COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Clements and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JOSEPH CALVIN QUARLES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0943-00-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 FEBRUARY 13, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

 Thomas N. Nance, Judge 

 Andrea C. Long (Charles C. Cosby, Jr.; Boone, 

Beale, Cosby & Long, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Joseph Calvin Quarles was convicted in a bench trial of 

possession of heroin and possession of a firearm while in 

possession of heroin. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment, 

suspended for ten years, on the possession offense and sentenced 

to the mandatory five-year term of imprisonment for the firearm 

offense. On appeal, Quarles challenges the conviction for 

possession of a firearm while in possession of heroin, arguing 

that Code § 18.2-308.4 is unconstitutional. He contends that the 

statute fails to proscribe a punishment for possession of a 
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firearm while in simple possession of narcotics and that the 

penalty provisions of Code § 18.2-308.4 are ambiguous. We 

disagree and affirm. 

BACKGROUND

 Quarles was approached by two police officers, who were on 

routine patrol. The officers approached Quarles after they 

observed him urinating in public. Before one of the officers had 

an opportunity to pat-down Quarles for weapons, Quarles informed 

the officer that he had a "burner" in his pocket. Quarles 

attempted to flee, but he was apprehended moments later. The 

officers searched Quarles and found a .22 caliber handgun and a 

folded dollar bill, which contained a tan, powdery substance that 

spilled when the bill was unfolded. The dollar bill tested 

positive for heroin residue. Quarles' appeal challenges the 

mandatory five-year sentence imposed under Code § 18.2-308.4. 

ANALYSIS

 "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, 

courts shall presume the statute to be valid." Gray v. 

Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 725, 731, 519 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1999). 

"Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect is 

on the challenger." Id. at 732, 519 S.E.2d at 828. 

"Every act of the legislature is presumed to 

be constitutional, and the Constitution is 

to be given a liberal construction so as to 

sustain the enactment in question, if 

practicable." "When the constitutionality 

of an act is challenged, a heavy burden of 
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proof is thrust upon the party making the 

challenge. All laws are presumed to be 

constitutional and this presumption is one 

of the strongest known to the law." 

Moses v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 293, 298-99, 498 S.E.2d 451, 

454 (1998) (citations omitted). "The plain, obvious, and 

rational meaning of a statute is always preferred to any 

curious, narrow or strained construction; a statute should never 

be construed so that it leads to absurd results." Branch v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1902). 

 Code § 18.2-308.4 provides in pertinent part: 

 A. It shall be unlawful for any person 

unlawfully in possession of a controlled 

substance . . . to simultaneously with 

knowledge and intent possess any firearm. 

 B. It shall be unlawful for any person 

to possess, use, or attempt to use any 

pistol, shotgun, rifle, or other firearm or 

display such weapon in a threatening manner 

while committing or attempting to commit the 

illegal manufacture, sale, distribution, or 

the possession with the intent to 

manufacture, sell, or distribute a 

controlled substance classified in Schedule 

I or Schedule II of the Drug Control Act 

. . . of Title 54.1 or more than one pound 

of marijuana. 

 Violation of this section shall 

constitute a separate and distinct felony 

and any person convicted thereof shall be 

guilty of a Class 6 felony, shall not be 

eligible for probation, and shall be 

sentenced to a minimum, mandatory term of 

imprisonment of five years, which shall not 

be suspended in whole or in part. 
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 Quarles contends that Code § 18.2-308.4 is 

unconstitutionally vague because it fails to proscribe a penalty 

for violation of Subsection A, that is, possession of a firearm 

while simultaneously possessing a controlled substance, and that 

to the extent the statute provides a penalty, it is ambiguous 

and confusing. He takes the view that the only punishment 

provided for a violation of Code § 18.2-308.4 is contained in 

the third unlettered paragraph which, he argues, applies only to 

Subsection B. We disagree. 

