If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

February 1, 2024

v No. 366716

Wayne Circuit Court

RICKY GENE ALLISON, LC No. 22-003174-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and HOOD, JJ.

K. F. KELLY, P.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I agree with the majority’s determination that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied defendant’s motion to introduce evidence concerning his sexual relationship with the 

victim. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion 

that the trial court also abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion regarding the 

introduction of evidence about the existence of the victim’s relationship with another individual at 

the time of the alleged assault. In my view, such testimony is prohibited under the rape-shield 

statute, MCL 750.520j, is irrelevant, and I respectfully dissent.

In defendant’s motion to offer evidence, which the trial court denied, defendant asserted 

that he desired to introduce evidence that the victim was “in a relationship with another person at 

the time of the alleged incident.” The purpose of such evidence, according to defendant, was to 

probe the victim’s “credibility, bias, and motive to make false allegation [sic] . . . .” For its part, 

the trial court determined that the potential evidence was not relevant and was not admissible under 

MCL 750.520j:

[W]ith respect to the proposed offer of evidence or questioning regards to the 

complainant’s potential relationship with another third-party individual to show 

that there was a motive to lie or fabrication, the Court does not find that that line of 

questioning or proposed evidence would be relevant in this case.

The fact that the complainant may have been in a relationship at the time 

does not show any real relevance in this case. You may say there could be a motive 

to lie or it’s being fabricated because of this other relationship, but I haven’t seen 
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anything in the motions or the briefs indicating there’s any other information other 

than you just want to ask questions about this other relationship to, in essence, call 

into question the complainant’s lifestyle, the fact that she was dating someone when 

these allegations came about.

So while you had brought up the concern of confrontation with respect to 

that and, as the parties agree, it doesn’t fall under the exceptions to the rape statute, 

Mr. Allison does not have a right to confrontation for irrelevant pieces of 

information and there’s very strong policy in this State through the legislature that 

questioning a witness or a complainant or a victim about sexual conduct with—

potential sexual conduct with third parties, not the Defendant, is certainly frowned 

upon and viewed as quite prejudicial.

In my view, the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. “The rape-shield 

statute constitutes a legislative policy determination that sexual conduct or reputation regarding 

sexual conduct as evidence of character and for impeachment, while perhaps logically relevant, is 

not legally relevant.” People v Sharpe, 502 Mich 313, 326; 918 NW2d 504 (2018) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “The statute also reflects a belief that inquiries into sex histories, 

even when minimally relevant, carry a danger of unfairly prejudicing and misleading the jury.” 

Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Finally, the statute protects the privacy of the alleged 

victim and, in so doing, removes an institutional discouragement from seeking prosecution.” Id. 

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

Under MCL 750.520j(1):

(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion 

evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim’s 

sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only 

to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material 

to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not 

outweigh its probative value:

(a) Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor.

(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or 

origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.

Defendant’s offer to introduce evidence that the victim was in another relationship at the 

time of the alleged assault is inadmissible under the rape-shield statute. By asking the victim if 

she is in another relationship, the implication would not be that she had an acquaintance or

friendship with this person, but rather that the victim and the third party had a sexual relationship. 

While defense counsel insisted at oral argument before this Court that the victim would not be 

asked if she was in a “sexual relationship,” only if she was in a “relationship” with another 

individual, counsel readily conceded that any such question would “assume[]” a sexual one. 

Indeed, as conceded, the implication and inference is absolutely clear—it goes to the victim’s 

sexual conduct; defendant does not want to elicit testimony from the victim about her friends and 

acquaintances, he wants to elicit testimony about her other sexual partners. Thus, in my view, 
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defendant’s offer of evidence amounts to offering “reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual 

conduct.” See MCL 750.520(j)(1). The victim’s sexual conduct and history with individuals that 

are not defendant are simply “not legally relevant.” Sharpe, 502 Mich at 326.

Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that the only question defendant merely asks 

the victim is whether she was in another “relationship,” even another “sexual relationship,” I also 

agree with the trial court that the question is not otherwise relevant. That the victim had a sexual 

relationship with another person at the time of the alleged assault is not, by itself, relevant to show 

that the victim had a motive to fabricate the criminal complaint. Perhaps the alleged relationship 

was “casual,” in that neither party expected monogamy from the other. Or perhaps not. But simply 

asking the victim if she was in a relationship, without otherwise having any basis to conclude the 

victim was not truthful, tells the jury nothing about whether the victim had a motive to lie, and 

only has the potential to mislead the jury. Thus, this case is unlike Olden v Kentucky, 488 US 227, 

232; 109 S Ct 480; 102 L Ed 2d 513 (1988), cited by the majority, where the defendant intended 

to pursue an entire “proposed line of cross-examination” that the victim lied about being sexually 

assaulted “out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship” with her boyfriend. Questioning the victim 

about whether she was in a relationship, without more, simply is not enough to make the potential 

responses to the question relevant.

Moreover, defendant’s assertion that the only “evidence” that would be introduced would 

be a single question to the victim inquiring whether she was in another relationship is not well 

taken. Should the victim simply deny that she was in a relationship or dispute defendant’s

characterization of the term, defendant concedes he would attempt to impeach her or introduce 

other evidence that there was a relationship by calling witnesses who claim to know her 

dating/sexual history. And should the prosecutor feel the need to rehabilitate the victim by having 

her explain the nature of that alleged relationship, the victim would be open to cross-examination 

regarding that testimony. Thus, the path that defendant wants to travel has the real potential to 

turn the proceedings into a minitrial concerning the victim’s sexual conduct and history, which the 

rape-shield statute prohibits and permits the trial court discretion to disallow.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to offer 

evidence of the victim’s other relationship, and I would affirm that portion of the order. The 

proposed evidence would not only violate the rape-shield statute but, as proposed by defendant, 

would also be irrelevant. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly