alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
financial statements listed on pages 17 and 18 of this Form 10-K and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001060513
<NAME> PARAGON CORPORATE HOLDINGS INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           7,462
<SECURITIES>                                    21,534
<RECEIVABLES>                                   42,077
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,498
<INVENTORY>                                     48,094
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               120,127
<PP&E>                                          22,995
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,295
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 175,409
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           57,358
<BONDS>                                        115,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          1
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     (5,120)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   175,409
<SALES>                                        268,624
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               268,624
<CGS>                                          163,958
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  163,958
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,128
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              11,311
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    142
<INCOME-TAX>                                       745
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (603)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (1,280)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,883)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2678 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for the tolling of the 

statute of limitations with regard to certain offenses committed by the 

President of the United States during or prior to tenure in office, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 10, 2019 

Mr. NADLER (for himself, Mr. SWALWELL of California, and Mr. DEUTCH) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the 

Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for the 

tolling of the statute of limitations with regard to certain 

offenses committed by the President of the United States 

during or prior to tenure in office, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No President is Above 

5 the Law Act’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2678 IH

1 SEC. 2. TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 

2 (a) OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THE PRESIDENT

3 DURING OR PRIOR TO TENURE IN OFFICE.—Section 3282 

4 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at 

5 the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(c) OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THE PRESIDENT

7 DURING OR PRIOR TO TENURE IN OFFICE.—In the case 

8 of any person serving as President of the United States, 

9 the duration of that person’s tenure in office shall not be 

10 considered for purposes of any statute of limitations appli11 cable to any Federal criminal offense committed by that 

12 person (including any offenses committed during any pe13 riod of time preceding such tenure in office).’’. 

14 (b) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by sub15 section (a) shall apply to any offense committed before the 

16 date of the enactment of this section, if the statute of limi17 tations applicable to that offense had not run as of such 

18 date. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 33-60966 on Form S-3, Post Effective Amendment No. 3 toRegistration Statement No. 33-29147 on Form S-8, Registration Statement Nos. 33-66488 and 33-72582 on Form S-8, Post Effective Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement Nos. 33-46773 and 33-87974 on Form S-8, Amendment No. 1 to RegistrationStatement No. 333-32433 on Form S-4, Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement Nos. 333-80377 and 333-80377-1 on Form S-3, Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement Nos. 333-85612 and 333-85612-01 on Form S-3, and Registration Statement No.333-102812 on Form S-8 of our report dated March 5, 2004, March 24, 2005 as to Note 21, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule of Duquesne Light Holdings, Inc., (which report expresses an unqualifiedopinion and includes explanatory paragraphs relating to a change in accounting for goodwill and other intangible assets and the restatement discussed in Note 21), appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Duquesne Light Holdings, Inc. forthe year ended December 31, 2003. 

 

/s/Deloitte & Touche LLP

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 

March 24, 2005
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 21.1

Duquesne Light has the following significant subsidiaries:

DQE Energy Limited, a Cayman Islands corporation
DQE Energy Two Limited, a Cayman Islands corporation
Duquesne Financial, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company
Monticello Corporation, a Delaware corporation (wholly owned by DQE Energy Two)
Duquesne Financial, L.P., a Pennsylvania partnership (Duquesne Light is 99%
     limited partner, Duquesne Financial, L.L.C., is 1% general partner)
DQU II Funding Corporation, a Delaware corporation (wholly owned by Duquesne
     Financial, L.P.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

RULE 13a-14(b) OF

THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

In connection with the quarterly report on Form
10-Q, (the Report), of SunCom Wireless, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as of the date hereof, I, Michael E. Kalogris, Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as appropriate, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



| |  |                                |  | 
| |  | ------------------------------ |  | 
| |  | /s/ Michael E. Kalogris        |  | 
| |  | Name: Michael E. Kalogris      |  | 
| |  | Title: Chief Executive Officer |  | 
| |  | Date: May 14, 2007             |  | 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Report,
is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made
before or after the date of the Report, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing).
#### Momcilo Pajovic et al., Appellants, v 94-06 34th Road Realty Co., LLC, Respondent.

