[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 133 (Monday, July 13, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37601-37605]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-18544]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-482]


Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; Notice of Consideration 
of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-42 issued to Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (the 
licensee) for operation of the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, 
Unit No. 1 located in Coffey County, Kansas.
    The proposed amendment would support a modification to the plant to 
increase the storage capacity of the spent fuel pool and increase the 
maximum nominal fuel enrichment to 5.0 nominal weight percent U-235.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant

[[Page 37602]]

hazards consideration, which is presented below:
    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    In the analysis of the safety issues concerning the expanded Spent 
Fuel Pool storage capacity, the following previously postulated 
accident scenarios have been considered:

a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the Spent Fuel Pool
b. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling flow
c. A seismic event
d. Misloaded fuel assembly

    The probability that any of the accidents in the above list can 
occur is not significantly increased by the modification itself. The 
probabilities of a seismic event or loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling 
flow are not influenced by the proposed changes. The probabilities of 
accidental fuel assembly drops or misloadings are primarily influenced 
by the methods used to lift and move these loads. The method of 
handling loads during normal plant operations is not significantly 
changed, since the same equipment (i.e., Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane) 
and procedures will be used. A new offset handling tool will be 
required to assess some storage rack cells located adjacent to the pool 
walls. The grapple mechanism, procedures, and fuel manipulation methods 
will be very similar to those used by the spent fuel handling tool. 
Therefore, this tool does not represent a significant change in the 
methods used to lift or move fuel. Since the methods used to move loads 
during normal operations remain nearly the same as those used 
previously, there is no significant increase in the probability of an 
accident.
    During rack removal and installation, all work in the pool area 
will be controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific 
written procedures. Any movement of fuel assemblies required to be 
performed to support the modification (e.g., removal and installation 
of racks) will be performed in the same manner as during normal 
refueling operations. Shipping cask movements will not be performed 
during the modification period.
    Accordingly, the proposed modification does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The consequences of the previously postulated scenarios for an 
accidental drop of a fuel assembly in the Spent Fuel Pool have been re-
evaluated for the proposed change. The results show that the postulated 
accident of a fuel assembly striking the top of the storage racks will 
not distort the racks sufficiently to impair their functionality. The 
minimum subcriticality margin, K<INF>eff</INF> less than or equal to 
0.95, will be maintained. The structural damage to the Fuel Building, 
pool liner, and fuel assembly resulting from a fuel assembly drop 
striking the pool floor or another assembly located within the racks is 
primarily dependent on the mass of the falling object and the drop 
height. Since these two parameters are not changed by the proposed 
modification, the structural damage to these items remains unchanged. 
Cycle specific calculations, using core specific parameters continue to 
ensure that the radiological dose at the exclusion area boundary remain 
within the limits documented in the WCGS [Wolf Creek Generating 
Station] Updated Safety Analysis Report. Dose levels remain well within 
the levels required by 10 CFR 100, paragraph 11, as defined in Section 
15.7.4.II.1 of the Standard Review Plan. Thus, the results of the 
postulated fuel drop accidents remain acceptable and do not represent a 
significant increase in consequences from any of the same previously 
evaluated accidents that have been reviewed and found acceptable by the 
NRC.
    The consequences of a loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling have been 
evaluated and found to have no increase. The concern with this accident 
is a reduction of Spent Fuel Pool water inventory from bulk pool 
boiling resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies. This situation would 
lead to fuel failure and subsequent significant increase in offsite 
dose. Loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling at WCGS is mitigated in the usual 
manner by ensuring that a sufficient time lapse exists between the loss 
of forced cooling and uncovering fuel. This period of time is compared 
against a reasonable period to re-establish cooling or supply an 
alternative water source. Evaluation of this accident usually includes 
determination of the time to boil. The time allowed for operator action 
is much less than the onset of any significant increase in offsite 
dose, since once boiling begins it would have to continue unchecked 
until the Spent Fuel Pool surface was lowered to the point of exposing 
active fuel. The time to boil represents the onset of loss of Spent 
Fuel Pool water inventory and is commonly used as a gage for 
establishing the comparison of consequences before and after a 
refueling project. The heat up rate in the Spent Fuel Pool is a nearly 
linear function of the fuel decay heat load. The fuel decay heat load 
will increase subsequent to the proposed changes because of the 
increase in the number [of] assemblies and higher fuel burnups. The 
methodology used in the thermal-hydraulic analysis determined the 
maximum fuel decay heat loads which are allowed by maintaining the 
current time allowed for operator action (i.e., more than two hours to 
boil during complete loss of forced cooling). Therefore, the allowed 
operator action time remains unchanged from the previous design basis. 
In the unlikely event that all Spent Fuel Pool cooling is lost, 
sufficient time will still be available subsequent to the proposed 
changes for the operators to provide alternate means of cooling before 
the onset of pool boiling. Therefore, the proposed change represents no 
increase in the consequences of loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling.
    The consequences of a design basis seismic event are not increased. 
The consequences of this accident are evaluated on the basis of 
subsequent fuel damage or compromise of the fuel storage or building 
configurations leading to radiological or criticality concerns. The new 
racks have been analyzed in their new configuration and found safe 
during seismic motion. Fuel has been determined to remain intact and 
the storage racks maintain the fuel and fixed poison configurations 
subsequent to a seismic event. The structural capability of the pool 
and liner will not be exceeded under the appropriate combinations of 
dead weight, thermal, and seismic loads. The Fuel Building structure 
will remain intact during a seismic event and will continue to 
adequately support and protect the fuel racks, storage array, and pool 
moderator/coolant. Thus, the consequences of a seismic event are not 
increased.
    Fuel misloading accidents were previously postulated occurrences. 
The consequence of this type of accident has been analyzed for the 
worst possible storage configuration subsequent to the proposed 
modification and the consequences were found to be acceptable because 
the reactivity in the Spent Fuel Pool remained below 0.95. After the 
proposed modification, the worst case postulated accident condition, 
for the Mixed Zone Three Region configuration, occurs when a fresh fuel 
assembly of the highest possible enrichment is inadvertently loaded 
into a Region 2 storage cell. Further, after the proposed modification, 
the worst case postulated accident condition, for the checkerboard 
configuration, occurs when a fresh fuel assembly of the highest 
possible

