alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 10-5477.

#### Larry Williamson, Petitioner v. Illinois.

562 U.S. 924, 131 S. Ct. 306,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7573.

178 L. Ed. 2d 199,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, denied.

Same case below, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 369 Ill. Dec. 95, 985 N.E.2d 1081.
**Exhibit32.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

The undersigned officerof Albany Molecular Research, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby certifies to hisknowledge that the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q to which thiscertification is attached (the “Report”), as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and that the information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company. This certification is provided solelypursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and Item 601(b)(32) ofRegulation S-K (“Item 601(b)(32)”) promulgated under the SecuritiesAct of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and the Exchange Act. Inaccordance with clause (ii) of Item 601(b)(32), this certification(A) shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of theExchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section, and(B) shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filingunder the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that theCompany specifically incorporates it by reference.
| Date:  November 9, 2006 |                                                                 |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                    | /s/ Thomas E. D’Ambra                                           |
|                    | Name: Thomas E. D’Ambra, Ph.D.                                  |
|                    | Title: Chairman of the Board, President and  Chief Executive Officer |

 

 

 

35

----
EXHIBIT 32.2
                                                                    ------------




                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SS. 1350)

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss. 1350),
the undersigned, David C. Kahn, Chief Financial Officer of Network-1 Security
Solutions, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), does hereby certify to
his knowledge, that:

The Quarterly Report of Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2005 of the
Company (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.





/S/  DAVID C. KAHN
-----------------------
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
NOVEMBER 18, 2005
No. 10-6266.

#### Brett D. Jones, Petitioner v. Nevada.

562 U.S. 1031, 131 S. Ct. 569,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8692.

178 L. Ed. 2d 416,

November 8, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Nevada denied.

Same case below, 126 Nev. 728.
No. 10-6868.

#### Mauricio Alfonso Mazza-Alaluf, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1035, 131 S. Ct. 583,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8665.

178 L. Ed. 2d 425,

November 8, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.

Same case below, 621 F.3d 205.
No. D-2476.

#### In the Matter of Disbarment of Steven R. Lapidus.

562 U.S. 958, 131 S. Ct. 500,

178 L. Ed. 2d 318,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7869.

October 12, 2010.

Disbarment entered.

Former order, 561 U.S. 1043, 131 S. Ct. 40, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1130, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5604.
2017-0421.

#### State v. Cornett.

Hamilton App. No. C-170035.
I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2619 

To amend title 11, United States Code, to include certain pension as 

administrative expenses in bankruptcy, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 9, 2019 

Mr. RYAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 11, United States Code, to include certain 

pension as administrative expenses in bankruptcy, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prioritizing Our Work5 ers Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ALLOWANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 503(b) of title 11, United 

8 States Code, is amended— 

9 (1) in paragraph (8)(B), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 

10 the end; 


pbinns on DSK79D2C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2619 IH

1 (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at 

2 the end and inserting a semicolon; and 

3 (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘(10) notwithstanding section 507(a)(5), all un6 funded vested benefits in a defined benefit pension 

7 plan; and 

8 ‘‘(11) withdrawal liability determined under 

9 part 1 of subtitle E of title IV of the Employee Re10 tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 

11 1381 et seq.).’’. 

12 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 507(a)(5) 

13 is amended by inserting ‘‘except as provided in section 

14 503(b)(10),’’ after ‘‘Fifth,’’. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSK79D2C42PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7325

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

REYNALDO S. LUNA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District Judge.

(CR-01-359-MJG; CA-03-482-MJG)

Submitted: March 5, 2004 Decided: March 29, 2004

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Reynaldo S. Luna, Appellant Pro Se. Stephen Matthew Schenning,

Lisa M. Griffin, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Reynaldo S. Luna seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying relief on his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue

absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that

his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676,

683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and

conclude that Luna has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
No. 10-5236.

#### Irving Charles Humphrey, Petitioner v. James A. Yates, Warden.

562 U.S. 910, 131 S. Ct. 262,

178 L. Ed. 2d 173,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6876.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Courtney Cherry, Appellant.

[65 NYS3d 696]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Erika M. Edwards, J. at first consolidation motion; Ann E. Scherzer, J. at second consolidation motion; Larry R.C. Stephen, J. at *579nonjury trial and sentencing), rendered April 9, 2014, convicting defendant of two counts of attempted forcible touching and two counts of sexual abuse in the third degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 60 days, unanimously affirmed.

The second motion court providently exercised its discretion in granting the People’s motion for consolidation. Given the issue of intent, proof relating to each incident was admissible with regard to the other *(see*CPL 200.20 [2] [b]).

Defendant’s principal argument on appeal is that the order granting consolidation after another court of coordinate jurisdiction had denied the motion constituted a violation of the law of the case doctrine. However, defendant did not preserve this issue *(see People v Johnson,*301 AD2d 462 [1st Dept 2003], *lv denied*99 NY2d 655 [2003]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject it on the merits.

Regardless of whether the court had been aware of the earlier determination, it was not bound by it. Here, the discretionary determination as to whether to consolidate the cases involved the determination of an evidentiary issue that would not be binding on a subsequent justice in the same case *(see People v Evans,*94 NY2d 499 [2000]; *People v McLeod,*279 AD2d 372 [1st Dept 2001], *lv denied*96 NY2d 921 [2001]).

In any event, defendant was not prejudiced by the consolidation. The trial court, sitting as trier of fact, made it clear that it was keeping the cases separate and avoiding any inference of criminal propensity.

Concur—Friedman, J.P., Gische, Web-ber, Kahn and Singh, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel Oliveira, Appellant.

[767 NYS2d 437]

*123Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Tejada, J.), rendered March 13, 2001, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of two counts of murder in the first degree, four counts of murder in the second degree and two counts of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of life without parole, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s motion, made pursuant to CPL 200.20 (3), for a severance of counts relating to offenses that had been properly joined as “the same or similar in law” (CPL 200.20 [2] [c]). The evidence as to the two incidents was capable of being easily segregated by the jury (see *People v Streitferdt,*169 AD2d 171 [1991], *lv denied*78 NY2d 1015 [1991]). There was no significant variance in the quantity of proof; on the contrary, the evidence of guilt as to both incidents was overwhelming. Defendant’s assertion of a need to testify as to one incident but not the other was unconvincing (see *People v*Lane, 56 NY2d 1, 8-9 [1982]), particularly since his proposed testimony would have opened the door to evidence of the crimes charged in the second incident (see *People v Wright,*300 AD2d 191 [2002], *lv denied*99 NY2d 634 [2003]).

The court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statements. The hearing court properly credited police testimony that defendant, whose native language is Portuguese, was asked, through a Portuguese interpreter, each question on a *Miranda*card, and that defendant answered “yes” in Portuguese and wrote that same answer after each question on the card, including the inquiry as to his willingness to answer questions. Defendant’s initial hesitancy in affixing his signature to the card did not constitute an invocation of his right to remain silent, since he had expressly agreed to answer questions *(see People v Robinson,*287 AD2d 398 [2001], *lv denied*98 NY2d 680 [2002]; *People v DaCosta,*201 AD2d 402 [1994], *lv denied*83 NY2d 871 [1994]).

The court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence recovered pursuant to two search warrants. Based on the commission of the crimes described in the warrant applications, it was reasonable to infer that the clothes worn during the crime, the weapon used, the contraband taken from the victim and the items purchased with the victim’s credit cards, would most likely be in defendant’s residence or gym bag only three weeks after the murder.

*124We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.

We have considered and rejected defendant’s remaining arguments. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Mazzarelli, Rosenberger, Lerner and Friedman, JJ.
# C_2014024EN.01003901.xml

| 25.1.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 24/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.1.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 24/39

---

Judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal (First Chamber) of 3 December 2013 — CT v EACEA

(Case F-36/13) (1)

1

(Civil Service - Temporary staff - Contract for an indefinite period - Termination - Adverse reflection on position - Breakdown in the relationship of trust)

2014/C 24/71

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: CT (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: S. Pappas, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) (represented by: H. Monet, acting as Agent, and B. Wägenbaur, lawyer)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application for annulment of the decision to terminate the applicant’s contract of employment on the basis of Article 47(c)(i) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (CEOS).

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Tribunal:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders CT to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders CT to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA).

---

(1)  OJ C 207, 20.7.2013, p. 58.

1

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Aman Kapoor, Appellant.

[49 NYS3d 918]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cacace, J.), rendered December 1, 2015, convicting him of attempted criminal sexual act in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for the appellant.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the defendant’s assigned counsel pursuant to *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]). Counsel has informed this Court that the defendant has not authorized counsel to raise any issue that would allow him to withdraw his plea. Upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted *(see*id.; *People v Rhodes,*128 AD3d 1100 [2015]; *Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.],*89 AD3d 252 [2011]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]).

Rivera, J.P., Austin, Roman, Hinds-Radix and Connolly, JJ., concur.
#### People v Gomez

1st Dept: 146 AD3d 622 (NY)

denied 3/31/17 (Fahey, J.)
No. 10-6574.

#### Ronnie D. Wilson, Petitioner v. Pat Hurley, Warden.

562 U.S. 1033, 131 S. Ct. 576,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8802.

178 L. Ed. 2d 421,

November 8, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 382 Fed. Appx. 471.
No. 10-6764.

#### Eulalio Moreno, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 1020, 131 S. Ct. 547,

178 L. Ed. 2d 401,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8419.

November 1, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-21-00080-CR

The State of Texas

v.

Justin Sirucek

On Appeal from the

94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 20FC-1246C

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause 

remanded to the trial court. The Court orders the judgment of the trial court REVERSED 

and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

January 27, 2022
Susquehanna’s Unit Material Fielding Point team follows pallets to the customer
 
  By DLA Distribution Public Affairs
  Select Defense Logistics Agency Distribution Susquehanna, Pa., Unit
Material Fielding Point employees, along with employees from Troop Support in
Philadelphia, visited Dover Air Force Base to see what happens to their work
after it leaves the distribution center. The team was able to follow the process after the Air Lines of
Communication pallets they build leave DLA Distribution Susquehanna, and see how
their work directly impacts the warfighter.ALOC pallets are specialty shipments for aircraft transport to
theater. Last calendar year, the UMFP area processed and shipped more than 900
ALOC pallets to Dover Air Force Base for forward shipment to Afghanistan and
Iraq.“The tour was important for us because
we had the opportunity to see what happens to our pallets when they get to
Dover,” said Jay Lightner, UMFP supervisor.“We wanted to see if there was anything
we could do to enhance the process.” “This was also a great networking opportunity
for us to finally meet the people we talk to on a weekly basis,” concluded
Lightner.  “I think we all
left with a greater appreciation for our work and its impact on the
warfighter.”
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

Theundersigned officer of Albany Molecular Research, Inc. (the “Company”)hereby certifies to his knowledge that the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Qto which this certification is attached (the “Report”), as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and that theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Thiscertification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 andItem 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K (“Item 601(b)(32)”)promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”),and the Exchange Act. In accordance with clause (ii) ofItem 601(b)(32), this certification (A) shall not be deemed “filed”for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act, or otherwise subject tothe liability of that section, and (B) shall not be deemed to beincorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act or theExchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporatesit by reference.

 
| Date: May 9, 2008 | /s/ Mark T. Frost                            |
|------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
|                   | Name: Mark T. Frost                          |
|                   | Title: Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer |

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
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     (Replace this text with the legend)
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<CIK>                         0001064435
<NAME>                        Cluett American Corp
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Dec-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                  Jan-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    Jul-3-1999
<CASH>                          1,361
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<RECEIVABLES>                   39,792
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<INVENTORY>                     90,060
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                134,332
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           177,364
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<SALES>                         160,318
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<CGS>                           114,097
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   38,866
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                29
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</TABLE>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAYMOND A. ROLES,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

MELODEE ARMFIELD,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 14-35056

D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00363-EJL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 17, 2015** 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

Idaho state prisoner Raymond A. Roles appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a violation of his

right to due process in connection with a disciplinary hearing. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc.

FILED

FEB 27 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal on the basis of a statute of

limitations); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Roles’s due process claim as barred by

the statute of limitations because Roles filed this action more than two years after

his claim against defendant Armfield arose. See Idaho Code § 5-219(4) (two-year

statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486

F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007) (forum state’s personal injury statute of

limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions; federal law determines when a

civil rights claim accrues, which is when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know

of the injury which is the basis of the action). We reject Roles’s arguments

concerning accrual and the continuing violation doctrine.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Roles’s motion for

relief from judgment because Roles failed to establish grounds warranting

reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5

F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and factors for

reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).

AFFIRMED.

2 14-35056