34940 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 123 / Friday, June 26, 1998 / Notices

and/or petition; and the Secretary or the

designated Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board will issue a notice of hearing or

an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a

petition for leave to intervene shall set

forth with particularity the interest of

the petitioner in the proceeding, and

how that interest may be affected by the

results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted

with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) the nature of the

petitioner’s right under the Act to be

made party to the proceeding; (2) the

nature and extent of the petitioner’s

property, financial, or other interest in

the proceeding; and (3) the possible

effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the

petitioner’s interest. The petition should

also identify the specific aspect(s) of the

subject matter of the proceeding as to

which petitioner wishes to intervene.

Any person who has filed a petition for

leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the

petition without requesting leave of the

Board up to 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, but such an amended

petition must satisfy the specificity

requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first

prehearing conference scheduled in the

proceeding, a petitioner shall file a

supplement to the petition to intervene

which must include a list of the

contentions which are sought to be

litigated in the matter. Each contention

must consist of a specific statement of

the issue of law or fact to be raised or

controverted. In addition, the petitioner

shall provide a brief explanation of the

bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert

opinion which support the contention

and on which the petitioner intends to

rely in proving the contention at the

hearing. The petitioner must also

provide references to those specific

sources and documents of which the

petitioner is aware and on which the

petitioner intends to rely to establish

those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner

must provide sufficient information to

show that a genuine dispute exists with

the applicant on a material issue of law

or fact. Contentions shall be limited to

matters within the scope of the

amendment under consideration. The

contention must be one which, if

proven, would entitle the petitioner to

relief. A petitioner who fails to file such

a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one

contention will not be permitted to

participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become

parties to the proceeding, subject to any

limitations in the order granting leave to

intervene, and have the opportunity to

participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to

present evidence and cross-examine

witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no

significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide

when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves no

significant hazards consideration, the

Commission may issue the amendment

and make it immediately effective,

notwithstanding the request for a

hearing. Any hearing held would take

place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the

amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any

hearing held would take place before

the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition

for leave to intervene must be filed with

the Secretary of the Commission, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention:

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or

may be delivered to the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, by the above date. A

copy of the petition should also be sent

to the Office of the General Counsel,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and to Jay

E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts

& Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW.,

Washington, DC 20037, attorney for the

licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for

leave to intervene, amended petitions,

supplemental petitions and/or requests

for hearing will not be entertained

absent a determination by the

Commission, the presiding officer or the

presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board that the petition and/or request

should be granted based upon a

balancing of the factors specified in 10

CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated June 19, 1998, which

is available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW., Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room located at the B.

F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin

Avenue, Aliquippa, PA 15001.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd

day of June 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Donald S. Brinkman,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate

I–2, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–17096 Filed 6–25–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–277 and 50–278]

PECO Energy Company, (Peach

Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2

and 3); Exemption

I

PECO Energy Company (the licensee)

is the holder of Facility Operating

License Nos. DPR–44 and DPR–56,

which authorize operation of Peach

Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS),

Units 2 and 3. The licenses provide,

among other things, that the licensee is

subject to all rules, regulations, and

orders of the Commission now or

hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of two boilingwater reactors at the licensee’s site

located in York County, Pennsylvania.

II

Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code

of Federal Regulations, ‘‘Criticality

Accident Requirements,’’ requires that

each licensee authorized to possess

special nuclear material (SNM) shall

maintain a criticality accident

monitoring system in each area where

such material is handled, used, or

stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of

10 CFR 70.24 specify detection and

sensitivity requirements that these

monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(3) of

10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to

maintain emergency procedures for each

area in which this licensed SNM is

handled, used, or stored and provides

that (1) the procedures ensure that all

personnel withdraw to an area of safety

upon the sounding of a criticality

accident monitor alarm, (2) the

procedures must include drills to

familiarize personnel with the

evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures

designate responsible individuals for

determining the cause of the alarm and

placement of radiation survey

instruments in accessible locations for

use in such an emergency. Subsection

(b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees

to have a means to identify quickly

personnel who have received a dose of

10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10

CFR 70.24 requires licensees to

maintain personnel decontamination

facilities, to maintain arrangements for a

physician and other medical personnel
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 123 / Friday, June 26, 1998 / Notices 34941

qualified to handle radiation

emergencies, and to maintain

arrangements for the transportation of

contaminated individuals to treatment

facilities outside the site boundary.

Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts

Part 50 licensees from the requirements

of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for

SNM used or to be used in the reactor.

Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that

any licensee who believes that there is

good cause why he should be granted an

exemption from all or part of 10 CFR

70.24 may apply to the Commission for

such an exemption and shall specify the

reasons for the relief requested.

