DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

JAMAAL PICKERSGILL,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-3115

[October 30, 2019]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Marina Garcia-Wood, Judge; L.T. Case No. 18-

005887CF10A.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kimberly T. Acuña, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, 

Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

FORST, J.

The State appeals from a post-verdict judgment of acquittal. In 

response, Appellee Jamaal Pickersgill argues that this court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider the appeal. We disagree; we have jurisdiction. We 

further find the State presented competent substantial evidence to support 

the jury’s verdict on all counts. Accordingly, we reverse.

Background

The State proceeded to trial against Pickersgill on charges of: (1)

possession of tetrahydrocannabinols (“THC”); (2) possession of cannabis 

with intent to deliver/sell; and (3) resisting a police officer without violence. 

The trial evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, recounts 

the following events took place on the date of Pickersgill’s arrest. 

Coral Springs Police Officers Monzon and Gomez stopped the car in 

which Pickersgill was a passenger for making an abrupt U-turn in front of 

their vehicle (which caused Officer Monzon to slam on the brakes of the 
2

patrol car), and because the car’s driver and front passenger (Pickersgill) 

were not wearing seatbelts. Pickersgill exited the passenger side of the car 

and, ignoring Officer Gomez’s command to get back in the car, took off 

running. Officer Gomez chased Pickersgill for about forty yards until 

Pickersgill stopped. After taking Pickersgill into custody, the officers 

detected an odor of marijuana coming from the stopped car. Officer 

Monzon testified: “I wasn’t even near the car and you could smell it. As 

soon as you open[ed] the door, it hit you like a ton of bricks.” 

The officers called for a K-9 unit, and the K-9 alerted to both rear doors 

of the vehicle and to the glove compartment. Seventy-two pre-rolled 

marijuana cigarettes (“blunts”) and four bags of a green leafy substance 

were found in a backpack in the backseat, directly behind Pickersgill’s 

seat. A wax substance was found in the glove compartment, directly in 

front of Pickersgill’s seat. 

The marijuana cigarettes were packaged in individual tubes and 

marked with a sticker that read, “RX package in compliance with state and 

local laws and regulations.” One of these cigarettes field tested1 positive 

for marijuana. A sample from each bag containing the green leafy 

substance was also field tested and all of the samples tested positive for 

marijuana. Later forensic tests confirmed that the wax substance 

recovered from the glove compartment contained THC. 

Officer Monzon testified that Pickersgill voluntarily stated at the scene 

that the narcotics were his and, after being read his Miranda2 rights, he

then reiterated that “[e]verything in the vehicle” was his. Officer Gomez 

also testified that Pickersgill “was Mirandized on scene,” waived his 

Miranda rights, and “took ownership” of the backpack, confessing that he 

was going to sell the marijuana. The officers did not obtain a written 

waiver of Miranda rights or record Pickersgill’s statements at the scene. 

Both officers testified that Pickersgill made further admissions after 

arriving at the police station. Officer Monzon noted that, while he was

reminding Pickersgill of his Miranda rights, Pickersgill interjected before 

1 At trial, Officer Gomez testified that he conducted a “mold field test” with a 

plastic container “that contains several chemicals in it that when the chemicals 

come into contact with the substance it’s able to provide if it’s marijuana or not.” 

Officer Gomez further testified that he had received specialized training on 

identifying narcotics, including “an extra class to get certified.” Officer Monzon 

testified that he had received training on identifying narcotics based on 

appearance, smell, and “testing.” 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

the officer could finish and again stated, “[e]verything in the car is mine.” 

Officer Gomez also testified that, at the station, Pickersgill said “everything 

was his.” According to Officer Monzon, the recording of Pickersgill’s 

statements at the police station was erased before Monzon requested it. 

Monzon did not know that the recording would not be preserved. 

Sean Grier, the driver of the car, was also taken into custody. He told 

police that he was helping Pickersgill “sell the narcotics in the vehicle.” He 

was released at the time, having agreed to act as a confidential informant. 

After the State rested its case, Pickersgill moved for a judgment of 

acquittal on all three counts. Pickersgill argued in part that there was “no 

direct evidence that [he] was in direct possession” of the narcotics. 

Specifically, he asserted that because the cannabis was found in a 

backpack in the back of the car, and the THC was found in the glove 

compartment, he did not have exclusive control over those items. And,

absent a video of his statements or a written waiver of Miranda rights—

there was “just an allegation by two officers” without corroboration. 

In response, the State argued it proved both actual and constructive 

possession. The State pointed to Pickersgill’s admissions to the officers 

that the drugs were his.3 The trial court remarked that Pickersgill 

“allegedly” made the admissions and the statements were not corroborated 

by anything other than the officers’ testimony. Noting the absence of a 

written statement or recording, the judge commented, “there’s 

inconsistency on the issue of whether he was Mirandized during these

alleged admissions.” 

As arguments continued, the court again commented on the lack of 

corroboration of the officers’ testimony: “There’s no written document 

indicating a written admission. . . . He made these two confessions. All 

we have is the Detective[s] saying that he confessed.” The State replied 

that the testimonial evidence sufficed and a written Miranda waiver is not

required. Regarding the absence of a written waiver or video recording, 

the following discussion occurred: 

THE COURT: And then we go back to the admission that it’s 

not written. We have, according to your argument, two 

experienced officers that did not know that they had to request 

to preserve the tape of the -- where they did -- the holding cell, 

where they did the interrogation. Did not know that they had 

3 Pickersgill never moved to suppress either the drugs or his statements to police. 

Nor did he dispute that the substance found in the car was in fact THC.
4

to preserve the tape. So, therefore, because I guess they didn’t 

know whether the charges were going to be filed, no one did 

anything. The evidence wasn’t preserved. From two 

experienced police officers. 

[THE STATE]: But, Your Honor, the evidence that the State 

can use in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt doesn’t 

have to be video evidence only. Testimonial evidence alone, 

even . . . is sufficient. 

THE COURT: But here you have two partners that are 

corroborating and they said the same, but, other than that 

and the best evidence would have been in fact, the video. I 

mean when people interrogate, there’s usually a video tape. I 

have never heard a police department say we don’t preserve it 

unless we’re asked to preserve it. To me that is unbelievable.

. . . An experienced detective and sergeant that they did not 

know that . . . you have to specifically request to preserve the 

video tape. If in fact there was a confession. So, when you 

say there’s no doubt, there’s no doubt that the statement was 

made; there’s a lot of doubt. 

(Emphasis added). In response to the trial court’s comments, the State 

noted that witness credibility is for the finder of fact to determine. 

The trial court ultimately deferred ruling on the motion for judgment of 

acquittal, and Pickersgill rested without presenting evidence. Pickersgill

then renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court stated that, 

if it disregarded Pickersgill’s alleged admissions, there would be an issue 

as to whether the State had met its burden, as proximity to narcotics and 

flight alone are insufficient to prove constructive possession. In response, 

the State maintained that “the Court cannot put aside the defendant’s 

admission at this point.” 

The trial court also expressed concern that only a field test was 

conducted on the cannabis. The State responded with case law holding 

that a positive field test and testimony from an officer experienced in 

recognizing marijuana is sufficient. (Mistakenly) noting the absence of

testimony that Officer Gomez had specific narcotics training, the court 

remarked, “[t]he Judge is supposed to consider the credibility of the witness, 

the experience of the witness.” The State replied that Officer Gomez had

testified to his narcotics training. Subsequently, the trial court denied the 

motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts. 
5

The jury retired to deliberate. When the bailiff advised that the jury 

had reached a verdict, the jury was returned to the courtroom. After the 

court reviewed the verdict, the court directed the jury back to the jury 

room. Once the jury exited the courtroom, the court stated that it was 

“not going to accept the verdict of the jury,” and that it was going to 

“reconsider [its] ruling . . . and . . . grant the defense motion for judgement 

of acquittal.” The court clarified that it was reconsidering the second 

motion that was made at the conclusion of the defense case. 

The court then recited the jury’s verdict: guilty as charged on count 1 

(possession of THC) and count 3 (resisting without violence), and guilty of 

the lesser included offense of possession of cannabis on count 2. The jury 

was polled, and the verdict was confirmed. Subsequently, the trial court 

entered a felony judgment of acquittal on all counts. This appeal followed. 

Analysis

A. This Court’s Jurisdiction

Pickersgill’s sole argument in his answer brief is that this court lacks 

jurisdiction over the State’s appeal. Pickersgill acknowledges that the 

State’s ability to appeal is statutory, and the State may appeal “[a] ruling 

granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.” § 

924.07(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added); see also Fla. R. App. P. 

9.140(c)(1)(E). However, Pickersgill submits that because the trial court 

granted his motion for judgment of acquittal before, not after, the jury 

verdict was recorded, the order granting the motion is not reviewable on 

appeal. Pickersgill notes the absence of case law expressly defining what 

“after a jury verdict” means in the context of the statute, but submits that, 

“under the common law,” there is no “jury verdict” until the jury’s 

determination has been “accepted by the trial court and filed with the clerk 

for recording.” We categorically reject this argument.

“The first place we look when construing a statute is to its plain 

language—if the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we look 

no further.” State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92, 93 (Fla. 2012). “Courts should 

not construe unambiguous statutes in a manner that would extend, 

modify, or limit their terms or the obvious implications as provided by the 

Legislature.” State v. Chubbuck, 141 So. 3d 1163, 1170 (Fla. 2014); see 

also Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 528 (Fla. 2004) (when construing a 

statute, this court “must give the statutory language its plain and ordinary 

meaning, and is not at liberty to add words . . . that were not placed there 

by the Legislature”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
6

The plain language of section 924.07(1)(j) provides that the State may 

appeal from a ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal “after a 

jury verdict.” See State v. Hartzog, 575 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1991) (“Section 924.07(1)(j) expressly authorizes the state to appeal from 

a ruling following a jury verdict. Obviously, if the words of a statute are 

unambiguous, judicial interpretation should not displace the clearly 

stated intent.”). The plain language of section 924.07(1)(j) does not state 

“after a jury verdict has been recorded,” “after a jury verdict has been 

rendered,” “after a jury verdict has been published,” “after the discharge of 

the jury,” or contain any other such qualifying language. 

By contrast, in cases in which our courts have dismissed State appeals 

from judgments of acquittal, it was clear that the acquittal was entered

before the jury had reached a verdict. See, e.g., State v. Stone, 42 So. 3d 

279 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (dismissing State’s appeal where the judgment of 

acquittal was entered immediately after the State rested its case (i.e., 

before the jury even had a chance to deliberate)); State v. Lundy, 233 So. 

3d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (order granting a renewed motion for 

judgment of acquittal was not appealable, as it was entered after the “jury 

could not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial”). None of the 

cases cited by Pickersgill as authority for his construction of “after a jury 

verdict” involved section 924.07(1)(j)—they all involved situations where 

there was a defect in the jury’s verdict, in the manner of delivering the 

verdict, in the verdict form, or in the jury’s deliberations.

Further support for our rejection of Pickersgill’s creative interpretation 

of “after a jury verdict” is found in the trial transcript. At the conclusion 

of the defense’s case, the trial court had denied the defense’s motion for a 

judgment of acquittal. The case was subsequently sent to the jury. When 

the jury returned, the bailiff announced “[t]hey have a verdict.” The jury 

foreperson answered “yes” in response to the trial court’s question “Ladies 

and gentlemen, have you reached a verdict?” The trial court next asked 

the bailiff to “get the verdict and bring it to the Court.” The trial court then 

announced “[a]t this time the Court is not going to accept the verdict of the 

jury.” The court later declared that it was “reject[ing] the jury’s verdict.” 

Clearly, the trial court believed that, prior to the rendering of its “judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict,” a verdict had been rendered by the jury. This 

belief is reasonable, and a contrary conclusion finds support only by 

impermissibly adding modifying language to the pertinent statute.

Here, the State’s appeal is authorized, where the order of acquittal was 

granted after the jury had deliberated and returned a verdict to the trial 

court on all charges. As the requested relief is to reverse and simply 

reinstate the jury verdict, double jeopardy is not implicated. See State v. 
7

Lee, 230 So. 3d 886, 887 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“No double jeopardy issue 

arises [from the State’s appeal] because, if there is a reversal, all that is 

necessary is a reinstatement of a verdict, not a retrial.”) (citation omitted).

B. Merits

The State argues the trial court erred in granting the motion for 

judgment of acquittal because there was competent substantial evidence 

to establish each element of the crimes charged, and the weight of the 

evidence and credibility of witnesses were questions solely for the jury. In 

his answer brief, Pickersgill does not address the merits of the State’s 

argument. We have de novo review. Lee, 230 So. 3d at 887 (internal 

citation omitted).

“In moving for a judgment of acquittal, a defendant admits the facts in 

evidence and every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that may be 

fairly and reasonably inferred from the evidence.” Turner v. State, 29 So. 

3d 361, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The existence of contradictory or 

conflicting evidence “does not warrant a judgment of acquittal because the 

weight of the evidence and the witnesses’ credibility are questions solely 

for the jury.” Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 508 (Fla. 2005); see also 

State v. Konegen, 18 So. 3d 697, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Furthermore, 

“[t]he testimony of a single witness, even if uncorroborated and 

contradicted by other State witnesses, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” 

Strouse v. State, 932 So. 2d 326, 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citation 

omitted). In other words, “[w]here there is room for a difference of opinion 

between reasonable men as to the proof of facts from which the ultimate 

fact is sought to be established,” the conflicting testimony should not be 

determined on a motion for judgment of acquittal. Darling v. State, 808 

So. 2d 145, 155 (Fla. 2002).

Here, the trial court’s comments during the discussion which 

transpired on the record upon Pickersgill’s motion for judgment of 

acquittal demonstrate that the court improperly weighed the evidence and 

made credibility determinations, which are the sole province of the jury. 

See Fitzpatrick, 900 So. 2d at 508. It was reasonable and acceptable for 

defense counsel to emphasize the State’s failure to preserve the video of 

the officer’s questioning of Pickersgill and the latter’s confessions to the 

officers, in calling the credibility of the officers’ testimony into question. 

This was buttressed by the trial court’s exclamation that, due to lack of 

the video, “there’s a lot of doubt” that Pickersgill confessed. However, there 

is no law—constitutional, statutory, or even judge-created—that either 

precludes law enforcement officers from testifying as to a defendant’s 

confessions without accompanying video or audio recordings of the 
8

confessions, or that prohibits the jury from weighing the credibility of that 

testimony. 

When the testimony of the arresting officers is considered, it is clear the 

State presented competent substantial evidence to support every element 

of the crimes charged.

To convict Pickersgill of possession of THC, the State had to prove that

he actually or constructively possessed some amount of the controlled 

substance. § 893.13(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). Actual possession is 

established if the substance is found on the defendant’s person or is 

“within his ‘ready reach’ and under his control.” McKire v. State, 252 So. 

3d 413, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citation omitted). Constructive 

possession is established by showing that “[the defendant] knew of the 

presence of the contraband on or about [the] premises and had the ability 

to maintain dominion and control over it.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, the forensic tests revealed that the substance was THC. And, in 

moving for a judgment of acquittal, Pickersgill did not dispute that the 

substance was THC. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to support 

a conviction for actual or constructive possession. The THC was found in 

the glove compartment directly in front of Pickersgill’s seat; thus, it was

within his “ready reach.” Moreover, Pickersgill immediately fled from the 

vehicle after it was stopped by the officers and later told the officers that 

“everything” in the vehicle was his—both before and after being read his 

Miranda rights. A written waiver of Miranda rights was not required. State 

v. Williams, 386 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (“[A]lthough obtaining 

written waivers might be the better practice, it is not required.”); see also

Meme v. State, 72 So. 3d 254, 256-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (finding 

possession when the combination of the circumstantial evidence, 

including the defendant’s “ready reach,” nervous behavior, and statements 

were inconsistent with defendant’s hypothesis of innocence); Taylor v. 

State, 13 So. 3d 77, 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (explaining that knowledge and 

control may be established by the defendant’s incriminating statements, 

actions, or other circumstances).

To prove possession of cannabis with intent to deliver/sell, the State 

was required to show that 1) Pickersgill possessed with intent to sell or 

deliver a certain substance; 2) the substance was cannabis; and 3)

Pickersgill had knowledge of the presence of the substance. See Fla. Std. 

Jury Instr. (Crim) 25.2; § 893.13(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). 

The evidence showed that the substance in the bags and one of the 

marijuana cigarettes field-tested positive for marijuana. Additionally, both 
9

officers testified that they were trained in identifying narcotics. Our courts 

have held that “it is not necessary for the state to prove the identity of 

marijuana by chemical or scientific proof.” See A.A. v. State, 461 So. 2d 

165, 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (“Testimony on other facts, such as a 

substance’s appearance and smell and the circumstances under which it 

was seized, can be used to meet the state’s burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that a substance is marijuana.”). These items were 

found in a backpack directly behind Pickersgill’s seat, and thus, were 

within his ready reach. This, coupled with Pickersgill’s post-Miranda

statements that “everything” in the vehicle was his, demonstrated 

possession. The intent to sell was demonstrated by his post-Miranda

statement that he had the marijuana “to sell,” and Grier’s statement that 

he was helping Pickersgill “sell the narcotics in the vehicle.” The evidence

also showed that the marijuana cigarettes were packaged in individual 

tubes and marked with a sticker. “The quantity or packaging of drugs 

found in a defendant’s possession may indicate an intent to sell.” Valentin 

v. State, 974 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 

Finally, to prove Pickersgill resisted a police officer without violence, the 

State was required to show that “(1) the officer was engaged in the lawful 

execution of a legal duty; and, (2) the actions of the defendant obstructed, 

resisted or opposed the officer in the performance of that legal duty.” 

Jackson v. State, 192 So. 3d 541, 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (citation 

omitted). Generally, “flight, standing alone, is insufficient to form the basis 

of a resisting without violence charge.” Brown v. State, 199 So. 3d 1010, 

1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181, 1186 

(Fla. 2009)). However, if the individual flees while knowing of the officer’s 

intent to detain him, and the officer is justified in detaining the individual 

before he flees, the individual is guilty of obstructing an officer without 

violence. See Brown, 199 So. 3d at 1012-13; J.L.H. v. State, 990 So. 2d 

686, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Here, Pickersgill did not dispute that Gomez 

was an officer, and Gomez testified that he commanded Pickersgill to 

“stop” multiple times. 

Finally, regarding whether Gomez was in the execution of a legal duty, 

the evidence showed that there was a lawful traffic stop, based on both the 

failure to yield in making a U-turn and failure of both the driver and front 

seat passenger to wear seatbelts. See §§ 316.1515 & 316.614(4)-(5), Fla. 

Stat. (2018); see also State v. Y.Q.R., 50 So. 3d 751, 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2010) (“[A] U-turn can amount to a traffic offense if it interferes with traffic 

or cannot be made safely.”); State v. Allen, 978 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2008) (“Police may stop a vehicle if the officer has a well-founded, 

articulable suspicion that the occupant has committed a traffic offense.”). 

Pickersgill was cited for not wearing a seat belt and, although he was a 
10

passenger in the vehicle, he could still be detained for the duration of the 

traffic stop. See Presley v. State, 227 So. 3d 95, 96 (Fla. 2017) (holding 

that “law enforcement officers may . . . detain the passengers of a vehicle

for the reasonable duration of a traffic stop . . . .”).

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s post-verdict judgment of acquittal, and 

remand with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict and conduct 

sentencing.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

TAYLOR and MAY, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.