IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSONS: 

M.F.M. AND M.G.M., PROTECTED 

MINORS. 

No. 82469 

FILED 

ERIN NEWPORT, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

MONTRAIL GREEN; AND JERMIA 

COAXUM-GREEN, 

Res • ondents. 

MAY 1 3 2022 

ELIZABEIN A. BROWN 

CLERTgJPREME COURT 

DEPUTY CLERK 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a district court order denying a petition 

to terminate a guardianship as to minor children. Eighth Judicial District 

Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Linda Marquis, Judge. 

This appeal implicates NRS 159A.1915, which governs what a 

parent must establish in order to terminate a guardianship over the 

parent's child. NRS 159A.1915 provides: 

1. If, before a protected minor is emancipated, a 

parent of the protected minor petitions the court for 

the termination of a guardianship of the protected 

minor, the parent has the burden of proof to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that: 

(a) There has been a material change of 

circumstances since the time the 

guardianship was created. The parent must 

show that, as part of the change of 

circumstances, the parent has been restored 

to suitability as described in NRS 159A.061. 

(b) Except as otherwise provided in 

subsection 2, the welfare of the protected 

minor would be substantially enhanced by 

the termination of the guardianship and the 

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placement of the protected minor with the 

parent. 

2. If the parent consented to the guardianship 

when it was created, the parent is required to make 

only that showing set forth in paragraph (a) of 

subsection 1. 

(Emphases added.) By its terms, the statute provides that if the parent did 

not initially consent to the guardianship, the parent must satisfy two 

requirements: (1) that "[t]here has been a material change in circumstances 

since the guardianship was created," and (2) that "the welfare • of the 

protected minor would be substantially enhanced by the termination of the 

guardianship." NRS 159A.1915(1). In contrast, if the parent did initially 

consent to the guardianship, the parent must only satisfy the first 

requirement. NRS 159A.1915(2). 

In this case, respondents, who are the aunt and uncle of twin 

girls M.F.M and M.G.M., filed a petition seeking to appoint themselves as 

the girls guardians. In response to the petition, appellant, who is the girls' 

mother, did not consent to respondents being appointed as guardians; 

rather, she proposed that the girls' grandfather should be appointed as their 

guardian and only for a 6-month period. The district court deClined to 

appoint the grandfather as the girls' guardian and declined to impose a time 

limit on the guardianship, instead deciding to appoint respondents as their 

guardians and ordering the guardianship to be in place for an undefined 

duration. A few months later, appellant petitioned to terminate the 

guardianship. The district court denied the petition. In so doing, it did not 

address whether appellant had satisfied NRS 159A.1915(1)s first 

requirement, but it reasoned that appellant had not consented to the initial 

guardianship and did not satisfy NRS 159A.1915(1)s second requirement. 

On appeal, appellant contends (1) she did consent to a guardianship, albeit 

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not the one the district court authorized, such that she is not obligated to 

satisfy NRS 159A.1915(1)s second requirement; and (2) even if she were 

obligated to satisfy the second requirement, the district court erred in 

finding that she failed to do so. We disagree with both arguments. 

Appellant's first argument implicates statutory construction, 

which we review de novo. Williams v. United Parcel Servs., 129 Nev. 386, 

391, 302 P.3d 1144, 1147 (2013). Appellant contends that •construing 

"consented to the guardianship" to mean the specific guardianship ordered 

by the district court would be contrary to public policy. See Young v. Nev. 

Gaming Control Bd., 136 Nev. 584, 586, 473 P.3d 1034, 1036 (2020) 

(recognizing that this court interprets statutes by their plain meaning 

unless there is ambiguity, the plain meaning would provide an absurd 

result, or the plain meaning clearly was not intended). In this, appellant 

contends that child-custody and child-guardianship statutes, such as NRS 

159A.061 (providing that when considering whom to appoint as a child's 

guardian, a court should give preference to a suitable parent), evince a 

preference that a suitable parent should be given custody over a fit 

nonparent. From there, appellant appears to contend that public policy is 

served by construing "consented to the guardianship" to mean "consented 

to a guardianship" because, when a parent recognizes that a guardianship 

is necessary, the parent is recognizing his or her temporary inability to look 

after a child and, in so doing, is actually being a suitable parent. Cf. Hudson 

v. Jones, 122 Nev. 708, 712, 138 P.3d 429, 431-32 (2006) ("[W]e do 'not want 

to discourage parents from willingly granting temporary guardianships, 

while working through problems in their own lives, if that is in the child's 

best interest."' (quoting Litz v. Bennum, 111 Nev. 35, 38, 888 P.2d 438, 440 

(1995))). Thus, so long as a parent has consented to a guardianship, 

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appellant contends the parent should not be required to satisfy NRS 

159A.1915(1)s second requirement. 

We are not persuaded by appellant's argument. When 

respondents petitioned for guardianship, the girls had been living with 

them for roughly half a year, evidently because their grandfather had no 

longer been able to care for them due to his health issues. In response to 

their petition, appellant requested the girls grandfather be appointed as 

guardian, but did not agree to the appointment of respondents as the 

guardians. The district court concluded the grandfather was not the most 

suitable guardian for the girls and granted the respondents' petition, 

despite the fact appellant had not agreed to their appointment. Thus, under 

the facts of this case, we are not persuaded that applying NRS 159A.1915 

by its plain language would be contrary to any identifiable public policy 

concern or legislative intent.' Accordingly, we agree with the district court 

that appellant did not consent to the initially imposed guardianship, such 

that in order to terminate it, appellant needed to satisfy both requirements 

in NRS 159A.1915(1).2 

INRS 159A.1915 was enacted in 2017 as part of an overhaul of the 

guardianship statutes. See 2017 Stat. Nev., ch. 172, digest, at 813; see also 

Hearing on A.B. 319 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 79th Leg., at 

16 (Nev., April 10, 2017) (testimony from Family Court Judge Egan Walker 

explaining that the committee that drafted A.B. 319 undertook a "giant 

task" of drafting NRS Chapter 159A to deal specifically with guardianships 

for minors). There is no discussion in the legislative history for A.B. 319 

regarding the specific intent behind NRS 159A.1915, and our research has 

not revealed whether the Legislature adopted NRS 159A.1915s text from 

another state's analogous statute. 

2We reiterate that an unpublished disposition from this court, while 

persuasive, see NRAP 36(c)(3), does not establish binding precedent. We 

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Appellant next contends that even if she were obligated to 

satisfy NRS 159A.1915(1)s second requirement, the district court erred in 

finding that she failed to do so. Appellant's second argument implicates the 

district court's factual findings, to which we generally give deference. See 

Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009) (The district 

court's factual findings . . . are given deference and will be upheld if not 

clearly erroneous and if supported by substantial evidence."); see also In re 

Guardianship of L.S. & H.S., 120 Nev. 157, 163, 87 P.3d 521, 525 (2004) 

• (Absent a showing of abuse, we will not disturb the district court's exercise 

of discretion concerning guardianship determinations."). 

We are not persuaded that the district court abused its 

discretion in declining to terminate the guardianship. The district court 

found that the girls had been living with respondents "for a substantial 

amount of time and that respondents had enrolled the girls in school and 

had ensured that the girls were receiving other services related to their 

wellbeing. The district court also considered appellant's proffered evidence 

in support of terminating the guardianship, which consisted of an 

apartment lease, paystubs, and pictures of appellant and the girls, and 

determined that this evidence did not establish that the girls welfare would 

be substantially enhanced by terminating the guardianship and placing 

them in appellant's care. Based on this record, we are not persuaded that 

the district court abused its discretion or clearly erred in finding that 

also note that portions of NRS 159A.1915 may present due process concerns, 

although none of those concerns have been articulated in this case. 

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appellant failed to satisfy NRS 159A.1915(1)s second requirement by clear 

and convincing evidence.3 

Relatedly and alternatively, appellant contends that the 

district court should have held an evidentiary hearing. In this, appellant 

likens her petition to terminate the guardianship to a request to modify a 

child custody• order. Under that scenario, she contends that she 

demonstrated "adequate cause for an evidentiary hearing. See Arcella v. 

Arcella, 133 Nev. 868, 871, 407 P.3d 341, 345 (2017) (holding that a district 

court must hold an evidentiary hearing "on a request to modify custodial 

ordere if the party requesting the hearing demonstrates "adequate cause"). 

To the extent that Arcella's "adequate cause" standard applies to the 

underlying proceeding, we are not persuaded that appellant Satisfied it, 

given that she did not and has not explained what evidence or whose 

3For the first time on appeal, appellant cites In re A.S., No. 73876, 

2018 WL 5291457 (Nev. Oct. 18, 2018) (Order of Reversal and Remand), for 

the proposition that the district court should have applied the parentalpreference presumption in deciding whether to terminate the guardianship. 

We are not persuaded under the facts of this case. First, the In re A.S. 

decision is distinguishable, in that this court determined the presumption 

should apply because the parent initially consented to the guardianship. 

2018 WL 5291457 at *1. Second, appellant made only a passing reference 

to the parental-preference presumption in district court when she filed an 

"amended petition to terminate the guardianship, which was filed after the 

district court• had orally denied her original petition. In its written 

judgment, the district court treated this "amended' petition as a motion for 

reconsideration and denied it. Given the lack of attention devoted to the 

parental-preference presumption in appellant's amended petition/motion 

for reconsideration, we are not persuaded that the district court abused its 

discretion by not expressly addressing the presumption in its written 

judgment. See AA Primo Builders v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 589, 245 

P.3d 1190, 1197 (2010) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the district 

court's denial of a motion for reconsideration). 

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testimony she wanted to introduce at the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the district court did not commit reversible error in 

declining to hold an evidentiary hearing and, relatedly, that the district 

court was within its discretion in finding that appellant failed to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that the girls welfare would be substantially 

enhanced by terminating the' guardianship. In re Guardianship of LS. & 

H.S., 120 Nev. at 163, 87 P.3d at 525 ("Absent a showing of abuse, we will 

not disturb the district court's exercise of discretion concerning 

guardianship determinations."). In light of the foregoing, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

/ , J. 

Hardesty A 

 J. 

Stiglich Herndon 

cc: Hon. Linda Marquis, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Morris Law Center 

Jermia Coaxum-Green 

Montrail Green 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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