Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JASON J. PATTISON GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Jenner Auxier & Pattison, LLP Attorney General of Indiana

Madison, Indiana

RICHARD C. WEBSTER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

MICHAEL S. SCROGGINS, II, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 39A01-1203-CR-91

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Sally A. Blankenship, Special Judge

Cause No. 39D01-1008-FC-638

September 28, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Michael S. Scroggins, II (Scroggins), appeals his sentence 

following a guilty plea to two Counts of reckless homicide, Class C felonies, Ind. Code § 

35-42-1-5, and one Count of criminal recklessness, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-

2(c)(3)(B).

We affirm.

ISSUE

Scroggins raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the 

following single issue: Whether the trial court properly sentenced Scroggins.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 2, 2010, Abby Jackson (Jackson) was traveling in the southbound lane 

of State Road 7 in Dupont, Indiana, when she observed a green Chevrolet pickup truck 

swerving at a high rate of speed behind her. Scroggins and a female passenger were in 

the pickup truck. The vehicles had entered a no passing zone, but Jackson moved to the 

right side of the road to allow Scroggins to pass. Scroggins drove around her, then 

abruptly cut back to the right, causing Jackson to apply her brakes to avoid a collision. 

Around the same time, Bonnie Ramey-Low (Ramey-Low), Lois Robinson (Robinson), 

and Cindy Speer (Speer) were traveling northbound on S.R. 7 in Ramey-Low’s Jeep 

Liberty. As their vehicle crested a small hill, Scroggins’ pickup truck appeared in their 
3

lane. Ramey-Low swerved to the left to avoid Scroggins, but their vehicles collided 

head-on. 

Police arrived at the accident soon thereafter and found Ramey-Low slumped over 

the steering wheel. Ramey-Low had died from the accident, but Speer and Robinson 

survived and were removed from the Jeep. Robinson later died from her injuries and

Speer suffered multiple fractures and inner ear damage. Scroggins and his passenger 

were removed from their vehicle as well, with Scroggins receiving significant injuries to 

his arms and the lower half of his body. 

On August 11, 2010, the State filed an Information charging Scroggins with 

Counts I and II, reckless homicide, Class C felonies, I.C. § 35-42-1-5; Counts III-V, 

criminal recklessness, Class C felonies, I.C. § 35-42-2-2(d)(1); Counts VI and VII, 

criminal recklessness, Class C felonies, I.C. § 35-42-2-2(c)(3)(B); and Count VIII, 

criminal recklessness, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-2(c)(2)(B). On December 20, 

2011, Scroggins entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he pled guilty to 

Counts I, II, and V in exchange for the State’s dismissal of Counts III-IV, VI-VIII. The 

State also agreed to forego the filing of five additional Counts as well as a habitual 

substance offender allegation. The plea agreement left Scroggins’ sentence to the trial 

court’s discretion. On January 10, 2012, the trial court accepted Scroggins’ plea 

agreement and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

On January 20, 2012, the trial court conducted the sentencing hearing. In 

requesting the maximum sentence for Scroggins, the State argued the following 
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aggravating factors: the harm suffered by the victims was greater than the elements 

required to prove the offense; Ramey-Low’s age; Scroggins’ criminal history, including 

prior convictions for driving under the influence and other traffic violations; the failure to 

deter Scroggins in spite of many opportunities for rehabilitation; and Scroggins’ 

substance abuse. Scroggins argued that his prior offenses deserved “medium weight”

because they were all misdemeanor convictions. (Sentencing Tr. p. 66). Further, 

Scroggins asserted that the State benefitted from his guilty plea since he had intended to 

challenge all facets of the case except for the fact that his vehicle was in Ramey-Low’s 

lane prior to the collision. He added that his ultimate acceptance of the plea agreement 

was due in part to his remorse. Although finding that Scroggins’ guilty plea and his 

remorse were mitigating factors, the trial court identified the harm suffered by the victims 

and his criminal history as significant aggravating factors. Concluding that the 

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, it sentenced Scroggins to eight 

years of incarceration on each Count, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for 

an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years.

Scroggins now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Scroggins contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed three 

consecutive eight year sentences for his reckless homicide and criminal recklessness 

convictions, all Class C felonies. A person who commits a Class C felony shall be 

imprisoned for a fixed term of between two and eight years, with the advisory sentence 
5

being four years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(a). Scroggins received the maximum sentence for 

each Count.

As long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only 

for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified

on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the 

reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. Ways in which 

the trial court may abuse its discretion include: wholly failing to issue a sentencing 

statement; issuing a sentencing statement that bases a sentence on reasons unsupported by 

the record, or that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Phelps v. State, 

914 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and 

mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now 

be said to have abused its discretion by failing to properly weigh such factors. 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. This is so because once the trial court has entered a 

sentencing statement, which may or may not include the existence of aggravating and 

mitigating factors, it may then impose any sentence that is authorized by statute and 

permitted under the Indiana Constitution. Id.

This does not mean that criminal defendants have no recourse in challenging 

sentences they believe are excessive. Id. Although a trial court may have acted within its 

lawful discretion in determining a sentence, Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that the 
6

appellate court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if it finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Id. It 

is on this basis alone that a criminal defendant may now challenge his sentence where the 

trial court has entered a sentencing statement that includes a reasonably detailed 

recitation of its reasons for imposing the particular sentence that is supported by the 

record, and the reasons are not improper as a matter of law. Id.

I. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

A. Aggravating Factors

Scroggins contends that the record does not support the trial court’s finding of an 

aggravating factor and that the trial court improperly considered statutory mitigating 

factors as aggravating factors. First, he asserts that the aggravating factor – the harm 

caused was greater than that necessary to prove the commission of the offense – was 

unsupported since he did not know or intentionally harm his victims and the resulting 

harm was no greater than that “associated with the death of a family member or loved one 

in an automobile collision.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 12).

The nature and circumstances of a crime can be a valid aggravating factor. 

Sharkey v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). However, a trial court 

must give more than a generalized reference to the nature and circumstances. Id. The 

trial court may assign aggravating weight to the harm, injury, loss or damage suffered by 

the victim if such harm was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove 

the commission of the offense. Id. In finding this aggravating factor, the trial court 
7

relied on evidence establishing that Speer witnessed the pain and death of fellow 

passengers Ramey-Low and Robinson. The trial court also relied on letters from 

community members who described its impact on them.

Speer read aloud her letter recounting events immediately after the accident at the 

sentencing hearing. She saw that Ramey-Low was “[s]lumped over the steering wheel 

which was pinned against her chest,” and Robinson, who later died, “was bleeding from 

her chin.” (Sentencing Tr. p. 63). The State submitted a letter from an elementary school 

principal retelling how the victims’ families, who were employees and students at the 

school, were informed of the tragic accident. The foregoing represents much more than a 

generalized reference to the nature and circumstances and we therefore conclude that the 

record supports the trial court’s finding of this aggravating factor.

Next, Scroggins contends that the trial court improperly used statutory mitigating 

factors as factors to aggravate his sentence. He points to the sentencing order, which 

stated that the victims did not induce or facilitate the offense and that Scroggins was 

unlikely to respond favorably to short term incarceration. The trial court may consider 

these as mitigating circumstances. However, the sentencing statement contains no 

pronouncement that the trial court used these to aggravate Scroggins’ sentence; it

indicates that the trial court simply found these were not mitigating factors. Accordingly, 

we find no abuse of discretion here. 
8

Moreover, we note that the trial court found two other aggravating factors, namely 

Ramey-Low’s age

1

and Scroggins’ extensive criminal history, which included multiple 

traffic offenses and driving under the influence convictions. One of the offenses involved

a crash resulting in an injury. As Scroggins concedes that these are valid aggravating 

factors, we therefore conclude that sufficient aggravating factors support the maximum

sentence imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, Scroggins has not shown that the trial 

court abused its discretion.

B. Mitigating Factor

Scroggins also argues that the trial court did not give sufficient weight to his guilty 

plea and his remorse. Specifically, Scroggins contends that because his guilty plea was a 

gesture of remorse and a pragmatic exercise by the State, the trial court abused its 

discretion by not according them with significant weight. It is well within the trial 

court’s discretion to determine the existence and weight of a mitigating factor. Phelps v. 

State, 914 N.E.2d 283, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

While the trial court found that Scroggins’ apologies and his guilty plea were

mitigating factors, it recognized that “charges were dismissed or not filed in return for the 

plea.” In emphasizing the significance of his guilty plea, Scroggins argues that the only 

uncontested matter was that he drove on the wrong side of the road, that a number of 

 

1 Although Scroggins concedes that the age of the victim is a valid statutory aggravating factor, he 

nevertheless contends that the trial court improperly relied upon Ramey-Low’s age because he was 

unaware of it. However, the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age is not necessary for it to qualify 

as an aggravating factor. See McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001). 
9

Counts filed against him were duplicative and constituted double jeopardy, and that his 

passenger’s testimony presented the only basis for the State’s filing of additional charges

and a habitual substance offender allegation. Notably, Scroggins does not contend that 

the trial court failed to identify the foregoing as mitigating factors; rather he merely 

argues that the trial court did not afford them sufficient weight. However, the relative 

weight or value assignable to reasons properly found is not subject to review for abuse. 

See Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion by the 

trial court and affirm its imposition of Scroggins’ sentence.

II. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)

App. Rule 7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, 

after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The 

burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is 

inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Scroggins has not 

met this burden.

With respect to the nature of the offense, we look to the details and circumstances 

of the commission of the offense and the defendant’s participation. See Washington v. 

State, 940 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Here, Scroggins was driving 

erratically behind Jackson in a no passing zone at a high rate of speed. Instead of 

reducing his speed, Scroggins was in the wrong lane and collided head-on with three 

women returning home from work. Scroggins’ acts not only resulted in two victims’ 
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deaths, but also in their co-worker witnessing the same. In sum, we find that the nature 

of the offense supports the sentence imposed by the trial court. 

Turning to his character, Scroggins’ history of traffic-related offenses, driver’s 

license suspensions, and other crimes cannot be ignored. We agree with the State that 

this establishes his recklessness and disregard for the safety of others on the highways. 

Scroggins has been afforded several rehabilitative opportunities to correct his behavior, 

yet his failure to do so resulted in the tragic loss of two lives and the imposition of lifealtering injuries to another. Under these circumstances, we find that Scroggins’ sentence 

is not inappropriate. We affirm the trial court’s imposition of an aggregate sentence of 

twenty-four years.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by sentencing Scroggins.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J. and CRONE, J. concur