[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-10777

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 9:19-cr-80024-RAR-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

PAUL E. SENAT, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(June 14, 2021)

Before JORDAN, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Paul Senat appeals his convictions and sentences for theft of government 

money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, and aiding and assisting the preparation of 

false tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). On appeal, he first argues 

that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because the jury’s verdict was 

inconsistent and because the government failed to present direct evidence that he 

prepared the tax returns. Next, he argues that the district court erred in denying his 

motion for mistrial based on a prejudicial statement by a witness because the 

statement was so damaging the curative instructions were insufficient. Next, he 

argues the district court incorrectly used an extrapolation method to calculate the 

total monetary loss because it should have investigated each tax return individually 

to show that any loss was due to fraud and not just negligence or mistake. Finally, 

he argues that the district court erred in assessing a two-step guideline 

enhancement for being a leader of a criminal scheme because he did not direct the 

actions of any other tax preparer.

I.

We review “de novo whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to 

support a jury’s verdict in a criminal trial, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government, and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor 

of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 

2009). The district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal “will be 

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upheld if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the evidence establishes the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Rodriguez, 218 

F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000). The test is the same even where most of the 

evidence is circumstantial. United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1114 (11th Cir. 

1994).

“It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, 

provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir. 

1990). This is so because “[a] jury is free to choose among reasonable 

constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th 

Cir. 1983) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, we must sustain a verdict where 

“there is a reasonable basis in the record for it.” United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 

1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).

We assume that “the jury made all credibility choices in support of the 

verdict.” United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir. 2016). 

Additionally, “[e]ach count in an indictment is separately considered,” meaning 

that “inconsistency between verdicts on different counts of the indictment does not 

vitiate convictions on those counts of which the defendant is found guilty.” United 

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States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir.), modified, 801 F.2d 378 (11th 

Cir. 1986).

It is illegal to knowingly receive, conceal, or retain stolen government 

money or property with the intent to convert it to one’s own use or gain. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 641. In order for a defendant to be convicted of theft of government property 

under 18 U.S.C. § 641, the government must establish that “(1) the money 

described in the indictment belonged to the United States or an agency thereof; 

(2) the defendant appropriated the property to his own use; and (3) the defendant 

did so knowingly with intent to deprive the government of the money.” United 

States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2015). “[T]o establish the 

requisite criminal intent, the government need only prove that defendant 

knowingly used government property for [his] own purpose[] in a manner that 

deprived the government of the use of that property.” Id. (quotation marks 

omitted, second and third alterations in original).

To prove a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), the government must show that 

the defendant (1) willfully and knowingly aided or assisted (2) in the preparation or 

filing of a federal income tax return (3) that contained false material statements. 

See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2); United States v. Haynes, 573 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 

1978). The defendant does not need to sign or prepare the return to be prosecuted 

under this statute. United States v. Wolfson, 573 F.2d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 1978). 

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Willfulness is a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty” that 

does not require proof of evil motive or bad intent. United States v. Brown, 548 

F.2d 1194, 1199 (5th Cir. 1977). This is generally shown through circumstantial 

evidence, such as making false invoices or documents, concealing assets to hide 

the source of income, and any other conduct that misleads or conceals. Id. at 1199 

& n.14. 

There is sufficient evidence for the jury to have found Senat guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt for Counts 4 through 11.1

 The following evidence supports that 

Senat aided or assisted in the preparation or filing of the tax returns in question. 

For Count 4, de Jesus testified that Senat did her taxes, and evidence showed that 

Senat’s name and PTIN were on her 2012 tax return that claimed false business 

losses. For Counts 5 and 11, Leger testified that Senat did his taxes, and evidence 

showed that Senat’s name and PTIN were on his 2013 and 2014 tax returns that 

claimed false business losses. For Counts 6 and 10, Rovezzi testified that Senat 

did his taxes, and evidence showed that Senat’s name and PTIN were on his 2013 

and 2014 tax returns that claimed false business losses and AOC. For Counts 7 

and 9, Ehman testified that Senat did her taxes, and evidence showed that Senat’s 

name and PTIN were on her 2013 and 2014 tax returns that claimed false business 

1 Senat abandoned any challenge to Count 12 by failing to fairly raise the issue in his brief 

on appeal.

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losses. For Count 8, Culmer testified that Senat did her taxes, and evidence 

showed that Senat’s name and PTIN were on her 2014 tax return that claimed false 

business losses and AOC. Additionally, each preparer in the office had their own 

clients, and Senat had the most. He was also the person that filed for an EFIN for 

his business. Although Senat presented evidence that he may not have prepared 

these tax returns because other preparers would use his PTIN, he does not need to 

be the one who actually prepared and sent in the returns to be convicted under 26 

U.S.C. § 7206(2). Even if he did not press “send,” just registering for a PTIN and 

allowing someone else in his business to use his name and PTIN would count as 

“assisting” in the preparation of tax returns. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2); Wolfson, 573 

F.2d at 225. 

Next, the following evidence shows that the tax returns contained statements 

that Senat knew were false. The statements about private business losses and 

college attendance were all false. He filed false education credits on his own 

returns, showing that he knew how to claim the false education credits. It also 

shows that he did not claim the same AOC credits on other people’s tax returns by 

mistake. None of the clients asked for the false information to be on their return, 

and none provided any documentation that would cause Senat to put the business 

losses or claim the AOC on their returns. 

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Much of the same evidence also supports that Senat knowingly and willfully 

assisted in the preparation of tax returns. In particular, his name was listed as the 

preparer for the tax returns in question, which is evidence that he knew about and 

helped create the false returns. Additionally, the fact that he filed for false 

education credits on his own tax returns suggests that he was willing to do so on 

other returns. He also took classes on tax preparation through the IRS, suggesting 

that he had the expertise to maximize the EITC on the tax returns in this case. 

Also, he collected large fees without his clients’ knowledge, over $370,000 in 

2014, which was deposited into a business bank account that he was the sole owner 

of. Brown, 548 F.2d 1194, 1199 & n.14. This shows motive for assisting in 

preparing fraudulent tax returns.

There was also sufficient evidence to find Senat guilty of Count 2—i.e. theft 

of government money. First, the money still belonged to the government because 

it had not been cashed by the intended recipient, JetEx. Second, the money was 

deposited into Senat’s personal account that only he had access to, which means 

that he took the money for personal use. Third, the government presented evidence 

that he deposited it on the same day that he deposited another personal check into 

his account. Despite what Senat argues, there was no evidence presented that 

anyone else ever withdrew or deposited money into his personal account where 

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JetEx’s check was deposited, but rather, only that others would withdraw funds 

from Senat’s business account. 

Despite Senat’s argument about his signature not matching, Kahalani was 

not certified as an expert, and the jury could determine if her evaluation of whether 

the signatures matched was credible. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d at 1188. Besides, she 

testified that his signature on the other personal check that he deposited that day 

did not exactly match either. Based on this evidence, the jury could find that Senat 

endorsed both checks, even though his signatures did not match. 

Senat’s argument that it would have been impossible for him to steal the 

check also fails. To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 641, the government does not have 

to show how Senat obtained possession of the check. He just needed to knowingly 

use the check for his own purpose. Wilson, 788 F.3d at 1309. 

Finally, Senat argues that his conviction on Count 2 was inconsistent with 

the jury finding him not guilty of Counts 1 (fraudulent endorsement) and 3 

(identity theft). However, the jury considers each count separately, so it was 

possible for the jury to have reasonable doubt that Senat was guilty of Counts 1 

and 3, but to find him guilty of Count 2. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1229. This can be 

explained by the jury having reasonable doubt that Senat was the one who forged 

Howe’s signature (involving Counts 1 and 3) but nonetheless concluding that he 

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was guilty of Count 2 by depositing the check into his personal account in 

violation of § 641 (theft of government money).

Because the evidence supported Senat’s convictions, we reject these 

arguments.

II.

We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Saldarriaga, 987 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11th Cir. 1993). 

The district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is also reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides that a district court may 

“grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Improper comments require 

granting motion for a mistrial or new trial only “if the defendant’s substantial 

rights are prejudicially affected.” United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 

(11th Cir. 2007). “This occurs when there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Id. We “make 

this determination in the context of the entire trial and in light of any curative 

instruction.” Id. “[W]hen the record contains sufficient independent evidence of 

guilt, any error was harmless.” Id. A partial acquittal “alone is telling proof that 

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[the defendant] was not prejudiced” by an improper remark. United States v. 

Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted).

We have held that “[t]he voicing of potentially prejudicial remarks by a 

witness is common, and any prejudice is generally cured efficiently by cautionary 

instructions from the bench.” United States v. Delgado, 321 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th 

Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). Such an instruction “purges the taint of a 

prejudicial remark because a jury is presumed to follow jury instructions.” United 

States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1356 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). 

This is especially true when the district court acts “promptly and decisively.” See 

United States v. Eubanks, 876 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1989). “[W]hen a 

district court gives a curative instruction, the reviewing court will reverse only if 

the evidence is so highly prejudicial as to be incurable by the trial court’s 

admonition.” Delgado, 321 F.3d at 1347 (quotation marks omitted).

Senat fails to show that he was prejudiced by the witness’s statement 

because the jury acquitted him of five of the counts against him, and there was 

sufficient evidence to convict him of the remaining counts. Additionally, the 

district court acted promptly to issue curative instructions, and there is no evidence 

that they were insufficient. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying Senat’s motion for mistrial and motion for new trial. 

III.

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We review the district court’s determination of the loss amount for clear 

error. United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). The 

government has the burden to prove the losses attributed to the defendant by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. The Guidelines do not require that the 

sentencing court make a precise determination of loss. Id. “Instead, [a] sentencing 

court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available 

information.” Id. (quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). 

“At sentencing, the district court may take into account conduct for which 

the defendant was not charged or convicted, so long as the government proves such 

conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.” Wilson, 788 F.3d at 1317. Where 

the defendant challenges the loss amount calculation, the government must support 

it “with reliable and specific evidence.” Id. at 1318. 

“When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds 

on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any 

challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” 

United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268, 1277 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and 

alteration omitted). An appellant’s failure to plainly and prominently raise an issue 

on appeal by not “devot[ing] a discrete, substantial portion of his argumentation to 

that issue” abandons the issue. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 

(11th Cir. 2003) (determining that four passing references to an issue, including in 

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a sub-heading and in the summary of the argument, were insufficient to preserve 

the issue for appellate review); see also United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d 1306, 

1319 n.5 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Because [the appellant’s] claims are not designated as 

discrete issues in his brief to this Court and are not supported by legal authority 

and substantive analysis, they are not properly before us.”).

Senat does not challenge one of the two methods that the district court used 

to calculate total loss, abandoning that issue. Therefore, we may affirm this issue 

without reaching his arguments as to the court’s use of the extrapolation method.

IV.

The district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement for the 

“defendant’s role as an organizer or leader is a factual finding that we review for 

clear error.” United States v. Zitron, 810 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2016) 

(quotation marks omitted). In order to be clearly erroneous, the finding of the 

district court must leave us with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been committed.” United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(quotation marks omitted). 

The district court applies a two-level enhancement when a defendant is an 

organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in a criminal activity that involved at 

least one participant. Zitron, 810 F.3d at 1261; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). “[T]he 

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assertion of control or influence over only one individual is enough to support a 

§ 3B1.1(c) enhancement.” United States v. Phillips, 287 F.3d 1053, 1058 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). 

At the sentencing hearing, a former employee testified that Senat trained her 

to falsify tax returns. She also testified that Senat would review the returns she 

prepared and make further changes. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err 

in applying a guidelines enhancement for being a leader of criminal activity. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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