### I N THE 

### I NTERMEDIATE 

### C OURT OF 

### A PPEALS OF 

### W EST 

### V IRGINIA Spring 2024 Term

_____________________ No. 23

- ICA

- 345

_____________________ MEGAN MCKNIGHT and LUKE MCKNIGHT ,

Plaintiff s Below, Petitioner s ,

v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF GLENVILLE STATE UNIVERSITY,

GARY Z. MORRIS, and JASON P. BARR , Defendant s Below, Respondent s .

___________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Gilmer County Honorable Richard A. Facemire , Judge Civil Action No. CC

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- 20 2 2

- C

- 17
REVERSED AND REMANDED

_________________________________________________________

Submitted: May 2 1 , 2024 Filed: June 11, 2024 Michael D. Crim , Esq. Crim Law Office , PLLC Clarksburg , West Virginia Counsel for Petitioner Allison B. Williams , Esq. A my M. Smith, Es q. Kaitlin L.H. Rob idoux, Esq. Steptoe & Johnson PLLC Bridgeport, West Virginia Counsel for Respondent s

JUDGE GREEAR delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

### FILED June 11, 2024 released at 3:00 p.m. ASHLEY N. DEEM , DE PUTY CLERK INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA1

GREEAR, JUDGE :

Petitioner s Megan McKnight (“ Dr

. McKnight ”) and Luke McKnight (“Mr. McKnight”) (collectively “ P etitioners ”) appeal the July 6 , 2023, order of the Gilmer County Circuit Court, which granted R espondent s Board of Governors of Glenville State University (“GSU”), Gary Z. Morris (“Morris”), and Jason P. Barr ’ s (“Barr”) (collectively

“ R espondents”) M otion to Dismiss

. 1 On appeal, Dr. McKnight argues that the circuit court erred in evaluating her claims under a heightened pleading standard . Further, Dr. McKnight contends the circuit court erred in concluding that she had failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a constructive discharge claim, sex/gender discrimination claim, discrimination claim against Morris and Barr, and hostile work environment claim

. Lastly, Mr. McKnight argues his loss of consortium claim should be remanded along with Dr. McKnight’s substantive claims . A s discussed below , after review of the record and
p leadings before this Court, we reverse the circuit court’s July 6 , 2023, orde r and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROU ND
Dr. McKnight received her Bluegrass Music Certificate in 200 7 and her B.A. in Elementary/Early Education in 2011, both from Glenville State University

. D uring the
2006

- 2007 school year , Dr. McKnight began working for GSU under the supervision of Buddy Griffin in the school's B luegrass Program, a position she maintained through the

1 Glenville State University was dismissed by separate order not pending before this Court on appeal.2

2009

- 2010 school year. On June 7, 2010, Dr. McKnight was employed to serve as the part

time Bluegrass Program Assistant. Dr . McKnight continued working for GSU in various positions until December 2021

. GSU employed Dr . McKnight for the 2011

- 2 012 school year in the position of Artist in Residence and Director of Bluegrass Programs. Dr

. McKnight was employed by GSU for the 2012

- 2013 school year as the Director of Bluegrass Programs . Dr . McKnight received her M aster of Education d egree from Marshall University in May 2013 , and her Doctor of Education degree from Walden University in April 2018.

After receiving her M aster of Education d egree, Dr . McKnight was employed by GSU for the 2013

- 2014, 2014

- 2015 and 2015

- 2016 school years in the position of Visiting Assistant Professor of Music and Director of Bluegrass Programs

. D uring the 2016

- 2017, 2017

- 2018, 2018

- 2019 and 2019

- 2020 school years , Dr. McKnight was employed by GSU a s an Assistant Professor of Music and Director of Bluegrass Programs

. Dr . McKnight help ed create the Pioneer Sta ge Bluegrass Music Education Center and developed and over saw the implementation of GSU 's online B achelor of Arts in Music program. Dr. McKnight’s c omplaint alleges that, i n or around the 2016

- 2017 school year, GSU promised that she would be offered an expedited promotion and tenure upon completion of her Doctor of Education degree based on her length of employment, her commitment to GSU , and her extra efforts and service to the university and community.3

Dr . McKnight reportedly was not offered expedited promotion and tenure after receiving her Doctorate degree. 2

During the 2017

- 2018 school year, Morris became the interim Vice

President of Academic Affairs for GSU. Morris became GSU’s Provost and Vice

- President of Academic Affairs on February 4, 2020. Morris selected and appointed Barr to be GSU's Chair of the Fine Arts Department on or about June 22, 2019. Prior to Morris becoming Provost and Vice

- President of Academic Affairs, Dr . McKnight had consistently received positive evaluations from GSU

.

Petitioner s filed their c omplaint in this matter on December 16, 2022. In their

c omplaint, Dr. McKnight and Mr. McKnight asserted the following c ounts : 1) discrimination based on sex/gender; 2 ) discrimination by Morris and Barr, 3 ) gender based hostile work environment; and 4 ) loss of consortium.

2 On August 27, 2021, Dr. McKnight entered into a revised contract for the 2021

- 2022 school year that promoted her to Associate Professor of Appalachian Studies and granted her tenure. While the complaint does not reference this revised contract, it was cons idered by the circuit court for purposes of analyzing the motion to dismiss. At oral argument, counsel for p etitioners conced ed that such consideration was not im proper under the circumstances of this case

. While the complaint do es not allege that Dr. McKnight eventually received a promotion and tenure, we find the same to be true based upon the record

. However, we note that the parties dispute whether the promotion and tenure were granted on an expedited basis.4 In he r c omplaint, Dr . McKnight alleged that GSU, Morris , and Barr subjected her to the following adverse employment actions: constructive discharge; d enial of opportunity to seek tenure on an expedited bas i s following receipt of d octorate; d enial of the opportunity to serve on committees; d enial of the opportunity to have a full slate of student advisees; d enial of the opportunity to provide instruction to students in GSU's Bluegrass Program which she was hand

- selected to lead; d enial of the opportunity to teach core classes in Appalachian Studies ; d enial of the opportunity to teach a Recording and Engineering course that she had taught for the previous ten years which was given to a male instructor ; d enial of the opportunity to run the Pioneer Stage Bluegrass Music and Education Center which she had established ; d enial of the stipend she was to receive for running the Pioneer Stage whic h GSU had agreed to provid e through 2023; d enial of the opportunity to teach a full course load as required by GSU ; compensation at a rate less than similarly situated male employees; and, that GSU , on more than one occasion, improperly withheld from Dr . McKnight the compensation to which she was entitled.

Additionally, Dr . McKnight alleg ed that the adverse decisions were made based on her gender . Specifically, Dr. McKnight’s c omplaint alleges: w hile denying Dr. McKnight the opportunity to advise students in the Appalachian Studies program, GSU and Morris hired a new male instructor to teach the Appalachian Studies courses and advise students in the Appalachian Studies program ; w hile denying Dr. M cKnight a full course load to teach, GSU and Morris hired a new male instructor to teach history courses that she was qualified to teach ; w hile denying Dr. McKnight the opportunity to teach a full course5

load, GSU assigned a male instructor to teach the Re cording and Engineering course that she had taught for the previous ten (10) years ; a fter Barr bec ame Chair of the Fine Arts Department, Dr. McKnight attended a meeting in which Barr was discussing the promotion of a female colleague and made a comment suggesting that the female colleague must have been sleeping with someone to get the promotion ; Morris attended an emergency meeting of the Board of Governors and in referring to Dr. McKnight , commented that "this girl" should not be on the faculty , she should only be staff; Morris actively lobbied the promotion and tenure committee to deny Dr. McKnight ’s promotion and tenure ; and Morris misrepresented to GSU 's President that Dr. McKnight did not have the academic credentials to teach either Music or Appalachian Studies , even though she was currently serving as an Assistant Professor of Music and had served in that capacity since 2013. Furthermore, the complaint makes the general allegation that all the actions and conduct of the R espondents would n ot have occurred but for Dr. McKnight’s gender.

On February 13, 2023, GSU, Morris , and Barr filed their motion to dismiss and memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was heard on May 22, 2023. The circuit c ourt entered an order granting the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case in its entirety on July 5, 2023. It is from this order that Dr. McKnight and Mr. McKnight appeal.6 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ Appellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint is de novo .” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex. rel McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac

- Buic k,
Inc. , 194 W. Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995). The West Virginia Supreme Court instructs that "motions to dismiss are viewed with disfavor," and it has "counsel [ed] lower courts to rarely grant such motions." Forshey v. Jackson, 222 W. Va. 743, 749, 671 S.E.2d 748, 754 (2008). Moreover, “[t]he trial court, in appraising the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of fa cts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Syl. Pt. 3, Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., Inc. , 160 W. Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977). On appeal of a dismissal based on granting a motion pursuant to West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6), the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true. Syl. Pt. 1, Wiggins v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. , 178 W. Va. 63, 357 S.E.2d 745 (1987).

III. DISCUSSION On appeal, the P etitioners argue six assignments of error as to the underlying final order granting the motion to dismiss which we will address in turn. First, P etitioners assert that the circuit court erred in evaluating Dr. McKnight’s substantive claims on a heightened pleading standard.

It is unclear what standard the circuit court actually utilized in evaluating
P etitioner s ’ complaint in its July 6, 2023, order . The order contains discuss ion of a7

heightened pleading standard when qualified immunity is at issue. However, t he circuit

court did not specify whether it viewed the complaint at issue here under a heightened pleading standard or under the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a) of the West V irginia Rules of Civil Procedure

. Regardless, the correct pleading standard for complaints alleging violations of the W est V irginia H uman R ights A ct (“WVHRA”) only requires the plaintiff to plead facts , taken as a whole, sufficient to show they are entitled to relief on any possibl e theory. See Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC v. City Nat’l Bank of W. Va. , 244 W. Va. 508, 522, 854 S.E.2d 870, 884 (2020). “Moreover, a party is not required to establish

a prima facie case at the pleading stage.” I d . “Before discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the required prima facie case in a particular case. Given that the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard.” Id

. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. , 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)).

In addressing the question of qualified immunity, the Supreme C ourt of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has stated “ a government entity has no qualified immunity where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the government entity's discretionary

‘ acts or omissions are in violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable person would have known[.] ’ ” Judy v. Eastern West Virginia Community and Technical College, 246 W. Va. 483, 488, 874 S.E.2d 285, 290 (2022) (citing Syl. Pt. 3, in part, W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Marple , 236 W. Va. 654, 657, 783 S.E.2d 75, 78 (2015) )

. In Judy , the respondent, Eastern West Virginia Community and Technical8

College , contended that it was entitled to qualified immunity because, as a public college, it was a state agency or a political subdivision. In response, the SCAWV stated “[r]espondent cannot reasonably argue that the WVHRA [...] does not constitute clearly established statutory law of which it should have known.” Id

. at 488, 874 S.E.2d at 290

. Here, as with Judy , P etitioners “pled facts demonstrating a violation of this clearly established law [WVHRA], so, per Marple , [GSU] is entitled to no qualified immunity here.” Id

. Thus, whatever standard was used by the circuit court, it is clear that a heightened pleading standard does not apply to claims alleging violations of the WVHRA. See Id

.

In her second assignment of error, Dr. McKnight allege s that the circuit court erred in concluding that she had failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a constructive discharge

. 3 A constructive discharge is sufficiently alleged when the employee claims that because of age, race, sexual, or other unlawful discrimination, the employer created a hostile working climate which was so intolerable that the employee was forced to leave his or her employment. Syl. Pt. 5, Burns v. West Virginia Department of Education and Arts , 242 W. Va. 392, 836 S.E.2d 43 (2019). In order to prove a constructive discharge, a plaintiff must establish that working conditions created by or known to the employe r were so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to quit. It is not necessary,

3 We note that constructive disc harge was not a specific count pled in p etitioner’s complaint. However, constructive discharge could conceivably be found to be an adverse employment decision in connection with Dr. McKnight’s WVHRA discrimination claims.9

however, that a plaintiff prove that the employer's actions were taken with a specific intent to cause the plaintiff to quit. See Id

. at 39 4 , 836 S.E.2d at 45.

As discussed above, the standard for assessing a motion to dismiss requires the circuit court to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take all allegations as true. See Wiggins , 178 W. Va. a t 63, 357 S.E.2d at 745

. S ee also Mountaineer Fire & Rescue Equip., LLC , 244 W. Va. at 520, 854 S.E.2d at 882 (the task of a court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not assay the weight of the evi dence which might be offered in support thereof )

.

Here, in assessing the legal feasibility of the complaint and viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the P etitioners , we hold that the complaint makes sufficient allegations to survive a motion to dismiss. With respect to her working conditions, Dr. McKnight allege d she was no t paid for any service she provided to the Pioneer Stage during the 2021

- 2022 school year despite GSU’s agreement to provide the same through 2023 ; she was denied the opportunity to serve on committees; she was denied the opportunity to have a full slate of student advisees; she was denied the opportunity to provide instruction to students in GSU's Bluegrass Program which she was hand

- selected to lead; she was denied the opportunity to teach core classes in Appalachian Studies ; she was denied the opportunity to teach a Recording and Enginee ring course that she had taught for the previous ten years which was given to a male instructor ; she was denied the opportunity to run the Pioneer Stage Bluegrass Music and Education Center which she had10

established ; she was denied the opportunity to teach a full c ourse load as required by GSU ; she was compensated at a rate less than similarly situated male employees; and, that GSU , on more than one occasion, improperly withheld from Dr . McKnight the compensation to which she was entitled. Further, Dr. McKnight alle ge d that after filing her grievance, Morris instructed one or more of Dr. McKnight’s colleagues to have no contact with her. These allegations, along with the allegations in the complaint alleging gender

- based hostile work environment and unlawful gender

- base d discrimination, taken as a whole, support Dr. McKnight ’s ability to prove some set of facts that would entitle her to relief. If Dr. McKnight was able to produce evidence supporting all the allegations contained in her complaint, a finder of fact could j ustifi ably conclude that a reasonable person would be compelled to quit under such circumstances. Accordingly, Dr. McKnight alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss the constructive discharge claim.

In Dr. McKnight’s third assignment of error, she argues that the circuit court erred in finding she that she had failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a gender discrimination claim. We agree.

The SCAWV has stated that allegations which would constitute a prima facie case of employment discrimination are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss

. See Judy , 246 W. Va. at 489, 874 S.E.2d at 291

. Further,

[i]n order to make a prima facie case of employment discrimination ... the plaintiff must offer proof o f the following: (1) That the plaintiff is a member of a protected11 class. (2) That the employer made an adverse decision concerning the plaintiff. (3) But for the plaintiff's protected status, the adverse decision would not have been made. Id

. (citing Syl. Pt. 3, Conaway v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 178 W. Va. 164, 358 S.E.2d 423 (1986)). “ T he ‘but for’ test of discriminatory motive in [ Conaway ], is merely a threshold inquiry, requiring only that a plaintiff show an inference of discrimination. ” Id. (citation omitted).

Dr. McKnight’s complaint sufficiently alleges she is a member of a protected class. Paragraph ninety (90) of P etitioner s ’ complaint alleged that the actions and conduct of the R espondents would not have occurred b ut for Dr. McKnight’s gender

.

Dr. McKnight also alleges that GSU made adverse decisions concerning her employment. Specifically, Dr. McKnight’s compla int alleges that: 1) after completing her degree in Appalachian Studies, GSU denied her the opportunity to teach any core classe s within the Appalachian Studies Program with the exception of Traditions of Appalachian Music; 2) GSU refused to continue to provide a contract or stipend to operate the Pioneer Stage Bluegrass Music Education Center for the 2021

- 2022 school year despite agreeing to provide such through 2023; and 3 ) she was constructively discharged due to the unlawful
discrimination and related working conditions

. While R espondents argue that mere changes to an employee’s duties do not constitute an adverse action, allegations of constructive discharge and loss of the Pioneer Stage stipend satisfy the adverse decision element of an employment dis crimination claim at the motion to dismiss stage.12 Finally, Dr. McKnight’s complaint satisfied the “but for” requirement . Dr. McKnight alleged that GSU hired a male instructor to teach and advise all Appalachian Studies courses. Dr. McKnight further contends that she was paid less than similarly situated males and was denied opportunities of employment as similarly situated males. Additionally, Dr. McKnight alleged that all the actions of the R espondents were due to her gender. While perhaps not a model of clarity, Dr. McKnight’s complaint, taken as a whole, alleges facts sufficient to s tate a prima facie claim of unlawful gender discrimination.

In her fourth assignment of error, Dr. McKnight argues that the circuit court erred in determining she failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a discrimination claim against Morris and Barr. Once again, we agr ee.

Dr. McKnight’s complaint alleges that the actions of Morris and Barr violate West Virginia Code § 16B

- 17

- 9(7). 4 The WVHRA states that it shall be unlawful for any employer to [e] ngage in any form of threats or reprisal, or to engage in, or

hire, o r conspire with others to commit acts or activities of any nature, the purpose of which is to harass, degrade, embarrass or cause physical harm or economic loss or to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce any person to engage in any of the unlawful discrimin atory practices defined in this section

.

4 W est Virginia Code § 5

- 11

- 1 et s eq. was recodified into W est Virginia Code § 16B

17

- 1 et seq. effective February 8, 2024.13

See W est Virginia Code § 16B

- 17

- 9(7)(A). The SCAWV has held that the language of the statue is clear and unambiguous

. Based on this language it is an unlawful discrimination practice for any person to : 1) e ngage in any form of threat or reprisal ; 2) engage in, or hire, or conspire with others to commit acts or activities of any nature, the purpose of which is to harass, degrade, embarrass or c ause physical harm or economic loss ; or 3) aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce any person to engage in any of the unlawful discriminatory practices defined in this section. See Michael v. Appalachian Heating, LLC , 226 W. Va. 394, 401, 701 S.E.2d 116, 123 (2010). Dr. McKnight’s complaint makes clear allegations that Morris and Barr engaged in acts with the purpose to harass, degrade, embarrass, or aid and abet unlawful discriminatory practices.

Dr. McKnight’s c omplaint specifically alleges that Morris actively lobbied th e promotion and tenure committee to deny Dr. McKnight ’s tenure due to her gender . She alleg es that both Morris and Barr prevented her from having a full slate of student advisees; that Morris hi red male teachers to teach the courses she was qualified to teach; and after filing a grievance, Morris instructed colleagues of Dr. McKnight to have no contact with her. These allegations, in conjunction with the complaint taken as whole and the adverse

e mployment decisions alleged by Dr. McKnight , are sufficient factual allegations to provide notice pleading to the defendants of the claim alleged against them. Additionally, this C ourt, as discussed above, has determined that P etitioners have pled sufficie nt facts to make a prima facie case of gender discrimination against GSU. Thus, the allegations14

against Morris and Barr are sufficient to state a claim of aiding and abetting GSU’s alleged gender discrimination.

Further, Dr. McKnight contends the circuit court erred in its finding that she only named Morris and Barr as defendants in their individual capacity, while all allegations concern their official capacities.

T he t erm “person,” as defined and utili zed within the context of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, includes both employees and employers

. A ny contrary interpretation, which might have the effect of barring suits by employees against their supervisors, would be counter to the plain meaning of the statutory language and contrar y to the very spirit and purpose of this particular legislation.
See Syl. Pt. 5, St. Peter v. Ampak

- Division of Gatewood Products, Inc. , 199 W. Va. 365, 484 S.E.2d 481 (1997). The Human Rights Act establishes a cause of action against an individual person who participates in unlawful discrimination

. Id. at 373 , 484 S.E.2d at 489

. While the complaint may be unartfully crafted in this respect , it is clear that Dr. McKnight named Morris and Barr as individuals under the WVHRA. As stated in her complaint, Dr. McKn ight’s allegations regarding Morris and Barr are based on their individual actions taken as agents of GSU. The circuit court erred in dismissing the complaint against Morris and Barr on this basis.

