# Final Rule for

Importation of Fresh
Ovine Meat from Uruguay

Environmental Assessment, September 20 1 1 United States Department of Agriculture

Marketing and Regulatory Programs

Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service

# Final Rule for Importation of

Fresh Ovine Meat from Uruguay

Environmental Assessment, September 20 1 1

Agency Contact:
Dr. Silvia Krein del, Senior Staff Veterinarian Regionalization Evaluation Services Staff National Center for Import and Export Veterinary Services Animal Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture
4700 River Rd. Unit 38 Riverdale, MD 20737

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–

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## Table of Contents

I. Need for the Proposed Rule

................................ ................... 1
A. Introduction

................................ ................................ .......... 1
B. Need

................................ ................................ .................... 3

II. Alternatives

................................ ................................ .............. 3
A. No Action

................................ ................................ ............. 4 B. Proposed Rule

................................ ................................ ..... 4

III. Envi ronmental Consequences

................................ ............. 1 0
A. No Action

................................ ................................ ........... 1 0 B. Proposed Rule

................................ ................................ ... 1 1
1. FMDV

................................ ................................ ............ 1 2
2. FMD and Ovine Meat Processing

................................ . 1 5 3. Regulatory Control of FMD

................................ ............ 1 7
4. Int erspecies Transmission of FMD

................................ 19 5. Environmental Fate of FMD V

................................ ........ 2 4
6. Publi c Health

................................ ................................ . 2 6

IV. Other En vironmental Issues

................................ ............... 2 7 A. Environmental Ju stice and the Proposed Action

............... 27 B. Protection of Ch ildren and the Proposed Action

................ 27 C. Threatened and Endangered Species and the Proposed Action

................................ ............................... 2 8 D. Potential Cumulative Imp acts

................................ ............ 29

V. Listing of A gencies Consulted

................................ ............. 3 0

VI. References

................................ ................................ ............ 3 11 

## I. Need for the Proposed Rule

A. Introduction

S anitary import regulations are designed to prevent the introduction and dissemination of injurious animal pests and diseases that are new or not widely distributed in the United States

. Currently, t he importation of
ovine meat from Uruguay is prohibited. These restrictions are designed to prevent the introduction of foot

- and

- m outh disease (FMD). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USD A)

– Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) established policy and rules in 1997 for recognizing regions, rather than only countries, for the purpose of importation of animals and animal products into the United States (62 Federal Register (FR) 5 5999, 62 FR 56027). This action was designed to facilitate trade while maintaining a low risk of animal disease introduction to the
United States.

A request was submitted to USDA

– APHIS to export fresh (chilled or frozen), maturated , and deboned ovine meat from Uruguay ( may also be
referred to hereafter as the export region) to the United States. The most
recent outbreak of FMD in Uruguay occurred on a farm in Palmitas in
2001

. Although APHIS previously conduc ted a risk analysis for import ation of fresh, maturated

, and deboned beef meat from Uruguay in 2002, which addressed the risk of transmitting FMD to the U.S. livestock industry, the risk presented by ovine meat was not addressed at that time
in the regulat ion (9 Code of Federal Regulations ( CFR ) § 94.11)

. Thus, given the history of the disease in Uruguay, APHIS conducted a new risk analysis to evaluate the likelihood of FMD introduction and establishment through importation of ovine meat under certain cond itions from Uruguay

.

FMD is an acute, highly contagious viral disease that primarily affects
cloven

- hoofed animals. FMD may affect humans; however, its occurrence is rare (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). Cattle, sheep, goats, deer, buffalo, and swine are all adversely affected by FMD, but the effects on cattle herds tend to be particularly devastating. The death rate from this disease is low; however, both temporary and permanent physical damage to the body of infected animals results in costly losses in meat and milk production. Although lesions on the feet and mouth area are the most prominent clinical signs, the systemic damage to the gastrointestinal tract and circulatory system from this disease causes greater damage to the animal’s
health and productivity. FMD virus (FMDV) is transmitted to susceptible
animals by direct contact with infected animals or with contaminated inanimate objects; ingestion (primarily by pigs) of contaminated meat products; ingestion of contaminated milk; insemina tion with contaminated semen; and inhalation of infectious aer osols. Exclusion of this disease from the United States is particularly important in that the virus2 responsible for this disease is highly contagious and can survive in the
environment for exten ded periods of time. Previous outbreaks of FMD in the United States have been very costly to contain and eradicate. The
United States has been free of FMD since 1929.

In response to the request from Uruguay

, and based upon the findings of
site visits a nd the risk analysis, USDA

– APHIS

– Veterinary Services (VS) is proposing to allow importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay to the United States under specific conditions for entry. The animal disease risk analysis determined that the likelihood of ovine meat from Uruguay introducing and establishing FMD in the United States is low. The analysis concluded that the proposed mitigations and conditions for entry are sufficient to initiate trade in fresh, maturated

, and deboned ovine meat
from Uruguay

.

To address the possibility that animals may not show clinical signs of disease and be infected and viremic at the time of slaughter, APHIS proposes to require the Uruguay Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries (MGAP) to ce rtify the following

—

(1) the ovine meat consists only of ovine parts that are, by standard practice, part of the animal’s carcass that is placed in a chiller for maturation after slaughter;

(2) certain parts of the ovine’s head, feet, hooves, and internal organs may reach the necessary pH level during the required maturation process; however, these items can contain lymph tissue, depot fat, and blood clots that may potentially harbor FMD V that is not inactivated. These parts would continue to be prohibited importation
into the U nited S tates

. Specifically, no part of ovine heads, feet, hooves, or internal organs will be exported;

(3) all bone and visually identifiable blood clots and lymphoid tissue have been removed from the meat;

( 4) the ovine meat comes from ovine carcasses that were allowed to
maturate at 4 to 10 o C for a minimum of 24 hours after slaughter

, and that reached a pH of 5.8 or less at the middle of both longissimus
dorsi muscle s at the end of the maturation period; and

(5) the establishment in which the ovines are slaughtered allows a periodic on

- site evaluation and subsequent inspection of its facilities, records, and operations by an APHIS representative. The requirements specified within th is rule for the ex port of ovine meat from Uruguay are designed to facilitate importation and maintain low potential disease risks related to FMD.3 

### B. Need

In response to an off

icial request from Uruguay ’s MGAP

, and in
accordance with s anitary and p hytosa nitary (SPS) agreements to base import decisions on an assessment of the risks to human, animal, and plant health, APHIS has reviewed the issues related to this importation and is proposing to amend the sanitary regulations (9 CFR part 94) by allowing impo rtation of fresh ovine meat from this region under specific conditions. The preparation of this environmental assessment ( EA ) was prompted by the anticipated public concern about the potential disease risk from importation of ovine meat

, and the need to a ddress environmental issues related to this disease risk. The issue of potential environmental risks of an outbreak of FMD in the United States resulting from imported ovine

meat is of great concern to APHIS. Characterization of the disease risk potentia l and adequate mitigation measures are critical to excluding this
disease from the United States.

This EA analyzes the potential environmental impacts resulting from implementation of this rule and from the change in the current regu lations. Implementation of this rule will allow , under certain conditions, the import ation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay in to the United States . T he importation of live animals that are susceptible to FMD will continue to be prohibited. In the event FM D is detected and reported in Uruguay , APHIS would immediately ban the importation of any potentially infected commodities. All exports to the United States would

, therefore

, cease until APHIS evaluate d the situation

.

This EA is d esigned to satisfy the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 United States Code ( U.S.C. ) 4321

– 4327, its implementing regulations, and Executive Order 12114, “Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions.”

The noti ce of availability of the EA for the proposed rule and comment period were provided (February 24, 2011, 76 FR 10266, Docket No.
APHIS

- 2008

- 0085) to ensure review and input to this EA from the public. APHIS received no public comments on the EA for the pro posed rule for the comment period extending from this Federal Register notice of availability to April 25, 2011.



## II

. Alternatives

This EA addresses potential environmental consequences of the proposal to amend the regulations gove rning importation of ovine meat into the United States (9 CFR p art 94). The amendment would allow the importation of fresh meat from sheep raised in Uruguay under certain
conditions. The t wo possible alternatives considered in this EA are (1) t he4 current prohibition of importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay (no action)

, and (2) regulation under the proposed action (preferred alternative).



