COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Annunziata and 

 Senior Judge Overton 

Argued by teleconference 

TREVOR TYRON ADDERLY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0785-01-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 AUGUST 27, 2002 

COMMONEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 

 William P. Robinson, Jr. (Robinson, Neeley & 

Anderson, on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Trevor Tyron Adderly was indicted by a grand jury alleging 

that he possessed more than one-half ounce, but less than five 

pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-248.1. Adderly moved to suppress evidence found 

during the search of his truck. The trial court denied the 

motion, and Adderly pled guilty to the charge, conditioned upon 

his ability to appeal that denial. The trial court convicted 

Adderly and sentenced him to ten years in prison, with eight 

years suspended. Adderly now appeals the trial court's denial 

of his motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm the trial court's decision to deny his motion to suppress 

and affirm his conviction. 

Background

 On August 12, 1998, Norfolk Police Investigator Todd 

Sterling and two other plain-clothed officers stopped a vehicle 

on Military Highway for a traffic violation. Sterling was 

working with the Vice and Narcotics Division at the time. 

 The driver of the vehicle, who later proved to be Jermaine 

Adderly, produced several different "identification-type 

documents," in response to a request for his license. The 

documents listed 1426 Picadilly Street, Apartment A, as the 

holder's address. The officers concluded they "couldn't really 

charge [the driver] until [they] found his true identity," and 

went to the Picadilly Street address to verify the driver's name 

and address. 

 When they arrived, Sterling noticed a 1996 "Chevy Tahoe" 

parked at the apartment. He ran a DMV check on the license 

plates, but they "didn't come back to anything." At Sterling's 

request, a uniformed officer went to the door of the apartment. 

 Trevor Tyron Adderly, the defendant, answered the door, and 

Sterling and the other uniformed officer walked up to the 

doorway. Sterling detected the odor of marijuana coming from 

the apartment. He asked Adderly if the truck in the front yard 

belonged to him, and Adderly responded that it did. When 

Sterling advised Adderly that the license plates did not "come 

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back to his vehicle," Adderly responded that he did not know why 

that would be the case. 

 Sterling continued his conversation with Adderly, advising 

him that Jermaine Adderly had been arrested and some documents 

in his possession linked him to the 1426 Picadilly address. 

When Sterling explained that he was attempting to verify 

Jermaine Adderly's identity so a summons could be issued, 

Adderly acknowledged that Jermaine lived at the address. 

 Sterling asked Adderly if there were any guns or drugs in 

the apartment. Adderly responded that he had a gun and a 

permit, and directed Sterling to the bedroom to show it to him. 

After examining the gun and permit, Sterling saw an ashtray that 

contained marijuana. When asked, Adderly stated the drugs 

belonged to him, explaining he had just finished smoking a 

joint. After advising Adderly of his Miranda rights, Sterling 

asked him if he could search the apartment for drugs. To 

alleviate Adderly's expressed concern about the absence of a 

search warrant, Sterling told him that he would not charge him 

with any drug offense based on drugs he might find in the 

apartment and that he would simply take the contraband and 

"voucher it." Accepting the terms proffered, Adderly agreed to 

the search of the apartment. Sterling found evidence of drug 

offenses in the apartment, but assured Adderly he would not 

bring any charges based on that evidence. 

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 He then asked if there were any drugs or guns in the "Chevy 

Tahoe." Adderly responded in the negative. Sterling asked if 

he could search the truck, and Adderly responded in the 

affirmative and gave Sterling the keys. In the truck, Sterling 

found 70 plastic baggies of marijuana. Adderly denied the drugs 

belonged to him, and denied knowledge that they were in his 

truck. Adderly was arrested based on the marijuana found in the 

truck. 

Analysis

 Adderly contends the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress the evidence found in his truck on the ground 

that his consent to the search of the truck was tainted by the 

events preceding his consent. For the reasons that follow, we 

disagree and affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 Subject to several well established exceptions, the Fourth 

Amendment prohibits warrantless searches of any place or thing 

in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). However, searches 

made by the police pursuant to a valid consent do not implicate 

the Fourth Amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 

222 (1973); Iglesias v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 93, 99, 372 

S.E.2d 170, 173 (1988) (en banc). 

 When relying upon consent as the justification for a 

search, the Commonwealth must prove, given the totality of the 

circumstances, that the consent was freely and voluntarily 

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given. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); 

Hairston v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 387, 388, 219 S.E.2d 668, 669 

(1975); Commonwealth v. Rice, 28 Va. App. 374, 378, 504 S.E.2d 

877, 879 (1998). "The voluntariness of the consent is a 

question of fact to be determined by the trial court and must be 

accepted on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Limonja v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 532, 540, 383 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1989) 

(en banc). As such, the trial court's resolution of those 

issues will not be reversed on appeal unless we find that the 

decision was clearly erroneous. McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 

Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (noting 

that appellate courts are "bound by the trial court's findings 

of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to 

support them and [this Court] give[s] due weight to the 

inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local 

law enforcement officers"); Satchell v. Commonwealth 20 Va. App. 

641, 648, 640 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1995) (en banc) (great deference 

is given the "peculiar fact finding capability of the trial 

court" since it is "not limited to the stark, written record," 

but "has before it the living witnesses and can observe their 

demeanors and inflections"). Therefore, Adderly must 

demonstrate on appeal "that the [trial court's] denial of [his] 

motion to suppress constitute[d] reversible error. Motley v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 440-41, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 

(1993). 

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 Adderly contends that the police acted unlawfully before 

obtaining his consent and deceived him as to their purpose. See 

Commonwealth v. Ealy, 12 Va. App. 744, 757, 407 S.E.2d 681, 689 

(1991) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to 

voluntary consent because it was tainted by previous unlawful 

searches (citation omitted)); Limonja, 8 Va. App. at 540, 383 

S.E.2d at 481 (noting that deception may invalidate a consent to 

search). Specifically, Adderly claims that his express consent 

was not freely and voluntarily given because: (1) the police did 

not have a "legitimate basis" for appearing at his door; (2) 

Sterling's questions about the possible presence of guns or 

drugs in the apartment were improper; and (3) Sterling "bribed" 

Adderly with the promise that any contraband found in the search 

of the residence would not be used as a basis for criminal 

charges. The evidence admitted at both the trial and 

suppression hearings, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, Greene v. Commonwealth 17 Va. App. 606, 607, 440 

S.E.2d 138, 139 (1994), does not support these contentions.1 

 1

 Although there is evidence to the contrary in the record, 

we need not consider it. See McCary v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. 

App. 27, 35, 548 S.E.2d 239, 243 (2001) (noting that it is the 

trial court's role on a motion to suppress to evaluate and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence). The trial court, in 

concluding that Adderly voluntarily consented to the search, 

credited the police officer's account of the events leading up 

to and including Adderly's consent to the search of his truck 

and resolved the conflicts between Sterling's testimony and that 

of Adderly in favor of the former. 

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 First, we find that Sterling did not act unlawfully before 

obtaining Adderly's consent to search his truck. The police may 

approach a citizen's door and knock to seek his attention. See

Shaver v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 789, 796, 520 S.E.2d 393, 

396-97 (1999). Moreover, the record shows that the police went 

to his apartment to verify the identity and address of an 

individual whom they had stopped for a traffic infraction 

because the suspect had produced one piece of identification 

that listed Adderly's apartment as his address. The officers 

needed the correct name and address to issue summonses and went 

to the Adderlys' residence for that express purpose. Indeed, 

during the visit, Sterling verified with Adderly that the 

traffic offender lived at that address. Thus, the initial 

encounter between Adderly and the police was consensual. 

 Second, Sterling's questions were proper and did not turn 

the consensual encounter into a seizure. See Florida v.

Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). Because Sterling smelled the 

odor of marijuana coming from the defendant's apartment, he 

asked Adderly if there were guns or drugs in the apartment. 

Adderly voluntarily responded that he had a gun in his bedroom 

for which he had a permit. He then asked Sterling if he wanted 

to see it. Sterling accepted the offer and followed Adderly to 

a bedroom in the rear of the apartment. After Sterling found 

the evidence of drugs in Adderly's apartment, he asked Adderly 

whether there were any drugs or guns inside the truck. Adderly 

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responded that there was not. Adderly thus consensually engaged 

in the encounter. 

 Third, Sterling's promise that he would not charge the 

defendant with any drug offense based on drugs he found in the 

apartment, pursuant to Adderly's consent, did not deceive 

Adderly. Sterling honored his promise and did not charge 

Adderly with any crimes based on the $8,615, two kilos of 

marijuana, 86 plastic baggies of marijuana, two additional 

weapons, and the digital scale he found in Adderly's apartment. 

Adderly was charged based on evidence found during the search of 

his truck, about which Sterling had made no promises. 

 In short, Adderly's contentions are without merit. 

Moreover, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that 

Adderly's consent to the search of his truck was voluntary. See

Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 439, 388 S.E.2d 659, 

665 (1990) (noting that whether an accused's consent to search 

was voluntary requires a review of the totality of the 

circumstances). As noted above, the conversation between the 

officer and Adderly prior to his consent to search his truck was 

not coercive. In addition, Sterling was open and honest with 

Adderly throughout the encounter. He told Adderly he did not 

have a search warrant. He said he could apply for one, but he 

was not sure that he could get one. He told Adderly he would 

not charge him with any drug crimes based on evidence found 

during the search of his apartment, and he remained true to his 

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word. He never lied to or deceived Adderly. Moreover, when the 

officer asked him whether he could search the truck, he said, 

"[g]o ahead," gave the officer the keys, and added that there 

was "nothing in there." Given these circumstances, the trial 

court correctly found that the officer's actions were 

objectively reasonable and that the defendant freely and 

voluntarily consented to the search of the truck. See Ohio v. 

Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (holding that the 

voluntariness of consent is determined by an objective test). 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to deny 

Adderly's motion to suppress the evidence found in his truck. 

Affirmed. 

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