Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

Chief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor 

Robert P. Young, Jr. Opinion Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JUNE 9, 2004 

MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LANSING,

CITY OF LANSING, and INGHAM

COUNTY COMMISSIONER LISA DEDDEN, 

Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 

v No. 124136 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE 

COMMISSION and WOLVERINE PIPE 

LINE COMPANY, 

Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 

_______________________________ 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

TAYLOR, J. 

In this case, we are called on to determine if 

defendant Wolverine Pipe Line Company (Wolverine) must 

obtain the permission of the city of Lansing before 

constructing a gas pipeline longitudinally in the right-ofway adjacent to an interstate highway when part of the 

pipeline would be constructed within city limits. We 

affirm the Court of Appeals decision that Wolverine must 

obtain local consent but that such consent need not be 
 

obtained before the 

Michigan Public Service

application 

Commission (PSC). 

I 

is submitted to the 

Wolverine is an interstate common carrier that 

constructs, operates, and maintains pipelines used for 

transporting petroleum products. It planned to construct a 

twenty-six-mile liquid petroleum pipeline along the 

Interstate-96 (I-96) corridor, within the right-of-way of 

the interstate highway. Although the land is under the 

control and jurisdiction of the state’s Department of 

Transportation, several miles of the highway are within the 

city limits. 

In December 2001, Wolverine, before commencing any 

work on the project, filed an application with the PSC for 

approval of its plan. The mayor and the city, as well as 

Ingham County Commissioner Lisa Dedden, were allowed to 

intervene in the PSC proceeding.1 The application was 

treated as a contested case and a hearing was held. The 

city moved to dismiss the application, arguing that the PSC 

had no jurisdiction because Wolverine’s application lacked 

the requisite consent from the city. The PSC denied the 

1

 Because of the similarity of interests, these three

parties will be referred to as “the city.” 

2
 
motion and authorized the project, finding that the city’s 

consent was not required to accompany the application. 

With regard to the reasonableness of the project, the PSC 

determined that there were no equal protection violations 

in the route selection and found the project necessary and 

safe. 

The city appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court 

reviewed the plain language of MCL 247.183 and determined 

that the statute did require local consent before 

construction began, but not before the applicant sought PSC 

approval. 257 Mich App 1, 16; 666 NW2d 298 (2003). Both 

sides sought leave to appeal. Wolverine and the PSC 

asserted that no local approval is required, and the city 

argued that approval is required during the application 

stage. This Court granted leave to appeal on both 

applications. 469 Mich 898 (2003). 

II 

We review de novo a question of statutory 

construction. In construing a statute, we are required to 

give effect to the Legislature’s intent. That intent is 

clear if the statutory language is unambiguous, and the 

statute must then be enforced as written. Weakland v 

Toledo Engineering Co, 467 Mich 344, 347; 656 NW2d 175 

(2003). We use the same rules of construction both for 

3
 
statutes and for administrative regulations. Soap & 

Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728, 

756-757; 330 NW2d 346 (1982). 

III 

The statute that controls this case is MCL 247.183, 

which reads: 

(1) Telegraph, telephone, power, and other

public utility companies, cable television 

companies, and municipalities may enter upon,

construct, and maintain telegraph, telephone, or

power lines, pipe lines, wires, cables, poles,

conduits, sewers or similar structures upon,

over, across, or under any public road, bridge,

street, or public place, including, subject to

subsection (2), longitudinally within limited 

access highway rights of way, and across or under

any of the waters in this state, with all 

necessary erections and fixtures for that 

purpose. A telegraph, telephone, power, and other

public utility company, cable television company,

and municipality, before any of this work is

commenced, shall first obtain the consent of the

governing body of the city, village, or township

through or along which these lines and poles are

to be constructed and maintained. 

(2) A utility as defined in 23 C.F.R. 

645.105(m) may enter upon, construct, and 

maintain utility lines and structures 

longitudinally within limited access highway

rights of way in accordance with standards 

approved by the state transportation commission

that conform to governing federal laws and 

regulations. The standards shall require that the

lines and structures be underground and be placed

in a manner that will not increase highway

maintenance costs for the state transportation

department. The standards may provide for the

imposition of a reasonable charge for 

longitudinal use of limited access highway rights

of way. The imposition of a reasonable charge is 

4
 
 

a governmental function, offsetting a portion of

the capital and maintenance expense of the 

limited access highway, and is not a proprietary

function. The charge shall be calculated to 

reflect a 1-time installation permit fee that

shall not exceed $1,000.00 per mile of 

longitudinal use of limited access highway rights

of way with a minimum fee of $5,000.00 per 

permit. All revenue received under this 

subsection shall be used for capital and 

maintenance expenses incurred for limited access

highways. 

Wolverine does not here dispute that it is both a 

“public utility,” as that phrase is used in subsection 1 of 

the statute, as well as a subsection 2 “utility as defined 

in 23 C.F.R 645.105[.]”2 Definitionally, both subsections 

are applicable to Wolverine unless something in the statute 

excludes Wolverine from the reach of one subsection or the 

other. Wolverine argues that such exclusionary language is 

found in subsection 1, which, paraphrased, states that any 

covered utility, including those subject to subsection 2, 

2

 This includes 

a privately, publicly, or cooperatively owned 

line, facility or system for producing,

transmitting, or distributing communications,

cable television, power, electricity, light,

heat, gas, oil, crude products, water, steam,

waste, storm water not connected with highway

drainage, or any other similar commodity,

including any fire or police signal system, which

directly or indirectly serves the public. The 

term utility shall also mean the utility company

inclusive of any wholly owned or controlled 

subsidiary. [23 CFR 645.105.] 

5
 
 

may use a public road longitudinally within the limited 

access highway right-of-way if it has local permission 

before work commences. The company’s construction of this 

passage is that the quoted phrase serves to remove 

subsection 2 utilities from subsection 1 rules and thus 

such utilities must only comply with the requirements of 

subsection 2. In support of this, Wolverine primarily 

contends that this reading is the only proper construction 

because otherwise the language “subject to subsection (2)” 

would be left without meaning. Because such constructions 

are to be avoided, and because Wolverine believes its 

reading gives the phrase meaning, it urges us to adopt that 

reading.3 We decline to do so, as did the Court of Appeals 

before us, because we think the reading urged by the city 

also gives meaning to and more accurately reflects the 

statute. 

3

 Wolverine also suggests several ways in which the

statute could have been worded to clearly indicate an

intent to impose both subsections on longitudinal projects.

Wolverine posits that because the statute is not worded in

one of the ways it suggests, it follows that the 

Legislature intended to impose only the requirements of

subsection 2 on longitudinal projects. This argument is

unconvincing because, while the Legislature doubtlessly 

could have made its intentions clearer in this statute, the

fact that it has not done so by adopting any of Wolverine’s

suggested approaches does not relieve this Court of giving

meaning to what actually was written. 

6
 
 

We note that Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 

(2001 ed), defines “subject” when used as an adjective in 

six ways. The most applicable is the fourth definition, 

“dependent upon something (usu. fol. by to): His consent is 

subject to your approval.” This definition, in essence, 

gives to the word “subject” the meaning, “dependent upon.” 

When used as it is here and in other places in the 

Legislature’s work, it is clear that the subsections work 

together,4

 see, e.g., MCL 15.443, 18.1237, and 168.677. 

That is, both subsections are applicable because the 

relevant words in subsection 1, the “subject to” words, do 

not mean that the requirements of subsection 1 do not apply 

to those utilities that are covered also by subsection 2. 

Further, because the Legislature expressly (and uniquely) 

used the word “including” before the “subject to” phrase, 

the implication is even stronger that the two subsections 

4

 Moreover, even if one were inclined to utilize one of

the other five definitions in the dictionary (“under the

domination, control, or influence of something [often fol.

by to]”; “being under the dominion, rule, or authority of

a sovereign, state, etc. [often fol. by to]”; “open or

exposed [usu. fol. by to]: subject to ridicule”; “being

under the necessity of undergoing something [usu. fol. by

to]: All beings are subject to death”; or “liable, prone

[usu. fol. by to]: subject to headaches”), these also lead

to the same conclusion that “dependent upon” yields: that

interaction, rather than disconnection, of the subsections

is called for. 

7
 
are to be read in combination. Thus, subsection 1 means 

the project cannot go forward without local approval and, 

not at all incompatibly, subsection 2 means it cannot go 

forward unless it meets certain construction standards. 

We are aware, and, indeed, Wolverine forcefully 

argues, that this reading of the statute may facilitate 

frivolous and potentially crippling resistance from local 

governments along the route of a utility project. Such an 

argument, however, misunderstands the role of the courts. 

Our task, under the Constitution, is the important, but yet 

limited, duty to read into and interpret what the 

Legislature has actually made the law. We have observed 

many times in the past that our Legislature is free to make 

policy choices that, especially in controversial matters, 

some observers will inevitably think unwise. This dispute 

over the wisdom of a law, however, cannot give warrant to a 

court to overrule the people’s Legislature. See Oakland Co 

Rd Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Cas Guaranty Ass’n, 456 

Mich 590, 612-613; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). We therefore 

affirm the Court of Appeals decision that subsection 1 as 

well as subsection 2 control and Wolverine is required by 

MCL 247.183 to get local consent before constructing its 

pipeline longitudinally in the right-of-way of I-96. 

8
 
 

 

IV 

Because we find that Wolverine is required to obtain 

local consent for its project, we must also address the 

question of when that consent must be obtained. The Court 

of Appeals found that local consent only has to be secured 

before work is commenced. Thus, at the time the permit 

from the PSC was sought, proof of local consent did not 

need to accompany the application. We agree with this 

holding. 

We begin our analysis with the statute that 

unambiguously requires local consent “before any of this 

work is commenced . . . .” MCL 247.183. We note also that 

the PSC’s applicable rule, 1999 AC, R 460.17601(2)(d), 

indicates that applications for new construction of utility 

facilities “shall set forth, or by attached exhibits show, 

. . . [t]he municipality from which the appropriate 

franchise or consent has been obtained, if required, 

together with a true copy of the franchise or consent.”5 

5

 1999 AC, R 460.17601 reads in its entirety: 

(1) An entity listed in this subrule shall

file an application with the commission for the

necessary authority to do the following: 

(a) A gas or electric utility within the

meaning of the provisions of Act No. 69 of the

Public Acts of 1929, as amended, being §460.501

(continued...) 

9
 
 

(...continued)

et seq. of the Michigan Compiled Laws, that wants

to construct a plant, equipment, property, or

facility for furnishing public utility service

for which a certificate of public convenience and

necessity is required by statute. 

(b) A natural gas pipeline company within

the meaning of the provisions of Act No. 9 of the

Public Acts of 1929, as amended, being §483.101

et seq. of the Michigan Compiled Laws, that wants

to construct a plant, equipment, property, or

facility for furnishing public utility service

for which a certificate of public convenience and

necessity is required by statute. 

(c) A corporation, association, or person

conducting oil pipeline operations within the 

meaning of the provisions of Act No. 16 of the

Public Acts of 1929, being §483.1 et seq. of the

Michigan Compiled Laws, that wants to construct

facilities to transport crude oil or petroleum or

any crude oil or petroleum products as a common

carrier for which approval is required by

statute. 

(2) The application required in subrule (1)

of this rule shall set forth, or by attached

exhibits show, all of the following information: 

(a) The name and address of the applicant. 

(b) The city, village, or township affected. 

(c) The nature of the utility service to be

furnished. 

(d) The municipality from which the 

appropriate franchise or consent has been 

obtained, if required, together with a true copy

of the franchise or consent. 

(e) A full description of the proposed new

construction or extension, including the manner

in which it will be constructed. 

(continued...) 

10
 
 

The PSC rule only requires utilities to provide proof 

of local consent if such is required to be obtained at the 

time the application is made, and the statute here does not 

require it. Thus, we agree with the PSC and the Court of 

Appeals that proof of local consent need not be filed with 

the application for this project. Although local consent 

was not filed with the application, the statute and the 

rules have been complied with and the PSC proceeded well 

within its authority. 

V 

Concerning the dissent, we offer the following 

observations: 

(1) The justices in this majority do not necessarily 

disagree with the dissent that MCL 247.183, as we construe 

it here, may be “cumbersome.” Post at 17. Nor, by this 

opinion, does any justice in this majority suggest that, 

had they been in the Legislature, they would have cast a 

(...continued)

(f) The names of all utilities rendering the

same type of service with which the proposed new

construction or extension is likely to compete. 

(3) A utility that is classified as a 

respondent pursuant to the provisions of R 

460.17101 may participate as a party to the 

application proceeding without filing a petition

to intervene. It may file an answer or other

response to the application. 

11
 
vote in support of MCL 247.183 as it is interpreted here. 

Nor are the justices in this majority oblivious to the 

practical difficulties that our interpretation of the law 

may impose upon utilities such as Wolverine Pipe Line 

Company. Rather, what we decide today is merely that the 

language of MCL 247.183 compels a particular result, and 

the justices of this majority do not believe themselves 

empowered to reach a different result by substituting their 

own policy preferences for those of the Legislature. 

(2) Rather than interpreting the language of MCL 

247.183, the dissent prefers to divine what it 

characterizes as the Legislature’s “true intent.” Post at 

1. This “true intent” is not one to be gleaned from the 

words actually enacted into law by the Legislature, but 

through reliance on various random facts and circumstances 

that the dissent selectively picks out from the universe of 

potentially available facts and circumstances. In 

contrast, rather than engaging in legislative mind-reading 

to discern the “true intent” of the law, we believe that 

the best measure of the Legislature’s intent is simply the 

words that it has chosen to enact into law. Among other 

salutary consequences, this approach to reading the law 

allows a court to assess not merely the intentions of one 

12
 
 

 

or two highlighted members of the Legislature, but the 

intentions of the entire Legislature. 

(3) The dissent avoids the difficult task of having to 

read the actual language of the law and determine its best 

interpretation by peremptorily concluding that MCL 247.183 

is “ambiguous.” Post at 2. A finding of ambiguity, of 

course, enables an appellate judge to bypass traditional 

approaches to interpretation and either substitute 

presumptive “rule[s] of policy,” see Klapp v United 

Insurance, 468 Mich 459, 474; 663 NW2d 447 (2003), quoting 

5 Corbin, Contracts (rev ed, 1998), § 24.27, p 306, or else 

to engage in a largely subjective and perambulatory reading 

of “legislative history.” However, as Klapp, relying on 

the treatises of both Corbin and Williston, concluded, a 

finding of ambiguity is to be reached only after “all other 

conventional means of [ ] interpretation” have been applied 

and found wanting.6 Klapp, supra at 474. Where the 

majority applies these conventional rules and concludes 

that the language of MCL 247.183 can be reasonably 

understood, the dissent, without demonstrating the flaws of 

6

 While Klapp concerned contract interpretation and the

instant case statutory interpretation, the rule stated in

Klapp, supra at 474—that ambiguity is a finding of last

resort—applies with equal force whether the court is 

interpreting a statutory text or a contractual one. 

13
 
the majority’s analysis except to assert that its opinion 

is not in accord with the “true intent” of the Legislature, 

opines that an “ambiguity” exists. An analysis, such as 

that of the dissent, that is in conflict with the actual 

language of the law and predicated on some supposed “true 

intent” is necessarily a result-oriented analysis. In 

other words, it is not a legal analysis at all. 

(4) In peremptorily reaching its conclusion that MCL 

247.183 is “ambiguous,” the dissent entirely misstates the 

standard for discerning ambiguity. The dissent would 

hasten findings of “ambiguity” by courts by predicating 

these findings on the basis of whether “reasonable minds 

can differ regarding” the meaning of a statute. Post at 3. 

Especially in the context of the types of cases and 

controversies considered by this Court—those in which the 

parties have been the most determined and persistent, the 

most persuaded by the merits of their own respective 

arguments—it is extraordinarily difficult to conclude that 

reasonable minds cannot differ on the correct outcome. 

That is not, and has never been, the standard either for 

resolving cases or for ascertaining the existence of an 

ambiguity in the law. The law is not ambiguous whenever a 

dissenting (and presumably reasonable) justice would 

interpret such law in a manner contrary to a majority. 

14
 
 

Where a majority finds the law to mean one thing and a 

dissenter finds it to mean another, neither may have 

concluded that the law is “ambiguous,” and their 

disagreement by itself does not transform that which is 

unambiguous into that which is ambiguous. Rather, a 

provision of the law is ambiguous only if it 

“irreconcilably conflict[s]” with another provision, id. at 

467, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a 

single meaning. In lieu of the traditional approach to 

discerning “ambiguity”—one in which only a few provisions 

are truly ambiguous and in which a diligent application of 

the rules of interpretation will normally yield a “better,” 

albeit perhaps imperfect, interpretation of the law—the 

dissent would create a judicial regime in which courts 

would be quick to declare ambiguity and quick therefore to 

resolve cases and controversies on the basis of something 

other than the words of the law.7 Moreover, the dissent 

implies that the decision of the United States Supreme 

Court in Yellow Transportation, Inc, v Michigan, 537 US 36; 

7

 The dissent also confusingly conflates 

unambiguousness and clarity. Post at 5. Instead, a great

many unambiguous provisions of the law are far from clear.

The interpretative process is often quite difficult,

struggling to remove a great deal of textual underbrush. A 

provision of law that is unambiguous may well be one that

merely has a better meaning, as opposed to a clear meaning. 

15
 
123 S Ct 371; 154 L Ed 2d 377 (2002), should be read to 

compel the adoption of his view of how we determine if a 

statute is ambiguous. We believe this is a misreading of 

Yellow Transportation. The United States Supreme Court 

established no rule in Yellow Transportation for 

determining or resolving statutory ambiguity. Moreover, 

even if the Court had fixed upon a method it chooses to use 

to determine if a statute is ambiguous, it could not be 

understood to have superceded the rules that state courts 

may use in a like undertaking. The United States courts, 

of whatever sort, when they rule, are of course always 

respectfully reviewed by state court judges but such 

holdings are only binding in a narrow range of cases such 

as, classically, in the construction and meaning of the 

United States Constitution. Statutory construction 

techniques are not of this genre. With that distraction 

clarified, Yellow Transportation should be understood as a 

narrow holding that stands for the simple proposition that 

if a federal administrative agency has given a defensible 

construction to a federal statute that it applied, that all 

state courts must follow that construction even if 

alternative constructions are also reasonable. We deal 

with no such situation in this case, and thus Yellow 

16
 
Transportation is inapposite in all particulars to this 

matter. 

(5) The dissent wrongly asserts that “the majority 

fails to construe subsection 1 in light of subsection 2 

. . . .” Post at 6-7. Rather, we assert that “subsection 

1 means the project cannot go forward without local 

approval and, not at all incompatibly, subsection 2 means 

it cannot go forward unless it meets certain construction 

standards,” p 8, and further assert that the “including, 

subject to subsection (2)” language in subsection 1 makes 

“the implication . . . even stronger that the two 

subsections are to be read in combination.” Pp 7-8. It is 

the dissent that misapprehends the relationship between 

subsections 1 and 2 by attempting to read these provisions 

in isolation and concluding that when read in this manner 

they compel different results and thus are “ambiguous.” 

However, the subsections of MCL 247.183, as with all other 

provisions of law, are not to be read discretely, but as 

part of a whole. The dissent errs in first reading these 

subsections “alone” and then asserting that it is reading 

these subsections “together” when it merely combines its 

“alone” interpretations. Post at 6. Rather, to read the 

law as a whole, it must, in fact, be read as a whole. The 

interpretative process does not, as the dissent does, 

17
 
remove words and provisions from their context, infuse 

these words and provisions with meanings that are 

independent of such context, and then reimport these 

context-free meanings back into the law. The law is not 

properly read as a whole when its words and provisions are 

isolated and given meanings that are independent of the 

rest of its provisions. This is especially true when, as 

here, one of these provisions expressly cross-references 

the other. 

(6) Therefore, even if the existence of a reasonable 

disagreement were the standard for identifying ambiguity— 

which it is not—the dissent’s interpretation of MCL 247.183 

is simply not a reasonable one when subsections 1 and 2 are 

read together, as opposed to being read discretely. It 

cannot correctly be said that these subsections “apply to 

different entities,” post at 7, when subsection 1 expressly 

observes that its provisions are made “subject to 

subsection (2).” Contrary to the mandate of this Court, 

the dissent fails to “give effect to every word, phrase, 

and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that 

would render any part of the statute surplusage,” State 

Farm & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 

NW2d 715 (2002), by essentially ignoring the term 

18
 
“including subject to subsection (2)” in its 

interpretation. 

(7) The dissent further asserts that MCL 267.183 is 

ambiguous because “application of the statute to the facts 

has rendered the correct application of the statute 

uncertain.” Post at 4. It is hard to know what this 

means. While any interpretation of the law is in some 

sense “fact specific,” the dissent fails to identify why 

the interpretation of this statute, any more than any other 

statute, is rendered ambiguous by the instant facts. This 

majority’s view of the law is that, whenever a public 

utility constructs a pipeline or other utility project 

longitudinally within limited access highway rights-of-way, 

MCL 247.183 requires that the utility must both obtain the 

consent of the local governing body (subsection 1) and 

construct the pipeline in accordance with state and federal 

standards (subsection 2). Is it the dissent’s view that 

its interpretation pertains in some instances but not in 

others? If not, what is the relevance of the dissent’s 

observation that its interpretation is “fact specific”? 

(8) Moreover, even if MCL 247.183 were truly 

ambiguous, the dissent’s analysis of what it views as the 

relevant legislative history is altogether unpersuasive. 

In In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes v Continental 

19
 
 

 

Biomass Ind, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 

(2003), this Court emphasized that not all legislative 

history is of equal value, which “results in varying 

degrees of quality and utility of legislative history.” 

There, we stated that examples of “the highest quality of 

legislative history that relates to an action of the 

Legislature from which a court may draw reasonable 

inferences about the Legislature’s intent with respect to 

an ambiguous statutory provision” are “actions of the 

Legislature intended to repudiate the judicial construction 

of a statute” or “actions of the Legislature in considering 

various alternatives in language in statutory provisions 

before settling on the language actually enacted.” Id. It 

is noteworthy that the dissent fails to rely on legislative 

history of either type. Instead, the dissent largely 

relies on the least persuasive form of legislative history— 

staff analyses—which we have found are of “considerably 

diminished quality,” and thus “are entitled to little 

judicial consideration in resolving ambiguous statutory 

provisions . . . .” Id.8 

8

 “The problem with relying on bill analyses is that

they do not necessarily represent the views of even a

single legislator. Rather, they are prepared by House and

Senate staff. Indeed, the analyses themselves note that

they do not constitute an official statement of legislative

(continued...) 

20
 
 

 

(9) Even examining this legislative history on the 

dissent's own terms, we are perplexed about how it supports 

the dissent’s position. For example, the dissent cites the 

fact that “SB 1008 was passed without a single ‘nay’ vote 

in either the House or Senate . . . .” Post at 15. How 

does this fact, this bit of legislative history, support 

the dissent’s understanding of the law, i.e., that the 

Legislature did not intend that utilities must obtain local 

consent before constructing utility projects in 

longitudinal highway rights-of-way? How does this 

demonstrate anything more than that the Legislature 

unanimously approved the statute being considered today?9 

Similarly, we believe that the dissent misapprehends 

the “changes” in which “the Department of Transportation 

(...continued)

intent.” Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463

Mich 578, 588 n 7; 624 NW2d 180 (2001). 

9 Our confusion over the dissent’s analysis of 

legislative history is heightened by its assertion that

“the 1994 statutory amendment transformed Michigan from a

state that generally did not allow entities to use limited

access highway rights-of-way to a state that generally does

allow the use of limited access highway rights-of-way, even

though that use is subject to the requirements contained in

subsection 2.” Post at 9. This seems to us not only

incorrect, but also contrary to the dissent’s own prior

analysis, post at 8, in which it notes that pre-1994

subsection 2 did allow use of rights-of-way by federally

defined utilities. 

21
 
and the major state utilities concurred” when SB 1008 was 

passed. Post at 16. The dissent suggests that the 

“changes” concerned the overall effect the bill would have 

on utility projects constructed in limited access highway 

rights-of-way. However, when read in context, it appears 

that the “changes” concerned only the “minor amendments” 

made by the House of Representatives to SB 1008 concerning 

the fee structure for such projects. Id. 

In fact, when we look at the most valuable type of 

legislative history available to us, that is, the actual 

change in statutory language made by the Legislature in 

1994, we find support for our view, rather than the 

dissent’s. Regardless of the vote count, the change that 

was enacted turned “except longitudinally within limited 

access highway rights-of-way” to “including, subject to 

subsection (2), longitudinally within limited access 

highway rights-of-way.” We find this legislative action to 

be a strong indication that the “true intent” of the 

drafters was to include such projects in both subsections, 

rather than exclude them from subsection 1. 

Finally, while we agree with the dissent that the 1994 

amendments were intended to “eliminate the ability of the 

state to deny access to these locations for construction of 

utility services,” the dissent relies on this statement to 

22
 
 

 

support its proposition that “[i]f the [1994] amendment 

were meant to remove the state’s power to deny access to 

these locations, it certainly could not have meant to grant 

this power to local entities . . . .” Post at 16-17. 

Perhaps, the dissent's assertion is correct, but it is 

hardly self-evident. There is nothing that logically 

impels the conclusion that authority is to be denied the 

locality if it is to be denied the state. While the 

dissent, and perhaps some justices in this majority, might 

question the wisdom of a policy that treats the state and 

localities differently in terms of the approval required 

for utility pipeline construction, it is hardly 

inconceivable that a Legislature committed to local control 

or to the principle of subsidiarity might adopt exactly 

such a policy.10 

10 Although not directly applicable to this case 

because I-96 is a federal highway and, thus, not a highway

“of” the city, perhaps the Legislature intended to require

local approval because such approval had been a 

longstanding part of Const 1963, art 7, § 29, which 

provides in relevant part: 

No person, partnership, association or corporation,

public or private, operating as a public utility shall have

the right to the use of the highways, streets, alleys or

other public places of any county, township, city or 

village for wires, poles, pipes, tracks, conduits or other

public utility facilities, without the consent of the duly

constituted authority of the county, township, city or

village . . . . 

23
 
(10) The dissent states that “[w]hile the statute does 

not clearly indicate whether the Legislature intended to 

require federally defined utilities to obtain local 

consent, it appears that this lack of clarity is the result 

of a clerical error and the intent was not to reverse the 

1989 elimination of local control.” Post at 14 (emphasis 

added). What precisely is this supposed “clerical error”? 

What is the dissent’s basis for assuming such a “clerical 

error” occurred? What is the evidence in support of the 

existence of such a “clerical error”? Is the dissent 

justifying its conclusion that MCL 267.183 is “ambiguous” 

on the basis of a “clerical error”? Or is the dissent, 

instead, asserting that the legislative history of MCL 

267.183 not only can be considered, but that this history 

can supersede its very language? 

(11) In the end, the essence of the dissent’s analysis 

is its (perhaps understandable) frustrated assertion that 

“I cannot believe that the Legislature intended to subject 

federally defined public utilities to local consent 

requirements.” Post at 17. This constitutes less a legal 

conclusion than a statement of discontent with the fact 

that the Legislature either had a different perspective on 

pipeline approval than the dissent or it failed effectively 

to communicate what the dissent alone knows to be its “true 

24
 
intent.” In either case, there is no warrant for this 

Court replacing the words of the Legislature with those of 

its own. 

VI 

We conclude that the plain language of MCL 247.183 

requires Wolverine to obtain local consent before beginning 

construction of its project. However, local consent is not 

required at the time of application to the PSC. We 

therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in 

all respects. 

Clifford W. Taylor

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

25
 
_______________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LANSING,

CITY OF LANSING, and INGHAM

COUNTY COMMISSIONER LISA DEDDEN, 

Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 

No. 124136 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE 

COMMISSION and WOLVERINE PIPE 

LINE COMPANY, 

Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 

WEAVER, J. (concurring). 

I concur with the majority in all but part V of its 

opinion. 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 
_______________________________ 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LANSING,

CITY OF LANSING, and INGHAM

COUNTY COMMISSIONER LISA DEDDEN, 

Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 

v No. 124136 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE 

COMMISSION and WOLVERINE PIPE 

LINE COMPANY, 

Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 

CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 

Today, the majority finds no ambiguity in the 

statutory provision at issue and, in so doing, ignores the 

true intent of the Legislature. Because I believe the true 

intent of the Legislature must be given effect, I 

respectfully dissent. The majority, apparently frustrated 

with my refusal to follow its lead and use a dictionary 

while turning a blind eye to reality, has issued a lengthy 

response to this dissent. While the majority asserts that 

I substitute my own policy preferences for those of the 

Legislature, I think it is necessary to note the following 

in regard to the majority’s approach: “A method of 
statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, 

and hence unconstrained, increases the risk that the 

judge’s own policy preferences will affect the decisional 

process.” Bedroc Limited, LLC v United States, 541 US ___, 

___; 124 S Ct 1587, 1598; 158 L Ed 2d 338 (2004) (Stevens, 

J., dissenting). 

This case requires us to examine MCL 247.183 to 

determine whether defendant Wolverine Pipe Line Company 

(Wolverine) must obtain permission from plaintiff city of 

Lansing to construct a gas pipeline longitudinally in the 

right-of-way of an interstate highway within the city 

limits. The majority finds no ambiguity in the statute 

and, thus, holds that Wolverine must obtain local consent 

before constructing the pipeline. I, on the other hand, 

believe that the statute is ambiguous and turn to the 

legislative history accompanying the statute to discern the 

Legislature’s true intent. A review of the legislative 

history indicates that the Legislature’s intent was to 

create a streamlined permit system that would not require 

consent from each municipality a pipeline crosses. On the 

bases of the history of the statute itself and of the 

legislative history recorded when the statute was enacted, 

I would hold that Wolverine is not obligated to obtain 

local consent. 

2
 
I agree with the majority that this case involves 

principles of statutory construction and that in construing 

a statute, we are required to give effect to the 

Legislature’s intent. I also agree that legislative intent 

must be gleaned from the statutory text if the language is 

unambiguous. However, when a statute is ambiguous, 

judicial construction is necessary to determine its 

meaning. In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 

(1999). 

A statute is ambiguous when reasonable minds can 

differ regarding its meaning. Id. My dissent in Yellow 

Freight System, Inc v Michigan, 464 Mich 21, 38; 627 NW2d 

236 (2001) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting), rev'd 537 US 36; 123 

S Ct 37; 151 L Ed 2d 377 (2002), vacated and remanded 468 

Mich 862; 659 NW2d 229 (2003), on remand 257 Mich App 602; 

669 NW2d 553 (2003), outlined the generally accepted method 

for making an ambiguity determination. 

[W]hen there can be reasonable disagreement over

a statute’s meaning, see People v Adair, 452 Mich

473, 479; 550 NW2d 505 (1996), or, as others have

put it, when a statute is capable of being

understood by reasonably well-informed persons in

two or more different senses, that statute is

ambiguous. See 2A Singer, Statutes & Statutory

Construction (6th ed), § 45.02, pp 11-12. 

While the majority in Yellow Freight expressly 

disagreed with my determination that the statute was 

3
 
 

ambiguous,1 the United States Supreme Court reversed the 

decision of the majority and held that the statute was 

ambiguous. Yellow Transportation, Inc v Michigan, 537 US 

36, 46; 123 S Ct 371; 154 L Ed 2d 377 (2002). 

My dissent in Yellow Freight collected cases where 

this Court has found statutes ambiguous. 

[T]his Court has concluded that statutes have

been ambiguous when one word in the statute has

an unclear meaning, see Perez v Keeler Brass Co,

461 Mich 602, 610; 608 NW2d 45 (2000), when a

statute’s interaction with another statute has 

rendered its meaning unclear, see People v Denio,

454 Mich 691, 699; 564 NW2d 13 (1997), or when

application of the statute to facts has rendered

the correct application of the statute uncertain,

see Elias Bros v Treasury Dep’t, 452 Mich 144,

150; 549 NW2d 837 (1996). [464 Mich 38.] 

In this case, application of the statute to the facts 

has rendered the correct application of the statute 

uncertain. 

1

 In fact, the majority made the same argument in

Yellow Freight that they assert here: 

The dissent contends that the statute is 

ambiguous, asserting that this is demonstrated by

“the several interpretations of its wording

advanced by the parties.” If the parties’

conflicting interpretations were the measure of a

statute’s ambiguity, then almost every statute

litigated would be deemed ambiguous. A statute 

is not ambiguous because it requires careful 

attention and analysis. [Yellow Freight, supra at 

30 n 12.] 

4
 
MCL 247.183, in pertinent part, reads: 

(1) . . . public utility companies . . . may

enter upon, construct, and maintain . . . pipe

lines . . . upon, over, across, or under any

public road, bridge, street or public place, 

including, subject to subsection (2),

longitudinally within limited access highway

rights of way, and across or under any of the

waters of this state, with all necessary

erections and fixtures for that purpose. A . . . 

public utility company . . . , before any of this

work is commenced, shall first obtain the consent

of the governing body of the city . . . through

or along which these lines and poles are to be

constructed and maintained. 

(2) A utility as defined in 23 C.F.R. 645.105[]

may enter upon, construct, and maintain utility

lines and structures longitudinally within 

limited access highway rights of way in 

accordance with standards approved by the state

transportation commission that conform to 

governing federal laws and regulations. . . . 

The majority’s statutory analysis begins and ends with 

the dictionary definition of “subject to.” The majority 

concludes that “subject to” does “not mean that the 

requirements of subsection 1 do not apply to those 

utilities that are covered also by subsection 2.” Ante at 

8. While the majority uses a double negative to hedge, I 

think the more direct statement to be gleaned from the 

inclusion of “subject to” in subsection 1 and its 

conspicuous absence from subsection 2 is that subsection 2 

utilities may not be “subject to” the requirements of 

subsection 1. Because subsection 2 utilities are a 

5
 
specific group of federally defined utilities that are 

subject to regulations beyond those imposed on the broad 

general utilities in subsection 1, I think it is fair to 

say that the Legislature may have intended to create a 

regulatory scheme specific to the more-regulated entities. 

Thus, it is unclear whether the requirement in 

subsection 1, that public utility companies must obtain 

local consent, applies to a utility, as defined in 

subsection 2. When reading subsection 1 alone it appears 

that all public utilities must obtain local consent before 

constructing pipelines in any public place. When reading 

subsection 2 alone, however, it appears that federally 

defined utilities may construct pipelines longitudinally 

within limited access highway rights-of-way as long as they 

comply with the applicable state standards. When the two 

sections are read together, it is unclear whether 

subsection 2 utilities must comply with the local consent 

requirement in subsection 1. 

“It is a well-established rule of statutory 

construction that provisions of a statute must be construed 

in light of the other provisions of the statute to carry 

out the apparent purpose of the Legislature.” Farrington v 

Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 209; 501 NW2d 76 

(1993). Here, the majority fails to construe subsection 1 

6
 
in light of subsection 2 and, thus, concludes that the 

statute is not ambiguous. 

I cannot agree that the meaning of MCL 247.183 is 

clear and unambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if there can 

be reasonable disagreement over the statute’s meaning. In 

re MCI, supra at 411. The meaning of this statute is 

subject to reasonable disagreement. There is a reasonable 

argument that subsection 2 imposes requirements, in 

addition to those imposed by subsection 1, on utilities 

that meet the definition of utility in 23 CFR 645.105, and 

that are looking to construct lines longitudinally within 

limited access highway rights-of-way. Under this reading 

of the statute, subsection 2 utilities would be required to 

obtain local consent. 

However, there is also a reasonable argument that 

subsections 1 and 2 apply to different entities and that 

subsection 2 entities are excepted from the requirements of 

subsection 1. Because there are at least two reasonable 

interpretations of MCL 247.183, the statute is ambiguous. 

When a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction is 

appropriate. In re MCI, supra at 411. As previously 

stated, it is a maxim of statutory construction that 

“provisions of a statute must be construed in light of the 

other provisions of the statute . . . .” Farrington, supra 

7
 
 

at 209. In construing subsection 1 in light of subsection 

2, I find that the Legislature intended to create a special 

process for federally defined utilities that wish to 

construct pipelines longitudinally within limited access 

highway rights-of-way. 

The statutory and legislative history further supports 

the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend for 

federally defined utilities, such as Wolverine, to have to 

obtain local consent before constructing pipelines 

longitudinally in limited access highway rights-of-way. 

When the statute governing construction and maintenance of 

pipelines was originally enacted in 1925, it did not 

address longitudinal rights-of-way.2 Until 1988, 

longitudinal use of interstate highway rights-of-way 

required a permit from the Federal Highway Administration. 

2

 Section 13 of 1925 PA 368 provided, in pertinent

part: 

Telegraph, telephone, power and other public utility

companies and municipalities are authorized to enter upon,

construct, and maintain . . . pipe lines . . . upon, over,

across, or under any public road, bridge, street or public

places and across or under any of the waters in this state,

with all the necessary erections and fixtures therefor:

Provided that every such . . . public utility company . . .

before any of the work of such construction and erection

shall be commenced, shall first obtain the consent of the

duly constituted authorities of the city, village, or 

township through or along which said lines and poles are to

be constructed and erected. 

8
 
 

In 1988, the federal regulations were amended to allow use 

of longitudinal rights-of-way in accordance with federal 

regulations if such use was permitted by the state. See 23 

CFR 645.105. 

The Michigan statute was amended in 1989 to reflect 

this change. 1989 PA 215. The phrase “except 

longitudinally within limited access rights of way” was 

added to subsection 1, and the Legislature also added 

subsection 2 to the statute.3 Essentially, MCL 247.183(1) 

provided that certain entities were authorized to construct 

pipelines upon, over, across, or under any public place, 

3

 When subsection 2 was added in 1989, it read: 

The state transportation department may permit a

utility as defined in 23 CFR 645.105(m) to enter

upon, construct, and maintain utility lines and

structures longitudinally within limited access

highway rights of way in accordance with 

standards approved by the state transportation

commission. Such lines and structures shall be 

underground or otherwise constructed so as not to

be visible. The standards shall conform to 

governing federal laws and regulations and may

provide for the imposition of a reasonable charge

for longitudinal use of limited access highway

rights of way. The imposition of a reasonable

charge constitutes a governmental function,

offsetting a portion of the capital and 

maintenance expense of the limited access 

highway, and is not a proprietary function. All 

revenue received under this subsection shall be 

used for capital and maintenance expenses

incurred for limited access highways. 

9
 
except within limited access highway rights-of-way. In 

other words, according to subsection 1, Michigan generally 

did not allow longitudinal use of limited access highway 

rights-of-way. While general use was prohibited by 

subsection 1, subsection 2 allowed federally defined 

utilities to obtain a permit to use the rights-of-way. 

In 1994, the statute was amended again. 1994 PA 306. 

The focus of the 1994 amendments was ensuring that it was 

feasible for utilities to construct in limited access 

highway rights-of-way. To this end, the fees that could be 

charged for longitudinal use of limited access highway 

rights-of-way were adjusted and the nature of the permit 

system was altered by changing the phraseology of 

subsection 1. In pertinent part, Senate Bill 1008 looked 

like this: 

Sec. 13. (1) Telegraph, telephone, power, and

other public utility companies, and cable 

television companies, and municipalities are 

authorized to MAY enter upon, construct and

maintain telegraph, telephone, or power lines,

pipe lines, wires, cables, poles, conduits, 

sewers and like OR SIMILAR structures upon,

over, across, or under any public road, bridge,

street, or public place, except INCLUDING,

SUBJECT TO SUBSECTION (2), longitudinally within

limited access highway rights of way . . . . 

Notably, the word “except” was replaced with the 

phrase “including, subject to subsection (2).” In other 

words, the 1994 statutory amendment changed Michigan from a 

10
 
state that generally did not allow entities to use limited 

access highway rights-of-way, at least not without a 

permit, to a state that generally does allow use of limited 

access highway rights-of-way, even though that use is 

subject to the requirements contained in subsection 2. 

Before the 1994 amendments, subsection 1 permitted 

pipeline construction in public areas, but prohibited 

construction within limited access highway rights-of-way. 

Subsection 1 also required local consent. Subsection 2, on 

the other hand, allowed the state Department of 

Transportation to issue permits to federally defined 

utilities to construct pipelines within limited access 

highway rights-of-way. After the 1994 amendments, 

subsection 1 still permits construction in public areas, 

but it also provides that entities may construct pipelines 

longitudinally within limited access highway rights-of-way. 

The second sentence of subsection 1 still requires 

utilities to obtain local consent. Subsection 2 now states 

that a utility may construct within limited access highway 

rights-of-way if the utility pays a fee and conforms to 

state standards that comport with the federal standards; it 

no longer requires a state permit from the Department of 

Transportation. 

11
 
While the history of the statute and the amendments 

themselves provide some insight into the Legislature’s 

intent, the legislative analyses and the documents 

contained in the House and Senate committee files provide 

even more insight. I recognize that this Court has held 

that “a legislative analysis is a feeble indicator of 

legislative intent and is therefore a generally 

unpersuasive tool of statutory construction.” Frank W 

Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 587; 624 

NW2d 180 (2001). However, this Court more recently 

recognized 

the benefit of using legislative history when a

statute is ambiguous and construction of an 

ambiguous provision becomes necessary. Stajos v

City of Lansing, 221 Mich App 223; 561 NW2d 116

(1997); People v Hall, 391 Mich 175; 215 NW2d 166

(1974); Liquor Control Comm v Fraternal Order of 

Eagles, Aerie No 629, 286 Mich 32; 281 NW 427

(1938). . . . Examples of legitimate legislative

history include . . . actions of the Legislature

in considering various alternatives in language

in statutory provisions before settling on the

language actually enacted. See, e.g., Miles ex 

rel Kamferbeek v Fortney, 223 Mich 552, 558; 194

NW 605 (1923). . . . By comparing alternative

legislative drafts, a court may be able to 

discern the intended meaning for the language

actually enacted. [In re Certified Question 

(Kenneth Henes Special Projects Procurement, 

Marketing and Consulting Corp v Continental 

Biomass Industries, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 115 n 5;

659 NW2d 597 (2003).] 

The “various alternatives in language” examined by the 

Court in Miles were statutory amendments made over a 

12
 
twenty-six year period. In that case, this Court found it 

telling that the Legislature eliminated words in 1917 that 

were added in 1909 and remained through the 1915 amendment. 

The amendments were to the general election law, which at 

the time of the election in question required election 

inspectors to indorse all ballots “in ink or with indelible 

pencil.” Miles, supra at 553. This Court concluded that 

the Legislature’s deletion of the words “or with lead” 

signified legislative intent to remove the possibility of 

signature with lead pencils. Id. at 558, 564. 

Although the Legislature added and then removed a 

specific term in Miles, that was not the case here. In 

this case, the Legislature did not eliminate the 

possibility of constructing pipelines longitudinally within 

limited access highway rights-of-way; rather, it subjected 

such construction to the requirements of subsection 2 only. 

It is clear from both the text of the statute and the 

legislative analysis of the 1989 amendment that the 1989 

amendment was intended to eliminate local control. 

Subsection 1 of the 1989 amendment prohibited construction 

within limited access highway rights-of-way. Thus, the 

local consent requirements of subsection 1 clearly did not 

apply to the prohibited actions. See also Senate 

Legislative Analysis, HB 4767, October 11, 1989 (“The bill 

13
 
would amend Public Act 365 of 1925 . . . to authorize the 

Department of Transportation, rather than local governing 

bodies, to permit the longitudinal construction of utility 

lines . . . within limited access highway rights-ofway. . . .”) 

However, the 1989 amendment of MCL 247.183 is not the 

language at issue because the most recent amendment of the 

statute was the 1994 amendment. While the statute does not 

clearly indicate whether the Legislature intended to 

require federally defined utilities to obtain local 

consent, it appears that the lack of clarity is the result 

of a clerical error and the intent was not to reverse the 

1989 elimination of local control. The legislative 

analysis accompanying the 1994 amendment suggests that the 

purpose of the amendment was simply to ensure that it was 

feasible for utilities to use limited access highway 

rights-of-way. This was accomplished by adjusting the fees 

for longitudinal use of limited access highway rights-ofway and ensuring that the state standards prevent an 

increase in highway maintenance costs. See Senate 

Legislative Analysis, SB 1008, August 3, 1994. 

The House and Senate journals provide further support 

for the notion that the Legislature did not intend the 

amendment to impose a requirement that federally defined 

14
 
utilities obtain local consent. The journals indicate that 

SB 1008 was passed without a single “nay” vote in either 

the House or Senate and the only amendments of the proposed 

bill were to subsection 2, which deals with the fees to be 

charged for longitudinal use of limited access highway 

rights-of-way. 1994 Journal of the Senate 1558, 1578; 1994 

Journal of the House 1639, 1978-1979. 

In addition to the journals, the standing committee 

records from the Senate Technology and Energy Committee and 

the discussions regarding the bill on the Senate floor also 

provide support for the notion that the Legislature did not 

intend to subject federally defined utilities to the local 

consent requirement. The Senate Committee on Technology 

and Energy held a committee hearing on March 23, 1994. 

Included in the committee records are the Senate 

Legislative Analysis, an analysis of the Senate Majority 

Policy Office, and written testimony of General Telephone 

and Electronics and the Michigan Department of 

Transportation. 

The analysis from the Senate Majority Policy Office 

states, “Senate Bill 1008 would amend current law to permit 

a utility to enter and construct utility services along the 

longitudinal axis of a limited access highway using 

standards adopted by the State Transportation Commission. 

15
 
 

The amendatory language would also eliminate the ability of 

the state to deny access to these locations for 

construction of utility services.” 

Senate Bill 1008, which resulted in the 1994 

amendments of the act, was introduced by Senator Hoffman. 

SB 1008 was introduced on February 8, 1994, and sent on to 

the House of Representatives on April 26, 1994. On June 

12, 1994, the bill returned from the House to the Senate 

with minor amendments and Senator Hoffman explained the 

bill on the Senate Floor before a vote. He explained that 

the House of Representatives made two amendments to the 

bill concerning the fee structure for constructing in 

limited access highway rights-of-way. He conveyed that the 

Department of Transportation and the major state utilities 

concurred in the changes and he urged the Senate members to 

concur as well. Audio Tape: Michigan State Senate Session 

(June 21, 1994)(on file at the State of Michigan Archives).4 

If the amendment were meant to remove the state’s 

power to deny access to these locations, it certainly could 

4

 Without stating what is missing from my alleged

recitation of “various random facts,” the majority asserts

that this dissent is underinclusive. Ante at 12. A few 

breaths later, however, the majority asserts that I have

included a useless “bit of legislative history.” Ante at 

20. I am at a loss for how to respond to a majority that

wants everything and nothing at the same time. 

16
 
not have been meant to grant this power to local entities, 

thus making it more cumbersome and maybe even impossible to 

construct within limited access highway rights-of-way. 

After reviewing the language used in the statute and the 

legislative history, I cannot believe that the Legislature 

intended to subject federally defined public utilities to 

local consent requirements. 

Because I believe that the statute is ambiguous and 

the true legislative intent was not to require local 

consent when federally defined utilities wish to construct 

pipelines longitudinally within limited access highway 

rights-of-way, I must respectfully dissent. 

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly 

17