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*********************************************** 
GABRIELLE DITULLIO v. LM GENERAL

INSURANCE COMPANY

(AC 44114)

Alvord, Suarez and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to confirm an arbitration award against the defendant

arising out of a separate action in which she sought to recover damages

from the insurer L for underinsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff

previously had received a $20,000 settlement from a tortfeasor in connection with injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle collision. In bringing

the underinsured motorist action against L, the plaintiff alleged that the

$20,000 settlement was insufficient to fully compensate her and that

L was legally responsible for damages in excess of the underinsured

motorist’s coverage. The plaintiff, the defendant and L ultimately agreed

to settle the case by means of binding arbitration and entered into a

written arbitration agreement. Thereafter, an arbitrator issued an award

in the amount of $33,807.50. The arbitrator made no findings regarding

collateral sources, which were to be deducted from the total damages

pursuant to the parties’ arbitration agreement. The parties subsequently

agreed with each other as to the amounts of collateral sources, but

disagreed as to whether the $20,000 settlement should be deducted from

the award. The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff’s application

to confirm the award, in which it argued, inter alia, that it was legally

responsible only for damages exceeding the $20,000 settlement that the

plaintiff already had received from the tortfeasor. The defendant did

not otherwise file a motion to modify or to correct the award. Thereafter,

upon the parties’ request, the arbitrator issued an articulation stating

that the award of $33,807.50 was a full value award, which did not take

into account any collateral sources or offsets, or the $20,000 settlement.

Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment confirming the award

with deductions of $1020.02 in collateral sources and $20,000 to offset

the prior settlement, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court properly deducted $20,000 from the arbitration award to

offset the settlement that the plaintiff had received from the tortfeasor:

although the plaintiff claimed that the court lacked statutory and common-law authority to modify the award, this court concluded that the

trial court did not modify the award but, instead, merely conformed the

award to the parties’ arbitration agreement; moreover, in light of the

agreement’s reference to the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist lawsuit

and the nature of her underlying claim, the only reasonable interpretation

of the agreement was that the parties initially contemplated and agreed

that the arbitrator’s gross award would be the sum of the plaintiff’s total

economic and noneconomic damages, less the $20,000 she had received

from the tortfeasor; furthermore, although the arbitration agreement

provided that the arbitrator would calculate the gross award and then

deduct damages determined to be collateral sources, the arbitrator made

clear in his decision and in his articulation that his award was for the

full value of the plaintiff’s damages, without considering the issues of

collateral sources or offsets, demonstrating that the parties subsequently

modified their written agreement and submitted to the arbitrator only

the question of the plaintiff’s total economic and noneconomic damages

and preserving the written agreement’s provisions limiting the defendant’s liability only to those damages in excess of the $20,000 settlement

and any collateral sources.

2. This court concluded that, although the trial court properly deducted

the $20,000 settlement from the arbitration award, it miscalculated the

amount of the judgment: subtracting the collateral sources and the

settlement from the arbitrator’s full value award yielded the sum of

$12,787.48, not the amount of $12,500 that the trial court had calculated.

Argued May 11, 2021—officially released February 1, 2022

Procedural History
Application to confirm an arbitration award, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury,

and tried to the court, Brazzel-Massaro, J.; judgment

confirming and clarifying the award, from which the

plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed in part;

reversed in part; judgment directed.

James M. Harrington, with whom, on the brief, was

Joseph T. Coppola II, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Matthias J. DeAngelo, with whom, on the brief, was

Evan Tegtmeier, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

CLARK, J. This appeal concerns an arbitration award

(award) that arose out of an underinsured motorist

cause of action. The plaintiff, Gabrielle DiTullio,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court ‘‘confirming

the arbitration award with a deduction for the $20,000

offset to clarify the amount to be awarded is $12,500

in accordance with the law.’’ (Emphasis added.) On

appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly

deducted $20,000 from the award because the court (1)

lacked statutory authority to do so, as the defendant,

LM General Insurance Company, failed to file a motion

to modify, correct, or vacate the award pursuant to

General Statutes § 52-407tt, § 52-407xx, or § 52-407ww,

and also (2) lacked common-law authority to do so.1

We conclude that the deduction was proper, but on

different grounds than those relied upon by the court.2

The court had authority to deduct the $20,000 settlement from the tortfeasor from the full value arbitration

award to conform the award to the parties’ written

agreement. The court, however, miscalculated the

amount of the judgment, and thus, we affirm in part

and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts.

The plaintiff was injured on March 30, 2015, when her

motor vehicle was struck in Bethel by a vehicle operated

by Tracie Fabri-Lino (tortfeasor). At the time of the

collision, the plaintiff’s vehicle was insured by Liberty

Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual).3 The

plaintiff settled her claims against the tortfeasor for

$20,000. Thereafter, in January, 2018, the plaintiff commenced an underinsured motorist action (UIM case)

against Liberty Mutual,4 alleging that she had sustained

injuries, damages, and other losses as a direct result of

the tortfeasor’s negligence. She also alleged that she

had settled her claim against the tortfeasor for $20,000,

the limit of the tortfeasor’s liability policy. Significantly

with respect to the present appeal, the plaintiff alleged

that the settlement was ‘‘insufficient to fully compensate [her] for her damages and losses. . . . Wherefore

[Liberty Mutual] . . . is legally responsible for all damages in excess of the underinsured driver’s coverage.’’

(Emphasis added.)

A pretrial settlement conference in the UIM case was

held in May, 2019, at which time the parties were unable

to agree on a sum to resolve the litigation. They agreed,

however, to settle the UIM case by means of binding

arbitration and that the UIM case would be withdrawn.

On May 31, 2019, the plaintiff, Liberty Mutual, and the

defendant signed an arbitration agreement (written

agreement) that provides in relevant part: ‘‘[The parties]

have agreed to arbitrate the UM/UIM Plaintiff’s claim

against the [defendant and Liberty Mutual] regarding a

motor vehicle accident which occurred on March 30,

2015 . . . . [T]he [p]arties hereby agree to the follow-
ing:

‘‘1. The issues in the Lawsuit shall be resolved by

means of binding arbitration, and the Lawsuit shall

be resolved by way of release and withdrawal of

action. . . .

‘‘2. The Arbitrator shall be mutually agreed upon

. . . . All issues of liability, causation, and damages

shall be decided by the Arbitrator.

* * *

‘‘6. Following the arbitration hearing in connection

with this matter, the Arbitrator will render a decision

containing a ‘Gross Award.’

‘‘7. After determining the Gross Award, the Arbitrator

is to deduct from total damages, all economic damages

determined to be collateral sources.

‘‘8. After the agreed deductions from the Gross Award

per Paragraph 7, the resulting sum shall be the ‘Net

Award.’

‘‘9. The parameters of the arbitration shall be subject

to a confidential high/low agreement wherein the Net

Award to the Plaintiff, per Paragraph 8, will be no higher

than thirty-two thousand five hundred dollars ($32,500)

and no lower than two thousand five hundred dollars

($2,500).

‘‘10. In the event that the Net Award is $32,500 or

greater, then the sum due . . . shall be $32,500. In the

event the Net Award is $2,500 or less, then the Sum

Due shall be $2,500.

‘‘11. None of the parties will disclose the high and

low figures of this Agreement to the Arbitrator. . . .’’5

(Emphasis added.)

On July 9, 2019, Attorney Christopher P. Kriesen

(arbitrator) held an arbitration hearing, and on July 12,

2019, he issued a written decision. In his decision, the

arbitrator found that the tortfeasor’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. He also found

that the plaintiff had received treatment from several

medical providers, but was able to complete training

at the police academy and become a patrol officer. The

arbitrator found that the plaintiff’s economic damages

were $13,807.50, her noneconomic damages were

$20,000, and the award was $33,807.50. The arbitrator

further stated that he made ‘‘no finding on collateral

sources. If the parties are unable to agree on the issue,

they may submit the issue to me.’’6 Neither the plaintiff

nor the defendant and Liberty Mutual filed with the

arbitrator a motion to modify or correct the award

pursuant to § 52-407tt.7

Thereafter, counsel for the plaintiff informed counsel

for the defendant and Liberty Mutual that the collateral

source payments totaled $1020.02. Counsel subtracted

the collateral source amount from the arbitrator’s eco-
nomic award, added the remainder to the arbitrator’s

$20,000 noneconomic award, and stated that the net

award was $32,787.48, which should be reduced to

$32,500 in accordance with the ‘‘high/low’’ provision set

forth in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the written agreement.

Counsel for the defendant and Liberty Mutual agreed

with respect to the amount of collateral source payments, but countered that the $20,000 settlement that

the plaintiff had received from the tortfeasor also had

to be subtracted from the award, resulting in a net

award of $12,787.48. Counsel for the plaintiff disagreed,

contending that the agreement was for ‘‘new money’’

and that the written agreement did not include a provision regarding the $20,000 tortfeasor settlement. Counsel were unable to resolve their disagreement, and on

July 19, 2019, the plaintiff moved to restore the UIM

case. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

On September 27, 2019, the plaintiff commenced the

present proceeding to confirm the award; she also filed

a motion to stay the UIM case. In her application to

confirm the award, the plaintiff asked the court to

‘‘order that the defendant comply with the terms of

the arbitration agreement and that the plaintiff be paid

$32,500 pursuant to that agreement and the arbitrator’s

award.’’ In her application, the plaintiff argued that the

court must confirm the award unless it finds grounds

to vacate, modify, or correct the award as permitted

by statute. She also argued that the agreement was

clear and unambiguous, made no mention of the $20,000

settlement and provided that only collateral sources,

which pursuant to General Statutes § 52-225b8 do not

include amounts received as a settlement, were to be

deducted from the gross award.

On October 11, 2019, the defendant filed an objection

to the plaintiff’s application to confirm the award on

the ground that it was frivolous given that there was a

prior lawsuit pending before the court. It also argued

that the plaintiff was asking the court to confirm ‘‘an

arbitration award without taking into account the

nature of the claim. This claim is, and always was, a

contractual claim for underinsured motorist benefits.’’

The defendant argued, as well, that the complaint in

the plaintiff’s underlying UIM case alleged that the

defendant and Liberty Mutual are ‘‘legally responsible

for all damages in excess of the [underinsured] driver’s

coverage.’’ (Emphasis altered.) The defendant also

argued that ‘‘it is well established that a plaintiff is not

[to] be compensated twice for the same damages.’’ The

defendant suggested that the parties return to the arbitrator for clarification of the award, noting that the

arbitrator had not made a finding with regard to collateral sources and that the arbitrator had invited the

parties to return if they were unable to agree with

respect to collateral sources.

The parties returned to the arbitrator on October 30,
2019, and requested that he articulate his July 12, 2019

award. On the same date, the arbitrator issued an articulation, stating that ‘‘the award of $33,807.50 is a ‘full

value’ award, taking into account only the facts and

basis set forth in the decision. . . . The award does

not take into account any collateral sources or offsets.

. . . The award does not take into account in any way

the $20,000 payment apparently made by the alleged

tortfeasor. This amount was disclosed to the arbitrator

in a position statement (which was not evidence) by

the plaintiff and in a deposition transcript submitted

by the defendant (but which was not considered since

it was irrelevant to the arbitrator’s determination of

the award and was therefore not deemed a fact by the

arbitrator). . . . The arbitrator will consider any

issues of collateral sources and/or offsets if the parties

have agreed, or do agree, to have these issues considered by the arbitrator.’’ (Emphasis added.)

On March 9, 2020, the parties appeared before the

court for a hearing on the plaintiff’s application to confirm the award. The court issued a memorandum of

decision on May 19, 2020, in which it noted that the

plaintiff had moved to confirm the award, and that,

under Connecticut law, a court must confirm an award

unless a motion to vacate, modify or correct the award

is filed and granted in accordance with the statutes

governing such motions.9 The plaintiff argued that

because no motion to vacate, modify or correct had

been filed, the court’s review was limited to determining

whether the arbitrator decided only matters the parties

submitted to arbitration, as defined by the written

agreement. She also argued that the written agreement

is clear and unambiguous and only permits deductions

for collateral sources, which, according to her, do not

include prior settlements.

The court also noted the defendant’s objection, in

which the defendant argued that the application to confirm was frivolous when filed because the UIM case

had been restored to the docket and remained pending

at that time. The defendant noted that the plaintiff was

asking the court to confirm the award without taking

into account the nature of the underlying contractual

claim for underinsured motorist benefits or the plaintiff’s UIM lawsuit, which were incorporated into the

written agreement by reference, and the defendant

alleged that it was legally responsible only for damages

exceeding the $20,000 settlement that the plaintiff

already had received from the tortfeasor.

In addition, during the March 9, 2020 hearing on the

plaintiff’s application to confirm, ‘‘the defendant also

alleged that the parties agreed to an offset and stated

in front of the arbitrator that he did not need to take

that into consideration because the parties had agreed

to the offset.’’ The plaintiff denied that there had been

any conversation with the arbitrator about an offset
and the court ultimately concluded that it was ‘‘not

necessary . . . to address any disagreement between

the parties about the subject of discussing the offset

with the arbitrator, as the arbitrator explained that the

award was a full value award, and though he was aware

of the offset, he did not consider it because it was

irrelevant in determining the award.’’

Turning to the merits of the plaintiff’s application to

confirm, the court found that the plaintiff’s underlying

claim was a contractual one for underinsured motorist

benefits. It also found that the written agreement was

clear and unambiguous, but that it did not mention

offsets for prior settlements. In addition, neither party

took issue with the decision rendered by the arbitrator.

Instead, they disagreed about whether an offset should

be subtracted from the arbitrator’s full value award.

Even though the defendant had not filed with the

court a motion to vacate, modify, or correct the award

pursuant to the statutory provisions authorizing such

filings, the court nevertheless considered the defendant’s objection and reviewed the law governing underinsured motorist coverage. In considering the plaintiff’s

application to confirm, the court stated that it was ‘‘necessary to also apply to the present case the fundamental

principle of the purpose of underinsured motorist insurance recognized by [Connecticut courts], which is to

place the insured in the same, but not better, position

as the insured would have been if the underinsured

tortfeasor had been fully insured, and the requirement

regarding automobile liability policies in [General Statutes] § 38a-335 (c) that no one is entitled to receive

duplicate payments for the same element of loss,’’ citing

Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17,

27, 699 A.2d 964 (1997) (public policy established by

underinsured motorist statute is that every insured entitled to recover for damages he or she would have been

able to recover if underinsured motorist had maintained

adequate policy of liability insurance), and Fahey v.

Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 49 Conn. App. 306, 309–10,

714 A.2d 686 (1998) (purpose of underinsured motorist

coverage is to protect named insured and additional

insured from suffering inadequately compensated

injury caused by accident with inadequately insured

automobile; in no event shall any person be entitled to

duplicate payments for same element of loss).

In ruling on the plaintiff’s motion to confirm, the

court noted the articulation that the award is a ‘‘full

value award has significance in deciphering the award

as no more than $32,500, which would not [have been]

so if the court awarded the entire sum in addition to the

settlement amount of $20,000.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

Therefore, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-407vv, the

court confirmed the award, but also ordered that ‘‘in

confirming the award, the $20,000 offset must be

deducted to clarify the amount to be awarded’’ to the
plaintiff is ‘‘$12,500 in accordance with the law.’’

(Emphasis added.) The plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, the plaintiff’s principal claim is that the

court lacked statutory and common-law authority to

modify the award. We agree that it would have been

improper for the court to modify the arbitrator’s award.

It is well settled that courts generally lack the authority to review unrestricted arbitration awards for errors

of law, particularly in the absence of a motion to vacate.

Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 80,

881 A.2d 139 (2005); id., 81 (motion to vacate should

be granted when arbitrator exceeded powers or so

imperfectly executed them that mutual, final, definite

award not made). ‘‘Judicial review of arbitral decisions

is narrowly confined.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. New England Health Care Employees

Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, 265 Conn. 771, 777,

830 A.2d 729 (2003). ‘‘[T]he law in this state takes a

strongly affirmative view of consensual arbitration.

. . . Arbitration is a favored method to prevent litigation, promote tranquility and expedite the equitable settlement of disputes.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocky Hill Teachers’ Assn. v.

Board of Education, 72 Conn. App. 274, 278, 804 A.2d

999, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 907, 810 A.2d 272 (2002).

‘‘Where the submission does not otherwise state, the

arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal

questions and an award cannot be vacated on the

grounds that . . . the interpretation of the agreement

by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review

the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted,

will they review the arbitrators’ decision of the legal

questions involved. . . . In other words, [u]nder an

unrestricted submission, the arbitrators’ decision is

considered final and binding; thus courts will not review

the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they

review the award for errors of law or fact. . . .’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 80.10

We, however, conclude that the court did not modify

the arbitrator’s award, but, in confirming the award as

it did, merely effectuated the parties’ written agreement.

As it did at trial, the defendant claims that the trial

court’s decision to deduct $20,000 from the award was

proper because making that deduction conformed the

arbitrator’s award to the parties’ agreement. For the

reasons that follow, we agree.

‘‘Arbitration agreements are contracts and their

meaning is to be determined . . . under accepted rules

of [state] contract law . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Levine v. Advest, Inc., 244 Conn. 732,

745, 714 A.2d 649 (1998). ‘‘When a party asserts a claim

that challenges the . . . construction of a contract, we

must first ascertain whether the relevant language in

the agreement is ambiguous. . . . A contract is ambig-
uous if the intent of the parties is not clear and certain

from the language of the contract itself. . . . When the

language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination

of the parties’ intent is a question of fact . . . . If a

contract is unambiguous within its four corners, intent

of the parties is a question of law requiring plenary

review. . . . Where the language of a contract is clear

and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect

according to its terms.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v. Waterbury, 286

Conn. 732, 743–44, 945 A.2d 936 (2008).

The parties’ written agreement in this case provides,

in relevant part, that ‘‘[the plaintiff] and [the defendant

and Liberty Mutual] . . . have agreed to arbitrate the

UM/UIM Plaintiff’s claim against the [defendant and

Liberty Mutual] regarding a motor vehicle accident

. . . . The issues in the [l]awsuit shall be resolved by

means of binding arbitration . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

The circumstances surrounding the making of the written agreement were the parties’ inability to settle the

UIM case. The parties, therefore, entered into the agreement to resolve the plaintiff’s UIM lawsuit. The plaintiff’s complaint in that lawsuit specifically alleged that

the tortfeasor’s $20,000 settlement with the plaintiff was

insufficient to fully compensate her for her damages

and losses and that Liberty Mutual was legally responsible for all damages in excess of the tortfeasor’s coverage.

The written agreement further provides that the arbitrator would render a ‘‘Gross Award.’’ After determining

the ‘‘Gross Award,’’ the written agreement stated that

the arbitrator would ‘‘deduct from total damages, all

economic damages determined to be collateral

sources.’’ The resulting sum would constitute the ‘‘Net

Award.’’ The ‘‘Sum Due’’ would be the ‘‘Net Award,’’

subject to the agreement’s ‘‘high/low’’ provision.11 In

light of the written agreement’s reference to the plaintiff’s lawsuit and the nature of her underlying claim,

the only reasonable interpretation of the agreement is

that the parties initially contemplated and agreed that

the arbitrator’s ‘‘Gross Award’’ would be the sum of the

plaintiff’s total economic and noneconomic damages,

less the $20,000 she had received from the tortfeasor.

The ‘‘Net Award,’’ in turn, would be that sum less ‘‘all

economic damages determined to be collateral

sources.’’ The arbitrator’s decision and articulation

make clear, however, that the parties ultimately submitted a different question to him.

In his decision, the arbitrator found that the tortfeasor caused the plaintiff’s injuries and that the plaintiff

sustained $20,000 in noneconomic damages and

$13,807.50 in economic damages. He issued an ‘‘Award’’

in the amount of $33,807.50. He made no mention of a

‘‘Gross Award’’ or ‘‘Net Award’’ and made no findings

regarding ‘‘collateral sources.’’ Instead, he informed the

parties that if they were ‘‘unable to agree on the issue,
they may submit the issue to me.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The parties subsequently agreed to return to the arbitrator for a clarification of his award. The arbitrator

articulated that the award was a ‘‘ ‘full value’ award,

taking into account only the facts and basis set forth

in the decision.’’ The arbitrator also stated in his articulation that ‘‘[t]he award does not take into account any

collateral sources or offsets. . . . The award does not

take into account in any way the $20,000 payment

apparently made by the alleged tortfeasor. This

amount was disclosed to the arbitrator in a position

statement (which was not evidence) by the plaintiff

and in a deposition transcript submitted by the defendant (but which was not considered since it was irrelevant to the arbitrator’s determination of the award

and was therefore not deemed a fact by the arbitrator).’’

(Emphasis added.) Last, the arbitrator stated that he

would ‘‘consider any issues of collateral sources and/

or offsets if the parties have agreed, or do agree, to have

these issues considered by the arbitrator.’’ (Emphasis

added.)

The arbitrator’s decision and articulation, therefore,

make clear that, although the written agreement

between the parties was to have the arbitrator decide

‘‘[a]ll issues of liability, causation, and damages’’ and

issue a ‘‘Gross Award’’ that accounted for the plaintiff’s

$20,000 settlement with the tortfeasor, the parties subsequently agreed to submit to him only the question of

the plaintiff’s total economic and noneconomic damages as result of the motor vehicle accident. That is

precisely the question that the arbitrator answered in

his articulation, and, in doing so, he made clear that his

award was for the full value of the plaintiff’s damages.

There is nothing in the record to support a claim that,

when they modified their written agreement about what

to submit to the arbitrator, the parties also agreed to

alter that agreement to limit the extent of the defendant’s liability to the amount it allegedly owed the plaintiff under the underinsured motorist policy. Concluding

otherwise would require us to infer that the defendant

agreed to change the written agreement in a way that

would make it liable to the plaintiff for amounts that

the plaintiff had never sought in the underlying lawsuit

and was not entitled to under the laws governing underinsured motorist coverage in our state. See General

Statutes § 38a-335 (c); see also Haynes v. Yale-New

Haven Hospital, supra, 243 Conn. 27; Fahey v. Safeco

Ins. Co. of America, supra, 49 Conn. App. 309–10. Nothing in the record supports such an inference.

On the basis of our review of the entire record, including the written agreement, the plaintiff’s UIM complaint,

the arbitrator’s decision, the parties’ agreement to

return to the arbitrator, and the articulation, we conclude that the parties agreed to submit to the arbitrator

only the question of the plaintiff’s total economic and
noneconomic damages as a result of the underlying

automobile collision, but also preserved the written

agreement’s provisions limiting the defendant’s liability

to only those damages in excess of the $20,000 settlement and any ‘‘collateral sources,’’ up to a maximum

of $32,500. For this reason, the court properly confirmed the award, and effectuated the parties’ written

agreement, by deducting from the arbitrator’s ‘‘full

value’’ award the plaintiff’s $20,000 settlement with the

tortfeasor, plus the amounts the parties agreed represent ‘‘collateral sources.’’

There is, however, another issue for us to consider.

In its brief, the defendant has identified an error in the

court’s calculation of the amount of the judgment, i.e.,

$12,500. We agree with the defendant. The amount due

to the plaintiff is the arbitrator’s full value award less

collateral sources and the $20,000 settlement with the

tortfeasor. Subtracting from the arbitrator’s gross

award of $33,807.50 the undisputed amount of $1020.02

in collateral sources and the $20,000 settlement amount

yields the sum of $12,787.48. Therefore, the net award

due to the plaintiff is $12,787.48.

The judgment is reversed only as to the amount of

the award, and the case is remanded with direction to

render judgment in accordance with this opinion; the

judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff also claims that the court’s improper deduction of $20,000

from the award (1) violates the public policy favoring arbitration as an

alternative to litigation and (2) permits parties to arbitration agreements to

seek judicial intervention when they are dissatisfied with the arbitrator’s

award, which will have a chilling effect on arbitration. Because we conclude

that the court properly confirmed the arbitration award, we need not reach

these claims.

2 The parties entered into the arbitration agreement on May 31, 2019. In

the trial court, the parties litigated, and the trial court adjudicated, the issues

pursuant to General Statutes § 53-408 et seq. The parties also cited § 53-408

et seq. in their appellate briefs. Pursuant to No. 18-94 of the 2018 Public

Acts, the legislature adopted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (revised

act), General Statutes § 52-407aa et seq. General Statutes § 52-407cc provides

in relevant part that ‘‘[s]ections 52-407aa to 52-407eee, inclusive, govern an

agreement to arbitrate made on or after October 1, 2018 . . . .’’

Following oral argument before us, we ordered the parties to file simultaneous supplemental briefs ‘‘addressing whether the [revised act] governs

the arbitration at issue in this case, and if so, whether that has any effect

on the present appeal.’’ In their supplemental briefs, the parties agree that

the revised act applies to the present appeal, and they each assert that the

revised act does not alter their respective positions regarding the issues on

appeal. In this opinion, we refer to statutes in the revised act when relevant.

3

In the confirmation proceeding and on appeal, the defendant was identified as the insurer of the vehicle.

4 See DiTullio v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district

of Danbury, Docket No. CV-18-6024859-S (withdrawn). The plaintiff withdrew the UIM case on May 31, 2019, the date that the parties signed the

written agreement. She, however, moved to restore the UIM case on July

19, 2019, following receipt of the arbitrator’s decision. On September 26,

2019, the plaintiff filed a motion to stay the restored UIM case pending a

resolution of the arbitration. In response to the motion for stay, the trial

court issued an order stating in part: ‘‘Counsel appeared at short calendar

and addressed the issue of whether the arbitrator will rule on the impact

if any for the $20,000 payment to the plaintiff as damages for the accident

and whether such insurance proceeds were considered by the arbitrator in
entering an award for $32,500.’’ The plaintiff again withdrew the UIM case

on October 30, 2019, when the case was called for jury selection.

5 The agreement referred to the underlying UIM case, but did not otherwise

make any express reference to the $20,000 settlement that the plaintiff had

received from the tortfeasor.

6 See paragraphs 7 and 8 of the written agreement previously set forth in

this opinion.

7 General Statutes § 52-407tt provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) On motion to

an arbitrator by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator may

modify or correct an award:

‘‘(1) Upon a ground stated in subdivision (1) or (3) of subsection (a) of

section 52-407xx . . . .’’

General Statutes § 52-407xx (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) There was

an evident mathematical miscalculation or an evident mistake in the description of a person, thing or property referred to in the award . . . (3) The

award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the decision

on the claims submitted.’’

8 General Statutes § 52-225b defines collateral sources for purposes of

General Statutes §§ 52-225a through 52-225c, inclusive. It provides in relevant

part: ‘‘ ‘Collateral sources’ means any payments made to the claimant, or

on his behalf, by or pursuant to: (1) Any health or sickness insurance,

automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits, and any other

similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the

claimant, whether purchased by him or provided by others; or (2) any

contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership or corporation

to provide, pay for or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental or other

health care services. ‘Collateral sources’ do not include amounts received

by a claimant as a settlement.’’ General Statutes § 52-225b. As the court

noted, however, the written agreement did not define ‘‘collateral sources’’

or make reference to § 52-225b.

9 General Statutes § 52-407vv provides: ‘‘After a party to an arbitration

proceeding receives notice of an award, the party may make a motion to

the court for an order confirming the award at which time the court shall

issue a confirming order unless the award is modified or corrected pursuant

to section 52-407tt or 52-407xx or is vacated pursuant to section 52-407ww.’’

10 We agree with the parties that the submission in the present case was

unrestricted.

11 The written agreement prohibited the parties from disclosing to the

arbitrator the ‘‘high/low’’ provision of the agreement.