IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

DANA NICOLE PROUTY, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

BRADLEY HUGHES, Respondent/Appellee.

________________________________

In re the Matter of:

DANA NICOLE PROUTY, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

ADAM TIMOTHY KAFKA, Respondent/Appellee.

Nos. 1 CA-CV 16-0397 FC

 1 CA-CV 16-0402 FC

 (Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. FC2012-053300

 FC2012-094898

The Honorable Jay M. Polk, Judge

AFFIRMED

FILED 12-11-2018
2

COUNSEL

The Nathanson Law Firm, Scottsdale

By Philip J. Nathanson

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Bishop Law Office, P.C., Phoenix

By Daniel P. Beeks

Counsel for Respondents/Appellees

OPINION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Maurice Portley1 joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Dana Nicole Prouty (“Mother”) appeals final orders relating 

to child custody, legal decision-making authority, child support, and 

attorney fees. We address in this opinion whether the superior court had

jurisdiction to modify a foreign child custody order concerning her 

daughter. Because our resolution of only this issue merits publication, we 

have addressed Mother’s other arguments in a memorandum decision filed 

concurrently with this opinion. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(h). For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Adam Timothy Kafka (“Kafka”) are the parents 

of M.P. (“Daughter”), born in Illinois in 2008. When Daughter was two 

years old, Mother and Kafka entered into a custody agreement in Illinois 

which awarded Mother sole legal decision-making authority and primary 

physical custody, and provided Kafka with unspecified parenting time. 

 

1 The Honorable Maurice Portley, Retired Judge of the Court of 

Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article 6, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution.
PROUTY v. HUGHES

Opinion of the Court

3

Soon thereafter, Mother and Daughter moved to Arizona after Mother 

became romantically involved with Bradley Hughes (“Hughes”). 

¶3 In December 2012, Kafka, a Nebraska resident, filed the 

Illinois custody order in Arizona with a petition to modify that order, along 

with a motion for temporary orders without notice seeking custody of 

Daughter. Pursuant to the agreement of Prouty, Hughes and Kafka, under 

Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure 69, the superior court granted 

temporary physical custody of Daughter to Hughes, with Mother having 

supervised parenting time and Kafka having parenting time with Daughter 

in Arizona once a month. 

¶4 In May 2013, Kafka filed a petition to modify the temporary 

orders. At the modification hearing, the superior court raised possible

jurisdictional concerns regarding the Illinois order and requested Kafka to 

register the foreign order in Arizona pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 25-1055. Kafka filed his affidavit registering the order in 

August 2013 and the court subsequently issued notice of the registration to 

the parties. Mother took the children to Illinois without notice the same 

month.

¶5 The superior court entered several additional temporary 

orders regarding custody of Daughter and legal decision-making authority. 

Specifically, in November 2013 the court entered orders for joint legal 

decision-making authority, but only temporarily, for Daughter to reside 

exclusively with Kafka. The court also issued a warrant to take physical 

custody of Daughter. 

¶6 When Kafka first attempted to enforce the warrant in Illinois, 

Mother obtained an emergency restraining order from the Illinois court 

against Kafka. In support of her petition for a restraining order, Mother 

alleged that Arizona did not have proper jurisdiction to make orders 

regarding Daughter because Mother and Daughter only “sporadically and 

temporarily” resided in Arizona, as their primary residence was Illinois,

and the Illinois order was not properly registered in Arizona because

Mother had not been personally served. 

¶7 Kafka filed an emergency motion for enforcement of the child 

custody warrant in Arizona and in December 2013 the superior court made

findings of fact and conclusions of law affirming the warrant and all prior 

orders. Of relevance, the court found Mother and Daughter resided in 

Arizona beginning October 2012 and Mother had made admissions 

conceding Arizona was Mother’s and Daughter’s home state. Shortly after, 
PROUTY v. HUGHES

Opinion of the Court

4

the parties appeared in Illinois. The Illinois court also found that Arizona 

was the proper forum and ordered that the Arizona custody warrant was

immediately enforceable. 

¶8 Mother urged the superior court to reconsider its December 

2013 orders arguing she did not receive notice of the registration because it 

was not sent to her Illinois address, and, therefore, the Illinois custody order 

was not properly registered. The superior court found the Illinois order 

was properly registered pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-1055 and Mother’s failure 

to update her address with the court did not invalidate its registration or 

enforceability.

¶9 Four months later, Mother filed a motion to dismiss the

Arizona proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. The superior court denied the 

motion and affirmed its December 2013 findings and orders. In May 2014, 

Kafka petitioned the superior court to find Mother in contempt for her 

failure to comply with the court’s November 2013 custody warrant, and 

later filed a supplement documenting attempts by Mother, in Illinois, to 

serve Kafka with an order of protection, listing Daughter as a protected 

person. On its own motion, the superior court set a Uniform Child Custody 

Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) conference with the Illinois court

to further address jurisdictional issues. The Illinois court found, for the 

purposes of the UCCJEA, that Arizona was the proper forum and that 

Mother was utilizing Illinois courts merely because she “[did] not agree 

with the orders of the court in Arizona.” The Illinois court vacated its order 

of protection proceedings.

¶10 Following a two and a half-day trial in January 2016, the 

Arizona court granted Kafka’s petition to modify legal decision-making 

authority and parenting time. 

¶11 We have jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal from these 

orders pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 This court reviews the superior court’s jurisdiction to modify 

a custody order from another state de novo. Danielson v. Evans, 201 Ariz. 

401, 411, ¶ 36 (App. 2001). When Kafka filed his petition to modify the 

Illinois custody order, he did not register the order in accordance with 

A.R.S. § 25-1055. Mother contends the superior court, therefore, lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Illinois custody order and, as a 

result, all subsequent orders by the superior court are void. In support of 
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Opinion of the Court

5

her argument, Mother relies on this court’s opinion in Glover v. Glover, 231 

Ariz. 1 (App. 2012). We find Glover distinguishable. 

¶13 In Glover, a Massachusetts court ordered the father to pay 

child support. The parties relocated to Arizona and subsequently entered 

into an agreement to reduce the father’s child support obligation. Id. at 2-3, 

¶¶ 2-5. On appeal, this court held the superior court lacked jurisdiction to

modify the foreign support order because it was never registered in 

Arizona as required by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act 

(“UIFSA”), A.R.S. § 25-1201 to -1342. Id. at 7, ¶¶ 21-22. 

¶14 The UIFSA applies to child support orders. The UIFSA 

statutes governing modification of foreign child support orders require 

such orders to be registered. See A.R.S. § 25-1309 (party seeking to modify 

foreign support order shall register that order); § 25-1310 (Arizona courts 

may enforce a registered foreign support order, but may modify a 

registered support order only if certain requirements are met); see also 

Glover, 231 Ariz. at 7, ¶ 21 (“Unless the foreign child support order is 

registered, the issuing state retains exclusive jurisdiction, which means 

another state lacks jurisdiction to modify the order unless it is registered 

and other prerequisites are satisfied.”). 

¶15 By contrast, the jurisdictional provision at issue here is the 

UCCJEA, A.R.S. § 25-1033, not the UIFSA. Unlike the UIFSA, the UCCJEA

does not require that a foreign custody order be registered before it may be 

modified. See also A.R.S. §§ 25-1055, -1056. While A.R.S. § 25-1055(A) 

provides that “[a] child custody determination issued by a court of another 

state may be registered in this state,” it does not require registration. 

(Emphasis added). Under the UCCJEA, the jurisdictional requirement for 

modification of a child custody determination is that this state have 

jurisdiction to make an initial determination and that either of the following 

be true: 

1. The court of the other state determines it no longer has 

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under § 25-1032 or that a 

court of this state would be a more convenient forum under 

§ 25-1037. 

2. A court of this state or a court of the other state determines 

that the child, the child’s parents and any person acting as a 

parent do not presently reside in the other state. 

A.R.S. § 25-1033. See Ex parte Davis, 82 So. 3d 695, 701 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)

(holding that under the plain language of a similar Alabama UCCJEA 
PROUTY v. HUGHES

Opinion of the Court

6

provision, registration is not required to modify foreign custody order, only 

to enforce such order), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Reynolds, 209 

So. 3d 1122, 1126 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016); see also Lopez v. Olson, 724 S.E.2d 

837, 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (holding Georgia’s identical version of UCCJEA 

did not require registration of foreign custody order prior to modification); 

Butler v. Butler, M2011-01341-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 4762105, at *4-5 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2012) (holding that to modify foreign custody order, 

Tennessee’s similar UCCJEA provisions do not require registration of 

order).

¶16 The reasons for a registration requirement in the UIFSA but 

not in the UCCJEA are explained in the UIFSA commentary:

UIFSA and UCCJEA seek a world in which there is but one 

order at a time for child support and custody and visitation. 

Both have similar restrictions on the ability of a tribunal to 

modify the existing order. The major difference between the 

two acts is that the basic jurisdictional nexus of each is 

founded on different considerations. UIFSA has its focus on 

the personal jurisdiction necessary to bind the obligor to 

payment of a child-support order. UCCJEA places its focus on 

the factual circumstances of the child, primarily the “home 

state” of the child; personal jurisdiction to bind a party to the 

custody decree is not required.

§ 611 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2008). Registration of the Illinois custody order

was not required; therefore, the failure to timely register the order did not 

deprive the Arizona court of jurisdiction.

¶17 Mother also argues other UCCJEA requirements were not met 

because Arizona did not have jurisdiction under § 25-1033. As previously 

stated, see supra ¶ 14, § 25-1033 requires jurisdiction to make an initial 

determination under § 25-1031(A)(1) or (2), and that one of two additional 

requirements be met. Here, all of the § 25-1033 jurisdictional requirements 

were satisfied. The superior court found that in December 2012, Arizona 

was Mother’s and Daughter’s home state and that neither Daughter nor 

either of the parties resided in Illinois. The record supports these findings. 

Therefore, the court did not err in finding it had jurisdiction under A.R.S. 

§ 25-1033 and properly exercised jurisdiction over Father’s petition to 

modify.
PROUTY v. HUGHES

Opinion of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.