[59 NYS3d 138]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Livote, J.), entered August 10, 2016, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The plaintiff Momcilo Pajovic (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly was injured when he fell down an interior staircase in an apartment building owned by the defendant. The injured plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging that the defendant was negligent in, among other things, failing to provide adequate lighting for the subject staircase. The defendant thereafter moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion.

The defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the ground that the plaintiffs could not identify the cause of the injured plaintiff’s fall. “[T]hat a defective or dangerous condition was the proximate cause of an accident can be established in the absence of direct evidence of causation and may be inferred from the facts and *782circumstances underlying the injury” *(Buglione v Spagnoletti,*123 AD3d 867, 867 [2014]; *see Schneider v Kings Hwy. Hosp. Ctr.,*67 NY2d 743, 744-745 [1986]). Here, the defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the alleged inadequate lighting condition for the subject staircase was a proximate cause of the injured plaintiffs fall *(see Lopez-Serrano v Ochoa,*149 AD3d 1063 [2017]; *Pol v Gjonbalaj,*125 AD3d 955, 956 [2015]). Such a finding, given the eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the fall and the injured plaintiff’s own statement just before the fall, warning his companions to “watch out, it is dark, you cannot see,” would be based on logical inferences, not speculation *(see Buglione v Spagnoletti,*123 AD3d 867 [2014]).

Since the defendant failed to meet its initial burden, the Supreme Court should have denied its motion without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ opposition papers *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851 [1985]).

Eng, P.J., Leventhal, Sgroi and Maltese, JJ., concur.
No. 10-6957.

#### Gary Devell Hodge, Petitioner v. California.

562 U.S. 1113, 131 S. Ct. 830,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9637.

178 L. Ed. 2d 565,

December 13, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, denied.
No. 10-7302.

#### Ramon De La Cruz-Alejo, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1095, 131 S. Ct. 805,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9575.

178 L. Ed. 2d 538,

December 6, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 384 Fed. Appx. 915.
No. 10-7258.

#### Pascal C. Bolomet, et ux., Petitioners v. RLI Insurance Company, et al.

562 U.S. 1133, 131 S. Ct. 976,

178 L. Ed. 2d 745,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 352.

January 10, 2011.

Motion of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioners are allowed until January 31, 2011, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
No. 10-125.

#### National Urological Group, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Federal Trade Commission.

562 U.S. 1003, 131 S. Ct. 505,

178 L. Ed. 2d 370,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8554.

November 1, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

*371Same case below, 356 Fed. Appx. 358.
No. 10-6796.

#### Marion Wilson, Petitioner v. William Terry, Warden.

562 U.S. 1093, 131 S. Ct. 799,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9493.

178 L. Ed. 2d 534,

December 6, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Superior Court of Georgia, Butts County, denied.
No. 10-6400.

#### Prentis W. Wilson, Petitioner v. Mary Berghuis, Warden.

562 U.S. 1014, 131 S. Ct. 531,

178 L. Ed. 2d 390,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8514.

November 1, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.2

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. SECTION 10A,
                   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

    I, Frederic B. Bassett, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K/A (Amendment No. 1 to the
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004) of EDO
Corporation (the "Registrant");

     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect this amended report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

Date:  July 29, 2005
                                       /s/Frederic B. Bassett
                              --------------------------------------------------
                                          Frederic B. Bassett
                                          Vice President -- Finance, Treasurer
                                          and Chief Financial Officer
#### Odunayo Olopade, Appellant, v Muhammad S. Khan, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

[59 NYS3d 802]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ottley, J.), dated March 2, 2016, which granted the motion of the defendant Muhammad S. Khan for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Muhammad S. Khan for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him is denied.

According to the plaintiffs deposition testimony, on September 14, 2013, the plaintiff and her daughter had gone shopping and stopped a livery cab on the street to take them back to their apartment in Brooklyn. After they arrived at their apartment building and paid the driver the agreed-upon fare, the plaintiff, while standing outside the front passenger side of the cab, attempted to retrieve change from the driver. The driver allegedly sped off while the plaintiff’s hand was caught in the door handle, which caused her to be dragged on the street for approximately four to five car lengths, until she was freed from the cab and fell to the ground. While she was still in the area where she fell, the driver returned to the scene, threw a dollar bill out the window of the cab, and drove away. At that time, the plaintiff observed and noted the license plate number of the cab.

