### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A SS IG N E D O N BR IE FS O CT O BE R 1 4, 200 5
REG INA LD D. HU GHES v. TE NN ESSE E BOA RD OF PA ROL E
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Laud erdale County No. 13009-38 M artha B. Brasfi eld, Chancellor

No. W2005-00838-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 20, 2005

T h e A p p el l ant, an inmate in the custody of the Tenne ssee Depa rtment of Correc tion, f

iled a handwritten pro se petition seeking revie w by common law writ of certiorari following a denia l of parole by the Tenne ssee B oard of

Probation and Parole. T he boar d fi l ed a motion to dism iss the petition, citing severa l defe cts with the Appellant’s petition. The trial court g rante d the Appellant time to cure the def

ects. The Appellant subseque ntly filed a motion to amend his petition in an eff ort to c omply with the trial court’s direc tives, howeve r, the trial court subsequently ent er ed an order dismiss ing the Appellant’s petition. There afte r, t he Appellant filed a post-trial “Motion to Rehear.” Whe n th e tria l c ou rt

did no t a dd re ss the mot ion , th e Ap pe llant f ile d a noti c e of

a pp e a l to thi s Co urt. We hold that t he Appe llant’s post-trial motion is, i n actua lity , a motion to alter or amend the judgme nt, theref

ore, w e re mand the ca se to the trial court for further proc eeding s on the motion.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Case R em anded to the Chancery Court for Further P roce edings
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined. Reg inald D. Hug hes, pro s e , Henning , TN
Pau l G

. Su mm e r s , A tt o r n e y G e n e r a l & Re p o rte r ; Mi c h a e l E

. M o o r e , So li c it o r G e n e r a l; B r a d le y

W. Flippin, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

AppelleeR ule 1 0 o f t he R ules o f

t he C o urt o f

A p p ea l s o f

T en ne ssee p ro vid es a s fo l l o w s: 1

T hi s Co ur t , wi t h t he concu r r enc e of all j ud ges par t i ci pat i ng i n t he cas e, may a f f i r m, re v er s e or modi f

y t h e ac t i on s of

t h e t r i al c ou r t by me mor an du m opi n i on whe n a f ormal opi ni on woul d hav e n o prece dent i al va l ue. W hen a c as e i s deci ded by memo r andum o p i nio n i t s hal l be des i gn at ed “ M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N ”, shal l not b e p ub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed o r rel i ed on f o r any reas o n i n any un r el at ed cas e.

T he st atute p ro vid es a s fo l l o w s: 2

S u c h p a rty sh a ll, w ithin sixty (6 0 ) d a ys fro m the e n try o f t h e o rd e r o r j u d g m e n t, fil e

a pet i t i on of ce r t i or ar i i n t h e ch an ce r y c ou r t of a n y c ou n t y i n w h i ch a n y on e ( 1) or mor e of t h e pet i t i on er s , or a n y on e ( 1) or mor e of t h e mat er i al de fen dan t s r es i de, or have t hei r pri nci p al off i ce, s t at i ng bri ef

l y t he i ss ues i nvo lve d in th e cause, t he subst ance o f

t he o rder o r ju d gm ent co m p l ai ned of, t he res p ect s i n whi ch t he p et i t i o ner cl ai m s t he o rder o r jud gm ent is err o neo us, and prayi ng fo r an accord ant
r evi ew.
T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 7 -9 -1 0 2 (2 0 0 0 ). (c o n tinu e d ...) -2- M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1
I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

Reg inald D. Hug hes (he reina fter “ Hugh es ” or “ Appellant”) is presently an inmate in the c us tod y of theTe nn e sse e De partme nt o f C or re c tio ns a t th e Wes t T e nn e sse e State Pe nit e nti ary in Henning , Tenne ssee. The Criminal Court of Shelby Countysentenc ed Hug hes to two consec utive thirty y ear sentenc es on Oc tober 8, 1997 a fter hewas c onvicted of two c ounts o f s econd deg ree murder. H ug hes bec ame e ligible for parole on J une 20, 2003, and the Tenne ssee B oard of Probation a ndParo le (h e re ina ft e r “ B oa rd ” or “ Ap pe lle e ” ) c on ve ne d a hea ri ng on that date to d isc us s H ug he s’ e li g ib il ity f o r p ar o le

