[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11731

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

LOUIS MATTHEW CLEMENTS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GOVERNOR, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

COMMISSIONER OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW 

ENFORCEMENT, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11731

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:23-cv-00024-AW-MAF

____________________

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Louis Clements appeals from the district court’s sua sponte

dismissal of (1) his claims challenging Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.0405 

without prejudice for lack of standing and (2) his claims challenging 

Florida’s sex-offender-registration scheme, Fla. Stat. Ann.

§§ 943.0435 and 775.21, with prejudice for failure to state a claim 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Clements argues on appeal that the 

district court erred in dismissing his case for lack of standing because he suffered a cognizable injury in fact that the district court 

could have remedied. He also argues that the district court erred 

in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim because it 

alleged sufficient facts to show that the relevant Florida statutes violated various constitutional provisions. We’ll address each argument in turn.

The facts are known to the parties, and we repeat them here 

only as necessary to resolve the case.1

1 We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of standing de novo. Scott v. 

Taylor, 470 F.3d 1014, 1017 (11th Cir. 2006). We also review a district court’s 

sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1) de novo. Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2023). 

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23-11731 Opinion of the Court 3

I

“Article III [of the U.S. Constitution] grants federal courts 

the ‘judicial Power’ to resolve only ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” 

Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 

2020) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1–2). “As a result, federal 

courts may exercise their power only for ‘the determination of real, 

earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.’” Id. (quoting 

Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)). 

To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must show three elements: 

“[T]he plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, the defendant 

must have caused that injury, and a favorable decision must be 

likely to redress it.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560–61 (1992)). “An injury in fact consists of ‘an invasion of a 

legally protected interest’ that is both ‘concrete and particularized’

and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id.

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de 

facto’—that is, it must be ‘real, and not abstract.’ . . . A ‘particularized’ injury ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual 

way.’” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 

330, 339–40 (2016)).

A Florida statute that was repealed in 2018 addressed when 

a “marriage license may be issued to persons under 18 years” as 

follows: 

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by 

attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed. Id. 

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If either of the parties shall be under the age of 18 

years but at least 16 years of age, the county court 

judge or clerk of the circuit court shall issue a license 

for the marriage of such party only if there is first presented and filed with him or her the written consent 

of the parents or guardian of such minor to such marriage.

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.0405(1) (repealed 2018). It also stated, 

When the fact of pregnancy is verified by the written 

statement of a licensed physician, the county court 

judge of any county in the state may, in his or her discretion, issue a license to marry: . . . To any female 

under the age of 18 years and male over the age of 18 

years upon the female’s application sworn under oath 

that she is an expectant parent.

Id. § 741.0405(3)(b) (repealed 2018).

Clements’s arguments against § 741.0405 fail to establish 

standing because he cannot satisfy either the injury-in-fact prong 

or the redressability prong. First, as to injury in fact, nowhere in 

Clements’s operative complaint did he state how he met either of 

the statutory provisions that would have allowed him to marry a 

minor. He didn’t indicate that the crime for which he pleaded 

guilty involved a minor who was at least 16 years old and had parental consent to marry. Nor did he allege that he had impregnated 

a minor under the age of 18 while he was over the age of 18. Because Clements didn’t fit the statutory provisions, he cannot show 

he was injured by this section of the Florida statute. Additionally, 

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even if he could have shown that he met the statutory factors, the 

contention that he could have married the victim is purely speculative, and so the alleged injury cannot meet the injury-in-fact standard. See Trichell, 964 F.3d at 996.

Regarding redressability, Florida repealed § 741.0405 in 2018. 

This means that the district court could provide no redress to remedy any injury that might have been caused by the provision. It 

also couldn’t provide redress for Clements’s conviction or sentence 

because he challenged neither of those.

Because Clements can’t meet either the injury-in-fact or redressability requirements necessary to show Article III standing, 

the district court didn’t err in dismissing his claim challenging 

§ 741.0405 for lack of standing. See Trichell, 964 F.3d at 996.

II

When a plaintiff files a civil action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the district court must review it and dismiss the 

filed complaint if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1). 

We apply the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

in reviewing dismissals under § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a 

claim. Christmas, 76 F.4th at 1328. “A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, 

show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 

199, 215 (2007). A complaint need not have “detailed factual allegations, but it” must have “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11731

662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A pleading 

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). A complaint also fails “if it tenders naked 

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration 

in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Clements’s operative complaint asserted a variety of challenges to Florida’s sex-offender registration scheme, Fla. Stat. Ann. 

§§ 943.0435 and 775.21, including broad allegations that they violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well 

as the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses. U.S. Const. art. 

I, § 9, cl. 3. 

All of Clements’s constitutional contentions except his expost-facto argument provided no specific facts as to how 

§§ 943.0534 and 775.21 violated the Constitution. The challenges 

under these provisions fail because they amount to nothing more 

than “labels and conclusions” and “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original). 

Clements’s ex-post-facto challenge had more substance to it. 

Unfortunately for Clements, we foreclosed that argument in Houston v. Williams where we held that Florida’s sex-offender registration scheme was regulatory, not punitive, and, thus, did not violate 

the Ex Post Facto Clause. 547 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003)).

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III

The district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing Clements’s complaint because he lacked standing with respect to his 

claims challenging § 741.0405 and because his claims challenging 

§§ 943.0435 and 775.21 failed to state a claim.

AFFIRMED.

 

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