Filed 4/23/14 Sparks v. Associated Press CA2/7 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SEVEN 

PHIL SPARKS, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

ASSOCIATED PRESS, 

 Defendant and Respondent. 

 B250473 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BC503090) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rolf M. 

Treu, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Phil Sparks, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, and Jonathan L. Segal for Defendant and 

Respondent. 

_______________________ 
2

Appellant Phil Sparks appeals from the trial court’s order granting the special 

motion to strike brought by respondent Associated Press (AP) pursuant to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 425.16.1 Following the AP’s publication of two articles reporting on 

civil restraining orders that were issued against Sparks, Sparks filed this action against 

the AP for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court 

granted the AP’s special motion to strike on the grounds that the claims alleged arose 

from acts in furtherance of the constitutional right of free speech and Sparks failed to 

prove a probability of prevailing on the merits. We affirm. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

I. The AP’s Published Articles 

On July 31, 2012, the AP published a news article about a temporary restraining 

order that had been issued against Sparks for allegedly making threats against singer 

Sheryl Crow. That article specifically stated: “A judge has granted Sheryl Crow a 

temporary restraining order against a man who is accused of threatening to shoot the 

Grammy-winning singer-songwriter. [¶] The order requires Phillip Gordon Sparks, 45, to 

stay 100 yards away and not attempt to contact Crow, her family or any of her workers. 

She wrote in a sworn statement that she is fearful of Sparks because he has claimed in 

profane online tirades that she has stolen money from him and broken into his house. 

[¶] She also states Sparks recently went to the offices of an entertainment union and told 

a worker that he was going to ‘just shoot’ her.” 

The July 31, 2012 article further provided: “A worker at the Screen Actors 

Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists wrote in a declaration 

accompanying Crow’s filing that she spoke with Sparks on July 16 and he made the 

threat against Crow. He also threatened to shoot film executive Weinstein because he 

believed they were filming him and had stolen millions from him, the worker stated.” 

 

1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure. 
3

The article noted that the temporary restraining order was granted on July 24, and that a 

hearing on a three-year protective order was scheduled for August 14. It also stated that 

attempts to contact Sparks had been unsuccessful. 

On August 14, 2012, the AP published a second news article about the issuance 

of a three-year restraining order against Sparks. That article stated, in pertinent part: 

“A judge granted Sheryl Crow a three-year restraining order against a man who 

acknowledged he threatened to shoot the singer-songwriter and film executive Harvey 

Weinstein. [¶] Philip Gordon Sparks, 45, agreed to stay away from the Grammy winner 

and Weinstein after an hour-long hearing in which he accused the pair of stealing $7.5 

million from him, videotaping and following him without permission and leaving him 

homeless. A forensic psychiatrist who interviewed Sparks recently called him 

‘imminently dangerous’ and said his psychosis is directed intently at Crow. [¶] Superior 

Court Judge James Hahn ordered Sparks to stay 300 yards away from Crow and 

Weinstein and make no attempt to contact them.” 

Like the AP’s prior article, the August 14, 2012 article referenced the declaration 

that was submitted by the Screen Actors Guild employee and the statement in that 

declaration that Sparks had threatened to shoot Crow and Weinstein. The article also 

reported as follows: “Sparks said he made the statement because he was frustrated 

because he believes they stole from him and continued to follow him. [¶] ‘Mr. Sparks is 

unambiguously delusional,’ forensic psychiatrist Dr. David Glaser testified during the 

hearing. [¶] Neither Crow nor Weinstein attended the hearing.” 

II. Sparks’s Civil Lawsuits Against the AP2

On November 13, 2012, Sparks filed his first civil action against the AP in Los 

Angeles County Superior Court (Case No. BC495593). The complaint asserted a single 

cause of action for defamation based on the AP’s publication of the August 14, 2012 

 

2 According to a declaration submitted by the AP’s counsel, Sparks has filed at least 

seven other lawsuits against media organizations apart from the AP, three of which have 

been dismissed by the trial courts under section 425.16. 
4

article. On February 22, 2013, the trial court granted the AP’s special motion to strike 

the complaint on the grounds that Sparks’s defamation claim was barred as a matter of 

law by the fair report privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), and by Sparks’s 

failure to demand a retraction or to prove special damages under Civil Code section 48a. 

