UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4136

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT PATRICK HOFFMAN, II,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior 

District Judge. (2:12-cr-00184-RGD-LRL-1)

Argued: March 26, 2015 Decided: May 5, 2015

Amended: June 2, 2015

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Davis wrote the 

opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Duncan joined.

ARGUED: Frances H. Pratt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert John Krask, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia; Heather M. 

Schmidt, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., 

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public 

Defender, Keith Loren Kimball, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States 
2

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Alan M. Salsbury, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:

After a five-day jury trial in the Eastern District of 

Virginia, Appellant Robert Patrick Hoffman, II was convicted of 

attempted espionage and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. 

On appeal, Hoffman argues that his defense was prejudiced as a 

result of the district court’s handling of his pretrial motions 

for expert services under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (the 

“CJA”). As relief, he apparently seeks a conditional remand to 

the district court for the appointment of a psychiatrist and, 

depending on the outcome of a thorough psychiatric examination, 

a new trial affording him an opportunity to present a mental 

status defense. Hoffman also asks that we review the district 

court’s rulings on certain pretrial motions filed by the 

government under the Classified Information Procedures Act (the 

“CIPA”). Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of 

the district court.1

I.

A.

The evidence adduced at trial permitted the jury to find 

the following facts.

 1 In light of our denial of Hoffman’s pro se request for 

substitution of counsel, we grant his motion for leave to file a 

supplemental brief pro se. In his pro se brief, Hoffman 

separately raises a number of issues that we have reviewed and 

do not find meritorious. 
4

Prior to his retirement in the fall of 2011, Hoffman served 

in the United States Navy for approximately twenty years, 

working as a cryptologic technician aboard fast track or guided 

missile submarines. Hoffman held a top secret/sensitive 

compartmentalized information clearance and regularly received 

classified information in his work, including information 

relating to the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and missions of 

United States submarines, and the methods of operation employed 

by adversaries of the United States. Hoffman entered into a 

number of nondisclosure agreements with the United States

government, and he received regular training on his obligations 

not to divulge classified information to persons not authorized 

to receive it and to report to authorities any attempt by an 

unauthorized person to solicit classified information.

In the fall of 2012, the FBI commenced an investigation of 

Hoffman to determine whether he was in contact with another 

country’s intelligence service. Specifically, agents of the FBI 

conducted a “false flag operation” in which they contacted and 

maintained communications with Hoffman while assuming the 

identities of agents of a foreign intelligence service. 

Communicating by email, an undercover FBI agent posing as an 

agent of the Russian secret service named “Vladimir” solicited 

information from Hoffman and instructed him in how to make dead 

drops of documents at a state park in Virginia Beach, Virginia. 
5

Hoffman indicated his willingness to assist the Russian agency 

and, over the course of several exchanges of correspondence and

visits to the dead drop site, he disclosed national defense 

information and advice for the Russian navy, including certain 

classified information.

According to the government, Hoffman came to suspect that 

he might be under surveillance and, for this reason, decided to 

report his activities to the FBI. On October 31, 2012, Hoffman 

visited the FBI’s office in Norfolk, Virginia and reported that 

he had been recruited by the Russian intelligence service to 

provide certain information. Hoffman claimed that he maintained 

communications with “Vladimir” in order to set up the Russian 

agent for investigation and apprehension by the FBI and the CIA, 

and that he did not intend to injure the United States. 

The FBI interviewed Hoffman and instructed him to give 

advance notice of any further contacts he had with Russian 

agents. “Vladimir” subsequently contacted Hoffman by email

inquiring about Hoffman’s failure to make a planned visit to the 

dead drop site. Hoffman reported this contact to the FBI, and an 

FBI agent instructed him to make a concise response to the 

email. Hoffman responded to “Vladimir” by coded email on 

November 8, 2012 that he had encountered a problem and would not 

be able to visit the dead drop site again until November 18. On 
6

November 17 and 18, 2012, Hoffman returned to the dead drop site 

without notifying the FBI.

B.

On December 5, 2012, a grand jury returned a single-count 

indictment against Hoffman for attempted espionage, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a). The indictment alleged that Hoffman 

attempted to communicate to the Russian Federation information 

relating to United States national defense, including 

information classified as secret. The indictment alleged further 

that Hoffman disclosed this information with intent and reason 

to believe that it would be used to injure the United States and 

to advantage the Russian Federation. The FBI arrested Hoffman 

the following day. The district court appointed counsel and set 

a pretrial motion deadline of February 28, 2013, with trial to 

commence on June 17, 2013. 

On March 21, 2013, defense counsel filed an ex parte motion 

under the CJA requesting appointment of a mental health expert

to conduct an examination of Hoffman and to provide professional 

opinions to assist the defense. Specifically, counsel sought 

opinions about how to communicate with Hoffman and whether 

Hoffman intended to commit espionage, as well as any expert 
7

mitigation evidence for presentation at sentencing should 

Hoffman be convicted.2

On April 17, 2013, the district court conducted an ex parte 

hearing on the CJA motion. In support of the motion, defense 

counsel expressed concerns about Hoffman’s ability to convey 

information about his background accurately and whether Hoffman 

was suffering from delusional thinking. The district court

agreed that counsel’s account raised the question of Hoffman’s 

mental competency and insisted that counsel was required to give 

notice to the government. Defense counsel responded that they 

intended to give notice once they determined that they would 

present a mental status defense but that they had not yet made 

any such decision. Notwithstanding counsels’ position, the 

district court directed counsel to issue and file immediately a 

notice under Rule 12.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure3 and a motion for an examination to determine Hoffman’s 

competency to assist his counsel and to stand trial.

 2 We have redacted from the public version of this opinion 

certain information that remains under seal. Counsel for the 

parties, who have received an unredacted copy of this opinion, 

are directed to advise us within thirty days whether the 

redactions remain necessary and appropriate. 

3 Rule 12.2 provides that a defendant who “intends” to 

assert an insanity defense or to introduce expert evidence of a 

mental condition bearing on the question of guilt must notify an 

attorney for the government in writing and file a copy of the 

notice with the court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a),(b). 
8

Acknowledging that the pretrial motion deadline had passed, the 

court stated that it would grant leave for these late filings.

The court declined to grant counsel’s request for a broader 

mental examination but stated that it would take the matter 

under advisement and entertain the request if raised again upon

completion of the competency examination.

Following the district court’s directive, defense counsel 

filed a Rule 12.2 notice and a motion for a competency 

examination under 18 U.S.C. § 4241,4 which the court later 

granted. Thereafter, the government filed a motion for its own 

examination of Hoffman to determine his mental status at the 

time of the charged offense under 18 U.S.C. § 42425 and his 

present competency to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. § 4241.

The district court held a pretrial conference on April 23, 

2013, at which defense counsel moved to withdraw the Rule 12.2 

notice filed less than a week before, arguing that the notice 

was premature until any mental examination results became 

 4 Section 4241 provides that a criminal defendant or the 

government “may file a motion for a hearing to determine the 

mental competency of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). If the 

motion is granted, the court may order a psychiatric or 

psychological examination and report before the date of the 

hearing. Id. § 4241(b).

5 Section 4242 provides that, upon a defendant’s filing of a 

Rule 12.2(a) notice, the district court must grant any 

government request for a psychiatric or psychological 

examination of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 4242(a).
9

available that might support an insanity defense. The district 

court reluctantly permitted withdrawal of the notice, expressing 

its concerns about delays that might result if the defense 

decided to reissue the notice later. Upon withdrawal of the 

notice, the government withdrew its § 4242 motion. 

The grand jury returned a superseding indictment on May 8, 

2013, to include an additional allegation that Hoffman attempted 

to communicate top secret information about United States

capabilities to track foreign warships. The district court 

granted a continuance and set a revised pretrial motion deadline 

of May 31, 2013, with trial to commence on August 12, 2013.

Meanwhile, the court appointed forensic psychiatrist Dr. 

Gregory Saathoff to conduct the competency examination of 

Hoffman. Dr. Saathoff submitted his report to the court on June 

3, 2013, concluding that Hoffman understood the nature and 

consequences of the proceedings against him and that he was able 

to assist his counsel in his defense. In making his assessment, 

Dr. Saathoff examined Hoffman’s jail records and military 

personnel records, and conducted interviews of Hoffman over the 

course of two days, as well as shorter interviews with one of 

Hoffman’s defense lawyers and a correctional officer. Dr. 

Saathoff ultimately found no history of mental illness and no 

current mental disease or defect that would render Hoffman

incompetent to stand trial. During a sealed proceeding on June 
10

24, 2013, the district court made a finding that Hoffman was 

competent to stand trial without objection from the defense but

scheduled a further hearing for July 9, 2013.

On the day before the scheduled hearing, July 8, 2013, 

defense counsel filed a motion seeking authorization for 

additional services by Dr. Saathoff under the CJA. The defense 

did not dispute Hoffman’s competency to stand trial but wished 

to have Dr. Saathoff examine “certain audio recordings” in which

Hoffman participated to determine whether Hoffman “was insane or 

suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the 

charged offense.” Defense counsel explained in the motion that 

they did not file a renewed Rule 12.2 notice because they did 

not have “a medical opinion upon which to base [an insanity] 

defense and/or filing.” At the hearing the next day, the 

district court reiterated its finding that Hoffman was competent 

to stand trial and denied the motion for additional services. 

The district court set out its reasoning in a written opinion 

issued on July 18, 2013, in which it noted the defense’s 

“inexcusable” failure to file a timely Rule 12.2 notice and 

concluding that the motion for additional services failed to 

establish any necessity for the requested psychiatric services.

The case proceeded to trial on August 15, 2013, and the 

jury returned a guilty verdict one week later. The district 
11

court sentenced Hoffman to thirty years’ imprisonment. This 

timely appeal followed.

II.

A.

Hoffman challenges as unconstitutional under the due 

process clause the district court’s refusal to grant his 

pretrial motions for the assistance of a mental health expert. 

An indigent criminal defendant’s right to due process includes

the right to the appointment and assistance of a psychiatrist

upon “a preliminary showing” in the trial court “that [the 

defendant’s] sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a 

significant factor at trial[.]” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 

(1985); see also Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249, 264 (4th Cir. 

1999), aff’d, 528 U.S. 225 (2000). Additionally, Sixth Amendment 

guarantees to counsel and a fair trial require defense counsel 

to seek, and trial courts to provide, the assistance of a 

psychiatrist where necessary to present an adequate defense.

Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1978); 

see also United States v. Walker, 537 F.2d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 

1976). Under the CJA, a district court must authorize funds for 

an indigent defendant’s counsel to obtain expert services, 

including psychiatric services, upon request and a finding that 

such services are “necessary for adequate representation” “after 

appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 
12

3006A(e)(1); see also Proffitt, 582 F.2d at 857 (“The expert 

services to which the Act refers include psychiatric 

assistance.”) (citing United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 377 

(4th Cir. 1971)). 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 

determination of whether expert services requested under the CJA

are necessary for adequate representation. United States v. 

Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 349 (4th Cir. 1997). Any error in the 

district court’s refusal to appoint an expert is reversible only 

upon a showing by the defendant that “the court’s refusal was 

prejudicial to his defense.” United States v. Perrera, 842 F.2d 

73, 77 (4th Cir. 1988). To establish a constitutional violation 

in the denial of a motion for expert assistance, the defendant 

must adduce convincing evidence of actual prejudice. Hartsell, 

127 F.3d at 349.

B.

Hoffman falls short of showing an abuse of discretion here, 

and in any event has not demonstrated the existence of 

prejudice. By his own admission, the March 21, 2013 motion 

presented no facts tending to establish that the broad mental 

health examination requested therein was necessary for adequate 

representation under the CJA. To the contrary, when the district 

court properly inquired about the necessity of the requested 

services at the ex parte hearing on the motion, defense counsel 
13

explained that they had received reports from Hoffman about 

events during his career that turned out to be inaccurate, 

suggesting that he might be presently suffering from a 

delusional mind state. Counsel did not offer any specific facts 

suggesting that Hoffman might have a history of mental illness 

or that his mental status at the time of the offense might 

contradict the government’s allegation that he intended to 

commit espionage.

The facts of this case are materially unlike those relied 

upon by Hoffman, in which a defendant’s right to psychiatric 

assistance in the development of his defense had been infringed. 

For example, at the time the defense in Ake requested 

appointment of a psychiatrist, Ake had exhibited “bizarre” 

behavior at his arraignment, a psychiatrist had found the 

defendant to be incompetent to stand trial and suggested 

commitment, a later finding of competency was conditioned upon 

frequent psychotropic medication during trial, and psychiatrists 

had reported that the defendant suffered from a mental illness 

that might have started years prior to time of the offense. Ake, 

470 U.S. at 86. In United States v. Reason, the defendant had, 

the day prior to committing the charged bank robbery, escaped 

from a state hospital where he had been confined for over two 

years and suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. 549 F.2d 309, 

310 (4th Cir. 1977). In Walker, the motion for a psychiatric 
14

examination “alleged that prior to the [charged conduct,] Walker 

received serious head injuries in an assault[,]” which resulted 

in “headaches, . . . recurring periods during which he could not 

‘think straight,’ and . . . permanent brain damage.” 537 F.2d at 

1193 n.1. The district court granted the motion but later 

refused additional funds for a further examination after the 

appointed psychiatrist failed, as instructed, to address

Walker’s capacity to commit the offense and after the defense 

learned of a report on Walker’s mental condition completed 

during an earlier hospital commitment. Id. at 1193-95. In

Taylor, the motion was “replete with factual allegations casting 

serious doubt on Taylor’s responsibility for his conduct,” 

“recit[ing] his extensive history of mental disturbance, his 

record of impulsive behavior, his own desire for treatment, and 

previous medical opinion to the effect that he was ‘psychotic’ 

and lacked sufficient internal controls over his conduct.” 437 

F.2d at 377.

Here, defense counsel presented no similar facts in support 

of the ex parte motion. Defense counsel’s description of

unexplained inaccuracies in Hoffman’s statements to them about 

his past experiences was certainly sufficient to call into 

question Hoffman’s then-present mental competency to assist his 

counsel and to stand trial. The district court properly 

determined that inquiry into Hoffman’s competency was in order.
15

Although the district court might well have granted the motion 

for a broader exploration of his mental health history in the 

exercise of its discretion, the scant facts provided by counsel 

were not sufficient to compel the district court to do so, such 

that its denial amounted to a prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Moreover, the district court here did not simply deny the

defense’s request without leaving open the possibility of 

reconsideration. Rather, the court invited defense counsel to 

renew their motion for a mental examination once the competency 

assessment was complete, at which point information suggesting a 

need for further psychiatric investigation might be available.

Given the weak showing of necessity, we cannot say that the 

district court abused its discretion in declining to grant the 

defense’s request while inviting a renewal of the request upon 

completion of a competency examination.

C.

Hoffman places significant focus on the district court’s 

directives at the ex parte hearing that the defense immediately 

file a motion for a competency determination and issue a notice 

under Rule 12.2 to the government. The contention that the 

district court’s imposition of these requirements amounted to a 

prejudicial abuse of discretion is unpersuasive.
16

1.

Upon a finding of reasonable cause that a criminal 

defendant “may presently be suffering from a mental disease or 

defect rendering him mentally incompetent,” the district court 

must either grant a motion by the defendant for a hearing to 

determine the defendant’s mental competency or “order such a 

hearing on its own motion[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Hoffman does 

not challenge the district court’s decision that an assessment 

of his competency to stand trial was appropriate. He simply 

argues that the district court should have ordered this 

assessment “on its own motion” rather than directing defense 

counsel to file a motion. Hoffman cites no legal authority 

forbidding the district court from directing counsel to file a § 

4241(a) motion in this context. We find no merit in this 

formalistic contention.

2.

Nor did the district court’s instruction that counsel file 

a Rule 12.2 notice amount to a prejudicial abuse of discretion. 

The question of a defendant’s competency to stand trial is of 

course distinct from the question of his mental condition at the 

time of the offense or his criminal responsibility for his acts. 

See Walker, 537 F.2d at 1195. Rule 12.2 provides that a 

defendant who “intends” (a) “to assert a defense of insanity at 

the time of the alleged offense” or (b) “to introduce expert 
17

evidence relating to a mental disease or defect or any other

mental condition of the defendant bearing on . . . the issue of 

guilt” must provide written notice to the government by the 

pretrial motion deadline “or at any later time the court sets,” 

and file a copy with the district court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

12.2(a),(b). Upon issuance of the notice, the government may 

seek its own examination of the defendant, which the district 

court must order upon the government’s motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 

4242(a); Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(c)(1)(B). 

Regardless of whether the district court should have

demanded the issuance of a Rule 12.2 notice when it did, it is 

clear from the record that Hoffman was not actually prejudiced

by this directive. First, it is undisputed that the government 

was already aware of the potential mental health issue. 

Therefore, by the time the Rule 12.2 notice issued, the 

government was already on actual notice that Hoffman might 

pursue a defense based on a mental condition. Second, Hoffman 

withdrew the formal notice within days of filing it and before 

the court ruled on the government’s motion for its own mental 

examination of Hoffman. Indeed, the defense’s withdrawal of the 

notice prompted the government to withdraw its motion. 

Accordingly, the district court’s order that counsel file the 

12.2 notice had no effect, substantial or otherwise, on 

Hoffman’s defense.
18

D.

Hoffman also challenges the denial of his later motion for 

additional services, which requested authorization to engage Dr. 

Saathoff to provide an opinion about Hoffman’s mental condition 

during the time he was in contact with “Vladimir” and the FBI by 

his examination of certain audio recordings. As already 

mentioned, the district court had invited the defense to renew 

its original motion for expert services upon review of Dr. 

Saathoff’s report on Hoffman’s competency to stand trial. But 

the defense did not renew the motion until July 8, 2013, 

approximately one month after Dr. Saathoff issued his report,

and it did not cite any findings or opinions made in the report 

to show a need for further inquiry. Indeed, upon review of 

twenty years’ worth of military personnel records and recent 

detention center records in addition to data gathered during 

several relevant interviews, Dr. Saathoff found no history of 

mental illness and no current manifestation of delusions or any 

other major mental illness. In the belatedly-filed motion for 

additional services, the defense accepted Dr. Saathoff’s 

findings and opinions but sought his review of “certain audio 

recordings” of Hoffman “near the time of the alleged offense.” 

However, the defense provided no explanation of why or how 

review of the audio tapes might be necessary for Dr. Saathoff to 

form a reliable opinion about Hoffman’s mental condition at the 
19

time of the offense. In short, the renewed motion made no 

greater showing of necessity for the requested services than had 

the original motion.

In any event, for Hoffman to present an insanity defense or 

to introduce expert evidence of a mental condition at trial, he 

was required to issue a Rule 12.2 notice to the government and 

file a copy with the district court by the extended pretrial 

motion deadline of May 31, 2013. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

12.2(a),(b). After withdrawing the original Rule 12.2 notice, 

the defense never timely reissued or refiled it, explaining in 

the motion for additional services that they lacked an expert 

opinion upon which to base an insanity defense. By the time the 

defense renewed the motion for psychiatric services, it was too 

late to issue a Rule 12.2 notice without leave of the court. As 

to the timing of the motion itself, defense counsel explained 

that they had recently learned that certain assertions by 

Hoffman about his prior experiences, not specifically stated in 

the motion, were untrue. As the district court noted in its 

opinion, however, this was not a new concern for counsel and was 

indeed part of the very reason that the court ordered the 

assessment of Hoffman’s competency months prior. The district 

court concluded that the defense lacked good cause to justify 

late filing of the requisite Rule 12.2 notice. See id.
20

In light of this ruling, Hoffman was precluded from 

asserting an insanity defense or introducing expert mental 

status evidence at trial and thus had no use for a further 

expert inquiry into his mental condition at the time of the 

offense. See United States v. Fince, 670 F.2d 1356, 1357-58 (4th 

Cir. 1982) (district court properly denied § 3006A(e)(1) request 

for expert assistance of chemist to develop a defense deemed 

meritless by the Fourth Circuit and therefore “appointment of 

[the] expert would have served no useful purpose”). Without a 

stronger showing of necessity for the services requested, and a 

concomitant showing that the denial of the motion resulted in

actual prejudice to the defense, we cannot say it amounted to an 

abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the defense’s 

motion for additional psychiatric services.

III.

Hoffman also seeks review of an order issued by the

district court protecting certain classified information from 

discovery and a second order restricting inquiry at trial into

matters related to the protected information. Specifically, 

Hoffman requests review of the protected matters for information 

relevant to his mental condition or a potential entrapment 

defense and any other discoverable information. Upon our review 

of the orders and relevant portions of the record, we find no 

reversible error.
21

A district court may permit a party to make an ex parte 

showing of good cause to restrict discovery and, upon such a 

showing, enter an appropriate protective order. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

16(d)(1). Section 4 of the CIPA provides that the district court 

may, “upon a sufficient showing,” permit the government to omit 

classified information from materials produced to the defendant 

in discovery. 18 U.S.C. App. III § 4. Section 6 provides that, 

upon the government’s motion, the court must determine prior to 

trial the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified 

information. Id. § 6(a). In these and other ways, the CIPA 

“serves to protect” “the governmental privilege in classified 

information” and “vests district courts with wide latitude to 

deal with thorny problems of national security in the context of 

criminal proceedings.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 

247 (4th Cir. 2008). We review a district court’s rulings under 

the CIPA for abuse of discretion. Id. at 253.

Before trial, the government filed an ex parte motion in 

the district court under § 4 seeking to protect certain 

classified information from discovery and a motion in limine 

under § 6 to prevent classified information of the same nature 

from being used at trial. The district court determined that the 

information at issue was properly classified and therefore 

implicates the governmental privilege; that it is not 

exculpatory, impeaching, or material to the preparation of the 
22

defense; and that its disclosure could cause grave and serious 

damage to the national security of the United States. 

Upon our in camera review of the classified materials, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 

The protected information does not include any statement made by 

Hoffman “in response to interrogation by a person [he] knew was 

a government agent,” or any information “material to preparing 

the defense” or obtained from Hoffman. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

16(a)(1)(A),(E). The information offers no support for an 

entrapment defense, and any inferences bearing on a 

determination of Hoffman’s mental condition are wholly absent. 

Even if the information was discoverable under Rule 16(a), it 

was classified information subject to the governmental 

privilege. Although the governmental privilege is “a qualified 

one,” it need not yield in this case because the information at 

issue here is not “helpful to the defense” or “essential to a 

fair determination of a cause.” United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 

1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is

AFFIRMED.