Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-1602 | February 28, 2019 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT, PRO SE

Timothy E. Huffman

Branchville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Timothy E. Huffman, Jr., 

$15,711.48 in Lawful United 

States Currency,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana, ex rel. 

Evansville-Vanderburgh County 

Drug Task Force (15-66385),

Appellee-Respondent.

February 28, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-MI-1602

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Circuit Court

The Honorable David D. Kiely, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

82C01-1512-MI-6275

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-1602 | February 28, 2019 Page 2 of 4

Statement of the Case

[1] Timothy E. Huffman (“Huffman”), pro se, appeals the denial of his petition for 

permission to file a belated notice of appeal. He argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion when it denied his petition. Finding no abuse of the trial 

court’s discretion, we affirm the denial of Huffman’s petition.1

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Huffman’s petition for permission to file a belated notice of 

appeal.

Facts

[3] In December 2015, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture that alleged 

Huffman had been arrested for dealing methamphetamine, possession of a 

firearm by a serious violent felon, resisting law enforcement with a weapon, and 

possession of marijuana. At the time of the arrest, $15,711.48 had been found 

on or near Huffman. The complaint alleged that the money was subject to 

forfeiture pursuant to statute. In September 2017, the trial court issued an 

agreed judgment entry, which provided that the State and Huffman, by counsel, 

had agreed that Huffman would forfeit $14,711.48 to the State and that the 

 

1 Because we affirm the trial court’s denial of Huffman’s petition for permission to file a belated appeal, we 

do not address the substantive issue that Huffman attempts to raise.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-1602 | February 28, 2019 Page 3 of 4

State would return $1,000.00 to Huffman’s counsel. In June 2018, Huffman 

filed a petition for permission to file a belated appeal pursuant to PostConviction Rule 2(1). The trial court denied the petition, and Huffman now 

appeals. 

Decision

[4] At the outset, we note that Huffman proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds 

pro se is held to the same rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to 

follow. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. 

denied. One risk a litigant takes when he proceeds pro se is that he will not know 

how to accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to accomplish. 

Id. When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for us to indulge 

in any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule for the orderly 

and proper conduct of his appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 502 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2006).

[5] We now to turn to Huffman’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion 

in denying his petition for permission to file a belated appeal. Huffman filed his

petition pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 2(1), which provides, in relevant 

part, that an “eligible defendant convicted after a trial or plea of guilty may 

petition the trial court for permission to file a belated notice of appeal of the 

conviction or sentence.” Post-Conviction Rule 2 defines an “eligible 

defendant” as “a defendant who, but for the defendant’s failure to do so timely, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-1602 | February 28, 2019 Page 4 of 4

would have the right to challenge on direct appeal a conviction or sentence after 

a trial or plea of guilty[.]”

[6] Here, however, Huffman was not convicted after a trial or a plea of guilty and 

he was not attempting to challenge on direct appeal a conviction or sentence. 

Rather, Huffman was attempting to challenge an agreed judgment order in a

forfeiture action, which is civil in nature. See Mesa v. State, 5 N.E.3d 488, 494 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Huffman is simply not an eligible defendant 

as contemplated by Post-Conviction Rule 2(1), and a belated notice of appeal is 

not available to him. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying his petition to file a belated notice of appeal.

2

 

[7] Affirmed.

[8] Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur. 

 

2 We further note that Huffman’s reliance on Curtis v. State, 981 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), is 

misplaced because Curtis concerned the trial court’s denial of a Trial Rule 60(B) motion, which Huffman has 

not filed. In addition, Huffman has failed to set forth any “extraordinarily compelling reasons” to restore his 

right of appeal from the agreed judgment order. See In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014).