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- S05008

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NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

THERESA WILE

Appellant :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 636 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP

- 46

- CR

- 0008044

- 2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: Filed: April 22, 2021

Theresa Wile appeals from the judgment of sentence of three months of

probation, plus the costs of prosecution, imposed after she was convicted of

the summary offense of harassment. We affirm.

Succinctly, Appellan t’s convictions are based upon her sending scores of

hostile, expletive

- ridden text messages to the victim, with whom she has two

children, in between police welfare checks she initiated on the mornings of

October 11 and 12, 2018. A ppellant was charged wi th both misdemeanor and

summary harassment, but the Commonwealth ultimately proceeded on the

summary charge. At the subsequent non

- jury trial, the Commonwealth

entered the contents of these text messages into evidence through printouts

of screenshots that the victim had provided to police. The trial court convicted

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-

Appellant of summary harassment and ultimately sentenced Appellant as

detailed above.

Appellant timely appealed, and presents the following issues for this

Court’s review:

1. Whether the admi ssion of photographs of text messages

was an abuse of discretion and a misapplication of the best

evidence rule as codified by Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 1002

-

1004?

2. Whether the admission of photographs of text messages

was an abuse of discretion a nd a misapplication of the rule of

completeness as codified by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 106?

3. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] had the

requisite intent for harassment, the “intent to harass, annoy or

alarm?”

4. Whether the court erred in imposing costs of prosecution

and supervision fees on [Appellant], an indigent person, absent

consideration of her ability to pay?

Appellant’s brief at 3 (footnote, unnecessary capitaliz ation, and suggested

answers omitted).

The following informs our review of Appellant’s claims of error. As to

Appellant’s sufficiency challenge, we bear in mind:

Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope

of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,

we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most

favorable to the Common wealth as verdict winner, were sufficient

to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the

province of the fa ct

- finder to determine the weight to be accorded

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-

to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the

evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving

every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence. More over, as an appellate court, we may not re

- weigh

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact

finder.

Commonwealth v. Williams , 176 A.3d 298, 305

- 06 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Concerning Appellant’s challenge to the imposition of costs of

prosecution without first determining her ability to pay them , the issue

“implicates the interpretation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which

presents a question of law. Therefore, our standard of review is de novo , and

our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Lopez , ___ A.3d ___,

2021 WL 1096376 at *1 (Pa.Super. March 23, 2021) ( en banc ).

After a thorough review of the certified record, the parties ’ briefs and

the pertinent law, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion on the part

of the trial court as to the issues raised by Appellant, and we affirm the

judgment of sentence on the basis of the cogent and well

- reasoned opinion

that Honorable Steven T. O’Neill entered on June 4, 2020

. 1



### Specifically, Judge O’ Neill observed that neither the best evidence rule

nor the rule of completeness rendered inadmissible of the screenshots of the

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 

### The certified record does not include the printed copies of the screenshots

of Appellant’s text messages admitted into evidence at trial. However, Officer

James McVeigh read sufficient portions of them on the witness stand to enable

our review.

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- 4

-

text messages Appellant sent to the victim, where Appellant did not contend

the contents were altered or that portions of the exchange were omitted. See

Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/20, at 3

- 5. The trial court likewise aptly detailed why

the law and the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom,

supported his finding that Appellant sent he r voluminous, increasingly

- hostile

,

and threatening profanity

- laden message s with the intent to harass her victim

rather than for some legitimate purpose

. See id

. at 6

- 7 (citing, inter alia

,

Commonwealth v. Cox , 72 A.3d 719, 722 (Pa.Super. 2013) (holding fact

finder could properly infer from the totality of the circumstances that a

Facebook post was made with the intent to harass)

. See also N.T. Trial,

11/4/19, at 52

- 63 (reading contents of text messages which patently serve

no legitimate purpose ). Finally, Judge O’ Neill correctly explained that

Appellant was not entitled to a hearing on her ability to pay before being

sentenced to pay costs, as Pa.R.Crim.P. 706 requires a hearing only before

incarcerating a de fendant for failure to pay. Id . at 7

- 8 (citing, inter alia

,

Commonwealth v. Childs , 63 A.3d 323, 32 5 (Pa.Super. 2013) )

