[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 17

- 13846 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:16

- cv - 14098

- RLR ANTRAEVIS SMITH, Petitioner

- Appellant,

versus SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents

- Appellees.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ ( January 28, 2020 ) Before WILLIAM PRYOR , ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 1 of 122 Antraevis Smith, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his counseled 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the state court unreasonably applied Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000) , or relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts , in concluding that the jury’s verdict legally supported his convictions and life sentences for robbery with a firearm and carjacking with a firearm. After careful review, we affirm the denial of habeas relief.
I. In 2009, the State of Florida charged Smith and two codefendants, Jamelle Davis and Derreck Littles, with carjacking with a deadly weapon , Fla. Stat. §§ 812.133 (2)(a) and 777.01 1 , and Smith and Littles with robbery with a deadly weapon while wearing a mask, Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(a), 777.01 1 , and 775.0845. Davis pled guilty to carjacking with a deadly weapon and testified against Smith at his jury trial. The state declined to prosecute the charges against Littles. At trial, the victim, Duane Ambrister , testified about the robbery and carjacking. Late one night, he was sitting in his parked, running vehicle when two masked men with guns approached , knocked on the windows with the guns, and demanded that Ambrister open the doors. Ambrister unlocked the doors and got out of the vehicle. Upon seeing Ambrister, o ne of the masked men ran off. The other

man went through Ambrister’s pockets, taking $1,200 in cash, and then jumped in

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 2 of 123 the driver’s seat of the vehicle, which was still running, and drove off. Ambrister testified that he knew Smit h , but he did not believe that Smith was either of the two robbers

. Smith’s codefendant D avis testified that h e was involved in the carjacking and robbery with Smith and Littles. According to Davis, Smith and Littles executed the robbery while he waited in a nearby vehicle. Later that night, police pulled over Davis’s car and found the masks , glove s , and guns that were used in the robbery. In discussing the jury instructions, the parties and the court agreed not to include any lesser offenses . In other words, the y agreed to require the jury to find that the offenses were committed with a firearm in order to return a guilty verdict.
S eparately, t he parties and the court agreed to ask the jury t o find whether Smith personally possessed a firearm as t o each offense , which they viewed as a factual finding essential to the application of a mandatory minimum penalty , see Fla. Stat. § 775.087(2)(a). After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury as to carjacking , robbery , and aiding

- and

- abetting liabi lity

. With regard to carjacking, t he court stated , [T] o prove the crime of carjacking, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that Mr. Smith took the motor vehicle from the person or custody of Duane Ambrister

. Second, force, violence, assault or putting in fear was used in the course of the taking. And third, the taking was with the intent to temporarily Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 3 of 124 or permanently deprive Duane Ambrister of his right to the motor vehicle or any benefit from it. The cou rt continued, If you find the Defendant guilty of the crime of carjacking, then you must further determine beyond a reasonable doubt if in the course of committing the carjacking the Defendant carried some kind of weapon. An act is in the course of com mitting the carjacking if it occurs in the attempt to commit carjacking or in flight after the attempt or commission.
I f you find the Defendant carried a firearm or other deadly weapon in the course of the carjacking, you should find him guilty of carjacking with a firearm or deadly weapon.
T he trial court’s instructions for robbery followed the same pattern. The cour t first gave the elements for simple robbery and then stated, If you find the Defendant guilty of the crime of robbery, you must further determine beyond a reasonable doubt if in the course of committing the robbery, the Defendant carried some kind of wea pon. An act is in the course of committing the robbery if it occurs in an attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission. If you find the Defendant carried a firearm in the course of committing the robbery, you should find him g uilty of robbery with a firearm. Finally, t he trial court instructed the jury on aiding

- and

- abetting liabili ty as follows : If the Defendant helped another person or persons commit or attempt to commit a crime, the Defendant is a principal and must be treated as if he had done all the things the other person or persons did if the Defendant had a conscious intent that the criminal act be done and the Defendant did some act or said some word which was intended to and Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 4 of 125 which did incite, cause, encourage, as sist or advise the other person or persons to actually commit or attempt to commit the time. T o be a principal, the Defendant does not have to be present when the crime is committed or attempted. The verdict form asked the jury to find, as to Count I, w hether Smith was “Guilty, of Carjacking with a Firearm,” or not guilty, and, as to Count II, whether Smith was “Guilty, of Robbery with a Firearm,” or not guilty. Under both counts, the verdict form stated , “ If you find the defendant guilty you must now m ake a further finding. Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense? ” The trial court went over the verdict form but did not clarify how “actual[] possess[ion]” differed from
t he standard applicable to the charged offenses. While deliberating, the jury sent a question asking whether it could check “guilty” to the charge s but “no” as to whether it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith “actually possessed a firearm during th e offense[s].” The prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that the jury could do so, if its decision was unanimous. The court responded to the question: “Members of the jury, yes, if the finding is unanimous.” The jury then returned a verdict, finding Smith guilty of both counts but checking “no” as to whether Smith actually possessed a firearm during the commission of the offenses. The court adjudicated Smith guilty and sentenced him
to concurrent life sentenc es.

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 5 of 126 Subsequently, Smith filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a), raising the subject of his instant § 2254 petition. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Smith’s sentences were not illegal. The c ourt concluded that the jury was able to find Smith guilty as charged, despite finding that he did not personally possess a firearm during the commission of the offense s , because the jury was instructed on aiding

- and

- abetting liability under Fla. Stat. § 7 77.011. Smith appealed, and the state appellate court summarily affirmed

. Smith then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition . The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied the petition

. Smith now appeals , and we granted a COA on the following issue: “[w]hether the state court unreasonably applied Apprendi [], or relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts, in concluding that Mr. Smith’s convictions and concurrent life sentences for robbery with a firearm and carjacking with a firearm were legally supported by the jury’s verdict.”
II. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, “but we owe deference to the final state habeas judgment.” Reed v. Sec ’ y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr. , 593 F.3d 1217, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). Specifically, under the Antiterroris m and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA” ), w here a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a federal

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 6 of 127 court may grant habeas relief only if the state

- court decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clear ly established F ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the S tate court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). “The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable

— a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan , 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). A state cou rt unreasonably applies clearly establish ed federal law if it correctly identifies the governing legal principl e but unreasonably applie s that principle to the facts. Borden v. Allen , 646 F.3d 785, 817 (11th Cir. 2011). To be “objectively unreasonable,” the state court’s ruling must be more than incorrect

— it must be “ so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Similarly, the “unreasonable determination of the facts” prong does not permit habeas relief “merely because we would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance” or if “reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.” Brumfield
v. Cain , 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) ( cleaned up).

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 7 of 128 Smith’s claim is based on Apprendi

. In Apprendi , the Supreme Court held that the “notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment” require that, “[o] ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 476, 490. The “statutory maximum,” for purpo ses of Apprendi , “is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant .” Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in original). Therefore, a judge may not lawfully “ inflict [] punishment that the jury ’ s verdict alone does not allow ” because “ the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment

. ” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Under Florida law, the basic versions of carjack ing and robbery are punishable by maximum terms of imprisonment of thirty and fifteen years, respectively. See Fla. Stat. §§ 812.133(2)(b), 775.082(3)(b)(1); Fla. Stat. §§ 812.13(2)(c), 775.082(3)(d). If the defendant carried a firearm or other deadly

we apon in the course of committing the offenses, however, t he statutory maximum increases to life imprisonment. Fla. Stat. §§ 812.133(2)(a), 812.13(2)(a). Additionally, F lorida “punishes aiders and abettors the same the same as principal offenders.” Bosto n v. United States , 939 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2019); see Fla.
Stat. § 777.011 ( “ W hoever commits any criminal offense . . . , or aids, abets,

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 8 of 129 counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attem pted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such.” ). Smith argues that his life sentences clearly violate Apprendi because the trial court did not instruct the jury as to the essential firearm or deadly weapon element of the offenses and the jury found he did not actually possess a firearm. As a result, in Smith’s view, the jury failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that either he or a codefendant carried a firearm during the offense s . Based on the jury’s verdict alone, according to Smith, he “ can only be sentenced for simple carjacking (thirty

- year maximum sentence) and simple robbery (fifteen

- year maximum sentence)

. ” Here, Smith has not shown that the state court unreasonably applied Apprendi or relied on an unreasonable determ ination of facts. While the jury instructions and verdict form are not models of clarity, the record contradicts Smith’s claim that t he trial court failed to instruct the jury as to the firearm or deadly weapon element of the offenses. The verdict form s pecifically asked the jury to find whether Smith was “Guilty, of Robbery with a Firearm,” and “Guilty, of Carjacking with a Firearm.” And the essential elements of those offenses were included in the jury instructions. After instructing the jury on the e lements of simple carjacking and robbery, the trial court stated that, if the jury found Smith guilty of those elements, it “must further determine beyond a reasonable doubt if in the course of committing [the offenses]

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 9 of 1210 the Defendant carried some kind of w eapon.” And if the jury found that Smith

“ carried a firearm, ” the court instructed, it “should find him guilty of [carjacking or robbery] with a firearm.” Thus, the jury was properly instructed that, to find Smith guilty of the charged offenses, it must find that he carried a firearm. See Fla. Stat. §§ 812.133(2)(a), 812.13(2)(a). Smith faults the trial court for failing to specifically instruct the jury that Smith could be found guilty of the charged offenses “if any of the defendants carried a firearm or other deadly weapon.” Appellant’s Br. at 12 n.3. Instead, according to Smith, the instructions asked the jur y to find only whether “the Defendant” carried a firearm, but in response to the interrogatory on the verdict form , the jury specifically found that he did not “actually possess[] a firearm during the offense[s].” While we agree that the trial court cou ld have done more to clarify how “actual[] possess[ion]” as used in the interrogatory differed from the standard applicable to the charged offenses , we cannot say that the denial of habeas relief was unreasonable. Although the jury ultimately found that S mith did not actually possess a firearm, the state post

- conviction court 1 reasonably concluded that the jury’s finding on that matter d id not undermine Smith’ s convictions or sentences because the jury was instructed on aiding

- and

- abetting liability

.

1 Because the Florida appellate court affirmed the post

- conviction court without issuing an opinion, we “look through” to the lower court’s reasoning and presume that it reflects the higher court’s reasons for affirming. See Wilson v. Sellers , 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 10 of 1211 Under § 777.011, Fla. Stat., which was alleged in the charging document, Smith could still be convicted of and punished for committing the charged offenses with a firearm even if he did not personally possess a firearm. S ee Lopez v. State , 833 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“ The law of principals allows Lopez to be convicted of [ carjacking with a firearm and robbery with a firearm ] regardless of whether he personally possessed a firearm, even if he could not b e given a minimum mandatory sentence. ”). Under that liability doctrine, as the trial court instructed the jury, Smith “must be treated as if he had done all the things the other
person or persons did” if he aided or abetted that other person. For that re ason, the trial court did not need to specify that the jury could find Smith guilty if someone other than Smith carried a firearm. And there was evidence that Smith aided or abetted a carjacking and robbery during which a firearm was carried and brandishe d. Thus, the jury’s verdict, viewed in light of the jury instructions, reasonably reflects a finding that Smith aided or abetted a co defendant who carried a firearm during the offenses , and therefore is treated as if he carried a firearm, but that he did
not in fact personally carry a firearm. See Blakely , 542 U.S. at 303

. That is a legally valid and consistent verdict under Florida law. See Lopez , 833 So. 2d at 284 (affirming convictions in similar circumstances). Be cause n o additional factual findings were necessary to sentence Smith to concurrent life sentences based on that

Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 11 of 1212 verdict , s ee Fla. Stat. §§ 812.13(2)(a), 812.133(2)(a ) , his sentences do not violate Apprendi

. In sum, the record reasonably supports the state court’s decision that Smith was properly convicted of and sentenced for armed carjacking and armed robbery. Despite the less

- than

- clear jury instructions, reasonable minds might disagree as to whether the jury “ fou nd all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment.” Blakely , 542 U.S. at 303. Even if we might have decided the matter different ly had it been our call in the first instance, Smith has not established “ an error well understood and comprehe nded in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter , 562 U.S. at 103 . Giv ing due deference to the state court’s decision, we must affirm the denial of Smith’ s § 2254 petition. AFFIRMED. Case: 17-13846 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 12 of 12