alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2449 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2449

  To modify the estate recovery provisions of the medicaid program to 
give States the option to recover the costs of home and community-based 
     services for individuals over age 55, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

           September 21 (legislative day, September 12), 1994

 Mr. Feingold introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To modify the estate recovery provisions of the medicaid program to 
give States the option to recover the costs of home and community-based 
     services for individuals over age 55, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERIES.

    Section 1917(b)(1)(B) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``consisting of--'' and all that 
follows and inserting the following: ``consisting of--
                    ``(i) nursing facility services and related 
                hospital and prescription drug services; and
                    ``(ii) at the option of the State, any additional 
                items or services under the State plan.''.

SEC. 2. REQUIRING STATES TO REGULATE GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF NURSING 
              FACILITY BEDS.

    (a) In General.--A nursing facility shall not receive reimbursement 
under the medicare program under title XVIII of the Social Security 
Act, the medicaid program under title XIX of such Act, or any other 
Federal program for services furnished with respect to any beds first 
operated by such facility on or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act unless a certificate of need is issued by the State with respect to 
such beds.
    (b) Issuance of Certificate.--A certificate of need may be issued 
by a State with respect to a geographic area only if the ratio of the 
number of nursing facility beds in such area to the total population in 
such area that is likely to need such beds is below the ratio included 
in guidelines that are established by the State and approved by the 
Secretary under subsection (c).
    (c) Approval of Guidelines.--The Secretary shall promulgate 
regulations under which States may submit proposed guidelines for the 
issuance of certificates of need under subsection (b) for review and 
approval.
                                 <all>
```
No. 09-1191.

#### Antwon Daniels, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 946, 131 S. Ct. 73,

178 L. Ed. 2d 241,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7683.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.

Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

Same case below, 590 F.3d 499.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 6513** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. STANLEY HOBEREK , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern Di strict of West Virginia , at Wheeling
. Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., Senior District Judge. ( 5:99

- cr - 00013

- FPS

- JES

- 1 )

Submitted : September 28, 2010 Decided: October 4, 2010

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DAVIS , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Stanley Hoberek, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Hugh McWilliams, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Stanley Hoberek seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2010 ) motion, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certi ficate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006) ; Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 06)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 5 29 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion state s a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Hoberek has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismi ss the appeal.3 Additionally, we construe Hoberek ’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. United States v. Winestock , 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims based on either: (1) newly discovered evidence, not previously discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional err or, no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review. 28 U.S.C. A. § 22 55(h ) (West Supp. 2010)
. Hoberek ’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to fi le a successive § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the cou rt and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

DISMISSED
No. 09-11317.

#### In re Ronald D. Blamey, Petitioner.

562 U.S. 825, 131 S. Ct. 177,

178 L. Ed. 2d 255,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7715.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
No. 09-11537.

#### Randy Thomas Naves, Petitioner v. Steven Turley, Warden.

562 U.S. 886, 131 S. Ct. 217,

178 L. Ed. 2d 130,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7017.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.

*131Same case below, 372 Fed. Appx. 866.
II

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2204

To provide authority for the NRC to recover costs of regulating Agreement

State programs.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 16 (legislative day, JUNE 7), 1994

Mr. DURENBERGER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

A BILL

To provide authority for the NRC to recover costs of

regulating Agreement State programs.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Regu5 latory Commission Fee Equity Act of 1994’’.

6 SEC. 2. COLLECTION AUTHORITY.

7 Section 6101(c) of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation

8 Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 2214) is amended to read as fol9 lows:

10 ‘‘(c) ANNUAL CHARGES.—
2

S 2204 IS

1 ‘‘(1) PERSONS SUBJECT TO CHARGE.—Any li2 censee of the Commission or any State with which

3 the Commission has entered into a cooperative

4 agreement pursuant to section 274 of the Atomic

5 Energy Act of 1954, as amended, may be required

6 to pay, in addition to the fees set forth in subsection

7 (b), an annual charge.

8 ‘‘(2) AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF CHARGES.—The

9 aggregate amount of the annual charge collected

10 from all persons subject to such charge, as identified

11 in paragraph (1), shall equal an amount that ap12 proximates 100 percent of the budget authority of

13 the Commissions in the fiscal year in which such

14 charge is collected, less any amount appropriated to

15 the Commission from the Nuclear Waste Fund and

16 the amount of fees collected under subsection (b) in

17 such fiscal year.

18 ‘‘(3) AMOUNT.—The Commission shall estab19 lish, by rule, a schedule of charges fairly and equi20 tably allocating the aggregate amount of charges de21 scribed in paragraph (2) among persons subject to

22 such charge as identified in paragraph (1). To the

23 maximum extent practicable, the charges shall have

24 a reasonable relationship to the cost of providing

25 regulatory services and may be based on the alloca-
3

S 2204 IS

1 tion of the Commission’s resources among licensees,

2 classes of licensees, and States with which the Com3 mission has entered into a cooperative agreement

4 pursuant to section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act

5 of 1954, as amended.’’.

Æ
No. 10-5785.

#### August C. Ghilarducci, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 937, 131 S. Ct. 345,

178 L. Ed. 2d 224,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7258.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
No. 10-5150.

#### Francisco Kelly-Palmer, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 906, 131 S. Ct. 250,

178 L. Ed. 2d 165,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6929.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

*166Same case below, 360 Fed. Appx. 941.
No. 10-5535.

#### Armando Leyva, Petitioner v. Antonio Williams, et al.

562 U.S. 927, 131 S. Ct. 315,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7472.

178 L. Ed. 2d 205,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
Exhibit 32

                                CERTIFICATIONS OF
                             CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                    SECTION 906 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the annual report on Form 10-KSB of GPS Industries, Inc.
(the " Company") for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the " Report"), I, Robert
C.  Silzer,  hereby  certify in my capacity  as  President  and Chief  Executive
Officer of the Company,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350 as adopted pursuant
to  Section  906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of  2002,  that  to the  best of my
knowledge and belief:

            1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

            2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



Dated: April 19, 2004            By:  /s/ Robert C. Silzer
                                      -----------------------------------------
                                   Name:  Robert C. Silzer
                                   Title: President and Chief Executive Officer


     In connection with the annual report on Form 10-KSB of GPS Industries, Inc.
(the " Company") for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the " Report"), I, Robert
C.  Silzer,  hereby  certify in my  capacity as Chief  Financial  Officer of the
Company,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge and belief:

            1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

            2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



Dated: April 19, 2004            By:      /s/ Robert C. Silzer
                                    -------------------------------------
                                       Name:  Robert C. Silzer
                                       Title: Chief Financial Officer
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-75,855

EX PARTE ZON EDWARD THOMAS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 21524-A IN THE 86TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM KAUFMAN COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of possession of

more than one gram of methamphetamine and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. The Eighth

Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Thomas v. State, No. 08-05-247-CR (Tex. App. - El Paso,

pet. dismissed).

Applicant contends that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance because counsel

failed to timely file a petition for discretionary review for Applicant. Appellate counsel filed an
THOMAS - 2

affidavit with the trial court. Based on that affidavit, the trial court has entered findings of fact and

conclusions of law that appellate counsel filed a petition for discretionary review for Applicant, but

it was dismissed because the filing was not timely. The trial court recommends that relief be

granted. We find, therefore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time

petition for discretionary review of the judgment of the Eighth Court of Appeals in Cause No. 08-05-

247-CR that affirmed his conviction in Case No. 21524 from the 86th Judicial District Court of

Kaufman County. Applicant shall file his petition for discretionary review with the Eighth Court

of Appeals within 30 days of the date on which this Court’s mandate issues.

Delivered: February 27, 2008

Do not publish
#### People v Banker

3d Dept: 138 AD3d 1253 (Clinton)

denied 8/2/16 (Abdus-Salaam, J.)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           3,104
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   60,906
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     17,379
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         390,598
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 585,811
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           75,048
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           307
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   585,811
<SALES>                                        340,507
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               424,693
<CGS>                                          254,508
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  306,993
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                74,109
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,680
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 35,748
<INCOME-TAX>                                    29,407
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              6,341
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  1,511
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,830
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .16
        

</TABLE>
# Sexual assault prevention and EEO combine training efforts for Land and Maritime first responders

/ Published July 2, 2021
COLUMBUS, Ohio, 
Defense Logistics Agency Land and Maritime’s Sexual Assault Prevention Response Coordinator and Equal Employment Opportunity office combined to provide targeted training to the Defense Supply Center Columbus’ first responders June 24 as part of annual training requirements.

Shari Murnahan, Land and Maritime Sexual Assault Prevention Response coordinator, and Penny Coop, Land and Maritime Equal Employment Opportunity director, provided training to approximately 50 first responders during three sessions over a two-day period. The training was tailored to accommodate the groups multiple shift schedules to ensure they maintained operations.

Murnahan explained that training for law enforcement officers is often done in person and working through the pandemic during the past 15 months made meeting that requirement challenging. This session was the first time the training requirements were combined to afford officers the opportunity to complete two annual requirements in person for the first time since the pandemic began.  

After Murnahan’s welcome Copp transitioned into the training portion that addressed employees’ rights and explained how sexual harassment is considered a form of discrimination. “Sexual harassment can create a hostile work environment for an associate,” Copp said. Copp further explained the 45-day timeline associates have to report a sexual harassment allegation or risk the complaint being denied.

Although all DLA associates are required to attend annual SAPR training, the requirements for police officers, security forces and first responders are structured differently due to the sensitive situations they encounter when responding to sexual assault incidents or assisting someone who wants to report a potentially harmful situation.

Transitioning into the sexual assault portion of the training Murnahan talked about some of the differences that distinguish sexual assault from sexual harassment. She said sexual assault involves intentional physical contact and that the response protocols are different. “Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination, whereas sexual assault is a crime and has no time restrictions on reporting,” Murnahan said.

SARCs serve as victim advocates while EEO officers work more directly in filing a harassment case where they transfer the investigative responsibilities to a third party. SARCs regularly connect victims to support resources through referrals.

The duo closed out the training with the presentation of a video titled Trauma and the Brain to help first responders better understand the myriad emotions and responses they may be confronted with when encountering sexual assault victims.

To learn more about the SAPR program and confidential reporting options visit https://www.dla.mil/Info/SAPR.aspx or call 1-800-841-0937
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1990

___________ Rodney Van Huskey, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Glen Boyer; Charles Richmond; Larry * Lashley; Bill Strickland; Linda Powell; * Appeal from the United States Ed Danielson; Unknown Hamlin; * District Court for the Dave Uinns; Dennis Lassing; C.D. * Eastern District of Missouri. Goben; Dave Owens; Jim Gould; Brian * Smith; Elaine Riggs; Dave Davis; * [UNPUBLISHED] Debbie Westerman; Kent Menning; * Harry Dunman; Jim Ballard; Matthew * Delia; Marty Harris; Steve Devore; * Fred Bradley; Dennis McHawes; Francis * Bequette; Jane Doe; N. Scharnhorst; * Steve Stivner, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: June 5, 1998 Filed: July 13, 1998

___________ Before FAGG, BEAM, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.The Hon orable Donald J. Stohr, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1 District of Missouri.
-2- Rodney Van Huskey appeals the di strict court & s dismissal with prejudice of his 1 42 U.S.C. § 1 983 complaint for, inter alia, failing to comply with the court & s show

cause order and failing to prosecute. After careful review of the record and the parties & briefs, we conclude the dismissal of Huskey & s complaint was not an abuse of discretion. See Rodge rs v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 135 F.3d 1216, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998 ) (standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm. See8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy.
Attest:
CLE RK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT

.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTHA ELENA CARPIO GUERRA,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 09-73638

Agency No. A072-118-162

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 24, 2011** 

Before: PREGERSON, THOMAS, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

Martha Elena Carpio Guerra, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to

reopen proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, Singh v.

FILED

JUN 09 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-73638

Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005), we grant the petition for review

and remand.

The BIA decided this case without the benefit of our decision in Perdomo v.

Holder, in which we remanded for the agency to determine “whether women in

Guatemala constitute a particular social group, and, if so, whether [petitioner] has

demonstrated a fear of persecution” on account of her membership in a protected

group. 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, we grant the petition for

review and remand to the BIA for further proceedings. See INS v. Ventura, 537

U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam).

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT

**CHRISTOPHER ALLEN JONES,**

**Petitioner**

**v.**

**COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BERKS COUNTY READING, PA ET AL,** 
**RESPONDENTS AND KATHLEEN G.**
**KANE ATTORNEY GENERAL THROUGH**
**KELLY M. SEKULA SENIOR DEPUTY**
**ATTORNEY GENERAL APPEALS AND**
**LEGAL SERVICE SECTION AND BERKS COUNTY PRISON RECORDS OFFICE,** 
**AND COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA CLERK OF COURT,** 
**DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICE AND**
**JOHN E. WETZEL SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,**  **RECORDS OFFICE SUPERVISOR,**
**GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR SUPERVISOR, AND RIGHT TO KNOW** 
**LAW GOVERNOR'S OFFICE AND MAGISTRATE JAMES TUPPER,**  **DISTRICT JUSTICE,**

**Respondents :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

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**:**

**:**

**:**

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**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 101 MM 2016** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 30th day of September, 2016, the “Petition fo r King Bench** 

**Extraordinary Jurisdiction” is** DENIED

**.**