J-S28023-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MAURICE ANDREWS

Appellant No. 598 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 7, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004380-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2016

Maurice Laverne Andrews appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County following a 

jury trial in which he was convicted of third-degree murder,1conspiracy to 

commit third-degree murder,2firearms not to be carried without a license,3

and criminal trespass.4 Andrews challenges the trial court’s denial of his 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503.
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suppression motion, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence and 

discretionary aspects of sentencing. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this matter as follows:

[A]t approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 22, 2013, [Andrews] and 

his cousin and co-conspirator – Michael Romain Hinton – arrived 

in the vicinity of Brian’s Café, a bar located in Pottstown, 

Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, with the purpose of 

confronting Victor “Short Man” Baez. [Andrews] was armed with 

a 9[]mm Glock handgun, and Hinton was armed with a .357 

Smith & Wesson revolver. The pair lay in wait for [Baez], 

ambushing him when he exited the bar shortly after 2:00 a.m. 

While [Baez] struggled with Hinton for control of Hinton’s 

revolver, [Andrews] shot [Baez] five times, killing him. Hinton 

was also hit by [Andrews’] gunfire and was wounded in the leg 

and hand.

Hinton’s .357 Smith & Wesson revolver was discovered lying 

next to the body of [Baez]. [Andrews’] 9[]mm Glock was never 

recovered. [Andrews] and Hinton fled the scene separately. The 

wounded Hinton was apprehended several hours later on the 

streets of Pottstown and was transported to Reading Hospital, 

following which he gave several statements to police in which he 

implicated [Andrews] as the shooter. [Andrews] left the area 

following the shooting, and was ultimately arrested in 

Philadelphia at the home of his Aunt – Danielle “Dee” White – on 

April 18, 2013. It was the Commonwealth’s theory of the case 

that [Baez] was murdered because [Andrews] had previously 

engaged in a botched robbery and kidnapping of [Baez’s] 

nephew, and [Andrews] was afraid that [Baez] planned to 

retaliate against him.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/15, at 1-2. 

After Hinton was released from Reading Hospital on the afternoon of 

March 22, detectives transported him to the Pottstown Police Department 

where they recorded a statement. Hinton’s statement to Detective Richard 

was read to the jury during trial.
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Although the 9 mm Glock used in the killing of Baez was never 

recovered, conversations recorded while Andrews was incarcerated at the 

Montgomery County Correctional Facility (MCCF) indicated that Andrews 

planned to discuss the location of the missing firearm with his mother, Julia 

White, when they met in person in a holding room of District Court 38-1-11 

in Pottstown on May 10, 2014. Based on this information, the 

Commonwealth sought and obtained an order from this Court authorizing 

the interception and recording of Andrews’ conversation with his mother at 

the district court. The Commonwealth sought to present the recorded 

conversation into evidence. Andrews filed a pretrial motion to suppress this 

evidence, the disposition of which was summarized by the trial court, as 

follows:

On January 17, 2014, [Andrews] filed an omnibus pre-trial 

motion contending, inter alia, that the intercepted conversation 

should be suppressed pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 5721.1. More 

specifically, [Andrews] claimed in his motion that the 

interception should be suppressed because:

a) It was not supported by probable cause;

b) The May 8, 2013 order of the Honorable James J. 

Fitzgerald, III, of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

that authorized the interception was materially 

insufficient on its face; and

c) The interception materially deviated from the 

requirements of the order of authorization.

A hearing on [Andrews’] motion to suppress was held before the 

undersigned on February 18, 2014. During the course of this 

hearing defense counsel withdrew [Andrews’] claim that the 

interception materially deviated from the requirements of the 

order of authorization. Counsel stated that his argument, 
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instead, was that “the Affidavit of Probable Cause lacked 

sufficient facts to support the granting of the wiretap order” and 

that the information that was in the affidavit was stale because it 

related to conversations engaged in by [Andrews] on and before 

April 24, 2013, and the interception authorized did not take 

place until May 10, 2013. The affidavit was entered into 

evidence as CS-1.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/15, at 19-20 (citations omitted). The trial court 

denied Andrews’ motion to suppress.

After a five-day trial, a jury found Andrews guilty of third-degree 

murder, conspiracy to commit third-degree murder, firearms not to be 

carried without a license, and criminal trespass. On October 7, 2014, 

Andrews was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-five to seventy years’ 

incarceration, including consecutive sentences of twenty to forty years’ 

incarceration for third-degree murder and fifteen to thirty years for 

conspiracy to commit third-degree murder, as well as a concurrent sentence 

of one to two years for firearms not to be carried without a license.5 The 

trial court imposed no further penalty on Andrews’ criminal trespass 

conviction. The trial court denied Andrews’ post-sentence motions on 

February 6, 2015, and Andrews filed a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on March 24, 2015.

____________________________________________

5 Andrews was also sentenced to one to two years’ incarceration for 

possession with intent to distribute and one to two years’ incarceration for 

possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. These sentences 

stemmed from guilty pleas entered by Andrews and were ordered to run 

consecutively to his sentences for third-degree murder and conspiracy to 

commit third-degree murder, bringing his total aggregate sentence to thirtyseven to seventy-four years’ incarceration. N.T. Sentencing, 10/7/14, at 32.
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On appeal, Andrews raises the following issues for our review:

I. [Whether the trial court] committed an error of law and 

abuse of discretion in failing to suppress the audio and

video recording of [Andrews] and his [m]other Julia White 

because the Commonwealth’s Application for Wiretap 

Authorization lacked probable cause and contained stale 

information.

II. [Whether the trial court] committed an error [of] law in 

denying [Andrews’ post-sentence motion] for judgment of 

acquittal based upon the fact that evidence introduced at 

trial was not legally sufficient to support the verdict 

because the evidence failed to establish each material 

element of the crimes charged and the commission thereof 

by [Andrews] beyond a reasonable doubt.

a. [Whether the] Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence that [Andrews] had committed 

the killing of Victor Baez with [m]alice.

b. [Whether the] Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence that [Andrews] had entered into a 

[c]onspiracy with Michael Hinton to commit the 

[c]rime of [third-degree murder].

c. [Whether the jury’s verdict for conspiracy to commit 

third-degree murder was] contrary to [the] law and 

[whether] the Commonwealth failed to prove the

specific intent to kill for [c]onspiracy.

III. [Whether, in] sentencing [Andrews], the [t]rial [c]ourt 

committed an abuse of discretion, whereby the sentence 

imposed by the court was unduly harsh and excessive and 

the court failed to take into account the mitigating factors 

presented at sentencing relating to [Andrews’] [a]ge and 

[c]hildhood.

Brief for Appellant, at 4-5. 

First, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting audio and video evidence of Andrews’ conversation with his 
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mother. Andrews contends that the Commonwealth’s Application for 

Wiretap Authorization lacked probable cause and was based on stale 

information.

When reviewing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion, our 

scope and standard of review is: 

whether the factual findings are supported by the record and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. When reviewing the rulings of a suppression court, this 

Court considers only the evidence of the prosecution and so 

much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted 

when read in the context of the record as a whole. When the 

record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. 

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Here, the Honorable James J. Fitzgerald, III,6issued an order on May 

8, 2013 authorizing the interception of anticipated oral communications 

between Andrews and his mother at the district court in Pottstown on May 

10, 2013. In that order, Judge Fitzgerald determined that there was 

probable cause to believe that communications between Andrews and his 

____________________________________________

6 We recognize that this claim requires us to review a wiretap order issued 

by a member of this Court, and that it is generally improper for a judge to 

overrule an order by another judge of the same court in the same case. 

However, because jurisdiction for wiretap authorizations is vested in this 

Court by the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5708, the rule of necessity requires that we review such decisions when 

raised on direct appeal. 
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mother would “provide evidence of the commission of the murder of [Baez] 

as well as provide evidence aiding in the apprehension of the perpetrators 

responsible for the murder of [Baez].” Order, 5/8/13, at 2. 

The trial court summarized the evidence contained in the affidavit of 

probable cause as follows:

During the early morning hours of March 22, 2013, Corporal 

Stephen Hatfield of the Pottstown Police Department discovered 

the body of [Baez] lying in the street outside Brian’s Café. An 

autopsy performed on the body of [Baez] determined that 

[Baez] was a homicide victim killed by multiple gunshot wounds. 

During processing of the crime scene, Montgomery County 

Detective Edward Schikel discovered six fired 9[]mm cartridge 

casings. During the course of interviews with law enforcement, 

[Hinton] stated that he and [Andrews] had gone to Brian’s Café 

on March 22, 2013 because of a dispute between [Andrews] and 

[Baez], and that [Andrews] had told him that he wanted to kill 

[Baez]. Hinton also reported that [Andrews] was armed with a 

Glock 9 mm semi-automatic handgun, and that [Andrews] had 

shot [Baez].

The affidavit of probable cause further averred that, between 

March 25, 2013[,] and April 18, 2013, the police were actively 

searching for [Andrews], and that Julia White told the police 

that, even if she knew where [Andrews] was, she would not tell 

the police.

The affidavit averred that [Andrews] was arrested in Philadelphia 

on April 18, 2013, and remanded to [MCCF] without bail. While 

incarcerated at MCCF, [Andrews] was permitted to make 

telephone calls and to have visits with family members. 

[Andrews] was advised that these conversations would be 

monitored and recorded.

The crux of the request for approval of interception of the 

anticipated meeting between [Andrews] and his mother on May 

10, 2013[,] was the fact that the gun used in the killing of 

[Baez] had not been recovered, and the authorities’ assertion 

that the lawfully-monitored conversations between [Andrews] 

and his family members between April 20, 2013[,] and April 24, 
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2013 established compelling reasons to believe that [Andrews] 

and his mother would discuss the location of that gun during 

their May 10, 2013 meeting.

On review of the affidavit, the undersigned found no reason 

whatever to reject Justice Fitzgerald’s determination that the 

affidavit presented sufficient facts to support the interception of 

the May 10, 2013 conversation on this basis.

Stated directly, the affidavit contains transcriptions of multiple 

conversations between [Andrews] and family members during 

which – employing vague and coded language – [Andrews] 

discusses the location of an unidentified item at the residence of 

“Aunt D.” This series of conversations culminates in a 

conversation taking place between [Andrews] and his mother on 

April 24, 2013, during a visit by [White] to her son in MCCF. 

During the course of this visit, [White] appears to castigate 

[Andrews] for his previous conversations with relatives on the 

telephone, and tells him: “I swear to God shut your f*cking 

mouth on the phones.” When [Andrews] persists in trying to 

talk to her in vague language, [White] responds: “Don’t try any 

codes. Don’t . . . we’ll talk at the hearing.” [Andrews] replies: 

“Oh yeah, the hearing’s next Thursday.”

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/15, at 20-22. Based on these facts, the trial court 

held that the wiretap authorization was supported by sufficient probable 

cause, and we agree.

Andrews also contends that the information contained in the

Application for Wiretap Authorization and affidavit of probable cause was 

stale. Andrews’ contention appears to be based on the fact that the 

conversation between Andrews and his mother occurred on May 10, 2013, 

while the wiretap authorization and affidavit of probable cause relied on 

conversations recorded on or before April 24, 2013. See Brief for Appellant, 

at 10. Andrews offers no other facts in support of this claim. Therefore, we 

hold that Andrews’ challenge to the staleness of the information in the 
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wiretap authorization has not been fully developed and is therefore waived. 

See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(issue waived where appellant fails to develop argument and provide 

discussion of relevant authority).

Andrews next claims that the Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence to support his convictions for third-degree murder and conspiracy.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, 

part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329, 341 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

With respect to the crime of third-degree murder, our Supreme Court 

has stated:

Section 2502 of the Crimes Code defines the three degrees of 

murder. This section sets forth the mens rea for first[-]degree 

murder, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) (an intentional killing), and 
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defines second[-]degree murder as that occurring during the 

perpetration of a felony. See id., § 2502 (b). Regarding third[-

]degree murder, however, the statute simply states, “All other 

kinds of murder shall be murder of the third degree.” Id., § 

2502 (c). Importantly, § 2502(c) does not set forth the requisite 

mens rea for third[-]degree murder; however, § 302(c) of the 

Crimes Code provides, “When the culpability sufficient to 

establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by 

law, such element is established if a person acts intentionally, 

knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.” Id., § 302(c).

Case law has further defined the elements of third-degree 

murder, holding:

[T]o convict a defendant of the offense of third-degree 

murder, the Commonwealth need only prove that the 

defendant killed another person with malice aforethought. 

This Court has long held that malice comprehends not only 

a particular ill-will, but . . . [also a] wickedness of 

disposition, hardness of heart, recklessness of 

consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, 

although a particular person may not be intended to be 

injured.

Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 363 (Pa. 2005) 

(alteration in original) (internal citation, quotation, and emphasis 

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 15 

(1868) (defining malice as quoted above).

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 1191 (Pa. 2013). This Court has 

previously found malice where the defendant has employed a deadly 

weapon;7 where the defendant has attempted to conceal his crime or 

____________________________________________

7 See Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095 (Pa. Super. 1997).
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destroy evidence;8and where the defendant has perpetrated a shooting 

motivated by a prior incident involving the victim or a relative.9

Andrews argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish 

the elements of third-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Brief for 

Appellant, at 11. Andrews contends that the Commonwealth’s case was 

based solely on the testimony of his co-defendant, Hinton, and the 

Commonwealth offered “no credible collaborative evidence . . . that 

[Andrews] was responsible for the malicious killing of [Baez].” Brief for 

Appellant, at 13.

Here, we find that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 

establish that Andrews committed the third-degree murder of Baez. 

Specifically, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Andrews acted with a reckless disregard of the fact 

that his actions could cause death or serious injury when Andrews armed 

himself with a 9 mm Glock, laid in wait for Baez outside of Brian’s Café, and 

then shot Baez several times. Hinton’s testimony detailed how he and 

Andrews acquired firearms and travelled to Brian’s Café with the intention of 

ambushing Baez. N.T. Trial, 6/25/14, at 142-44. Hinton also testified that 

Andrews had told him that he was scared that Baez was going to retaliate 

____________________________________________

8 See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 858 A.2d 1219 (Pa. Super. 2004).

9 See Commonwealth v. Marquez, 980 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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against him after his failed robbery of Baez’s nephew. Id. at 139-41. 

Finally, Hinton described how, when Baez emerged from Brian’s Café, 

Andrews shot him several times with a 9 mm Glock. Id. at 147.

Hinton’s testimony was largely corroborated by the Commonwealth’s 

other witnesses. Benjamin Alford, a prisoner on Andrews’ cellblock, testified 

about a conversation he had with Andrews after his arrest. See id. at 68-

54. Alford testified that Andrews told him that a man named “Vic” had been 

looking to retaliate against Andrews after Andrews’ failed robbery attempt on 

his nephew. Id. at 61-63. Alford then related Andrews’ statements about 

how he waited for “Vic” outside of a bar in Pottstown with his cousin and 

then shot “Vic” several times. Id. Saquanna Harrell, a cousin of Hinton, 

testified that she took a bus trip with Hinton and Andrews from Norristown 

to Pottstown on the night Baez was murdered. N.T. Trial, 6/24/14, at 147. 

Harrell also testified that Andrews led her and Hinton to an abandoned 

house, where Andrews armed himself and Hinton with firearms. Id. at 155-

57. 

In addition, the Commonwealth also presented telephone records 

establishing that Andrews’ cell phone was in the vicinity of Brian’s Café both 

shortly before and after Baez’s death. N.T. Trial, 6/26/14, at 39-45. 

Several 9 mm shell casings were found at the scene of the murder and a 9 

mm bullet was recovered from Baez’s body. Additionally, Andrews’ aunt, 

Dee White, testified that she observed Andrews with a handgun that was 
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similar in appearance to a 9 mm Glock shortly after the murder. N.T. Trial, 

6/25/14, at 41-43.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict 

winner, see Best, supra, the trial court properly concluded that the 

Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to establish that Andrews 

killed Baez and did so with malice. See Fisher, supra.

Next, Andrews contends that there was insufficient evidence at trial to 

convict him of conspiracy to commit third-degree murder. The Crimes Code 

defines criminal conspiracy, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Definition of conspiracy.—A person is guilty of conspiracy 

with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the 

intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or 

one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime; or

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime.

. . .

(e) Overt Act.—No person may be convicted of conspiracy to 

commit a crime unless an overt act in pursuance of such 

conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him or by 

a person with whom he conspired.

18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a), (e). Therefore, to sustain a conviction for criminal 

conspiracy, “the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant (1) 

entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another 

person or persons, (2) with a shared criminal intent and, (3) an overt act 
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was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fisher, supra at 1190 

(citations omitted).

Here, the trial court correctly noted that:

Fisher specifically holds that, where the crime at issue is 

conspiracy to commit third-degree murder, there exists no 

requirement that the intended result of the conspiracy was the 

death of the victim. Fisher holds, rather, that for conspiracy to 

commit third-degree murder what is required is an agreement to 

engage in an intentional malicious act that results in death, 

regardless of whether death was the intended result.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/15, at 15-16. Based on this standard, the trial 

court properly concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 

determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Andrews and Hinton agreed to 

commit the criminal and malicious act of arming themselves with firearms 

and confronting Baez outside of Brian’s Café. 

Specifically, sufficient evidence was presented at trial that Andrews 

possessed the intent to carry out a malicious act, that he shared this intent 

with Hinton, and that he carried out an overt act in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. Andrews told Hinton that he wanted to kill Baez. Andrews then 

armed himself and Hinton and the two travelled to Brian’s Café to carry out 

their plan to ambush Baez. Hinton then entered Brian’s Café to determine 

whether Baez had arrived yet, while Andrews lay in wait outside of the bar. 

Furthermore, not only did Andrews and Hinton conspire to arm themselves 

with firearms and proceed to Brian’s Café to ambush Baez, but Andrews 

actually shot Baez several times, causing his death. 
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Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict 

winner, see Best, supra, the trial court properly concluded that the

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish that Andrews 

engaged in a conspiracy to commit third-degree murder.10 See Fisher, 

supra.

____________________________________________

10 Andrews also argues that a conviction for conspiracy to commit thirddegree murder requires that the Commonwealth prove a “specific intent to 

kill.” Our Supreme Court has squarely rejected the proposition that specific 

intent to kill is an element of conspiracy to commit third-degree murder:

The absence of intent to kill does not preclude a defendant from 

being convicted of conspiracy to commit third-degree murder. 

Absence of specific intent is not an element of third-degree 

murder; the third-degree murder statute does not list elements 

or specify a requisite mens rea, but rather categorizes this

degree of homicide as “[a]ll other kinds of murder” not falling 

within the definition of first or second degree murder. 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2502(c).

. . .

If a defendant acts with his co-conspirators in brutally attacking 

the victim with the intention of killing him, he conspires to 

commit first degree murder; if the defendant performs the same 

action but does not care whether the victim dies or not, he 

conspires to commit third-degree murder. In the latter example, 

the defendant did not . . . intend to aid an unintentional murder; 

rather, he intended to aid a malicious act resulting in a killing. 

Malice is not the absence of any intent, just the specific intent to 

kill. Where, as here, the defendant intends the underlying act . . 

. which results in death, the evidence supports the charge of 

conspiracy to commit third-degree murder.

Fisher, supra at 1195.
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Finally, Andrews contends that his sentence was unduly harsh and 

excessive, which presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing. An appellant is not entitled to review of the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing unless he or she satisfies a four-part test: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief 

has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en 

banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super. 

2011)). 

Instantly, Andrews filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his 

issues in a post-sentence motion. However, Andrews’ brief does not include 

a statement of the reasons relied upon regarding the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). The Commonwealth has 

objected to Andrews’ failure to include a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. 

See Brief for Appellee, at 29. Accordingly, Andrews is not entitled to review 

of the discretionary aspects of sentencing. See Caldwell, supra.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/15/2016