alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
32.1




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I,
Robert T. DeVincenzi, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:




(i)           the
Annual Report of LaserCard Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the
period ended March 31, 2009 (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements
of section 13(a) or 15(d), whichever is applicable, of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended, and




(ii)          the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
June 15, 2009


/s/Robert
      T. DeVincenziRobert
      T. DeVincenziChief
      Executive Officer(Principal
      Executive
Officer)
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MAY 31, 2019

NO. 03-18-00434-CV

Wichita County, Texas, Appellant

v.

Environmental Engineering & Geotechnics, Inc., Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES GOODWIN, BAKER, TRIANA

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; 

REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART --

OPINION BY JUSTICE TRIANA;

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the order signed by the district court on June 21, 2018. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was reversible error in the 

court’s order. Therefore, this Court: affirms the portion of the district court’s order directing 

Wichita County to pay Environmental Engineering & Geotechnics, Inc.’s (EEG’s) scanning 

expense totaling $3,711.39; reverses the portion of the district court’s order directing the County 

to pay EEG $92.50 and renders judgment that EEG take nothing for the block-billed time spent 

prior to April 25, 2018; and reverses the remaining portion of the district court’s order directing 

the County to pay EEG $7,480.00 for the executives’ block-billed time. We remand this cause 
for further proceedings consistent with this Court’s opinion. Appellee shall pay all costs relating 

to this appeal, both in this Court and in the court below.
# C_2017283EN.01005502.xml

| 28.8.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 283/55 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.8.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 283/55

---

Order of the General Court of 10 July 2017 — Meta Group v Commission

(Joined Cases T-34/13 and T-35/13) (1)

1

(2017/C 283/86)

Language of the case: Italian

The President of the Sixth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 79, 16.3.2013.

1

---
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-30643

Summary Calendar

_____________________

JOHNNY CHATMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(97-CV-1715)

_________________________________________________________________

March 3, 1999

Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In contesting the denial of supplemental and disability

income, Johnny Chatman maintains that the Administrative Law Judge

did not compare his residual capacity with the physical and mental

demands of his past relevant work and did not make specific

findings regarding his residual functional capacity; challenges the

ALJ’s determination that his testimony regarding his ability to

return to such past work was not credible; asserts that the ALJ’s

determination was not supported by substantial evidence; and

contends that the ALJ erred by failing to act on his request for a

consultative psychological examination at government expense.
Chatman failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

regarding the psychological examination because he did not raise

his contention before the Appeals Council in his request for review

of the ALJ’s decision; therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review

that issue. E.g., Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir.

1994); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(b), 416.1400(b).

For the remaining issues, we cannot disturb the Commissioner’s

determinations unless substantial evidence does not exist in the

record to support them, or an error of law was made. Leggett v.

Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). Pursuant to our review

of the record, we find no reversible error. 

AFFIRMED
Fourth Amendment to Vendor Agreement



 Exhibit 10.0 
  

			
		
	 Exhibit 10.0
 as filed with
 10-Q
	  	Confidential treatment has been requested for portions of this exhibit. The copy filed herewith omits the information subject to the confidentiality request. Omissions are designated as
[*]. A complete version of this exhibit has been filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

  
 FOURTH AMENDMENT TO VENDOR AGREEMENT 
  
 This FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE VENDOR
AGREEMENT (this “Fourth Amendment”) is effective as of July 1, 2004 (the “Fourth Amendment Effective Date”) by and between BEST BUY PURCHASING
LLC and TIVO INC. 
  
 RECITALS 
  
 WHEREAS, Best Buy Co., Inc. and TiVo Inc. entered into that certain Vendor Agreement having an effective date of March 3, 2002, as amended (the “Vendor Agreement”); and 
  
 WHEREAS, Best Buy Purchasing LLC and
TiVo Inc. wish to modify certain provisions in the Vendor Agreement as explicitly set forth in this Fourth Amendment. 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, Best Buy Purchasing LLC and TiVo Inc. agree as follows: 
  
 AGREEMENT 
  
 Unless stated otherwise, capitalized terms used herein shall have the
meanings set forth in the Vendor Agreement. 
  
