#### First Advantage LNS, Inc., et al., Appellants, v LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc., Respondent.

[69 NYS3d 630]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Kathryn E. Freed, J.), entered February 17, 2017, which, among other things, dismissed the amended complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered February 2, 2017, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.

Supreme Court correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ indemnification claims for the cases *Freckleton*and *Baker,*as neither is within defendant’s indemnification obligations under the Purchase Agreement. Neither case is among the specific “matters set forth below” in Schedule 9.1 (j) of the agreement. Nor were the *Freckleton*and *Baker*cases “resulting from, attributable to, based upon or arising out of” *Goode and Goodman v LexisNexis Risk & Information Analytics*Group, *Inc.*(the G&G Action), one of the matters “set forth below” on Schedule 9.1 (j). The *Freckleton*and *Baker*suits could have been brought even had the G&G Action never been commenced, and they result from, and are based on, defendant’s alleged conduct, not the G&G Action.

Plaintiffs’ construction of 9.1 (j) (i) renders 9.1 (j) (ii) redundant. Were the phrase in 9.1 (j) (i) “[t]hose matters set forth below” read to include anything *other*than the specific *596matters listed, there would have been no need to include the provision at 9.1 (j) (ii) involving the same or similar parties, with the same or similar legal issues applied to the same or similar facts or subject matter. We reject plaintiffs’ efforts to fit *Baker,*which postdated the limitations period of 9.1 (j) (ii), into 9.1 (j) (i). A contrary holding would impermissibly strip that provision of all force and effect *(see Nautilus Ins. Co. v Matthew David Events, Ltd.,*69 AD3d 457, 460 [1st Dept 2010]).

We also reject plaintiffs’ efforts to fit *Freckleton*into Schedule 9.1 (j) (ii), as plaintiffs disregard or contort that subsection’s caveat: “to the extent such matters below are claims by a Governmental Entity or private class-action.” To fit within (j) (ii), *Freckleton’s*claims needed to be the same or similar to the class-action claims asserted in the G&G Action, which they are not.

The class-wide claims in G&G are based on different statutory provisions, and do not depend on the accuracy of information in an individual’s screening report. In contrast, *Freckleton’s*claim, like the G&G Action individual claims, depends on the accuracy of the reported information *(see*15 USC § 1681g). Moreover, the facts in the G&G Action class-wide claims are not “substantially similar” to *Freckleton1*s. *Freckleton’s*claim turns on circumstances specific to each individual employee. In contrast, the G&G Action’s class-wide claims concern defendant’s alleged systemic failures to provide advance notice or disclose requested information.

We disagree that *Freckleton*and the G&G class claims are substantially similar because both concern Fair Credit Reporting Act violations in the context of the Esteem database. Were this general category the intended scope of indemnification, the parties, sophisticated corporate entities on both sides, could have so indicated. However, the specific language of Schedule 9.1 (j) shows that they did not, and we should not read the agreement to imply what they chose not to include *(see Ashwood Capital, Inc. v OTG Mgt., Inc.,*99 AD3d 1, 7 [1st Dept 2012]).

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur—Sweeny, J.R, Richter, Andrias, Web-ber, Oing, JJ.