Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-452 | September 7, 2018 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lee M. Stoy, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tanner Cripe,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 7, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-452

Appeal from the Noble Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Michael J. Kramer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

57C01-1612-F5-85

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-452 | September 7, 2018 Page 2 of 15

[1] Tanner Cripe appeals his termination from the Noble County Drug Court 

Program and his sentence for Level 5 Felony Burglary1 and Level 6 Felony 

Theft.2 He argues that the drug court erred by denying him due process during 

his termination hearing and by not considering certain mitigating factors during 

sentencing, and that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses and his character. Finding no error, and that his sentence is not 

inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On July 16, 2016, a private home security camera recorded Cripe walking from 

his garage to a neighboring structure in Kendallville owned by Thomas Taner. 

Cripe entered the structure through an unlocked door and took several items, 

including a drill, drill bits, flashlight, GPS unit, gloves, and a ratchet set. He 

then returned to his own garage. The same camera later recorded him leaving 

his home for work.

[3] Later that day, Kendallville police officers stopped Cripe. They searched his 

home, finding several items taken from Taner’s property. The police also found 

items that belonged to other people that had been reported stolen in earlier theft 

cases, including a purse that contained a paycheck payable to Cayla Blackshire 

and Blackshire’s driver’s license, and a wallet that contained a driver’s license 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.

2

I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a)(1).
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belonging to Brent Wagner. Both Blackshire and Wagner had reported these 

items stolen from their vehicles earlier in the day.

[4] On July 18, 2016, the State charged Cripe with Level 6 felony theft for stealing 

Blackshire’s and Wagner’s property. On July 21, 2016, the State charged Cripe 

under a separate cause number with Level 5 felony burglary for entering 

Taner’s property and stealing tools. The causes were consolidated on 

September 22, 2016.

[5] On November 2, 2016, Cripe was referred to the Noble County problem solving 

court, and on November 30, 2016, he was accepted into the program. On 

December 7, 2016, Cripe entered into a Problem Solving Court Participation 

Agreement with the State. In this agreement, Cripe agreed to participate in the 

drug court’s programs, and in exchange for his successful completion of the 

programs, the State would dismiss all charges. The agreement required Cripe to 

attend and successfully complete all assigned education, treatment, 

intervention, and service programs; to truthfully answer all reasonable questions 

asked by the problem solving court team members; to not consume any alcohol;

and to not be arrested, charged, cited, or convicted of any violation of the law. 

The agreement’s special conditions also required Cripe to complete an intensive 

outpatient program as directed by the court; to attend four support group 

meetings per week in the first phase of the program and as directed by the court 

thereafter; and to reside at a halfway facility until further order of the court. 
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[6] Also on December 7, 2016, Cripe pleaded guilty to the charges and entered the 

problem solving drug court program. Cripe then violated the terms of his

participation agreement five times:

• On February 1, 2017, the drug court found that Cripe violated a no 

contact order. The drug court advised Cripe that violating a no contact 

order could be a criminal offense that could end his participation in drug 

court and lead to jail. The trial court ordered Cripe to attend “Courage 

to Change” classes through probation.

• On March 22, 2017, the drug court found that Cripe again contacted the 

individual he was not allowed to contact and sentenced him to eight days 

in jail.

• On May 10, 2017, the drug court found that Cripe tested positive for 

alcohol. The drug court increased the frequency of Cripe’s drug and 

alcohol screens and ordered him to attend a meeting3every day for the 

next ninety days.

• On June 7, 2017, the drug court found that Cripe missed a meeting. 

Cripe stated that he missed it because he did not write it down in his 

book. The drug court increased Cripe’s meeting requirement to a 

meeting every day for 100 days and ordered him to reside at Pilot House, 

a men’s shelter. On June 28, 2017, the drug court learned that Cripe had 

been dishonest about why he had missed the meeting and sentenced him 

to fourteen days in jail. 

• On September 20, 2017, the drug court found that Cripe again violated 

his agreement4 and sentenced him to forty days in jail, followed by six 

months of home detention. 

 

3 The record does not specify what kind of meeting Cripe was required to attend.

4 The record does not reveal exactly how Cripe violated his participation agreement. The trial court stated 

that “you’ve been sanctioned multiple times for this same thing and you just keep going back to it.” Tr. Vol. 

II p. 152. 
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[7] On November 21, 2017, the probation department filed a drug court violation 

report stating that Cripe was going to be evicted from Pilot House that day;5the 

report recommended a hearing to determine whether Cripe had violated the 

terms of his participation agreement and whether it should be modified or 

revoked. A hearing took place on November 22, 2017, during which the drug 

court told Cripe that the drug court team would be meeting to discuss whether 

he should be terminated from the program. The drug court also told Cripe that 

someone involved with the program would talk with him about the process. 

The drug court asked Cripe whether he had any questions, to which Cripe 

replied, “No sir, thank you.” Tr. Vol. II p. 174. 

[8] The termination hearing took place on November 29, 2017, during which the 

following exchange occurred:

Court: The Drug Court team has decided that you be terminated 

from Drug Court. Do you want an attorney to represent you?

Cripe: Um, at this point let’s just move forward to sentencing it 

would be wasting the Court’s time to ask for an attorney I’ve 

already pled guilty in this case.

Court: You just want to represent yourself and admit that you 

violated.

 

5 The record does not reveal the reason for Cripe’s eviction.
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Cripe: Yeah.

Id. at 177. The drug court terminated Cripe’s participation with the drug court 

program, ordered a pre-sentence investigation report, scheduled a sentencing 

hearing, and told Cripe that a probation officer would talk with him about the 

pre-sentence investigation report. The drug court then asked Cripe whether he 

had any questions, and Cripe responded, “not at this time.” Id. at 178.

[9] On December 7, 2017, Cripe requested an attorney, and one was appointed for 

him. On January 24, 2018, the sentencing hearing took place. During the 

hearing, the trial court found Cripe’s involvement with the drug court program 

to be a mitigating factor; in its sentencing order, it found potential hardship 

suffered by Cripe and/or Cripe’s dependents by his imprisonment to be another 

mitigating factor. The trial court found that Cripe’s lengthy criminal history, 

which includes previous convictions for burglary and theft, to be an aggravating 

factor. The trial court then sentenced Cripe to concurrent terms of six years for 

burglary and two and one-half years for theft, with two years executed, three 

years in community corrections, and one year on probation. Cripe now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Due Process

[10] Cripe argues that he did not receive minimum due process during the hearing 

that resulted in the termination of his participation in the drug court program. 
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Specifically, he claims that he received inadequate notice of the alleged program

violation for which he was terminated and was deprived of his right to counsel. 

[11] The drug court program is a forensic diversion program akin to community 

corrections, and we will review the termination of placement in a drug court 

program as we do a revocation of placement in community corrections. Withers 

v. State, 15 N.E.3d 660, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Our Court has stated that:

For purposes of appellate review, we treat a hearing on a petition 

to revoke a placement in a community corrections program the 

same as we do a hearing on a petition to revoke probation. The 

similarities between the two dictate this approach. Both 

probation and community corrections programs serve as 

alternatives to commitment to the [Department of Correction] 

and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. A 

defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or 

a community corrections program. Rather, placement in either is 

a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a 

right.

While a community corrections placement revocation hearing 

has certain due process requirements, it is not to be equated with 

an adversarial criminal proceeding. Rather, it is a narrow 

inquiry, and its procedures are to be more flexible. This is 

necessary to permit the court to exercise its inherent power to 

enforce obedience to its lawful orders. . . . 

Id. at 663-64.

[12] Indiana Code section 33-23-16-14.5 governs the termination of an individual’s 

participation in a problem solving court program. The statute provides:
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(c) The problem solving court judge or other hearing officer shall 

conduct a hearing concerning an alleged violation of a condition 

of a problem solving court program as follows:

***

(3) The individual who is alleged to have committed the 

violation is entitled to:

(A) receive written notice of the alleged violation;

(B) obtain the disclosure of evidence against the 

individual;

(C) confront and cross-examine witnesses; and

(D) be represented by counsel.

I.C. § 33-23-16-14.5.

[13] Cripe first contends that he did not receive adequate written notice of the 

alleged violation that led to the termination of his participation in drug court. 

The drug court violation report filed by a probation officer stated that:

On November 20, 2017, this Officer was advised that Mr. Cripe 

is going to be evicted from the Pilot House program on 

November 21, 2017.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 53.
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[14] This notice was sufficient to apprise Cripe of the alleged violation—that he was 

going to be evicted from the Pilot House. Although Cripe contends that the 

report does not specify how an eviction could violate the terms of his 

participation agreement, one of the special conditions of his participation 

agreement was that he had to reside at a halfway facility until further order of 

the court; Cripe’s pending eviction was in violation of this condition. Cripe 

does not dispute that he was evicted, nor does he contend that he was evicted 

for a reason that should not have resulted in the drug court finding a violation 

of his participation agreement. Rather, he simply speculates that he could have 

been evicted for a reason that would not have resulted in a violation.

[15] Moreover, at both the November 22 and 29 hearings, Cripe was given 

opportunities to ask questions; he did not ask any at either hearing. Cripe had 

appeared before the drug court multiple times during his time with the program

and had asked questions during at least one previous hearing. Then, at the 

November 29 hearing, Cripe admitted to the violation. It is reasonable to infer 

that because Cripe asked no questions and admitted to the violation that he 

knew and understood his violation. We find, therefore, that Cripe did not 

receive inadequate notice of his alleged violation. 

[16] Cripe also contends that he was deprived of his right to counsel. At the 

November 22, 2017, hearing, the following exchange took place:

Court: The Drug Court team has decided that you be terminated 

from Drug Court. Do you want an attorney to represent you?
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Cripe: Um, at this point let’s just move forward to sentencing it 

would be wasting the Court’s time to ask for an attorney I’ve 

already pled guilty in this case.

Court: You just want to represent yourself and admit that you 

violated.

Cripe: Yeah.

Tr. Vol. II p. 177.

[17] Cripe argues that this exchange does not show that his waiver of his right to

counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. To support his assertion, he 

analyzes the Poynter factors that this Court considers when determining whether 

a waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Poynter v. State, 

749 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind. 2001). But the Poynter factors apply to waiver of counsel 

for a criminal defendant entitled to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at 

trial. See Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1125-28. An individual participating in a 

problem solving drug court is not entitled to the full array of constitutional 

rights afforded to defendants at trial, including the Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999) (discussing due process 

rights for a hearing on a petition to revoke placement in community 

corrections). Consequently, Cripe’s right to counsel is bestowed by statute 

rather than by constitution. A waiver of a statutory right requires less inquiry 

than a waiver of a constitutional right. This is because, for sentencing 

alternatives such as problem solving drug courts “to be viable options for 

Indiana judges, judges must have the ability to move with alacrity to protect 
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public safety when adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their 

sentences.” Id. at 550. In other words, “obstacles to revoking an alternative 

sentence may diminish the likelihood of [the alternative sentence] being made 

in the first place.” Id.

[18] The drug court asked Cripe whether he wanted an attorney; when Cripe 

declined, the drug court confirmed that Cripe wanted to represent himself. 

While Cripe takes issue with the court’s semantics, the record shows that Cripe 

invited the court to move forward with his case. Further, Cripe has significant 

experience with the criminal justice system, including previous participation

with another problem solving drug court program from which he was also 

terminated. In other words, Cripe knew he could have obtained an attorney, 

and he intentionally decided to forego having one on November 22. That Cripe 

later wrote to the court to ask for an attorney further shows that Cripe knew 

that he had a right to an attorney. We find no error with Cripe’s waiver of his 

right to counsel at this hearing.6

 

6 Cripe also contends that his admission to the violation is invalid because he was deprived of his right to 

counsel. Because we find no error with his waiver of right to counsel, we do not find that his admission was 

invalid. Cripe then contends that the cumulative effect of the lack of notice and counsel resulted in his being 

deprived of his required hearing. Based on our conclusions, we find this argument unavailing.
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II. Mitigating Factors

[19] Cripe also argues that the trial court erred by not considering two mitigating 

factors: Cripe’s guilty plea and the undue hardship Cripe’s dependents would 

suffer upon his imprisonment.

[20] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g on other 

grounds at 875 N.E.2d 218. A trial court may err in its decision if it is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

A trial court may err by finding aggravating or mitigating factors that are not 

supported by the record, by omitting factors that are clearly supported by the 

record and advanced for consideration, or by finding factors that are improper 

as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. “An allegation that the trial court failed to 

identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the 

mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id.

at 493.

[21] Our Supreme Court has held “that a defendant who pleads guilty deserves 

‘some’ mitigating weight be given to the plea in return.” Anglemyer v. State, 875 

N.E.2d 218, 220 (Ind. 2007) (quoting McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 591 

(Ind. 2007)). A trial court may attribute little weight to a guilty plea when the 

plea “does not demonstrate the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility or 

when the defendant receives a substantial benefit in return for the plea.” Id. at 

221. A defendant’s decision to plead guilty may be merely pragmatic when the 
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evidence is strong against him and thus, his guilty plea is not a mitigating 

factor. Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[22] Here, Cripe received a substantial benefit in return for his plea because he was 

able to enroll in the drug court program and receive help and treatment for his 

problems. Further, Cripe’s guilty plea appears to be merely pragmatic because 

there was already strong evidence against him. A camera recorded Cripe 

entering and taking several items from his neighbor’s property. A search of 

Cripe’s garage revealed the items he took from that property and other items 

that had been reported stolen in separate theft cases. The trial court did not err 

by declining to find Cripe’s guilty plea to be a mitigating factor.

[23] As for the undue hardship Cripe’s dependents may suffer by his imprisonment, 

the trial court did find that factor to be mitigating. Although the trial court did 

not mention it during the sentencing hearing, the court included it as a 

mitigating factor in its written sentencing order. And while the trial court found 

Cripe’s participation in the drug court program to be a mitigating factor during 

the sentencing hearing, it did not include that in its sentencing order. 

[24] This Court is not confined to either the oral sentencing statement or the written 

sentencing order to determine what the trial court found as mitigating and 

aggravating factors; instead, we examine both to determine the trial court’s 

conclusions. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007). Here, because 

the trial court found one mitigating factor during sentencing that was not 

included in its sentencing order, and one mitigating factor in its sentencing 
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order that was not mentioned during the hearing, it is reasonable to conclude 

that the trial court found both factors to be mitigating. Therefore, the trial court 

did not err by not finding any undue hardship on Cripe’s dependents to be a 

mitigating factor, because the trial court did, in fact, find it to be a mitigating 

factor. 

III. Sentence

[25] Cripe next argues that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses and his character pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). In 

considering an argument under Rule 7(B), we must “conduct [this] review with 

substantial deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court's decision—

since the ‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and 

not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 

1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 

2013)) (internal citations omitted). 

[26] Cripe was convicted of Level 5 felony burglary, for which he faced a term of 

one to six years imprisonment, with an advisory term of three years. Ind. Code 

§ 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court imposed a six-year term. Cripe was also 

convicted of Level 6 felony theft, for which he faced a term of six months and 

two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-

7(b). The trial court imposed a sentence of two and one-half years. The trial 

court ordered the sentences to run concurrently with two years executed, three 

years on community corrections, and one year on probation. Had the trial 
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court ordered consecutive terms, Cripe would have received a sentence of eight 

and one-half years.

[27] With respect to the nature of the offenses, Cripe burglarized a neighbor’s 

property and stole several valuable items from that neighbor. Cripe also broke 

into two vehicles, stealing the wallets of each vehicle’s owner.

[28] With respect to Cripe’s character, Cripe now has four felony convictions for 

burglary and four felony convictions for theft. He also has a felony conviction 

for possession of a controlled substance and misdemeanor convictions for 

possession of an alcoholic beverage, driving while suspended, and false 

informing. Cripe has repeatedly failed to take advantage of the leniency in 

sentencing and the opportunities for rehabilitation that he has received. Most 

notably, during his previous participation in a drug court program, he violated 

the terms of his placement at least four times, resulting in him serving two years 

in the Department of Correction. His violations in the instant case show that 

he failed to learn from either of his experiences with a drug court program and 

is unable or unwilling to reform his behavior.

[29] Under these circumstances, we find that the sentence imposed by the trial court 

is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and Cripe’s character.

[30] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May, J., and Robb, J., concur.