IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 17, 2020

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GLENN BROWN AND THOMAS BYRD

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 109768 Bobby R. McGee, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2019-01618-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

The Defendants, Glenn Brown and Thomas Byrd, were jointly tried before a Knox County 

Criminal Court jury on a number of drug and gun-related offenses. At the conclusion of 

the trial, both Defendants were convicted of possession with the intent to sell/deliver 0.5 

grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, possession with the intent to 

sell/deliver a controlled substance analogue, and possession of marijuana. Defendant 

Brown was alone convicted of the various gun-related charges, including employment of a 

firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of 

a felony. In this consolidated appeal, Defendant Byrd challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence in support of his felony convictions and argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting evidence of his failure to contest the forfeiture of the large amount of cash seized 

from him. Defendant Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his 

felony drug and employment of a firearm during a dangerous felony convictions and argues 

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of the traffic stop and 

in issuing inconsistent oral and written jury instructions that prevented unanimity of the 

verdicts. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT,

JR., and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Gerald L. Gulley, Knoxville, Tennessee (on appeal) and Mary Ward, Knoxville, Tennessee 

(at trial), for the appellant, Glenn Brown. 

J. Liddell Kirk, Knoxville, Tennessee (on appeal) and Joshua Hedrick, Knoxville, 

Tennessee, for the appellant, Thomas Lenwood Byrd.

06/17/2021
- 2 -

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Assistant 

Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Ta Kisha Fitzgerald, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

On March 28, 2016, Defendant Brown was driving a silver Toyota Highlander at 38 

miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone in north Knoxville with Defendant Byrd as his 

passenger when he was stopped by a Knoxville police officer for speeding. Both men 

appeared nervous, and Defendant Brown told the officer that he was frightened and 

considering running. When the backup officer arrived, Defendant Brown told him that 

there was a weapon inside the vehicle and gave the officer consent to search the SUV. The 

officer found a loaded Smith and Wesson semi-automatic 9-milimeter handgun in the 

center console area and an eyeglass case with crack and powder cocaine, another powder

that field tested as positive for methamphetamine, assorted loose pills, and marijuana 

underneath the passenger seat. Defendant Byrd was carrying $1,520 in cash, and 

Defendant Brown had $80 in cash. The Knox County Grand Jury subsequently returned a

fifteen-count indictment charging both Defendants with possession of 0.5 grams or more 

of cocaine with the intent to sell and with the intent to deliver in a drug free school zone, 

possession of a controlled substance analogue with the intent to sell and with the intent to 

deliver, simple possession of marijuana, and four counts of possession of a firearm with 

the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant Brown 

was charged alone with two counts of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted 

felon and four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during 

the commission of a dangerous felony, having been previously convicted of a felony. 

Motion to Suppress

On June 14, 2017, Defendant Brown filed a motion to suppress the results of the 

traffic stop, arguing that the search was unconstitutional because the duration of the stop 

exceeded that necessary to issue a speeding citation, and he was not advised of his Miranda

rights and was unaware he could refuse consent for the search. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Steve Kaufman of the Knoxville Police 

Department (“KPD”) testified that at approximately 7:00 p.m. on March 28, 2016, he was 

working radar enforcement in the north Knoxville area when he clocked a silver SUV 

traveling 13 miles per hour over the posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour. He said he 
- 3 -

pulled behind the vehicle and turned on his lights to initiate a stop. However, the vehicle 

continued traveling another block and a half to two blocks before the driver pulled over. 

Officer Kaufman testified that Defendant Byrd was in the passenger seat, and 

Defendant Brown was in the driver’s seat. Defendant Byrd gave him an identification card. 

Defendant Brown told him he did not have his driver’s license on him, but he informed 

him that his name was “Jermaine Fields,” and he provided a date of birth. Officer Kaufman 

stated that he instructed both men to remain in the vehicle and returned to his patrol car to 

call in the traffic stop and to request backup. While he was on the radio, Defendant Byrd 

exited the vehicle, and Officer Kaufman ordered him to get back inside. Defendant Brown 

then exited the vehicle, looked at him, and said, “I’m scared. I’m thinking of running.” 

Officer Kaufman said he responded by telling him to get back in the vehicle and that he 

would work with him. 

Officer Kaufman identified his patrol vehicle’s videotape of the stop and narrated 

portions of it as it was played for the court. He testified that there was an open container 

of alcohol in the vehicle and that Defendant Byrd, who appeared to be under the influence, 

kept fidgeting, so he instructed him to sit with his hands on his knees where he could see 

them. Officer Darren Carden arrived, and Officer Kaufman and Officer Carden 

approached the vehicle, removed Defendant Brown, and handcuffed him before Officer 

Carden took him to Officer Carden’s patrol vehicle. When Officer Carden informed him 

that there was a gun inside the SUV, Officer Kaufman asked Defendant Byrd to step out, 

handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of his own patrol vehicle. 

Officer Kaufman testified that Officer Carden told him he had obtained Defendant 

Brown’s consent to search the SUV. Officer Carden searched the vehicle while he was on 

the radio checking the Defendants’ identifications. During the search, Officer Carden 

found a gun in the center console area and narcotics inside an eyeglass case that was 

underneath the front passenger seat. On cross-examination, he agreed that Defendant Byrd 

was not free to leave after he was handcuffed and placed in the back of Officer Carden’s 

patrol vehicle. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court overruled the motion to suppress. 

Among other things, the court found that the officers did not question Defendant Brown 

but noted that, regardless, Miranda warnings are not implicated by Fourth Amendment 

issues. The court further found that Defendant Brown not only gave consent but that

exigent circumstances justified the search of the vehicle. 

Trial
- 4 -

At trial, Officer Kaufman reiterated much of his suppression hearing testimony 

about the traffic stop that led to the discovery and seizure of the gun, narcotics, and cash. 

He identified his dashcam video of the stop, portions of which were admitted into evidence, 

and narrated the action as the video was played for the jury. He testified that Belle Morris 

Elementary School was approximately a block and a half north of where Defendant Brown

pulled over, and he identified on a map the exact location of the stop. He said that 

Defendant Byrd was “getting very agitated” and “digging in his pockets” while he was 

seated in the SUV, which prompted Officer Kaufman to instruct him to sit still and keep 

his hands where he could see them. He testified that Defendant Byrd informed him that he 

had $3,000 cash on him that he had received from the sale of some automobile rims, but

officers found and seized a total of only approximately $1,600 in cash from the two men, 

with $80 found on Defendant Brown and the rest on Defendant Byrd. Some of the cash 

found on Defendant Byrd was in his wallet but the “vast majority was in a pants pocket.” 

On cross-examination by Defendant Byrd’s counsel, Officer Kaufman 

acknowledged that the vehicle belonged to Defendant Brown’s girlfriend and that 

Defendant Byrd was cooperative and provided him with an identification card with his 

correct name. On cross-examination by Defendant’s Brown’s counsel, he acknowledged

that Defendant Brown was cooperative as well, informing the officers about the gun, 

providing his real name after initially giving a false name, and giving the officers consent 

to search the vehicle. He further acknowledged that the console area where the gun was 

found was accessible to both the driver and the passenger. 

KPD Officer Darren Carden testified that when he arrived on the scene, he observed 

both the driver and the passenger turned around in their seats “digging in the back of the 

car a little bit.” He said he and Officer Kaufman approached the vehicle together, and he 

asked Defendant Brown to step out of the vehicle. As he was walking the handcuffed 

Defendant Brown to his patrol vehicle, Defendant Brown told him there was a gun in the 

SUV, so he quickly patted him down, placed him in the back of his cruiser, and returned 

to the SUV to inform his partner. After he assisted Officer Kaufman in taking Defendant 

Byrd into custody, he returned to his cruiser and obtained Defendant Brown’s permission 

to search the vehicle. He stated he found the loaded handgun in the open console area and 

a small eyeglass case under the front passenger seat that contained “multiple substances of 

narcotics.” He identified his patrol vehicle’s video recording of the stop and photographs 

of the evidence, which were admitted into evidence and published to the jury. 

On cross-examination, Officer Carden acknowledged that the handle of the gun was 

oriented toward the driver’s seat with the barrel pointing toward the passenger’s seat. On 

redirect examination, he testified that he found no drug paraphernalia in the vehicle. 
- 5 -

KPD Sergeant J.D. Burrell testified that he was the patrol supervisor for the east 

district and was called to the scene, per departmental policy, to double-check the count of 

cash seized from the Defendants. According to the currency envelopes, they seized $1,624 

from Defendant Byrd, consisting of two $50 bills, 72 $20 bills, one $10 bill, six $5 bills 

and 44 $1 bills, and $87 from Defendant Brown, consisting of four $20 bills, one $5 bill, 

and two $1 bills.

KPD Officer Jonathan Gomez, who was formerly a civilian evidence technician, 

identified photographs he took of the objects found in the vehicle, including the black 

Smith and Wesson 9-millimeter handgun loaded with eleven 9-millimeter rounds and the 

narcotics found in the eyeglass case. He said he was unable to lift any prints from the 

weapon or the ammunition. On cross-examination, he acknowledged that one of his 

photographs showed a “Swisher Sweets” cigar wrapper inside the vehicle. 

KPD Officer Krista Davies, who transported the narcotics to the police department, 

testified that the evidence consisted of: a green leafy substance that appeared to be 

marijuana; a hard, yellowish-white rock substance that appeared to be crack cocaine; a 

brownish, powdery substance that field tested positive for methamphetamine; a white 

powdery substance that field tested positive for cocaine, and three different kinds of loose 

pills. She said she was present when Officer Kaufman had Defendant Byrd sign the 

forfeiture paperwork for the cash, on the back of which is printed the process for contesting 

the forfeiture. She explained that the process for contesting a forfeiture of property is to 

file an appeal with the State, which triggers a hearing at which the individual is afforded 

an opportunity to show that that he or she obtained the property through legitimate means. 

In this case, the State kept the cash; to her knowledge, no forfeiture hearing was ever held. 

On cross-examination, Officer Davies testified that a $350 fee is required to file a 

petition to request a hearing. She acknowledged that the burden is on the individual to 

show a legitimate source for the cash or other property. She believed, based on the amount 

of drugs that was found in the vehicle, that the cash seized was money that had been 

obtained from the sale of drugs. She acknowledged that Defendant Byrd had an additional 

$400 in money orders on him that they did not seize. She further acknowledged that there 

were unopened Swisher cigars in the vehicle and that it is possible for crack cocaine and 

marijuana to be ingested by rolling it into a cigar to smoke. 

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) Special Agent Forensic Scientist Jacob 

White, an expert in forensic chemistry, testified that he analyzed three of the eight 

substances submitted to the laboratory and determined them to consist of 1.17 grams of 

marijuana, 4.85 grams of cocaine base, and 1.21 grams of chloromethcathinone, an 

analogue of the controlled substance methcathinone. He explained that an analogue is a 
- 6 -

substance that is chemically structurally similar to another substance, requiring only 

“minor small changes” to convert it into the other substance. 

David Stuart Stills, a training sergeant with the Knoxville County School Division, 

testified that Belle Morris Elementary School was an elementary school that was in 

operation on March 28, 2016. 

Donna Roach of the Knox County Geographic Information System identified a map 

of the 1000-foot zone around Belle Morris Elementary School, which showed that the 

location of the traffic stop was within 1000 feet of the school. 

KPD Investigator Phillip Jinks, an expert in narcotics investigations, opined that the 

controlled substances in the case, with the exception of the marijuana, were possessed for 

resale. He explained in detail the basis for his opinion and the factors that indicated to him 

that the drugs were possessed for resale, which included: the amount of controlled 

substances; the large amount of cash, including the many $20 bills, which he said was the 

cost of the typical “rock” of crack cocaine; the loaded weapon; the nervous actions of the 

Defendants during the stop; and the lack of typical paraphernalia for ingesting the drugs. 

He said the amount of marijuana found in the vehicle, along with the fact that it was 

packaged in one single bag, indicated to him that it was for personal use.

Investigator Jinks estimated that the wholesale value of the crack cocaine was 

approximately $300 to $500 but that it would bring $1000 if broken into tenth of a gram 

rocks and sold individually on the street. He estimated the wholesale value of the powder 

cocaine was approximately $300, but it would be worth more if sold individually in smaller 

amounts. In his experience, there was a higher demand for crack cocaine, and he estimated 

that if the powder cocaine were converted into crack cocaine, it would be worth 

approximately $1,000 in a retail market. He said he was not familiar with the market value 

of the methcathinone analogue, which was similar to what is known as “bath salts” or 

“Molly,” but knew that there was a resale market for it. He explained that drug 

manufacturers frequently changed the chemical structures of controlled substance 

analogues in order to “skirt the law” and that it was difficult for him to keep up with the 

current value. 

Investigator Jinks also explained in some detail the forfeiture of drug-related cash 

and property and the process for contesting the forfeiture. He said the individual contesting 

the forfeiture has to pay a $350 cost bond to the Department of Safety when filing a petition 

contesting the forfeiture, unless incapable of making the payment. He stated that if 

incapable of paying, the individual can file an affidavit of indigency to have the cost bond 

waived. According to his testimony, information about the affidavit of indigency was in 

the notice from the Department of Safety that a forfeiture warrant has been issued. 
- 7 -

On cross-examination, he acknowledged that the “green sheet” given to Defendant 

Byrd by the arresting officer was not the official start of the Department of Safety’s 

forfeiture process, which begins when the Department of Safety sends its notice to the 

individual that forfeiture proceedings have been initiated. He conceded that the affidavit of 

indigency was not on the “green sheet” but said the green sheet contained information 

about the affidavit of indigency. To his knowledge, the officer did not explain to Defendant 

Byrd what an affidavit of indigency was or how to file one. He also did not know if 

Defendant Byrd ever received the Department of Safety’s official notice of forfeiture. 

On further cross-examination, he acknowledged that $20 bills are common and the 

denomination usually dispensed by bank ATMs. He also agreed that many Craigslist or 

Facebook marketplace sales are, presumably, cash transactions. He acknowledged that the 

narcotics found in the SUV were not broken down into the quantities that were typically 

used for resale. 

As its final evidence, the State introduced a stipulation of facts that Defendant 

Brown, prior to March 28, 2016, had both a felony conviction for a drug offense and a 

felony conviction involving violence. 

Defendant Byrd testified that on March 28, 2016, he sold a set of rims for $1,600 to 

a man who responded to his Facebook advertisement. He said he was at home counting 

the money and separating the amount he owed for child support to the three mothers of his 

children when his girlfriend got into an argument with him about his relationship with the 

mothers of those children. To escape the conflict, he called his long-time friend, Defendant 

Brown, to come pick him up from his home. He stated that he did not have any drugs or 

firearms on him and was unaware of the gun and the drugs in Defendant Brown’s vehicle. 

He said he gave the officer his real name and became very uncomfortable when he heard 

Defendant Brown give a false name. He got out of the vehicle because Defendant Brown 

informed him that he was considering fleeing in the vehicle, and he wanted no part of that 

situation. He was agitated during the traffic stop and his subsequent arrest because he was 

not involved with the gun or the drugs and had no prior knowledge that they were in the 

vehicle. 

On cross-examination, he acknowledged that he had been convicted of criminal 

impersonation in Knox County on May 10, 2007. He testified that he was unfamiliar with 

cocaine, but he acknowledged that he had previously been convicted of possession of 

cocaine. He said he never received any forfeiture notice from the Department of Safety. 

Following deliberations, the jury convicted Defendant Brown of all the indicted 

offenses. The jury convicted Defendant Byrd of all the indicted drug offenses but acquitted 
- 8 -

him of the gun offenses. After merging the various counts based on alternate theories of 

the same offense, the trial court sentenced Defendant Byrd to an effective fifteen-year 

sentence in the Department of Correction and sentenced Defendant Brown to an effective 

thirty-year sentence in the Department of Correction.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Both Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of their felony 

drug convictions. In addition, Defendant Brown, without any argument, asserts that the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for employing a firearm during the 

commission of a dangerous felony. 

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the 

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn. 

R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury 

shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact 

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn. 

1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given 

the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 

754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by 

the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all 

conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 

1973). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant

is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant 

has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639 

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to sustain 

the convictions. Neither Defendant challenges the location of the traffic stop in a drug free 

school zone or the amount of drugs found in the vehicle. In essence, each Defendant simply

claims ignorance of the drugs and gun and argues that the proof shows that they belonged 

to the other man alone. In support, Defendant Byrd points to evidence that the vehicle 

belonged to Defendant Brown’s girlfriend, that Defendant Brown gave a false name and 

indicated a desire to run, and that the gun was positioned with its handle toward the driver’s 

seat. He also cites his explanation for how and why he had such a large sum of cash on his 

person. Defendant Brown, in turn, points to the large amount of cash found on Defendant 

Byrd and the fact that the drugs were found underneath the passenger seat of the vehicle to 
- 9 -

argue that there was no proof that he possessed the drugs himself or acted with any intent 

to promote or assist Defendant Byrd in the sale of the drugs or to benefit from the proceeds 

of Defendant Byrd’s drug sales. Defendant Brown argues that the proof, at most, supports 

a conviction for facilitation. The jury, however, heard all the proof and was instructed on 

the lesser offense of facilitation and yet convicted both Defendants of the indicted drug 

offenses. The jury acquitted Defendant Byrd of the gun offenses but convicted Defendant 

Brown of those offenses. By its verdicts, the jury obviously found that both men were in 

possession of the drugs together, that their possession of the drugs was with the intent to 

sell or deliver them, and that the gun found in the vehicle was Defendant Brown’s alone 

and was not used by Defendant Byrd. There was sufficient proof from which the jury could

make these determinations. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

II. Denial of Motion to Suppress

Defendant Brown contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress the results of the traffic stop. He argues that the search was unconstitutional 

because his consent was obtained in response to questioning by the officer after he had 

been placed in custody but had not been advised of his Miranda rights against selfincrimination. The State argues that the officer’s request for consent to search the vehicle 

was not an interrogation, that Defendant Browns’s consent to the search was not an 

incriminating admission under Miranda, and that the officer was not required to issue 

Miranda warnings before asking basic investigatory questions of the Defendants. 

When this court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, 

“[q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and 

resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of 

fact.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The party prevailing at the 

suppression hearing is afforded the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all 

reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v.

Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1998). The findings of a trial court in a suppression 

hearing are upheld unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. See id. The 

application of the law to the facts found by the trial court is a question of law and is 

reviewed de novo. State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Crutcher, 989 

S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997).

Both the United States and Tennessee constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches 

and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, §7. Generally, “under both the 

federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, 

and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State 

demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly 

defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 630 
- 10 -

(Tenn. 1997). The State has the burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that a warrantless search falls under one of the exceptions to the warrant 

requirement. State v. Harris, 280 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008).

Exceptions to the warrant requirement include consent to search, search incident to 

a lawful arrest, evidence in plain view, hot pursuit, exigent circumstances, and consent to 

search. State v. Berrios, 235 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tenn. 2007).

The consent exception applies when an individual voluntarily consents to a 

search. State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283, 306-07 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Berrios, 235 S.W.3d at 109. The State has the 

burden to prove that consent was freely and voluntarily given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 

222. “The pertinent question is . . . whether the [individual’s] act of consenting is the 

product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice. If the [individual’s] will was 

overborne and his or her capacity for self-determination critically impaired, due process is 

offended.” State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 185 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 

at 225-26). Among the factors to be considered are the time and place of the encounter, 

level of hostility between the police and the individual, number of officers involved, and 

the individual’s “age, education, intelligence, knowledge, maturity, sophistication, 

experience, prior contact with law enforcement personnel, and prior cooperation or refusal 

to cooperate with law enforcement personnel.” Cox, 171 S.W.3d at 185 (internal 

quotations omitted).

There are three levels of police-citizen interactions: (1) a full-scale arrest, which 

must be supported by probable cause; (2) a brief investigatory detention, which must be 

supported by a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, of criminal 

wrong-doing; and (3) a brief “encounter” which requires no objective justification. State

v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Tenn. 2008). 

On appeal, Defendant Brown does not challenge the officer’s basis for the stop or 

the duration of the stop, nor that he gave the officer consent to search the vehicle. Instead, 

he argues only that he was under custodial arrest when handcuffed and placed in the back 

of the patrol vehicle and should have been issued Miranda warnings before the officer 

asked for his consent for the search. 

Both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions protect against compelled selfincrimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. The State is, therefore, 

prohibited from using statements made by an accused during custodial interrogation unless 

the accused has previously advised of his or her constitutional rights to remain silent and 

to an attorney, and has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived those rights.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436,444 (1966). 
- 11 -

We agree with the State that the officer’s asking for consent to search the vehicle 

was not a “custodial interrogation,” and Defendant Brown’s response giving him 

permission was not an “incriminating statement.” The trial court found that Defendant 

Brown gave the officer consent to search the vehicle. Implicit in the trial court’s ruling is 

a finding that the consent was voluntary. The evidence does not preponderate against these 

findings. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly denied the motion to 

suppress. 

III. Jury Instructions

Defendant Brown also contends that the trial court erred by giving the jury 

“inconsistent oral and written instructions that prevented jury unanimity on several 

counts.” [Brief, 16 (header)]. The State responds that the Defendant is not entitled to any 

relief on the basis of this issue, noting that although the trial court initially gave the jury an 

incorrect oral instruction in counts 3 and 4, it immediately corrected its mistake after 

reading the written instructions, so that both the oral and written instructions were 

consistent. 

It is well settled that a defendant has a constitutional right to a complete and correct 

charge of the law, so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the 

jury on proper instructions.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 390 (Tenn. 2011); see

also State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 204 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 

426, 432 (Tenn. 2000)). Accordingly, trial courts have the duty to give “a complete charge 

of the law applicable to the facts of the case.” State v. Davenport, 973 S.W.2d 283, 287 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citing State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 1986)). 

“Whether jury instructions are sufficient is a question of law appellate courts review de 

novo with no presumption of correctness.” State v. Clark, 425 S.W.3d 268, 295 (Tenn. 

2014).

The record reflects that the trial court initially erroneously instructed the jury with 

respect to counts three and four that the Defendants were charged with knowingly selling 

and delivering a controlled substance analogue, rather than with possession with the intent 

to sell or deliver. After that mistake, the trial court issued corrected instructions, informing 

the jurors it had made a change to the instructions in counts three and four and that the 

correct instructions were marked on the written set of instructions that the court was 

sending with them as they retired to deliberate. 

We agree with the State that the trial court’s correction of its initial mistake was 

sufficient to ensure that the jury was properly instructed on the law. We conclude, 

therefore, that Defendant Brown is not entitled to relief on the basis of this issue. 
- 12 -

IV. Defendant Byrd’s Failure to Contest Forfeiture Proceedings

Defendant Byrd contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to question 

witnesses about the forfeiture proceedings and whether Defendant Byrd contested the 

forfeiture of his cash to the State. He argues that evidence related to a separate civil 

forfeiture proceeding was not relevant to the issues in his criminal trial and that, even if 

marginally relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice and misleading the jury. 

In considering this issue, we apply the general rule that “admission of evidence is 

entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial court’s ruling on evidence 

will be disturbed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.” State v. Robinson, 

146 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2004). A trial court’s exercise of discretion will only be 

reversed on appeal if the court “‘applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision 

which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.’” Id. 

(quoting State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997)). When determining 

admissibility, a trial court must first determine if the evidence is relevant. Id.; Tenn. R. 

Evid. 402. If the court determines that the evidence is relevant, it must then determine 

whether its probative value is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 

of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403; Robinson, 

146 S.W.3d at 490. 

The record reflects that Defendant Byrd raised an objection when the prosecutor 

began questioning Officer Davies about the forfeiture process. The trial court overruled 

the objection, noting that the rules of evidence are broad and that it would be for the jury 

to determine what inferences to draw from the evidence. 

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. The evidence was relevant 

to the issue of whether the drugs found in the vehicle were possessed with the intent to sell 

and deliver them, and its probative value was not “substantially outweighed” by the danger 

of unfair prejudice or misleading of the jury. With respect to this latter point, we note that 

counsel for Defendant Byrd was successful in eliciting admissions from the State’s 

witnesses about the cost involved in filing a petition to contest the forfeiture and the fact 

that the sheet provided by the officer did not include an affidavit of indigency. Investigator 

Jinks also acknowledged that he had no idea if Defendant Byrd received notice from the 

Department of Safety of the forfeiture proceedings, and Defendant Byrd testified that he 

did not. Defendant Byrd is not entitled to relief on the basis of this issue. 

CONCLUSION
- 13 -

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgments of the 

trial court. 

____________________________________

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE