34198 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 120 /Tuesday, June 23, 1998 / Notices

Dr. Richard F. Cole, Special Assistant,

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th

day of June 1998.

B. Paul Cotter, Jr.,

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety

and Licensing Board Panel.

[FR Doc. 98–16639 Filed 6–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–315]

Indiana Michigan Power Company;

Notice of Withdrawal of Application for

Amendment to Facility Operating

License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) has

granted the request of Indiana Michigan

Power Company (the licensee) to

withdraw its August 4, 1995,

application for proposed amendment to

Facility Operating License No. DPR–58,

for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant,

Unit Nos. 1, located in Berrien County,

Michigan.

The proposed amendment would

have revised the technical specifications

to allow for repair of hybrid expansion

joint sleeved steam generator tubes.

The Commission had previously

issued a Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment published in

the Federal Register on January 29,

1997 (62 FR 4351). However, by letter

dated January 6, 1998, the licensee

withdrew the proposed change.

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated August 4, 1995, and

the licensee’s letter dated January 6,

1998, which withdrew the application

for license amendment. The above

documents are available for public

inspection at the Commission’s Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building,

2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,

and at the local public document room

located at the Maud Preston Palenske

Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St.

Joseph, MI 49085.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day

of June 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John F. Stang,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate

III–3, Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–16650 Filed 6–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–315 and 50–316]

Indiana Michigan Power Company;

Notice of Withdrawal of Application for

Amendment to Facility Operating

License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) has

granted the request of Indiana Michigan

Power Company (the licensee) to

withdraw its November 16, 1994

application for proposed amendment to

Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–58

and DPR–74, for the Donald C. Cook

Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2,

located in Berrien County, Michigan.

The proposed amendment would

have revised the technical specifications

to reduce the decay time required before

refueling operations could begin.

The Commission had previously

issued a Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment published in

the Federal Register on December 21,

1994 (59 FR 65816). However, by letter

dated January 27, 1998, the licensee

withdrew the proposed change.

For further details with respect to this

action, see the application for

amendment dated November 16, 1994,

and the licensee’s letter dated January

27, 1998, which withdrew the

application for license amendment. The

above documents are available for

public inspection at the Commission’s

Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, and at the local public

document room located at the Maud

Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 500

Market Street, St. Joseph, MI 49085.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day

of June 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John F. Stang,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate

III–3, Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV,

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 98–16651 Filed 6–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 030–31174, License No. 07–

28386–01, EA NO. 98–061]

Koch Engineering Company, Inc.,

Newark, Delaware; Order Imposing a

Civil Monetary Penalty

I

Koch Engineering Company, Inc.

(Licensee) is the holder of Byproduct

Materials License No. 07–28386–01

(License) issued by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC or

Commission) on July 24, 1989, and most

recently renewed by the NRC on August

28, 1995. The License authorizes the

Licensee to possess and use certain

byproduct materials in accordance with

the conditions specified therein at its

facilities in Newark, Delaware, Canton,

Michigan, and temporary job sites

anywhere in the United States where

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission maintains jurisdiction.

II

A special inspection of the Licensee’s

activities was conducted on September

15, 1997, to review the circumstances

associated with an event involving the

shipment of a package of radioactive

material (3 cesium-137 sources) via

Federal Express from the Licensee’s

facility in Newark, Delaware to

Wilmington, North Carolina. The

package was empty upon arrival in

North Carolina, and the sources were

later found at a Federal Express facility

in Memphis, Tennessee. The NRC

inspection was continued in the Region

I office on January 20, 1998, to review

evaluations of doses received by Federal

Express workers as a result of the event.

The results of this inspection indicated

that the Licensee had not conducted its

activities in full compliance with NRC

requirements. A written Notice of

Violation and Proposed Imposition of

Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon

the Licensee by letter dated March 13,

1998. The Notice states the nature of the

violations, the provisions of the NRC

requirements that the Licensee violated,

and the amount of the civil penalty

proposed for the violation.

The Licensee responded to the Notice

in letters, dated April 8 and 9, 1998. In

its responses, the Licensee admits the

violations, but disputes the Severity

Level of the violation that resulted in

the issuance of the civil penalty and

requests that the proposed penalty of

$4,400 be reconsidered.

III

After consideration of the Licensee’s

response and the statements of fact,

explanation, and argument contained

therein, the NRC staff has determined,

as set forth in the Appendix to this

Order, that the Licensee has not

provided an adequate basis for reducing

the Severity Level of the violation or for

withdrawal of the civil penalty

associated with this violation.

Therefore, a civil penalty in the amount

of $4,400 should be imposed.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 120 /Tuesday, June 23, 1998 / Notices 34199

IV

In view of the foregoing and pursuant

to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.

2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, It is hereby

ordered that:

The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the

amount of $4,400 within 30 days of the date

of this Order, by check, draft, money order,

or electronic transfer, payable to the

Treasurer of the United States and mailed to

Mr. James Lieberman, Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, One White Flint North, 11555

Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852–2738.

V

The Licensee may request a hearing

within 30 days of the date of this Order.

Where good cause is shown,

consideration will be given to extending

the time to request a hearing. A request

for extension of time must be made in

writing to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555,

and include a statement of good cause

for the extension. A request for a

hearing should be clearly marked as a

‘‘Request for an Enforcement Hearing’’

and shall be addressed to the Director,

Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington,

DC 20555, with a copy to the

Commission’s Document Control Desk,

Washington, DC 20555. Copies also

shall be sent to the Deputy Assistant

General Counsel for Enforcement at the

same address and to the Regional

Administrator, NRC Region I, 475

Allendale Road, King of Prussia, PA

19406.

If a hearing is requested, the

Commission will issue an Order

designating the time and place of the

hearing. If the Licensee fails to request

a hearing within 30 days of the date of

this Order (or if written approval of an

extension of time in which to request a

hearing has not been granted), the

provisions of this Order shall be

effective without further proceedings. If

payment has not been made by that

time, the matter may be referred to the

Attorney General for collection.

In the event the Licensee requests a

hearing as provided above, the issues to

be considered at such hearing shall be:

Whether on the basis of the violation

admitted by the Licensee, this Order

should be sustained.

Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of

June 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Ashok C. Thadani,

Acting Deputy Executive Director for

Regulatory Effectiveness.

Appendix—Evaluations and Conclusion

On March 13, 1998, a Notice of

Violation and Proposed Imposition of

Civil Penalty (Notice) was issued to

Koch Engineering Company, Inc.

(Licensee) for violations identified

during NRC review of the circumstances

associated with an event involving the

shipment of a package containing 3

cesium-137 sources from the Licensee’s

facility in Newark, Delaware to

Wilmington, North Carolina. The

package was empty upon arrival in

North Carolina, and the sources were

later found at a Federal Express facility

in Memphis, Tennessee. The Licensee

responded to the Notice in letters, dated

April 8 and 9, 1998. In its responses, the

Licensee admits the violations, but

disputes the Severity Level of the

violation for which a civil penalty was

assessed and requests the NRC

reconsider the proposed civil penalty of

$4,400. The NRC’s evaluation and

conclusion regarding the Licensee’s

requests are as follows:

Restatement of the Violation

10 CFR 71.5(a) requires that a licensee

who transports licensed material

outside of the site of usage, as specified

in the NRC license, or where transport

is on public highways, or who delivers

licensed material to a carrier for

transport, comply with the applicable

requirements of the regulations

appropriate to the mode of transport of

the Department of Transportation (DOT)

in 49 CFR Parts 170 through 189.

49 CFR 173.475 requires, in part, that

before each shipment of any radioactive

materials package, the offeror must

ensure, by examination or appropriate

tests, that each closure device of the

packaging, including any required

gasket, is properly installed, secured,

and free of defects.

Contrary to the above, prior to

September 15, 1997, the licensee had

failed to ensure, by examination or test,

that each closure device was properly

installed, secured, and free of defects

before each shipment of packages

containing radioactive material.

Specifically, the licensee did not ensure

that the Master Lock No. 175 padlock

attached to the packages were examined

or tested in that the individual

responsible for installing the padlock

did not pull on the lock after it was

closed to ensure that it was secure.

This is a Severity Level II violation

(Supplement VI). Civil Penalty—$4,400

Summary of the Licensee’s Response

The Licensee admits the violation, but

contends that the criteria used to

classify the violation at Severity Level II

are not applicable, because it believes

that it is possible that the loss of control

of radioactive material could have

resulted from inappropriate handling by

the carrier (Federal Express) and that

the violation did not result in a clear

potential for a member of the public to

receive more than 100 mrem to the

whole body.

The Licensee agrees that the violation

may have been the probable cause for

the ‘‘loss of control of radioactive

material via a breach in the package’s

integrity,’’ but it believes that the

inappropriate handling by the carrier’s

hazmat personnel may have also been a

contributing factor. The Licensee

contends that the package was offered to

the carrier with the lock and two

electrical tie wraps installed and that

inappropriate handling by the carrier,

such as a substantial drop from a height

of greater than 4 feet, may have resulted

in the initial lock failure and subsequent

loss of the three sealed sources from the

container. Additionally, the Licensee

contends that the carrier’s hazmat

employee, who first noticed the opened

empty container, did not follow proper

procedures when he/she placed the lid

back on the container and allowed the

container to proceed, rather than

immediately reporting the incident to

his/her supervisor.

Based on the regulatory criteria

specified in 49 CFR, the Licensee

contends that regulations required that

its package should have only been in the

care of individuals classified as ‘‘hazmat

employees’’ during all stages of the

shipping process. The Licensee also

states that the regulations require that

hazmat employees be trained

concerning ‘‘methods and procedures

for avoiding accidents, such as the

proper procedures for handling

packages of hazardous material.’’

Therefore, the Licensee contends that,

while the carrier is not regulated by the

NRC, the carrier’s actions should be

considered when determining

accountability.

The Licensee also contends that the

violation did not result in a ‘‘clear

potential for a member of the public to

receive more than 100 mrem to the

whole body,’’ noting that the regulations

required that their radioactive material

shipment only be handled by trained

hazmat employees. The Licensee

contends that the carrier’s hazmat

employees are not considered members

of the public while performing hazmat

duties because they receive
34200 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 120 /Tuesday, June 23, 1998 / Notices

‘‘occupational dose.’’ Additionally, the

Licensee notes that the incident

occurred at the end of the film badge

reporting period and there is no

supportive evidence that all of the 90

mrem received by the worker was the

direct result of the incident. Therefore,

the Licensee maintains that there was

no clear potential for a member of the

public to receive more than 100 mrem

to the whole body.

Finally, the Licensee notes that while

the NRC’s March 13, 1998 Notice stated

that the Licensee’s corrective actions

were prompt and comprehensive, it was

not clear whether credit for such actions

was considered in assessing the amount

of the civil penalty.

NRC’s Evaluation of the Licensee’s

Response

The NRC does not dispute the

Licensee’s contention that inappropriate

handling by the carrier’s hazmat

personnel may have contributed to the

loss of control of radioactive material.

At a minimum, proper action when the

lid was found unattached could have

minimized the amount of time that the

radioactive material was uncontrolled.

However, the carrier’s actions do not

relieve the Licensee of its responsibility

to ensure that each closure device on

the radioactive materials package is

properly installed and secure.

Regardless of events that occurred after

the package left the Licensee’s control,

the Licensee’s failure to assure that the

hasp on the lock was secure prior to

shipment was the most probable cause

of the loss of control of the radioactive

material, and is considered a significant

violation of NRC requirements.

In addition, the NRC does not dispute

the Licensee’s position that hazmat

employees are not considered members

of the public. However, the NRC

disagrees that there was no clear

potential for a member of the public to

receive more than 100 mrem to the

whole body as a result of the Licensee’s

failure to ensure that the lock on the

package containing the sealed sources

was properly installed and secure. The

sources could have been lost at any time

during the shipping process, such as on

the aircraft or in the vehicle that were

used to transport the package, and so

the clear possibility existed that

members of the public could have come

in contact with the sources. Considering

the configuration of the sources (the

sealed sources were contained in

approximately 4 inch long bolts) and the

quantity of radioactive material in the

package (the 3 sources contained 1, 18,

and 100 millicuries of cesium-137

respectively), the NRC continues to

conclude that there was a clear potential

for a member of the public to

unknowingly come in contact with the

sources and receive an exposure greater

than 100 mrem to the whole body.

Example B.1 of Supplement V of the

NRC’s Enforcement Policy provides that

a ‘‘[f]ailure to meet transportation

requirements that resulted in loss of

control of radioactive material with a

breach in package integrity such that

there was a clear potential for the

member of the public to receive more

than .1 rem [100 mrem] to the whole

body’’ be considered as a Severity Level

II violation. Therefore, the NRC

maintains that the violation was

appropriately classified at Severity

Level II.

With regard to the Licensee’s

argument concerning its corrective

actions, as stated in our March 13, 1998

letter, credit was warranted for your

corrective actions in accordance with

the civil penalty assessment process in

Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement

Policy. Had the Licensee not taken

prompt and comprehensive corrective

actions, a civil penalty of $8,800 (twice

the base amount) would have been

proposed.

NRC Conclusion

The NRC has concluded that the

Licensee did not provide a basis for

reducing the Severity Level of the

violation nor for reducing or

withdrawing the civil penalty.

Accordingly, a civil penalty in the

amount of $4,400 should be issued.

[FR Doc. 98–16645 Filed 6–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–443–LA ASLBP No. 98–746–

05–LA]

North Atlantic Energy Service

Corporation; Establishment of Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board

Pursuant to delegation by the

Commission dated December 29, 1972,

published in the Federal Register, 37 FR

28710 (1972), and §§ 2.105, 2.700, 2.702,

2.714, 2.714a, 2.717, 2.721 of the

Commission’s Regulations, all as

amended, an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board is being established to

preside over the following proceeding.

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation

Seabrook Station Unit No. 1

This Board is being established

pursuant to the request for hearing

submitted by Robert A. Backus on

behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution

League. The petition opposes the

issuance of a license amendment to

North Atlantic Energy Service

Corporation for Seabrook Station Unit

No. 1 that would revise Technical

Specifications on the frequency of steam

generator inspections to accommodate a

24 month fuel cycle. A notice of the

proposed amendment was published in

the Federal Register at 63 FR 25101,

25113 (May 6, 1998).

The Board is comprised of the

following administrative judges:

B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chairman, Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board Panel,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dr. Charles N. Kelber, Atomic Safety

and Licensing Board Panel, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, D.C. 20555

Linda W. Little, 5000 Hermitage Drive,

Raleigh, NC 27612

All correspondence, documents and

other materials shall be filed with the

Judges in accordance with 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.701.

Issued at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th

day of June 1998.

B. Paul Cotter, Jr.,

Chief Administrative Judge, Atomic Safety

and Licensing Board Panel.

[FR Doc. 98–16638 Filed 6–22–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50–388]

Pennsylvania Power and Light

Company; Notice of Consideration of

Issuance of Amendment to Facility

Operating License, Proposed No

Significant Hazards Consideration

Determination, and Opportunity for a

Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment

to Facility Operating License No. NPF–

22 issued to Pennsylvania Power and

Light Company for operation of the

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station

(SSES), Unit 2 located in Luzerne

County, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment would

amend the Susquehanna Steam Electric

Station’s Technical Specifications (TSs)

to add notations to TSs 3.3.7.5, 4.3.7.5,

3.4.2, and 4.4.2 that the acoustic

monitor for safety relief valve (SRV) ‘‘J’’

may be inoperable beginning June 15,

1998, until the next unit shutdown of

sufficient duration to allow for

containment entry, not to exceed the

ninth refueling and inspection outage

(spring 1999).