. F o ll o w in g th e h e ar in g , th e B o ar d v o te d to d e n y H u g h e s p ar o le a n d s e t h is n e xt parole hearing f

or the y ear

2013.
On J anuary

14, 2004, Hug hes filed a handwritten pro se petition in the Chancery C o urt of Davidson County

seeking revie w of the B oard’ s decision by wr i t of ce rtiorari. There in, Hug hes stated that he w as making “no challeng e to the i ntrinsic corr ectne ss of t he Board’ s decision to dec line [him ] paro le , o nly

thele ng th of fu tur e re vie w. ” Hu g he s a sse rt e d that the B oa rd ’s de c isi on to s e t hi s ne xt paro le he ari ng for th e y e ar 2 01 3 w a s a rb itr ary , c apric iou s, a ndill e g a l be c aus e it v iol a te d h is Fifth, Eig hth, and Fourteenth Amendme nt rig hts under the United States Constitution. On Februa ry 13, 2004, the Board filed a mot ion to dismiss Hug hes’ petition pursuant to Rule 12 of t he Te nnessee Rules of Civil Procedur e, asserting the foll owing : (1) Hug hes filed the pe tition bey ond the six ty -day limit set forth in sec tion 27-9-102 of the Tenne ssee Code, there fore , the chancery court wa s without 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2

T h e sta tute p ro v id e s tha t “[t]h e p e tit io n fo r c e rtio ra ri m a y b e sw o rn to b e fo re the c le rk o f t h e c irc u it c o u rt, 3
t h e j u dg e, an y j u dg e of t h e cou r t of g en er al s es s i on s , or a n ot ar y pu bl i c, an d s h al l s t at e t h at i t i s t h e f i r s t a ppl i ca t i on for the w rit.” T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 2 7 -8 -1 0 6 (2 0 0 0 ).

I n i t s bri ef

f i l ed on appeal , t he B oard as s er t s t hat i t er r ed i n a r gu i ng t ha t H ug he s f i l ed hi s pet i t i on i n a n 4 i m p rop er venue i n i t s m o t i o n t o dis m i ss
. T he B o ard, ci t i ng t o o ur decis i o n i n H awki ns v . Tenn. D ep’ t of Cor r ec t i on , 12 7 S. W

. 3d 749 , 763 n. 16 ( T enn
. Ct

. Ap p. 200 2), arg ues t hat “ [ a] ct i ons ch al l eng i ng t he deci s i ons of t he T enn es s ee B oard of P r ob at i on an d P ar ol e a r e pr op er l y broug ht i n t he cour t s of D avi dson C ount y
. ” -3- jurisdic t i o n t o h ea r t he ca se; (2) H ug hes’ pe tition failed to state a claim for which r elief c an be g rante d beca

use it did not satisfy

section 2 7 -8 -1 06 of the Te nnessee Code; and (3) Hug hes’ f iled 3 the petit ion in an im proper venue. On Februa ry 26, 2004, Hug hes re sponded to the B oard’ s motion by assertin g t h at he filed an administrative appe al to the B oard, w hich the B oard de nied on November

12, 2003.
On May 5, 2004, the Chance ry Court of Davidson County enter ed an or der transfer

ring the c a se to the Chanc e ry

Cou rt of L aud e rd a le Cou nty

wh ere W est Te nn e sse e State Pe nit e nti ary is located. On Octobe r 19, 2004, the Chance ry Court of L auder dale County enter ed an or der f

inding 4 that “it appea

rs that the 60-day statute of limit ations deadline should be calc ulated from the date on which the [Boa

rd] denied [Hughe s’] final administrative appea l, if such an appeal was made.” The chanc ery court rule d that Hug hes should have u n t i l J anuary 18, 2005 to submitdocumentation sh ow ing thedate on wh ic h th e B oa rd de nie d his a dmi nis tr a tiv e app e a l a nd to a me ndhis pe tit ionto cure any defe cts. On November 17, 2004, Hug hes filed a “Motion to Amend Petition for Common L aw Writ of C ertiora

ri.” I n an ef

fort to ensurethat his petition compli ed with sec tion 27-8-106 of the Tenne ssee Code, Hug hes alleg ed that this was his first application for re view by common law writ o f c e rt ior ari

. I n a n e ff ort to c omp ly wi th se c tio n 27 -9 -1 02 of theTe nn e sse e Cod e , H ug he s a lso attache d a copy of his r equest for an administrative appe al of the B oard’ s decision dated Septe mber 8, 2003 and a le tter fr om the Boa rd date d November

12, 2003 denying his a

ppeal.
On M ar ch 7, 2005, the chancery court e ntere d an orde r dismissing Hug hes’ pe tition. The chanc ellor noted that the c ourt g ave H ug hes until J anuary 18, 2005 to cure any

defe cts in his petition a nd to sub mit do c ume ntatio n sho wi ng the date on wh ic h the B oa rd de nie d his a dmi nis tr a tiv e app e a l. The c ourt ruled that, “ [a] s of the date of this order, [Hug hes] has not filed the document at i o n as require d in the order of October 19, 2004.” On M arc h 18, 2005, Hug hes filed a handwritten “Motion to Rehear ” asking the chancery court to re examine its denial of his petition for common law writ of c e rt ior ari . T he re in, Hu g he s cit e d his co mpl ia nc e wi th the c ou rt ’s prior or de r b y fi lin g his mot ionto amend the pe tition on November 17, 2004. When the chancery court did not addre ss his mot ion, Hug hes filed a pro se notice of appea l to this Court on April 6, 2005 raising numer ous issues for ourH u g h es a s k s t h i s Cour t t o, i n e s s en ce , g r an t h i m t h e fol l owi n g r el i ef : ( 1) r ev er s e t h e 2013 r ev i ew da t e s et by 5
t he B o ard and ord er t hat hi s next pa role revi ew dat e b e no m o re t han t hree y ears f rom t he i ni t i al de ni al of p arole by t he B oard, ( 2) r eve r s e t he pri s on’ s deci s i on t o re mo ve hi m f r om hi s cur r ent hous i ng cl as s i f i cat i on an d pl ace hi m i n a not her h ou s i n g u n i t , ( 3) t o a wa r d h i m pu n i t i v e dama g es i n t h e amou n t of $50, 000. 00 a gai nst the T en n es s ee D epa r t men t of C orr ect i on, an d (4) r et ur n hi m t o h i s ol d j ob at t he pri s on wi t h back pay and a pay i ncr eas e. M ost of t he i s s ues r ai s ed by H ug hes ar e n ot t he proper s ubj ect of an appeal of

t hi s na t ur e. H owever , we nee d not addres s t he propri et y of ea ch i nd i vid ua l i ssue raised b y t he A p p ell an t given o ur ne ed t o rem an d t his case t o t he t rial co urt f o r f urthe r p ro ce ed i ng s. -4- revie w. We remand this ca se to the chancery court for furt h er p roceeding s on the Appellant’s 5 “Motion to Rehear .”

I. D I S CUS S I ON
The B oard a

rg ues that this appea l is premature beca use the trial court ha s not entere d a fina l order addre ssing Hug hes’ “ Motion to R ehea r.” TheBoa

rd cites to no authority in its brief to support this proposition. When the re cord pr esents an issue r eg arding this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, we must consider the issue reg ardle ss of whether it is properly raised by the parties. See Tenn. R. App. P. 1 3( b) (2 00 5) ; Hun tington Nat’l Ban k v. Hooker , 840 S.W .2d 916, 922 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
Rule 4 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e re quires an a ppellant to file his or her no tic e of app e a l “ wi thi n 30 day s a ft e r the date of e ntry of thejud g me nt a pp e a le d f ro m.” Te nn . R. App. P. 4(a) ( 2005). “This de adline may be extended by filing c erta in post-judgment motions.” Lee v. State V olun teer Mut. In s. Co. , No. E2002-03127-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXI S 26, at *18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2005) (no perm. app. filed). Reg arding the tolling of the time for filing a no tic e of app e a l, R ule4 p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:
I n a civil action, if a ti mely motion under the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil P roce dure is filed in the t ri al court by any party : (1) under Rule 50.02 for judgment i n acc ordanc e with a mot ion for a dir ecte d
v er d i ct ; (2 ) un d er R u l e 52

. 0 2 t o am en d o r m ak e ad d i t i o n a l f i n d i n gs of fa ct, whether o r n o t an alter ation of the judg ment would be re qu ir e d if

themot ionis g rante d; ( 3) un de r Rule59 .0 2 f or a ne w t ri a l; (4) unde r Rule 59.04 to alter or amend the judg ment; the time for ap p ea l fo r a l l p ar t i es s h al l ru n fr o mt h e e n tryo f t h e o rd erd en y i n g a new tria l or g ranting or denying any other such motion.
Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 4 (b ) ( 20 05 ); see also Te nn . R. Civ

