NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JASON LANARD MEEKS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0121

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-150750-002

The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED AND 

REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Gracynthia Claw

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Kevin D. Heade

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MEEKS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

B E E N E, Judge:

¶1 Jason Lanard Meeks appeals his 17-year sentence resulting 

from his conviction for armed robbery, a class 2, dangerous felony. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm Meeks’ conviction, vacate the sentence, and 

remand for resentencing.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On October 16, 2014, the victim, M.S., attempted to purchase 

prescription drugs from Meeks. M.S. and Meeks met at a Mesa apartment 

complex to exchange cash for drugs. Meeks held M.S. up with a knife, and 

robbed him of two cell phones, a wallet, gym shoes, and approximately 

$6,000. An accomplice assisted Meeks during the armed robbery.

¶3 The jury convicted Meeks of one count of armed robbery. The 

jury also found that three aggravating circumstances were present—the use 

of a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime, the presence of an 

accomplice, and Meeks committed this offense while on community 

supervision.

¶4 At sentencing, the superior court found that Meeks had five 

prior felony convictions—four non-dangerous felonies and a class 4 

dangerous felony. The superior court considered the aggravating factors

found by the jury, Meeks’ five prior felony convictions, and three mitigating

factors when sentencing Meeks. In its sentencing order, the superior court 

found that Meeks was a dangerous, repetitive offender pursuant to Arizona 

Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) § 13-704.

1 Because Meeks committed this offense 

while on community supervision, the superior court determined that he 

could be sentenced to no less than the presumptive prison sentence of 15.75 

years. A.R.S. § 13-708(A) (2017). After the superior court found “that the 

aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to warrant a 

 

1 Absent material revisions after the date of an alleged offense, we cite a 

statute’s current version.
STATE v. MEEKS

Decision of the Court

3

somewhat aggravated sentence,” Meeks was sentenced to a slightly 

aggravated 17-year prison sentence.

¶5 Meeks timely appealed his sentence. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2017), 13-4031 (2017), 13-4033(A)(1)

(2017) and Article VI, § 9 of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶6 On appeal, Meeks argues that the superior court erred when 

it considered the use of a deadly weapon as an aggravating factor because 

the use of a deadly weapon is an essential element of armed robbery.

2 

Meeks additionally asserts that the superior court erred when it sentenced 

him as a dangerous, repetitive offender pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-704(D)

(2017). Meeks contends that the superior court’s consideration of the 

improper aggravating factor and its erroneous determination that he was a 

dangerous, repetitive offender resulted in an illegal sentence that was 

fundamentally prejudicial.

¶7 Meeks’ claim, which is raised for the first time on appeal, is 

subject to fundamental error review only. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 

567, ¶ 19 (2005). Fundamental error occurs only “in those rare cases that 

involve error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes [away]

from the defendant a right that is essential to his defense, and error of such 

magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.” 

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). The defendant has the 

burden to show that fundamental error occurred and such error caused 

prejudice. Id. at 567, ¶ 20. When the superior court considers an improper 

aggravating factor in imposing sentence, we will affirm the sentence “only 

where the record clearly shows the [superior] court would have reached the 

same result even without consideration of the improper factors.” State v. 

Ojeda, 159 Ariz. 560, 562 (1989).

A. Fundamental Error

¶8 “The failure to impose a sentence in conformity with 

mandatory sentencing statutes makes the resulting sentence illegal.” State 

v. Carbajal, 184 Ariz. 117, 118 (App. 1995). And we have held that the 

“[i]mposition of an illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error.” State v. 

Thues, 203 Ariz. 339, 340, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). As previously stated, the superior

 

2 The State concedes that the superior court erred when it considered the 

use of a dangerous weapon as an aggravating factor when sentencing 

Meeks for armed robbery. See A.R.S. § 13-1904 (2017).
STATE v. MEEKS

Decision of the Court

4

court sentenced Meeks as a dangerous, repetitive offender. In order to be 

classified as a dangerous, repetitive offender, the defendant must be 

convicted of a class 2 or 3 dangerous felony and have one historical prior 

felony conviction that is a class 1, 2, or 3 dangerous felony. A.R.S. § 13-

704(D). Although Meeks was convicted of a class 2 dangerous felony at 

trial, he did not possess the requisite prior felony convictions necessary to 

classify him as a dangerous, repetitive offender pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

704(D). The superior court’s failure to impose a sentence in conformity with 

the sentencing statutes, in addition to the use of an improper aggravating 

factor, makes Meeks’ sentence illegal and therefore constitutes fundamental 

error.

B. Prejudice

¶9 In addition to showing fundamental error, Meeks “must 

demonstrate that the error caused him prejudice.” See Henderson, 210 Ariz. 

at 568, ¶ 26. Determining whether prejudice exists “involves a factintensive inquiry, and the showing required to establish prejudice therefore

differs from case to case.” Id. Meeks bears the burden of showing that if 

the superior court had not improperly considered the use of a deadly 

weapon in the commission of the offense and that he was a dangerous, 

repetitive offender, the superior court could have reasonably imposed a 

lighter sentence. See id.

¶10 At sentencing, the superior court erroneously found that 

Meeks was a dangerous, repetitive offender. Additionally, the superior

court improperly considered Meeks’ use of a deadly weapon in the 

commission of the armed robbery as an aggravating factor. However, the 

superior court did properly consider that Meeks employed an accomplice 

during the armed robbery as an aggravating factor. See A.R.S. § 13-

701(D)(4). The superior court then found the following mitigating

circumstances—Meeks’ difficult childhood, his history of substance abuse,

and his strong family support. After considering these aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances, the superior court found that the aggravating 

circumstances were sufficiently substantial to warrant a “somewhat 

aggravated sentence.” Meeks has demonstrated that absent the errors, the 

superior court could have imposed a lighter sentence. When it is “unclear 

whether the judge would have imposed the same sentences absent the 

inappropriate factor, the case must be remanded for resentencing.” State v. 

Alvarez, 205 Ariz. 110, 116, ¶ 19 (App. 2003).
STATE v. MEEKS

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Meeks’ conviction, 

vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this 

decision.