DISMISS and Opinion Filed April 6, 2022 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-01149-CV A TO Z WHOLESALE WINE & SP IRITS, LLC, AMAR ALI, AND NUR ALI, Appellants
V.
SPECTRA BANK F/K/A RI VERBEND BANK, Appellee On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-02050 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, Justi ce Molberg, and Justice Goldstein Opinion by Justice Goldstein Before the Court is appellants’ motion for extension of time to file their notice of appeal from the trial court’s Septem ber 8, 2021 final summary judgment. See
T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 26.3. Because appellants timely f iled a motion for new trial, their notice of appeal was due December 7, 2021, w ithin ninety days of judgment, or, with an extension motion, December 22, 2021, fifteen days later. See id. 26.1(a), 26.3. The notice of appeal was filed December 22.–2– Appellants explain in their extension mo tion that, rather than filing the notice of appeal by December 7 in accordance with the rules of appellate procedure, they relied on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b (e) and filed it after their motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law in order “to allow for complete disposition of all motions a nd dispositive issues below.” 1 See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 329b(e) (providing that trial court’s plenary power expires thirty days after a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law). A ppellee opposes the motion, asserting that appellants’ explanation fails to satisfy the “reasonableness” standard of rule 26.3. We agree with appellee. It is well-settled that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. See Brashear v. Victoria Gardens of McKinney, L.L.C. , 302 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). An appellate court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal under rule 26. 3 if the party filing the appeal offers a reasonable explanation for the delay in filing. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 10.5(b), 26.3(b). The Texas Supreme Court has defined a “reasonable explanation” as “any plausible statement of circumstances indicating that fa ilure to file [within the specified period] was not deliberate or intentional, but was the result of inadvertence, mistake, or mischance.” Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc. , 774 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. 1989)

1 The notice of appeal was filed thirty days afte r the new trial motion was overruled by operation of law. See T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 329b(c) (providing that, if a motion for new trial is not determined by written order signed within seventy-five days of j udgment, it is overruled by operation of law).–3– (citation omitted). An explanation that demonstrates a conscious or strategic decision to wait is not reasonable. See , e.g. , Hykonnen v. Baker Hughes Bus. Support
Servs. , 93 S.W.3d 562, 563-64 (Tex. App.—H ouston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (waiting until representation secured not reasonable); Weik v. Second Baptist Church of Houston , 988 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. App.—Houst on [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (waiting until trial court’s plen ary power expired in event tr ial court reinstated case not reasonable). As appellee notes in its response, we ha ve repeatedly held that delay caused by waiting for the trial court to rule on a pos t-judgment motion or for the trial court’s plenary power to expire is unreasonable as it reflects an awareness of the deadline for filing a notice of appeal but a conscious decision to ignore it. See , e.g. , Daoudi v. Klalib, No. 05-21-00145-CV, 2021 WL 1660644, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Zhao v. Lone Star Engine Installation Ctr., Inc. , No. 05-09-01055-CV, 2009 WL 3177578, at *1-2 (T ex. App.—Dallas Oct. 6, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op) (per curiam). In a reply, appellants asse rt that appellee “ignores” their reliance on rule 329b(e). They maintain the notice of appeal “was inadvertently and mistakenly delayed by the time frame for overruling the motion for new trial by operation of law.” Yet, they also assert in that same reply that “had grant of a new trial been made while plenar y power was in effect, the no tice of filing this appeal would fall to injustice.” Appellants’ own argument demonstrates a conscious disregard of the deadline in favor of waiting for a ruling on their new trial motion.–4– Accordingly, we deny the extension moti on and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.3(a); Weik , 988 S.W.2d 439.

211149F.P05 / Bonnie Lee Goldstein / BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE–5– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

A TO Z WHOLESALE WINE & SPIRITS, LLC, AMAR ALI, AND NUR ALI, Appellants
No. 05-21-01149-CV V.
SPECTRA BANK F/K/A RIVERBEND BANK, Appellee On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-02050. Opinion delivered by Justice Goldstein, Chief Justice Burns and Justice Molberg participating.

In accordance with this Court’ s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal.
We ORDER that appellee Spectra Bank f/ k/a Riverbend Bank recover its costs, if any, of this appeal from appella nts A to Z Wholesale Wine & Spirits, LLC, Amar Ali, and Nur Ali.
Judgment entered April 6, 2022.