2020 WI 21

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2018AP53-CR

COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

 v.

Dennis Brantner,

 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION FILED: February 25, 2020 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: October 3, 2019 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: Circuit 

COUNTY: Fond du Lac 

JUDGE: Peter L. Grimm 

JUSTICES:

KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the court, in which 

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., 

joined, and in which ROGGENSACK, C.J. and ZIEGLER, J., joined as 

to parts I, II, III.B, III.C, and IV. ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a 

concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 

ATTORNEYS:

For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 

filed by Taylor Rens and Krug & Rens LLC, West Allis. There was an 

oral argument by Taylor Rens.

For the plaintiff-respondent, there were briefs filed by Lisa 

E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 

was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument 

by Lisa E.F. Kumfer.
2020 WI 21

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2018AP53-CR

(L.C. No. 2015CF457)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

 v.

Dennis Brantner,

 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

FILED

FEB 25, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Supreme Court

KELLY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and DALLET, JJ., joined, 

and in which ROGGENSACK, C.J. and ZIEGLER, J., joined as to parts 

I, II, III.B, III.C, and IV. ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a concurring 

opinion, in which ZIEGLER, J., joined. 

Brian K. Hagedorn, J., did not participate.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed in 

part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the circuit 

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

¶1 DANIEL KELLY, J. Fond du Lac County sheriff's 

detectives arrested Mr. Brantner at the Kenosha County courthouse 

and transported him to the Fond du Lac County jail to face criminal 

charges unrelated to this case. During the booking process, a 

sheriff's deputy discovered a cache of narcotics and prescription 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

2

medications in Mr. Brantner's boot, a discovery that gave rise to 

his trial in this case in the Fond du Lac County circuit court. 

Mr. Brantner says he should not have been tried in Fond du Lac 

County because he did not possess the drugs when the deputy 

discovered them——not because the drugs were not there——but because 

the arrest in Kenosha County terminated, as a matter of law, his 

ability to possess any contraband on his person. We disagree. 

Mr. Brantner did not lose possession of the drugs in his boot upon 

his arrest in Kenosha County. And because he still possessed the 

drugs in Fond du Lac County, venue there was proper.

¶2 Mr. Brantner also says that two of the charges on which 

the jury convicted him were multiplicitous. One of the charges 

was for possession of 20mg oxycodone pills in violation of Wis. 

Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am) (2017-18).1 The other was for possession 

of 5mg oxycodone pills in violation of the same statute. We agree 

with Mr. Brantner, and so reverse the court of appeals with respect 

to his multiplicity challenge.2

I. BACKGROUND

¶3 Six years ago, Mr. Brantner was in the Kenosha County 

circuit court defending against a charge that he was a "felon in

possession of a firearm." As he left the courtroom, he immediately 

 

1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 

the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.

2 This is a review of the court of appeals, State v. Brantner, 

No. 2018AP53-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2019),

which summarily affirmed the Fond du Lac County postconviction 

court's denial of Mr. Brantner's postconviction motion, the 

Honorable Peter L. Grimm, presiding.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

3

encountered two Fond du Lac County sheriff's detectives. They 

were there to arrest him in connection with a thirty-year-old 

homicide. The detectives handcuffed Mr. Brantner with a belly

belt, patted him down, searched his pockets, and transported him 

to Fond du Lac County for processing.

¶4 The booking process at the Fond du Lac County jail 

required Mr. Brantner to remove the outer layer of his clothing, 

including his footwear. He removed his right boot easily enough 

but encountered difficulty with his left boot. He said he had a 

muscle spasm in his calf, which he addressed by striking his leg 

for 20-30 seconds. One of the detectives offered to help him 

remove the boot, but Mr. Brantner declined. Eventually, with the 

muscle spasm apparently resolved, Mr. Brantner successfully 

removed his remaining boot and turned it over to the sheriff's 

deputy processing his belongings. Inside the boot the deputy found 

a bag containing a total of 54 pills, comprising: (1) 35 20mg 

oxycodone pills; (2) two 5mg oxycodone pills; (3) two pills 

containing both 325mg of acetaminophen and 5mg of hydrocodone; (4) 

11 12.5mg zolpidem pills; and (5) four 10mg cyclobenzaprine pills. 

Nothing in the record indicates that, before Mr. Brantner handed 

his boot to the deputy, the detectives had known the drugs were in 

Mr. Brantner's boot. 

¶5 Mr. Brantner did not have a valid prescription for any 

of the pills in his boot, so the State charged him with five counts 

of possession——one for each category of drug and dosage. The State 

also paired each possession charge with a corresponding felony 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

4

bail-jumping charge.3 Consequently, the list of charges against 

Mr. Brantner comprised:4

(1) Possession of oxycodone (20mg), a Schedule II 

narcotic substance, without a valid prescription, 

contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am);

(2) Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 

§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing oxycodone 20mg;

(3) Possession of oxycodone (5mg), a Schedule II 

narcotic substance, without a valid prescription, 

contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am);

(4) Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 

§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing oxycodone 5mg;

(5) Possession of hydrocodone, a Schedule II narcotic 

substance, without a valid prescription, contrary to

Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am);

(6) Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 

§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing hydrocodone;

(7) Possession of zolpidem, a controlled substance, 

without a valid prescription, contrary to Wis. Stat. 

§ 961.41(3g)(b);

(8) Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 

§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing zolpidem;

(9) Possession of cyclobenzaprine, a prescription drug, 

contrary to Wis. Stat. § 450.11(7)(h); and

 

3 One of the conditions of Mr. Brantner's bond in the Kenosha 

County felon-in-possession case was that he commit no new crimes.

4 Initially, the charges against Mr. Brantner on counts one, 

three, and five also included penalty enhancers pursuant to Wis. 

Stat. § 961.495 (2017-18) for possession of a controlled substance 

within 1000 feet of the Fond du Lac County jail; however, the State 

voluntarily dismissed all of the penalty enhancers prior to voir 

dire.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

5

(10) Felony bail jumping contrary to Wis. Stat. 

§ 946.49(1)(b) for possessing cyclobenzaprine.5

¶6 The jury found Mr. Brantner guilty on all counts and he 

received his sentence in due course. He subsequently filed a 

postconviction motion in which he claimed that venue did not lie 

in Fond du Lac County and that the two charges for possessing 

oxycodone (counts one and three) were multiplicitous. The court 

denied Mr. Brantner's motion, and the court of appeals summarily 

affirmed. We granted Mr. Brantner's petition for review and now 

affirm the court of appeals with respect to venue, but reverse 

with respect to counts one and three because they are 

multiplicitous. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 Although venue is not an element of a crime, the State 

must nonetheless establish it beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 

Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 501-02, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969). We 

review venue challenges for sufficiency of evidence, so "[w]e will 

not reverse a conviction based upon the State's failure to 

establish venue unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the 

state and the conviction, is so insufficient that there is no basis 

upon which a trier of fact could determine venue beyond a 

reasonable doubt." State v. Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 407–08, 

572 N.W.2d 845 (1998). Whether such a basis exists is a question 

of law we review independently of the court of appeals. State v. 

Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410 ("The 

 

5 Counts one, three, and five are Class I felonies; the bail 

jumping charges are Class H felonies; and counts seven and nine 

are misdemeanors.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

6

question of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a 

verdict of guilt in a criminal prosecution is a question of law, 

subject to our de novo review.").

¶8 Whether two or more charges are multiplicitous is a 

question of law subject to our independent review. State v. 

Patterson, 2010 WI 130, ¶12, 329 Wis. 2d 599, 790 N.W.2d 909; 

State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶52, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437.

III. ANALYSIS

¶9 Mr. Brantner challenges his conviction for two reasons. 

First, he says that he should not have been tried in Fond du Lac 

County because his arrest in Kenosha County terminated, as a matter 

of law, his ability to possess any contraband on his person. 

Therefore, he concludes, he had a right to have a jury hear his 

case in Kenosha County, the last geographical location he says he 

possessed the pills in his boot. Second, he claims the State may 

not charge him with two separate charges for possessing oxycodone 

simply because the pills contained different amounts of the 

narcotic. We conclude that Fond du Lac County was a proper venue 

for the case, but that the oxycodone-related possession charges 

were multiplicitous.

A. Venue

¶10 Mr. Brantner says he is entitled to trial in Kenosha 

County because, generally speaking, the State must try a defendant 

in the county in which the crime occurred. Wis. Stat. § 971.19(1) 

("Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the crime 

was committed, except as otherwise provided."). Answering Mr. 

Brantner's argument requires us to consult the criminal statutes 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

7

defining the crimes' elements so that we may identify where they 

were fulfilled. As relevant here, possession of controlled 

substances is unlawful pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g), which 

says:

No person may possess or attempt to possess a controlled 

substance or a controlled substance analog unless the 

person obtains the substance or the analog directly 

from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of, 

a practitioner who is acting in the course of his or her 

professional practice, or unless the person is otherwise 

authorized by this chapter to possess the substance or 

analog.[6]

The unauthorized possession of prescription drugs is unlawful 

according to Wis. Stat. § 450.11(7)(h), which says: "Except as 

provided in sub. (1i)(b), no person may possess a prescription 

 

6 The penalty for possessing a Schedule II narcotic drug, 

such as oxycodone, is provided by Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am): 

Schedule I and II Narcotic Drugs. If a person possesses 

or attempts to possess a controlled substance included 

in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, or a 

controlled substance analog of a controlled substance 

included in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, 

the person is guilty of a class I felony.

The penalty for possessing non-scheduled controlled substances 

is provided by Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(b):

Other drugs generally. Except as provided in pars. (c) 

to (g), if the person possesses or attempts to possess 

a controlled substance or controlled substance analog, 

other than a controlled substance included in schedule 

I or II that is a narcotic drug or a controlled substance 

analog of a controlled substance included in schedule I 

or II that is a narcotic drug, the person is guilty of 

a misdemeanor, punishable under s. 939.61.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

8

drug unless the prescription drug is obtained in compliance with 

this section."7

¶11 The crimes with which Mr. Brantner was charged were 

obviously possessory in nature, which means he committed the crimes 

where he "possessed" the pills in his boot. Wis. Stat. 

§ 961.41(3g) ("No person may possess . . . ."); Wis. Stat.

§ 450.11(7)(h) ("[N]o person may possess . . . ."). So we must 

discern the meaning of the term "possess" within the context of 

§§ 961.41(3g) and 450.11(7)(h). The answer to that question, as 

applied to the facts of this case, will tell us where venue lies.

¶12 This is not the first time we have had cause to explore 

the meaning of "possess" in our statutes. In Schwartz v. State, 

192 Wis. 414, 212 N.W. 664 (1927), the State claimed the defendant 

unlawfully possessed intoxicating liquor by virtue of its mere 

presence in his business premises. We said that "[i]t is perfectly 

plain that the possession of liquor which is made unlawful is the 

possession under some claim of right, control, or dominion with 

knowledge of the facts." Id. at 418. And in State v. Peete, 185 

Wis. 2d 4, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994), we recognized that "the 

Wisconsin criminal jury instructions provide a standard definition 

for the term 'possession[,]'" and that "the term 'possession' has 

 

7 Subsection (1i)(b), which addresses opioid antagonists, is 

not relevant to this case. Wis. Stat. § 450.11(1i)(b). And Mr. 

Brantner does not claim he obtained the cyclobenzaprine in 

compliance with § 450.11.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

9

a consistent, established meaning throughout the Wisconsin 

criminal statutes . . . ." Id. at 15-16.8 

¶13 Both parties recommended Wis JI——Criminal 6030 (2016) to 

us as an appropriate explanation of this "consistent, established 

meaning." This instruction describes two senses in which we may 

understand the term "possession." In the first sense, "possessed" 

means "the defendant knowingly had actual physical control of a 

substance." Id. In the second sense, a "substance is (also) in 

a person's possession if it is in an area over which the person 

has control and the person intends to exercise control over the 

substance." Id.

¶14 We can glean from Schwartz and Wis JI——Criminal 6030, 

therefore, that "possessing" something requires both knowledge and 

control. Here, it is the "control" component of possession with 

which Mr. Brantner takes exception. The instruction's first 

definition of control contemplates the ability to kinetically 

influence the object in question. The instruction expresses this 

idea as "actual physical control," which Black's Law Dictionary 

defines as "[d]irect bodily power over something, esp. a vehicle." 

Actual Physical Control, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

¶15 The second "control" test does not require the ability 

to physically manipulate the object directly. Instead, it reflects 

 

8 State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994), 

addressed Wis JI——Criminal 920 (2000), the general "possession" 

instruction. This case, of course, focuses on Wis JI——Criminal 

6030 (2016), which is the jury instruction specific to Wis. Stat. 

§ 961.41(3g). However, the definition is the same in each 

instance, which the comments to Wis JI——Criminal 6030 acknowledge.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

10

the defendant's ability to exercise power over the object 

indirectly. In the words of the jury instruction, possession 

occurs when the object is in an area over which the defendant has 

control, and he intends to exercise that control. "Control" is a 

common and frequently used word. There is nothing technical or 

specialized about it, and so we look to the dictionary for a 

common, ordinary definition.9 Turning to Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary, we find two particularly helpful 

definitions. First, Webster's says "control" means "to exercise 

restraining or directing influence over." Control, Webster's 

Third New International Dictionary (496 (1986) (definition 

4(a)(1))). It also provides that "control" means "to have power 

over." Id. (definition 4(a)(2)). Similarly, The Oxford English 

Dictionary, as relevant here, offers the following definitions of 

"control": (1) "The fact or power of directing and regulating the 

actions of . . . things; direction, management; command[;] and (2) 

"To exercise power or authority over; to determine the behavior or 

action of, to direct or command; to regulate or govern." Control, 

The Oxford English Dictionary (definitions 2.a. (noun) and 3.a. 

(verb), respectively). Likewise, Black's Law Dictionary defines 

"control," in relevant part, as meaning "[t]o exercise power or 

influence over." Control, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 

The consistent principle linking all of these definitions is that 

 

9 See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 

WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Statutory language 

is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 

technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 

technical or special definitional meaning.").
No. 2018AP53-CR 

11

an individual may control an object without directly and personally 

affecting it physically. Instead, one may control the object 

through the exercise of authority, direction, or command. We will 

refer to this type of control as "indirect power."

¶16 The sum of this definitional work is that, within the 

meaning of Schwartz and Wis JI——Criminal 6030, Mr. Brantner 

possessed the pills in his boot if he knew they were there and he 

either: (1) "had actual physical control" (that is, "direct bodily 

power") over them; or (2) they were "in an area over which [he] 

ha[d] control and [he] intend[ed] to exercise control over" them 

(that is, he had "indirect power" over the pills). If those 

elements coincided in Fond du Lac County, then venue was proper.

¶17 According to Mr. Brantner, they did not coincide. He 

says he "lost possession of the pills when he was taken into

custody in Kenosha County because that is when he lost control of 

the pills."10 Specifically, he says his arrest meant he could no 

longer "ingest, sell, destroy or otherwise dispossess himself of 

[the pills]. He could not do anything except leave them right

where they were." He concludes that under these circumstances, 

"[w]hen a government bears down on an individual with such heavy 

force, the individual loses control of any substances on his person 

as a matter of law." That an individual should cease to control—

—and consequently cease to possess——everything on his person upon 

arrest is a surprising proposition. That has never been the law 

 

10 Mr. Brantner does not challenge the knowledge component of 

possession, and so we need not address it here.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

12

in Wisconsin, and our courts regularly uphold convictions in which 

police discover contraband after arresting the person who 

possesses it. See, e.g., State v. Delap, 2018 WI 64, 382 

Wis. 2d 92, 913 N.W.2d 175 (affirming judgment of conviction for, 

inter alia, possession of drug paraphernalia discovered in search 

after arrest); State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, 327 Wis. 2d 252, 786 

N.W.2d 97 (defendant convicted based on drugs found in his vehicle 

after arrest); State v. Stewart, 2011 WI App 152, 337 Wis. 2d 618, 

807 N.W.2d 15 (affirming denial of motion to suppress cocaine 

discovered in search of trunk after arrest and thereby upholding 

conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver); State 

v. Smiter, 2011 WI App 15, 331 Wis. 2d 431, 793 N.W.2d 920 

(affirming judgment of conviction for possession of cocaine with 

intent to deliver stemming from discovery of cocaine pursuant to 

a vehicle search after defendant's arrest for possession of 

marijuana).

¶18 But the deeper problem with Mr. Brantner's argument is 

that it misses the point of our "possession" jurisprudence. In 

this case, one of the following must be the possessor of the pills: 

(1) Mr. Brantner; (2) the sheriff's deputies; or (3) no one. The 

purpose of our analysis is not to make metaphysical distinctions, 

but merely to distinguish between these three possibilities. We 

can rule out the deputies as the possessors pretty easily——they 

did not know the pills existed until Mr. Brantner handed them his 

boot, which means the knowledge element of possession was 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

13

missing.11 Mr. Brantner rules himself out as the possessor because 

he claims he lacked control over them. So he says we must conclude 

that nobody possessed the pills. The pills, that is to say, that 

were in his boot. Not only is such a conclusion counterintuitive, 

it does not logically follow from the definition of "possession." 

Here is why.

¶19 As we observed above, Mr. Brantner contests only the 

"control" component of possession——he admits he knew the pills 

were in his boot. The evidence presented in his trial, however, 

leaves no doubt about his control of the pills in Fond du Lac 

County. He took off his right boot with no difficulties during 

the booking process, but claimed a muscle spasm kept him from 

removing his drug-laden boot. Finding no reprieve in his delaying 

tactics, he eventually removed the boot and handed it to the 

sheriff's deputy in the processing room. So Mr. Brantner exercised 

"direct bodily power" over the pills by first delaying their 

conveyance to the deputy and then physically handing them over. 

In his brief, Mr. Brantner largely concedes that this is evidence 

of control over the pills:

If th[is] situation had unfolded inside a friend's 

living room, with no law enforcement involvement

whatsoever, then Brantner clearly would be exercising 

actual physical control over the pills by removing his 

boot and handing it to his friend. Handing an object to 

 

11 We base our analysis on the understanding that the 

detectives did not know of the pills in Mr. Brantner's boot before 

they transported him to Fond du Lac County, and we express no 

opinion on how this case would resolve had they known of them while 

still in Kenosha County.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

14

someone is precisely the type of act that "actual 

physical control" refers to in ordinary circumstances.

We agree that this is precisely the type of act that exemplifies 

actual physical control. Mr. Brantner, however, says this does 

not count in this case because of the extraordinary circumstances 

in which he handed over the boot. In Mr. Brantner's telling, those 

circumstances relieved him of possession of the pills as a matter 

of law because he was handing officials the evidence necessary to 

arrest him for the crimes with which the State eventually charged 

him. But Mr. Brantner never explained how his "extraordinary 

circumstances" proposition could negate the physical control he 

actually exerted over the drug-containing boot. If we were to 

credit his position, we would have to conclude that the boot 

somehow made its way from Mr. Brantner to the sheriff's deputy 

with no human intervention. The laws of physics, as we presently 

understand them, do not allow for such a phenomenon. 

¶20 Mr. Brantner also argues the evidence was insufficient 

to prove the alternative method of establishing control, to wit, 

through the exercise of indirect power over the pills. Upon arrest 

in Kenosha County, he says, he lost his ability to direct the 

disposition of the pills. He says the State's argument that he 

"maintained possession of the pills solely by manifesting an intent 

to exercise control over them" is nonsensical: "The State's claim 

that Brantner maintained physical control over the pills through 

the power of thought is odd. Brantner is unable to find any 

authority from any jurisdiction holding that an individual
No. 2018AP53-CR 

15

maintained constructive possession of an item on his person without

maintaining actual physical possession [of] it."

¶21 Mr. Brantner need not go far to find the authority he 

believes does not exist. He already acknowledged that Wis JI——

Criminal 6030 (which he recommended to us) provides a second means 

of establishing the control element of possession. Under Schwartz

and this jury instruction, a factfinder could conclude that Mr. 

Brantner still controlled the pills after his arrest if he could 

have exerted indirect power over them through the exercise of 

authority, direction, or command. If he had wanted to avoid venue 

in Fond du Lac County, he could have asked the detectives (while 

they were all still in Kenosha County) to remove his boot because 

he no longer wished to have on his person the contraband it 

contained. The detectives surely would have been willing to assist 

him in accomplishing that goal, and in doing so they would have 

demonstrated that Mr. Brantner had indirect power over the pills 

in his boot. Mr. Brantner dismisses this as a Hobson's choice: 

"If Brantner was required to tell the officers about the pills to 

terminate his possession of them, then Brantner was effectively 

required to choose between the protections of the right to remain 

silent and the right to venue." But that is not true at all. Mr. 

Brantner has the right to proper venue, not venue in Kenosha County 

come what may. He chose to maintain the secrecy of the pills, 

which inevitably led to their presence in Fond du Lac County. And 

upon arrival in Fond du Lac County, he could have made the request 

he chose not to make in Kenosha County. The fact that he chose to 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

16

remain silent does not mean he did not have indirect power over 

the pills, it just means he decided not to exercise it.

¶22 We conclude the evidence was such that the jury could 

determine that Mr. Brantner possessed the pills in Fond du Lac 

County beyond a reasonable doubt, which made venue in that county 

proper. Mr. Brantner admittedly knew of the pills' presence in 

his boot. And he exercised direct physical power over them when 

he handed his drug-laden boot to the officials during the booking 

process. He also had indirect power over the pills even after the 

arrest because he could have requested the detective's assistance 

in ridding himself of the contraband's presence. The fact that he 

chose not to exercise that indirect power does not mean he lacked 

control over the pills. For these reasons, we affirm the court of 

appeals with respect to the venue issue.12

B. Multiplicity

¶23 The State charged Mr. Brantner with (amongst other 

offenses) possession of 20mg oxycodone pills (Count 1), and 5mg 

oxycodone pills (Count 3), both in violation of Wis. Stat. 

§ 961.41(3g)(am). Mr. Brantner says these counts are 

 

12 Mr. Brantner also says the Wisconsin and United States 

Constitutions guaranteed to him the right to a trial in Kenosha 

County, not Fond du Lac County. See, e.g., Wis. Const. art. I, 

§ 7 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 

right to . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 

county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed; 

which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by 

law."). But he also recognized, as he must, that these rights 

were dependent on the location at which he committed the offenses. 

As demonstrated above, he committed them in both Kenosha and Fond 

du Lac Counties. Consequently, venue in Fond du Lac County was 

consistent with his asserted constitutional rights.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

17

multiplicitous because § 961.41(3g)(am) proscribes possession of 

this drug without regard to the dosage of the pills. We agree.

¶24 Claims are multiplicitous when the State charges a 

defendant more than once for the same offense. State v. Ziegler, 

2012 WI 73, ¶59, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238; State v. Rabe, 

96 Wis. 2d 48, 61, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980) ("Multiplicity arises 

where the defendant is charged in more than one count for a single 

offense."). Such charges violate our state and federal 

constitutions because they place the defendant in jeopardy of 

multiple convictions for the same offense. Ziegler, 342 

Wis. 2d 256, ¶59 ("The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution and its parallel 

provision of the Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 8(1), 

prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense."). Charges 

are not multiplicitous, however, when the statutes "authorize 

cumulative punishments for the same offense." State v. Davison, 

2003 WI 89, ¶¶36-37, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1 ("In situations 

where the legislature intends to authorize cumulative punishments 

for the same offense, we no longer say that the charges are 

'multiplicitous' or that they violate double jeopardy. Use of the 

term 'multiplicitous' should be limited to situations in which the 

legislature has not authorized multiple charges and cumulative 

punishments.").

¶25 "We review multiplicity claims according to a wellestablished two-pronged methodology." Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 

¶60. First, we employ the "elements-only" test to determine 

whether the offenses are identical in both law and fact. Id., 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

18

(citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). 

The result of this step determines whether we will presume, in the 

second step of the analysis, that the statutes provide for 

cumulative punishment. Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶¶43-44. If the 

offenses are identical in law and fact, we presume "that the 

legislature did not intend to permit multiple punishments." 

Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶15. "The State may rebut that 

presumption only by a clear indication of contrary legislative 

intent." Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶61. If the offenses differ 

in law or fact, then they are not the "same" for double jeopardy 

purposes, and we therefore presume that the statutes allow for 

cumulative punishment. Patterson, 329 Wis. 2d 599, ¶15. The 

defendant can overcome the presumption if he can prove that, 

notwithstanding the separate offenses, "the legislature did not 

intend to authorize cumulative punishments." Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 

256, ¶62. If it did not, then there has been a due process 

violation as opposed to a double jeopardy violation. Id.

1. The "Elements-Only" Analysis

¶26 Mr. Brantner says the offenses described in Counts 1 and 

3 of the State's Complaint are the same both in law and in fact 

because they both charge him with possessing oxycodone contrary to 

Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am). Offenses are identical in law "if 

one offense does not require proof of any fact in addition to those 

which must be proved for the other offense." Ziegler, 342 

Wis. 2d 256, ¶60. They are identical in fact unless they are 

"separated in time or are of a significantly different nature." 

State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 31, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980). To be 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

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"separate in time" means that "there was sufficient time for 

reflection between the acts such that the defendant re-committed 

himself to the criminal conduct." Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, ¶56. 

Charges are "'different in nature' even when they are the same 

types of acts as long as each required 'a new volitional departure 

in the defendant's course of conduct.'" Id., ¶57.

¶27 We begin with assessing whether the offenses described 

in Counts 1 and 3, both of which charged Mr. Brantner with 

violating Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(am), are identical in law. This 

statute says:

No person may possess or attempt to possess a controlled 

substance or a controlled substance analog unless the 

person obtains the substance or the analog directly 

from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of, 

a practitioner who is acting in the course of his or her 

professional practice, or unless the person is otherwise 

authorized by this chapter to possess the substance or 

the analog. 

§ 961.41(3g). The statute goes on to distinguish between different 

types of controlled substances to determine the gravity of the 

offense. According to Wis. Stat. § 961.16(2)(a)11., the pills 

referenced in both Counts 1 and 3 were Schedule II narcotic drugs, 

which comprise (inter alia), "[a]ny material, compound, mixture or 

preparation which contains any quantity" of oxycodone. (Emphasis 

added.) Possession of Schedule II narcotic drugs (such as 

oxycodone) is a Class I felony:

(am) Schedule I and II narcotic drugs. If a person 

possesses or attempts to possess a controlled substance 

included in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, 

or a controlled substance analog of a controlled 

substance included in schedule I or II which is a 

narcotic drug, the person is guilty of a Class I felony.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

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§ 961.41(3g)(am). Because our statutes proscribe possession of 

pills without regard to the amount of oxycodone they might contain, 

there is no legal distinction between possessing a pill containing 

20mg of oxycodone as opposed to one containing only 5mg of 

oxycodone. That, however, is the only difference between Counts 

1 and 3. As a result, neither count "require[d] proof of any fact 

in addition to those which must be proved for the other offense." 

See Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶60. We must therefore conclude 

that the offenses described in Counts 1 and 3 are identical in 

law.

¶28 The State says Counts 1 and 3 are different in fact 

because they were different in both time and nature. It says they 

are different in nature because it "had to prove that Brantner 

committed two different volitional acts of possession by obtaining 

two different types of oxycodone pills from different sources, 

showing that each possession required 'a new volitional departure'

by Brantner." See, e.g., Multaler, 252 Wis. 2d 54, ¶57 (explaining 

that charges are "'different in nature' . . . as long as each 

required 'a new volitional departure in the defendant's course of 

conduct.'"). The counts are different in time, the State says, 

because "Brantner either had to have taken possession of the 20mg 

oxycodone pills at some point when Michael[13] had a prescription 

for 20mg oxycodone pills, or obtained them from somewhere else." 

Either way, the State says, "Brantner had to complete the act of 

 

13 Michael is Mr. Brantner's brother, and it is the State's 

theory that Mr. Brantner stole the pills from him.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

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taking possession of each type of pill separately, therefore those 

acts were separate in time . . . ." See, e.g., Multaler, 252 

Wis. 2d 54, ¶56 (explaining that offenses are different in time if 

"there was sufficient time for reflection between the acts such 

that the defendant re-committed himself to the criminal 

conduct.").

¶29 Although the State is correct about what it had to prove, 

it is not possible to reconcile its conclusion with the evidence 

of record.14 The evidence certainly shows that Mr. Brantner 

possessed 20mg and 5mg oxycodone pills. But nothing in the record 

directly establishes that Mr. Brantner obtained the different 

dosages via "two different volitional acts" or temporally 

separated acts of acquisition. To remedy this dearth of evidence, 

the State proposed that we conclude the offenses were different in 

both nature and time through necessary inference from the evidence 

of record. 

¶30 The State's inferential reasoning cannot, by itself, 

connect its premises to its conclusions. Instead, its argument 

outsourced most of the evidentiary work to some pretty hefty 

 

14 The record says very little about how Mr. Brantner obtained 

the pills. At trial, the jury heard a recording of a phone call 

between Mr. Brantner and his significant other in which Mr. 

Brantner commented that he had gotten the pills from his brother, 

Michael, and that he'd had the pills since 2010. Detective Vergos 

testified that he attempted to ascertain the source of the pills 

by searching Michael's home. He testified that he discovered 

prescription pill bottles that matched four of the five types of 

pills and dosages found in Mr. Brantner's boot, but that he found 

no evidence that Michael had a prescription for 20mg oxycodone 

pills.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

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assumptions. The foundational assumption is that Mr. Brantner 

could not have obtained the 20mg and 5mg pills at the same time. 

It derives this assumption from one of two alternative scenarios, 

both of which rely on their own chain of assumptions. The first 

scenario started with the assumption that Mr. Brantner obtained 

all of the oxycodone pills from his brother's house. The State 

further assumed that his brother never had both 20mg and 5mg pills 

in the house at the same time. This assumption, however, required 

supporting assumptions of its own. So it assumed that the brother 

obtained both the 20mg and 5mg pills from valid prescriptions. It 

then observed that, when Mr. Brantner was arrested, his brother 

had a prescription for only the 5mg oxycodone pills. From this 

the State assumed that the 20mg pills must have come from a prior 

(and now superseded) prescription. The State had to also assume 

that the brother did not fill the prescription for the 5mg pills 

until he had used all of the 20mg pills from the assumed previous 

prescription. If we stack up all of these assumptions, the State 

says, we reach the conclusion that Mr. Brantner's brother never 

had 20mg and 5mg pills in the house at the same time. And that 

necessarily means Mr. Brantner had to have acquired the pills at 

different times. 

¶31 Alternatively, the State allows for the possibility that 

the 20mg and 5mg pills actually were in the brother's house at the 

same time. In this scenario, the State assumes that the brother 

assiduously kept his 20mg and 5mg pills separated into their 

respective, closed containers. To obtain both types of pills, 

therefore, Mr. Brantner would have had to open two separate 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

23

containers to access the drugs, thereby introducing a temporal 

distinction (however small) between the acquisitions.

¶32 The State needs all of these assumptions (or their 

alternatives) to be true to operationalize its "necessary 

inference" argument. But one need not be a cynic to recognize 

that the State's assumptions describe a world that is substantially 

neater and more precise than the one in which we live. It is 

altogether possible that each of the State's assumptions (or its

alternatives) reflect the process by which Mr. Brantner actually 

obtained the 20mg and 5mg oxycodone pills. But there is nothing 

to say that any of the assumptions is necessarily true. For 

example, Mr. Brantner's brother could have obtained the 20mg pills 

without a prescription, making it possible for him to have the 

20mg and 5mg pills in the house at the same time. Or he may have 

had prescriptions for both 20mg and 5mg pills that overlapped; or 

he may not have finished the 20mg pills before filling the 

prescription for the 5mg pills, either of which circumstance would 

make it possible for both dosages to be present in the house at 

the same time. And nothing says that, assuming Mr. Brantner's 

brother had 20mg and 5mg pills in the house at the same time, he 

would keep them carefully separated into different containers. 

And even if he did, nothing says Mr. Brantner did not just swipe 

the containers at the same time and only later emptied them into 

a bag for transport in his boot.

¶33 All of this means that, according to the record before 

us, there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Brantner must have 

obtained the 20mg and 5mg pills separately. If Mr. Brantner 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

24

obtained all the oxycodone pills simultaneously, it is not possible 

for there to have been different volitional departures in his 

course of conduct (meaning the offenses are not "different in 

nature"). And simultaneous acquisition also necessarily means 

they cannot be "different in time." Nothing in the record suggests 

that the State's assumptions describe the method by which Mr. 

Brantner obtained the oxycodone pills. So, unless we credit those 

assumptions (and we do not), the offenses described in Counts 1 

and 3 are the same in fact.15 

¶34 We conclude that, pursuant to the Blockburger elementsonly test, the offenses described in Counts 1 and 3 are identical 

in law and fact. 

2. Cumulative Punishment

¶35 Our resolution of the elements-only test means we 

presume our statutes do not permit multiple punishments for the 

offenses described in Counts 1 and 3. See Patterson, 329 

Wis. 2d 599, ¶15. However, we allow the State to "rebut that 

presumption . . . by a clear indication of contrary legislative 

intent." Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶61; see also Whalen v. United 

 

15 It is worth noting that there is no easily discernible 

limiting principle to the State's inferential assumptions. For 

example, the State's reasoning would appear to support charging 

Mr. Brantner with 37 counts of possessing oxycodone pills——one 

count for each of the 35 20mg pills, and one count for each of the 

5mg pills. The State could simply postulate that Mr. Brantner 

took one pill from his brother each day to reduce the chances of 

discovery, thereby resulting in an assumed total of 37 individual 

volitional acts. The State's reasoning would require no evidence 

that Mr. Brantner obtained the pills like this, only that he could 

have obtained them in that manner.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

25

States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980) ("Accordingly, where two 

statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense,' they are 

construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence 

of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.").

¶36 In this case, however, we need not perform this analysis. 

The State's argument with respect to this aspect of the 

multiplicity rubric anticipated success in demonstrating that the 

offenses described in Counts 1 and 3 are different in fact. If it 

had succeeded, of course, Mr. Brantner would have borne the burden 

of rebutting the presumption that the statutes allow for multiple 

punishments. So the State focused its argument entirely on 

explaining why Mr. Brantner could not rebut the presumption. As 

it turns out, the State did not succeed in proving the offenses 

are different in fact, and its brief did not provide for such a 

contingency. So Mr. Brantner enjoys the presumption that the 

statutes do not allow for multiple punishments for the same 

offense, and the State has offered no argument against that 

presumption. We will not develop an argument where the State has 

chosen not to. See Clean Wis., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 

2005 WI 93, ¶180 n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 ("We will 

not address undeveloped arguments."). Therefore, we conclude that 

the presumption remains and, consequently, that Counts 1 and 3 are 

multiplicitous.16

 

16 The State concedes "that if one of the oxycodone charges 

is vacated [as multiplicitous], then the corresponding bail 

jumping charge must be vacated as well." The parties did not fully 

address this issue before the court, and we will therefore rely on 

the State's concession in this case rather than deciding the issue.
No. 2018AP53-CR 

26

C. Resentencing

¶37 The circuit court fashioned a complex sentence based on 

the ten charges for which the jury returned a guilty verdict. In 

particular, the court sentenced Counts 1 and 3 differently, despite 

both having been oxycodone-related charges, because it believed it 

was "more logical and fair to consider one [of the two oxycodone 

charges]——Count 1 for prison." However, because Counts 1 and 3 

are multiplicitous, Mr. Brantner argues that "[t]he appropriate 

remedy . . . is resentencing on all counts." The State says the 

appropriate remedy is to remand the matter to the circuit court to 

allow it to determine whether resentencing is appropriate. We 

agree with the State.

¶38 "[W]hen a defendant is convicted of and sentenced for 

multiple offenses and one conviction and sentence is vacated 

because it was held to be multiplicitous, the validity of all 

sentences is implicated and resentencing on the remaining 

convictions is permissible." State v. Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d 245, 

255, 483 N.W.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Martin, 121 

Wis. 2d 670, 672-73, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985)). Accordingly, "the 

trial court has the inherent power to resentence, but it need not 

exercise that power." Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d at 255. We therefore 

remand the matter to the circuit court to exercise its discretion 

in determining whether resentencing is appropriate in light of our 

conclusion that Counts 1 and 3 are multiplicitous. 

IV. CONCLUSION

¶39 We affirm the court of appeals with respect to its 

conclusion that venue in Fond du Lac County was proper. We reverse 
No. 2018AP53-CR 

27

the court of appeals with respect to its conclusion that Counts 1 

and 3 were not multiplicitous and remand to the circuit court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶40 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 

affirmed in part, reversed and part, and the cause is remanded to 

the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

¶41 BRIAN K. HAGEDORN, J., did not participate.
No. 2018AP53-CR.pdr

1

¶42 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (concurring). Part of 

our obligation as supreme court justices is to take complicated 

legal issues and decide them in a way that simplifies and explains 

them. I write in concurrence because the majority opinion does 

the opposite. It takes a simple issue, possession, and makes it 

complicated. It also has the potential to confuse the meaning of 

possession, which is employed throughout Wisconsin's criminal 

code. Therefore, although I agree that possession was shown at 

trial, I join none of the majority's discussion of possession. I 

do, however, join the majority opinion's discussion and decision 

on the double jeopardy issue. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

I. BACKGROUND

¶43 On March 27, 2015, Fond du Lac County Sheriff's Office 

detectives took Dennis Brantner into custody on an arrest warrant 

as he was leaving the Kenosha County Courthouse. Upon arresting 

Brantner, Detective Vergos asked Brantner if he had anything on 

him that the detective should know about before he patted him down 

for the detectives' safety. Brantner did not disclose 54 pills, 

controlled substances, which he had placed in his left boot. 

¶44 Brantner was handcuffed to a belly belt for the trip to 

Fond du Lac County. When the detectives and Brantner arrived at 

the Fond du Lac County Jail, Brantner said he had cramps in his 

legs. He then asked to go to the bathroom. His handcuffs were 

removed, and Detective Vergos took him to the bathroom. Detective 

Vergos remained with Brantner until he was finished. Detective 

Vergos then took Brantner to the booking area where Brantner was 
No. 2018AP53-CR.pdr

2

told to remove his outer shirt and boots. Brantner took off his 

outer shirt, but said that he had cramps in his legs and indicated 

difficulty in removing his left boot. Detective Vergos offered to 

help him remove his boot. Brantner refused the detective's help 

and removed both boots himself. He gave them to the booking 

officer, who found a baggie containing 54 pills inside Brantner's 

left boot. 

¶45 At trial, Detective Vergos testified and a video 

recording of Brantner's intake was played for the jury. The 

circuit court also admitted into evidence and played audios of 

Brantner's jail phone calls, where he admitted that he got the 

pills from his brother, Michael.

¶46 The State charged Brantner with three counts of 

possession of narcotic drugs and two misdemeanors for the other 

pills in the baggie. Before trial, Brantner contested venue in 

Fond du Lac County, asserting that he did not possess the drugs in 

Fond du Lac County. He asserted that because he was handcuffed to 

a belly belt during his transport to Fond du Lac County, he could 

not control the pills in his boot and therefore, he did not possess 

them. He contends that the last time he possessed them was in 

Kenosha County before he was handcuffed. 

¶47 At trial, the circuit court gave the following jury 

instruction on the offense of possession of a controlled substance:

[T]he Wisconsin Statutes make[] it a crime to possess a 

controlled substance. 

Before you may find the defendant guilty of this 

offense, the State must prove by evidence which 

satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

following three elements were present. 
No. 2018AP53-CR.pdr

3

One, the defendant possessed a substance oxycodone, 

"OP" "20" 20 milligrams. 

"Possessed" means that the defendant knowingly had 

actual physical control of a substance.

A substance is also in a person's possession if it 

is in an area over which the person has control and the 

person intends to exercise control over the substance.

. . . .

Two, the substance was oxycodone. Oxycodone is a 

controlled substance whose possession is prohibited by 

law, without a valid prescription. 

Three, the defendant knew or believed that the 

substance was oxycodone, a controlled substance, and the 

defendant did not have a valid prescription. 

You cannot look into a person's mind to determine 

knowledge or belief. Knowledge or belief must be found, 

if found at all, from the defendant's acts, words, and 

statements, if any, and from the facts and circumstances 

in this case bearing upon knowledge or belief.

A criminal case is required to be tried in the 

county where the crime was committed.

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant committed the offense charged in Fond du Lac 

County, you should find the defendant guilty.

The definition of possession in the instructions given at trial is 

word-for-word consistent with Criminal Jury Instruction 920, which 

is employed to define possession throughout the criminal 

code: "'Possession' means that the defendant knowingly had actual 

physical control of the item." Wis JI——Criminal 920 (2000). 

II. DISCUSSION

¶48 Brantner's arguments about possession are focused on 

trying to avoid venue in Fond du Lac County. Sufficiency of the 

evidence is the standard used for deciding whether the State proved 

facts sufficient to support venue in Fond du Lac County. State v. 
No. 2018AP53-CR.pdr

4

Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 407-08, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998). An 

appellate court "will not reverse a conviction based on the failure 

of the State to establish venue unless the evidence, viewed most 

favorably to the State and the conviction, is so insufficient that 

there is no basis upon which a trier of fact could determine venue 

beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Swinson, 2003 WI App 45, 

¶19, 261 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 12.

¶49 Brantner grounds his venue argument in the contention 

that he did not possess the pills in Fond du Lac County because he 

could not reach them while he was handcuffed. His argument misses 

the mark for several reasons. First, even if one were to buy 

Brantner's argument that he could not possess the pills while 

handcuffed, which I do not, handcuffs were removed when he got to 

the Fond du Lac County Jail. His antics about leg cramps and 

difficulty removing his left boot demonstrate physical control of 

the pills that he knew were in his boot. Furthermore, it was 

Brantner who handed his left boot containing the pills to the 

booking clerk.

¶50 Second, Brantner has never objected to the correctness 

of those instructions——either at trial or in his petition for 

review. Nor does he bring a claim of ineffective assistance based 

on an erroneous jury instruction. Therefore, before us, the 

instructions on possession, set forth above, are uncontroverted. 

State v. Shea, 221 Wis. 2d 418, 430, 585 N.W.2d 662 (1998). Third, 

the jury made a finding of possession consistent with the circuit 

court's instructions on possession, i.e., that Brantner knowingly 

had actual physical control of the pills. It was uncontroverted 
No. 2018AP53-CR.pdr

5

that the pills were in Brantner's boot, pills that he obtained 

from his brother, Michael. Pills in a boot are not different from 

the facts in State v. Harris, 190 Wis. 2d 718, 721, 528 N.W.2d 7 

(Ct. App. 1994), where Harris was charged in Milwaukee County with 

possession when cocaine was discovered in his shoe during a 

probation search. 

¶51 Fourth, possession has "a consistent, established 

meaning throughout the Wisconsin criminal statutes." State v. 

Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 16, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994) (giving essentially 

the same instruction in regard to possession as the circuit court 

gave here). There was sufficient evidence for a jury reasonably 

to find that Brantner knowingly had actual physical control of the 

pills in Fond du Lac County. That he also knowingly had actual 

physical control of the pills in Kenosha County does not diminish 

the evidence of possession in Fond du Lac County. As Wis. Stat. 

§ 971.19(2) provides: "Where 2 or more acts are requisite to the 

commission of any offense, the trial may be in any county in which 

any of such acts occurred." State v. Elverman, 2015 WI App 91, 

¶38, 366 Wis. 2d 169, 873 N.W.2d 528. 

¶52 Finally, Brantner knowingly had actual physical control 

of the pills in his boot in Fond du Lac County, which boot was on 

his foot until he took it off and handed it to the booking agent. 

Brantner's ruse that he was having leg cramps and therefore had 

difficulty removing his boot only goes to confirm that he knew the 

pills were in his boot when he was in Fond du Lac County, and he 

was exerting control over them so that he would not be required to 

hand them over to the booking agent. The uncontested facts 
No. 2018AP53-CR.pdr

6

presented at trial were sufficient evidence for a jury to find 

that Brantner "knowingly had actual physical control" of the pills 

until he gave his boot to the officer at the Fond du Lac County 

Jail. 

III. CONCLUSION

¶53 The majority opinion takes a simple issue, possession, 

and makes it complicated. The majority opinion also has the 

potential to confuse the meaning of possession, which is employed 

throughout Wisconsin's criminal code. Therefore, although I agree 

that possession was shown at trial, I join none of the majority's 

discussion of possession. I do, however, join the majority

opinion's discussion and decision on the double jeopardy issue. 

Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 

¶54 I am authorized to state that Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND 

ZIEGLER joins this concurrence.
No. 2018AP53-CR.pdr

1