IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

REX ALLAN KREBS,

Defendant and Appellant.

S099439

San Luis Obispo County Superior Court

No. F283378

November 21, 2019

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 

Court, in which Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 

and Groban concurred.
1

PEOPLE v. KREBS

S099439

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

A jury convicted defendant Rex Allan Krebs of the first 

degree murder of Rachel Newhouse and Aundria Crawford (Pen. 

Code, § 187),1one count of kidnapping Newhouse to commit rape 

and one count of kidnapping Crawford to commit rape and 

sodomy (§ 209, subd. (b)), one count of rape by force of Newhouse 

and two counts of rape by force of Crawford (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), 

one count of sodomy by force of Crawford (§ 286, subd. (c)), and 

one count of first degree burglary (§ 459). The jury found true 

the special circumstance allegations that defendant committed 

multiple murders, that the murder of Newhouse was committed 

while engaged in kidnapping and rape, and that the murder of 

Crawford was committed while engaged in kidnapping, rape, 

and sodomy. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17).) Defendant admitted 

prior convictions for rape, sodomy, assault to commit rape, 

residential burglary, and felony grand theft. The court found 

the prior convictions to be true.

Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned 

verdicts of death for each of the two murder convictions. The 

trial court denied defendant’s motion to modify the death 

penalty verdict and his motion for a new trial. (§ 190.4, subd. 

(e).) The court sentenced defendant to death for each of the 

murder convictions. It also sentenced him to a total of 166 years 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
PEOPLE v. KREBS

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

2

to life with the possibility of parole for the other offenses and 

enhancements, a sentence it stayed pursuant to section 654. 

This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the 

judgment in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Evidence at the Guilt Phase 

1. Investigation prior to defendant’s confession

Rachel Newhouse, a student at California Polytechnic 

State University at San Luis Obispo, was last seen on November 

12, 1998, at about 11:30 p.m., in Tortilla Flats, a restaurant and 

bar in San Luis Obispo. Blood drops were found an hour or so 

later on the Jennifer Street Bridge, a pedestrian bridge that 

Newhouse would have crossed if she walked home from Tortilla 

Flats. Samples taken from blood recovered from the bridge and 

a nearby parking lot matched blood samples from Newhouse’s 

parents.

Aundria Crawford, a student at Cuesta College who lived 

in San Luis Obispo, spoke with a friend by telephone until 2:46 

a.m. on March 11, 1999.2 Crawford missed an appointment and 

failed to respond to texts on March 11, and an investigation 

begun the next day failed to locate her.

Defendant’s parole officer, David Zaragoza, thought there 

were similarities between the description in a newspaper article 

of the abduction of Crawford and defendant’s prior crimes. In 

mid-March, he visited defendant at his residence. When 

defendant came out to meet Zaragoza, he was walking as if in 

pain, and he was holding his rib area. Defendant stated that he 

 

2 All further date references are to the year 1999 unless 

otherwise specified.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

3

had hurt his ribs when he fell off a wall into some firewood, but 

Zaragoza was suspicious because he did not see any injuries to 

defendant’s hands or arms. Zaragoza reported his suspicions to 

the lead investigator of the Crawford abduction.

Two days later, Zaragoza and other agents conducted a 

parole search of defendant’s residence. Among the items seized 

was an eight-ball keychain. Zaragoza also found BBs. One of 

defendant’s parole conditions was that he was not allowed to 

possess objects resembling a firearm. The next day, Zaragoza 

seized a BB gun at defendant’s place of employment and caused

defendant to be arrested and transported to the San Luis Obispo 

County jail.

Larry Hobson, an investigator with the County of San Luis 

Obispo District Attorney’s Office, interviewed defendant a day 

after his arrest. At this point, defendant had been arrested for 

violating his parole by possessing a simulated firearm and 

drinking alcohol. When Hobson asked defendant if he had any 

idea why he was being interviewed, defendant stated he 

assumed it related to the disappearance of the two victims, 

because defendant was on parole for rape and had a prior sex 

offense. He did not recall where he was the day Newhouse 

disappeared. However, defendant said he stayed home all night 

on March 10, the night of Crawford’s disappearance. At about 

8:00 a.m. the next day, he walked to a woodpile, and his 

landlord’s daughter, Debra Wright, stopped and talked to him 

briefly. He said he had slipped on some lattice work and fallen 

into the woodpile, injuring his ribs. 

Defendant denied ever driving down Crawford’s street or 

seeing the victims except on fliers posted around San Luis 

Obispo. Hobson asked where defendant had acquired the eight-
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

4

ball keychain found during the parole search, and he said he 

found it on the yard while in Soledad prison in 1996. In response 

to Hobson’s telling defendant that he might have to question 

him again, defendant said he was willing to do anything to prove 

that he was not responsible for the abductions, and he gave 

Hobson permission to search his vehicle and his residence.

A few days later, a search of defendant’s truck disclosed 

duct tape, binoculars, and a bottle of stain remover. Also, some 

of the carpet had been cut out, and one of the jump seats was 

missing.

In early April, Hobson interviewed defendant a second 

time. Defendant gave an account of his whereabouts on March 

11 that was partly inconsistent with his prior statements. When 

asked why someone would identify him or his truck in the 

vicinity of Crawford’s house, he stated he had driven down 

Crawford’s street two or three times. With respect to the eightball keychain that defendant claimed to have found in 1996, 

Hobson asserted that it had not been manufactured until 1998. 

Defendant responded, “ ‘that’s strange.’ ”

Five days later, a search of defendant’s home led to the 

discovery of the jump seat from his truck. The seat had blood 

stains on it.

On April 21, Hobson interviewed defendant a third time.3 

Defendant again had difficulty recalling what he did on March 

11. Hobson and defendant discussed defendant’s prior sex 

 

3

In this appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s 

admission of his various statements made after this interview 

under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). We 

discuss the circumstances of the interviews in more detail in 

part II.B.1, post.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

5

crimes, and defendant admitted that he fantasized about 

abducting women but claimed to have “worked through” that. 

Hobson then showed defendant the eight-ball keychain and said 

it belonged to Crawford. Defendant denied the keychain was 

the one that had been found in his home. Hobson told defendant 

that the police had found the missing jump seat, and that there 

were traces of Newhouse’s blood on it. Defendant then stopped 

talking for about 15 minutes while Hobson kept up a monologue. 

Hobson asked defendant to take him to the victims, and 

defendant stated he did not want to help Hobson at that time. 

Hobson eventually returned defendant to the county jail.

2. Defendant’s confession

On April 22, Hobson returned to the jail, and correctional 

officers brought defendant to an employee breakroom to meet 

him. Some minutes into the conversation, defendant asked 

what Hobson wanted him to say, and Hobson said he wanted the 

truth. Defendant responded, “okay” and said that he wanted to 

talk somewhere else. Before transporting defendant from the 

jail and after giving him Miranda warnings, Hobson asked 

defendant if he was responsible for the disappearance and death

of Newhouse and Crawford. Defendant responded, “yes.” 

Hobson then took defendant to the police department, where the 

ensuing interrogation was recorded. The jury was shown the 

videotape, during which defendant described what he had done 

to the victims.4

 

4 Video recordings of interviews conducted on April 22 and 

April 27 were played for the jury, and transcripts of these two 

interviews were provided to assist the jury. The jury was also 

shown a video recording made on April 22, which depicted 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

6

Defendant stated that starting at about 8:30 p.m. on 

November 12, 1998, he drank six or seven shots of whiskey. At 

about midnight, he saw Newhouse walking down a street in San 

Luis Obispo. He told Hobson he had a premonition that 

Newhouse would walk across a bridge, so he parked his truck 

and walked onto the bridge. As Newhouse walked behind him 

on the bridge, defendant turned around and hit her on the jaw 

with his fist. When she screamed, defendant picked her up and 

threw her down on her back. Then he hit her again, knocking 

her unconscious, and dragged her by her hair down the stairs. 

At this point, she was bleeding from the back of her head and 

about her face. When he reached his truck, he put the stillunconscious Newhouse behind the front passenger seat in the 

area where the jump seats were located. He got rope from the 

bed of his truck and tied her hands behind her back. He then 

drove along railroad tracks for about 200 yards, where he 

stopped and used the same rope to tie her legs. Finally, he 

reached into her pants, ripped off her panties, stuffed them in 

her mouth, and tied the rope through her mouth.

Beside the road that led to defendant’s residence was an 

abandoned cabin. Defendant drove to the cabin, carried 

Newhouse inside, removed her pants, and raped her. She was 

conscious by this time, and was cursing at him. After he raped 

her, he re-tied her legs, hogtied her legs to her hands, and 

stuffed her panties back into her mouth. Then he drove up to 

his residence, leaving Newhouse in the cabin. He returned to 

the cabin 15 or 20 minutes later and found Newhouse dead. He 

 

defendant pointing out the victims’ burial sites and items at his 

house. In addition, Hobson testified about his subsequent 

interviews of defendant in late April and early May.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

7

told Hobson that when he left her, the rope he had tied around 

her neck was not in a position that would have prevented her 

from breathing. Hobson asked whether defendant was saying 

that Newhouse’s struggling had caused her strangulation. He 

responded, “That or her legs relaxed or something, I don’t know.” 

Defendant told Hobson that he panicked, put her body behind 

the cabin, and went home.

The next morning, defendant drove his truck past a spot 

where he had been cutting wood and dug a grave. He returned 

home and, at some point, cleaned blood from his truck. When 

he was unable to remove all of the blood, he cut out portions of 

carpet, threw them in a dumpster, and put the stained jump seat 

in his home. Sometime between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, he 

put Newhouse’s body in the back of his truck, drove to where he 

had dug a grave, and buried it.

Turning to the Crawford case, defendant stated that the 

first time he saw her he was driving by her house as she was 

getting out of her car. He followed her back to the house, got out 

of his truck, and looked at her through a small gap at the bottom 

of the curtains on a window. He left after a few minutes.

Over the following days, defendant twice more returned to 

Crawford’s house to watch her. Each time he was intoxicated. 

Finally, defendant returned for a third time, knowing that he 

was going to abduct her. Again intoxicated, defendant was not 

certain what time he went to her house, but it could have been 

as late as 2:00 or 3:00 a.m.

Defendant found a small bathroom window that was not 

latched, removed the screen, and crawled feet first into a shower 

stall. He hurt his ribs going through the window. Defendant 

told Hobson that he was “getting ready to go out the bathroom 
PEOPLE v. KREBS

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

8

door. The only thing I’m thinking of is leaving right then” when

Crawford opened the bathroom door, wearing a T-shirt and 

underwear. He punched her, knocking her back against the 

wall, and kept punching her, causing her to lose consciousness. 

He hogtied her with a rope he had brought with him and put 

duct tape across her mouth. He went upstairs and got two 

pillowcases. Although he was wearing pantyhose over his head, 

he put a pillowcase over Crawford’s head and tied it on so she 

could not identify him. He put CDs and some of Crawford’s 

clothes in the other pillowcase. He also took a VCR, videotapes 

of movies, and her keys with the eight-ball keychain, which he 

put in his truck.

When defendant returned to the house, Crawford had 

regained consciousness and was struggling. He put her in his 

truck and went back to her house to clean up the blood. Then 

he drove her to the abandoned cabin, left her on a couch, drove 

home, and drank more whiskey. As it was starting to get light, 

he drove to the woodpile to chop some wood so that his landlord’s 

daughter, Debra Wright, would see him as she went to work. 

After Wright left, defendant brought Crawford from the cabin to 

his residence. He removed some of the rope, but he left her 

hands tied together and kept the pillowcase and duct tape in 

place. He raped and sodomized Crawford on the bed, tied her 

feet back together, went to the kitchen for more liquor and 

coffee, and fell asleep on the couch. When he woke up an hour 

or so later, he replaced the pillowcase with a bandanna blindfold 

and removed the duct tape. She asked him why he was doing 

this, asked him to stop, pleaded with him to let her go, and cried. 

He did not say anything to her, and raped her over a coffee table. 

Leaving her hands tied and her legs untied, he clothed her in a 
PEOPLE v. KREBS

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

9

sweatshirt and sweatpants he had brought from her home. He 

put her back in his bed and went to sleep on the couch.

Defendant was awakened by a noise and saw Crawford 

coming out of the bedroom without the blindfold. He threw her 

to the floor and strangled her to death with a rope. He moved 

her body to the bedroom and drank more whiskey. Then he dug 

a grave in his yard and buried her. Defendant disposed of 

everything he had taken except the eight-ball keychain, a second 

black sweatshirt, and the CDs. He threw the VCR and 

videotapes, which were in a garbage bag, near a road and burned 

everything else.

After confessing, defendant accompanied Hobson and 

others to his home and the locations of the graves and the

garbage bag that contained the VCR, videotapes, and CDs. The 

jury was shown a videotape of the trip.

3. Exhumations and autopsies

The victims’ bodies were recovered the day after defendant

confessed. Newhouse’s body was found buried about 30 feet 

above the road. Crawford’s body was found by defendant’s 

residence, buried about two feet deep.

Dr. George Sterbenz, a forensic pathologist, observed the 

exhumations. He testified that Newhouse’s body was in an 

advanced state of decomposition. She had on a shirt that had 

been cut in half up the back, and a bra with shoulder straps 

pulled down from her shoulders. She had on no other clothing. 

Two areas of her scalp were more decomposed, indicating that 

they had been injured, and dried fluid on top of her head was 

consistent with blood. Dr. Sterbenz believed the cause of death 

was asphyxiation, but decomposition prevented him from 

determining the specific mechanism by which this occurred. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

10

Decomposition also prevented a determination of whether 

Newhouse suffered any trauma to the vaginal area. 

Crawford’s body was not as decomposed as Newhouse’s 

body, although the level of decomposition precluded a 

determination of whether Crawford’s vaginal or anal area was 

bruised. Crawford was wearing a black sweatshirt with a Hard 

Rock Cafe logo and black sweatpants. A blindfold made from a 

bandanna covered her eyes and nose. A rope circled her neck 

two and one-half times and was also wrapped about her torso 

and extremities. Two black flex ties were tied around her wrists, 

and a third flex tie connected them and passed through the rope. 

There were two lacerations inside her mouth that were 

consistent with a blow by a fist to the face. There was also an 

area of bruising on her scalp. Dr. Sterbenz concluded that her 

cause of death was asphyxia by ligature strangulation. 

4. Other corroborating evidence

On April 23, a search of the abandoned cabin close to 

defendant’s residence disclosed a large blood stain on the pad 

underneath the cushions of the couch. The next day, another 

search of defendant’s home led to the discovery of black flex ties 

that matched the flex ties on Crawford’s wrists. Searchers also 

discovered some keys about 48 feet from his home. The keys 

unlocked the doors to Crawford’s house.

Analyses of blood stains and hair at the Jennifer Street 

Bridge and surrounding areas corroborated defendant’s 

description of his abduction of Newhouse. Rodney Andrus, the 

assistant director at the Attorney General’s laboratory in 

Fresno, also tested blood stains from the jump seat and the 

couch in the cabin. He found that their markers were consistent 

with Newhouse’s blood and the blood stains on the bridge.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

11

An inspection of Crawford’s home further corroborated 

defendant’s confession. Items that defendant confessed to 

taking were indeed missing. The state of the bed also suggested

that Crawford had gotten out of bed shortly before she was 

abducted. Blood stains matching Crawford’s were found in the 

bathroom.

Evidence concerning Crawford’s clothes and belongings 

was also consistent with defendant’s confession. Crawford’s 

mother, Leslie Crawford, described some of her daughter’s 

belongings, including an eight-ball keychain and a souvenir 

sweatshirt with a Hard Rock Cafe logo which she wore only 

infrequently. She recalled that her daughter normally wore a 

T-shirt and panties to bed. A search of Crawford’s house failed 

to find the dark sweatclothes that Crawford’s mother reported 

missing.

5. Additional interviews of defendant

After the interview on April 22, during which defendant 

confessed, Hobson interviewed defendant six more times. Two 

days after the confession, Hobson interviewed defendant to 

review some of the details of the crimes and his interactions with 

the victims. Hobson next contacted defendant the following day

to discuss his childhood and upbringing. The day after that, 

Hobson met with defendant to talk about defendant’s relatives.

On April 27, after driving defendant to view the area 

where he abducted Newhouse, Hobson conducted a videotaped 

interview, which was shown to the jury. Defendant told Hobson 

that Newhouse cursed at him and the more she cursed, the 

angrier he became. Hobson asked, “When you get mad, what do 

you want to do?” Defendant responded, “Rape her.” He stated 

that after he raped her, he was no longer angry, and he denied 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

12

intentionally tying her so tightly that she would strangle 

herself. He confirmed, however, that he had tied her differently 

when she was in the truck.

In contrast to Newhouse, Crawford did not curse at 

defendant; he had placed duct tape over her mouth. When

raping Crawford, defendant was acting out a fantasy that 

involved sexual pleasure and dominance. Control was part of 

the fantasy, and he had used plastic restraints on Crawford 

because they were a better means of control. He agreed with 

Hobson’s theory that once Crawford saw defendant, “it took 

away the rest of the fantasy and you just knew you had to kill 

her.” He also agreed that when he hogtied her, he was hoping 

that she would die like Newhouse so he would not have to kill 

her himself, but when she broke a thin rope he had put around 

her feet, he pulled on both sides of the rope around her neck and 

strangled her. When Hobson pointed out the inconsistency 

between this description and an earlier account in which 

defendant said he hogtied Crawford, left to drink more, and then 

came back and took a small piece of rope and strangled her, 

defendant said his current description was more accurate. He 

said that if Crawford had not struggled, he would have released 

her that night.

With respect to defendant’s assertion that he had planned 

to release both of the victims, Hobson asked how he planned to 

avoid being identified as the perpetrator, given that he had not 

used a condom. Defendant stated that he planned to wash them 

in the bathtub at his home and use a bottle to wash out his 

semen.

Hobson asked whether defendant committed his first rape 

when he was 21 years old, and defendant said he committed an 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

13

attempted rape when he was 18, in Sandpoint, Idaho. The 

victim was a young girl. By the time he abducted Crawford, his 

fantasies always involved tying his victims up and cutting their 

clothes off. Torture had never been part of his fantasy, which 

involved only dominance and the ability to have sex repeatedly. 

He was uncomfortable when he killed Crawford; it made him 

feel sick and angry at himself. When he saw fliers about 

Newhouse or Crawford, he felt sick and sorry for them. Finally, 

he denied taking a camera from Crawford’s house, and said he 

had not committed any other crimes while on parole. He also 

denied shooting a person in the chest in Santa Barbara over a 

drug deal before he went to prison. The transcript of the 

interview included parenthetical statements, added to inform 

the jury that defendant later admitted off-camera to stealing 

Crawford’s camera and shooting a man in Santa Barbara.

Hobson met again with defendant in the last days of April, 

when they discussed Hobson’s intention to go to Idaho and 

interview defendant’s relatives. Then in early May, after 

interviewing defendant’s friends and relatives, Hobson met with 

defendant to discuss what Hobson had learned.

6. Defendant’s prior sexual assault of Shelley C.

At trial, the prosecution introduced testimony regarding

defendant’s prior assault of Shelley C. Shelley testified that 

early one morning in 1987 when she was living in San Luis 

Obispo County, she woke to a man’s hand over her mouth. He 

held a knife to her throat and tied her hands behind her back. 

He cut off her clothes, started to gag and blindfold her, but 

stopped when she said she would not say anything or look. He 

raped and sodomized her and then hogtied her. When he heard 

Shelley’s roommate’s car, he fled. There was a strong odor of 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

14

alcohol on the assailant. When he was interrogated concerning 

this assault, defendant stated that he wanted counseling, but 

was afraid of the time he would spend in prison. Defendant 

confessed to the crimes and pleaded guilty to residential 

burglary, rape and sodomy.

7. Defense case

The defense offered no evidence at the guilt phase.

B. Evidence at the Penalty Phase

1. Defense case

Defendant introduced extensive evidence at the penalty 

phase. The evidence falls into two general categories. In the 

first category is testimony that painted defendant as a 

sympathetic character, a child who was abused by a violent

father and a person who, despite the abuse suffered, still had a 

moral compass, good personality traits, and the ability to form 

positive relationships. In the second category is testimony that 

aimed to reduce defendant’s moral culpability. Defendant

introduced evidence to show that he suffered from a mental 

illness, one that impaired his ability to control himself, and that

the various institutions under which he was placed — including 

California’s Department of Corrections — failed to afford him 

any treatment.

Through the testimony of his mother, sisters, 

grandmother, aunts, uncles, stepmother, stepsister, elementary 

school classmates, teacher, principal, neighbor, and others, 

defendant described the serious mental and physical abuse he 

suffered as a child. Born in 1966 to Connie Ridley and Allan 

Krebs, defendant was the second of four children. Allan Krebs 

drank, abused drugs, and beat Ridley. When she left Allan, 

Ridley, then an alcoholic, began living with a man who spanked 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

15

defendant, forced him to wear soiled underwear on his head, and 

once made defendant go to school in a diaper. Ridley eventually 

sent defendant back to live with his father. Allan beat 

defendant, once severely enough to leave “black and blue” marks 

and cuts from the “waistline, all the way down to his ankles.”

In 1981, when defendant was 15 years old, he broke into a 

neighbor’s home and stole a gun and some other items. As a 

result, defendant was sent to the North Idaho Children’s Home

(Children’s Home), a “private, nonprofit, residential treatment 

facility.” Defendant introduced the testimony of several staff 

members from the Children’s Home, who described his good 

behavior while at the facility. Consistent with the defense 

presentation of defendant as a person capable of empathy for his 

victims and remorse for his actions, a childcare worker from the 

Children’s Home, Scott Mosher, testified that defendant was

“very remorseful” if he “did something wrong during this period 

of time.” Toward the end of this testimony, counsel asked

Mosher whether he felt defendant “should receive the death 

penalty.” The prosecution objected, and the trial court sustained 

the objection, explaining that Mosher’s opinion lacked relevance 

because Mosher last saw defendant in 1983 and no longer had 

any relationship with him.

When he was at the Children’s Home, defendant dated an 

11-year-old girl, Adonia Krug. Krug testified that defendant 

“helped [her] through a lot.” The relationship ended amicably 

when Diana Scheyt, Krug’s mother, told defendant how old Krug 

was. Scheyt thought defendant had a positive influence on her 

daughter and allowed the two to keep in contact as friends.

In 1984, after defendant turned 18, he assaulted a 12-

year-old girl in Sandpoint, Idaho. Defendant pleaded guilty to 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

16

a misdemeanor assault charge and spent three months in the 

county jail for the attack. The victim, Jennifer E., testified for 

the prosecution during the penalty phase, and the prosecution 

used this incident to cross-examine several witnesses who 

opined that defendant should not receive the death penalty.

During the same year, defendant was convicted of grand 

theft of an automobile. For this infraction, defendant served a 

prison term at the North Idaho Correctional Institute at 

Cottonwood (Cottonwood). Defendant presented the testimony 

of a Cottonwood correctional officer who recounted his generally 

positive attitude and good behavior while incarcerated.

Shortly after he was released from prison in 1986, 

defendant went to California to live with his mother and her 

then-husband, John Hollister. Hollister testified that he and 

defendant had a friendly relationship, and that defendant had a 

girlfriend during this time, Liesel Turner. According to 

Hollister, defendant and Turner had “[a] good relationship” and 

defendant was “infatuated with her, wanted to impress her.” As 

described post, the prosecution called Turner as a rebuttal 

witness.

In 1987, defendant was arrested and convicted of the 

attempted rape and rape of two women, A.C. and Shelley C.

Defendant served his sentence at Soledad prison. He introduced 

the testimony of three correctional officers who worked at the 

facility. According to Officer Jeanne Pullano, defendant was “a 

model prisoner.” Pullano further testified that there was no 

counseling for “sexual predators” available at Soledad at that 

time, and even if there had been, inmates “probably would not 

attend because they would be identified as sex offenders if they 

did” and “child molesters” and “rapists” were “low . . . on the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

17

totem pole” “within the prison population.” The other 

correctional officers offered similar testimony.

In September 1997, defendant was paroled to San Luis 

Obispo County. Defendant found a job in the surrounding area, 

made friends, and began a relationship with a woman named 

Rosalynn Moore. Moore testified that defendant treated her 

“fairly well.” In particular, defendant was never 

“inappropriately forceful with [her]” “in a sexual way,” and if she 

“didn’t want to do something, he would say okay and . . . that 

was the end of it.”

Three of defendant’s friends testified that they were 

present at a bar called Outlaws in August 1998 when defendant 

got into a fight with a man. One of the friends, Melissa 

Copeland, said that defendant had gotten into the fight because 

the man had threatened her and defendant “was defending 

[her],” “defending [her] honor.”

Defendant pressed the theme of institutional failure as it 

pertained to his parole. For example, his counsel drew from

Parole Officer Zaragoza the statements that (1) although San 

Luis Obispo referred all sex offenders to a “parole outpatient 

clinic,” the program was “more monitoring” than “confidential 

psychotherapy,” and (2) other than the parole outpatient clinic, 

there was no other program “available to parolees of rape 

convictions for their treatment.” Defendant also introduced the 

testimony of Dr. Randall True, who worked at the parole 

outpatient clinic and saw defendant while he was on parole. 

True testified to the “limited resources” that he had to do his 

work. In response to the question, “if the resources were 

available — for a person such as [defendant] at the time you saw 

him — what programs would you put him in,” True named a 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

18

number of treatment programs that defendant, in fact, was not 

afforded. True admitted, however, that defendant never told 

him that he had fantasies about raping women. Had defendant 

done so, True would have undertaken additional work.

In addition to the lay witnesses, defendant introduced the 

testimony of two experts, Drs. Craig Haney and Fred Berlin. 

Haney, a psychologist, examined defendant’s background with 

an eye to forming an opinion concerning (1) the “opportunities 

in which [defendant] might have been treated for the problems 

from which he suffered and whether or not there was evidence 

that, in fact, he had been treated,” and (2) the “kind of 

adjustment [defendant] would make . . . under a sentence of life 

in prison without the possibility of parole.” After interviewing 

defendant and people who knew him, Haney came to the 

following conclusions. First, defendant has lived “a traumatic 

and traumatically damaging life.” His manifestations of certain 

“long-lasting problems” were observed throughout his life by 

various people. Yet, despite the fact that “[o]ftentimes the 

observations were accompanied with very clear 

recommendations that [defendant] receive treatment,” 

defendant “received no psychotherapy, really no psychotherapy 

throughout his entire life, including the ten-year period of time 

during which he was incarcerated in the California Department 

of Corrections.” Second, defendant was “a person who [would] 

make[] a remarkably good adjustment to institutional settings,” 

including life in prison.

The main defense expert was Dr. Berlin, a board-certified 

psychiatrist who interviewed defendant and “made two 

diagnoses with conviction.” Berlin first diagnosed defendant 

with sexual sadism, a sexual disorder characterized by “intense, 

recurrent, erotically arousing fantasies and urges [that] are 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

19

about having sex in a coercive and sadistic fashion rather than 

in a consenting fashion.” Crucially, Berlin opined that sexual 

sadism impaired defendant’s “ability to be in full control of 

himself.” In slightly more technical terms, Berlin said that 

sexual sadism caused defendant to be volitionally impaired. 

According to Berlin, sexual sadists, like alcoholics or heroin 

addicts, “on their own, often can’t stop doing it [giving in to their 

urges] because they have an impairment in their ability to be in 

control.” Like a kleptomaniac who is “driven to repeatedly 

steal,” defendant was driven to engage in his behavior.

Anticipating the prosecution’s argument, Dr. Berlin 

explained that a person suffering from volitional impairment is

nonetheless able to plan and premeditate his or her actions. 

Berlin also explained that such a person is able to defer his or 

her urges. A volitionally impaired person could desist from 

acting out his or her urges given sufficient “external controls,” 

for example, those controls that exist in a prison setting. This 

does not mean that the person has the internal controls 

necessary to control his or her behavior. Berlin opined that 

sexual sadism is a treatable disorder.

In addition to his diagnosis of sexual sadism, Dr. Berlin 

diagnosed defendant with alcoholism. Berlin testified that the 

impact of alcoholism “on sexual sadism is like pouring a fuel on 

the fire.” The witness elaborated that “both because he was 

intoxicated and because he had a disorder that does impair a 

person’s ability to be in full control of himself,” defendant’s 

capacity “to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” was 

“impaired.” Finally, Berlin considered but did not diagnose 

defendant with antisocial personality disorder.
PEOPLE v. KREBS

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

20

At the point in his testimony in which Dr. Berlin discussed

the ability of a sexual sadist to defer his actions, defense counsel 

attempted to ask the witness about a law in California known 

as the Sexually Violent Predator Act. The prosecution objected, 

and after an extensive discussion with counsel, the court 

sustained the objection.

On cross-examination, the prosecution attacked Dr. 

Berlin’s opinion that defendant could not control his urges. For 

instance, the prosecution inquired about a test known as the 

“policeman at the elbow,” which asked whether an individual 

would have acted on his or her impulses if there had been a 

police officer present. Berlin conceded that “if the policeman 

had come, [defendant] would have stopped and tried not to be 

apprehended.” However, a police officer was an external control, 

and once that external control was removed, Berlin did not 

“believe for a minute that [defendant] wouldn’t have been driven 

to then seek out somebody else.” Last, the prosecution asked 

Berlin what defendant did to resist the urge to kidnap

Newhouse or break into Crawford’s house. Berlin replied that 

defendant “didn’t say he tried to resist.” “In fact,” elaborated 

the doctor, “he said that after these urges had come back, and 

he dates it to the incident in which he was in the bar fight [at

Outlaws], that after fighting so hard for so many years to resist 

it, he kind of became demoralized and gave up and kind of 

stopped fighting as hard as he had previously.”

2. Prosecution case

The prosecution presented three types of aggravating 

evidence: defendant’s prior criminal activities, surviving family 

members’ victim impact statements, and testimony to rebut 

defendant’s mitigating evidence.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

21

To establish defendant’s prior criminal activities, the 

prosecution introduced evidence of his assaults on Jennifer E. 

and A.C. Jennifer E. testified that in 1984, when she was 12 

years old, she met defendant. One night in February 1984, 

Jennifer was downtown with a group of friends that included

defendant. At some point, defendant pulled Jennifer “off to one 

side” and tried to kiss her. She said, “no, I’m only 12.” When 

she tried to walk away, defendant grabbed her, and they both 

fell to the ground. Defendant then attempted “to undo his pants 

and [her] pants.” Jennifer fought to get defendant off, and 

defendant struck her three or four times with a closed fist. 

Eventually, the two rolled over an embarkment, and Jennifer 

was able to get away.

A.C. testified that in 1987, she lived in San Luis Obispo 

County. On a night in mid-June, she was in bed with her 

daughter when defendant broke into the house and climbed on 

top of her. Defendant was carrying a knife and a screwdriver. 

A.C.’s daughter cried and screamed. A.C. asked defendant to 

take her to another room. When they were walking down the 

hallway, defendant attempted to tie A.C. up and “got really 

upset” when she did not cooperate. He “hit [her] head against 

the wall.” When A.C. tried (unsuccessfully) to stab defendant 

with his knife, defendant “got mad . . . and bit [her] finger.” 

Defendant then left. A.C. later underwent surgery on her finger

but could not make full use of it again.

To show the impact that defendant’s crimes had on the 

victims’ families, the prosecution introduced the testimony of 

Newhouse’s mother and aunt and Crawford’s mother and 

grandmother. The family members testified about the victims’ 

lives and plans they had for the future. They also described the 

devastation brought by the victims’ deaths.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

22

Finally, the prosecution produced rebuttal testimony. It

called Liesel Turner, who was defendant’s girlfriend in 1987. 

Turner testified that she ended the relationship with defendant 

because she did not “feel safe” and gave reasons for her feelings.

In addition, the prosecution rebutted Dr. Berlin’s 

testimony with the testimony of Dr. Park Dietz. Unlike Berlin, 

Dietz testified that individuals “whose only problem is sexual 

sadism” did not suffer from volitional impairment. Dietz 

nonetheless afforded a role to mental illness, opining “the reason 

[defendant] behaves in this way toward victims is because he 

has an antisocial personality disorder.” Finally, Dietz rested his 

conclusion that defendant did not suffer volitional impairment 

on the particular facts of the case. Specifically, Dietz testified 

that defendant’s decisions to drink, lie to his doctor, “cruise” for 

victims, carry a “rape kit,” and stop resisting his impulses 

showed that his “volitional control was there.” When asked

“whether at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant 

. . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was 

impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect,” Dietz’s 

answer was that defendant’s “decision to stop resisting, to stop 

trying to conform his conduct, is a choice, a bad choice, he made, 

rather than his not having the ability to control himself.”

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jury Selection Issues

Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly used his 

peremptory challenges to remove Catholic prospective jurors in 

violation of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) and 

People v. Batson (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson). Although 

defendant argued before the trial court that the prosecution 

wrongfully removed six prospective jurors on the basis of their 
PEOPLE v. KREBS

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

23

religious affiliation, Catholicism, defendant’s Batson/Wheeler

claim on appeal is restricted to the removal of a single 

prospective juror, Juror No. 6.5 For the reasons explained below, 

we reject his claim.

1. Background

Prospective Juror No. 6, along with more than 150 other 

venire members, filled out a written questionnaire and was 

individually questioned by the court and counsel. Jurors who 

were not excused during the individual questioning were asked 

to return some days later. Upon their return, the remaining 

jurors were subject to peremptory challenges by the prosecution 

and defense — each of which had 20 such challenges. In quick 

succession, the parties struck 25 jurors, with the prosecution 

striking Juror No. 6 as his eighth strike. After the prosecution 

also struck Juror Nos. 122 and 126, the defense raised a 

Batson/Wheeler challenge, arguing that the prosecution had 

improperly removed these three jurors because they were 

Catholic.6 Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant was 

 

5 Batson has been held to preclude the removal of a 

potential juror based solely on the venire member’s religious 

affiliation. (U.S. v. Brown (2d Cir. 2003) 352 F.3d 654, 667-669; 

see People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158 (Gutierrez) 

[“At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any specific 

prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against an 

identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or 

similar grounds”].) The Attorney General does not contend 

otherwise.

6 Defense counsel also mentioned Prospective Juror No. 49 

but admitted that “the record is a little more ambiguous” about 

whether he was Catholic. The trial court did not inquire about 

this juror much thereafter, and we infer that the court 

determined Juror No. 49 was not Catholic.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

24

not Catholic but stressed that he “has received religious 

counseling from a Catholic nun.” 

Before asking the prosecution to give its reasons for 

striking the three jurors, the court made the following 

statement. “[T]here’s some question as to whether — in the case 

law the record assumes that the finding has been made of a 

reasonable inference if you ask for justification from the other 

party. And on this record I don’t think I can make a finding that 

there’s a reasonable inference although there does seem to be at 

least the beginnings of a trend. [¶] But with three jurors — I 

know there are a lot of Catholics on this panel, just in my 

memory. I don’t know which numbers they are, but I know there 

are a lot.” The court then stated, “with that caveat, I’ll ask the 

prosecutor to state what his reasons were for those three jurors.”

The prosecutor offered his reasons for excusing the venire 

members. With regard to Prospective Juror No. 6, the 

prosecutor stated that he was concerned with the juror’s stance 

on “psychiatric issues.” Citing questions from the written 

questionnaire, the prosecutor described the juror’s answers as 

revealing that she “puts faith in psychiatric testing, thinks 

psychology and psychiatry is very useful, and believes it can 

explain a lot about a person.”7 These responses concerned the 

 

7 The questions and answers from the written questionnaire 

the prosecutor referred to are as follows:

“Q111. Are you familiar with psychological testing?

“A. [Juror circled “Yes.”]

“Q. Which tests?

“A. Not sure.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

25

prosecution because “the defense has hired one of the top 

psychologists in the country, Dr. Fred Berlin.”

The prosecutor also cited Prospective Juror No. 6’s

response to Question No. 129 on the questionnaire. This 

question asks, “Is there any type of information regarding a 

defendant’s background or character that would be important to 

you when choosing between life without parole and death (e.g. 

work record, childhood abuse, brutal parents, alcoholism, 

former good deeds, illnesses, etc.)?” In response, the juror wrote, 

“childhood abuse, brutal parents, alcoholism, illnesses.” The 

 

“Q. How do you feel about these tests?

“A. It determines what is the true feelings of that 

person.”

“Q113. What is your opinion about the use of 

psychology or psychiatry to explain human 

behavior?

“A. I think it[’]s very useful.”

“Q114. Have you ever studied psychiatry, psychology, 

or any related subjects?

“A. [Juror circled “No.”]

“Q. Do you have an interest in the psychology of 

the mind?

“A. I’m curious to know.

“Q. Have you read articles or watched information 

and/or entertainment programs relating to 

this subject?

“A. Yes.

“Q. What are your general opinions about this 

subject?

“A. I think it can explain a lot about a person.”
PEOPLE v. KREBS

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

26

prosecution noted that childhood abuse, brutal parents, and 

alcoholism were things “we know will be offered in this case” as 

mitigating factors at the penalty phase.

The court made its ruling after hearing the prosecution’s 

reasons and the defense’s response. Directing its comments at 

the prosecutor, the court stated, “Actually went a lot further 

than you needed to, but on the basis of this record, I can’t find a 

reasonable inference, as I indicated earlier, based on just three 

jurors. My feeling was there were probably about 20 [Catholic 

prospective jurors] in the field of 83. Ms. Ashbaugh’s [one of 

defendant’s attorneys] indicating that there are 18. [¶] But in 

any event, it appears that there certainly are secular reasons for 

excusing each of the jurors, and it clearly — in the process that 

we’ve gone through, the record obviously reflects that the 

questionnaire is replete with questions that would give you 

information for preempts on both sides. . . . [¶] But, as I say, in 

this case I don’t at this point even find a reasonable inference. 

I only asked for the response just for the record.” The court 

denied defendant’s Batson/Wheeler motion.

The defense renewed its motion upon dismissals of more 

prospective jurors, and the court deferred discussion until jury 

selection had finished. Once both parties had exhausted their 

peremptory challenges, the defense contested the prosecution’s

excusal of Prospective Juror Nos. 127, 201, and 141. Juror No. 

141 was the prosecution’s last challenge; the prosecution had 

previously accepted a panel with Juror No. 141 on the panel, but 

after the defense struck another juror, the prosecution exercised 

its two remaining peremptory challenges to strike more jurors, 

including Juror No. 141. The court heard the parties’ arguments 

regarding the strikes and once again denied the Batson/Wheeler 

motion. In so ruling, the court stated, “I don’t find a reasonable 
PEOPLE v. KREBS

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

27

inference of a group bias, but I did get reasons on the record from 

the prosecutor as to why the excusals were made. . . . [¶] And 

the fact that there are . . . two jurors still on the panel who are 

Catholics is of some weight, except that all the challenges have 

been exhausted.”

Despite the objections raised to the excusals of multiple 

panelists during jury selection, defendant, as noted earlier, now 

challenges the trial court’s ruling only with respect to 

Prospective Juror No. 6. Because “reviewing courts must 

consider all evidence bearing on the trial court’s factual finding 

regarding discriminatory intent,” we bear the above record in 

mind as we examine defendant’s Batson/Wheeler arguments 

with regard to this single juror. (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 

Cal.4th 602, 607 (Lenix).)

2. Analysis

The framework for analyzing a Batson/Wheeler challenge 

is well established. The analysis proceeds in three stages. 

“First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant 

has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a 

peremptory challenge based on [religious affiliation]. Second, if 

the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to 

demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for a [group]-

neutral reason. Third, the court determines whether the 

defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.” (Lenix, supra, 

44 Cal.4th at p. 612.)

A preliminary question is whether defendant’s 

Batson/Wheeler challenge here should be reviewed at the first or 

third stage. Defendant presses that we should conduct a thirdstage inquiry. The Attorney General concedes the point, but her

brief was filed before we decided People v. Scott (2015) 61 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

28

Cal.4th 363, 391 (Scott). In Scott, we acknowledged that our 

jurisprudence in distinguishing between a first- and a thirdstage review “has not always been entirely consistent.” (Id. at 

p. 386.) We sought to rectify the inconsistency by clarifying that

“where (1) the trial court has determined that no prima facie 

case of discrimination exists, (2) the trial court allows or invites 

the prosecutor to state his or her reasons for excusing the juror 

for the record, (3) the prosecutor provides nondiscriminatory 

reasons, and (4) the trial court determines that the prosecutor’s 

nondiscriminatory reasons are genuine, an appellate court 

should begin its analysis of the trial court’s denial of the 

Batson/Wheeler motion with a review of the first-stage ruling.” 

(Id. at p. 391.) Accordingly, if the trial court makes a first-stage 

ruling before the prosecutor states his or her reasons for 

excusing the prospective jurors, an appellate court reviews that 

first-stage ruling. In contrast, when the trial court listens to the 

prosecutor’s reasons before purporting to rule on the first stage

inquiry, “we infer an ‘implied prima facie finding’ of 

discrimination and proceed directly to review of the ultimate 

question of purposeful discrimination.” (Id. at p. 387, fn. 1.)

The trial court here found that defendant did not make out 

a prima facie case of discrimination. This was what the court 

meant when it said it did not find a “reasonable inference.” But 

of course, the court said it could not make “a reasonable 

inference” twice, once before inviting the prosecutor to offer his 

reasons and once after hearing those reasons. If the court’s first 

statement — “on this record I don’t think I can make a finding 

that there’s a reasonable inference” — constitutes a ruling, then 

we should review that first-stage ruling. On the other hand, if 

the court did not make a ruling until after it heard the 

prosecutor’s reasons — when it stated more definitively that “on 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

29

the basis of this record, I can’t find a reasonable inference” —

then we should treat the prima facie case as moot and “instead 

skip to Batson’s third stage.” (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 

158, 174.) The record is susceptible of both readings, but the 

ambiguity proves immaterial in this case. Even were we to 

assume — as defendant urges — that his challenge has arrived 

at the third stage, still we would find against him.

“At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson inquiry, ‘the 

issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the 

prosecutor’s [group]-neutral explanations to be credible.’ ” 

(Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613.) “Review of a trial court’s 

denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only 

whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. . . . ‘So 

long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to 

evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its 

conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal.’ ” (Id. at pp. 613-

614.) Defendant urges us not to accord deference to the trial 

court’s decision because, in his view, the court did not make a 

“sincere and reasoned effort” to evaluate the prosecutor’s 

reasons. In particular, defendant faults the court for not 

evaluating “any of the actual reasons given by the prosecutor”

and instead speaking only in the hypothetical, stating that “the 

questionnaire is replete with questions that would give you 

information for preempts.”

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court’s 

statements indicate it did generally evaluate the prosecutor’s 

proffered reasons — responses on the written questionnaire —

for excusing the prospective jurors. As the trial court observed, 

“it appears that there certainly are secular reasons for excusing 

each of the jurors, and it clearly — in the process that we’ve gone 

through, the record obviously reflects that the questionnaire is 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

30

replete with questions that would give you information for 

preempts on both sides.” Defendant makes much of the fact that 

the court used the conditional tense, i.e., that it stated the 

questionnaire “would give you information for preempts on both 

sides” and not that the questionnaire did supply information to 

strike the jurors. But the court’s phrasing is understandable in 

light of the fact that it ruled against defendant at the first stage 

and made a third-stage finding only were it, counterfactually, to 

reach the matter.

In any event, we find substantial evidence to support the 

trial court’s denial of defendant’s Batson/Wheeler challenge. The 

prosecutor’s reasons for striking Prospective Juror No. 6 are 

plausible and supported. The prosecution expected defendant 

to argue — partly through the use of psychiatric testimony —

that he did not deserve the death penalty because he suffered 

childhood abuse, alcoholism, and mental illnesses. Juror No. 6 

indicated that she was receptive to such arguments. It was 

therefore sound trial strategy for the prosecution to have struck

her. (See, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1168; see also 

People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 665 [crediting a 

prospective juror’s receptivity to psychological testimony as a 

race-neutral reason for the prosecutor to have struck her when 

the defense was expected to rely heavily on such testimony]; 

People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 676-678 [finding no 

Batson/Wheeler error when a juror was struck because she may 

have been “overly sympathetic” to the defendant’s evidence “of 

abuse and neglect during his childhood”].)

Defendant argues that the prosecution had no genuine 

reason to want to strike a prospective juror who was receptive 

to psychiatry. Defendant contends that a juror’s attitude to 

psychiatry was a neutral factor, as a psychiatrist was also 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

31

expected to testify for the prosecution. But the prosecution 

could have judged that a juror not so inclined to believe in 

psychiatric testimony altogether might be better for its case. 

However correct was its judgment, we see little to suggest that 

it exercised its peremptory challenge improperly. (See, e.g., 

Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1171.)

Defendant also argues that the prosecution should not 

have relied on Prospective Juror No. 6’s response to Question 

No. 129 because the question was asked in a leading manner. 

Yet, simply because the juror may not have focused on 

“childhood abuse, brutal parents, alcoholism, [and] illnesses” 

until prompted by the question does not mean her response was

unreliable. There is nothing to indicate that the prosecution 

behaved disingenuously in reading the juror’s answer as 

indicating that she was sympathetic to defendant’s case in 

mitigation.

Other evidence supports the conclusion that the 

prosecutor’s reasons for striking Prospective Juror No. 6 were 

genuinely held. (See, e.g., People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 

76.) First, we have the prosecution’s oral examination of the 

juror. Far from being desultory, the prosecutor during voir dire 

explored the same topics from the questionnaire that ultimately 

motivated him to excuse the juror. For example, the prosecutor 

asked Juror No. 6 about her “curios[ity] about the criminal 

mind,” and she responded that she wanted an explanation for 

why criminals do what they do and that “childhood abuse or 

brutal parents or alcoholism” could be an explanation for why 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

32

people commit crimes.8 The juror also confirmed that she 

wanted to know about “abuse or alcoholism, or illness” before 

deciding on the penalty. The fact that the prosecutor took the 

time to ask Juror No. 6 about areas that concerned him suggests 

that he was not using her written answers as a pretext for 

excluding her.

Second, we note that two Catholic jurors sat on the jury. 

Of course, the presence of Catholic jurors on the jury is “not 

conclusive” to our inquiry, because the “[e]xclusion of even one 

prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and 

Wheeler constitutes structural error” regardless of how many 

other venire members were not so erroneously excluded. (People 

v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168; Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th 

at p. 1158; see also People v. Motton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 596, 607-

608; People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 225.) Nonetheless, a 

prosecutor’s acceptance of a jury with members of a group that

the prosecutor allegedly discriminated against “strongly 

suggests that [bias] was not a motive in his challenge” and, as 

such, is “an appropriate factor . . . to consider” in the 

Batson/Wheeler analysis. (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 629; 

Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 168; see also People v. Blacksher

(2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 802; People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 

346, 362-363 (Jones); People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 780.) 

The trial court did not give this circumstance much weight 

because it thought that the prosecution had run out of 

 

8 The prospective juror went so far as to state that none of 

the people she knew who had been abused as children grew up 

“normal,” as they either “abused their kids or . . . follow[] 

through with how they were raised.” “In a way,” she said, “it 

seems like they can’t help it because that’s the way they were 

raised, but it’s not an excuse.”
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

33

peremptory challenges and thus had to accept the jury. This 

was incorrect. Prior to exhausting its peremptory challenges,

the prosecution had accepted the jury with three Catholics on 

the panel. It was only after the defense struck one more juror 

that the prosecution exercised its two remaining challenges and 

excused another Catholic prospective juror (Prospective Juror 

No. 141). The fact that the prosecution accepted a panel with 

three Catholic jurors on it when it could have winnowed the 

number to one is another piece of evidence suggesting that the 

prosecutor did not harbor group bias against Catholics.

Against the substantial evidence supporting the trial 

court’s decision, defendant urges us to undertake a comparative 

juror analysis. According to defendant, a comparison of 

Prospective Juror No. 6’s answers against those of seated jurors 

shows that the prosecutor’s reasons for excusing Juror No. 6 

were pretextual, as many jurors gave answers similar to those 

of Juror No. 6 but the prosecution did not strike them. Having 

examined the record ourselves, we do not agree that the seated 

jurors were comparable to Juror No. 6.

“Comparative juror analysis is evidence that, while 

subject to inherent limitations, must be considered when 

reviewing claims of error at Wheeler/Batson’s third stage when 

the defendant relies on such evidence and the record is adequate 

to permit the comparisons. In those circumstances, comparative 

juror analysis must be performed on appeal even when such an 

analysis was not conducted below.” (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 

p. 607.) Because defendant did not attempt such a comparison 

during trial, “the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to 

explain his reasons for dismissing [the challenged jurors] while 

later retaining [the seated jurors].” (People v. O’Malley (2016) 

62 Cal.4th 944, 977.) Under such circumstances, we “ ‘must not 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

34

turn a blind eye to reasons the record discloses for not 

challenging other jurors even if those other jurors are similar in 

some respects to excused jurors.’ ” (Ibid.; see Jones, supra, 51 

Cal.4th at pp. 365-366.) Hence, to determine whether the seated 

jurors were truly comparable to the challenged juror, we may 

look at more than just the specific questions from the 

questionnaire that the prosecutor cited in explaining his 

decision to strike Prospective Juror No. 6. (O’Malley, supra, 62 

Cal.4th at p. 977; Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 365 [rejecting 

the defendant’s argument that the court “may not consider 

reasons not stated on the record for accepting other jurors”].) 

Defendant is wrong to suggest otherwise and did not respond to 

the Attorney General’s extensive showing that the unexcused 

jurors were, in many respects, more favorable to the prosecution 

than Juror No. 6.

Furthermore, the sworn jurors did not give substantially 

the same answers as Prospective Juror No. 6 on the specific

questions mentioned by the prosecutor. Defendant strings 

together a number of jurors whose answers were somewhat 

similar to Juror No. 6’s on either the questions about psychiatric 

attitude (Question Nos. 112 and 113 in particular) or the 

question about the important factors in deciding on penalty 

(Question No. 129). However, just three of those jurors gave

purportedly similar answers to Juror No. 6 on both sets of 

questions. Other jurors gave answers similar to those of Juror 

No. 6 on only one of the two areas. These jurors are thus not 

comparable to Juror No. 6 at the outset. (See Lenix, supra, 44 

Cal.4th at p. 624 [“Two panelists might give a similar answer on 

a given point. Yet the risk posed by one panelist might be offset 

by other answers, behavior, attitudes or experiences that make 

one juror, on balance, more or less desirable.”]; id. at p. 631 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

35

[“Advocates do not evaluate panelists based on a single answer. 

Likewise, reviewing courts should not do so.”].)

The answers of the remaining three jurors do little to 

strengthen defendant’s case. Of these jurors, none said — as 

Prospective Juror No. 6 did — that psychological testing 

“determines what is the true feelings of [a] person.” Unlike 

Juror No. 6, they also did not say that psychology or psychiatry 

is “very helpful” “to explain human behavior.” Instead, when 

asked for an opinion on “the use of psychology or psychiatry to 

explain [such] behavior,” Juror No. 253 simply said, “I do not 

know what other field deals with human behavior”; Juror No. 

334 gave the circumspect answer of, “It could be reasonable 

depending on how it is presented”; and Juror No. 338 answered 

somewhat ambivalently, “Perhaps to explain the motivational 

factors behind the crime. Also, to permit introduction of 

mitigating/extenuating circumstances.” Moreover, these seated 

jurors did not identify specific factors that were important to 

them at the penalty phase. Juror Nos. 253 and 338 simply said, 

“yes” when asked if there is “any type of information regarding 

a defendant’s background or character that would be important 

to you when choosing between life without parole and death.” 

Juror No. 334 gave the even weaker answer of, “Depend on the 

evidence.” None of the three jurors singled out “childhood abuse, 

brutal parents, alcoholism, illnesses” as did Juror No. 6.

The comparative juror analysis, in short, does not 

persuade us that it is more likely than not that the prosecution’s 

reasons for excusing Prospective Juror No. 6 were pretextual.

Defendant’s other arguments fare no better, and we affirm the 

trial court’s denial of defendant’s Batson/Wheeler challenge.
PEOPLE v. KREBS

Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

36

B. Guilt Phase Issues

1. Admission of defendant’s confession

Defendant contends his confession on April 22, 1999 and 

all subsequent statements should have been excluded because 

his invocation of the right against self-incrimination on April 21

was not honored and his waiver under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 

436 was involuntary. As explained below, we agree that the 

investigator should have stopped the interrogation on April 21 

sooner than he did but disagree that the failure compels the 

exclusion of the confession obtained on April 22 or thereafter. 

We therefore reject defendant’s claim that the court erred in 

admitting his statements.

a. Background

Before trial began, defendant filed a motion to suppress 

his April 22 confession and all following statements. At the 

hearing on the motion to suppress, Hobson testified. Hobson 

stated that he met with defendant for the first time in March

1999, after defendant had been arrested for violating his parole. 

At that time, defendant was one of 13 to 16 individuals who, 

because of their prior commission of sexual offenses, were being 

questioned regarding the disappearance of the two victims. 

Without giving defendant the warnings required by Miranda, 

Hobson interviewed him for an hour or so. Defendant told 

Hobson that he knew he would be questioned about the 

disappearance of the two women, and he was willing to 

cooperate in the investigation because he was confident the 

investigation would establish his innocence. He also told 

Hobson the police could search his vehicles and his house at any 

time, and that he was willing to answer questions that arose in 

the future.
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37

In early April 1999, Hobson met again with defendant at 

the San Luis Obispo Police Department. Hobson asked 

defendant to submit to a polygraph examination, and defendant

eventually agreed. The polygraph examiner advised defendant, 

both orally and in writing, of his Miranda rights, and defendant 

signed a statement waiving those rights. Defendant began the 

polygraph examination, but terminated it before the 

examination was completed.

After the polygraph examination ended, Hobson again

talked to defendant. Hobson asked defendant if he remembered 

the Miranda rights that the polygraph examiner had read him. 

Defendant indicated that he remembered them and stated that 

he was willing to talk to Hobson. During the 30- to 40-minute 

interview that followed, Hobson asked him again where he was 

on various dates. Defendant readily answered questions and 

reiterated that he was confident that the investigation would 

clear him of any involvement in the two cases.

On April 21, 1999, Hobson met defendant at the jail and 

asked if he was still willing to talk and cooperate with the 

investigation. Defendant said he was. Hobson transported 

defendant to the police department, where the subsequent 

questioning was recorded. At the beginning of the interview, 

Hobson asked defendant if he still knew the rights the polygraph 

examiner had read him. Defendant confirmed that he knew 

those rights, and Hobson stated, “those are the rights that still 

apply here.”

Defendant was initially cooperative. However, once

Hobson began confronting him with physical evidence 

connecting him to the crimes — the eight-ball keychain found in 

defendant’s possession that resembled Crawford’s and the blood 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

38

found on defendant’s jump seat that matched Newhouse’s —

defendant lapsed into silence. During the next 15 or 16 minutes, 

defendant remained silent while Hobson urged him to give an 

account of what happened. Defendant eventually stated, “Put 

me down in a holding cell and let me think, all right?” When 

Hobson did not honor the request, defendant said that if Hobson 

“sit[s] there and tr[ies] [to] keep beating on [him],” he was “not 

gonna say nothing.” After some more back-and-forth, Hobson 

agreed to give defendant a 10-minute break and left.

Hobson returned approximately five minutes later, telling

defendant, “we know you did it . . . . What matters is why you 

did it.” In response, defendant whispered, “Take me back to 

jail.” Hobson asked if defendant did not want to help him, and 

defendant confirmed, “Not right now.” Hobson continued 

talking, and defendant said, “Nothing to say Larry.”

Hobson then spoke some more. Defendant indicated for 

the second time that he had “[n]othing to say.” At this point, 

Hobson agreed to take defendant back to jail, saying that 

defendant should call him when he was ready to talk. Hobson 

then stated, “I’ll take you back out just like I brought you in. 

You’re on a parole hold,”

9 and defendant responded, “I’m on 

parole hold forever.”

As Hobson and defendant were leaving to return to the 

jail, defendant asked Hobson for a cigarette and for him to drive 

around a while so defendant could smoke. During the ride, 

Hobson asked defendant more questions. For instance, when he

 

9 The transcript included the parenthetical “(Meaning he 

was not being arrested for the murders of Rachel and Aundria)” 

following Hobson’s statement that defendant was “on a parole 

hold.”
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

39

heard defendant in the back seat crying and mumbling to 

himself, Hobson asked what defendant was thinking. When 

they arrived at the entrance to the jail facility, Hobson asked 

defendant whether he was willing to take him to the victims. 

Defendant told Hobson to turn into the facility instead, and

Hobson complied. As they were walking to the jail, Hobson also 

asked if, in the event Hobson did not hear back from defendant, 

he would be willing to let Hobson return the next day. 

Defendant responded, “ “Maybe I’ll deal with it tomorrow.’ ” 

Their conversation ended at approximately 2:00 or 2:30 p.m.

At approximately 9:45 a.m. on April 22, Hobson arrived 

uninvited back at the jail facility. He met with defendant in an 

employee break room, and had defendant brought to him

without handcuffs or other restraints. Hobson testified at the 

suppression hearing that he chose the break room instead of the 

police department because he “wanted it to be a noncustodialtype situation,” where defendant would not “feel any type of 

coercion.” Once defendant arrived, Hobson began talking, 

observing that the situation with the disappearance of the two 

victims was not going to go away. Hobson stated that the 

investigation painted a terrible picture, and he wanted to hear 

defendant’s side of the story, which might be different. 

Defendant told Hobson that Hobson was wrong, that “I’m 

nothing but an animal, and I don’t deserve to live.” Defendant

also mumbled, “Nothing can justify what I did.” The first 

statement (“I’m nothing but an animal, and I don’t deserve to 

live”) came within five minutes of Hobson initiating

conversation with defendant, and the second (“Nothing can 

justify what I did”) followed shortly thereafter.

When Hobson returned to topics he had broached 

previously, defendant asked Hobson what he wanted defendant
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

40

to tell him. Hobson said he wanted the truth. Defendant

responded, “Okay. But I don’t want to talk here.” Hobson 

agreed to take him to the police department.

Before transporting defendant from the jail, Hobson 

informed defendant that he “wanted to make sure [defendant] 

understood exactly what we were going to be doing and the 

questions I was going to be asking . . . so we didn’t spend another 

two hours of wasted time.” Hobson then read defendant his 

Miranda rights, and defendant acknowledged that he 

understood them. Hobson asked defendant if he was responsible 

for the disappearance and deaths of the two victims, and 

defendant said he was. Hobson subsequently arranged for 

defendant to be transported to the San Luis Obispo Police 

Department. The interaction at the jail took “a total of 30 

minutes from the time [Hobson] walked in until the time [he] 

left.”

Upon arriving at the police department, Hobson advised 

defendant of his Miranda rights for the second time that day

and asked if he understood them. Defendant answered in the 

affirmative. He then provided a detailed confession to the 

crimes as described ante, part I.A.2.

Hobson followed the same advisement procedure when he 

interviewed defendant on April 27. During this interrogation, 

Hobson asked defendant if he had “always talked to [Hobson] 

voluntarily.” Defendant agreed that he had. Although the 

interview was primarily devoted to obtaining more details about

the kidnappings and killings of Newhouse and Crawford, 

Hobson also asked defendant toward the end of the 

interrogation what prompted him to confess. Defendant 

responded, “[c]ause what I did was wrong.” When asked if 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

41

anything Hobson told him “convinced [him] that [he] should 

talk,” defendant responded, “[b]lood on my car seat.” Defendant 

distinguished between the two pieces of physical evidence the 

police had at that time, the eight-ball keychain and the blood. 

With regard to the blood, defendant said he “knew what was 

there” and so knew that the police were not “bluffing.” He 

confirmed that if all Hobson had was the keychain, he would not 

have confessed.

After listening to Hobson’s testimony and reviewing the 

taped confessions, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to 

suppress. In its order, the trial court noted that defendant had 

first been advised of his Miranda rights on April 1 and had 

agreed to discuss the case with Hobson. It further noted that on 

April 21, defendant said he recalled his rights. The court found

that on April 21 “defendant had invoked his right to remain 

silent” but did not resolve when exactly he did so. The court 

further reasoned that Hobson “stumbled in his attempt to 

honor” defendant’s invocation when Hobson asked defendant at 

the end of the drive to take Hobson to the victims. However, the 

court concluded that Hobson’s inappropriate “contact was 

terminated at the jail in late afternoon at approximately 4:00 

p.m” when Hobson dropped defendant off. Furthermore, 

“[d]efendant at that time indicated that he might be willing to 

speak with Hobson the next day: ‘Maybe. I’ll deal with it 

tomorrow.’ ”

10

 Based on these facts, the court concluded that 

 

10 The trial court’s order includes a period after “Maybe.” 

The court reporter transcribed Hobson’s testimony as stating, 

“Maybe I’ll deal with that tomorrow.” Moreover, Hobson 

testified that their conversation on April 21 ended at 

approximately 2:00 or 2:30 p.m., rather than at 4:00 p.m. as the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

42

defendant’s “request to cease questioning then was honored 

within the meaning of federal law.”

Turning to the events of April 22, the trial court rejected 

the Attorney General’s argument that defendant was not in 

custody when Hobson approached him that morning. Although 

defendant’s jailed status “was due to parole violations,” the court 

found that a reasonable person would believe he was in custody 

“on the case in question.” As such, defendant was in custody for 

Miranda purposes and “should have been advised of his 

Miranda rights or at least reminded of them by Investigator 

Hobson.” Because Hobson failed to do so, the court excluded 

defendant’s inculpatory statements that were made before 

Hobson read defendant his Miranda rights, i.e., the statements 

“I’m nothing but an animal. I don’t deserve to live” and “Nothing 

can justify what I did.” The court nonetheless concluded that 

these admissions were voluntary.

Finally, the trial court found all statements taken after 

Hobson gave defendant his Miranda warnings on April 22 were

admissible. It reasoned that Hobson had “obtained implied 

waivers,” and “[t]here is no evidence that defendant’s will was 

overcome.” We review these findings below.

b. Analysis

We begin with the uncontroverted premise that 

statements made by a defendant subject to custodial 

interrogation are inadmissible (for certain purposes) unless the 

defendant was “warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 

 

trial court’s order stated. The Attorney General’s brief quotes 

the reporter’s transcript, with no period after “maybe,” and 

recites that Hobson dropped defendant off at the jail at about 

2:00 or 2:30 p.m.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

43

any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 

him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,

either retained or appointed.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 

p. 444; see Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 224.) “The 

defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the 

waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 

(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.)

“On appeal, we review independently the trial court’s legal 

determinations of whether a defendant’s . . . Miranda waivers 

were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made [citation], 

and whether his later actions constituted an invocation of his 

right to silence [citation]. We evaluate the trial court’s factual 

findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the 

defendant’s statements and waivers, and “ ‘ “accept the trial 

court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its 

evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial 

evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 115 

(Rundle).)

Independent of whether a defendant’s rights under 

Miranda were observed, his or her statements may not be 

admitted unless they were voluntary. “The court in making a 

voluntariness determination ‘examines “whether a defendant’s 

will was overborne” by the circumstances surrounding the 

giving of a confession.’ ” (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 114.) 

The prosecution bears the burden of proof and must show “by a 

preponderance of the evidence the statements were, in fact, 

voluntary.” (Ibid.)

i. Custody status

As a threshold matter, the Attorney General argues that 

defendant was not in custody when he confessed and so Miranda 
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44

has no application. (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 

833 [“ ‘Miranda warnings are required only where there has 

been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him 

“in custody” ’ ”].) The Attorney General acknowledges that 

defendant was under arrest and held in county jail when Hobson 

questioned him, but maintains that such restriction on 

defendant’s freedom related only to his parole violations. As 

such, he was not in custody “for Miranda purposes as to the 

Newhouse/Crawford cases at the time he confessed to the 

crimes.” The trial court rejected this argument, and so do we.

We recognize that a formal arrest does not always 

constitute custody for Miranda purposes. (See Maryland v. 

Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 112 (Shatzer); Howes v. Fields (2012) 

565 U.S. 499, 509 (Howes).) In Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at page

112, the high court explained that such an arrest or the 

equivalent restraint in freedom of movement is “only a 

necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” 

In particular, an incarcerated person who is interrogated by the 

police is not necessarily in Miranda custody. This is because 

such a person is not always exposed to “the coercive pressures 

identified in Miranda.” (Id. at p. 113; see also Howes, supra, 565 

U.S. at pp. 508-509 [“ ‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies 

circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious 

danger of coercion”].)

The high court returned to the same theme in Howes. The 

court began by identifying “three strong grounds” why an 

incarcerated person may not experience the coercive pressure of 

Miranda custody. (Howes, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 511.) “First, 

questioning a person who is already serving a prison term does 

not generally involve the shock that very often accompanies 

arrest.” (Ibid.) “Second, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

45

been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured 

into speaking by a longing for prompt release.” (Ibid.) “Third, 

a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been convicted and 

sentenced, knows that the law enforcement officers who 

question him probably lack the authority to affect the duration 

of his sentence.” (Id. at p. 512.) Reviewing the facts of the case 

before it, the court concluded that the prisoner “was not in 

custody within the meaning of Miranda.” (Id. at p. 517.) In 

coming to this conclusion, the court took “into account all of the 

circumstances of the questioning” but thought the “[m]ost 

important” factor was that the prisoner had been “told at the 

outset of the interrogation, and reminded thereafter, that he 

could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted.” (Id. at 

pp. 517, 515.)

This case is different from Shatzer or Howes. In those 

cases, a person serving a prison sentence was brought in for 

questioning on an unrelated crime. By contrast, here defendant 

was not serving a term of incarceration when he was questioned, 

and it is difficult to separate his jailed status from the 

investigation into the Newhouse and Crawford murders. 

Although the legal justification for defendant’s detention was a 

parole violation, the impetus for the arrest was the perceived 

similarity between defendant’s prior crimes and Crawford’s 

disappearance. Moreover, defendant’s interactions with law 

enforcement after his arrest all concerned the Newhouse and 

Crawford investigation. At the time of his confession on April 

22, defendant had been repeatedly questioned about the 

disappearance of these two women. With good reason then, 

defendant appeared to have understood that his custodial 

status, although technically a parole hold, was connected to the 

Newhouse and Crawford matters. This explains defendant’s 
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46

uncontradicted statement that he was going to be on parole hold 

“forever,” something that seems unlikely were defendant held 

only for drinking alcohol and possessing something that looked

like a firearm.

All this matters because, in such circumstances, the 

rationales given in Howes concerning why a person would not 

necessarily feel the coercive pressure of interrogation fall away. 

Unlike the defendant in Howes, defendant was recently arrested 

and presumably still experiencing “the shock that very often 

accompanies arrest.” (Howes, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 511.) He 

likely hoped for “prompt release” and so might have been lured 

into speaking. (Ibid.) Finally, he might well have thought that 

Hobson had “the authority to affect the duration” of his parole 

hold. (Id. at p. 512.) Because law enforcement interest in 

defendant appeared to have been motivated by the 

disappearance of the two women, defendant might reasonably 

have thought that if he could convince Hobson he was not 

responsible for what happened to Newhouse and Crawford, he 

might be released. This explains defendant’s willingness to 

cooperate with the police — including by voluntarily answering 

questions, giving law enforcement permission to search his 

property, and undergoing a polygraph examination.

Moreover, we find that defendant was, in fact, subject to 

the coercive pressure associated with interrogation. At no point 

was defendant told that he “could leave and go back to his cell 

[at the county jail] whenever he wanted.” (Howes, supra, 565 

U.S. at p. 515.) Indeed, when defendant asked to be taken back 

to jail on April 21, Hobson took some time to accede to the

request. Hobson also used the time in the interim to try to elicit 

incriminating responses from defendant — that is, to subject 

him to interrogation. (See Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 
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291, 300-301; Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 112 [reasoning that

“the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed to guard 

against” was the “ ‘danger of coercion [that] results from the 

interaction of custody and official interrogation’ ”, italics 

omitted].) Considering the circumstances surrounding 

defendant’s interrogation, we cannot say that a reasonable 

person in his position “ ‘would have felt free to terminate the 

interview and leave.’ ” (Howes, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 515.) We 

therefore find that defendant was in custody for Miranda 

purposes when he confessed.

ii. Waiver and confession

We now address the merits of defendant’s claim that his 

confession should have been suppressed. Because defendant

seeks to suppress the statements that he gave on April 22 and 

thereafter, we begin with the circumstances most immediately 

surrounding these statements. The statements — detailed, 

recorded admissions of how defendant kidnapped, raped, and 

murdered Newhouse and Crawford — were taken after Hobson 

advised defendant of his Miranda rights and confirmed that he 

understood them. As long as defendant validly waived the

Miranda protection and voluntarily confessed, the statements 

are admissible. (See Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600, 

608-609 (Seibert) [“giving the warnings and getting a waiver has 

generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining 

that a statement is involuntary even though given after 

warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual 

stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the 

finding of a valid waiver”].)

A valid waiver need not be express, but “may be implied 

from the defendant’s words and actions.” (People v. Parker
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(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1216 (Parker).) When a suspect “ ‘having 

heard and understood a full explanation of his or her Miranda

rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to 

talk, he or she has thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently waived them.’ ” (Id. at p. 1216.)

There is no question that defendant “heard and 

understood a full explanation” of his rights. (Parker, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at p. 1216.) On April 22, Hobson twice read defendant 

his rights, and defendant expressly stated that he understood 

them. Moreover, defendant “had extensive prior experience 

with the criminal justice system,” having been convicted of 

numerous felonies before being interrogated in this case. (Ibid.) 

Such familiarity bolsters the conclusion that defendant had “full 

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and 

the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (Moran v. 

Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421; see also Parker, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at p. 1216 [crediting such prior experience with the 

criminal justice system].)

Likewise, there is no dispute that defendant spoke to 

Hobson — and so “act[ed] in a manner inconsistent” with the 

exercise of his Miranda rights. (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 

560 U.S. 370, 385 (Berghuis).) After being apprised of his rights, 

defendant “proceeded to actively participate in the conversation 

with the detective[] — answering questions, asking for 

clarification, and generally contributing to a discussion he knew 

was being tape-recorded.” (Parker, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1216.) 

He did not once mention an attorney. Such conduct suggests 

that defendant “has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the 

protection those rights afford.” (Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at 

p. 385.)
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We now turn to the question whether the waiver and 

confession were voluntary. The waiver in this case is inferred 

from defendant’s confession, and defendant maintains that both 

were involuntarily given because he was coerced. Defendant 

lists a host of “tactics” that he said were “designed to overcome 

[his] decision not to incriminate himself,” including “repeated 

questioning after invocation, lies and misrepresentations 

concerning the evidence, implied promises of leniency and 

benefits, verbal commands to talk, physical touching, and an 

approach of ‘softening-up’ [defendant].”

Before addressing each of these interrogation techniques, 

we note the following. First, when asked at the April 27 

interview, defendant agreed that he had “always talked to 

[Hobson] voluntarily,” and that Hobson had “never coerced 

[him], threatened [him], [or] promised [him] anything.” (See, 

e.g., People v. Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 673 (Spencer)

[taking account of the fact the defendant “acknowledged at the 

end of the interview that his confession was ‘free and voluntarily 

given’ ” and that “the officers made him no promises and that 

they did not threaten him”]; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 

731, 753 (Dykes) [similar].)

Second, and more important, defendant himself identified 

why he confessed. The reasons did not involve any interrogation 

tactic that he now claims was coercive. Instead, defendant said 

he confessed because he felt “what [he] did was wrong” and 

because the police had recovered blood from his vehicle’s seat. 

Of all the things Hobson told him, defendant said it was 

Hobson’s disclosure that the police had found blood on his

truck’s jump seat that “convinced [him] that [he] should talk.”

Hobson’s statement that the police had found Newhouse’s blood 

on defendant’s jump seat was true and cannot be said to have 
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50

been coercive. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115 

(Holloway) [stating that proper questioning “ ‘may include 

exchanges of information, [and] summaries of evidence . . .’ ”].) 

Defendant’s own words thus undermine his claim that he 

involuntarily confessed because of coercion.

We nonetheless examine seriatim the complained-of

interrogation techniques. We do not find that, individually or 

collectively, these techniques served to overbear defendant’s will 

or to render his confessions involuntary. Defendant first claims 

that Hobson improperly “continu[ed] to attempt to convince 

[defendant] to talk on April 21st after repeated invocations of 

[his] right to remain silent.” We will return below to the claim 

that defendant “repeated[ly]” invoked his right to remain silent 

on April 21. For the purpose of determining whether the 

confessions were voluntary, however, it is enough to observe

that — even assuming Hobson failed to heed defendant’s 

invocations of the right to remain silent on April 21 — that 

failure did not produce the confession on April 22 or the 

statements thereafter. (See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal. 

4th 405, 437 (Williams) [“A confession is not involuntary unless 

the coercive police conduct and the defendant’s statement are 

causally related”].)

There is no evidence that what Hobson said to defendant 

after he lapsed into silence — the earliest time defendant claims 

he invoked his right against self-incrimination — caused 

defendant to confess. Hobson had already told defendant about 

the blood found in his truck before defendant stopped 

responding to questions. Thereafter, Hobson repeated the same 

exhortations to tell the truth that he employed before defendant 

stopped talking. Defendant was not swayed by what Hobson 

said, telling Hobson that if he “keep[s] beating on me,” “[t]hen 
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I’m not gonna say nothing. I know me.” And indeed, defendant 

made no inculpatory statement on April 21. It was not until the 

following day, after a night away from any importuning by 

Hobson, that defendant made the inculpatory statements.

In light of these facts, we find that Hobson’s “continuing 

to attempt to convince [defendant] to talk on April 21” did not 

cause defendant to confess and so did not render his confession 

on April 22 or thereafter involuntary. (See People v. Carrington

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 172 (Carrington) [“we conclude that 

Sergeant Sherman’s comments did not affect defendant’s 

decision to confess to the murder of Esparza, because she 

maintained her innocence during the remainder of the second 

interview and, during the third interview, revealed that she 

already was aware that [what the sergeant said was false]”]; 

Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 114 [“Coercive police tactics by 

themselves do not render a defendant’s statements involuntary 

if the defendant’s free will was not in fact overborne by the 

coercion and his decision to speak instead was based upon some 

other consideration”].)

We come to the same conclusion with regard to defendant’s 

assertions that Hobson engaged in “lies and misrepresentations 

concerning the evidence, implied promises of leniency and 

benefits, verbal commands to talk, physical touching, and an 

approach of ‘softening-up’ [defendant].” Defendant complains 

that Hobson lied to him when he told him that the eight-ball 

keychain had been “ ‘tested’ and found to have been 

manufactured” later than when defendant said he found the 

item. Defendant, however, expressly disclaimed that the eightball keychain in itself caused him to confess, answering “[n]o” 

when Hobson asked, “What if all I had was the 8 ball? . . . Would 

you have confessed?” Moreover, “[t]he use of deceptive 
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statements during an interrogation . . . does not invalidate a 

confession unless the deception is ‘ “ ‘of a type reasonably likely 

to procure an untrue statement.’ ” ’ ” (Carrington, supra, 47 

Cal.4th at p. 172.) We do not think that Hobson’s representation 

about the keychain is of such a type. (See People v. Smith (2007) 

40 Cal.4th 483, 505-506 (Smith) [listing cases in which courts 

have found similar deceptive interrogation tactics permissible].)

Defendant also claims that Hobson misrepresented that 

“three witnesses will testify” to seeing defendant’s vehicle in 

Crawford’s neighborhood. Defendant characterizes this as a 

“lie,” because “[n]o such witnesses were ever called.” Yet, weeks 

before he confessed, defendant himself admitted that he had 

driven down Crawford’s street several times. Hobson’s 

statement about the three witnesses, whether or not true, thus 

was not likely to procure an unreliable admission. (Carrington, 

supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 172.)

Defendant attempts to bolster his argument about the 

supposed misrepresentations by claiming that Hobson 

“maximize[d] the psychological effect of his lies by repeatedly

insisting that he could be trusted.” We do not find that such 

statements are either inherently coercive or here served to 

undermine defendant’s will. Certainly, however many times 

Hobson told defendant that he could trust him, defendant was 

not inclined to believe Hobson or confess because of the “lies.” 

We should not forget that defendant was a grown man, 

experienced with the criminal justice system, physically 

healthy, and displaying no indication that he was especially 

susceptible to Hobson’s representations. As such, defendant 

was rather well placed to resist interrogation. (See, e.g., Dykes, 

supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 752.)
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We are likewise unpersuaded that Hobson “falsely told 

[defendant] that the authorities would give him favorable 

consideration if [he] confessed.” Hobson told defendant no such 

thing. The message Hobson conveyed was that both he and the 

district attorney wanted to know defendant’s “story” and why 

defendant did what he did. Such sentiment cannot fairly be 

taken to imply that the district attorney would give defendant 

favorable treatment. (See Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at 

p. 174 [finding that the interrogators’ statements “did not 

constitute a promise of leniency” when “[t]he interviewing 

officers did not suggest they could influence the decisions of the 

district attorney, but simply informed defendant that full 

cooperation might be beneficial in an unspecified way”].) And 

even if what Hobson said might be construed as suggesting that 

defendant’s version of events could make a difference in how he 

was prosecuted, this was not false. (Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th 

at p. 116 [observing that some circumstances “can reduce the 

degree of a homicide or, at the least, serve as arguments for 

mitigation in the penalty phase”].) In any event, Hobson “did no 

more than tell defendant of the benefit that might ‘ “flow[] 

naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct.” ’ ”

(Ibid.) Such statements did not render defendant’s subsequent 

statements involuntary. (Id. at p. 115.)

Defendant also complains that Hobson “physically 

touched [him] and told him that talking to Hobson was 

required.” We do not see how the physical touching that 

occurred here was improper. Defendant makes “no claim of 

physical intimidation or deprivation.” (Holloway, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 114.) Instead, he objects to the occasional touches 

on his person because they were purportedly “psychologically 

powerful.” Yet, even if the touches constituted “psychological 
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ploys” and here “establish[ed] a false sense of rapport, intimacy, 

and caring,” we still do not think that they were so coercive as 

to “ ‘tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and 

unreliable.’ ” (Smith, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 501.)

In addition, although Hobson said things like, “you got to 

talk to me man,” “[i]t’s not going away,” and, “[w]e have to deal 

with it,” it is clear that that Hobson was not requiring defendant

talk to him but exhorting him to do so. Moreover, defendant’s 

conduct indicates that he knew he did not have to talk to 

Hobson. Even if his refusal to continue answering questions

was not immediately honored on April 21, still defendant

managed to stop the interrogation. He did not begin talking 

again until the next morning, and he did not give a full 

confession until Hobson transported him to a place (from the jail 

to the police station) more to his liking.

Finally, defendant relies on People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 

Cal.3d 150 to argue that, because the waiver came on the heels 

of Hobson’s “ ‘clever softening-up’ of [defendant] without 

advising him of his rights,” the waiver was not valid. In 

Honeycutt, we said that “[w]hen the waiver results from a clever 

softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim 

and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive 

without a Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary

. . . .” (20 Cal.3d at p. 160.) That holding finds no application in 

this case: Hobson did not disparage the victims, engage in 

conversations that could be fairly characterized as 

“ingratiating,” or fail to give defendant Miranda warnings 

before he confessed. Moreover, Honeycutt has been limited to its 

facts. In People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 478, we identified 

“the two salient features of Honeycutt” as involving (1) an 

interrogating officer who had a prior relationship with the 
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defendant and who sought to “ingratiate” himself “by discussing 

‘unrelated past events and former acquaintances’ ” and (2) the 

officer disparaging the victim. (Id. at pp. 477-478.) When these 

two features are not present, we found reliance on Honeycutt to 

be “misplaced.” (Id. at p. 478; see also People v. Michaels (2002) 

28 Cal.4th 486, 511 (Michaels) [rejecting the defendant’s 

reliance on Honeycutt when the facts presented “are not at all 

like Honeycutt, which . . . involved ‘an unrecorded 30-minute, 

pre-Miranda conversation, discussing mutual acquaintances, 

past events and finally the victim’ ”]; People v. Kelly (1990) 51 

Cal.3d 931, 954 [finding Honeycutt “clearly distinguishable” 

when “[n]o misconduct of [the type described in Honeycutt] 

occurred here”].) It is likewise misplaced in this case.

iii. Failure to advise on April 22

Defendant alternatively argues that we should not focus 

on the confessions obtained after the Miranda advisement on 

April 22 but rather on the events preceding that advisement. 

Specifically, defendant calls our attention to the fact Hobson did 

not initially provide him with Miranda warnings when he 

approached him on April 22.11 Only after defendant made two 

inculpatory statements — “I’m nothing but an animal, and I 

don’t deserve to live” and “Nothing can justify what I did” — did 

Hobson read him his rights. Defendant claims that this shows 

that Hobson engaged in an impermissible “question first, warn 

later” technique that renders the warnings ineffective. As such, 

 

11 Defendant seems to assume that the Miranda advisement 

was necessary on the morning of April 22. It is not entirely clear 

that this is so, as defendant was reminded of his rights on April 

21 and readvisement the next day may not have been necessary. 

(See, e.g., Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 434.) Nonetheless, 

we engage with defendant’s arguments as he has laid them out.
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statements made after the warnings must be excluded. We 

cannot agree.

Under the high court’s precedent, the mere fact that a 

defendant has made unwarned admissions does not render

subsequent warned confessions inadmissible. (See generally, 

Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 (Elstad); Seibert, supra, 

542 U.S. 600.) In Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at page 318, the court 

held that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet 

uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his 

rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite 

Miranda warnings.” Instead, as long as both the initial 

unwarned statement and the subsequent warned statement are 

voluntary, the warned statement may be deemed the product of 

a defendant’s “rational and intelligent choice” to confess and so 

is admissible. (Id. at pp. 314, 318; see also Williams, supra, 49 

Cal.4th at p. 448 [“Even when a first statement is taken in the 

absence of proper advisements and is incriminating, so long as 

the first statement was voluntary a subsequent voluntary 

confession ordinarily is not tainted simply because it was 

procured after a Miranda violation”].)

Given that we already found the warned confession in this 

case to be voluntary, we need only examine whether defendant’s 

unwarned statements were also voluntary. The trial court here 

found “no evidence that defendant’s will was overcome” when he 

made the unwarned statements. We agree. The unwarned 

portion of the interview on April 22 was short. Hobson testified 

that his entire conversation with defendant at the jail lasted no 

more than 15 minutes and defendant made the two inculpatory 

statements within the first five minutes. During this time, 

defendant was unrestrained and sitting in an employee break 

room. Prior to defendant’s utterance of the two inculpatory 
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admissions, Hobson’s statements to defendant that most 

directly related to the crimes were “the situation . . . wasn’t 

going to go away” and Hobson “needed him to tell . . . his side of 

the story.” Consistent with our previous explanation, we do not 

find such statements to be coercive.

For his part, defendant appeared to have readily 

cooperated. When Hobson told defendant that he wanted him 

to tell the truth, defendant answered, “Okay,” but requested to 

be taken “someplace else” first. Hobson then said to defendant 

that before he “transported him back to the police department,”

he “wanted to make sure he understood exactly what we were 

going to be doing and the questions that I was going to be asking 

him.” Hobson thereafter advised defendant of his Miranda 

rights, and defendant admitted to being responsible for the 

disappearance and death of Newhouse and Crawford. Nothing 

about this exchange suggests that defendant’s statements prior 

to receiving the advisement were involuntary. As such, 

although the unwarned statements must be suppressed (and 

they were), the warned confession on April 22 and subsequent 

statements were properly admitted.

Defendant, however, argues that Elstad does not apply 

because “Hobson deliberately used a ‘question first,’ warn later 

technique in violation of Missouri v. Seibert.” In Seibert, the 

high court confronted a situation where the interrogating officer 

“made a ‘conscious decision’ to withhold Miranda warnings.” 

(Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 605-606.) The police officer 

testified that he did so in accordance with “an interrogation 

technique he had been taught: question first, then give the 

warnings, and then repeat the question ‘until I get the answer 

that [the suspect] already provided once.’ ” (Id. at p. 606.) 

Another police officer testified that his department “promoted” 
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“the strategy of withholding Miranda warnings until after 

interrogating and drawing out a confession.” (Id. at p. 609.)

Under such circumstances, a majority of the high court 

found the warned confession inadmissible. (Seibert, supra, 542 

U.S. at p. 604 (plur. opn.); id. at p. 618 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, 

J.).) The court fractured, however, on why that is so. A 

plurality of four justices explained that “when interrogators 

question first and warn later” (id. at p. 611 (plur. opn.)), the 

later, warned confession is admissible only if “in the 

circumstances the Miranda warnings given could reasonably be 

found effective.” (Id. at p. 612, fn. 4 (plur. opn.).) Under the 

facts of the case, the four justices concluded that the 

circumstances “do not reasonably support a conclusion that the 

warnings given could have served their purpose,” and the 

postwarning statements therefore were inadmissible. (Id. at 

pp. 616-617 (plur. opn.).)

Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but proposed 

a different rule. In Justice Kennedy’s view, the plurality’s test

“cuts too broadly.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 621-622 (conc. 

opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Justice Kennedy instead “would apply a 

narrower test applicable only in the infrequent case, such as we 

have here, in which the two-step interrogation technique was 

used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.” 

(Id. at p. 622 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Under that approach, 

where the “deliberate two-step strategy” was not employed, 

“[t]he admissibility of postwarning statements should continue 

to be governed by the principles of Elstad.” (Ibid.)

The fractured nature of Seibert has given rise to a debate 

over whether it is the plurality’s opinion or Justice Kennedy’s 

concurrence that provides the controlling standard. (Compare 
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U.S. v. Ray (6th Cir. 2015) 803 F.3d 244, 272 [“we adopt Seibert 

plurality’s multi-factor test for this Circuit and direct the 

district court to apply this test”] with U.S. v. Capers (2d Cir. 

2010) 627 F.3d 470, 476 [“this Court joined the Eleventh, Fifth, 

Ninth, Third, and Eighth Circuits in applying Justice Kennedy’s 

approach in Seibert”]; U.S. v. Kiam (3d Cir. 2006) 432 F.3d 524, 

532; U.S. v. Mashburn (4th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3d 303, 309 

[“Justice Kennedy’s opinion therefore represents the holding of 

the Seibert Court”]; U.S. v. Courtney (5th Cir. 2006) 463 F.3d 

333, 338; U.S. v. Ollie (8th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 1135, 1142; U.S.

v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148, 1157-1158; U.S. v. 

Street (11th Cir. 2006) 472 F.3d 1298, 1313.) We need not decide 

the matter here, as the result in this case would be the same 

under either approach. (See U.S. v. Faust (1st Cir. 2017) 853 

F.3d 39, 48, fn. 6 [“Because we find that Faust’s argument fails 

under either [the plurality or the concurrence’s] approach, there 

is no need to address this question here]; U.S. v. Heron (7th Cir. 

2009) 564 F.3d 879, 885 [similar]; U.S. v. Carrizales-Toledo

(10th Cir. 2006) 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 [similar]; U.S. v. Straker

(D.C. Cir. 2015) 800 F.3d 570, 617 [similar].)

Under the plurality’s approach, the relevant inquiry in a 

“question first” scenario is “whether it would be reasonable to 

find that in these circumstances the warnings could function 

‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at 

pp. 611-612 (plur. opn.).) In other words, “could the warnings 

effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about 

giving an admissible statement at that juncture? Could they 

reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he 

had talked earlier?” (Id. at p. 612 (plur. opn.).) In making this 

determination, the trial court is to consider a number of factors, 

including “the completeness and detail of the questions and 
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60

answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping 

content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first 

and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the 

degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second 

round as continuous with the first.” (Id. at p. 615 (plur. opn.).)

A consideration of these factors cuts in favor of admitting 

defendant’s confessions. Although all of the relevant 

questioning here was conducted by a single person (Hobson) 

over the course of a single day (thus satisfying the “continuity of 

police personnel” factor), there was no extended questioning 

before Miranda warnings were given; defendant’s prewarning 

responses, though undoubtedly incriminating, were nonspecific 

and lacking in detail; and, at defendant’s request, there was a 

change of setting before he gave the detailed confession that was 

ultimately used against him at trial. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 

at pp. 615-616 (plur. opn.).) Moreover, the conversation that 

preceded the second round of interrogation alerted defendant 

that he had a “real choice” whether to follow up on his earlier 

incriminating statements or “stop talking.” (Id. at p. 612 (plur. 

opn.).) Before reading defendant his rights, Hobson informed 

defendant that he “wanted to make sure [defendant] understood 

exactly what we were going to be doing and the questions I was 

going to be asking . . . so we didn’t spend another two hours of 

wasted time.” Hobson’s statements reasonably signaled to 

defendant that it was up to him whether he wanted to answer 

Hobson’s questions or, alternatively, to “waste” Hobson’s time. 

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the warnings 

“function[ed] ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.” (Seibert, supra, 

542 U.S. at pp. 612-613 (plur. opn.).)

Defendant’s statement was likewise admissible under 

Justice Kennedy’s approach. According to Justice Kennedy, 
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Seibert does not control unless Hobson employed “the two-step 

interrogation technique . . . in a calculated way to undermine 

the Miranda warning.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 622 

(conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) We find no such deliberateness 

here.

Although Justice Kennedy “did not articulate how a court 

should determine whether an interrogator used a deliberate 

two-step strategy,” the facts of Seibert and Elstad afford us some

guidance. (U.S. v. Williams, supra, 435 F.3d at p. 1158.) On the 

one hand, we have nothing here like the circumstances of 

Seibert. There is no evidence that the San Luis Obispo Police 

Department or District Attorney’s Office had a policy of 

“withholding Miranda warnings until after interrogating and 

drawing out a confession,” or that Hobson was following such a 

policy when he interrogated defendant. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. 

at p. 609 (plur. opn.).)

On the other hand, like the officers in Elstad, Hobson did 

not provide warnings because he failed to “realize that a suspect 

is in custody and warnings are required.” (Seibert, supra, 542 

U.S. at p. 620 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.); Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 

at pp. 315-316.) Hobson testified that he did not advise 

defendant of his Miranda rights on April 21 and did not 

immediately provide him with those rights when he approached 

him on April 22 because defendant “was not in custody on the 

. . . disappearance of Rachel Newhouse and Aundria Crawford. 

He was in custody on a parole violation.” In line with Justice 

Kennedy’s identification of a failure to “realize that a suspect is 

in custody and warnings are required” as a scenario properly 

analyzed under Elstad principles, we find that Siebert does not 
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62

control here. (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 620 (conc. opn. of 

Kennedy, J.).)12

Other aspects of Hobson’s conduct persuade us that he did 

not engage in “a two-step questioning technique based on a 

deliberate violation of Miranda.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at 

p. 620 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Significantly, Hobson 

advised defendant of his Miranda rights before defendant 

confessed. (See Bobby v. Dixon (2011) 565 U.S. 23, 31 [“unlike 

in Seibert, there is no concern here that police gave Dixon 

Miranda warnings and then led him to repeat an earlier murder 

confession, because there was no earlier confession to repeat”].) 

Hobson also did not attempt to use defendant’s prewarning 

 

12 Of course, Hobson did provide defendant with Miranda

warnings on the morning of April 22 after defendant made 

vaguely incriminating statements. This raises the question of 

whether Hobson thought that defendant’s custody status had 

changed at that point. On this issue, we note that Hobson did 

not tie his recitation of the Miranda warnings to defendant’s 

custody status. Instead, he described the sequence of events in 

this way: After defendant asked to be taken “someplace else,” 

he (Hobson) “told [defendant] before I transported him back to 

the police department I wanted to make sure he understood 

exactly what we were going to be doing and the questions that I 

was going to be asking him so we didn’t spend another two hours 

of wasted time. [¶] So at that point I advised Rex Krebs of his 

Miranda rights, as read from the DOJ form, and then I asked 

him the two questions.” Thus, although Hobson never 

pinpointed the precise moment he believed defendant’s custody 

status changed, the timing of his advisement is consistent with 

the (mistaken) belief that (1) defendant became “in custody” 

after incriminating himself in response to Hobson’s “two 

questions,” or (2) defendant acquired “in custody” status after 

being transported to the police station, when Hobson got to 

“doing” what he was going to do and asking “the questions [he] 

was going to be asking.”
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statements to induce him to talk after advising him of his rights 

under Miranda. (Bobby v. Dixon, supra, 565 U.S. at p. 31 [“[n]or 

is there any evidence that police used Dixon’s earlier 

[unwarned] admission to forgery to induce him to waive his right 

to silence later”]; contra, Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 605 (plur. 

opn.) [interrogating officer “confronted [the suspect] with her 

prewarning statements”].)

To be sure, Hobson could have read defendant his 

Miranda rights before defendant made inculpatory statements 

or agreed to tell the truth. Yet simply because an officer could 

have given an advisement earlier is not enough to show that he 

delayed “in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda

warning.” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 622 (conc. opn. of 

Kennedy, J.); see People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 

637, 639 [no finding of deliberateness despite the officer stating 

“[i]f you want to talk to me, I’ll advise you of your rights” but 

then forgoing the advisement when the suspect indicated that 

he wanted to talk to an attorney first].) Likewise, that 

advisement did issue after acquiescence to tell the truth does 

not mean that the officer sought to undermine Miranda. (See 

Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 448 [reasoning that the 

principles of Elstad apply even when advisement came only 

after “the defendant’s letting ‘the cat out of the bag’ ”].) Last, 

even if Hobson had no good reason for failing to give Miranda

warnings when he first approached defendant on April 22, there 

is no ground to believe Hobson acted deliberately “to obscure 

both the practical and legal significance of the admonition when 

finally given” or that his conduct had such an effect. (Seibert, 

supra, 542 U.S. at p. 620 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)
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In light of the preceding, we find that defendant’s warned 

confessions were properly admitted despite his prior unwarned 

statements.

iv. Failure to heed invocation on April 21

Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting the statements he made on April 22 and thereafter 

because Hobson failed to honor defendant’s invocation of his 

right to remain silent on April 21. We agree that Hobson should 

have stopped his interrogation on April 21 sooner than he did. 

However, in light of the facts that defendant made no 

inculpatory statements on April 21, that Hobson did not 

overcome defendant’s will that day or any time thereafter, that 

Hobson’s failure to honor defendant’s invocation was not 

causally related to defendant’s subsequent decision to confess, 

and that, at the time of his confession on the next day, 

defendant’s right to cut off questioning was honored, we find no 

error in the admission of the confession.

As the trial court found and the prosecution conceded, 

defendant invoked his right to remain silent on April 21.13 Like 

the trial court, we need not decide the precise moment when

defendant made his invocation, except to observe that it was 

later than when defendant claims he first asserted his right but 

earlier than when Hobson said he understood defendant to have 

done so.

 

13 Hobson testified that he thought defendant asserted his 

right to remain silent when he stated near the end of the 

interview on April 21, “Nothing to say.” The prosecution’s 

opposition to the motion to suppress acknowledged that 

defendant had invoked his right at “the end of the interview.”
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Defendant did not invoke his right to silence by merely 

saying nothing for 15 minutes while Hobson talked. Prior to the 

conversation arriving at this point, defendant had waived his 

Miranda rights — first by signing a waiver on April 1 and again 

by talking to Hobson after being reminded of his rights on April 

21. (See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373.) 

Because defendant had previously waived his rights, a 

subsequent invocation must be unambiguous to be effective. 

(E.g., Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 381-382; People v. 

Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 948 (Martinez).) In essence, he 

needed to say “that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not 

want to talk with the police.” (Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at 

p. 382 [holding that a suspect who did neither of these things 

following an earlier waiver “did not invoke his right to remain 

silent”].) In the absence of such unambiguous statements, 

Hobson was free to continue questioning defendant. (Martinez, 

supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 948 [“ ‘Faced with an ambiguous or 

equivocal statement, law enforcement officers are not required 

. . . either to ask clarifying questions or to cease questioning 

altogether’ ”].)

Likewise, when defendant requested that Hobson “[p]ut 

me down in a holding cell and let me think,” he did not 

unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent. Rather, he 

likely “merely asked for a break from questioning.” (Rundle, 

supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 116.) Because defendant was then 

housed at the county jail and so presumably could not be left in

the police station’s holding cell for long, the request to be put 

back in a holding cell (so he could “think”) is reasonably 

interpreted as a request to be left alone for a moment. 

Interpreted this way, the statement stands in contrast to what 

defendant said when Hobson returned from giving him a five-
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66

minute break: “Take me back to jail.” At that point, defendant 

has arguably indicated that, beyond wanting a temporary break 

from questioning, “he did not want to talk with the police.” 

(Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 382.) And even if this later 

statement was ambiguous in the context of defendant’s previous 

request for a short break (see Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 

p. 429), any ambiguity was resolved when defendant said, for 

the first of two times, “Nothing to say.” By this point at the 

latest, defendant had unambiguously invoked his right to 

remain silent and Hobson should have stopped the 

interrogation.

Hobson did not stop. Instead, he continued questioning 

defendant until defendant once again asserted that he had 

“nothing to say.” Hobson testified that he understood defendant 

to have invoked only at this point, when defendant repeated 

himself. Even with this understanding, however, Hobson asked

defendant still more questions while transporting him back to 

jail.

Yet, despite the failure to honor defendant’s right to 

remain silent on April 21, Hobson made no contact with 

defendant for the next 18 hours. Moreover, as the trial court 

found, defendant did not foreclose the possibility of Hobson 

returning the next day. Indeed, when Hobson returned the 

following morning, defendant showed no reluctance to talk, 

readily answering questions and voluntarily confessing.

The question is whether Hobson’s failure to honor 

defendant’s invocation to remain silent on April 21 renders 

inadmissible the statements obtained on April 22 and 

thereafter. In Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 104 

(Mosley), the high court held “the admissibility of statements 
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67

obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent 

depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off 

questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ”

14

 The court did not 

address a situation in which the right to cut off questioning was 

eventually, but not immediately, honored.

In the years since Mosley was decided, we have never 

found that an initial failure to honor a defendant’s invocation —

whether of the to remain silent or the right to have counsel 

present — poses a categorical bar to the admission of any 

subsequent statement regardless of the circumstances. Instead, 

in case after case, we have held that despite the initial failure to 

 

14 California courts initially did not follow Mosley, rejecting 

it in favor of the rule that “after a defendant has once 

demonstrated he does not wish to waive his privilege against 

self-incrimination, the police cannot lawfully subject him to a 

new round of interrogation even if they repeat the Miranda

warnings.” (People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 238, 251.) 

In 1982, however, California voters approved Proposition 8 and 

amended the state Constitution to add a “Right to Truth-inEvidence.” Under this provision, “relevant evidence shall not be 

excluded in any criminal proceeding.” (Cal. Const., Art. I § 28, 

subd. (f)(2).)

Although we have never expressly held that Proposition 8 

abrogated Pettingill, our cases have clearly nodded in this 

direction. (See People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318 [“Given 

the probable aim of the voters in adopting section 28[(f)(2)], . . .

it is not reasonably likely that the California voters intended to 

preserve, in the form of a ‘statutory’ privilege, a judicially 

created exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United 

States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution”]; In re 

Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [similar]; Martinez, supra, 

47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [applying Mosley without mentioning 

Pettingill].) Perhaps for this reason, defendant does not seek to 

rely on Pettingill, and we accept that the analysis should 

proceed without reference to the Pettingill rule.
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68

honor a Miranda invocation, a voluntary confession obtained 

during a subsequent interrogation is admissible. Thus, in People 

v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1040-1043 (Bradford), we 

held that a warned confession was admissible despite the fact 

that (1) a day earlier, detectives had persisted in interrogating 

the defendant after he answered, “ ‘No. I want my lawyer,’ ” in 

response to the questions, “ ‘Do you wish to give up the right to 

remain silent? Do you want to talk to me about what happened 

last night?’ ” (id. at p. 1025), and (2) the continued questioning 

produced an admission that the defendant killed the victim. We 

reasoned that suppression was not necessary because the first 

confession was “ ‘unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other 

circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to 

exercise his free will’ ” and the second (warned) confession was 

“ ‘knowingly and voluntarily made.’ ” (Id. at p. 1040.) We 

likewise did not suppress warned statements in People v. Storm

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1039, despite the police having ignored 

the defendant’s invocation of the right of counsel during an 

interrogation two days earlier. We reached the same result in 

People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 444, even though the police 

there interrogated the suspect despite his clear statement from 

the day before that he “would not waive his [Miranda] rights.” 

(Id. at p. 437.) In contrast, we suppressed the defendant’s 

confession in a case where we found the police not only 

“intentionally continued interrogation . . . in spite of defendant’s 

invocation,” but also induced an involuntary confession. (People 

v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 68, 74.)

In light of our precedent, we conclude that Hobson’s 

failure to honor defendant’s invocation of the right to remain 

silent on April 21 does not compel the suppression of the 

voluntary, warned statements taken on April 22 and thereafter. 
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Apart from his failure to immediately cease questioning, 

Hobson’s interrogation techniques were not coercive. In 

addition, no “ ‘other circumstances’ ” existed to “ ‘to undermine 

the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will.’ ” (Bradford, supra, 

14 Cal.4th at p. 1040.) Indeed, defendant’s will was not

overcome on April 21 or at any time thereafter. Although 

defendant was subdued during the April 21 interrogation and 

cried during the drive back to the county jail, he showed a clear 

ability to exercise his free will, including by stopping the 

interrogation, refusing to incriminate himself, controlling when 

he would be dropped off at the jail (by requesting that Hobson 

drive around so that he could smoke), and directing Hobson to 

turn into the jail despite Hobson’s last request for defendant to 

take him to the bodies. Likewise, as explained ante, in part 

II.B.1.ii, he exercised his free will when he voluntarily confessed

on April 22 after receiving his Miranda advisement.

Nor should we forget that there was a period of about 18 

hours in which defendant was subjected to no questioning after 

invoking his right to remain silent. (Contra, People v. Peracchi

(2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 353, 362 [finding that a confession should 

have been suppressed because “[d]espite Peracchi’s invocation of 

his right to remain silent, the officer persisted in asking him 

questions regarding why he did not wish to speak with the 

officers at that time without even a momentary cessation in 

questioning”]; Anderson v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 781, 

791 [suppressing a confession when the court was “not faced 

with a situation where there was a break in questioning after 

the Miranda invocation”].) This was substantially longer than 

the two-hour period in Mosley in which the suspect was left 

alone and the court found questioning could be reinitiated. 

(Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104.)
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Finally, even though he did not do so immediately, Hobson 

did honor defendant’s right to cut off questioning. On April 21, 

Hobson asked if he could return to talk to defendant the next 

day if he did not hear back from him, and defendant replied

“Maybe I’ll deal with it tomorrow,” or “Maybe. I’ll deal with it 

tomorrow.” Whatever defendant’s exact response was, it seems 

that Hobson could reasonably have understood it as conveying 

that he could return the next day — if only to find out whether 

defendant was willing to talk. When Hobson came to the jail on 

April 22, defendant expressed no desire to remain silent, thus 

indicating that he had decided that he would talk. 

We reject defendant’s reliance on People v. Montano (1991) 

226 Cal.App.3d 914. In Montano, the court found that 

Montano’s confession was actually coerced. In that case, not 

only did police officers ignore Montano’s double-digit number of 

invocations, they “aggravated the situation by using their 

common religion to conjure up in defendant’s mind the picture 

of confessing to avoid going to hell.” (Id. at p. 935.) Moreover, 

the tactics “succeeded because the officers were not employing 

them on a person who had a history of experience with police 

interrogation or on someone who in the circumstances would 

have unlimited powers of resistance. At the time of the 

interrogation defendant was 18 years old, having entered the 

country illegally 8 months before.” (Id. at pp. 935-936.) In these

circumstances, Montano’s will was overcome and he “tacitly 

admitted that he alone was responsible for the victim’s murder.” 

(Id. at p. 937.) In contrast, defendant here was not merely 18 

years old; he did have “a history of experience with police 

interrogation” (id. at p. 935); and he made no admission during 

the interrogation in which he invoked his right to silence. (Ibid.) 
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71

Defendant simply was not coerced, and Montano supplies no 

basis to suppress the confessions at issue here.

To summarize, defendant was at no time coerced. He was 

given an 18-hour break from interrogation after invoking his 

right to remain silent; he left open the possibility for the officer 

to reinitiate contact, and upon being contacted, cooperated with 

the interrogation. When he confessed, his confessions were 

preceded by Miranda warnings that effectively apprised him of 

his rights. Without suggesting that all of the above must be 

present or that any of those factors is sufficient, we conclude 

that under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in 

admitting the postadvisement confession obtained on April 22 

and thereafter.

2. Independent evidence of rape and sodomy of 

Crawford

Defendant next argues his convictions for the rape and 

sodomy of Crawford must be reversed because “insufficient 

evidence aside from [his] confession exists to support” the 

convictions. Defendant’s argument relies on the corpus delicti 

rule, which “requires corroboration of the defendant’s 

extrajudicial utterances insofar as they indicate a crime was 

committed, and forces the People to supply, as part of their 

burden of proof in every criminal prosecution, some evidence of 

the corpus delicti aside from, or in addition to, such statements.” 

(People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1178, italics omitted

(Alvarez).) We find that defendant’s confession was adequately 

corroborated in this case.

“The amount of independent proof of a crime required [to 

satisfy the corpus delicti rule] is quite small.” (People v. Jones

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301.) The prosecution need not adduce 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

72

“independent evidence of every physical act constituting an 

element of an offense.” (Id. at p. 303.) Instead, it need only 

make “some indication that the charged crime actually 

happened,” so as to ensure “that the accused is not admitting to 

a crime that never occurred.” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 

Cal.3d 334, 368 (Jennings).)

In challenging his convictions for the rape and sodomy of 

Crawford, defendant’s sole contention is that there was no 

independent evidence “corroborating that she was in fact 

sexually assaulted.” He concedes that there was “sufficient 

independent evidence of rape against Newhouse since her body 

was naked from the waist down when found.” In contrast, he 

asserts there was insufficient evidence as to Crawford because 

“Crawford’s body was fully clothed in sweat pants and a 

sweatshirt.” The Attorney General disputes that Crawford was 

fully clothed when she was found. Dr. Sterbenz, the pathologist 

who observed the exhumation of the victims’ bodies, testified 

that Crawford was found “partially clothed,” wearing “black 

sweat pants” and “a black sweatshirt” with “a logo on it for the 

Hard Rock cafe.” Crawford’s mother testified that her daughter 

normally wore to bed “T-shirt and panties,” items that were 

missing when her body was found. She also testified that the 

Hard Rock Cafe sweatshirt was a “souvenir-type sweatshirt” 

that her daughter would “just wear . . . for special occasions.”

The testimony reasonably gives rise to the inference that 

Crawford’s body was found “dressed differently” from when she 

was taken from her house. Crawford was taken from her house 

early in the morning after having gotten out of bed, as 

independently corroborated by the state of her bed and the fact 

that she was talking to a friend by phone until 2:46 a.m. on 

March 11, 1999. Based on the timing and her mother’s 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

73

testimony, the jury could have concluded that Crawford was 

wearing underwear and a T-shirt when defendant abducted her. 

Yet, her body was found with no underwear, no T-shirt, and 

clothed in a “special occasion[]” sweatshirt that she did not 

normally wear to bed. Thus, there was circumstantial evidence 

that Crawford was “ ‘disrobed’ ” and “ ‘covered . . . again’ ” after 

she was kidnapped. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 

404.) This evidence suffices to satisfy the corpus delicti of 

rape.15 (Id. at pp. 404-406 [finding the requisite corpus delicti 

for rape when the victim was found with her pants on backwards 

and her sweatshirt inside out, allowing for the inference that 

she was disrobed and reclothed]; see also Alvarez, supra, 27 

Cal.4th at p. 1171 [“[t]he independent proof may be 

circumstantial and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt”].)

Because the People have established the corpus delicti for 

rape, they have also established the corpus delicti for sodomy. 

(See People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 302-304 [finding the 

corpus delicti for oral copulation satisfied although there was no 

physical evidence on victim’s mouth because there was semen in 

the victim’s other orifices and “we have never interpreted the 

corpus delicti rule so strictly that independent evidence of every 

physical act constituting an element of an offense is necessary”]; 

accord, Robbins, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 886.) Accordingly, we

affirm the convictions for the rape and sodomy of Crawford.

 

15 Because we find “the physical evidence, and reasonable 

inferences drawn therefore, satisfy the corpus delicti rule,” we 

need not decide whether other-crimes evidence, including the 

rape and sodomy of Shelley C. and the rape of Newhouse, also 

establish the corpus delicti with regard to Crawford. (Jennings, 

supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 367; cf. People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 

867, 886 (Robbins).)
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

74

C. Penalty Phase Issues

1. Arguments involving testimony of defendant’s 

volitional impairment

Defendant makes a series of arguments relating to Dr. 

Dietz’s testimony that sexual sadism does not impair an 

individual’s ability to control his or her behavior. The gist of 

defendant’s arguments is that the testimony is inconsistent with

the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 6600 et seq.) or is demonstrably false as shown by the 

existence of the act. Defendant also argues that the trial court 

erred by excluding references to the SVPA and by failing to “give 

proper instruction in light of the State’s expert testimony.” On 

these bases, defendant urges us to reverse the death sentence.

a. Background

Despite being an expert for the prosecution, Dr. Dietz 

agreed with Dr. Berlin, the defense expert, on many substantive 

points. In particular, Dietz agreed with Berlin’s diagnosis of 

defendant as a sexual sadist and an alcoholic. Dietz also 

“agree[d] entirely” with Berlin that “people do not choose their 

sexual deviations. They do not choose to become a sexual 

sadist.”

Dr. Dietz, however, disagreed with Dr. Berlin regarding 

his diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. In Dietz’s 

opinion, defendant did have antisocial personality disorder. 

Dietz explained the criteria for diagnosing the disorder, and 

cited examples from defendant’s history to show that he met the 

diagnostic criteria.

In addition, although Dr. Dietz agreed with Dr. Berlin’s 

diagnosis of sexual sadism, he offered a different understanding

of the disorder. According to Dietz, the sexual disorder 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

75

“amounts to saying what is it that turns the person on.” For a 

person who is a sexual sadist, the things that he or she finds 

sexually arousing include “bondage,” “captivity,” dominance, 

“humiliation,” “spanking and whipping,” and “choking and 

strangulation.” Dietz did not deny that it was “a problem to 

have in life to want to do that to another person.” He explained, 

however, that “[t]he way that people cope with that problem is 

quite variable.” Although there were sexual sadists who 

“commit violent crimes in order to fulfill their fantasies,” Dietz 

stressed that “just a tiny group of the sexual sadists . . . ever get 

to that point.”

Crucially, Dr. Dietz disagreed with Dr. Berlin regarding

whether sexual sadism compromised an individual’s ability to 

control his or her actions. As Dietz categorically stated, 

“[s]omeone whose only problem is sexual sadism has only one 

fundamental difference from normal people and that is a 

difference in what excites them sexually. It doesn’t affect how 

they think. It doesn’t affect their emotions. It doesn’t affect 

their capacity to control themselves. It only affects what it is 

that turns them on sexually.”

The prosecution then asked Dr. Dietz about the 

“policeman at the elbow” test. Dietz responded that “[t]hat’s a 

test . . . long . . . used in the field of forensic psychiatry as a way 

of looking at whether someone has volitional control, do they 

have the free will to conform to the law.” Dietz, like Berlin, 

stated that “had there been a policeman at [defendant’s] elbow, 

he certainly would not have committed these crimes.” As such, 

Dietz concluded that defendant “was fully aware that this was 

wrong behavior and capable of stopping it with those kinds of 

external controls.”
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

76

The prosecution then asked Dr. Dietz to evaluate Dr. 

Berlin’s opinion. In particular, the prosecution asked, “Dr. 

Berlin talked about the sexual sadism and the fantasies almost 

becoming a compulsion. Is that — is that an opinion that’s 

widely held in your field?” Dietz answered, “No, it isn’t. But 

there is a group of people who are not in my field who come at it 

from a Christian counseling point of view who have become very 

fond of the idea of this being an addiction that begins with 

masturbation, exposure to pornography, obscene phone calls. 

And if one doesn’t find some spiritual relief or additional aid, it 

can degenerate into horrible kinds of behavior such as this. [¶] 

That’s not an accepted medical or psychological view. It’s the 

fad that’s been around the last ten or fifteen years. [¶] And 

that’s like the theory of this being a compulsion.” When crossexamined, Dietz nonetheless agreed that “the jury, as part of the 

process of making a decision in this case, should consider and 

listen to Dr. Berlin,” specifically his opinion that “sexual sadism 

. . . opens the door to irresistible impulse.” “[T]he jury’s got a 

difficult job here,” Dietz explained, and “we’re in an area where 

there are competing points of view.” Later in his testimony, 

Dietz reiterated that “it’s arguable — that this [sexual sadism] 

affects impulse control. It’s arguable that you could look at it 

the way Dr. Berlin does. I respect his opinion, but I disagree 

with him.”

Despite his testimony that sexual sadism does not cause 

volitional impairment, Dr. Dietz acknowledged that a mental 

disorder contributed to defendant’s behavior. In his opinion, 

however, that mental disorder was antisocial personality

disorder, not sexual sadism. As Dietz opined, “I think that the 

reason [defendant] behaves in this way toward victims is 

because he has an antisocial personality disorder. I think if he 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

77

were a sexual sadist who didn’t have the — this disorder, he 

wouldn’t be doing these bad acts.” In response to further 

questioning, Dietz confirmed, “If he were only sexually sadistic 

and did not have any other impairment, he wouldn’t have done 

that [assaulted Jennifer E. or raped Shelley C.].”

Dr. Dietz, like Dr. Berlin, was ultimately asked to opine 

“whether at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant 

. . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was 

impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect.” Dietz gave a 

two-part answer. First, he said that defendant did not suffer 

from a mental disease or defect, as he defined those terms: 

“mental diseases . . . are those conditions that cause a person to 

have a profoundly entirely different view of reality than a 

normal human being” and mental defects referred to “mental 

retardation.” Second, Dietz said, “even if he did [suffer from a 

mental disease or defect], we have evidence that his volitional 

control was there.” Dietz then detailed the various decisions 

defendant made that demonstrated he made a choice to rape 

Newhouse and Crawford. These included “his decision to drink,” 

as “he’s never even attempted rape when he’s sober”; “his

decision to lie to Dr. True,” telling “Dr. True he wasn’t having 

sexual temptations, that he wasn’t drinking”; the decision to 

“cruise,” or look for victims; the decision to “carry a rape kit, 

which eventually came to include a mask, precut lengths of rope, 

duct tape for gagging the victim . . .”; and finally, the decision, 

“after the fight at Outlaws Bar,” to “stop[] trying to control his 

fantasies and urges and . . . not make the effort anymore to 

resist the urges that he had.” This last decision, “rather than 

his not having the ability to control himself,” led to the deaths

of Newhouse and Crawford.
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78

b. Analysis

i. Asserted inconsistent theories

Defendant argues that the prosecution “committed 

prejudicial error by presenting evidence and theories regarding 

volitional impairment [that are] inconsistent with those 

presented by the People in civil commitment cases.” According 

to defendant, the People’s experts in civil commitment 

proceedings routinely testify that sexual disorders impair a 

person’s ability to control him- or herself. Yet, the prosecution 

in this case called an expert who said that sexual sadism has no 

such effect. Defendant contends that this amounts to 

inconsistent prosecutorial theories and the use of such theories

violated his right to due process under both the United States 

and California Constitutions.

16

Defendant is correct that “[a]t least where the punishment 

involved is death, due process is as offended by the People’s 

inconsistent and irreconcilable attribution of culpabilityincreasing acts as by the inconsistent and irreconcilable 

attribution of crimes.” (In re Sakarias (2005) 35 Cal.4th 140, 

160.) But he ignores the principle that where “the asserted 

inconsistencies in prosecutorial theory were not the subject of 

 

16 In a cursory manner, defendant also argues that the same 

asserted inconsistencies violated the Eighth Amendment. 

Neither of the cases he cites supports the idea that “the Eighth 

Amendment . . . could be violated when the State takes 

inconsistent positions for tactical advantages in a capital 

sentencing proceeding.” (See Bradshaw v. Stumpf (2005) 545 

U.S. 175, 187 [stating only that the court “express[ed] no opinion 

on whether the prosecutor’s actions [in arguing inconsistent 

theories about who shot the victim] amounted to a due process 

violation”]; Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [no 

mention of inconsistent theories].)
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

79

any proceeding in the trial court and, hence, neither the 

inconsistencies nor any explanations the prosecutor may have 

been able to offer appear in the appellate record, any due process 

claim defendant can state should be ‘presented by petition for 

writ of habeas corpus rather than by appeal.’ ” (People v. 

Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 635 (Sakarias); see Spencer, 

supra, 5 Cal. 5th at p. 694 [citing cases supporting the 

proposition that “an inconsistent theories claim should be 

brought — not on appeal — but in a habeas corpus petition”].)

Defendant’s claim thus must be rejected because “the 

asserted inconsistencies . . . were not the subject of any 

proceeding in the trial court.” (Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 

p. 635.) Defendant concedes he did not argue before the trial 

court that Dr. Dietz’s testimony was inconsistent with the 

SVPA, and our review of the record confirms that to be the case. 

Although defendant alerted the court that he wanted to ask Dr. 

Berlin about the SVPA, the bases on which he sought to 

introduce the testimony were not to show any inconsistencies 

between the SVPA and Dietz’s opinion. Instead, defendant 

argued that the SVPA was relevant because the program 

showed that (1) a “mental disorder that lead to this lack of 

volitional control was treatable” and (2) defendant’s lack of 

treatment was due to institutional failure.

To be sure, defense counsel mentioned in passing that the 

SVPA “is impeachment of what I believe is Dr. Dietz’s position 

that there is not volitional impairment.” However, counsel

never developed this position. Instead, he pressed the argument 

concerning the treatability of sexual disorders and the issue of 

institutional failure. Unsurprisingly, the court ruled only with 

respect to these bases for admissibility.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

80

In addition, when the court rejected defendant’s 

arguments and so excluded references to the SVPA, it made 

clear that its ruling was tentative. The court expressly stated 

that it would be willing to reconsider its position. Despite the 

court’s invitation, however, defendant never brought a motion 

or thereafter called the court’s attention to any purported 

inconsistencies between the SVPA and Dr. Dietz’s opinion. 

Probably for this reason, the record contains no explanation 

from the prosecutor about the asserted inconsistencies.17

Under such circumstances, we find that “the asserted 

inconsistencies in prosecutorial theory were not the subject of 

any proceeding in the trial court.” (Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th 

at p. 635.) We therefore reject defendant’s inconsistent theories

claim, leaving it to be raised on habeas corpus.

ii. Asserted false or misleading testimony

Similar to his claim that Dr. Dietz’s testimony was 

inconsistent with the SVPA, defendant contends that Dietz’s

testimony was false, as demonstrated by the existence of the 

SVPA. Defendant argues the prosecution violated his due 

process rights by relying on and failing to correct such false or 

misleading testimony. (See, e.g., People v. Morrison (2004) 34 

 

17 Because defendant never raised the argument at trial, he 

never had to explain why the fact that other prosecutors, in 

unrelated civil cases, may call experts to opine that individuals 

suffering from certain mental disorders are predisposed to 

committing criminal sexual acts here amounts to the use of 

inconsistent prosecutorial theories. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 6600 et seq.) At a minimum, defendant’s theory of a due 

process violation is quite different from the situation we 

confronted in In re Sakarias, supra, 35 Cal.4th 140, and nothing 

we say here should be taken as suggesting that we find them 

similar or endorsing an expansion of In re Sakarias.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

81

Cal.4th 698, 716-717.) Unlike the inconsistent-theories claim, 

we can decide this false-evidence claim on appeal.

First, we note that the claim is forfeited. Defendant 

complains that four different statements offered by Dr. Dietz 

were false or misleading. These include: (1) “a paraphilia does 

not impair volition”; (2) “Dr. Berlin’s view that it does is 

unaccepted”; (3) “the ‘police man at elbow’ test is the appropriate 

test for volitional impairment”; and (4) “sexual sadism [is] not 

. . . a ‘mental disease or defect.’ ” Yet, defendant did not object 

to any of this testimony at the time it was offered. Accordingly, 

the claim that the evidence should not have been introduced or 

that the prosecution violated due process by introducing such 

evidence is forfeited. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. 

Hajek and Vo (2014), 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1214 (Hajek and Vo); 

People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436 [“To the extent, if 

any, that defendant may be understood to argue that due 

process required exclusion of the evidence for a reason different 

from his trial objection, that claim is forfeited”].)

Second, even if we were to overlook defendant’s forfeiture, 

we still would not be convinced that the SVPA shows Dr. Dietz’s 

testimony to be false. The SVPA is a civil commitment scheme 

that permits the state to involuntarily confine individuals 

proved to be “sexually violent predators.”18 (In re Howard N.

(2005) 35 Cal.4th 117, 127.) A “sexually violent predator” is “a 

person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 

against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental 

disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety 

of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually 

 

18

 Defendant was never found to be a sexually violent 

predator.
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

82

violent criminal behavior.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. 

(a)(1).)) “Diagnosed mental disorder,” in turn, is defined as “a 

congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 

volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the 

commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the 

person a menace to the health and safety of others.” (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (c).) The SVPA does not specify that 

any particular condition meets this definition. It makes no 

mention of any sexual disorder, let alone the specific disorder of 

sexual sadism. The language of the SVPA thus furnishes no 

evidence to suggest that Dr. Dietz’s testimony regarding the 

volitional effect of sexual sadism was false.

Perhaps for this reason, defendant cites a number of 

“published cases regarding SVP trials.” We question the value 

of such cases to show that Dr. Dietz’s testimony was false. First, 

we are aware of no authorities establishing that an expert’s 

testimony is false as a matter of law, just because it purportedly 

conflicts with other expert opinions given in other trials. Thus, 

the fact that various experts may have offered opinions contrary 

to Dietz’s does not mean these opinions have established that 

any particular disorder precludes a defendant from controlling 

his or her behavior. Instead, that remained an issue to be 

resolved by the jury upon hearing the opposing experts’ 

testimony. (Accord, Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 81 

[“Psychiatry is not . . . an exact science, and psychiatrists 

disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental 

illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given 

behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on 

likelihood of future dangerousness. Perhaps because there often 

is no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion . . ., juries remain 

the primary factfinders [and] . . . must resolve differences in 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

83

opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the 

evidence offered by each party.”].)

Second, the opinions in the cases cited do not conflict with 

Dr. Dietz’s testimony. Dietz opined that for a person “whose 

only problem is sexual sadism,” the disorder did not impair his 

or her volition. (Italics added.) In other words, sexual sadism, 

by itself, does not affect the individual’s capacity to control him

or herself. Dietz did not testify that no sexual disorder affected

an individual’s volition, or that individuals diagnosed with 

sexual sadism and other mental disorders still categorically 

have full control of themselves.

Yet, defendant would have us read Dr. Dietz’s opinion this 

way. Defendant complains that the prosecution’s theory at trial, 

as established by Dietz’s testimony, is that “paraphilia does not 

impair volition.” Paraphilia, or more accurately “paraphilic 

disorders,” is the term psychiatrists use to refer to sexual 

disorders. The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual of Mental Disorders, the version in use at the time of 

defendant’s trial, discusses nine different paraphilic disorders. 

(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 

Association (4th ed. 2000) pp. 569-576 [referencing

exhibitionism, fetishism, frotteurism, pedophilia, sexual 

masochism, sexual sadism, transvestic fetishism, voyeurism, 

and paraphilia not otherwise specified (paraphilia NOS)]; People 

v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 983, fn. 1 (Roberge).) Sexual

sadism is one of the nine paraphilic disorders; it is one specific 

paraphilia. Hence, the prosecution’s theory was never that 

“paraphilia,” meaning any and all paraphilic disorders, left a

person in full control of him- or herself. Instead, it was that one 

particular paraphilic disorder — sexual sadism — did not 

compromise a person’s ability to control him- or herself.
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Thus, to the extent that cases applying the SVPA can have 

a bearing on whether Dr. Dietz’s testimony about volitional 

control was false, they must address sexual sadism. Yet many 

of the cases defendant cited did not involve an individual 

diagnosed with sexual sadism.19 (E.g., Kansas v. Crane (2002) 

534 U.S. 407, 411 (Crane) [defendant diagnosed with 

exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder]; Kan. v. 

Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 354-356 (Hendricks) [defendant 

diagnosed with pedophilia]; People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 

109, 118-121 [defendant variously diagnosed with paraphilia 

NOS, personality disorder NOS, narcissistic traits, or simply 

personality disorder]; People v. Williams (2003) 31 Cal.4th 757, 

761-762 [diagnoses of paraphilia NOS and psychosis NOS]; 

People v. Hurtado (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1179, 1184 [pedophilia and 

antisocial personality disorder]; Albertson v. Superior Court

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 796, 799 [paraphilia NOS and antisocial 

personality disorder]; Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 

Cal.4th 1138, 1150 (Hubbart) [paraphilia NOS, with features of 

bondage, “ ‘rape, sodomy and klismaphilia’ ”].) These cases do 

not help us evaluate the truth or falsity of Dietz’s testimony that 

sexual sadism does not impair volition.

Nor do cases that feature a combination of diagnoses, of 

which sexual sadism is only one, assist us. (E.g., People v. Allen 

(2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 852-854 [“defendant’s mental disorders 

include paraphilia (specifically, an urge for sex with 

nonconsenting adults), antisocial personality disorder, 

psychosis, and cocaine dependency”]; Roberge, supra, 29 Cal.4th 

at p. 983 [after changing her mind, one of the People’s experts 

 

19 A majority of the cases cited also postdate defendant’s 

trial.
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diagnosed the defendant with sexual sadism while the other 

expert diagnosed him with paraphilia NOS and antisocial 

personality disorder]; People v. Leonard (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 

776, 781 [defendant was diagnosed with “two mental disorders: 

(1) paraphilia, rape, or sexual sadism; and (2) antisocial 

personality disorder”].) Dr. Dietz testified that individuals 

“whose only problem is sexual sadism” do not suffer from 

volitional impairment. He offered no categorial opinion 

regarding persons suffering from sexual sadism and other 

mental impediments. Accordingly, SVPA cases containing 

testimony that a defendant was volitionally impaired and that 

he or she was diagnosed with multiple mental disorders do not 

contradict Dietz’s opinion.20

We likewise find no evidence to suggest that Dr. Dietz 

testified falsely when he stated that Dr. Berlin’s view was not 

“widely held” within his field. We simply do not know what were

the views of psychiatrists on sexual sadism and the ability to 

control oneself. Dietz himself testified that “ ‘we’re in an area 

where there are competing points of view’ ” and said that 

although he disagreed with it, the jury should consider Berlin’s 

opinion. Insofar as defendant suggests Dietz’s views must have 

been false, his suggestion relies on the premise that we can treat

all paraphilic disorders as interchangeable. Nothing in the 

record or the cases cited allows us to do so.

 

20 To the extent Dr. Dietz testified that defendant, who he 

diagnosed as suffering from both sexual sadism and antisocial 

personality disorder, was not volitionally impaired, his 

testimony rested on the specific circumstances of defendant’s 

case. The fact that somebody else suffering from the same 

conditions may be impaired does not demonstrate that Dietz’s 

testimony was false.
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Similarly, we cannot conclude that Dr. Dietz provided 

false or misleading testimony in stating that the “policeman at 

the elbow” test was a test “used in the field of forensic psychiatry 

as a way of looking at whether someone has volitional control.” 

True: We have interpreted the SVPA’s requirement of a 

“condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity” (Welf. 

& Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (c)) to mean a condition that “causes 

serious difficulty in controlling violent sexual impulses,” and not 

one as to which “such control is impossible.” (People v. Superior 

Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 921, fn. 12; see People v. 

Williams, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 776; Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at 

pp. 411-412.) Yet, Dietz was never asked to apply this particular

standard of volitional impairment. He also did not say that the 

“policeman at the elbow” test showed that defendant had little 

difficulty in controlling his behavior. Instead, Dietz testified 

that the test indicated defendant “was fully aware that this was 

wrong behavior and capable of stopping it with those kinds of 

external controls.” This was entirely consistent with Dr. 

Berlin’s testimony.

Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that Dr. Dietz 

“falsely and misleadingly suggested that only severely psychotic 

or severely retarded persons could have the requisite ‘mental 

disease or defect’ to establish volitional impairment under the 

statutory mitigating factor (h)” of section 190.3. Dietz never 

mentioned section 190.3, factor (h), or urged the jury to accept 

the idea that “only severely psychotic or severely retarded 

persons could have the requisite ‘mental disease or defect’ to 

establish volitional impairment.” Indeed, given the extensive 

testimony of Berlin and Dietz, no rational jury could have drawn 

this conclusion. Berlin and Dietz argued at length about 

whether sexual sadists suffered from volitional impairment, but 
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the argument never pivoted on whether sexual sadism was or 

was not a severe psychosis or a form of intellectual disability. 

Dietz did not opine that defendant could control himself because 

he suffered from neither severe psychosis nor serious 

intellectual disability. Rather, he testified that defendant did 

not suffer from a mental disease or defect but even if he did, his 

behavior showed that his volitional capability was intact. The

testimony did not mislead the jury in the way defendant 

suggests.

In sum, we find that Dr. Dietz did not testify falsely and, 

as such, the prosecution did not violate due process by failing to 

“correct” his testimony.

iii. Exclusion of testimony concerning the

SVPA

Defendant next contends the trial court’s exclusion of 

testimony regarding the SVPA violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to fully and fairly cross-examine Dr. Dietz and his Eighth 

Amendment right to produce mitigating evidence.

We begin with the Eighth Amendment claim. The 

“ ‘Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider 

and give effect to’ a capital defendant’s mitigating evidence.” 

(Tennard v. Dretke (2004) 542 U.S. 274, 285.) “Thus, a State 

cannot bar ‘the consideration of . . . evidence if the sentencer 

could reasonably find that it warrants a sentence less than 

death.’ ” (Ibid.) Despite this constitutional proscription, “the 

trial court still ‘ “determines relevancy in the first instance and 

retains discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 

will create substantial danger of confusing the issues or 

misleading the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 
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287, 320; see also Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 12; 

People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 431; People v. Loker

(2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 731.) A trial court’s decision to exclude 

asserted mitigating evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. (E.g., People v. McDowell, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 

pp. 433-434; People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 162; People 

v. Williams, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 320.)

Here, the trial court excluded references to the SVPA 

when it rejected both of defendant’s bases for admissibility. The 

court found that the SVPA was irrelevant to the issue of 

institutional failure because defendant was, correctly, found 

ineligible for confinement as a sexually violent predator (SVP). 

Because defendant was not an SVP, he could not rely on the 

SVPA to argue that the penal system should have afforded him

treatment available to those confined under the terms of the 

statute. The court distinguished defendant’s case from People 

v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 193 (Mickle), in which we held 

that evidence that a defendant “had sought and/or been denied 

treatment which might have controlled the same dangerous 

personality disorder that purportedly contributed to the instant 

crimes” was “relevant and admissible.”

We agree that Mickle does not control the case before us. 

In Mickle, the excluded evidence concerned “the state’s 

‘improper’ diagnosis and treatment” of the defendant. (Mickle, 

supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 193.) In this case, the SVPA has no 

bearing on whether the state improperly diagnosed and treated 

defendant, given that defendant was not entitled to any care 

under the statute.

Moreover, even if the trial court erred by excluding 

testimony about the SVPA for the purpose of establishing
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89

institutional failure, the error was harmless under any 

applicable standard. (People v. Williams, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 

p. 320.) Multiple witnesses testified regarding the failure to 

provide appropriate care. Two correctional officers from Soledad 

prison told the jury that there was no counseling for “sexual 

predators” available at the prison and, even if there were, 

inmates probably would not attend out of a concern for their 

safety. Officer Zaragoza likewise said that San Luis Obispo 

County afforded paroled sex offenders no “confidential 

psychotherapy.” The only treatment parolees like defendant got 

was from the outpatient clinic, and Dr. True, the doctor in 

charge of that clinic, testified that he had very limited resources. 

True further testified had resources been available, he would 

have placed defendant in a number of additional treatment 

programs. A different expert, Dr. Haney, opined that defendant 

“received no psychotherapy, really no psychotherapy throughout 

his entire life” despite clear signs that he needed treatment. 

Defense counsel also emphasized institutional failure as a 

mitigating factor in closing argument. Under such 

circumstances, “[n]o prejudice occurred.” (Mickle, supra, 54 

Cal.3d at p. 194.)

The trial court also disallowed testimony about the SVPA 

for the purpose of bolstering Dr. Berlin’s testimony that sexual 

sadism was a treatable condition. In so doing, the court 

exercised its broad discretion under Evidence Code section 352, 

finding the SVPA’s probative value to be “very limited” and 

“substantially outweighed by . . . consumption of time.” The 

court explained that the probative value of the statute was low

because the SVPA “wasn’t passed to treat [offenders].” Although 

treatment is mandated under the SVPA (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 6606, subd. (a)), an individual may be involuntarily committed 
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even when treatment is neither expected to be “successful” nor 

“potentially successful.” (Id. subd. (b) [“Amenability to 

treatment is not required for a finding that any person is a 

person described in Section 6600, nor is it required for treatment 

of that person. Treatment does not mean that the treatment be 

successful or potentially successful . . . .”]; Hubbart, supra, 19 

Cal.4th at p. 1167; accord, Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 366; 

People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1195.) Accordingly, 

when treatment is understood to mean effective treatment or 

treatment that is at least “potentially successful,” the probative 

value of the statute to show treatability is indeed limited. (Welf. 

& Inst. Code, § 6606, subd. (b).) Moreover, the court correctly 

noted that testimony about the SVPA would have resulted in 

“consumption of time, which would be required to basically 

educate the jury as to how the SVP[A] came about, what the 

requirements are, what the purpose of the statute is,” etc. We 

therefore cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 

excluding the evidence.

In addition to treatability and institutional failure, 

defendant claims that he “clearly” advanced another theory of 

admissibility at trial: “to support Dr. Berlin’s testimony and 

prove that a paraphilia, and more specifically sexual sadism, 

was generally accepted by state experts, jurists and prosecuting 

attorneys nationwide to be the type of disorder that is capable 

of impairing volitional control.” Defendant overstates how 

“clearly” he argued this basis for admitting evidence of the 

SVPA. But even assuming that he preserved the claim and the 

trial court erred in excluding the evidence, any error was

harmless. Dr. Dietz himself stated that “we’re in an area where 

there are competing points of view.” He told the jury “it’s 

arguable — that this [sexual sadism] affects impulse control. 
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It’s arguable that you could look at it the way Dr. Berlin does.” 

Dietz informed the jury that he respected Berlin’s opinion and 

said it should consider Berlin’s testimony that “sexual sadism 

. . . opens the door to irresistible impulse.” Given Dietz’s onpoint testimony about the credibility of his opponent’s view 

regarding volitional impairment and sexual sadism, exclusion of 

testimony about the SVPA — a statute that does not even 

mention sexual sadism — did not result in prejudice.

We next examine defendant’s Sixth Amendment 

argument that the exclusion of testimony concerning the SVPA 

violated his right to fully and fairly cross-examine Dr. Dietz. To 

prevail on his claim (assuming he has preserved it for review), 

defendant must show that had Dietz been confronted with the 

evidence, “the ‘cross-examination would have produced “a 

significantly different impression of [the witness’s] 

credibility.” ’ ” (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 

52 (Dement); People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1188

(Linton); People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623-624.)

We do not think that introduction of testimony about the 

SVPA would have significantly affected the jury’s impression of 

Dr. Dietz’s credibility. The witness was thoroughly crossexamined, including by being confronted with his own affidavit 

from a prior case. In the affidavit, Dietz attested that sexual 

sadism (1) “open[ed] the door to irresistible impulse testimony 

from some experts”; (2) was “arguably the basis for a finding of 

extreme emotional distress where the offender feels impelled by 

strong sexual urges to commit the offense”; and (3) was a 

disorder “ ‘for which specific treatments are available . . . that 

can reduce or eliminate dangerousness.’ ” When so confronted, 

Dietz not only acknowledged that he held those opinions, but 

also said that he had changed his mind only on “one point,” no 
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longer taking “the position that treatment can eliminate 

dangerousness.” Accordingly, Dietz was impeached by his own 

testimony on precisely those points on which defendant claims 

the SVPA was relevant. Further impeachment with testimony 

concerning the SVPA would not have “produced ‘ “a significantly 

different impression of [his] credibility.” ’ ” (Dement, supra, 53 

Cal.4th at p. 52; accord, People v. Smith (2015) 61 Cal.4th 18, 

59-60 [explaining that there was no error when the court 

excluded certain expert testimony after it “issue[d] a narrow 

ruling” that still permitted testimony “in some areas”].)

 Defendant also complains that the restriction on his 

ability to confront Dr. Dietz damaged his own expert’s 

credibility. For the same reason given in our discussion of 

defendant’s Eighth Amendment claim, we do not find that had 

testimony regarding the SVPA been admitted, the jury would 

have received a “ ‘ “significantly different impression” ’ ” of Dr. 

Berlin’s credibility. (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52.)

In sum, we find no error in the exclusion of testimony 

about the SVPA. When we have assumed error, the error was 

harmless.

iv. Imposition of the death penalty upon 

persons with a mental disorder that reduces 

their volitional control

Defendant contends imposition of the death penalty on 

persons with a mental disorder that reduces their volitional 

control to such a degree that they can be subject to civil 

detention is excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 

Defendant’s argument relies on Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536

U.S. 304, 321 in which the high court held that “death is not a 

suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.” 
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Defendant urges us to extend the rationale of Atkins to mentally 

disordered criminals, making such offenders categorically 

ineligible for the death penalty. We have considered such 

invitations before and have consistently declined them. (E.g., 

People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 962-963 (Powell); People 

v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 275-276; People v. Mendoza 

(2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 908-911 (Mendoza); People v. Boyce

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 719-722; Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th 

at pp. 1250-1252.) Defendant advances no persuasive reason for 

us to reconsider our position, notwithstanding his assertion of 

“a recent trend by state legislatures to view sexually violent 

offenders’ crimes as the product of a non-psychotic mental 

disorder which nevertheless impairs their volitional control.” 

The same trend was in effect when we decided the line of cases 

above, including cases from just a year ago.

Consistent with our precedent, we reject defendant’s 

claim. “We leave it to the Legislature, if it chooses, to determine 

exactly the type and level of mental impairment that must be 

shown to warrant a categorical exemption from the death 

penalty.” (Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1252.)

v. Jury instruction regarding lack of volitional 

control

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give 

an instruction defining the term “mental disease or defect.” 

Following the language of section 190.3, factor (h), the court

instructed the jury that it should consider “whether or not at the 

time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate 

the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 

requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease 

or defect or the effects of intoxication.” Defendant argues the 

court had a duty to supplement this instruction on its own 
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94

motion and instruct the jury as to the meaning of the term 

“mental disease or defect.” Without such an instruction, “the 

jury . . . may have accepted Dietz’s testimony and wrongly 

ascribed a restrictive meaning to the statutory phrase ‘mental 

disease or defect’ and therefore concluded that [defendant’s]

paraphilic disorder did not qualify under factor (h).”

We are not convinced that the trial court was obliged to

define “mental disease or defect” in the absence of a party’s 

request. A court’s duty to define statutory terms “arises where 

the terms have a technical meaning that is peculiar to the law.” 

(People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 408.) In contrast, 

“[w]hen a word or phrase ‘ “is commonly understood by those 

familiar with the English language and is not used in a technical 

sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an 

instruction as to its meaning in the absence of a request.” ’ ” 

(People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574 (Estrada).) We 

have never held that as used in section 190.3, factor (h), the 

phrase “mental disease or defect” carries a technical, legal 

meaning requiring clarification on the court’s own motion. To 

the contrary, “ ‘[t]he language of a statute . . . is generally an 

appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction, and is 

ordinarily sufficient when the defendant fails to request 

amplification.’ ” (Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 574.) 

Defendant attempts to persuade us otherwise by citing cases

that deal with the term “mental disease or defect” in the context 

of legal insanity. (In re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 424-

428; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 968-969.) Those

cases are clearly inapposite because legal insanity is a technical, 

legal concept.

Moreover, defendant’s argument is not really that the 

term “mental disease or defect” has some meaning other than 
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95

that “ ‘ “commonly understood by those familiar with the 

English language.” ’ ” (Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 574.) 

Instead, it is that because a witness in this case has supplied a 

definition for the term, the jury may be misled into adopting that 

definition rather than using “the meaning that might be 

ascribed to the same terms in common parlance.” (Id. at p. 575.) 

Hence, defendant’s argument is really that the court should 

have given an instruction to dissipate any potential confusion 

caused by this particular witness’s testimony. At most, this 

amounts to an argument for a pinpoint instruction to “relate 

particular facts to a legal issue in the case.” (People v. Saille

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119.) Such instructions “are not 

required to be given sua sponte.” (Ibid.)

In any event, even assuming the court should have 

instructed the jury on its own motion, the failure to do so was 

harmless. As discussed earlier, no reasonable juror could have 

drawn from the testimony of Drs. Berlin and Dietz the 

conclusion that “only severely psychotic or severely retarded 

persons could have the requisite ‘mental disease or defect’ to 

establish volitional impairment.” The prosecution’s closing 

argument bolsters the point. In discussing section 190.3, factor 

(h), the prosecutor made no mention of whether defendant was 

or was not psychotic or intellectually disabled. Instead, he 

argued that defendant did not suffer “sexual compulsion.” The 

prosecutor referred to Dr. Dietz’s testimony, stating “Dr. Dietz 

. . . said that [defendant] makes his choices.” “But,” said the 

prosecutor, “you know you don’t need an MD to know that. . . .

You should know that as well.” The prosecution thus exhorted 

the jury to rely on its own experience, not any definition supplied 

by Dietz (which was not even mentioned). Read as a whole, the

testimony and arguments are entirely inconsistent with the 
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96

possibility that the jury may have been “misled about the nature 

of the statutory mitigating factor.”

Finally, even if the jury was somehow misled about section 

190.3, factor (h), it could still consider defendant’s sexual 

sadism, antisocial personality disorder, and any other diagnosis 

of a mental condition under the section 190.3, factor (k), the 

“catchall” factor. (Accord, People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 

353 [“even though [section 190.3] factor (d) refers to ‘extreme’ 

emotional or mental disturbance, evidence of mental disorder of 

less extreme character is admissible under factor (k)”].) No 

reversible error occurred.

2. Restriction on testimony that witnesses believed 

defendant should not be executed

Defendant contends the trial court erred in limiting 

testimony from some witnesses who would have testified that 

they believed defendant should not be executed. The court 

allowed defendant’s mother, sister, former girlfriend (Adonia 

Krug), the mother to his son (Rosalynn Moore), and a spiritual 

advisor to respond to the question whether each thought 

defendant should receive life in prison instead of death. Each

gave the unsurprising answer that she thought defendant 

should live. However, when defendant asked the same question 

of Mosher, a staff member at the Children’s Home where 

defendant was sent when he was 15, the prosecution objected 

and the court sustained the objection. The court based its ruling 

on the fact Mosher last saw defendant in 1983 and no longer had 

a significant relationship with him. The defense then made an 

offer of proof that Mosher, other staff members at the Children’s 

Home, and Scheyt — the mother of the girl defendant dated in 

1981 — would have testified that they thought defendant should 

not receive the death penalty. The court affirmed its ruling as 
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97

to all of these witnesses. Accordingly, although Mosher, other 

members of the Children’s Home, and Scheyt testified to 

defendant’s various positive characteristics and their high 

opinions of him, they did not say whether they believed

defendant’s life should be spared.

“[E]vidence that a family member or friend wants the 

defendant to live is admissible to the extent it relates to the 

defendant’s character . . . .” (People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th 

at p. 367.) To be admissible, the witness must “have a 

significant relationship with the defendant.” (Ibid.) We have

not, however, considered whether a person whose significant 

relationship with the defendant ended more than a decade

before the event for which the defendant is on trial must be 

allowed to give an opinion regarding whether he or she wants 

the defendant to live. (Cf. People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 

pp. 366-367 [finding that an educational therapist who had a 

significant relationship with the defendant until three years 

before his crime should have been allowed to testify that she did 

not want him executed]; Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 194 

[finding that the opinion of a close family friend that the 

defendant’s life should be spared was relevant and admissible]; 

People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 180, 194 (Heishman) 

[holding that a former wife who had a daughter with the 

defendant six years before the crimes in question should have 

been allowed to say whether she thought the death penalty was

appropriate for him].) We need not reach the issue here because, 

even assuming that the trial court should have permitted people 

who knew defendant as a teenager to opine that his character 

was such that he should live, the exclusion of the testimony was 

harmless.
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Multiple people pleaded with the jury to spare defendant’s 

life. His mother, sister, a childhood girlfriend (who kept in 

contact with defendant), the mother of his child, and a spiritual

advisor all said that they wanted him to live. Moreover, the 

witnesses who were not allowed to give their opinion regarding

the penalty nonetheless offered “direct evidence of defendant’s 

character” and their testimony was “generally so supportive of 

defendant that it is very unlikely that any juror would infer that 

[they] would want to see him put to death.” (People v. Smith, 

supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 368; Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at 

p. 194.) Under such circumstances, “it is not reasonably possible 

that the jury would have returned a different penalty verdict” 

had it heard these witnesses say that defendant should not be 

executed. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 103; see People 

v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 368; Heishman, supra, 45 

Cal.3d at p. 194.)

3. Testimony of a former girlfriend concerning her 

relationship with defendant

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting testimony concerning why his relationship with 

former girlfriend Liesel Turner ended. Over a defense objection, 

the court allowed Turner to testify as follows. Although the 

relationship was initially “very nice, very romantic,” Turner 

eventually became frightened of defendant. Defendant told 

Turner that his former girlfriend “had been raped and murdered 

and that he had committed a crime so that he could get put in 

jail so that he could go kill the person that had raped and 

murdered her.” When Turner stated defendant told her he had 

killed the person, the court interrupted. The court instructed 

the jury that Turner’s statements that defendant murdered 

someone “are admissible just to show why someone reacted to 
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99

those statements. It’s not admitted to show that what’s in the 

statement is true. . . . There’s not going to be any evidence that 

what [defendant] said is, in fact, true, in fact, occurred. The 

reason the statement is admissible is just to show why Ms. 

Turner reacted to it.” Turner continued testifying, stating that 

she eventually ended her relationship with defendant because 

she “didn’t feel safe.”

Before the trial court, defendant argued that Turner’s 

entire testimony was improper because it exceeded the scope of 

permissible rebuttal. The trial court rejected the argument, 

finding that the testimony served two purposes: (1) to rebut 

“character” testimony that defendant “does have the good 

quality that he can have a good relationship with women,” as 

defendant’s prior girlfriends (Krug and Moore) testified; and (2) 

to rebut testimony from witnesses who said defendant’s

relationship with Turner was “good.”

The court’s reasoning is sound and supported by the 

record. Defendant had elicited statements from four women —

Krug, Moore, Krug’s mother, and a friend (Jaime Prisco) — to

establish that he had good intimate relationships with women. 

In addition, he drew from two witnesses the testimony that

defendant and Turner had a “good” relationship. Hence, to the 

extent that Turner’s testimony showed that she became afraid 

of defendant and broke up with him because she “didn’t feel 

safe,” the testimony tended to rebut the impression that 

defendant’s relationship with women in general — and Turner 

in particular — was as good as defendant’s witnesses had 

suggested. “ ‘ “The admission of rebuttal evidence rests largely 

within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be 

disturbed on appeal in the absence of ‘palpable abuse.’ ” ’ ” 
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(People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 359.) We find no such

abuse here.

Defendant further argues that even if Turner’s testimony 

was relevant, it should have been excluded under Evidence Code 

section 352. We agree Turner’s statement that defendant told 

her he killed a person to avenge a girlfriend’s death had the 

potential to create undue prejudice. However, the court 

properly instructed the jury that the statement was not 

admitted for its truth (to show that defendant did kill someone 

for revenge) but only to explain Turner’s state of mind (to 

explain why she became afraid of defendant). “Absent some 

showing to the contrary, we presume the jury followed the 

court’s instructions.” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 

48-49 (Merriman).) Defendant has not made such a showing, 

despite arguing it was impossible for the jury to believe that 

Turner was afraid of defendant without also believing that 

defendant “did in fact plot and engage in murder.” A boast that 

one has killed a person is disturbing in and of itself, even if it 

was an empty boast intended to “impress” a girlfriend. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by determining that, being 

admitted for a limited purpose, the probative value of Turner’s 

statement was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 

undue prejudice.

4. Admission of photograph of defendant

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting in the penalty phase a photograph of him, shirtless 

and flexing. The prosecution authenticated the photograph as 

having been taken in February 1999, after defendant killed 

Newhouse but before he killed Crawford. The court allowed the 

prosecution to admit the photograph as an exhibit and to display 
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it to the jury during closing argument. Because defendant had 

presented testimony and otherwise argued that he showed 

remorse after his arrest, the court admitted the photograph as 

evidence tending to suggest that the remorse was not genuine. 

As the court stated, “here one of the main mitigating factors 

that’s being argued is remorse. . . . I think it would be a 

reasonable inference for the jury to look at this photograph and 

decide that his remorse didn’t begin until he was arrested” and 

so was “self-serving.” The court acknowledged that the 

photograph was “ambiguous,” or capable of giving rise to more 

than one inference, but found that its admission would not be 

“overly prejudicial,” because the adverse inference was not “an 

unfair [one] to draw.”

On appeal, defendant raises the same arguments that 

were rejected at trial. He first asserts the photograph had no 

relevance pertaining to remorse (or the lack thereof) because 

“[r]emorse is a complex, changing state of mind, and is not 

something that can be proved to be absent or present merely by 

a picture.” Defendant’s argument misses the mark. Under 

Evidence Code section 210, relevant evidence is evidence

“having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any 

disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 

action.” (Italics added.) Accordingly, to be relevant and 

admissible, the photograph did not need to “prove[]” “a complex, 

changing state of mind”; it needed only to have a “tendency” to 

do so. (Ibid.) In this case, the photograph tended to corroborate 

evidence introduced at the guilt phase that defendant appeared 

“in a good mood,” “joking around,” and “happy” in March 1999, 

shortly after he killed Crawford and before he was arrested. As 

such, it gave rise to a “reasonable inference . . . that 

[defendant’s] remorse didn’t begin until he was arrested.” This, 
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in turn, suggested that defendant’s “displays of remorse and acts 

of contrition” were not genuine and therefore should be afforded 

little value in mitigation. (See, e.g., Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 

Cal.4th at p. 1239.) The trial court did not abuse its 

“considerable discretion” in finding the photograph relevant. 

(Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 74.)

Second, defendant argues that the photograph should 

have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. 

Specifically, he asserts that (1) “the court erred by failing to 

weigh prejudice against probative value” because it mistakenly 

treated the photograph as “ ‘circumstance of the crime’ ”

evidence under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a); and (2)

properly weighted, the photograph should have been excluded 

because it was unduly prejudicial.

We do not think the trial court failed to weigh the value of 

the evidence against the risk of undue prejudice. “[A] court need 

not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value or even 

expressly state that it has done so, if the record as a whole shows 

the court was aware of and performed its balancing functions 

under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 1155, 1169 (Taylor); see People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 

1153, 1187-1188.)

In this case, “the record as a whole” does so show. (Taylor, 

supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1169.) Before admitting the photograph, 

the trial court heard argument from both sides outside of the 

presence of the jury. The court subsequently stated, “on the 352 

issue, . . . I think 352 is different in the penalty phase than it is 

in the guilt phase. And I think the penalty phase, you go to the 

cases which deal with the victim impact evidence. And 

obviously . . . some evidence presented in the penalty phase [is]
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emotional or . . . prejudicial and, in some cases overly so.” 

“Ultimately,” concluded the court, “the court’s direction has been 

that you need to discern whether [the evidence at issue] would 

divert the jury’s attention from [its] duty in the penalty trial and 

whether it would do so in a way that is unfair. [¶] . . . The real 

test for rebuttal evidence simply is[,] is it proper rebuttal. And 

. . . my judgment is the only way to — for 352 to exclude it at 

that point would be if it would unfairly — be unfair in the sense 

that it would divert the jury’s attention from [its] ultimate duty.” 

The court thereafter admitted the photograph.

Given this record, we cannot say that the court failed to 

perform its duty under section 352 of the Evidence Code. The 

trial court “held an extensive hearing outside the jury’s presence 

to determine whether to admit the photograph[]” (Taylor, supra, 

26 Cal.4th at p. 1169) and its statements during that hearing 

showed that it understood that it could exclude the photograph 

on section 352 grounds if the photograph “would divert the jury’s 

attention from [its] ultimate duty.” Although the court also 

mentioned “cases which deal with the victim impact evidence,” 

it is clear that the court did not confuse the photograph with

victim impact evidence or apply some standard of prejudice that 

was unique to such evidence. Considered as a whole, the record 

does not support defendant’s claim that the trial court 

mistakenly treated the photograph as Penal Code section 190.3, 

factor (a)’s “circumstances of the crime” evidence.

Regarding the issue of prejudice, defendant contends the 

photograph was the prosecution’s “most potent weapon,” as

shown by the fact that the prosecutor displayed an enlarged

image of the photograph for about 18 minutes during its hourlong closing argument. He also makes much of the trial court’s 

remark that the prosecution “use[d] the photo effectively in 
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argument.” Using a photograph to cast doubt on defendant’s 

supposed remorse may have been effective, but there is nothing 

improper about effective argument, or argument that 

capitalized on the probative value of a piece of evidence. Put 

differently, frequent use of a piece of evidence to undermine a 

defendant’s attempt at mitigation does not equate to undue 

prejudice. (See, e.g., People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 

Cal.5th 790, 824 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “Evidence is not prejudicial, as that term 

is used in a section 352 context, merely because it undermines 

the opponent’s position or shores up that of the 

proponent” ’ ” ’ ”].) Having examined the photograph ourselves 

and reviewed the record for the way in which it was used, we 

find the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

image. (See, e.g., Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 532.)

5. Admission of evidence that defendant lied about 

shooting a person

To support his diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, 

Dr. Dietz recounted various instances in defendant’s history in 

which he had displayed the diagnostic criterion of 

“deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying.” Defendant now 

complains about one such instance of deceitful conduct as 

relayed by Dietz.

The incident involved a shooting of a man in Santa 

Barbara in 1987. During his April 27, 1999 interview, Hobson

asked defendant, “Just before you went to prison in ‘87, 

somebody called Crime Stoppers, San Luis Obispo here, and 

identified you as shooting somebody in the chest in Santa 

Barbara three times over a drug deal. Wasn’t you?” Defendant 

answered, “Shoot somebody in the chest three times, no. Wasn’t 

me.” After the tape recorder was turned off, however, defendant 

admitted that he had shot a man in the leg that year. Hobson 
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documented the admission in a report, which was provided to 

Dr. Dietz. The doctor, in turn, told the jury that defendant “was 

asked about whether he had shot a man in Santa Barbara,” and 

after having “said no, he hadn’t done it,” “he subsequently 

admitted to Investigator Hobson that he had been the guy that 

shot a man in the leg in Santa Barbara in 1987.” On crossexamination, defense counsel suggested that Dietz did not know 

whether defendant really shot a person in 1987. Dietz agreed

but countered that “[w]hether he lied when he said he didn’t 

[shoot a person] or lied when he said he did, one of them’s a lie.”

On appeal, defendant accuses Dr. Dietz of having 

improperly “vouched” to the jury that defendant in fact shot a 

man three times in the chest. We disagree. In his testimony, 

Dietz said that after having first denied the incident, defendant 

“subsequently admitted” that he “shot a man in the leg in Santa 

Barbara in 1987.” Dietz never said that defendant shot 

somebody in the chest three times. More to the point, the 

incident was relevant to the doctor’s opinion insofar as the 

inconsistency between the denial and the admission showed 

that defendant was being deceitful in his interview with Hobson. 

The actual details of how defendant shot the person — and 

indeed whether defendant shot a person in Santa Barbara in 

1987 at all — were immaterial.

In short, Dr. Dietz’s testimony could not reasonably be 

understood as vouching that defendant shot a person three 

times in the chest, and the prosecution did not commit 

misconduct in presenting his testimony.
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6. Suggestion that defendant was convicted of sexual 

assault relating to the Jennifer E. incident

a. Background

Connie Ridley, defendant’s mother, testified that her son 

should be spared the death penalty because “until the last few 

years, [he] has hurt no one.” The prosecution sought to impeach 

this assertion with pretrial statements Ridley made to its 

investigators. According to an investigator’s report, Ridley had 

said that defendant “got into a lot of serious trouble with the law 

as he was growing up. He was convicted of a sexual assault 

while in Sandpoint and was sent to the Cottonwood facility.” 

The defense objected to Ridley being confronted with her 

statements, pointing out that defendant did not “go to 

Cottonwood for [the Sandpoint assault],” having instead “spent 

a couple of months in county jail.”

The assault the parties were referring to concerned 12-

year-old Jennifer E. The parties agreed that defendant pleaded 

to a misdemeanor assault charge and was sentenced to the local 

jail for the incident. The trial court nonetheless allowed Ridley 

to be impeached with her pretrial statements, reasoning that if 

she “had knowledge of — of a sexual assault that he had been 

convicted of and, she believes, sent to prison,” then “even though 

those aren’t the facts, . . . it directly impeaches her testimony” 

that he “hasn’t hurt anyone up until the past few years.” In 

accordance with the court’s ruling, the prosecutor asked Ridley, 

“Did you tell Investigator Hanley and Investigator Hobson . . .

that your son, Rex, got into a lot of serious trouble with the law 

as he was growing up?” Ridley answered yes, and the prosecutor 

followed up with, “Okay. And that’s when you told them that he 

was convicted of a sexual assault while in Sandpoint and was 

sent to the Cottonwood facility?” Ridley again answered, “Yes.”
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The prosecution likewise cross-examined several 

witnesses by referring to Ridley’s pretrial statement that 

defendant “was convicted in Sandpoint Idaho of a sexual 

assault.” Although these witnesses were examined before 

Jennifer E. took the stand, Jennifer did testify. She told the jury 

that one evening in February 1984, she found defendant on top 

of her, trying to unzip her and his pants after she told him that 

she did not want to have sex with him. As she continued to 

struggle, defendant punched her “hard” “on the forehead, the 

eye area, and . . . on the jaw.” The defense disputed few of the 

details of the assault, simply drawing out that alcohol had been 

involved.

b. Analysis

Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct 

by “insinuat[ing]” to the jury during cross-examination that 

defendant was convicted of yet another sexual assault in 

addition to those relating to Shelley C., A.C., and the two 

murder victims in this case. We reject the claim.

It is well established that a prosecutor may not “ ‘ask 

questions of a witness that suggest facts harmful to a defendant, 

absent a good faith belief that such facts exist.’ ” (People v. 

Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 562.) Under this standard, the 

prosecution did not commit misconduct in questioning 

defendant’s mother. As the trial court explained, the

prosecution did not pose the complained-of question to Ridley to 

suggest that defendant was convicted of a sexual assault and 

sent to Cottonwood prison. Instead, he was asking her that 

question to establish an inconsistency in her testimony: that 

she believed her son, at 18, was sent to prison for sexual assault
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108

and yet still maintained that “until the last few years, [he] has 

hurt no one.”

A different analysis is called for when the prosecution 

asked other witnesses about Ridley’s statement. With these 

witnesses, the prosecution was not seeking to establish

inconsistencies, but rather implying the truth of its questions: 

that defendant’s mother believed he was convicted of a sexual 

assault because he was, in fact, convicted of such an assault. At 

no point during trial, however, did the prosecution imply that 

the sexual assault conviction was some conviction other than 

that relating to Jennifer E. And Jennifer E.’s testimony —

largely uncontradicted by the defense — indicated that 

defendant sexually assaulted her. Defendant struck Jennifer 

while trying to undo her pants after she refused to have sex with 

him. Under such circumstances, it is hardly misleading to call 

defendant’s act a sexual assault. Indeed, all witnesses who 

referred to the Jennifer E. incident described it as a sexual 

assault of some sort. Defendant himself admitted in his 

interview with Hobson that he attempted to rape a “young girl” 

when he was 18. Dr. Berlin, the main defense expert, similarly

testified that “[a]t the age of 18, [defendant] . . . forced himself 

sexually upon a young lady.”

To the extent that defendant now claims that he was not 

convicted of sexual assault, he seems to be drawing a hypertechnical distinction: that his conviction for misdemeanor 

assault, which stemmed from sexual assaultive conduct, was

different from “a conviction of sexual assault.” We are not 

convinced that the distinction, if it exists, is meaningful. 

Whether or not defendant was convicted of the specific crime of 

sexual assault, he was convicted for conduct that any reasonable 

jury would think of as sexual assault. As such, the prosecutor’s 
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questions did not result in prejudice. (E.g., People v. 

Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1019.)

7. Prosecutor’s remarks in opening and closing 

statements

Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed multiple 

instances of misconduct in his opening and closing remarks. 

“ ‘ “As a general rule, a defendant may not complain on appeal 

of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion — and on 

the same ground — the defendant made an assignment of 

misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to 

disregard the impropriety.” ’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 

Cal.5th 838, 894 (Covarrubias).)

Except as noted below, defendant failed to object to the 

comments of which he now complains. Because an objection and

request for an admonishment would not have been futile, 

defendant has forfeited his claims. (E.g., People v. Clark (2011) 

52 Cal.4th 856, 960 (Clark); Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 683; 

cf. People v. Bandhauer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 524, 530 [permitting 

the defendant to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct for 

the first time on appeal when the ground for objection was not 

“apparent” until it was “too late to cure the error by 

admonition”].) And, forfeiture aside, we find no merit to 

defendant’s arguments.

a. Use of the word “animal” and “argumentative

attacks”

Defendant begins by complaining that the prosecution 

called him an “animal.” In its opening statement, the 

prosecution recounted the incident with A.C. After describing 

how defendant broke into A.C.’s house, struggled with her down 

the hallway, and banged her head on the wall, prosecutor said,
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“finally this animal bites her on the finger so bad he cuts the 

tendons in her finger.”

“Argument may include opprobrious epithets warranted 

by the evidence. [Citation.] Where they are so supported, we 

have condoned a wide range of epithets to describe the egregious 

nature of the defendant’s conduct,” including “ ‘monstrous,’ ”

“ ‘ “perverted murderous cancer,” ’ ” “ ‘ “human monster,” ’ ” and 

“ ‘mutation.’ ” (People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1172 

(Zambrano).) No one disputes that defendant bit A.C.. 

Accordingly, an isolated reference to defendant as an “animal” 

who bit his victim does not amount to misconduct.

Defendant further objects to “argumentative attacks” on

his trial counsel. As part of his opening statement, the 

prosecutor highlighted defendant’s criminal record and said, in 

light of such record, it was “absolutely amazing” that defense 

counsel would “want . . . you to give him a break.” The 

prosecutor also emphasized the expected victim impact 

statements. Referring to the defense attorney who argued that, 

by confessing, defendant “was the one who helped bring closure” 

to the victims’ families, the prosecutor said, “[s]he doesn’t 

understand this. There has been no closure for these families.” 

We fail to see any misconduct. “When the comments are 

considered in context, there is no likelihood that the jury would 

have understood the comments as anything beyond criticism of 

defense counsel’s tactical approach in argument and the defense 

view of the evidence in the case, as is allowed.” (Linton, supra, 

56 Cal.4th at p. 1206.)
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b. Comments on defense mitigation strategy, 

experts, and counsel

Defendant complains that the prosecutor improperly 

denigrated his mitigation strategy, expert witnesses, and trial 

counsel. Defendant’s strategy at the penalty phase was to offer

evidence of his childhood abuse, mental illness, and the failure 

of various institutions to treat him. The prosecution previewed 

this strategy by telling the jury, “[t]he evidence you will be 

presented with from these defense attorneys will try to blame 

everybody but their client. They’ll call it an explanation, but it’s 

really a blame game. They’re going to blame the State of Idaho. 

They’re going to blame the State of California. . . . Mostly 

they’re going to blame [defendant’s] father.” The prosecutor

returned to the same theme in closing argument, arguing that 

defense was “trying to deflect . . . responsibility” and instead 

“lay some kind of a guilt trip on you for what their client truly 

deserves.” The prosecutor also characterized the defense as

offering an “ ‘abuse excuse.’ ”

We find no misconduct. The thrust of the prosecutor’s

argument was that defendant alone was responsible for his 

crimes and could not shift the blame onto others, even if he did

suffer abuse, mental disorder, and lack of treatment. There is 

nothing “deceptive” or “reprehensible” about such an argument. 

(E.g., People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 947 (Gonzales).) 

“Prosecutors may attack the defense case and argument. ‘Doing 

so is proper and is, indeed, the essence of advocacy.’ ” (People v. 

Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 455 (Thornton).) Likewise, the 

prosecutor’s use of pungent language, calling defense strategy a 

“blame game,” “guilt trip,” or “abuse excuse,” does not rise to the 

level of misconduct. (E.g., ibid. [no misconduct in the 

prosecutor’s suggestion that “defendant was relying on an 
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112

‘abuse excuse’ ”]; People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 539 

(Davis) [no misconduct when the prosecutor said the defense 

strategy was “ ‘to attack and smear everybody they could in the 

hopes of somehow deflecting or diffusing blame’ ” and “ ‘to try 

to lay a guilt trip on you’ ”].)

As part of the same argument, defendant also objects to 

the prosecutor’s attacks on the credibility of Drs. Berlin and 

Haney. Defendant did not lodge specific objections against these 

statements.

21 And even if he did, “ ‘harsh and colorful attacks 

on the credibility of opposing witnesses are permissible.’ ” 

(Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 962.) So, too, are remarks “to 

expose bias in the witness[es] by showing [their] propensity to 

advocate for criminal defendants even in extreme cases.” 

(Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1165.) Accordingly, none of 

the prosecutor’s remarks amounts to misconduct.

Finally, defendant accuses the prosecutor of having 

impugned the integrity of defense counsel. In his closing 

argument, the prosecutor posed the rhetorical question, “You 

think they just pick these witnesses out of a hat? You think a 

lot of this defense was orchestrated?” Later, referring to the fact 

that Dr. Haney sat in on an interview that Dr. Berlin conducted

with defendant, the prosecutor said, “What kind of 

professionalism is that? . . . [¶] Why did they do that? Was it 

to get all the ducks in a row?”

 

21 Defendant did object when the prosecutor said “to show 

you how absolutely ridiculous the defendant’s psychology team 

is, we will present Dr. Park Dietz.” The objection, however, was 

on the ground that the prosecution should not be able to 

“reference . . . any rebuttal evidence . . . in opening statement,” 

an objection entirely different from the argument now raised on 

appeal.
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It is true that “[a] prosecutor is not permitted to make 

false or unsubstantiated accusations that counsel is fabricating 

a defense or deceiving the jury.” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 

p. 961.) In context, however, the prosecutor’s statement that the 

“defense was orchestrated” does not appear to rise to an 

insinuation of deceit. The prosecutor contrasted “orchestrated” 

with “pick[ing] . . . witnesses out of a hat.” So by saying that the 

defense was “orchestrated,” the prosecution seemed to mean 

that it was carefully crafted, or presented with a deliberate 

selection of witnesses. Of course, there is nothing untoward in 

a careful selection of witnesses. But then it is not misconduct 

either to tell the jury that as the opposing party was deliberate 

and selective in its presentation, the jury should be aware of the 

fact and judge the case accordingly. (Accord, Davis, supra, 10 

Cal.4th at pp. 538-539 [rejecting the claim that the prosecution 

accused the defense of “manipulating witnesses and suppressing 

testimony of uncooperative witnesses” when it suggested that 

the defendant’s brother, unlike his sisters, did not testify 

because “ ‘he knew what they wanted and wasn’t willing to do 

it’ ”].)

Likewise, the statement that the defense witnesses 

interviewed defendant together “to get all the ducks in a row”

was not misconduct. The prosecution implied that the defense 

coordinated its experts but stopped short of insinuating that the 

experts lied. In any event, the comment was brief and

interposed in the middle of a lengthy closing argument. It did 

not result in prejudice.

c. Asserted statement of personal belief

Defendant asserts the prosecutor improperly injected his

personal belief by beginning his closing statement with the 
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following: “While some of us have been working on this case for 

over two years now . . . you, too, have now devoted a significant 

portion of your lives to this case. . . . [¶] You realize now what 

so many of us have realized for a long time. You realize now you 

have been in the presence of one of the most cruel, calculating, 

and brutal individuals on the planet, Rex Allan Krebs.”

Prosecutors may not “base argument on facts not in 

evidence” or otherwise seek to “ ‘ “bolster their case ‘by invoking

their . . . depth of experience, or the prestige or reputation of 

their office.’ ” ’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 906; Linton, 

supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1207.) Here, the prosecutor did not do 

either of those things. At closing argument, after the jury has 

heard all the evidence, the prosecutor urged it to “realize” that

defendant was a most “cruel, calculating, and brutal 

individual[].” Although the prosecutor indicated that by coming 

to such a realization, the jury would be agreeing with the 

prosecution’s poor opinion of defendant, it nowhere suggested 

that the prosecution formed that opinion based on “ ‘ “evidence 

available to the government, but not before the jury.” ’ ” (Linton, 

supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1207.) Nor did it imply that the jury 

should adopt the prosecution’s view because of its “ ‘ “ prestige, 

reputation, or depth of experience.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Accordingly, there 

was neither impermissible vouching nor reliance on evidence 

outside the record.

d. Asserted mischaracterization of Drs. Berlin and 

Haney’s testimony

Defendant raises additional issues relating to the 

prosecutor’s characterization of Drs. Berlin’s and Haney’s 

testimony. With regard to Berlin, defendant objects to the 

portion in the prosecutor’s closing argument in which he said: 

“the defense attorney[] seeks out Dr. Berlin from across the 
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115

country. Can’t find somebody in California. Can’t even find 

somebody west of the Rockies. Gets Dr. Berlin from across the 

country to travel to California.”

Generally, “prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and 

draw inferences from the evidence presented at trial.” 

(Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 454.) In this case, no one 

disputed that Dr. Berlin was affiliated with Johns Hopkins 

University and so was “from across the country.” The 

implication of the prosecution’s statements goes further than 

that, however. By remarking that “the defense . . . can’t . . . find 

somebody west of the Rockies” and had to go “across the country” 

to “seek[] out Dr. Berlin,” the prosecution implied that Berlin’s 

views were idiosyncratic, not shared by anyone “west of the 

Rockies.” Yet Dr. Dietz — the prosecution’s own witness —

testified that although he and Berlin disagreed, “we’re in an 

area where there are competing points of view” and Dietz 

respected his colleague’s opinion. The prosecution also 

represented during voir dire that Berlin was “one of the top 

psychologists in the country.” As such, there is some tension 

between the prosecutor’s closing argument and what he and his 

expert had said elsewhere.

Nonetheless, even assuming the prosecutor overstepped 

his bounds, any error is not prejudicial. The jury was told of Dr. 

Berlin’s credentials, that he was “an associate professor at the 

John[]s Hopkins University,” “an attending physician at the 

John[]s Hopkins’s Hospital,” “the founder of the John[]s Hopkins 

Sexual Disorders Clinic,” and the director for a national 

institute on sexual trauma. In addition, the jury knew that 

Berlin had published in peer reviewed journals, spoken to 

judges, appeared before senators, and been certified by 

numerous professional boards. It also knew that Berlin did the 
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same residency at Johns Hopkins and served on the same “DSM 

publication committee” as Dr. Dietz. In addition, the jury heard 

a direct rebuttal to the charge that the defense “couldn’t find a 

doctor west of the Rockies.” As defendant’s attorney stated, “We 

went to John[s] Hopkins. They went looking for the best guy 

they could find. We went looking for the best guy we could find. 

They’re both from John[s] Hopkins.”

Finally, the court instructed the jury regarding expert

testimony. It twice told the jury to “consider the qualifications 

and believability of the witness” as well as the underlying bases 

for their opinions. The instructions for the jury to focus on the 

relevant matters, combined with the rebuttal revealing the 

tenuous ground on which the prosecution asserted that Dr. 

Berlin’s opinion could not be found “west of the Rockies,” 

eliminated any reasonable possibility that the jury would have 

been persuaded to reach a different penalty verdict absent the 

prosecutor’s challenged comments.

With regard to Dr. Haney, defendant is correct that the 

prosecution misstated the record when it said, “He called him 

the ‘Hole Boy.’ ” The term “hole boy” or “hole kid” referred to the 

period of time that defendant spent in isolation during his stay 

at Cottonwood prison. Defendant had represented to Haney 

that he did a significant amount of time in isolation, going so far 

as call himself the “Hole Kid.” But it was defendant who gave 

himself that name; Haney did not call defendant the “hole kid” 

or “hole boy.”

It is clear, however, that the misstatement does not 

warrant reversal of the death judgment. The moniker “hole boy” 

or “hole kid” was relevant to the prosecution’s argument insofar 

as it tended to show that Dr. Haney was biased; after all, he 
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knowingly depended on defendant — a witness with a motive to 

lie — to supply his social history. To the extent that defendant 

indeed lied about how much time he spent in isolation, the 

prosecution’s point was valid. The fact that Haney did not call 

defendant a “hole boy” had little significance.

e. Exhortation for the jury to be “outraged”

Finally, defendant urges us to find misconduct in a 

comment the prosecutor made toward the end of his closing 

statement. “Justice,” said the prosecutor, “is not served until 

the citizens of our community, jurors and citizens alike, are as 

outraged by what Rex Krebs did as the families of his victims.” 

“[P]rosecutorial references to community vengeance, while 

potentially inflammatory, are not misconduct if they are brief 

and isolated, and do not form the principal basis for advocating 

the death penalty.” (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1178.) 

The brief comment here does not amount to error.

8. Order to submit to psychiatric examination by 

prosecution expert

Over defense objection, the trial court ordered defendant 

to be examined by Dr. Dietz. Defendant refused and was not 

examined, a fact Dietz disclosed during his testimony. The 

prosecution also mentioned defendant’s refusal to be examined 

in closing argument, stating, “the defendant will spend days 

talking to Dr. Berlin . . . but when the Court orders the 

defendant to talk to Dr. Dietz . . . the defendant refused. 

Where’s the fairness in that? Who’s looking for the truth?”

On appeal, the Attorney General concedes that the court

erred in ordering defendant to be examined by Dr. Dietz. (See 

Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1109 (Verdin)

[“any rule that existed before 1990 suggesting or holding a 
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criminal defendant who places his or her mental state in issue 

may thereby be required to grant the prosecution access for 

purposes of a mental examination by a prosecution expert was 

superseded by the enactment of the criminal discovery statutes 

in 1990”]; Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 927, fn. 15 [applying 

Verdin retroactively].)22 The Attorney General argues, however,

that the error did not cause prejudice. We agree.

This case is much like People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 

1032, 1087-1088 (Wallace), where we found the Verdin error 

harmless. As in Wallace, the prosecution expert here “did not 

rely on defendant’s refusal to participate in the court-ordered 

examination” to criticize his opponent’s conclusions. (Id. at 

p. 1087.) Moreover, “the brutality of defendant’s crimes . . .

weighs heavily in aggravation.” (Ibid.) Such factors, along with 

the fact that the defense provided the jury with an explanation 

of why defendant refused to be examined by Dr. Dietz (because 

he would have examined defendant with an opinion already 

formed), lean against a finding of prejudice.

Of course, there are differences between this case and 

Wallace as well. In Wallace, the jury “heard [from yet another 

expert for whom no Verdin error occurred] that the reliability of 

the defense expert testimony was questionable.” (Wallace, 

supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1087.) Furthermore, the prosecutor in 

Wallace did not remark on the defendant’s refusal to be 

examined. Nonetheless, these differences do not persuade us to 

 

22

“Shortly after Verdin, the Legislature amended section 

1054.3 to expressly authorize courts to compel a mental 

examination by a prosecution-retained expert. (See § 1054.3, 

subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2009, ch. 297, § 1.) But because 

this case predates that amendment, Verdin applies.” (People v. 

Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1193 (Banks).)
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a different conclusion. The jury here did not hear from another 

prosecution expert, but it did hear details supporting Dr. Dietz’s 

testimony from both defendant and his expert. Dietz testified 

that defendant’s choices showed that he did not suffer from 

volitional impairment. Defendant’s confessions then supplied, 

in vivid detail, the choices he made, and Dr. Berlin confirmed 

that defendant consciously stopped resisting his impulses after 

a bar fight. As for the prosecutor’s brief comments in closing 

argument highlighting defendant’s refusal to submit to an 

interview with Dietz, they do not provide a basis to reprise all of 

defendant’s arguments about opposing party’s supposed 

“venomous treatment of the defense experts.” With few 

exceptions, we have found that the prosecution conducted itself 

within the bounds allowed by law. Under the totality of the 

circumstances, “it is not reasonably possible that [in the absence

of the Verdin error] the jury would have returned a penalty 

verdict of life without parole . . . rather than death.” (Wallace, 

supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1087-1088.)

9. Instructions relating to section 190.3

Defendant raises two arguments regarding the pattern 

instructions the jury received concerning the aggravating and 

mitigating factors under section 190.3. We reject both claims.

a. Mitigating circumstance

Using CALJIC No. 8.85, the trial court told the jury: “In 

determining which penalty is to be imposed on defendant . . .

[y]ou shall consider, take into account and be guided by the 

following factors . . . .” The court then instructed the jury on the 

various factors enumerated in section 190.3, including, as is 

relevant here, factors (d) and (h). The court thus instructed the 

jury that it should consider “[w]hether or not the offense was 
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committed while the defendant was under the influence of 

extreme mental or emotional disturbance” and “[w]hether or not 

at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to 

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 

conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of 

mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication.”

Defendant first argues that the pattern instructions above 

improperly informed the jury that “any listed factor could be 

considered as aggravation.” Specifically, defendant contends 

that if a jury finds that a defendant did not act “under the 

influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” or was 

not impaired in his “capacity . . . to appreciate the criminality of 

his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 

law,” then because of the “whether or not” language of the 

instruction, the jury will interpret the absence of such 

mitigating factors to be an aggravating circumstance. We have 

repeatedly rejected such argument. (E.g., People v. Miracle

(2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 354 (Miracle); People v. Wall (2017) 3 

Cal.5th 1048, 1073; Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 1207-1208; 

People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618 [“CALJIC No. 8.85’s 

use of the phrase ‘whether or not,’ is not an invitation to jurors 

who find ‘a factor not proven’ to then ‘use that factor as a factor 

favoring imposition of the death penalty’ ”]; People v. Sapp

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 315.) We once again reject it here.

To the extent defendant attempts to rely on other 

instructions to bolster his argument, we find the effort

unpersuasive. For instance, defendant points to statements the 

court made to certain jurors during voir dire. These earlier 

statements do not help defendant, as the jury was instructed to

“[d]isregard all other instructions given . . . in other phases of 

th[e] trial” before entering penalty deliberation.
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Similarly, the fact that the court gave a jury instruction 

patterned on CALJIC No. 8.88 adds little to defendant’s claim. 

This instruction defined “[a]n aggravating factor [a]s any fact, 

condition or event attending the commission of a crime which 

increases its guilt or enormity.” Defendant asserts that under 

this definition, the jury may have considered his mental illness 

and intoxication — the same circumstances mentioned under 

section 190.3, factor (h) — as aggravating because they were 

“fact[s], condition[s], or event[s] attending the commission of the 

crime.”

We agree that the jury may indeed have drawn this 

conclusion, but find no impropriety thereby. Both parties here 

agreed that defendant’s alcohol use and mental disorder 

(whether it be sexual sadism, as claimed by the defense, or 

antisocial personality disorder, as argued by the prosecution) 

were drivers behind his abductions, rapes, and ultimately, 

murders of Newhouse and Crawford. As such, defendant’s 

intoxication and mental disorders were relevant to 

“circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was 

convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any 

special circumstances found to be true.” (§ 190.3, factor (a).) 

Hence, the jury may properly have considered them 

aggravating, even though they “also bear[] upon a mitigating 

factor” listed in section 190.3. (People v. Smith, supra, 

35 Cal.4th at p. 356.)

Put differently, although impairment as a result of a 

mental disorder or intoxication is always mitigating, the mere 

presence of a mental disorder or intoxication is not. In cases 

where a mental disorder and/or drunkenness relate to the 

circumstances of the crime, they may be aggravating and it is 

not error to allow the jury to consider them as such. (See People 
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122

v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 356 [“evidence of mental illness 

. . . is admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief [as an 

aggravating circumstance] if, as here, it relates to an 

aggravating factor listed in section 190.3”].)

In sum, we reject defendant’s claim that the pattern 

instructions improperly allowed the jury to consider any strictly 

mitigating circumstance as aggravating.

b. Vagueness

Defendant argues that section 190.3, factor (h) is 

unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, he contends the 

instruction is infirm because (1) it fails to define the phrase 

“mental disease or defect” and (2) it does not adequately explain 

“the concept of volitional capacity impairment conveyed by the

phrase ‘capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements 

of the law was impaired.’ ” We disagree.

Defendant’s argument about the term “mental disease or 

defect” in section 190.3, factor (h) is, by and large, a reprisal of 

his contention that the trial court needed to define the term on 

its own motion. Defendant once again asserts that the phrase 

is not “ ‘commonly understandable’ ” given Dr. Dietz’s 

testimony. However, as we have earlier explained, although 

Dietz espoused a narrow definition of “mental disease or defect,” 

the testimony, arguments, and instructions considered in their 

entirety did not preclude the jury from treating defendant’s 

mental conditions as mitigating. Accordingly, even assuming 

that the instruction was vague, no prejudicial error occurred.

We further reject defendant’s argument concerning the 

asserted vagueness of the phrase “the capacity of the defendant 

. . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 

impaired as a result of mental disease or defect.” (§ 190.3, subd. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J.

123

(h).) Defendant claims that such language is vague because 

“[w]hen a person ‘gives in’ to an impulse, urge, craving or desire 

which is associated with a mental illness, and commits a crime,” 

it is not clear whether “the act of ‘giving in’ or acting on the urge 

properly [is] considered an act of free will, or . . . an act 

evidencing an impaired capacity to control one’s behavior.” Yet, 

if this is the difficulty, then defendant’s argument boils down to 

nothing more than that the jury had a difficult job to do. It fell 

upon the jury to sift between competing testimony, theories, and 

arguments to draw its own conclusion about whether 

defendant’s actions evidenced “an impaired capacity to control 

one’s behavior” or the choice not to resist evil impulses. This is 

a factual question on which no instruction of law could have 

provided the answer. The factor is not vague just because its 

application to specific facts is an irreducibly difficult task. 

(Accord, Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 977 

[“difficulty in application is not equivalent to vagueness”].)

10. Constitutionality of California’s death penalty 

scheme

Defendant argues California’s death penalty scheme is 

unconstitutional, although he concedes that we have repeatedly 

rejected such arguments. Because defendant advances no 

persuasive reason for us to revisit the issues, we continue to hold 

as follows.

“California’s death penalty laws adequately narrow the 

class of murderers subject to the death penalty.” (Powell, supra, 

5 Cal.5th at p. 963.)

The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional despite 

not requiring “findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 

aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor 
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(b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors 

outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 

appropriate sentence.” (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 

1235.)

“Because capital defendants and noncapital defendants 

are not similarly situated, California does not deny capital 

defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural 

protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital 

defendants. [Citation.] In particular, written findings by a jury 

recommending a death sentence are not required.” (Spencer, 

supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 695.)

Section 190.3, factor (a) is not unconstitutionally 

overbroad, arbitrary, capricious, or vague as applied. (Miracle,

supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 353.)

Intercase proportionality review is not required. 

(Mendoza, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 916.)

The use of unadjudicated criminal activity as an 

aggravating factor under section 190.3, factor (b) does not 

violate constitutional mandates. (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th 

1, 106.)

The trial court “was not required to instruct the jury that 

the statutory mitigating factors were relevant solely to 

mitigation, and the court’s instruction directing the jury to 

consider ‘whether or not’ certain mitigating factors were present 

did not invite the jury to use the absence of such factors as an 

aggravating circumstance, in violation of state law and the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th 

at p. 964.)

“Prosecutorial discretion and the absence of standards for 

deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty in an eligible 
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125

case” do not render California’s death penalty laws 

unconstitutional. (Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 107.)

The death qualification process of jurors does not violate 

the United States Constitution or international law. 

(Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 868.)

Victim impact evidence “is admissible as a circumstance 

of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).” (Spencer, supra, 

5 Cal.5th at p. 676.) The use of such evidence is neither 

“nonstatutory” nor “unrestricted.”

The imposition of the death penalty under California’s law 

does not violate international law or prevailing norms of 

decency. (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1008.)

The delay in executing a condemned inmate does not 

violate the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Ochoa (2001)

26 Cal.4th 398, 462-464.) The rarity of executions does not 

result in arbitrary results. (People v. Seumanu (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 1293, 1371-1375.) Contrary to the argument raised 

in defendant’s supplemental brief, the Governor’s moratorium 

on the death penalty does not compel the court to reexamine 

these holdings. (Governor’s Exec. Order No. N-09-19 (Mar. 13, 

2019) [stating that the order “does not . . . alter any current 

conviction or sentence” and likewise “does not[] create any rights 

or benefits . . . enforceable at law”].)
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III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed in its entirety.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

We Concur:

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion People v. Krebs

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal XXX

Original Proceeding

Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S099439

Date Filed: November 21, 2019

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Luis Obispo

Judge: Barry T. LaBarbera

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Neil B. Quinn, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Sharlene A. Honnaka, A. 

Scott Hayward and Kenneth C. Byrne, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Neil B. Quinn

Attorney at Law

300 Douglas Street

Ojai, CA 93023

(805) 646-5832

Kenneth C. Byrne

Deputy Attorney General

300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702

Los Angeles, CA 90013

(213) 269-6008