In her fifth assignment of error, Dr. McKnight asserts the circuit court erred in concluding she failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a hostile environment claim. We agree.15 An e mployee may state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment if unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. See Syl. Pt. 3, Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc. , 226 W. Va. 214 , 700 S.E.2d 183 (2010). To establish a claim for sexual harassment under the West

Virginia Human Rights Act based upon a hostile or abusive work environment, a plaintiff

- employee must prove that: (1) the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputable on some factual basis to the employer. Syl. Pt. 6, Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC v. Griffith , 235 W. Va. 538 , 775 S.E.2d 90 (2015). Further, k nowledge of work place misconduct may be im puted to an employer by circumstantial evidence if the conduct is shown to be sufficiently pervasive or repetitive so that a reasonable employer, intent on complying with the West Virginia Human Rights Act, would be aware of the conduct. See Syl. Pt. 5. Co nrad v. ARA Szabo , 198 W. Va. 362 , 480 S.E.2d 801 (1996)

.

In the July 6, 2023, order, the circuit court dismisse d Dr. McKnight’s claim of gender based hostile work environment due to the lack of severity and pervasiveness of the alleged conduct

. Dr. McKnight allege d two specific instances of workplace sexual harassment. First, she alleges that when she attended a meeting with Barr, h e was16

discussing the promotion of a female colleague and suggested that she must be sleeping with someone to get the promotion. Next, Dr. McKnight alleges that Morris, in a meeting with GSU, referred to Dr. McKnight as “this girl” when suggesting she should be staff, not faculty. The allegations further sta te that GSU was on notice and failed to stop or remedy
the hostile work environment.

In Conrad , the circuit court also focused on the perceived lack of pervasiveness and severity of the alleged harassment and granted summary judg ment for the defendan t

. See Conrad at 372, 480 S.E.2d at 811. The circuit court in Conrad looked at the alleged sexual harassment conduct separate and apart from the discriminatory actions of a non

- sexual nature. Id

. at 371 , 480 S.E.2d at 810 . On appeal, the SCAWV reversed the grant of summary judg ment and stated, “[s]uch incidents [...] cannot be viewed in isolation
of the mistreatment tha t did not have an overt sexual component. Rather, the plaintiff’s environment must be considered under all the circumstances, taken as a whole.” Id

. at 372 , 480 S.E.2d at 811. Dr. McKnight alleges sexually discriminatory remarks directed at her and female employees; acts of Morris and Barr meant to embarrass, and aid unlawful discrimination against Dr. McKnight ; and gender discrimination regarding compensation and job opportunities. “ Whether sexual harassment at the workplace is sufficiently severe
and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well being of employees is a question to be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances. ” Id. at 373 , 480 S.E.2d at
81 2

. “Assuming evidence of a prima facie case of sexual harassment has been shown, we noted in [ Conrad ] t hat unless ‘only one conclusion could be drawn from the record in the17

case,’ the case presents factual issues which require a jury to resolve.” Akers v. Cabell Huntington Hosp., Inc ., 215 W. Va. 346, 352, 59 9 S.E.2d 769, 775 (2004). Taken as a whole, Dr. McKnight’s allegations are sufficient to place defendants on notice of gender based hostile work environment for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.

Undeniably, the P etitioners must still develop sufficient facts to ultimately prevail on th eir claim s , but it does not appear beyond doubt to th is Court that the P etitioners can prove no set of facts in support of their claim s which would entitle them to relief. Accordingly, we find the circuit court erred in its determination that Dr. McKnight’s complaint failed to sufficiently plead her substantive claims

.

Regarding the sixth assignment of error, P etitioners argue that Mr. McKnight’s loss of consortium claim should be remanded with the substantive claims as it is derivative of the discrimination claims. Respondents argue that Mr. McKnight’s loss of consortium claim was properly dismissed as it is derivative of the substantive claims which were dismissed below. As discus sed above, this Court finds that Dr. McKnight sufficiently pled her substantive claims, meriting reversal of the circuit court’s order. As dismissal of the substantive claims is hereby reversed, then it is appropriate that Mr. McKnight’s
derivative claim a lso be reversed and reinstated.18 IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court reverses the Circuit Court of Gilmer County’s order dated July 6 , 2023 , in its entirety and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

. Reve rsed and Remanded

.