FAA Part 16 Docket Clerk 

AGC-600 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue SW 

\Vashington, DC 20591 

October 3, 2015 

HOWARD C. JONES II 

ATTORNEY AT LAW 

howardcjones@attglobal.net 

105 WEST FOURTH STREET, SUITE 400 E 

WINSTON-SALEM, NC 27101 

TELEPHONE: 336.750.0860 

FAX: 336.727.1085 

RECE\VED 

OC1 0 5 Z015 

PART 16 DOCKETS 

Re: William Alfred Hicks, Jr. AJK/A Billy Hicks V. City Of Mount Airy, North 

Carolina; A.nd The County Of Surry, Nort.'l Carolina; Through The Mount Airy/Surry 

County Airport Authority; FAA Docket No. 16-15-07 

Dear FAA Part 16 Docket Clerk: 

Enclosed please find an original and three copies (one of which has not been 

stapled) of the Answer and Incorporation by Reference of Motions, Affidavits and 

Exhibits Previously Filed. 

I note that both the County of Surry and the City of Mount Airy have previously 

filed a notice adopting the motions and answer filed and to be filed by the Authonty. 

Also enclosed is copy of the first page of the Answer. Please mark this as filed 

and remrn it in the self addressed and stamped envelope. 

Thank for your consideration 0f this matter 

cc: counsel of record 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, DC 

WILLIAM ALFRED HICKS, JR. 

a/k/a BILLY HICKS 

Complainant, 

vs. 

CITY OF MOUNT AIRY, NORTH 

CAROLINA; and the COUNTY OF SURRY, 

NORTH CAROLINA; through the MOUNT 

AIRY/SURRY COUNTY AIRPORT 

AUTHORITY 

Respondent. 

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____________________________) 

Submitted By: 

Howard C. Jones II, Attorney At Law 

105 West Fourth Street, Suite 400-E 

Winston-Salem, NC 27101 

Phone: 336 750-0860; Cell: 336-816-1716 

Fax: (336) 727-1085 

Email: howardcjonesii@gmail.com 

Attorney for Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority 

FAA Docket No. 16-15-07 

ANSWER 

AND INCORPORATION BY 

REFERENCE OF MOTIONS, 

AFFIDA VIIS AND EXHIBITS 

PREVIOUSLY FILED 

RECEIVED 

OCT 0 5 2015 

PART 16 DOCKETS 

The Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority ("the Authority") hereby files 

the following answer to the complaint filed in this matter. Respondent notes that the 

sponsors, the County of Surry and the City of Mount Airy, have previously filed notices 

adopting the motions and Answer "filed and to be filed" by the Authority. 

Part I of this Answer is a statement of facts. Part II incorporates by reference the 

prior motions, affidavits and exhibits which respondent has filed herein. Part III sets 

forth respondent's admissions and denials of the allegations of the complaint. Part IV 

sets forth respondent's affirmative defenses. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

On January 7 2013, complainant's friend - Mr. Venable filed suit against the 

Authority and the FBO. (Composite Ex. 7-A - Venable Complaint). Venable's 

complaint asserted that in April of 2012 the Authority violated FAA rules by allegedly 

granting the FBO an exclusive right to offer flight instruction, Id. at ~~1-19, and also 

accused the FBO of making defamatory statements. The complaint sought monetary 

damages and an order removing the FBO as airport manager. Id., at page 8. 

Thereafter, the Venable lawsuit was sent to court-ordered mediation and a 

settlement was reached by all parties. On December 10, 2013, Mr. Venable executed a 

"Release of All Claims" in favor of the Authority and the FBO. (Composite Ex. 7-BRelease). In exchange for payments to Mr. Venable and his attorney (who also 

represents Mr. Hicks in this Part 16 proceeding), the release granted the Authority and the 

FBO a full release of all claims of any and all matters whatsoever, including those 

matters alleged in the lawsuit regarding alleged exclusivity. On December 31, 2013, 

Venable dismissed his lawsuit with prejudice. (Composite Ex. 7-C- Dismissal). 

On June 13 2011, complainant and the Authority entered a three-year hangar lease 

with a stated expiration date of May 31 2014. (Ex. 30 to the Part 16 Compl.). In March 

of2013, plaintiff used his hangar to spray paint his airplane. (Part 16 Compl., page 44). 

Plaintiff over-sprayed his plane and damaged aircraft belonging to other tenants. Id. 

The owners of these aircraft (and other tenants) complained to the Authority. Examples 

of tenant letters to the Authority voicing some of these concerns are attached as Exhibits 

33-1 and 33-2 to the Part 16 complaint. However, Mr. Hicks (who was a sitting member 

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of the board) refused to attend the duly noticed meeting of the Authority which was 

intended to address this matter. (Springthorpe Aff., ~ 59). 

On May 17, 2013, the Authority's transactional attorney, Jay Williams, sent a 

letter to Mr. Hicks attempting to terminate the lease due to lease violations, which 

included the overspray incident. In response, on June 5 2013, Mr. Hicks filed a 

declaratory judgment action in state superior court seeking an injunction against eviction 

and a renewal of the lease. (Composite Ex. 7-D- Hicks State Court Complaint). After 

litigating this action and engaging in protracted discovery, Mr. Hicks dismissed the state 

court action without proceeding to trial. (Composite Ex. 7-D- Dismissal). 

On May 31 2014, the Hicks lease expired by its terms. On August 14 2014, the 

Authority filed a summary ejectment action in state magistrate's court on the basis that 

the lease had expired and plaintiff refused to vacate. (Composite Ex. 7-F - Summary 

Ejectment Complaint). Mr. Hicks' written answer requested transfer to state district 

court, alleged that the Authority had violated plaintiff's constitutional rights, and 

incorporated his request for renewal of the lease. (Composite Ex. 7-G - Answer to 

Summary Ejectment). After multiple continuances by Mr. Hicks, the state court 

peremptorily set summary ejectment for hearing on January 13 2015. (Composite Ex. 7-I 

-State Court Order Dated January 20 2015). 

On the evening of January 12 2015 Mr. Hicks filed a lawsuit in federal court 

seeking renewal of the lease and damages from the Authority and each of the seven 

current board members. (Composite Ex. 7-H - Hicks Federal Complaint). The next 

morning, Mr. Hicks attempted to use the federal lawsuit to stop the state court summary 

ejectment hearing. However, the state court judge refused and entered a written finding 

3 
that the last minute filing of the federal lawsuit was filed "for the purposes of delay." 

(Composite Ex. 7-I- State Court Order Dated January 20 2015). After hearing evidence, 

the state court found that Mr. Hicks was not entitled to an extension of the lease and 

granted summary ejectment. (Composite Ex. 7-J- State Court Order Dated January 30 

2015). On February 5 2015, Mr. Hicks appealed the summary ejectment order to the 

North Carolina Court of Appeals. (Composite Ex. 7-K- Notice of Appeal). 

On February 23 2015, despite the fact that the Authority had not issued a writ of 

possession, Mr. Hicks vacated the leased premises and surrendered possession to the 

Authority. (Composite Ex. 7-L- Joint Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot, ~3(c)). On 

April 1, 2015, in reliance on Mr. Hicks' decision to surrender and vacate hangar number 

7, the Authority entered a new lease for hangar 7 with a new tenant - Mr. O'Neal. 

(Springthorpe Aff., ~61). Mr. O'Neal moved his aircraft into hangar 7 and is currently 

occupying the hangar. I d. 

Thereafter, Mr. Hicks agreed that his surrender of hangar 7 mooted his state court 

appeal of the summary ejectment order. (Composite Ex. 7-L- Joint Motion to Dismiss 

Appeal as Moot, ~3(c)). Accordingly, Mr. Hicks agreed to dismissal of the appeal in 

order to avoid the imposition of sanctions for a frivolous appeal. Id. at ~6. On April 16 

2015, the state court of appeals dismissed Mr. Hicks' appeal as moot. (Composite Ex. 7-

M- State court of appeals order dated April 16 10 15). 

On April 6 2015, Mr. Hicks amended his federal lawsuit to add claims against the 

Authority's transactional attorney, Jay Williams, and the Surry County Fire Marshal. 

(Composite Ex. 7-N- Hicks First Amended Complaint). The amended complaint filed in 

federal court does not contest that plaintiff damaged airplanes belonging to other tenants 

4 
and in so doing violated the lease and the fire code. Instead, the amended federal 

complaint asserts that other tenants may have also violated their leases (albeit without 

damaging other tenants' aircraft); and asserts in that the lease was not renewed in 

retaliation for Mr. Hicks' support of Mr. Venable. (Composite Ex. 7-N - Amend. 

