ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Jennifer A. Joas Gregory F. Zoeller

Madison, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Brian Reitz

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________

In the

Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________

No. 69S01-1301-CR-24

CALVIN MERIDA,

Appellant (Defendant below),

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,

Appellee (Plaintiff below).

_________________________________

Appeal from the Ripley Circuit Court

No. 69C01-1012-FA-8

The Honorable Carl H. Taul, Judge

_________________________________

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 69A01-1203-CR-110

_________________________________

May 17, 2013]

Per Curiam.

An investigation showed Merida had been molesting a girl from the time she was five or 

six years old, starting perhaps as early as 2000. In all, Merida was charged with ten counts of 

child molesting covering the period from 2000 through 2007. After a jury was empanelled but 
2

before evidence was offered, Merida pled guilty to two counts of child molesting as Class A 

felonies. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) (2008). The remaining counts were dismissed. The 

sentencing range for a Class A felony is from twenty years to fifty years; the advisory sentence is 

thirty years. See I. C. § 35-50-2-4 (2008). 

The trial court imposed consecutive advisory sentences for an aggregate term of sixty 

years. As mitigating circumstances, the Court noted the guilty plea but did not accord it a lot of 

weight since the State and the victim had had to prepare for trial. The trial court also noted 

Merida’s lack of criminal history. The trial court discussed several aggravating circumstances. 

Merida was in a position of having care, custody and control of the girl, and his conduct occurred 

over a seven-year period. Also, as a result of the offense becoming known in the community, the 

girl no longer attends public school and does not go out with friends or talk with them on the 

phone as she once did. She has suffered an emotional impact greater than in the usual case, the 

trial court noted. 

Citing Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), the Court of Appeals revised the sentences by 

ordering them to run concurrently, thus reducing the aggregate term from sixty years to thirty 

years. See Merida v. State, 977 N.E.2d 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), vacated. We granted the 

State’s petition to transfer jurisdiction to this Court. See Merida v. State, 980 N.E.2d 841 (Ind. 

Jan. 11, 2013) (table); App. R. 56(B); 58(A).

The authority granted by Article 7, § 4 of the Indiana Constitution permitting appellate 

review and revision of criminal sentences is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which 

provides: “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of 
3

the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and the character of the offender.” Under this rule, and as interpreted by case law, 

appellate courts may revise sentences after due consideration of the trial court's decision, if the 

sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222-25 (Ind. 2008); Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 

852, 856-57 (Ind. 2003). The principal role of such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers.

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. 

Having reviewed the matter, our collective judgment is that the sentence imposed by the 

trial court is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B), and does not warrant appellate 

revision. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, David, Massa, and Rush, JJ., concur.