alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AT DECEMBER 31, 1999 AND THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS
OF OPERATIONS AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1999, AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         248,491
<SECURITIES>                                 1,654,101
<RECEIVABLES>                                  143,049
<ALLOWANCES>                                    32,206
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,015,309
<PP&E>                                          77,413
<DEPRECIATION>                                  56,104
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,422,343
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,015,712
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       306,210
<OTHER-SE>                                     319,052
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,422,343
<SALES>                                      6,033,627
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,033,627
<CGS>                                        3,944,252
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,990,560
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (552,007)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             193,340
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                401,734
<INCOME-TAX>                                    45,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            356,734
<DISCONTINUED>                                 946,058
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,302,792
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .03


</TABLE>
# C_2013336EN.01001001.xml

| 16.11.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 336/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 336/10

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 3 September 2013 — Adala Bero

(Case C-473/13)

2013/C 336/20

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Adala Bero

Appellant:

Authority involved: Regierungspräsidium Kassel

Authority involved:

Question referred

Question referred

Does Article 16(1) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (1) also require a Member State to carry out detentions for the purpose of removal as a rule in specialised detention facilities when such facilities exist in only one part of the federal subdivisions of that Member State but not in others?

1

---

(1)  OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98.

1

---
No. 10-6982.

#### Edgar Mosquera Gamboa, Petitioner v. Joseph Norwood, Warden.

562 U.S. 1051, 131 S. Ct. 616,

178 L. Ed. 2d 447,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8841.

November 15, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 380 Fed. Appx. 613.
Exhibit 21.1 

 

Duquesne Light Holdings, Inc., has the following direct subsidiaries, all of which are whollyor majority owned: 

 

Duquesne Light Company, a Pennsylvaniacorporation 

AquaSource, Inc., a Delaware corporation 

Duquesne Energy Solutions, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (previously DQE Energy Services, LLC) 

DQE Financial Corp., a Delaware corporation 

DQE Enterprises, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation 

DQE Systems, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation 

Duquesne Power Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation 

DQE Capital Corporation, a Delaware corporation 

Cherrington Insurance Ltd., a Bermuda corporation 

Duquesne Light Energy, a Delaware limited liability company 

 

DuquesneLight has the following significant subsidiaries: 

 

DQE EnergyLimited, a Cayman Islands corporation 

DQE Energy Two Limited, a Cayman Islands corporation 

Duquesne Financial, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company 

Monticello Corporation, a Delaware corporation (wholly owned by DQE Energy) 

Duquesne Financial, L.P., aPennsylvania partnership (Duquesne Light is 99% limited partner, Duquesne Financial, L.L.C., is 1% general partner) 

DQU II FundingCorporation, a Delaware corporation (wholly owned by Duquesne Financial, L.P. 

Duquesne Power, Inc., a Delaware corporation 

Duquesne Power, L.P., (Duquesne Light is 99% limited partner, Duquesne Power, Inc. is 1% general partner)
Slip Op. 99-17 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

:

AMERICAN SILICON TECHNOLOGIES, :

ELKEM METALS COMPANY, GLOBE :

METALLURGICAL, INC., and :

SKW METALS & ALLOYS, INC., :

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. : Before: MUSGRAVE, JUDGE

: Court No. 96-10-02313

UNITED STATES, :

:

Defendant, :

:

and :

:

COMPANHIA FERROLIGAS MINAS :

GERAIS-MINASLIGAS and :

ELETROSILEX BELO HORIZONTE, :

:

Defendant-Intervenors. :

 :

JUDGMENT

Upon having received and reviewed the United States Department of Commerce,

International Trade Administration’s (“Commerce”) Silicon Metal From Brazil, Final Results of

Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, American Silicon Technologies v. United States,

Court No. 96-10-02313, Slip Op. 98-110 (July 30, 1998) (“Remand Results”) filed December 16,

1998, upon finding that Commerce complied with the Court’s remand order, and upon review of

Plaintiffs’ Comments on Department of Commerce Final Remand Results, it is hereby
Court No. 96-10-02313 Page 2

ORDERED that the Remand Results are affirmed in their entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that, all other issues having been decided, this case is dismissed.

_______________________________

 R. KENTON MUSGRAVE

 JUDGE

Dated: February 17, 1999

 New York, New York
#### W. H. Bailey and May E. Bailey, his wife, and Ruth Schilling, a widow, *Appellants,*vs. John B. Newman, *Appellee.*

*195144 So. 392.

Division B.

Opinion filed November 8, 1932.

*Kehoe <& Kehoe*and *George M. Okell,*for Appellants.

*Padgett & Burton*and *Howard W. McCoy,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

Upon a motion to dismiss this appeal because it is frivolous, and subject to being quashed under Section 4639 C. G. L., 2920 R. G. S., the Court has been compelled to read and consider the briefs and record in the case.

From such examination of the briefs on the merits, which have all been filed, and from our inspection of the transcript of the record, the Court has reached the conclusion that the decree of foreclosure appealed from must inevitably be affirmed on the authority of Fagg Mill Work & Lbr. Co. v. Greer, 102 Fla. 955, 136 Sou. Rep. 679; Catlett v. White, 102 Fla. 110, 135 Sou. Rep. 565.

Therefore the motion to quash the appeal as frivolous is denied and the decree appealed from is affirmed on the authority of Grand Lodge K. of P. v. Goodall, decided at the present term, and Roberts Bros. v. Langford, 99 Fla. 1268, 128 Sou. Rep. 810.

Motion to quash appeal as frivolous denied and decree affirmed.

Whitfield, P.J. and Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.

Buford, C.J. and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
#### Hertz Vehicles LLC, Appellant, v Significant Care, PT, P.C., et al., Defendants, and Ksenia Pavlova, DO, Respondent.

[70 NYS3d 5]

*601Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Jaffe, J.), entered August 17, 2017, which denied plaintiff Hertz Vehicles, LLC’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that it failed to demonstrate that it timely requested examinations under oath (EUO), unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment declaring that Hertz owes no coverage for the no-fault services rendered by defendant Pavlova to defendant claimant Beard.

The affidavit of the Hertz claims handler personally assigned to this claim, as corroborated by the NF-10 denial of claim form *(Wausau Bus. Ins. Co. v 3280 Broadway Realty Co. LLC,*47 AD3d 549, 549 [1st Dept 2008]; *see also American Tr. Ins. Co. v Longevity Med. Supply, Inc.,*131 AD3d 841, 842 [1st Dept 2015]), stated that the date Pavlova’s bill was received by the insurer was July 18, 2014. Hertz therefore established its compliance with 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (b) by generating the first EUO scheduling letter within 15 days of receipt of the provider’s bill, and compliance with 11 NYCRR 65-3.6 (b), by generating the second EUO scheduling letter less than 10 days after the first nonappearance on August 7, 2014.

Hertz also established proof of mailing because it included an affidavit of service, which was executed by the person who mailed the EUO notices and who attested that each was mailed by regular mail to the address provided on the claimant’s claim form, as well as to claimant’s attorney, in a “postpaid, properly addressed wrapper, in an official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Postal Service within the State of New York” *(see American Tr. Ins. Co. v Lucas,*111 AD3d 423, 424 [1st Dept 2013]; *see also DeLuca v Smith,*146 AD3d 732, 732 [1st Dept 2017]).

Pavlova’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the second EUO nonappearance date was not a non-appearance because the claimant’s counsel was present, and because there was a statement on the record which not only acknowledged claimant’s nonappearance, but also agreed to reschedule the EUO, is unpreserved and unavailing.

Concur—Acosta, P.J., Renwick, Kapnick, Kahn, Kern, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Hyatt, Appellant.

[768 NYS2d 651]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Brennan, J.), rendered November 5, 2001, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, criminal trespass in the second degree, and petit larceny, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

There is no merit to the defendant’s contention that he was *750denied the effective assistance of counsel. Any error in eliciting or in failing to object to hearsay or bolstering testimony “was at most a mistaken judgment as to trial strategy and cannot be characterized as ineffective assistance of counsel” *(People v Jackson,*52 NY2d 1027, 1029 [1981]; *see People v Beaty,*231 AD2d 909 [1996]; *People v Mercedes,*182 AD2d 778, 779 [1992]; *People v Greene,*160 AD2d 726 [1990]). Under the circumstances of this case, the defense counsel provided meaningful representation *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 714 [1998]; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).

The defendant’s contention that his adjudication as a persistent violent felony offender violated his right to a jury trial pursuant to *Apprendi v New Jersey*(530 US 466 [2000]) is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit *(see People v Rosen,*96 NY2d 329, 335 [2001], *cert denied*534 US 899 [2001]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). S. Miller, J.P., Goldstein, Adams and Crane, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Dieurison T. Westchester County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Jean T. et al., Appellants.

[59 NYS3d 76]

Appeal by the mother, and separate appeal by the father, from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Westchester County (Nilda Morales-Horowitz, J.), dated February 22, 2016. The order, after a fact-finding hearing, found that the mother and the father were presently, and for the foreseeable future, unable by reason of mental illness to provide proper and adequate care for the subject child, terminated the mother’s and the father’s parental rights, and transferred the guardianship and custody of the subject child to the Westchester County Department of Social Services.

Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

A court-appointed psychologist interviewed and tested the mother and concluded that she suffers from schizoaffective disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. The psychologist opined that due to, among other things, the mother’s acute mental health distress and history of noncompliance with treatment, the mother is presently unable to provide proper and adequate care for the subject child. A licensed psychiatrist interviewed the father and reviewed certain of his medical records. The psychiatrist determined that the father suffers from schizophrenia, paranoid type. The psychiatrist testified that the father lacked insight into his mental illness, and that his prognosis for remedying his mental illness was poor. The evidence provided by the psychologist and the psychiatrist, respectively, established by clear and convincing evidence that the mother and the father are presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness, to provide proper and adequate care for the child *(see*Social Services Law § 384-b *610[4] [c]; *Matter of Chloe S. [Jane Z.],*138 AD3d 867, 868 [2016]; *Matter of Dominique Larissa Blue M. [Yasmin M.],*84 AD3d 962, 963 [2011]). Accordingly, the Family Court properly terminated the parental rights of the mother and the father on the ground of mental illness.

In light of our determination, the parties’ remaining contentions have been rendered academic.

Balkin, J.P., Chambers, Barros and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
# C_2014421EN.01005701.xml

| 24.11.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 421/57 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.11.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 421/57

---

Order of the Civil Service Tribunal (1st Chamber) of 9 September 2014 — Moriarty v Parliament

(Case F-98/13) (1)

1

((Civil service - Promotion - 2012 promotion procedure - Non-inclusion in the list of promoted officials - Application manifestly lacking any legal basis))

2014/C 421/81

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Rainer Moriarty (Colmar-Berg, Luxembourg) (represented by: A. Salerno and B. Cortese, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: E. Despotopoulou and E. Taneva, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application to annul the decision adopting the list of officials promoted in respect of the 2012 promotion procedure, in so far as, first, it does not include the applicant’s name among the officials of Grade AST 6, non-attested, promoted to Grade AST 7 and, secondly, it contains the name of another official.

Operative part of the order

Operative part of the order

| 1. | Mr Moriarty’s action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any legal basis. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Mr Moriarty’s action is dismissed as manifestly lacking any legal basis.

| 2. | Mr Moriarty is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the European Parliament. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mr Moriarty is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the European Parliament.

---

(1)  OJ C 367, 14.12.2013, p. 40.

1

---
```
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 16 (Monday, January 26, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 3727]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-1698]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. ER98-1180-000]

Florida Power & Light Company; Notice of Filing

January 20, 1998.
    Take notice that on December 22, 1997, Florida Power & Light 
Company (FPL), tendered for filing a letter from the Executive 
Committee of the Western Systems Power Pool (WSPP), indicating that FPL 
had completed all the steps for pool membership. FPL requests that the 
Commission amend the WSPP Agreement to include it as a member. FPL 
requests an effective date of December 23, 1997, for the proposed 
amendment.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20426, 
in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 18 CFR 385.214). All such 
motions or protests should be filed on or before February 2, 1998. 
Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the 
appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants 
parties to the proceeding. Any person wishing to become a party must 
file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the 
Commission and are available for public inspection.
David P. Boergers,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 98-1698 Filed 1-23-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
```
No. 10-5074.

#### Kwaheri M. Rowland, Petitioner v. Anthony A. Lamarque, Warden.

562 U.S. 902, 131 S. Ct. 237,

178 L. Ed. 2d 158,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6024.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
No. 10-6685.

#### Leroy Gipson, Jr., Petitioner v. Burl Cain, Warden.

562 U.S. 1069, 131 S. Ct. 658,

178 L. Ed. 2d 492,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 9181.

November 29, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 13, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-10195

Conference Calendar

BOBBY JOE BURTON, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

DAN JOSLIN,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CV-1445

--------------------

Before BARKSDALE, GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Bobby Joe Burton, Jr., federal prisoner # 75272-079, appeals

the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. Burton

challenged the life sentence he received after he pleaded guilty

to conspiracy to manufacture crack cocaine and possession of

crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Burton argues that his

challenge to his sentence falls under the savings clause of 28

U.S.C. § 2255.

Burton’s challenge to his sentence is based on United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). A claim relying on Booker does
No. 06-10195

-2-

not meet the requirements of § 2255's savings clause. See

Padilla v. United States, 416 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing

Burton’s § 2241 petition. 

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of State of New York, Respondent, v Jacob Kaff, Appellant.

[51 NYS3d 170]

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Brennan, J.), dated December 9, 2015, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant was properly assessed 20 points under risk factor 13 for unsatisfactory conduct while confined that involved inappropriate sexual conduct (see *People v Baluja,*109 AD3d 803, 804 [2013]; *People v Lawson,*90 AD3d 1006, 1007 [2011]). There is no merit to the defendant’s contention that it was improper to assess points under risk factor 13 because the incident resulting in his tier III disciplinary violation for lewd conduct, which occurred in November 2013, was too temporally remote to be relevant to his risk of reoffense on his release from prison in 2016, and took place more than one year before *784he completed sex offender counseling. The Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary (2006) (hereinafter Guidelines) discuss risk factor 13 in two paragraphs *(see*Guidelines at 16-17). The first paragraph discusses unsatisfactory conduct while confined or supervised that warrants the assessment of 10 points *(see*Guidelines at 16). The first paragraph provides that a recent tier III disciplinary violation is one ground for assessing 10 points under risk factor 13 *(see*Guidelines at 16). The second paragraph discusses unsatisfactory conduct while confined or supervised that involved sexual misconduct, which warrants the assessment of 20 points *(see*Guidelines at 16-17). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Guidelines do not preclude the assessment of points based on remoteness (see Guidelines at 16-17).

Contrary to the defendant’s further contention, the Supreme Court properly denied his application for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level three. The mitigating factors identified by the defendant either were adequately taken into account by the Guidelines or did not warrant a downward departure from the presumptive risk level *(see People v Rose,*146 AD3d 911, 912 [2017]; *People v Ibarra,*137 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2016]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly designated the defendant a level three sex offender.

Leventhal, J.R, Sgroi, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AT MARCH 31, 1997 (AUDITED) AND THE
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE TWELVE MONTHS ENDED
MARCH 31, 1997 (AUDITED) AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                           2,916
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      615
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        852
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 4,588
<PP&E>                                          13,404
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,790
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   7,089
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,030
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        31,607
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     7,089
<SALES>                                          3,510
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,529
<CGS>                                            2,388
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,388
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,540
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   8
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,335)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,335)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (2,335)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.26)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.26)
        

</TABLE>
No. 10-6081.

#### Roosevelt Simmons, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 944, 131 S. Ct. 368,

178 L. Ed. 2d 237,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7135.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 380 Fed. Appx. 323.