The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the AP on March 18, 2013. 

On March 15, 2013, Sparks filed this action against the AP in Los Angeles County 

Superior Court (Case No. BC503090). The complaint asserted two causes of action for 

defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the AP’s publication 

of the July 31, 2012 and August 14, 2012 articles. Sparks alleged that the AP falsely and 

maliciously published in its articles that a union representative had stated that Sparks 

threatened to shoot Crow and Weinstein, and that a forensic psychiatrist had interviewed 

Sparks and diagnosed him as “imminently dangerous” and “unambiguously delusional.” 

Sparks sought compensatory and punitive damages, and injunctive relief. 

III. The AP’s Special Motion to Strike the Complaint 

On May 20, 2013, the AP filed and served a special motion to strike Sparks’s 

complaint. Due to an inadvertent error, however, the caption page on the notice of 

motion incorrectly listed the case number of the prior action that Sparks had filed against 

the AP. On June 10, 2013, after discovering the error, the AP filed and served a notice of 

errata along with a copy of its motion with the corrected case number. On June 18, 2013, 

Sparks filed an opposition to the special motion to strike. The hearing on the motion was 

scheduled for June 19, 2013. 

At the June 19, 2013 hearing, Sparks appeared and objected to the AP’s motion on 

the ground that it originally listed the incorrect case number. The trial court ordered that 

the correct case number be interlineated on the AP’s motion, continued the hearing to 

July 24, 2013, and offered Sparks the opportunity to file a new opposition. Sparks 

indicated that the brief he had filed the day before was sufficient to constitute his 

opposition on the merits, and the trial court agreed to accept that filing as Sparks’s 

opposition. 
5

At the July 24, 2013 hearing, Sparks again appeared and argued that the AP’s 

motion should be denied because he had shown a probability of prevailing on the merits 

of his claims. Following the hearing, the trial court granted the special motion to strike. 

The court specifically found that the AP’s publication of the articles constituted protected 

activity under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4) because the articles reported 

on judicial proceedings and concerned an issue of public interest. The court further 

found that Sparks could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits because 

his claims were barred by (1) the fair report privilege of Civil Code section 47, 

subdivision (d), (2) the retraction demand provisions of Civil Code section 48a, and (3) 

the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. On August 6, 2013, Sparks filed a 

notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard Of Review 

Section 425.16 is commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute.3 It provides, 

in pertinent part, that “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that 

person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United 

States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a 

special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that 

there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 

Section 425.16 must be “construed broadly” to effectuate the statute’s purpose, which 

is to encourage participation in matters of public significance and to ensure that such 

participation is not chilled through an abuse of the judicial process. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) 

Resolution of a section 425.16 special motion to strike requires a two-step process. 

First, the moving party must make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of 

action arises from constitutionally protected activity. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 

 

3 SLAPP is an acronym for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.” 

(Jarrow Formulas, Inc., v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1.) 
6

Cal.4th 1048, 1056; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 

67.) If the moving party satisfies this prong, the burden shifts to the opposing party to 

demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claim. (Rusheen v. Cohen, 

supra, at p. 1056; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., supra, at p. 67.) We 

review a trial court’s ruling on a special motion to strike de novo, conducting an 

independent review of the entire record. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 

325; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3.) 

II. Arising From Constitutionally Protected Activity 

A cause of action arises from protected activity within the meaning of section 

425.16 if the conduct of the defendant on which the cause of action is based was an 

act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech. (City of Cotati v. 

Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 [“statutory phrase ‘cause of action . . . arising from’ 

means simply that the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must 

itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech”]; Navellier v. 

Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89 [“[i]n the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration 

is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or 

petitioning activity”].) Under section 425.16, an act in furtherance of the right of free 

speech includes “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an 

issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any 

other official proceeding authorized by law” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)), and “any other 

conduct in furtherance of the exercise of . . . the constitutional right of free speech in 

connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)). 

Sparks does not dispute that the AP’s publication of the challenged articles 

constituted protected activity under section 425.16. The articles reported on restraining 

orders issued against Sparks as a result of court proceedings, and thus, concerned “an 

issue under consideration . . . by a . . . judicial body” within the scope of section 425.16, 

subdivision (e)(2). (Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 

397 [“courts have repeatedly held that reports of judicial proceedings . . . are an exercise 
7

of free speech within the meaning of section 425.16”]; see also Braun v. Chronicle 

Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048-1049.) Because the restraining orders 

were sought by Crow and Weinstein, two well-known figures in the entertainment 

industry, the articles also were published “in connection with . . . an issue of public 

interest” within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (Hall v. Time Warner, 

Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1347 [“[a] statement . . . is ‘in connection with an 

issue of public interest’ . . . if [it] concerns a topic of widespread public interest and 

contributes in some manner to a public discussion of the topic”]; see also Seelig v. Infinity 

Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807-808.) The AP therefore met its 

burden of proving that Sparks’s complaint arose from constitutionally protected speech. 

III. Probability of Prevailing on the Merits 

Because the AP made a prima facie showing that the articles fell within the scope 

of section 425.16, the burden shifted to Sparks to prove a reasonable probability of 

prevailing on his claims. To demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of 

a challenged cause of action, “the plaintiff must ‘state[ ] and substantiate[ ] a legally 

sufficient claim.’ [Citation.]” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, supra, 31 Cal.4th 

at p. 741.) The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would, if proven, 

support a judgment in his or her favor. (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, supra, 

39 Cal.4th at p. 291.) For purposes of this inquiry, the court “‘“must accept as true the 

evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only 

to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.”’” 

(Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 326.) Although “‘the court does not weigh the 

credibility or comparative probative strength of competing evidence, it should grant the 

motion if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the 

plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.’ [Citation.]” (Soukup v. 

Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, supra, at p. 291.) 

Civil Code section 47 provides an absolute privilege for publications made “[b]y 

a fair and true report in, or a communication to, a public journal, of (A) a judicial, (B) 
8

legislative, or (C) other public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in the course 

thereof . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (d)(1); Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress

(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 240.) “The privilege applies if the substance of the 

publication or broadcast captures the gist or sting of the statements made in the official 

proceedings.” (Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1337.) 

A privileged “‘news article need not track verbatim the underlying proceeding. Only if 

the deviation is of such a “substantial character” that it “produce[s] a different effect” on 

the reader will the privilege be suspended. [Citation.] News articles, in other words, 

need only convey the substance of the proceedings on which they report, as measured by 

their impact on the average reader.’ [Citation.]” (Carver v. Bonds (2005) 135 

Cal.App.4th 328, 351-352; see also Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 

Cal.App.4th 1551, 1558 [“publication concerning legal proceedings is privileged as long 

as the substance of the proceedings is described accurately”].) “In the context of judicial 

proceedings, . . . reports which comprise a history of the proceeding come within the 

privilege, as do statements made outside the courtroom and invoking no function of the 

court. . . .” (Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1050.) 

In this case, each of the alleged defamatory statements in the AP’s articles was 

absolutely privileged as a fair and true report of judicial proceedings. The substance of 

both the July 31, 2012 and August 14, 2012 articles was that restraining orders had been 

issued against Sparks following court hearings based on threats he had made against 

Crow and Weinstein. The articles accurately described statements made at the hearings 

and in the documents filed on behalf of Crow and Weinstein in support of their requests 

for a restraining order. Indeed, the record reflects that all of the statements in the articles 

that Sparks claims were defamatory were taken directly from declarations contained in 

court filings and from testimony given at court hearings. While Sparks asserts that the 

AP’s editorial decisions gave a “false tone” of the events surrounding the hearings and a 

“false impression” of his mental or emotional state, he did not make any showing that the 

AP’s articles misrepresented what was said during the judicial proceedings. 
9

In support of his claims, Sparks challenges the AP’s statement in both the July 31, 

2012 and August 14, 2012 articles that a union representative reported that Sparks had 

threatened to shoot Crow and Weinstein. He also contends that the AP falsely published 

that he acknowledged making such threat at the August 14, 2012 hearing. The statement 

in the AP’s articles about the threat that Sparks communicated to the Screen Actors Guild 

employee was based directly on a declaration submitted by the employee in support of 

Crow’s request for a restraining order. In the declaration, the employee stated that, 

during a telephone conversation with Sparks in which he complained about Crow and 

Weinstein stealing from him and surreptitiously filming him, Sparks said to her at one 

point, “I’ll just shoot them. Fuck it.” At the August 14, 2012 hearing, Sparks did not 

deny that he had threatened to shoot Crow and Weinstein in his conversation with the 

union employee. Instead, when questioned about the threat, Sparks testified that the 

employee’s statement about what was said should have included the caveat that Crow and 

Weinstein were “threatening [his] life.”4 Although the AP did not report Sparks’s 

 

4 The transcript of the August 14, 2012 hearing reflects that, when asked whether 

he told the union employee that he would shoot Crow and Weinstein, Sparks testified 

as follows: “That was part of a sentence that she edited out. What the thing was, was 

Sheryl Crow threatened – kept threatening me. Kept threatening – well, I’m – I’m 

homeless. Driving by at 2:00 in the morning, ‘You are going to be killed, Phil.’ I’m 

with SAG because I am a Screen Actors Guild member. And one of the constitutions 

of being a union member, no one should be harassed or filmed, you know, without his or 

her permission. I’ve been to Screen Actors Guild three times. After the first 2007 show, 

I went to the Screen Actors Guild. I’m a union member. Sheryl Crow and Harvey 

Weinstein filmed me illegally.” 

 When asked to clarify how his statement was taken out of context, Sparks further 

testified: “The whole sentence was: ‘These people are threatening me, threatening my 

life.’ I have a reason to feel threatened. Because Ronni Chasen was helping me. She 

was going to turn Sheryl Crow and Steve Weintraub in to the authorities. For one, for 

embezzlement, and some other stuff. And rape. . . . But I said, ‘These people are 

threatening my life. I’m asking for help. You know, I’m a union member. You are 

supposed to help me. For one, they are filming me without my permission. Two, I’m 

homeless in – not Hollywood – Santa Monica and Venice. They are driving by yelling 

profanity; telling me I’m going to be killed; telling me I should have kept my mouth 
10

specific claim that Crow and Weinstein had threatened his life, it did relate that Sparks 

had stated that he made his threat in frustration because he believed they had stolen from 

him and continued to follow him. The AP’s articles thus accurately conveyed the 

substance or gist of Sparks’s threat. 

Sparks also argues that the AP’s August 14, 2012 article misrepresented the 

qualifications of the testifying psychiatrist, Dr. David Glaser, and the circumstances 

of his meeting with Sparks. In particular, Sparks asserts that the AP should have 

investigated whether Dr. Glaser had a valid medical license at the time of his testimony, 

and should have reported that his interview with Sparks was a brief casual conversation, 

held under false pretenses. However, the statements in the AP’s article concerning the 

basis for Dr. Glaser’s opinion about Sparks came directly from his testimony at the 

August 14, 2012 hearing. Dr. Glaser specifically testified that he was board certified in 

forensic psychiatry and that he interviewed Sparks for about an hour on August 9, 2012 

after approaching him along the Venice Beach Boardwalk. Sparks did not raise any 

objections to Dr. Glaser’s qualifications at the August 14, 2012 hearing, nor did he offer 

any evidence at that time regarding the status of the doctor’s medical license. While 

Sparks did try to elicit testimony from Dr. Glaser that their meeting lasted only 10 

minutes, Dr. Glaser maintained that he spoke with Sparks for almost an hour. The 

article’s references to Dr. Glaser as a forensic psychiatrist who had recently interviewed 

Sparks was a fair and true report of the doctor’s testimony. 

Sparks further claims that the AP made defamatory statements in its August 14, 

2012 article when it reported that Dr. Glaser had diagnosed him as being “imminently 

dangerous” and “unambiguously delusional.” The record reflects that these statements 

in the AP’s article were based on direct quotes from Dr. Glaser’s testimony at the 

 

shut.’ . . . And I have a reason to be feared for my life because the person that was 

helping me, Sheryl Crow’s publicist, was murdered. She was close to me. So I have a 

reason. And on that statement I said, ‘Listen, if they come near me and they try to hurt 

me, yes, because you are not helping me, if anybody comes near me and tries to hurt me, 

I will shoot them.’” 
11

August 14, 2012 hearing and were accurately represented by the AP as the doctor’s 

proffered opinion about Sparks. Dr. Glaser specifically testified that Sparks had 

“directed his psychosis at Ms. Crow,” and that his internet postings were “rampant with 

data that supports that this man is imminently dangerous.” Dr. Glaser also testified that 

Sparks “is unambiguously delusional, and his delusions and his delusional web has pulled 

Ms. Crow and Mr. Weinstein into it.” While Sparks contests the underlying validity of 

Dr. Glaser’s diagnosis and qualifications, he cannot dispute that the AP accurately 

described what Dr. Glaser said about him at the hearing. 

Sparks nevertheless suggests that the AP’s article should have portrayed him in a 

more favorable light by reporting his allegations that he was being “railroaded” by false 

testimony from witnesses. However, the AP was not required to present Sparks’s version 

of the facts in reporting on the results of the judicial proceedings or to independently 

investigate whether the witnesses who testified against him were credible. (Paterno v. 

Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1355, 1356 [“journalists may simply report 

the facts of proceedings without providing an explanation of those facts” and “are within 

their constitutionally protected rights to write an article describing the perspective of only 

one side of a controversy”]; Dorsey v. National Enquirer, Inc. (9th Cir. 1992) 973 F.2d 

1431, 1436 [California’s fair report privilege “‘does not require the reporter to resolve the 

merits of the charges, nor does it require that he present the [plaintiff’s] version of the 

facts’”].) Because the AP’s articles accurately represented the substance of the judicial 

proceedings and the restraining orders issued against Sparks, they were protected by the 

fair report privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d). The trial court accordingly 

did not err in granting the AP’s special motion to strike.5

 

5 In light of our conclusion that Sparks’s claims were barred as a matter of law by 

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (d), we need not consider the trial court’s alternative 

grounds for granting the special motion to strike. 
12

IV. Notice of the Special Motion to Strike 

Sparks also contends that reversal is required because the AP filed its special 

motion to strike “illegally” by listing the incorrect case number on the notice of motion. 

This claim lacks merit because Sparks opposed the AP’s motion on the merits and failed 

to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the alleged defect in the notice. 

“A party who appears at the hearing on a motion and contests the motion on the 

merits without objecting to a defect or irregularity in the notice of motion ordinarily is 

deemed to waive the defect or irregularity. . . . Courts have applied this rule where the 

party failed to object at the hearing [citations], where the objection was deemed 

inadequate [citations], and where the party may have objected but failed to show 

prejudice resulting from the defective notice [citations]. Courts applying the waiver 

rule generally have concluded that the party’s appearance at the hearing and opposition 

on the merits showed that the notice ‘served its purpose,’ despite any defect [citations], 

and that any defect in the notice did not prejudice the party’s preparation for the hearing 

and opportunity to be heard. [Citations.]” (Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 

Cal.App.4th 333, 342-343.) Consequently, “[i]n order to obtain a reversal based upon 

such a procedural flaw, the appellant must demonstrate not only that the notice was 

defective, but that he or she was prejudiced. [Citations.] ‘. . . Procedural defects which 

do not affect the substantial rights of the parties do not constitute reversible error. 

[Citation.]’” (Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288.) 

The record reflects that the AP timely filed and served its special motion to strike 

and that Sparks received the motion. Although the notice of motion originally listed the 

incorrect case number, the AP corrected the error in a notice of errata that it filed and 

served on Sparks at least eight days prior to the scheduled hearing. Sparks then filed an 

opposition to the AP’s motion and appeared at the hearing. When Sparks objected that 

the original notice was defective based on the incorrect case number, the trial court 

agreed to continue the hearing for an additional month and offered Sparks an opportunity 

to file a new opposition. Sparks advised the court, however, that the brief he had filed 

was sufficient to constitute his opposition on the merits, and the court agreed to accept 
13

that brief as Sparks’s timely filed opposition. Sparks thereafter attended the continued 

hearing where he argued the merits of the motion before the trial court. Under these 

circumstances, Sparks cannot show that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the 

caption error in the original notice of motion. Because the alleged defect was harmless to 

Sparks, it does not require reversal of the judgment. 

DISPOSITION 

The judgment is affirmed. The AP shall recover its costs on appeal. 

 ZELON, J. 

We concur: 

 PERLUSS, P. J. 

 SEGAL, J.

 



 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.