Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 129 /Tuesday, July 7, 1998 / Notices 36721

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–309]

Maine Yankee Atomic Power

Company; Maine Yankee Atomic

Power Station; Exemption

I

Maine Yankee Atomic Power

Company (MYAPCo or the licensee) is

the holder of Facility Operating License

No. DPR–36, which authorizes

operation of Maine Yankee Atomic

Power Station (Maine Yankee). The

license provides, among other things,

that the facility is subject to all rules,

regulations, and orders of the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the

Commission) now or hereafter in effect.

The facility is a pressurized-water

reactor located on the licensee’s site in

Lincoln County, Maine. On August 7,

1997, the licensee informed the

Commission that it had decided to

permanently cease operations at Maine

Yankee and that all fuel had been

permanently removed from the reactor.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2),

the certifications in the letter modified

the facility operating license to

permanently withdraw MYAPCo’s

authority to operate the reactor and to

load fuel in the reactor vessel.

II

It is stated in 10 CFR 73.55,

‘‘Requirements for physical protection

of licensed activities in nuclear power

reactors against radiological sabotage,’’

paragraph (a), that ‘‘The licensee shall

establish and maintain an onsite

physical protection system and security

organization which will have as its

objective to provide high assurance that

activities involving special nuclear

material are not inimical to the common

defense and security and do not

constitute an unreasonable risk to the

public health and safety.’’

By letter dated November 25, 1997,

the licensee requested 11 exemptions

from certain requirements of 10 CFR

73.55. Eight exemptions are being

granted at this time as follows: (1) 10

CFR 73.55(a)—an exemption from the

requirement that a licensed senior

operator suspend safeguards measures

and assigning that authority to a

certified fuel handler; (2) 10 CFR

73.55(e)(1)—an exemption from the

requirement that the secondary power

supply be located in a security area;

(3)—10 CFR 73.55(d)(1) ‘‘an exemption

from the requirement that a last access

control point at the entrance to the

protected area be bullet resistant; (4) 10

CFR 73.55(h)(3)’an exemption reducing

the required number of guards and

armed trained personnel; (5) 10 CFR

73.55(e)(1)—an exemption from the

requirement for a secondary alarm

station, (6) 10 CFR 73.55(f)(4)—

exemption from the requirement that

non-portable communication equipment

located in the central alarm station

remain operable from independent

power sources if normal power is lost,

(7) 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1)—exemption from

the requirement that an alarm station be

located outside the protected area, and

(8) 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1) and (c)(6)—

exemption from the requirement that

the alarm station and new control room

be bullet resistant. The proposed

exemption is a preliminary step toward

enabling MYAPCo to revise the Maine

Yankee Security Plan under 10 CFR

50.54(p) to implement a defueled

security plan that was developed to

protect against radiological sabotage at a

permanently shutdown reactor facility

with all fuel stored in the spent fuel

storage pool.

III

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ‘‘Specific

exemptions,’’ the Commission may,

upon application of any interested

person or upon its own initiative, grant

such exemptions in this part as it

determines are authorized by law and

will not endanger life or property or the

common defense and security, and are

otherwise in the public interest. The

Code of Federal Regulations at 10 CFR

73.55 allows the Commission to

authorize a licensee to provide

alternative measures for protection

against radiological sabotage, provided

the licensee demonstrates that the

proposed measures meet the general

performance requirements of the

regulation and that the overall level of

system performance provides protection

against radiological sabotage equivalent

to that provided by the regulation.

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR

73.55 is to provide reasonable assurance

that adequate security measures can be

taken in the event of an act of

radiological sabotage. Because of its

permanently shutdown and defueled

condition, the radiological risk from

Maine Yankee is less than the risk from

an operating unit. With more than 16

months of radiological and heat decay

since the plant was shut down on

December 6, 1996, the potential source

term associated with the remaining

design-basis accidents and radiological

sabotage has decreased significantly.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the

Commission has determined that the

proposed alternative measures for

protection against radiological sabotage

meet the same assurance objective and

the general performance requirements of

10 CFR 73.55 associated with the

reduced risk of radiological sabotage for

a permanently shutdown reactor site

that has all of the fuel in the spent fuel

pool. In addition, the staff has

determined that the overall level of the

proposed system’s performance, as

limited by this exemption, would not

result in a reduction in the physical

protection capabilities for the protection

of special nuclear material or of Maine

Yankee. Specifically, a limited

exemption is being granted for eight (8)

specific areas in which the licensee is

authorized to modify the existing

security plan commitments

commensurate with the security threats

associated with a permanently

shutdown and defueled site, as follows:

(1) 10 CFR 73.55(a)—an exemption from

the requirement that a licensed senior

operator suspend safeguards measures

and assigning that authority to a

certified fuel handler; (2) 10 CFR

73.55(e)(1)—an exemption from the

requirement that the secondary power

supply be located in a security area; (3)

10 CFR 73.55(d)(1)—an exemption from

the requirement that a last access

control point at the entrance to the

protected area be bullet resistant; (4) 10

CFR 73.55(h)(3)—an exemption

reducing the required number of guards

and armed trained personnel; (5) 10 CFR

73.55(e)(1)—an exemption from the

requirement a secondary alarm station;

(6) 10 CFR 73.55(f)(4)—exemption from

the requirement that non-portable

communication equipment located in

the central alarm station; remain

operable from independent power

sources if normal power is lost; (7) 10

CFR 73.55(e)(1)—exemption from the

requirement that an alarm station be

located outside the protected area; and

(8) 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1) and (c)(6)—

exemption from the requirement that

the alarm station and new control room

be bullet resistant.

Accordingly, the Commission has

determined that pursuant to 10 CFR

73.5, this exemption is authorized by

law, will not endanger life or property

or the common defense and security,

and is otherwise in the public interest.

Therefore, the Commission hereby

grants MYAPCo a limited exemption as

described above from those

requirements of 10 CFR 73.55 at Maine

Yankee in its permanently defueled

condition.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that this

exemption will not have a significant

effect on the quality of the human
36722 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 129 /Tuesday, July 7, 1998 / Notices

environment (63 FR 35295, dated June

29, 1998).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 29th day of

June 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–17920 Filed 7–6–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–382]

Entergy Operations, Inc.; Waterford

Steam Electric Station, Unit 3;

Environmental Assessment and

Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

38, issued to Entergy Operations, Inc.,

(the licensee), for operation of the

Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

(Waterford 3), located in St. Charles

Parish, Louisiana.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action would change

the Waterford 3 Technical

Specifications to allow an increase in

the Waterford 3 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

storage capacity from 1088 to 2398 fuel

assemblies, and to allow an increase in

the maximum fuel enrichment from 4.9

w/o (weight percent) to 5.0 w/o U–235.

The increase in spent fuel storage

capacity is achieved by replacing the

existing spent fuel storage racks by the

higher density racks, a process referred

to herein as ‘‘reracking.’’ The proposed

action is in accordance with the

licensee’s application for license

amendment dated March 27, 1997, as

supplemented by letters dated April 3,

July 21, October 23, November 13, and

December 12, 1997, January 21, January

29, March 23, May 1, May 19, May 21,

May 28, and June 12, 1998.

The Need for the Proposed Action

The Waterford 3 SFP currently

contains 1088 storage cells in 16 spent

fuel racks and full core off-load

capability would be lost in the year

2000. Under the proposed reracking, the

16 existing racks, which contain

Boraflex as the neutron absorber, would

be removed and replaced by new high

density modules. There are no

commercial independent spent fuel

storage facilities operating in the U.S.,

nor are there any domestic reprocessing

facilities; therefore, the projected loss of

storage capacity in the Waterford 3 SFP

would affect the licensee’s ability to

operate Waterford 3. The proposed

amendment will provide a full core offload capability through the end of Cycle

19 (Year 2018).

