W i t h regard t o t he rob b ery co nvi ct i o n, t he judgm ent fo rm s i gned b y t he t ri al judge s t at es t hat t he A p p el l ant 1

was pl ace d on probat i on for s i x y ear s . T he probat i on order en t er ed b y the t rial j udge r eci t es t hat t he A pp el l ant was

“ pl ac ed on pr obat i on for a pe r i od of 5 y ea r s a n d 1 da y ( af

t er s er v i n g 11 mon t h s an d 29 day s )

. ” M or eov er , t h e pr obat i on (c o n tinu e d ...) 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary11, 200 5 STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KEN DR ICK L AM ONT BR OOKS

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty No. 97-374 Roy B. Mor gan, Jr., Judge

No. W2004-00475-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled April 28, 2005

The Appe llant, Kendrick L amont Br ooks, appea ls the revoc ation of his probation by the Madison CountyCircuit Court. On appeal, Brooks arg ues t hat t he trial court was without authority to revoke his pr ob a tio n b e c aus e the vio la tio n w arr a nt wa s issu e d a ft e r h is s e nte nc e ha d e xpir e d. F ind ing thi s arg ume nt w ith ou t me ri t, w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tria l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed; Re m anded f

or Cor rec ted Judgme nts of

Conviction
D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and J. C. M C LIN , J J ., joined.
Ge or g e Mo rt on Go og e , Di stric t Pub lic De fe nd e r; a nd Ste ph e n P. Spr a c he r, As si st ant P ub lic De fe nd e r, Jac ks on , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe llant, Ke nd ri c k L a mon t B ro ok s. Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vidE. Coe ne n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Jer ry Woo da ll, Di stric t Attorne y Ge ne ra l; a nd Jody S. Pic ke ns , As sis ta nt Di stric t Attorne y Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
On J anuary

7, 1998, the Appellant p l ed gu i lty to robbery

and misdemea nor possession of cocaine. He r ece ived conc urre nt sentence s of six y ear s for the r obbery conv i ct i o n, which wa s order ed suspende d, and ele ven months and t we n t y -nine day s for the posse ssion conviction, to be serve d in the county

jail. No pre trial jail cre dit is reflec ted on th e j u d gm ent form for either 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

o rd e r p ro v id e s, “T h e e x p ira tio n d a te o f th is p ro b a tio n a ry se n te n c e is t h e 7 d a y o f Ja n u a ry, 2 0 0 4

. . . O rd e re d

. . . t h is th the 7 d a y o f Ja n u a ry 1 9 9 8 .” th

B ec au s e n o j ai l c r edi t i s s h own on e i t h er j u dg men t for m, a r ema n d i s n ec es s ar y for c or r ec t i on of t h e for ms for 2

a n a c c u ra te re c o rd o f the p ro c e e d ing s b e lo w w ith re g a rd to ja il c re d its an d fo r D e p a rtm e n t o f C o rr e c tio n p u rp o se s w ith regard t o t he fel o ny co nvi ct i o n. -2- conviction; howeve r, the a ppellate r ecor d was supplemented with a “mitt imus” which re flec ts that the Ap pe lla nt w a s c re dit e d w ith“ 32 0 d a y s jail t ime ” for bo th se nte nc e s. Al tho ug h th e re c or d is 2 silent on this poi nt, we pre sum e, based upon the number of pretria l jail credits, that the Appe llant was re lease d to supervised probation on the date the g uiltypleas we re e ntere d.
On J une 19, 2003, a pr obation violation warrant was issued alleg ing that the Appellant had violated t he conditions of probation based upon new a rre sts and convictions for D UI , driving on a suspended lice nse, disobeying a traff ic sig n, not ha ving proof of insurance , leaving the scene of an acc ident, and domesti c assault. Additionally , the warrant charg ed failure to report to his probation office r and failure to inform of a chang e in employ ment. A re vocation hea ring was he ld on Febr

uary 17, 2004, at which time the Appe llant conce ded the a lleg ed violations. He arg ued, howeve r, that the three hundred twe nty

day s of pre trial jail cre dit reduce d his six -y ear sentenc e by the same numbe r of day s; thus, he asserted that his sentenc e had expired in Febr uary 2003, prior to the issuance of the probation wa

rra nt in J une 2003, and that the trial court wa s without jurisdi ction to revoke . The trial c ou rt re je c te d th is a

rg ume nt andre ins ta te d th e orig ina l si x-y e ar se nte nc e , g ranti ng theAp pe lla nt j a il cr ed i to f t h re e h u n d re d t we n t y d ay s aga i n s tt h e s en t en ce . T h e A p p el l an tap p ea l s t h i s ru l i n g.

Ana lys is
On appea l, the Appellant raises the leg al question of whether the detention period a waiting trial, or in this case the period prior to ent ry o f t h e guiltyplea, pr oportionally reduc es the probationary

sentenc e. In eff

ect, the A ppellant c o n t en d s t hat his probationary period ha d expired prior to the issuance of the revoc ation war rant “bec ause of the three hundred twe nty day s cre dit due fo r h is p re -p le a

inc arc e ratio n. ” I t is fu nd a me nta l th a t a tria l c ou rt

has no auth ority

to c aus e revoc ation of a suspe nded sente nce a fter the sentenc e has e x pired. State v. Steven B. Mangrum , No. 01C01-9007-CC-00176 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Fe b. 21, 1991).
T h e A p p e l l a n tc i t e s a s au t h o r i t y State v. W atkins , 972 S.W .2d 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) to support his arg ument that his probationary sentenc e had e x pired. The holding in W atkins did not decide the under ly ing issue pr esente d in the instant case and i s , t h u s, not disposi tive. W atkins involved the probation revocation of two consec utive eleve n month and twenty -n i n e day misdemeanor se ntence s. Central to the W atkins holding was that “the tria l court may not impose a period of pr obation that exceeds the se ntence authorized by law.” 972 S.W .2d at 705. The W atkins c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t be c aus e the imp os e d pr ob a tio na ry pe ri ode xten de d b e y on d th e ma ximum tim e allowed f or the c onviction, i.e. , eleve n months a nd twenty -nine day s, the sentenc e had expired befor e the violation warr ant issued. Id . at 70 5- 70 6. More ov e r, a lth ou g h th e Ap pe llant a rg ue s th a t hi s-3-

se rv ic e of

thr e e hu nd re d tw e nty

day s in ja il p ro po rt ion a lly re du c e d th e ex pir a tio n d a te of his probationary

sentenc e, two opinions of this c ourt have rea ched contra ry conclusions. See State v

. W ill iam A. Ma rsh all , No. M2001-02954-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. C ri m . App. at Nashville, Oct. 14, 2002) (pr etrial jail credits do not acc eler ate the e x piration date of a def endant’ s probationary se nte nc e ); State v. De nnis R. Jack s , No. E2000-00643- CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. A p p . at K n ox ville, May 7, 2001), perm. app. de nied , (T e nn . 200 1) (p re tr ia l jail c re dit did no t a ff e c t th e e xpir a tio n d a te of the probationary

sentenc e).
The e x piration date of

a sente nce of

probation is expressly

g overne d by

the provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-310 (2003) w hich provide: The trial judg e shall possess the powe r, at a ny time within the max imum ti me which was dire cted a nd order ed by the court for such s uspension, afte r proc eeding as provided in § 40-35- 311, to revoke and annul such suspension, and in such ca ses the orig inal judgme nt so render ed by the trial judge shall be in f ull f orce and eff

ect f rom the date of

the re vocation of such sus pension, and shall be ex ecute d acc ording ly

. .

. . (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; Se e als o State v. Taylor , 992 S.W .2d 941, 944-45 (Te nn. 1999). I n Taylor , the Appellant re ceive d a four -y ear sentenc e which w as suspende d afte r he ha d serve d a p eriod of incar cer ation. On appe al, he a rg ued that his sentenc e had e x pired prior to the ins tituti on of revoc ation proce eding s. Dec iding a dverse ly to the Appellant, the c ourt rea soned:
A four- y ear

sentenc e will expire after service of 1460 day s . . . . [ T ay lor had] 549 day s of sentenc ing c redits. . . . He did successfully complete a term of thre e y ear s and 186 day s probation. H o we v er, he had not complete d an entire four- y ear term of probation prior to the r evocation procee dings. .

. . There fore , [Tay lor’s] sentence had no t e xpir e d be c aus e he ha d ne ith e r se rv e d the e nti re fo ur y e ars no r su c c e ssf ull y completed a

four- y ear term of pr obation.
Id

. I t is manifest fr om a re ading of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-310 that the trial court in this case possessed the power at any time within six y ear s from the date the sentence was imp os e d to re vo ke su sp e ns ionof the se nte nc e . T he pr ob a tio na ry pe ri od of six y e ars is c le arl y wi thi n the fiftee n-y ear statutory maxi mum time for the class C c onviction of fense of robbery . Th e t ri al court imposed a six -y ear suspended sentence and placed the Appe llant on probation for six y ear s on J anuary 7, 1998; thus , the Appellant r emained on pr obation until J anuary 7, 2004. Be cause the probation violation warr ant issued in J une 2003, the tria l court possessed the power to revoke

. CO NC LU SION-4-

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the trial court was within its authority to revoke the Appellant’ s suspended se ntence . The judg ment is affirme d.

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE