J-S24027-20

2020 PA Super 240

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN

Appellant No. 2793 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 27, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0303571-2006

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2020

Appellant, Michael McLaughlin, appeals from an order denying his 

petition seeking coram nobis relief on the ground that the judge who presided 

over his trial should have recused himself because he himself was under 

criminal investigation at the time of trial. We affirm. Coram nobis relief is 

unavailable because claims of judicial bias are only cognizable under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Furthermore, 

PCRA relief is unavailable because Appellant has completed service of his 

sentence. 

On September 4, 2007, following a four-day trial in which Appellant 

represented himself, the jury found Appellant guilty of stalking his former 

girlfriend. The Honorable Willis Berry sentenced him to 2-4 years’ 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S24027-20

- 2 -

imprisonment followed by 3 years’ probation. On November 8, 2010, this 

Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence (“McLaughlin I”). On April 

7, 2011, the Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal.

In 2012, Appellant filed a PCRA petition and amended it several times. 

Appellant argued, inter alia, that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

by failing to object to the pre-trial waiver of counsel colloquy. On May 29, 

2014, following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s 

petition. Appellant timely appealed to this Court at 1965 EDA 2014.

While his appeal was pending, Appellant filed a second PCRA petition in 

July 2014 alleging that Judge Berry’s own arrest and criminal prosecution in 

2014 proved that he was biased against Appellant at the time of Appellant’s 

trial in 2007. In September 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s 

second PCRA petition.

In his appeal at 1965 EDA 2014, Appellant argued both that trial counsel 

was ineffective in connection with the pre-trial waiver of counsel colloquy and 

that Judge Berry exhibited bias on behalf of the Commonwealth because he 

knew he was the subject of a criminal investigation. In a memorandum on 

December 8, 2015, this Court affirmed the May 29, 2014 order denying PCRA

relief. In the course of this memorandum, we held that Appellant could not 

obtain PCRA relief because he had completed service of his sentence in this 

case. We added in dicta that assuming Appellant’s claim was cognizable under 

the PCRA, it lacked merit because Judge Berry did not become aware of the 

criminal investigation against him until two years after Appellant’s trial. 
J-S24027-20

- 3 -

Commonwealth v. McLaughlin (“McLaughlin II”), 1965 EDA 2014, at 10-

11 (Pa. Super., December 8, 2015) (memorandum).

On June 3, 2016, Appellant filed a third PCRA petition, alleging again 

that he was denied a fair trial because Judge Berry was biased against him at 

the time of trial in 2007. On March 20, 2017, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s petition without a hearing. On November 21, 2018, this Court 

affirmed on the ground that Appellant was ineligible for PCRA relief because 

he was no longer serving a sentence for his stalking conviction. 

Commonwealth v. McLaughlin (“McLaughlin III”), 1249 EDA 2017, at 

4- 5 (Pa. Super., November 21, 2018) (memorandum). 

On November 27, 2018, Appellant filed the petition presently under 

review, a petition for writ of coram nobis. Once again, Appellant contended 

that he was denied a fair trial because Judge Berry presided over his trial while 

he was under criminal investigation. Appellant argued that he had the right 

to seek coram nobis relief because this Court held that PCRA relief was no 

longer available. The court appointed counsel, who filed a “no merit” letter 

and sought leave to withdraw under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 

927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988).1 On September 27, 2019, the court dismissed Appellant’s petition and 

granted counsel leave to withdraw. This appeal followed.

____________________________________________

1 We have reviewed counsel’s “no merit” letter and motion for leave to 

withdraw and note that it complies with the technical requirements of Turner 

and Finley. 
J-S24027-20

- 4 -

Appellant raises a single issue on appeal: “Did the lower court commit 

an error of law by denying Appellant’s writ of coram nobis without a hearing?” 

Appellant continues to raise the same issue that he has raised unsuccessfully 

in prior appeals: he is entitled to relief because Judge Berry was biased against 

him due to his own criminal investigation. Since we held in McLaughlin II 

and III that Appellant is not eligible for relief under the PCRA, Appellant now 

seeks relief through a different and rarely used mechanism: a writ of coram

nobis. No relief is due.

A writ of coram nobis “is generally available to challenge the validity of 

a judgment based on facts not before the court when the judgment was 

entered.” Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 494 n.1 (Pa. 2016). 

This writ “provides a way to collaterally attack a criminal conviction for a 

person . . . who is no longer ‘in custody’ and therefore cannot seek habeas 

relief.” Chaidez v. U.S., 568 U.S. 342, 345 n.1 (2013). 

However, the law prohibits petitioners from using coram nobis as an end 

run around the PCRA. To explain, it is well-settled that “where a petitioner’s 

claim is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the only method of obtaining 

collateral review.” Descardes, 136 A.3d at 503. The fact that PCRA relief no 

longer is available does not mean that coram nobis becomes a viable avenue 

for relief. Id. If the claim was cognizable under the PCRA, it cannot be revived 

through a writ of coram nobis. Id. It is equally well-settled that relief is 

unavailable under the PCRA unless the defendant is “currently serving a 

sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 
J-S24027-20

- 5 -

9543(a)(1)(i). Thus, when the defendant raises a claim that is cognizable 

under the PCRA, but he has completed service of his sentence, he is ineligible 

for relief under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 

(Pa. 1997). 

Presently, Appellant seeks coram nobis relief on the ground that Judge 

Berry was biased against him. No relief is available. Judicial bias is a violation 

of due process. Commonwealth v. Kohler, __A.3d__, 2020 WL 1973876, 

*9 (Pa., Apr. 24, 2020) (“due process demands the absence of judicial bias,”

so litigant’s due process rights are violated if biased appellate judge decides 

fate of his appeal); In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955) (judicial bias 

of trial judge constituted due process violation). Due process violations are 

cognizable under the PCRA as “violation[s] of the Constitution of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i). Thus, claims of judicial bias are 

cognizable under the PCRA and cannot serve as the basis for coram nobis

relief. Moreover, as discussed above, Appellant cannot obtain PCRA relief on 

his judicial bias claim because he has completed service of his sentence.

Therefore, we affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s petition for coram 

nobis relief.

Order affirmed.
J-S24027-20

- 6 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/28/20