UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1163

ANTONIO ROBLERO-MORALES, a/k/a Everardo Valasquez-Reyes, 

a/k/a Evrardo Valasquez-Reyes, a/k/a Ebelardo VelasquezReyes, a/k/a Antonio Roblero Morales,

Petitioner,

v.

DANA JAMES BOENTE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Argued: January 24, 2017 Decided: February 3, 2017 

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Bradley Bruce Banias, BARNWELL, WHALEY, PATTERSON, AND 

HELMS, Charleston, South Carolina, for Petitioner. Craig Alan 

Newell, Jr., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, 

D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Emily Anne 

Radford, Assistant Director, Kohsei Ugumori, Senior Litigation 

Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Antonio Roblero-Morales petitions for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (Board) order affirming the decision of the 

Immigration Judge (IJ) to deny him relief from removal. Roblero 

contends that the IJ violated Roblero’s procedural due process 

rights. We deny the petition for review.

I.

On or around September 13, 2013, border patrol agents 

apprehended Roblero, a citizen of Guatemala, when he attempted 

to enter the United States unlawfully. The Department of 

Homeland Security charged Roblero as removable, found that he 

had a credible fear of persecution or torture, and issued him a 

Notice to Appear. At Roblero’s initial removal hearing, he 

conceded removability but sought relief from removal on the 

bases of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 

the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

After receiving a two-month continuance to find counsel, 

the IJ scheduled a second hearing. At this hearing, Roblero 

informed the IJ that he left Guatemala because gangs “kept 

extorting [him] all the time” and, subsequently, “wanted [him] 

to work for them.” After hearing this summary of Roblero’s 

claim, the IJ granted him a second continuance. In doing so, 

the IJ told Roblero:
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All right. Sir, I’m going to hear your case, but it’s 

not a very strong case and the reason is because I 

understand there’s a lot of gangs in Guatemala and 

they try to extort money from people or try to recruit 

people. That doesn’t provide a legal basis for you to 

get asylum here in the United States. But because 

you’ve already filed an asylum application I’m going 

to give you a hearing.

After the IJ gave Roblero the date for the next hearing, 

Roblero asked the IJ if he could “fill out some things that [he] 

left out on page 5” of his asylum application. Following an 

off-the-record discussion about other issues, Roblero again 

asked to “complete page 5” so that it reflected his contention 

that he fled Guatemala because gangs threatened to kill him. 

The following discussion ensued:

MR. ROBLEO-MORALES [sic]:

When the official caught me in the desert I tried 

to explain to him that I was afraid to go back to my 

country, but they wouldn’t let me explain and he told 

me he did not make the law.

JUDGE:

Okay. Well, sir, you filed an application for --

saying you’re afraid of the gangs because they were 

extorting money from you. Right?

MR. ROBLEO-MORALES [sic]:

That is true.

JUDGE:

And is that the reason why you’re afraid to go 

back?

MR. ROBLEO-MORALES [sic]:
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Yes. Because they threatened me that they were 

going to kill me, so I left running away from my 

house.

JUDGE:

All right. Well, sir, I’m going to hear your 

case on July 31st. Okay. Do you have any questions?

MR. ROBLEO-MORALES [sic]:

No.

JUDGE:

All right. I’ll see you on July 31st.

The IJ then adjourned the hearing without acting on Roblero’s 

request to “complete” page 5.

The IJ held Roblero’s merits hearing, as scheduled, on July 

31, 2014. Roblero testified that he left his home in 2012 

because of gang extortion. He testified that the gang first 

charged him 100 quetzales (the Guatemalan currency), which he 

paid. Next, the gang charged him 300 quetzales, and he paid 

that as well. However, when the gang sought 400 quetzales, 

Roblero refused. The gang members told Roblero that if he 

refused to pay he would need to work for them to collect money 

from other people. Instead of complying, Roblero fled. Roblero 

acknowledged that while in Guatemala, gangs never harmed him, 

but he testified that he knew “a lot of people who have lost 

their lives for the same thing.”
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Leaving his family behind, Roblero entered Mexico in April 

2013. He remained there for five months, when unknown 

individuals kidnapped him. Roblero’s captors beat him and tried 

to learn information about his family for extortionary purposes, 

but he provided none. After a month, Roblero’s captors released 

him when they found information about another captive’s family. 

Roblero then fled to the United States, where border patrol

agents apprehended him.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ orally denied 

Roblero’s asylum application on the ground that “being extorted 

by gang members in Guatemala [was] not a basis for which [he] 

could grant [Roblero] asylum.” The IJ subsequently issued a 

written decision further explaining his reasoning. The IJ found 

Roblero credible, but denied his application due to the lack of 

proof of “the requisite nexus between the alleged persecution he 

perceived in Guatemala and a statutorily protected ground.” The 

IJ pointed out that “merely being subject to extortion attempts 

does not provide the required on account of grounds so as to be 

eligible for asylum.” The IJ also denied Roblero’s other 

grounds for relief.

Roblero, now with counsel, timely appealed to the Board. 

He asserted that the IJ erred in not allowing him to amend his 

asylum application, and that the IJ improperly prejudged his 

case. Roblero explained that, if permitted to do so, he would 
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have testified to “his status as a taxi driver” and “his direct 

political actions against the criminal organizations and corrupt 

government supporters.”

On January 19, 2016, the Board dismissed Roblero’s appeal. 

The Board held that the IJ did not violate Roblero’s due process 

rights because even though Roblero was not permitted to amend 

his asylum application, “he was provided an opportunity to 

present his claim during the hearing and has shown no prejudice 

resulting from the Immigration Judge’s actions.” Roblero timely 

filed this Petition for Review of the Board’s Order.

II.

Roblero’s petition contends only that the IJ’s denial of 

asylum violated his procedural due process rights. “We review 

due process claims alleging procedural failings in the 

immigration context de novo.” Singh v. Holder, 699 F.3d 321, 

335 (4th Cir. 2012). Because the Board’s order combined its own 

reasoning with the IJ’s, we review both orders. Martinez v. 

Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 908 n.1 (4th Cir. 2014).

To prevail, Roblero must prove both that the IJ’s actions 

rendered the proceedings “fundamentally unfair,” and that the 

defect the IJ introduced into the proceedings “prejudiced the 

outcome of the case.” Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th 

Cir. 2008). To show prejudice, Roblero must demonstrate that 
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“the defect, in retrospect in [this] specific case, was ‘likely 

to impact the results of the proceeding.’” Id. (quoting Rusu v. 

INS, 296 F.3d 316, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2002)). Roblero maintains

that the IJ improperly prevented him from amending his asylum 

application to specify his grounds for removal and that the IJ 

prejudged his case. The Government argues that, assuming the IJ 

erred, Roblero cannot demonstrate prejudice. We consider each 

of Roblero’s arguments in turn, recognizing that due process 

mandates only “a meaningful opportunity to present [a] claim,” a 

requirement falling short of an “obligation to ensure . . . a 

meaningful presentation.” Rusu, 296 F.3d at 324.

A.

Roblero contends that the IJ’s refusal to allow him to 

amend his application prejudiced him because it precluded the 

development of a full record. This failure, Roblero claims, 

prevented him from explaining the nexus between his persecution 

and his membership in a protected class.

The IJ, however, asked several questions that gave Roblero 

an opportunity to provide a further explanation of his claim. 

These open-ended inquiries included questions such as “Why did 

you leave Guatemala the last time?”; “What was the reason you 

left your home country in 2012?”; “Sir, while we were off the 

record you indicated you wanted to say something. What is it 
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you wanted to tell the Court?”; and “Anything else you want to 

tell me?”

These questions gave Roblero the opportunity to explain the 

full nature of his claim. In response to them, Roblero never 

specified the protected group to which he claimed to be a 

member. The record contains no indication that the IJ prevented

Roblero from providing testimony beyond the content of his 

application, or that Roblero refrained from offering any 

testimony out of a fear that the IJ would not allow it.

Given this record, Roblero cannot show prejudice. Not only 

did the IJ offer him a chance to put into the record anything he 

wished, but there is no indication that Roblero had any evidence 

that would entitle him to relief. We thus have no basis on 

which to hold that the IJ’s failure to permit him to amend his 

asylum application prejudiced Roblero.

B.

Roblero’s contention that the IJ prejudged his case also 

fails. He asserts that this prejudgment was evidenced by the 

IJ’s remark that Roblero did not have a strong case and the IJ’s 

assertedly preconceived notion that gangs in Guatemala 

frequently try to extort and recruit individuals for money.

The record demonstrates that in fact Roblero’s case was not 

a strong one and that the IJ denied Roblero’s application not 

because of a belief about the ubiquity of Guatemalan gangs’ 
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extortion efforts, but because, as a matter of law, this motive 

did not implicate Roblero’s status as a member of any protected 

group. Roblero provides no authority for the position that this 

legal conclusion is wrong. C.f. Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 

167 (4th Cir. 2012) (“In sum, the BIA’s conclusion that Zelaya’s 

proposed social group of young Honduran males who refuse to join 

MS-13, have notified the police of MS-13’s harassment tactics, 

and have an identifiable tormentor within the gang does not 

qualify as a particular social group within the INA is not 

manifestly contrary to the law or an abuse of discretion.”).

Accordingly, we cannot hold that any prejudgment by the IJ

prejudiced Roblero’s case.

III.

Since Roblero cannot demonstrate that any of the IJ’s 

purported errors altered the outcome of the proceedings, his due 

process challenge fails. For the foregoing reasons, the

petition for review is

DENIED.