State. 

¶7 From our review of the record, it is clear the District Court adjudged Villa to be 

guilty of theft of the Ford F-350 pickup, but erroneously referred to that as “Count One” 

rather than “Count Five” in its Judgments. The District Court’s Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law clearly indicate the court’s determination that “Villa purposely or 

knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over property of the owner with the 

purpose of depriving the owner of the property. Said property was of a value in excess of 

$1,500, to-wit: 2009 Ford F-350 Super Duty Pickup VIN#1FDWW37R19EB02742.” The 

court’s findings and conclusions specifically find Villa guilty of committing the theft of 

the Ford F-350 pickup and specifically acquitting Villa of committing the theft of the Ford 
5

F-450 pickup—finding insufficient evidence to establish criminal liability for the theft of

the Ford F-450 pickup. It is clear and obvious that the judgments contain a clerical or 

scrivener’s error referencing Count Five as Count One. The court has inherent power to 

correct clerical errors in its own judgments to correct an error that is apparent on the face 

of the record so long as such does not set aside a judgment actually rendered nor change 

what was originally intended. State v Megard, 2006 MT 84, ¶ 19, 332 Mont. 27, 134 P.3d 

90; State v. Owens, 230 Mont. 135, 138, 748 P.2d 473, 474 (1988); § 46-18-116(3), MCA.

“The law does not permit a court to exercise a revisory power over its own adjudications 

after they have, in contemplation of the law, passed out of the ‘breast of the judges.’”

Megard, ¶ 19 (quoting Fredericks v. Davis, 6 Mont. 460, 463, 13 P. 125, 127 (1887)). 

Here, correcting the clerical error does not set aside the judgment actually rendered in 

application of the facts to the law as passed “out of the breast of the judge[]” but rather 

imposes that judgment and what was actually intended. 

¶8 Villa next asserts that if we permit amendment of the judgments as advocated by 

the State, there was insufficient evidence for the District Court to convict him of the theft 

of the Ford F-350 pickup. We are not persuaded by this argument. We review claims of 

insufficiency of the evidence to determine if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Fleming, 2019 MT 237, ¶ 12, 397 Mont. 

345, 449 P.3d 1234 (citing State v. Yuhas, 2010 MT 223, ¶ 7, 358 Mont. 27, 243 P.3d 409). 

From our review of the record, the circumstantial evidence, although perhaps susceptible 

to two interpretations—one establishing guilt and one supporting acquittal—was sufficient 
6

to support the District Court’s finding Villa knowingly obtained or exerted unauthorized 

control over the Ford F-350 pickup (valued at over $1,500) with the purpose of depriving 

the owner of the pickup. The State entered a surveillance video showing Villa in the stolen 

Ford F-350. Co-defendant Salois and witness Daniel Framness implicated Villa in 

stripping and selling custom equipment off the Ford F-350 pickup. Evidence was presented 

Villa transferred items from a different stolen vehicle into the Ford F-350, indicating his 

possession and control over the Ford F-350. Villa, without prompting, connected himself 

to Salois—who admitted his role in the vehicle thefts and thefts of other items from Fugle 

Welding—upon his arrest and booking into the jail. The District Court could reasonably 

infer Villa’s unauthorized possession and control over the Ford F-350 pickup and intent to 

deprive the owner of the pickup from this evidence. See State v. Kelley, 2005 MT 200, 

¶ 21, 328 Mont. 187, 119 P.3d 67. 

¶9 Alternately, Villa asserts that if we affirm his conviction, the District Court erred in 

the written sentencing judgment by imposing 34 conditions applicable to any suspended 

portion of his sentence and also erred in calculating the time he should have been credited 

for time-served. At sentencing, the District Court specifically stated, “[s]ince no time is 

suspended, I don’t need to put any conditions of suspended sentence.” The District Court 

then included 34 conditions of suspended sentence in its written order. The State concedes

it is appropriate to remand this case to the District Court to strike the 34 conditions of 

suspended sentence from the sentencing Judgment to conform the Judgment with the oral 

pronouncement of sentence. We agree and so remand. 
7

¶10 With regard to Villa’s claim related to the court’s time-served calculation, he asserts 

he was arrested on August 14, 2017, on the charges involved in this case and remained in 

custody until his sentencing on August 28, 2018, with the exception of a several week 

period where he was accidentally released from jail. The District Court credited Villa with 

277 days credit based on the PSI report. Villa asserts the time-served credit contained in 

the PSI report was inaccurate and the record does not explain the PSI time-served credit, 

when Villa was accidentally released from jail, and when he was re-arrested. The State 

agrees the record is insufficient in this regard. As such, we remand this matter to the 

District Court to establish a record as to whether the time served noted in the Judgment is 

correct, or alternatively, to create a record and properly determine the correct credit for 

time served. 

¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the 

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of 

applicable standards of review. 

¶12 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for action consistent with this 

Opinion. 

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ JIM RICE