33696 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and

clarity of the information to be

collected; and

(4) Minimize the burden of the

collection of information on those who

are to respond, including through the

use of appropriate automated,

electronic, mechanical, or other

technological collection techniques or

other forms of information technology,

e.g., permitting electronic submission of

responses.

If you have additional comments,

suggestions, or need a copy of the

proposed information collection

instrument with instructions, or

additional information, please contact

Kristen Mahoney, 202–616–2896, U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of

Community Oriented Policing Services,

1100 Vermont Avenue, NW,

Washington, D.C. 20530.

Additionally, comments and/or

suggestions regarding the item(s)

contained in this notice, especially

regarding the estimated public burden

and associated response time should be

directed to Kristen Mahoney, 202–616–

2896, U.S. Department of Justice, Office

of Community Oriented Policing

Services, 1100 Vermont Avenue, NW,

Washington, D.C. 20530.

Overview of this information

collection:

(1) Type of Information Collection:

Reinstatement, without change, of a

previously approved collection for

which approval has expired.

(2) Title of the Form/Collection:

Universal Hiring Grant Application.

(3) Agency form number, if any, and

the applicable component of the

Department of Justice sponsoring the

collection:

Form: None. Office of Community

Oriented Services, Department of

Justice.

(4) Affected public who will be asked

or required to respond, as well as a brief

abstract:

Primary: State and Local

governments, Tribal governments.

Other: None.

This application will be used by state

and local jurisdictions to apply for

federal funding which will be used to

increase the number of law enforcement

positions in their law enforcement

agencies.

(5) An estimate of the total number of

respondents and the amount of time

estimated for an average respondent to

respond: 3200 respondents; 5.5 hours.

(6) An estimate of the total public

burden (in hours) associated with the

collection: 17,600 annual burden hours.

If additional information is required

contact: Mr. Robert B. Briggs, Clearance

Officer, United States Department of

Justice, Information Management and

Security Staff, Justice Management

Division, Suite 850, Washington Center,

1001 G Street, NW, Washington, DC

20530.

Dated: June 15, 1998.

Robert B. Briggs,

Department Clearance Officer, United States

Department of Justice.

[FR Doc. 98–16295 Filed 6–18–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–AT–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Office of the Attorney General

[A.G. Order No. 2166–98]

RIN 1105–AA56

Proposed Guidelines for the Jacob

Wetterling Crimes Against Children

and Sexually Violent Offender

Registration Act, as Amended

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Proposed guidelines.

SUMMARY: The United States Department

of Justice is publishing Proposed

Guidelines to implement the Jacob

Wetterling Crimes Against Children and

Sexually Violent Offender Registration

Act as amended by Megan’s Law, the

Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking

and Identification Act of 1996, and

section 115 of the General Provisions of

Title I of the Departments of Commerce,

Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and

Related Agencies Appropriations Act,

1998.

DATES: Comments must be received by

August 18, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to

Bonnie J. Campbell, Director, Violence

Against Women Office, U.S. Department

of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue,

NW., Washington, DC 20530, 202–616–

8894.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Pam

Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and

Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.

104–236, 110 Stat. 3093 (the ‘‘Pam

Lychner Act’’), and section 115 of the

General Provisions of Title I of the

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and

State, the Judiciary, and Related

Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998,

Pub. L. No. 105–119, 111 Stat. 2440,

2461 (the ‘‘CJSA’’), amended section

17101 of the Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.

No. 103–322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038

(codified at 42 U.S.C. 14071), which

contains the Jacob Wetterling Crimes

Against Children and Sexually Violent

Offender Registration Act (the

‘‘Wetterling Act’’ or ‘‘the Act’’). These

legislative changes require conforming

changes in the Final Guidelines for the

Jacob Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law

(Pub. L. No. 104–145, 110 Stat. 1345)

that were published by the Department

of Justice on July 21, 1997, in the

Federal Register (62 FR 39009).

The Wetterling Act generally sets out

minimum standards for state sex

offender registration programs. States

that fail to comply with these standards

within the applicable time frame will be

subject to a mandatory 10% reduction of

formula grant funding under the Edward

Byrne Memorial State and Local Law

Enforcement Assistance Program (42

U.S.C. 3756), which is administered by

the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the

Department of Justice. Any funds that

are not allocated to noncomplying states

will be reallocated to states that are in

compliance. Information concerning

compliance review procedures and

requirements appears in part VIII of

these guidelines.

The Wetterling Act’s requirements for

compliance may be divided into three

categories, each of which carries a

different compliance deadline,

depending on the legislation from

which it derives:

1. Original requirements. Many of the

provisions of the current formulation of

the Wetterling Act derive from the

original version of the Act, which was

enacted on September 13, 1994, or from

the Megan’s Law amendment to the Act.

These include, for example, the basic

requirements to register offenders for at

least 10 years; to take registration

information from offenders and to

inform them of registration obligations

when they are released; to require

registrants to update address

information when they move; to verify

the registered address periodically; and

to release registration information as

necessary for public safety. The

deadline for compliance with these

features of the Act was September 12,

1997, based on the specification of 42

U.S.C. 14071(g) that states have three

years from the Act’s original enactment

date (i.e., September 13, 1994) to

achieve compliance. However, 42 U.S.C.

14071(g) allows a two-year extension of

the deadline for states that are making

good faith efforts to achieve compliance,

and states that have been granted this

extension have until September 12,

1999, to comply with these features of

the Act.

2. Pam Lychner Act requirements. The

Pam Lychner Act’s amendments to the

Wetterling Act created a limited number

of new requirements for state

registration programs, including a

requirement that the perpetrators of

particularly serious offenses and
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices 33697

recidivists be subject to lifetime

registration. The time frame for

compliance with these new

requirements is specified in section

10(b) of the Pam Lychner Act—three

years from the Pam Lychner Act’s

enactment date of October 3, 1996,

subject to a possible extension of two

years for states that are making good

faith efforts to come into compliance.

Hence, barring an extension, states will

need to comply with these features of

the Act by October 2, 1999.

3. CISA requirements. The CJSA

amendments made extensive changes to

the Wetterling Act, many of which

afford states greater flexibility in

achieving compliance. Under the

effective date provisions in section

115(c) of the CJSA, states immediately

have the benefit of amendments that

afford them greater discretion and can

rely on these amendments in

determining what changes (if any) are

needed in their registration programs to

comply with the Act. For example, the

Act as amended by CJSA affords states

discretion concerning the procedures to

be used in periodic verification of

registrants’ addresses, in contrast to the

Act’s original requirement that a

specific verification-form procedure be

used. In light of this change, effective

immediately, states have discretion

concerning the particular procedures

that will be used in address verification.

While the CJSA’s amendments to the

Wetterling Act were largely in the

direction of affording states greater

discretion, the CJSA did add some new

requirements to the Wetterling Act. For

example, the CJSA added provisions to

promote registration of sex offenders in

states where they work or attend school

(as well as states of residence) and to

promote registration of federal and

military sex offenders. The time frame

for compliance with new requirements

under CJSA amendments, as specified

in section 115(c)(2) of the CJSA, is three

years from the CJSA’s enactment date of

November 26, 1997, subject to a possible

extension of two years for states that are

making good faith efforts to come into

compliance. Hence, barring an

extension, states will need to comply

with these features of the Act by

November 25, 2000.

The proposed guidelines in this

publication identify and discuss

separately all of the requirements that

states will need to meet by each of the

three specified deadlines, thereby

making it clear when states will need to

be in compliance with each element of

the Wetterling Act to maintain

eligibility for full Byrne Formula Grant

funding.

Proposed Guidelines

1. General purposes and principles of

interpretation. These guidelines carry

out a statutory directive to the Attorney

General in subsection (a)(1) of the

Wetterling Act (42 U.S.C. 14071(a)(1)) to

establish guidelines for state registration

programs under the Act. Before turning

to the specific provisions of the Act, five

general points should be noted

concerning the Act’s interpretation and

application.

First, the general objective of the Act

is to assist law enforcement and protect

the public from convicted child

molesters and violent sex offenders

through requirements of registration and

appropriate release of registration

information. The Act is not intended to,

and does not have the effect of, making

states less free than they were under

prior law to impose such requirements.

Hence, the Act’s standards constitute a

floor for state programs, not a ceiling.

States do not have to go beyond the

Act’s minimum requirements to

maintain eligibility for full Byrne Grant

funding, but they retain the discretion to

do so, and state programs do often

contain elements that are not required

under the Act’s standards. For example,

a state may have a registration system

that covers broader classes of offenders

than those identified in the Act, requires

address verification for registered

offenders at more frequent intervals

than the Act prescribes, or requires

offenders to register for a longer period

of time than the period specified in the

Act. Exercising these options creates no

problem of compliance because the

Act’s provisions concerning duration of

registration, covered offenders, and

other matters do not limit state

discretion to impose more extensive or

stringent requirements that encompass

the Act’s baseline requirements.

Second, to comply with the

Wetterling Act, states do not have to

revise their registration systems to use

technical definitions of covered sex

offenses based on federal law. Rather,

subject to certain constraints, they may

use their own criminal law definitions

and categories in defining registration

requirements. This point is explained

more fully below.

Third, the Act’s definitions of covered

offense categories are tailored to its

general purpose of protecting the public

from persons who molest or sexually

exploit children and from other sexually

violent offenders. Hence, these

definitions do not include all offenses

that involve a sexual element. For

example, offenses consisting of

consensual acts between adults are not

among the offenses for which

registration is required under the Act,

and requiring registration for persons

convicted of such offenses would not

further the Act’s objectives.

Fourth, the Wetterling Act

contemplates the establishment of

programs that will prescribe registration

and notification requirements for

offenders who are subsequently

convicted of offenses in the pertinent

categories. The Act does not require

states to attempt to identify and to

prescribe such requirements for

offenders who are convicted prior to the

establishment of a conforming program.

Nevertheless, the Act does not preclude

states from prescribing registration and

notification requirements for offenders

convicted prior to the establishment of

the program.

Fifth, the Act sets minimum standards

for state registration and notification

programs but does not require that its

standards be implemented by statute. In

assessing compliance with the Act, the

totality of a state’s rules governing the

operation of its registration and

notification program will be considered,

including administrative policies and

procedures as well as statutes.

2. Related litigation. Some state

registration and notification systems

have been challenged on constitutional

grounds. The majority of courts, and all

federal appeals courts, that have dealt

with the issue thus far have held that

systems like those contemplated by the

Wetterling Act do not violate released

offenders’ constitutional rights. See, e.g.,

Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125

F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997) (Connecticut

probation office notification policy);

Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th

Cir. 1997) (Washington state act), cert

denied, 118 S.Ct. 1191 (1998); Doe v.

Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997)

(New York act), cert denied, 118 S.Ct.

1066 (1998); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d

1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (New Jersey

notification provisions), cert. denied.

118 S.Ct. 1039 (1998); Artway v.

Attorney General, 81 F.3d Cir. 1996)

(New Jersey registration provision); Doe

v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich.

1997) (Michigan notification

provisions); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp.

425 (D. Mass. 1996) (Massachusetts

registration of juvenile offenders); State

v. Pickens, 558 N.W. 2d 396 (Iowa

1997); Arizona Dep’t of Public Safety v.

Superior Court, 949 P.2d 983 (Ariz.

App. 1997); Opinion of the Justices to

the Senate, 423 Mass. 1201, 668 N.E. 2d

738 (Mass 1996); Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J.

1, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995); State v.

Ward, 123 Wash. 2d 488, 869 P.2d 1062

(Wash. 1994). The United States has

filed ‘‘friend of the court’’ briefs in

several of these cases, arguing that sex
33698 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices

offender registration and community

notification do not impose punishment

for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and

Double Jeopardy Clause or violate

privacy or liberty interests guaranteed

by the federal Constitution.

In a few other cases, however, courts

have found that certain applications or

provisions of some state systems violate

the United States Constitution or

provisions of a state constitution. See,

e.g., Doe v. Attorney General, 426 Mass.

136, 686 N.E. 2d 1007 (Mass. 1997)

(holding that the Massachusetts act

implicates liberty and property interests

protected by the Massachusetts

constitution, so that the act could not be

applied to Doe—who had been

convicted of ‘‘indecent assault’’ for

sexually suggestive touching of an

undercover police officer in an area

known for consensual sexual activity

between adult males—without a prior

hearing to determine if he individually

presented any threat to persons for

whose protection the act was passed;

the court did not rule out the possibility

that a categorical ‘‘dangerousness’’

determination could be justified by

certain other conviction offenses); State

v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 923 P. 2d 1024

(Kan. 1996) (holding that due to the

breadth of offenses subject to Kansas

registration act and the potentially

unlimited scope of notification, Kansas

notification provisions violate the Ex

Post Facto Clause), cert. denied, 117 S.

Ct. 2508 (1997). The New Jersey

Supreme Court in Doe v. Poritz (above)

also found a state law privacy interest

requiring certain procedural protections,

and those procedures were further

elaborated upon by the Third Circuit in

E.B. v. Verniero (above).

In addition, when these guidelines

were written, there were appeals

pending in the Sixth Circuit, see

Cutshall v. Sundquist, 980 F. Supp. 928

(M.D. Tenn. 1997) (holding that the

Tennessee notification provisions

implicate federal and state law privacy

and employment interests, requiring

procedural protections prior to

notification), appeal pending, 6th Cir.

Nos. 97–6276 & 97–6321, and in the

Third Circuit, see Paul v. Verniero, 3d

Cir. No. 97–5791 (from district court’s

rejection of constitutional privacy

challenge to community notification).

There was also ongoing litigation in

federal district court in Minnesota and

in state courts in Ohio and

Pennsylvania.

3. Summary and text of guidelines.

The following guidelines explain the

interpretation and application of the

Wetterling Act’s standards for

registration programs and related

requirements. All citations in these

guidelines to the Act are to the Act’s

current text, reflecting the Megan’s Law,

Pam Lychner Act, and CJSA

amendments. The detailed explanation

is preceded by a table that summarizes

the organization of the guidelines, the

major elements of the Act, and the time

for compliance with each element under

the enacting legislation.

Summary and Deadlines for Wetterling

Act Compliance

I. Ten-Year Minimum Registration for

Persons Convicted of a Criminal Offense

Against a Victim Who is a Minor or a

Sexually Violent Offense [Sept. 12,

1997; Possible Two-Year Extension]

A. ‘‘States’’ to which the Act applies

B. Duration of registration

C. Coverage of offenses

D. Coverage of offenders

II. Registration and Tracking

Procedures; Penalties for

Registration Violations [Sept. 12,

1997; Possible Two-Year Extension]

A. Initial registration procedures

B. Change of address procedures

C. Periodic address verification

D. Penalties for registration violations

III. Release of Registration Information

[Sept. 12, 1997; Possible Two-Year

Extension]

IV. Special Registration Requirements

Under the Pam Lychner Act for

Recidivists and Aggravated

Offenders [Oct. 2, 1999; Possible

Two-Year Extension]

V. Special Registration Requirements

Under the CJSA Amendments

Relating to Sexually Violent

Predators, Federal and Military

Offenders, and Non-Resident

Workers and Students [Nov. 25,

2000; Possible Two-Year Extension]

A. Heightened sexually violent

predator registration or alternative

measures

B. Federal and military offenders;

non-resident workers and students

VI. Participation in the National Sex

Offender Registry [Nov. 25, 2000;

Possible Two-Year Extension]

VII. Good Faith Immunity [Available to

States Immediately]

VIII. Compliance Review; Consequences

of Non-Compliance

Text of Detailed Guidelines for

Wetterling Act Compliance

I. Ten-Year Minimum Registration for

Persons Convicted of a Criminal

Offense Against a Victim Who is a

Minor or a Sexually Violent Offense

[Time For Compliance: September 12,

1997; Possible Two-Year Extension]

To comply with subsections (a)(1) and

(b)(6)(A) of the Wetterling Act, a state

registration program must require

current address registration for a period

of 10 years for persons convicted of ‘‘a

criminal offense against a victim who is

a minor’’ or a ‘‘sexually violent offense.’’

This requirement derives from the

Wetterling Act as originally enacted.

The time for compliance is accordingly

that provided in 42 U.S.C. 14071(g)—

Sept. 12, 1997, or Sept. 12, 1999, for

states that have received a two-year

extension based on good faith efforts to

achieve compliance.

The interpretation and application of

this requirement are as follows:

A. ‘‘States’’ to Which the Act Applies

For purposes of the Act, ‘‘state’’ refers

to the political units identified in the

provision defining ‘‘state’’ for purposes

of eligibility for Byrne formula Grant

funding (42 U.S.C. 3791(a)(2)). Hence,

the ‘‘states’’ that must comply with the

Act’s standards for registration programs

to maintain full eligibility for such

funding are the fifty states, the District

of Columbia, the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,

American Samoa, Guam, and the

Northern Mariana Islands.

B. Duration of Registration

Subsection (b)(6)(A) provides that the

registration requirement must remain in

effect for 10 years following the

registrant’s release from prison or

placement on parole, supervised release,

or probation. States may choose to

establish longer registration periods,

and are required to do so under the

Act’s standards for certain types of

offenders as discussed in parts IV and

V of these guidelines. Registration

requirements of shorter duration than 10

years are not consistent with the Act.

Hence, for example, a state program

would not be in compliance with the

Act if it allowed registration obligations

to be waived or terminated before the

end of the 10 year period on such

grounds as a finding of rehabilitation or

a finding that registration (or continued

registration) would not serve the

purposes of the state’s registration

provisions. However, if the underlying

conviction is reversed, vacated, or set

aside, or if the registrant is pardoned,

registration (or continued registration) is

not required under the Act.

Also, in light of a proviso in

subsection (b)(6), a state need not

require registration ‘‘during ensuing

periods of incarceration.’’ The reference

to subsequent ‘‘incarceration’’ should be

understood to include periods of civil

commitment, as well as imprisonment

for the commission of another criminal

offense, since a state may conclude that

it is superfluous to carry out address

registration and verification procedures

while the registrant is in either criminal
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices 33699

or civil confinement. To comply with

the Act, a state that does waive

registration during subsequent criminal

or civil confinement must require that

registration resume when the registrant

is released, if time remains under the

registration period required by the Act.

C. Coverage of Offenses

1. ‘‘Criminal offense against a victim

who is a minor’’. The Act requires

registration of any person convicted of

a ‘‘criminal offense against a victim who

is a minor.’’ Subsection (a)(3)(A) defines

the relevant category of offenses. The

general purpose of the definition is to

ensure comprehensive registration for

persons convicted of offenses involving

sexual molestation or sexual

exploitation of minors. ‘‘Minors’’ for

purposes of the Act means a person

below the age of 18.

The specific clauses in the Act’s

definition of ‘‘criminal offense against a

victim who is a minor’’ are as follows:

(1)–(2) Clauses (i) and (ii) cover

kidnapping of a minor (except by a

parent) and false imprisonment of a

minor (except by a parent). All states

have statutes that define offenses—going

by such names as ‘‘kidnapping,’’

‘‘criminal restraint,’’ or ‘‘false

imprisonment’’—whose gravamen is

abduction or unlawful restraint of a

person. States can comply with these

clauses by requiring registration for

persons convicted of these statutory

offenses whose victims were below the

age of 18. It is a matter of state

discretion under these clauses whether

registration should be required for such

offenses in cases where the offender is

a parent of the victim.

(3) Clause (iii) covers offenses

consisting of ‘‘criminal sexual conduct

toward a minor.’’ States can comply

with this clause by requiring registration

for persons convicted of all statutory sex

offenses under state law whose elements

involve physical contact with a victim—

such as provisions defining crimes of

‘‘rape,’’ ‘‘sexual assault,’’ ‘‘sexual

abuse,’’ or ‘‘incest’’—in cases where the

victim was a minor at the time of the

offense. Coverage is not limited to cases

where the victim’s age is an element of

the offense (such as prosecutions for

specially defined child molestation

offenses). It is a matter of state

discretion under this clause whether

registration should be required for sex

offenses that do not involve physical

contact, such as exhibitionism offenses.

(4) Clause (iv) covers offenses

consisting of solicitation of a minor to

engage in sexual conduct. The notion of

‘‘sexual conduct’’ should be understood

in the same sense as in clause (iii).

Hence, states can comply with clause

(iv) by consistently requiring

registration, in cases where the victim

was below the age of 18, based on:

—A conviction for an offense involving

solicitation of the victim under a

general attempt or solicitation

provision, where the object offense

would be covered by clause (iii), and

—A conviction for an offense involving

solicitation of the victim under any

provision defining a particular crime

whose elements include soliciting or

attempting to engage in sexual activity

involving physical contact.

(5) Clause (v) covers offenses

consisting of using a minor in a sexual

performance. This includes both live

performances and using minors in the

production of pornography.

(6) Clause (vi) covers offenses

consisting of solicitation of a minor to

practice prostitution. The interpretation

of this clause is parallel to that of clause

(iv). States can comply with clause (vi)

by consistently requiring registration, in

cases where the victim was below the

age of 18, based on:

—A conviction for an offense involving

solicitation of the victim under a

general attempt or solicitation

provision, where the object offense is

a prostitution offense, and

—A conviction for an offense involving

solicitation of the victim under any

provision defining a particular crime

whose elements include soliciting or

attempting to get a person to engage

in prostitution.

(7) Clause (vii) covers offenses

consisting of any conduct that by its

nature is a sexual offense against a

minor. This clause is intended to ensure

coverage of convictions under statutes

defining sex offenses in which the status

of the victim as a minor is an element

of an offense, such as specially defined

child molestation offenses, and other

offenses prohibiting sexual activity with

underage persons. States can comply

with this clause by including

convictions under these statutes in the

registration requirement. A proviso at

the conclusion of the Act’s definition of

‘‘criminal offense against a victim who

is a minor’’ allows states to exclude

from registration requirements persons

convicted for conduct that is criminal

only because of the age of the victim if

the perpetrator is 18 years of age or

younger. Whether registration should be

required for such offenders is a matter

of state discretion under the Act.

(8) Considered in isolation, clause

(viii) gives states discretion whether to

require registration for attempts to

commit offenses described in clauses (i)

through (vii). However, state discretion

to exclude attempted sexual offenses

against minors is limited by other

provisions of the Act, since any verbal

command or attempted persuasion of

the victim to engage in sexual conduct

would bring the offense within the

scope of the solicitation clause (clause

(iv)) and make it subject to the Act’s

mandatory registration requirements.

Hence, the simplest approach for states

is to include attempted sexual assaults

on minors (as well as completed

offenses) uniformly as predicates for the

registration requirement.

2. ‘‘Sexually violent offense’’. The Act

prescribes a 10-year registration

requirement for offenders convicted of a

‘‘sexually violent offense,’’ as well as for

those convicted of a ‘‘criminal offense

against a victim who is a minor.’’

Subsection (a)(3)(B) defines the term

‘‘sexually violent offense.’’ The general

purpose of the definition is to require

registration of persons convicted of rape

or rape-like offenses—i.e., nonconsensual sexually assaultive crimes

involving penetration—regardless of the

age of the victim. The definition refers

specifically to any criminal offense that

consists of aggravated sexual abuse or

sexual abuse (as described in sections

2241 and 2242 of title 18 of the United

States Code, or as described in the state

criminal code), or an offense that has as

its elements engaging in physical

contact with another person with intent

to commit such an offense.

In light of this definition, there are

two ways in which a state can satisfy

the requirement of registration for

persons convicted of ‘‘sexually violent

offenses’’:

First, a state can comply by requiring

registration for offenders convicted for

criminal conduct that would violate 18

U.S.C. 2241 or 2242—the federal

‘‘aggravated sexual abuse’’ and ‘‘sexual

abuse’’ offenses—if prosecuted

federally. (The part of the definition

relating to physical contact with intent

to commit aggravated sexual abuse or

sexual abuse does not enlarge the class

of covered offenses under the federal

law definitions, because sections 2241

and 2242 explicitly encompass attempts

as well as completed offenses.)

Second, a state can comply by

requiring registration for offenders

convicted of the state offenses that

correspond to the federal offenses

described above—i.e., the most serious

sexually assaultive crime or crimes

under state law, covering nonconsensual sexual acts involving

penetration—together with state

offenses (if any) that have as their

elements engaging in physical contact

with another person with intent to

commit such a crime.
33700 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices

Like the other requirements of the

Act, the requirement to register persons

convicted of sexually violent offenses,

regardless of the age of the victim,

establishes only a baseline for state

registration programs. Whether

registration should be required for

additional offenses against adult victims

is a matter of state discretion under the

Act.

3. ‘‘Comparable * * * range of

offenses’’. As a result of language added

by the CJSA amendments, states need

not comply exactly with the specific

offense coverage requirements in

subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection

(a)(3). Rather, a state may comply with

the Act by requiring registration for

persons convicted of offenses in a

‘‘range of offenses specified by State law

which is comparable to or which

exceeds’’ the range of offenses described

in the Act.

This change reflects a practical

recognition by Congress that exact state

compliance with the Act’s offense

coverage specifications may be difficult

because of the degree of detail in the

Act’s definitions and because of the

variations among different jurisdictions

in the terminology and categorizations

used in defining sex offenses. See H.R.

Rep. No. 256, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 15

(1997). As a result, Congress was

concerned that some states ‘‘may

inadvertently find themselves out of

compliance with the Wetterling Act’’

because the state registration provisions

‘‘are not exactly congruent’’ with the

Act’s offense categories, ‘‘even if the

offenses covered by the [state] program

are much broader in other respects than

required by the Wetterling Act.’’ Id. The

language concerning coverage of a

‘‘comparable’’ range of offenses was

added to address this concern.

States should aim to have their

registration offenses fully encompass

the offense categories described in the

Act and will be assured of compliance

with the Act’s offense coverage

requirements if they do so. However, in

light of the CJSA amendments affording

a degree of flexibility concerning offense

coverage, inadvertent departures from

the Act’s offense category specifications

will not necessarily result in a finding

of non-compliance. Such departures

will be allowed if, in the judgment of

the reviewing authority, they do not

substantially undermine the objective of

comprehensive registration for persons

convicted of crimes involving sexual

molestation or sexual exploitation of

minors, and of persons convicted of

rape or rape-like crimes against victims

of any age.

In addition, in assessing compliance,

the reviewing authority may consider

whether a state program imposes

registration requirements which are

broader in other respects than the

offense coverage specifications of the

Act. For example, consistently requiring

registration for persons convicted of

attempted offenses, and of sexual

assaults against adult victims other than

rape-like offenses, goes beyond the Act’s

mandatory standards. Such additional

coverage may be considered by the

reviewing authority in deciding whether

the overall offense coverage under a

state program ‘‘is comparable to or

* * * exceeds’’ the Act’s offense

coverage specifications.

D. Coverage of Offenders

1. Resident offenders convicted in

other states. In addition to the Act’s

requirement that states register their

own offenders in the pertinent

categories, subsection (b)(7) of the Act

requires states, as provided in these

guidelines, to include in their

registration programs residents who

were convicted in other states.

To comply with this requirement,

states must apply the Act’s standards to

residents who were convicted in other

states of a criminal offense against a

victim who is a minor or a sexually

violent offense as defined in the Act).

Specifically, states must require such

persons to promptly provide current

address information to the appropriate

authorities when they establish

residence in the state, and thereafter

must apply to such persons all of the

Act’s standards relating to treatment of

registered offenders following release

including reporting of subsequent

changes of address, periodic address

verification, criminal penalties for

registration violations, and release of

registration information as necessary for

protection of the public. States also

should be aware that it is a federal

offense for registered offenders to

change residence to another state

without notifying the new state of

residence and the FBI. See 42 U.S.C.

14072(g)(3) and (i).

The durational requirements for

registration of offenders convicted in

other states are the same as those for instate offenders—registration for at least

10 years or for life as provided in

subsection (b)(6) of the Act. If a portion

of the applicable registration period has

run while the registrant was residing in

another state, a new state of residence

may give the registrant credit for that

period. For example, if a person

required to register for 10 years under

the Act’s standards has lived for six

years following release in the state of

conviction, another state to which the

registrant moves at that point does not

have to require registration for more

than the four remaining years.

2. Juvenile delinquents and offenders.

The Act’s registration requirements

depend in all circumstances on

conviction for certain types of offenses.

Hence, states are not required to

mandate registration for juveniles who

are adjudicated delinquent—as opposed

to adults convicted of crimes and

juveniles convicted as adults—even if

the conduct on which the juvenile

delinquency adjudication is based

would constitute an offense giving rise

to a registration requirement if engaged

in by an adult. However, states may

require registration for juvenile

delinquents, and the conviction of a

juvenile who is prosecuted as an adult

does count as a conviction for purposes

of the Act’s registration requirements.

3. Tribal offenders. The Act does not

impose any requirements relating to

registration of persons convicted of sex

offenses in Indian tribal courts.

However, a sex offender convicted in an

Indian tribal court whose presence is

unknown to state authorities or Indian

tribal authorities raises the same public

safety concern as an unregistered

offender convicted of a similar offense

in a state court. States are accordingly

encouraged to require registration for

sex offenders subject to their

jurisdiction who were convicted in

Indian tribal courts and to work with

tribal authorities to ensure effective

registration for such persons.

4. Protected witnesses. The Act

requires current address registration but

does not dictate under what name a

person must be required to register.

Hence, the Act does not preclude states

from taking measures for the security of

registrants who have been provided new

identities and relocated under the

federal witness security program (see 18

U.S.C. 3521 et seq.) or comparable state

programs. A state may provide that the

registration system records will identify

such a registrant only by his or her new

name and that the registration system

records will not include the true prerelocation address of the registrant or

other information from which his or her

original identity or participation in a

witness security program could be

inferred. States are encouraged to make

provision in their laws and procedures

for the security of such registrants and

to honor requests from the United States

Marshals Service and other agencies

responsible for witness protection to

ensure that the identities of these

registrants are not compromised.

States should also be aware that 18

U.S.C. 3521(b)(1)(H), enacted by section

115(a)(9) of CJSA, specifically

authorizes the Attorney General to
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices 33701

adopt regulations to ‘‘protect the

confidentiality of the identity and

location’’ of protected witnesses who

are subject to registration requirements,

‘‘including prescribing alternative

procedures to those otherwise provided

by Federal or State law for registration

and tracking of such persons.’’ The

Attorney General’s policy, to the

maximum extent allowed by security

considerations, is to require the

registration of all federally protected

witnesses who otherwise would be

required to register. However, in the

Attorney General’s discretion, the

Attorney General will decide on a caseby-case basis whether these registrations

will utilize new identities, modified

listings, or other special conditions or

procedures that are warranted to avoid

inappropriately jeopardizing the safety

of the protected witnesses.

II. Registration and Tracking

Procedures; Penalties for Registration

Violations [September 12, 1997;

Possible Two-Year Extension]

Paragraphs (1)(A) and (2)(A) of

subsection (b) of the Act set out general

duties for states in relation to offenders

required to register who are released

from prison or who are placed on any

form of post-conviction supervised

release (‘‘parole, supervised release, or

probation’’). The duties include taking

registration information, informing the

offender of registration obligations,

making the information available at the

state level and to local law enforcement,

and transmission of conviction data and

fingerprints to the FBI. Paragraphs (4)–

(5) of subsection (b) of the Act contain

requirements that are designed to ensure

that registration information will be

updated when the registrant changes

address and that registrants will

continue to be required to register when

they move from one state to another

during the registration period.

Subsection (b)(3)(A) states that ‘‘State

procedures shall provide for verification

of address at least annually.’’

These requirements generally derive

from the Wetterling Act as originally

enacted. The time for compliance is

accordingly that provided in 42 U.S.C.

14071(g)—Sept. 12, 1997, or Sept. 12,

1999, for states which have received a

two-year extension based on good faith

efforts to achieve compliance. However,

one aspect of subsection (b)(1)(A)—a

requirement to inform offenders that

they must register in states where they

work or attend school, in clause (iii)—

derives from the CJSA and consequently

is subject to a longer deadline for

compliance as discussed in part V of

these guidelines.

A. Initial Registration Procedures

1. Taking of registration information

and informing offenders of registration

obligations. Subsection (b)(1)(A)

provides that ‘‘a State prison officer, the

court, or another responsible officer or

official’’ must carry out specified duties

in relation to persons who are required

to register. The purpose of this

provision is to ensure that offenders are

made aware of their registration

obligations and to preclude ‘‘honor

systems’’ in which the initial

registration depends on the offender’s

reporting the information on his own.

States have discretion under the Act

concerning what types of officials or

officers will be made responsible for

these initial registration functions.

The specific duties set out in

subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1)

include: (i) informing the person of the

duty to register and obtaining the

information required for registration

(i.e., address information), (ii) informing

the person that he must report

subsequent changes of address in the

manner provided by state law, (iii)

informing the person that if he moves to

another state, he must report the change

of address in the manner provided by

state law and comply with any

registration requirement in the new state

of residence, (iv) obtaining fingerprints

and a photograph if they have not

already been obtained and (v) requiring

the person to read and sign a form

stating that these requirements have

been explained.

In addition, the CJSA amended

subparagraph (A)(iii) to require that the

person be informed that he also must

register in states where he works or

attends school. States must comply with

this new requirement by November 25,

2000 (subject to a possible two-year

extension), as explained in part V of

these guidelines.

These informational requirements,

like other requirements in the Act, only

define minimum standards. Hence,

states may require more extensive

information from offenders. For

example, the Act does not require a state

to obtain information about a

registrant’s expected employment when

it releases him, but a state may

legitimately wish to know if a convicted

child molester is seeking or has

obtained employment that involves

responsibility for the care of children.

As a second example, states are

strongly encouraged to collect DNA

samples, where permitted under

applicable legal standards, to be typed

and stored in state DNA databases.

States are also urged to participate in

the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s

(FBI’s) Combined DNA Index System

(CODIS). CODIS is the FBI’s program of

technical assistance to state and local

crime laboratories that allows them to

store and match DNA records from

convicted offenders and crime scene

evidence. The FBI provides CODIS

software, in addition to user support

and training, free of charge, to state and

local crime laboratories for performing

forensic DNA analysis. CODIS permits

DNA examiners in crime laboratories to

exchange forensic DNA data on an

intrastate level and will enable states to

exchange DNA records among

themselves through the national CODIS

system. Thus, collection of DNA

samples and participation in CODIS

greatly enhance a state’s capacity to

investigate and solve crimes involving

biological evidence, especially, serial

and stranger rapes.

2. Transmission of registration

information. Paragraph (2)(A) of

subsection (b) states, in part, that the

registration information must be

promptly made available to a law

enforcement agency having jurisdiction

where the registrant expects to reside

and entered into the appropriate state

records system. The purpose of this

provision is to ensure that registration

information will be available both to

local law enforcement and at the state

level.

States have discretion under the Act

concerning the specific mechanisms and

procedures for carrying out this

requirement. For example, a state may

provide that the responsible official or

officer is to transmit the registration

information concurrently to an

appropriate local law enforcement

agency and to the agency responsible for

maintenance of the information at the

state level, or may provide that the

information is to be provided in the first

instance only to the local agency or to

the state agency, which then transmits

it to the other. States also have

discretion concerning the form of

notification or transmission. For

example, in meeting the requirement to

make the information available to a law

enforcement agency where the registrant

will reside, permissible options include

written notice, electronic transmission

of registration information, and

provision of on-line access to

registration information.

While the Act generally leaves states

discretion concerning specific

procedures for taking and transmitting

registration information, it does require

that the information be ‘‘promptly’’

made available to the appropriate

recipient agencies (both state and local).

This requirement precludes procedures

under which lengthy delays are allowed
33702 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices

in the transmission or forwarding of the

information. For example, in relation to

registrants released from prison, state

procedures must ensure: (1) that the

registration information taken from the

offender will be transmitted prior to

release or within a short time (e.g., five

days) thereafter, and (2) that there is no

long delay in any subsequent

forwarding of the information required

for compliance with the Act, such as

provision of the information to an

appropriate local law enforcement

agency by a state agency if only the state

agency receives the information in the

first instance.

The Act leaves states discretion in

determining which state record system

is appropriate for storing registration

information, and which agency will be

responsible at the state level for the

maintenance of this information. As

discussed in Part VI of these guidelines,

however, states will be required

effective November 25, 2000, to

participate in the National Sex Offender

Registry (NSOR), which is administered

by the FBI. States can ensure that they

will be able to freely exchange

registration information with the FBI’s

records systems and comply with the

requirement of participation in NSOR

by making a ‘‘criminal justice agency’’

as defined in 28 CFR 20.3(c) responsible

for the registration information at the

state level. This continues to leave states

with broad discretion concerning the

designation of responsibility for the

state registry, since ‘‘criminal justice

agency’’ is defined broadly in the rule

and generally includes (inter alia) law

enforcement agencies, correctional and

offender supervision agencies, and

agencies responsible for criminal

identification activities or criminal

history records.

In addition to requiring procedures

that ensure the prompt availability of

the initial registration information both

to local law enforcement and at the state

level, paragraph (2)(A) of subsection (b)

requires the prompt transmission of

conviction data and fingerprints of

registrants to the FBI. This should not

be understood as requiring duplicative

transmission of conviction data and

fingerprints to the FBI at the time of

initial registration if the state already

has sent this information to the FBI (e.g.,

at the time of conviction).

3. Fingerprinting. The final subsection

of the Wetterling Act—which should be

designated as subsection (h) but is

designated as a second subsection (g)

because of a technical drafting error in

section 115(a)(3) of the CJSA—relates to

a requirement under the Pam Lychner

Act that certain offenders register

directly with the FBI. In conjunction

with other provisions of the Pam

Lychner Act, it requires that fingerprints

be obtained from such offenders by the

FBI or by a local law enforcement

official pursuant to regulations issued

by the Attorney General. However,

section 115(a)(7) of the CJSA deferred

the effective date for direct FBI

registration of certain offenders and

issuance of related regulations. Hence,

the final subsection of the Wetterling

Act does not impose any requirements

on the states at the present time.

B. Change of Address Procedures

1. Intrastate moves. Subsection (b)(4)

provides that registrants are to report

changes of address in the manner

provided by state law. It further

provides that state procedures must

ensure that the updated address

information is promptly made available

to a law enforcement agency having

jurisdiction where the person will

reside and entered into the appropriate

state records or data system.

The purpose of this provision is to

ensure that current address information

will continue to be available both to

local law enforcement and at the state

level. To comply with this part of the

Act, states must require registrants to

report changes of address within the

state in a manner which ensures that

information concerning the new address

will promptly be made available to local

law enforcement in the new place of

residence and at the state level. Thus,

states must require registrants to report

changes of address prior to moving, or

by some short time (e.g., 10 days) after

moving.

States have discretion under the Act

concerning specific mechanisms and

procedures for reporting the updated

address information and ensuring that it

reaches the appropriate recipients. For

example, many states require the

registrant to notify local law

enforcement agencies (e.g., local

sheriffs’ offices) in the place he is

leaving and the place to which he is

going and then require one of these local

agencies to notify the agency

responsible for maintenance of

registration information at the state

level. Alternatively, a state may require

the registrant to directly notify a central

registration agency at the state level,

which then makes the information

available to an appropriate local law

enforcement agency. Another possibility

is to require the registrant to report the

change of address to a third party, such

as a probation officer responsible for his

supervision, who then is responsible for

notifying a law enforcement agency in

the new place of residence and the state

registration agency.

The choice among these alternatives

or the election of other alternatives

beyond those described is a matter of

state discretion. States will be in

compliance as long as the procedures

adopted ensure the prompt availability

of the updated address information to

law enforcement in the relevant local

jurisdiction and at the state level.

2. Interstate moves. Subsection (b)(5)

states that a registrant who moves to

another state must report the change of

address to the responsible agency in the

state he is leaving and must comply

with any registration requirement in the

new state of residence. It further

provides that the procedures of the state

the registrant is leaving must ensure that

notice is provided promptly to an

agency responsible for registration in

the new state of residence, if that state

requires registration.

The purpose of this provision is to

ensure a gap-free nationwide network of

state registration programs that reliably

tracks all offenders throughout the

applicable period of registration and

ensures that offenders cannot evade

registration obligations by moving from

one state to another. Hence, a state’s

procedures must require the registrant

to report his departure to a responsible

agency in the state, and must provide

for prompt notice of the registrant’s

move by an agency in the state to the

responsible registration authority in the

new state of residence. An ‘‘honor

system’’ approach, under which it is left

to the registrant to notify the registration

authority in the new state of residence

on his own, does not satisfy the Act’s

requirements.

As discussed in part I.D.1 of these

guidelines, the Wetterling Act’s

registration requirements ‘‘follow the

registrant’’ if he moves to another state,

and any state in which he establishes

residence must include him in its

registration program if registration is

still required under the Wetterling Act’s

standards. This includes requiring the

registrant to continue to register for at

least the remainder of the Act’s

minimum ten-year registration period

and to register for life if he is in a

lifetime registration category under

subsection (b)(6)(B) of the Act. Hence,

the state a registrant is leaving is

strongly encouraged to provide as part

of its notice to the new state of

residence sufficiently detailed

information concerning the registrant’s

offenses and status to enable the new

state to register him without difficulty

in the appropriate category and for the

appropriate amount of time.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices 33703

C. Periodic Address Verification

Subsection (b)(3)(A) requires that state

procedures provide for the verification

of registrants’ addresses at least

annually. The purpose of the

requirement of periodic address

verification is to ensure that the

authorities will become aware if a

registrant has moved away from the

registered address and has failed to

report the change of address. Such

procedures are obviously important for

effective tracking of sex offenders and

enforcement of registration

requirements.

As a result of changes made by the

CJSA amendments, the particular

approach to address verification is a

matter of state discretion under the Act.

For example, some states verify

addresses by having the responsible

state or local agency annually send to

the registered address a nonforwardable

address verification form, which the

registrant is required to sign and return

within 10 days or some other limited

period. This is one means by which

states may comply with the verification

requirement under subsection (b)(3)(A).

The legislative history of the CJSA

amendments to the Act noted other

possible approaches: ‘‘A review of State

sex offender registry laws indicates that

some States require registrants to appear

in person periodically at local law

enforcement agencies to verify their

address (and for such purposes as

photographing and fingerprinting).

Some States assign caseworkers to verify

periodically that registrants still reside

at the registered address. These * * *

procedures effectively verify registrants’

location, and impress on registrants that

they are under observation by the

authorities, in addition to making law

enforcement agencies aware of the

presence and identity of registered sex

offenders in their neighborhoods.’’ H.R.

Rep. No. 256, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 17

(1997).

D. Penalties for Registration Violations

Subsection (d) provides that a person

required to register under a state

program established pursuant to the Act

who knowingly fails to register and keep

such registration current shall be subject

to criminal penalties. Accordingly,

states that wish to comply with the Act

must have criminal provisions covering

this situation.

The requirement of criminal penalties

for registration violations under the Act

applies both to a state’s own offenders

who are required to register and to

persons convicted in other states who

are required to register because they

have moved into the state to reside.

The Act neither requires states to

allow a defense for offenders who were

unaware of their legal registration

obligations nor precludes states from

doing so. As a practical matter, states

can ensure that offenders are aware of

their obligations through consistent

compliance with the Act’s provisions

for advising offenders of registration

requirements at the time of release and

obtaining a signed acknowledgment that

this information has been provided.

As discussed in part V of these

guidelines, the Act as amended by the

CJSA includes provisions that are

designed to promote the registration of

federal and military offenders and of

non-resident workers and students. The

CJSA amendments did not apply the

Act’s mandatory requirement of

criminal penalties under state law for

registration violations to federal and

military offenders who reside in the

state or to non-resident workers and

students. However, Congress recognized

the desirability of fully incorporating

such offenders into state registration

programs by statute, see H.R. Rep. No.

256, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1997),

and the availability of substantial

sanctions for registration violations by

all types of sex offenders is important to

realize the Act’s objective of a

comprehensive, nationwide sex offender

registration system. Hence, states are

strongly encouraged to provide criminal

penalties for registration violations by

all offenders within the scope of the

Act, regardless of whether the registrant

is present in the state as a resident,

worker, or student, and regardless of

whether registration is premised on a

conviction under the law of a state or

under federal or military law.

III. Release of Registration Information

[September 12, 1997; Possible Two-Year

Extension]

Subsection (e) of the Act governs the

disclosure of information collected

under state registration programs.

This part of the Act derives from the

federal Megan’s Law amendment to the

Wetterling Act (Pub. L. No. 104–145,

110 Stat. 1345), which is subject to the

same deadline for compliance as the

original provisions of the Act under 42

U.S.C. 14071(g). Hence, the deadline for

compliance is Sept. 12, 1997, or Sept.

12, 1999, for states which have received

a two-year extension based on good

faith efforts to achieve compliance.

Paragraph (1) of subsection (e)

provides that information collected

under a state registration program may

be disclosed for any purpose permitted

under the laws of the state. Hence, there

is no requirement under the Act that

registration information be treated as

private or confidential to any greater

extent than the state may wish.

Paragraph (2) of subsection (e)

provides that the state or any agency

authorized by the state shall release

relevant information as necessary to

protect the public. To comply with this

requirement, a state must establish a

conforming information release program

that applies to offenders required to

register on the basis of convictions

occurring after the establishment of the

program. States do not have to apply

new information release standards to

offenders whose convictions predate the

establishment of a conforming program,

but the Act does not preclude states

from applying such standards

retroactively to offenders convicted

earlier if they so wish.

The principal objective of the

information release requirement in

paragraph (2) of subsection (e) is to

ensure that registration programs will

include means for members of the

public to obtain information concerning

registered offenders that is necessary for

the protection of themselves or their

families. Hence, a state cannot comply

with the Act by releasing registration

information only to law enforcement

agencies, to other governmental or nongovernmental agencies or organizations,

to prospective employers, or to the

victims of registrants’ offenses. States

also cannot comply by having purely

permissive or discretionary authority for

officials to release registration

information. Information must be

released to members of the public as

necessary to protect the public from

registered offenders. This disclosure

requirement applies both in relation to

offenders required to register because of

conviction for ‘‘a criminal offense

against a victim who is a minor’’ and

those required to register because of

conviction for a ‘‘sexually violent

offense.’’

States do, however, retain discretion

to make judgments concerning the

circumstances in which, and the extent

to which, the disclosure of registration

information to the public is necessary

for public safety purposes and to specify

standards and procedures for making

these determinations. Several different

approaches to this issue appear in

existing state laws.

One type of approach, which is

consistent with the requirements of the

Act, involves particularized risk

assessments of registered offenders,

with differing degrees of information

release based on the degree of risk. For

example, some states classify registered

offenders in this manner into risk levels,

with registration information limited to

law enforcement uses for offenders in
33704 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices

the ‘‘low risk’’ level; notice to

organizations with a particular safety

interest (such as schools and other child

car entities) for ‘‘medium risk’’

offenders; and notice to neighbors for

‘‘high risk’’ offenders.

States also are free under the Act to

make judgments concerning the degree

of danger posed by different types of

offenders and to provide information

disclosure for all offenders (or only

offenders) with certain characteristics or

in certain offense categories. For

example, states may decide to focus

particularly on child molesters, in light

of the vulnerability of the potential

victim class, and on recidivists, in light

of the threat posed by offenders who

persistently commit sexual offenses.

Another approach by which states can

comply with the Act is to make

information accessible to members of

the public on request. This may be

done, for example, by making

registration lists open for inspection by

the public, or by establishing

procedures to provide information

concerning the registration status of

identified individuals in response to

requests by members of the public. As

with proactive notification systems,

states that have information-on-request

systems may make judgments about

which registered offenders or classes of

registered offenders should be covered

and what information will be disclosed

concerning these offenders.

States are encouraged to involve

victims and victim advocates in the

development of their information

release programs, and in the process for

particularized risk assessments of

registrants if the state program involves

such assessments.

A proviso at the end of paragraph (2)

of subsection (e) states that the identity

of the victim of an offense that requires

registration under the Act shall not be

released. This proviso safeguards victim

privacy by prohibiting disclosure of

victim identity to the general public in

the context of information release

programs for registered offenders. It

does not bar the dissemination of victim

identity information for law

enforcement or other governmental

purposes (as opposed to disclosure to

the public) and does not require that a

state limit maintenance of or access to

victim identity information in public

records (such as police and court

records) that exist independently of the

registration system. Because the purpose

of the proviso is to protect the privacy

of victims, its restriction may be waived

at the victim’s option.

So long as the victim is not identified,

the proviso in paragraph (2) does not bar

including information concerning the

characteristics of the victim and the

nature and circumstances of the offense

in information release programs for

registered offenders. For example, states

are not barred by the proviso from

releasing such information as victim age

and gender, a description of the

offender’s conduct, and the geographic

area where the offense occurred.

However, states are encouraged to avoid

unnecessarily including information

that may inadvertently result in the

victim’s identity becoming known, such

as identifying a specific familial

relationship between the offender and a

victim who still lives in the area.

Concerns have been raised that the

disclosure of registration information to

the public under ‘‘community

notification’’ programs may result in

criminal acts or other reprisals against

registrants. While currently available

information does not indicate that this

has been a significant problem under

state programs, states are encouraged to

consider including measures in their

programs to minimize any possibility of

misuse of the information released

under the program. For example, some

states include in their informational

notices statements that the information

is provided only for legitimate

protective purposes, and that criminal

acts against registrants will result in

prosecution. As a further example, some

states provide special training for

officers responsible for community

notification and/or hold community

meetings in connection with the

provision of notice to the community

concerning a registrant’s presence.

IV. Special Registration Requirements

Under The Pam Lychner Act for

Recidivists and Aggravated Offenders

[October 2, 1999; Possible Two-Year

Extension]

Subsection (b)(6)(B)(i)–(ii) of the Act

requires lifetime registration for persons

in two categories: (1) registrants who

have a prior conviction for an offense

for which registration is required by the

Act, and (2) registrants who have been

convicted of an ‘‘aggravated offense.’’

This requirement derives from an

amendment to the Wetterling Act

enacted by the Pam Lychner Act. The

time for compliance is accordingly that

provided in section 10(b) of the Pam

Lychner Act—Oct. 2, 1999, subject to a

possible two-year extension for states

making good faith efforts to come into

compliance.

Subsection (b)(6)(B)(i) requires

lifetime registration for certain

recidivist. States can comply with this

provision by requiring offenders to

register for life where the following

conditions are satisfied: (1) the current

offense is one for which registration is

required by the Act—i.e., an offense in

the range of offenses specified in

subsection (a)(3)(A)–(B) or a comparable

range of offenses, and (2) the offender

has a prior conviction for an offense for

which registration is required by the

Act.

Subsection (b)(6)(B)(ii) requires

lifetime registration for persons

convicted of an ‘‘aggravated offense,’’

even on a first conviction. ‘‘Aggravated

offense’’ refers to state offenses

comparable to aggravated sexual abuse

as defined in federal law (18 U.S.C.

2241), which principally encompasses:

(1) engaging in sexual acts involving

penetration with victims of any age

through the use of force or the threat of

serious violence, and (2) engaging in

sexual acts involving penetration with

victims below the age of 12. Hence,

states can comply with this provision by

requiring lifetime registration for

persons convicted of the state offenses

which cover such conduct.

A state is not in compliance with

subsection (b)(6)(B) (i) or (ii) if it has a

procedure or authorization for

terminating the registration of convicted

offenders within the scope of these

provisions at any point in their

lifetimes. However, if the underlying

conviction is reversed, vacated, or set

aside, or if the registrant is pardoned,

registration (or continued registration) is

not required under the Act. Likewise, if

the applicability of the lifetime

registration requirement is premised on

a prior conviction pursuant to

subsection (b)(6)(B)(i), it become

inapplicable if the prior conviction is

reversed, vacated, or set aside, or if the

registrant is pardoned for the prior

conviction offense.

The proviso in subsection (b)(6) that

registration need not be required

‘‘during ensuing periods of

incarceration’’ applies to registrants

subject to lifetime registration. Hence,

states are not required to carry out

address registration and verification

procedures for such registrants during

subsequent periods in which the

registrant is imprisoned or civilly

committed. To comply with the Act, a

state that does waive registration for

such registrants during subsequent

criminal or civil confinement must

require that registration resume when

the registrant is released.
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices 33705

V. Special Registration Requirements

Under The CJSA Amendments Relating

to Sexually Violent Predators. Federal

and Military Offenders, and NonResident Workers and Students

[November 25, 2000; Possible Two-Year

Extension]

Subsections (a)(2), (a)(3)(C)–(E),

(b)(1)(B), and (b)(6)(B)(iii) of the Act

prescribe heightened registration

requirements for persons who are

determined to be ‘‘sexually violent

predators’’ under specified procedures.

These provisions also, however, allow

the approval of alternative procedures

and of alternative measures of

comparable or greater effectiveness in

protecting the public.

Subsection (b)(7) of the Act requires

states, as provided in these guidelines,

to ensure that procedures are in place to

accept registration information from (1)

residents convicted of a federal offense

or sentenced by a court martial, and (2)

nonresident offenders who have crossed

into another state in order to work or

attend school.

Because these requirements, in their

current form, derive from the CJSA, the

time for compliance is that provided in

section 115(c)(2) of the CJSA—Nov. 25,

2000, subject to a possible two-year

extension for states making good faith

efforts to come into compliance.

A. Heightened Sexually Violent Predator

Registration or Alternative Measures

1. Heightened sexually violent

predator registration. Subparagraphs

(B)–(E) of subsection (a)(3) contain the

Act’s definition of ‘‘sexually violent

predator’’ and related definitions.

Subparagraph (C) defines ‘‘sexually

violent predator’’ to mean a person who

has been convicted of a sexually violent

offense and who suffers from a medical

abnormality or personality disorder that

makes the person likely to engage in

predatory sexually violent offense.

Subparagraph (D) essentially defines

‘‘medical abnormality’’ to mean a

condition involving a disposition to

commit criminal sexual acts of such a

degree that it makes the person a

menace to others. The definition of

‘‘personality disorder’’ is a matter of

state discretion since the Act includes

no specification on this point. For

example, a state may choose to utilize

the definition of ‘‘personality disorder’’

that appears in the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Medical Disorders:

DSM–IV. American Psychiatric

Association, Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Medical Disorders (4th ed.

1994). Subparagraph (E) defines

‘‘predatory’’ to mean an act directed at

a stranger or at a person with whom a

relationship has been established or

promoted for the primary purpose of

victimization.

A state that wishes to comply with the

Act’s provisions concerning sexually

violent predator registration must adopt

some approach to deciding when a

determination will be sought as to

whether a particular offender is a

sexually violent predator. However, the

specifics are a matter of state discretion.

For example, a state might commit the

decision whether to seek classification

of an offender as a sexually violent

predator to the judgment of prosecutors,

or might provide that a determination of

this question should be undertaken

routinely when a person is convicted of

a sexually violent offense and has a

prior history of committing such crimes.

Similarly, the Act affords states

discretion with regard to the timing of

the determination whether an offender

is a ‘‘sexually violent predator.’’ A state

may, but need not, provide that a

determination on this issue be made at

the time of sentencing or as a part of the

original sentence. It could, for example,

be made instead when the offender has

served a term of imprisonment and is

about to be released from custody.

Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of

subsection (a)(2) govern the procedures

for making the sexually violent predator

determination. Subparagraph (A) states

that the determination is to be made by

a court after considering the

recommendation of a board composed

of experts in the behavior and treatment

of sex offenders, victims’ rights

advocates, and representatives of law

enforcement agencies. However,

subparagraph (B) allows the Attorney

General to waive these requirements

where a state has established alternative

procedures or legal standards for

designating a person as a sexually

violent predator.

The waiver authority under

subparagraph (B), which was added by

the CJSA amendments, recognizes that a

judicial determination informed by the

recommendations of a board of mixed

composition is not the only approach

states may validly adopt to secure

appropriate input and make fair

determinations. For example, at a

sentencing proceeding or other hearing

to determine sexually violent predator

status, a state might provide for input

concerning psychological assessment

through expert testimony; input from

the law enforcement perspective

through the prosecutor’s presentation;

and input from the perspective of

victims through allocation or testimony

by the victim(s) of the underlying

sexually violent offense or offenses.

Moreover, judicial determinations

concerning sexually violent predator

status are not the only legitimate

approach since, for example, a state may

decide to assign responsibility for such

determinations to a parole board or

other administrative agency with

adjudicatory functions. Because there

are many valid approaches that states

may devise, the particular approach

taken to determining whether an

offender is a sexually violent predator as

defined in the Act will be treated as a

matter of state discretion under the Act.

For registrants who have been

determined to be ‘‘sexually violent

predators’’ under the Act’s definitions,

the Act prescribes three special

registration requirements:

First, subsection (b)(1)(B) provides

that the initial registration information

obtained from a sexually violent

predator must include ‘‘the name of the

person, identifying factors, anticipated

future residence, offense history, and

documentation of any treatment

received for the mental abnormality or

personality disorder of the person.’’ In

determining whether offenders have

received treatment, the officers

responsible for obtaining the initial

registration information may rely on

information that is readily available to

them, either from existing records or the

offender, and may comply with the

requirement to document an offender’s

treatment history simply by noting that

the offender received treatment. If states

want to require the inclusion of more

detailed information about offenders’

treatment history, however, they are free

to do so.

Second, subsection (b)(3)(B) requires

quarterly address verification for

sexually violent predators, as opposed

to the annual address verification

required for registrants generally under

subsection (b)(3)(A). Part II.C of these

guidelines provides a general

explanation of the Act’s address

verification requirement.

Third, subsection (b)(6)(B)(iii)

requires lifetime registration for

sexually violent predators. This

requirement is unqualified. While

language in subsection (a)(1)(B) of the

Act alludes to possible termination of

sexually violent predator status under

subsection (b)(6)(B), this is a relic of

earlier versions of the Act that has no

referent in the Act’s current text

following the Pam Lychner Act and

CJSA amendments.

Hence, for example, a state is not in

compliance with the Act’s requirements

if it allows registration to be terminated

for a person who has been found to be

a sexually violent predator on the basis

of a later determination that the person

is no longer a sexually violent predator
33706 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices

or has been rehabilitated. However, if

the underlying conviction for a sexually

violent offense is reversed, vacated, or

set aside, or if the registrant is pardoned

for the offense, registration (or

continued registration) as a sexually

violent predator is not required under

the Act. Moreover, the proviso in

subsection (b)(6) that registration need

not be required ‘‘during ensuing periods

of incarceration’’ applies to sexually

violent predators. Hence, states are not

required to carry out address

registration and verification procedures

when a sexually violent predator is

subsequently imprisoned or civilly

committed. To comply with the Act, a

state that does waive registration for

sexually violent predators during

subsequent criminal or civil

confinement must require that

registration resume when the registrant

is released.

2. Alternative measures of

comparable or greater effectiveness.

Subparagraph (C) of subsection (a)(2)

authorizes the Attorney General to

approve ‘‘alternative measures of

comparable or greater effectiveness in

protecting the public from unusually

dangerous or recidivistic sexual

offenders in lieu of the specific

measures set forth in this section

regarding sexually violent predators.’’

This authorization was added by the

CJSA, reflecting Congress’s recognition

that few states followed the Act’s

specific provisions concerning sexually

violent predators; that it would be

difficult for many states to do so; and

that states can ‘‘incorporate other

features into their systems which further

the objective of protecting the public

from particularly dangerous sex

offenders.’’ H.R. Rep. No. 256, 105th

Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1997).

The legislative history of the CJSA

identified a number of factors that

would be pertinent to a determination

whether a state has adopted alternative

measures of comparable or greater

effectiveness:

States can * * * incorporate other

features into their systems which further

the objective of protecting the public

from particularly dangerous sex

offenders. For example, some State

programs have registration periods for

broadly defined categories of sex

offenders which are much longer than

the basic 10-year registration period

under the Wetterling Act. This may

provide more protection for the public

than heightened registration

requirements limited to a relatively

small class of offenders who would be

classified as sexually violent predators.

* * * Moreover, some States require

civil commitment, lifetime supervision,

or very long periods of imprisonment

for sexually violent predators or broader

classes of serious sex offenders.

[Subsection (a)(2)] makes it clear that

alternative approaches like these can be

approved if a State’s approach is equally

effective or more effective in protecting

the public from particularly dangerous

sex offenders.

H.R. Rep. No. 256 105th Cong., 1st

Sess. 15 (1997).

Hence, for example, the reviewing

authority will approve a state system as

providing alternative measures ‘‘of

comparable or greater effectiveness’’ if

the state applies the principal

heightened registration requirements

under the Act’s sexually violent

predator provisons—i.e., lifetime

registration and quarterly address

verification—to a class of offenders that

is generally broader than ‘‘sexually

violent predators.’’ Since ‘‘sexually

violent predators’’ are, by definition, a

subclass of persons convicted of a

‘‘sexually violent offense,’’ a state has

obviously adopted an alternative

measure of comparable or greater

effectiveness if it requires lifetime

registration and quarterly address

verification uniformly for persons in the

broader class of those convicted of a

‘‘sexually violent offense.’’

For states that follow other

approaches, the determination whether

‘‘alternative measures of comparable or

greater effectiveness’’ have been

adopted will be made on a case-by-case

basis.

B. Federal and Military Offenders: NonResident Workers and Students

Subsection (b)(7) of the Act requires

states, as provided in these guidelines,

to ensure that procedures are in place to

accept registration information from: (1)

residents convicted of federal offenses

or sentenced by courts martial, and (2)

nonresident offenders who cross into

other states in order to work or attend

school.

This requirement was added to close

two gaps in the Wetterling Act

standards for registration programs.

First, Congress was concerned about the

lack of any provision for registration of

persons convicted of federal sex

offenses—such as those defined in

chapters 109A, 110, and 117 of title 18,

United States Code—and the lack of any

provision for registration of persons

convicted of sexual offenses under the

Uniform Code of Military Justice while

in the armed forces. Second, Congress

was concerned about the commission of

offenses by registered offenders at or

near their place of work or study, where

the local authorities are unaware of the

offenders’ presence in those areas

because they reside in a different state.

The new provisions relating to

registration of federal and military

offenders, and non-resident workers and

students, were added to address these

concerns.

1. Federal and military offenders. In

relation to federal and military

offenders, states can comply with the

new requirement under subsection

(b)(7) by accepting in their registration

programs address information from such

offenders who reside in the state, where

the federal convictions or court martial

sentence was for a criminal offense

against a victim who is a minor or a

sexually violent offense (as defined in

the Act).

Congress did not otherwise make the

Act’s mandatory standards for state

registration programs applicable to

federal and military offenders. Congress,

however, did note that ‘‘it would be

preferable that States fully incorporate

federal offenders [and] persons

sentenced by courts martial * * * into

their registration and notification

programs by statute.’’ H.R. Rep. No. 256,

105th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1997). As a

practical matter, the presence in a state

of a sex offender whose whereabouts are

unknown to the authorities poses the

same potential danger to the public,

regardless of whether the offender was

convicted in a state court for a state

offense or for a comparable offense

under federal or military law.

Hence, as a matter of sound policy,

states are strongly encouraged to subject

federal and military offenders to the full

panoply of registration requirements

and procedures established for state

offenders, including reporting of

subsequent changes of address

following the initial registration,

periodic address verification, criminal

penalties for registration violations, and

release of registration information as

necessary for protection of the public.

Some states currently put sex offenders

convicted in federal or military courts

on the same footing as state offenders

under their registration programs; all

states are encouraged to adopt this

approach.

States should be aware that the CJSA

enacted provisions that impose

complementary obligations on federal

authorities to facilitate state registration

of federal and military offenders.

Specifically, provisions in section

115(a)(8) of the CJSA require federal and

military authorities to notify state and

local law enforcement and registration

agencies concerning the release or

subsequent movement to their areas of

federal and military sex offenders. In

addition, under amendments in section

115(a)(8) of the CJSA, federal sex
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices 33707

offenders are required to register in

states where they reside, work, or attend

school as mandatory conditions of

probation, parole, and post

imprisonment supervised release. State

and local officers accordingly are

encouraged to notify federal authorities

of any failure by such offenders to

register, so that appropriate action can

be taken with respect to their federal

release status. States also should be

aware that section 115 of the CJSA

amended the federal failure-to-register

offense (42 U.S.C. 14072(i)) in order to

bring within its scope federal and

military sex offenders who fail to

register.

2. Non-resident workers and students.

Subsection (b)(7)(B) of the Act requires

states to accept registration information

from non-residents who have come into

the state to work or attend school.

Related provisions appear in

subsections (a)(3)(F)–(G) and (c). As

specified in these provisions, the

workers from whom registration

information must be accepted include

those who have any sort of full-time or

part-time employment in the state, with

or without compensation, for more than

14 days, or for an aggregate period

exceeding 30 days in a calendar year.

The students from whom registration

information must be accepted include

those who are enrolled in any type of

school in the state on a full-time or parttime basis.

The Act’s provisions regarding nonresident workers and students

sometimes refer to persons who cross

into another state ‘‘in order to work or

attend school’’ and sometimes refer to

persons who are may be in another state

where the person ‘‘is employed,’’

‘‘carries on a vocation,’’ or ‘‘is a

student.’’ These are merely

terminological variations; the Act’s

various references to non-resident

workers and students all refer to the

same classes of persons, as defined

above.

States can comply with the Act’s

requirement to accept registration

information from non-resident workers

and students by accepting registration

information from such persons, where

the person would be required to register

in his state of residence under the Act’s

standards. The ‘‘registration

information’’ the state must accept from

such a registrant to comply with the Act

is, at a minimum, information

concerning the registrant’s place of

employment or the school attended in

the state and his address in his state of

residence. States are free to accept or

require more extensive information if

they wish, such as information

concerning any place of lodging the

registrant may have in the state for

purposes of work or school attendance.

Congress did not otherwise make the

Act’s mandatory standards for state

registration programs applicable to nonresident workers and students, but did

note that ‘‘it would be preferable that

States fully incorporate * * * offenders

crossing State borders to work or go to

school * * * into their registration and

notification programs by statute.’’ H.R.

Rep. No. 256, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 18

(1997). States are encouraged to include

measures in their registration systems

that will ensure effective registration of

non-resident workers and students,

including provision of criminal

penalties under state law for such

offenders who fail to register and release

of registration information concerning

such offenders as necessary for public

safety. States also should be aware that

section 115 of the CJSA amended the

federal failure-to-register offense (42

U.S.C. 14072(i)) in order to bring within

its scope non-resident workers and

students who fail to register.

In addition to requiring states to

accept registration information from

non-resident workers and students, the

CJSA amendments added, as part of

subsection (b)(1)(A)(iii), a requirement

to inform a registrant in the initial

registration process that he must register

in a state where he is employed, carries

on a vocation, or is a student. As

discussed in Part II.A of these

guidelines, subsection (b)(1)(A) of the

Act has always required that offenders

be informed of the general duty to

register, of the duty to report subsequent

changes of address, and of the duty to

register in any state of residence. States

can readily supplement their procedures

for informing offenders of registration

obligations to include the information

that the offender also must register in

any state where he is employed, carries

on a vocation, or is a student.

VI. Participation in The National Sex

Offender Registry [November 25, 2000;

Possible Two-Year Extension]

Subsection (b)(2)(B) of the Act

requires states to ‘‘participate in the

national database established under

section 14072(b)’’—i.e., the National Sex

Offender Registry (NSOR)—‘‘in

accordance with guidelines issued by

the Attorney General, including

transmission of current address

information and other information on

registrants to the extent provided by the

guidelines.’’

This requirement derives from the

amendment of the Wetterling Act by

section 115(a)(2)(B) of CJSA. The time

for compliance is accordingly that

provided in section 115(c)(2) of CJSA—

Nov. 25, 2000, subject to a possible twoyear extension for states making good

faith efforts to come into compliance. At

the present time, many states are

already participating in NSOR, and the

remainder are strongly encouraged to do

so as promptly as possible.

States should be aware that

participation in NSOR is a condition for

determining that a state has a

‘‘minimally sufficient’’ sex offender

registration program as defined in 42

U.S.C. 14072(a)(3). Pursuant to section

115(a)(7) of the CJSA, states have until

October 2, 1999, to establish ‘‘minimally

sufficient’’ programs (subject to a

possible two-year extension for states

making good faith efforts). In states that

have not established ‘‘minimally

sufficient’’ programs by that time, the

FBI will be required to directly register

sex offenders convicted in the state, and

there will be correlative responsibilities

on such states to facilitate FBI

registration of their sex offenders as

provided in 42 U.S.C. 14072(h)(1) and

(k). Hence, the failure of a state to

participate in NSOR by October 2, 1999,

may result in otherwise avoidable

federal intervention in sex offender

registration in the state.

States should also be aware that under

the National Sex Offender Registry

Assistance Program (NSOR–AP),

funding is available from the Bureau of

Justice Statistics of the United States

Department of Justice to facilitate state

participation in NSOR and upgrade state

sex offender registries. States desiring

additional information concerning this

funding program should contact the

Bureau of Justice Statistics.

In accordance with 42 U.S.C.

14072(b), the FBI has established an

interim version of NSOR (the ‘‘Interim

Registry’’) to track the whereabouts and

movement of persons required to

register under sex offender registration

programs. The Interim Registry

functions as a ‘‘pointer’’ system,

indicating on an individual’s FBI

Identification Record the fact that the

individual is a registered sex offender

and the name and location of the state

agency that maintains the offender’s

registration information.

The FBI will be issuing regulations

concerning state participation in NSOR.

To participate in NSOR under current

procedures, states must submit the

following information on registrants to

the FBI: the name under which the

person is registered; the registering

agency’s name and location; the date of

registration; and the date registration

expires. Upon the submission of this

information, a notice indicating that an

individual is a registered sex offender

and listing the information will be
33708 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 118 / Friday, June 19, 1998 / Notices

included on the individual’s FBI

Identification Record.

The FBI is in the process of modifying

the National Crime Information Center

(NCIC) to establish a new crime

information system which will be

known as ‘‘NCIC 2000.’’ NCIC 2000,

which is expected to go on-line in mid1999, will include a Convicted Sexual

Offender Registry File that will serve as

the permanent National Sex Offender

Registry (the ‘‘Permanent Registry’’). In

the Permanent Registry, sex offender

registration information will be entered

directly into the NCIC Convicted Sexual

Offender Registry File, via the NCIC

communication circuit, and will include

such information as the offender’s name

and address and details regarding the

conviction resulting in registration.

States will receive further guidance

concerning participation in the

Permanent Registry through future

modifications of regulations and

guidelines.

VII. Good Faith Immunity [Available to

States Immediately]

Subsection (f) states that law

enforcement agencies, employees of law

enforcement agencies, independent

contractors acting at the direction of

such agencies, and state officials shall

be immune from liability for good faith

conduct under the Act, Inclusion of this

provision in the Act was necessary to

protect state actors and contractors

involved in registration and notification

programs for unwarranted exposure to

liability, since the states cannot legislate

immunities to liability under federal

causes of action. This part of the Act

does not impose any requirement on

states and the character of state law

provisions regarding the scope of

immunity or liability will not be

considered in the compliance review

under the Act.

VIII. Compliance Review;

Consequences of Non-Compliance

The time states have to comply with

the Act’s requirements depends on the

legislation from which the requirements

derive, as specified in these guidelines.

Thus, the initial deadline for complying

with requirements derived from the

Wetterling Act as originally enacted or

from Megan’s Law was September 12,

1997, and the deadline is now

September 12, 1999, for states that have

received a two-year extension based on

good faith efforts to achieve compliance.

Requirements deriving from the Pam

Lychner Act must be complied with by

October 2, 1999, subject to a possible

two-year extension for states making

good faith efforts to comply.

Requirements deriving from the CJSA

must be complied with by November 25,

2000, subject to a possible two-year

extension for states making good faith

efforts to comply.

These deadlines set outer limits for

state compliance to avoid a reduction of

Byrne Formula Grant funding. States are

strongly encouraged to attempt to

achieve compliance with all parts of the

Act as quickly as possible to maximize

the benefits of the Act’s reforms.

States that fail to come into

compliance within the specified time

periods will be subject to a mandatory

10% reduction of Byrne Formula Grant

funding, and any funds that are not

allocated to noncomplying states will be

reallocated to states that are in

compliance. If a state’s funding has been

reduced because it has failed to comply

with the Act’s requirements by an

applicable deadline, the state may

regain eligibility for full funding in later

program years by establishing

compliance with all applicable

requirements of the Act in such later

years.

States are encouraged to submit

information concerning existing and

proposed sex offender registration

provisions to the Bureau of Justice

Assistance with as much lead-time as

possible. This will enable the reviewing

authority to assess the status of state

compliance with the Act and to suggest

any necessary changes to achieve

compliance before the funding

reduction goes into effect. At the latest,

state submissions must be provided on

the following timetable:

To maintain eligiblity for full Byrne

Formula Grant funding following

September 12, 1999—the end of the

implementation period for the Act’s

original requirements and Megan’s Law,

for states that have received the twoyear ‘‘good faith’’ extension—such states

must submit to the Bureau of Justice

Assistance by July 12, 1999, information

that shows compliance, in the reviewing

authority’s judgment, with the

requirements described in parts I, II, and

III of these guidelines.

To maintain eligibility for full Byrne

Formula Grant funding following

October 2, 1999—the end of the

implementation period for the Pam

Lychner Act requirements, absent an

extension—states must submit to the

Bureau of Justice Assistance by July 12,

1999, information that shows

compliance, in the reviewing authority’s

judgment, with the requirements

described in part IV of these guidelines,

or a written explanation of why

compliance cannot be achieved within

that period and a description of the

good faith efforts that justify an

extension of time (but not more than

two years) for achieving compliance.

To maintain eligibility for full Byrne

Grant funding following November 25,

2000—the end of the implementation

period for the CJSA requirements,

absent an extension—states must submit

to the Bureau of Justice Assistance by

September 25, 2000, information that

shows compliance, in the reviewing

authority’s judgment, with the

requirements described in the parts V

and VI of these guidelines, or a written

explanation of why compliance cannot

be achieved within that period and a

description of the good faith efforts that

justify an extension of time (but not

more than two years) for achieving

compliance.

After the reviewing authority has

determined that a state is in compliance

with the Act, the state will be required

as part of the Byrne Formula Grant

application process in subsequent

program years to certify that the state

remains in compliance with the Act.

Dated: June 13, 1998.

Janet Reno,

Attorney General.

[FR Doc. 98–16391 Filed 6–18–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–BB–M

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree

Under the Comprehensive,

Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act

(‘‘CERCLA’’)

In accordance with Departmental

policy, 28 CFR 50.7, notice is hereby

given that a proposed consent decree in

United States v. Atkemix Thirty-Seven,

Inc., (M.D. Fl.) Civil Action No. 98–

1203–CIV–T–25–F was lodged on June

10, 1998, with the United States District

Court for the Middle District of Florida.

In this action the United States sought

injunctive relief and recovery of

response costs under sections 106(a)

and 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9606(a)

and 9607, with respect to the Stauffer

Chemical Superfund Site in Tampa,

Florida (‘‘the Site’’).

Under a proposed Consent Decree,

Atkemix Thirty-Seven, Inc., the present

owner and operator of a portion of the

Site, has agreed to perform the remedy

chosen by EPA to clean up the Site, pay

the government’s remaining past

response costs, and pay future response

costs, in settlement of the government’s

claims under sections 106 and 107 of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9606 and 9607.

The Department of Justice will

receive, for a period of thirty (30) days

from the date of this publication,