Plan

Petro Star Valdez Refinery

Flare Management Plan

In response to

40 CFR Part 60 Subpart Ja

Prepared for

Petro Star, Inc.

Submitted to

United States Environmental Protection Agency

January 2014

III

Contents

Section Page

Acronyms and Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................v

1 Description of Flare....................................................................................................................... 1-1

2 Baseline Flow Evaluation............................................................................................................... 2-1

3 Flare Minimization Assessment..................................................................................................... 3-1

Appendixes

A P&IDs

B Flare Tip Drawings

C Process Hazard Analysis

Tables

1-1 List of Equipment Connected to the Flare....................................................................................... 1-5

1-2 Flare Design Parameters................................................................................................................ 1-8

1-3 Flare Gas Lines and Associated Monitors...................................................................................... 1-11

2-1 Baseline Flow................................................................................................................................. 2-1

Figures

1-1 Simplified Process Flow Diagram of Principal Flare Components.................................................... 1-2

1-2 Simple Process Flow Diagram of Gas Lines to the Flare................................................................... 1-7

V

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

FFG Flame Front Generator

H2

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

S hydrogen sulfide

PHA process hazard analysis

PSM Process Safety Management

PSV pressure safety valve

RMP Risk Management Program

SO2

ULSD ultra-low sulfur diesel

sulfur dioxide

USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency

SECTION 1

1-1

Description of Flare

This section has been prepared to meet the requirements listed in 40 CFR Part 60.103a(a)(1) and (3).

A John Zink elevated air-assisted flare is the end point of Petro Star's vent collection system located on the 

far north-west quadrant of the site. The crude unit has a vent collection header that runs throughout the 

plant facility and terminates in Knockout Vessel V-1105. The pressure safety valves (PSVs) within the plant 

tie into the vent collection header system at various points in the facility. In the event that one or multiple 

PSV's in the plant lift, the vapor and or liquid hydrocarbons are routed through the PSVs, into the header 

pipe, and travel to V-1105.

The header enters into V-1105 at the top of the vessel and travels down through the vessel to the bottom. 

Here, the vapor exits the pipe into 18" of diesel fuel, which creates a 'seal' for the hydrocarbons exiting the 

vent pipe. The seal exists so that entrained liquid hydrocarbons fall out and hot vapor has the opportunity to 

cool and re-condense before any remaining vapors escape the 18" seal and are released to the next 

downstream Knockout Vessel V-30202. An additional purpose for the seal leg in V-1105 is to maintain an 

oxygen free environment within the upstream vent system for corrosion and explosive atmosphere control 

purposes. When the liquid in V-1105 reaches its high limit Knockout Drum Pump P-1117 is automatically 

turned on and begins pumping down the accumulated liquids to the crude oil slop line. In the extreme event 

a liquid level fills V-1105, it will continue on just as the vapors do to the next knockout vessel V-30202. 

V-30202 also has a pump (P-30513) and high level switch. P-30513 also is routed to the crude oil slop line. 

Vapor release continues out of V-30202 and on to the John Zinc Flare.

Within the flare are three pilots that burn continuously. The pilots are supplied by propane direct from 

T-30203 with a regulator in line. They each have sensors that relay a signal to the Flame Front Generator 

(FFG). If one goes out an electronic ignition is started automatically to relight it. If the electronic auto re-light 

is unsuccessful an alarm is sent to the DCS and an operator can re-light the pilot by way of a mechanical 

ignition system sent from the FFG. In addition to the pilot lights, there is a flow of "purge gas" supplied from 

the outlet piping of the sulfa-treat vessels that flows into the vent header piping. This purge gas keeps the 

header piping free of oxygen and maintains a flame at the flare. In the event the Crude Unit shuts down, 

propane from V-30203 is introduced into the vent header piping for replacement of the lost purge gas from 

process. This enables the flow of purge gas to continue uninterrupted maintaining an oxygen free piping 

system so that an explosive atmosphere is not created within that system.

In the event of a release, a fan (F-30802) located at the base of the vertical flare piping controlled by a 

Variable Frequency Drive ramps up according to flow indication to maintain a virtually smokeless flame from 

the flare.

Because it combusts gas during normal operating conditions, and because it does not maintain a water seal, 

the flare is not considered an emergency flare. No other flare is present at the site (including backup flares). 

The flare is not equipped with a flare gas recovery system.

P&IDs for the flare are provided in Appendix A. The flare, flare tip, knockout drums, header and assist and 

ignition systems are marked on Figure 1-1. As shown in the figure, waste gas exits the burner in one or more 

narrow annular jets, each surrounded by assist air. The annular flare design maximizes the perimeter area 

and extends tip life by minimizing internal burning. The nominal and effective tip diameters are 6.79 and 

6.625 feet, respectively. Tip drawings are provided in Appendix B.

Table 1-1 lists the refinery process units, ancillary equipment and fuel gas systems connected to the flare. 

Table 1-2 lists the flare maximum vent gas, sweep gas and pilot gas flow rates.
SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-2

Figure 1-2 provides a simple process flow diagram of the gas lines associated with the flare. Table 1-3 

describes the type of gas used in each line, and whether or not the lines are monitored for flow and/or 

hydrogen sulfide. Type, make and model of monitors associated with the gas lines are also listed in Table 1-

3. Precision, range, accuracy, calibration requirements, maintenance and quality assurance procedures are 

provided in the Petro Star Valdez Refinery Quality Assurance Plan. 
SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-3

SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-5

TABLE 1-1

List of Equipment Connected to the Flare

Tag Number Description

PROCESS UNITS

Sulfur Recovery Unit

Hydrogen Plant

DHT Process Unit

Crude Unit

ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT

PSVs

10-PSV-1081-2

E-109B 

LAGO RELIEF VALVE

10-PSV-1205A

V-111 

CRUDE TOWER OVERHEAD RELIEF

10-PSV-1205B

V-111 

CRUDE TOWER OVERHEAD RELIEF

10-PSV-1301A

V-1301A 

SULPHA TREAT VESSEL

10-PSV-1301B

V-1301B 

SULPHA TREAT VESSEL

10-PSV-3004

F-14801 

DHT FEED FILTER 

10-PSV-3012 E-1134A/B FLASHED CRUDE TO H-201 RELIEF

10-PSV-5182-2012 F-1002 LSR COELESCER RELIEF TO VENT COLLECTION

10-PSV-9903 D-101 FLASHED OVERHEAD TO VENT COLLECTION

10-PSV-9904-2 E-106B KEROSENE PRODUCT RELIEF

14-PSV-001-2012 V-14203 COLD SEPERATOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-003A-2012 C-14401A RECYCLE GAS DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-003B-2012 C-14401B RECYCLE GAS DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-007A-2012 C-14401A HYDROGEN GAS DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-007B-2012 C-14401B HYDROGEN GAS DISCHARGE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-009 V-14205 DHT STABILIZER OVERHEAD VAPOR PRESSURE RELIEF TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-011 V-14207 OVERHEAD VAPOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-012-2012 V-14209 DHT SPLITTER OFFGAS PRESSURE RELIEF TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-013-2013 SOUR GAS FROM V-14206 TO SRU PRESSURE RELIEF TO FLARE HEADER

14-PSV-016 E-14611 KERO PRODUCT TO BATTERY LIMITS PRESSURE RELIEF TO FLARE HEADER

15-PSV-3070-2012 SEP-15810 INLET GAS SEPARATOR

15-PSV-3071-2012 SEP-15830 OUTLET GAS SEPARATOR

15-PSV-3072 V-15220 SPARGE TOWER
SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-6

TABLE 1-1

List of Equipment Connected to the Flare

Tag Number Description

PSV-302 H2 Compressor

PSV-3040-2013 LSR Storage Drum

PSV-3042-2013 Feed Vaporizer

PSV-3043-2013 LSR Liquid to Burner

PSV-3044-2013 Feed Heater inlet

PSV-3045A-2013 Desulfurizer A 

PSV-3045B-2013 Desulfurizer B 

PSV-3047-2013 PSA Feed 

PSV-3049A-2013 ADSORBER- A 

PSV-3049B-2013 ADSORBER- B

PSV-3049C-2013 ADSORBER- C 

PSV-3049D-2013 ADSORBER-D 

PSV-3049E-2013 ADSORBER-E 

PSV-3050 PSA Surge Vessel

20-PSV-2008

V-1330 

LSR SALT TOWER

20-PSV-5011-2012

V-1101 

LSR FUEL CLAY FILTER

20-PSV-5022-2012

F-2001 

LSR FUEL COALESCER FILTER

20-PSX-9901 VENT GAS FROM ARC / CRUDE SYSTEM

PSV-3002 V-30203 FLARE PILOT PROPANE TANK PRESSURE SAFETY VALVE

Other Equipment

30-BIT-314 Flare Smoke Monitor

30-BT-314 Flare Smoke Monitor Transmitter

30-UA-801 ICP-3003 Analyzer

40-FT-105 Fuel gas flow transmitter

BV-201 Manual ball valve

BV-202 Manual ball valve

BV-203 Manual ball valve

E-30701 Flare Area Sump Heating Element

FAN-30802 Flare Stack Blower Fan

FE-302A V-30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK-30801 Flow Element

FE-302B V-30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK-30801 Flow Element

FI-302 V-30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK-30801 Flow Indicator

FT-302 V-30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK-30801 Flow Transmitter
SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-7

TABLE 1-1

List of Equipment Connected to the Flare

Tag Number Description

HOA-513 P-30513 Pump Motor Hand/off/auto switch

HS-802 Fan-30802 Hand Switch

HV-101 Manual Needle Valve

HV-102 Manual Needle Valve

IJB 30801 Control Panel

LCP-30801 Control Panel

LG-301 V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Gauge

LI-308A V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Indicator

LI-308B V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Indicator

LI-701 T-30701 Flare Area Sump Level Indicator

LSH-315 T-30701 Flare Area Sump Level Switch High

LT-308A V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Transmitter

LT-308B V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum Level Transmitter

LT-701 T-30701 Flare Area Sump Level Transmitter

P-30513 Flare Knockout Drum Pump

PCV-303 Instrument Air from Header to ICP-3003 Pressure Control Valve

PCV-304 ICP-3003 Propane/Air to STK-30801 Pressure Control Valve

PCV-311 Pilot Gas to STK-30801 Pressure Control Valve

PCV-313 V-30203 Flare Pilot Gas Propane Tank Pressure Control Valve

15-PCV-209B Sour Gas SRU Bypass

PCV-317 Instrument Air

PCV-318 Instrument Air

PI_102 Pressure Gauge

PI-101 Pressure Gauge

PI-305 Instrument Air from Header to ICP-3003 Pressure Indicator

PM-30513 P-30513 Pump Motor Control

PM-30802 Fan-30802 Pump Motor Run Status

PT-302 V-30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK-30801 Pressure Transmitter

PT-305 Instrument Air from Header to ICP-3003 Pressure Transmitter

14-PV-223B Splitter Offgas

18-PV-156 Process Gas

18-PV-160B Hydrogen

18-PV-173A Vent Gas

SC-802 Fan-30802

STK-30801 Flare Stack
SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-8

TABLE 1-1

List of Equipment Connected to the Flare

Tag Number Description

T-30701 Flare Area Sump

TJB 30801 Control Panel

TT-302 V-30202 Relief Gas to Flare STK-30801 Temperature Transmitter

V-30202 Flare Knockout Drum

V-30203 Flare Pilot Gas Propane Tank

FUEL GAS SYSTEMS

Sulfur Recovery Unit

Crude Unit

Hydrogen Plant

Refinery process unit means any segment of the petroleum refinery in which a specific processing operation is conducted.

Ancillary equipment means equipment used in conjunction with or that serve a refinery process unit. Ancillary equipment 

includes, but is not limited to, storage tanks, product loading operations, pressure relief valves.

Fuel gas system means a system of compressors, piping, knock-out pots, mix drums, and units used to remove sulfur contaminants 

from the fuel gas (e.g., amine scrubbers) that collects refinery fuel gas from one or more sources for treatment as necessary prior 

to combusting in process heaters or boilers. A fuel gas system may have an overpressure vent to a flare but the primary purpose 

for a fuel gas system is to provide fuel to the refinery.

TABLE 1-2

Flare Design Parameters

Parameter Value

Maximum vent gas flow rate 350,000 lb/hr

Minimum sweep gas flow rate 64 lb/hr

Maximum pilot gas flow rate 675 scfh

lb/hr-pounds per hour

scfh - standard cubic feet per hour
SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-9

SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-11

TABLE 1-3

Flare Gas Lines and Associated Monitors

ID From To Gas Exempt from Monitoring? Monitor ID 1 Monitor Type Make Model

20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT V-30202 STK-30801 All (Relief, Vent, Purge, Sweep, Propane) No 30-FT-302 Flow Transmitter GE Panametrics GF868-1-11-20F14-FM

2"-PR-30010-C10 2"-PR-30008-C10 Pilot Pilot Gas Pilot gas

2"-PR-30008-C10 2"-PR-30007-C10 2"-PR-30010-C10 Pilot Gas Pilot gas

2"-PR-30007-C10 V-30203 2"-PR-30008-C10 Pilot Gas Pilot gas

1"PR-30011-C10-IGT ICP-3003 Ignition Tubes Propane/Air Pilot gas

1"PR-30012-C10-IGT ICP-3003 Ignition Tubes Propane/Air Pilot gas

1"PR-30013-C10-IGT ICP-3003 Ignition Tubes Propane/Air Pilot gas

2"-PR-30018-C10 2"-PR-30009-C10 ICP-3003 Propane Pilot gas

2"-PR-30009-C10 2"-PR-30008-C10 2"-PR-30018-C10 Propane Pilot gas

20"-FL-40011-C10-IGT V-1105 V-30202 Relief Gas (Relief, Sweep, Propane) Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"-FG-20002-C10-IGT 5047-C10-6"-IGT 20"-FL-40011-C10-IGT Purge gas No 20-FIT-309 Flow Indicating Transmitter Rosemount 3051CD2A02A1AS5E5

5047-C10-6"-IGT V-1301A&B 2"-FG-20002-C10-IGT Purge gas No 20-FIT-309 Flow Indicating Transmitter Rosemount 3051CD2A02A1AS5E5

2"-PR-40007-C10 2"-PR-30008-C10 2"-FG-20002-C10-IGT Propane No

2"-PR-40136-C10 2"-PR-40007-C10 1"-PR-40135-C10 Propane No 40-FT-103 Flow Transmitter Rosemount 8800DR010SA3N1F1E5

1"-PR-40135-C10 2"-PR-40135-C10 8"-FL-40118-C10-IGT Propane No 40-FT-103 Flow Transmitter Rosemount 8800DR010SA3N1F1E5

12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT 12"-FL-14400-1A1B-2"H-IGT 20"-FL-40011-C10-IGT Relief gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3"-FL-14416-1A1B PSV-007B 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Hydrogen Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"-FL-14408-1A1B PSV-03B 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Recycle Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"-FL-14405-1A1B PSV-03A 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Recycle Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

6"-FL-14438-1A1B-2"H-GT 4"-SG-14055-1A4N-1.5"H-GT 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

6"-FL-14421-1A1B PSV-13 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3"-FL-14413-1A1B PSV-007A 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Hydrogen Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

6"-FL-14402-1A1B-2"H-GT XV-102 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Recycle Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"-FL-14415-1A1B-1.5"H-GT C-14401B Blowdown 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Blowdown Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"-FL-14412-1A1B-1.5"H-GT C-14401A Blowdown 2"-FL-14415-1A1B-1.5"H-GT Blowdown Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3/8" SS Tubing Sample Vent 2"-FL-14415-1A1B-1.5"H-GT Sample Vent Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"-FL-14407-1A1B-1.5"H-GT C-14401B Blowdown 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Blowdown Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"-FL-14404-1A1B-1.5"H-GT C-14401A Blowdown 2"-FL-14407-1A1B-1.5"H-GT Blowdown Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"-FL-14415-1A1B C-14401A Packing Vents 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Packing Vent Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"-FL-14414-1A1B C-14401B Packing Vents 2"-FL-14415-1A1B Packing Vent Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"-FL-14217-1A1B PSV-016 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Kero Product Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"-FL-14420-1A1B-1"P PV-223B 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Splitter Offgas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"-FL-14419-1A1B PSV-12 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Splitter Offgas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

8"-FL-14401-1A1B PSV-01 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Recycle Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3/4"-FL-14423-1A1B-1.5"H-GT Sample Panel Vent 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Sample Vent Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT
SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-12

TABLE 1-3

Flare Gas Lines and Associated Monitors

ID From To Gas Exempt from Monitoring? Monitor ID 1 Monitor Type Make Model

10"-FL-14418-1A1B PSV-11 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Splitter Overhead Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

10"-FL-14417-1A1B PSV-09 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Stabilizer Overhead Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3/4"-FG-14464-1A1B-1.5"H-GT 4"-FG-14230-1A1B-1.5"H-GT 12"-FL-40117-C10-IGT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 14-FI-267 Flow Indicator

4"-FG-14230-1A1B-1.5"H-GT 4"-FG-40032-C10-IGT 3/4"-FG-14464-1A1B-1.5"H-GT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 14-FI-267 Flow Indicator

4"-FG-40032-C10-IGT 4"-FG-40035-C10-IGT 4"-FG-14230-1A1B-1.5"H-GT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 14-FI-267 Flow Indicator

4"-FG-40035-C10-IGT 3"-PG-15104-C10-1.5"-IGT 4"-FG-40032-C10-IGT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 14-FI-267 Flow Indicator

8"-FL-40118-C10-IGT N/A 20"-FL-40011-C10-IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

6"-FL-40120-C10-IGT 6"-VT336-H10CS 8"-FL-40118-C10-IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

6"-VT336-H10CS N/A 6"-FL-40120-C10-IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3/4"VT337-H10CS PSV-302 6"-VT336-H10CS Hydrogen Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"VT330-H10CS PSV-3050 6"-VT336-H10CS Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

6"VT331-H10CS PSV-173A 6"-VT336-H10CS Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

6"VT324-H10CS PV-156 6"-VT336-H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3"VT322-H10CS PSV-3047 6"-VT336-H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT325-H10CS PSV-3049A 6"-VT336-H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT326-H10CS PSV-3049B 6"-VT336-H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"VT409-H10CS PV-160B 6"-VT336-H10CS Hydrogen Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT327-H10CS PSV-3049C 6"-VT336-H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT328-H10CS PSV-3049D 6"-VT336-H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3/4"N634-H10CS 3/4"N635-A10CS 6"-VT336-H10CS Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 18-FI-193

3/4"N635-A10CS 2"N625-A10CS 3/4"N634-H10CS Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 18-FI-193

2"N625-A10CS 2"FG-40210-C10-IGT 3/4"N635-A10CS Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 18-FI-193

2"FG-40210-C10-IGT 2"N625-A10CS 4"FG-40035-C10-IGT Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT329-H10CS PSV-3049E 6"-VT336-H10CS Process Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"VT137-A10CS V-18225 6"-VT336-H10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"VT136-A10CS N/A V-18225 LSR Vapor/Liquid Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT129-A10CS PSV-3042 4"VT136-A10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT128-A10CS PSV-3040 4"VT136-A10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT130-A10CS PSV-3043 4"VT136-A10CS LSR Liquid Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3/4"N626-A10CS 3/4"N634-A10CS 4"VT136-A10CS Fuel Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 18-FI-193

2"VT132-A10CS PSV-3045A/B 4"VT136-A10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

2"VT131-A10CS PSV-3044 4"VT136-A10CS LSR Vapor Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"-FL-40038-C10-IGT 4"-FL-40035-C10-IGT 8"-FL-40118-C10-IGT SRU fuel gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 40-FT-102 Flow Transmitter Rosemount 8800DR010SA3N1F1E5

4"-FL-40035-C10-IGT 3"-PG-15104-C10-1.5"-IGT 4"-FL-40038-C10-IGT/4"FG-40035-C10-IGT SRU fuel gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT AI-107 H2S Monitor Spectra Sensors SS2100

1"-FG-40206-C10-IGT 4"-FL-40038-C10-IGT 4"-FL-40038-C10-IGT SRU fuel gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT 40-FT-104 Flow Transmitter Rosemount 8800DR010SA3N1F1E5

4"-FL-40119-C10-IGT 4"-FL-15168-C10-IGT 8"-FL-40118-C10-IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT
SECTION 1 0BDESCRIPTION OF FLARE

1-13

TABLE 1-3

Flare Gas Lines and Associated Monitors

ID From To Gas Exempt from Monitoring? Monitor ID 1 Monitor Type Make Model

4"-FL-15168-C10-IGT N/A 4"-FL-40119-C10-IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

4"-PG-15113-C10-1.5"IGT PCV-209B 4"-FL-15168-C10-IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT FE-209

1"-FL-15131-C10-1"IGT PSV-3070 4"-FL-15168-C10-IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3"-FL-151368-C10-1.5"IGT PSV-3072 4"-FL-15168-C10-IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

1"-FL-15127-C10-1"IGT PSV-3071 4"-FL-15168-C10-IGT Sour Gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

10109-C10-2"-PP PSV-1032A/B V-1105 Fuel gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

6000--C10-3" PSV-1301-A ????-C10-8" Fuel gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

xxxx--C10-3" PSV-1301-B ????-C10-8" Fuel gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

????-C10-8" N/A V-1105 Fuel gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

5410-C10-16"-PP N/A V-1105 Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

C10-1"-IGT PSV-2008 5410-C10-16"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

5411-C10-3"-PP 1"-VF-20074-C10-IGT 5410-C10-16"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3/4"-VF-20074-C10-IGT PSV-5022 5411-C10-3"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

1"VF-20073-C10-IGT PSV-5011 1"-VF-20074-C10-IGT Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

5400-C10-16"-PP N/A 5410-C10-16"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

10151-C10-4"-IGT PSV-3012 5400-C10-16"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

1"-IGT PSV-5182 5400-C10-16"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

5404-C10-12"-PP PSV-1205A/B 5400-C10-16"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

9934-C10-4"-PP PSV-1081-2 5404-C10-12"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

10238-C10-4"-IS PSV-9904-2 5404-C10-12"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

9939-C30-6"-IH PSX-9901 5404-C10-12"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

3" PV-264 Bypass 5410-C10-6"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

9907-C10-2"-PP PSV-9903 5410-C10-6"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

5406-C10-4"-PP PV-264 9907-C10-2"-PP Vent gas Monitored at 20"-FL-30002-C10-IGT

1 Monitoring exemptions:

60.103a(a)(3)(iv) Designate which lines are exempt from sulfur, H2S or flow monitoring and why (e.g., natural gas, inherently low sulfur, pilot gas)

SECTION 2

2-1

Baseline Flow Evaluation

This section has been prepared to meet the requirements listed in 40 CFR Part 60.103a(a)(4).

A baseline flow evaluation has been conducted for the flare. Table 2-1 lists the baseline flow for normal 

operations and for the case of ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) outage.

TABLE 2-1

Baseline Flow 

Petro Star Valdez Refinery Flare Management Plan

Baseline Case Fuel Type Flow

Normal Operations Crude Heater Fuel Gas 850 scfh

Hydrogen Plant PSA Purge Gas 17,000 scfh

Sulfur Recovery Unit Sweet Fuel Gas 500 scfh

ULSD Unit outage Crude Heater Fuel Gas 850 scfh

Hydrogen Plant PSA Purge Gas 3 million scfh

scfh – standard cubic feet per hour

SECTION 3

3-1

Flare Minimization Assessment

This section has been prepared to meet the requirements listed in 40 CFR Part 60.103a(a)(1) and (3). 

The assessment was taken from the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA). The purpose of this PHA was to conduct 

a PHA by a multi-disciplined team in accordance with the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration's (OSHA) "Process Safety Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals" regulation 

(29 CFR 1910.119), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (USEPA) "Risk Management Program" (RMP) 

rule (40 CFR Part 68) requirements, and Petro Star requirements for process safety review. The PHA 

systematically reviewed the Petro Star Flare System using the HAZOP methodology.

The scope of the PHA included the covered equipment, piping and instrumentation associated with the 

Petro Star Flare System per the referenced drawings, a process covered by OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119) 

regulation, USEPA Risk Management Plan Rule (40 CFR Part 68) requirements at the Petro Star site in Valdez, 

Alaska. The analysis included start-up, normal (steady-state) operating and shutdown procedures, and global 

issues such as Services, Utilities, applicable industry incidents, Human Factors, Facility Siting, and Emergency 

Procedures to the extent available. Information reviewed included the Facility and Process Description 

provided by Petro Star.

The objective of the PHA was to identify possible deviations from the covered process design, maintenance 

inspection, or operating practices which could lead to fires, explosions or toxic releases of covered chemicals 

in the covered process potentially resulting in personnel injury, equipment damage, public or environmental 

impact. The analysis also addressed significant operability issues such as scenarios which could lead to a unit 

shutdown and considered potential impacts of utilities and external events upon the covered process.

Failure of existing engineering and administrative controls and protections were evaluated for credible 

events, including multiple failures, which could lead to a hazardous scenario. Problems in the operation of 

utilities such as instrument air, nitrogen, steam, electrical power, and cooling water were reviewed for affect 

upon potential hazardous scenarios in the covered process.

No previous accidents such as recordable injuries, reportable releases in similar covered processes were

identified for consideration during the study.

Deviations, causes, consequences, safeguard and recommendations for each node and parameter at the 

flare are listed in Appendix C.

Appendix A

P&IDs


















Appendix B

Tip Drawings





Appendix C

Process Hazard Analysis
Page: 1

Company: Petro Star

Facility: Valdez Refinery

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105

Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 

16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Flow

Intention: 0 to 250,000 lbs per hour of hydrocarbons

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Flow 

(from PSV's 

& LSR from 

Co-GenNormal 

Operations)

1. Normal 

operation

:No hazardous 

consequences 

identified by the team

No Flow 

(from PSV's -

emergency 

operation)

2. Unit 

upset and 

manual 

valves at 

PSV 

blocked in

2.1. Potential 

overpressure of 

equipment resulting in 

pressure burst, loss of 

containment, and 

possible personnel 

injury

2.1.1. Manual valves 

Car Sealed Opened 

(CSO)

5 1 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

2.1.2. Car seal policy 

POL-030

2.1.3. Energy isolation 

policy POL-010

2.1.4. Energy isolation 

procedure/blinding 

procedure PW-NOP032

2.1.5. Secondary 

containment

Less Less Flow 

(from PSV's -

emergency 

operation)

3. Unit 

upset and 

manual 

valves 

partialy 

closed at 

PSV

3.1. Potential 

overpressure of 

equipment resulting in 

pressure burst, loss of 

containment, and 

possible personnel 

injury

3.1.1. Manual valves 

Car Sealed Opened 

(CSO)

5 1 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

3.1.2. Car seal policy 

POL-030

3.1.3. Energy isolation 

procedure/blinding 

procedure PW-NOP032

3.1.4. Secondary 

containment

More More Flow 

(from PSV's -

emergency 

operation)

4. Partial 

power 

failure and 

loss of 

multipule 

middle 

pump 

arounds

4.1. Exceed design 

capacity of the vent 

system resulting in 

potential overpressure 

of the crude tower 

with loss of 

containment and 

possible personnel 

injury

4.1.1. High pressure 

alarms PAH 316 A/B/C 

with 2 out of 3 high is 

designed to shutdown 

the plant in the safe 

mode (HIPS trip is P311 A/B, P-2012 A/B 

and crude furnace 

shutdown and 

remaining equipment is 

shutdown through the 

ESD system).

5 1 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

4.1.2. Crude unit PSV's 

are balanced bellows

4.1.3. Secondary 

containment
Other 

Than

Misdirected 

Flow

5. PSV in 

system 

leaking

5.1. Loss of raw 

material to the flare 

header system

5.1.1. High pressure 

alarm PAH 5181 set @ 

18 inches water

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

5.1.2. High high 

pressure alarm PAHH 

5181 set @ 21 inches 

water

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105

Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 

16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Temperature

Intention: 35 degrees F minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Less Lower 

Temperature

6. Freezing 

weather with 

loss of hot 

glycol system 

or manual valve 

closed/partially 

closed in glycol 

system

6.1. Water freezing 

in pump suction line 

not allowing the 

pump to maintain a 

set level in the tank 

resulting liquid going 

to the flare

6.1.1. Operator 

rounds 

checking vessel 

temperature 

and level

4 1 2 1 Consider filling knockout 

boot and suction piping 

to P-1117 with glycol to 

prevent line from 

freezing.

MS

6.1.2. High high 

level alarm 

LSHH 5118 set 

@ 5'1" will 

sound on DCS

2 Consider setting the LSH 

5118 to a lower setting to 

allow for more liquid relief 

in the V-1105 before it 

overflows to the 

downstream knockout 

vessel V-30202 and flare. 

(Team suggested 2'-6")

ANVIL

6.1.3. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

3 Consider setting the 

LSHH 5118 to 10 inches 

above LSH 5118 set 

point.

ANVIL

6.2. Water freezing 

in suction line of 

pump resulting in 

line failure and loss 

of containment

6.2.1. Prewinterization 

checklist

3 3 3 :Same As 1

6.2.2. 

Seconodary 

containment

More Higher 

Temperature

7. Glycol 

system running 

during hot 

weather

:No hazardous 

consequences 

identified by the 

team

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105

Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 

16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Pressure

Intention: 37 psig maximun

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

More Higher 

Pressure

:Same 

As 4. 

More 

Flow

8.1. Increasing size 

of the fire with 

8.1.1. HIPPS trip 

set @ 35 psig 2 

5 1 3 4 Consider evaluating the fail 

position, size, and operation 

RM 

ANVIL
8. 

External 

fire

potential 

overpressure of 

crude unit vessels 

with loss of 

containment and 

personnel injury

out 3 voting 

closes emergeny 

block valves and 

shuts down 

furnace H-201. 

HIPPS will 

activate the ESD.

of PV 264 to control the 

pressure on the crude unit in 

a external fire scenario with 

the intent to emergency 

depressurization of the unit. 

Suggested fail position of PV 

264 is fail last or fail open 

with back-up air receiver. Add 

step to CDU ESD in "event of 

fire" to depressurize unit.

8.1.2. ESD 

System

8.1.3. PSV 1205A 

set @ 64 psig

8.1.4. PSV 1205B 

set @ 67 psig

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105

Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 

16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Composition

Intention: Diesel fuel seal leg

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

As 

Well 

As

Contamination 9. Water 

condensing 

from the 

purge gas

9.1. Water freezing in 

pump suction line not 

allowing the pump to 

maintain a set level in 

the tank resulting 

liquid going to the 

flare

9.1.1. Hot glycol 

system to 

maintain the 

vessel 

temperature 

above 35 

degrees F.

4 1 2 :Same As 1

9.1.2. Operator 

rounds checking 

vessel 

temperature and 

level

:Same As 2

9.1.3. High high 

level alarm 

LSHH 5118 set 

@ 5'1" will sound 

on DCS

:Same As 3

9.1.4. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

9.2. Water freezing in 

suction line of pump 

resulting in line failure 

and loss of 

containment

9.2.1. Prewinterization 

checklist

3 3 3 :Same As 1

9.2.2. Secondary 

containment

10. LSR 

(light 

straight run) 

from Co-gen 

purge cycle

10.1. LSR 

contaminates the 

diesel seal leg; high 

concentration of LSR 

could result in a vapor 

lock of the P-1117 

pump

:None identified 5 Consider having CVEA Cogen repair the switch in 

their line that would incidate 

when LSR is being put to V1105 and have the output 

from the switch alarm in 

Petro Star control room.

RM

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105
Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 

16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Level

Intention: 18 inches to 4 foot 3 inches

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Level 11. Vessel 

pumped out 

by P-1117 

and not 

reflilled by 

operations

11.1. Potential air 

ingress into the vent 

header system 

resulting in an 

explosive mixture

11.1.1. V-1105 has 

a wier build in the 

area of vent piping 

which maintains an 

18 inch liquid level 

separate from the 

pump suction boot.

4 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations identified 

by Team.

12. Failure 

of LSL 5118 

to shutdown 

the P-1117

12.1. Possible 

damage to P-1117 

with loss of 

containment

:Secondary 

containment

2 2 2 6 Consider having a run 

status indication for P-1117 

on the DCS and alarm the 

on confirm to alert 

operations the pump has 

started.

JS

More Higher 

Level

13. Failure 

of LSH 5118 

to start P1117

13.1. Fill V-1105 and 

overflow liquid to the 

flare

13.1.1. High high 

level alarm LSHH 

5118 set @ 5'1" will 

sound on DCS

4 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations identified 

by Team.

13.1.2. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (1) Crude Unit Relief Collection System, V-1105 Knockout Drum, LSL, LSH, LSHH5188, Nitrogen Purge to V-1105

Drawings: 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 

16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Purging / Inerting

Intention: System to be free of air

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Purging / 

Inerting

14. System 

contains air after 

a shutdown or 

maintenance.

14.1. Explosive 

mixture in the vent 

header system

14.1.1. Purging 

crude unit prior to 

start-up procedure 

CU-SUP-010

4 2 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

14.1.2. PSSR prior 

to starting the unit 

after maintenance 

or shutdown POL070

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B

Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Flow

Intention: 0 to 350,000 pounds per hour of hydrocarbons

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Flow (V1105)15. 

Normal 

operation

:No hazardous consequences 

identified by the team

More More Flow 

(emergency 

venting from V

-1105)

16. Crude 

unit upset

:No hazardous consequences 

identified by the team - vessel 

is designed to handle 100,000 
pounds per hour more than 

the design of V-1105)

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B

Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Temperature

Intention: 35 degrees F minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Less Lower 

Temperature

17. Freezing 

weather with 

loss of hot 

glycol system or 

manual valve 

closed/partially 

closed in glycol 

system

17.1. Water freezing 

in pump suction line 

not allowing the 

pump to maintain a 

set level in the tank 

resulting liquid going 

to the flare

17.1.1. 

Operator 

rounds 

checking vessel 

temperature 

and level

4 1 2 7 Consider filling knockout 

boot and suction piping 

to P-30513 with glycol to 

prevent line from 

freezing.

MS

17.1.2. High 

high level 

alarms HHLL 

308 A/B set @ 

3'6" will sound 

on DCS

8 Consider having a local 

temperature indicator on 

the bottom of the vessel 

for operations to use to 

adjust the glycol flow rate 

to the vessel to maintain 

the temperature.

ANVIL

17.2. Water freezing 

in suction line of 

pump resulting in 

line failure and loss 

of containment

17.2.1. Prewinterization 

checklist

3 3 3 :Same As 7

17.2.2. 

Seconodary 

containment

More Higher 

Temperature

18. Glycol 

system running 

during hot 

weather

:No hazardous 

consequences 

identified by the 

team

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B

Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Composition

Intention: Empty

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

As 

Well 

As

Contamination 19. Water 

condensing 

from the 

purge gas

19.1. Water freezing in 

pump suction line not 

allowing the pump to 

maintain a set level in 

the tank resulting liquid 

going to the flare

19.1.1. Hot glycol 

system to maintain 

vessel 

temperature above 

35 degrees F.

4 1 2 :Same As 7

19.1.2. Operator 

rounds checking 

vessel 

temperature and 

level

19.1.3. High high 

level alarms HHLL 

308 A/B set @ 3'6" 

will sound on DCS

19.2. Water freezing in 

suction line of pump 

19.2.1. Prewinterization 

checklist

3 3 3 :Same As 7
resulting in line failure 

and loss of containment

19.2.2. Secondary 

containment

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B

Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Level

Intention: 1' 6" to 3" liquid level in the tank

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Level 20. 

Malfunction 

of the level 

transmitter 

LT 308A

20.1. Run P-30513 

resulting in pump 

damage and loss of 

containment

20.1.1. 

Redundant 

transmitter LT 

308 B read out 

on DCS panel

2 3 3 9 Consider having the 

redundant level 

transmitters look at 

Process Variable (bad or 

good), uses the good 

transmitter and deviation 

alarm to indicate there is a 

level problem.

JS

10 Consider lowering the 

pump shutdown from 1 

foot six inches down to 0 

inches on transmitter to 

keep vessel as low as 

possible.

JS/ANVIL

11 Consider having a run 

status indication for P30513 on the DCS and 

alarm the on confirm to 

alert operations the pump 

has started.

JS

More Higher 

Level

21. Failure 

of HHLL 

308A to 

start P30513

21.1. Fill V-30202 

and overflow liquid 

to the flare

21.1.1. 

Redundant 

transmitter LT 

308 B read out 

on DCS panel

4 3 4 :Same As 9

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (2) Flare Knockout Drum V-30202, LT-308A/B

Drawings: 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Purging / Inerting

Intention: Free of air

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Purging / Inerting :See Node 4

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (3) Liquid Knockout from P-1117 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of 

operation)

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Flow

Intention: 0 to 70 gpm

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Flow 22. Manual 

suction valve 

close

22.1. Fill V-1105 and 

overflow liquid to the 

flare

22.1.1. High high 

level alarm 

LSHH 5118 set 

4 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.
@ 5'1" will sound 

on DCS

22.1.2. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

22.2. Possible pump 

damage with loss of 

containment and 

potential personnel 

exposure

22.2.1. Manual 

valve is Car 

Sealed Open 

(CSO)

2 2 2 :Same As 6

22.2.2. 

Secondary 

containment

23. Pump 

failure, loss of 

power, or 

pump left in 

manual mode

23.1. Fill V-1105 and 

overflow liquid to the 

flare

23.1.1. High high 

level alarm 

LSHH 5118 set 

@ 5'1" will sound 

on DCS

4 1 2 12 Consider having a sign at 

the pump switch stating 

that P-1117 be left in the 

auto run mode.

MS

23.1.2. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

24. Manual 

discharge 

valve(s) 

closed

24.1. Fill V-1105 and 

overflow liquid to the 

flare

24.1.1. High high 

level alarm 

LSHH 5118 set 

@ 5'1" will sound 

on DCS

4 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

24.1.2. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

24.2. Possible pump 

damage with loss of 

containment and 

potential personnel 

exposure

24.2.1. Manual 

valve is Car 

Sealed Open 

(CSO)

2 2 2 :Same As 6

24.2.2. 

Secondary 

containment

Less Less Flow 25. Manual 

suction valve 

partially close 

or strainer 

plugging

:Same As 22.1

26. Manual 

discharge 

valve(s) 

partially 

closed

:Same As 24.1

Reverse Reverse 

Flow

27. check 

valve fails

27.1. Contents of T1106 flow back into V

-1105 with potential of 

overflowing to flare if 

pump P-1117 fails

27.1.1. High 

level switch LSH 

5118 starts P1117

4 2 3 :Same As 6

27.1.2. High high 

level alarm 

LSHH 5118 set 

@ 5'1" will sound 

on DCS

27.1.3. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

Other 

Than

Misdirected 

Flow

28. Manual 

valve(s) to 

sumps left 

open

28.1. Over flow sump 

with oily water

28.1.1. Check 

valve in the 

sump lines

3 2 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.
28.1.2. Valves 

maintained chain 

locked closed

28.1.3. 

Secondary 

containment

28.2. Rain water 

being pumped to the 

crude tanks if sump 

pump starts

:None identified :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

29. P-1301 

fuel gas 

condensate 

of the sulfatreat vessels 

pump block 

valve left 

open

29.1. Oily water into 

sulfa-treat vessels 

resulting in fouling the 

media with potential 

shutdown of the 

furnace H-201

29.1.1. Check 

valve in the line

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

30. P-1122 

fuel gas 

header 

condensate 

pump block 

valve left 

open

30.1. Oily water into 

the fuel gas header 

resulting in a potential 

furnace H-201 

shutdown

30.1.1. Two 

check valves in 

the line

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

30.1.2. Pump 

remains in auto

31. P-1123 oil 

skimming 

pump on T1113 block 

valve left 

open

31.1. Oily water back 

into the storm water 

tank with potential to 

over flow T-1113 to 

environment

31.1.1. Check 

valve in line

2 2 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team. 31.1.2. High 

level alarm LAH 

5102 on DCS 

panel

31.1.3. 

Secondary 

containment

32. LSR salt 

tower V-1330 

chcek valve 

fails and unit 

down

32.1. Oily water 

contamination of the 

LSR fuel stream 

resulting in potential 

shutdown of H-201 

and co-gen

:None identified :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (3) Liquid Knockout from P-1117 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of 

operation)

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Temperature

Intention: 35 degrees F minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Less Lower 

Temperature

33. Manual valve 

on hot glycol 

system 

closed/partially 

closed or hot 

glycol system 

down

33.1. Water freezes in 

line resulting in no 

flow, filling up V-1105 

with potential overflow 

liquid to the flare

33.1.1. High high 

level alarm LSHH 

5118 set @ 5'1" 

will sound on 

DCS

4 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

33.1.2. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

33.1.3. Glycol 

heat tracing 

system PM and 
pre-winterization 

check

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (3) Liquid Knockout from P-1117 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of 

operation)

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Pressure

Intention: 30 to 40 psi

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Less Lower 

Pressure

34. Pump 

running 

too far 

out on 

pump 

curve

34.1. Not being able 

to pump contents 

out of V-1105 

resulting in V-1105 

overflowing to the 

flare

34.1.1. High 

high level alarm 

LSHH 5118 set 

@ 5'1" will 

sound on DCS

4 3 4 13 Consider doing a hydraulic 

test on the pump P-1117 to 

determine what size orifice 

plate to install in the line to 

maintain the proper back 

pressure for the pump to 

stay within optimum pump 

curve.

RM/ANVIL

34.1.2. V-30202 

Flare Knockout 

Drum

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (4) Purge Gas, Back-up Purge Gas to relief header

Drawings: 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0766 Rev. 9

Parameter: Flow

Intention: 675 scfh minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Flow 35. Manual 

valve(s) in 

line closed

35.1. Loss of purge 

gas to flare with 

potential air ingress 

into the system 

resulting in potential 

explosive mixture in 

the flare header.

35.1.1. Valves 

are chain locked 

open (CLO)

5 1 3 14 Consider having a low 

flow alarm FAL 309 on 

DCS to alert operations of 

a low flow of purge gas to 

the flare.

JS

35.1.2. PSSR on 

starting unit to 

check valve 

positions

15 Consider having a low 

low flow critical alarm 

FALL 302 on DCS to alert 

operations of a low flow 

to the flare.

JS

35.1.3. Low flow 

switch FSL 309 

designed to open 

SOV 310 

propane back-up 

purge gas

Less Less Flow 36. Manual 

valve(s) in 

line partially 

closed or 

adjustment 

valve not 

open 

enough

36.1. Same As 35.1

More More Flow 37. Manual 

adjustment 

valve open 

too much

37.1. Loss of raw 

material to the flare

37.1.1. Flow 

reading on FT 

302

16 Consider adding a high 

flow alarm on FAH 302 to 

alert operations of a high 

flow to the flare stack.

JS

Reverse Reverse 

Flow

38. Crude 

unit normal 

shut down 

and back-up 

38.1. Loss of purge 

gas to flare with 

potential air ingress 

into the system 

resulting in potential 

38.1.1. Check 

valve in line

5 1 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team. 38.1.2. Pressure 

is maintained in 
purge gas 

flowing

explosive mixture in 

the flare header.

the fuel gas 

system

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (5) Propane Storage Tank including distribution system to users (back-up purge gas & flare pilots).

Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Flow

Intention: 65 to 75 scfh of propane gas

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Flow 

(out of V30203)

39. Manual 

valve(s) 

closed or 

PCV 313 fails 

to open

39.1. Loss of 

propane supply to 

users resulting in 

loss of pilot lights 

on flare and 

possible loss of 

purge gas flame 

with potential 

unburned 

hydrocarbons 

going to the 

environment

39.1.1. Low 

temperature 

alarm TAL 

101/102/103 

on DCS

3 3 3 17 Consider adding to the 

flare procedure 

operator response to 

no propane to the pilot 

lights; procedure for by

-passing a PCV.

SD

39.1.2. Low 

low 

temperature 

alarm TALL 

101/102/103 

on DCS

39.1.3. Manual 

by-pass 

around PCV 

313 and local 

PI to adjust 

gas pressure if 

PCV 313 fails 

to open

No Flow (to 

pilot lights)

40. Manual 

valve(s) 

closed or 

PCV 311 fails 

to open

40.1. Loss of 

propane supply to 

the pilot lights on 

flare and possible 

loss of purge gas 

flame with 

potential unburned 

hydrocarbons 

going to the 

environment

40.1.1. Low 

temperature 

alarm TAL 

101/102/103 

on DCS

3 3 3 :Same As 17

40.1.2. Low 

low 

temperature 

alarm TALL 

101/102/103 

on DCS

40.1.3. Manual 

by-pass 

around PCV 

311 and local 

PI to adjust 

gas pressure if 

PCV 311 fails 

to open

No Flow (to 

back-up 

purge 

system 

when 

needed)

41. Manual 

valve(s) 

closed or 

SOV 310 fails 

to open

41.1. Loss of backup purge gas to 

flare with potential 

air ingress into the 

system resulting in 

potential explosive 

mixture in the flare 

header.

41.1.1. Valves 

are chain 

locked open 

(CLO)

5 1 3 18 Consider changing 

SOV 310 to fail open 

which is the fail safe 

position for this valve 

to keep purge flow to 

the flare system.

ANVIL

41.1.2. PSSR 

on starting unit 

to check valve 

positions

19 Consider adding to the 

flare procedure 

operator response to 

total loss of the purge 

system.

SD

42. Line 

plugged with 

42.1. Loss of backup purge gas to :None 

identified

5 3 4 20 Consider insulating 

and hot glycol tracing 

RM/ANVIL
ice from 

moisture 

coming from 

fuel gas

flare with potential 

air ingress into the 

system resulting in 

potential explosive 

mixture in the flare 

header.

the back-up purge gas 

line from where it ties 

in to the purge gas line 

back to SOV 310 to 

prevent ice formation 

in the line and stopping 

propane flow.

Less Less Flow 

(out of V30203)

43. Manual 

valve(s) 

partially 

closed, PCV 

313 fails 

partially open, 

or propane 

running low

:Same As 39.1

No Flow (to 

pilot lights)

44. Manual 

valve(s) 

partially 

closed, PCV 

311 fails 

partially open, 

or propane 

running low

:Same As 40.1

No Flow (to 

back-up 

purge 

system 

when 

needed)

45. Manual 

valve(s) 

partially 

closed, SOV 

310 fails 

partially open, 

or propane 

running low

:Same As 41.1

46. Line 

plugging with 

ice from 

moisture 

coming from 

fuel gas

:Same As 42.1

More More Flow 

(out of V30203)

47. Manual by

-pass valve 

left open or 

leaks by, PCV 

313 fails open

47.1. Increased 

pressure to 

downstream users 

resulting in 

potential higher 

usage

47.1.1. 

Downstream 

users have a 

regulator or 

orfice plate to 

control the gas 

pressure

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

47.1.2. 

Pipework is 

higher design 

pressure than 

the propane 

system

More Flow 

(to pilot 

lights)

48. Manual by

-pass valve 

left open or 

leaks by, PCV 

311 fails open

48.1. Increased 

pressure to pilots 

could result in 

pilots being blown 

out resulting in 

unburned 

hydrocarbons 

going to the 

environment

48.1.1. Manual 

by-pass 

around PCV 

311 and local 

PI to adjust 

gas pressure if 

PCV 311 fails 

to open

3 3 3 :Same As 17

Reverse Reverse 

Flow

49. 

Disconnecting 

unloading 

hoses from V30203 and 

not having 

49.1. Loss of 

propane to the 

environment with 

potential for an 

explosion and 

personnel injury

49.1.1. One 

way valve 

inside the tank 

on the fill line 

to prevent 

reverse flow

4 2 3 21 Verify the propane 

emergency tank and 

line isolation is 

installed and added to 

the P&ID as shown on 

the vendor drawings.

ANVIL
the tank 

isolated from 

hoses

49.1.2. Special 

one way valve 

in unloading 

line to prevent 

reverse flow

Other 

Than

Misdirected 

Flow

50. Driver 

pulls away 

from tank 

while still 

connected

50.1. Loss of 

propane to the 

environment with 

potential for an 

explosion and 

personnel injury

50.1.1. One 

way valve 

inside the tank 

on the fill line 

to prevent 

reverse flow

4 2 3 :Same As 21

50.1.2. Special 

one way valve 

in unloading 

line to prevent 

reverse flow

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (5) Propane Storage Tank including distribution system to users (back-up purge gas & flare pilots).

Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Pressure

Intention: 45 to 250 psig

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

More Higher 

Pressure

51. External 

fire

51.1. Overpressure V -

30203 resulting in loss 

of containment and 

potential personnel 

injury

51.1.1. PSV 3002 

set @ 250 psig and 

is designed to 

relieve to a safe 

location

5 1 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

51.1.2. Two 

manually operated 

fire monitors in the 

area

52. 

Unloading 

line liquid 

full on a 

warm day

52.1. Propane expands 

in the line with potential 

line failure

52.1.1. One way 

valve in the 

unloading line will 

allow flow into the 

tank

3 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

52.1.2. PSV on line

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (5) Propane Storage Tank including distribution system to users (back-up purge gas & flare pilots).

Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Level

Intention: 20% to 84% instrument range

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Level 53. 

Operations 

does not 

order 

propane in 

time

:Same As 39.1

More Higher 

Level

54. 

Overfilling 

the tank 

higher than 

85%

54.1. Possibility of having 

liquid propane going to 

end users with potential 

damage to the 

downstream regulators 

resulting in high pressure 

54.1.1. Level 

guage on the 

vessel

3 3 3 22 Consider adding propane 

deliveries to the Process 

Chemical Receiving and 

Processing PW-SWP-050

MS

54.1.2. Spitter 

valves on the 
gas going to the end 

users; could result in pilots 

being blown out resulting 

in unburned hydrocarbons 

going to the environment

tank used as a 

second means of 

guaging tank 

level

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (6) Flare Front Generator Ignition System

Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1

Parameter: Flow

Intention: Propane 70 scfh; air 1500 scfh

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Flow 

(Propane 

when 

needed)

55. Manual 

valve(s) 

closed, 

PCV 304 

fails to 

open or 

PCV 304 

plugged 

with scale

55.1. Loss of propane 

to the flame front 

generator resulting in 

not being able to light a 

pilot light, thus potential 

unburned hydrocarbons 

going to the 

environment

55.1.1. 

Redundant 

pilots on the 

flare (3)

3 2 3 23 Consider adding a y 

strainer in the line to trap 

scale and prevent 

pluggage of the regulator 

(recommended by vendor 

- John Zink).

ANVIL

No Flow (Air 

when 

needed)

56. Manual 

valve(s) 

closed, 

PCV 303 

fails to 

open or 

PCV 303 

plugged 

with scale

56.1. Loss of air to the 

flame front generator 

resulting in not being 

able to light a pilot light, 

thus potential unburned 

hydrocarbons going to 

the environment

56.1.1. 

Redundant 

pilots on the 

flare (3)

3 2 3 :Same As 23

Less Less Flow 

(Propane 

when 

needed)

57. Manual 

valve(s) 

partially 

closed or 

PCV 304 

fails 

partially 

open

:Same As 55.1

Less Flow 

(Air when 

needed)

58. Manual 

valve(s) 

partially 

closed or 

PCV 303 

fails 

partially 

open

58.1. Same As 56.1

More More Flow 

(Propane 

when 

needed)

59. Manual 

by-pass 

valve left 

open or 

leaks by, 

PCV 304 

fails open

59.1. Too much 

propane going to the 

flame front generator 

resulting in not being 

able to light a pilot light, 

thus potential unburned 

hydrocarbons going to 

the environment

59.1.1. 

Redundant 

pilots on the 

flare (3)

3 2 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

More Flow 

(Air when 

needed)

60. Manual 

by-pass 

valve left 

open or 

leaks by, 

PCV 303 

fails open

60.1. Too much air 

going to the flame front 

generator resulting in 

not being able to light a 

pilot light, thus potential 

unburned hydrocarbons 

going to the 

environment

60.1.1. 

Redundant 

pilots on the 

flare (3)

3 2 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.
Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (6) Flare Front Generator Ignition System

Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1

Parameter: Pressure

Intention: Air 14 psig maximum; Propane 10 psig maximum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

More Higher 

Pressure 

(Propane)

61. Failure of PCV 

304 or bypass left 

open or leaks by

:Same As 59.1

Higher 

Pressure (Air)

62. Failure of PCV 

303 or bypass left 

open or leaks by

:Same As 60.1

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (7) Flare Stack STK-30801, Flare Fan FAN-30802, associated instrumentation/camera

Drawings: 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0

Parameter: Flow

Intention: 0 to 350,000 pounds per hour hydrocarbon vapor to flare; 10% to 100% operating range for FAN-30802

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Flow 

(vent gas 

header)

:Other than 

purge gas to 

the flare no 

flow is 

normal 

operations

No Flow 

(Flare Fan 

FAN-30802)

63. Failure 

of the fan, 

loss of 

power to the 

fan, or fan 

not started

63.1. Potential 

damage to the flare 

due to the flame 

burning too low in the 

flare

63.1.1. Fan motor 

run status on the 

DCS

3 3 3 24 Consider adding the FAN 

to the PM program for 

the crude unit.

JH

No Flow 

(instrument 

air to the 

camera)

64. Loss of 

air supply, 

manual 

valve 

closed, or 

PCV fails 

closed

64.1. Camera lens 

covered with snow or 

trash blocking the 

view of the stack; thus 

preventing camera 

from increasing fan 

speed to prevent flare 

from smoking

:None identified 3 3 3 25 Consult vendor on the 

instrument air 

requirement, 

consequences on loss of 

air, and safeguards if the 

air is lost.

SD

More More Flow 

(from PSV's 

- emergency 

operation)

65. Partial 

power 

failure and 

loss of 

multipule 

middle 

pump 

arounds

65.1. Exceed design 

capacity of the vent 

system resulting in 

potential overpressure 

of the crude tower 

with loss of 

containment and 

possible personnel 

injury

65.1.1. High 

pressure alarms 

PAH 316 A/B/C with 

2 out of 3 high is 

designed to 

shutdown the plant 

in the safe mode 

(HIPS trip is P-311 

A/B, P-2012 A/B and 

crude furnace 

shutdown and 

remaining equipment 

is shutdown through 

the ESD system).

5 1 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

65.1.2. Crude unit 

PSV's are balanced 

bellows
65.1.3. Secondary 

containment

More Flow 

(Flare Fan 

FAN-30802)

66. Failure 

of camera 

control loop, 

VFD in bypass (motor 

goes to 

100%), or in 

manual 

mode set 

too high

66.1. The flare flame 

can be overaerated 

which results in high 

frequency modulation 

of the combustion and 

causes noise and 

vibration

66.1.1. Operations to 

adjust fan rate to 

minimize noise and 

vibration

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (8) Liquid Knockout from P-30513 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of 

operation)

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0

Parameter: Flow

Intention: 0 to 70 gpm

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Flow 67. Manual 

suction 

valve close

67.1. Fill V-30202 and 

overflow liquid to the 

flare

67.1.1. High high 

level alarm HHLL 

308 A set @ 3'6" 

will sound on 

DCS

4 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

67.2. Possible pump 

damage with loss of 

containment and 

potential personnel 

exposure

67.2.1. Manual 

valve is Car 

Sealed Open 

(CSO)

2 2 2 :Same As 11

67.2.2. 

Secondary 

containment

68. Pump 

failure, loss 

of power, or 

pump left in 

manual 

mode

68.1. Fill V-30202 and 

overflow liquid to the 

flare

68.1.1. High high 

level alarm HHLL 

308 A set @ 3'6" 

will sound on 

DCS

4 1 2 26 Consider having a sign at 

the pump switch stating 

that P-30202 be left in the 

auto run mode.

MS

69. Manual 

discharge 

valve(s) 

closed

69.1. Fill V-30202 and 

overflow liquid to the 

flare

69.1.1. High high 

level alarm HHLL 

308 A set @ 3'6" 

will sound on 

DCS

4 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

69.2. Possible pump 

damage with loss of 

containment and 

potential personnel 

exposure

69.2.1. Manual 

valve is Car 

Sealed Open 

(CSO)

2 2 2 :Same As10

69.2.2. 

Secondary 

containment

Less Less Flow 70. Manual 

suction 

valve 

partially 

close or 

strainer 

plugging

:Same As 67.1

71. Manual 

discharge 

valve(s) 

:Same As 69.1
partially 

closed

Reverse Reverse 

Flow

72. check 

valve fails

72.1. Contents of T1106 flow back into V1105 with potential of 

overflowing to flare if 

pump P-1117 fails

72.1.1. High level 

switch HLL 308 A 

starts P-30513

4 2 3 :Same As 11

72.1.2. High high 

level alarm HHLL 

30202 set @ 3'6" 

will sound on 

DCS

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (8) Liquid Knockout from P-30513 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of 

operation)

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0

Parameter: Temperature

Intention: 35 degrees F minimum

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Less Lower 

Temperature

73. Manual valve 

on hot glycol 

system 

closed/partially 

closed or hot 

glycol system 

down

73.1. Water freezes in 

line resulting in no 

flow, filling up V30202 with potential 

overflow liquid to the 

flare

73.1.1. Glycol 

heat tracing 

system PM and 

pre-winterization 

check

4 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

73.1.2. High high 

level alarm HHLL 

308 A set @ 3'6" 

will sound on 

DCS

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (8) Liquid Knockout from P-30513 to Crude Storage (T-1106) or (T-1115 when in crude service-temporary mode of 

operation)

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0

Parameter: Pressure

Intention: 30 to 40 psi

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Less Lower 

Pressure

74. Pump 

running 

too far 

out on 

pump 

curve

74.1. Not being able 

to pump contents 

out of V-1105 

resulting in V-1105 

overflowing to the 

flare

74.1.1. High 

high level alarm 

HHLL 308 A set 

@ 3'6" will 

sound on DCS

4 3 4 27 Consider doing a hydraulic 

test on the pump P-30513 

to determine what size 

orifice plate to install in the 

line to maintain the proper 

back pressure for the pump 

to stay within optimum 

pump curve.

RM/ANVIL

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (9) Global Nodes

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 

Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 

Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1

Parameter: Flow

Intention: To address general flow issues

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

323
Other 

Than

Misdirected 

Flow

75. 

Drain/bleed 

valves left 

open or leaks 

by

75.1. Material lost to 

the environment

75.1.1. Drain/bleed 

valves on lines 

capped/plugged 

when not in use

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

75.1.2. Secondary 

containment

Table of contents

Session: (1) 8/10/2009

Revision: 

Node: (9) Global Nodes

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 

Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 

Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1

Parameter: Services / Utilities

Intention: Maintain Service

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No 

Services / 

Utilities 

(electrical)

76. Loss 

of 

electrical 

supplier

76.1. Loss of ability to 

pump liquid from V-1105 

and V-30202 during 

emergency venting 

resulting in overflow of 

liquid to the flare

76.1.1. Pumps P1117 and P-30513 

are on the 

emergency 

generation system

5 1 3 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

76.2. Loss of additional 

combustion air to flare 

stack (FAN 30802) 

resulting in air emissions

76.2.1. FAN 30802 

is on the 

emergency 

generation system

3 1 2 :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

76.3. Loss of ability to use 

auto igniter or flame front 

generator resulting in not 

being able to light a pilot 

light, thus potential 

unburned hydrocarbons 

going to the environment

76.3.1. Auto igniter 

and flame front 

generator are on 

the emergency 

generation system

3 1 2 28 Verify the auto igniter and 

flame front generator are 

on the emergency 

generation system

RM

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (9) Global Nodes

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 

Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 

Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1

Parameter: Purging / Inerting

Intention: To prevent air ingress into the system

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

No No Purging / 

Inerting

77. Failure 

to oxygen 

free vent 

collection & 

flare system 

prior to 

lighting 

pilots

77.1. Potential for 

ignition of explosive 

mixture in vent 

collection/flare resulting 

in equipment damage 

and injury to personnel.

77.1.1. Hand 

held oxygen 

meter to test for 

zero O2 in 

system

4 2 3 29 Consider modifying Crude 

Unit Purge Prior to Startup 

Procedure CU-SUP-010 to 

include lighting flare pilots 

after N2 purge of system.

MS

77.1.2. Manual 

back-up nitrogen 

purge to V-1105

30 Consider removing flow 

meter from nitrogen purge 

line to V-1105 and ensuring 

adequate line size 

connection for high volume 

back-up N2 purge.

RM

31 Consider including an initial 

purging step of noncombustible gas in flare 

startup procedure.

SD
Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (9) Global Nodes

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 

Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 

Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1

Parameter: Safety

Intention: To keep personnel safe

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Less Less Safety 78. Crude unit 

shutdown for 

maintenance 

and using 

propane for 

purge gas to the 

flare

78.1. Potential for 

backflow of propane 

into the crude unit fuel 

system and crude 

tower

78.1.1. Check 

valve in the line

32 Consider closing fuel gas 

purge supply valve to the 

crude unit shutdown 

procedure CU-NSP-010

MS

79. Crude unit 

shutdown for 

maintenance 

and no back-up 

propane purge 

gas flowing.

79.1. Potential to draw 

oxygen into crude unit 

creating a potential 

explossive 

atmosphere.

79.1.1. Check 

valve in the line

5 1 3 :same as 32

79.1.2. Valves 

are chain locked 

open (CLO)

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (9) Global Nodes

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 

Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 

Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1

Parameter: Human Factors

Intention: To address human factors issues

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Part 

Of

Part Of 

Human 

Factors

: HUMAN 

FACTORS 

CHECKLIST 

ITEM

: PHA TEAM'S 

RESPONSE

: JUSTIFICATIONS 

FOR TEAM'S 

RESPONSE

80. Working area 

cleanliness

80.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

80.1.1. Operations, 

maintenance and 

contractors are 

required to clean-up 

job site after each 

task.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

80.1.2. Individual 

and supervisor 

enforcement on a 

daily basis

80.1.3. Monthly 

housing keeping 

inspection checks

81. Signage 

posted, clearly 

visible, and easily 

understood in the 

area (e.g., 

emergency exit, 

response signs)

81.1. Personnel 

exposure to radiant 

heat if close to the 

flare stack

:None identified 33 Consider placing 

signage around the 

radiant zone to alert 

personnel to the radiant 

heat dangers if flaring 

was to ocurr.

MS

82. General 

environment 

:Same As 81.1
conducive to 

efficient 

performance 

(e.g., noise level, 

ambient 

temperature, 

visibility)

83. Lighting 

conditions for the 

unit.

83.1. Adequate 83.1.1. Semi-annual 

facility self 

inspection checklist 

29 CFR 1903

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

84. Supplies of 

protective gear 

readily available 

for routine and 

emergency use.

84.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

84.1.1. PPE (bunker 

gear inspected 

every three months)

34 Consider including the 

use of radiant heat gear 

in plant maintenance 

procedures when 

preforming work inside 

the radiant heat zone.

JH

85. 

Communications 

equipment 

adequacy and 

accessibility.

85.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

85.1.1. Two PSVR 

frequencies, 

repeater & talkaround and a third 

VPT talk farm 

frequency

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

85.1.2. Repeater 

equipped w/ battery 

back-up

85.1.3. Base station 

on battery back-up

85.1.4. Adequate 

availability of 

portable radios 

maintained by a 

battery conditioning 

system

85.1.5. Motorola -

ProComm 

maintains radio 

system

86. Availability 

and use of right 

tools for work.

86.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

86.1.1. Individual 

crew tool cribs & 

main maintenance 

tool crib

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

87. Labeling of 

important 

equipment 

(vessels, pipes, 

valves, 

instruments, 

controls, etc.)

87.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

87.1.1. PSSR; 

adequacy of 

labeling checked as 

part of pre-startup 

safety review.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

88. Accuracy of 

existing labels

88.1. Needs 

updated to reflect 

changes, rebuild of 

fire reconstruction 

project

88.1.1. PSSR :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team. 88.1.2. On-going 

task

89. Adequacy of 

feed back and 

displays on the 

DCS

89.1. Adequate 89.1.1. PSSR; 

Testing and 

functional check-out 

of DCS will be 

conducted prior to 

commissioning 

rebuilt unit.

35 Consider completing 

documentation package 

of DCS changes and 

attaching to MOC.

JS

SD

36 Verify training is 

conducted and PSSR 

completed prior to 

commissioning unit.

JS

SD

90. Arrangement 

of controls and 

90.1. Adequate 90.1.1. 

Development of 

37 Verify final DCS 

configuration protocol is 

JS
displays being 

logical to match 

operators 

expectations.

DCS configuration 

and graphic follows 

written petro star 

protocol

complete prior to 

commissioning unit.

SD

91. Visibility of 

control displays 

from all relevant 

work positions

91.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

91.1.1. Process 

controls are set up 

with redundant CPU 

work station 

arrange so board 

operator can utilize 

both CPU work 

stations for 

monitoring or 

changing process 

parameters.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

92. Consistency 

of separate 

control displays

92.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

92.1.1. 

Development of 

DCS configuration 

and graphic follows 

written petro star 

protocol

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

92.1.2. Work station

(s) are configure 

similar and 

redundant

93. Grouping of 

related controls 

and displays

93.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

93.1.1. 

Development of 

DCS configuration 

and graphic follows 

written petro star 

protocol

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

93.1.2. Process 

controls grouped by 

unit modules 

specific to a control 

scheme and 

displayed on same 

graphic

94. Sufficiency of 

information to 

diagnose an 

upset notified by 

Control System

94.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

94.1.1. PSSR :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team. 94.1.2. 

Development of 

DCS configuration 

and graphic follows 

written petro star 

protocol

94.1.3. Control 

schemes have the 

operating 

parameters needed 

for a board operator 

to diagnose an 

upset in the 

process.

95. Control 

alarms separated 

from critical safety 

alarms.

95.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

95.1.1. PSSR :No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team. 95.1.2. Alarm 

Management 

Program

95.1.3. 

Development of 

DCS configuration 

and graphic follows 

written petro star 

protocol
95.1.4. Process 

control alarms are 

configured different 

from critical alarms.

95.1.5. Critical 

alarms appear in a 

red banner with 

separate and 

unique sound and 

can not be 

suppressed.

96. Prioritization 

of alarms.

96.1. Currently 

Petro Star does not 

utilize the alarm 

prioritization 

functionality within 

delta-v

96.1.1. Alarm 

management

38 Consider incorporating 

alarm prioritization 

within the delta-v alarm 

management program

JS

SD

97. Speed of 

feedback from 

instruments for 

operational 

action.

97.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

97.1.1. Confirmed 

by operations 

personnel

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

98. Controls 

distinguishability 

and ease of use.

98.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

98.1.1. Controls are 

well labeled, 

accessible and easy 

to use.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

98.1.2. Process 

controls 

development follow 

written petro star 

protocol

99. Controls 

conformance to 

strong 

populational 

stereotypes 

(color, direction of 

movement, etc.)

99.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

99.1.1. 

Development of 

DCS configuration 

and graphic follows 

written petro star 

protocol

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

100. Adequacy of 

control logic

100.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

100.1.1. MOC 

process required to 

implement or 

change control 

logic.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

100.1.2. Logic is 

tested using delta-v 

simulate prior to 

implementation.

100.1.3. PSSR, 

logic is reviewed for 

adequacy and 

functionality prior to 

commissioning.

101. 

Control/alarm 

setpoints and 

control actions 

clearly specified

101.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

101.1.1. Delta-V is 

an advanced 

process control 

system

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

101.1.2. 

Development of 

DCS configuration 

and graphic follows 

written petro star 

protocol
101.1.3. Alarm 

management 

Program

101.1.4. Procedures 

clearly identified for 

all modes of 

operation

102. Personnel 

mobility 

considerations 

with respect to 

protective gear 

required for 

certain tasks, 

including 

emergency 

response.

102.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

102.1.1. Operation, 

maintenance & 

emergency 

response activities 

considered when 

conducting model 

review of process

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

103. Adequate 

personnel 

availability to 

respond to 

expected 

emergencies as 

stated in 

Emergency 

Response Plan.

103.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

103.1.1. Minimum 

operations crew 

level consists of a 

board lead operator 

and two outside 

operators.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

103.1.2. Plant ESD 

available to 

shutdown the unit.

103.1.3. Plant 

evacuation alarm 

simple to activate

103.1.4. Fire pump 

can be remote 

started

104. Personnel 

making changes 

to equipment to 

better suit their 

needs.

104.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record - No 

allowed

104.1.1. MOC 

required for 

changes to 

equipment within 

the covered 

process.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

105. Accessibility 

to valves (chain 

operators, 

ladders, 

platforms, etc.)

105.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

105.1.1. Validated 

during the model 

review process

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

106. Adequacy of 

signs and 

protections 

against hot 

surfaces

106.1. Adequate 106.1.1. PSSR, all 

P&ID's are marked 

as to insulation 

requirements.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

Table of contents

Session: (2) 8/11/2009

Revision: 

Node: (9) Global Nodes

Drawings: 10-D-0710 Rev. 17C 10-D-0711 Rev. 11D 10-D-0713 Rev. 12E 10-D-0715 Rev. 17E 10-D-0715A Rev. 14F 10-D-0722 

Rev. 8 10-D-0723 Rev. 16E 10-D-0758A Rev. 6 10-D-0765 Rev. 14C 10-D-0766 Rev. 9 30-F-0001 Rev. 0 30-F-0002 

Rev. 0 40-F-0003 Rev. 0 John Zink B-F-9092802-150 Rev. 1

Parameter: Facility Siting

Intention: To address potential siting hazards.

GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS S L R REF# RECOMMENDATIONS BY

Part 

Of

Part of 

Facility 

Siting

: FACILITY 

SITING 

: PHA TEAM'S 

RESPONSE

: JUSTIFICATIONS 

FOR TEAM'S 

RESPONSE
CHECKLIST 

ITEM

107. Security at 

facility

107.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

107.1.1. Fenced 

facility

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team. 107.1.2. Gates 

require access code 

or remote openers

107.1.3. Gate 

security

107.1.4. CCTV 

System

108. Location of 

critical systems 

(PLC, DCS)

108.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

108.1.1. Location of 

DCS and PLC 

centrally located in 

the MCC

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

109. Prevailing 

wind direction

109.1. Summer: 

west to east 

Winter: east to 

west

109.1.1. Prevailing 

winds considered in 

placement of 

process in relation to 

flare

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

109.1.2. Wind sock 

located on T-1116

110. Site 

topography

110.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

110.1.1. Site 

drainage is toward 

the south, southeast

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

110.1.2. Drainage is 

away from process 

skids

111. Offsite traffic 

flow patterns and 

clearances

111.1. Adequate 111.1.1. Both access 

points to facility are 

DOT approved

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

112. On-site 

traffic flow 

patterns and 

clearances

112.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

112.1.1. Approach 

ways adequate to 

keep arriving traffic 

free of roadway 

when clearing 

control point(s)

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

113. Security and 

reliability of 

critical feeds and 

utilities

113.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

113.1.1. Pipelines 

are buried, metering 

building in secure 

fenced area

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

113.1.2. Utility power 

in buried from substation into facility. 

Transformer yard is 

fenced

113.1.3. Firewater 

redundancy of equal 

capacity

113.1.4. Private 

firewater supply can 

be re-supplied using 

firewell

113.1.5. Private 

firewater mains are 

buried and designed 

with segment 

isolation valves
113.1.6. Private 

Potable water 

system adequate for 

users, spared pump 

kept in warehouse

114. Evacuation 

routes, 

emergency exits, 

safe rally spots

114.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

114.1.1. Access 

roads are well 

engineered, multiple 

evacuation/egress 

routes leading to 

main staging area.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

114.1.2. Facility 

orientations clearly 

spell out evacuation 

requirements, routes 

and staging area.

115. Process 

area electrical 

classification

115.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

115.1.1. Electrical 

classifications 

current See DWG 00

-D-7802W and 00-D7802E

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

116. Equipment 

accessibility for 

operation and 

maintenance

116.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

116.1.1. 

Maintenance 

consideration 

included during 

model review 

process. No 

additional issues 

identified.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

117. Protection of 

piping and 

vessels from 

external impact

117.1. Adequate 117.1.1. Ballard and 

impact guarding 

located in areas 

identified as 

requiring additional 

impact protection 

from heavy 

equipment.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

118. Protection of 

small lines and 

fittings from 

external impact

118.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

118.1.1. No issues 

identified, most 

process located 

within curbed 

process areas.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

119. Routing of 

process piping, 

critical control 

cable trays, 

critical utilities

119.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

119.1.1. ESD 

configured to fail 

safe and routed 

away from high 

hazard areas and/or 

located underground

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

119.1.2. When 

feasible 

consideration is 

made to routing of 

critical process 

piping and control.

119.1.3. Critical 

electrical service is 

routed away from 

high hazard areas 

and/or located 

underground (i.e. 

Emergency 

generator power to 

MCC, fire pump 
power supply, 

lighting circuits etc.)

119.1.4. Main 

firewater line is 

routed away from 

high hazard areas 

and/or located 

underground.

119.1.5. Fire 

detection circuits are 

routed away from 

high hazard areas 

and/or located 

underground.

120. Vent, drain, 

and relief valve 

discharge 

locations

120.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

120.1.1. Relief 

valves discharge to a 

safe location

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

121. 

Incompatible 

materials 

segregated in 

storage, dikes, 

sumps, drains, 

waste collection 

and disposal 

areas

121.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

121.1.1. Segregated 

bottled gas storage 

area

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

121.1.2. No strong 

oxidizers or acids 

currently used in 

process

121.1.3. Fuels lab 

has segregated 

storage for 

incompatible lab 

chemical identified in 

lab hygiene plan.

122. Location of 

loading and 

unloading spots 

for incompatible 

materials

122.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

122.1.1. Currently no 

bulk chemical with 

significant 

incompatibility 

properties are 

handled within the 

facility. See PWSWP-050 "Process 

Chemicals Deliveries 

& Handling" 

procedure.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

123. Storage 

tank separation 

distances (to 

process, between 

tanks)

123.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

123.1.1. Tank 

spacing in 

accordance with 

applicable codes and 

standards.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

124. Spill control, 

drainage 

direction, 

destination, 

treatment 

capacity

124.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

124.1.1. Process 

areas and skids 

within secondary 

containment.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

124.1.2. Valves and 

equipment located 

inside containment 

skids w/ appropriate 

impact barriers were 

needed.

124.1.3. Tank farm 

within secondary 

containment in 

accordance with 

applicable codes and 

standards.
124.1.4. Site 

drainage is generally 

away from skid or 

tankage.

124.1.5. Facility has 

a perimeter dike w/ 

canal valves 

normally maintained 

closed for spill 

control.

124.1.6. Dedicated 

spill response 

equipment on-site.

125. Access for 

fire fighting and 

other emergency 

services

125.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

125.1.1. Fire pumps 

and foam trailer 

building located safe 

distance from 

process area.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

125.1.2. Fire 

monitors and fire 

equipment 

adequately spaced.

126. Ignition 

sources 

(continuous, 

occasional / 

intermittent, 

uncontrolled)

126.1. Adequate 126.1.1. Siting of 

fired process 

equipment in 

accordance with 

codes and 

standards.

39 Consider verifying 

electrical conduits have 

been sealed in classified 

areas and developing a 

method for verifying 

seals area poured.

KK

126.1.2. Process 

equipment installed 

in accordance with 

electrical codes and 

standards.

40 Consider conducting a 

facility siting study on all 

occupied buildings 

adjacent to process 

areas.

LL

126.1.3. Hot work 

activities controlled 

by permit process

127. Location of 

detectors of 

leaks/ruptures

127.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

127.1.1. Leak 

detection on 

underground 

pipelines

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

127.1.2. taddle tales 

on storage tanks 

checked monthly 

during API Tank 

Farm Inspections.

127.1.3. CCTV used 

for monitoring 

process areas

128. Emergency 

shutdown switch 

location

128.1. Switch 

location is 

adequate

128.1.1. CDU-ESP010 Crude Unit 

Emergency 

Shutdown

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

128.1.2. CDU ESD's: 

control room, and at 

each exit from 

control room.

128.1.3. Crude Unit 

ESD: Control Room 

and east of crude 

heater.
128.1.4. Truck 

Loading rack local 

shutdown: East and 

west ends of truck 

rack.

128.1.5. Loading 

pump remote 

shutdown(s): Control 

room

128.1.6. Emergency 

generator: west side 

of engine driver,

128.1.7. Plant air 

compressors: On 

each unit's control 

panel.

129. Accessibility 

of emergency 

isolation valve

129.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

129.1.1. EBV's are 

being installed as 

part of the CDU ESD 

system.

41 Verify the installation 

and location of the 

emergency shutdown 

valves for the propane 

storage vessel.

JH

129.1.2. Valves will 

be automated and 

can be activated 

from a ESD button 

located in safe 

locations.

130. 

Passageways, 

pedestrian traffic 

patterns versus 

hazardous 

locations

130.1. Team 

identified no issues 

to record

130.1.1. Facility 

vehicle traffic road 

ways well defined 

and access limitation 

understood.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

130.1.2. Facility 

orientation and 

access control

130.1.3. Posted 10 

mph speed limit

130.1.4. Restricted 

vehicle access to 

classified areas.

131. 

SCBA/respirator 

locations, 

accessibility

131.1. Adequate 131.1.1. SCBA are 

located in the control 

room entryway. 

SCBA are only used 

for escape or rescue.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

131.1.2. SCBA's 

readiness is ensured 

by monthly 

inspections.

131.1.3. SCBA's are 

maintained by 

authorized servicing 

center.

131.1.4. Individuals 

are assigned 

personal respirators 

as outlined in the 

facilities respirator 

protection program

131.1.5. Medical 

surveillance, fit tests, 

monthly individual 
respirator 

inspections and 

approved respirators 

& cartridge types are 

included in respirator 

protection program.

132. Locations of 

safety showers or 

eye wash station

132.1. Adequate 132.1.1. Based on 

the MSDS 

requirements our two 

emergency 

showers/eyewash 

are adequate and 

meet OSHA's 

requirements (50' or 

10 seconds with 15 

minutes of flow) for 

siting of the 

emergency showers.

:No additional 

recommendations 

identified by Team.

132.1.2. Safe work 

practices: PW-SWP050 "Process 

Chemical Deliveries 

and Handling"

132.1.3. Safety 

showers/eyewash 

are located in the 

Fuels Lab & Utility 

Bldg.

PHAWorks by Primatech Inc.