alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit No. 32.3   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   In connection with this report of Questar Pipeline Company (the Company) on Form 10-Q/A, Amendment No. 2 for the period ended June 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), R. Allan Bradley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of his knowledge:  (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY   September 19, 2011 /s/R. Allan Bradley R. Allan Bradley President and Chief Executive Officer
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________**
No. 23

- 10043 Summary Calendar

**____________ United States of America,** 

Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus
**Jorge Alberto Spears, Jr.**

Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:22

- CR

- 194

- 6

**______________________________**
Before **Willett, Duncan,**  and **Wilson,** Circuit Judges

. **Per Curiam :**  *****
Jorge Alberto Spears , Jr. , pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, and he was sentenced to 151 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. In the plea agreement, Spears waived his right to appea l his conviction and sentence, with certain limited exceptions.

**___________ __________** 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir**

**. R** 

**.** 47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED September 6, 2023 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 23-10043 Document: 00516884944 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/06/2023No. 23

- 10043

2 In this direct appeal from that sentence , Spears argues that the magistrate judge who conducted his plea colloquy did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N)

. That rule requires that, before accept ing a plea of guilty, a court must “ inform the defendant of , and
determine that the defendant understands

. . . the terms of any plea

agreement provision waiving the right to appeal

. . . the sentence.” Id. Because Spears did no t raise this objection in the district court, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Oliver , 630 F.3d 397, 411 (5th Cir. 2011).
The record reflects that the plea colloquy was sufficient to ensure that Spears understood the terms of the appea l waiver in accordance with Rule 11(b)(1)(N) , and that the appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary. See id. at
411

– 12; United States v. McKinney , 406 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005).

The magistrate judge specifically advised Spears that the plea agreement “contains a waiver of your right to appeal except under certain
limited circumstances.” Following that admonishment, the magistrate judge confirmed that Spears had read and understood the appeal waiver provision
and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal as set forth in that provision. The magistrate judge also confirmed that Spears had read and understood the plea agreement prior to signing it. Moreover, the magistrate judge asked Spears if he h ad any questions about the information covered in the colloquy, and Spears said that he did not. Under these circumstances, Spears has not demonstrated an y plain error with respect to the plea colloquy

. See Oliver , 630 F.3d at 411

– 12

. **AFFIRMED**

. Case: 23-10043 Document: 00516884944 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/06/2023
# 14

- - A Hardesty Parraguirre J. J. 115 Nev. 21, 23, 973 P.2d 241, 242 (1999). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in denying the petition. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

cc: Hon. Doug Smith, District Judge Richard S. Haddad Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 2
#### Harrell, Matter of, v Blue Diamond Sheet Metal

3d Dept: 146 AD3d 1189

denied
Exhibit 31-24**SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION**I, David E. Meador, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2006 ofMichigan Consolidated Gas Company;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;  b. (Intentionally omitted)  c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and  d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscalquarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions): a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.     /s/ DAVID E. MEADOR
#### John Pirraglia, Respondent, v Jofsen, Inc., et al., Appellants.

[49 NYS3d 296]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), entered August 2, 2016, which, insofar as appealed from, denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, unanimously modified, on the law, and the motion granted to the extent of remanding the matter for a framed-issue hearing only as to whether defendant Jofsen, Inc. had a valid agreement to arbitrate, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. Order, same court (Doris M. Gonzalez, J.), entered August 22, 2016, which denied defendants’ motion to stay the enforcement of a notice to quit, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. Order, same court and Justice, entered September 1, 2016, which granted plaintiff’s motion to permanently stay the arbitration proceedings, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant the stay pending the disposition of the framed-issue hearing, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration was properly denied with respect to Jorgenson’s Landing, Inc. and John P. Jorgenson, since they were not parties to the original 1986 arbitration agreement *(see*CPLR 7503 [a]; *Matter of Lubin v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y.,*119 AD2d 497, 500 [1st Dept 1986]). Their rights were governed by a 2003 lease agreement, which provided that all disputes were to be resolved in a court of law.

However, as to defendant Jofsen, Inc., there is a “substantial *649question” whether a valid arbitration agreement was in place, requiring the motion court to conduct a framed-issue hearing on that question (see CPLR 7503 [a]; *Matter of Frankel v Citicorp Ins. Servs., Inc.,*80 AD3d 280 [2d Dept 2010]; *see generally Matter of S.M. Wolff Co. [Tulkoff],*9 NY2d 356, 363 [1961]). Although Jofsen, Inc. was a party to the 1986 agreement, which required arbitration of all disputes, it was also a party to a subsequent lease agreement that stated contradictorily that the terms of the 1986 agreement remained in full force and existence and that all disputes were to be settled in a court of law. Thus, a framed-issue hearing is necessary to determine whether the latter agreement superseded the arbitration provision in the 1986 agreement.

Defendants established their entitlement to a stay of the notice to quit, served by plaintiff on defendants Jorgenson’s Landing, Jorgenson, and Carl D. Madsen. They demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of whether the Jorgenson defendants and Madsen could be evicted from using the easement and pier at the center of plaintiff and Jofsen’s dispute; the use of the pier and easement belonged to Jofsen, and the remaining defendants made use of the easement and pier as Jofsen’s invitees (see *Menucha of Nyack, LLC v Fisher,*110 AD3d 1037, 1042 [2d Dept 2013]). The record also shows that they would suffer irreparable harm if the notice to quit were enforced.

Concur — Tom, J.P., Moskowitz, Feinman, Gische and Kapnick, JJ.
No. 10-5350.

#### Miguel Rodriguez-Ayala, Petitioner v. American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc.

562 U.S. 824, 131 S. Ct. 385,

178 L. Ed. 2d 20,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6190.

October 4, 2010.

Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied. Petitioner is allowed until October 25, 2010, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Devonte Kelly, Appellant.

[49 NYS3d 693]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ellen N. Biben, J.), rendered September 21, 2015, as amended September 22, 2015, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of sexual abuse in the first degree and three counts of forcible touching, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of four years, unanimously affirmed.

We reject defendant’s challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting the sexual gratification element of sexual abuse *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). Defendant’s actions and words support the inference that he acted for the purpose of gratifying a sexual desire. The record fails to support defendant’s claim that he had such difficulty expressing himself that his sexual remark to the victim should not be taken literally.

Defendant was appropriately charged with a single count of first-degree sexual abuse, and that count was not duplicitous, because all of the sexual abuse occurred during a single “uninterrupted course of conduct” *(People v Alonzo,*16 NY3d 267, 270 [2011]). The fact that the victim briefly fought defendant off before he resumed his attack did not create two separate incidents that should have been charged to the jury separately.

Contrary to defendant’s argument, the People did not actu*586ally introduce evidence of an uncharged crime or bad act, and even if the evidence challenged by defendant is deemed to fall within the category of bad acts, it was still providently admitted. The court received limited testimony that shortly before the charged incident occurred, a teacher had seen one of his students crying in the playground, that when he asked what was wrong, the student pointed to defendant, and that after directing defendant to leave and calling the police, the teacher drove around with the police and pointed out defendant, who then had his arms around the victim of the charged crime as he hugged and kissed her. The jury was never informed that defendant did anything to the crying girl, and “mere speculation that a jury might discern something sinister about a defendant’s behavior does not render that behavior an ‘uncharged crime’ ” *(People v Flores,*210 AD2d 1, 2 [1st Dept 1994], *lv denied*84 AD2d 1031 [1995]). In any event, even if analyzed under the principles applicable to uncharged crimes and bad acts, this evidence completed the narrative, explaining why the police stopped defendant even though all they saw was hugging and kissing. Furthermore, defendant’s articulate remark when the teacher told him to leave tended to refute his claim of difficulty in communicating, and defendant’s arguments regarding the scope of our review of the court’s ruling are unavailing *(see People v Nicholson,*26 NY3d 813 [2016]; *People v Garrett,*23 NY3d 878, 885 n 2 [2014]). The probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect, which was minimized by the court’s thorough limiting instructions.

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence.

Concur— Sweeny, J.P., Richter, Moskowitz, Feinman and Gische, JJ.
#### Margot Head, Appellant, v Emblem Health et al., Respondents.

[64 NYS3d 518]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan B. Lobis, J.), entered October 11, 2016, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the causes of action for fraud and bad faith breach of insurance contract, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

In support of the fraud causes of action, the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish the element of a material misrepresentation *(see Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward & Kissel, LLP,*12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009]). While the Attorney General’s investigation documented numerous instances of defendants’ misconduct, contrary to plaintiff’s contention, it did not detail instances of fraud. Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants entered into the insurance contract with an undisclosed intention not to perform in accordance with the contract’s terms is insufficient to establish a misrepresentation or a material omission *(see New York Univ. v Continental Ins.*Co., 87 NY2d 308, *425318 [1995]). The fraud causes of action were correctly dismissed as duplicative of the breach of contract cause of action *(see Coppola v Applied Elec. Corp.,*288 AD2d 41, 42 [1st Dept 2001]).

There is no independent cause of action for bad faith breach of insurance contract arising from an insurer’s failure to perform its obligations under an insurance contract *(see Orient Overseas Assoc. v XL Ins. Am., Inc.,*132 AD3d 574 [1st Dept 2015]; *McGowan v Great N. Ins. Co.,*78 AD3d 1137 [2d Dept 2010]).

Concur—Richter, J.R, Manzanet-Daniels, Andrias, Kern and Singh, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2

                         THE MONARCH CEMENT COMPANY
                         CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                          18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                                SECTION 906
                                  OF THE
                         SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Monarch Cement Company (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2005, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned, in the capacity and on the date indicated
below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of
          Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
          Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly
          presents, in all material respects, the financial
          condition and results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to The Monarch Cement Company and will be retained by The
Monarch Cement Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


Dated:  November 14, 2005

                                         /S/ Debra P. Roe
                                        Debra P. Roe, CPA
                                        Chief Financial Officer and
                                        Assistant Secretary-Treasurer
# Troop Support helps Coast Guard celebrate new Uniform Distribution Center at ribbon cutting ceremony 

/ Published Feb. 28, 2022
PHILADELPHIA, 
A ribbon cutting ceremony recognizing the partnership between the Defense Logistics Agency and U.S. Coast Guard took place at the Uniform Distribution Center, Training Center Cape May, N.J., Feb. 23, 2022.

DLA Troop Support Executive Director of Contracting and Acquisition Management William J. Kenny helped cut the ribbon along with Coast Guard Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics Rear Adm. Carola List and the TCCM Executive Officer Cmdr. Brad Conway. C&T leaders also attended the ribbon cutting ceremony.

“This event is a testament of many years of planning, hard work and partnership,” Kenny said.

“Our Clothing and Textiles team has provided uniform items to new Coast Guard recruits for many years,” Kenny continued. “And for the past two years, our team helped develop infrastructure updates to improve the issuance process, including transitioning nearly 1,200 national stock number-listed items from the U.S. Coast Guard to DLA ownership.”

Kenny described some of the features and benefits of the new infrastructure, including reducing issuance time and improving stock accountability for better demand planning.

“This improved inventory model aligns with the support DLA currently provides to other military services’ recruit training centers,” he said.

Recruits began receiving uniforms under Troop Support’s new item management process in November 2021.

“Standing up this facility has been a valiant effort of partnership and collaboration between the Coast Guard, Defense Logistics Agency, Coast Guard Exchange and our dedicated vendor partners,” said the mistress of ceremony Coast Guard Lt. Cmdr. Sonya Leibowitz, deputy chief of the Office of Logistics Program Management Division.

List and team also visited Troop Support headquarters in Philadelphia a day ahead of the ribbon cutting ceremony to learn about the agency’s capabilities.

“My logistics team here ... we’re looking for opportunities that we can leverage with DLA,” List said. “I think uniforms here, what we’re doing at Cape May, is just one part of it.”
No. 09-10683.

#### George A. DaCosta, Petitioner v. Union Local 306 of the Motion Picture Projectionists, Operators, Video Technicians, Theatrical Employees & Allied Crafts, et al.

562 U.S. 849, 131 S. Ct. 98,

178 L. Ed. 2d 61,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6221,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.
##### 



EXHIBIT 21

PACIFICARE HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.

LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES

|                                                            |  |                       
|----------------------------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------
|Name of Subsidiary                                          |  | State of Incorporation
|                                                            |  |                       
|Antero Health Plans, Inc.                                   |  | Colorado              
|FHP Reinsurance Limited                                     |  | Bermuda               
|PacifiCare Asia Pacific Insurance Brokers,
    Inc.         |  | Guam                  
|PacifiCare Behavioral Health of California,
    Inc.        |  | Delaware              
|PacifiCare Behavioral Health, Inc.                          |  | Delaware              
|PacifiCare Dental                                           |  | California            
|PacifiCare Dental of Colorado, Inc.                         |  | Colorado              
|PacifiCare eHoldings, Inc.                                  |  | California            
|PacifiCare Health Insurance Company of
    Micronesia, Inc. |  | Guam                  
|PacifiCare Health Plan Administrators,
    Inc.             |  | Indiana               
|PacifiCare International Limited                            |  | Ireland               
|PacifiCare Life and Health Insurance Company                |  | Indiana               
|PacifiCare Life Assurance Company                           |  | Colorado              
|PacifiCare Life Insurance Company                           |  | Arizona               
|PacifiCare of Arizona, Inc.                                 |  | Arizona               
|PacifiCare of California                                    |  | California            
|PacifiCare of Colorado, Inc.                                |  | Colorado              
|PacifiCare of Nevada, Inc.                                  |  | Nevada                
|PacifiCare of Ohio, Inc.                                    |  | Ohio                  
|PacifiCare of Oklahoma, Inc.                                |  | Oklahoma              
|PacifiCare of Oregon, Inc.                                  |  | Oregon                
|PacifiCare of Texas, Inc.                                   |  | Texas                 
|PacifiCare of Washington, Inc.                              |  | Washington            
|PacifiCare Ventures, Inc.                                   |  | California            
|MEDeMORPHUS Healthcare Solutions,
    Inc.                  |  | California            
|Rx Solutions, Inc.                                          |  | California            
|Salveo Holding Company Ltd.                                 |  | Cayman Islands        
|Salveo Insurance Company Ltd.                               |  | Cayman Islands        
|SecureHorizons USA, Inc.                                    |  | California            
|SeniorCo, Inc.                                              |  | Delaware
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11729

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RONALD LORENZO BROWN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cr-00001-MW-MAF-1

____________________

USCA11 Case: 21-11729 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 1 of 2
2 Opinion of the Court 21-11729

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Megan Saillant, appointed counsel for Ronald Brown in this 

appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the 

appellant and filed a brief prepared under Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), following the revocation of Brown’s supervised release. Our independent review of the entire record reveals that 

counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. 

Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no 

arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is 

GRANTED, and Brown’s revocation of supervised release and sentence are AFFIRMED. 

.

USCA11 Case: 21-11729 Date Filed: 02/08/2022 Page: 2 of 2