### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 01 93 -C R

______________________________ CHARL ES EUGENE ORAN GE, Appe llant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 124th J udicial District Court

Gre g g County , Texas Trial Court No. 34,849-B

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice MoseleySee T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 21.11(a) (1) ( Ver non Supp. 2009). 1 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON Charles Eug ene Ora

ng e was convicted by a Gre g g County jury of indec ency

with a child by contac t. The jury recommended a sentenc e of f

ive y ear s' imprisonment, but recommende d 1 suspension of that sentenc e and c ommunity supervision, a re commend at i o n ref lected in the tr ial court' s imposit ion of sentenc e. Orang e raises ten poi nts of error on appea l, which we g roup i n the following cate g ories of c omplaint: s u fficie ncy of the e vidence ; alleg ed juror misconduc t; alleg ed
e rr or in t he ex clu sio n o f e vid e nc e of Or ang e ' s a c qu itt a l in

an e arl ie r t

ri a l of sim ila r o ff e ns e s, including a

n alleg ation of double jeopa rdy ; and alleg ed err or in two evidentiar y ruling s by the trial
c ourt . A ft e r r e vie wi ngthe re c or ds and c on sid e ri ngor a l argume nt f ro m th e pa

rt ies, we ov e rr

ule Or ang e ' s p oin ts o f e rr or

and a ff ir m hi s c on vic tio n. We m od if y th e tr ia l c ourt ' s ju dg me nt t o
acc urate ly

ref lect the of fense of which O rang e wa s convicted, a nd as modified, we aff

irm. I. SUF F ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE Stand ards of Review I n r e vie wi ngthe le g a l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , w e vie w a ll the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t favor able to the ve rdict, and de termine whe ther a ny rational trier

of fa ct co uld have f

ound the essential ele ments of the off ense be y ond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Kin g v . S

tat e , 29 S.W .3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).We f ind the tr ia l c ourt ' s c ha

rg e to t he jur y us e d in thi s c a se to h a ve be e n in

su bs tanti a l—i f 2 n o tc o mp l e t e

— c o mp l i an c e w i t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e l aw , an d

t h u s , t h e e qu i v a l e n to f

a h yp o t h e t i c a l l ycorr ect c harg e. 3 I n a fa ctual sufficie ncy revie w, we revie w all the evidenc e, but do so in a neutra l light and deter mine whether

the evidenc e supporting the verdic t is so weak or is so outweighe d by the g reat
we i g h t an d p r e p o n d e r an c e o f

t h e e v i d e n c e t h a tt h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c ti s c l e ar l y

w r o n g o r

m a nif e stl y unjust. Lan c on v . S

tat e , 25 3 S.W. 3d

69 9, 70 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ); Ro be rts v . S tat e , 220 S.W .3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I n our re view of the sufficie ncy o f t h e ev i d ence , we a re instruc ted to use the hy pothetically -cor

rec t jury char g e ana ly sis to evaluate both the leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e. Gr ott i v . S

tat e , 273 S.W. 3d 27 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ). Suc h a c ha rg e a c c ur a te ly

se ts out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnec essar ily incre ase the State' s burden of proof or unnece ssarily restric t the State' s theories of liability , and adequately descr ibes the par

ticular offe nse for

which the de fenda

nt wa s tried. Vi lla rre al v . S tat e , 286 S.W .3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 09 ); Ma lik

v . S tat e , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 2 Apply ing the hy

pothetically -cor

rec t jury char g e an aly sis, we find that in order to convict Ora ng e of the offe nse of whic h he wa s convicted, it wa s nece ssary for the State to prove be y ond a
rea sonable doubt that (1) Ora ng e (2) eng ag ed in sexual contact (3) with a child y oung er tha n seventeen y ear s of ag e who wa s not his spouse. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 21.11(a) (1). " Sex ual
c on ta c t" me ans " any

tou c hin g of

the anu s, br e a st, or

any pa rt of the g e nit a ls o f a

no the r p e rs on

wi thKi lg or e , T e xas, is s itu a te d a str ide the lin e be tw e e n Gr e g g and Rus k Co un tie s. We a dd re ss 3 venue in our

analy sis of Orang e' s tenth point of error

. 4 in ten t t o aro us e o r gr ati fy th e sex ual des ir e of a ny

pers on ." T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 21.01(2) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). II. DIRECT EVIDENCE: J.P .'s TE STIMONY J .P., the victim, was fourtee n y ear s old at the time of trial. L iving with J.P . in a t railer park in K il g o r e , T e xa s , w e r e thr e e o th e r p e r ma n e n t r e s id e n ts : J. P. ' s mo th e r , T h e r e s a Williams, her 3 husband and J.P.'s stepfather, Mar k Wil liams, and J .P.'s one -y ear -y oung er sister, S.P. There wer e at least two o t h er i n termittent residents of the mobile home: There sa' s cousin, Ang ie B aker , and Ang ie' s boy friend, Steven Stewart. Further , during the per iod betwee n 2002 and 2004, Or ang e lived wi t h J
. P
. an d

h i s fa m i l y . Du ri n g h i s p er i o d o f r es i d en cy

w i t h t h e f

a m i l y , Or an ge s t ay edi nJ
. P
. 's
ro o m . J
. P. testified that during this period, Ora ng e fr equently

g ot into bed with him and touched h im , s ay in g th a t O r an g e " to u c h e d me . . . [i ]n my p r iv a te
. " H e w e n t o n to e xp la in that "pr ivate"
me ant h is p e nis and

that O ra ng e ha d to uc he d h is " pr ivate " wi th Or ang e ' s " ha nd s, his mouth a

nd his pr ivate ." Th is tou c hin g wa s und e rn e a th J.P. ' s c lot he s w hil e the y

we re lyingdo wn . O ra

ng e po int s
ou t th a t de sp ite thi s mor e se ri ou s c ha rg e by J.P., the jur

y a c qu itt e d h im o f a g g ra

vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult , but convicted him only

of indec ency

with a child by

contac t.A v i d eo re co rd i n g o f T erre l l 's No v em b er 2 0 0 4 i n t er v i ew wi t h J
. P
. wa s i n t ro d u ce d as S t at e's 4 Exhi bit 1. Te rr e ll t e sti fi e d tha t in te rv ie w w a s a bo ut a n h our l on g ; ho we ve r, the c op y su pp lie d to thi s Court ends abruptly

afte r about thi rty -seve n minutes, clear ly in the middle of the interview

. A l t h o u g h p r o v i d i n g e x h i b i t s t o t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r

ti s t h e c o u rtr e p o rt e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ( see T EX . R. A PP . P. 34.6(a)( 1)), in ca ses like this where au d i o / v i s u al exhibi ts are e ntere d into evidence , the proponent of that evidence would do well to see that the Court is suppli ed with either the ac tual exhibi t or a usea

ble copy

. 5 III. CIRCUM STANTIAL E VIDENCE B un n y T e r r e l l , a f o r e n s i c i n t e r

v i e w e r w i t h t h e C h i l dr e n ' s A d v o c a c y C e n t e r ( C A C ) in L ong view, testified that she conducte d two interviews with J.P . I n the first such inter view (c on du c te d o n N ov e mbe r 3 0, 20 04 ), J.P. in iti a lly state d n o o ne ha d e ng a g e d in any ina pp ro pr ia te tou c hin g wi th h im. Ho we ve r, wh e n T e rr e ll a sk e d if any on e ma de J.P. d o th ing s h e did no t w a nt t o do, J .P. used a marke r or pe n to point to Orang e' s name on a sheet upon which Terr ell had wr itten the name s o f p e rs on s li vin g in J.P.' s home

. I n the se c on d inte rv ie w ( c on du c te d in July 20 06 ), J.P. 4 said that Ora

ng e had touc hed J.P .' s penis and that Or ange h ad p u t J
. P.'s pe nis in Orang e' s mouth. Terr ell also offe red e x p er t t es t imony about a tec hnique commonly used by sexual abusers ca lled "g rooming ." She e x plained that this is a p ro cess whe reby sexual abusers esta

blish rapport with a
c hil d v ic timby

g ivi ngg if

ts o r s pe c ia l a tte nti on to the c hil d. She a lso e xpla ine d w hat sh e c a lle d c hil d abu se ac com mo dat io n s y nd rom e, w hi ch s he d e s c r i b e d as a "chi ldaccom mo dat [ in g] t he ab us e";
un de r t his sy nd ro me , th e c hi ld ba sic a lly

le arn s to liv e wi th o r a

bid e the a bu se be c a us e if the y tol d of the a bu siv e c on du c t, " thi ng s c ou ld b e wo rs e ." J.P. told Te rr e ll that O ra ng e sle pt i n th e be d w ith him. W hen J.P

. talked to Terr ell in 2004 about J .P.'s sleeping on the couch, he said Or ang e for badeTh e re wa s e vid e nc e the ho me ha d a ve ri ta ble me na g e ri e of anim a ls c omp ri se d of thr e e do g s, 5 two fer rets, two hamster s, and a c ockatiel. The dog s seemed to have fr ee r ang e of the interior of the ho us e and

ro uti ne ly ur inate d a

nd de fe c a te d in

it. 6 it, and qu ote d O ra

ng e a s sa y ing , " Yo u a

re n' t g oin g to g e t th a t st ink y sme ll o n y ou ; y ou

are g oin g to stay rig ht here ." 5 Ora ng e moved in with J .P.'s fa mily sometime during J .P.'s third-g rade y ear . J une B edfor d, J.P.' s th ir d- g ra de te a c he r, te sti fi e d th a t J.P. w a s n ot p op ula r a nd wa s ma de fu

n o f b y oth e r s tud e nts
. He ha d b e e n in fe ste d w ithlic e " a lot ," he c a me to sc ho ol wit h " be d h e a d, " so me tim e s w or e the same cl o t h es t wo d ay s i na r o w, h i s cl o t h es m i gh tb e w o rn i n s i d e o u t , an d h i s c l o t h e s l o o k edas t h o u gh the y c a m e f r o m G o o dw i l l

. H e o f

t e nh a d d i rt y h an d s w h e nh e c a m e t o s c h o o l an d B e d f o r d h a d to make sure he washed. Howeve r, by the fourth or fifth gra de, J.P .' s appea ranc e took a dr amatic turn for the better. He was dresse d in nice new clothes, which he said Ora ng e had boug ht for him, and J .P. sported jewelr

y , such as a nec klace and a br ace let. Ora ng e said that J.P . had g otten the nec klace by taking quarte rs out of a c an in which Or ang e kept them and then boug ht the necklace from a boy at school. J.P. te sti fi e d th a t he re g ula rl y sle pt i n his " sle e p c lot

he s, " wh ic h c on sis te d o f a sh ir t and sh or ts
an d t h at Or an ge s l ep ti nh i s "b o x er s " u n d erwe ar , b u tt h at J
. P
. wo u l d s l ee p i n h i s u n d erwe ar

i f O ra n ge was not pre sent. Ora

ng e bought t oy s (i.e, "[s] kateboa rd stuff a nd bike stuff" ), jewe lry , and clothing fo r J.P. Whe n th e y

we nt o ut t og e the r, Or ang e wo uld sp ra y his c olo g ne on

J.P. O ra ng e e nr oll e d J.P. in ka rate classes and in soc cer . Ora ng e fr equently

took J .P. to C huck E. Chee se, to the B MX trac k,7

and to Skateplex for rollerbla ding. A t home , they play ed tog ether

on the Xbox that Orang e provide d. J .P. testified t hat Orang e would preve nt him from seeing the re st of his family by making J .P. stay in his bedroom with Ora

ng e. Ora ng e kept the door to J .P.'s room c losed when the y wer e in the room toge ther. J .P. testified Orang e li ked to kee p things sec ret, e lucidating that "like stuff we do in our
ro om, he wo uld

n' t wa nt no bo dy to kn ow ." Che ry l Ho lla , the a ssi sta

nt pr inc ipa l wh e n J .P . wa s in fi ft h g ra de , s a id J.P. tol d h e r o ne da y e ith e r t hat " Cha rl e s and Isle e p tog e the r, " or

that " We s le e p in the same be d tog e the r. " Ev e n thou g h she c ou ld not pr e c ise ly re c a ll whi c h p hr a se wa s u se d, sh e sa id that at the time it was told to h er, she was not suffic iently conce rned w ith the content of the statement to notify

Child P rotec tive Service s (CPS ). J .P. ex plained that his f

ear of Ora ng e cause d him to not i nitially repor t the sexual abuse; he
s ai d t h at h e w as af

ra i d o f O ra n ge an d fe ar ed t h at Or an ge wo u l d h u rt m em b er s o f J

. P
. 's fa m i l y . J
. P
. 's mother testified that J.P . had ov er h ea rd Orang e tell her , "if any body ever come throug h the relationship of him and m y s o n , that he would kill me." J.P. also testi fied that he overhe ard the threat. Contrarily , it should be noted that sever al witnesses t es t i fi ed t h at they had see n J .P. and Ora ng e intera ct and did not think that J .P. fear ed Or ang e. I V. J . P. ' S H O ME L I FE J.P.' s mo the r a c kn ow le dg e d that CPS ha d be e n inv olv e d wi th s ome ov e rs ig ht o f t he fa mil y
a s f ar b a c k a s 1 99 7. She sa id that CPS ha d re sp on de d to alle g a tio ns of ne g le c t. At that time , J.P.
rec eived a

third-deg ree burned f

inge r fr om sticking it in an elec trical box; however, she denied a ny8

me mor y of a lle gati on s th at the c hil dr e n h a d s uf fe re d b la c ke ne d e y e s o r o the r b ru ise s o r o f C PS having rec eived a

repor t of lack of adequate supervision of the c hildren. Ther esa did a dmit to having discovere d S.P. and J .P. acting out or experimenting se x ually many times; on those occasions, she ha d ta lke d to the c hil dr e n a nd tol d the m the be havio r wa s wr on g , but the y pe rs ist e d in it. Ma rk sa id he un de rs too d O ra

ng e ' s d e sir e to k e e p th e do or to J.P.' s ro om shut so a s to e xclu de the do g s. Th e re sa admitted to having applied the bug kill er Raid on the heads of S .P. and J .P. and on their beds in an eff ort to rid them of lice, but de nied havingused ker osene in that eff ort. Howeve r, B ertile Johnson, a CPS i nvestig ator, said that her ag ency had rec eived a repor t of kerose ne beingused and that she ha d d e te rm ine d th a t sh e ha d " re a so n to be lie ve " that the c hil dr e n h a d s uf fe re d p hy sic a l a

bu se be c a us e of the use of

kerose ne. There sa re lated that Or ang e had told her in 2002 that he had nowhe re e lse to g o and that she ha d a llo we d him to mov e int o the Willi a ms ho me a t that tim e . She wa s injured in an autom ob ile
acc ident in Febr

uary 2003 and ca

me to rely on Ora ng e' s help around the house duringher pe riod of
rec overy . Ora

ng e wa s listed, along w ith Theresa ' s mother, with school offic ials as a pe rson
a uth or ize d to pic k u

p th e c hildr e n f

ro m sc ho ol i n th e e ve nt o f a n e me rg e nc y . A lth ou g h T he re sa
a sk e d O ra ng e to s le e p o n th e c ou c h, he sa id h e wo uld sle e p on the fl oo r i n J.P. ' s r oo m. S he be c a me
awa re that Orang e wa s sleeping in the bed with J .P., but did not think any thing wa s amiss in the

arr ang e me nt b e c a

us e the y we re tw o ma le s. Th ou g h O ra ng e wo rk e d n ig hts a t Wal- Ma rt , h e wo uld sleep in the be d with J .P. on hi s n ights off , and on the nig hts he was wor king, he would lay

down9

with J .P. to get him t o g o to sleep bef ore g oing to wor

k. She admitted she neve r did any thing to kee p Ora ng e fr om sleeping with J .P. because she did not think that a n y t h i n g wrongwas takingplace

. There sa testified that she gre w t o fea r Orang e and that Ora

ng e prevented J .P. from taking his ADHD medication. When T here sa would try to talk to Orang e about ke eping the door to J.P .' s room shut

a ll the tim e , O ra

ng e wo uld

thr e a te n to c a ll CP S. Katy Wady , a CPS i nvestig ator, s ai d she talked to J.P . when he was a bout seven or e ight y ear s old; she had bee n investigating r eports o f t h e chil dren ha ving lice . J .P. made an a lleg ation ag ainst Mark, his stepfather, but it does not appea r t hat any criminal ca se wa s pursued. Mar k denied the a lle g a tio n. Wad

y did say the re wa s a disc us sio n ab ou t sexua l ac tin g ou t by S.P. and J.P. S. P.
a lso re po rt e d h e r " tus hy " hurt ingand Ma rk watc hin g a

" nake d movi e." F ur

the r, tw o o the r C PS inv e sti g a t o r s , t o w h o m J. P
. d i d n o tm a k e ano u t c r

y o f a b u s e , d i d t e s t i f y t h a ti f anu n r e l a t e d

a d ult male wa s sleeping in the same be d with a child, it would cause them conce rn. V. DE F EN SIV E C ASE -I N- CH IEF Ora ng e pre sented seve ral witnesse s wh o m h e had either baby sat as childre n or par ents for whom he had a cted a s a baby sitter; they eac h testified that t h ey t h o u gh t he wa s safe to be ar ound children a nd that he h ad never ha

rmed or a bused childre n to their knowledg e. He also prese nted teac hers a

nd fac ulty

from J.P .' s school who testified var iously that J .P. had a bad rep u t at ion for truthfulness and who g ener al l y ex p re s s ed t hat they did not find J .P. to be a cr edible per son. One teac h er al s o testified she did not find J .P.'s mother, T here sa, cr edible. B edfor d, the third-g rade10

te a c h e r , a ls o te s ti f

ie d J. P. f r e qu e n tl y li e d a

b o u t h o me w o r

k an d e v e n ts in s c h o o l, to th e e xte n t that when he told he r about his mother being involved in an automobile ac cident, B edfor d did not believe J .P. Ora

ng e took the s tand and cate g orica lly denied J.P .' s alleg ations, also contra dicting se vera l
e le me nts of

te sti mony

g ive n b y J.P. a nd his fa mil y . H e sai d he had ne ve r b e e n k ic ke d o ut o f h is mother' s house. His version of the s tory was that he had known Theresa socially from the tra iler par

k neig hborhood and that it was Theresa who offere d to let Ora ng e li ve in her family home s o that he
c o u ld g e t t o w o r

k e a s ie r , s ay in g th a t h e h a d p r e v io u s ly

b e e nli v in g w it

h h is mo th e r , w h o r esided
some seven miles out of town. Ora ng e said that he could not a bide the filth in the W illiams hom e,
so he ate and bathed at his br other' s house. He clea ned J .P.'s room, wher e he stay ed , i n cluding
wee kly steam-c leaningof the c arpe t. He testified that he kept the door closed to ke ep the dog s out and that he did J.P .' s laundry beca use Ther esa ne ver did. Ora ng e explained that he worke d the overnight shift at Wal-Mar t and that if J.P . was not at home, he would slee p in J .P.'s be d; otherwise, he would sleep on the floor, using a pallet, e g g crate,
or an a ir ma ttr e ss. He sa id t

hat on on e oc c a sio n, J.P. ha d c ome do wn to the fl oo r to s le e p w ithhim and Or ang e had not be en aw are of that until awake ning. Ora ng e said a fter living in the Wil liams home about a y ear (about De cembe r 2003), he beg an to spend more time w ith J.P

. and beg an g etting him involved in kar ate a nd socce r. Ora

ng e said that he did thi s b e c a us e Mark wa s aw ay so muc h an d be c a us e he be lie ve d tha t The re sa ne ith e r a de qu a te ly11

supervised J .P., nor devoted sufficie nt time to him . He de nied g iving J.P . pref ere ntial treatment ove r S.P.; rathe r, he sa id the children ha d to ea rn specia l treatments (suc h as g oing out to eat) by perf orming small c hores and S.P. seldom did the littl e chore s for which Ora ng e g rade d t h em . He did say that he ha d bou g ht cl oth e s for S.P. , a sta te me nt w hic h w a s c on tr a dic te d b y oth e r w itn e sse s. Ora ng e testified that on four occa sions dur ing the per iod he lived with the family , he found S.P. and J .P
. in v ari ou s st a te s o f u nd re ss e ng a g e d in

se xua l c on ta c t. Wa dy

ha d in te rv ie we d J.P. about these a ctivities in April 2000. I n this int ervie w, J .P. had also made a n alleg ation that Mark ha d eng ag ed in some for

m of touching of J.P .' s "pr ivates." There wer e also statements by J .P. in 2005 to C PS w or

ke r Joh ns on

that a t so me po int

in the pa st, a

re la tio n o f J.P. ' s st e pf

a the r n a me d " Willi a m" had eng ag ed in some form of a busive behavior toward J.P. and S.P ., but these alleg ations were not clea rly develope d or explained in the rec ord. During oral arg ument, Ora ng e (refe rringto evidence that on se ve ra l oc c a sio ns , J.P. and S.P. ha d be e n ca ug ht en g a g ing in se xua l touc hin g or a c tiv iti e s) argued ther e wa s evidenc e J.P . had bee n "se x ualized" since about the ag e of f ive or six. Ora ng e s ai d t h at he had c aug ht There sa havingan af fair w ith St eve, the boy friend of Th e re sa ' s cou sin , Ang ie B a ke r. Or ang e sa id he tol d Mar k ab ou t the a ff

a ir , but w he n M ark

ta lke d to There sa about it, she said that Steve ha d just been sleeping on the floor near wher e Angie ha d been sleeping in There sa' s bed with Ther esa. O rang e said be cause of this affa ir, Ther esa a nd Steve
concoc ted a sc heme to g et Ora ng e out of the house

. Or ang e said that he overhe ard The resa and Ste ve plo t to g e t S. P. t o ma ke an a lle g a tio n of imp e rm iss ibl e tou c hin g a g a ins t Ora ng e , but t hat S. P.12

had re fused to par

ticipate. F ailin g t h i s , Or ang e maintained, the y convince d J .P. to make the alleg ations. Th e State the n c a lle d Ang ie on re bu tta l. She de nie d tha t The re sa and Ste ve ha d e ng a g e d in an af fair a nd denied, f

urther, O rang e' s testimony that he had f

ound Ang ie cry

ing a bout the aff

air a nd that she had ta lked to Ora ng e about it. Ang ie testified that Orang e' s testimony was the first that she had eve r hea

rd about a

n alleg ed af

fa ir betwe en The resa

and Steve. The resa

denied having ha d an aff air with Steve. VI. LEGAL SUF F ICIENCY Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to t h e ver dict, a rational jury could have f o u n d t h e e l e m e n t s o f i n d e c e n c y w i t h a c h i l d b y c o n t a c t b e y o n d a r e a s o nable do ub t. Jackson v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) . A lth ou g h o ur ana ly sis c on sid e rs a ll e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tr ia l, in a leg al suffic iency

revie w, we ma

y not rewe igh the evidenc e and substitute our judg ment for that of the jury

. King , 29 S.W .3d at 562. We find the evide nce to be leg ally s u ff i ci en t to support the conviction. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule O rang e' s first and sec ond points of error

. VII. F ACTUAL SUF F ICIENCY Ex amining the evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht, we obser ve that J.P . testified to the abuse by Ora ng e. Or ang e emphasiz es evidence calling J .P.'s credibility into question, but the cr edibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury to r esolve. Once we have dete rmined that the e vidence raised issues fo r t he jur y ' s r e so lut ion , w e wi ll n ot s it a s th e thi rt e e nth jur or re -e va luatin g the we ig ht a nd c re dib ili tySee T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22.021(a) (1)( B) (iii) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). 6 13 of the e vidence

. W

ill iam s v . S

tat e , 235 S.W .3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We g ive full play to the jury ' s respon s i b i l i t y t o weig h the evidenc e, re solve conflicts in the testimony , and dra w
rea sonable infere nces f

rom basic f

acts. J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 23 S.W .3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Cle wis v . S

tat e , 92 2 S.W. 2d 12 6, 13 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). Or ang e a lso po int s o ut t hat de sp ite J .P.'s stateme nt that Orange put J .P.'s pe nis in Orang e' s mouth, the jury acquitted Or ang e of the offe nse of a g g ravated sexual a ssault, but c onvicted him of indece ncy by contac t. The finder

of fa ct 6 deter mines the weig ht to place on contra dictory testimonial e vidence beca use that d eter

mination depends on the fact-finde r' s evaluation of credibility and deme anor. Cai n v . S

tat e , 958 S.W .2d 404, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). As the deter miner of the cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s, the fac t-finder may choose to be lieve all, some, or none of the testimony prese nted. Id . at 40 7 n .5 . As a n a pp e llate court, we may

not rewe igh t h e ev i d en ce or substitut e our judg ment for that of the fa ct-finde r. J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 9 67 S.W. 2d

41 0, 41 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); King , 29 S.W .3d at 562. As for Or ang e' s denials of the of fense , explanations of his behavior while living with J .P. and h i s fa m i l y , an d

wi t n es s es t es t i fy i n g t o t h e la ck o f cr ed i b i l i t y o f J

. P
. an d h i s m o t h er , an d t o Or an ge be inga sa fe pe rs on

a ro un d c hil dr e n, we c an n e ith e r s ay the e vid e nc e is so ob vi ou sly we a k a s to undermine c onfidenc e i n the ver dict, nor is the evidenc e, if take n alone, g reatly outweig hed byOr ang e ' s f ourt h p oin t of

e rr or ba sic a lly a sse rt s th a t be c a

us e the S tate a c kn ow le dg e d in 7 opening argument that J .P. had a history of telling lies, his testim ony must be completely

discounted o r e x c l u d e d f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n . W e c o n s t r u e t h i s ar g u m e n ta s ana t t a c k u p o nJ
. P
. ' s c r e d i b i l i t y, which wa s considere d and dec ided by the jury

. Or ang e a lso a tte mpt s to re ly on a thi rd do c ume nt t o w hi ch he ref e rs a s an a ff

ida vit

. 8 Howeve r, that docume nt is not si g ned; there is a copy of an e mail in the rec ord purpor ting to be f

rom the jur or statin g tha

t a lth ou g h h e did

no t w ant t o s ig n it , h e wo uld a pp e ar t o te sti fy

a bo ut i ts c on te nt.
14 contra ry proof so a s to be clea

rly wrongand unjust. Zul ian i v . S tat e , 97 S.W .3d 5 8 9 , 5 9 5 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ). Th e e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt. We overrule Ora

ng e' s third and fourth points of er ror. 7 VIII. ALLEGATIONS OF JURYMISCONDUCT A. Aff

idavits Coul d Not be Considered I n his fifth point of error , Ora ng e clai m s t h at t h e jury

eng ag ed in misconduct and the trial
c ourt e rr e d in no t g ra nti ngOr ang e ' s mo tio n fo r ne w tr ia l ba se d on thi s a lle g e d mi sc on du c t. I n h is po int s r e g ar d i n g

j u r y m i s c o nd uc t, O ra ng e re lie s o n a ff

ida vit s f ro m tw o ju

ro rs , wh ic h g e ne ra lly

c la im 8 the ver dict was re ache d by compromise; that is, beca use the jury

could not ag re e on a una nimous

v er d i ct , t hey

ag ree d to find Orang e g uilty of indec ency

with a child (the le sser off ense) and then
rec ommend community

supervision. Ora ng e' s complaints are foiled by Rule 606(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence : Inq uiry into Validity of V erdictor Indictm ent. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a ve rdict or ind i ct ment, a juror ma y not testify

as to any

matter or statement occurring during the j ury ' s deliberations, or t o the effec t of any thing on any juror' s mind or emotions or mental proce sses, as influenc ing a ny juror' s assent to or15

dissent from the verdict or i ndictment. Nor may a juror's a ffidavit or a ny statement by a juror c oncer

ning a ny matter a bout which the jur o r wo u l d be pre cluded f rom testify ing be admitted in evidenc e for any of t hese pur poses. Howe ver, a

juror may testify : (1) whether any outside influence was improperly broug ht to bear upon a

ny juror; or (2) to rebut a c laim that the juror wa s not qualified to serve

. T EX . R. E V ID . 60 6. Th is ru le pla inl y fo rb a de the tr ia l c ourt fr om c on sid e ri ngthe jur or a ff ida vit s to the extent they

discussed matters occur

ring in de liberations. See State v. Krueger , 179 S.W .3d 663, 665–66 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2005, no pet. ) (trial court g rante d motion for new tria l based on informal discussions betwee n court, attorney s, and jurors following trial; court of appea ls rever sed be c a us e jur or s' state me nts no t c omp e te nt e vid e nc e un de r R ule 60 6( b) ); Da v is v. Sta te , 119 S.W .3d 35 9, 36 5– 66 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 3, pe t. r e f' d) (t e sti mony of jur y ' s c on sid e ra

tio n o f p a ro le application not per

mitted under Rule 606(b) a t hear ing on motion for ne w trial); H ines v . Stat e , 3 S.W .3d 618, 621 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. ref' d) (stating under Rule 606(b), juror s not competent to testify "that the y decide d the verdic t by lot, that they decide d the ca se base d on another juror' s incorre ct statement of the law, or that they discussed the de fenda

nt's f ailure to testify

and used that failure as a ba sis for convicting him"). The affidavits from the jurors could not be consider ed to atta c k a

ny ma tte r w ith in t

he jur y ' s d e lib e ra

tio ns . B. Bif

urcate d Trial Or ang e a lso c la ims the a lle g e d ju ry mis c on du c t de nie d h im a bif ur c a te d tr ia l. H e su

pp or ts this claim by

pointing to a note f

rom the j ury , during g uilt/i nnocenc e deliberations, asking whether the jur y wa s " re sp on sib le fo r the se nte nc ing ph a se ." Th e tr ia l c ourt se nt b a c k a

no te sa y ingthat inTh e on ly c a se c ite d b y Or ang e in t

his br ie f a sse rt ion

of e rr or is Fa irf ie ld v . S tat e , 610 S.W .2d 9 771, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. [P anel Op.] 1981), whe re a footnote mentions that with a g uilty plea, the tr ia l be c ome s unit ary , th a t is , o nly a punis hme nt t

ri a l. 16 the eve nt of a guilty

verdic t, it would assess punis h m en t
. "H oweve r[,] y ou are not to discuss or
c on c e rn y ours e lve s wi th the iss ue of punis hme nt duri ng y our de lib e ratio ns a t th is p ha se of the tr ia l. Th e so le iss ue be fo re the jur y a t th is t ime is whe th er th e Defe nd ant i s g uil ty or no t g uil ty . Pl e a se continue y our deliber ations." O rang e also points out that the jury deliberated onl y twelve minutes on punishment. The jury

is presumed to have followed the trial court' s instruction in the not e above

. Colbu rn v . S

tat e , 966 S.W .2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Or ang e has not e x plained or
e sta bli sh e d h owthe se c ir c ums tanc e s d e mon str a te a de nia l of the bif ur c a te d tr ia l pr ov ide d f

or in Article 37.07. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 37.07 (V ernon Supp. 2009). 9 C. Outsid e Infl uence Or ang e a lso c la ims an o uts ide inf lue nc e wa s b ro ug ht t o b e ar up on th e jur y , w hic h h e a lso de sc ri be s a s an ind ic a tio n of j ur y mis c on du c t. T his is a

pe rm iss ibl e are a

of jur or dis c us sio n, pe r R

ule 606(b). One of the juror

aff idavits s ay s , "i t ca m e o ut that one of the juror s had bee n molested or

a bu se d a s a

c hil d a nd sh e had de c ide d n ot t o h a ve c hil dr e n f or tha t r e a so n. She c on sid e re d th is inc ide nt [w he re a

po lic e of fi c e r foun d Or ang e in a

c ar w a tc hin g c hil dr e n o n a pla y g ro un d w ith binoculars] important evidence to convict the def endant of something." Ora

ng e concludes the juror mentioned in the af

fi d av i t must have bee n the same one who ac knowledg ed, in voir dire, that she had been a victim of sexual assault from the ag es of six t hroug h twelve. Unde r questioning by theSee T EX . R. E V ID . 606(b). 10 17 attorney s and the trial c ourt, this juror said she could rema in impartial and dec ide Ora ng e' s case on the evidenc e adduce d and set aside her pe rsonal history . We first point out t here is nothing in the
re c or d to c on c lus ive ly

e sta bli shthat th e jur or

wh o a dd re sse d th e c ourt fo llo wi ng vo ir dir e is the same
one re fer red t o i n t h e above aff

idavit. But more importa ntly , the plain lang uag e of Rule 606( b) indicates that an outside influence is something outside both the jury room and the juror

. W

hite v. Sta te , 225 S.W .3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). "E ven a juror' s injection of his own per sonal
e xpe ri e nc e s, kn ow le dg e , o r e xpe rt ise is n ot c on sid e re d a n o uts ide inf

luenc e, b e c a

us e tho se repr esen tat io ns ema nat e fro m in si de the ju ry ." Hines , 3 S.W .3d at 623 (discussion of pa role lawat deliberations held not to be an outside influence ). Even assuming a juror made ref ere nce to personal experience s during deliberations (for which the re is dec idedly scant if a ny evidenc e in the re cord) , there is nothing that would qualify as an outside influe nce. IX. DENIAL OF M OTION FOR NEW TRIAL Or an ge's s i x t h an d s ev en t h p o i n t s o f erro r cl ai m t h e tr i al co u rt erre d i n n o t gra n t i n g Or an ge's reque st for a ne w trial. W e re view a tr ial court' s ruling on a motion for new tria l under a n abuse of discretion standa

rd. State v. He rndon , 215 S.W .3d 901, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I f we understand O rang e' s six th and seve nth points correc tly , he appe ars to cla im that notwithstanding interpr etations of Rule 606(b) (discussed a bove) and Rules 21.4, 21.5, and 21.7 10See T EX . R. A PP . P. 21.4, 21.5, 21.7. 11 18 of the Te x as Rules of Appellate P roce dure (addr essing motions for new t rial) a s well as ca selaw 11 from the Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls and intermediate Texas courts of a ppeals, the tria l court abused its discre tion in failing to consider the j uror affidavits for the purpose of proving an imprope r method of re achingthe jury ' s verdict; by ref using to c onsider the af

fidavits on the basis they

wer e untimely filed; and that Rules 21.4, 21.5, 21.7, and 606(b) violate the sepa ration of powe rs doctrine of constitutional law. We have e stablished, i n our discussion of Ora ng e' s fifth point of err or, that Rul e 60 6( b) pr e c lud e s tes tim on y or a ff ida vit s del vin g int o a jur

y ' s del ibe ratio ns . T he tr ia l c ourt did not abuse its discretion in dec lining to consider those parts of the juror af fidavits which addr essed deliberations. Ad dit ion a lly , th e tr ia l c ourt wa s w e ll w ith in i ts d isc re tio n to no t c on sid e r the a ff ida vit s at a ll. Th e tr ia l c ourt po int e d o ut t o O ra ng e langua g e fr om Kla

pe sk yv . S tat e , 2 5 6 S. W. 3 d 4 4 2 , 4 5 5 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref ' d): "F iling aff

idavits in support of a motion for new trial more than 30 day s after sentenc ing is c onsidered a n untimely

attempt to amend the motion." I n Ora ng e' s case , the judgme nt was ente red June 27, 2008; the m otion for new t rial was filed J uly 17, 2008; Orang e then filed the a ffidavits August 26, 27, and 28; and an a mended motion for ne w trial September 3, 2008. An amende d motion for new tria l must be filed within the t hirty -day period prescribe d for the f iling of a motion for ne w trial. T EX . R. A PP . P. 2 1. 4. ; Sta te v . M oo re , 2 25 S.W. 3d

55 6, 56 6 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2007).We d o a c kn ow le dg e a se e min g inc on g ru ity

in 6 06 (b ) s tr ic t a

pp lic a tio n: i .e ., ho w is a 12 purported instanc e of juror misconduct to be investig ated whe re the only parties to the de liberation are prec luded from discussing events in that deliber ation? See Just ice Gr ant' s concur renc e fr om se ve ra l y e ars a g o: I must express conce rn about Rule 606(b) of the Tex as Rules of Evidence. Iurg e the Texas Supreme Court and the Te x as Court of C riminal Appea ls to examine the broa d langua g e of

thi s r ule in l ig ht o f t

he po ssi ble c on se qu e nc e s. Th is r ule c ou ld u n d e r m i n e c o u rtp r o c e d

u r e s an d r e n d e r t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s an d

d e l i b e r a t i o n s a

m o c k e r y. I t prohibits juro rs fr om testify ing a bout any thing e x cept outside influenc es that 19 Ora ng e cla ims that Rul e 606(b) is unconstituti o nal bec ause it violates the se paration of po w e r s d o c tr in e . F o r

me r Ch ie f Ju s ti c e Co r

n e li u s o f th is Co u rt a d dr e s s e d th e c o n s ti tuti o n a li ty of Rule 606(b) in Hines , 3 S.W .3d at 622–23, and f ound the rule c onstitut ional. Fur ther, when the Texas Court o f C ri m inal Appea ls affirme d this Court i n W hit e , that court a g ree d with our finding that 606(b) is constitutional. W hit e , 2 25 S.W. 3d at 572– 73 . O ra ng e a lso c la ims 60 6( b) is unconstitutional because it violates the separ ation of powe rs doctrine . He ar gu es that "it violates separ ation of powe rs for a Court-made Rule to ab ro gat e a (f ormer) statute." I n this contention, Ora ng e re fer s to former A rticle 40.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e; he a cknowledg es this statute was repe aled in 1986 and replac ed by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedur e. Onc e the statute was repea led, it was no long er in e ffe ct; there fore , there is certa inly no conflict be tween the leg islative and judicial bra nche s t h ere . Ora

ng e does not e x plain how a r ule of e vidence (implemented by

the Texas judiciary

) can be in such c onflict with the Rules of Appellate Procedur e (also implemented by

the Texas judiciary

) such that a separ ation of powe rs violation has occ urre d. We overrule Ora

ng e' s six th and seve nth points of error

. 12aff ecte d their dec ision.

. . . . Iunderstand the need to make verdic ts final and the need not to open up the testimony to what might have bee n eac h juror' s ment al p ro ce s ses, but matters aff ectingthe fundamental process of j ury deliberation should not be for ever closed to j ud ic ia l r e vie w. I n th e pr e se nt c a se , if the jur y fo re man r e fu se d to a llo w a jur or to chang e h is v o te p r io r to th e ju r y r e tu r n in g it s v e r d ic t to th e c o u rt, th is s h o uld be a ma tte r t hat c ou ld b e c on sid e re d b y the c ourt
. Ha rt v . S tat e , 15 S.W .3d 117, 124 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. re f' d) (Gr ant, J ., concur ring ). Howeve r, Rule 606(b) ha s been c onsistently upheld and a

pp l i ed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls, and we f

ind it controls this situation. I n t h e pr ev i o u s t h re e tr i al s , as we l l as t h e in s t an t ca s e al l egi n g J
. P
. as t h e vi c t i m , G re gg 13 County us e d " JohnDo e " and a sp e c if ic numbe r, pr ob a

bly c or re sp on din g wi th t

he c hil d v ic tim ' s d a te of birth, t o i dentify

eac h complainant. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 57.02(h) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). 20 X. NO ERROR IN NOT ADMITTINGEVIDENCE OF P RIOR ACQUITTAL I n his e ighth point of err or, Ora ng e claims the trial court err ed in pr eventing the j u ry fr om hear ing e vidence that Ora ng e had pr eviousl y b ee n acquitted on thre e indictments which a lleg ed offe nses similar to those for whic h he wa s tried in the instant case . I n Aug ust 2007, Ora ng e wa s tried, in a c onsolidated proce eding , for thre e indictments, which a lleg ed var ious cou nts o f a g g ravated sexual assault and indece ncy with a child; eac h indictment alleg ed a differ ent vi ctim. Ora ng e wa s
a c qu itt e d o n a ll c ounts , o n a ll thr e e ind ic tme nts
. J.P. te sti fi e d in re bu tta l fo r the State a t th a t tr ia l, bu t he wa s n ot o ne of

the name d v ic tim s in

any of the thr e e ind ic tme nts
. 1321

We f ind tha t O ra ng e is p roc e dura lly

ba rr e d f ro m a sse rt ingthi s c la im b e c a us e he fa ile d to prese rve a

ny such er ror f or appe llate re view. Specif ically , we c an find nowhe re in the r ecor d wher e Ora ng e either objected to the t rial court's ruling that evidenc e of the ac quittals was not admissible,
or wh e re Or ang e sp e c if

ic a lly tol d th e tr ia l c ourt

he wi sh e d to in tr od

uc e thi s e vid e nc e . Pr ior

to t ri a l, Ora ng e filed a motion in limine, c overing such are as as prior convictions, prior arres t s , prior offe nses, and a

ny alleg ed prior violations of the la w. B oth parties agr ee d t o b e bound by the
c on str a int s so ug ht i n th a t mo tio n in lim ine

. Th ro ug ho ut tr ia l, a t va ri ou s c on fe re nc e s and

argume nts outside the jury ' s prese nce, the re a re nume rous mentions of a "motion in lim ine," which see m to refe r to a motion requiring at-the- bench disc ussions before ref ere nce to the pr ior trial. Fu rt h er , on the
rec ord (but outside the jury ' s prese nce) , numerous witnesse s a re a dmonished to eschew

any ref ere nce to the j udg ments from the prior trial or to the other alleg ed victims; they

wer e instructed, instea d, that any ref ere nce to a

ny thing f rom that p ri o r t ri al s hould be to the ea rlier " hear ing." Howeve r, at no place in the rec ord bef

ore us did Ora

ng e either challeng e these proc edure s or inform the tria l court that he wished to pre sent evidenc e of the prior judg ments. Ora ng e complains ther e is no motion in limine filed by the S tate in the appellate re cord, a nd he is corr ect—no suc h motion can be f ound

. T h e S t at e, h oweve r, see ms to indi cate that such a mot ion wa s f ile d. Th e " Ag re e me nt a

nd Or de r R e g ard ingPr e -Trial Mo tio ns " ind ic a te s th a t bo th Ora ng e' s motion i n limine a

nd a motion in limine f

iled by the State wer e ag ree d to by the par ties.22

Ev e n w ith ou t th e State ' s motio n b e fo re us , f ro m st a te me nts by

the pa rt ie s and the tr ia l c ourt , it is clea r t hat s pecif

ics of t he prior trial wer e not t o come be fore the jury . As we ha ve mentioned, Or a ng e n e v e r

v o i c e d an y o b j e c t i o nt o t h i s p r o c e d

u r e . A to n e p o i n th e s a i d , " I ' m j u s te xtre me ly
conce rned that some wher e along the line it's g oing to le ad into that are a wher e we ' re try ing to avoid, which is the three case s he' s alrea dy been acquitted on." T hen, af ter the tria l court ruled that a video
rec ording could be a dmitted into evidence a nd that Bur ch could sponso r i t s introduction, but that Bur ch could not mention when the war rant wa s executed, the followingcolloquy took place: [DE F EN SE C OU

NSE L ]: An d th e n I a lso

-- are we g oin g to n e e d mo tio ns in limine or any

thing limine-ing that -- a

re w e off limit s fo r t al k i n g about these othe r thr e e c a se s? TH E CO UR T: We a

re of f l imi ts talkinga

bo ut t he oth e r t hr e e c a se s. My understandingof wha

t [the State] said, she wasn' t e ven g oing to g o into the date of the sea rch w arr ant, that way

it doesn' t make the jury

-- [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: That i s no problem. I ' m just ki nd of cur ious how it's g oing to be phrase d, as t o how t hey enter ed his home, or they executed a se arc h war rant . . . . I t is noted, further, at the conclusion of voir dire, the issue of the r eleva nce of the prior a cquittals was the subject of an ex chang e between the trial court and Ora ng e' s attorney , during which ti me the trial court indi cate d that Ora

ng e was not to raise the matter of those ac quittals before the jury during the g uilt/i nnocenc e phase of the trial. On the r ecor d, Ora ng e' s attorney

then explained that instruction to Orang e. Dur ing the se discussions, neither Or ange n o r h i s att orney voiced a ny dissent from or objection to this instruction. Thus, althoug h the t rial court made no formal ruling at that juncture,Even if Or ang e had oppose d the State' s m o t i o n i n l i mine reg ardingevidenc e of the prior 14 acquittal, it would have be en nec essar y for him t o o b t ai n an adve rse r uling dur ing the trial which preve nted him f

rom offe ring the evidenc e in orde r to prese rve a ny err or in the matter. Se e Ha rn e tt , 38 S.W .3d at 655. 23 it i s qu ite c le ar that Or ang e wa s w e ll a wa re of the tr ia l c ourt ' s p os iti on

re g ard ingthe a dmi ssi bil ity of evide nce of

the prior tria l, a

nd Ora ng e never objected to that positi on. He ne ither there afte r made

an atte mpt

to p ro ff e r e vid e nc e of

the a c qu itt a l in the pr ior tr ia l, no r ob ta ine d a ru lin g that he c ou ld not do so. In this c ontext , it is appropr iate to note that a ruling on a motion in limine is not a ruling that excludes evidenc e; rather, it mere ly require s the parties to a

pproac h the trial court for a definitive ruling befor e attempting to put on evidence within the sc ope of the order on the motion in li mine. Bo bo v . S

tat e , 7 57 S.W. 2d

58 , 6 1 ( Tex . App .—Ho us ton [14t h D ist .] 19 88 , p e t. r e f' d) . " I t is

ax io mat ic th at mo ti on s in l im in e do no t p res erve erro r." Ha rn e tt v . S tat e , 3 8 S. W. 3 d

6 5 0 , 6 5 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 00 , p e t. r e f' d) . Aru lin g on a mot ion in l imi ne is n ot a

ru lin g on the me ri ts, bu t on ly
o n e wh i ch re g ulates the a dminist ration of a trial. Acc ording ly , Ora

ng e has f ailed to pre serve any
err or conc erningthis matter for r eview. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1. 14 Ev e n h a d O ra

ng e pr eser ved th is c la im f or a pp e llate re vie w, we wo uld fi nd no re ve rs ibl e
err or. We revie w eviden t i ar y ru l i n g s under a n abuse of

discretion standa

rd. Sa laz ar

v . S tat e , 38 S.W. 3d 14 1, 15 3– 54 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se s it s d iscreti on whe n it a c ts "w ithout refer en ce t o an y gu iding r ules and princ iples, or ac ts in a manner that is arbitrary or capr ici ou s. " Lam v . S

tat e , 25 S.W .3d 233, 236–37 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (c iting Mo ntgom e ry

v . S tat e , 8 10 S.W. 2d

37 2, 39 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 )) . Atr ia l c ourt do e s n ot a

bu seSee U. S. C O N ST . ame nd s. V, XIV; T EX . C O N ST . art. I , § 14. 15 24 it s d is cret io n i f i t s ru l i n g was at lea st wi th in "th e z on e of r easo nab le d is agreemen t. " Salazar , 38 S.W .3d at 153–54. At least two case s have found err or wher e a trial court allowed the State to offer evidenc e conc ernin g p ri o r ex trane ous offe nses, eve n though the defe ndant had be en ac quitted of those extraneous alleg ations. Stu ar t v . S tat e , 561 S.W
. 2 d 1 8 1, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Mc Do we ll v . S

tat e , 142 Tex. Crim . 530, 155 S.W .2d 377 (1941). He re, it could not be sa id the trial
c ourt ru lin g wa s o uts ide the zon e of re a so na ble dis a g re e me nt, and

therefo re, it ca

nn ot b e sa id i t abused its discre tion. Orang e' s eig hth point of error is overrule d. XI. NO DOUBLE JE OP ARDY Ora ng e cla ims that he was subjected to double jeopar dy in violation of the United States and Te xas C on sti tut ion s. He argue s th a t be c a us e J.P., the vict im in th e ins tant c a se , te sti fi e d a s a 15 rebuttal witness in the pre vious trial (see our discuss i on of Ora

ng e' s eig hth point of error above) , Or ang e c ann ot n owbe su bje c ted to a tr ial whe re the pr ior tr ia l' s w itn e ss i s n owthe c omp la ina nt. Although O rang e offe rs no authority or rea soning for this contention, it i s assumed that he r easons t h at i f a p ri o r j u ry

ac q u i t t e d h i m i nt h e p re v i o u s ca s e, t h at j u ry m u s th av e d i s b el i ev edJ
. P
. 's t e s t i m o n y. The Double J eopar dy Clause of the F ifth Amendment, applica ble to the States throug h the Four teenth Amendme nt, protects an acc used ag ainst a second prosec ution f or the same off

ense f or whi c h h e h a s b e e n p r e v io u s ly a c qu itte d o r p r e v io u s ly c o n v ic te d

. I t a ls o p r o te c ts an a ccuse d from"[T]wo offense s ca n n o t b e the same if they have dif fer ent leg al eleme nts. But under the 16 Do ub le Jeop ard

y Cla us e , a n o ff e ns e mus t no t only be the same in law - - i t mu st a lso be the same in fac t. Even if Robert is convic ted of robbe ry in an ear lier trial, he may

later be char g ed with and trie d f o r r o b b e r y s o l o n g a s t h e s e c o n d i n d i c t m e n t c o n c e r n s a f a c tu a l l y d i f

f e r e n tr o b b e r

y - - c o m m i t t e d , s a y, on a diffe rent da

y ag ainst a diffe rent victim. . . . Even if the identity of the robbe ry victim and the day of the robbe ry

are not formal ele ments of the off ense of robbe ry -- in other words, eve n if the leg al eleme nts in Robert's two tria ls are ide ntical -- Robe rt would have no good double jeopar dy defe nse. He simply

broke the same lawtwice, a nd thus he may

be tried twic e and punishe d twice. He may be ' twice put in jeopar dy of life or limb' bec ause he committed two offense s, not one." 25 being punished more than once for the same off ense. Litt re ll v. Sta te , 2 7 1 S. W. 3 d

2 7 3 , 2 7 6 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2008). I t seems self- evident that in two cr iminal alleg ations, even if the s ame c rime is alleg ed, but differ ent victims are a lleg ed, the c rime is not the same off ense a s contemplated by

double jeopar dy law. See Akhil Reed Amar , D o u b l e J e o p a rd yL a w M a d e Si mp le , 106 Y AL E L
. J. 1807, 1817–18 (1997). For example, w here a burg lar takes numerous items from one house in one burg lary , but

16 the same items belong to a father and other it ems belong to the daughter , there is no double jeopar dy violation in charg ing the burg lar with two cr imes: theft of the father' s proper ty and thef t of the daug hter' s. Ig le ha rt v . S

tat e , 837 S.W .2d 122, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Her e, Ora ng e was not c harg ed with the same offe nse for which he w as pre viously

acquitted. No jeopar dy

attache d. We overrule Ora

ng e' s ninth point of er

ror.T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt . 1 3. 17 (V e rn on

20 05 ); Mu rp hy v . S

tat e , 112 S.W .3d 592, 17 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 26 XI I. NO ER RO RS IN TR IA L C OU RT EV ID EN TI ARY RUL IN GS Ora ng e' s tenth point of error

complains o f t wo trial cour t evidentiary

ruling s. We find no
err or and ove rrule the appellate contention. A. Ade quat e P r oo f of Ve nue Ora ng e complains that one of the witnesse s for the State was a llowed to provide he arsa y testimony that proved ve nue. Offic er Kevin Fr eema n testified t hat i n the course of his investigation, he lea rned the alleg ed sexual abuse ha d occur red at 1320 Shirley Street. After the hea rsay objection
was ove rruled, F ree man said, " Iwas a dvised it occur red at 1320 Shirley

Street." Next, he said that t h e S h i r l e y S t r e e ta d dr e s s w a s o u t s i d e t h e K i l g o r e c i t y l i m i t s , b u ts i tu a t e d w i t h i nG r e g g C o u n t y. S i m i l ar ev i d en ce ca m e i nv i a a n o t h er wi t n es s . J
. P
. 's m o t h er

t es t i fi edt h at d

u ri n g t h e p er i o d

Or an ge liv e d w iththe Willi a ms f a mil y , th e fa

mily live d o n Sh ir le y

Str e e t. S he the n te sti fi e d th a t th e ir
re sid e nc e a t th a t ti me wa s i n th e po rt ion of the City of Ki lg or e lyingin G re g g County . T his testimony was not he arsa

y and elicited no objection. Even if Fr eema n' s statement was he arsa

y and the admission of the st at em ent was e rror , other e vidence of the location of the family home was proper ly admitted. Se e Br oo k

s v . S tat e , 990 S.W .2d 278, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding any
err or in admission of

hear say testimony

was ha rmless in light of other

proper ly admitted evidenc e proving same fa ct). Thus, ther e wa s sufficie nt e vidence to pr ove venue by a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e, and Or ang e ca n prove no ha

rm. 17Also, when the State cross-e x amined Or ang e' s expert on child sex ual abuse , Carol Walker, 18 sh e wa s a sk e d a

bo ut the sig nif

ic anc e of a man w a tc hin g c hil dr e n o n a pla y g ro un d w ithbin oc ula

rs : W alk er s aid sh e wo ul d b e "very con cern ed. " 27 B. Ext r ane ous Ac t P r ov e d in St at e 's R e but ta l C as e I n Ora ng e' s case -in-chie f, he prese nted s ever al wit nesses who te stified to his good re putation

and to t he e ff e c t that he wa s sa fe aro un d c hil dr e n. Pe rs on s te sti fi e d fo r wh om O ra ng e ha d b a

by sa t, as did the par ents of childre n whom Ora ng e had ba

by sat. I n rebuttal, the State c alled Of fice r Da rre n Mixon , w ho te sti fi e d th a t so me tim e in 199 9 or 200 0, he re sp on de d to a ca ll of a su sp ic iou s v e hic le outside an ele mentary

school in Kilgor e. He found Ora ng e sitting in an a

utomobile, about 75 to 100 y ar d s fr o m a p l ay gro u n d , u s i n g b i n o cu l ar s t o wa t ch ch i l d re no nt h e p l ay gro u n d

. Or an ge's explanation f

or this c onduct was that he was watching a child for whom he was c aring . No cr iminal offe nse havingoccur

red, Mixon tol d Ora

ng e to move along , and Or ang e complied. 18 The trial c ourt did a balanc ing test pursuant to Rule 403 and found the prejudicia l import of the t estimony did not substantially outweig h its probative value. T EX . R. E V ID . 40 3. I n ma kin g its ruling , the trial cour

t said: Th e de fe ns e pu t th e de fend ant' s c ha ra c te r, his c ha

ra c te r t ra it f or sa fe de a lin g wi th children, at issue. T h er ef o re , based on that, this C ourt finds that under Rule 405, 40 4( b) , th a t it

is a dmi ssi ble . A lso , und e r a Rul e 40 3 b a lanc ingte st, Ifi nd that, w hil e i t m ay b e p r e

j u d i c i a l , i t i s r e l e v an t an d t h a t i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e i s n o tsu bs ta nti a lly outweig hed by

the dang er of unfair prejudice , confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury , or undue de lay . There fore , Iwill admit and allow that testimony

. As a g ener al rule, to pre vent an a ccuse d from beingprosec uted for some collater al cr ime or misconduct, the State may not introduce e vidence of bad acts sim ilar t o the offe nse cha rg ed. Ro be rts28

v . S tat e , 29 S.W .3d 596, 600–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2000, pet. re f' d). Rule 404 provides that "[e]vi dence of other c rimes, wrong s or ac ts is not admis sible to prove the c hara cter of a per so n i n o rder

to sh ow a cti on in con for mi ty th erewi th ." T EX . R. E V ID . 404(b). How ever , evidenc e of e x trane ous acts and misconduc t is admissi ble when it i s rele vant to a noncha rac ter
c on fo rm ity

" fa c t of c on se qu e nc e " in a

c a se , s uc h as e sta

bli sh ingmot ive , o pp or

tun ity , in te nt, prep ar at i o n, plan, knowledg e, identity , absenc e of mistake or acc ident, or re butting a de fensive theory

. Id .; Ro bb ins v . S

tat e , 88 S.W .3d 256, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Ev ide nc e a dmi tte d a s r e le va nt u nd e r R ule 40 4( b) may

no ne the le ss b e e xclu de d und e r R ule 403 if its probative v alue is substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, c onfusion of the issues, or misleadingthe jury , or by considerations of undue delay , or needle ss presentation of cumulative e vidence . T EX . R. E V ID . 403; Mozo n v . S tat e , 991 S.W. 2d 84 1, 84 6–47 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ). Ev ide nc e is unfai rly pr e jud ic ia l w he n it

ha s a n und ue te nd e nc y

to s ug g e st that a decision be made on an improper ba sis, commonly , but not necessa rily , an emotional one. Mozon , 991 S.W .2d at 847 n.7. I n c on du c tin g a

Rul e 40 3 ba lanc ing te st, a tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld c on sid e r t

he fo llo wi ngfa c tor s: (1 ) t he pr ob a tiv e va lue of

the e vid e nc e ; ( 2) the po te nti a l of the e vid e nc e to i mpr e ss t

he jur y in s ome irrational, but never

theless indelible way ; (3) the time the pr oponent nee ds to develop the e vidence ; and (4) the propone nt's ne ed for the evidenc e. W

y att v . S tat e , 23 S.W .3d 18, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The T exas Court of Criminal Appea ls ha s held that the bala ncing test under Rule 403 we ighsOb vio us ly , fo r the re a so ns dis c us se d in our pr e c e din g ana ly sis , we on ly c on sid er t he se 19 a ff ida vit s ane c do ta lly

fo r p ur po se s o f r e vie wi ngthe tr ia l c ourt ' s Ru le 40 3 b a lanc ingte st.

29 in f a vo r o f t he a dmi ssi on of re le va

nt e vid e nc e and c arr ie s a

pr e su mpt ion

that r e le va

nt e vid e nc e wi ll be more probative tha

n prejudicia l. Se e Ra

yfo rd v. Stat e , 125 S.W .3d 521, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 03 ); W ill iam s v . S

tat e , 9 58 S.W. 2d

18 6, 19 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). Withthe se pr incipl es in mind, we now examine the admissibility of the e vidence at issue her e under Rule 403. W e find the pr ob a tiv e natur e of

Mixon ' s te sti mony

we ig hs in f

a vo r o f a dmi ssi on

of thi s evidenc e. Much of t he S tate' s case was buil t around the theory of "g rooming " and that Ora ng e spent signific ant time with y oung J .P. Or ang e' s own expert said that she would be ver y conce rned if a

n adu l t we re fo u n d wa t ch i n g ch i l dre n o n a p l ay gro u n d wi t h b i n o cu l ar s . Be ca u s e t h e b u l k o f O ra n ge's defe nsive ca se consisted of witnesses who said he ha d provided saf e child ca re, this evidenc e wa s rele vant to rebutting Ora

ng e' s defe nsive theory

. We a c kn ow le dg e thi s e vid e nc e ha d th e po te nti a l to imp re ss t he jur y in an ir ratio na l, i nd e lib le way . For example, the jurors' aff

idavits discusse d above both make mention of the sig nificanc e the jury attributed to Mix on' s testimon y . No cr iminal act was shown to have bee n committed by 19 O r an g e i nt h e e v e n t s r e l a t e d b y M i x o n . T h i s w e i g h s a g a i n s ta d m i s s i o no f t h e t e s t i m o n y. Mix on' s direct e x amination testimony took bare ly two pag es of the c ourt repor ter' s rec ord. The time spent provingthe extraneous ac t was neg ligible, whic h weig hs in favor of its admissi on. As fo r t h e S t at e ' s n e e d t o p re s en tt h i s ev i d en ce , we ac kn o wl ed ge t h at t h e c o mp l ai n an t 's
cre dibilit y

had bee n challeng ed throug hout the trial; and J .P. ha d denied a ny inappropriate contac t30

with Orang e on more than one oc casion be fore making his alleg ation. Ba sed o n t h e s t re am of witnesses Ora

ng e submitted who testified a s t o h i s sound char acte r and a ppropriate ness in being around c hildren, we find this factor w eig hs slightly in f avor of admission. We a lso point out , as cited above, the Texas Court of Criminal App eals' holding that a bala ncing test under Rule 403 we ighs in favor of

the admission of rele vant evidenc e. Ra y for d , 125 S.W .3d at 529. We f ind a dmi ssi on of Mixon ' s tes tim on y wa s with in the zon e of re a so na ble dis a g re e me nt,
and , th e re fo re , th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in adm itt ing that tes tim on y . Or ang e ' s te nth point of err or is overr

uled. As a fi na l no te , w e po int

ou t th a t th e tr ia l c ourt jud g me nt lis ts the Te xas Pe na l Cod e statut e of t he o ffen se f

or w hi ch O range was con vi cte d, in decen cy wi th a chi ld , to be S ect io n 2 2. 02 1(a) (2) (B) of the Te x as Penal Code. T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 22.021(a) (2)( B) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). Howeve r, the judg ment is errone ous; that statute is ag g ravated sexual assaul t, a cha rg e of w hich Ora ng e wa s acquitted. The judgme nt is also errone ous in stating that Oran ge was convicted of a third-deg ree felony . Ora ng e wa s indicted and c onvicted by a jury of indec en cy wi th a child by contac t, pursuant to Section 21.11(a) (1) of the Texas Penal Code, a se cond-de g ree felony

. See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 21.11(a) (1), ( d) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). This Court has t he authority to modify the judg ment to make the r ecor d speak the truth when t h e m atter ha s been c alled to our attention by any source . Fr e nc h v . S

tat e , 8 3 0 S
. W
. 2 d 6 0 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1992). I n As be rry v . S tat e , 813 S.W .2d 526 (Tex. Ap p . — Da l l as 1991, pet. re f' d), the31

court noted that the authority of the a ppellate c ourt to modify

incorre ct judg ments is not dependent
on re qu e st o f a

ny pa rt y ; th e a pp e llate c ourt

may a c t su a sp on te. Th e Tex as Rule s o f A pp e llate Procedur e provide direc t authority for this Court to modify

the judg ment of the trial c ourt. T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2. We modify

the trial court judgme nt to acc urate ly ref lect the ty pe and de g ree of off

ense f or wh ic h O ra

ng e wa s c on vic te d, the se c on d- de g re e fe lon y of fe ns e of ind e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d b y c on ta c t. As modified, we a ffirm.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: October 21, 2009 Date D ecide d: November 19, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh