MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 2 ME 27 Docket: And

- 21

- 216 Argued : April	6,	2022 Decided: May	17,	2022 Panel: MEAD ,	JABAR , HUMPHREY,	HORTON , and CONNORS , JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. CLIFTON	THOMAS

JABAR ,	J. [¶1] Clifton	 Thomas	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 o f six offenses, 1 entered	by	the	trial	court	(Androscoggin	County, McKeon,	J. )	after	a three

- day	jury	trial. Thomas	challenges	the	denial	of	his request	for	sanctions for	 the	 State’s alleged	 discovery	 violations	 and	 the	 denial	 of	 his	 motion	 to dismiss because	of	the	makeup	of	the	jury venire

. Thomas	also contends	that the	trial	court committed	an	obvious	error by admitting	testimony	of	a	police officer	 that contained hearsay ; that the trial	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 by

1 The offenses	for	which	Thomas	was	charged	were domestic	violence	c riminal	threatening	with a	dangerous	weapon	(Class	C), 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	209

- A(1)(A) (202 2 ) (Count	1) ;	reckless	conduct	with	a firearm	 (Class	C), 17

- A M.R.S.	 §	211(1) (202 2 ) (Count	2) ;	domestic	 violence	 terrorizing	 (Class	D), 17

- A	M.R.S. § 210

- B(1)(A)	 (20 22 ) ( Count	3) ;	 threatening	display	of	a	weapon	 (Class	D), 25	M.R.S. § 2001

- A(1)(A)	 (202 2 ) (Count	 4) ;	 domestic	 violence	 assault	 (Class	D), 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	 207

- A(1)(A) (202 2 ) (Count	5) ;	domestic	violence	assault	(Class	D),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	207

- A(1)(A)	(202 2 ) (Count	6) ; possession	of	a	firearm	by	a	prohibited	person	(Class	C), 15	M.R.S.	§	393(1)(A

- 1)(3)	(202 2 ) (Count 7)

. The	jury	found	Thomas	not	guilty	on	Count	5.2 failing	to	admit	a	letter that Thomas	claim ed was	written	on	behalf of	the	victim because	it	could	not	be	authenticated; and that	there	was	insufficient	evidence for	the	jury	to	convict	him

. We	affirm

. I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts [¶ 2 ] “Viewing	 the	 evidence	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	 the	 jury’s verdict,	the trial record	supports	the	following	facts.” See State	v.	Murray ,	2021 ME	47,	¶	2,	259	A.3d	1276 .		On	February	7,	20 20 ,	Thomas	beat the	victim

— a former romantic	partner	and	the	mother	of	Thomas’s	child

— causing	swelling and	bruising	to	her	face.		At	the	time, the	victim did	not	report	this	incident	to the	police. [¶ 3 ] On	February	26,	2020,	Thomas	entered the	victim’s home	and	began yelling	at	her.		He	d rew	a	firearm,	loaded	it,	and	pointed	it	at	her	while	she	had a	child	on	her	lap.		He	took the	victim’s cell	phone	from	her and	stated that he would give	it	back	if	she would let	him	shoot	her	in	the	leg. After	hearing	a	noise outside,	Thomas	left with	the	victim’s	cell	phone

. Once	Thomas	departed , the
victim left	 the	 apartment,	 brought	 her	 children	 to	 safety,	 and	 reported	 this incident , as	well	as	the	incident on	February	7 , to	the	police

.3 [¶ 4 ] On	 February	 27,	 2020,	 the	 police	learned	 that	 Thom as	might	 be staying	at	an	apartment	in	Lewiston.		The	police	reviewed	surveillance	video	of the	building	and	observed	Thomas	at	the	building.		The	police	then	searched the	apartment	and	found	a	.22

- caliber	handgun , ammunition , and the	victim’s cell	phone. 2 The victim later said	that	the	gun found	in	the	apartment was	not the	gun that Thomas	had	threatened	her	with.
B. Arrest	and	Indictment [¶ 5 ] Thomas was	 arrested	 on	 February	 27,	 2020.	 	 At	 the	 time	 of	 his

arrest , the	police	found	two	cell	phones	on	his	person. The	next	day , the	cell phones	 were	 turned over	 to	 the	 New	 York	 Police	 Department because	 they

were related	to	an	ongoing	investigation in	New	Y ork

. [¶ 6 ] T he	 State	 filed	 a	 two

- count	 complaint	 against	 Thomas	 for	 the domestic	violence	incidents that	occurred on	February	7	and	February	26.		On July	 6,	 2020,	 an	 Androscoggin	 County	 Grand	 Jury	 returned	 a	 six

- count indictment	 for the events	 that alleg edly occurred in February	 2020.	 	 On October 5,	2020,	the	Androscoggin	County	Grand	Jury	returned	a	seven

- count superseding	indictment	adding	an	additional	charge of possession	of	a	firearm by	a	prohibited	person.		Thomas pleaded	not	guilty	on	all	counts

.

2 The legality	of	the entry	and	search	of the apartment	is	not	at	issue	on	appeal.4 C. Motion	for	Discovery [¶ 7 ] On	November	17,	2020,	Thomas	filed	a	motion	for	discovery	seeking the	two	cell	phones	the	police	seized	from	him	when	he	was	arrested	and	that were	 in	 the	 custody	 of	 the	 NYPD.	 	 Thomas	 claimed	 the	 phones	 contained exculpatory evidence	and	sought	sanctions	against	the	State for	not	providing them .		The	court	( Stanfill,	J. )	held	a	hearing	on t his	motion	on	March	26,	2021. On	April	23,	202 1 ,	the	court	denied	the	motion,	determining	that	“the	Lewiston Police	Department	had	no	particular	reason	to	think	the	cell	phones	would	have exculpatory	information	or	indeed	any	relevant	information	on	them	when	[the phones]	were	turned	over	to	the	NYPD,” and	that	there	was	“no	showing	that [evidence	on	the	phones]	was	materially	exculpatory.”
D. Jury	Selection	and	Motion	to	Dismiss [¶ 8 ] The	 jury	 was	 selected	 on	 May	 10,	 2021.	 	While	 350 prospective jurors	 were	 summonsed	 to	 be	 in	 the	 jury	 venire,	 only	 16 5	 potential	 jurors appeared. According	to the	court’s	observations,	there	were	three persons of color	in	the	jury	venire. [¶ 9 ] Thomas,	who	is	African American,	and	two	other	African American defendants in	other	cases shared the	same	jury	venire .		Each of	the	defendants filed	a	motion	to	dismiss	due	to the	failure	of	the	jury	venire	to	represent	a	fair5 cross	section	of	 the	community .		The	court	( McKeon,	J. )	held	a	hearing	on all three	motions	in	all	three	cases on	May	13,	2021.		The	court stated	that	it had “no	 information	 .	 .	 .	 actually	 on	 the	 record	 except	 for	 perhaps	 [the	 2019 Androscoggin	County]	census	stat[istics]	[provided	by	the	State]	and	the	jury data	the	Court	accumulated	in	preparation	for	today.”		Instead	of	denying	the motion,	 the	 court	gave Thomas the	 option	 of	 continuing his trials	 so that he could	better	develop his arguments,	but	Thomas	elected	 to	proceed	with	 the jury	trial. The court	denied	the	motion	to	dismiss.
E. The	Trial [¶1 0 ] A three

- day	jury	trial	was	held	on	May	18	through	May	20,	2021. Before	 the	 jury	 was	 brought	 into	 the	 courtroom for	 the	 first	 time ,	 Thomas indicated	that	he	was	going	to	cross

- examine the	victim about	a	letter that she allegedly sent	 him	 while	 he	 was	 incarc erated	 in	 the	 county	 jail.	 	 The	 State questioned the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 letter. The	 court deferred	 ruling	 on	 the
matter, indicating that,	if the	victim were	to	deny that she	authored	the	letter, then Thomas	 would	 have	 to	 authenticate	 it	 with	 other	 eviden ce.	 	When the
victim was	asked	about	the	letter	outside	the	presence	of	the	jury,	she	denied having	 written	 the	 letter. When	 Thomas later tried	 to	 present	 the	 letter	 as6 evidence	during	his	 testimony,	 t he	court	did	not	admit	 the	letter,	ruling that there	w as in sufficient	evidence	to	authenticate	it. [¶ 1 1 ] The	State	called the	victim , who testified	about	her	relationship with	 Thomas	 and	 the	 incidents	 that	 occurred	 in	 February	 2020.	 	 On

cross - examination,	Thomas	attacked the	victim’s credibility,	introducing	a false statement	made	by	the	victim	to	the	police ,	a 9

- 1

- 1	call	that	refuted	her	c laim that she	 drove	 to	 the	 police	 station on	 February	 26 ,	 and	 other	 examples	 of purported	embellishment.		The	State	also	called the Lewiston p olice o fficer who first	interviewed the	victim , and	he	testified	to statements that the	victim	made on	February	26 ,	2020 ,	that	were	consistent	with	the	victim’s	testimony	at	trial

. Thomas	 did	 not	 object	 to the	 officer’s testimony regarding	 the	 victim’s statements	to	him

. [¶1 2 ] The jury	found	Thomas	guilty	of	Counts	1,	2,	3,	4,	and	6. After	the jury	was excused ,	the	court	found	Thomas,	a	convicted	felon,	guilty	of	Count	7. The court sentenced	Thomas	to	three	years	and	six	months ’ incarceration on Counts	 1,	 2,	 and	 7,	 concurrent	 with	 each	 other;	 364	 days ’ incarcerat ion on Counts	 3	 and	 4	 to	 run	 concurrent ly with	 each	 other	 and with Count	 1;	 and
364 days ’ incarceration and two	 years ’ probation	 on	 Count	 6 , to	 run7 consecutive ly to the	other	counts.		Thomas	timely	appeal ed

. 15	M.R.S.	§	2115 (202 2 ) ;	M.R.	App. P. 2B(b)(1 )

. II. DISCUSSION [¶1 3 ] Thomas makes five claims on	appeal: ( 1)	 the	court	should	have dismissed all charges	as	a	discovery	sanction	after	the	state	failed	to	preserve the exculpatory	evidence that	was allegedly	on the cell	phones	that	were	turned over	to	the	NYPD; ( 2) the	court	erred	when	it admitted statements	of	a	police officer that constituted hearsay ; ( 3) the	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 by determining that a	letter offered	by	Thomas was	not properly authenticated; ( 4)	the	court	should	have	dismissed all	charges because	the	jury	pool	did not represent	 an	 adequate	 cross

- section	 of	 the	 community;	 and, ( 5) there	 was insufficient	evidence	for	a	jury	to	convict	Thomas	of	his	crimes. 3
A. Discovery	Violation
1. State’s	Duty	to	Preserve	Evidence [¶1 4 ] Thomas	argues	that	the State’s failure to	preserve the exculpatory evidence that	 was allegedly on	 the	 cell	 phones	 turned	 over	 to	 the	 NYPD

3 Thomas	has asserted	and	developed	his	constitutional	claims	based	only	on	the	Constitution	of the	United	States,	not	the	Maine	Constitution,	and	therefore	we	review	his	claims by applying	federal law	and	principles. See State	v.	Philbrick ,	481	A.2d	488,	493	n.3	(Me

. 1984) (“Because	the	Defendant does	 not	 argue	 that	 his	 state	 constitutional	 rights	 were	 infringed,	 we	 depart	 from	 our	 preferred practice	 of	 deciding	 issues	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 our	 state	 constitution	 before	 we	 address	 federal constitutional	questions.		 Just	as certain	considerations	of	judicial	restraint	ordinarily	impel	us	 to ground	a	decision	on	state,	rather	than	federal [,] law,	other	considerations	of	judicial	restraint	lead8 constitute d a	discovery	violation,	entitling	him	to	a	dismissal	as	a	sanction

. See
M.R.U.	 Crim. P. 16( e )

. Although “prosecutors	 have	 a	 constitutional	 duty	 to preserve	material	evidence”	 to	 “protect	a	criminal	defendant’s	 right	 to	a	 fair trial,”	the	defendant	bears	the	burden	of	proving	a	violation	of	his	constitutional rights. State	 v. Cote , 2015	 ME	 78,	 ¶¶	 11,	 14

- 15, 118	 A.3d	 805 .	 	 We	 have instructed	that	courts	undertake	a	“bifurcated	analysis” in	which [f]irst,	the	court	must	determine	whether	the	evidence	possessed an	exculpatory	 value	 that	was	apparent	before	 the	evidence	was destroyed.	 	 If	 so,	 then	 the	 defendant must	 show	 only	 that	 the evidence	was	of	such	a	nature	that	the	defendant	would	be	unable to	 obtain	 comparable	 evidence	 by	 other	 reasonably	 available means. If,	however,	the	exculpatory	value	of	the	evidence	was	not apparent	 at	 the	 time	 of	 its	 loss	 or	 disa ppearance,	 the	 defendant cannot	establish	a	constitutional	deprivation	without	proof	that	the State	also	acted	in	bad	faith	in	failing	to	preserve the	evidence.
Id. ¶	15 (citation s and	quotation	marks	omitted).
2
. Application [¶1 5 ] In conducting the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 analysis ,	 we	 conclude	 that Thomas	has	not	shown	that	either	cell	phone	contained	apparent	exculpatory value. T he	motion	court ( Stanfill,	J. ) heard	testimony	from	the	detective	who first	entered	the	phones	into	evidence	at the	Lewiston	Police	Department ;	he

us	to	refrain	from	deciding	important	state	constitutional	issues	that	have	been	nei ther	briefed n or argued.” (citations	omitted) ).9 testified	that he	did	not	review the	data	on	the	phones	before	they	were sent to the	 NYPD.	 	 Similar	 testimony	 was	 elicited	 from	 another	 detective	 and	 the Lewiston	Police	Department’s	evidence	manager. There is no evidenc e that	the police	had	any	indication that the	phones	had	exculpatory	value. There	is	“a distinction	 between	 apparently	 exculpatory	 evidence	 and	 potentially	 useful evidence.” Cote , 2015	ME	78,	¶	1 3 ,	118	A.3d	805. Thomas	did	not	offer	any evidence	indicating that	either	cell	phone had any	specific	exculpatory	evidence but	instead	relied	on	the	generalization	that	domestic	partners	communicate with each	other using	such	devices. 4 [¶1 6 ] Because	there	was	no	excu lpatory	value that	was	apparent at	the time	 the	 phones	 left	 Lewiston	 Police	 Department	 custody,	 Thomas	 had	 the burden	to	prove that	the police	acted	in	bad	faith	in	failing	to	preserve	the	cell phones. An	act of	“bad	faith”	requires	more	than mere neglige nce. Id. ¶	19	n.5. [¶1 7 ] I n	the	second	part	of	the bifurcated	analysis , Thomas	must	prove that	 the	 phones contained “potentially	 useful” evidence and that	 “the	 State acted	in	bad	faith	in	failing	to	preserve [ the	evidence ] .” See i d. ¶	19. Thomas’s

4 Even if we	 agreed	 that	 the	 exculpatory	 value	 of	 the	 phones	 should	 have	 been	 apparent	 to authorities,	 Thomas	 would	 still	 have	 to	 show	 “that	 the	 evidence	 was	 of	 such	 a	 nature	 that	 the defendant	would	be	un able	 to	obtain	comparable	evidence	by	other	reasonably	available	means.” State	v.	Chan ,	2020	ME	91,	¶	14,	236	A.3d	471 (quotation	marks	omitted).		However,	Thomas	admits that	he	“ did	possess some	copies	of	texts”	between the	victim	and	himself ,	and these text	messages were	submitted	as	evidence	at	trial.10 motion	asserted	that	the	authorities	acted	in	bad	faith when	they	“intentionally disposed”	 of	 the	 phones ,	 but	 he	 presented	 no	 evidence	 or	legal authority	 to support	his	contention. Further,	t he	c o urt	found that the police	did	not	act	in bad	faith , and	this	finding	is	supported	by	the evidence

. [¶1 8 ] We	conclude	that the	court	did	not	err	in	determining	that Thomas failed	to	establish	the	neces sary	elements	proving	that	the	police	violated	their duty	to	preserve	exculpatory	evidence	and that	therefore the	State’s	failure	to provide	access	to	the	seized	cell	phones did	not	deny	Thomas	his	constitutional right	to	a	fair	trial.
B. Hearsay	Evidenc e [¶1 9 ] Thomas	 next	argues	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 ( McKeon,	J. )	 committed obvious	 error	 when	 it	 admitted testimony	 of a	 Lewiston	 police	 officer that constituted hearsay under	 M.R.	 Evid	 801

. As	 Thomas	 recognizes,	 because Thomas failed	 to	 object	 to the officer ’s t estimony,	 we	 review	 the	 court’s admission	of	the	evidence	for	obvious	error. See State	v.	Dolloff ,	2012	ME	130, ¶	52,	58	A.3d	1032

. “To	demonstrate	obvious	error,	the	defendant	must	show that	 there	 is	 ‘(1)	 an	 error,	 (2 )	 that	 is	 plain,	 and	 (3)	 that	 affects	 substantial rights.’” Id. ¶	35 (quoting State	v.	Pabon ,	2011	ME	100,	¶	29,	28	A.3d	1147 ). “[I]f	these three conditions	are	met, we will	set	aside	a	jury’s	verdict	only	if we11 conclude that	(4) the	error	seriously	affects	the	fairness	and	integrity	or	public reputation	of	judicial	proceedings.” Dolloff ,	2012	ME	130,	¶	35,	58	A.3d	1032 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 20 ] “Hearsay	is	an	out

- of

- court	statement	made	by	a	declarant	offered in	 evidence by	 a	 witness	 to	 prove	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 matter	 asserted	 and	 is generally	inadmissible.” Needham	v.	Needham ,	2022	ME	7,	¶	11,	267	A.3d	1112 ;

see M.R.	Evid.	801,	802.		However,	Maine’s	rules	of	evidence set	forth several categories	 of	 statements	 that	 are	 not	 hearsay.	 	M.R.	 Evid.	 801(d).	 	 One such

statement is	a	declarant

- witness’s	prior	statement	that	“[i]s	consistent	with	the declarant’s	testimony	and	is	offered:	(i)	to	rebut	an	express	or	implied	charge that	 the declarant	 recently	 fabricated	 it	 or	 acted	 from	 a	 recent	 improper influence	 or	 motive in	 so	 testifying ;	 or	 (ii)	 to	 rehabilitate	 the	 declarant’s credibility	 as	 a	 witness	 when	 attacked	 on	 another	 ground .” M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).	 	 This type	 of	 statement can be	 used	 “both	 for its rehabilitative	and	substantive	effect.”		M.R.	Evid.	801 Advisory	Committee	Note

– August	2018

. [¶ 2 1] Here, the	officer testified	about	what the	victim had	told	him	on the	 night	 of	 February	 26,	 2020,	 when	 she	 first	 reported	 the	 February	 2020 incidents.		This	included	her	statement	that	Thomas	had	brandished	a	gun	at12 her, that	he	had made	threats	to	her,	that	Thomas	had	taken	her	cell	phone,	and that	ther e	had	been	previous	episodes	of	domestic	violence	that	Thomas	had committed	against	her.		At	this	point	in	the	trial, the	victim had	already	testified to	 these	 events	 and	 had	 been	 cross

- examined	 by	 Thomas.	 	 During	 the

cross - examination,	to	demonstrate	she was	unable	to	“get	her	story	straight,” Thomas attacked	 her	 character	 for	 truthfulness,	 brought	 her	 memory	 and recollection	into	question,	and	questioned	the	consistency	of	her	statements. [¶ 22 ] The	 officer’s testimony	 supported the	 victim’s credibilit y	 after Thomas	 attacked	it and	was	 consistent	with the	 victim’s in

- court	 testimony

. T hese	 statements by	 the	 victim	 to	 the	 officer were	 not	 hearsay and were admissible	 under M.R.	 Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)

. The trial	 court	 did	 not	 commit obvious	error	in	admitting the	officer’s testimony.
C. Admissibility	of	the	Letter [¶ 23 ] Thomas	next	argues	that	the	trial	court	abused	its	discretion	when it	did	not	allow	him	to	introduce	a	letter that he	claimed that the	vi ctim had sent him	while	he	was	in	 the	Androscoggin	County	 Jail.		We	review	a	 trial	court’s ruling	 on	 admissibility	 of	 evidence	 for	 abuse	 of	 discretion. State	 v.	 Hussein , 2019	ME	74,	¶	10,	208	A.3d	752 .		 “A	court	abuses	its	discretion	in	ruling	on evidenti ary	issues	if	the	ruling	arises	from	a	failure	to	apply	principles	of	law13 applicable	 to	 the	 situation [,] resulting	 in	 prejudice.” Id. (quotation	 marks omitted). [¶ 24 ] The	standard	for	authentication	is	articulated in M.R.	Evid. 901(a), which	states that “[t]o	satisfy	the	requirement	of	authenticating	or	identifying an	item	of	evidence,	the	proponent	must	produce	evidence	sufficient	to	support a	 finding	 that	 the	item	is	what	 the	proponent	claims	it	is.”		This	is “ a	 flexible approach	to	authentication refl ecting a	low	burden	of	proof.” Hussein ,	2019	ME 74,	¶	11,	208	A.3d	752. [¶ 25 ] Here,	 the	letter	in	question,	which	is	unsigned,	was	purportedly written	 on	 behalf	 of the	 victim and	 claimed	 that the	 victim was	 angry	 with Thomas	at	the	time	of	her	report and that	she	had	given inconsistent	statements to	the	police. Thomas	offered	with	the	letter an	envelope	addressed	t o Thomas at	the	Androscoggin	County	Jail.		However,	when	asked	about	the	letter	outside the	presence	of	the	jury, the	victim denied	writing the	letter	or	having	anyone else	write	the	letter	for	her.		She	admitted	that	she	sent	the	envelope	to	the	jail but	stated	that	it	contained	photographs	and	not	the	letter.		The person who Thomas	claimed	wrote	the	letter	on the	victim’s behalf	was	in	the courtroom and	was	a	listed	witness	for	Thomas, but she was	not	called	to	testify

. Although14 Thomas testified	that he	received	the	letter,	he	produced	no	further	evidence that	demonstrated that the	letter	was sent	by the	victim or	on	her	behalf

. [¶ 26 ] In a	sidebar	conversation,	 the	court	clearly	articulated	Rule	901 and	stated	 that	Thomas

— without	a	handwriting	expert,	 the	 testimony	of	 the writer,	or	even	the	original	letter

— was	unable	to	meet	his	burden. The court did	not	abuse	its	discretion	when	it	did not	admit	the	unauthenticated	letter.
D. Jury	Venire [¶ 27 ] The Sixth	 Amendment	 guarantees	 that	 “[i]n	 all	 criminal prosecutions,	the	accused	shall	enjoy	the	right	to	a	.	.	.	trial,	by	an	impartial	jury of	 the	State	and	district	wherein	 the	crime	shall	have	been	committed.”		U.S. Const.	amend

. VI.	 	This	jury	must	 be	 dr awn	 from	a	 “fair	 cross	 section	 of	 the community,”	but	a	“fair	cross	section”	does	not	guarantee	that	juries	be	“of	any particular	 composition.” Taylor	 v.	 Louisiana ,	 419	U.S.	 522,	 527,	 538	 (1975)

. Instead,	the	“jury	wheels,	pools	of	names,	panels,	or	veni res	from	which	juries are	drawn	must	not	systematically	exclude	distinctive	groups	in	the	community and	thereby	fail	to	be	reasonably	representative	thereof.” Id. at	538. [¶ 28 ] R elying	on	the	Supreme	Court	case Duren	v.	Missouri ,	439	U.S.	357, 364	(197 9) , we have stated : To	 establish	 a	 prima	 facie	 claim	 that	 a	 jury	 selection	 process violates	 the	 constitutional	 requirement	 that	 the	 jury	 be	 selected15 from	 a	 pool	 representative	 of	 the	 community	 at	 large,	 the challenging	 party	 has	 the	 burden	 to	 show that:	 (1)	 the	 group alleged	 to	be	excluded	is	a	 “distinctive”	group	in	 the	community; (2)	the	representation	of	this	group	in	jury	pools	from	which	juries are	selected	is	not	fair	and	reasonable	in	relation	to	the	number	of such	persons	in	the	community;	a nd	(3)	this	underrepresentation is	 due	 to	 systematic	 exclusion	 of	 the	 group	 in	 the	 jury	 selection process. State	v.	Holland ,	2009	ME	72,	¶	23,	976	A.2d	227 .		 “Certain	groups

— such	as those	defined	by	race	or	sex

— are	unquestionably ‘ distinctive. ’ ” State	v. Anaya , 456	A.2d	1255,	1260	(Me.	1983) (footnotes	omitted)

. [¶ 29 ] Here,	 Thomas, has	 met	 the	 first	 element	 of	 the Duren test	 by alleging	 that	 a	 ‘distinctive’	 group

— African	 Americans

— were	 excluded	 from the	jury	venire. See	Holland ,	2009	ME	72,	¶	24,	976 A.2d	227. However,	Thomas failed	to	carry	his	burden as	to	the	other	two	elements	of	the	test .		The	State, not	Thomas,	provided	limited	evidence of	the	proportion	of	the	community’s population	 that	 was	 African	 American .	 	 Furthermore, Thomas provided	 no evidence	of	a	systematic	exclusion	in	the jury	selection process. Thomas	was given	the	option	to	continue	the	trial	so	he	could	better	develop	the	record	for this	challenge,	but	he	chose	to proceed with	the	trial. Because	Thomas	failed	to

est ablish	the	second	and	third	elements	of	the Duren test, the	court	did	not	err
in denyin g Thomas’ s motion.16 E. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence [¶ 30 ] We	 review	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 evidence by reviewing	the	evidence	adduced	at	trial “in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	State to	 determine	whether	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 rationally	 could	 have	 found	 beyond	 a reasonable	doubt	every	element	of	the	offense	charged , ” State	v.	Smen ,	2006	ME 40,	¶	7,	895	A.2d	319 (quotation	marks	omitted ) .		Fact fin ders	are	“permitted to	draw	all	reasonable	inferences	 from	 the	evidence,” State	v.	Williams ,	2012 ME	63,	¶	49,	52	A.3d	911 ,	and	“[t]he	weight	to	be	given	to	the	evidence	and	the determination	 of	 witness	 credibility	 are	 the	 exclusive	 province	 of	 the	 jury.” State	v.	Filler ,	2010	ME	90,	¶	24,	3	A.3d	365 (quotation	marks	omitted) .		“[A] jury’s	acquittal	of	a	defendant	on	one	charge	does	not	limit	the	evidence	that can	 be	 considered	 in	 a	 post

- trial	 determination	 of	 whether	 the	 evidence	 is sufficient	 to	 support the	jury’s	guilty	 verdict	 on	a	 different	 charge.” State	 v.
Lowe ,	2015	ME	124,	¶	29,	124	A.3d	156

. [¶ 3 1] Thomas	 does	 not	 challenge	 any	 specific	 elements	 of	 any	 of	 the crimes	the	jury	convicted	him	of,	and broadly challenge s all of the	evidence. 5

5 Thomas’s argument reads	 that	“[n]o	rational	juror	could	have	been	convinced	of	Appellant’s guilt	beyond	a	 reasonable	doubt”	and	 that	 there	was	 “insufficient	evidence	 for	a	jury	 to	conclude Appellant was	guilty	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.” Although the	court	did	“note	the jury verdict	that required	 a	 finding	 of	 possession	 of	 a	 weapon”	 given	 that	 Count	 7	 was	 the	 court’s	 decision, independent	 of	 the	 jury, we	 interpret Thomas ’s	 appeal a s	 challen ging only the	 jury	 verdicts	 on Counts 1,	2,	3,	4,	and	6.17 The jury heard	 testimony	 from the	 victim about	 the physical abuse	 that	 she suffered	from	Thomas and the	incident	when Thomas	pointed	a	gun	at	her.		This evidence	was	supported	by	the	testimony	of	police	officers,	photographs	of	the injuries	 she	 suffered,	 and	items	 found in	 the	 apartment .	 	While	 Thomas	 did testify	 and	 claimed	 that	 he	 did	 not	 strike	 or	 threaten the	 victim , the	 jury apparently did	not	find	him	credible. See	Filler ,	2010	ME	90,	¶ 24,	3	A.3d	365. There was	sufficient	evidence	for the jury	to	have	rationally	found	that	every element	 of	 each count Thomas	 was	 convicted	 of was	 proved beyond	 a reasonable	doubt. The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Verne	E.	Paradie,	Jr. ,	Esq. (orally) ,	Lewiston,	for	appellant	Clifton	Thomas Katherine	 E.	 Bozeman,	 Asst.	 Dist.	 Atty. (orally) , and	 Katherine	 M.	 Hudson

MacRea,	 Asst.	 Dist.	 Atty.,	 Androscoggin	 County	 District	 Attorney’s	 Office, Lewiston,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Androscoggin	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

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