[[Page 37603]]

enrichment is inadvertently loaded into an empty storage cell. In both 
postulated accident scenarios, credit is allowed for soluble boron in 
the water, and the Spent Fuel Pool reactivity is maintained below 0.95. 
Therefore, there is no increase in consequences due to the 
modification.
    Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not 
significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    To assess the possibility of new or different kind of accidents, a 
list of the important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage 
was established. Safe fuel storage is defined here as providing an 
environment which would not present any significant threats to workers 
or the general public. In other words, meeting the requirements of 10 
CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20. Any new events which would modify these 
parameters sufficiently to place them outside of the boundaries 
analyzed for normal conditions and/or outside of the boundaries 
previously considered for accidents would be considered a new or 
different accident. The criticality and radiological safety evaluations 
were reviewed to establish the list of important parameters. The fuel 
configuration and the existence of the moderator/coolant were 
identified as the only two parameters which were important to safe fuel 
storage. Significant modification of these two parameters represents 
the only possibility of an unsafe storage condition. Once the two 
important parameters were established, an additional step was taken to 
determine what events (which were not previously considered) could 
result in changes to the storage configuration or moderator/coolant 
presence during or subsequent to the proposed changes. This process was 
adopted to ensure that the possibility of any new or different accident 
scenario or event would be identified.
    Due to the proposed changes, an accidental drop of a rack module 
during construction activity in the pool was considered as the only 
event which might represent a new or different kind of accident.
    An installation accident of a rack dropping onto stored spent fuel 
or the pool floor liner is not a postulated event due to the defense-
in-depth approach to be taken, as discussed in detail within Section 
3.5 of the Licensing Report [Enclosure I to the March 20, 1998 letter]. 
This approach is similar to that taken previously for lifting a pool 
gate with the Spent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane. A new temporary hoist and 
rack lifting rig will be introduced to lift and suspend the racks from 
the bridge of the Cask Handling Crane. These temporary lift items have 
been designed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0612 and 
ANSI N14.6 with respect to redundancy in load path or safety margin. 
The postulated rack drop event is commonly referred to as a ``heavy 
load drop'' over the pools. Heavy loads will not be allowed to travel 
over any racks containing fuel assemblies, thus a rack drop onto fuel 
is precluded. A rack drop to the pool liner is not a postulated event, 
since all of the lifting components (except for the Cask Handling 
Crane) either provide redundancy in load path or are designed with 
safety margins greater than a factor of ten. Nevertheless, the analysis 
of a rack dropping to the liner has been performed and shown to be 
acceptable. However, the question of a new or different type of event 
is answered by determining whether similar heavy loads have been 
carried over the pool. As stated above, pool gates have been previously 
lifted within the Spent Fuel Pool. The pool gate and the storage racks 
are both designated as ``heavy loads'' and the safeguards taken to 
preclude these accidents are similar. All movements of heavy loads over 
the pool will comply with the applicable administrative controls and 
guidelines (i.e., plant procedures, NUREG-0612, etc.) Therefore, the 
rack drop does not represent a new or different kind of accident.
    The proposed change does not alter the operating requirements of 
the plant or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the design 
basis accidents. The proposed change does not affect any of the 
important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage. Therefore, 
the potential for a new or previously unanalyzed accident is not 
created.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in 
a margin of safety.
    The function of the Spent Fuel Pool is to store the fuel assemblies 
in a subcritical and coolable configuration through all environmental 
and abnormal loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel assembly drop. The 
new rack design must meet all applicable requirements for safe storage 
and be functionally compatible with the Spent Fuel Pool.
    WCNOC has addressed the safety issues related to the expanded pool 
storage capacity in the following areas:

1. Material, mechanical and structural considerations
2. Nuclear criticality
3. Thermal-hydraulic and pool cooling

    The mechanical, material, and structural designs of the new racks 
have been reviewed in accordance with the applicable provisions of the 
NRC Guidance entitled, ``Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage 
and Handling Applications''. The rack materials used are compatible 
with the spent fuel assemblies and the Spent Fuel Pool environment. The 
design of the new racks preserves the proper margin of safety during 
abnormal loads such as a dropped assembly and tensile loads from a 
stuck assembly. It has been shown that such loads will not invalidate 
the mechanical design and material selection to safely store fuel in a 
coolable and subcritical configuration.
    The methodology used in the criticality analysis of the expanded 
Spent Fuel Pool meets the appropriate NRC guidelines and the ANSI 
standards (GDC 62, NUREG-0800, Section 9.1.2, the ``OT Position for 
Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling 
Applications,'' Regulatory Guide 1.13, and ANSI ANS 8.17). The 
criticality analysis for the Mixed Zone Three Region and/or 
checkerboard configuration confirms that the K<INF>eff</INF> is 
maintained less than 0.95 without credit for the soluble boron in the 
Spent Fuel Pool. Calculations show that for the most severe accident 
condition, a soluble boron concentration of 500 ppm boron, in addition 
to the Boral contained in the racks, would be adequate to maintain the 
K<INF>eff</INF> less than 0.95. In accordance with NRC guidelines, the 
soluble boron in the Spent Fuel Pool may be credited in accident 
conditions. A minimum boron concentration of 2000 parts-per-million 
(ppm) is maintained in the Spent Fuel Pool. The soluble boron in the 
Spent Fuel Pool will ensure that K<INF>eff</INF> is maintained 
substantially less than the design limitations under all conditions. 
The margin of safety for subcriticality is maintained by having the 
neutron multiplication factor equal to, or less than, 0.95 under all 
accident conditions, including uncertainties. This criterion is the 
same as that used previously to establish criticality safety evaluation 
acceptance and remains satisfied for all analyzed accidents.
    The thermal-hydraulic and cooling evaluation of the pool 
demonstrated that the pool can be maintained below the specified 
thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat load and during 
all credible accident sequences and seismic events. The bulk pool 
temperature will not exceed 207 deg.F during the worst single failure 
of a

[[Page 37604]]

cooling pump. Localized pool boiling is predicted to occur in the worst 
single failure of a cooling pump in the hypothetical worst case storage 
cell, immediately following the completion of a full-core discharge. 
This cell is very conservatively modeled to contain the hottest spent 
fuel assembly, with maximum flow resistance including 50% blockage of 
both the inlet and outlet flow areas. However, bulk pool boiling will 
not occur, nor will fuel cladding experience DNB [departure from 
nucleate boiling] or excessive thermal stresses. The fuel will not 
undergo any significant heat up after an accidental drop of a fuel 
assembly on top of the rack blocking the flow path. A loss of cooling 
to the pool will allow sufficient time (2 hours) for the operators to 
intervene and line up alternate cooling paths and the means of 
inventory make-up before the onset of pool boiling. Therefore the 
allowed operator action time remains unchanged from the previous design 
bases. In the unlikely event that all pool cooling is lost coincident 
with the completion of a full-core discharge, sufficient time will 
still be available subsequent to the proposed changes for the operators 
to provide an alternate means of cooling before the onset of bulk pool 
boiling. Therefore, the accepted margin of safety remains the same.
    Thus, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By August 12, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Emporia State University, William Allen 
White Library, 1200 Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas 66801 and 
Washburn University School of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 66621. If a 
request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by 
the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, 
designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety 
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; 
and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.

[[Page 37605]]

    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jay Silberg, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, 
Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037, 
attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on 
an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of 
Section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 
10154. Under Section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of 
any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with 
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in 
controversy among the parties.'' The hybrid procedures in Section 134 
provide for oral argument on matters in controversy, preceded by 
discovery under the Commission's rules, and the designation, following 
argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and 
substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to 
be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings 
are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of 
Section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.
    The Commission's rules implementing Section 134 of the NWPA are 
found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for 
Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear 
Power Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41670, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR 
2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any party to the proceeding may 
invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the presiding 
officer a written request for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be 
timely, the request must be filed within 10 days of an order granting a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene. (As outlined above, the 
Commission's rules in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, and 2.714 in 
particular, continue to govern the filing of requests for a hearing or 
petitions to intervene, as well as the admission of contentions.) The 
presiding officer shall grant a timely request for oral argument. The 
presiding officer may grant an untimely request for oral argument only 
upon showing of good cause by the requesting party for the failure to 
file on time and after providing the other parties an opportunity to 
respond to the untimely request. If the presiding officer grants a 
request for oral argument, any hearing held on the application shall be 
conducted in accordance with the hybrid hearing procedures. In essence, 
those procedures limit the time available for discovery and require 
that an oral argument be held to determine whether any contentions must 
be resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no party to the proceedings 
requests oral argument, or if all untimely requests for oral argument 
are denied, then the usual procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, 
apply.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated March 20, 1998, as supplemented by 
letter dated May 28, 1998, which is available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room 
located at the Emporia State University, William Allen White Library, 
1200 Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas 66801 and Washburn University 
School of Law Library, Topeka, Kansas 66621.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of July 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Kristine M. Thomas,
Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-2, Division of Reactor Projects 
III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-18544 Filed 7-10-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P