### A. No Action

The no action alternative is defined as continuation of the current sanit ary regulation of importation of ovine meat from Uruguay. This alternative would involve continuation of the prohibition of the importation of fresh
ovine meat from Uruguay . The lack of any changes in conditions for entry of commercial shipments of ovine meat from Uruguay m aintains overall disease risks at the present low levels. Selection of this alternative may not, however, satisfy international trade agreements requiring justification of the more rigorous sanitary requirements of maintaining current regulations over less restrictive alternate approaches. In compliance with the SPS measures stipulated by the World Trade Organization, APHIS is obligated to consider less restrictive sanitary measures that provide comparable protection against disease ri sks. The issues of potential environmental impacts associated with the disease risks of each alternative are discussed in chapter 3, Environmental Consequences of the
Alternatives.



### B. Proposed Rule

The description of this alternative is defined by the proposed action and would result in enforcement of the amended sanitary regulations for importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay under specific conditions
for entry. This rule requires the implementation of mitigations to maintain

s anitary security while facilitating trade. This approach has been used effectively for establishing conditions of importation of fresh beef from Uruguay, which has involved comparable disease risks. An authorized veterinary official of the Government of Uruguay would have to certify on the foreign meat inspection certificate for the meat that the conditions of the regulations have been met.

The importation requirements for fresh ovine meat from Uruguay include the following mitigations

—

• Ovine meat must originate from animals that have been born, raised, and slaughtered in Uruguay.

• All animals must pass both ante

- and post

- mortem inspections.

• The meat must be from carcasses that were allowed to maturate at 40 to 50 oF (4 to 10 oC) for a t least 24 hours but no more than 60 hours after slaughter and reached a pH of 5.8 or less in the loin muscle at the end5 of the maturation period. Measurements for pH must be taken at the middle of both longissimus dorsi muscles.

• The meat must cons ist only of ovine parts that are, by standard practice, part of the animal’s carcass that is placed in a chiller for maturation after slaughter. No heads, feet, hooves, or internal organs may be included. All bones and visually identifiable blood clots a nd lymphoid
tissue must have been removed.

APHIS evaluated 11 factors related to the potential FMD risks in Uruguay. The findings of this evaluation are presented in the disease risk analysis (USDA

– APHIS, 2008) and are summarized as follows

—

(1) Based upon s ite visits and documentation reviews, APHIS considers Uruguay to have the veterinary and regulatory infrastructure to adequately monitor and control the possible incursion of FMD. MGAP has a strong veterinary infrastructure that should allow adequate epid emiological followup in the event of an outbreak in a timely manner

. In addition, veterinary personnel are very knowledgeable about the disease and its control

measures , as well as their roles in the FMD program

.

Garbage feeding is prohibited in Urugua y. In addition, lan dfills are inspected every 3 months to ensure that there is no possibility for exposure to wild or feral animals. Furthermore, garbage is heat treated to reduce potential infectivity in the event that any waste leaves the facility.

(2) AP HIS did not detect any evidence to suggest that active outbreaks of FMD exist in Uruguay. It has also been determined
that s heep were not heavily involved in the recent outbreaks of FMD in Uruguay, either clinically or serologically, indicating that they played a limited role in the propagation of disease during the outbreak despite the fact that farming practices were to graze sheep and cattle together on the same pastures. Despite occasional outbreaks of FMD in Uruguay in the past and in neighbouring

co untries in South America, APHIS concluded that Uruguay can
detect the disease quickly and limit its spread.

(3) Uruguay appears to have successfully prevented the introduction of FMD from Argentina and Brazil during some

, but not all

,
ou tbreaks in th ose countr ies . Consequently, if disease were to break out in Argentina or Brazil, it would present a potential source for entry of FMD into Uruguay. Despite occasional outbreaks of FMD in Brazil and in Argentina, Uruguay has not
had an outbr eak since 2001. APHIS concluded that there is a risk of reintroduction from adjacent areas into Uruguay a s long as6 FMD is endemic in the overall region in South America

. However, APHIS conclud e d that MGAP could detect disease quickly, limit its spread, an d would report promptly.

(4) The FMD prevention and response program in Uruguay is
effective at the local and national levels. Emergency p lans ar e up to date an d in place in local offices, and several surveillance plans

are ongoing with a strong disease not ification system in place.

A PHIS concluded that Uruguay has a control program to respond quickly to FMD emergencies through quarantine and testing of suspicious premises.

(5) The ovine population in Uruguay is not vaccinated against FMD V.
Vaccination of s heep, in addition to goats and pigs, is prohibited in order to maintain these populations as sentinels for the
introduction of FMD V into Uruguay. Vaccination of the entire cattle population of Uruguay is currently mandatory. Vaccinations
occur three time s per year with bivalent FMD vaccines imported from Colombia (virus O1 and A24) and Argentina (O1 and A24, strain A2000) . Current vaccination efforts in the cattle population impact the likelihood of entry and propagation of FMD V within the country should Uruguayan livestock, including sheep, be exposed to it.

(6) Most of Uruguay’s borders are adequately protected by effective
natural barriers which reduce the unrestricted flow of animals and animal products from Argentina and Brazil. In those areas where

na tural barriers do no t exist, government control measures provide appropriate levels of protection

.

(7) In 2007

, APHIS reviewed and evaluated the extent of movement
of animal s and animal products from controlled regions of higher
risk

, as well as the level of biosecurity regarding such movements. Additional sanitary precautions are taken in the case of vehicles arriving from areas with known circulation of FMD V

. Routine precautionary measures should result in an overall low r isk of import of FMDV

. The 2007 evaluation concluded that Uruguay ’s
border control measures were effective in reducing the risk of
introduction of FMD V

.

(8) Sheep represent a large portion of Uruguay’s livestock industry, equal in number to cattle. During the visit to farms

, foot baths and routine disinfection of entrance of vehicles was not observed; however, the overall low number s of animal movement and human movement between farms mitigates this risk to some degree.

Moreover , during a recognized outbreak

, strict biosecurity7 measures ad dressing all of these issues will be implemented

, as has been done in the past.

Uruguay exercises impressive oversight and knowledge of animal movement and inventory, and has in place a complex system of premovement certification requirements

. The miti gations already required at slaughter for exporting fresh beef to the U nited S tates are similar to those that would be required to export ovine meat. APHIS believes that MGAP has the ability to implement the mitigations required to export ovine meat into the U nited S tates (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 )

.

(9) Uruguay has a two

- phase surveillance system that include s both active and passive surveillance techniques. To date, the serologic studies conducted have provided strong evidence that FMDV is

n ot currently circulating within the sheep population of Uruguay. The studies were rigorous and inc luded multiple layers o f followup , inc luding clinical and serologic measures.

Passive surveillance measures appear to be effective and rigorous.
There is a high level of cooperation between producers, veterinarians, and official veterinary service s personnel. When suspicious cases are reported

, country officials have acted quickly to suspend animal movement immediately until a conclusive diagnosis can be m ade.

(10) Uruguay has one central laboratory located in Montevideo which provides both disease diagnosis and food safety functions ; it is the only laboratory in Uruguay authorized to test for FMD. MGAP is working on the accreditation procedures for the FMD se ction of
the laboratory to become accredited as ISO

- 9001 (international quality management systems standard s ) . Only serological testing is currently done in Uruguay. Confirmation of suspect cases is done at the Institute for Animal Health Pirbright Labor atory, USDA’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Plum Island, or the Pan American Center for Foot

- and

- Mouth Disease ( PANAFTOSA ) . During ongoing FMD outbreaks, the strain of the virus is rechecked every 3 months at the laboratory in
Montevideo , with strain typing done at PANAFTOSA.

In 2007 , APHIS evaluated the infrastructure and diagnostic capabilities of the FMD laboratory in Uruguay

, and concluded that the laboratory infrastructure and capacity are sufficient to run serological tests for FMD . The evaluation also determined that the FMD laboratory staff is adequate to support surveillance activities and is trained to respond rapidly in the event of detection of FMD. It was further determined that the facilities visited during the8 evaluation were sufficient to perform diagnostic tasks. The recordkeeping system is efficiently maintained

, and c ontingency plans spelled out actions to be taken in the event of a positive diagnosis.

(11) Emergency preparedness and the legal authority to take the

necess ary actions to prevent the introduction and spread of FMD into Uruguay are essential for successful prevention of FMDV introduction and spread. In 2007 , APHIS evaluated MGAP ’s FMD response capabilities and concluded that MGAP has the legal authority and t he ability to implement a plan to control and prevent the spread of disease in a timely manner. This was demonstrated during the 2001 outbreak. Further, the official veterinary personnel, private veterinarians, livestock industry

, and producers of Urugua y are all vigilant for the emergence of FMD within the country’s livestock. The contingency plan is broad in scope and provides the necessary support and guidance to conduct an eradication program

, if necessary. Uruguay appears to be well prepared to res pond to an incursion of FMD.

Proposed Amendment s to Regulations

Uruguay is a country that practices vaccination against FMD

. Uruguay has requested to be allowed to export fresh ovine meat to the United
States. APHIS previously conducted a risk analysis for import ation of fresh, maturated

, and deboned beef from Uruguay in 2002, which addressed the risk of introducing FMD into the U nited S tates ; the risk presented by ovine meat was not addressed at that time. After conducting

a r isk assessment in connection with the current request to export fresh
ovine meat to the United States

, it wa s determined that fresh ovine meat can be safely imported from Uruguay, provided that c ertain requirements

are met.

The current regulation s , 9 C FR § 94.2 2

, allow the importation of fresh

beef under certain conditions. APHIS proposes to allow the importation

of fresh ovine meat provid ed that t he ovine meat meets requirements

simi lar to restrictions in 9 CFR § 94. 22 for beef

.

There is no evidence that FMD currently exists in Uruguay, and APHIS has evaluated the infrastructure and response capabilities of the country

and considers the MGAP infrastructure and control measures to be
sufficient to detect, control, and eradicate FMD, in the event of a f uture
outbreak.

However, some countries in South America are known to be affected with FMD, hence there is a risk that FMD will be reintroduced into Uruguay9 from those countries. To address this risk, APHIS has proposed that, if FMD is detected anywher e in Urug uay, the export of ovine meat from all of Uruguay to the United States will be prohibited until at least 12 months have elapsed since the depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection of the last infected premises. This prohibition will allow us to de termine whether FMD, if reintroduced into Uruguay, has become enzootic within the country. Such a determination would be particularly necessary if the outbreak is extensive, such as that experienced in 2001.

In order to ensure compliance with the appro priate controls, APHIS will require that Uruguay certify that the animals and products originated in the export region and certify that these were not commingled with animals or products from areas APHIS considers to be FMD

- affected

. Specifically,
APHIS w ould require the following certifications for ovine meat exported
to the U nited S tates from Uruguay

—

 T he meat comes from ovines t hat have been born, raised, and slaughtered in Uruguay ;

 T he meat comes from ovines that originate from premises where FMD has not been present during the lifetime of any sheep slaughtered for the export of ovine meat to the United States.

 The meat comes from ovines that moved directly from the premises of origin to the slaughtering establishment without any
contact with other animals ;

 T he meat has not been in contact with meat from regions other
than those considered as FMD

- free by APHIS (listed under 9 CFR § 94.1(a)(2)) ; and

 T he ovine meat meets additional cer tification requirements under
9 CFR § 94.11(c). T hese res trictions prohibit the export

- approved slaughter establishment from receiving FMD

- susceptible animals or animal products that originated, tran sited , or commingled with animals or animal products from regions that APHIS does not
consider as FMD

- free.

Shee p in Uruguay are grass fed on extensive establishments

, and may not be subject to routine supervision. Sheep might be distant from human
contact for significant periods of time; t herefore, close observation of animals might be infrequent and

, subsequently

, clinical signs might be
missed. To ensure that the animals receive the appropriate inspection

, APHIS will require that MGAP certify the following

—

 The ovine meat comes from ovines that received both an ante

- mortem and po st

- mortem veterinary inspection (which include s inspection of10 the head and feet) at the slaughtering establishment, with no evidence
found of vesicular disease

.

To address the possibility that animals may not show clinical signs of
disease and be infected and viremic at the time of slau ghter, APHIS will require MGAP to certify the following

—

 The ovine meat consists only of ovine parts that are, by standard practice, part of the animal’s carcass that is placed in a chiller for maturation after slaughter;

 Certain parts of a n ovine’s he ad, feet, hooves, and internal organs may reach the necessary pH level during the required maturation process; however, these items can contain lymph tissue, depot fat, and blood clots that may potentially harbor FMD V that is not
inactivated . Therefore, t hese parts would continue to be prohibited
from importation into the U nited S tates

. Specifically, no part of ovine heads, feet, hooves, and internal organs will be exported;

 All bone and visually identifiable blood clots and lymphoid tissue
have been rem oved from the meat;

 The ovine meat comes from ovine carcasses that were allowed to
maturate at 4 to 10 o C for a minimum of 24 hours after slaughter

, and that reached a pH of 5.8 or less at the middle of both longissimus dorsi muscle s at the end of the mat uration period; and

 The establishment in which the ovines are slaughtered allows a periodic on

- site evaluation and subsequent inspection of its facilities, records, and operations by an APHIS representative.


## III. Environmental Consequences

A. No Actio n

The biological history and disease potential of FMD suggest that continuation of the current regulations restricting fresh ovine meat (no

U nited S tates entry) from Uruguay would result in no potential for
increased disease risk and

, therefore

, no change in potential impact on the human environment. Although the required mitigations under the proposed action provide a means of export for Uruguayan producers that have been shown to be effective against all known strains of FMD V , ther e remains some potential risk that does not exist under the no action
alternative.11 The prohibition of importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay has
maintained no disease risk from this commodity and negligible
environmental effects in the United States . As with most commodities, there is always some risk of smuggling ; however, the frequency is low due to the high punitive costs from noncompliance. The high potential risks from disease associated with noncompliance make it APHIS’ policy to provide a st rong deterrent. Therefore, APHIS keeps importers and shippers informed of import regulations

, as well as the penalties for inadequate compliance. The importer or shipper could be subject to civil penalties, criminal fines, jail sentences, and loss of rev enue due to APHIS’ rejection of commodities, permit applications, and/or compliance agreements. APHIS ha s the option to refuse entry, require treatment, or require destruction of infected or potentially infected cargo. All of these options are costly to the shipping line and the exporter who must assume all costs for the delays and any treatments. This offers strong incentive for their full compliance with import regulations. Monitoring of the rates of compliance with a phytosanitary rule

, promulgated i n 1998

, found that proper compliance with those import requirements was achieved approximately 98 percent of the time. Comparable compliance could be expected for any present or revised sanitary regulations related to the importation of fresh ovine meat f rom Uruguay.

The issue of potential risks of an outbreak of FMD to the human environment in the United States is of great concern to APHIS as the consequences of an FMD outbreak in the U nited S tates would be extremely high. Animal illness and mortality from FMD would devastate wild and domestic susceptible populations and

, thus

, indirectly impact humans and other animals depending upon them as a food source.

The no action alternative would leave the current importation regulations unchanged, that is , exportation of ovine meat from Uruguay to the
United States would continue to be prohibited. The low FMD risk of
ovine meat that has met certain conditions is not reflected in the current
U.S. import regulations. The continuance of such unsupported tra de restrictions would be contrary to U.S. obligations under its international trade agreements.



### B. Proposed Rule

The environmental conseq uences from promulgation of this rule are largely contingent upon the ability of various mitigation s to prevent the importation to the United States of any Uruguayan ovine meat that is potentially infected with FMD V . The disease risk analysis (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ) of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay into the United States examined the sanitary concerns related to fulfilling the request from Uruguay ’s MGAP . The analysis assessed the likelihood of introduction
and outbreak of FMD in livestock in the United States from12 implementation of the rule. Findings of the risk assessment are
summarized within this document and are inco rporated by reference
herein.

Compliance with NEPA requires APHIS to consider all potential effects to
the human environment from this rule. In addition to consideration of disease issues related to livestock, this document analy z es characterization
of t he potential effects to humans, wildlife, and environmental quality. The information is presented by topics related to program requirements and associated mitigative actions that affect potential disease risks associated with the proposed ovine meat import ation rule. This includes sections with issues related to the vaccination process, the meat maturation process, the regulatory control process, the disease transmission mechanism as related to wildlife, and the persistence of FMD V under
various environmen tal conditions on or in environmental media

, such as in soil, in water, on plants, and on abiotic surfaces.

F oot

- and

- mouth disease virus (FMDV) is the agent that causes FMD. FMDVs are members of the Picornaviridae family

, and viru ses of the

genus Aphthovirus

. FMDV is a small virus which is very infectious, multiplying in and causing damage to cells throughout the body of susceptible animals, and which can survive in the environment for extended periods of time. FMD is an acute, h ighly contagious viral disease, mainly, but not exclusively, of cloven

- footed animal s. The risk to humans from FMDV is very slight. Confirmed cases of FMD in humans are rare. Symptoms in humans are mostl y mild and mainly include fever
and blisters on th e hands, feet, mouth, and tongue. Patients usually recover within a week after the last blister formation (USDA

– APHIS,
2008 ). The major host species for FMDV is widely recognized to be domestic cattle. FMD is characterized by the formation of lesions on the feet and mouth, damage to the mucous membrane lining the gastrointestinal system, and high fever. Damage from FMDV may also occur to the heart muscle cells (particularly in young animals), the milk

secreting cells of the udder

, and hormone

- producing cells.

For FMD to remain in a population, each infected animal must infect at least one other animal. The primary methods in which FMDV moves out
of an infected animal are in air

- borne droplets from the lungs and the
fluid

- filled vesicles; in the saliv a, urine, feces, semen

, and milk; secretions from the eyes, nose, prepuce

, and vagina; and through direct contact with skin or pieces of infected skin that may drop off the animal ( WIN, 2001 ).
It i s also possible to transmit FMDV in infected carcasses on meat, hides,
and bones (WIN, 2001 )

. FMDV is commonly spread by the movement of
infected animals ; h owever, the virus may also move independently outside of the animal. Humans, birds, rodents, dogs, and cats may carry and spread the virus if they contact a ny of the above

- mentioned body
substances and

, particularly with humans and probably other vertebrates, 1. FMDV13 for a short time after they have breathed in the infected airborne droplets. The wind may move the air

- borne droplets containing the virus up to
250 ki lometers over water and shorter distances over land (WIN, 2001 )

. The virus must re enter a susceptible animal in which it can multiply; this can be through inhalation, ingestion, sexual transmission, conjunctival membranes, inoculation, and damaged skin.

It is possible for animals to carry FMDV without appearing clinically ill under conditions such as recovery from clinical disease, undetected subclinical disease, and exposure of va ccinated animals to the virus;
h owever, reports of carrier animals infectin g susceptible animals are extremely rare ( WIN, 2001 ). Different strains 1 of FMD V have different capacities to establish persistent infection

, and the proportion of animals
that become carriers following exposure to virus varies depending o n the severity o f the challenge; however, it does not appear to be influenced by the age or sex of the host (WIN, 2001 ). The establishment of carriers is
reduced in endemic areas if routine vaccination is used. Vaccination does not make animals into FMDV carriers. Prop erly inactivated vaccine, when injected into animals, does not give rise to the carrier state (WIN,
2001 ).

Three general conditions must be fulfilled for a virus to persist long term in a host. First, the virus must be able to infect host cells without b eing lethal to the cell. Second, there must be mechanisms for long

- term maintenance of the viral genome 2 in host cells. Third, the virus has to avoid detection and elimination by the host’s immune system (Fields,

e t al. , 1996). Viruses have devised vari ous strategies to accomplish these goals. The normal response of the immune system is to detect antigens 5 and establish an immune response to those antigens. A virus will modify specific antigens or proteins so as to evade the host’s immune system

, ther eby establishing persistent infection in the host. In the case of FMD,

t he modification of specific antigens or proteins gives rise to a sub strain of
virus

.

Given that viruses tend to modify their antigenic and protein characteristics for persistent sur vival within the host, FMDV could have variations within a particular strain . Animal health authorities in Uruguay may respond to an outbreak by following a “ stamping out ” course of action, which involves the killing of susceptible animals, the vaccinatio n of animals for the new strain, or a combination of both with other

e mergency procedures. Regardless of the strain that may cause an outbreak, MGAP will deal with any outbreak in the same manner, and a

1 A strain is a taxonomic subdivision of a micro

- organism based on characteristic antigens or proteins.
2 A genome represents all of the genetic information or heredita ry material possessed by an organism or micro

- organism

. 5 An antigen is a substance that can trigger an immune response, usually a foreign protein, which is not found naturally in the body.14 sanitary state of emergency will be declared with th e accompanying quarantine and movement restrictions and sanitary measures.

FMD Surveillance

APHIS recognizes that FMD is endemic to some countries in South
America

, and that outbreaks of the disease may occur in the exporting regi on. It is possible that FMD

- affected animals, animal products, people, and vehicles may cross domestic or international boundaries illegally. Effective FMD surveillance programs are essential in the prevention and
containment of disease outbreaks. APHIS has evaluated the movement
controls and detection c apabilities in place for Uruguay

, and has determined that they are adequate to maintain an overall low level of risk of introducing FMD V to the United States via the pathway of ovine meat exported from th e designated region (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ).

FMD surveillance performed in Uruguay is ongoing and can be broadly characterized as having two objectives: (1) determining the level of involvement of sheep and cattle in an FMD outbreak, an d (2) determining
the level of immunity of cattle as a result of vaccination

, and to detect and quantify the ex istence of circulating FMDV in cattle and sheep populations (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). It is mandatory to r eport suspected
cases of FMD whereupon movement controls are swif tly imposed until FMD has been ruled out by authorized investigation. APHIS considers Uruguay to have implemented effective disease surveillance strategies for the proposed export region

, and is not requiring additional measures for this mitigation (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ).

Uruguay employs dual ( “active” and “passive” ) systems of surveillance which are designed

, in part

, to mitigate potential detection complications associated with vaccination. The dual systems also provide a basis for demonstrating freedom fr om FMD over certain areas or periods of time. Generally speaking, the passive surveillance gathers qualitative
information about FMD

, and the active surveillance gathers quantitative data. Passive surveillance in Uruguay is bolstered by effective communi ty education and involvement, while the bulk of active surveillance consists of the annual serological sampling of randomly selected animals and regular survey s of higher

- risk areas (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ).

As of April 2007

, extensive serological and clinical studies for FMD have
been conducted in both cattle and sheep populations in Uruguay. No evidence of FMD has been found in any of the sheep tested. The APHIS disease risk analysis concludes that FMD V is not currently circulating within the sheep populatio n of Uruguay, but takes the most conservative
estimate

— that asymptomatic FMD

- infected ovi nes will be sent to slaughter

— and includes additional mitigation requirements for the15 processing stage in order to minimize the risk of FMD

- contam inated meat entering the United States.

Animal processing can lead to exposure and spread of FMD. Only ovines from production areas certified under the requirements of th is rulemaking
action would be accepted for slaughter, and processing would occur only at approved facil ities in the designated export region of Uruguay.

Mitigations during processing will be required to allow for the detection and removal of animals showing clinical signs of disease, maturation and
acidification of the ovine meat in o rder to i nactivate any FMDV which may be present

, and removal of animal parts in which no acidification

occurs . Incorrectly processed meat may harbour FMD V and devastate exposed domestic and wild animal populations and

, thus

, pollut e the
environment with massive c arcass disposals

, as well as adversely affect the human economy and food supply.

A critical mitigation measure affecting the introduction potential of

FMDV is the drop in the pH of meat which accompanies rigor mortis (muscular stiffe ning following death). FMD V is sensitive to pH and cannot survive in skeletal muscle after rigor mortis has developed provided that the appropriate pH is reached. The accumulation of lactic
acid that accompanies rigor mortis decreases the pH of skeletal muscle. Virus survival is optimal between pH 7.2 and 7.6 ; at pH values above 9 or
below 6

, the virus is rapidly destroyed. As long as meat is maturated to a pH below 6, FMD V is inactivated, if present (AVIS, 200 2 ).

Several studies showed that in tissues where no acidification occurs (e.g., lymph nodes, bone marrow, fat, and blood), the virus may survive for
extended times in cured

, uncured

, and frozen meat (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 )

. O IE recommends a minimum maturation time of 24 hours and a pH value
less than 6 for beef where vaccination is practiced. Currently

, processing facilities in Uruguay follow the European Union export standards of
24 hours minimum of maturation at 2 to 10 oC, and rejection of maturated carcasses with a pH greater than 5. 9

. Ovine meat destined for export to the United States must originate from carcasses allowed to maturate at 4 to 10 oC for a minimum of 24 hours, but no more than 60 hours, to reach a pH of 5.8 or less.

The production protocols ( w hich will be required under the fina l rule for allowing ovine meat from Uruguay to be exported to the United States ) are designed to mitigate the risk of FMD in ovines sent to slaughter (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). In order to move sheep or lambs to slaughter in Uruguay

, their owner must secure four required documents. The animals must travel directly from farm to slaughter establishment and be accompanied by a MGAP certificate of sanitary status of the farm, the original health certificate (issued by a private

, registered veterinarian), an export 2. FMD and
Ovine Meat Processing16 s laughter waybill (with appropriate seals intact), and the cleaning and disinfection certificate for the transport vehicle (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). As discussed earlier in this document, the ovine population in Uruguay is not vaccinated against FMD. Cattle vacc ination against FMD is mandatory ; however, some animals may have a limited response resulting in partial or no immunity. These animals may develop unapparent clinical signs of the disease while still shedding virus and allowing the exposure of sheep flock s to FMD V

. Additionally, i nfected sheep may not always develop typical clinical signs of FMD. To address the possibility that animals may not show clinical signs of disease and be infected and viremic at the time of slaughter, APHIS proposes to require M GAP to certify the following

—

 The ovine meat consists only of ovine parts that are, by standard practice, part of the animal’s carcass that is placed in a chiller for maturation after slaughter.

 Certain parts of an ovine’s head, feet, hooves, and inte rnal organs may reach the necessary pH level during the required maturation process; however, these items can contain lymph tissue, depot fat, and blood clots that may potentially harbor FMD V that is not inactivated. These parts would continue to be prohi bited importation into the U nited
States

. Specifically, no part of ovine heads, feet, hooves, and internal organs will be exported.

 All bone and visually identifiable blood clots and lymphoid tissue have
been removed from the meat.

 The ovine meat comes from ovine carcasses that were allowed to
maturate at 4 to 10 o C for a minimum of 24 hours after slaughter

, and that reached a pH of 5.8 or less at the middle of both longissimus dorsi
muscle s at the end of the maturation period.

 The establishment in whi ch the ovines are slaughtered allows a periodic on

- site evaluation and subsequent inspection of its facilities, records, and operations by an APHIS representative.

The mitigations already required at slaughter for exporting fresh beef from Uruguay into th e United States are similar to those that would be required to export ovine meat. APHIS considers the MGAP system to be effective
and closely followed by slaughter establishment employees. Some modifications would need to be made to adopt the proposed ex port requirements ; however, these would be similar in nature to those already employed (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). Although the consequences of an FMD
outbreak in the U nited S tates would be very high, given the findings of the
2008 risk analysis, APHIS considers the risk of FMD

- infected ovine meat entering the U nited S tates from the export region and exposing U.S.17 livestock through feeding of infected materials to susceptible animals to be
low.

APHIS has determined that Uruguay possesses the detection capabilitie s, reporting systems, and emergency response systems that are necessary for combating FMD in the export region

, and that the potential masking of disease in the ovine population is effectively mitigated through appropriate processing procedures. The propo sed mitigations will utilize existing technology and regulatory infrastructure in Uruguay, and are designed to reduce the risk of FMD outbreaks in the United States by mitigating risk of the disease in the export regions. There are no adverse
environmenta l consequences expected in Uruguay or the United States due to implementation of the ovine meat processing requirements in the designated regions under th is rule.

I n order to mitigate the risk of introduction of FMD V to susceptibl e animal populations via the pathway of imported Uruguayan ovine meat

, APHIS is proposing a systems approach similar to that used for the importation of Uruguayan beef into the United States . Based upon documentation submitted by Uruguay, published report s, and site visits by
APHIS

– V S in July 2002 and March 2007, APHIS considers that Uruguay’s MGAP has sufficient legal authority to carry out official control, eradication, and quarantine activities for animal health programs

, and that officials of MGAP have demonstrated an infrastructure adequate for rapid detection of FMD and for carrying out surveillance and eradication programs (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ).

The country of Uruguay is subdivided into S tate

- like jurisdictions known as departments. Departmental level veterinary services enforce the animal health laws in Uruguay. MGAP oversees their operation, and establishes and enforces animal health regulations nationally to prevent the introduction and spread of animal pests and diseases. MGAP’s movement
controls over cattle ( the domesticated species considered most vulnerable

to FMD ) are stringent and are linked to FMD vaccination coverage. The ovine population is , however, considered to present a small likelihood of being a carrier of the infection, and is proh ibited from FMD vaccination in order to serve as a sentinel population for the introduction of FMD V into Uruguay (Saraiva, 2004; USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). Cattle and sheep in

Uru guay often share pastures ; however , the vaccination campaign targeting cattle has be en shown to be a successful deterrent of FMD by providing an effective barrier of protected animals between infected and susceptible animals (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ; AVIS , 2007). MGAP officials conduct regular inspections and testing of ovine and bovine populat ions ;

no sheep have been identified as positive for FMD since the 2001 outbreak (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). Should there be a pest or disease outbreak that requires emergency action to be taken, such as an FMD outbreak, Uruguay’s police and army would be deployed to support the response and 3

. Regulatory Control of
FMD18 protect established quarantine barriers between the zones that are pest

- or disease

- free and those that are known to have the pest or disease (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ).

The central unit for the animal movement control and tracking sy stem in Uruguay is the Livestock Movement Controls Directorate (DICOSE). In some circumstances, such as breeding sheep sold at auction, animals will receive unique identification numbers ; however, generally, sheep are registered in groups and identified b y owner rather than by individual animal. The monitoring system includes mandatory reporting of the owner’s land holdings, animal inventory and movement, changes in animal status, vaccination and treatment histories, and so on, and must be
available to DI COSE upon request. All animal movement is documented and monitored by Uruguayan police and tracked by DICOSE

, regardless of destination or change in ownership. Sheep sent for slaughter must be certified by a MGAP

- registered veterinarian

, and their origin and destination documented. Vehicles used to transport the animals must also bear certification of appropriate cleaning and disinfection. Animals are tracked throughout the slaughterhouse process

, and packaged meat can be traced to the farm of origin. The DICOSE system facilitates animal tracing for disease eradication purposes

, and enables Uruguay to certify the origin of exported animals and animal byproducts.

It is general knowledge that movement of FMD

- susceptible species or products can result i n viral transmission where there are insufficient physical barriers between FMD

- affected and

- unaffected areas. Uruguay’s international borders are jointly monitored by Uruguay, Argentina

, and Brazil in a regional disease control effort. Even so, disease introduction into Uruguay from these neighboring countries has occurred. The latest outbreak of FMD in Uruguay was in 2001; the virus is believed to have entered the country via mechanical contamination from Argentina (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). A human factor in this transmission is likely as Uruguay is separated from Argentina by two rivers which provide geographic barriers to the spread of FMD. Uruguay shares a traversable
land border with Brazil

, however, is otherwise bounded by the Atlantic
Ocean. In area s where natural barriers do not exist, and at its ports of entry, Uruguay has established effective governmental protocols to protect its animal populations against FMD. Border surveillance and extensive biosecurity measures are in place to control the mo vement of people,
animals

, and goods as they enter the country. Imports of FMD

- susceptible livestock from approved countries are quarantined and tested. Imports of
live FMD

- susceptible animals are prohibited from Argentina and Brazil as
both countries ha ve been potential sources of FMD virus in the past

. Uruguay participates with Argentina and Brazil in the Cuenca del Plata Agreement

— a harmonized regional subprogram of the PANAFTOSA Hemispheric Pl an for the Eradication of FMD

— reporting and responding

to disease risks in neighboring South American countries. APHIS has19 evaluated the FMD control program in Uruguay and concluded that MGAP could and would detect disease in sheep and other animals quickly, limit its spread, and report promptly (USDA

– APHIS, 200 8 ).

In the United States, APHIS provides Federal regulation and assistance and information concerning FMD, and operates an ongoing system of emergency response and disease controls (USDA

– APHIS, 2002). Recent outbreaks of FMD in the United Kingdom and a s uspected case of the disease in a domestic herd of swine in Minnesota provided opportunities to test the FMD programs in place in the U nited S tates (USDA

– APHIS,
2007 ; DJIN, 2007) ; t he Minnesota response proved sufficient. Moreover,
to date

, no FMD has bee n detected in the United States from either
incident. The following sequence of events is likely to occur should an FMD epidemic be caused by the importation into the United States of ovine meat from Uruguay

—

 an inspector, farmer

, or other individual wou ld report a suspicious

case;

 Federal agriculture and national security personnel would be deployed, followed by involvement

, as necessary , of the Departments of State, Transportation

, and Health and Human Services;

 a quarantine area would be establishe d, tissue samples would be analyzed

, and lab determinations published; and

,

 dependi ng on jurisdiction, Federal or S tate authorities would regulate the methods and materials used for animal movement, vaccination, culling and carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, and
surveillance.

FMD is one of the most contagious animal diseases known (AVIS/OIE, 2000); although rare human cases have occurred, FMD is not considered
zoonotic under natura l conditions (Enserink, 2001; AVIS , 200 7). Natural
infection with FMD V has been reported worldwide in animal families including the Bovidai, Cervidai, Suidae, Tayasuidae, Camelidae, Giraffidae, Erinaceidae, Muridae, Elephantidae, Tapiridae, and Ursidae (Mouchanta n t et al., 2005). Transmission between susceptible cloven

hoofed wild and domesticated animals is possible, and is known to have occurred once in the United States in 1924 (Rhyan et al., 2006). The virus may also be transmitted mechanically by humans and non susceptible
animals

, such a s rodents and birds.

FMD can cause blisters and flu

- like symptoms in humans

, and lasting
debilitation or death in cloven

- hoofed animals. There is no known treatment for FMD ( AVIS , 2007). The s everity of the disease and expression of symptoms can vary greatly, even within a species. Sheep 4. Interspecies
Transmission
of FMD20 are generally considered to be “carriers

, ” while swine are “amplifiers

, ” and cattle are “indicators” ( CIDRAP , 2007). Although occasionally FMD can be very destructive to wildlife populations (for example, the South

A frican impala in the late 19th century

, or , more recently in mountain gazelles in Israel (Shimshony et al., 1986; Thomson et al., 2003)), generally FMD “results in a relatively mild disease from which the
affected animals recover in a week or two. ”

The transfer of FMD from wildlife to domestic animals may be unlikely.
In Africa , deer, wild antelope, wild swine, and African buffalo have been linked to FMD outbreaks in domestic species (AVIS, 2002); however, wildlife has not been responsible for any of th e more r ecent incursions of the disease which have occurred in Southeast Asia, South America, and Western Europe (Thomson et al., 2003). Once FMD has been eradicated from livestock, “it has also generally disappeared from wildlife in those regions . . . W ildlife appear to have been an extension of the disease in livestock (Thomson et al., 2003).” Although certain species of wild ungulates can become carriers, the likelihood that they will transmit the infection in uncrowded field conditions is rare (Pinto , 2004; Vosloo et al., 2005). There are several ways the virus may be transferred between wildlife and susceptible livestock (USG S , 2001 ; WDNR, 2003)

, including the following

—

 exposure to infected saliva, feces, urine, milk, semen, meat, and meat bypr oducts of infected animals ;

 exposure to viral particles carried via wind, animals, or on virtually any object (farm equipment, hay, shoes, etc.) ;

 drinking from a common source of contaminated water ; and

 exposure to raw or improperly cooked

, infected garb age.

In order to conduct a thorough analysis of the effect th is rule could have on the human environment in the United States, APHIS examined the consequences of movement of FMD V between wild animals and domestic livestock within Uruguay and surrounding regions, as well as within the United States. There is the possibility that wildlife in Uruguay and neighboring regions may become infe cted with or transport FMDV and

, by their natural movement

, infect FMD

- free Uruguayan livestock being slaughtered for ex port, ultimately resulting in contaminated meat being imported into the United States. FMD V can survive for long periods of
time in meat (EUFMD, 2007). Once virus

- infected meat enters the United States, susceptible livestock and wildlife are at risk of c ontracting and spreading the disease. North American wildlife ( including white

- tailed deer and other deer species, feral pigs, bison, moose, antelope, peccaries, musk ox, caribou, sheep

, and elk ) are known to be susceptible to FMD and would likely be targ eted for eradication in the vicinity of FMD outbreaks (USGS, 2007a ; USGS, 2007 b ). Loss of livestock, rare species

, and habitat due to the culling process, the pollution of the environment from mass21 carcass disposals, and increased danger to humans and ani mals from widespread disinfectant or other chemical uses are all likely in the event of an FMD outbreak (Pinto, 2004).

a. Uruguay and Surrounding Countries

The importance of wildlife in the transmission and maintenance of FMD
in So uth America has not been established ; however, it is accepted that the
wildlife there may be secondarily affected by outbreaks in domestic species (Saraiva , 2004). While FMD V can be transmitted over long distances and remain viable for up to 15 weeks unde r certain conditions (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 )

, the potential for transmission between wildlife and domestic livestock in Uruguay is offset by the country’s strict surveillance program and animal movement controls (USDA

– APHIS,
2008 ). The country’s system of anim al husbandry, in which housing and pasturing of cattle, swine

, and small ruminants ( such as sheep or goats ) occur mainly at fixed places

, allows for effective control of FMD by the
vaccination of only cattle (Barteling et al., 2004). Successive serologica l surveys have been conducted in Uruguay, including regions where wild animals may be in contact with domestic livestock; the survey results have revealed no evidence of viral activity in sheep (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 )

.

Generally, viral transfer of FMD is possi ble when wildlife and livestock exist within close proximity to one another. The APHIS risk analysis for Uruguayan ovine meat considers geographic barriers and international
borders i n terms of the legal and illegal movement of domestic livestock and proc essed meat (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ); these areas could also be considered temporary reservoirs for FMD V if wildlife bec a me infected. Wildlife may move across traversable national boundaries and infect other wildlife and livestock by means such as sharing contami nated water, exposure to infected saliva, feces, urine, or mechanical transfer of
the virus.

As previously stated, animals need not be susceptible to FMD to spread the virus. Certain wild and domestic species may become infected and
shed virus without showing clinical signs, thus

, acting as carriers of FMD (USGS, 2001; Kitching and Hughes, 2002; Thomson et al., 2003). FMDV can survive up to 91 hours on the feathers of live birds and can pass unaltered through their digestive system (WDNR, 2003). In ad dition, the pathway need not be a live animal. Infectious levels of virus can survive
in cleaned

, salted

, and dried intestine destined for sausage casing, or in the clothing and nasal passages of human travelers (Haas and Kramer, 2000; Schoenian, 2005).

In Uruguay and surrounding countries, there is the potential for wildlife to consume infected garbage present in livestock feed or landfill sites.
APHIS observed birds feeding at a landfill in the neighboring country of22 Brazil . I t is realistic to assume that if there were other wildlife in the area, they could transport the virus mechanically via their fur, feathers, saliva

, or droppings. To date, however, there is no evidence that Uruguayan wildlife visiting landfills is a vector for FMD transmission. APHIS considers the feeding of contaminated waste to swine ( which then transmit the virus to other livestock populations ) to be the primary pathway for virus introduction in Uruguay (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). Because of the risk
from FMD transmission , U ruguay pr ohibits garbage feedin g to livestock

, and requires landfills to be inspected and their waste heat

- treated to en sure that there is no possibility for exposure to wild or feral animals (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ).

b. The United States

The Uni ted States has retained a n FMD

- free status since 1929 ( AVIS

, 2007). Prohibition of importation of live ruminants and swine and their products from FMD

- affected countries, and the avoidance of contact with livestock, zoo animals

, or wildlife by returning t ravelers continue s to be considered essential for preventing FMD outbreaks ( AVIS , 2007). However, there is the potential for infection and interspecies spread of
FMD in the United States should infected meat be imported into the
country.

If FMD V

- contam inated meat were imported and disposed of in U.S. landfills or as an ingredient of livestock feed, susceptible wildlife populations could become infected. For example, the rapidly growing
white

- tailed deer and feral pig populations in the U nited S tates ar e leading to increased foraging, scavenging, predation

, and contact with domestic livestock populations; these species can be wiped out or provide another source of infection (USGS, 2001; LDWF, 2007; ODA, 2007). In addition,

non

- susceptible animals and h umans can transfer the virus mechanically,
as has been discussed.

The United States has already battled FMD in wildlife populations. In 1924, for example, in a section of Stanislaus National Forest, California, FMD became established in deer (CDA, 1926 ). At the time of the
outbreak it was impossible to gather the wild deer to determine the extent of infection. The eradication effort, where all deer were either poisoned or shot within a 1,000

- square mile area of the national forest, took 2 years. Avai lable literature does not indicate that the wild deer ever re infected
cattle herds. The eradication process was expensive, restricted human and livestock access to the area, and angered people who were concerned with
the well

- being of the wild deer popula tion.

APHIS cooperates with other Federal and S tate authorities in the detection and management of notifiable disease outbreaks in the United States. If susceptible wild species should be exposed to FMD, Morgan et al. (2003)23 suggested analyzing and poss ibly implementing the following measures in order to prevent the transmission of the disease to domestic livestock

—

 lethal collection of wild animals for diagnostic testing

,

 provisions for surveillance zone,

 the possibility of reducing the density of susc eptible wildlife populations within an infected zone,

 long

- term observation, and

 additional prevention and control measures, such as the closure of hunting seasons and restriction of access to public lands by humans ( because humans can spread the virus via physical contact)

.

c. Ongoing Wildlife Research

While in 1925 eradication was the method used to control the spread of FMD from wild animal populations to domestic livestock, APHIS believes that FMD most likely will be self

- limiti ng in wildlife in the long term (Fischer, 2001). In the event of an FMD outbreak, the risk to wildlife will depend on the distribution, density

, and biology of species in the affected location, the level of exposure to infected animals, and existing
envir onmental conditions (Corn and Fischer, 2001). In order to develop more effective control of FMD, more needs to be understood about the epidemiology of the disease and the role of possible wildlife reservoirs.

USDA ’s Agricultural Research Service, in as sociation with the Department of Homeland Security and a Maryland biopharmaceutical

company , has developed a new FMD vaccine which is not only affordable, but can be manufactured in the United States without using infectious
FMD materials. The current for mulation is for use on cattle and may prove effective in protecting domestic and wild animal populations. The vaccine will allow for improved diagnosis and response, and may lead to a change in trade restrictions as it is possible to tell whether an anima l possessing FMD antibodies acquired them from vaccination or from infection (FASS, 2007).

Uruguay may consider an ecosystems approach to FMD eradication

s imilar to the one used globally against rinderpest , another serious animal disease agent (FAO/GREP , 2008)

. APHIS has recently recognized Uruguay as free of rinderpest ( Federal Register , 11/13/07 ). Successful

r inderpest eradication has result ed by considering virus persistence,
surveillance

, and control in “ecosystems” whose boundaries are defined by trading partners rather than national borders; an ecosystem s approach may also work in the case of FMD (EMPRES, 2007). Currently, APHIS
interacts with USGS

– National Wildlife Health Center to coordinate
research and monitor outbreaks of FMD in South Americ a . This Federal team is developing prevention and contingency plans for informing U.S. land management and conservation agencies about the risk that FMD24 poses to wildlife (USGS, 2007 a ). In addition to helping the United States control FMD in wildlife pop ulations, these efforts may also assist Uruguay
if confronted with interspecies spread of FMD in the future.

FMD V may persist in the environment for extended periods of time when susceptible animals come in cl ose contact with other animals that have been exposed to the virus. For a virus to become freely circulating

, it must be able to persist in the environment either inside or outside of the host long enough to infect a susceptible host. The Cottral study ( 1 969) reports
the survival time of FMD V on or within various contaminated objects at ambient temperatures as shown in table 1.

In addition to the objects listed in table 1, many other contaminated items have been suspected as the sou rce of FMD outbreaks including various domestic or wild animals and birds, humans, truck tires, and even postal
materials. The survival time of FMD V is shorter for the virus in the
environment than for the virus in animals. Sunlight, temperature, pH
chan ges, relative humidity, and the dilution effect of rain and melting
snow all affect virus survival ; however, sunlight and ultraviolet radiation have little effect on virus persistence (Pharo, 2002). Longer survival times
for FMD V on objects would be expec ted at the low temperatures associated with high altitudes or the arctic regions than at sea level or in the tropic al regions. Although temperatures above 50 o C destroy most infectivity, it is likely that a small proportion of the virus particles are
rela tively resistant to the effects of heat and pH in most populations (Pharo, 2002).

The effect of temperature and pH on time for 90 percent virus inactivation is shown in table 2 and table 3, respectively, based on findings from the
Bachrach et al. (1975) study. There is also the potential for FMDV to be disseminated over considerable distances by aerosols (Cottral, 1 969). In
aerosols

, FMDV survives best when t he relative humidity exceeds
70 percent and there is a critical humidity level of 55 to 60 percent, below which survival is poor (Pharo, 2002). Based on available scientific data,
the survival of residual FMD V in the external environment, following eradication of an outbreak of FMD in susceptible animals, would be expected to persist no longer than 8 months. 5. Environ

mental
Fate
of FMDV25 Table 1. Survival Time of FMD Virus on Various Contaminated Objects At

Ambient Temperatures.

Contaminated Objects Weeks of Survival

Soil, S

– W 7 1

– 21

Barn dirt; Barn sand 1

– 10

Road sand; garden soil 1.5

– 4

Manure, S

–

W 1

– 24

Sewage, S

–

W 3

– 15

Barns (brick, adobe, wood), S

– W 2

– 11

Walls, brick and plaster 2

– 4

Soil, water, lichens 4

Pasture plants, S

–

W 1

– 7

Haystack, S

–

W 4

– 29

Feed sacks; bran 20

Meal 7

Vegetables 1

Water 3

– 14

Houseflies 10

T icks 15

– 20

Wool, sheep 2

Hair, cattle 4

– 6

Glass surface 2

Clothing and footwear, S

– W 8 3

– 9, 14

Meat cloth (at 4 o C) 6

7 S

– W, 1

– 21: summer 1 week, winter 21 weeks.

8 Cotton garments, l eather shoes, rubber boots.26 Table 2. Effect of Temperature (at pH 7.5) On Time for 90 Percent FMD

Virus Inactivation.
Temperature Inactivation time (90 percent)

61 o C 30 seconds

55 o C 2 minutes

49 o C 1 hour

43 o C 7 hours

37 o C 21 hours

20 o C 11 days

4 o C 18 weeks

Table 3. Effect of pH (at 4 o C) On Time for 90 Percent FMD Virus

Inacti vation.
pH Inactivation time (90 percent)

10.0 14 hours

9.0 1 week

8.0 3 weeks

7.0

– 7.5 >5 weeks

6.5 14 hours

6.0 1 minute

5.0 1 second

FMD may affect humans

, however, its occurrence is quite rare. The number of cases repor ted is so small when compared with the number of persons exposed to FMD that it is generally not considered a threat to humans. FMDV has been isolated and typed in only 40 patients during the last century. Symptoms in humans are mostly mild and mainly in clude fever and blisters on the hands, feet, mouth, and tongue. Patients usually recover within a week after the last blister formation (USDA

– APHIS,
2008 ).

Perhaps more importantly, an FMD outbreak of the magnitude observed in the United Kingdom can res ult in severe psychosocial effects on farmers and farming communities. Farmers and their families can suffer from grief over losing animals ( in some cases blood lines kept over many generations ), as well as loss of control over their lives due to movement restrictions, disruptions in community life, and short

- and long

- term stress over their financial future. Researchers from Lancaster University in the United Kingdom conducted a new study into the social consequences of FMD in the Cumbria community ; the study revealed high rates of depression, alcohol consumption

, and mortality among farmers during the crisis (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). 6. Publ ic
Health27 Based on evaluation of the 11 factors and observations from the site visits, Uruguay demonstrates it ha s the detection capabil ities, reporting systems, and emergency response systems that are necessary for combating FMD in the export region . It was also found that Uruguay demonstrates that the potential masking of disease in the ovine population is effectively mitigated through appropriate processing procedures. Furth er, any potential environment al impacts resulting from this rulemaking are sufficiently mitigated and

, therefore

, present a low risk. Moreover, there are no significant environmental impacts anticipated as a result of implementing the proposal to allow fresh ovine meat to be imported into the United States from Uruguay.



## IV. Other Environmental Issues

A. Environmental Justice and the Proposed Acti on

Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low

- I ncome Populations,” requires each Federal agency to make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low

- income populations in the United States and its territories and possessions. Th is rule allows for the importation of fresh ovine meat to the United States

. Importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay , under the proposed action

, is not expected to substantially affect profits of any meat, including beef producers in the United S tates. Most of the impact

- generating compliance
actions under this rule occur outside of the United States (in Uruguay )

, and none have any disproportionate adverse effects on minority or low

income populations. Although one could design scenarios involvi ng in troduction of FMD to the United States, these are primarily remote and hypothetical. Even if such scenarios did occur, the resultant impact to minority and low

- income populations would be expected to be negligible.



### B. Protecti on of Children and the Proposed Action

Executive Order 13045, “Protection of Children f rom Environmental Health Risks and Safety Factors,” requires each Federal agency to address disproportionate environmental health risks or safety risks to children from implementation of proposed policies, programs, activities, and
standards. C hanges pertaining to this rulemaking do not pose greater risks to children than to other parts of the affected populations. The risks from importation depen d primarily upon adherence to the sanitary requirements for entry of ovine meat ; this adherence precludes the potential for adverse
effects to humans and makes other introduction

- related risks remote and of negligible concern in regard to the protection of children.28 

### C. Threatened and Endangered Species and the Proposed Action

Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and its implementing regulations require Federal agencies to ensure their actions are not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of threatened or endangered species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. APHIS considered the potential effects of the proposed action on threatened and endangered species and designated critical ha bitat. There are six listed ungulate species that are p otentially susceptible to FMD (t able 4 ) ; however, based on the application of required mitigation measures for the importation of ovine products

, there is no likelihood for these species to be exposed to and

, thus

, affected by this action. Therefore, APHIS expects
th is rule will have no effect on threatened or endangered species or their
critical habitat in the United States

.

Table 4. Endangered Species in the United States Susceptible to Foot

- and

M outh Disease.

Common Name Scientific Name Critical
Habitat Listing Status

Woodland caribou Rangifer tarandus caribou No Endangered

Columbian white

tailed deer Odocoileus virginianus leuceurus No Endangered

Key deer Odocoileus virginianus clavium No En dangered

Sonoran pronghorn Antilocapra americana sonoriensis No Endangered

Bighorn sheep Ovis Canadensis Yes Endangered

Sierra Nevada bighorn sheep Ovis canadensis californiana No Endangered

APHIS conducted a risk analysis to determine the risk of in fected ovine products entering the United States from Uruguay . APHIS concluded that
the FMD risk from importing fresh ovine meat that had met certain conditions prior to export was low, and that matured, deboned ovine meat could be safely imported from Ur uguay. As a result, the potential to expose U.S. livestock or other susceptible species to FMD V is considered to be low (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). Therefore, implementation of th is rulemaking is expected to have no effect on federally listed threatened or
endan gered species or designated critical habitat.29 

### D . Potential Cumulative Impacts

The potential impacts from this rule in combination with similar actions are referred to as cumulative impacts. B ased upon the findings of the risk analysis , t hese impacts are not expected to pose any substantial risks (USDA

– APHIS, 2008 ). Although importation of fresh ovine meat does increase the potential for introduction of FMD to the United States, the program mitigat ions required of producers and slaughtering
establishments in Uruguay make introduction of the disease extremely unlikely, even when considering other importations of fresh beef and future importations of ovine meat from countries with comparable risks (su ch as Argentina and Brazil ). It is difficult to precisely quantify the potential cumulative impacts which are dependent upon both the disease
conditions in Uruguay and compliance with importation conditions in Uruguay and other regulated countries. The n ature of disease mitigation is of principal concern for this issue

, and the constraints provided by program mitigations are considered to provide adequate protection.30 

## V. Listing of Agencies Consulted

Envi ronmental and Risk Analysis Services Policy and Program Development Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture 4700 River Road, Unit 149 Riverdale, MD 20737

– 1237

Regionalization Evaluation Services National Center for Impor t & Export Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture 4700 River Road, Unit 38 Riverdale, MD 20737

– 1231

Regulatory Analysis and Development Policy and Program Development Animal and Plant Health Inspecti on Service U.S. Department of Agriculture 4700 River Road, Unit 118 Riverdale, MD 2073731 

## VI. References

AVIS

— See Advanced Veterinary Information System

A dvanced V eterinary I nformation S ystem , 2002. The Advanced Veterinary In formation System. Foot

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- m outh d isease (2002 suite).
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Advanced V eterinary Information System /OIE, 2000. International Office of Epizootics: Animal d isease c ards. Foot and m outh d isease (FMD). Office International des Epizooties: August 30, 2000. [Online].
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. [ 2007 , Aug. 21 ].

Advanced Veterinary Information System, 2007. American Veterinary
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, Nov. 7 ].

Bachrach, H.L., Breese, S.S., Callis, J.J., Hess, W.R., and Patty, R.E.,
1975. Inactiva tion of foot

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– 52.

Barteling, S.

, Yadin, H.

, and Sutmoller, P. , 2004. Appendix 19: Discussion paper on guid elines for control of f oot

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CDA

— See California Department of Agriculture

California Department of Agriculture , 1926 . The e pizootic of f oot

- and

m outh disease in California

, February 17, 1924 to June 10, 1926. Charles Keane, D.V.S. Special Publicat ion No. 65, 110 pp. Sacramento, CA.

CIDRAP

— See Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy

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. Foot

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biosec/anim

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. , and Fischer, J

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Cottral, G.E., 1969. Persistence of f oot

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, 70(3):549

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Cottral, G.E., Cox, B.F., and Baldwin, D.E., 1960. The survival of foot

and

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– 297.

DJIN

— See Dow Jones International News

Dow Jones International News , 2007. Associated Press. White House
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NewsAlert Oct. 16 , 2007 : Dow Jones International News: Oct

. 15, 2007.

Enserink, Martin , 2001 . The English Patient. ScienceNOW 2001 (426): 2. April 26, 2001. [Online]. Available: http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org [ 2007 , Sept. 20 ].

EUFMD

— See European Commission for the Control of Foot

- and

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Disease

European Commission for the Control of Foot

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- Mouth Disease, 2007.
The Disease: transmission. FAO/AGA /The European Commission for
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FAO/GREP

— See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
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FASS

— See Federation of Animal Science Societies

Federal Register, 2007. Foot

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Fischer, John , 2001 . APHIS p o licies for w ildlife in an FMD e mergency.

s outheastern c ooperative w ildlife d isease s tudy (SCWDS) Briefs, April 2001, 17.1 [Online]. Available: http ://www.uga.edu/scwds/topic_index/2001/APHISPoliciesforWildlifeina nFMDEmergency.pdf [ 2007 , Nov. 6 ].

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations /Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme , 2008. Agriculture and Consumer Protection Department, An imal Production and Health Division. March 25, 2008. [Online]. Available: www.fao.org/ag/AGAinfo//////program mes/en/grep/home.html [ 2008 , Sept 25 ].

Haas, B.

, Kramer, M

. , 2000. Appendix 11: Possible i ntroduction of FMDV with sheep intestines from FMD countries. FAO/AGA/The European Commission for the Control of Foot

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LDWF

— See Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

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, Fischer, J., Hostetler, M.E. , 2003

. If f oot

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c ame to Florida: p otential i mpact on w hite

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, Haas, B.

, Lutz, W.

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, Frolich, K. , 2005.
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- ranging r oe d eer from s elected a reas of Germany (2001

– 2002). Wildlife Disease
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– 605.

ODA

— See Oregon Department of Agriculture34 Oregon Department of Agriculture , 2007 . Story of the Week: Feral swine action plan getting some attention in Oregon. [Online]. Available: http://oregon.gov/ODA/docs/pdf/news/070808pigs.pdf [2011, Aug.26].

Pharo, H.J., 2002. Foot

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No v. 14, 2007

.

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, Shalev, M.

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, and Salman, M. , 2006

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vtrans.html [ 2007 , Oct. 17 ].

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. [ 2007 , Sept. 20 ].

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, Orgad, U.

, Baharav, D.

, Prudovsky, S.

, Yakobson, B.

, Ba r Moshe, B.

, Dagan, D. , 1986. Malignant foot

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.

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, Vosloo, W.

, Bastos, A.D.S. , 2003. Foot

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USDA

, A PHIS

— See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service

, 2008. (Draft) Risk Analysis: foot

- and

- mouth disease (FMD) Risk from importation of fresh (chi lled or frozen) matured, and deboned ovine meat from Uruguay into the United States. Jan. 7, 2008.35 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 2007. APHIS Veterinary Services, Centers for Epidemiology and
Animal Health I nfo Sheet: CEI Impact Worksheet Foot and Mouth Disease, United Kingdom. August 8, 2007.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service

, 2002. APHIS Veterinary Services f actsheet: USDA

s afeguarding m easures a gainst f oot

- and

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USGS

— See U.S. Geological Survey

U.S. Geological Survey, National Wildlife Health Center , 2007a . Wildlife
Health Bulletin #01

- 01 from Bob McLean, Director NWHC: Foot and

m outh d isease in Europe

— f act s heet. June 28, 2007. [Online].
Available : http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov [2011, Aug. 30].

U.S. Geological Survey, National Wildlife Health Center , 2007b . Foot and Mouth Disease. June 28, 2007. [Online]. Available : http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov [2011, Aug. 30].

U.S. Geological Survey, Office of Communication, 2001. USGS issues
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Vosloo, W.

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, Sahle, M.

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, Dwarka, R.M. , 2005. Chapter 10: Virus t opotypes and the r ole of w ildlife in f oot

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ahead.org/slides_pdfs/wilnavosloo.pdf [ 2007 , Nov. 14 ].

WIN

— See Wildlife Information Network

Wildlife Information Network, 2001. Picornaviridae: Foot

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WDNR

— See Wisconsin Depart ment of Natural Resources

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources , 2003 . Foot

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d isease: i ssues for Wisconsin w ildlife. A pril 17, 2003. [Online].
Available: http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/land/wildlife/whealth/issues/fmd.htm [ 2004 , Sept. 15 ].