IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30313

Summary Calendar

MICHAEL J. RILEY, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION; LOUISIANA ATTORNEY

DISCIPLINARY BOARD; OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL FOR

THE LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana,

USDC No. 2:09-CV-07710

Before KING, BENAVIDES, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael J. Riley appeals the district court’s decision to

dismiss his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the

district court that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the court of jurisdiction

to hear Riley’s claims, and accordingly, we AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 16, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 10-30313

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We begin by noting that this is not the first time Riley has asked this

Court to collaterally review a final judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Riley was disbarred from the Louisiana State Bar in 1987. After twice

seeking readmission unsuccessfully, he sought readmission for the third time in

2003. On November 19, 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his

application for readmission. Riley then sued the Louisiana State Bar

Association (“LSBA”) and the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board (“LADB”)

in United States District Court, for the Eastern District of Louisiana in what

became Riley I. In Riley I, Riley claimed that he was denied readmission in

violation of his civil rights, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection

Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found, in part, that

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the courtlacked subject matter jurisdiction

over Riley’s claims which amounted to nothing more than an impermissible

collateral attack on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling denying Riley

readmission to the Louisiana State Bar. Riley appealed the district court’s

decision in Riley I to this Court, and we affirmed the district court’s dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Riley v. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n, 214

Fed.Appx. 456 (5th Cir. 2007).

We now find ourselves presented with Riley II. On June 17, 2009, Riley

again moved for readmission to the LSBA. On August 19, 2009, he received a

letter from the LADB’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”), concerning

allegations of misconduct from when Riley was employed by FEMA in 2006-07.

The LADB then granted a stay of Riley’s June 2009 readmission application, in

order to pursue the disciplinary investigation concerning Riley’s alleged

misconduct during his tenure with FEMA.

On December 10, 2009, Riley received a notice of sworn statement demand

from the ODC. The next day, Riley filed an application for emergency writ,

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Objection, and Motion for Relief from the notice of sworn statement with the

Louisiana Supreme Court. On December 14, the Louisiana Supreme Court

denied Riley’s application for relief from the notice to give sworn statement. Two

days later, on December 16, Riley filed the instant action in federal district

court, once again against the LSBA and LADB, asserting that the application of

Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX(6)(A) to him, as it applies to his conduct that

he deems “unrelated to the practice of law” following the termination of his

membership, amounts to an unconstitutional denial of his First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,

1985, and 1988.

1

On February 3, 2010, the district court granted the Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. In doing so, the district court

found that, just as this Court had already explained in Riley I, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to subsequent suits that are “inextricably

intertwined” with a final state court judgment–thus barring the district court’s

subject matter jurisdiction over Riley’s claims. The district court dismissed

Riley’s claims with prejudice, and the instant appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

“We review a ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Budget Prepay, Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,

605 F.3d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 2010). “The party asserting jurisdiction bears the

burden of proof.” Id.

We note that in the three and one-half years since we issued our decision

in Riley I, the law in this Circuit regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has not

On December 30, 2009, Riley filed an Amended Complaint, challenging the issuance 1

of a subpoena in the disciplinary investigation, and adding a claim under the Fourth

Amendment.

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No. 10-30313

changed, evolved, or dissipated. Thus, in Riley I, we explained that “[t]he

2

Rooker-Feldman doctrine directs that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to

entertain collateral attacks on state court judgments.” Riley I, 214 Fed.Appx. at

458 (citing Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)). This

is because “[c]onstitutional questions arising in state proceedings are to be

resolved by the state courts.” Liedtke, 18 F.3d at 317. Our decision in Liedtke

advises individuals like Riley that:

[i]f a state trial court errs the judgment is not void, it is to be

reviewed and corrected by the appropriate state appellate court.

Thereafter, recourse at the federal level is limited solely to an

application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme

Court. The casting of a complaint in the form of a civil rights action

cannot circumvent this rule, as absent a specific delegation[,] federal

district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, lack appellate

jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify final orders of state courts.

Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Accordingly, if Riley feels that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision not

to grant his emergency relief and enjoin the LSBA from completing their

disciplinary investigation constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights,

Riley’s recourse is with the United States Supreme Court–not the federal district

court in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See id. Riley’s “request for . . .

injunctive relief, stripped to essentials, is an attack on the judgment of the state

district court. His . . . suit, which arises from the state proceeding, is

‘inextricably intertwined’ with that judgment.” Id. at 318 (citation omitted).

Thus, for the same reasons we iterated in Riley I, we once again conclude

that “[u]nder Rooker-Feldman, the district court lacked jurisdiction over Riley’s

claims and properly dismissed his suit.” Riley I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 459.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to the doctrine derived from two Supreme Court 2

cases, see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

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CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.

3

 In affirming the district court, we also recognize the sagacity in Judge McNamara’s

3

warning to Riley “that if he files any further pleadings barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

his multiplicationofproceedings may well be deemed ‘unreasonable’ and ‘vexatious’ to warrant

the imposition of sanctions.” 

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