Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

Order 

December 9, 2016

153422

YUAN LEI, by BRIAN GOETZ, 

as Next Friend,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 153422

COA: 325168

Washtenaw CC: 13-000436-NI

PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

DONNA McBRIDE, STATE FARM

MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

COMPANY, CITIZENS INSURANCE

COMPANY OF AMERICA, and HOME- OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 16, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). 

Plaintiff was struck by an uninsured motorist while crossing a street. At the time 

of the accident, plaintiff lived part of the time with her stepgrandmother, Merilyn Goetz, 

who was insured by defendant. The issue here is whether plaintiff is Merilyn’s “relative” 

under this coverage. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition 

and subsequently entered a consent judgment in favor of plaintiff that allowed defendant 

to file an appeal. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff 

was not Merilyn’s relative under the policy. 

The pertinent policy defines “relative” as “a person residing in the same household 

as you, and related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, and includes a ward, 

stepchild, or foster child.” Plaintiff argues, and the trial court held, that plaintiff is 

Merilyn’s relative because she is related to Merilyn “by marriage.” The Court of Appeals 

disagreed, holding that because the phrase “and includes a . . . stepchild” provides that 

stepchildren are relatives in addition to persons related to the insured by marriage, this 

necessarily signifies that the phrase “related to you by . . . marriage” does not include 

step-relationships. According to the Court of Appeals, if the phrase “related to you by 
2

. . . marriage” is interpreted to include step-relationships, the phrase “and includes a . . . 

stepchild” would be rendered surplusage. The Court of Appeals dissent on the other hand 

concluded that the phrase “and includes a ward, stepchild, or foster child” is not meant to 

be limiting, but rather illustrative and expansive so as to communicate the broad meaning 

of the word “related.” According to the dissent, the phrase “related to you by . . . 

marriage” must mean more than just the named insured’s spouse because otherwise it 

would render the phrase mere surplusage given that the policy defines the word “you” to 

include the named insured’s spouse.

Both sides, in my view, raise good arguments. On the one hand, if the phrase 

“related to you by . . . marriage” includes step-relationships, why does the policy proceed 

to state “and includes a . . . stepchild”? On the other hand, if the phrase “related to you 

by . . . marriage” does not include step-relationships, what does it include? The Court of 

Appeals held that it includes the named insured’s spouse. However, as the dissenting 

judge pointed out, a spouse is already covered under the definition of “you.” It seems 

that no matter how the contract is interpreted, one of the two phrases is rendered 

surplusage. 

The dissenting judge concluded that the best way to interpret the contract is to 

conclude that the phrase “related to you by . . . marriage” includes step-relationships and 

the phrase “and includes a . . . stepchild” is simply illustrative. Defendant argues that this 

cannot be correct because neither a ward nor a foster child is necessarily “related to you 

by blood, marriage, or adoption.” Therefore, we would have to conclude that the phrase 

“and includes a ward, stepchild, or foster child” is intended to expand coverage with 

regards to a ward or a foster child, but is only intended to be illustrative with regards to a 

stepchild. Perhaps that is appropriate though because a ward or a foster child could be 

“related to you by . . . marriage” and in that case the phrase would be illustrative rather 

than expansive. In other words, it might simply be the case that the parties to the contract 

intended the phrase to be both illustrative and expansive depending on the circumstances.

Because I believe that the dissent sets forth a reasonably persuasive harmonizing 

analysis of the policy language and because “when parties have freely established their 

mutual rights and obligations through the formation of unambiguous contracts, the law

requires this Court to enforce the terms and conditions contained in such contracts, if the 
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 9, 2016

a1209

3

Clerk

contract is not ‘contrary to public policy,’ ” Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass’n v 

Birmingham, 479 Mich 206, 213 (2007) (citation omitted), I would grant leave to appeal 

to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the instant policy.

BERNSTEIN, J., joins the statement of MARKMAN, J.