Filed 8/20/14 Donaldson v. Ojaroodi CA2/7 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SEVEN 

CHARLES O. DONALDSON, JR., 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

MOHAMMAD OJAROODI, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B251472 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. VS023783) 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Debra 

Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Charles O. Donaldson, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

 Mohammed Ojaroodi, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. 

_________________________ 
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Appellant Mohammed Ojaroodi appeals from the entry of a civil restraining order 

against him in favor of his neighbor. Finding no grounds for reversal, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PRODCEDURAL SUMMARY 

Appellant Ojaroodi and his neighbor respondent Charles Donaldson, Jr. have been 

in a dispute for some years, culminating in Donaldson’s request for a temporary 

restraining order in 2012. After a series of continuances while related criminal charges 

proceeded, the restraining order came on for hearing on August 8, 2013. 

 Donaldson testified that Ojaroodi had thrown gasoline on Donaldson’s door, had 

threatened him and his wife, and threatened to shoot him. Donaldson asserted he was in 

fear for his life, and that of his wife and grandchildren. Donaldson also testified that 

Ojaroodi had sprayed water on him and his wife and called him offensive names. 

 Ojaroodi was represented by counsel at the hearing. Counsel asserted the dispute 

concerned cigarette smoke coming from Donaldson’s garage onto Ojaroodi’s property, 

and denied the allegations of threats and use of gasoline. Ojaroodi testified that he had 

not made the threat asserted by Donaldson, but instead had tried to work out a solution 

for the smoke. He also denied putting gasoline on the door. 

 The court indicated its intention to grant the restraining order, at which point 

Ojaroodi asked to bring to the court’s attention a conflict in the statements in the police 

report; his counsel made no request. The court made no ruling on the issue, and, after the 

parties discussed the terms of the order, issued an order with a term of three years. 

Ojaroodi timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

 On appeal, Ojaroodi, representing himself, argues that the trial court erred because 

it: failed to issue a statement of decision; granted the order without sufficient evidence; 

and refused to consider impeachment evidence. 
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 1. Standard of Review 

 We review the trial court’s decision to determine whether there is sufficient 

evidence to support the ruling; “we review the evidence before the court in accordance 

with the customary rules of appellate review. We resolve all factual conflicts and 

questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and indulge in all legitimate and 

reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court if it is supported by 

substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Schild v. Rubin

(1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) 

 2. Statement of Decision 

 Code of Civil Procedure, Section 632,1 requires the court to issue a statement of 

decision, explaining the basis for its decision, when requested by a party appearing at the 

trial. In a case such as this, where the trial was concluded within one calendar day, the 

request must be made prior to the submission of the matter for decision.2

 The record of this proceeding does not indicate any request by counsel for 

Ojaroodi, or by Ojaroodi himself, for a statement of decision. Accordingly, the court did 

not err. 

 

1 All further statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure. 

2 “In superior courts, upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, written 

findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required. The court shall issue a 

statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of 

the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the 

trial. The request must be made within 10 days after the court announces a tentative 

decision unless the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours 

over more than one day in which event the request must be made prior to the submission 

of the matter for decision. The request for a statement of decision shall specify those 

controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision. After a 

party has requested the statement, any party may make proposals as to the content of the 

statement of decision. [¶] The statement of decision shall be in writing, unless the 

parties appearing at trial agree otherwise; however, when the trial is concluded within one 

calendar day or in less than 8 hours over more than one day, the statement of decision 

may be made orally on the record in the presence of the parties.”
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 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Section 527.6 provides three grounds for possible relief: unlawful violence (527.6, 

subd. (b)(1)); a credible threat of violence (527.6, subd. (b)(2)); or harassment (527.6, 

subd. (b)(3)). Although the court did not indicate in its ruling the ground on which it 

based its decision, the testimony of Donaldson, which the trial court believed, pointed 

most directly to a finding of a credible threat of violence. 

 This ground requires clear and convincing evidence of a “knowing and willful 

statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her 

safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate 

purpose.” (527.6, subd. (b)(3).) Here, there was sufficient evidence of a threat to kill, 

which placed Donaldson in fear of his own safety as well as that of his family. (See, e.g., 

USS-Posco Industries v. Edwards (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 436 [party told co-workers he 

had a gun and would kill them].) Moreover, Donaldson also testified that gasoline had 

been placed on his door, raising a reasonable fear of explosion. Taken together, and 

resolving all credibility questions in favor of the prevailing party, as we must, this 

evidence is sufficient to support the order. 

 4. Impeachment Evidence 

 Ojaroodi asserts the court erred in excluding prior inconsistent statements by 

Donaldson contained in a police report. While the court is required to receive relevant 

testimony, and to give a party charged with harassment the opportunity to present his or 

her case (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1110), the party seeking to 

introduce evidence must object to its exclusion and make known to the trial court the 

substance of the excluded evidence, along with its relevance. (Malatka v. Helm (2010) 

188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1086.) 

 Here, the record is silent. Ojaroodi’s counsel did not request cross-examination of 

Donaldson, nor did he request that the court consider statements in the police report in 

any manner. While Ojaroodi himself suggested there was a conflict in the statements, 

counsel did not proffer the report or indicate what those conflicting statements were. The 
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record on appeal does not contain the police report, or any information pertaining to it. 

As a result, not only did Ojaroodi fail to adequately raise the issue at the trial court, he 

has failed to provide any basis for us to determine whether the evidence was relevant 

impeachment. 

DISPOSITION 

 The issuance of the restraining order is affirmed. Respondent is to recover his 

costs on appeal. 

 ZELON, J. 

We concur: 

 PERLUSS, P. J. 

 WOODS, J.