F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

P A RR A KKA M A N N I L K OS HY B I LJI V A RG H ESE , Petitioner-Appellant ,

v.
D OMI NGO U RI BE , J R ., Warden; E DMUND G. B ROWN , J R .,

Respondents-A

ppellees

. No. 11-55686

D.C. No. 3:09-cv-02801- WQH-WVG

OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Southe rn

Di str ic t of

Ca lif or nia Wil liam Q. Hay es, District Judge, Pre siding

Argued and Submitted Janu ary 8, 20 13 —Pa sa de na , Ca lif or nia Filed June 26, 2013

Be fore : Alex Koz inski, Chi ef Judge , M. Marg are t Mc Ke ow n, and

Mil an D . Sm ith , Jr. , Ci rc uit Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Milan D. Smith, J r.V ARGHES E V

. U RI BE

2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es n o part of t he op i ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s * b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y *

Hab e as Co r pus The pa nel af firmed the district c ourt’s denia l of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas c orpus petition c halleng ing a murde r conviction.

Pe tit ion e r s ou g ht to tes t the re ma ind e r of a blo od sampl e a ft e r t he pr os e c uti on

ha d c on du c te d a

n init ia l D NAte st, wi th no obligation to re veal the test results to the prosec ution. The panel he ld that the stat e t ri al court’s c ompromise – to have either a neutra l laboratory

or the de fense expert test the blood, but on ly if the re su lts we re m ade ava ila ble to b oth

pa rt ie s – was ne ither contra

ry to nor an unre asonable appli cation of clea rly established fe dera l law.

CO UN SEL Todd W. Burns (a

rgued) , Bur

ns & Cohan, San D ieg o, Ca lif or nia , f or Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt.
L y nn e G. Mc Gi nn is ( argue d) , D e puty Attor ne y Ge ne ra l; K am a l a D

. H ar r i s , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l o f

C a l i f o r n i a ; J u l i e L. Gar land, Senior Assist ant Attorney Gene ral; Ke vin Vienna
and Gi l Go nza le z, Sup e rv isi ng De puty Attor ne y s Gener a l, Offic e of the Attorney

Gene ral, San Die g o, C al i fornia, for Re sp on de nts -A

pp e lle e s.V ARGHES E V

. U RI BE 3
OP IN ION
M. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e:
Parakkam ann il K os hy

B ilj i V arghe se , a

Ca lif or nia state prisoner, appea ls the district court’s denia l of his petition for
a wr it of habea s corpus unde r 28 U.S. C

. § 2254. A jury convicted V arg hese of

stabbing and murdering his ex -wife ’s lover. A ke y

piece of evidenc e in the case was a small blood sta in f ound a t the c ri me sc e ne
. Th e pr os e c uti on ’s ini tia l te st of the blood stain showed that i t m atched Var g hese’ s DNA. Va rghe se re qu e ste d th e re ma ini ngblo od sampl e to c on du c t a DN A t e s t u s i n g h i s o w n e xp e rt , b u t w i t h o u t h a v i n g to disc lo s e th e te s t r e s u lt s to th e p r o s e c u ti o n , e v e n th o u g h a second test would likely consume the re maining blood. The trial court de nied Var g hese’ s reques t and instead of fer ed Var g h e s e th e c h o ic e o f h av in g e it

h e r anin d e p e n dent la bo rator y or his ow n e xpe rt te st the blo od , but on ly if the te st results wer e made available to both parties. Var g hese’ s counsel re fused the tr ial court’s pr oposal. Var g hese a ppeale d, arguing, a

mong othe r thing s, that the t rial cour t’s ruling violated his rig ht to counsel. I n a reasoned dec ision, the Ca lif or nia Court of Ap pe a l a ff

ir me d th e tr ia l c ourt

. On fe dera l habea s review , Var g hese c laims that the trial
c ourt ’s ru lin g re g ard ingthe blo od sampl e vi ol ate d h is constitutional rights to counsel and due proc ess. B eca use, at the time the California Court of Appea l r ender ed its decision, there was no Supreme Court decision that square ly addre ssed Va rghe se ’s c la ims , or ann ounc e d a pr inc ipl e that c le arl y extended to the circ umstances of this case, we h o l d that the state cour

t’s decision wa s not “ co n trary to” or a

n “unre asonable application” of “cle arly established F eder al law” un de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 54 (d )( 1) . A c c or din g ly , w e a ff ir m.V ARGHES E V

. U RI BE

4

T he f act ual ba ckground i s p ri nci p al l y drawn f rom t he C al i f

o rni a C o urt 1
o f A p p eal ’ s d eci si o n i n P eo p l e v

. V a rg h ese , 76 C al

. Rpt r
. 3d 449 ( Ct

. App. 2 0 0 8 ). I n a hab eas pro ceed i ng, t he f i nd i ngs o f

f act m ad e b y t he st at e co urt
ar e “ pr es u med t o be c or r ec t , ” an d t h e pet i t i on er c ar r i es t h e b ur den of
r e bu t t i n g t h a t pr e s u mp t i on by “ c l e a r an d c on v i n c i n g e v i de n c e
. ” 2 8 U. S. C. § 22 5 4 (e)( 1 ). F ACTS AND P RIOR P ROCEEDING
A. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound 1

