Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed February 3 , 202 2
.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 20

- 00313

- CR NO. 14

- 20

- 00314

- CR

SAYANTAN GHOSE , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee
On Appeal from the 122nd District Court Galveston County, Te xas Tri al Co urt Cause No s . 17

- CR

- 2032 , 17

- CR

- 2033

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Sayantan Ghose appeals ju dgments of conviction for murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon

. Appellan t presents two identical issues in both appeals . First, he arg ues tha t the trial court erroneously omitted from the jury charge certain instruction s limit ing the right of a citizen to make an arrest , which appellant con tends deprived him of the correct application of the se lf

defen se statute

. Because appellant conce dedly d id not object to the jury charge on2

this basis, we hold the issue is waived

. Second, appellant contends that legally insufficien t evidence support s the jury ’ s rejection of his self

- defense theory. C onclud ing that the evidence is legally sufficient , w e ov errule this issue

. In his appeal from the murder conviction, appellant presents an add itional issue : that the charge given violated the felony m erger doctrine. We hold that there is no error in the charge as alleged. Accordingly, we affirm the tri al c ourt ’ s judgment in both cases

. Background App ellant is the ex

- husband of Amanda Harris. Following her divorce fro m appellant, Amanda married Wayne Harris. Appellant repe atedly conta ct ed Amanda and her daught er, K atie , 1 against Amanda ’ s wishes. Ap pel lant appeared regularly at the Harris family home unannounc ed and uni nvited. The Harrises viewe d this as stalking and harassment

. Appellant received at least one criminal trespass warning from law enforcement.
One n ight, when W ayne was at home and Ama n da and Katie were out shopping, appellant drove to the Harrises ’ home in L eag ue C ity

. A manda and Katie returned home a f

ew minutes after appellant arrived

. Amanda parked her car next to Wayne ’ s car in the driveway. According to Amanda, she saw Wayne “ w i th his gun draw n , ” and appellant was on his knees in an alcove just outside the hou se ’ s front door. Amanda g ot out of her car, carrying a handgun , while Katie remained in the backseat

. A video c aptured by a neighbor ’ s security camera shows Amanda standi n g in f

ront of her car. Wayne and appellant , in the al cove , are out of the camera ’ s view

.

1 Katie is a pseudonym. See Tex. R. App. P. 9. 10 ( a ) (3)

.3

Amanda call e d 911 and told t he operator that she was making a “ citizen ’ s arrest ” o f appellant. The 911 operator instruc t ed Amanda to put down her weapon and to tell Wayne to do the same. Both Wayne and Amanda set their guns down : he, on a console ta ble inside the h ouse , and she, on the grou nd in front of her car

. T hen , appel lant stood and “ ran ” t oward Amanda

. She thought appellant was coming after her weapon.
T h e vide o shows that appellant and Wayne walked away from the front door and into the driveway . Amanda, still by the front of her car, bent down and stood back up. Appellant wa s walking in front of Wayne, away from Amanda . Near the garage doors, appellan t and W ayne began to scu ffle. Although Amanda told the 911 operator that she did not see appellant with a weapon, appellant was in fact carrying a handgun , for which he did not have a license

. He shot Amanda in the arm and leg and shot Wayne s even times , inclu ding twice in the head

. Amanda fell to the ground between the two parked

cars. Appellant jo gged toward the street, doubled back to where Ama nda lay in the driveway, an d attempted to shoot her aga in, but the gun misfired. Appellant then
return ed t o his c ar and left. When appellant was later arrested in New Mexico,
po lice confiscated a handgun , w hich matched the twe lve spent casi ngs recov ered from the Harrises ’ driveway . Amanda ’ s an d Wayne ’ s guns were eliminated as source guns that fir ed the c asin g s.
W ayne died as a res ult of the shooting. A Galveston County grand jury in dicted ap pellant for murder (of Wayne) and for aggravated assault (of Amanda)

. Appellant pleaded not guilty to bot h charges. The ju ry found appellant guilty on both c harges . T h e tria l court sentenced appellant to fifty years ’ confinement for the murder charge and twenty years ’4

confinement fo r the aggravated assault charge. Appe llant appeals both judgments of co nviction

. Analysis
A. U n preserved Defensive Issue in Jury Ch arge
In hi s first issue in both appeals , appellant argues that the trial c o urt erred by failing to include , sua sponte, la nguage in the jury charge that a citizen may not use deadly force to make a cit izen ’ s arrest.
The jury charge included an instructio n on “ Ci ti z en ’ s A rrest, ” providing: “ A peace officer or a ny other person, may , without a warrant, arrest an o ffender when the offense is committed in his pres ence or within his view, i f the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the p ublic peac e
. ” 2 T he charge also instructed , regarding self

- defens e, that “ a pe rson is jus tified in using force against

ano ther when and to the degree that the actor rea sonably b elieves the force is immediately necessary to protect one self against the other person ’ s u se or attempted use of unlawful force. ” 3 Furth er, the charge provi ded that “ [a] p erson is justifie d in using d eadly force against another if the actor would be justified in using force against the other in the first place, as above set out, and when the a ctor

r easonably believes that such deadly force is imm ediately nece ssary to p rotect oneself against the other p erson ’ s use or att empted use of unlawful deadly force. ” 4 The charg e then instructed the jury that if the evidence proved beyond a

reas o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t a p p e l l a n t c o m m i t t e d murder as alleged in the indictment , the n it must find appellant guilty of the charg ed offense

. But, if the jur ors found

2 This instruction tracks Code o f Crimi nal Pr o cedure art icle 14.01(a).
3 T his instruction tr acks P enal Code section 9.31(a).

4 This instructi on tr acks Penal Cod e section 9.32(a).5

that appellant ’ s use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself against Way ne ’ s or Amand a ’ s unl awful deadly force , then they must acquit appellant and find him not guilty as charged. During the char ge conference, appell ant ’ s attorney objected to the i nclusion of any instruction regarding a citi zen ’ s arrest: “ [W] hy do we have to d efine it a n d put it into the jury charge? I mean, they d o n ’ t have to prove that Amanda was making any type of citizen ’ s a rrest

. And it ’ s
-- it ’ s
-- it hurts the defense. ” T he lawyers then, accor ding to appellant ’ s counse l, “ diverted . . . to [another se ction of
t h e char ge] about the t h reats as justifiable forc e. ” But upon returning to the subject

o f citizen ’ s arrest, appe llant ’ s attorney reite rated his belief that there was no “ need to define it for the jury . . . [or] to talk about it in front of the j ury.
. . . This law isn ’ t applicable. ” At no point did a ppellant re quest additional language regarding a p rohibition of deadly force duri ng a citizen ’ s arrest , which appella nt concedes on appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals recently reaffirmed that a d efendant m u st pre serve i n the trial court a complaint rega rding submission of a defensive issue in the jury charge , in ord er to present the complaint for appellate review

. Se e Williams v. State , -- - S.W.3d

-- - , 2021 WL 2132167, at *5

- 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021 )

. W hen i t comes to jury instructions, the trial judge ha s an absolute sua sponte duty to prepare a jury charg e that a ccu rately sets out “ the law applicable to the specific o f

fense charged. ” Delgado v. State , 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

. But it doe s not i nevitably follow that the ju dge has a sim ilar sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on all potential defen sive issues

. Id. Therefore , unrequested defensive instruct ions are st ill subject to ordinary rules of procedural default. Posey v. State , 966 S.W.2d 57, 6 1

- 6 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)

. A def endant cannot complain for the first time on appeal about the la ck of a6

defensive instru ction absent preservation of the err or. Id. at 62 (deciding that a “defensive issue” is not “applicable to th e case” un l ess th e defendant “timely requests the issue or objects to the omission of the issue in the jury char ge”)

. Here , the given inst ruction regarding ci tizen ’ s arrest was corre ct and tracked the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.01 ( a )

