[Cite as Williams v. Dayton Water, 2020-Ohio-4332.]

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

CITY OF DAYTON WATER 

Defendant-Appellee 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

:

Appellate Case No. 28686 

Trial Court Case No. 2019-CV-4918 

(Civil Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 4th day of September, 2020. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS, 1955 Kipling Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45406 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se 

 

MARTIN W. GEHRES, Atty. Reg. No. 96711, Assistant City Attorney, City of Dayton 

Attorney’s Office, 101 West Third Street, P.O. Box 22, Dayton, Ohio 45401 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

FROELICH, J. 
-2- 

{¶ 1} Travis Lanier Williams appeals from the dismissal of his action against the 

City of Dayton, Department of Water, claiming that the City should have accepted his 

international bills of exchange as payment for his water bills. For the following reasons, 

the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Williams’s complaint consists of a short civil complaint form and several 

attachments. From these documents, we glean the following facts. 

{¶ 3} Williams received a bill in the amount of $187.42 from the City of Dayton’s 

Department of Water. On September 26, 2019, in response to that bill, Williams sent the 

Department a self-prepared international bill of exchange, drawn on the United States 

Department of Treasury, for that amount. The City did not accept the purported bill of 

exchange as payment. 

{¶ 4} On October 22, 2019, Williams received a notice from the Department of 

Water that the bill for water service for June 11, 2019 to September 11, 2019 remained 

unpaid and that service would be discontinued if payment were not received. On 

October 23, 2019, Williams mailed a second self-prepared international bill of exchange 

in the amount of $194.18, again drawn on the United States Department of Treasury, to 

the Department. That purported bill of exchange also was not accepted as payment. 

{¶ 5} The same day (October 23), Williams filed a complaint in the Montgomery 

Court of Common Pleas against the City, claiming that the City should have accepted his 

bills of exchange as legal tender and payment for his water bills. He cited to 12 U.S.C. 

95a as support. Williams asserted that by not discharging his obligation (the water bill), 
-3- 

the City dishonored the bills of exchange in violation of his rights pursuant to R.C. 1.22 

(change in judicial construction does not affect prior valid obligations), R.C. 1.03 

(definition of “anything of value”), and R.C. 1303.61 (presentment of instruments). 

{¶ 6} The City responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss pursuant to 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The City argued that Williams’s “hand drafted ‘bill of exchange’ [was] 

not a legitimate negotiable instrument” and that the documents were “nothing more than 

a meaningless piece of paper.” The City noted that several courts have found similar 

claims to be frivolous and that the United States Department of Treasury has issued an 

alert about fraudulent bills of exchange. 

{¶ 7} Williams did not respond to the motion to dismiss. 

{¶ 8} On December 20, 2019, the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss. 

First, the court noted that one Ohio court had held that a presented International “Bill of 

Exchange” was not a proper payment for a mortgage to prevent a foreclosure order. Bank 

of N.Y. v. Markos, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-906, 2006-Ohio-2073. Second, the court 

noted the numerous cases cited in the City’s motion, all of which held that a dismissal of 

a case is proper under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) when a “bill of exchange” is at issue. The 

court quoted Bryant v. Washington Mut. Bank, 524 F.Supp 2d 753 (W.D. Va. 2007) for its 

summary of the “redemption theory” underlying the use of purported bills of exchange. 

The trial court further indicated that the Bryant court had dismissed this theory as 

“nonsense in almost every detail,” id. at 760, and had warned the debtor that “people 

frequently end up in prison” for passing bills of exchange drawn against the U.S. Treasury. 

Id. at 763. Finally, the trial court noted that the United States Treasury Department had 

issued an alert about fraudulent bills of exchange. Based on the case law and “simple 
-4- 

common sense,” the trial court concluded that Williams’s self-created international bills of 

exchange were not valid legal documents or tender. 

{¶ 9} Williams appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his action. 

II. Standard of Review 

{¶ 10} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), “is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the 

complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 

548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992); Grover v. Bartsch, 170 Ohio App.3d 188, 2006-Ohio-6115, 

866 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). The court must construe the complaint in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, presume all of the factual allegations in the complaint are true, 

and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Grover at ¶ 16, citing Mitchell 

v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). A motion to dismiss 

under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) should be granted only where the complaint, so construed, 

demonstrates that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Sherrod v. 

Haller, 2017-Ohio-5614, 94 N.E.3d 148, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.). “The standard for dismissal under 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is consistent with Civ.R. 8(A), which requires that a complaint ‘contain 

* * * a short and plain statement of the claim [or claims] showing that the [plaintiff] is 

entitled to relief.’ ” Toney v. Dayton, 2017-Ohio-5618, 94 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 11} “An order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is subject to de novo 

review.” Duer v. Henderson, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2009 CA 15, 2009-Ohio-6815, ¶ 68, 

quoting Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 

44, ¶ 5. This means the appellate court “must independently review the complaint to 

determine whether dismissal is appropriate.” Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2d Dist. 
-5- 

Montgomery No. 25950, 2015-Ohio-1394, ¶ 13, quoting Ament v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. 

Co., 180 Ohio App.3d 440, 2009-Ohio-36, 905 N.E.2d 1246, ¶ 60 (8th Dist.). 

{¶ 12} In conducting that review, we are “bound to assume that the facts pleaded 

in the complaint are true, but the same does not apply to conclusions of law that the 

pleader contends are proved by those facts.” Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., Inc., 

2011-Ohio-6712, 969 N.E.2d 1284, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.). We are not to consider “unsupported 

conclusions that may be included among, but not supported by, the factual allegations of 

the complaint.” Boyd at ¶ 13, quoting Wright v. Ghee, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1459, 

2002-Ohio-5487, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 13} Although the rule itself states that matters to be considered on a Civ.R. 

12(B)(6) motion are limited to those that appear within the relevant pleading, material 

incorporated within a complaint is part of that pleading. Boyd at ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. 

Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health, 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, 673 N.E.2d 1281, fn. 1, 

(1997) (“Material incorporated in a complaint may be considered part of the complaint for 

purposes of determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.”). Such material includes 

not only exhibits to a complaint, but also written instruments “upon which a claim is 

predicated,” regardless of whether such material actually is attached to the pleading. Id.

III. Williams’s Claim Based on his “International Bill of Exchange” 

{¶ 14} The trial court dismissed Williams’s complaint, finding, as a matter of law, 

that Williams’s purported international bills of exchange were not legal tender and, 

consequently, he did not state a viable claim that the City erred in failing to accept them. 

We agree with the trial court that Williams’s self-prepared international bills of exchange 

were not legal tender and, as a matter of law, Williams did not state a viable claim that 
-6- 

the City erred in failing to accept them as payment. 

{¶ 15} At the outset, 12 U.S.C. 95a does not provide a basis for Williams’s claim. 

That section formerly granted, in time of war, authority for the president to regulate 

transactions in the foreign exchange of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, 

and transfers of property in which any foreign country or a foreign national has any 

interest. See former 12 U.S.C. 95a(1)(A) and (B). The section upon which Williams 

relies, former 12 U.S.C. 95a(2), provided: 

Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of property or 

interest therein, made to or for the account of the United States, * * * shall 

to the extent thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of 

the obligation of the person making the same; and no person shall be held 

liable in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith 

in connection with the administration of, or in pursuance of and in reliance 

on, this section, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or direction issued 

hereunder. 

{¶ 16} 12 U.S.C. 95a was in effect until November 30, 2015. As of December 1, 

2015, that section has no content and is entitled “Omitted.”1 In short, Section 95a is no 

longer valid. Accordingly, Williams now cannot state a claim based on that statute, as a 

matter of law. 

{¶ 17} Williams’s international bills of exchange appear to be based on a 

 

1 “Congress omitted § 95a from the United States Code effective December 1, 2015, 

because ‘an identical section exists in 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(2) and has since 1941.’ ” 

United States v. Nobrega, 124 A.F.T.R.2d 2019-6942, 2019 WL 6619853, *6 (D.Me.Dec. 

5, 2019), quoting Walquist v. Commr. of Revenue, No. 08890-R, 2016 WL 2989259, *2, 

n.28 (Minn. Tax Ct. May 11, 2016). 
-7- 

“Redemptionist” theory. As the Third Circuit summarized: 

[T]he “Redemptionist” theory * * * propounds that a person has a split 

personality: a real person and a fictional person called the “strawman.” 

The “strawman” purportedly came into being when the United States went 

off the gold standard in 19[3]3, and, instead, pledged the strawman of its 

citizens as collateral for the country’s national debt. Redemptionists claim 

that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live 

person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC 

financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. 

Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay 

enormous sums of money to use the strawman’s name * * *. 

Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203, fn. 4 (3d Cir.2008). 

{¶ 18} The federal district court in Connecticut further explained: 

Another tenet of the Redemptionist theory is that when the United States 

Government “pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the 

country’s national debt,” it created an “exemption account” for each citizen, 

identified by each person’s Social Security number. When citizens 

contract for debt, the theory goes, their debts are collateralized by their 

respective exemption accounts, essentially making the U.S. Government 

ultimately responsible for satisfaction of their debts. Moreover, each 

citizen’s exemption account is virtually bottomless, meaning that those who 

understand this theory — and who file the appropriate UCC financing 

statements, and thereby become a free sovereign, a process known as 
-8- 

“redemption” — never have to actually pay for anything. 

(Citations omitted.) McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 726 F.Supp.2d 201, 210 

(D.Conn.2010). 

{¶ 19} Courts have uniformly rejected arguments that self-prepared documents 

created under the Redemptionist theory or one of its corollaries are valid legal tender. 

See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Markos, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-906, 2006-Ohio2073, ¶ 18 (self-prepared international bill of exchange was not a valid payment of 

mortgage debt); Vachon v. Reverse Mtge. Sols., Inc., Case No. EDCV 16-02419-DMG 

(KES), 2017 WL 6628103, *6 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 11, 2017); Bryant v. Washington Mut. Bank, 

524 F.Supp 2d 753 (W.D. Va. 2007); In re Hill, Case No. 1:14-bk-15544-SDR, 2015 WL 

5575499, *3 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. Sept. 18, 2015). Rather, they have consistently found 

that similar bills of exchange supposedly drawn on treasury accounts are no more than 

“worthless piece[s] of paper.” Bryant at 760; see also, e.g., U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Phillips, 

366 Ill.App.3d 593, 852 N.E.2d 380 (2006). 

{¶ 20} Viewing Williams’s complaint, including the attached documents, in the light 

most favorable to him, Williams presented two self-prepared international bills of 

exchange drawn on the United States Treasury to the City to pay his water bills. We find 

no law, including R.C. Chapter 1303 (Negotiable Instruments), indicating that Williams’s 

documents constituted valid legal tender or negotiable instruments. Additionally, courts 

throughout the country have reached the same conclusions with similar documents. The 

trial court thus did not err in likewise determining, as a matter of law, that Williams’s 

international bills of exchange were not valid legal documents or tender. We conclude 

that Williams thus failed to state a claim against the City for failing to accept his purported 
-9- 

international bills of exchange as payment for his water bills.

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 21} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Travis L. Williams 

Martin W. Gehres 

Hon. Steven K. Dankof