J udg e Sara L ioi, U n i t ed S t ates District J udg e for the Northe rn District of Ohio, sitting by * desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0438n.06 No. 07-4200 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. RO B ERT D. HO L YC RO SS, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE S O U T H E R

N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

Be fore : SUTTON and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; L I OI , District J udg e. * SUTTON, C ircuit J udg e. Robert Holy cross appeals his conviction and sentence for be ing
a fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm . We a ff

ir m.
I.
I n the ea rly morning of Au gu s t 2 6 , 2005, police off icer s in an unmarke d vehicle obse rved Holy cross driving“at a

high r ate of

speed” down Sullivant Avenue in Colum bus, Ohio. J A 183. After Holy cross “ almost sideswip[ ed]” the off icer s and vee red le ft of ce nter, one of the officer s called the police dispatcher and asked for a marke d vehicle to stop Holy cross. Id. Responding to the dispatch a few minutes later, a pair of office rs observe d Holy cross stop at an inter section. Pointing their ca r’s he adlig hts at the stopped car , the office rs noticed Holy cross look at the police car , “kindNo. 07-4200

Un ite d S tat es v . H oly c ro ss

- 2 - of g [e]t a lit tle bit bige y e d” and

make a qu ick m oti on

tow ard the fl oo r b e hin d th e pa sse ng e r s e a t. J A 133. The of

fice rs initiated a

traff ic stop, and as Holycross slowed the car , one of the office rs saw him ag ain lean t o wa rd t he passe ng er side. U pon lear ning that Holy cross did not have a drive r’s license, the office rs ar

rested him. An inventor

y sear ch of the vehicle r evea led a ha ndg un under the pa sse ng e r s e a t. A jury co n v i cted Holy cross of be ing a felon in possession of a f irea rm. See 18 U. S.C. 922(g )(1)
. At sentenc ing, the district c ourt calc ulated an offe nse level of 33—the minimum required by the Arme d Caree r Criminal Act , see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4( b)(3) (B )—and a g uidelines rang e of 210 to 2 62 months. Th e c ourt imp os e d a

be low -guid e lin e s se nte nc e of 20 0 mo nth s in

pr iso n, a nd

it denied Holycross’s motion for a new tria l.
II. Holy cross fir st challeng es his conviction, claiming that t h e governme nt failed to prove possession of the we apon. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g) . Sufficienc y challeng es re ceive defe rential re view. We m us t “ vie w[] th e e vid e nc e in t he lig ht mos t fa vo ra

ble to the pr os e c uti on ” and wi ll r e ve rs e on ly if no “ ratio na l tr ie r of fa c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Direct or circ umstantial evidence may support a convic tion, as may actua l or construc tive possession of the w ea p o n . Un ite d S tat es v . A rn old , 486 F.3d 177, 181, 183 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Although a defendant’s prox imity to a we apon does not by itself prove posse ssion, United States v.No. 07-4200

Un ite d S tat es v . H oly c ro ss

- 3 - Bailey , 553 F.3d 940, 944 ( 6th Cir. 2009), proxi mity combined with “o ther incr iminating evidenc e”—inc luding a

n attempt to conce al the we apon or f orens ic e v id e n c e
—

ma y s u p p o r t a finding of possession. Ar

no ld , 4 86 F .3 d at 18 3; see, e.g. , United St ates v. Newsom , 4 52 F .3 d 5 93 , 6 09 (6 th Cir. 2006) (noting that there was suff icient evidenc e of posse ssion where , among other thing s, the de fe nd ant “ a

pp e are d .
. . a s if

he wa s ma

y be pu tti ngso me thi ngun de r t he se a t” of

the c ar) ; United S t a t es v. Carter , 3 5 5 F
. 3 d 9 2 0 , 9 2 5 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 4 ) ( n o ti n g th a t th e r e w a s s u f f ic ie n t e v id e n c e of possession where , among other thing s, the defe ndant “re ach[ed] unde r the seat while looking ba ck over his shoulder a

t the detec tive when he approa ched the vehicle” ). Ample evidence supported the conviction. The officer s rec overe d a handgun from under the p as s en ger s ea t o f th e c ar

t h at Ho l y cr o s s wa s dri v i n g. Three office rs—the two who r esponded to the police dispatch a

nd one fr om the unmarke d car that followed Holy cross a fter c ontacting the dispatcher

—observe d Holy cr o s s m ak e a mot ion toward the pa sseng er side of his vehicle a s he stopped at the interse ction. One of the office rs testified that he sawHoly cross make another simil ar motion. And a fore nsic scientist testified that the DNAfound on the gun matched H oly cross’s D NA and that the same DNA ty pe occ urs in one in over

a quintillion (a billi on billion) people.
Un ite d S tat es v . B e v e rly , 750 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1984), does not support a diffe rent c onclusion and indeed offe rs a poor analog y to this case . There , the defendant did not have e x clusive control over the are a whe re the g un was found a nd the police did not observe him attempting to c oncea l the fi rea rm. Id. a t 3 7
. H a v in g f

a il e d to r a is e an y

o th e r s e r io u s c o n te n ti o n s in

s u p p o rt o f h is p o s ition, Ho ly c ro ss’ s su ff

ic ie nc y argume nt f

a ils
.No. 07-4200

Un ite d S tat es v . H oly c ro ss

- 4 - III
. Holy cross hints that the district court improper l y al l o we d the g overnme nt to use hear say te sti mony to e sta bli sha ne xus bet we e n the g un

and int e rs ta te c omm e rc e . B r. at 30 , 4 8. B ut b e c a us e he make s the ar gu m en t i n p as sing a nd without developing it, he has for feited it. Se e Le ar y v. Liv ing sto n Co un ty , 528 F.3d 438, 449 ( 6th Cir. 2008).
I V. Holy cross a

rg ues that the e rror s of his trial counsel amounted to ineffe ctive assistanc e and that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

the re fo re e rr e d in

de nyinghis mot ion

fo r a ne w tri a l. Al tho ug h w e g e ne ra lly do not addre ss ineffe ctive-a ssistance c laims on dir ec t ap p ea l , we may do so “[i] f the pa

rties have adequately

develope d the re cord.” United States v. Fore man , 323 F.3 d 4 9 8 , 502 (6th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Be cause the district c ourt conducte d an evide ntiary hear ing on the issue, and be cause both parties ask us to c onsider the claim on dire ct appe al, see Fore man , 323 F.3d at 502, we will do so. The district c ourt may g rant a motion for a new trial “if the intere st of justice so require s.” F ed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). To succeed on a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e, a defe ndant must establish that his attorney ’s per formanc e wa s “def icient”—that his attorne y “made
err ors so serious that counse l w as not f unctioning as the ‘counse l’ g uara nteed the def

endant by the Six th Amendment”—a

nd that the er

rors we re pr ejudicial. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).No. 07-4200

Un ite d S tat es v . H oly c ro ss

- 5 - Holy cross princ ipally

argues t h at h i s attorney

should have pre sented testimony from thre e witnesses: Holy cross; his g irlfriend, D ebbie Munc ie; and Muncie’s cousin, Kristy Goad. Ac cording to H olyc ro ss, he wo uld

have te sti fi e d th a t he wa s n ot a wa re of the g un , a nd Mu nc ie and Go a d w ou ld have te stified that the g un belong ed to Goad. B ut his attorney ’s testimony at the post-trial he aring makes it clea

r that he ha d a sound re ason for declining to call H o ly cross, Muncie and Goa d as witnesses. According to the attorney , the g overnme nt had turned ove r a r ecor ding that could have
com p romised the testimony of ea ch of the three individuals. The rec ording , made dur ing Holy cross’s incarc eration, memorialized a damag ing conver sation betwee n Holy cross a nd Muncie. As summarized by

his attorney , the re cordingsaid:
There wer e many

spots on those ta pes whe re Mr . Holy cross a nd Ms. Muncy

discussed try ing to g e t K

r is ty to c o u rt to te s ti f

y . . . th a t it w a s h e r g u n . . . . [T ]h e r e c o uld be an argument made that they

wer e attempting to ge t her to come forwa rd and tell the truth that it was her gun, and ther e were other constructions that Ithought would make it clear that they wer e attempting to ge t her to fa lsely claim it was her

g un.
J A 349. The district c ourt found Holy cross’s attorney cre dible and found Goad, who also testified
a t th e he ari ng , n ot c re dib le . A n atto rn e y , q uit e un de rs tand a

bly , ma y de c lin e to ca ll witne sse s w ho se testimony might be se vere ly

impeache d at trial.
No r d id t he a tto rn e y pr ov ide ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e in de c lin ingto c a ll H olyc ro ss a s a wi tne ss. As Hol y cross a cknowledg es, his “prior [criminal] recor d was e x tensive and the re w ould be a
c re dib ili ty

iss ue wh e n th e jur

y he ard a bo ut h is p ri or []” c on vic tio ns . B r. a t 33
. B e c a us e we pr e su me that an attorne y ’s trial s t ra t egy decisions ar e “sound,” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 9, and be c a us eNo. 07-4200

Un ite d S tat es v . H oly c ro ss

- 6 - Holy cross’s c oncession conf irms that presumption r at h er than re butting it, this arg ument g oes nowher e.
Ho ly c ro ss s e pa

rate ly argue s th a t hi s atto rn e y

sh ou ld h a ve pr e se nte d a

n in de pe nd e nt a

na ly sis of the DN A evidenc e at tria l. But he offe rs no answe r to the district c ourt’s finding s that “the e x pert would corr oborate the finding of [ Holy cross’s] DNA on the firearm” and that his pref err ed expert “could not identify

any other pe rson’s DNAon the wea pon.” JA 61. Finally , Holy cross a

rg ues that his attorney wa s i n ef fective bec ause he failed to introduce doc u me n ts

—

p aw ns h o p r e c e ip ts

— in d ic a ti n g th a t G o a d o w n e d th e g u n . B u t t

h is e v id e n c e d o es nothing to re fute e vidence of construc tive possess i o n o ff ered by the g overnme nt and thus cannot satisfy the re quirement of pr ejudice. See U nited States v. W

illiams , 106 F.3d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 19 97 ). Ho ly c ro ss’ s in e ff

e c tiv e ne ss c la im f

a ils
. V. Holy cross a lso arg ues t hat hi s prior convictions for bur g lary and attempted bur g lary

wer e not “v i o l en t felon[ies] ” under the Arme d Caree r Criminal Act. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)( 1); see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4( b)(3) (B ). A pe rson convicte d of beinga fe lon in possession who has three prior convic tions for “violent felon[ies]” is subject t o a mi nimum sentenc e of 15 y ear s, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1), a nd an offe nse le v e l o f

a t l e a s t 3 3 ( s u

b je c t t o ana d

ju s tm e n t f

o r a c c e p ta n c e o f r e s p o n s ib il it

y ) , U
. S. S. G. § 4B1.4( b)(3) (B ). A violent f elony is a ny crime punishable by more than one y ear of imprisonment that “has a s an element the us e, attempted use, or threatene d use of phy sical for ce a g ainst the personNo. 07-4200

Un ite d S tat es v . H oly c ro ss

- 7 - of anothe r” or

“is burg lary , arson, or

extorti o n , i nvolves use of e x plosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pr esents a se rious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2) (B ).
To qu a lif y a s a “ burg lary” un de r A CCA , a de fe nd ant’ s pr ior c onvic tio n mu st b e fo r “ g e ne ri c burg lary ”—“a

n unlawful or unpr ivilege d entry into, or rema ining in, a building or other struc ture, with i n t ent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). A state law
e xten ds be y on d g e ne ri c burg lary if it “ inc lud [es ] pla c e s, su c h a s a uto mob ile s and

ve nd ingma c hin e s, other than building s.” Id. Ohio’s burglar y law ex tends bey ond g ener ic burglar y beca use i t cover s th e f ts inv o lv in g ma

n y o th e r s tr u c tu r e s
— in c lu d in g “ w a te r c r a f t, a ir c r a ft, rail r o a d

c ar [s ], tr u c k [s ], tr a ile r[s ], [ and ] te nt[s ],” R.C . § 29 09 .0 1; see R.C . § 29 11 .1 2; United States v. Lane , 909 F.2d 895, 903 (6th Cir. 1990)—making the statutory offe nse not a “ burg lary” under ACCA.
That make s no differ ence here , howeve r, bec ause the convictions amount to crim es of violence unde r the re sidual “other wise” clause
. Attempted burg lary and burg lary under O hio law, we have held, “ involve[] conduct that prese nts a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another” and thus are crimes of violence unde r ACCA. Lane , 909 F.2d at 903. Holy cross ha lf-hea rtedly asks us to look be y ond the state law definition of the crime to “ the ac tual fac ts of the offe nses for w hich he wa s c on vic te d to de te rm ine wh e the r a c ri me of vio le nc e oc c ur re d, ” B r. a t 47 , b ut t

hat g oe s a g a ins t prec edent, see, e .g. , Taylor , 495 U.S. at 600; Un ite d S tat es v . F or d , 560 F.3d 420, 421–22 (6th Cir. 2009).No. 07-4200

Un ite d S tat es v . H oly c ro ss

- 8 - V I.
F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.