[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 133 (Monday, July 13, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37598-37601]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-18545]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-483]


Union Electric Company Notice of Consideration of Issuance of 
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
NPF-30 issued to Union Electric Company (the licensee) for operation of 
the Callaway Plant, Unit 1 located in Callaway County, Missouri.
    The proposed amendment would support a modification to the plant to 
increase the storage capacity of the spent fuel pool.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:
    1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    In the analysis of the safety issues concerning the expanded pool 
storage capacity, the following previously postulated accident 
scenarios have been considered:

a. A spent fuel assembly drop in the Spent fuel pool
b. Loss of Spent fuel pool cooling flow
c. A seismic event
d. Misloaded fuel assembly

    The probability that any of the accidents in the above list can 
occur is not significantly increased by the modification itself. The 
probabilities of a seismic event or loss of spent fuel pool cooling 
flow are not influenced by the proposed changes. The probabilities of 
accidental fuel assembly drops or misloadings are primarily influenced 
by the methods used to lift and move these loads. The method of 
handling loads during normal plant operations is not significantly 
changed, since the same equipment (i.e., Spent Fuel Handling Machine) 
and procedures will be used. A new offset handling tool will be 
required to assess some storage rack cells located adjacent to the pool 
walls. The grapple mechanism, procedures, and fuel manipulation methods 
will be very similar to those used by the standard fuel handling tool. 
Therefore, this tool does not represent a significant change in the 
methods used to lift or move fuel. Since the methods used to move loads 
during normal operations remain nearly the same as those used 
previously, there is no significant increase in the probability of an 
accident.
    During rack removal and installation, all work in the pool area 
will be controlled and performed in strict accordance with specific 
written procedures. Any movement of fuel assemblies required to be 
performed to support the modification (e.g., removal and installation 
of racks) will be performed in the same manner as during normal 
refueling operations. Shipping cask movements will not be performed 
during the modification period.
    Accordingly, the proposed modification does not involve a 
significant increase in the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated.
    The consequences of the previously postulated scenarios for an 
accidental drop of a fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool have been re-
evaluated for the proposed change. The results show that the postulated 
accident of a fuel assembly striking the top of the storage racks will 
not distort the racks sufficiently to impair their functionality. The 
minimum subcriticality margin, K<INF>eff</INF> less than or equal to 
0.95, will be maintained. The structural damage to the Fuel Building, 
pool liner, and fuel assembly resulting from a fuel assembly drop 
striking the pool floor or another assembly located within the racks is 
primarily dependent on the mass of the falling object and the drop 
height. Since these two parameters are not changed by the proposed 
modification, the structural damage to these items remains unchanged. 
Cycle specific calculations, using core specific parameters continue to 
ensure that the radiological dose at the exclusion area boundary remain 
within the limits documented in the Callaway FSAR [Final Safety 
Analysis Report]. Dose levels will remain ``well within'' the levels 
required by 10 CFR 100, paragraph 11, as defined in Section 15.7.4.II.1 
of the Standard Review Plan. Thus, the results of the postulated fuel 
drop accidents remain acceptable and do not represent a significant 
increase in consequences from any of the previously evaluated accidents 
that have been reviewed and found acceptable by the NRC.
    The consequences of a loss of spent fuel pool cooling have been 
evaluated and found to have no increase. The concern with this accident 
is a reduction of spent fuel pool water inventory from bulk pool 
boiling resulting in uncovering fuel assemblies. This situation would 
lead to fuel failure and subsequent significant increase in offsite 
dose. Loss of spent fuel pool cooling at Callaway is mitigated by 
ensuring that a sufficient time lapse exists between the loss of forced 
cooling and uncovering fuel. This period of time is compared against a 
reasonable period to re-establish cooling or supply an alternative 
water source. Evaluation of this accident usually includes 
determination of the time to boil. The time allowed for operator 
actions is much less than the onset of any significant increase in 
offsite dose, since once boiling begins it would have to continue 
unchecked until the pool surface was lowered to the point of exposing 
active fuel. The time to boil represents the onset of loss of pool 
water inventory and is commonly used as a gage for establishing the 
comparison of consequences before and after a reracking project. The 
heat up rate in the Spent fuel pool is a nearly linear function of the 
fuel decay heat load. The fuel decay heat load will increase subsequent 
to the proposed changes because of the increase in the number of 
assemblies. The methodology

[[Page 37599]]

used in the thermal-hydraulic analysis determined the maximum fuel 
decay heat loads which are allowed by maintaining the current time 
allowed for operator actions (i.e., more than two hours to boil during 
complete loss of forced cooling). In the unlikely event that all pool 
cooling is lost, sufficient time will still be available subsequent to 
the proposed changes for the operators to provide alternate means of 
cooling before the onset of pool boiling. Therefore, the proposed 
change represents no increase in the consequences of loss of pool 
cooling.
    The consequences of a design basis seismic event are not increased. 
The consequences of this accident are evaluated on the basis of 
subsequent fuel damage or compromise of the fuel storage or building 
configurations leading to radiological or criticality concerns. The new 
racks have been analyzed in their new configuration and found safe 
during seismic motion. Fuel has been determined to remain intact and 
the storage racks maintain the fuel and fixed poison configurations 
subsequent to a seismic event. The structural capability of the pool 
and liner will not be exceeded under the appropriate combinations of 
dead weight, thermal, and seismic loads. The Fuel Building structure 
will remain intact during a seismic event and will continue to 
adequately support and protect the fuel racks, storage array, and pool 
moderator/coolant. Thus, the consequences of a seismic event are not 
increased.
    This rerack amendment does not involve an increase in fuel 
enrichment or burnup levels and does not alter the source term.
    Fuel misloading accidents were previously postulated occurrences. 
The consequence of this type of accident has been analyzed for the 
worst possible storage configuration subsequent to the proposed 
modification and the consequences were found to be acceptable because 
the reactivity in the spent fuel pool remained below 0.95. After the 
proposed modification, the worst case postulated accident condition, 
for the MZTR configuration, occurs when a fresh fuel assembly of the 
highest possible enrichment in inadvertently loaded into a Region 2 
storage cell. Further, after the proposed modification, the worst case 
postulated accident condition, for the checkerboard configuration, 
occurs when a fresh fuel assembly of the highest possible enrichment is 
inadvertently loaded into an empty storage cell. In both postulated 
accident scenarios, credit is allowed for soluble boron in the water, 
and the spent fuel pool reactivity is maintained below 0.95. Therefore, 
there is no increase in consequences due to the modification.
    Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not 
significantly increase the probability or consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    To assess the possibility of new or different kind of accidents, a 
list of the important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage 
was established. Safe fuel storage is defined here as providing an 
environment which would not present any significant threats to workers 
or the general public. In other words, meeting the requirements of 10 
CFR 100 and 10 CFR 20. Any new events which would modify these 
parameters sufficiently to place them outside of the boundaries 
analyzed for normal conditions and/or outside of the boundaries 
previously considered for accidents would be considered a new or 
different accident. The criticality and radiological safety evaluations 
were reviewed to establish the list of important parameters. The fuel 
configuration and the existence of the moderator/coolant were 
identified as the only two parameters which were important to safe fuel 
storage. Significant modification of these two parameters represents 
the only possibility of an unsafe storage condition. Once the two 
important parameters were established, an additional step was taken to 
determine what events (which were not previously considered) could 
result in changes to the storage configuration or moderator/coolant 
presence during or subsequent to the proposed changes. This process was 
adopted to ensure that the possibility of any new or different accident 
scenario or event would be identified.
    Due to the proposed changes, an accidental drop of a rack module 
during construction activity in the pool was considered as the only 
event which might represent a new or different kind of accident.
    A construction accident resulting in a rack drop is an unlikely 
event. A new temporary hoist and rack lifting rig will be introduced to 
lift and suspend the racks from the bridge of the Cask Handling Crane. 
These items have been designed in accordance with the requirements of 
NUREG-0612 and ANSI N14.6. The postulated rack drop event is commonly 
referred to as a ``heavy load drop'' over the pools. Heavy loads will 
not be allowed to travel over any racks containing fuel assemblies. The 
danger represented by this event is that the racks will drop to the 
pool floor and the pool structure will be compromised leading to loss 
of moderator/coolant, which is one of the two important parameters 
identified above. However, although the analysis of this event has been 
performed and shown to be acceptable, the question of a new or 
different type of event is answered by determining whether heavy load 
drops over the pool have been considered previously. The postulated 
drop of a pool gate was previously evaluated and represents a similar 
heavy load drop consideration. All movements of heavy loads over the 
pool will be in accordance with the objectives of the Union Electric 
Company, NRC approved submittals in response to NUREG-0612. Therefore, 
the rack drop does not represent a new or different kind of accident.
    The proposed change does not alter the operating requirements of 
the plant or of the equipment credited in the mitigation of the design 
basis accidents. The proposed change does not affect any of the 
important parameters required to ensure safe fuel storage. Therefore, 
the potential for a new or previously unanalyzed accident is not 
created.
    3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in 
a margin of safety.
    The function of the spent fuel pool is to store the fuel assemblies 
in a subcritical and coolable configuration through all environmental 
and abnormal loadings, such as an earthquake or fuel assembly drop. The 
new rack design must meet all applicable requirements for safe storage 
and be functionally compatible with the spent fuel pool.
    UE has addressed the safety issues related to the expanded pool 
storage capacity in the following areas:

