alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tawana Colemanorange, Also Known as Tawana Coleman-Orange, Appellant.

[55 NYS3d 439]

*739Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Carter, J.), rendered January 22, 2016, convicting her of assault in the second degree, upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that her plea of guilty was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent is unpreserved for appellate review, since she did not move to withdraw the plea (see *People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 665 [1988]; *People v Narbonne,*131 AD3d 626, 627 [2015]; *People v Canole,*123 AD3d 940 [2014]). In any event, the defendant’s contention is without merit. Contrary to the defendant’s further contention, there was nothing in the plea allocution that triggered the Supreme Court’s duty to inquire into a potential affirmative defense to the charge based upon mental disease or defect *(see*Penal Law § 40.15; *People v Thomas,*139 AD3d 986 [2016]; *People v Serrano,*160 AD2d 745, 746 [1990]; *cf. People v Mox,*20 NY3d 936, 939 [2012]). The fact that the defendant had been diagnosed with bipolar schizophrenia and was receiving medication did not trigger such a duty of inquiry *(see People v Gelikkaya,*84 NY2d 456, 459 [1994]; *People v Gensler,*72 NY2d 239, 244 [1988]; *People v Thomas,*139 AD3d 986 [2016]).

Moreover, there is no support in the record for the defendant’s contention that she lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings against her or that she was unable to assist in her defense (see CPL 730.30 [1]; *People v Narbonne,*131 AD3d 626, 627 [2015]; *People v Kelly,*121 AD3d 713 [2014]; *People v M’Lady,*59 AD3d 568 [2009]). To the contrary, the defendant’s responses at the plea and sentencing proceedings were appropriate, and did not indicate that she was incapacitated (see *People v Thomas,*139 AD3d at 987; *People v M’Lady,*59 AD3d at 568; *People v Pryor,*11 AD3d 565, 566 [2004]). In addition, the two CPL 730.30 examinations conducted two months after the defendant pleaded guilty are not evidence of the defendant’s capacity at the time of her plea (see *People v Gelikkaya,*84 NY2d 456, 459-460 [1994]; *People v Coons,*73 AD3d 1343, 1345 [2010]; *People v Pena,*251 AD2d 26, 30-31 [1998]).

Dillon, J.P., Cohen, Duffy and Connolly, JJ., concur.
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Double Eagle Petroleum Co.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange
Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,
to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated Subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case
of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or
persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and




---



##### 



b)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting.
 Date: March 14, 2006
    /s/ Stephen H. HollisStephen H. Hollis, Chief Executive Officer
No. 10-6892.

#### Willie J. Asbury, Petitioner v. Donald Driskell, et al.

562 U.S. 1112, 131 S. Ct. 827,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9654.

178 L. Ed. 2d 564,

December 13, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 355 Fed. Appx. 682.
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 120 (Tuesday, June 23, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 34156]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-16599]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. RP98-18-002]


Iroquois Gas Transmission System, L.P.; Notice of Proposed 
Changes in FERC Gas Tariff

June 16, 1998.
    Take notice that on June 10, 1998, Iroquois Gas Transmission 
System, L.P. (Iroquois) tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas 
Tariff, First Revised Volume No. 1, the following tariff sheets to 
become effective November 16, 1997:

Substitute Fifth Revised Sheet No. 11
Substitute Second Revised Sheet No. 11A
Substitute Third Revised Sheet No. 11B
Second Substitute Second Revised Sheet No. 50A
Second Substitute Original Sheet No. 50B
Second Substitute Second Revised Sheet No. 122

    Iroquois states that this filing is made to comply with the 
Commission's June 1, 1998 Order in the above-referenced docket, which 
directed Iroquois to modify its recent negotiated rate tariff filing 
within 10 days of its Order, by filing revised tariff sheets to be 
effective November 16, 1997. Iroquois states that, in compliance with 
that order, it has (i) revised the definitions of ``Negotiated Rate'' 
and ``Negotiated Rate Formula,'' (ii) removed references to capacity 
releases from Section 32.2 of its tariff, which deals with negotiated 
rates; and (iii) clarified how it will evaluate negotiated rates or 
bids at negotiated rates that use different rate designs.
    Iroquois also states that copies of this filing were served upon 
all customers and interested state regulatory agencies.
    Any person desiring to protest this filing should file a protest 
with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Section 385.211 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such protests must be filed as 
provided in Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests 
will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate 
action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to 
the proceedings. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission 
and are available for public inspection in the Public Reference Room.
David P. Boergers,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 98-16599 Filed 6-22-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
# C_2014292EN.01004401.xml

| 1.9.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 292/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.9.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 292/44

---

Judgment of the General Court of 14 July 2014 — NIIT Insurance Technologies v OHIM (SUBSCRIBE)

(Case T-404/13) (1)

1

((Community trade mark - Application for Community word mark SUBSCRIBE - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - Equal treatment - Article 56 TFEU))

2014/C 292/54

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: NIIT Insurance Technologies Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: M. Wirtz, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented by: A. Schifko, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 4 June 2013 (Case R 1308/2012-5) concerning an application for registration of the word sign SUBSCRIBE as a Community trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders NIIT Insurance Technologies Ltd to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders NIIT Insurance Technologies Ltd to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 274, 21.9.2013.

1

---
#### Joseph Bux, Appellant, v Selim Pervez et al., Respondents.

[68 NYS3d 67]

*551Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Joseph E. Capella, J.), entered on or about April 21, 2017, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate that he suffered a serious injury to his cervical spine, lumbar spine or right shoulder within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), unanimously modified, on the law, to deny the motion with respect to plaintiff’s claims that he suffered a serious injury to his right shoulder, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff alleges that he sustained permanent consequential and significant limitations in his cervical spine, lumbar spine and right shoulder as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident. Defendants made a prima facie showing that plaintiff’s conditions were not causally related to the accident by submitting the affirmed report of a radiologist, who opined that the MRI films of the cervical spine, lumbar spine and right shoulder all revealed degenerative conditions that preexisted the accident *(see Rivera v Fernandez & Ulloa Auto Group,*123 AD3d 509, 509 [1st Dept 2014], *affd*25 NY3d 1222 [2015]; *Alvarez v NYLL Mgt. Ltd.,*120 AD3d 1043, 1044 [1st Dept 2014], *affd*24 NY3d 1191 [2015]). They also submitted the affirmed report of an orthopedist who found normal range of motion in the shoulder.

In opposition, plaintiff submitted his own medical records, which included an X-ray report of his spine showing extensive degeneration, but failed to submit any medical report explaining those findings. Thus, he failed to raise an issue of fact causally relating his claimed spinal injuries to the accident *(see Rivera,*123 AD3d at 509-510; *Alvarez,*120 AD3d at 1044).

However, with respect to his right shoulder, plaintiff raised an issue of fact through the affirmed report of his orthopedic surgeon, who examined him within months after the accident and four years later. That doctor found limitations in range of motion at both examinations, and opined that the tears in plaintiff’s right shoulder were caused by the accident, based on his examinations of plaintiff, his review of the MRI film and report, and the fact that plaintiff was asymptomatic before the accident *(see Ahmed v Cannon,*129 AD3d 645, 647 [1st Dept 2015]; *Yuen v Arka Memory Cab Corp.,*80 AD3d 481, 482 [1st Dept 2011]).

Under the circumstances, plaintiff’s cessation of physical therapy treatment is not dispositive. He provided other evi*552dence concerning the causation and seriousness of his shoulder injury *(see generally Pommells v Perez,*4 NY3d 566, 577 [2005]), and was not required to provide any particular proof of his inability to pay for costs associated with treatment *(see Ramkumar v Grand Style Transp. Enters. Inc.,*22 NY3d 905, 906 [2013]).

Concur—Acosta, P.J., Richter, Mazzarelli, Andrias and Gesmer, JJ.
Reginald Parks

- Reality Marketing Group

- 55W Church Street, Orlando, FL 32805

To whom it may concern,

I would like to file a petition to be eligible to fly my unmanned aircraft for photography, cinematography and other creative projects that fall within the two before mentioned categories. With the FAA's approval I will honor the flight regulations for my drone aircraft and surely only used it within the policy
of the law. I will only use this aircraft in capturing of video for Reality Marketing Group and plan to fly below the drone ceiling at all times while flyi ng.

Please accept my petition for the ability to fly for my Reality Marketing Group brand.

Reginald Parks RealityMG.com
# Anniston’s Hogan receives Global Distribution Excellence: Material Management Civilian of the Year award

/ Published July 28, 2016
ANNISTON, Alabama, 
Susan Hogan, materials examiner and identifier at Defense Logistics Agency Distribution Anniston, Ala., has been awarded the Global Distribution Excellence: Material Management Civilian of the Year award for her contributions to the distribution center during Care of Supplies in Storage process.

“Hogan’s professionalism, pride, technical expertise, and knowledge of established management principles, and administrative regulations from higher headquarters has made her instrumental to the success of operations at DLA Distribution Anniston,” said deputy commander Guy Taylor.  

She worked consistently with all branches of the organization to help resolve customer inquiries and to ensure material is stored precisely.  

Furthermore, Hogan’s initiative and guidance served as the focal point in reclassifying material line items that required extensive research and physical inspections.  She was instrumental in reclassifying dormant material, to include nearly 200 line items of stock valued over $125 million.  “Her enthusiasm and determination is a tremendous asset to the Stock Readiness Section,” said Taylor.  

Hogan performed a fundamental role in clearing a backlog of Z-Status material requiring specific instructions from item managers that involved coordination with DLA Disposition Services personnel.  While instrumental in assisting employees with storage issues that arise during the picking, packing or shipping process, she is the individual that leaders and subordinates routinely depend upon.

“Hogan is especially adept at working with others, and her confidence and spirit of cooperation have been highly commendable. Her superb working knowledge has increased the operational excellence of Defense Logistics Agency Distribution Anniston,” concluded Taylor.
#### Citi Mortgage Inc., Respondent, v Nkenge Scott, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[67 NYS3d 201]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen A. Rakower, J.), entered September 15, 2016, which, following a traverse hearing, denied defendant Nkenge Scott’s motion to, among other things, vacate the default judgment entered against her, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

There exists no basis to disturb the hearing court’s determination, which turned largely on the credibility of the witnesses and was substantiated by the record, including affidavits of service *(see Arrufat v Bhikhi,*101 AD3d 441, 442 [1st Dept 2012]). Plaintiff satisfied its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that service of process was effectuated on defendant and personal jurisdiction was thereby obtained *(see*CPLR 308 [2]; *Gass v Gass,*42 AD3d 393, 393 [1st Dept 2007]). While defendant submitted evidence of her residence at another location, she did not conclusively establish that she did not reside at the subject property, which she had identified in the loan application as her primary address *508
      *(see Arrufat,*101 AD3d at 442; *Cadle Co. v Nunez,*43 AD3d 653, 656 [1st Dept 2007]).

We have considered defendant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur—Renwick, J.P., Richter, Manzanet-Daniels, Kahn and Kern, JJ.
Exhibit 10-7.4 

 

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION 

EXECUTIVE CASH BALANCEPLAN 

(As Amended and Restated Effective January 1, 1999) 

 

AMENDMENT 4 

 

Pursuant to Section 8 of the Duke Energy Corporation Executive Cash Balance Plan, as amended (“Plan”), Duke Energy Corporation(“Corporation”) hereby amends the Plan, effective December 31, 2004, in the following respects: 

 

“As part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Section 409A has been added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Code Section 409Aimposes new requirements upon deferred compensation plans that must be satisfied in order that amounts deferred will not be currently included in taxable income. Code Section 409A, by its terms, does not apply to “amounts deferred” beforeJanuary 1, 2005, and earnings thereon, under a deferred compensation plan that is not “materially modified” after October 3, 2004. 

 

Effective immediately before January 1, 2005, the Plan is divided into two separate deferred compensation plans, one of which shall be named Plan“I” and the other shall be named Plan “II”. Plan I shall include only “amounts deferred” before January 1 , 2005, and earnings thereon, and such deferred compensation shall be subject to the provisions of the Plan as ineffect on October 3, 2004, and as Plan I is subsequently amended or otherwise changed, except as would result in such deferred compensation becoming subject to Code Section 409A. 

 

Plan II shall include only “amounts deferred” after December 31, 2004, and earnings thereon, and such deferredcompensation shall be subject to the provisions of the Plan as in effect after December 31, 2004, including subsequent amendments or other changes to Plan II as may be approved by the Duke Energy Director — Executive Compensation & Benefitsfor the purpose of enabling Plan II deferred compensation to satisfy the requirements imposed by Code Section 409A. Such requirements include the following: restrictions as to when a new participant may make an initial deferral election;restrictions as to the earliest date a participant may receive distribution; prohibition against acceleration of distribution; and restrictions on a participant’s ability to make a subsequent election that delays distribution or changes theform of distribution. 

 

This Amendment is intended to result inPlan I deferred compensation not being subject to Code Section 409A and to result in Plan II deferred compensation 

 

satisfying the requirements imposed by Code Section 409A, and this Amendment shall be interpreted and implemented to carry out such intention. 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this amendment to the Plan is executed on behalf of theCorporation this 27 day of October, 2004. 

 

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION

By:
 /s/    CHRISTOPHER C.ROLFE        
Its:
 **Vice President**  **Human Resources**
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2583 

To designate Union Station in Washington, DC, as ‘‘Harry S. Truman 

Union Station’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 8, 2019 

Mr. CLEAVER (for himself and Mr. GRAVES of Missouri) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To designate Union Station in Washington, DC, as ‘‘Harry 

S. Truman Union Station’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. HARRY S. TRUMAN UNION STATION. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—Union Station, located at 40 

5 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, DC, shall be 

6 known and designated as ‘‘Harry S. Truman Union Sta7 tion’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

10 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2583 IH

1 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Harry S. Truman 

2 Union Station’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
No. 09-11489.

#### Andres Zarate-Morales, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1002, 131 S. Ct. 503,

178 L. Ed. 2d 370,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8580.

November 1, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 377 Fed. Appx. 696.
1i rS0'

Mr. Jonathan Blees Assistant Chief Counsel 

### Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 April 14, 2006

California Energy Commission 1516 Ninth Street, Mail Station 14 Sacramento, California 95814-5512 Dear Mr. Blees: This letter is to inform you that the comment period on the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) notice of receipt of the California Energy Commission's (CEC) Petition for Exemption from Federal Preemption of California's Water Conservation Standards for Residential Clothes Washers (California Petition) has cibsed, and to invite the CEC to provide rebuttal statement to the comments DOE received.
In accordance with 10 CFR 430.43(a) and (b), DOE published notice of the California Petition in the Federal Register on February 6, 2006. (71 FR 6022) In the February 6, 2006, notice, DOE invited public comments on the California Petition and information related to the evaluation factors outlined in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA). The comments are on the DOE website at the following address: http://www.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance standards/state petitions.html, In accordance with section 327(d)(2) of EPCA, DOE invites the CEC to submit a rebuttal comment to the public comments received. The CEC may submit rebuttal comments via the public comment procedures as provided in the February 6, 2006, notice. Should the CEC wish to submit rebuttal comments, they should be submitted to DOE within thirty days of the date of this letter We request CEC include the docket number (EE-RM-PET- 100) on all submissions If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact. Mr. Bryan Berrinër at Bryan,Berringeree.doe.gov or at the following address: Mr. Bryan Berringer, us. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Building Technologies Program, EE-2J, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585-0121. Sincerely,

Richard F. Moorer Deputy Assistant Secretary Technology Development Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy

Printed with soy ink on recycled paper