I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2913 

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 22, 2019 

Mr. DEUTCH (for himself, Mr. BILIRAKIS, and Mr. CICILLINE) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Oversight and 

Reform, Ways and Means, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 

provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern 

Mediterranean, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Eastern Mediterranean 

5 Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) The security of partners and allies in the 

2 Eastern Mediterranean region is critical to the secu3 rity of the United States and Europe. 

4 (2) Greece is a valuable member of the North 

5 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a key pil6 lar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

7 (3) Israel is a steadfast ally of the United 

8 States and has been designated a ‘‘major non-NATO 

9 ally’’ and ‘‘major strategic partner’’. 

10 (4) Cyprus is an important partner in the East11 ern Mediterranean and signed a Statement of Intent 

12 with the United States on July 10, 2018, to enhance 

13 bilateral security cooperation. 

14 (5) The countries of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus 

15 participate in a critical trilateral dialogue to improve 

16 cooperation on energy and security issues. 

17 (6) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo partici18 pated in the trilateral dialogue among the three 

19 countries on March 20, 2019. 

20 (7) All three countries oppose any action in the 

21 Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea that 

22 could challenge stability, violate international law, or 

23 undermine good neighborly relations. 

24 (8) The recent discovery of a large natural gas 

25 field off the Egyptian coast and the newest discovVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:15 Jun 06, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2913.IH H2913

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1 eries of natural gas off of the Cypriot coast could 

2 represent a significant positive development for the 

3 Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East and 

4 may offer new economic opportunities in the region 

5 provided ecologically sound extraction methods pro6 tect the regional environment. 

7 (9) The Government of Turkey has expressed 

8 an intent to purchase the S–400 missile defense sys9 tem from the Russian Federation, which could trig10 ger the imposition of mandatory sanctions under the 

11 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc12 tions Act (Public Law 115–114). 

13 (10) It is in the national security interests of 

14 the United States to promote, achieve, and maintain 

15 energy security among, and through cooperation 

16 with, allies. 

17 (11) Natural gas developments in the Eastern 

18 Mediterranean have the potential to provide eco19 nomic gains and contribute to energy security in the 

20 region and Europe, as well as support European ef21 forts to diversify away from natural gas supplied by 

22 the Russian Federation. 

23 (12) The soon to be completed Trans Adriatic 

24 pipeline is a critical component of the Southern Gas 


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1 Corridor and the European Union’s efforts to diver2 sify energy resources. 

3 (13) The proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipe4 line if commercially viable would provide for energy 

5 diversification in accordance with the European 

6 Union’s third energy package of reforms. 

7 (14) Cooperation between the United States, 

8 Cyprus, and Greece for the purpose of research and 

9 development of energy sources would be in the na10 tional interests of not only the United States, but 

11 also Israel, and other countries in the Eastern Medi12 terranean and North Africa with similar natural gas 

13 finds. 

14 (15) The United States acknowledges the 

15 achievements and importance of the Binational In16 dustrial Research and Development Foundation 

17 (BIRD) and the United States-Israel Binational 

18 Science Foundation (BSF) and supports continued 

19 multiyear funding to ensure the continuity of the 

20 programs of the Foundations. 

21 (16) The United States has welcomed Greece’s 

22 allocation of two percent of its gross domestic prod23 uct (GDP) to defense in accordance with commit24 ments made at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. 


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1 (17) Energy exploration efforts in the Eastern 

2 Mediterranean region must be safeguarded against 

3 threats posed by terrorist and extremist groups, in4 cluding Hezbollah and others. 

5 (18) The energy exploration in the Republic of 

6 Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial 

7 waters— 

8 (A) furthers United States interests by 

9 providing a potential alternative to Russian gas 

10 for United States allies and partners; and 

11 (B) should not be impeded by other sov12 ereign states. 

13 (19) The United States Government cooperates 

14 closely with the Government of Cyprus through nu15 merous bilateral agreements. 

16 (20) United States officials have assisted the 

17 Government of Cyprus with crafting that country’s 

18 national security strategy. 

19 (21) The United States Government provides 

20 training to Cypriot officials in areas such as cyberse21 curity, counterterrorism, and explosive ordnance dis22 posal and stockpile management. 

23 (22) Cyprus is a valued member of the Pro24 liferation Security Initiative to combat the traf25 ficking of weapons of mass destruction. 


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1 (23) Cyprus continues to work closely with the 

2 United Nations and regional partners in Europe to 

3 combat terrorism and violent extremism. 

4 (24) Cyprus has been used as an offshore bank5 ing hub. While Cyprus is working to upgrade its 

6 anti-money laundering legal framework, the Depart7 ment of State’s 2019 International Narcotics Con8 trol Strategy Report (INCSR) noted that, ‘‘the Cyp9 riot financial system is vulnerable to money laun10 dering by domestic and foreign criminal enterprises 

11 and individuals’’ and that ‘‘organized criminal 

12 groups and others have reportedly used Cypriot 

13 banks to launder proceeds, particularly from Rus14 sian and Ukrainian illicit activity.’’ 

15 (25) As of February 2019, Cyprus has taken 

16 steps to address legitimate criticism of its use of in17 vestor citizenship schemes (known as ‘‘golden pass18 ports’’), which have in the past allowed Russian 

19 oligarchs under United States sanctions to obtain 

20 Cypriot passports and gain full access to the Euro21 pean Union. 

22 (26) United Nations Security Council Resolu23 tion 1251 (1999) noted ‘‘grave concern at the con24 tinuing excessive levels of military forces and arma25 ments in the Republic of Cyprus and the rate at 


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1 which they are being expanded, upgraded and mod2 ernized’’ and called upon ‘‘all concerned to commit 

3 themselves to . . . limiting and then substantially 

4 reducing the level of all troops and armaments in 

5 the Republic of Cyprus.’’. 

6 (27) A 1987 United States arms prohibition 

7 was designed to restrict United States arms sales 

8 and transfer to Cyprus and the occupied part of Cy9 prus to avoid hindering reunification efforts. 

10 (28) At least 40,000 Turkish troops are sta11 tioned in the occupied part of Cyprus. 

12 (29) While the United States has, as a matter 

13 of policy, avoided the provision of defense articles 

14 and services to Cyprus, the Government of Cyprus 

15 has, in the past, sought to obtain defense articles 

16 from other countries, such as Russia, that pose chal17 lenges to United States interests around the world. 

18 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

19 It is the policy of the United States— 

20 (1) to continue to actively participate in the tri21 lateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cyber 

22 security and protection of critical infrastructure con23 ducted among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus; 

24 (2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners 

25 and allies to deepen energy security cooperation 


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1 among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus and encourage the 

2 private sector to make investments in energy infra3 structure in the Eastern Mediterranean; 

4 (3) to strongly support the completion of the 

5 Trans Adriatic pipeline and the Eastern Mediterra6 nean pipeline and the establishment of liquified nat7 ural gas (LNG) terminals across the Eastern Medi8 terranean as a means of diversifying regional energy 

9 needs away from the Russian Federation; 

10 (4) to maintain a robust United States naval 

11 presence and investments in the naval facility at 

12 Souda Bay, Greece, and develop deeper security co13 operation with Greece; 

14 (5) to welcome Greece’s commitment to move 

15 forward with the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria 

16 (IGB pipeline) and additional LNG terminals that 

17 will help facilitate delivery of non-Russian gas to the 

18 Balkans and central Europe; 

19 (6) to continue to support efforts to reach a 

20 comprehensive settlement to reunify Cyprus as a bi21 zonal, bicommunal federation and urge all parties to 

22 intensify their work on behalf of peace; 

23 (7) to deepen security cooperation with Cyprus, 

24 potentially including lifting current restrictions on 

25 the export of defense articles and services to Cyprus; 


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1 (8) to support robust International Military 

2 Education and Training (IMET) programing with 

3 Greece and Cyprus; 

4 (9) to leverage relationships within NATO and 

5 the European Union to encourage investments in 

6 Cypriot border and maritime security; 

7 (10) to support efforts to counter Russian in8 terference and influence in the Eastern Mediterra9 nean through increased security cooperation with 

10 Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, to include intelligence 

11 sharing, cyber cooperation, and maritime domain 

12 awareness; 

13 (11) to support Cyprus’s efforts to better regu14 late its banking industry to ensure that it is not 

15 used as a source of international money laundering 

16 and encourage additional measures toward that end; 

17 (12) to encourage Cyprus and other relevant 

18 countries to ensure that investor citizenship schemes 

19 do not create security, money laundering, or tax eva20 sion vulnerabilities; 

21 (13) to strongly oppose any actions that would 

22 trigger mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231 

23 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

24 Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44), to include the 


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1 purchase by Turkey of an S–400 missile defense sys2 tem from the Russian Federation; 

3 (14) to continue robust official strategic dia4 logues with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus; 

5 (15) to urge countries in the region to deny 

6 port services to Russian vessels deployed to support 

7 the government of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and 

8 terminate existing agreements granting Russian 

9 naval vessels access to ports; 

10 (16) to support joint military exercises among 

11 Israel, Greece, and Cyprus; 

12 (17) to fully implement relevant provisions of 

13 the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

14 Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44) to prevent inter15 ference by the Government of the Russian Federa16 tion in the region; 

17 (18) to support efforts by countries in the re18 gion to demobilize military equipment supplied by 

19 the Government of the Russian Federation in favor 

20 of equipment provided by NATO and NATO-allied 

21 member countries; and 

22 (19) to strongly support the active and robust 

23 participation of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in the 

24 Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program. 


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1 SEC. 4. UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN2 ERGY COOPERATION. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con4 sultation with the Secretary of Energy, may, subject to 

5 the availability of appropriations, enter into cooperative 

6 agreements supporting and enhancing dialogue and plan7 ning involving international partnerships between the 

8 United States and Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. 

9 (b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—If the Secretary of State, in 

10 consultation with the Secretary of Energy, enters into 

11 agreements authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary 

12 shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congres13 sional committees that describes— 

14 (1) actions taken to implement such agree15 ments; and 

16 (2) any projects undertaken pursuant to such 

17 agreements. 

18 (c) UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN19 ERGY CENTER.—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation 

20 with the Secretary of State, may establish a joint United 

21 States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in the 

22 United States leveraging the experience, knowledge, and 

23 expertise of institutions of higher education and entities 

24 in the private sector, among others, in offshore energy de25 velopment to further dialogue and collaboration to develop 

26 more robust academic cooperation in energy innovation 


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1 technology and engineering, water science, technology 

2 transfer, and analysis of emerging geopolitical implica3 tions, which include opportunities as well as crises and 

4 threats from foreign natural resource and energy acquisi5 tions. 

6 SEC. 5. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF ARTI7 CLES ON THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS 

8 LIST TO CYPRUS. 

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con10 gress that— 

11 (1) the direct sale or transfer of arms by the 

12 United States to Cyprus would advance United 

13 States security interests in Europe by helping to re14 duce the dependence of the Government of Cyprus 

15 on other countries for defense-related materiel, in16 cluding countries that pose challenges to United 

17 States interests around the world; and 

18 (2) it is in the interest of the United States— 

19 (A) to continue to support United Nations20 facilitated efforts toward a comprehensive solu21 tion to the division of Cyprus; and 

22 (B) for the Republic of Cyprus to join 

23 NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. 

24 (b) MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION.—Section 

25 620C(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 


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1 2373(e)) is amended by adding at the end of the following 

2 new paragraph: 

3 ‘‘(3) The requirement under paragraph (1) 

4 shall not apply to any sale or other provision of any 

5 defense article or defense service to Cyprus if the 

6 end-user of such defense or defense service is Cy7 prus.’’. 

8 (c) EXCLUSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RE9 PUBLIC OF CYPRUS FROM CERTAIN RELATED REGULA10 TIONS.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this 

11 Act, the Secretary of State shall not apply a policy of de12 nial for exports, re-exports, or transfers of defense articles 

13 and defense services destined for or originating in the Re14 public of Cyprus if— 

15 (1) the request is made by or on behalf of Cy16 prus; and 

17 (2) the end-user of such defense articles or de18 fense services is Cyprus. 

19 SEC. 6. IMET ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE AND CYPRUS. 

20 (a) GREECE.—There is authorized to be appropriated 

21 for fiscal year 2020 $2,000,000 for assistance under chap22 ter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

23 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.; relating to International Military 

24 Education and Training) for Greece. 


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1 (b) CYPRUS.—It is the sense of Congress that for fis2 cal year 2020 such sums as may be necessary should be 

3 made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II 

4 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for Cyprus. 

5 (c) PURPOSES.—The assistance described in sub6 sections (a) and (b) should be made available for the fol7 lowing purposes: 

8 (1) Training of future leaders. 

9 (2) Fostering a better understanding of the 

10 United States. 

11 (3) Establishing a rapport between the United 

12 States military and the country’s military to build 

13 alliances for the future. 

14 (4) Enhancement of interoperability and capa15 bilities for joint operations. 

16 (5) Focusing on professional military education. 

17 (6) Enabling countries to use their national 

18 funds to receive a reduced cost for other Department 

19 of Defense education and training. 

20 (7) Provision of English Language Training as21 sistance. 

22 SEC. 7. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE. 

23 There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 

24 2020 $3,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing for 

25 Greece to assist the country in meeting its commitment 


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1 as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

2 to dedicate 20 percent of its defense budget to enhance 

3 research and development. 

4 SEC. 8. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F–35 AIRCRAFT TO 

5 TURKEY. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under sub7 section (b), no funds may be obligated or expended— 

8 (1) to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or au9 thorize the transfer of, an F–35 aircraft to Turkey; 

10 (2) to transfer intellectual property or technical 

11 data necessary for or related to any maintenance or 

12 support of the F–35 aircraft; or 

13 (3) to construct a storage facility for, or other14 wise facilitate the storage in Turkey of, an F–35 air15 craft transferred to Turkey. 

16 (b) EXCEPTION.—The President may waive the limi17 tation under subsection (a) upon a written certification to 

18 Congress that the Government of Turkey does not plan 

19 or intend to accept delivery of the S–400 air defense sys20 tem. 

21 (c) TRANSFER DEFINED.—In this section, the term 

22 ‘‘transfer’’ includes the physical relocation outside of the 

23 continental United States. 


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1 (d) APPLICABILITY.—The limitation under sub2 section (a) does not apply to F–35 aircraft operated by 

3 the United States Armed Forces. 

4 SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PURCHASE BY TURKEY OF 

5 S–400 AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. 

6 It is the sense of Congress that, if the Government 

7 of Turkey purchases the S–400 air defense system from 

8 the Russian Federation— 

9 (1) such a purchase would constitute a signifi10 cant transaction within the meaning of section 

11 231(a) of the Countering Russian Influence in Eu12 rope and Eurasia Act of 2017 (22 U.S.C. 9525(a)); 

13 (2) such a purchase would endanger the integ14 rity of the NATO alliance; 

15 (3) such a purchase would adversely affect on16 going operations of the United States Armed Forces, 

17 including coalition operations in which the United 

18 States Armed Forces participate; 

19 (4) such a purchase would result in a signifi20 cant impact to defense cooperation between the 

21 United States and Turkey; 

22 (5) such a purchase would significantly increase 

23 the risk of compromising United States defense sys24 tems and operational capabilities; and 


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1 (6) the President should faithfully execute the 

2 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eur3 asia Act of 2017 by imposing and applying sanctions 

4 described in section 235 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 

5 9529) with respect to any individual or entity deter6 mined to have engaged in such significant trans7 action as if such person were a sanctioned person for 

8 purposes of such Act. 

9 SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES ENERGY COOPERA10 TION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

13 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec14 retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres15 sional committees a strategy on enhanced security and en16 ergy cooperation with countries in the Eastern Mediterra17 nean, including Israel, Greece, and Cyprus. 

18 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub19 section (a) shall include the following elements: 

20 (1) A description of United States participation 

21 in the Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Forum. 

22 (2) An evaluation of all possible delivery mecha23 nisms into Europe for natural gas discoveries in the 

24 Eastern Mediterranean. 


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1 (3) An evaluation of efforts to protect energy 

2 exploration infrastructure in the region, including 

3 that of United States companies. 

4 (4) An assessment of the capacity of Cyprus to 

5 host an Energy Crisis Center in the region which 

6 could provide basing facilities in support of search 

7 and rescue efforts in the event of an accident. 

8 (5) An assessment of the timing of natural gas 

9 delivery in the region as well as assessment of the 

10 ultimate destination countries for the natural gas 

11 delivery from the region. 

12 (6) A plan to work with United States busi13 nesses seeking to invest in Eastern Mediterranean 

14 energy exploration, development, and cooperation. 

15 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) 

16 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 

17 a classified annex. 

18 SEC. 11. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION MALIGN INFLU19 ENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

22 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

23 a report on Russian Federation malign influence in Israel, 

24 Greece, and Cyprus since January 1, 2017. 


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1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub2 section (a) shall include the following elements: 

3 (1) An assessment of security, political, and en4 ergy goals of the Government of the Russian Fed5 eration in the Eastern Mediterranean. 

6 (2) A description of energy projects of the Gov7 ernment of the Russian Federation in the Eastern 

8 Mediterranean. 

9 (3) A listing of Russian national ownership of 

10 media outlets in these countries, including the name 

11 of the media outlet, approximate viewership, and as12 sessment of whether the outlet promotes pro-Krem13 lin views. 

14 (4) An assessment of military engagement by 

15 the Government of the Russian Federation in the se16 curity sector, including engagement by military 

17 equipment and personnel contractors. 

18 (5) An assessment of efforts supported by the 

19 Government of the Russian Federation to influence 

20 elections in the three countries, through the use of 

21 cyber attacks, social media campaigns, or other ma22 lign influence techniques. 

23 (6) An assessment of activity by Russian re24 lated entities and other entities to use Cyprus’s 


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1 banking and legal systems to facilitate illicit busi2 ness transactions. 

3 (7) An assessment of improvements that Cy4 prus must make to its banking system and legal sys5 tem to prevent the country from serving as a safe 

6 haven for those seeking to conduct illicit business 

7 transactions. 

8 (8) An assessment of efforts by the Government 

9 of the Russian Federation to intimidate and influ10 ence the decision by His All Holiness Ecumenical 

11 Patriarch Bartholomew, leader of 300,000,000 Or12 thodox Christians worldwide, to grant autocephaly to 

13 the Ukrainan Orthodox Church. 

14 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) 

15 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 

16 a classified annex. 

17 SEC. 12. REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECO18 NOMIC ZONE OF CYPRUS, THE SOVEREIGN 

19 TERRITORY OF GREECE IN THE AEGEAN SEA, 

20 AND ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 

22 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

23 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec24 retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres25 sional committees a report that— 


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1 (1) lists incidents where the Exclusive Eco2 nomic Zone of Cyprus or the sovereign territory of 

3 Greece in the Aegean Sea have been violated; and 

4 (2) assesses opportunities to establish long-term 

5 peace on Cyprus. 

6 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub7 section (a) shall include the following elements: 

8 (1) A listing of incidents since January 1, 

9 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to be 

10 violations by unauthorized vessels of Cyprus’ Exclu11 sive Economic Zone. 

12 (2) A listing of incidents since January 1, 

13 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to be 

14 violations of the sovereign territory of Greece by its 

15 neighbors, particularly airspace violations over the 

16 Aegean Sea. 

17 (3) An assessment of the opportunities to estab18 lish a long-term peace agreement among all parties 

19 in Cyprus. 

20 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) 

21 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 

22 a classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 13. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE2 FINED. 

3 In this Act, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com4 mittees’’ means— 

5 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

6 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Com7 mittee on Science, Space, and Technology of the 

8 House of Representatives; and 

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

10 the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of 

11 the Senate. 

Æ 


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