J-A20019-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

VINCENT THOMAS WALLACE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1238 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 12, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-CR-0000270-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: NOVEMBER 23, 2021

Appellant, Vincent Thomas Wallace, appeals from the aggregate 

judgment of sentence of 12-24 years’ incarceration, imposed following his 

conviction for rape,1 strangulation,2 and related offenses.3 Herein, Appellant 

claims he is entitled to a new trial, alleging a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963). After careful review, we affirm. 

The trial court summarized the facts adduced at trial as follows:

Early on the morning of March 3, 2019, at approximately 2:00 

A.M., [Appellant] knocked on [Victim]’s door in Ford City, 

Pennsylvania. The two had known each other for a few months. 

They then walked to [Appellant]’s house several blocks away, to 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718.

 

3 The trial court sentenced Appellant to 8-16 years’ incarceration for rape, a 

consecutive term of 4-8 years’ incarceration for strangulation, and to no 

further penalty for all remaining offenses.
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have some drinks and smoke marijuana. [Victim] and [Appellant] 

each began drinking an alcoholic beverage called Twisted Tea 

while another man rolled them a marijuana cigarette. After a 

short time, they headed upstairs to [Appellant]’s room ostensibly 

to smoke. 

Upon entering the room, [Victim] took a seat on the side of the 

bed, smoking and sipping the Twisted Tea. [Appellant] walked in 

after her and remained standing. After a short time[,] he forced 

himself upon her, pushing her back onto the bed. He then 

penetrated her vagina with his penis through her leggings, made 

of a thin, stretchy material, under which [Victim] was not wearing 

anything. He stopped to pull her pants off, when [Victim] began 

yelling loudly for him to stop. [Appellant] began having 

intercourse with her, this time placing his hands on her neck and 

choking her while engaged in the act. After removing his hands 

from her neck[,] he covered her face with a pillow, all the time 

continuing to have sex with her, and threatening her, telling her 

that she “wasn’t going to get out alive.” [Victim]’s head was 

hanging over the edge of the bed and hitting the wall paneling 

while this was happening.

[Appellant] removed the pillow[] and continued removing articles 

of clothing from [Victim] as he had sex with her. She repeatedly 

asked him to stop and told him she wanted to go home. Brianna 

Hynes, sleeping over her friend’s house next door, testified to 

hearing yelling and struggling through the wall over the course of 

a few hours. In total[,] [Appellant] had sex with [Victim] six times 

over the course of those hours, with various time periods between 

each assault, before growing tired. At that point[,] [Victim]

pushed him off her, grabbed her things, and ran downstairs.

[Victim] dressed herself, left the house, and called Armstrong 

County Detective Frank Pitzer as she walked away from the 

residence. [Detective] Pitzer was [Victim]’s arresting officer for a 

drug-related offense. [Detective] Pitzer told her to call 9-1-1, 

which she did, and the 9-1-1 operator told her to walk to the Ford 

City police station, where she then went and filed a report.

Following the police report, [Victim] went to the hospital, where 

she had a SANE[4]test performed, commonly known as a “rape 

kit.” DNA evidence was collected over the course of the day, and 

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4 Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner.
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pictures [were] taken of [Victim]. She gave a supplemental 

statement and had more pictures taken on March 5, 2019, two 

days after the assault.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 1/5/21, at 3-5.

Following a trial that concluded on March 13, 2020, the jury convicted 

Appellant of six counts each of rape, sexual assault,

5 and aggravated indecent 

assault,

6 and one count each of strangulation, unlawful restraint,7

terroristic 

threats,8 and simple assault.9 On June 12, 2020, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant as stated, supra. Subsequently, Appellant

filed a timely post-sentence motion for [a] new trial on May 26, 

2020, and following post-trial discovery and an amended motion, 

[he] ultimately filed his second amended motion on September 4, 

2020. The court held a hearing on the motion on October 14[, 

2020]. On November 2, 2020, Appellant’s second amended 

motion for a new trial was denied.

Id. at 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and a timely, court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

on January 5, 2021. Appellant now presents the following question for our 

review: “Did the trial court err in concluding that, even in spite of the 

Commonwealth[’s] improperly withholding impeachment evidence, 

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5 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1.

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125.

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 2902.

8 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.

9 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.
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[Appellant] received a fair trial worthy of confidence in the verdict?” 

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

Appellant’s multi-part claim concerns the trial court’s determination that 

the Commonwealth’s withholding of Brady evidence did not deprive Appellant

of a fair trial.

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that 

“suppression by the prosecution of favorable evidence to an 

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment....” Brady, 373 U.S. at 

87. Brady’s mandate is not limited to pure exculpatory evidence; 

impeachment evidence also falls within Brady’s parameters and 

therefore must be disclosed by prosecutors. U.S. v. Bagley, 473 

U.S. 667, 677 (1985). However, “the prosecutor is not required 

to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose 

evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would 

deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Id. at 675.

[T]o establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate 

that: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the Commonwealth, 

either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to 

the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its 

omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Commonwealth 

v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 308 (Pa. 2011). The burden rests with 

the defendant to “prove, by reference to the record, that evidence 

was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution.” 

Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 451 (Pa. 2011). The 

withheld evidence must have been in the exclusive control of the 

prosecution at the time of trial. No Brady violation occurs when 

the defendant knew, or with reasonable diligence, could have 

discovered the evidence in question. Similarly, no violation occurs 

when the evidence was available to the defense from a nongovernmental source. Id.

To demonstrate prejudice, “the evidence suppressed must have 

been material to guilt or punishment.” Commonwealth v. 

Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1126 (Pa. 2008). Evidence is material 

under Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the 

evidence been disclosed, the result of the trial could have been 

different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 (1995). “The 
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mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might 

have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of 

the trial[,] does not establish materiality in the constitutional 

sense.” Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Pa. 

2003) (quoting U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1976)). The 

relevant inquiry is “not whether the defendant would more likely 

than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but 

whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a 

trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. 

at 434. To prove materiality where the undisclosed evidence 

affects a witness’ credibility, a defendant “must demonstrate that 

the reliability of the witness may well be determinative of [the 

defendant’s] guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

727 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa. 1999).

Commonwealth v. Haskins, 60 A.3d 538, 546–47 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations reformatted).

Here, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth repeatedly withheld 

Brady evidence. First, he claims the District Attorney had determined prior 

to trial that Detective Pitzer had interfered in Appellant’s prosecution. 

Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant maintains that Detective Pitzer told Victim 

not to trust the District Attorney’s office, which, inter alia, resulted in his 

termination from employment. Id. at 15-16. Second, Appellant contends 

that the Commonwealth failed to disclose that Victim was a confidential 

informant (“C.I.”) for police agencies in Armstrong County prior to March 3, 

2019, contrary to her testimony at trial, which he claims was supported by 

evidence that Detective Pitzer referred to Victim as a C.I. in a text message 

sent to the District Attorney. Id. Appellant also asserts that, between the 

dates of her arrest by Detective Pitzer and the rape, Victim and Detective 

Pitzer repeatedly communicated, and Victim “provided Detective Pitzer with 
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information regarding drug activity in Armstrong County.” Id. at 17. Third, 

Appellant contends that the Commonwealth withheld a text message from 

Detective Pitzer to Victim that conflicted with Victim’s trial testimony regarding 

the timeline of events on the evening of the rape. Id. at 16. 

The trial court states that the first two 

allegations of a Brady violation stem from two uncontested 

circumstances, both of which occurred in the months between the 

rape on March 3, 2019[,] and the trial. First, Armstrong County 

Detective Frank Pitzer, employed by the District Attorney, had 

some sort of differences with his boss which caused him to caution 

... [V]ictim ... to be wary in her dealings with the District Attorney. 

The District Attorney considered this to be insubordination at best, 

and intentional interference with a pending criminal case at worst. 

For this, and apparently other reasons, the District Attorney 

terminated Detective Pitzer’s employment. It is worth noting at 

the outset that Detective Frank Pitzer was not the prosecuting 

police officer in this case, nor was he a witness for either the 

Commonwealth or the defense at trial. While [Detective] Pitzer’s 

warning to [Victim] had repercussions for [Detective] Pitzer 

himself, there is no evidence that it had any impact whatsoever 

on this case.

The second circumstance had to do with [V]ictim’s activities as a 

[C.I.]. It is uncontested that at the time of the rape[,] [V]ictim 

was not working as a [C.I.] for any agency whatsoever. She was 

cross[-]examined about this at trial and denied that she was a C.I. 

and more specifically [denied] that she “targeted” [Appellant] on 

March 3. However, when he learned of the assault, Detective 

Pitzer sent the District Attorney a text message in which he 

identified [Victim] as “our C.I.” Detective Pitzer later explained 

that while [Victim] may have informally provided some drugrelated information, she was never formally signed up as a [C.I.]

by him, which would have involved her in undercover drug buys. 

His “our C.I.” text appears to have been a simple mistake in 

nomenclature. The District Attorney did, however, learn that 

[Victim] had worked as a C.I. for an unspecified agency, not the 

local drug task force, sometime after the rape[,] but prior to trial. 

The District Attorney did not inform [Appellant’s] trial counsel of 
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this[] because she did not believe it to be relevant to any issue 

involved in this case[] and therefore not exculpatory.

TCO at 13-14.

Regarding the undisclosed evidence of Detective Pitzer’s termination by 

the District Attorney, and his ‘warning’ to Victim not to trust the District 

Attorney, the trial court determined that these facts were not relevant to any 

issue at trial, nor to the credibility of any witnesses. On that basis, the court 

determined that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the withheld evidence 

undermined the fairness of his trial. See id. at 14. The Commonwealth 

agrees with the trial court, asserting that:

This evidence ... fails prong (3) of the Brady test in that it is not

material to this case. [Detective] Pitzer was not the prosecuting 

officer, and had no relation to the investigation or trying of this 

case, nor was he called as a witness for the Defense or the 

Prosecution. [Appellant] has failed to make a showing that had 

this evidence been discovered it would have affected the outcome 

of this case in the form of prejudice. [Appellant] asserts that 

[with] this information, [he c]ould have cast doubt on whether the 

District Attorney could act properly as the prosecutor of this case, 

however, the events that [led] to [Detective] Pitzer’s termination 

were separate and apart from this case, and [Detective] Pitzer’s 

involvement was so minimal it would not have been material to 

the determination of [Appellant]’s guilt or innocen[ce].

There is also no showing by [Appellant] as to how the termination 

of an officer unrelated to the case would have resulted in different 

treatment of the case by the District Attorney sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the verdict beyond mere conjecture, 

thereby making the termination non-material evidence. Because 

of this, there was no Brady violation ... concerning this evidence. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-12. 

In response, Appellant argues that:
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The information contained in the December 13, 2019 termination 

letter is also material for Bagley purposes.[10]In that letter, the 

District Attorney writes that Detective Pitzer was being terminated 

due to his contact with [Victim] in defiance of her order to him to 

have no such contact, and that said contact included Detective 

Pitzer[’s] interfering in the prosecution of [Appellant]. Had that 

suppressed information been made known to the defense, not only 

would it have been used to impeach and call into doubt the 

veracity of the Commonwealth’s case against [Appellant], but it 

would also have cast doubt upon whether the District Attorney’s 

Office could properly act as the prosecutor in prosecuting 

[Appellant]. Indeed, the District Attorney may well have found 

herself in the capacity of a witness at [Appellant]’s trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 20. 

We agree with the Commonwealth and the trial court. Appellant argues

generally that this evidence would be used “to impeach and call into doubt the 

veracity of the Commonwealth’s case,” but he provides no support for this 

argument by explaining, specifically, how prompt disclosure of this evidence 

could have undermined the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial, or the 

credibility of its witnesses, regarding Appellant’s prosecution for his sexual 

assault of Victim. Furthermore, Appellant does not cite any relevant legal 

authority, or meaningfully develop any argument, supporting his speculation 

that the District Attorney had a conflict of interest or other ethical deficiency 

in the prosecution of Appellant’s trial due to the firing of Detective Pitzer. 

Appellant also fails to direct this Court’s attention to any evidence of record 

tending to demonstrate that the conflict between Detective Pitzer and the 

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10 In Bagley, the Supreme Court held that impeachment evidence that is not 

directly exculpatory may still be material and, therefore, must be disclosed 

under Brady. 
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District Attorney was relevant to Appellant’s guilt or innocence merely because 

Detective Pitzer had improper contact with Victim. Moreover, Appellant fails 

to explain how this information might have assisted in his preparation for trial. 

Thus, Appellant has not met his burden to demonstrate that prompt disclosure 

of this evidence could have reasonably affected the fairness of his trial.

Next, Appellant alleges that the Commonwealth withheld evidence that 

Victim was working with Detective Pitzer as a C.I. Specifically, Appellant 

maintains that Victim “testified at trial that she was never working as an 

informant for the Commonwealth, and that she had no communications with 

Detective Pitzer other than when he transported her to her preliminary 

hearing.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. He claims that Victim’s testimony at trial 

was “directly refuted” by the detective’s testimony at the hearing and in his 

text messages with the District Attorney, wherein Detective Pitzer referred to 

Victim as a C.I. Id. 

The trial court determined that the absence of this evidence did not 

deprive Appellant of a fair trial. The court stated that it was “uncontested that 

at the time of the rape that the victim was not working” as a C.I., and that at 

trial, she had specifically denied targeting Appellant on behalf of law 

enforcement. TCO at 13-14; see also N.T., 3/11/20, at 37 (Victim’s 

testimony during direct examination that she did not target Appellant on 

behalf of Detective Pitzer). Victim “had worked as a C.I. for an unspecified 

agency, not the local drug task force, sometime after the rape but prior 

to trial.” TCO at 14 (emphasis added). Moreover, the trial court found that 
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Detective Pitzer’s reference to Victim as a C.I. in a text message to the District 

Attorney “appears to have been a simple mistake in nomenclature” because 

Victim had passed along “drug-related information” to the detective but he 

had “never formally signed up” Victim as a C.I., “which would have involved 

her in undercover drug buys.” Id. Furthermore, the court found that 

Appellant failed to provide any evidence that Victim was interacting with 

Appellant on behalf of law enforcement on the night of the rape. See id. at 

15 (stating that “there have been no hints beyond mere conjecture that 

[Victim] went to [Appellant’s home] for any reason other than to smoke and 

drink”). 

In addition to agreeing with the rationale provided by the trial court, we 

reject Appellant’s exaggerated characterization of Victim’s testimony at trial. 

Victim was not asked at trial whether she was, or ever had been, a C.I. 

Rather, during cross-examination, Victim was asked whether she and 

Detective Pitzer ever discussed “making controlled purchases of narcotics from 

[Appellant].” N.T. at 84. She replied, “No.” Id. Victim was also asked 

whether her testimony against Appellant was in any way related to a promise 

made by the Commonwealth or Detective Pitzer regarding any of Victim’s 

pending criminal cases. Id. at 89. Victim repeatedly denied any such 

promises were made. Id. Victim did not deny being a C.I. or an informant

at any time, nor did her testimony at trial leave that impression. Thus, the 

existence of evidence that Victim was at some point an informant or C.I. for 

police does not contradict or otherwise undermine her trial testimony, 
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particularly where there is no evidence that she was acting as an actual or 

informal agent for police when interacting with Appellant in the events that 

led to the criminal charges in this matter. 

In light of the peripheral nature of this credibility attack, the lack of any 

clear conflict with Victim’s trial testimony, and because no evidence exists that 

Victim had ever worked on behalf of the Commonwealth with respect to her 

relationship to Appellant,11 we agree with the trial court that the undisclosed 

evidence of Detective Pitzer’s reference to Victim as a C.I. in a text message 

with the District Attorney was not material to Appellant’s guilt or innocence, 

and did not undermine the fairness of his trial. 

Finally, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth withheld evidence 

that contradicted Victim’s trial testimony regarding her initial interactions with 

Appellant on March 3, 2019. Appellant argues that 

[Victim] at trial testified that on the evening of the alleged rape, 

she and [Appellant] engaged in pleasantries and socialized with 

one another for some time prior to him beginning to rape her. In 

the text messages between Detective Pitzer and the District 

Attorney, however, [Detective] Pitzer tells the District Attorney 

that [Victim] related to him on the morning after the alleged rape 

that [Appellant] began to rape her as soon as she went into his 

house.

Appellant’s Brief at 19.

We disagree with Appellant, and instead agree with the Commonwealth 

that Victim’s “testimony at trial indicated that the two spoke in the living room 

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11 Victim admitted at trial that she was in contact with Detective Pitzer at the 

time of the rape, and that she knew him to be “the head of ... the Armstrong 

County Drug Task Force” at that time. N.T. at 81. 
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of her home exchanging pleasantries as [Appellant] indicated, not in 

[Appellant]’s home, and only stayed downstairs in [Appellant]’s kitchen for 

long enough to get a drink and roll a joint, so the text messages do not show 

any significant contradictions” between Victim’s testimony and the text 

message. Commonwealth’s Brief at 13. Victim testified that her interaction 

with Appellant began on March 3, 2019, at her own home, where the two

talked for about “10 to 15 minutes.” N.T. at 7. Victim indicated that little 

transpired between her arrival at Appellant’s home and the assault. She only 

testified she retrieved an alcoholic drink from Appellant’s refrigerator, and

then accompanied Appellant to his room, where she briefly smoked marijuana. 

Id. at 9, 13. Victim stated that the sexual assault began soon thereafter. Id.

at 15. On these facts, the record does not demonstrate an obvious conflict 

with the truth of the hearsay statement imbedded in the text message

between Detective Pitzer and the District Attorney that would call into question 

the fairness of Appellant’s trial, especially since the duration of time between 

Victim’s arrival at Appellant’s home and the assault was not a crucial issue in 

dispute at his trial. 

In sum, we agree with the trial court that none of the withheld evidence 

was so prejudicial that its omission deprived Appellant of a fair trial. 

Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Appellant was not entitled to 

relief under Brady.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2021