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1

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

2 Hon. M. Elaine Hammond, United States Bankruptcy Judge for

the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP Nos. CC-11-1410-HHaMk

) CC-11-1423-HHaMk

ANTONIA ALEMAN, ) (Related Appeals)

)

Debtor. ) Bk. No. 11-11734-RR

______________________________)

)

ELIZABETH CAMPOS, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) M E M O R A N D U M1

)

ANTONIA ALEMAN, )

)

Appellee. )

______________________________)

Submitted Without Oral Argument on

September 21, 2012

Filed - November 7, 2012

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Robin L. Riblet, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 

Appearances: Appellant Elizabeth Campos pro se on brief;

Clifton Earl Reed, Esq. on brief for appellee

Antonia Aleman. 

Before: HOLLOWELL, HAMMOND2 and MARKELL, Bankruptcy Judges.

FILED

NOV 07 2012

SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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3 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 

All “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

4

 In order to fully understand the facts underlying these

appeals, we have taken judicial notice of documents filed with

the bankruptcy court on its electronic docket. See See O’Rourke

v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955,

957-58 (9th Cir. 1988); Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co.

(In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).

5

 The Debtor amended her bankruptcy schedules on May 27,

2011, based on the additional documentation sought by the

bankruptcy trustee.

-2-

The appellant, Elizabeth Campos (Campos) appeals two orders

of the bankruptcy court. BAP No. CC-11-1410 is an appeal of the

bankruptcy court’s order denying Campos a waiver of the filing

fee for an adversary proceeding that Campos intended to bring to

except her claim from discharge under § 523(a)(6).3 BAP No.

CC-1423 is an appeal of the debtor’s discharge. For the reasons

explained below, we DISMISS both appeals for lack of

jurisdiction.

I. FACTS4

On April 14, 2011, Antonia Aleman (the Debtor) filed a

voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The § 341 meeting of

creditors was scheduled for May 10, 2011, and continued to

June 1, 2011, so that the Debtor could submit additional

documentation and information to the bankruptcy trustee.5 A

notice was sent to all creditors that the deadline to object to

the Debtor’s discharge or to challenge the dischargeability of

any debt was July 11, 2011. The notice specified that if a
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creditor believed “that the debtor is not entitled to receive a

discharge under Bankruptcy Code § 727(a) or that a debt owed

. . . is not dischargeable under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2), (4)

or (6), [the creditor] must file a complaint or a motion . . . by

the [deadline].”

Campos was listed on the Debtor’s schedules as an unsecured

creditor holding a claim in the amount of $6,500. The bankruptcy 

case docket reflects that Campos received notice of the deadline

for bringing actions objecting to or excepting debts from

discharge.

On June 2, 2011, the bankruptcy trustee filed a report of no

distribution, finding that there was no property available for

distribution from the estate over and above that exempted by the

Debtor. In the report, the trustee stated that the estate had

been fully administered and requested relief from any further

duties.

On June 16, 2011, Campos filed an application requesting

that the bankruptcy court waive the fee for filing an adversary

proceeding (Motion to Waive AP Fee). Campos contended that she

could not afford to pay the filing fee to initiate an adversary

proceeding and that based on her income and disability, she was

entitled to proceed with filing a nondischargeability complaint

in forma pauperis (IFP).

Along with the Motion to Waive AP Fee, Campos included a

copy of a complaint (Proposed Complaint), which she intended to

file against the Debtor if the filing fee were waived. According

to the Proposed Complaint, Campos had obtained a judgment in the
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6

 Campos sued the Debtor in Ventura County Small Claims

Court and appears to have also prevailed on an appeal of that

order in the same court. See Appellee’s Opening Br. at 2.

7 No explanation accompanies the bankruptcy court’s order

regarding why the amount was set at $150.00, or what section of

the Bankruptcy Code or other federal law authorized the reduction

of the filing fee.

8

 On appeal, Campos asserts that because her IFP request to

proceed with her appeal was transferred to the district court and

(continued...)

-4-

Ventura County Court (Judgment) in March 2011.6 The Judgment

stemmed from a 2009 incident involving Campos, who is disabled

and uses a wheelchair along with a service dog, and her neighbors

(including the Debtor), who Campos alleged willfully and

maliciously caused their dog to attack her and her service dog. 

The attack resulted in severe injury to Campos’ service dog that

required $6,500 in veterinary expenses and forced Campos to

obtain a replacement service dog. The Proposed Complaint sought

a declaration that the Judgment was nondischargeable under 

§ 523(a)(6). 

Additionally, Campos asserted in the Proposed Complaint that

the Debtor committed fraud by failing to fully disclose

information regarding her marital status and dependents on her

bankruptcy schedules.

On June 17, 2011, the bankruptcy court entered an order

denying the Motion to Waive AP Fee (Fee Waiver Order); however,

it did reduce the fee to $150.00.7

 On July 8, 2011, Campos filed

a notice of appeal, challenging the bankruptcy court’s authority

to deny her IFP request.8
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8(...continued)

subsequently approved by that court, the bankruptcy court lacked

the authority to decide the Motion to Waive AP Fee. Moreover,

she asserts that the approval by the district court of her

request to proceed with her appeal IFP established her

entitlement to have proceeded with the Proposed Complaint without

paying the filing fee.

-5-

Also on July 8, 2011, the Debtor filed a motion requesting

an extension of time to file the appeal. Campos did not,

however, pay the reduced fee to file the Proposed Complaint or

file the Proposed Complaint without paying the required fee.

Campos also did not seek an extension of time to file the

Proposed Complaint while her appeal of the Fee Waiver Order was

pending. The deadline for filing nondischargeability actions

passed on July 11, 2011, and the Debtor received a discharge on

July 18, 2011 (Discharge Order).

On July 26, 2011, Campos filed an appeal of the Discharge

Order, contending that the bankruptcy court erred in entering a

discharge as to her claim.

On September 26, 2011, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP)

entered an order noting that the appeal of the Fee Waiver Order

had not been filed within 14 days of its entry but that a motion

for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was timely

under Rule 8002(c)(2). However, because the bankruptcy court had

not ruled on the extension motion, the BAP remanded the matter to

the bankruptcy court for the limited purpose of ruling on the

extension motion. On October 7, 2011, the bankruptcy court

granted the extension of time to file the appeal.
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Campos requested to proceed with both her appeals IFP. Her

request was transferred to the district court pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915. On April 26, 2012, the district court granted

Campos’ request.

II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(A). We address our jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 158 below.

III. ISSUES

Do we have jurisdiction over the appeals?

If we have jurisdiction over the appeals, did the bankruptcy

court err in entering the Fee Waiver Order and Discharge Order?

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We may raise the question of our jurisdiction over an appeal

sua sponte. WMX Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). Our jurisdiction, such as whether an

appeal is moot, is a question of law that we address de novo. 

Menk v. Lapaglia (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 903 (9th Cir. BAP

1999).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Fee Order

Constitutional mootness is derived from Article III of the

U.S. Constitution, which provides that the exercise of judicial

power depends on the existence of a case or controversy. DeFunis

v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974); Clear Channel Outdoor,

Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25, 33 (9th Cir. BAP

2008). The doctrine of constitutional mootness is a recognition

of Article III’s prohibition against federal courts’ issuing
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advisory opinions. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United

States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1980) (“It has long been settled that a

federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot

questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or

rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case

before it.’”) (internal citation omitted).

The mootness doctrine applies when events occur during the

pendency of the appeal that make it impossible for the appellate

court to grant effective relief. Id. The determining issue is

“whether there exists a ‘present controversy as to which

effective relief can be granted.’” People of Village of Gambell

v. Babbitt, 999 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting NW Envtl.

v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988)). If no effective

relief is possible, we must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 

United States v. Arkison (In re Cascade Rds., Inc.), 34 F.3d 756,

759 (9th Cir. 1994). 

After reviewing the record before us, we conclude that we

cannot provide effective relief to Campos even if we were to

reverse the Fee Waiver Order. The Proposed Complaint alleged

that the Judgment was excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). 

Under Rule 4007(c), the Proposed Complaint had to be filed

60 days after the first date established for the § 341 meeting of

creditors. Schreiber v. Halstead (In re Halstead), 158 B.R. 485,

487 (9th Cir. BAP 1993) aff’d and adopted, 53 F.3d 253 (9th Cir.

1995) (Rule 4007(c) is strictly construed in the Ninth Circuit). 

Thus, creditors must act promptly to request a determination that

a debt is nondischargeable or risk the consequence that it is

discharged.
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-8-

While Campos contemplated a timely filing of the Proposed

Complaint, she did not actually file it. Nor did she seek an

extension of time in which to file the Proposed Complaint while

the appeal of the Fee Waiver Order was pending. Accordingly, the

July 11, 2011 deadline to file complaints challenging the

dischargeability of the Debtor’s debts passed without Campos

preserving her right to challenge the dischargeability of the

Judgment. Neither the bankruptcy court nor the appellate court

may grant an extension of time for the filing of dischargeability

complaints once the deadline has passed. Rule 9006(b)(3); see

also, Classic Auto Refurbishing, Inc. v. Marino (In re Marino),

37 F.3d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1994).

Under these circumstances, we can offer Campos no effective

relief even if we were to reverse the Fee Waiver Order. Any

opinion on whether the bankruptcy court erred in entering the Fee

Waiver Order now would be advisory. Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d

949, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) (Constitution forbids issuance of

advisory opinions). As a result, we dismiss BAP No. CC-11-1410

for lack of jurisdiction. 

B. Discharge Order

Campos asserts that it is a “flagrant abuse of judicial

power” for the bankruptcy court to have entered the Discharge

Order when she had appealed the Fee Waiver Order. See

Appellant’s Opening Br. at 1.

The timely filing of an appeal of a final order ordinarily

divests a bankruptcy court of jurisdiction “‘over those aspects

of the case involved in the appeal.’” Sherman v. Sec. & Exch.

Comm’n (In re Sherman), 491 F.3d 948, 967 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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9

 Rule 4004 determines when a bankruptcy court may grant a

discharge under § 727. It provides that “[i]n a chapter 7 case,

on expiration of the times fixed for objecting to discharge . . .

the court shall forthwith grant the discharge unless [one of

twelve enumerated conditions exist.]” Rule 4004(c)(1). If none

of those conditions exist, the bankruptcy court is required to

promptly enter the discharge.

10 We DENY Campos’s request to the BAP to order the

bankruptcy judge to pay her damages in the amount of $15,462.

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However, the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over other

proceedings related to the petition. Id. Therefore, even though

Campos appealed the Fee Waiver Order, the bankruptcy court had

jurisdiction to enter the Discharge Order.9

For the same reasons that we articulated above, reversal of

the Discharge Order cannot provide Campos with effective relief,

namely, the ability to have the Judgment declared

nondischargeable. The deadline to challenge the Debtor’s

discharge has passed, and as we previously noted, neither this

Court nor the bankruptcy court has the power to extend it. As a

result, we lack jurisdiction over BAP No. CC-11-1423. Therefore,

we do not reach the merits of either appeal.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we DISMISS both the appeal of the

Fee Waiver Order (BAP No. CC-11-1410) and the appeal of the

bankruptcy court’s entry of the Discharge Order (BAP No.

CC-11-1423) on jurisdictional grounds.10