III

The SNM that could be assembled

into a critical mass at PBAPS, Units 2

and 3, is in the form of nuclear fuel; the

quantity of SNM other than fuel that is

stored on site in any given location is

small enough to preclude achieving a

critical mass. The Commission’s

technical staff has evaluated the

possibility of an inadvertent criticality

of the nuclear fuel at PBAPS, Units 2

and 3, and has determined that it is

extremely unlikely for such an accident

to occur if the licensee meets the

following seven criteria:

1. Only three new fuel assemblies are

allowed out of a shipping cask or

storage rack at one time.

2. The k-effective does not exceed

0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%

confidence level in the event that the

fresh fuel storage racks are filled with

fuel of the maximum permissible U–235

enrichment and flooded with pure

water.

3. If optimum moderation occurs at

low moderator density, then the keffective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level in the

event that the fresh fuel storage racks

are filled with fuel of the maximum

permissible U–235 enrichment and

flooded with a moderator at the density

corresponding to optimum moderation.

4. The k-effective does not exceed

0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%

confidence level in the event that the

spent fuel storage racks are filled with

fuel of the maximum permissible U–235

enrichment and flooded with pure

water.

5. The quantity of forms of special

nuclear material, other than nuclear

fuel, that are stored on site in any given

area is less than the quantity necessary

for a critical mass.

6. Radiation monitors, as required by

General Design Criterion 63, are

provided in fuel storage and handling

areas to detect excessive radiation levels

and to initiate appropriate safety

actions.

7. The maximum nominal U–235

enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight

percent.

By letter dated March 18, 1998, the

licensee requested an exemption from

10 CFR 70.24.

In this request the licensee addressed

the seven criteria given above. The

Commission’s technical staff has

reviewed the licensee’s submittal and

has determined that PBAPS, Units 2 and

3, meet the applicable criteria. Criteria

2 and 3 are not applicable to PBAPS,

Units 2 and 3, since Technical

Specification Section 4.3.1.2 specifically

states, ‘‘The new fuel storage racks shall

not be used for fuel storage. The new

fuel shall be stored in the spent fuel

storage racks.’’ The reference to General

Design Criterion (GDC) 63 was initially

incorporated to ensure that licensees

receiving an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24

would not erroneously view the

exemption as the basis for removing

from the spent fuel pool area radiation

monitors that were meeting other

monitoring requirements, such as those

contained in GDC 63. However,

Criterion 63 is not applicable to PBAPS

because the units were evaluated against

the draft GDCs current when PBAPS

was licensed rather than the current

GDCs proposed in July 1967. Thus, even

though PBAPS is not required to meet

GDC 63, the staff has determined that it

is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent

criticality to occur in SNM handling and

storage areas at PBAPS, Units 2 and 3.

Additionally, PBAPS, Units 2 and 3,

have area radiation monitors (ARMs)

that meet the requirements of 10 CFR

70.24(a)2, and function as a monitoring

system capable of detecting criticality in

the only area (the refuel floor) where

accidental criticality is possible.

The purpose of the criticality

monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is to

ensure that if a criticality were to occur

during the handling of SNM, personnel

would be alerted to that fact and would

take appropriate action. The staff has

determined that it is extremely unlikely

that such an accident could occur. The

low probability of an inadvertent

criticality constitutes good cause for

granting an exemption from the

requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a).

IV.

The Commission has determined that,

pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this

exemption is authorized by law, will not

endanger life or property or the common

defense and security, and is otherwise

in the public interest. Therefore, the

Commission hereby grants PECO Energy

Company, an exemption from the

requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a) for

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station,

Units 2 and 3.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the

Commission has determined that the

granting of this exemption will have no

significant impact on the environment

(63 FR 33735).

This exemption is effective upon

issuance.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd

day of June 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–17095 Filed 6–25–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–346]

Toledo Edison Company, et al.; (DavisBesse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1);

Confirmatory Order Modifying License,

Effective Immediately

I

Toledo Edison Company, Centerior

Service Company, and The Cleveland

Electric Illuminating Company (the

Licensees) are the holders of Facility

Operating License No. NPF–3, which

authorizes operation of the Davis-Besse

Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, located

in Ottawa County, Ohio.

II

The staff of the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been

concerned that Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire

barrier systems installed by licensees

may not provide the level of fire

endurance intended and that licensees

using Thermo-Lag 330–1 fire barriers

may not be meeting regulatory

requirements. During the 1992 to 1994

timeframe, the NRC staff issued Generic

Letter (GL) 92–08, ‘‘Thermo-Lag 330–1

Fire Barriers,’’ and subsequent requests

for additional information that asked

licensees to submit plans and schedules

for resolving the Thermo-Lag issue. The

NRC staff has obtained and reviewed all

such corrective plans and schedules.

The staff is concerned that some

licensees may not be making adequate

progress toward resolving the plantspecific issues, and that some

implementation schedules may be either

too tenuous or too protracted. For

example, several licensees informed the

NRC staff that their completion dates

had slipped by 6 months to as much as

3 years. The NRC staff has met with

licensees of plants that have completion

action scheduled beyond 1997 to