COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00346-CR

WALTER HALL APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Walter Hall was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery with a 

deadly weapon and was sentenced to forty years’ confinement in the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In two points, Hall argues 

that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) the 

identification procedure used to identify him violated his due process rights under 

both the United States and Texas constitutions. Because we hold that the 

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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evidence is sufficient to support Hall’s conviction and because Hall failed to 

properly preserve his challenge to the identification procedure, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

Sufficiency Challenge

In his first point, Hall asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 

verdict against him. Specifically, Hall claims an improper identification process 

irrevocably tainted his conviction. Hall further argues that the items of physical 

evidence introduced at trial fail to connect him to the robbery as a matter of law.

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a 

reviewing court must consider all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in 

the light most favorable to the verdict to determine, based on that evidence and 

reasonable inferences, whether a rational fact finder could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 

746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We defer to the jury’s weight and credibility 

determinations because it is within the jury’s sole province to assess credibility, 

resolve conflicts in testimony, and weigh the evidence. Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Each fact need not point directly and 

independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all 

the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper v. 

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
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At trial, Fredy Gonzalez testified that while he was at home with his young 

son and daughter on a summer evening, a large man entered his home uninvited 

through the back door. Dressed in black pants, black shirt, and mask, the man 

pointed a long .38 caliber black revolver at Gonzalez. He demanded money.

The man then removed the cash from Gonzalez’s wallet, which Gonzalez 

testified was about $32.00, hit Gonzalez in the head, and shot at Gonzalez 

twice. The gun made noises, but no bullets were fired. The man also searched 

several rooms of the home. In Gonzalez’s daughter’s bedroom, the robber 

demanded jewelry without success. Ultimately, the robber took cash from the 

wallet, a flat-screen Toshiba television, its remote control, and Gonzalez’s cell 

phone with him when he exited the home.

Gonzalez, with the aid of his neighbor, contacted the police, and several 

police officers responded. Officer Matthew McMeans contacted Air One, the Fort 

Worth Police Department’s helicopter, and requested helicopter support to locate 

the individual. The remaining officers responding to Gonzalez’s call established 

a search perimeter in the wooded area around Gonzalez’s home and, with the 

help of the Air One helicopter, located a man without a shirt but otherwise 

matching Gonzalez’s description of the intruder. When Air One shined its light on 

the man, he ran. The police identified themselves and ordered the man to stop,

but he kept running. A chase ensued, and ultimately the man was tackled and 

detained. During the detainment, the suspect was not compliant—kicking, 
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fighting, yelling. A Toshiba remote control was found in the back pocket of the 

suspect’s black pants. The suspect was later identified as Hall.

Once Hall was restrained and in the police car, the police transported him

to Gonzalez’s home and asked Gonzalez to identify the suspect while the 

suspect sat in the patrol car. Gonzalez testified, “I looked at him and he looked 

just like him, because he had been wearing the black shirt and black pants, but at 

the time that I saw him the second time, he was just wearing the plastic

[covering], but he looked exactly like him when he was wearing the black pants, 

but at that time he was no longer wearing a mask.”

A search of the area revealed a flat-screen Toshiba television in an open 

field and a black, torn shirt hanging on a barbed wire fence. The officer who 

found the shirt testified that the shirt was sweaty or damp and that he therefore 

believed that the shirt had not been there long. Despite a search, no gun was 

located; however, a later search of Hall’s pants pockets did reveal $26.00 in cash 

and six .38 caliber bullets. Additionally, in a search of Gonzalez’s home, the 

police found a hat near the back door that did not belong to Gonzalez.

Subsequent DNA testing on the hat matched Hall.

Hall argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove he was the person 

who robbed Gonzalez because the identification process used at the crime scene 

was improper and because certain physical evidence admitted at trial was not 

relevant or credible. We disagree. This court must evaluate all the evidence in 

the record, whether admissible or inadmissible, when making a legal sufficiency 
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determination. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); 

Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 529 

U.S. 1131 (2000). Thus, regardless of whether Gonzalez’s identification of Hall 

at the scene as his attacker was properly admitted, such evidence is properly 

considered in a sufficiency review of the evidence. See Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 

767; Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 740. Similarly, Hall’s complaint that certain items of 

physical evidence were not relevant fails under a sufficiency challenge for the 

same reason. See Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 767; Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 

197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Finally, Hall’s credibility challenge to certain items of 

physical evidence, such as the hat recovered at Gonzalez’s home, fails to 

acknowledge or recognize that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of 

witnesses and of the strength to be given to the evidence. See Brooks, 323 

S.W.3d at 899. It is “the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts 

in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from 

basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.

Here, the jury heard evidence that Hall, a man fitting Gonzalez’s 

description of his attacker, was found running near the scene of the robbery soon 

after the robbery. The jury further heard evidence that Hall refused to stop 

running when ordered by the police and that once he was detained, he had in his 

back pants pocket the remote control stolen from Gonzalez’s home. Additionally, 

the jury heard that Hall had approximately the same amount of cash in his 

possession that Gonzalez had reported stolen from his wallet and six bullets in 
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his pocket that were of the same caliber as the gun used in the robbery. Finally, 

the jury heard that Hall’s hat was found at Gonzalez’s home and that Gonzalez 

identified Hall as his attacker a short time after the crime. On this record, we 

conclude that a jury could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall 

committed aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon against Gonzalez. We 

overrule Hall’s first point.

Identification Procedure

In his second point, Hall argues that Gonzalez’s “show-up,” “one-on-one” 

identification of him violated his due process rights under both the United States 

and Texas constitutions. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S. Ct. 

1967, 1972 (1967) (recognizing that based on totality of circumstances, 

confrontation of accused for identification purposes may infringe due process

rights). Hall asserts that eyewitness identification carries great weight with a jury 

yet, here, the identification was too suggestive to have credibility.

The admissibility of evidence may be challenged in either of two ways: (1) 

by objecting to the admission of the evidence at the time it is offered at trial and 

requesting a hearing outside the presence of the jury; or (2) by filing a pretrial 

motion to suppress evidence and having the motion heard and ruled on before 

trial. Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Here, Hall 

failed to do either. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the identification 

evidence as impermissibly suggestive and unreliable, but he did not obtain a 

ruling on the pretrial motion. During trial, Hall raised no objection to Gonzalez's
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testimony concerning his identification of Hall at the scene. To preserve a 

complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the appellant made his 

specific complaint known to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or 

motion and that the trial court ruled on the request, objection, or motion. Tex. R.

App. P. 33.1(a); Ross v. State, 678 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 

Because Hall did not obtain a ruling on his motion to suppress or object to the 

identification evidence at trial, he has failed to preserve this issue for review. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Aguilar v. State, 26 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2000). We overrule Hall’s second point.

Conclusion

Having overruled Hall’s two points, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN

JUSTICE

PANEL: MCCOY and MEIER, JJ.; and PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN (Senior Justice, 

Retired, Sitting by Assignment)

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: September 12, 2013