1470 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 7 / Tuesday, January 12, 2016 / Notices 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

553(c), DOT solicits comments from the 

public to better inform its rulemaking 

process. DOT posts these comments, 

without edit, including any personal 

information the commenter provides, to 

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described in the system of records 

notice (DOT/ALL–14 FDMS), which can 

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privacy. 

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comments received may be read at 

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Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to the Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Deana Stedman, ANM–113, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356, 

email deana.stedman@faa.gov, phone 

(425) 227–2148. 

This notice is published pursuant to 

14 CFR 11.85. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on January 6, 

2016. 

Lirio Liu, 

Director, Office of Rulemaking. 

PETITION FOR EXEMPTION 

Docket No.: FAA–2015–3836. 

Petitioner: Bombardier Inc. 

Section(s) of 14 CFR Affected: 

§ 25.813(e) 

Description of Relief Sought: 

Title 14 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (14 CFR) Section 25.813(e) 

prohibits the installation of a door that 

separates any passenger seat that is 

occupiable during takeoff and landing 

from any passenger emergency exit. 

Bombardier Inc., seeks relief from this 

requirement for the BD–700–2B12 

Global 7000 and BD–700–2B13 Global 

8000 to allow installation of one or more 

doors between passenger seats and 

passenger emergency exits. 

Furthermore, Bombardier Inc., 

requests that the exemption, if granted, 

not include a condition (limitation) that 

would prohibit the aircraft from being 

operated for hire pursuant to 14 CFR 

part 135. 

The petitioner asserts that the aircraft 

and door(s) will incorporate design 

features that assure passengers’ ability 

to recognize the location of emergency 

exits and access those exits; thereby 

providing for an overall level of safety 

that is consistent with the intent of the 

regulations. 

[FR Doc. 2016–00411 Filed 1–11–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Waiver of Debris Containment 

Requirements for Launch 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of waiver. 

SUMMARY: This notice concerns two 

petitions for waiver submitted to the 

FAA by Space Exploration Technologies 

Corp. (SpaceX): (1) A petition to waive 

the requirement that a waiver request be 

submitted at least 60 days before the 

effective date of the waiver unless good 

cause for later submission is shown in 

the petition; and (2) a petition to waive 

the requirement that analysis must 

establish designated impact limit lines 

to bound the area where debris with a 

ballistic coefficient of three or more 

pounds per square foot is allowed to 

impact if the flight safety system (FSS) 

functions properly. 

DATES: This notice is effective January 

12, 2016 and is applicable beginning 

December 18, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

waiver, contact Charles P. Brinkman, 

Licensing Program Lead, Commercial 

Space Transportation—Licensing and 

Evaluation Division, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone: (202) 267–7715; email: 

Phil.Brinkman@faa.gov. For legal 

questions concerning this waiver, 

contact Laura Montgomery, Manager, 

Space Law Branch, AGC–210, Office of 

the Chief Counsel, Regulations Division, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–3150; email: Laura.Montgomery@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On December 3, 2015, SpaceX 

submitted a petition to the Federal 

Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) 

Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation (AST) requesting relief 

from a regulatory requirement for a 

launch license for flight of a Falcon 9 

launch vehicle carrying ORBCOMM–2 

satellites. Specifically, SpaceX 

requested relief from § 417.213(a), 

which requires an analysis to establish 

flight safety limits that define when an 

FSS must terminate a launch vehicle’s 

flight to prevent the hazardous effects of 

the resulting debris impacts from 

reaching any populated or other 

protected area, and the associated 

requirement of § 417.213(d), which 

requires an analysis to establish 

designated impact limit lines to bound 

the area where debris with a ballistic 

coefficient of three or more is allowed 

to impact if the FSS functions properly. 

On December 17, 2015, the FAA advised 

SpaceX that this relief must be 

requested as a waiver of § 417.213(a) 

and (d), and SpaceX modified its 

request to be a waiver petition in 

accordance with 14 CFR part 404. 

Because the scheduled launch was 

planned to occur in less than sixty days, 

SpaceX also requested a waiver to 

section 404.3(b)(5), which requires that 

a petition for waiver be submitted at 

least sixty days before the proposed 

effective date of the waiver, which in 

this case would be the date of the 

planned launch. 

The FAA licenses the launch of a 

launch vehicle and reentry of a reentry 

vehicle under authority granted to the 

Secretary of Transportation in the 

Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 

as amended and re-codified by 51 U.S.C. 

Subtitle V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509), 

and delegated to the FAA Administrator 

and the Associate Administrator for 

Commercial Space Transportation, who 

exercises licensing authority under 

Chapter 509. 

SpaceX is a private commercial space 

flight company. The petition addresses 

an upcoming flight that SpaceX plans to 

undertake to deliver ORBCOMM–2 

satellites. SpaceX plans for the Falcon 9 

launch vehicle to launch from Cape 

Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) 

and fly back the first stage to CCAFS for 

landing. The flight termination system 

together with autonomous engine 

shutdown cannot prevent debris from 

reaching protected areas for all failure 

scenarios during the Falcon 9 fly back 

portion of the launch. Specifically, 

impact limit lines cannot be developed 

to ensure all debris with a ballistic 

coefficient of 3 pounds per square foot 

(psf) or greater remains on CCAFS. 

Waiver Criteria 

Chapter 509 allows the FAA to waive 

a license requirement if the waiver (1) 

will not jeopardize public health and 

safety, safety of property; (2) will not 

jeopardize national security and foreign 

policy interests of the United States; and 

(3) will be in the public interest. 51 

U.S.C. 50905(b)(3) (2011); 14 CFR 

404.5(b) (2011). 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 7 / Tuesday, January 12, 2016 / Notices 1471 

1 ‘‘The Air Force and the FAA remain committed 

to the partnership outlined in the MOA and . . . 

developing common launch safety requirements 

and for coordinating the common requirements.’’ 

Licensing and Safety Requrieemtns for Launch, 

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 67 

FR 49456, 49471 (July 30, 2002). 

2Eastern and Western Range 127–1, Range Safety 

Requirements, 1998, see page 1–viii. 

3ANSI/AIAA S–061–1998, ‘‘Commercial Launch 

Safety,’’ see Section 4.5. 

4 14 CFR 417.107(a)(1)(ii). 

5 67 FR 49464. 

6 ‘‘A conditional risk management process should 

be implemented to assure that mission rules and 

flight termination criteria do not induce 

unacceptable levels of risk when they are 

implemented.’’ Range Commanders Council Risk 

Committee of the Range Safety Group, Common 

Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, RCC 321–10, 

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, p. 2–7 

(2010). 

Section 404.3(b)(5) Waiver Petition 

Section 404.3(b)(5) requires that a 

petition for waiver be submitted at least 

sixty days before the proposed effective 

date of the waiver, which in this case 

would be the date of the planned 

launch, initially scheduled for 

December 19, 2015. This section also 

provides that a petition may be 

submitted late for good cause. Here, 

SpaceX initially submitted its request 

on December 17, 2015, shortly after 

being apprised by the FAA that a waiver 

would be required. Accordingly, the 

FAA is able to find good cause. 

Section 417.213(a) and (d) Waiver 

Petition 

The exact text of 14 CFR 417.213(a) 

and (d), the regulations at issue, states: 

(a) General. A flight safety analysis 

must identify the location of populated 

or other protected areas, and establish 

flight safety limits that define when a 

flight safety system must terminate a 

launch vehicle’s flight to prevent the 

hazardous effects of the resulting debris 

impacts from reaching any populated or 

other protected area and ensure that the 

launch satisfies the public risk criteria 

of § 417.107(b). 

(d) Designated debris impact limits. 

The analysis must establish designated 

impact limit lines to bound the area 

where debris with a ballistic coefficient 

of three or more is allowed to impact if 

the flight safety system functions 

properly. 

Launch of the Falcon 9 Vehicle 

The FAA waives the requirement of 

§ 417.213(a) that analysis must establish 

flight safety limits that define when a 

flight safety system must terminate a 

launch vehicle’s flight to prevent the 

hazardous effects of the resulting debris 

impacts from reaching any populated or 

other protected area and the associated 

requirement of § 417.213(d) that the 

analysis must establish designated 

impact limit lines to bound the area 

where debris with a ballistic coefficient 

of three or more is allowed to impact if 

the flight safety system functions 

properly because the Falcon 9 launch 

will not jeopardize public health and 

safety or safety of property, a national 

security or foreign policy interest of the 

United States, and is in the public 

interest. 

i. Public Health and Safety and Safety 

of Property 

The Falcon 9 ORBCOMM–2 launch is 

the first launch of an orbital expendable 

launch vehicle with a planned fly back 

of one of its stages to its launch site. 

SpaceX has attempted two landings of 

its Falcon 9 first stage on a barge on the 

ocean off CCAFS. The stages reached 

their intended landing spot, but did not 

survive the landings. In neither case was 

public health or safety or safety of third 

party property jeopardized. The damage 

to SpaceX’s barge was minimal. The 

USAF conducted an assessment of the 

risk to property on CCAFS and has 

determined that the risks are acceptable. 

The FAA requirements in 14 CFR part 

417 have their genesis in USAF Range 

safety requirements. The FAA and 

USAF committed to a partnership 

during the development of today’s 

launch safety regulations with a goal of 

developing common launch safety 

requirements and coordinating on 

requests for relief from the common 

requirements.1 The USAF launch safety 

requirements were documented in EWR 

127–1, which stated the governing 

principle that ‘‘to provide for the public 

safety, the Ranges, using a Range Safety 

Program, shall ensure that the launch 

and flight of launch vehicles and 

payloads present no greater risk to the 

general public than that imposed by the 

over-flight of conventional aircraft.’’ 2 In 

addition, an American National 

Standard endorsed the same governing 

principle: ‘‘during the launch and flight 

phase of commercial space vehicle 

operations, the safety risk for the general 

public should be no more hazardous 

than that caused by other hazardous 

human activities (e.g., general aviation 

over flight).’’ 3

Specifically, the 3 psf ballistic 

coefficient requirement of § 417.213(d) 

was intended to (1) capture the current 

practice of the USAF, (2) provide a clear 

and consistent basis to establish impact 

limit lines to determine if an accident as 

defined by § 401.5 occurred, and (3) 

help prevent a high consequence to the 

public given FSS activation.4 Although 

§ 417.107(c) requires a launch operator’s 

flight safety analysis to account for any 

inert debris impact with a mean 

expected kinetic energy at impact 

greater than or equal to 11 ft-lbs., impact 

kinetic energy was deemed an 

impractical metric for establishing 

impact limit lines because kinetic 

energy at impact can vary significantly 

depending on wind conditions, and 

impact limit lines that vary with wind 

conditions are impractical. Thus, 

ballistic coefficient was deemed a better 

metric than impact kinetic energy to 

establish the debris that needed to be 

accounted for in establishing flight 

safety limits. In adopting the 3 psf 

ballistics coefficient standard, the FAA 

recognized that ballistic coefficient is 

not well correlated with the probability 

of a casualty producing impact.5 There 

are significant probabilities that impacts 

with debris with a ballistic coefficient 

less than 3 psf might produce a casualty 

and that debris impacts with a ballistic 

coefficient greater than 3 psf might not 

produce a casualty. The population 

potentially exposed to an impact (e.g., 

whether in the open or sheltered in 

buildings, or elsewhere), as well as the 

shape and impact orientation of debris, 

in addition to its energy and other 

characteristics, all influence whether or 

not an impact is likely to produce a 

casualty. Hence, the FAA required an 

expected casualty analysis in addition 

to the establishment of impact limit 

lines. In this regard, the 3 psf threshold 

for establishing impact limit lines was 

intended to provide an initial 

assessment of the risk of casualty for 

debris of a specific character, but this 

threshold correlates with public safety 

only in part. 

In assessing the potential public 

safety impacts associated with debris 

outside of the impact limit lines for the 

SpaceX launch, the FAA returned to the 

original intent of the launch safety 

requirements: To ensure that launch 

presents no greater risk to the general 

public than that imposed by the overflight of conventional aircraft. In doing 

so, it applied state-of-the-art techniques 

to examine the conditional Ec (CEC) of 

a failure that could generate debris 

outside of the impact limit lines. The 

use of CEC to establish impact limit 

lines was endorsed by the Range 

Commanders Council in a consensus 

standard in 2010.6 Conditional Ec is 

defined as the expected casualties given 

the occurrence of a vehicle failure 

during flight. The FAA analysis of 30 

years of empirical evidence provided by 

the NTSB shows that a CEC of 0.01 

represents the public safety 

consequence associated with general 

aviation accidents. Further, analysis 

conducted by the FAA and 45SW/SELR 

demonstrates that the consequence of 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
1472 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 7 / Tuesday, January 12, 2016 / Notices 

events that could produce debris 

outside of the impact limit lines for a 

small portion of the ORBCOMM–2 fly 

back operations (where the concern 

exists) is within this threshold, even 

with input data that assume the worst 

case weather conditions. Thus, the FAA 

has determined that this waiver will not 

jeopardize public health and safety or 

the safety of property. 

ii. National Security and Foreign Policy 

Implications 

The USAF conducted an assessment 

of the risk to property on CCAFS, 

including assets used for national 

security space missions, and has 

determined that those risks are 

acceptable. The FAA has identified no 

national security or foreign policy 

implications associated with granting 

this waiver. 

iii. Public Interest 

The waiver is consistent with the 

public interest goals of Chapter 509 and 

the National Space Transportation 

Policy. Three of the public policy goals 

of Chapter 509 are: (1) To promote 

economic growth and entrepreneurial 

activity through use of the space 

environment; (2) to encourage the 

United States private sector to provide 

launch and reentry vehicles and 

associated services; and (3) to facilitate 

the strengthening and expansion of the 

United States space transportation 

infrastructure to support the full range 

of United States space-related activities. 

See 51 U.S.C. 50901(b)(1), (2), (4). 

Commercial Space Transportation 

Licensing Regulations, Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking, 62 FR 13230 

(Mar. 19, 1997). A successful 

demonstration of a stage returning to a 

launch site has the potential for 

reducing launch costs. As it is a major 

procurer of launch services, reduced 

launch costs will be of direct benefit to 

the U.S. Government. It will also help 

to make the U.S. launch industry more 

competitive internationally. The 

National Space Transportation Policy 

clearly identifies how strengthening 

U.S. competitiveness in the 

international launch market and 

improving the cost effectiveness of U.S. 

space transportation services are in the 

public interest: ‘‘Maintaining an assured 

capability to meet United States 

Government needs, while also taking 

the necessary steps to strengthen U.S. 

competitiveness in the international 

commercial launch market, is important 

to ensuring that U.S. space 

transportation capabilities will be 

reliable, robust, safe, and affordable in 

the future. Among other steps, 

improving the cost effectiveness of U.S. 

space transportation services could help 

achieve this goal by allowing the United 

States Government to invest a greater 

share of its resources in other needs 

such as facilities modernization, 

technology advancement, scientific 

discovery, and national security. 

Further, a healthier, more competitive 

U.S. space transportation industry 

would facilitate new markets, encourage 

new industries, create high technology 

jobs, lead to greater economic growth 

and security, and would further the 

Nation’s leadership role in space.’’ 

SpaceX’s proposed demonstration is in 

the public interest. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on December 

18, 2015. 

Kenneth Wong, 

Commercial Space Transportation, Licensing 

and Evaluation Division Manager. 

[FR Doc. 2016–00444 Filed 1–11–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Waiver of Acceptable Risk Restriction 

for Launch 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of waiver. 

SUMMARY: This notice concerns two 

petitions for waiver submitted to the 

FAA by Space Exploration Technologies 

Corp. (SpaceX): (1) A petition to waive 

the requirement that a waiver request be 

submitted at least 60 days before the 

effective date of the waiver unless good 

cause for later submission is shown in 

the petition; and (2) a petition to waive 

the restriction that the risk to the public 

from the launch of an expendable 

launch vehicle not exceed an expected 

average number of 0.00003 casualties 

(Ec ≤ 30 × 10¥6) from debris. 

DATES: This notice is effective January 

12, 2016 and is applicable beginning 

December 18, 2015. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical questions concerning this 

waiver, contact Charles P. Brinkman, 

Licensing Program Lead, Commercial 

Space Transportation—Licensing and 

Evaluation Division, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone: (202) 267–7715; email: 

Phil.Brinkman@faa.gov. For legal 

questions concerning this waiver, 

contact Laura Montgomery, Manager, 

Space Law Branch, AGC–210, Office of 

the Chief Counsel, Regulations Division, 

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 

267–3150; email: Laura.Montgomery@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On November 19, 2015, SpaceX 

submitted a petition, which it revised 

on November 24, 2015, to the Federal 

Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) 

Office of Commercial Space 

Transportation (AST) requesting a 

waiver with respect to a launch license 

for flight of a Falcon 9 launch vehicle 

carrying ORBCOMM–2 satellites. 

SpaceX requested a waiver of 14 CFR 

417.107(b)(1), which prohibits the 

launch of an expendable launch vehicle 

if the total expected average number of 

casualties (Ec) for the launch exceeds 

0.00003 for risk from debris. Because 

the scheduled launch was planned to 

occur in less than sixty days, SpaceX 

also requested a waiver to section 

404.3(b)(5), which requires that a 

petition for waiver be submitted at least 

sixty days before the proposed effective 

date of the waiver, which in this case 

would be the date of the planned 

launch. 

The FAA licenses the launch of a 

launch vehicle and reentry of a reentry 

vehicle under authority granted to the 

Secretary of Transportation in the 

Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 

as amended and re-codified by 51 U.S.C. 

Subtitle V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509), 

and delegated to the FAA Administrator 

and the Associate Administrator for 

Commercial Space Transportation, who 

exercises licensing authority under 

Chapter 509. 

SpaceX is a private commercial space 

flight company. The petition addresses 

an upcoming flight that SpaceX plans to 

undertake to deliver the ORBCOMM–2 

satellites. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 launch 

vehicle will launch from Cape 

Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) 

and its first stage will fly back to CCAFS 

for landing. 

The U.S. Air Force advised SpaceX 

that the preliminary calculation of Ec for 

the launch, including the planned first 

stage fly back, shows the launch would 

exceed the 0.00003 limit imposed by 

section 417.107(b)(1). The 45th Space 

Wing Range Safety calculated the total 

unmitigated Ec for the mission to be 

0.000118 based on daytime populations 

on CCAFS, the worst-case December 

weather within the 45th Space Wing 

Range Safety data files, and 0.9665 

reliability assigned to the flight 

computer with autonomous engine 

shutdown algorithms. The reliability of 

the human-activated flight termination 

system is 0.999. With mitigation, 

namely, the evacuation of all nonVerDate Sep<11>2014 20:14 Jan 11, 2016 Jkt 238001 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\12JAN1.SGM 12JAN1

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