i i i i i i



### OPIN ION

No
. 04 -0 8- 00 28 6- CR Br ady L ee BURNS , Appellant
v . The STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw No. 9 , Be x ar County , Texas Trial Court No. 985433 Honora ble L aura Salinas, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice

Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Aug ust 5, 2009 AFF I RMED Br ady L ee B urns was convicted of driving while intox icated a nd punishment was assesse d
a t 18 0 da y s c on fi ne me nt, pr ob a te d fo r e ig hte e n months , a nd a $1 ,0 00 fi ne . B ur

ns ra ise s tw o is su e s,
ar g u in g the tr ia l c o u rt e r

r e d in a ll o w in g e v id e n c e o f

r e tr o g r a d e e xtr a

p o lati o nb e f

o r e th e ju r y . We
a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.04
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- 2- B ACKG ROUND Be x ar County De p u t y S h eriff For est Hore cka te stified that at appr ox imately 1:40 a.m. on October 15, 2006, he wa s dispatched to look for a possible intox icat ed d ri v er o n Hig hway 87. Approxim ately

five minutes later , he sawa pickup truc k d ri v i ng on the improved shoulder of the highw ay . B e c a

us e the tr uc k d id n ot m a tc h th e de sc ri pti on pr ov ide d b y

the dis patch er, Dep uty Hore cka c ontinued to look for the desc ribed ve hicle for approximately

thirty seconds. When he sa

w no other ve hicle, De puty

Hore cka r eturne d h is attention to the truck and f ollowed it. He sawthe driver make an illega l w ide turn onto a road, decide d to stop the driver , and ac tivated his emerg ency lights. When he initially

contac ted the drive r, De puty Hore cka w as st ruck by

a strongodor of a

n alcoholic be vera g e comingfrom inside the ve hicle. De puty Hore cka de termined ther e we re two pe op le ins ide the tr

uc k – B ur ns , who wa s dri vin g , an d the pa sse ng e r, wh o own e d th e ve hic le . B oth
men admitted they had been drinking , and the deputy noticed Bur ns’s speec h was “ver

y s l u rr ed.” De puty Ho re c ka a sk e d B ur

ns to g e t out of

the tr uc k and a dmi nis te re d a se ri e s of fi e ld s ob ri e ty te sts
. The de puty

testified B urns per formed poor ly on eac h of the tests, and he conclude d Bur n s was int oxic a te d. Th e State a lso pla c e d in to evide nc e a vid e ota pe sh ow ingB ur

ns pe rf or min g the fi e ld sobriety tests. When the tape w as play ed for the jury , Deputy

Hore cka pointed out the pa rts of the tests that led him to conclude B urns was intoxi cate d. Deputy Hore cka a dmitted that to the untrained pe rs on , Bu

rn s may no t ha ve a pp e are d intoxic a te d, but te sti fi e d h e be lie ve d “ on e -h un dr e d p e rc e nt” Bur ns was intox icated. Bur ns later consented to a breath t est, which wa s administered a pproxi mately

seventy -five minutes after

he wa s stopped by the deputy
. The test results showing a blood alcohol content of .116 and .113 we re a dmitted into evidence. Ge org e Allen M cD o u gal l , the B reath Test Tec hnical04
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1 ... “ Ret r og r ade e x t r apol at i on i s t h e compu t at i on ba ck i n t i me of t h e bl ood- al coh ol l ev el – t h at i s , t h e es t i mat i on of t he l eve l at t he t i me of d r i vi ng b as ed on a t es t res ul t f r om some l at er t i me. ” M a ta v . S ta te , 46 S. W
. 3d 902, 908- 09 (T e x . C rim . A p p . 2 0 0 1 ) (c iti n g L a w re n c e T a ylo r, D RUN K D RI VI NG D EF ENSE § 5.2 (5th ed. ) ( 2 0 0 0 ))
.

- 3- Supervisor for

Be x ar County and the State’s expert, testified about the scie ntific theory underlying the br e a th t e st m a c hin e us e d in thi s c a se and int e rp re te d the te st re su lts fo r t he jur y . M c Do ug a ll t old the jury that based on the test results, Bur ns had a n al co h o l concentration of e ither .116 or .113 g rams of a lcohol in 210 liters of his breath. This amount was above t he “leg al l evel of intox ication” in Texas, which is .080, and that “for purposes of dr iving,” a per son with that co n centration of
a lc oh ol w ou ld n ot h ave the no rm a l us e of his me nta l or

ph y sic a l f

a c ult ie s. McDoug all also testified about t h e underlying sc ientific theorie s and studies conc erning retrograde extrapolation. 1 He ex plained that a person “norma lly ” has an alcohol elimination rate of .0 18 pe r h our, but he a dmi tte d h e ha d n o id e a a s to B ur

ns ’s e lim inatio n rate . M c Do ug a ll a lso te sti fi e d th a t ba se d o n at le a st two pu bli sh e d s tud ie s and

his ow n e xpe ri ence, he bel ie ve d n ine ty perc ent of the dr inking dr ivers would be in the elimination phase while driving , and ten pe rce nt of the same population would be in the absor ption phase. Althoug h reque sted by the State to provide
a ra ng e for the possible “alc ohol levels” of a person who tested at a .116 seve nty -five minutes a fter driving , McDoug all failed to g ive a spe cific numbe r ra ng e, but simply

repe ated that ther e wa s a “te n perc ent cha

nce that he’s rising at the time that he ’s tested, and there ’s a ninety perc ent cha

nce that he’s c oming down.” McDoug all further testified that if such a person wa s in the absorption phase, the absorption rate would be no more than 0.010 per hour. Howe ver, Mc Doug all also told the jury he could not opine a

bout Burns’ s blood alcohol conc entration at the time of driving beca use he kne w nothing of

the individual char acte ristics and fa cts nec essar y t o ex p ress that opini on. The blood
a lc oh ol c on c e ntr a tio n c ou ld h ave be e n h ig he r, lo we r, or the same a s th e re su lts of the br e a th t e st04
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2 ... K e lly v . S ta te , 8 2 4 S .W .2 d 5 6 8 (T e x . C rim
. A p p . 1 9 9 2 ); E. I

. du Pont de Nemour s & Co. v . Robi ns on , 923 S.W
. 2 d 54 9 (T ex. 19 9 5 ).

- 4- administered some se venty -five minutes a fter a rre st. He also testified he did not know i f B urns was in the absorption phase or elimination phase of the blood alcohol cur

ve. The trial c ourt instructed the jury it could retu rn a guilty

verdic t if it found Burns ha d an “alc ohol conce ntration of 0.08 or more ,” or ha d lost the “normal used of his phy sical or menta l fa c ult ie s. ” Th e jur

y fo un d B ur

ns g uil ty and he pe rf e c te d th is a

pp e a l. RE T ROG RADE E XT RAP OL AT I ON I n his first issue, Burns a sserts the trial c ourt err ed in “[a] llowing [McDoug all] t o conduct retrograde extrapolation . . . in viol ation of the Kell y/ Robinson 2 standard a

nd in violation of Ma ta . . . .” He argues McDoug all’s testimony about re trog rade extrapolation was not proper ly applied beca use “the possible r ang e of Appellant’s blood a lcohol content re sults back to the time of driving . . . did not specific ally apply to Appellant.” Bur ns appea rs t o argue that bec ause Mc Doug all based his testimony

on the two studies relating to a g ener al popul at i o n o f d ri nking dr ivers rather than Bur n’s individual char acte ristics and the fa cts of the c ase, Mc Doug all’s testimony was unre liable. Applicable Law We reviewthe trial cour

t’s decision t o admit scientific evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Ma ta , 46 S.W .3d at 909. “[I ]t is the responsibility of the trial c ourt to determine whether the scientific e vidence offe red is suff iciently reliable , as we ll as relevant, to help t he jury in rea ching
acc urate results.” Id. I n Ma ta , the cour

t of criminal appe als co n s i dere d whether the trial cour

t erre d in allowing Mc Do ug a ll, the same e xpe rt us e d b y the State in t

his c a se , to expr e ss a

n o pin ion a s to the po ssi ble rang e of Mat a’ s b l o o d alcohol conc entration at the time of driving by applying r etrog rade04
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3 ... For conv eni enc e, we r ef er t o t hes e i ndi vi dual ch ar act er i s t i cs as t he “ M a ta f act ors . ”
4 ... In M a ta , wh er e t he brea t h t es t was admi ni s t er ed over t wo hour s af t er t he of f ens e, t he cour t s t at ed t he del ay was “ s i gn i f

i can t ” a nd “ s er i ous l y af f ect s t he r el i abi l i t y of

an y ex t r apol at i on. ” Id
. a t 917.

- 5- extrapolation. 46 S.W .3d at 904-06. The court of criminal appeals he ld the State failed to prove by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that McD oug all’s testimony was re liable. Id. at 9 1 7
. The c ourt sug g ested the tria l court should look to severa l individual cha rac teristics of the alleg ed drunk dr iver in consideringthe re liability of a w itness’s retrograde extrapolation. Id . at 91 6-1 7. Th os e char acte ristics include the drive r’s we ight, ge nder, ty pical drinkingpattern, toler ance for a lcohol, the qu anti ty and ty pe of a lc oh ol co ns ume d, the tim e pe ri od wh e n the a lc oh ol w a s c on sume d, the tim e of the last drink, a

nd whether the driver consumed any food befor e, during , or af ter drinkingand the ty pe of f ood consumed. 3 Id . at 916. The c ourt reiter ated its prior holding that to establish reliability of the e x pert’s opinion, the State was required to demonstrate by clea r and convincingevidenc e the sc ientific evide nce a t issue was prope rly

applied to the def

endant. Id. at 9 0 8 (c i t i n g K e l ly , 8 2 4 S
. W .2d at 573). More specific ally , it made clea

r that any retrograde extrapolation was not r eliable unless it was based on sufficie nt char acte ristics of the def endant on tria l. Ma ta , 46 S.W .3d at 91 6-17. Absent suff icient knowledg e of those f

acts, or othe r mea

ns of re p l ac i ng those fac tors, no reliable retrog rade extrapolation is possi ble. Id
. F or e xamp le , if the re is a sin g le te st a dmi nis te re d w ith in a re a so na ble tim e 4 of arr est, then the expert must know “ many ”of the Ma ta fac tors. Id . at 916
. “ [A] sing le te st conducte d some time after the offe nse could re sult in a reliable ex trapolation onl y if the expert had knowledg e of many persona l c hara cter istics and behavior s of the def endant.” Id. On the other

hand,

“ [i]f t he Sta te ha d mo re tha

n one te st, e a c h tes t a re a so na ble le ng th of tim e a

pa rt , a nd the fi rs t te st
we re c on du c te d w ith in a re a so na ble tim e fr om t

he tim e of

the of fe nse, th en an e xpe rt

c ou ld04
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- 6- potentially

cre ate a reliabl e es t i mate of the defe ndant’s [alcohol conc entration] with limi ted knowledg e of persona l char acte ristics and beha viors.” Id .; se e als o B igo n v . S tate , 252 S.W .3d 360, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that retrog ra d e ex t rapolation testim ony was re liable eve n tho ug h e xpe rt

ba se d h is o pin ion

in p art on a ssumpt ion

that defe ndant w a s in

e lim inatio n b e c a

us e there wer e two blood tests approximately one and one-ha lf hours apa rt and e x pert met other Ma ta
c on dit ion s) . “ Som e wh e re in t he mid dle mig ht f

a ll a c a se in whic h t here was a sin g le te st a
rea sonable length of time from the driving , and two or t hree persona l char acte ristics of the de fenda nt
wer e known to the e x pert.” Ma ta , 46 S.W .3d at 916-17. Discussion I nitially , we must deter

mine whether Ma ta applies in this case. The State argues no Ma ta analy sis is war

rante d beca

use McDoug all never testified befor e the jury to a s p ec i fi c alcohol
conce ntration rang e. Rather, McDoug all testified only in ve ry broad terms as to the re sults of two studies indicating that ninety perc ent of the dr ivers found ope ratinga motor vehic le af ter drinking
we re in t he e lim inatio n p ha se of the a lc oh ol ab so rp tio n curv e wh ile dr ivi ngand te n p e rc e nt w e re in the a bs or pti on ph a se . Mc Do ug a ll als o te sti fi e d th a t if a dr ive r w a s in

the a bs or pti on ph a se , h is r a te of absorption would be .01 per hour. The State contends this testimony does not amount to the ty pe of re trog rade extrapolation testimony discussed in Ma ta . We disag ree . When the St a te a s k e d M c D o u g a ll to p r o v id e a r an g e o f “ a lc o h o l le v e ls ” b a s e d on a hy po the tic a l qu e sti on

tha t in c or po rate d th e fa cts of

thi s c a se , M c Do ug a ll t old the jur y the re wa s a “ten pe rce nt chanc e that he’s rising at the t ime that he’s tested, and ther e’s a ninety perc ent cha

nce that he’s c oming down.” This testimony told the jury

two things. F irst, and re quiring no mathematica l calculat ions by the jury , there was a

ninety perc ent cha

nce B urns’s wa s in the04
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5 ... U si ng t he l o w er fi gu re o f .11 3 , an d sev en t y- f i ve m i nu t es e q ua t es to o ne an d o ne - q ua rter ho urs o r 1 .25 ho urs,

. 113 -
. 0125 = . 1005

- 7- elimination phase at the time of the test, making his al co h o l l ev el highe r than .113 at the time of driving . Second, and r equiringnothing more than t h e appli cation of a simple mathematical calc ulation by

the jury , even if

Bur ns was in the absorption phase at the time of the br eath test, g iven an absor ption rate of .01 pe r hour, B urns’s alc ohol level would have been no lower tha n roug hly .10 at t h e t i m e o f d ri v i n g. 5 In essenc e, McDoug all testified B urns’s alc ohol conce ntration would have been no lowe r than .10 at the time of driving . We hold this testimony must be evaluated within the require ments of Ma ta . Se e Do uth itt v . S tate , 127 S.W .3d 327 (T ex . App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (appe als court used Ma ta to de termine whether trial court err ed in per mitti ng expert to testify

that defe ndant’s alc ohol conce ntration would have been “at least .13 or greater” rathe r than e x pressing
any ra ng e of n umb e rs ); Bl um e ns te tte r v . S tate , 135 S.W .3d 234 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (a ppeals c ourt used Ma ta fac tors to determine whether trial counsel r ender ed inef fec tive assistance when he failed to objec t to ex pert ’s t es t imony that there was “ no scena rio” in which defe ndant’s alc ohol conce ntration would not have be en “a bove .08 at the time of

the ac cident.”)
. Havingdeter

mined Mata applies to our ana ly sis, we turn to whether McDoug all’s testimony
wa s p ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d. Mc Do ug a ll a dmi tte d h e kn e w n on e of the ind ivi du a l cha ra c te ri sti c s and

fa c ts
nece ssary to express a

n opinion as to any

rang e of a lcohol conce ntration for B urns, and opined that at the time of his a

rre st, B urns’ a lcohol conce ntration could have been hig her, lowe r, or the sa me as indicated by

the bre ath test. He a lso testified he did not know whe ther B urns was in the e limination or absor ption phase at the time of his a rre st. Bec ause the State’s wit ness conceded a nd admitted he kn e w n o n e o f

t h e f a c t o r s r e qu i r e d

b y Ma ta when only a si ng le t est is available, the trial court a bused i t s d i s c r e t i o ni na dm i t t i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y.04
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- 8- RE L E VANCY Be fore we turn to the issue of harm, we addre ss Burns’ s second issue in which he ar g ues the evidenc e of r etrog rade extrapolation was not rele vant, or if r eleva nt , t h e p ro b ati ve value of the evidenc e wa s g reatly outweig hed by its prejudicia l eff ect upon the j ury . Havingfound the testimony to b e unre lia

ble , w e a lso fi nd

the te sti mony

wa s ir re le va nt a nd its pr ob a tiv e va lue wa s g re a tly outweig hed by its prejudicial ef fec t. See Ac e v e do v . S

tate , 255 S.W .3d 162, 169-70 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref

’d) ( holding e x pert’s te stimony was i n a dmissibl e bec ause it wa s unreliable a nd ir re le va nt) ; Sa laz ar

v . S tate , 1 27 S.W. 3d

35 5, 36 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 04 , p e ts.
re f’ d) (h old inge xpe rt

te sti mony

mus t be re lia

ble and re le va

nt t o b e a dmi ssi ble ); see also Ruffin v. Sta te , 270 S.W .3d 586, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (stating expert’s testimony should be excluded und er Rule 403 if it i s “insufficie ntly rele vant or re liable under our state’ s g uidelines for e x pert te sti mony .” ); Ma ta , 46 S.W .3d at 908 (noting that Rule 702 involves “dual inquiry of re levanc e and reliability .”). H A R M A N A L Y SIS The e rrone ous admission of retrograde extrapolation testimony is non-constitutional error. Ba gh e ri v . S tate , 1 19 S.W. 3d 75 5, 76 2- 63 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ). L ike wi se , e vid e nc e a dmi tte d in violation of Rule 403 is non-constituti onal er ror. W ill iam s v . S

tate , 2 7 S
. W
. 3 d 5 9 9 , 6 0 3 ( T e x. App.—Waco 2000, pet. r ef’ d). We there fore reve rse only if the er ror in this case aff

ecte d Bur ns’s substantial rig hts. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(b). Stated another way , we must a ffirm the trial court’ s jud g me nt “ if

we ha ve fa ir a ssu ra nc e fr om a

n exam inatio n of the re c or d as a wh ole that th e e rr or

did not inf luence the jury , or had but slig ht effe ct.” Tay lor v . S tate , 268 S.W. 3d

57 1, 59 2 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2008). The issue is not whe ther ther e is sufficie nt evidence to support the verdic t. Motilla v.04
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6 ... B a g h e ri a n d a n o the r w itne ss te stif ie d tha t th e d e fe n d a n t w a s fatig u e d fro m w o rk ing
. Id
. B u r n s di d n ot p rese nt any d efen se w i t ne sses.

- 9- Sta te , 78 S.W .3d 352, 356 (T ex . C ri m . App. 2002). Rather , the cour t should consider the e ntire
rec ord, j ury instructions, jury argument, and even voi r di re, if applicable
. Id . at 355-56. “ I mportant fac tors are ‘the nature of the evidenc e supporting the verdic t, the char acte r of the a lleg ed er ror a nd how it might be considere d in connec tion with other evidence in the case.’ More spec ifically , the
re vie wing c ourt

sh ou ld c on sid e r whe the r t he State e mph a size d th e e rr or , w he the r t he e rr on e ou sly admitted evidenc e wa s cumulative, and wh et h er it was elicited fr om an expert.” Ba gh e ri , 119 S.W .3d at 763 (interna l citations omit ted). Rely ing on Ba

gh e riand Ow e ns v . S

tate , 135 S.W .3d 302 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2 0 0 4 , n o p e t
. ) , B ur

n s c o n t e n d s M c D o u g a l l ’ s t e s t i m o n y h a d m o r e t h an a s l i g h t e f f e c t o n t h e j u r

y . In Ba gh e ri , the State conc eded the testimony reg ardingretrograde extrapolation should not have be en place d befor e the jury
. Id . at 760. Using the ana ly tical structure descr ibed ab o v e, t h e co urt of criminal appe als conc luded B ag heri wa s harmed a nd aff irmed t his court’s rever sal of t he convic tion. Id . at 762-64. In doing so, the court of c rimi n al ap p ea ls reasone d harm wa s evident bec ause the testimony was e licited from an e x pert, throug h o u t t h e trial the State empha siz ed it would prese nt
sc ie nti fi c e vid e nc e fr om a n expe rt de mon str a tin g the a lc oh ol c on c e ntr a tio n w a s o ve r t he le g a l li mit at the time of driving , and in closing argument emphasized McDoug all “studied with the lea ding experts in the field” and his ca lculations were based on “ scientifica lly reliable , valid evidenc e.” Id
. at 763. After ex amining the rema ining evidence , the court conclude d the re trog rade extrapolation testimony was not cumulative a

nd reje cted the State’ s sugg estion that t h ere was ove rwhe lming
e v id e n c e o f th e d e f

e n d an t’ s g u ilt. Id. a t 76 4. Th e c ourt no te d B a g he ri pr e se nte d a n a lte rn a te explanation 6 for his poor pe rfor mance on the field sobrie ty tests. Id . The c ourt also re fer red to the04
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- 10- fa c t th a t on

vo ir dir e , s e ve ra l juro rs e xpre sse d th e op inion that a su bje c t’ s a lc oh ol c on te nt w ou ld alway s be hig her at the time of driving
. The court noted the jurors’ statements wer e an indication of the “ power ful persua sive eff ect that ‘ scientific’ evidenc e has on the aver ag e juror.” Id
. I n Owens , the Four

teenth Court of Appe als conc luded the appel l ant was ha rmed by the
err oneous admission of retrog rade extrapolation testimony
. Owens , 135 S.W .3d at 312. However, in rea chingits conclusion, t he court noted the State hig hlighted the expert’s cre dentials, urg ed the jur y to r e ly on the e xpe rt ’s op ini on , the e xpe rt te sti fi e d wi th c e rt a int y that th e a

pp e lla nt w a s “ le g a lly intox icated” at a level of near ly twice the leg al limit , and based on hy pothetical questions, could not envision a sce nario whe re the appellant wa s not over .08. Id . at 311. The State a lso emphasized the expert’s testimony

during its closing ar g ument. Id
. I n contra st, the Austin Court of Appeals in Do uth itt found t he appellant was not har med by the improper a dmission of retrog rade extrapolation testimony
. Se e Do uth itt , 1 2 7 S
. W
. 3 d a t3 3 8
. In that case , the cour

t noted that unlike Ba

gh e ri , none of the venire members ex presse d an opinion on the subject of a lcohol conce ntration, the prose cutor did not mention retrog rade extrapolation during his opening statement, and the expert’s testimony was cumulative “in t he sense that there was other signific ant evidenc e” of

intox ication. Id . Such evidenc e included te stimony that Douthitt shared a 1.75 l i t er b o ttle of J ack D aniels Down H ome Punch and at least a twe lve-pa ck of be er w ith two companions on the da

y of his arr est. Id . The c ourt conc luded: I n summary , the retrog rade extrapolation te stimony in this cause was e licited from an e x pert, but there is no i n d i ca t i o n t h at the jurors w ere predisposed to g ive such testimony

g reater we ight than the other evidenc e befor e them. The re trog rade extrapolation testimony

was c u mu la ti v e o f o th er e vidence of intox ication and wa s not g iven spec ial emphasis by the S tate. Althoug h the prosec utor did remind the jurors of [the e xpe rt ’s ] te sti mony duri nghis argume nts , h e did no t c la im s pe c ia l e xpe rt ise for [the expert] or sugg est that his testimony wa s alone suff icient to convict. Cf. Ba gh e ri II , 119 S.W .3d at 763. Given the stre ng th of the S tate’s c ase a nd the re lative04
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7 ... D uri ng hi s t est i m o ny , D ep ut y H o recka ad m i t t ed he d i d not ask any que st i o ns p ri nt ed on t he D W I r ep o rt d esi gned t o dis co ver f act s t hat co ul d be us ed t o co nd uct a ret rograd e ext rapo l at i o n. H e st at ed he f ai l ed t o ask t he ques t i ons becau s e h e di d not r eal i ze t hei r i mp ort anc e.

- 11- weakness of appellant’ s defe nsive theories, we can state wit h fair assuranc e that the err oneous admission of the retr og rade extrapolation testimony had, at most, a slig ht eff ect on the jur

y . We theref

ore c onclude that the e rror should be disreg arde d. Id . at 339. The fa cts of the pr esent c ase a re disting uishable fr om those in Ba gh e ri and Owens , and ar e closer to those in Do uth itt
. The common threa d in Ba gh e ri and Ow e ns was the State’ s emphasis of the e xpe rt ’s c re de nti a ls a

nd the re lia bil ity of the re tr ogra de e xtra

po latio n te sti mony . T hat e mph a sis is lacking in this case. Ne ither the State nor B urns mentioned the issue of retrograde extrapolation during voir dire or

in th ei r respective ope ning statements. In his closing, B urns twice r efe renc ed McDoug all’s testimony

about re trog rade extrapolation. Burns f irst argued: Point 08: Mr. McDo u gal l , their expert, re lies primarily on two studies, and t wo s tu d i es al o n e, an d

o n e o f t h e s t u d i es h e r el i edo ni s b y a gu y n am edGu l l b er g, an d G u l l b e r g ’ s [ s i c ] e v e nd o n e o t h e r s tu d i e s t h a t M r . M c D o u g a l l , I g u e s s , a p p ar e n t l y, isn’t that familiar with. And I tried to do the best job that I could to t al k ab out the studies; y ou know. He then a rgued McD oug all’s cr edibility should be questioned beca use he was paid by the county and not likely to admit shortcomings in the Intox ilyzer 5000. A short time later B urns ar g ued: And the off

icer – McDoug all – we talke d a little b i t ab o u t ext rapolation. Ex trapolation is g oing ba ck in time to fig ure out what his blood alcohol leve l was at the tim e of

dr ivi ng . A nd

the y c an d o that. T he re are stu die s th a t ha ve do ne tha

t. An d th e of

fi c e r h a s q

ue sti on s th a t w e re pr e pr int e d in his re po rt to g e t th os e thi ng s. 7 An d I ’m no t be a tin g up on

the of fi c e r. Ime an, Ilik e law e nf or c e me nt. Bur ns continued his argument by telling the jur

y that the l eg islature could have e asily define d driving while intox icated to include driving afte r ing esting any amount of alc ohol but it had not done so.04
- 08
- 00 28 6- CR

- 12- The State refe re n ce d

M cD o u gal l ’s t es t i m o n y

o n l y o n ce i ncl o s i n g ar gu ment. After discussing the te sti mony

a bo ut B ur ns ’s pe rf or manc e on the fi e ld so br ie ty te sts , th e State tur ne d it s atte nti on

to the br e a th t e st. But on top of all that evidenc e – it doesn’t stop there – the de fenda nt ga ve a br e a th s ampl e . H e ble w a .1 16 ov e r . 11 3. Th e le g a l lim it is .0 8 or mor e . So h e re is y our .08 or more . Way

more. And y ou h ea rd from Mr. McDoug all that 90 perc ent – 90 per cent of the population is coming down at the time of the test. He w as a .116 ove r . 1 13 at the time that he took his test an hour and 15 minutes af ter the stop. The State then c losed by

asking the jury

to return a

g uilty verdic t based “ on all this evidence .” W e h o l d M c D o u g a l l ’ s r e t r o g r a d e e x t r a p o l a t i o nt e s t i m o n y h a d

b u ts l i g h te f

f e c tu p o nt h e j u r

y. Al tho ug h th e te sti mony

c ame fr om a

n e xpe rt and wa s n ot cumul a tiv e of

oth e r e vid e nc e , th e State did
n o te mp h a s i z e M c D o u g a l l ’ s s t a tu s a s ane x p e r tn o r s u b s c r i b e s p e c i a l c r e d i b i l i t y t o h i s t e s t i m o n y. Moreove r, there was other persua sive evidenc e supporting the jury ’s ver dict: (1) the r esults of the field sobriety

tests, (2) testimony of Bur ns’s poor driving skills, including the making of an improper tur n a nd stop pi ng partia lly

on the ro a dw ay , ( 3) the re su lts of a br e a th t e st a dmi nis te re d r e lativ e ly
soon afte r t he arrest, (4) the deputy ’s observations that Burns had ve ry slurred spe ech a

nd the odor of intox icants on his breath, ( 5) Bur ns’s admission that he consumed a lcoholic beve rag es, and ( 6) the deputy ’s testimony

that he wa s “100 per cent sure ” B urns was intoxi cate d.

C ONCL US I ON The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med. Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice PUB L I SH