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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2011-NMSC-023

Filing Date: May 20, 2011

Docket No. 32,170

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

GREGORY KETELSON,

Defendant-Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI

William G. W. Shoobridge, District Judge

Gary K. King, Attorney General

James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

Goldberg Segalla, LLP

Matthew S. Lerner

Brian T. Stapleton

Albany, NY

for Amicus Curiae

National Rifle Association of America

OPINION

MAES, Justice.
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{1} The issue presented in this appeal is whether a police officer can temporarily remove

a visible firearm from a vehicle to prevent immediate access to it by an occupant during the

short duration of a lawful traffic stop, consistent with the strictures of the Fourth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.

Pursuant to our interstitial approach to constitutional analysis, we first address the federal

constitutional issue. With respect to the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the officers

had reasonable articulable suspicion permitting them to remove the weapon. Accordingly,

their actions were consistent with the federal constitution. With respect to Article II, Section

10, we conclude that the officers’ removal of the firearm was a minimal intrusion, which was

reasonable given the grave need for officer safety during traffic stops. Thus, we hold that

the temporary removal of the firearm was consistent with our state constitution. We reverse

the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court and remand for further

proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{2} The record reflects the following facts found by the district judge during the

suppression hearing. On the evening of November 13, 2008, Officer Shane Blevins of the

Hobbs Police Department stopped a GMC Jimmy with expired temporary tags. Officer

Blevins approached the driver side of the vehicle and informed the driver, Kerri Allen, of

the reason for the stop. Meanwhile, Officer Miroslava Belyeu (née Jurado) approached the

passenger side of the vehicle, where Gregory Ketelson (Defendant) was seated. Officer

Belyeu saw a black nine millimeter handgun lying on the back seat floorboard. Officer

Belyeu asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle, and Officer Blevins retrieved the firearm

from the back seat floorboard. Neither Defendant nor Ms. Allen was in the vehicle when

Officer Blevins retrieved the firearm. After Officer Blevins retrieved the firearm, Defendant

signed a card consenting to the search and admitted that the firearm belonged to him.

{3} Officer Blevins requested dispatch to run a background check on Defendant. The

background check revealed that Defendant had a prior felony conviction in Texas for

burglary in 1999. Defendant was placed under arrest as a felon in possession of a firearm

in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 30-7-16 (2001).

{4} Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the firearm and statements made to the

police regarding its ownership. Defendant argued that pursuant to State v. Garcia,

2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29, 138 N.M. 1, 116 P.3d 72, an officer does not have authority to enter

a car and seize an object absent a search warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. The

State responded that the entry into the vehicle and removing the firearm were lawful as a

“minimal intrusion” necessary for officer safety while the officers determined that Defendant

was a felon. The district court found that the State did not make a showing sufficient to

support exigent circumstances; rather, it found that both Defendant and the driver of the car

were “at all times cooperative, and they created no apparent threat or imminent danger to life

or serious damage to property.” Accordingly, the district court granted the motion to

suppress, noting that non-felons may legally carry loaded handguns in private automobiles,
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and thus, the State must make some showing beyond the mere presence of a firearm in the

car before officers effect a warrantless “seizure.”

{5} The State appealed to the Court of Appeals. See NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-3(B)(2)

(1972) (permitting appeal upon a district court’s order to suppress evidence). In a

memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, determining that

“there was no proper basis upon which to justify the warrantless seizure of the firearm.”

State v. Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op. at 3 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2009). Relying on State

v. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 151, 184 P.3d 1045, and Garcia, 2005-NMSC017, ¶ 31, the Court held that either exigent circumstances or another exception to the

warrant requirement was required before an officer may seize an object in plain view from

a vehicle and found no such exception applicable here. Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op. at 3,

5.

{6} The Court rejected several bases for exigent circumstances. It noted that the driver’s

allegedly nervous behavior after the stop could support exigent circumstances, which would

provide a basis for the warrantless seizure of the firearm, but deferred to the district court’s

finding that no exigencies were present. Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op. at 3-4. The Court

also noted that evidence of a crime in plain view could support exigent circumstances

pursuant to Bomboy. Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op. at 6. Bomboy held that incident to a

lawful traffic stop an officer may seize an object in plain view provided the officer has

probable cause to believe the object is evidence of a crime. 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 17.

However, the Court distinguished the present stop from Bomboy, concluding that in this case

the officers did not have probable cause to believe the firearm was evidence of a crime

because they only learned after it had been removed from the car that Defendant was a felon.

Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op. at 6.

{7} Finally, the Court rejected officer safety as a potential basis for exigent

circumstances. Id. at 4. It found unpersuasive the State’s argument that removing the

firearm from the car was a “minimal intrusion” justified by the needs of officer safety. Id.

The State argued that “a weapon in plain view during a traffic stop creates a reasonable

suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants are armed and dangerous, and thus is subject to

seizure to ensure officer safety.” Id. at 5. The State grounded its argument in federal

authority, which permits an officer to disarm a suspect during an investigatory detention

when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. See

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit

a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason

to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether

he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”); see also Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977) (concluding that, under the principles of Terry, an

officer could conduct a protective frisk for weapons after observing a bulge in the suspect’s

jacket). To the Court of Appeals, accepting the State’s argument was tantamount to

establishing a presumption of exigent circumstances whenever an officer observed a firearm

in a lawfully stopped vehicle. Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op. at 4-5. It declined to adopt such
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a presumption, noting that New Mexico had not adopted other “bright line” presumptions

from federal law, such as the federal automobile exception. Id. at 5; see State v. Weidner,

2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 16, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d 1025.

{8} We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section

34-5-14(B) (1972) and Rule 12-502 NMRA to determine whether it is unreasonable under

the state and federal constitutions for a police officer to remove a visible firearm from a

vehicle subject to a lawful traffic stop.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

{9} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.

We review factual determinations for substantial evidence and legal determinations de novo.

State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. Because the district

court “is in a better position to judge the credibility of witnesses and resolve questions of

fact, the factual analysis should be viewed in a light favorable to the prevailing party.”

Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 27.

II. Interstitial Approach and Preservation

{10} “Because both the United States and the New Mexico Constitutions provide

overlapping protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, we apply our interstitial

approach.” State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 12, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (citing State

v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19-23, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1). The interstitial approach

requires that we first consider “whether the right being asserted is protected under the federal

constitution.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19. If the right is protected by the federal

constitution, then the state constitutional claim is not reached. Id. If not, we next consider

whether the New Mexico Constitution provides broader protection, and we may diverge

from federal precedent for three reasons: “a flawed federal analysis, structural differences

between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics.” Gomez, 1997-

NMSC-006, ¶ 19. As we recently explained in State v. Leyva, a defendant must properly

preserve his argument under the state constitution in order for us to consider it on appeal.

2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 36, ___ N.M. ___, 250 P.3d 861. Thus, as an initial matter, we must

determine whether our analysis is confined to the Fourth Amendment or whether Defendant

properly preserved his argument under Article II, Section 10.

{11} Varying preservation requirements apply, depending on whether the state

constitutional provision has “previously been interpreted more expansively than its federal

counterpart.” Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 49. Where the state constitutional provision has

already been interpreted to provide broader protection than its federal counterpart, “trial

counsel must develop the necessary factual base and raise the applicable constitutional

provision in trial court.” Id. However, where the state constitutional provision has not been
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determined to offer broader protection, more stringent preservation requirements apply. See

id. (“Where the provision has never before been addressed under our interstitial analysis,

trial counsel additionally must argue that the state constitutional provision should provide

greater protection, and suggest reasons as to why . . . .”). Our precedents have clearly

established that Article II, Section 10 offers broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.

Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 50. Thus, we apply the general requirements of Rule 12-216(A)

to determine whether Defendant “develop[ed] the necessary factual base and raise[d] the

applicable constitutional provision” at the trial level. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 49.

{12} In Leyva, we determined that the defendant had preserved his argument under the

state constitution by pleading both the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 in his

motion to suppress and “developing a factual record in his motion and at the suppression

hearing.” Id. ¶ 50. Here, Defendant plead both the Fourth Amendment and Article II,

Section 10 in his motion to suppress; moreover, Defendant developed a factual record in his

motion and at the hearing. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 27 (concluding that argument

under the state constitution was preserved where testimony at the suppression hearing

discussed the circumstances of the search). Accordingly, Defendant’s Article II, Section 10

argument was preserved.

{13} We also address an additional preservation issue. In his motion to suppress,

Defendant challenged only the officers’ decision to remove the handgun from the vehicle

after they had observed it. He did not challenge the propriety of the traffic stop, nor could

he, because the stop was lawful; Officer Blevins pulled over the vehicle in which Defendant

rode as a passenger because its tags were expired. See NMSA 1978, § 66-3-18(C) (2007)

(requiring display of valid vehicle registration); see also Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (holding

there was a lawful reason to conduct a traffic stop where vehicle tags were expired, in

violation of state law). Moreover, Defendant did not challenge the officers’ subsequent

actions, namely running the weapon through a registry to determine whether it was stolen

and running the background check that ultimately determined that Defendant was a felon.

Thus, we do not reach the issue of whether officers may conduct further investigation when

they temporarily remove a firearm from a vehicle as a safety precaution. See generally

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (holding that the officer, performing an exigent

circumstances search of a residence in response to a shooting, violated the Fourth

Amendment by moving stereo equipment observed during the search in order to reveal its

serial number). Rather, our sole focus is the propriety of the officers’ removal of the gun

from the vehicle. Thus, pursuant to our interstitial approach, we first address the Fourth

Amendment and then turn to Article II, Section 10. State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 13,

147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032; Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19.

III. Fourth Amendment

{14} The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
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Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, a search or seizure conducted without a

warrant supported by probable cause is “presumptively unreasonable,” unless the officer’s

conduct fell within one of the well-defined exceptions. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,

717 (1984). In this case, there was no warrant, so our analysis focuses on whether the

officers’ conduct falls within one of the well-defined exceptions. See id.

{15} In Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that one such exception provides

that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him

reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may

be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and

presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he

identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where

nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable

fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself

and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer

clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be

used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth

Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in

evidence against the person from whom they were taken.

392 U.S. at 30-31. This exception was invoked in Mimms. 434 U.S. at 111-12. There, an

officer conducting a traffic stop observed a bulge protruding from the suspect’s sports jacket

and “[f]earing that the bulge might be a weapon, the officer frisked [the suspect] and

discovered in his waistband a .38-caliber revolver loaded with five rounds of ammunition.”

Id. at 107. Because, under Terry, an officer may “conduct[] a limited search for weapons”

upon a reasonable suspicion that the “suspect might be armed and presently dangerous,” the

Court concluded that the limited protective search conducted by the officer was

constitutional. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111-12.

{16} In order to determine whether a limited protective search is proper, the “critical

question” is whether the officer had a “particularized and objective basis” for his suspicion

that the suspect might have been armed and dangerous. United States v. Jones, 606 F.3d

964, 967 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts

assess the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether the officer maintained

reasonable suspicion in order to support the frisk. United States v. Tinnie, 629 F.3d 749, 751

(7th Cir. 2011). In viewing the totality of the circumstances, the court “must look at the facts

objectively.” Id. at 753.

{17} We note that the federal courts have long stressed the importance of officer safety

and the danger firearms pose during an officer interaction with a suspect. As the U.S.

Supreme Court has observed, “[f]irearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers

sometimes justify unusual precautions.” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000). The

federal courts are keenly aware that traffic stops pose particular dangers to police officers.
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“An officer in today’s reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his or her life

every time a motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after all, is a confrontation.” United

States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1223 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc), holding modified on other

grounds by United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007). With these

considerations in mind, we turn to the traffic stop during which the officers took possession

of Defendant’s gun.

{18} After Officer Blevins stopped the vehicle in which Defendant rode as a passenger,

Officer Belyeu observed a gun on the back floorboard of the vehicle, directly behind

Defendant. Officer Belyeu alerted Officer Blevins to the presence of the gun. Both the

driver and Defendant were outside of the vehicle when Officer Blevins reached into the

passenger compartment of the vehicle to secure the firearm and unload the ammunition;

however, neither was handcuffed nor restrained.

{19} Terry does not require certainty on the part of the officer that a suspect is armed and

dangerous in order to conduct a limited protective search; rather, it requires only that the

suspect “may” be armed and dangerous. 392 U.S. at 30. Critically, in this case, the gun was

visible to the officers during the traffic stop, and thus the officers were certain that

Defendant had access to a firearm. Additionally, neither the Defendant nor the driver was

restrained, and thus the risk that one of them would access the firearm was especially potent.

Under such circumstances, Officer Blevins could constitutionally remove the firearm from

the vehicle because he possessed a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts

which warranted him in believing that Defendant was “armed and thus posed a serious and

present danger to [his] safety.” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.

IV. Article II, Section 10

{20} Pursuant to our interstitial approach, we next turn to Article II, Section 10 of the New

Mexico Constitution. See Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 13. Article II, Section 10 ensures

that

[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from

unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or

seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be

searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing

of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.

The key inquiry under Article II, Section 10 is reasonableness. See Campos v. State, 117

N.M. 155, 157, 870 P.2d 117, 119 (1994) (“[T]he ultimate question is whether the search and

seizure was reasonable.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Attaway,

117 N.M. 141, 149, 870 P.2d 103, 111 (1994), modified on other grounds by State v. Lopez,

2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 13-20, 138 N.M. 9, 116 P.3d 80. The constitutional provision

“expresses the fundamental notion that every person . . . is entitled to be free from

unwarranted governmental intrusions.” State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 444, 863 P.2d
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1052, 1065 (1993). Accordingly, reasonableness depends on the balance between the public

interest and the individual’s interest in freedom from police intrusion upon personal liberty.

{21} In this case, the facts presented require us to undertake a thorough exploration of the

competing interests at stake, individual rights and officer safety. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC006, ¶ 19 (noting that distinctive state characteristics may provide a reason to depart from

the federal analysis); State v. Dees, 100 N.M. 252, 253, 669 P.2d 261, 262 (Ct. App. 1983)

(noting that New Mexico’s constitutional protection of firearms is “unique”). Our Article

II, Section 10 jurisprudence has long focused on concepts of reasonableness, and we

conclude that through the lens of reasonableness, we can properly explore the competing

interests at stake here.

{22} In order to determine whether Officer Blevin’s removal of the gun from the vehicle

was reasonable, we first examine the public interest supporting his action. The State

identifies officer safety as the public interest which justifies the removal of the gun from the

vehicle. The State explains that police officers perform a public service, and therefore,

relying on Terry, the State argues that “it would be unreasonable to require that police

officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.” 392 U.S. at 23. The State

also highlights the dangers inherent in traffic stops. The State contends that when an officer

confronts a motorist, the officer enters an uncertain situation, not knowing the motorist’s

intentions, and as a result the officer is exposed to a grave risk of assault.

{23} Against concerns for officer safety, we balance the individual’s interest in freedom

from police intrusion upon personal liberty. In New Mexico, individuals may carry a gun

“in a private automobile or other private means of conveyance, for lawful protection of the

person’s or another’s person or property,” without fear of criminal prosecution. NMSA

1978, § 30-7-2(A)(2) (2001); see N.M. Const. art. II § 6. Even though this was not a

traditional seizure of evidence or contraband, even a temporary moving of the firearm

constituted, to some degree, an interference with Defendant’s possessory interest. See

Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 9 (recognizing that seizure of methamphetamine in plain view

in a car affected a property interest). Here, unlike the seizure in Bomboy, however, the

retrieval of the gun from the vehicle during the limited context of the traffic stop was at most

a minimal interference with the suspect’s possessory interest.

{24} Two considerations lead us to conclude that the interference with the suspect’s

possessory rights is minimal. First, the interference is minimal because the officer holds the

firearm for a limited period. The interference is subject to temporal constraints on the length

of a traffic stop. See State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 35, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836

(“The length of the detention should be reasonably limited to the time it takes to complete

the underlying justification for the stop.”), overruled on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-

NMSC-009, ¶ 62. Thus, the interference with the suspect’s possessory interest in the gun

is constrained by the mandatory brevity of a lawful traffic stop. Second, we consider the

officer’s retrieval of the gun from the vehicle to be a minimal intrusion to the suspect’s
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possessory interests because the officer’s actions are unlikely to disturb any legitimate use

of the firearm.

{25} We proceed to balance the relevant interests. Concerns for officer safety are

undoubtedly legitimate and weigh heavily in the reasonableness calculus. We have

recognized that officers face inordinate risks when they are conducting traffic stops. See

State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 34, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. Against these

concerns, we must weigh the individual’s interest in freedom from governmental intrusion

upon a personal possessory interest. The officer’s removal of the firearm from the vehicle

was at most a minimal intrusion upon a personal possessory interest, as it was limited in

duration and did not interfere with any legitimate use for the firearm. Accordingly, because

the need for officer safety outweighs the minimal intrusion upon a personal possessory

interest occasioned by the officer’s retrieval of the firearm from the vehicle, it is reasonable,

pursuant to Article II, Section 10, for an officer to temporarily take possession of a visible

firearm during a lawful traffic stop.

{26} We recognize that the course we chart today, which focuses so heavily on

reasonableness, may appear inconsistent with some of the language employed in Garcia.

Indeed, both the Court of Appeals and the district court relied upon it in their decisions

below. See Ketelson, No. 29,876, slip op. at 5-6. In Garcia, officers conducting a traffic

stop observed “what appeared to be a gun in a holster protruding from underneath the rear

of the passenger seat.” 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 4. The officers removed the driver and

passenger from the vehicle and patted them down for weapons. As the officers retrieved the

firearm from the vehicle, they happened upon an open beer bottle. Id. As a result, the

passenger was prosecuted on an open container charge and on a felon in possession charge.

See id. ¶ 5. At the inception of the traffic stop, the passenger left the car prematurely and

then refused to follow the officers’ commands to return to the vehicle. We held that this

aggressive behavior constituted exigent circumstances, and thus, the officers were entitled

to a limited search of the car, including seizing the firearm. Id. ¶ 32. In the course of our

analysis, we also stated that

[t]here must be a reasonable suspicion [that] the suspect is both armed and

dangerous. An individual in a car with a weapon, by itself, does not create

exigent circumstances. In New Mexico it is lawful for a non-felon to carry

a loaded handgun in a private automobile or other private means of

conveyance. Because of that, it would be anomalous to treat the mere

presence of a firearm in an automobile as supporting a reasonable suspicion

that the occupants are inclined to harm an officer in the course of a routine

traffic stop.

Id. ¶ 31 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This dicta was part of the

discussion of the issue presented by the parties in Garcia, whether the circumstances

justified a finding of particularized reasonable suspicion to believe that a particular person

was dangerous. It has no applicability to the situation presented here, in which an officer
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takes a routine precaution of separating any person from a deadly weapon during the brief

duration of a traffic stop. Moving the weapon temporarily is no less reasonable a choice than

directing the occupants to step away from the vehicle temporarily. Although either may

technically be called “seizures,” they are both minimal intrusions on possessory or liberty

interest that are equally reasonable under the circumstances.

{27} In this case, we are mindful of the grave need for officer safety in the midst of the

dangers and uncertainties that are always inherent in traffic stops. We conclude that

removing Defendant’s firearm from the vehicle in order to ensure that it was beyond the

reach of any of the occupants during the stop was a reasonable and minimal intrusion, which

does not outweigh legitimate concerns of officer safety. Our decision in this case, which

addresses a temporary separation of a firearm from the occupants of a car during the duration

of a traffic stop, does not depend on any requirement of particularized suspicion that an

occupant is inclined to use the firearm improperly. As with other warrant exception cases,

our touchstone is the requirement of Article II, Section 10 of our New Mexico Constitution

that “[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from

unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” Under the circumstances of this case, it was

constitutionally reasonable for the officer to remove the firearm from the vehicle. Therefore,

the evidence should not have been suppressed.

CONCLUSION

{28} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and we

remand the case to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

{29} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________

PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice

____________________________________

PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice

____________________________________

RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice

____________________________________

EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
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Topic Index for State v. Ketelson, Docket No. 32,170

AE APPEAL AND ERROR

AE-PA Preservation of Issues for Appeal

CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CT-CG Constitutional Law, General

CT-FA Fourth Amendment

CT-IT Interstitial Analysis

CT-NM New Mexico Constitution, General

CT-SU Suppression of Evidence

CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CA-MR Motion to Suppress

CA-SZ Search and Seizure