### `TEXAS C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 254 -CV
Darlene Balas, as NextF riend of C. L. H., A. E. H., an d L. P. H. , Appellan ts
v. Sm ithkl ine Beecham Corporat ion a/k/a Glaxosm ithkl ine , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-06- 0011 39 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This is an appea l from a pa rt ial summary judgme nt in a suit for damag es re sulting from the a lleg ed wr ong ful death of Br ian B alas. The district cour t g rante d the par tial summary judgme nt in favor of

Smit hkline Be echa

m Corporation a/k/a Glax osmithkl ine (“ GSK”) w ith reg ard to the claims of the thre e childre n of B alas’s w idow, Dar lene B alas (“ Dar lene” ). The issue on appea l is whether the children, who wer e Bal as’s stepc hildren, ca n rec over f

or his death unde r the Texas Wrongful De ath Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. §§ 71.001-.012 (West 2008). Be cause we hold as a matter of law that unadopted stepchildren a re not “ children” under the Act, we aff irm the district court’s or der g rantingpartial summary judgme nt in favor of GSK and dismissing the childre n’s claims.
BACK GR OUND

I n September 2000, B alas married Darlene , who had three children from a pre vious marria g e. Thre e months later, B alas be g an takingthe anti-de pressa n t P axil for the tr eatment of a2

drinking problem. After he beg an taking Pax il, he experience d hallucinations and star ted exhibit ing bizarre a nd disturbing be havior. In Marc h 2001, he took his own life. After his death, his pare nts and Dar lene filed suit ag ainst GSK, the manufa cture r of Pax il, and other de fenda

nts, bringingcommon-law c laims and cl ai m s under the Texas Wrongful Death Act (“ the Act” ) and the Texas Survival St atu t e. See id . §§ 71.001-.012, 71.021-.022 (We st 2 00 8) . D arl e ne fi le d s uit ind ivi du a lly and a s n e xt fr ie nd

of he r t hr e e min or

c hil dr e n. GSK filed a join t n o -evide nce a nd traditional summary -judg ment motion with reg ard to the c hildren’s claims, a ll e g in g th a t b e c a u s e th e c h il dr e n w e r e n o t th e b io lo g ic a l o r le g a ll y a d o p te d c h ildr en of Ba las, they

could not rec over unde r the Ac t. The district court g rante d the motion. The parties the n filed a motion to sever the children’ s claims from the suit, which the district c ourt g rante d, making the pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt f

ina l and a pp e a la ble . D arl e ne a

pp e a ls fr om the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r i n three issues, alleg ing that (1) minor, depe ndent s tepchildre n should be consider ed “c hildren” unde r the Ac t; ( 2) c hil dr e n w ho wo uld be c on sid e re d e qu ita bly a do pte d f or he ir sh ip p ur

po se s sh ou ld a lso b e consi dere d equitably

adopted unde r the Ac t; and (3) e x cluding minor, depende nt stepchildren from re cover

y under the Act violates e qual protec tion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW We reviewa no-e vid en ce summary judgme nt de novo. Shaun T. Mian Corp. v. He wlett-Packard Co. , 237 S.W
. 3 d 8 5 1, 855 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pe t. denied). Anoe vid e nc e summa

ry jud g me nt is e sse nti a lly

a pr e tr ia l di re c te d v e rd ic t. King Ranch, Inc. v . Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 750 (Tex. 2003). A def endant se ekinga no-e vidence summary judgme nt contends that there is no evidence of one or more e ssent i al elements of the plaintiff’s cla im. Tex . R. Civ.3

P. 1 66 a (i ); Hamilton v. W ilson , 249 S.W .3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008). We consider the evidenc e in t he light most fa

vorable to the non-movant and disreg ard contra ry evidenc e and infere nces. King Ranch , 118 S.W .3d at 751. A no-evidence motion is proper ly g rante d if the non-movant doe s not produce more than a

scintil l a of probative evidenc e ra ising a n issue of mater ial fac t with respec t to the
e sse nti a l e le me nts a tta c ke d by the mov ant. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); King Ranch , 118 S.W .3d at 751. More than a scintilla exis ts if rea sonable people could di ffe r i n their conclusions about t he evide nce; evidenc e amounts to less than a scintilla if it doe s no more than c reate a surmise or suspicion of a fac t. King Ranch , 118 S.W .3d at 751. The non-movant need not ma rshal its proof, but must point to e vid e nc e ra isi nga

g e nu ine iss ue of

material fact
. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ) c mt. ; Hamilton , 249 S.W .3d at 426.

L ike a no- ev i dence summary judgme nt, we also re view a tr aditional summary j u d gm ent de novo. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 1 6 4 S. W. 3 d 6 5 6 , 6 6 1 ( T e x. 2 0 0 5 ) . For a traditional summary -judg ment motion to be gr an t ed, the movant must establish that no g enuine issue of mater ial fac t exi sts and that it is entit led to j u d g ment as a matter of law . Tex. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. G rant , 7 3 S. W. 3 d 2 1 1 , 2 1 5 ( T e x. 2 0 0 2 )
. When revie wing a summary

judgme nt, we take as true a ll evidenc e fa v o ra b l e to the nonmovant, and w e indulge ever

y rea sonable inferenc e and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. So uth we ste rn , 73 S.W .3d at 215.

When, as here , the trial cour t’s order does not indicate the grounds upon which the mot ion wa s g ra nte d, we mus t a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r i f a ny of th e g ro un ds pr e se nte d is meritorious. W

estern Inv s., Inc. v . Urena , 162 S.W .3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).4 DI SCU SSIO N “Children” Under the Texas Wrongful Death Act I n her f irst issue, Darle ne conte nds that minor, depende nt stepchildren should be inc lud e d in

the de fi nit ion

of “ chi ldre n” un de r t

he Ac t and

that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

the re fo re e rr e d in g rantingsumma

r y judg ment for GSK. This issue involves statutory construction, which is a

question of l aw that we re view de novo. State v. Shumak e , 199 S.W .3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). In resolving
an i s s u e o f s t at u t o ry

co n s t ru ct i o n , we ar e r eq u i re d , fi rs tan d fo re m o s t , t o fo l l o w t h e p l ai nl an gu age of the statute. Texas He alth Ins. Risk Pool v. Southwest Ser v. Life Ins. Co. , 272 S.W .3d 797, 801 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

20 08 , no pe t.) . We re a d e ve ry wo rd , p hr a se , a

nd e xpre ssi on

in a statut e a s if

it
we re de libe rate ly

c ho se n, and

we pr e sume tha

t w or ds e xclu de d f

ro m th e statut e are do ne so purposef ully
. Ga ble

s R e alt yLtd

. P’s hip v . Trav is C

e nt. Ap prais al D ist
. , 81 S.W .3d 869, 873 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied). We must rea d the s tatute as a whole, rather than just isolated portions, gi v i n g m ea n ing to the la ng uag e that is consistent with other provisions in the statute. Dallas County Cmty. Coll . Dist. v. Bolton , 1 85 S.W. 3d 86 8, 87 2- 73 (T e x. 20 05 ); Texas De p’t of Transp. v. Cit

y of Sunset Valley , 146 S.W .3d 637, 642 (Tex
. 2 0 0 4 ). W e may also consider

the
c omm on law, and

we pr e sume that th e le g isl a ture e na c te d th e statut e wi th c omp le te knowledg e of a

nd ref ere nce to e x isting law. SeeTex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.023(4) ( West 2005); L el a nd v. Brandal , 257 S.W .3d 204, 208 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Ack er v. Tex as W

ater Comm’n , 790 S.W .2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990)).

Recove ry u n d er the Act is limited to an exclusive class of per sons that includes only “the surviving spouse, children, a nd pare nts of the dec ease d.” Te x . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code5

Ann. § 7 1. 00 4; Brown v. Edwards Trans fer Co. , 764 S.W .2d 220, 222 (Tex. 1988). The Act does not define “ children.” Dar lene a cknowledg es that the district cour t’s decision followed e x isting Texas case law, in which c ourts have co n s i s t en t ly held that only

biologica l or leg ally

adopted children c an re co v er u n d er t he Ac t. Se e Tra ns po rt I ns . Co . v . F

airc lot h , 898 S.W .2d 269, 275 (T ex . 1 9 9 5 ) (s t at i n g t h at “o n l y b i o l o gi ca l o r l ega l l y -a d o p t ed ch i l dre n o f t h e d ec ed en th av e s t an d i n g”
un de r A c t) ; Amos v. Central Freight Lines, Inc. , 575 S.W .2d 636, 637-38 (Te x . Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ) (holdingfoster children not “childre n” under Act e ven thoug h they lived wi th d e c e a s e d

f o r p e r i o d o f y e ar s an d

d e c e a s e d f i l e d p e t i t i o nf

o r a d o p t i o nb e f

o r e d e a t h ) ; Go ss v. Franz , 28 7 S.W. 2d 28 9, 28 9- 90 (T e x. Civ
. Ap p. —A mari llo 19 56 , wr it re f’ d) (h old ing fo ste r c hil d not “ child” under Act even thoug h dece ased c are d for him since e arly y outh, treate d him as natural
c hil d, and

pr omi se d to a do pt h im) ; cf
. Ro bin so n v . Ch iar e llo , 806 S.W .2d 304, 310-11 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 1991, writ denied) (h o l d i n g that aunt and unc le could not re cover under Act bec ause the y

wer e “ne ither the natural par ents no r l ega l ad o ptive pare nts” of their ne phew) ; T a y l or v . P ar r , 678 S.W .2d 527, 529 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1984, writ ref ’d n.r.e .) (holding foster pa

rents not “pa

rents” unde r Ac t even t h o u gh they assumed all duties and
re sp on sib ili tie s o f p are nts ); Boudreaux v . Texas &N.O.R. Co. , 78 S.W .2d 641, 644-45 (Tex . Civ. App.—B eaumont 1 935, writ ref ’d) ( concludingthat stepmother not included within def inition of “par ent” in Ac t).

Da rl e ne ur g e s th is C ourt

to r e a c h a dif fe re nt r e su lt, a sse rt ing that the c hil dr e n s ho uld not be excluded from rec overing for B alas’s wrong ful death simpl y beca use he did not leg ally

adopt them befor e his death. D arle ne contends that this Court can “ reinter pret” the term “ children” in the6

Act “in light of developing trends in law and in support of f amily values in society .” In support of her position, she cites to se vera l c ases in which she alleg es that cour ts have “ reinter

prete d” undef

ined terms in the Act to include mor e than wha t the terms did befor e. Se e Sh e ph e rd v . Le dfo rd , 96 2 S. W.2 d 2 8, 35 (T e x. 19 98 ) ( tr e a tin g c omm on -l aw w if e a s “ sp ou se ” un de r A c t) ; Fa ir clot h , 898 S.W .2d at 275 (Te x . 1995) (r ecogniz i n g t h at adopted c hildren ar e included in de finition of

“ c hil dr e n” un de r A c t) ; Br own , 764 S.W .2d at 223 (holding that “childre n” i n Ac t includes ill e g iti mate c hil dr e n) ; Moore v . Lill ebo , 722 S.W .2d 683, 685 (Tex. 198 6 ) (acknowledg ing that “dama g es” unde r Ac t include m en t al -anguish dama g es and de clining to r equire proof of phy sical manifestation of me ntal anguish in order for family member to re cover

under A ct); Cav na r v . Q ua lit y Control Parking, Inc. , 696 S.W .2d 549, 551 (Tex. 1985) (re cog nizi ng that “d amage s” under Act inc lud e me nta l- anguis h d ama g e s and ho ldi ngthat me nta l- anguis h d a ma g e s are re c ov e ra ble by a ll family members listed in Act); Sanchez v . Schindler , 651 S.W .2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983) (abolishing pecunia ry -loss rule as me asure of dama g es under Act and allowing pa rent to re cover

damag es for mental anguish for loss of m inor child). Alt houg h Dar lene r efe rs to the cour ts’ actions in these c ases as “reinte r

p r e ti n g ” te r

ms in th e A c t, o n ly

o n e o f th e c it e d c a s e s a c tu a ll y

a b o li s h e s a

p r e v io us interpre tation and adopts anothe r. See Sanc hez , 651 S.W
. 2 d at 2 5 1
. There , the supreme court explained that it was not ove rstepping its role or usurping the role of the leg islature by chang ing the definition of “damag es” unde r the Ac t beca use it was mer ely

abolishing a court-ma de rule in favor of anothe r cour

t-made r ule. Se e id . at 2 51 -5 2; Lubbock County v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds , 80 S.W .3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) (st at i n g that supreme c ourt may modify judicially

cre ated doctrines) . As an interme diate cour t of appeal s , h o wever, we must follow established law.7

See Tramme l’s , 80 S.W .3d at 585. We have no a utho ri t y t o modify

or abr og ate e stablished prec edent. See id
. Although the supreme c ourt has addr essed the de finition of “childre n” under the Act only in dicta, the cour

t clear ly stated that only

biologica l and leg ally

ad o p t ed chil dren ha

ve standing under the Act, se e Fa irc lot h , 898 S.W .2d at 27 5 , a co n clusion consistent with other Texas case law. See Robinson , 8 06 S.W. 2d a t 31 0- 11 ; Taylor , 6 78 S.W. 2d a t 52 9; Amos , 57 5 S. W.2 d at 63 7- 38 ; Go ss , 2 87 S.W. 2d a t 28 9- 90 ; Boudreaux , 78 S.W .2d at 644-45. There is no contra ry authority . Acc ording ly , we hold that “c hildren” unde r the Ac t is limited to biologica l and leg ally adopted c hildren. We also disag ree with Darle ne’s a rgument that we should adopt her inter pretation of

“ c hil d” be c a

us e the Ac t w a s p a tte rn e d a ft e r “ L or d Cam pb e ll’ s Ac t,” a statut e pa sse d by the B ri tis h Parliament in 1840 that specif ically included a ste pchild within the definition of “c hild.” See The F a ta l Ac c ide nt Ac t, 9 & 10 Vi c t., c h. 93 § 5 (1 84 6) ; Fo rt W or th Os te op ath ic Ho sp ., In c . v. Re ese , 148 S.W .3d 94, 96 (Tex. 2004). I n L ord C ampbell’s Ac t, the parliame nt defined “ child” to include a son, daug hter, gra

ndson, g randda

ug hter, stepson, a

nd stepdaug hter. See Th e F a ta l A c c ide nt A c t, 9 & 10 V ict., ch. 93 § 5. Da rlene argues that bec ause the Act w as patter ned af ter L ord Campbell’s Act, c ourts should also a dopt the same de finition of “child.” In response , GSK contends that th e fa c t th a t th e le g isl a tur e patte rn e d th e Ac t af te r L or d Cam

pb e ll’ s Ac t but did no t us e the same de fi nit ion of “ c hil d” sh ow s th a t th e le g isl a tur e did no t in te nd to a do pt that de fi nit ion . We a g re e wi th GSK . Co ns ide ri ngthat the le g isl a tur e wa s famil iar w iththe langua g e in L or d Ca mpb e ll’ s A c t w hil e draf ting the Act but chose not to provide a definition of the ter

m “child,” we can only

conclude that it did so purposely
. Se e Ga ble s R e alt yLtd . P ’s hip , 81 S.W .3d at 873 (stating that courts must rea d
ever y word, phra se, and e x pression i n statute as if de liberate ly chosen a nd presume that words8

e xclu de d f

ro m st a tut e are do ne so purp os e fu lly ); Boudreaux , 7 8 S. W.2 d at 644 ( statin g that be c a us e L ord Campbell’s Act provided specific definition of “pa rent” but Act did not, leg islature intended
no t to a do pt s ame de fi nit ion ). We t he re fo re re

je c t th is a rgume nt. Da rl en e a l s o as s er t s t h at t h e A ct ’s d ef i n i t i o no f “ ch ildren” should include ste pchildren beca use numerous othe r Texas statutes either include stepchildren in the definiti on of “children” or otherwise trea t stepchildren a s children. See Tex. I ns. Code Ann. §§ 1551.004(b), 1601.004( b) (West 2009); Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 401.011( 7) (West Supp. 2008); T ex . Gov’t C ode Ann. § 572.006 (West 2004); Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 157.063 (West 2008); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 2 5. 02 (a )( 2) (We st Su pp . 2 00 8) ; Tex. F a m. Cod e Ann. § 6 .2 06 (We st 2 00 6) ; T e x. Hum. R e s. Code Ann. § 31.015(b) (3) ( West S upp. 2008). We ag ree with D arle ne that there are times in which
co u rts look to other statutes to aid in statutory construction. See T e x. G o v ’ t Code Ann. § 3 11 .0 23 (4 ); Moore v. Trevino , 94 S.W .3d 723, 727 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 2002, pe t. denied). Howeve r, in Mo or e , the i ssue was one of first impression, and be cause the statute there did not provide a definition of the phrase “hea ling arts,” the court looked to de finitions of the phrase in other statutes. 94 S.W .3d at 726-27. The case befor e us is distinguishable be cause unlike Mo or e , there is c a s e la w r e g ar d in g w h o c o n s ti tute s a “ c h il d ” u n d e r th e A ct. Se e Fa irc lot h , 898 S.W .2d at 275; Robinson , 8 06 S.W. 2d

a t 31 0- 11 ; Taylor , 6 78 S.W. 2d a t 52 9; Amos , 57 5 S. W.2 d at 63 7- 38 ; Go ss , 28 7 S. W.2 d at 28 9- 90 ; Boudreaux , 78 S.W .2d at 644-45. Thus, we are not p er s u ad ed b y other statutory definitions of the t erm. Fur ther, although we sy

mpathize with Darlene ’s ar g ument, it is not our plac e as an intermediate court of a ppeals to depa

rt from e stablished case law or intrude upon the
r o le o f th e le g is lature. S ee Trammel’s , 80 S.W .3d at 585; Taylor , 6 7 8 S. W. 2 d a t 5 2 9

- 3 0
. We acknow ledg e that no Te x as cour t has specif

ically held that stepchildre n are not “childre n” under the9

Act, but Texas law is clea r that re g ardle ss of how much the relationship betwe en the dec ease d and the child re sembles a tra ditional parent-c hild r e lationship, only biologica l or leg ally

adopted c hildren
are included within the term’s de finition. I t is undisput ed that B alas wa s not the biologica l father of the c hildren and that, although the summary -judg ment evidenc e shows that he spoke of his desire to a do pt t

he m, h e ne ve r t oo k s te ps to d o s o b e fo re hi s death. Ac c or din g ly , w e ov e rr ule Dar lene’ s first issue. Equi table Adoption

I n her se cond issue, Da

rlene alleg es that B alas e quitably adopted the c hildren bef

ore his death and t h at equitably adopted c hildren should qualify as childre n under the Act. Da rlene acknow ledg es that it is only case s involving heirship proc eeding s under the probate code in whic h
c o u rt s h av e a l l o w e d a p e r s o n t o r e c o v e r b a s e d o nane qu i t a

b l e - a d o p t i o nt h e o r

y. See H

eien v. Crabtree , 3 6 9 S. W. 2 d 2 8 , 3 0 (Tex. 1963); L u na v. Estate of Rodriguez , 906 S.W .2d 576, 582 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin

19 95 , n o w ri t) . I n co ntr a st, e ve ry c ourt that has a dd re sse d a c la im o f e qu ita

ble adoption under the Texas Wrong ful Death A ct has re jected it. See Byrnes v. Ford Motor Co. , 6 42 F. Supp. 309, 311 ( E.D. Tex. 1986) (stating that “Te x as courts do not pla ce equitably adopted c hildren within the terms of the [Act]”); Amos , 575 S.W .2d at 638-39 (r ejec ting e quitable-a doption theory
un de r Ac t whe re de c e a se d ha d fil e d pe tit ion fo r ad op tio n be fo re de a th) ; Go ss , 287 S.W .2d at 289-90 (re jecting equitable- adoption theory under A ct wher e dec ease d had promised to adopt c hild and treated him as natura l c hild). Yet, Dar lene urg es this c ourt to e x tend the rec og nition of an equitable

adoption theory

to this case based on a “more reality -base d understanding of t he word ‘childre n’” and “in lig ht of the re al-wor ld pare nt-child relationship.” W e dec line to do so. Even assuming that10

the childre n wer e equitably adopted by Ba las, we will not depa rt from e stablished case law re jecting the equitable- adoption theory and holdingthat only biologica l and lega lly -adopte d children qua lify
as “childre n” under

the Act. Se e Fa irc lot

h , 8 98 S.W. 2d

a t 27 5; Robinson , 806 S.W .2d at 310-11; Taylor , 67 8 S.W. 2d a t 52 9; Amos , 575 S.W. 2d a t 63 7- 38 ; Go ss , 2 87 S.W. 2d a t 28 9- 90 ; Boudreaux , 78 S.W .2d at 644-45. F urther, w e will not eng ag e in conduc t t h at is within the purview of the leg islature. See Taylor , 678 S.W .2d at 529-30. We there fore overr ule Dar lene’ s second issue. Equal Protection I n her third issue, Dar lene asser ts that c onstruing the Act to e x cl u d e s t ep children vio late s th e Eq

ua l Pr ote c tio n Cla

us e of the U. S. Cons tit

uti on . Ho we ve r, Da

rl e ne did no t r a ise thi s iss ue in the dis tr ic t court
. To pr e se rv e a c omp la int

fo r a pp e llate re vie w, the c omp la ini ngpa rt y mus t prese nt the complaint to the trial court by t i m el y re quest, objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)( 1). This is true eve n for c onstitut ional claims. See Texas Dep’t o f P rotective & Re gu lator ySe rv s. v . S he rry , 4 6 S. W.3 d 8 57 , 861 (T e x. 20 01 ). Da rl e ne did no t r a ise an e qu a lprotec tion argument in her plea dings or her response to G SK’s motion for summary judgme nt. As
a re sult, she waived this issue on appe al. Id
.

Even if she had not waived the issue, we are not persua ded by her e qual-prote ction argument. Dar lene cites only one case in support of he r ar g ument, see Levy v . Louisi ana , 3 91 U. S. 68 (1968), and the case i s distinguishable fr om the case befor e us. In Levy , the U.S. Supreme Court held that L ouisiana’s e x clusion of illeg itimate children fr om the definition of “children” unde r the L ouisiana wrong fu l d ea t h statute violated the e qual protec tion clause be cause it constitut ed “a n invidious di scrimination ag ainst a par ticular c lass.” 391 U. S
. at 7 1
. There , the ca se involved11

five illeg itimate children suingfor the a lleg ed wr ong ful death of t heir mot her, a nd the cour

t stated that “[t] he rig hts asser

ted here i nvolve t he int imate, familial relationship between a child and his own mother.” Id . T he U. S. Su pr e me Court

late r e xpre sse d th e reas on fo r d e c isi on s su c h a s th e on e in Levy , stating in a

later c ase that “[o] ur consider ation of t hese cases has been animated by a spec ial
co n ce rn fo r di scrimination ag ainst illegitimate c hildren.” Pi c k e tt v . B ro wn , 4 6 2 U
. S. 1 , 7 ( 1 9 8 3 ). The Te x as Supreme Court ha s likewise held that illeg itimate children have a rig ht to sue under the Act. Se e Br own , 764 S.W .2d at 223. Howe ver, the standing o f i l l eg itimate children, who a re the biologica l children of the dece ased pa ren t an d woul d only

be excluded fr om rec overy based on discrimination, is considerably differ ent from the sta

nding o f s tep c h il d ren, who often have two living biologica l pare nts in addition t o their steppar ents. Her e, the rec ord shows t hat B alas’s stepc hildren had two biolog ical pare nts who both had par ental rig hts at the time of B alas’s de ath. The c hildren
c ou ld h ave br ou g ht a

wr on g ful d e a th s uit

fo r t he de a th o f e ith e r o f t

he ir bio log ic a l pa

re nts . T hu s, Levy does not apply

to this case, and w e over rule Da rlene ’s third issue.
CO NC LU SION Be cause we hold as a

matter of la

w that unadopted ste pchildre n ar e n o t “childre n” under the Act, we aff

irm the district court’s summary -judg ment order
.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Patterson and Puryear Affir med Filed: June 18, 2009