# The Attorney General of Texas
February 6, 1980

Honorable HenryWade District Attorney Sixth Floor, Records Buildin Dallas, Texas 75202 OpinionNo. m-199 Re: Validity of county prohibition on the purehese of faeign automobiles. Dear Mr. Wader You ask whetherthe Dsllas CountyCommiskners Court hasauthority to adopt a policy against the purchase of foreign cars for official county purposes. We first mustdetermine whether the purchase of automobilesby Dallas County is subject to article 2366% V.T.C.B., which requires competitive btdding

for any county purchaseof $3,000 or mae. Inthepast, section 2 of article 2368a 

### made the competitive bidding requirement inapplicable to counties having a population of mere than 350,600 inhabitants. Bee Acts 1973,6&d Leg., ch 269, S l, at 635. Thus, it did not apply to Dalla~ounty. 

### However, sectia~ 2 **of** article 2368a was revised by the 66th Legislature. It was the subjeot **of** two amendmen&l,which retained the population limitation. Senate Bill No. 4S6, Acts lS79,66th Leg., ch. 436, at 540; Senate Bill No. SOS, **Acts** 1929,66th Leg., ch, 824, at 2147. Another statute expressly repealed the population limitation. House Bill No. 1612, Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch 770, at ISOl, to be codified as 

### V.T.C.S. art. 2368a.3, S 8. The repealing statute was enacted cn May 24 and became effective on June 13. Each of the amendments was enacted at ti earlier date thsn ~therepeakr, hut became effective at a later date. Senate Bill 

### 436 was enacted on MayI2andbecame effective August 27. Senate BilI309 

### was enacted 

### UI.May

### 18end became effect4ve onJune 14. Where conductingstatutes are enacted by the name session of the legislature, the latest expression of legislative intent prevails Ex Jcp 

### Jesus de la 0. 227 S.W.td 212(Tex. Crim. MO); **Attorney** General Opmon -The repealingstatute was the last enacted statute, and thus

. represents the most recent expressian of legislative intent cn the subject. It fs suggested, however, that the statute with the latest effective We, rather 

### than date of enactment, should prevaiL We do not find a Texas case or Attorney General opinionthat deals with this issue, The Code Construction Act, however, states the following general rule:



### p. 1147.

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HonorableHenryWade - PageTwo (Mw-139)



### . . . if statutes enacted at the same or different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest in date of enactment prevails. 

### V.T.C.S. art. 5429b-2, S 3.05(a). Although article 2368a,V.T.C.S., is not part 0f.a code and thus not subject to the Code Construction Act, see HarrisCounty v. SuburbanUtility Company, 547 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. - Ho@& ilst Did.] 1977, no wit), th& provision does express the legislature’s view that the date **of** enactment is the significant date. Moreover, this question has been addressed by legal scholars and by the courts of otherjurisdictions. Sutherlandon Statutory Constructionstates the following rule:

Because the latest expression of the legislative will prevails, the statute last passed will prevaii over a statute passed prior to it, irrespective **of** 

### whether the prior statute takes effect before Q after the later statute. lA Sutherland

Statutory Construction, S 23.17,at 251(4th ed. by C. Sands 1972). See also

al 1905);Phelpsvi City of Minneapolis,219N.W. 87E conclude that House Bin 1612, as the latest expression of legislative intent, repealed the populationlimitation formerly found in section 2 of article 2368a,V.T.C.S. Dallas County is now subject to the competitive bidding requirement of that statute. In Texas Highway Comm’n v. Texas Ass% of Steel Importers, Inc., 372 S.W.2d.525 (Tex. 1963),the court dealt with a Highway Department rule restrictmg bids ‘to those providing that materials furnished would be .manufacturedin the United States, its territories endpossessions. The court held that the rule was illegal as a violation **of** the relevant eompetitive bidding statute and quoted with approval the following statement regardingcompetitive biddingfrom Sterrett v. BelJ.240S.W.Bd 516,520 (Tex. Civ. **App.**- Dallas 1955

no writ): Its purpose is to stimulate competition, prevent favoritism **and** secure the best work and materials at the lowest practicabLs price, **for** the beat interests and benefit **of** tha taxpayers and property 

### owners. There can be no competitive bidding in a legal sense where the terms **of** tha letting of the contract prevent or restrict competition, favor a contractor or material man, or increase the cost of the work or of the materials cc other items go@ into the project. 372 S.Wld at 527. Attorney General Opinion H-108608771 determined that a county requirementrestricting the source 

### of materials would also be an illegal restriction upon competitiar Consequently, Dallas County may not adopt a policy against the purchaseof foreign cats for 

### official county purposeswhere.thevalueof the contract exceeds $3,000.

p. 448. .:

HonorableHenryWade - PageThree (Mw-139)

SUMMARY Dallas County is subject to the competitive biddirrgrequiremmts stated in article 2366a,V.T.C.S. It may not adopt a policy agfhd the purchase of toreign ars ice official county purposeswherethe contract price exceeds $3,000.

Y%$g;# Attorney General of Texas JOHNW. FAINTER,JR. First Assistant Attorney General TEDL. HARTLEY Executive As&ant Attorney General Prepared bySusanGarrison Assistant Attorney General APPROVED:. OPINIONCOMMITTEE C. Robert Heath, Chairman Jim Allison DavidB. Brooks Walter Davis Bob Gammage SusanGarrison Rick Gilpin Bruce Youngblood .

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