### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 039 -CR

Je sus Or daz , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 06- 220- K2 6 , HO NORAB LE B ILLY RAY STUB B LEF IELD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Jesu s O rd a z ap pe a ls f

ro m hi s c on vic tio n b y

a jur y of the se c on d d e g re e fe lony of fe ns e of money launder ing. See Tex. P en al C o d e Ann. § 34.02 (West S upp. 2006). Afte r appe llant pleade d true to an e nhance ment penalty , the jury assessed punishment at 40 y ear s in p ri s o n and a $10,000 fine, a

nd the trial cour

t sentence d him accor dingly
. I n four issues, appellant contends that the trial cour

t err ed in its jury char g e and in de nying his motion to suppress, and that the e vidence was leg ally

and fa ctually

insufficient to support hi s conviction. Be cause the trial cour t did not err in it s c h ar g e o r in d e n y in g th e mo ti o n to s u p p r e s s , an d th e e v id e n c e w a s s u f f ic ie n t to support
a pp e lla nt’ s c on vic tio n, we a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND Th e e vid e nc e a t tr ia l sh ow e d th a t on the a ft e rn oo n o f Janu ary 26 , 20 06 , Of fi c e r E ri c Mo un t, a n o ff ic e r a ssi g ne d to the tr a ff ic divi si on of the R ound Roc k Po lic e De pa

rtme nt w ith2

extensive training and ex perie nce in the field of nar cotics interdiction, obser ved appe llant traveling southbound in a Dodg e Dur ang o on I nterstate 35. B eca use appe llant was trave ling at 70 miles per hour, which w as in excess of the poste d l i m i t o f 6 5 miles per hour, Mount pulled along side the vehicle a nd motioned to appellant, the driver, t o slow down. When Mount could not ge t appellant’s attention and appellant continued to focus straight ahead, Mount activate d his overhea d lights and attempted to execute a

stop. Although ther e wa s room for a p p el l an t t o pull over on the side of the hig hwa y , he continued dow n the hig hway for a pproxi mately

a quar ter of a mile. Appellant then pulled into a re stau ra n t parkinglot and stopped. Appellant’s de lay in stopping g ave Mount
conce rn that appe llant w as either try ing to c oncea l something or w as attempting to retrieve a we apon b ef o re s t o p p i n g.

As M o u n t a

p p r o a c h e d th e v e h ic le , h e o b s e r v e d a p p e ll an t in th e dr iv e r ’ s s e a t an d a fe ma le in t

he pa sse ng e r s e a t. Alic e ns e c he c k s ho we d th a t th e veh icl e was re g ist e re d to a fe ma le with a ho me add re ss i n Sa n A nto nio . App e lla

nt i de nti fi e d h ims e lf

and sh ow e d a

dr ive r’ s li c e ns e listi ng his home addre ss in Eag le Pass. Patricia Mora les, the passe ng er, ide ntified herse lf as the
owner o f t h e ca r, b u t she did not have insura nce. A s Mount ex plained to appe llant that Mount stopped him beca

use he w as spee ding, Mount notice d the smell of air f reshe ner or

deod o rizer coming from the vehicle. He observe d box es of zipl ock plastic bag s, a conta iner of a ir fre shener , and baby wet wipes in the back seat. Mount also observe d a “big computer l ooking thing” on the dashboa rd that he ide nti fi e d a s a

GPS , a g lob a l po sit ion ingsy ste m. Mo un t tes tif

ie d at so me le ng th t

hat th e ite ms h e ob se rv e d w e re c on sis te nt w ith
na rc oti c s tr a ff

ic kin g and

an atte mpt to c on c e a l c on tr a ba nd
. B e c a us e he make s fr om 8 to 2 0 v e hic leTh a t a pp e lla nt sp ok e En g lis h a s w e ll a s Sp anis h w a s ma de c le ar i n h is s tate me nt g ive n to 1 of fi c e rs a ft e r h is a

rr e st. 3 stops a day

on I nterstate 35 and, based on his tra ining, Mount te stified that I nterstate 35 is a major drug arte ry and Eag le Pass, a common destination for na rcotics tra fficking . He testified that tracking device s su c h a s th e o n e o n th e d a s hb o ar d ar e c o mm o n ly u s e d b y n ar c o ti c s tr a f f ic k e r s to tr a c k

the transport vehicle. Ba sed on his c umulative observations a nd his g rowing suspicions , M o u nt separ ated a

ppellant and Mora les and que stioned them about their trip. Appellant told Mount that he and Morales, w ho he identified a s his wife, had be en to Dallas to visit Morales’s cousin. Mount testified t hat, whil e spea king w ith appellant, appe llant display ed ner

vous behavior. A

ppellant beg an to shake, his e y e twitched, his lower lip quivere d, and his mouth appeare d dry

and he wa s licking his lips. Although a ppellant had a

ppear ed to under stand En g lis h e arl y

in t hei r con ver satio n, he late r i nd ic a te d h e did no t un de rs tand

Mo un t. Morales

1 told Mount t hat she a

nd appellant ha d driven to Da llas from Ea gl e P as s t o v isit friends and “buy some wig s.” Mount testified that, beca use of his sus picions of cr iminal activity , he aske d Morales for consent to se arc h the vehicle. She a g ree d. Another of fice r, Mar tin Flores, who spoke Spanish, had ar rived at the s cene and asked appellant in Spanish for his consent to sear ch the ve hicle. F lores te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt g a ve his ve rb a l c on se nt. Mount a nd Flore s conducte d a sear ch of the vehicle. Mount te stified that a scr ew wa s mis sin g in t

he c e nte r c on so le in t

he int e ri or

of the ve hicl e and

that thre e oth e r s c re ws a

pp e are d to be “sc ratc hed up and obvious that they had bee n remove d for some rea son.” The of fice rs testified4

that they found plasti c ziplock bag s containing a lar g e quantity of cur renc y beneath the cente r console. Af

ter discove ring the curr ency , the offic ers a rre sted appe llant and Morale s and transpor ted the vehicle to a city

maintenanc e fa cility

wher e they continued the sear ch. During the course of the
sear ch, the of

fice rs re cover ed a total of $116,133 in United States curr ency , including bundle s of
cu rr en cy i np l as t i c b ags n ea r t h e e n g i n e w h e r e t h e a i r f i l t er s h o u l d h av e b ee nan d

i np l as t i c b ags located in a hidden compar tment unde rneath the plastic molding on the unde rside of the vehicle. T he
c ur re nc y c on si ste d o f v ari ou s d e no min a tio ns , in c lud inglarg e qu anti tie s o f s ma ll d e no min a tio ns . Both off icer s testified that the cur renc y had a strongsmel l o f “f o o foo” or

air fr eshene r. A dog specia lly trained to detec t the s cent of narc otics aler ted t o the rear carg o are a of the vehicle w here the offic ers obse rved small amounts of “ marijuana debris.” I n an intervie w following his arre st, appellant stated that he and Mora les trave led from Ea g le Pass to Dallas, that a ma n whose name he did not know paid him $1500 to transport the
curr ency from Da llas to Eag le Pass, that he conce aled the curr ency inside the vehicle and then dr ove the ve hic le fr om D a lla s unti l he wa s st op pe d in Round Roc k, and that, o nc e he arr ive d in Ea g le Pa ss, he wa s supposed to be conta cted by a man named “Jose” who would provide further instructions on wher e to take the money . A fing erpr int ex aminer testified at trial that a ppellant’s rig ht thumb print matched a latent fing erpr int lifted from one of the box es conta ining ziplock bag s rec overe d from the vehicle. O ffice r F lores testified that no one ever claimed the mone y

seized from the ve hicle. Ba sed upon their obse rvations and their training and experience , the offic ers testified that the amount of curr ency rec overe d from the vehicle and t he manner i n which it was store d and transporte d was c onsistent with the sale and dis tribution of narcotics. Prior to trial, appellant f iled5

a motion to suppress the phy sical evidence seized from the vehicle on the grounds that it was seized in violation of the Four

th A mendment of the U nited States Consti tution and Article I , Section 9 of the Texas Constit ution because appellant wa s subjected to an illeg al detention. Appellant did not challeng e the leg ality

of the initial stop of

the vehicle . No hea

ring was he ld prior to trial. Appellant prese nted his motion during trial at the time the State offe red a reda cted video a

nd audio re cording of the tra ffic stop. The trial court de nied the motion.
AN AL YSI S Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

To suppress e vidence on an a l l ege d violation of Fourth Ame ndment rig hts, the defe ndant bear s the initial burde n of produc ing e vidence that rebuts the pr esumption of proper police conduct. Fo rd

v . S tate , 15 8 S.W. 3d 48 8, 49 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ). A de fe nd ant sat is fi es t his burden by

establishing that a sea

rch or s eiz ure oc curs without a wa rra nt. Id . Once the def

endant makes this showing , the burde n shifts to the St ate, whic h must then est ab l i s h t h at t he sea rch or seizure was c onducted pur suant to a wa rra nt or was r easona

ble. Id
. We reviewa trial c ourt’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standar d of re view, g iving a lmost t otal defe renc e to a tria l cour t’s deter mination of historical fac ts and
re v i ew i n g d

e n ovo t h e co u rt ’s application of the law. Se e W ie dev . S tate , 214 S.W .3d 17, 24-25 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 2 0 07 ); Maxwe ll v . S tate , 7 3 S. W.3 d 2 78 , 2 81 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Guzman

v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 87-90 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997). When f indings of fac t a

re not r equeste d by the pa rt ie s and no t f

ile d b y the tr ia l c ourt

a s h e re , w e vie w the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the trial court’s ruling and assume that the tria l court made implicit findi ng s of fa ct that support6

its ruling as longas those finding s are supported by the re cord. See State v . Cullen , 195 S.W .3d 696, 69 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Al tho ug h a

pp e lla nt c on c e de s th a t th e ini tia l st op of his ve hic le wa s law fu l, in h is f ir st issue he co n te n d s th a t, in s te a d o f is s u in g a tr a f f ic c it a ti o n f

o r s p e e d in g to a

p p e ll an t o r f

o r the ins ur anc e inf

ra c tio n to Mo ra le s, the of

fi c e r s d e t a i n e d

h i m w i t h o ut r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

to i nv e sti g a te t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

t h at h e w as t ra n s p o rt i n g dru gs . C i t i n g Kot hev . S tate , 1 52 S.W. 3d

54 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2004), appellant urg es t hat t he officer s detained appellant bey ond the initial purpose of the stop without the requisite rea sonable suspi cion t hat criminal activity was a foot. As in Kothe , here , neither the i nitial stop nor i ts duration violated the F ourth Amendment, a nd the conse nts to searc h wer e not there by tainted. Se e id . at 67.
Init ial Traffic Stops

A l aw e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e r m ay la wf ull y sto p a mot oris t wh o c omm its a tr a ff ic violation. State v. Gray , 1 58 S.W. 3d 46 5, 46 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Ga rc ia v . S tate , 827 S.W .2d 93 7, 94 4 ( Te x. Cr im. App
. 19 92 ). I n g e ne ra l, t he de c isi on

to s top an a

uto mob ile is r e a so na

ble when a n office r has pr obable c ause to be lieve that a tr aff ic violation has occ urre d. W alte r v . S tate , 28 S.W. 3d

53 8, 54 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); see also W hren v. U nited States , 5 1 7 U. S
. 8 0 6 , 810 (1 9 9 6 ). A t ra ff

i c s t o p i s a “ s ei z u re ” w i t h i nt h e m ea n i n g o f t h e F o u rt h A m e n dm en t , ev en t h o u gh the purpose of t he st op is limit ed and the re sulting dete ntion is brief. De law ar e v . Pro us e , 4 40 U. S. 64 8, 65 3 ( 19 79 ); see U

nited State v. Brigham , 382 F .3 d 5 00 , 5 06 (5 th C ir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc ); Fran c is
v . S tat e , 922 S.W .2d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).7 Of fi c e rs may

sto p a nd br ie fl y de tain persons su sp e c te d o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity on le ss information t han is constitutionally require d for probable cause to arrest. Te rry v . O hio , 3 92 U. S. 1, 21-22 (1968). Be cause a routine traff ic s top is analog ous to a tempora ry investigative detention,
we a naly ze such s t o p as a Terry stop. Se e Be rk e me r v . M

c Car ty , 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); Brigham , 382 F.3d at 506. Such detention may last no longe r than is nec essar y to effec t u ate the purpose of

the stop. Florida v. Roye r , 4 60 U. S. 4 91 , 5 00 (1 98 3) ; Da v is v. Sta te , 947 S.W .2d 240, 243-45 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997).

Duringa routine t ra ff

i c s t op, an off

icer may detain an individual to che ck for outstand i n g wa rr ants. Da v is v . S tate , 9 47 S.W. 2d

24 0, 24 5 n .6 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); se e als o W a lter , 2 8 S. W. 3 d

a t 5 4 2
. A no f

f ic e r ma y a ls o r e qu e s t a

dr iv e r ’ s li c e n s e , li a

b il it y in s u r ance information, and ve hicle owne rship information. Da v is , 9 4 7 S
. W
. 2 d a t 24 5; Veal v . S

tate , 28 S.W. 3d 83 2, 83 5 (T e x. Ap p. —B e a umo nt 2 00 0, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Po we ll v . S tate , 5 S.W .3d 369, 377 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 19 99 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Mo hm e d v . S tate , 977 S.W .2d 624, 628 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1998, pet. ref’ d). While an officer is awa iting a computer warr ant che ck, questioning about
ma tte rs unre late d to the ini tia l tr a ff ic sto p d oe s n ot v iol a te the F ourt h A me ndme nt b e c a

us e such questioning does not extend the duration of an initial valid seizure. United States v. Sharpe , 47 0 U .S. 67 5, 68 7 ( 19 85 ) (“ Cle arl y thi s c a se do e s no t inv olv e any de lay unne c e ssa

ry to t he le g iti mate inv e sti g a tio n o f t

he law e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs .” ); Un ite d Sta te

s v. Sh abaz

z , 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993). In some circ umstances, howe ver, e xte n s iv e q u e s ti o n ing a

bout unrelate d matters may exceed the sc ope of the initial st op. United States v. Kelley , 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 ( 5th Cir. 1993).8

Reasonable Su spicion

Under Te rry , a

te mpo ra ry inv e sti g a tiv e d e t e nti on

—a F ourt h A me ndme nt s e izur e —is
rea sonable, a

nd there fore constitutional, if (1) the off icer ’s ac tion was jus t i fi ed at the detention’s inception; and (2) the detention wa s rea sonably related in sc ope to the circ umstances that justified the interfe renc e i n the first plac e. Te rry , 392 U.S. at 19-20. F or the off icer ’s initial action to be jus tif ie d und e r t

he fi rs t Te rry p r o n g , w e a s k w h e t h e r t h e r e e xi s t e d s p e c i f i c , art i c u l a

b l e f a c t s tha t, taken tog ether

with rational infer ence s from those fa cts, rea sonably war rante d that intrusion. Id . at 21 ; se e als o D av is , 9 47 S.W. 2d a t 24 2. Th e of

fi c e r m us t ha ve a re a so na ble su sp ic ion

that so me activity out o f

th e o r d in ar

y is o c c u r r in g o r h a s o c c u r

r e d , s o me s u g g e s ti o nto c o n n e c t t h e d e ta inee wi th t he unus ua l a c tiv ity , a

nd so me ind ic a tio n th a t th e unus ua l a c tiv ity is r e late d to a

c ri min a l a c t. Da v is , 9 47 S.W. 2d

a t 24 4; Ga rza v . S

tate , 771 S.W .2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). “Rea sonable suspicion” ex ists if the officer has specific , articula ble facts that, when combined with rational infere nces f rom those fa cts, would lead the office r to rea sonably conclude that a par t i cular

person a ctually

is, has been, or

soon will be eng ag ed in cr iminal activity
. Fo rd , 15 8 S. W.3 d at 49 2; Ga rc ia v . S tate , 43 S.W .3d 5 2 7 , 5 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We give due we ight, not to the off icer ’s inchoate and unpar ticularized suspicion or “hunc h,” but to the specific rea sonable infe renc es that he is entitled to dra w from the fa ct s i n l ight of his ex perie nce. Se e Te rry , 392 U.S. at 27; Da v is , 9 47 S.W. 2d at 24 3 n .3 . Wh e the r a

n o ff ic e r h a d r e aso nab le suspicion to support an i nvestig ative dete ntion is determined by consideringthe totality

of the circ umstances known to the of fice r at the time the dete ntion occurr ed. Fo rd , 158 S.W .3d at 492-93. We c onsider the totality

of the c ircumstance s rather than a piec emea l examination of the evidence
.9

W iede , 2 14 S.W. 3d

a t 25 . A n inve sti g a tiv e de te nti on that is no t ba se d o n r e a so na ble suspi c ion

is
unrea sonable a

nd violates the F ourth Amendment. Da v is , 947 S.W .2d at 243. A seizure that is rea sonable at its i nception may viol at e the Four

th Amendment by virtue of its excessive intensity and scope
. Da v is , 947 S.W .2d at 243. Thus, under the second Te rry pr on g , a n inve sti g a tiv e de te nti on

mus t be te mpo ra

ry and la st n o lo ng e r t

ha n is ne c e ssa

ry to e ff e c tuate the purpose of

the stop. Roye r , 460 U.S. at 500. Once the reason for the s top has been satisfied, the stop may not be us ed as a “fishing ex pedition for unrelated criminal activity .” Da v is , 947 S.W .2d at 243. We revie w the reas o n ab l eness of the detention fr om the same pe rspec tive as the off icer :
us ingan o bje c tiv e sta

nd ard , w e a sk

wh e the r t

he fa c ts a va ila ble a t the mome nt o f d e te nti on wo uld
war rant a person of rea sonable caution in the belief that the action take n was a ppropriate
. Te rry , 392 U. S. at 21 -2 2; Da v is , 947 S.W .2d at 243.

