NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHE ARING MOTION AND, IF FILED , D ETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT
RED BERYL , INC. , a Nevada corporation, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14

- 4092 ) SARASOTA VAULT DEPOSITOR Y, INC.; ) PRIVATE CAPITAL GROUP, INC., a Utah ) corporation; TINA NIELSON, an individual; ) SUMMIT DEVELOPERS, LLC, an Arizona ) limited liability company; DWAYNE ) SEITER, an individual; BRANDON ) BENTLEY, an individual; KIM PURCELL, ) an individual; KR IS PURCELL, an ) individual; DAVID A. KAHN, an individual; ) CHELLE HOLDINGS, LLC, a New York ) l imited liability company; LORA ) MORGENSTERN, an individual; ENTRUST ) ARIZONA FBO GLEN FORTHUM #10874; ) NORMAN STEINER, an individual; ) JONATHAN K. FOWLER , an individual; ) HEATHER D. FOWLER, an individual; ) THE ELDEN & CAROL GARDNER FAMILY ) TRUST DTD 12/11/1989; PRIVATE ) CAPITAL GROUP DIVERSIFIED FUND, ) LLC, a Utah limited liability company; ) VAN HADLOCK, an individual; and ) WENDY HADLOCK, an ind ividual, ) ) Appellee s

. ) ) Opinion filed October 9, 2015. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Charles E. Williams , Judge

.- 2

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Dale T. Golden of Golden Scaz Gagain, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellant.
R. John Cole, II, of R. John Cole, II, & Associates, P.A ., Sarasota, for Appellee Sarasota Vault Depository, Inc. No appearance for remaining Appellees.
ALTENBERND, Judge

.

Inside the vault at Sarasota Vault Depository, Inc. , there is a lock box purported to contain more than $5,000,000 in rare, red beryl gems. Sarasota Vault claims no interest in these gems , but many of the remaining parties in the style of this
case do. Sarasota Vault filed a complaint seeking to interplead these gems or, in the
alternati ve, to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the rights of the parties to these gems. The trial court entered a nonfinal order that partially grant ed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of interpleader. Th e order does not place the gems in the regis try of the court, but it grants the request for interpleader to the extent that Sarasota Vault is required to secure and hold the gems until further order of the court. The trial court intends to conduct evidentiary proceedings to determine the rights of the parties. The trial court has not discharged Sarasota Vault from any liability and has not dismissed it as a party.

Red Beryl , Inc. , filed a notice of appeal challenging this order. It argues primarily that interpleader is improper because Sarasota V ault , by the terms of its rental agreement, is not in possession of the gems. In essence , it argues that Sarasota Vault is in possession only of the vault and lock box in which the gems are held

. After ordering supplemental briefing on the matter, and a s explained later in this opinion, we- 3

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treat the notice as a petition for writ of common law certiorari. We conclude that the trial court has not departed from the essential requirements of the law by entering an order that allows the action for interpleade r to proceed and temporarily secures the gems in the vault under the supervision of the court

. As explained later, the circumstances surrounding the lock box are far more complex than the rental agreement. Documents in addition to the rental agreement se em to give Sarasota Vault greater custodial obligations for these gems. As a practical matter, even if Sarasota Vault has possession only of the lock box, the documents in this case do not give any one party an undisputed right of access to its contents. Sarasota Vault disavows any interest in the contents of the lock box . The court properly accepted an interpleader of the lock box and restricted access to its contents. The fact that Sarasota Vault might ultimately have some monetary liability to one or more of the defendants due to its handling of the gems does not alter the fact that it has no claim to or interest in the gems themselves.

I. THE ALLEGATIONS REGARDING OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF TH E GEMS Sarasota Vault is a private company in Sarasot a that rents lock boxes to customers for a monthly fee. 1 As described in greater detail later in this opinion , it has entered into rental agreements for the lock box in this case with at least two different
entities. The most recent of these is with Red Beryl, a Nevada corporation, and its purported agent, Tina Nielson. This standardized rental agreement claims that Sarasota Vault d oes no t have " custody " or " control " of the contents, is not responsible for the contents, and is a lessor of the box and not a " warehouseman. " The rental

1 At this stage of the proceedings, the "facts" are based on the contents of the record, which is limited and does not contain evidence comparable to the testimony of a trial.- 4

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agreement provides that it is " not intended to, nor does it in any way, create a bailment between the parties " except in the case of default or failure to pay the rent by the
lessee . It further provides that: "Tenant has ful l rights to privacy, and Landlord does not want to know the nature, quantity, quality or value of the Contents of the Box."

Despite this contractual language in the rental agreement , the record reflects that Sarasota Vault also issued at least four separat e document s entitled "Safekeeping Receipt ." Each of these document s confirm s that Sarasota Vault ' s " client" has "deposited " with Sarasota Vault one thousand "R ed E merald G emstones, " total ing
298 carats in weight and valued at $5,005,023. Each receipt rec ites that Sarasota Vault

" stand [s] ready to confirm safekeeping by telephone or facsimile, to any inquiring bank,

or authorized representative , and will transfer this Original Safekeeping Certificate with written approval of [its] Client." Thus, the se rec eipt s seem to create relationship s regarding these gems beyond the mere rental of an empty, secret box to Red Beryl

. I t is doubtful that the receipts are each a complete transfer of the preceding receipt.

I n September 2008 , Sarasota Vault entered into th e first rental agreement of the lock box with an individual who is not a party to this action. It issued the original safekeeping receipt for these gems to this individual. 2 In June 2009, the individual issued a release of the gems to either Rex Harris, the purported " legal owner " of the
gems, or a designated agent of Mr. Harris

. But Rex Harris apparently did not enter into a new rental agreement or obtain a transfer of the safekeeping certificate.

2 It is worth noting that neither the trial court nor this court has inspected this lock box. All of the parties seem to agree that the box contains valuable gems, but that fact is not independently established in this record.- 5

- Instead, at that time, Tina Nielson, the daughter of M r. Harris and a purported agent for Red Beryl, asked Sarasota Vault to transfer the gems to Red Beryl

w ith a new safekeeping receipt. Red Beryl and Ms. Nielson then entered into the second rental agreement with Sarasota Vault to lease the lock box , and Sa rasota Vault issued a second safekeeping receipt confirming that the gems had been deposited by

" its client, Red Beryl , Inc." If this was done with written approval of the first client, that fact is not clear from our record.

Next, i n July 2010, Patrick Lewis , holding himself out as an agent of Red Beryl, asked Sarasota Vault to issue a third safekeeping rece ipt to Progress Solutions, LLC , another Nevada company

. At the same time , Sarasota Vault also received a document from Progress Solutions titled " Re vised Resolution to Borrow, " which stated that Progress Solutions wished to " lease " the gems to a third party. The document was signed by Rex Harris, Tina Nielson, and Patrick Lewis, and it authorized Mr. Lewis to sign, execute and endorse " all lease docu ments " that might be required to lease the gems. Sarasota Vault issued its third safekeeping receipt for these gems to Progress Solutions o n July 6, 2010. Apparently, Red Beryl does not regard this safekeeping receipt to be a full transfer of its earlier receipt.

Just two weeks later, Mr. Lewis

— allegedly still holding himself out as an agent of Red Beryl

— asked Sarasota Vault to issue yet a fourth safekeeping receipt, this
tim e to Summit Developers, LLC, an Arizona development company . He also asked Sa rasota Vault to endorse a document titled " Con firmation of Blocking of Assets " (the blocking agreement), which already had been signed by representatives of both Summit Developers and Private Capital Group (PCG), a Utah corporation. Summit Developers- 6

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had apparently borrowed $400,000 from PCG and various other lenders (collectively, the lenders) , 3 and had secured the loan in part with some of the gems located in the vault

. 4 Despite the fact that Sarasota Vault had just issued a receipt for all of these
gem s to Progress Solutions, it issued the fourth safekeeping receipt to Summit Developers on July 21, 2010 . If Progress Solutions gave written approval for this transfer, that fact is not apparent from this record.

Sarasota Vault also signed the blocking a greement, in which it represented that the gems w ere " reserved and blocked " for the benefit of PCG for one year pending payment of the promissory note by Summit Developers to PCG . Sarasota Vault agreed to " facilitate delivery " of the gems to PCG upon rece ipt of a written notice of default by Summit Developers

.

Summit Developers subsequently defaulted on the promissory note. In

e arly 2011, PC G provided Sarasota Vault with written notice of the default and request ed delivery of the gems. Sarasota Vault di d not deliver the gems to PCG. In September 2011, the lenders filed an action against Summit Developers in Utah state court for breach o f the loan agreement. The lenders also named Sarasota Vault as a defendant, alleging conversion and breach of contract for failing to facilitate the delivery

3 PCG, Summit Developers, and t hese lenders

— Dwayne Seiter, Brandon Bentley, Kim and Kris Purcell, David A

. Kahn, Chelle Holdings, LLC, Lora Morgenstern, Entrust Arizona FBO Glen Forthum #10874, Norman Steiner, Jonathan K

. and Heather D. Fowler, The Elden and Carol Gardner Family Trust DTD 12/11/1989, Private Capital Group Diversified Fund, LLC, and Van and Wendy Hadlock

— are all defendants in the interpleader acti on below . None of these parties have appeared in this appeal, and they are thus appellees by operation of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g).

4 Although the parties do not fully explain this, according to the security agreement for the loan and an attached inventory list, only about one hundred of the one thousand gems that are allegedly in the vault were partial collateral on the loan. Their value is not included on the inventory list.- 7

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of the gems pursuant to the blocking agreement. At some point after this , Red Beryl attempted to gain access to the vault and lock box , but Sarasota Vault did not allow it. In September 2012, Red Beryl sent a demand letter to Sarasota Vault in which it threatened suit for civil theft and treble damages if Sarasota Vault did not give it access
to the gems. II . THE ACTION FOR IN TERPLEADER A. The Pleadings Sarasota Vault filed its amended complaint for interpleader in 2013. It named as defendants Red Beryl, Tina Nielson, Summit Developers, PCG, and the remaining lenders . In its count for interpleader, Sar a sota Vault alleged that it had no interest in the gems and wished to deliver them to whomever they lawfully be longed but , based on the alleged events and the conflicting claims to the gems , it could not make this determination without threat of litigation from the defendant claimants . It asked the court to enter an order allowing it to transfer the gems into the court registry, releasing it of all liability to the claimants , discharging it from the action, and requiring the claimants
to interplead and settle their respective rights to the gems among themselves

. In its alternative count for declaratory judgment, S arasota Vault asked for a determination of
who is entitled to possession of the gems

.

The lenders filed an answer to Sarasota Vault ' s amended complaint for interpleader in which they brought counterclaims against Sarasota Vault , including claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and conversion. They also brought crossclaims against Red Beryl.- 8

- Red Beryl , meanwhile, filed simultaneous motions to dismiss and to "strike" the amended complaint for interpleade r, arguing in both motions that interpleader wa s not proper because , according to the lease agreement for the vault , Sarasota Vault does not have possession of the gems and thus does not meet the definition of a "stakeholder" articulated by the Florida Sup reme Court in Paul v. Harold Davis, Inc. , 20 So. 2d 795, 796 (Fla. 1945)

. The trial court denied both motions. After Red Beryl filed a "motion to dete rmine propriety of interpleader, " in which it repeated the argument from its prior motions, the court en tered an order denying the motion and explaining that if Red Beryl was seeking a judgment that Sarasota Vault wa s not entitled to interpleader , it should file a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings on that basis.
B . The Parties ' M otion s for Summary Judgment and the Order on Review Red Beryl filed a motion for summary judgment and again made the same argument regarding interpleader . It also argued that Sarasota Vault i s not entitled to declaratory relief b ecause it is seeking a declarat ion of the defendants ' rights to the stake but not its own.

Sarasota Vault filed its own motion for summary judgment as to interpleader and its alternative count for declaratory relief. It argued that it is a proper stakeholder because it has actual pos session or control over the gems , it has no interest in the gems , and it is exposed to multiple liability regarding the conflicting claims
to the gems . It maintained that these are the only requirement s for interpleader under the current rule

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- After a h earing on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered a written order that allowed both counts to go forward on the merits. It found that an evidentiary hearing i s needed to determine who is entitled to possession of the gems and accordingly denied summary judgment on the co unt for declaratory judgment. It found that interpleader is proper because Sarasota Vault has established that there are competing claims to the gems for which Sarasota Vault i s exposed to multiple liability and that Sara sota Vault is a stakeholder with "actual possession" of the gems for purposes of interpleader

. I t ordered that the gems remain with Sarasota Vault for safekeeping until further order of the court. It also ordered that Sarasota Vault not be discharged fro m liability or dismissed from the p roceedings until further order and that Red Beryl and PCG must interplead and litigate between themselves their respective rights to the gems. It denied Red Beryl ' s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Red Beryl filed this appeal.

III. THE ORDER IS NOT APP EALABLE AS EITHER

A NONFINAL OR FINAL ORDER Red Beryl initially sought to appeal this order as either a nonfinal order determining the right to immediate possession of property pursuant to Florida Rule of Ap pellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) , or as a final order of interpleader. The order is not appealable as either. 5

5 We recognize that this conclusion is not consistent with the direct appellate review in Zimmerman v. Cade Enter pri s es, Inc. , 34 So. 3d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Zimmerman appears to involve an appeal in the same posture as this one. One of the claimant s in Zimmerman appealed the trial court ' s order granting in terpleader to the extent that the action was allowed to proceed and the plaintiff was required to place the stake into the court registry. Id. at 200

- 01. And although this fact is not explicitly address ed , the plaintiff does not appear to have been dismi ssed from the suit. See id.- 10

- As an initial matter , the portion of the order denying summary judgment on the alternative count for declaratory relief is nonfinal and i s not appealable under rule 9.130(a)(3). Likewise, that portion of the order is not a proper subject for certiorari
review. See, e.g. , Miami

- Dade C ty. v. Perez , 988 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008 )

.

The portion of the order on the count for interpleader is also nonfinal: it expressly decline s to release Sarasota Vault from the suit or from liability

. It is therefore not final as to either party , and it is not appealable as such. Cf. Schnebelt v. Schnebelt , 710 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ( holding that t he order granting interpleader was final as to the stakeholder , who was dismissed from the suit, and affirming the order insofar as it required the remaining parties to interplead but concluding that the court was without jurisdiction to reach any other is sues raised by those parties in the appeal ). The trial court undoubtedly did not dismiss Sarasota Vault from the lawsuit or from liability because of the unusual factual circumstances in this case and the fact that several of the defendants have brought c ounterclaims against Sarasota Vault

. See , e.g. , Rainess v. Estate of Machida , 81 So. 3d 504 , 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (explaining
that the trial court allowed interpleader to proceed but denied a motion to withdraw by the stakeholder who ultimately faced co unterclaims).

This nonfinal, interlocutory order is not appealable as a n order determining "the right to immediate possession of property " under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii)

. Because
t he purpose of rule 9.130 is to "restrict the number of appe alable nonfinal orders, " we are obligated to interpret the rule narrowly. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns , 443 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla. 1984)

. Thus, despite Red Beryl ' s assertion, the court did not make a
The First District did not address jurisdiction in Zimmerman , and it is likely that the jurisdictional question was never considered in that case.- 11

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determination regarding any of the parties ' "right" to possess the g ems . To the contrary, the court ordered that the gems remain in the vault for safekeeping pending the court ' s future determination of their rightful owner or owners

. 6 See Walker v. Fla. Gas Transmission Co. , 134 So. 3d 571, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Perez , 988 So. 2d at 41 ("T he effect of the order was simply to deny summary disposition of the parties ' respective claims to immediate possession

— not to determine those claims. The claims remain subject to determination at trial." (emphasi s omitted )); see als o Higgins v. Ryan , 81 So. 3d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ( concluding , in a published order, that an interlocutory order in which the trial court simply gave its "opinion" of ownership interests was not appealable under rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) and dismissing app eal for lack of jurisdiction)

.

If Red Beryl is entitled to review of the trial court ' s decision to take temporary supervision of these gems while the parties ' rights to the gems are resolved , it must be by certiorari jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9

. 030(b)(1)(B), (2)(A) . We thus treat this appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.040(c) (providing that where " a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought" ).

