Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A02-1512-CR-2111 | July 29, 2016 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark Leeman

Leeman Law Offices

Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Chester Irons,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 29, 2016 

Court of Appeals Cause No.

09A02-1512-CR-2111

Appeal from the Cass Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Leo T. Burns, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09C01-0008-CF-31

Barnes, Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A02-1512-CR-2111 | July 29, 2016 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] Chester Irons appeals the trial court's decision revoking his probation and 

ordering him to serve five years of his previously-suspended sentence following 

his probation violation. We affirm.

Issue

[2] The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking

Irons’s probation and ordering him to serve five years of his previouslysuspended sentence.

Facts

[3] On August 15, 2000, Irons was charged with four counts of Class A felony 

dealing in cocaine. Irons entered a guilty plea to one count of dealing in 

cocaine and the remaining counts were dismissed by agreement. Irons was 

sentenced to thirty years in the Department of Correction with ten years 

suspended to probation, five of the ten years of probation were to be supervised.

[4] On December 1, 2006, Irons filed a petition to modify his sentence. The trial 

court granted Iron’s petition to modify his sentence and ordered that Irons be 

released from the Department of Correction to serve the remainder of his 

sentence with Cass County work release. Irons’s work release was transferred 

to Riverside Community Corrections. Riverside Community Corrections filed 

a notice of work release violation. The trial court found that Irons violated the 

terms of work release and reinstated the unsuspended portion of his sentence, 
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which was 1,402 days, and ordered Irons to begin his five-year probation term

after he completed his sentence. 

[5] Four years into Irons’s probation, the State filed a violation of probation. The 

trial court found that Irons had violated the terms of his probation and ordered 

him to serve eight days of his previously-suspended sentence and continue on 

probation.

[6] On April 25, 2014, six violations of probation were filed against Irons. The 

violations alleged that Irons failed to report for substance abuse screening on 

four separate occasions, failed to comply with substance abuse counseling, and 

failed to make a good faith effort to pay his court fees. At a hearing for the 

probation violations, Irons admitted to each violation. The trial court 

subsequently revoked Irons’s probation, reinstated five years of his previouslysuspended ten-year sentence, and terminated any remaining probation. Irons 

now appeals.

Analysis

[7] Irons challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court after he admitted that 

he violated his probation. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court 

discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 

878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). “The trial court determines the conditions of 

probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Id. A trial 

court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the 

abuse of discretion standard. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the 
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decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” 

Id. A defendant cannot collaterally attack the propriety of an original sentence 

in the context of a probation revocation proceeding. Abernathy v. State, 852 

N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, a defendant is entitled to 

challenge the sentence a trial court decides to impose after revoking probation. 

Id. 

[8] Proof of a single violation of the conditions of a defendant's probation is 

sufficient to support a trial court's decision to revoke probation. Hubbard v. 

State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Upon a finding of a probation 

violation, a trial court may: (1) continue the person on probation, with or 

without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the person's 

probationary period for not more than one year beyond the original 

probationary period; and (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that 

was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35–38–2–3(g). “If 

there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's 

conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation, we will 

affirm its decision to revoke probation.” Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 

(Ind. 1995). 

[9] Here, Irons argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his

probation and imposed five years of his previously-suspended sentence at the 

Department of Correction following his probation violation. After being 

sentenced to thirty years in the Department of Correction with ten years 

suspended to probation for Class A felony dealing in cocaine, Irons violated his 
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probation twice before this current probation violation. Irons was given the 

opportunity three times to show the trial court that probation was the best 

option for him. Irons’s disregard for his probation on numerous occasions was 

a clear indicator that probation was not the best option for him.

[10] Irons also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it omitted 

from its consideration mitigating circumstances. Irons explained to the trial 

court that he had an asthmatic child who needed his support and that he had 

custody of his other child. The trial court is not required to consider mitigating

circumstances when imposing a sanction for probation violation. Indiana Code

Section 35-38-1-7.1 sets forth various aggravating or mitigating factors to be 

considered by the court, but with reference to the sentence being imposed for a 

crime, not for a probation violation. Irons’s imposed five-year sentence is

merely a previously-suspended sentence ordered to be executed as a result of his 

third probation violation.

[11] Given Irons’s repeated disregard for probation rules and that the trial court is 

not required to consider mitigating circumstances when imposing a sanction for 

a probation violation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking 

Irons’s probation and ordering him to serve five years of his previouslysuspended sentence.
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Conclusion

[12] The trial court’s revocation of Irons’s probation and imposition of five years of 

his previously-suspended sentence upon his probation violation was not an 

abuse of discretion. We affirm. 

[13] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.