2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 5-8-2003 

# M a nnel l a v . Al leghe n y P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t 02-2448

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2003 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion
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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/565* Judge Becker complet ed his term as Chief Judge on May 4, 2003. NOT PRE CEDENT IAL IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT No. 02-2448

________________________________ 

### JEANNINE MANNELLA; FRANK MARCIW, her husband,

Appellants
v. COUNTY OF A

LLEGHENY; MARTIN SCH MOTZER

____________________________ App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the W estern Distric t of Pe nnsy lvania (D.C. No. 98-cv- 00979) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Robert J. Cindrich

____________________________ Argued March 14, 2003 Be fore : BE CK ER , Chief Judge , * RENDELL an d AMBRO

Circuit Judges
. (Fil ed May 6, 2003)
VINC ENT A. COPPO LA, ESQUI RE ( ARGUED) Priba nic & Priba nic 513 Court Place Pitt sburgh, PA 15219 Co unse l for A ppella nts-2-

CHARLES P. MCCULLOUGH, ESQUI RE County Solici tor CAROLI NE LI EBENGUT H, ESQUI RE ( ARGUED) Assist ant County Soli citor Allegheny County Law Department 300 Fort Pit

t Commons B uildi ng 445 F ort Pitt Bouleva rd Pitt sburgh, PA 15219 Counsel for

Appellees

____________________________

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

_____________________________ BE CK ER , Chief Judge
. On Feb ruary 2, 1996, Jeannine Mannella was terminated from her position as a bond counter i n the Clerk of Courts of Allegheny County ( the “County”) . Asserting that ge nde r d is cr imi na ti on mo ti va te d he r d is mis sa l, Mann el laan d he r h us ba nd, Fr an k Mar ci w, filed a co m plain t aga inst th e C oun ty in the D istrict Co urt o n Ju ne 4 , 199 6, alle gin g, inter alia , a vi olati on of Titl e VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , a deprivat ion of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Unit ed State s Constit ution i n violat

ion of 42 U.S. C. § 1983, and a number of state consti tuti onal and tort clai ms. After di scovery, Mannella amended her complai nt to al lege a vi olati on of the First Amendm ent by rea son of poli tica l ret aliation. With respect to the § 1983 c laim, t

he Distric t Cou rt held th at it wa s barre d by the statu te of lim itations b ut reac hed th e m erits
non ethele ss. Th e Co urt then gran ted su mm ary jud gm ent in fa vor o f the C oun ty on all-3-

claim s. This appealfoll owed. Mannella cont ends that the doctrine of

equitable estoppel should save her § 1983 claim from the st atute of li mitati ons bar becaus e the Cler k of Courts misl ed her as t o the tr ue reason f

or her di smissal . During t he course of

discovery, M anne lla iden tified a fo rme r em ploy ee of th e Cle rk of C ourts w ho sta ted in a n affid avit that Mannell a was terminated because her father was the mayor of a t own that did not support J oyce Itki n for the Clerk of Court s in the previous election; I tkin was t he one who dism issed M anne lla. The Co unty respo nds th at equ itable es topp el is inap prop riate beca use th ere is n o evid ence that the Clerk of C ourts a ctively misle d M anne lla; rather, it maintains th at cuts to the Clerk of Cou rts’s budget an d conc erns abou t Man nella’s atte ndance motivat ed her te rminati on. We agree with t he County that

this case does not call for th e app lication o f equ itable es topp el. Mannella als o argues that theClerk of Court s’s pr offer ed reasons for her termination were pretextual . However, becaus e she does not present any evidence t

hat suffi ciently support s thi s contention, t he Court correctl y granted s umm ary judgment on the Title VII clai m. Finally, Mannella contends that, after dismissing her federal cl aims, the Dist rict Court shoul d have rel inquis hed juri sdiction over her state consti tuti onal la w clai ms and dismissed t

hem without prej udice. We disagree. The Court had supplemental juri sdiction over t

he state clai ms under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and it was not an abuse of discr etion to retai n juri sdiction and dis miss them with pr ejudic e together with t he federa l-4-

claims. I. Mannella worked in t

he Clerk of Court s of Alle gheny County for more t han fif teen years prior t o her termination, twelve of whic h as a bond counte r. I n a letter dated February 1, 1996, Joyce I tkin, the Clerk of Courts, notif ied Mannella t

hat eff ecti ve February 2, 1996, her pos iti on would be “eli minated” i n “order to accommodate present bu dg et re st ri cti on s. ” [ a7 3. ] N oti ng t ha t t wo o t he r w ome n we re t ermi na t ed on t he sa me day but that a le ss-se nior man ret ained hi s position as a bond counter, Mannell a suspected that gende r discrimination m otivated her dism issal. On M ay 2, 199 6, she filed a gen derrelated em ploy me nt discr imin ation c om plaint w ith the E qual E mp loym ent O ppo rtunity Co m m issio n (“ EE OC ”). In respons e to requests from the EE OC as to the justification for M annella’s termination, t

he Clerk of Court s prepar ed a memorandum for her soli citor detai ling t

he reasons why M annella was dismissed but W illi am M alits , her male colleague with less tenure, was not. The memorandum explained t hat theClerk of Court s was trans ferring the b ail bo nd c oun ter to ano ther bui ldin g an d so ugh t to k eep it op en 2 4 ho urs a day , 7 days a week. To that

end, the Clerk of Court s int erviewed the bond counter s to determine whe t he r t

he y wo ul d wi l l i ng t o wo rk on a s wi ng sh i ft
. Acc or di ng t o the memo rand um, Mannella had concerns about “worki ng longer hour s and going t o a swing shif t, worki ng 40 hou r week s, 52 we eks a yea r, exclusive of va cation.” [a58.]-5-

The mem orandum also st ated that rec ent cut s in the Clerk of Court s’s budget would require one person on som e shifts, thus making attendance critical; this is because
som eone m ust alway s be available to a llow perso ns unde r arrest to post bond . The C lerk of Courts e xplaine d that Mannell a’s attendance r ecord was spotty, and that s he had miss ed a n um ber o f day s in the m onth s befo re she wa s term inated . By c ontras t, Ma lits “demonstrat ed overal l pers everance, not only i n his work as a bond c ounter cl erk, but was very ins trumentalin the de sign, organization and ope ning of t he new bond counter of fi ce .” [a 59. ] T he Cl erk of Cou rt s a ls o di sp ut ed Mann el la ’s as se rtio n be fo re th e EE OC that s he held the position of “bond counter manager” becaus e accordi ng to the De par tm enta l Po sition Re por t, that title d id n ot ex ist at th e tim e. [a5 8.] Follo win g the re ceipt o f a righ t-to-sue letter from the E EO C, M anne lla commenced the instant action in t he District Court . Her complaint alle ged that

the Co unt y vi olate d he r righ ts un der Title VI I of th e C ivil R igh ts A ct of196 4, 42 U.S .C. § 2000e et seq. , and the Fourteent h Amendm ent of t

he United States Constitution, actionable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She also raised a number of state law claims, including a v iolation of the Pen nsylvania H um an Re lations Act, 43 P .S. § 955(a), intent ional i nfli ction of

emotional di stre ss, and loss of consortium, toget

her with her husband, Fr ank Marciw. After the completion of di scovery, Mannella fi led a sec ond amended complaint addi ng First and Fourteent

h Amendm ent viol ations to her § 1983 clai m, along with a nalogous vi olati ons of thePennsylvani a Constit ution.-6-

The C ounty m oved fo r summ ary judgm ent on all claim s, which the District Cou rt granted. The Distri ct Court ha d juri sdiction under 28 U.S. C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction pu rsuant to 28 U .S.C. § 129 1 and rev iew the D istrict Court’s decisio n to g rant su mm ary jud gm ent de novo
. Sem pier v. Jo hns on & Hig gin s, 45 F.3d 724 , 727 (3d Cir . 199 5). II. The Distri ct Court c oncluded that Mannella’ s § 1983 clai m was barred by the stat ute of l imitations. Because court s must borrow thestat ute of l imitations from analogous s tate causes of acti on for § 1983 cl aims, the Court properly appli ed the t woyea r pe riod der ived from Pen nsy lvan ia law
. Nelson v. County of All egheny , 60 F.3d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir . 1995). The Court noted t hat Mannella f

iled he r complaint

on June 4, 1998, more than two years aft er she was t erminated f rom her job. Even though the additi onal cl aims rai sed in t he second amended complaint relate back to the date the origi nal complai nt was fi led, these cl aims were als o untimely. Despite t his concl usion, the Court reached the meri ts of t he § 1983 clai m and ruled advers ely to Mannell a. Mannella argues that, to whatever extent the st atute of li mitati ons bar governed the Co urt’s de cision, th e Co urt erred in no t apply ing the doctrin e of eq uitable estop pel to preserve her cl aim. In Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman , 38 F.3d 1380 ( 3d Cir. 1994 ), we identified “three principal, though not exclusive ” situations wh ere equita ble esto ppel m ight be applie d pro perly: “ (1) w here th e defe ndan t has ac tively-7-

misle d the p laintiff resp ecting the pla intiff’s cau se of a ction; (2 ) wh ere the plaintiff in
som e extraordina ry way has been prevented from a sserting his or her rights; or (3) w here the plainti ff has t

imely asse rted hi s or her rights mistakenl y in the wrong f orum.” Id. at 1387. Mannella contends that the fi rst s ituat

ion – the de fendant a ctive ly misle ading the plain tiff – a ppl ies to her cas e. Her argument rel ies on an af fidavi t fr om Robert Martine, a former employee of the Clerk of Court s, who stated that he was “pers onally a ware that Jeannine Mannell a was chosen for termination ” becau se her father w as the m ayor of a tow n that “did no t support Joy ce Itk in,” th e C lerk of C our ts w ho t erm inate d M ann ella, “ in th e pr ior e lectio n.” [ a32 .] Martine al so repre sented t hat he knew “fr om first hand knowledge that

Joyce It kin st ated that we coul d defend Ms. Mannella’ s dismiss al on thebasis t hat she had be en absent f rom th e o ff ic e . . . an d, th er ef

or e, [I tkin ] e xpe ct ed no retri but io n f ro m [Ma nne ll a. ]” [a 32. ] He further st ated that It

kin tol d him that t

he real reason f

or Mannella’ s termination was t o let it be known “within the Democratic part y that t hose persons and communities t hat supported her wo uld be treated d ifferently than those w ho did n ot suppo rt her.” [a31.] W e do n ot belie ve tha t the be lated d iscov ery o f M artine’s a ffidav it is sufficien t to justif y the application of equit able estoppel. I n employm ent discriminati on cases, equitable tol ling “may excuse the plainti ff’s non-compliance with the s tatutory li mitati on provisi on when it appear s that (1) the defendant

acti vely misl ed the pl ainti ff re specti ng the rea son for t

he plai ntif

f’s di scharge, and (2) this decept ion caused t

he plai ntif

f’s non--8-

compliance with the li mitati ons peri od.” Oshiver , 38 F.3d at 1387. Mannella cannot esta blish eithe r of th ese nec essa ry c ond ition s. First , Marti ne’s af

fidavi t does not

contradi ct the Clerk of Court ’s prof fered reason for t erminati ng Mannella (the rest rictions i n the Clerk of Court’ s budget) , nor does the affi davit di spute t

he distincti ons the Cler

k of Courts i dentif

ied bet ween Mannella and William Malit s, the retained bond count er, i n its memorandum to the EEOC. Second and even more important , Mannella cannot point to anythi ng the Clerk of Courts di d that caused her not

to exerc ise a mini mal level of dil igence by i ntervi ewing former employees durin g the tw o yea rs befo re the s tatute o f limitatio ns ran . Indee d, M artine’s a ffidav it is dated March 14, 2002 – more t han four year s aft er Mannella was t erminated. When presse d at ora l argum ent to e xplain wh y M artine w as no t discov ered e arlier, M anne lla fail ed to ass ert a c ompelling j usti ficat ion, l et al one lay any bl ame of acti ve decepti on on the Clerk of Courts f

or thi s lengt

hy delay. We therefore conc lude that it would not be appropriate to apply e quitabl e estoppel to sa ve Mann el la ’s § 19 83 c la im f ro m th e s tatu te of

li mit atio ns ba r. Acc or di ngl y, we need not re ach the meri ts of t he clai m and will aff

irm the Dist

rict Court’s gr ant of summary judgment with res pect thereto. III. Ma nnella also con tends that the D istrict Court erred in gran ting sum mary judg me nt on her T itle VII c laim of ge nder discrim ination . The Co unty does not d ispute-9-

that Ma nnella presen ts a prima fac ie case of discrim ination that survives su mm ary judgment, but

rather argues that it

has proff

ered le giti mate, nondi scri minatory r easons for her termination. Thus, the sole ques tion on appe al is whether Mannella ha s produced evidence “demo nstrati ng such wea knesses, implausibili ties, inconsistencies, incoh erenc ies, or co ntradic tions in the em ploy er’s pro ffered legitim ate rea sons for its actio n th at a re aso nab le fac t find er co uld ratio nally find them unw orth y of cred enc e,”
suc h th at the real r eas on w as o n ac cou nt o f ge nde r. Fue ntes v. P erskie , 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). She does not meet thi s burden. As noted above, t

he terminat

ion let ter f rom the Clerk of

Courts st ated that Mannella was fi red due to “ budget res tri ctions ” that necessi tate d the el iminati on of her positio n. [a73 .] Ad ditiona lly, in its m em oran dum to the E EO C, the Clerk of C ourts explai ned that

Malits was r etai ned instead of Mannella be cause of t he need for c onsistent attendance and flexible scheduli ng when the bond counter becam e a 24 hour/7 days a week operati on. The Clerk of Courts was al so concerned about Mannella’ s attendance record an d eagern ess to wo rk on a sw ing shift, especially w hen co mp ared w ith Malits’s “overal l pers everance” i n the openi ng of the new bond count er off ice. [a58–59.] Finall y, the Clerk of Courts di sputed Mannell a’s ass erti on that s he was the “bond count er
ma nage r,” and thus M alits’s sup erior, by noting that the De partm ental P osition Rep ort did not list su ch a title at that t im e. [a5 8.] In her brief, Mannella concedes that s he does “not c halle nge whether any suc h-10-

bud get red uction in fact o ccurre d.” R ather, sh e criticize s the re ason s the C lerk of Co urts identi fied i n its memorandum for why Mannella was chosen f or eli mination i nstead of M alits. W ithout a ny ev idenc e of ac tual disc rimin ation, M anne lla attem pts to “p oint to evide nce e stablish ing a re ason able in ferenc e that th e em ploy er’s pro ffered expla nation is unworthy of cr edence.” Sem pier , 45 F.3d at 728. However, she fai ls t o meet this burden for the foll owing reasons. First , Mannella di sputes t he Clerk of Court s’s contention t hat she was not

the “bond counter

manager” by present

ing her County- issued i dentif ication card t

hat st ated this as her titl e [a69] as well as an a ffi davit f rom the Clerk of

Courts who preceded I tkin, which claimed that Ma nnella had been p romo ted to that position. Th is is, howeve r, imma terialbecause M annella’s ti tle was never an issue in the Clerk’s decis ion to choose her for e lim inati on. Second, Mannella s ubmits that the s tate ment in her af fidavi t that

she “was will ing to w ork a ny sh ift, but that [s he] p referred the da y shift if th at we re po ssible,” [a 25] re buts the C lerk of Co urts’s cla im th at M anne lla wa s hesita nt to w ork a swin g shift. B ut this does not se em to be all that di ffer ent fr om the Clerk of Court s’s st atement i n her
mem orandu m that “[t]here was co ncern from Ms . Man nella abou t working longer ho urs and g oing to a sw ing sh ift.” [a58 .] Con trary to M anna lla’s asse rtions, the Clerk of C ourts never stated that Mannella was unwilling to work fl exiblehours, but rat her that she expressed greater concern about it t han M alits
.-11-

Fina lly, M anne lla pick s apa rt the nu mb er of d ays th at the C lerk ac cuse d M anne lla of missi ng in the months before her termination. She notes that a number of thes e days
we re h olid ays and that M ann ella w as e ntitle d to use her vac ation and sick day s. Neverthel ess, the County submit s that the rea son that

Mannella was terminated was due to budget reducti ons, not her absenteeism. I t is this record of absentee ism, among other factor s, that dif

ferentiate d Mannella fr om M alit s and led to the Clerk of Courts c hoosing her for te rm inati on i n re spo nse to th e bu dge t red uctio ns. In sum, Mannella f

ails to pres ent evi dence that would enable “a reasonable fact finder ” to fi nd the Clerk of Courts’ s reason f or termination “unwort

hy of credenc e.” Fue ntes v. P erskie , 32 F.3d at 765. We will therefore affi rm the District Court ’s grant of
su mmary j ud gme nt

di smi ss i ng t he Ti t l e VI I c l ai m. IV. Lastly, Mannella submits that a fter dismissi ng her feder al cl aims, the District Court should have relinquished jurisdi ction over the state constituti onal law claims as a matter of comity and becaus e there were “questi ons of st ate l aw that re mained unsettled. ” Inste ad, the Court rea ched the meri ts of t hese claims, al leged vi olati ons of Arti cle I, §§ 7, 26, and 28 of t

he Pennsylvani a Constit ution, and concluded t

hat for the same reas ons that applied to M annella’s federa l claims, the state claim s could no t survive sum mary judgment. Notably, Mannell a does not di spute t he Court’s substant

ive concl usion. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c ) gives the dis tri ct court the dis creti on to exerc ise suppl emental-12-

juri sdiction over s tate law clai ms. While the di smissal of allfederalclai ms before trial might warrant

the rel inquis hment of jurisdi ction ove r state cl aims, the Supreme Court has exp laine d th at thi s ac tion is no t m and ator y bu t rath er a m atter of d iscre tion
. CarnegieM ellon U niv. v. C ohill , 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) . A court s hould balance a number of fact ors, includi ng judici al economy, conveni ence, f airnes s, and comity, when
exe rcisin g su ch d iscre tion
. Id. In the c ase at b ar, M anne lla doe s not e xplain her sta te consti tuti onal the ories or submit any e vidence that the y are subst antive , le t alone “uns ettled.” W e there fore d o no t believ e that a vagu e refere nce to “com ity” w ill call into questi on the Dist

rict Court’s di scretion to maint ain jurisdi ction and dismiss wit h prejudi ce Mannella’s s tate consti tuti onal la w claims along wit h her other

clai ms in the i nteres t of jud icial e con om y, co nve nien ce, a nd f airn ess. The judgment of the District Court will be a ffi rmed.-13- ___________________________ TO THE C LERK: Please f ile t he foregoi ng Opinion. BY THE COURT:

/s/ Edward R. Becker Circuit Judge-14--15-