THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Richard Ralph and Euge nia Ralph, Appellants,

v.

Paul Dennis McLaughlin and Susan Rode McLaughlin, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2017-000866

Appeal From Charleston County Roger M. Young, Sr., C ircuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 5681 Heard May 15, 2019 – Filed August 21, 2019

REVERSED AND REMANDED

G. Dana Sinkler, of Gibbs & Holmes, of Wadmalaw Island, and Ainsley Fisher Tillman, of Ford Wallace Thomson LLC, of Charlest on, both for Appellants.

George Hamlin O'Kelley, III, of Buist Byars & Taylor, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondents.

GEATHERS, J.: This case involves a property dispute on Seabrook Island betw een neighbors Richard and Eugenia Ralph ("the Ralphs"), and Paul an d Susan McLaughlin ("the McLaughlins"). The dispute in question concer ns the destruction

of a drainage easement by the McLaughlins that, the Ralphs alle ge, exacerbated drainage issues on the Ralphs' property. At trial, the jury fo und for the Ralphs on their cause of action for trespass and awarded them $1,000 in n ominal damages. On appeal, the Ralphs argue the cir cuit court erred in 1) failing to apply the rulings andfactual determinations from a previous grant of summary judgmen t to a third-party defendant as the law of the case; 2) entering a directed verdic t for the McLaughlins on the issue of punitive damages ; 3) failing to find the McLaug hlins trespassed as a matter of law; and 4) failing to grant the Ralphs a new trial a bsolute, a new trial nisi

additur

, or a new trial on damages. We reverse and remand the case fo r a new trial on compensatory damages and punitive damages.

FACTS

In 1984, E.M. Seabrook, J r. prepared and recorded a plat depic ting blocks 32 and 33 of Seabrook Island ("the Seabrook plat"). In 1987, he s imilarly prepared and

recorded a second plat depicting blocks 32 and 33. To alleviat e drainage issues concerning several lots on bloc k 32, Seabrook established a twe nty-foot-wide drainage easement and a corresponding no-build area across the back of lots 21 through 28, which are reflected in the plats. The plats also r eflect a twenty-foot-wide drainage easement running between the property lines of lots 21 and 22, extending ten feet into each lot. The drainage easements contained a pip e that began at the front corner of lot 22, ran down the property line, turned nine ty degrees, and extended across lots 22 through 28 before emptying into a water hazard on the neighboring golf course. 1

In 1997, the Ralphs purchased lot 23 and recorded their deed, which granted

them the property "with, all and singular, the Rights, Members, Hereditaments and Appurtenances to the said Premises belonging, or in anywise inc ident or appertaining." The deed also indicated the property was subjec t to "the Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, Limitations, Affirmative Obligations and Easements of

Record .

. . ." Similarly, i n 1998 or 1999, Carroll and Lorrai ne Gantz ("the Gantzes") purchased lot 22 and recorded the ir deed. The Gantzes' deed in dicated lot 22 was subject to "a twenty[-]foot (20') easement for drainage and a t en[-]foot (10') easement for drainage as shown on the [Seabrook plat]," as well as "the area designated as 'No Build Area' s hown on the [Seabrook plat]."

In 2002, the Gantzes, predecessors in title to the McLaughlins , approached the Seabrook Island Property Owners Association ("SIPOA") about eli minating the twenty-foot drainage easement a nd no-build area on the back of lot 22. Thereafter, SIPOA unanimously voted to give the easement back to the owners of lot 22. On September 11, 2002, a new plat prepared by Forsberg Engineering ("the Forsberg plat") entitled "Plat Showing Abandonment of an Existing 20' Dr ainage Easement

1 Lots 23 through 28 are downstream from lot 22.Lot 22, Block 32," was recorded. The Forsberg plat also indica ted the current

no-build area was to be abandoned.

In October 2002, the Gantzes c onveyed lot 22 to the McLaughlin s, and the deed was recorded. The legal description of the property indic ated that it remained subject to the ten-foot drainage easement depicted in the Forsb erg plat and "all Restrictions, Covenants, Easemen ts, Rights-of-Way, Matters and Conditions of record affecting said property . . . ." Mr. McLaughlin indicat ed he never discussed the twenty-foot easement with the Gantzes or SIPOA prior to clo sing, but he maintained that the real estate agent asserted the easement had been abandoned. 2 Mr. McLaughlin also testified his closing attorney brought the twenty-foot easement

to his attention before indicatin g that it had been abandoned, telling him "everything was appropriate and in order."

In 2006, the McLaughlins approached SIPOA's Architectural Revi ew Board about building a house on their property. According to the pla ns, part of the house was to be sited over the twenty-foot easement and no-build area . At an August 15, 2006 SIPOA meeting, the preliminary plans were unanimously appr oved subject to several stipulations. 3 Thereafter, the McLaughlins received a letter from the

administrator of the Architectur al Review Board, dated August 1 8, 2006, stating:

The Architectural Review Board has approved the Preliminary Plans submitted for Block 32 Lot 22, Seabrook Island, SC. Please address the following comments of the ARB and re-submit plans for Conditional

Review.

1. Owner is to assume all responsibility for the underground drainage line at the 20' drainage easement/driveway. [4]

2 However, Mr. McLaughlin conceded that the real estate agent ha d never shown

him any documents concerning the abandonment of the easement.

3 These stipulations are identical to the comments included in t he letter from the

administrator of the Architectural Review Board. See infra

. 4 In a later lawsuit, SIPOA indicated it "defined the 'cost nece ssary to remove the

easement' to be the cost of re-working the drainage in a manner that maintains the existing drainage for other related lots, i.e., the cost of ins talling alternative drainage

in a manner that will not undermin e or adversely affect such ex isting drainage system

'downstream.'" Mr. McLaughlin indicated he understood this to mean the2. Owner is to assume all responsibility for the abandoned drainage easement that may contain a pipe.

3. Property lines must be located prior to any grading because of the Right-Of-Way for the SIPOA 20' drainage easement.

In June 2007, the McLaughlins received a letter from SIPOA reg arding a plan to address the drainage pipe and eliminate the twenty-foot ease ment. The Ralphs received the same letter. After receiving the letter, Mr. Ralph met with John Thompson, the executive director of SIPOA, to voice his objecti ons regarding any plans to remove the drainage pipe.

Over the course of the next yea r, the McLaughlins sought finan cing for their construction, closing on a loan in June 2008. At some point, t he McLaughlins

received a call from the chair of the SIPOA legal committee ind icating there were some issues concerning the draina ge pipe. On September 22, 200 8, Thompson sent an email to the owners of lots 21 through 28 seeking to schedul e a meeting concerning the easement. The email summarized the dispute surr ounding the

easement 5 and indicated the drainage pipe was still functioning. The email further indicated that several neighbors objected to the removal of the pipe due to concerns over adverse effects it would have on drainage and that SIPOA h ad hired an engineer, Robert George, to eval uate the consequences of removi ng the pipe. 6

The meeting between SIPOA, the M cLaughlins, and the affected p roperty owners was held on September 29, 2008. At the meeting, Mr. Geo rge presented his findings and advised against removing the drainage pipe on lot 22, indicating that doing so would increase the likelihood of flooding and exacerba te existing drainage problems. Another meeting was held to discuss the issue on Oct ober 1, 2008. Following the meetings, several em ails were exchanged between t he affected property owners and the McLaughlins. In these emails, the prop erty owners continued to express their conc erns about the adverse impact the removal of the pipe

McLaughlins, "bore the financia l responsibility of taking care of removing [the pipe] if [they] wanted to."

