# Plan 

# Petro Star Valdez Refinery Flare Management Plan

In response to 

# 40 CFR Part 60 Subpart Ja

Prepared for 

# Petro Star, Inc.

Submitted to 

# United States Environmental Protection Agency

January 2014III 

# Contents

Section Page Acronyms and Abbreviations
................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... v 1 Description of Flare
................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 1
- 1 2 Baseline Flow Evaluation
................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 2
- 1 3 Flare Minimization Assessment
................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 3
- 1 Appendixes A P&IDs B Flare Tip Drawings C Process Hazard Analysis Tables 1

- 1 List of Equipment Connected to the Flare

................................ ................................ ....................... 1

- 5 1

- 2 Flare Design Parameters

................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 1

- 8 1

- 3 Flare Gas Lines and Associated Monitors

................................ ................................ ...................... 1

- 11 2

- 1 Baseline Flow

................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ . 2

- 1
Figures 1

- 1 Simplified Process Flow Diagram of Principal Flare Components

................................ .................... 1

- 2 1

- 2 Simple Process Flow Diagram of Gas Lines to the Flare

................................ ................................ ... 1

- 7V 

# Acronyms and Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations FF G Flame Front Generator H 2 

### OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration S hydrogen sulfide

PHA process hazard analysis PSM Process Safety Management PSV pressure safety valve RMP Risk Management Program SO 2 

### ULS D ultra

- low sulfur diesel sulfur dioxide

USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency

### SECTION 1

1
- 1 

# Description of Flare

This section has been prepared to meet the requirements listed in 40 CFR Part 60.103a(a)(1) and (3). A John Zin k elevated air

- a ssisted f lare is the end point of Petro Star's vent collection system located on the far north

- w est quadrant of the site. The cru de u nit has a vent collection header that runs throughout the plant facility and terminates in Knockout Vessel V

- 1105. The pressure safety valves ( PSV s ) within the plant tie into the vent collection header system at various points in the facility. In the e vent that one or multiple PSV's in the plant lift, the vapor and or liquid hydrocar bons are routed through the PSV s, into the header pipe, and travel to V

- 1105. The header enters into V

- 1105 at the top of the vessel and travels down through the vessel to the bottom. Here, the vapor exits the pipe into 18" of diesel fuel, which creates a 'seal' for the hydrocarbons exiting the vent pipe. The seal exists so that entrained liquid hydrocarbons fall out and hot vapor has the opportunity to cool and re

- condense before any remaining vapors escape the 18" seal and are released to the next downstream Knockout Vessel V

- 30202. An additional purpose for the seal leg in V

- 1105 is to maintain an oxygen free environment within the upstream vent system for corrosion and ex plosive atmosphere control purposes. When the liquid in V

- 1105 reaches its high limit Knockout Drum Pump P

- 1117 is automatically turned on and begins pumping down the accumulated liquids to the crude oil slop line. In the extreme event a liquid level fills V

- 1105, it will continue on just as the vapors do to the next knockout vessel V

- 30202. V

- 30202 also has a pump (P

- 30513) and high level switch. P

- 30513 also is routed to the crude oil slop line. Vapor release continues out of V

- 30202 and on to the John Zi nc Flare. Within the flare are three pilots that burn continuously. The pilots are supplied by propane direct from T

- 30203 with a regulator in line. They each have sensors that relay a signal to the Flame Front Generator (FFG). If one goes out an electron ic ignition is started automatically to relight it. If the electronic auto re

- light is unsuccessful an alarm is sent to the DCS and an operator can re

- light the pilot by way of a mechanical ignition system sent from the FFG. In addition to the pilot lights , there is a flow of "purge gas" supplied from the outlet piping of the sulfa

- treat vessels that flows into the vent header piping. This purge gas keeps the header piping free of oxygen and maintains a flame at the flare. In the event the Crude Unit shuts down, propane from V

- 30203 is introduced into the vent header piping for replacement of the lost purge gas from process. This enables the flow of purge gas to continue uninterrupted maintaining an oxygen free piping system so that an explosive atmosphere i s not created within that system. In the event of a release, a fan (F

- 30802) located at the base of the vertical flare piping controlled by a Variable Frequency Drive ramps up according to flow indication to maintain a virtually smokeless flame from the f lare. Because it combusts gas during normal operating conditions, and because it does not maintain a water seal, the flare is not considered an emergency flare. No other flare is present at the site (including backup flares). The flare is not equipped with a flare gas recovery system. P&IDs for the flare are provided in Appendix A. The flare, flare tip, knockout drums, header and assist and ignition systems are marked on Figure 1

- 1. As shown in the figure, w aste gas exits the burner in one or more narrow an nular jets, each surrounded by assist air. The annular flare design maximizes the perimeter area and extends tip life by minimizing internal burning. The nominal and effective tip diameters are 6.79 and 6.625 feet, respectively. Tip dra wings are provided i n Appendix B

. Table 1

- 1 lists the refinery process units, ancillary equipment and fuel gas systems connected to the flare. Table 1

- 2 lists the flare maximum vent gas, sweep gas and pilot gas flow rates.SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 2 

### Figure 1

- 2 provides a simple process flow diagram of the gas lines associated with the flare. Table 1

- 3 describes the type of gas used in each line, and whether or not the lines are monitored for flow and/or hydrogen sulfide . Type, make and model of monitors associated with the gas lines are also listed in T able 1

- 3. Precision, range, accuracy, calibration requirements, maintenance and quality assurance procedures are provided in the Petro Star Valdez Refinery Quality Assurance Plan.SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 3SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 5 

### TABLE 1

- 1 List of Equipment Connected to the Flare Tag Number Description PROCESS UNITS Sulfur Recovery Unit Hydrogen Plant DHT Process Unit Crude Unit ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT PSVs

10

- PSV

- 1081

- 2 E

- 109B LAGO RELIEF VALVE

10

- PSV

- 1205A V

- 111 CRUDE TOWER OVERHEAD RELIEF

10

- PSV

- 1205B V

- 111 CRUDE TOWER OVERHEAD RELIEF

10

- PSV

- 1301A V

- 1301A SULPHA TREAT VESSEL

10

- PSV

- 1301B V

- 1301B SULPHA TREAT VESSEL

10

- PSV

- 3004 F

- 14801 DHT FEED FILTER 10

- PSV

- 3012 E

- 1134A/B FLASHED CRUDE TO H

- 201 RELIEF 10

- PSV

- 5182

- 2012 F

- 1002 LSR COELESCER RELIEF TO VENT COLLECTION 10

- PSV

- 9903 D

- 101 FLASHED OVERHEAD TO VENT COLLECTION 10

- PSV

- 9904

- 2 E

- 106B KEROSENE PRODUCT RELIEF 14

- PSV

- 001

- 2012 V

- 14203 COLD SEPERATOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 003A

- 2012 C

- 14401A RECYCLE GAS DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 003B

- 2012 C

- 14401B RECYCLE GAS DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 007A

- 2012 C

- 14401A HYDROGEN GAS DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 007B

- 2012 C

- 14401B HYDROGEN GAS DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 009 V

- 14205 DHT STABILIZER OVERHEAD VAPOR PRESSURE RELIEF TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 011 V

- 14207 OVERHEAD VAPOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 012

- 2012 V

- 14209 DHT SPLITTER OFFGAS PRESSURE RELIEF TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 013

- 2013 SOUR GAS FROM V

- 14206 TO SRU PRESSURE RELIEF TO FLARE HEADER 14

- PSV

- 016 E

- 14611 KERO PRODUCT TO BATTERY LIMITS PRESSURE RELIEF TO FLARE HEADER 15

- PSV

- 3070

- 2012 SEP

- 15810 INLET GAS SEPARATOR 15

- PSV

- 3071

- 2012 SEP

- 15830 OUTLET GAS SEPARATOR 15

- PSV

- 3072 V

- 15220 SPARGE TOWERSECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 6



### TABLE 1

- 1 List of Equipment Connected to the Flare Tag Number Description PSV

- 302 H2 Compressor PSV

- 3040

- 2013 LSR Storage Drum PSV

- 3042

- 2013 Feed Vaporizer PSV

- 3043

- 2013 LSR Liquid to Burner PSV

- 3044

- 2013 Feed Heater inlet PSV

- 3045A

- 2013 Desulfurizer A PSV

- 3045B

- 2013 Desulfurizer B PSV

- 3047

- 2013 PSA Feed PSV

- 3049A

- 2013 ADSORBER

- A PSV

- 3049B

- 2013 ADSORBER

- B PSV

- 3049C

- 2013 ADSORBER

- C PSV

- 3049D

- 2013 ADSORBER

- D PSV

- 3049E

- 2013 ADSORBER

- E PSV

- 3050 PSA Surge Vessel

20

- PSV

- 2008 V

- 1330 LSR SALT TOWER

20

- PSV

- 5011

- 2012 V

- 1101 LSR FUEL CLAY FILTER

20

- PSV

- 5022

- 2012 F

- 2001 LSR FUEL COALESCER FILTER 20

- PSX

- 9901 VENT GAS FROM ARC / CRUDE SYSTEM PSV

- 3002 V

- 30203 FLARE PILOT PROPANE TANK PRESSURE SAFETY VALVE Other Equipment 30

- BIT

- 314 Flare Smoke Monitor 30

- BT

- 314 Flare Smoke Monitor Transmitter 30

- UA

- 801 ICP

- 3003 Analyzer 40

- FT

- 105 Fuel gas flow transmitter BV

- 201 Manual ball valve BV

- 202 Manual ball valve BV

- 203 Manual ball valve E

- 30701 Flare Area Sump Heating Element FAN

- 30802 Flare Stack Blower Fan FE

- 302A V

- 30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK

- 30801 Flow Element FE

- 302B V

- 30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK

- 30801 Flow Element FI

- 302 V

- 30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK

- 30801 Flow Indicator FT

- 302 V

- 30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK

- 30801 Flow TransmitterSECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 7 

### TABLE 1

- 1 List of Equipment Connected to the Flare Tag Number Description HOA

- 513 P

- 30513 Pump Motor Hand/off/auto switch HS

- 802 Fan

- 30802 Hand Switch HV

- 101 Manual Needle Valve HV

- 102 Manual Needle Valve IJB 30801 Control Panel LCP

- 30801 Control Panel LG

- 301 V

- 30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Gauge LI

- 308A V

- 30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Indicator LI

- 308B V

- 30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Indicator LI

- 701 T

- 30701 Flare Area Sump Level Indicator LSH

- 315 T

- 30701 Flare Area Sump Level Switch High LT

- 308A V

- 30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Transmitter LT

- 308B V

- 30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Transmitter LT

- 701 T

- 30701 Flare Area Sump Level Transmitter P

- 30513 Flare Knockout Drum Pump PCV

- 303 Instrument Air from Header to ICP

- 3003 Pressure Control Valve PCV

- 304 ICP

- 3003 Propane/Air to STK

- 30801 Pressure Control Valve PCV

- 311 Pilot Gas to STK

- 30801 Pressure Control Valve PCV

- 313 V

- 30203 Flare Pilot Gas Propane Tank Pressure Control Valve 15

- PCV

- 209B Sour Gas SRU Bypass PCV

- 317 Instrument Air PCV

- 318 Instrument Air PI_102 Pressure Gauge PI

- 101 Pressure Gauge PI

- 305 Instrument Air from Header to ICP

- 3003 Pressure Indicator PM

- 30513 P

- 30513 Pump Motor Control PM

- 30802 Fan

- 30802 Pump Motor Run Status PT

- 302 V

- 30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK

- 30801 Pressure Transmitter PT

- 305 Instrument Air from Header to ICP

- 3003 Pressure Transmitter 14

- PV

- 223B Splitter Offgas 18

- PV

- 156 Process Gas 18

- PV

- 160B Hydrogen 18

- PV

- 173A Vent Gas SC

- 802 Fan

- 30802 STK

- 30801 Flare StackSECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 8



### TABLE 1

- 1 List of Equipment Connected to the Flare Tag Number Description T

- 30701 Flare Area Sump TJB 30801 Control Panel TT

- 302 V

- 30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK

- 30801 Temperature Transmitter V

- 30202 Flare Knockout Drum V

- 30203 Flare Pilot Gas Propane Tank FUEL GAS SYSTEMS Sulfur Recovery Unit Crude Unit Hydrogen Plant Refinery process unit means any segment of the petroleum refinery in which a specific processing operation is conducted. Ancillary equipment means equipment used in conjunction with or that serve a refinery process unit. Ancillary equipment includes, but is not limited to, stor age tanks, product loading operations, pressure relief valves. Fuel gas system means a system of compressors, piping, knock

- out pots, mix drums, and units used to remove sulfur contaminants from the fuel gas (e.g., amine scrubbers) that collects refinery f uel gas from one or more sources for treatment as necessary prior to combusting in process heaters or boilers. A fuel gas system may have an overpressure vent to a flare but the primary purpose for a fuel gas system is to provide fuel to the refinery.



### TABLE 1

- 2 Flare Design Parameters Parameter Value Maximum vent gas flow rate 350,000 lb/hr Minimum sweep gas flow rate 64 lb/hr Maximum pilot gas flow rate 675 scfh lb/hr

- pounds per hour scfh

- standard cubic feet per hourSECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 9SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 11 

### TABLE 1

- 3 Flare Gas Lines and Associated Monitors ID From To Gas Exempt from Monitoring? Monitor ID 1 Monitor Type Make Model 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT V

- 30202 STK

- 30801 All (Relief, Vent, Purge, Sweep, Propane) No 30

- FT

- 302 Flow Transmitter GE Panametrics GF868

- 1

- 11

- 20F14

- FM 2"

- PR

- 30010

- C10 2"

- PR

- 30008

- C10 Pilot Pilot Gas Pilot gas 2"

- PR

- 30008

- C10 2"

- PR

- 30007

- C10 2"

- PR

- 30010

- C10 Pilot Gas Pilot gas 2"

- PR

- 30007

- C10 V

- 30203 2"

- PR

- 30008

- C10 Pilot Gas Pilot gas 1"PR

- 30011

- C10

- IGT ICP

- 3003 Ignition Tubes Propane/Air Pilot gas 1"PR

- 30012

- C10

- IGT ICP

- 3003 Ignition Tubes Propane/Air Pilot gas 1"PR

- 30013

- C10

- IGT ICP

- 3003 Ignition Tubes Propane/Air Pilot gas 2"

- PR

- 30018

- C10 2"

- PR

- 30009

- C10 ICP

- 3003 Propane Pilot gas 2"

- PR

- 30009

- C10 2"

- PR

- 30008

- C10 2"

- PR

- 30018

- C10 Propane Pilot gas 20"

- FL

- 40011

- C10

- IGT V

- 1105 V

- 30202 Relief Gas (Relief, Sweep, Propane) Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"

- FG

- 20002

- C10

- IGT 5047

- C10

- 6"

- IGT 20"

- FL

- 40011

- C10

- IGT Purge gas No 20

- FIT

- 309 Flow Indicating Transmitter Rosemount 3051CD2A02A1AS5E5 5047

- C10

- 6"

- IGT V

- 1301A&B 2"

- FG

- 20002

- C10

- IGT Purge gas No 20

- FIT

- 309 Flow Indicating Transmitter Rosemount 3051CD2A02A1AS5E5 2"

- PR

- 40007

- C10 2"

- PR

- 30008

- C10 2"

- FG

- 20002

- C10

- IGT Propane No 2"

- PR

- 40136

- C10 2"

- PR

- 40007

- C10 1"

- PR

- 40135

- C10 Propane No 40

- FT

- 103 Flow Transmitter Rosemount 8800DR010SA3N1F1E5 1"

- PR

- 40135

- C10 2"

- PR

- 40135

- C10 8"

- FL

- 40118

- C10

- IGT Propane No 40

- FT

- 103 Flow Transmitter Rosemount 8800DR010SA3N1F1E5 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT 12"

- FL

- 14400

- 1A1B

- 2"H

- IGT 20"

- FL

- 40011

- C10

- IGT Relief gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3"

- FL

- 14416

- 1A1B PSV

- 007B 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Hydrogen Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 14408

- 1A1B PSV

- 03B 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Recycle Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 14405

- 1A1B PSV

- 03A 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Recycle Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 6"

- FL

- 14438

- 1A1B

- 2"H

- GT 4"

- SG

- 14055

- 1A4N

- 1.5"H

- GT 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 6"

- FL

- 14421

- 1A1B PSV

- 13 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3"

- FL

- 14413

- 1A1B PSV

- 007A 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Hydrogen Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 6"

- FL

- 14402

- 1A1B

- 2"H

- GT XV

- 102 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Recycle Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"

- FL

- 14415

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT C

- 14401B Blowdown 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Blowdown Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"

- FL

- 14412

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT C

- 14401A Blowdown 2"

- FL

- 14415

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT Blowdown Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3/8" SS Tubing Sample Vent 2"

- FL

- 14415

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT Sample Vent Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"

- FL

- 14407

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT C

- 14401B Blowdown 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Blowdown Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"

- FL

- 14404

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT C

- 14401A Blowdown 2"

- FL

- 14407

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT Blowdown Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"

- FL

- 14415

- 1A1B C

- 14401A Packing Vents 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Packing Vent Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"

- FL

- 14414

- 1A1B C

- 14401B Packing Vents 2"

- FL

- 14415

- 1A1B Packing Vent Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 14217

- 1A1B PSV

- 016 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Kero Product Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"

- FL

- 14420

- 1A1B

- 1"P PV

- 223B 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Splitter Offgas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 14419

- 1A1B PSV

- 12 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Splitter Offgas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 8"

- FL

- 14401

- 1A1B PSV

- 01 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Recycle Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3/4"

- FL

- 14423

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT Sample Panel Vent 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Sample Vent Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGTSECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 12



### TABLE 1

- 3 Flare Gas Lines and Associated Monitors ID From To Gas Exempt from Monitoring? Monitor ID 1 Monitor Type Make Model 10"

- FL

- 14418

- 1A1B PSV

- 11 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Splitter Overhead Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 10"

- FL

- 14417

- 1A1B PSV

- 09 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Stabilizer Overhead Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3/4"

- FG

- 14464

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT 4"

- FG

- 14230

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT 12"

- FL

- 40117

- C10

- IGT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 14

- FI

- 267 Flow Indicator 4"

- FG

- 14230

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT 4"

- FG

- 40032

- C10

- IGT 3/4"

- FG

- 14464

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 14

- FI

- 267 Flow Indicator 4"

- FG

- 40032

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FG

- 40035

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FG

- 14230

- 1A1B

- 1.5"H

- GT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 14

- FI

- 267 Flow Indicator 4"

- FG

- 40035

- C10

- IGT 3"

- PG

- 15104

- C10

- 1.5"

- IGT 4"

- FG

- 40032

- C10

- IGT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 14

- FI

- 267 Flow Indicator 8"

- FL

- 40118

- C10

- IGT N/A 20"

- FL

- 40011

- C10

- IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 6"

- FL

- 40120

- C10

- IGT 6"

- VT336

- H10CS 8"

- FL

- 40118

- C10

- IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 6"

- VT336

- H10CS N/A 6"

- FL

- 40120

- C10

- IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3/4"VT337

- H10CS PSV

- 302 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Hydrogen Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"VT330

- H10CS PSV

- 3050 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 6"VT331

- H10CS PSV

- 173A 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 6"VT324

- H10CS PV

- 156 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3"VT322

- H10CS PSV

- 3047 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT325

- H10CS PSV

- 3049A 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT326

- H10CS PSV

- 3049B 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"VT409

- H10CS PV

- 160B 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Hydrogen Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT327

- H10CS PSV

- 3049C 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT328

- H10CS PSV

- 3049D 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3/4"N634

- H10CS 3/4"N635

- A10CS 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 18

- FI

- 193 3/4"N635

- A10CS 2"N625

- A10CS 3/4"N634

- H10CS Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 18

- FI

- 193 2"N625

- A10CS 2"FG

- 40210

- C10

- IGT 3/4"N635

- A10CS Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 18

- FI

- 193 2"FG

- 40210

- C10

- IGT 2"N625

- A10CS 4"FG

- 40035

- C10

- IGT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT329

- H10CS PSV

- 3049E 6"

- VT336

- H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"VT137

- A10CS V

- 18225 6"

- VT336

- H10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"VT136

- A10CS N/A V

- 18225 LSR Vapor/Liquid Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT129

- A10CS PSV

- 3042 4"VT136

- A10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT128

- A10CS PSV

- 3040 4"VT136

- A10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT130

- A10CS PSV

- 3043 4"VT136

- A10CS LSR Liquid Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3/4"N626

- A10CS 3/4"N634

- A10CS 4"VT136

- A10CS Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 18

- FI

- 193 2"VT132

- A10CS PSV

- 3045A/B 4"VT136

- A10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 2"VT131

- A10CS PSV

- 3044 4"VT136

- A10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 40038

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 40035

- C10

- IGT 8"

- FL

- 40118

- C10

- IGT SRU fuel gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 40

- FT

- 102 Flow Transmitter Rosemount 8800DR010SA3N1F1E5 4"

- FL

- 40035

- C10

- IGT 3"

- PG

- 15104

- C10

- 1.5"

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 40038

- C10

- IGT/4"FG

- 40035

- C10

- IGT SRU fuel gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT AI

- 107 H 2 Spectra Sensors S Monitor SS2100 1"

- FG

- 40206

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 40038

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 40038

- C10

- IGT SRU fuel gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 40

- FT

- 104 Flow Transmitter Rosemount 8800DR010SA3N1F1E5 4"

- FL

- 40119

- C10

- IGT 4"

- FL

- 15168

- C10

- IGT 8"

- FL

- 40118

- C10

- IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGTSECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLA RE

1
- 13 

### TABLE 1

- 3 Flare Gas Lines and Associated Monitors ID From To Gas Exempt from Monitoring? Monitor ID 1 Monitor Type Make Model 4"

- FL

- 15168

- C10

- IGT N/A 4"

- FL

- 40119

- C10

- IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 4"

- PG

- 15113

- C10

- 1.5"IGT PCV

- 209B 4"

- FL

- 15168

- C10

- IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT FE

- 209 1"

- FL

- 15131

- C10

- 1"IGT PSV

- 3070 4"

- FL

- 15168

- C10

- IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3"

- FL

- 151368

- C10

- 1.5"IGT PSV

- 3072 4"

- FL

- 15168

- C10

- IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 1"

- FL

- 15127

- C10

- 1"IGT PSV

- 3071 4"

- FL

- 15168

- C10

- IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 10109

- C10

- 2"

- PP PSV

- 1032A/B V

- 1105 Fuel gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 6000

-- C10

- 3" PSV

- 1301

- A ????

- C10

- 8" Fuel gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT

xxxx -- C10

- 3" PSV

- 1301

- B ????

- C10

- 8" Fuel gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT ????

- C10

- 8" N/A V

- 1105 Fuel gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 5410

- C10

- 16"

- PP N/A V

- 1105 Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT C10

- 1"

- IGT PSV

- 2008 5410

- C10

- 16"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 5411

- C10

- 3"

- PP 1"

- VF

- 20074

- C10

- IGT 5410

- C10

- 16"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3/4"

- VF

- 20074

- C10

- IGT PSV

- 5022 5411

- C10

- 3"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 1"VF

- 20073

- C10

- IGT PSV

- 5011 1"

- VF

- 20074

- C10

- IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 5400

- C10

- 16"

- PP N/A 5410

- C10

- 16"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 10151

- C10

- 4"

- IGT PSV

- 3012 5400

- C10

- 16"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 1"

- IGT PSV

- 5182 5400

- C10

- 16"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 5404

- C10

- 12"

- PP PSV

- 1205A/B 5400

- C10

- 16"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 9934

- C10

- 4"

- PP PSV

- 1081

- 2 5404

- C10

- 12"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 10238

- C10

- 4"

- IS PSV

- 9904

- 2 5404

- C10

- 12"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 9939

- C30

- 6"

- IH PSX

- 9901 5404

- C10

- 12"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 3" PV

- 264 Bypass 5410

- C10

- 6"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 9907

- C10

- 2"

- PP PSV

- 9903 5410

- C10

- 6"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 5406

- C10

- 4"

- PP PV

- 264 9907

- C10

- 2"

- PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"

- FL

- 30002

- C10

- IGT 1 Monitoring exemptions: 60.103a(a)(3)(iv) Designate which lines are exempt from sulfur , H 2 S or flow monitoring and why (e.g., natural gas, inherently low sulfur, pilot gas)

### SECTION 2

2
- 1 

# Baseline Flow Evaluation

This section has been prepared to meet the requirements listed in 40 CFR Part 60.103a(a)(4). A baseline flow evaluation has been conducted for the flare. Table 2

- 1 lists the baseline flow for normal operations and for the case of ultra

- low sulfur diesel ( ULSD ) outage.
TABLE 2

- 1 Baseline Flow Petro Star Valdez Refinery Flare Management Plan Baseline Case Fuel Type Flow Normal Operations Crude Heater Fuel Gas 850 scfh Hydrogen Plant PSA Purge Gas 17,000 scfh Sulfur Recovery Unit Sweet Fuel Gas 500 scfh ULSD Unit outage Crude Heater Fuel Gas 850 scfh Hydrogen Plant PSA Purge Gas 3 million scfh scfh

– standard cubic feet per hour

### SECTION 3

3
- 1 

# Flare Minimization Assessment

This section has been prepared to meet the requirements listed in 40 CFR Part 60.103a(a)(1) and (3). The assessment was taken from the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

. Th e purpose of this PHA was to conduct a PHA by a multi

- disciplined team in accordance with the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) "Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals" regulation (29 CFR 1910.119), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ( US EPA) "Risk Management Program" (RMP) rule (40 CFR Part 68) requirements, and Petro Star requirements for process safety review. The PHA systematically reviewed the Petro Star Flare System using the HAZOP methodology. T he scope of the PHA included the covered equipment, piping and instrumentation associated with the Petro Star Flare System per the referenced drawings, a process covered by OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119) regulation, US EPA Risk Management Plan Rule (40 CFR Part 68) requirements at the Petro Star site in Valdez, Alaska. The analysis included start

- up, normal (steady

- state) operating and shutdown procedures, and global issues such as Services, Utilities, applicable industry incidents, Human Factors, Facility Sitin g, and Emergency Procedures to the extent available. Information reviewed included the Facility and Process Description provided by Petro Star. The objective of the PHA was to identify possible deviations from the covered process design, maintenance inspec tion, or operating practices which could lead to fires, explosions or toxic releases of covered chemicals in the covered process potentially resulting in personnel injury, equipment damage, public or environmental impact. The analysis also addressed signif icant operability issues such as scenarios which could lead to a unit shutdown and considered potential impacts of utilities and external events upon the covered process. Failure of existing engineering and administrative controls and protections were eval uated for credible events, including multiple failures, which could lead to a hazardous scenario. Problems in the operation of utilities such as instrument air, nitrogen, steam, electrical power, and cooling water were reviewed for affect upon potential ha zardous scenarios in the covered process. No previous accidents such as recordable injuries, reportable releases in similar covered processes were identified for consideration during the study. Deviations, causes, consequences, safeguard and recommendation s for each node and parameter at the flare are listed in Appendix C

.

# Appendix A P&IDs

# Appendix B Tip Drawings

# Appendix C Process Hazard AnalysisPage: 1 Company: Petro Star Facility: Valdez Refinery
Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105 Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Flow Intention: 0 to 250,000 lbs per hour of hydrocarbons

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Flow (from PSV's & LSR fromCo-GenNormal Operations) 1. Normal operation :No hazardous consequences identified by the team

No Flow (from PSV's - emergency operation) 2. Unit upset and manual valves at PSV blocked in 2.1. Potential overpressure of equipment resulting in pressure burst, loss of containment, and possible personnel injury 2.1.1. Manual valves Car Sealed Opened (CSO) 5 1 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 2.1.2. Car seal policy POL-030 2.1.3. Energy isolation policy POL-010 2.1.4. Energy isolation procedure/blindingprocedure PW-NOP032 2.1.5. Secondary containment Less Less Flow (from PSV's - emergency operation) 3. Unit upset and manual valves partialy closed at PSV 3.1. Potential overpressure of equipment resulting in pressure burst, loss of containment, and possible personnel injury 3.1.1. Manual valves Car Sealed Opened (CSO) 5 1 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 3.1.2. Car seal policy POL-030 3.1.3. Energy isolation procedure/blindingprocedure PW-NOP032 3.1.4. Secondary containment More More Flow (from PSV's - emergency operation) 4. Partial power failure and loss of multipule middle pump arounds 4.1. Exceed design capacity of the vent system resulting in potential overpressure of the crude tower with loss of containment and possible personnel injury 4.1.1. High pressure alarms PAH 316 A/B/C with 2 out of 3 high is designed to shutdown the plant in the safemode (HIPS trip is P311 A/B, P-2012 A/B and crude furnace shutdown and remaining equipment is shutdown through the ESD system). 5 1 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

4.1.2. Crude unit PSV's are balanced bellows 4.1.3. Secondary containmentOther Than Misdirected Flow 5. PSV in system leaking 5.1. Loss of raw material to the flare header system 5.1.1. High pressure alarm PAH 5181 set @ 18 inches water :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 5.1.2. High high pressure alarm PAHH 5181 set @ 21 inches water

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105 Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Temperature Intention: 35 degrees F minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Less Lower Temperature 6. Freezing weather with loss of hot glycol system or manual valve closed/partially closed in glycol system 6.1. Water freezing in pump suction line not allowing the pump to maintain a set level in the tank resulting liquid going to the flare 6.1.1. Operator rounds checking vessel temperature and level 4 1 2 1 Consider filling knockout boot and suction piping to P-1117 with glycol to prevent line from freezing. MS

6.1.2. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set @ 5'1" will sound on DCS 2 Consider setting the LSH 5118 to a lower setting to allow for more liquid relief in the V-1105 before it overflows to the downstream knockout vessel V-30202 and flare. (Team suggested 2'-6") ANVIL

6.1.3. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum 3 Consider setting the LSHH 5118 to 10 inches above LSH 5118 set point. ANVIL

6.2. Water freezing in suction line of pump resulting in line failure and loss of containment 6.2.1. Prewinterization checklist 3 3 3 :Same As 1

6.2.2. Seconodary containment More Higher Temperature 7. Glycol system running during hot weather :No hazardous consequences identified by the team

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105 Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Pressure Intention: 37 psig maximun

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY More Higher Pressure :Same As 4. More Flow 8.1. Increasing size of the fire with 8.1.1. HIPPS trip set @ 35 psig 2 5 1 3 4 Consider evaluating the fail position, size, and operation RM ANVIL8. External fire potential overpressure of crude unit vessels with loss of containment and personnel injury out 3 voting closes emergeny block valves and shuts down furnace H-201. HIPPS will activate the ESD. of PV 264 to control the pressure on the crude unit in a external fire scenario with the intent to emergency depressurization of the unit. Suggested fail position of PV 264 is fail last or fail open with back-up air receiver. Add step to CDU ESD in "event of fire" to depressurize unit. 8.1.2. ESD System 8.1.3. PSV 1205A set @ 64 psig 8.1.4. PSV 1205B set @ 67 psig

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105 Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Composition Intention: Diesel fuel seal leg

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY As Well As Contamination 9. Water condensing from the purge gas 9.1. Water freezing in pump suction line not allowing the pump to maintain a set level in the tank resulting liquid going to the flare 9.1.1. Hot glycol system to maintain the vessel temperature above 35 degrees F. 4 1 2 :Same As 1

9.1.2. Operator rounds checking vessel temperature and level :Same As 2

9.1.3. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set @ 5'1" will sound on DCS :Same As 3

9.1.4. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum 9.2. Water freezing in suction line of pump resulting in line failure and loss of containment 9.2.1. Prewinterization checklist 3 3 3 :Same As 1

9.2.2. Secondary containment 10. LSR (light straight run) from Co-gen purge cycle 10.1. LSR contaminates the diesel seal leg; high concentration of LSR could result in a vapor lock of the P-1117 pump :None identified 5 Consider having CVEA Cogen repair the switch in their line that would incidatewhen LSR is being put to V1105 and have the output from the switch alarm in Petro Star control room. RM

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Level Intention: 18 inches to 4 foot 3 inches

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Level 11. Vessel pumped out by P-1117 and not reflilled by operations 11.1. Potential air ingress into the vent header system resulting in an explosive mixture 11.1.1. V-1105 has a wier build in the area of vent piping which maintains an 18 inch liquid level separate from the pump suction boot. 4 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

12. Failure of LSL 5118 to shutdown the P-1117 12.1. Possible damage to P-1117 with loss of containment :Secondary containment 2 2 2 6 Consider having a run status indication for P-1117 on the DCS and alarm the on confirm to alert operations the pump has started. JS

More Higher Level 13. Failure of LSH 5118to start P1117 13.1. Fill V-1105 and overflow liquid to the flare 13.1.1. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set @ 5'1" will sound on DCS 4 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.
13.1.2. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105 Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Purging / Inerting Intention: System to be free of air

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Purging / Inerting 14. System contains air after a shutdown or maintenance. 14.1. Explosive mixture in the vent header system 14.1.1. Purging crude unit prior to start-up procedure CU-SUP-010 4 2 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 14.1.2. PSSR prior to starting the unit after maintenanceor shutdown POL070

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Flow Intention: 0 to 350,000 pounds per hour of hydrocarbons

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BYNo No Flow (V1105) 15. Normal operation :No hazardous consequences identified by the team
More More Flow (emergency venting from V -1105) 16. Crude unit upset :No hazardous consequences identified by the team - vessel is designed to handle 100,000pounds per hour more than the design of V-1105)

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Temperature Intention: 35 degrees F minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Less Lower Temperature 17. Freezing weather with loss of hot glycol system or manual valve closed/partially closed in glycol system 17.1. Water freezing in pump suction line not allowing the pump to maintain a set level in the tank resulting liquid going to the flare 17.1.1. Operator rounds checking vessel temperature and level 4 1 2 7 Consider filling knockout boot and suction piping to P-30513 with glycol to prevent line from freezing. MS

17.1.2. High high level alarms HHLL 308 A/B set @ 3'6" will sound on DCS 8 Consider having a local temperature indicator on the bottom of the vessel for operations to use to adjust the glycol flow rate to the vessel to maintain the temperature. ANVIL

17.2. Water freezing in suction line of pump resulting in line failure and loss of containment 17.2.1. Prewinterization checklist 3 3 3 :Same As 7

17.2.2. Seconodary containment More Higher Temperature 18. Glycol system running during hot weather :No hazardous consequences identified by the team

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Composition Intention: Empty

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY As Well As Contamination 19. Water condensing from the purge gas 19.1. Water freezing in pump suction line not allowing the pump to maintain a set level in the tank resulting liquid going to the flare 19.1.1. Hot glycol system to maintain vessel temperature above 35 degrees F. 4 1 2 :Same As 7

19.1.2. Operator rounds checking vessel temperature and level 19.1.3. High high level alarms HHLL 308 A/B set @ 3'6" will sound on DCS 19.2. Water freezing in suction line of pump 19.2.1. Prewinterization checklist 3 3 3 :Same As 7resulting in line failure and loss of containment 19.2.2. Secondary containment

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Level Intention: 1' 6" to 3" liquid level in the tank

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Level 20. Malfunction of the level transmitter LT 308A 20.1. Run P-30513 resulting in pump damage and loss of containment 20.1.1. Redundant transmitter LT 308 B read out on DCS panel 2 3 3 9 Consider having the redundant level transmitters look at Process Variable (bad or good), uses the good transmitter and deviation alarm to indicate there is a level problem. JS

10 Consider lowering the pump shutdown from 1 foot six inches down to 0 inches on transmitter to keep vessel as low as possible. JS/ANVIL

11 Consider having a runstatus indication for P30513 on the DCS and alarm the on confirm to alert operations the pump has started. JS

More Higher Level 21. Failure of HHLL 308A tostart P30513 21.1. Fill V-30202 and overflow liquid to the flare 21.1.1. Redundant transmitter LT 308 B read out on DCS panel 4 3 4 :Same As 9

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Purging / Inerting Intention: Free of air

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Purging / Inerting :See Node 4

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (3) Liquid Knockout from P-1117 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of operation) Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Flow Intention: 0 to 70 gpm GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Flow 22. Manual suction valve close 22.1. Fill V-1105 and overflow liquid to the flare 22.1.1. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set 4 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.@ 5'1" will sound on DCS 22.1.2. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum 22.2. Possible pump damage with loss of containment and potential personnel exposure 22.2.1. Manual valve is Car Sealed Open (CSO) 2 2 2 :Same As 6

22.2.2. Secondary containment 23. Pump failure, loss of power, or pump left in manual mode 23.1. Fill V-1105 and overflow liquid to the flare 23.1.1. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set @ 5'1" will sound on DCS 4 1 2 12 Consider having a sign at the pump switch stating that P-1117 be left in the auto run mode. MS

23.1.2. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum 24. Manual discharge valve(s) closed 24.1. Fill V-1105 and overflow liquid to the flare 24.1.1. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set @ 5'1" will sound on DCS 4 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

24.1.2. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum 24.2. Possible pump damage with loss of containment and potential personnel exposure 24.2.1. Manual valve is Car Sealed Open (CSO) 2 2 2 :Same As 6

24.2.2. Secondary containment Less Less Flow 25. Manual suction valve partially close or strainer plugging :Same As 22.1

26. Manual discharge valve(s) partially closed :Same As 24.1

Reverse Reverse Flow 27. check valve fails 27.1. Contents of T1106 flow back into V -1105 with potential of overflowing to flare if pump P-1117 fails 27.1.1. High level switch LSH5118 starts P1117 4 2 3 :Same As 6

27.1.2. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set @ 5'1" will sound on DCS 27.1.3. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum Other Than Misdirected Flow 28. Manual valve(s) to sumps left open 28.1. Over flow sump with oily water 28.1.1. Check valve in the sump lines 3 2 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.28.1.2. Valves maintained chain locked closed 28.1.3. Secondary containment 28.2. Rain water being pumped to the crude tanks if sump pump starts :None identified :No additional recommendations identified by Team.
29. P-1301 fuel gas condensateof the sulfatreat vessels pump block valve left open 29.1. Oily water into sulfa-treat vessels resulting in fouling the media with potential shutdown of the furnace H-201 29.1.1. Check valve in the line :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

30. P-1122 fuel gas header condensate pump block valve left open 30.1. Oily water into the fuel gas header resulting in a potential furnace H-201 shutdown 30.1.1. Two check valves in the line :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 30.1.2. Pump remains in auto
31. P-1123 oil skimmingpump on T1113 block valve left open 31.1. Oily water back into the storm water tank with potential to over flow T-1113 to environment 31.1.1. Check valve in line 2 2 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 31.1.2. High level alarm LAH 5102 on DCS panel 31.1.3. Secondary containment 32. LSR salt tower V-1330 chcek valve fails and unit down 32.1. Oily water contamination of the LSR fuel stream resulting in potential shutdown of H-201 and co-gen :None identified :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (3) Liquid Knockout from P-1117 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of operation) Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Temperature Intention: 35 degrees F minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Less Lower Temperature 33. Manual valve on hot glycol system closed/partially closed or hot glycol system down 33.1. Water freezes in line resulting in no flow, filling up V-1105 with potential overflow liquid to the flare 33.1.1. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set @ 5'1" will sound on DCS 4 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

33.1.2. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum 33.1.3. Glycol heat tracing system PM andpre-winterization check

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (3) Liquid Knockout from P-1117 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of operation) Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Pressure Intention: 30 to 40 psi

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Less Lower Pressure 34. Pump running too far out on pump curve 34.1. Not being able to pump contents out of V-1105 resulting in V-1105 overflowing to the flare 34.1.1. High high level alarm LSHH 5118 set @ 5'1" will sound on DCS 4 3 4 13 Consider doing a hydraulic test on the pump P-1117 to determine what size orifice plate to install in the line to maintain the proper back pressure for the pump to stay within optimum pump curve. RM/ANVIL

34.1.2. V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (4) Purge Gas, Back-up Purge Gas to relief header Drawings: 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 Parameter: Flow Intention: 675 scfh minimum GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Flow 35. Manual valve(s) in line closed 35.1. Loss of purge gas to flare with potential air ingress into the system resulting in potential explosive mixture in the flare header. 35.1.1. Valves are chain locked open (CLO) 5 1 3 14 Consider having a low flow alarm FAL 309 on DCS to alert operations of a low flow of purge gas to the flare. JS

35.1.2. PSSR on starting unit to check valve positions 15 Consider having a low low flow critical alarm FALL 302 on DCS to alert operations of a low flow to the flare. JS

35.1.3. Low flow switch FSL 309 designed to open SOV 310 propane back-up purge gas Less Less Flow 36. Manual valve(s) in line partially closed or adjustment valve not open enough 36.1. Same As 35.1

More More Flow 37. Manual adjustment valve open too much 37.1. Loss of raw material to the flare 37.1.1. Flow reading on FT 302 16 Consider adding a high flow alarm on FAH 302 to alert operations of a high flow to the flare stack. JS

Reverse Reverse Flow 38. Crude unit normal shut down and back-up 38.1. Loss of purge gas to flare with potential air ingress into the system resulting in potential 38.1.1. Check valve in line 5 1 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 38.1.2. Pressure is maintained inpurge gas flowing explosive mixture in the flare header. the fuel gas system

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (5) Propane Storage Tank including distribution syst em to users (back-up purge gas & flare pilots). Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Flow Intention: 65 to 75 scfh of propane gas GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Flow(out of V30203) 39. Manual valve(s) closed or PCV 313 fails to open 39.1. Loss of propane supply to users resulting in loss of pilot lights on flare and possible loss of purge gas flame with potential unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment 39.1.1. Low temperature alarm TAL 101/102/103 on DCS 3 3 3 17 Consider adding to the flare procedure operator response to no propane to the pilot lights; procedure for by -passing a PCV. SD

39.1.2. Low low temperature alarm TALL 101/102/103 on DCS 39.1.3. Manual by-pass around PCV 313 and local PI to adjust gas pressure if PCV 313 fails to open No Flow (to pilot lights) 40. Manual valve(s) closed or PCV 311 fails to open 40.1. Loss of propane supply to the pilot lights on flare and possible loss of purge gas flame with potential unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment 40.1.1. Low temperature alarm TAL 101/102/103 on DCS 3 3 3 :Same As 17

40.1.2. Low low temperature alarm TALL 101/102/103 on DCS 40.1.3. Manual by-pass around PCV 311 and local PI to adjust gas pressure if PCV 311 fails to open No Flow (to back-up purge system when needed) 41. Manual valve(s) closed or SOV 310 fails to open 41.1. Loss of backup purge gas to flare with potential air ingress into the system resulting in potential explosive mixture in the flare header. 41.1.1. Valves are chain locked open (CLO) 5 1 3 18 Consider changing SOV 310 to fail open which is the fail safe position for this valve to keep purge flow to the flare system. ANVIL

41.1.2. PSSR on starting unit to check valve positions 19 Consider adding to the flare procedure operator response to total loss of the purge system. SD

42. Line plugged with 42.1. Loss of backup purge gas to :None identified 5 3 4 20 Consider insulating and hot glycol tracing RM/ANVILice from moisture coming from fuel gas flare with potential air ingress into the system resulting in potential explosive mixture in the flare header. the back-up purge gas line from where it ties in to the purge gas line back to SOV 310 to prevent ice formation in the line and stopping propane flow. Less Less Flow(out of V30203) 43. Manual valve(s) partially closed, PCV 313 fails partially open, or propane running low :Same As 39.1

No Flow (to pilot lights) 44. Manual valve(s) partially closed, PCV 311 fails partially open, or propane running low :Same As 40.1

No Flow (to back-up purge system when needed) 45. Manual valve(s) partially closed, SOV 310 fails partially open, or propane running low :Same As 41.1

46. Line plugging with ice from moisture coming from fuel gas :Same As 42.1

More More Flow(out of V30203) 47. Manual by -pass valve left open or leaks by, PCV 313 fails open 47.1. Increased pressure to downstream users resulting in potential higher usage 47.1.1. Downstream users have a regulator or orfice plate to control the gas pressure :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

47.1.2. Pipework is higher design pressure than the propane system More Flow (to pilot lights) 48. Manual by -pass valve left open or leaks by, PCV 311 fails open 48.1. Increased pressure to pilots could result in pilots being blown out resulting in unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment 48.1.1. Manual by-pass around PCV 311 and local PI to adjust gas pressure if PCV 311 fails to open 3 3 3 :Same As 17

Reverse Reverse Flow 49. Disconnecting unloadinghoses from V30203 and not having 49.1. Loss of propane to the environment with potential for an explosion and personnel injury 49.1.1. One way valve inside the tank on the fill line to prevent reverse flow 4 2 3 21 Verify the propane emergency tank and line isolation is installed and added to the P&ID as shown on the vendor drawings. ANVILthe tank isolated from hoses 49.1.2. Special one way valve in unloading line to prevent reverse flow Other Than Misdirected Flow 50. Driver pulls away from tank while still connected 50.1. Loss of propane to the environment with potential for an explosion and personnel injury 50.1.1. One way valve inside the tank on the fill line to prevent reverse flow 4 2 3 :Same As 21

50.1.2. Special one way valve in unloading line to prevent reverse flow

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (5) Propane Storage Tank including distribution syst em to users (back-up purge gas & flare pilots). Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Pressure Intention: 45 to 250 psig

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY More Higher Pressure 51. External fire 51.1. Overpressure V - 30203 resulting in loss of containment and potential personnel injury 51.1.1. PSV 3002 set @ 250 psig and is designed to relieve to a safe location 5 1 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

51.1.2. Two manually operated fire monitors in the area 52. Unloading line liquid full on a warm day 52.1. Propane expands in the line with potential line failure 52.1.1. One way valve in the unloading line will allow flow into the tank 3 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

52.1.2. PSV on line

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (5) Propane Storage Tank including distribution syst em to users (back-up purge gas & flare pilots). Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Level Intention: 20% to 84% instrument range

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Level 53. Operations does not order propane in time :Same As 39.1

More Higher Level 54. Overfilling the tank higher than 85% 54.1. Possibility of having liquid propane going to end users with potential damage to the downstream regulators resulting in high pressure 54.1.1. Level guage on the vessel 3 3 3 22 Consider adding propane deliveries to the Process Chemical Receiving and Processing PW-SWP-050 MS

54.1.2. Spitter valves on thegas going to the end users; could result in pilots being blown out resulting in unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment tank used as a second means of guaging tank level

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (6) Flare Front Generator Ignition System Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1 Parameter: Flow Intention: Propane 70 scfh; air 1500 scfh

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Flow (Propane when needed) 55. Manual valve(s) closed, PCV 304 fails to open or PCV 304 plugged with scale 55.1. Loss of propane to the flame front generator resulting in not being able to light a pilot light, thus potential unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment 55.1.1. Redundant pilots on the flare (3) 3 2 3 23 Consider adding a y strainer in the line to trap scale and prevent pluggage of the regulator (recommended by vendor - John Zink). ANVIL

No Flow (Air when needed) 56. Manual valve(s) closed, PCV 303 fails to open or PCV 303 plugged with scale 56.1. Loss of air to the flame front generator resulting in not being able to light a pilot light, thus potential unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment 56.1.1. Redundant pilots on the flare (3) 3 2 3 :Same As 23

Less Less Flow (Propane when needed) 57. Manual valve(s) partially closed or PCV 304 fails partially open :Same As 55.1

Less Flow (Air when needed) 58. Manual valve(s) partially closed or PCV 303 fails partially open 58.1. Same As 56.1

More More Flow (Propane when needed) 59. Manual by-pass valve left open or leaks by, PCV 304 fails open 59.1. Too much propane going to the flame front generator resulting in not being able to light a pilot light, thus potential unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment 59.1.1. Redundant pilots on the flare (3) 3 2 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

More Flow (Air when needed) 60. Manual by-pass valve left open or leaks by, PCV 303 fails open 60.1. Too much air going to the flame front generator resulting in not being able to light a pilot light, thus potential unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment 60.1.1. Redundant pilots on the flare (3) 3 2 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (6) Flare Front Generator Ignition System Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1 Parameter: Pressure Intention: Air 14 psig maximum; Propane 10 psig maximum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY More Higher Pressure (Propane) 61. Failure of PCV 304 or bypass left open or leaks by :Same As 59.1

Higher Pressure (Air) 62. Failure of PCV 303 or bypass left open or leaks by :Same As 60.1

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (7) Flare Stack STK-30801, Flare Fan FAN-30802, associated instrumentation/camera Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 Parameter: Flow Intention: 0 to 350,000 pounds per hour hydrocarbon vapor to flare; 10% to 100% operating range for FAN-30802

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Flow (vent gas header) :Other than purge gas to the flare no flow is normal operations No Flow (Flare Fan FAN-30802) 63. Failure of the fan, loss of power to the fan, or fan not started 63.1. Potential damage to the flare due to the flame burning too low in the flare 63.1.1. Fan motor run status on the DCS 3 3 3 24 Consider adding the FAN to the PM program for the crude unit. JH

No Flow (instrument air to the camera) 64. Loss of air supply, manual valve closed, or PCV fails closed 64.1. Camera lens covered with snow or trash blocking the view of the stack; thus preventing camera from increasing fan speed to prevent flare from smoking :None identified 3 3 3 25 Consult vendor on the instrument air requirement, consequences on loss of air, and safeguards if the air is lost. SD

More More Flow (from PSV's - emergency operation) 65. Partial power failure and loss of multipule middle pump arounds 65.1. Exceed design capacity of the vent system resulting in potential overpressure of the crude tower with loss of containment and possible personnel injury 65.1.1. High pressure alarms PAH 316 A/B/C with 2 out of 3 high is designed to shutdown the plant in the safe mode (HIPS trip is P-311 A/B, P-2012 A/B and crude furnace shutdown and remaining equipment is shutdown through the ESD system). 5 1 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

65.1.2. Crude unit PSV's are balanced bellows65.1.3. Secondary containment More Flow (Flare Fan FAN-30802) 66. Failure of camera control loop,VFD in bypass (motor goes to 100%), or in manual mode set too high 66.1. The flare flame can be overaerated which results in high frequency modulation of the combustion and causes noise and vibration 66.1.1. Operations to adjust fan rate to minimize noise and vibration :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (8) Liquid Knockout from P-30513 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of operation) Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 Parameter: Flow Intention: 0 to 70 gpm GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Flow 67. Manual suction valve close 67.1. Fill V-30202 and overflow liquid to the flare 67.1.1. High high level alarm HHLL 308 A set @ 3'6" will sound on DCS 4 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

67.2. Possible pump damage with loss of containment and potential personnel exposure 67.2.1. Manual valve is Car Sealed Open (CSO) 2 2 2 :Same As 11

67.2.2. Secondary containment 68. Pump failure, loss of power, or pump left in manual mode 68.1. Fill V-30202 and overflow liquid to the flare 68.1.1. High high level alarm HHLL 308 A set @ 3'6" will sound on DCS 4 1 2 26 Consider having a sign at the pump switch stating that P-30202 be left in the auto run mode. MS

69. Manual discharge valve(s) closed 69.1. Fill V-30202 and overflow liquid to the flare 69.1.1. High high level alarm HHLL 308 A set @ 3'6" will sound on DCS 4 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

69.2. Possible pump damage with loss of containment and potential personnel exposure 69.2.1. Manual valve is Car Sealed Open (CSO) 2 2 2 :Same As10

69.2.2. Secondary containment Less Less Flow 70. Manual suction valve partially close or strainer plugging :Same As 67.1

71. Manual discharge valve(s) :Same As 69.1partially closed Reverse Reverse Flow 72. check valve fails 72.1. Contents of T1106 flow back into V1105 with potential of overflowing to flare if pump P-1117 fails 72.1.1. High level switch HLL 308 A starts P-30513 4 2 3 :Same As 11

72.1.2. High high level alarm HHLL 30202 set @ 3'6" will sound on DCS

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (8) Liquid Knockout from P-30513 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of operation) Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 Parameter: Temperature Intention: 35 degrees F minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Less Lower Temperature 73. Manual valve on hot glycol system closed/partially closed or hot glycol system down 73.1. Water freezes in line resulting in noflow, filling up V30202 with potential overflow liquid to the flare 73.1.1. Glycol heat tracing system PM and pre-winterization check 4 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

73.1.2. High high level alarm HHLL 308 A set @ 3'6" will sound on DCS :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (8) Liquid Knockout from P-30513 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of operation) Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 Parameter: Pressure Intention: 30 to 40 psi

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Less Lower Pressure 74. Pump running too far out on pump curve 74.1. Not being able to pump contents out of V-1105 resulting in V-1105 overflowing to the flare 74.1.1. High high level alarm HHLL 308 A set @ 3'6" will sound on DCS 4 3 4 27 Consider doing a hydraulic test on the pump P-30513 to determine what size orifice plate to install in the line to maintain the proper back pressure for the pump to stay within optimum pump curve. RM/ANVIL

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (9) Global Nodes Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1 Parameter: Flow Intention: To address general flow issues

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY 323Other Than Misdirected Flow 75. Drain/bleed valves left open or leaks by 75.1. Material lost to the environment 75.1.1. Drain/bleed valves on lines capped/plugged when not in use :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 75.1.2. Secondary containment

Table of contents Session: (1) 8/10/2009 Revision: Node: (9) Global Nodes Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1 Parameter: Services / Utilities Intention: Maintain Service

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Services / Utilities (electrical) 76. Loss of electrical supplier 76.1. Loss of ability to pump liquid from V-1105 and V-30202 during emergency venting resulting in overflow of liquid to the flare 76.1.1. Pumps P1117 and P-30513 are on the emergency generation system 5 1 3 :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

76.2. Loss of additional combustion air to flare stack (FAN 30802) resulting in air emissions 76.2.1. FAN 30802 is on the emergency generation system 3 1 2 :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 76.3. Loss of ability to use auto igniter or flame front generator resulting in not being able to light a pilot light, thus potential unburned hydrocarbons going to the environment 76.3.1. Auto igniter and flame front generator are on the emergency generation system 3 1 2 28 Verify the auto igniter and flame front generator are on the emergency generation system RM

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (9) Global Nodes Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1 Parameter: Purging / Inerting Intention: To prevent air ingress into the system

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY No No Purging / Inerting 77. Failure to oxygen free vent collection & flare system prior to lighting pilots 77.1. Potential for ignition of explosive mixture in vent collection/flare resulting in equipment damage and injury to personnel. 77.1.1. Hand held oxygen meter to test for zero O2 in system 4 2 3 29 Consider modifying Crude Unit Purge Prior to Startup Procedure CU-SUP-010 to include lighting flare pilots after N2 purge of system. MS

77.1.2. Manual back-up nitrogen purge to V-1105 30 Consider removing flow meter from nitrogen purge line to V-1105 and ensuring adequate line size connection for high volume back-up N2 purge. RM

31 Consider including an initialpurging step of noncombustible gas in flare startup procedure. SDTable of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (9) Global Nodes Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1 Parameter: Safety Intention: To keep personnel safe

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Less Less Safety 78. Crude unit shutdown for maintenance and using propane for purge gas to the flare 78.1. Potential for backflow of propane into the crude unit fuel system and crude tower 78.1.1. Check valve in the line 32 Consider closing fuel gas purge supply valve to the crude unit shutdown procedure CU-NSP-010 MS

79. Crude unit shutdown for maintenance and no back-up propane purge gas flowing. 79.1. Potential to draw oxygen into crude unit creating a potential explossive atmosphere. 79.1.1. Check valve in the line 5 1 3 :same as 32

79.1.2. Valves are chain locked open (CLO)

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (9) Global Nodes Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1 Parameter: Human Factors Intention: To address human factors issues

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Part Of Part Of Human Factors : HUMAN FACTORS CHECKLIST ITEM : PHA TEAM'S RESPONSE : JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TEAM'S RESPONSE 80. Working area cleanliness 80.1. Team identified no issues to record 80.1.1. Operations, maintenance and contractors are required to clean-up job site after each task. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

80.1.2. Individual and supervisor enforcement on a daily basis 80.1.3. Monthly housing keeping inspection checks 81. Signage posted, clearly visible, and easily understood in the area (e.g., emergency exit, response signs) 81.1. Personnel exposure to radiant heat if close to the flare stack :None identified 33 Consider placing signage around the radiant zone to alert personnel to the radiant heat dangers if flaring was to ocurr. MS

82. General environment :Same As 81.1conducive to efficient performance (e.g., noise level, ambient temperature, visibility) 83. Lighting conditions for the unit. 83.1. Adequate 83.1.1. Semi-annual facility self inspection checklist 29 CFR 1903 :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 84. Supplies of protective gear readily available for routine and emergency use. 84.1. Team identified no issues to record 84.1.1. PPE (bunker gear inspected every three months) 34 Consider including the use of radiant heat gear in plant maintenance procedures when preforming work inside the radiant heat zone. JH

85. Communications equipment adequacy and accessibility. 85.1. Team identified no issues to record 85.1.1. Two PSVR frequencies,repeater & talkaround and a third VPT talk farm frequency :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

85.1.2. Repeater equipped w/ battery back-up 85.1.3. Base station on battery back-up 85.1.4. Adequate availability of portable radios maintained by a battery conditioning system 85.1.5. Motorola - ProComm maintains radio system 86. Availability and use of right tools for work. 86.1. Team identified no issues to record 86.1.1. Individual crew tool cribs & main maintenance tool crib :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 87. Labeling of important equipment (vessels, pipes, valves, instruments, controls, etc.) 87.1. Team identified no issues to record 87.1.1. PSSR; adequacy of labeling checked as part of pre-startup safety review. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

88. Accuracy of existing labels 88.1. Needs updated to reflect changes, rebuild of fire reconstruction project 88.1.1. PSSR :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 88.1.2. On-going task 89. Adequacy of feed back and displays on the DCS 89.1. Adequate 89.1.1. PSSR; Testing and functional check-out of DCS will be conducted prior to commissioning rebuilt unit. 35 Consider completing documentation package of DCS changes and attaching to MOC. JS SD 36 Verify training is conducted and PSSR completed prior to commissioning unit. JS SD 90. Arrangement of controls and 90.1. Adequate 90.1.1. Development of 37 Verify final DCS configuration protocol is JSdisplays being logical to match operators expectations. DCS configuration and graphic follows written petro star protocol complete prior to commissioning unit. SD

91. Visibility of control displays from all relevant work positions 91.1. Team identified no issues to record 91.1.1. Process controls are set up with redundant CPU work station arrange so board operator can utilize both CPU work stations for monitoring or changing process parameters. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

92. Consistency of separate control displays 92.1. Team identified no issues to record 92.1.1. Development of DCS configuration and graphic follows written petro star protocol :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

92.1.2. Work station (s) are configure similar and redundant 93. Grouping of related controls and displays 93.1. Team identified no issues to record 93.1.1. Development of DCS configuration and graphic follows written petro star protocol :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

93.1.2. Process controls grouped by unit modules specific to a control scheme and displayed on same graphic 94. Sufficiency of information to diagnose an upset notified by Control System 94.1. Team identified no issues to record 94.1.1. PSSR :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 94.1.2. Development of DCS configuration and graphic follows written petro star protocol 94.1.3. Control schemes have the operating parameters needed for a board operator to diagnose an upset in the process. 95. Control alarms separated from critical safety alarms. 95.1. Team identified no issues to record 95.1.1. PSSR :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 95.1.2. Alarm Management Program 95.1.3. Development of DCS configuration and graphic follows written petro star protocol95.1.4. Process control alarms are configured different from critical alarms. 95.1.5. Critical alarms appear in a red banner with separate and unique sound and can not be suppressed. 96. Prioritization of alarms. 96.1. Currently Petro Star does not utilize the alarm prioritization functionality within delta-v 96.1.1. Alarm management 38 Consider incorporating alarm prioritization within the delta-v alarm management program JS SD
97. Speed of feedback from instruments for operational action. 97.1. Team identified no issues to record 97.1.1. Confirmed by operations personnel :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

98. Controls distinguishability and ease of use. 98.1. Team identified no issues to record 98.1.1. Controls are well labeled, accessible and easy to use. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.
98.1.2. Process controls development follow written petro star protocol 99. Controls conformance to strong populational stereotypes (color, direction of movement, etc.) 99.1. Team identified no issues to record 99.1.1. Development of DCS configuration and graphic follows written petro star protocol :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

100. Adequacy of control logic 100.1. Team identified no issues to record 100.1.1. MOC process required to implement or change control logic. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

100.1.2. Logic is tested using delta-v simulate prior to implementation. 100.1.3. PSSR, logic is reviewed for adequacy and functionality prior to commissioning. 101. Control/alarm setpoints and control actions clearly specified 101.1. Team identified no issues to record 101.1.1. Delta-V is an advanced process control system :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

101.1.2. Development of DCS configuration and graphic follows written petro star protocol101.1.3. Alarm management Program 101.1.4. Procedures clearly identified for all modes of operation 102. Personnel mobility considerations with respect to protective gear required for certain tasks, including emergency response. 102.1. Team identified no issues to record 102.1.1. Operation, maintenance & emergency response activities considered when conducting model review of process :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

103. Adequate personnel availability to respond to expected emergencies as stated in Emergency Response Plan. 103.1. Team identified no issues to record 103.1.1. Minimum operations crew level consists of a board lead operator and two outside operators. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

103.1.2. Plant ESD available to shutdown the unit. 103.1.3. Plant evacuation alarm simple to activate 103.1.4. Fire pump can be remote started 104. Personnel making changes to equipment to better suit their needs. 104.1. Team identified no issues to record - No allowed 104.1.1. MOC required for changes to equipment within the covered process. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

105. Accessibility to valves (chain operators, ladders, platforms, etc.) 105.1. Team identified no issues to record 105.1.1. Validated during the model review process :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

106. Adequacy of signs and protections against hot surfaces 106.1. Adequate 106.1.1. PSSR, all P&ID's are marked as to insulation requirements. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

Table of contents Session: (2) 8/11/2009 Revision: Node: (9) Global Nodes Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1 Parameter: Facility Siting Intention: To address potential siting hazards.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY Part Of Part of Facility Siting : FACILITY SITING : PHA TEAM'S RESPONSE : JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TEAM'S RESPONSECHECKLIST ITEM 107. Security at facility 107.1. Team identified no issues to record 107.1.1. Fenced facility :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 107.1.2. Gates require access code or remote openers 107.1.3. Gate security 107.1.4. CCTV System 108. Location of critical systems (PLC, DCS) 108.1. Team identified no issues to record 108.1.1. Location of DCS and PLC centrally located in the MCC :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 109. Prevailing wind direction 109.1. Summer: west to east Winter: east to west 109.1.1. Prevailing winds considered in placement of process in relation to flare :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

109.1.2. Wind sock located on T-1116 110. Site topography 110.1. Team identified no issues to record 110.1.1. Site drainage is toward the south, southeast :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 110.1.2. Drainage is away from process skids 111. Offsite traffic flow patterns and clearances 111.1. Adequate 111.1.1. Both access points to facility are DOT approved :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 112. On-site traffic flow patterns and clearances 112.1. Team identified no issues to record 112.1.1. Approach ways adequate to keep arriving traffic free of roadway when clearing control point(s) :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

113. Security and reliability of critical feeds and utilities 113.1. Team identified no issues to record 113.1.1. Pipelines are buried, metering building in secure fenced area :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 113.1.2. Utility powerin buried from substation into facility. Transformer yard is fenced 113.1.3. Firewater redundancy of equal capacity 113.1.4. Private firewater supply can be re-supplied using firewell 113.1.5. Private firewater mains are buried and designed with segment isolation valves113.1.6. Private Potable water system adequate for users, spared pump kept in warehouse 114. Evacuation routes, emergency exits, safe rally spots 114.1. Team identified no issues to record 114.1.1. Access roads are well engineered, multiple evacuation/egress routes leading to main staging area. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

114.1.2. Facility orientations clearly spell out evacuation requirements, routes and staging area. 115. Process area electrical classification 115.1. Team identified no issues to record 115.1.1. Electrical classifications current See DWG 00-D-7802W and 00-D7802E :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

116. Equipment accessibility for operation and maintenance 116.1. Team identified no issues to record 116.1.1. Maintenance consideration included during model review process. No additional issues identified. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

117. Protection of piping and vessels from external impact 117.1. Adequate 117.1.1. Ballard and impact guarding located in areas identified as requiring additional impact protection from heavy equipment. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

118. Protection of small lines and fittings from external impact 118.1. Team identified no issues to record 118.1.1. No issues identified, most process located within curbed process areas. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

119. Routing of process piping, critical control cable trays, critical utilities 119.1. Team identified no issues to record 119.1.1. ESD configured to fail safe and routed away from high hazard areas and/or located underground :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

119.1.2. When feasible consideration is made to routing of critical process piping and control. 119.1.3. Critical electrical service is routed away from high hazard areas and/or located underground (i.e. Emergency generator power to MCC, fire pumppower supply, lighting circuits etc.) 119.1.4. Main firewater line is routed away from high hazard areas and/or located underground. 119.1.5. Fire detection circuits are routed away from high hazard areas and/or located underground. 120. Vent, drain, and relief valve discharge locations 120.1. Team identified no issues to record 120.1.1. Relief valves discharge to a safe location :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

121. Incompatible materials segregated in storage, dikes, sumps, drains, waste collection and disposal areas 121.1. Team identified no issues to record 121.1.1. Segregated bottled gas storage area :No additional recommendations identified by Team. 121.1.2. No strong oxidizers or acids currently used in process 121.1.3. Fuels lab has segregated storage for incompatible lab chemical identified in lab hygiene plan. 122. Location of loading and unloading spots for incompatible materials 122.1. Team identified no issues to record 122.1.1. Currently no bulk chemical with significant incompatibility properties are handled within thefacility. See PWSWP-050 "Process Chemicals Deliveries & Handling" procedure. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

123. Storage tank separation distances (to process, between tanks) 123.1. Team identified no issues to record 123.1.1. Tank spacing in accordance with applicable codes and standards. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

124. Spill control, drainage direction, destination, treatment capacity 124.1. Team identified no issues to record 124.1.1. Process areas and skids within secondary containment. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.
124.1.2. Valves and equipment located inside containment skids w/ appropriate impact barriers were needed. 124.1.3. Tank farm within secondary containment in accordance with applicable codes and standards.124.1.4. Site drainage is generally away from skid or tankage. 124.1.5. Facility has a perimeter dike w/ canal valves normally maintained closed for spill control. 124.1.6. Dedicated spill response equipment on-site. 125. Access for fire fighting and other emergency services 125.1. Team identified no issues to record 125.1.1. Fire pumps and foam trailer building located safe distance from process area. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

125.1.2. Fire monitors and fire equipment adequately spaced. 126. Ignition sources (continuous, occasional / intermittent, uncontrolled) 126.1. Adequate 126.1.1. Siting of fired process equipment in accordance with codes and standards. 39 Consider verifying electrical conduits have been sealed in classified areas and developing a method for verifying seals area poured. KK

126.1.2. Process equipment installed in accordance with electrical codes and standards. 40 Consider conducting a facility siting study on all occupied buildings adjacent to process areas. LL

126.1.3. Hot work activities controlled by permit process 127. Location of detectors of leaks/ruptures 127.1. Team identified no issues to record 127.1.1. Leak detection on underground pipelines :No additional recommendations identified by Team.
127.1.2. taddle tales on storage tanks checked monthly during API Tank Farm Inspections. 127.1.3. CCTV used for monitoring process areas 128. Emergency shutdown switch location 128.1. Switch location is adequate 128.1.1. CDU-ESP010 Crude Unit Emergency Shutdown :No additional recommendations identified by Team.
128.1.2. CDU ESD's: control room, and at each exit from control room. 128.1.3. Crude Unit ESD: Control Room and east of crude heater.128.1.4. Truck Loading rack local shutdown: East and west ends of truck rack. 128.1.5. Loading pump remote shutdown(s): Control room 128.1.6. Emergency generator: west side of engine driver, 128.1.7. Plant air compressors: On each unit's control panel. 129. Accessibility of emergency isolation valve 129.1. Team identified no issues to record 129.1.1. EBV's are being installed as part of the CDU ESD system. 41 Verify the installation and location of the emergency shutdown valves for the propane storage vessel. JH

129.1.2. Valves will be automated and can be activated from a ESD button located in safe locations. 130. Passageways, pedestrian traffic patterns versus hazardous locations 130.1. Team identified no issues to record 130.1.1. Facility vehicle traffic road ways well defined and access limitation understood. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

130.1.2. Facility orientation and access control 130.1.3. Posted 10 mph speed limit 130.1.4. Restricted vehicle access to classified areas. 131. SCBA/respirator locations, accessibility 131.1. Adequate 131.1.1. SCBA are located in the control room entryway. SCBA are only used for escape or rescue. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

131.1.2. SCBA's readiness is ensured by monthly inspections. 131.1.3. SCBA's are maintained by authorized servicing center. 131.1.4. Individuals are assigned personal respirators as outlined in the facilities respirator protection program 131.1.5. Medical surveillance, fit tests, monthly individualrespirator inspections and approved respirators & cartridge types are included in respirator protection program. 132. Locations of safety showers or eye wash station 132.1. Adequate 132.1.1. Based on the MSDS requirements our two emergency showers/eyewash are adequate and meet OSHA's requirements (50' or 10 seconds with 15 minutes of flow) for siting of the emergency showers. :No additional recommendations identified by Team.

132.1.2. Safe workpractices: PW-SWP050 "Process Chemical Deliveries and Handling" 132.1.3. Safety showers/eyewash are located in the Fuels Lab & Utility Bldg.

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