ALD-066 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-2037

___________

RICKY MILLER,

Appellant

v.

GEORGE LITTLE, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; JOHN/JANE 

DOE, Mailroom Supervisor/Employee, PA Department of Corrections; JOHN E. 

WETZEL, former Secretary of PADOC; LAUREL HARRY, Facility Manager of SCICamp Hill; BOBBI JO SALAMON, Facility Manager of SCI-Rockview

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-21-cv-01941)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Saporito, Jr. 

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 8, 2024

Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 6, 2024)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Ricky Miller, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the District 

Court’s orders dismissing his civil rights action and denying his motions for 

reconsideration and to amend his complaint. We will summarily affirm. 

In November 2021, Miller filed a complaint alleging that prison staff failed to 

notify him that they had rejected his incoming legal mail. In his operative amended 

complaint, Miller asserted claims arising from the rejection of legal mail in June and July 

2021 at SCI-Camp Hill and in October 2021 and March 2022 at SCI-Rockview. He 

averred that staff rejected the mail pursuant to prison policy DC-ADM 803, which 

required that the mail have an assigned control number. Miller claimed violations of his 

rights to due process and access to the courts and a conspiracy to violate his due process 

rights. He sought money damages and other relief.

The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 It held that Miller 

waived his access-to-courts claim by withdrawing it in his response to the motion, and 

that he failed to state a conspiracy claim. The District Court also ruled that Miller failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his due process claims. While it held that he 

had exhausted certain claims for injunctive relief, it decided that such relief was not due. 

The District Court also denied Miller’s motions for reconsideration and to amend his 

complaint. This appeal followed.

1 A Magistrate Judge adjudicated the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) upon the 

consent of the parties.
3

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review 

over the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Drummond v. Robinson Twp., 9 

F.4th 217, 225 n.4 (3d Cir. 2021). We consider the allegations in the complaint, the 

exhibits attached thereto, and matters of public record. Id. At 228 n.10. On the issue of 

exhaustion, we may also consider indisputably authentic documents related to Miller’s 

grievances. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).2

The District Court did not err in dismissing Miller’s access-to-courts claim. The 

record reflects that he withdrew this claim. See Reply in Opp. To Motion to Dismiss, 

DCT ECF No. 97 at 28. The record also supports the District Court’s dismissal of 

Miller’s conspiracy claim because he did not allege facts supporting a conclusion that 

there was an agreement to violate his rights. Miller alleged, and the grievance responses 

reflect, that staff advised him that prison policy did not require notice when mail was 

rejected. We agree with the District Court that allowing amendment of the complaint as 

to this claim would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 

(3d Cir. 2002).

We also agree with the District Court insofar as it held that Miller did not exhaust 

his administrative remedies as to claims for money damages for alleged due process 

violations at SCI-Camp Hill in June and July 2021. Exhaustion of available 

administrative remedies is mandatory under 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). Ross v. Blake, 578 

2 Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, the 

defendants should have moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Id. at 

223 n.2. However, there is no material difference in the applicable legal standards. Id.
4

U.S. 632, 638 (2016). Claims that are not properly exhausted under a prison’s 

administrative regulations are procedurally defaulted. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 222. Here, 

prison policy DC-ADM 804 requires an inmate, if he or she “desires compensation or 

other legal relief normally available from a court,” to request “the specific relief sought in 

his/her initial grievance.” DCT ECF No. 98, Ex. 6 to Miller Declaration at 1-2. 

Miller acknowledges that he did not request money damages in his initial 

grievance. He contends that he followed the 2017 Inmate Handbook that he was given, 

which does not instruct inmates to request money damages in the initial grievance. 

However, the grievance form that Miller used instructed him to refer to DC-ADM 804 for 

grievance procedures and to “[s]tate all relief that you are seeking.” DCT ECF No. 83-1, 

Ex. 1 to Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss. Miller asserts that he lacked access to the 

library and procedures due to COVID-19 restrictions and that he was misled by the 

omission in the handbook. But, given the explicit instruction on the form to state all 

relief sought, we cannot conclude that Miller was prevented from using the grievance 

process or that the process was otherwise unavailable. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 644. And 

contrary to Miller’s argument, exhaustion is required even where money damages are 

unavailable in grievance proceedings. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227.

Miller also contends that the prison waived any procedural default because his 

grievance appeal was addressed on the merits. He states that he requested compensation 

on appeal, that this request was acknowledged in the Facility Manager’s appeal decision, 

and that DC-ADM 804 provides that the Facility Manager will determine whether an 

appeal complies with procedures. The Facility Manager, however, did not pass on 
5

Miller’s procedural compliance or state that such compliance was waived. As a result, 

the District Court was required to undertake an independent procedural default inquiry. 

See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 232 (stating same where prison administrators addressed a

grievance on the merits and did not pass on a failure to request money damages).3

With regard to the rejection of mail in October 2021 and March 2022 at SCIRockview, the District Court ruled, and the record reflects, that Miller filed his action 

before he had exhausted his administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 

(providing that no action regarding prison conditions shall be brought until available 

administrative remedies are exhausted); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 & n.9 

(3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing same). Miller contends that, while he filed grievances related 

to these incidents, the grievance process was unavailable because he had already raised 

the issue of lack of notice of his rejected mail in his grievance at SCI-Camp Hill. He 

relies on DC-ADM 804, which states that “[a]ny grievance issue that has been or is 

currently being addressed will not be re-addressed in a subsequent grievance.” DCT ECF 

No. 98, Ex. 6 at 1-3. Miller’s argument that he did not have an available remedy, 

however, is unpersuasive as his later grievances were not denied on this basis.

Finally, Miller filed post-judgment motions seeking to amend his complaint. He 

sought to bring claims related to newly discovered incidents when his mail was rejected 

without notice from May 2021 through February 2022. Miller asserted that he had no 

available administrative remedy as to these claims. For substantially the reasons stated in 

3 To the extent Miller exhausted claims for injunctive relief, he has not shown that he has 

a viable claim for such relief.
6

the District Court’s decision denying reconsideration, Miller did not show that 

administrative remedies were unavailable. Moreover, Miller has stated in filings in this 

Court that he has now exhausted his administrative remedies as to these claims. As an 

action may not be brought until administrative remedies are exhausted, the District Court

did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration or leave to amend. See Long v. 

Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting standard of review 

for a motion for reconsideration). 

Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will 

summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 

10.6.4

4 Miller’s motions to lift the stay of his appeal are granted to the extent they seek to lift 

the stay. His remaining motions are denied.