I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2707 

To limit funding for any extension of the New START Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement includes the People’s Republic 

of China and covers all strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of 

the Russian Federation. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 14, 2019 

Ms. CHENEY (for herself, Mr. BANKS, Mr. WALTZ, Mr. DESJARLAIS, Mr. 

LAMBORN, and Mr. TURNER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by 

the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To limit funding for any extension of the New START 

Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement 

includes the People’s Republic of China and covers all 

strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian 

Federation. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘New START Treaty 

5 Improvement Act of 2019’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) The United States and the Russian Federa4 tion signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Trea5 ty (the ‘‘New START Treaty’’) on April 8, 2010. 

6 (2) The United States Senate advised and con7 sented to the the treaty on December 22, 2010, by 

8 a vote of 71-26. 

9 (3) The Senate resolution advising and con10 senting to the ratification of the New START Trea11 ty states that ‘‘prior to the entry into force of the 

12 New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 

13 the Senate that. . .the United States will seek to 

14 initiate. . .not later than one year after the entry 

15 into force of the New START Treaty, negotiations 

16 with the Russian Federation on an agreement to ad17 dress the disparity between the non-strategic (tac18 tical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian 

19 Federation and of the United States’’. 

20 (4) The New START Treaty is due to expire in 

21 February 2021. 

22 (5) The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states— 

23 (A) ‘‘While the United States has contin24 ued to reduce the number and salience of nu25 clear weapons, others, including Russia and 

26 China, have moved in the opposite direction. 


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•HR 2707 IH

1 Russia has expanded and improved its strategic 

2 and non-strategic nuclear forces. China’s mili3 tary modernization has resulted in an expanded 

4 nuclear force, with little to no transparency into 

5 its intentions.’’; 

6 (B) ‘‘Russia is developing and deploying 

7 new nuclear warheads and launchers. These ef8 forts include multiple upgrades for every leg of 

9 the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers, 

10 sea-based missiles, and landbased missiles. Rus11 sia is also developing at least two new inter12 continental range systems, a hypersonic glide 

13 vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear14 armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous 

15 torpedo.’’; 

16 (C) ‘‘[Russia] is also building a large, di17 verse, and modern set of non-strategic systems 

18 that are dual-capable. . .These theater- and 

19 tactical-range systems are not accountable 

20 under the New START Treaty’’; 

21 (D) ‘‘China continues to increase the num22 ber, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear 

23 forces.’’; and 

24 (E) ‘‘China has developed a new road-mo25 bile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile 


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1 (ICBM), a new multi-warhead version of its 

2 DF5 silo-based ICBM, and its most advanced 

3 ballistic missile submarine armed with new sub4 marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It 

5 has also announced development of a new nu6 clear-capable strategic bomber, giving China a 

7 nuclear triad.’’. 

8 (6) On April 4, 2019, President Donald J. 

9 Trump stated, ‘‘Between Russia and China and us, 

10 we’re all making hundreds of billions of dollars 

11 worth of weapons, including nuclear, which is ridicu12 lous. . .and I would say that China will come along, 

13 and I would say Russia will come along. It doesn’t 

14 really make sense that we’re doing this.’’. 

15 (7) In testimony before the Committee on For16 eign Relations of the Senate on April 10, 2019, Sec17 retary of State Mike Pompeo stated, in response to 

18 a question about extending the New START treaty, 

19 that ‘‘we need to make sure that we’ve got all of the 

20 parties that are relevant as a component of this as 

21 well’’. 

22 (8) On March 16, 2019, National Security Ad23 visor John Bolton stated, ‘‘China is building up its 

24 nuclear capacity now. It’s. . .one reason why if 

25 we’re going to have another arms control negotiaVerDate Sep 11 2014 06:39 May 23, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2707.IH H2707

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1 tion, for example, with the Russians, it may make 

2 sense to include China in that discussion as well’’. 

3 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that— 

5 (1) arms control is beneficial for both United 

6 States national security and international stability, 

7 but the United States should not enter arms control 

8 agreements that impose unilateral restrictions on the 

9 United States Armed Forces and fail to properly ac10 count for the nuclear arsenals of all near-peer com11 petitors in the international system; and 

12 (2) any New START Treaty extension or suc13 cessor agreement must be a trilateral arrangement 

14 among the United States, the Russian Federation, 

15 and the People’s Republic of China. 

16 SEC. 4. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS. 

17 No funds shall be expended to implement a New 

18 START Treaty extension or any successor agreement un19 less the New START Treaty or such successor agree20 ment— 

21 (1) includes and is signed by the People’s Re22 public of China; and 

23 (2) covers all strategic and non-strategic nu24 clear forces held by the Russian Federation, includ25 ing— 


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1 (A) the RS–28 Sarmat (SS–X–30) inter2 continental ballistic missile system; 

3 (B) the 9M730 Burevestnik (SSC–X–9) 

4 nuclear-powered cruise missile system; 

5 (C) the KH–47M2 Kinzhal air-launched 

6 hypersonic missile system; 

7 (D) the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide 

8 vehicle system; and 

9 (E) the Status–6 (Kanyon) unmanned un10 dersea vehicle. 

Æ 


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