Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1711-GU-2676 | July 9, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Cody Cogswell

Fishers, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

John T. Wilson

Jeffrey A. Lockwood

Anderson, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the 

Guardianship of Cor.G. and 

Col.G, 

William Tankersley and Mona

Tankersley,

Appellants-Petitioners,

v.

Gregory Greer (Father) and

Shelly Brewer (Mother),

Respondents,

 and

Tony Greer and Rebecca Greer,

Appellees-Intervenors

July 9, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A02-1711-GU-2676

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Thomas Newman, 

Jr., Judge

The Honorable Christopher A. 

Cage, Commissioner

Trial Court Cause Nos.

48C03-1608-GU-452, -453
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Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] William and Mona Tankersley (“Maternal Grandparents”) appeal the trial 

court’s order correcting a prior order regarding visitation with their 

grandchildren, ten-year-old Cor.G and twelve-year-old Col.G. (collectively “the 

Grandchildren”), who are under the guardianship of Troy and Rebecca Greer 

(“Paternal Grandparents”). They assert that the trial court abused its discretion 

in modifying its prior visitation order and in declining their request to hold 

Paternal Grandparents in contempt. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 23, 2016, Paternal Grandparents filed an emergency petition for 

guardianship and custody of the Grandchildren. According to their petition, 

Paternal Grandparents sought guardianship because the Grandchildren’s 

natural parents have drug problems and “have both been found guilty of 

actively running a ‘meth lab’ on the property” where the Grandchildren were 

residing. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 37. They alleged that the Department of 

Child Services (“DCS”) had been involved repeatedly with the natural parents,

that the Grandchildren’s living situation with the parents was “substantially 

dangerous,” and that a guardianship was in the best interests of the 

Grandchildren. Id. at 36. On October 27, 2016, the trial court granted Paternal 

Grandparents temporary guardianship over the Grandchildren. On January 4,

2017, with consent of the Grandchildren’s mother, Maternal Grandparents filed 
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a motion to intervene and a petition for guardianship of the Grandchildren. 

The trial court granted the motion to intervene and set the matter for a 

permanent guardianship hearing.

[3] The parties (including the Grandchildren’s parents and DCS) appeared for a 

permanent guardianship hearing on January 26, 2017. During the hearing, the 

parties reached an agreement that was recited in open court and approved by 

the trial court. Per the agreement, Paternal Grandparents were awarded 

guardianship of the Grandchildren and Maternal Grandparents were granted 

visitation. Specifically, the agreed-upon visitation consisted of alternating 

weekends, and two three-hour midweek visits. The natural parents were 

allowed only supervised visitation until further order of the court, and DCS

agreed to dismiss the related children in need of services (“CHINS”) action that 

had been filed against the parents. The trial court directed Paternal 

Grandparents’ attorney, Charles Bugby, to prepare a written order reflecting the 

parties’ agreement. Bugby prepared an order that was signed by the trial court 

on February 7, 2017. In addition to the visitation agreed upon in open court, 

paragraph 11 of the order provided visitation time for Maternal Grandparents

during the summer and holiday breaks in accordance with the Indiana 

Parenting Time Guidelines. 

[4] Bugby withdrew as counsel for Paternal Grandparents on February 23, 2017. 

On April 21, 2017, Paternal Grandparents filed a pro se motion with the trial 

court alerting the court that its February 2017 order contained a visitation 

provision that “was not agreed to in court.” Id. at 61. On May 11, 2017, the 
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Paternal Grandparents filed another pro se correspondence with the trial court 

alerting the court that although they were complying with the written visitation 

order and allowing Maternal Grandparents visitation that had never been 

agreed upon, there was substantial confusion and conflict between the parties

because the visitation arrangement was more like a “divorce” arrangement

instead of the intended “guardianship” arrangement. Id. at 62.

[5] On May 26, 2017, Maternal Grandparents filed a rule to show cause and 

request for attorney’s fees against Paternal Grandparents alleging that they had 

denied them visitation on May 25, 2017, in violation of the written visitation 

order. The trial court set the matter for hearing and, in the meantime, ordered 

Paternal Grandparents to follow the court’s visitation order. Thereafter, 

Paternal Grandparents filed a motion for relief from judgment or in the 

alternative to modify order granting grandparent visitation.

[6] The trial court held a hearing on all pending motions on June 21, 2017. On 

June 30, 2017, the trial court issued an order concluding in relevant part, 

[Paternal Grandparents] have raised an objection concerning the 

fact that they did not agree to holiday or summer visitation 

pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines at the hearing 

on January 26, 2017. Rather the first time they became aware of 

that provision in the written agreement was after the fact. Having 

reviewed the oral record of said hearing, the Court is inclined to 

agree.... No specific mention of those holidays or breaks were 

mentioned. Accordingly, the written order did not accurately 

reflect what was tendered to the Court orally in open Court. As 

such, the visitation order is required to be modified in order to 
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accurately reflect what was submitted and approved by the 

Court.

Appealed Order at 3. Therefore, the trial court struck paragraph 11 of the 

original visitation agreement and stated, “All other visitation shall remain as 

ordered.” Id. The trial court further concluded that Maternal Grandparents’ 

“request for show cause and attorney fees is DENIED at this time.” Id. 

(emphasis omitted). Maternal Grandparents filed a motion to correct error 

which was subsequently denied by the trial court. This appeal ensued.1

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

correcting the visitation order to accurately reflect the parties’ 

agreement.

[7] Maternal Grandparents first argue that the trial court abused its discretion in 

modifying visitation absent a showing that such modification was in the best 

interests of the Grandchildren. However, no modification of the agreed-upon 

visitation occurred. Rather, the trial court essentially entered a nunc pro tunc 

order to correct its February 2017 written order to “accurately reflect what was 

submitted and approved by the Court.” Appealed Order at 3; see Cotton v. State, 

658 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ind. 1995) (a nunc pro tunc order is “an entry made now 

 

1 The Grandchildren’s natural parents and original respondents in the guardianship proceedings, Gregory 

Greer and Shelly Brewer, did not file briefs on appeal. However, we have included them on the caption page 

because pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), a party of record in the trial court shall be a party on 

appeal.
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of something which was actually previously done, to have effect as of the 

former date.”) (citation omitted). Maternal Grandparents have shown no abuse 

of discretion.

Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying the petition for contempt.

[8] Maternal Grandparents also argue that the trial court abused its discretion in 

declining to find Paternal Grandparents in contempt for restricting their 

visitation in violation of the written visitation order. Generally, the 

determination of whether a party is in contempt is a matter within the trial 

court’s discretion, and we will reverse a trial court’s decision in this regard only 

if we find that an abuse of that discretion has occurred. Van Wieren v. Van 

Wieren, 858 N.E.2d 216, 222-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). “When reviewing a 

contempt order, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility 

of witnesses.” Id. at 223. “Crucial to the determination of contempt is the 

evaluation of a person’s state of mind, that is, whether the alleged 

contemptuous conduct was done willfully.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 

129 (Ind. 2016) (citation omitted).

[9] Paternal Grandparents conceded that they did restrict some visitation, but they 

testified unequivocally that it was never their intent to deprive Maternal 

Grandparents of visitation with the Grandchildren. They explained that any 

restrictions were minimal, and that such restrictions were mainly due to the 

confusion caused by the fact that the written visitation order did not accurately 

reflect what they had agreed to in open court. Paternal Grandfather further 
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explained that his son (the Grandchildrens’ father) had threatened his life and 

that because Maternal Grandparents had been allowing his son to see the 

Grandchildren during their visitation time, Paternal Grandfather was 

concerned for the Grandchildren’s safety and so he briefly halted visitation until 

a hearing could be held. Maternal Grandmother testified that she understood 

why Paternal Grandparents would have wanted to restrict visitation under the

circumstances.

[10] The trial court, who saw the witnesses and heard their impassioned testimony, 

declined to find the conduct of Paternal Grandparents to be willfully 

contemptuous under the circumstances. However, the court warned that “any 

further denials of visitation may result in the imposition of fees.” Appealed 

Order at 4. This was a reasonable exercise of discretion, and we reject Maternal 

Grandparents’ invitation to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment 

for that of the trial court. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to find Paternal Grandparents in contempt. The judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed.

[11] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.