Final Rule for 

Importation of Fresh 

Ovine Meat from 

Uruguay 

Environmental Assessment,

September 2011

United States

Department of 

Agriculture

Marketing and 

Regulatory 

Programs

Animal and 

Plant Health 

Inspection 

Service
Final Rule for Importation of 

Fresh Ovine Meat from 

Uruguay

Environmental Assessment,

September 2011

Agency Contact:

Dr. Silvia Kreindel, Senior Staff Veterinarian

Regionalization Evaluation Services Staff

National Center for Import and Export

Veterinary Services

Animal Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

4700 River Rd. Unit 38

Riverdale, MD 20737

__________________________________________________________

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its 

programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, 

religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or marital or family 

status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with 

disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program 

information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’S 

TARGET Center at (202) 720–2600 (voice and TDD).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, 

Room 326–W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, 

DC 20250–9410 or call (202) 720–5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is an equal 

opportunity provider and employer.

__________________________________________________________

Mention of companies or commercial products in this report does not imply 

recommendation or endorsement by the U.S. Department of Agriculture over 

others not mentioned. USDA neither guarantees nor warrants the standard of 

any product mentioned. Product names are mentioned solely to report 

factually on available data and to provide specific information.
Table of Contents

I. Need for the Proposed Rule................................................... 1

A. Introduction.......................................................................... 1

B. Need .................................................................................... 3

II. Alternatives.............................................................................. 3

A. No Action ............................................................................. 4

B. Proposed Rule ..................................................................... 4

III. Environmental Consequences............................................. 10

A. No Action ........................................................................... 10

B. Proposed Rule................................................................... 11

1. FMDV ............................................................................ 12

2. FMD and Ovine Meat Processing ................................. 15

3. Regulatory Control of FMD............................................ 17

4. Interspecies Transmission of FMD................................ 19

5. Environmental Fate of FMDV........................................ 24

6. Public Health................................................................. 26

IV. Other Environmental Issues ............................................... 27

A. Environmental Justice and the Proposed Action ............... 27

B. Protection of Children and the Proposed Action................ 27

C. Threatened and Endangered Species and the 

 Proposed Action ............................................................... 28

D. Potential Cumulative Impacts............................................ 29

V. Listing of Agencies Consulted............................................. 30

VI. References ............................................................................ 31
1

I. Need for the Proposed Rule 

A. Introduction

Sanitary import regulations are designed to prevent the introduction and 

dissemination of injurious animal pests and diseases that are new or not 

widely distributed in the United States. Currently, the importation of

ovine meat from Uruguay is prohibited. These restrictions are designed to 

prevent the introduction of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). The U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA)–Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service (APHIS) established policy and rules in 1997 for recognizing 

regions, rather than only countries, for the purpose of importation of 

animals and animal products into the United States (62 Federal Register

(FR) 55999, 62 FR 56027). This action was designed to facilitate trade 

while maintaining a low risk of animal disease introduction to the 

United States. 

A request was submitted to USDA–APHIS to export fresh (chilled or 

frozen), maturated, and deboned ovine meat from Uruguay (may also be 

referred to hereafter as the export region) to the United States. The most 

recent outbreak of FMD in Uruguay occurred on a farm in Palmitas in 

2001. Although APHIS previously conducted a risk analysis for 

importation of fresh, maturated, and deboned beef meat from Uruguay in 

2002, which addressed the risk of transmitting FMD to the U.S. livestock 

industry, the risk presented by ovine meat was not addressed at that time

in the regulation (9 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 94.11). Thus, 

given the history of the disease in Uruguay, APHIS conducted a new risk 

analysis to evaluate the likelihood of FMD introduction and establishment 

through importation of ovine meat under certain conditions from Uruguay.

FMD is an acute, highly contagious viral disease that primarily affects 

cloven-hoofed animals. FMD may affect humans; however, its occurrence 

is rare (USDA–APHIS, 2008). Cattle, sheep, goats, deer, buffalo, and

swine are all adversely affected by FMD, but the effects on cattle herds 

tend to be particularly devastating. The death rate from this disease is 

low; however, both temporary and permanent physical damage to the body 

of infected animals results in costly losses in meat and milk production. 

Although lesions on the feet and mouth area are the most prominent 

clinical signs, the systemic damage to the gastrointestinal tract and 

circulatory system from this disease causes greater damage to the animal’s 

health and productivity. FMD virus (FMDV) is transmitted to susceptible 

animals by direct contact with infected animals or with contaminated 

inanimate objects; ingestion (primarily by pigs) of contaminated meat 

products; ingestion of contaminated milk; insemination with contaminated 

semen; and inhalation of infectious aerosols. Exclusion of this disease 

from the United States is particularly important in that the virus 
2

responsible for this disease is highly contagious and can survive in the 

environment for extended periods of time. Previous outbreaks of FMD in 

the United States have been very costly to contain and eradicate. The 

United States has been free of FMD since 1929. 

In response to the request from Uruguay, and based upon the findings of 

site visits and the risk analysis, USDA–APHIS–Veterinary Services (VS) 

is proposing to allow importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay to the 

United States under specific conditions for entry. The animal disease risk 

analysis determined that the likelihood of ovine meat from Uruguay

introducing and establishing FMD in the United States is low. The 

analysis concluded that the proposed mitigations and conditions for entry 

are sufficient to initiate trade in fresh, maturated, and deboned ovine meat 

from Uruguay. 

To address the possibility that animals may not show clinical signs of 

disease and be infected and viremic at the time of slaughter, APHIS 

proposes to require the Uruguay Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and 

Fisheries (MGAP) to certify the following—

(1) the ovine meat consists only of ovine parts that are, by standard 

practice, part of the animal’s carcass that is placed in a chiller for 

maturation after slaughter; 

 

 (2) certain parts of the ovine’s head, feet, hooves, and internal organs 

may reach the necessary pH level during the required maturation 

process; however, these items can contain lymph tissue, depot fat, 

and blood clots that may potentially harbor FMDV that is not 

inactivated. These parts would continue to be prohibited importation 

into the United States. Specifically, no part of ovine heads, feet, 

hooves, or internal organs will be exported; 

 (3) all bone and visually identifiable blood clots and lymphoid tissue 

have been removed from the meat; 

 (4) the ovine meat comes from ovine carcasses that were allowed to 

maturate at 4 to 10 oC for a minimum of 24 hours after slaughter, and 

that reached a pH of 5.8 or less at the middle of both longissimus 

dorsi muscles at the end of the maturation period; and 

 (5) the establishment in which the ovines are slaughtered allows a 

periodic on-site evaluation and subsequent inspection of its facilities, 

records, and operations by an APHIS representative. The 

requirements specified within this rule for the export of ovine meat 

from Uruguay are designed to facilitate importation and maintain 

low potential disease risks related to FMD.
3

B. Need

In response to an official request from Uruguay’s MGAP, and in 

accordance with sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreements to base 

import decisions on an assessment of the risks to human, animal, and plant 

health, APHIS has reviewed the issues related to this importation and is 

proposing to amend the sanitary regulations (9 CFR part 94) by allowing 

importation of fresh ovine meat from this region under specific conditions. 

The preparation of this environmental assessment (EA) was prompted by 

the anticipated public concern about the potential disease risk from 

importation of ovine meat, and the need to address environmental issues 

related to this disease risk. The issue of potential environmental risks of 

an outbreak of FMD in the United States resulting from imported ovine 

meat is of great concern to APHIS. Characterization of the disease risk 

potential and adequate mitigation measures are critical to excluding this 

disease from the United States.

This EA analyzes the potential environmental impacts resulting from 

implementation of this rule and from the change in the current regulations. 

Implementation of this rule will allow, under certain conditions, the 

importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay into the United States. The 

importation of live animals that are susceptible to FMD will continue to be 

prohibited. In the event FMD is detected and reported in Uruguay, APHIS 

would immediately ban the importation of any potentially infected 

commodities. All exports to the United States would, therefore, cease 

until APHIS evaluated the situation.

This EA is designed to satisfy the provisions of the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 United States Code 

(U.S.C.) 4321–4327, its implementing regulations, and Executive Order 

12114, “Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions.”

The notice of availability of the EA for the proposed rule and comment 

period were provided (February 24, 2011, 76 FR 10266, Docket No. 

APHIS-2008-0085) to ensure review and input to this EA from the public. 

APHIS received no public comments on the EA for the proposed rule for 

the comment period extending from this Federal Register notice of 

availability to April 25, 2011.

II. Alternatives

This EA addresses potential environmental consequences of the proposal 

to amend the regulations governing importation of ovine meat into the 

United States (9 CFR part 94). The amendment would allow the 

importation of fresh meat from sheep raised in Uruguay under certain 

conditions. The two possible alternatives considered in this EA are (1) the 
4

current prohibition of importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay (no 

action), and (2) regulation under the proposed action (preferred 

alternative).

A. No Action

The no action alternative is defined as continuation of the current sanitary 

regulation of importation of ovine meat from Uruguay. This alternative 

would involve continuation of the prohibition of the importation of fresh 

ovine meat from Uruguay. The lack of any changes in conditions for entry 

of commercial shipments of ovine meat from Uruguay maintains overall 

disease risks at the present low levels. Selection of this alternative may 

not, however, satisfy international trade agreements requiring justification 

of the more rigorous sanitary requirements of maintaining current 

regulations over less restrictive alternate approaches. In compliance with 

the SPS measures stipulated by the World Trade Organization, APHIS is 

obligated to consider less restrictive sanitary measures that provide 

comparable protection against disease risks. The issues of potential 

environmental impacts associated with the disease risks of each alternative 

are discussed in chapter 3, Environmental Consequences of the 

Alternatives.

