alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Kevin McK, Appellant, v Elizabeth A.E., Respondent.

[54 NYS3d 17]

Order, Family Court, New York County (Jane Pearl, J.), entered on or about April 16, 2015, which, among other things, dismissed without prejudice petitioner father’s petitions seeking to modify a custody order and to enforce a visitation order, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Family Court properly declined to exercise its continuing jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76-a (1) (a), as the record supports its determination that neither the child nor the mother had a “significant connection” to New York and that “substantial evidence” was no longer available in New York, concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships (Domestic Relations Law § 76-a [1] [a]). The record shows that the child had been living continuously with his mother and maternal grandparents in Mississippi since October 2013, and had no continued significant connection to New York, aside from his father living here. Although the father testified that he had lived at the same address in New York for eight months, the record shows that his visits with the child after the child’s relocation to Mississippi generally involved trips outside of New York State. In addition, the court properly determined that evidence related to the allegations in the father’s petitions concerning the mother’s conduct and the child’s welfare would be located in Mississippi *(see id.; see also Clark v Clark,*21 AD3d 1326 [4th Dept 2005]).

*601Even if Family Court had continuing jurisdiction, it providently exercised its discretion in determining that Mississippi was the more convenient forum (see Domestic Relations Law § 76-f). The court applied the statute’s relevant factors, including that the Mississippi court was well equipped to decide the litigation expeditiously, as it was familiar with the parties’ case and expressed its own belief that the case should be heard in Mississippi (see § 76-f [2]; *see also Matter of Luis F.F. v Jessica G.,*127 AD3d 496, 497 [1st Dept 2015]).

Family Court properly found that the father had waived any right to counsel, given that he voluntarily proceeded pro se throughout these ongoing custody/visitation proceedings *(see generally Matter of Joshua UU. v Martha VV.,*118 AD3d 1051, 1053 [3d Dept 2014]).

We have considered the father’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick and Gesmer, JJ.
No. 10-6288.

#### Michael Luong, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 973, 131 S. Ct. 489,

178 L. Ed. 2d 309,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7870.

October 12, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2199 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2199

  To authorize a certificate of documentation for the vessel EMERALD 
                                 AYES.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                June 16 (legislative day, June 7), 1994

 Mr. Hollings introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
   referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To authorize a certificate of documentation for the vessel EMERALD 
                                 AYES.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That notwithstanding 
sections 12106, 12107, and 12108 of title 46, United States Code, and 
section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), as 
applicable on the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Transportation may issue a certificate of documentation for the vessel 
EMERALD AYES, United States official number 986099.

                                 <all>
```
103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2406

AN ACT

To amend title 17, United States Code, relating to

transmitter, and for other purposes.the definition of a local service area of a primary
103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2406

AN ACT

To amend title 17, United States Code, relating to the definition of a local service area of a primary transmitter,

and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 2406 ES

1 SECTION 1. LOCAL SERVICE AREA OF A PRIMARY TRANS2 MITTER.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 111(f) of title 17, United

4 States Code, is amended in the paragraph relating to the

5 definition of ‘‘local service area of a primary transmit6 ter’’—

7 (1) by striking out ‘‘comprises the area’’ and

8 inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘comprises either the area’’;

9 and

10 (2) by inserting after ‘‘April 15, 1976,’’ the fol11 lowing: ‘‘or such station’s television market as de12 fined in section 76.55(e) of title 47, Code of Federal

13 Regulations (as in effect on September 18, 1993), or

14 any subsequent modifications to such television mar15 ket made pursuant to section 76.55(e) or 76.59 of

16 title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations,’’.

17 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made under

18 subsection (a), relating to the definition of the local service

19 area of a primary transmitter, shall take effect on July

20 1, 1994.

Passed the Senate August 18, 1994.

Attest:

Secretary.
#### Jessica Lausell, Appellant, v City of New York et al., Respondents.

[62 NYS3d 269]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Elizabeth A. Taylor, J.), entered July 20, 2016, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants sustained their initial burden through the testimony and affidavit of the building manager, plaintiff, the assistant principal, and plaintiff’s daughter, as well as with the log book entries, which demonstrated that there was a path that was cleared of snow and ice at the crosswalk and on the sidewalk in front of the Marion Avenue entrance to the building; and that the building manager had inspected the area where plaintiff fell 80 minutes before her accident and it was free of snow and ice *(see Herrera v E. 103rd St. & Lexington Ave. Realty Corp.,*95 AD3d 463 [1st Dept 2012]).

The court properly found that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact concerning defendants’ notice of the hazardous condition and as to defendants’ negligence *(see McKenzie v City of New York,*116 AD3d 526, 527 [1st Dept 2014]). Even if plaintiff’s testimony that she did not climb over a mound of *587snow to access the sidewalk on Webster Avenue was accepted, despite the contrary testimony by the assistant principal and plaintiff’s daughter, it was undisputed that plaintiff nevertheless elected to cross the street mid-block, wearing sneakers, and ignored the clear crosswalk and path on Marion Avenue *(see Zayas v New York City Hous. Auth.,*115 AD3d 485 [1st Dept 2014]).

Concur — Renwick, J.R, Kapnick, Gesmer and Kern, JJ.
Materials Not Included in

Airworthiness Directive (AD) Docket

Docket Number: FAA- 2015-3144

Directorate Identifier: 2014NM110AD

F900EX-450 --- 3/10/14

F2000EX-344 --- 3/10/14

Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in FDMS Docket and Maintained in the 

Supplemental AD Docket

MAY BE VIEWED AT: Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate

Rules Docket

1601 Lind Ave. SW.,

Renton, WA 98057

425.227.1221

DURING THE HOURS OF: 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

Form Date: 03/05/2008
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Antoine Simmons, Appellant.

[64 NYS3d 79]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Neary, J.), rendered May 26, 2016, convicting him of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, driving while ability impaired by drugs in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4), reckless driving, and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Hawkins,*11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.12 [1]) and criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law § 125.10) beyond a reasonable doubt *(see People v Davis,*112 AD3d 959, 960-961 [2013]). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor *(see People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict as to those crimes was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633, 643-644 [2006]).

The defendant contends that the Supreme Court limited his ability to seek advice from standby counsel. This contention, as the defendant acknowledges, is unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). In any event,

*783the record does not support his claim that the court limited his ability to seek advice from standby counsel. A criminal defendant has no federal or state constitutional right to hybrid representation *(see People v Rodriguez,*95 NY2d 497, 501 [2000]; *People v White,*73 NY2d 468, 477 [1989]). Thus, a defendant who elects to exercise the right to self-representation is not guaranteed the assistance of standby counsel during trial *(see People v Rodriguez,*95 NY2d at 501; *People v Mirenda,*57 NY2d 261, 265-266 [1982]). Although a court may appoint standby counsel to assist a pro se defendant, the assignment of standby counsel is a matter of trial management. As such, it is subject to the discretion of the trial court *(see People v Mirenda,*57 NY2d at 266). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the defendant’s access to standby counsel, inter alia, to breaks in the trial *(see People v Pettus,*22 AD3d 869, 870 [2005]).

Leventhal, J.P., Austin, Cohen and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Lorin F., Respondent, v Jason D., Appellant.

[65 NYS3d 700]

Order of protection, Family Court, Bronx County (Peter J. Passidomo, J.), entered on or about November 21, 2016, upon a fact-finding determination that respondent committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Respondent’s contention that the record does not establish that the parties were involved in an “intimate relationship,” as required for the underlying offense to be considered as a family *549offense *(see*Family Ct Act § 812 [1] [e]), is unpreserved for appellate review *(see e.g. Matter of Larry*B., 39 AD3d 399 [1st Dept 2007]). In any event, both parties testified that they were in a relationship on and off for at least four years, leaving no doubt that their relationship was intimate *(see Matter of Sonia S. v Pedro Antonio S.,*139 AD3d 546, 547 [1st Dept 2016]).

Although the Family Court did not specify which family offense respondent committed, the parties addressed the offense of harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [3]) in their summations, and respondent concedes that “it can be inferred” from the court’s findings of fact, which refer to elements of that offense, that the court found he had committed that offense. In any event, reversal would not be required because “the record is sufficiently complete to allow this Court to make an independent factual review and [to] draw its own conclusions” *(Matter of Keith H. [Logann M.K.],*113 AD3d 555, 555 [1st Dept 2014], *lv denied*23 NY3d 902 [2014]; *see Matter of Charlene R. v Malachi R.,*151 AD3d 482 [1st Dept 2017]), and upon review of the evidence, and according great deference to the court’s findings and credibility determinations *(see Matter of Sonia S. v Pedro Antonio S.,*139 AD3d at 547), a preponderance of the evidence supports a determination that respondent committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree.

Contrary to respondent’s argument, the petition gave adequate notice of the incidents charged, and respondent’s conduct was not an isolated incident, but a course of conduct over a period of time involving threats and demands for money, followed by postings of pictures on different sites.

Concur—Acosta, P.J., Richter, Mazzarelli, Andrias and Gesmer, JJ.
# Army’s first food truck in Germany opens

/ Published June 1, 2020
KAISERSLAUTERN, Germany, 
During a meeting of Army food service professionals in September 2019, the senior Army logistician in Europe talked about the need for soldiers to have more dining options in the Kaiserslautern Military Community in Germany.

A Defense Logistics Agency customer support representative at the meeting at Ramstein Air Base told Maj. Gen. Christopher Mohan, 21st Theater Sustainment Command commander, that DLA had a solution.

Less than 10 months after Greg Turner, with DLA Troop Support Europe & Africa in Kaiserslautern, spoke up, soldiers can now grab breakfast and lunch from the first Army food truck parked outside the United States.

Army culinary specialists started serving meals from the truck, called the Culinary Outpost, during several openings over the last two weeks at locations throughout U.S. Army Garrison Rheinland-Pfalz.

DLA has worked with the Army to deliver six food trucks to bases in the U.S. The most recent one opened at Fort Hood, Texas ,in February.

02:11VIDEO  | 02:11 |Culinary Outpost Food Truck Training

The trucks are meant to reach soldiers who can’t easily get to a dining facility from a training range or the motor pool, Larry Westley, Jr., supervisory logistician with the 405th Army Field Support Brigade Europe and Africa, said.

Culinary specialists with the 55th Quartermaster Company, 16th Special Troops Battalion prepare the food fresh daily and can serve more than 200 meals in a 90-minute meal period. They serve breakfast sandwiches and bowls, traditional quick order meals and four menus for lunch and dinner: Tex-Mex, Asian, Southern and barbeque.

Spc. Nyaka Kpakra was at the food truck opening May 22 at Panzer Kaserne, where he ate chicken teriyaki for lunch.

“It tastes just like what I got from a restaurant,” he said. “This is great, especially for soldiers like myself who don’t have a car.”

The food truck features most of the same equipment that a DFAC has, except an air fryer has been substituted for a grease fryer. DLA Troop Support procured the truck for the Army through the food service equipment program and provides the food through its regional Subsistence prime vendor.

“When I was an Army cook, a food truck like this would have been a game changer,” said Turner, a retired Army food service specialist. “The new food truck keeps us in line with industry and most importantly, enables better support of the warfighter.”

In addition to Panzer Kaserne, the food truck will rotate to Baumholder and Sembach Kaserne. Soldiers can pay for their meals with cash, a meal card, debit or credit card.

“The food truck provides a healthy choice for soldiers,” Lt. Col. Sherdrick Rankin, DLA Troop Support Europe & Africa commander, said. “Instead of them traveling off base to eat at fast food restaurants, now they have a food truck in their back yard.”

***Editor's note:**Video courtesy of Spc. Elliot Page, 21st Theater Sustainment Command Public Affairs Office*
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

NEHEMIAH REID and ENID REID,

Appellants,

v.

HURRICANE METAL SUPPLY, LLC and HIGHLANDER ROOFING, INC.,

Appellees.

No. 4D19-1314

[October 3, 2019]

Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuit, Broward County; David A. Haimes, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

