IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1107

Filed October 2, 2024

STANLEY CHARLES HIGDON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LEANNE P. RANA,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

SHAWN A. RANA,

Defendant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, John M. Wright, 

Judge.

Leanne Rana appeals the judgment of the district court finding that she 

breached an express oral contract for improvements to her home. AFFIRMED.

Richard A. Bartolomei of Bartolomei & Lange, P.L.C., Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Richard L. Fehseke III of Fehseke & Gray Law Offices, Fort Madison, for 

appellee.

Considered by Badding, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.
2

SANDY, Judge.

After purchasing a home together in Burlington, Leanne and Shawn Rana 

approached general contractor Stanley Higdon to inquire whether he would be 

willing to perform renovations on their home. Higdon agreed to do so on a time 

and material basis. He completed a kitchen remodel and a garage addition. Yet

the Ranas never paid Higdon in full for the work he performed. Higdon sued,

asserting a breach-of-contract claim against Leanne and Shawn. Shawn failed to 

appear in this case or otherwise participate, and the district court entered a default 

judgment against him. The district court also found Leanne liable for breach of an 

express oral contract and entered judgment against her. 

Leanne appeals the district court ruling, arguing (1) the district court erred 

by not finding Higdon to be an incompetent witness and (2) the evidence was 

insufficient to find her liable under an express oral contract. 

After reviewing the record, we find (1) Leanne’s competency argument was 

not preserved for appeal and (2) substantial evidence existed to support a finding 

that an express oral contract existed between she and Higdon. We therefore affirm 

the district court. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The Ranas purchased a home together in Burlington in the fall of 2013. 

Shortly after purchasing the home, Shawn approached Higdon—an experienced 

general contractor—to inquire whether he would be willing to renovate the Ranas’

home. This initial meeting between Shawn and Higdon was brief, but Higdon 

agreed to meet with Shawn and Leanne at their home to discuss the desired 

renovations. 
3

At the meeting at the Ranas’ home, Higdon walked through the home with 

Shawn and Leanne to visualize and discuss the renovations they wanted. Leanne 

and Shawn indicated they wanted the kitchen remodeled, some new doors for the 

home, and some other minor renovations to the interior of the home. According to 

Leanne, Shawn was interested in having the home’s kitchen remodeled because 

he wanted a suitable space to host and entertain clients of his company. At the 

end of their meeting, Higdon discussed with the Ranas that he would perform the 

work on a time and materials basis under which he would be paid twenty-five 

dollars per hour for his labor. According to Higdon, Shawn and Leanne agreed to 

compensate him for the work to be done. 

Shortly after meeting with the Ranas, Higdon began the work of remodeling 

their kitchen. According to Higdon, Shawn would do most of the talking and would 

communicate decisions regarding the work to be performed after he and Leanne 

had a chance to discuss things. Leanne was aware of the work Higdon performed 

in remodeling the kitchen and other renovations to the interior of the home. She 

enjoyed the remodeled kitchen and was satisfied with Higdon’s work. And she 

understood Higdon did not perform the work gratuitously and expected to be paid. 

In fact, Leanne did pay Higdon for the work he performed in remodeling the kitchen. 

Leanne signed several checks made out to Higdon for nearly $200,000. 

As the renovations to the kitchen and the interior of the home were nearing 

completion, Shawn approached Higdon with a request to add an additional garage 

to the home. Higdon agreed to add an additional garage to the home and later 

met with Leanne and Shawn to discuss the garage project. According to Higdon:
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before we started the[y] came out, and Mr. and Mrs. Rana were 

there. We laid out the positions for the garage, where it was gonna 

go, and they discussed among it themselves, exactly which 

directions they wanted it and how—how big they wanted it, and a 

couple times Mrs. Rana wanted to know if it’s gonna be attached to 

the house or would there be a garage separately.

Higdon added that he discussed the garage project with Leanne “[a] couple 

different times” and that she expressed she wanted the additional garage to be 

attached to the house. Ultimately, the additional garage was attached to the house 

via a breezeway. 

Leanne has a very different recollection of the garage project. Her 

testimony insinuated the garage project was done at the behest of Shawn and was 

intended to house his considerable collection of cars. Additionally, she testified 

she did not want an additional garage and received no benefit from it. According 

to her, she had no input on where the garage was to be built. As she explained in 

her testimony, the garage was built where it was because “[t]hat was where Shawn 

decided he wanted it to go.” 

After nearly two years of work, Higdon completed his services in late 

December of 2015. A few weeks later, Higdon drove to the Ranas’ home and hand 

delivered a closing statement addressed to Leanne and Shawn showing an 

outstanding balance of $120,385.25. Leanne testified she was personally handed 

the closing statement by Higdon. Higdon stated at trial that Leanne did not object 

when he handed her the closing statement. Neither Shawn nor Leanne ever paid 

the outstanding balance owed to Higdon.1 

1 At the time, Shawn was employed as an executive at Iowa Fertilizer Company 

and earned a considerable salary. Leanne, at that time, worked as a stay-at-home 

mother with no source of outside income. At trial, Leanne testified Shawn had 
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Higdon then filed a mechanic’s lien on the Ranas’ home for the $120,385.25 

outstanding balance owed to him in March 2016. Purportedly Leanne and Shawn 

were unaware of the mechanic’s lien placed on their home. In a turn of events, 

Leanne and Shawn divorced in September 2017. As part of the dissolution decree,

Leanne was awarded the home. Leanne then attempted to sell the home in 

October 2017. To clear title, Leanne negotiated a release of the mechanics lien in 

exchange for $80,000 from the proceeds of the sale. But in his release, Higdon 

never acknowledged that Leanne’s payment satisfied the entire debt he was owed. 

Nor did Higdon waive his right to sue Leanne or Shawn for satisfaction of the debt. 

Higdon then filed suit asserting claims of breach of an express oral contract, 

an implied contract, and unjust enrichment against Leanne and Shawn.2 Higdon 

alleged Leanne and Shawn owed him an outstanding $40,385.25 for the work he 

performed on their home. Higdon filed a motion to compel Shawn’s attendance at 

a deposition and the production of the requested documents. Such motion was 

granted. However, after Shawn failed to appear at his deposition or otherwise 

produce the requested documents, Higdon filed for sanctions. The district court 

granted the motion and entered default judgment against Shawn. 

But Shawn appealed the district court’s order granting sanctions, arguing 

that he was never personally served with the motion to compel as required by Iowa 

complete control of the family’s finances and that she had no independent means 

to possibly pay Higdon for his work.

2 At trial, Higdon made a motion to orally amend his petition to include a claim 

under Iowa Code section 597.14 (2019), which provides that the “reasonable and 

necessary expenses of the family and the education of the children are chargeable 

upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation 

thereto they may be sued jointly or separately.” The motion was granted, but the 

district court never addressed such statutory claim in its ruling. 
6

Rule Civil Procedure 1.517(1)(e). We agreed with Shawn’s argument and 

reversed the sanctions imposed by the district court. See Higdon v. Rana, No. 

20-0332, 2021 WL 1399760, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021) (holding sanctions 

were improper because defendant was not personally served with motion to 

compel). However, Shawn’s participation in this case was minimal after we 

reversed the sanctions imposed on him by the district court. And he failed to 

appear at trial. Discovery in this case was scant.

A bench trial was held in April of 2023. Leanne and Higdon were the only 

parties to appear. Additionally, they were the only witnesses who testified. In lieu 

of oral closing arguments, counsel for both parties submitted written closings. The 

district court issued its ruling in June. It found “the evidence best supports the 

theory that all parties hereto entered into a contract to remodel the home’s kitchen, 

and then to build an attached garage.” The district court did not address the 

alternative theories of recovery asserted by Higdon. The district court explicitly 

found Higdon’s testimony—on the existence of a contract—to be more credible 

than Leanne’s. Accordingly, the district court entered judgment against Leanne 

and Shawn in the amount of $40,385.25 plus interest. 

Leanne now appeals, arguing (1) the district court erred by failing to find 

Higdon to be an incompetent witness and (2) the evidence was insufficient to 

establish Leanne’s liability under an express oral contract. 

II. Standard of Review

“The standard of review for a breach of contract action is for correction of 

errors at law.” Iowa Mortg. Ctr., L.L.C. v. Baccam, 841 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 

2013). The district court’s findings of fact are binding upon us if they are supported 
7

by substantial evidence. NevadaCare, Inc. v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 783 

N.W.2d 459, 465 (Iowa 2010). Evidence is considered substantial if a reasonable 

mind would find it sufficient to reach the conclusion of the district court. Smith v. 

State, 845 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa 2014). Evidence is not insubstantial simply 

because we would reach a different conclusion; rather, the ultimate question is 

whether the evidence supports the finding made. Sahu v. Iowa Bd. of Med. 

Exam’rs, 537 N.W.2d 674, 676–77 (Iowa 1995). We conduct this review in the 

light most favorable to the district court’s ruling. Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Bergstrom, 

703 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Iowa 2005). 

A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

State v. Williams, 929 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Iowa 2019). 

III. Analysis

A. Witness Competency 

We begin our analysis with Leanne’s first claim of error by the district court. 

Leanne contends that “[i]n failing to adequately address the role of Higdon’s lack 

of recollection,” the district court erred as a matter of law. Leanne notes Higdon 

testified repeatedly that he could not recall a specific date on which she agreed to 

be responsible for payment for his services. She argues Higdon only testified that 

he believed Leanne was present when he discussed the terms under which he 

would perform the work on the home. 

Leanne also highlights that Higdon testified at least twenty-seven times that 

he could not recall specific details regarding the work he performed. Leanne 

contends Higdon’s “[l]ack of recollection is not evidence at all, and Higdon’s lack 

of recollection made him incompetent to testify to rebut [her] testimony that she 
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never agreed to pay for” the work done on the home. Because Leanne believes 

Higdon was an incompetent witness due to his failure to recall numerous details 

during his testimony, she contends she was the only witness with the capacity to 

testify, i.e., the only witness. 

Leanne did not preserve error on this issue. Although Higdon does not 

contest error preservation, we may consider whether error has been properly 

preserved sua sponte. See Top of Iowa Co-op v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d

454, 470 (Iowa 2000) (“In view of the range of interests protected by our error 

preservation rules, this court will consider on appeal whether error was preserved 

despite the opposing party’s omission in not raising this issue at trial or on 

appeal.”). We conclude error was not preserved on the challenge to Higdon’s 

competency as a witness for two reasons. 

First, while Leanne did raise the issue of Higdon’s competency as a witness 

to testify about the existence of a contact in her closing written argument, she never 

obtained a ruling on this issue. In an almost identical situation, we explicitly 

reiterated that error preservation “generally involves two steps: (1) properly raising 

the issue before the district court and (2) obtaining a ruling.” In re Est. of Laube, 

No. 20-1399, 2022 WL 108937, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (per curiam). 

When a party does not obtain a ruling on an issue raised in the district court, our 

case law is clear that a party must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to 

preserve error for appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 

2002) (noting that a party must file a motion requesting a ruling with the district 

court when an issue was not ruled on by the district court to preserve error for 
9

appeal). Leanne made no such motion. Thus, she has not preserved error on this 

issue. 

Second, the proper time to challenge the competency of a witness is at the 

time the relevant party is presented as a witness. As the Fourth Circuit has 

succinctly stated:

The general rule is that any objection to the competency of a witness 

should be raised at the time the party is presented as a witness and, 

absent objection at that time, any claim of competency of the witness 

is waived; and this is particularly so, if there is not a motion to strike 

at the conclusion of the witness’ testimony.

United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 1984). Leanne never objected 

to Higdon’s competency as a witness before or during his testimony. Leanne never 

moved to strike Higdon’s testimony at any time prior to the close of evidence. For 

these reasons, we conclude Leanne has not preserved error on this issue for 

appeal.3

3 Even if we were to consider the merits of Leanne’s argument, she would not be 

successful in her claim. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.601 states that “[e]very person 

is competent to be witness unless a statute or rule provides otherwise.” And as 

our supreme court recently stated, “The basic premise behind Federal Rule 601 

and presumably behind the most recent Iowa rule is that virtually all witnesses who 

possess relevant evidence should be allowed to present it to the jury and allow the 

jury to determine its probative value.” State v. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19, 34 (Iowa 

2022) (citation omitted). And as federal courts have recognized: 

[Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 601 . . . , which is the controlling guide 

in federal criminal courts on qualifications of witnesses, represents, 

in the words of the leading commentator on the Rules, the 

culmination of the modern trend which has converted questions of 

competency into questions credibility while steadily moving towards 

a realization that judicial determination of the question of whether a 

witness should be heard at all should be abrogated in favor of 

hearing the testimony for what its worth. 

Odom, 736 F.2d at 112 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Applying these principles, we cannot conclude Higdon was an incompetent 

witness simply because he could not recall some specific details regarding the 

alleged contract existing between him and Leanne. See Cahill, 972 N.W.2d at 34 
10

B. Pleading Alternative Theories of Recovery 

Leanne next argues that the district court erred in its ruling because an 

express oral contract cannot co-exist with an implied contract. Leanne notes that 

Higdon pled an express contract claim and an implied contract claim. Leanne 

highlights that Iowa law has long held that an express contract cannot co-exist with 

an implied contract. Likewise, Leanne points out that Higdon also pleaded an 

unjust enrichment claim. She asserts that an unjust enrichment claim cannot be 

used to circumvent an express or implied contract. 

Leanne is correct that an express and implied contract cannot coexist. See 

Giese Constr. Co., Inc. v. Randa, 524 N.W.2d 427, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“An 

express contract and an implied contract cannot coexist with respect to the same 

subject matter, and the law will not imply a contract where there is an express 

contract.”). Similarly, our law recognizes that a theory of unjust enrichment may 

not be used to circumvent an express contract. Kunde v. Est. of Bowman, 920 

N.W.2d 803, 808 (Iowa 2018) (“The existence of an express contract on these 

matters prevents [a party] from circumventing their agreement by seeking to use 

theories of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit to recover for improvements to 

which he was plainly not entitled under the terms of the contract.”). 

However, Iowa law also recognizes that a plaintiff may plead alternative 

theories of recovery. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.231 (“A single plaintiff may join in the 

same petition as many causes of action, legal or equitable, independent or 

(noting the appellant could did not “cite a single reported Iowa case holding that 

inconsistencies in recollection or narrative are, by themselves, a ground for 

excluding a witness”). 
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alternative, as there are against a single defendant.”); see also N/S Corp. v. Car 

Wash Consultants, Inc., No. 11-0174, 2012 WL 1439084, at *10 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Apr. 25, 2012) (noting Iowa courts have readily allowed alternative theories of 

recovery to be submitted to a district court). Additionally, we have addressed a 

similar challenge in the past and suggested that a party may plead both an express 

contract and implied contract simultaneously. See Coppock v. Lustgraaf, No. 09-

0655, 2010 WL 2079676, at *5 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 26, 2010) (noting that “since 

pleading in the alternative is permitted[,] [r]ecovery under [an] implied contract may 

be permitted, for example, where an express contract proves unenforceable”). 

The district court allowing litigation of multiple competing claims is different 

than the court granting simultaneous recovery on competing claims. Therefore, 

we reject any assignment of error to the district court simply because Higdon 

pleaded alternative theories of recovery. 

C. Existence of a Contract 

The meat of Leanne’s appeal—that a contract did not exist between herself 

and Higdon—fails. Leanne claims the evidence is insufficient to support the district 

court’s conclusion that an express oral contract existed. She contends there is no 

evidence in the record demonstrating that she agreed to terms on a contract or 

agreed to be responsible for payment to Higdon. She contends there was never 

a “meeting of the minds” for either the kitchen remodeling or the garage project. 

Thus, she claims a contract cannot be found to exist because there was never 

mutual assent to the alleged agreement. She is wrong. 

To establish a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the 

existence of a contract; (2) the terms and conditions of the contract; (3) that he or 
12

she has performed all terms and conditions required under the contract; (4) the 

defendant breached the contract in some particular way; and (5) that he or she has 

suffered damages as a result of the defendant’s breach. Royal Indem. Co. v. Mut. 

Ins. Co., 786 N.W.2d 839, 846 (Iowa 2010). 

For a valid contract to exist, the parties must express mutual assent to the 

contract’s terms. Schaer v. Webster Cnty., 644 N.W.2d 327, 338 (Iowa 2002). 

Mutual assent exists when it is evident from the objective evidence that there has 

been a meeting of the minds. Est. of Cox v. Dunakey & Klatt, P.C., 893 N.W.2d 

295, 303 (Iowa 2017). In analyzing issues of mutual assent, we are to look to what 

the parties did and said, rather than to some secret, undisclosed intention. Peak 

v. Adams, 799 N.W.2d 535, 544 (Iowa 2011). 

Under Iowa law, we have traditionally recognized two types of contracts—

express and implied. Irons v. Cmty. State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 1990). “When the parties manifest their agreement by words, the contract is 

said to be express.” Iowa Waste Sys., Inc. v. Buchanan Cnty., 617 N.W.2d 23, 29 

(Iowa 2000) (citation omitted). When parties manifest their agreement through 

conduct, the contract is said to be implied. Duhme v. Duhme, 260 N.W.2d 415, 

419 (Iowa 1977). 

Applying these principles, we find substantial evidence exists to support the 

district court’s finding that Leanne manifested her assent to an express oral 

contract with Higdon for the kitchen remodel and garage project. Leanne contends 

there is insufficient evidence to establish that she ever agreed to be bound by a 

contract with Higdon because Higdon, through his testimony, could not identify any 

specific date on which she expressed to be bounds by the terms he offered or 
13

otherwise agreed to be financially responsible for payment. But this argument 

misses the mark for two reasons. 

First, although Higdon testified that he could not recall a specific date on 

which Leanne agreed to be responsible for payment, he did testify that both 

Leanne and Shawn expressed to him that they would be responsible for payment. 

Not recalling the specific date when this occurred is different than the event not 

having occurred. Second—while mutual assent to an express oral contract is 

typically manifested by words—our supreme court has stated “[t]he existence of 

an agreement or meeting of the minds should not alone be determined from the 

words used by the parties, but also from the situation and surrounding 

circumstances and by the inferences which mankind would ordinarily and 

reasonably draw therefrom.” McCarter v. Uban, 166 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Iowa 1969). 

The district court reasonably found that the circumstances supported an 

inference that there was a meeting of the minds between Leanne and Higdon. 

Leanne testified that she was aware of Higdon performing improvements on her 

home for nearly two years. At no point did Leanne ever object to the work being 

performed. We have previously stated that such inaction can support an inference 

mutual assent was given. See L&L Builders Co. v. Quirk, No. 09-1311, 2010 WL 

1052073, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2010) (noting a party’s silence after the 

other party to the contract began performance was evidence of manifestation of 

assent). Further, Leanne never objected when Higdon hand delivered her closing 

statement4 specifically addressed to her. Most importantly, Leanne herself made 

4 The invoice. 
14

payments of nearly $200,000 to Higdon via checks she personally signed. 

Payment under the terms of an alleged contract is cogent evidence that a party 

has assented to the terms of a contract and agreed to be bound. See Sullivan v. 

Porter, 861 A.2d 625, 632 (Me. 2004) (noting a party’s payment supported 

inference that a contract existed between the parties). We believe this undisputed 

evidence, coupled with Higdon’s testimony that Leanne agreed to be responsible 

for payment, provides substantial evidence that there was a meeting of the minds 

between Leanne and Higdon. 

Leanne contends she was not present when Higdon discussed the kitchen 

remodel and garage project with Shawn. She highlights that she never agreed to 

be responsible for payment. But these arguments ignore the fact that the district 

court found Higdon’s testimony more credible on these points than Leanne’s. And 

we readily defer to the district court’s witness credibility determinations, especially 

when such determinations are factors in the outcome of a case. See Hora v. Hora, 

5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (noting appellate courts should defer to a district 

court’s witness credibility determinations when they act as a factor in the outcome). 

We give such deference because the district court had a front-row seat to the live 

testimony, whereas we are limited to a cold record. See id. Thus, we defer to the 

district court’s determination that Higdon’s testimony was more credible than 

Leanne’s. 

We conclude substantial evidence exists to support the district court’s 

finding that a meeting of the minds existed between Leanne and Higdon. 

Therefore, we conclude a contract existed between Leanne and Higdon and that 

Leanne breached that contract. 
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IV. Conclusion 

Because we find substantial evidence exists to establish that a meeting of 

a minds occurred between Leanne and Higdon, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

AFFIRMED.