. P. 59 .0 1 (2 00 5) (“ Th e se mot ion s aretheon ly mot ion s c on te mpl a te d in th e se ru le s f or e xten din g thetim e fo r t akin g ste ps in the re g ula r a pp e llate proce ss.”).
After the chancery court enter ed the order dismiss ing his pe tition, Hug hes filed a handw ritten do c ume nt w iththetria l cou rt e nti tle d “Mo tio n to Reh e ar. ” We h a ve re c e ntl y a dd re sse d s uc h p os tj u d gm en tm o t i o n s , s t at i n g:-5- Under t h e current rules of

prac tice, filing a post-judg ment

“ mot io n to r e he ar” in the tria l c ou rt ma y e a sil y a mou nt t o a

fata l, self-inflicte d appellate wound. Motions to rehear have not e x isted for over thirty -threey ear s. Ma sh v . M as h , 1989 Tenn. App. LEXI S 182, No. 88-165-II , 1989 WL 22704, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1989) (N o T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a pp lic a tion fi led) ; 4 N AN CY F RA SS MACLEAN ET AL ., TENNESSEE PRACTI CE § 59:9, at 344 (3d ed. 2000). T hus, they

are not one of the post-judg ment motions specific ally

listed in Tenn. R. A pp. P. 4( b) and Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 that ha ve thee ff

e c t of exte nd ing thetim e fo r f ili ng a no tic e of app e a l. Howeve r, too many lawy ers continue to file post-judg ment “motions to rehe ar,” “petitions for re consideration,” or “pe titi o n s to rehe ar” and then a tt e mp t t o r e ly

o n th e mo ti o n o r

p e ti ti o n to e xte n d th e ti mef or fi lin g the ir

no tic e of app e a l. When a lawy er files a post-judg ment motion called a “ petition to rehe ar” or some other name not cle arly ref ere nced in Te nn. R. App. P. 4( b) or Tenn. R. Ci v
. P

. 59.01, the ap pe lla te c ou rts mu st p ar

se thr ou gh th e bo dy o

f th e pe tit ion or

mo tio n to de te rm ine whe the r it requests the sort of relief av ailable through one of the four motions specifically listed in Tenn. R. App. P. 4( b) or Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01

. Te n n e s s e e F

a r m e r s M u t. I n s
. Co

. v
. F

a r mer , 9 70 S.W .2d 453, 455 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; In re Es tate of M c Cor d , 1986 Tenn. App. LEXI S 2764, No. 85-271-II , 1986 WL

2014, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1986) (N o T e nn . R. App . P. 11 app lic a tio n f ile d) . I f the re lie f r e qu e ste d in the petition or motion is not the sort o f relief that may be soug ht by one or moreof the four

motions specifically

listed in Tenn. R. App. P. 4 (b ) or Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01, then the motion will not be co n s i d er ed t o b e o n e t h att o l l s t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e t i m e f o r f i l i n g a no tic e of app e a l.
Lee , 2005 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 26, at *18–20 (emphasis adde d) (f ootnotes omitt ed). When e valuating Hug hes’ “ Moti o n t o R eh ea r, ” we are mindful that he is a pro se litigant. “Pro se litigants who invoke the complex and sometimes technica l proce dures of the courts assume a ve ry

heavy burden.” Irv in v. Ci ty o

f Clar ks v ill e , 7 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d 6 4 9 , 6 5 2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 8 ) ( ci t i n g Gray v . Stil lm an Whit e Co. , 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I . 1987)). “ Pro se litigants are entitl ed to fair and equa l treatment.” Whit aker v. Whirlpool Cor

p. , 3 2 S

. W

. 3 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 7 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Chi lds v. Duc kwo rth , 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983)). “ Pro se lit ig a nts are no t e xcu se d f ro m c omp lying wi th the s am e s u b s tan ti v e a n d p r o c e d u r a l r e q u ir e me n ts th a t o th e r r e p r e s e n te d p arti e s mu s t a d h e r e to.” Id. (c i t i n g Irv in , 7 67 S.W. 2da t 65 2) ; se e als o Ed mundso n v . P

ra tt , 9 45 S.W. 2d75 4, 75 5 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 96 ). Ho we ve r, the c ou rt s of this state mus t bemin df ul o f the fa c t th a t “ ma ny

pr o s e lit ig a nts have no le g al training and little familiarity with the judicial sy stem.” Y oung v. Barrow , 130 S.W .3d 5 9 , 6 2

– 6 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Irv in , 767 S.W .2d at 652). “ Pro se lit ig a nts aree nti tle d to the same liber ality

of construc tion with reg ard to their pleading s that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 1, 8.05 & 8.06In fed eral co urt s, t he m o t i o n t o a lter o r a m end m ust be f i l ed wi t hi n t en d ays af

t er t he t ri al co urt ent ers t he 6 ju d g m e n t i n a c a se
. See Fed

. R

. C i v. P

. 59 (e) (20 0 5 ). In T enness ee co urt s, “[ a] m o t i o n t o al t er or am end a judgm ent shal l be f

i l ed a nd served w i t hi n thi rt y (3 0 ) d ays a f t er t he ent ry o f

the jud gm ent

. ” T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 59

. 0 4 (20 0 5 ). T he ch an ce r y c ou r t e n t er ed t h e or der di s mi s s i n g h i s pet i t i on on M ar ch 7, 2005. H u g h es f i l ed h i s mot i on on M ar ch 18, 2005. T h u s, H u g h e s fil e d his m o tio n w ithin thirty d a ys o f t h e e n try o f t h e ju d g m e n t at issu e
. -6- aff ord any other litigant.” Irv in , 7 6 7 S

. W

. 2 d a t6 5 2 (c i t i n g Est e lle v . G amble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))

. Moreove r, “[t] he courts g ive pro se litigants who are untrained in the law a certain amount of lee way in drafting their plea dings and briefs.” Young , 1 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d at6 3 (c i t i n g W hita k er , 32 S.W .3d at 227). “ Acc ording ly , we mea sure the pa pers pr epar ed by pro se litigants using standards that are less stringe nt than t hose applied to papers pre pare d by lawy ers.” Id. (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see als o Ba xte r v . Ro se , 523 S.W .2d 930, 939 (Tenn. 1975)

. Courts “should g ive effec t to the substance, rathe r than the f

orm or terminology , of a pr o se l i t i gan t ’s papers.” Young , 130 S.W .3d at 63 (citations omitted).
I n his “Motion to R ehea r,” H ug hes ar g ued that he c omplied with the chanc ery court’s October 19, 2004 order direc ting him to submit documentation showing t he date on which the Boar d denied his administrative a ppeal and to cure any

defe cts in his original petition. Rega rding the s u b s t an ce o f aR u l e 5 9 m o t i o n , we h av e n o t ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
The F eder al Rules o f C i v i l Procedure , like the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil P roce dure, do not re cog nize a mo t i on or petition for re co n s i d er at i o n
. 1 2 J AM E S W M

. M OO R E E T A L. , M OO R E 'S FE DE R AL P R AC T I C E § 5 9

. 3 0 [ * 2 1 ] [ 7 ] (3 d ed

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( "M OO R E 'S FED ERAL

PRACTI CE") . Howeve r, whe n a motion or petition for rec onsideration is filed within ten day s following the entry of the jud g me nt, thefe de ra l c ou rt s w ill tr e a t it a s a Ru le 59 (e ) m oti on to 6 alter or amend a s long a s it is r eq uesting a substantive alter ation of the judg ment, not me rely the corr ection of a cle rica l error or re lief of a typ e wh o l l y co l l at er al t o t h e ju d gm en t i t s el f. 1 2 M OO R E 'S FED ERAL

PRACTI CE § 59.30[ 2] [b] ; 11 CHARLES ALAN WR I GH T E T AL ., FED ERAL PRACTI CE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1, at 121 (2 d ed

. 1995) (“ FED ERAL PRACTI CE AND PROCEDURE”). When it is de batable whether the motion should be char acte rized as substantive or not, it should be char acte rized as substantive. Herzog C ontracting Corp. v. McGowen Corp. , 976 F.2d 1062, 1065 (7th Cir. 1992). Ne ith e r the fe de ra l no r the state ve rs ionof Ru le 59 lis ts specific g rounds for a

moti o n t o alter or

amend. Ac cording ly , trial courts haveconsidera

ble discre tion in granting o r d e n ying the motion. As a g ener al matter, the re a re f our basic g rounds upon which a motion to alter or amend may be g rante d. First, the moving party m ay demonstrate that it is nece ssary to correc t manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based

. Second, the motion may beIn i t s m o t i o n t o dis m i ss , t he B o ard argued t hat H ughes f i l ed hi s p et i t i o n in an i nco rr ect ve nue. O n a p p eal , t he 7 B o ard no w co nced es t hat H ughes di d not f i l e hi s p et i t i o n i n an i nco rr ect v e n u e w h e n h e sub m i t t ed i t t o t he C hancery C our t of D avi dson C ount y
. T hu s , H ug hes ne eded onl y t o cur e t he aforemen t i oned defect s i n or der t o avoi d a di s mi s s al
o f hi s p et i t i o n. -7-

g rante d to permit the moving party to present ne wly

discovere d or previously

unavailable evidenc e. Third, the motion may be justified by an interve ning c hang e in the contr olling law. Fourt h , the motion may be g ra n t ed w hen nec essary to prev ent a manifest injustice . 11 FED ERAL

PRACTI CE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1, at 124-27; 12 M O O RE ' S F E D E RA L

PR A CT I CE§ 5 9

. 3 0 [5 ][a ].
Lee v. State V

olun teer Mut. Ins. C

o. , No. E2002-03127- COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 26, at *20–22 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 21, 2005) ( emphasis adde d) (no pe rm. app. filed)

. I n substance, H ug hes’ motion amounts to a motion to alter or ame nd the judg ment dismiss ing his petition. Ther ein he a sserts that the chancery court ove rlooked the doc umentation he provide d when he filed his motion to amend his petit ion on November 17, 2004. After

revie wing the re cord, we c a nn ot say

that H ug he s’ mot ionis w ho lly wi tho ut m e ri t. T he B oa rda sse rt e d th a t H ug he s’ pe tit ionwa s d e fe c tiv e fo r tw o re a so ns : (1 ) he faile d to de mon str a te that he fi le d his pe tit ionwi thi n the six ty -day

limit allowed by

section 27-9-102 of t he Te nnessee Code, and (2) he failed to certify that his petition constit uted his first application for a writ of certiorari as require d by section 27-8- 106 of the Tenne ssee Code. On October 19, 2004, the chanc ery court enter ed an o rd er gi v ing 7 Hu g he s u nti l Janu ary 18 , 20 05 to c or re c t the se de fe c ts. On No ve mbe r 17 , 20 04 , we ll wi thi n th e tim e permitted by the chanc ery court, Hug hes filed a motion to amend his pe tition. There in, in an eff ort to comply with section 27-8-106 of

the Tenne ssee Code, he asserted that this was his first application for a common law writ of certiorari. More over, in a n eff ort to comply

with section 27-9-102 of

the Tenne ssee Code, he submitt ed two exhibits with his mot ion: (1) a c opy o f h i s re q uest for an administrative appe al of the B oard’ s decision, and ( 2) a c opy o f a l et t er from the B oard dated Nov e mb e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 3 d e n y in g h is a d mi n is tr a ti v e ap p e a l. St r a n g e ly , th e c h a n c e r y c o u rt enter ed an order on Marc h 7, 2005 holding that “ [a] s of the date of this ord er , [Hughe s] has not filed the documentation as r equire d in the order of Oc tober 19, 2004.” I n any event, weneed not de cide wh e the r H ug he s’ mot ion to al te r or a me nd the jud g me nt sho uldbe g rante d. Th is i s a n is su e pr op e rl y left to the trial court’s discretion. See Le e , 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 26, at *22.-8-

It is app are nt f

ro m t he r e c or d b e fo rethi s Co urt onapp e a l th a t H ug he s’ mot ionis, in su bs ta nc e , a

mot ionto a lte r o r ame ndthejud g me nt o f the c ha nc e ry c ou rt fi le d p ur su a nt t o Ru le 59 .0 4 o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Civi l Proc e du re
. “ [C]erta in pos t- tria l mo tio ns , s uc h a s a mot ionto a lte r o r ame ndpu rs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il P roce du re59 .0 4, if tim e ly fi le d, tol l commence ment of the thirty -day period unti l an orde r g ranting or denying the motion is enter ed.” Albert v. Frye , 145 S.W. 3d 52 6, 52 8 (T e nn . 200 4) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o Bink le y v . M e dling , 117 S.W .3d 252, 255 (Tenn. 2003) . Acc ording ly , we re m an d t h is case to the c hance ry court for re s o lution of the Appellant’s post-trial motion. Costs of this appea l are to be taxed equally to the Appellant, Ronald D. Hug hes, and the Appellee , the Tenne ssee B oard of Probation and Parole , for
w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

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ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE