United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 21-1511

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Mark Fredrick Sandell

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa 

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Submitted: November 19, 2021

Filed: March 3, 2022

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Before COLLOTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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GRASZ, Circuit Judge. 

Mark Sandell pled guilty to receiving child pornography in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). Before his plea, Sandell moved to suppress 

statements made to law enforcement during an in-home interrogation. The district

court1 denied Sandell’s motion to suppress. We affirm the district court. 

1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, then Chief Judge, now United States District 

Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
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I. Background

Law enforcement obtained a search warrant for a home in Red Oak, Iowa, 

during an investigation of a peer-to-peer computer file sharing network being used 

to acquire child pornography. After questioning the residents and searching their 

home, the officers ruled out the residents of the home as suspects. The officers began 

to suspect Sandell, a neighbor, after the residents explained that Sandell asked to use 

their Wi-Fi when he moved into his home so he could access the internet to register 

his sex offender status. 

Officers then went to Sandell’s home for questioning. Upon arrival, the 

officers knocked on Sandell’s door, and Sandell answered. The officers identified 

themselves as law enforcement and instructed Sandell to step outside while they 

conducted a sweep of the home. Once the officers determined no one else was in 

the home, the officers asked Sandell where he would like to talk. Sandell told the 

officers he preferred to speak in his living room. The officers followed Sandell into 

his living room and explained they were attempting to obtain a search warrant for 

Sandell’s home based on the information from Sandell’s neighbors. One officer 

informed Sandell he was not under arrest and was not obligated to talk to them. 

Officers also asked Sandell if he would consent to a home search, but Sandell 

refused. 

The conversation continued and the officers again reminded Sandell he was 

not obligated to speak to them. The officers informed Sandell he was free to leave 

but they also informed him that if he chose to drive, they would ask for consent to 

search his vehicle. They further informed Sandell they needed to supervise his 

movements inside the home to ensure Sandell did not access any weapons or tamper 

with evidence. Indeed, the officers supervised Sandell while he took his dog out, 

took his medication, made coffee, used the restroom, and retrieved the phone number 

of his probation officer from a separate floor of the home. 
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Sandell made several incriminating statements during his conversation with 

the officers. Sandell admitted to downloading child pornography recently and that 

his child pornography collection on his laptop contained a little of “everything.” 

Sandell also voluntarily retrieved and turned over a camera and two thumb drives to 

the officers. But Sandell refused to discuss the details of his past child pornography 

conviction. Sandell did, however, comment that given his criminal history, he was 

likely facing fifteen years of imprisonment. One officer agreed with Sandell’s 

estimated prison time and commented that, at Sandell’s age, he would likely spend 

the rest of his life in prison. 

The officers ultimately obtained a search warrant for Sandell’s home and 

collected evidence including Sandell’s laptop, thumb drives, and DVDs. Although 

the officers left after the search without arresting Sandell, he was later charged with 

distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography. Sandell unsuccessfully 

moved to suppress statements made during the interrogation at his home. Sandell 

then pled guilty to receipt of child pornography but, in his plea agreement, preserved 

his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 

 

II. Analysis

Sandell appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements 

made to the officers while in his home. We review the district court’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Parker, 

993 F.3d 595, 601 (8th Cir. 2021). 

A. Miranda Argument

Sandell first argues the officers violated his Miranda rights while questioning 

him in his home. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). “The Fifth 

Amendment requires that Miranda warnings be given when a person is interrogated 

by law enforcement after being taken into custody.” Parker, 993 F.3d at 601

(quoting United States v. Giboney, 863 F.3d 1022, 1027 (8th Cir. 2017)). Here, the 
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government concedes that none of the officers advised Sandell of his Miranda rights. 

The government also agrees that the February 27, 2020, visit by law enforcement at 

Sandell’s residence was an interrogation. Thus, the issue is whether Sandell was in 

custody during the interrogation.

A person is considered to be in custody for the purposes of Miranda warnings 

when there is a “formal arrest or restraint [on his or her] freedom of movement of 

the degree associated with formal arrest.” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 

760 F.3d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 2014). “To determine whether a suspect was in custody, 

we ask whether, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would 

have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave or cause the agents to 

leave.” Id. (quoting United States v. Laurita, 821 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2016)). 

This court considers six non-exhaustive factors when making this determination: 

(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the 

questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request 

the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered under arrest; 

(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement 

during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with 

authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to 

questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were 

employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the 

questioning was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was 

placed under arrest at the termination of questioning.

United States v. Ferguson, 970 F.3d 895, 901 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States 

v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990)).

Here, all six factors weigh in favor of Sandell’s not being in custody; thus, the 

officers did not need to advise Sandell of his Miranda rights. First, it is undisputed 

that officers informed Sandell many times he was not under arrest and was not 

obligated to speak to the officers. Repetitive reminders that a defendant is free to 

terminate an interview “is powerful evidence that a reasonable person would have 

understood that he was free to terminate the interview.” Giboney, 863 F.3d at 1027–
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28 (quoting United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004)); see also 

United States v. Perrin, 659 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting this court has 

never held a person was in custody after receiving admonitions from officers that 

the defendant was free to leave). 

Second, Sandell retained his freedom of movement during questioning. 

Sandell argues his movement was restrained because officers followed him while 

moving around his house. But we have consistently held police escorts throughout 

a house do not restrain a defendant’s movement to the degree associated with a 

formal arrest. See, e.g., Giboney, 863 F.3d at 1028; Czichray, 378 F.3d at 825, 830. 

Moreover, Sandell was never handcuffed or physically or verbally restrained from 

moving about. See Laurita, 821 F.3d at 1025 (finding that absence of handcuffing 

or physical or verbal restraint weighed against defendant being in custody). And 

while Sandell was told his vehicle needed to be searched if he chose to leave in it, 

this did not restrict his movement during questions or require him to answer 

questions. 

Third, Sandell voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to 

questions. While the officers initiated the encounter, the record shows that the 

officers frequently reminded Sandell he was not obligated to speak with them. Yet 

Sandell continued to converse with the officers—thus acquiescing to their requests 

to respond to questions. Compare United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 910, 919 (8th 

Cir. 2010) (finding a defendant voluntarily acquiesced to police interview in his own 

home by responding to questioning after police informed him he was free to leave at 

any time), with United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1138 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding 

defendant did not voluntarily acquiesce to police questioning where probation 

officer ordered a defendant to talk to the police chief). 

The remaining factors likewise weigh against a custody finding. The officers 

did not use any strong arm or deceptive tactics. While Sandell argues an officer’s 

mention of the K-9 unit’s being on its way was an attempt to strong arm him into 

making statements, this was hardly a tactic—the K-9 unit arrived at Sandell’s 
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residence and searched the premises. And although Sandell was certainly 

outnumbered with four officers in his home, we have found custody did not exist in 

even more police-dominated circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Axsom, 289 

F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding a defendant was not in custody when nine 

agents executed a search warrant and two of those nine agents conducted an 

interview). Lastly, Sandell was not arrested at the conclusion of the interrogation. 

Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in 

holding the in-home interrogation was not custodial. As a result, the district court 

correctly denied Sandell’s motion to suppress because the officers were not required 

to advise Sandell of his Miranda rights. 

B. Voluntariness

Sandell next argues his statements made during the in-home interrogation

were involuntary. “A statement is involuntary when it is extracted by threats, 

violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant’s will 

and critically impair his capacity for self-determination.” United States v. Roberts, 

975 F.3d 709, 718 (8th Cir. 2020). “We determine if a defendant’s will has been 

overborne by examining the totality of the circumstances, including both the conduct 

of law enforcement in exerting pressure to confess on the defendant and the 

defendant’s ability to resist that pressure.” United States v. Magallon, 984 F.3d 

1263, 1284 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Brave Heart, 397 F.3d 1035, 

1040 (8th Cir. 2005)). Factors used to make this determination include “the degree 

of police coercion, the length of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, and the 

defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and mental condition.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Boslau, 632 F.3d 422, 428 (8th Cir. 2011)).

The totality of circumstances demonstrates that Sandell’s will was not 

overborne at the time he made the challenged statements. There is no evidence 

Sandell lacked the requisite maturity, education, or mental or physical stamina to 

understand his rights. Throughout the interview, officers continued to remind 

Sandell he was not under arrest and was not obligated to talk to them. And while 
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the officers discussed the potential of a lengthy prison sentence for Sandell, it was 

Sandell who first raised the topic. Moreover, Sandell admitted he had experience 

with the criminal justice system suggesting he was familiar with his constitutional 

rights. See United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 482 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A history of 

interaction with the criminal justice system supports an inference that an interviewee 

is familiar with his constitutional rights and that his statements to the police are 

voluntary.”). Under these facts, the district court did not err in finding Sandell 

voluntarily made statements to law enforcement. 

 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Sandell’s 

motion to suppress. 

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