T he re is so m e d i scr ep ancy co ncerni ng t he f i rs t nam e o f

t he ap p el l ant

. T he t ri al record and off i ci al f i l i ngs 1
i nd i ca t e h i s nam e is “ H arc e,” w hil e h i s b rief ha s “H o rac e” i n the sty l e. W e w i l l use the n am e sho w n o n the c o urt rec o rd s. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON O n- Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 17, 200 6
HORACE RAY RUNIONS v. MARY RUNIONS

A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Henry County No. 19058 The Honorabl e Ron E. Harm on, Chan cellor

No. W2005-01954-C OA-R3-C V - F iled May 19, 2006

I n this divorce ca se, Appellant/Husband appea ls f rom the trial court’s c lassification of c erta in rea l property as marital pr operty . The prope rty at issue was H usband’s sepa rat e p roperty

prior to the marria g e. The property

was sold to a third party during the marria g e, and a de ed of trust sec ured the balanc e of the purcha se price

. The third party defaulted in the installment pay ments, and Husband p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y a tt h e f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e a n d r e c e i v e d a tru s t e e ’ s d e e d i n h i s n a m e o n l y. Hu s b an d as serts that the prope rty is separate prope rty

under e ither T.C.A. §36-4- 121(b)( 2)(A) or T.C.A. §36-4-121( b)(2) (B ). The trial court concluded that the property was marital property

under T. C.A . § 36 -4 -1 21 (b )( 1) (A ). We a ff ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opi nion of the c ourt, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

J ames H. B radbe rry

of Dre sden, Tenne ssee f

or Appe llant, Harc e Ray

Runions
Robert W. Hawley

of Paris, Tenne ssee f

or Appe llee, Mary

Runions

OP IN ION

Har ce Ra y

Runions (“Appellant” ) and Mary E. Runions (“Appellee ”) w ere marrie d on 1 Dec ember

23, 1 9 8 3

. Prior to the marria g e, on September 9, 1978, Mr. Runions purchase d rea l property located at 118 Mimosa Drive in M ar t i n , Tenne ssee ( the “Weakle y CountyProperty ”), which is the subject of this a ppeal. At the time of the purc hase, Mr . Runions paid $34,500.00 for the Weakley

CountyProperty . By

Warranty Dee d dated June 24, 1999, “Ray Runions and Wi fe,-2-

Mary E. Runions” transfe rre d titled of the Weakley CountyProperty

to Melvin Harlan. B oth parties signe d this W arr anty

Dee d. Mr. Ha rl an ultimately defaulted on his pay ments, and the Weakle y County Property was offere d at a forec losure sale . On or a bout April 6, 2001, a “Tr

ustee’s D eed”
wa s e xec ute d, wh ic h r e a ds , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
NOW, THEREFORE, the sa id Mark F . Gallien , acting as Trustee as afor esaid, in the consideration of the premises and for the said sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND S IX HUNDRED SEVENTY AN D 91/100 ($ 70 ,6 70 .9 1) DO LL AR S, to him in ha nd pa id, ha s b arg a ine d a ndso ld and by these pre sents does here by barg ain, sell, transfe r and c onvey unto the said RAY RU NIONS , his heirs and assigns, the [Weakley CountyProperty ]....

TO HAV E AND TO HOLD s aid l and and pr emises, tog ether wi th a ll p ri vil e g e s a nd app urte na nc e s th e re un to b e lon g ing , to the sa id RAY RU NIONS , his he ir s and a ssi g ns , in fe e simple , f or e ve r, a ndin bar of all rig ht of equity

of re demption.

