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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PATRICK NEIL KINNEY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

UNPUBLISHED 

January 19, 2017 

V No. 329588 

Ingham Circuit Court 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, LC No. 15-000144-AA 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and MARKEY and MURRAY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this prison-misconduct appeal, plaintiff argues that the prison rule under which he was 

charged and adjudicated is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree and affirm. 

 Plaintiff was charged with violating Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) 

Prisoner Discipline Policy Directive 03.03.105, possession of dangerous contraband—escape 

material. The charge is based on a detailed drawing that plaintiff created that depicts the prison 

security perimeter from a vantage point inside the prison. The drawing includes the fence, 

support posts, guard tower, and light posts. Plaintiff claims that he created the drawing as an art 

project and that he intended on submitting it in a contest in which he had previously participated. 

Following a hearing, the misconduct charge was initially upheld. A hearings’ administrator who 

ordered a rehearing requested that the next hearing officer determine whether the drawing was 

escape material and whether plaintiff had sufficient notice that the drawing could be considered 

escape material. The hearing officer subsequently determined that even though plaintiff likely 

intended to use the drawing for an art project and not to attempt to escape, he was nevertheless 

not authorized by prison staff to create the drawing. The hearing officer also determined that the 

drawing was escape material based on the MDOC prisoner mail policy directive, which prohibits 

prisoners from receiving drawings or detailed descriptions of corrections facilities that depict 

methods of escape. The hearing officer determined that plaintiff had sufficient notice that the 

drawing could be considered escape material, noting that the prisoner mail policy clearly defines 

escape material as including a detailed drawing of a prison facility and that the mail policy “adds 

some of the lacking exemplifications in the pertinent part of the Prisoner Discipline Policy.” 

Plaintiff’s initial guilty adjudication was upheld. 

 Plaintiff filed an appeal in the circuit court, arguing that the prison rule prohibiting escape 

material is unconstitutionally vague and that the hearing officer’s decision that plaintiff’s 
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drawing was escape material was not supported by substantial evidence. The circuit court 

affirmed, noting that the prisoner discipline policy did not define escape material but that the 

“common definitions of escape material would obviously find that drawings of prison facilities 

created with exacting details would constitute escape materials.” The court also noted that the 

mail policy defined escape materials, which put plaintiff on notice that his drawing was 

prohibited. Addressing plaintiff’s argument that other prisoners had created similar drawings in 

the past and gone unpunished, the court noted that the other drawings “were all stylized, artistic 

depictions,” while plaintiff’s drawing “is of an identifiable section of fencing and includes the 

fence, support posts, guard tower, light posts, and even snow banks.” The court ultimately 

determined that plaintiff had fair notice that his conduct was prohibited and that the prison rule 

was not unconstitutionally vague. 

 When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, a court must determine whether 

the decision was authorized by law and whether the agency’s factual findings were “supported 

by competent, material and substantial evidence.” Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 791.255(4). 

This Court must then decide “whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and 

whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence to the agency’s factual 

findings.” Boyd v Civil Serv Comm, 220 Mich App 226, 234; 559 NW2d 342 (1996). This 

Court reviews de novo the interpretation of administrative regulations. In re Petition of Attorney 

General for Investigative Subpoenas, 274 Mich App 696, 698; 736 NW2d 594 (2007). 

 Because the principles of statutory interpretation apply equally to the construction of 

administrative rules, City of Romulus v Mich Dep’t of Environmental Quality, 260 Mich App 54, 

65; 678 NW2d 444 (2003), this Court should presume the prison rule involved here to be 

constitutional, and plaintiff must prove it is invalid. See People v Sadows, 283 Mich App 65, 67; 

768 NW2d 93 (2009)(citations omitted)(“A statute is presumed constitutional, and the party 

challenging the statute has the burden of proving its invalidity.”). A statute may be challenged 

on vagueness grounds if it “does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed.” People v 

Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 651; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). Fair notice, requires that a statute give a 

person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Id. at 652. 

“A statute is sufficiently definite if its meaning can fairly be ascertained by reference to judicial 

interpretations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises, or the commonly accepted meanings of 

words.” Id. 

 If an administrative rule’s language is unambiguous, further judicial interpretation is not 

allowed, but where the language is ambiguous, a court may “properly go beyond the words of the 

statute or administrative rule to ascertain the drafter’s intent.” Id. An agency’s interpretation of 

its own administrative rule “is entitled to respectful consideration and, if persuasive, should not 

be overruled without cogent reasons.” In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich, 482 Mich 

90, 108; 754 NW2d 259 (2008). While “the agency’s interpretation cannot conflict with the 

plain meaning of the statute,” it “can be particularly helpful for ‘doubtful or obscure’ 

provisions.” Id. (citation omitted). 

 The prisoner discipline policy directive lists possession of dangerous contraband as a 

class I misconduct. According to the directive, dangerous contraband includes “escape 

material,” but nowhere in the directive is that phrase defined. Defendant urges this Court to look 

at the ordinary dictionary definition and the prisoner mail policy directive to interpret the phrase. 
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Given these tools of statutory construction, defendant contends, and we agree, it is clear that a 

detailed drawing of a prison falls within the prohibited escape material and that plaintiff received 

fair notice of this prohibition. Plaintiff, on the other hand, suggests that he should not be 

required to read another policy directive to figure out what conduct the phrase prohibits, and he 

contends that a plain reading of the prisoner discipline policy directive would not put him on 

notice that a drawing of a prison intended for submission to an art show is prohibited conduct. 

 Under the doctrine of in pari materia, statutes or rules “that relate to the same subject or 

that share a common purpose should, if possible, be read together to create a harmonious body of 

law.” People v Mazur, 497 Mich 302, 313; 872 NW2d 201 (2015). MDOC policy directive 

03.03.105 is entitled prisoner discipline, outlines procedures for prisoner discipline, and lists the 

levels of misconduct. MDOC policy directive 05.03.118 is entitled prisoner mail, outlines rules 

regarding the mail system, and describes mail content that a prisoner is prohibited from 

receiving. Thus, both directives proscribe certain conduct, and the purpose of each directive is to 

regulate prisoner conduct and foster a safe environment for the facility. Because they share a 

common purpose, they should be read together. 

 “Escape material” is not defined in policy directive 03.03.105, and none of the listed 

“common examples” are comparable to the drawing at issue here.1

 MDOC policy directive 

05.03.118 expressly prohibits “[m]ail depicting, encouraging, or describing methods of escape 

from a correctional facility . . . includ[ing] blueprints, drawings, or similar detailed descriptions 

of correctional facilities. . . .” Id., ¶ MM(16). Reading the two directives together because they 

are in pari materia, one cannot question that “escape material” as used within policy directive 

03.03.105, includes “blueprints, drawings, or similar detailed descriptions of correctional 

facilities,” policy directive 05.03.118. While plaintiff posits that a “person of ordinary 

intelligence” should not be required to read multiple policy directives to determine what conduct 

is prohibited, it is not unreasonable to require prisoners—who are inherently subject to strict 

regulations—to know and understand all of the policy directives to which they are subject. 

Because a prisoner is subject to the policy prohibiting incoming mail depicting escape methods 

such as drawings of correctional facilities, it is reasonable to conclude that the policy prohibiting 

escape material includes the same type of drawings. Thus, we conclude that plaintiff had fair 

notice that he was subject to discipline for possessing a detailed drawing of the correctional 

facility. 

 Plaintiff also incorporated into his vagueness argument claims that he was not given fair 

notice because prison staff allowed plaintiff to receive drawings of prisons through the mail and 

allowed other prisoners to make drawings of prisons in the past without punishment. In support 

of his position, plaintiff relies heavily on Wolfel v Morris, 972 F2d 712 (CA 6, 1992). In Wolfel, 

prisoners circulated the signature page of petitions among facility inmates. Id. at 714. The 

facility’s guards and officials seized the pages and charged the prisoners with “possession of, 

 

1

 Both parties note that the policy directive has now been amended to include as common 

examples of escape material “blueprints, drawings, or similar detailed descriptions of 

correctional facilities, courthouses, and medical care facilities.” 
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conspiracy to possess, or attempt to possess contraband” in violation of prison rules. Id. The 

Wolfel court noted that prisoners in the past had been allowed to circulate numerous petitions 

without punishment. Id. at 717. Therefore, the court found that the prisoners charged in the case 

“had no reason to believe that they were engaging in activity prohibited by prison regulations,” 

noting that their conduct “was ‘virtually identical to conduct previously tolerated.’ ” Id., quoting 

Waters v Peterson, 161 US App DC 265, 274; 495 F2d 91 (1973). Ultimately, the Wolfel court 

held that the prisoners’ punishment “violated their due process rights since they had no fair 

warning that they were engaging in prohibited activity.” Id.

 The case at hand is distinguishable from Wolfel. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, there is 

no evidence that prison officials allowed other prisoners to make similar drawings in the past 

without punishment. The drawings that are included in the agency record are substantially 

different. Some include artistic imagery and are not intended to factually represent the details of 

an existing prison structure. They are not “detailed drawings” that depict the prison perimeter 

and highlight the intricacies of the prison security system. The included drawings that do include 

some detail are from a vantage point outside of the facility. Plaintiff’s drawing depicts in detail a 

section of the prison perimeter from inside the facility, including the fence, posts, guard tower, 

lighting, and snow banks. Thus, the fact that these other drawings did not trigger punishment 

does not negate the fair-notice analysis above or render the prison rule void for vagueness. 

 Plaintiff also references his intent as a factor to determine whether he had fair notice that 

his conduct was prohibited. Intent is neither a part of a vagueness analysis nor a part of the rule 

under which plaintiff was charged. A rule provides fair notice if it gives “a person of ordinary 

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Noble, 238 Mich App at 652 

(emphasis added). The rule at issue states nothing regarding intent—it merely prohibits a 

prisoner from possessing dangerous contraband, including escape material. Thus, even if 

plaintiff’s only intent were to submit his drawing to an art competition, he was still given fair 

notice that he could not possess such a detailed drawing of a prison. And the rule provided fair 

notice that his intent in possessing the drawing was not relevant. Therefore, the administrative 

rule prohibiting escape material was not void for vagueness as applied to the facts of this case. 

 We affirm. 

/s/ Peter D. O'Connell 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray