alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2014093EN.01002501.xml

| 29.3.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 93/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.3.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 93/25

---

Action brought on 31 December 2013 — Mikhalchanka v Council

(Case T-693/13)

2014/C 93/42

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Aliaksei Mikhalchanka (Minsk, Belarus) (represented by: M. Michalauskas, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:

| — | annul Council Decision 2013/534/CFSP of 29 October 2013 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus, in so far as it concerns the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Decision 2013/534/CFSP of 29 October 2013 amending Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Belarus, in so far as it concerns the applicant;

| — | annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1054/2013 of 29 October 2013 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus, in so far as it concerns the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1054/2013 of 29 October 2013 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus, in so far as it concerns the applicant;

| — | order the Council to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of defence, since the prior inter partes procedure was not respected by the Council. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of defence, since the prior inter partes procedure was not respected by the Council.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging insufficient reasoning, since the reasons for the measures do not allow the applicant to contest their validity before the General Court and the latter to exercise its review of their lawfulness. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging insufficient reasoning, since the reasons for the measures do not allow the applicant to contest their validity before the General Court and the latter to exercise its review of their lawfulness.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging an error of assessment, in so far as the contested measure lacks all factual justification. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging an error of assessment, in so far as the contested measure lacks all factual justification.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality in particular with regard to the restriction on entry into, and transit through, the territory of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality in particular with regard to the restriction on entry into, and transit through, the territory of the European Union.

---
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<PAGE>
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF NETWORK-1 SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC. FOR THE
PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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No. 10-586.

#### Roland Johnson, Petitioner v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General.

562 U.S. 1138, 131 S. Ct. 934,

178 L. Ed. 2d 753,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 305.

January 10, 2011.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.

Same case below, 398 Fed. Appx. 644.
No. 10-6478.

#### Raheem Taylor, Petitioner v. New Jersey, et al.

562 U.S. 1173, 131 S. Ct. 989,

178 L. Ed. 2d 818,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 275.

January 10, 2011.

Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 562 U.S. 1048, 131 S. Ct. 607, 178 L. Ed. 2d 442, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 8989.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-6969

JIMMY CLAYTON WALKER, Petitioner - Appellant, versus J N BROWNING; ROBERTA LAWSON; CITY OF GREENVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge. (CA-04-946-20AK-6) Submitted: November 18, 2004 Decided: November 24, 2004 Before LUTTIG and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jimmy Clayton Walker, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Jimmy Clayton Walker seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2000). The magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised Walker that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, Walker failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned that failure to object will waive appellate review. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Walker has waived appellate review by failing to file objections after receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2686 

To prohibit the transfer, obligation, or expenditure of Federal funds to take 

property for the construction of a wall along the southern border, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 10, 2019 

Ms. WATERS (for herself, Mr. TAKANO, Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia, Ms. NORTON, Ms. LEE of California, Ms. MOORE, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. 

MCGOVERN, Mr. LOWENTHAL, Ms. LOFGREN, Ms. OCASIO-CORTEZ, Ms. 

SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. TLAIB, and Ms. OMAR) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To prohibit the transfer, obligation, or expenditure of Federal 

funds to take property for the construction of a wall 

along the southern border, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Border Property Pro5 tection Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi8 sion of law, no Federal department or agency may transVerDate Sep 11 2014 19:04 May 21, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2686.IH H2686

pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2686 IH

1 fer, obligate, or expend any funds in connection with the 

2 use of eminent domain to take any property from any 

3 landowner on or in the vicinity of the southern border for 

4 construction of fencing, physical barriers, or a wall, includ5 ing if such transfer, obligation, or expenditure is done in 

6 furtherance of the President’s February 15, 2019, dec7 laration of a national emergency pursuant to section 201 

8 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1621) enti9 tled ‘‘Presidential Proclamation on Declaring a National 

10 Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United 

11 States’’ (Proclamation 9844; 84 Fed. Reg. 4949) or any 

12 such related successor declaration. 

13 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

14 (1) LANDOWNER.—The term ‘‘landowner’’ 

15 means any person who owns any property. 

16 (2) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means a nat17 ural person, any Tribal, State, or local government 

18 or similar entity, or any private sector entity. 

19 (3) PROPERTY.—The term ‘‘property’’ means 

20 land, including an estate or interest in land, includ21 ing an easement or right of way in land. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7917

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RICHARD HARRY ROBERTSON, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg,

District Judge. (CR-02-19; CA-04-121)

Submitted: February 7, 2007 Decided: March 5, 2007

Before MICHAEL, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Harry Robertson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Richard

Ascik, Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
*In the same order, we denied a certificate of appealability

and dismissed Robertson’s appeal with respect to his remaining

claim that his sentence violated United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005).

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Richard Harry Robertson, Jr., appealed the district

court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion, and we

granted a certificate of appealability on Robertson’s claim that

his counsel was ineffective by failing to appeal his conviction

despite Robertson’s request that he do so.* For the reasons that

follow, we vacate the district court’s order as to Robertson’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim and remand for further

proceedings.

Unless the motion, files, and records of the case

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the

district court shall hold a prompt hearing to determine the issues

and make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the movant’s

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A hearing is required when a movant

presents a colorable Sixth Amendment claim showing disputed

material facts and a credibility determination is necessary to

resolve the issue. See United States v. Witherspoon, 231 F.3d 923,

925-27 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39, 42 (4th

Cir. 1993).

