2016 IL App (2d) 150040 

No. 2-15-0040 

Opinion filed March 23, 2016 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

as Trustee, ) of Du Page County. 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 09-CH-4410 

) 

SYEDA NAZIA RAHMAN, ) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant and Cross- ) 

Appellee ) 

) 

(Edward Hines Lumber Company; Hinsdale ) 

Developers, Inc.; VG Masonry Company, Inc.; ) 

Southwest Insulation, Inc.; Complete ) 

Flashings, Inc.; J.J. McIlwee Company; Comex ) 

Construction Company; Signature Stairs of ) 

D and D Woodworking, Inc.; and Unknown ) 

Owners and Nonrecord Claimants, Defendants; ) 

John Baderman and Catherine Baderman, ) Honorable 

Third-Party Purchasers-Appellees and ) Robert G. Gibson, 

Cross-Appellants). ) Judge, Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices McLaren and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 This appeal concerns whether defendant, Syeda Nazia Rahman, was properly served and, 

if she was not, whether she could obtain relief. 
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¶ 2 Plaintiff, U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank), filed a complaint to foreclose a 

mortgage against, inter alios, defendant. U.S. Bank issued summonses for defendant and 

attempted service at two listed addresses. 

¶ 3 After defendant did not appear, U.S. Bank moved for a default judgment. The court 

granted the motion and entered a default judgment of foreclosure and sale. U.S. Bank 

subsequently sold the foreclosed property at a sheriff’s sale, and the court confirmed the report of 

sale. 

¶ 4 More than two years after the sale, defendant filed a petition to quash service of process 

because she had been improperly served by a special process server in Cook County in violation 

of section 2-202(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)). 

The court found that service had been improper under section 2-202(a), the court had lacked 

personal jurisdiction over defendant, and the default judgment was void. However, it also found 

that the property rights of Catherine and John Baderman, the third-party purchasers of the 

property, were protected by section 2-1401(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401(e) (West 2014)), 

because no jurisdictional defect affirmatively appeared on the face of the record.

¶ 5 Defendant appeals, and the Badermans cross-appeal. We affirm.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 U.S. Bank filed its complaint to foreclose a residential mortgage against defendant on 

September 29, 2009. U.S. Bank was represented by Pierce & Associates, P.C. Defendant agreed 

to the subject mortgage on July 30, 2007, and executed an accompanying note, promising to 

repay $1,496,000, plus interest. The subject property was commonly known as 612 North 

Jefferson Street, Hinsdale, Illinois, 60521 (Subject Property). 

¶ 8 U.S. Bank issued four summonses for this case on September 29, 2009. The summonses
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each included a service list containing 11 addresses, 2 of which were defendant’s addresses. 

Defendant’s addresses were at the Subject Property and at 827 Kensington Lane in Hanover Park 

(Hanover Park Address). The second, third, and fourth summonses were identical to the first, 

except that they were marked by a handwritten “duplicate 1,” “duplicate 2,” and “duplicate 3,” 

respectively. The service list attached to each duplicate summons was the same as that for the 

original summons, but different addresses were crossed off (but still legible) on each list. 

¶ 9 Every address on the service lists was marked with one of the following designations: 

DU, DS1, DS2, or DS3. On the service list accompanying the original summons, six addresses 

were crossed off, and the remaining five addresses were marked DU. On the service list 

accompanying the duplicate 1 summons, seven addresses were crossed out, and the remaining 

four addresses were marked DS1. On the service list accompanying the duplicate 2 summons, 

10 addresses were crossed out, and the last address was marked DS2. Following the pattern 

here, on the service list for the duplicate 3 summons, 10 addresses were crossed off and the 

remaining address was marked DS3. 

¶ 10 Pierce & Associates employed ProVest, LLC, as a special process server. Pamela 

Thornburg, a ProVest employee, averred that she served defendant at 318 Veronica Circle in 

Bartlett on October 4, 2009 (Bartlett Address). Thornburg separately averred that she also 

served defendant at the Hanover Park Address on October 7. 

¶ 11 On December 10, 2009, U.S. Bank moved for summary judgment, a default judgment of 

foreclosure and sale, and appointment of a foreclosure sale officer. Pierce & Associates certified 

that it served notice of the motion on defendant via United States mail at the Subject Property 

and the Hanover Park Address. The cause was continued on U.S. Bank’s request until July 13, 

2010. 
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¶ 12 On July 13, 2010, the court entered an order of default against, inter alios, defendant, for 

failure to appear or plead. The court further entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. The 

Subject Property was sold via a sheriff’s sale on January 26, 2012. On February 15, 2012, the 

court approved and confirmed the report of sale and ordered that the sheriff evict defendant from 

the Subject Property. The Badermans eventually purchased the Subject Property, obtaining the 

deed on December 27, 2012. 

¶ 13 On September 4, 2014, defendant filed a petition to quash service of process pursuant to 

sections 2-301 and 2-1401(f) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-301, 2-1401(f) (West 2014)) and a 

motion to dismiss the case under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (eff. July 1, 2007) because

U.S. Bank failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining service. U.S. Bank responded with three 

arguments against the petition to quash: first, that service was proper; second, that Cook County 

General Administrative Order 2007-03 (GAO 2007-03) allowed the service in that it permitted a 

law firm to move for a standing order to appoint a special process server for a term of three 

months, which Pierce & Associates had done; and third, that defendant failed to present any 

meritorious claims or defenses and failed to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing any claim or 

defense.

¶ 14 On November 24, 2014, the court held a hearing on defendant’s petition to quash service 

of process. Also on November 24, 2014, counsel for the Badermans filed an appearance.

¶ 15 At the hearing, the court first summarized the proceedings. It recounted that defendant 

was served twice: once at the Bartlett Address and once at the Hanover Park Address. She was 

served on both occasions by Thornburg. A judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered July 

13, 2010, in the amount of $1,745,283.22. The Subject Property was sold at the subsequent 

sheriff’s sale for $1,112,500, creating a deficiency of more than $886,000. However, U.S. Bank
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did not seek a personal deficiency judgment, and the court entered only an in rem judgment. 

¶ 16 Regarding defendant’s petition to quash service, the trial court reasoned as follows. First, 

it cited section 2-202(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)), which requires that 

service in Cook County be effected by the Cook County sheriff unless the plaintiff seeks leave to 

appoint a special process server. Here, the sheriff did not serve defendant, nor did the court 

appoint a special process server. The court noted that service by an unauthorized process server

was not good service. 

¶ 17 Next, addressing U.S. Bank’s second argument, it reasoned that GAO 2007-03 was

effective in Cook County but was not binding on Du Page County courts. Addressing U.S. 

Bank’s third argument, the court relied on Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 

95 (2002), and stated that an allegation of voidness made it unnecessary to allege facts 

constituting a meritorious defense or due diligence. Rather, Sarkissian required strict 

compliance with the statutes governing service of process before a court would acquire personal 

jurisdiction over defendant. Therefore, it granted defendant’s petition to quash service. 

¶ 18 Consequently, the court vacated the foreclosure judgment, the sheriff’s sale, and the order 

approving the sale. However, the court denied the motion to dismiss the case for U.S. Bank’s

lack of due diligence in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b), because U.S. Bank

promptly served defendant twice and merely lacked prudence in failing to obtain the 

appointment of a special process server. 

¶ 19 The court continued that, where an underlying judgment is void but the lack of 

jurisdiction did not affirmatively appear on the record when the judgment was entered, the 

subsequent vacation of the judgment does not affect any right, title, or interest in any real 

property acquired by third parties, pursuant to section 2-1401(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-
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1401(e) (West 2014)). The court reasoned that here the lack of jurisdiction did not affirmatively 

appear on the record. Both the Hanover Park and Bartlett addresses, where defendant was 

served, had portions in both Du Page and Cook counties. Therefore, external materials would 

have been necessary to determine whether service occurred in Cook or Du Page County. 

Supporting the court’s reasoning was the fact that defendant had to attach to her petition a 

printout showing that the addresses where service occurred were in Cook County. Therefore, the 

court did not see what defendant hoped to accomplish, because the only possible outcome was 

that U.S. Bank would seek a personal deficiency judgment of around $886,000 against her. 

¶ 20 Defendant filed a late notice of appeal, which we allowed on January 28, 2015. 

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 On appeal, defendant argues that section 2-1401(e) did not apply because (1) the trial 

court’s lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the record, and (2) the Badermans were 

not bona fide purchasers. We address each argument in turn. 

¶ 23 A. Jurisdiction 

¶ 24 Defendant argues that the court lacked jurisdiction over her and that the lack of 

jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the record. An order, judgment, or decree entered by a 

court without jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties is void and may be attacked, 

directly or indirectly, in any court at any time. Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 103. Personal 

jurisdiction must be established with service of process or voluntary submission to the court’s 

jurisdiction. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 18. Strict 

compliance with the statutes governing service of process is necessary. Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 

109. Accordingly, a judgment rendered without voluntary submission or service of process in 

strict compliance with statutory authority is void regardless of whether the defendant had actual 
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knowledge of the proceedings. See State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308 

(1986). 

¶ 25 A petitioner may attack a judgment as void in a section 2-1401 petition. Sarkissian, 201 

Ill. 2d at 105 (a petition seeking relief from a void judgment is a section 2-1401 petition). 

Typically, relief under section 2-1401 requires that a petitioner file, between 30 days and 2 years 

after the entry of the judgment, a petition showing: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or 

claim; (2) due diligence in presenting the defense or claim; and (3) due diligence in filing the 

petition. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986). However, a petition attacking a 

judgment as void is not subject to those requirements. In re Estate of Barth, 339 Ill. App. 3d 

651, 663 (2003); see 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2014). 

¶ 26 However, even if the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction, section 2-1401(e) may 

protect a bona fide purchaser for value. In re Application of the County Collector, 397 Ill. App. 

3d 535, 549 (2009). Section 2-1401(e) embodies the public policy respecting third-party 

purchasers of property and protecting them from the effects of an order setting aside a judgment 

affecting title to property. Christiansen v. Saylor, 297 Ill. App. 3d 719, 724 (1998). In 

particular, section 2-1401(e) protects a bona fide purchaser’s interest in real property where the 

defect in service is not apparent from the record and the bona fide purchaser was not a party to

the original action but acquired title before the filing of the petition. Id.; City of Rockford v. 

Lemar, 157 Ill. App. 3d 350, 352-53 (1987). 

¶ 27 In determining whether a lack of jurisdiction is apparent from the record, we look at the 

whole record, including the pleadings, the return of process, and the judgment of the trial court. 

Concord Air, Inc. v. Malarz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140639, ¶ 33. A lack of jurisdiction is apparent 

from the record if it does not require inquiry beyond the face of the record. See Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 
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at 314. Here, we review de novo defendant’s section 2-1401 claim because it is a purely legal 

claim challenging a final judgment as void. Warren County Soil & Water Conservation District 

v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 47. 

¶ 28 Defendant argues that the lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of the record, 

citing section 2-202(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)), which governs service 

of summons. Section 2-202(a) provided, in pertinent part, that service in a county with a 

population of 1 million or more required a court-appointed special process server if service was 

not provided by a sheriff.1

 Id. Here, U.S. Bank served defendant via a special process server, 

but the record contains no order appointing a special process server. Defendant argues that such

an order was necessary pursuant to section 2-202(a) of the Code because service occurred in 

Cook County, which had a population of 1 million or more. Defendant also points to the 

designations on the service lists―DU, DS1, DS2, and DS3―to argue that U.S. Bank knew that 

certain addresses were outside of Du Page County. Defendant argues that DU stood for Du Page 

and that DS1, DS2, and DS3 stood for addresses outside of Du Page. Therefore, defendant 

asserts, the record was clear that U.S. Bank served her in Cook County in contravention of

section 2-202(a). 

¶ 29 The Badermans respond that service was proper and that, in any event, the claimed 

jurisdictional defect did not affirmatively appear on the face of the record. First, they argue that 

service was proper because the relevant county under section 2-202(a) was the county in which 

the case was pending, that is, Du Page County. They cite Schorsch v. Fireside Chrysler-

 1 We note that in 2010 the legislature amended section 2-202(a) to allow special service 

without a court appointment in a county with a population of less than 2 million. Pub. Act 96-

1451 § 5 (eff. Aug. 20, 2010) (amending 735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)). 
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Plymouth, Mazda, Inc., 172 Ill. App. 3d 993, 996-98 (1988), and attack its holding that the 

county of service, not the venue of the case, is the relevant county for purposes of section 2-

202(a). They argue that the Schorsch holding “does not necessarily follow from the authority 

cited,” including historical notes and legislative debates. 

¶ 30 Moreover, the Badermans refer us to the standing order, filed in Cook County chancery 

court, that permitted ProVest to serve process for Pierce & Associates for a period of three 

months, including October 2009. Therefore, they argue, service on defendant in Cook County

was authorized by a court order and did not violate section 2-202(a). 

¶ 31 The Badermans continue that, even if there was a jurisdictional defect, it was not

apparent on the face of the record. They argue that there are two kinds of jurisdictional defects: 

those apparent on the face of the record and those not apparent. They argue that an example of 

an apparent defect occurred in Malarz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140639, ¶ 44, where service by 

publication was improper. There, service was attempted on the wrong person at the wrong 

address, with the defect evident from the materials filed along with the plaintiff’s affidavit of 

nonservice. Id. However, the defect is not always apparent from the record, and section 2-

1401(e) requires that the defect “affirmatively” appear from the record. Here, the Badermans 

argue that, unlike in Malarz, no defect affirmatively appeared on the face of the record. In 

particular, they argue that service by a duplicate summons did not affirmatively show that 

service was made in Cook County. 

¶ 32 Defendant replies that section 2-202(a) of the Code was unambiguous in stating that 

serving summons in a county with a population of 1 million people or more via a special process 

server required leave of court, and U.S. Bank did not seek leave of court. 
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¶ 33 We agree with defendant that the service of process was improper—and that thus the trial 

court lacked personal jurisdiction over her—but we agree with the Badermans that the lack of 

jurisdiction did not affirmatively appear on the face of the record. First, the service was 

improper with respect to defendant. Service was made via special process server at the Bartlett 

and Hanover Park addresses. These addresses were located in Cook County, which had a 

population of 1 million or more. See People ex rel. County of Du Page v. Smith, 21 Ill. 2d 572, 

579 (1961) (taking judicial notice of the population of Cook County). Pursuant to section 2-

202(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008)), process could be served by a special 

process server, but in a county with a population of 1 million or more, the special process server 

must have first been appointed by the court. See West Suburban Bank v. Advantage Financial 

Partners, LLC, 2014 IL App (2d) 131146, ¶ 15. Here, U.S. Bank did not seek the appointment 

of a special process server. However, the Badermans argue that service was proper because the 

relevant county for purposes of section 2-202(a) is the county in which the case is pending, not 

the county where service is processed. 

¶ 34 We reject the Badermans’ invitation to reinterpret section 2-202(a) to hold that the 

relevant county is the county in which the case is pending. The Badermans’ disagreement with

Schorsch is misplaced. Schorsch rightly held that, under the plain language of section 2-202(a), 

service by a special process server was authorized without a court appointment only in a county

with a population of less than 1 million. Section 2-202(a) provided that “[i]n counties with a 

population of less than 1,000,000, process may be served, without special appointment,” by 

certain licensed or registered persons. 735 ILCS 5/2-202(a) (West 2008). The plain language of 

the statute was clearly concerned with where the service takes place—“In counties with a 

population of less than 1,000,000”—not where the case is pending. There was no reference in 
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section 2-202(a) to the county in which the case is pending. Other appellate courts have cited

Schorsch’s interpretation approvingly. See Malarz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140639, ¶ 39; 

C.T.A.S.S.&U. Federal Credit Union v. Johnson, 383 Ill. App. 3d 909, 912 (2008) (section 2-202 

requires that a private detective serving process in Cook County be appointed by the trial court). 

While Schorsch referenced historical notes and legislative debates outside of the language of the 

statute to bolster its interpretation, these references were not essential to its holding based on the 

plain language of the statute. Accordingly, we reject the Badermans’ argument that we should 

revisit Schorsch and hold that the relevant county under section 2-202(a) is the county in which 

the case is pending. 

¶ 35 We further reject that the standing order appointing ProVest as Pierce & Associates’ 

special process server, issued by a Cook County circuit court pursuant to GAO 2007-03, made 

service proper. The standing order appointing ProVest was for “cases filed by *** Pierce & 

Associates, P.C. in the Mortgage Foreclosure Section of the Chancery Division pursuant to 735 

ILCS 5/2-202.” The standing order’s clear language indicates that the order applied only to 

cases filed in Cook County chancery court. This echoes the language of GAO 2007-03, which 

provided that law firms handling mortgage foreclosure cases in the Cook County chancery 

division may move for standing orders for the appointment of designated special process servers. 

Sewickley, LLC v. Chicago Title Land Trust Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 112977, ¶ 20. GAO 2007-03 

provided, in pertinent part: 

“ ‘Because of the increase in mortgage foreclosure filings and insufficient resources 

allocated to the Chancery Division’s Clerk’s Office, the Clerk of the Court has been 

unable to process promptly Motions for Appointment of Special Process Servers and 

Orders Appointing Special Process Servers.’ ” Id. (quoting GAO 2007-03). 
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The purpose of GAO 2007-03 was to alleviate a problem particular to Cook County—that is, the 

efficient appointment of special process servers in Cook County chancery court. Therefore, 

unlike section 2-202(a) as properly interpreted, GAO 2007-03 was concerned with the county in 

which the case was pending: Cook County. Because this case originated in Du Page County, 

GAO 2007-03 was inapplicable, and the trial court rightly found that it was not binding on the 

Du Page County circuit court. 

¶ 36 We conclude that service of process was improper and that therefore the trial court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over defendant and the judgment was void. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d at 308. 

Nevertheless, section 2-1401(e) protects third-party purchasers if the jurisdictional defect does

not affirmatively appear on the face of the record. 

¶ 37 Here, defendant argues that the jurisdictional defect affirmatively appeared on the face of 

the record. She argues that the summonses and accompanying service lists were sufficient to put 

the Badermans on notice that service by a special process server would have required a court 

order. In support, defendant references the abbreviations on the summonses: DU, DS1, DS2, 

and DS3. Defendant argues that DU indicates service within Du Page County and that DS1, 

DS2, and DS3 indicate service outside of Du Page County. Furthermore, defendant argues that 

she was first served not at the Subject Property but instead at the Bartlett Address, which was 

outside of Du Page County. 

¶ 38 We disagree with defendant. A review of the summonses and their attached service lists

logically implies that DS1 stands for “duplicate summons 1,” DS2 for “duplicate summons 2,” 

and DS3 for “duplicate summons 3.” The service list attached to duplicate summons 1 has all 

addresses crossed off except those marked DS1. Likewise, the lists attached to duplicate 

summonses 2 and 3 have all addresses crossed off except those marked DS2 and DS3, 
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respectively. At the very least, nothing on the summonses or the corresponding service lists 

shows that DS1, DS2, and DS3 necessarily designated summonses to be served outside of Du 

Page County. Therefore, we reject defendant’s argument that the summonses demonstrate that 

service took place outside of Du Page County. 

¶ 39 Nor do the affidavits of service affirmatively show that service took place in Cook 

County. Thornburg provided affidavits of service on defendant at the Bartlett Address and the 

Hanover Park Address.

2

 Like with the summonses, it was impossible to determine in which 

county service occurred from the face of the affidavits—outside materials were necessary. 

Therefore, we cannot say that the jurisdictional defect affirmatively appeared on the face of the 

record. 

¶ 40 B. Bona Fide Purchasers

¶ 41 Defendant also argues that the Badermans have not proved that they were bona fide

purchasers for purposes of section 2-1401(e). Section 2-1401(e) has been interpreted by Illinois 

courts as intending to protect bona fide purchasers for value. Mortgage Electronic Systems v. 

Gipson, 379 Ill. App. 3d 622, 633 (2008). A purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser if he or she 

had constructive notice of an outstanding title or right of another party. Bank of New York v. 

Unknown Heirs & Legatees, 369 Ill. App. 3d 472, 477 (2006). 

¶ 42 Here, defendant argues that, because the lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the face of 

the record, the Badermans had constructive notice of her outstanding right and title to the Subject 

 2 There was also an affidavit of nonservice, provided by Michael Menichini, for 

defendant at 612 N. Jefferson Street, Hinsdale, Du Page County. Service was not completed 

because the home was vacant, the utilities were not on, and the white pickup truck in the 

driveway had no license plates.
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Property. However, we have already rejected that the lack of jurisdiction was apparent on the 

face of the record. Contrary to defendant’s argument, a simple review of the record would not 

have revealed a jurisdictional defect. As discussed supra, neither the service lists nor the 

affidavits of service affirmatively demonstrated a lack of jurisdiction. Rather, the service lists 

and affidavits of service would lead a reasonably prudent purchaser to conclude that service took 

place in Du Page County, thereby permitting service by a special process server without an 

appointment by the court. Accordingly, we find that there is no basis in the record to conclude 

that the Badermans were anything but bona fide purchasers under section 2-1401(e). Therefore, 

section 2-1401(e) protected their rights in the Subject Property despite the jurisdictional defect.

¶ 43 C. The Badermans’ Remaining Arguments 

¶ 44 The Badermans argue that defendant’s petition should have been barred by laches. 

Laches is an affirmative defense, equitable in nature, and it requires the party raising it to show 

that there was unreasonable delay in bringing an action and that the delay caused prejudice. 

Hynes v. Snyder, 355 Ill. App. 3d 394, 398 (2005). Defendant argues that laches is inapplicable 

when a judgment is void, because a void judgment may be attacked at any time. Moreover, the 

Badermans did not raise the issue below—although they argue that they did not have time to do 

so. We need not reach these arguments. The issue is moot because we have already determined

that section 2-1401(e) of the Code protects the Badermans’ rights in the Subject Property, 

regardless of defendant’s petition to quash service. 

¶ 45 Likewise, we need not address the Badermans’ argument that defendant’s petition was 

barred by section 30 of the Conveyances Act (765 ILCS 5/30 (West 2014)), because we have 

already held that their rights in the Subject Property were protected under section 2-1401(e) of 

the Code. 
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¶ 46 Finally, we decline the Badermans’ invitation to revisit Sarkissian and Thill in light of 

Justice Birkett’s special concurrence in West Suburban Bank, 2014 IL App (2d) 131146. We are 

bound to follow our supreme court’s precedent (Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 

366 Ill. App. 3d 730, 734 (2006)), and, in any event, we have already ruled in the Badermans’ 

favor. 

¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 48 Service of process was defective, rendering the judgment against defendant void. 

Nevertheless, section 2-1401(e) protected the Badermans’ rights in the Subject Property. 

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Du Page County circuit court. 

¶ 49 Affirmed.