J-A08015-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S.A., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.H.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2957 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 20, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000345-2023

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.N.A., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.H.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2958 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 20, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000346-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 5, 2024

S.H.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees terminating her parental 

rights as to her two daughters, K.S.A., born in February 2017, and S.N.A., 

born in April 2019.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Separately, on the same date, the trial court terminated the parental rights 

of the children’s biological father, S.A. (“Father”). Father has not appealed 

that decision. 
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We glean the following background from the certified record. On May 

13, 2021, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) received a 

report from child protective services that, earlier that day, Mother had a 

mental health crisis and attacked both K.S.A. and S.N.A. More particularly, 

police responded to the residence for a disturbance and, upon arrival, 

observed Mother jumping from a third-story window and attempting to run 

into traffic. Inside the home, law enforcement located K.S.A., who was four 

years old at the time and suffering from cancer, with a bloody face and nose. 

S.N.A., then two years old, was found bleeding and unconscious, wedged 

between a bed and window. Both children were taken to Children’s Hospital 

of Philadelphia. The treating doctors determined that S.N.A. had a right orbital 

bone fracture and tested positive for benzodiazepines. She was subsequently 

admitted to the intensive care unit.

Representatives from DHS spoke with the children and Father at the 

hospital. K.S.A. indicated that Mother was responsible for both child’s injuries. 

Father stated that he had recently ceased his relationship with Mother and 

that, despite still living in the home, he was not present at the time of the 

attack. Father also informed that he was aware that Mother had mental health 

issues but believed they were under control. 

After determining that returning K.S.A. and S.N.A. to Father’s custody 

would be inappropriate, DHS obtained orders of protective custody as to both 

children. Upon each child’s discharge from the hospital, DHS placed them into 

different foster homes pursuant to the recommendation of each child’s 
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therapist.

2

 In June 2021, the trial court adjudicated K.S.A. and S.N.A. 

dependent and committed them to the care of DHS. 

Mother was arrested two days after the incident and charged with 

various crimes, including aggravated assault. During the pendency of these 

termination matters, she pled guilty to one count each of aggravated assault 

and endangering the welfare of children. The trial court in the criminal case 

sentenced her to an aggregate term of three to six years in prison, and further 

entered a no-contact order as between Mother and the children. Mother has 

remained incarcerated since the time of her arrest in May 2021. The earliest 

she would be eligible for parole is in May 2024, whereas her sentence 

maximum date is in May 2027. 

Shortly after Mother’s arrest, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)

created an initial single case plan (“SCP”) for Mother, requiring her to complete 

a dual diagnosis evaluation. In May 2022, based on Mother’s conduct, the 

trial court entered an order finding aggravated circumstances, which relieved 

DHS from its obligation to utilize reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with the 

children or otherwise preserve the familial relationship as between them. 

Nonetheless, Mother’s SCP was later revised in April 2023, ultimately calling 

for her to attend a dual diagnosis evaluation, maintain contact with CUA, and 

complete parenting courses. 

____________________________________________

2 The children have remained in the same respective pre-adoptive foster 

homes since initial placement, shortly after the assault. Despite being placed 

separately, K.S.A. and S.N.A. have had the opportunity to see each other 

every weekend and have become familiar with each other’s foster families.
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In August 2023, DHS filed a petition seeking to change the children’s 

permanency goals from reunification to adoption by the respective resource 

parents, as well as termination of the parental rights of both Mother and 

Father. The court held a hearing on November 20, 2023, where it heard from 

CUA case manager Alexis Church, social worker Roya Paller, and Mother.3 

Ms. Church testified that she was assigned this case in October 2021 

and has managed it since that time. She contacted Mother in prison on 

approximately three occasions in late October and early November of 2021. 

Since then, Mother has made no outreach to CUA as to her reunification plan 

or goals. Ms. Church further said that Mother has had no contact with either 

child since her arrest and that the children have no relationship with Mother. 

She did not believe reunification was appropriate, explaining as follows:

[Mother] has not provided anything for the children, whether it’s 

their needs, their medical needs, educational needs, support 

system. She also hasn’t maintained contact with CUA to ensure 

that, whether there was a protection order or not, that she’s well

aware of what’s going on when it comes to their medical, when it 

comes to [K.S.A.]’s cancer, and things like that. She doesn’t 

really – well she doesn’t participate in [her SCP]. We have 

meetings for the girls. They have [individualized education 

program] meetings. [Mother] doesn’t reach out. She hasn’t 

signed consents or releases for the children. She doesn’t have 

housing. We are unaware of her mental state at this point, if she 

is receiving treatment. If so, what kind of treatment. So[,] there 

[ are] a lot of safety concerns when it comes to [Mother].

N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/20/23, at 17. 

____________________________________________

3 At the termination hearings, the children were represented collectively by 

Edward Louden, Esquire, as legal counsel, and Gary Server, Esquire, as 

guardian ad litem (“GAL”). 
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Ms. Paller attested that she is a social worker who examined and spoke 

with both K.S.A. and S.N.A. on several occasions. When asked about 

adoption, six-year-old K.S.A. expressed a desire to continue living with her 

foster mother, whom she identified as “mom.” This foster mother helped 

K.S.A. through her chemotherapy treatment for cancer. As to S.N.A., who 

was just shy of four years old at the time of the interviews, all indications were 

that she desired to stay in the same home as her foster parents. She had 

lived with them since her initial placement at age two, and accordingly these 

parents were the only ones she knew. Ms. Paller ultimately opined that there 

would be irreparable harm to both children if they were removed from the 

respective foster families. 

Mother, for her part, testified that she wanted to be a part of her 

children’s lives and needed more time to place herself into a position to be a 

parent. She indicated that CUA had not contacted her after the first few initial 

calls in November 2021, and otherwise did little to make her aware of her 

reunification goals. Mother also outlined her progress in prison, which 

included completing a drug and alcohol treatment program, working in the 

prison kitchen for a period, beginning the process of obtaining her GED, and 

starting enrollment in parenting courses and another drug treatment program. 

However, she did not introduce any documentation verifying her participation 

in these programs. 

After testimony was taken, both the GAL and counsel for the children 

informed the trial court that they believed the best interests of both children 
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would be served by termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered separate decrees

terminating the parental rights of both parents as to K.S.A. and S.N.A. 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as § 2511(b). 

These timely appeals followed. The court ordered Mother to file a 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

and Mother complied. The trial court entered a notice of compliance with Rule 

1925(a), referring us to relevant portions of the transcript from the 

termination hearing, wherein it recited its findings. We consolidated the 

appeals sua sponte. 

Mother presents five issues for our consideration:

I. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(1) where Mother presented evidence 

that she tried to perform her parental duties.

II. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(2) where Mother presented evidence 

that she is trying to remedy her situation while incarcerated, 

by receiving drug treatment and mental health treatment, 

starting parenting classes and working in the kitchen and 

will have the present capacity to care for her child.

III. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(5) where evidence was provided to 

establish that the children w[ere] removed from the care of 

. . . Mother and Mother is now working on her goal and will 

have the ability to care for her children once she is released 

from prison.
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IV. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(a)(8) where evidence was presented to 

show that Mother would be capable of caring for her children 

after she completes parenting classes, and has already 

received mental health treatment, drug treatment[,] and is 

employed.

V. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by 

terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b) where evidence was presented that 

Mother was denied visitation and the chance to bond with 

her children. 

Mother’s brief at 7 (cleaned up).

We begin with our well-settled standard of review.

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, 

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard 

employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not 

require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences 

or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported, 

we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an 

error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized 

our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However, 

we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in 

order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported 

by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up). 

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 
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and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, 

we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In 

re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed 

by the needs and welfare of the child, which we have described as follows:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the 

child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 705 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citations 

omitted). The bases for termination must be proven by clear and convincing 

evidence, or evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to 

enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.” Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 831 (Pa.Super. 

2022) (citation omitted). 
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Termination is proper when the moving party proves grounds for 

termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In 

re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa.Super. 2011) (stating that “[w]e must agree 

with the trial court’s decision as to only one subsection of . . . § 2511(a) in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights). Here, we consider 

§ 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

. . . . 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under § 2511(a)(2) due 

to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but may also 

include acts of refusal and inability to perform parental duties. See In re 

S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2021). We have long recognized that 
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a parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt 

assumption of full parental responsibilities. See, e.g., In re Adoption of 

M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017). Our Supreme Court has also 

indicated that,

incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, 

in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist under 

§ 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a 

parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes 

of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012). The Court further 

stated that “the length of the remaining confinement can be considered as 

highly relevant to whether the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent, sufficient to 

provide grounds for termination pursuant to . . . § 2511(a)(2).” Id. at 830 

(cleaned up).

On appeal, Mother contends that her parental rights were terminated

solely based on her past incapacity, without consideration of her soon-to-be 

present ability to parent, in contravention to our case law. See Mother’s brief 

at 16. She asserts that she has “substantially completed her SCP goals,” 

including “parenting classes, employment, [and] mental health and drug 

treatment while incarcerated.” Id. Mother maintains that she will be released 

from prison “in the near future” and can then “provide a safe home for herself 

and the children.” Id. In short, she believes that DHS did not adequately 
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meet its burden pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) since, upon her release, she will 

have gained the capacity to care for K.S.A. and S.N.A. Id.

In concluding that DHS carried its evidentiary burden as to this 

subsection, the trial court noted the following on the record at the termination 

hearing:

[M]other is incarcerated and has some limitations obviously on 

her ability to engage in her case plan objectives, [yet M]other has 

not produced any documentation through her attorney to show 

that she’s actively been engaged in any type of mental health 

treatment. We don’t have any documentation of the parenting

[courses]. We don’t have anything to show that [Mother has] 

done anything to remedy the situation while she’s been 

incarcerated or that any additional time would correct the 

situation, if more time were given. While [M]other may be eligible 

for [parole in six months], she may also be in jail for several more 

years based on the current sentence she has.

N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/20/23, at 64. As such, the court found that DHS 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has not “demonstrated 

an ability to remedy this situation.” Id. at 63.

Upon review, we find that the certified record supports the trial court’s 

conclusions. The testimony from the termination hearing bore out that, after 

CUA initially reached out to Mother and provided her with her SCP objectives, 

Mother took no steps to follow up with CUA on those goals. She likewise did 

not contact CUA to check in on her children or to assist even minimally 

concerning the medical care and special needs of her children, such as by 

executing medical consents or releases. Aside from her self-serving testimony 

as to programs she purportedly undertook in prison, she did not introduce any 
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evidence supporting her assertions, as the trial court correctly noted. Further, 

assuming arguendo that Mother did enroll in parenting classes, by her own 

attestation she did not do so until after being in prison for two years and had 

not completed them as of the time of the hearing.

Moreover, to the extent Mother faults CUA for not providing reunification 

services, we note that the agency was relieved of that obligation pursuant to 

the trial court’s finding of aggravated circumstances in May 2022. Had that 

order not been entered, Mother nonetheless would not be entitled to relief on 

that basis. See In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 896 (Pa.Super. 2014) (finding that 

an agency’s failure to provide reunification services alone “is not a basis to 

disturb the trial court’s order terminating . . . parental rights”). 

Finally, although Mother claims to have a present ability to parent the 

children, she would not be in a position to do so until her release from prison 

in May 2024 at the soonest, and possibly as late as May 2027. The record 

simply belies her claim that she has the ability to remedy her incapacity and 

become a parent to either K.S.A. or S.N.A.

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying upon 

§ 2511(a)(2) as a basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

Turning to § 2511(b), we “consider the matter from the child’s 

perspective, placing [the child’s] developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 

296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). This analysis “should not be 
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applied mechanically,” but “must be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein 

“the court must determine each child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1105-06 

(cleaned up). Thus, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that must be 

considered. Id. at 1113 n.28. While the particular circumstances of each 

case dictate the factors to be considered, our precedent indicates that relevant 

points of inquiry include “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has mandated, however, that an 

evaluation pursuant to § 2511(b) should also consider the child’s bond with 

his or her parent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, 

the court must render “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and 

beneficial to the child[.]” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. This 

involves consideration of the effect of severing the child’s bond with the 

parent. Id. at 1109. In termination matters, “severance of a necessary and 

beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that would predictably cause ‘extreme 

emotional consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” Id. at 1109-10 

(quoting In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 484). The High Court has distinguished, 

however, “extreme emotional consequences” from a mere “adverse or 

detrimental impact” in the termination context. Id. at 1111. Specifically, it 

has cautioned that Pennsylvania courts “must not truncate [their] analysis and 

preclude severance based solely on evidence of an adverse or detrimental 

impact to the child.” Id. at 1114 (cleaned up).
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Furthermore, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the 

biological parent, but also examine” the child’s bond “with the foster parent.” 

Id. at 1111 (emphasis in original, cleaned up). Thus, we consider factors that 

arise from the circumstances of each case, such as the child’s need for 

permanency and length of time in foster care, whether the child is bonded 

with the foster parents, and whether the foster home meets the child’s needs. 

Id. at 1113. Overall, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all intangible 

factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of 

primary importance in the [§] 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109 (cleaned up). 

In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts 

must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 

at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an 

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts 

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. 

Given these crucial concerns, a court cannot “toll the well-being and 

permanency” of a child indefinitely in the hope that a parent “will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

999, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted).

As to this issue, Mother summarily argues, in relevant part, that “[t]he 

children were never permitted to visit with [her]. If [she] was provided 

visitation with her children[,] she could have maintained a bond with her 
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children.” Mother’s brief at 18. Notably, Mother does not discuss any aspect 

of the relationship between each child and their respective foster parents. 

At the termination hearing, the trial court found as follows:

With regard to [§] 2511(b), I do not find that there is a parent 

child relationship between . . . [M]other . . . and these two 

children. While the children may know who their parents are, they 

certainly don’t look to them to meet any of their parental needs 

or any of their daily needs. By contrast, they look to the resource 

parents to do so. And I find that the children would not suffer any 

irreparable harm if parental rights were terminated in this case.

N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/20/23, at 66. 

Again, we determine that the trial court’s conclusions are fully supported 

by the evidence of record. Mother plainly does not share a parental bond with 

either K.S.A or S.N.A. Instead, both children are attached to their foster 

families, with whom they have resided for more than two and one-half years. 

While K.S.A. remembers who Mother is, she has not relied on her for any 

aspect of her care in that time. As to S.N.A., she has not seen Mother since 

she was attacked at two years old and has now spent more than half of her 

life with her foster parents. Ms. Paller testified that the children are thriving 

with their respective resource families and that to remove them from those 

environments would be substantially detrimental to the children. While 

Mother believes that in due time, she may eventually be in a position to 

successfully parent the children, we cannot “toll the well-being and 

permanency” of these children in the hope that one day transpires. In re 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007.
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In sum, the court did not err in finding that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would not “cause extreme emotional consequences or 

significant, irreparable harm.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10 

(cleaned up). 

Having determined that the orphans’ court properly found statutory 

grounds for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the 

decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights as to K.S.A. and S.N.A.

Decrees affirmed.

Date: 3/5/2024