The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendant Muhammad S. Khan (hereinafter the defendant), who, based on the license plate number recorded by the plaintiff, was identified as the owner of the vehicle allegedly involved in the incident. After depositions were completed, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, arguing that neither he nor his vehicle was involved in the incident. The Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiff appeals.

The evidence submitted by the defendant in support of his motion, which included his own affidavit, photographs, and his deposition testimony, as well as the deposition testimony of the *849plaintiff and her daughter, was insufficient to establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The evidence presented factual issues as to whether the defendant and his vehicle were involved in the alleged incident *(see Bykov v Brody,*150 AD3d 808 [2017]; *Ferrer v Stofsky,*204 AD2d 386, 386-387 [1994]). In light of the defendant’s failure to meet his prima facie burden, we need not consider the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposition papers *(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; *Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Dillon, J.P., Roman, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
# C_2013313EN.01001001.xml

| 26.10.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 313/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.10.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 313/10

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Handelsgericht Wien (Austria) lodged on 5 August 2013 — Pez Hejduk v EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH

(Case C-441/13)

2013/C 313/18

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Handelsgericht Wien

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Pez Hejduk

Applicant:

Defendant: EnergieAgentur.NRW GmbH

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

Is Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1) to be interpreted as meaning that, in a dispute concerning an infringement of rights related to copyright which is alleged to have been committed in that a photograph was kept accessible on a website, the website being operated under the top-level domain of a Member State other than that in which the proprietor of the right is domiciled, there is jurisdiction only

1

| — | in the Member State in which the alleged infringer is established; and |
| --- | --- |

—

in the Member State in which the alleged infringer is established; and

| — | in the Member State(s) to which the website, according to its content, is directed? |
| --- | --- |

—

in the Member State(s) to which the website, according to its content, is directed?

---

(1)  OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1.

1

---
2017-0384.

#### State v. Hendrix.

Hamilton App. No. C-160887. On appellant’s application for dismissal. Application granted. Cause dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5 
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                              AUG-02-1997
<CASH>                                     12,858,000
<SECURITIES>                                9,661,000         
<RECEIVABLES>                              11,660,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                  884,000
<INVENTORY>                                67,755,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                          105,039,000 
<PP&E>                                    269,944,000
<DEPRECIATION>                            157,558,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                            249,795,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      89,431,000
<BONDS>                                   100,000,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                      115,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 29,965,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>              249,795,000
<SALES>                                   485,320,000 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                          485,320,000
<CGS>                                     360,669,000         
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             360,669,000 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          5,905,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             3,166,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         3,166,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0 
<NET-INCOME>                                3,166,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0.29
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0.27
        




</TABLE>
# C_2015026EN.01003101.xml

| 26.1.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 26/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.1.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 26/31

---

Order of the General Court of 10 November 2014 — Theophilou v Commission and ECB

(Case T-293/13) (1)

1

((Action for annulment and compensation - Stability support programme for Cyprus - Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality concluded between the Republic of Cyprus and the ESM - Jurisdiction of the General Court - Causal link - Action in part inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law))

(2015/C 026/38)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicants: Christos Theophilou (Nicosia, Cyprus); and Eleni Theophilou (Nicosia, Cyprus) (represented by: C. Paschalides, Solicitor, and A. Paschalides, lawyer)

Applicants:

Defendants: European Commission (represented by: B. Smulders and J.-P. Keppenne, Agents); and European Central Bank (ECB) (represented by: A. Sáinz de Vicuña Barroso, N. Lenihan and F. Athanasiou, Agents, and by W. Bussian, W. Devroe and D. Arts, lawyers)

Defendants:

Re:

Re:

First, application for annulment of paragraphs 1.23 to 1.27 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality concluded between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) on 26 April 2013, and, second, for compensation for damage allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of the inclusion of paragraphs 1.23 to 1.27 in the Memorandum of Understanding and an infringement of the Commission’s supervisory obligation.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | Mr Christos Theophilou and Ms Eleni Theophilou shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission and by the European Central Bank (ECB). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mr Christos Theophilou and Ms Eleni Theophilou shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission and by the European Central Bank (ECB).

---

(1)  OJ C 226, 3.8.2013.

1

---