NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

CHRISTIAN GREGORY JACKMAN, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

TERESA MARIE MCCANN, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0341 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2014-096241

The Honorable Adele Ponce, Judge

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL

Teresa Marie McCann, Gilbert

Respondent/Appellant

FILED 4-11-2023
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

H O W E , Judge:

¶1 Teresa Marie McCann (“Mother”) appeals the order denying 

her petition to modify legal decision-making authority, parenting time, and 

child support. Because she has shown no abuse of discretion or legal error, 

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Christian Gregory Jackman (“Father”) had three 

minor children when they divorced in 2016. Two of the children have since 

turned 18 and are not involved in this appeal. In the 2016 decree, the family 

court found that Mother physically and emotionally abused the children. 

Therefore, the court awarded Father sole legal decision-making authority.

The court also determined that awarding substantial parenting time to 

Mother would endanger the children’s physical or emotional well-being. 

As a result, the court ordered a parenting time plan that gradually increased 

Mother’s time with the children and required that the family participate in 

an intensive therapeutic reunification program. 

¶3 While Mother’s appeal from the decree was pending, the 

Department of Child Safety petitioned for the children’s dependency, and

the juvenile court found the children dependent as to Mother. See Jackman 

v. McCann, 2017 WL 4052001, 1 CA-CV 16-0263FC, *1 ¶ 8 (Ariz. App. Sept.

14, 2017). Because the juvenile court order superseded the decree, this court 

deemed Mother’s appeal from the legal decision-making and parenting 

time orders in the decree moot. Id. at *1–2 ¶¶ 8–9 (citing A.R.S. § 8–202(F)); 

Michael M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 230, 234 

¶ 15 (App. 2007). Later, the juvenile court took temporary jurisdiction over 

the family court case, ordered the children to live with Father, allowed 

parenting time with Mother at the children’s discretion, and dismissed the 

dependency action. The juvenile court order is the most recent parenting 

time order. 
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 In February 2021, Mother petitioned to modify legal decisionmaking authority, parenting time, and child support orders. She sought 

sole legal decision-making authority and supervised parenting time for 

Father. The family court appointed an advisor to prepare a report. The court 

held an evidentiary hearing, during which Mother, Father, and their 

daughter testified. After the evidentiary hearing, the court denied Mother’s 

petition to modify and again awarded Father sole legal decision-making

pursuant to the child’s best interests. Citing the unusual history of this case 

and the fact that the only minor child was now 16 years old, the court found 

that allowing the child to decide whether to communicate or spend time 

with Mother was in the child’s best interests. The court also specified

parameters for Mother’s communications with the child and denied her 

request to modify child support, finding no change from the child support 

order in place. Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. § 12–2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Mother argues that the court erred in (1) awarding Father sole 

legal decision-making authority, (2) violating her constitutional rights, and 

(3) failing to reduce the child support order after the second child turned 18 

in March 2022. Father did not file an answering brief, which we may treat 

as a confession of error, but we decline to do so here because a child’s best 

interests are involved. See In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, 525 ¶ 2 

(App. 2002). 

¶6 As a threshold matter, Mother contends that the trial 

transcript is inaccurate and was “tampered with.” The email she relies on 

to support this claim is not part of the record on appeal. Therefore, we do 

not consider it. GM Dev. Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 4 (App. 

1990). Mother failed to provide other record evidence of any inaccuracies 

or an accurate copy of the transcript in accordance with Rule 19. See Ariz. 

R. Fam. Law P. 19 (requiring party to identify lost or destroyed record, 

provide accurate copy, and proof of accuracy).

I. The Record Supports the Legal Decision-Making Authority and 

Parenting Time Orders.

¶7 We review the family court’s legal decision-making authority 

and parenting time orders for an abuse of discretion. Engstrom v. McCarthy, 

243 Ariz. 469, 471 ¶ 4 (App. 2018). We accept the court’s findings of fact 

absent clear error. Id. 
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

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¶8 The record supports the court’s order that Father be awarded 

sole legal decision-making authority. The court determines legal decisionmaking and parenting time “in accordance with the best interests of the 

child,” which involves considering “all factors that are relevant to the 

child’s physical and emotional well-being.” A.R.S. § 25–403(A). A finding 

of any domestic violence creates a rebuttable presumption that awarding 

sole or joint legal decision-making authority to a parent who has committed 

an act of domestic violence is contrary to the child’s best interests. A.R.S. 

§ 25–403.03(D); see DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 424 ¶ 16 (App. 2019). 

However, “[t]his presumption does not apply if both parents have 

committed an act of domestic violence.” A.R.S. § 25–403.03(D). 

¶9 Here, the family court considered both parents’ acts of 

domestic violence in the record in making its findings. Evidence supports 

the finding that Mother abused the children. Although she cites evidence 

from the 2015 family court evaluation and the children’s 2017 psychological 

evaluation that contradicted Father’s reports of her abuse, other evidence 

supports the finding that Mother abused the children, including sworn 

testimony by those with personal knowledge. Also, the original dissolution 

decree found that Mother physically and emotionally abused the children. 

And in the 2015 court-ordered family assessment, Mother admitted to 

hitting the children with a wooden spoon and putting hot sauce in their 

mouths as punishment. Additionally, Mother provided the middle child’s 

medical records in which he confirmed the past abuse. At this hearing, 

Mother admitted to locking the children in their rooms at night with no 

access to a bathroom. Mother also offered evidence of Father’s 2020 

conviction for domestic violence against her. Because Mother and Father

each committed acts of domestic violence, the presumption does not apply. 

Therefore, the court did not err in awarding Father sole legal decisionmaking authority.

¶10 The court also did not err in finding that living with Father 

and contacting Mother on his own terms is in the minor child’s best 

interests. As the family court explained, this case is “unusual.” Contrary to 

Mother’s contention, the court expressly considered that Father may have 

improperly influenced the child’s wishes on this issue. Mother had abused 

the children in the past, damaging her relationship with them. On the other 

hand, Father further alienated Mother by discouraging reunification efforts 

and acting contrary to the children’s best interests. Given these 

circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the 

16-year-old child’s expressed desire to have no relationship with Mother. 
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

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¶11 Mother contends that the family court “intentionally and 

willfully ignore[d]” evidence weighing against Father. Throughout the 

ruling, however, the court acknowledged that Father’s alienation and

continued portrayal of Mother as a danger and a threat harmed the

children. The court also questioned some of Father’s allegations. The court 

considered the best interest attorney’s concerns that Father’s failure to 

protect the children from Mother’s abuse harmed the children. Finally, the 

court noted that Father did not complete the court-ordered counseling. 

Mother asks this court to weigh this evidence differently. But we do not 

reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations on appeal. Hurd 

v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 16 (App. 2009). Because the family court is in the 

best position to determine witness credibility and resolve conflicts in the 

evidence, we defer to its findings. Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155 ¶ 18 

(App. 2015). 1

II. The Family Court Did Not Violate Mother’s Constitutional Rights.

¶12 Parents have a fundamental right to decide on the care,

custody, and management of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,

65–66 (2000). And absent evidence to the contrary, both parents providing

“substantial, frequent, meaningful and continuing parenting time” with the 

child and “participat[ing] in decision-making about the child” is generally 

in that child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 25–103(B). A court should also 

maximize parenting time consistent with the child’s best interests, A.R.S. 

§ 25–403.02(B), and “shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights unless 

it finds that the parenting time would endanger seriously the child’s 

physical, mental, moral or emotional health.” A.R.S. § 25–411(J).

¶13 In the original decree, the family court found that unrestricted 

parenting time would endanger the child’s physical, mental, moral or

emotional health based on the “long history of emotional and physical 

abuse.” The original decree conditioned Mother’s parenting time on an 

intensive therapeutic reunification process. Then, the juvenile court further 

limited Mother’s contact to occur only if the children wanted it. The 

parenting time order continues to allow parenting time at the child’s 

discretion, but it now allows Mother to communicate with the child 

electronically within specific parameters. The court expressly found “this 

1 Having concluded that the family court did not ignore evidence, we 

do not reach Mother’s assertion that the court violated Arizona Rule of 

Family Law Procedure 2, which requires compliance with the Arizona 

Rules of Evidence at a properly noticed hearing.
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

6

to be the right amount of contact given the history of the case.” Because the 

record supports the findings of past abuse, and the restrictions are 

reasonably crafted to minimize the danger of further emotional or physical 

abuse, we find no violation of Mother’s constitutional rights and affirm. See 

Paul E. v. Courtney F., 246 Ariz. 388, 394 ¶ 20 (2019). 

III. The Record Supports the Child Support Order.

¶14 We review the ruling on a petition to modify child support for 

an abuse of discretion. See Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520 ¶ 5 (1999). The 

child support order was proper.

¶15 The family court properly denied Mother’s request to modify 

child support because it did not modify the parenting time orders. A parent 

must pay child support for a child who turns 18 while still attending high 

school. A.R.S. § 25–320(F); A.R.S. § 25–501(A). Here, although the middle 

child turned 18 on March 3, 2022, he was a junior in high school during the 

2021-2022 academic year. Absent evidence that the child graduated, 

completed a high school equivalency program, or stopped attending school 

at the time of the trial, the family court properly included the 18-year-old 

middle child in calculating the child support order. Id.

¶16 Mother contends that she is not required to pay child support 

because she has no parental rights. But the courts did not terminate 

Mother’s parental rights. For that reason, her child support obligation 

continues regardless of the amount of court-ordered parenting time. See 

A.R.S. § 25–320 app., Child Support Guidelines § I(C)(6) (“The obligation to 

pay . . . child support is separate from any rights or responsibilities relating 

to legal decision-making and parenting time.”); A.R.S. § 25–501(A) (absent 

an exception not applicable here, “every person has the duty to provide all 

reasonable support for that person’s natural and adopted minor, 

unemancipated children.”). The court did not err.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm the order denying Mother’s petition to modify.