THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Patrick O'Neil McGowan, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2016-001220 

Appeal From Laurens County 

Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5719 

Heard March 17, 2020 – Filed April 22, 2020 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART 

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of 

Columbia, for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General William Frederick Schumacher, IV, 

both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, 

of Greenwood, all for Respondent. 

GEATHERS, J.: Appellant Patrick O'Neil McGowan seeks reversal of his 

convictions for four counts of first degree assault and battery. Appellant argues the 

circuit court erred by failing to direct a verdict on the indictment referencing a child 

victim because there was no evidence showing Appellant's knowledge of the child's 

presence inside the home into which Appellant fired gunshots. Appellant also argues 
 

                                                            

the circuit court erred by declining to instruct the jury that the State was required to 

prove specific intent as to each victim. We affirm in part and reverse in part.1 

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On March 31, 2012, John Glenn and his wife, Sarah Irby, hosted a birthday 

party for their four-year-old granddaughter (Child) at their mobile home on Boyd 

Road in Laurens. In the early evening, after the birthday party concluded, the couple 

hosted a cookout for friends and neighbors. Appellant, who was related to one of 

the neighbors, attended the cookout and started arguing with Glenn. At this time, 

Irby and Child were inside the home. As soon as Irby heard the argument, she went 

outside and brought Glenn back inside with her. On his way into the home, Glenn 

asked Appellant to leave the premises. 

Irby's daughter, Tiffany Garrett, who had been acquainted with Appellant and 

saw him at the cookout, testified that she was standing by the porch of the home 

when she saw Glenn and Appellant arguing. She also stated that when Glenn 

subsequently went inside the home, Appellant, who was angry and appeared 

intoxicated, started walking toward the road and shooting a gun. At that time, she 

thought that Appellant was shooting into the air. However, bullets flew into Glenn's 

home, which was below street level. 

One bullet went into the bathroom where Irby was at the time. Another bullet 

went into the bedroom used by Child and Garrett, who were both living with Glenn 

and Irby. Child was asleep in the bedroom at that time. A third bullet went through 

the living room wall, flew past Glenn, and shattered a television screen. Irby ran 

outside and saw Appellant, who was carrying a gun, fleeing the premises. Garrett 

later identified Appellant from a photographic lineup. 

On August 3, 2012, Appellant was indicted for four counts of attempted 

murder. On May 31 through June 2, 2016, the circuit court conducted a trial during 

which Irby identified Appellant. At the conclusion of the State's case, the circuit 

court denied Appellant's directed verdict motion but indicated that it was inclined to 

1

 Because we reverse the conviction pertaining to the child victim on the ground of 

specific intent, we need not address Appellant's argument that the evidence of only 

three gunshots limited his possible convictions to three counts. See Futch v. 

McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 

(1999) (providing that an appellate court need not address remaining issues when 

resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). 
 

give a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of first degree assault and 

battery and to possibly grant a renewed directed verdict motion as to Child after the 

conclusion of the defense's case and any possible rebuttal by the State. 

When Appellant renewed his directed verdict motion, the presiding judge 

indicated he would take the matter under advisement and asked defense counsel to 

remind him the next morning to place his ruling on the record. However, the record 

reflects neither a reminder from counsel nor an express ruling from the circuit court 

on the following morning. The circuit court instructed the jury on both attempted 

murder and first degree assault and battery as defined in section 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i) 

of the South Carolina Code (2015). 

At the trial's conclusion, the jury found Appellant guilty of four counts of first 

degree assault and battery. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to seven and onehalf years of imprisonment as to each of the four victims, with two of the sentences 

to run consecutively and the other two to run concurrently with each other and with 

the two consecutive sentences. This appeal followed. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL 

1. Was there sufficient evidence of Appellant's specific intent to harm Child? 

2. Did the circuit court err by declining to instruct the jury that specific intent 

had to be proven as to each victim? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Directed Verdict 

"When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the [circuit court] is 

concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight." State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 

376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014) (quoting State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 545, 

500 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1998)). Likewise, on appeal, "this [c]ourt must affirm the 

[circuit] court's decision to submit the case to the jury" when "the [S]tate has 

presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably 

tending to prove the guilt of the accused.'" State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 429, 753 

S.E.2d 402, 409 (2013) (quoting State v. Cherry, 361 S.C. 588, 593, 606 S.E.2d 475, 

478 (2004)). In making this determination, "this [c]ourt views the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State." State v. Pearson, 415 
S.C. 463, 470, 783 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2016) (quoting Butler, 407 S.C. at 381, 755 

S.E.2d at 460). 

Jury Instruction 

An appellate court will not reverse a circuit court's decision regarding a jury 

instruction unless there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Cottrell, 421 S.C. 622, 

643, 809 S.E.2d 423, 435 (2017). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the [circuit] 

court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, 

is without evidentiary support." State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 570, 647 S.E.2d 

144, 166–67 (2007). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

I. Directed Verdict 

Appellant argues the circuit court erred by failing to direct a verdict on the 

indictment referencing Child because there was no evidence showing Appellant's 

knowledge of Child's presence inside Glenn's home, and thus, there was no showing 

of Appellant's specific intent to injure Child. We agree. 

A. Preservation 

The State argues that the question of whether the circuit court should have 

granted Appellant's directed verdict motion is not preserved for review because the 

circuit court never ruled on the motion. We disagree. 

At trial, the circuit court denied Appellant's initial directed verdict motion as 

to all four indictments. The circuit court added that once Appellant renewed the 

motion, the court might grant it as to the indictment referencing Child. When 

Appellant renewed the motion, the presiding judge advised counsel that he was 

taking the motion under advisement and asked Appellant's counsel to remind him 

"in the morning to put [his] ruling on the record." The record has no further specific 

reference to the motion. Nonetheless, during jury instructions, the circuit court 

directed the jury to determine whether Appellant was guilty or not guilty of 

attempted murder or first degree assault and battery as to all four indictments. 

Therefore, the circuit court implicitly denied Appellant's renewed directed verdict 

motion. 

B. Specific Intent 
                                                            

Appellant argues that first degree assault and battery is a specific intent crime 

and there was no evidence of Appellant's specific intent to harm Child because 

Appellant had no knowledge that Child was inside Glenn's home when Appellant 

fired the gunshots.2

 Section 16-3-600(C)(1)(b) provides, in pertinent part, "A person 

commits the offense of assault and battery in the first degree if the person 

unlawfully . . . offers or attempts to injure another person with the present ability to 

do so, and the act . . . is accomplished by means likely to produce death or great 

bodily injury . . . ."3

 As to the "attempt" alternative of section 16-3-600(C)(1)(b), 

our case law provides, 

A person guilty of attempt is punishable as if he had 

committed the underlying offense. To prove attempt, the 

State must prove that the defendant had the specific intent 

to commit the underlying offense, along with some overt 

act, beyond mere preparation, in furtherance of the intent. 

In the context of an attempt crime, specific intent 

means the defendant intended to complete the acts 

comprising the underlying offense. 

State v. Reid, 393 S.C. 325, 329, 713 S.E.2d 274, 276 (2011) (citations omitted); see 

also State v. King, 422 S.C. 47, 56, 810 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2017) (stating that attempted 

murder requires the specific intent to kill); State v. Sutton, 340 S.C. 393, 397, 532 

S.E.2d 283, 285 (2000) ("In the context of an 'attempt' crime, specific intent means 

that the defendant consciously intended the completion of acts comprising the choate 

offense. In other words, the completion of such acts is the defendant's purpose."). 

At trial, the State conceded that it would be difficult to show specific intent as 

to Child because the testimony indicated Appellant arrived at Glenn's home "around 

2

 Appellant also argues the State could not show specific intent by application of the 

transferred intent doctrine because Child was uninjured. We note that during 

arguments on Appellant's initial directed verdict motion, the State relied on the 

doctrine of transferred intent, but when the circuit court ruled on the motion, it stated 

that it was not relying on the doctrine.

3

 Subsection (C)(3) provides that first degree assault and battery is a lesser-included 

offense of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, as defined in 

subsection (B)(1), and attempted murder, as defined in section 16-3-29 of the South 

Carolina Code (2015). 
 

7:00 [p.m.] and the children's party ended around 5:00 [p.m.]." Further, the record 

does not reveal any indicators that would have alerted Appellant to the presence of 

Child inside the home. This lack of evidence that Appellant specifically intended to 

injure Child required the circuit court to direct a verdict for Appellant as to the 

indictment involving Child. Therefore, we reverse Appellant's first degree assault 

and battery conviction as to Child. 

II. Jury Instruction 

Appellant asserts the circuit court erred by declining to instruct the jury that 

the State was required to prove specific intent as to each victim. The State argues 

that the circuit court's instructions to the jury were equivalent to Appellant's 

requested instruction and, therefore, the circuit court's verbal indication that it was 

denying Appellant's request was meaningless. We agree with the State. 

During the charge conference, Appellant requested the circuit court to 

reference each victim listed in the respective indictments in its jury charges on the 

specific intent element of both attempted murder and first degree assault and battery. 

The circuit court stated that it was denying the request. However, the circuit court 

included the following statements in its jury instructions: 

The indictments in this case allege four counts of 

attempted murder against the Defendant, attempted 

murder of Sarah Irby, attempted murder of John Glenn, 

attempted murder of Tiffany Garrett, and attempted 

murder of [Child]. Each indictment charges a separate and 

distinct offense because each indictment involves a 

separate alleged victim. You must decide each indictment 

separately based upon the evidence and law applicable to 

it uninfluenced by your decision as to any other 

indictment. The Defendant may be convicted or acquitted 

on any or all of the indictments. You will be asked to write 

a separate verdict of guilty or not guilty for each 

indictment. And I will explain that to you at the 

conclusion of my charge. 

. . . 

Now, criminal intent can either be specific or general. 

General intent crimes are crimes [that] only require the 
doing of some act and do not require that any specific 

result was intended by the Defendant. Criminal intent 

only requires that the pr[o]scribed act taken by the 

Defendant be voluntary in nature. A specific intent crime 

requires that the Defendant had the intent to cause a 

particular result or that the Defendant had the specific 

intent in committing the act. A person acts with specific 

intent when his conscious objective is to cause the specific 

result pr[o]scribed by the statute defining the events. 

. . . 

. . . A specific intent to kill is an element of attempted 

murder, which must be proven by the State beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Now, ladies and gentlemen, if you find that the State has 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

Defendant committed attempted murder on any of the four 

indictments, then you may consider whether the State has 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt the lesser included 

charge of assault and battery in the first degree. A person 

commits the offense of assault and battery in the first 

degree if the person unlawfully offers or attempts to injure 

another person with the present ability to do so and the act 

is accomplished by means likely to produce death or great 

bodily injury. 

. . . A specific intent is an element of assault and battery 

first degree [that] must be proven by the State beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

Now, in just a moment, I'm going to come down to the jury 

box and explain the verdict form that I have prepared to 

assist you in your deliberations and in reaching your 

verdict. As to each indictment, your verdict must be 

unanimous, an agreement by the 12 of you. Once you have 

reached a verdict as to each indictment, then you will 

notify the bailiff that a verdict has been reached. 
 

 

                                                            

. . . 

And [the verdict form is] divided up into four sections. 

One section for each indictment. . . . First indictment 

involves Sarah Irby. You make a determination whether 

or not the Defendant is guilt[y] or not guilty as to the 

attempted murder. If you determine that the Defendant is 

guilty, then you would go to the second indictment and 

conduct the same analysis. However, if you believe that 

the State has failed to meet its burden of proof by proving 

to you each and every element of attempted murder as to 

Sarah Irby, then you can go to the lesser included offense 

of assault and battery in the first degree and determine 

whether or not the Defendant is not guilty or guilty. That 

same analysis will apply to each indictment. The next 

indictment involves John Glenn. The same analysis. The 

third indictment, Tiffany Garrett, same analysis. The 

fourth indictment is involving [Child]. Okay. 

When the jury has reached a unanimous verdict and you 

mark the appropriate line, put your initials, okay, to 

indicate the verdict as to each indictment. 

(emphases added). These statements as a whole satisfy Appellant's request to link 

the specific intent element to a particular victim,4

 especially the statements, 

[I]f you believe that the State has failed to meet its burden 

of proof by proving to you each and every element of 

attempted murder as to Sarah Irby, then you can go to the 

lesser included offense of assault and battery in the first 

degree and determine whether or not the Defendant is not 

guilty or guilty. That same analysis will apply to each 

indictment. 

4

 Appellant maintains on page 7 of his brief "[h]ad the jury been properly charged 

that the state was required to prove intent as to each victim beyond a reasonable 

doubt, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have found [Appellant] 

not guilty of one or more of the charges." 
 

 

 

 

(emphases added). The jury instruction advised the jury that specific intent was a 

required element of first degree assault and battery and that the jury had to apply the 

same analysis to each respective indictment referencing the four victims by name 

when determining whether the state had proved the elements of either attempted 

murder or first degree assault and battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the 

instruction as a whole covered Appellant's desired instruction. See State v. Marin, 

415 S.C. 475, 482, 783 S.E.2d 808, 812 (2016) ("In reviewing jury charges for error, 

we must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and 

issues presented at trial." (quoting State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 549, 713 S.E.2d 

591, 603 (2011))); id. ("The substance of the law is what must be instructed to the 

jury, not any particular verbiage." (quoting State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 554, 446 

S.E.2d 411, 415 (1994))). 

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, we reverse Appellant's first degree assault and battery 

conviction as to Child but affirm Appellant's remaining convictions. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. 

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HEWITT, J., concur.