In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 

LAERA D. REED and PAIGE RAY-CLUNEY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

CHARLES PALMER, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin. 

Nos. 17-cv-590 & 17-cv-591 — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2018 — DECIDED OCTOBER 9, 2018 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. The State of Iowa declared Laera 

Reed and Paige Ray-Cluney delinquent youths and sent them 

to a juvenile institution in Wisconsin. Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple Wisconsin officials and 

Charles Palmer, the Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services, alleging they suffered from the excessive use of 

isolation cells and excessive force. A district court in the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against 
2 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

Palmer at the pleading stage on the basis of qualified immunity, and plaintiffs now appeal. For the reasons below, we reverse. 

I. Background 

A. Factual Background 

In January 2014, the State of Iowa closed the Iowa Girls 

State Training School in Toledo, Iowa. Defendant Charles 

Palmer, Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services, 

subsequently contracted with the State of Wisconsin to use 

the Wisconsin Girls State Training School (also known as 

“Copper Lake”) in Irma, Wisconsin. Under the terms of the 

agreement, Iowa agreed to pay Wisconsin $301 per day for 

each child. 

According to plaintiffs, Copper Lake comes with a disreputable history. They claim that, since its opening in 2011, it 

“has had a very high turnover rate of employees,” leading to 

“over worked and untrained staff.” They further assert that 

between 2012 and 2016, the facility received criticism from 

multiple Wisconsin circuit court judges regarding its “sordid” 

and “inhumane” treatment of juveniles. Plaintiffs claim a 

state criminal probe into Copper Lake began in 2015. 

Iowa juvenile courts ordered plaintiffs Paige Ray-Cluney 

and Laura Reed to be placed at Copper Lake on March 10 and 

June 4, 2015, respectively. At the time, both girls were sixteen 

years old. Plaintiffs claim that during their stays, Copper Lake 

staff subjected them to prolonged periods of “isolation,”1

 1 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Reed spent at least thirty-four days 

in isolation between August and October 2015, and another thirty to forty 

days in isolation between November 2015 and February 2016. They allege 

Ray-Cluney spent at least four weeks in isolation between June 29 and 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 3

which involved spending approximately twenty-two out of 

twenty-four hours each day in a seven-foot by ten-foot concrete cell furnished with only a metal cot and a thin mattress. 

They allege these isolation cells had urine stains on the floor 

and wall, and only one window “covered by a thick cage reducing light that [could] pass through.” They claim that during their limited periods of release, they were only allowed to 

“shower, clean [their] room[s], receive 15 minutes to exercise, 

receive 10-15 minutes to write a letter, and use the restroom.” 

If any time remained, they were required to sit in chairs by 

themselves and were “not allowed to speak.” They allege they 

were not released from isolation for meals and received little 

or no educational instruction. Both plaintiffs attempted suicide. 

In addition to solitary confinement, plaintiffs also claim 

they were subjected to excessive force. Reed alleges that, during one of her periods of isolation, a security guard pulled her 

“fingers through the food tray slot in the cell door,” causing 

“scrapes and bleeding.” She further asserts that, on an occasion when she attempted self-harm by placing her head underneath her cot, the same security guard stood on top of the 

cot in order to tighten it against her neck. She also alleges the 

security guard “slammed her against [her] cell wall with such 

force as to leave a contusion on her head and a laceration on 

her lips.” Meanwhile, Ray-Cluney alleges she was “placed in 

restraints so tight that they left her arm purple” and “had her 

 

September 14, 2015, and all but three days in isolation between September 

14 and December 15, 2015. Overall, Reed believes she was held in isolation 

for over two months and Ray-Cluney asserts she was in isolation for over 

five months. 
4 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

head rammed against the wall of the cell.” Finally, both plaintiffs claim Copper Lake staff sprayed them with mace on multiple occasions. 

B. Procedural Background 

Plaintiffs separately filed suit in the Western District of 

Wisconsin on August 1, 2017. They each asserted violations of 

the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment, excessive 

force, and deprivation of due process. They additionally 

brought common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. Finally, Reed alleged multiple 

violations of the Iowa state constitution. 

The named defendants in both cases were almost entirely 

Wisconsin officials associated with Copper Lake.2 The lone 

exception was Palmer. According to the complaints in each 

case: the state of Iowa, by and through Palmer, contracted 

with the state of Wisconsin to use the Copper Lake facility; 

Palmer had custody of both plaintiffs in June 2015 pursuant 

to court orders; the State of Iowa, by and through Palmer, 

“monitored and received reports concerning [plaintiffs’] confinement at Copper Lake”; and Palmer knew or should have 

known of Copper Lake’s use of isolation cells and, despite this 

knowledge, failed to remove the Iowa girls, failed to ensure 

 2 These defendants included Copper Lake’s current and former Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent, Director of Security, Corrections Unit 

Supervisor, and security guards, as well as the Wisconsin Administrator 

of Juvenile Corrections. 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 5

Copper Lake’s staff were properly trained and supervised, 

and acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.3

Palmer moved to dismiss the claims against him in both 

cases. He raised multiple legal objections, including: (1) lack 

of personal jurisdiction; (2) forum non conveniens; (3) Eleventh 

Amendment immunity; (4) failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted; (5) absolute immunity; (6) qualified immunity; (7) lack of personal responsibility; and (8) failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies related to the tort claims. 

Palmer also argued that the district court should abstain from 

determining the contours of the state constitutional claims 

raised in Reed’s complaint. 

The district court concluded that it “need not address” 

Palmer’s personal jurisdiction defense because it could “resolv[e] the suit on the merits.” Specifically, the court found 

that no law clearly established “what the [C]onstitution requires of a government official in [Palmer’s] position under 

similar circumstances.” As a result, the court held qualified 

immunity barred plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims. The 

court further dismissed plaintiffs’ common law claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state constitutional claims.4 This appeal followed.5

 

3 Plaintiffs do not allege that Palmer had any knowledge of Copper 

Lake’s use of excessive force. 

4 Plaintiffs do not challenge this aspect of the district court’s ruling, 

and they have filed a complaint in Iowa state court asserting all of their 

state law claims. 

5 The district court entered a partial judgment in favor of Palmer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) 
6 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

II. Discussion 

A. Qualified Immunity 

We review the district court’s qualified immunity analysis 

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo. Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 

911, 918 (7th Cir. 2017). In doing so, “we consider the facts, 

including all reasonable inferences from them, in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. at 918–19. 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government 

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold 

public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, 

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. “The defense provides ‘ample room for mistaken 

judgments’ and protects all but the ‘plainly incompetent and 

those who knowingly violate the law.’” Green v. Newport, 868 

F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 

F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008)). 

“A state official is protected by qualified immunity unless 

the plaintiff shows: ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or 

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Kemp v. Liebel, 

 

(“[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a 

final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, ... parties ... if the 

court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”). Plaintiffs’ claims against the Wisconsin defendants remain pending. 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 7

877 F.3d 346, 350–51 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). “If either inquiry is answered in 

the negative, the defendant official” is protected by qualified 

immunity. Green, 868 F.3d at 633 (quoting Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 

F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014)). “In order to avoid ‘[u]nnecessary 

litigation of constitutional issues’ and expending scarce judicial resources that ultimately do not impact the outcome of 

the case,” courts “may analyze the ‘clearly established’ prong 

without first considering whether the alleged constitutional 

right was violated.” Kemp, 877 F.3d at 351 (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–37). The district court 

adopted that approach here. 

Under the clearly established prong, “the burden is on 

plaintiffs to demonstrate the alleged violation of their [constitutional] right[s] was ‘clearly established.’” Id. “To be clearly 

established at the time of the challenged conduct, the right’s 

contours must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates 

that right ... .” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gustafson v. 

Adkins, 803 F.3d 883, 891 (7th Cir. 2015)). “[T]he crucial question [is] whether the official acted reasonably in the particular 

circumstances that he or she faced.” Id. (alterations in original) 

(emphasis added) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 

2023 (2014)). 

Ordinarily, to show that the law was “clearly established,” 

plaintiffs must point to a “closely analogous case” finding the 

alleged violation unlawful. Findlay v. Lendermon, 722 F.3d 895, 

899 (7th Cir. 2013). They need not point to an identical case, 

“but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 

constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 

S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 
8 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

741); see also Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(“The law is ‘clearly established’ when ‘various courts have 

agreed that certain conduct is a constitutional violation under 

facts not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented 

in the case at hand.’” (quoting Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 

701 (7th Cir. 2001))). “[W]e look first to controlling Supreme 

Court precedent and our own circuit decisions on the issue.” 

Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 2000). If no 

controlling precedent exists, “we broaden our survey to include all relevant caselaw in order to determine ‘whether 

there was such a clear trend in the caselaw that we can say 

with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time.’” Id. (quoting Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 

1989)); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (requiring a “robust 

‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” (quoting Wilson 

v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999))). 

Alternatively, “[i]n some rare cases, where the constitutional violation is patently obvious, the plaintiffs may not be 

required to present the court with any analogous cases.” Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 767. Instead, plaintiffs can demonstrate 

clearly established law by proving the defendant’s conduct 

was “so egregious and unreasonable that ... no reasonable 

[official] could have thought he was acting lawfully.” Abbott 

v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013). Outrageous conduct “obviously will be unconstitutional.” Safford 

Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S 364, 377 (2009). “But 

even as to action less than an outrage, ‘officials can still be on 

notice that their conduct violates established law ... in novel 

factual circumstances.’” Id. at 377–78 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 9

Importantly, “[b]efore we can determine if the law was 

clearly established, ‘the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity.’” Kemp, 877 F.3d 

at 351 (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615). “The Supreme Court 

has ‘repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established 

law at a high level of generality.’” Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 

1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting alKidd, 563 U.S. at 742); see, e.g., Kiesla v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 

1152 (2018) (per curiam); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 

(2017) (per curiam); Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308; Plumhoff, 134 S. 

Ct. at 2023. Instead, “[t]he dispositive question is ‘whether the 

violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’” 

Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). In 

other words, “the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (quoting 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); see also 

Volkman, 736 F.3d at 1090 (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has long 

held that ‘the test for immunity should be whether the law 

was clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public 

official when he acted.’” (quoting Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 

304, 308 (7th Cir. 1987))). 

B. Qualified Immunity Defenses at the Rule 12(b)(6) 

Stage 

Because a qualified immunity defense so closely depends 

“on the facts of the case,” a “complaint is generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.” 

Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). “A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based only on the complaint 

itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that 

are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice.” Geinosky v. 
10 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). These 

sources rarely develop a robust factual record, given that, at 

the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only “state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 

612 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007)). To state a “plausible” claim, a plaintiff need 

not include every detail or fact related to the basis of her allegations. Rather, she only needs to include “enough details 

about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that 

holds together.” Catinella v. County of Cook, 881 F.3d 514, 516 

(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 

404 (7th Cir. 2010)). 

The plausibility standard creates tension at this stage of 

litigation between developing the requisite facts for a well-informed qualified immunity determination and preserving a 

government official’s right to avoid the burdens of pretrial 

matters, including discovery. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 

299, 308 (1996). We have recognized that tension, noting: 

[I]t appears that in some cases, a complaint may 

be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified 

immunity grounds .... In that case, while the 

plaintiff may have stated a claim, it is not one 

“upon which relief can be granted” and a court 

may properly address this purely legal question 

under Rule 12(b)(6). However, in many cases, 

the existence of qualified immunity will depend 

on the particular facts of a given case. In those 

cases, the plaintiff is not required initially to 

plead factual allegations that anticipate and 

overcome a defense of qualified immunity . ... 

The district court then has a variety of means at 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 11

its disposal to move the case incrementally forward in order to address the qualified immunity issue at the earliest possible stage, so that a 

defendant who is immune from suit is not put 

through the time, effort and expense of defending himself against a claim upon which, ultimately, no relief can be granted. 

Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 765 n.3 (citations omitted); see also id. at 775 

(Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment) (“Rule 12(b)(6) is a mismatch for immunity and almost always a bad ground of dismissal.”). Other circuits have 

made similar observations. See, e.g., Wesley v. Campbell, 779 

F.3d 421, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2015); Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 

1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014); Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorneys 

Office, 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir. 2014); Barnett v. Mount Vernon 

Police Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 811, 813 (2d Cir. 2013); Thomas v. Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 299 (3d Cir. 2006); Chesser 

v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001). 

In short, “[a]sserting a qualified immunity defense via a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion ... subjects the defendant to a more challenging standard of review than would apply on summary 

judgment.” Thomas, 765 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004)). Under the former, “it 

is the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is 

scrutinized for ‘objective legal reasonableness.’” Behrens, 516 

U.S. at 309. Under the latter, “the plaintiff can no longer rest 

on the pleadings, and the court looks to the evidence before it 

(in the light most favorable to the plaintiff) when conducting 

the [qualified immunity] inquiry.” Id. (citation omitted). 
12 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

C. Palmer’s Qualified Immunity Defense 

Given this backdrop, the district court acted prematurely 

in deciding Palmer’s entitlement to qualified immunity at the 

motion to dismiss stage. The court found that, during the time 

period alleged in the complaints, no law clearly established 

“what the [C]onstitution requires of a government official in 

[Palmer’s] position under similar circumstances.” 

Palmer’s position is determined with reference to the wellpleaded factual allegations in plaintiffs’ complaints, which 

are taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to 

plaintiffs on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Ewell, 853 

F.3d at 918–19. According to the complaints, Palmer contracted with the state of Wisconsin to place juveniles, including plaintiffs, in the Copper Lake facility. The complaints further allege that both plaintiffs were in Palmer’s custody pursuant to state court orders. Moreover, Palmer monitored and 

received reports concerning Reed’s and Ray-Cluney’s conditions of confinement at Copper Lake. Based on these reports, 

plaintiffs allege Palmer “knew or should have known of the 

systemic and excessive use of isolation cells at Copper Lake,” 

and “[d]espite such knowledge, Palmer failed to remove the 

Iowa girls placed at Copper Lake and acted with deliberate 

indifference in doing so.” These allegations are sufficient to 

withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their constitutional 

rights were violated through excessive use of isolation cells at 

Copper Lake. Supreme Court precedent is not clear about 

whether state juvenile detention facility conditions should be 

judged under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 

Punishment Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1431–32 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 13

(9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has not announced the 

appropriate federal standards by which to judge state juvenile 

detention facility conditions.”); Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 

1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983) (same). Indeed, the Court expressly 

avoided deciding this question in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 

651, 669 n.37 (1977). 

In a case over forty years ago, we applied the Eighth 

Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment standard to 

evaluate the use of corporal punishment and tranquilizing 

drugs at a juvenile correctional institution. See Nelson v. Heyne, 

491 F.2d 352, 354–57 (7th Cir. 1974). Under that test, a prison’s 

deprivation must be an “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’ ... 

denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” 

and the state actor “must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of 

mind.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations 

omitted). Using this standard, a district court recently held, in 

the context of a preliminary injunction motion, that juvenile 

isolation is likely unconstitutional. See V.W. ex rel. Williams v. 

Conway, 236 F. Supp. 3d 554, 584 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[T]he use 

of disciplinary confinement on juveniles [was] not reasonably

calculated to restore prison safety and, even when it [was], 

disciplinary isolation at the [detention center] continue[d] 

long after any safety concerns had been abated.”). 

Meanwhile, other circuits have applied the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s “more protective” Due Process Clause in evaluating juvenile detention center conditions. Gary H., 831 F.2d 

at 1432 (evaluating management of facility for adolescent 

wards of the juvenile court); see also A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 

F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995) (juvenile pretrial detainees); H.C. 

v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Santana, 714 F.2d at 1179–81 (juvenile residents of industrial 
14 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

school); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 & n.10 (10th Cir. 

1982) (private school for juvenile boys with behavioral and 

mental health problems). This standard is more protective in 

that “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after 

the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.” Ingraham,

430 U.S. at 671 n.40. “Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Id.

To determine “the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention” using a Fourteenth Amendment due process inquiry, courts must first evaluate “whether 

those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee,” because “a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Still, “restrictions on liberty” 

are permissible so long as they are “reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982); see also 

Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (“A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it 

is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.”). To make this determination, courts “weigh[] the individual’s interest in liberty against the State’s asserted reasons” for their restraint. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320. 

At the time plaintiffs were allegedly in Palmer’s custody, 

isolation of pre-trial juvenile detainees not “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective,” Bell, 441 U.S. at 

539, could rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Here, 

plaintiffs’ complaints plausibly allege that they were kept in 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 15

isolation at Copper Lake for excessive amounts of time. 

Caselaw clearly establishes that such conduct could violate 

the Fourteenth and/or the Eighth Amendment. 

On the present record, however, it is impossible to determine whether such a constitutional violation occurred in 

plaintiffs’ cases. We know the respective complaints allege 

plaintiffs spent an inordinate amount of time at Copper Lake 

in isolation. However, we do not know the reasons behind 

their seclusion. We therefore cannot evaluate, under the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Palmer—or the other defendants—acted reasonably pursuant to a “legitimate governmental objective” or instead unlawfully “punished” plaintiffs. See 

Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 539. Nor can we determine, under the 

Eighth Amendment, whether Palmer had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In sum, as 

one district court recently concluded in denying a motion to 

dismiss Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising 

from a plaintiff’s isolated confinement at an Iowa juvenile 

home: 

Whether the alleged actions herein were “reasonably related to a legitimate institutional interest,” or were for the “legitimate purpose” of 

containing Plaintiff’s violent behavior, requires a 

factual inquiry that cannot be accomplished at this 

stage of proceedings so long as Plaintiff has alleged facts that generate a plausible claim. Taking the complaint in its entirety, Defendants’ 

current legal arguments [did] not render implausible the allegations in the complaint. Additionally, ... even if a legitimate purpose for 

isolating a detainee is provided, a due process 
16 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

violation may still occur if the conditions imposed are excessive in relation to the nonpunitive purpose, a further factual inquiry .... Accordingly, Defendants have not shown that they are 

entitled to qualified immunity on the face of the 

compliant. 

Turner v. Palmer, 84 F. Supp. 3d 880, 883–84 (S.D. Iowa 2015) 

(emphasis added) (citation omitted). The same reasoning applies here. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their constitutional rights were violated at Copper Lake when they were 

placed in isolation “without justification.” On the face of 

plaintiffs’ complaints alone, Palmer has not shown he is entitled to qualified immunity. 

This case involves the added wrinkle that plaintiffs were 

housed in Wisconsin, not in Iowa. In other words, Palmer was 

not one of the Copper Lake officials placing plaintiffs in isolation. Rather, plaintiffs allege Palmer only contracted with 

Wisconsin to send juveniles to Copper Lake and later “received” and “monitored” reports regarding the juveniles sent 

there. According to the district court, this made the claims 

against Palmer “completely different” from other cases where 

the defendants “actually controlled and operated the institution in which the abuse had occurred and ‘oversaw the use of 

the isolation cells in which [the] plaintiff was confined.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Turner, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 882). In 

the district court’s view, no law clearly establishes what the 

Constitution requires of an official in Palmer’s unique posture. 

Palmer’s additional degree of separation is a distinguishing feature of this litigation, but at the motion to dismiss stage, 

our conclusion does not change. Under DeShaney v. Winnebago 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 17

County Department of Social Services, it is clearly established 

that the Due Process Clause “forbids the State itself to deprive 

individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due process 

of law,’” but does not “impose an affirmative obligation on 

the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm 

through other means.” 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). It is equally 

established, however, that an exception to the DeShaney principle arises “if the state has a ‘special relationship’ with a person, that is, if the state has custody of a person, thus cutting 

off alternate avenues of aid.” Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 

516 (7th Cir. 1998). In such cases, the State “assumes at least a 

rudimentary duty of safekeeping.” Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. 

Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). 

On multiple occasions, we have applied the “special relationship” exception to cases where “the State removes a child 

from her natural parents.” Id.; see also Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 

1286, 1296–98 (7th Cir. 1995); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 

(7th Cir. 1990). Thus, “once a state removes a child from her 

parents’ custody,” it “assumes a duty of safekeeping” due to 

the restraints it places on the liberty of the child. Berman v. 

Young, 291 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of 

reh’g (June 26, 2002). Such a duty is violated when the State 

“place[s] a child in custody with foster parents it knows are 

incompetent or dangerous.” Hutchinson, 126 F.3d at 900; see 

also Waubanascum v. Shawano County, 416 F.3d 658, 665 (7th 

Cir. 2005). 

This case differs from Berman and Waubanascum; plaintiffs 

were placed at an out-of-state institution, not a private foster 

care home. Nevertheless, in K.H., we defined the relevant constitutional right as “the right of a child in state custody not to 
18 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

be handed over by state officers to a foster parent or other custodian, private or public whom the state knows or suspects to 

be a child abuser.” 914 F.2d at 852 (emphasis added and then 

removed); see also id. at 851 (“[T]he Constitution requires the 

responsible state officials to take steps to prevent children in 

state institutions from deteriorating physically or psychologically.” (emphasis added)). This language encompasses 

Palmer’s alleged role here.6 Allegations against Palmer are 

 

6 The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Smith v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 

86 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reinforces this conclusion. There, the District of Columbia placed delinquent youths in so-called “independent living programs” 

run by private companies: such placements were made, and could only be 

changed by, court order. Id. at 89, 91. One such youth placed in this program was murdered while living at his assigned apartment. Id. at 90. The 

deceased’s grandmother filed due process claims against not only the private apartment complex and the independent living program, but also the 

District. Id. The District argued it was not liable because the deceased 

could not “meaningfully be said to have been in the District’s custody 

when he was murdered” given this contractual relationship with the private company housing the deceased. Id. at 94. The D.C. Circuit disagreed: 

“[T]he District’s legal custody over [the deceased was] a good indicator 

that it had a duty to look after him.” Id. (emphasis added). It analogized 

the case to decisions “holding that children in foster care are in state custody for substantive due process purposes and ... that in placing them in 

foster homes and monitoring their progress, the state owes them a constitutional duty of care.” Id. at 95 (collecting cases). According to the court, 

“[l]ike such children, [the deceased] not only looked to the government as 

primary guardian of his needs, but, absent District approval, also lacked 

freedom to seek alternate arrangements—precisely the two circumstances 

courts have found create ... custody in the foster care situation.” Id. 

This case closely resembles Smith. Just as the District retained legal 

custody of the deceased in Smith, plaintiffs here allege that Palmer and the 

Iowa Department of Human Services retained legal custody for their wellbeing. Although Palmer argues that plaintiffs’ placement was technically 

made—and controlled—by judicial rather than executive order, that same 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 19

not limited to his role in signing the contract that led to plaintiffs’ placement at Copper Lake: Plaintiffs further allege that 

Palmer retained custody and received reports detailing their 

excessive isolation, yet took no steps to remove them from the 

facility and was deliberately indifferent in doing so. 

The district court critiqued plaintiffs’ failure to “provide 

any details” about the reports Palmer allegedly received or 

what his alleged monitoring entailed. However, as noted 

above, plaintiffs do not need to provide such details to cross 

the “plausibility” threshold at this stage: they need only include enough facts in their complaint “to present a story that 

holds together.” Catinella, 881 F.3d at 516 (quoting Swanson 

614 F.3d at 404); see also Archer, 870 F.3d at 612 (“A claim has 

the requisite plausibility [to survive a motion to dismiss] 

‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009))). Construing the well-pleaded facts and 

reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, as we must, it can be 

reasonably inferred that Palmer had custody of plaintiffs 

while they were at Copper Lake and that he had the 

knowledge, responsibility, and influence to request removal 

of plaintiffs from the facility. 

Palmer’s remaining objections are undermined by the preliminary stage of the proceedings. He argues, for example, 

that he “did not have direct custody of the Plaintiffs.” But this 

is directly contradicted by plaintiffs’ complaints, which state 

 

fact did not prevent the Smith court from holding the District liable. Nor 

did the fact that the District contracted its day-to-day hands-on responsibilities to an outside entity, which is precisely what Palmer did here, 

change the court’s decision.
20 Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438

they were both in “custody of ... Palmer” during their time at 

Copper Lake. He further complains that plaintiffs “cannot 

show that ... [he] actually knew either girl was at risk of harm 

at the time of her placement.” Maybe so. At this juncture, 

however, we are tied to plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations, 

which expressly allege that Palmer “knew or should have 

known of the systemic and excessive use of isolation cells.” 

Of course, the above discussion does not preclude Palmer 

from securing qualified immunity later.7 It is entirely possible, for example, that plaintiffs did not endure the extent of 

isolation that they allege. It is equally feasible that such solitary confinement was ordered pursuant to a legitimate governmental objective, or that plaintiffs will be unable to marshal evidence to show that defendants’ actions substantially 

departed from accepted standards. Plaintiffs might also overstate Palmer’s true level of involvement or his actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly unconstitutional activity. If so, the district court would possess the authority to revisit the issue. In the meantime, however, this case is one that 

would greatly benefit from a more robust record. In short, although qualified immunity defenses should be decided at “the 

earliest possible stage in litigation,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 

224, 227 (1991), the determination whether qualified immunity exists for Palmer depends on “particular facts” that are not 

yet in the record. See Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 765 n.3. 

 7 It also does not preclude Palmer from reasserting any of his defenses 

that the district court declined to address on the initial motion to dismiss, 

including his personal jurisdiction defense. Cf. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. 

South, 125 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 1997) (failure of an appellee to raise on 

appeal all alternative grounds for affirming district court’s decision does 

not operate as a waiver). 
Nos. 18-1429 & 18-1438 21

Such a result does not condemn the district court to unnecessary litigation or impede Palmer’s potential right to be 

free from suit. The district court has “a variety of means ... to 

move the case incrementally forward in order to address the 

qualified immunity issue at the earliest possible stage.” Id. For 

instance, “[t]he Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is perhaps the best procedural tool available to the defendant to obtain the factual basis underlying a plaintiff’s 

claim for relief.” Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301. Alternatively, if additional evidence is needed to develop the factual record, the 

district court may “limit the timing, sequence, frequency, and 

extent of that discovery under Rule 26.” Id. And of course, defendants can move for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the 

district court in favor of Palmer on plaintiffs’ claims against 

him and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.