Docket No . 103796.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OF

THE STATE OF

ILLINO IS, Appel

lant, v. RAYMOND HARR

IS, Appel lee.
Opinion filed March 20, 2008.

JUSTICE GARMAN delive re d th e j ud gm en t of th e c our t, w ith op inion. Chi ef Justice Thomas and Jus tices F

reema n, Fi tzgerald, Ki

lb ride, Karmeier , a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINION

De f en da nt, Ray mond E. Harri s, was a passe nger i n a car that was stopped by

a poli ce off ic er after the driv er made an illegal lef t turn. In t he course

of th e traf f i c stop, the

off i cer a sked def

en da nt fo rhis i de nti f i ca ti on and he co mplied wit h t he r equ est . T he off ic er conducted
a com puter s earch th at rev eal

ed an outstand ing w arra nt and pla

ced defend ant unde r a rr est . T he se ar ch incident t o a rr est re vealed co caine and dr ugpa ra ph er n al i a i n th e p ock

et of de f en da nt’s j acket. Defe ndan t’s motion to suppress evi dence was

deni ed. Af ter a j ury tri al

in t he cir cu it co ur t o f Will County, def

endan t was convi cted of unl

awful possessi on of a controll

edsubstanc e. 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1996). The app ella t e c o ur t r ev er se d o n t he ba sis that defen

dant’s com

pli ance wi th the o ff

ic e r’ s req

ue st f or-2- ide nt ific at io n

was not volun

tary; theref

ore, any ev

ide nce di scovered
as a resul t shoul d hav e b een

supp ress ed. People

v. Harr is , 32 5 I ll. App. 3d 26 2, 266 ( 2001)

. T his co ur t allowe d t he St at e’s p et itio n for leave t o a ppe al and aff irm edthe a ppel l ate court’ s j udgm

en t, a lt hou gh o n different gro unds. People v. Harri

s ( Harris I

), 207 Ill . 2d 515 (2003). On t he
sa me day, t his co ur t fil

ed it s o pinion in People v. Caballes ( Caballes I ), 207 Il l . 2d 504 (2003 ). The Uni ted St ates Supreme Court granted t he St at e’s p et itio ns f or certiorari in bot h Harri

s and Caballes . I n Caballes , the Court fi led an opi ni on and v acated this c ourt’ s j udgm en t, re man di ng the matter f or further procee di ngs
. Illinois

v. Caballes , 543 U.S . 405 , 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2 005 ). In Harri s , the Court sum

ma ril y vacated t his cou rt ’s jud gme nt an d r ema nd ed fo rr ec o nsid er at io n inl i gh t of its de ci si on in Caballes

. Illinois v. Harris , 543 U.S. 1135, 161 L. Ed. 2d 94, 125 S. Ct. 1292

(2005 ). T his co ur t subs equ ent ly f iled a se co nd o pinion in People v. Caballes( CaballesII

), 221 Ill . 2d 282 (2 006 ). We t hen r emande d t he pr ese nt case to t he appel la te court for reconsi

der at ion in l

i gh t of Illino is v. Caball es an d t his c o ur t ’s o pin io n inCaba lles II

. On re man d, t h e a pp el l ate courtstood

by its e arl i er j udgm en t. No. 3–00 –0190 ( unpu blished o rd er unde r S upr eme Co ur t Rule 2 3) . We have aga in allowed t he Stat e’s peti tion f or leave to appeal under Rul

es 315 a nd 6 04(a)( 2) (210

Il l . 2d Rs . 315, 60

4(a)(2 )).

BACK GROUND On the af tern oon of Se pt emb er 27 , 19 97 , a W ill Cou nty sherif

f’s de pu ty obs er ved a 199 1 bl ackFi rebi rd make a

n i ll egal le ft turn. He stopped the car and asked the driv erf or h i s l i cens e a nd proof of insurance. T he dr ive rst at ed t ha t he did not have his li cense wit h him, butga v e th e of f i ce r a n am e a n d d ate of birt h. The off

ic er transmi

tt ed t he inf orm ati on to co un t y dis pa t ch , wh ich de t er mined t ha t t he na me and bir t hd at e d id n o t co r r es po nd t o a v alid li cense. W hen confronted wi th t his informat ion, th e d

ri v er ad m itted h i s tr ue i denti ty an d t ha t his li cense w as ei

ther suspended or revoked. At th e h ea ri n g on de f en da nt’s m otion to quashar re st and suppress evi dence, the off

ic er testifi

ed that when h

e asked defendan t f

or-3- ident ifi cat ion, it w as in ke eping with h is usual pr act ice whe n ar re st ing t he dr iver o f a ve hicle . I f a passenger in

the vehi cle produces a va lid driver’s license, he allow s t he pa sseng er t o d rive t he vehi cl e awa y, thus avo iding t he exp ense and inco nveni enc e o f ha ving t he ve hic le to wed. He

f ur th er tes tif i ed th at when

he a sked t o see defendant’s ident ifi cat ion, he did not sus pe ct h im of an y wron gd oi

n g. He d i d n ot, how ev er, as k d efe nda nt if he ha d a valid dr iver ’s lic ens e o r if h e wantedto tak

e respon si b il ity for dr iving

the car away

from the scene

. Defend ant co mplied wit h t he of f i ce r’ s r eq ue st, h an di n g h im a s tate i de nti f i ca ti on c ard. T he o ffi

cer re t ur ned t o his s qua d ca r a nd conduct ed a c om

put er ized s ear ch o f bot h t he dr iver’s and t he defendant’s informat ion. As a r es ult o f t his search, h e di scovered an
ou t st anding ar

re st w ar ra nt f or d ef en da nt f or f ai l ure to a pp ea r i n cou rt. The off ic er plac ed defe

ndan t under arrest. A searc h inc i dent to arrest reveal

ed a pea-si

zed rock of cocain

e i n de fe ndan

t’s ja cket pocket, a l on g w ith a copper scrubbi

ng pad ty pic al ly used as a devi

ce f orheati ng an d sm oking c ocain

e. A search

of the car reveal

edanother pea-sizedrock

of cocaine. The driver was al so placed under arrest and the car was i

mpounded. At t rial, t he o ffi

cer aga in tes t ifi

ed t hat he req

ue ste d i de nti f i ca ti on f rom t he defend ant t o d et er mine whet her he wa s lega lly able t o d rive t he car s o t ha t it wo uld no t ha ve t o be t o we d a wa y. H e a ls o acknowl edgedth at h

i s w ri tten repor t s t at ed t ha t t he ca rwa s le ga lly parked. Neverthel

ess, he testifi

ed that in the absen

ce of a pa sseng er elig ible to driv

e the veh ic le , he wo uld have ar ra nged for t he ca r t o be t ow ed a nd do ne an invent or y sear ch, which wo uld have re vealed t he
co caine in t he b ac ks ea t . T he o ff i ce r f ur th er st at ed t hat he as ked t he defend ant f

or i de nt ific ation after t he driv er admi tt ed that hi s li

cense was su sp en de d o rr ev o ke d, bu t be fo r e h e v er ified t his fact . T hus, t he
sec ond tim

e he re tur n edto hi

s s qua d c ar, it wa s f

or the p urp ose

of
run ni ng c he ckson b oth occup an

ts of th e ca r. The jur y fo und def

end ant gu ilty o f unla wfu l po ss es sio n o f a contro ll edsubs t ance . D efend an t fil ed a po st t rial mot ion in which he arguedthat th e ev i den ce

wa s n ot s uf f ici en t to pr ov e h im gu il ty beyond
a reas onab le doubt. The p osttria

l m otion did not, howev er, r ea ss er t his earli erar gument t hat t he evi dencefou nd in his po cke t sho uld have been su pp r es se d. T he t r ial c o ur t de nie d t he po st t r ial mo ti on and-4- sentenced de fe nd an t t o 28 da ys in jail , wit h c r ed it fo rt he 28 da ys pr ev io us ly

serv ed, a ter m of 24 months’ pro bation, and various fi nes. The Stat e arguedo n app eal t hat defend ant for feite d t he sup pr essio n issue be cau se he failed t o r aise it in his pos t t rial mot ion. The appell ate court

acknowl edged def endan t’s forfe iture of the i ssue, butstated t hat

it deem ed the i ssue

“suf fi ciently signi fi cant to merit our revi ew, des pi te def endan t’s f ai l ure to properl

y pres erv e i

t bel ow.” Harri s , 325 Il l . App. 3d a

t 265. On the m eri ts, the a ppel l ate court fou nd th at def

en da nt’s m otion to suppress should have been granted. Harri s , 325 Ill . App. 3d at 267. T his court gr an

ted the State ’s pe titi on fo rlea ve t o ap pe al. As t he app ellant bef

ore t hi s court, however, the State did n ot arg ue that is sues related to the suppress io n mot ion had been fo rfeit ed by de fendan t. This co ur t add re ssed t he issue s o n t he merit s, w ith no dis cussi on of f orfei ture. As noted a

bov e, th i s c ourt’ s op ini

on in Harri s I wa s s ub se qu en t ly vacated by the Un ited St ates Sup

rem e C ourt. On r

em an d f or rec onsi derati

on, the ap pe ll ate court con

cl uded th at th

e j udgm en ts of t he Su pr eme Co ur t in Caballesand t his co ur t in Caba lles II have no bear ing on t he pr ese nt ca se . No. 3–00–0190 ( Harr is II ) (unpubl ished order un der Su prem e Court Rule 23).

ISSUES The par t ies disag re e as t o t he is sue or issues pr o pe r ly befo r e t his
cou rt. The State, as appell

ant, argue s that defenda

nt has f orfei ted revi ew of al l issues re l ate d to th

e tr i al cou rt’ s r ul in g on h i s m otion to suppress by fa iling t o r ais e s uc h is sues in his pos t t rial mot ion. Forf ei ture aside , t he St at e a r gu es t ha t t he so le q ue st io n fo rt his court is wh eth er, in th e a bs en ce of r ea son able s us pi

ci on , the f our th amendment p ermits a poli ce off ic er to conduct a warrant check
re gar ding a pa sseng er dur ing a lawful t ra ffi c st op . I n Harris I , a maj ori ty of th i s court held t hat suc h a wa rr ant chec k wa s o ut side t he scope of the traff

ic stop and, theref

ore, un reas onab le. Harri s I , 20 7 I ll. 2d at 530. The di ssen

ting j ustices

would ha ve f ound the warrant check permissi bl e. Harri s I , 207 Ill . 2d at 537-38 ( Fi tzgerald, J., dis senti

ng, joined by T homas and G ar man, JJ. ). As t he judg ment in Harri s I has-5- been va ca t ed an d t he ca us e r ema nd ed fo rr ec o nsid er at io n, t his qu es ti on re mai n s un an sw ered

b y thi s c our t. Defend ant argue s tha

t the pro per iss ue fo ro ur co nsid er at io n is whether t he o ffice r ’s r eq ue st fo ride nt ifica t io n vio lat ed his f our th
ame nd men t r igh t s be ca us e h is compl ia nce was no t vo lun t ar y. T his is t he issue a ddr esse d bythe a ppel l ate court in it s p ub lishe d o pin io n in Harri s I , 325 Il

l. App . 3 d at 267 , a nd it s o rd er in Harr is II , No. 3–00– 0190 (unp

ubl i sh ed order und er Suprem

e Court Rule 23). We f i rs t addres s th

e f orf ei ture q ue sti on an d c on cl ud e th at it is
ne ces sary to reach the m

er it s of b oth i ssue s. Logi c w oul

d s eem to di cta te t hat t he issue s be dec ided in chr ono log ical or der , d et er mini ng whether the p oli

ce of f i cer’ s req

ues t for ide ntif

ic ation vi

olated defendant’s fou rt h amendment right s befo re co nsider ing whet her t he warrant check was proper. Neverthel ess, we treat t he wa rr ant check is suefi rst because the State, as appell ant, argues only

this is sue. On ly if t he St at e’s p os itio n re gar ding the w arr an t ch ec k is co r r ec t is it
ne ces sary to revi si t t he other

iss ue , be ca us e t he wa r r an t ch ec k w o uld not have be en po ssible if the o ffi cer had no t first obt ained t he defendant’s ident ifi

cat ion infor matio n. See Harris I , 20 7 I ll. 2d at 537 (Fi tzgerald, J., dissent ing, jo ined byTho mas and Gar man, JJ .) (no t ing that “w he r e t he id en t it y of the p assen ger is unknown , the offi

cer ca nn ot run a check for outst andi ng warrants un

le ss the pass enger ass en ts to the of

f i cer’ s req ues t for i den tif i cation”).

FORFEITURE To preserve an

is suefor app eal, bot h a t imely objec t ion at t rial and
a wr itten pos ttrial m otion ra i si n g th e i ssue are

requi red. People v. Enoch , 122 Ill . 2d 1 76, 186 ( 19 88 )

. T his lo ng
- st an din g r ule is
co nsist ent wi

th s ec ti on 1 16– 1 of

the Code of Cri m ina l Proc ed ure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116–1 (W es t 200 6)) (m

oti on for a new t rial), and
s erves th e p ur

pos e of al l owi n g th e tr i al cou rt “ ‘th e oppor tun ity to gr ant a new

trial , if warranted.’ ” Enoch , 122 Ill. 2d at 186 , q uo t ing People v. Caba llero , 102 Il l . 2d 23, 3 1-32 (1 984). Thus, bef ore r eachi ng the meri

ts o f ei ther issue, we must address t he Stat e’s cl

ai m that b ec au se de f en da nt f ai led to raise the su ppr es si on is suein h

i s posttrial

m otion , h e for feite d co nsider at ion o f the-6- un de r lyin g is sue s–t he r equ est for ident ifi cat ion and t he wa rr ant ch ec k– o n a pp ea l. The pr esent ca se prese

nts a n un usua l set of ci rcum stan ces . In Harris I , t he Stat e, as the appel la nt bef ore t hi s court, fai

led to argue that the a

ppel l ate court er red by not givi

ng effect to defendant’s forfe iture, thus f

orfei ting the f

orfei ture argument. See People v. Williams , 193 Il

l . 2d 306 , 347 (2 000) (n

otin g tha t the f orfe iture r ule is appl ic a bl

e to t he State as well

as to a defendan

t in a c rim in al procee di ng)

. Instead, the St ate pr evai led on the meri

ts o f the request f oride ntif ic ation i ssue, but unsuc cessf ull y a rgued th e merit s o f the warrant-check

is sue. The State t hen

obta ined a wri t of certio rari and
was prepared to argue the me rits of the w a rr ant -c heck issue t o t he Uni ted States Su

prem e Court. Th

e Supr em e Court v ac ate d t his
cou rt ’s judg ment in Harr

is I and rem

an de d f orre co nsider at ion in light of its dec i si on in Caballes

. T he ap pe llat e c o ur t did no t en ga ge in such
re co nsider at ion. W e c on cl

ud e th at i t falls to us t o follow t he Supr eme Cour t’s dire ct ive t o r ec o nsid er t his ca se in light o f Caballes , not wit hst anding earli erf orf ei ture s b y both pa rties . We, th

ere f ore, ad dre ssthe

i ss ue s on the merits.

STAN DA RD OF REVIEW Wh en r ev iew in g a

tr ial cour t’s rulin

g on a motion to suppress evi dence, we appl

y the two- part standard o f

re view ad op t ed by t he Su pr eme Co ur t in Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 91 1, 920, 1 16 S. C t. 1657, 16 63 (19 96). Under t his standard, a t r ial c o ur t ’s fin din gs o f hi stori ca l f ac t are rev i ew ed f or clear er r o r , giv in g due weight to any in ferences drawn f

rom those f ac ts by the f act f inde r. Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S. Ct . a t 166 3. Thu s, t his co ur t has he ld t hat a r eviewing
c ourt m ay

rej ect the

tria l court’sf indi ngs of f act onl y if they are against the

man if es t we i gh t of the evi den ce. People v. Sorenson , 196 Il l . 2d 425 , 431 (2 001). A revi ewi ng c ourt, howev

er, may a ss es s t he es t ab lishe d fa ct s in rel ati on to the is sues an

d ma y dr aw it s o wn co nclusio ns whe n dec iding what rel i ef , if an y , shoul d be

gran ted. People v. Pitman , 21 1 Ill . 2d 502, 512 (2004). Accordingl y, we rev ie w de novo the t rial court ’s-7- ul timate rul ing a s to whe

ther suppre ssi

on i s wa rran ted. Ornelas , 517 U.S. at 699 , 13 4 L. Ed. 2d at 920 , 11 6 S. Ct . at 166 3; Pitman , 21 1 I ll. 2d at 512 ; Sorenson , 196 Ill . 2d at 431.

AN AL YSIS Thi s court has previously

observed that a passen

geris sei ze d f

or fou rt h amendment pur po ses w hen t he ve hic le in w hic h he is r idin g is subj ected to a traff

i c stop. People v. Bunch , 207 Ill . 2d 7, 13 (20 03). The Su pr eme Cour t hasmade s im il ar obs erv ati ons. S ee, e.g. , Berkemer v. McCar ty , 468 U.S. 420, 436-37, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 332- 33, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 31 48 ( 198 4) (“ ‘st op ping an a ut omo bile and det aining it s occup an

ts c on sti tute a “seizu re ” ’ ” fo r fo ur t h amendment purpo ses, “ ‘ev

en though the purpose of t he st op is li mited and t he
re sult ing detention qui

te brief ’ ”), quot in

g Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648 , 653, 59L. Ed. 2 d 660, 6 67, 99 S . Ct. 1391 , 1396 ( 1979)

. Su bseq uent t o t his co ur t ’s de cision in Harris I , t he Su pr eme Court decidedt he c as e o f Brendlin v. California , in w h i ch i t d efin it ive ly
an swered t he qu es t io n w he t he ra p as se ng er o f a s t o pp ed ve hic le is seizedf or fourth am endm en t purpose s. Brendlin v. California , 5 51 U.S. ___, __

_, 168 L . Ed. 2d 13 2, 138- 39, 127 S. Ct. 2400 , 2 40 6 (2007) (a ckno wledg ing t hat t he Court hassaid “o ver and o ver in dicta that during a traffi

c sto p an offi

cer se iz es ever

y one i n the v eh i cl e”). Applying t he r ule o f Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S . 429 , 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 11 1 S . C t. 2 38 2 ( 19 91 ), th e Cour t co nclude d in Brendlin that when a veh ic le is subj ect to a traff

ic stop, “a ny reas onab le pas sen ger”
woul d u n de

rs tan d “ th e p ol i ce of f i ce rs to b e ex erci si

n g c ontrol

to t he po intthat no one in

the car was f

ree to depart without poli ce perm i ssi on.” Brendlin , 551 U.S. at ___, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 139, 127 S. Ct. at 2406-07. Thus, the Court hel d, not o nl y the driv erbut also any pas sen gersar e se ized fo r fo ur t h amendment pur po ses w hen t he
ve hic le in w

hi ch the y are trav el ing i s s ub j ec ted to at r affic st op . T he Courtno t ed t ha t t his con

cl us i on “ com portswi th th e v i ew s of all nine Federal Court s of A

ppeal s, and n

early every state co urt, t o have rul

ed
on the question.” Brendlin , 551 U.S. at ___, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 140, 127 S. Ct. at 2407- 08, ci

tin g, inter al ia , Bunch , 2 07 I ll. 2d a t 13. The Courtthen rej ected the Stat e’s argum ent that a seized passen

ger may not br ing a fo ur t h a men dme nt ch all en ge to the leg al ity of the stop it se lf. Brendlin , 551 U.S. at ___, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 140, 127 S. Ct. at-8- 2408. Bec ause t h e S tate

con ce de d that th

e p ol i ce h ad n o adeq ua te j us ti f i ca ti on f or the s top of

t he ca rin which Br endlin was riding, and becauseBre

nd l in w assei ze d “f

rom the m om en t [th e] c ar c am

e to a ha lt on th e s i de of the road ,” i t wa s e rror f or th e s tate

cou rt to deny the su ppr es si on m oti on on t he gr ou nd t hat t he seizure did n ot occur un t il the f orma l arres t. Brendlin , 551 U.S. at ___, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 143-44, 127 S. Ct . at 2410. In the present case, the

ini ti al stopwas lawful, because the of fi cer had pr oba ble cau se t o s t op t he ca r t hat he observed m aki ng an il legal left turn. Unli

ke Brendl

in , who was a p ass enger i n a car stopped withoutpr oba ble cau se, defend ant in the p re sent cas e w as law fully seized. T he iss ue s p r es en t ed in t his cas e involve t he re mainder of t he
encoun ter: when a person i s l awful

ly seized, but the poli

ce l ack ind ivid ua liz ed re aso nable su spicio n, may t he o ffi cer re que st t hat t he pers on pr ov i de i dentif i ca ti on an d th en us e th at i n f orm ati on to conduct a warrant check?

The Wa rrant Check The Sta te ar gue s t hat “a

stra i gh tf orwa rd a ppl i ca ti on of Illinois v. Caballes ” dic t at es t ha t t his co ur t must ado pt t he po sitio n held byt he di sse nters in Harris I

–t hat when an o ff

icer knows a passenger ’s id en t it y, ei

ther from prev

ious contactw ith the i

ndi vi dual or after having law fully r eq ue st ed id en ti ficat ion fro m the p asse nger , “a war ra nt chec k, without more, does not somehow chan ge the ‘f undam ental
na ture of the stop.’ ” Harris I , 207 Il l . 2d at 53 7 (Fi

tzgera l d, J., dis senti ng, jo ine d b y T h om

asan d G ar man , JJ. ). Thus , the S tate argues, a w arran

t ch ec k nee d not be

rel ate d to the p urp ose

of the stop orsupported by

rea sonable, a

rticu l able s us pi

ci on of crim in al conduct by the passen

ger. See Harris I , 207 Ill . 2d at 53 9 ( Fi tz geral d, J., di sse nti ng, j oin ed by Thom as a nd Garm an , JJ.). The Stat e c o r r ec t ly no t es t ha t a w ar r an t is a mat t er o f pu blic record and, t her efo re , t he subjec t of t he wa rr ant has no ex pe cta ti on of priv acy in t he info r ma

tion contain

ed therein . See Gist v. Macon County Sheriff’s Department , 284 Il l . App. 3d 36 7, 3 77 (1996) (d ismi ssing plain

tiff ’s defam ation action against

pu blish er s o f “Cr ime Sto ppers” flyer t ha t ac cu r at ely p ub lishe d in fo r mat io n av aila ble in pub l i c rec ords).-9- The St at e t hen su gg es t s a n an alo gy be t we en t he e xist enc e o f a war ra nt and an

in div idual ’s statu s as a

re gist er ed s ex o ffender , c iting t his co ur t ’s de cision in People v. Cornelius , 213 Ill . 2d 1 78 (200 4) ( st at ut o r ily

man da ted re gi strati on a s a se x o ffen de rcr ea t es a p ub lic record; diss em

in ation of that

r ec o r d v iath e I nter

n et does n ot v i ol ate an y cons tituti onal ri ght of the re gi stered

indi vi dual ). Fin ally, t he St at e r elie s o n t he de cis io n o f t he ap pe ll ate c o ur t in People v. Roberson , 367 Il

l . App. 3d 19 3 (200 6), a p ost

- Caballes de ci si on in volv in g a warrant check on a v ehi cle passen

ger durin g a la wful t ra ffi c st op . R obe rso n w a s the dri ve r of a car s topped f

or a t r affic vi olation. The

off ic er asked both Roberson an d hi s passen

ger fo r thei r n am es, whi ch they provided. A

warrant check revealed an out stan di ng arrest warrant for the passenger, whom the off ic er then arrested. When

a se arc h of t he ca r incide nt t o t he ar re st of t he passen gerreveal ed c on tr aband , t he o ffi

cer also ar re st ed R obe rso n. Th e t rial co ur t , r elying on t his co ur t ’s o pinion in Harris I , gr an te d Rober son’s m

oti on t o s upp re ss. The appel

la te court , however, noted that Harr is I ha d s ub se qu en t ly be en v ac ate d by

th e S up re m

e C our t. The appe ll ate

cou rt f ur th er con cl ud ed th at Caballesr eq uir es t he opp osi te resu l t. Roberso n , 36 7 I ll. App. 3d a t 201 . B eca use t he
war ra nt chec k neit her unr eas ona bly pro long ed t he du ra t ion o f the t r affic stop nor inf

rin ged upon the p as se ng er ’s leg it imat e in t er es t in pr iva cy, it di d not vi ola te the f ourth am endm en t. The ev ide

nce dis coveredin

the car was, therefore, adm is si bl e agai nst both the driv

er and the pas sen ger. Roberson , 367 Ill . App. 3d at 201. Defend ant makes no a rg ument on t he issue o f the warrant check. The app el

l ate court, on

rem an d f or re con si

derati on i n l i gh t of Caballes , fou nd no guid ance what so ever in that op inion. I nst ead , t he appe ll ate co ur t d ist ing uis he d t he pr es en t ca se fr o m Caballes on several base s: t his case do es no t involve a d og sniff; defenda nt was t he pas sen ger, not t he dri

ver, of the stopped vehi

cle; an d defen dant rais es no c laims under t he I lli

nois C ons t itu t ion. S ub se qu en t ly, in People

v. A n d re ws , 372 Ill . App. 3d 960, 962-63 (2007 ), th e a

pp el l ate court appl

ied t he a nalyt ica l fra mew o rk o f People
v. Gonzalez , 204 Il

l . 2d 220 (2003 ), to concl

ude that a warrant check of a p as se n ge r w h ose i denti ty wa s k n own to t he off ic er was outside t he sco pe o f the st op . B eca use t he wa rr ant chec k “co uld we ll have len gthen ed the durati on of th e detention

if th e of f i ce r h ad to wa it f or-10- t he resul t s of the ch

eck,” the court held that the warrant check “changed t he fund ament al n at ur e o f t he t r affic st o p, ” c o nve r t ing it

“ into an in qu i ry into defen

dant’s past m

is conduct.” A n d re ws , 37 2 I ll. App. 3d at 9 63. The co urt further concluded that this resu lt w as co nsist ent wi

th t he Su pr eme Co ur t ’s de cis io n in Caballesbeca use t he
case did not i

nv olve a d og sniff and beca use t he de fendant was not t he dri ve r of th e stoppe d ve

hi cl e. A n d re ws , 372 Ill . App. 3d at 963. The dissent ing j us ti ce

n oted th e a b se n ce of ev i den ce to support an al leg ati on tha t the wa rra nt s ea rch prol ong ed the durati on o f t he t r affic stop. A n d re ws , 372 Il

l . App. 3d a

t 965 (Sch

m i dt, J., di sse

nti ng) . In add itio n, t he dis se nt in g jus tice would have found the wa rrant check pe r miss ible und

er Caballes

. A n d re ws , 372 Ill . App. 3d at 964 (Sch m i dt, J., di sse

nti ng)

. The app ellate co ur t is co rr ect t hat t he sp ec ifi c issue in Caballes
was “[w]hether the F ourt h A me ndm ent requires

reasonabl

e, ar t icu lab le suspi

cion to justif

y usin g a drug -detec t io n do g t o sniff a
ve hic le durin

g a legi tim ate tr aff ic stop. ” Caballes , 543 U.S. at 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846, 125 S. Ct. at 837. Th e app el l ate court, howev er, in bot h Harr

is II and A n d re ws , overlooked the obvious anal ogy between a dog sn

if f an d a warrant check. By va ca t ing t his co ur t ’s judg ment in Harr is I and rem

an di ng f or rec onsi derati

on in li ght o f Caballes , the Supreme C ourt directed that
an Ill in ois court conduct t he sam

e type of i nqui ry that i t appli edto dog sniffs to de te rmi

ne wh ether a warrant check perf ormed duri

ng a co nc ed ed ly

la wful traffi c stop co mprom

is es a co n sti

t ut io na lly prot ected in

terest by reveal

in g legiti ma tely priv ate i nf

ormation. See Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837. For t he r eas ons t hat follow , w e r ever se t he ap pellat e co ur t ’s judg ment in the p re sent cas e and ove rr ule it s judg ment in A n d re ws
. Cabal le s was seized when t he ca r he was dri vi ng was s to ppedf

or speedi ng. Defe ndan t was seizedwhen

the car in whi ch h e was riding
was st op ped aft er making an illeg al lef t tur n . B oth stops were based
on probabl e cause. In each

case, the occupants of the vehi cle we re law fully seized. See Brendlin , 551 U.S. at ___, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 139- 40, 127 S. Ct. at 2407. Nevertheless, “a

se i zu re th at is l aw f ul at i ts i n ce pti on ca n v i ol ate t he Fo ur t h Amen dme nt if its manne r o f e xe cu t io n u nr ea so na bly1 Although Cox is st ill “good la w” for th

isli m it e d p ro po siti on , th

isco urt subs equently

overru led Cox

in par t in People v. Bew , No. 1040 84 (Ma rch 20, 2008).
-11- in fri ngesi nter es ts prot ected by

the Constitution.” Caballes , 543 U.S. at 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 84 6, 125 S . Ct. at 837. A sei zure ca n be co me un law ful, fo rex amp le, “if it is pr o lo ng ed be yo nd t he t ime r ea so na bly required”to compl

ete the traf f i c stop. Caballes , 543 U.S. at 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846, 125 S. Ct. at 837, citin g People v. Cox , 202 Ill . 2d 462 ( 20 02 ) ( do g s niff c o nd uc t ed du r ing t r affic stop was impe r miss ible becauseit occurred after an overl y l ong det en

ti on of the d rive r). 1 Thus, the C ourt noted t his co ur t ’s co nclusio n t hat t he du ra t ion o f the t r affic st op in Caballes“was e nt irely just ifi ed by t he t ra ffi

c o ffense and t he or dinar y inquiries incident t o s uch a st op ,” but obs er ved t hat t he sei zure wo uld hav e be co me u nlaw ful “if t he dog s ni ff had b een conducted whi

le [Cabal le s] was bei

ng unl awful ly detain ed.” Caballes , 543 U .S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846-47, 125 S. Ct . at 837. Defend ant has n

ot argued that the com

pu te rized wa

rrant check, conducted at the same ti

me as the off ic er’s ch eck of the sta tus of t he driv er’s l ic ense, un reasonabl y prol onged hi s sei

zure. Af ter add re ssing t he du ra t ion o f the seizu re , t he Co ur t in Caballes then st at ed t hat co nduc t ing a do g sni ff “woul d no t chang e t he character of a tra f f i c s top th at i s l

aw f ul at i ts i nc ep ti on and ot herwise executed in a r ea so na ble man ne r , un les s t he do g s niff it se lf in fri nged [t he seized i

ndi vi dual’s] constitutionall

y protect ed in

terest in pri va cy .” Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837. S imila r ly, unl

ess a warrant check itse l f i nf ri nges upon a s ei zed indi vidual’ s co nst it ut io na lly pr o t ec t ed int er es t in p riv acy , an off

ic er may p er fo r m a

war ra nt chec k du ring a t ra ffi c st op , so long as i

t do es not unreasonabl

y prol ong the duration of the stop. With respec t t o t he seized indi

vidual’ s pr ivacy inter est s, t he Court concl ud ed in Caba lles t hat beca use a do g sniff can r evea l only the posses si on of con tra b an d, i t doe s n ot co m pr om i se an y leg itimate in terest in privac y andi s n

ot a s ea rc h su b j ec t to the f

our th am en dm en t. Caballes , 543 U. S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837. Th e Court compared the dog sni ff , which does not reveal any leg it imat ely pr iva

te informat ion, t o t he us e o f a t her mal-imaging-12- devi ce to de t ec t t he pr es en ce o f mar ijua na pla nt s in a home
. Caballes , 543 U.S. at 409 , 160 L . Ed . 2 d at 847 -4 8, 125 S. Ct . a t 838 , c iting Kyllov. United States , 533 U .S. 27, 15 0 L. E d. 2d 94 , 12 1 S . C t. 2038 (2001 ). In Kyllo , t he Co ur t fou nd t hat t he wa rr ant less us e o f the devi ce con sti tuted an un l aw f ul se arch b ec au se it wa s c ap able of reveal ing lawf ul a ctivi ty i n wh ic h the occupants of the h

ome had a priv acy intere st. Kyllo , 533 U.S. at 38, 150 L. Ed. 2d at 104-05, 121 S. Ct. a t 204 5. I n c ontras t, “[a] dog snif f conducted duri

ng a con ce de dl y l aw f ul traf f i c s top t ha t r ev ea ls no in

form ation other than t he l oca ti on of a sub stance that no in

div idua l h as any right to possess does not violate the Fourt h A me ndm ent.” Caballes , 543 U.S. at 410, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 848, 125 S. Ct. at 838. As noted above, a war ra nt is a mat t er of p ublic re co rd . An ind ivi dua l ha s n o rea sonable e xp ec tati

on of priv acy in the fact t hat

a courthas entered a writt en order c omman din g hi s arrest . 725 I LCS 5/107–1 (Wes t 200 2) . A w ar ra nt ch eck d oes n ot i m pl i ca te leg itimate priv acy int er es t s be ca us e, like a d o g s nif f , it do es no t re veal any leg it imat ely priv ate activi ty or in form ation, or res u lt i

n an y ph ysic al contact with the i

ndi vi dual o rhis pr o pe r t y. See Caballes , 543 U.S. at 409-10, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 848, 125 S. Ct. at 838. We, therefore, conclude t hat t his court ’s t re at ment o f the wa rra ntcheck issue in Harr

is I is in consi stent with the Suprem e C our t’s
an alys is in Caballes

. W e h ol d th at a wa rra nt c heck on th e oc cu pa nts of a l awful ly stoppe d vehi cle do es no t violat e fo ur t h amendment rights, so long as the

duration of the s to p is no t un ne ce ss ar ily pr o lo nged

for the pur pose o f conducting the check and the st op i s “otherwise ex ec ut ed in

a reasonabl

e m ann er” ( Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 16 0 L. Ed . 2d at 84 7, 125 S . Ct. at 837). Applying t his r ule t o t he fa ct s o f t he p re se nt ca se , w e find , fi rst , tha t the sei zure of

defen dant was ini

tia ll y l awf ul ; s econd, the

sei zure was of re as on able d

ur ati on ; an d, t h i rd , the war

ra nt c heck di d not inf ri ng e upon a constitutional

ly prot ected pr ivacy inter est . T hus, t he
war ra nt check did n ot v i ol ate de f en da nt’s ri gh t un de r th e f our th amendment to be f

ree from unreasonab

le search an

d seizure. Theref ore, unless t he offi

cer’s reque st f

or id en tif i cation wa s i

m proper,2 We do not consider whether theofficer’s request for identification should be ana lyzed in the same manner a s a dog sniff or a wa rr ant check bec ause the State has n ot arg ue d th at Cabal les is a pp lica ble t o th is i ss ue. -13- t he evidence disc overed a s a r esu lt o f the war ra nt chec k and
su bse qu en t ar r es t wa s p r o pe r ly ad mit t ed at t r ial. 2

Co nt inue d V it alit y of Gonzalez In Gonzalez , thi s court

con cl uded th at a

traf f i c s top is anal ogous to a Terry in

vestiga t ory

stopan d, th ere f ore, the rea sonablen

es s of poli ce conduct during a traffi c st op may

be j ud ge d by

re f eren ce to Terry ’s “dual

in quiry .” Gonzalez , 20 4 I ll. 2d at 226-28, citin g Terry
v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 88 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (19 68) . T he two prongs of thi s i

nqui ry are: (1) whe

ther the stop was justifi

edat it s inc ep ti on and (2) whether

t he o ffi cer ’s ac t ions dur ing t he co ur se o f the stopwere reasonabl

y rel ated in scope to the ci

rcums tances that init iallyjustif

ied the stop. Gonzalez , 204 Ill . 2d at 228. T hi s court t hen further defined t he scope in

quiry , determi

ni ng that the al

lowable scope of a stop coul

d be ex cee ded e

ither b y im perm iss ib ly pro long ing t he de ten ti on o rby fu nd ame nt ally a lt e rin g the nature of the stop. Gonzalez , 204 Ill . 2d at 235. Gonzal ez was a passe

nger i n a vehi cle that was subj ect to ala wful t r affic st op . T hus, in Gonzalez , this court adopt ed the Terry -based inq uir y n ot onl y wi th re sp ec t to the f

our th am en dm en t ri gh ts o f drivers, but also with respect t o t he righ ts o f passen

gers. The St ate argu es that this cour t’s dec ision in Gonzalez was implic it ly over ruled by the Supr eme Cour t’s dec ision in Caballes

. We must resolve this

question before addressi ng the reque st f

or i de nti f i ca ti on iss ue be ca us e o ur an alys is o f t he is sue in Harr is I was guided by the Gonzalez

fram ework. The Stat e ass er ts th

re e b as esf

or f in di n g that Gonzalez has been overruled. The f

irst two are c lo s el

y rel ate d: f i rs t, i f ap pl i ca ti on of Caballes lea ds t o a r es ult diff er ent on th

e w arran t-ch ec k i ss ue f rom that t hi s co ur t re ache d in Harris I by appl yi ng the Gonzal e z fram ework, t hen Gonzalez

must have b een

implic itly ove rr uled by Caballes ; and s eco nd, Jus t ice Ginsbu rg ’s diss ent in Caballes ack no wle dges t hat t he C o ur t re jec t ed t he a pp licat io n o f Terry-14- prin ci ple s to poli

ce conduct durin

g a traff ic stop. The State’ s fina l
ar gument i s th

at Gonza lez was wrong when it was decided because Terry pr in ci pl esare n ot ap pl i ca b le to a t r affic st o p b as ed o n p r o ba ble
cause. Ca balles es tab l

i sh estwo pr

inci pl esgovern

ing the anal y si s of poli ce con du ct d ur in g a tra f f i c s top. Fi rs t, a se i zu re th at is l aw f ul at i ts inc ep ti on can be co me unlawful “i f it is pr o lo ng ed be yo nd t he t ime
r ea so na bly

re qu i re d” to co m

pl ete the purpose

of th e stop. Caballes , 543 U. S. a

t 40 7, 1 60

L. Ed. 2d at 8 46 , 12 5 S . C t. at 837. Seco nd, so l ong as t he t r affic st o p is “o t he r wis e e xe cu t ed in a r ea so na ble
man ne r,” pol i ce c onduct does “not chan ge the charac ter” of the stop unl ess t he co nduc t itse lf i nf r inges upon t he seized indi vidual’ s “c o nst it ut io na lly

prot ected in

terest in pri

vacy .” Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 16 0 L. Ed . 2d at 84 7, 125 S . Ct. at 837. Wha t we hav

e come to call

the “scope” prong of the Gonzale z inqu i ry co nt ains t wo pa rt s– whe t her t he d ur at io n o f t he stop was impe r miss ibly

prolonged and wh

ether the poli

ce conduct altered

t he fun dam ental nature of the stop. Gonzalez , 20 4 I ll . 2 d at 235 . T he durati on pro ng cl early surviv es Caballes

. Caballes , 543 U.S. at 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846, 125 S. Ct. at 837. The con tinue d v ital ity of th e “ al terati on of

the f undam en tal na ture of t he st op ” pr ong is in ques t ion. Caballesma y b e read as hol

din g that
o nly conduct that inf

rin ges upon a constitutional

ly prot ected priv acy in terest impe r miss ib ly

chan ges the cha

racter o f the s to p. Indeed, Jus tice G insburg , in her dissent , a rg ued t hat t he major ity er re d by
co nsider ing onl

y the d ura ti o n of t he se izur e and aband oning any con si derati on of the m

ann erin wh ic h the stop was conducted. Caballes , 543 U.S. at 421, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 855, 125 S. Ct. at 845. (Gi nsbur g, J., di sse nti ng, j oin ed by Souter, J.). On t he o t her hand, t he Court stated in Caballest hat co nduc t ing
a dog sni ff “would n ot ch an ge t he ch ar ac t er o f a t r affic st o p t ha t is la wful at i ts i nc ep ti on and

otherwise exe cuted i

n a reas onab le m an ne r, unless the do g sni

ff itsel f i nf ringed [the seized i

ndi vi dual’s]
co nst it ut io na lly

prot ected in

terest in pri

vacy .” (Emphasis adde d.) Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 12 5 S. Ct. at 837. Anot her re ad ing o f Caballes mi

ght be that the phrase “and otherwise executed in a reasonabl

e m ann er” ( Caballes , 543 U.S . at 408, 160 L.-15- Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct

. at 83 7) , pr es er ve s s o me r o le for t he se co nd “f undam ental nat ur e o f the stop” prong of the Terry/Gonzalez inq ui r y. We need not res olv

e this que sti on, howev er, by care ful par sing of t he lang ua ge o f Caballes , because Gonzalez is uneq uiv o ca lly overruled by t he Su pr eme Co ur t ’s su bseq uent dec ision in Muehler v. Mena , 544 U .S. 93, 16 1 L. Ed . 2d 299 , 125 S. Ct. 1464 (2005). Muehler in volv edt he deten

ti on an d q ue sti onin g of th e oc cu pa nts of a house at whi

ch the poli ce executed a sea

rch warrant. The poli

ce had re aso n t o be lieve

t hat a ga ng member who ha d b ee n inv o lve d in
a dr ive-by shooting was res idi ng i n the house. The warrant authorized
a search of the premises f

or deadly weapons an

d evide nc e o f gang
me mb ershi p. An Immigrat ion and Naturali zation Servi

ce (INS) o ff

ic er accompan ied t he po lice officer s. T he occu pan ts of th e house w ere hand cuff edand detai

ned wh il e the warrant was bei

ng execu ted , pur su an t to Michigan v. Summers , 452 U.S. 692, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S. Ct . 2 587 (1 981 ) ( officer s exe cut ing a se ar ch warr an t f or co nt ra band may

detai n th e oc cu pa nts of t he premises wh

il e the search is bei ng conducted). Durin

g this period of detention, the INS offi cer asked Iris Me na fo r he r na me, d at e o f birth, place of birt h, a nd im m i gra ti on sta tus . He al so a sk

ed f ordoc ume

ntation of h

er im m i gra ti on st at us. Mena ’s pa per s co nf ir med that she was a perm anen t resi den t of thi s coun try. Muehler , 544 U.S. at 9 6, 16 1 L. Ed. 2d at 305, 125 S. Ct. at 1468. Mena subsequently

fi led a section 1983 la

wsui t (42 U.S. C. §1983) agai nst the off

ic ers, all egi ng vi olations of her ri ghts under

t he f our th amendment based on (1) the use of handcuffs and (2) t he INS o ff icer’s qu est ioning he

r about her i

m m i gra ti on status

in th e a bs en ce of
r ea so na ble su sp i ci

on of wron gdoi ng on he r part. The j ury awa

rded actual and pun iti ve dam ages and the Co urt of

A ppe al s a f f i rm ed on b oth coun ts. Mena v. City of Simi Valley , 33 2 F. 3d 1255 ( 9th C i r. 2003)

. The Un ited States S upre me Co urt reversed. Fo r ou r purpo ses, o nly the Co urt ’s r es o lut io n o f t he se co nd cla im i s rel ev an t. The C ourt
n oted its repeated prior holdi

ng that “ ‘m ere poli ce questioni

ng does not constitute a seizure.’ ” Muehler , 544 U.S. at 100, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 308, 125 S. Ct . a t 147 1, quo t ing Bostick , 501 U.S . at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 2386. Court quot ed Bostick f urthe r, sta tin g that:-16- “‘[ E]ven wh en of fi cer s hav e no basis f

or suspecting a particularin

div idua l, they ma y ge neral ly ask questi ons of that ind ivid ua l; as k to examine t he individual’s ide nt ifi cat ion; and request consent to searchhis or her luggage.’ ” Muehler , 544 U .S. at 1 00, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 308-09, 125 S. Ct . at 1471 , quo t ing Bostick , 501 U .S. at 434-3 5, 1 15 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 2386. Applying t his rule to Mena, the Court co ncl uded that because h

er de ten ti on was not prolonged by

the questioni

ng, “there was n o a dd itional sei zure withi

n th e m ean ing of the F ourth A m endm en t.” Th us , th e of f i ce r “ di d not need

rea sonable s us pi

ci on to a sk Mena f or her nam e, date a nd place of birth, or im mi gration status.” Muehler , 544 U.S. at 101, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 309, 125 S. Ct. at 1471. The Court then ref

erred to its recent d

ec i si on in Caballes , noting, f i rs t, its h oldi ng i n that case that

a d og s ni f f i s n ot a s ea rc h su b j ec t to t he fourth am

endm ent and, second, its re

j ec ti on of th e n otion th at a dog sn if f , wh i ch need not be j ustif ied by reasonabl

e suspi ci on, causes a “sh if t in pur pose” that converts a lawf ul traf fi c stop into a drug invest igat ion. Muehler , 544 U.S. at 101, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 309, 125 S. Ct. at 1471, citi

ng Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837. Appl yi ng these pri

nci ple s to Mena, the Court concl uded that her de ten ti on was lawf ul at the time

the im mi gration off

ic er questioned her re gar ding her imm

igra t ion st at us ( t her e having be en no findingthat t he duration was un

duly prolonged), and t hat “n o addi ti on al Fo ur th Amendment j usti

f i cation” f or the i nqu i ry wasrequi

red. Muehler , 544 U.S. at 101 , 161 L . Ed. 2d a t 309, 125 S. Ct. at 147 1-72. S imila r ly, t he do g s niff p er fo r med du r ing Ca ba lles ’ t r affic st o p d id not cause an addi tional seizure or im

pli cate constitutional

ly prot ected priv acy in terest s, and, theref

ore, no ad di tional j usti f i cation i n the f orm of reasonabl

e suspi ci on was requi

red. Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837. In light o f Muehler , i

t b ec om escl ea r th at Cab alles rejected
re aso ning th at l edto this court ’s adoption of the “ fun dam ental al tera ti on of t he nat ur e o f the stop ” p ortion of the “ sc ope ” p ron g of Gonzalez

. Al

l that rem

ai ns i s the dura tion prong. Durin g a l awful seizure, as occurred in bot h Muehler and Caballes , t he poli ce may ask-17- que st ions unr elat ed t o t he o riginal de t ent ion and are n ot re qu i re d to f orm an ind ep en de nt r ea sonable s us pi

ci onof cri m ina l acti vi ty b ef ore do ing so . Fu rt her , t he Co ur t ’s r eliance o n Bostick in Muehler

in dic ates t hat t he enc ou nt er sho uld be an al y zed u nde r Bostick , even wh

en t he per so n being questioned h as al ready b een sei zed. Muehler , 544 U.S. at 101, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 309, 125 S. Ct. at 1471 (m ere que sti oni ng of
a se ize d in div idu al d o es no t co nst it ut e a n “a dd it io na l se izu r e w it hin the m ean ing of the F ourth A m endm en t”). Fin ally, we no t e t ha t t he a pp licab ility o f Muehler , wh i ch di d not involve a traffi

c stop, t o t he f

acts of the present case, wh ic h does involve a tra

f f i c s top, c an

not be ques tion ed. F i rst, Muehler

itsel f rel ied
on Caballes–a traff

ic stop case– t hu s il lustrat in g that t he pri

nci ple s bei ng appl ied are relevant wi

thout regard to the factualbasis fo r t he
en co un t er be t we en t he po lice an d t he ind ivid ua l. S econd, num

erous federal

and state court s hav

e concl ude d t ha t Muehler i s appl i cable to both dr

ive rs and pas sen

gerswho are sei

zed dur ing a l

aw f ul tr aff ic stop. See, e.g. , United States v. SorianoJarquin , 49 2 F.3d 495 (4t h Cir. 2 007 ); United States v. OliveraMendez , 484 F.3d50 5 ( 8th Cir. 2 007 ); United States v. Mendez , 476 F.3d107 7 (9 th Cir. 200 7); United Sta tes v. Stewart , 473 F.3d 1 26 5 (1 0th Cir. 2 007 ); United States v. Hernandez , 41 8 F .3d 12 06(1 1th Ci r. 200 5); United States v. Singh , 415 F.3d 288 (2d Ci r. 2005 ); Salmeron v. State , 280 G a . 73 5, 6 32 S .E .2d 645 (20 06) ; State v. Baxter , 144 Idaho 672, 168 P.3d 1019 (Ap p. 2 007 ); Marinaro v. State , 163 P.3d 833 (Wy

o. 2007). Indeed, our o wn appel la te court has reached thi s sa m e concl usi on. People v. Starnes , 374 Ill . App. 3d329 (20 07) ; People v. Ramsey , 362 Il l . App. 3d 61 0 (200 5). Thi rd, t he pa r alle ls between a l awful traf f i c s top a nd the exec uti on of a s ea r ch wa r r an t ar e c lea r
. Bo t h a r e b as ed o n p r o ba ble cau se. The
occup an ts of t he vehicle a nd t he occup an ts of t he pr emises co ver ed by t he warra nt are l aw f ul l y sei ze d f or the d ura ti on of the stopor war ra nt sea rc h, so l

ong asthe durati on i s n ot un rea sonab ly p rolonged. Brendlin , 551 U.S. at ___, 168 L. E d. 2d at 138-39, 127 S. Ct. at 240 6; Summers , 452 U.S. at 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 351, 101 S. Ct. at 2595. The same pri

nci ples t hat per mit t he qu est ioning o f Mena
re gar ding h er imm

i gra ti on status

wi thou t the req ui rem en t of in div idua li zedreasonabl

e suspi ci on permi

t an off ic er to req uest t he pas seng er in a st op ped vehicle t o p ro vide ident ifi cat ion.3 This co urt h as employed the Gonzal ez fra mework in two sub sequent de cision s. In Bunch , we found tha t the offic er’s questioning of the defendant “p ro longed defenda nt’ s det enti on bey ond t he completion of the pu rp ose of the stop.” Bunch , 20 7 Ill. 2d at 17. Ther efore, the overr uling of Gonzal ez does not under mine the result in Bunch

. In People v. Moss , 217 Il

l. 2d 511, 528 (200 5), we concluded that the off icer im perm issib ly expan de d th e purpo se of the st op in violat ion of the scope pr ong of

Gonz alez wh en he requested per mission to s ear ch the de fe nd ant’s tru ck. T he defendant, however, was s erving a p eriod of
man da torysuper vised release. Thus , while the reques t to s ear ch was not “r easonab ly related to the pur pose of the tra ffic stop, ” it was r easonab le in lightof d efe ndant’sstatu s. Moss , t her efor e, is una ffected by ou r overr uling of Gonzal ez
. -18- We, therefore, overrule Gonzalez t o t he ext ent t hat it ho ld s that t he reasonabl

enes s o f a tra

f f i c s top m us t b e j ud ge d n

ot onl y b y its dur at ion, but by

the addi tional cri teri on of w het her t he ac t ions o f the off ic er alter the f

undam ental nature of the stop. 3 The dura ti on p ro ng o f t he inq uir y pr ed at es o ur de cis io n in Gonzalez and has been

re af f i rm ed in b oth Caballesand Muehler . It, therefore, su rviv es a s the sole focus of the s cope in

quiry . See Gonzalez , 204 Ill . 2d at 230, citing United States v. Shabazz , 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5 th Ci

r. 1 993) (re

jec t ing pr emis e t ha t qu es t io nin g b y a poli ce off ic ert ha t is u nr ela t ed t o t he pu r po se o f a t r affic st o p is it se lf a f ourth am endm en t vi ola tion ).

Re que st f or Iden ti f i ca ti on As noted abo ve, t he wa rr ant chec k wa s po ssible o nly because t he
o ffi cer lea rned de f en da nt’s n am e wh en h e pre se

nted a s tat e i de nti f i ca ti on card in response to the offi cer’s request f

or i de nti f i ca ti on
. Thu s, if t he man ne rin w hic h he o bt ain ed t his in f orm ati on wa s i m pr ope r, th e m otion to suppress sh

ould ha ve b een granted. In Harris I , thi s c ourt w asun an i m ou s in its c onc lusion t hat t he offi cer’s re qu es t f

or i dentif i ca ti on di d n ot v i ol ate de f en da nt’ s ri gh ts under t he fo ur t h amendment

. The m aj ority appl

ied the Terry -based
an alys is o f Gonzalez , which we ha ve now overruled, to determin e that “the t r affic st o p w as jus t ifie d at its inception,” a nd that the o ff icer’s4 The appe llate court, o n re man d, fo und “no basis fo

r chang ing o ur origi nal deci sion in

this case.” Harris

II , No. 3–00–019 0 (u npu bli shed or der unde r Supr em e Court Rule

23).
-19- request that t he def

endan t/pas se ng er ide nt ify himse lf wa s “fa cia lly in nocuous.” Harris I , 20 7 I ll. 2d at 525, ci ting Gonzalez , 204 Ill . 2d at 2 36 . Th

e m aj ori ty re as on ed th at: “Such a request gave the off

ic ert he o pp o r t un it y t o id en t ify a pot entia l witne ss to t he traff

ic vi olation a n d to t he offi

cer’s act ions dur ing the cou rse of the stop, pro vi din g a certain le vel of prot ection to both t he off ic erand the driv

er of the veh

ic le

. Moreov er, t he r eq ue st fo ride nt if i ca t io n, in a nd o f it se lf, did not chang e t he f

unda m en tal na ture of the stopby conve rt ing it into a ge ner al inquisitio n abo ut pas t , p re sent and f uture wrongdoing.” Harris I , 207 Ill . 2d at 525. The d i ss en

ting j us ti ce s a

greed tha t the of f i ce r’ s req ue st f or i de nti f i ca ti on was law ful. Harris I , 207 Il l . 2d at 53 7 (Fi

tzgera l d, J., di sse nti ng, j oin ed by Thom as a nd Garm an , JJ.). We note tha t the State ha s f ai led to p re se nt an ar gu men t o n t his is sue , exce pt t o s ay tha t t his co ur t ’s co nclusio n in Harris I was unanim ous and c or re ct . T he St at e fails to app re ciat e t hat whe n w e agreedwi th its a ss er ti on th at Gonzalez

ha s b een overrule d by t he Su pr eme Court, i

t bec am e nece ssa ry t o an alyz e t his iss ue un de rso me fram ework ot her than the a

ban doned Gonzalez

app ro ach. Defend ant ac kn o wle dg es t ha t he wa s la wf ul ly de ta ined fo r t he durati on of the traff

ic stop, whi ch wa s n ot unreasonab

ly prolonged. See Caballes , 543 U.S. at 407, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 846, 125 S. Ct. at 837 (a seizure can become un la wful “if it is p r o lo ng ed be yo nd t he t ime
r ea so na bly

requi red” to com

pl ete the tra ff ic stop ). H e d oesnot suggest that t he st op was no t “o t he r wis e e xe cu t ed in a r ea so na ble
man ne r.” Caballes , 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 8 47 , 12 5 S . C t. at 837. H e argues, i

ns tead, t ha t wh

en the of f i ce r aske d h

im f or ident ifi cat ion, he wasnot free t o lea ve and he reasonab ly bel ie ved that
co mpliance wit h t he offi

cer’s request was required. His argument is , in ef f ec t, th at th

e a pp el l ate court’sorigina

l an al y si s of the reques t-fori de nti f i ca ti on is sue under the pri

nci ple s enun ci ated by the Uni ted St at es S upr eme Co ur t in Bostick wa s a n d c ontinue s to b e c orre

ct. 4-20- The Supreme C ourt ci

ted Bostick

in Muehler , but because Mena did n ot ar

gu e th at h er re sp on se to the INS offi

cer’s questions was inv o lu nt ar y, the Court did not conduct a Bostick analysis. D efenda nt argues t hat t he of

f i ce r’ s req ue st f ori dentif i ca ti on v i ol ate d h

i s f our th amendment ri

gh ts because hi s compl ia nce was not vo lun

tary, we must t her efo re add re ss t hat que st ion. The general

pr incip les o f Bostick

can be sum

mari zed as foll

ows: For purposes of

th e f our th am en dm en t, an i ndi vi dual is “sei zed” when
an o ffic er “ ‘ by me an s o f p hys ica l fo r ce o rsh o w o f a ut ho r it y, ha s in
so me way restrained the li

berty of a ci tizen .’ ” Bos tick , 501 U .S. at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 2386 (1991), quo ting Terry , 392 U.S . at 19 n.16 , 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905 n.16, 88 S. Ct . at 1879 n.16. “So long as a re aso nable pe rso n wo uld feel fre e ‘t o d isreg ar d t he poli ce and go ab out hi s busi ne ss,’ [ci tation], t he e nc o un t er is
consensual

and no re ason ab le su spi cion i s req

ui re d. ” Bostick , 501 U.S. at 434 , 1 15 L . E d. 2d a t 398 , 1 11 S . C t . a t 238 6, quo t ing California

v. Hodari D. , 499 U.S. 621, 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552 ( 1991 ). If, how ever , w hen “ ‘all the ci rcums tances surroundin g the in

ci dent’ ” ( Immi gration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado , 466 U.S. 210, 215, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (1984), quo ting United S tates v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 10 0 S . C t. 1870, 1877 (1980)) are t aken i nto account, the conduct of t he poli ce wo uld le ad a reasonab le

in nocent person under i

denti cal ci rcums tances to bel ie ve that he or she was not “f

ree to decli

ne the offi cers’ re qu es ts orot her wise t er minate t he encounter” ( Bostick , 501 U.S. at 436, 115 L. Ed. 2d a

t 400, 1 11 S. Ct. at 2387), that perso n i s sei zed. Ac co r di ng ly, t he ana lysi s hinges o n an o bject ive evalua t ion o f t he po lic e co nduc t and no t upo n t he su bject ive per cep t ion o f the in div idua l approac he d. Hodari D. , 499 U.S. at 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 111 S. Ct. at 1551. The app ellate co ur t not ed t he “f la shi ng em ergency lights” of t he squad car, the i mp ending a rr est of t he dr iver, and t he fact t hat t he off ic erdid not expla

i n t o de fen da nt wh y he w as as kin g t o se e h is ident ifi cat ion. The t ot ality o f the se c ircu msta nces , t he appell ate court concl uded, rendered

def endan t’s c omp l i ance i nvolu ntary

. Harris I , 325 Ill . App. 3d at 266.-21- In People v. Luedemann , 22 2 I ll. 2d 530, 555 (2006 ), thi s court observed t hat t he qu est ion is no t whet her t he indivi du al “p r ac t ica lly and r ealist ically

” felt free t o d ecline t he o ffi cer ’s r equ est . R at her , t he courtm us t conduct an ob

j ec tiv e a ss es sm

en t of pol i ce con du ct to det er mine if the defe

ndan t’s compl

ia nce was obtained through phy sical force or show of authority . This test “pr esu pposes a r ea so na ble innocent

pers on.” (Em

pha si s i n ori gi na l .) Luedemann , 222 I ll. 2d at 55 1. “T he an alys is r eq uir es an o bje ct ive ev alu at io n of t he poli ce co nduct in ques t ion and do es no t hinge up on t he su bject ive perce pti on of the person i

nvol ved.” Luedeman n , 222 Ill . 2d at 551. The f a ct that defendan

t was seized at the tim e the off ic er requested his id en t ific at io n is ce r t ain ly r ele va nt t o t his inq ui r y. Wh en t he in div idual appro ached and questioned by a police off

icer i s a passen gerwho ha s al

rea dy been sei ze d i nci de nta l to a tra f f i c s top ( Brendlin , 551 U.S. at ___, 168 L. Ed. 2d at 138- 39, 127 S. Ct. at 2406 ), or a person who is detai ned wh il e a search

is conduct e d pur sua nt to a w ar

ra nt ( Summers , 452 U .S. at 705, 6 9 L. Ed . 2 d at 351, 101 S. Ct. at 2595), the individua l is not free t o t er minate t he
encoun ter. The proper i nqu i ry und er Bostick , therefore, is

whether t he in div idua l wa s fr ee t o de cline t he o ffic er’s req ue st

. T he sp ec ific que sti on in the pres e nt ca se is w he t he ran inno ce nt pe r so n in defendant’s ci

rcums tances would h

ave f el t freeto decl

in e to pr oduce his i den tif i cation f or the of f i cer. We co ncl ude t hat de fendant was free t o de cli ne the o ff

icer’s request for ident ifi

cat ion no t wit hst anding t he fact that he wasnot free to termi nate the encounter. A reasonab le in nocen t pa ss en ge rin defendant’s si

tuation, even

upo n re alizing tha t t he dr iver o f the ca rin whi ch he has been

ridi ng i s about to be arrested, woul d f eel f re e to dec line to provide h

i s dri ve r’ s license o r o t her ident ifi cat ion. Being in volv edin a traf f i c s top i s n

ot quit e as st re ssful o r u pse t t ing for t he pa ss en ge ras it is fo rt he dr ive r
. As t his court has n ot ed, in a porti on of Gonzalez

t hat do es no t co nfli

ct wit h t he Sup

rem e C ourt’ s dec i si

on in Muehler , a r eq ue st fo ride nt ifica t io n is faci al ly in nocuous: “It does not su gg es t o fficia linte

rrog ati on a nd i s n ot the ty pe of que sti on or req uest th at wo uld incr eas e t he co nfro nt at ional nat ur e o f the encounter.” Gonzalez , 20 4 I ll. 2d at 236. An i nnocen t passenger has not hing to fea

r a nd no reason to feel

in tim ida ted or threatened. He mightev en ask why the po lice officer need s t he infor matio n. I f the-22- off ic erexplains that he m

ay le t the passen

ger driv e the veh ic le , he m ay choose that opt ion or decl in e. If he de cl ine s, th e of f i ce r m ay not in sist that he c omp l y . S ee, e.g. , Bautista v. State of Florida , 902 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. App. 2005) ( after arrest of d river dur ing law ful t r affic stop, pas sen

ger re sponded to of

f i cer’ s re que st for ident ifi cat ion by saying that he di d not have an y i dentif ic ation wi th hi m; in the absen ce of reasonabl

e suspi ci on, the offi

cer’s sub sequen

t dem and that pas sen ger rem ove h i s wa llet f rom h i s pock et wasim proper). We co ncl ud e that the request for defenda nt’s i dentif ic ation was p er mi ss ible und

er Muehler

and tha t hi s com pl i ance wa s v olu

ntary under Bostick , a nd , thus , di d n ot v i ol ate

de f en da nt’s f our th
amen dmen t rights.

CONCLUSION The trial cou rt p rope rly

denied defendant’s m

ot ion to suppr ess. Nei thert he o ffi

cer ’s r equ est t hat defend ant prov i de i de nti f i ca ti on nor t he subs equ ent war ra nt chec k us ing t he infor matio n obt ained fr om t he defend ant v i ol ate d h

i s r i gh ts un de r th e f our th am endm ent. Therefore,
we rev ers e th e a ppe ll ate court’ s j udgm

en t and a f f i rm the j udgm en t of th e c i rc ui t cou rt.
Appellate court judgment revers ed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.