1 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The

parties consented to adjudication by a magistrate judge. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b).

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 07-1143

SANDRA D. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OSI EDUCATIONAL

SERVICES, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 06 C 285—Patricia J. Gorence, Magistrate Judge.

____________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 2007—DECIDED OCTOBER 10, 2007

____________

Before RIPPLE, MANION and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Sandra Williams filed this action

in the district court on behalf of herself and a putative

class. She sought relief under the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2000).1

 The

district court granted the defendant, OSI Educational
2 No. 07-1143

2 Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Services, Inc., (“OSI”), summary judgment. Ms. Williams

then filed a timely appeal to this court.2

 For the reasons

set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

Ms. Williams is a consumer whose debt was incurred

for personal, family or household purposes. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692a(5). OSI is a debt collection agency, as defined in 15

U.S.C. § 1692a(6); it was hired by Great Lakes Higher

Education Guaranty Corp. (“Great Lakes”) to collect its

debts. OSI sent Ms. Williams a letter and a debt validation notice, dated March 28, 2005. The letter, which is set

out as an appendix to this opinion, sought to collect a sum

of $807.89 labeled as “Total Due,” which was the outstanding balance owed to Great Lakes. The letter breaks down

the amount owed as follows:

DATE: 03/28/05

PRINCIPAL: $683.56

INTEREST: $ 16.46

FEES: $107.87

TOTAL DUE: $807.89

The letter further states:

The balance may not reflect the exact amount of interest which is accruing daily per your original agreement
No. 07-1143 3

with your creditor. Contact us to find out your exact

payout balance.

R.17, Ex. A.

B.

The district court granted OSI’s motion for summary

judgment. It determined that the letter apprised Ms.

Williams of the total amount due, including the amount

of the principal, interest and fees due. The district court

stated that, “[a]lthough the language in the letter does not

exactly track the ‘safe harbor’ wording in Miller [v. McCalla,

Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d

872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000)], the letter clearly advises that

additional interest is accruing on a daily basis and that,

therefore, additional interest may be added.” R.28 at 6.

Comparing this case to Taylor v. Cavalry Investment, L.L.C.,

365 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2004), the district court took the

view that the letter complied with the statute because

OSI’s “letter states the amount of the debt clearly enough

so that an unsophisticated recipient would not misunderstand it.” R.28 at 6-7.

II

DISCUSSION

Ms. Williams submits that there is an issue of material

fact as to whether OSI’s letter clearly states the amount of

the debt, as required by the FDCPA. In examining that

contention, we begin with the wording of the statute. The

FDCPA requires that debt collectors state “the amount of

the debt” that they are seeking to collect from the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). The debt collector’s letter

must state the amount of the debt “clearly enough that the
4 No. 07-1143

recipient is likely to understand it.” Chuway v. Nat’l Action

Fin. Servs. Inc., 362 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 2004); see also

Taylor, 365 F.3d at 574. To ensure that this statutory command is implemented properly, we must evaluate the

letter to determine whether it causes any “confusion” or

“misunderstand[ing]” as to the amount due. Taylor, 365

F.3d at 575-76. Our test is an objective one. See Durkin v.

Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2005).

In making this determination, we evaluate the letter

from the perspective of an “unsophisticated consumer or

debtor.” Id. The unsophisticated consumer is “uninformed,

naive, [and] trusting,” but possesses “rudimentary knowledge about the financial world, is wise enough to read

collection notices with added care, possesses ‘reasonable

intelligence,’ and is capable of making basic logical deductions and inferences.” Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditor

Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2000); see also

Veach v. Sheeks, 316 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2003). Notably,

we have rejected explicitly the notion that we should

employ the least sophisticated debtor standard, the “very

last rung on the sophistication ladder.” Pettit, 211 F.3d at

1060 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gammon v.

GC Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994). In

short, we must determine whether the letter “[c]ould

well confuse a substantial number of recipients.” Taylor,

365 F.3d at 575.

In undertaking our review, we must keep in mind the

procedural framework in which the case comes to us. The

general principles that guide our review of a case coming to us on summary judgment are well-established. We

review de novo a district court’s decision on a motion for

summary judgment and construe all facts in favor of the

non-moving party, here Ms. Williams. See Durkin, 406 F.3d

at 414. “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if, on the
No. 07-1143 5

record as a whole, a rational trier of fact could not find for

the non-moving party.” Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., Inc.,

330 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 324 (1986). In an FDCPA case, “a mere claim of

confusion is not enough” to prevail on summary judgment.

Rather, the “plaintiff must show that the challenged

language of the letters unacceptably increases the level of

confusion.” Durkin, 406 F.3d at 415 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Our past cases indicate that summary

judgment may be avoided by showing that the letter, on

its face, will “confuse a substantial number of recipients.”

Taylor, 365 F.3d at 575. We also have said that, absent a

showing that the face of the letter will precipitate such a

level of confusion, the “plaintiff must come forward with

evidence beyond the letter and beyond [her] own selfserving assertions that the letter is confusing in order to

create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Durkin, 406

F.3d at 415 (noting that evidence may consist of “carefully

designed and conducted consumer survey[s]” or expert

witnesses); Pettit, 211 F.3d at 1061-62; Walker v. Nat’l

Recovery, Inc., 200 F.3d 500, 502, 504 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson

v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp., 169 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (7th Cir.

1999).

Ms. Williams chooses to base her case on the first of these

options. She focuses on the following language from OSI’s

letter:

The balance may not reflect the exact amount of interest which is accruing daily per your original agreement

with your creditor. Contact us to find out your exact

payout balance.

R.17, Ex. A. In her view, there are three reasons why OSI’s

letter would confuse a substantial number of recipients.

We shall examine each.
6 No. 07-1143

First, Ms. Williams argues that the language in OSI’s

letter is more confusing than that in Chuway, which we held

could “confuse a substantial number of recipients.”

Chuway, 362 F.3d at 948. In that case, the letter stated the

“balance” and also contained the following language:

“Please remit the balance listed above in the return envelope provided. To obtain your most current balance

information, please call [phone number].” Id. at 947. We

held that the letter violated the FDCPA. There, the confusion arose because the letter did not state why the “current

balance” would be different than the stated “balance.” The

plaintiff could have thought that “the reference to the

‘current balance’ meant that the defendant was trying

to collect an additional debt [without] telling her how

large an additional debt and thus violating the statute.”

Id. at 947-48. In contrast, the language in OSI’s letter links

the difference between the “total due” and the “exact

payout balance” to the “interest which is accruing daily

per your original agreement with your creditor.” R.17,

Ex. A. OSI’s letter thus provides the information that

created the confusion in the Chuway letter.

Ms. Williams’ second and third arguments are best

treated together. She submits that the letter’s language

leaves open the possibility that the actual amount due is

less than the amount stated on the letter. She further

suggests that the sentence’s use of the present tense makes

it possible to conclude that the stated amount due was

not accurate on the date that the letter was written. In

our view, both these contentions are based on a strained

reading of the sentence. It would be “unrealistic, peculiar,

[and] bizarre” to read OSI’s letter in this way. Durkin, 406

F.3d at 414; see also Pettit, 211 F.3d at 1060 (rejecting

“bizarre” or “idiosyncratic” interpretations). The common

sense reading of the letter is that the balance is accurate
No. 07-1143 7

3 Also at issue in Taylor, a consolidated appeal, was a letter that

used the following language: “[Y]our account balance may

be periodically increased due to the addition of accrued interest

or other charges as provided in your agreement with your

(continued...)

as of the date the letter is written, but that the amount

due will increase because of interest that is accruing

daily. This construction is supported by the letter’s itemization of “PRINCIPAL,” “INTEREST,” “FEES” and “TOTAL

DUE” in a box with, and immediately below, the “DATE.”

Under a natural reading, the language conveys, even to an

unsophisticated consumer, that interest will accrue after

the letter is sent and therefore that the consumer

should call to find out the “exact payout balance.” R.17,

Ex. A (emphasis added). As we said in Chuway, “It is

impossible to draft a letter that is certain to be understood

by every person who receives it; only if it would confuse

a significant fraction of the persons to whom it is directed will the defendant be liable.” 362 F.3d at 948.

We believe that the language in this letter is closer to

the language in Taylor than to the language in Chuway. In

Taylor, the letter similarly set forth the total due and broke

down that total into principal and interest. It further

stated: “[I]f applicable, your account may have or will

accrue interest at a rate specified in your contractual

agreement with the original creditor.” Taylor, 365 F.3d at

574. Three plaintiffs in Taylor had submitted affidavits

stating that this sentence confused them about the amount

of debt that the debt collector was trying to collect. Id. We

held that the language was “entirely clear on its face” and

thus, without further evidence of confusion, the plaintiffs’

affidavits were insufficient to create a genuine issue of

material fact for trial.3 Id. at 575.
8 No. 07-1143

3 (...continued)

creditor.” Id. at 575. That letter similarly set forth the total due

and broke down that total into principal and interest. We

held that this language—“the clear statement of a truism”—

complied with the statute. Id.

As we noted earlier, in opposing summary judgment,

Ms. Williams relied solely on OSI’s letter. She submitted

no other evidence to support her view that OSI’s letter

is confusing. Without more, Ms. Williams’ unsupported

assertion that OSI’s letter is confusing is insufficient to

create a genuine issue of fact as to confusion.

Finally, from what we have said up to this point, it

should be evident that our decision in Miller v. McCalla,

Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872

(7th Cir. 2000), provides no support for Ms. Williams. In

Miller, we dealt with a letter that stated the “unpaid

principal balance” of the loan but added that

this amount does not include accrued but unpaid

interest, unpaid late charges, escrow advances or other

charges for preservation and protection of the lender’s

interest in the property, as authorized by your loan

agreement. The amount to reinstate or pay off your

loan changes daily. You may call our office for complete reinstatement and payoff figures.

Id. at 875. We determined that the letter violated the

statute because it did not state the “amount of the debt,”

as the FDCPA requires. Id. “[I]n an effort to minimize

litigation under the debt collection statute,” we also
No. 07-1143 9

4 The safe harbor provides:

As of the date of this letter, you owe $____ [the exact

amount due]. Because of interest, late charges, and other

charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on

the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you pay the

amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after

we receive your check, in which event we will inform

you before depositing the check for collection. For further

information, write the undersigned or call 1-800 [phone

number].

Id. at 876.

established a “safe harbor”4 for complying with this

requirement. Id. at 876. The fact that the letter in this case

does not adopt the language of the safe harbor is of no

consequence. We made clear in Miller that “we do not hold

that a debt collector must use this form of words to avoid

violating the statute.” Id. Although the safe harbor was

offered in an attempt both to bring predictability to this

area and to conserve judicial resources, it is compliance

with the statute, not our suggested language, that counts.

Conclusion

The letter set forth the amount of the debt with sufficient clarity and accuracy to comply with the requirements of the statute. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

of the district court.

AFFIRMED
10 No. 07-1143

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—10-10-07