5 In his email, Thompson indicated SIPOA had voted to give the e asement back to the property owners, but only two had chosen "to take the forma l action to remove

the easement from the recorded documents at the [c]ounty record[]s office . . . ."

6 Additionally, the email contained an attached report prepared by Mr. George advising against the removal of the drainage pipe on lot 22.would have on their properties, and the McLaughlins adamantly d enied the existence of an easement on their lot. After the McLaughlins and their n eighbors failed to reach an agreement, SIPOA indicated it had exhausted its option s. On October 22, 2008, SIPOA sent a letter to the a ffected property owners indic ating that it had rescinded the May 2002 resolution abandoning the easement.

On December 5, 2008, the McLaughlins emailed the neighboring p roperty owners asserting that there was no easement on their property, they had been patient with SIPOA, and they would begin construction on their home. O n December 9, 2008, the McLaughlins authorized t heir construction team to rem ove the drainage pipe. On the same day, SIPOA filed a lawsuit against the McLau ghlins seeking a temporary restraining order to p revent the removal of the pipe. 7 However, SIPOA withdrew the lawsuit two days later on December 11, 2008. 8 Following the removal of the pipe, the McLaughlins built part of their home over the no-build area and the area formerly containing the pipe.

On September 30, 2011, the Ralphs filed a complaint 9 against the McLaughlins seeking actual and punitive damages and alleging th e McLaughlins caused flooding and poor drainage on the Ralphs' property by de stroying the drainage easement. On December 6, 2011, the McLaughlins filed an answer and a third-party complaint against SIPOA alleging reliance on repres entations by SIPOA. On February 14, 2014, the Ralphs moved for partial summary judg ment on their trespass claim. The McLaughlins filed a motion for summary jud gment on February 19, 2014, and, a day later, SIPOA filed a motion for summary ju dgment. While these motions were pending, the Ralphs moved to strike the matt er from the docket

pursuant to Rule 40(j) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Pro cedure (SCRCP), 10 and the parties entered into a consent order striking the case from the docket on June 24, 2014. The Ralphs moved to restore the case to the active docket on May 11,

7 It is unclear whether the McLaughlins removed the pipe before the filing of the lawsuit. The lawsuit was filed at 11:40 a.m., and Mr. Ralph te stified the pipe was removed around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. However, Mr. McLaughlin testi fied the pipe was removed before the lawsuit was filed.

8 In his deposition, Thompson indicated the lawsuit was withdraw n as moot because the pipe had already been removed.

9 The Ralphs filed an amended complaint on July 17, 2013, pleadi ng trespass, punitive damages, and intentional infliction of emotional distr ess.

10 Pursuant to Rule 40(j), "[a] party may strike its complaint . . . from any docket one

time as a matter of right, provided that all parties adverse to that claim . . . agree in writing that it may be stricken . . . ."2015, and the case was restored by consent order on June 23, 20 15, pursuant to Rule 40(j), SCRCP. 11

After the case was restored, the parties refiled their motions for summary judgment. On May 11, 2016, the Honorable G. Thomas Cooper, Jr.

, 12 heard all three motions for summary judgment, denying both the Ralphs' motion a nd the McLaughlins' motion. However, Judge Cooper granted SIPOA's mot ion for summary judgment, finding there was no evidence to show SIPOA h ad made any promises to the McLaughlins and, as a matter of law, the McLaug hlins could not have reasonably relied on SIPOA.

At trial, the Ralphs presented H oward Yates as an expert in re al property.

Yates indicated that he examined the chains of title for the Ra lphs and McLaughlins and opined that both properties became subject to the drainage easement after the properties were first purchased according to the Seabrook Islan d plat. Yates explained the lot owners each held a special property interest in the easement. Yates further testified SIPOA could not unilaterally abandon the ease ment, indicating abandonment would require the cons ent of everyone who held a sp ecial property interest. Additionally, while Yates conceded that lot 22 was s ubject to the Forsberg plat, he maintained that it was still subject to the earlier pl ats as well. Yates further testified that determining whether SIPOA had authority to abandon the easement would require an attorney to look at the deed and plats and tha t such a review would only take twenty to thirty minutes.

The Ralphs also presented Robert George as an expert in civil engineering, registered land surveying, and storm-water drainage. George te stified that the Ralphs' yard is a trough and the original design for Seabrook Island was meant to alleviate this issue. George fu rther explained this design was interrupted by the McLaughlins' removal of the pipe, leading to increased water fl ow into the Ralphs' yard, increased "ponding," 13 and poor drainage. Additionally, Mrs. Ralph indicated the standing water in their yard could reach a depth of eight i nches and could take several days to drain, whereas the water would typically dissip ate within a day and a half before removal of the pipe.

11 Pursuant to Rule 40(j), "[u]pon being restored, the case shall be placed on the General Docket and proceed from that date as provided in this r ule."

12 While Judge Cooper ruled on the motions for summary judgment, the rest of the

case was before the Honor able Roger M. Young, Sr.

13 The term "ponding" was used to d escribe the accumulation of st anding water as a result of poor surface absorption caused by the high water tabl e on Seabrook Island.Concerning damages, the Ralphs estimated their house was worth $775,000 without the backyard ponding issues . After removal of the pipe, both of the Ralphs testified that they believed the value of their property had dr opped by at least $200,000. The Ralphs also present ed Nick Thompson as an expert in commercial and residential appraisal. Thom pson indicated he had trouble appraising the Ralphs' property because he had not been able to find any sales with a similar problem. According to Thompson, the lack o f comparable sales indicated t hat either the Ralphs' drainage problems were unique and a similar situation h ad never existed before or property owners with the same problems had not been a ble to find a buyer. Thompson then estimated the Ralphs' property had decreased in value by ten, fifty, or sixty percent. Thompson further indicated he believed the R alphs' property to be worth approximately $567,000 befo re the pipe was removed, opini ng that the Ralphs would be lucky to sell their prope rty for half that price after wards. Additionally, Mrs. Ralph testified that they had paid Mr. George $17,000 in a n attempt to alleviate the drainage problem, but no so lution could be implemented.

After the Ralphs rested their case, the McLaughlins moved for a directed verdict on several issues, incl uding punitive damages. The Ral phs argued Mr. McLaughlin's testimony indicated that he acted with reckless disregard for the rights of his neighbors. 14 The circuit court indicated it did not think punitive damages were applicable because Mr. McLaughlin believed he had the right to remove the pipe. Ultimately, the circuit court f ound, "I don't think he was acti ng malevolently, certainly not to the level of clear and convincing, so I'll gra nt their motion for punitive damages."

After this ruling, the Ralphs made two additional arguments in support of punitive damages. First, the Ralphs argued that, under South C arolina law, a purchaser is imputed with knowledge of all the other deeds in h is chain of title and the act of digging up the pipe could be construed as willful be cause the McLaughlins are presumed to have known the easement ran across their proper ty. The circuit court responded, "Well, I got to disagree with you on that. Th at's language in the deed. I doubt there's probably anybody in this room, including all the lawyers, who read the deed when they bought t heir piece of property. They had their lawyer read it, and it's there." Second, the Ralphs argued the conclusion in Judge Cooper's unappealed grant of summary judgment—that the McLaughlins could not rely on

14 Mr. McLaughlin testified he attended the SIPOA meeting where M r. George presented his findings, was aware removing the pipe could have adverse effects on the downstream lots, and procee ded with construction despite th e concerns of his neighbors.any representations by SIPOA—was the law of the case. As such, the Ralphs argued this conclusion should be binding, and they should be allowed t o argue to the jury that the removal of the pipe was intentional and punitive damag es applied. However, the circuit court ruled the grant of summary judgment to SIPOA was not binding on the jury. After dismissing these arguments, the circuit court reiterated that it was granting the directed verdict on punitive damages.

The McLaughlins' case centered on the theory that they had jus tifiably relied on SIPOA and the purported abandonment of the easement in remov ing the pipe. The McLaughlins also testified they had observed significant am ounts of standing water in the Ralphs' yard when visiting their property prior to construction. Additionally, Mr. McLaughlin explained that when determining wh ere to site their house, SIPOA's Architectural Review Board required the McLaughl ins to preserve a large oak tree in the middle of their property. As such, the McLaughlins had the option to site the house on the front or back side of the oak t ree, and they ultimately

decided to site the house on the back side. 15 Mr. McLaughlin further indicated he removed the pipe because he was frustrated; he had not asked an y of his neighbors for permission to remove the pipe or begin construction; and fo llowing construction, he told SIPOA that it could take on the responsibility of provi ding a solution to the Ralphs' drainage problem.

After the close of the McLaughlins' case, the Ralphs moved for a directed verdict on trespass, arguing SIPOA's purported abandonment of t he drainage

easement would not have affected the Ralphs' property rights. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the issues of trespass and abandonme nt were both for the jury. After closing arguments, the circuit court charged the j ury on, among other things, the law of easements, trespass, abandonment, and nomina l damages. After deliberating for about five hours, the jury indicated it was de adlocked, and the circuit

court issued an Allen 16 charge. After resuming deliber ations for a little over an hou r, the jury returned the following verdict: "We, the jury, find fo r the plaintiff against

the defendant in the am ount of $1,000 actual nominal [17] damages . . . ."

On February 3, 2017, the Ralphs moved for, in the alternative, a new trial absolute, a new trial as to damages, or a new trial nisi additur pursuant to Rule 59, SCRCP. In denying the motions for a new trial absolute and a n ew trial nisi additur

,

15 The drainage easement and no-bui ld area ran along the back side of the property.

16 Allen v. United States , 164 U.S. 492 (1896).

17 The verdict form only had a space for actual damages, but the jury wrote in the

word nominal underneath.the circuit court found it was the jury's intention to award no minal damages and that such an award was supported by the evidence at trial. Addition ally, in denying the motion for a new trial as to damages, the circuit court cited t he same rationale and

indicated a new trial as to dam ages was not warranted because a directed verdict on the issue of trespass would not have been proper. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the circuit court err by failing to apply the rulings and f actual

determinations in the previous grant of summary judgment to SIP OA as the

law of the case?

2. Did the circuit court err by entering a directed verdict for th e McLaughlins on the issue of punitive damages?

3. Did the circuit court err in failing to find the McLaughlins tr espassed as a

matter of law?

4. Did the circuit court err in failing to grant the Ralphs a new trial absolute, a

new trial nisi additur , or a new trial on damages?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Directed Verdict

"In reviewing [] a motion for di rected verdict . . . , the app ellate court applies

the same standard as the circuit court." Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC , 394 S.C. 383, 394, 714 S.E.2d 904, 910 (Ct. App. 2011) (second alteratio n in original) (quoting Mishoe v. QHG of Lake City, Inc. , 366 S.C. 195, 200, 621 S.E.2d 363, 366 (Ct. App. 2005)). As such, "this [c]ourt must view the evidenc e and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion." Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp. , 398 S.C. 90, 99, 727 S.E.2d 407, 411 (2012). "In essence, we must det ermine whether a verdict for a party opposing the motion would be reasonably possible under the facts as liberall y construed in his

favor." Hurd v. Williamsburg Cty. , 353 S.C. 596, 608, 579 S.E.2d 136, 142 (Ct. App. 2003). "The appellate cour t will reverse the [circuit] co urt's ruling on a [directed verdict] motion only when there is no evidence to sup port the ruling or where the ruling is controlled by an error of law." Zinn v. CFI Sales & Mktg., Ltd

, 415 S.C. 93, 108–09, 780 S.E.2d 611, 619 (Ct. App. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr. , 368 S.C. 424, 434–35, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006)).New Trial

"A [circuit court]'s order granting or denying a new trial upon the facts will not be disturbed unless [its] d ecision is wholly unsupported by the evidence[] or the conclusion was controlled by an error of law." Curtis v. Blake , 392 S.C. 494, 500, 709 S.E.2d 79, 82 (Ct . App. 2011) (quoting Folkens v. Hunt , 300 S.C. 251, 254–55, 387 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990)). "Rev iew by an appellate court of the grant or denial

of a new trial is 'limited to consideration of whether evidence exists to support the [circuit] court's order.'" Id . at 505–06, 709 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting Lane v. Gilbert

Constr. Co., Ltd. , 383 S.C. 590, 597, 681 S.E. 2d 879, 883 (2009)). "In deciding

whether to assess error to a court's denial of a motion for a n ew trial, we must consider the testimony and reasona ble inferences to be drawn th erefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Vinson v. Hartley , 324 S.C. 389, 405, 477 S.E.2d 715, 723 (Ct. App. 1996); Umhoefer v. Bollinger , 298 S.C. 221, 224, 379 S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ct. App. 1989).

New Trial Nisi Additur

"The denial of a motion for a new trial nisi is within the [circuit court]'s discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse o f discretion." Vinson

, 324 S.C. at 406, 477 S.E.2d at 723. "This [c]ourt has the duty to review the record

and determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion amo unting to an error

of law." Id . at 406, 477 S.E.2d at 723–24. "We will only reverse if the [ circuit court] abused [its] discretion in deciding a motion for new trial nisi additur to the extent

that an error of law results." Green v. Fritz , 356 S.C. 566, 570, 590 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ct. App. 2003). "The [circuit c ourt] who heard the evidence a nd is more familiar with the evidentiary atmosphere at trial possesses a better-inf ormed view of the damages than this [c]ourt. Accord ingly, great deference is giv en to the [circuit court]." Vinson , 324 S.C. at 405–06, 477 S.E.2d at 723 (internal citation omit ted). "Therefore, on appeal of the denial of a motion for a new trial nisi, this [c]ourt will reverse when the verdict is gros sly inadequate or excessive req uiring the granting of

a new trial absolute." Id . at 406, 477 S.E.2d at 724.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Law of the Case

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in failing to apply t he findings of fact and conclusions of law in the grant of summary judgment to SIPO A as the law of the case. The McLaughlins argue the circuit court properly ref used to apply the findings of fact and conclusions of law in Judge Cooper's summa ry judgment orderas the law of the case because there was no ruling in his order applying to the Ralphs and McLaughlins; Judge Cooper denied the summary judgment motio ns of the Ralphs and the McLaughlins; and Judge Cooper ruled on the issue of indemnity, not trespass or punitive damages. We agree with the Ralphs.