In its informal brief to this court, the Government

concedes “that the record before the district court raised a
- 3 -

genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel’s

performance was per se ineffective under Peak. Accordingly, the

district court’s summary dismissal of this claim without resolving

the dispute was in error.” We agree. Accordingly, we vacate the

district court’s order as to Robertson’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim and remand that claim for further proceedings. We

grant Robertson leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED
No. 10-5353.

#### Francisco F. Velarde, Petitioner v. California.

562 U.S. 917, 131 S. Ct. 282,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7110.

178 L. Ed. 2d 185,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, denied.
No. 10-7293.

#### David Lamar Johnson, Petitioner v. Alabama, et al.

562 U.S. 1150, 131 S. Ct. 932,

178 L. Ed. 2d 775,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 469,

January 10, 2011.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.
No. 10-6861.

#### Terry Smith, Petitioner v. Burl Cain, Warden.

562 U.S. 1112, 131 S. Ct. 824,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9808.

178 L. Ed. 2d 562,

December 13, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
---

Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Lexon Technologies,
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (Report ), I,
James Park, Chief Executive Officer and I, Bong S. Park Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge and belief:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

/s/ James Park James Park Chief Executive Officer
Chief Financial Officer Date: August 15, 2011

/s/ Bong S. Park Bong S. Park Chief Financial Officer
Date: August 18, 2011

---
No. 10-6983.

#### Todd R. Gehringer, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1051, 131 S. Ct. 616,

178 L. Ed. 2d 447,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8828.

November 15, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 385 Fed. Appx. 830.
Order entered January 27, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01282-CR

MARQUIS K. JONES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F15-54782-T

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s January 13, 2020 motion to abate the appeal to allow 

appellant to file an out-of-time motion for new trial. We DENY appellant’s motion without 

prejudice to raising the issue in his brief on the merits.

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE
No. 10-7493.

#### Zachary Johnson, Petitioner v. Mississippi.

562 U.S. 1154, 131 S. Ct. 946,

178 L. Ed. 2d 782,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 115.

January 10, 2011.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi denied.
II

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2437

To amend the Food Security Act of 1985 to extend, improve, increase flexibility, and increase conservation benefits of the conservation reserve program, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 14 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 12), 1994

Mr. CONRAD (for himself and Mr. DASCHLE) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

A BILL

To amend the Food Security Act of 1985 to extend, improve,

increase flexibility, and increase conservation benefits of

the conservation reserve program, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Conservation Reserve

5 Program Extension Act of 1994’’.
2

•S 2437 IS

1 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF CONSERVATION RESERVE

2 PROGRAM.

3 Chapter 1 of subtitle D of title XII of the Food Secu4 rity Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3830 et seq.) is amended by

5 striking ‘‘1995’’ each place it appears in section 1230(a),

6 subsections (a), (b)(3), and (d) of section 1231, and sec7 tion 1232(c) and inserting ‘‘2005’’.

8 SEC. 3. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE ACCEPTABILITY

9 OF CONTRACT OFFERS.

10 Paragraph (3) of section 1234(c) of the Food Secu11 rity Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3834(c)(3)) is amended to

12 read as follows:

13 ‘‘(3) In determining the acceptability of contract of14 fers, the Secretary shall, to the extent practicable—

15 ‘‘(A) consider the extent that enrollment of the

16 land that is the subject of the contract offer would

17 provide environmental benefits, using criteria that,

18 as determined by the Secretary, give equal weight to

19 improvement of soil quality, improvement of water

20 quality, and improvement of wildlife habitat; and

21 ‘‘(B) establish different criteria in various

22 States and regions of the United States if, as deter23 mined by the Secretary, the establishment of dif24 ferent criteria would improve water quality or wild25 life habitat or abate erosion.’’.

Æ
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6905

JOSEPH RUHREN,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

MARCOS SPITTAL, Detective Prince William County Police; 

LUTHER, Sergeant Manassas A.D.C.; MELETIS, Superintendent 

Manassas A.D.C.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:15-cv-00445-AJT-JFA)

Submitted: October 20, 2015 Decided: October 23, 2015

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph Ruhren, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Joseph Ruhren appeals the district court’s order dismissing 

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 

(2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the 

district court. Ruhren v. Spittal, No. 1:15-cv-00445-AJT-JFA 

(E.D. Va. May 14, 2015). We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
No. 10-5727.

#### Ricardo Ivan Palos-Marquez, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 936, 131 S. Ct. 339,

178 L. Ed. 2d 221,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7406.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 591 F.3d 1272.
#### Dionisio Garcia, Appellant, v County of Suffolk et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[51 NYS3d 192]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Molia, J.), dated March 6, 2015, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Transit Bus which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion of the defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Transit Bus which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.

The defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Transit Bus (hereinafter together the moving defendants) failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The photographs submitted by the moving defendants, depicting scars on the plaintiff’s head and left shoulder, failed to establish, prima facie, that these scars did not constitute “significant disfigurement [s]” as defined by Insurance Law § 5102 (d) *(see Borquist v Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist.,*107 AD3d 926 [2013]; *Langensiepen v Kruml,*92 AD3d 1302, 1302-1303 [2012]; *O’Brien v Bainbridge,*89 AD3d 1511, 1513 [2011]; *Tugman v PJC Sanitation Serv., Inc.,*23 AD3d 457 [2005]). Since the moving defendants did not sustain their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; *Che Hong Kim v Kossoff,*90 AD3d 969 [2011]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that *813branch of the moving defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.