Compl., 'j88). The amended federal complaint asserts that this was part of a grand 

conspiracy involving each of the seven members of the Authority, the Authority's 

transactional attorney and the Surry County Fire Marshal. 

On May 4 2015, Mr. Hicks filed this forty-nine-page Part 16 complaint. In 

keeping with prior litigation, the Part 16 complaint once again claims that Mr. Hicks is 

entitled to a hangar lease and once again contends that his lease was not renewed because 

of a conspiracy against Mr. Hicks due to his support for Mr. Venable. However, in this 

Part 16 complaint Mr. Hicks also seeks to re-litigate the exclusive rights claim Mr. 

Venable previously raised in state court and settled in the fall of 2012. The Part 16 

complaint also seeks to litigate claims that unsuccessful 2013 bidders for the FBO 

contract (who are not parties to this filing) should have been allowed to resubmit their 

bids. The Part 16 complaint also alleges a myriad of conspiracies purporting to effectuate 

purported "special interests" spanning a period of ahnost twenty years. 

As should be evident by claimant's delay in raising these other matters, at the 

heart of the Part 16 complaint is Mr. Hicks' contention that he is entitled to a new hangar 

lease. This is the same claim Mr. Hicks raised in the state court declaratory judgment 

action (which Mr. Hicks dismissed without proceeding to trial); in the summary 

ejectment action (which Mr. Hicks lost); and in the appeal (which was dismissed as moot 

because Mr. Hicks vacated and surrendered the hangar to the Authority). It is also the 

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same claim Mr. Hicks raised in the federal lawsuit (which has been briefed and is 

awaiting ruling on motions to dismiss). 

The complaint in this Part 16 proceeding is lengthy and makes a variety of factual 

claims. A fuller discussion of these matters is provided in the Motion to Dismiss or in the 

Alternative for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum and the affidavits filed 

in support of the same. The facts relating to these claims are summarized as follows. 

With regard to the lease, the Authority terminated Mr. Hicks's lease because he 

damaged aircraft belonging to several other tenants, and in so doing violated his lease and 

the fire code. The termination did not treat Mr. Hicks differently than other similarly 

situated tenants - there were no similarly situated tenants - that is, there were no other 

tenants besides Mr. Hicks who damaged other tenant's aircraft. 

With regard to alleged removal of an unnamed friend from the waiting list, the 

Authority did not remove another (unnamed) person from a hangar waiting list because 

of a relationship with Mr. Hicks and Mr. Hicks was not banned from the airport, 

constructively or otherwise. 

With regard to the airport expansion project, the Authority has acquired all title 

and easements necessary for the portions of the expansion project which have been 

funded. The Authority's efforts to acquire title and easements were reasonable given the 

constraints they faced. The purposes or goals of the expansion project are not a special 

interest. 

With regard to Pike through the fence access, Pike does in fact have a written 

agreement with the Authority and the agreement does in fact protect airport interests and 

adequately compensate the airport. 

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With regard to corporate leases and fuel farms, these practices alleged are 

beneficial to the airport, reasonable and in keeping with industry practices. 

With regard to shared maintenance, the Authority's maintenance cost sharing 

practices with adjoining landowners are beneficial to the airport, reasonable and in 

keeping with industry practices. The example cited in the complaint did not interfere 

with airport use. 

With regard to the hayfield, the Authority does not use or authorize the use of the 

hayfield owned by Mr. and Mrs. Kirkman. There has never been an occasion where the 

hayfield interfered with the use of the airport. 

With regard to the fuel audit, Mr. Springthorpe did not change the Tasking for the 

audit. The audit was performed per the Tasking. The Authority has taken reasonable 

steps to develop and implement procedures to address the issues raised in the audit. 

Authority funds are no longer used for maintaining fuel inventory. 

With regard to airport management, the authority has retained sufficient control 

over the airport manager. This control is retained in the FBO agreement and documented 

by the Authority's history. 

With regard to FBO bidding, the bidding process for the FBO contract was fair 

and the Authority did not grant the FBO an exclusive right to bid on the contract. 

With regard to Mr. Venable, the Authority settled Mr. Venable's claim regarding 

exclusivity. Even if the Authority had not settled this claim, the Authority did not grant 

the FBO an exclusive right to conduct flight training. 

7 
With regard to alleged car detailing by the FBO, the Authority did not give 

permission for car detailing. The Authority took prompt and reasonable steps to insure 

that, if car detailing was currently occurring it would be stopped and not occur again. 

II. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE OF MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS AND 

EXHIBITS PREVIOUSLY FILED. 

Respondent reasserts and incorporates by reference the motions raised in the 

previously filed Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment 

and Supporting Memorandum and affirmatively asserts the statements contained therein 

as part of this answer. Respondent also incorporates by reference the affidavits which 

respondent filed in support of these motions and affirmatively asserts the statements 

contained therein as part of this answer. Respondent further incorporates by reference the 

Composite Exhibit of Related Lawsuits as evidence of the history of this controversy. 

III. ADMISSIONS AND DENIALS OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE 

COMPLAINT 

Respondent notes that the complaint filed in this part 16 proceeding does not 

contain numbered paragraphs. Respondent further notes that, in addition to rambling 

factual assertions, unsupported conclusions and speculation, the complaint contains legal 

argument. Respondent has attempted to set forth admissions and denials of the factual 

assertions found in the complaint by restating the subject headings of the complaint in 

italics, and then providing respondent's response. To the extent this answer does not 

expressly admit allegations of the complaint, the allegations of the complaint are hereby 

denied. 

8 
A. Complainant's section entitled JURISDICTION on pages 1-2 of the 

complaint. 

Respondent admits that in a Part 16 proceeding the FAA has jurisdiction to 

determine compliance with grant assurances. However, complainant has raised a number 

of issues in the complaint which do not relate to grant assurance compliance. Respondent 

denies that the FAA has jurisdiction under Part 16 to determine state law contract 

disputes regarding complainant's hangar lease and the waiting list (which have already 

been litigated in the state courts). Respondent also denies that the FAA has jurisdiction 

in a Part 16 proceeding to entertain allegations concerning the appropriateness of the 

policy goals of the airport improvement project (previously approved by the FAA). 

Respondent also denies that the FAA has jurisdiction under Part 16 to entertain 

allegations regarding the private use of private property belonging to Mr. and Mrs. 

Kirkman (who are not a parties to this proceeding, and whom, upon information and 

belief, have received no federal aviation grants pertaining to said property). 

B. Complainant's section entitled PARTIES on page 2 of the complaint. 

It is admitted that Mr. Hicks was a past board member and a past tenant. It is 

further admitted that respondent Mount Airy /Surry County Airport Authority is the 

governing body of the airport and the City of Mount Airy and the County of Surry are the 

sponsors. In all other respects, the allegations of this section are denied. 

C. Complainant's section entitled CERTIFICATIONS OF ATTEMPTS 

AT RESOLUTION on pages 2-3 of the complaint. 

It is admitted that complainant did attempt to resolve his allegation that he was 

entitled to a renewal of the hangar lease. However, it is denied that complainant made 

9 
the required attempts to resolve the other matters alleged in the complaint. This matter is 

more fully addressed on pages I 0 and II of respondent's Motion to Dismiss or in the 

Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum and paragraph 

2 of Mr. Springthorpe's affidavit which are incorporated herein by reference. 

D. Complainant's section entitled BASIS OF THE COMPLAINT on 

pages 3-5 of the complaint. 

It is admitted that Mr. Hicks was a past member of the board of the Mount 

Airy/Surry County Airport Authority. It is denied that complainant is directly or 

substantially affected by the matters alleged in the complaint. 

Subparagraphs (i) through (x) of this section are argument and legal conclusions, 

and do not require a response. Alternatively, the same are denied. 

On page four, complainant asserts that respondent has violated grant assurances 4, 

5, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 24. Again, this constitutes argument and legal conclusions, and 

does not require a response. Alternatively, it is expressly denied that respondent has 

violated these grant assurances. 

In all other respects, the allegations ofthis section are denied. 

E. Complainant's section in STATEMENT OF FACTS entitled A. Parties 

involved at KMWK and with these issues on pages 5-6 of the complaint. 

The first three paragraphs of this section are admitted only as to the identity of the 

persons and entities identified. With regard to the fourth paragraph of this section, it is 

admitted that Joseph H. Williams is an attorney and provides legal services to the board. 

It is further admitted the FBO agreement has been filed by respondent as Exhibit 4 to the 

affidavit of Mr. Zamora and is the best evidence of the same. 

10 
In all other respects, the allegations of this section are denied. 

F. Complainant's section in STATEMENT OF FACTS entitled B. Audit 

of FBO' fuel usage and hangar rents inteifered with by Chairman Springthorpe on 

pages 6-7 of the complaint. 

It is admitted that the board voted to engage the accounting firm of Haynes Strand 

to perform an audit, and by definition this means that at least a majority of the board was 

in favor of an audit and that the decision to undertake an audit was supported by the 

board, not just complainant. The Part 16 complaint correctly attached a copy of the 

Tasking for Haynes Strand as Exhibit I to the complaint. However, the complaint 

incorrectly states that Mr. Springthorpe changed the Tasking. Further, complainant also 

failed to attach a full copy of the Haynes Strand report, and instead, misleadingly limited 

complainant's Exhibit 2 to the two pages of recommendations from Haynes Strand but 

omitted the eight -page report on which these recommendations were predicated. 

It is further admitted and alleged that the true and correct factual history of this 

matter is set forth on pages 34-3 7 of the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion 

for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, paragraphs 15-20 of Mr. 

Springthorpe's affidavit and paragraphs 1-12 of Mr. Zamora's affidavit, which are 

incorporated herein by reference. 

In all other respects the allegations of this section are denied. 

G. Complainant's section in STATEMENT OF FACTS entitled C. RaTech permitted exclusive flight training terminating a competitor flight instructor on 

pages 7-10 of the complaint. 

11 
With regard to the allegations of the first paragraph of this section, it is admitted 

that respondent has filed a copy of the FBO agreement with this tribunal and that this is 

the best evidence of said agreement. In all other respects, this paragraph is denied. 

With regard to the remaining paragraphs in this section, it is admitted that Mr. 

Venable did not obtain permission to engage in flight instruction and did not comply with 

the rules and regulations for the same. It is expressly denied that respondent granted 

exclusive rights to Mr. Spane or RaTech. In all other respects the allegations of these 

paragraphs are denied. 

It is further admitted and alleged that the true and correct factual history of this 

matter is set forth on pages 42-44 of the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion 

for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum and paragraphs 52-56 of Mr. 

Springthorpe's affidavit, which are incorporated herein by reference. It is further 

admitted that the history of Mr. Venable's litigation and settlement of this matter is 

documented by the complaint, settlement and dismissal of the same which have been 

filed by respondent in the Composite Exhibit of Related Lawsuits. 

In all other respects the allegations of this section are denied. 

H. Complainant's section in STATEMENT OF FACTS entitled D. 

Request for proposals to operate the FBO at KMWK on pages 10-11 of the complaint. 

This section of the complaint contains allegations concerning two matters: (1) 

allegations concerning the FBO bidding process and (2) allegations concerning car 

detailing by the FBO. 

With regard to allegations concerning the FBO bidding process, it is admitted that 

the board put the FBO contract up for bid in 2013. It is further admitted that the board 

12 
voted to enter a contract with Mr. Spane and Ra-Tech. It is further admitted and alleged 

that the true and correct factual history of this matter is set forth on pages 40-42 of the 

Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting 

Memorandum and paragraphs 36-42 of Mr. Springthorpe's affidavit, which are 

incorporated herein by reference. In all other respects, the allegations concerning the 

FBO bidding process are denied. 

With regard to allegations concerning car detailing by the FBO, the complaint 

cites complainant's Exhibit SA as evidence of current non-aeronautical operations. 

Exhibit S appears to be a less than normal printout of a facebook posting with parts 

missing. However, the language concerning car detailing contained in SA indicates a 

date of September of2012. 

It is further admitted and alleged that the true and correct factual history of this 

matter is set forth on page 4S of the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for 

Sunm1ary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum and paragraphs 43-46 of Mr. 

Springthorpe's affidavit which are incorporated herein by reference. 

Respondent is without knowledge as to whether car detailing occurred at the FBO 

or whether it occurred for any significant time and therefore denies the same. However, 

respondent has taken steps to assure this is not now occurring and will not occur in the 

future. 

In all other respects, the allegations of this section are denied. 

I. Complainant's section in STATEMENT OF FACTS entitled E. 

Runway expansion questions on pages 11-14 of the complaint. 

13 
It is admitted that respondent has acquired the necessary title and easements for 

the portions of the project that have been funded. It is further admitted and alleged that 

the true and correct factual history of this matter is set forth on pages 21-25 of the Motion 

to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting 

Memorandum, paragraphs 3-14 of Mr. Springthorpe's affidavit, paragraphs 1-17 of Mr. 

Kirby's affidavit and paragraphs 1-6 of Mr. Semones' affidavit which are incorporated 

herein by reference. 

In all other respects, the allegations in this section are denied. 

J. Complainant's section in STATEMENT OF FACTS entitled F. Pike 

Electric Company and a "Through the Fence" Agreement on pages 14-15 of the 

complaint. 

This section contains allegations concerning (I) Pike's through the fence access; 

(2) corporate hangars; and (3) fuel farms. 

It is admitted that Pike has through the fence access controlled by the agreement 

which respondent has filed as an exhibit to the affidavit of Ms. Hall. It is further 

admitted that Mr. Kirkman provided pilot services for Pike and Insteel. It is further 

admitted that corporate tenants have invested their own funds to construct hangars and 

improve airport property. It is further admitted that Insteel has a fuel farm which it 

constructed with its own funds. However, it is denied Mr. Springthorpe, or any entity 

associated with Mr. Springthorpe, has a fuel farm. In all other respects, the allegations of 

this section are denied. 

With regard to Pike's access, it is further admitted and alleged that the true and 

correct factual history of this matter is set forth on pages 27-28 of the Motion to Dismiss 

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or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, 

paragraphs 22-23 of Mr. Springthorpe's affidavit and paragraphs 1-3 of Ms. Hall's 

affidavit, which are incorporated herein by reference. 

With regard to corporate hangars and fuel farms, it is further admitted and alleged 

that the true and correct factual history of this matter is set forth on pages 28-31 of the 

Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting 

Memorandum, paragraphs 24-31 of Mr. Springthorpe's affidavit which are incorporated 

herein by reference. 

In all other respects, the allegations of this section are denied. 

K. Complainant's section in STATEMENT OF FACTS entitled G. 

Special Interests by long-term Airport Authority Board Members on pages 15-16 of the 

complaint. 

This section contains allegations concerning (1) the Hayfield belonging to Mr. 

and Mrs. Kirkman and (2) allegations that the purpose of the airport expansion project is 

an impermissible special interest for board members. 

With regard to the Hayfield, it is admitted that Mr. and Mrs. Kirkman own a 

hayfield and that, on occasion, Mr. Kirkman uses the hayfield to land and take off. It is 

further admitted and alleged that the true and correct factual history of this matter is set 

forth on pages 33-34 of the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary 

Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, paragraphs 32-35 of Mr. Springthorpe's 

affidavit and paragraphs 1-4 of Mr. Kirkman's affidavit, which are incorporated herein by 

reference. In all other respects, the allegations of this section of the complaint are denied. 

15 
With regard to the purpose of the expansion project, it is admitted that the 

improvements called for in this project are designed to enhance the capacity and safety of 

operations for the public, general aviation and corporate and business aircraft using the 

facility. It is further admitted and alleged that the true and correct factual history of this 

matter is set forth on pages 25-27 of the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion 

for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, and paragraphs 4-9 of Mr. 

Springthorpe's affidavit which are incorporated herein by reference. In all other respects, 

the allegations of this section of the complaint are denied. 

L. Complainant's section in STATEMENT OF FACTS entitled H. Billy 

Hicks hangar lease terminated by the Board on pages 16-20 of the complaint. 

This section contains allegations concerning (1) the termination of Mr. Hick's 

lease; (2) allegations concerning banning Mr. Hicks from the airport and the removal of 

"an acquaintance" from a waiting list; and (3) allegations concerning car detailing. 

With regard to the allegations concerning the lease, it is admitted that Mr. Hicks 

was a member of the board. It is further admitted that Mr. Hicks had a lease and was on 

the waiting list for another hangar. It is further admitted that Mr. Hicks's lease was not 

renewed, and his name was removed from the hangar waiting list, because Mr. Hicks 

engaged in spray painting of his aircraft in his leasehold to the detriment and serious 

damage to the aircraft of several tenants and in so doing violated his lease and the fire 

code. It is expressly denied that any other tenant has ever engaged in this type of conduct 

to the damage of aircraft owed by other tenants. In all other respects, the allegations of 

this section are denied. 

16 
It is further admitted and alleged that the true and correct factual history of this 

matter is set forth on pages 2-6 and 14-20 of the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative 

Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum and paragraphs 57-63 of 

Mr. Springthorpe's affidavit which are incorporated herein by reference. The extensive 

litigation history of this matter is also documented in the Composite Exhibit of Related 

Lawsuits which respondent has filed herein. 

With regard to the allegations concerning FBO car detailing, these allegations are 

addressed above and said response is incorporated herein by reference. In all other 

respects, these allegations are denied. 

With regard to the allegations regarding the alleged unnamed "acquaintance" and 

allegations that Mr. Hicks has been banned from the airport, it is denied that respondent 

has removed anyone from a waiting list for reasons relating in any way to Mr. Hicks. It 

is also denied that Mr. Hicks has been banned from the airport. It is further admitted and 

alleged that the true and correct factual history of this matter is set forth on page 20 of the 

Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting 

Memorandum and paragraphs 63-64 of Mr. Springthorpe's affidavit which are 

incorporated herein by reference. 

In all other respects, the allegations of this section are denied. 

M. Complainant's section entitled STATEMENT OF COMPLAINTS 

PRESENTED on pages 20-21 of the complaint. 

This section (including but not limited to items I through IX thereof) is legal 

argument and does not require admission or denial. Accordingly, no response ts 

required. Alternatively, the allegations of this section are denied. 

17 
N. Complainant's section entitled ARGUMENT on pages 21-46 of the 

complaint. 

This section (including but not limited to sections I through IX thereof) is legal 

argument and does not require admission or denial. Accordingly, no response IS 

required. Alternatively, the allegations of this section are denied. 

0. Complainant's section entitled CONCLUSION on page 47 of the 

complaint. 

This section (including but not limited to items A through H thereof) is legal 

argument and does not require admission or denial. Accordingly, no response is required. 

Alternatively, it is denied that respondent has violated grant assurances and it is denied 

that claimant is entitled to any relief from this tribunal. Alternatively, in all other 

respects, the allegations of this section are denied. 

P. Complainant's exhibits. 

It is admitted that the excerpts from deposition testimony are coptes of the 

deposition testimony. It is further admitted that the exhibits purporting to be copies of 

the Tasking, the complainant's lease, minutes, and emails and letters from board 

members, tenants and counsel, are the documents they purport to be. However, it is 

denied that complainant has attached full and complete copies of some of the documents 

(i.e., the Haynes Strand Audit). With regard to the remainder of the exhibits, respondent 

objections on the grounds that these documents are not authenticated and many of these 

documents contain false or misleading information and unsubstantiated hearsay and are 

otherwise inaccurate. 

18 
Q. Further denial. 

To the extent that respondent has not expressly admitted any of the allegations of 

the complaint, said allegations are expressly denied. 

S. Incorporation by reference. The substance of and statements contained 

in the affidavits respondent has filed herein are incorporated herein by reference as 

affirmative allegations and part of this answer. The substance of and statements 

contained in the Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively for Summary Judgment and 

Supporting Memorandum are incorporated herein by reference as affirmative allegations 

and part of this answer. 

IV. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 

By way of further defense to the matters alleged in the complaint, respondent 

alleges as follows: 

1. All of complainant's claims except for those pertaining to termination of 

his lease are barred by complainant's failure to attempt resolution prior to filing this Part 

16 complaint. 

2. Complainant lacks standing to assert claims pertaining to Mr. Venable, 

complainant's unnamed "acquaintance" and the unsuccessful bidders for the FBO 

contract because complainant is not the real party in interest and the real parties in 

interest are not parties to this Part 16 proceeding. 

3. Complainant lacks standing to assert any of the claims raised in the 

complaint because he is not directly or substantially affected by the matters alleged. 

19 
4. All of the claims alleged in the complaint are barred because they are stale 

and on the grounds of laches and on the grounds of the inexcusable delay of complainant 

in bringing theses claims. 

