SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5068-17T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JALIYL AMAKER, a/k/a 

JAMALL BROWN, JALIL 

BROWN, JAYLIL AMAKER, 

JALIYL S. AMAKER, JALIVI S. 

AMAKER, JAVLIL AMAKER, 

JAYLIL TAYLOR, and JOLLI,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted November 4, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti, Mawla, and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 17-04-0256.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 14, 2020
2

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Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, 

on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon and other offenses. Defendant appeals from his 

judgment of conviction dated May 21, 2018. For the following reasons, we 

affirm defendant's convictions and sentence.

I.

In January 2017, a 9-1-1 caller reported that there was a man flashing a 

gun on a street in Jersey City and threatening to shoot people. The responding 

officers observed a group of men at the identified location but only the defendant 

matched the description provided by the 9-1-1 caller. As the defendant 

approached the officers, one of the responding officers saw a handgun 

protruding from his waistband. 

Defendant then grabbed the handgun from his waistband, turned, and ran 

from the responding officers followed by Reonte Oliver. One officer testified 

that Oliver yelled out "throw the gun, throw the gun" to defendant. Defendant 

threw the gun from his waistband and discarded it as he crossed the street. The 

handgun was later described by one of the officers as "gigantic," and had a 
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A-5068-17T1

magazine loaded with eight .45 caliber bullets with an additional bullet in the 

chamber.

Defendant was ultimately tackled and during a search incident to arrest, 

the police seized a handgun magazine loaded with eight bullets in defendant's 

jacket. The officers also arrested Oliver. 

Defendant was later charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a 

weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count one); fourth-degree possession of a 

defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d) (count two); fourth-degree obstruction of 

the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (count three); fourth-degree 

resisting arrest by flight, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2) (count four); fourth-degree 

possession of a large capacity magazine, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (count five); thirddegree hindering his own apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (count six); and 

second-degree certain persons not to possess a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1) 

(count eight). Oliver was charged with third-degree hindering the apprehension 

of another, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(4).

The morning of jury selection, defendant moved to sever his case from 

Oliver's. Defendant argued that trying the cases together would be unfairly 

prejudicial because the State intended to introduce Oliver's statement directing 

defendant to "throw the gun" which was averse to his interests. When asked by 
4

A-5068-17T1

the court why defendant's counsel waited so long to make the motion, counsel 

stated she thought "there [wa]s no co-defendant in this case." The State opposed 

the motion as untimely and noted that defendant's counsel was fully aware of 

Oliver's status as a co-defendant, having received previous orders of the court 

which identified Oliver as such. 

The court noted that the motion practice in the case included Oliver's

application to dismiss the indictment and the State's motion to admit the 911 

call, which were "filed, heard, [and] ruled upon" and as such, defendant's

counsel would have received notifications of the court's rulings which confirmed

Oliver's status as a co-defendant. The court accordingly denied defendant's 

motion and characterized it as "terribly out of time" as all motions were to be 

filed no later than June 5, 2017, approximately nine months prior to the date on 

which defendant filed his severance application. The court also found that 

defendant had "ample opportunity" to make a timely application and that there 

was no newly discovered evidence unavailable to defendant prior to making the 

motion. 

During jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to 

excuse four African-American jurors. The first excused juror stated he had 

previously testified in court when "somebody claimed to be [him], got a ticket, 
5

A-5068-17T1

didn't pay it, [and the court] sent out a bench warrant." He explained that he 

offered proof about the mistaken identity issue, but the officer refused to state

whether he recognized him. When the prosecutor sought clarification as to how 

this affected his views of the justice system and police, the juror stated, "I just 

didn't appreciate the way he didn't acknowledge that I wasn't the person." 

A second excused juror stated she was a probation officer, had a degree 

in social work, and had a cousin incarcerated for attempted murder. A third 

juror explained how he had previously served as a juror in a civil case in the 

Bronx. Finally, the fourth juror, when explaining his views on gun control, 

stated "I don't think guns are the problem, guns have never been the problem, 

it's stupid people with guns." 

The court, sua sponte, addressed the State's challenges with the prosecutor

who offered non-race-based reasons for dismissing each juror. Regarding the 

juror who was issued an erroneous bench warrant, the prosecutor explained he

was "afraid that [the juror] would not believe the officer's testimony" which was 

significant as the evidence was "completely officer-based." With respect to the 

juror who was employed as a probation officer, the prosecutor noted that because 

a family member was incarcerated and she served as a probation officer, he

"didn't want somebody who was dealing with criminals on a daily basis" serving 
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as a juror. As to the juror who had previously served on a jury in the Bronx, the 

prosecutor explained that he "attempted to make eye contact with him more than 

once" and the juror "looked back towards the defense a number of times." 

Finally, the prosecutor stated the fourth juror was excused because "[t]he stupid 

people with guns comment bothered" him and he was concerned regarding 

potential jury nullification. 

The court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial and explained that it 

"recall[ed] the comment about stupid people carrying guns" and that the juror 

who experienced mistaken identity seemed "a bit annoyed." The court also 

found the probation officer "ha[d] much contact with criminal defendants" and 

"could lead one to believe that she may be a little bit softer or more lenient" on 

defendant. The court concluded that the prosecutor's decision to strike the four 

African-American jurors was "simply coincidental" and "not an effort to purge 

the jury of African-Americans." 

At trial, defendant stipulated that he did not have a permit to carry a 

firearm. A detective for the State Police Ballistics Unit testified that the gun 

was operable, the magazine held .45 caliber ammunition which fit into 

defendant's gun, was capable of being fired with the magazine, and the serial 

number had been grinded off. On the State's application, the court dismissed 
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A-5068-17T1

count five because the ballistics expert concluded the gun only carried fourteen 

bullets, not fifteen as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j).

After the State rested, Oliver moved for a judgment of acquittal, which 

the court granted. The court determined that Oliver's statement was not

admissible against defendant because "the prejudice far outweigh[ed] any 

relevance." The court then instructed the jury as follows:

I've struck those statements from the record. They are 

not evidence. When you return to deliberate at the end 

of this case, you cannot consider those statements as 

evidence.

Now I don't expect that you can erase that from your 

mind. I know the mind is not a tape recorder. In 

instructing you on that, what I'm telling you is, you 

have to remember those statements and remember that 

you cannot use [them]. They can't come up during the 

deliberations, they can play no role.

They had only been admitted as they related to Mr. 

Oliver. As you know, he's not here, so the statements 

play no role in this case and the case against Mr. 

Amaker.

During the jury charge, the court again instructed the jury that Oliver's 

statement was not evidence and could not "be considered by you in your 

deliberations in this matter." The jury found defendant guilty of counts one, 

two, three, four, and six. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to count eight, 

which was bifurcated from the trial. 
8

A-5068-17T1

At sentencing, the State made an application for an extended term 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), and defendant conceded his prior conviction

for aggravated assault with a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4), subjected him to 

a mandatory extended term which converted his sentencing exposure for his 

second-degree charge from five to ten years to the range for a first-degree crime, 

or ten to twenty years. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a). The court reviewed defendant's 

prior arrests and convictions and noted "a history that is replete with violent 

behavior." 

After concluding that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the 

nonexistent mitigating factors, the court imposed the following prison term for 

each count: 1) sixteen years subject to eight years of parole ineligibility,

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) for count one; 2) separate eighteen-month 

sentences for counts two, three, and four; 3) five years for count six; and 4) ten 

years subject to five years of parole ineligibility for count eight. The court found 

the sixteen-year sentence imposed on count one "sufficient" and ordered the 

remaining sentences to run concurrent to the sentence imposed on count one. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions: 

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD 

THAT DEFENDANT'S SEVERANCE MOTION 

WAS UNTIMELY AND REFUSED TO 

CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THAT MOTION. 
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A-5068-17T1

A. [THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 

WHEN IT REFUSED TO 

CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 

SEVERANCE MOTION AND 

INSTEAD FOUND THAT IT WAS 

MADE OUT OF TIME.]

B. [THE SEVERANCE MOTION 

SHOULD HAVE BEEN 

GRANTED.] 

C. [THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS 

IN FAILING TO SEVER THE 

CASES WAS COMPOUNDED 

WHEN JUDGMENT OF 

ACQUITTAL WAS GRANTED 

FOR THE CO-DEFENDANT 

AFTER HIS PREJUDICIAL AND 

INADMISSIBLE STATEMENT 

HAD ALREADY BEEN 

ADMITTED AT TRIAL.]

D. [THE TRIAL COURT'S 

CURATIVE INSTRUCTION WAS 

INSUFFICIENT TO CURE THE 

TAINT CAUSED BY THE 

FORMER CO-DEFENDANT'S 

PREJUDICIAL STATEMENT.] 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED 

THAT THE STATE'S USE OF PEREMPTORY 

CHALLENGES TO EXCUSE FOUR 

AFRICAN-AMERICAN JURORS WAS BASED

UPON LEGITIMATE NONDISCRIMINATORY REASONS. 
10 A-5068-17T1

III. DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY 

EXCESSIVE AND MUST BE REDUCED. 

II.

In his first point, defendant challenges the court's severance decision on 

both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, he contends the court 

abused its discretion in denying the motion as untimely as good cause existed 

for the court to consider the merits of his application. Substantively, he 

maintains that the severance application should have been granted as he was 

prejudiced by the jury considering then co-defendant Oliver's statement to

"throw the gun, throw the gun," notwithstanding the court's limiting instructions. 

We disagree with both of these arguments. 

The applicable law of severance is clear. "Two or more defendants may 

be tried jointly 'if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 

transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense 

or offenses.'" State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 159-60 (2001) (quoting R. 3:7-7).

Courts generally prefer to try co-defendants jointly, "particularly when 'much of 

the same evidence is needed to prosecute each defendant.'" Id. at 160 (quoting 

State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 605 (1990)). "That preference is guided by a need 

for judicial efficiency, to accommodate witnesses and victims, to avoid 
11 A-5068-17T1

inconsistent verdicts, and to facilitate a more accurate assessment of relative 

culpability." Ibid.

A single joint trial, however, may not take place at the expense of a 

defendant's right to a fair trial. State v. Sanchez, 143 N.J. 273, 290 (1996).

When considering a motion for severance, a trial court should "balance the 

potential prejudice to defendant's due process rights against the State's interest 

in judicial efficiency." Brown, 118 N.J. at 605 (quoting State v. Coleman, 46 

N.J. 16, 24 (1965)).

Courts apply a rigorous test for granting severance. Brown, 170 N.J. at 

160. A mere claim of prejudice is insufficient to support a motion to sever. 

State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 274 (1988). A defendant also does not have the 

right to severance simply because he or she believes that a separate trial "would 

offer defendant a better chance of acquittal." State v. Johnson, 274 N.J. Super. 

137, 151 (App. Div. 1994) (quoting State v. Morales, 138 N.J. Super. 225, 231

(App. Div. 1975)). 

"A motion for separate trial of counts of an indictment or accusation must 

be made pursuant to [Rule] 3:10-2, unless the court, for good cause shown, 

enlarges the time." R. 3:15-2(c). Typically, post-indictment motions must be 

made by the initial case disposition conference and a pre-trial motion should be 
12 A-5068-17T1

determined before the trial memorandum is prepared and the trial date is fixed 

"unless the court, for good cause, orders it deferred for determination at or after 

trial." R. 3:10-2(b). 

Our scope of review on this issue is limited. The decision to sever rests 

within the trial court's discretion. State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 149 (2014). 

An appellate court will defer to the trial court's decision on a severance motion 

unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Ibid. 

In this matter, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider 

the defendant's severance application. The motion was made the morning of 

jury selection, well after the deadline imposed by the Rules. Further, while 

defendant offered lack of notice about the joint trial as a reason for the delay, 

the court's conclusion that defendant's explanation did not establish good cause 

under Rule 3:10-2 was amply supported by the record as defendant would have

been aware of his status as a co-defendant with Oliver based on the motion 

practice in the case, at a minimum.

Citing State v. McLaughlin, 205 N.J. 185, 206-08 (2011) and Bruton v. 

United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), defendant also contends that by failing to 

consider the severance motion, defendant's constitutional right to confront 

Oliver about his statement was violated. Defendant argues allowing the 
13 A-5068-17T1

statement was prejudicial because it created the inference that "defendant was, 

in fact, in possession of a gun." Defendant also contends: 1) the statement's

prejudice to defendant was "compounded" when a judgment of acquittal was 

granted for Oliver, 2) the statement was inadmissible hearsay, and 3) the court's 

curative instruction to the jury was "meaningless," citing State v. Vallejo, 198 

N.J. 122, 134 (2009), because the instruction was not "firm" or "clear." 

We conclude these arguments are substantively meritless as they ignore 

the practical effect of the court's dismissal of the charge against Oliver, its 

subsequent multiple limiting instructions, and the overwhelming evidence of 

defendant's guilt independent of Oliver's statement. 

First, as noted, when the court granted Oliver's motion for a judgment of 

acquittal, it effectively severed it from defendant's trial prior to the jury's 

deliberations. Second, the court provided two strongly worded limiting 

instructions that directed the jury to give no consideration to Oliver's statement. 

We assume and have no reason to doubt based on the record, that the jury heeded 

the court's instructions. See State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 335 (2007) ("One of 

the foundations of our jury system is that the jury is presumed to follow the trial 

court's instructions." (citing State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 526 (1998))). 
14 A-5068-17T1

Additionally, the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. See

State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 104 (2013) (affirming defendant's conviction 

despite improper joinder because of "the strong, independent proof of 

defendant's guilt"). Indeed, one of the responding officers who arrested 

defendant testified that he clearly saw a gun protruding from defendant's 

waistband, that defendant "grabbed at the handgun" before running from him, 

that he subsequently "discarded [the gun] on the street," and he heard the gun 

"ma[k]e a loud clanking noise when it hit the ground." The officer also 

identified the gun and the loaded magazine that defendant discarded, and a gun 

magazine and bullets found on defendant when he was arrested. A second

responding officer similarly testified to observing defendant in possession of the 

gun. 

Finally, the 9-1-1 call which the jury considered described an individual 

resembling defendant as in possession of a gun. The responding officers 

identified defendant as the only person who matched the description provided 

by the 911 caller. Thus, even if the court's joinder decision was incorrect, the 

overwhelming evidence against defendant supports the conclusion that any error 

was harmless. See R. 2:10-2; see also State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 588 (2018) 

("[W]hen evaluated in light of the vast evidence against defendant, . . . errors
15 A-5068-17T1

[by the trial court] were not 'sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether 

[they] led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" (alteration 

in original) (quoting State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95 (2004))). 

III.

In his second point, defendant challenges the prosecutor's exercise of 

peremptory challenges. Defendant, an African-American, specifically claims 

the prosecutor improperly used preemptory challenges to exclude prospective 

African-American jurors from the jury panel, in violation of defendant's 

constitutional right under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and State v. 

Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 (1986), as explained in State v. Osorio, 199 N.J. 486 

(2009). We disagree. 

"[T]he determination of whether the prosecution has exercised peremptory 

challenges in a discriminatory manner involves a three-step procedure." State 

v. Clark, 316 N.J. Super. 462, 468 (App. Div. 1998). It begins with a "rebuttable 

presumption that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges on"

permissible grounds. State v. Thompson, 224 N.J. 324, 340 (2016) (quoting 

Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 535). To rebut this presumption, the defense must show 

"that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionallyimpermissible grounds." Id. at 341 (quoting Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 539).
16 A-5068-17T1

As the party objecting to a peremptory challenge, defendant bears the 

burden to prove purposeful discrimination based on the "totality of the relevant 

facts." Batson, 476 U.S. at 94. "The opponent of the strike bears the burden of 

persuasion regarding racial motivation . . . ." Thompson, 224 N.J. at 334 

(quoting Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 271 (2015)). "That burden is slight, as 

the challenger need only tender sufficient proofs to raise an inference of 

discrimination." Osorio, 199 N.J. at 492.

After the defense has made this showing, the burden shifts to the State to 

"articulat[e] 'clear and reasonably specific' explanations of its 'legitimate 

reasons' for exercising each of the peremptory challenges." Thompson, 224 N.J. 

at 341 (quoting Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 537). The party exercising the peremptory 

challenge must provide evidence "that the peremptory challenge[] under review 

[is] justifiable on the basis of concerns about situation-specific bias." Gilmore, 

103 N.J. at 537. 

The trial court must determine whether counsel provided a "reasoned, 

neutral basis for the challenge or if the explanations tendered are pretext." 

Osorio, 199 N.J. at 492. The party "must satisfy the court that [it] exercised 

such peremptories on grounds that are reasonably relevant to the particular case 
17 A-5068-17T1

on trial or its parties or witnesses." Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 538 (alteration in 

original) (quoting People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 760-61 (Cal. 1978)).

In the third step, if the court is satisfied that the State has advanced 

legitimate nondiscriminatory grounds in response to the objection, it must then 

determine "whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the party contesting 

the exercise of a peremptory challenge has proven that the contested peremptory 

challenge was exercised on . . . impermissible grounds of presumed group bias." 

Osorio, 199 N.J. at 492-93. The court must consider whether the party 

exercising the peremptory challenge: 

has applied the proffered reasons for the exercise of the 

disputed challenges even-handedly to all prospective 

jurors. A nondiscriminatory reason for exercising a 

peremptory challenge which appears genuine and 

reasonable on its face may become suspect if the only 

prospective jurors with that characteristic who the 

[party exercising the peremptory challenge] has 

excused are members of a cognizable group. 

In addition, the court must consider the overall pattern 

of the [party exercising the peremptory challenge]'s use 

of its peremptory challenges. Even if the reasons for 

each individual challenge appear sufficient when 

considered in isolation from the . . . other challenges, 

the use of a disproportionate number of peremptory 

challenges to remove members of a cognizable group 

may warrant a finding that those reasons are not 

genuine and reasonable. 
18 A-5068-17T1

Finally, the court must consider the composition of the 

jury ultimately selected to try the case. Although the 

presence on the jury of some members of the group 

alleged to have been improperly excluded does not 

relieve the trial court of the responsibility to ascertain 

if any prospective juror was peremptorily challenged on 

a discriminatory basis, this circumstance may be highly 

probative of the ultimate question whether the . . . 

proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for exercising 

peremptory challenges are genuine and reasonable. 

[Id. at 506 (alterations in original) (quoting Clark, 316 

N.J. Super. at 473-74).] 

We will uphold the trial court's ruling on whether the prosecution has 

exercised its peremptory challenges on constitutionally impermissible grounds 

unless it is clearly erroneous. Thompson, 224 N.J. at 344. The standard of 

review "necessarily applies to the trial court's assessment of the prosecutor's 

candor and sincerity in the presentation of reasons for exercising peremptory 

challenges." Id. at 345 (citing State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 411 (1988)). 

We are satisfied from a review of the record that the court's decision was 

not clearly erroneous. Even assuming that defendant made a prima facie 

showing under the first step of the Osorio analysis based on the court's sua 

sponte raising of the issue, the prosecutor provided a reasoned, neutral basis for 

excluding each African-American juror that was supported by the record thereby 

satisfying step two of the Osorio test. Those reasons included: 1) one juror's 
19 A-5068-17T1

potential to not believe the police officer's testimony, 2) a second juror who 

worked as a probation officer and the prosecutor's concerns regarding purported

bias, 3) a third juror's failure to make eye contact with the prosecutor, and 4) the 

fourth juror's comment about "stupid people with guns." After considering the 

prosecutor's explanations, the court explicitly found that "the State ha[d] 

provided sufficient information to establish that the striking of these jurors [wa]s 

simply coincidental."1 

As to step three, the court considered the arguments of both the State and 

defendant's counsel and found no constitutional violation. The court further

explained: 

I do find that the State has provided . . . sufficient 

information to establish that the striking of these jurors 

1 While the court did not make a specific finding as to the juror who the 

prosecutor contended failed to make eye contact, defendant points to no 

authority to suggest he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction because of this 

failure. We have previously acknowledged that "[i]t is not unimportant for an 

attorney to establish eye contact with a potential juror." State v. Clark, 324 N.J. 

Super. 558, 571-72 (App. Div. 1999) (upholding the strike of a potential juror 

who "refused to look at" the prosecutor). Further, the reasons offered by the 

prosecutor were strong and undisputed. In this regard, defense counsel did not 

dispute that the excused juror refused to make eye contact with the prosecutor 

while repeatedly looking at defense counsel. Cf. Osorio, 199 N.J. at 496-97

(trial counsel contested whether potential jurors high-fived each other). Finally,

the trial court's statements detailed supra, and its resumption of jury selection, 

established that the court credited the prosecutor's non-discriminatory reasons 

and rejected any claim of discrimination. 
20 A-5068-17T1

is simply coincidental, it was not a pattern, not an effort 

to purge this jury of African-Americans. 

. . . .

There has been a large number of African-Americans 

excused by the court for cause. I would say that when 

the panel came up it was a true reflection of the 

community in terms of various sexes, races, ethnic 

backgrounds . . . . It[ is just that] to this point . . . we 

have had numerous African-Americans that were 

excused for cause without objection. 

So the fact that it is now a limited number is not as a 

result of the actions of the State it has been for reasons 

that we [have] had jurors come to sidebar, victims of 

crimes, opinions on guns, and things of that nature.2 

In sum, there was ample evidence that the prosecutor had offered a 

credible, "reasoned, neutral basis for [each] challenge," and that defendant had 

failed to "prove[] that the contested peremptory challenge was exercised on 

unconstitutionally impermissible grounds of presumed group bias." Osorio, 199 

N.J. at 492-93. That evidence rebutted the apparent satisfaction of defendant's

prima facie claim, and defendant offered the trial court no evidence, argument, 

or complaint to the contrary. "[I]f . . . the trial court believes the prosecutor's 

nonracial justification, and that finding is not clearly erroneous, that is the end 

2 We note that defendant did not renew his motion for a mistrial at the conclusion 

of jury selection. 
21 A-5068-17T1

of the matter." Thompson, 224 N.J. at 340 (alteration in original)(citation 

omitted). 

IV.

In defendant's final argument, he contends that the sentencing court erred 

by finding aggravating factors three and six, failing to "find specific deterrence 

as it relates to aggravating factor nine," refusing to "apply mitigating factors two 

and eleven," and imposing "an excessive sentence in light of the aggravating 

factors." We disagree with all of these arguments. 

Sentencing determinations are reviewed on appeal with a highly 

deferential standard. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). 

The appellate court must affirm the sentence unless (1) 

the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the 

aggravating and mitigating factors found by the 

sentencing court were not based upon competent and 

credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application 

of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the 

sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the 

judicial conscience." 

[Ibid. (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 

(1984)).] 

Once the trial court has balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors 

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and -1(b), it "may impose a term within the 

permissible range for the offense." State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 608 (2010); 
22 A-5068-17T1

see also State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014) (instructing that appellate courts 

may not substitute their judgment for that of the sentencing court, provided that 

the "aggravating and mitigating factors are identified [and] supported by 

competent, credible evidence in the record"). 

Here, the court found aggravating factors three, "[t]he risk that . . . 

defendant will commit another offense," N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(3); six, "[t]he 

extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses 

of which he has been convicted," N.J.S.A. 2C:44–1(a)(6); and nine, "[t]he need 

for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(9). We are satisfied from our review of the record that the court based its 

findings on these aggravating factors on the seriousness of the offenses, 

defendant's criminal history, and the need for deterrence. These findings were 

all supported by competent and credible evidence in the record.

Further, any possible mitigating factor was clearly outweighed by the wellsupported aggravating factors. As the court observed, defendant has an 

extensive juvenile and adult criminal history, that was "replete with violent 

behavior." This criminal history supports a finding that there was a need for 

specific deterrence. See State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153-54 (2006).
23 A-5068-17T1

The fact that defendant attempted to evade the responding officers while 

in possession of a defaced and loaded gun supports the court's decision not to 

apply mitigating factor two. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2) ("The defendant did 

not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm."). Nor 

does the record contain evidence of excessive hardship establishing the 

applicability of mitigating factor eleven. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11) ("The 

imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his 

dependents."); State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 505 (2005).

In sum, the sentence is well within the permissible range, is supported by 

credible evidence in the record, and does not shock the judicial conscience.

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. at

70.

To the extent we have not addressed any of the defendant's arguments, it 

is because we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.