1

Filed 3/29/23 In re A.S. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.S., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E079906

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ112306)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mona M. Nemat, Judge. 

Affirmed.

Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Prabhath Shettigar, 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

A juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendant and appellant T.S. 

(mother) as to her daughter, A.S. (the child). On appeal, mother contends the court erred 

by finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights 

did not apply. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2020, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services 

(DPSS) received an immediate response referral with allegations of general neglect. The 

social worker responded to a restaurant parking lot, where she observed mother sitting, 

holding the child. The police were present and advised the social worker that mother 

appeared to be under the influence and homeless. She had been smoking 

methamphetamine in her car, with the child sleeping in the back seat. The social worker 

observed the child to be wearing what appeared to be pajamas with no underwear, socks, 

or shoes, and her arms, legs, and feet were exposed to the cold weather. Mother 

displayed behavior consistent with someone under the influence of methamphetamine, 

including rocking back and forth, and moving her jaw back and forth excessively; her 

eyes were moving back and forth rapidly, while she was opening and closing them. The 

child told the social worker she was cold and hungry and asked if the social worker had 

any food to eat. The child told the social worker she “sleeps in her mom’s car.” The 

social worker observed that mother’s car was cluttered with clothing, trash, and bags 

1

 All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code 

section unless otherwise indicated.
3

from fast food restaurants, and there was alcohol, a methamphetamine pipe, and a jaggededged machete inside of it.

On December 8, 2020, DPSS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the child, 

who was four years old at the time. The petition alleged that she came within section 

300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). The petition 

included allegations that mother had an unresolved history of substance abuse, lived a 

transient lifestyle, and endangered the child’s safety in that the child was found residing 

in a car with an illegal weapon, drugs, and drug paraphernalia within her reach. Mother 

was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia, an illegal weapon, and child 

endangerment. The petition further alleged that the exact identity and whereabouts of the 

child’s father were unknown. A first amended petition was subsequently filed, which 

deleted the portion alleging that mother was arrested for possession of an illegal weapon 

and child endangerment.

The court held a detention hearing on December 9, 2020, and detained the child in 

foster care. The court ordered supervised, in-person visitation to be at a minimum of

twice a week for one hour each. At that time, due to COVID concerns, the court 

authorized electronic visits as well.

Jurisdiction/Disposition

The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report on January 4, 2021, and 

recommended that the court sustain the petition, declare the child a dependent, and order

reunification services to be provided. The social worker reported that mother’s son, 

Aj.S., was detained from her in 2006 and placed in protective care after DPSS received a 
4

referral stating that mother dropped him off at a friend’s house and fled. It was also 

alleged that mother was using methamphetamine. The court found allegations of general 

neglect true and eventually returned Aj.S. to mother under a plan of family maintenance.

The social worker further reported that mother was arrested in September 2020 for 

transporting a child under the age of eight without using a child passenger restraint 

system.

2

The social worker reported that mother wanted the child to be placed with the 

maternal aunt, J.S. (the maternal aunt), with whom mother’s son Aj.S. was residing. On 

December 20, 2020, a Relative Family Approval (RFA) referral was submitted on the 

maternal aunt’s behalf.

As to visitation, the social worker reported that at the detention hearing the court 

ordered in-person visitation and electronic visitation, to be supervised by DPSS or an 

adult approved by DPSS. During the month of December 2020, due to COVID, mother

had phone and/or Skype visits with the child, which lasted 12-15 minutes each. During a 

call on December 22, 2020, mother appeared to be heavily under the influence. Her

speech was slurred, and she was unable to have a meaningful conversation. She was 

nodding off, closing her eyes, and constantly moving her head side to side. Mother kept 

wiping her nose and could not sit still, so the video visit was ended. During the month of 

January 2021, mother had three video call visits that went well. She and the child talked 

for 20 minutes during each call, and mother was actively engaged. On January 19, 2021, 

2

 The report does not state the disposition of that case.
5

they had an in-person visit that reportedly went well until the end, when the child became 

upset and wanted to leave early because she was hungry. They had three other in-person 

visits in January that were positive. Mother and the child hugged each other, talked, and 

played; the child cried at the end of two of them, and mother comforted her.

The social worker noted her concern that mother had not enrolled in any services. 

Mother was offered outpatient substance abuse services but declined because she wanted 

inpatient services. She was also offered enrollment in the Intensive Family Preservation 

court program but refused it.

The court held a contested jurisdiction hearing on February 3, 2021. County 

counsel informed the court that it had submitted a second amended petition for filing that 

day.3 The court ordered the second amended petition to be filed, sustained the amended 

petition, adjudged the child a dependent, and removed her from mother’s custody. The 

court ordered mother to participate in reunification services and ordered the prior 

visitation orders to remain in place. It authorized liberalized visits, to include 

unsupervised, overnight, and weekend visits.

Six-month Status Review

The social worker filed a six-month status review report on July 14, 2021, 

recommending that mother’s services be continued. The social worker reported that 

mother was unemployed and homeless, but she maintained communication with DPSS.

3

 The second amended petition essentially just deleted the words “chronic and 

unresolved” from its description of mother’s history of substance abuse and “an illegal 

weapon, and child endangerment” from its description of mother’s arrest.
6

On May 11, 2021, mother said she was entering a sober living facility. The facility 

confirmed she was living there and could stay up to 18 months. However, mother left the 

facility on May 26, 2021, but declined to say why. The social worker further reported 

that the maternal aunt was approved by RFA, and the child was placed in her home on 

April 16, 2021. The maternal aunt was providing a stable living environment, and the 

child was thriving in her care.

The social worker further stated that during this reporting period, mother had been 

generally consistent in visiting the child. The supervised visits took place twice a week 

for two hours at the DPSS office and were described as appropriate. The child was 

affectionate toward mother and appeared to be bonded with her. Mother also called and 

video chatted daily.

The court held a contested six-month review hearing on August 3, 2021, and 

continued mother’s services.

Twelve-month Status Review

The social worker filed a 12-month status review report on January 11, 2022, 

recommending the court continue reunification services. As to visitation, the social 

worker reported that mother was having consistent weekly supervised visits with the 

child at the beginning of this reporting period. However, mother entered an inpatient 

substance abuse treatment program on September 30, 2021, and since that time had not 

had consistent in-person visitation; at first, it was due to not wanting to have her daughter 

visit her at the facility, and later it was due to scheduling issues. Mother was currently 

having in-person visits one to two times a month, with the last visit being on December 
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18, 2021. She was consistently having supervised video visits several times a week, and 

sometimes every day. No concerns were reported.

The social worker stated that out-of-home placement remained in the best interest 

of the child, as mother was still addressing her substance abuse issue and needed to 

obtain stable, safe housing. The social worker stated that mother was only minimally 

participating in her substance abuse program and continued to resist individual therapy.

The court held a 12-month status review hearing on January 26, 2022. It followed 

the social worker’s recommendation and continued reunification services. It also 

maintained the current visitation orders.

Eighteen-month Status Review

The social worker filed an 18-month status review report on April 28, 2022, and 

recommended that the court terminate mother’s services and set a section 366.26 hearing.

The social worker reported that mother was now renting a room in an apartment. She 

also reported that mother tested positive for methamphetamine on March 15, 2022. The 

social worker opined that out-of-home placement remained in the child’s best interest 

since mother failed to resolve the issue that led to the removal of the child. Mother 

completed an inpatient substance abuse program and parenting program, but apparently 

had failed to benefit from them. She also refused to participate in any aftercare or 

outpatient substance abuse services.

The child continued to thrive in the maternal aunt’s home and liked living there 

with her cousins and brother. As to visitation, the social worker reported that mother had

consistent weekly, supervised visits, as well as phone calls, throughout this review 
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period. The visits took place at the maternal aunt’s home or in the community. The 

maternal aunt supervised the visits and reported that mother was appropriate. The child

enjoyed visiting with mother and liked that the visits took place at the maternal aunt’s 

home.

The court held a contested 18-month review hearing on May 26, 2022, and county 

counsel asked the court to set a section 366.26 hearing and reduce mother’s visits to twice 

a month. The court stated it had no evidence of mother’s sobriety and decided to follow 

DPSS’s recommendation. The court found mother had failed to make substantive 

progress in her case plan and terminated her services. The court found that mother was 

visiting regularly, and the visits went well; thus, it maintained the current visitation order. 

It then set a section 366.26 hearing.

Section 366.26 Hearing

The social worker filed a section 366.26 report on September 13, 2022, 

recommending that parental rights be terminated with adoption as the permanent plan,

and it submitted a preliminary adoption assessment. The social worker reported that 

mother had been having consistent weekly visitation with the child throughout the case, 

and the visits were generally appropriate. However, the maternal aunt further reported 

that, during this review period, mother had been inconsistent with her visits. Mother 

would promise the child she would visit, and then would not schedule visits. The 

maternal aunt said this was hard on the child, as evidenced by her crying and saying she 

missed her mother. The maternal aunt did report that there had been moments after visits 

where the child exhibited signs of incontinence, and she theorized this was a stress-
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induced behavior. The maternal aunt would shower the child with positive attention and 

praise, which appeared to help her transition back from visits with mother.

The social worker reported that the child had been living with the maternal aunt

since April 16, 2021, was thriving in the home and was bonded with her. The maternal 

aunt had been in the child’s life since birth. Although the child knew she was not her 

biological mother, the child would call her “mom” from time to time. The child felt safe 

living in her home, and when asked about her “forever home,” the child said it was with 

her relatives and prospective adoptive mother. While the child was under the impression 

she would be living with mother soon, she said she “was good” with staying in the 

maternal aunt’s home. The maternal aunt was committed to caring for the child for the 

rest of her life, and she understood her responsibility to provide a safe and loving 

environment, as well as her legal and financial responsibilities that came with adoption.

The court held a section 366.26 hearing on September 29, 2022. Mother’s counsel 

objected to the plan of adoption and called mother as a witness. Mother testified that she 

would set up visits with the child by talking to her sister and seeing when was a good 

time for both of them. Mother said she usually had visits with the child at her mother’s 

house, and they would play, talk, read, watch television, or “just whatever.” When asked 

if she had seen the child on a weekly basis during the past six or seven months, and how 

she would characterize the number of visits, mother responded, “I don’t see her enough 

due to my sister’s schedule.” Mother testified that she last saw the child the prior day,

and before that, a couple of weeks ago. Mother said she had ongoing contact with the 

child. When asked if there was a time she was having regular visits in the last six 
10

months, she said yes. She was then asked, “Going back to last year at Christmas time, 

were you seeing your daughter,” and she said, “Off and on, yes.” Mother added that it 

was just a matter of arranging visits between her and her sister. Mother said there was a 

very strong bond between her and the child, and the child saw her as her mother.

Counsel gave closing arguments and mother’s counsel argued that the beneficial 

parental exception applied. He argued that mother had visited the child, then stated, 

“There may have been some inconsistencies. But, again, the child is with a relative.” He 

then asserted that, “for the most part” mother was visiting on a consistent basis. Counsel 

further asserted that there was a bond between mother and daughter, and the child called 

her “mom.” County counsel argued the record did indicate that mother was having 

consistent visitation; however, after her services were terminated, the visits were not

consistent. Mother would promise to visit, and then not follow through. County counsel 

further argued that, although mother loved the child, it would not be detrimental to 

terminate parental rights. Counsel for the child agreed with the social worker’s 

recommendation to terminate parental rights and allow adoption to occur.

The court recognized that, at one point, there was regular visitation and that 

mother testified she saw the child the day prior to the current hearing; however, before

that, she saw the child two weeks ago. The court noted that prior to that, mother was not

able to “give a concrete answer as to [a] visitation schedule, or how often.” The court 

stated that when asked about Christmas time last year, mother indicated visitation “was 

on and off.” Thus, the court found there was no regular visitation. It further noted that 

the child was thriving in her current placement and that while she recognized the 
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parent/child relationship with mother, the child was also attached to the maternal aunt. 

The court found the maternal aunt “fill[ed] a parental role.” It concluded that, “for the 

reasons stated in the report, as well as the reasons given on the record,” the beneficial 

parental relationship exception did not apply. The court then terminated parental rights 

and found that adoption was in the best interest of the child.

DISCUSSION

The Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception Did Not Apply

Mother contends the court erred in not applying the beneficial parental 

relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). She specifically 

argues that she consistently visited the child throughout the life of the case. Mother also 

claims the court improperly considered the parental role she and the maternal aunt 

occupied and, as a result, failed to properly consider if the child would benefit from 

continuing her relationship with mother and if terminating the relationship would be 

detrimental. We conclude the court properly found the exception did not apply.

A. Relevant Law 

At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court selects a permanent plan for the 

dependent child. (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 620.) Permanent plans include 

adoption, guardianship, and long-term foster care. (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 

289, 296; § 366.26, subd. (b)(1)-(7).) “Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan 

preferred by the Legislature.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573 

(Autumn H.).) A permanent plan of adoption necessarily involves termination of the 

biological parents’ parental rights to the child. (Id. at p. 574.)
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In selecting a permanent plan for the child, the court is first required to determine 

whether the child is likely to be adopted. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the court finds, 

based on clear and convincing evidence, that the child is likely to be adopted, and if there 

has been a previous court determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it 

would be detrimental to the child to return the child to his or her parent or guardian 

(§§ 366.21, 366.22), then the court is required to terminate parental rights and select 

adoption as the child’s permanent plan, unless the parent shows that termination of 

parental rights would be detrimental to the child under at least one of several statutory 

exceptions to the adoption preference. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th

242, 249; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi).) “The statutory exceptions merely permit the 

court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, 

which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) The parentalbenefit exception applies where the court finds a “compelling reason” for determining 

that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because, in the words 

of the statute, “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child 

and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

Our Supreme Court recently clarified the proper application of the parental-benefit 

exception and, in doing so, discerned “three elements the parent must prove to establish 

the exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation 

of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).) As 
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Caden C. indicates, the second and third elements of the exception are inextricably 

connected.

The Autumn H. court recognized this connection when it interpreted “the ‘benefit 

from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean the relationship 

promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the 

child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the 

court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a 

tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would 

confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a 

substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, 

the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not 

terminated.” (Autumn H., 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575, italics added.)

We review the juvenile court’s findings on the first two elements of the parentalbenefit exception for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) 

“The determination that the parent has visited and maintained contact with the child . . . is 

essentially a factual determination. It’s likewise essentially a factual determination 

whether the relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing it.” (Ibid.) 

The third element—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the 

child—is “somewhat different” in that it requires the court to “assess[] what the child’s 

life would be like in an adoptive home without the parent in his life.” (Id. at p. 640.) 

“The court makes the assessment by weighing the harm [to the child] of losing the 

relationship against the benefits [to the child] of placement in a new, adoptive home. 
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And so, the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with the parent—is discretionary 

and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.)

A court abuses its discretion only when it “ ‘ “has exceeded the limits of legal 

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” (In 

re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) A reviewing court should find an abuse of 

discretion, “only ‘ “if ” ’ ” it finds that no judge could reasonably have made the decision 

that the judge did when all of the evidence is viewed most favorably in support of the 

judge’s decision. (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.)

B. Mother Did Not Maintain Regular Visitation and Contact

As to the first element, “[t]he question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ ” 

and is essentially a factual determination. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, 640.) 

The court here found that mother did not maintain regular visitation and contact with the 

child, and substantial evidence supports this determination. The social worker 

acknowledged that mother was having consistent weekly visitation with the child 

throughout the case, and the visits were generally appropriate. However, when mother 

entered an inpatient substance abuse treatment program on September 30, 2021, she

stopped having consistent in-person visitation. At first, it was due to her not wanting to 

have the child visit her at the facility, and later it was due to scheduling issues. The 

social worker reported that mother was only having in-person visits once or twice a 
15

month, although the court ordered her to have in-person visits twice a week, at a 

minimum.4

Furthermore, during the period from May 2022 to September 2022, the maternal 

aunt reported that mother “has been inconsistent with her visitations. The mother has 

been promising [the child] she is going to visit, and then will not schedule to meet.”

Additionally, at the section 366.26 hearing, mother testified that she saw the child the day 

before the hearing, but prior to that, it had been a couple of weeks. When asked how she 

would characterize the number of visits she had with the child in the past six or seven 

months, mother said, “I don’t see her enough . . . .” Although mother blamed her sister’s 

schedule, we again note the maternal aunt said the visits were inconsistent because 

mother would promise to visit and then would fail to schedule visits. Moreover, when 

asked if she was visiting the child at Christmas time in 2021, mother said, “[o]ff and on,” 

which indicates the visits were not consistent.5

Therefore, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that mother had not 

maintained consistent visitation and contact with the child. 

4

 The social worker also reported that mother was having consistent video visits 

with the child; however, we note this regular contact apparently took place only through

the 18-month review period. After that, there is no evidence of video visits.

5

 Notably, at the section 366.26 hearing, mother’s counsel acknowledged that 

“[t]here may have been some inconsistencies” and stated that “for the most part” mother 

was visiting on a consistent basis.
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C. The Child Would Benefit from Continuing the Relationship

“As to the second element, courts assess whether ‘the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal. 5th at p. 632.) When analyzing 

this element, courts look to “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion 

of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of 

interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Ibid.)

We observe the court did not make any express findings with respect to the second 

element. However, we will assume the child derived some benefit from the relationship 

since she spent the majority of her life in mother’s care, and, after removal, they had 

positive visits where they hugged each other, talked, and played, and the child cried at the 

end of some visits. The record also reflects that for some time, mother video chatted 

daily with the child, and the child appeared to be bonded with her. Thus, it appears they 

had positive interactions from which the child derived some benefit. (See Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal. 5th at p. 632.) 

D. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights Would Not Be Detrimental to the 

Child

“Concerning the third element—whether ‘termination would be detrimental to the 

child due to’ the relationship—the court must decide whether it would be harmful to the 

child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 633.) In other words, courts need to determine “how the child would be affected by 

losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an 

adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Ibid.) Mother has not proffered 
17

any evidence to support a finding that she had a “substantial, positive emotional 

attachment [with the child] such that the child would be greatly harmed” if the 

relationship was severed. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) She merely

states that she “occupied and maintained a parental role in [the child’s] life” and

concludes that she satisfied the third element.6 To the contrary, the evidence showed the 

child would not be greatly harmed if the relationship was severed. The adoption 

assessment report stated that, while the child was under the impression she would be 

living with mother soon, the child said she would “be good” with staying with the 

maternal aunt. The child said she felt safe in that home, and when asked about her 

forever home, she said it was with the maternal aunt. Thus, there was evidently no

substantial, emotional attachment between mother and the child. 

Mother claims the court “appl[ied] the wrong legal standard when evaluating 

whether [she] filled a parental role in the eyes of [the child].” She contends the court 

erred “[b]y considering the bond and parental role of the prospective adoptive parent”

and asserts that the child’s relationship with the caregiver was not relevant to the third 

6

 We agree with this court’s statement in In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197 

regarding the preferred practice of not using the term “parental role” in dealing with the 

parental benefit exception. There we said, “Caden C. did not use the words ‘parental 

role’ in its analysis. In fact, our Supreme Court has never formulated the parental-benefit 

exception in terms of a ‘parental role.’ [¶] Caden C. cautioned that ‘rarely do “[p]arentchild relationships” conform to an entirely consistent pattern. [Citations.] Certainly, it is 

not necessary—even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise “quantitative measurement 

of the specific amount of ‘comfort, nourishment or physical care’ [the parent] provided 

during [his or] her weekly visits.” [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 210.) In re L.A.-O stated that 

“because ‘parental role,’ standing alone, is ambiguous—we think it is better not to use the 

words ‘parental role’ at all. After all, Caden C. managed to describe and discuss the 

parental-benefit exception without using them.” (Id. at p. 211.)
18

element. The court here noted the child was thriving in her current placement and that 

while she recognized the parent/child relationship with mother, the child was also 

attached to the maternal aunt. The court further noted the maternal aunt “fill[ed] a 

parental role.” Contrary to mother’s claim that the court “applied the wrong legal 

standard,” the record indicates the court properly considered the security and stability the 

maternal aunt was providing for the child in her home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 633.) Moreover, the evidence showed the child was bonded with the maternal aunt. 

By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, she had lived with her for over 17 months, and 

they had a mutual attachment. The maternal aunt was meeting all her needs and was 

committed to raising her to adulthood. The social worker reported that the child was 

happy living with the maternal aunt, felt safe in her home, and said she would “be good” 

with staying there permanently.

Ultimately, mother failed to meet her burden of showing that the child had a 

substantial, emotional attachment to her such that the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship, or that terminating the relationship would be detrimental to 

the child when balanced against the benefit of an adoptive home. (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 636.) We see no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in this 

determination of the final Caden C. element of the exception. Therefore, the court 

properly declined to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception under section 

366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
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DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS

J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON

Acting P. J.

MENETREZ

J.