21-202 

Mirlis v. Greer

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit ______________

August Term, 2022 

(Argued: February 21, 2023 Decided: August 30, 2023) 

Docket No. 21-202 

______________

ELIYAHU MIRLIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

–v.– 

SARAH GREER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

______________

Before: WALKER, LYNCH, and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges. 

______________

Defendant-Appellant Sarah Greer appeals the district court’s 

judgment awarding damages to Plaintiff-Appellee Eliyahu Mirlis to 

recover funds Greer received as the result of various alleged 

fraudulent transfers. The district court entered a default against 

Greer as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) for 

her repeated failure to comply with discovery orders, and ultimately 

entered a default judgment against Greer for fraudulent transfers, 
2 

awarding Mirlis damages calculated based on three checks Greer 

drew from bank accounts she held jointly with her debtor husband.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in determining that Greer’s noncompliance during discovery 

warranted a default. We also conclude that, on this record, Greer’s

withdrawals from accounts she held jointly with her husband 

constitute fraudulent transfers under Connecticut law. We 

accordingly AFFIRM. 

AFFIRMED. 

______________

MATTHEW K. BEATMAN, James M. Moriarty, John

L. Cesaroni (on the brief), Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., 

Bridgeport, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellee 

RICHARD P. COLBERT, Matthew J. Letten (on the

brief), Day Pitney LLP, New Haven, CT; Jonathan

J. Einhorn (on the brief), Law Office of Jonathan J.

Einhorn, New Haven, CT, for Defendant-Appellant. 

______________

ROBINSON, Circuit Judge: 

Defendant-Appellant Sarah Greer appeals the district court’s judgment 

awarding damages to Plaintiff-Appellee Eliyahu Mirlis to recover funds Greer 

received as the result of an alleged fraudulent transfer—namely, money she 

withdrew from bank accounts she held jointly with her debtor husband and placed 

into her personal, individually held bank accounts. 
3 

The district court entered a default against Greer as a sanction under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) for her repeated failure to comply with discovery 

orders, and ultimately entered a default judgment against Greer for fraudulent 

transfers, awarding Mirlis damages calculated based on three checks Greer drew 

from bank accounts she held jointly with her debtor husband.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in determining that Greer’s noncompliance during discovery 

warranted a default. We also conclude that, on this record, Greer’s withdrawals 

constitute fraudulent transfers under the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent 

Transfer Act (“CUFTA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-552e, 52-552f, and Connecticut 

common law. We accordingly AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Mirlis is a creditor of Greer’s husband, having secured a judgment against 

him of over $21 million in June 2017.1 See Mirlis v. Daniel Greer, No. 3:16-cv-678 

(MPS), Judgment, Dkt. No. 163 (D. Conn. June 6, 2017). Greer’s husband was on 

notice of the claims that gave rise to Mirlis’ underlying lawsuit since at least 2002, 

1 Unless otherwise specified, the facts set forth here are drawn from the district court’s Ruling on 

Motion for Default Judgment, Mirlis v. Greer, No. 3:18cv2082(MPS), 2021 WL 405886 (D. Conn. 

Jan. 4, 2021), reconsideration denied, 2021 WL 1711649 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2021), and the facts alleged 

in Mirlis’s complaint. Because the district court’s judgment was based on an order of default 

against Greer, the district court appropriately accepted the facts alleged in Mirlis’s complaint as 

true. 
4

when the conduct giving rise to Mirlis’s claims against him began, and Greer 

herself was on notice since at least May 2016, when the underlying lawsuit was 

filed. 

As relevant to this appeal, in order to collect on the judgment against her 

husband, Mirlis brought claims against Greer arising from three allegedly 

fraudulent transfers to her. Greer and her husband held joint checking accounts

at Liberty Bank and Start Community Bank. The Liberty Bank account was 

opened in January 2010, after Greer’s husband was on notice of the claims that 

gave rise to the suit against him, see J. App’x 439 (reflecting a “Consumer Signature 

Card” for the Liberty account dated January 13, 2010), and the Start account was 

opened in February 2017, after Mirlis sued Greer’s husband, see also J. App’x 405-

