FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 07-50251

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  CR-06-00867-GAF1 ARAM BARSUMYAN, aka Seal A (1),

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 10, 2008—Pasadena, California

Filed February 28, 2008

Before: Jerome Farris and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

Circuit Judges, and H. Russel Holland,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

*The Honorable H. Russel Holland, Senior United States District Judge

for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation. 

1763
COUNSEL

Davina T. Chen, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellant. 

Alexander A. Bustamante and Anne Voights, Assistant

United States Attorneys, Major Frauds Section, Los Angeles,

California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge: 

Defendant-Appellant Aram Barsumyan appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea

to one count of possession of device-making equipment under

18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(4). Barsumyan contends that his 21-

month prison sentence was unreasonable because the operation of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) effected a 6-level increase in

his offense level. Barsumyan also argues that the sentencing

court impermissibly imposed two conditions of supervised

release: a restriction on “access[ing] or possess[ing] any computer or computer-related devices in any manner,” and a

requirement that, if he is deported and reenters the country, he

1766 UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN
report to the United States Probation Office. We affirm the

sentence and reporting condition, but reverse and vacate the

computer restriction and remand to the district court for

reconsideration of that condition. 

Facts, Procedural History, and Jurisdiction

In October 2005, an informant cooperating with the United

States Secret Service charged that Defendant-Appellant Aram

Barsumyan was involved in schemes to manufacture counterfeit credit cards. Barsumyan told this informant that he was

interested in making contacts to help him engage in various

kinds of credit card fraud. The informant agreed to introduce

Barsumyan to a hotel employee, who, unbeknown to Barsumyan, was an undercover Secret Service Case Agent. During

an arranged meeting, the Agent told Barsumyan that, in the

course of her duties at the hotel, she had access to guests’

credit cards. Barsumyan gave the Agent a “skimming device,”

1

and asked her to covertly “skim” the hotel guests’ credit cards

when they registered. The Agent was instructed to then return

the device to Barsumyan. He then promised her that for every

ten credit card numbers she captured on the device, he would

give her two “high quality” counterfeit credit cards. 

The following month, the Agent returned the skimming

device to Barsumyan, loaded with ten credit card numbers. At

a subsequent rendezvous, Barsumyan gave the Agent one

counterfeit credit card. When the Agent asked for the promised second card, Barsumyan told her that she was only getting one, because she had only given him six credit card

1

In this context, “skimming device” (or sometimes just “skimmer”)

refers to a small electronic device that can capture the account information

encoded on a credit card’s magnetic strip. The information is stored on the

device until it is downloaded onto a computer, whose operator can then

manufacture counterfeit credit cards with magnetic strips identical to those

on the genuine cards. Skimming devices can be attached to ordinary credit

card readers, capturing a new card’s information every time a card is

swiped. 

UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN 1767
numbers on the skimmer. He also told her that in light of her

breach of their understanding, he was altering the deal: thereafter, he would require twenty-five numbers if she wanted an

additional card. He then returned the skimming device to the

Agent. 

Barsumyan was arrested and indicted for one count of producing, using, and trafficking in a counterfeit credit card, 18

U.S.C. § 1029(a)(1), and three counts of possession of devicemaking equipment, 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(4).2

 Pursuant to a

plea agreement, Barsumyan pleaded guilty to one count of

possession of device-making equipment. The agreement contemplated a base offense level of 6, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(a)(2), with a 2-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(A)(i) for possession of device-making equipment. The government also agreed to recommend a sentence

at the low end of the applicable range, as long as the total

offense level was 8 or lower. 

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10), however, not only mandates a 2-

level increase in all cases, but also requires that “[i]f the

resulting offense level is less than level 12, increase to level

12.” Section 2B1.1(b)(10) therefore effectively increased Barsumyan’s offense level by six levels. The Presentence Report

recommended a 2-level downward adjustment for acceptance

of responsibility, yielding a total offense level of 10. Barsumyan’s probation officer recommended a sentence of 21

months, at the high end of the range prescribed for an offense

level of 10, and recommended the following conditions for

supervised release: 

2

“Device-making equipment” is defined as “any equipment, mechanism, or impression designed or primarily used for making an access

device or a counterfeit access device.” 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(6). “Access

device” means, in relevant part, “any card, . . . account number, electronic

serial number, . . . or other means of account access that can be used, alone

or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer

of funds.” 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1). 

1768 UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN
3. The defendant shall comply with the immigration rules and regulations of the United States,

and, if deported from this country, either voluntarily or involuntarily, not reenter the United

States illegally. The defendant is not required to

report to the Probation Office while residing

outside of the United States; however, within 72

hours of release from any custody or any reentry

to the United States during the period of Courtordered supervision, the defendant shall report

for instructions to the United States Probation

Office . . . . 

. . . 

5. The defendant shall not access or possess any

computer or computer-related devices in any

manner, or for any purpose, unless approved in

advance by the Probation Officer. 

The justification provided for the latter condition was simply,

“Condition No. 5 is recommended due to the nature of the

offense.” 

Over Barsumyan’s objection that the 6-level increase was

inappropriate due to the nature of Barsumyan’s offense, the

district court adopted the recommendations of the probation

officer, and imposed a 21-month sentence. The district court

further adopted, without analysis, recommended conditions of

supervised release No. 3 and No. 5. Barsumyan appealed. 

We have jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291.

Sentence

Barsumyan first appeals his 21-month sentence.

UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN 1769
1. Standard of Review 

United States v. Booker rendered the Sentencing Guidelines

“effectively advisory.” 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). Following

Booker, this court reviews criminal sentences for “reasonableness,” in a “two-step review procedure” outlined in United

States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1278-81 (9th Cir. 2006). 

First, we must “determine whether the district court properly calculated the applicable range under the advisory guidelines.” United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir.

2006). In doing so, we review the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, the determination of the facts

for clear error, and the application of the Guidelines to the

facts for abuse of discretion. Cantrell, 433 F.3d at 1279. In

the event we find error, we remand to the district court so it

can recalculate the guideline range in accordance with our

direction. Id. 

Second, “we will next consider challenges to the reasonableness of the overall sentence in light of all the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, including the applicable Guidelines range.”

Id. at 1280.3 These factors are to be applied parsimoniously—

3These factors are: 

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history

and characteristics of the defendant; 

(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the

offense; 

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 

1770 UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN
the sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of punishment. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). Our review of the district court’s sentence is for

“reasonableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial court

abused its discretion.” Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,

2465 (2006); see also Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586,

591 (2007) (holding that “courts of appeals must review all

sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard”).

2. Calculation of the Guidelines Range 

Both parties concede that the district court’s determination

of sentencing levels within the Guidelines was correct.

Although Barsumyan takes issue with the 6-level increase, he

does not do so on the ground that the enhancement does not

apply here. Rather, he appears to advocate a sort of hybrid

reasonableness test, arguing that “the enhancement—that is,

the plain language of the enhancement—is itself unreasonable,” and therefore ought not to apply. 

Barsumyan contends that the severity of the § 2B1.1(b)(10)

(3) the kinds of sentences available; 

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established

for . . . the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . 

(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing

Commission . . . subject to any amendments made to such policy

statement by act of Congress . . . . 

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

similar conduct; and 

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN 1771
increase targets “more aggravated and sophisticated forms of

identity theft” than the simple credit card fraud found in this

case. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 596 (2000) (describing the

rationale for the 12-level minimum). He also claims that the

12-level minimum was aimed at two classes of criminals:

those who engage in the cloning of wireless telephones4 and

those who engage in “affirmative” or “breeding” identity theft.5

To apply § 2B1.1(b)(10) to him, he argues, would create an

unreasonably broad and severe enhancement. 

[1] Barsumyan’s suggested approach to sentencing review

clashes with this court’s approach, as set forth in Cantrell.

That decision envisions two discrete steps in reviewing sentences: first, review of the calculation to verify that “the district court committed no error in applying the Guidelines,”

followed by “challenges to the reasonableness of the overall

sentence.” 433 F.3d at 1280; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 261

(stating that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) “told appellate courts to

determine whether the sentence ‘is unreasonable’ ”). Barsumyan, by contrast, seems to urge us to perform a sort of miniBooker reasonableness determination at each step in determining the Sentencing Guidelines offense level. 

[2] Barsumyan’s proposition that the district court ought to

have reviewed each step for appropriateness under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) is in error. The statutory factors are to be applied

4Both wireless telephones and credit cards are considered “access

devices” for these purposes. The cloning of wireless telephones was considered particularly serious because cloned cell phones are commonly

used by drug dealers and other criminals to evade surveillance. See 144

Cong. Rec. S3021 (1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 143 Cong. Rec.

S2655 (1997) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 

5

“Affirmative” or “breeding” identity theft involves “affirmative activity to generate or ‘breed’ another level of identification means without the

knowledge of the individual victim whose identification means are misused, purloined, or ‘taken over.’ ” U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 596 (2000).

This next level of identification is, in turn, used to create new bank

accounts, loans, etc. 

1772 UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN
“in determining the particular sentence to be imposed.” 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). Post-Booker, defendants certainly may

attack the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines by arguing that

they reflect over-broad or mistaken policy priorities. Interestingly, one of the Supreme Court’s most recent opinions

respecting the Guidelines blessed just such a policy-based

deviation from the Sentencing Guidelines. See Kimbrough v.

United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) (allowing variance from

Guidelines-prescribed sentencing range due to disagreement

with crack cocaine/powder cocaine disparity). That deviation

however, must come (as it did in Kimbrough) after the advisory Guidelines range has been determined, when the district

court examines the final advisory sentencing range dictated by

the Guidelines in light of all relevant § 3553(a) factors and

“the particular circumstances of [the defendant]’s case.” Id. at

576; see also id. at 575 (“The District Court began by properly calculating and considering the advisory Guidelines

range. It then addressed the relevant § 3553(a) factors.”).6 If

the operation of a particular guideline has inappropriately distorted the final range calculation, that is one factor which the

district court may take into account in determining the final

sentence. 

[3] The touchstone of a policy-based argument against the

Sentencing Guidelines, therefore, is not that a particular

6

In Kimbrough, for example, the district court first cited numerous mitigating factors pertaining to the case itself, such as the defendant’s military

service, steady history of employment, and lack of prior convictions, as

well as the unremarkable nature of the offense. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at

575. Importantly, even as the sentencing court then took into account the

irrational effect of the crack/powder disparity, the Supreme Court noted

with approval that “the court did not purport to establish a ratio of its own.

Rather, it appropriately framed its final determination in line with

§ 3553(a)’s overarching instruction to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but

not greater than necessary’ to accomplish the sentencing goals advanced

in § 3553(a)(2).” Id. Instead of rewriting each characteristic, enhancement,

and adjustment, the district court in Kimbrough properly calculated the

advisory range according to the Guidelines as written, and only deviated

from that range after engaging in a holistic § 3553(a) review. 

UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN 1773
upward or downward adjustment, measured in levels, is

unreasonable in isolation, but rather that its operation in the

case under consideration results in a sentence, measured in

months and years, that is inappropriate in light of § 3553(a).

We then review that final, holistic sentencing determination

for reasonableness.

3. Reasonableness of the Sentence 

[4] In addition to other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, a district court must consider “any pertinent policy statement

issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(5). Similarly, § 3553(a)(1) requires consideration of

“the nature and circumstances of the offense.” Both are relevant to Barsumyan’s over-criminalization complaint—that he

is a petty criminal caught in a net meant to snare far more

serious crimes. 

[4] The sentencing court, however, cited a number of

§ 3553(a) factors that militate for a harsher punishment. It

stated that “with respect to the nature and circumstances of

the offense . . . but for the information from the informant,

this could have been a case involving very substantial losses

and numerous victims.” The record reflects that, by stating

that he would provide his ersatz co-conspirator with two fake

cards for every ten credit card numbers she provided, Barsumyan initially contemplated at a minimum ten victims, and

possibly many more.7 The court also noted the “calculated”

nature of the offense. 

[6] Second, when it considered the history and characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need to protect the public,

the court noted that Barsumyan was not only “a recidivist,”

7After allegedly receiving only six numbers, Barsumyan demanded

another 25 before he would provide the Agent with another counterfeit

credit card. In other words, before his arrest, Barsumyan contemplated at

least 31 potential victims. 

1774 UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN
but one whose prior crimes included one conviction for credit

card fraud. It also observed that “His criminal history is

escalating, not deescalating, and those all suggest that prison

time is appropriate in this case.” 

[7] Therefore, the district court adequately explained the

sentence even though it did not specifically comment on Barsumyan’s argument regarding the over-broadness of

§ 2B.1.1(b)(10)(A)(i). Given the defendant’s criminal history

(including a prior conviction, for which he was then on probation, for a related offense), the calculated and deliberate

nature of the crime, and the contemplated number of victims

had this crime been successful, we hold that a 21-month sentence was not unreasonable.

Conditions of Supervised Release

[8] Barsumyan objects to two conditions of supervised

release: the ban on the use of computers (Condition #5) and

the requirement that he report to the Parole Office upon reentry after removal (Condition #3). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d),

conditions of supervised release must be “reasonably related”

to the purposes of punishment set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1) and “involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary” to deter future criminal conduct,

protect the public from further crimes, and promote rehabilitation of the defendant. 

Because Barsumyan failed to object to either condition at

his sentencing hearing, we review their imposition for plain

error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). Plain

error is (1) error, (2) that is plain and (3) affects “substantial

rights.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993).

“Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of

appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion

unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 732 (quoting

UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN 1775
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)) (quotation

marks omitted). If our court holds that imposition of a condition of supervised release is plainly erroneous, we remand to

the district court for resentencing on an open record. United

States v. Abbouchi, 502 F.3d 850, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2007). 

1. Computer Restriction

[9] Barsumyan first challenges Condition #5, the prohibition on “access[ing] or possess[ing] any computer or

computer-related devices in any manner, or for any purpose.”

The record does not indicate what the district court might

have meant by “computer-related devices,” and given the categorical language involved (“in any manner”),8

 one can only

speculate as to the outer limits of this proscription—cellular

phones? ATMs? Driving a modern car? Checking out groceries using a bar code scanner? 

We confronted a similar condition in United States v. Sales,

476 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2007).9 In Sales, the defendant had

been convicted of using his personal computer (including

scanner and printer) to make counterfeit $20 bills. Id. at 734.

The court rejected the condition forbidding access, however,

stating that “[t]he breadth of condition #5 is not reasonably

related to the nature and circumstances of Sales’s counterfeit8

It is unclear whether “in any manner” is meant to refer to manners of

devices or manners of accessing or possessing them. Either interpretation

would make the condition sweeping in the extreme. 

9

Indeed, the prohibition in Sales was more specific, namely: 

Computers and computer-related devices include, but are not limited to, personal computers, personal data assistants (PDAs),

internet appliances, electronic games, and cellular telephones, as

well as their peripherial equipment, that can access, or be modified to access, the internet, electronic bulletin boards, and other

computers, or similar media[.] 

476 F.3d at 734. The focus of the prohibition in Sales reflected a concern

more with computer connectivity than with computers per se. No such

limitation is present here. 

1776 UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN
ing offense or Sales’s history and characteristics.” Id. at 736.

Rather, the condition “results in a far greater deprivation of

Sales’s liberty than is reasonably necessary to prevent recidivism, protect the public, or promote any form of rehabilitation.” Id.

[10] If anything, Condition #5 here is even less appropriate

than the condition in Sales. In Sales, the defendant had actually used a computer in the commission of his crime. By contrast, while a computer is required to download the credit card

numbers that a skimming device has skimmed, there is no

indication that Barsumyan was going to be the one to do the

downloading. Barsumyan was “an intermediary,” who told

the Secret Service Agent that he knew “two individuals who

would be able to produce” cards from the numbers provided

on the skimmer. 

[11] The government’s attempts to distinguish Sales are

unconvincing. First, it notes that the defendant in Sales had no

prior criminal convictions, 476 F.3d at 734, while Barsumyan

has several, including another one for credit card forgery.10

But there is no indication that Barsumyan used a computer in

any of those crimes either. Even if he had, however, Sales is

clear that a mere nexus between the crime and a computer

does not justify proscribing the use of anything containing a

circuit board or microchips.11

10The other convictions are for petty theft, vandalism, and speeding. 

11When this court has upheld conditions restricting Internet access in

cases involving child pornography, it has done so citing the “ ‘strong link

between child pornography and the Internet, and the need to protect the

public, particularly children, from sex offenders.’ ” United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Zinn, 321

F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003). We are aware of no published cases

approving Internet restrictions imposed on a defendant convicted of a nonsexual offense—let alone a restriction on all computer-related devices,

whether Internet-capable or not. 

UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN 1777
Second, Barsumyan’s statement to the Secret Service Agent

that he “was interested in making money by committing different types of credit card fraud,” does not justify such a

sweeping and indefinite condition. Perhaps Barsumyan’s

statement refers to different ways of obtaining credit card

numbers, or different ways to exploit the numbers. We can

only speculate, and that speculation does not make the condition any more “reasonably necessary” to prevent further

crimes.12

[12] Having determined that it was error to impose Condition #5, we further hold that the error was plain. Sales struck

down a more defined condition on facts that would make a

ban on computer access more appropriate than in this case. Cf.

Abbouchi, 502 F.3d at 858 (finding plain error where the

“only evidence considered by the district court to support” a

domestic violence treatment program condition “was a paragraph in the Presentence Report suggesting ‘strains’ in

Abbouchi’s relationship with his wife and that he and his wife

had separated”). The record in this case shows no attempt, by

either the Probation Officer or sentencing court, to justify this

sweeping condition. Had either attempted one, the error

would have become apparent. 

Condition #5 affected Barsumyan’s “substantial rights.”

See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (holding that error affects substantial rights when it “affect[s] the outcome of the district court

proceeding”); Abbouchi, 502 F.3d at 858 (holding that imposition of a sentencing condition affects defendant’s substantial

rights); accord United States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 239, 244 (3d

Cir. 1997)(same). Similarly, Abbouchi held that erroneous

imposition of a sentencing condition without adequate justification “seriously affect[ed] the fairness . . . of [the] judicial

12Unless “computer-related devices” encompasses skimmers (it might

not have under the definition in Sales because the skimmers cannot access

the Internet), Condition #5 would not have prevented the crime of which

Barsumyan was convicted. 

1778 UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN
proceedings.” 502 F.3d at 858 (quoting United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks

omitted). 

[13] The government contends that Barsumyan’s “substantial rights” were not affected because, as an alien, he “is likely

to be removed/deported from the United States and never subject to supervision.” It is thus highly unlikely that he will ever

be subject to the computer condition that he now challenges.13

In United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, this court rejected a

similar argument made on ripeness grounds, holding that a

defendant may “assert[ ] a facial challenge to a condition

imposed upon him at the time of his sentence,” notwithstanding that several contingencies might have to occur before he

could be punished for its violation. 441 F.3d 767, 771-72 (9th

Cir. 2006). The government’s argument here is effectively the

converse, i.e., that the challenge is moot because several contingencies must not occur for Barsumyan to be affected. This

argument is equally unavailing. The probability that the

defendant will actually be subject to the condition is irrelevant

to the determination of “substantial rights” in the plain error

context, which equates “substantial rights” with legal prejudice. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (“It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”). Since the condition

would not have been imposed had the error not occurred, it

necessarily affected substantial rights. 

In a similar vein, the government contends that Barsumyan’s likely removal means we ought to decline to exercise our

discretion to consider the plain error under Rule 52(b).14 Even

if removal is “likely,” however, it is not certain, and we are

13We express no opinion as to Barsumyan’s actual removability, and

assume, arguendo, (1) that immigration proceedings will rule Barsumyan

to be removable and (2) that it is likely that he will actually be deported.

14Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) states that “[a] plain error

that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not

brought to the court’s attention.” (Emphasis added). 

UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN 1779
unwilling to speculate whether such a sweeping and inappropriate condition will actually be enforced. Neither does the

prospect of Barsumyan’s future removal mean that the error

has not already “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings,” requiring our correction. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. 

[14] We therefore vacate Condition #5 and remand for the

district court to impose a computer-related restriction permitted by this opinion.

2. Reporting Requirement

[15] Barsumyan also complains that Condition #3, requiring that he report to the Probation Office upon reentry to the

United States, violates his Fifth Amendment right against

self-incrimination. He contends that to do so would be, in

effect, to report himself for the new crime of being found in

the country after deportation. See United States v. Pina-Jaime,

332 F.3d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an alien need

not have reentered the United States illegally to be convicted

of being “found in” the country illegally). As Barsumyan himself concedes, however, this court has ruled that an identical

reporting condition does not violate the Fifth Amendment.

See Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 441 F.3d at 772-73. The district

court did not err in imposing Condition #3 in this case. 

Conclusion

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 21-month sentence. We further hold that

the district court plainly erred in imposing a restriction on all

computer use as a condition of supervised release, but did not

plainly err in requiring the defendant to report to the Probation Office upon reentry to the United States. The defendant’s

sentence is AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART and

REMANDED. 

1780 UNITED STATES v. BARSUMYAN