"An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and requires affi rmance." Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union , 403 S.C. 560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 (2013); see also Berry v. McLeod , 328 S.C. 435, 442, 492 S.E.2d 794, 798 (Ct. App. 1997) ("There is no appeal from this ruling, and thus, it becom es the law of the case."). "Where no exception is taken to findings of fact or c onclusions of law, they

become the 'law of the case.'" Walters v. Canal Ins. Co. , 294 S.C. 150, 151, 363 S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Ashy v. WeCare Distribs., Inc. , 289 S.C. 526, 528, 347 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ct. App. 1986)). "The law of th e case applies both to those issues explicitly decided and to those issues [that] w ere necessarily decided

in the former case." Ross v. Med. Univ. of S.C. , 328 S.C. 51, 62, 492 S.E.2d 62, 68 (1997). "This State has a long- standing rule that one judge of the same court cannot

overrule another." Shirley's , 403 S.C. at 573, 743 S.E.2d at 785.

In Shirley's , our supreme court found that previous unappealed orders by separate judges did not constitut e the law of the case because the issues in question were distinctly different. Id . In so holding, the supreme court found that neither of the previous unappealed orders specifically ruled on the issue in question. Id

. Similarly, in Binkley v. Burry , this court found that a previous judge's unappealed order in regard to notice of the existence of an easement did n ot constitute the law of the case concerning notice of the scope of the easement. 35 2 S.C. 286, 294–95, 573 S.E.2d 838, 843 (Ct. App. 2002). The Binkley court held, "the question of notice regarding the existence of an easement is distinct from the question of notice as it

relates to the scope and enforceability of the easement." Id . at 294, 573 S.E.2d at

843. The court further held that while "the law of the case do ctrine may preclude [] challenging [the] finding that the Binkleys did not have notice of the scope and enforceability of the easement, the doctrine does not prevent [] raising the issue of when the Binkleys had notice of t he existence of the easement." Id . at 294–95, 573

S.E.2d at 843.

Here, Judge Cooper's grant of s ummary judgment made explicit r ulings and findings of fact concerning the McLaughlins. Specifically, Jud ge Cooper ruled "as a matter of law, there is simply no genuine issue of material f act that the McLaughlins reasonably relied on the unambiguous acts, representations, and writings of SIPOA or otherwise reasonably based their decision to remove the pipe in 2008 . . . ." Judge Cooper's grant of summary judgment was not appealed. As such, the finding that the McLa ughlins could not claim reliance on SIPOA inremoving the pipe was the law of the case. See Shirley's , 403 S.C. at 573, 743 S.E.2d at 785 ("An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and requir es affirmance.").

The issue of whether the McLaughlins could rely on SIPOA is th e exact issue the Ralphs raised to the circuit court in arguing that Judge Co oper's order constituted the law of the case. Accordingly, we find the circuit court er red in ruling that Judge Cooper's findings were not binding on the court and the jury. We note the McLaughlins' defense was significantly based on the theory that they were acting in reliance on SIPOA. Moreover, the circuit court's decision to grant the directed verdict on punitive damages was b ased largely on its determinat ion that the McLaughlins believed they had the right to remove the pipe base d on SIPOA's representations. We address the impact of this error below.

II. Punitive Damages

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in granting a directe d verdict as to punitive damages because more than one reasonable inference cou ld be drawn from

the evidence as to whether the McLaughlins acted with reckless disregard for the property rights of the Ralphs. We agree.

Preservation

At the outset, the McLaughlins argue this issue is not preserv ed because the Ralphs did not raise the issue of punitive damages in their pos t-trial motions and did not object when the directed verdi ct was granted. We disagree.

"It is well-settled that an issue cannot be raised for the fir st time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit] co urt to be preserved for appellate review." Staubes v. City of Folly Beach , 339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000). "The losing party must first try to convince the lower court it has ruled wrongly and then, if that effort fails, convince the appe llate court that the lower

court erred." I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant , 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000). "Without an initia l ruling by the [circuit] c ourt, a reviewing court simply would not be able to evaluate whether the [circuit] cour t committed error."

Staubes , 339 S.C. at 412, 529 S.E.2d at 5 46. "If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it , the party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review."

I'On , 338 S.C. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724 (emphasis added); see also Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp. , 361 S.C. 9, 24, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004) ("A party must file such a motion when an issue or argument has been raised, but not ruled on

, in order to preserve it for appellate review." (second emphasis added)). "Imposing thispreservation requirement on the appellant is meant to enable th e lower court to rule properly after it has considered all relevant facts, law, and a rguments." I'On , 338 S.C. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724. However, "[p]ost-trial motions are not necessary to preserve issues that have been ruled upon at trial . . . ." Wilder Corp. v. Wilke , 330 S.C. 71, 77, 497 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1998). As such, the mere fac t that a party received an unfavorable ruling does not re quire that party to re-raise t he issue in a Rule 59(e) motion to preserve it. See Eubank v. Eubank , 347 S.C. 367, 373 n.2, 555 S.E.2d 413, 416 n.2 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The 'raised to and ruled on' rul e of error preservation requires only a ruling, not necessarily a favorable one ." (emphasis added)).

The issue of punitive damages was raised to the circuit court when the McLaughlins moved for a directed verdict. In opposing the moti on, the Ralphs argued that evidence in the recor d supported the inference that the McLaughlins acted recklessly, that the McLa ughlins had imputed knowledge of the easement through their chain of title, and that the law of the case prec luded the McLaughlins

from claiming reliance on SIPOA. See I'On , 338 S.C. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724 ("The losing party must first try to convince the lower court i t is has ruled wrongly and then, if that effort fails , convince the appellate court th at the lower court erred."). After hearing arguments from both sides, the circuit court gran ted a directed verdict in favor of the McLaughlins. See Staubes , 339 S.C. at 412, 529 S.E.2d at 546 ("Without an initial ruling by the [circuit] court, a reviewing court simply would not

be able to evaluate whether the [circuit] court committed error ."). Accordingly, because this issue was raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court, the Ralphs were not required to make an objection or raise the issue in a post- trial motion to preserve it for appellate review. See I'On , 338 S.C. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724 ("If the losing party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it , the party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in orde r to preserve the issue for appellate review." (emphasis added)); Wilder Corp. , 330 S.C. at 77, 497 S.E.2d at 734 ("Post-trial motions are not necessary to preserve issue s that have been ruled upon at trial . . . .").

Merits

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in failing to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. The McLaughlins argue the circui t court properly granted a directed verdict on punitive damages because there wa s no evidence to support the inference that the McLaughlins acted recklessly, wi llfully, or wantonly. We agree with the Ralphs.