07 (reflecting a “New Account Review Form” for the Start account dated February 

17, 2017). Greer’s husband contributed all of the funds in the Liberty account, and 

almost all of the funds in the Start account.2 

2 Greer testified that she did not know whether she had deposited any funds into the Start 

account, and that, “[b]esides Social Security,” she would have had no funds available in 2017 to 

have deposited in that account. J. App’x 425. In addition, Mirlis alleged that Greer deposited the

money she earned into a separate account owned solely by her. A review of the May and June 

2017 Start bank statements (the only statements for this account in the record) confirms that the 
5

In May 2017, about a week before the jury returned its verdict in the

underlying action between Mirlis and Greer’s husband, Greer drafted a $5,000 

check from the Start account payable to herself. This check was then deposited 

into an account Greer held solely in her own name. The next month, in June 2017, 

after the jury verdict but a day before judgment was entered against Greer’s 

husband, Greer drafted a $220,000 check from the Liberty account payable to 

herself. Greer deposited this check into an account at another bank that she 

recently opened solely in her name. Greer testified at her deposition that she 

transferred the funds from the Liberty account “[b]ecause [she] did not want it 

taken.” J. App’x 427. Afterjudgment was entered in Mirlis’s action against Greer’s 

husband, Greer wrote a $13,000 check drawn from the Start account; that check 

Start account balance as of April 29, 2017 was $10,932.26, and that a total of approximately 

$30,641.80 was deposited into the account between April 29 and Greer’s second withdrawal of 

$13,000 on June 16, 2017. J. App’x 430-31, 434-35. The only record evidence of a deposit of social 

security benefits for Greer reflects a $1,997.70 payment from the Social Security Administration 

on May 24. J. App’x 431. (There was also a deposit of the same amount on June 28, 2017, but that 

was after Greer made the withdrawals at issue in this case. J. App’x 435.) This is substantially 

less than the $18,000 she withdrew that Mirlis contends constituted fraudulent transfers, and only 

a small portion of the monies in the account as of April 29 or deposited thereafter by Greer’s 

husband. In addition, Greer’s contributions to the Start account were further offset by payments 

she made from the account to third parties. See, e.g., J. App’x 420, 422 (Greer acknowledging that 

she made payments to third parties from the Start account in May and June 2017); J. App’x 432, 

436 (copies of checks with Greer’s signature). Because Greer has not argued on appeal or in the 

proceedings below that she personally contributed funds to the Start account, we need not 

determine with more specificity her precise contributions to the account. 
6

was likewise deposited into an account held solely in her name. Greer did not 

provide consideration for any of these checks. 

In December 2018, Mirlis sued Greer under Connecticut statutory and 

common law to recover the funds Greer withdrew from the joint accounts.3 Mirlis

alleged that Greer’s husband transferred the funds to Greer “to avoid paying” the 

debt owed to Mirlis, J. App’x 18 ¶ 1, and that the transfers “were made with the 

actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud” Greer’s husband’s creditors, J. App’x 25 

¶ 49. 

Mirlis first served Greer with interrogatories and requests for production 

regarding her finances in May 2019. Greer did not respond. In August 2019, the 

district court ordered Greer to comply with the discovery requests within 14 days. 

Greer did not timely respond. In October 2019, the court granted Mirlis’s motion 

for sanctions and again ordered Greer to “respond in full to the outstanding 

discovery requests.” J. App’x 269. The court also ordered Greer to pay Mirlis’s 

attorney’s fees relating to the motion for sanctions and to file an affidavit setting 

3 Mirlis also sued to recover funds transferred from the Yeshiva of New Haven to Greer’s 

retirement accounts. Greer’s appeal with respect to those transfers and the related denial of her 

motion for reconsideration is now moot because, after Greer filed her opening brief in the instant 

appeal, this Court—at Mirlis’s request—remanded the case, and the district court amended its 

judgment to exclude damages associated with these retirement transfers. For that reason, we 

need not address the arguments in Greer’s opening brief challenging the district court’s award of 

damages as to the retirement account transfers. 
7

forth with specificity the steps she had taken to comply with the discovery 

requests. It warned that “[f]ailure to comply with this order may result in a default 

judgment . . . .” J. App’x 269-70 (emphasis omitted). Greer filed an affidavit, but 

her response to the court’s order was incomplete because she failed to produce the 

requested financial documents, gave unresponsive answers to the interrogatories,

and failed to pay the sanctions award. 

In November 2019, Mirlis filed a second motion for sanctions, this time 

seeking entry of default judgment in addition to an award of attorney’s fees. Greer 

did not oppose the motion. In January 2020, the court ordered Greer to show cause 

within 14 days as to why it should not enter a default against her for 

noncompliance, explicitly warning Greer that her failure to respond would result 

in the entry of default. Greer did not timely respond. Thereafter, the district 

court stayed further proceedings pending this Court’s resolution of the appeal in 

the underlying case that led to the judgment against Greer’s husband. After this 

Court affirmed that judgment in April 2020, Mirlis v. Daniel Greer, 952 F.3d 36 (2d 

Cir. 2020), the district court again ordered Greer to show cause within 14 days as 

to why it should not enter a default against her. Greer did not respond. On June 

2, 2020, the district court entered a default against Greer pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 37(b). The court then invited Mirlis “to file a motion for default judgment as to 
8

damages, together with evidence[,] . . . that will allow the Court to calculate 

damages with reasonable certainty.” Sp. App’x 7. Mirlis and Greer each 

responded to the court’s order, and Greer requested an evidentiary hearing with 

respect to damages.4 

In January 2021, after reviewing Mirlis’s and Greer’s submissions and 

determining that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, the district court 

entered a default judgment against Greer for $238,000.00 plus $51,215.02 in 

prejudgment interest on the claims at issue in this appeal.5 In entering default 

judgment, the court concluded that Greer’s three withdrawals from the joint 

accounts held with her husband constituted intentional fraudulent transfers in 

violation of CUFTA, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e(a)(1), constructive fraudulent 

transfers in violation of § 52-552f(a) and § 52-552e(a)(2), and common law 

fraudulent transfers. 

On appeal, Greer argues that the district court abused its discretion by 

imposing the sanction of default, and she contends that, as a matter of law, the 

three check transfers for which the district court awarded damages were not 

4 Notably, Greer’s request for an evidentiary hearing focused on the uncertainties in calculating 

damages for the retirement account transfers. See Greer’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing, Dist. 

Ct. Dkt. No. 112-1, at 4–5. With respect to the check transfers, Greer “conceded that [the] two 

amounts [in the Start Account] might be suitable to calculation with reasonable certainty, upon 

presentation of the required and appropriate affidavits.” Id. at 5.

5 For the reasons explained in note 3 above, the district court’s total judgment was higher. 
9

fraudulent transfers under CUFTA, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-552a-5521, or 

Connecticut common law. 

DISCUSSION

I. Default Sanction

We review a district court’s imposition of sanctions under Rule 37 for abuse 

of discretion, and the factual findings in support of the district court’s decision for 

clear error. S. New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 143 (2d Cir. 

2010). 

Rule 37(b) provides that when a party fails to comply with a discovery 

order, a court may impose sanctions, including “rendering a default judgment 

against the disobedient party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi). A district court 

judge should only enter the harsh penalty of default judgment in “extreme 

circumstances,” where “a party fails to comply with the court’s discovery orders 

willfully, in bad faith, or through fault.” John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum 

Prods., Inc., 845 F.2d 1172, 1176 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, N.Y. Branch, 100 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1996). 

In those extreme circumstances, however, “[d]efault procedures . . . provide a 

useful remedy when a litigant is confronted by an obstructionist adversary. Under 

such circumstances those procedural rules play a constructive role in maintaining 
10

the orderly and efficient administration of justice.” Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 

10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993).

In considering whether case-dispositive sanctions are within a district 

court’s discretion under Rule 37, we have relied on the following non-exclusive 

factors: “(1) the willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for 

noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of the period 

of noncompliance; and (4) whether the non-compliant party had been warned of 

the consequences of . . . noncompliance.” Agiwal v. Mid Island Mortg. Corp., 555 

F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Greer argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 

sanction—default judgment—that was “grossly disproportionate” to her actual 

conduct. Appellant’s Br. 17. She contends that the district court gave insufficient 

weight to the fact that Mirlis already had many of the records he requested in 

discovery, that she did not have possession of the requested financial records and 

was not sufficiently familiar with her and her husband’s finances to have gotten

them, and that she had been preoccupied with her husband’s then-pending 

criminal trial. 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. As set forth 

above, Greer repeatedly failed to respond to interrogatories and produce the 
11

documents Mirlis requested, in violation of the district court’s many orders. This 

record supports the district court’s determination that Greer acted willfully, that 

lesser sanctions would have been inadequate given Greer’s continued 

noncompliance after multiple explicit warnings about the consequences of further 

noncompliance, that Greer was given ample notice that her continued 

noncompliance would result in sanctions, including the entry of default judgment, 

and that her noncompliance spanned more than six months. 

With respect to Greer’s argument that her involvement in her husband’s 

then-pending criminal trial interfered with her ability to respond to the discovery 

requests and court orders, the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying 

on the fact that Greer was originally obligated to respond to Mirlis’s discovery 

requests well before her husband’s trial and that she failed to respond to the 

court’s numerous show cause orders long after trial had ended. In addition, Greer 

offers no support for her suggestion that, merely because she thought Mirlis 

already had some of the requested financial documents, she could ignore the 

discovery requests and the district court’s orders compelling her to make an 

adequate response. And we have found none. Cf. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Playboy 

Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 390 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Rule 37(d) makes it explicit that 

a party properly served has an absolute duty to respond, that is, to . . . serve a 
12

response to requests for discovery under Rule 34[,] . . . and that the court in which 

the action is pending may enforce this duty by imposing sanctions for its 

violation.” (emphasis added)).

Moreover, Greer’s lack of physical possession of certain bank records does 

not excuse her noncompliance with the court’s order. Mirlis was entitled to 

request records in Greer’s “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

34(a)(1). “Control” does not require “actual physical possession of the documents 

at issue; rather, documents are considered to be under a party’s control when that 

party has the right, authority, or practical ability to obtain the documents . . . .” 

Coventry Cap. US LLC v. EEA Life Settlements Inc., 333 F.R.D. 60, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), 

on reconsideration in part, 439 F. Supp. 3d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Bank of New 

York v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 146-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 

For that reason, “if a party has access and the practical ability to possess 

documents not available to the party seeking them, production may be required.”

Shcherbakovskiy v. Da Capo Al Fine, Ltd., 490 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2007). Greer failed 

to establish that she had neither access to, nor the practical ability to obtain, the 

financial documents Mirlis sought.

Finally, Greer failed to demonstrate that lesser sanctions short of entry of 

default would have been enough to compel her compliance with the discovery 
13

requests. In light of the attorney’s fee award that she had already ignored, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Greer was unlikely to 

respond to additional monetary penalties. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing a sanction of default in response to Greer’s sustained failure 

to comply with discovery requests and orders from the court.

II. Fraudulent Transfers

Greer argues that, even if the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing default as a Rule 37(b) sanction, the default judgment should 

nevertheless be vacated because Mirlis’s allegations do not establish as a matter of 

law that Greer’s withdrawals from the joint accounts were fraudulent transfers by

a debtor under CUFTA or Connecticut common law. 

On a motion for default judgment after default has entered, “a court is 

required to accept all of the [plaintiff’s] factual allegations as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor, but it is also required to determine 

whether the [plaintiff’s] allegations establish [the defendant’s] liability as a matter 

of law.” Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citations 

omitted). We review the district court’s application of law on a motion for default 

judgment without deference to the district court. Id. 
14

CUFTA establishes various circumstances in which a “transfer . . . by a 

debtor” is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was 

made. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e(a); see id. § 52-552e(a)(1) (intentional fraudulent 

transfer made where debtor “inten[ded] to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor of 

the debtor”); id. § 52-552f(a) (constructive fraudulent transfer made where debtor 

did not receive “a reasonably equivalent value in exchange . . . and the debtor was 

insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer”); 

id. § 52-552e(a)(2) (constructive fraudulent transfer made where debtor did not 

receive “a reasonably equivalent value in exchange . . . and the debtor (A) was 

engaged or was about to engage in a business or transaction” in relation to which 

the debtor’s remaining assets were “unreasonably small,” or “(B) intended to 

incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that [the debtor] would 

incur, debts beyond [the debtor’s] ability to pay as they came due”). Under 

Connecticut common law, which is largely coextensive with CUFTA as to 

fraudulent transfers, a party alleging a fraudulent transfer must show “either: (1) 

that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and rendered the 

transferor unable to meet [the transferor’s] obligations or (2) that the conveyance 

was made with a fraudulent intent in which the grantee participated.” Certain 
15

Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 394 (2008) (quoting 

Bizzoco v. Chinitz, 193 Conn. 304, 312 (1984)). 

Under any legal theory, the existence of a “transfer . . . by a debtor” is an 

essential element of a fraudulent transfer claim. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-552e(a), 52-

552f(a). “Debtor” is defined as “a person who is liable on a claim.” Id. § 52-552b(6). 

The central question in this appeal is whether Greer’s independent withdrawals 

of funds from the joint accounts qualify as “transfer[s] . . . by a debtor.”6 Id. §§ 52-

552e(a), 52-552f(a).

Greer says no. She argues that the funds she withdrew from her joint 

accounts with her husband were not transfers of her debtor husband’s property. 

Greer points to Connecticut case law recognizing a rebuttable presumption that a 

spouse’s deposit into a bank account held jointly with the other spouse is a gift. 

See Trenchard v. Trenchard, 141 Conn. 627, 630 (Conn. 1954) (“[A] transfer from a 

wife to a husband is presumed to be a gift.”); Wright v. Mallett, 94 Conn. App. 789, 

792 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that “[a] rebuttable presumption of donative 

intent exists when the grantee is the natural object of the grantor’s bounty” and

6 Mirlis has not alleged that Greer made the withdrawals at her debtor husband’s direction. Cf. 

Geriatrics, Inc. v. McGee, 332 Conn. 1, 11-24 (2019) (applying agency principles and holding that 

“CUFTA’s requirement that the fraudulent transfer be ‘made by the debtor’ encompasses a 

transfer made by a debtor’s attorney-in-fact”). 
16 

that Connecticut courts “traditionally have recognized such a presumption 

between husband and wife” (internal citation omitted)). In Greer’s view, her 

debtor husband’s deposit of his funds into the joint accounts may have constituted 

a “transfer,” but once the money was in the joint accounts, that money had been 

gifted to her and her withdrawals cannot be viewed as fraudulent transfers by her 

debtor husband. 

We disagree. We predict that the Connecticut Supreme Court would 

conclude that, even assuming Greer’s husband’s deposits into their joint accounts 

were gifts from him to her, under the broad terms of CUFTA her withdrawals 

nevertheless constitute “transfer[s] . . . by a debtor.” Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-552e(a), 

52-552f(a); see also Tom Rice Buick-Pontiac v. Gen. Motors Corp., 551 F.3d 149, 154 (2d 

Cir. 2008) (explaining that, in the absence of authoritative law from a state’s 

highest court, a federal court must predict how the state court would resolve the 

state law question unless state law is so uncertain that the federal court can make 

no reasonable prediction).

Our conclusion relies primarily on two features of Connecticut law. First, 

CUFTA’s broad definition of “transfer,” see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b(12), and 

second, CUFTA’s provision that a transfer occurs, or is “perfected,” when the 

debtor’s funds are no longer potentially subject to a lien in favor of the debtor’s 
17

judgment creditors,seeid. § 52-552g(1)(B), which, in this case, would have occurred

at the moment the funds were withdrawn from the Greers’ joint accounts, see Fleet 

Bank Connecticut, N.A. v. Carillo, 240 Conn. 343 (1997). 

Significantly, CUFTA broadly defines “transfer” as “every mode, direct or 

indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or 

parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, 

release, lease and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-

552b(12) (emphasis added). The Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Canty 

v. Otto is instructive as to the wide scope of this definition as applied to property 

jointly owned by spouses. 304 Conn. 546 (2012). In that case, the court considered 

a CUFTA claim by a creditor against the ex-wife of a debtor to recover funds 

awarded to the ex-wife pursuant to an allegedly collusive divorce decree entered

after the claim against the debtor husband arose. Id. at 549-52. In concluding that

the dissolution decree distributing property to the debtor’s wife could qualify as a 

“transfer” under CUFTA, the Supreme Court emphasized the broad definition of 

“transfer” under the statute. See id. at 558. In particular, it explained, “the use of 

the phrases ‘every mode’ and ‘voluntary or involuntary’ supports the conclusion 

that the term transfer is defined very broadly under the act.” Id. The court also 

noted that strong policy considerations supported that view: “in view of the
18

overall policy of protecting creditors, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to 

grant married couples a one-time-only opportunity to defraud creditors by 

including the fraudulent transfer in a marital separation agreement.” Id. at 562

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Mejia v. Reed, 31 Cal. 

4th 657, 668 (Cal. 2003)). 

Moreover, CUFTA provides that a transfer is not completed until it “is so 

far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien 

otherwise than under [CUFTA] that is superior to the interest of the transferee.” 

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552g(1)(B). Thus, to the extent that the funds deposited by 

Greer’s husband remained potentially subject to a lien by Greer’s husband’s 

judgment creditors, his deposit of the funds did not complete any donative 

“transfer” to Greer for purposes of CUFTA.

Finally, under Connecticut law, the funds were subject to a lien in favor of 

Greer’s husband’s judgment creditors until the time she withdrew them. See Fleet 

Bank, 240 Conn. at 350-52. In Fleet Bank, the Connecticut Supreme Court 

considered whether a judgment creditor could enforce a statutory right to a bank 

execution “against the entire balance of a joint bank account to which both a 

judgment debtor and his nondebtor spouse ha[d] contributed funds.” Id. at 345. 

The court held that each coholder of a joint account “has a sufficient property 
19 

interest to permit a judgment creditor to exercise a bank execution” pursuant to 

Connecticut’s bank execution statute. Id. at 352 (emphasis omitted) (citing Conn. 

Gen. Stat. § 52-367b). The court explained that “a coholder’s property interest in 

the joint account exposes that account, in its entirety, to the creditor’s collection 

powers, in the absence of statutory or common law protections.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Thus, even if Greer’s husband’s deposits constituted gifts to her, as she 

argues, her withdrawals of those funds perfected the transfers by him and thus

constituted “transfer[s] . . . by a debtor” for purposes of CUFTA. Conn. Gen. Stat. 

§§ 52-552e(a), 52-552f(a). 

Given these principles of Connecticut law, the record supports the district 

court’s conclusion that the three withdrawals in question constituted fraudulent 

transfers under CUFTA and Connecticut common law. Mirlis, 2021 WL 405886 at 

*3-5. Indeed, although Greer’s husband did not himself withdraw funds from the 

joint accounts and deposit them into Greer’s personal accounts, he set the transfers 

in motion by depositing his funds into the joint accounts. We can reasonably 

predict that, if the Connecticut Supreme Court were to reach this question, it 

would hold that the text of CUFTA and the strong policy considerations 

underlying it would support a broad reading of “transfer . . . by a debtor” that 

would encompass the situation presented here—namely, a debtor’s funding of a 
20

joint account from which a spouse can withdraw funds without accountability to 

the debtor’s creditors. 

As set forth above, the Liberty and Start accounts—which were funded 

primarily or entirely by Greer’s debtor husband—were created after Greer’s 

husband had notice of the claims against him. In addition, Mirlis alleged that 

Greer’s husband transferred the funds to Greer “to avoid paying” his debt to Mirlis

and that the transfers “were made with the actual intent to hinder, delay or 

defraud” Greer’s husband’s creditors. J. App’x 25 ¶ 49. These allegations are 

supported by a host of factors identified in CUFTA as supporting an inference of 

fraudulent intent, including the facts that, as the debtor’s spouse, Greer was an 

“insider,” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b(7)(A)(i); her husband had been sued before 

the transfers were perfected; and Greer did not provide consideration for the 

money withdrawn. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e(b) (listing non-exclusive factors a

court may consider in determining whether a transfer was made with fraudulent 

intent). Moreover, Greer testified that she transferred the funds from the Liberty 

account “[b]ecause [she] did not want it taken.” J. App’x 427. These facts are 

sufficient to establish Greer’s liability under CUFTA and Connecticut common law 

for effectuating fraudulent transfers initiated by her debtor husband.
21

In sum, the district court did not err in concluding that Greer is liable for the 

alleged fraudulent transfers as a matter of Connecticut law, and the district court 

properly entered default judgment against her.

***

For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.