NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS
D IVISION O NE

S TATE OF ARIZONA
, Appellee
,

v.

RAM IN KHORRAMI
, Appellant

.
No. 1 CA- CR 20-0088

A ppeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR 2015-002870-001 The Honorable Geoffrey H. Fish
, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL
Arizona Attorney General’s Office , Phoenix By Michelle L. Hogan Counsel for Appellee

C oleman & Balogh LLP, San Diego, California By Benjamin Lee Coleman, appearing Pro Hac Vice Co

- Counsel for Appellant

P apetti Samuels Weiss LLP , Scottsdale By Bruce E. Samuels Co -C ounsel for Appellant FILED 7-29-2021STATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

G A S S , Judge:

Ramin Khorrami appeals his convictions and the resulting suspensions of sentences for one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices and one count of theft

. W e affirm

.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This court re v iews the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict, resolving all reasonable inferences against Khorrami

. See State v. Fe l ix , 237 Ariz. 280, 283, ¶ 2 (App. 2015). We use pseudonyms for the victims to protect their privacy. See
, e.g. , State v. Bolivar
, 250 Ariz. 213, 217, ¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2020).

Pearl and Khorrami met in May 2012

. Pearl told Khorrami she li ved i n Phoenix with her husband
, Trey , and worked in real e state

. Khorrami told Pearl he lived in Los Angeles and o ffered to he lp her find real estate clients there . T hey exchanged phone numbers

. A fter Pearl returned home
, she and Khorrami regularly exchanged flirtatious text messages and often spoke on the phone. When Pearl visited Khorrami a few months later
, they began a sexual relationsh ip

. Over the next few months
, Pearl frequent ly travelled to spend time with Khorrami. Pearl told Khorrami she planned to leave Trey , and the two discusse d a future together

.
Over time, K horram i became jealous and paranoid. He

accus ed Pearl of having affairs with other men
, demand ed she send him photographs throughout the day to show her location , and told her he hired

a pr ivate in v estigator to follow her

. Later , Pearl angered Khorrami when she decid ed to remain in her marriage

. I n response, he threatened to reveal their affair to Tre y

. They then mended their relationshi p , and Khorrami did
not carry out his threat

. In June 2013, after a nother falling

- out , Khorrami accused Pearl of repeatedly lying to him and again t hreatened to r eveal their affair
to Trey

. Pearl plead ed with him not to do s o , and he agreed to delay tellingSTATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

3 Trey while he thought about wh at to do . Khorrami called Pearl a few days later and promise d not to reveal the affair i f she paid him $40,000

.
After Khorrami’s money

- for

- silence proposal
, Pearl began secretly record ing their phone calls

. When Pearl next spoke with Khorrami, they negotiated the terms

. H e agreed to accept $30,00 0 , which she would pay in multiple installments over a month

. He required her to put a false
comment on the checks saying “Rose gold Rolex ” and indicat ing the remaining amount she owed

. Khorrami sent Pearl text message s saying she had “20 days to finish your deal, not one day more” and his “ only communication with [her] will be regarding [their] deal till [ sic ] the end of July. ”
The day they agreed to their deal, Pearl mailed Khorrami a $5,000 check with the false comment

. After Khorrami received the first payment, he added to his demands . He told Pearl to call him every morning, send pictures showing her location th roughout the day, and refrain from sexual relations with anyone except him

. When Pearl at times did not comply
, he sent her text messages saying the “deal is off” and the “deal is going to change

. ” He demand ed an additional $10,000 after she failed to answer a phone call

. Khorrami eventually withdrew t h at demand

. A week after sending the first check, Pearl mailed Khorrami a $2,000 check
, then later a third check for the remaining amount of $23,000. Khorrami rejected the final payment bec ause Pearl did not include the false
comment on the check

. At his demand, s he sen t a nother check with the false
comment

. A fter receiving the fourth check , Khorrami demanded Pearl pay $40,000 more and continue their sexual relationship
, again threatening to disclose the affair to Trey if she did not comply

.
Pearl gave Khorrami another $4,000
, but she also realized Khorrami ’s additional demands would n ever end and he never intended to keep his side of the bargain

. As a result, Pearl told Trey about the affair in November 2013

. The next day, Khorrami told Trey about the affair and Pearl ’s affairs with other men. Trey reporte d Khorrami to the police
, and Pearl and Trey filed a civil lawsuit against Khorrami

.

T he State ultimately tried Khorrami for one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class 2 felony, and theft, also a class 2 felony. After a twelve

- day trial, the jury convicted Khorrami on both
counts

. T he superior court entered judgments of convicti on , suspended Khorrami’s sentence, and plac ed him on concurrent two

- year terms of supervised probation. The superior court also imposed a two

- month jailSTATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

4 term. Khorrami timely appealed. This c ourt has jurisdiction under a rticle VI , s ection 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 13

- 4031 and 13

- 4033

. A

. 1

.
ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the E vidence

Khorrami first argues his convictions lack sufficient evidence. C iting Fasulo v. Unite d States , 272 U.S. 620 (1926)
, and Norton v. United States
, 92 F.2d 753 ( 9th Cir. 1937 )
, he asserts the statutes underlying his conviction s “were not meant to govern the circumstances of this case

. ”

This court review s de novo whether sufficient evidence support s a conviction

. State v. Pena , 235 Ariz. 277 , 2 79 , ¶ 5 (201 4 ). Evid ence is sufficien t if the record contains “substantial evidence” of guilt , meaning evidence “ reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilt y verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. ” Id

. ( citation omitted )

. “Reversible error based on insufficiency of the evidence occurs only [when] there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conviction.” State v. Soto

Fong , 187 Ariz. 186, 200 (1996) (quoting State v. Scott , 113 Ariz. 423, 424

– 25 (1976))

.
“Evidence is not insubstantial simply because testimony is conflicting or reasonable persons may draw different conclusions from the evidence.” State v. Toney , 113 Ariz. 404, 408 (1976)

. This court will not

“ reweigh evidence or reassess the witnesses’ credibility

. ” State v . Buccheri

Bianca , 233 Ariz. 324, 334, ¶ 38 (App. 2013 )

. I n its review, this court do es not distinguish between circumstantial and direct evidence

. State v. Bible , 175 Ariz. 549, 560 n.1 (1993). J urors usually must “ infer [a defendant’s mental state] from [the defendant’s] behaviors and other circumstances surrounding the event.” State v. Noriega , 187 Ariz. 282, 286 (App. 1996)

.

To su pport Khorrami ’s fraudulent

- schemes

- and

- artifices conviction , substantial evidence i n the record must show : (1) pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud ; ( 2 ) Khorrami knowingly obtained any benefit from the victim ( s ) ; ( 3 ) by means of false or fraudulent pretenses
, representations, promises, or material omissions

. A.R.S. § 13

- 2310

. A ; se e State v. Haas
, 138 Ariz. 413, 418

– 24 ( 1983 ) ( describing statutory elements under an earlier version of the fraud statute )

. “ Reliance on the part of any person” is not an element of the offense. A.R.S. § 13

- 2310

. B. The superior court instructed the jurors “the State must prove that the scheme or artifice to defraud was intended to defraud, meaning it was intended to mislead another person for the purpose of gaining some benefit.”STATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

5 The fraudulent

- schemes

- and

- artifices statute is meant to “encompass [] a very broad range of fraudulent activities.” Haas , 138 Ariz.
at 422 ( citation omitted)

. Section 13

- 2310

. A is violated “ when [a] defendant has knowingly [mis] led the adverse party

. . . by active misrepresentations, or omitting material facts which defendant knew were being misunderstood, or by stating half

- truths, or by any combination of these methods. ” Id. at 423.

T o convict on the theft charge, t he superior court instructed the jurors the S tate had to prove Khorrami , without lawful authority, knowingly o btain ed the victims’ “U.S. currency of a value of $25,000 or more, but less than $100,000” by means of any material misrepresentation
, with the intent to deprive the m of such currency

. See A.R.S. § 13

- 1802

. A

. 3

. Material misrepresentat ion means “a pretense, promise, represe nt ation or statement of present, past or future fact that is fraudulent and that
, when used or communicat ed
, is instrumental in causing the wrongful control or transfer o f propert y or services

. ” A.R.S. § 13

- 1801

. A

. 8

.

T he record contains ample evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude Khorrami obtained money from Pearl under the false pretense he woul d not reveal their affair to Trey

. Pearl repeatedly testified she believed she was buying Khorrami’ s silence on the affai r when they agreed to the initial, negotiated payment of $30,000

. S he describ ed in detail how he led her to have that belief

. S he recounted the terms of their deal and her compliance with them , despite Khorrami’s ever

- changing demands

. And Pearl finally disclose d the affair to Trey once she was convinced Khorrami had deceived her

.

P earl ’s testimony
, together with reasonable inferences
, alone is sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. See State v. Felix , 234 Ariz. 118, 120

– 21, ¶ 10 (App. 2014) (affirming conviction based on single witness’s testimony). T he State further corroborat ed Pearl ’s account with evidence of phone calls and text messages between Pearl and Khorrami in which they discussed the arrangement and its terms. And Khorrami took the money from Pearl
, spent it soon afterward, and made additional demands befor e ultimately reveal ing the affair to Trey

.

A reasonable juror could infer Khorrami required Pearl to include the false comment on the checks from the outset so he could later reveal the affair but still say he obtained the money legitimately

. Khorrami ’s additional deman ds to maintain his silence after Pearl paid the agreed

- upon $30,000 bolstered the inference Khorrami’s intent was to extract as much money as he could before he ultimatel y reveal ed the affair

.STATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

6 Based on the above evidence, a reasonable jury could decide Khorrami purposely misled Pearl to believe a false state of fact s : if she paid him $30,000 , he would not reveal their affai r. At the very least , reasonable minds could disagree on the point. See T oney , 113 Ariz. at 408

. Accordingly, sufficient evidence support s his convictions.

Khorrami counters that he merely threatened Pearl , which is
not actionable fraud under Fasulo and Norton

. We are not persuaded. Those

cases interpret a federa l mail fraud statute to require an intent to deceive but do not suggest s a fraud conviction cannot stand simply because it is accompanied by a threat. See State v. Johnson , 179 Ariz. 375, 381 (1994) (“This is not to say that a crime can never satisfy the overlapping elements of both theft and fraud. ” ). Those cases do not change our conclusion . T he evidence here was sufficient.

II. Jury Instructions
For the first time on appeal, Khorrami challenges the j ury instructions given for the charged offens es. First, Khorrami argues the fraudulent

- schemes

- and

- artifices instruction failed to require proof of “materiality

. ” Second, he asserts the theft

- by

- misrepresentation instruction should have require d proof of j ustifiable reliance

. F undamental

- error review applies because Khorrami did not object to the instructions at trial

. See State v. Gomez , 211 Ariz. 494, 499, ¶ 20 (2005).

To obtain relief on fundamental

- error review, a defendant first must show “trial error exists

. ” State v. Escalante
, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018)

. If error exists, t he defendant then must establish the error : (1) went to the foundation of the case ; (2) took away a right essential to the defense ; or (3) was so egregious the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial. Id

. Here, the instruction s tracked the applicable statutory language

. See A.R.S

. §§ 13

- 1802.A.3
, - 2310

. A ; se e also Rev

. Ariz

. Jury Instr

. Stat

. Crim

. 18.02.01
, 23 .10 (5th ed. 2019)

. And t he fraudulent

- schemes

- and

artifices instruction was nearly identical to the instruction endorse d by the Arizona Supreme Court

. S ee State v. Bridgeforth , 156 Ariz. 60, 64

– 65 (1988 )

. Khorram i fai ls to carry his burden to show the superior court erred

. For the same reasons, we reject Khorrami’s argument the superior court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jurors : (1) a breach of contract does not constitute fraud, even if intentional; (2) the State had to prove Khorrami did not intend to keep his promise at the time he made it; and (3) a “heightened intent requirement cannot be met” by a defendant’sSTATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

7 failure to per form. See State v. Doerr , 193 Ariz. 56, 65, ¶ 35 (1998) (“Where the law is adequately covered by instructions as a whole, no reversible error has occurred.”).
Without citing any Arizona authority
, Khorra m i reli es on several federal cases addressing the mat eriality requirement in the federal mail

- fraud, wire

- fraud, and bank

- fraud statutes to a ssert the State must prove materiality for all means of committing a violation of § 13

- 2310

. A

. Those decisions are not controlling here

. See P h oeni x Newspapers, Inc

. , v. Reinstein , 240 Ariz. 442, 449, ¶ 25 (App. 2016) (decisions of federal circuit courts may be persuasive authority but are not binding on Arizona courts)

.
Unlike the federal mail

- fraud statute , which is silent on materiality, our legislature expressly included a “ material ” requirement in § 13

- 23 10

. A and only applied the requirement to “ omissions. ” T he United States Supreme Court h e ld “materiality of falsehood is an el ement o f the federal mail fraud , wire fraud , and bank fraud statutes ” because , in part, those statutes neither defined “ s cheme o r artifice to defraud ” nor “even mention[ed] materiality .” Neder v. United States
, 527 U.S. 1, 20

– 25 (1999). The Supreme Court said the absence of an express reference to materi ality in th e federal fraud statutes indicated Congress ’s intent to incorporate the

common

- law meaning of fraud , which include s materiality

. Id. Arizona’s
statute is differ ent

. Khorrami’s suggested interpretati on would r ender superflu ous the material ity element set forth in § 13

- 2310

. A

. S ee City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.
, 209 Ariz. 544, 552, ¶ 31 ( 200 5 ) ( “[W]e do not interpret statut es in such a manner as to render a clause superfluous .” )

. Khorrami invites us to impos e a requirement the legislature expressly chose not to require , which this court will not do

. See Hart v. Hart , 220 Ariz. 183, 187, ¶ 17 (App. 2009)

. Finally, th is court has previo usly rejected Khorrami’s argument a theft

- by

- misrepresentation conviction requires justifiable reliance. See State v. Schneider , 148 Ariz. 441, 444

– 45 (App. 1985)

. We discern

no reason on this record to re consider that decision

.

III. Asserted Insufficient Notice

A. Indictment
Khorrami argues the indictment was fatally de fective and lacked sufficient notice because it “simply tracked the statutory language and did not even identify the false promise or pretense that formed the basisSTATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

8 of the two charges .” But Khorrami filed pretrial mo tion s to dismiss the indictment and never objected on the grounds he asserts now

. C riminal defendants are barre d on appeal from challenging an alleged facial defect in an indictment when they fail to make a proper objection before the superior court

. State v. Anderson
, 210 Ariz. 327, 335

– 36, ¶¶ 14

– 1 7 (2005)

.
Even absent waiver , we find no error. “An indictment is legally sufficient if it informs the defendant of the essential elements of the charge, is definite enough to permit the defendant to prepare a defense against the charge, and affords the defendant protection from subsequent prosecution f or the same offense.” State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc. , 224 Ariz. 173, 187, ¶ 36 (App. 2010 ); see State v. Mallory , 19 Ariz. App

. 15, 18 (1972) (charging document track ing statutory language generally provides sufficient notice). D efendant s must receive “ actual notice of the charges, from either the indictment or other sources.” State v. Freeney , 223 Ariz. 110, 115, ¶ 29 (2009)

.

T he indictment was sufficiently specific. It tracked the elements of the charged offense s , provided the statutory citations , identif ied the victims, and list ed the dates of the offenses and the county where they occurred. Khorrami received notice of the factual allegations from the grand jury transcript
, joint pretrial statements
, and pretrial disclosures

. See Freeney , 223 Ariz. at 114, ¶ 27 (listing other sources of notice)

. Indeed, Khorrami recounted the factual allegations in his dismiss al motions

. Accordingly, Khorrami received actual notice. See id.

B. Rebuttal Closing Argument
In this appeal
, Khorrami for the first time argues the prosecutor’s statement in rebuttal closing argument was a new liability theory, impermissibly amending the indictment and risking a non

unanimous verdict : So whether you believe that the misrepresentation took place the first time, the second time, the third time, the fourth time, whatever time that you think that he misrepresented and he was getting all this money, that’s a misrepresentation . If you believe that the first time he said $30 ,000 for silence, do you believe that he was really going to stay silent that time? Okay. But do you believe it the second time? Do you believe it with the $40,000? Do you believe it with the sexual demands? During that time period if you believe he misrep resented this one time, then that’s enough for that element.STATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

9 Because Khorrami failed to object at trial, this court reviews for fundamental, prejudicial error

. See Escalante , 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12.

“ Unless the defendant consent s , a charge may be amended only to correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal or technical defects. The charging document is deemed amended to conform to the evidence admitted during any court proceeding. ” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.5(b). T he evidence and jury instructions cons truc tively amend an indictment if they

“ modify essential terms of the charged offense ” and cause “ a substantial likelihood that the jury may have convicted the defendant for [ a different] offense

. ” United States v. Daraio , 445 F.3d 253, 259

– 60 (3rd Cir. 2006 ) ; see also State v. Lua
, 237 A r iz . 301, 305

– 06
, ¶¶ 15

– 18 ( 2015 ) ( re view ing whether jury instructions constructively amended indictment )

. Nothing in the record suggests the prose cutor sought to amend the indictment by making the challenged remarks. T he elemen t s of the offenses submitted to the jury wer e identical to th ose of the charged offenses. See F reeney , 223 Ariz. at 113, ¶ ¶ 15

– 20

. This court presume s jurors follow the instructions they are given. State v. LeBlanc , 186 Ariz. 437, 439 (1996)

. For that reason alone, we reject Khorrami ’s argument the State violat ed Rule 13.5(b ).

Moreover, t he prosecutor did not urge conviction on an improper basis. The State’s theory before and during trial was Khorrami had a single scheme he implemented through a series of ongoing transactions and he always intended to disclose the affair

. See State v. Suarez
, 137 Ariz. 368, 373 (App. 1983) (“A scheme to defraud thus implies a plan, and numerous acts may be committed in furtherance of that plan.”)

. The State pointed to Khorrami’s actions after making the agreement to further demonstrate his fraudulent promissory intent.

And t he record belies Khorrami ’s c omplaint he had no notice of the culpability theory he now protests

. T he day before the jury was empaneled
, during a hearing on trial issues, Khorrami sought and received clarification from the State on the terms allegedly constitut ing the agreement

. Khorrami’s co ntention that he lacked notice is unfounded

. S ee Freeney , 223 Ariz. at 115 , ¶ 2 9 ; see also State v. Eastlack , 180 Ariz. 243, 258 (1994) ( “ Defendant is entitled to notice of the crimes with which he may be convicted, not the manner in which the [S] tate will prove his guilt. ” )

.

IV. Victim Testimony
Khorrami challenge s the admission of what he alleges are “victim

- impact” and “victim

- opinion” testi mony. This court generallySTATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

10 review s a superior court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion

. State v. Dann , 220 Ariz. 351, 36 5 , ¶ 66 (2009)

. But because Khorrami did not object, fundamental

- error review applies

. See Escalante
, 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12

.

A. Asserted Victim

- Impact Testimony
Khorrami argues the superior court improperly allowed the State to elicit testimony from the victims describing how the offenses personally affected them

. We disagree.

Khorrami’s defense was he never entered into any agreement with Pearl
, argu ing she fabricated its existence and manipulated Trey into believing Khorrami exploited her

. Khorrami ’s counsel explained the defense’s theory to the jurors in opening statement : Pearl and Trey sought revenge agai nst Khorrami.

To support that theory
, defense counsel cross

- examined Pearl about her reasons for disclos ing the affair to Trey when Khorr a mi had not done so

. Defense counsel then asked why she would pursu e criminal charges and a civil lawsuit against Khorrami , and not just “ let sleeping dogs lie?” Pearl said she had a “mental breakdown ” from the experience
, which led Trey to report Khorrami to the police.

On redirect exa mi n a tion, the prosecutor asked Pearl to explain “why [ she ] could n’ t let sleeping dogs lie.” S he answered she

“ endured so much pain and suffering ” and “ almost died .” She continued,

“ I wouldn’t be alive if my husband didn’t make sure I was okay and fed me. I really suffered and there’s a lot of this stuff w hat he did that’s not covered in this case

. ” Khorrami did not object.

While c ross

- examining Trey , defense counsel asked, “ H ow much are you hoping to get from the civil lawsuit ?” Trey replied he sought only justice , not money

. Defense counsel also ques t ioned why Trey , and not Pearl
, had contacted the police and a civil attorney.

On redirect examinatio n , the prosecutor asked Trey to explain why he, not Pearl
, report ed Khorrami to the police

. Trey said “ [ Pearl ] was unable to. She was completely incapable of doing anythi ng. She wouldn’t remember anything. She would be very fearful. Every day she locked the door. [He’s] going to come after me to k ill me. ” Kh orrami objected to this
response

. Over Khorrami’s objection, Trey testified he had to help Pearl deal with the effect s of the experience, which in turn affected his career

.STATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

11 When a party “ope n[s] the door” and invites later, generally objectionable testimony
, no error occurs if the other party’s response is

“ pertinent , ” meaning “specifically responsive to the invitation

. ” State v. Leyvas , 221 Ariz. 181, 189, ¶ 25 (App. 2009) ( citation s omitted)

. Khorrami ’s opening statement and cross

- examination suggested the victims repor ted Khorrami to the police and fil ed a civil clai m against him for money and revenge

. Khorrami opened the door to rebuttal testimony on those subjects
, making the victims’ reasons for their actions relevant. W e find t he questions and answers sufficiently responsive to Khorrami’s invitation

. See i d. at ¶¶ 25

– 26. The superior court did not err

.

B. Religious References

Khorrami contends the State improperly elicited testimony from the victims concerning religious beliefs to “demonize” him and to portra y the victims sympathetically

. Spe cifically, he points to : (1) Trey ’s testimony he was initially att racted to Pearl in part because she was interested in his religious faith; (2) Pearl ’s testimony Khorrami and Trey share Persian heritage ; and (3) Pearl ’s testimony she and Khorrami envisioned a future to gether despite their different religious faith s

. Khor r ami did not o bject to any of the cited instances

.

A ssuming without deciding the isolated remarks consti tuted fundamental error
, Khorrami fails to establish prejudice

. H e merely speculates the remarks “likely added to the improper prejudice that tainted the fairness of Mr. Khorrami’s tria l .” S peculative prejudice is insufficient to prevail on fundamental

- error review. See E scalante
, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21 ( showing prejudice “ involves a fact

- intensive inquiry” (citation omitted) ).
Moreover, the jurors learned of far more pertinent evidence about Khorrami’s conduct. T he jurors heard recorded phone calls in which Khorrami repeatedly insult ed Pearl using demeaning and profane language

. Pearl testified at length about the derogatory way he spoke to her

. Khorrami even conceded his demeaning conduct . In closing argum ent, d efense counsel t old the jurors
, “ [Khorrami’s] an asshole . Okay? The way that he s poke to [ Pearl ] is absolutely reprehensible and indefensible

. . . . It was disgusting, right?

. . . He’s an ass

. ” A d mitting the testimony , therefore, did not deprive Khorrami of a fair trial by prejudicing the jury against him

. See State v. Weatherbee , 158 Ariz. 303, 305 (App. 1988) ( improperly admitted evidence may be harmless when it is “entirely cumulative”)

.STATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

12 C. A llege d Improper Opinion Testimony

On redirect examination, t he prosecutor asked Pearl the following : Q: In your line of work, you know when people want to come to a deal, right?

A: Yes

. Q: From everything that you experienced, did the defendant ever want this

-- ever intend on this deal staying in place?

A: Retrospectively looking at it, no.
Q: What do you feel like he wanted?

[ Defense counsel ]: Objection, speculation.

THE COURT : Overruled.
A: Revenge.
Khorrami argues the testimony constituted an improper opinion. F undamental

- error review applies because Kh orrami did not object at trial on the ground he asserts on appeal

. Escalante , 245 Ariz. at 140, ¶ 12

.

“ [ L ] ay testimony may include inferences or opinions” if based on the witness’s perceptions and helpful to understanding the witness’s testimony. State v. Ayala , 178 Ariz. 385, 387 (App. 1994) ; see also Ariz. R. Evid. 7 01 (a)

. T he prosecutor’s introductory question pertaining to Pearl ’s “line of work” did not seek to qualif y her under Rule 702 to offer an expert opinion on the intent of contracting parties

. See State v. Peltz , 242 Ariz. 23, 29, ¶ 18 (App. 2017) (approving lay witness opinion based on “training and experience” as well as “logic”)

. Pearl ’s testimony did not involve scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge implicating Rule 702

. R ather, her testimony amounted to a reasonable inference based on her perception and personal knowledge

. See Ariz. R. Evid. 701. Pearl ’s perception of Khorrami’s motiv e assisted the jurors in determining whether Khorrami had deceived Pearl by falsely promising payment would ensure his silence

. See i d.STATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

13 V. Jury Size
Citing Ramos v. Louisiana , 140 S. Ct. 1390 (20 20 ), Khorrami

a rgue s

— for the first time on appeal

— he was unconstitutional ly tried by an eight

- person jury. A twelve

- person jury “ is not a necessary ingredient of ‘trial by jury.’” Williams v. Florida , 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). Arizona’s state constitution , however, guarantees criminal defendants a twelve

- person ju r y in cases whe n the sentence authorized by law is death or imprisonment for thirty years or more

. Ariz. Const. art. II , § 23 ; see also A.R.S. § 21

- 102

. A

. O therwise, a criminal defendant may be tried with an eight

- person jury. A.R.S. § 21

- 102

. B

. “ Improper denial of a twelve

- person jury is fundamental error that may provide a basis for relief even if not raised in the trial court.” State v. Kuck , 212 Ariz. 232, 233, ¶ 8 (App. 2006).

Khorrami argues Ramo s requires twelve

- person juries in all criminal trials

. I n Ramos , however, the Supreme Court did not address any issue of constitutionally permissible jury size, much less overrule Williams

. Rather, t he Supreme Court said due process requires unanimous verdi cts in criminal trials

. See Ramos
, 140 S. Ct. at 1397

.

T he Supreme Court “does not normally overturn . . . earlier authority sub silentio

. ” Shalal a v. Ill

. Council on Long Term Care, Inc.
, 529 U.S. 1, 18 ( 2000 )

. W e cannot conclude the Supreme Court silently changed a fundamental feature of its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
, particularly given the issue was neither raised nor litigated in Ramos

. W e decline Khorrami’s invitation to reconsider the cons titutionality of eight

- person juries in Arizona

.

VI. Cumulative E rror

F inding no err o r in any of Khorrami’s individual challenges
, we discern n o merit in his argu ment the cumulative effect of the asserted trial errors violated his due

- process rights. S ee S tate v. Bocharski , 218 Ariz. 476, 492, ¶ 75 (2008) (“Absent any finding of [error], there can be no cumulative effect of [error] sufficient to permeate the entire atmosphere of the trial with unfairness.”)

.STATE v. KHORRAMI Decision of the Court

14 CONCLUSION

W e affirm Khorram i’s convictions.