# C_2013086EN.01002202.xml

| 23.3.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 86/22 |
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Appeal brought on 24 January 2013 by Mario Paulo da Silva Tenreiro against the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of 14 November 2012 in Case F-120/11 da Silva Tenreiro v Commission

(Case T-32/13 P)

2013/C 86/36

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Mario Paulo da Silva Tenreiro (Kraainem, Belgium) (represented by S. Orlandi, J.-N. Louis and D. Abreu Caldas, lawyers)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought by the appellant

| — | Order
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that the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal delivered on 14 November 2012 (Case F-120/11 da Silva Tenreiro v Commission) dismissing the action brought by the applicant is annulled; | — | that the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal delivered on 14 November 2012 (Case F-120/11 da Silva Tenreiro v Commission) dismissing the action brought by the applicant is annulled; |
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| — | that the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal delivered on 14 November 2012 (Case F-120/11 da Silva Tenreiro v Commission) dismissing the action brought by the applicant is annulled; | | |

| — | giving judgment itself, |
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| — | order
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that the decision of the European Commission rejecting the applicant’s application for the vacant post of Director of Directorate A ‘Civil Justice’ in Directorate General (DG) ‘Justice’ and the decision nominating Ms Y to that post are annulled; | — | that the decision of the European Commission rejecting the applicant’s application for the vacant post of Director of Directorate A ‘Civil Justice’ in Directorate General (DG) ‘Justice’ and the decision nominating Ms Y to that post are annulled; |
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| — | that the decision of the European Commission rejecting the applicant’s application for the vacant post of Director of Directorate A ‘Civil Justice’ in Directorate General (DG) ‘Justice’ and the decision nominating Ms Y to that post are annulled; | | |

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs at both instances. |
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Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging distortion of the facts:
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firstly, in that the CST considered that the term ‘background’ used in the vacancy notice in the contested procedure referred to experience and not to training. The appellant submits that it is apparent in particular from the vacancy notices published by the Commission that when professional experience is required, the term ‘experience’ is used rather than ‘background’; —
secondly, in that the CST considered that the term ‘regulation’ did not refer to regulatory mechanisms but to the legislative process. | — | firstly, in that the CST considered that the term ‘background’ used in the vacancy notice in the contested procedure referred to experience and not to training. The appellant submits that it is apparent in particular from the vacancy notices published by the Commission that when professional experience is required, the term ‘experience’ is used rather than ‘background’; | — | secondly, in that the CST considered that the term ‘regulation’ did not refer to regulatory mechanisms but to the legislative process. |
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| — | firstly, in that the CST considered that the term ‘background’ used in the vacancy notice in the contested procedure referred to experience and not to training. The appellant submits that it is apparent in particular from the vacancy notices published by the Commission that when professional experience is required, the term ‘experience’ is used rather than ‘background’; | | | | |
| — | secondly, in that the CST considered that the term ‘regulation’ did not refer to regulatory mechanisms but to the legislative process. | | | | |

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging errors of law, the CST having examined the indications of misuse of power in an isolated rather than global manner, without seeking to establish whether the indications taken together, given their number, made it possible to call into question the lawfulness of the decisions contested at first instance.
In addition, the appellant argues that the CST disregarded, in the light of the inequality of arms of the parties, the right to a fair hearing by refusing to adopt measures of organisation of the procedure enabling the indications of misuse of power to be emphasised and evidence to be adduced of a factor which could have been demonstrated only by such a measure. |
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