Use of Military Personnel to Maintain Order Among Cuban

Parolees on Military Bases

T h e prohibition in the Posse C om itatus A ct, 18 U .S.C. § 1385, against using m ilitary 

personnel to execute the law , was not intended to restrict the m ilitary’s ability to 

m aintain o rd er am ong civilians on its ow n reservations.

M ilitary personnel m ay take any steps deem ed by the base com m ander to be reasonably 

necessary to ensure that C uban parolees housed on a m ilitary base d o not breach the 

peace o f the base, and m ay restrict them to areas o f the base specifically designated for 

their use; how ever, any claim o f a parolee o f a legal right to depart the base should be 

evaluated by non-m ilitary law enforcem ent personnel.

May 29, 1980

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR TH E ATTORNEY GENERAL

This responds to your request for our opinion whether, consistent 

with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, military personnel may 

be used to maintain law and order among the Cubans paroled into the 

United States and housed at various United States military bases, awaiting processing under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the 

Refugee Act of 1980. The answer to your question turns on general 

principles which this Department and the courts have considered over 

the years. Based upon this prior consideration, as set forth below, I 

conclude that the Posse Comitatus Act does not prohibit military commanders from directing the use of military personnel to maintain order 

among the Cuban parolees while on military bases.

Arrangements have been made for the Cuban parolees to be temporarily housed on three military bases: Fort Chaffee in Arkansas, Fort 

Indiantown Gap in Pennsylvania, and Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.1 

While the physical arrangements which have been made at each base 

differ in detail, certain features are common to all three. In each case, 

an area within the military reservation has been set aside for the 

parolees, and certain base facilities and supplies have been made available for their use while there. The area set aside has been cordoned 

off,2 and the parolees are not authorized to enter other areas of the base

'H ie use o f military facilities has been arranged by the Federal Em ergency M anagement Agency 

(FEM A ), under authority o f § 302(a) o f the Disaster Relief A ct Amendments o f 1974, Pub. L. No. 93- 

288, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Stat. 143.

2 At Eglin A FB a fence has been erected to surround the area in which the Cubans are being 

housed; at Fort ChafTee and at Indiantown Gap, the boundaries of the reserved area are marked only 

by sawhorses and ropes.

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except as the commanding officer may direct. At Fort Chaffee and at 

Indiantown Gap, the parolees are being housed in military barracks; at 

Eglin, temporary shelters of wood and canvas have been specially 

constructed.

At all three bases, military personnel have been sharing responsibility 

for the welfare of the parolees with state and federal civilian law 

enforcement and disaster relief personnel. Questions have been raised, 

however, as to the nature and extent of participation which may properly be expected of the military in this connection.

Historically, the commander of the military installation has had both 

the responsibility and the authority to maintain law and order in his 

command. This authority derives generally from the President’s constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief,3 as well as from statutes,4 and 

more particularly from regulations applicable to the respective military 

services.5 Congress has implicitly recognized the existence of this authority in two criminal statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which makes it 

unlawful to enter a military base for an unlawful purpose, or to reenter 

a base after having been removed therefrom; and 50 U.S.C. § 797, 

which makes unlawful the violation of any “regulation or order” issued 

by “any military commander designated by the Secretary of Defense” 

for “the protection or security o f ” property and places subject to his 

jurisdiction, including “the ingress thereto or egress or removal of 

persons therefrom. . . .”

The military’s power to preserve order among civilians on its own 

reservations has been recognized and affirmed by the Supreme Court, 

see, e.g., Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), and 

by your predecessors. The first explicit formulation of the power of 

military officers to maintain order among civilians on a military reservation is apparently that given by Attorney General Butler in 1837, 3 

Op. Att’y Gen. 268. In the course of affirming the power of the 

commandant of West Point to exclude civilians from that enclave, the 

Attorney G.eneral said that the commandant “has a general authority to 

prevent any person within [the base] limits from interrupting its disci3 We believe it beyond question that, inherent in the President’s pow er as Commander-in-Chief, is 

the authority to see that order and discipline are maintained in the arm ed forces. In the chain of 

command, base com m anders perform this function on behalf o f the President, on their respective 

bases.

4 Congress has provided that the Secretaries o f the Arm y and A ir Force “ [are] responsible for and

[have] the authority necessary to conduct all affairs'’ of their respective Departm ents, 10 U.S.C.

§§ 3012(b) and 8012(b). As part of this authority, the Secretaries have been given the pow er to issue

regulations for “the custody, use, and preservation of [the D epartm ent’s property].” 5 U.S.C. § 301. 

See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 4832 and 9832. The Suprem e C ourt has held that A rm y regulations, when 

sanctioned by the President, have the force of law. See United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291,

301-02 (1842).

s Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the A rm y state that a base com m ander is “ responsible for the efficient and econom ical operation, administration, service, and supply of all individuals, 

units, and activities assigned to or under the jurisdiction of the installation . . .“ 32 C .F.R . § 552.18(c).

Io the A ir Force, base com m anders are “responsible for protecting personnel and property under their 

jurisdictions -and for maintaining order on installations, to insure the uninterrupted and successful 

accomplishment of the A ir Force Mission." 32 C.F.R. § 809a. 1(a).

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pline, or obstructing in any way the performance of the duties assigned” to military personnel there stationed. Id. at 272. Even with 

respect to civilians owning property within a military enclave, “there 

can be no doubt of [the commandant’s] authority to exclude such 

person . . . from access to any part of the post not essential to the use 

of the building he may occupy, and to his ingress and egress from it.”

Attorney General Butler’s views of the broad discretionary power of 

the base commander were reiterated by Attorney General Hoyt in 

1906: “The power of a military commandant over a reservation is 

necessarily extensive and practically exclusive, forbidding entrance and 

controlling residence as the public interest may demand.” 26 Op. Att’y 

Gen. 91, 92.

Numerous statements of the Army Judge Advocate General’s Office 

reconfirm the long-standing power of commanding officers to control 

civilian access to and behavior on military bases:

It is well settled that a post commander can, under the 

authority conferred on him by statutes and regulations, in 

his discretion, exclude private persons and property therefrom, or admit them under such restrictions as he may 

prescribe in the interest of good order and military discipline.

JAG 680.44, October 6, 1925. See also JAGA 1956/8970, December 27, 

1956.

The commander of a military base has broad responsibility for the 

maintenance of order on the base under his command, and a commensurate degree of authority follows that responsibility. In the recent case 

of Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 367 (1971), the Supreme 

Court stressed “[t]he essential and obvious interest of the military in the 

security of persons and of property on the military enclave.” A military 

base need not be segregated, and, indeed, generally cannot rationally be 

segregated into military and non-military areas for law enforcement 

purposes. Thus, a base commander may exercise his authority to maintain order base-wide, even in areas utilized for putatively non-military 

purposes. In Relford, the Court emphasized:

[t]he impact and adverse effect that a crime committed 

against a person or property on a military base, thus 

violating the base’s very security, has upon morale, discipline, reputation and integrity of the base itself, upon its 

personnel and upon the military operation and the military mission.

401 U.S. at 367. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) in 

which the Court again noted “the historically unquestioned power” of 

a commanding officer to prevent civilian disruption of the functioning 

of a military base.

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It is necessary to reconcile this broad and accepted authority of 

military base commanders with the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1385. That statute, enacted during Reconstruction, provides:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air 

Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the 

laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned 

not more than two years, or both.

The Posse Comitatus Act was passed as a partisan reaction to the 

equally partisan use of troops for law enforcement purposes in the 

civilian community after the Civil War.6 The Act was not intended, 

and has never been interpreted, to restrict military authorities’ ability to 

maintain the security of a military installation.

In interpreting the applicability of the prohibition of the Posse Comitatus Act to the use of military personnel, the Department of Justice 

and the Department of Defense generally have been careful to distinguish between the use of such personnel on military bases, on the one 

hand, and off military bases on the other.7 And at least one court has 

specifically held that the Posse Comitatus Act was not intended to 

prohibit military personnel from arresting civilians on military bases 

who, by committing crimes, are a threat to military or other federal 

property or to the good order and discipline of the base. In United

States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1024

(1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

squarely rejected a civilian’s claim that his arrest by military police on a 

military base for violation of federal narcotics law violated the Posse 

Comitatus Act. The court held that the Act “does not prohibit military 

personnel from acting upon on-base violations committed by civilians.” 

539 F.2d at 16.

6 T he practice o f using troops in a marshal’s posse appears to have begun about 1854 during the 

bitter political struggle over the Fugitive Slave A ct in the N orth, and was explicitly approved by 

A ttorney G eneral Cushing. See 6 Op. A tt’y Gen. 466, 473 (1854). Following the Civil W ar, wide use 

was made o f the military posse for law enforcem ent activities under the control of federal marshals, 

federal officers, and sheriffs. See 7 Cong. Rec. 3581 (1878) (rem arks o f Rep. Kimmel). D uring the 

congressional debates over the Act, a number o f specific practices w ere cited as abuses: the use of 

troops by federal officials as guards during the 1876 presidential election, id. at 3850, 4185, and 4240 

(1878) (remarks o f Sens. Southard, M errimon, and Keman); the widespread use of troops to assist 

revenue officers in destroying illegal stills, id. at 4248 (remarks o f Sen. Hill); and the use o f troops, 

w ithout presidential authorization, to assist in the suppression o f a labor dispute, id. at 3581 (remarks 

o f Rep. Kimmel). T he deleterious effect o f the practice on the command structure o f the Army, and 

criticism Of the general practice by military leaders, w ere also cited, id. at 3581 and 4241 (remarks of 

Rep. Kimmel and Sen. Sargent).

7 F o r example, since 1942 an agreem ent has existed betw een the D epartm ents of Defense and 

Justice perm itting military lawyers to prosecute petty offenses com m itted on military reservations by 

civilian employees or visitors to the base. See paragraphs 6 and 7 of the D epartm ent of the -Army 

Regulation 27-40. In 1962, after this arrangem ent had been in effect for over 20 years, both the Office 

o f Legal Counsel of this D epartm ent and the Judge A dvocate G eneral of the A rm y reaffirmed that 

this practice does not violate the Posse Com itatus Act.

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Applying this learning and experience to present circumstances, I 

conclude that the Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict the broad 

authority of military commanders in their use of military personnel to 

protect the “morale, discipline, reputation and integrity” of the base 

while the Cuban parolees are housed there. To this end, military personnel may take any steps deemed by the base commander to be 

reasonably necessary to ensure that the Cuban parolees do not breach 

the peace of the base, even where disturbances are confined to the area 

to which the parolees are restricted. Military personnel may apprehend 

and restrain parolees for on-base violations of federal and state law 

which in the base commander’s view threaten the security and good 

order of the base.8

The military has primary authority for the care of the Cuban parolees 

while they are housed on the bases, and it can use military personnel to 

protect the delivery of that care against any disruption. Military personnel may use necessary force against civilian conduct threatening military equipment or facilities provided for the use of the parolees, and 

may patrol within the reserved area for this purpose.

Finally, a military commander may lawfully restrict the parolees’ 

access to areas of the base not specifically designated for their use, and 

may use military personnel to enforce this restriction. Specifically, 

military personnel may be used to contain the parolees within the area 

to which they have been assigned. However, a claim by a parolee of a 

legal right to depart a base should be evaluated by non-military law 

enforcement personnel.

It should not go unremarked that all or most of these measures seem 

to be well within the authority given the base commander in the 

regulations of both the Army and the Air Force.9

J o h n M . H a r m o n

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

8 If a Cuban parolee is arrested, he should be turned over as soon as practicable to civilian 

authorities. See 32 C .F.R . § 501.1(c).

9 See, e.g., 32 C .F.R . § 552.18(f) (A rm y com m andant may establish rules governing entry into and 

exit from the installation, and the search of civilians when entering, during their stay, o r when 

leaving); 32 C.F.R. §851.13 (A ir Force regulations on resource protection and visitor “control and 

surveillance” in controlled areas o f the base). See also 32 C.F.R. §503.1 (A rm y personnel have “the 

ordinary right and duty o f citizens to assist in the maintenance o f the peace,” and may apprehend and 

restrain persons com m itting a felony or breach o f the peace in their presence).

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