B. Proposed Rule

The description of this alternative is defined by the proposed action and 

would result in enforcement of the amended sanitary regulations for 

importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay under specific conditions 

for entry. This rule requires the implementation of mitigations to maintain 

sanitary security while facilitating trade. This approach has been used 

effectively for establishing conditions of importation of fresh beef from 

Uruguay, which has involved comparable disease risks. An authorized 

veterinary official of the Government of Uruguay would have to certify on 

the foreign meat inspection certificate for the meat that the conditions of 

the regulations have been met. 

The importation requirements for fresh ovine meat from Uruguay include 

the following mitigations—

• Ovine meat must originate from animals that have been born, raised, 

and slaughtered in Uruguay.

• All animals must pass both ante- and post-mortem inspections.

• The meat must be from carcasses that were allowed to maturate at 40 to 

50 oF (4 to 10 oC) for at least 24 hours but no more than 60 hours after 

slaughter and reached a pH of 5.8 or less in the loin muscle at the end 
5

of the maturation period. Measurements for pH must be taken at the 

middle of both longissimus dorsi muscles. 

• The meat must consist only of ovine parts that are, by standard practice, 

part of the animal’s carcass that is placed in a chiller for maturation 

after slaughter. No heads, feet, hooves, or internal organs may be 

included. All bones and visually identifiable blood clots and lymphoid 

tissue must have been removed.

APHIS evaluated 11 factors related to the potential FMD risks in Uruguay. 

The findings of this evaluation are presented in the disease risk analysis 

(USDA–APHIS, 2008) and are summarized as follows—

(1) Based upon site visits and documentation reviews, APHIS 

considers Uruguay to have the veterinary and regulatory 

infrastructure to adequately monitor and control the possible 

incursion of FMD. MGAP has a strong veterinary infrastructure 

that should allow adequate epidemiological followup in the event 

of an outbreak in a timely manner. In addition, veterinary 

personnel are very knowledgeable about the disease and its control 

measures, as well as their roles in the FMD program. 

Garbage feeding is prohibited in Uruguay. In addition, landfills 

are inspected every 3 months to ensure that there is no possibility 

for exposure to wild or feral animals. Furthermore, garbage is heat 

treated to reduce potential infectivity in the event that any waste 

leaves the facility.

(2) APHIS did not detect any evidence to suggest that active 

outbreaks of FMD exist in Uruguay. It has also been determined 

that sheep were not heavily involved in the recent outbreaks of 

FMD in Uruguay, either clinically or serologically, indicating that 

they played a limited role in the propagation of disease during the 

outbreak despite the fact that farming practices were to graze 

sheep and cattle together on the same pastures. Despite occasional 

outbreaks of FMD in Uruguay in the past and in neighbouring

countries in South America, APHIS concluded that Uruguay can 

detect the disease quickly and limit its spread.

(3) Uruguay appears to have successfully prevented the introduction 

of FMD from Argentina and Brazil during some, but not all,

outbreaks in those countries. Consequently, if disease were to 

break out in Argentina or Brazil, it would present a potential 

source for entry of FMD into Uruguay. Despite occasional 

outbreaks of FMD in Brazil and in Argentina, Uruguay has not 

had an outbreak since 2001. APHIS concluded that there is a risk 

of reintroduction from adjacent areas into Uruguay as long as 
6

FMD is endemic in the overall region in South America.

However, APHIS concluded that MGAP could detect disease 

quickly, limit its spread, and would report promptly. 

(4) The FMD prevention and response program in Uruguay is 

effective at the local and national levels. Emergency plans are up 

to date and in place in local offices, and several surveillance plans 

are ongoing with a strong disease notification system in place. 

APHIS concluded that Uruguay has a control program to respond 

quickly to FMD emergencies through quarantine and testing of 

suspicious premises. 

(5) The ovine population in Uruguay is not vaccinated against FMDV. 

Vaccination of sheep, in addition to goats and pigs, is prohibited in 

order to maintain these populations as sentinels for the 

introduction of FMDV into Uruguay. Vaccination of the entire 

cattle population of Uruguay is currently mandatory. Vaccinations 

occur three times per year with bivalent FMD vaccines imported 

from Colombia (virus O1 and A24) and Argentina (O1 and A24, 

strain A2000). Current vaccination efforts in the cattle population 

impact the likelihood of entry and propagation of FMDV within 

the country should Uruguayan livestock, including sheep, be 

exposed to it.

(6) Most of Uruguay’s borders are adequately protected by effective 

natural barriers which reduce the unrestricted flow of animals and 

animal products from Argentina and Brazil. In those areas where 

natural barriers do not exist, government control measures provide 

appropriate levels of protection.

(7) In 2007, APHIS reviewed and evaluated the extent of movement 

of animals and animal products from controlled regions of higher 

risk, as well as the level of biosecurity regarding such movements. 

Additional sanitary precautions are taken in the case of vehicles 

arriving from areas with known circulation of FMDV. Routine 

precautionary measures should result in an overall low risk of 

import of FMDV. The 2007 evaluation concluded that Uruguay’s

border control measures were effective in reducing the risk of 

introduction of FMDV.

(8) Sheep represent a large portion of Uruguay’s livestock industry, 

equal in number to cattle. During the visit to farms, foot baths and

routine disinfection of entrance of vehicles was not observed; 

however, the overall low numbers of animal movement and human 

movement between farms mitigates this risk to some degree. 

Moreover, during a recognized outbreak, strict biosecurity 
7

measures addressing all of these issues will be implemented, as 

has been done in the past. 

Uruguay exercises impressive oversight and knowledge of animal 

movement and inventory, and has in place a complex system of 

premovement certification requirements. The mitigations already 

required at slaughter for exporting fresh beef to the United States

are similar to those that would be required to export ovine meat. 

APHIS believes that MGAP has the ability to implement the 

mitigations required to export ovine meat into the United States

(USDA–APHIS, 2008). 

(9) Uruguay has a two-phase surveillance system that includes both 

active and passive surveillance techniques. To date, the serologic 

studies conducted have provided strong evidence that FMDV is 

not currently circulating within the sheep population of Uruguay. 

The studies were rigorous and included multiple layers of 

followup, including clinical and serologic measures. 

Passive surveillance measures appear to be effective and rigorous. 

There is a high level of cooperation between producers, 

veterinarians, and official veterinary services personnel. When 

suspicious cases are reported, country officials have acted quickly 

to suspend animal movement immediately until a conclusive 

diagnosis can be made.

(10) Uruguay has one central laboratory located in Montevideo which 

provides both disease diagnosis and food safety functions; it is the 

only laboratory in Uruguay authorized to test for FMD. MGAP is 

working on the accreditation procedures for the FMD section of 

the laboratory to become accredited as ISO-9001 (international 

quality management systems standards). Only serological testing 

is currently done in Uruguay. Confirmation of suspect cases is 

done at the Institute for Animal Health Pirbright Laboratory, 

USDA’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory at Plum 

Island, or the Pan American Center for Foot-and-Mouth Disease 

(PANAFTOSA). During ongoing FMD outbreaks, the strain of 

the virus is rechecked every 3 months at the laboratory in 

Montevideo, with strain typing done at PANAFTOSA.

In 2007, APHIS evaluated the infrastructure and diagnostic 

capabilities of the FMD laboratory in Uruguay, and concluded that 

the laboratory infrastructure and capacity are sufficient to run 

serological tests for FMD. The evaluation also determined that the 

FMD laboratory staff is adequate to support surveillance activities 

and is trained to respond rapidly in the event of detection of FMD. 

It was further determined that the facilities visited during the 
8

evaluation were sufficient to perform diagnostic tasks. The 

recordkeeping system is efficiently maintained, and contingency 

plans spelled out actions to be taken in the event of a positive 

diagnosis.

(11) Emergency preparedness and the legal authority to take the 

necessary actions to prevent the introduction and spread of FMD 

into Uruguay are essential for successful prevention of FMDV 

introduction and spread. In 2007, APHIS evaluated MGAP’s

FMD response capabilities and concluded that MGAP has the 

legal authority and the ability to implement a plan to control and 

prevent the spread of disease in a timely manner. This was 

demonstrated during the 2001 outbreak. Further, the official 

veterinary personnel, private veterinarians, livestock industry, and 

producers of Uruguay are all vigilant for the emergence of FMD 

within the country’s livestock. The contingency plan is broad in 

scope and provides the necessary support and guidance to conduct 

an eradication program, if necessary. Uruguay appears to be well 

prepared to respond to an incursion of FMD.

Proposed Amendments to Regulations

 

Uruguay is a country that practices vaccination against FMD. Uruguay 

has requested to be allowed to export fresh ovine meat to the United 

States. APHIS previously conducted a risk analysis for importation of 

fresh, maturated, and deboned beef from Uruguay in 2002, which 

addressed the risk of introducing FMD into the United States; the risk 

presented by ovine meat was not addressed at that time. After conducting 

a risk assessment in connection with the current request to export fresh 

ovine meat to the United States, it was determined that fresh ovine meat 

can be safely imported from Uruguay, provided that certain requirements 

are met. 

The current regulations, 9 CFR § 94.22, allow the importation of fresh 

beef under certain conditions. APHIS proposes to allow the importation 

of fresh ovine meat provided that the ovine meat meets requirements 

similar to restrictions in 9 CFR § 94.22 for beef.

There is no evidence that FMD currently exists in Uruguay, and APHIS 

has evaluated the infrastructure and response capabilities of the country 

and considers the MGAP infrastructure and control measures to be

sufficient to detect, control, and eradicate FMD, in the event of a future 

outbreak. 

However, some countries in South America are known to be affected with 

FMD, hence there is a risk that FMD will be reintroduced into Uruguay 
9

from those countries. To address this risk, APHIS has proposed that, if 

FMD is detected anywhere in Uruguay, the export of ovine meat from all 

of Uruguay to the United States will be prohibited until at least 12 months 

have elapsed since the depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection of the last 

infected premises. This prohibition will allow us to determine whether 

FMD, if reintroduced into Uruguay, has become enzootic within the 

country. Such a determination would be particularly necessary if the 

outbreak is extensive, such as that experienced in 2001.

In order to ensure compliance with the appropriate controls, APHIS will 

require that Uruguay certify that the animals and products originated in the 

export region and certify that these were not commingled with animals or 

products from areas APHIS considers to be FMD-affected. Specifically, 

APHIS would require the following certifications for ovine meat exported 

to the United States from Uruguay—

 The meat comes from ovines that have been born, raised, and

 slaughtered in Uruguay;

 The meat comes from ovines that originate from premises where

FMD has not been present during the lifetime of any sheep 

slaughtered for the export of ovine meat to the United States.

 The meat comes from ovines that moved directly from the 

premises of origin to the slaughtering establishment without any 

contact with other animals;

 The meat has not been in contact with meat from regions other 

than those considered as FMD-free by APHIS (listed under 9 CFR 

§ 94.1(a)(2)); and 

 The ovine meat meets additional certification requirements under 

9 CFR § 94.11(c). These restrictions prohibit the export-approved 

slaughter establishment from receiving FMD-susceptible animals 

or animal products that originated, transited, or commingled with 

animals or animal products from regions that APHIS does not 

consider as FMD-free. 

Sheep in Uruguay are grass fed on extensive establishments, and may not 

be subject to routine supervision. Sheep might be distant from human 

contact for significant periods of time; therefore, close observation of 

animals might be infrequent and, subsequently, clinical signs might be 

missed. To ensure that the animals receive the appropriate inspection, 

APHIS will require that MGAP certify the following—

 The ovine meat comes from ovines that received both an ante-mortem 

and post-mortem veterinary inspection (which includes inspection of 
10

the head and feet) at the slaughtering establishment, with no evidence 

found of vesicular disease.

To address the possibility that animals may not show clinical signs of 

disease and be infected and viremic at the time of slaughter, APHIS will 

require MGAP to certify the following— 

 The ovine meat consists only of ovine parts that are, by standard 

practice, part of the animal’s carcass that is placed in a chiller for 

maturation after slaughter;

 Certain parts of an ovine’s head, feet, hooves, and internal organs 

may reach the necessary pH level during the required maturation 

process; however, these items can contain lymph tissue, depot fat, 

and blood clots that may potentially harbor FMDV that is not 

inactivated. Therefore, these parts would continue to be prohibited 

from importation into the United States. Specifically, no part of 

ovine heads, feet, hooves, and internal organs will be exported;

 All bone and visually identifiable blood clots and lymphoid tissue 

have been removed from the meat;

 The ovine meat comes from ovine carcasses that were allowed to 

maturate at 4 to 10 oC for a minimum of 24 hours after slaughter,

and that reached a pH of 5.8 or less at the middle of both 

longissimus dorsi muscles at the end of the maturation period; and

 The establishment in which the ovines are slaughtered allows a 

periodic on-site evaluation and subsequent inspection of its 

facilities, records, and operations by an APHIS representative.

III. Environmental Consequences

 

A. No Action

The biological history and disease potential of FMD suggest that 

continuation of the current regulations restricting fresh ovine meat (no 

United States entry) from Uruguay would result in no potential for 

increased disease risk and, therefore, no change in potential impact on the 

human environment. Although the required mitigations under the 

proposed action provide a means of export for Uruguayan producers that 

have been shown to be effective against all known strains of FMDV, there 

remains some potential risk that does not exist under the no action 

alternative.
11

The prohibition of importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay has 

maintained no disease risk from this commodity and negligible 

environmental effects in the United States. As with most commodities, 

there is always some risk of smuggling; however, the frequency is low due 

to the high punitive costs from noncompliance. The high potential risks 

from disease associated with noncompliance make it APHIS’ policy to 

provide a strong deterrent. Therefore, APHIS keeps importers and 

shippers informed of import regulations, as well as the penalties for 

inadequate compliance. The importer or shipper could be subject to civil 

penalties, criminal fines, jail sentences, and loss of revenue due to APHIS’ 

rejection of commodities, permit applications, and/or compliance 

agreements. APHIS has the option to refuse entry, require treatment, or 

require destruction of infected or potentially infected cargo. All of these 

options are costly to the shipping line and the exporter who must assume 

all costs for the delays and any treatments. This offers strong incentive for 

their full compliance with import regulations. Monitoring of the rates of 

compliance with a phytosanitary rule, promulgated in 1998, found that 

proper compliance with those import requirements was achieved 

approximately 98 percent of the time. Comparable compliance could be 

expected for any present or revised sanitary regulations related to the 

importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay. 

The issue of potential risks of an outbreak of FMD to the human 

environment in the United States is of great concern to APHIS as the 

consequences of an FMD outbreak in the United States would be 

extremely high. Animal illness and mortality from FMD would devastate 

wild and domestic susceptible populations and, thus, indirectly impact 

humans and other animals depending upon them as a food source. 

The no action alternative would leave the current importation regulations 

unchanged, that is, exportation of ovine meat from Uruguay to the 

United States would continue to be prohibited. The low FMD risk of 

ovine meat that has met certain conditions is not reflected in the current 

U.S. import regulations. The continuance of such unsupported trade 

restrictions would be contrary to U.S. obligations under its international 

trade agreements.

B. Proposed Rule 

The environmental consequences from promulgation of this rule are 

largely contingent upon the ability of various mitigations to prevent the

importation to the United States of any Uruguayan ovine meat that is 

potentially infected with FMDV. The disease risk analysis (USDA–

APHIS, 2008) of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay into the United States 

examined the sanitary concerns related to fulfilling the request from 

Uruguay’s MGAP. The analysis assessed the likelihood of introduction 

and outbreak of FMD in livestock in the United States from 
12

implementation of the rule. Findings of the risk assessment are 

summarized within this document and are incorporated by reference 

herein.

Compliance with NEPA requires APHIS to consider all potential effects to 

the human environment from this rule. In addition to consideration of 

disease issues related to livestock, this document analyzes characterization 

of the potential effects to humans, wildlife, and environmental quality. 

The information is presented by topics related to program requirements 

and associated mitigative actions that affect potential disease risks 

associated with the proposed ovine meat importation rule. This includes 

sections with issues related to the vaccination process, the meat maturation 

process, the regulatory control process, the disease transmission 

mechanism as related to wildlife, and the persistence of FMDV under 

various environmental conditions on or in environmental media, such as in 

soil, in water, on plants, and on abiotic surfaces. 

Foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) is the agent that causes FMD. 

FMDVs are members of the Picornaviridae family, and viruses of the 

genus Aphthovirus. FMDV is a small virus which is very infectious, 

multiplying in and causing damage to cells throughout the body of 

susceptible animals, and which can survive in the environment for 

extended periods of time. FMD is an acute, highly contagious viral 

disease, mainly, but not exclusively, of cloven-footed animals. The risk to 

humans from FMDV is very slight. Confirmed cases of FMD in humans 

are rare. Symptoms in humans are mostly mild and mainly include fever

and blisters on the hands, feet, mouth, and tongue. Patients usually 

recover within a week after the last blister formation (USDA–APHIS, 

2008). The major host species for FMDV is widely recognized to be 

domestic cattle. FMD is characterized by the formation of lesions on the 

feet and mouth, damage to the mucous membrane lining the 

gastrointestinal system, and high fever. Damage from FMDV may also 

occur to the heart muscle cells (particularly in young animals), the milksecreting cells of the udder, and hormone-producing cells. 

For FMD to remain in a population, each infected animal must infect at 

least one other animal. The primary methods in which FMDV moves out 

of an infected animal are in air-borne droplets from the lungs and the 

fluid-filled vesicles; in the saliva, urine, feces, semen, and milk; secretions 

from the eyes, nose, prepuce, and vagina; and through direct contact with 

skin or pieces of infected skin that may drop off the animal (WIN, 2001). 

It is also possible to transmit FMDV in infected carcasses on meat, hides, 

and bones (WIN, 2001). FMDV is commonly spread by the movement of 

infected animals; however, the virus may also move independently outside 

of the animal. Humans, birds, rodents, dogs, and cats may carry and 

spread the virus if they contact any of the above-mentioned body 

substances and, particularly with humans and probably other vertebrates, 

1. FMDV 
13

for a short time after they have breathed in the infected airborne droplets. 

The wind may move the air-borne droplets containing the virus up to 

250 kilometers over water and shorter distances over land (WIN, 2001). 

The virus must reenter a susceptible animal in which it can multiply; this 

can be through inhalation, ingestion, sexual transmission, conjunctival 

membranes, inoculation, and damaged skin.

It is possible for animals to carry FMDV without appearing clinically ill 

under conditions such as recovery from clinical disease, undetected 

subclinical disease, and exposure of vaccinated animals to the virus; 

however, reports of carrier animals infecting susceptible animals are 

extremely rare (WIN, 2001). Different strains1of FMDV have different 

capacities to establish persistent infection, and the proportion of animals 

that become carriers following exposure to virus varies depending on the 

severity of the challenge; however, it does not appear to be influenced by 

the age or sex of the host (WIN, 2001). The establishment of carriers is 

reduced in endemic areas if routine vaccination is used. Vaccination does 

not make animals into FMDV carriers. Properly inactivated vaccine, 

when injected into animals, does not give rise to the carrier state (WIN, 

2001).

Three general conditions must be fulfilled for a virus to persist long term 

in a host. First, the virus must be able to infect host cells without being 

lethal to the cell. Second, there must be mechanisms for long-term 

maintenance of the viral genome2in host cells. Third, the virus has to 

avoid detection and elimination by the host’s immune system (Fields, 

et al., 1996). Viruses have devised various strategies to accomplish these 

goals. The normal response of the immune system is to detect antigens5 

and establish an immune response to those antigens. A virus will modify 

specific antigens or proteins so as to evade the host’s immune system, 

thereby establishing persistent infection in the host. In the case of FMD, 

the modification of specific antigens or proteins gives rise to a substrain of 

virus.

Given that viruses tend to modify their antigenic and protein 

characteristics for persistent survival within the host, FMDV could have 

variations within a particular strain. Animal health authorities in Uruguay 

may respond to an outbreak by following a “stamping out” course of 

action, which involves the killing of susceptible animals, the vaccination 

of animals for the new strain, or a combination of both with other

emergency procedures. Regardless of the strain that may cause an 

outbreak, MGAP will deal with any outbreak in the same manner, and a 

 

1

A strain is a taxonomic subdivision of a micro-organism based on characteristic antigens or 

proteins.

2

A genome represents all of the genetic information or hereditary material possessed by an 

organism or micro-organism.

5

An antigen is a substance that can trigger an immune response, usually a foreign protein, which is 

not found naturally in the body.
14

sanitary state of emergency will be declared with the accompanying 

quarantine and movement restrictions and sanitary measures. 

FMD Surveillance

APHIS recognizes that FMD is endemic to some countries in South 

America, and that outbreaks of the disease may occur in the exporting 

region. It is possible that FMD-affected animals, animal products, people, 

and vehicles may cross domestic or international boundaries illegally. 

Effective FMD surveillance programs are essential in the prevention and 

containment of disease outbreaks. APHIS has evaluated the movement 

controls and detection capabilities in place for Uruguay, and has 

determined that they are adequate to maintain an overall low level of risk 

of introducing FMDV to the United States via the pathway of ovine meat 

exported from the designated region (USDA–APHIS, 2008). 

FMD surveillance performed in Uruguay is ongoing and can be broadly 

characterized as having two objectives: (1) determining the level of 

involvement of sheep and cattle in an FMD outbreak, and (2) determining 

the level of immunity of cattle as a result of vaccination, and to detect and 

quantify the existence of circulating FMDV in cattle and sheep 

populations (USDA–APHIS, 2008). It is mandatory to report suspected 

cases of FMD whereupon movement controls are swiftly imposed until 

FMD has been ruled out by authorized investigation. APHIS considers 

Uruguay to have implemented effective disease surveillance strategies for 

the proposed export region, and is not requiring additional measures for 

this mitigation (USDA–APHIS, 2008).

Uruguay employs dual (“active” and “passive”) systems of surveillance 

which are designed, in part, to mitigate potential detection complications 

associated with vaccination. The dual systems also provide a basis for 

demonstrating freedom from FMD over certain areas or periods of time. 

Generally speaking, the passive surveillance gathers qualitative 

information about FMD, and the active surveillance gathers quantitative 

data. Passive surveillance in Uruguay is bolstered by effective community 

education and involvement, while the bulk of active surveillance consists 

of the annual serological sampling of randomly selected animals and 

regular surveys of higher-risk areas (USDA–APHIS, 2008).

As of April 2007, extensive serological and clinical studies for FMD have 

been conducted in both cattle and sheep populations in Uruguay. No 

evidence of FMD has been found in any of the sheep tested. The APHIS 

disease risk analysis concludes that FMDV is not currently circulating 

within the sheep population of Uruguay, but takes the most conservative 

estimate—that asymptomatic FMD-infected ovines will be sent to 

slaughter—and includes additional mitigation requirements for the 
15

processing stage in order to minimize the risk of FMD-contaminated meat 

entering the United States.

Animal processing can lead to exposure and spread of FMD. Only ovines 

from production areas certified under the requirements of this rulemaking

action would be accepted for slaughter, and processing would occur only 

at approved facilities in the designated export region of Uruguay. 

Mitigations during processing will be required to allow for the detection 

and removal of animals showing clinical signs of disease, maturation and 

acidification of the ovine meat in order to inactivate any FMDV which 

may be present, and removal of animal parts in which no acidification 

occurs. Incorrectly processed meat may harbour FMDV and devastate 

exposed domestic and wild animal populations and, thus, pollute the 

environment with massive carcass disposals, as well as adversely affect 

the human economy and food supply.

A critical mitigation measure affecting the introduction potential of

FMDV is the drop in the pH of meat which accompanies rigor mortis 

(muscular stiffening following death). FMDV is sensitive to pH and 

cannot survive in skeletal muscle after rigor mortis has developed

provided that the appropriate pH is reached. The accumulation of lactic 

acid that accompanies rigor mortis decreases the pH of skeletal muscle. 

Virus survival is optimal between pH 7.2 and 7.6; at pH values above 9 or 

below 6, the virus is rapidly destroyed. As long as meat is maturated to a 

pH below 6, FMDV is inactivated, if present (AVIS, 2002). 

Several studies showed that in tissues where no acidification occurs (e.g., 

lymph nodes, bone marrow, fat, and blood), the virus may survive for 

extended times in cured, uncured, and frozen meat (USDA–APHIS, 2008). 

OIE recommends a minimum maturation time of 24 hours and a pH value 

less than 6 for beef where vaccination is practiced. Currently, processing 

facilities in Uruguay follow the European Union export standards of 

24 hours minimum of maturation at 2 to 10 oC, and rejection of maturated 

carcasses with a pH greater than 5.9. Ovine meat destined for export to 

the United States must originate from carcasses allowed to maturate at 4 to 

10 oC for a minimum of 24 hours, but no more than 60 hours, to reach a 

pH of 5.8 or less. 

The production protocols (which will be required under the final rule for 

allowing ovine meat from Uruguay to be exported to the United States) are 

designed to mitigate the risk of FMD in ovines sent to slaughter (USDA–

APHIS, 2008). In order to move sheep or lambs to slaughter in Uruguay,

their owner must secure four required documents. The animals must 

travel directly from farm to slaughter establishment and be accompanied 

by a MGAP certificate of sanitary status of the farm, the original health 

certificate (issued by a private, registered veterinarian), an export 

2. FMD and 

 Ovine Meat 

 Processing
16

slaughter waybill (with appropriate seals intact), and the cleaning and 

disinfection certificate for the transport vehicle (USDA–APHIS, 2008).

As discussed earlier in this document, the ovine population in Uruguay is 

not vaccinated against FMD. Cattle vaccination against FMD is 

mandatory; however, some animals may have a limited response resulting 

in partial or no immunity. These animals may develop unapparent clinical 

signs of the disease while still shedding virus and allowing the exposure of 

sheep flocks to FMDV. Additionally, infected sheep may not always 

develop typical clinical signs of FMD. To address the possibility that 

animals may not show clinical signs of disease and be infected and 

viremic at the time of slaughter, APHIS proposes to require MGAP to 

certify the following— 

 The ovine meat consists only of ovine parts that are, by standard 

practice, part of the animal’s carcass that is placed in a chiller for 

maturation after slaughter. 

 Certain parts of an ovine’s head, feet, hooves, and internal organs may 

reach the necessary pH level during the required maturation process; 

however, these items can contain lymph tissue, depot fat, and blood 

clots that may potentially harbor FMDV that is not inactivated. These 

parts would continue to be prohibited importation into the United 

States. Specifically, no part of ovine heads, feet, hooves, and internal 

organs will be exported. 

 All bone and visually identifiable blood clots and lymphoid tissue have 

been removed from the meat.

 The ovine meat comes from ovine carcasses that were allowed to 

maturate at 4 to 10 oC for a minimum of 24 hours after slaughter, and 

that reached a pH of 5.8 or less at the middle of both longissimus dorsi 

muscles at the end of the maturation period.

 The establishment in which the ovines are slaughtered allows a 

periodic on-site evaluation and subsequent inspection of its facilities, 

records, and operations by an APHIS representative.

The mitigations already required at slaughter for exporting fresh beef from 

Uruguay into the United States are similar to those that would be required 

to export ovine meat. APHIS considers the MGAP system to be effective 

and closely followed by slaughter establishment employees. Some 

modifications would need to be made to adopt the proposed export 

requirements; however, these would be similar in nature to those already 

employed (USDA–APHIS, 2008). Although the consequences of an FMD 

outbreak in the United States would be very high, given the findings of the 

2008 risk analysis, APHIS considers the risk of FMD-infected ovine meat 

entering the United States from the export region and exposing U.S. 
17

livestock through feeding of infected materials to susceptible animals to be 

low.

APHIS has determined that Uruguay possesses the detection capabilities, 

reporting systems, and emergency response systems that are necessary for 

combating FMD in the export region, and that the potential masking of 

disease in the ovine population is effectively mitigated through 

appropriate processing procedures. The proposed mitigations will utilize 

existing technology and regulatory infrastructure in Uruguay, and are 

designed to reduce the risk of FMD outbreaks in the United States by 

mitigating risk of the disease in the export regions. There are no adverse 

environmental consequences expected in Uruguay or the United States due 

to implementation of the ovine meat processing requirements in the 

designated regions under this rule. 

In order to mitigate the risk of introduction of FMDV to susceptible 

animal populations via the pathway of imported Uruguayan ovine meat, 

APHIS is proposing a systems approach similar to that used for the 

importation of Uruguayan beef into the United States. Based upon 

documentation submitted by Uruguay, published reports, and site visits by 

APHIS–VS in July 2002 and March 2007, APHIS considers that 

Uruguay’s MGAP has sufficient legal authority to carry out official 

control, eradication, and quarantine activities for animal health programs,

and that officials of MGAP have demonstrated an infrastructure adequate 

for rapid detection of FMD and for carrying out surveillance and 

eradication programs (USDA–APHIS, 2008).

The country of Uruguay is subdivided into State-like jurisdictions known 

as departments. Departmental level veterinary services enforce the animal 

health laws in Uruguay. MGAP oversees their operation, and establishes 

and enforces animal health regulations nationally to prevent the 

introduction and spread of animal pests and diseases. MGAP’s movement 

controls over cattle (the domesticated species considered most vulnerable 

to FMD) are stringent and are linked to FMD vaccination coverage. The 

ovine population is, however, considered to present a small likelihood of 

being a carrier of the infection, and is prohibited from FMD vaccination in 

order to serve as a sentinel population for the introduction of FMDV into 

Uruguay (Saraiva, 2004; USDA–APHIS, 2008). Cattle and sheep in 

Uruguay often share pastures; however, the vaccination campaign 

targeting cattle has been shown to be a successful deterrent of FMD by 

providing an effective barrier of protected animals between infected and 

susceptible animals (USDA–APHIS, 2008; AVIS, 2007). MGAP officials 

conduct regular inspections and testing of ovine and bovine populations; 

no sheep have been identified as positive for FMD since the 2001 outbreak 

(USDA–APHIS, 2008). Should there be a pest or disease outbreak that 

requires emergency action to be taken, such as an FMD outbreak, 

Uruguay’s police and army would be deployed to support the response and 

3. Regulatory 

Control of 

FMD
18

protect established quarantine barriers between the zones that are pest- or 

disease-free and those that are known to have the pest or disease (USDA–

APHIS, 2008).

The central unit for the animal movement control and tracking system in 

Uruguay is the Livestock Movement Controls Directorate (DICOSE). In 

some circumstances, such as breeding sheep sold at auction, animals will 

receive unique identification numbers; however, generally, sheep are 

registered in groups and identified by owner rather than by individual 

animal. The monitoring system includes mandatory reporting of the 

owner’s land holdings, animal inventory and movement, changes in 

animal status, vaccination and treatment histories, and so on, and must be 

available to DICOSE upon request. All animal movement is documented 

and monitored by Uruguayan police and tracked by DICOSE, regardless 

of destination or change in ownership. Sheep sent for slaughter must be 

certified by a MGAP-registered veterinarian, and their origin and 

destination documented. Vehicles used to transport the animals must also 

bear certification of appropriate cleaning and disinfection. Animals are 

tracked throughout the slaughterhouse process, and packaged meat can be 

traced to the farm of origin. The DICOSE system facilitates animal 

tracing for disease eradication purposes, and enables Uruguay to certify 

the origin of exported animals and animal byproducts. 

It is general knowledge that movement of FMD-susceptible species or 

products can result in viral transmission where there are insufficient 

physical barriers between FMD-affected and -unaffected areas. Uruguay’s 

international borders are jointly monitored by Uruguay, Argentina, and 

Brazil in a regional disease control effort. Even so, disease introduction 

into Uruguay from these neighboring countries has occurred. The latest 

outbreak of FMD in Uruguay was in 2001; the virus is believed to have 

entered the country via mechanical contamination from Argentina 

(USDA–APHIS, 2008). A human factor in this transmission is likely as 

Uruguay is separated from Argentina by two rivers which provide 

geographic barriers to the spread of FMD. Uruguay shares a traversable 

land border with Brazil, however, is otherwise bounded by the Atlantic 

Ocean. In areas where natural barriers do not exist, and at its ports of 

entry, Uruguay has established effective governmental protocols to protect 

its animal populations against FMD. Border surveillance and extensive 

biosecurity measures are in place to control the movement of people, 

animals, and goods as they enter the country. Imports of FMD-susceptible 

livestock from approved countries are quarantined and tested. Imports of 

live FMD-susceptible animals are prohibited from Argentina and Brazil as 

both countries have been potential sources of FMD virus in the past. 

Uruguay participates with Argentina and Brazil in the Cuenca del Plata 

Agreement—a harmonized regional subprogram of the PANAFTOSA 

Hemispheric Plan for the Eradication of FMD—reporting and responding 

to disease risks in neighboring South American countries. APHIS has 
19

evaluated the FMD control program in Uruguay and concluded that 

MGAP could and would detect disease in sheep and other animals quickly, 

limit its spread, and report promptly (USDA–APHIS, 2008).

In the United States, APHIS provides Federal regulation and assistance 

and information concerning FMD, and operates an ongoing system of 

emergency response and disease controls (USDA–APHIS, 2002). Recent 

outbreaks of FMD in the United Kingdom and a suspected case of the 

disease in a domestic herd of swine in Minnesota provided opportunities 

to test the FMD programs in place in the United States (USDA–APHIS, 

2007; DJIN, 2007); the Minnesota response proved sufficient. Moreover, 

to date, no FMD has been detected in the United States from either 

incident. The following sequence of events is likely to occur should an 

FMD epidemic be caused by the importation into the United States of 

ovine meat from Uruguay—

 an inspector, farmer, or other individual would report a suspicious 

case; 

 Federal agriculture and national security personnel would be deployed, 

followed by involvement, as necessary, of the Departments of State, 

Transportation, and Health and Human Services; 

 a quarantine area would be established, tissue samples would be 

analyzed, and lab determinations published; and,

 depending on jurisdiction, Federal or State authorities would regulate 

the methods and materials used for animal movement, vaccination, 

culling and carcass disposal, cleaning and disinfection, and 

surveillance. 

FMD is one of the most contagious animal diseases known (AVIS/OIE, 

2000); although rare human cases have occurred, FMD is not considered 

zoonotic under natural conditions (Enserink, 2001; AVIS, 2007). Natural 

infection with FMDV has been reported worldwide in animal families 

including the Bovidai, Cervidai, Suidae, Tayasuidae, Camelidae, 

Giraffidae, Erinaceidae, Muridae, Elephantidae, Tapiridae, and Ursidae 

(Mouchantant et al., 2005). Transmission between susceptible clovenhoofed wild and domesticated animals is possible, and is known to have 

occurred once in the United States in 1924 (Rhyan et al., 2006). The virus 

may also be transmitted mechanically by humans and nonsusceptible 

animals, such as rodents and birds. 

FMD can cause blisters and flu-like symptoms in humans, and lasting 

debilitation or death in cloven-hoofed animals. There is no known 

treatment for FMD (AVIS, 2007). The severity of the disease and 

expression of symptoms can vary greatly, even within a species. Sheep 

4. Interspecies 

Transmission

 of FMD 
20

are generally considered to be “carriers,” while swine are “amplifiers,” 

and cattle are “indicators” (CIDRAP, 2007). Although occasionally FMD 

can be very destructive to wildlife populations (for example, the South 

African impala in the late 19th century, or, more recently in mountain 

gazelles in Israel (Shimshony et al., 1986; Thomson et al., 2003)), 

generally FMD “results in a relatively mild disease from which the 

affected animals recover in a week or two.” 

The transfer of FMD from wildlife to domestic animals may be unlikely. 

In Africa, deer, wild antelope, wild swine, and African buffalo have been 

linked to FMD outbreaks in domestic species (AVIS, 2002); however, 

wildlife has not been responsible for any of the more recent incursions of 

the disease which have occurred in Southeast Asia, South America, and 

Western Europe (Thomson et al., 2003). Once FMD has been eradicated 

from livestock, “it has also generally disappeared from wildlife in those 

regions . . . Wildlife appear to have been an extension of the disease in 

livestock (Thomson et al., 2003).” Although certain species of wild 

ungulates can become carriers, the likelihood that they will transmit the 

infection in uncrowded field conditions is rare (Pinto, 2004; Vosloo et al., 

2005). There are several ways the virus may be transferred between 

wildlife and susceptible livestock (USGS, 2001; WDNR, 2003), including 

the following—

 exposure to infected saliva, feces, urine, milk, semen, meat, and meat 

byproducts of infected animals;

 exposure to viral particles carried via wind, animals, or on virtually 

any object (farm equipment, hay, shoes, etc.);

 drinking from a common source of contaminated water; and

 exposure to raw or improperly cooked, infected garbage. 

In order to conduct a thorough analysis of the effect this rule could have 

on the human environment in the United States, APHIS examined the 

consequences of movement of FMDV between wild animals and domestic 

livestock within Uruguay and surrounding regions, as well as within the 

United States. There is the possibility that wildlife in Uruguay and 

neighboring regions may become infected with or transport FMDV and,

by their natural movement, infect FMD-free Uruguayan livestock being 

slaughtered for export, ultimately resulting in contaminated meat being 

imported into the United States. FMDV can survive for long periods of 

time in meat (EUFMD, 2007). Once virus-infected meat enters the United 

States, susceptible livestock and wildlife are at risk of contracting and 

spreading the disease. North American wildlife (including white-tailed 

deer and other deer species, feral pigs, bison, moose, antelope, peccaries, 

musk ox, caribou, sheep, and elk) are known to be susceptible to FMD and 

would likely be targeted for eradication in the vicinity of FMD outbreaks 

(USGS, 2007a; USGS, 2007b). Loss of livestock, rare species, and habitat 

due to the culling process, the pollution of the environment from mass 
21

carcass disposals, and increased danger to humans and animals from 

widespread disinfectant or other chemical uses are all likely in the event of 

an FMD outbreak (Pinto, 2004).

a. Uruguay and Surrounding Countries

The importance of wildlife in the transmission and maintenance of FMD 

in South America has not been established; however, it is accepted that the 

wildlife there may be secondarily affected by outbreaks in domestic 

species (Saraiva, 2004). While FMDV can be transmitted over long 

distances and remain viable for up to 15 weeks under certain conditions 

(USDA–APHIS, 2008), the potential for transmission between wildlife 

and domestic livestock in Uruguay is offset by the country’s strict 

surveillance program and animal movement controls (USDA–APHIS, 

2008). The country’s system of animal husbandry, in which housing and 

pasturing of cattle, swine, and small ruminants (such as sheep or goats)

occur mainly at fixed places, allows for effective control of FMD by the 

vaccination of only cattle (Barteling et al., 2004). Successive serological 

surveys have been conducted in Uruguay, including regions where wild 

animals may be in contact with domestic livestock; the survey results have 

revealed no evidence of viral activity in sheep (USDA–APHIS, 2008).

Generally, viral transfer of FMD is possible when wildlife and livestock 

exist within close proximity to one another. The APHIS risk analysis for 

Uruguayan ovine meat considers geographic barriers and international 

borders in terms of the legal and illegal movement of domestic livestock 

and processed meat (USDA–APHIS, 2008); these areas could also be 

considered temporary reservoirs for FMDV if wildlife became infected. 

Wildlife may move across traversable national boundaries and infect 

other wildlife and livestock by means such as sharing contaminated 

water, exposure to infected saliva, feces, urine, or mechanical transfer of 

the virus. 

As previously stated, animals need not be susceptible to FMD to spread 

the virus. Certain wild and domestic species may become infected and 

shed virus without showing clinical signs, thus, acting as carriers of FMD 

(USGS, 2001; Kitching and Hughes, 2002; Thomson et al., 2003). FMDV

can survive up to 91 hours on the feathers of live birds and can pass 

unaltered through their digestive system (WDNR, 2003). In addition, the 

pathway need not be a live animal. Infectious levels of virus can survive 

in cleaned, salted, and dried intestine destined for sausage casing, or in the 

clothing and nasal passages of human travelers (Haas and Kramer, 2000; 

Schoenian, 2005).

In Uruguay and surrounding countries, there is the potential for wildlife to 

consume infected garbage present in livestock feed or landfill sites. 

APHIS observed birds feeding at a landfill in the neighboring country of 
22

Brazil. It is realistic to assume that if there were other wildlife in the area, 

they could transport the virus mechanically via their fur, feathers, saliva,

or droppings. To date, however, there is no evidence that Uruguayan 

wildlife visiting landfills is a vector for FMD transmission. APHIS 

considers the feeding of contaminated waste to swine (which then transmit 

the virus to other livestock populations) to be the primary pathway for 

virus introduction in Uruguay (USDA–APHIS, 2008). Because of the risk 

from FMD transmission, Uruguay prohibits garbage feeding to livestock,

and requires landfills to be inspected and their waste heat-treated to ensure 

that there is no possibility for exposure to wild or feral animals (USDA–

APHIS, 2008).

b. The United States

The United States has retained an FMD-free status since 1929 (AVIS, 

2007). Prohibition of importation of live ruminants and swine and their 

products from FMD-affected countries, and the avoidance of contact with 

livestock, zoo animals, or wildlife by returning travelers continues to be 

considered essential for preventing FMD outbreaks (AVIS, 2007). 

However, there is the potential for infection and interspecies spread of 

FMD in the United States should infected meat be imported into the 

country. 

If FMDV-contaminated meat were imported and disposed of in U.S. 

landfills or as an ingredient of livestock feed, susceptible wildlife 

populations could become infected. For example, the rapidly growing 

white-tailed deer and feral pig populations in the United States are leading 

to increased foraging, scavenging, predation, and contact with domestic 

livestock populations; these species can be wiped out or provide another 

source of infection (USGS, 2001; LDWF, 2007; ODA, 2007). In addition, 

non-susceptible animals and humans can transfer the virus mechanically, 

as has been discussed. 

The United States has already battled FMD in wildlife populations. In 

1924, for example, in a section of Stanislaus National Forest, California, 

FMD became established in deer (CDA, 1926). At the time of the 

outbreak it was impossible to gather the wild deer to determine the extent 

of infection. The eradication effort, where all deer were either poisoned or 

shot within a 1,000-square mile area of the national forest, took 2 years. 

Available literature does not indicate that the wild deer ever reinfected 

cattle herds. The eradication process was expensive, restricted human and 

livestock access to the area, and angered people who were concerned with 

the well-being of the wild deer population. 

APHIS cooperates with other Federal and State authorities in the detection 

and management of notifiable disease outbreaks in the United States. If 

susceptible wild species should be exposed to FMD, Morgan et al. (2003) 
23

suggested analyzing and possibly implementing the following measures in 

order to prevent the transmission of the disease to domestic livestock—

 lethal collection of wild animals for diagnostic testing,

 provisions for surveillance zone,

 the possibility of reducing the density of susceptible wildlife 

populations within an infected zone,

 long-term observation, and

 additional prevention and control measures, such as the closure of 

hunting seasons and restriction of access to public lands by humans 

(because humans can spread the virus via physical contact).

c. Ongoing Wildlife Research

While in 1925 eradication was the method used to control the spread of 

FMD from wild animal populations to domestic livestock, APHIS believes 

that FMD most likely will be self-limiting in wildlife in the long term 

(Fischer, 2001). In the event of an FMD outbreak, the risk to wildlife will 

depend on the distribution, density, and biology of species in the affected 

location, the level of exposure to infected animals, and existing 

environmental conditions (Corn and Fischer, 2001). In order to develop 

more effective control of FMD, more needs to be understood about the 

epidemiology of the disease and the role of possible wildlife reservoirs. 

USDA’s Agricultural Research Service, in association with the 

Department of Homeland Security and a Maryland biopharmaceutical 

company, has developed a new FMD vaccine which is not only affordable, 

but can be manufactured in the United States without using infectious 

FMD materials. The current formulation is for use on cattle and may 

prove effective in protecting domestic and wild animal populations. The 

vaccine will allow for improved diagnosis and response, and may lead to a 

change in trade restrictions as it is possible to tell whether an animal 

possessing FMD antibodies acquired them from vaccination or from 

infection (FASS, 2007). 

Uruguay may consider an ecosystems approach to FMD eradication 

similar to the one used globally against rinderpest, another serious animal 

disease agent (FAO/GREP, 2008). APHIS has recently recognized

Uruguay as free of rinderpest (Federal Register, 11/13/07). Successful 

rinderpest eradication has resulted by considering virus persistence, 

surveillance, and control in “ecosystems” whose boundaries are defined by 

trading partners rather than national borders; an ecosystems approach may 

also work in the case of FMD (EMPRES, 2007). Currently, APHIS 

interacts with USGS–National Wildlife Health Center to coordinate 

research and monitor outbreaks of FMD in South America. This Federal 

team is developing prevention and contingency plans for informing U.S. 

land management and conservation agencies about the risk that FMD 
24

poses to wildlife (USGS, 2007a). In addition to helping the United States 

control FMD in wildlife populations, these efforts may also assist Uruguay 

if confronted with interspecies spread of FMD in the future. 

FMDV may persist in the environment for extended periods of time when 

susceptible animals come in close contact with other animals that have 

been exposed to the virus. For a virus to become freely circulating, it must 

be able to persist in the environment either inside or outside of the host 

long enough to infect a susceptible host. The Cottral study (1969) reports 

the survival time of FMDV on or within various contaminated objects at 

ambient temperatures as shown in table 1.

In addition to the objects listed in table 1, many other contaminated items 

have been suspected as the source of FMD outbreaks including various 

domestic or wild animals and birds, humans, truck tires, and even postal 

materials. The survival time of FMDV is shorter for the virus in the 

environment than for the virus in animals. Sunlight, temperature, pH 

changes, relative humidity, and the dilution effect of rain and melting 

snow all affect virus survival; however, sunlight and ultraviolet radiation 

have little effect on virus persistence (Pharo, 2002). Longer survival times 

for FMDV on objects would be expected at the low temperatures 

associated with high altitudes or the arctic regions than at sea level or in 

the tropical regions. Although temperatures above 50 oC destroy most 

infectivity, it is likely that a small proportion of the virus particles are 

relatively resistant to the effects of heat and pH in most populations 

(Pharo, 2002). 

The effect of temperature and pH on time for 90 percent virus inactivation 

is shown in table 2 and table 3, respectively, based on findings from the 

Bachrach et al. (1975) study. There is also the potential for FMDV to be 

disseminated over considerable distances by aerosols (Cottral, 1969). In 

aerosols, FMDV survives best when the relative humidity exceeds 

70 percent and there is a critical humidity level of 55 to 60 percent, below 

which survival is poor (Pharo, 2002). Based on available scientific data, 

the survival of residual FMDV in the external environment, following 

eradication of an outbreak of FMD in susceptible animals, would be 

expected to persist no longer than 8 months.

5. Environmental 

Fate 

of FMDV
25

Table 1. Survival Time of FMD Virus on Various Contaminated Objects At 

Ambient Temperatures.

Contaminated Objects Weeks of Survival

Soil, S–W 71–21

Barn dirt; Barn sand 1–10

Road sand; garden soil 1.5–4

Manure, S–W 1–24

Sewage, S–W 3–15

Barns (brick, adobe, wood), S–W 2–11

Walls, brick and plaster 2–4

Soil, water, lichens 4

Pasture plants, S–W 1–7

Haystack, S–W 4–29

Feed sacks; bran 20

Meal 7

Vegetables 1

Water 3–14

Houseflies 10

Ticks 15–20

Wool, sheep 2

Hair, cattle 4–6

Glass surface 2

Clothing and footwear, S–W 83–9, 14

Meat cloth (at 4 oC) 6

 

7

S–W, 1–21: summer 1 week, winter 21 weeks.

8

Cotton garments, leather shoes, rubber boots.
26

Table 2. Effect of Temperature (at pH 7.5) On Time for 90 Percent FMD 

Virus Inactivation.

Temperature Inactivation time (90 percent)

61 oC 30 seconds

55 oC 2 minutes

49 oC 1 hour

43 oC 7 hours

37 oC 21 hours

20 oC 11 days

4

oC 18 weeks

Table 3. Effect of pH (at 4 oC) On Time for 90 Percent FMD Virus 

Inactivation.

pH Inactivation time (90 percent)

10.0 14 hours

9.0 1 week

8.0 3 weeks

7.0–7.5 >5 weeks

6.5 14 hours

6.0 1 minute

5.0 1 second

FMD may affect humans, however, its occurrence is quite rare. The 

number of cases reported is so small when compared with the number of 

persons exposed to FMD that it is generally not considered a threat to 

humans. FMDV has been isolated and typed in only 40 patients during the 

last century. Symptoms in humans are mostly mild and mainly include 

fever and blisters on the hands, feet, mouth, and tongue. Patients usually 

recover within a week after the last blister formation (USDA–APHIS, 

2008). 

Perhaps more importantly, an FMD outbreak of the magnitude observed in 

the United Kingdom can result in severe psychosocial effects on farmers 

and farming communities. Farmers and their families can suffer from 

grief over losing animals (in some cases blood lines kept over many 

generations), as well as loss of control over their lives due to movement

restrictions, disruptions in community life, and short- and long-term stress 

over their financial future. Researchers from Lancaster University in the 

United Kingdom conducted a new study into the social consequences of 

FMD in the Cumbria community; the study revealed high rates of 

depression, alcohol consumption, and mortality among farmers during the 

crisis (USDA–APHIS, 2008). 

6. Public 

Health
27

Based on evaluation of the 11 factors and observations from the site visits, 

Uruguay demonstrates it has the detection capabilities, reporting systems, 

and emergency response systems that are necessary for combating FMD in 

the export region. It was also found that Uruguay demonstrates that the 

potential masking of disease in the ovine population is effectively 

mitigated through appropriate processing procedures. Further, any 

potential environmental impacts resulting from this rulemaking are 

sufficiently mitigated and, therefore, present a low risk. Moreover, there 

are no significant environmental impacts anticipated as a result of 

implementing the proposal to allow fresh ovine meat to be imported into 

the United States from Uruguay.

IV. Other Environmental Issues 

A. Environmental Justice and the Proposed Action

Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions to Address Environmental 

Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,” requires 

each Federal agency to make achieving environmental justice part of its 

mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately 

high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, 

policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income 

populations in the United States and its territories and possessions. This

rule allows for the importation of fresh ovine meat to the United States.

Importation of fresh ovine meat from Uruguay, under the proposed action, 

is not expected to substantially affect profits of any meat, including beef 

producers in the United States. Most of the impact-generating compliance 

actions under this rule occur outside of the United States (in Uruguay),

and none have any disproportionate adverse effects on minority or lowincome populations. Although one could design scenarios involving 

introduction of FMD to the United States, these are primarily remote and 

hypothetical. Even if such scenarios did occur, the resultant impact to 

minority and low-income populations would be expected to be negligible.

B. Protection of Children and the Proposed Action

Executive Order 13045, “Protection of Children from Environmental 

Health Risks and Safety Factors,” requires each Federal agency to address 

disproportionate environmental health risks or safety risks to children 

from implementation of proposed policies, programs, activities, and 

standards. Changes pertaining to this rulemaking do not pose greater risks 

to children than to other parts of the affected populations. The risks from 

importation depend primarily upon adherence to the sanitary requirements 

for entry of ovine meat; this adherence precludes the potential for adverse 

effects to humans and makes other introduction-related risks remote and of 

negligible concern in regard to the protection of children. 
28

C. Threatened and Endangered Species and the 

Proposed Action 

Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and its implementing regulations 

require Federal agencies to ensure their actions are not likely to jeopardize 

the continued existence of threatened or endangered species or result in 

the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. APHIS 

considered the potential effects of the proposed action on threatened and 

endangered species and designated critical habitat. There are six listed 

ungulate species that are potentially susceptible to FMD (table 4);

however, based on the application of required mitigation measures for the 

importation of ovine products, there is no likelihood for these species to be 

exposed to and, thus, affected by this action. Therefore, APHIS expects 

this rule will have no effect on threatened or endangered species or their 

critical habitat in the United States.

Table 4. Endangered Species in the United States Susceptible to Foot-and

Mouth Disease. 

Common Name Scientific Name Critical 

Habitat Listing Status

Woodland caribou Rangifer tarandus caribou No Endangered

Columbian whitetailed deer

Odocoileus virginianus leuceurus No Endangered

Key deer Odocoileus virginianus clavium No Endangered

Sonoran pronghorn Antilocapra americana sonoriensis No Endangered

Bighorn sheep Ovis Canadensis Yes Endangered

Sierra Nevada 

bighorn sheep

Ovis canadensis californiana No Endangered

APHIS conducted a risk analysis to determine the risk of infected ovine 

products entering the United States from Uruguay. APHIS concluded that 

the FMD risk from importing fresh ovine meat that had met certain 

conditions prior to export was low, and that matured, deboned ovine meat 

could be safely imported from Uruguay. As a result, the potential to 

expose U.S. livestock or other susceptible species to FMDV is considered

to be low (USDA–APHIS, 2008). Therefore, implementation of this

rulemaking is expected to have no effect on federally listed threatened or 

endangered species or designated critical habitat. 

 
29

D. Potential Cumulative Impacts 

The potential impacts from this rule in combination with similar actions 

are referred to as cumulative impacts. Based upon the findings of the risk 

analysis, these impacts are not expected to pose any substantial risks 

(USDA–APHIS, 2008). Although importation of fresh ovine meat does 

increase the potential for introduction of FMD to the United States, the 

program mitigations required of producers and slaughtering 

establishments in Uruguay make introduction of the disease extremely 

unlikely, even when considering other importations of fresh beef and 

future importations of ovine meat from countries with comparable risks 

(such as Argentina and Brazil). It is difficult to precisely quantify the 

potential cumulative impacts which are dependent upon both the disease 

conditions in Uruguay and compliance with importation conditions in 

Uruguay and other regulated countries. The nature of disease mitigation is 

of principal concern for this issue, and the constraints provided by 

program mitigations are considered to provide adequate protection.
30

V. Listing of Agencies Consulted

Environmental and Risk Analysis Services

Policy and Program Development

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

4700 River Road, Unit 149

Riverdale, MD 20737–1237

Regionalization Evaluation Services

National Center for Import & Export

Veterinary Services

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

4700 River Road, Unit 38

Riverdale, MD 20737–1231

Regulatory Analysis and Development

Policy and Program Development

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture

4700 River Road, Unit 118

Riverdale, MD 20737
31

VI. References

 

AVIS—See Advanced Veterinary Information System 

Advanced Veterinary Information System, 2002. The Advanced 

Veterinary Information System. Foot-and-mouth disease (2002 suite). 

AVIS/FMD/Control: Species of wildlife susceptible to FMD. [Online]. 

Available: http://www.aleffgroup.com/AVISFMD/ [2011, Aug. 26].

Advanced Veterinary Information System /OIE, 2000. International 

Office of Epizootics: Animal disease cards. Foot and mouth disease 

(FMD). Office International des Epizooties: August 30, 2000. [Online]. 

Available: http://www.aleffgroup.com/avisfmd/cards/A010-fmd-00.HTM. 

[2007, Aug. 21].

Advanced Veterinary Information System, 2007. American Veterinary 

Medical Association. Foot-and-mouth disease backgrounder. February 

14, 2007. [Online]. Available: 

http://www.avma.org/reference/backgrounders/fmd_bgnd.pdf [2007, 

Nov. 7].

Bachrach, H.L., Breese, S.S., Callis, J.J., Hess, W.R., and Patty, R.E., 

1975. Inactivation of foot-and-mouth disease virus by pH and temperature 

changes and by formaldehyde. Proceedings of the Society for 

Experimental Biology and Medicine, 95, 147–52.

Barteling, S., Yadin, H., and Sutmoller, P., 2004. Appendix 19: 

Discussion paper on guidelines for control of foot-and-mouth disease 

(FMD) vaccine quality and performance in the field. [Online]. Available: 

http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/commissions/docs/greece04/App19.pdf 

[2007, Nov. 8].

CDA—See California Department of Agriculture

California Department of Agriculture, 1926. The epizootic of foot-andmouth disease in California, February 17, 1924 to June 10, 1926. Charles 

Keane, D.V.S. Special Publication No. 65, 110 pp. Sacramento, CA.

CIDRAP—See Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy 

Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 2007. University of 

Minnesota, Academic Health Center. Foot-and-mouth disease. [Online]. 

Available: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/biosecurity/agbiosec/anim-disease/foot-mouth.html [2007, Sept 13].
32

Corn, J., and Fischer, J., 2001. What if FMD hits? Southeastern 

Cooperative Wildlife Disease Study (SCWDS) Briefs, April 2001, 17.1 

[Online]. Available: 

http://www.uga.edu/scwds/topic_index/2001/WhatifFMDHits.pdf

[2011, Aug. 26].

Cottral, G.E., 1969. Persistence of foot-and-mouth disease virus in 

animals, their products and the environment. Bull. Off. Int. Epizoot., 

70(3):549–68. Nov. 7, 2007.

Cottral, G.E., Cox, B.F., and Baldwin, D.E., 1960. The survival of footand-mouth disease virus in cured and uncured meat. American Journal of 

Veterinary Research, 288–297.

DJIN—See Dow Jones International News

Dow Jones International News, 2007. Associated Press. White House 

GOT secret summer briefings on foot-mouth concern. Source: APHIS 

NewsAlert Oct. 16, 2007: Dow Jones International News: Oct. 15, 2007.

Enserink, Martin, 2001. The English Patient. ScienceNOW 2001 (426): 

2. April 26, 2001. [Online]. Available: 

http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org [2007, Sept. 20].

EUFMD—See European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth 

Disease 

European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, 2007.

The Disease: transmission. FAO/AGA/The European Commission for 

the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. [Online]. Available: 

http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/commissions/en/eufmd/dis_transmiss.html

[2011, Aug. 26].

FAO/GREP—See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 

Nations, Global Rinderpest Eradication Programme

FASS—See Federation of Animal Science Societies

Federal Register, 2007. Foot-and-mouth disease status of Uruguay: final 

rule. Federal Register/Vol. 72, No. 218/Tuesday, Novermber 13, 

2007/Rules and Regulations. Pages 63796–63797

Federation of Animal Science Societies, 2007. Foot-and-mouth disease 

vaccine developed by USDA, ARS Scientists. Article #1244, distributed 

May 31, 2007. [Online]. Available: 

http://www.fass.org/page.asp?pageID=205 [2007, Oct. 16].
33

Fields, B.N., Knipe, D.M., and Howley, P.M., 1996. Fundemental 

Virology, 3rd Edition.

Fischer, John, 2001. APHIS policies for wildlife in an FMD emergency. 

southeastern cooperative wildlife disease study (SCWDS) Briefs, April 

2001, 17.1 [Online]. Available: 

http://www.uga.edu/scwds/topic_index/2001/APHISPoliciesforWildlifeina

nFMDEmergency.pdf [2007, Nov. 6].

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/Global 

Rinderpest Eradication Programme, 2008. Agriculture and Consumer 

Protection Department, Animal Production and Health Division. March 

25, 2008. [Online]. Available: www.fao.org/ag/AGAinfo//////program 

mes/en/grep/home.html [2008, Sept 25].

Haas, B., Kramer, M., 2000. Appendix 11: Possible introduction of 

FMDV with sheep intestines from FMD countries. FAO/AGA/The 

European Commission for the Control of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. 

[Online]. Available: 

http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/commissions/en/eufmd/archive/resgr_boro

vet.html [2007, Nov. 6].

Kitching, R.P., Hughes, G.J., 2002. Clinical variation in foot and mouth 

disease: sheep and goats. OIE: Rev. sci. tech. Off. int. Epiz., 2002, 21 

(3), 505-512. [Online]. Available: http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D476.PDF

[2011, Aug. 30].

LDWF—See Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 2007. Surveillance plan 

to help control wild hog population adopted. [Online]. Available:

http://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/news/29613 [2011, Aug. 30].

Morgan, J.T., Fischer, J., Hostetler, M.E., 2003. If foot-and-mouth disease 

came to Florida: potential impact on white-tailed deer in Florida. 

University of Florida. [Online]. Available:

http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/BODY_UW183 [2004, Oct. 20].

Mouchantant, S., Haas, B., Lutz, W., Pohlmeyer, K., Frolich, K., 2005. 

Absence of antibodies to foot-and-mouth disease virus in free-ranging roe 

deer from selected areas of Germany (2001–2002). Wildlife Disease 

Association: Journal of Wildlife Diseases 41(3), July 2005, pp. 599–605.

ODA—See Oregon Department of Agriculture
34

Oregon Department of Agriculture, 2007. Story of the Week: Feral swine 

action plan getting some attention in Oregon. [Online]. Available: 

http://oregon.gov/ODA/docs/pdf/news/070808pigs.pdf [2011, Aug.26].

Pharo, H.J., 2002. Foot-and-mouth disease: An assessment of the risks 

facing New Zealand. New Zealand Veterinary Journal, 50(2), 46–55.

Nov. 14, 2007.

Pinto, Aramis A., 2004. Foot-and-mouth disease in tropical wildlife. 

Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1026:65–72 (2004).

Rhyan, J., Shalev, M., Gidlewski, T., McCollum, M., Ward, G., Deng, M.,

McKenna, T., and Salman, M., 2006. Susceptibility of North American 

wild ungulates to foot-and-mouth disease virus: initial findings. 

FAO/EUFMD Reports, 2006 Session of the Research Group of the 

Standing Technical Committee of EUFMD (Pahphos, Cyprus: October 

2006). [Online]. Available: 

http://www.fao.org/AG/AGAInfo/commissions/en/eufmd/Paphosvtrans.html [2007, Oct. 17]. 

Saraiva, Victor, 2004. Foot-and-mouth disease in the Americas: 

epidemiology and ecologic changes affecting distribution. Annals of the 

New York Academy of Sciences, 1026:73–78 (2004).

Schoenian, S., 2005. Mad cow and foot-and-mouth. University of 

Maryland, Maryland Cooperative Extension, Western Maryland Research 

& Education Center. Dec. 23, 2005. [Online]. Available: 

http://www.sheepandgoat.com/articles/bse_fmd.html. 

[2007, Sept. 20].

Shimshony, A., Orgad, U., Baharav, D., Prudovsky, S., Yakobson, B., Bar 

Moshe, B., Dagan, D., 1986. Malignant foot-and-mouth disease in 

mountain gazelles. Veterinary Record (1986) 119, 175–176.

Thomson, G.R., Vosloo, W., Bastos, A.D.S., 2003. Foot-and-mouth 

disease in wildlife. Virus Research 91 (2003) 145–161

USDA, APHIS—See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service, 2008. (Draft) Risk Analysis: foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) 

Risk from importation of fresh (chilled or frozen) matured, and deboned 

ovine meat from Uruguay into the United States. Jan. 7, 2008. 
35

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service, 2007. APHIS Veterinary Services, Centers for Epidemiology and 

Animal Health Info Sheet: CEI Impact Worksheet Foot and Mouth 

Disease, United Kingdom. August 8, 2007.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection 

Service, 2002. APHIS Veterinary Services factsheet: USDA 

safeguarding measures against foot-and-mouth disease. January 2002.

USGS—See U.S. Geological Survey 

U.S. Geological Survey, National Wildlife Health Center, 2007a. Wildlife 

Health Bulletin #01-01 from Bob McLean, Director NWHC: Foot and 

mouth disease in Europe—fact sheet. June 28, 2007. [Online]. 

Available: http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov [2011, Aug. 30].

U.S. Geological Survey, National Wildlife Health Center, 2007b. Foot 

and Mouth Disease. June 28, 2007. [Online]. Available:

http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov [2011, Aug. 30].

U.S. Geological Survey, Office of Communication, 2001. USGS issues 

wildlife health alert for foot-and-mouth disease. Released 4/18/01. 

[Online]. Available: http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=480

[2011, Aug. 30].

Vosloo, W., Bastos, A.D.S., Sahle, M., Sangare, O., Dwarka, R.M., 2005. 

Chapter 10: Virus topotypes and the role of wildlife in foot-and-mouth 

disease in Africa. The World Conservation Union (IUCN): Conservation 

and development interventions at the wildlife/livestock interface (Steven 

Osovsky, ed.), 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.wcsahead.org/slides_pdfs/wilnavosloo.pdf [2007, Nov. 14].

WIN—See Wildlife Information Network

Wildlife Information Network, 2001. Picornaviridae: Foot-and-mouth 

disease virus. [Online]. Available: 

http://www.wildlifeinformation.org/Subdirectories_for_Search2/SampleSp

ecies/picornaviridae/Picornaviridae_FMDVirus.htm [2011, Aug. 30].

WDNR—See Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2003. Foot-and-mouth 

disease: issues for Wisconsin wildlife. April 17, 2003. [Online]. 

Available:

http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/land/wildlife/whealth/issues/fmd.htm

[2004, Sept. 15].