1. Material, mechanical and structural considerations
2. Nuclear criticality
3. Thermal-hydraulic and pool cooling

    The mechanical, material, and structural designs of the new racks 
have been reviewed in accordance with the applicable provisions of the 
NRC Guidance entitled, ``Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage 
and Handling Applications''. The rack materials used are compatible 
with the spent fuel assemblies and the spent fuel pool environment. The 
design of the new racks preserves the proper margin of safety during 
abnormal loads such as a dropped assembly and tensile loads from a 
stuck assembly. It has been shown that such loads will not invalidate 
the mechanical design and

[[Page 37600]]

material selection to safely store fuel in a coolable and subcritical 
configuration.
    The methodology used in the criticality analysis of the expanded 
Spent fuel pool meets the appropriate NRC guidelines and the ANSI 
standards (GDC 62, NUREG 0800, Section 9.1.2, the OT Position for 
Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications, 
Reg. Guide 1.13, and ANSI ANS 8.17). The margin of safety for 
subcriticality is maintained by having the neutron multiplication 
factor equal to, or less than 0.95 under all accident conditions, 
including uncertainties. This criterion is the same as that used 
previously to establish criticality safety evaluation acceptance and 
remains satisfied for all analyzed accidents. Therefore, the accepted 
margin of safety remains the same.
    The thermal-hydraulic and cooling evaluation of the pool 
demonstrated that the pool can be maintained below the specified 
thermal limits under the conditions of the maximum heat load and during 
all credible accident sequences and seismic events. The bulk pool 
temperature will not exceed 207  deg.F during an assumed loss of all 
cooling for up to two hours. Bulk pool boiling will not occur, nor will 
fuel cladding experience DNB [departure from nucleate boiling] or 
excessive thermal stresses. The fuel will not undergo any significant 
heat up after an accidental drop of fuel assembly on top of the rack 
blocking the flow path. A loss of cooling to the pool will allow 
sufficient time (2 hours) for the operators to intervene and line up 
alternate cooling paths and the means of inventory make-up before the 
onset of pool boiling. Therefore the allowed operator response time 
remains unchanged from the previous design basis. In the unlikely event 
that all pool cooling is lost coincident with the completion of a full 
core discharge, sufficient time will still be available, subsequent to 
the proposed changes, for the operators to provide alternate means of 
cooling before the onset of bulk pool boiling. Therefore, the accepted 
margin of safety remains the same.
    Thus, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.
    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and 
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of 
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to 
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of 
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By August 12, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Callaway County Public Library, 710 Court 
Street, Fulton, Missouri 65251. If a request for a hearing or petition 
for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by 
the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule 
on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an 
appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The

[[Page 37601]]

contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner 
to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which 
satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention 
will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the 
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to John O'Neill, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, 
Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037, 
attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on 
an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of 
Section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. 
10154. Under Section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of 
any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with 
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in 
conroversy among the parties.'' The hybrid procedures in Section 134 
provide for oral argument on matters in controversy, preceeded by 
discovery under the Commission's rules, and the designation, following 
argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and 
substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to 
be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings 
are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of 
Section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.
    The Commission's rules implementing Section 134 of the NWPA are 
found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for 
Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear 
Power Reactors' (published at 50 FR 41670, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR 
2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any party to the proceeding may 
invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the presiding 
officer a written request for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be 
timely, the request must be filed within 10 days of an order granting a 
request for hearing or petition to intervene. (As outlined above, the 
Commission's rules in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, and 2.714 in 
particular, continue to govern the filing of requests for a hearing or 
petitions to intervene, as well as the admission of contentions.) The 
presiding officer shall grant a timely request for oral argument. The 
presiding officer may grant an untimely request for oral argument only 
upon showing of good cause by the requesting party for the failure to 
file on time and after providing the other parties an opportunity to 
respond to the untimely request. If the presiding officer grants a 
request for oral argument, any hearing held on the application shall be 
conducted in accordance with the hybrid hearing procedures. In essence, 
those procedures limit the time available for discovery and require 
that an oral argument be held to determine whether any contentions must 
be resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no party to the proceedings 
requests oral argument, or if all untimely requests for oral argument 
are denied, then the usual procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, 
apply.
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated March 20, 1998, as supplemented by 
letter dated May 28, 1998, which is available for public inspection at 
the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room 
located at the Callaway County Public Library, 710 Court Street, 
Fulton, Missouri 65251.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of July 1998.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Kristine M. Thomas,
Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-2, Division of Reactor Projects 
III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-18545 Filed 7-10-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P