Filed 10/10/13 In re Javier G. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re JAVIER G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JAVIER G., Defendant and Appellant. F066716 (Super. Ct. No. JJD064115)



### OPINION

THE COURT * APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo J. Loza, Temporary Judge. †
R. Randall Riccardo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral, Julie A. Hokans and J. Robert Jibson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* Before Levy, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Detjen, J. † Pursuant to California Constitution, article VI, section 21.2.-ooOooINTRODUCTION On appeal following adjudication of a Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 602, subdivision (a) petition, Javier G. contends th e juvenile court erred in denying his motion to dismiss counts 7 (petty theft) and 8 (v andalism) “because there was insubstantial evidence” in support of those counts. He also contends the evidence was legally insufficient to support the juve nile court’s finding that he committed the crimes of theft and vandalism. Lastly, Javier argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to a youth facility for 365 days because it relied upon “non-existent factors” in doing so. We will affirm. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 In a third amended juvenile petition f iled August 30, 2012, the Tulare County District Attorney alleged Javier committed th e following violations: battery (Pen. Code, § 242, count 1); public intoxication ( id. , § 647, subd. (f), counts 2, 4 & 6); resisting an officer ( id. , § 148, subd. (a)(1), count 3); possession of alcohol by a minor (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 25662, subd. (a), count 5); petty theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a), count 7); vandalism ( id. , § 594, subd. (a), counts 8 & 10); and trespass ( id. , § 602, subd. (m), count 9). Javier denied all allegations. When Javier failed to appear at the ju risdictional hearing set for December 3, 2012, a bench warrant was issued. Following Javier’s subseque nt detention, a contested hearing was held January 11, 2013. The court found true the allegations in counts 1 through 3, and 6 through 10. It

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 A first petition alleging one count of vanda lism was filed August 6, 2009. Javier was placed on informal probation. The petition wa s dismissed March 1, 2010, because he complied with the terms and conditions of that probati on. A second petition was filed November 17, 2011, alleging eight counts of vandalism. Those alle gations were found true. At the April 5, 2012, disposition hearing, Javier was to remain in hi s parents’ home, pay restitution, and obey all terms and conditions of formal probation.3. found the allegation in count 4 not true. Following a section 701 .1 motion by defense counsel, the court granted the motion to dismiss as to count 5, but deni ed it as to counts 7
and 8. Thereafter, at disposition on January 28, 2013, the court dete rmined the maximum period of confinement to be four years eight months. It ordered that Javier be committed to the Tulare County Youth Fac ility for a period of 365 days. The court also ordered that, inter alia, Javier participate in alcohol and ot her drug counseling. This appeal followed. SUMMARY OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3 April 13, 2012 Inci dent (Count 3) At 10:10 p.m. on April 13, 2012, City of Lindsay police officer Andrew Robinson was on patrol in a marked police vehicle. The officer observed two juveniles walking
near the intersection of Honolul u Street and Gale Hill Avenue past the municipal curfew. He recognized one of the juveniles as Ja vier. He pulled over and asked them to approach; neither complied. Instead, they continued walk ing, pulling things from their pockets and dropping them to the ground. In an effort to stop them, Officer Robins on grabbed Javier by his right arm. Javier responded by swinging at the officer. He di d not comply with the officer’s request to stop. Because Javier was aggressive, the officer grabbed him from behind and pinned him against the patrol car and called for backup. He could smell a strong odor of alcohol on Javier’s person and breath. Based upon hi s observations, the officer believed Javier to
be intoxicated.
Javier tried to run and was taken to the ground. He used profanity and continued to resist while on the ground, fl ailing his head about. Once other officers arrived, Javier was placed in handcuffs.

3 The facts are limited to those of the third juvenile petition. To the degree the facts arising from the first and second pe titions are relevant to this pr oceeding, they will be addressed in the discussion.4. April 14, 2012 Incident (Counts 1 & 2) Officer Robinson was on duty at 9:10 p.m. on April 14, 2012. He was dispatched to a disturbance at the Veterans Memorial Building in Lindsay. Initially, Officer Robinson was contacted about another minor being detained for underage drinking and possession of alcohol. However, he heard others in attendance say a fight was going to happen inside the hall. Robinson sent Officer Silva inside the hall to investigate. Silva returned w ith Javier. Javier was very angry and was attempting to pull away from Officer Silva. He called both officers “fucking pussies” and continued to be uncooperative. Robinson directed Silva to transport Javier to the police department. Later, Silva requested Robinson’s assistan ce with removing Javier from the patrol car at the department. When Robinson told Javier to calm down, Javier replied “Fuck you, you fucking bitches.” He continued to use profanity and tried to pull away from the
officers. He also threatened to assault both officers. Javier wa s uncooperative and would not comply with directives; ultimately, he was restrained forcefu lly and handcuffed.
Even then he continued to shout profanities and took a swing at Officer Robinson. As Robinson patted down Javier, he co uld smell a strong odor of alcohol. His eyes were bloodshot, red and watery, and his sp eech was slightly slurred. It was obvious
to the officer that Javier was quite intoxicated. Triple A Security guard Je nnifer Shields observed Javierdrinking a beer earlier that evening. When she aske d him for identification, he th rew a nearly full beer can at her; it hit her in the stomach and soiled her un iform. Javier then walked toward Shields and shoved her with his right shoulder, striki ng her right arm. He was very aggressive and used profanity during the incident. Shield s’ senior officer addressed Javier about the earlier incident, but he was not asked to leave at that time. May 5, 2012 Incident (Count 4) About 11:48 p.m. on May 5, 2012, Tu lare County deputy sheriff Brandee Robinson responded to a dispatch regarding a possible theft or vehicle burglary at a residence in Lindsay. A party was taking place and about 50 or more adults and juveniles5. were in attendance. Alcohol was being served at the party. Although her investigation
revealed no evidence of vehicle bu rglary or forced entry into any vehicle, Javier came to the deputy’s attention. He had alcohol on his breath and the o dor of alcohol on his person. His eyes were red and watery, his speech was sl urred, and he was unsteady on
his feet. When Deputy Robinson asked Javier whethe r he had had anything to drink, Javier replied that he did not drink and he had no t had anything to drink. Nevertheless, the deputy believed Javier was under the influe nce of alcohol and presented a danger to
himself and others. Javier was arrested for public intoxication. May 27, 2012 Incident (Counts 5 & 6) On May 27, 2012, at 12:43 a.m., while on patrol near Washington School in Lindsay, Officer Robinson observed thr ee subjects, one of whom was carrying a backpack, walking across the school parking lot. Officer Robi nson recognized one of the subjects as Javier. As the o fficer approached them in his patrol car, one of the subjects dropped the backpack to the ground. Althou gh the officer ordered the subjects to stop, they continued walking. He advised them he would release a canine if they did not stop. After dropping other items to the ground, they stopped. The juveniles were ordered to lie on th e ground, and once backup arrived, they
were handcuffed. Officer Robinson noted Javier was intoxicated; his eyes were bloodshot and watery, his speech was slurred, a nd his breath held the odor of alcohol.
The other two were also intoxi cated. Marijuana, a pipe, several knives, a set of keys, and a lighter were found nearby. Officer Robinson did not see which of the three individuals dropped the backpack that was ca rrying 19 cans of Bud Light beer. Later, at the police station, Javier advise d Robinson he was so intoxicated that he was going to throw up. He was given a tras h can and he vomited into the trash can. June 17, 2012 Incident (Counts 7 & 8) At 10:05 p.m. on June 17, 2012, Officer Robinson was dispatched to a residence
on East Samoa Street in Lind say following the report of a th eft from a vehicle. Robinson6. made contact with victim Simitrio Meza. Meza advised that an unknown suspect stole the faceplate from his vehicle’s stereo. Ba sed upon Meza’s initial report of the theft to police, a be-on-the-lookout described the possi ble suspect as a Hispanic male wearing a
white T-shirt on his head. Shortly thereafter, within five minutes or less, Officer Alcantar with the Lindsay Police Department responded to the area, having detained Javier. Javier had a white T-shirt with him, although he was not wearing it at the time.
Alcantar handed Robinson an Xtreme Sound stereo faceplate; Meza identified the faceplate as his. There were no other suspects. Meza explained he had been lying in bed about 10:00 p.m. when a neighbor advised him someone was trying to steal something from his 1995 Hyundai Sonata. Meza called the police immediately. Earlier that afternoon, Meza had parked hi s car under a tree next to the house. A window was cracked open at the top and he initially believe d the car had been locked. 4
Meza indicated the stereo and dashboard were in working order when he parked the car
next to his home earlier that afternoon. He had not given anyone permission to use or take any item from his car. While waiting fo r the police, Meza no ticed the stereo’s faceplate was missing and the dashboard ar ea near the stereo was damaged. Additionally, the hazard lights on the vehicle were flashing.
When an officer arrived with the person believed to have stolen his stereo’s faceplate, Meza initially testified he thought the faceplate had been taken from the suspect’s pants pocket. However, later he i ndicated he was uncerta in about whether the faceplate was in the suspect’s possession or whether the officer had possession of it. After the break-in, the stereo was brok en and the dashboard was torn up. No repairs had been made; Meza estimated the da mage to his vehicle to be about $300.

4 On cross-examination, Meza explained he had told the officer the car was unlocked because one of the keys to the vehicle had broke n off. Although he had a replacement key made, that key only worked on the ignition.7. August 22, 2012 Inci dent (Counts 9 & 10) Lindsay police officer Andrew Loftin wa s on patrol at 6:27 p.m. on August 22, 2012, when he was dispatched following a report of several subjects inside a vacant house. After checking the front and side area s of the home, he proceeded to the backyard where he observed an open door. As he appr oached the door he could hear voices and smell burnt marijuana. The doo r looked as though it had been forced open and there was damage to the doorjamb. While waiting for backup to arrive, Officer Loftin announced his presence loudly; no one responded. Once the other officers arrived, they began clearing the home. Eventually they pro ceeded to an upstairs bedroom and bathroom area where they
observed four individuals. Ja vier was one of those indi viduals. The suspects were
ordered to lie down and the scene was secure d. Marijuana and smoking devices were
found. Property owner Jeff Munter testified th at while the home had been vacant for some time, and a previous trespass had occu rred, he had locked and secured the back door of the home on his previous visit. Wh ile some damage had been done to the door and doorframe previously, after this particular incident, the damage was greater. Additionally, a shower had been left runni ng and the shower handle was in pieces. As a result, Munter also later discovered the carpet in that bathroom had suffered water damage. Graffiti was found on two walls upsta irs, but that could have been inflicted by the previous trespass er or trespassers. DISCUSSION
1. The Section 701.1 Motion to Dismiss Counts 7 and 8 Javier contends the juvenile court e rred when it denied his motion to dismiss
counts 7 and 8 because the ev idence regarding those counts is not substantial. The People assert otherwise.8. A. Applicable Legal Standards
Section 701.1 authorizes th e juvenile court, upon the minor’s motion, to dismiss a wardship petition “after the presentation of evid ence on behalf of the petitioner has been closed, if the court, upon weighi ng the evidence then before it, finds that the minor is not a person described by section 601 or 602.” (§ 701.1.) Section 701.1 “is substantially
similar to Penal Code Section 1118 governing motions to acqu it in criminal trials .... [¶] Thus, the requirement in a criminal case that on a motion for acquittal the trial court is required ‘to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and determine that the case against the defendant is “proved beyond a reasonable doubt before [the defendant] is required to put on a defense”’ applies equally well to motions to dismiss brought in juvenile pro ceedings. [Citation.]” ( In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 727, fn. omitted.) “[T]he standard for review of the juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is whether there is substa ntial evidence to su pport the offense charged in the petition. [Citation.] In applying the substantial evidence rule, we must ‘assume in favor of [the court’s] order the existence of every fact from which the [court] could have reasonably deduced from the evidence whether the o ffense charged was committed and if it was perpetrated by the person or persons accus ed of the offense. [Citations.] Accordingly, we may not set aside the trial court’s denial of the motion on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence unless it clearly appears that upon no hypothesis whatso ever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached by th e court below.’ [Citations.]” ( In re Man J . (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475, 482.) “‘[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact coul d have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a re asonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” ( People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1289–1290.)
“Substantial evidence incl udes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” ( In re Michael D . (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 126.) “‘[W]hile substantial ev idence may consist of inferen ces, such inferences must be “a product of logic and reason” and “must rest on the eviden ce” [citation]; inferences that9. are the result of mere speculation or conjectu re cannot support a finding [citations.]’” ( In re Savannah M . (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393 -1394, italics omitted.) “Evidence which merely raises a strong suspicion of the defendant’s gu ilt is not sufficient to support a conviction.” ( People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) B. Analysis Javier contends the juvenile court erre d by denying his motion to dismiss counts 7
and 8 because there is insuffi cient evidence that he committe d the crimes of theft and
vandalism. Penal Code section 484, subdivision (a), pr ovides in relevant part: “Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead , or drive away the personal property of another ... is guilty of theft.” Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a) provides that any person who maliciously commits damage to the personal proper ty of another is guilty of vandalism. Thus, the People were required to prove that Javier stole Meza’s stereo faceplate from Meza’s vehicle, and that Javi er was the cause of the damage to Meza’s
vehicle’s dashboard.
The evidence established th at when Meza parked his car under a tree near his home on the afternoon of June 17, 2012, the vehicle’s stereo system was operable and the dashboard was undamaged. It also establishe d that Meza’s neighbor advised him at about 10:00 p.m. that someone was breaking into his car. Meza immediately called 911 and reported the crime, including a description of th e suspect. Very shortly thereafter, Officer
Alcantar arrived on the scene with Javier in tow. Javier was a Hispanic male in possession of a white T-shirt; th e suspect was described as a Hispanic male wearing a
white T-shirt on his head. Even assumi ng Officer Alcantar handed Officer Robinson Meza’s stereo faceplate—because it was not on Javier’s person when he was returned to the scene—the fact finder’s inference, that Javier stole Meza’s stereo faceplate and damaged the vehicle’s dashboard in the proce ss, is the product of logic and reason and rests upon the evidence admitted. ( In re Savannah M. , supra , 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1393-1394.)10. The lack of direct eviden ce that Javier possessed Meza’s stereo faceplate is not a bar to a finding of guilt. “‘“‘Circumstantia l evidence may be su fficient to connect a
defendant with the crime a nd to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’” ( People
v. Howard (2010) 51 Cal.4th 15, 34.) Here, the reasonable infere nces relied upon by the juvenile court are not based on suspicion al one, nor “‘on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjec ture, or guess work.’” ( People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21, disapproved on an unrelated point in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543, fn. 5.) Contrary to Javier’s claim, the inferenc es relied upon by the juvenile court, although circumstantial, are reasonably drawn from the evidence. Javier was located near the scene of the theft within a very short time of the call to 911. He matched the description of the suspect. The officer who located Javier returned to the scen e with Javier and the missing stereo faceplate. Reasonable inferen ces support the true findings regarding theft
and vandalism. Javier contends the juvenile court imperm issibly shifted the burden of proof to him in making the following findings in consideration of his motion: “With respect to [counts] 7 and 8, we have a situation here that it’s primarily circumstantial ev idence. We have a s ituation where the police officer detained an individual shortly af ter the call is made to the police, he was arrested in close proximity to wh ere this vehicle was vandalized and property taken therefrom. The office r who detained this minor brings the minor back to the scene. The minor is the only person that he brings back to the scene. The officer is—either the officer is in possession of this faceplate or the minor is in possessi on of this item in his pocket. The witness could not say one way or the other what was the case. But it’s clear that at the scene this minor was arrested close—in close proximity and close in time to this offense, and he—when he and the property that was specifically taken from this vehicle are presented, the victim identifies that property as his.
“So I think all the circumstantial evid ence points to the fact that this minor is the only person th at could have committed th is crime. There is absolutely no circumstantia l evidence that points to the possibility that somebody else may have committed this crime. And so when the Court is presented with circumstantia l evidence, if there is no logical explanation or some other explanation other than th e evidence pointing towards the minor,11. the Court must accept the one that points to the minor. And there’s absolutely no evid ence in this case that indicates that anyone other than this minor could have committed this crime. [¶ ] So the motion is denied with respect to Counts 7 and 8.” We agree with the People that the court was merely providing its interpretation of
the evidence before it. The court’s co mment was not intended to, nor did it, impermissibly shift the burden to Javier. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, our review reveals the juvenile court properly found the essential el ements of the crimes of theft and vandalism beyond a reasonable doubt, after weighing the evidence and evaluating witness credibility. ( In re Anthony J. , supra , 117 Cal.App.4t h at p. 727; In re Man J. , supra , 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 482.) Therefore, the juve nile court did not err in denying Javier’s
motion to dismiss counts 7 and 8. 2. The Sufficiency of the Evid ence Regarding Counts 7 and 8 In a related argument, Javier claims th e evidence regarding counts 7 and 8 is insufficient to support his conviction for those crimes. The People disagree. “As a preliminary matter, we note th at on this appeal challenging the sufficiency of the eviden ce to support a juvenile court judgment sustaining the criminal allegations of a petition ma de under the provis ions of section 602 ..., we must apply the same standard of review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging th e sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction on a ppeal. Under this standard, the critical inquiry is ‘whether, after revi ewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of factcould have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) An appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substa ntial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendan t guilty beyond a re asonable doubt.’ ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)” ( In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) “‘It is axiomatic that an appellate c ourt defers to the trier of fact on such determinations, and has no power to judge th e effect or value of, or to weigh the12. evidence; to consider the cred ibility of witnesses; or to re solve conflicts in, or make
inferences or deductions from th e evidence. We revi ew a cold record and, unlike a trial court, have no opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses. [Citation.] “Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the tr ial court.” [Citations.] It is not an appellate court’s function, in short, to redetermine the facts.’” ( In re S.A . (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1140, quoting In re Sheila B . (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199- 200.) “The standard of appellate review is the same when the evidence of guilt is primarily circumstantial. ‘A lthough it is the duty of the [finder of fact] to acquit a defendant if it fi nds that circumst antial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [finder of fact], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’ s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circ umstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding do es not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’”’ [Citations.]” ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 668.) Here, in stating its ruling after the pr esentation of evidence and argument, the juvenile court found as follows: “Counts 7 and 8, the Court is gonna fi nd those allegations true, as well. The Court previously has made reference to that. In my view, there is—it’s primarily based on the circumstantia l evidence. A ll the—the only circumstantial evidence presented poi nts to the minor’s guilt. There is absolutely no ev idence that points to his inno cence. So when you combine all the totality of the circumstances, cl early, it points to this minor being the person who committed the vandalism and th e theft of the property. So the Court finds Counts 7 and 8 true.” The juvenile court, as trier of fact, ack nowledged the evidence was circumstantial. Yet, it determined that evidence was not susceptible to two in terpretations. Further, in its view, the only interpretation of the circum stantial evidence supported Javier’s guilt. As discussed above, the evidence establis hed that when Meza parked his car under
a tree near his home on the afternoon of June17, 2012, the vehicle’s stereo system was operable and the dashboard was undamaged. Th e evidence also revealed that about 10:00 o’clock that evening Meza’s ne ighbor told him someone was br eaking into his car. Meza13. called 911 and reported the crime. His report included a description of the suspect, to wit: a Hispanic male wearing a white T-sh irt on his head. Offi cer Robinson responded to the dispatch that followed Meza’s call; the officer met M eza at his home. Meanwhile, a be-on-the-lookout provided a suspect descri ption. About five minutes later, Officer
Alcantar arrived at the Meza residence with Javier in his custody. As a Hispanic male in possession of a white T-shirt, in close proximity to the scene of the theft, Javier matched the description of the suspect. Whether the stereo faceplate was in Javier’s possession or the officer’s possession was in dispute. Even assuming Officer Alcantar had posse ssion of the stereo faceplate during the
duration of the encounter at the Meza residen ce, the fact finder’s inference that Javier stole Meza’s stereo faceplate and damaged th e vehicle’s dashboard in the process was reasonable. Javier is essentially asking us to make different inferences or deductions from the evidence. He alleges that he or Officer Alcantar could have found the stereo faceplate lying on the ground. However, it is not this court’s role to redetermine the facts where contrary inferences might be draw n in favor of Javier’s innocence. ( People v.
Holt , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 668.) In sum, the evidence here is reasonable, credible a nd of a solid value, such that a
reasonable trier of fact c ould find Javier guilty beyonda reasonable doubt. ( In re Ryan
N. , supra , 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371.) The in ferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence regarding Javier’s possession of the stereo faceplate and his having damaged the dashboard during its removal from Meza’s vehicl e are reasonable and logical. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the lig ht most favorable to the prosecution, we find Javier’s convictions for petty theft and vandalis m are supported by sufficient evidence. 3. The Juvenile Court’s Finding Regar ding Javier’s Commitment to a Youth Facility Javier argues the juvenile court abus ed its discretion by committing him to the youth facility. More particularly, he argues the court should have sentenced him to less restrictive conditions, namely, an ankle monitor and outpatient alcohol counseling. He14. also contends the juvenile court’s order does not adequately provide for alcohol counseling despite the court’s obvious concer ns about his drinking. Finally, Javier complains the court misstat ed certain facts and mischaracterized others. An appellate court may reverse a juven ile court’s commitment order only upon a showing the juvenile court abused its discretion. ( In re Robert H . (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329–1330 (Robert H. ).) As long as the evidence demonstrates the minor will
benefit from the commitment and that less restri ctive alternatives woul d be ineffective, a particular commitment order does not cons titute an abuse of discretion. (See In re Pedro
M . (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556, disapproved on another ground in People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 375, fn. 6.) Moreover, the juvenile court has full discretion in evaluating the credibility of the minor, the probation officer recommendations, and other in formation presented during the proceedings. (Robert H. , supra , at p. 1329.) Thus, while the juvenile court law contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of dispositions, no absolute rule requires the juvenile court attempt a less restrictive placement before ordering a particular commitment. (§ 202, subd. (e); In re Teofilio A . (1989) 210 Cal.A pp.3d 571, 577 ( Teofilio A .).) When reviewing the record, the appellate court grants all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court’s decision and does not disturb findings supported by substantial evidence. (Robert H. , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1 330.) To determine if substantial evidence exists, th e appellate court examines th e record in light of the purposes of the juvenile court law, whic h include protecting th e public and minor, preserving the minor’s family ties, and remo ving the minor from his or her family only when necessary for the minor’s welfare or the public’s safety. (§ 202, subd. (a); In re Lorenza M . (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 49, 53.) In addition, section 202 provides that minors in delinquency proceedings shall receive care, treatment, and guid ance that is consistent with their best interests, holds them accountable for their behavior, and is appr opriate given the circumstances. (§ 202,15. subd. (b).) Thus, the statute recognizes both punishment and reha bilitation as important tools and objectives. ( Teofilio A. , supra , 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 576.) In ordering disposition, the juvenile court must broadly consider the minor’s age, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, the minor’s delinquent history, and any other relevant information. (§ 725.5; Robert H. , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) The juvenile court need not specifically discu ss each factor during the proceedings, and a record that indicates the court merely c onsidered each factor is sufficient. ( In re John F

. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 182, 185.) Here, in making its commitment finding, the juvenile court stated as follows:

“T HE C OURT : Okay. Well in fact this, I heard both trials, the current one and the one that he’s on probation for and there is a real common thread to all this. The previous case he was charged with eight counts of vandalism and I do recall the details of that, reviewed that again and basically he was out of control then but he was given a chance to go home then even though the circumstances of the previous case were pretty significant in that he—there was a great deal of damage that was caused through vandalism in that case, we gave him an opportunity to go home and then we heard the testimony in this case as well and I’m going to say I really think he’s beyond, he’s totally beyond his parents’ control. Almost every one of these cases he’s out there pa st 12 o’clock at night, 2 o’clock in the morning out there drin king in every single one of these instances and there were I think six different incide nts in which he was out there getting into fights, drinking, vandalizing prop erty and so forth and every one of these cases he’s totally be yond control and he is in toxicated, he’s out in some of these cases he’s out there as la te as 2 o’clock in the morning and so it just seems to me that he is totall y beyond his parents’ control and the parents either can’t or won’t supervise him appropriately and so it is, it is a bad situation that I’m extremely concerned about and especially in light of the fact that he was given a chance on the previous case and I read your letter and to be honest with you if th is was the first time, that letter would make a lot of sense to me but in light of what happened la st time it doesn’t make a lot of sense to me because it indicates to me you didn’t learn your lesson and, secondly, as the DA points out, you wouldn’t have been in custody on this case at all except for th e fact that you failed to appear for trial. “So I look at the entire history of your case, all the various circumstances that brought you before the Court, the fact that you’re not doing well in school and so forth, the very aggressive nature of how you16. behave when you’re out there on the stre ets drunk, you get in a lot of fights, your behavior with the police when they were arresting you was extremely poor and so I think the recommendation of the probation officer is appropriate because of th e fact that you do have an extremely serious problem that needs to be dealt with an d your parents need to stop protecting you. In a sense they’re not doing yo u any favors by trying to keep you at home when they either can’t or won’ t supervise you properly so you don’t get in trouble and you’re only 15 year s old but they let you out running around at 2 o’clock in the morning w ith your friends ge tting drunk, so I think your entire family needs to make an assessment of the situation that you’re not doing well at home and that when you do, when you do return home that things have not changed because I think you have a good family, you have good parents that care about you, but either you won’t let them be good parents or they need to be in structed on what ne eds to be done to monitor you properly.
“So I think the recommendation is cl early appropriate that the Youth Facility is in order. So the Court is going to follow the recommendation of the probation officer. [¶] ...[¶]
“The Court finds that the minor is committed to the Youth Facility Program for 365 days with 50 days credit fo r time served. “The welfare of the minor requires that physical custody be removed from the parent or guardian. [¶] ... [¶] “Reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. [¶] ... [¶] “The minor is to participate in all the services as offered by the Youth Facility, including individual, group, a nd family counseling, alcohol and drug counseling , anger management counseling ....” (Italics added.) It is clear on this record that the juve nile court did not abuse its discretion. It considered Javier’s age, the circumstances and gravity of the offe nses, his delinquency history, and other relevant information. It evaluated the credibility of the minor and made reasonable inferences based upon the evidence. The court was concerned for Javier’s safety, and its commitment order pr ovides for the minor’s safety, care, and

treatment. With regard to a less restrictive placem ent, significantly, the court was concerned with the fact that Javier’s parents were eith er unable or unwilling to control his behavior.17. Despite the filing of two previous petitions, th e latter resulting in a term of probation that included a 9:00 p.m. curfew, all but one of the six incidents giving rise to this third petition happened afte r curfew. Thus, it was reasonable fo r the court to conclude Javier’s parents were either unwilling or unable to ke ep him home and out of trouble. The court expressly noted its previous attempt at home placement and formal probation proved unsuccessful. Javier’s behavior did not impr ove; rather, it worsened. In fact, Javier
committed the first of ten new offenses only eight days afte r the court adjudicated the second petition and placed Javier on formal probation. The j uvenile court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and we will not disturb them. ( Robert H. , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330; In re Lorenza M. , supra , 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 53.) Javier’s argument concerning the juven ile court’s misstatements about the time at
which he committed his offenses misses the mark. The court’s concern was plainly that despite the imposition of a curfew—either that imposed by an earlier probation condition or the municipality’s curfew—Javier consis tently disobeyed curfew. Whether it was actually two o’clock in the morning or not, in five of the six incidents relevant here, Javier was out past curfew.
Javier also takes issue w ith the court’s references to fighting. Yet the record supports the court’s references. 5 For example, on April 14, 2012, officers came into contact with Javier at a quinceañera party af ter hearing from other attendees about a fight inside the hall. On another occasion, Javierassaulted a security guard by throwing a can of beer at her, striking her in the stomach, and shoving her with hi s shoulder. Finally, Javier has consistently failed to comply with the requests of law enforcement officials and has fought or struggled with them on a numb er of occasions. As a result, the juvenile court’s characterization in this regard is proper.

5 Discipline records from Javier’s junior high school indicate he has been disciplined for bullying, “sock[ing] a student in the stomach,” truancy, and disr espectful and defiant behavior.18. Javier’s contention that the court’s commitment order did not address alcohol counseling is without merit. The judge expressly stated the commitment would involve “alcohol and drug counseling.” In speaking di rectly to the minor, the juvenile court alluded to alcohol counseling as a part of its commitment order involving the youth facility: “I think you do reco gnize the fact that you have a serious problem and you just have to work on it ... so you n eed to take this time, this opp ortunity to go to school, get yourself on track, get yourself clean and hopef ully with this period of time when you get out, you will stay clean because you have a se rious drinking problem.” Notably too, the People referenced alcohol c ounseling when they argued in favor of the youth facility commitment recommended by probation: “[T] he minor said that he would like to do alcohol and drug counseling but in order for him to do these things, being in boot camp he’ll be forced to do these things.” The probation report’s use of the term or phrase “substance abuse counseling” does not exclude alcohol treatment, as Javier argues. Instead, substance abuse treatm ent encompasses alcohol and drugs. (See, e.g., Kulig, M.D., M.P.H., Tobacco , Alcohol , and Other Drugs: The Role of the Pediatrician in
Prevention , Identification , and Management of Substance Abuse (Mar. 2005) vol. 115, No. 3, Pediatrics 816-821, http://pediatric s.aappublications.org/c ontent/115/3/816.full [substance abuse treatment includes alcohol treatment or counseling].) 6 As for Javier’s passing reference that the commitment order did not consider his diabetes, while the order did not expressly reference the conditi on, it did provide that the probation officer had authority to obtain medical treatment pursuant to section 73 9 on Javier’s behalf. Following a third petition that alleged a se ries of crimes more serious than those alleged in either of the first two juvenile petitions, the court noted Javier’s previous home

6 Javier cites us to a reference at Alcoholis m.About.com, contending “‘when most people talk about substance abus e, they are referring to the use of ill egal drugs.’” The court notes that, preceding the partial quotation provided above, the article states “Substance abuse can simply be defined as a pattern of harmful use of any subs tance for mood-altering pur poses.” Clearly then, substance abuse includes the use of alcohol; thus, treatment for substance abuse would involve treatment for the abuse of alcohol.19. placement with supervision had been unsu ccessful. The court determined home placement would not be appropriate in light of the new allegations, all of which were
committed while Javier was on probation for the previous offenses. The earlier home placement did not curtail Javier’s drinking or behavioral issues. ( Teofilio A , supra , 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.) Moreover, there is s ubstantial evidence in th e record to support the juvenile court’s commitment order. ( Robert H. , supra , 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.)
The evidence demonstrates Javier will benefit from a placement at the Tulare County Youth Facility and that a less restrictiv e placement would have been ineffective. Hence, the juvenile court di d not abuse its discretion. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.