UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN P. HASSMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 00-1104

LOUIS CALDERA, in his official

capacity as the Secretary of the

Army,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge.

(CA-99-386-A)

Submitted: July 20, 2000

Decided: August 22, 2000

Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges,

and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

George M. Chuzi, KALIJARVI, CHUZI & NEWMAN, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney,

Joel E. Wilson, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria,

Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Steven P. Hassman appeals the district court's orders granting summary judgment to the Secretary of the Army ("Army") on Hassman's

claims of religious and national origin discrimination and reprisal

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e

to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.

Hassman raises three claims on appeal, alleging that the district

court erred in: (1) ruling that the Army's decision not to recommend

Hassman for an extension of his overseas tour did not constitute an

actionable adverse personnel action; (2) ruling that Hassman failed to

show that the Army's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for declining to give Hassman an acting program manger position

were pretextual; and (3) finding that a written statement by Hassman's wife containing her account of a conversation with her supervisor constituted inadmissible hearsay.

First, we uphold the district court's determination that the Army's

decision not to recommend Hassman for an extension of his overseas

tour did not constitute an actionable adverse employment action. Title

VII does not regulate all activities in the workplace; rather, it regulates only adverse employment decisions. See Boone v. Goldin, 178

F.3d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1999); Page v. Bolger , 645 F.2d 227, 233

(4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Thus, Hassman is only protected against

discrimination with regard to "ultimate employment decisions such as

hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating."

Page, 645 F.2d at 233. Our review of the record convinces us that

Hassman was hired subject to the terms of the Army's tour rotation

policy and remained under the policy during his employment. Further,

we note that Hassman has retained his position, performs the same

duties, and receives the same pay as he did prior to the allegedly dis-

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criminatory acts. Accordingly, we find that Hassman has not suffered

an adverse employment action.

Second, we find that the district court did not err in finding that

Hassman failed to show that the Army's nondiscriminatory reasons

for declining to detail Hassman to an acting program manager position were pretextual. The record indicates that Hassman stated that he

would not accept a similar position without a promotion to GS-13.

Because the program manager positions were both classified as GS12 and did not involve an increase in grade or salary, we find that the

Army reasonably concluded that Hassman would not be interested in

these positions. Additionally, we find that Hassman failed to provide

sufficient evidence to show: (1) the duties and qualifications of the

new positions; (2) that he was qualified for the positions; and (3) that

he was more qualified for the positions than the selected candidates.

See Taylor v. Virginia Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999)

(holding that to successfully challenge the selection of another candidate, the litigant must establish that he is better qualified for the position), cert. denied, ___, U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1243 (2000).

Finally, we find that the district court correctly concluded that Mrs.

Hassman's proffered statement was inadmissible hearsay not falling

within any exception to the hearsay rule. Mrs. Hassman's statement

described a conversation with her supervisor, Major Zeleznik, regarding Hassman's employment. Hassman contends that the statement is

admissible as an admission made by a party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agent's employment pursuant

to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). In order for a statement to constitute

a party admission, however, the proponent for admission must produce independent evidence showing that the scope of the declarant's

authority included the matters discussed in the alleged conversation.

See Precision Piping & Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours

& Co., 951 F.2d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 1991). Despite ample opportunity, Hassman was unable to produce any independent evidence

showing that the scope of Major Zeleznik's authority included any

matters related to Hassman's employment.

Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the district court. We deny

Hassman's motion to file a supplemental brief. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-

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sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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