The scope of

th e s e iz u r e mu s t b e r e s tr ic te d to th a t n e c e s s ar

y to f u lf il l t h e s e iz u r e ’s purpose. Roye r , 4 60 U. S. a t 50 0. “ Th e re is, ho we ve r, no c on sti tut ion a l st op watc h o n tr a ff ic sto ps . I nstead, the r eleva

nt question in assessing w hether a dete ntion ex tends beyond a re asonable duration is ‘whether

the police dilig ently

pursued a

m eans of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their s uspicions quickly .’” Brigham , 3 8 2 F. 3 d at 5 1 1 (q u o t i n g Sharpe , 470 U.S. at 686). An inv e sti g a tiv e de te nti on

fo llo wi nga

tr affic s top “ may

la st a s lo nga s is re a so na bly ne c e ssa ry to eff ectuate the purpose of the stop, including the re solution of reas o n ab l e suspicion, supported by articula ble facts within the officer’ s profe ssional judgme nt, that emer g es duringthe stop.” Id . at 512. The Supreme Court has expressly reje cted p l ac i n g a rig id time lim itation on Terry investigative detentions. Kothe , 152 S.W .3d at 64-65.10

Cont inu ed Investigative De tention Duri ngthe c ours e of

a lawf ul t ra ff ic st op, a n o ff ic e r who de ve lop s r e a so na ble suspicion that an occ upant of the ve hicle is eng ag ed in, or will eng age i n , crimi nal ac tivity may continue the de tention of the occ upants of the ve hicle to investig ate c riminal activi ty bey ond the scope of the law violation that for med the basis of the initial st op. Sim s v . S tate , 98 S.W .3d 29 2, 29 5- 96 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; Es tra da v . S tate , 30 S.W .3d 599, 603 (Tex. Ap p.—Austin 2000, pet. ref ’d). In forming rea sonable suspicion to justify a continued detention, an of

fice r may drawon his training a

nd experience
. Estrada , 3 0 S. W.2 d at 60 3; see United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).

Once the traf

fic stop inve stigation is conclude d, the office r may no longe r deta in the dr iv e r , w h o mu s t b e p e r

mi tt e d to leave. Kothe , 1 52 S.W. 3d a t 63 -6 4. An

of fi c e r m ay re qu e st consent to sea

rch a vehicle afte r the purpose of the traff ic stop has bee n acc omplished, as long a s the reque st is rea sonable under t he circumstance s and the office r has not communicated that compliance with the office r’s re quest is require d. Le ac h v . S tate , 3 5 S. W.3 d 2 32 , 2 35 -3 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 00 , no pe t.) ; Sim

ps on v . S tate , 2 9 S. W.3 d 3 24 , 3 28 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 00 , p e t. ref ’d). B ut if consent is ref

used, the off

icer must have rea sonable suspi cion t o continue to detain the person stopped. Simpson , 29 S.W .3d at 328. I f, during a valid traff ic s top and detention, the of fice r develops re asonable suspicion that the detaine e is eng ag ed in cr iminal activity , continued dete ntion is justi fied. Da v is , 947 S.W .2d at 244-45.11 Appellant does not dispute the validity of the initial traffic stop. I nstead, he contends that his detention was unduly prolong ed and not supported by rea sonable suspicion to justify the continued dete ntion. The rec ord does not support appe llant’s contention.

Her e, Of fice r Mount pulled along side a spee ding ve hicle and tr ied to attra ct the attention of the driver, w ho failed to a cknowledg e the of fice r. Mount then ac tivated his overhe ad lights t o stop the vehicle. Mount testified that a lthough ther e wa s plenty of room to pull over on the side of the hig hway , the vehicle took “a little m o re t i m e t h an most cars would to stop,” “pa ssing
sever al safe place s where most cars would have stopped.” I nstead of pulling over on the side of the highw ay , the vehicle continued for a quarte r of a mile and exited at the next ex it, pulli ng into the parkinglot of a re staurant. Mount testified that he ran a computer c heck on the license plate of the vehicle, le arningthat it was reg istered to a f emale in San Antonio. As he approa ch ed t h e drive r, Mo un t ob se rv e d th a t th e dr ive r w a s ma le and tha t he pr e se nte d a

dr ive r’ s li c e ns e sh owin g his residenc e as Ea g le Pass. Mount testified that he imm ed i at el y observe d “unusual” activities that
c a us e d h im t o b e “ su sp ic iou s at th is p oin t:”
While I ’m

ta lki ngto h im I

c an s me ll w ha

t I wo uld re fe r t o a s p e rf

ume or a ir deodorizer something t h at s mells. And also as I ’m talking to him in t he bac kseat there is a bag . A ziplock bag and it s g ot a bagof ziplock free zer bagty pe thing s, a lit tle bo ttl e of

a ir fr e sh e ne r, and

so me ba by wi pe s.
On the dashboa

rd, Mount observe d a computer ized global positioning sy st em u n i t . Mount questioned the occupa

nts of the vehicle separ ately , and their acc ounts of their trave ls differe d from one anothe r. Articulating the c ircumstance s that g ave him conc ern, Mount testified:12

There was a

whole bunch of things from the very beg inning. But the f act that whe n I was driving right nex t to the driver in a mar ked police c ar try

ing to g et his attention. As a cop we’ re use to people staring at us all the time, this driver wouldn’t eve n look a t me
. I f o u n d it h a r d to b e li e v e h e d id

n ’ t kn o w I w a s th e r e . I w a s dr iv in g r ig h t n e xt to him. He was staring straig ht a head holding tig ht on the steeringwhee l. When I did tr y to stop him it took long er than normal to stop. Then before I introduc ed my self I could smell air fre shener
. I could see the items; the bag s, baby wipes, what not, in the back. The re is y ou know all those things individually may be nothing but when a ll this stuff happe ns rig ht there at the beg inning it’s not a nor mal traff ic stop.
On cr oss-examination, Mount continued: [Y] ou have to unde rstand from the minute Iwalked up to the w indow when I ’d a lr e a dy no tic e d how lon g it too k to pull ov e r. We a lr e a dy ve e re d o ve r f

ro m w hat a no rm a l ve hic le wo uld

do . Sm e lli nga ir fr e sh e ne r, se e ing wh a t I saw i n th e ba c ks e a t, befor e I said a word to any

body
. So the s peeding , the insuranc e, they still need to be a d dr e s s e d
. B u tI ’ m m o r e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t w h e t h e r t h e c ar w a s s t o l e n . A r e t h e se g uy s g onna hurt me. What’s g oing on.
As Mount noticed fa ctual discre pancie s betwee n the ac counts of the ve hicle’s oc cup an t s and observe d appellant’ s nervousne ss, he aske d Moral es for c onsent to sear ch the ve hicle. She consente d. Speaking Spanish to a ppellant, Off

icer Flore s asked a

ppellant for c onsent to sear ch and he, too, ag ree d. The re cord doe s not show th at t here was a ny delay from the time the dispatc her inf or me d M ount t

hat ne ith e r ap pe lla

nt nor Mo ra le s h a d a

n o uts tand ingwa

rr ant u nti l th e oc c up ants consente d to the sear ch of the vehicle.

The e vidence shows clea

rly that the information that for med the basis for

Mount’s suspicion was obtained a t t h e very beg inning of

the stop and that Mount followed up on the information with leg itimate questioning. Thr oug hout the duration of the stop—the dr iver’s lice nse, license c heck, a

nd revie w of the ve hicle’s pa perw ork—the que stioning and c onversation between13

a pp e lla nt a nd Mo un t c on tin

ue d to provi de Mo unt w itha dd iti on a l in fo rm a tio n th a t c on tr ibute d to Mount’s rea sonable suspicion. The e vidence shows that in his conversations with ap pellant and Morales, a s he re ceive d conflictingresponse s about t heir trip, Mount asked for conse nt to searc h the vehicle. See Ke lley , 981 F.2d at 1470.

Mo un t’ s q

ue sti on ingof

a pp e lla nt t hat to ok pla c e fr om t

he tim e of the ini tia l st op un til the c omp le tio n o f t

he wa rn ingwa s su

pp or te d b y re a so na ble su sp ic ion , e ve n w henunre late d to the spee ding violation. See U nited States v. Dor tch , 1 99 F .3 d 1 93 , 1 98 (5 th C ir . 1 99 9) ; Sh ab az z , 99 3 F .2 d at 43 7. Th e a dd iti on a l in fo rm a tio n— art ic ula ble fa c ts a

nd ra tio na l in fe re nc e s f

ro m th os e fac ts—that Mount dis cover ed or le arne d during the lawf ul detention could re aso n ab ly form the ba s i s for c ontinued detention and justify further investigation. Se e Po we ll v . S tate , 5 S.W .3d 36 9, 37 8- 79 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 19 99 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; se e als o W olf v . S tate , 137 S.W .3d 797, 804 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.).

Th e se sp e c if

ic , a rt ic ula ble fa c ts and the ra

tio na l inf e re nc e s ari sin g fr om t

he se fa c ts g ave the office rs a rea sonable basis for suspecting that appellant was eng ag ed in i lleg al ac tivity and fo r t he c on tin ue d d e te nti on . A t tr ia l, t

he of fi c e rs art ic ulate d th e fa c tor s tha t g a ve the m a re a so na ble suspicion to continue to de tain appellant. See, e.g., Leach , 3 5 S. W.3 d at 23 5- 36 (o ff ic e r m ay re qu e st
c on se nt t o s e arc h v e hic le a ft e r p ur po se of sto p h a s b e e n a c c omp lis he d, as lo nga s r e qu e st i s
re a so na ble un de r t

he c ir c ums tance s and

of fi c e r h a s n ot c on ve y e d me ssa g e that c omp lia nc e wi th his re qu e st i s r e qu ir e d) ; Simpson , 29 S.W .3d at 328 (same ). The officers ac ted in a dilige nt and
rea sonable manne r, and the re is no evide nce that the office rs wer e dilatory in their investigation. The district court did not err by overr uling the motion to suppress. We ove rrule a ppellant’s first issue.14 I n his second and third issues, appellant challeng es the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y to support his conviction. Spec i fi ca l l y , he conte nds that the State failed to e stablish bey ond a
re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e c ur

re nc y fo un d in the ve hic le wa s th e pr oc e e ds of fe lony c ri min a l a c tiv ity or, bec ause of

the manner

in which th e currenc y

was c oncea led in the vehicle , that appellant kn ow ing ly

po sse sse d o r t

ra ns po rt e d th e pr oc e e ds
. I n a leg al suffic iency

revie w, we vie w the evide nce in the l ight most favor able to the verdic t and dec ide whethe r any rational trier

of fa ct could have found t he esse ntial elements of the convicted of

fense bey ond a re asonable doubt. Mo ff v . S tate , 131 S.W .3d 485, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We consider all evidenc e the jury was pe rmitted to consider. Id
. The jury is the exclusive judge of the c redibility

of the witnesses and of the weig ht a ssigne d to their testimony
. J on es v . S tate , 944 S.W .2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

I n a factual sufficiency revie w, we view all of the e vidence admitted befor e the jury in a neutra l light and se t aside th e j u ry ’s v er dict only if the evide nce of

g uilt is so weak that the
v er d i ct is clea

rly wrongand manife stly

unjust, or the verdic t is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Se e W ats on v . S tate , 204 S
. W
. 3 d 4 0 4 , 4 14-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 20 06 ); Cai n v . S

tate , 9 58 S.W. 2d

40 4, 40 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). A j ur y ’s ve rd ic t is no t c le arl y
wr on g and manif

e stl y un jus t simpl y be c a

us e the jur

y re so lve d co nf

lic tin g vie ws of the e vid e nc e in favor of the State. Cai n , 95 8 S.W. 2d a t 41 0. As the tr ie r o f f a c t and the so le jud g e of

the c re dib ili ty of the wit n esses and the weig ht to be acc orded the ir testimony , id . at 407, the jury may acc ept or reje ct all or a

ny evidenc e pre sented by t h e parties a nd may drawrea sonable infe renc es fr om the evidenc e. J

on es v . S tate , 184 S.W .3d 915, 919 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.).15 When viewed cumulatively and in the light most fa vorable to the jury ’s ver dict, the
e v id e n c e in

th is c a s e p r o v id e d

a s u f f ic ie n t b a s is f

o r a r a ti o n a l j u r

y to c o n c lu d e th a t t

h e c u r r e ncy
rec overe d from the vehicle driven by appellant was the proceeds of felony criminal ac tivity

and that ap p el l an th adt h e r eq u i s i t e k n o wl ed ge t o s u p p o rth i s co n v i ct i o n

fo r m o n ey

l au n d er i n g. Displaying signs of nervousne ss when he spoke wit h the officer, a ppellant g ave a

n
acc ount of his a ctivities that w as inconsistent w ith that of his pa sseng er and consistent with that of
someone e ng ag ed in illeg al ac tiviti es. A g lobal positioni ng sy stem trac king device was located on the dashboar d. A narc otics canine aler ted to the pre sence of nar cotics in the re ar c arg o are a of the vehicle, a nd the offic ers obse rved small amounts of mar ijuana shre ds there. The jury also hea rd and obse rved e x tensive e v i d en ce about the off icer s’ seizure of $116,133 in United States curr ency , how t he currenc y was packag ed in z iplock bag s and conc eale d throug hout the car , that there wer e lar g e number s of bills in various, small denominations, and that it h a d b e e n s pr ay e d w itha ir fr e sh e ne r. I n h is s tate me nt, a pp e lla nt d e nie d tr ans po rt ingmari jua na to Dallas, but he a dmitted that his “sole purpose” in g oing to Dallas was “to g et the money .” Appe llant
a lso adm it ted th a t he wa s th e on e wh o p a c ke d th e c ur re nc y in zi plo c k b a g s and

c on c e a le d it

in
va ri ou s p la c e s in sid e the ve hic le , th a t he receiv e d $ 15 00 fr om a n unid e nti fi e d ma

n in Da lla s to transport the c urre ncy

to the Mexi can bor der, a nd that he wa s to deliver the c urr en cy to a man he identified to offic ers whe n he ar rived in Eag le Pass. The off icer s testified that no one e ver c laimed the money

and, base d upon their obser vations, training , and experienc e, the money rec overe d from the ve hic le wa s c on sis te nt wi th pr oc e e ds fr om the sa le and dis tr ibutio n of na rc oti c s. Ap pe lla

nt d id not testify or off er othe r testimony

on his behalf.16 Even whe n viewed in a neutra l lig ht, the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the jury ’s
c on c lus ion that the c ur

re nc y re c ov e re d fr om the ve hic le wa s th e pr oc e e ds of fe lony c ri min a l a c tiv ity and that appe llant knowingly possessed or tra

nsported the pr ocee ds of the c ri m i n al ac tivity . The
e vid e n c e w a s a mp l e an d

n o ts o w e a k

a s t o r e n d e r

t h e j u r y ’ s v e r d i c tc l e ar l y

w r o n g o r ma nif e stl y unjust. Nor was it ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. The evidenc e at trial was both le g ally and fac tually sufficie nt to support t h e j u ry ’s deter mination that appellant knowing ly acquir ed or maintained an intere st in, concea led, possessed, transfe rre d, or transpor

ted the proc eeds of

felony criminal ac tivity . We overrule his seco n d and thi rd iss ue s. I n his fourth issue, appe llant contends the c ourt err ed by ref using to instruct the jury pursuant to ar

ticle 38.23. See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . Ann . ar t. 38. 23 (a ) ( Wes t 20 05 ). Ar tic le 38.23(a) provides that in any case in which the “evide nce r aises an issue” that evidenc e wa s obtained in violation of its provisi ons, the jury should be instructed to disreg ard e v i d en ce t h at i t believes was obtaine d in violation of the constitution or laws of Texas or of the United States. Id . Appellant
c on te nd s tha t the jur

y sh ou ld have be e n inst

ru c te d to disr e g ard the c ur re nc y se ize d in

the ve hic le if i td e t e r m i n e d t h a tt h e e v i d e n c e h a d

b e e ns e i z e d

u n l aw f u l l y. An article 38.23 instruction is required w hen a dispute e x ists concer ning a n historical fac t unde rlying the manner in w hich the evide nce w as obtained. Se e Va sq ue z v . S tate , 225 S.W .3d 54 1, 54 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); W esb ro ok v . S tate , 29 S.W .3d 103, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Be ll v . S tat e , 9 38 S.W. 2d

35 , 4 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); T h o m a s v . S

t ate , 723 S.W .2d 696, 707 (Tex. C r im
. A p p . 1 9 8 6 )
. T h e d is p u te d f a c t is s u e mu s t h a v e a d ir e c t b e ar in g o n th e le g a lity of the17

police ac tions in obt aining the evidenc e. Ga rza v . S tate , 126 S.W .3d 79, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). When the re is no conflicting testimony reg arding the rele vant fac ts, no jury instruction is required. At tr ia l, a pp e lla nt f a ile d to ra ise an is su e re g ard inga fa c tua l di sp ute , b ut d isp ute d o nly the infer ence s to be draw n from the of fice rs’ observations and the gr ounds for a ppellant’s continued detention, which r aise only the leg al issue of whe ther appellant’ s continued detention was ba sed on
rea sonable suspicion. Althoug h appellant a sserts on appea l that a disputed issue exist s, his counsel did not respond to the S tate’s assertion that one did not exi st and the trial cour t found that he fa iled to r aise an issue of a disputed historical fac t. Appellant was not e ntitled to an article 38.23( a) jury instruction beca

use he failed to ide ntify a disputed issue of historical fac t unde rlying the leg ality of his detention. We overrule appellant’ s fourth issue.
CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled ap p ell ant’s issues, we aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Oc tober 10, 2007 Do No t Pu

bli sh