6 When the court concluded that interpleader was proper , it explained that altho ugh it would normally order the stake to be deposited into the court registry, taking this course of action with gems had caused trouble for the clerk of court in the past. It therefore gave the parties the option of keeping the gems where they were or fi nding an independent receiver to take possession of them. The parties apparently did not elect to have an independent receiver take possession , and the court appropriately ordered that the gems remain in the vault. See, e.g. , Roger s v. Publix Super Mk ts

. , Inc. , 575 So. 2d 214 , 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ("Retention of funds by a trustworthy person in an action for interpleader is not unusual and avoids the clerk ' s fees."). Thus, for purposes of this appeal, these gems are under the supervision of the court just as if they were in the registry of the court.- 12

- IV. THE O RDER IS NOT A DEPART URE FROM THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMEN TS OF THE LAW
A nonfinal, nonappealable order may be reviewable by certiorari jurisdiction in limited circumstances. Bd. o f Tr s

. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ

. Enters

. , LLC , 99 So. 3d 450, 454

- 55 (Fla. 2012) . The party seeking relief must demonstrate that the challenged order constitutes : (1) a departure from the essential requirement s of the law; (2) resulting in material injury for t he remainder of the proceedings; ( 3 ) that cannot b e corrected on postjudgment appeal. Id. at 455 (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc. , 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004)); see also Parkway Bank v. Ft. Myers Armature Works, Inc. , 658 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Red Beryl has not made thi s showing

.

For purposes of this proceeding, we accept that Red Beryl , if it actually has a right of possession to these gems at this time, could suffer irreparable injury by having the gems held by the court. Cf. Tetrault v. Calkins , 79 So. 3d 213, 215 (F la. 2 d DCA 2012) (explaining that an order denying a motion to discharge a lis pendens may cause harm not remediable on appeal because a lis pendens operates as a cloud on title that may constrain a petitioner's right to convey property).

Nevertheless, th e trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law . In actuality, Red Beryl is not claiming that it is aggrieved because the court took supervision of the lock box or its contents. Its grievance is that it w ants the right to immediat e ly access the contents of the lock box . So do many of the other defendants. Red Beryl has not established in this record that it has such a clear right to the contents of the lock box that the court should deny interpleader and allow it exclusive access to the box.- 13

- Red Beryl asserts that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it allowed interpleader to proceed because Sarasota Vault does not fit the definition of a stakeholder in a decades

- old supreme court case , Paul v. Harold Davis, Inc. , 20 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 1945). In Paul , the supreme court explained that it "underst[oo]d a stakeholder to be a person in possession of a fund with naked authority to deliver it upon a contingency or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a n event." Id. at 796 . Red Beryl argues that, pursuant to the express terms of the rental agreement , Sarasota Vault does not have "custody" or "control" of the gems and is not a
bailee or "warehous e man" with naked authority to possess the gems or to deliv er them to another party. It contends that Sarasota Vault thus does not fit the definition of a
stakeholder set forth in Paul , and interpleader is not proper in this case

.

As an initial matter, Red Beryl ' s argument is based on the questionable assumptio n that the term s of the rental agreement exclusively control Sarasota Vault ' s obligations regarding the lock box and its contents. As we have explained, the circumstances surrounding the lock box a nd its contents

— and in particular , the four safekeeping ag reements

— suggest that this is not the case. But even assuming that Red Beryl ' s assumption is correct, Red Beryl ' s argument ignores the current law and the purpose for interpleader

. Paul was decided before the common law requirements for strict interplead er were replaced by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.240. See
Zimmerman v . Cade Enters

. , Inc. , 34 So. 3d 199, 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ; Joe Hatton, Inc. v. Conner , 247 So. 2d 782, 783

- 84 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). Rule 1.240 provides that:

Persons having claim s against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability . It is not ground for objection to the joinder- 14

- that the claim of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not have common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that the plaintiff is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the cla imants. Id. (emphasis added).

Interpleader is a two

- stage action. First, the trial court determines whether interpleader is prop er

— i.e., whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for interpleader

— and second, the trial court determines who is actually en titled to the stake. See, e.g. , N & C Props. v. Vanguard Bank & Tr. Co. , 519 So. 2d 1048, 1050

- 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)

. If the court determines that a claim for interplead er has been properly pleaded in step one, it may deposit the stake into the court re gistry or order alternative safekeeping. See , e.g. , Bruce J. Berman & Peter D. Webster , Berman's F lorida Civil
Procedure § 1.240: 5 (West ' s Fla. Prac. Series 20 15 ed.). The court may also dismiss the plaintiff from the action and discharge the plaintiff f rom further liability regarding
entitlement to the stake. See id. However, if the plaintiff faces liability to the claimants
on theories that are independent from the entitlement to the stake , the court may keep the plaintiff in step two of the litigatio n to defend against those claims. See, e.g. , Rainess , 81 So. 3d at 508

.

Although some courts have continue d to recite the four common law requirements for "strict" interpleader , 7 t he only requirement to state a claim for

7 To maintain an action in strict interpleader, the common law required that: (1) the claims to the stake were dependent or had common origin; (2) the same thing, debt, or stake was claimed by the defendant s; (3) the plaintiff had "no interest in the subject matter

— that is, in strict interpleader as distinguished from a suit in the nature of interpleader "; and (4) the plaintiff was in a position of indifference as to the claimants, "having incurred no indepe ndent liability to [any] of the claimants" and it appearing that

" no act on his part . . . caused the embarrassment of conflicting claims and the peril of- 15

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interpleader that remains under r u le 1.240 " is that the stakeholder ' is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability ' for competing claims to a single fund. " Brock v. Bowein , 99 So. 3d 580, 584 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting Zimmerman , 34 So. 3d at 202). The current relevance of the ea rlier four requirements that applied under the common law before the adoption of rule 1.240 and the merger of law and equity in 1967 is not easily explained. But when the order of interpleader does not discharge the plaintiff o f potential liability and th e plaintiff remains a party to the modern proceeding , it is clear that the third and fourth requirements of the common law of "strict ' interpleader have no application in the determination of whether interpleader may proceed

. See , e.g. , Bruce J. Berman & Peter D. Webster , Berman's F lorida Civil Procedure § 1.240: 4 (West ' s Fla. Prac. Series 2015 ed.) (explaining the historical development of the requirements for "strict" interpleader ); s ee also Bradley v. Kochenash , 4 4 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1995)

.

Thus, u nder the modern rule, the nature or propriety of the stakeholder ' s possession does not determine whether a plaintiff may bring an action for interpleader. See Joe Hatton, Inc. , 247 So. 2d at 782

- 83 ( finding that interpleader was the proper method for the agricultural commissioner to return assessments that had been deemed unconstitutional and to which the state was no longer legally entitled ). T he purpose of interpleader is to protect a stakeholder, who himself has no interest in the stake, from liability for incorrectly determining which of the multiple claimants is entitled to the stake. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.240 author's cmt.

- 1967

. Thus, w hether Sarasota Vault has

double vexation. " Riverside Bank of Jacksonville v. Fla. Dealers & Growers Bank , 151 So. 2d 834, 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) , superseded by rule , Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.240, as stated in Zimmerman , 34 So. 3d at 202.- 16

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"naked" or legal authority to deliver the gems to the parties is not relevant to whether it has properly pleaded an action for interpleader and whether the trial court has properly ordered the gems to remain in the vault pending a determination of the parties ' interests in them. We conclude that t he trial court's determination that this is a proper case for interpleader is not a departure from the essential requirements of the law

. Sarasota Vault does not claim any interest in the gems. But in order for any of the claimants to take possession of the gems, they must obtain physical access to the vault with the permission of Sarasota Vault. Sarasota Vault has properly alleged that, based on what is admittedly a convoluted series of events, it is unclear who properly owns the gems and that it faces liability to multiple parties if it either den ies or allows any one of them access to the gems. Red Beryl has made demand that it will sue for conversion if Sarasota Vault fails to turn over the gems; the lenders have in fact filed suit against Sarasota Vault in Utah state court alleging conversion a nd breach of contract for Sarasota Vault ' s failure to deliver the gems pursuant to the blocking agreement, and the lenders have filed several counterclaims against Sarasota Vault in this case alleging various causes of action based on Red Beryl's failure t o deliver the gems pursuant to the blocking agreement. Putting aside whether Sarasota Vault bears any responsibility or fault for the circumstances leading to the dispute, it can take no course of action or
inaction regarding the gems without facing liabi lity to someone. Although this situation is unusual, it is precisely the kind of situation that interpleader was intended to address.

Petition for certiorari d enied

. CASANUEVA and KHOUZAM , JJ., Concur.