MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	85

Docket: Ken-19-502

Submitted

On	Briefs: May 28,	2020

Decided: June	9,	2020

Panel: GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON, and	CONNORS,	JJ.

IN	RE	CHILDREN	OF	JAMIE	P.

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]	 A	mother	 and	 father	appeal	 from	 a	consolidated	judgment	 of	 the	

District	Court	 (Augusta,	Rushlau,	J.)	 terminating	 their	parental	 rights	 to	 their	

three	 children.	 See	 22	 M.R.S.	 §	 4055(1)(B)(2)(a),	 (b)(i)-(ii)	 (2020).	 Both	

parents	 argue that	 the	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	 Services	 did	 not	

present	sufficient	evidence	upon	which	the	trial	court	could	find	that	they	are

parentally	unfit	and	contend	that	the	court	abused	its	discretion	in	finding	that	

termination	was	in	the	children’s	best	interests.		The	father	also	contends	that	

the	 trial	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion	 by	 engaging	 in	 improper	 sua	 sponte	

questioning	of	witnesses	pursuant	to	Maine	Rule	of	Evidence	614.		We	affirm	

the	judgment.	

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 In	 February	 2019,	 the	 Department	 petitioned	 to	 terminate	 the	

parents’	parental	rights	as	to	all	three	children.	 See 22	M.R.S.	§	4052	(2020).	
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The	trial	court	(Rushlau,	J.)	held	a	two-day	hearing,	from	July	11	to	July	12,	2019,	

on	 the	Department’s	petition. Both	parents	were	present	at	 the	hearing	and	

represented	by	counsel.	 See 22	M.R.S.	§	4054	(2020).

[¶3]		In	a	judgment	dated	November	21,	2019,	the	trial	court	terminated	

the	 parents’ parental	 rights	 with	 regard	 to	 all	 three	 children.	 See

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a),	 (b)(i)-(ii).		The	 trial	court	 found	by	clear	and	convincing	

evidence	that	each	parent	is	unwilling	or	unable	to	protect	the	children	from	

jeopardy	and	that	these	circumstances	are	unlikely	change	within	a	time	which	

is	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	children’s	needs,	and	that	each	parent	has	

been	unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the	children	within	a	time	

which	 is	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 the	 children’s	 needs.	 See

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).		The	trial	court	also	found	by	clear	and	convincing	

evidence	that	termination	of	the	parents’	parental	rights	is	in	the	children’s	best	

interests.	 See §	4055(1)(B)(2)(a).	 Its	findings	were	supported	by	competent	

evidence	in	the	record.		In	re	Child	of Carl	D.,	2019	ME	67,	¶	4,	207	A.3d	1202.	

[¶4]	 	 The	 trial	 court’s	 judgment	 contained	 the	 following	 findings

regarding	the	mother’s	fitness:

After	[the	twins]	were	born	in	2015	.	.	.	there	were	a	series	of	events

which	led	both	to	legal	proceedings	and	made	the	family	situation	

unstable. On	 August	 14,	 2015,	 [the	 father]	 filed	 a	 complaint	 for	

protection	 from	 abuse	 .	 .	 .	 .	 He	 claimed	 that	 [the	 mother]	 had	
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physically	 abused	 him	 and	 threatened	 to	 kill	 both	 him	 and	 the	

children.	 	 He	 received	 a	 temporary	 and	 then	 a	 final	 protection	

order.		Although	the	final	order	was	originally	to	remain	in	effect	

until	 September	 4,	 2017,	 the	 complaint	 was	 dismissed,	 and	 the	

order	terminated	on	[the	father’s]	motion	on	May	13,	2016.	 Four	

months	 later	 [the	 father]	 returned	 to	 the	 same	 court and	 filed	

another	complaint	 for	protection	 from	abuse	.	.	.	.	 He	once	again	

described	domestic	violence	by	[the	mother],	including	violence	in	

the	 presence	 of	 the	 children. [The	 father]	 once	 again received	 a	

protection	order. Once	again	[the	father]	returned	to	court	within	

a	 few	 months	 and	 moved	 for	 dismissal	 of	 the	 complaint.	 .	 .	 .		

Meanwhile	 [the	 mother]	 had	 been prosecuted	 for	 the	 criminal	

conduct	committed	against	[the	father]	.	.	.	.		She	ultimately	pleaded	

guilty	to	Domestic	Violence	Terrorizing .	.	.	.	

DHHS	was	involved	with	the	family	between	2015	and	2017.		

The	 primary	 purpose	 of	 their	 involvement	 was	 apparently	 to	

ensure	that	[the	father]	and	the	children	were	not	living	with	[the	

mother].	.	.	.	 DHHS	began	a	more	significant	involvement	in	June	

2017.		[A	caseworker]	visited	the	.	.	.	home	of	[a	family	member]	.	. .	

and	 found	 that	 [the	 parents]	 were	 living	 there	 with	 all	 three	

children.	.	.	.	During	the	visit,	[the	father]	told	the	caseworker	about	

[the	mother’s]	violence	against	him .	.	.	.

During	the	[termination]	hearing	 [the	father]	confirmed	.	.	.	

that	 [the	 mother]	 had	 engaged	 in	 repeated	 violence	 against	 him	

throughout	 this	 entire	 period. He	 also	 confirmed	 that	 she	 had	

threatened	 to	 kill	 the	 children.	 .	 .	 .	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 [the	 mother]	

engaged	 in	 significant	 domestic	 violence	 against	 [the	 father]	 for	

several	 years	 and	 that	 when	 the	 children	 are	 in	 [the	 father’s]	

presence	they	are	exposed	to	this	violence.

.	.	.	.	

.	.	.	DHHS’s	Rehabilitation	and	Reunification	Plan	signed	by	

[the	mother]	on	January	19,	2018,	described	a	series	of	steps	[the	

mother] needed	 to	 take	 in	 order	 to	 make	 progress	 toward	

reunification.		One	step	was	 to	complete	a	batterers	intervention	
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program	 (BIP).	 	 Other	 steps	 included	 being	 employed,	 having	

stable	 housing,	 and	 developing	 an	 effective	 mental	 health	

treatment	and	medication	program. While	[the	mother]	has	been	

working	to	some	extent	on	all	these	issues,	she	has	made	relatively	

little	 progress. She	 began	 a	 BIP	 in	 Lewiston	 but	 .	 .	 .	 failed	 to	

complete	 the	program. .	 .	 .	 Her housing	 situation	was	erratic	 for	

many	months,	and	included	“couch	surfing,”	camping	out	in	a	tent	

for	a	period	of	time,	and	a	stay	in	a	homeless	shelter. .	.	.	 She	worked	

for brief	periods	for	several	different	employers.	.	.	.	 [The	mother]	

engaged	 with	 [a	 counselor]	 at	 Kennebec	 Behavioral	 Health	 for	

many	months	.	.	.	.	 However,	[the	mother’s]	progress	was	regularly	

disrupted	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons.	 .	 .	 .	 	 [The	 counselor]	 saw	 no	

progress	 at	 all	 in	 one	 important	 area,	 which	 was	 [the	 mother]	

gaining	insight	on	how	to	avoid	conflict	with	others .	.	.	.	 		

DHHS	 arranged	 for	 [the	 mother]	 to	 have	 a	 trial	 placement	

with	the	twins	in	August	of	2018.	.	.	.		A	few	days	later	[the	mother]	

drove	her	car	with	the	twins	as	passengers.		They	were	in	ordinary	

seat	belts.		[The	mother]	failed	to	secure	them	in	child	safety	seats.	

.	.	.		[The	mother]	drove	through a	stop	sign	.	.	.	and	collided	with	

another	vehicle.		Both	vehicles	were	damaged	and	 [the	mother’s]	

was	 [totaled].	 	 The	 twins	 had	 medical	 evaluations	 and	 some	

treatment	 but	 fortunately	 neither child	 was	 seriously	 injured.		

However,	 the	 emotional	 effect	 of	 the	 crash	 on	 the	 twins,	 and	

indirectly	on	[the	older	child],	was	significant.	

[¶5]	 	 The	 court’s	 supported	 evidentiary	 findings	 as	 to	 the	 father’s	

parental	fitness	are	as	follows:	

[The	 father]	 was	 the	 target	 of	 multiple	 acts	 of	 physically	 violent	

behavior	by	[the	mother]	over	a	period	of	years. [The	mother]	also	

threatened	 violence	 against	 both	 him	 and	 against	 the	 children.		

Initially	 he	 acted	 responsibly	 to	 protect	 the	 children	 when	 he	

obtained	a	protection	order	in	2015.	 Several	months	later	he	had	

the	protection	 order	 terminated.	 His	 reason	was	 that	it	was	 too	

difficult	for him	to	take	care	of	the	children	on	his	own.		Within	a	

short	 time,	 [the	mother]	engaged	in	more violent	behavior.		 [The	
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father]	 again	 acted	 responsibly	by	 obtaining	 a	second	protection	

order.	 Once	 again,	he	had	 the	 order	 terminated.	 	Once	again,	he	

allowed	[the	mother]	to	have	access	to	the	children.		He	was	then,	

once	again,	the	target	of	[the	mother’s]	violent	behavior .	.	.	.

.	.	.	[I]n	June	2017,	[the	father]	told	the	DHHS	caseworker	that	

he	was	 overwhelmed	by	 the	 responsibilities	 of	being	a	 parent	 of	

three	 children.	 .	 .	 .	 He	 terminated	 both	 protection	 orders	 and	

allowed	 [the	 mother]	 access	 to	 the	 children	 because	 he	 was	

incapable	of	providing	appropriate	care	on	his	own.	 The	testimony	

of	[a	family	member]	showed	that	as	early	as	2015	she	and	other	

family	members	were	caring	for	the	children	for	various	periods	of	

time .	.	.	.

After	DHHS	 placed	 the	 children	with	 [a	 family	member]	in	

June	 2017,	 [the	 father]	 had	 an	 opportunity	 to,	 at	minimum,	 help	

provide	care	for	[the	oldest	child].		He	was	not	successful	even	in	

that	 limited	 role.	 	[The	 family	 member] asked	 him	 to	 leave.	 	 He	

became	homeless .	.	.	.

The	jeopardy	order	agreed	to	by	[the	father]	emphasized	his	

failure	to	protect	the	children	from	[the	mother’s]	violent	behavior.		

However,	it	 also	 described	 [the	 father’s]	 own	 unsafe	 behavior	in	

leaving	 the	 children	 unsupervised	 despite	 their	 age	 and	

developmental	needs .	.	.	.		The	twins	were	only	2	1/2	years	old	and	

incapable	 of	 protecting	 themselves	 from	 harm.	 .	 .	 .	 [The	 oldest	

child]	was	placed	with	[the	father]	on	a	trial	basis	in	August	2018.		

[The	father]	had	a	lapse	in	judgment	in	the	fall	of	that	year	when	he	

entered	the	vacant	home	of	[the	mother’s]	family	to	remove	some	

personal	possessions.	.	.	. DHHS	temporarily	interrupted	the	trial	

placement.		

There	was	 a	 far	more	 serious	 event	in	 January	 2019.	 	 The	

father]	planned	to	pick	up	 [the	oldest	child]	at	school	in	Augusta.	

He	did	not	appear.	. .	.		[The	oldest	child]	was	upset	and	concerned	

that	 [the	 father]	had	been	in	a	car	crash.	.	.	.	 The	 trial	placement	

was	terminated.	
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.	.	.	.	

[The	 father’s]	 situation	 deteriorated significantly	 between	

the	 end	 of	 the	 trial	 placement	 and	 the	 date	 of	 the	[termination]	

hearing.		He	was	evicted	from	his	apartment.	.	.	.		After	the	eviction	

he	began	living	with	a	man	he	knew	only	as	“Q.”	.	.	.	

.	.	.	[The	father]	was	charged	with	drug	possession	as	a	result	

of	an	encounter	with	a	 Gardiner	 police	 officer	 .	 .	 .	.		 [The	 officer]	

found	[the	father]	unconscious	and	slumped	over	in	the	front	seat	

of	his	car	in	a	parking	lot.		It	was	3:00	a.m.		There	was	a	plate	next	

to	 [the	 father]	 with	 a	 substance	 the	 officer	 identified	 as	

methamphetamine.	.	.	.	 The	resulting	criminal	case	was	pending	at	

the	time	of	the	hearing	.	.	.	.	

[¶6]		The	court	also	made	the	following	supported	findings	regarding	the	

best	interests of	the	children:	

Since	 the	 placement,	 the	 twins	 have	 been	 with	 [a	 family	

member]	for	all	but	the	few	days	of	the	 trial	placement	with	[the	

mother].	.	.	.	 She	has	provided	them	with	a	safe	and	stable	home	for	

the	 majority	 of	 their	 lives,	 and	 they	 are thriving in	 that	

environment.	 .	 .	 .	 [N]either	 parent	 has	 made	 progress	 toward	

creating	a	home	where	the	twins	will	be	protected	from	harm. [The	

father’s]	life	has	deteriorated.		It	is	in	such	disarray	that	he	could	

not	 figure	 out	 how	 to	have	 visits	with	 the twins,	and	 visits	were	

suspended .	.	.	.

[The	oldest	child]	has	done	relatively	well	in	his	most	recent	

placement.	 	 His	 life	 has	 been	 disrupted	 since	 2015	 by	 repeated	

changes	in	residence	including	the	trial	placement	with	[the	father]	

which	ended	abruptly	after	several	months.	It	has	been	difficult	for	

him	 to	 make	 progress,	 although	 the	 care	 provided	 by	 [a	 family	

member],	 and	 by	 the	 current	 foster	 family,	 has	 been	 of	 great	

benefit.		His	recent	contact	with	the parents	has	not	been	beneficial.

.	.	.	 [The	oldest	child]	has	expressed	the	desire	to reunite	with	[the	

father].		There	is	no	indication of	a	similar	desire	as	to	[the	mother].		
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[The	 father]	 has	 encouraged	 [the	 oldest	 child]	 to	 believe	

reunification	is	possible.	.	.	.		Whatever	capacity	 [the	 father]	once	

had	to	provide	a	safe	home	for	[the oldest	child]	is	not	in	existence	

now.	

[¶7]		Based	on	 these	supported	findings,	 the	trial	court concluded	 that	

the	parents were unwilling	or	unable	to	protect	the	children	from	jeopardy and	

that	these	circumstances	are	unlikely	to	change	within	a	time	calculated	to	meet	

the	children’s	needs,	and	that	the	parents have been	unwilling	or	unable	to	take	

responsibility	for	the	children	within	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	

children’s needs.		22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). The	court	also	concluded	

that	termination	of	both	parents’	parental	rights was	in	the	best	interest	of	each	

child. 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(a).	 The mother	and	father	each	filed	a	notice	

of	appeal.	 See	22	M.R.S.	§	4006	(2020); M.R.	App.	P.	2B(c)(1).

II.		DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence

1. Parental	Unfitness

[¶8] On	 appeal,	 both	 parents	 contend	 that	 the	 record	 contains	

insufficient	 evidence	 for	 the trial	 court	 to	 conclude	 that	 they	 were	 unfit	 to	

parent	the	children.		Contrary	to	their	contentions,	the	record	indeed	contains	

sufficient	evidence	 to	support	 the	 trial	court’s	 findings	as	 to	both	grounds	of	

parental	unfitness	with	regard	to	each	parent.	 “We	review	the	court’s	findings	
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of	fact	for	clear	error	and	the	court’s	ultimate	determination	that	termination	

of	the	parental	rights	is	in	the	child’s	best	interest	for	an	abuse	of	discretion.”		

In	re	Child	of	Olivia	F.,	2019	ME	149,	¶	5,	217	A.3d	1106.		“We	will	affirm	an	

order	 terminating	 parental	 rights	 when	 a	 review	 of	 the	 entire	 record	

demonstrates	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 rationally	 could	 have	 found	 clear	 and	

convincing	evidence	in	that	record	to	support	the	necessary	factual	findings	as	

to	the	bases	for	termination.”	Id.	(quotation	marks	omitted).		“A	court	need	find	

only	one	of	four	statutory	grounds	of	parental	unfitness	to	find	that	a	parent	is	

unfit	 to	 parent	 his	 or	 her	 child. Where	 the	 court	 finds	 multiple	 bases	 for	

unfitness,	we	will	affirm	if	any	one	of	the	alternative	bases	is	supported	by	clear	

and	convincing	evidence.”	Id.	¶	6 (citation	omitted)(quotation	marks	omitted);	

see 22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(b)	(2020).		“[T]he	court	must	examine	from	the	

child’s	 perspective—not	 the	 parent’s—the	 time	within	which	 the	 parent	 can	

take	 responsibility	 for	 a	 child	 and	 protect	 that	 child	 from jeopardy.”	 	 In	 re	