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed

Action

Radiological Impacts

The Waterford 3 uses waste treatment

systems designed to collect and process

gaseous, liquid, and solid waste that

might contain radioactive material.

These radioactive waste treatment

systems are evaluated in the Final

Environmental Statement (FES) dated

March 1973. The proposed rerack will

not involve any change in the waste

treatment systems described in the FES.

Radioactive Material Released to the

Atmosphere

During reactor operation, a small

percentage of the fuel assemblies in the

core are expected to develop leaks,

resulting in a release of fission products

to the reactor coolant. The storage of

additional spent fuel assemblies in the

SFP will not significantly affect the

release of radioactive gases from the SFP

since fission products generally do not

escape from the SFP.

The higher fuel burnup used in the

new rack analysis will result in a higher

concentration of Krypton-85 (Kr-85) in

the reactor coolant, some of which will

be introduced into the SFP water during

refuelings. Accounting for this increased

Kr-85 concentration in the SFP water,

the licensee calculated that the Kr-85

concentration in the air in the fuel

handling building would be two orders

of magnitude lower than the permissible

effluent concentration for the general

public (Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 20).

Iodine-131 released from spent fuel

assemblies to the SFP water will not be

significantly increased due to the

expansion of the fuel storage capacity

since the Iodine-131 inventory in the

fuel will decay to negligible levels

between refuelings.

Most of the tritium in the SFP water

results from activation of boron and

lithium in the primary coolant. A

relatively small amount of tritium is

produced during reactor operation by

the fission process within the reactor

fuel. The subsequent diffusion of the

tritium through the fuel and cladding

represents a small contribution to the

total amount of tritium in the SFP water.

Tritium releases from the fuel

assemblies to the reactor coolant occur

mainly during reactor operation and, to

a limited extent, shortly after shutdown.

Since a small portion of the tritium is

due to fission in the fuel, the increased

fuel burnup will result in an increase in

the amount of tritium in the reactor

coolant.

Most airborne releases of tritium from

nuclear power plants result during

refuelings from evaporation of reactor

coolant, which contains tritium in

higher concentrations than in the SFP.

The storage of additional spent fuel

assemblies in the SFP is not expected to

increase the SFP bulk water temperature

significantly above the 155° used in the

design analysis and, therefore,

evaporation rates from the SFP are not

expected to increase. The higher tritium

concentrations in the SFP water are

expected to result in higher airborne

tritium levels in the fuel handling

building. However, the licensee has

calculated these tritium levels to be

lower than the permissible effluent

concentrations for the general public

contained in Appendix B of 10 CFR Part

20.

Solid Radioactive Wastes

Spent resins are generated by the

processing of SFP water through the

SFP purification system. These spent

resins are replaced about two to four

times a year and are disposed of as solid

radioactive waste. The licensee will use

a vacuum system with an underwater

filtration unit to clean the floor of the

Cask Storage Pit prior to reracking and

the floor of the SFP following removal

of the old SFP rack modules.

Vacuuming of the SFP and Cask Storage

Pit will remove any extraneous debris,

reduce general contamination levels

prior to diving operations, and ensure

visual clarity in the SFP to facilitate

diving operations and SFP rack

changeout. The licensee also plans on

hydrolazing the old fuel rack modules

with demineralized water before

removal from the SFP to remove any

loose crud from the modules. If

necessary, the licensee may also use a

wire brush or equivalent abrasive tool to

assist in the removal of hot particles.

The licensee does not expect that the

additional fuel storage made possible by

the increased storage capacity will

result in a significant change in the

generation of solid radwaste (in the form

of spent resins).

Once the old SFP rack modules have

been hydrolazed, they will be placed

into anti-contamination bags and loaded

into shipping containers for shipment

offsite for decontamination and

disposal. The licensee has stated that

the shipping containers and procedures

will conform to all applicable U.S.