alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2763 Reported in House (RH)]

<DOC>

                                                 Union Calendar No. 154
116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2763

                          [Report No. 116-196]

    To prohibit the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 
                      implementing certain rules.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 15, 2019

 Ms. Garcia of Texas (for herself, Mr. Garcia of Illinois, Ms. Ocasio-
  Cortez, Ms. Escobar, and Mr. Correa) introduced the following bill; 
       which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

                           September 6, 2019

Additional sponsors: Ms. Pressley, Mrs. Trahan, Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney 
 of New York, Mr. Raskin, Mr. Schiff, Ms. Brownley of California, Mr. 
    Thompson of California, Mr. Vargas, Ms. Roybal-Allard, and Mr. 
                               DeSaulnier

                           September 6, 2019

  Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 
       House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on May 15, 
                                 2019]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To prohibit the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 
                      implementing certain rules.

 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Keeping Families Together Act of 
2019''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION.

    The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may not implement, 
administer, enforce, or in any manner make effective the proposed rule 
entitled ``Housing and Community Development Act of 1980: Verification 
of Eligible Status'', issued by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development on May 10, 2019 (Docket No. FR-6124-P-01), or any final 
rule based substantially on such proposed rule.
                                                 Union Calendar No. 154

116th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 2763

                          [Report No. 116-196]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

    To prohibit the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from 
                      implementing certain rules.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           September 6, 2019

  Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 
       House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed
```
#### People v Montgomery

4th Dept: 140 AD3d 1662 (Monroe)

denied 8/23/16 (Rivera, J.)
Exhibit 23.1

Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm Consent

We consent to
the incorporation by reference in the registration statement of Escalade,
Incorporated (Company) on Form S-8 (File Nos. 33-16279, 333-52475, 333-52477,
333-142756 and 333-142757) of our report dated March 27, 2009, on our audits of
the consolidated financial statements of the Company as of December 27, 2008
and December 29, 2007, and for each of the three years in the period ended
December 27, 2008, which report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.

|                    | 
|------------------- | 
|/s/ BKD, LLP        | 
|                    | 
|BKD, LLP            | 
|Evansville, Indiana | 
|March 27,
  2009    | 

---
**Exhibit
      32.1**




**CERTIFICATION**




The
      undersigned officer of Albany Molecular Research, Inc. (the “Company”)
      hereby certifies to his knowledge that the Company’s quarterly report on
      Form 10-Q to which this certification is attached (the “Report”), as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies
      with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and that the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. This
      certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and
      Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K (“Item 601(b)(32)”) promulgated
      under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and the
      Exchange Act. In accordance with clause (ii) of Item 601(b)(32), this
      certification (A) shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of
      Section 18 of the Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of
      that section, and (B) shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference
      into any filing under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, except to the
      extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.




Date:
                August 7, 2008/s/
                Thomas E. D’AmbraName:
                Thomas E. D’Ambra, Ph.D.Title:
                Chairman of the Board, President andChief Executive
                Officer
# C_2014175EN.01004501.xml

| 10.6.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 175/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.6.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 175/45

---

Order of the President of the General Court of 4 February 2014 — Serco Belgium and Others v Commission

(Case T-644/13 R)

((Interim proceedings - Public procurement - Tendering procedure - Rejection of a tender - Application for suspension of operation - Prima facie case))

2014/C 175/62

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicants: Serco Belgium SA (Brussels, Belgium); SA Bull NV (Brussels); and Unisys Belgium SA (Brussels) (represented by: V. Ost and M. Vanderstraeten, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: S. Delaude, L. Cappelletti and F. Moro, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for, first, suspension of operation of the decision of the Commission of 30 October 2013 rejecting the tender submitted by the consortium formed by the applicants in the public tendering procedure DIGIT/R2/PO/2012/026 — ITIC-SM (IT service management for the integrated and consolidated IT desktop environment of the European Commission) (OJ 2012/S 69 — 112095) and awarding the contract to another consortium, secondly, an order that the Commission refrain from concluding the framework contract at issue and from concluding specific contracts under that framework contract and, thirdly, the grant of any other appropriate interim measures.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The application for interim measures is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The application for interim measures is dismissed.

| 2. | Costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Costs are reserved.

---
No. 09-9754.

#### Vernon Daniels, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1079, 131 S. Ct. 635,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9096.

178 L. Ed. 2d 510,

November 29, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Same case below, 345 Fed. Appx. 514.
# C_2013215EN.01001702.xml

| 27.7.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 215/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 215/17

---

Action brought on 28 May 2013 — Nordex Holding/OHIM — Fontana Food (Taverna MEDITERRANEAN WHITE CHEESE)

(Case T-301/13)

2013/C 215/25

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Nordex Holding A/S (Dronninglund, Denmark) (represented by: M. Kleis, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Fontana Food AB (Tyresö, Sweden)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the First Board of Appeal’s decision of 1 March 2013 in Case R 2604/2011-1; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the First Board of Appeal’s decision of 1 March 2013 in Case R 2604/2011-1;

| — | Annul the Cancellation Division’s decision of 21 October 2011 No 4892 C, which preceded the adoption of the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the Cancellation Division’s decision of 21 October 2011 No 4892 C, which preceded the adoption of the contested decision;

| — | Order the Office to pay the costs, including those incurred in the appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Office to pay the costs, including those incurred in the appeal proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Registered Community trade mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity has been sought: The figurative mark containing the word elements ‘Taverna MEDITERRANEAN WHITE CHEESE’ — Community trade mark registration No 3 600 285

Registered Community trade mark in respect of which a declaration of invalidity has been sought:

Proprietor of the Community trade mark: The applicant

Proprietor of the Community trade mark:

Applicant for the declaration of invalidity of the Community trade mark: The other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Applicant for the declaration of invalidity of the Community trade mark:

Grounds for the application for a declaration of invalidity: The grounds of the request for a declaration of invalidity were those laid down in Articles 53(1)(a) and 8(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 207/2009

Grounds for the application for a declaration of invalidity:

Decision of the Cancellation Division: Declared the contested Community trade mark partially invalid

Decision of the Cancellation Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissed the appeal

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Articles 53(1)(a) in conjunction with 8(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 207/2009.

Pleas in law:

---
#### Ellen LoCurto, Appellant, v City of New York, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 25]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Betty Owen Stinson, J.), entered June 17, 2002, which, in an action for personal injuries sustained when plaintiff, after putting money in a parking meter, tripped and fell traversing a strip of grass and dirt between the curb and the paved sidewalk, granted defendant City of New York’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We are in accord with the other Departments that a grassy area between a curb and a paved sidewalk is part of the sidewalk, as defined in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 144 *(see Zizzo v City of New York,*176 AD2d 722 [2d Dept 1991]; *Castiglione v Village of Ellenville,*291 AD2d 769, 770 [3d Dept 2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 604 [2002]; *Hall v City of Syracuse,*275 AD2d 1022 [4th Dept 2000]). Accordingly, the City’s Pothole Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-201) applies *(see Zizzo, id.),*requiring a showing that the City had prior written notice of the alleged hole in the ground, or created the hole through an *278affirmative act of negligence, or made a special use of the grassy area that conferred a benefit (see *Torres v City of New York,*306 AD2d 191, 194 [2003]). Admittedly, the City did not have prior written notice, and we reject plaintiff’s expert’s conclusory opinion that the siting of the meters was an affirmative act of negligence that caused heavy traffic on the grassy strip and thus the dangerous condition that caused plaintiff’s fall *(cf. Zizzo, supra).*Certainly, the grassy strip may have been traversed by pedestrians for reasons completely unrelated to the meters. Moreover, even if it were assumed that the installation of parking meters adjacent to a grassy area is a departure from some accepted standard of safety, such an assumption would not permit a reasonably reliable inference that the hole that caused plaintiff’s fall was a consequence of such a departure rather than normal deterioration over time *(see Cardona v City of New York,*305 AD2d 303 [2003]). Nor does it avail plaintiff to argue that the parking meters constitute a special use of the grassy area that confer a benefit on the City, where she does not show that the hole on which she tripped emanated from a parking meter. To hold otherwise would be to make actionable any defect in any sidewalk along which parking meters are placed. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Lerner and Marlow, JJ.
No. 137,

Original.

#### State of Montana, Plaintiff v. State of Wyoming and State of North Dakota.

562 U.S. 979, 131 S. Ct. 442,

178 L. Ed. 2d 319,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8187.

October 18, 2010.

Montana’s motion for partial summary judgment granted in part and denied in part without prejudice in accordance with the Special Master’s First Interim Report, and Anadarko Petroleum’s motion for leave to intervene denied.

Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
No. 10-5654.

#### Desman Stanley, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 917, 131 S. Ct. 333,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6920.

178 L. Ed. 2d 216,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 376 Fed. Appx. 933.
EXHIBIT 31

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(Rule 13a-14(a) / 15d-14(a))

I,
Leslie J. Jezuit, certify that:

|                         |  |                                                                          
|------------------------ |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: September 15, 2008 |  | /s/LESLIE J. JEZUITLeslie J. Jezuit
President and Chief Executive Officer

---



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
(Rule 13a-14(a) / 15d-14(a))

I,
Daniel P. Gorey, certify that:

|                         |  |                                                                                        
|------------------------ |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: September 15, 2008 |  | /s/DANIEL P. GOREYDaniel P. Gorey
Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
and Treasurer

---
#### Elizabeth McDonald, Appellant, v Josephine Lengel, Respondent.

[770 NYS2d 194]

*1183Crew III, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Relihan, Jr., J.), entered April 14, 2003 in Broome County, which, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

In August 2001, plaintiff and her mother, Mary McDonald, entered into a contract to purchase certain real property owned by defendant in Broome County. When plaintiff and McDonald were unable to obtain a mortgage commitment within the 30-day period specified in the contract, defendant refused to complete the sale, prompting McDonald to commence an action for specific performance. Following McDonald’s repeated failure to comply with various discovery demands, Supreme Court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the action brought by McDonald and, upon appeal, we affirmed *(McDonald v Lengel, 2*AD3d 774 [2003]). In the interim, plaintiff commenced this virtually identical action against defendant seeking specific performance of the underlying real estate contract. Defendant thereafter moved to dismiss contending, inter alia, that the instant action is barred by res judicata. Supreme Court, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion, prompting this appeal by plaintiff.

We affirm. Although plaintiff indeed is correct in arguing that Supreme Court erred in dismissing the complaint based upon principles of collateral estoppel, defendant is equally correct that a valid, alternate basis for dismissal exists—namely, res judicata. In this regard, the case law makes clear that “[t]he doctrine of res judicata bars litigation between the same parties, or others in privity, of any cause of action arising out of the same transaction which either was or could have been asserted in the prior proceeding” *(Matter of State of New York v Town of Hardenburgh,*273 AD2d 769, 772 [2000]; *see Beck v Eastern Mut. Ins. Co.,*295 AD2d 740, 741 [2002]).

Here, plaintiff plainly is in privity with McDonald, as evidenced by the relevant contract documents bearing both their names and signatures. Additionally, plaintiffs action for specific performance, which essentially is identical to the prior action brought against defendant by McDonald, undeniably arises out of the same underlying real estate transaction and, clearly, plaintiff could have joined McDonald as a plaintiff in her action. *1184Finally, as a review of the record reveals that the McDonald action was dismissed “on the merits,” Supreme Court’s decision in that regard is entitled to preclusive effect. Accordingly, plaintiff’s action for specific performance is barred by res judicata. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the alternate bases for dismissal raised by the parties.

Cardona, P.J., Mugglin, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
No. 10-7670.

#### Clyde Austin Gray, Jr., Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1158, 131 S. Ct. 957,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 88.

178 L. Ed. 2d 789,

January 10, 2011.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 393 Fed. Appx. 971.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2529 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2529

 To amend title XI of the Social Security Act with respect to certain 
  criminal penalties for acts involving the medicare program or State 
                         health care programs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

            October 6 (legislative day, September 12), 1994

  Mr. Graham introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title XI of the Social Security Act with respect to certain 
  criminal penalties for acts involving the medicare program or State 
                         health care programs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR ACTS INVOLVING THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 
              OR STATE HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS.

    Section 1128B(b)(3) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-
7b(b)(3)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (D);
            (2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (E) 
        and inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
            ``(F)(i) any premium payment made to a health insurer or 
        health maintenance organization by a State agency in connection 
        with a demonstration project operated under the State medicaid 
        program pursuant to section 1115 with respect to individuals 
        participating in such project; or
            ``(ii) any payment made by a health insurer or a health 
        maintenance organization to a sales representative or a 
        licensed insurance agent for the purpose of servicing, 
        marketing, or enrolling individuals participating in such 
        demonstration project in a health plan offered by such an 
        insurer or organization.''.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



EXHIBIT 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

We, Jeffrey A. Ludrof, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and Philip A. Garcia, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1350, that:



| | (1) |  | The Annual Report on Form 10-K of
the Company for the annual period December 31, 2003 (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and
| | --- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.                                                                           

/s/ Jeffrey A. Ludrof
Jeffrey A. Ludrof
President & Chief Executive Officer

/s/ Philip A. Garcia
Philip A. Garcia
Executive VP & Chief Financial Officer

March 4, 2004

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Erie Family Life
Insurance Company and will be retained by Erie Family Life Insurance Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

96
No. 10-7713.

#### Roy Keith Lucas, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1159, 131 S. Ct. 961,

2011 U.S. LEXIS 522,

178 L. Ed. 2d 792,

January 10, 2011.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 376 Fed. Appx. 305.
No. 10-5625.

#### James E. Dailey, Petitioner v. Mike Martel, Warden.

562 U.S. 1045, 131 S. Ct. 596,

178 L. Ed. 2d 437,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8956.

November 15, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 369 Fed. Appx. 782.