Children	of	Tiyonie	R.,	2019	ME	34,	¶	6,	203	A.3d	824.		

a. As	to	the	Mother

[¶9] The	 mother	 argues	 that	 “she	 has	 continuously	 moved	 forward	

towards reunification,” and	 that	 her	 good	 faith	 efforts	 at	 rehabilitation	 and	

reunification	 are fatal	 to	 the	 Department’s	 petition.	 However,	 competent	
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evidence	in	the	record	supports	the	trial	court’s	conclusion	that	the	mother	is

unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 protect	 the	 children	 from	 jeopardy and	 that	 these	

circumstances	 are	 unlikely	 to	 change	within	 a	 time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	

meet	 the	children’s	needs,	as	well	as	its	conclusion	 that	 the	mother	has	been

unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 children within	 a	 time	

reasonably	calculated	to	meet	their	needs.		22	M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).

[¶10] Here,	the	mother,	despite	repeated	efforts,	failed	to	complete	any	

of	the	goals	set	forth	in	her	rehabilitation	and	reunification	plan. She	failed	to	

complete	 a	 BIP	 program;	 her	 housing	 and	 employment	 situations	 were	

unstable	at	best;	her	relationship	with	the	children’s	father	remained	volatile	

and	 continued	 to	 involve	 encounters	 with	 law	 enforcement;	 her	 work	 with	

counselors	plateaued,	and	she	 terminated	her	relationship	with her	longtime	

counselor	prior	to	the	termination	hearing. These	facts,	supported	by	record	

evidence,	 suggest	 that	 the	 mother	 was	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 take	

responsibility	for	the	children	and	unable	or	unwilling	to	protect	the	children	

from	jeopardy.		22 M.R.S.	§	4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).		

[¶11] Furthermore,	the	record	supports	the	trial	court’s	conclusion	that	

what	little	 progress	 the	mother	 did	make	 occurred	 at	 such	 a	 slow	 pace	 that	

circumstances	were	unlikely	to	change	within	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	
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meet	 the	children’s	needs.		22	M.R.S. §	4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). She	was	not	

close	to	completing	treatment	for	her	domestically	violent	behavior,	and	at	the	

termination	hearing	she	categorically	denied	committing	any	such	behavior—

even	 in	 the	 face	 of	 overwhelming	 contradictory	 evidence. Over	 a	 two-year	

period	during	which	 the	mother	had	access	 to	 support	 services	 she	 failed	 to	

make	 progress.	 The	 mother’s	 contention	 that	 she	 has	 “continuously	 moved	

towards reunification” is	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 record.	 Rather,	 the record	

supports	 the	 trial court’s	 conclusion	 to	 the	 contrary—that	 the	 mother	 is	

unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	 protect	 the	 children	 from	 jeopardy,	 and	 has	 been	

unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the	children	in	a	time	reasonably	

calculated	to	meet	their	needs.

b. As	to	the	Father

[¶12] The	father	also	argues	that	the	record	evidence	is	insufficient	to	

support	 the	 trial	 court’s	 finding	 that	 he	 is	 also	 unfit	 to	 parent	 the	 children	

because	he is	unwilling	 or	unable	 to	protect	 the	children	 from	jeopardy	and	

take	responsibility for	the	children	in	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	their	

needs.		

[¶13] Contrary	to	the	father’s	contentions,	the	record	supports	the	trial	

court’s	 findings	 on	 both	 grounds.	 	 The	 Department’s	 involvement	 originally	
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stemmed	from	concern	that	the	father	could	not	keep	the	children	away	from	

the	 mother	 and	 the	 domestic	 violence	that	was	 endemic	 to	 the	 relationship	

between	the	mother	and	the	father. Competent record	evidence	demonstrates	

that	the	father	has	not	separated	from	the	mother.	 Furthermore,	the	father’s	

circumstances—apart	 from	 his	 relationship—have	 deteriorated	 significantly	

since	 2017.	 	 He	 has	 experienced	 periods	 of	 homelessness.	 	 He	 does	 not	

currently	have	an	apartment	or	suitable	housing	 for	any	of	 the	children.	 His	

relationships	with	family	members	who	had	previously	assisted	with	childcare	

and	housing	are	broken.		The	circumstances	of	his	recent	arrest	and	the	abrupt	

end	 of	 the	 trial	 placement	with	 the	 oldest	child	 suggest	 that	he	continues	 to	

struggle	with	substance	abuse.	

2. Children’s	Best	Interests	

[¶14]	 	 Both	 parents	 also	 argue	 on	 appeal	 that	 the	 record	 contains	

insufficient	evidence	for	the	trial	court	to	conclude	that	termination	was	in	the	

children’s	 best	 interests.	 The	 father	 contends	 that	 the absence	 of	 identified	

adoptive	 homes	 for	 the	 children	 requires	 that	 we	 vacate	 the	 trial	 court’s	

termination	order.	 Contrary	to	the	parents’	contentions,	the record	is	sufficient

to	support	 the	 trial	court’s	 finding	 that	 termination of	each	parent’s	parental	

rights	 is	 in	 the	 children’s	 best	 interests,	 and	 the	 identification	 of	 adoptive	
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homes	is	not	a	prerequisite	to	a	finding	that	termination	is	in	the	children’s	best	

interests.		In	 re	Children	 of	Meagan	 C.,	2019	ME	 129,	¶	20,	214	A.3d	9. “We	

review	the	court’s	ultimate	conclusion	regarding	the	best	interest	of	the	child	

for	an	 abuse	 of	discretion,	 viewing	 the	 facts,	and	 the	weight	 to	be	given	 [to]	

them,	through	the	trial	court’s	lens.”	 In	re	Child	of	Carl	D.,	2019	ME	67,	¶	5,	207	

A.3d	1202 (quotation	marks	omitted.)	

[¶15]		The	record	supports	the	trial	court’s	conclusion	that	termination	

of	each	parent’s	parental	rights	would	facilitate	permanency	and	stability	and	

therefore	be	in	 the	children’s	best	interests.	 The	 two	 youngest	children	had	

been	living	with	a	family	member almost	exclusively	for	more	than	two	years,	

and	the	same	family	member served as	caregiver	even	before	that	placement	

became	official.		The	family	member,	however,	was not	a	permanency	option.

Neither	 parent	 had made	 any	 progress	 toward	 establishing	 a	 situation	 that	

could	 accommodate	 the	 two	 youngest	 children	 permanently.	 	 The	 mother’s	

brief	trial	placement	with	the	two	youngest	children	ended	when	she	crashed	

her	car	with	the	two	toddlers	secured	only	by	adult	seat	belts.		The	father	had	

not	 been	 able	 to	 arrange	 a	 safe	 place	 even	 for	 supervised	 visits	 with	 the	

children.	
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[¶16]	 	 The	 record	 also	 supports	 the	 trial	 court’s	 conclusion	 that	

termination	was	in	the	best	interest	of	the	oldest	child.	 The	oldest	child	was	

particularly	 negatively	 affected	 by	 the	 frequent	 and	 abrupt	 changes	 in	

residences	and	caregivers.		He	expressed	no	desire	to	reunite	with	his	mother.		

Although	 he	 expressed	 a	 preference	 to	 reunite	 with	 the	 father,	 the	 sudden	

termination	of	his	trial	placement	with	the	father	had	derailed	the	oldest	child’s	

progress	for	some	time	thereafter.	 The	father	continued	to	foster	in	the	oldest	

child	unrealistic	expectations	of	reunification,	but	visits	with	the	child	were	not	

beneficial	 to	 the child.	 	 The	 father	 did	 not	 possess	 the	 means	 by	 which	 to	

provide	 a	 safe	 or	 supportive	 home	 for	 the	 oldest	 child,	 nor	 did	it	 appear	 he	

would	obtain	those	means	in	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	the	oldest	

child’s	 needs.	 The trial	 court	 did	 not	 abuse	its	 discretion	in	 concluding	 that	

termination	of	the	parents’	parental	rights	was	in	the	children’s	best	interest.	

B. Trial	Court’s	Questioning	of	Witnesses	

[¶17]		The	father	argues	for	the	first	time	on	appeal	that	the	trial	court	

abused	its	discretion	by	engaging	in	sua	sponte	questioning	of	witnesses	at	the	

termination	hearing,	 the	 extent	and	nature	 of	which	 “suggested	a	posture	 of	

advocacy	and	a	retreat	 from	impartiality.”		However,	contrary	 to	 the	 father’s	

contentions,	we	discern	no	abuse	of	discretion on	the	part	of	the	trial	court	with	
14

regard	to	its	examination	of	witnesses	at	the	termination	hearing,	and	the	trial	

record	does	not	suggest	any	such	“retreat	from impartiality.”

[¶18]		“Subject	to	the	obvious	caveat	to	maintain	judicial	impartiality,	and	

not	to	assume	the	posture	of	an	advocate,	a	presiding	justice	may	interrogate	

witnesses.”		State	v.	Colomy,	407	A.2d	1115,	1118	(Me.	1979) (citation	omitted)	

(quotation	 marks	 omitted); see M.R.	 Evid.	 614.	 “So	 long	 as	 the	 trial	 judge	

intervenes	for	the	purpose	of	clarifying	testimony,	saving	time,	or	preventing	a	

miscarriage	 of	 justice,	 he	 must	 be	 allowed	 considerable	 latitude	 in	 his	

questioning.”	 	 State	 v.	 Greenwood,	 385	 A.2d	 803,	 804	 (Me.	 1978).	 “The	

paramount	concern	[regarding	judicial	interrogation]	has been	that	the	judge	

not	participate	in	any	manner	from	which	the	jury	may	infer	that	he	endorses	

the	 cause	 of	 one	 side.” State	 v.	 Pickering,	 491	 A.2d	 560,	 564	 (Me.	 1985).	

Therefore,	where there	is	no	jury,	“this	concern	is	absent.”		Id.		Where	a	party	

does	 not	preserve	his	 objection	 to	a	line	 of	questioning	by	bringing	it	 to	 the	

attention	of	the	court	in	a	timely	manner,	we	review	for	obvious	error. See	State	

v.	Haycock,	296	A.2d	489,	492	(Me.	1972).	

[¶19]		Here,	the	trial	court	did	not	abuse	its	discretion in	questioning	the	

father	or	any	other	witness	pursuant	 to	Rule	614.		Although	 the	Department	

and	the	parents	were	both	represented	by	experienced	counsel,	the	long	and	
15

convoluted	 path	 of	 the	 Department’s	 involvement	 with	 the	 children	 created	

challenges	in	bringing	out	a	coherent	chronology	 through	witness	 testimony.	

In	its	role	as	 factfinder,	 the	court	questioned	several	witnesses	at	length.		 Its	

questions	 were	 limited	 to	 attempts	 to	 clarify	 and	 bring	 out	 facts	 key	 to	 its	

ultimate	findings	and	judgment.		Cf.	Greenwood,	385	A.2d	at	804	(holding	that	a	

court’s	questioning	of	a	witness	was	improper	where	the	questions	were	“only	

marginally	helpful	in	ascertaining	the	facts”	and	focused	on	impeaching	a	key	

witness).	Furthermore,	the	record	does	not	suggest	that	the	court’s	questioning	

of	 the	 father,	 in	 particular,	 was	 improper	 or	 revealed	 a	 retreat	 from	

impartiality.	 The	court	questioned	 other	witnesses	at	similar	length,	and	its	

interrogation	of	the	father	was	focused	primarily	on	evidence	of	the	mother’s

behavior. The	 court’s	 participation	 in	 the	 questioning	 of	 witnesses	 at	 the	

termination	hearing	was	not	improper.	

III.		CONCLUSION

[¶20]		The	trial	court	did	not	clearly	err	in	finding	by	clear	and	convincing	

evidence	that	the	mother	and	father	were	each	unable	or	unwilling	to	protect	

the	children	from	jeopardy	or	take	responsibility	for	the	children	within	a	time	

reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 the	 children’s	 needs.	 Nor	 did	 the	 trial	 court	

commit	clear	error	or	abuse	its	discretion	in	determining	that	termination	was	
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in	each	child’s	best	interest. See	 In	re	M.B.,	2013	ME	46,	¶	37,	65	A.3d	1260.		

Finally,	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 commit	 obvious	 error in	 its	 questioning	 of	

witnesses. See	Haycock,	296	A.2d	at	492.	

The	entry	is:

Judgment affirmed.

Andrew	Wright,	Esq.,	Brunswick,	for	appellant	mother

David	Paris,	Esq.,	Bath,	for	appellant	father

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Hunter	C.	Umphrey,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	

of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human	

Services

Augusta	District	Court	docket	number	PC-2017-31

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY