[Cite as State ex rel. Jelinek v. Schneider , 127 Ohio St.3d 332, 2010-Ohio-5986.]

T HE S TATE EX REL . J ELINEK , A PPELLANT , v. S CHNEIDER , J UDGE , ET AL ., A PPELLEES . [Cite as State ex rel. Jelinek v. Schneider ,

127 Ohio St.3d 332, 2010-Ohio-5986.] Court of appeals’ judgment denying pe tition for writs of mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition affirmed — Court of common pleas judge did not patently disregard the court of appeals’ mandate on remand. (No. 2010-0824

— Submitted November 16, 2010

— Decided December 14, 2010.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 08AP-957, 2010-Ohio-1220.

__________________ B ROWN , C.J. {¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the court of appeals denying a petition for writs of mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition to compel appellees Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Charles A. Schneider to carry out the court of app eals’ mandate in a previous appeal by allowing appellant to alle ge constructive discharge in conducting a new trial on an age-discrimination claim. Because the common pleas court and Judge Schneider did not patently and unambiguously disregar d the court of appeals’ mandate, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying the requested extraordinary
relief.
Facts {¶ 2} In September 1999, appellant, David A. Jelinek, filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas against appellee Abbott Laboratories, Ross Products Division (“A bbott”) and several current and formerS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 Abbott employees, including appellees Karl V. Insani and Gregory A. Lindberg. Jelinek alleged that “[a]fter 30 years in various sales capacities with Ross
Laboratories and the Ross Products Divi sion of Abbott Laboratories, [he] was retaliated against, demoted and constructively terminated by defendants on the basis of his age.” Jelinek sought damage s. After the common pleas court granted summary judgment in favor of the defenda nts on all of his claims, he appealed. {¶ 3} In his assignments of error, Jelinek claimed that the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment on the claims of age discrimination, promissory estoppel, constructive discha rge, retaliation, and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In September 2001, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed the judgment of the trial court on the claims of age discrimination, promissory es toppel, and constructive di scharge and remanded the cause to that court for further proceedings. Jelinek v. Abbott Laboratories (Sept. 13, 2001), Franklin App. No. 01AP-217, 2001 WL 1045534 (“ Jelinek I ”). The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on the remaining claims.
Id. {¶ 4} On remand, the matter proceeded to a jury trial before Judge John P. Bessey, and the jury returned a verdict against Abbott, Insani, and Lindberg on the age-discrimination claim, awarding Jelinek $700,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, $25,000,000 in punitive damages, and attorney fees. Although the jury found in favor of Jelinek on his age-discrimination claim based on his job transfer to Lake County, Indiana, the jury answered in an interrogatory that he did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the transfer resulted in working conditions that were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have been compelled to resi gn from his employment with Abbott.” Thus, the jury found in favor of the defendants on Jelinek’s claims for constructive discharge. The defendants also prevailed on Jelinek’s promissoryestoppel claim.January Term, 2010

3 {¶ 5} On June 23, 2003, Judge Bessey entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) in favor of the defendants and against Jelinek on his age-discrimination claim. In the alternative, the judge ordered that “defendants’ motion for new trial on plai ntiff’s claim of age discrimination is hereby conditionally granted should the JNOV in favor of Abbott Laboratories, Karl V. Insani or Gregory A. Lindberg be vacated or reversed on appeal.” In the same judgment entry, Judge Bessey entere d judgment in favor of the defendants on Jelinek’s promissory-estoppel a nd constructive-discharge claims. {¶ 6} Jelinek appealed, and the defendants cross-appealed. Jelinekraised several assignments of error, including one relating to his constructivedischarge claim: {¶ 7} “IV. The trial court erred in excluding certain evidence related to plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim which resulted in an adverse jury verdict on plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim.” {¶ 8} In October 2005, the court of appeal s reversed the judgment of the common pleas court insofar as the cour t granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Jelinek’s age-discrimination claim, but it affirmed the portion of the judgment conditionally granting the defendants’ motion for a new trial on the age-discrimination claim. Jelinek v. Abbott
Laboratories , 164 Ohio App.3d 607, 2005-Ohio-5696, 843 N.E.2d 807 (“ Jelinek
II

”). The court of appeals overruled Jelinek ’s assignment of error regarding the constructive-discharge claim. {¶ 9} Two retrials of Jelinek’s age-discrimination claim ended in mistrials, and Judge Bessey recused hims elf from the case in February 2008. Judge Schneider was then assigned to the case. In September 2008, Judge Schneider issued a decision stating that “the scope of the new trial is confined to the age-discrimination claim and excludes a retrial of the constructive-discharge claim, including facts or allegations that relate to that claim.”S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 10} The next month, Jelinek filed a complaint in the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel the common pleas court and Judge Schneider to conduct a new trial on the issue or claim of constructive discharge in the context of his age-discrimination claim. Jelinek also sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the comm on pleas court and Judge Schneider from disregarding the court of appeals’ mandate in Jelinek II by excluding evidence of constructive discharge in the retrial of his age-discrimination claim. Appellees, Abbott, Insani, and Lindberg, intervened as additional respondents in the writ action. Following the submission of evid ence and briefs, the court of appeals
denied the writs. {¶ 11} Jelinek appealed from that judgme nt, and the cause is now before the court as an appeal as of right. Legal Analysis {¶ 12} Extraordinary relief is appropriate to require a lower court to comply with and not proceed contrary to the mandate of a superior court. See State ex rel. Non-Employees of Chateau Estates Resident Assn. v. Kessler , 107 Ohio St.3d 197, 2005-Ohio-6182, 837 N.E.2d 778, ¶ 14 (mandamus and procedendo); State ex rel. Danziger v. Yarbrough , 114 Ohio St.3d 261, 2007- Ohio-4009, 871 N.E.2d 593, ¶ 8 (prohibition). This precedent is supported by the law-of-the-case doctrine, which “is necessary to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.” Hopkins v. Dyer , 104 Ohio St.3d 461, 2004-Ohio-6769, 820 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 15. “The portion of the [law-of-the-case] doctrine generally applied in extraordinary-writ cases provides that ‘[a]bsent extraordinary ci rcumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.’ ” State ex rel.January Term, 2010

5 Dannaher v. Crawford (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 394, 678 N.E.2d 549, quoting
Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 11 OBR 1, 462 N.E.2d 410, syllabus. {¶ 13} Nevertheless, neither mandamus, nor procedendo, nor prohibition will issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. See State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornof , 126 Ohio St.3d 47, 2010-Ohio-2516, 930 N.E.2d 305, ¶ 2 (mandamus and prohibition); State ex rel. Hazel v. Bender , 125 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-2112, 928 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 1 (procedendo). “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that ju risdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove , 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5. {¶ 14} The court of appeals is in the best position to interpret its own
mandate in Jelinek II and determine whether Judge Schneider violated that mandate. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pyle v. Bessey , 112 Ohio St.3d 119, 2006-Ohio6514, 858 N.E.2d 383, ¶ 12. The court of appe als expressly determined that its prior mandate in Jelinek II did not order retrial of Je linek’s constructive-discharge theory and that Judge Schneider had “not acted in a manner inconsistent with this
court’s mandate in Jelinek II .” State ex rel. Jelinek v. Schneider , 10th Dist. No. 08AP-957, 2010-Ohio-1220, ¶ 15 and 17. Moreover, “the use of extraordinary relief to enforce a judgment is not widespread, because of the availability of other means of enforcement, e.g ., motion for contempt.” Dzina v. Celebrezze , 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006-Ohio-1195, 843 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 14; State ex rel. Obojski v.
Perciak , 113 Ohio St.3d 486, 2007-Ohio-2453, 866 N.E.2d 1070, ¶ 16. {¶ 15} The common pleas court and Judge Schneider did not patently and unambiguously disregard the cour t of appeals’ mandate in Jelinek II . Jelinek has adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law by appeal and by motion forS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 contempt to challenge Judge Sc hneider’s rulings on remand. See Dzina , 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006-Ohio-1195, 843 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 14.
Conclusion {¶ 16} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly denied Jelinek’s request for extraordinary relief in mandamus, procedendo, and prohibition. Accordingly, we affirm th e judgment of the court of appeals. 1 Judgment affirmed.
L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’C ONNOR , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , and C UPP , JJ., concur.
P FEIFER , J., concurs in judgment only.

__________________ Law Offices of Russell A. Kelm, Russe ll A. Kelm, and Joa nne W. Detrick, for appellant. Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Pros ecuting Attorney, and Patrick J. Piccininni, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney , for appellees Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Charles A. Schneider. Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., James F. Hu rst, Derek J. Sarafa, and Samantha L. Maxfield; 2 and Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Michael G. Long, and Lisa Pierce Reisz, for appellees Abbo tt Laboratories, Ross Products Division, Karl V. Insani, and Gregory A. Lindberg.

______________________

1. We deny Jelinek’s request for oral argument. This case does not raise any complex factual or legal issues, and the parties’ briefs are sufficient for us to resolve the case. State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall , 123 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009-Ohio-4986, 915 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 41. 2. The motion for admission pro hac vice of James F. Hurst, Derek J. Sarafa, and Samantha L. Maxfield by Lisa Pierce Reisz is granted.