34784 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 123 / Friday, June 26, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

due to insured causes, you must destroy it.

If you disagree and refuse to destroy the

tobacco with no value, we will determine the

value and count it as production to count.

14. Late Planting.

(a) In lieu of late planting provisions in the

Basic Provisions regarding acreage initially

planted after the final planting date,

insurance will be provided for acreage

planted to the insured crop after the final

planting date as follows:

(1) For each acre or portion thereof planted

during the first 10 days after the final

planting date, the farm yield will be reduced

by 1 percent per day; and

(2) For each acre or portion thereof planted

during the 11th through the 15th day after

the final planting date, the farm yield will be

reduced by 2 percent per day.

(b) If you plant enough acreage to fulfill the

effective poundage marketing quota, there

will be no reduction in the insured poundage

quota as a result of any late planted acreage.

15. Prevented Planting.

The prevented planting provisions in the

Basic Provisions are not applicable to quota

tobacco.

Signed in Washington, D.C., on June 19,

1998.

Kenneth D. Ackerman,

Manager, Federal Crop Insurance

Corporation.

[FR Doc. 98–16968 Filed 6–25–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–08–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 21 and 29

[Docket No. SW002; Special Condition No.

29–002–SC]

Special Conditions: Eurocopter France

Model AS–365 N3 ‘‘Dauphin’’

Helicopters, Full Authority Digital

Engine Control (FADEC)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special condition; request

for comments.

SUMMARY: This special condition is

issued for the Eurocopter France Model

AS–365 N3 ‘‘Dauphin’’ helicopters.

These helicopters will have a novel or

unusual design feature associated with

the Full Authority Digital Engine

Control (FADEC). The applicable

airworthiness regulations do not contain

adequate or appropriate safety standards

to protect systems that perform critical

functions from the effects of highintensity radiated fields (HIRF). This

special condition contains the

additional safety standards that the

Administrator considers necessary to

ensure that critical functions of systems

will be maintained when exposed to

HIRF.

DATES: The effective date of this special

condition is June 17, 1998. Comments

must be received on or before August

25, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this special

condition may be mailed in duplicate

to: Federal Aviation Administration,

Office of the Regional Counsel,

Southwest Region, Attention: Rules

Docket No. SW002, Fort Worth, Texas

76193–0007 or deliver in duplicate to

the Office of the Regional Counsel,

Southwest Region, at 2601 Meacham

Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

Comments must be marked: Rules

Docket No. SW002. Comments may be

inspected in the Rules Docket

weekdays, except Federal holidays,

between 8:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Carroll Wright, FAA, Rotorcraft

Directorate, Regulations Group, Fort

Worth, Texas 76193–0111; telephone

817–222–5120, fax 817–222–5961.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA

has determined that notice and

opportunity for prior public comment

hereon are impracticable because these

procedures would significantly delay

issuance of the approval design and

thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In

addition, notice and opportunity for

prior public comment are unnecessary

since the substance of this special

condition has been subject to the public

comment process in several prior

instances with no substantive comments

received. The FAA therefore finds that

good cause exists for making this special

condition effective upon issuance.

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

submit such written data, views, or

arguments as they may desire.

Communications should identify the

regulatory docket and be submitted in

duplicate to the address specified above.

All communications received on or

before the closing date for comments

will be considered by the Administrator.

The special condition may be changed

in light of the comments received. All

comments received will be available in

the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons, both before and after

the closing date for comments. A report

summarizing each substantive public

contact with FAA personnel concerning

this rulemaking will be filed in the

docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this Special

Condition must include a selfaddressed, stamped postcard on which

the following statement is made:

‘‘Comments to Rules Docket No.

SW002’’ The postcard will be date

stamped and returned to the

commenter.

Background

On September 1, 1997, Eurocopter

France applied for an amendment to

Type Certificate (TC) No. H10EU to

include the new Model AS–365 N3

‘‘Dauphin’’ helicopter. The Model AS–

365 N3 ‘‘Dauphin’’ helicopter, which is

a derivative of the Model AS–365 N2

helicopter that is currently approved

under TC No. H10EU, is a transport

category A and B helicopter powered by

two Turbomeca Arriel 2C engines with

FADEC. The Turbomeca Arriel 1C2

engine has been replaced with the

Turbomeca Arriel 2C engine, which

includes a digital engine control system.

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of 14 CFR

§ 21.101, Eurocopter France must show

that the Model AS–365 N3 ‘‘Dauphin’’

helicopter meets the applicable

provisions of the regulations

incorporated by reference in TC No.

H10EU or the applicable regulations in

effect on the date of application for the

change to the Model No. AS–365 N3.

The regulations incorporated by

reference in the type certificate are

commonly referred to as the ‘‘original

type certification basis.’’ The regulations

incorporated by reference in H10EU are

as follows: § 21.29 and 14 CFR part 29,

effective February 1, 1965, plus

Amendments 29–1 through 29–11. In

addition, the applicant elected to

comply with 14 CFR part 29

amendments 29–12 through 29–16,

except for 14 CFR part 29.397

concerning the rotorbrake. The

certification basis also includes certain

special conditions and equivalent safety

findings that are not relevant to this

special condition.

If the Administrator finds that the

applicable airworthiness regulations do

not contain adequate or appropriate

safety standards for these helicopters

because of a novel or unusual design

feature, special conditions are

prescribed under the provisions of

§ 21.16.

In addition to the applicable

airworthiness regulations and special

conditions, the Model AS–365 N3

helicopter must comply with the noise

certification requirements of 14 CFR

part 36; and the FAA must issue a

finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant

to § 611 of Public Law 92–574, the

‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’

Special conditions, as appropriate, are

issued in accordance with § 11.49, as

required by §§ 11.28 and 11.29(b), and

become part of the type certification

basis in accordance with § 21.101(b)(2).
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 123 / Friday, June 26, 1998 /Rules and Regulations 34785

Special conditions are initially

applicable to the model for which they

are issued. Should the type certificate

for that model be amended later to

include any other model that

incorporates the same novel or unusual

design feature, or should any other

model already included on the same

type certificate be modified to

incorporate the same novel or unusual

design feature, the special conditions

would also apply to the other model

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

The Eurocopter France Model AS–365

N3 ‘‘Dauphin’’ helicopter will

incorporate the following novel or

unusual design features: Electrical,

electronic, or combination of electrical

electronic (electrical/electronic)

systems, such as FADEC, that will be

performing functions critical to the

continued safe flight and landing of the

helicopter. FADEC is an electronic

device that performs the functions of

engine control.

Discussion

The Eurocopter France Model AS–365

N3 ‘‘Dauphin’’ helicopter, at the time of

application, was identified as having

modifications that incorporate one and

possibly more electrical/electronic

systems, such as FADEC. After the

design is finalized, Eurocopter France

will provide the FAA with a

preliminary hazard analysis that will

identify any other critical functions

required for safe flight and landing that

are performed by the electrical/

electronic systems.

Recent advances in technology have

given rise to the application in aircraft

designs of advanced electrical/

electronic systems that perform critical

functions. These advanced systems

respond to the transient effects of

induced electrical current and voltage

caused by HIRF incident on the external

surface of the helicopter. These induced

transient currents and voltages can

degrade the performance of the

electrical/ electronic systems by

damaging the components or by

upsetting the systems’ functions.

Furthermore, the electromagnetic

environment has undergone a

transformation not envisioned by the

current application of 14 CFR

§ 29.1309(a). Higher energy levels

radiate from operational transmitters

currently used for radar, radio, and

television. Also, the number of HIRF

transmitters has increased significantly.

Existing aircraft certification

requirements are inappropriate in view

of these technological advances. In

addition, the FAA has received reports

of some significant safety incidents and

accidents involving military aircraft

equipped with advanced electrical/

electronic systems when they were

exposed to electromagnetic radiation.

The combined effects of the

technological advances in helicopter

design and the changing environment

have resulted in an increased level of

vulnerability of the electrical/electronic

systems required for the continued safe

flight and landing of the helicopter.

Effective measures to protect these

helicopters against the adverse effects of

exposure to HIRF will be provided by

the design and installation of these

systems. The following primary factors

contributed to the current conditions:

(1) increased use of sensitive electronics

that perform critical functions; (2)

reduced electromagnetic shielding

afforded helicopter systems by

advanced technology airframe materials;

(3) adverse service experience of

military aircraft using these

technologies; and (4) an increase in the

number and power of radio frequency

transmitters and the expected increase

in the future.

The FAA recognizes the need for

aircraft certification standards to keep

pace with the developments in

technology and environment and, in

1986, initiated a high-priority program

to (1) determine and define

electromagnetic energy levels; (2)

develop and describe guidance material

for design, test, and analysis; and (3)

prescribe and promulgate regulatory

standards.

The FAA participated with industry

and airworthiness authorities of other

countries to develop internationally

recognized standards for certification.

The FAA and airworthiness

authorities of other countries have

identified two levels of the HIRF

environment to which a helicopter

could be exposed, one environment for

VFR operations and a different

environment for IFR operations. While

the HIRF rulemaking requirements are

being finalized, the FAA is adopting a

special condition for the certification of

aircraft that employ electrical/electronic

systems that perform critical functions.

The accepted maximum energy levels

that civilian helicopter system

installations must withstand for safe

operation are based on surveys and

analysis of existing radio frequency

transmitters. This special condition will

require the helicopters’ electrical/

electronic systems and associated

wiring to be protected from these energy

levels. These external threat levels are

believed to represent the worst-case

exposure for a helicopter operating

under VFR or IFR.

Compliance with HIRF requirements

will be demonstrated by tests, analysis,

computer models, similarity with

existing systems, or a combination of

these methods. Service experience alone

will not be acceptable since such

experience in normal flight operations

may not include an exposure to HIRF.

Reliance on a system with similar

design features for redundancy, as a

means of protection against the effects

of external HIRF, is generally

insufficient because all elements of a

redundant system are likely to be

concurrently exposed to the radiated

fields.

This special condition will require the

systems that perform critical control

functions, or provide critical displays as

installed in the aircraft, to meet certain

standards based on either a defined

HIRF environment or a fixed value

using laboratory tests. Control system

failures and malfunctions can more

directly and abruptly contribute to a

catastrophic event than display system

failures and malfunctions. Therefore, it

is considered appropriate to require

more rigorous HIRF verification

methods for critical control systems

than for critical display systems.

The applicant may demonstrate that

the operation and operational

capabilities of the installed electrical/

electronic systems that perform critical

functions are not adversely affected

when the aircraft is exposed to the

defined HIRF test environment. The

FAA has determined that the test

environment defined in Table 1 is

acceptable for critical control functions

in helicopters. The test environment

defined in Table 2 is acceptable for

critical display systems in helicopters.

The applicant may also demonstrate

by a laboratory test that the electrical/

electronic systems that perform critical

control, or provide critical displays, can

withstand a peak electromagnetic field

strength in a frequency range of 10 KHz

to 18 GHz. If a laboratory test is used to

show compliance with the defined HIRF

environment, no credit will be given for

signal attenuation due to installation. A

level of 100 volts per meter (v/m) is

appropriate for critical displays systems.

A level of 200 v/m is appropriate for

critical control functions. Laboratory

test levels are defined according to

RTCA/DO–160D Section 20 Category W

(100 v/m and 150 mA) and Category Y

(200 v/m and 300 mA). As defined in

DO–160D Section 20, the test levels are

defined as the peak of the root mean

square (rms) envelope. As a minimum,

the modulations required for RTCA/

DO–160D Section 20 Categories W and

Y will be used. Other modulations

should be selected for the signal most
34786 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 123 / Friday, June 26, 1998 /Rules and Regulations

likely to disrupt the operation of the

system under test, based on its design

characteristics. For example, flight

control systems may be susceptible to 3

Hz square wave modulation while the

video signals for electronic display

systems may be susceptible to 400 Hz

sinusoidal modulation. If the worst-case

modulation is unknown or cannot be

determined, default modulations may be

used. Suggested default values are a 1

KHz sine wave with 80 percent depth of

modulation in the frequency range from

10 KHz to 400 MHz and 1 KHz square

wave with greater than 90 percent depth

of modulation from 400 MHz to 18 GHz.

For frequencies where the unmodulated

signal would cause deviations from

normal operation, several different

modulating signals with various

waveforms and frequencies should be

applied.

Applicants must perform a

preliminary hazard analysis to identify

electrical/electronic systems that

perform critical functions. The term

‘‘critical’’ means those functions whose

failure would contribute to or cause an

unsafe condition that would prevent the

continued safe flight and landing of the

helicopter. The systems identified by

the hazard analysis as performing

critical functions are required to have

HIRF protection. A system may perform

both critical and noncritical functions.

Primary electronic flight display

systems and their associated

components perform critical functions

such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed

indications. HIRF requirements would

apply only to the systems that perform

critical functions.

Acceptable system performance

would be attained by demonstrating that

the critical function components of the

system under consideration continue to

perform their intended function during

and after exposure to required

electromagnetic fields. Deviations from

system specifications may be acceptable

but must be independently assessed by

the FAA on a case-by-case basis.

TABLE 1.—VFR ROTORCRAFT FIELD

STRENGTH VOLTS/METER

Frequency Peak Average

10–100 KHz .............. 150 150

100–500 .................... 200 200

500–2000 .................. 200 200

2–30 MHz .................. 200 200

30–100 ...................... 200 200

100–200 .................... 200 200

200–400 .................... 200 200

400–700 .................... 730 200

700–1000 .................. 1400 240

1–2 GHz .................... 5000 250

2–4 ............................ 6000 490

4–6 ............................ 7200 400

TABLE 1.—VFR ROTORCRAFT FIELD

STRENGTH VOLTS/METER—Continued

Frequency Peak Average

6–8 ............................ 1100 170

8–12 .......................... 5000 330

12–18 ........................ 2000 330

18–40 ........................ 1000 420

TABLE 2.—IFR ROTORCRAFT FIELD

STRENGTH VOLTS/METER

Frequency Peak Average

10–100 KHz .............. 50 50

100–500 .................... 50 50

500–2000 .................. 50 50

2–30 MHz .................. 100 100

30–70 ........................ 50 50

70–100 ...................... 50 50

100–200 .................... 100 100

200–400 .................... 100 100

400–700 .................... 700 50

700–1000 .................. 700 100

1–2 GHz .................... 2000 200

2–4 ............................ 3000 200

4–6 ............................ 3000 200

6–8 ............................ 1000 200

8–12 .......................... 3000 300

12–18 ........................ 2000 200

18–40 ........................ 600 200

Applicability

As previously discussed, this special

condition is applicable to Model AS–

365 N3 helicopters. Should Eurocopter

France apply at a later date for a change

to the type certificate to include another

model incorporating the same novel or

unusual design feature, the special

condition would apply to that model as

well under the provisions of

§ 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel

or unusual design features on one model

series of helicopters. It is not a rule of

general applicability and affects only

the applicant who applied to the FAA

for approval of these features on the

helicopters.

The substance of this special

condition has been subjected to the

notice and comment procedures in

several prior instances and has been

derived without substantive change

from those previously issued. It is

unlikely that prior public comment

would result in a significant change

from the substance contained herein.

For this reason and because a delay

would significantly affect the

certification of the helicopter, which is

imminent, the FAA has determined that

prior public notice and comment are

unnecessary and impracticable, and

good cause exists for adopting this

special condition upon issuance. The

FAA is requesting comments to allow

interested persons to submit views that

may not have been submitted in

response to the prior opportunities for

comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 21 and

29

Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation

safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.

The authority citation for these

special conditions is as follows: 42 USC

7572; 49 USC. 106(g), 40105, 40113,

44701–44702, 44704, 44709, 44711,

44713, 44715, 45303.

The Special Condition

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the following special

condition is issued as part of the type

certification basis for Eurocopter France

Model AS 365 N3 ‘‘Dauphin’’

helicopters.

Protection for Electrical and Electronic

Systems From High Intensity Radiated

Fields

Each system that performs critical

functions must be designed and

installed to ensure that the operation

and operational capabilities of these

critical functions are not adversely

affected when the helicopter is exposed

to high intensity radiated fields external

to the helicopter.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on June 17,

1998.

Eric Bries,

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate

Aircraft Certification Service, ASW–100.

[FR Doc. 98–16960 Filed 6–25–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 27

[Docket No. SW001; Special Conditions No.

27–001–SC]

Special Conditions: Eurocopter Model

AS–350 B3 ‘‘Ecureuil’’ Helicopters, Full

Authority Digital Engine Control

(FADEC)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special condition; request

for comments.

SUMMARY: This special condition is

issued for the Eurocopter Model AS–350

B3 ‘‘Ecureuil’’ helicopters. These

helicopters will have a novel or unusual

design feature associated with the Full

Authority Digital Engine Control