### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ma y 2, 200 6 S es sio n



### HECK VAN TRAN v . STATE OF TENNES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -14409 John P. Colt on, Jr., Judge

No. W2005-01334-C CA-R 3-P D - F iled Novem ber 9, 2006

Th is m a tte r is be fo re thi s c ou rt fo llo wi ng the Pe tit ion e r He c k Van T ran’ s mo tio n to re op e n h is p os tconviction petition for the limited purpose of determining whether the Petitioner is mentally reta rded

an d th u s in e li g ib le f

o r th e d e a th p e n a lty

. T h e lo w e r c o u r t e n te r e d a n o r d e r d e n y in g r e li e f . The Petitioner appea ls asserting that the proof es tablished by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e that the Petitioner is mentally

reta rded r ender s his sentence of death unconstitutional. After a re view of the

rec ord and the applicable law, we aff irm the lower c ourt’s denia l of relief

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and J .C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Br ock Mehle r, Nashville, Tennessee , and Willi am D. Masse y , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appellant, He ck Va n Tran.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Mic helle Chapman McI ntire, Assistant Attorney Gen er al ; Wil liam Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral, a nd J ohn Campbell, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

I n 1 98 9, the Pe tit ion e r wa s c on vic te d of thr e e c ou nts of fe lon y mur de r a nd se nte nc e d to d e a th for his role in the killing of three people dur i n g a robbery at a Me mphis restaura nt. State v. Van Tr a n, 86 4 S. W.2 d 4 65 , 4 68 (T e nn . 1 99 3) . O n a pp e a l, the Tennesse e Sup re me Cou rt a ff ir me d a ll three of the murde r convic tions and one of the de ath s entenc es. I d. Finding that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to establish one of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s relied upon by the State, the court

rema nded the two r emaining death se ntences for re sentenc ing. I d. On re mand, the Petitioner

rec eived two c oncurr ent life sente nces f or these two c onvictions. I d.-2-

On M arc h 7, 1995, the P etitioner filed a petiti on for post-conviction relief
, alleg ing in pa

rt that in lig ht o f h is p re se nt m e ntal in c omp e te nc y it w ou ld b e un c on sti tut ion a l to c arry ou t th e de a th
sentenc e. See Van T ra n v

. S t ate, 6 S.W.3d 257, 261 (Tenn. 1999). The petition alleg ed that the Petitioner had bee n psy chotic and treated wit h “antipsy chotic, antidepr essant and antiparkinson [si c] medica t i o n .” I d. The pe tition further alleg ed that “nume rous mental hea lth professionals had diag nosed [the Petiti oner] as suffe ring from chr onic par anoid schizophrenia, a condition from which remiss i o n i s ra re a nd which had a prog nosis of unchang ed or pr og ressive de terioration.” I d. At ta c he d to the pe tit ion wa s a n a ff ida vit of the a tte nd ing ph y sic ia n at Rive rb e ndMa ximum Se c urity I nstitut ion in which the phy sician opined that the Petitioner was not c ompetent to be executed. I d. Additionally , Dr. Andr ew J. Adl er ev al u ated the Petiti oner and testified at a he aring that the Petitioner had a full scale I .Q. of 67 and that he had defic its in adaptive behavior that had manife sted during the deve lopmental period be fore the ag e of eig hteen. Van Tr an v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 793 (Tenn. 2001). Dr. Ly nn Z ag er, a psy cholog ist c alled as a witness by the State, testi fi ed t h at t he Petitio n er ’s I

. Q. was a ctually 72 with a standar d err or mea surement of plus or minus three, rather than 67 as testified by Dr. Adler. I d. at 793. Dr. Za g er ex plained that Dr. Adler had made a clerical

err or in a pply ing the conver sion c hart. I d. The trial court acc redited Dr. Z ag er’s t es t i m o n y

. I d. Relief wa s denied by

the trial court, this court, and the Te nnessee Sup re m e C ourt. Van Tr an, 6 S.W .3d at 261.

I n December

1999, Dr. Andr ew Adle r ag ain tested the Petitioner de termining that the Petitioner had a f

ull-scale I .Q. of 65. Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 794. Rely ing upon this d ata, the Petitioner filed a motion to reope n his post-c onviction pe tition on Fe bruary 7, 2000. I d. The trial court issued a

preliminary order deny ing the motion to reope n, and this Court denied the Petitioner’s application for

permission to app ea l. I d. The Te nnessee Supreme Court, howe ver, g rante d application for

permission to appea l. Our supreme court, in a matter of first impression, held that “the Eig hth Amendment to the United Stat es C o n stitut ion and article I , § 16 of the Te nnessee Con sti tut ion pr oh ibi t th e e xec uti on of me nta lly re tard e d in div idu a ls b e c a us e su c h e xec uti on s v iol a te

e vo lvi ng sta nd ard s o f d e c e nc y that ma rk the pr og re ss o f a

ma turing so c ie ty , are g ro ssl y d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e , a n d s e r v e n o v a l i d p e n o l o g i c a l p u rp o s e

. . . . ” V a n T r a n , 6 6 S

. W

. 3 d a t7 9 2

. In

acc ordanc e with this holding, the supreme court re manded this matter to the tria l court for further
pr oc e e din g s.

P os t- Co nvi c ti on P r oc e e ding

Dr. Da niel H. Gra nt, a psy cholog ist li cense d in the State of Ge org ia, testified that he specia liz es in the ar eas of pain manag ement, that he is b o ar d ce rt i fi ed as a neuropsy cholog ist and fo re ns ic e xami ne r, a ndthat he is a boa rd c e rt if ie d expe rt in tr a umatic str e ss. Dr . G rant’ s c re de nti a ls established him as an e x pert in mental re tardation and neuro- psy cholog y

. Dr. Gra nt e valuated the Petitioner on November

13 and 16, 2002. He explained that his ex aminatio n co n s i s t ed of the admin is tr a ti o n o f

n u me r o u s te s ts o v e r

a tw o

- d a y p e r io d

. I n a d d it io n to th e s e te s ts , D r

. G r a nt revie wed doc uments and af fidavits, interviewe d the Petitioner, and talked with some of the off icer s at the “Corr ectional Cente r.”-3-

Dr. Gr ant re lated that the statutory definition of mental re tardation provides that mental
reta rdation is “the sig nificant sub-a vera g e intellectua l functioning as evide nced by an I .Q. of 70, or below, defic its in adaptive behavior , and it has to be manife sted during the deve lopmental period or by the ag e of eig hteen.” He commented t hat ps y cholog ists rely upon a si milar standard. Dr. Gr ant cited to the standa

rd s et forth in the Diag nostic and Statistical Manual of Me ntal Disorder s, the DSM-I V, and the r evised e dition called TR, which provide s that, for an individual to be c lassified mentally reta rded, the indivi d u al “w o uld have to have an intellectua l functioning with an I .Q. between 7 0
, i t could g o up to 85, because they take into consider ation the standar d err or of

measure ment of the instrument. .

. . That he ha s to have sig nificant subave rag e ada ptive behavior

. And ag ain, these c riteria ha ve to have been m et b ythe ag e of e ighte en, or the end of the de ve lop me nta l pe ri od .” “ Ad apti ve be ha vio r” is d e fi ne d b y the DSM -IV b y

te n c ri te ri a

c on ta ine d in social ski lls, communication, work, leisure, home living, functional aca demics and use within the community . Dr. Gr ant explained that all ten criteria ne ed not be met. Rather, a defic it in any two of the are a s w ill sa tis fy

the c ri te ri a

fo r “ sig ni fi cant defi cits in a da pti ve be ha vio r. ” Dr . G rant a lso rela t ed t h e standard on me ntal reta rdation established by

the American Assoc iation on Mental Retardation. This st andar d define s mental reta rdation as “ a disability

char acte rized by

signific ant limit ations of both in te ll e c tu a l functioning and ada ptive behavior

and expressed in c onceptua l, social

a ndpr a c tic a l a da

pti ve sk ill s. ” To me e t thi s c ri te ri a , “ the le ve l of int e lli g e nc e a ndthe le ve l of de fi c it

a da pti ve be ha vio r h a ve to b e tw o s ta nd ardde viatio ns be low the no rm , wh ic h is 10 0. ” Ag a in, the se defic its must occur

during the deve lopmental period a nd befor e the a g e of e ighte en.

As a re sult of his evaluation of the Petit i o n er , Dr

. Grant summariz ed that, in his clinical opinion, the Petiti oner satisf i ed t h e criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13- 203, “as ha ving sig nificant sub-avera g e intellectua l functioning , evidenc ed by the I .Q. of 70, or below.” H e adde d that the P etitioner had “def icits in adaptive behavior as define d by the American As so c ia tio n o f Me ntal Re tard a tio n a ndthe Am e ri c a n Ps y c hiatr ic As so c ia tio n. An d b othof tho se defic its manifested bef

ore the ag e of e ighte en.” Specifica lly , Dr. Gr ant conc luded that the Petitioner has an int el l i gen ce q uotient of 70 or below. T his assessment was made pursuant to the administration of the Weschler Adult I ntellige nce Sca le, I I I Edition, after which the Petitioner wa s assessed as having a full scale I .Q. of 70. Dr. Gr ant mentioned that the Petitioner ha d a performanc e I .Q. of 76 a nd a ver

bal I .Q. of 70. He noted, howeve r, that the “ full scale is c onsidered to be the
most v al i d an d m o s t reliable of the thre e mea sures a nd the full scale should be consider ed as the

score to be used.” Dr. Gr ant adde d that his results were consistent with the results rea ched a fter

a dmi nis tr a tio n o f the sa me te st by Dr

. Ad le r. Af te r D r. Ad le r’ s a dmi nis tr a tio n o f the Wec hs le r t e st, the Petitioner had rece ived a verba l I .Q. of 67, a perf ormanc e I .Q. of 68 a nd a full sca le I .Q. of 65. Dr. Adle r’s a dminist ration of the te st occurr ed prior to Dr . Gra nt’s admi n i s t ration of the test. Dr. Gr a nt c on c lud e d th a t th is f a c t e x plaine d th e hig he r s c or e a c hie ve d b y the Pe tit ion e r d uring his administration of the test. He note d t h at t he Wechsler ’s Adult I ntellige nce Sca le – Revised, wa s administered to the Petitioner in 1996. The r esults of this testing re veale d a v er b al I .Q. of 71, a
pe rf orma nc e I .Q . o f 7 7 a nda

fu ll s c a le I .Q . o f 7 2. He no te d th a t th e fu ll s c a le sc or e of 72 wa s mo st likely inflated a full three points bec ause of the ag e of the test.

I n addition to the W ec h s l er test, Dr. Gr ant administered the Comprehensive Te st of-4-

Nonver bal I ntellige nce, a

test of intellige nce not r equiring l an gu ag e on the pa rt of either

the administer or the pa

rticipant. Dr. Gra nt explained that this test is comprised of two sub-te sts, one part pictoria l non-verba l and one pa rt g eometri c n o n -v erbal. On the pictorial test, the Petitioner

re c e ive d a n I .Q . s c or e of

68 . H e re c e ive d a n I .Q

. sc or e of 72 on the g e ome tr ic no n- ve rb a l te st. Th e se two score s resulted in an overall I .Q. score of 68. Dr. G rant a cknowledg ed that the Petitioner’s consistent score s betwee n 65 and 70 on all four occa sions when tes t i n g wa s administered wa s signific ant in the fa ct that it “shows a str o n g validity , strong reliability , acr oss the differ ent instruments, as well as a dminist ration of the same instruments at diffe rent pe riods of time.”

Other te stimonywas a dminist ere d i n o rd er to evaluate the Petitioner’s lang uag e and communication skills, including the Peabody picture vocabulary test. The P etitioner scor ed a 53 on this test, reflec ting that the Petitioner ha s a “w eakne ss, or a de ficit in rec eptive, or he aring

vo c ab u la r y

. ” D r

. G r a n t d e s c r ib e d th is d e f ic it a s “ s e v e r e

. ” A ls o a d mi n is te r e d w a s th e e xp r essive vocabula ry test, on which the Petitioner score d “a status score of less than 40.” Dr . Gra nt relate d that thi s “ wa s th e low e st s c or e that th e no rm s wo uldg o to a ndhe wa s 4 0 o r l e ss tha n 4 0. ” An oth e r t e st

on or a l w ri tte n lang ua g e sk ill s, nic kn a me d th e OWL S, wa s adm ini ste re d to det e rm ine the abil ity to compre hend the spoke n word a nd to assess ability to comprehe nd the lang uag e. The Petitioner had a standa rd scor e of 68 on the sub-test, which, althoug h being consistent with his level of intellige nce,

reve aled a

significan t d ef

i cit . The ora l expressive sub-test was a lso administered. The Petitioner

sc or e d a 62 on thi s su b- te st. Th e c omp os ite sc or e on the se tw o su b- te sts wa s a 63 , “ wh ic h me a ns , his overall lang uag e ability for listening compre hensio nan d o ral e x pression over

those two measur es

are the 63.” This scor e indicate s a sig nificant de ficit.

Dr. Gr ant admitted that the Petitioner’s native lang uag e is V ietnamese and that the tests we re administered in Eng lish. He explained that this was one re ason why he administere d the Comprehensive Te st of Nonver bal I ntellige nce, because i t does not require a langua g e on the part of the a dminist er or t h e participant. Dr. Gr ant stated that the Petitioner’ s result on this test was consistent with the Petitioner’s perf ormanc e on the Wechsler test. Additionally
, he stated that Dr. Was se rm a n i n t e r v i e w e d t h e P e t i t i o n e r a n d a d m i n i s t e r e d a

m e a s u r e o f

h i s u s e o f

h i s V i e t n a m e se lang uag e and a lso of his abilityto rea d in Vietnamese . This ex amination resulted in finding s that the Petitioner is impaired in bot h Eng lish and Vietnamese , with the Petitioner being more impaire d in Vietnamese than in Eng lish. The Pet i t i o n er ’s co mprehe nsion in Vietnamese wa s poor. Dr. W as s er m an c o n c l u d ed t h at t h e P et i t i o n er ’s E n gl i s h p ro fi ci en cyex ce ed t h e V i et n am es e l an gu age proficie ncy

and that she w ould theref ore e x pect that he would score highe r o n tests that were administered in Eng lish than on tests that were a dminist ere d in Vietnamese

. Dr. Grant s tated that the Petitioner’s def

icits in the Vietnamese la ng uag e we re that of a five-y ear -old and we re two standard de viations below of what y ou would expect. Dr. Gr ant adde d that these de ficits wer e consistent with the results from Dr . Adler’ s administrat i o n of the CELF, c linical evaluation of lang uag e funda mentals. On this test, the Petitioner had re ceive d a re ceptive la ng uag e scor e of 50, an expressive lang uag e scor e of 50 a nd a total score of less than 50. Dr . Gra nt stated that the Petitioner’s defic its in communi cation skills satisfied one of t h e t wo criteria nee ded by the classification sy stem for re tardation.-5-

Reg arding an asse ssment of the Petitioner’s ac ademic skills, Dr. Gr ant administered the Kauf man func tional aca demic skills test. On this t est, the P etitioner receive d an arithmetic standard

score of 93, a re ading standard sc ore of 66, and a f

unctional ac ademic sc ore of 79. The Petitioner had a r eading compre hension score o f 4

. 1 and, on the wide rang e ac hievement test, he rec eived a read i n g grade level of 3.1 w ith a standard sc ore of 57. Dr. Gr ant continued that the Petitioner’ s sp e lli ng wa s a t a

4. 1 g ra de le ve l a ndhis ma th ski lls we re a t a 7.6 g ra de le ve l. D r. Gr a nt p la c e d li ttl e import a s to the Petitioner’s perf ormanc e on the a

rithmetic testing, noting that all individuals, even mentally reta rded individuals, ha ve streng ths and wea knesses a nd that mathematics wa s one of the P et i t i o n er ’s ar ea s o f s tre n gt h

. Dr

. Gr an ts t at ed t h at t h e P et i t i o n er ’s p o o r p er fo rm an ce i n s p el l i n g,

rea ding, and rea ding compre hension wer e evidenc e of a signific ant defic it. I n this reg ard, D r. Grant noted that the Petitioner has be en in a G.E.D. (g ener al equivalency diploma) prog ram c lassroom for eig ht to nine y ears an d h e is stil l scoring at a 4.1 g rade level in re ading . Dr. Gr ant stated that the Petitioner’s “f

u n cti onal ac ademic skills are signific antly impaired,” thus satisfy ing another of the criteria nee ded by

the classific ation sy stem for re tardation.

Dr. Gr an t also administered the I ndepende nt Living Sca les test desig ned to measur e an individual’s abilityto live or function indepe ndently . On this test, the Petiti oner r ece ived a score of 69 . T his sc or e me e ts the c ri te ri a fo r h a vin g a

sig nif ic a nt d e fi c it i n a da

pti ve be ha vio r b e c a us e it f e ll two standard de viations below the mea n. The Petitioner wa s also subject t o the Vineland a daptive behavior scale . This test was administered twic e by Dr. Adler, reve aling score s of 58 and 65. Dr

. Gra nt stated that both of th es e measures mee t criteria for the A merican Association of Menta l Retardation as two standard de viations below the mea n for a daptive beha vior.

Dr . G rant c on c lud e d th a t ba se d u po n th e te sts a dmi niste re d to the Pe tit ion e r r e g ard ing his abilities, communication, lang uag e skills, and independe nt living that the Petitioner had sig nificant defic its in adaptive beha vior. He f urther c oncluded that thes e d ef i ci ts manifested during the Petitioner’s developmenta l period. To support this second c onclusion, Dr. Gr ant base d his decision upon a socia l history

compiled by

Mr. Dinh. This report r evea led that the Petitioner did not speak

un til he wa s si x y e ars old , d id n ot d o w e ll i n s c ho ol, faile d to le arna s o the r i nd ivi du a ls i n h is E ng lis h

a s a S e c o n d L a n g u a g e c l a s s i n t h e M e m p h i s s c h o o l s ys t e m , a n d h a d d i f f i c u l t y l i v i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y. Dr. Gr ant adde d that his evaluation re veal ed t h at the Petitioner had ne ver suc cee ded in living independe ntly

.

Dr . G rant t e sti fi e d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r’ s so c ia l his tory a lso c on ta ine d s ome ide nti fi able “ ri sk fa c tor s” fo r m e nta l r e tard a tio n. Th e se fa c tor s in c lud e d th e fa c t th a t th e Pe tit ion e r d id n ot s pe ak u nti l he was six y ear s old. Another f actor is that he was not toilet-traine d until he was five y ear s old. Dr. Gr a nt a g a in state d that it wa s his op ini on that the Pe tit ion e r is me nta lly re tard e d pu rs ua nt to the te rm s of the statute, the te rms of the DSM-IV, and the sta ndards of the American Association of Mental Retardation.

On cr oss-examination, Dr. Gra nt testified t hat t he P etitioner came to the United States fr om Vi e tnam w he n h e wa s si xtee n o r s e ve nte e n y e ars old

. On ly a ft e r arrivi ng in the Un ite d St a te s d id the Petitio n er l ea rn to speak and write Eng lish. Notwithst anding , Dr. Gr ant maintained that the-6-

Petitioner was more proficie nt in the Eng lish langua g e than in his native Vie tnamese. He adde d that the Petitioner only

attended sc hool for two y ear s while in Vietnam.

Dr. Gr ant ag ree d with the prosec utor that the Petitioner’s living c onditions i n Vietnam we re “down right hor

rible.” The Petitioner and hi s mother l ived “on the stree t,” “ba sically , throug h black marke t, selling c iga

rettes a nd things.” The Petitioner came t o this country throug h a sponsorship by Catholic Charities. I t was only a “f ew y ear s” from the t ime of hi s arrival in this country , when he

was seve nteen, until he wa s incarc erated at ag e twenty . Dr. Gr ant fa iled t o co ncede that the Pe tit ion e r’ s li fe his tory

wo uldha ve ha d a

su bs ta nti a l impa c t on hi s f a ilu re to p ro pe rl y

re sp on d to lifesty le questions asked in c orre spondence to his evaluation.

Dr . G rant c on c e de d th a t th e W.A .I .S. – I I I te st f or I .Q . w a s p ote nti a lly

no t a n a ccur a te te st for pe rsons of Asian ance stry

. To compensate for any inacc urac ies, Dr. Gr ant stated that he “g ave the sec ond measure to control for that. . . .” He a dded that ther e was no basis on which to believe that the Petitioner’s I .Q. had “ g on e down over the y ear s.” Dr. G rant a cknowledg ed that the Pe t i t i o n e r h a d b e e n d i a g n o s e d a s c h i z o p h r e n i c a n d t h a t t h e c o g n i t i v e ab i l i t y o f a p e r s o n wi th schizophrenia will decr ease over time. Dr . Gra nt maintained, howeve r, that the P eti tioner wa s

“ fu nc tioni ng ess entia lly

the sa me pla c e he wa s f un c tio nin g wh e n h e wa s a dmi nis te re d th os e achie vement tests at Sheff ield Hig h School.” He a dded that it was not signific ant, in his opinion, that the Petitioner’s perf

ormanc e I .Q. was six points hig her than his ove rall I .Q. Dr. Gra nt noted that the Petitioner had sig nificant ne urolog ical impairments. He stated t hat these e x isted prior to the onset of his schizophrenia. These neurolog ical impairments impaired the Petitioner’s ability to acquire knowledg e and lang uag e and also impaired his a bility to a dapt. Dr. Gra nt ma in t ai n ed t h at t he Pe tit ion e r w a s a t a

su ff ic ie ntl y re tard e d le ve l prior

to the on se t of hi s sch iz op hrenia . It w a s a lso

reve aled that the Petitioner’ s mother has a low cog nitive ability . This fac t would not have impaire d her a bilityto understand the que stions contained in the Vineland a ssessment.

Dr. Gr ant furthe r explained that it was possible for a mentally reta rded individual to learn another lang uag e as a ccomplished by the Pet itioner. He f

urther stated that mentally reta rded individuals could work, g o to school, and ac hieve lea rning levels up to the six th gr ade.

Dr. Pamela

Auble, a psy cholog ist wi t h a specia lty in neuropsy cholog y , examined the Petitioner in November 200 2

. He r evaluation was comprised of some standar dized testing administered to the Petitioner and of i nterview s with the P etitioner, as well as other pe rsons whom had bee n involved with the Petitioner. The people other than the Petiti oner inc luded a c orre ctional office r, three doctors, an attorney , and the Petitioner’s mother . As a r es u l t of her evaluation, Dr. Auble found that the Petitioner “met the criteria for mental reta rdation. [S he] a lso found evidenc e of neur ologic al impairment as de fined a s deficits in other a rea s of func tioning.”

Dr. Auble related t hat t he nationally acc epted de finition of mental reta rdation wa s contained in the DSM -IV. She e xpla ine d th a t th e DSM -IV’ s d e fi nit ion c on si st ed of thr e e pr on g s: “ [o]ne , is signific antly

sub-ave rag e intellectua l functioning as evidenced by an I Q of

. . . approximately 70 or below. Second, de ficits and ada ptive behavior , which has a very specific meaning and looks at very-7-

specific are as. And, third, that it must be manifested by ag e 18.” D r. Auble opine d that this standard and the Te nnessee standard a re ba sically

the same. She note d that the Tenne ssee sta t u te states signific antly

sub-ave rag e intellectua l functioning as evide nced by a func tional I .Q. of 70 or be low wher e the DSM-IV provides f or an I .Q. of “ approximately 70” and the AAMR definition provides “70 to 75.” Notwithstanding these di ffe renc es, Dr. Auble maintained that a ll three de finitions are “all talking about an I Q, a true I Q that’s two standa rd deviations below the means.”

Dr. Auble stated that eig hty -five pe rce nt of the persons who are mentally reta rded fall in the
rang e of mild mental re tardation, an I

. Q. i n t h e ra n ge of fifty (50) to seve nty

(70). The se per sons

a tta in so me le ve l of lif

e a nd wo rk

sk ill s, c a n h olda

job , a ndma y

be able to o btain a c a de mic sk ill s

abo ut t o th e sixth g ra de le ve l. P e op le in the low e r le ve ls, I .Q .s be tw e e n f orty -n ine (4 9) a ndtw e nty (20), a nd classified a s moderate , sever e, or prof ound mental re tardation, “mainly live in insti tutions or under very supervised se ttings.” D r. Auble c ommented t hat even those persons with mild mental
reta rdation re quire some de g ree of “support service s.”

Dr. Auble proce eded to provide a definition of “adaptive behavior,” the second prong for the diag nosis of mental re t ar d at ion. She expl ained that the D SM-I V listed ten or ele ven ar eas of functioning . These ar ea s i n cl u d e c o m m u n i ca t i o n , s el f- d i re ct i o n , fu n ct i o n al ac ad em i cs , h o m e l i v i n g, social/interper sonal, self-c are , use of c ommunityreso u rce s, work, leisure , health, and sa fety . To have a def i ci t i n adaptive be havior, one must have def icits in at least two of the e leven a rea s of fu nc tio nin g . A s D r. Au ble e xpla ine d: The AA MR, Tenth Edition, defines ada ptive functi o n i n g as def

icits falling into at le a st o ne of

thr e e are a s. One is p ra c tic a l, w hic h is the abil ity to m a int a in y ou rs e lf ind e pe nd e ntl y in te rm s of a c a de mic s a ndwo rk e nv ir on me nt. Th e se c on d is so c ia l, wh ic h in vo lve s g ull ibi lit y , soc ia l unde rs ta nd ing , th e abil ity to a vo id b e ing a

vic tim
, taking responsibility , home skills. And the third is conceptual. An are a which inv olv e s la ng ua g e , re a din g , w ri tin g , mana g ingmon e y , s e lf -d ir e c tio n, a ndabil iti e s in that order

. Dr. Auble stated that, under the AAMR def

inition, one ne eded one of these thr ee a rea s to qualify

for a diag nosis o f m en tal reta rdation in the ada

ptive defic its prong. She e x plained that one ne ed not ha ve de fi c its in a ll o f the are a s. I n th is r e g ard , D r. Au ble no te d th a t, “ lik e the re st o f u s, ” “ pe op le with mental reta

rdation” “ have stre ng ths and wea knesses and may have deficits in some are as and relatively g ood functioning in other ar eas.”

Dr. Auble further

testified that she c onducted ne uropsy ch o l o gi cal testing and testing for d i ff er en tar ea s o f f

u n ct i o n i n g s u ch as m em o ryan d m en t al fl ex i b i l i t y , l ang uag e, and al s o m al i n ger i n g. She “ fo un d tha t [ the Pe tit ion e r] pa sse d the ma lin g e ri ng te st. ” She state d tha t he did no t app e ar t o be fa king and was “ putting forth a g ood eff ort on the tes t proce dures.” The ne uropsy cholog ical
t e s t i n g i n d i c a t e d i m p a i r m e n t s

. D r

. A u b l e r e l a t e d t h a ts h e a d m i n i s t e r e d t h e H a l s t e a d R e i t a n B a t t e r y, the most w idely

acc epted ne uropsy cholog ical test battery in the United States, which is a se ries of tests from which y ou obtain a g lobal measure of how impaire d he is over those multipl e tests. The Petitioner’s Halstea d I mpairment I ndex was .9. Dr. Auble e x plained that the scale rang es fr om zero to one, with the hig her sc ores indicating more impairment. Acc ording ly , the Petitioner’s scor e of-8-

“.9 is close to as ba d as it g ets and is in the impaired r ang e.”

I de nti fying the pa

rt ic ula r i mpair me nts , D r. Au ble te sti fi e d that the Pe tit ion e r h a d s pe c if ic i mpairments in four a

rea s. First, the Petitioner had de ficits in tasks that measure frontal lobe functioning

. Dr. Auble explained that frontal lobe functioning has t o do with the “ability of a pe rson to adapt to a ne w situation, to modi fy thei r beha vior when thing s chang e, to switch fr om one idea
to the ne xt. I t’ s a kin d of me nta l fl e xibil ity .” As a re su lt of the Pe tit ion e r’ s p e rf

orma nc e on a

va ri e ty of fr ontal lobe t ests, Dr. Auble described hi m as “mentally rig id,” “[ o]nce he gets int o an idea he has trouble cha ng ing that idea.” T o exemplifyher state ment, Dr. Auble stated that the Petitioner had
tr ou ble wi th t e sts that “ inv olv e d h im f ig uring ou t th e me a nin g of a ne w w or d b y

g ivi ng him examples of that word in a diff ere nt context.”

Second, Dr . Auble conc luded that the Petitioner had “ evidenc e of de ficits on testing of lang uag e and ve rbal c ommunication.” These results wer e consistent with re sults reac hed on other evaluations of the Petitioner. S h e ex p l ained that the Petiti oner ha d difficulty naming common objects on the B oston Naming T es t

. L i kewise, on the Boston Diag nostic Aphasia Exam, “he ha d trouble under standing ” “pr etty short” stories. Dr . Auble re lated that the Petitioner’s perf ormanc e on this test wa s “about aver ag e for someone who has an aphasia or a lang uag e disturbanc e.” A nother ind ic a tio n th a t th e Pe tit ion e r h a d a la ng ua g e dis tur ba nc e wa s the fa c t tha t the Pe tit ion e r h a d d if fi c ulty repe ating what Dr . Auble had sa id.

The Petitioner’s third a

rea of impairment wa s on memory testing. D r. Auble state d that the Petitioner’s “memory

is particular ly

poor for information that he’s told, f or stories, for words.” She further explained that the W echsle r Memory Scale is normed w ith the Wechsler Intellige nce Sca le, meaning that the person’ s memory skill cor responds with the ir intelligenc e level. She added that the P e t i t i o n e r ’ s m e m o r y

“ w a s s i g n i f

i c a n t l y b e l o w w h a t y o u w o u l d e x p e c tf o r s o m e o n e w h o h a s a n IQ of 65.” Thus, the Petitioner has a de ficit in his verbal memory that is lower than one would expect for someone of his level of intellig ence

.

Th e fi na l are a of imp a ir me nt wa s on moto r spe e d, wh ic h is a fi ng e r t app ing te st. Dr . A ub le
reported that the Petitioner wa s slow with both hands, both his right hand a nd with his left hand.

Dr. Aublere m ar k ed t h ati d en t i fi ca t i o n o f t h es e a re as o f i m p ai rm en ti s i m p o rt an ti n ev al uating mental re tardation because it revea ls things that I .Q. does not me asure

. These impairments further indicate that the Petitioner ha s extensive defic its that are above and bey ond what y ou would expect in some body even w ith his I .Q. level. Dr . Auble continued that these impairments have an impact on the Petitioner’s ada

ptive functioning and on his functional intelligence . I n terms of menta l

re tard a tio n, Dr . A ub le st a te d th a t th e re wa s e vid e nc e of ne ur olo g ic a l impa ir me nts prior to h is attaining the ag e of e ighte en.

I n making her e valuations, Dr. A u b le re viewed thethree Wechsler Intellige nce T ests, one administered by

Dr. Adle r in 1996, the second a dminist ere d by Dr. Adle r in 1999, and the third administered by

Dr. Gr ant in 2002. She related t hat t he P etitioner receive d a full scale I .Q. of 72 on-9-

the 1996 te s t. T h is s c o r e w a s r e c e iv e d a t th e c o n c lu s io n o f a n o r mi n g p e r io d o f th e test and imm e diate ly

prior to the Wec hs le r I I I te st c omi ng ou t. Dr

. Au ble re la te d th a t th is s c or e wa s a c tua lly 2. 9 p oin ts h ig he r tha n it

wo uldha ve be e n ha d the Pe tit ion e r b e e n a dmi nis te re d th e Wec hs le r II I te st. Ac c or din g ly , she re la te d tha t the sc or e of 72 wa s, in ac tua lit y , a sco re of 69 on the Wec hs le r II I te st. As to the re ma ini ng te sts , th e Peti ti on er r e c e ive d a fu ll s c a le I .Q . o f 6 5 o n th e 19 99 te st anda fu ll scale I .Q. of 70 on the 2002 test. Dr. Auble also considere d the C omprehe nsive Test of Non- verba l I nte lli g e nc e c on du c te d b y Dr

. Gr a nt. Th e Pe tit ion e r r e c e ive d a no n- ve rb a l I .Q . s c or e of

68 on thi s test. Dr. Auble c oncluded that a ll of these scor es we re c onsistent with one another.

Dr. Auble further

added that the score s wer e not lowere d in any way due to the fact that the
tests were not normed on an A si an population. She expl ained that, a lthough ther e ar e no Asian lang uag e ver sions o f t h e W ec hsler I ntellige nce Sca le, there has bee n a study of the Wechsler I ntellige nce S ca l e for Chi ldren re vised with Asian Americans whic h finds that the Wechsler I ntelligen ce Sca le for Children is va lid in predicting aca demic ac hievement in Asian c hildren. Moreove r, in determining the va lidityof I .Q. t esting
, one can consider an individual’s performance

on a pa rt ic ula r s ub -p art of the te st wh ic h is “ he a vil y loa de d

. . . in A me ri c a n c ultur e .” She no te d th a t, while the Petitioner scored a 6 on this sub-part, which is below ave rag e, this scorewas hig her tha n 11 of the 12 other

sub-parts of the test, indicating that the Petitioner is not perf orming “less we ll on questions that have a heavy cultural loading.” Another measure is the C omprehe nsive Test of Nonverba l I ntellige nce. She e x plained that this test was desig ned to be g iven to individuals who have differ ent cultures and differ ent history

. Specifica lly
, she noted that the Comprehensive Te st of Nonverba l I ntellige nce “ has normative data for A sians.” “T he non-ve rbal I Q for the Asi ans was an 103. [The Petiti oner’ s] s core [was] 68.” Finally , Dr. Auble noted that “in g ener al, Asian Ame rica ns tend to score hig her tha n Cauca sians on tests of cognitive abilit y .” I n so stating, she ref err ed to a study indicating that “Asian’ s in g ener al have larg er brains than Cauca sians.” I n essenc e, the study relied
up on by Dr . A ub le ind ic a te d that a ny bia s in the te sti ng sc or e s w ou ld f a vo r A sians ov e r C a uc a sia ns

. Dr. Auble further testified that the Petitioner’s primary lang uag e is Eng lish, not Vietnamese. She further explained that Dr. Wasserman, a doctor who pr eviously

evaluated the Petitioner, wa s fluent in b othVi e tname se a ndEn g lis h. Dr

. Was se rm a n e va luate d the Pe tit ion e r a nd de te rm ine d that w hil e the Pe tit ion e r’ s E ng lis h w a s b e low e xpe c ta tio ns , his Eng lis h wa s still be tte r tha n his p ro fi c ie nc y in Vi e tname se . Ind e e d, Dr . Wa sse rm a n n ote d th a t th e P eti ti on er “did no t e ve n kno w the c omp le te Vietnamese alphabe t.”

When questioned as to the i mpact that the P etitioner’s schizophrenia had upon his I .Q., Dr. Auble stated that, in her opinion, this fac t did not lower the Petitioner’s I .Q. This conclusion wa s ba se d u po n th re e fa c ts. On e , th e Pe tit ion e r’ s sympt oms of sc hizo ph re nia

we re re la tiv e ly

we llc on tr oll e d. Th is f

a c t me a ns that he wa s a ble to f oc us a tte nti on on the te st and , th e re fo re , h is schizophrenia did not eff

ect his per formanc e on the intelligenc e test. She rec alled that the Petitioner put f orth a “g ood eff

ort and that he was attending to the task befor e him.” Additionally , she adde d that there was long itudinal resea rch indicating that de ficits are prese nt many y ear s befor e schizophrenia ever develops. I n stating this fa ct, Dr. Auble relied upon a study published in 1999

w h i c h i n d i c a t e d t h a tI. Q

. i s g e n e r a l l y l o w e r i n c h i l d r e n w h o d e v e l o p s c h i z o p h r e n i a y e ar s l a t e r

. In other wor ds, s h e s u mmarized that the I .Q. does not dec line; rather , it starts out low and ends low.-10-

Finally , Dr. Auble stated t hat, where treatment is initi ated pr omptlyupon diag noses, then I .Q. score s do not decline a nd can, in f act, improve . Fr om what Dr. A uble was a ble to asce rtain fr om prison

rec ords, the Petitioner has be en treated since his schizophrenia was diag nosed. The Petitioner w as taking the pre scription medication Ha ldol for his schizophrenia. Dr. Auble stated that without the Haldol the Petitioner, most likely , would not have be en testable

.

Re g ard ing the se c on d p ro ng for fi nd ing me nta l r e tard a tio n a da pti ve de fi c its , D r. Au ble

e xpla ine d th a t, i n o rd e r t o d e te rm ine wh e the r a pe rs on ha d a da pti ve de fi c its
, a ps y c ho log ist wo uld use standar dized scales obtained by having the person perf orm various tasks or throug h the re port of oth e r p e op le . A ps y c ho log ist wo uld a lso us e so c ia l his tory inf orma tio n. F ina lly , th e re are so me specific tests desig ned to assess adaptive behavior

. Dr. Auble stated that Dr. G rant a nd Dr. Adle r administered the sta ndardized t es t s to the Petitioner in this case. Dr. A uble re lated that the Pe tit ion e r’ s sc or e on the I nd e pe nd e nt L ivi ng Sc a le , o ne of the se sp e c ia lize d te sts , w a s 6 9. She a lso
reported t hat t wo Vineland tests wer e adminis tere d; one was filled out by the Petitioner’s mother, and t h e other

was c ompleted by

corr ectional of

fice rs at Riverbe nd. The ove rall scor e on the Vineland tests wa s 65. These sc ores plac ed the Petitioner i n t h e i m p aire d rang e, which is two
sta nd ardde viatio ns be low the me a n. Dr . A ub le state d th a t, a c c or din g to the AA MR an d th e DSM

I V, these te sts scores we re illustrative of a daptive def icits. Dr. Au b l e fu rt her state d that, in her opinion, the Petiti oner “ met five of the 10 or 11 are as of adaptive deficits from the DS M-I V list of criteria.” S p ecif

ically , the Petitioner exhibi ted clea r def icits in his basic lang uag e skills and communication. He e x hibited clear defic its in functional acade mics. I n this reg ard, D r. Auble state d that the Petitioner has bee n in a GED pr og ram since 1990, has y et to complete the c lass, and has not
prog resse d. Dr. Auble also conc luded that the Petitioner’s c onceptional r easoning and ada p t i ve flexibi litywer e impaire d. A g uard at the corr ectional fac ility described the Petitioner as “c hild like.” Dr. Auble added that the Petitioner does well in the prison setting
, wh i ch i s highly structure d and wh ic h d oe s n ot req ui re hi m to make de c isi on s. F ou rth, Dr . A ub le state d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r i s impaired on th e in d e p e n d e n t l iv in g s c a le s u b

- te s t m e a s u r in g h e a lth a n d s a f e ty

. O n th is te s t, the Petitioner’s score was only 55. Fifth, in terms of social and inter persona l functioning , the Petitioner

was c hara cterized as g ullible and as a f ollower.

Dr. Auble testified as to how the Petitioner’s ada ptive behavior

fit within the three domains of the AA MR Tenth Editio n

. T h e first domain is conc eptual enc ompassing thing s like lang uag e,

re a din g sk ill s, a ndwritin g sk ill s. Dr . A ub le re la te d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r s ho ws imp a ir me nt a s to a ll of these skills. The Petitioner does n o t ad ap t t o chang e, and he does not do well in complex situations that require him to alter his behavior

. The P etitioner has troublereme mbering . She added that he “ te nd s to do wh a t he is t old .” Dr . A ub le state d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r h a s n e ve r l ive d c omp le te ly on his own.

When questioned as to the ef fec t of the Petitioner’s “stre et smarts,” D r. Auble state d that “stree t smarts” is slang and is not a scientific term with scientific standards. Howeve r, using a “sla ng dic tio na ry ,” Dr . A ub le de fi ne d “ str e et sm art s” a s “ c un nin g a ndc le ve r p art ic ula rl y a t su rv ivi ng in urban settings.” Under this definition, Dr. Auble opined that there had not bee n any evidenc e of the Pe tit ion e r b e ing c un nin g or c le ve r in his lif e his tory

. She e xpla ine d th a t, f ro m th e Pe tit ion e r’ s e arl y-11-

to late childhood, he lived on the stree ts with his m other. She stated that he “ba rely survived.” O nce in the United S tates and in school, the Petiti oner le arne d Eng lish more slowly than others who ha d started with him

. He left school afte r one y ear

. The Petitioner beg an using alcohol and dr ug s on a d ail y basis. The Petitioner has ne ver be en able to maintain a stable living situation or to live

c o m p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y. T h e P e t i t i o n e r h a d c o n f l i c t s w i t h h i s m o t h e r

. H e l i v e d w i t h C ar o l yn Mitchell who enc ourag ed him to leave be cause he wa s too depende nt on her. He lived with severa l
y oung men and with a g irlfriend.

As to the third require ment under the AAMR, Dr. Auble stated that the evidenc e indicate s that the impairments appe are d during the Petitioner’s d ev elopmental period. I n this reg ard, she stated that the Petitioner’s life history indicates a

number of risk fac tors that would have c ontributed to his mental retar dation. Using a table list ing various pot ential risk fac tors for menta l retar dation provided in the Te nth Edition of the AAMR
, Dr

. Au b l e proc eede d to enumerate those fa ctors applicable to the Petitioner. First, t he P etitioner’s mot her ha d poor pre natal ca re. The Petitioner’s mother suffe red f

rom a fa ll while she was pr eg nant re sulting in “s o m e b l ee d ing and some other injuries. . . . The Petitioner’s mother “smoked a

bout a half a

pack a day at the time she wa s preg nant with him.” The Petitioner’s mother is “proba bly relatively limit ed in intellige nce.” The Petitioner did not hav e m ed i ca l t re at ment while he lived in Vietna m. As a child, he ha d malnutrition and
reportedly had seizures. The Petitioner had traumatic brain injuries. The Petitioner al s o l acked

a de qu a te sti mul a tio n a nde xpe ri e nc e d f a mil y po ve rt y

. Hi s livin g situatio n w a s e sse nti a lly ho me le ss. During his childhood, he only attended sc hool f

or two y ear s. The Petitioner suffe red c hild abuse and
neg lect. The Petitioner had no consistent car etake rs or friends. His mother was a si ng le par ent, and the Petitioner did not really know his father . The Petitioner did not speak until he was six y ear s old,

a nd , w he n he didsp e ak, his sp e e c h w a s a bn orma l. P re se ntl y , th e Pe tit ion e r h a s sp e e c h impa ir me nts in both Vietnamese and Eng lish. Th e P eti tioner wa s a poor student, a lthough he did have g ood attendanc e. “T hese f

indings indicate that there was brain dy sfunction t hat was prese nt in childhood

as we ll as prese nt now.” Dr . Auble summariz ed, “. . .he had an impair ed mother. H e had la ck of support from his family . He ha d abuse, pove rty , war , discrimination .

. . , early drug and alc ohol abuse. A ll of this contributed to his compr omised functioning during childhood.” She conc luded that, in her opinion, the Petitioner is “mentally reta rded under the definition of the Tenne ssee Statute, the AAMR and the D SM manual.”

On cr oss- ex am i n at i o n , Dr

. Au b l e r ea ff i rm ed t h at t h e P et i t i o n erfi rs tca m e t o t h e U n i t ed States when he was seventeen y ear s old and could only speak V ietnamese . Once in the United States, the Petitioner was enr olled in a prog ram that wa s desig ned to assimilate fore ign born students into the
sy stem. The Petitioner re mained in this prog ram for one y ear

. During this time, he did not take an I .Q. test. He w as, howe ver, “ g iven achie vement testing.” On this testing, the Petitioner re ceive d a “g rade of ‘C’ for social interac tion. A ‘B’ for one period of bi lingua l studies, first semester . And all of those other

classes w ere ‘D.’” Although D r. Auble state d that, in her opi nion, the Petitioner was not able to live independently
, she concede d that the Petitioner “took ca re of [Ms . Mitchell] and her c hildren” w hen he lived w ith her. I n fac t, the Petitioner did “some cooking ” and he lped her children g et re ady

for sc hool. Dr. Auble further conce ded that the Petitioner has had “ sever al jobs.” I n fac t, the Petitioner’s last place of employ ment was with Whitt ington B uilding Supplies. His job-12-

du tie s c on sis te d o f c le a nin g the y arda ndc utt ing wo odto fi xed le ng ths

. Tw o da y s pri or to the c ri me for whic h he is c urre ntly under a sentenc e of death, the Petitioner was promoted f rom an outside job
to t he s a m e j o b i n s i d e t h e s h o p

. T h e P e t i t i o n e r w a s d e s c r i b e d a s a n “ e xc e l l e n t e m p l o y e e ” byhis
manag ers. Dr . Auble conf irmed that the Petitioner had a lso been e mploy ed for a while at J ade E ast,” the loc a tio n o f the c ri me , f or a wh ile . T he Pe tit ion e r r e po rt e d th a t he ha d b e e n “f ir e d fr om Jade Ea st beca use he [made too many

eg g rolls] .”

Ag ain, Dr. Auble conc eded that the Petitioner was not administered any type of e valuation until he was inca

rce rate d and that this testing wa s at the re quest of the Petitioner’s c ounsel. She stated that the fir st I .Q. test was administ ere d to the Petitioner by Dr. Adle r in 1996. The Petitioner

rec eived an I .Q. score of 72. Dr. Auble explained that this score was inflated, howeve r, due to the “F ly nn Effect
, ” o r re -n o rming of the test. Dr . Auble stated that the fac t that a per son has an I .Q. below 70 does not, by

itself, rende r that per son mentally reta rded.

Dr. Auble stated that the Petitioner wa s first diag nosed wit h schizophrenia in Aug ust 1990 by Dr. Humble. D r. Auble e x plained that, shortl y afte r the Petitioner’s a

rrival at Riverbend, “he started e x hibiting very

bizarre be havior.” The Petitioner beg an taking m ed i cation on Aug ust 9, 1990. Howeve r, Dr. A uble conc eded that the Petitioner still experience d hallucinations in 1992. She aff irmed that this may have been due to the Petitioner’s ref usal to ta ke his medication. Throug hout Aug ust 1993, the Petiti oner st i l l co m p l ained of hearing “ auditor hallucinations,” stating that the medication improved the hallucinations but did not el i m i n at e t h em. Dr. Auble stated that the Petitioner was pre scribed ne uroleptic a ntipsy chotic medication pretty consistently since 1990. He b ega n t ak i n g Ha l d o l
, t h en t o o k P ro l i x i n , an d fo r a t i m e T h o ra z i n e. Dr

. Au b l e s t at ed t h at , al t h o u gh Haldol is one of the olde st n eu ro l ep t i cs, the Petitioner wa s probably still taking it because it was chea per tha n the newe r medications.

B a se d up on the pr oo f pr e se nte d a t the e vid e nti ary he ari ng s, the Pe tit ion e r a ve rr e d th a t he is mentally reta rded w ithin the meaning of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-203, and a sserted that hi s se nte nc e of

de a th s ho uldbe mod if

ie d to a se nte nc e of

lif e imp ri so nme nt.

P roof Introdu ced at P rior P roce edings

A. Trial

The mate rial fa cts of the c rim es co m m i t t ed bythe Petitioner are set forth be low as inc or po rate d f ro m ou r s up re me c ou rt ’s de c isi on ondir e c t app e a l: On the afte rnoon of October 20, 1987, Ar t h u r L ee , Am y L ee, and Kai Yin Chuey

wer e found dead in the J ade East Restaura nt in Memphis. The restaur ant had not
y et opene d for business that day , and the v i ct i m s had appa rently been inside making p r e p ar a ti o n s f

o r th e e v e n in g

. Je w e lry w ith a w h o le s a le v a lue of $25,00 0

. 0 0 h a d b e e n ta k e n f r o m th e r e s ta

u r a n t. T h e St a te ’ s c r it ic a l pr oof inc lud e d: a

state me nt t ake n f

ro m th e De fe nd a nt i n w hic h h e a dmi tte d h is-13-

involvement in the crimes; De fendan t ’s fi n gerprint on one of the jew elry case s t ak e n d u r i n g t h e r o b b e r y; a n d t h e e ye w i t n e s s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e D e f e n d a n tb y a

s u r v i v o r o f t h e r o b b e r y.

. . .

The De fenda nt . . . was born on Nove mber 7, 1966. His mother wa s Vietnamese ; and his father , an American se rvice man, died in Vietna m in 1968. The De fenda nt started school whe n he wa s si x y ear s old but stopped when Saig on fe ll. I n 1 98 3 a

Ca tho lic re lie f a g e nc y

re se ttl e d th e De fe nd a nt and his mothe r i n Memphis. The De fenda nt briefly attended sc hool before dropping out in 1984.

Af te r h is a rr e st by the Ho us ton , T e xas, po lic e , D e fe nd a nt g a ve a state me nt i n which he a cknowledg ed his role in the r obbery and murde rs. He stated that he ha d worke d briefly

at the Jade East Restaurant a month or two befor e the c rimes and that Mr. L ee ha d fired him bec ause “ he didn’t like me” an d “s aid Icooked too
many eg g rolls.” The D efe ndant i m p l i ca ted Hung Van Chung , Kong Chung Bounna m and Duc Phuoc D oan in the robbe ry . He stated that the four me n enter ed the ba ck door of

the r es taura nt and he talke d to Arthur L ee “ for a bout ten minutes be fore there was any shooting.” The Def endant had a .2 2 re volver, Bounna m a .44, Chung a .22 and D oan a .25.

. . . [A ]ft e r the g ro up pu lle d o ut the ir g un s: Mr. L ee g rabbe d Na m ’s [ Bounnam’s] hand with the gun and elbowed him in the chest. Na m fell bac k and hit the old lady . The old l ad y fe l l on me and whe n she hit me it caused the g un to g o off. I don’t know what I

hit that tim e. Mr. L ee the n kicked Hung [C hung ]/I

hear d Hung Chung shoot one or two times and then Mr. L ee tri ed t o g rab the g un and Hung Chung shoot him. Whil e Mr. L ee w as trying to ge t Hung [C hung ’s] gun, I told him not to or I wo u l d h av e t o hurt him. He turned a nd t ri ed t o get m y g un and I

shot him. He fell and wa s moving a round and I shot him i n the fa ce some wher e. The n I walked t h r[ o u gh ] t h e door w here they kept the mone y an d gold. I looked up and sa w the old lady roll over. I thought she had something in her ha nd. I shot her in the bac k of the he ad.

Whil e the De fe nd a nt w a s in the of fi c e c oll e c tin g the je we lry
, he hea rdmor e sh ots

. He state d that he did not know “ wh o wa s s h o oting or what” or who had shot “the
y oung g irl,” Amy

L ee. U pon leaving the offic e, the De fendant saw B ounnam holding Ging Sam L ee. T he De fendant t o l d Bounnam not to hurt her. B ounnam hit Mr s. L e e on the ba c k o f the he a d, a nda ll the a ssaila nts le ft

.

Ou tsi de th e re staur a nt, the De fe nd a nt d isc ov e re d th a t B ou nn a m ha d b e e n s ho t in the le ft le g ne ar the g ro in. B ou nn a m cla im ed tha t th e De fe nd a nt h a d s ho t hi m. The g r o u p f

le d in B o u n n a m’ s Cama r o to a n a c q u a in tan c e ’ s ap ar tm e n t. F r om-14-

there , the D ef

endant, B ounnam and Chung drove Chung ’s ca r to Washington, D.C. Bounna m’s Camaro wa s left in Memphis. Doan re mained in Tenne ssee.

Fr o m Wa s h in g to n , th e trio d r o v e to H o u s to n , T e xa s

. O n c e in H o u s ton, the Def endant we nt to the Saigon Pool Hall and talke d with a Vietnames e m an about

se lli ng so me g old . T he man too k th e g olda ndre turne d in abo ut t e n mi nu te s w ith $4 ,0 00 .0 0. Th e De fe nd ant pai d the ma n $ 20 0 a nddiv ide d th e re st thr e e way s. L ater , Bounna m flew to North Car olina and Chung went to Dallas w ith a friend.

On April 28, 1988, alm o s t s i x months after the robbery , the Def endant wa s

arr ested in Houston. . . .

2. Post-Convi ction Procee ding

Th e Pe tit ion e r a

rg ue d th a t he wa s me nta lly re tard e d in his orig inal pe tit ionfo r p os tconvict io n r e li e f

. A t th e e v id e n ti ar y h e ar in g o n th is p e ti ti o n , th e Pe ti ti o n e r p r e s e n te d the testimonyof Dr. A ndrew Adler, a psy cholog ist who administered psy cho l o gi cal tests to t he Petitioner. See He ck Va n T ra n v. State, No. 02C01-9803-CR-00078, 1999 WL 177560, *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ac k s o n , Apr. 1, 1999). Dr. Adler testified that the Petitioner’s I .Q. was 67 . D r. Ad le r a lso c on c luded th at the Pe tit ion e r s uf fe re d f ro m pa rano id s c hizo ph re nia , in addition to, post-traumatic stress disorde r. Ho we v er , the post-conviction court found that Dr. Adler misre ad the manua l relating to I .Q. ca lculation. I d. Dr. Ly nn Z ag er, a psy cholog ist who testified for the State, related that the prope r ca lculation was 72, not 67. I d.

Additionally , the p ro of established that the Petitioner’s appointed trial c ounsel reported an initial difficulty

in commun i ca t i n g wi th the Petitioner due to the lang uag e bar rier. I d. at 8. Ho we ve r, on c e a n in te rp re te r w a s a pp ointed
, cou ns e l r e po rt e d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r w a s a ble to understand

. I d

. Both c ounselors Quinn and Sca rmoutsos reporte d that neither f elt that

co m petenc y

was a n issue. I d. T r ia l c o u n s e l r e tain e d th e s e r v ic e s o f D r

. Kh a n n a , a

c li n ic al
p s y ch o l o gi s t , p ri o r t o tri al

. I d

. Dr

. Kh an n a fo u n d t h e P et i t i o n er t o b e be l o w t h e a v er age intelligenc e leve l, depre ssed with s u i cidal ideations, and under a g reat deal of stre ss. I d. There was no indication from Dr. Khanna that the Petitioner wa s incompetent. I d.

Dr . Wil lia m K e nn e r w a s a pp oin te d b y

the David so n Co un ty

Pr ob a te Cou rt in 19 92 to determ i n e whether

the Petitioner was c ompetent to make de cisions about his medical ca re. I d. Dr. Ke nner de termined that the P et itioner was not compe tent to make such de terminations. I d. Dr . K e nn e r a lso pe rf

orme d a n e va lu ati on of th e Pe tit ion e r i n A pril 1 99 7 at th e re qu e st o f p os tconviction counse l. I d. At the time of the post-c onviction hearing, D r. Ke nner b el i ev ed the Petitioner to be suffe ring from chr onic, seve re pa ranoid s ch i zophrenia. I d. Dr. Ke nner informed the post-conviction court that the ons et o f t h i s illness is precede d by a prodoma l phase that slowly develops ove r a numbe r of months, sometimes y ear s. I d.-15- F ind ings of

P ost-Conviction Court

On May 5, 2004, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner’s r equest for relief . The trial court, r ely ing upon the instructions provided b y the Tenne ssee Supre me Court in Van Tran and Howe ll concluded that the Petitioner did not “me et the def inition of mental retar dation as set forth b y t he statute.” The trial c ourt denied the motion to reopen. The c ourt’s orde r denying relief was c omprehe nsive and de tailed, consisting of approximately

fifty (50) pa g es.

The trial c ourt noted that it must determine “ wh ether petitioner has e stablished, by a preponde ra n ce of the evide nce , that (1) he has sig nificant subave rag e intellectua l functioning

e vid e nc e d b y

a fu nc tio na l in te lli g e nc e qu oti e nt o f s e ve nty or be low ; ( 2) he su ff

e rs fr om d e fi c its in adaptive behavior and (3) the defic its in both I .Q. and adaptive behavior developed prior to the
ag e of e ighte en. S ee V an Tran, 66 S.W .3d 790, 812, apply ing T enn. Code Ann. 39- 13-203; Michae l Way ne Howe ll v. S t at e, 1 51 S.W .3d 450 (Tenn. 2004) (filed Nove mber16, 2004 at J ackson) .” Apply ing the se g uidelines, the court proce eded to e valua te ea ch of the “ele ments” of

“ me nta l r e tard a tio n in de pen den tly .” I nit ia lly , th e tr ia l c ou rt no te d th e e xtre me dif

fi c ulty in

makin g a de te rm inatio n in thi s pa rt ic ula r c a se g ive n the fa c t that the Pe tit ion e r sp eaks very li ttl e Eng lish; has very

littl e formal edu ca t i o n ; l i ved most of his “y oung life” on the streets of V ietnam

a nd liv e d mos t of his a du lt lif e in priso n; a nd the fa c t that the Pe tit ion e r su ff e rs from par a no id schizophrenia. With these circumstanc es p re s ent, the trial c ourt questioned that ability of standardized testing to acc urate ly determine the Petitioner’s leve l of intellige nce. T he court then made the f

ollowing f

indings a s summarized herein.

The c ourt found that “the [P ]etit ioner h as p ro ven by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e that he has a functional intelligenc e quotient of seventy (70) or below.” Although the cou rt fo und that the 1996 test score of 72 did not satisfy the first criteria of the statute, the a d d i t i o n al t es ting perf ormed upon Petitioner did indicate that the Pet itioner’s I .Q. was be low 70. Specifica lly , the trial court f

ound that “[a]ll three subsequent I .Q. tests score s [65, 7 0
, an d 6 8 ] m eet the require ments of [Tennessee Code Annotated se ction] 39-13-203(a) (1).”

Next, the trial court determine d t h at t he Petitioner “doe s not have de ficits in adaptive behavior .” I n making this finding, the tria l court noted: This court notes its ag ree ment with the State’s assessment that, due to the unique circ umstances of

the petitioner’s ba ckg round, some of the ques t i o n s posed on the I ndepende nt L iving Sca le borde r o n t h e absurd. Additionally , this court notes the testimonyof Dr. G rant on re -direc t examinati o n , i n which he te stified that, the three y ear s the petitioner spent in this country as a f ree perso n wo u ld be suffic ient for him to learn some of the skills t h at are measure d by the I ndepende nt L iving Scale, but certainly

not all of them. Moreove r, the fa ct that the petitioner ha d been inc arc erated for mor e than ten y ear s when these tests were administered

certain l y ef

fec t their eff

icac y . Thus, despite the a ssertions of Dr. A uble and Dr

. Gra nt’s [si c], this court is convinced b y t h e State’s cr oss examination of the

e xpe rt wi tne sses a ndarg ume nts of c ou ns e l, that th e I nd e pe nd e nt L ivi ng Sc a le-16-

should be g iven limited weig ht in this case . . . . [L ikewise, the t ri al co u rt ag ree d with the State’s ar g ument reg arding the ef fica cy of t h e Vi n el an d test.] [ The trial
court found] inher ent problems with the administration of t h e Vineland. Participants ar e aske d to ev al u at e t he petitioner a s if he we re a fre e and functioning member of this socie ty and as if the petitioner wer e sev en t ee n y ears

o ld

. Wi thr e g ar d to th e p e ti ti o n e r ’ s mo th e r , s h e h e r s e lf is b ar e ly a f u n c ti o n ing

me mbe r o f this so c ie ty

a ndha s n ot s e e n h e r s on on a c on sis te nt bas is for a lmo st fiftee n y ear s. She is likelyvery unfamili ar with many

of the tasks listed in the Vinelan d

. A d d it io n a ll y , o n c e s h e a n d th e p e ti ti o n e r c a me to th e U n it e d St a te s they

we re on ly liv ing tog e the r f

or a sh ort ti me ; th us , s he h ad v e ry lit tle op po rtun ity

to observe the petitioner in a “ traditi o n al” setting. Ther efor e, this court finds the Vi ne la ndc on du c te d w ith the pe tit ion e r’ s mo the r shou ld be g ive n v e ry lit tle , if
any , weig ht. The Vinela nd was a lso administered to a Vi etnamese prison g uard at the fa c ili ty

wh e re the pe tit ion e r is be ing he ld. Th e c ou rt fi nd s th e e ff

ic a c y of thi s test to be questionable a s well. When the test was administered, the petitioner ha d been i n ca rc er ated f

or over ten y ear s. Petiti oner is inca rce rate d in a manner

that

sever elyr e s tric ts h is a c ti v it ie s a n d in a man n e r th at p r o v id e s a

s tric tl y c o n tr o lle d environment. .

. . He is not require d to cook for himself; he is told when and how much m e d ic in e to ta

k e ; h e is g iv e n me d ic a l t r e a tm e n t w h e n n e e d e d
, w ithout
reque st; he is provided fac iliti es and opportunities for attending to his personal hy g ien e. Al l of these a rea s are cover ed by

the Vineland, y et in this case, the petitioner has lived in an e nvironment for ove r ten y ear s where he does not have to do anything f

or himself. More over, the prison g uard ha s never observe d the
p e ti ti o n e r in a n y o th e r e n v ir o n me n t. T h e r e f o r e , th e c o u r t a ls o f

in d s li tt le weig ht should be g iven to the Vineland a dminist ere d to the prison g uard. The post-c onviction court also conside red the testimonyand testi n g completed by both Dr. Grant and Dr . Auble. Eve n so, the court f ound th at t h e P eti tioner “f ails to meet his burden unde r the second pr ong of the s t at u t e. Whil e the c ourt does find that ther e is overw helming pr oof that the
pe tit ion e r s uf

fe rs fr om d e fi c its in the are a of c ommun ic a tio n, of

the te n A AM R c ri te ri a, th is is the only are a in which the c ourt finds there to be def icits.” “. . .[W ]i th reg ard to the r emaining criteria, this court finds no def icits.” Despite Dr . Auble’s testimony that petitioner’s fr ontal lobe fu nc tio nin g ind ic a te s d e fi c its in the are a s o f s e lf -d ir e c tio n a ndso c ia l in te rp e rs on a l skill s, thi s court doe s not find deficits i n these a rea s. Dr. Auble te stified that she found the pe titioner was mentally rig id and unable to a dapt to new situations or mod ify his behavior. How ever , the
sp e c ific te sti ng wh ic h w a s u se d b y Dr . A ub le to e va luate the se are a s a g a in r e la te d to c e rt a in lang uag e sk i l l s such as pe titioner’s ability to fig ure out the me aning of new words. Thus, the results of these tests were likely skewe d by

the fa ct that petitioner ha s a l i m i t ed g rasp of the E n gl i s h l an gu age

. T h e c o u rt s t at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g: The a ssertion that petitioner has de ficits in the are as of se lf-dire ction and socia l sk ill s is fu rthe r c on tr a dic te d b y te sti mony at pet ition e r’ s tria l. A t th e tr ia l, petitioner’s spo n s o r, Ms. Mitchell testified that petitioner ca red f or her while she

wa s il l; c oo ke d f

or he r f a mil y a nd even ca

re d f or he r c hil dr e n, inc lud ing a c hil d who suffe rs from c ere bral pa lsy . . . . Testimony at trial also indicate d that-17-

petitioner wa s able to hold a job and w as ev en promoted to a job with more responsibility . . . . Additionally , afte r the murde rs, p et i tioner fled the city and evade d arr est for six months; and testimony at trial indicated it was t h e p et i tioner wh o n e g oti a te d th e sa le fo r the sto le n g olda ndsp lit up the pr oc e e ds a mon g st h is co-de fenda nts. . . . Moreov er , any mental rig idityor ability to adapt could just as likely be attributable to cog nitive dy sfunction associated wi th petitioner’s schizophrenia or tre atment he is re ceiving for that c ondition.

The trial c o u r t a c c r e d it e d li tt le w e ig h t t o D r

. A u b le ’ s f in d in g th a t th e Pe ti ti o ner demonstrated de ficits in the ar ea o f health and safe ty as this finding w as base d larg ely upon the I ndepende nt L iving Sca le. The c ourt furthe r found that, because the Petitioner had spent most of his life living eit h er on the streets or in prison, the Petitioner ha d littl e opportunity to develop or ref ine the skills associated with this criteria. Finally
, the trial court f ound no defic it in the area of functional a cade mics. Whi le the court acknowl ed ged t h at the Petitioner had de ficits in the are a of re ading proficie ncy

and lang uag e skills, t he court found that the def icits were more in the a

rea of communication rather than fu n ct i o nal ac ademics. In this reg ard, the trial court noted that the Petitioner only at t en d ed s chool i n the United States for one y ear and attende d school in Vietnam

s p o ra dically

for a period of only

two y ear s. The court further noted that the Petitioner’s scor e on one test w a s n o t b e lo w a v e r a g e a n d th a t o th e r te s ti n g r e v e a le d a

p a tt e r n w h e r e th e Pe ti ti o n e r ’s
mat h s co re s we re highe r than his re ading score s. The court stated that, while the test scor es indicated “some aca demic deficit,” t he court was una ble to conclude that the re sults indi cate d “an

overa ll deficit in the are a of functional ac ademics.” I n summary , the cour t concluded, “[A]l though this court finds p et i t i o n er has defic its in one of the criteria listed in the Manua l of the American Assoc iation of Mental Retar dation, 9 Edition, namely , communication, this is not th

e no ug h to c on c lud e pe tit ion e r h a s defi cits in a da pti ve be ha vio r. Pe tit ion e r mus t de mon str a te defic its in at least t wo of the listed criteria; thus, petitioner has f ailed to demonstrate that he has defic its in adaptive beha vior as re quired by [Tennessee Code Ann o t at ed s ection] 39-13- 203(a) (2).”

Re gardi ng the thi rdpr on g , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt fo un d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r “ faile d to demonstrate t h at an y

such [adaptive] deficits manifeste d during the deve lopmental period a s require d by

part (a )(3) of the statute.” Both pa rties agree d t hat no test of intellectua l functioning

wa s a dmi nistere d to th e Pe tition e r p ri or to h is r e a c hin g the a g e of e ig hte e n o r p ri or

to h is incar cer ation. The c ourt noted that the Petitioner wa s first tested ten y ear s after his incarc eration. Wit h considerat i o n t h at no t esting was pe rformed until a deca de af ter his incar cer ation, the court determined that the Petitioner could not establish that he satisfied the fi nal prong of the statutory criteria. I n so finding, the court c oncluded that ne it h er Dr

. Au b l e n or Dr. G rant c ould offer any

rea l proof to estab l i sh that the defic its occurr ed prior to a g e eig hteen. The court further re lied upon the testimony

and socia l history

prepa red by Doan Dinh at t h e first post-c onviction
proce eding . The c ourt wa s n o t co nvinced that c erta in fac tors prese nt in the Petiti oner’ s

c hi l d h o o d w e r e i n d i c a t i v e t h a tt h e P e t i t i o n e r ’ s d e f i c i t s m a n i f

e s t e d d u ri n g t h i s t i m e

. I n t h is
respe ct, the court determined that the Petitioner’s late d ev el o pment could have been the result of “neg lect” r ather

than neur ologic al def

icit. Finally , the court observed that the Petitioner suffer ed-18-

from par anoid schizophrenia. This diag nosis was made te n y ea rs ea rl i er and at least one expert te s ti f ie d th a t o v e r ti me th is d is e a s e w o u ld e r o d e b r a in f u n c ti o n in g

. T h u s , th e c o urt conc luded that it wa s a lso lik e ly

that a ny de fi c its in i nte lle c tua l f uncti oning oc c ur

re d a s a re su lt o f this disease. In rea ching this conclusion, the court n o t ed that the Petit ioner “ suffe red f rom schizophrenia for

nearly eig ht y ear s prior to being diag nosed and tre ated.

The trial c ourt noted that this prong , like the ada ptive defic it prong
, wa s s u bjective. The court stated that this prong c ould be established by school rec ords, medica l rec ords, documente d social h i s t ory , and obser vations of eva luating e x perts. “In this case[,] t here are no school

rec ords, n o m ed i cal recor ds, very littl e docume nted social history and the obse rvations of the experts on this poi nt are s p ec u l at i v e at best.” The trial court concluded that “in light of the proof
prese nted, it is no t p o s s i b l e to di scern when the pe titioner’s defic its in i ntellectual f unctioning develope d, this court finds petitioner has a lso failed to meet his burde n with respec t to the third
prong of the statute.”

Summ ary of App licable Law

I n 1990, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-203 was e nacted p ro h i biting the execution of men t all y

reta rded individuals. See How ell v. State, 151 S.W .3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2004). While our supreme c ourt determined that this legislation was not to be a pplied
retroa ctively , the hig h court did hold that the execution of mentally reta rded pe rsons violated constitutional prohibiti ons ag ainst crue l an d u n u s u al punishment. I d. (citing Van Tr an, 66 S.W .3d 790, 798-799 (Te nn. 2001)); cf . Atkins v. Virg inia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 1 2 2 S

. Ct. 2242 (2002) ( execution of mentally reta rded individuals violates the United States Constitution).

As the Petitioner was convicted prior to the ena ctment of the statute, our supreme c ourt determined that a cla im that he was menta ll y re t ar d ed should be broug ht under proc edure s for re

op e nin g a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f. Van T ran, 66 S.W.3da t 81 1- 81 2. Mo re ov e r, wh ile section 39-13- 203 did not apply retroa ctively t o the Petitioner’s ca se, the supre me court held that the prope r cri t er i a fo r evaluating his cla im of mental reta rdation we re those se t forth within the statute. Van Tr an, 66 S.W.3d at 812.

Section 39-13-203 pr ovides the following definition of mental re tardation: (1) Significa ntly s ub-ave rag e g ener al intellectual f unctioning a s evidenc ed by a func tional intelligenc e quotient (I .Q.) of se venty (70) or below; (2) Def

icits in adaptive beha vior; and (3) Th e m en tal reta rdation must have be en manife sted during the developmenta l period or by eig hteen ( 18) y ear s of ag e. All three c riteria must be satisfied befor e a f inding of men t al re tardation may be made

. Moreove r, our supre me court noted that the demarcation of an I .Q. score of seve nty (70) in the
statute is a “b r ig h t- li n e c u to f f ” a n d mu s t b e me t. B yr o n B la c k v

. St a te , N o

. M 2 0 0 4

- 0 1 3 4 5

- CC AR 3

- P D
, 2 0 0 5 W L 2 6 6 2 5 7 7
, a t * 1 2 ( c i t i n g H o w e l l
, 1 5 1 S

. W

. 3 d a t 4 5 6
, 4 5 8

- 5 9

. “ [T ]h e sta tut e should not be interpre ted to make a llowanc e for any standard e rror

of mea surement or

other-19-

c ir c umsta nc e s w he re by

a pe rs on wi th an I .Q . a

bo ve se ve nty

c ou ld b e c on sid e re d me nta lly
reta rded.” I d. (quoting Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 456).

L a te r, in H owe ll, the su pr e me c ou rt e sta bli sh e d th e stand ard s to be app lie d b y the po stc onvi cti on c ou rt , d e lin e a te d th e app ro pria te bu rd e ns of pr oo f, a ndde te rm ine d th a t a pe tit ion e r i s not entitled to have a jury determine wheth er h e is mentally reta rded. B yron B lack v. State, No. M2004-01345-CCA-R3-PD, 2005 WL 2662577, at *11 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oc t. 19, 2005), p er m

. t o appea l denied, (Te nn. Fe b. 2006) (c iting Howe ll, 151 S.W .3d at 457-58, 463- 6 5 ). Ou r s u p re m e c o u rt n o t ed t h at , i n a m o t i o n t o re o p en a p o s t

- c o n v i ct i o n p ro ce ed i n g, defe ndants must present fa cts which “ would establish by clea r and c onvincing eviden ce ” that they are entitled t o re l i ef. Howell, 151 S.W .3d at 460. (c iting T.C.A. § 40-30- 117(a) (4))

. Howeve r, the c ourt, utiliz ing principles of du e p ro cess, lowered the standard to the le sser “color able c laim” standar d when c laims are r aised unde r Va n Tran and Atkins. I d. at 463. Sho uldthe de fe nd a nt s e t f orth a “ c olo rabl e c la im” of

me nta l r e tard a tio n inhis mot ion , h e is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing. I d.

Ne xt, th e c ou rt

a dd re sse d th e le ve l of

pr oo f r e qu ir e d in pr ov ing t he a lle g a tio ns raise d in the motion. Our supreme court, a cknowledg ing t h e disparity betwee n the burde n place d on defe ndants at trial (pr eponderanc e of the evidenc e) and those in the post-conviction stag e (c lear and convinc ing e vidence ), held that due proces s p ro h i b i ted the application of the hig her standa rd of proof at the post-convic tion stage . I d. at 4 6 3 -6 4

. Acc ording ly , the court held that “at a n evidentiary

hearing, [a de fenda nt] will ha v e the opportunityto prove menta l retar dation by
pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e .” I d. a t 46 5. I n so ho ldi ng , the c ou rt re c og nize d that, a lth ou gh its “holding . . . is at odds with the standard se t out in Tenness ee C o de Annotate d section 40-30- 11 7, ” “ it w ou ld v iol a te du e pr oc e ss t o e xec ute a de fe nd a nt w ho is m or e lik e ly than n ot m e nta lly

re tard e d. ” I d. a t 46 4- 65 . F ina lly , th e Ho we ll c ou rt c on sid e re d w he the r a

de fe nd a nt i s ent it led to have a jury determine whether he is me ntally reta rded with c onsideration of the United S t ates Supreme Court ruling s in Apprendi v. Ne w J ers ey and Ring v. Arizona. Our supre me court reje cted Petitioner How ell’s ar g ument that a “de fe n d an t ’s lack of mental re tardation is t he fu nc tio na l e qu iva le nt o f a n a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e

. . .[th a t] mus t be fo un d by a jury .” Ho we ll, 151 S.W .3d at 465. I n s o d o i ng , our supre me court acknowle dg ed that the United States Supreme Court, i n Atkins, had “pointedly expressed that mental re tardation should be considere d
apart from mitigating fac to rs

. ” Ho we l l, 151 S.W .3d at 466. Additionally , our leg islature plac ed the prohibition on ex ec uting menta lly reta rded individuals in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 3 9 -13-203, r ather

than placing it among the mitigating fac tors listed in Tennessee Code Annot a te d s e c ti o n 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 ( j)

. H o w e ll
, 1 5 1 S. W. 3 d a t 4 6 6

. T h e c o u r t h e ld th a t th e is s u e of mental r e ta

r d a ti o n is “ n o t o n e o f a g g r a v a ti n g o r e n h a n c in g f a c to r s , b u t o f e li g ib il it y f o r the
sentenc e imposed by

a jury .” I d. The c ourt furthe r held that “ mental re tar d at i o n wo rk s to reduc e the maxi mum possible sentenc e, based upon the jury ’s verdic t, f rom death to life i m p ri s o nment.” I d. at 467. I n this reg ard, “ [m ental re tardation] is not an element of the offe nse and is not re quired to be prove n by

the State nor f

o u n d by a jury .” I d. B a se d u po n th e se c on c lus ion s, ou r s up re me court held that “the determination of mental reta rdation is more appropriately left t o t h e t ri al
court judge
, as conte mplated under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39-13-203(c ) which state sT h e Pe t i t i on e r a c k n ow l e dg e s t h a t t h i s i s s u e i s r a i s e d t o p r e s e r v e r e v i e w by t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s S u pr e me 1

C o u rt. S e e S ta te v. G o m e z , 1 6 3 S .W .3 d 6 3 2 (T e n n . 2 0 0 5 ) (d e fen d a n t no t p re c lud e d fro m ra ising c la im sim p ly b ecause p ri o r decis i o n rej ect ed s am e).

-20- ‘[t] he dete rmination of whethe r th e defenda nt was mentally reta rded at the time of the off ense of f ir s t- d e g r e e mu r d e r s h a ll be made by the c ou rt. ’” I d. (empha sis in original). T he court also noted that “the bur den of pe rsuasion in this respec t in upon the defe ndant rather t h an the State.” I d. (citing T.C.A. 39-13-203( c).

I. Ri ght to Jur y D e te r m ina ti on o n M e nt al R e ta r dat ion

The Petitioner conte nds that the United States Constitut ion gua rante es the Petitioner t he rig ht
to a jury determination whe rein the State shall have the burden to disprove his me n t al re t ar d at ion bey ond a re asonable doubt. The State re sponds that this claim is waived as t h e i s sue wa s not 1 raised in the initial motion to reopen a nd beca use no court ha s ever

g rante d a motion to reopen on thi s sp e c if

ic iss ue . A lte rn a tiv e ly , th e State ass ert s tha t th is i ssu e wa s r e je c te d b y ou r s up re me

c ou rt in H ow e ll v . St a te . O ur su pr e me c ou rt re

je c te d th e arg ume nt m a de by the Pe tit ion e r i n Howell v. State. See supr a

. Acc ording ly , the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

II. Whether the P etitioneris Mentally Ret arded P ursuan t to T.C.A. § 39- 13-203

A. Standard of

Review

The que stio n of whe ther a defe ndant is mentally

reta rded and, thus, ineligible for the death pe nalty

is a mix ed question of law and fa ct. B yro n Bl ac kv. State, No. M2004-01345- CCA-R3-PD, 2005 W L

2662577, at *12 . Thus, this Court m ust review the post-conviction

c ou r t ’ s f i n d i n g s o f f

a c t d e n o v o , w i t h a p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o rr e c t n e s s t h a t i s t o b e o v e r c o m e on ly wh en the pr eponder ance of the e vidence is contrary to the court’s f

indings. I d. (citing Fields v. Sta te , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 50 , 4 56 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ). I n revi ewing the app lic a tio n o f the la w t o th e fa c ts, howeve r, this C o u rt conducts a purely de novo re view. I d. (citing Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 457). Thus, no presumption of corr ectne ss attaches to the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law. I d.

B. Tenn essee Code Annotated § 39-13-203

I n determining whe ther the Petitioner is mentally reta rded an d
, t h u s , ineligible f or the death pe nalty , this Court i s bound b y o u r s u p re m e court’s decisions in Van Tr an and H owell. As such, the a

pplicable criteria to be used by a court in making a

determination of mental reta rdation

are those set forth in Te nn es s ee Code Annotated sec tion 39-13-203. As pre viouslynoted, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tio n 39-13-203 se ts forth the criteria for making a dete rmination of mental re tardation as it im pacts one’s elig ibilit y for the de ath pena lty . Section 39-13-203
pr ov ide s, in p art , (a ) As us e d in thi s se c tio n, “ me nta l r e tard a tio n” me a ns :-21- (1) Significa nt subaver ag e g ener al intellectual functionin g as evidence by a func tional intelligenc e quotient (I .Q.) o f seventy (70) or below; (2) Def

icits in adaptive beha vior; and (3) Th e mental retardation must have be en manife sted during the developmenta l period, or by eig hteen ( 18) y ear s of ag e. T.C.A. § 39-13-203( a). A ll three prong s of this definition mus t b e s atisfied to establish mental
reta rdation.

C. Stand ard of Proof

I n H o w e l l v

. S ta te
, our s up re me c ou rt he ld that “ a t a n e vid e nti ary he ari ng , [a

de fe nd a nt] will have the opportunityto prove menta l retar dation by preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.” Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 465. A preponde ranc e of the evidenc e means evidenc e which is of
g re a ter wei g ht, or

is m or e c on vin c ing , th a n th a t e vid e nc e of fe re d inop po sit ion . 3 2A C.J.S. Evidence 1312 (2005). “ [T] he term does not mean pre ponderance in a mount, b u t i m p l i es an overba lancing in weight, and that it means, in the la st analy sis, ‘probability of the truth.’” I d. (interna l footnote omitted). “Suspicio n s ar e i nsufficie nt to amount to proof by a pre pondera nce of the e vidence .” I d.

Th e sa tis fa c tio n o f this “ pr e po nd e ranc e ” st and ardre qu ir e s th e fi nd e r o f f a c t to e va luate the e vid e nc e , dete rm ine wh a t e vid e nc e is r e lia ble , a ndde te rm ine wh a t e vid e nc e is p ro bativ e to d e m o n s tr a t e t h e tru t h o f

t h e a s s e r t e d p r o p o s i t i o n w i t h t h e r e q u i s i t e d e g r e e o f c e r t a i n t y

. Id

. In other wor ds, a p re p o n d er ance is such proof a s leads the trie r of f act to find that it is more
pr ob able than n ot, or

mor e lik e ly

than n ot, that a

c on te ste d f

a c t e xist s. I d. A pr e po nd e ranc e is attained whe re the evidenc e in its qualityof cr edibilitydestroy s and o v er b alanc es the equilibrium. I d. Moreove r, it is not re q uired that the trie r of f act must be “ entirely ” or

“ tho ro ug hly ” sa tis fi e d o r c on vi nced
, or sat isf ie d w ith “ c le arn e ss andc e rt a inty ,” or that a fa c t in iss ue sh a ll be pro ve d to “ fu ll s a tis fa c tio n” or to “ the re a so na

ble satis fa c tio n” of

the tr ie r o f f

a c t. I d. The proba

b i l i t i es m u s t be such that the c onclusion is acce ptable to the judg ment of the c ourt

or ju r y ap p li e d to th e e v id e n c e in th e p ar ti c u la r c a s e ; me r e p r o o f o f p o s s ib il it y , o r p o s s ib il it ie s, or

even a preponde ranc e of possibilities or a majority of chan ces, or

a choic e of pr obabilities, or

a mon g dif

fe re nt p os sib ili tie s, ne ve r c a n s uf fi c e a lon e to e sta

bli sh a pr op os iti on of

fa c t.

D. P e ti ti one r ’s Ar gum e nt

The Petitioner make s numerous complaints re g arding the trial court’s finding s of fa ct and conclusions of law . Add i t ionally , the Petitioner properly points out t hat this Court’s review inv olv e s a n a

pp lic atio n o f the la w t o th e fa c ts andis d e no vo . In th is r e g ard , th e Pe tit ion e r a sse rt s that: (1) the c redibility

of the witnesses wa s not an issue in these proc eeding s; (2) the trial c ourt

wa s n ot c ho os ing be tw e e n tw o p e rm iss ibl e vie ws of the e vid e nc e be c a us e the Stat e fai le d to
p re s en tan y

wi t n es s es o r e v i d e n ce ; an d (3 ) t h e j u d ge a tt h e e v i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g wa s n o tt h e j u d ge who pre sided over the orig inal trial or the origina l p o s t -c onviction proce eding and, in this reg ard,-22-

wa s n ot i n b e tte r p os iti on than th is C ou rt to review th e tr ansc ri pts of the se prior

pr oc e e din g s. The Petitioner also a sserts that the trial c ourt i m p roper ly attempted to exercise “ clinical jud g me nt” i n f

i n d i n g t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t h a v e d e f i c i t s i n a d ap t i v e b e h a v i o r a n d t h a t hi s subaver ag e intellectua l functioning did not manifest during his developmental pe riod.

E. Review

1. Sig nific ant ly S ubav e r ag e G e ne r al I nt e lle c tu al F unc ti oni ng
The post-c onviction court found that the Petiti o n er h as subaverag e g ener al intellectual functioning as ev i d enced by a func tional I .Q. of 70 or be low. The c ourt found that “the [ P ] et i t i oner ha s proven by a pre ponderance of

the evidenc e that he ha s a func tional intelligenc e qu oti e nt o f s e ve nty

(7 0) or be low . A lth ou g h th e c ou rt foun d th a t th e 19 96 te st s c or e of 72 did

no t satis fy

the fi rs t c ri te ri a

of the statut e , the add it io na l te sti ng pe rf orme d u po n th e Pe tit ion e r d id ind ic a te th at the Pe tit ion e r’ s I .Q . w a s b e low 70 . Sp e c if ic a lly , th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t “ [a]ll three subsequent I .Q. tests s co res [65, 70, and 68] meet the re quirements of [Tenne ssee Code Annotated] section 39-13-203( a)( 1).” The Petitione r d o es n o t contest the lower court’s conclusion as the f

irst prong of the statute. We ag ree with the post-co nviction court that the proof pr esente d by

the Petitioner establishes that he c urre ntly has a functional intellige nce quotient of seventy

(70) or below.

1. Deficits in Adap tive Behavior

The sec ond prong of the statutory crit eria for e stablishing mental r etar dation, “ada ptive fu nc tio nin g ” re fe rs to h ow e ff e c tively in di vid ua ls c op e wi th c omm on lif e de ma nd s a ndho w w e ll
t h eym ee tt h e s t an d ar d s o f p er s o n al i n d ep en d en ce ex p ec t ed o f s o m eo n e i n t h ei r p ar t i cu l arage g roup, socio-cultura l ba ckg round, and community setting.” Van Tran, 66 S.W .2d at 795 (citing Americ an Psy chiatric Association, Diag nostic and Statistical Manual of Me ntal Disorder s, 40 (4 th ed. 1994))

. A me n ta ll y

r e ta r d e d in d iv id u a l w il l h a v e s ig n if ic a n t l im it a ti o n s in a t l e a s t t w o o f the following basic sk i l l s : “communication, self-ca re, home living, socia l/interpersona l skill s, use of community

res o u rc es, self- direc tion, functional ac ademic skills, work, leisure , health, and safe t y

. ” I d

. I nfluenc es on ada ptive functioning may

include the individual’s “e ducation, motivation, p er s o n ality

char acte ristics, social and voc ational opportunities, and the menta l d i s o r d e r s a n d g e n e r a l m e d i c a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a tm a y c o e x i s tw i t h M e n t a l R e t ar d a t i o n

. ” Id

. In 1994, our supre me court construed the te rm defic its in adaptive beha v i o r in its ordinary sense a s “the in ab il it y o f a n in d iv id u a l to b e h a v e s o a s to a d ap t to s u rr o u n d in g c ir c u ms tan c e s

. ” State v. Smit h, 893 S.W .2d 908, 918 (Tenn. 1994)

.

The tria l court dete rmined that the Petitioner “did not have defic its in adaptive beha vior.” Th e Pe ti ti o n e r

c o n te s ts th is f

in d in g

. Sp e c if

ic a ll y , th e Pe ti ti o n e r

a s s e r ts o n ap p e a l th a t th e p roof
estab li s h e d b y

a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f

th e e v id e n c e th a t h e e xh ib it s d e f ic it s in a d ap ti v e b e h a v io r, inc lud ing (1 ) d e fi c its in c ommun ic a tio n, (2 ) d e fi c its in fu nct iona l a c a de mic s, a nd(3 ) d e fi c its in social skills and self-dire ction. Moreove r, the P et i t i o n er as s erts that he ha s score d two standard-23-

deviations below the me an on standard i z ed tests of a daptive beha vior indicating , under the AA MR 1 0 , th at he has d e fi c its in a da pti ve be ha vio r. Th e Pe tit ion e r a lso a sse rt s th a t it is th
contra dictory

for the trial cour t t o fi n d that the re sults of the I .Q. tests are valid, but that the results of tests measuring f unctio n al ac ad emics and ne urolog ical impairment should be disreg arde d beca

use they wer e g iven in Eng lish without the aid of an interpre ter.

At the evidentiary

heari n g, Dr. Auble , relying upon the AAMR, Tenth Edition,
cate g orized adaptive de ficits i nto three main are as: (1) Pra ctical, whic h she explained as the ability to maintain y ourself inde pendently in terms of ac ademics and work e nvir o n m en t ; (2) S o ci al
, wh i ch s h e s t at ed i n v o l v e d gu l l i b i l i t y , s o ci al u n d er s t an d i n g, t h e a b i l i t y t o av o i d b ei n g a victim, taking r esponsibility , and home skills; and (3) Conce ptual, which sh e d efine d as an a rea involving lang uag e, re ading , writing , manag ing mone y , self-dire ction, and abilities.

A. Deficits in Com m uni cation

Dr. Gr ant testified that the P et i t ioner ha d “def icits in adaptive beha vior as def ined by the Americ an Association of Mental Retardation and the American Psy chiatr i c As sociation.” He administered va

rious tests to evaluate the Petitioner’s lang uag e and c ommunication skill s. After evaluating the P et i t i o ner’ s perf ormanc e on these tests, Dr. Grant describe d the Petitioner’s lang uag e and c ommunication skill defic its as “seve re.” He a dded that the Petitioner’s sc ore on an expressive voc abulary test we re “the lowest scor e that the norms would go to. . .” and that the P et i t i o n er ’s s co re o n t h e o ra l wr i t t e n l a n g u age s k i l l s t es tre v ea l ed a s i gn i fi ca n td ef i ci t

. Al t h o u gh Dr. Gr ant conc eded that the Petitione r’ s native lang uag e is Vietname se and that the tests were

a d m i n i s t e r e d i n E n g l i s h
, h e s u r m i s e d t h a tt h i s f a c td i d n o ts k e w t h e r e s u l t s r e a c h e d

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Dr. Gr ant noted that the Petitioner’s c o m p re h en s i on in Vietnamese was poor and that the Petitioner’s Engl i s h proficie ncy exceede d his proficienc y in Vietnamese . Dr. Gr ant conc luded that the Petitioner’s def

icits in communication ski l l s s atisfied one of the two criteria ne eded by the classific ation sy stem for re tardation.

The trial c ourt did conclude that “the re i s o v erw helming pr oof that the pe titioner suffer s f r o m d e f ic it s in th e ar e a o f c o mmu n ic a ti o n , o f th e te n A A M R c r it e r ia

. . . . ” T h e Petitioner does

no t c on te st this fi nd ing ma de by the tr ia l c ou rt

.

B. Deficits in Functional Academ ics

Dr . G rant c on du c te d a n a sse ssm e nt o f the Pe tit ion e r’ s academi c skill s. As a re su lt o f h is evaluation, Dr. Gra nt concluded that the Petitioner had a r eading compre h en s i o n score of 4.1 and had a r eading g rade level of 3.1. H e adde d that the Petitioner’s spelling was at a 4.1 g rade level and that his math skills were at a 7.6 g rade level. Dr . Gra nt concluded that t h e Petitioner’s proof perf ormanc e in spelling , rea ding, and rea ding com prehe nsion were evidenc e of a signific ant defic it. He furthe r commente d t h at , al t h o ug h the Petitioner had be en in a G.E .D. prog ram

c la s s r o o m f

o r e ig h t to n in e y e ar s , h e is s ti ll s c o r in g a t a 4

. 1 g r a d e le v e l in r e a d in g

. B a s e d upon the Petitioner’s scor es, Dr. G rant stated that the Petitioner’s “func tional ac ad em i c skills are-24-

signific antly

impaired,” thus satisfy ing another of the criteria nee ded by the classific ation s y s tem for r etar dation.”

C. Deficits in Social S kill s and Self -Dire ction

The P etitioner contends that the t rial court’s finding s are incorre ct. Fir st, he contends that that the trial court’s finding that the re s u l t s o n t h e Halstead Reitan battery wer e skew ed “by

the fac t that petitioner has a limited g rasp of t h e E n gl i s h lang uag e” is without support in the rec ord. Next, h e contends that the tria l court attempted to e x erc ise clinical judg ment and ra ised the evidentiary

bar by demanding of the pe titioner a leve l of incapa city that is n o t re q u i red f

or a finding of ada

ptive defic its. The Petitioner also finds fault with the tria l court’s state ment that the Pe tit ion e r’ s me nta l r ig idi ty or ina bil ity to a da pt “ c ou ld j us t a s li ke ly

be a ttribu ta

ble to cog nitive dy sfunction associate d with pe titioner’s schizophrenia or treatment he is r ece ivin g for that condition” as be ing both spe culative a nd based on a misreading of the re cord. The Petitioner

asserts that the cumulative ef fec t of these e rror s compromises t h e t rial court’s analy sis and fi nd ing s.

D. P etitionerScored Two S tandard Deviations Below the Me an

The Petitioner asse rts that the AAMR, Tenth Edition, p ro v i d es that adaptive be havior c an be a sse sse d th ro ug h th e us e of st and ard ize d in str ume nts . Se e AA MR, 10 Edition, p. 76 (“an TH

overa ll score on a

standardized mea sure of conce ptual, social, and pr actica l skill s.). He r elies upon two di ff

er en t standardized tests of ada ptive behavior

to support his assertion that the fa ct that both of these test scor es we re t wo standards de viations below the mea n are proof of adaptive de fi c its . In th is r e g ard , h e c on te nd s th a t th e tr ial cou rt ’s failu reto a c c re dit the re su lts of

the se standardized tests was e rror

.

Dr. Gr ant administered the I ndepende nt L iving Sca les test to t h e Petitioner. The Petitioner rec eived a

score of 69. He related that this score f ell two standard de viations below the mean, thus satisfying the criteria for ha ving a signific ant defi ci t i n adaptive be havior. Simi la r ly
, th e Pe ti ti o n e r r e c e iv e d s c o r e s o f 5 8 a n d 6 5 o n tw o s u c c e s s iv e a d mi n is tr a tions of the Vinelan d ad ap t i ve beha vior scale . Both of the se mea sures satisfied the criteria for the Americ an Association of Menta l Retardation as two standa rd deviat ions below the mea n for a daptive behavior

.

Dr. Aub le c o rr o b o r a te d th e te s ti mo n y o f D r

. G r a n t b y s tati n g th a t s tan d ar d iz e d te s ts wer e used to determine whether a per son had ada

ptive defic its. Dr. Auble testified that the Petitioner’s

score s on the I ndepend ent Living Sca le and the two V ineland tests place d the Petitioner in the imp a ir e d r a ng e , th a t is tw o s ta nd ardde viatio ns be low the me a n. She e xpla ine d th a t, a c c or din g to both the AAMR and the DSM-IV, these te st scores we re illustrative of a daptive def icits.-25-

E. Review of

Trial Court’s F ind ings Regarding Defi cits in Adaptive Behavior

De s p i t e t he testimony

of the Petitioner’s e x perts and the fac t that the State prese nted no evidenc e, the trial court re jected the results of the standa rdized tests and the opinions of the Pe tit ion e r’ s e xpe rt s. Th e Pe tit ion e r i mpl ie s th a t th is fact, a lon e , is e rr or . Wh ile the State prese nted no new evidenc e at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to reope n, the trial court need
not revi ew th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at th e mot ionto r e op e n ina va c uu m. In o the r w or ds
, information re g arding the Petitioner prese nted at prior pr ocee d ings is re levant in making a prope r determination reg arding mental re tardation. See I n re: Ande rson Haw thorne, J r. , 105 P.3d 552, 559 (Cal. 2005); Morrison v. State, 583 S.E.2d 873, 876 (Ga. 2003) . I n this reg ard, w e note that the trial court is neither bound by the opinion of expert witnesses nor by t es t re s u l t s

. I n re: An de rs on Ha wtho rn e , Jr. , 1 05 P.3 d at 55 9. Ra the r, the c ou rt ma y we ig h and con si de r a ll evidenc e bearing on the issue of reta rdation. I d. (citations omitted). Thus, t h e t ri al court proper ly considere d evidenc e introduce d at pri o r p ro ce eding s, including the penalty phase of the trial and the prior post-conviction proc eeding

.

I n the pre sent ca se, the trial c ourt determined that t he “unique circ umstances of [t he] petitioner’s backg round,” rende red questions pose d on the I ndepende nt Living Scale “a bsurd.” Simi larly , the trial court rejec ted the re sults of the Vineland tests. The trial court observe d that the se te sts re qu ir e d th a t tw o o bs e rv e rs , th e Pe tit ion e r’ s mo the r anda c or re c tio na l of

fi c e r, e va luate the Petitioner as if he wer e a f ree and func tioning member of society . The trial c ourt dis cr ed i ted these observations, noting that the Petitioner’ s m o t h er h ad not see n him on a consistent basis for approximat e ly f

if te e n y e ar s a n d th e c o rr e c ti o n a l o f f ic e r h a d n e v e r o b s e r v e d th e Pe ti ti o n e r in a non-instituti onaliz ed setting. The trial court f urther de termined that the Petitioner wa s in a position un i q u e to ot her individuals, and those c ircumstance s impacted the e ffica cy of the testing

a nde va luatio n p ro c e du re s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a dd e d th a t th e c ir c ums ta nces of the of fe ns e contra dicted the f

indings of the Petitioner’s experts reg arding defic its in adaptive beha vior.

Adaptive be havior mea ns the eff ectivene ss or deg ree with which a person mee ts the standards of

persona l independenc e and soc ial responsibilityexpected of the person’ s ag e and cultural g rou p

. See American Assoc iation on Mental Def iciency (AAMD) , at 11. The a daptive behavior criteria ar e excee dingly subjective, a nd, undoubtedly , ex perts will be found to off er opinions on both si des of the issue in most ca ses. Ther e ar e evide ntiary fa ct o rs , h o wever, which fac tfinders in the c ri m i nal trial conte x t may focus upon in we ighing evidenc e as indicative of

m en t al re t ar d at i o n o r o f ap er s o n al i t y d i s o rd er , i n cl u d i n g: 1. Did those who knew the person best during the d ev el opmental stag e think the p e r s o n w a s me n ta ll y

r e ta r d e d a t th a t t im e a n d
, if

s o , a c t i n a c corda nce with that determination? 2. Does the pe rson’s conduc t show l eadership or doe s it show that he is led

aro un d b y oth e rs ? 3

. I s h is c o n d u c t in r e s p o n s e to e xte rn a l s ti mu li r a tiona l and appropr iate,
reg ardle ss of whethe r it socially acc eptable?-26-

4. Does the pe rson re spond coher entl y , ra t i o n al l y , an d o n point to oral or

writt e n q ue sti on s o r d o h is r e sp on se s w a nd e r f ro m su bje c t to su bje c t? 5. Ca n th e pe rs on hid e fa c ts o r l ie e ff e c tiv e ly in h is o wn or

oth e rs ’ i nte re sts ? 6. Did th e co m m i s s i o n o f t h e o ff en s e re q uire for ethoug ht, planning and complex ex ecution of pur pose? See Ex parte Jose Garc ia B riseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. C rim. App. 2004).

Although e x perts may

offe r insightf

ul opinions on t he ques t i o n o f whether a pa rticular
person satisfies the psy cholog ical diagno s t i c criteria for me ntal reta rdation, the ultimate issue of whether a person is, in fac t, me ntally reta rded for purposes of the constitution al b an o n ex cessive punishment is one for the f inder o f fac t, based upon a ll of the evidenc e and de terminations of

c re dib ili ty . E x part e Jose Ga rc ia B ri se no , 1 35 S.W. 3da t 1 ( c iti ng Kans a s v . Cr a ne, 53 4 U .S. 407, 413, 122 S. Ct . 867 (2002) ( noting that “ the s ci en ce of psy chiatry , which informs but does not control ultimate leg al determinations, is an ever- advanc ing sc ience , whose distinctions do not

se e k p re c ise ly

to m ir ro r tho se of

the l aw”); S tat e v. Willi a ms, 83 1 So .2 d 8 35 , 8 59 (L a . 2 00 2) (i n determining Atkins claim, “t h e trial court must not rely so ext ensively

upon this ex pert testimony as to commit the ultim ate de cision of mental re tardation to the ex perts.”)

. We ag ree with the trial court’ s assessm en t t h at t he Petitioner is in a unique position. The Petitioner was born in Vie tnam. There is no question that the Petiti oner’ s childhood was aty pical. His social history

reve als abuse, ne g lect, and soc ial ostracism. He essentially “lived on the str e e ts” un til a g e se ve nteen wh e n h e c a me to this c ou ntry thr ou g h th e a ssi stanc e of Ca tho lic Charities. The Petitioner’s f ormal schooling was limited to severa l y ear s in Vietnam and ab out one y ea r in this country . The Petitioner has spe nt the majority of his time in this country inc arc e rate d. Whil e the Pe tit ion e r’ s e xpe rt s maint a ine d th a t th e Peti tio ne r w a s mo re pr of ic ie nt i n the Eng lish langua g e than in Vietna mese, proof at the Petit i o n er’s orig inal post-conviction he ari ng ind ic a te d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r h a d d if fi c ult y c ommun ic a tin g wi th t

ri a l c ou ns e l un til a Vietnamese interpret er was a ppointed. A social wor

ker w ith Catholi c Charities testified that the Petitioner spoke and understood the Vietnamese lang uag e. The Petitioner has a history o f d rug and alc ohol u s e. The Petitioner has a lso been diag nosed with paranoid schizophrenia. The pr oof

a lso c or ro bo rate s th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ionthat th e Pe tit ion e r w a s in a po sit ion un iq ue to m os t Americ an adults. Dr. G rant c oncede d that the Petitioner h ad p ro b ab l ynever “filled out a c heck,

or a mone y

order .” More over, there is no indication that the testing questions took into account the Petitioner’s lifesty le in Vietnam or that he has spe nt the majority of his adult life inca

rce rate d. Acc ording ly , we a g ree with the trial court’ s assessment that little w eig ht should be g iven to the Petitioner’s below a vera g e scor e on the Independe nt L iving Sca le.

As rec og nized by t h e Un i t ed S tates Supreme Court, “ [n] ot all people who c laim to be mentally reta rded wi l l b e s o i m p aire d as to fall within the ra ng e of me ntally reta rded of fende rs about whom there is a national conse ns u s

. ” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S. C t. at 2242. The circumstances of the Petitioner’s crime be lie any assertion that the Petiti oner suf fer ed fr om any defic it in in te ll e c tu a l ab il it y o r a d ap ti v e s k il ls

. T h e Pe ti ti o n e r h a d p r e v io u s ly b e e n e mp lo y ed by the victims of his crime. He knew the lay o u t o f the re staurant a nd knew that jew elry was ke pt on-27-

the pre mises. The Petitioner did the talking wi t h o n e o f t he victims at the onset of the crime. The Petitioner wa s the person that went into the of fice to collect the jew elry . After the crime, the Petitioner es caped with two of his co-de fendants to Houston, Tex as, whe re it wa s the Petitioner who ar rang ed to s el l the jewelry to a Vietname se man for $4,000. I t was also the Petitioner who paid this man from the proc eeds a nd divided the money with his two co-def

endants. The Petitioner’s ac tive part i cipation and planning in the offe nse is the “opposite e nd of the spec trum from [th e] b eh av i o r o f m entally reta rded of fende rs.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20, 122 S. Ct. at 2242.

This court def

ers to the tria l court’s finding s of fa ct as they are supported by

the re cord. Th e de te rm inatio n o f w hat c on sti tut e s me nta l r e tard a tio n ina pa rt ic ula r c a se va ri es sh arp ly de pe nd ing up on wh o p e rf orms the a na ly sis and the me tho do log y us e d. Al tho ug h th e de fe ns e experts testified that the Petitioner demonstrate d proficien t d ef i ci t s in adaptive be havior, the tria l

c ou rt found t o th e c on tr ary . We a g re e . In th e le g a l se tti ng , th e c ou rt mus t no t be c ome so entang led with the opinions of psy chiatric experts that we lose sig ht of the nature of the c riminal offe n s e i tself. We must also not turn a blind ey e to the def endant’ s abilityto use society to better his ne e ds . T he re are me nta lly re tard e d p e rs on s w ho are c ri min a ls, bu t th e y te nd to com mi t fa ir ly primitive crimes, impulsive crimes, and sudde n acts of violenc e. The more c omplex the crime, ho we ve r, the le ss l ike ly

that th e pe rs on is m e nta lly re tarded. Thus , th e c ou rt c a nn ot f or g e t to examine the nature of the c riminal conduct a nd the circ umst an ces involved in that c onduct when determining whe ther a

person is mentally

reta rded. B ecau s e t h er e is ample evide nce in the

rec ord to support the trial court’s fac tual determinations, we adopt its findings.

3. Manif estat ion Durin g Deve lopme ntal Pe riod

Finally , the Pet itioner contends that a preponde ranc e of the proof e stablished that mental
reta rdation manife sted during the developmenta l pe riod. The Petitioner asse rts that the trial court require d proof g rea

ter than a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e and th at t h e trial court misrea d and misconstrued the re cord. The Petitioner cites to evidenc e in the re cord a s establishing that it was “more likely

than not” that the Petitioner’s intellec tual functioning was sub av er age in the d e v e l o p m e n t a l p e r i o d

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, 1

. The re s u lt s o f

a c h ie v e me n t t e s ts a d mi n is te r e d w h e n th e Pe ti ti o n e r w a s 17
y ear s of ag e ar e consistent with his curr ent I

. Q. Dr

. Gr ant testified that there i s a “ve ry

high, strong corr elation betwe en ac hievement a nd intelligenc e.” 2. Dr. Gr ant testified to the fac t t h at I

. Q. i s relatively stable over

time. He also found i t s i gn i fica nt that despite 9 y ear s of participation in G.E.D. classes at the prison, the Petitioner still reads at the sa me 4th-g rade level that he re ad at whe n he wa s tested at ag e 17. 3. The P et i t i o n er suffe rs from schizophrenia. L ong -term studies have show n that c hil dr en w ho de ve lop sc hizo ph re nia in a du lth oo d h a ve low I .Q .’ s in childhood: their low functioning exis ts prior to the onset of the disea se.-28-

4. As a

c hil d, the Pe tit ion e r e xhibi te d s ig nifi c a nt i mpair me nts a ndde la y s in

re a c hin g de ve lop me nta l mi le sto ne s, pa rt ic ula rl y the abil ity

to u se lang uag e. He h as n ever ac quired more than a c hild-like use of his native Vietnamese , which also indicated that h i s intellectual and a daptive impairments manifested in the de velopmental period. 5. Petitioner’s ea

rly life was beset with numerous known risk factor s which predisposed him to mental re tardation, e.g .: ma t er nal poverty , materna l malnutrition during pr eg nancy , lack of prenatal car e, injuries during
preg nancy , m aternal smoking during pr eg nancy , low intelligenc e of the mother, lac k of pre paration for par enthood, lack of medical post-natal car e,

ma ln u trit io n , f

a mi ly p o v e r ty , la c k o f a d e q u a te s ti mu lati o n , lack of schooling , inadequate safe ty measure s, phy s i cal a

buse, lac k of interve ntion

se rv ic e s, la c k o f s pe c ia l e du c a tio n s e rv ic e s, a ndina de qu a te famil y su pp ort.

Th e Pe tit ion e r h a d n ot be e n a dmi nis te re d a ny te st o f i nte lle c tua l f

un c tio nin g prior

to

rea ching th e a g e o f

e ig h te e n , a n d n o te s ti n g w a s p e r f o r me d u n ti l t e n y e a

r s a f te r h is in c ar c e r a tion. The only proof e stabl i s h i n g t his third prong wer e re liance upon soc ial fac tors prese nt in the Petitioner’s childhood, including extreme pover t y an d ch ild abuse. I n this reg ard, w e cannot conclude that the trial c o urt’s conc lusion that the Petit ioner’s late deve lopment could have be en the re sul t o f “n egl ec t ” rather than ne urolog ical def icit was in err or or c ontrary to the evidenc e. The e vidence of p o v er t y , child abuse, la ck of e ducation, familydy sfunction and poor social conditions are n o t en o ug h to demonstrate that a ny defic its manifested during the deve lopmental period. The proof e stablished that the Petitioner supported himself, t o o k ca re of others, and was

e mpl oy e d. Th e pr oo f a lso e sta bli sh e d th a t th e Peti ti on er, wi th the a id o f an in te rp re te r, wa s a ble to assist and communicate wi t h h is trial attorney s. The occ urre nces of these a biliti es all occ urre d

a ft e r the a g e of

e ig hte e n. Mo re ov e r, we c on c lud e that th e fact that th e Pe tit ion e r a dmi ts t o alcohol and dr

ug abuse a nd the fa ct that he h as b ee n diag nosed with schizophrenia may have imp a ir e d h is b rain f

un c tio nin g . F ina lly , D r. Au ble ’s lit a ny of po ten ti a l “ ri sk

fa c tor s” fail t o provide suff

icient fa cts to support the conc lusion that any impairments wer e re veale d d u ri ng the developmenta l period. Ac cording ly , Petitioner cannot satisfy the t h i rd p ro n g of the test for mental re tardation.

Conclusion

Whil e ther e is expert opinion in thi s rec ord that would supp o rt a fi nding that the Pe tit ion e r i s me nta lly

re tard e d p ur su a nt t o T e nn ess ee Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 03 , th e re is also ample e vidence to support the trial cou rt ’s fi n d i n g that the Petitioner failed to pr ove that he is me ntally reta

rded by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. The circ umstances of eve ry ca s e a re unique as a

re the circ umstances of every defe ndant. C ircumstance s exi st in thi s case which cloud the pic tur e , p art ic ula

rl y the c on tr a dic tory

pr oo f r e g ard ing the Pe tit io ner’s V ie tname se ba c kg ro un d, i.e
., wh e the r V ie tname se or E ng lis h is the Pe tit ion e r’ s p ro fi c ie nt l a ng ua g e . Se e Jose Alfre do Rivera v. Doug Dre tke, No. Civ. B -03-139, 2006 WL 870927, *15 (S.D. Tex. M ar

. 31, 2006). Additionally
, ex trane ous fac tors, i.e., drug use and me ntal illness, further ske w the-29-

determi n at i o n o f mental re tardation. These fa ctors, in conne ction with the require ment that experts must speculate re trospectively as to what c onditions ex isted prior to the ag e of e ighte en

a ndt h e o b v i o u s m o t i v a t i o n i n m ak i n g s u c h c l a i m , f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e t h i s c o u r t ’ s d u t y o n app e a l. We d e fe r t o th e tr ial c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns of c re dib ili ty

a nda do pt the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ult imate finding s of fa ct. B ased on those f indi n gs an d this court’s independe nt review , we c onclude that the trial court’s determ i nation that the Petitioner is not mentally reta rded pur suant to Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 39-13-203, should be a ffirme d. Finding no other e rror in th e re cord, the trial court’ s denial of r elief is af firmed.

____________________________________

J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE