[Cite as State v. Thompson, 2015-Ohio-3882.]

 Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 102326

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

LONNIE THOMPSON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 

REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-11-553640-A 

BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, P.J., McCormack, J., and Stewart, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 24, 2015
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John F. Corrigan 

405 Lake Forest Dr. 

Bay Village, Ohio 44140 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Eric L. Foster 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Lonnie Thompson appeals from an order of the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas granting in part and denying in part his motion to correct 

judgment and a related nunc pro tunc journal entry in which the court reduced Thompson’s 

stated aggregate prison sentence on multiple counts of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, 

forgery, theft, telecommunications fraud and identity fraud from 321⁄2 years to 311⁄2 years. 

Thompson contends that the trial court’s nunc pro tunc entry fails “to conform 

to the truth of the record at the sentencing hearing” and that his sentence “was 

actually 28 1⁄2 years.” Thompson also contends that the trial court erred in 

ordering him to pay restitution, a fine and costs, claiming that “no financial 

sanctions” were imposed during the sentencing hearing. Finally, he contends 

that the trial court erred in failing to give him 48 days of jail-time credit. For 

the reasons that follow, we reverse, in part, the trial court’s judgment and 

remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶2} Between March 7, 2008, and October 17, 2008, Thompson 

operated a criminal enterprise involving the production of counterfeit checks 

that were cashed at various stores throughout northeast Ohio. A jury found 

Thompson guilty of one count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, 29 counts of 
forgery, one count of telecommunications fraud, 12 counts of identity fraud and one count of 

theft in connection with the counterfeit check cashing scheme. At his sentencing hearing 

on March 4, 2013, the trial court orally pronounced the sentences to be imposed 

on each of these counts as follows: 

• Count 1 (engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity): $250 fine 

and 8 years consecutive to the sentences imposed on all other 

counts; 

• Counts 2-4 (forgery): $250 fine and 12 months for each count, 

concurrent to each other and consecutive to the sentences 

imposed on all other counts; 

• Counts 5-6 (forgery): $250 fine and 12 months for each count, 

concurrent to each other and consecutive to the sentences 

imposed on all other counts; 

• Counts 7-28 (forgery): $250 fine and 12 months for each 

count, concurrent to each other and consecutive to the 

sentences imposed on all other counts; 

• Count 30 (telecommunications fraud): $250 fine and 12 

months, concurrent with the sentence imposed on Count 31 

and consecutive to the sentences imposed on all other counts; 

• Counts 31-43 (identity fraud): $250 fine and 12 months for 

each count, consecutive to each other and consecutive to the 

sentences imposed on all other counts; 

• Counts 44-47 (identity fraud): $250 fine and 18 months for 

each count, consecutive to each other and consecutive to the 

sentences imposed on all other counts; 

• Counts 48-49 (forgery): $250 fine and 12 months for each 

count, concurrent to each other and Count 50 and 

consecutive to the sentences imposed on all other counts; and 
• Count 50 (theft): $250 fine and 18 months, concurrent to 

Counts 48 and 49 and consecutive to the sentences imposed 

on all other counts.

The trial court also indicated that Thompson would be subject to a period of 

postrelease control not to exceed three years. 

{¶3} Thompson’s individual sentences, when added together, result in 

an aggregate prison sentence of 311⁄2 years. There was, however, some 

confusion regarding the calculation of Thompson’s aggregate prison sentence 

during the sentencing hearing as evidenced by the following exchange: 

THE COURT: Anything further? 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. Mr. Thompson would like to know 

how many years you have just sentenced him to. 

THE COURT: Okay. Twenty-eight and one-half years. Is that 

what you get? 

[PROSECUTOR]: Um, yes. 

THE COURT: Yes or no? 

[PROSECUTOR]: I had 29 and a half, your Honor. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

[PROSECUTOR]: I guess we can go through it again. 

THE COURT: Let’s do that. 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We can, but I have 28 and a half too. I 

think the year was the overlap on the telecommunications. You 

stated that you considered that — 
[PROSECUTOR]: That is fine, Judge. 

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 

[PROSECUTOR]: Nothing from the State, your Honor. 

{¶4} After the trial court pronounced his sentences, Thompson 

requested that payment of the fine and costs be deferred while he was in 

prison. The trial court found him to be indigent and indicated that the fine 

and costs would be “suspended.” Although the state requested restitution in 

the amount of $18,985.22, the trial court did not order restitution during the 

sentencing hearing. 

{¶5} On March 13, 2013, the trial court issued its sentencing journal 

entry. The prison sentences stated in the sentencing journal entry matched 

the sentences the trial court had orally pronounced for each count at the 

sentencing hearing with one exception: although the trial court stated at the 

sentencing hearing that the 12-month sentence on Count 30 would run 

concurrent with the sentence on Count 31 and consecutive to the sentences on 

all other counts, the sentencing entry indicated that the 12-month sentence on 

Count 30 was “consecutive to any other count.” Accordingly, the sentencing 

journal entry indicated that an aggregate prison sentence of 32 1⁄2 years had 

been imposed. The sentencing journal entry also indicated that Thompson 

would be subject to postrelease control for a mandatory term of three years, 
imposed a fine of $5,750 and court costs and ordered restitution in the amount 

of $18,985.22. Thompson appealed his convictions and sentences. On 

appeal, this court held that Thompson’s convictions for telecommunications 

fraud and identity fraud in Counts 30 and 31 should have merged for 

sentencing. The court affirmed Thompson’s remaining convictions and 

remanded the case for resentencing on the counts that should have merged. 

State v. Thompson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99628, 2014-Ohio-202 (“Thompson 

I”). The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. State v. Thompson, 

139 Ohio St.3d 1406, 2014-Ohio-2245, 9 N.E.3d 1063. Thompson filed an 

application to reopen his appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B), which this court 

denied in State v. Thompson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99628, 2014-Ohio-4198 

(“Thompson II”). Once again, the Ohio Supreme Court declined further 

review. State v. Thompson, 142 Ohio St.3d 1423, 2015-Ohio-1353, 28 N.E.3d 

122. 

{¶6} Thompson did not raise any issue in his prior appeal regarding a 

discrepancy between the sentences orally pronounced during his sentencing 

hearing and the sentences imposed in the March 13, 2013 sentencing journal 

entry. Likewise, he raised no issue in his prior appeal related to the trial 

court’s imposition of a fine, costs and restitution or with respect to the trial 

court’s failure to give him jail-time credit. 
{¶7} In November 2013, while his appeal was pending, Thompson filed 

a pro se motion to correct the trial court’s March 13, 2013 sentencing journal 

entry, arguing that the sentencing journal entry erroneously imposed a fine 

and costs, which the trial court had stated at the sentencing hearing would be 

suspended due to Thompson’s indigency. After this court ruled on his appeal, 

Thompson filed a second, nearly identical pro se motion to correct the 

sentencing journal entry. The state filed a response in which it indicated that 

it did not oppose correction of the sentencing entry to suspend the fine and 

costs. 

{¶8} On February 26, 2014, the trial court issued a journal entry with 

the vague language “[s]entencing journal entry to reflect defendant’s fine and 

cost[s] are suspended.” The journal entry does not indicate that it was issued 

in response to any motion that was filed. The trial court never issued a 

subsequent sentencing journal entry reflecting its suspension of the fine and 

costs. 

{¶9} On March 20, 2014, Thompson filed a third pro se motion to correct 

the trial court’s March 13, 2013 sentencing journal entry, claiming that the 

sentencing journal entry incorrectly stated that he was sentenced to 32 1⁄2 years 

in prison when, in fact, he had been sentenced to 28 1⁄2 years in prison at the 

sentencing hearing. On November 12, 2014, the trial court granted the 

motion, in part, indicating in a journal entry that it would issue “a nunc pro 
tunc entry that correctly reflects the sentences imposed upon defendant at the 

sentencing hearing held on or about March 4, 2013.” 

{¶10} That same day, the trial court issued two other separate journal 

entries. One is described on the trial court’s docket as “[j]ournal entry to 

merely correct the error in calculating the total sentence imposed upon the 

defendant.” The other purports to be a nunc pro tunc entry “as if and for the 

sentencing journal entry issued on 3-13-2013.” Each of these journal entries 

states that it is “issued nunc pro tunc to correct the error in calculating the 

total sentence imposed upon the defendant” from 32 1⁄2 years to 311⁄2 years. 

The entries further state that “[t]he sentence imposed upon defendant on each 

count shall remain unchanged from the sentencing entry issued on March 13, 

2013.” Each of these journal entries reflects the assessment of court costs 

against Thompson, the imposition of a significant fine and restitution that was 

never ordered in open court. 

{¶11} Thompson appeals from (1) the trial court’s November 12, 2014 

order granting in part his motion to correct the trial court’s March 13, 2013 

sentencing journal entry and (2) the trial court’s November 12, 2014 nunc pro 

tunc entry, raising the following two assignments of error for review: 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I: 

 

The trial court erred in journalizing a sentence greater than twenty-eight and onehalf years and journalizing the imposition of financial sanctions. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II: 

The trial court erred in failing to give jail credit. 

Law and Analysis 

Nunc Pro Tunc Entry

{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Thompson argues that the trial court’s November 

12, 2014 nunc pro tunc entry is invalid because the trial court lacked authority to impose a 

sentence greater than 28 1⁄2 years. Thompson claims that the trial court lacked authority to 

impose a sentence greater than 28 1⁄2 years because (1) the trial court stated during the 

sentencing hearing that it had calculated Thompson’s aggregate prison sentence on the 49 counts 

of which he was convicted as being 28 1⁄2 years and (2) the state indicated on the record that it 

was satisfied with such a sentence. Thompson similarly claims that the trial court lacked 

authority to impose a fine and costs and to order restitution because the transcript from the 

sentencing hearing reflects that the trial court “decided not to impose fines or court costs” and 

that it did not order restitution at the sentencing hearing. The state argues that Thompson’s 

claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

{¶13} Although Thompson purports to challenge the trial court’s November 12, 2014 

nunc pro tunc entry in this appeal, his complaints regarding the length of his sentence actually 

relate back to the trial court’s original March 13, 2013 sentencing entry. It was the March 13, 

2013 sentencing entry in which the trial court first indicated that Thompson had been sentenced 
to an aggregate prison sentence in excess of the 28 1⁄2 year aggregate prison sentence 

Thompson now claims the parties agreed to at the sentencing hearing. There is no dispute that 

Thompson could have raised this issue in his prior appeal but failed to do so. Indeed, 

Thompson specifically argued in his prior appeal that the trial court “abused its discretion by 

imposing a total sentence of 32 1⁄2 years.” Thompson I at ¶ 21. 

{¶14} Where an argument could have been raised in a prior appeal, “res judicata dictates 

that it is inappropriate to consider that same argument on a second appeal.” State v. Davis, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99376, 2013-Ohio-4905, ¶ 9; see also State v. Brooks, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 98380, 2012-Ohio-5292, ¶ 8 (because defendant could have raised, but did not 

raise, any issue regarding sentencing entry in his direct appeal, the issue was barred by res 

judicata). Thompson does not get another “bite at the apple” and cannot avoid the res judicata 

bar to his claim that the trial court committed error in sentencing him to an aggregate sentence 

of more than 28 1⁄2 years simply by characterizing his attack on his sentence as a challenge to 

the trial court’s November 12, 2014 nunc pro tunc entry. See, e.g., State v. Grenter, 11th Dist. 

Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0013, 2011-Ohio-6003, ¶ 12 (where defendant could have raised any 

issue regarding his conviction, the substance of his sentence, the sentencing entry or the 

sentencing hearing on direct appeal, he “may not now find his way into court through a side 

entrance and upon the back of what appears to be a pre-textual motion and appeal therefrom”);

see also State v. Spragling, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2015-A-0008, 2015-Ohio-2598, ¶ 10 
(“As a general proposition, sentencing errors can only be contested through a direct appeal of 

the sentencing judgment. Res judicata bars an appellant from asserting sentencing errors in 

appeals from subsequent judgments when such issues could have been litigated in an appeal of 

the earlier sentencing entry.”). 

{¶15} We further find that the trial court appropriately used a nunc pro tunc entry to 

correct the error in its March 13, 2013 sentencing journal entry with respect to the calculation 

of Thompson’s aggregate prison sentence, indicating that Thompson’s aggregate prison 

sentence was 311⁄2 years rather than 32 1⁄2 years, as originally stated in the March 13, 2013 

sentencing journal entry. Although trial courts generally lack authority to reconsider their own 

valid final judgments in criminal cases, they retain continuing jurisdiction to correct certain 

types of errors in judgments by nunc pro tunc entry to reflect what the court actually decided. 

State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, 967 N.E.2d 718, ¶ 13, citing State ex 

rel. Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, 943 N.E.2d 1010, ¶ 13. 

Pursuant to Crim.R. 36, “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, 

and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at 

any time.” See also State ex rel. DeWine v. Burge, 128 Ohio St.3d 236, 239, 2011-Ohio-235, 

943 N.E.2d 535, ¶ 17 (“‘[C]ourts possess inherent authority to correct clerical errors in 

judgment entries so that the record speaks the truth.’”), quoting State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 

111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 19. A nunc pro tunc entry can be 
used to correct mathematical calculations and typographical or clerical errors, i.e.,“‘a mistake 

or omission, mechanical in nature and apparent on the record, which does not involve a legal 

decision or judgment.’” State v. Spears, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94089, 2010-Ohio-2229, ¶ 

10; State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, 940 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 15, quoting 

Zaleski at ¶ 19. However, proper use of a nunc pro tunc order “is limited to memorializing 

what the trial court actually did at an earlier point in time, such as correcting a previously issued 

order that fails to reflect the trial court’s true action,” Spears at ¶ 10, “not what the court might 

or should have decided or what the court intended to decide.” State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 

303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 18. A nunc pro tunc entry relates back to the date 

of the original entry. Marsh at ¶ 15. 

{¶16} Thus, where a clerical or mathematical error exists in a sentencing entry, a nunc 

pro tunc entry may be properly used to correct the sentencing entry to reflect the sentence the 

trial court actually imposed upon the defendant at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., Spears at 

¶ 8-10 (where trial court sentenced defendant to an 11-year aggregate prison sentence at 

sentencing hearing but erroneously indicated in its sentencing journal entry that defendant’s 

sentences amounted to a net ten-year sentence, trial court could use a nunc pro nunc entry to 

correct sentencing entry to reflect that defendant had received a net 11-year prison sentence and 

not a ten-year sentence); State v. Fugate, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000-02-031 2000 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 5235, *3-6 (Nov. 13, 2000) (where trial court sentenced defendant to three-year prison 
term at sentencing hearing but filed a judgment entry that inconsistently stated that defendant’s 

term of imprisonment was two years, trial court properly issued nunc pro tunc entry correcting 

the error so that the sentencing entry would accurately reflect the penalty imposed at the 

sentencing hearing); State v. Battle, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23404, 2007-Ohio-2475, ¶ 2, 8 

(where trial court’s journal entry sentenced defendant to 18 months of community control 

rather than two years of community control as pronounced during the sentencing hearing, the 

sentencing journal entry “contained a clerical mistake that could be corrected with a nunc pro 

tunc entry”). 

{¶17} In this case, it is undisputed that the original March 13, 2013 sentencing journal 

entry set forth an incorrect aggregate sentence of 32 1⁄2 years and imposed a fine, costs and 

restitution that were not imposed at the sentencing hearing. It is likewise undisputed that when 

the individual sentences the trial court imposed at the sentencing hearing are correctly added 

together, the result is an aggregate prison sentence of 311⁄2 years — consistent with the 

aggregate sentence stated in the November 12, 2014 nunc pro tunc entry. Although 

Thompson’s sentences on each of the individual counts were clearly stated at the sentencing 

hearing, the record reflects that the trial court, the state and defense counsel each made a math 

error in calculating Thompson’s aggregate sentence at the sentencing hearing. 

{¶18} In its March 13, 2013 sentencing entry, the trial court purported to fix that error, 

indicating that the sum of the individual sentences imposed on the offenses of which Thompson 
had been convicted was an aggregate sentence of 32 1⁄2 years. However, due to a clerical 

error in its memorialization of the sentence on Count 30 — indicating that the 12-month 

sentence on Count 30 was “consecutive to any other count” rather than concurrent 

with the sentence on Count 31 and consecutive to the sentences on all other 

counts as stated at the sentencing hearing — the March 13, 2013 sentencing entry 

overstated Thompson’s aggregate sentence by one year. With its November 12, 2014 nunc 

pro tunc entry, the trial court properly “corrected its judgment to reflect what transpired at the 

sentencing hearing” with respect to the aggregate sentence imposed. State v. Kimmie, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98979, 2013-Ohio-2906, ¶ 23. However, as no journal entry was ever 

issued to correct the trial court’s improper imposition of a fine, costs and restitution — which 

were either ordered suspended or not imposed at the sentencing hearing — the November 12, 

2014 nunc pro tunc entry is incomplete and a new nunc pro tunc entry must be issued correcting 

all of the mathematical and clerical errors in the March 13, 2013 sentencing journal entry. 

{¶19} Thompson’s first assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. 

Jail-Time Credit 

{¶20} In his second assignment of error, Thompson argues that the trial court erred in 

failing to give him 48 days of jail-time credit for the time he remained in the Cuyahoga County 

jail from January 29, 2013 (the date of the jury verdicts) until March 18, 2013 (when he was 

transported to the Lorain Correctional Institution following sentencing). He argues that 
calculation of jail-time credit is the “duty” of the trial court and that a trial court’s failure to 

award jail-time credit is “remediable by appeal or motion for jail time credit.” The state argues 

that because Thompson failed to raise the issue of jail-time credit in his direct appeal, his claim 

is barred for appeal by res judicata. We disagree. 

{¶21} Criminal defendants have a right to jail-time credit. State v. Alredge, 7th Dist. 

Belmont No. 14 BE 52, 2015-Ohio-2586, ¶ 10. In September 2012, R.C. 2929.19 was 

amended to “impose certain duties on a trial court at the time of sentencing with respect to 

jail-time credit.” State v. Fitzgerald, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98723, 2013-Ohio-1893, ¶ 6 

(Boyle, J., concurring). Under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i), if the trial court determines at the 

sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, it is the duty of the trial court, at 

the time of sentencing, to 

[d]etermine, notify the offender of, and include in the sentencing entry the 

number of days that the offender has been confined for any reason arising out of 

the offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by which the 

department of rehabilitation and correction must reduce the stated prison term 

under section 2967.191 of the Revised Code. * * * 

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) further provides, in relevant part: 

The sentencing court retains continuing jurisdiction to correct any error not 

previously raised at sentencing in making a determination under [R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i)]. The offender may, at any time after sentencing, file a 

motion in the sentencing court to correct any error made in making a 

determination under [R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i)], and the court may in its 

discretion grant or deny that motion. If the court changes the number of days 

in its determination or redetermination, the court shall cause the entry granting 
that change to be delivered to the department of rehabilitation and correction 

without delay. * * * 

R.C. 2931.15, relating to motions for a new trial, and R.C. 2953.21, relating to petitions for 

postconviction relief, do not apply to a motion made under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii). R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii). An “inaccurate determination” of jail-time credit “is not grounds for 

setting aside the offender’s conviction or sentence and does not otherwise render the sentence 

void or voidable.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iv). 

{¶22} As this court observed in State v. Quarterman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101064, 

2014-Ohio-5796, ¶ 8: 

Amended R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) marks a significant change in the law 

regarding jail-time credit. Previously, inmates could only challenge errors in 

jail-time credit on direct appeal unless the error consisted of a mathematical 

mistake in calculation rather than an erroneous legal determination. See, e.g., 

State v. Robinson, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 00 CA 2698, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 

5001 (Oct. 23, 2000). R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) now allows the court to correct 

“any error,” regardless of whether the error involved a mathematical 

miscalculation or an erroneous legal determination * * *. 

See also State v. Inboden, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 14AP-312 and 14AP-317, 2014-Ohio-5762, 

¶ 8 (R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) states that the trial court has “continuing jurisdiction to correct 

any jail-time credit error ‘not previously raised at sentencing,’ thereby abating the application 

of the doctrine of res judicata as it relates to issues that could have been raised at sentencing but 

were not.”). 

{¶23} In this case, the trial court failed to make any determination of the jail-time 

credit to which Thompson was entitled at the sentencing hearing and no jail-time credit was 
referenced in the sentencing journal entry. Thompson did not raise the issue of jail-time credit 

during sentencing, in his prior appeal or in any of his motions to correct the trial court’s 

sentencing journal entry. While jail-time credit errors can be corrected through a direct appeal 

— see, e.g., State v. Ponyard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101266, 2015-Ohio-311, ¶ 10-12; State 

v. Collins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99111, 2013-Ohio-3726, ¶ 22-25 — R.C. 

2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) also provides a mechanism for correcting jail-time credit errors “not 

previously raised at sentencing” “at any time after sentencing” by filing an appropriate motion 

with the trial court. Alredge, at ¶ 12. Because Thompson did not raise the issue at 

sentencing or in his prior appeal, Thompson’s remedy, under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), is to 

file a motion with the trial court seeking to correct the error. Accordingly, Thompson’s second 

assignment of error is overruled.

{¶24} Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for the issuance 

of a new nunc pro tunc sentencing journal entry that corrects both (1) the mathematical error in 

calculating Thompson’s aggregate sentence as 32 1⁄2 years rather than 311⁄2 years 

(that was previously corrected in the November 12, 2014 nunc pro tunc entry) 

and (2) the clerical error in imposing a fine, costs and restitution. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas 

court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_________________________________________________ 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

TIM McCORMACK, J., and 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR