UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
) RAYMONE K. BAIN ) ) Plaintiff , ) ) v. ) Civil No. 13
- 848 (RCL) ) GARY, WILLIAMS, PARE NTI, WATSON & GARY, P.L., ET AL ., ) ) ) Defendant s . ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the Court upon d efendants ’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Failure to State a Claim

. Upon consideration of the defendant s ’ motion [5 ], plaintiff ’ s opposition thereto [8 ], and the defendants ’ reply [12 ], the Court D ENIES the defendants ’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND This case arises from a personal services agreement ( “PSA ”) between the plaintiff, Raymone K. Bain, and the late King of Pop, Michael Jackson. The agreement, signed on May 30, 2006, entitled Ms. Bain to a 10% finder ’ s fee in the event that Mr. Jackson benefitted from any agreements or engagements initiated by Ms. Bain or her contacts

. Bain v. Jackson , 783 F. Supp. 2d 13 , 16 (D.D.C. 2010)

. In the following months, Ms. Bain claims that she negotiated deals for Mr. Jackson entitling her to millions of dollars

. Id

. On December 27, 2007, Ms. Bain signed an agreement releasing Mr. Jackson from any liability to her in exces s of $488, 820.05, the sum that Mr. Jackson agreed to pay as compensation to Ms. Bain. Id

.2 In May 2009, Ms. Bain , represented by the firm Cahn & Samuels LLP, filed suit a gainst Mr. Jackson and affiliated corporate entities , arguing that notwithstanding the release, Mr. Jackson owed $44 million in damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum
meruit. On June 18, 2009, Mr. Jackson moved to dismiss solely on the basis of the release. Mr. Jackson died seven days later. On July 2, 2009, Cahn & Samuels filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on Ms. Bain ’s behalf. Bain v. Jackson , No. 09

- 826, Pl. ’ s Opp. to Defs. ’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 2 8

. T he opposition first urged that consider at ion of the release, a document outside of the pleadings , was inappropriate on a motion to dismiss , and second, argued that the release was invalid because it was procured through fraudulent inducement , misrepresentation, and mistake. I d . at 1. The then

- presiding district judge, the H o norable James Robertson, agreed on the first point and notified the parties that the motion to dismiss wo uld be treated as a motion for summary judgment

. Bain v. Jackson , No. 09

- 826, Order, ECF No. 31. And in light of Mr. Jackson ’s unexpected passing, Judge Robertson stayed the case pending appointment of an executor for Mr. Jackson ’s estate. I d

. The court lifted the stay on November 20, 2009, Bain v. Jackson , No. 09

- 826, Order,
ECF No. 36, and on December 15, granted Cahn & Samuels ’ motion to withdraw as Ms. Bain ’s counsel , Bain v. Jackson , No. 09

- 826, Order, ECF No. 3 8

. Ms. Bain then retained counsel from the law firm of Gary, Williams, Finney, Lewis, Watson, and Sperando, P.L. ( “Gary Firm ”) , w ho entered their appearance on December 18, 2009. On January 4, 2010, the Gary Firm filed a supplemental opposition to the motion to dismiss that larg ely focused on the authenticity of the release. Bain v. Jackson , No. 09

- 826,
Or der, ECF No. 48. On May 7, 2010, Judge Robertson, finding that the release was both3 genuine and a bar to Ms. Bain ’s claims, granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Jackson. Bain v. Jackson , 783 F. Supp. 2d a t 16

– 19. The Gary F irm did not move for reconsideration or file an appeal. Five months later, Ms. Bain filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), which allows relief from a final judgment where there is “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been d iscovered in time to move for a new trial. ” T he new evidence claimed by Ms. Bain was an April 24, 2008 letter wherein Mr. Jackson denies any knowledge of the release and requests that Ms. Bain continue working on his behalf. In her motion, Ms. Bain cla imed that although she was aware of the letter ’s existence, and informed her counsel of it, she had been unable to locate a copy of the letter until files that were in the possession of a consultant for the Michael Jackson Company LLC were returned to her in July 2010. T his Court denied relief under Rule 60(b)(2), holding that Ms. Bain failed to exercise due diligence to locate the document because she and her counsel “knew of the 2008 letter ’s existence, [but] failed to reference it in any of their filings with the
Court

. ” Bain v. Jackson , No. 09

- 826, Memorandum a nd Order , ECF No. 79. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Circuit held that “a party ’s unannounced awareness of evidence can affect the assessment of whether it exercised the ‘reasonable diligence contemplated by the Rule. ” Bain v. MJJ Prods., Inc. , 12

- 7061, 2014 WL 1887370 (D.C. Cir. May 13, 2014)

. Ms. Bain ’s failure to apprise the district court of the 2008 letter in order to request the court ’s assistance in unearthing the letter in discovery was the principal reason for the Circuit ’s decision. While the appeal was pending, Ms. Bain filed the present action, alleging that the Gary Firm committed legal malpractice by failing to (1) amend the complaint to include events that4 occurred subsequent to initiation of the suit ; (2) marshal additional facts and evidence to support
Ms . Bain ’s claims; (3) alert the court to the existence of the April 24, 2008 letter and request the
court ’s assistance in recovering the letter through discovery; (4) keep Ms. Bain informed about the status of her case; and (5) file a timely mot ion for reconsideration and /or notice of appeal

. The defendants have moved to dismiss f or failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. LEGAL STANDARD The events giving rise to this complaint occurred in the District of Columbia, and this case was initially filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C. Code §
11

- 921. Defendants successfully rem oved the case to this Court, which has jurisdiction over this
matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because of the complete diversity of citize nship between Ms. Bain and the Gary Firm. In such cases, “federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law

. ” Burke v. Air Serv

. Int ’ l, Inc. , 685 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (emphasis added)

. Accordingly, District of Columbia law applies to the substantive legal malpractice claim while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the question whether Ms. Bain has pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim. A. Legal Malpractice Under District of Columbia law, to prevail on a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) a breach of that sta ndard; and (3) that the breach caused the harm complained of. B iomet Inc. v. Finnegan Henderson LLP , 967 A.2d 662, 664 (D.C. 2009)

. T he standard of care owed by attorneys to their clients is one of reasonableness, meaning that att orneys owe their clients a “d uty to work in [the client ’s] interests using a reasonable degree of knowledge, care, and skill. ” Id . at 665. As applied by D.C. courts,5 t h e doctrine of judgmental immunity forecloses liability for attorney “ mistakes made in the honest exercise of professional judgment. ” Id . Significantly, “ an attorney ’ s judg mental immunity and an attorney ’ s obligation to exercise reasonable car e coexist such that an attorney ’ s

non - lia bility for strategic decisions is conditioned upon the attorney acting in good faith and upon an informed judgm ent after undertaking reasonable research of the relevant legal principal s and facts of the given case. ” Id . (internal quotations omitted). Thus, despite the word “immunity, ” the doctrine of judgmental immunity “ appears to be nothing more than a recognition that if an attorne y ’ s actions could under no circumstances be held to be negligent, then a court may rule as a matter of law that there is no liability. ” Jones v. Lattimer , No. CV 12

- 2050 , 2014 WL 869470, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014) (quoting Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 981 P.2d 236, 240 (1999) ).
B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). Although Rule 8(a)(2) , which sets forth the pleading standard for federal complaints, does not require “detailed factual allegations,” a complaint must present more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supp orted by mere conclusory statements.” Id

. Taken together, the facts alleged in the complaint must be sufficient to raise a plausible claim and to permit “the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id

. In deciding the motion, the Court must “accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Browning v. Clinton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002).6 (internal quotations omitted). “ Factual allegations, although assumed to be true, must still ‘be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Hettinga v. United States , 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir . 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) are generally disfavored , and “ a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which wo uld entitle him to relief.” Kingman Park Civic
Ass ’ n v. Williams , 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

. III. ANALYSIS Defendants assert three arguments to supp ort dismissal: (1) that any finding of legal malpractice would require speculation as to the harm suffered by Ms. Bain; (2) that Ms. Bain ’ s claims are contradicted by the documentary record; (3) that Ms. Bain cannot establish that the Gary Firm ’ s negligence caused her injury; and (4) that Ms. Bain cannot establish that she would have prevailed in the district court or on appeal in the absence of the Gary Firm ’ s negligenc e. The second argument is easily r ejected because the defendants ’ motion present s no facts to support their assertion. The remaining arguments are dismissed because they are incongruent with the findings made in the underlying case. The gravamen of Ms. Bain ’ s legal malpractice claim is that the Gary Firm ’ s advice that the 2008 lette r, which allegedly p roves the fraudulent nature of the release , could not be mentioned to the court because it was lost was erroneous an d caused her to lose her claim. Indeed, the release was the principal reason for Judge Robertson ’ s rejection of Ms. Bain ’ s case. And, the Circuit ’ s opinion affirming this Court ’ s rejection of Ms. Bain ’ s motion to set aside Judge Robertson ’ s judgment relied entirely upon the failure of Ms. Bain to inform the court of7 the letter ’ s existence. It is therefore not specula t io n to infer that, assuming the truth of all facts asserted by Ms. Bain, the Gary Firm ’ s erroneous advice caused the loss of Ms. Bain ’ s claim.
Mo reover, there are two crucial question s of fa ct to be resolved in this case . First, the parties disag ree on whether Ms. Bain communicated the existence of the April 24, 2008 letter to members of the Gary Firm. In at least two places in their motion, the defendants imply that Ms. Bain did not inform t hem of the letter. See Defs. ’ s Mot. to Dismiss Complaint for Fail ure to State a Claim, ECF No. 5 , at 4 ( “ Bain has not alleged a date or described the specific circumstances of her informing the Gary Defendants about the existence of the unauthenticated April 24 th letter[.] ” ); id . at 12 (same). Second, the defendants dispute Ms. Bain ’ s contention that Willie Gary, a partner in the Gary Firm, promised to file a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal after Judge Rober tson ’ s summary judgment order, but failed to do so. See id . at 4 ( “ [Bain] has [not] demonstrated that the Gary Defendants were responsible for filing a motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal. ” ). This Court cannot resolve these fundament al questions of fact on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the defendants ’ motion is DENIED. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.
Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge, on July 7 , 2014

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