alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2013274EN.01002901.xml

| 21.9.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 274/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.9.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 274/29

---

Action brought on 6 June 2013 — ZZ v Commission

(Case F-56/13)

2013/C 274/45

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: ZZ (represented by: L. Vogel, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Annulment of the decision concerning the transfer of the applicant’s pension rights into the European Union pension scheme, which decision applies the new GIP relating to Articles 11 and 12 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials.

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision adopted by the appointing authority on 27 February 2013 rejecting the complaints made by the applicant on 7 January 2013 against the decisions of the PMO.4 of 10 October 2012; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision adopted by the appointing authority on 27 February 2013 rejecting the complaints made by the applicant on 7 January 2013 against the decisions of the PMO.4 of 10 October 2012;

| — | annul in addition those decisions of 10 October 2012 adopted by the PMO.4 against which the applicant’s complaints were made; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul in addition those decisions of 10 October 2012 adopted by the PMO.4 against which the applicant’s complaints were made;

| — | declare unlawful the general implementing provisions of Articles 11 and 12 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, as adopted on 3 March 2011, particularly Article 9 thereof, and declare them inapplicable to the present case; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare unlawful the general implementing provisions of Articles 11 and 12 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, as adopted on 3 March 2011, particularly Article 9 thereof, and declare them inapplicable to the present case;

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

---
Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATIONS I, Richard L. Feinstein, certify that:  1.I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Ameritrans Capital Corporation;2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4.The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;c)Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andd)Disclosed in this report any changes in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter, that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and5.The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.Date: February 14, 2012/s/ Richard L. Feinstein
Richard L. Feinstein
Chief Financial Officer
No. D-2536.

#### In the Matter of Discipline of Ira Carlton Hatch, Jr.

562 U.S. 813, 131 S. Ct. 404,

178 L. Ed. 2d 269,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7528.

October 4, 2010.

Ira Carlton Hatch, Jr., of Vero Beach, Florida, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-19-00751-CV

IN RE K.J.C., JR. and J.S.M., Children

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018-PA-02668

Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE CHAPA, AND JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order of termination is 

AFFIRMED. Because appellant is indigent, no costs of this appeal are assessed. 

SIGNED April 8, 2020.

_____________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
#### Henry Herrmann, Appellant, v Salvatore Giovanniello et al., Respondents.

[64 NYS3d 561]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Marber, J.), entered February 23, 2017, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle driven by the defendant Salvatore Giovanniello as the plaintiff was crossing Merrick Road in Freeport outside of a crosswalk or intersec*604tion. Giovanniello testified, at his deposition, that the plaintiff was standing in a westbound traffic lane when Giovanniello first saw him, and that the plaintiff then stepped back, across the double-yellow line, into the eastbound traffic lane in which Giovanniello was traveling. Giovanniello applied the brakes with heavy pressure and swerved to the right slightly, but the front driver’s side of his vehicle struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident *(see Boereau v Scott,*140 AD3d 687, 688 [2016]; *see also Braxton v Jennings,*63 AD3d 772 [2009]; *DiCocco v Center for Dev. Disabilities,*264 AD2d 803 [1999]). The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Balkin, J.P., Leventhal, Chambers and Miller, JJ., concur.
# C_2016383EN.01001101.xml

| 17.10.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 383/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.10.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/11

---

Judgment of the General Court of 8 September 2016 — Generics (UK) v Commission

(Case T-469/13) (1)

1

((Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Market for antidepressant medicinal products containing the active pharmaceutical ingredient citalopram - Concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ - Potential competition - Generic medicinal products - Barriers to market entry resulting from the existence of patents - Agreements concluded between a patent holder and a generic undertaking - Error of law - Error of assessment - Rights of defence - Fines))

(2016/C 383/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Generics (UK) Ltd (Potters Bar, United Kingdom) (represented by: I. Vandenborre and T. Goetz, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission (represented initially by J. Bourke, F. Castilla Contreras and T. Vecchi, and subsequently by F. Castilla Contreras, T. Vecchi, B. Mongin and C. Vollrath, acting as Agents, assisted by S. Kingston, Barrister)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of Commission Decision C(2013) 3803 final of 19 June 2013 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 [TFEU] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39226 — Lundbeck), and for reduction of the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant by that decision.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Generics (UK) Ltd to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Generics (UK) Ltd to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 325, 9.11.2013.

1

---
#### People v Rabanal

2d Dept: 139 AD3d 758 (Nassau)

denied 8/10/16 (Rivera, J.)
#### People v Cummings

1st Dept: 145 AD3d 490 (NY)

granted 3/31/17 (Fahey, J.)
No. 10-7059.

#### Edelmiro Cesario, Petitioner v. New York.

562 U.S. 1073, 131 S. Ct. 670,

178 L. Ed. 2d 499,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9090.

November 29, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, denied.

Same case below, 71 App. Div. 3d 587, 900 N.Y.S.2d 4.
Exhibit 32

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Lexon Technologies, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ending June 30, 2003, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Kenneth J. Eaken, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best
of my knowledge and belief:

 (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


Date: August 19, 2003     /S/Kenneth J. Eaken
                         Principal Executive Officer
                         Principal Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
2017-1295.

#### State ex rel. Ames v. Reinbold.

In Procedendo. Case referred to mediation under S.Ct.Prac.R. 19.01.
#### Dan R. Enterprises, Doing Business as Village Auto/ Dan Rubin, Appellant, v Kuglers Service Station, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[768 NYS2d 838]

Carpinello, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Kramer, J.), entered March 31, 2003 in Schenectady County, which, inter alia, granted that portion of defendants’ motion seeking to strike Dennis Kugler as a party defendant.

Plaintiff leased commercial property from defendant Kuglers Service Station, Inc. (hereinafter defendant) for the purpose of operating a vehicle repair shop. The lease term spanned a 14-month period and contained a default provision permitting repossession of the premises “without further notice” if plaintiff failed “to cure any financial obligation” within five days of written notice of default. It is undisputed that plaintiff failed to pay any rent after the first month of the tenancy because it could not generate enough business to do so. It is also undisputed that the locks on the premises were thereafter changed by defendant’s president, defendant Dennis Kugler, thus precluding plaintiffs proprietor from entering the premises.

Plaintiff now seeks to recover treble damages against defendant and Kugler individually for forcible dispossession *(see*RPAPL 853). Supreme Court granted a defense motion to strike Kugler as an individual party. Since the conduct alleged against him was clearly performed in his capacity as defendant’s president, we are unable to conclude that Supreme Court abused its discretion in granting the motion and striking Kugler as a party *1257
      *(see Solimine v Yale,*281 AD2d 796, 797 [2001]; *see generally We’re Assoc. Co. v Cohen, Stracher & Bloom,*65 NY2d 148 [1985]).

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
No. 09-10663.

#### Thomas G. Dean, Petitioner v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank.

562 U.S. 848, 131 S. Ct. 96,

178 L. Ed. 2d 60,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 5937.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

Same case below, 364 Fed. Appx. 611.
No. 10-5544.

#### Luis J. Alcalde, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 928, 131 S. Ct. 316,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7439.

178 L. Ed. 2d 206,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 115 (Tuesday, June 16, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 32875]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-15915]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Project No. 2389]


Edwards Manufacturing Company, City of Augusta, Maine; Notice of 
Meeting

June 10, 1998.
    A technical conference will be held on June 30, 1998, to discuss 
removal of Edwards Dam. The process and schedule for dam removal will 
be defined and any additional studies identified.
    The conference will be held at the Civic Center in Augusta, Maine 
on June 30, 1998, at 9:00 am. Any recommendations for technical items 
to be included on the conference agenda should be filed with the 
Commission by June 26, 1998, and copies provided to all parties.
    Items may be filed to: The Secretary, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, Mail Code: DLC, HL-11.2, 888 First Street, N.E., 
Washington, DC 20426.
    The Offer of Settlement filed with the Commission on May 28, 1998, 
proposes an ambitious schedule. Frequent technical interaction with 
Commission staff would be essential to meet that schedule. To help 
expedite this process, the possibility of waiving the Commission's ex 
parte requirements will be discussed among the parties at the technical 
conference.
    Any questions, please contact Mr. John Schnagl at (202) 219-2661.
Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 98-15915 Filed 6-15-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
No. 10-6289.

#### Xuan T. James, Petitioner v. T.H. Continental Limited Partnership.

562 U.S. 1013, 131 S. Ct. 529,

178 L. Ed. 2d 389,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8643.

November 1, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, denied.
Amendment to Employment Agreement between Allin Corp. and Dean C. Praskach


 Exhibit 10.2 
  
 AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
  
 This amendment is made and entered into as of this 8th day of December 2004, and effective as of that date, by and between Allin Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“Employer”) and Dean C. Praskach
(“Employee”), a resident of Pennsylvania. 
  
 WHEREAS,
Employer and Employee entered into an employment agreement (the “Agreement”) as of June 23, 2000 and now desire to amend that Agreement by mutual consent. 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements herein contained and intending to be legally bound
hereby the parties do hereby agree as follows: 
  
 Section 2(a) of
the Agreement is hereby amended and restated as follows: 
  
 (a) Term. The term of Employee’s employment hereunder shall commence on June 23, 2000 and shall continue through June 23, 2010 unless sooner terminated in accordance with the terms of Section 2
(“Employment Period”). 
  
 Section 3(g) of the Agreement
is hereby amended by replacing the second paragraph of that Section with the following paragraph: 
  
 If Employee’s employment is terminated, during the Employment Period, by Employer or Employee in conjunction with, or within one year after, the
occurrence of a Change of Control, Employee shall receive, in addition to severance payments as outlined in the immediately preceding paragraph, the right to convert each of his vested options to purchase stock of the Employer granted prior to
February 13, 2001 into the right to receive cash in an amount equal to the difference between the fair market value of the stock on the date the right is exercised and the exercise price of the option from which the right was converted. These rights
may be exercised at any time prior to the “Expiration Date”, as defined in Employee’s stock option agreement from which the right was converted, notwithstanding the expiration of the options based on Employee’s termination prior
to the Expiration Date. Employee’s options granted prior to February 13, 2001 will automatically convert into such rights immediately prior to the day such options otherwise terminate based on the termination of Employee’s employment with
Employer. 
  
 In all other respects, the terms and conditions of
the Agreement are ratified and confirmed. 
  

					
	 	 	 ALLIN CORPORATION

		
	 	 	 /s/ Richard W. Talarico


	 	 	 By:
	 	 Richard Talarico, Chairman

	 WITNESS:
	 	 	 	 
		
	 /s/ Richard W. Talarico

	 	 /s/ Dean C. Praskach


	 	 	 Dean C. Praskach
No. 10-5113.

#### Ronnie Dale Walker, Petitioner v. Scott E. Thomsen, et al.

562 U.S. 1030, 131 S. Ct. 566,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8777.

178 L. Ed. 2d 416,

November 8, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edgar Quinones, Appellant.

[767 NYS2d 921]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Kreindler, J.), rendered January 8, 2002, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245 [1989]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84 [1903]). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86 [1974]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s contention that his adjudication as a persistent violent felony offender violated his right to a jury trial is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit *(see People v Rosen,*96 NY2d 329, 335 [2001], *cert denied*534 US 899 [2001]). The case of *Brown v Greiner*(253 F Supp 2d 413 [2003], *superseded*258 F Supp 2d 68 [2003]) does not hold to the contrary *(see Matter of DeBellis v Property Clerk of City of N.Y.,*79 NY2d 49, 57 [1992]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Cozier and Mastro, JJ., concur.
No. 10-5975.

#### Kenneth Styles, Petitioner v. Gene M. Johnson, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections.

562 U.S. 985, 131 S. Ct. 421,

178 L. Ed. 2d 328,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8282.

October 18, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia denied.
#### People v Hayes

2d Dept: 139 AD3d 754 (Queens)

denied 8/1/16 (Rivera, J.)
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

273 

CA 09-01153 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES HIGH, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

 

DAVISON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, CANANDAIGUA (MARK C. DAVISON OF COUNSEL),

FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (FRANK BRADY OF

COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas

M. Van Strydonck, J.), entered April 2, 2009 in a proceeding pursuant

to Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The order committed respondent to a

secure treatment facility. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent appeals from an order determining that he

is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement pursuant to Mental

Hygiene Law article 10 and committing him to a secure treatment

facility. We conclude that petitioner met its burden of establishing

by clear and convincing evidence that respondent suffers from a mental

abnormality (see Matter of State of New York v Farnsworth, 75 AD3d 14,

29-30, appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 848; see generally § 10.03 [i]). We

further conclude that the jury’s determination with respect to the

issue of mental abnormality is entitled to great deference because the

jury had the best opportunity to evaluate the weight and credibility

of conflicting expert testimony (see Matter of State of New York v

Donald N., 63 AD3d 1391, 1394). Petitioner also established by clear

and convincing evidence that respondent has such an inability to

control his behavior that he “is likely to be a danger to others and

to commit sex offenses if not confined” (§ 10.07 [f]). Thus, it

cannot be said that Supreme Court erred in determining that respondent

required confinement and should be committed to a secure treatment

facility (see id.). Respondent’s contention that the court erred in

permitting testimony during the disposition hearing with respect to

the use of the STATIC-99 tool is not preserved for our review (see

generally CPLR 4017; CPLR 5501 [a] [3]) and, in any event, his

challenge to that testimony goes to the weight thereof rather than its

admissibility (see Matter of State of New York v Fox, 79 AD3d 1782,
-2- 273 

CA 09-01153 

1784; see also Matter of State of New York v Timothy JJ., 70 AD3d

1138, 1140-1142). 

Entered: April 1, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court
No. 09-11526.

#### Warren Chase, Petitioner v. Gary D. Maynard, Secretary, Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, et al.

562 U.S. 1087, 131 S. Ct. 693,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9264.

178 L. Ed. 2d 523,

November 29, 2010.

Petition for rehearing denied.

Former decision, 562 U.S. 886, 131 S. Ct. 215, 178 L. Ed. 2d 129, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6956.