RA

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P e t i t ion f or E x e m p t ion f r om 14 C FR 25.981 ( a ) ( 3) A me nd m e n t 2 5

- 125

N a m e a n d A dd re ss of t h e P e t i t io n e r

Doug las M. L a n e , Di r ec to r

, Commercial Airplanes

The B o e ing C omp a n y

P O B ox 3707

S ea ttl e

, W a shin g ton, 98124

S ect io n ( s) of t h e R e g u la t io n s f r om w h i c h R e li e f is S o u g h t :

B o e i n g is p e titioning f o r a n e x e mption to 14 C F R 25.981 (a)( 3 ) f or f u e l t a nk st r u c tu ra l li g htni n g

p r ot ec tion f or the 737

- 8 ( P r oj ec t Numbers PS 12

- 0038 )

. The petition is also requested for the

737

- 7 (Project Number PS 12

- 0037) and 737

- 9 (Project Number PS 12

- 0039). The references to

the 737 MAX in this document refer to the 737

- 7 , 737

- 8 and 737

- 9. The subj ec t r e g u l a tion

s ec tion is un c h a n g e d b e tw ee n A m e ndm e nt l e v e l 102 a nd 125. The r e g u l a tion a s c u r r e nt l y

w r itt e n :

(a ) No i g nition sou rc e m a y b e p re s e nt a t e ac h po i nt in the f u e l t a nk or f u e l t a nk s y st e m

w h er e ca t a st r ophic f a ilu r e c o uld o cc ur due to i g nition of f u e l or v a po r s. This must be

shown b y :

( 3) D e monst ra ti n g th a t a n i g nition sou rc e c ould not re sult fr om e a c h sin g le fa ilu re

, f r om

e a c h sin g le f a ilu r e in c ombin a tion with eac h l a t e nt fa il u r e c ondition not shown to be

e x t re m e l y re mot e

, a nd f r om a ll c o m bin a tions of fa ilu re s not s hown to be e x t re m e l y

i m p r ob a bl e . The eff e c ts of m a nu f ac tu r i n g v ar i a bili t y

, a g i n g

, w e a r

, c o rr osion, a nd lik e l y

d a m a g e must be c onsid ere d.

Th e E x te n t of R e li e f S o u g h t a n d R e aso n ( s)

R e g ul a tion R e qui re s: R e li e f is N ece s s a r y b e c a us e:

14 C FR

25.98 1 ( a ) ( 3)

A m end m ent

25

- 125 C ompli a n c e to 14 C F R

25.981 (a)( 3 ) f or f u e l

t a nk st r u c tu ra l l i g htning

p r ot ec tion would re qui r e

dual fault tolerant or

th re e ind e p e nd e nt l a y e r s

of p r ot ec tion. B o e i n g h a s c on c lud e d t h a t f or f u e l t a nk fa st e n er s and structural joints , t h er e ar e no pr ac ti ca l m ea ns

in c u rre nt t e c hnol og y to provide three m ea ns o f

p r ot e c tion in a ll lo ca tions.

Boeing has considered changes which might

provide additional mitigation , but found these

means:

a) Still do not provide a means of dire c t

compliance to 25.981(a)(3)

, b) Are unnecessary to ensure safety of the fleet

c) Would incur a significant cost (e.g. fuel burn

due to increased weight) to the public.

d) Do not provide a commensurate safety benefitP e t i t i on f or E x e m pt i on f r om § 2 5 .9 8 1 ( a )( 3) RA

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D e s cr i p t ion of Iss u e

B o e i n g is p e titioning f o r a n e x e mption to 14 C F R 25.981 (a)( 3 ) f or f u e l t a nk st r u c tu ra l

li g htni n g p r ot ec tion f or the 737 MAX

. The PS

- ANM

- 25.981

- 02 F AA poli c y

m e mo ra ndum p r ovid e s t he f ollowing a lt er n a t e r e qui re m e nts:

(1) The fuel tank structure and systems must be designed and installed to prevent catastrophic

fuel vapor ignition due to lightning.

(2) The fuel tank structure and systems lightning protection design must be fault tolerant for

failures that result in lightning

- related ignition sources.

(3) Fault tolerance is not required for any specific design feature if:

(a) Fault tolerance is show n to be impractical for that feature, and

(b) Fuel tank vapor ignition because of that feature and all other non

- fault

- tolerant

features, when their fuel tank vapor ignition event probabilities are combined, is

shown to be extremely improbable.

Note: FAA Policy Memo PS

- ANM

- 25.981

- 02 defines “Practicality” is a balance of

available means, economic viability, and proportional benefit to safety.

(4) Inspections or other procedures must be established to prevent development of lightning

related ignition sources within the fuel tank structure and systems, for example:

(a) Identifying as airworthiness limitations, mandatory maintenance actions (i.e.,

inspections), or CDCCLs, necessary to preclude the development of unsafe

conditions due to non

- fault

- tolera nt lightning protection features;

(b) Including sampling programs, maintenance, and/or inspections for fault

- tolerant

lightning protection features in the manufacturer’s recommended airplane

maintenance program;

Note: If inspections from non

- mandatory p rograms such as Baseline Zonal inspection

program, Corrosion Prevention and Control Program (CPCP), etc., are going to be

used to support the robustness of the overall inspection program, these programs must

become mandatory and must be included in the Air worthiness Limitations section of

the airplane’s Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.

(c) Incorporating into applicable airplane maintenance documents, including the

manufacturer’s structural repair manual, caution information that identifies the

li ghtning protection features of the fuel system design to minimize the potential for

inadvertent damage or disruption of these features.

(5) An analysis must be performed to show that the airplane’s design, its manufacturing

processes, and the Airworthine ss Limitations section of its Instructions for Continued

Airworthiness include all practical measures to prevent, and detect and correct, failures of

fuel tank structure and systems lightning protection features because of manufacturing

variability, aging, wear, corrosion, and likely damage.P e t i t i on f or E x e m pt i on f r om § 2 5 .9 8 1 ( a )( 3) RA

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Dis c ussion

B o e i n g h a s c on c lud e d t h a t th er e a r e no p r ac ti ca l m e a ns in c u rre nt t e c hnol og y to obt a in

t r iple re dund a n t m ea ns of f u e l t a n k st r u c tu ra l fa st e n er li g htning p r ot ec tion in a ll lo ca tions.

For example, o ne impractical op t ion would be to a pp l y in s p ec tion int er v a l whi c h

m onito r s the h ea lth of e a c h fa st e n e r t h a t p e n e t r a t e s t he f u e l t a nks. W ith thous a nds of

fa st e n er s on the wing of t h e 737 MAX

, and the inability to visually inspect most means

of protection, this option is imp rac ti ca l. I n c rea si n g the numb e r o f in

- t a nk insp ec tion

int er v a ls c ould a lso h a ve a pot e nti a l unint e nd e d c o n s e qu e n c e o f d a m a g i n g t h e ignition

p r ot ec tive fe a tu re s or oth e r c ompon e n t s inside the f u e l t a nks.

E x a mpl e s of additional d e si g n c on s id era tions , found to be impractical w e r e :

• C ondu c tive st ee l fa st e n e r s : W id e sp r e a d use r e sults in hi g h e r w e i g ht, f u e l b u r n a nd

a sso c i a t e d e missions, a nd hi g h e r r isk of c o rr osion. D e si g n w ith a ll st ee l fa st e n er s is

s t ill not du a l fa ult tol era nt.

• Addition a l s ea l a nt on bolt locations already sealed : R e d u ce s st r u c tu r a l insp ec t a b i li t y

f

or c rac ks a nd c o r r o s ion, pot e nti a l l y re du c i n g ov e ra ll f l ee t s a f e t y

. W ould re sult in

a dd i tion a l w e i g ht, f u e l bu r n a nd e missions.

• C omposite skin p r ot ec tion m e thods : Not a ppli c a ble to a luminum d e si g n. Note the

m a jo r i t y of th e se m e thods a r e int e nd e d to in crea s e c ond u c tivi t y of the out e r t a nk

su r f ac e in the ar e a lo ca l to the fa st e n e r h e a d s, whi c h a luminum st r u c tu r e p r ovid e s

inh e re nt l y

.

• F u e l t a nk bl a d d er s or do u ble w a ll e d f u e l t a nks : W ould re sult in a n e w e n c los e d f u e l

v a p o r sp ace , whi c h would pose a n a ddition a l v a por i g nition th rea t du r i n g a l i g htning

a tt a c hm e nt a nd thus do e s not in crea s e s afe t y . This would a lso in crea s e w e i g ht whi c h

i n crea s e s f u e l bu r n a nd e missions, plus re du ce s us a ble f u e l t a nk vol u me whi c h

re d u ce s r a n g e

. The bl a dd er s a lso inhibit st r u c tu ra l insp ec t a bili t y inside the t a nk.

• S pot B onds : S pot bond is a lo ca l bond in whi c h the p r im e r is re mo v e d a t t he int er n a l

fa st e n e r int e rf a c e with st r u c tu re

. R e movi n g p r im e r in cr e a s e s c o r r osion r is k

, d e t rac ti n g fr om a n y b e n ef it of i n cr e a s e d c ondu c tivi t y o f fe r e d b y the spot bond. The

spot bonds would still be subj ec t to fa ults a nd do e s not re sult in a du a l fa ult tol era nt

d e s i g n.

• Fa st e n e r F re e W i n g S t r u c tu r e : S t r u c tu r e th a t do e s not h a ve a n y f a st e n er s would not

be sus ce ptible to li g htning p r ot ec tion fa ults a sso c i a t e d with fa st e n er s but is n o t

n ece ss ar i l y du a l fa ult tol era nt. I t is not possible to p r odu c e r a w m a t er i a ls l a r g e

e no u g h to c r ea te monolithic wing p a n e ls or sp ar s in d im e nsions th a t the 737 MAX

re qui re s . Also, monolithic d e si g ns would re du c e st r u c tu ra l cr a c k tol era n c e . Usi n g

a dh e siv e s inst ea d of fa st e n er s to b ond m a jor c ompon e nts re p r e s e nts a ra di ca l

d e p ar tu r e fr om e s t a blish e d m e t a llic wing p r im a r y st r u c tu r e e x p er i e n ce.

Th e se t y p e s of d e si g ns w er e d e t er min e d to be imp rac ti ca l because some are not possible

within the current state of the art, others introduce more risk than mitigated, and because

the design is safe without them.P e t i t i on f or E x e m pt i on f r om § 2 5 .9 8 1 ( a )( 3) RA

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In addition, adding sealant over 1⁄4” and larger rivets was determined to be impractical

d u e to l ac k of proportional s afe t y b e n ef it, in c r ea s ed w e i g ht, in c rea s e d f u e l b u r n, in cr e a s e d

e missions, a nd re du c e d insp ec t a bility du r i n g m a int e n a n ce

. Boeing has assessed the

likelihood of lightning attachment to a faulted rivet during flammable tank conditions,

and concluded this combination is not expected to occur in the life of the fleet.

Regardless of this probabilistic conclusion, Boeing has perfor med development testing

(will repeat for compliance) of rivet installations representative of the 737 design and

demonstrated that even with faults present, the installations will not cause an ignition

source during sever e direct lightning attachments. Since the design is already safe during

this combination of conditions that are unlikely to occur in the life of the fleet, Boeing

concluded that further mitigation ( i.e. covering 1⁄4” and larger rivets with sealant ) would

not provide a commensurate safety b enefit to the public considering the significant

weight and associated fuel costs plus carbon emissions , aircraft production costs and

operator maintenance cost impacts

. Additional detailed proprietary information has been

provided to the FAA via Boeing l etter RA

- 14

- 0527 5

.

The on l y fa ults currently id e nti f i e d f or whi c h the d e si g n is n ot fa ult tol era nt a r e :

1) The pot e nti a l f or a l a t e nt crac k in st r u c tu re , or

2) A bolt fa ilu r e th a t a lso ca us e s the fa st e n e r nut ( or c oll ar ) to re l ea se with su ff i c i e nt

f

o r c e to t ea r f r e e the a sso c i a t e d c a p s ea l.

B oth of th e se fa ilu r e mo d e s ar e i d e nti f i e d in the F AA P oli c y M e mo a s t y p i ca l situ a tions

wh er e a ppli ca nts h a ve b ee n un a ble to id e nti f y p r ac ti ca l m ea ns f or f a ult tol era n c e

. I n eac h

o f th e se ca s es, sp ar king d u e to th e se f a ilu re s would on l y o cc u r if th er e w a s a di r e c t

a tt ac h m e nt to the lo ca l ar e a of the fa ilu re

. A n a ss e ssm e nt will be p r ovid e d d e monst ra ti n g

that the risk o f a f u e l v a por i g nition due to the sum of th e s e fa ilu re s is not anticipated in

the life of the fleet.

P r opos e d R isk Miti g a tion

As dis c uss e d in the F A A P oli c y M e mo, B o e i n g w i ll submit d e t a il e d p r op r i e t a r y

i n f o r m a tion to the F AA a bout the m ea su r e s t a k e n in the 737 MAX d e s i g n to p r ovide

p rac ti c a l st r u c tu ra l l i g htning p r ot ec tion. I n g e n era l, t h e 737 MAX li g htni n g p r ot e c tion

fea tu r e s a r e b a s e d o n st a te of the ar t indust r y d e si g n p r ac ti c e s f or a lu m inum wing

st r u c tu r e i n c luding inh e r e nt c u rr e n t p a ths th a t h a ve b e e n us e d in e x is t ing in s er vi c e

d e s i g ns. F u r th er

, B o e i n g p r o pos e s to e nh a n c e the li g htning p r o t ec tion b y in c o r po ra ti n g

f

a ult tol era nt p r ot ec tion means where practical, th e r e b y in crea si n g the l e v e l of f u e l t a nk

s a f e t y

.

Boeing will comply with 14 CFR 25.981(b) at Amendment 25

- 125. A flammability

exposure assessment will be provided showing that the 737 MAX main tanks are low

flammability exposure tanks equivalent to a conventional unheated aluminum main wing

. In addition, the center wing tank of the 737 MAX will utilize an inerting system designed

to meet the flammability exposure criteria of Part 2 5 Appendix M. The aspects of NGS

Performance with respect to compliance to 14 CFR 25.981 are covered in the 737 MAX

Fuel System Installation Certification Plan

.P e t i t i on f or E x e m pt i on f r om § 2 5 .9 8 1 ( a )( 3) RA

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Boeing will provide the following with respect to each of the 5 policy requirements :

Policy Requirement 1

- Prevent catastrophic fuel vapor ignition due to

lightning:

In summary, B o e i n g will impl e m e nt in the d e si g n a ll p r ac ti ca l m ea su re s f o r fault

tolerant st r u c tu r a l li g htni n g p r ot ec tion. B o e i n g will utilize m a nu f ac tu r i n g

p r o ce ss e s to minimize the risk of errors in aircraft manufacturing which could

affect the l i g htni n g p r ot ec tion fea tu r e s. Structural Re p a ir Manual p r o c e du res will

be provided to retain the li g htni n g p r ot e c tion fea tu r e s th r oughout the li f e of the

a i r pl a n e

. I nst r u c t i ons f or C ontinu e d Ai r w o r thin e ss including CDCCLs will be

d e v e lop e d a nd in c lud e d in the cer ti f i c a tion do c um e nt a tion. A c ompl e te a n a l y sis

of the m a nu f a c tu r i n g p r o ce ss a nd r e p a ir p r o ce du r e will be p ar t o f the Fuel System

Lightning Protection S y st e m S afe t y As s e ssm e nt

.

Policy Requirement 2

– Provide f ault t olerant lightning p rotection:

Boeing will show that where practical t h e stru c tu r al f asten e r and joint de si gns f or

the m odel 737 MAX wing will provide fault tolerant li g htning pr o t ection. A

d e t a il ed Failure Mode and Affects Analysis ( F MEA ) including a qualitative

assessment of all known and hypothetical failure modes will be p r ovid e d a s p ar t

of the c ompli a n c e do c um e nt a tion. An a l y sis, design review, and use of existing

test data will be the p r im a r y m ea ns to d e monst ra te f a ult tol era n ce for both direct

and conducted current lightning threats

. W h er e a n a l y sis is insufficient or test data

is not available, additional testing will be performed

. The syste m s supporting

structure w i ll also be analyzed as part of the safety assess m ent to e n sure that they

meet the require m ents of the policy statement

.

T e s t ing will show t h at the f a s te n er in s tallati o n s will n ot produce any sparks i n side

t h e fuel tanks during exposure to threats for the appli ca ble lightning zone

require m ents. For example, during previous programs B o eing has shown b y test

that most structural joints and some fasteners provide inherent fault tolerant

protection. In addition, Boeing has shown by test that a cap seal, as a second

la y er of protection, will co n t ain spark ing where a fastener or joint cannot

demonstrate inherent fault tolerant protection

.

Policy Requirement 3

– Demonstrate s afety of limited non fault tolerant

conditions:

For t h e li m ited areas in whi c h a single or cascading failure c o uld res u lt in loss of

all protection features, a sa f ety assessment will be done to show that the summed

risk of all non fault tolerant lightning related fuel tank ignition threats is not

anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all 737 MAX airplanes

. Se r vi c e e x p er i e n c e on the e x isting Boeing aircraft c omm erc i a l f l ee t (including the

737 fleet) sh o ws eac h o f th e se f a ilu re s to be ra r e . This assessment is similar to

the assessment for the 747

- 8 aircraft (ref: Exemption 10174), where analysis

demonstrated that the probability of a lightning related fuel tank ignition is

extremely improbable (and thus unlikely to occur in the life of the fleet). The 737

MAX wing is a conventional aluminum wing, much smaller in size relative to 747

-

8/8F and uses the same fastener types and installation procedures and design

standards common to Boeing airplanes. A failure rate based on in

- service data for

fasteners on Boeing airplanes will be used. The expected rate of occurrence of

structural cracking wi ll be conservatively based on Boeing’s structural fatigueP e t i t i on f or E x e m pt i on f r om § 2 5 .9 8 1 ( a )( 3) RA

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Page 6 of 9

methodology. This methodology is based on test and service experience, and

ensures that the presence of fatigue cracks is minimized during the life of the

airplane.

Currently B o e i n g h a s identifie d two non

- fault tolerant fa ilu r e mod e s ( b r o k e n bolts

a nd st r u c tu ra l c rac ks ), however a nalysis and/or testing is not complete thus

additional non

- fault tolerant installations may be indentified which may also be

impractical to preclude. All areas where fault tolerance is impractical will be

indentified in the Fuel System Lightning Protection S y st e m S afe t y As s e ssm e nt

.

Policy Requirement 4

– Provide lightning protection m aintenance

i nformation:

Non fault tolerant features: No ALI or mandatory inspections for structural

lightning protection related to non

- fault tolerant features (e.g. broken bolts and

cracks) are anticipated, however assessment is not complete; they will be included

if necessary. Existing mandatory structural inspections are adequate to ensure

related failures will not exceed failure rates used in risk analyses.

Fault tolerant features: As recently added to the 737 A WL s , a CDCCL will

require a n inspection of sealant per an Airp lane Maintenance M anual Fuel Tank

Closure procedure any time the tank area is exited after maintenance or alteration

. No additional maintenance or inspections for structural lightning protection are

anticipated, however assessment is not complete; Additional maintenance

requirements will be included if necessary.

Repairs: The Structural Repair Manual will include instructions to minimize the

risk that alterations ( repairs ) will affect lightning protection. The SRM will

include CDCCL references (eq uivalent to Cautions) . Also note that as discussed

above, a CDCCL will identify an Airplane Maintenance Manual procedure to

perform a visual sealant inspection before exiting any tank area where

maintenance, inspection or repair has been performed.

Policy Requirement 5

- Analysis of design, manufacturing and maintenance

procedure s :

Boeing has implemented in the design all practical measures for structural

lightning protection. The manufacturing processes will include practical means to

minimize the r isk that lightning protection features are not implemented as

intended on the drawings. As noted for requirement 4, the continued airworthiness

program will include appropriate CDCCL and the SRM repair procedures will be

established to retain the lightning protection features throughout the life of the

airplane. A complete analysis of the manufacturing process and repair procedure

will be part of the Fuel System Lightning Protection S y st e m S afe t y As s e ssm e nt

. Additional detailed proprietary information has been provided to the FAA via

Boeing letter RA

- 14

- 0527 5

.P e t i t i on f or E x e m pt i on f r om § 2 5 .9 8 1 ( a )( 3) RA

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Page 7 of 9

S t a t e m e n t of P ub lic I n tere st

Boeing is working to improve the efficie n cy of the 737 m odel by a redesign. The 737

MAX has an all new engine for improved fuel burn and reduced community noise o v er

the 737

- 800 model . For light n i ng protection, the 737 MAX has additional features to

enhance safety and protect the fuel tanks from potential ignition sources due to a

lightning event. All practical measures have been utilized. Additional features to

di rectly m eet the r u le are impracti c al and w ould potentially add significant cost, weight,

increased emissions

, and m aintenance to the a i rp l a ne without a proportional safety

benefit. Further, a d ditio n al lig h tning pr o t ection features could inhibit the ability to

inspect the structure (reducing safety).

Requiring the 737 MAX to atte m pt to directly co mply with this rule would significantly

inhibit Boeing’s ability to design and certi f y the a irplane on a co m petitive schedule. It

would also render the 737 MAX to be of lesser v a lue to the p u blic int e rest with no

commensurate increase in safety. Many Boeing custo m ers are depending on the 737

MAX to m eet their business needs. The n ew 737 MAX airplane will typ i cally replace

o l der

, less fuel efficient m odels, reducing the public e x pense for fuel consu m ed in air

travel and freight delivery. There f ore, Boeing believes that it is in t h e p ublic int e re s t f or

the FAA to grant this exe m ption.

S t a t e m e n t of No A d v er s e E ff ec t on S a f et y

W ith c u rre nt d e si g n p rac t i ce s f or l i g htning p r ot ec t i on, B o e i n g a i r cr a f t d e s i gns h a ve

a c c umul a t e d in e x ce ss of 800 million re v e nue s er v i c e f l i g ht hou r s with no li g htning

r e l a t e d e v e nts. P r ior to th e se d e si g ns a nd s er vi c e hou r s, th er e w e r e 2 c omm e rc i a l j e t

t ra nspo r t hull loss e v e nts whi c h a r e b e li e v e d to h a ve b ee n ca us e d b y l i g htni n g st r ik e s

( r ef e re n c e A R AC R e po r t: 1998 A R AC F u e l t a nk H ar moni z a tion W o r king G r oup re p o r t

, T a sk G r o u p 1 S er vi c e Histo r y / F u e l T a nk S afe t y L e v e l Ass e ssm e nt )

. The f i r st w a s in

1963, whi c h l e d to the d e v e lopm e nt of l i g ht n ing p r ot e c tion st a nd ar ds f or f u e l t a nks. T h e

s ec o n d a nd l a st e v e nt w a s in 1 976 a nd a lso re sult e d in i mp r ov e m e nts in f u e l t a n k

li g htning p r o t ec tion. T h e hou r s a c c umul a t e d sin c e the l a st e v e nt r e p re s e nt ov e r 8 tim e s

the hou r s acc umul a t e d with ear li e r d e si g ns th r o u g h 1976. T h e a c c id e nt f r e e f l e e t histo r y

sin c e 1976 shows c u rre nt B o e i n g wi n g d e s i g ns h a v e su ff i c i e nt p r ot e c tion a g a inst

li g htning i n du ce d f u e l t a nk i g nition e v e nts.

This s afe t y r e c o r d f o r the f u e l s y s t e m d e si g ns up o n whi c h the enhanced B o e ing 737

MAX d e si g n is b a s e d

, indi ca t e s th a t the p r opos e d f u e l t a nk li g htni n g p r o t ec tion d e si g n o f

the mo d e l 737 MAX will be s afe.

R e qu e st t o ‘ Waive P ub li c a t ion a n d Co m m e n t ’

B o e i n g r e qu e sts to w a ive the re qui re m e nt f or pub l i ca tion a nd c omm e nt. B o e ing b e li e v e s

th e r e is g ood c a use to be g ra nt e d a w a iv e r d u e to the f ac t t h a t the F AA p re vious l y f ound a

g ra nt of e x e mption w a s in the public int ere st f or the s a m e f u e l t a nk lightning protection

compliance to CFR 25.981a(3) issue o n the 747

- 8/8F ( B D C O P r oj ec t No PS 05

- 0212 &

PS 05

- 0211) ( E x e mption No. 10174 w a s g ra n t e d )

.P e t i t i on f or E x e m pt i on f r om § 2 5 .9 8 1 ( a )( 3) RA

- 14

- 05714 Enclosure

Page 8 of 9

P r ivil e g e s of t h e E x e m p t ion O u t si d e t h e U n i te d S t a te s

P e r 14 C F R 11.81 ( h )

, B o e ing r e qu e sts th a t the p r i vil e g e s o f this e x e mption be e x t e nd e d

outside the Unit e d S t a t e s. This e x t e n sion of p r ivil e g e s is n e c e ss a r y f or o p era tions b a s e d

within f o re i g n c ount r i e s h a ving bil a t e ra l a g ree m e nts with the Unit e d S t a t e s acce pti n g

F AA 14 C F R p ar t 25 a s th e ir a i r wo r thin e ss st a nd a r ds f or t ra nspo r t c a t e g o r y a i r c raf t. The

737 MAX is int e nd e d f or the g lob a l m a r k e t pl ace.

Co n c l u sion

B o e i n g is p e titioning f o r a n e x e mption fr om 14 C F R 25.981 (a ) ( 3) a t a m e n dm e nt 125 f or

f u e l

- t a nk st r u c tu ra l li g htni n g p r ot e c tion. G ra nting this e x e mption will a llow B o e i n g to

c o m pl e te its d e si g n a nd cer ti f y the 737 MAX f or d e liv e r y

. The p r opo s e d d e si g n f o r the

737 MAX will p r ovide a n a p p r op r i a te l e v e l of s a f e t y a g a inst li g htnin g

- ind u ce d f u e l

- t a nk

i g nition, a nd will be shown to c omp l y with the a lt er n a tive r e qui re m e nts p r ovid e d in the

F A A poli c y m e mo PS

- ANM

- 25.981

- 02

.P e t i t i on f or E x e m pt i on f r om § 2 5 .9 8 1 ( a )( 3) RA

- 14

- 05714 Enclosure

Page 9 of 9

Su m m a r y t o b e P ub lis he d in t h e F e de r al R e gis t er

P E T I T I O N E R : The B o e i n g C omp a n y

S E C TI O N O F 1 4 C F R A FF E C T E D : 14 C F R 25.981 ( a)( 3)

D E SC R I P T I O N O F R E L IE F S O U G H T : The p e tition e r s ee ks re li e f fr om the

r e qui re m e nts of f u e l t a nk st r u c tu ra l li g htni n g p r ot e c tion f or the B o e i n g 737

- 7/

- 8 /

- 9 mod e l

a i rpl a n e

.