SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO . A

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RODNEY LEE,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

and

JANET COLLIER,

Plaintiff,

v.

PHELAN HALLINAN DIAMOND & JONES, PC,

Defendant

- Respondent.

______ _______________________

Submitted August 1, 2019

– Decided August 7, 2019

Before Judges Whipple and Firko.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L

- 1766

- 18.

Rodney Lee, appellant pro se.

Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones PC, respondent pro

se (Brian J. Yoder , on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet

, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36

- 3.2 A

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PER CURIAM

Self

- represented plaintiff Rodney Lee appeals a Law Division order

entered on October 29, 2018 granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's

complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:6

- 2(e). For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

On August 21, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Law Division

requesting judgment for damages against defendant, Phelan Hallinan Diamond

& Jones, PC, who represented the mortgagee, U.S. Bank National Association

(U.S. Bank)

, in the und erlying mortgage foreclosure action. Plainti ff alleged he

still owned the Subject P roperty located at 83 Pine Grove Terrace in Newark,

U.S. Bank had no right to collect rent payments from any tenants at the property

, defendant violated the New Jersey Cons umer Fraud Act by making false

statements about him, and defendant violated the Foreclosure Fairness Act,

N.J.S.A. 2A:50

- 69 to

- 71.

On October 4, 2018, defendant filed the motion to dismiss under review.

Defendant construed plaintiff's allegations as a " bad faith and futile attempt to

collaterally attack the underlying foreclosure action an d U.S. Bank's ownership

of the Subject P roperty" notwithstanding plaintiff's actual knowledge of the

Sheriff's sale. Defendant presented the following arguments in sup port of its3 A

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motion to dismiss: plaintiff's claims are based on the doctrines of res judicata,

collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine because "the record of

the Chancery Court under docket F

- 030486

- 13 establishes beyond question the

fact that [U.S. Bank] acquired title[] to the S ubject P roperty at Sheriff's sale on

May 31, 2016 [
, ] " thereby disavowing plaintiff's claim that he still owns the

property, and plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Plaintiff filed opposition to defendant's motion on October 10, 2018 and

waived his appearance for oral argument. On October 29, 2018, the scheduled

date for oral argument, Judge Susan L. Claypoole entered an order and a
statement of reasons dismissing plaintiff's compl aint with prejudice. Judge

Claypoole's opinion fully explained her reasons for granting defendant's motion:

Res judicata , or claim preclusion, is a doctrine that declares that on c e a matter has been fully litigated and resolved, it cannot be re

- litigated. Nolan v. First Colony Life Ins. Co. , 345 N.J. Super. 142, 153 (App. Div. 2001) [(citing Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control , 33 N.J. 428, 435 (1960)).] In order for re s judicata to have effect, there must be (1) a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of issues, (3) identity of parties, and (4) identity of the cause of action. Brookshires Equity, LLC v. Montaquiza , 346 N.J. Super. 310, 318 ( App. Div. 2002).

Res judicata promotes judicial efficiency, as litigation in a matter must eventually end. Watkins v. Resorts Int'l [] Hotel & Casino , 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991). "In4 A

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, 123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991) (c itations omitted). For a decision to have the effect of res judicata, there must be a valid and final judgment on an issue of fact or law that is essential to the judgment. Id. at 506. It is then binding on the parties, whether in the same or a differen t claim. Ibid.

In order for collateral estoppel to apply, a party must show (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. First U nion Nat ['l] Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc. , 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007) [( citing Hennessey v. Winslow Tw p

. , 183 N.J. 593, 599 (2005)).]

The Entire Controversy Doctrine is found in [ R ule ] 4 : 30A. Pursuant to [ R ule ] 4:30A: "N on

- joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine. . . ." R. 4:30A.

The purpose of the entire controversy doctrine is to avoid fragmentation of lit igation and to promote party fairness, judicial economy and efficiency. See Thomas v. Hargest , 363 N.J. Super. 589, 596 (App. Div. 2003). Thus, a litigant is required to assert in one action all claims arising from a single controversy. Id. at 595. In5 A

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The entire controversy doctrine is one of judicial fairness and will be invoked in that spirit. Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk , A.G. , 96 N.J. 336, 343 (1984). The doctrine was judicially created as a "reflection of . . . the unification of the state courts" in light of our Constitution's recognition of "the value in resolving rel ated claims in one adjudication so that all matters in controversy between parties may be completely determined." Higgins v. Thurber , 413 N.J. Super. 1, 11

- 12 (App. Div. 2010). The objectives of the doctrine are: (1) to encourage the comprehensive and

c onclusive determination of a legal controversy; (2) to achieve party fairness, including both parties before the court as well as prospective parties; and (3) to promote judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding fragmented, multiple and duplicative litig ation. Id. at 12.

. . . . In support of its [m]otion, [d]efendant cites to Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm [ittee] v. First New Jersey Nat[tional] Bank , in which the [appellate] court held that the entire controversy doctrine [ bar r ed ] the claims because "the bank's claims in the prior suit, upon which judgment was recovered, and plaintiffs' claims in the present litigation, do derive from the same transaction or series of transactions

— the underlying alleged agreements to extend credit. " [ 163 N.J. Supe r. 463, 498 (App. Div. 1978).] Here, [d]efendant argues that [p]laintiffs' claims against it are "entirely dependent on a challenge to [ U.S. Bank 's] ownership of the Subject Property. However, [ U.S. Bank 's] right to6 A

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. . . .

Plaintiff Lee contends that [d]efendant has violated the New Jersey Fair Foreclosure Fairness Act. Specifically, [p]laintiff Lee states that, in New Jersey, ownership of real property is transferred by deed, and the transfer of a property interest is complete upon delivery of same. Here, according to [p]laintiff Lee, the certification of Brian J. Yoder, Esq. fails to certify that the Sheriff's Deed

. . . was transferred and completed; that [ U.S. Bank ] is "person who takes titles, as a r esult of a [S] heriff's sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure to a residential property ["] ; and that [d]efendant, as an agent of [ U.S. Bank ] , provided the Notice to Tenants in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:50

- 70. Further, [p]laintiff Lee asserts that the certification of Brian J. Yoder, Esq. also fails to offer any credible evidence to prove that it was the intent that the Sheriff's Deed be effective upon its physical delivery to [U.S. Bank] or to transfer the Subject Property to same.

[Plaintiff] also asserts that [d]efendant has failed to demonstrate tha t it did not violate the New Jersey Fair Foreclosure Fairness Act and, as such, the allegations set forth against [d]efendant remain undisputed. Nor has [d]efendant presented any credible evidence that [ U.S. Bank ] had taken title[] to the Subject Premises prior to, or after, sending the Notice to Tenants. In support of this assertion, [p]laintiff Lee cites to an apparently unanswered letter dated August 2, 2018 in which he demanded proof that ownership of the Subjec t Property had in fact changed. . . .7 A

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- 18T2 In reply, [d]efendant argues that, despite any claims to the contrary, the evidence attached to the [m] otion to [d] ismiss is admissible. Defendant cites to [ Rule ] 902 which provides that extrinsic evidence of authenticity as condition precedent to admissibi lity is not required with respect to New Jersey public documents and certified copies of public records. [N.J.R.E. 902.] Here, all of the documents on which [d]efendant relies are limited to true and correct copies of New Jersey public documents and copi es of public records. Therefore, all of [d]efendant's exhibits are self

authenticating and admissible.

Further, [d]efendant states that the publically recorded Sheriff's Deed demonstrates that title to the Subject Property has v ested in [U.S. Bank]. Whi le [p]laintiff Lee claims that no proof was submitted of any physical delivery, [d]efendant contends that such extrinsic evidence is not required as "the public recording of the Deed automatically creates a presumption at law of delivery with the intent to transfer." Ibid.

[(Citations omitted).]

The judge concluded that dismissal was warranted under Rule 4:6

- 2 (e)

because "the record is replete with evidence showing that [U. S. Bank] gained

title to the S ubject [P]r operty via the Sheriff's [s]ale." Further, the judge aptly

noted that

, on November 25, 2015, a final judgment and writ of execution were

granted in favor of U.S. Bank. On May 31, 2016, the Essex County Sheriff sold

the Subject P roperty to U.S. Bank and issued a She riff's deed on August 6, 2016.

On July 10, 2017, p laintiff's motion to vacate the Sheriff's sale was denied, and8 A

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on June 26, 2018
, a post

- sale Notice to Tenant was properly forwarded to the

tenants in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:50

- 70. The judge concluded there was

"proof" of ownership vesting in U.S. Bank, the issue of ownership "has been

clearly decided," and p laintiff's claims are barred under the doctrines of res

judicata, collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine. This appeal

followed.

"On appeal, we apply a plenary standard of review from a trial court's

decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6

- 2(e)." Rezem Family

Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone , 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011).

"[W]e owe no special def erence to a trial judge's legal interpretations in deciding

any motion." Giannakopoulos v. Mid State Mall , 438 N.J. Super 595, 600 (App.

Div. 2014).

"In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 4:6

- 2(e) our inquiry is

limited to examining the legal suf ficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the

complaint." Printing Mart

- Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp. , 116 N.J. 739, 746

(1989). "The essential test is simply 'whether a cause of action is "suggested" by

the facts.'" Green v. Morgan Props. , 215 N.J . 431, 451 (2013) (quoting Printing

Mart

- Morristown , 116 N.J. at 746). Reviewing courts must "search[] the

complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a9 A

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cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement o f claim

, opportunity being given to amend if necessary." Printing Mart

- Morristown , 116

N.J. at 746 (quoting Di Cr istofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem' l Park , 43 N.J. Super.

244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)).

Applying this standard of review, following our review of plaintiff 's

arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Law Division's

order substantially for the reasons set forth in J udge Claypoole's comprehensive

and well

- reasoned statement of reasons.

Any argument raised by plaintiff not explicitly a ddressed in this opinion

lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11

-
3(e)(1)(E).

Affirm ed

.