### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 27, 200 7

BOBBY A. DA VIS v. HOWA RD CA RLT ON, WAR DEN

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Johnson County

No. 5074 Lynn W. Brown , Judge

No. E2007-01279-CC A-R3- HC - F iled Fe bruary 4, 2008

The pro se petitioner, B obby A. Davis, a

ppeals the summar

y dismiss al of his petitio n for writ of ha be a s c or pu s, a rguin g that hi s a g g ra va te d r a pe a nd a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

c on vic tio ns a re vo id d

ue to various def

ects in the indictments. Following our re view, we aff irm the summary

dismiss al of the petition.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined. Bobby A. Davis, Mountain City , Tenne ssee, Pro Se. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; and Da vid H. Findley , Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

I n 1991 the petitioner and his c odefe ndant, Rodney Tipton, w ere eac h convi ct ed of ag g ravated ra

pe and a g g ravated robbe ry and rece ived ef

fec tive sentenc es of thirty -three y ear s. The petitioner’s c onvictions were aff irmed by this court on direc t appea l, and our supreme c ourt denied his application for permission to appea l. See S tate v. Davis, 872 S.W .2d 950 (Tenn. Crim. App.) , perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn. 1993). Our direct appeal opi nion provides the following acc ount of the c ri me s:
The proof adduce d at trial reve als that on the evening of J anuar y 7, 1991, the victim went to the Red Food St ore f rom her mother ’s house a t approxim ately 11:30 p.m. She hear d a ca

r drive up f

ast behind her . At that time, a m an tapped he r-2-

window, jerke d o p en h er door, stuck a ha ndg un in her side a

nd said, “Move ove r, bitch.” This man had on a ski mask. She g ave him the ke y s as he de manded, a nd he started the c ar a

nd drove out of the lot.

She later sa

w the fa ce of this man and identified hi m as the [petitioner]. He
ma de he r b lin df

old he rs e lf wi th a be a c h to we l sh e ha d in he r c a r. She he a rd a sma ll
car following them. L ater

that evening , she wa s able to see t h e fa ce of the sec ond man, and she identified him as the appe llant Tipton.

I n the cour se of the evening , the appe llants drove the victim ar ound stopping
a t in te rv a ls at w hic h ti me s sh e wa s re pe a te dly ra pe d va g ina lly a nd

a na lly , f or c e d to pe rf or m f e lla tio a nd threa te ne d at g un

po int . T he vic timwa s ta ke n to a mot e l ju st
a c ro ss t he No rt h Ca ro lin a state -l ine a nd wa s fur

the r r a pe d. She re ma ine d in

c a pti vit y throug hout the following day until one of her c apt o rs wr ecked her vehicle a

nd
e ve ntu a ll y

too k h e r t o a

no the r m ote l in

Swe e tw a te r, wh e re the vic timmana g e d to
esca pe.

I d. at 952. The pe titioner later filed a petiti on for post-conviction relief , which the post-c onviction court dismiss ed as untimely

. This c ourt aff irmed the dismiss al of the petition for post-conviction re lief,
a nd our s up re me c ourt

de nie d th e pe tit ion e r’ s a

pp lic a tio n fo r pe rm iss ion to a pp e a l. Se e B ob by

Da vis v. State, No. E2006-00667- CCA-R3-PC, 2006 W L2684820, at *1 (Ten n . Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2006), per

m. to appeal de nied (Te nn. J an. 29, 2007). On April 23, 2007, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of ha beas c orpus, alleg ing that his convictions wer e void due to various defec ts in the charg ing instruments. S pecif ically , he
asser ted that the trial court lacke d subject matter jur isdiction or leg al authority to rende r judg ment on the ag g ravated ra

pe convic tion because: (1 ) t he convic tion stemmed from an improper
am en d m en tt o the origi n al i n d i ct m en t , wh i ch h ad ch ar ged t h e p et i t i o n er wi t h aggr av at ed k i dn ap p i n g; (2) the tr ial court substantively altere d the cha rg ing te rms of the indictment by its inst ructions to the jur y , w hic h a llo we d th e jur

y to c on vic t the pe tit ion e r ba se d on fi nd ing s th a t he e ith e r c a us e d b od ily injury to the victim or was aided and abetted by another ; and (3) the indictment failed to a lleg e the
mens rea of t he crime. The pe titioner asserte d that the trial cour t lacked subje ct matter jurisdiction or leg al authority to enter judgme nt on the agg ravated robbery conviction bec ause of an improper amendment to that indictment, which c harg ed him with taking “ a 1980 Pontiac F irebird” in addition to the items alleg ed in the orig inal indictment.
Among the documents the pe titioner attache d in suppo rt of his petition were the two indictmen t s in his case. Indictment No. C-5588, issued on April 15, 1991, cha rg ed that the pe tit ion e r “ did

un lawf ull y a nd fo rc ibl y , w hil e a rm e d w itha we apo n, to- wi t: A ha

nd g un , s e xua lly penetr ate [t he victim] , in violation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated Sec tion 39-13-502[.] ” Indictment No. C-5707, issued the same day and sig ned by

the same g rand jur y fo re m an , char g ed that the-3-

petitioner “did unlaw fully and knowing ly obtain proper ty , a purse and conte nts, from the per son of [the vic tim ] by vio le nc e a nd a c c omp a nie d by the us e of a de a dly we a po n, to- wi t: Aha

nd g un , a s a result of whic h [ t h e v i ct i m ] s u ffered se rious bodily injury . . . .” The petitioner attac hed the two jud g me nts c or

re sp on din g to t

ho se ind ic tme nts , w hic h s ho w that he wa s con vi cte d in Ca se No . C5588 of ag g ravated ra

pe and in Case No. C-5707 of a g g ravated robbe ry . He a lso attache d two order s of the trial c ourt amending the i ndictments. An order entered on November 5, 1991, and appr oved by the di strict attorney g ener al and counsel for the petitioner, amended Indictment No. C-5707 by the inclusion of the wor ds “and a 1980 Pontiac Fire bird automobile.” Anothe r orde r, ente red on Au g us t 13 , 1 99 1, in C a se No . C- 55 88 , s ta te s:

This cause came on to be hea rd o n t he 13th day of Aug ust, 1991, upon the motion to ame n d t h e i ndictment to char g e ag g ravated ra pe filed by

the State, the defe ndant being repr esente d by Kevin Shepher d, As s i s tant Public Defe nder f or B lou nt C ounty

a nd the Sta te be ingre pr e se nte d b y th e Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l. After hear ing a rg ument from counse l for both par ties, the Court is of t he opinion that the motion is well taken and it is approve d.

The State responde d with a motion to dismiss , ar gu ing, int e r a lia , that the petitioner’s alleg ations, even taken as true , would rende r the c onvictio n s mere ly voidable. On Ma

y 24, 2007, the ha be a s c ourt

summa ri ly dis mis se d th e pe tit ion , c on c lud ingthat no ne of the a ll ega tio ns wo uld support a finding by

the cour t that the petitioner’s c onvictions wer e void or his sentenc es expired. Th e pe tit ion e r n owa

pp e a ls the ha

be a s c ourt ’s or de r o f s umm a ry dis mis sa l.

AN AL YSI S Whether the pe titioner is entitled to habeas c orpus re lief i s a q u es t i o n of law. Summers v. State, 212 S.W .3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007); Har t v. State, 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000) . As such,
our r e vie w i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss give n to t h e trial court’ s findings a nd conclusions. I d.

I t is we ll- e sta

bli sh e d in Te nn e sse e that th e re me dy pr ov ide d b y

a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s is limit ed in scope and may only be invoked whe re the judgme nt is void or the petitioner’s term of imprisonment ha s expired. Fa ulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W .3d 624, 629 (Tenn. 2000) ; State v. Davenpor t, 980 S. W

. 2 d 4 0 7 , 4 09 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The judgme nt of a court of g ener al jurisdiction is conclusive and presumed to be valid, and such a judg ment can only be impeac hed if the r ecor d aff irmatively

shows that the re nderingcourt was without persona l or subject matter jurisdiction. Ar cher v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 162 (Tenn. 1993). A void, as oppose d to a voidable, judgme nt is “one that is fac ially invalid beca

use the c ourt did not have the statutory authority to rende r such judg ment.” Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 256 (citing Dy kes v. Compton, 978 S.W .2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998) ). A petitioner bea rs the burde n of establishing a

void judgment or

illega l confineme nt by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidence. Wy att v. Sta te , 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 3 1 9 , 3 2 2 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0 )

. F u rt h e r m o r e , w h e n “ a h a

b e a s c o r p u s p e t i t i o n f

a ils to-4-

e sta bli shtha t a jud g me nt is vo id, a tr ia l c ourt may dis mis s th e pe tit ion wi tho ut a he a ri ng .” Sum me rs , 212 S.W .3d at 260 (c iting Hog an v. Mills, 168 S.W .3d 753, 755 (Tenn. 2005) ).

Th e pe tit ion e r fi rs t ar g ue s tha t the tr ia l cou rt la c ke d sub

je c t matt e r j ur isd ic tio n o r a uth or ity to rende r judg ment on the conviction for ag g ravated rape beca use “the conviction stemmed fr om an a m e n d m e n t t o t h e o r i g i n a l i n d i c t m e n tc h a r g i n g [ t h e p e t i t i o n e r ] w i t h a g g r a v a t e d k i dn a p p i n g [

. ] ” In
su pp or t, h e re lie s n ot o nly on the e xhibi ts he a tta c he d to h is p e tit ion , b ut a lso on do c ume nts he did
no t pr ov ide to the ha

be a s cou rt : his a rr e st w a rr a nt c ha

rg inghim wi th a g g ra

vate d k idn a

pp inga nd his Marc h 26, 1991, “Notice of De fenda nt’s Claim to R ight of

Speedy Trial,” in which his trial counsel stated that the petitioner had been incar cer ated on the char g e of a g g ravated kidnapping in Case No. C-5588. The pe titioner sugg ests, based on the se docume nts, that the trial court ha d the ag g ravated rape indictment entere d nunc pro tunc to r efle ct the date of April 15, 1991, afte r ruling on the State’s motion to amend the ag g ravated ki dnapping indictment. He a sserts that he did not ag ree to have the orig inal indictment f

or ag g ravated kidnapping transfor med into a

n indictment f

or ag g ravated ra

pe.

T h e S tate ar g ues, int e r a lia , t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f o n t h e b a s i s of thi s c la im b e c a

us e the re c or d sho ws tw o fa c ia lly va lid ind ic tme nts a nd tw o c or re sp on din g jud g me nts

. We ag ree with the State. The pe titioner alleg es that he w as orig inally i n d i ct ed for a g g ravated k id n a p p in g a n d

th a t t h e in d ic tm e n t w a s late r

ame n d e d , w it

h o u t h is c o n s e n t, to a n in d ic tm e n t f or ag g ravated rape

. Howeve r, there is nothing in the rec ord to support these c laims. I n Summers, our
su pr e me c ourt str e sse d that it is the pe tit ion e r wh o be a rs the burd e n of pr ov ing that he is e nti tle d to ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f: The habeas corpus s tatutes place the burde n of proving entitlement to relief up on the pe tit ion e r. Ten ne sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 2 9- 21 -1 09 pr ov ide s in pertinent pa

rt: “I f, from the showing of t he petitioner , the pl ai n t i ff wo u ld not be
e nti tle d to a ny re lie f, the wr it [of ha be a s c or pu s] may be re fu se d.

. . .” (Emph a sis added) . . . . More r ece ntly , . . . we have re iterate d that when a habea s corpus pe tition fails to establish that a judg ment is void, a trial court may d i s miss the petition without a hear ing.

Sum m er s, 212 S.W .3d at 260 (c itations omi tted). Thus, bec ause the judgme nt in Sum mers wa s fac ially valid and Summers fa iled to s u p p o rt his alleg ations with documents from the unde rly ing proce eding s, the court c oncluded that summary dismiss al of the pe tition was proper. I d. at 262.

Her e, likewise, the petitioner ha s not supported his alleg ation that an ag g ravated kidnapping indictment was improper ly amende d to an i ndictment for ag g ravated rape wit h any proof f rom the
rec ord of the pr ocee dings. The Augus t 13, 1991, order of the trial cour

t amending the indictment to ag g ravated ra

pe conta ins no refe renc e to what wa s char g ed in the orig inal indictment. The pe tit ion e r a sse rt s that his “ e ff or ts to s e c ur e the or ig ina l in dic tme nt i n Ca se No . C- 55 88 c ha rg inghim with ag g ra v ated kidnapping have bee n hamstrung by the loss of the re cord c ompiled on direct appea l.” Thus, he ur g es this court to esche w a na rrow r eadingof Summers a nd to a ppoint counsel to help with his problem. We note, howeve r, t hat t he petiti oner did not ra ise the alleg edly improper-5-

amendment of the indictment as an issue on dire ct appe al. See Da vis, 872 S.W .2d at 950. Had suc h an improper amendment of the indictment occur

red, w e think it unlikely

that trial counsel would not have raised it a s an issue befor e this court. Reg ardle ss, it remains the petitioner’s bur den to prove his alleg ations in a habe as cor pus petition, and he has f ailed to do so.

The petitioner next contends that the trial court c onstructively amende d the ag g ravated ra pe ind ic tme nt b y

its ins tr uc tio ns to t

he jur y , w hic h all ow e d the jur

y to fi nd him

g uil ty ba se d o n a lte rn a te theories of

the offe nse fr om the one alleg ed in the indictment. The State argues that err oneous jury instructions would at most render a j udg ment voidable and not void. We, ag ain, ag ree with the State.

This court has r epeatedly found that er

roneous j u ry

instructions do not form the basis for habea s corpus re lief. See Ronald Eug ene G ilmore v. Kenne th L ocke, War den, No. M2005-01235- CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 1097 4 9 3 , at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Ma r. 30, 2006) ( “‘Er

roneous jury instructi o n s m ee t n o n e of the . . . require ments for ha beas c orpus re lief. The only method of collater ally

attackingthe judg ment beca use of c onstitut ional deprivations occasioned by err oneous jury instructions is by

peti t i o n for post convic tion relief.’ ”) ( quoting Willie Edward Thor nton v. Raney , No. 02C01-9302- C C -0 0 0 2 5, slip op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, J an. 26, 1994)) ; J ohn Haws Bur

rell v. Howar d Carlton, Warden, No. E2004- 01700-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL 544732, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2005) ( concluding that petitioner’s a rgum en t that trial court provided e rrone ous instructions to jury , even if true, “ would mere ly

rende r the c onvictions voidable, not void”), per

m. to appeal de nied (Te nn. J une 20, 2005); Va nce Mc Caslin v. St ate, No. 01C01- 9611-CC-00480, 1998 WL 44919, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 1998) (“A s a g ener al rule, ne ither
err o n e o u s ju

r y in s tr u c ti o n s n o r th e in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l e n ti tl e a p e ti ti o n e r to habea s corpus r elief. Even i f t aken as true, such alleg ations only rende r a c onviction voidable, not void.”), perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn. Nov. 9, 1998). We f ind State v. Stokes, 24 S.W .3d 303 (Tenn. 2000) , and De monbreun v. B ell, 226 S.W .3d 321 (Tenn. 2007) , upon which the pe titioner relies in support of his c la im, ina

pp os ite to thi s ca se , a s th e y bo th d e a l w ithc on vic tio ns a ri sin g ou t of the tr ia l c ourt s’
err oneous instructions to the jury that the conviction off

enses wer e lesser- included offe nses of the offe nses that had be en cha rg ed in the indictments. The pe titioner next contends that his ag g ravated ra pe convic tion is voi d beca use the indictment f

ailed to alleg e the mens rea of t he offense. The S tate cites State v. H ill, 954 S .W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997) , to a

rg ue that the indictment met the constitutional and statutory require ment of notice to the petitioner. I n Hill, our supreme court conclude d that for offe nses, such as ag g rav at ed rape,
which neither

expressly

require nor plainly

dispense w i t h t h e require ment for a culpable me ntal state, an indictment whic h fails to alleg e such me ntal state will be sufficie nt to support prosecution and c onviction for that off ense so long as (1) the la

ng uag e o f t he indictment is sufficient to mee t the
co n s t i tu t i o n al r e q u i r e m en t s o f n o t i ce t o t h e a cc u s ed o f t h e c h ar ge ag ainst which the acc used must de fend, adequate basis for e ntry of a p r o p e r j u d g m e n t , a n d

p r o t e c t i o n f

r o m d o u b l e j e o p a r dy;-6- (2) the f orm of the indictment meets t he re quirements of Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202; a

nd (3) the me ntal state ca

n be logically inferr ed from the conduc t alleg ed.

I d. at 726-27. The indictment here met all these re quirements, cha rg ing that the petitioner on the 7th/8th day

of January , 1991, in Bl o u n t C ounty , Tenne ssee, a nd befor e the finding of this indictment, did unlawfully and forc ibly , while ar

med with a we apon, to-wit: A hand g un, sexually penetr ate [t he victim] , in violation of Te nnessee Code Annotated, Sec tion 39-13-502, all of whic h is ag ainst the pea ce a nd d ignity

of the State of Tenne ssee.

Be cause Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-502 does not spec ify a mental state, the offe nse is committed when a de fenda nt acts intentionally , knowing ly , or rec klessly

. I d. at 729 (c iting Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 11 -3 01 (c )) . A nd , as the Hi ll c ourt ob se rv e d, the a c t of

“ un lawf ull y se xua lly pe ne tr a t[in g ]” a vic tim “ is co mmi tta ble on ly if the pr inc ipa l a c tor ’s mens rea i s i n t en t i o n al , k n o wi n g, or re ckless.” I d. (footnote omitted). The petitioner is simply wrong in his asser tion that ag g ravated
ra pe c a nn ot be c omm itt e d re c kle ssl y

. Se e id. , n. 6; Sta te v. Ho od , 22 1 S. W.3 d 5 31 , 5 46 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 2006) (conc luding that offe nse of ag g ravated rape may be committed with intent, knowledg e, or re cklessness and, thus, that it was not er ror f or the trial c ourt to include the mens rea of re c kle ssl y in its charg e to the jury

).

Finall y , t h e p etitioner conte nds that his ag g ravated robbe ry conviction is void beca

use the trial court improperly amende d the indictment w ith the inclusion of the words “a nd a 1980 Pontiac Fire bird automobile.” We re spectfully disag ree

. As the S tate point s out, the order of the trial c ourt amending the i ndictment contains t he si g nature s of bot h the district attorney and the pe titioner’s trial counsel, indica ting that the pe titioner ag ree d to the amendment. See Te nn. R. Crim. P . 7(b) (providing that an indictment “may be ame nded in all ca ses with the conse nt of the def endant” ).

CO NC LU SION

We c onclude that the petitioner has not me t his burden of showing that either his ag g ravated rape or agg ravated robbery conviction i s void. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the ha beas c ourt’s summary dismiss al of the pe tition.

___________________________________ AL AN E. GL ENN, JUDGE