NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

ELLEN MICHELE CAMARGO, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DANIEL MARC ANTON CAMARGO, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0720 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2015-094491

The Honorable Laura M. Reckart, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Amber L. Guymon, PLLC, Gilbert

By Amber L. Guymon

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Lawrence B. Slater, PLLC, Gilbert

By Lawrence B. Slater

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 9-26-2017
CAMARGO v. CAMARGO

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Daniel Marc Anton Camargo (“Father”) appeals from the 

superior court’s dissolution decree and denial of his motion for new trial. 

For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to 

the superior court for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Ellen Michele Camargo (“Mother”) petitioned for dissolution 

of marriage to Father. Father, at the time represented by counsel, filed his 

response, contesting several of Mother’s claims. Mother and Father filed 

proposed resolution statements and a conference was held addressing 

parenting time and setting a date for a temporary orders hearing. Shortly 

before the temporary orders hearing, Father’s counsel withdrew due to a 

conflict of interest and Father then proceeded without counsel.

¶3 At the temporary orders hearing, Mother presented exhibits 

and testimony; Father presented limited testimony and no exhibits. The 

court ordered Father to pay child and spousal support, awarded sole legal 

decision making to Mother on a temporary basis, and ordered the parties 

to follow the parenting time plan established by their counselor. Trial was 

set and the court ordered deadlines for discovery and the submission of

trial exhibits.

¶4 Before trial, a scheduled settlement conference was vacated 

because of Father’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations. The 

court granted Mother’s motion to compel and awarded Mother 

corresponding attorneys’ fees of $675. Father’s deposition was taken one 

day prior to the close of discovery.

¶5 Thereafter, Mother moved to compel the sale of rental 

property and for an order to show cause why Father should not be held in 

contempt for his failure to pay court-ordered child support and spousal 

maintenance. These issues were to be addressed on the day of trial.
CAMARGO v. CAMARGO

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¶6 On the first day of the dissolution trial, Mother testified about 

the marital residence, vehicles, and various accounts. Mother testified the 

parties had agreed at a meeting before trial to divide these assets pursuant 

to Father’s pretrial statement. Mother also introduced Father’s deposition 

testimony into evidence, and it was admitted without objection. Father, 

representing himself, examined Mother and her witness. The superior 

court put on the record the parties’ agreement to sell the Geronimo

residence and divide the proceeds equally, and ordered the parties to file a 

written formal order documenting any remaining agreements. The court 

continued the remainder of the trial. No additional agreements were

documented by the parties.

¶7 On the second day of trial, the court began by asking where it 

had left off. Mother’s counsel noted that Father “still needed to testify,” but 

Father stated he wanted to finish cross-examining Mother. After Father 

finished cross-examining Mother, the superior court asked him if he had 

any additional witnesses, and he said no. The court took the matter under 

advisement without testimony from Father.

¶8 Shortly thereafter, Mother filed a notice purportedly 

summarizing agreements the parties had made pursuant to Arizona Rule 

of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69 and advised the court that Father had 

not signed the document because he wanted additional time to review it. 

Father did not respond to Mother’s Rule 69 notice and never signed it.

Later, Mother filed a “Notice of Submission of Newly Discovered 

Evidence” stating Father had obtained new employment that he had not 

disclosed. Mother mailed a copy of her notice to Father.

¶9 The court then issued an order rescinding its order placing the 

matter under advisement, and stated it would issue a new underadvisement date “at a later date upon the scheduling of a Status Conference 

with the parties.” The court held a nineteen-minute status conference on

July 26, at which it addressed financial issues, legal decision making,

parenting time, and Mother’s notice of newly discovered evidence. Father 

was not present. No new evidence was presented, but Mother’s counsel 

addressed her position on the issues, based on the evidence taken under 

advisement at trial. Although the court stated in its minute entry following

the status conference that Father had “actual notice” of the hearing, the 

record is devoid of any notice of the status conference to either party. The 

court ended the conference by affirming all temporary orders that were 

currently in place.
CAMARGO v. CAMARGO

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¶10 On September 23, 2016, the court entered its decree. It found 

the parties entered a Rule 69 agreement on issues including the marital 

residence, vehicles, accounts, and reimbursement to Mother of certain 

expenses. The court noted and found that although Father had not signed 

the agreement, both parties had entered the agreement knowingly. The 

court accepted the Rule 69 agreement and reduced it to judgment. The 

decree also addressed the other matters in dispute below.

¶11 Father filed a motion for new trial, which the superior court 

denied.

¶12 We have jurisdiction over Father’s timely appeal pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1) and (A)(5)(a).

DISCUSSION

I. Due Process Argument

¶13 Father argues the superior court did not allow him a 

meaningful opportunity to be heard at the trial and failed to give him notice 

of the status conference. We review de novo Father’s contention that the 

superior court denied him due process. Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 260, 

¶ 16 (App. 2014).

¶14 In Father’s pretrial statement he listed himself as a potential 

witness, and at the outset of the first day of trial, he stated that he planned 

to call himself as his only witness. At trial, the record shows Father crossexamined witnesses and the superior court gave Father the opportunity to 

call additional witnesses, but he declined. During the first day of trial the 

court responded to Father’s question regarding the amount of time 

remaining by stating, “[w]e’re obviously not going to finish today because 

you haven’t even had an opportunity to finish your case.” During the 

second day, as Father continued his cross-examination of Mother, the court 

advised him, “you’re at a half an hour now. And so if you’re going to want 

to present anything in your case you’re going to have 30 minutes from this 

point forward.”

¶15 Father clearly knew he had a right to testify at the trial. The 

pretrial statement he himself signed and filed listed himself as a witness, 

and he told the court at the outset of the trial that he would testify. Further, 

at the beginning of the second day of trial, Mother’s counsel noted that 

Father still needed to testify. Moreover, the court informed Father during 

his cross-examination of Mother that he could present evidence in his 

dedicated portion of the hearing. Father acknowledged the court’s 
CAMARGO v. CAMARGO

Decision of the Court

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statement, yet failed to object, ask for more time, or otherwise comment 

when the court took the matter under advisement after Mother’s lawyer 

finished her redirect examination of Mother at the conclusion of the second 

trial day. Under these circumstances, we find no denial of due process at 

the two-day trial. Curtis v. Richardson, 212 Ariz. 308, 312, ¶ 16 (App. 2006) 

(noting that meaningful participation includes the cross-examination of 

witnesses and opportunity to offer evidence).

¶16 As for the status conference, the record contains no evidence 

that Father received actual notice of the hearing. When the court rescinded 

its initial order placing the matter under advisement, it announced it would 

set a status conference and a new under advisement date later. However, 

there is no record that the court gave either party notice of the date and time 

of the status conference. We therefore have no basis on which to defer to 

the superior court’s finding that “Respondent received actual notice of this 

proceeding and has failed to appear.” At the July 26 conference, Mother’s 

counsel presented argument regarding financial issues, legal decision 

making, and parenting time based on the evidence presented at trial, and 

also presented argument concerning Mother’s notice of newly discovered 

evidence. On this record, Father suffered prejudice when he was deprived 

of the opportunity to argue his position at the status conference on those 

issues, based on the evidence submitted at trial.

¶17 Because the court violated Father’s due process rights by 

ruling without allowing Father to present argument concerning the issues 

addressed at the July 26 conference, we vacate and remand the decree for 

reconsideration of those issues. On remand, the court shall set those issues 

for re-argument so that Father may present his position before the court 

rules.

II. Denial of Motion for New Trial

¶18 Next, Father argues the superior court improperly denied his 

motion for new trial, which we review for abuse of discretion. See Matos v. 

City of Phx., 176 Ariz. 125, 130 (App. 1993). To the extent Father’s motion 

was based on his argument that he was deprived of due process during the 

two-day trial, we have concluded that no due process violation occurred 

during the trial, and affirm the denial of the motion for new trial on that 

ground. To the extent that Father’s motion was based on his contention that 

he was deprived of due process at the July 26 status conference, our remand 

for reconsideration of issues addressed at the status conference moots 

Father’s argument on appeal.
CAMARGO v. CAMARGO

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III. Parties’ Rule 69 Agreement

¶19 Father also argues the superior court erred by finding the 

parties entered a Rule 69 agreement on any issues other than the Geronimo 

home. We review for abuse of discretion a finding concerning whether a 

party intends to be bound by an agreement. Tabler v. Indus. Comm’n, 202 

Ariz. 518, 521, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). We accept the superior court’s factual 

findings as to the intent of the parties in entering into an agreement, unless 

they are clearly erroneous. McNeil v. Hoskyns, 236 Ariz. 173, 176, ¶ 13 (App. 

2014). Additionally, agreements between parties in family court “are to be 

read in light of the parties’ intentions as reflected by their language and in 

view of all circumstances . . . .” Harris v. Harris, 195 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15

(App. 1999).

¶20 Rule 69 provides that an agreement between parties shall be 

presumed to be valid and binding if “the agreement is in writing, or . . . the 

terms of the agreement are set forth on the record before a judge.” Ariz. R.

Fam. Law P. 69(A)-(B).

¶21 At the end of the first day of trial, the parties put a partial Rule 

69 agreement on the record to expedite the sale of the Geronimo residence. 

The court engaged the parties in a colloquy under oath, to determine

whether they were knowingly entering this partial agreement. Two weeks 

passed before the court and parties reconvened for the second and final day 

of trial. No further agreements, under Rule 69 or otherwise, were entered 

by the parties.

¶22 On April 25, 2016, Mother’s counsel filed a “Notice of Filing 

Parties’ Rule 69 Agreements Entered In Open Court on March 24, 2016.” 

This Notice contained the Rule 69 agreement concerning the Geronimo

residence that was entered in open court on March 24; however, it also 

listed purported agreements concerning other community property based 

on pretrial settlement negotiations that the parties never finalized. It is 

undisputed that Father never signed the written agreement, and the record 

contains no agreement by Father to those additional items in open court. 

At the July 26 status conference, Mother’s counsel advised the court that 

she filed the agreements reached by the parties before trial, but later Father

disclaimed those agreements. Because the record shows no writing or 

manifestation of assent by Father to enter a Rule 69 agreement as to any 

property other than the Geronimo residence, the court erred by accepting 

the notice of agreement as to the other items.
CAMARGO v. CAMARGO

Decision of the Court

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¶23 The court based its distribution of community property in the 

decree on its finding that the purported Rule 69 agreement was valid. 

Because the court erred in finding such an agreement except as to the 

Geronimo home, we vacate the decree’s apportionment of community 

property other than the Geronimo home and remand to the superior court 

for apportionment on the basis of a fair and equitable allocation, supported 

by reasonable evidence. In re Marriage of Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, 536, ¶¶ 17-

18 (App. 2010).

IV. Legal Decision Making, Parenting Time, Child Support, Spousal 

Maintenance, Unreimbursed Medical Expenses, Temporary Orders, 

Attorneys’ Fees, and Contempt

¶24 Father argues the superior court also erred in (1) awarding 

sole legal decision-making authority to Mother, with limited parenting time 

awarded to Father, child and spousal support, and attorneys’ fees; (2) 

ordering him to pay uninsured medical expenses for the children; (3) 

reaffirming temporary orders; and (4) finding him in contempt. This Court 

reviews these determinations for an abuse of discretion. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 

Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 (App. 2009); In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 167 

(App. 1983).

¶25 Father’s argument as to these issues is based on his contention 

that he was deprived of due process at the July 26 status conference. Based 

on our conclusion that he was deprived of due process at that conference, 

we also remand these issues as outlined above, see ¶ 16, supra.

V. Past-Due Child Support

¶26 Father argues the court erred in calculating the amount of 

past-due child support. Because we remand to provide Father the 

opportunity to argue his position in respect to child support, we similarly 

remand to the superior court to determine the appropriate amount of any 

past-due child support after Father has the opportunity to present 

argument before the court.

CONCLUSION

¶27 At the July 26 status conference, Father was deprived the 

opportunity to argue his position on the evidence submitted at trial. On 

remand, the court shall grant the parties the opportunity to argue their 

positions on the matters addressed at the July 26 conference that Father did 

not attend. As to the division of community property, the parties entered 

no agreements under Rule 69, except as to the Geronimo home. 
CAMARGO v. CAMARGO

Decision of the Court

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Accordingly, the court must make specific factual findings as to a fair and 

equitable allocation of property, but may base its decree on the evidence 

already contained in the record.

¶28 Both parties seek an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal. After 

considering the parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness of their 

positions, we deny attorneys’ fees on appeal to either party. Upon 

compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21, we award 

Father his costs on appeal.

¶29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, 

and remand to the superior court for further proceedings in compliance 

with this decision.