J-S30045-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JOHN MONROE MOHLER

Appellant No. 3499 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 14, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0004290-2013

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED JULY 14, 2015

Appellant John Monroe Mohler appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas following his bench 

trial conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (highest rate, 

second offense) (“DUI”).1 We affirm.

On September 20, 2013, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Adam 

Dickinson observed Appellant’s vehicle nearly cause an accident while 

turning abruptly out of a parking lot and across a lane of traffic. Trooper 

Dickinson followed Appellant and, over the course of two miles, witnessed 

Appellant’s vehicle drive in a fashion that caused the trooper to pull 

Appellant over to investigate whether he was intoxicated. Seeing sufficient 

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1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).
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indicia of intoxication, Trooper Dickinson ultimately arrested Appellant for 

DUI and related offenses.2

On April 25, 2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking 

suppression of evidence from the traffic stop. The trial court conducted a 

hearing on June 19, 2014, and denied the suppression motion on August 11, 

2014. 

On November 14, 2014, following a stipulated non-jury trial, the trial 

court convicted Appellant of DUI. On the same date, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to 15 days’ incarceration followed by 2 years of County 

Intermediate Punishment, with the first 75 days to be served on electronic 

home monitoring.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 26, 2014. Both 

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by not suppressing evidence 

gained by the [t]rooper after making a motor vehicle stop. 

Specifically, the trial court erred by finding that the [t]rooper 

possessed probable cause to effectuate a motor vehicle stop and 

that he also possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that 

[Appellant] was driving intoxicated.

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2

Police also charged Appellant with multiple summary violations: 

disregarding traffic lane, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309, failure to yield entering or 

crossing roadway, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3324, turning movements and required 

signals, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3334, careless driving, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714, and failure 

to wear seatbelt, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4581. The Commonwealth withdrew the 

summary charges and proceeded only on the DUI charge at trial.
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Appellant’s Brief, p. 4.

Appellant claims that the trial court erred in determining the trooper 

possessed probable cause to pull him over. Appellant argues that, because 

triggering the emergency lights of the police vehicle would have engaged the 

motor vehicle recorder (“MVR”) in the trooper’s car, the fact that the MVR 

did not record Appellant’s driving means his driving must not have 

warranted a motor vehicle violation, and thus the trooper did not have the 

requisite suspicion to pull him over. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 7-8. 

Appellant further avers that the indications of intoxication the MVR recorded 

“are suspect at best[,]” and concludes he is entitled to a new trial. Id. at 8. 

We disagree.

Regarding vehicle stops, the Vehicle Code provides as follows:

Authority of police officer.--Whenever a police officer is 

engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers 

or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is 

occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request 

or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, 

proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or 

engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other 

information as the officer may reasonably believe to be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).

“The threshold justification for a vehicle stop is reasonable suspicion.” 

Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 927 A.2d 289, 290 (Pa.Super.2007) (citing

Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa.Super.2006)). The 

police may stop a motorist on reasonable suspicion of DUI. 75 Pa.C.S. § 
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6308(b); Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.2008) 

(“Extensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle stop for DUI 

may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop investigation is 

normally feasible.”); Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 270 

(Pa.Super.2005) (“a suspected violation for DUI is in fact a scenario where 

further investigation almost invariably leads to the most incriminating type 

of evidence . . . This type of evidence can only be obtained by a stop and 

investigation[]”). “In order to determine whether the police officer had 

reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. 

In making this determination, [a court] must give due weight . . . to the 

specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled to draw from the 

facts in light of his experience.” Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984, 

990 (Pa.Super.2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848 

(Pa.Super.2007)). “[T]he totality of the circumstances test does not limit 

[an] inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate 

criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken 

together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Id. 

Further, our Supreme Court has stated, “when the existence of reasonable 

suspicion combines with the expectation that the stop will allow light to be 

shed on the relevant matters, the stop is not unconstitutional.” Chase, 960 

A.2d at 115.

This Court has ruled that erratic driving alone can impart a reasonable 

suspicion of DUI. In Commonwealth v. Hughes, police followed the 
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defendant on a limited access highway and observed the defendant’s vehicle 

swerve from the right northbound lane onto the right-hand berm, back into 

the right lane, and then into the left-hand lane of northbound traffic. 908 

A.2d 924, 926 (Pa.Super.2006). The police observed the defendant swerve 

two more times into the left-hand lane while following the defendant for the 

next one-half to three-quarters of a mile. Id. This Court ruled that, based 

upon these observations, the police had sufficient reasonable suspicion to 

stop and detain the defendant for DUI. Id. at 927. See also

Commonwealth v. Sands, supra, (reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for 

DUI existed where, in the early morning hours, police observed vehicle drift 

across a roadway fog line and then slowly drift back into lane); 

Commonwealth v. Masters, 737 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Pa.Super.1999) 

(reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop existed where defendant’s 

erratic driving raised police concerns about the safety of the driver, even 

where the driver’s conduct did not endanger other motorists). 

The trial court summarized the suppression hearing testimony and its 

determination thereon as follows:

Upon consideration of the testimony provided by 

Commonwealth witness [] Trooper Dickinson, who has six years 

of experience and approximately forty-five (45) DUI-related 

vehicle stops, and the MVR video admitted as Commonwealth 

Exhibit #1 at the pretrial hearing held on June 19, 2014, the 

[c]ourt accepts the material facts testified to by Trooper 

Dickinson as its factual findings. The testimony established that, 

as Trooper Dickinson was traveling westbound on Business 

Route 30 (“Lancaster Ave.”) in an area west of Route 340, Caln 

Township, on routine patrol in a marked patrol car, he observed 
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[Appellant’s] vehicle, described as a blue Cadillac, abruptly make 

a left turn out of a parking lot on the north side of Lancaster 

Ave. without signaling, in order to head eastbound on Lancaster 

Ave., traveling across the path of a westbound pickup truck at 

such close proximity as to create a hazard. The trooper testified 

that the truck driver applied his brakes in response to the 

maneuvers of [Appellant’s] vehicle; however, there were no skid 

marks left on the roadway and no accident resulted. Trooper 

Dickinson made a U-turn and began following [Appellant’s] 

vehicle in order to investigate further by observation. Trooper 

Dickinson followed [Appellant’s] vehicle for approximately two 

miles before actuating a vehicle stop. The trooper testified that, 

over the course of those two miles, [Appellant’s] vehicle 

travelled over the yellow dividing line, nearly into a turning lane 

to the left of [Appellant’s] lane of travel, as well as travelling to 

the right side of his travel lane, nearly striking a guardrail and 

curb several times. These observations led the trooper to 

manually engage his MVR device and to continue following 

[Appellant’s] vehicle for investigative purposes, before pulling 

[Appellant] over to check his license and registration, and to 

investigate whether [Appellant] was intoxicated.

We conclude that Trooper Dickinson, based upon his direct 

observation of [Appellant’s] driving, had probable cause to 

believe a number of Vehicle Code violations had occurred in his 

presence (i.e. [Appellant’s] vehicle turning without signaling, 

entering a roadway from a parking lot without yielding to 

oncoming traffic, and travelling outside his lined lane), and had 

reasonable suspicion to believe that [Appellant] was driving his 

vehicle while intoxicated, which provided the foundation for a 

lawful vehicle stop and further investigation by the trooper. 

Additionally, the trooper has articulated specific observations 

which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from 

those observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of 

his experience, that criminal activity was afoot. Considering the 

totality of the circumstances, he therefore had the authority to 

stop [Appellant’s] vehicle under the provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. § 

6308(b).

Subsequent to the authorized vehicle stop, Trooper 

Dickinson was justified in conducting further investigation by 

questioning [Appellant] and asking him to perform field sobriety 

tests, based on direct observations made by the trooper at the 

time of the stop, and the totality of the circumstances, which led 

him to reasonably suspect that [Appellant] might be under the 
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influence of alcohol while operating his vehicle, such as the smell 

of alcohol emanating from [Appellant’s] breath and person, 

[Appellant’s] ostensible confusion while speaking with the 

trooper, and [Appellant’s] difficulty in performing field sobriety 

tests. After noting multiple indicia of intoxication in [Appellant’s] 

demeanor, Trooper Dickinson effected a lawful arrest of 

[Appellant] based upon the probable cause that [Appellant] had 

been operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 

Therefore, the [c]ourt must deny [Appellant’s] Omnibus Pretrial 

Motion (Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence).

Trial Court’s August 11, 2014 Order,3 pp. 2-3 n.1.

The trial court properly determined that the trooper needed only 

reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant and conduct further investigation into 

whether he was driving while intoxicated. The trial court further properly 

determined that the trooper’s observations of Appellant’s vehicle provided 

the requisite reasonable suspicion. The trooper observed Appellant abruptly 

make a left turn out of a parking lot on the north side of Lancaster Ave. 

without signaling, cutting across a lane of traffic and nearly causing an 

accident. Thereafter, the trooper observed Appellant for two miles, during 

which time Appellant’s vehicle travelled left over the yellow dividing line, 

nearly into the oncoming lane of traffic, and also travelled so far to the right 

of his lane of traffic as to nearly strike a guardrail and curb several times. 

These observations provided Trooper Dickinson with (1) reasonable 

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3 The trial court submitted a brief Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that referenced 

and attached the court’s August 11, 2014 order in which it explained its 

denial of Appellant’s suppression motion.
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suspicion to stop Appellant and further investigate whether he was 

intoxicated, and (2) probable cause to stop Appellant for the numerous 

moving violations with which he was later charged.4 Accordingly, the trial 

court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2015

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4 We acknowledge that, unlike a suspected DUI situation, where a vehicle 

stop may lead to further evidence of the offense, “[m]ere reasonable 

suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot 

serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” 

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super.2010) (en 

banc). In such an instance, an officer must articulate specific facts 

possessed by him at the time of the stop that would provide probable cause 

to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of 

the Code. Id. In the instant case, Trooper Dickson articulated sufficient 

specific facts to justify a vehicle stop even in the absence of the suspected 

DUI. See Footnote 2, supra.