# United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 20 , 201 8 ∗

Decided July 23 , 201 8

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK , C ircuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON , Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE , Circuit Judge

No. 1 8

- 1518

PATRICIA WILLIAMS , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,

v
.
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT , et al., Defendant s

- Appell ees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin

.
No s
. 17

- cv
- 253

- bbc, 17

- cv
- 254

- bbc, 17

- cv
- 255

- bbc

Barbara B. Crabb , Judge

.

O R D E R
Patricia Williams, who both provided and receive d vocational rehabilitation services for years to and from the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, appeals the entry of summary judgment against her in this lawsuit asserting claims of

∗ We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantl y aid the court. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C ). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 18

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employment discrimination and retal iation. The district court determined that Williams offered no admissible evidence to support her claims. We affirm

. Williams ran a career
- placement business that entered into a service agreement in 2010 with the state’s Division of Vocational Rehabilitation , an agency that helps persons with disabilities obtain and maintain their job. In 2012 , however, the Department notified Williams that it intended t o terminate the service agreement because her business was not meeting expectations in provid ing quality services

. Williams, the Department added, also had engaged in an “unethical business practice” by directly soliciting business from individuals who sought vocational services from the Department. Williams then filed a complaint with the Departm ent’s Equal Rights Division, alleging that the Department had ended her service

- provider contract because of her disability (depression and diabetes) and race ( African American )

. T hat case remains pending

. Two other incidents with the Department followed i n 2015. That year Williams lost at an administrative hearing on a matter unrelated to this appeal , and then petitioned for judicial review in state court

. When the defendants sought to file the certified record of the administrative proceedings , she objected on grounds that the record contained “ confidential case file records

. ” The state c ourt overruled Williams’s objection and ultimately upheld the agency’s decision

. Also that year , Williams accused the Department of forging her signature on ch ecks it issued and then cash ing them without her consent. Both federal and state l aw
- enforcement agencies investigated her claim, but found no evidence of wrongdoing.

Later in 2015 Williams applied for a “ limited

- term ” (1400 hours) position in the Departme nt’s call center and was hired. But h er supervisor concluded that she did not retain the training information as well as her counterparts and reduced her tasks over the remainder of her term

. Around the same time, Williams applied for three full

- time positions with in the Department. She was interviewed for a position as an employment

- and

- training specialist but was passed over when the Department hired a candidate with stronger qualifications. She did not receive interviews for the other two positions because she failed the requisite civil service examination

. Williams brought three separate lawsuits against the defendants, alleging claims under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , a nd the Rehabilitation Act , 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq

.No. 18

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The district court consolidated the suits and allowed Williams to proceed o n her claims (1) that the defendants r efused to hire her and disclosed her “confidential” records in retaliation for her complaints about the Department , and (2) that the defendants discriminated against her based on her race, sex, se xual orientation and disability.
The d efendants moved for summary judgment and the d istrict court granted the motion

. Regarding Williams’s employment

- related discrimination and retaliation claims, t he court found that Williams submitted no evidence showing that th ose defendants in charge of hiring were aware

— when they passed her over for the employment

- and

- training specialist position

— of her disability, sexual orientation, or the internal c omplaints that she had made a gainst the Department

. As for the other two full

- time positions, t he court accepted the defendants’ explanation that there were other more qualified candidates and that Williams did not pass the required civil service
exam

. T he court also rejected Williams’s claim regarding the disclosure of her records as frivolous because the state court needed to access the certified record in order to review the administrative proceeding , and state law required it. See W IS

. S TAT

. A NN

. § 227.55 (West 2017 )

. On appeal Williams has not meaningfully developed the arguments in her brief,
see F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 28(a)(8), but we touch upon t wo arguments that we can discern. First, she a sserts that the defendants “did not show or prove that the discrimination did not happen.” But this misstates the burden of proof . I n order for Williams to stave off summary judgment, she had to introduce sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendants acted fo r an unlawful reason

. See Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. , 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)

. She did not.

Williams also asserts that the district court “created an unfair process” by not considering certain evidence she submitted

— specifically a d eclarat ion from her daughter, Shameeah Flowers , that was supplemented with attachments that included correspondence between the defendants and Williams a s well as copies of the allegedly forged checks

. But t he district court did not abuse its discretion by disregard ing the declaration because Williams failed to authenticate the attachments by explaining how her daughter had personal knowledge of them. F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c)(4 ) ; Bell v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’ n , 800 F.3d 360, 371 (7th Cir. 2015).

Williams also ra ises additional arguments in her reply brief for the first time , but arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived. See Laborers’ Pension Fund v. W.R. Weis Co., Inc. , 879 F.3d 760, 768 (7th Cir. 2018)

. W e have considered her remaining arg uments and none has merit.No. 18

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The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED