THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Shelton Lathal Butler Jr., Petitioner, 

v. 

State of South Carolina, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2020-000660 

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 

Opinion No. 28069 

Heard June 17, 2021 – Filed December 1, 2021 

RELIEF DENIED 

Jessica Elizabeth Kinard and Tommy Arthur Thomas, 

both of Irmo, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General Chelsey Faith Marto, both of Columbia, 

for Respondent. 

JUSTICE FEW: Shelton Butler and two other men set out to rob two victims from 

whom they supposedly were going to purchase marijuana. During the robbery, one 

of the other men—Donavon Johnson—shot and killed one of the victims—Juan Rico 

Gutierrez. The State tried Butler for murder before trying the others. A jury 

convicted Butler on the theory the "hand of one is the hand of all." Two months 

later, the State tried the two others—Donavon and Charles. The trial court in that 

case granted Charles a directed verdict, and the jury found Donavon not guilty. 

Butler asks this Court in our original jurisdiction to vacate his murder conviction 
 

because Donavon and Charles were found not guilty, claiming "there, by law, is no 

crime with which he could have been involved." 

Under the theory the "hand of one is the hand of all," when two people join together 

to commit a crime, and during the commission of that crime one of the two commits 

another crime, both may be criminally liable for the unplanned crime if it was a 

natural and probable consequence of their common plan to commit the initial crime. 

See State v. Harry, 420 S.C. 290, 299, 803 S.E.2d 272, 276 (2017). In State v. 

Crowe, 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972), for example, the defendant and his 

cousin went to a poker club with guns, intending to rob the players. 258 S.C. at 265, 

188 S.E.2d at 382. In the course of the robbery, the cousin shot and killed the victim. 

258 S.C. at 264, 188 S.E.2d at 381. We held the homicide was a natural and probable 

consequence of their mutual plan to commit robbery, and therefore, the defendant 

who did not shoot the victim was "as guilty as the one who committed the fatal act." 

258 S.C. at 265, 188 S.E.2d at 382. 

For our purposes in reviewing the validity of Butler's conviction, the disposition of 

the indictments of his codefendants—or even whether they were charged or indicted 

in the first place—is not dispositive.1

 The important question is whether the State 

proved at Butler's trial what is necessary to convict Butler. See State v. Cox, 290 

S.C. 489, 493, 351 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1986); State v. Price, 278 S.C. 266, 268-69, 294 

S.E.2d 426, 428 (1982); State v. Massey, 267 S.C. 432, 443-46, 229 S.E.2d 332, 338-

39 (1976). To meet this burden in this case, the State proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt Butler joined with Donavon and Charles to rob Gutierrez, and Donavon 

murdered Gutierrez in the course of the robbery. Because the State met this burden 

in Butler's trial, it does not matter to the validity of Butler's conviction that Donavon 

was subsequently acquitted of the murder in a separate trial.2 

RELIEF DENIED. 

KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Stephanie P. McDonald, 

concur. BEATTY, C.J., concurring in result only. 

1

 Nothing prevents any defendant from making a motion for a new trial based on 

previously unknown evidence revealed during the trial of a codefendant. See Rule 

29(b), SCRCrimP. 

2

 There are many reasons a jury may have acquitted Donavon. It is unnecessary to 

consider them, however, because Butler's guilt is based on what was proven in his 

own trial. See Massey, 267 S.C. at 446, 229 S.E.2d at 339 (discussing reasons).