NO. CAAP-24-0000074

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I

FRIENDS OF HA IKŪ STAIRS, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation;

DR. KATRENA KENNEDY, an individual;

RANDALL KENNEDY, an individual;

DONALD KAMALANI MAIWA PUA III, an individual;

BILL SAGER, an individual; ERNEST SHIH, an individual; and

RICHARD TUGGLE, an individual, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, Defendant-Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

(CIVIL NO. 1CCV-23-0001022)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

(By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge and McCullen, J.;

with Hiraoka, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

On June 10, 2024, Plaintiffs-Appellants Friends of

Ha ikū Stairs, Dr. Katrena Kennedy, Randall Kennedy, Donald

Kamalani Maiwa Pua III, Bill Sager, Ernest Shih and Richard

Tuggle (together, Friends) filed an Emergency Motion for

Injunction Pending Appeal To Prevent Imminent and Irreparable

Destruction of The Ha ikū Stairs (Motion for Injunction Pending

Appeal). On June 18, 2024, Defendant-Appellee City and County of

Honolulu (City) filed a memorandum in opposition to the Motion

for Injunction Pending Appeal, and this court held a hearing on

June 26, 2024. 

Electronically Filed

Intermediate Court of Appeals

CAAP-24-0000074

03-JUL-2024

03:19 PM

Dkt. 96 ORD
The Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal is granted in

part, for the reasons and to the extent set forth herein.

Friends principally argue that their strong showing of

irreparable harm warrants the issuance of an order enjoining the

City (and others) from, inter alia, demolishing the Ha ikū Stairs

and/or Moanalua Saddle Stairs pending a decision on the merits of

this appeal. Friends also argue that they have a likelihood of

success on the merits of this appeal, and in further proceedings

following remand, based on new evidence and arguments, and new

declarations filed with the Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. 

Finally, Friends argue that important public interests would be

protected by granting the requested relief.

The sole issue before this court is whether Friends

should be granted an injunction pending the review of Friends'

appeal by a merits panel and a decision on the merits. This

issue is governed by the Hawai i Rules of Appellate Procedure

(HRAP) Rule 8, which provides in relevant part:

Rule 8. STAYS, SUPERSEDEAS BONDS, OR INJUNCTIONS

PENDING APPEAL.

(a) Motions for stay, supersedeas bond or injunction

in the appellate courts. A motion for stay of the judgment

or order in a civil appeal, or for approval of a supersedeas

bond, or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or

granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal

shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to the court

or agency appealed from.

A motion for such relief on an appeal may be made to

the appellate court before which the appeal is pending or to

a judge thereof, but, if the appeal is from a court, the

motion shall show that application to the court appealed

from for the relief sought is not practicable, or that the

court appealed from has denied an application, or has failed

to afford the relief the applicant requested, with the

reasons given by the court appealed from for its action. 

The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief

requested and the facts relied upon, and, if the facts are

subject to dispute, the motion shall be supported by

affidavits, declarations, or other sworn statements or

copies thereof. With the motion shall be filed such copies

of parts of the record as are relevant. Notice of the

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motion shall be given to all parties. The motion shall be

filed with the appellate clerk and should ordinarily be

considered by the appellate court, but in exceptional cases

where such procedure would be impracticable due to the

requirements of time, the application may be made to and

considered by a single judge or justice of the court. If

the motion for such relief is from an agency, the motion

shall comply with statutory requirements, if any.

This court has previously explained the standard for

granting injunctive relief pending appeal as follows: 

Generally, the standard for a preliminary injunction

is: (1) whether the moving party has shown that it is likely

to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the balance of

irreparable harms favors the issuance of an injunction; and

(3) whether the public interest supports granting such an

injunction. See, e.g., Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous.

and Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 117 Hawai i 174, 212, 177 P.3d

884, 922 (2008). This standard has been most frequently

applied to a trial court's consideration of a motion for

preliminary injunction or an appellate court's review of a

trial court's decision on such motion.

It appears, however, that a stronger showing on the

merits may be required when a party seeks an injunction

pending appeal. See, e.g., Life of the Land, Inc. v. City

Council of the City and County of Honolulu, 60 Haw. 446,

447, 592 P.2d 26, 27 (1979) ("In order for an appellant to

obtain an injunction pending appeal, there must be a showing

that he is threatened with irreparable injury and that there

is substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits

of his appeal.") (emphasis added); Life of the Land v.

Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. 156, 165, 577 P.2d 1116, 1122 (1978)

(holding that appellant had failed to establish a prima

facie case on the merits, "much less a showing of

substantial likelihood of success"); MDG Supply, Inc. v.

Diversified Inv., Inc., 51 Haw. 480, 482, 463 P.2d 530, 532

(1969) ("[T]here must be a showing that appellant is

threatened with irreparable injury and that there is great

likelihood, approaching near certainty, that he will

prevail.") (citations omitted). . . .

We recognize, too, that, if a court is able to

conclude that a prima facie case has been made in support of

the movant's position on the merits of a case, the weight

attached to the various elements may vary, and a strong

showing of irreparable harm may reduce the weight given to

any lack of likelihood of success on the merits. See, e.g.,

Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 117 Hawai i at 211–12, 177 P.3d

at 921–22 ("[T]he more the balance of irreparable damage

favors issuance of the injunction, the less the party

seeking the injunction has to show the likelihood of his

success on the merits.") (citation omitted); Life of the

Land v. Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. at 165, 577 P.2d at 1122 ("We

recognize that the weight to be attached to the various

elements of the test may vary, and that a strong showing of

irreparable harm may reduce the weight given to any lack of

likelihood of success on the merits.") (citation omitted). 

The opposite proposition is, of course, true as well. A

strong showing on the merits may reduce, but not eliminate,

the moving party's burden on the issues of irreparable harm

and public interest. See Penn v. Transp. Lease Haw., Ltd.,

2 Haw. App. 272, 276, 630 P.2d 646, 650 (1981) ("[T]he

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greater the probability that the party seeking the

injunction is likely to prevail on the merits, the less he

has to show that the balance of irreparable damage favors

issuance of the injunction."). 

Stop Rail Now v. DeCosta, 120 Hawai i 238, 243-44, 203 P.3d 658,

663-64 (App. 2008). 

Thus, an appellant-movant seeking an injunction pending

appeal must, at a minimum, demonstrate that a prima facie case

has been made in support of their position on the merits of the

appeal, even if a strong showing of irreparable harm may reduce

the weight given to any lack of likelihood to prevail on the

merits.

Here, Friends filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court of

the First Circuit (Circuit Court) seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief under the Hawai i Environmental Policy Act

(HEPA), Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 343, and further

relief based on claims for estoppel and alleged violations of

their rights under article XI, section 9 of the Hawai i

Constitution and due process violations.1 Friends filed a First

Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint) adding a claim for

"improper segmentation" based on Hawai i Administrative Rules

(HAR) § 11-200.1-10. The City filed a motion to dismiss and/or

for summary judgment, which was granted on the grounds that there

were no genuine issues of material fact and the City was entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. The Circuit Court entered a

1 Friends make no arguments concerning the merits of their article

XI, section 9 and due process claims. Friends mention (in a single sentence

in a footnote) that they contend that the City must conduct a new EIS, but

make no argument in support of that contention. Thus, such arguments are

waived for the purposes of this Motion.

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final judgment in favor of the City, and Friends timely filed a

notice of appeal.

On May 31, 2024, Friends filed a motion for injunction

pending appeal in the Circuit Court. In a declaration filed with

the Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal (in this court),

Friends' counsel avers (and the City does not dispute) that at a

June 7, 2024 status conference, the Circuit Court informed the

parties that it did not have jurisdiction pursuant to Hawai i

Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 62 to rule on the motion.

The Circuit Court motion was then withdrawn. We decline to

address the issue of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. However,

we conclude that Friends have made a sufficient showing that

further application to the Circuit Court for the relief sought

herein is not practicable.

In this light, we apply the three-part test from Stop

Rail Now to the motion for injunction pending appeal.

I. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

To be clear, this is not a decision on the merits of

Friends' appeal. This appeal is not yet fully briefed, and this

is a ruling on a preliminary motion. Accordingly, we address the

issue of Friends' likelihood of success on the merits in this

appeal on narrow grounds. 

Our view of Friends' likelihood to prevail on the

merits of this appeal is guided by the standard of review

applicable to an appeal from an order granting summary judgment. 

As the Hawai i Supreme Court has often held, we review summary

judgments de novo. See Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn &

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Stifel, 117 Hawai i 92, 104, 176 P.3d 91, 103 (2008). Under HRCP

Rule 56(c), the Circuit Court shall grant a motion for summary

judgment when the moving party shows that: (1) there is no

genuine issue regarding any material fact; and (2) it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Id. We view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party; factual inferences

are made in favor of the non-moving party. Id. 

"In cases of public importance, a circuit court should

grant a motion for summary judgment 'sparingly, and never on

limited and indefinite factual foundations.'" Kilakila O

Haleakala v. Univ. of Haw., 138 Hawai i 364, 375, 382 P.3d 176,

187 (2016) (quoting Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Ass'n v. Cobb, 63

Haw. 453, 458, 629 P.2d 1134, 1139 (1981)). However, if there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party

clearly demonstrates that they should prevail as a matter of law,

then summary judgment is proper. Id.

In the Amended Complaint, Friends allege, inter alia,

that the City violated HEPA by failing to prepare a Supplemental

Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS). Friends challenge to the

City's reliance on the "January 2020 Ha ikū Stairs Study: Final

Environmental Impact Statement" (FEIS) is grounded in allegations

that substantial changes have occurred since the completion of

the FEIS, that these changes may have a significant effect on the

environment, and therefore an SEIS is required pursuant to HAR

§ 11-200.1-30.

This rule provides in relevant part:

§ 11-200.1-30 Supplemental environmental impact

statements. (a) An EIS that is accepted with respect to a

particular action is usually qualified by the size, scope,

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location, intensity, use, and timing of the action, among

other things. An EIS that is accepted with respect to a

particular action shall satisfy the requirements of this

chapter and no supplemental EIS for that proposed action

shall be required, to the extent that the action has not

changed substantively in size, scope, intensity, use,

location, or timing, among other things. If there is any

change in any of these characteristics which may have a

significant effect, the original statement that was changed

shall no longer be valid because an essentially different

action would be under consideration and a supplemental EIS

shall be prepared and reviewed as provided by this chapter.

As long as there is no change in a proposed action resulting

in individual or cumulative impacts not originally

disclosed, the EIS associated with that action shall be

deemed to comply with this chapter.

(b) The accepting authority or approving agency in

coordination with the original accepting authority shall be

responsible for determining whether a supplemental EIS is

required. This determination will be submitted to the

office for publication in the periodic bulletin. Proposing

agencies or applicants shall prepare for public review

supplemental EISs whenever the proposed action for which an

EIS was accepted has been modified to the extent that new or

different environmental impacts are anticipated. A

supplemental EIS shall be warranted when the scope of an

action has been substantially increased, when the intensity

of environmental impacts will be increased, when the

mitigating measures originally planned will not be

implemented, or where new circumstances or evidence have

brought to light different or likely increased environmental

impacts not previously dealt with.

(Emphasis added).

For the purposes of this motion, we focus on HAR § 11-

200.1-30(b), which provides that an SEIS shall be warranted when:

1. the scope of an action has been substantially

increased;

2. the intensity of environmental impacts will be

increased;

3. the mitigating measures originally planned will

not be implemented; or

4. new circumstances or evidence have brought to

light different or likely increased environmental

impacts not previously dealt with.

In granting summary judgment in favor of the City on

this issue, the Circuit Court necessarily concluded, inter alia,

that the City met its burden to demonstrate that there is no

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genuine issue of material fact as to any of these alternatives

and that the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Amended Complaint appears to allege, in particular,

facts purporting to support the second, third, and fourth

alternatives. For the purposes of this motion, we focus on only

a portion of Friends' allegations, i.e., that since the FEIS was

approved, and the prohibition on access to the Ha ikū Stairs has

been strictly enforced, the problems previously associated with

the Ha ikū Stairs shifted from the Ha ikū Valley to the Moanalua

side of the Ko olau range, the "back way" to climb to the summit

of the Ha ikū Stairs, creating secondary environmental and human

impacts that were not anticipated or addressed in the FEIS. The

FEIS defines secondary effects as "those caused by the action

(project) later in time or farther removed in distance, but are

still foreseeable" and states that the removal of the Ha ikū

Stairs "will not involve significant secondary effects."

The Amended Complaint alleges that, since the

prohibition on access to the Ha ikū Stairs has been strictly

enforced, the volume of hiker traffic on the Moanalua side has

risen exponentially, reaching as many as a hundred climbers daily

on weekends. It alleges that the Moanalua trail is longer, more

difficult, and far more dangerous, because the Ha ikū Stairs have

handrails on both sides and regular, no-slip steps, with no

possibility of getting lost. It further alleges that the

Moanalua trail follows uneven terrain along a heavily eroded

ridgeline, with steep drops on both sides, with poor markings,

and often muddy, slippery conditions. The increase in hiker

traffic has allegedly led to disturbances to Moanalua residents

8
that was not anticipated, as well as reduced hiker safety and

more rescues. Importantly, the Amended Complaint alleges that

rerouting of hikers from Ha ikū to Moanalua has had devastating

environmental effects, as the Moanalua route has no metal stairs

to climb and the steady trampling of hikers directly on the

ground has "spurred massive erosion," with impact, e.g., to rare

endemic plants and the ecosystem that was not studied in the

FEIS. For the ease of discussion, we will refer to this as the

Moanalua-side Impact.

In assessing whether Friends are likely to prevail on

the merits of their appeal from the Circuit Court's entry of

summary judgment against them, we necessarily consider the

supreme court's instructions for situations where – like here –

the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial.

This court has set forth a burden shifting paradigm

for situations where the non-movant bears the burden of

proof at trial:

The burden is on the party moving for summary

judgment (moving party) to show the absence of any

genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under

applicable principles of substantive law, entitles the

moving party to judgment as a matter of law. This

burden has two components.

First, the moving party has the burden of

producing support for its claim that: (1) no genuine

issue of material fact exists with respect to the

essential elements of the claim or defense which the

motion seeks to establish or which the motion

questions; and (2) based on the undisputed facts, it

is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 

Only when the moving party satisfies its initial

burden of production does the burden shift to the

nonmoving party to respond to the motion for summary

judgment and demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to

general allegations, that present a genuine issue

worthy of trial.

Second, the moving party bears the ultimate

burden of persuasion. This burden always remains with

the moving party and requires the moving party to

convince the court that no genuine issue of material

fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law.

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Thus, where the non-movant bears the burden of

proof at trial, a movant may demonstrate that there is

no genuine issue of material fact by either: (1)

presenting evidence negating an element of the

non-movant's claim, or (2) demonstrating that the

non-movant will be unable to carry his or her burden

of proof at trial.

Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai i 46, 56-57, 292 P.3d 1276, 1286-87

(2013) (citations omitted; emphasis added).

Therefore, when the merits of this appeal are reached,

the first issue to be addressed is whether the City, as the

movant in the motion for summary judgment, satisfied its initial

burden of production by either (1) presenting evidence negating

an element of Friends' SEIS claim related to the Moanalua-side

Impact, or (2) demonstrating that the Friends will be unable to

carry their burden of proof at trial. See id.

The entirety of the City's argument on the Moanaluaside Impact in its motion for summary judgment states:

Plaintiffs allege that security in Kāne ohe has led to

increased traffic in Moanalua, an increase in rescues,

disturbance of Moanalua residents, and a decrease in

trespassing. . . . The EIS also considered hikers' ingress

from Moanalua and HFD rescues. See, e.g., EIS at 73-74, 144

(removal of the Stairs would reduce, but not eliminate,

access); id. at 216 (in considering partial removal: 

"Helicopter noise . . . would occur on occasion if hikers

access Ha ikū Stairs from Moanalua Valley.")

The referenced portions of the FEIS state: at (.pdf)

page 73, "Removing Ha ikū Stairs will . . . significantly reduce

illegal access from Moanalua Valley"; at page 74, "The Proposed

Action will end future illegal access up the ridgeline from

Ha ikū Valley and Moanalua Valley;" and at page 216, that

occasional rescue helicopter noise would occur from Moanalua-side

hikers if Ha ikū Stairs were only partially removed.

We cannot conclude that the references to the FEIS in

the City's summary judgment motion negated an element of Friends'

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SEIS claim, i.e., that the intensity of environmental impacts of

the removal of the Ha ikū Stairs had and would be increased

beyond what was considered in the FEIS, and/or new circumstances

or evidence have brought to light different or likely increased

environmental impact on the Moanalua side of the Ko olau range. 

Nor is the City's evidence or argument sufficient to demonstrate

that Friends will be unable to carry their burden of proof to

establish the need for an SEIS. 

In addition, in the Motion for Injunction Pending

Appeal, Friends point to the Moanalua-side Impacts, both the

increased safety risks and increased environmental impacts not

dealt with in the FEIS. Friends' arguments are supported by

multiple declarations, as is permitted by HRAP Rule 8.2

To be clear, we are not saying that Friends will

ultimately prevail on their claims for relief in the Amended

Complaint. Nor is this preliminary ruling binding on the merits

panel that will fully review and analyze the parties' arguments

after briefing is complete. However, we conclude that, with

respect to this narrow issue, Friends have established at least a

prima facie case that they are likely to succeed on the merits of

their appeal from the order granting summary judgment in favor of

the City.

2 Although this testimonial evidence was not submitted in opposition

to the City's summary judgment motion, we note two things. First, it appears

that the City failed to carry its initial burden on this issue at summary

judgment, and therefore, the burden never shifted to Friends to bring this

evidence forward. Second, the City's motion was filed in lieu of an answer to

the Amended Complaint, no deadlines had been set for discovery or naming of

witnesses, no trial date was set, and Friends had requested that the Circuit

Court continue the hearing or deny summary judgment pursuant to HRCP Rule

56(f) to allow them time to, inter alia, take discovery before the Circuit

Court ruled that they would be unable to carry their burden of proof at trial. 

We do not reach the merits of any arguments related to these issues.

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As we have concluded that Friends are likely to succeed

on one of the issues on appeal, we decline to address the merits

of Friends' other arguments contending that the Circuit Court

erred in ruling that no SEIS was necessary, and that the City was

entitled to summary judgment on Friends' estoppel and

segmentation claims.

II. THE BALANCING OF IRREPARABLE HARM

Friends principally argue that the balance of

irreparable harm favors granting the requested injunctive relief

because removing the Ha ikū Stairs cannot be undone. Friends

also point to and offer support for the irreversible damage to

their stewardship mission to preserve the Ha ikū Stairs, their

historic legacy, and the surrounding environment, noting that

although the Ha ikū Stairs are now closed to the public, that has

not always been the case, and they could be reopened in the

future. Friends also submit that even if the Ha ikū Stairs were

not reopened, their loss would cause Friends other harms by

permanently removing them from the Windward O ahu vista and

destroying historic property. Finally, Friends contend that the

loss of their procedural rights to the process HEPA mandates is

sufficient to establish irreparable injury.

The City does not dispute that removal of the Ha ikū

Stairs cannot be undone, but points to other harms caused by

leaving them in place, including the diversion of police

resources, trespassers in the Ha ikū Valley residential area, and

potential spread of invasive species. At the hearing on the

Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, the City's attorney

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represented that some modules of the Ha ikū Stairs have been

detached or destabilized by the City's contractor such that a

continued injunction disallowing further work on those modules 

pending this appeal poses a threat to public safety. Documents

submitted by the City in opposition to Friends' request for

injunctive relief indicate that such preliminary work began in

May. On July 2, 2024, the City submitted the Declaration of

Austin Nakoa, President of The Nakoa Companies, Inc., which

described the current status of the removal work.

This court can provide no relief to Friends on this

Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal for their most grievouslyfelt harm, i.e., the potential permanent loss of the Ha ikū

Stairs as a uniquely spectacular recreational resource. There is

no legal recreational access to the Ha ikū Stairs at this time,

and absent significant changes in the City's stance, a way

forward may prove illusory. 

We nevertheless conclude that the balance of

irreparable harm strongly favors Friends on this Motion for

Injunction Pending Appeal. The demolition and removal of the

Ha ikū Stairs cannot be undone. The procedural rights and

protections offered by Hawaii's strong environmental laws and

regulations are significant, and Friends' ability to make its

arguments on the merits, e.g., on the SEIS issue discussed above,

should not be rendered moot. Cf. Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 128

Hawai i 53, 71, 283 P.3d 60, 78 (2012) (discussing importance of

procedural rights). While the other harms asserted by Friends

may be less compelling, they support the balancing in favor of

Friends.

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We also give weight to the harms identified by the

City, particularly the potential public safety concerning

portions of the Ha ikū Stairs and the Moanalua Saddle Stairs that

have been fully or partially detached. We are able to address

this by limiting the injunctive relief, to mitigate the public

safety issue with respect to the detached or partially detached

Ha ikū Stairs and Moanalua Saddle Stairs. The necessity for

additional police resources to maintain strict enforcement of

trail access and address neighborhood trespass concerns for the

period pending this appeal is given somewhat less weight, because

it appears that these public services would be required for a

period of time in any case.3 This court can take certain steps

to try to move this case along toward a decision on the merits,

whereas there is nothing we can do to mitigate the permanent

demolition of the Ha ikū Stairs.

III. PUBLIC POLICY

There are strong public policy arguments on both sides

of this issue. Friends' public policy arguments are closely tied

to their arguments concerning irreparable harm. The City argues

that its action to remove the Ha ikū Stairs has the support of

the elected representatives of City government and points to the

public costs associated with a delay in the demolition. The

public policy arguments tend to favor the City, particularly as

to the decision-making authority of elected officials. However,

these public policy arguments could be made in most any case

3 It appears that the City's strict access restrictions will also

help mitigate introduction of invasive plant species by hikers for the limited

period of this injunction.

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where a citizen or group of citizens seeks to enforce

environmental or other rights against a government entity and,

under the circumstances of this case, they do not outweigh the

other factors of the Stop Rail Now test discussed above.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for

Injunction Pending Appeal is granted in part as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the City is enjoined from

further detaching, demolishing, or removing all or any part of

the Ha ikū Stairs and/or Moanalua Saddle Stairs — directly or

indirectly through its agents, representatives, employees,

agencies, and/or contractors — pending disposition of this

appeal.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, notwithstanding the

foregoing injunction, the City may remove the approximately 60

stair modules of Moanalua Saddle Stairs and approximately 10-15

stair modules of the Ha ikū Stairs that were detached by the

City's contractor prior to the entry of this court's June 20,

2024 Order for Temporary Injunction.4 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Friends' request for other

forms of injunctive relief (concerning contracts and payments) is

denied, and the City's request for a bond in excess of $1,000,000

is denied.

In addition, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to

HRAP Rule 2, the deadline to file the Opening Brief is hereby

4 This order does not prohibit the City from securing other modules

to the extent possible, as referenced in the July 2, 2024 Declaration of

Austin Nakoa.

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advanced from August 19, 2024, to August 5, 2024;5 the deadline

to file the Answering Brief is advanced to September 3, 2024; the

deadline to file the Reply Brief is advanced to September 10,

2024; and the provisions of HRAP Rule 29 are suspended. Motions

for extensions of time to file briefs shall be made at least 5

days prior to the due date of the Opening Brief or Answering

Brief, and at least 2 days prior to the due date of the Reply

Brief, and will be approved by a judge upon a showing of

extraordinary circumstances.

This Order for Injunction Pending Appeal remains

subject to the further order of this court.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, July 3, 2024.

/s/ Katherine G. Leonard

Acting Chief Judge

/s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen

Associate Judge

HIRAOKA, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART

I concur with the majority's Stop Rail Now analysis and

the portions of the order (1) enjoining the City from detaching,

demolishing, or removing the modules of the Ha ikū Stairs and

Moanalua Saddle Stairs that were not fully or partially detached

when we issued our Order for Temporary Injunction on June 20,

2024, and (2) allowing the City to remove those modules that were

fully detached as of June 20, 2024. But I respectfully dissent

from the majority's enjoining the City from further detaching,

5 The original deadline was extended by the court after a court

reporter requested additional time to complete a transcript. However, that

transcript has been filed. Briefing of this appeal, without undue delay, will

allow the merits panel to be assigned and for the case to be expeditiously

decided on the merits, mitigating concerns raised by the City. 

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demolishing, or removing the modules that were partially detached

as of June 20, 2024.

"[A] prohibitory injunction requires that a party cease

certain conduct in order to preserve the status quo." Wahba, LLC

v. USRP (Don), LLC, 106 Hawai i 466, 472, 106 P.3d 1109, 1115

(2005) (emphasis added). The status quo Friends seek to preserve

— the condition of the Ha ikū Stairs and Moanalua Saddle Stairs

before the City's contractor began its work — no longer exists. 

The City contracted with The Nakoa Companies on June 29, 2023. 

Friends filed the action below on August 8, 2023, but did not

seek a restraining order or preliminary injunction. Friends

first moved the Circuit Court for an injunction on May 31, 2024,

after deconstruction had begun. But Friends had already filed a

notice of appeal. The Circuit Court believed it no longer had

jurisdiction over the case. Friends then moved this court for an

injunction on June 10, 2024. By the time we issued the Order for

Temporary Injunction on June 20, 2024 — almost a year after the

City awarded the contract — the contractor had fully or partially

detached some stair modules in preparation for their removal.

According to Austin Nakoa's declaration, "[i]n their

current state, the modules are extraordinarily dangerous for

hikers. . . . This is particularly true for the 70-75 modules

that have been fully detached, but it is also true for those

modules that have been partially detached[.]" The majority "does

not prohibit the City from securing [the partially detached]

modules to the extent possible, as referenced in" Nakoa's

declaration. Under the circumstances, that looks like a

mandatory injunction "which goes well beyond the status quo[,] is

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particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the

facts and law clearly favor the moving party." Wahba, LLC, 106

Hawai i at 472, 106 P.3d at 1115 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). 

In my view, Friends have not made such a showing.

Going back to secure the partially detached modules

could inequitably require the City to incur more costs. The

remedial work described in Nakoa's declaration seems to be

outside the scope of the City's contract; it may entail an

additive change order for labor, materials, and helicopter

operations, among other things. Any additional costs will

ultimately be borne by O ahu taxpayers.

Under all these circumstances, particularly Friends'

belated attempts to obtain injunctive relief, I would allow the

City to remove the partially detached modules. That would

preserve the status quo ante June 20, 2024 without additional

cost to the City, and further the public policy of promoting

public safety and minimizing the City's potential liability to

those who persist in illegally hiking the Ha ikū Stairs.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, July 3, 2024.

/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka

Associate Judge

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