CACE 14-016288.

Erik B. Espinosa of The Law Offices of Erik B. Espinosa, P.A., Sunrise, 

for appellants.

Richard J. Delgado of Law Office of Delgado & Delgado, P.A., Hialeah, 

for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GROSS, DAMOORGIAN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
<PAGE>   1
Exhibit 23.1 Consent of BDO Seidman, LLP



              CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS



InfoCure Corporation
Atlanta, Georgia



We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration
statements (Nos. 333-88589, 333-87795 and 333-73097) on Form S-3 and (Nos.
333-74773 and 333-48829) on Form S-8 of our report dated February 21, 2000,
relating to the consolidated financial statements of InfoCure Corporation and
subsidiaries appearing in the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year
ended December 31, 1999.



BDO SEIDMAN, LLP



Atlanta, Georgia
March 30, 2000
#### Edgar Villongco, Appellant, v Tompkins Square Bagels et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[63 NYS3d 855]

*590Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol R. Edmead, J.), entered on or about May 18, 2016, which granted the motion of defendants Tompkins Square Bagels and Sage the Cat, LLC (collectively defendant), for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Summary judgment was properly granted in this action for personal injuries sustained when defendant restaurant’s employee (defendant Bershadsky) followed plaintiff customer outside the restaurant and punched him in the face. Bershad-sky clearly acted beyond the scope of his employment, and was motivate by private concerns not related to any conduct in furtherance of defendant’s business, and thus defendant is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior *(see Conde v Yeshiva Univ.,*16 AD3d 185, 187 [1st Dept 2005]). Furthermore, defendant is not liable for plaintiff’s injuries based upon negligent training or supervision, as there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that defendant knew, or should have known, of Bershadsky’s propensity for violence *(see Sheila C. v Povich,*11 AD3d 120, 129-130 [1st Dept 2004]).

We have considered plaintiff’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur—Renwick, J.R, Manzanet-Daniels, Mazzarelli, Kahn and Moulton, JJ.
No. 09-1458.

#### Kevin E. Fields, Petitioner v. Michael Wilbur, et al.

562 U.S. 834, 131 S. Ct. 141,

178 L. Ed. 2d 36,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 5830.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 360 Fed. Appx. 843.
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 116 (Wednesday, June 17, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 33092]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-16083]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

National Park Service


Niobrara National Scenic River Advisory Commission

AGENCY: National Park Service, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice sets the schedule for the forthcoming meeting of 
the Niobrara National Scenic River Advisory Commission. Notice of this 
meeting is required under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 
92-463).

DATES: Saturday, July 18, 1998 at 2 p.m.

ADDRESSES: Smith Falls State Park, Nebraska Group Picnic Shelter.

AGENDA: Topics include: (1) Discussion of Niobrara Council Management 
activities for the Niobrara National Scenic River; (2) Update of NPS 
and other agency actions taken or planned within the scenic river 
corridor; and (3) Discussion regarding the extent of future meetings 
and/or activities of the advisory commission. This meeting is open to 
the public. Interested persons may make oral/written presentation to 
the Commission or file written statements. Requests for time for making 
presentations may be made to the Superintendent prior to the meeting or 
to the Chairman at the beginning of the meeting. In order to accomplish 
the agenda for the meeting, the Chairman may want to limit or schedule 
public presentations. The meeting will be recorded for documentation 
and a summary in the form of minutes will be transcribed for 
dissemination. The Commission members will make minutes of the meeting 
available to the public after approval. Copies of the minutes may be 
requested by contacting the Superintendent. An audio tape of the 
meeting will be available at the headquarters office of the Niobrara/
Missouri National Scenic Riverways in O'Neill, Nebraska.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The law that established the Niobrara 
National Scenic River, Public Law 102-50 established The Advisory 
Commission. The purpose of the group, according to its charter, is to 
advise the Secretary of the Interior on matters pertaining to the 
development of a management plan, and management and operation of the 
Scenic River. The Niobrara National Scenic River segment runs from 
Borman Bridge, east of Valentine, Nebraska, 76 miles downstream to 
State Highway 137.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Superintendent Paul Hedren, Niobrara/
Missouri National Scenic Riverways, P.O. Box 591, O'Neill, Nebraska 
68763-0591 or at telephone number 402-336-3970.

    Dated: June 10, 1998.
William W. Schenk,
Regional Director.
[FR Doc. 98-16083 Filed 6-16-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-70-P
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of Ameritrans Capital Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gary C. Granoff, Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition, and results of operations of the Company.   By: /s/Gary C. Granoff Gary C. Granoff Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer  November 14, 2007