 1. ADDITIONAL
DVR PRODUCTS. TiVo agrees that the [*] shall be subject to the Section 1.3 of the Vendor Program Agreement attached to the Vendor Agreement. 
  

2. EFFECT OF AMENDMENT. Except as expressly modified herein, all other terms and conditions of the Vendor Agreement
shall remain in full force and effect. 
  
 IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, Best Buy Purchasing LLC’s and TiVo Inc.’s respective duly authorized officers have executed this Fourth Amendment. This Fourth Amendment may be executed in counterparts,
each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same original. 
  

							
	TIVO INC.	 	BEST BUY PURCHASING LLC
				
	 By:
	 	 /s/ Joe Miller

	 	 By:
	 	 /s/ Ron Boire


	 Printed Name:
	 	 Joe Miller
	 	 Printed Name:
	 	 Ron Boire

	 Title:
	 	 VP, Sales
	 	 Title:
	 	 Executive Vice President, OMM




	[*]	Certain information on this page has been omitted and filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Confidential treatment has been requested with respect to the
omitted portions.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-4688

_____________________________

MV SENIOR MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Appellant,

v.

REDUS FLORIDA HOUSING, LLC, 

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Adrian G. Soud, Judge.

March 20, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Upon review of the record and Appellant’s response to our 

order to show cause on jurisdiction, we find that the claim 

remaining pending below is interrelated with the claim on 

appeal, depriving us of jurisdiction. The order on appeal disposes 

of only count one of Appellee’s two-count third-party complaint 

against Appellant. Count one seeks contractual and common-law 

indemnity. Count two, still pending below and stayed pending 

this appeal, alleges breach of contract for Appellant’s failure to 

obtain insurance and indemnify Appellee. Both counts relate to 

the same underlying tort claim against Appellee, and both counts 

arise out of the same management agreement between the two 

parties to this appeal. This is a classic case of a piecemeal appeal. 

See S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99-100 (Fla. 
2

1974) (holding that piecemeal review is disfavored and the lower 

tribunal should rule on all interrelated claims to avoid the 

potential need for successive appeals).

This appeal does not fall within the scope of Florida Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 9.110(k), allowing immediate appeals of 

certain partial final judgments. That rule requires that the cause 

of action disposed of in the order appealed not be “interdependent 

with other pleaded claims,” and that is not the case here. Id.; see 

also Fla. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. v. Peacock’s Excavating 

Serv., Inc., 186 So. 3d 6, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (dismissing 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction where claim still pending below 

involved same facts and contracts as the order appealed).

DISMISSED.

ROWE, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

R. Daniel Noey and Wesley D. Fina of Schutt, Schmidt & Noey, 

Jacksonville, for Appellant.

W. Douglas Childs and Brian M. Pederson of Childs, Hester & 

Love, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee Redus Florida Housing, 

LLC.
#### In the Matter of Robert E. McKee et al., Petitioners, v Commissioner of Taxation and Finance et al., Respondents.

[768 NYS2d 677]

*1078Kane, J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to Tax Law § 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal which sustained an assessment of personal income tax imposed under Tax Law article 22.

The Department of Taxation and Finance (hereinafter Department) issued petitioners a notice and demand for payment of tax covering their 1995 personal income tax, interest and penalties. Petitioners claimed they sent a check with their tax return. The Department advised petitioners to submit documentation demonstrating that payment was made. Petitioners submitted a photocopy of the front of one check, but the back of another check. Petitioners eventually informed the Department that the original check could not be located by either petitioners or their bank, and supplied a copy of the front of the check previously submitted with the back of a different check. The Department and its bank could not determine if the front and back were from the same check because certain numbers were illegible. The Department then requested a legible copy of the check and a copy of petitioners’ bank statement showing that their account was debited for that check, neither of which was ever produced. After a hearing before the Division of Tax Appeals, an Administrative Law Judge sustained the Department’s notice and demand. Respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal affirmed that determination.

We confirm the Tribunal’s determination because it is supported by substantial evidence *(see Matter of Menik v Roth,*280 AD2d 702, 703 [2001]; *Matter of Hopper v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin.,*224 AD2d 733, 737 [1996], *lv denied*88 NY2d 808 [1996]). The Department’s deficiency notice is presumed correct, with the burden on petitioners to prove the notice erroneous by clear and convincing evidence *(see Matter of Suburban Restoration Co. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y.,*299 AD2d 751, 752 [2002]; *Matter of Carpenter Tech. Corp. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin.,*295 AD2d 830, 832 [2002]). Petitioners failed to meet this burden. The Department’s files and computer records showed no payment had been made, petitioners were unable to produce the original check allegedly used to make the payment, copies of the front and back of the alleged payment check were not identified as belonging to the same check, petitioners did not submit a bank statement listing the payment amount debited from their account, and petitioners’ bank stated that the check that petitioners claim was used to *1079make payment “was never received by the bank for encashment.” Thus, the presumption of correctness applies and the Tribunal’s determination will not be disturbed.

Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-19-00051-CR

Robert Allen Boyden Jr.

v.

The State of Texas

On Appeal from the

156th District Court of Bee County, Texas

Trial Cause No. B-18-2112-0-CR-B

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

May 9, 2019
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          71,123
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,612
<ALLOWANCES>                                       224
<INVENTORY>                                      1,624
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                82,492
<PP&E>                                           3,560
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,236
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  85,294
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,894
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             9
<OTHER-SE>                                      81,391
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    85,294
<SALES>                                         10,054
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                10,054
<CGS>                                            2,163
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,966
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    17
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    19
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,055
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,222
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,833
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,833
<EPS-BASIC>                                      .21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .19


</TABLE>
No. 10-6161.

#### Monte C. Hoisington, Petitioner v. Robin Williams.

562 U.S. 1011, 131 S. Ct. 521,

178 L. Ed. 2d 384,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8561.

November 1, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
# C_2014142EN.01005504.xml

| 12.5.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 142/55 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.5.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 142/55

---

Order of the General Court of 19 March 2014 — Stichting Sona and Nao v Commission

(Case T-505/13) (1)

1

2014/C 142/74

Language of the case: Dutch

The President of the Seventh Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 344, 23.11.2013.

1

---
From: Baldyga, Lyndsey [LBaldyga@tecoenergy.com]

Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 1:58 PM

To: Hofmeister, Art

Cc: Lukcic, David M.; Burrows, Byron T.

Subject: Duct Burner Efficiency 

Art, 

Please see the below for the requested information during our call yesterday. Please let us know if you 

have questions or need any additional information regarding this permit.

Thank you,

Lyndsey Figler (Baldyga)

TEC is required to provide a Ten-Year Site Plan (TYSP) to the Florida Public Service Commission 

every year showing how we will meet our projected load growth. Development of the TYSP uses 

an Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) approach to evaluate demand-side and supply-side 

resources on a fair and consistent basis to determine the most cost-effective and reliable 

expansion plan for our system. 

During the planning cycle that determined that the Polk 2 Combined Cycle Project was the most 

cost-effective option for our customers, we evaluated the project both with and without duct 

burners. In the scenario where duct burners were not included, the next most cost-effective 

expansion plan required installation of an additional simple cycle combustion turbine 

(7FA)(rather than any other type of generation) to meet future load growth. As can be seen 

from the table below the efficiency of this technology is more than 20% worse than including 

duct burners in the Polk 2 Combined Cycle Project design.

Technology Heat Rate (Btu/kWh)*

Peaking Unit 10,800

Duct Burners** 8,800

*10% margin is included

**The heat rate for the duct burners is incremental

The Florida Public Service Commission found that this project is the most cost effective and 

reliable alternative to meet future power needs. Other potential options discussed during our 

recent call, battery storage, solar hybrid, or a combination are not commercially viable to meet 

the requirements of our customers and would redefine the source. Therefore, these 

technologies are excluded from BACT in Step 1 of the process.

NOTICE: This email is intended only for the individual(s) to whom it is addressed and may contain confidential information. If you have 

received this email by mistake, please notify the sender immediately, delete this email from your system and do not copy or disclose it to 

anyone else. Although we take precautions to protect against viruses, we advise you to take your own precautions to protect against viruses 

as we accept no liability for any which remain.
1 The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chie f Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-2602

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Mucio Montesinos-Montiel, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 24, 2006 Filed: April 27, 2006

___________ Before RILEY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. With a certificate of appealability granted by the district court, 1 Mucio Montesinos-Montiel appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We affirm for the reasons stated by the district c ourt in its thorough and well-reasoned opinion. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 123 (Friday, June 26, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 34927]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-17259]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

[USITC SE-98-011]


Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: United States International Trade 
Commission.

TIME AND DATE: July 10, 1998 at 11:00 a.m.

PLACE: Room 101, 500 E Street S.W. Washington, DC 20436.

STATUS: Open to the public.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:
    1. Agenda for future meeting: none.
    2. Minutes.
    3. Ratification List.
    4. Inv. Nos. 751-TA-17-20 (Titanium Sponge from Japan, Kazakstan, 
Russia, and Ukraine)--briefing and vote.
    5. Outstanding action jackets: none.
    In accordance with Commission policy, subject matter listed above, 
not disposed of at the scheduled meeting, may be carried over to the 
agenda of the following meeting.

    Issued: June 22, 1998.

    By order of the Commission.
Donna R. Koehnke,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 98-17259 Filed 6-24-98; 12:57 pm]
BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

DAVID MEDNANSKY, individually and

MARTINE MEDNANSKY, individually.

 Defendants - Appellants.

No. 13-55662

D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01307-MMABGS

ORDER

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

The memorandum disposition filed on September 4, 2015, 2015 WL

5167842, is amended as follows:

On page 2, line 13, the text <83.3(g)(1)> is deleted and replaced with

<83.3(f)(1)>.

The panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing.

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no

judge of the court has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc.

Fed. R. App. P. 35. Appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc is denied.

No further petitions shall be entertained. 

FILED

NOV 10 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SACRAMENTO METROPOLITAN
AIR QUALITY LarryGreene MANAGEM~NT DISTRICT AIR POLLUTION CONTROL OFFICER November 13, 2015 Gerardo Rios Chief, Permits Office ~~g’% ~, 

## 2015 U.S. EPA, Region IX, Mail Stop AIR-3 75 Hawthorne Street San Francisco, CA 941 05-3901 Subject: Comments on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) proposed limited approval and limited disapproval of Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) Regulation 2, Rule 2, Permits, New Source Review (Docket ID EPA-R09-OAR-2015-0280) DearMr. Rios: On August 28, 2015, the EPA proposed State Implementation Plan limited approval and limited disapproval of BayAreaAir Quality Management District (BAAQMD) Regulation 2, Rule 2, New Source Review (NSR rule)1. I am writing to correct BAAQMD statements regarding Sacramento Metropolitan AirQuality Management District (SMAQMD) New Source Review rule discussed in the technical support documentfor EPA’s proposed rulemaking revisions2. BAAQMD sent a letterto EPA3, erroneouslystating that EPA Region IX is “changing its position” regarding what is requiredforapproval ofdistricts NSR programs and erroneouslystating that“in many cases” SMAQMD rules allow potential to emit (PTE) to be utilized in the offset calculation procedureformajor modifications instead ofactual emissions4. SMAQMD Rule 214, Federal New Source Reviewwas approved by EPA5 and while itdoes allow major modifications to use potential to emit instead of actual emissions in offset calculations, it does so only in very limited circumstances. EPAaccurately concluded thatthese limitations are reasonable restrictions. In fact, no sources have utilized the limited calculation procedure since Rule 214was adopted five years ago. Sincerely,
Larry Greene Executive Director/Air Pollution Control Officer Sacramento Metropolitan AirQuality Management District

1 80 FR 52236, August28, 2015. 2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9. Technical Support Document, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Revisionstothe California State Implementation Plan BayArea AirQuality Management District, August, 19. 2015, pp. 117-120.

~ Brian C. Bunger, Esq., letterto Nancy Marvel, Esq. (EPA Region 9), July31, 2012.

~ Ibid, p. 1 and p.2.

~ 78 FR 53270, August29, 2013. 777 12th Street, 3rd Floor I Sacramento, CA95814-1908

916/874-4800 I 916/874-4899fax www.airquality.org