SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3182-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

MICHAEL W. SANDERS, 

a/k/a MICHAEL WILLIAMS, 

MICHAEL WILLIAM, 

MIKE WILLIAMS, 

and MIKE SANDERS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________

Submitted September 27, 2023 – Decided December 7, 2023 

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 16-10-2408.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Anderson David Harkov, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief). 

William E. Reynolds, Atlantic County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Mario Christopher Formica,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3182-21

Chief Counsel to the Prosecutor, of counsel; Linda 

Anne Shashoua, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

Defendant Michael Sanders appeals from the April 20, 2022, Law 

Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an 

evidentiary hearing. We affirm. 

We glean these facts from the record. On October 19, 2016, defendant 

was indicted on one count of first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-

1(a)(2). On January 19, 2017, defendant entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to 

the charge, see R. 3:9-3(c), and testified during his plea colloquy that he robbed 

a bank on July 28, 2016, while threatening the teller that he had a gun in his 

waistband. The teller gave defendant over $600 in cash. Because he had been 

a bank customer and his identity was not obscured, bank employees recognized 

defendant, who subsequently turned himself in voluntarily and confessed after 

being administered Miranda1 warnings. 

Defendant had three prior robbery convictions and was on parole for the 

latest conviction when he committed the offense. As a result, the State objected 

to the non-negotiated plea and sought a fifteen-year prison sentence, subject to 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Nonetheless, the trial 

court gave a conditional indication that it would sentence defendant to a twelveyear NERA sentence, concurrent to the parole violation sentence he was already 

serving, with credit for time served as determined by the court. 

During the plea colloquy, defendant confirmed his understanding of the 

terms of his guilty plea as discussed in open court and as memorialized in the 

plea forms. Defendant acknowledged his potential exposure to a mandatory 

extended term sentence of life in prison, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, and his 

understanding that if the court decided "the interests of justice would [not] be 

served" by the imposition of a twelve-year NERA sentence, R. 3:9-3(c), he

would have the option of withdrawing his guilty plea. After ensuring that the 

plea complied with the requirements of Rule 3:9-2, the court accepted 

defendant's guilty plea and scheduled sentencing. 

At the March 3, 2017, sentencing hearing, the court found aggravating 

factors three, six, and nine based on defendant's high risk of re-offense, 

extensive prior criminal history, and need for deterrence, and mitigating factor 

twelve based on defendant's voluntary surrender and confession. See N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9), (b)(12). The court sentenced defendant to twelve years 

of imprisonment, subject to NERA, for the armed robbery, to run concurrent 
4 A-3182-21

with the parole violation sentence. The court also awarded 85 days of jail credit, 

and 150 days of gap-time credit. See State v. C.H., 228 N.J. 111, 117 (2017) 

(explaining that only jail credits reduce a parole ineligibility term as well as the 

underlying sentence imposed). 

Defendant did not file a direct appeal. However, defendant filed a timely 

PCR petition, supplemented by assigned counsel's brief. In his PCR petition 

and brief, among other things, defendant asserted his attorney was ineffective 

by failing to explain the difference between jail and gap-time credit. According 

to defendant, he pled guilty expecting to receive all 235 days in custody as jail 

credit but only received 85 days of jail credit. 

Following oral argument conducted on March 23, 2022, the PCR court 

issued a written decision dated April 20, 2022, denying defendant's PCR petition 

without an evidentiary hearing. The judge reviewed the factual background and 

procedural history of the case, applied the governing legal principles, and 

concluded defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel (IAC). This appeal followed. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT ONE 

THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 

GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN 
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EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE THERE WAS 

NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT PLEA 

COUNSEL EVER EXPLAINED TO DEFENDANT 

THAT HE WOULD NOT RECEIVE JAIL CREDIT 

FOR MOST OF THE TIME HE WAS 

INCARCERATED PRIOR TO SENTENCING AND 

ANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN COUNSEL AND 

DEFENDANT THAT TOOK PLACE COULD ONLY 

BE REVEALED THROUGH AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING. 

POINT TWO 

THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED 

WHEN IT FAILED TO CONCLUDE THAT AS A 

RESULT OF PLEA COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 

ADVISE DEFENDANT THAT HE WOULD NOT 

RECEIVE FULL JAIL CREDIT FOR THE TIME HE 

SERVED IN CUSTODY PRIOR TO SENTENCING, 

COMBINED WITH HIS FAILURE TO EXPLAIN TO 

DEFENDANT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JAIL 

CREDIT AND GAP-TIME CREDIT, THAT 

DEFENDANT ENTERED AN INVOLUNTARY 

GUILTY PLEA, WITHOUT A FULL 

UNDERSTANDING OF ITS CONSEQUENCES, 

DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF HIS 

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 

"[W]e review under the abuse of discretion standard the PCR court's 

determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster, 

429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013). "If the court perceives that holding 

an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant 
6 A-3182-21

is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State 

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citations omitted). 

An evidentiary hearing is only required when a defendant establishes "a 

prima facie case in support of [PCR]," the court determines that there are 

"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the 

existing record," and the court determines that "an evidentiary hearing is 

necessary to resolve the claims" asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 

(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). "[W]here . . . no 

evidentiary hearing was conducted," as here, "we may review the factual 

inferences the [trial] court has drawn from the documentary record de novo," 

and "[w]e also review de novo the court's conclusions of law." State v. Blake, 

444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016). 

"To establish a prima facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable 

likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most 

favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-

10(b). To establish a prima facie IAC claim, a defendant must demonstrate "by 

a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357 

(2009), that his or her attorneys' performance fell below the objective standard 

of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
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(1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 49-58 

(1987), and that the outcome would have been different without the purported 

deficient performance. Stated differently, a defendant must show that: (1)

counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. 

To establish the prejudice prong to set aside a guilty plea based on IAC, a 

defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). To that end, "'a 

[defendant] must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain'" 

and "insist on going to trial" would have been "'rational under the 

circumstances.'" State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011) 

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). That determination 

should be "based on evidence, not speculation." Ibid. 

Failure to meet either prong of the two-prong Strickland/Fritz test results 

in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012) 

(citing Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). That said, "courts are permitted leeway to 

choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not, to 
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dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance was 

constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation 

omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

Applying these principles, we discern no abuse of discretion in the PCR 

judge's denial of defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing, and 

we affirm the denial substantially for the reasons stated in the judge's cogent 

written opinion. Even if his attorney was deficient, defendant cannot show it 

would have been rational under the circumstances to reject the plea offer when 

he was facing the possibility of mandatory life imprisonment and the specter of 

overwhelming evidence of guilt. See State v. Rountree, 388 N.J. Super. 190, 

215 (App. Div. 2006) (rejecting defendant's IAC claim based only on 

defendant's "'bald assertions'" that his "misunderstanding" of gap-time credit 

caused him to turn down an offer (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999))). Thus, defendant failed to establish the prejudice 

prong to warrant PCR relief or an evidentiary hearing. 

Affirmed.