I N T H E

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 19S-JV-12

J.W.,

Appellant (Defendant),

–v–

State of Indiana,

Appellee (Plaintiff).

Argued: April 20, 2018 | Decided: January 9, 2019

Appeal from the Henry County Circuit Court 1

Cause No. 33C01-1707-JD-38

The Honorable Bob A. Witham, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 33A04-1708-JV-1934

Opinion by Justice Slaughter

Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur.
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Slaughter, Justice.

We held in Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996), that an adult 

criminal defendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea on 

direct appeal. He must, instead, pursue post-conviction relief and raise in 

that proceeding any claims of error concerning his plea.

At issue here is whether to extend Tumulty to the juvenile-law 

counterpart to a criminal plea—namely, an agreed delinquency 

adjudication. We hold that juveniles cannot immediately challenge on 

direct appeal any errors concerning their agreed adjudication. But because 

juveniles are not eligible for post-conviction relief, before pursuing their 

constitutional right to appeal, they must first assert any claims of error 

concerning their agreed judgment in a request for post-judgment relief

filed with the juvenile court. Juveniles who seek that relief in postjudgment proceedings have a statutory right to counsel under Indiana 

Code article 31-32.

Factual and Procedural History

J.W., a juvenile, has a significant history with the juvenile-justice system 

dating to his early teens. In 2013, J.W. was adjudicated a delinquent at age 

13 for committing criminal mischief, a class B felony if committed by an 

adult. While on probation, he assaulted a student at school and possessed 

weapons on several occasions. He was placed in foster care but then was 

relocated to secure detention because he stole from his foster family, 

ingested rubbing alcohol to become intoxicated, and possessed a 

handgun. Undeterred, he continued with various criminal behaviors until 

his probation was terminated in 2015 and he was placed with the 

Department of Correction. In 2017, he was released from the Department 

and reportedly moved back into his parents’ home. But just a week later, 

he fled and was reported as a runaway.

In July 2017, the New Castle Police Department responded to a 911 call 

that a young man was threatening suicide. When police arrived, J.W. was 

running through a mobile-home park and heeded the officer’s command 

to surrender. After he was detained, J.W. identified himself to police as his 
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older brother M.W. and stated falsely that his birthdate was October 4, 

1998, which would have made him 18 years old. The responding officer 

also spoke with J.W.’s girlfriend, who had called 911. She explained that 

J.W. became upset after she asked him to leave. He started punching 

himself in the face and chin, grabbed a kitchen knife, put it to his throat,

and threatened suicide. Because of J.W.’s self-inflicted injuries and his 

suicide threat, the officer called for paramedics to administer treatment 

and to transport J.W. to the local hospital emergency room.

After J.W. was admitted to the hospital under the name of M.W.,

hospital staff received a phone call from a person identifying herself as 

J.W.’s sister. The nurses on duty told the caller they had no patient by that 

name, but later learned that J.W. was a juvenile and had provided the 

wrong name. Once medical staff learned that J.W. was not his 18-year old 

brother, they contacted J.W.’s parents to obtain consent to treat him. The

parents consented and spoke with the officer when they got to the 

hospital. Upon learning of J.W.’s real age and identity, the officer 

contacted a Henry County probation officer who had previously

encountered J.W. in the juvenile system. The police officer also arrested 

J.W. as a juvenile runaway and for false informing.

Both the police and probation officers testified at J.W.’s detention 

hearing in July 2017. The probation officer recommended that J.W. remain

in secure detention, based on his failure to benefit from less restrictive 

services. The court adopted the recommendation and continued J.W.’s 

placement in secure detention. The following day, the court issued an 

order finding probable cause that J.W. was delinquent and that detention 

was “essential to protect the child or the community”.

In August 2017, the court held an initial hearing that J.W., his counsel, 

and his mother attended. Counsel advised that the State and J.W. had 

agreed to settle the case and represented that J.W. would admit to Count 

1, class B misdemeanor false informing if committed by an adult, Ind.

Code §§ 35-44.l-2-3(d)(1), 31-37-1-2, in exchange for the State’s dismissing

Count 2, leaving home without the permission of a parent, guardian, or 

custodian, id. §§ 31-37-1-2, 31-37-2-2. Counsel also advised that J.W. would
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waive a pre-dispositional report and would accept placement in the 

Department of Correction.

During his colloquy with the court, J.W. admitted to providing a false 

name and birthdate at the hospital. The trial court accepted J.W.’s 

admission as made freely and voluntarily, found a factual basis for 

accepting the admission on Count 1, and the State, consistent with the 

parties’ agreement, moved to dismiss Count 2. Because J.W. waived a predispositional report, the court proceeded to disposition and ordered J.W. 

committed to the Department.

Despite the parties’ consent judgment, entered in accordance with their 

settlement, J.W. appealed, arguing that his agreed delinquency judgment 

should be set aside for four reasons. First, he said, the court did not

provide him with the statutory advisement of rights required by Indiana 

Code section 31-37-12-5; did not determine whether he had knowingly 

and voluntarily waived his rights; and did not provide him and his 

parents with the required opportunity to be heard during the proceedings.

Second, the facts he admitted to during his colloquy do not constitute an

offense. Third, the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to 

the Department of Correction without determining that he knowingly and 

intentionally entered into the agreed judgment and without providing

him with an opportunity to be heard. Fourth, his counsel was ineffective

for all the reasons outlined in the first three arguments.

Following its own precedent, the court of appeals dismissed J.W.’s 

appeal, concluding that “the appropriate remedy for relief that a juvenile 

defendant must seek is through the filing of a Trial Rule 60 motion”. J.W. 

v. State, No. 33A04-1708-JV-1934, 2017 WL 6273184, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 

Dec. 11, 2017) (quoting favorably from J.H. v. State, 809 N.E.2d 456, 458 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). And the court remanded the case to 

the trial court to allow J.W. to file a motion for relief from the judgment 

adjudicating him a delinquent.
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Standard of Review

The procedural path a party must pursue to obtain appellate review is a 

legal question we review de novo.

Discussion and Decision

Trial Rule 60(B) respects the presumptive finality 

of a juvenile’s agreed delinquency judgment while 

providing an efficient mechanism for an aggrieved 

party to vindicate claims that his adverse judgment 

was obtained unlawfully.

A. Our legal system respects litigants’ ability to settle cases 

and supports the finality of agreed judgments.

Indiana’s judicial policy strongly favors agreements to settle litigation 

disputes. Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003). Our judicial 

system counts on such settlements to occur in the lion’s share of both civil 

and criminal cases. Otherwise, with more than a million cases filed in our

trial courts each year, the system would grind to a halt.

For example, parties to civil suits may enter a consent judgment, thus 

contractually settling a dispute over any matter that may be the subject of 

litigation. State v. Huebner, 230 Ind. 461, 467, 104 N.E.2d 385, 387 (1952). 

After a court enters an agreed civil judgment, it cannot modify the 

judgment. Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359, 362 (Ind. 2012). Once entered by a 

trial court, a consent judgment has the same “dignity” and 

“conclusiveness” as an “adjudication between the parties”. Huebner, 230 

Ind. at 468, 104 N.E.2d at 388. And if a party fails to perform its obligations 

under a consent judgment, the aggrieved party may obtain a decree 

enforcing the judgment from the court that approved it. Fackler v. Powell, 

839 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ind. 2005) (explaining that absent parties’ contrary 

agreement, court accepting divorce property settlement as part of 
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dissolution decree retains jurisdiction to interpret and enforce settlement’s 

terms).

In criminal cases, the same principles apply to encourage parties to 

enter into—and for courts to enforce violations of—plea agreements. A

plea agreement is a contract, and its terms are binding on the defendant, 

the State, and the trial court. Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (Ind. 

1994). See also I.C. § 35-35-3-3(e). Choices have consequences. And as we 

held in Tumulty, one consequence of a defendant’s choice to plead guilty

and allow judgment to be entered against him is that he is foreclosed from 

challenging his conviction on direct appeal.

[A criminal] plea as a legal act brings to a close the dispute 

between the parties, much as settling civil parties do by 

submitting an agreed judgment. To permit appeal by settling 

parties would, of course, make settlements difficult to achieve 

in any litigation.

Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 396.

What we have said about agreed dispositions in the civil and criminal 

sphere is no less true of such dispositions in juvenile cases—which are, 

after all, civil proceedings. Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 381, 254 N.E.2d 319, 

322 (1970). The same concerns of finality and freedom of the parties to 

settle their disputes counsel in favor of encouraging and enforcing 

juvenile agreements, too—including the delinquency agreement at issue 

here. As with other consent judgments, an agreed delinquency judgment

limits the juvenile’s ability to challenge the agreed judgment on direct 

appeal. As discussed next, the juvenile must instead pursue another 

avenue for obtaining relief—one that begins in the trial court.
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B. Challenges to settlement agreements and agreed 

judgments often require additional proceedings before 

a trial court.

We encourage settlements for all the reasons stated. But if an agreement

is legally problematic, the aggrieved party will have recourse to challenge 

its validity and enforceability. The issue is not whether legal recourse 

exists but what procedure the litigant must pursue to obtain relief.

Grounds for challenging consent judgments, as with any contract, 

include coercion, duress, undue influence, misrepresentation, fraud, and 

lack of consent. See, e.g., Indianapolis, D. & W. Ry. Co. v. Sands, 133 Ind. 

433, 435, 32 N.E. 722, 724 (1892). After a trial court has entered a consent 

judgment, “no party to such agreement can or ought to be permitted to 

have the decree modified or changed without showing some fraud or 

mistake by which he was induced to enter into the agreement ... or 

without showing some valid reason why he should be released from it.” 

Id.

Challenging a consent judgment often requires the aggrieved party to 

develop a factual record that he did not enter into the agreement freely 

and with informed consent. For example, we have long held that whether 

a contracting party was defrauded is a question of fact for the trial court. 

Prop. Owners, Inc. v. City of Anderson, 231 Ind. 78, 89, 107 N.E.2d 3, 8 (1952). 

Similarly, when a party claims he executed a contract under duress, “the 

ultimate fact to be determined is whether or not the purported victim was 

deprived of the free exercise of his own will.” Raymundo v. Hammond 

Clinic Ass'n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 283 (Ind. 1983) (original emphasis omitted). 

Thus, once a trial court enters a consent judgment, the party attacking it 

must typically initiate further proceedings in the trial court to establish a 

factual basis for its alleged invalidity.

Indiana’s post-conviction rules also require a separate, collateral 

proceeding at which a trial court hears evidence, finds facts, and issues 

legal conclusions. Tumulty, 666 N.E.2d at 396 (citing Ind. Post-Conviction 

Rule 1); Crain v. State, 261 Ind. 272, 273, 301 N.E.2d 751, 751-52 (1973).

After conducting the hearing, the trial court must “make specific findings 
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of facts[] and conclusions of law on all issues presented” in the postconviction petition. P-C. R. 1(6). See generally Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 

1134, 1138 (Ind. 2013).

Thus, in both the civil and criminal contexts, challenging an agreed 

judgment generally requires a trial court to conduct additional factfinding in connection with the formation of the parties’ agreement. And 

that is no less true of challenges to agreed judgments in juvenile cases.

C. Trial Rule 60(B) provides a fitting procedural 

mechanism for juveniles to challenge the validity of an 

agreed adverse judgment.

As mentioned, juveniles must have a suitable procedural vehicle for 

challenging an allegedly unlawful adjudication agreement, and that 

includes developing an adequate factual record to support their claims. 

Post-conviction proceedings will not suffice because they apply only to 

adult criminal convictions. Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1987). We 

hold that Trial Rule 60 is an appropriate avenue through which a juvenile 

must raise any and all claims premised on the illegality of an agreed 

delinquency adjudication. Under Rule 60, “the court shall hear any 

pertinent evidence, allow new parties to be served with summons, allow 

discovery, [and] grant relief”. Ind. Trial Rule 60(D). And after the trial 

court has ruled, a party aggrieved by the post-judgment ruling can then 

appeal. T.R. 60(C).

J.W. responds that he does not need a post-judgment forum for 

developing a further factual record. He says the existing trial-court record 

is enough to establish his entitlement to relief on two of his claims—that 

his trial counsel was ineffective, and that the trial court’s disposition order 

was an abuse of discretion. We express no opinion on the merits of any of 

J.W.’s claims, including the two claims he says are ripe for appellate 

disposition.

That is because the rule we announce today is a bright-line rule. A

juvenile’s claim that his agreed delinquency adjudication is unlawful, 

along with any claim premised on the agreement’s illegality, cannot be 
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raised on direct appeal. Such claims must first be brought in the juvenile 

court in a post-judgment motion under Rule 60. Moreover, in the interest 

of judicial economy, if a juvenile’s direct appeal includes any claim subject 

to our extended Tumulty rule, the entire appeal shall be dismissed without 

prejudice so the so-called “Tumulty claims” can receive a full airing in the 

juvenile court. Only after the juvenile court has resolved the Tumulty

claims in a post-judgment proceeding can the juvenile proceed on appeal 

with all his claims. 

The virtue of our rule is its simplicity and ease of application. It 

guarantees juveniles an avenue for challenging the legality of an 

adjudication agreement. It allows the juvenile court the first opportunity 

to correct errors expeditiously where appropriate. And it enables juveniles

to develop an adequate factual record where necessary. We acknowledge

that our rule’s virtue—its simplicity and ease of application—may also be 

its vice. Its one-size-fits-all approach may be overinclusive, as J.W. argues 

here, in that its sweeping scope may include claims for which the factual 

record is already sufficiently developed. But we conclude the rule’s likely 

benefits in simplicity and overall judicial economy outweigh its costs.

D. Juveniles retain the right to counsel to seek postjudgment relief challenging an agreed delinquency 

adjudication.

Finally, a juvenile who challenges the validity of his consent judgment

through a post-judgment motion is entitled to legal representation. Our 

legislature has codified the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings when 

a child is charged with a delinquent act, I.C. §§ 31-32-2-2(1), 31-32-4-1(1), 

and “in any other proceeding” at the court’s discretion, id. § 31-32-4-2(b).

We hold that the statutory right to counsel extends to the Tumulty-type 

post-judgment proceedings contemplated here under Trial Rule 60(B), in 

which a juvenile asserts one or more claims premised on the allegation 

that his consent judgment was obtained unlawfully.
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Conclusion

For these reasons, we grant transfer and hold that before J.W. may 

pursue an appeal, he must first seek relief from the trial court under Trial 

Rule 60(B). J.W.’s failure to follow this procedure means his appeal was 

premature. We thus dismiss the appeal without prejudice and remand to 

the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The time J.W. spent litigating this appeal shall not count against him for 

purposes of evaluating whether any forthcoming post-judgment motion is 

filed timely.

Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur.

A T T O R N E Y F O R A P P E L L A N T

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L E E

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana