IN THE CASE OF 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Frank J. RONGHI, Staff Sergeant 

U.S. Army, Appellant 

No. 03-0520 

Crim. App. No. 20000635 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 

Argued February 11, 2004 

Decided June 30, 2004 

GIERKE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

CRAWFORD, C.J., EFFRON, BAKER, and ERDMANN, JJ., joined. 

Counsel 

For Appellant: Captain Eilin J. Chiang (argued); Colonel Robert 

D. Teetsel, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tellitocci, and Major 

Allyson G. Lambert (on brief); Captain Terri J. Erisman. 

For Appellee: Captain Mark A. Visger (argued); Colonel Lauren 

B. Leeker, Lieutenant Colonel Margaret B. Baines, and Captain 

Charles C. Choi (on brief). 

Military Judge: Kenneth H. Clevenger 

This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final publication. 
United States v. Ronghi, No. 03-0520/AR 

2

Judge GIERKE delivered the opinion of the Court. 

 Congress passed a bill authorizing the court-martial 

punishment of confinement for life without eligibility for 

parole (LWOP) on November 6, 1997.1

 The President signed that 

bill into law on November 18, 1997.2

 However, the President did 

not amend the Manual for Courts-Martial to incorporate LWOP 

until April 11, 2002.3 The issue in this case is whether LWOP 

was an authorized court-martial punishment for the crime of 

premeditated murder during the period between enactment of the 

LWOP statute and the Manual’s revision. We conclude that the 

statute creating LWOP authorized that punishment for 

premeditated murder offenses committed after November 18, 1997. 

Background 

 Appellant was deployed with the 82d Airborne Division in 

Kosovo on January 13, 2000, when he committed the crimes that 

resulted in his sentence to LWOP. As aptly described by the 

government, Appellant “took advantage of the trust, respect, and 

kindness” that eleven-year-old Merita Shabiu showed to American 

soldiers. “Appellant led her to a dark and deserted, filthy, 

 

1

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. 

L. No. 105-85, § 581, 111 Stat. 1629, 1759 (1997) (codified at 

10 U.S.C. § 856a (2000)). 

2

 Signing Statement, 33 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1861 (Nov. 18, 

1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2707. 

3

 Exec. Order No. 13,262, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,773 (April 17, 2002). 
United States v. Ronghi, No. 03-0520/AR 

3

trash-strewn basement where he indecently assaulted, forcibly 

anally sodomized, and murdered with premeditation, this innocent 

child victim.” 

 As a result of these brutal acts, Appellant pled guilty to 

and was found guilty of premeditated murder, indecent acts with 

a child under 16 years of age, and forcible sodomy of a child 

under 16 years of age, in violation of Articles 118, 134, and 

125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 10 U.S.C. 

§§ 918, 934, 925 (2000). Appellant agreed to plead guilty under 

a pretrial agreement that provided for a non-capital referral. 

 At trial, both the defense counsel and Appellant personally 

agreed that the maximum authorized punishment included LWOP. 

On August 1, 2000, a court-martial panel of officer members 

sentenced Appellant to LWOP, a dishonorable discharge, 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the 

lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority approved the 

sentence as adjudged, and the Army Court of Criminal Appeals 

affirmed the findings and sentence in an unpublished opinion.4

 

We granted review to determine whether LWOP was an authorized 

court-martial punishment for the crime of premeditated murder on 

the date of Appellant’s offenses.5

 

 

4

 United States v.Ronghi, No. ARMY 20000635 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 

May 27, 2003). 

5

 See United States v. Ronghi, 59 M.J. 167 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (order 

granting review). 
United States v. Ronghi, No. 03-0520/AR 

4

Discussion 

 “It is well established that, absent a clear direction by 

Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its 

enactment.” United States v. Pritt, 54 M.J. 47, 50 (C.A.A.F. 

2000) (quoting Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 

(1991)). An examination of the applicable statutes reveals that 

Congress authorized LWOP as a sentence for any premeditated 

murder committed from the day after its enactment forward. 

Article 56a Authorized LWOP for Premeditated Murder Offenses 

Committed Starting the Day After Its Enactment

 Article 56a(a) of the UCMJ provides, “For any offense for 

which a sentence of confinement for life may be adjudged, a 

court-martial may adjudge a sentence of confinement for life 

without eligibility for parole.” 10 U.S.C. § 856a(a) (2000). 

The statute that added this language to the UCMJ also provided 

that Article 56a “shall be applicable only with respect to an 

offense committed after the date of the enactment of this Act.” 

Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 581(b), 111 Stat. at 1759. That date of 

enactment was November 18, 1997, when the President signed it 

into law. 

 When Congress adopted Article 118, it provided only two 

authorized sentences for the offenses of premeditated murder and 

felony murder: “death or imprisonment for life.” Art. 118, 

UCMJ; 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2000). When it adopted Article 56a, 

Congress plainly intended to authorize LWOP as a third available 
United States v. Ronghi, No. 03-0520/AR 

5

sentence for a premeditated murder that occurred after November 

18, 1997. Thus, absent some other statutory provision limiting 

LWOP’s availability, it was an authorized sentence when 

Appellant committed his offenses on January 13, 2000. 

The 2000 Manual for Courts-Martial

Did Not Conflict with the LWOP Statute 

 For most of the UCMJ’s punitive articles, the President 

plays a role in determining the maximum authorized punishment. 

Article 56 provides, “The punishment which a court-martial may 

direct for an offense may not exceed such limits as the 

President may prescribe for that offense.” Art. 56, UCMJ, 10 

U.S.C. § 856 (2000). Article 18 similarly authorizes the 

President to prescribe “limitations” on the punishments adjudged 

by general courts-martial. Art. 18, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 818 

(2000). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of 

this general delegation of Congress’s “authority to define 

criminal punishments” for military offenses. Loving v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996). The President has executed 

this delegated authority by establishing maximum punishments in 

Part IV of the Manual for Courts-Martial. 

 The 2000 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial, which 

governed Appellant’s case,6

 provided that the maximum punishment 

 

6

 The 2000 Manual incorporated the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2000’s UCMJ amendments and Executive Order 

13,140’s amendments to the Manual. 2000 Manual at Preface. The 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which 
United States v. Ronghi, No. 03-0520/AR 

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for premeditated murder was “death.” Manual for Courts-Martial, 

United States, Pt. IV, para. 43.e(1) (2000 ed.) [hereinafter 

2000 Manual]. The same Manual provision noted that the 

mandatory minimum punishment for premeditated murder was 

“imprisonment for life.” Id. Because LWOP is a lesser 

punishment than the maximum (death), the Manual’s maximum 

sentence provision did not conflict with the congressionallyauthorized sentence of LWOP in a premeditated murder case. 

 Additionally, the 2002 executive order that amended the 

Manual for Courts-Martial to incorporate LWOP indicated that the 

punishment “shall only apply to offenses committed after 

November 18, 1997.” Exec. Order 13,262 § 6.b, 67 Fed. Reg. 

18,773, 18,779 (April 11, 2002). Thus, the executive order 

itself recognized LWOP’s availability as an authorized sentence 

at the time of Appellant’s offenses. 

 Another presidential limitation on court-martial sentencing 

authority is Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1003, which 

provides an exclusive list of the kinds of punishments that a 

court-martial may impose. The 2000 Manual’s version of R.C.M. 

1003 did not specifically mention LWOP. Rather, the 2000 

 

is not relevant to this appeal, was enacted on October 5, 1999. 

Pub. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999). Executive Order 

13,140 was signed on October 6, 1999, and generally took effect 

on November 1, 1999. See Exec. Order 13,140 § 4, 64 Fed. Reg. 

55,115, 55,120 (Oct. 12, 1999). 
United States v. Ronghi, No. 03-0520/AR 

7

Manual’s version of R.C.M. 1003, like its predecessors, 

authorized “confinement” as a form of punishment without 

addressing the term of confinement at all. But R.C.M. 1003 

nevertheless allowed LWOP, because it is not a new form of 

punishment, but simply a longer term of confinement than 

military law had previously allowed a court-martial to adjudge.7

 

 In State v. Allen, 488 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. 1997), the North 

Carolina Supreme Court faced a similar issue. Under North 

Carolina law, premeditated murder is punishable by only death or 

life imprisonment without parole. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 

(2003). The North Carolina Constitution provides: 

The following punishments only shall be known to the 

laws of this State: death, imprisonment, fines, 

suspension of jail or prison term with or without 

conditions, restitutions, community service, 

restraints on liberty, work programs, removal from 

office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 

office of honor, trust, or profit under this State. 

 

N.C. Const. art. XI, § 1. One issue in Allen was whether the 

North Carolina legislature was authorized to create the 

punishment of LWOP, which Article XI did not expressly mention. 

The North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was, reasoning 

that “the term ‘life imprisonment without parole’ falls within 

the meaning of the constitutional term ‘imprisonment,’ so the 

 

7 See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 269 (1974) (Marshall, J., 

dissenting) (“Confinement without possibility of parole is 

unknown to military law; it is not and never has been authorized 

for any UCMJ offense.” (footnote and citations omitted)). 
United States v. Ronghi, No. 03-0520/AR 

8

sentence was authorized by the Constitution.” Allen, 488 S.E.2d 

at 737. We find Allen persuasive. Applying the North Carolina 

Supreme Court’s reasoning to the military justice system 

supports the conclusion that “confinement for life without 

eligibility for parole” falls within the meaning of R.C.M. 

1003(b)(7)’s term “confinement.” 

 We hold that LWOP was an authorized punishment for 

Appellant’s offenses. To resolve the present case, we need not, 

and do not, address the availability of LWOP for any other 

offense. 

CONCLUSION 

 The decision of the United States Army Court of Criminal 

Appeals is affirmed.