5. All of the claims are barred on the grounds that they do not relate to issues 

concerning present non-compliance with grant assurances. 

6. Complainant's claims concerning the lease and waiting list are barred on 

the grounds that they are moot because complainant voluntarily vacated his lease and 

thereafter the hangar was leased to another tenant. 

7. The claims concerning Mr. Venable are barred by the prior litigation and 

settlement of Mr. Venable's claims and Part 16's policy of promoting settlement and 

informal resolution. 

8. Complainant's claims regarding his lease and the waiting list have been 

litigated in state court and are barred by res-judicata and collateral estoppel. 

9. The following claims are not proper claims for consideration under a Part 

16 proceeding and this tribunal lacks jurisdiction regarding the same: (a) Mr. and Mrs. 

Kirkman's hayfield; (b) claims concerning the wisdom and policy goals of the airport 

improvement project; and (c) claims concerning state law contract rights under the lease 

or the waiting list. 

10. Complainant's claims regarding his lease and the waiting list are barred on 

the grounds of complainant's illegal, unjust and irresponsible behavior and his unclean 

hands in that he and he alone decided to engage in behavior which damaged the aircraft 

of other tenants (which also violated his lease and the fire code) and he and he alone 

refused to even attend the meeting which was duly noticed to address concerns regarding 

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the same or offer any assurances that he would not engage in this type of behavior again. 

Instead, complainant steadfastly maintained and continues to maintain this this was a 

trivial occurrence and that complainant has the right to violate rules without regard to the 

consequences on other tenants. 

11. Respondent's practices with regard to the maters alleged in the complaint 

were reasonable, in keeping with respondent's duties, in keeping with industry standards 

for an airport of similar local and size, and were prudent and beneficial to the airport and 

the users of the airport. 

12. Much of the conduct complained of by complainant was required by Grant 

Assurances and the responsibilities that flow therefrom. For example: 

(a) With regard to long term leases for hangars constructed usmg 

tenant funds, Grant Assurance 38 requires the granting of long-term leases to 

tenants which construct hangars at their own expense. The corporate leases 

complained of by complainant in this case which were granted to tenants who 

expended their own funds to construct the same were a reasonable exercise of 

these responsibilities. 

(b) With regard to fuel farms, respondent has a duty to permit selffueling under reasonable standards that enhance the safety and efficiency of an 

airport operation. The fuel farm at issue in this case was a reasonable exercise of 

these responsibilities. 

(c) With regard to Mr, Hick's lease, respondent has an obligation to 

protect the rights of other tenants to be able to use their hangars without fear of 

incurring damage to their aircraft resulting from illegal conduct of irresponsible 

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tenants such as Mr. Hicks. Terminating Mr. Hicks' lease after he interfered with 

other tenants' rights was a reasonable exercise of these responsibilities. 

WHEREFORE respondent respectfully requests that this tribunal dismiss the 

complaint with prejudice and for such other and further relief as this tribunal deems 

appropriate. 

Respectfully submitted, this the 3rd day of October 2015. 

Winston-Salem, NC 2710106 

Telephone: (336) 750-0860 

Fax: (336) 727-1085 

Email: howardcjonesii@gmail.com 

Attorney for Mount Airy/Surry County Airport Authority 

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rERTIFICATE OF SERVI~E 

I, Howard C. Jones II, certifY that on October 3, 2015 I filed and served this 

Answer by placing the original thereof and three copies to the FAA, in prepaid first class 

or express envelopes or boxes in the custody of the United Stutes Mail and by delivering 

a copy to counsel of record addressed as follows: 

Mailed To: 

FAA Part 16 Docket Clerk 

AGC-600 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Mailed To: 

Randolph M. James 

Attorney for Plaintiffs 

Randolph M. James, P.C. 

P.O. Box 20069 

Winston-Salem, NC 27120 

A!!orney For Complainant 

Mailed To: 

Edwin M. Woltz 

119 Rawley A venue 

Mount Airy, NC 27030 

Attorney for the County of Smry, North Carolina 

Mailed To: 

Hugh B. Campbell, lil 

235 E. Independence B I vel. 

PO Box 1846 

Mount Airy, North Carolina 27030 

Attorney for the City of Mount Airy, North Carolina 

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