"The purposes of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer and deter the wrongdoer and others from engaging in similar reckless, willful , wanton, ormalicious conduct in the future." Wimberly v. Barr , 359 S.C. 414, 423, 597 S.E.2d 853, 858 (Ct. App. 2004). "Punitiv e damages may be awarded for trespass when a defendant's acts have been willf ul, wanton or in reckless disregard of the rights of

another." Id .; see also Hinson v. A. T. Sistare Constr. Co. , 236 S.C. 125, 131, 113 S.E.2d 341, 344 (1960) ("Trespass through mere negligence affor ds no ground for punitive damages; but such damages may be awarded whe[n] the tr espass is wil[l]ful and deliberate."), overruled on other grounds by McCall by Andrews v. Batson , 285

S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). "'Recklessness implies the do ing of a negligent act knowingly'; it is a 'conscious failure to exercise due care .'" Berberich v. Jack

, 392 S.C. 278, 287, 709 S.E. 2d 607, 612 (2011) (quoting Yaun v. Baldridge , 243 S.C. 414, 419, 134 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1964 )). "If a person of ordinar y reason and prudence would have been conscious of the probability of resulting injur y, the law says the person is reckless or willful and wanton, all of which have the same meaning—the

conscious failure to exercise due care." Id . Moreover, "[a] jury may award punitive damages even 'when the wrongdoer does not actually realize that he is invading the rights of another, provided the act is committed in such a mann er that a person of ordinary prudence would say that it was a reckless disregard of another's rights.'" Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp. , 385 S.C. 344, 353–54, 683 S.E.2d 818, 823 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Camp v. Components, Inc. , 285 S.C. 443, 444, 330 S.E.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1985)).

"When ruling on a directed verdict motion as to punitive damag es, 'the circuit court must view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Hollis , 394 S.C. at 393–94, 714 S.E.2d at 909–10 (quoting Mishoe , 366 S.C. at 200, 621 S.E.2d at 366). "It is not the duty of the [circuit] court to weigh the testimony in ruling on a motion

for a directed verdict." Fairchild , 398 S.C. at 99, 727 S.E.2d at 411. Rather, "[t]he issue of punitive damages must be submitted to the jury if more than one reasonable

inference can be drawn from the ev idence as to whether the defe ndant's behavior was reckless, willful, or wanton." Hollis , 394 S.C. at 394, 714 S.E.2d at 910 (quoting

Mishoe , 366 S.C. at 201, 621 S.E.2d at 366). Once the issue has been submitted to the jury, "the plaintiff has the burden of proving [punitive] d amages by clear and convincing evidence." S.C. Cod e Ann. § 15-33-135 (2005). Acco rdingly, in ruling on a directed verdict motion as to punitive damages, the circui t court must determine whether there are any reasonable inferences from the evidence t o support the

conclusion that the defendant's behavior was reckless. If such an inference can be made, the issue should be submitted to the jury, who in turn mu st determine whether recklessness was proven by clea r and convincing evidence.As referenced above, this court has previously addressed when the issue of punitive damages must be submitted to the jury in Mishoe and Hollis . In Mishoe

, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries to her left ankle and right knee when her foot got caught in a hole while walking across the pavement near a hospital's emergency room exit. 366 S.C. at 199, 621 S .E.2d at 365. In determining that the circuit court correctly denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and a judgment not withstanding the verdict, this c ourt noted that the chief execu tive officer of the hospital was provided with actual, written notice of the hole a lmost a year before the plaintiff's accident. Id . at 201, 621 S.E.2d at 366. The court then stressed that, despite such notice, the hospital took no action to repair the hole or to warn visitors or patients of its existence. Id . at 201–02, 621 S.E.2d at 366. Accordingly, the court

determined "evidence of this w ritten notice [was] sufficient to submit the issue of [Defendant]'s willful, wanton, reckless, or malicious conduct t o the jury." Id . at 202,

621 S.E.2d at 366.

In Hollis

, this court again found that the circuit court properly denied a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages. 394 S.C. at 390, 714 S.E.2d at 907–08. In the case, the defendant purchased property directly upstream from the plaintiffs for the purpose of developing a residential subdivision. Id . at 390, 714

S.E.2d at 908. As a result of the defendant's development, the plaintiffs experienced severe flooding on their property that inhibited access to thei r home and filled their ponds with up to four feet of sediment. Id . In determining the issue was correctly submitted to the jury, the Hollis court noted that the defendant "ignored regulations regarding erosion control, storm water runoff, and even its own engineer's plans; took no action to prevent or correct damage it knew it was causing to the ponds; and used threats and deception to avoid the consequences of its miscondu ct." Id . at 394, 714 S.E.2d at 910. The court then highlighted the circuit court's summary of the evidence, finding that the plaintiffs had expressed concerns ab out the development's effects on their property both before and during construction, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environm ental Control and Richland Cou nty had put the defendant on notice that it was not maintaining its stormwater management plan, the defendant inadequately maintained the stormwater management sys tem, and the defendant attempted to bully and threaten the plaintiffs. Id . After reviewing the record, the Hollis court found that the circuit court "correctly denied the motio n because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to th e [plaintiffs], the jury had ample evidence from which to find [defendant] acted in reck less disregard of the rights of others." Id . at 395, 714 S.E.2d at 910.

We find the decision to grant the directed verdict was based o n an error of law, as the circuit court's determination that the McLaughlins justifiably relied onSIPOA's representations in removing the pipe was in direct cont ravention of Judge Cooper's determinations of law. 18 See Zinn , 415 S.C. at 108–09, 780 S.E.2d at 619 ("The appellate court will revers e the [circuit] court's ruling on a [directed verdict] motion [] when . . . the ruling is controlled by an error of la w." (second alteration in original) (quoting Law , 368 S.C. at 434–35, 629 S.E.2d at 648)). However, even absent Judge Cooper's ruling, the circuit court should have sub mitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury.

First, the jury could have found the McLaughlins knew or shoul d have known

that their downstream neighbors had property interests in the d rainage easement and no-build area before the McLaughl ins removed the pipe and built their house. Mr. McLaughlin indicated he relied on the representations of his re al estate agent and did not speak to SIPOA about the existence of the easement befo re purchasing the property. However, under South Carolina law, the McLaughlins h ad a duty to inquire into the property rights in the easement, as they are p resumed to have knowledge of the recorded easements in their chain of title. See Moyle v. Campbell

, 126 S.C. 180, 193–94, 119 S.E. 186, 190 (1923) ("The law impute s to a purchaser

of real estate notice of the recitals contained in the written instruments[] forming his

chain of title and charges him with the duty of making such reasonable inquiry and

investigation as is suggested by the recitals and references therein contain ed." (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)); Binkley v. Rabon Creek Watershed Conservation Dist. of Fountain Inn , 348 S.C. 58, 71, 558 S.E.2d 902, 909 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Notice of a deed is notice of its whole contents .

. . and it is also notice of whatever matters one would have learned by any inquiry which the recitals of the instrument made it one's duty to pursue ." (alteration in original) (quoting 66 C.J.S.

Notice § 19, at 454 (1998))); Harbison Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Mueller , 319 S.C. 99, 103, 459 S.E.2d 860, 863 (Ct. App. 1995) ("A homeowner is charg ed with constructive notice of any restriction properly recorded within the chain of title."). 19 Additionally, SIPOA notified the McLaughlins that if they remov ed the drainage pipe, they bore the responsibility of doing so in a manner that maintained the drainage system for the downstream lots. Despite receiving such notice and hearing the objections of their neighbor s, the McLaughlins refused to a cknowledge the

18 See supra Section I.

19 As such, we do not agree that the circuit court's contention t hat most people do

not read their deeds overcomes th is presumption, particularly w hen considering Mr. Yates's testimony that an a ttorney could have discovered th e easement after twenty to thirty minutes of searching the title. See Moyle , 126 S.C. at 194, 119

S.E. at 190 ("Generally the means of knowle dge and the duty of using them are equivalent to knowledge.").existence of the easement. Fin ally, Mr. McLaughlin conceded th at he authorized his contractors to remove the pipe after getting "frustrated" with SIPOA's inability to provide a solution that allowed the McLaughlins to build their house as sited. Therefore, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable t o the Ralphs, we find the jury could have determined that a person of ordinary reason and prudence would

have been on notice that the McL aughlins' downstream neighbors had property interests in the drainage easemen t. Thus, the jury could have reasonably found that the McLaughlins acted in conscious disregard of the rights of their downstream neighbors in removing the drainage pipe and building in the no- build area. See

Berberich , 392 S.C. at 287, 709 S.E.2d at 612 ("'Recklessness implies the doing of a negligent act knowingly '; it is a 'conscious failure to exercise due care.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Yaun , 243 S.C. at 419, 134 S.E.2d at 251)); id . ("If a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of the p robability of resulting injury, the law says the person is reckless or willfu l and wanton, all of which have the same meaning—the conscious failure to exercise d ue care.").

Second, even if the McLaughlins believed they had the right to remove the pipe, this would not preclude a jury from finding that they act ed recklessly. See

Fairchild , 385 S.C. at 353–54, 683 S.E.2d at 823 ("A jury may award puni tive damages even 'when the wrongdoer does not actually realize that he is invading the rights of another, provided the act is committed in such a mann er that a person of ordinary prudence would say that it was a reckless disregard of another's rights.'" (quoting Camp , 285 S.C. at 444, 330 S.E.2d at 316)). At trial, Mr. McLaughlin acknowledged that he was aware sev eral of his neighbors had rai sed concerns about the removal of the pipe. Mr. McLaughlin also acknowledged that he attended the meeting where Mr. George gave his presentation and understood r emoving the pipe would have adverse effects on his neighbors' properties. Final ly, Mr. McLaughlin testified that the McLaughlins could have sited their house on the front or back side

of the oak tree in the middle of their lot. However, the McLau ghlins never attempted

or offered to site the house on the front side, which would hav e left the drainage easement intact. When taking these facts in the light most fav orable to the Ralphs, we find the jury could have determined that a person of ordinar y reason and prudence would have known that removing t he drainage pipe would produce negative consequences for the downstream properties that relied on the d rainage easement. Thus, the jury could have reasona bly determined that the McLaug hlins acted in reckless disregard of the rights of their downstream neighbors by removing the pipe and building in the no-build area. See Berberich , 392 S.C. at 287, 709 S.E.2d at 612 ("If a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been c onscious of the probability of resulting injury, the law says the person is rec kless or willful andwanton, all of which have the same meaning—the conscious failur e to exercise due care.").

In ruling that a directed verdic t was justified, the circuit c ourt indicated it did not think the McLaughlins were acting recklessly or intentional ly because it found the McLaughlins reasonably believed they had the right to remov e the pipe. The court stressed that it did not "think [the McLaughlins were] ac ting malevolently, certainly not to the level of clear and convincing . . . ." (emphasis added). In so ruling, we find the circuit court invaded the jury's province b y improperly weighing

the evidence. See Fairchild , 398 S.C. at 99, 727 S.E.2d at 411 ("It is not the duty of the [circuit] court to weigh the testimony in ruling on a motio n for a directed verdict."). Because a reasonabl e juror could have found the McLaughlins acted recklessly in either 1) removing the pipe and building in the no-build area when they

knew or should have known that the ir neighbors had property int erests in the drainage easement or 2) removing the pipe with knowledge that i t would adversely affect their neighbors' propertie s, the circuit court erred by not submitting punitive damages to the jury. See Hollis , 394 S.C. at 394, 714 S.E.2d at 910 ("The issue of punitive damages must be submitted to the jury if more than one reasonable

inference can be drawn from the ev idence as to whether the defe ndant's behavior was reckless, willful, or wanton." (quoting Mishoe , 366 S.C. at 201, 621 S.E.2d at 366)).

III. Directed Verdict on Trespass

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict on the issues of abandonment and trespass because both were questions of law and not fact. The McLaughlins argue both issues were properly submitted to the jury, as they were both questions of f act. We agree with the Ralphs.

"When ruling on a directed verdict motion [], 'the circuit cou rt must view the

evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Hollis , 394 S.C. at 393–94, 714 S.E.2d at 909– 10 (quoting Mishoe , 366 S.C. at 200, 621 S.E.2d at 366). "A case should be submitted to the jury when the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable

inference." Fairchild , 398 S.C. at 99, 727 S.E.2d at 411. However, "[o]ur courts have recognized that when only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the evidence, the question becomes one of law for the court." Hurd , 353 S.C. at 609, 579 S.E.2d at 143. Thus, "[w]hen the evidence yields only one inference, a directed verdict in favor of the moving party is proper." Id . at 609, 579 S.E.2d at 142."The unwarrantable entry on land in the peaceable possession o f another is a trespass, without regard to the degree of force used, the means by which the enclosure is broken, or the exte nt of the damage inflicted." Snow v. City of

Columbia , 305 S.C. 544, 552, 409 S.E.2d 797, 802 (Ct. App. 1991). "The entry itself is the wrong. Thus, for example, if one without license from t he person in possession of land walks upon it, or casts a twig upon it, or pours a buck et of water upon it, he

commits a trespass by the very act of breaking the enclosure." Id . "To constitute an actionable trespass, [] there must be an affirmative act, the i nvasion of the land must be intentional, and the harm caused must be the direct result o f that invasion." Id . at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802. "Intent is proved by showing that the defendant acted voluntarily and that he knew or should have known the result wo uld follow from his

act." Id . Accordingly, the owner of a servient estate commits trespass by intentionally destroying an easement without the consent of the easement holder.

See Susan F. French, Relocating Easements: Restat ement (Third), Servitudes § 4.8(3) , 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 4–5 (2003) (noting the majori ty rule since the late 19th century has been that "the owner of the servient estate commits trespass by relocating [or destroying] an easement without the consent of t he holder of the easement.").

At trial, Mr. McLaughlin conceded that he authorized his contractors to remove the pipe and build part of his home over the easement an d no-build area. See

Snow , 305 S.C. at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802. ("To constitute an action able trespass . . . the invasion of the land must be intentional . .

. ."). Additionally, Mr. McLaughlin acknowledged that he did not obtain the Ralphs' perm ission before doing so. See id . at 552, 409 S.E.2d at 802 ([I]f one without license from the person in possession of land walks upon it . . . he commits a trespass by the very act of breaking the enclosure." (emphasis added)). Thus, upon establi shing an ownership interest in the easement, the Ralphs would be entitled to judgm ent as a matter of law.

See French, supra , at 4–5 ("[T]he owner of the servient estate commits trespass by [destroying] an easement without the consent of the holder of the easement. " (emphasis added)); see also Hurd , 353 S.C. at 609, 579 S.E.2d at 143 ("Our courts have recognized that when only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the evidence, the question becomes one of law for the court."). As we will discuss below, ownership of the drainag e easement at the time it was destroyed was a question of law. Therefore, we find the circuit court erred in submitting the issue of trespass to the jury.

The existence of the drainage easement was undisputed at trial . However, the McLaughlins argue any ownership in terests in the drainage easem ent had been extinguished before they removed the pipe because SIPOA had unilaterallyabandoned the easement. Whether SIPOA could effectively abando n the drainage

easement turns on the o wnership interests i n the easement befor e it was purportedly

abandoned. Because determination of such ownership interests w as a question of interpreting the Seabrook Plat and subsequent deeds, it was a q uestion of law. See

Slear v. Hanna , 329 S.C. 407, 410–11, 496 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1998) ("The

determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact .

. . [, however, if] the action is viewed as interpreting a deed, it is an equitable matter . . . ." (emphasis added) (inte rnal citation omitted)).

"[W]here a deed describes land as is shown on a certain plat, such plat

becomes a part of the deed." Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. Williamson , 247 S.C. 112, 118, 145 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1965). "[ T]he purchaser of lots with reference to the plat of the subdivision acquire[s] ev ery easement, privilege[,] and advantage shown upon said plat . . . ." Carolina Land Co., Inc. v. Bland , 265 S.C. 98, 105, 217 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1975); see also Corbin v. Cherokee Realty Co. , 229 S.C. 16, 24, 91 S.E.2d 542, 546 (1956) ("Such purchasers acqui re[] every easement, privileg e[,] and advantage [that] the plat represent[s] as belonging to them."). "It is g enerally held that when the owner of land has it subdivided and platted into lots and [ easements,] and sells and conveys the lots with referen ce to the plat, he thereby ded icates said [easements] to the use of such lot owners [and] their successors in title . . . ." Williamson , 247 S.C. at 118, 145 S.E.2d at 924–25. "[A]s between the owner, wh o has conveyed lots according to a plat, and his grantee or grantees, the dedicatio n is complete when the conveyance is made . . . ." Outlaw v. Moise , 222 S.C. 24, 30, 71 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1952) (citation omitted). "Such an easement is deemed a part of the property to which the grantee is entitled and of which he cannot be diveste d except by due process of law." Bland , 265 S.C. at 106, 217 S.E.2d at 20 (citation omitted). Accordingly, an easement dedicated by plat is an easement appur tenant. See Tupper v. Dorchester Cty. , 326 S.C. 318, 325, 487 S.E. 2d 187, 191 (1997) ("[A]n appurtenant easement inheres in the land, concerns the premises , has one terminus on the land of the party claiming it, and is essentially necess ary to the enjoyment thereof."). Therefore, such easements pass with the dominant e state upon

conveyance. See id . ("[An easement appurtenant] pa sses with the dominant estate upon conveyance.").

The Seabrook Plat included the easement and no-build area acro ss lots 21-28. Therefore, the easement was dedicated to the property owners upon conveyance of the lots in question. See Williamson , 247 S.C. at 118, 145 S.E.2d at 924–25 ("It is generally held that when the owner of land has it subdivided an d platted into lots and [easements,] and sells and conveys the lots with reference to the plat, he thereby

dedicates said [easements] to the use of such lot owners [and] their successors intitle . . . ."). As such, we find the Ralphs (as owners of lot 23)—as well as the owners of lots 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28—acquired ownership interests in the drainage

easement and no-build area acro ss lot 22 as a matter of law.

Consequently, because the lot owners had property interests in the drainage easement, the question of wheth er SIPOA's unilateral abandonmen t was effective was a question of law. "It is [a] well-settled principle that an owner of an easement may relinquish that easement by abandonment, express or implied ." Immanuel Baptist Church of N. Augusta v. Barnes , 274 S.C. 125, 131, 264 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1980) (emphasis added). "The pivotal issue in determining whe ther there has been

an abandonment is the intention of the owner ." Id . (emphasis added). "[Intent to abandon an easement] may be in ferred from the acts and conduct of the owner and

the nature and situati on of the property . . . ." Bland , 265 S.C. at 109, 217 S.E.2d at 21 (emphasis added). Thus, a th ird-party cannot unilaterally a ffect the rights of the easement holder or unilaterally abandon an owner's easement by recording a new plat. See Corbin , 229 S.C. at 24, 91 S.E.2d at 546 ("The Florenza Company could

not without the consent of [the owner] change the location or width of [the easement]." (emphasis added)); Bland , 265 S.C. at 107, 217 S. E.2d at 20 ("The fact that a new plat of the property in question was made did not de stroy the easement created on the [original] plat.").

Under South Carolina law, it is clear that an easement may only be abandoned by its owner. See Barnes , 274 S.C. at 131, 264 S.E.2d at 144 ("It is [a] well-settled principle that an owner of an easement may relinquish that easement by abandonment, express or implied." (emphasis added)). As such, SIPOA's purported abandonment of the drainage easement could not affect the Ralph s' interest as a

matter of law. See Bland , 265 S.C. at 106, 217 S.E.2d at 20 ("Such an easement is

deemed a part of the property to which the grantee is entitled and of which he cannot be divested except by due process of law." (citation omitted)). Similarly, the recording of the Forsberg Plat could not affect the Ralphs' int erest as a matter of law.

See id . at 107, 217 S.E.2d at 20 ("The fact that a new plat of the property in question was made did not destroy the easement created on the [original] plat."). Rather, Mr. Yates correctly testified that abandonment of the drainage ease ment would not be

effective unless all of the lot owners with an interest in the easement agreed to the

abandonment. See Barnes , 274 S.C. at 131, 264 S.E.2d at 144 ("The pivotal issue in determining whether there has been an abandonment is the intention of the owner ." (emphasis added)). Therefore, w e find the circuit court erred in submitting the issue of abandonment to the jury.

Accordingly, because the Ralphs established ownership of the e asement as a

matter of law and the ineffectiveness of SIPOA's abandonment as a matter of law,we find the Ralphs were entitled to enforce the easement as a m atter of law. Therefore, because Mr. McLaughlin admitted authorizing his cont ractors to remove the pipe and build over the no-bu ild area, the issue of trespas s is susceptible to only

one inference and should not have been submitted to the jury. See Hurd , 353 S.C. at 609, 579 S.E.2d at 142 ("When the evidence yields only one i nference, a directed verdict in favor of the moving pa rty is proper."). As such, we find the circuit court erred in refusing to grant a d irected verdict on trespass.

IV. New Trial Motions

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in denying their moti on for a new trial absolute, a new trial on damages, or a new trial nisi additur because its judgment and order denying a new trial were characterized by errors of law and the damages award was wholly unsupported by the evidence. As indicated abo ve, the circuit court committed several errors of law, particularly 1) failing to apply Judge Cooper's ruling as the law of the case; 2) granting a directed verdict o n punitive damages; and 3) submitting the issues of trespass and abandonment to the jur y. As a result of these errors, we agree that the Ralphs are entitled to a new trial. 20

A new trial is an appropriate remedy when "the verdict is inco nsistent and reflects the jury's confusion." Vinson , 324 S.C. at 404, 477 S.E.2d at 722. As such,

a circuit court must take certain steps to prevent juror confusion. In crafting a jury charge, "[o]nly law applicable t o the case should be charged to the jury. Instructions that do not fit the facts of the case may serve only to confuse the jury." State v.

Blurton , 352 S.C. 203, 208, 573 S.E. 2d 802, 804 (2002). Similarly, "i t [is] the duty of the [circuit court] to elimin ate from the proceedings the qu estions of law[] and to submit to the jury only questions of fact .

. . ." Duren v. Kee , 41 S.C. 171, 176, 19 S.E. 492, 494 (1894). Accordingl y, when a jury charge consists of irrelevant and inapplicable principles that con fuse the jury in a manner affec ting the outcome of the trial, it constitute s reversible error. Cole v. Raut , 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008). Likewise, "it is reversible error to charge a correct principle of law as governing a case when such pri nciple is inapplicable to the issues on trial." Dunsil

v. E.M. Jones Chevrolet Co., Inc. , 268 S.C. 291, 295, 233 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1977).

20 Because we find the Ralphs are entitled to a new trial based o n several errors of law, we decline to address their argument that the evidence in the record does not support the jury's nominal damages award. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc. , 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an appellate court need not address appellant's remaining issues w hen its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).When taken together, we find the failure to apply Judge Cooper 's order as the law of the case and the failure to grant a directed verdict on trespass likely overburdened and confused the j ury, affecting its damages award . The circuit court should have instructed the jury on the law of the case and prec luded the McLaughlins from arguing reliance on SIPOA to t he jury. Furthermore, becau se trespass was

established as a matter of law, the jury should have only been responsible for determining damages and punitive d amages. Instead, the circuit court allowed the McLaughlins to argue reliance to the jury; did not instruct the jury that the McLaughlins could not rely on SIPOA as a matter of law; and sub mitted the issues of trespass, abandonment, a nd damages to the jury. See Blurton , 352 S.C. at 208, 573 S.E.2d at 804 ("Only law applicable to the case should be c harged to the jury."). As such, the jury's role expanded from simply determining damages to ruling on complex questions of law. 21 See Duren , 41 S.C. at 175, 19 S.E. at 494 ("[Q]uestions of law do not go to the jury . . . .").

Moreover, by allowing the jury to hear evidence of reliance an d rule on the issue of abandonment, the circuit court gave credence to the Mc Laughlins' theories that 1) the easement could have been abandoned by SIPOA and 2) they justifiably relied on SIPOA's representations t hat the easement had been ab andoned. In turn these theories supported the overall theme of the McLaughlins' case: that they were not responsible for damaging the Ralphs' property because they did not know the easement existed. However, both of these theories are misleadi ng, as SIPOA could

not have abandoned the easement a s a matter of law and any purp orted reliance on SIPOA was irrelevant in determining damages. 22 Accordingly, we find the combined effect of these errors likely confused and overburdene d the jury in a manner prejudicial to the Ralphs. See Cole , 378 S.C. at 404, 663 S.E.2d at 33 ("A jury charge consisting of irrelevant and inapplicable principle s may confuse the jury and constitutes reversible error where the jury[']s confusion a ffects the outcome of the trial."); Dunsil , 268 S.C. at 295, 233 S.E.2d at 103 ("[I]t is reversible error to charge a correct principle of law as governing a case when such principle is inapplicable to the issues on trial."); see, e.g. , C. I. T. Corp. v. Corley , 196 S.C. 339,

21 As indicated above, the issues of abandonment and trespass wer e both questions

of law rather than fact. See supra Section III.

22 Moreover, even though the issue of trespass should not have be en submitted to the jury, we note that any purported reliance on SIPOA's representa tions by the McLaughlins would have also been irrelevant in determining tres pass. See Snow

, 305 S.C. at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802 ("Although neither deliberat ion, purpose, motive, nor malice are necessary elements of intent, the defendant must intend the act which in law constitutes [trespass].").342–43, 13 S.E.2d 440, 441–42 (1941) (reversing a circuit court 's order that conflicted with a previous una ppealed order constituting the la w of the case).

Second, we find the failure to submit the issue of punitive da mages to the jury

also constitutes reversible error. See Zinn , 415 S.C. at 108–09, 780 S.E.2d at 619 ("The appellate court will revers e the [circuit] court's ruling on a [directed verdict] motion [] when there is no evidence to support the ruling or wh ere the ruling is controlled by an error of law." ( second alteration in original) (quoting Law , 368 S.C. at 434–35, 629 S.E.2d at 648)); see, e.g. , Rhodes v. Lawrence , 279 S.C. 96, 97–98, 302 S.E.2d 343, 344 (1983) (remanding for a new trial after det ermining the circuit court erred in granting a direct ed verdict on punitive damages)

.

As such, we agree that the Ralphs are entitled to a new trial. However, we find the scope of the new trial can be limited on remand. "The law in South Carolina

is clear that when a verdict in favor of a plaintiff is fully s upported by the evidence on the issue of liability but the damages awarded are inadequat e, a new trial may be ordered on the issue of damages alone." Cartin v. Keller Bldg. Prods. of Charleston

, 299 S.C. 152, 153, 382 S.E.2d 922, 923 (1989). In other words, "[a] new trial on damages alone is not warranted unless the evidence presented indicated that a directed verdict on the issue of liability would have been prop er." Pelican Bldg. Ctrs. of Horry-Georgetown, Inc. v. Dutton , 311 S.C. 56, 61, 427 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1993); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-33-125 (2005) ("Unless the plaintiff is en titled

to a directed verdict on the i ssue of liability, any new trial must include both issues of liability and damages.").

As discussed above, 23 we find the Ralphs were entitled to a directed verdict on trespass. Therefore, as the issue of liability has already been established as a matter of law, it is not necessary to remand the case for a new trial absolute. See § 15-33-125 ("Unless the plaintiff is entitled to a directed ve rdict on the issue of liability, any new trial must inc lude both issues of liability and damages."). Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial on compensatory damages and punitive damages only.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court erred in failing to apply Judge Cooper's ruling as the law of the case, granting a directed ver dict on the issue of punitive damages, and submitting the issues of trespass and aba ndonment to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial on

23 See supra Section III.compensatory damages and punitive damages. Furthermore, on rem and, Judge Cooper's determination that the McLaughlins could not reasonabl y rely on SIPOA's representations shall be applie d as the law of the case.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WILLIAMS and HILL, JJ., concur.