STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

Christina Marie Karawan,
 

Respondent Below, Petitioner FILED
 

March 31, 2014 

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK vs) No. 13-0336 (Kanawha County 09-D-1333) SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Henry John Karawan Jr., 

Petitioner Below, Respondent 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Christina Karawan, by counsel Charles R. Bailey and Jordan K. Herrick, 

appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s February 22, 2013, order denying her appeal from 

the Family Court of Kanawha County. Respondent Henry Karawan Jr., by counsel David Moye, 

filed a response. Petitioner filed a reply. On appeal, petitioner alleges that the circuit court erred in 

denying her appeal because the family court failed to 1) equitably distribute the proceeds from the 

sale of a 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle; 2) order respondent to reimburse petitioner for an unpaid 

portion of the couple’s 2008 joint federal and state tax liability; and 3) order respondent to 

compensate petitioner for repairs to the marital home. 

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error in regard to 

petitioner’s third assignment of error. However, as more fully explained below, the Court finds 

prejudicial error in regard to petitioner’s first two assignments of error. The Court is of the 

opinion that the circuit court erred in denying petitioner relief on appeal in regard to the family 

court’s failure to equitably distribute the profits from the Chevelle’s sale and failure to order 

respondent to pay his portion of the 2008 joint tax liability. Accordingly, this case satisfies the 

“limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate 

Procedure and it is appropriate for the Court to issue a memorandum decision rather than an 

opinion. 

In September of 1992, the parties to this appeal were married. During the marriage, in 

2004, respondent purchased a 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle. Later, and within the bounds of the 

marriage, respondent sold the Chevelle in May of 2008, for the sum of $20,500. The parties then 

separated in December of 2008, with respondent filing for divorce in June of 2009. In September 

of 2009, the family court entered its Temporary Order Regarding Custody and Child Support. In 

March of 2010, the family court entered its Bifurcated Divorce Order severing the parties’ 

marriage. 

In regard to the marital assets, the family court held a hearing to determine the estate’s 

equitable distribution in June of 2011. On September 21, 2011, the family court entered its Final 

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Order Regarding Equitable Distribution. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for new trial or, 

alternatively, relief from judgment in regard to the family court’s final order. The family court 

denied the motion by order entered in May of 2012. Petitioner appealed to the circuit court and a 

hearing was held on December 20, 2012. By order entered on February 22, 2013, the circuit court 

denied petitioner’s appeal. It is from this order that petitioner appeals. 

We have previously held that 

“[i]n reviewing a final order entered by a circuit judge upon a review of, or 

upon a refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the 

findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous 

standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion 

standard. We review questions of law de novo.” Syllabus, Carr v. Hancock, 216 

W.Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004). 

Syl. Pt. 1, Staton v. Staton, 218 W.Va. 201, 624 S.E.2d 548 (2005). To begin, the Court finds no 

error in the circuit court denying petitioner’s appeal in regard to her request that respondent 

contribute to repairs to the marital home. Petitioner argues that she is entitled to compensation for 

repairs to the marital home made after respondent moved out because it is unjust for respondent to 

share in the home’s alleged increased value without contributing to the repair costs. However, the 

record is clear that the parties agreed upon a fair market value for the home of $220,000 that was 

based upon an appraisal conducted in October of 2009. Further, the record shows that petitioner 

was awarded the home and that she was also responsible for “any and all . . . maintenance and 

repairs theron, holding [respondent] forever harmless for the same.” 

While petitioner argues that the home had latent defects at the time of the appraisal and 

that the discovery of such defects following the appraisal required her to expend over $5,000 in 

repairs to maintain that agreed upon value, the Court finds no error in the circuit court’s refusal to 

order respondent to pay for such repairs. This is based upon the parties’ agreement to a fair 

market value and petitioner’s assumption of any repairs or maintenance to the home. For these 

reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order in regard to petitioner’s third assignment of error. 

However, in regard to petitioner’s first two assignments of error, the Court finds that the 

circuit court erred in denying petitioner’s appeal from family court on these issues. We have 

previously stated as follows: 

“W. Va.Code, 48–2–1(e)(1) (1986) [W. Va.Code § 48–1–233 (2001) 

(Repl.Vol.2004)], defining all property acquired during the marriage as marital 

property except for certain limited categories of property which are considered 

separate or nonmarital, expresses a marked preference for characterizing the 

property of the parties to a divorce action as marital property.” Syllabus point 3, 

Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990). 

Syl. Pt. 2, Staton v. Staton, 218 W.Va. 201, 624 S.E.2d 548 (2005). With that in mind, the Court 

notes that in the family court, respondent clearly testified that he purchased and sold a 1970 

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Chevelle within the bounds of the marriage. Respondent’s testimony was further clear that after 

selling the vehicle for the sum of $20,500, he retained the proceeds for himself. This Court has 

previously declined to classify proceeds from a fraudulent contract claim related to a vehicle as 

separate property, despite the vehicle having been financed solely by one spouse. See Miller v. 

Miller, 216 W.Va. 720, 613 S.E.2d 87 (2005). As such, it was error for the circuit court to deny 

petitioner relief on appeal after the family court failed to classify this money as marital property 

subject to equitable distribution during the divorce proceedings. Therefore, we remand with 

instructions for the circuit court to order an equitable distribution of the proceeds respondent 

obtained from the Chevelle’s sale. 

Finally, the Court finds that the circuit court erred in failing to grant petitioner relief in 

regard to her assignment of error concerning reimbursement for respondent’s unpaid portion of 

their 2008 joint federal and state tax burden. In fact, respondent concedes that the family court 

failed to address equitable distribution of this liability, and admits that he still owes petitioner 

$2,633 toward the same; petitioner agrees this amount is accurate. For these reasons, we remand 

with direction to order respondent to pay his outstanding portion of the couple’s 2008 joint tax 

liability. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s February 22, 2013, order denying 

petitioner’s appeal from the family court in regard to the allegation that petitioner is entitled to 

reimbursement for repairs made to the family home. However, the Court reverses the circuit 

court’s order, in part, and remands with instructions to equitably distribute the proceeds of the 

1970 Chevelle’s sale and order respondent to pay petitioner his portion of the couple’s 2008 joint 

tax liability. 

Affirmed, in part, and reversed and remanded, in part, with directions. 

ISSUED: March 31, 2014 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Brent D. Benjamin 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

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