2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

4-27-2004 

# Kin gvi sion v

. 898 B elmon t I nc

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 02-1770

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w
. v i l l a no va
. e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w
. v i l l a no va
. e du

. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" Kin gv i sion v

. 898 Be lmon t I nc " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s
. P ape r 739. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w
. v i l l a no va
. e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/739

### 1 PRECEDENTIAL UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF

APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT



### No: 02-1770

____ KINGVISION PAY-PE R-VIEW, CORP., L TD.,
Appellant

v.

898 BE LMONT , INC., d/b/a EL TORO BAR; BERHANU DEGIFE

___________________ Appeal from the United State s District

Cou rt for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. Civi l Action No. 01-cv-02970) Di s t r i ct J ud ge : Ho no r ab l e B erl e M

. Schill er

_______________ Argued on March 4, 2003

Befo re : ROTH, BARRY and FUENTES

CIRCUIT J UDGES

(Fil ed: April27, 2004)

Francine R. Strauss , Esquire (Argued) 11917 Gainsborough Road Potomac, MD 20854
Bradley H . Trushin, Esq uire Mar cu s W. Cor win , P .A

. 7777 Glades Road, Sui te 208 Boca Raton, FL 33424

Co unse l for A ppella nts

Donald M. Moser, Esquire(Argued) Washington West Buil ding 235 South 8 th Street Philadelphia, PA 19106-3519
Counsel for Appell ees

OPI NION

ROTH , Circ uit J udge:

Once again, we m ust determine what stat ute of limi tati ons to apply

when a federalst atu te d oe s n ot sp ec ify a limitations period. In this case, i nvolving the Fed eral C om mu nic ati ons A ct (FCA ), KingVision claims thatdefendant s exhibited a close d circui t tel ecast t hrough the use of an illeg al de cod ing dev ice. The Distri ct Court appli ed the two year limi tati ons period of

th e Pen nsylvan ia cable piracy s t at ute ins tead of the three year li mi tati ons peri od of the Copy right Ac t. We hold t hat the two year state limi tat ions period does ap pl y t o KingV ision’s FCA clai m s because t he Pennsyl va nia piracy statu te is direc tly analogous to § 553 of the FCA and neithe r

### 2

the “practical iti es of

litigati on” nor federal policy or law are fr

ustrat ed by such applic ation. See North Star St eel Co. v. Thomas , 515 U .S. 29, 34-35 (1 995); Reed

v. Transp. Union , 488 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Ac cor din gly, we will af firm the dec is ion of the Dist

rict Court granting defendants’ M otion f or Jud gm ent o n the Plea dings and dism issing allclaims against defendants.
I. Facts and Procedural History
P la inti ff KingVision, a lic ensee of sports programming, sued defendant s 898 Belm ont, Inc., d/b/a t

he El Toro Bar, and Berhanu Degife, i ts owner and operator, in the Dis tric t C our

t f orth e Ea st ern Di stric t of Pennsyl vania un der 4 7 U.S.C. §§ 553 (unauthorized reception of cable serv i ce) and 605 (una ut horized publication or use of com mun ications), the “piracystatutes” of the FCA, as amended bythe Cab l e Communications Po licy A ct of 198 4. It is uncontest ed t hat on March 13, 1999, with o ut KingVi si on’ s au tho ri zation , the El Toro Bar inte rce pt ed and broadcas t the Evander Holyfi eld/Lenn ox L ewi s cham pion ship boxing match an d “associ ated und ercard bou ts” to its patrons. It is a lso uncontested that KingVision did not pr ovide defenda n ts wi th the decod ing equipm ent or t h e satellite coor dinate s necessary t o recei ve the sig nal, nor did KingVisi on recei ve a sublicense fee or reve nue fr om El Toro Bar for patron admissi ons to the broa dcas t. KingVision wro te to the ElToro Bar about the unau thorize d bro adca st in A pril 19 99 but fail ed to bri ng suit untilJune 2001. De fend ants file d an Answer and a Motion for Judgment on the Pl eadings on t he grou nd th at theComplaint was fi led after the expirat

ion of the tw o year state limita tio ns period appl icabl e to the Pen nsylvan ia cable pi racystat ute, 18 Pa. Co n. Stat. § 910, as s pecifi ed in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524 (7) for actio ns not oth erwise subje ct to a sp ecific lim itatio n s per iod

. The Dis tric t C our

t appl ie d the two year stat ute of l imit ations of § 5524(7) and dismis sed Kin gVision’s clai ms as ti mebarred. KingVision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. 898 Belmont, I

nc. , No. 01-297 0, 200 2 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2275, at

*8 ( E. D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2002). On February 24, 2002, KingVis ion file d a time ly Motion forReconsideration, arguing tha t the Cop yright Act more closel y par alle ls the pirac y se ctions of the FCA, so that

the l imi tati ons peri od of the Copyri ght Ac t shou ld be appli ed instead of the state limita tion s pe riod

. KingV ision’s motion was denied on March 8, 2002, and this appeal fol lowed.
III. Jurisdic tion and Standard of

Review
The Distri ct Court ha d j uri sdiction to hear thi s case pur suant t o 28 U .S.C. §§ 1331, as it

is a ci vil ac tion arisi ng un der the laws o f t he United States. We have juri sdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, because the D is t rict

Court’s Febr

uary 14, 200 2, or der is fin al an d ap pea lable

. We re vi ew de novo t he D ist rict Cou rt’s dismis sal of t

he case o n statute of limi tati ons groun ds. See L ake v . Arno ld , 233 F .3d 360, 36 5 (3d C ir. 2000)

### 3

IV. Discussi on
Deter minin g the st atute o f limi tati ons period for

acti vity governed by

a federalstat

ute is a que stio n of federal la w. Neverthel ess, as recogni zed by th e Supreme Court in North Star St eel Co. v. Thomas , 515 U.S. 29 (1995) , when a federalstat

ute fai ls t o provide astatute of limitati ons , a cou rt shou ld look to analogous state stat

utes. The Court stated, “our practic e has le ft no doubt about t he lender of first reso r t. Since 183 0, ‘state stat utes have rep eatedl y suppl ied the periods of

limi tati ons for feder al causes of acti on’ when the federallegis lati on made

no provisi on.” Id. at 34 (ci ting Auto mo bile Workers v. Hoos ie r Car di nal Co rp. , 383 U.S. 696, 703- 704 ( 1966) ). Th e rule is that “courts look to t

he state st atute ‘most closely an al ogo us ’ t o the fe de ra l Ac t in

nee d.” Id. ; Reed v. Tra nsp. Union , 488 U.S. 319, 323 (1989) ; D elCostel lo v. Teamsters , 462 U .S. 151, 158 (1983). 1 The reas o n fo r this jud icially-created rule is that Congre ss has an “appropri ate” and “real istic” e xpe ctation that , give n longstandi ng practi ce, c ourts w ill look to analo g ous state stat utes of l imit ations for federallaws that

do not provi de t hem

. Nor th Star , 515 U.S

. at 34 , 37 ( Sca lia, J.,

concu rring). Thus, while courts are not require d to choose a state st atute of limi tati ons period, theygeneral ly choose a state li mi t ations period “a s a matte r of in ters titial fashioni ng of remedialdetai l s under the respective subst a ntive f ederal stat utes. ” De lCos tello , 462 U.S. at 160

. In North Star , the Suprem e Cou rt notes two excepti ons to th is rul e. First , 28 U.S .C. § 1 658 p rovides a g eneral, fouryear limi tati ons peri od for federa l st atute s passed after

December 1, 1990, that do not conta in their

own limit ations period. Id. at 34 n.*. Sec tio n 1658 is not at is sue here, how ever, since the FCA w as p ass ed in 1934, and the Cable Commun i cati ons Policy Ac t ame ndm ents w ere pa ssed in 198 4. Second, a cour t may turn to a limi tati ons period pr o vided withi n an analogous fede ral statute wh en the state limi tati ons periods would “‘frus trate or in terfere with the i mplementation of nationa l pol icies ’. . . or be ‘at odd s with the purp ose o r ope ratio n of federal substant ive law.’” Nort hst ar , 515 U.S. at 34 (internalcitati ons o m itted). Th is

s econd excep tion i s very narrow ; “refere nce to feder al la w is the excepti on, and we d ec li ne to fo ll ow a state limi tati ons periodonly when a rule f rom elsew here in fed eral law clearly provides a closer analogythan avai lablestate stat utes, and when the feder al poli cies at stake and t he practi cali ties of lit

igati on make that r

ule a signif icantly mo re app ropria te vehicl e for 1 Lampf v. Gilbe rtson , 501 U. S. 350 (1991) articul ates a s lightlydiffere nt versi on of the rul e for choosi ng limi tati ons peri ods when federal s tatutes fail to speci fy t

hem. In Lampf

, the Court considered the need for uniformit

y, the “geographi c character” of the clai m, and the “closest fit,” provide d statutory pur pos e an d ele me nts. Id. at 35 7-5 8. This expres sion of the rule i s not followed bythe Court i n North Star.

### 4

inter sti tiallawmaking

. ” Id. at 35 (i nternal quo tatio ns o mitte d).
In other w ords, ifthere is a paral lel state stat ute, there i s no reason to e xplore federallaw, unl ess thestate limi tati ons periodimp ede s the i mpl eme nt ation of nation al polici es, i s at odds wit h the purpose or operation of federalsubstant ive la w, or is de manded by the prac ticalities of litigati on. See, e. g., Reed , 488 U.S. at 327 (“In light

of the ana lo gy between § 101(a)( 2) and pe rsonal injury actions, and of the la ck of a n y confl ict be tween the practi cali ties of § 101 (a)(2) litiga ti on a nd state pe rso nal injurylimitations periods,

we are bound to bor

row stat e personal injury st atut es abs ent

som e co mp e lli ng demonstration that

‘the federalpolici es at stake’ in § 101(a) (2) actions make a federallimitation s perio d ‘a sig nifica ntly

more appr opriate vehic le for in te rsti tial lawmaking.’ ”) (quoti ng De lCos tello , 4 6 2 U.S. a t 172). H owe ver, as the Co urt expla ined in De lCos tello :
In some circumst ance s

. . . state stat utes of l imit ations

can be unsati sfact or y vehicl e s for the e nforcement of federallaw

. In those in stances , it m ay b e inapp ropria te to concl ude that Congress wo uld choose to adopt st ate rul es at odds

w ith th e purpose o r o p erati o n of fe dera l sub stan tive l aw

.

462 U.S . at 16 1 (e mp has is ad ded ). As we see then, unde r North Star, Reed , and Del Co stell o , if t here is an analogous state limi tati ons peri od, absent any im ped iment of i mplementation of nationa l policies i f tha t state pe riod is applie d, courts are not requiredto examine fed eral l imita tion s pe riod s. Following the st andard est ablis hed in De lCos tell o, the Supreme Court has applie d state lim ita tio ns peri ods to a variety of clai ms, including cl ai ms under the Worker Adjustment and Retrai ning Notific ationAct (WA RN ), see North Star , 515 U.S. at 33- 37; the Labor- Management and Repo rt ing an d Disclosure Act (LM RD A) , see Reed , 488 U.S. at 323-34; and § 1983, see Wilso n v. G arcia , 471 U.S. 261, 266 -80 (19 85)

. DelCostello its elf, how ever, is an exampl e of the type o f acti on in which a

federa l limi tati ons period is call ed for. There, th e Court appl ied a federallimi tati ons peri od to a hybri d § 301 /fair repres entatio n claim aris ing under the National Labor Relati ons Act (NL RA ), 462 U.S . at 15 1, 15 8-7 2. Ag ain, in a Racket eer Influenc ed and Corrup t Orga ni zati ons Act (RICO) clai m, the Cou rt applie d a federallimi tati ons peri od in Agency Holding Corp. v. M alley-D uff & Assocs. , Inc. , 483 U.S . 143 (19 87)

. Our rev iew of De lCos tello and Malley- Du

ff demonstrat es tha t th e Sup rem e Court examines stat ute of limi tati ons queries based on the t ype of claim pres ente d r ath er th an on a c as e- bycase ba si s. NLRA an d RIC O case s are two categories of t

he ty pes of federa l stat utes excepted fr om the general applic ationof state limitatio n s periods.

### 5

The justif icat ion for appl ying th e excepti on in the DelCost e llo 301 /fair repres entation hybrid claim is evi den t

. Wh ile the § 3 01 co mp onen t of the claim is

a straight contract claim f or wh ich there

were close s tate an alogs , the fair repres entation cl ai m, which is a cha llenge to pri vate set

tlement s underthe col lective bargaini ng agreement, was w ithout close analog in state law. 462 U.S. at 165 . It

wa s p ossibl e to appl y the state arbit rati on limi tati ons period s to the hybrid clai m, but t hey are extremelyshort – onl y 10 t o 9 0 da ys – a nd wo ul d al lo w in suf fi ci ent ti me for plaint

iffs t o complete n eces sarytasks relat ing to th e fa ir

re pr es ent at io n cl ai m, i.e

. , ev aluating the a dequacy of union counsel , obtaini ng private counsel, and framing the s uit. Id. at 166. In addition, the s tatearbit

rati on stat

utes as sume the vacati on of an award, but the arbit rati on in De lCos tell o did not resolve the emp loyee’s claim againstthe union because the union

was acti ng as the empl oyee’ s repres entative (and union couns el as employee’s cou nse l). Id. at 167. I n the alte rnati ve, apply ing the l onger si x year state contrac t li mitations period to t h e hybrid claim wo uld h ave in terfere d w ith the “rapid f

inal resolution of

labor di sputes favored by feder al law.” Id. at 168. The practi cali ties ofliti ga tin g a hyb rid cl ai m,
as in De lCos tello , distingui sh that ty pe of case from the present

one. The RIC O c ivil enforcement a ction in M alley-D uff is a bro ader e xcep tion to the st at e l imi tatio ns r

ul e. The S upr eme Cou rt has a rticulated three p oints to

co nsi der in dete rmining whethe r, for uni for mity p urp ose s, a court s hould adopt

a federal , rat

her than a

state, l imit ations period. First , a gener al pref erence for

un ifo rm ity, even if t o avoid forum shopping, is an insuffi cient reason to app ly the limi tati ons peri od of the closestfederal

a nalog. See, e. g., Nort

h Star , 515 U.S . a t 36. The Co urt no ted, in N orth S ta r, th at “t he practi ce of adopti ng state stat utes o f limi tati ons for federa l causes of act ion can result in diff erent li mi tations p eriods in differe nt States for

th e s ame federalacti on

. . . . But these are justthe co sts of th e rule its elf .

. .. ” Id. Second, the desire to unifythe limi tati ons periods of fed eral laws with simil ar purposes i s not a suf fici ent reason to adopt feder al limi tati ons peri ods. For inst ance, i n Reed , the Court commented:
Res pon dents argue that the

sa me federallabor pol icie s that led us in De lCos tello to b orrow the NL RA § 10(b ) statute of lim it ations for hybr i d § 301/fai r repres entat ion c laim s likewise re quire th at

we borrow § 10(b) for LMRDA § 10 1 (a)(2) a ctions. T his argumentla cks me rit . It fa il s to takeseri ouslyour admoniti on that analogo u s state stat utes of l imit ations

are to be used unl es s they frustra te or signi ficantly interfere with f edera l policies.

### 6

488 U.S. at 327 Third, there is a differ ence between unifo rmity in const

rui ng the subst antive elem ents of a s tatute in o rder to charact erizea clai m fo r stat ute of limi tati ons purposes and t he next step of determi ning what limi tati ons p eriods to adoptfor a p articular type of c laim

. For example, in Wilson , th e Suprem e Cou rt held that § 1983 clai ms should be charact erize d unifo r mly as state tort actions. The Court then de termine d, how ever, that

the le ngth of

the li mitations periodis t o be gove rned byst at e t or t l aw. 471 U.S. at 268-271, 275-28 0. The C ourt stressed that un iform ity was an issue o nly in the char acterization of the cl aim, st ating “the stat ute [§ 1983] is fairlyconstrued [as

a tort clai m] as a directiv e to sele ct, in each State, th e one mo st app ropria te statute of limi tati ons for al l § 1983 claims. The federal interes ts i n u ni fo rm ity,

ce rta in ty, an d the mini mizati on of

unnec essary liti g ation all s upport t he conclusi on that C ong ress fa vore d th i s simp le approach. ” Id . at 27 5. Thus, wh ile the Court embraced uni fo rm ity i n recogniz ing § 19 83 cla im s a s t or t c la ims for s ta tute of limitation s purp oses, it d id not find thatthe li mitations periods themselve s needed t o be un iform . It is only after th is charact erization of t he ty pe of claim has b een c om plete d that t he De lCos tello/N orth Star

/Reedexaminati on is to be don e to det ermine i f there are no analog ous s tate statu tes or if th e state l imit ations p eriods frustra te th e pr acti cali ties of litigatio n or a re at odd s wit h fe der al pu rpo se o r law

. We see then t his proc es s taking place in M alley-D uff

, the RICO cas e i n wh ich the Court he ld that a four yea r limi tati ons period for C la yt on Ac t civil enforcementactions applies to RICO acti ons an d r ejected the state “catch -all” statute of lim itatio ns c hoi ce. 4 83 U .S. a t 155-56

. The Co urt is ve ry carefu l in M alley-D uff to dis tingu is h its narrow holding with regard to thes e RICO actions from oth er l imitati ons period cases. The Cou rt explai ne d th at u niformit y i s a greater
concern fo r RI CO c ivil acti ons, si nce by statute such acti ons requi re both anexus to interstate or foreign c ommerce and a pa tte rn of r ack etee ring

. Id. at 153; 18 U.S .C. § 1962 (b), (c). Ra ckete ering itse lf often involves interstate transa ctions, s in c e it may inc lude any of nine st ate l aw feloni es and over 25 f ede ral sta tutes

. Id. at 149 (citing A.J. Cunningham Packing Corp. v. Congress Fin. Corp. , 792 F.2d 330, 337 (3d Cir. 1986 ) (Sl ovi ter, J.,

con cur ring )); 18 U.S .C. § 196 1.
The Co urt’s de sire to lim it i ts holding in M alley-D uff is made cl ear in No rth Sta r. The North Star c our t distinguis hed M alle y- Du ff on the ground t hat the event

in North Star

was a sing l e incide nt, “ a plant

closi ng,” a “mass lay off ata sing le site o f em plo ymen t,” and it was “relative ly simp le a nd n arrow in its

sco pe,” 515 U.S. at 37 (i nternalquotati ons omitted). The RIC O c laim in M alley-D uff , on the othe r h and, i s acknowledged as requ irin g a n exus to i nters tateor forei gn
c omm erce as a jurisdi ctional ele ment as

we ll as an all egati on of a pa ttern of racketeeri ng, which is l ikely to include

### 7

interstate tran sac tion s. M alley -D uff, 483 U.S. at 153-54. KingVision is cor rect t hat cable piracy , like RI CO claims, may involve wide-spre ad an d multi pl e wrongful actio ns such as theft, tortious interference with pros pe ctiveadvantage, misrepr esentat

ion, civil consp i racy , and unjust enrich men t, but m ultiple, inte rstate cl ai ms are n ot requi red as an el ement of the cause of action under §§ 553 or 605 of the Cab le Ac t, nor are they at stak e in this

cas e. Although the Supreme C our t has not yet been face d w ith the is sue of the limi tati ons period to applyin FCA/Cab l e Act pi r acy case s, the issu e has arisen in federaldist

rict courts and ha s been addresse d by the F ifth C ircuit C o urt of Appeals. As th e D istrict Co urt no ted in this case, f

ede ra l dis tri ct court s have applie d th e federal limita tions period under the Copyri ght Actto FCA cl ai ms when the

o nly st at e l aw f

ro m whi ch to bor

ro w a limi tati ons period was a g enera l conversi on law . W e ag ree with t he Distri ctCourt that

“these c ases do not predict the proper o utco me of the case at bar involving a state statute narr owl y craft ed to dete r cable piracy .” 200 2 U. S. Dis t. LE XIS 227 5 at *8 . It is not,

moreo ver, a require m ent that a dis tri ct

cour t, in pick ing an analo gou s state limi tati ons period, de te rmine that ev ery state has such an analog ous statutory

sc heme – but only that th e state whose law is bei ng applie d has such a one. 2 KingVision, however, rel ies on t he Fifth Circuit Co urt of Appea ls’ decisio n in Prostar v. Ma ssachi , 239 F .3d 66 9 (5th Cir. 2 001) to argue f

or the appl ication of the fede ral limitatio ns pe rio d of the Copyri ght Ac t. We declin e , how ever, to follow the h olding i n Prostar . Although the facts parall el thos e of the present case, Prostar is disting uisha ble on the ground that the appl icabl e state law at i ssue , one of general conversi on, is not as cl ose an
ana log to the F CA as the P enns ylvania piracy statutes. 3 Further , the Prostar court appears to confl ate, or a t least fa ils to distinguish b etween, t he need fo r unifo rmity in cons truing th e type of statute for limi tati ons purp oses a nd u niform ity in the length of

the li mitation s periods adopted. See Wilson , 471 U. S. at 268-271, 275-280. The Prostar

court s tate s that t

he FCA requires uniform enforcement vi a the applic ationof a f edera l li mit ations period because “issues facing the cable indu stry [are ] nat ional i n scope.” 239 F. 3d at 676 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at22 (1984), reprint edin 1 984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4659,

2 In his c oncurrence in North Star , Justi ce Scali a notes t

hat the“closer analo gy” rule f irst ann oun ced in De lCos tello is “not

only erroneous but

unw orka ble” b ecau se it can result in s tate limi tati ons apply ing in s ome state s and the feder al st atutein other s. 515 U.S. at 37. We, however, wil l leave the resol ution of t

his di lemma to the Sup reme Co urt.

3 We take judic ial not

ice that KingVision i dentif

ies New York and M ississipp i as othe r states w ithout s tate pira cy an alog s.

### 8

4720-2 2). This con clusion, how ever, simp ly does not fol low. The nati onal

concerns of the cable indu stry are rel evant only i nsofa r as they are embodied in t he FCA. As a thresh old matter , the y are used to characterizethe cl aim for which a stat ut e of limi tati ons peri od is then to be applie d. The violatio ns of the C able A ct, how ever, are particular acts w hich are pursued in the l ocati ons where theyoccur

– as was done in the present case. The local ized violat

ions – even i f multi ple –

are very diff erent f rom th e interstate activ ity invo lved in R ICO claim s. Following North Star , w e t urn our atte ntion then to t

he Pennsy lvania

piracy statutes. Their pro visi ons mirror those of the FCA. Section 3926 o f the Pen nsylvan ia stat

ute, like 47 U. S.C. § 605, makes punishabl e by fi ne or impri sonment the th eft o f certain wire services

. 4 It al lo ws an aggrieved se rv ice provi der “eq uitable or decla rator y r elie f , comp ensatory and pun it ive d am age s . . . costs

. . . and attorney fee s.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3926(g). Section 910 is the state companion statute to § 3926 and is t he state stat

ute addre ssed b y t he District Co urt. It focus es upon the us e of d evice s for theft of telecommunications services, mirroring 47 U. S. C. § 5 53. 5 KingVision disput es the ap plicab ility of § 91 0, as it deals with thef

t via a “devi ce,” andit i s not clear that a “device” was us ed in the pre se nt case to interce pt the te lecast. Nevertheless, even though we do not know the meth od o f interc epti on use d at the El Toro Bar, we can ass ume recepti on of the Ho lyfield-Le wis fight was not the product of mere seren dipity. Furth er, wh ile KingVision is cor

rect t hat § 910 speaks about manuf acture of ill ega l tele communicati ons devices and § 553 about impr oper interce ptio n of a communicati on , § 910(e) define s “manufac t u r e of an unlawfu l tele communicati on device” as using a de vice to re ce iv e, t ra ns m it, o r d ec ryp t a telec om mu nica tion s ser vice

. The Distric t Cou rt is corre ct that § 910 provi de s “a remarkably close ana log to the Cable Act [ § 553].” 2002 U.S

. LEX IS 2275 at *6. As the court descri bed, § 910, like 47 U.S.C. § 553: (1)spe cifically prohibits use o f an unlawfu l tele communicati ons device to decode “transmissions, signal s or servi ces over any cable tele visi on

. . . . ” 18 Pa.

4 Section 39 26 pertains to w ire and r adio s ervice s, and § 60 5 to telecommunication and cable services.

5 KingVision al leged vi olati on of bot h §§ 605 and 553 of th e C able Ac t. Sectio n 60 5, how ever, d oes n ot app ly in the p rese nt ca se. See TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp. , 267 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (hol ding that

“a cable televi sion descramble r does not

facil itate the intercepti on of ‘communicati ons by radio’ and the refore the statutory damages avail able under § 605 do not applyhere.” )

### 9 Cons. Stat. § 910(e) (comp are with 4 7 U.S.C . § 553(a)).

(2) provides for cri minal sanctions; prior

convictions under the Cabl e Act are considered in gradi ng an offense. 1 8 Pa . Con s. Stat. § 910(b ) (5) (co mp are w ith 47 U .S.C. § 553 (b)).

(3) provides for civil statutory sa nc tions of $250 to $10,000 per vi olati on absentevidence t

hat the ac ts

were w ill ful and fo r purpo ses of pe rsona l fi nancialgain or com merc ia l advantage, in which case the court may increase the award of stat

utorydamages by no more than $50,000 per violat ion. 18 Pa. C ons. S tat. § 910(d.1)(2)-(3 ) (comp are with 47 U.S.C. § 5 53 (c), espe cially part (c)(3)(A)(ii), (c)(3 )(B )).

( 4) prov ides fo r injunc ti v e reli ef, statutory or ac tual dama g es, attorney ’s fees, and costs in almost i dentic al language as the FC A. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat . § 910(d. 1)(1- 3), (d)(2) (iv) (com pare w ith 47 U.S.C. § 553 (c) (2)- (c)(3)(B)).

C on se qu en tly, we conclude that the Distri ct Co urt did n ot err in h olding that, “because Section 910 is para llel in substanc e an d fo rm to the C able A ct, it is the ‘closer fit’ the Supre me C ourt contemplated as th e a ppropri ate source from which to borr ow a statute of li mitations, preclu ding KingVisi on’ s proposed adoptionof the C opyright Act’s three- year

period.” 200 2 U.S . LEX IS 2275 a t *8 (internal citations om itted).
Furthermore, this case does not warrantthe exception of apply ing a federal limi tati ons period w here a state limi tati ons pe ri od “frust

rates the prac tica lities of litigati on ” o r other wise interfe res w ith federalpol icy or la w. KingVision knew of the allege d vio latio n o ver two y ears prior to c ommen cing sui t. I n such a straightforw ard and r elatively simp le suit, it is di fficul t to im agine why atwo year limi tati ons period would be i nadequate. See, e.g. , North St

ar , 515 U.S. at 36 (holdi ng that a two year limi tati ons peri od in a f a irly straightfo rwa rd W AR N c laim

was insuf fic ient to “ frustr ate th e practi cali ties of l itig at io n”) . Th e Su pr eme Cou rt has turned to federa l la w for limi tati ons periods when a statelimi tati ons periodwa s too sh ort to ac com mo date t he specialcircumst ances of litigati on, such as investigati on. See De lCos te llo , 462 U. S. at166 (hold ing tha t a sta t e limi tati ons periodo f general ly between 10 and 90 da ys was in su ff

ic ie ntto br in g a LMRA § 301 /fair repres entation h ybrid action).

### 10

There are no such s pec i al consi derati ons relevant to br in gi ng C FA c laim s that

wo uld b e fr ustrated bya two-y ear limita t ions per iod

. Cf. Reed , 488 U.S. at 327 -32 8n.4 (findin g in t he LMRDA context that t here was no indica tion tha t it shou ld take mor e tha n t wo years to ident ify an injury and hire an attorney).
A dd itio na lly, the two yea r state limi tati ons perio d do es not frustrate the purpose or implement ation of the F CA or its C able A ct am endm ents. T he ov erall purpose of the FCA is to “ regulat [e] inte rst ate and f oreign com merc e in communicati on by wire and radio so as to make availa ble . . . to all the peopl e of the United Sta tes . . . a rap id ef ficie nt . . . communi ca tion servic e w ith ade quate facil iti es at rea sonable charg es . . .. ” 47 U.S .C. § 151. More specifically, Congress passed §§ 553 and 605 to preve nt unauthor ized interc eption of cabl e t ransm issio ns, includ ing inte rceptio n through unauthori zed use o f decoding devices. These poli cies and l aws are not impeded in th e present case whe re KingVision has had up to two yea rs t o bring suit in order

to dete r theft

and keep the cos ts of serv ices dow n. T he re is no evidence that t

he practical iti es of

litigati on req uire mo re tim e.

Conclusion
For the fore go ing rea sons , we w ill affi rm the jud gm ent of the D istrict Co urt, dism issing K ingV ision’s C om plaint.