IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0414

Filed May 17, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C., R.C., and L.C.,

T.W., Mother,

Appellant,

J.C., Father,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Phillip J. Tabor, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother and a father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights to their children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Judd J. Parker of Parker Law Office, Clinton, for appellant mother.

Barbara E. Maness, Davenport, for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and David M. Van Compernolle, 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.

Brian P. Donnelly of Mayer, Lonergan & Rolfes, Clinton, guardian ad litem 

for minor children.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ. Tabor, J., takes 

no part.
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DOYLE, Judge.

A mother and a father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights to their three children. Each challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting termination. We review these claims de novo, giving weight to the 

juvenile court’s fact findings though we are not bound by them. See In re A.B., 

815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). 

The children came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human 

Services (DHS) in August 2015. In September 2015, after both parents tested 

positive for methamphetamine, the children were placed in foster care. The 

juvenile court adjudicated the children to be in need of assistance (CINA) in 

October 2015.

The DHS provided the parents with services designed to reunite the 

family, but neither was able to progress as needed to have the children returned 

to their care. The mother did successfully complete substance abuse treatment,

but she relapsed and was under the influence of methamphetamine while caring 

for the children in October 2016. The father never completed substance abuse 

treatment, and he reportedly attended visits with the children while under the 

influence. Neither parent submitted to drug testing in the months leading up to 

the termination hearing. Both missed visits with the children. Neither adequately 

followed through with recommended mental health treatment. 

Due to the parents’ lack of progress by the end of 2016, the State filed a 

petition seeking to terminate both the mother’s and the father’s parental rights to 

the children. Following a February 2017 hearing, the juvenile court entered its 

order terminating the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section
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232.116(1)(d) and (f) (2016). It terminated the mother’s parental rights to the 

children pursuant to section 232.116(1)(d), (f), and (l). Both parents separately 

appeal.

Before a court may terminate parental rights, the State must prove by 

clear and convincing evidence the existence of one ground for termination listed 

under section 232.116(1). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). 

When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on multiple statutory grounds, 

we may affirm so long as the evidence supports termination on one of the 

grounds. See id. at 707. The court here terminated the mother’s and the father’s 

parental rights to all three children under section 232.116(1)(f). To terminate on 

this ground, the State must prove the following by clear and convincing evidence 

with regard to each child:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of 

assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of 

the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or 

for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home 

has been less than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the 

present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the 

child’s parents as provided in section 232.102.

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). Neither parent disputes the State proved the first 

three elements of section 232.116(1)(f). Each instead argues the evidence is 

insufficient to show the children could not be returned to their care at the time of 

the termination hearing. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (noting “at the present 

time” means “at the time of the termination hearing”). 
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The evidence shows the mother and the father continued to use 

methamphetamine at the time of the termination hearing. Both were under the 

influence of controlled substances during visits with the children. Their 

substance abuse issues place the children at risk if returned to the parents’ care. 

Because each parent’s substance abuse continues unabated, clear and 

convincing evidence establishes the children could not be returned to either 

parent’s care at the time of the termination hearing. Therefore, State proved the 

grounds for terminating both the mother’s and the father’s parental rights under 

section 232.116(1)(f).

Having determined a statutory ground for termination exists, we then 

consider whether termination is in the children’s best interest. See In re A.M., 

843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014). Our primary consideration is the children’s 

safety, the best placement to further their long-term nurturing and growth, and 

the children’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. See id. 

The children’s need for a permanent home is also a primary concern in 

determining their best interests. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 

2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). Accordingly, once the grounds for 

termination exist, time is of the essence. See In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 614 

(Iowa 1987) (“It is unnecessary to take from the children’s future any more than is 

demanded by statute. Stated otherwise, plans which extend the . . . period 

during which parents attempt to become adequate in parenting skills should be 

viewed with a sense of urgency.”); see also In re R.J., 436 N.W.2d 630, 636 

(Iowa 1989) (noting that once the time period for reunification set by the 
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legislature has expired, “patience on behalf of the parent can quickly translate 

into intolerable hardship for the children”). 

Comparing the length of time the parents had to remedy the issues that

led to the children’s removal with the lack of effort and progress each parent

demonstrated clearly shows termination is in the children’s best interests. The 

parents’ past conduct indicates what we may expect from them in the future. 

See In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990); In re D.R.J., 454 N.W.2d 838, 

845 (Iowa 1990). On this record, the prognosis for the children’s return to either 

parent is poor. Children are not equipped with pause buttons; delaying the 

children’s permanency in favor of the parents is contrary to the children’s best 

interests. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 112 (noting children must not be deprived 

permanency on the hope that someday the parent will be able to provide a stable 

home); A.C., 415 N.W.2d at 614 (“The crucial days of childhood cannot be 

suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own 

problems.”). 

The mother also seeks to avoid termination of her parental rights to the 

oldest child under the exception set forth in section 232.116(3)(b). This 

exception provides that the court need not terminate a parent’s rights to a child if 

“[t]he child is over ten years of age and objects to the termination.” Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(b). Although the oldest child is over the age of ten, we are unable 

to find evidence she objected to termination. Rather, the evidence shows the 

child was concerned about returning to either parent’s care and wanted to stay 

with her foster care family, who are interested in adopting. The exception 
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provided in section 232.116(3)(b) is inapplicable. Accordingly, we affirm the 

termination of both the mother’s and the father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.