34200 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 120 /Tuesday, June 23, 1998 / Notices

‘‘occupational dose.’’ Additionally, the

Licensee notes that the incident

occurred at the end of the film badge

reporting period and there is no

supportive evidence that all of the 90

mrem received by the worker was the

direct result of the incident. Therefore,

the Licensee maintains that there was

no clear potential for a member of the

public to receive more than 100 mrem

to the whole body.

Finally, the Licensee notes that while

the NRC’s March 13, 1998 Notice stated

that the Licensee’s corrective actions

were prompt and comprehensive, it was

not clear whether credit for such actions

was considered in assessing the amount

of the civil penalty.

NRC’s Evaluation of the Licensee’s

Response

The NRC does not dispute the

Licensee’s contention that inappropriate

handling by the carrier’s hazmat

personnel may have contributed to the

loss of control of radioactive material.

At a minimum, proper action when the

lid was found unattached could have

minimized the amount of time that the

radioactive material was uncontrolled.

However, the carrier’s actions do not

relieve the Licensee of its responsibility

to ensure that each closure device on

the radioactive materials package is

properly installed and secure.

Regardless of events that occurred after

the package left the Licensee’s control,

the Licensee’s failure to assure that the

hasp on the lock was secure prior to

shipment was the most probable cause

of the loss of control of the radioactive

material, and is considered a significant

violation of NRC requirements.

In addition, the NRC does not dispute

the Licensee’s position that hazmat

employees are not considered members

of the public. However, the NRC

disagrees that there was no clear

potential for a member of the public to

receive more than 100 mrem to the

whole body as a result of the Licensee’s

failure to ensure that the lock on the

package containing the sealed sources

was properly installed and secure. The

sources could have been lost at any time

during the shipping process, such as on

the aircraft or in the vehicle that were

used to transport the package, and so

the clear possibility existed that

members of the public could have come

in contact with the sources. Considering

the configuration of the sources (the

sealed sources were contained in

approximately 4 inch long bolts) and the

quantity of radioactive material in the

package (the 3 sources contained 1, 18,

and 100 millicuries of cesium-137

respectively), the NRC continues to

conclude that there was a clear potential

for a member of the public to

unknowingly come in contact with the

sources and receive an exposure greater

than 100 mrem to the whole body.

Example B.1 of Supplement V of the

NRC’s Enforcement Policy provides that

a ‘‘[f]ailure to meet transportation

requirements that resulted in loss of

control of radioactive material with a

breach in package integrity such that

there was a clear potential for the

member of the public to receive more

than .1 rem [100 mrem] to the whole

body’’ be considered as a Severity Level

II violation. Therefore, the NRC

maintains that the violation was

appropriately classified at Severity

Level II.

With regard to the Licensee’s

argument concerning its corrective

actions, as stated in our March 13, 1998

letter, credit was warranted for your

corrective actions in accordance with

the civil penalty assessment process in

Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement

Policy. Had the Licensee not taken

prompt and comprehensive corrective

actions, a civil penalty of $8,800 (twice

the base amount) would have been

proposed.

NRC Conclusion

The NRC has concluded that the

Licensee did not provide a basis for

reducing the Severity Level of the

violation nor for reducing or

withdrawing the civil penalty.

Accordingly, a civil penalty in the

amount of $4,400 should be issued.

[FR Doc. 98–16645 Filed 6–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–443–LA ASLBP No. 98–746–

05–LA]

North Atlantic Energy Service

Corporation; Establishment of Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board

Pursuant to delegation by the

Commission dated December 29, 1972,

published in the Federal Register, 37 FR

28710 (1972), and §§ 2.105, 2.700, 2.702,

2.714, 2.714a, 2.717, 2.721 of the

Commission’s Regulations, all as

amended, an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board is being established to

preside over the following proceeding.

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation

Seabrook Station Unit No. 1

This Board is being established

pursuant to the request for hearing

submitted by Robert A. Backus on

behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution

League. The petition opposes the

issuance of a license amendment to

North Atlantic Energy Service

Corporation for Seabrook Station Unit

No. 1 that would revise Technical

Specifications on the frequency of steam

generator inspections to accommodate a

24 month fuel cycle. A notice of the

proposed amendment was published in

the Federal Register at 63 FR 25101,

25113 (May 6, 1998).

The Board is comprised of the

following administrative judges:

B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chairman, Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board Panel,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dr. Charles N. Kelber, Atomic Safety

and Licensing Board Panel, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555

Linda W. Little, 5000 Hermitage Drive,

Raleigh, NC 27612

All correspondence, documents and

other materials shall be filed with the

Judges in accordance with 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.701.

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th

day of June 1998.

B. Paul Cotter, Jr.,

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety

and Licensing Board Panel.

[FR Doc. 98–16638 Filed 6–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–388]

Pennsylvania Power and Light

Company; Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration

Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

22 issued to Pennsylvania Power and

Light Company for operation of the

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station

(SSES), Unit 2 located in Luzerne

County, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment would

amend the Susquehanna Steam Electric

Station’s Technical Specifications (TSs)

to add notations to TSs 3.3.7.5, 4.3.7.5,

3.4.2, and 4.4.2 that the acoustic

monitor for safety relief valve (SRV) ‘‘J’’

may be inoperable beginning June 15,

1998, until the next unit shutdown of

sufficient duration to allow for

containment entry, not to exceed the

ninth refueling and inspection outage

(spring 1999).