. A ppellant nevertheless argue s that the tri al court should have sua spont e included additional language fro m the Penal Code that a citizen may not use dead ly force whe n mak ing an arrest. See Tex. Pen al Code § 9. 5 1(g) ( “ Deadly force may only be used u n der th e cir cumstances enum erated in Subsections ( c) and (d), ” which were not applicable in this case.). But ap pellan t concededly did not direct the trial court to the Pen al Code or otherwise object to the omission of this addi tional language an d thus fai l ed to place the trial court on notice that he w anted an instruction on the prohibi tion against use of deadly fo rce during a citizen ’ s arrest

. We conclude that the trial c ourt did not err in failing to submit such an instruction sua sponte. See Bennett v

. State , 235 S.W.3d 24 1, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 07) ; Posey , 966 S.W.2d at 61 ; see also Magee v. State , No. 14

- 16

- 00408

- CR, 2017 WL 2818229, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th D ist.] June 29, 2017 , pet. ref ’ d ) (mem.
op. , not designated for publication ) ( “ Genera l ly, a court is not re quired to instruct the jur y on every conceivable statement or nuance of law potentially ap plicable to the case. ” ). We overrule appellant ’ s first issue in appe llate cause numbers 14

- 20

- 00 313

- CR and 14

- 20

- 00 314

- CR

. 5

5 In his brief, app ellant asserts, “ Appellant did not object to the omission of t he instruction that a citiz e n may n ot use deadly force to make an arre st. ” Based on thi s un ob jected

to error, appe llant argues he must s how egreg ious harm under Alm anza in or der to obtain a reversal. But as the Court of Criminal Appeals notes , “ when the com plained

- of error is the lac k of a d efensive instruction, the Almanza f ramework does not app l y. ” Williams , 2021 WL7

B. Felon y M urder and t he Mer ger Do ctrine
In the second issue of his a ppeal from the murder conviction , appellant
argu es that the jury charge violated the merger doc trine. The State alleged that appellant committed the offense of murder by : (1) intentionally o r knowingl y c aus i ng Wayne ’ s death ; ( 2) intend ing to cause serious bodily injury and comm it tin g an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused Wayne ’ s death ; or (3) commit ting or attemp ting to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in f ur ther ance of the commis s ion or attempt, or in immediate flight from the comm issio n or attempt, commit ting or attempting to commit an act clearly dan gerous to human life that caus ed Wayne ’ s death

. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(b) ( setting out thr ee alterna t iv e ma nner and means by w hich a person can commit murder). The third manner and m eans is commonly known as “ felo ny murder. ” See Zavala v. State , 401 S.W.3d 171, 182 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] 2011 , pet. ref ’ d )

. T o support a m urder c onv iction under a f elon y
- murder theory, the p redicate felony must be one “other than manslaughter.” Id. § 19 .02(b)(3). In 1978 , the C ourt of Criminal Appeals interp reted this pr ovisi on and held that, in a felony

murder case, the felony had to be feloniou s c onduct other t ha n th e assault causi ng the homicide. See Garrett v. State , 573 S.W.2d 543 , 546 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel O p.] 1978)). “This limitation on the felony

- murder rule” bec a me “known as the merger doctrine.” Murphy v. State , 665 S.W.2d 116, 119 (T ex. Crim. App

. 1 983)

. But the court subsequently disavow ed its “ overly broad statement ” in Garrett that , in order to su pport a conv iction under the felony

- murder provision, “ ‘ [t]h e re must be a showing of felonious criminal conduct other th an the assaul t c ausing the

2132167, at * 5. Becau se appellant did no t preserv e his comp lained

- of error , we need not address his arguments regarding harm.8

ho m ic ide. ’ ” Johnson v. State , 4 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Garrett , 573 S.W.2d at 546 )

. Instead o f a general merger doctrine, the court stated th a t the doctrine exists only to the extent consistent with Penal Code secti on 19.02(b)(3). Th us, Garrett stands only for the proposition that “ a conviction for felony murder under sec tion 19.02(b)(3) will no t lie when the underlying felony is manslaughter o r a lesser included offense of manslaughter. ” Id

. O ne type of aggravat ed assault is a l es ser
- included offense of manslaughter in the abstrac t

— when the defendant acts reckless ly and causes serious bodily injur y. See Fraser v. State , 583 S.W.3d 5 6 4, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)

. But an “int entional” or “knowing” aggravated ass ault can support a felo ny
- murder conviction because that kind of aggra vated assault is not a lesser

- included offense of manslaughter ( beca use it requires a greater culpable me n tal state than the “reckless” culpable m ental state required by manslaughter). See Lawson v. St a te , 64 S.W.3d 396, 397 (Tex . Crim. App. 2001)

. With t his precedent in mind, we turn to the charge in this case , which instructed th e jury as follows:
Our law provides th at a person commits th e offense of murder

. . . i f he comm itted or att empted to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of an individual and the defendant was in the cour se of intentionally or knowingly committing or attempting to commit a felony , an d the d eath of an individual was caused while th e d e fendant was i n the course of an d in furtherance of the commission or attempt of th at felony or while the defend ant was in immediate flight from the commission or attempt o f that felo ny
. The charge later i nstructed the jury, in the application section : [I]f you find f

r om the e vidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 2 8th day of June A.D., 2017, in Galveston County, Texas, the d efendan t, SAYANTAN GHOSE , did t he n and there intentionally or know i ngly commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that9

caused t he deat h of said Clarence Wayne Harris, by shooting a firear m at or near Clarence Wayne Harris or Amanda Harris and the defendant
wa s in the cou rse of intenti onally or kn owingly committing or attempting to commit a felony, namel y, S talkin g or Aggravated A s sa u lt , and the death of Clarence Wayne Harris was caused while t he defendant and [sic] t hen you will find th e defendant, SAYAN TAN GH OSE , guilty of murder, as charged in t he in dictment.
The cha rge also allowed the jury to find appellant no t guilty of murde r bu t to

con sider appellant ’ s guilt regarding a lesser

- includ ed o ffe nse of aggravated assault. The charge provided that “ [a] person commits aggravated assau lt if the pers on intentionally, know ingl y, or recklessly causes bodily injury to a nother and uses o r

ex hibi ts a deadly weapon during the commission of the assaul t. ”
Because the charge ’ s definition of aggrava ted assault include d a me n s rea of recklessness, ap pellant argu es t hat the jury improperly could have found appell ant guilty of fel ony murder by com m itt ing reckless aggravated assau l t, a l esser
included offense of mans lau ghter, in violation of the merger doctrine

. We disagree and hold that appellan t has not demonstrated reversible error in this ch arge. The charge ap prop riately l imite d both the in stru c tio n an d the application regarding felony murder to a n “ intentional ” or “ knowing ” commission

o r attempt of aggravated assault. See Lawson , 64 S.W .3d at 397 ; see also Durham v. State , No. 13

- 19

- 00017

- CR, 2020 WL 6343338, at *10 (Tex. App.

— Corp us Chris ti O c t. 29, 2020 , pet. ref ’ d ) (mem. op., not designated for public ation) ( “ In charging Durham with felony murder, the State need only prove that Durham intentionally o r knowingly committed or attempted to commit aggravated assault by threat or injury and i n th e co urse of and in furtherance of the commiss ion or attempt, h e committed an act ‘ clearly dange rous to human life. ’ ” ). The jury could not have co n victed appellant of felon y mu r der based on a reckless aggravated assault because the charge expressly in stru c ted the jury to find beyond a reasonable10

doubt that appellant “ intentionally or know ingly comm it t [ ed] or attempt [ed] to commit a felony, namel y,
. . . Aggravated Assa ult

. ” Accordingly, the charge is consistent with Penal Code section 19. 02(b)(3), doe s no t vio lat e the merger doctrine, and is not er roneous for the reasons appellant contends

. See Lawson , 64 S.W.3d 396, 39 7 ; Esquivel v. State , No. 01

- 16

- 00301

- CR, 2017 WL 3910793, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7, 2017 , pet . ref ’ d ) (mem. op

. , no t d esig nated for publication) ( “ We thus conclude that the jury charge ’ s application paragraph regardin g felo ny murder wa s not erroneous, and the jury charge did no t
conta in an invalid legal theory of murder. ” ); c f. Keen v. State , No. 03

- 19

- 00744

- CR, 2 0 21 WL 4 8190 78, at *7 (Tex. App.

— Austin Oct. 15, 2021 , pet. ref ’ d ) (mem. op., not designated for publicatio n) (error in charg e whe n submission of felony murder “ did not differ entiate between an aggravated assault committed intentionally or knowingly and on e commit ted only recklessly ” ). We overrule appell ant ’ s second issue in appellate cause number 14

- 20

- 00 313

- CR

. C. Suff

iciency of the Evidence of Self

- Defense
In his remaining i ssue in both appea ls , appellant argues that the ev idence at tria l was legally ins u fficien t to support the jury ’ s rejection of his self

- defense theor y. Ag ain, the court included the following self

- defense i nstruction in the jury charge , in relevant part :

Upon the law of self

- defe nse, you are instructed that a p erson is justified in usin g force a gainst another when and to the degree that the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect oneself against the other person’s use or attempted use of unlawful fo rce. A person is justified in us ing deadly force against a nother if the actor would be justified in using force against the other in the first place, as set out above, and when the actor reasonably believes that11

such deadly force is immediately necessary to protect oneself against the ot her person’s use or attemp ted use o f unlawful deadly force.

. . . In determining the existence of real or apparent danger, you should consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence before you, all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the event in question, if any , the previo us relationship existing between the accused and the complainant, together with all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the m ind of the defendant at the time of the offense, and in considering such circumstances, you shou ld plac e yourselves in the defendant’s position at the time and view them from his standpoint alone.
1. Standard of review We review the legal sufficie ncy of the evide nce to supp ort a jury ’ s reje ction of a sel f

- defense claim under the Jackson v. Virginia stan dard. Se e Martinez v. State , No. 14

- 20

- 0013 6

- CR, 2021 WL 416 5302, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] Sept. 14, 2021 , pet. ref ’ d ) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ; Smith v. State , 355 S.W.3d 13 8, 144 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. r ef ’ d )

. U nder that standard, we must examine all the ev idence in the lig ht most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the

es sential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virgin ia , 443 U .S. 307, 319 (19 79). W e look not t o whether the Sta te presented evidence that refuted appellant ’ s self

- defense evidence, but to whether after viewing all the e videnc e in the light mo st favorable t o the prosecution, any rational factfinder would h ave fou nd the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and also would h a v e f o u n d a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t on the self

- defe nse issue beyond a reasonable doubt. See Darkins v. State , 430 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref ’ d ) ( cit in g Saxton v. State , 804 S.W .2d12

910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) and Hernandez v. State , 309 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref ’ d)).
The rev iewing court must defer to the jury ’ s determinations of the witnesses ’ credibility and th e weight to be given their t estimony, a s the jury is the sole judge of those matters. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326 ; Brooks v. State , 323 S.W. 3d 893, 899

- 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We must be mindful that self

- defense is a fact issue to be determined b y t he ju ry and that the jury is fr ee to accept or reject any defensive evidence on the issue. Saxton , 804 S.W.2d at 913

- 14.
2. App lica tion
Accordi ng to appellant, the evidence at trial showed that Wayne and Amanda initiated the use of deadly force, that suc h de adl y force was un lawful, and th at he was “ attempting to leave the premises when he was physically assaulted by Wayne Harris

. ” Regarding Wayn e, appellant relies on a portion of the neighbo r ’ s video recording purpo rtedly showing Wayne “ grab[bing] Appell a nt and t oss[ing] him to the ground

. ” Regarding Amanda, appellant focuses on a portion of the video showing Amanda bending down toward the drive way after she ha d placed he r handgun on the ground in front of her car

. A ccording to responding law enforcem e nt , h er gu n was found in between the two parked v ehicle s
. Based on th is evidence , appellant asser ts that Amanda m ust have picked her gun back up and brand i shed it at him before he shot her and she fell to the ground

. In sum,

a p pellant ’ s argumen t is premi sed on his assertion that Wayne and/or Amanda were using unlawful deadly force at the relevant moment . Thu s, he ar gues, he was lawfully entitled to defend himself with dead ly force

. The jury rejected appellant ’ s defensi ve theory , and we conclude it coul d have don e so beyond a re a sonable dou bt. T he evidence h ighlighted by app ellant
may , under his view of the entire circumstances, support his self

- defense argument ,13

b ut appellant ig nores other evidence a rational factfi nder c ould have be lieved that refute s self

- d efe nse
. For e xample, the jury reasonably could have found that nei ther Wayne nor Ama nda were still ar med when appellant shot them. It is undisputed that Wayne set his g un on a table inside the house. T he video shows that Way ne and appellant physi cally e nga ged each other in the driveway, a nd that interaction was at most only a mat ter of seconds and there is no indic ation that Wayne attempted to exert dead ly physical force again st appellant at tha t m oment

. Appellant is a large man, and it is uncont rover te d t hat Wayne was un ar med at that time. R e garding Amanda, the video shows her b ending down toward the ground, but we cannot see th at sh e picked up her gun. Am anda testified that she d id not remember p icking up her gun or moving it, although she ack nowledg ed it was possi ble

. The jurors were free to resolve any inconsistency against appellant. Appellant was not entitled to use deadl y for ce against unarmed persons who did not pose an immediate threat to appellant ’ s safety

. See Graves v. State , 452 S .W.3d 9 07, 911 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2014, pe t. ref ’ d) (findi ng no evidence of sel f

- defense when initial ag gressor was shot only after he was in the process of backing away from defendant)

. Also, appell ant shot Wayne seven times , shot Amanda twice, and t h en bega n t o flee but returned and attempt e d to shoot Amanda a third time . Th e number of

s hots fired at Wayne and the calculated attempt to shoot a n injured Amanda a third time militates against appell ant ’ s claim of self

- defense

. See, e.g. , Ru ssell v. St a te , No. 05

- 17

- 00124

- CR, 2018 WL 525559, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Jan. 24, 2018 , pet. ref ’ d ) ( “ Additionally, th e jury could al so r easonably infer tha t the she er number of bullets that were fired

— Tell was shot twelve times and Garcia was shot eight times

— are beyond wha t can be considered immediately necessary to protect appellant from any action taken by either Tell or Garcia. ” ) ; Smith , 35 5 S.W.3d a t14

1 4 7 ; Heng v. State , No. 01

- 0 4

- 00450

- C R, 2006 WL 66461, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] Jan. 12, 2006, pet. ref ’ d) (m em. op., not de s ignated for publication) (determining that evidence was sufficient to support rejection of self

defense claim where evidence sho wed that defendant armed him self, that victim had no weapon, and that def endant shot victim multiple times) ; Cle veland v. State , 177 S.W.3d 374, 387 (T ex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 2005, pet . ref ’ d) ( jury could have reasonably concluded that d efendant ’ s conduct in continuing to stab w ife as she la y bleedi ng on floor was inconsistent w ith h is claim of self

- d efense).
F inally, appellant fled the scene of the shooting and was a pprehe nde d in a dif ferent st ate

. Flight reflects consciousness of guilt , which a jury can consider in rejecting a self

- defense claim. See Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 7 72, 780 (Tex. Crim . App. 200 7) (noting that a factfinder may draw a n inference of guil t from th e circumst ance of f

light) ; Kirk v. State , 421 S.W.3d 772, 781 (T ex. App.

— Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref ’ d) (referencing fli g ht from the scene of a crime as evidence a jury could consid er in reje cting a self

- defense c laim)

. It was the jury ’ s responsibil ity to we igh and re solve con flicting evidence, assess witness credibility , and draw reasonable inferences in reaching a verdict

. See B rooks , 323 S.W.3d at 898

- 99. Viewi ng the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury ’ s verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of f act could have found beyond a reasonable doubt t hat ap pellant was not acting in self

- de fense when he shot Wa y ne or w hen he shot Amanda

. See Saxton , 80 4 S.W.2d at 914. We overrul e appellant ’ s third issue in appella te cause number 14

- 20

- 00 313

- CR

an d his seco nd issue in appellate cause numbe r 14

- 20

- 00 314

- CR.15 Conclusion
We affirm the tri al court ’ s judgment s
.

/s/ Kevin J ewell Justi ce

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot , and Poissant

. Do Not Publi sh

— Tex. R. App. P

. 47.2( b).