The HONORABLE MICHAEL J. DAVIS, Uni ted States District Judge for the 1 District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for th e 2 Western District of Missouri.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-2723

___________ Jerry M. Bass; Bonnie Bass, * * Appellees, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. General Motors Corporation, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 12, 1998 Filed: July 24, 1998

___________ Before WOLLMAN and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, District Judge. 1

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
G e neral Motors Corporation appeals from the judgment entered by the district court o n the jury verdict in favor of Jerry M. Bass and Bonnie Bass on their claim of 2 strict product liability. General Motors contends that t he district court erred in denyingAtth e scene of the accident, Bass was initially assisted by Sylvester Tart, a 3 witness to the collision. Tart u nbuckled Bass’s seatbelt and helped Bass from the car. Tart later learned that the Dodge sedan that caused the accident was owned by hi s sister, from whom it had been recently stolen. This industry term refers to the method by which the tension in the shoulde r 4 strap of the seatbelt can be released. As explained by plaintiffs’ expert witness:

-2- its alternati ve motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Genera l Motors also contends that the court erred in refusing to dismiss this action with prejudice as a sanction for the Basses’ failure to preserve relevant evidence. Because the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and because w e find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling on sanctions, we affirm.

I.
On June 10, 1986, Jerry Bass was re turning to his home in Columbia, Missouri, in his wife’s 1986 Oldsmobile Cutlass Ciera when he observed an approaching Dodge sedan in th e opposing lane. The driver of the Dodge seemed to lose control of th e vehicle, and it swerved across the road into the oncoming lane, colliding with Bass’s vehicle and causing the Ciera to strike a third vehicle parked on the side of the street. Bass was thrown forward into the windshield, striking his head and leaving a jagged “starburst” imprint on the glass. He suffered a closed head injury, resulting i n permanent damage to the brain. The driver of the Dodge, a young male, fled the scene of the accident on foot and was never identified or apprehended by police. 3

The Basses originally filed this action in the circuit court of Jackson County , Missouri. The suit was voluntarily dismissed and subsequently refiled in district court. The Basses prosecuted the case on the t heory that the seatbelt system in the Ciera was designe d with a dangerous structural defect. The seatbelt system incorporated wha t General Motors termed a “window shade comfort feature,” a device that permitted the 4[T]he industry calls it a window shade because the means by which th e

belt is locked up is similar to what we have in a roll-up window shade in a home where you pull it

down slowly and give a little jerk at the bottom andit locks at that point. And then if we want to unlock it, we just pull it down a little bit, it releases it and you can roll it up. Trial Transcript, Vol. IV at 598. The Basses additionally sought to assign liability to General Motors premised 5 upon its failure to equip the Ciera with a driver’s side airbag sys tem. The court granted summary judgment on that claim, holding that it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. -3- retra ctor spring to be compromised, eliminating the constant tension that woul d otherwise exist, and allowing for excessive slack to develop in the shoulder strap of the driver’s seatbelt. Accordi ng to the Basses’ theory, when excessive slack is allowed to develop , the seatbelt becomes too loose to restrain the driver properly, resulting i n diminished

protection and a greater risk of serious injury in the event of an accident. T he Basses contended that this alleged design defect caused or enhanced the injuries Jerry Bas s suffered in the accident. They sought to hold General Motors liable fo r those injuries under theories of negligence and strict product liability. 5

Afterthe district court resolved a dispute involving sanctions, the details o f which a re set forth later in this opinion, the case proceeded to trial. At the close o f plai ntiffs’ case, General Motors moved for judgment as a matter of law, which th e court denied. The court denied a similar motion by General Motors at the close of all evidence, but did rule that the Basses could not submit a claim for punitive damages to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of General Motors on the negligenc e claimand in favor of the Basses on their strict product liability claim, awardin g $1,170,000 to Jerry Bass for his injuries and $75,000 to Bonnie Bass for loss o f consortium. The court entered judgment on the verdi cts, denying a renewed motion by General Motors for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial.-4- II.
We review a motion for judgment as a matter of la w de novo, applying the same standard as that employed by the district court. See Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc. , 127 F.3d 686, 689 (8th Cir. 1997). A post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law requires the court to determine whether the record contains sufficient eviden ce to support the jury’s verdict. See McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc. , 3 6 F.3d 1396, 1400 (8th Cir. 1994). “In determining whether a plaintiff has made a submis sible case, we must examine the sufficiency of the evidence in the light mos t favorable to the plaintiff and view all inferences in his or her favor. ” Pree v. Brunswick Corp. , 983 F.2d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 1993). “Ju dgment as a matter of law is appropriate
on lywhen all of the evidence points one way and is ‘susceptible of no reasonabl e inference sustaining the position of the nonmov ing party.’” McKnight , 36 F.3d at 1400 (quoting White v. Pence , 961 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 1992)).

The denial of motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) is reviewed with great deference to t

he district court’s ruling and will not be reversed in the absence of
a cle ar abuse of discretion. See McKnight , 36 F.3d at 1400. “The key question i s whether a new trial should have been granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Id.

General Motors claims that the Basses failed to establ ish a submissible claim for st rict product liability based on the theory variously known as “enhanced injury, ” “second collision,” or “crashworthiness” liability. As we explained in Polk v. For d Motor Co. :

The second collision doctrine, enhanced injury doctrine, or defect

enhancing doctrine, as it is variously called, is the legal concept whic h impos es liability based on the construction or design of a product which causes enhanced or greater injuries in the course of or following an initial accident or collision brought about by some independent cause.-5-

529 F.2d 259, 264 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc); see also Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc. , 981 F.2d 377, 383 (8th Cir. 1992).

This doctrine has its roots in Larsen v. General Motor s Corp. , 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), in which we held that an automobile manufacturer “is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to a n unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision.” Id. at 502. In explaining th e pote ntial liabilities of an automobile manufacturer that failed to exercise reasonabl e care in the design and construction of a vehicle, we stated:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject th e manufac turer

to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacture r shou ld be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by th e defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would hav e occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defectiv e design.

Id. at 503 (emphasis supplied).

Sin ce Larsen , two competing frameworks have emerged. In Huddell v. Levin , 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976 ), the Third Circuit explained that in an enhanced injury or crashworthy case a plainti ff must prove: (1) that a practicable alternative, safer design existed; (2) what injuries, if any, would have resulted if the altern ative, safer design had be enused; and (3) some method of establishing the extent of enhanced injurie s attributable to the defective design. See id. at 737-38. The court rejected the idea that
amanufacturer might be liable for the totality of a plaintiff’s injuries if those injuries
were de emed indivisible: “We simply do not accept the proposition that suing fo r wrongful death suffices to convert limited, second collision, enhanced injuries liability into plenary liability for the entire consequences of an accident which the automobile manufacturer played no part in precipitating.” Id. at 739.-6-

The second approach is reflected in Mitchell v. Volks wagenwerk, AG , 669 F.2d 1199 ( 8th Cir. 1982), in which we predicted that in an enhanced injury liability cas e involving an indivisible injury, the Minnesota courts would reject the rationale o f Huddell , see id. at 1207-08, as well as the notion that a n injured victim should have the burden of proving the injuries he probably would have suffered in an accident absent the alleged defect:

Thus we conclude that under Minnesota law the plaintiffs’ burden o f pro of should be deemed satisfied against the manufacturer if it is shown that the design defect was a subst antial factor in producing damages over and abo ve those which were probably caused as a result of the origina l impact or collision. Furthermore, the extent of the manufacturer’s liability depends upon whether

or not the injuries involved are divisible such that th e injuries can be clearly separated and attributed either to th e manufacturer or the original tortfeasor. If the manufacturer’s negligence is found to be a substantial factor in causing an indivisible injury such as paraplegia, death, etc., then absent a reasonable basis to determine which wrongdoer actually ca

used the harm, the defendants should be treated as joint and several tortfeasors.

Id. at 1206.

Gene ral Motors contends that the standard of proof for enhanced injury o r second collision liability articulated in Larsen was not met because the Basses failed to prove the extent to whi ch, if at all, any alleged defect in the Ciera’s seatbelt system enhanced the injuries that Jerry Bass would have otherwise suffered as a result of the
acc ident. General Motors further maintains that it can be held liable only for thos e enhanced injuries proven to have been caused by the alleged defect, rather than Bass’s injuries as a whole.

Missouri law controls in this diversity action. See American Eagle Ins. Co. v. Thompson , 85 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1996). We review the district court’s-7-

interpretation of Missouri law de novo. See Salve Regina College v. Russell , 499 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1991). I n resolving any substantive issues of state law, we are bound by the decis ions of the Missouri Supreme Court. See Kovarik v. American Family Ins

. Group , 108 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir . 1997); Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc. , 820 F.2d 271, 278 (8th Cir. 1987) (“We look to the highest court of the state as the final authority on state law”). If the Missouri Supreme Court has not spoken on a particular issue, “we may consider relevant state precedent, analogous decisions, considered dicta, . . . and any oth er reliable data.” Kovarik , 108 F.3d at 964 (quoting Ventura v. Titan Sports , Inc. , 65 F.3d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 1995)).

III.

The Missouri Supreme Court has adopted the view of strict liability set forth in Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). See Pree , 983 F.2d at 865; Keener v. Dayto n Elec. Mfg. Co. , 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. 1969). This doctrine applies i n defective design cases. See Pree , 983 F.2d at 865; Nesselr ode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc. , 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Blevins v. Cushman Motors , 55 1 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). Such liability imposes a duty upon a manufacturer

not to introduce an unreasonably dangerous product into commerce , whether the dang er arises from defective manufacture, defective design, or a failure to warn of danger. See Magnuson by Mabe v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. , 844 S.W.2d 448, 455 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Peters v. Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc. , 783 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
To prevail under a strict liability theory in a de fective design case, plaintiffs must prove four elements: (1) the product was sold in the course of the defendant’s business; (2) at that time, the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous when put to a r easonably anticipated use; (3) the product was put to use in a reasonabl y anticipatedmanner; and (4) the plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of a defective condition which existed at the time the product was sold. See Pree , 983 F.2d at 865;-8-

Mulligan v. Truman Med. Ctr. , 950 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Fahy v

. Dresser Indus., Inc. , 740 S.W.2d 6 35, 637-38 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Mo. Ann Stat. §§ 537.76 0 et seq. (West 1988). It is the last of these elements with respect to whic h Gene ral Motors challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding causation an d damages.

In Polk , we predicted that the Missouri courts would recognize the concept o f enhancedinjury or second collision liability. We stated a view consistent with ou r decision in Larsen :

The appellees observe correctly that the negligent driver of the other car was a joint tortfeasor with Ford in respect to the enhanced injuries since there was no sufficient intervenin g cause to limit the driver’s liability. On the other hand, Ford was not a joint tortfeasor in respect to any damages occurring pri or to the fire; it is only the enhanced injuries for which Ford may b e held liable in this case. Larsen v. General Motors Corp. , supra , 391 F.2d at 503; see Passwaters v. General Motors Corp. , 454 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (8th Cir. 1972).

Polk , 529 F.2d at 268.
The enhanced injury/second collisio n doctrine was subsequently adopted by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Cryts v. Ford Motor Co. , 571 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). “The second collision doctrine merely extends the scope of liability of a manufact urer

to the situations in which the construction or design of its product ha s caused separate or enhanced injuries in the course of an initial accident brought about by an independent cause.” Id. The court set forth the elements to be proved in a n enhanced injury or second collision case:
To recover under the second collision doctrine, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the product was defective in condition or design-9-

whenit left the hands of the manufacturer. To establish that the product was def ective, plaintiff must show that he was injured while using th e product i n its intended manner. Further, the plaintiff has the burden o f provin g that the product was unreasonably dangerous; i.e., the produc t must be dangerous to an extent beyond tha t which would be contemplated b y the user with ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. If there is evidence from which a jury could find that an unreasonably dangerous condition existed and that the defect caused the injury, the evidence is sufficient to support a jury verdict against th e manufacturer.

Id. at 688 (internal citations omitted).
Cryts focused on the elements of proof regarding the alleged defe ctive design and didnot discuss the burden of proof to be utilized in apportioning liability for injurie s b e tween the tortfeasor whose negligence caused the accident and the manufacturer of the defe ctive product. The latter issue was addressed in Richardson v

. Volkswa genwerk, A.G. , 552 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Mo. 1982). Basing its view o f Missouri law on the Missouri Supreme Court’s decisions in Glick v. Ballent ine Produce, Inc. , 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965) and Barlow v. Thornhill , 537 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1976) (en banc), the court held “that a strict liability defendant in a second collision case is to be h eld jointly and severally liable as a concurrent tortfeasor whenever the jury find s that the defendant’s defective product was a substantial factor in producing a n in divisible injury to the plaintiff.” Richardson , 552 F. Supp. at 81. Summarizing th e burden of proof it would apply, the court stated:
[T]his Court concludes that a plaintiff’s burden of proof in a secon d coll ision-strict

liability case should be deemed satisfied against th e manufact urer

if it is shown that the defective product was a substantia l factor, rather than the sole factor, in producing damages over and above those which were probably caused as a result of the original collision

. Further more, the extent of the manufacturer’s liability depends upo n whether or not the injuries involved are divisible such that the injuries can-10-

be cle arly separated and attributed either to the manufacturer or th e orig inaltortfeasor. If the manufacturer’s conduct is found to be a substantial factor in causing an indivisible injury such as paraplegia , qua driplegia, death, etc., then absent a reasonable basis to determin e which wrongdoer actually caused the harm, the defendants are jointly and severally liable for plaintiff’s total injuries.

Id. at 83.

In McDo well v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. USA , 799 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected Huddell and cited Richardson with approval:
To make a submissible case, the plaintiff need not prove with specificity those injuries actua

lly caused by the negligence of the original tort-feasor and those caused by the specific defects in the product. The [ Richardson ] co urt stated that a strict liability defendant may be held “jointly an d severally liable as a concurrent tort-feasor whenever the jury finds that the defendant’s defective product was a substantial factor [rather than the sole cause] in producing an indivisible injury to the plaintiff.” Richardson , 552 F. Supp. at 81. It

was adequate in this case for plaintiffs to show that the fa iring bracket was a substantial factor in producing the severe injury t o Jame s McDowell’s leg. Plaintiffs made a submissible case and the tria l court did not err when it so held.

799 S.W.2d at 867.

To the exten t that its decisions have not already done so, we conclude that i f presented with the question, the Missouri Supreme Court would adopt the standard of proof set fort

h in Richardson and McDowell by holding that a plaintiff in an enhanced injury or second collision ca se involving an allegedly defective product need not prove with specificity the injuries that flowed directly from the defect. Rath er, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defect was a substantial factor in producing damages-11-

over and above t

hose which were probably caused as a result of the original impact or collision.

IV.

The B asses submitted the testimony of several witnesses on the issue of th e existen ce, extent, and cause of Jerry Bass’s injuries. A physician/physiatrist and a neuropsychologis t testified that the damage to Jerry Bass’s brain and the symptoms of that damage were the result of the closed head injury he received when his head struck the windshield of the Ciera.

The Ba sses’ principal witness on the issue of causation was H. Boulter Kelsey, Jr., an a djunct professor of mechanical engineering at Washington University in St

. Louis and consulting engineer. Kelsey f irst testified generally regarding the physics of the forces that impact upon the driv er of an automobile involved in a head-on collision. He described in extensive detail the increased force of impact the driver suffers when excessive slack exists in the seatbelt:
Q:

. . . Is excessive slack or any slack ever desirable in a seat bel t design?
A: No , sir, slack is not desirable. . . . There’s no such thing as a n adequate right amount of slack. The problem with slack is that when you have a slack belt, you have the body moving forward , accelerat ing, and then hitting the belt, so now we have adde d impact loading to the body fro m the belt itself, which is not present if the re is no slack. . . . But as we go from that standard toward s what we do in passenger cars, th e less slack we can have the better the system will function in terms of containing the body an d keeping it from moving into impact loading with something including th e belt itself.-12-

Tr. Vol. IV at 579-80. And later:

A: The i nclusion of a tension relief for comfort allows slack to b e gener ated in the system. Any slack is bad. The greater the slac k the worse it becomes. So the corollary or the actual thrust of that is if we design a system to eliminate the slack, then we have got a much more ef

ficient safer seat belt system that will provide for the energy a ttenuation and reduction of injury to people in relativel y low-speed collisions. Obviously if you hit a br idge abutment at 100 miles an hour it’s not going to make a whole lot of difference in that circumstance. But if we have a relatively l ow-speed crash, the kind that happen all the time, the belt system will do a much better job protecting somebody if it is snug against the body at all times.
Tr. Vol. IV at 585-86. And finally:
Q: If you were subjected to an emergency situation, what would occur with that amount of slack that you just saw in the design?

. . . . A: The sh oulder harness would have lost virtually all of it s effe ctiveness. I had a loop that I could hold out here about eigh t inc hes in front of my chest instead of having a loop against my bod y. I wouldn’t say that it brings the shoulder harnes s effecti veness down to zero, but it very significantly reduced it s ability to distribute the motion of the upper torso, and more injury will be the result . Depending on what the velocity of the crash is, how hard and heavy a crash it is, you’ ll have more gross movement of the body than you would with the belt snug against it.

Tr. Vol . IV at 613-14 (emphasis supplied). According to Kelsey, then, because th e Ciera’s comfort feature allowed for excessive slack to be introduced in the shoulder-13-

strap of the seatbelt, it con stituted an unreasonably dangerous design defect capable of significantly enhancin g any injuries suffered by a driver when an accident occurs. See Tr. Vol. IV at 583-84.
Next, Kels ey testified that, in his opinion, without the slack introduced in th e seatbelt by the comfort feature, Bass l ikely would not have struck the windshield at all:

A: It’s my opinion that the excessive slack generated by the windo w shade comfort feature allowed Jerry Bass’ upper torso to mov e forward far enough in this accident to strike the win dshield, and had he h ad a snugly fitting shoulder belt, at the speed of this crash, I do ubt that it would be possible for him to get near the windshiel d and have a head strike on the windshield.
Tr. Vol. IV at 610. In Kelsey ’s opinion, the event that directly resulted in the injury to Bass ’s brain would not have occurred in the absence of the defective design that h e described:
Q: Would that have eliminated this whole issue of excessive slack?
A: Yes, sir.

. . . . Q: Would it have eliminated this incident?
A: Yes, sir, I believe so.

Tr. Vol. IV at 693.

Oncross-examination, Kelsey conceded the possibility that even if the seatbelt system had met the standards he identified, Bass mig ht have hit his head on the steering-14-

wheel rather than

on the windshield. Kelsey steadfastly maintained, however, that the force of any impact, and thus the severity of any injury, would likely have been greatly red ucedif the design defect that allowed excessive slack to develop had not bee n present and Bass had been properly protected and restrained.
Under Missouri law, “absolute certainty o f causation is not required in a product liability case and . . . ‘probative facts’ established by circumstantial evidence an d pointing to the desired conclusi on with enough certainty to be reasonable and probable is sufficient.” Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co. , 660 S.W.2d 404, 410 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Lifritz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 472 S.W.2d 28, 32-33 (Mo. Ct

. Ap p. 1971)); see also Miller v. Varity Corp. , 922 S.W.2d 821, 826-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 19 96) (causal connection established when plaintiff shows that absent the allege d wrongful act, injury would not have been sustained); Klein v. General Elec. Co. , 714 S.W.2 d 896, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (testimony of expert that product defect wa s proba ble cause of incident may constitute substantial evidence); Asbridge v. Genera l Motors Corp. , 797 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (“The jury was free t o believe th e opinions of plaintiff’s expert on defect, unreasonable danger and causation”) ; Sanders v. Wallace , 817 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (plaintiffs sat isfy burden of pro of on causation by showing that injury is natural and probable consequence o f negligent act or omission).

When viewed in the light most favorable to the Basses and giving them “th e ben efit of all reasonable favorable inferences and disregarding defendant’s evidenc e except inso far as it may aid the plaintiff’s case,” see Klugesherz v. American Hond a Motor Co ., Inc. , 929 S.W.2d 811, 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996), we conclude that th e evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that the comfort feature desig n incorporated into the seatbelt system consti tuted an unreasonably dangerous defect that
was a substantial factor in producing injuries over and above those which would have resulted had the seatbelt not been defectively designed.-15-

Ba ss’s closed head injury and resulting brain damage was an indivisible injury incapable of apportionment as a matter of law. See, e.g. , Richardson , 552 F. Supp. at 84; Sanders , 817 S.W.2d at 517 (“An indivisible injury results when two o r more causes combine to produce a single injury incapable of division on any reasonable basis an d each is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm”). Thus, General Motors wa s properly treated as a concurrent tortfeasor jointly and severally liable for Bass’s total injuries. See Richardson , 552 F. Supp. at 83; Sanders , 817 S.W.2d at 517.

In sum , then, because the record contains sufficient evidence to support th e verdict of the jury , we conclude that General Motors’ motion for judgment as a matter of law was properly denied. Similarly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying General Motors’ alternative motion for a new trial.

V.

In p reparation for litigation, the Basses’ previous counsel retained experts t o conduct an examination of the Cutlass Ciera. The car was photographed and v ideotaped and a porti on of the driver’s seatbelt was removed. The Basses then permitted th e automobile to be destroyed for salvage without first allowing General Motors th e opportunity to have its own experts examine the car. General Motors moved to dismiss the action with prejudice as a sanction for the failure to preserve relevant evidence. The distr ict court denied this motion, but did impose sanctions upon the Basses b y precludin g any testimony by experts who had examined the vehicle prior to it s destruction and by authorizing defense argument on and a jury instruction regarding the adverse inference that could be drawn from the destruction of the vehicle. See Bass v. General Motors Corp. , 929 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (W.D. Mo. 1996).

A district court is ves ted with discretion to impose sanctions upon a party under i t s inherent disciplinary power. See Sylla-Sawdon v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. , 47 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1995); Dillon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. , 986 F.2d 263, 267-16-

(8th Cir. 1993 ). We review the imposition of sanctions by the district court, and it s deter minations regarding the factual basis for any sanctions, for an abuse of tha t discretion. See id. ; Sylla-Sawdon , 47 F.3d at 280. The ultima te issue to be determined, therefore, “is not what we might have done if the situation had been presented to u s originally , but rather, whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing th e sancti on.” Dillon , 986 F.2d at 267. In particular, “whether the extent of a sanction is appropri ate is a question peculiarly committed to the district court.” Id. at 268 (citing Frumkin v. Mayo Clinic , 965 F.2d 620, 626-27 (8th Cir. 1992)).

In additi on to our deferential standard of review, “[t]here is a strong polic y favoring a trial on the merits and against depriving a party of his day in court.” Baker v. General Motors Corp. , 86 F.3d 811, 817 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fox v. StudebakerWorthington, Inc. , 516 F.2d 989, 996 (8th Cir. 1975)). This policy rests upon th e recognition “that the opportunity to be heard is a litigant’s ‘most precious right an d should be spa

ringly denied.’” Baker , 86 F.3d at 817 (quoting Edgar v. Slaughter , 548 F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1977)).
The Basses’ conduct in permitting the car to be destroyed clearly warranted some type of sanction. See, e.g. , Dillon , 986 F.2d at 267 (“We do not hesitate in determining that the findings in this case—a retained witness and counsel destroyed evidence that they knew or should have known was relevant to imminent litigation—are sufficient for imposing sanctions”). Without question, General Motors was prejudiced by the Basses’ failure to produce the Ciera. See id. at 267-68. Nevertheless, we are n ot persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in declining to impose the ultimate sanction o f dismissal. We agree with the court that General Motors was capable of presenting an adequate defense, and we conclude that the sanctions imposed were commensurate with the Basses’ actions and that they fell within the realm of the court’s sound discretion.
The judgment is affirmed.-17-

A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.