 To construe the statute as Quarles urges would have us 

attribute to the General Assembly the creation of a criminal 

offense without providing for any punishment for a violation of 

that offense, a result that is irrational and which we will not 

ascribe to the legislature. We hold that the penalty provision 

of the statute proscribes the penalty for a violation of either 

Subsection A or B. Thus, Code § 18.2-308.4(A) and the penalty 

provision, when read together, provide that possession of a 

controlled substance while simultaneously possessing a firearm 

is a Class 6 felony, requiring imposition of a mandatory 

five-year term of imprisonment for such a violation. 

 Both a rational reading of the statute and its legislative 

history support this construction. Prior to the 1999 amendment 

of the statute, Code § 18.2-308.4 provided that a violation of 

Subsection A, possession of a controlled substance while 
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simultaneously possessing a firearm, was a Class 6 felony and 

that a violation of Subsection B, possession of a firearm while 

committing or attempting to commit the illegal manufacture, 

sale, distribution, or the possession with the intent to 

manufacture, sell, or distribute a controlled substance, was a 

separate and distinct felony punishable by a mandatory 

three-year term of imprisonment for the first offense and by a 

mandatory five-year term of imprisonment for a subsequent 

offense. Thus, each subsection provided for a separate penalty 

for each separately defined offense. However, when the 

legislature amended Code § 18.2-308.4 in 1999, it provided that 

a "[v]iolation of this section shall constitute" a Class 6 

felony punishable by a mandatory five-year term of imprisonment. 

(Emphasis added). Thus, the General Assembly declared, in 

effect, that possession of a firearm while simultaneously 

possessing a Schedule I or II controlled drug shall be a Class 6 

felony with a mandatory minimum five-year term of imprisonment, 

the same as possessing or using a firearm while committing or 

attempting to commit the manufacture, sale, or distribution of a 

Schedule I or II controlled substance. The 1999 amendment 

provided that regardless of the drug offense involved, 

possession of a firearm while simultaneously engaging in any of 

the enumerated drug offenses is a Class 6 felony subject to a 

mandatory five-year term of imprisonment. Quarles' contention 
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that his five-year mandatory sentence is void because Code 

§ 18.2-308.4 fails to provide a punishment for possession of a 

controlled substance while simultaneously possessing a firearm 

is without merit. 

 In addition, we hold that the statutorily mandated 

five-year term of imprisonment proscribed in Code § 18.2-308.4 

is neither vague nor unconstitutional. 

Every person has a fundamental right to 

liberty in the sense that the Government may 

not punish him unless and until it proves 

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a 

criminal trial conducted in accordance with 

the relevant constitutional guarantees. But 

a person who has been so convicted is 

eligible for, and the court may impose, 

whatever punishment is authorized by statute 

for his offense, so long as that penalty is 

not cruel and unusual, and so long as the 

penalty is not based on an arbitrary 

distinction that would violate the Due 

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (citations 

omitted); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) 

(acknowledging reluctance to review legislatively mandated terms 

of imprisonment). The legislature "has the power to define 

criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing 

discretion." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 467 (citing cases upholding 

mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses). "A 

sentencing scheme providing for 'individualized sentences rests 

not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted 

into statutes.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
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 Here, as we have held, the legislature provided a 

punishment for possession of a Schedule I or II controlled 

substance while simultaneously possessing a firearm. The 

legislature, in its 1999 amendment, classified possession of a 

controlled substance while simultaneously possessing a firearm 

and possessing or using a firearm while committing or attempting 

to commit any of several specified drug offenses as Class 6 

felonies. In 1999, the legislature imposed a minimum mandatory 

sentence for a violation of either offense. By amending the 

statute to proscribe a mandatory minimum sentence for either 

violation of the statute, the legislature merely determined that 

it was removing from a trial court's discretion the power to 

sentence the defendant within a statutorily proscribed range of 

punishments. To do so is not vague or unconstitutional. We, 

therefore, uphold the punishment scheme for Code § 18.2-308.4. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed.