alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NO. 07-07-0132-CR NO. 07-07-0133-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D APRIL 24, 2007

______________________________ EDW IN ROJAS, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, A PPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE 2 13TH DI STRICT COURT OF T ARRANT CO UNTY; NOS. 0942114D & 09 42115D; HONOR ABLE ROBERT K. GI LL, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPIN ION Pending before th is Court i s Edwin Rojas’s pro se Motion to Withdraw Appeal in which he express es he no longer wishes to pursue these appeals. As required by Rule 42.2(a)of the Texas Rul es of Appellate Procedure, the m otion is signed by Appellant. No decision of this Court having been delivered to date, the motion is granted and the app eals2

are dismissed. No motions for rehe aring will be entertained and our mandates wil l issue forthwith. Accordingl y, the appeals are dismiss ed. Patrick A. Pirtle

Justice Do not publish
.
# C_2015198EN.01003101.xml

| 15.6.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 198/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.6.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 198/31

---

Judgment of the General Court of 29 April 2015 — National Iranian Gas Company v Council

(Case T-9/13) (1)

1

((Common Foreign and Security Policy - Restrictive measures taken against Iran with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation - Freezing of funds - Objection of illegality - Error of law - Proportionality - Right to property - Jurisdiction of the Council - Obligation to state reasons - Rights of the defence - Review of the restrictive measures adopted - Right to effective judicial protection - Error of assessment))

(2015/C 198/41)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: The National Iranian Gas Company (Teheran, Iran) (represented by: E. Glaser and S. Perrotet, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: A. Vitro and M. Bishop, Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

First, application for partial annulment of Article 1, point 8, of Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2012 L 282, p. 58) and, secondly, application for annulment of Decision 2012/635, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2012 L 282, p. 16), and of the decision communicated by the Council’s letter of 14 March 2014, in so far as the inclusion of the applicant’s name in Annex II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39), and in Annex IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1) is concerned.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders the National Iranian Gas Company to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the National Iranian Gas Company to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 79, 16.3.2013.

1

---
# Central Virginia PAOs discuss leveraging social media

/ Published Feb. 24, 2016
RICHMOND, Virginia, 
Defense Logistics Agency Aviation’s Public Affairs Office hosted the Central Virginia Military Public Affairs luncheon and meeting Feb. 18, 2016 at the Bellwood Club on Defense Supply Center Richmond, Virginia.   Guest speaker, DLA Social Media Manager Mason Lowery presented an overview on social media strategies. 

This was the second meeting of the group which formed last fall. Central Virginia Military PAOs include Department of Defense public affairs professionals from DLA Aviation, U.S. Army Fort Lee Garrison, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, Defense Commissary Agency, Kenner Army Health Clinic, Hunter Holmes McGuire Veterans Administration Medical Center, Defense Contract Management Agency, the Virginia National Guard, and the U.S. Army Richmond Recruiting Battalion.  The group meets quarterly to discuss trends in DoD public affairs and to share ideas and lessons learned.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Maximiliano Lozada, Appellant.

[47 NYS3d 909]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lasak, J.), rendered July 22, 2014, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s purported waiver of his right to appeal was invalid *(see People v Bradshaw,*18 NY3d 257, 267 [2011]; *People v Guarchaj,*122 AD3d 878, 879 [2014]; *People v Pressley,*116 AD3d 794, 795-796 [2014]; *People v Salgado,*111 AD3d 859 [2013]; *People v Pelaez,*100 AD3d 803, 803-804 [2012]), and thus, does not preclude review of his excessive sentence claim. However, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

Balkin, J.P., Miller, LaSalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
#### West 17th Street and Tenth Avenue Realty, LLC, Appellant, v The N.E.W. Corp., Respondent.

[65 NYS3d 132]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Werner Kornreich, J.), entered August 19, 2016, which, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and awarded defendant the down payment in this failed real estate transaction, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly found that defendant did not breach the contract by failing to disclose the presence of underground gas tanks on the property. In paragraph 4.13 of the contract, defendant guaranteed and warranted only that it had not generated, stored or disposed of hazardous materials and had no knowledge of the previous presence of such materials on the property. Plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether defendant was responsible for the presence of the gas tanks or had any knowledge of it. The former owner of the property and a managing member of defendant testified that he was unaware of the presence of the gas tanks.

In addition, paragraph 5 of the rider, which superseded the terms of the contract, provided that defendant disclaimed and was not making any warranties or representations concerning environmental conditions. Plaintiff acknowledged that it was relying solely on its own expertise and consultants in this regard, and was purchasing the property “as is, where is” *(see e.g. Rivietz v Wolohojian,*38 AD3d 301 [1st Dept 2007]; *Kasten v Golden,*50 AD3d 1098 [2d Dept 2008]).

Furthermore, the governmental E designation did not show that the tanks were located on the subject property, since the designation was issued if there were gas tanks on adjacent properties. Defendant demonstrated that the various websites *479of governmental agencies indicated that gas tanks were located on nearby properties and were not on the property, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the presence of the gas tanks on or under the property.

Defendant’s failure to disclose approximately $87,000 in rent arrears of one tenant was not material as a matter of law to this $32.5 million transaction *(see Savasta v Duffy,*257 AD2d 435, 436 [1st Dept 1999]).

We have considered plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

Concur—Renwick, J.P., Manzanet-Daniels, Andrias, Kern and Oing, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Julio Rivera, Appellant.

[767 NYS2d 881]

Appeal by the defendant from the judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lott, J.), rendered June 4, 2001, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury with respect to manslaughter in the first and second degrees as lesser-included offenses of intentional murder *(see*CPL 300.50; *People v Butler,*84 NY2d 627 [1994]). Under no reasonable view of the evidence could the jury have found that the defendant committed the lesser offenses but not the greater, given the number of shots fired by the defendant at close range into the victim’s vital organs as the victim tried to escape *(see People v Butler, supra; People v Ev*
      *543
      *ans,*192 AD2d 671 [1993]; *People v Rielly,*190 AD2d 695 [1993]). The defendant’s claim that he was intoxicated and therefore was entitled to a charge of manslaughter in the second degree as a lesser-included offense of intentional murder is improperly raised for the first time on appeal *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 25 [1995]; *People v Johnston,*166 AD2d 667 [1990]). In any event, the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, did not support the defendant’s contention that his alcohol consumption affected his mental capacity to commit intentional murder *(see People v Butler, supra*at 632-633; *cf. People v Gaines,*83 NY2d 925, 926 [1994]; *People v Rodriguez,*76 NY2d 918, 920-921 [1990]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Smith, J.P., McGinity, Luciano and Townes, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-6683
RICHARD EDWARD JANEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus MR. MEIKLEJOHN, Anne Arundel County Commission Office, #102, Defendant - Appellee.
No. 00-6822
RICHARD EDWARD JANEY, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MR. MEIKLEJOHN, Anne Arundel County Commission Office, #102, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Alexander Harvey II, Senior District Judge. (CA-98-1646)2 Submitted: September 20, 2000 Decided: October 19, 2000 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. No. 00-6683 affirmed and No. 00-6822 dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard Edward Janey, Appellant Pro Se. Phillip F. Scheibe, Hamilton F. Tyler, Julie Theresa Sweeney, ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: In No. 00-6683, Richard Edward Janey appeals the district court’s order of judgment denying relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s orders and find no reversible error. Accordingly,in No. 00-6683, we affirm the district court’s orders on the reasoning of the district court. See Janey v. Meiklejohn , No. CA-98- 1646 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2000). In light of our disposition of Janey’s appeal, we dismiss Meiklejohn’s cross-appeal, No. 00-6822, as moot.We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

No. 00-6683 - AFFIRMED No. 00-6822 - DISMISSED
# C_2013079EN.01003303.xml

| 16.3.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 79/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 79/33

---

Action brought on 3 January 2013 — ZZ v Europol

(Case F-1/13)

2013/C 79/56

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: ZZ (represented by: J.-J. Ghosez, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Police Office (Europol)

Defendant:

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Annulment of Europol’s decision not to renew the applicant’s contract for an unlimited period and an order that Europol pay the difference between the remuneration which she could have continued to receive from Europol and any other allowance which she actually received.

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision adopted by the defendant on 29 February 2012 by which the defendant informed the applicant that it would not be renewing her fixed-term contract which expired on 31 May 2012; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision adopted by the defendant on 29 February 2012 by which the defendant informed the applicant that it would not be renewing her fixed-term contract which expired on 31 May 2012;

| — | Order the defendant to pay the applicant the difference between the amount of the remuneration which she would have been able to claim had she remained in her post with the defendant and the amount of the remuneration, fees, unemployment benefits or any other substituted payment which she has actually received since 1 June 2012 to replace the remuneration which she received as a temporary staff member; |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the defendant to pay the applicant the difference between the amount of the remuneration which she would have been able to claim had she remained in her post with the defendant and the amount of the remuneration, fees, unemployment benefits or any other substituted payment which she has actually received since 1 June 2012 to replace the remuneration which she received as a temporary staff member;

| — | Order Europol to pay all the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order Europol to pay all the costs.

---
#### Lillyan Rosenberg et al., Respondents, v Jing Jiang et al., Appellants.

[60 NYS3d 300]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (O’Donoghue, J.), entered March 14, 2016, *745which, upon a jury verdict on the issue of damages, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against them in the principal sum of $200,000.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff Lilly an Rosenberg (hereinafter the injured plaintiff), then 87 years old, received acupuncture treatment for groin pain from the defendant Jing Jiang. During her third and final acupuncture treatment, Jing Jiang used heat lamp treatment, which allegedly caused the injured plaintiff to suffer third degree burns and permanent scarring. The injured plaintiff, and her husband suing derivatively, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries.

The defendants conceded liability, and the parties proceeded to a jury trial on the issue of damages. During trial, the defendants objected to certain questioning of the injured plaintiff by her counsel as leading. The defendants also objected when the trial court permitted the plaintiffs’ counsel to elicit testimony from a nontreating physician, who was called to testify as an expert regarding medical history given by the injured plaintiff to that witness. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the principal sum of $200,000. The defendants appeal from the judgment.

Under CPLR 4011, the trial court has the authority to “regulate the conduct of the trial in order to achieve a speedy and unprejudiced disposition of the matters at issue” (CPLR 4011). A “trial court is granted wide latitude in controlling the conduct of a trial” *(Roma v Blaustein,*44 AD2d 576, 576 [1974]), and “is generally accorded broad discretion in making eviden-tiary rulings” *(Matter of State of New York v John S.,*23 NY3d 326, 344 [2014]; *see Feldsberg v Nitschke,*49 NY2d 636, 643 [1980]; *Coopersmith v Gold,*223 AD2d 572, 574 [1996], *affd*89 NY2d 957 [1997]). Furthermore, CPLR 2002 provides that “[a]n error in a ruling of the court shall be disregarded if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced” (CPLR 2002).

Here, any error in the admission of testimony was harmless, as we are satisfied that the result would have been the same if the testimony at issue had not been admitted *(see*CPLR 2002; *Barracato v Camp Bauman Buses,*217 AD2d 677, 678 [1995]; *Catalan v Empire Stor. Warehouse,*213 AD2d 366 [1995]).

Mastro, J.P., Hall, Cohen and Iannacci, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 99 Sarbanes Section 906 Certification

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Tumbleweed,  Inc. (the Company),  on
Form 10-Q for the period ended  September 8, 2002, as filed with the  Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  on the  date  hereof  (the  Report),  I,  Glennon  F.
Mattingly,  Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  that to the best of my knowledge  the Report fully
complies  with the  requirements  of  section  13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the  information  contained  in the Report  fairly
presents,  in all material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of
operations of the Company.

Date:    October 18, 2002                  /s/Glennon F. Mattingly
                                              ---------------------------
                                              Glennon F. Mattingly
                                              Vice President and Chief
                                              Financial Officer




In connection with the Quarterly  Report of Tumbleweed,  Inc. (the Company),  on
Form 10-Q for the period ended  September 8, 2002, as filed with the  Securities
and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the Report),  I, Terrance A. Smith,
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge the Report fully complies with the
requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934
and that  the  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

Date:    October 18, 2002                 /s/Terrance A. Smith
                                             --------------------------------
                                             Terrance A. Smith
                                             President and Chief Executive
                                             Officer



<PAGE>
No. 10-5405.

#### Marcos Moreno-Montano, Petitioner v. Greg Jacquert, et al.

562 U.S. 920, 131 S. Ct. 291,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7171.

178 L. Ed. 2d 191,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 376 Fed. Appx. 865.
# Interns among C&T employees to visit life-saving equipment manufacturer

/ Published July 14, 2016
TRENTON, 

Madison Maynard was one of 23 employees to visit Switlik Inc. in Trenton, New Jersey last month to learn how the company makes life-saving equipment that DLA procures for its military customers.

“This perspective is essential to allowing us to understand what type of problems manufacturers can be faced with when producing the equipment we use to help support the warfighter,” Maynard said.

John Lee is also a C&T intern and said that after the visit, he had a better appreciation of the company’s efforts. 

“As an intern, it can be difficult to apprehend how hard the manufacturers’ job truly is when you are behind the computer screen just looking at and expecting stock,” Lee said. “The truth is, problems always occur and the fact remains that the people producing the items we help provide to the warfighter are the best at their jobs.”

Both Maynard and Lee have been working at DLA Troop Support for approximately four weeks within C&T’s customer operations directorate.

The visit to Switlik was sponsored by C&T’s culture improvement team as part of the supply chain’s efforts to provide employees first-hand exposure to the industrial base, CIT lead Robin Kirkland-Gonzales said.

C&T currently procures anti-gravity suits, anti-exposure flyer's coveralls and anti-exposure socks from Switlik. The family-owned business has made inflatable safety and survival products since 1920, according to its website.
**Exhibit 32(b)**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350,****ASADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of ALLTELCorporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2003 asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (theReport), I, Jeffery R. Gardner, Executive Vice President and Chief FinancialOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adoptedpursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge,that:

 

(1)          The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/Jeffery R. Gardner                                |   |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Jeffery R. Gardner                                   |
| Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer |
| August 13, 2003                                      |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 hasbeen provided to ALLTEL Corporation and will be retained by ALLTEL Corporationand furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.

 

----
#### National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, Respondent, v Compaction Systems Corporation of New Jersey et al., Appellants.

[64 NYS3d 548]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shlomo Hagler, J.), entered September 27, 2016, which denied defendants’ (collectively, Compaction) motion to dismiss or stay the fourth cause of action, seeking a declaration that the contribution claim asserted by Compaction against plaintiff’s (National Union) insured, Combustion Equipment Associates, Inc. (CEA), in related pending federal environmental litigation, is not covered under the National Union policies, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, and the cause of action stayed pending resolution of the federal litigation.

The prior appeal in this case considered the first cause of action ripe for adjudication because the issue concerned National Union’s relationship with Compaction pursuant to the 1998 settlement agreement between those parties *(see National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v Compaction Sys. Corp. of N.J.,*136 AD3d 594, 594 [1st Dept 2016]). Issues remain as to whether complete relief can be afforded as to National Union’s fourth cause of action, for declaratory relief as to Compaction’s claim for contribution, because, to the extent the fourth cause of action implicates liability, the insurer may be exonerated in this declaratory action “on a different factual basis from that which will ... be established” in the pending federal action *(Prashker v United States Guar. Co.,*1 NY2d 584, 590-591 [1956]).

Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Andrias and Gesmer, JJ.