alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 23.6

CONSENT OF G.J. VAN DER HEEVER, B.SC. HONS., PRI SCI. NAT.

I consent to the inclusion in
this annual report on Form 40-F of Anooraq Resources Corporation (the Company), which is being filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, of references to my name and to the summaries of the technical reports
entitled Resource Estimate Boikgantsho Joint Venture, Northern Limb, Bushveld Igneous Complex, Limpopo Province, Republic of South Africa dated December 22, 2004 and Preliminary Assessment Boikgantsho Joint Venture, Northern
Limb, Bushveld Igneous Complex, Northern Province, Republic of South Africa dated March 2005, included in the Companys Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2010 and Managements Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the year ended December 31, 2010.

Dated this 23rd day of March, 2011.



/S/ G.J. VAN DER HEEVERG.J. van der Heever, B.Sc. Hons., Pri Sci. Nat.
#### Frances Brown, Appellant, v City of New York, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[56 NYS3d 67]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Michael D. Stallman, J.), entered November 12, 2015, which granted the motion of defendant City of New York for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff alleges that, as she was exiting a bus, she tripped and fell over the stump of a pole sign protruding about three to four inches from the sidewalk near the bus stop. The City met its prima facie burden by showing that plaintiff did not plead that the City received prior written notice of the sidewalk defect as required by Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-201 (c) (2) *(see Katz v City of New York,*87 NY2d 241, 243 [1995]).

The City also submitted evidence showing the absence of prior written notice; that the sign was in good condition two years before the accident; that the City received a citizen complaint through 311 less than 15 days before plaintiff’s ac*616cident; and that it repaired the condition a few days after her accident. The complaint received before the accident, even if it were in writing, could not constitute prior written notice for purposes of the statute, since it was received within the 15-day grace period provided by the statute for the City to make repairs after receiving notice *(see Berrios v City of New York,*114 AD3d 451 [1st Dept 2014]; *Silva v City of New York,*17 AD3d 566, 567 [2d Dept 2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 705 [2005]).

As the City established there was no prior written notice, the burden shifted to plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of prior written notice or the applicability of one of two recognized exceptions to the rule *(see Yarborough v City of New York,*10 NY3d 726, 728 [2008]). Plaintiff failed to demonstrate either that she pled prior written notice or that the 311 complaint received by the City within the 15-day grace period constitutes such notice. Plaintiffs contention that the City affirmatively created the condition by removing the sign from the sleeve is unsupported by any evidence. The City’s record search demonstrated that the sign was last repaired two years before plaintiffs accident, and plaintiff failed to present any evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, she failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether the City may have caused the condition through affirmative negligence that “immediately result [ed]” in a dangerous condition *(Bielecki v City of New York,*14 AD3d 301, 301 [1st Dept 2005]; *see Oboler v City of New York,*8 NY3d 888 [2007]).

Concur—Acosta, P.J., Friedman, Andrias, Webber and Gesmer, JJ.
No. 09-11483.

#### Leroy Morales, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 883, 131 S. Ct. 207,

178 L. Ed. 2d 125,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6639.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 590 F.3d 1049.
Exhibit 32.1



                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Cedric
Kushner, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.






/s/ Cedric Kushner
--------------------------------------------------------
Name: Cedric Kushner
Title: Chief Executive Officer


Date: August 20, 2003
#### In the Matter of COB 3420 Broadway, LLC, Appellant, v Darryl C. Towns et al., Respondents, and Sixto Merino, Respondent.

[65 NYS3d 703]

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered May 20, 2016, denying the petition to annul the determination of respondent New York State Homes and Community Renewal (DHCR), dated August 13, 2015, that a rent overcharge occurred, and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the petition granted, and the determination annulled.

DHCR’s finding of a rent overcharge was based on its incorrect determination that respondent Merino’s apartment was rent stabilized. Upon vacancy of the apartment by the previous rent controlled tenant, the rent reached the $2,000 deregulation threshold due to a combination of vacancy and individual apartment improvement increases that were not challenged *(see Matter of 18 St. Marks Place Trident LLC v State of New York Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, Off. of Rent*Admin., 149 AD3d 574 [1st Dept 2017]; *but see Altman v 285*W. *Fourth, LLC,*127 AD3d 654 [1st Dept 2015]). Thus, the apartment qualified for exemption from rent stabilization, regardless of whether Merino was actually charged and paid a monthly rent that was less than the deregulation threshold (Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] former § 2520.11 [r] [8] [i], now § 2520.11 [r] [10] [i]).

Concur—Friedman, J.P., Gische, Webber, Kahn and Singh, JJ.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 31 , 2020

NO. 03

- 19

- 00140

- CR

Randall Jones, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 167TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES GOODWIN, KELLY , AN D SMITH

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLY

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having reviewed

the record and the part ies’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in

the judgment

. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of conviction

. Because

appellant is indigent and u nable to pay costs, no adjudica t i on of costs is made.

### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 31 , 2020

NO. 03

- 19

- 0014 1

- CR

Randall Jones, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 167TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES GOODWIN, KELLY , AN D SMITH

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLY

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having reviewed

the record and the part ies’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in

the judgment

. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of conviction

. Because

appellant is indigent and u nable to pay costs, no adjudica t i on of costs is made.
#### Rosa Hair Stylists, Inc., Respondent, v Jaber Food Corp., Doing Business as Trade Fair, Appellant.

[631 NYS2d 167]

—In an action for a permanent injunction, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.), dated March 16, 1995, as upon, in effect, granting its motion to vacate a prior order of the same court, dated October 31, 1994, granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction restraining the defendant from maintaining an addition erected in front of its business premises and from maintaining two automated can redemption machines situated next to the plaintiff’s business premises.

Ordered that the order dated March 16, 1995, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion when it, in effect, vacated its prior order, which was *794entered without opposition. The defendant showed that it did not have actual notice of the plaintiffs motion and it had a meritorious defense (see, CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; *Brown v Long Beach Mem. Hosp.,*196 AD2d 802; *Robles v Grace Episcopal Church,*192 AD2d 515). Therefore, the defendant’s default was properly excused.

However, the Supreme Court improperly granted the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction which granted mandatory relief. It is well settled that in order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a movant must clearly demonstrate (1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent granting of the preliminary injunction, and (3) a balancing of the equities in the movant’s favor *(see, e.g., Doe v Axelrod,*73 NY2d *748; Doe v Poe,*189 AD2d 132). A mandatory injunction should not be granted, absent extraordinary circumstances, where the status quo would be disturbed and the plaintiff would receive the ultimate relief sought, pendente lite *(see, Bachman v Harrington,*184 NY 458, 464; *Morgan v New York Racing Assn.,*72 AD2d 740, 741; *Ash v Holdeman,*5 AD2d 1017, 1018). The plaintiff has failed to satisfy its heavy burden of proving a clear right to mandatory injunctive relief, which, in effect, would grant the plaintiff the ultimate relief requested. The record reveals many unresolved issues, and therefore it cannot be determined whether there is a likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits *(see, Anastasi v Majopon Realty Corp.,*181 AD2d 706). Similarly, the plaintiff failed to submit sufficient proof to show that it would suffer irreparable injury absent the granting of this preliminary injunction *(see, Kurzban & Son v Board of Educ.,*129 AD2d 756; *L & J Roost v Department of Consumer Affairs,*128 AD2d 677). The circumstances presented in this case are not of such an extraordinary nature so as to warrant mandatory relief *(see, Bachman v Harrington, supra; Morgan v New York Racing Assn., supra; Ash v Holdeman, supra).*Copertino, J. P., Santucci, Altman and Friedmann, JJ., concur.
No. 09-10549.

#### Larry Charles Webb, Petitioner v. Texas.

562 U.S. 846, 131 S. Ct. 88,

178 L. Ed. 2d 56,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 5881.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas denied.
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS No. 10
- 13
- 00159
- CR EALON CHARLES SCOTT , Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

From the 220th District Court Hamilton County, Texas Trial Court No. CR 7755

ABATEMENT ORDER
Ealon Charles Scott was convicted of evading arrest and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was represented at trial and is represented on appeal by appointed counsel. Scott and his app ointed counsel have filed a motion in this Court to appoint new appellate counsel. This Court does not have such authority. See T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN
. art 26.04(j)(2) (West Supp. 2012 ); Noland v. State , 261 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2008, order); En riquez v. State , 999 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tex. App.

— Waco 1999, order) (construing predecessor to current statute; see Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch 979 § 2, amendedScott v. State Page 2

by Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch 906, § 6). By the motion, the Court has been informed that,
due to a fa mily emergency, counsel has moved out of the district and can no longer represent Scott on appeal. Scott’s brief wa s due in this Court on September 9, 2013. Accordingly, this appeal is abated to the trial court to hold a hearing within 28 days from the da te of this order to consider whether Scott is still indigent and if so, whether to discharge Scott’s currently appointed counsel and to appoint new appellate counsel for Scott. Supplemental Clerk’s and Reporter’s Records containing the trial
court’s writt en or oral findings and rulings are ordered to be filed within 42 days from
the date of this order.

PER CURIAM Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Appeal abated Order issued and filed September 12 , 2013
#### In the Matter of David Casselman, Respondent, v Village of Lowville, Appellant.

[768 NYS2d 890]

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of Supreme Court, Jefferson County (Gilbert, J.), entered December 19, 2002, which granted the petition and annulled the determination denying petitioner’s application for General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed with costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging respondent’s determination to deny his application for benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c on the ground that petitioner’s injury was not “incurred in the performance of special work related to the nature of heightened risks and duties” of police work *(Balcerak v County of Nassau,*94 NY2d 253, 259 [1999]). Supreme Court properly granted the petition and annulled the determination. “[I]n order to be eligible for section 207-c benefits, a covered municipal employee need only prove a ‘direct causal relationship between job duties and the resulting illness or injury’ ” *(Matter of Theroux v Reilly,*1 NY3d 232, 243-244 [2003]). Petitioner proved such a direct *1282causal relationship and thus demonstrated his entitlement to benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c. Present—Green, J.P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Kehoe and Hayes, JJ.
No. 10-5563.

#### Nathaniel Singleton, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 929, 131 S. Ct. 319,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7447.

178 L. Ed. 2d 208,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 373 Fed. Appx. 532.
# Contracting division chief receives Aviation leadership award 

/ Published Aug. 5, 2022
RICHMOND, Va., 
Amanda Parker, contracting division chief in the Strategic Acquisition Programs Directorate at Defense Logistics Agency Aviation in Richmond, Virginia, was awarded the Defense Logistics Agency Aviation Leadership Award for the month of March.

This award recognizes DLA Aviation leaders who exemplify the four leadership traits deemed by the agency as the characteristics needed to be a good leader. These traits are referred to as the four dimensions of transformative leadership: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration.    

“Receiving this award makes me feel boosted,” Parker said.

According to Jason Elliot, a Contracting Division chief within the Strategic Acquisition Programs Directorate, as well as the nominating official responsible for Parker receiving this award, Parker displayed substantive traits of transformational leadership throughout the rating period making her the perfect recipient for this award.  

“Ms. Parker assumed the leadership role over aircraft structural components solicitation after closing,” Elliott said. “As a result of her leadership, the project has successfully gone through technical, cyber, past performance and pricing reviews with no slips to the schedule.”

The project Parker manages is a 10-year contract that consists of approximately 600 national stock numbers with a maximum dollar value of $7.6 billion. In addition, she utilized resources to successfully manage an industrial prime vendor site with no contracting officer or customer liaison specialist.

“It’s easy to get caught up in the day-to-day and not realize the impact that you are having on the team around you,” Parker said. “Receiving an award reinforces what you are doing, why it matters and that you’re succeeding at it.”
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 115 (Tuesday, June 16, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 32886]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-15926]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention


Disease, Disability, and Injury Prevention and Control Special 
Emphasis Panel (SEP): Cooperative Agreements for Prevention Research 
Centers, Program Announcement 98047; Meeting

    In accordance with section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) announces the following committee meeting.

    Name: Disease, Disability, and Injury Prevention and Control 
SEP: Cooperative Agreements for Prevention Research Centers, Program 
Announcement 98047.
    Times and Dates: 8 a.m.-5 p.m., July 14, 1998; 8 a.m.-5 p.m., 
July 15, 1998; 8 a.m.-5 p.m., July 16, 1998.
    Place: Sheraton Colony Square Hotel, 188 14th Street, N.E., 
Atlanta, Georgia 30316.
    Status: The meeting will be open from 8 a.m.-9 a.m., July 14, 
1998; and closed 9 a.m. July 14, 1998, through 5 p.m. July 16, 1998.
    Matters to be Discussed: The meeting will include the review, 
discussion, and evaluation of applications received in response to 
Program Announcement 98047.
    Portions of this meeting will be closed to the public in 
accordance with provisions set forth in section 552b(c)(4) and (6), 
Title 5 U.S.C., and the Determination of the Associate Director for 
Management and Operations, CDC, pursuant to Pub. L. 92-463.
    Contact Person for more Information: Michael N. Waller, National 
Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, CDC, M/S 
K30, 4770 Buford Highway, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30345, telephone 
770/488-5264.

    Dated: June 10, 1998.
Carolyn J. Russell,
Director, Management Analysis and Services Office, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC).
[FR Doc. 98-15926 Filed 6-15-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-18-P
No. 10-5170.

#### Ricardo Jose Calderon-Lopez, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 907, 131 S. Ct. 253,

178 L. Ed. 2d 168,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6971,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


          We  hereby   consent  to  the   incorporation   by  reference  in  the
registration statement  (Post-Effective Amendment No. 2 on Form F-3 to Form F-1,
Registration  Number  333-6136) and related  prospectus and in the  registration
statement (Form S-8, Registration Number 333-8592) and related prospectus of our
report dated June 30, 1999 with respect to the consolidated financial statements
of Genesis Development and Construction Ltd. included in its Annual Report (Form
20-F) for the year ended  December 31, 1998. We also consent to the reference to
our firm under the caption "Experts" in the prospectuses.



                              KOST LEVARY and FORER
                      Certified Public Accountants (Israel)
                     A member of Ernst & Young International



Haifa, Israel
June 30, 1999
# C_2014052EN.01002601.xml

| 22.2.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 52/26 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.2.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 52/26

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) of 20 November 2013 — Ministero dell'Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare, Ministero della Salute, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico v Ediltecnica SpA

(Case C-592/13)

2014/C 52/46

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Ministero dell'Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare, Ministero della Salute, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

Appellants:

Respondent: Ediltecnica SpA

Respondent:

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

Do the European Union principles relating to the environment, laid down in Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in Directive 2004/35/EC (1) of 21 April 2004 (Articles 1 and 8(3) and recitals 13 and 24 in the preamble) — specifically, the ‘polluter pays’principle, the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken and that environmental damage should be rectified at source as a matter of priority — preclude national legislation, such as the rules set out in Articles 244, 245 and 253 of Legislative Decree No 152 of 3 April 2006, which, in circumstances in which it is established that a site is contaminated and in which it is impossible to identify the polluter or to have that person adopt the restoration measures, do not permit the administrative authority to require the owner (who is not responsible for the pollution) to implement the emergency safety and decontamination measures, merely attributing to that person financial liability limited to the value of the site once the decontamination measures have been carried out?

1

---

(1)  Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (OJ 2004 L 143, p. 56).

1

---
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