NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2022 IL App (3d) 190639-U

Order filed March 30, 2022

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

THOMAS M. LEVERETTE, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 10th Judicial Circuit, 

Stark County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-19-0639 

Circuit No. 16-CF-11 

Honorable 

Michael P. McCuskey, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice O’Brien and Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err in dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition at 

the first stage. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Thomas M. Leverette, appeals from the first-stage dismissal of his 

postconviction petition. Defendant argues that the Stark County circuit court erred in dismissing 

his petition because he presented the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. We affirm.
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On June 29, 2016, the State charged defendant with four counts of aggravated criminal 

sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d) (West 2014)). The charges alleged different sexual acts 

occurring between defendant, who was over 17 years of age and more than 5 years older than the 

victim, who was between the ages of 13 and 17. The conduct was alleged to have occurred 

between May and August of 2014 and 2015. The public defender was appointed to represent 

defendant. 

¶ 5 Defendant pled guilty to counts I through III on October 28, 2016. In exchange for his 

guilty plea and promise to testify truthfully in other pending matters, the State agreed to cap its

sentencing recommendation at seven years’ imprisonment and dismiss the remaining count. 

¶ 6 The State provided the following factual basis for the plea. The victim would testify that 

he was 14 years old in the summer of 2014 and that he knew defendant. The victim went to 

defendant’s home to play video games, at which time the sexual abuse occurred. In the summer 

of 2015, defendant committed additional acts of sexual abuse with the victim. Defendant asked 

the victim his age in the summer of 2014, and the victim replied he was 14 years old. Defendant 

admitted to the police that he committed the 2014 sexual abuse. Defendant was 26 years old in 

2014. 

¶ 7 The court accepted defendant’s plea and continued the case for a sentencing hearing. The 

court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI) be prepared.

¶ 8 At the sentencing hearing, the parties conversed about a fact presented in the PSI that had 

not been previously discussed on the record. The PSI stated that defendant gave a statement to 

investigators on July 5, 2016, asserting that he had met the victim on a homosexual dating 

website. During arguments, the court expressed some confusion regarding this statement. In 
3 

response, the State informed the court that “[t]here was some familiarity between the defendant 

and the victim and family.” In response, defense counsel indicated that “[t]heir families were 

acquainted” but he did not know the extent of that acquaintance. Both sides argued and made 

sentencing recommendations. Defendant made a statement in allocution. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the court sentenced defendant to four years’ imprisonment. No postjudgment motions 

were filed, nor did defendant appeal his case.

¶ 9 On August 29, 2019, defendant filed, as a self-represented litigant, a postconviction 

petition. The petition generally alleged that the State inadvertently suppressed exculpatory and 

impeaching evidence, and appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to render 

adequate legal assistance and the conviction could have been overturned “as the strategic 

decisions upon which the defendant was advised by counsel during the guilt and punishment 

phase, which constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.”

¶ 10 Defendant more specifically claimed that in 2014 he downloaded a phone application 

(app) for a social website for homosexual men to meet. The app was intended only for adult use. 

The app used location data and required its users to input a valid email address and consent to 

terms and conditions which required the user to indicate that they were 18 years of age or older 

at that time. Defendant indicated that after creating his account, the app showed the victim as a 

user in his area with the listed age of 19 years old. Defendant messaged the victim through the 

app, saying “I did not know you were gay.” The victim did not respond to defendant. Defendant 

then messaged the victim on Facebook. Defendant alleged that the information regarding the 

victim’s fraudulent profile with the deceptive age information, having been disclosed by the 

State or raised by his counsel, would have been used to challenge the victim’s credibility.

¶ 11 The court summarily dismissed defendant’s petition, and defendant appeals.
4 

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Defendant argues that his petition sets forth sufficient facts to state the gist of a 

constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act creates a procedure for imprisoned criminal defendants 

to collaterally attack their convictions or sentences based on a substantial denial of their rights 

under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) 

(West 2018). “At the first stage, the court must accept as true and liberally construe all of the 

allegations in the petition unless contradicted by the record.” People v. Walker, 2019 IL App (3d) 

170374, ¶ 13. A defendant need only state the gist of a constitutional claim, which is a low 

threshold. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). “At this stage, a defendant need not 

make legal arguments or cite to legal authority.” Id. 

¶ 15 “If the trial court finds in the first stage of proceedings that the petition is frivolous or 

patently without merit, it shall summarily dismiss the petition ***.” People v. Moore, 2018 IL 

App (3d) 160271, ¶ 15. A petition is considered frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or 

fact. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-13, 16 (2009). Although the threshold for a first-stage 

postconviction petition is low, defendant must still present a “modest amount of detail.” People 

v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 504 (2004). The purpose of postconviction proceedings is to inquire 

into issues that were not, and could not, have been raised on direct appeal. People v. Barrow, 195 

Ill. 2d 506, 519 (2001). Issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, and were not, are 

procedurally forfeited. Id. The circuit court’s first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition is 

reviewed de novo. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9. 

¶ 16 First, defendant concedes on appeal that his claim that the State inadvertently suppressed 

evidence of an exculpatory and impeaching nature that established that the victim lied about his 
5 

age is without merit. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 1196-97 (1963). Defendant 

acknowledges that this issue is not viable as this evidence was within defendant’s control and 

was not used by the State.

¶ 17 Second, defendant argues that his petition stated the gist of a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, a petition that alleges 

ineffective assistance of counsel may not be summarily dismissed if it is arguable that:

(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the 

defendant was prejudiced. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17. To establish prejudice on a guilty plea, 

defendant’s allegation that he would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial but for counsel’s 

deficiency must be accompanied by either a claim of innocence or the articulation of a plausible 

defense that could have been raised at trial. People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 335-36 (2005).

¶ 18 Here, defendant does not provide any facts asserting or reasonably implying an inability 

to have raised this claim of ineffective assistance in a direct appeal; thus, the issue is 

procedurally forfeited. Additionally, defendant’s claims are so general that they lack a basis in 

fact. Defendant does not define or point to any specific deficiencies in counsel’s representation

but merely states that the conviction could have been challenged if not for counsel’s deficient

advice and strategy. Nor does defendant allege sufficient prejudice, that is, he would not have 

pled guilty but for counsel’s deficient performance. 

¶ 19 The frivolous nature of defendant’s petition is shown by the trial court’s finding that 

“[t]he alleged suppressed evidence was addressed in the PSI and even commented on in the 

sentencing hearing.” The court also correctly noted that even if the victim’s profile listed his age 

as 19, the record revealed that defendant was acquainted with the victim and his family prior to 
6 

these events. For these reasons, we find defendant’s petition does not have a basis in fact or law 

necessary to avoid summary dismissal.

¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 21 The judgment of the circuit court of Stark County is affirmed. 

¶ 22 Affirmed.