Docket No. 105805.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. LISA

MADIGAN, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JAMES B. KINZER et al.,

Respondents.

Opinion filed January 23, 2009.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Thomas, Garman, and

Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Burke specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice

Freeman.

OPINION

Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed an original

mandamus action in this court under Supreme Court Rule 381 (188

Ill. 2d R. 381), seeking to vacate a sentence of court supervision

imposed upon Kyle Kissack for his driving under the influence of

alcohol conviction. The petitioner contends that court supervision is

prohibited by section 5–6–1(d)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections

(Code) (730 ILCS 5/5–6–1(d)(3) (West 2006)), because Kissack

previously pled guilty to reckless driving as a result of a plea

agreement. We hold that the sentence of court supervision is not
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authorized by statute in these circumstances. Accordingly, we award

the order of mandamus.

I. BACKGROUND

Kyle Kissack was charged with driving under the influence of

alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11–501 (West 2006)). On August 24,

2007, he entered a guilty plea to that offense in the circuit court of

Iroquois County and the Honorable James B. Kinzer (respondent)

sentenced him to 14 months of court supervision.

The State filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, asserting that

Kissack had previously pled guilty to reckless driving as part of a plea

agreement. The State contended that section 5–6–1(d)(3) of the Code

(730 ILCS 5/5–6–1(d)(3) (West 2006)) prohibits a sentence of court

supervision for DUI when the defendant previously pled guilty to

reckless driving under a plea agreement. The State, therefore,

maintained that Kissack’s sentence was void because it was not

authorized by statute.

The respondent denied the motion to reconsider in a written order.

Respondent acknowledged section 5–6–1(d)(3) provides that court

supervision is not authorized if a defendant previously pled guilty to

reckless driving as a result of a plea agreement. Respondent initially

found, however, that a literal application of section 5–6–1(d)(3)

would create an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption that a

reckless driving charge was reduced from a DUI. Respondent could

find no justification for treating previous convictions of reckless

driving and DUI identically for purposes of court supervision on a

subsequent DUI offense.

Respondent found that the legislature intended to treat prior guilty

pleas to reckless driving and DUI identically only when a DUI charge

was reduced to reckless driving. According to respondent, People v.

Kuhn, 126 Ill. 2d 202 (1988), was “controlling: there must be

evidence that the plea was the result of a plea agreement involving an

effort to reduce the effect of the DUI charge (as opposed to a

recognition by the State that the DUI charge was simply not capable

of being proved at trial and dismissed for that reason).”

Respondent noted that Kissack pled guilty to reckless driving in

2002. A DUI charge was dismissed in that case. The reason for the
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dismissal was unclear, however. Respondent observed that the DUI

charge may have been dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

Accordingly, respondent found that Kissack was eligible for court

supervision under section 5–6–1(d)(3).

The State filed a motion to amend the order to comply with

Supreme Court Rule 18 (210 Ill. 2d R. 18), asserting that the order

did not contain the information required when a circuit court declares

a statute unconstitutional. Kissack responded that the order did not

declare the statute unconstitutional. Rather, the order was based on

the respondent’s construction of section 5–6–1(d). Following a

hearing, respondent denied the State’s motion to amend the order.

There is no record of respondent’s reasoning in denying the motion.

The petitioner then moved this court for leave to file an original

mandamus complaint. This court allowed the petitioner to file the

complaint and ordered the parties to brief the issues. The petitioner

seeks an order directing the respondent to vacate the sentence of court

supervision and impose a sentence in accordance with the Code.

The petitioner attached to the complaint the docket sheet showing

the disposition of Kissack’s previous charges. The docket entry in

case number 2001–DT–160 for May 7, 2002, states in pertinent part:

“Case called for jury trial outside the presence of the jury.

Jury waiver signed. Defendant pleads guilty to Reckless

Driving, one year court supervision, fine of $350 plus costs of

$123.00[.] State moves to Nolle prosse DUI charge in

01DT160 pursuant to agreement.”

The entry for May 9, 2002, states, “Case nolle prossed.”

II. ANALYSIS

This court may exercise original jurisdiction in mandamus

actions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(a). Mandamusis an extraordinary

remedy to enforce the performance of official nondiscretionary duties

by a public officer. 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Healey, 223 Ill. 2d

607, 614 (2006). Mandamus will be granted only when the petitioner

shows a clear right to relief, a clear public duty to act, and clear

authority of the official to comply with the order. People ex rel.

Devine v. Sharkey, 221 Ill. 2d 613, 616-17 (2006). Mandamus relief

is improper if it substitutes the court’s judgment or discretion for that
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of the official. Holly v. Montes, 231 Ill. 2d 153, 156 (2008). It is well

settled, however, that mandamus is a proper means to compel

compliance with the mandatory sentencing provisions of the Unified

Code of Corrections. People ex rel. Birkett v. Jorgensen, 216 Ill. 2d

358, 362 (2005).

Petitioner contends that the plain language and purpose of section

5–6–1(d)(3) preclude a sentence of court supervision for Kissack’s

conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol. Petitioner asserts

that this court should, therefore, enter a mandamus order directing the

respondent to sentence Kissack in accordance with the Code.

Respondent did not file a responsive brief. In his brief, Kissack

argues that section 5–6–1(d)(3) precludes court supervision only

when the offender previously entered into a plea agreement reducing

a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol to reckless driving.

In this case, he pled guilty to reckless driving and the State dismissed

theDUI charge. Thus, according to Kissack, section 5–6–1(d)(3) does

not preclude court supervision because a DUI charge was not reduced

to reckless driving.

Here, we must determine whether Kissack’s sentence of court

supervision is authorized under section 5–6–1(d)(3) of the Code. This

case presents a question of statutory construction subject to de novo

review. People v. Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2006). The

fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and

give effect to the intent of the legislature. Jorgensen, 216 Ill. 2d at

363. The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language

given its plain and ordinary meaning. Holly, 231 Ill. 2d at 159. When

statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the statute must be

applied as written without resort to aids of statutory construction.

People v. Howard, 228 Ill. 2d 428, 438 (2008). We may not depart

from a statute’s plain language by reading into it exceptions,

limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. Lewis, 223

Ill. 2d at 402. Courts should not attempt to read a statute other than

in the manner it was written. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v.

Caterpillar, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 559, 567 (2007).

Section 5–6–1(d) of the Code states:

“The provisions of paragraph (c) [pertaining to court

supervision] shall not apply to a defendant charged with
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violating Section 11–501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code [DUI]

or a similar provision of a local ordinance when the defendant

has previously been:

(1) convicted for a violation of Section 11–501 of the

Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision of a local

ordinance or any similar law or ordinance of another state;

or

(2) assigned supervision for a violation of Section

11–501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar provision

of a local ordinance or any similar law or ordinance of

another state; or

(3) pleaded guilty to or stipulated to the facts

supporting a charge or a finding of guilty to a violation of

Section 11–503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code [reckless

driving] or a similar provision of a local ordinance or any

similar law or ordinance of another state, and the plea or

stipulation was the result of a plea agreement.” 730 ILCS

5/5–6–1(d) (West 2006).

Thus, section 5–6–1(d)(3) provides that a defendant charged with

DUI is not eligible for court supervision if the defendant has

previously pled guilty to reckless driving as a result of a plea

agreement. Under the plain language of the statute in these

circumstances, a previous guilty plea to reckless driving under a plea

agreement is the only requirement for barring a sentence of court

supervision.

Contrary to Kissack’s argument, the plain language of the statute

does not require the previous plea agreement to include a reduction

of the charge from DUI to reckless driving. The legislature did not

limit or condition the phrase “plea agreement” in any way. Kissack’s

construction of section 5–6–1(d)(3) requires adding a condition to the

plain language of the statute. We will not read into the plain language

of a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the

legislature. See Lewis, 223 Ill. 2d at 402.

This court has recognized that plea agreements generally result in

a reduction of the original charge or some other consideration in

exchange for an agreement to plead guilty. People v. Eckhardt, 127

Ill. 2d 146, 151-52 (1989). The State’s offer of consideration for
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pleading guilty distinguishes a plea agreement from a blind guilty

plea. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151-52. Further, Supreme Court Rule

402(d) indicates that the consideration for a plea agreement may

include the State’s recommendation of a specific sentence or

dismissal of other charges. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d). Thus, any agreement

where the State offers some consideration in return for a defendant’s

guilty plea will satisfy the plain language of section 5–6–1(d)(3).

Kissack argues, nonetheless, that this court’s decisions in

Eckhardt and People v. Kuhn, 126 Ill. 2d 202 (1988), support his

interpretation of section 5–6–1(d). He contends that those cases

construed section 5–6–1(d) to prohibit court supervision only when

a defendant’s previous conviction of reckless driving resulted from

a reduction of a DUI charge.

In Eckhardt, the State filed a direct appeal from a circuit court

decision finding section 5–6–1(d) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,

ch. 38, par. 1005–6–1(d)) unconstitutional on equal protection

grounds. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 148. The trial court determined that

a defendant pleading guilty to reckless driving under a plea agreement

committed the same conduct as one who entered a blind guilty plea

to reckless driving. Section 5–6–1(d) of the Code treated those two

groups of defendants differently, however. The trial court, therefore,

held that the statute violated equal protection guarantees. Eckhardt,

127 Ill. 2d at 150.

This court disagreed with the trial court’s finding that a blind

guilty plea to reckless driving is the same quality of offense as a

guilty plea by agreement. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151. We recognized

that plea agreements generally result in a reduction of the original

charge or some other consideration in exchange for pleading guilty.

Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151-52. A defendant entering a blind guilty

plea does not receive any such concession. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at

151-52. Viewing the statute in this context, we held that it did not

violate equal protection guarantees. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 152.

In Eckhardt, this court conclusively resolved the defendant’s

equal protection claim by finding that the groups at issue were not

similarly situated. See People v. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 512 (2007)

(declining to apply the rational basis test because the defendant could

not meet the threshold requirement of showing that he and the group

he used for comparison were similarly situated). This court
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nevertheless went on to find that section 5–6–1(d) was rationally

related to the state’s legitimate goal of promoting highway safety.

Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 152-53. We observed that the “thrust” of

section 5–6–1(d) is to prevent repeat drunk driving offenders from

endangering the lives of other motorists. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 152.

We also stated that the “obvious focus” of section 5–6–1(d) is to

preclude supervision not only to thosepreviously convicted of driving

under the influence, but also to those who were previously charged

with that offense and entered into a plea agreement for the lesser

offense of reckless driving. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 152-53. We

therefore concluded that section 5–6–1(d) is rationally related to the

state’s goal of promoting highway safety.

In Eckhardt, the construction of section 5–6–1(d) was not raised

as an issue. Thus, this court did not engage in a construction of the

plain language of that statute. Instead, we simply made statements

about the broad focus of section 5–6–1(d) in the context of

determining whether it was rationally related to the state’s goal of

promoting highway safety.

A legislative classification will be sustained against an equal

protection challenge if any collection of facts can be reasonably

conceived to uphold the classification. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 152,

citing Village of Oak Lawn v. Rosewell, 113 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1986).

Therefore, the analysis in Eckhardt was not intended to be an allencompassing construction of section 5–6–1(d)(3). The analysis of

section 5–6–1(d)(3) in Eckhardt was simply a broad statement of the

focus of that section in the context of resolving whether the statute

was rationally related to promoting highway safety. We conclude that

Eckhardt does not control our construction of section 5–6–1(d)(3)

because the issue was never presented and, accordingly, was never

addressed in that case.

This court’s decision in Kuhn is also inapposite. As in Eckhardt,

the issue in Kuhn was whether section 5–6–1(d)(3) of the Code (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005–6–1(d)(3)) is unconstitutional on

equal protection grounds. Kuhn, 126 Ill. 2d at 204. After reviewing

the record, this court determined it was unnecessary to address that

constitutional issue. We first noted that the parties agreed section

5–6–1(d)(3) applied only when a defendant previously entered a

guilty plea to reckless driving under a plea agreement. Kuhn, 126 Ill.
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2d at 206. The parties also agreed that the record did not show the

defendant’s prior guilty plea to reckless driving was pursuant to a plea

agreement. Kuhn, 126 Ill. 2d at 206. Thus, there was no indication in

the record that section 5–6–1(d)(3) precluded the defendant from

receiving courtsupervision for his subsequent DUI charge. Kuhn, 126

Ill. 2d at 206. The trial court’s order declaring section 5–6–1(d)(3)

unconstitutional was vacated, and the matter was remanded for

further proceedings. Kuhn, 126 Ill. 2d at 207.

In Kuhn, this court did not address the interpretation of section

5–6–1(d)(3). We simply held, in accordance with the parties’

agreement, that the record did not indicate the defendant’s prior plea

of guilty was pursuant to a plea agreement. The decision in Kuhn was

based on the failure to show any plea agreement existed in that case.

In the absence of a plea agreement, there was no showing that section

5–6–1(d)(3) precluded a sentence of court supervision. Kuhn does not

provide any guidance on the construction of section 5–6–1(d)(3).

In sum, we conclude that the plain language of section

5–6–1(d)(3) precludes a sentence of court supervision for driving

under the influence of alcohol if the defendant has previously pled

guilty to reckless driving under a plea agreement. The phrase “plea

agreement” is not limited or conditioned in any way. Accordingly,

there is no requirement for the plea agreement to reduce a charge of

driving under the influence of alcohol to reckless driving.

Here, Kissack was previously charged in 2001 with DUI and

reckless driving. The docket sheet submitted by the State shows that

the case was called for jury trial. Kissack pled guilty to reckless

driving prior to trial. The docket sheet also shows that the State

moved to nol-pros the DUI charge “pursuant to agreement.” Kissack

received consideration in exchange for his guilty plea to reckless

driving based on the State’s agreement to dismiss the DUI charge.

The record, therefore, clearly establishes that Kissack’s guilty plea

was the result of a plea agreement. Accordingly, section 5–6–1(d)(3)

precludes a sentence of court supervision for Kissack’s current charge

of driving under the influence of alcohol in these circumstances.

Finally, the petitioner argues that section 5–6–1(d) does not

violate equal protection provisions or create an unconstitutional

mandatory presumption. The petitioner makes those arguments in

response to the order denying the State’s motion to reconsider the
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sentence. Kissack does not respond. We conclude that these

constitutional arguments are not properly before this court.

In his order, the respondent never expressly mentioned equal

protection guarantees. Moreover, he did not find that the statute

created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. The respondent

simply asserted that section 5–6–1(d)(3) would create an

unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption if it were applied literally.

There is certainly no express finding of unconstitutionality in the

respondent’s order.

Further, the respondent denied the State’s motion to amend the

written order to comply with Supreme Court Rule 18 (210 Ill. 2d R.

18). Supreme Court Rule 18 sets forth requirements for trial courts

finding a statute unconstitutional. This court may summarily vacate

and remand a circuit court judgment declaring a statute

unconstitutional if it fails to comply with Rule 18. 210 Ill. 2d R.

302(c)(2). The respondent’s decision to decline amending the order

in accordance with Rule 18 indicates that he did not intend to declare

the statute unconstitutional. The respondent’s decision was based

solely on his interpretation of section 5–6–1(d)(3).

Additionally, Kissack does not contend that the statute is

unconstitutional. Kissack’s arguments are directed at the

interpretation of the statute. In this case, a constitutional issue has not

been properly raised either by the respondent declaring the statute

unconstitutional or by an argument of a party on appeal. Accordingly,

the constitutionality of section 5–6–1(d)(3) is not properly before this

court, and we decline to address that subject.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the plain language of

section 5–6–1(d)(3) precludes a sentence of court supervision for

Kissack’s driving under the influence of alcohol conviction. The

respondent has no discretion to depart from the mandatory provisions

of section 5–6–1(d)(3). Accordingly, mandamus relief is granted

directing the respondent to vacate the sentence of court supervision

and impose a sentence in accordance with the Code.

Mandamus awarded.
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JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring:

I agree with the majority that a sentence of court supervision is

not authorized by statute under the circumstances of this case.

Accordingly, I agree that a mandamus order should issue directing

Judge Kinzer to vacate the sentence of court supervision and impose

a sentence in accordance with the law. My reasons for reaching this

conclusion, however, differ from those expressed by the majority.

Section 5–6–1(d)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:

“The provisions of paragraph (c) [which authorize an

order of supervision] shall not apply to a defendant charged

with violating Section 11–501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or

a similar provision of a local ordinance when the defendant

has previously ***

* * *

(3) pleaded guilty to or stipulated to the facts

supporting a charge or a finding of guilty to a violation of

Section 11–503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code [reckless

driving] or a similar provision of a local ordinance or any

similar law or ordinance of another state, and the plea or

stipulation was the result of a plea agreement.” 730 ILCS

5/5–6–1(d)(3) (West 2006).

The State contends, and the majority holds, that the “plea

agreement” referred to in paragraph (3) above means any plea

agreement,regardlessofits terms or basis. Respondent, Kyle Kissack,

however, contends that, pursuant to our decision in People v.

Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d 146 (1989), section 5–6–1(d)(3) has been

interpreted to mean that a sentence of court supervision is prohibited

only if the previous plea of guilty to reckless driving was the result of

a plea agreement whereby a charge of driving under the influence was

reduced or otherwise disposed of. On this point, I agree with

respondent.

In Eckhardt we were asked to decide whether section 5–6–1(d)(3)

violated equal protection guarantees provided by both the United

States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and the Illinois

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). The defendant in Eckhardt

contended that section 5–6–1(d)(3) violated equal protection

principles because it treated those who were found guilty of reckless
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driving pursuant to a plea agreement differently than those who were

convicted of the same offense after entering a blind plea or having

gone to trial, with respect to their eligibility for supervision on a

subsequent section 11–501 (driving under the influence of alcohol)

charge.

Addressing this claim, we first noted that the equal protection

guarantee does not prevent different classes of people from being

treated differently, as long as there is a reasonable basis for

distinguishing the class to which the law applies from the class to

which the statute is inapplicable. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151; People

v. Coleman, 111 Ill. 2d 87, 95 (1986). Thus, we said, a legislative

classification will be upheld against an equal protection challenge if

any set of facts can reasonably be conceived which will sustain the

classification. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at 151. We further noted that,

where a suspect classification or a fundamental right is not involved,

the legislation need only be rationally related to a legitimate state

interest to survive an equal protection challenge. Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d

at 151.

Applying these standards, we initially held that there was a

rational basis for differentiating between persons who have plea

bargained to reckless driving and those who have entered a blind plea

to reckless driving. Plea bargaining typically results in a reduction of

the initial charge. Thus, we concluded that persons who plea

bargained were given some consideration for the agreement to plead

guilty which persons who entered blind pleas did not receive. We

further found that section 5–6–1(d) was rationally related to the

state’s legitimate goal of promoting highway safety. We said:

“The thrust of this statute is to prevent repeat drunk driving

offenders from driving and endangering the lives of motorists

on Illinois highways. This is a legitimate goal that is well

within the State’s police powers.” Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d at

151-52.

We then went on to state:

“The next focus of inquiry is whether the denial of

supervision to those who, pursuant to a plea agreement, have

pled guilty to, or stipulated to facts supporting a charge or a

finding of guilty of, a violation of section 11–503 (reckless
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driving) within the last five years is rationally related to the

goal of highway safety. Reckless driving is a Class B

misdemeanor. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951⁄2, par. 11–503(b).)

Driving under the influence is a Class A misdemeanor for a

first offense in addition to administrative penalties. (Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1985, ch. 951⁄2, par. 11–501(c).) The obvious focus of the

prohibition of supervision found in section 5–6–1(d) of the

Unified Code of Corrections is to preclude supervision not

only to those who had previously been convicted of driving

under the influence, but also to those who had been charged

with that offense and plea bargained for the lesser offense of

reckless driving. A person who has plea bargained to a charge

of reckless driving is thus in a different position from a person

who has entered a blind plea to a reckless driving charge. We

find that section 5–6–1(d) is rationally related to the State’s

legitimate goal of promoting highway safety. In view of our

analysis of the purpose of the statute, we find no equal

protection violation.” (Emphasis added.)Eckhardt, 127 Ill. 2d

at 152-53.

In responding to the equal protection challenge in Eckhardt, we

construed section 5–6–1(d) in a way which would preserve its

constitutionality. Doing so, we held that the statute was rationally

related to a legitimate state interest when applied to “those who had

been charged with [driving under the influence] and plea bargained

for the lesser offense of reckless driving.” The majority errs when it

finds that, in Eckhardt, “we simply made statements about the broad

focus of section 5–6–1(d) in the context of determining whether it

was rationally related to the state’s goal of promoting highway

safety.” Slip op. at 7.

The majorityholds that the Eckhardt court “conclusively resolved

the defendant’s equal protection claim by finding that the groups at

issue were not similarly situated.” Slip op. at 6. The majority then

states that the Eckhardt court “nevertheless went on to find that

section 5–6–1(d) was rationally related to the state’s legitimate goal

of promoting highway safety,” relegating theEckhardt court’s finding

of a rational basis for the legislation to mere dicta which need not be

followed. Slip op. at 6-7. I cannot agree.
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I agree that a person who plea bargains to reckless driving is

differently situated than a person who enters a blind plea or is

prosecuted and convicted of reckless driving. But, as Eckhardt

recognized, the reason why it is appropriate to treat a person who plea

bargains more harshly (denying them supervision) is because of the

presumption that the person who plea bargains to reckless driving

was, in fact, charged with DUI, could have been found guilty on that

charge, but was able to obtain a reduction of that charge. The opposite

is true for a person who enters a blind plea or goes to trial and is

convicted of reckless driving. In these case, the presumption is that

the person was either not charged with DUI or that there was

insufficient evidence to support a conviction for DUI.

The rational basis determination in Eckhardt was not simply

empty musings or meaningless dicta. It was essential to its finding of

constitutionality. Pursuant to Eckhard, the constitutionality of section

5–6–1(d)(3) is sustainable only if the respondent’s previous plea to

reckless driving was part of a plea agreement calculated to avoid a

conviction for DUI. By overruling Eckhardt’s finding of a rational

basis, the majority is calling into question whether the statute survives

equal protection scrutiny. Indeed, the majority’s interpretation renders

the statute potentially unconstitutional.

To the extent that the circuit court interpreted the statute as

requiring the respondent’s prior plea to reckless driving to be part of

a plea agreement to reduce or dismiss a prior charge of DUI, I would

affirm the court’s judgment. I believe, however, that the circuit

court’s application of the statute, as interpreted, to the facts of the

case at bar, was incorrect. The record shows that the State produced

evidence which showed that respondent was charged in 2002 with

DUI and reckless driving. At that time, respondent pled guilty to

reckless driving and the DUI charge was dismissed “pursuant to

agreement.” Although the sentencing statement for this earlier plea

does not explicitly provide that the plea to reckless driving was in

exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss the DUI charge, that is

a reasonable interpretation ofthe court’s 2002 sentencing order. Thus,

section 5–6–1(d)(3), even when interpreted as stated above, applies

in this instance. Accordingly, I join in the majority’s decision to grant

the State’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
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JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.