United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 17-1637

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

DeMarko L. Collins

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: March 12, 2018

 Filed: April 23, 2018

[Unpublished] 

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Before WOLLMAN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

DeMarko L. Collins pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and to possession of a stolen
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j) and 924(a)(2). The district court

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sentenced Collins to 108 months’ imprisonment on each count to run consecutively

followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Collins argues the district court

erred in applying two sentencing enhancements to his convictions under the United

States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines or U.S.S.G.). We affirm.

Collins argues that the district court erred in imposing a four-level sentencing

enhancement because the court incorrectly determined that Collins’s prior Missouri

conviction for second-degree robbery was a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines. 

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2); see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.030.1 (1979). This argument

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is foreclosed, however, because in United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 

2018) (en banc) we held that a “conviction for Missouri second-degree robbery [i]s

a ‘violent felony’ under the [Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)].” Our precedent

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views a “violent felony” under the ACCA and a “crime of violence” under the

Guidelines as interchangeable. United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir.

2017). The district court thus did not err in its ruling. See Owsley v. Luebbers, 281

F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one

panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.”).

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.

Effective January 1, 2017, Missouri amended its second-degree robberystatute

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to require “physical injury to another person.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.025.1. This

opinion addresses only the second-degree robbery statute in effect when Collins was

convicted in 2010.

See also United States v. Wilkins, No. 16-4026, slip op., 2018 WL 1750611, 3

— F. App’x — (8th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018); Diemer v. United States, No. 16-3403, slip

op., 2018 WL 1617840, — F. App’x — (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2018); Robinett v. United

States, 886 F.3d 689 (8th Cir. 2018).

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Collins next argues that the district court erred when it applied a three-level

sentencing enhancement “for multiple prior sentences.” Under Guidelines

§ 4A1.2(a)(1), a prior sentence is “any sentence previously imposed upon

adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for

conduct not part of the instant offense.” If two prior sentences were imposed on the

same day, however, the sentences are not counted separately unless there was an

“intervening arrest” between the first and second offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). 

Collins argues that his prior convictions in Jackson County, Missouri, case numbers

0716-CR-02971-01 and 0916-CR-04728-01,should not have been counted separately

because the state court imposed sentences for both offenses on the same day. The

district court ruled, however, that an intervening arrest occurred between the two

incidents. This finding is not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Paden, 330 F.3d

1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review).

The judgment is affirmed.

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