### IN**T HE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING**  **2014 W Y 138**  **OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2014** 

November 4, 2014 KENNETH RAY LEVENGOOD, Appellant (Defendant),
v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff). S
- 14
-0078

**Appeal from the District Court of Laramie**  **County The Honorable**  **Thomas T.C. Campbell , Judge**  **Representing Appellant:** Donald A. Cole, Cole & Cole, Cheyenne, Wyoming. **Representing Appellee:** Peter K. Michael, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Caitlin F. Young, Assistant Attorney General. **Befo re BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE,**  **DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.**

**NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication**  **in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers**  **are requested**  **to notify**  **the Clerk**  **of the**  **Supreme Court,**  **Supreme Court**  **Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be**  **made before final publication in the permanent volume.**1

**FOX ,**  **Justice .**  [¶1 ] Kenneth Levengood was convicted of aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6
-2
-502(a)(iii) for threatening to use a drawn deadly weapon on his exgirlfriend

. On appeal , Mr. Levengood contends there was in sufficient evidence that he threatened to use the weapon . We affirm. **ISSUE** [¶2 ] Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to prove Mr. Levengood threatened to use the knife he was carrying? **FACTS** [¶3 ] On the morning of January 9, 2013, as twelve

- year- old A.L. got ready for school, her father, Mr. Levengood, opened her bedroom door with an eighteen

- inch kitchen knife in his hand and told her to go back to sleep. Realizing he was drunk and “acting strange,” A.L. followed her father into the hallway and told him to go to the kitchen and stay there. Mr. Levengood did not respond, but clenched his j aw, and with knife still in hand walked to the kitchen. [¶4 ] A.L. “had never seen him act like that before,” and, scared that he would hurt her, his ex

- girlfriend, or himself, she entered the bedroom Mr. Levengood shared with his ex

girlfriend, Aundrea Thompson, 1 to tell her what was go ing on. Ms. Thompson told A.L. to lock the bedroom door and then she tried calling two me mbers of Mr. Levengood’s family. Mr. Levengood rattled the doorknob while asking to be let in, to which Ms. Thompson responded, “No.” Mr. Levengood forced the bedroom door open and entered, holding the knife down at his side. Ms. Thompson told him to leav e, and he complied. A.L. locked the bedroom door once again. [¶5 ] Unable to reach Mr. Levengood’s relatives, Ms. Thompson called 911. A.L. testified that while Ms. Thompson was talking to the 911 dispatcher, “ [D] ad came again to the door, and it sounded like he was kind of like knocking, kind of like pounding on it. ” [¶6 ] Officer Michael Sutton , a crime scene technician with the Cheyenne Police Department who arrived shortly thereafter, estimated the bedroom door contained eight to eleven independent marks “consistent with knife marks that I’ve seen on other cases.” Towards the top of the door, and down to the center, “was a very long and sort of

1 Testimony at trial indicated that Ms. Thompson and Mr. Levengood had recently ended their relationship. Ms. Thompson would remain in the house until the end of the month, at which time she was going to move to Laramie , Wyoming, to begin school.2

pyramid

- shaped

. . . or triangular

- shaped slash mark which appeared to be done with some sharp object.” At several other locations, Officer Sutton reported “smaller holes that looked like something was poked into the door, very skinny, which I would attribute to what I’ ve seen with knife wounds[

. ] ” In one location there was an entry hole followed by a four

-to - five inch slash that appeared to have been created by a knife pushed into the door and then forced down through the door usin g “significant force.” Officer Sutton also observed an “unusual” large dent and pry marks on the top of the doorknob, as well as “jab” marks in the door jamb, appearing as though “something had been stuck into the door, and then it appeared as someone pried down on the doorknob, like someone was trying to damage the doorknob.” At trial, commenting on the marks, Officer Sutton testified: You know, typically when I see marks like this in a

door, this is from a very violent situation. It’s not the first time I’v e seen marks like this. I ’v e seen marks like this in walls. I ’v

e seen marks like this in doors. I ’v e seen marks like this in people. A

nd every time I’ve seen marks like this it was a very violent situation. [¶7 ] A.L. further testified:

And then he was able to get the door open again. And I think he could tell that Andrea [sic ] was on the phone with the p olice, and so he put the knife

-- he walked ov er into the room and he put the knife on the stand, on the TV stand, and he walked out. [¶8 ] The police arrived soon after, and as Ms. Thompson and A.L. left the bedroom, A.L. noticed marks on the bedroom door and walls of the hallway outside the bedroom. [¶9 ] When Officer Sutton went down the hallway leading to the bedroom, he observed fresh slash marks on the hallway walls. Regarding these marks, Officer Sutton testified, “You know, in my training and experience, when you see slash marks l ike this . . . these are typically of a violent situation. It indicates to me that someone’s very upset, and has made these marks in anger.” [¶10 ] Mr. Levengood was arrested and charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery for threatening to use a drawn deadly weapon against Ms. Thompson. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6
-2
- 502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2013). F ollowing a bench trial, the district court found Mr. Levengood guilty. He was sentenced to serve four to five years in prison, suspended in favor of three years supervised probation. Mr. Levengood timely filed this appeal.3 **STANDARD OF REVIEW** [¶11 ] Mr. Levengood contends the State presented in sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he threatened to use a drawn deadly weapon. Our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is well established.

[W] e review that ev

idence with the assumption that the ev idence of the prevailing party is true, disregard the ev idence fav

oring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the evidence. We will not reweigh the ev

idence nor will we re - examine the credibility of the witnesses. Brown v. State, 2014 WY 104, ¶ 8 , 332 P.3d 1168, 1171

-72 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Perritt v. State , 2005 WY 121, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d 181, 186 (Wyo. 2005)). [¶ 12 ] “[W] e must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ” Hart v. State , 2003 WY 12, ¶ 8, 62 P.3d 566, 569 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Wi lliams v. State , 986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999 )). In other words, we do not consider “whether or not the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but [instead] whether or not the ev idence could reasonably support such a finding by the factfinder.” Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1985). We review the decision from a criminal bench trial the same as we would that of a jury trial. Romero v. State , 2010 WY 84, ¶ 6, 233 P.3d 951, 953 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Fitzgerald v. State , 599 P.2d 572, 574 (Wyo. 1979) (“The function of the finder of fact in [criminal] cases tried to a court is identical to that in cases tried to juries, and the same rules are applicable with respect to the standards and principles applied in appellate review.”))

. **DISCUSSION** [¶13 ] Mr. Leveng

ood was conv

icted of aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6
-2
-502(a)(iii), which reads,

(a) A person is gu ilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:

. . . . (iii) Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another[.]4

[¶ 14 ] Section 6
-2
- 502(a)(iii) is a general rather than a specific intent crime. Cox v. State , 829 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Wyo. 1992); Simmons v. State, 674 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Wyo. 1984); Carfield v. State , 649 P.2d 865, 869 (Wyo. 1982). In Dean v. State , 668 P.2d 639 (Wyo. 1983), we explained the difference

.

When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without ref erence to intent to do a f urther act or achieve a future consequence the fact that the defendant intended to do the proscribed act makes that crime a general criminal intent offense. W hen the definition refers to defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent. Id

. at 642 (citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). [¶15 ] As a general intent crime, the language, “[t]hreatens to use,” describes what a defendant must do with a drawn deadly weapon to be guilty of aggravated assault under § 6
-2
- 502(a)(iii)

. Dean , 668 P.2d at 642. We have held that “ ‘threatens to use ’ requires proof of an actual threat of physical injury during the act of employing a deadly weapon. ” Johnston v. State , 747 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1987) (internal citation omitted)

. In Johnston , we approved the trial court’s definition of “threat:”

A threat is an expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, or punishment. It may be expressed by words or acts, or a combination of words or acts. Considering all the circumstances of the case, you mu st decide whether the defendant’s words and acts amounted to an express or implied statement of his intention to use a drawn deadly weapon to inflict pain, injury, or punishment. Id. at 1135
. [¶16 ] In Johnston , appellant Johnston, observed an altercation between two relatives. Id

. at 1133. Johnston retrieved a knife that was dislodged during the altercation and approached one of the two relatives, brandishing the knife in the area of the person’s face and neck. Id

. The victim testified that Johnston nicked him with the knife. Id

. Johnston claimed that the only threat he made towards the v ictim was possessing the knife whil e questioning: “You like to play with knives?” Id

. He was convicted of aggravated assault under § 6

-2
-502(a)(iii). Id

. [¶17 ] In Johnston’s appeal , we looked to the circumstances of the altercation in order to determine whether the jury could properly infer a threatening employment of the knife as5

an expression of intention to inflict pain or injury. Id. at 1135. Giv ing every favorable inference to the State’s evidence, we concluded:

Appellant was a forty

-three

-year old, 6’ 3” man, weighing 245 pounds, towering over McDaneld, a nineteen

-year- old, 5’ 11” boy, weighing 155 pounds; “working,” i.e., opening and closing, the butterfly knife as he approached within inches of the boy’s throat; nicking the boy; only to be interrupted in the further employment of the knife by the advent of McDaneld’s mother onto the scene. Under these circumstances, not only could the jury properly have inferred a threatening em ployment of the drawn knife as an expression of an intention to inflict pain and injury, but also as an accomplishment of that expression as manifested by the nicked and bloodied throat. These were reasonable inferences that the jury was entitled to draw from the evidence before it. Id

. at 1137. [¶18 ] I n Cox v. State , 829 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Wyo. 1992), the highly

- intoxicated defendant approached a police officer while slashing back and forth with a hunting knife. We explained that “actual threat,” requires that the alleged threat be measured by the “defendant’s conduct and not by the victim’s reaction.” We also stated that “[a]s a general intent crime, aggravated assault requires only that intent which may be inferred from do ing the act which constitutes the offense charged; i.e., slashing back and forth with the hunting knife. ” Id

. (citing Carfield, 649 P.2d at 869; Sanchez v. State , 567 P.2d 270, 279 (Wyo. 1977)). [¶19 ] We are not concerned with the subjective reaction of the victim. Instead, we must objectively consider the actions of the defendant, and decide whether a rational trier of fact could infer from Mr. Levengood’s words and acts an intention to use a drawn deadly weapon to inflict pain, injury, or punishment

. Here, there is undisputed evidence from Mr. Levengood’s daughter that he was drunk and “acting strange.” She also reported that a 240
-pound Mr. Levengood twice violently forced his way through a locked door with a knife

. The evidence includes a number of photographic exhibits detailing the significant damage Mr. Levengood inflicted upon the hallway and bedroom door while trying to gain entry to the bedroom

. Finally, we have the testimony of Officer Sutton who concluded,
“ev ery time I’ve seen marks like this it was a very violent situation. ” Construing this undisputed evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that , under the circumstances, Mr. Levengood’s conduct constituted a threat to Ms. Thompson under § 6
-2
- 502(a)(iii).6

[¶20 ] Mr. Levengood argues that “it was not illegal for the Appellant to remain in his home, enter the bedroom or to have a knife in his possession.” We ag ree that the mere possession of a deadly weapon does not constitute a threat under § 6
-2
- 502(a)(iii). See Hart, 2003 WY 12, ¶ 8, 62 P.3d at 569; Johnston , 747 P.3d at 1134. However, this harmless picture ignores the totality of the circumstances, which included a highly

intoxicated 240

-pound ex-boyfriend; in possession of an 18

- inch knife; violently seeking entry to a locked bedroom where A.L. and Ms. Thompson sought refuge; and slashing, puncturing, and prying with the knife to gain entry. [¶21 ] Mr. Levengood insists that because he never used the knife directly on Ms. Thompson, instead attacking the door, he never “threatened to use” the knife

. He argues “[t]here is no ev

idence that the Appellant ever raised the knife in a threatening manner. There are no motions involving slashing, waving, pointing, stabbing, jabbing or throwing.” In fact, the evidence shows that Mr. Levengood did use the knife in a threatening manner; the only question is whether he can be insulated by the presence of a locked do or between him and his victim, a door which he twice broke open. [¶22 ] I n Hart v. State , 62 P.3d 566 (Wyo. 2003) , Hart attempted to g ain entry to his ex

wife’s parent’s residence. As Hart walked toward the home, Ms. Moline’s father went to the front door to lock and secure it

. Id

. at 569. Hart opened the outer screen door and demanded , “you better let me in.” Id

. Mr. Moline responded by telling Hart to go home and cool off or settle down. Id

. Hart then pulled the gun out of his back waistband, and showed it to Mr. Moline by holding it straight up in the air, pointed towards the sky. Id

. Hart then started to beat on the door. Id

. When it was apparent that he would not g ain entry, Hart left, pausing in front of Ms. Moline’s car and discharging four rounds into her vehicle. Id

. Hart was charged and convicted under § 6
-2
-502(a)(iii). [¶23 ] On Hart’s appeal for sufficiency of the evidence we affirmed , stating:

Viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the facts show that Hart went to the front door of the Molines’ home and told Mr. Moline, “you better let me in.” To reinforce this demand, Hart held up his handgun for Mr. Moline to see. Clearly, this is more than mere presence of a weapon in Hart’s hand. Instead, given Hart’s demands, and his display of adeadly weapon to the man resisting the demands, we are satisfied that a jury could rational ly conclude that Hart made an actual threat to use a drawn deadly weapon on Mr. Moline. We thus conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Id

. at 569
- 570.7

[¶24 ] As in Hart, even though Mr. Levengood did not point the knife directly at Ms. Thompson , the evidence is sufficient for a factfinder to rationally conclude that Mr. Levengood made an actual threat to use the knife on Ms. Thompson. There is ample ev idence in the record that Mr. Levengood did indeed raise the knife to slash, puncture , and pry at the locked bedroom door, behind which A.L. and Ms. Thompson sought refuge. I n spite of being twice refused entry, Mr. Levengood used the knife to attack the door and gain entry to the bedroom. These circumstances justify a factfinder’s rejection of Mr. Levengood ’s contention that his violent actions should be narrowly construed as an act of violence only to the bedroom door

. Instead, c onsidering the undisputed facts presented at trial, a rational trier of fact could construe Mr. Levengood’s slashing, puncturing, and prying at the bedroom door while demanding to b e let in, as an actual threat― an expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, or punishment towards Ms. Thompson. **CONCLUSION** [¶25 ] Affording ev

ery favorable inference to the evidence presented by the State at trial, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that , under the circumstances, Mr. Levengood’s actions were an actual threat towards Ms
. Thompson

. There is sufficient ev idence to sustain the conviction and therefore we affirm.