I n April 2003, Var g hese a nd his wi fe , Vi lia Var g hese,
se pa rate d. Va rghe se wa s unha

pp y wi th the se pa

ra tio n a nd did not want a divorce. During this per iod, Vilia beg an a re latio ns hip wi th Hava l Rav in, a ph y sic ian w ho ra n a fe rt ili ty clinic.
On No ve mbe r 1 2, 20 04 , Ra vin wa s f ound de a d at hi s ho me , w ithmul tip le sta

b w ound s to his bo dy , in c lud ingto h is
n eck, a bdomen, bac k, bicep, a

nd testicles. Police offic ers fo un d s e ve ra l in c ulp a tor

y pie c e s o f evide nc e a t th e c ri me scene , including a

sho e t h at belong ed to Var g hese a nd a mat chingbloody

shoeprint. A cr itical piece of evide nce f or the prosecution was a blood spot (I tem 19) found near a lig ht
sw itc h at Ravin ’s ho me
. Th e pr os e c uti on ’s ini tia l D NAte st and ana ly sis of

the blo od

sp ot, c on du c ted b y

c ri min a lis t Da vid Cor na c c hia of the Sa n D ie g o Po lic e De pa

rtme nt, F or e ns ic Sc ie nc e Se c tio n, ind ic a te d that Va rghe se wa s a lmo st cer tainly the source of the DN A p ro fi le. The pr obability of selec ti n g an individual, at random, who matc hed the DN A pr of ile fr om t his blo od sampl e wa s in

the qu int ill ion s. By p re t rial motion, Varg hese r equeste d an orde r permitting his expert, Dr. E dwar d Blake, to test the bloodV ARGHES E V

. U RI BE 5

sample, but with no obligation to revea l the test results to the prosec ution. Varg hese c oncede d that a sec on d test might consume the rema ining blood. The prosecution opposed the mot ion, s tatin g that it

wi sh e d to c on du c t f

ur the r t e sti ngto c or ro bo rate its ini tia l re su lts , an d w ou ld b e un a ble to d o s o if Var g hese’ s motion were g rante d. The prose cution sug g ested that either a

neu t ral laboratory

ag ree able to both par

ties or Va rghe se ’s e xpe rt

te st the re ma ini ngblo od , b ut o nly if bo th pa rt ie s c ou ld a c c e ss a

nd int ro du c e a t tria l th e data

and re su lts of that te st. Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d th a t th e re was a hi g h r isk that additional testing w ould consume the re mai n i n g blood,
an d c o nc lud e d th a t th e pr os e c uti on wa s e nti tle d to c or

ro bo rate its f i n d i n g s with reg ard to such a n important piece of evidenc e. Unde r the c ircumstance s, the t rial court determined that the prosec ution’s proposed compr omise was re asonable , and denie d Var g hese’ s motion for the rele ase of I tem 1 9 for confide ntial testing. Va rg hese f iled a motion for
rec onsideration, which the trial court de n i ed. During the
se c on d mo tio n he ari ng , the tr ia l c ourt re ite rate d th a t it

wo uld be willing to pe rmit a

neutra l laboratory

or the de fense expert to t e st t he blo od , b ut o nly

if the re su lts were m ade ava ila ble to both parties. The de fense declined the court’s of fer

. I n Apr il 20 06 , V arghe se wa s c on vic te d b y a jur y of fi rs tdeg ree murder, a

nd use of a

deadly we apon, a knife, in the commission of the murder, in viol at i o n of California Pena l Code §§ 187(a) and 12022(b) (1). He was sente nced to a prison term of 26 y ear s to life. Var g hese a ppeale d the conviction, ar g uing, inte r a lia , that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in conditioning the use of his own ex pert on his disclosure of the te st r e su lts to t

he pr os e c uti on, in vi olat ion of his ri g ht t o counsel unde r Pr inc e v

. Su pe rio r Co ur t , 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Ct. App. 1992). In a reas o n ed d ecision, issued on May 8, 20 08 , th e Ca lif

or nia Court of Ap pe a l af

fi rm e d the tr ia l c ourt

.V ARGHES E V

. U RI BE

6
Se e Va rg he se , 7 6 Ca l. Rp tr. 3 d at 45 4– 58 . T he Ca lif or nia Supreme Court s u m marily denied the pe tition for review

. The U.S. Supreme Court subseque ntly denied Va

rg hese’ s petition for a wr it of cer

tiorari. Se e Va rg

he se v. Calif

or nia , 555 U.S. 1143 (2009).

B. Habeas Pr ocedural History
On Dec ember

10, 2 0 0 9 , Var g hese f

iled a petition for a
wr it of ha

be a s c or pu s in fe de ra l dis tr ic t c ourt . Var g he se asser ted that his Six th Amendment rig ht to co u n s el and Four teen t h Amendment rig ht to due proce ss were violated when the tr ial court c onditioned the defe nse’s testingof I tem 19 on its disclos u re of the re sults of that test to the prosec ution. A mag istrate judg e re commended that Var g hese’ s petition be denied unde r t h e Antit err orism and Effe ctive De ath Pena l t y Act of 1996 ( AEDPA). The
ma g istrate jud g e c on c lud e d that, at th e tim e Va rghe se ’s c la im
wa s d e c ide d b y

the state a

pp e llate c ourt , the re wa s n o U .S. Supreme Court authority that decide d the pre cise issue of “whe ther due proce ss and the rig ht to co u n sel are violated when a court order s that a criminal defe ndant be gr anted
a c c e ss t o te st a

sampl e of

pr os e c uti on

e viden ce that w ill de str oy the e vid e nc e and

the n r e qu ir e [s] the re su lt o f t he te st to be dis cl o s ed to t he prose cution.” As such, the state cour t “ca nnot be said to have unrea sonably applied the law as to the issue prese nted in the Petition.” The mag istrate judge further reje cted Va

rg hese’ s argument t h at the princ iples announce d in Akev. Ok

lahoma , 4 7 0 U

. S. 6 8 ( 1 9 8 5 ), S t rickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Powel l v. Alabama , 28 7 U .S. 45 (1 93 2) , c le arl y e xten de d to the issues raise d in the petition.V ARGHES E V

. U RI BE 7

The district court substantia l l y adopted the
rec omme n d at i on of the mag istrate judg e and de nied the petition. Never

theless, the district cour t concluded that Var g hese r aised “nonfr ivolous constitut ional arguments” and g ran t ed a c ertifica

te of a ppeala bility

. See 28 U. S.C. § 2253(c) ; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)

. JU RI SDI CT ION AN D ST AN DA RD OF RE VI EW
We ha ve jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a) . A district court’s de nial o f a p et ition for a wr it of habea s corpus is re viewed de novo, Lopez v. T hompson , 202 F.3d 1110, 1116 ( 9th Cir. 20 0 0 ) (e n b anc) , and we may aff irm on any

g rou n d supported by

the re cord, Holley v

. Y arborough , 568 F.3d 1091, 1098 ( 9th Cir. 2009).

Fe dera l courts ar e author ized to gra nt habea s corpus re lief to persons in state custody under 28 U .S

. C . § 2254, as
ame n d e d b y A E D PA , Pu b

. L

. N o
. 1 0 4

- 1 3 2 , 1 1 0 St a t. 1214. AEDPA controls this case beca use Va rg hese f iled his habea s petition in 2009, after that statute b ec ame e ffe ctive. See Lindh v. Murphy , 5 2 1 U

. S. 3 2 0 , 3 2 6

– 2 7 ( 1 9 9 7 ). Unde r AE DPA , V arghe se c an pr e va il on his ha be a s p e tit ion

on ly if he shows the state court’s de cision (1) “ resulted in a de cision that was contra

ry to, or involved an unre asonable application of, cle arly

established F eder al law, a s determ ined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or ( 2) “r es u l t ed in a decision t hat was ba sed on an unr easona ble deter mination of the fac ts in light of the evidenc e pre sented in the State c ourt proce eding .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Va rghe se re lie s on the “ unre a so na ble a pp lic a tio n” c la

us e of se c tio n 22 54 (d )( 1)

. A de c isi on inv olv e s an “ unre a so na ble application” of

fede ral lawif it ( i ) “corre ctly identifies theV ARGHES E V

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8

g ove r n in g r u le b u t u n r e a s o n a b ly a p p li e s it to a n e w s e t of fac ts” or (ii) “ fails to extend a cl ear ly established leg al pri n c ip le to a

n e w c o n te xt i na

w ay th a t i s u n r e a s o n a

b le.” Himes v . Thompson , 336 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 2003). The
a pp lic a tio n mu st be mor e tha n in c or re c t or e rr on e ou s; i t mu st be “obje ctively

unrea sonable.” Lockye r v. Andrade , 538 U. S. 63, 75 (2003). “ Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the s t at es , our Circuit prec edent r emains re levant persua sive authority

in determining whether a state c ourt decision is objectively

unrea sonable.” Himes , 3 3 6 F.3d at 853.
AEDPA’s “hig hly

defe rential standa

rd,” Lindh , 5 21 U. S. at 333 n.7, “stops short of im posing a complete ba

r on fe dera l
c ourt re lit ig a tio n of c la ims a lr e a dy re je c te d in

state proce eding s,” Harrington v. Ri chter , 131 S. Ct . 770, 786 (2011). We a

re require d to a ffirm the denial of V arghe se’s ha be a s p e tit ion

un le ss t he state c ourt ’s de c isi on wa s “ so lackingin justi fication that there wa s an er ror we ll understood and compr ehende d in exi sting lawbeyond any possibili ty

for fairminded disa g ree ment.” Richter , 131 S

. C t

. at 786–87. Var g hese be ars the bur den of pr oof i n this appeal, a nd the state c ourt

de c isi on mus t be ac c or de d the be ne fi t of the do ub t. W oo dfo rd v . V isc iot ti , 537 U.S. 19, 24–25 (2002 ) ( per cu ri am). S tate cour

t decisions are measure d ag ainst the Supreme Court’s pre cede nt “as of the time the s t ate court rende rs i ts decision.” Cullen v. Pinholster , 131 S. Ct . 1388, 1399 (2011) ( citation and quotes omitted). We r eview the last rea soned state c ourt dec ision, Musladin v . L a ma rque , 55 5 F .3 d 8 30 , 83 4– 35 (9 th C ir . 2 00 9) , w hic h in thi s c a se is the California Court of A ppeal’ s May

2008 opinion.V ARGHES E V

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DI SCU SSIO N
Under AEDPA, we must de fer to the sta t e court’s de c isi on if a Sup re me Court deci si on fa ils to ( i) “ sq ua re ly addre ss the issue in the ca s e” or (ii) “ establish a leg al principle that c lear ly ex tends to a newcontext to t he extent
r e qu ir e d b y th e Su

p r e me Court.” Moses v. Payne , 555 F.3d 7 4 2 , 7 5 4 ( 9 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 9 ) ( a l t e r a t i o n s an d qu o t e s o m i t t e d )

. If a Supreme C o urt’s dec ision provides “a c ontrolling leg al standard” that is applicable to the petitioner’s claim “without ta il o r in g o r

mo d if ic a ti o no f

the s ta n d ar d , ” th e nth e n e xt inquiry is to decide “ whether

the application of that standard was objectively unrea sonable, even i f t he facts of the c ase at issue are not identical to the Supreme Court pre cede nt,” Moses , 555 F.3d at 754 (citation and quote s omitt ed).

“ [E]va luatin g wh e the r a

ru le a pp licatio n w a s unr e a so na ble require s consideringthe rule’ s specific ity . The more g ener al the rule, the more lee way courts have in re aching outcome s in case -by -ca se dete rminations.” Y arb o r o u gh v. Alvarado , 54 1 U.S. 65 2, 66 4 ( 20 04 ); accord Ric hter , 131 S. Ct . at 786.
Her e, Va rg h ese argues that the trial c ourt’s ruling
re g ard ingthe te sti ng of the blo od sampl e vio la

te d h is
c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h t s t o c o u n s e l an d d u e p r o c e s s
. In challeng ing the California Court of Appeal’s de cision under AEDPA, Va

rg hese must identify

either a Supreme Court decision t hat “squa

rely addre sses” his claim, or a leg al principle, a s es t ab lished by a Supreme Court decision, that “c l ea rly extends” to the circumstanc es of this ca se. M o ses , 555 F.3d at 754. Varg hese f ails to do either.V ARGHES E V

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10
A
. Su p r e m e C o u r t D e c i s i o n S q u a r e l y A d d r e s s i ng Cl aim
Th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y re c og nize d th a t th e re is n o U .S. Supreme Court authority

that square ly

addre sses Var g hese’ s claim—namely , that a criminal defe ndant’s rights t o counsel and due proce ss a

re violated when the state cour t conditions his acc ess to, and testing of, the prose cution’s limited evidenc e on the di sclosure of the test results to the pr os e c uti on
. Whe re , a s h e re , a state c ourt

ha s n o s pe c if

ic leg al rule to a

pply , the state c ourt’s dec ision “is not an
unrea sonable a

pplication of cle arly established Fe dera l law.” Knowles v. Mirzayance , 556 U.S. 111, 122 ( 2009) (c itations and quotes omi tted); se e als o Car e y v . M us lad in , 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2 00 6) (“ Gi ve n th e la c k of h old ing s f ro m th is C ourt

. . . it cannot be said that the state c o u rt unrea sonably applied
c le arl y e sta bli sh e d F e de ra l la

w. ” (c itatio n a

nd br a c ke ts omitted)).

B. Interfere nce with E ff ect ive Assistance of Counsel

I n th e a bs ence of

a Sup re me Court

de c isi on sq ua re ly addre ssing Va

rg hese’ s claim, we ne x t consi der whether Va rghe se ha s id e nti fi e d a

n e sta bli sh e d p ri nc ipl e that “ c le arl y extends” to the circ umstances of this c ase. Moses , 555 F.3d at 754.
Va rghe se inv ok e s a c lus te r o f b ro a d p ri nc ipl e s r e late d to the ri g hts to c ouns e l and du e pr oc e ss. Und e r t

he Sixth Amendment, the a ccuse d in a criminal proce eding is entitled

“ to h ave the As sis tanc e of Couns e l f or his de fe nc e .” U. S. Const. amend. VI . The S upreme Court has long rec og nized tha t “ t h e S i xth A m e n dm e n t r i g h t t o c o u n s e l e xi s t s , a ndis
ne e de d, in o rd e r t o p ro te c t th e fu nd ame nta l r ig ht t o a

fai rV ARGHES E V

. U RI BE 11

D u r i n g ora l a r g u men t , V ar g h es e’ s c ou n s el i den t i f i ed A ke an d Nob l es 2 as t he t wo s t rongest Sup rem e C o urt cases supp o rt i ng V arghese’ s p o si t i o n. V arghese f

urt her r el i es on Sm i t h v. M cCo r m i ck , 91 4 F.2d 11 5 3 (9t h C i r. 19 90 )

. B ut becau s e M cCo r m i ck , a ci r cui t cas e, i s not cl ear l y es t abl i s hed S u p r e m e C o u r t p r e c e d e n t , i t i s n o t g e r m a n e t o o u r A ED PA a n a l y s i s
. On
a p p e a l, V a rg h e se d o e s n o t re n e w h is a rg u m e n t t h a t Po w e l l v

. A l a b a ma cl ear l y ex t ends t o t hi s ca s e. trial.” Strickla n d v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). “Gove rnment violates the r ight to e ff ec tive assistance when it i nterferes in c e rt a in w ay s w iththe a bil ity of c ouns e l to make indepe ndent dec isions about how to conduct the defe nse.” Id. at 686.
Var g hese a

rgues that a core aspec t of the rig ht to effe ctive assistance of counse l is that counsel be per mitted to undertake
rea sonable investig ations, which includes the rig ht to employ experts for that purpose , fr ee from state or judicial interfe renc e. Ac cordingto Varghe se, the attorney -client privileg e and the work-pr oduct doctrine are essential components of the a

ttorney ’s abil i ty

to provide ef

fec tive repr esentation. See H

ickman v . Taylor , 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947) ( “In perf

orming his various duties . . . it is e s s en t ial that a lawy er work wit h a ce rtain deg ree of privac y , fre e fr om unne c e ssa

ry int ru sio n b y

op po sin g pa

rt ie s and the ir counsel.” ). Va

rg hese contends that his rig hts to counsel and du e pr oc e ss we re vio late d wh e n the tr ia l c ourt c on dit ion e d h is
a c c e ss t o th e blo od sampl e on his dis c los ing the te st r e su lts to the prosec ution, thereby

“re quir[ing] t hat def

ense c ounsel g ive up a most basic pr otection of the attorney -client relationship.” As support for thes e p rinciples, Va rg hese r elies primarily on two Supreme Court dec isions, Ake v. Ok lahoma , 470 U.S. 68 (1985), and U n ite d S ta te s v

. No bles , 42 2 U .S. 225 (1975). Howeve r, Ake and Nob le s articulate more 2 specific principles than those invoke d by Var g hese—which,V ARGHES E V

. U RI BE

12
wh e n v i e w e d

i nt h e i r f a c tu a l c i r c u m s t an c e s , d o n o tc l e ar ly extend to the present conte x t, M o ses , 555 F.3d at 754, such that th e state a

pp e llate c ourt ’s fa ilure to e xt end tho se principles to this case was not objectively unrea sonable, Himes , 3 36 F .3 d at 85 2; Lockye r , 538 U.S. at 75.
1. A k ev . O k l a h o ma
I n Ake , defe nse counse l informed the tria l court that he planned to raise an insanity defe nse and asked that the cour t e ith e r arrang e or

pa y fo r a ps y c hiatr ic e xami natio n f or his client, an indig ent. 470 U.S. at 7 2

. The c ourt ref used, eff ectively prec luding de fense counsel fr om presentingany evidenc e re g ardingdefe n d an t’s sanity at the time of the offe nse. Id. The S upreme Court concluded that this rendere d the trial fundamentally

unfa i r, and held that “ when a defe ndant demonstrate s to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the off

ense is to be a

signific ant fa ctor at trial, the State must, at a minimum , assure the def en d an t acc ess to a com pe te nt p syc hiatr ist

wh o w ill c on du c t an a pp ro pr ia te examination and assist in evaluation, prepa ration, and prese ntation of the def

ense.” Id. at 83.
A ked o e s n o t c le ar ly

e xte n d to V ar g h e s e ’ s c o n s ti tuti o nal claim. Akeheld that the state mu s t i n some circ umstances provide indi gen t defe ndants with acc ess to a par ticular kind of expert, a psychiatrist, to ensure fundame ntal fairne ss at trial. Var g hese ne ither asse rt s t h at he was indige nt, nor claims that he asked the state to provide a psy chiatrist or a ny other kind of ex pert to assist in the preparation of his defense

. He ha d, in fac t, ret ai n ed his own DNAexpert, Dr. B lake. Even if this e x pert was una ble to conduct a

confide ntial DNA t es t , h e co u l d h el p d ef

en s e co u n s el ev al u at e th e m et h o d o l o gy used by the state’s la

b, decide whether to attack it at trial, a ndV ARGHES E V

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prepa re f or cr oss -e x ami nation of the state’ s lab technic ian. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . Ch isc hil ly , 30 F .3 d 1 14 4, 11 52 –5 3 ( 9th Cir . 1 99 4) ; cf. Ake , 470 U.S. at 81. This is sim ply not a ca se, a s w a s Ake , w he re the def e nd ant l a c ke d “ the ra

w m a te ri a ls i n teg ral to the building of an e ffe ctive def ense.” Ake , 470 U.S. at 77. Second, Akedid not conce rn expert testing of phy sical evidenc e, much less testing that would consume a vanishing quantity of such evide nce. Akethus provided the state c ourt wi th n o guid anc e on ho w to ba lanc e the de fe nd ant’ s in te re st in c on du c tin g his ow n D NAte st w iththe state ’s leg iti mate interest in corroborating its initial results. Even if we acc ept Va rghe se ’s argume nt t

hat Ake acknow ledg es t he importanc e of expert assistance g ener ally —as opposed to the a ssis t an ce of psy chiatric experts in particula r—that case simply

did not involve the trade offs at stake her e.
Var g hese c ontends that the state’ s int er est in additional testing is we ak bec ause ( 1) it alrea dy had a r eliable t est and (2) Va rgh es e agree d not to challeng e the state ’s blood evidenc e if his own testing confirme d the state’s results. But the state , w hic h h a s to pr ov e its cas e be y on d a re a so na ble doubt, has an inter es t in bulletproofing its evide nce that the blood r ecove red from the cr ime scene belong ed to Var g hese. SeeJ ohn Devlin, Gene tics and Justice: An In d igent Defendan t ’s Right to DNA Expert Assistance , 1 99 8 U . Ch i. L eg al F. 395, 407 ( 1998) (noting t he prose cutor orde red multipl e tests of the D NA evide nce in the O.J . Simps on trial). Nothing in Akesu gg e sts that, whe re ph y sic a l e vid e nc e is
conce rned, a

defe ndant’s intere st in confidential testing tr ump s th e state ’s int e re st i n c on fi rm ingits re su lts

.V ARGHES E V

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14
2. United Stat

es v. N obles

I n Nobles , th e d e f

e n s e s o u g h t to im

p e a ch the p r o s e c u t i o n ’ s k e y

w i t n e s s e s u s i n g s t a t e m e n t s a d e fe ns e investigator obtained fr o m t h e witnesses. 422 U.S. at 227. The issue be fore the Supr eme Court was whether , under the
c ir c ums tanc e s, a

fe de ra l tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld c omp e l th e de fe ns e to reve al the re levant portions of the investig ator’s r eport for the prosec ution’s use in cross-e x amining the investigator. Id. The de fense argued, inte r a lia , that the work- product doc trine exempted the investigator’s re port from disclosure at trial. Id. at 236. The Nob le

s Court c on c lud e d th a t be c a

us e the de fe ns e ha d v olu nta ri ly e le c ted to p re se nt t

he inv e sti g a tor

a s a wi tne ss, the de fe ns e ha d wa ive d the pr ivi le g e wi th r e sp e c t to matters cove red in the inves t igator’s testimony

. Id. at 239–40.

I nvoking the principles in Nobles , Varg hese a rgues that by conditioning the de fense ’s ac cess to the blood sample on disclosure of the test results, the tri al court compelled
surre nder of

his attorney ’s privileg es and the ref ore violate d his right to effe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. We note that the Sup re me Court

de ve lop e d the wo rk pr od

uc t do c tr ine to s hie ld counsel’s pr ivate memora nda from the liberal discove ry permitted by the Feder al Rules of C ivil P roce dure. The Court g rounded the doctrine not in the Constituti on , b u t on the assumption that the draf

ters of the Feder al Rules did not seek to alter “ the historical and the n ecessary way in which lawy ers a ct within the fram ew o rk of our sy stem of jur isp ru de nc e to p ro mot e justic e and to p ro te c t th e ir

c lie nts ’ interests.” Hickm an , 3 29 U. S. at 51 1; se e als o J eff A. Anderson et al., The W

ork Product Doc trine , 6 8 C o rn e l l L. Rev. 760, 765–79 (1983). The doc trine g overns discove ry and disclosure in federal

case s, both civil and criminal, andV ARGHES E V

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it cann o t s u

p p o rt a s tate p r is o n e r ’ s h a

b e a s c la im

an y mo re than a violation of the F eder al Rules of Evidenc e could.

But t he Nobles Court also considere d, in a footnote, whether the forc ed disclosure of the investig ator’s rep o rt vio late d the Sixth Am e ndme nt ri g ht t o c ouns e l. A s V arghe se d o es h ere, the def

endant in Nobles argued that such a dis c losu re was un con st it ut io nal be c a us e it w ou ld “compr omise counsel’s ability to inve stigate and pr epar e the defe nse ca se thoroug hly .” Nobles , 422 U.S. at 240 n.15. The Court r ejec ted this c laim, invoking notions of waiver

. Once the def endant made a “ voluntary elec tion” to present the investigator’s repor

t at tr ial, he could no longe r hide b ehind the attorne y -client re lati o n s hip to shield thi s information from the prosec ution. Id.
This constituti onal holding doe s not clear ly extend to the circ umstances of Var g hese’ s case
. Nobles decide d only that the Six th Amendment does not prohibit the disclosure of a defe nse investig ator’s r eport, c ontaining his distillation of witness interviews, whe n the defe ndant ca lls the investigator to testify at trial. The c ase doe s not a d d re s s wh ether a defe ndant may withhold ex pert mate rials of a wholly differ ent kin d— sc ie nti fi c te st r e su lts —if the de fe nd ant d e c ide s no t to us e tho se re su lts a t tr ial

. A re a so na ble jur ist mig ht w e ll conclude that disclosure of a n expert’s test results is less of an intrusion on the attorney -client relationship than di sclosure of the expert’s subjective impre ssions or mental proce sses would be.
Th is i s e sp e c ia lly

tr ue in Va rghe se ’s c a se , wh e re the state trial courtV ARGHES E V

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16
did not order

the re ports or obser

vations of the
e x p e rtb e tu r n e d

o v e r t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n
. It order ed only

the re sult o f t h e test to be
reve aled. In doi n g s o, the cour t gr anted the defe ndant the rig ht to test the r esults and kee p a ll of its wo rk pr od uc t and rep or

ts con fi d ential. At the same time it foreclose d the possibilit y

th at a test result matching that of the prose cution’s expe rt would be destroy ed a n d the People lef t without the ability to corrobor ate its findings if the defe nse w ere to challeng e at tria l the pr os e c uti on

e xpe rt

. Va rg he se , 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 458. A labora t o ry ’s “bottom li n e re s u lt of the test,” id. a t 45 7, wh ic h w ou ld p re suma bly inc lud e DN A q

ua nti fi c a tio n d a ta , is not su bs tanti a lly equivalent to the e x pert’s “ mental proc es ses,” Nobles , 42 2 U .S. a t 23 8, a s it

may be re fl e c te d in

the e xpe rt ’s re po rt s, observations, im pressions, or c ommunicatio n s made in the assistance of the de fense

. I n response , Var g hese argues that the California Court of Ap pe a l’ s n oti on that the tr ia l court or de re d that on ly the te st results be disclosed is “f

actua lly wrong .” Under

AEDPA, the state c ou rt ’s fa c tua l de te rm inatio ns , in c lud ingthe a pp e llate court’s inter

pretation of what the trial court a ctually order ed,
are “pre sumed t o b e correc t,” unless re butted by “cle ar a nd
c on vin c inge vid e nc e .” 28 U. S.C. § 2 25 4(e) (1 ); se e als o He rn an de z v. S ma ll , 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 ( 9th Cir. 2002). Va rghe se do e s no t sa

tis fy thi s burd e n be c a

us e he fai ls to provide c lear an d convincingevidenc e fr om the rec ord available to the appellate court that the tria l court orde red any thing be y o n d t he test re sults. Varg hese’ s citation to theV ARGHES E V

. U RI BE 17

V ar gh es e f

ur t her s ug ges t s t hat the appel l at e c our t ’ s deci s i on was 3

u n r ea s on abl e bec au s e t h e def en s e of f er ed a s t i pu l at i on du r i n g h i s mot i on he aring t ha t o b viated an y nee d f o r the p ro sec uti o n to co nd uc t a sec o nd t est of t he bl oo d s amp l e. Speci f i cal l y , V ar gh es e ar gu es t hat t he def ens e s t at ed pr os e c uti on ’s re qu e st that bo th pa rt ie s be a llo we d “ to a c c e ss and int r o d

u c e in f u ll a t t r ia l a ll o f

th e d a ta an d te s ting conducte d on those items” does not sug g est that the pr o s e c u t i o nr e qu e s t e d

f u l l a c c e s s t o t h e e xp e rt ’ s r e p or ts, o b s e r v a ti o n s , o r to an y c o n f

id e n ti a l mate r ia ls inv o lv in g the expert. As the Supreme Court not ed wi th respec t to the defe nse in Nobles , Va rghese “fa ils to recog nize the limi ted and conditional nature of the court’s order .” Nobles , 4 22 U. S. at 240 n.15. The tria l court i n this case did not authorize a “g ener al fishing expedition i nto t h e defense f iles or indeed even into the de fense [ex pert’s] repor t.” Id. at 240 (c itation and quotes omitted). Indeed, the trial court r ej ec t ed the defe nse’s a

rgu m en t that if it adopted the prose cution’s proposed c ompromise, it “somehow opens the door to allow the Pe op le to g o a ft e r a

ny thi nga bo ve and be y on d th e te st results with D r. Blake, to invade that attorney -client e x pert situation.” The trial c ourt interpre ted t he prose cution’s pr op os e d c omp ro mis e a s b e ingc on fi ne d to it s a bil ity to

“ re te st” and

“ ve ri fy and va lid a te ” its fi rs t te st. Th e de fe ns e aver red that it wanted the re mainder of t h e b l ood sample, without “ag ree [i ng ] t hat the People would have acc ess to the
re su lts of Mr. B lake’ s analy sis.” (empha sis added). Ultimately , the trial court require d Var g hese to disclose the test results if he opted to u se his own expert, and nothing
m ore. SeeTr. Mot. Procee dings ( J uly 1, 2005), at 62–63 (“We’r e talkingabout verification of the re sults of the initi al examina t i o n .”); id. at 65–66 (“ I ’m willing to issue an or der all o wi n g Dr. Blake to test [the blood sample] as long a s the results are available to ever y body .”). 3V ARGHES E V

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18

t hat i f he wer e a l l owed t o perf orm conf

i dent i al t es t i ng us i ng hi s own e x p e rt, D r. B la k e , t h e n d e p e n d ing o n the tes t r e s u lt s, he w o u ld e ithe r (i)
ca l l D r
. B l ak e t o t es t i f

y a n d h i s t es t r es u l t s w ou l d be pu t i n t o e v i den ce , or ( i i ) “ t he def

ens e woul d n ot cal l an exper t an d t hen t he P eopl e’ s ev i dence
wou l d g o e s s en t i al l y u n ch al l en g ed. ” H owe v er , V ar g h es e’ s a r g u men t i s n ot t et hered t o any rel evant Sup rem e C o urt case and t hus i s no t rel evant t o our A E D P A anal y si s. M o reove r, an off er not t o cal l a D N A exp ert by t he d e fen se d o e s n o t g u a ra n te e th a t th e p ro se c u tio n ’s D N A te st re su lts wo u ld g o fully un c h a llen g e d b e c a u se , fo r e x a m p le , M r. C o rn a c c h ia ’s cr e d ib ili ty
m i g h t be at t ac k ed, i n wh i ch ca s e h i s t es t i mon y v al i dat i n g t he p rosecut i o n’ s f

i rs t t est c o ul d b e und erm i ned

. A co rr o b o rat i ng t est on t he
r ema i n i n g bl ood s ampl e wou l d t h en be cr u ci al i n bol s t er i n g t h e r es u l t s of t he p rosecut i o n’ s i ni t i al D N A t est

. Sin c e th e b l o o d s am p l e was t he pros ecu t i on’ s ev i dence , t he pros ecu t i on was ent i t l ed t o r ender a k ey pi ece of e v i de n c e h i g h l y credi bl e by ob t a i n i n g c or r ob or a t i n g r e s u l t s f r om a se c o n d tes t. I n sum, the trial court sanctioned a compromise that wa s confine d to the purpose of corr obo ra t i n g the re sults of the first DNA te st, a n d was a response to the limited blood samp le av a il a

b le to b o th s id e s
. T h is w a s an e xe r cise of d is c r e ti o n th a t w a s n o t o b je c ti v e ly u n r e a s o n a

b le u n d er the circ umstances, a

nd is consi stent with the purpose a nimating the ri g ht to e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, wh ic h i s “to
ensure a f ai r t ri al.” Strickland , 4 6 6 U. S

. at 6 8 6

. Al t h o u gh
rea sonable jurists may

disagree as to whe ther this was a n abuse of the trial cour

t’s discretion, the standa rd under AEDPA re quires us to d efe r to the appe llate cour t’s deter mination that i t was not i n the abse nce of contra ry S u p r e m e C o u rta

u t h o r i t y.
C. Choosin g between Tw o Constitutional Righ ts
Var g hese f

urther r elies on Simmons v. United States , 39 0 U .S. 37 7 ( 19 68 ), fo r t he pr inc ipl e that it

is unconstitutional to force a defe ndant to choose betwee n twoV ARGHES E V

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rig hts. I n Simmons , the cr iminal defenda nt challeng ed the constitutionalit y

of t he trial court’s admission of his motionto-suppress testimony

on the issue of his g u i l t . 390 U.S. at 38 9. Th e Court

he ld t hat “ wh e n a

de fe nd ant t e sti fi es in
su pp or t of a mot ion to s up press e vid e nc e on F ourt h Amendment gr o u n ds, his testim ony may not therea fter be admitted ag ainst h i m at trial on the issue of guilt unless he
ma k e s n o o b je c tion.” Id. a t 39 4. Th e Court re a so ne d th a t, g iven the defen d an t’s situation, the defenda nt “was oblig ed
e ith e r t o g ive up wh a t he be lie ve d, wi th t he a dv ic e of

c ouns e l, to b e a va lid F ourt h A me ndmen t cla im o r, in l e g a l e ff e c t, t o waive his F ifth Amendment privil ege ag ainst selfincrim i nation.” Id. Th e Court no te d th a t “ [i]n th e se circ umstances, we find it in tolerable that one constitutional rig ht should have to be surr ender ed in orde r to asser t another .” Id.
The rule established in Sim mo ns is ina pp os ite becau se Va rghe se ’s c on sti tut ion a l c la im doe s n ot i mpl ic a te his F ourt h Amendment p ri vileg e ag ainst unrea sonable sea rche s and sei zur e s o r

h is F if th A me n dme n t r igh t a g a in s t s e lfinc ri min a tio n. Va

rghe se ’s c la im c on c e rn s h is r ig ht t o a c c e ss and test l imited evidence using his own e x pert, without dis c los ing the te sts re su lts to the pr os e c uti on . N e ve rt he le ss, abstrac ting the gene ra l principle that a defe ndant ca

nnot be forced t o choose be tween two c onstitut ional rig hts, id. , Var g hese a

rgues that the state imper

missibl y soug ht to force him to cho o s e between the “ rig ht to have def ense c ounsel
c on du c t a re a so na ble inv e sti g a tio n” and

the “ ri g ht t o ma int a in the deg ree of privac y

in defe nse counse l’s repr esentation that is e ssent ia l to e ff

e c tiv e re pr e se ntatio n. ” Ev e n w e re we to a c c e pt V arghe se ’s c on te nti on that Sim mo ns establishes such
a broad rule, there is no merit to his arg ument beca use he w asV ARGHES E V

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20
not forec losed from using hi s own ex pert in testing the blood sample or in deve loping his def ense.
CO NC LU SION The Supreme Court has not squarely addre ssed Va rghe se ’s c la im o r a

rt ic ulate d a

ru le that c le arl y e xten ds to the pre sent ca se. Moses , 5 55 F .3 d at 75 4. Th e Cali fo rn ia Court of Appea l ’s d ecision there fore cannot be said to have
unrea sonably

applied cle arly

established fe dera l law under AEDPA. Himes , 33 6 F .3 d a t 85 2. Ac c or din g ly , we de fe r t o the state c ourt , a

nd a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt

. AF F IRMED.