alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dante Newman, Appellant.

[57 NYS3d 412]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Del Giudice, J.), rendered July 21, 2015, convicting him of assault in the first degree and attempted robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the sentence imposed; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with intent to cause serious physical injury *(see*Penal Law § 120.10 [1]; *People v France,*120 AD3d 1357 [2014]). The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the convictions because the testimony of his accomplice was not sufficiently corroborated is unpreserved for appellate review (see *People v Echols,*144 AD3d 702 [2016]; *People v Weaver,*118 AD3d 1270 [2014]; *People v Rivera,*74 AD3d 993 [2010]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the accomplice’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated (see CPL 60.22 [1]; *People v Reome,*15 NY3d 188 [2010]; *People v Echols,*144 AD3d 702 [2016]; *People v Paige,*134 AD3d 1048 [2015]). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see *People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

Certain remarks made by the sentencing court demonstrate that it improperly considered a crime of which the defendant was acquitted as a basis for sentencing. Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentencing *(see People v Brown,*113 AD3d 785 [2014]; *People v Flowers,*97 AD3d 693 [2012]; *People v Grant,*94 AD3d 1139 [2012]). Further, since the People failed to establish that the acts underlying the conviction of assault in the first degree were separate and distinct from the acts underlying the conviction of attempted robbery in the first degree, the sentences imposed on remittal are to run concurrently *(see People v Henderson,*148 AD3d 929 [2017]; *People v Kaye,*137 AD3d 938*640[2016]; *People v Grant,*94 AD3d 1139 [2012]; *cf. People v Brahney,*29 NY3d 10 [2017]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions either are without merit or do not require a new trial.

Dillon, J.P., Austin, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
1 The Hon. James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 03-1798EA

_____________ Kimberly Pruett, * * Appellant, * On Appeal from the United * States District Court v. * for the Eastern District * of Arkansas * Village News, Inc., doing business * [Not To Be Published] as Blytheville Courier News, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: November 20, 2003 Filed: December 1, 2003

___________ Before BYE, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Kimberly Pruett appeals from the District Court's 1 grant of summary judgment to defendant, Blytheville Courier News, on various claims related to her employment with, and termination by, the defendant. After reviewing de novo , see Uhiren v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , 346 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2003), we affirm.2 We do not reach Ms. Pruett's argument that the District Court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to her sexual-discrimination claim rather than the analysis applicable to "mixed-motive" cases under Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa , __ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003). Because she did not raise the issue that this is a "mixed-motive" case until the filing of her supplemental brief, we conclude that the issue is not properly before us. -2- Ms. Pruett worked for Blytheville Courier News during several different time periods. At issue is her last period of employment, which began on December 4, 1998, and ended on or about September 15, 1999, when she learned that she had been terminated. Ms. Pruett asserts that soon after she was rehired by the Blytheville Courier News in December 1998, David Tennyson subjected her to offensive touching, and that she was forced to hear vulgar language and see pornographic images on her office computer. She also contends that Mr. Tennyson drank alcohol in the workplace and kept a gun at his desk. Ms. Pruett also alleges she was denied 401(k) benefits and commissions. Her complaint alleges claims under Title VII, including sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and retaliation, a claim under the Equal Pay Act, and a state-law breach-of-contract claim. Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). All evidence and inferences are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). After reviewing the record de novo , we affirm substantially for the reasons given by the District Court. 2See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
No. 10-47.

#### Lorraine A. Wells, Petitioner v. Franklin Apartments, et al.

562 U.S. 961, 131 S. Ct. 459,

178 L. Ed. 2d 287,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8114.

October 12, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 370 Fed. Appx. 794.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FEBRUARY 22, 2013

NO. 03-11-00886-CV

Angelica Mitchell Moore and Kevin Alexander Moore, Appellants

v.

Donna M. Brown and Alvin Benard Brown, Appellees

APPEAL FROM 426TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PEMBERTON AND FIELD

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PEMBERTON

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being 

considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in the district court’s 

judgment: IT IS THEREFORE considered, adjudged and ordered that the judgment of the 

district court is in all things affirmed. It is FURTHER ordered that the appellants pay all costs 

relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below; and that this decision be certified 

below for observance.
# C_2013215EN.01001301.xml

| 27.7.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 215/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 215/13

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 10 June 2013 — Gérard Fenoll v Centre d’aide par le travail La Jouvene, Association de parents et d’amis de personnes handicapées mentales (APEI) d’Avignon

(Case C-316/13)

2013/C 215/17

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Referring court

Cour de cassation

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant in cassation: Gérard Fenoll

Appellant in cassation:

Respondents in cassation: Centre d’aide par le travail La Jouvene, Association de parents et d’amis de personnes handicapées mentales (APEI) d’Avignon

Respondents in cassation:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 3 of Directive 89/391/EEC, (1) to which Article 1 of Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003, (2) determining the scope thereof, refers, be interpreted as meaning that a person placed in a work rehabilitation centre can be classified as a ‘worker’ within the meaning of that Article 3? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 3 of Directive 89/391/EEC, (1) to which Article 1 of Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003, (2) determining the scope thereof, refers, be interpreted as meaning that a person placed in a work rehabilitation centre can be classified as a ‘worker’ within the meaning of that Article 3?

1

2

| 2. | Must Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that a person, such as described in the previous question, can be classified as a ‘worker’ within the meaning of that Article 31? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as meaning that a person, such as described in the previous question, can be classified as a ‘worker’ within the meaning of that Article 31?

| 3. | Can a person, such as described in the first question, rely directly on the rights conferred on her or him by the Charter in order to obtain an entitlement to paid leave if national legislation does not provide for any such entitlement, and must the national courts, in order to ensure that those rights are fully effective, set aside any contrary provision of national law? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Can a person, such as described in the first question, rely directly on the rights conferred on her or him by the Charter in order to obtain an entitlement to paid leave if national legislation does not provide for any such entitlement, and must the national courts, in order to ensure that those rights are fully effective, set aside any contrary provision of national law?

---

(1)  Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (OJ 1989 L 183, p. 1).

1

(2)  Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).

2

---
# MWR hosts HQC Halloween 5K Run/Walk for fun, fitness

/ Published Nov. 6, 2015
Fort Belvoir, Virginia,
##### 



Exhibit
10.5
 Genitope Corporation
 2003 Employee Stock Purchase Plan
 Adopted August 7, 2003  Approved by stockholders August 29, 2003
 1. Purpose .
 (a)
 (b)
 (c)
 2. Definitions.
 (a) Board
 (b) Code .
 (c) Committee
 (d) Common Stock
 (e) Company
 (f) Contributions
 (g) Corporate Transaction
 (i)
 1.




---



##### 



(ii)
 (iii)
 (iv)
 (h) Director
 (i) Eligible Employee
 (j) Employee
 (k) Employee Stock Purchase Plan
 (l) Exchange Act
 (m) Fair Market Value The Wall Street Journal
 (n) Offering
 (o) Offering Date
 (p)  Officer 
 2.




---



##### 



(q) Participant
 (r) Plan
 (s) Purchase Date
 (t) Purchase Period
 (u) Purchase Right
 (v) Related Corporation
 (w) Securities Act
 (x)  Trading Day 
 3. Administration.
 (a)
 (b)
 (i)
 (ii)
 (iii)
 3.




---



##### 



(iv)
 (v)
 (c)
 (d)
 4. Shares of Common Stock Subject to the Plan .
  5. Grant of Purchase Rights; Offering .
 (a)
 4.




---



##### 



(b)
 6. Eligibility.
 (a)
 (b)
 (i)
 (ii)
 (iii)
 5.




---



##### 



(c)
 (d)
 (e)
 7. Purchase Rights; Purchase Price .
 (a)
 (b)
 (c)
 6.




---



##### 



(d)
 (i)
 (ii)
 8. Participation; Withdrawal; Termination .
 (a)
 (b)
 (c)
 7.




---



##### 



(d)
 (e)
 9. Exercise.
 (a)
 (b)
 (c)
 8.




---



##### 



10. Covenants of the Company .
  11. Use of Proceeds from Shares of Common Stock .
  12. Rights as a stockholder .
  13. Designation of Beneficiary .
 (a)
 (b)
 14. Adjustments upon Changes in Securities; Corporate Transactions .
 (a)
 9.




---



##### 



(b)
 15. Amendment of the Plan.
 (a)
 (b)
 (c)
 16. Termination or Suspension of the Plan .
 (a)
 10.




---



##### 



(b)
 17. Effective Date of Plan .
  18. Miscellaneous Provisions .
 (a)
 (b)
 11.




---



##### 



Genitope Corporation
 2003 Employee Stock Purchase Plan
 Offering
 Adopted by the Board of Directors: August 7, 2003  Amended and Restated: February 1, 2007
  1. Grant; Offering Date.
 (a)
 (b) New Offering
 (c)
 (d)
 (e)
  1.




---



##### 



2. Eligible Employees.
 (a)
 (b) not
 (i)
 (ii)
 (iii)
 (c)
 (i)
 2.




---



##### 



(ii)
 3. Purchase Rights.
 (a) provided, however
 (b)
 (c)
 3.




---



##### 



(d)
 4. Purchase Price.
  5. Participation.
 (a)
 (b)
 (c)
 4.




---



##### 



(d)
 6. Purchases.
  7. Notices and Agreements.
  8. Exercise Contingent on Stockholder Approval .
  9. Offering Subject to Plan.
  5.
POWER OF ATTORNEY

          KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned does hereby
constitute and appoint Carl A. Gilbert and John R. Major, and each of them, his
true and lawful attorneys-in-fact and agents, with full power of substitution
and resubstitution, for him in his name, place and stead, in any and all
capacities (including his capacity as a director and/or officer of Dravo
Corporation), to sign the Form 10-K Annual Report of Dravo Corporation for the
year ended December 31, 1997 and any and all amendments thereto, and to file
the same, with all exhibits thereto, and all other documents in connection
therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto said
attorneys-in-fact and agents, and each of them, full power and authority to do
and perform each and every act and thing requisite and necessary to be done in
and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as the undersigned
might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that
attorneys-in-fact and agents or any of them, or their or his substitute or
substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof. 
          WITNESS the due execution hereof this 22 day of January, 1998. 

/s/ ARTHUR E. BYRNES
/s/ JAMES C. HUNTINGTON, JR.
/s/ WILLIAM E. KASSLING
/s/ PETER T. KROSS
/s/ WILLIAM G. ROTH
/s/ KONRAD M. WEIS

                                   24-1
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

May 21, 2010 

p0518 

Order 

 

May 21, 2010 

139984 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 139984 

 COA: 285101 

Lenawee CC: 07-012858-FC 

DOUGLAS EUGENE CAMP, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On May 11, 2010, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to 

appeal the September 17, 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, 

the application is again considered. MCR 7.302(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to 

appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the trial court did 

not clearly err in finding that the defendant consented to the mistrial declared by the 

court. Where a defendant consents to a mistrial, double jeopardy considerations do not 

apply. United States v Dinitz, 424 US 600, 607; 96 S Ct 1075; 47 L Ed 2d 267 (1976). 

We REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues raised by 

the defendant but not addressed by that court during its initial review of the case. 

 We do not retain jurisdiction.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Burnett, Appellant.

[64 NYS3d 513]

An appeal having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald A. Zweibel, J. at plea; Juan Merchan, J. at sentencing), rendered March 24, 2016, said appeal having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, due deliberation having been had thereon, and finding the sentence not excessive, it is unanimously ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same is hereby affirmed.

Concur—Renwick, J.P., Manzanet-Daniels, Mazzarelli, Kahn and Moulton, JJ.
#### Com. v. McLaine

09/30/2015

324 MAL (2015)

Denied

Pa.Super., 120 A.3d 1063
# DLA Disposition Services sells excess military property to Afghan companies, stimulates economy

/ Published Aug. 17, 2015
Bagram, 
Twelve trucks loaded with supplies left Bagram Airfield and headed toward Afghan businesses after a "white goods" sale at the Defense Logistics Agency Disposition Services Yard Aug. 7. Sale items included a Bobcat, forklifts and refrigerator containers.DLA Disposition Services, responsible for the disposition of military excess property, held its first sale at U.S. sites across Afghanistan in June 2014. Since then, DLA Disposition Services has been selling nonmilitary items used largely for base support to Afghan businesses. Total sales to date at BAF equal 37 with proceeds totaling $2,729,860. All proceeds are turned over to the U.S. Treasury."I enjoy my job because it's always different," said Eric Robie, a property disposal specialist in DLA Disposition Services. "We have a huge responsibly here at Bagram to save the U.S. government money and try to do our part to help the local economy. When our usable sales are prepared, we take time to really go over the property and make sure it's properly researched and will be well within our sales guidelines. All of the deployed DLA Disposition Service employees, past and present, have done a great job."According to Russell Manuel, DLA Disposition Services deputy director in Afghanistan, DLA Disposition Services advertises the usable goods contracts through the federal government's contracting website, FedBizOpps; the DLA Disposition Services website; and regional Afghanistan contracting offices. Criteria for contract awards include that the company be based in Afghanistan and owned 100 percent by Afghan citizens. The final details for releasing the property to buyers is worked out with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Minister of Finance and the Afghanistan Customs Department for taxation of the imported goods."The usable goods sales program is one of the best platforms the U.S. government uses to stimulus the Afghan economy," Manuel said. "The program helps DLA avoid property disposal costs associated disposal operations and the equipment is used by local business owners to support economic development. Overall, the program is a quick-win effort for the U.S. and the Afghan government."
No. 10-5596.

#### In re Mark Mearl Bowersock, Petitioner.

562 U.S. 826, 131 S. Ct. 324,

178 L. Ed. 2d 260,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7666.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of mandamus denied.
#### Yolanda M., Matter of (Jose M.)

2d Dept: 147 AD3d 954 (Proceeding No. 2)

denied*
#### In the Matter of the Will of Miriam Schwartz, Deceased. Gloria Schwarz, Appellant; Andrea Namanworth, Respondent.

[61 NYS3d 892]

Decree, Surrogate’s Court, Bronx County (Nelida Malave-Gonzalez, S.), entered on or about September 6, 2016, admitting the decedent’s will into probate, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Appeals from orders, same court and Surrogate, entered November 2, 2016, and on or about July 25, 2016; which granted proponent’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the objections and denied objectant’s motion and, insofar as appealed from, denied objectant’s motion for reargument, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the decree and nonappealable, respectively.

Proponent established prima facie that the decedent’s will was duly executed by submitting the attesting witnesses’ affidavits and the statements of the attorney who supervised the execution ceremony *(see*SCPA 1408; *Matter of Halpern,*76 AD3d 429, 431 [1st Dept 2010], *affd*16 NY3d 777 [2011]). Objectant failed to raise an issue of fact, citing no evidence of a material irregularity in the proceeding or of a lack of testamentary capacity on the decedent’s part *(see Matter of Korn,*25 AD3d 379 [1st Dept 2006]).

Nor did objectant raise an issue of fact as to undue influence or fraud *(see Matter of Schuman,*132 AD3d 551 [1st Dept 2015]). The close familial relationship between the decedent and proponent counterbalances any inference of undue influence. Moreover, in light of the evidence that the decedent relied on proponent for assistance with daily living for a long time, her grant to proponent of a power of attorney does not shift the burden to proponent to explain the challenged bequests. In any event, proponent fully explained the bequests as a product of the decedent’s grievances against objectant. As to fraud, object-ant failed to present evidence of any false statements made to the decedent by proponent or her agents that caused the decedent to change her will.

No appeal lies from the denial of a motion for reargument *(see Lopez v Post Mgt. LLC,*68 AD3d 671 [1st Dept 2009]).

*541We have considered objectant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Acosta, P.J., Friedman, Webber, Oing and Moulton, JJ.
# Orders for kosher for Passover 2024 meals, ready-to-eat, begin

/ Published Sept. 20, 2023
PHILADELPHIA, 
Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support's Subsistence supply chain is taking orders from Oct. 1 to Dec. 15, 2023, to provide kosher for Passover meals to warfighters across the globe in time for 2024’s Passover, April 22-30. 

More than 17,000 special meals, ready to eat were delivered in time for Passover this year around the world for customers who religiously observe the holiday.

Joseph Zanolle, customer account specialist with the DLA Troop Support Subsistence supply chain, is working to receive customer orders six months in advance to provide the vendor, LaBriute Meals, with an accurate minimum and maximum order number.

Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures requisition orders should be submitted through the customer’s food supply officer just as with the regular MREs.

If you have any questions on the ordering process for kosher for Passover MREs, please contact Zanolle at Joseph.Zanolle@dla.mil or Amanda Witte, customer account specialist with the DLA Troop Support Subsistence supply chain, at Amanda.Witte@dla.mil.

For more information, visit the Meal, Religious, Kosher for Passover page on the DLA website.
# C_2014031EN.01002301.xml

| 1.2.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 31/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.2.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 31/23

---

Action brought on 30 November 2013 — ZZ v Frontex

(Case F-117/13)

2014/C 31/41

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: ZZ (represented by: S. Pappas, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Agence européenne pour la gestion de la coopération opérationnelle aux frontières extérieures des États membres de l'Union européenne (FRONTEX)

Defendant:

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

The annulment of the decision not to renew the contract of the applicant after the annulment, by the Civil Service Tribunal, of the first decision of non-renewal of his contract.

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul the decision of Frontex dated 19 February 2013 not to renew the contract of the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul the decision of Frontex dated 19 February 2013 not to renew the contract of the applicant;

| — | exercise, if so required, its full jurisdiction to ensure the effectiveness of its decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

exercise, if so required, its full jurisdiction to ensure the effectiveness of its decision;

| — | order the Defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Defendant to pay the costs.

---
No. 10-5758.

#### Tiram Lewis, Petitioner v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.

562 U.S. 966, 131 S. Ct. 466,

178 L. Ed. 2d 296,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 8045.

October 12, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.