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Filed 6/5/13 P. v. Hollowell CA3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

(Sacramento) 

---- 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

TROY JASON HOLLOWELL, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

C072075 

(Super. Ct. No. 11F06405) 

 Defendant Troy Jason Hollowell appeals from a judgment after he pled no contest 

to possession of a completed check with the intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 475, subd. 

(c))1 and identity theft with a prior identity theft conviction (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2)), and 

admitted one strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and five prior prison term (§ 667.5, 

subd. (b)) allegations. 

 On appeal, defendant contends the trial court’s failure to award additional conduct 

credits pursuant to the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act) 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2 

(Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482) deprived him of equal protection under the law. We disagree 

and affirm the judgment. 

FACTS 

 Defendant committed the crimes for which he was convicted on September 15, 

2011. On July 2, 2012, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve nine years in state 

prison and awarded 435 days of presentence credit, consisting of 291 actual days and 144 

days of conduct credit. 

 The trial court calculated defendant’s conduct credits under the September 28, 

2010, revision of the presentence custody credit law. Under that version, a defendant 

with a current or prior serious or violent felony conviction was entitled to two days of 

conduct credit for every four days of presentence custody. (Former §§ 2933, 4019 (Stats. 

2010, ch. 426, § 2).) 

DISCUSSION 

 Operative October 1, 2011, the Realignment Act amended section 4019 to enhance 

the rate at which defendants could earn conduct credits from two days for every four days 

actually served (former § 4019) to two days for every two days actually served (amended 

§ 4019, subd. (f)). The Realignment Act also added subdivision (h) to section 4019, 

which provides: “The changes to this section enacted by the act that added this 

subdivision shall apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to 

[specified facilities] for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011. Any days earned 

by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior 

law.” 

 On appeal, defendant contends he is entitled to have his presentence conduct 

credits calculated at the enhanced rate provided by the Realignment Act for his days in 

custody from October 1, 2011, to July 2, 2012. He argues that for defendants who 

committed offenses prior to October 1, 2011, principles of equal protection compel the 
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application of section 4019 to defendants in presentence custody from October 1, 2011, 

to the date of sentencing. Consistent with the reasoning of other appellate courts, we 

reject defendant’s equal protection argument.2 

 In People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 at pages 318-322 (Brown), our Supreme 

Court held that under general rules of statutory construction a prior amendment to section 

4019 must be read prospectively only, even though the Legislature did not expressly so 

state, and even though this meant “prisoners whose custody overlapped the statute’s 

operative date . . . earned credit at two different rates.” (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 

p. 322.) The court reasoned that “the important correctional purposes of a statute 

authorizing incentives for good behavior [citation] are not served by rewarding prisoners 

who served time before the incentives took effect and thus could not have modified their 

behavior in response. That prisoners who served time before and after former section 

4019 took effect are not similarly situated necessarily follows.” (Brown, supra, at 

pp. 328-330; see People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896, 906, fn. 9.) 

 Defendant argues that unlike the defendant in Brown, he is similarly situated for 

purposes of conduct incentives to other defendants who are in presentence custody on or 

after October 1, 2011. Defendant contends there are two groups of similarly situated 

prisoners: those in presentence custody on or after October 1, 2011, for crimes 

committed before that date and those in presentence custody on or after October 1, 2011, 

for crimes committed on or after that date. He next argues there is no rational basis to 

deny enhanced presentence custody credits to those who committed crimes before 

 

2 Defendant does not make a statutory construction argument based on the language in 

subdivision (h) of section 4019. Thus, we do not need to address this argument. 

However, we note two appellate decisions have rejected this statutory construction 

argument. (See People v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546 (Ellis) and People v.

Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42 (Rajanayagam).) 
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October 1, 2011, and who are in presentence custody after this date because it is not 

reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose. 

 Two appellate courts, relying on Brown’s reasoning, have rejected the equal 

protection argument defendant raises as to the October 1, 2011, amendment to section 

4019. (Ellis, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1551-1553; People v. Kennedy (2012) 

209 Cal.App.4th 385, 395-399 (Kennedy).)3 We agree with these cases that the reasoning 

of Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th 314 applies with equal force to the current version of section 

4019. 

 Even assuming the two groups of defendants are similarly situated for purposes of 

the October 1, 2011, amendment to section 4019, we conclude the classifications bear a 

rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Like the appellate courts in Kennedy, 

Verba, and Rajanayagam that applied the equal protection rational basis test, there are 

several legitimate reasons for making the enhanced presentence conduct credits 

applicable only to those who commit their crimes on or after October 1, 2011, including 

cost savings measured against public safety (Verba, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 996-

997; Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 55), maintaining the desired deterrent 

effect of penal laws by carrying out the punishment in effect at the time defendants 

commit their offenses (Kennedy, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 398, Verba, supra, 210 

Cal.App.4th at p. 997), and the Legislature’s right to control the risk of new legislation by 

limiting its application (Verba, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 997). 

 For these reasons, we reject defendant’s equal protection argument. 

 

3 Two appellate courts did not rely on Brown in their analysis rejecting an equal 

protection argument. Both courts concluded the two groups of prisoners are similarly 

situated for purposes of the October 1, 2011, amendment and determined there was a 

rational basis for the classifications. (People v. Verba (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 991, 995-

997 (Verba); Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 54-55.) 
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DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 

 HOCH , J. 

We concur: 

 RAYE , P. J. 

 HULL , J.