. See also

Lopez

, supra at *5 (reaffirming “ Childs ’ holding that a that a defendant is

not entitled to an ability

- to

- pay hearing before a court imposes court costs at

sentencing”). As to all of the foregoing points, we adopt Judge O’ Neill ’s

reasoning as our own.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date:4/22/21**Received 10/5/2020** **11:15:16 Filed** **10/5/2020 11:15:00** **PM Superior** **Court Eastern** **District 636** **EDA 2020** **IN THE** **COURT OF** **COMMON PLEAS** **OF MONTGOMERY** **COUNTY PENNSYLVANIA** **CRIMINAL DIVISION** **COMMONWEALTH OF** **PENNSYLVANIA :** **NO. 8044-18** **636 EDA** **2020 V.** **THERESA WILE** **OPINION O'NEILL,** **J. C:)** **• June** **7' 20k** **—4- xM-rCD** **•'• =** **••cam rt,** **The Defendant,** **Theresa Wile,** **appeals from** **the judgement** **of sentfFnce** **entered on** **January 21,** **2020. For** **the reasons** **set forth** **below, the** **judgn t** **of: sentence** **should be** **affirmed. I.** **Facts and** **Procedural History** **Early on** **the morning** **of October** **11, 2018,** **the Defendant** **sent police** **to the** **victim's home** **for a** **welfare check** **on the** **couple's two** **children. N.T.** **Nov. 4,** **2019 at** **21. That** **afternoon, the** **victim texted** **the Defendant** **about a** **dance their** **daughter was** **to attend** **that evening.** **Id. The** **victim testified** **that the** **messages began** **to get** **abusive, so** **he told** **the Defendant** **he would** **take their** **daughter to** **the dance.** **Id. On** **the morning** **of October** **12, 2018,** **the victim** **was awoken** **by the** **police knocking** **on his** **door to** **conduct another** **welfare check.** **Id. At** **that point,** **the victim** **saw nearly** **80 text** **messages from** **the Defendant** **that had** **been sent** **between 8:08** **p.m. and** **7:53 a.m.;** **the victim** **did not** **respond to** **any of** **the messages.** **Id. at** **28. The** **Defendant testified** **that it** **was a** **"continuous string"** **of messages.** **Id. at** **103. The** **Defendant had** **previously been** **advised not** **to contact** **the victim.** **Id. at** **46, 100.** **The majority** **of the** **messages contained** **obscene language.** **For example,** **she texted,** **"Fuck 1** **you. I** **said don't** **do that,** **you fucking** **pig. Fuck** **you. Fuck** **you fucking** **treacherous fucking** **cocksucking pussy** **whipped cunt** **bag fucker.** **IRS mother** **fucking one** **bitch. Yeah,** **I realize** **what's going** **on, dickhead.** **Nope, dumbass.** **Try again."** **Id. at** **56. The** **victim went** **to the** **Lansdale police** **department and** **showed police** **the texts.** **Id. at** **22. Officer** **McVeigh photographed** **some of** **the text** **with a** **patrol phone** **and ultimately** **asked the** **victim to** **sereenshot the** **messages and** **email them** **to him.** **Id. at** **52. Following** **a trial** **by bench',** **the Defendant** **was convicted** **of a** **summary charge** **of harassment.** **On January** **21, 2020** **she was** **sentenced to** **a three** **month term** **of probation** **and ordered** **to pay** **the costs** **of prosecution.** **The Defendant** **filed a** **post-sentence motion,** **which this** **Court denied** **on February** **6, 2020.** **This appeal** **followed. The** **Defendant was** **directed, pursuant** **to Pa.** **R.A. P.** **1925 (b)** **to file** **a concise** **statement of** **errors; she** **has since** **complied with** **that directive.** **II. Issues** **The Defendant** **raises the** **following issues** **in her** **concise statement:** **1. Appellant** **challenges the** **denial of** **the Motion** **in Limine.** **See, November** **4, 2019** **Order. The** **use of** **photographs did** **not satisfy** **the "best** **evidence" rules** **under Pa.** **R.E. 1002** **and 1004.** **2. Appellant** **challenges the** **denial of** **the Motion** **in Limine.** **See, November** **4, 2019** **Order. The** **use of** **photographs did** **not satisfy** **the rule** **of completeness** **set forth** **in Rule** **106 of** **the Pa.** **Rules of** **Evidence. '** **She was** **simultaneously convicted** **in the** **matter indexed** **at 8045-18** **and sentenced** **to a** **consecutive three** **months' probation.** **The appeal** **of that** **matter is** **addressed separately** **in the** **appeal indexed** **at 637** **EDA 2020.** **18 Pa.** **C.S.A. §** **2709(a)(3). 2** **3. Appellant** **challenges the** **sufficiency of** **the evidence** **with regard** **to the** **requisite intent** **of Count** **2, Harassment.** **4. Appellant** **challenges the** **imposition of** **costs and** **supervision fees** **without consideration** **of Ms.** **Wile's ability** **to pay.** **III. Discussion** **In her** **first two** **issues, the** **Defendant challenges** **the admission** **of screenshots** **of the** **text messages** **she sent** **to the** **victim. First,** **she claims** **that the** **screenshots do** **not satisfy** **the "best** **evidence rule"** **and second,** **she claims** **that the** **admission of** **screenshots violated** **the "rule** **of completeness."** **It is** **well settled** **that, "[a]dmission** **of evidence** **is within** **the sound** **discretion of** **the trial** **court and** **will be** **reversed only** **upon a** **showing that** **the trial** **court clearly** **abused its** **discretion." Commonwealth** **v. Drumheller,** **808 A.2d** **893, 904** **(Pa. 2002).** **"An abuse** **of discretion** **is not** **merely an** **error of** **judgment, but** **is rather** **the overriding** **or misapplication** **of the** **law, or** **the exercise** **of judgment** **that is** **manifestly unreasonable,** **or the** **result of** **bias, prejudice,** **ill-will or** **partiality, as** **shown by** **the evidence** **of record."** **Commonwealth v.** **Harris, 884** **A.2d 920,** **924 (Pa.** **Super. 2005),** **appeal denied,** **593 Pa.** **726, 928** **A.2d 1289** **(2007). This** **standard also** **applies to** **rulings on** **a motion** **in limine.** **Commonwealth v.** **Parker, 104** **A.2d 17** **(Pa. Super.** **2014) (citation** **omitted). The** **Rules of** **Evidence provide:** **"[a]n original** **writing, recording,** **or photograph** **is required** **in order** **to prove** **its content** **unless these** **rules, other** **rules prescribed** **by the** **Supreme Court,** **or a** **statute provides** **otherwise." Pa.R.E.** **1002. This** **rule corresponds** **to the** **common law** **"best evidence** **rule." 3** **Pa. R.E.** **1002, cmt.** **The comment** **to the** **rule further** **notes that,** **there are** **four reasons** **justifying the** **rule: (1)** **The exact** **words of** **many documents,** **especially operative** **or dispositive** **documents, such** **as deeds,** **wills or** **contracts, are** **so important** **in determining** **a party's** **rights accruing** **under those** **documents. (2)** **Secondary evidence** **of the** **contents of** **documents, whether** **copies or** **testimony, is** **susceptible to** **inaccuracy. (3)** **The rule** **inhibits fraud** **because it** **allows the** **parties to** **examine the** **original documents** **to detect** **alterations and** **erroneous testimony** **about the** **contents of** **the document.** **(4) The** **appearance of** **the original** **may furnish** **information as** **to its** **authenticity. Pa.R.E.** **1002, cmt.** **(citing 5** **Weinstein &** **Berger, Weinstein's** **Evidence §** **1002(2) (Sandra** **D. Katz** **rev. 1994)).** **The Rule** **of Completeness** **provides, "[i]f** **a party** **introduces all** **or part** **of a** **writing or** **recorded statement,** **an adverse** **party may** **require the** **introduction, at** **that time,** **of any** **other part--or** **any other** **writing or** **recorded statement--that** **in fairness** **ought to** **be considered** **at the** **same time."** **Pa. R.** **E. 106.** **Neither rule** **is applicable.** **First, the** **Defendant misapprehends** **the purpose** **of the** **best evidence** **rule. "[T]he** **best evidence** **rule exists** **to prevent** **a witness** **from misrepresenting** **the content** **of a** **piece of** **evidence "** **Commonwealth v.** **Janda, 14** **A.3d 147,** **162 (Pa.** **Super. 2011).** **Instantly, the** **victim took** **his phone** **to the** **police station** **and showed** **officers the** **more than** **80 abusive** **messages sent** **by the** **Defendant. He** **then took** **screenshots of** **the messages** **and emailed** **them to** **the investigating** **officers. The** **Defendant admitted** **that she** **sent the** **messages, but** **argued that** **the police** **were required** **4 to** **download the** **contents of** **the victim's** **phone to** **obtain the** **messages. N.T.** **Nov. 4,** **2019 at** **13. The** **Defendant made** **no argument** **that the** **messages were** **altered or** **inaccurate, only** **that they** **were turned** **over by** **the victim** **and should,** **thus, be** **considered unreliable.** **The Commonwealth** **admitted the** **screenshots of** **the messages** **into evidence.** **Commonwealth Exhibits** **C-1 through** **C-5. Had** **the Commonwealth** **only presented** **the victim's** **testimony regarding** **the contents** **of the** **messages, without** **the admission** **of the** **messages themselves,** **the Defendant** **could raise** **a colorable** **best evidence** **argument. Likewise,** **the police** **were not** **required to** **download the** **victim's phone** **for the** **messages to** **be admissible.** **See, Janda** **at 162.** **(finding that** **Commonwealth was** **not required** **to admit** **memory card** **from a** **digital camera;** **photographs obtained** **from that** **camera were** **admissible). Therefore,** **this claim** **is without** **merit and** **must fail.** **Likewise, the** **rule of** **completeness does** **not apply.** **The Court** **notes that** **while the** **Defendant raised** **the rule** **of completeness** **in her** **Motion in** **Limine, she** **did not** **present argument** **on that** **issue, which** **this Court** **submits may** **constitute waiver.** **Even if** **this issue** **was not** **waived, it** **is wholly** **meritless. There** **was no** **evidence that** **the text** **messages were** **taken out** **of context** **or that** **there were** **additional messages** **that were** **not introduced** **into evidence.** **By her** **own admission,** **the Defendant** **sent a** **string of** **unanswered messages,** **thus there** **were no** **other messages** **to be** **admitted and** **this claim** **is without** **merit. The** **Defendant's next** **claim is** **that the** **evidence was** **insufficient to** **convict her** **of harassment.** **It is** **well settled** **that, [i]n** **reviewing the** **sufficiency of** **the evidence,** **we are** **required to** **view the** **evidence, and** **all permissible** **inferences to** **be drawn** **5 therefrom,** **in the** **light most** **favorable to** **the Commonwealth,** **as verdict** **winner. The** **test is** **whether, taking** **as true** **the evidence** **most favorable** **to the** **Commonwealth, together** **with all** **reasonable inferences** **therefrom, the** **evidence is** **sufficient to** **prove appellant's** **guilt beyond** **a reasonable** **doubt. Commonwealth** **v. Ruffin,** **463 A.2d** **1117, 1118-19** **(Pa. Super.** **1983) (citations** **omitted). "A** **person commits** **the crime** **of harassment** **when, with** **intent to** **harass, annoy** **or alarm** **another, the** **person engages** **in a** **course of** **conduct or** **repeatedly commits** **acts which** **serve no** **legitimate purpose."** **18 Pa.C.S.A.** **§ 2709** **(a)(3). "An** **intent to** **harass may** **be inferred** **from the** **totality of** **the circumstances."** **Commonwealth v.** **Cox, 72** **A.3d 719,** **721 (Pa.** **Super. 2013)** **(citation omitted).** **"[The Superior** **Court] has** **held that** **"with intent** **to harass,"** **in phone-call** **related cases,** **requires a** **determination of** **whether the** **caller knew** **or should** **have known** **that the** **effect of** **the call** **would be** **to harass** **the listener.** **The use** **of obscene** **language and** **threats of** **death satisfy** **this requirement."** **Commonwealth v.** **Duda, 831** **A.2d 728,** **731 (Pa.** **Super. 2003)** **(citation omitted).** **Instantly, the** **Defendant sent** **the victim** **a "continuous** **string" of** **profanity laden** **text messages** **that became** **increasingly hostile** **as he** **did not** **respond to** **her. Commonwealth** **Exhibits C-1** **through C-5.** **As with** **a phone** **call, this** **Court submits** **that the** **use of** **obscenities and** **threats in** **a text** **message is** **sufficient to** **prove the** **intent to** **harass. .** **Nearly every** **message contained** **obscene language,** **as noted** **above. She** **also threatened** **to call** **the 6** **police, stating** **"Three minutes** **or you're** **going to** **see what** **I mean.** **911 is** **about to** **be called."** **N.T. Nov.** **4, 2019** **at 53.** **Clearly, based** **on the** **totality of** **the circumstances,** **the evidence** **was sufficient** **to prove** **that she** **intended to** **harass the** **victim. The** **texts did** **not pertain** **to the** **care and** **custody of** **their children** **and served** **no purpose** **other than** **to harass** **the victim.** **Therefore, this** **claim is** **without merit** **and must** **fail. In** **her final** **issue, the** **Defendant challenges** **the imposition** **of the** **costs of** **prosecution. While** **the Defendant** **did raise** **this claim** **in a** **post-sentence motion,** **she did** **not raise** **it at** **the time** **of sentencing** **when costs** **were imposed,** **thus she** **may have** **waived the** **issue. N.T.** **Jan. 21,** **2020 at** **19. Insofar** **as this** **claim may** **implicate the** **legality of** **the Defendant's** **sentence, which** **cannot be** **waived, she** **is due-** **no relief.** **Commonwealth v.** **Childs, 63** **A.3d 323,** **325 (Pa.** **Super. 2013)(stating** **that challenge** **to denial** **of hearing** **on inability** **to pay** **"contests the** **authority of** **the court** **to impose** **the costs** **at issue** **and, therefore,** **challenges the** **legality of** **his sentence").** **A defendant** **is not** **entitled to** **a pre** **sentence hearing** **on his** **ability to** **pay. Id.** **(citing Commonwealth** **v. Hernandez,** **917 A.2d** **332, 336-37** **(Pa. Super.** **2007)). Therefore,** **this claim** **is without** **merit and** **must fail.** **Pursuant to** **the Rules** **of Criminal** **Procedure, the** **"court shall** **not commit** **the defendant** **to prison** **for failure** **to pay** **a fine** **or costs** **unless it** **appears after** **hearing that** **the defendant** **is financially** **able to** **pay the** **fine or** **costs." Pa.** **R. Crim.** **P. 706** **(A). Accordingly,** **"[wJhile Rule** **706 "permits** **a defendant** **to 7** **demonstrate financial** **inability either** **after a** **default hearing** **or when** **costs are** **initially ordered** **to be** **paid in** **installments," the** **Rule only** **requires such** **a hearing** **prior to** **any order** **directing incarceration** **for failure** **to pay** **the ordered** **costs. Childs,** **63 A.3d** **at 326** **(citing Hernandez,** **917 A.2d** **at 337)(emphasis** **in original).** **In Hernandez,** **the Superior** **Court concluded** **that a** **hearing on** **ability to** **pay is** **not required** **at the** **time that** **costs are** **imposed: The** **Supreme Court** **... did** **not state** **that Fuller** **requires a** **trial court** **to assess** **the defendant's** **financial ability** **to make** **payment at** **the time** **of sentencing.** **In interpreting** **Fuller, numerous** **federal and** **state jurisdictions** **have held** **that it** **is not** **constitutionally necessary** **to have** **a determination** **of the** **defendant's ability** **to pay** **prior to** **or at** **the judgment** **of sentence....** **[We] conclude** **that Fuller** **compels a** **trial court** **only to** **make a** **determination of** **an indigent** **defendant's ability** **to render** **payment before** **he/she is** **committed. Hernandez,** **917 A.2d** **at 337.** **Thus, even** **if she** **had requested** **this Court** **to do** **so, this** **Court was** **not required** **to hold** **a hearing** **on the** **Defendant's ability** **to pay** **costs. In** **the event** **that the** **Defendant fails** **to make** **payment as** **ordered, at** **that time** **the court** **will be** **required to** **hold a** **hearing on** **his ability** **to pay.** **Fuller v.** **Oregon, 94** **S.Ct. 2116,** **2118, 417** **U.S. 40,** **40 (1974).** **The Court** **recognizes that** **this issue** **is currently** **awaiting en** **banc resolution** **before our** **Superior Court** **in the** **matters of** **Commonwealth v.** **Gary-Ravenell, J-E01004-20,** **2551 EDA** **2018, and/or** **Commonwealth v.** **Lopez, J-E01005-20,** **1313 EDA** **2018. Unless** **and until** **the Superior** **Court decides** **otherwise, precedent** **dictates that** **the Defendant** **is not** **entitled to** **an ability** **to pay** **hearing at** **the time** **of sentencing.** **8 IV.** **Conclusion Based** **on the** **foregoing, the** **judgement of** **sentence should** **be affirmed.** **BY THE** **COURT: STEVEN** **. O'NEILL** **J. Copy** **of the** **ab ve** **Opinion sent** **on •** **Jad to** **the following:** **Robert Falin,** **Esq. Lee** **: .** **rey, E** **Judicial ire** **istant 9**