NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

RAMIN KHORRAMI, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0088 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2015-002870-001 

The Honorable Geoffrey H. Fish, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michelle L. Hogan

Counsel for Appellee 

Coleman & Balogh LLP, San Diego, California

By Benjamin Lee Coleman, appearing Pro Hac Vice

Co-Counsel for Appellant 

Papetti Samuels Weiss LLP, Scottsdale

By Bruce E. Samuels

Co-Counsel for Appellant

FILED 7-29-2021
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

G A S S, Judge:

Ramin Khorrami appeals his convictions and the resulting 

suspensions of sentences for one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices 

and one count of theft. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury’s verdict, resolving all reasonable inferences against 

Khorrami. See State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 2 (App. 2015). We use 

pseudonyms for the victims to protect their privacy. See, e.g., State v. Bolivar, 

250 Ariz. 213, 217, ¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2020).

Pearl and Khorrami met in May 2012. Pearl told Khorrami she 

lived in Phoenix with her husband, Trey, and worked in real estate. 

Khorrami told Pearl he lived in Los Angeles and offered to help her find 

real estate clients there. They exchanged phone numbers. After Pearl

returned home, she and Khorrami regularly exchanged flirtatious text

messages and often spoke on the phone. When Pearl visited Khorrami a few 

months later, they began a sexual relationship. Over the next few months,

Pearl frequently travelled to spend time with Khorrami. Pearl told 

Khorrami she planned to leave Trey, and the two discussed a future 

together.

Over time, Khorrami became jealous and paranoid. He

accused Pearl of having affairs with other men, demanded she send him 

photographs throughout the day to show her location, and told her he hired 

a private investigator to follow her. Later, Pearl angered Khorrami when 

she decided to remain in her marriage. In response, he threatened to reveal 

their affair to Trey. They then mended their relationship, and Khorrami did 

not carry out his threat.

In June 2013, after another falling-out, Khorrami accused 

Pearl of repeatedly lying to him and again threatened to reveal their affair 

to Trey. Pearl pleaded with him not to do so, and he agreed to delay telling 
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

3

Trey while he thought about what to do. Khorrami called Pearl a few days 

later and promised not to reveal the affair if she paid him $40,000.

After Khorrami’s money-for-silence proposal, Pearl began

secretly recording their phone calls. When Pearl next spoke with Khorrami, 

they negotiated the terms. He agreed to accept $30,000, which she would 

pay in multiple installments over a month. He required her to put a false 

comment on the checks saying “Rose gold Rolex” and indicating the 

remaining amount she owed. Khorrami sent Pearl text messages saying she 

had “20 days to finish your deal, not one day more” and his “only 

communication with [her] will be regarding [their] deal till [sic] the end of 

July.”

The day they agreed to their deal, Pearl mailed Khorrami a 

$5,000 check with the false comment. After Khorrami received the first 

payment, he added to his demands. He told Pearl to call him every 

morning, send pictures showing her location throughout the day, and 

refrain from sexual relations with anyone except him. When Pearl at times 

did not comply, he sent her text messages saying the “deal is off” and the 

“deal is going to change.” He demanded an additional $10,000 after she 

failed to answer a phone call. Khorrami eventually withdrew that demand.

A week after sending the first check, Pearl mailed Khorrami a 

$2,000 check, then later a third check for the remaining amount of $23,000.

Khorrami rejected the final payment because Pearl did not include the false 

comment on the check. At his demand, she sent another check with the false 

comment. After receiving the fourth check, Khorrami demanded Pearl pay 

$40,000 more and continue their sexual relationship, again threatening to 

disclose the affair to Trey if she did not comply.

Pearl gave Khorrami another $4,000, but she also realized

Khorrami’s additional demands would never end and he never intended to 

keep his side of the bargain. As a result, Pearl told Trey about the affair in 

November 2013. The next day, Khorrami told Trey about the affair and 

Pearl’s affairs with other men. Trey reported Khorrami to the police, and

Pearl and Trey filed a civil lawsuit against Khorrami.

The State ultimately tried Khorrami for one count of 

fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class 2 felony, and theft, also a class 2

felony. After a twelve-day trial, the jury convicted Khorrami on both 

counts. The superior court entered judgments of conviction, suspended 

Khorrami’s sentence, and placed him on concurrent two-year terms of 

supervised probation. The superior court also imposed a two-month jail 
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

4

term. Khorrami timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under article 

VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-

4033.A.1.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Khorrami first argues his convictions lack sufficient evidence. 

Citing Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620 (1926), and Norton v. United States, 

92 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1937), he asserts the statutes underlying his convictions

“were not meant to govern the circumstances of this case.”

This court reviews de novo whether sufficient evidence

supports a conviction. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014). Evidence 

is sufficient if the record contains “substantial evidence” of guilt, meaning 

evidence “reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty 

verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). “Reversible error 

based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs only [when] there is a 

complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction.” State v. SotoFong, 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996) (quoting State v. Scott, 113 Ariz. 423, 424–25 

(1976)).

“Evidence is not insubstantial simply because testimony is 

conflicting or reasonable persons may draw different conclusions from the 

evidence.” State v. Toney, 113 Ariz. 404, 408 (1976). This court will not 

“reweigh evidence or reassess the witnesses’ credibility.” State v. BuccheriBianca, 233 Ariz. 324, 334, ¶ 38 (App. 2013). In its review, this court does not 

distinguish between circumstantial and direct evidence. State v. Bible, 175 

Ariz. 549, 560 n.1 (1993). Jurors usually must “infer [a defendant’s mental 

state] from [the defendant’s] behaviors and other circumstances 

surrounding the event.” State v. Noriega, 187 Ariz. 282, 286 (App. 1996). 

To support Khorrami’s fraudulent-schemes-and-artifices 

conviction, substantial evidence in the record must show: (1) pursuant to a 

scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) Khorrami knowingly obtained any benefit

from the victim(s); (3) by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 

representations, promises, or material omissions. A.R.S. § 13-2310.A; see

State v. Haas, 138 Ariz. 413, 418–24 (1983) (describing statutory elements

under an earlier version of the fraud statute). “Reliance on the part of any 

person” is not an element of the offense. A.R.S. § 13-2310.B. The superior 

court instructed the jurors “the State must prove that the scheme or artifice 

to defraud was intended to defraud, meaning it was intended to mislead 

another person for the purpose of gaining some benefit.”
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

5

The fraudulent-schemes-and-artifices statute is meant to 

“encompass[] a very broad range of fraudulent activities.” Haas, 138 Ariz. 

at 422 (citation omitted). Section 13-2310.A is violated “when [a] defendant 

has knowingly [mis]led the adverse party . . . by active misrepresentations, 

or omitting material facts which defendant knew were being 

misunderstood, or by stating half-truths, or by any combination of these 

methods.” Id. at 423.

To convict on the theft charge, the superior court instructed 

the jurors the State had to prove Khorrami, without lawful authority, 

knowingly obtained the victims’ “U.S. currency of a value of $25,000 or 

more, but less than $100,000” by means of any material misrepresentation,

with the intent to deprive them of such currency. See A.R.S. § 13-1802.A.3.

Material misrepresentation means “a pretense, promise, representation or 

statement of present, past or future fact that is fraudulent and that, when 

used or communicated, is instrumental in causing the wrongful control or 

transfer of property or services.” A.R.S. § 13-1801.A.8.

The record contains ample evidence from which a reasonable 

juror could conclude Khorrami obtained money from Pearl under the false 

pretense he would not reveal their affair to Trey. Pearl repeatedly testified

she believed she was buying Khorrami’s silence on the affair when they 

agreed to the initial, negotiated payment of $30,000. She described in detail 

how he led her to have that belief. She recounted the terms of their deal and 

her compliance with them, despite Khorrami’s ever-changing demands.

And Pearl finally disclosed the affair to Trey once she was convinced

Khorrami had deceived her.

Pearl’s testimony, together with reasonable inferences, alone 

is sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. See State v. Felix, 234 Ariz. 118, 

120–21, ¶ 10 (App. 2014) (affirming conviction based on single witness’s 

testimony). The State further corroborated Pearl’s account with evidence of 

phone calls and text messages between Pearl and Khorrami in which they 

discussed the arrangement and its terms. And Khorrami took the money 

from Pearl, spent it soon afterward, and made additional demands before 

ultimately revealing the affair to Trey.

A reasonable juror could infer Khorrami required Pearl to 

include the false comment on the checks from the outset so he could later 

reveal the affair but still say he obtained the money legitimately.

Khorrami’s additional demands to maintain his silence after Pearl paid the

agreed-upon $30,000 bolstered the inference Khorrami’s intent was to 

extract as much money as he could before he ultimately revealed the affair.
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

6

Based on the above evidence, a reasonable jury could decide

Khorrami purposely misled Pearl to believe a false state of facts: if she paid 

him $30,000, he would not reveal their affair. At the very least, reasonable 

minds could disagree on the point. See Toney, 113 Ariz. at 408. Accordingly, 

sufficient evidence supports his convictions.

Khorrami counters that he merely threatened Pearl, which is 

not actionable fraud under Fasulo and Norton. We are not persuaded. Those 

cases interpret a federal mail fraud statute to require an intent to deceive

but do not suggests a fraud conviction cannot stand simply because it is 

accompanied by a threat. See State v. Johnson, 179 Ariz. 375, 381 (1994) (“This 

is not to say that a crime can never satisfy the overlapping elements of both 

theft and fraud.”). Those cases do not change our conclusion. The evidence 

here was sufficient.

II. Jury Instructions

For the first time on appeal, Khorrami challenges the jury 

instructions given for the charged offenses. First, Khorrami argues the 

fraudulent-schemes-and-artifices instruction failed to require proof of 

“materiality.” Second, he asserts the theft-by-misrepresentation instruction 

should have required proof of justifiable reliance. Fundamental-error 

review applies because Khorrami did not object to the instructions at trial.

See State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, 499, ¶ 20 (2005).

To obtain relief on fundamental-error review, a defendant 

first must show “trial error exists.” State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 

(2018). If error exists, the defendant then must establish the error: (1) went 

to the foundation of the case; (2) took away a right essential to the defense;

or (3) was so egregious the defendant could not possibly have received a 

fair trial. Id. 

Here, the instructions tracked the applicable statutory 

language. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1802.A.3, -2310.A; see also Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr.

Stat. Crim. 18.02.01, 23.10 (5th ed. 2019). And the fraudulent-schemes-andartifices instruction was nearly identical to the instruction endorsed by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. See State v. Bridgeforth, 156 Ariz. 60, 64–65 (1988).

Khorrami fails to carry his burden to show the superior court erred.

For the same reasons, we reject Khorrami’s argument the 

superior court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jurors: (1) a breach 

of contract does not constitute fraud, even if intentional; (2) the State had to 

prove Khorrami did not intend to keep his promise at the time he made it; 

and (3) a “heightened intent requirement cannot be met” by a defendant’s 
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

7

failure to perform. See State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 65, ¶ 35 (1998) (“Where 

the law is adequately covered by instructions as a whole, no reversible error 

has occurred.”).

Without citing any Arizona authority, Khorrami relies on

several federal cases addressing the materiality requirement in the federal 

mail-fraud, wire-fraud, and bank-fraud statutes to assert the State must 

prove materiality for all means of committing a violation of § 13-2310.A.

Those decisions are not controlling here. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., v. 

Reinstein, 240 Ariz. 442, 449, ¶ 25 (App. 2016) (decisions of federal circuit 

courts may be persuasive authority but are not binding on Arizona courts).

Unlike the federal mail-fraud statute, which is silent on 

materiality, our legislature expressly included a “material” requirement in 

§ 13-2310.A and only applied the requirement to “omissions.” The United 

States Supreme Court held “materiality of falsehood is an element of the 

federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes” because, in part,

those statutes neither defined “scheme or artifice to defraud” nor “even

mention[ed] materiality.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20–25 (1999). The 

Supreme Court said the absence of an express reference to materiality in the 

federal fraud statutes indicated Congress’s intent to incorporate the 

common-law meaning of fraud, which includes materiality. Id. Arizona’s 

statute is different.

Khorrami’s suggested interpretation would render

superfluous the materiality element set forth in § 13-2310.A. See City of 

Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 552, ¶ 31 (2005) (“[W]e 

do not interpret statutes in such a manner as to render a clause 

superfluous.”). Khorrami invites us to impose a requirement the legislature

expressly chose not to require, which this court will not do. See Hart v. Hart, 

220 Ariz. 183, 187, ¶ 17 (App. 2009).

Finally, this court has previously rejected Khorrami’s 

argument a theft-by-misrepresentation conviction requires justifiable

reliance. See State v. Schneider, 148 Ariz. 441, 444–45 (App. 1985). We discern

no reason on this record to reconsider that decision. 

III. Asserted Insufficient Notice

A. Indictment

Khorrami argues the indictment was fatally defective and 

lacked sufficient notice because it “simply tracked the statutory language 

and did not even identify the false promise or pretense that formed the basis 
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

8

of the two charges.” But Khorrami filed pretrial motions to dismiss the 

indictment and never objected on the grounds he asserts now. Criminal 

defendants are barred on appeal from challenging an alleged facial defect

in an indictment when they fail to make a proper objection before the 

superior court. State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 335–36, ¶¶ 14–17 (2005).

Even absent waiver, we find no error. “An indictment is 

legally sufficient if it informs the defendant of the essential elements of the 

charge, is definite enough to permit the defendant to prepare a defense 

against the charge, and affords the defendant protection from subsequent 

prosecution for the same offense.” State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 224 

Ariz. 173, 187, ¶ 36 (App. 2010); see State v. Mallory, 19 Ariz. App. 15, 18 

(1972) (charging document tracking statutory language generally provides 

sufficient notice). Defendants must receive “actual notice of the charges, 

from either the indictment or other sources.” State v. Freeney, 223 Ariz. 110, 

115, ¶ 29 (2009).

The indictment was sufficiently specific. It tracked the 

elements of the charged offenses, provided the statutory citations,

identified the victims, and listed the dates of the offenses and the county 

where they occurred. Khorrami received notice of the factual allegations 

from the grand jury transcript, joint pretrial statements, and pretrial 

disclosures. See Freeney, 223 Ariz. at 114, ¶ 27 (listing other sources of 

notice). Indeed, Khorrami recounted the factual allegations in his dismissal 

motions. Accordingly, Khorrami received actual notice. See id.

B. Rebuttal Closing Argument

In this appeal, Khorrami for the first time argues the 

prosecutor’s statement in rebuttal closing argument was a new liability 

theory, impermissibly amending the indictment and risking a nonunanimous verdict:

So whether you believe that the misrepresentation took place 

the first time, the second time, the third time, the fourth time, 

whatever time that you think that he misrepresented and he 

was getting all this money, that’s a misrepresentation. If you 

believe that the first time he said $30,000 for silence, do you 

believe that he was really going to stay silent that time? Okay. 

But do you believe it the second time? Do you believe it with 

the $40,000? Do you believe it with the sexual demands? 

During that time period if you believe he misrepresented this 

one time, then that’s enough for that element.
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

9

Because Khorrami failed to object at trial, this court reviews for 

fundamental, prejudicial error. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12.

“Unless the defendant consents, a charge may be amended 

only to correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal or technical defects. The 

charging document is deemed amended to conform to the evidence 

admitted during any court proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.5(b). The 

evidence and jury instructions constructively amend an indictment if they

“modify essential terms of the charged offense” and cause “a substantial 

likelihood that the jury may have convicted the defendant for [a different]

offense.” United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259–60 (3rd Cir. 2006); see also

State v. Lua, 237 Ariz. 301, 305–06, ¶¶ 15–18 (2015) (reviewing whether jury 

instructions constructively amended indictment). 

Nothing in the record suggests the prosecutor sought to 

amend the indictment by making the challenged remarks. The elements of 

the offenses submitted to the jury were identical to those of the charged 

offenses. See Freeney, 223 Ariz. at 113, ¶¶ 15–20. This court presumes jurors 

follow the instructions they are given. State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 439 

(1996). For that reason alone, we reject Khorrami’s argument the State

violated Rule 13.5(b).

Moreover, the prosecutor did not urge conviction on an 

improper basis. The State’s theory before and during trial was Khorrami 

had a single scheme he implemented through a series of ongoing 

transactions and he always intended to disclose the affair. See State v. Suarez, 

137 Ariz. 368, 373 (App. 1983) (“A scheme to defraud thus implies a plan, 

and numerous acts may be committed in furtherance of that plan.”). The 

State pointed to Khorrami’s actions after making the agreement to further 

demonstrate his fraudulent promissory intent. 

And the record belies Khorrami’s complaint he had no notice

of the culpability theory he now protests. The day before the jury was 

empaneled, during a hearing on trial issues, Khorrami sought and received 

clarification from the State on the terms allegedly constituting the 

agreement. Khorrami’s contention that he lacked notice is unfounded. See 

Freeney, 223 Ariz. at 115, ¶ 29; see also State v. Eastlack, 180 Ariz. 243, 258 

(1994) (“Defendant is entitled to notice of the crimes with which he may be 

convicted, not the manner in which the [S]tate will prove his guilt.”).

IV. Victim Testimony 

Khorrami challenges the admission of what he alleges are 

“victim-impact” and “victim-opinion” testimony. This court generally 
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

10

reviews a superior court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State 

v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 365, ¶ 66 (2009). But because Khorrami did not object, 

fundamental-error review applies. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12.

A. Asserted Victim-Impact Testimony 

Khorrami argues the superior court improperly allowed the 

State to elicit testimony from the victims describing how the offenses 

personally affected them. We disagree.

Khorrami’s defense was he never entered into any agreement

with Pearl, arguing she fabricated its existence and manipulated Trey into 

believing Khorrami exploited her. Khorrami’s counsel explained the 

defense’s theory to the jurors in opening statement: Pearl and Trey sought

revenge against Khorrami.

To support that theory, defense counsel cross-examined Pearl

about her reasons for disclosing the affair to Trey when Khorrami had not 

done so. Defense counsel then asked why she would pursue criminal 

charges and a civil lawsuit against Khorrami, and not just “let sleeping dogs 

lie?” Pearl said she had a “mental breakdown” from the experience, which 

led Trey to report Khorrami to the police.

On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Pearl to 

explain “why [she] couldn’t let sleeping dogs lie.” She answered she 

“endured so much pain and suffering” and “almost died.” She continued, 

“I wouldn’t be alive if my husband didn’t make sure I was okay and fed

me. I really suffered and there’s a lot of this stuff what he did that’s not 

covered in this case.” Khorrami did not object.

While cross-examining Trey, defense counsel asked, “How 

much are you hoping to get from the civil lawsuit?” Trey replied he sought 

only justice, not money. Defense counsel also questioned why Trey, and not 

Pearl, had contacted the police and a civil attorney.

On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Trey to explain 

why he, not Pearl, reported Khorrami to the police. Trey said “[Pearl] was 

unable to. She was completely incapable of doing anything. She wouldn’t 

remember anything. She would be very fearful. Every day she locked the 

door. [He’s] going to come after me to kill me.” Khorrami objected to this 

response. Over Khorrami’s objection, Trey testified he had to help Pearl

deal with the effects of the experience, which in turn affected his career.
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

11

When a party “open[s] the door” and invites later, generally 

objectionable testimony, no error occurs if the other party’s response is 

“pertinent,” meaning “specifically responsive to the invitation.” State v. 

Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, 189, ¶ 25 (App. 2009) (citations omitted). Khorrami’s 

opening statement and cross-examination suggested the victims reported

Khorrami to the police and filed a civil claim against him for money and 

revenge. Khorrami opened the door to rebuttal testimony on those subjects, 

making the victims’ reasons for their actions relevant. We find the questions 

and answers sufficiently responsive to Khorrami’s invitation. See id. at ¶¶ 

25–26. The superior court did not err.

B. Religious References 

Khorrami contends the State improperly elicited testimony

from the victims concerning religious beliefs to “demonize” him and to 

portray the victims sympathetically. Specifically, he points to: (1) Trey’s 

testimony he was initially attracted to Pearl in part because she was 

interested in his religious faith; (2) Pearl’s testimony Khorrami and Trey

share Persian heritage; and (3) Pearl’s testimony she and Khorrami 

envisioned a future together despite their different religious faiths.

Khorrami did not object to any of the cited instances.

Assuming without deciding the isolated remarks constituted 

fundamental error, Khorrami fails to establish prejudice. He merely 

speculates the remarks “likely added to the improper prejudice that tainted 

the fairness of Mr. Khorrami’s trial.” Speculative prejudice is insufficient to 

prevail on fundamental-error review. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21

(showing prejudice “involves a fact-intensive inquiry” (citation omitted)).

Moreover, the jurors learned of far more pertinent evidence 

about Khorrami’s conduct. The jurors heard recorded phone calls in which 

Khorrami repeatedly insulted Pearl using demeaning and profane 

language. Pearl testified at length about the derogatory way he spoke to 

her. Khorrami even conceded his demeaning conduct. In closing argument, 

defense counsel told the jurors, “[Khorrami’s] an asshole. Okay? The way 

that he spoke to [Pearl] is absolutely reprehensible and indefensible . . . . It 

was disgusting, right? . . . He’s an ass.” Admitting the testimony, therefore,

did not deprive Khorrami of a fair trial by prejudicing the jury against him.

See State v. Weatherbee, 158 Ariz. 303, 305 (App. 1988) (improperly admitted

evidence may be harmless when it is “entirely cumulative”).
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

12

C. Alleged Improper Opinion Testimony

On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Pearl the 

following:

Q: In your line of work, you know when people want to come 

to a deal, right?

A: Yes.

Q: From everything that you experienced, did the defendant 

ever want this -- ever intend on this deal staying in place?

A: Retrospectively looking at it, no.

Q: What do you feel like he wanted?

[Defense counsel]: Objection, speculation.

THE COURT: Overruled.

A: Revenge.

Khorrami argues the testimony constituted an improper 

opinion. Fundamental-error review applies because Khorrami did not 

object at trial on the ground he asserts on appeal. Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 140, 

¶ 12.

“[L]ay testimony may include inferences or opinions” if based 

on the witness’s perceptions and helpful to understanding the witness’s 

testimony. State v. Ayala, 178 Ariz. 385, 387 (App. 1994); see also Ariz. R. 

Evid. 701(a). The prosecutor’s introductory question pertaining to Pearl’s

“line of work” did not seek to qualify her under Rule 702 to offer an expert 

opinion on the intent of contracting parties. See State v. Peltz, 242 Ariz. 23, 

29, ¶ 18 (App. 2017) (approving lay witness opinion based on “training and 

experience” as well as “logic”). Pearl’s testimony did not involve scientific, 

technical, or specialized knowledge implicating Rule 702. Rather, her

testimony amounted to a reasonable inference based on her perception and 

personal knowledge. See Ariz. R. Evid. 701. Pearl’s perception of 

Khorrami’s motive assisted the jurors in determining whether Khorrami 

had deceived Pearl by falsely promising payment would ensure his silence.

See id.
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

13

V. Jury Size

Citing Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), Khorrami 

argues—for the first time on appeal—he was unconstitutionally tried by an 

eight-person jury. A twelve-person jury “is not a necessary ingredient of 

‘trial by jury.’” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). Arizona’s state

constitution, however, guarantees criminal defendants a twelve-person 

jury in cases when the sentence authorized by law is death or imprisonment 

for thirty years or more. Ariz. Const. art. II, § 23; see also A.R.S. § 21-102.A.

Otherwise, a criminal defendant may be tried with an eight-person jury.

A.R.S. § 21-102.B. “Improper denial of a twelve-person jury is fundamental 

error that may provide a basis for relief even if not raised in the trial court.” 

State v. Kuck, 212 Ariz. 232, 233, ¶ 8 (App. 2006).

Khorrami argues Ramos requires twelve-person juries in all 

criminal trials. In Ramos, however, the Supreme Court did not address any

issue of constitutionally permissible jury size, much less overrule Williams.

Rather, the Supreme Court said due process requires unanimous verdicts 

in criminal trials. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397.

The Supreme Court “does not normally overturn . . . earlier 

authority sub silentio.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S.

1, 18 (2000). We cannot conclude the Supreme Court silently changed a 

fundamental feature of its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, particularly

given the issue was neither raised nor litigated in Ramos. We decline

Khorrami’s invitation to reconsider the constitutionality of eight-person 

juries in Arizona.

VI. Cumulative Error

Finding no error in any of Khorrami’s individual challenges, 

we discern no merit in his argument the cumulative effect of the asserted 

trial errors violated his due-process rights. See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 

476, 492, ¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of [error], there can be no 

cumulative effect of [error] sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of 

the trial with unfairness.”).
STATE v. KHORRAMI

Decision of the Court

14

CONCLUSION

We affirm Khorrami’s convictions.