alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
S91A1189.

#### KEMP v. THE STATE.

(411 SE2d 711)

Fletcher, Justice.

Andrew Alexander Kemp shot and killed Jose Hernandez and later bragged to acquaintances that he had just robbed and killed a man for $10. Kemp appeals from his convictions for murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.1 We affirm.

1. Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Kemp guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. *Jackson v. Virginia,*443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Kemp contends that the trial court erred by permitting the state to present evidence concerning two independent offenses committed by Kemp. We disagree.

Both of the independent offenses involved robberies committed by Kemp within four weeks of the crimes involved in the present case. In the first robbery, the victim testified that Kemp “started going under his bed like he was pulling out a gun” as he demanded the victim’s money. The amount involved in the first robbery was $50. In the second robbery, Kemp informed the victims that he had a gun in his pocket and demanded their money. The amount involved in the second robbery was $1.

The state sought to introduce evidence concerning these independent offenses, not to raise an improper inference as to the character of the accused but to establish his identity. Identity was at issue because there were no witnesses to Hernandez’s murder and Kemp denied having committed the crime. Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to establish that Kemp committed the independent offenses. Finally, the three crimes occurred within a short span of time and all involved robberies for small amounts of money where a gun was either used or its use was threatened. Accordingly, there was a sufficient connection between the independent offenses and the crime charged that proof of the former tended to prove the latter. Accord *Williams v. State,*261 Ga. 640 (409 SE2d 649) (1991).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Clarke, C. J., Weltner, P. J., Bell, Hunt and Benham, JJ., concur.*

*805Decided January 9, 1992.

*Omotayo B.*Alii, for appellant.

*Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Carl P. Greenberg, Joseph J. Drolet, A. Thomas Jones, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peggy R. Katz, Staff Attorney,*for appelleé.

1

 The crimes occurred on December 9, 1989 and Kemp was indicted on August 14, 1990. The jury returned its verdict on October 29, 1990 and Kemp was sentenced the same day. A motion for new trial was filed on November 28, 1990 and was denied on April 1, 1991. A notice of appeal to this court was filed on April 29, 1991 and the case was submitted for decision without oral argument on July 19, 1991.
II

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2326

To require the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations concerning use

of the term ‘‘fresh’’ in the labeling of poultry, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 27 (legislative day, JULY 20), 1994

Mrs. BOXER (for herself and Mrs. FEINSTEIN) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

A BILL

To require the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations

concerning use of the term ‘‘fresh’’ in the labeling of

poultry, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Truth in Poultry La5 beling Act of 1994’’.

6 SEC. 2. REGULATIONS ON LABELING OF POULTRY.

7 Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment

8 of this Act, the Secretary of Agriculture shall issue final

9 regulations under the Poultry Product Inspection Act (21
2

•S 2326 IS

1 U.S.C. 451 et seq.) that prohibit the use of the term

2 ‘‘fresh’’ on labeling of any poultry or poultry part, or of

3 any edible portion of the poultry or part, that has been

4 frozen or previously frozen to below 26 degrees Fahr5 enheit.

Æ
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Mediacom Capital Corporation (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the Report), Rocco B. Commisso, Chief Executive Officer and Mark E. Stephan,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant
to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. May 16, 2005
    By:
    /s/ Rocco B. CommissoRocco B. CommissoChief Executive Officer By:
    /s/ Mark E. StephanMark E. StephanPrincipal Financial Officer
#### IN THE MATTER OF JAY JENKINS.

(Supreme Court Disciplinary No. 911)

(411 SE2d 268)

Decided October 3, 1991.

*William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Paul B. Cohen, Assistant General Counsel State Bar,*for State Bar of Georgia.

*Howard J. Weintraub,*for Jenkins.

Per curiam.

Acting pursuant to State Bar Rule 4-203 (b) (4), Jay Jenkins filed with the Review Panel of the State Bar of Georgia a petition for voluntary surrender of his license to practice law. The Review Panel determined that Jenkins had entered a guilty plea in the Superior Court of Cobb County to two felony counts of theft by taking. The Review Panel found that the entry of the guilty plea was a violation of Standard 66 of Bar Rule 4-102 (d), and recommended that Jenkins’ petition to surrender his license be approved.

The recommendation is adopted. Voluntary surrender being the equivalent of disbarment, Jenkins is prohibited from practicing law.

*Voluntary surrender of license accepted.*

*All the Justices concur.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS (UNAUDITED) FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH
31, 1999 AND CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET (UNAUDITED) AS OF MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                           3,760
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,558
<ALLOWANCES>                                       394
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                10,400
<PP&E>                                           2,994
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,858
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  64,730
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           13,758
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            82
<OTHER-SE>                                      26,321
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    64,730
<SALES>                                         24,057
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                24,057
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   14,183
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,875
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 564
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,503
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,035
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,468
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,468
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.17
        

</TABLE>
#### Virginia Perla De Chica, Appellant, v Ezequiel Saldana et al., Respondents.

[59 NYS3d 794]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), entered December 16, 2016, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she slipped and fell on a snow and ice condition on the landing of the front exterior steps of the defendants’ home. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced the instant action to recover damages for personal injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the Supreme Court granted the motion.

Under the storm in progress rule, a property owner will not be held responsible for accidents occurring as a result of the accumulation of snow and ice on its premises until an adequate period of time has passed following the cessation of the storm to allow the owner an opportunity to ameliorate the hazards caused by the storm (see *Solazzo v New York City Tr. Auth.,*6 NY3d 734 [2005]; *Baolin Liu v Westchester Prop. Mgt. Group, Inc.,*145 AD3d 942 [2016]; *Dumela-Felix v FGP W. St., LLC,*135 AD3d 809 [2016]; *McCurdy v KYMA Holdings, LLC,*109 AD3d 799 [2013]; *Smith v Christ’s First Presbyt. Church of Hempstead,*93 AD3d 839 [2012]). On a motion for summary judgment, the question of whether a reasonable time has elapsed may be decided as a matter of law by the court, based upon the circumstances of the case (see *Baolin Liu v Westchester Prop. Mgt. Group, Inc.,*145 AD3d at 943; *Dumela-Felix v FGP W. St., LLC,*135 AD3d at 809).

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence, including climatological data, demonstrating that they did not have a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition under the storm in progress rule *(see Valentine v City of New York,*57 NY2d 932, 933-934 [1982]; *Baolin Liu v Westchester Prop. Mgt.*
      *783
      *Group, Inc.,*145 AD3d at 943; *Lanos v Cronheim,*77 AD3d 631, 632-633 [2010]). Similarly, the defendants did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff of the open and obvious condition on the front steps *(see Skouras v New York City Tr. Auth.,*48 AD3d 547 [2008]; *DeMarrais v Swift,*283 AD2d 540 [2001]). In opposition to the defendants’ prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Mastro, J.P., Hall, Cohen and Iannacci, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350),
the undersigned, James R. Henderson, President and Chief Executive Officer of
ECC International Corp., a Delaware corporation (the Company), does hereby
certify, to his knowledge, that:

The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2002 of the Company
(the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

| |  |                                                                            
| |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | /s/ James R. Henderson                                                     
| |  |                                                                            
| |  | James R. Henderson
President and Chief Executive Officer
September 27, 2002

Page 50 of 54
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      I, William R. Walker, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the
Quarterly Report of hi/fn, inc. on Form 10-Q for the three months ended June 30,
2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of hi/fn, inc.

Date: July 30, 2004

                                                 By: /s/ William R. Walker
                                                    ----------------------------
                                                 Name: William R. Walker
                                                 Title: Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ameritrans Capital Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gary C. Granoff, Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition, and results of operations of the Company.





By: /s/Gary C. Granoff

Gary C. Granoff

Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer



February 14, 2007
No. 10-7353.

#### Napoleon Lajuan Randall, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1096, 131 S. Ct. 808,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9468.

178 L. Ed. 2d 540,

December 6, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 389 Fed. Appx. 373.
# Navy admiral encourages HQC employees to embrace the vitality, legacy of Hispanic culture

/ Published Sept. 24, 2015
Fort Belvoir, Virginia,
No. 09-10706.

#### Alexander Samuel, Petitioner v. Bellevue Hospital Center.

562 U.S. 950, 131 S. Ct. 100,

178 L. Ed. 2d 247,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7722,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.

Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Same case below, 366 Fed. Appx. 206.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-41106

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

YAIR ESTRADA-FIGUEROA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:14-CR-806-1

Before DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Yair EstradaFigueroa has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Estrada-Figueroa has not filed a response. We have 

reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected 

therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-41106 Document: 00513080106 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/16/2015
No. 14-41106

2

nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave 

to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities 

herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 14-41106 Document: 00513080106 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/16/2015
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 115 (Tuesday, June 16, 1998)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 32736]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-15900]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 100

[CGD 05-98-040]
RIN 2115-AE46


Special Local Regulations for Marine Events; Patapsco River, 
Baltimore, MD

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of implementation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice implements the special local regulations at 33 CFR 
100.515 during the fireworks display to be held July 4, 1998, on the 
Patapsco River at Baltimore, Maryland. These special local regulations 
are necessary to control vessel traffic due to the confined nature of 
the waterway and expected vessel congestion during the fireworks 
display. The effect will be to restrict general navigation in the 
regulated area for the safety of spectators and vessels transiting the 
event area.

DATES: 33 CFR 100.515 is effective from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m. on July 4, 
1998.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chief Warrant Officer R.L. Houck, 
Marine Events Coordinator, Commander, Coast Guard Activities Baltimore, 
2401 Hawkins Point Road, Baltimore, MD 21226-1971, (410) 576-2674.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The City of Baltimore will sponsor a 
fireworks display on July 4, 1998 on the Patapsco River, Baltimore, 
Maryland. The fireworks display will be launched from a barge 
positioned within the regulated area. In order to ensure the safety of 
participants and transiting vessels, 33 CFR 100.515 will be in effect 
for the duration of the event. Under provisions of 33 CFR 100.515, a 
vessel may not enter the regulated area unless it receives permission 
from the Coast Guard Patrol Commander. Spectator vessels may anchor 
outside the regulated area but may not block a navigable channel. 
Because these restrictions will be in effect for a limited period, they 
should not result in a significant disruption of maritime traffic.

    Dated: May 29, 1998.
P.M. Stillman,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Acting Commander, Fifth Coast Guard 
District.
[FR Doc. 98-15900 Filed 6-15-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-15-M
# C_2013108EN.01003601.xml

| 13.4.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 108/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.4.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 108/36

---

Action brought on 13 February 2013 — Walcher Meßtechnik v OHIM (HIPERDRIVE)

(Case T-95/13)

2013/C 108/85

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Walcher Meßtechnik GmbH (Kirchzarten, Germany) (represented by S. Walter, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 13 December 2012 in Case R 1779/2012-1; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 13 December 2012 in Case R 1779/2012-1;

| — | Order OHIM to pay the costs including those incurred in the course of the appeal proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order OHIM to pay the costs including those incurred in the course of the appeal proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

Community trade mark concerned: the word mark ‘HIPERDRIVE’ for goods in Classes 7 and 9

Community trade mark concerned:

Decision of the Examiner: the application was rejected

Decision of the Examiner:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: the appeal was dismissed in part

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law:

Pleas in law:

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009

---
No. 10-6977.

#### Philander Butler, Petitioner v. Juan D. Castillo, Warden.

562 U.S. 1051, 131 S. Ct. 615,

178 L. Ed. 2d 447,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8986.

November 15, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.