IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19

- 0515 Filed June 5, 2019

IN THE INTEREST OF G.W., Minor Child, G.W., Father, Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph Seidlin , Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental relationship with his three

year - old son. AFFIRMED.

Edward S. Fishman of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Adel, for appellant father. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.
Karl Wolle of Juvenile Public Defender , Des Moines, attorney and guardian

a d litem for minor child.

Considered by Vogel, C.J. , and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.2

TABOR , Judge

. A father, Gregory, appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental relationship with his son, G.W., who was born in November 2015. The court found Gregory had a “mounting history of domestic violence” and untreated problems
with alcohol and substance abuse , which hindered his ability to parent G.W. On appeal, Gregory contends the State did not prove statutory grounds for
terminatio n , reasonable efforts to reunify, or that termination is in G.W.’ s best interests. Gregory also alleges the court should have denied the petition to terminate based on the closeness of the parent

- child relationship. In the alternative, he asks to delay p ermanency for six months. After an independent review of the record, we share the conclusions of the juvenile court. 1 Gregory is not in a position to be G.W.’s caretaker at the present
time

— he admitted that at the termination hearing. And because his remaining arguments muster no traction, we affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings Gregory has engaged in a pattern of domestic violence over the past
decade. It was his assault on G.W.’s mother, Monica, in the child’s presence that drew the attention of th e Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) in July 2017. 2
The parents also were using controlled substance s and drinking alcohol to excess.

1 We review child

- welfare cases de novo

. In re M.W. , 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016) (citing In re A.M. , 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014)). Clear and convincing evidence must support the juvenile court’s conclusions. Id. (citing In re D.W. , 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010)). Clear and convincing evidence means we harbor no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusion drawn from the evidence. Id. (citing D.W. , 791 N.W.2d at 706). 2 Monica, who suffers from depression , voluntarily gave up her rights to G.W. at the termination hearing.3

Gregory was on probation for cocaine possession at the time of the assault. The court approved the DHS decision to remove G.W. from the parents’ care and placed the toddler with his maternal grandmother

. For the next fourteen months, Gregory did little to improve his parenting skills or his relationship with G.W. He had limited contact with G.W. He participated i n none of the DHS

- recommended services and continued to use drugs frequently and drink alcohol heavily on a daily basis. As the juvenile court observed: “He was relying on Monica to reunite with [G.W.] rather than make the needed changes himself.” Then, in September 201 8, things took a nother turn for the worse. Police investigated another attack by Gregory against Monica. She told officers Gregory grabbed her by the throat with both hands and strangled her until she lost
consciousness. He struck her se veral times in the face. And he strutted around the apartment with a gun, threatening to kill her. Officers noticed marks on her neck and an open cut on her upper lip. They found a .22 caliber magnum revolver
in the couple’s bedroom. Gregory faced char ges of felony domestic abuse strangulation and spent the next three months in the Polk County jail awaiting trial. He was granted pretrial release in late December to attend residential substance

abuse treatment in Fort Dodge. In October 2018, the DHS placed G.W. in the same household as his three
older half

- brothers, who live with their father and his girlfriend. The case worker reported G.W. was h appy with his siblings and well

- adjusted to that home. At the termination hearing in January 2019, Gregory invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege on all of the assistant county attorney’s question s about the4

assault on G.W.s mother. In doing so, he exuded a hostility to the process and a fundamental misunderstanding about the impact of his criminality o n his relationship with his son, saying “ Can we get to the fact that it’ s about my child? It’s not about me and this criminal charge, like for real .” He also complained that the State “badgering” him about his criminal charges was “counterproductive to

w hat he was trying to do for [himself] right now.” The juvenile court terminated parental rights in a February 2019 order. Gregory now appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Statutory Grounds To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must first find clear and
convinci ng evidence supporting one of the grounds for termination listed under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2018)

. See D.W. , 791 N.W.2d at 706. In G.W. ’s case, the court found the State me t its burden under paragraphs (e ) and (h). To affirm, we need only find sufficient proof under one o f th os e paragraphs

. See In re S.R. , 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). We focus on paragraph (h). 3 Gregory makes a barebones assertion in his petition on appeal that he disagrees with the juvenile court’s sufficiency finding.
Yet at the termination hearing he agreed with the assistan t county attorney that he

3 Termination under this subsection requires proof the child (1) i s three years of age or younger; (2) has been adjudicated a child in need of assist ance pursuant to section 232.96; (3) h as been removed from th e physical custody of the child’ s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days ; and (4) cannot be return ed to the custody of the parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.5

could not assume custody of G.W. at the tim e of the hearing. 4 See A.M. , 843 N.W.2d at 111 (describing “present time” as the time of the hearing). Gregory faced domestic abuse charges and was only beginning to address his aggression
and substance

- abuse issues. Because no element of section 232.11 6(1)(h) is truly at issue, we affirm on this ground.
B. Best Interests and Parent - Child Bond Having found clear and convincing evidence to support terminating Gregory’s parental rights under secti on 232.116(1)(h), we turn to his claim that ending the father

- son relationship is not in G.W.’s best interests. In making the
best

- interests determination, we give primary consideration to G.W. ’s safety, the
b est placement for furthering his long

- term nurturing and growth, as well as h is phys ical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. See In re P.L. , 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2) ). Safety and the need for a permanent home mark the “defining elements in a child’s best interest.” In re J.E ., 723 N.W.2d 793 , 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). After considering the pertinent factors, we are convinced w aiting for his father to deal with alcoholism, substance abuse, and his penchant to commit domestic violence is not in G.W.’s best interests. See P.L. , 778 N.W.2d at 38 (“A stable, loving homelife is essential to a child ’ s physical, emotional, and spiritual
well

- being.” (citation omitted)). Gregory next contends the closeness of the parent

- child relationship should preclude termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). The record does not

4 Gregory resisted having his rights terminated but testified , “I want to give my parental rights to my mother.”6

support that contention. Even before he went to jail, Gregory had little contact with G.W. The case worker testified G.W. “probably recognizes Greg” but she did not believe they had a strong connection. An y bond between G.W. and Gregory does not outweigh the grounds for termination. C. Reasonable Efforts The DHS is required to “make every reasonable effort ” to return the child
h ome as quickly as possible consistent with the child’s best interests

. Iowa Code § 232.102(7); In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). We focus on the services provided by the State and the parent’s response, not on services the parent now claims the DHS failed to provide

. C.B. , 611 N.W.2d at 494

. Gregory contends the DHS did not make reasonable effort s to reunite the family because the agency did not facilitate visitation with G.W. while Gregory was in jail, failed initially to send notices to paternal relatives, and did not assist Gregory in obtaining health insurance and transportation. The termination ruling addressed only the jail visitation issue, finding the DHS decision not to set up interactions was
reasonable consider ing the factors in In re S.J. , 620 N.W.2d 522, 524 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000). The DHS worker testi fied she did not recommend visitation because Gregory did not have contact with G.W. for “a significant amount of time” before he was incarcerated. She said the jail had no visiting room and communication through a monitor would not have been “productive.” She also considered the seriousness of the offense for which Gr egory was incarcerated.
T he worker’s conclusion that video communication would not have been meaningful appears unsubstantiated . Other witnesses testified to having pleasant “video chats” with the child. But on balance, like the juvenile court, we acce pt the7

DHS decision not to offer Gregory visitation while he was awaiting trial for a violent assault on G.W.’s mother. On the issue of relative notice, I owa Code section 232.84(2) requires the DHS to “exercise due diligence in identifying an d providing notice to the child’ s grandparents, aunts, uncles, adult siblings, and adult relat ives suggested by the child’ s parents ” within thirty days after the entry of an order transferring custody of a child to an agency for placement

. See In re R.B., 832 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (holding statutory language “ places the onus on the department rather than the parents to identify relatives subject to notification ”)

. The case
worker testified she did not send timely notices to Gregory’s relatives because G.W. “was placed with a stable family member already.” It appears the worker misunderstood her obligation under the statute. The assistant county attorney acknowledged at the hearing it was “ unfortunate” relative notice did not happen in this case, but insisted the Sta te had still met its reasonable efforts requirement.
In R.B. , our court grappled with the appropriate remedy for a violation of section 232.84(2). Id . at 382. We reasoned “ th e father is hard

- pressed to show that he suffered injust ice by virtue of the department’ s failure to notify his mother ”
because he did not contest the grounds for termination

. Id

. The situation is comparable here. Gregory does not explain how notice wou ld have aided his ability to reunite with G.W. A similar disconnect exists with Gregory’s mention of insurance and transportation issues. Because he does not fully explore the import of these services, we decline to grant relief on the issue of reasonabl e efforts.8

D. Delay in Permanency As a final issue, Gregory asserts he “should have been granted a six

- month extension rather than having his rights terminated.” But he offers no supporting rationale for his assertion. To continue placement for an addit ional six months , Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) requires the juvenile court to determine the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the extension. In considering a delay in permanency , the court must bear in mind “if the plan fails, all extended time must be subtracted from an already shortened life for the children in a better home.” In re A.A.G ., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92

– 93 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). We do not favor delaying permanency for G.W

. Gregory has a long track record of domestic violence and substance
abuse. He has not come close to resolving these concerns. The record does not
show six more months of services would prevent termination.
AFFIRMED.