NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 18

- 1399

____________ MANUEL CASTILLO

- LOPEZ , Petitioner

v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

____________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A200

- 864

- 012 )

____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 6 , 2018 Before: HARDIMAN , KRAUSE, and GREENBERG , Circuit Judges

. (Filed: November 8, 2018 )

____________ OPINION *

____________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge

. Manuel Castillo

- Lopez petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals . The BIA deemed Castillo

- Lopez ineligible for cancellation of removal because his New Jersey criminal conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)

. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review.
I 1
In 201 2 , Castillo

- Lopez was convicted of aggravated assault after he recklessly caused bodily injury to a uniformed police officer in violation of N.J. Stat. § 2C:12

- 1b(5) (a)

. Applying the modified categorical approach, t he BIA deemed that conviction a CIMT , which made Castillo

- Lopez ineligible for cancellation of removal

. In his petition for review, Castillo

- Lopez offers three chal lenges which we will address in turn.
A Castillo

- Lopez first claims N .J. Stat. § 2C:12

- 1b(5) is indivisible and thus not categorically a CIMT

. This argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Abdullah , -- F.3d

-- , 2018 WL 4702225, at *4 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 2018) . In that case, we stated that § 2C:12

- 1b not only is divisible into three altern ative degrees of condu ct, but

1 Whether Cast illo

- Lopez’s crime of conviction was a CIMT is a question of law, which we have jurisdiction to review under 8 U.S.C. § 1 252(a)(2)(D)

. See Mayorga v. Att’y Gen. , 757 F.3d 126, 128 n.2 (3d Cir. 2014) . We review de novo the BIA’s unpublished, single

- member decision , which is not entitled to Chevron deference. See Mahn v. Att’y Gen. , 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014)

.3 is also “further divisible into a number of different third

- degree aggravated assault offenses.” Id. And, as in Abdullah , the Model Criminal Jury Charge for § 2C:12

- 1b(5) indicates that New Jersey treats subsections (5)(a) through (5) (k) as separate elements.
See id. (considering New Jersey’ s jury instructions to determine whether § 2C:12

- 1b is divisible among subsections); New Jersey Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “ Aggravated Assault

- Upon Law Enforcement Officer (Attempting to Cause or Pur posely, Knowingly or Recklessly Causing Bodily Injury) (N.J.S.A. 2C:12

- 1b(5)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g)) ” (revised Dec. 3, 2001) n.1 (noting that the model jury instruction is drafted to address only aggravated assault against a law enforcement offic er and that, if a different subsection is at issue, the jury instruction “ must be adapted to fit the facts of [that] case” )

. Because the relevant state statute is divisible, the BIA did not err in applying the modified categorical approach to determine whi ch subsection of § 2C:12

- 1b(5) Castillo

Lopez violated.
B Castillo

- Lopez next argues that his conviction under § 2C:12

- 1b(5) is not a CIMT under th e modified c ategorical approach. Castillo

- Lopez concedes, as he must, that a review of his plea colloquy indicates that he violated subsection (a) of § 2C:12

- 1b(5) because he recklessly caused bodily injury to a “ law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibi ting evidence of his authority. ” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12

- 1b(5)(a) (West 2010) (effective Jan. 4, 2011 through April 19, 2012).4 The crux of Castillo

- Lopez’s argument is that he committed a simple assault, which is typically not a CIMT. And he argues the fac t that his victim was a law enforcement officer does not make his crime turpitudinous , even though New Jersey law elevated the crime to aggravated assault based on the status of the victim. We are unpersuaded by this argument. “[T] he hallmark of moral turpitude is a reprehensible act committed with an appreciable level of consciousness or deliberation. ” Partyka v. Att’y Gen. , 417 F.3d 408 , 414 (3d Cir. 2005)

. In our pri or analysis of the statute at issue here , we stated (in dicta ) that we would affirm a finding of moral turpitude for an intentional, knowing, or reckless infliction of bodily injury to a law enforcement officer

. See i d. at 416. And w e have observed elsewhere as well that certain serious criminal conduct committed recklessly may reflect moral turpitude. See Totimeh v. Att’y Gen. , 666 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012)

. In view of our prior decisions , we hold that the BIA did not err when it concluded that Castillo

- Lopez is ineligible for cancel l ation of removal for having committed a CIMT

. C Finally, Castillo

- Lopez contends that the CIMT statute ( 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) ) is void for vagueness as applied to him

. This argument is foreclosed by our decision in Moreno v. Attorney General , w here w e rejected a vagueness challenge to the same statute and emphasized that we have “consistently defined” the bounds of moral turpitude. 887 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2018)

. Moreover , Castillo

- Lopez cannot credibly claim he lacked fair notice of th e CIMT standard when5 we first recognized his crime a CIMT in 2005, well before his conviction

. See Partyka , 417 F.3d at 41 6

. * * * For the reasons stated , we will deny Castillo

- Lopez’s petition for review.