On De c e mbe r 4 , 2 00 1, Mr . Ru nio ns fi le d a “ Complaint fo r Di vo rc e ” a g a ins t Ms . Ru nio ns

. Ms. Runions fil ed her

“Answe r” on O ctober

15, 2002. By

J udg ment enter ed on Oc tober 14, 2003, Ms. Runions was g rante d an absolute divorce from Mr. Runions. The J udg ment order ed, int e r a lia , the Weakley

CountyProperty

to be “sold and the proce eds of said sale...to be equally divided.” On November

4, 2003, Mr. Runions filed a “Motion to Alter or A mend J udg ment or in the Alternative for a New T rial,” in whic h he stated that the J udg ment “orde r[ed] a g reat de al of the property to be sold, however , the marital intere st of separ ate pr operty was not provided f

or in the De cre e.”
By Orde r of Aug ust 3, 2004, the t rial court order ed the Clerk and Master to proce ed with t he
sa le of the Wea kle y Count y Pr op e rt y . O n A pril 1 8, 20 05 , M r. Run ion s f ile d a no the r “ Mo tio n to Al te r o r A me nd ,” in w hic h h e state d, in r e le va nt p art :

4. That th e Final Decr ee c ontained a pr ovision that a parc el of re al pr op e rt y loc a te d in Weakle y Cou nty wa s a mari ta l a sse t th a t it

wo uld b e s o l d a n d i tw o u l d b e d i v i d e de q u a l l y.
5

. That the Movant a sserts that the prope rty ref err ed to in the proce eding par agr ap h is property owned by

him, prior to the marria g e, so l d by

him during the marria g e, but was the result of a fo re c los ur e sa le , w hic h r e turne d th e pr op e rt y to the Mo va nt.

6. Th a t th e Mo va nt a sse rt [s] the ma jority of the va lue of

thi s p ro pe rt y a s w ill be re fl e c te d b y

the sa le of

the pr op e rt y , is not a ma

ri ta l a sse t, bu t is a se pa rate a sse t th a t sh ou ld b e a wa rd e d to him

.-3- 7. Th a t th e Mo va nt a sse rt [s] that the c ir c ums ta nc e s w hic h r e su lte d in the inclusion of the lang uag e re lative to this property was a mistake in a dv e rt e nc e or

e x cus able ne g le c t a ndpu rs ua nt t o r ule 59 .0 4 is subject to being modified.

On Ma y 25 , 2 00 5, the Cle rk

a ndMa ste r f

ile d h e r r e po rt

of the sa le of the Wea

kle y Cou nty Property . The re port indicates that the Wea kley CountyProperty

was sold at auc tion to Harce Ray Runions for the sum of $50,000.00. An “O rder Approving Sale of Real P roperty ” wa s entere d by the trial court on J une 6, 2005. A “ Final Or der” was entered on J uly 20, 2005. I n this Order, the trial court spec ifically

finds that “t h e procee ds of the sale of the Weakle y Countyrea l prop[erty ] are totally marital asse ts and shall be divided ac cording to this court’s order ....”
On Aug ust 15, 2005, Mr

. Runions filed his “N otice of A ppeal” from the Or der of J uly 20, 2005. On September

7, 2005, Mr. Runions filed a Notice stating that neither a transcr i p t o r ot her verbatim recording of the trial c ourt proce eding , nor a state ment of the e vidence , would be filed.

Mr . Ru nio ns raise s o ne iss ue fo r a pp e a l a s st a te d in his brie f: Whe the r a Res ide nc e , ti tle to which re sted in the name of the Appell an t at t he time of mar riag e and at the time of divorce was separ ate pr operty , wher e the only disruption in his exclusive ownership wa s a sale and fore closure to a third party

during a brie f three (3) y ear period.

Be cause this case wa s tried by the court sitting without a jury , we revie w the case de novo up on the re c or d w ith a

pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss o f the fi nd ing s o f f a c t by the tr ia l c ou rt . U nle ss the evidenc e pre pon d erates ag ainst the finding s, we must aff irm, absent er

ror of law. See Tenn. R.A pp . P. 13 (d ). F urthe rm or e , in the abs e nc e of a tr a ns c ri pt or state me nt o f the e vid e nc e , w e mus t conclusively

presume that e very fac t a dmissibl e under the pleading s was found or should have be en found fa vorably

to the Appellee

. Se e Le e k v . P owe ll , 8 84 S.W. 2d 11 8 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 94 ); Lyon v. Ly on , 765 S.W .2d 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

T. C.A . § 36 -4 -1 21 (b )( 1) (A ) ( 20 05 ) d e fi ne s “ Ma ri ta l pr op e rt y ,” in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

“ Ma ri ta l pr op e rt y ” me a ns a ll re a l a nd pe rs on a l pr op e rt y , bo th t a ng ibl e a nd int a ng ibl e , a c qu ir e d b y e ith e r o r b othsp ou se s d uring the c ou rs e of the mar

riag e up to the date of the final divorc e hea ring and owne d by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint for divorce

....
I n the instant case , Mr. Runi o n s asserts that the Weakley CountyProperty

is not marital property under the above de finition. Rather, he a sserts that the prope rty is separate prope rty

as de fi ne d b y

the statut e , to wi t:
(2 ) “ Se pa rate pr op e rt y ” me a ns :-4- (A ) A ll r e a l a ndpe rs on a l pr op e rt y ow ne d b y

a sp ou se be fo re marria g e , in c lud ing , b ut n ot l imi te d to, a sse ts held in individual retirement a ccounts (IRAs).... (B ) P ro pe rt y

a c qu ir e d in e xch a ng e fo r pr op e rt y acquir ed bef

ore the marria g e; T.C.A. §36-4-121( b)(2) (2005).

Whe the r an a sse t is se pa

rate pr op e rt y or mari ta l pr op e rt y is a qu e sti on of

fa c t. Cut singer v. Cut singer , 9 17 S.W. 2d23 8, 24 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) ; She rri ll v . She rri ll , 831 S.W .2d 293, 295 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992). T hus, a t ri al court's c lassification dec isions are e ntitled to gre at weig ht on appea l. Wil

so n v . M oo re , 929 S.W .2d 367, 372 (T en n. Ct. App. 1996). These de cisions will be presumed to be correc t unless the evidence pr eponder ates other wise, Har din v . Ha rd

in , 689 S.W .2d 152, 154 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983), or unless they are based on an err or of law

. Mahaffey v. Mahaffe y , 775 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

There is no dispute that Mr. R u n i o n s o wned the Wea kley CountyProperty

prior to the
marria g e

. Con se qu e ntl y , if thi s pr op e rt y ha d no t be e n so ld, the n sa me wo uldc e rt a inl y be se pa rate pr op e rt y un de r T .C. A. §3 6- 4- 12 1( b) (2 )( A) . H ow e ve r, wh e n th e pr op e rt y wa s so ld t o M r. Ha

rl a n in 1999, there is no evidence in this record that either pa rty reta ined any

owner ship of the Weakley CountyProperty . When Mr. Har lan def aulted on his payments, the rec ord indicates that the Weakley CountyProperty

beca me the subjec t of a public sale (i.e. ther e wa s no automatic reve rsion or rig ht of re -entry i n ei t h er M r. Runions or Ms. Runions). Rather, the Trustee ’s Dee d indicates that Mr. Run ion s w a s th e “ last and hig he st b idd e r” . A lth ou g h th e Tr us te e ’s De e d li sts on ly

Mr . Ru nio ns , u n d er T

. C

. A. § 3 6 -4 -1 2 1 (b )( 1 )( A) , t h er e i s a p re s u m p t i o n t h at p ro p er t y ac q u i re d d u ri n g t h e m ar ri age b y eitheror

bo th s po us e s a ndsti ll o wn e d b y e ith e r o r b othsp ou se s wh e n the div or c e is g rante d is classified a s marital prope rty and is , thus, subject t o equitable division. Howeve r, this presumption can be rebutted w ith "evide nce of circ umstances or communications clea rly indicating an intent that th e pro pert y

rem ain sep arat e." McClellan v. McClellan , 873 S.W .2d 350, 351 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (c i t i n g Batson v. Batson , 7 69 S.W. 2d84 9, 85 8( Te nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 89 ))

. I n th e ins ta nt c a se , th e re is no evidenc e to show wher e the proce eds fr om the 1999 sale we nt, nor to show wher e the $70,670.91 used to purcha se the Weakle y CountyProperty

at the for eclosure sale in 2001 ca me from.

Mr . R un ions a

rg ue s th a t th e Wea

kle y Cou nty Pr op e rt y is s e pa rate pr op e rt y

a s “ pr op e rt y exchang ed for

p ro p er t y acquir ed prior to the ma rriag e.” T .C.A. §36-4-121(b) (2)( B) . I n his brief, Mr . Ru nio ns ’ s pe c if

ic a lly state s:
At the time this sale [i .e. the 1999 sale to Mr

. Har lan] took place the deed w as also executed by [Ms . Runions] ; ho we v er, the derivation clause on the deed states, “Mary Runions joi ns in this convey ance for the purpose of

conveying any

marital intere st she m ay h ave in the [W e a kl e y C o u n ty P r o p e r ty ]”

.. .. [Mr . Ru nio ns ] sub mit s th a t th is w ou ld bri ng th e p r o p ert y

wi th in th e me ani ng [ of] 36 -4- 12 1(b )(2 )(B)-5- “Property ex ch an g ed for

property acquir ed prior to the ma rriag e.” Th is c la ssi c a lly

bring s th e no te a c qu ir e d by [Mr . Runi on s] at the tim e h e s o l d t h e p r o p e r t y t o H a r l a n i n t o t h e s t a t u s o f s e p ar a t e p r o p e r t y. [Mr. Runi ons] s implyreve rsed this transa ction when he fore closed on the prope rty . The note be ing pr opert y acquir ed in exchang e for propert yacquir ed prior to the ma rriag e. When the note wa s exti ng uished by

the f o re cl osure, it simplyreve rted ba ck to the property acquir ed prior to the m arriag e, the rea l property . I t is evident by the trus te e ’s de e d th a t th e app e lla nt sou g ht t o r e ta in the se pa rate pr op e rt y status by takin g the pr op e rt y

fr om thetrus te e in h is n a me alone.

As discussed above , ther e is no indication that Mr. Runions retained a ny interest in the Weakley CountyProperty

upon the s ale to Mr. Harlan, nor is there any indication that Mr. Runions rece ived any property in exchang e for

the Weakley

CountyProperty

so as t o satisfy

the re quirements of T.C.A

. § 3 6

- 4

- 1 2 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( B )

. Rath e r , f r o m th e 1 9 9 9 Wa

rr a n ty D e e d , it ap p e ar s th a t M r

. Ru nions tr a ns fe rr e d a ll o f h is i nte re st i n th e pr op e rt y to M r. Ha

rl a n. Th e fa c t th a t t he Wea kle y Cou nty Property ultimately

fell i nto forec losure under Mr. Harlan’s owne rship does not reve rse the convey ance to Mr. Har lan. M r. R u n i ons ownership of the Weakley CountyProperty

was not automatically

reinstated at the point of Mr. Harlan’s def ault; rather , in order

to secure owner ship of the pr op e rt y , Mr

. Run ion s b e c a me a bid de r at a

pu bli c sa le . T he fa c t th a t on ly Mr . Ru nio ns ’ n a me is l ist e d o n th e Tr

us te e ’s De e d is no t disp os iti ve on the qu e sti on of se pa rate ve rs us mari ta l pr op e rt y beca use T.C.A. §36-4- 121(b)( 1)(A) makes no distinction betwee n property purcha sed by either one spouse alone or

by both toge ther. We have revie wed the r ecor d, and we find no evidenc e to re but the pre sumption t hat t h e W ea k l eyC o u n t y P ro p er t y b ec am e m ar i t al p ro p er t y

wh en p u rc h as ed i n 2 0 0 1.

For the fore g oing rea sons, we affirm the Final Order of the trial court. Costs of this appea l
ar e a s s e s s e d a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l a n t , H ar c e R a y R u n i o n s , a n dh i s s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. F RA NK CRAW FOR D, P RE S I

DI NG J UD GE , W. S.