SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1079-18T2

RODNEY LEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

JANET COLLIER,

Plaintiff,

v.

PHELAN HALLINAN 

DIAMOND & JONES, PC,

Defendant-Respondent.

_____________________________

Submitted August 1, 2019 – Decided August 7, 2019

Before Judges Whipple and Firko.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-1766-18.

Rodney Lee, appellant pro se.

Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones PC, respondent pro 

se (Brian J. Yoder, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-1079-18T2

PER CURIAM

Self-represented plaintiff Rodney Lee appeals a Law Division order 

entered on October 29, 2018 granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's 

complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). For the reasons that follow,

we affirm.

On August 21, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Law Division 

requesting judgment for damages against defendant, Phelan Hallinan Diamond 

& Jones, PC, who represented the mortgagee, U.S. Bank National Association 

(U.S. Bank), in the underlying mortgage foreclosure action. Plaintiff alleged he 

still owned the Subject Property located at 83 Pine Grove Terrace in Newark, 

U.S. Bank had no right to collect rent payments from any tenants at the property, 

defendant violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act by making false 

statements about him, and defendant violated the Foreclosure Fairness Act, 

N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 to -71.

On October 4, 2018, defendant filed the motion to dismiss under review. 

Defendant construed plaintiff's allegations as a "bad faith and futile attempt to 

collaterally attack the underlying foreclosure action and U.S. Bank's ownership 

of the Subject Property" notwithstanding plaintiff's actual knowledge of the 

Sheriff's sale. Defendant presented the following arguments in support of its 
3

A-1079-18T2

motion to dismiss: plaintiff's claims are based on the doctrines of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine because "the record of 

the Chancery Court under docket F-030486-13 establishes beyond question the 

fact that [U.S. Bank] acquired title[] to the Subject Property at Sheriff's sale on 

May 31, 2016[,]" thereby disavowing plaintiff's claim that he still owns the 

property, and plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Plaintiff filed opposition to defendant's motion on October 10, 2018 and 

waived his appearance for oral argument. On October 29, 2018, the scheduled 

date for oral argument, Judge Susan L. Claypoole entered an order and a

statement of reasons dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Judge 

Claypoole's opinion fully explained her reasons for granting defendant's motion:

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is a doctrine that 

declares that once a matter has been fully litigated and 

resolved, it cannot be re-litigated. Nolan v. First 

Colony Life Ins. Co., 345 N.J. Super. 142, 153 (App. 

Div. 2001) [(citing Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic 

Beverage Control, 33 N.J. 428, 435 (1960)).] In order 

for res judicata to have effect, there must be (1) a final 

judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) 

identity of issues, (3) identity of parties, and (4) identity 

of the cause of action. Brookshires Equity, LLC v. 

Montaquiza, 346 N.J. Super. 310, 318 (App. Div. 

2002).

Res judicata promotes judicial efficiency, as litigation 

in a matter must eventually end. Watkins v. Resorts 

Int'l[] Hotel & Casino, 124 N.J. 398, 409 (1991). "In 
4

A-1079-18T2

essence, the doctrine of res judicata provides that a 

cause of action between parties that has been finally 

determined on the merits by a tribunal having 

jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or 

their privies in a new proceeding." Velasquez v. Franz, 

123 N.J. 498, 505 (1991) (citations omitted). For a 

decision to have the effect of res judicata, there must be 

a valid and final judgment on an issue of fact or law that 

is essential to the judgment. Id. at 506. It is then 

binding on the parties, whether in the same or a 

different claim. Ibid.

In order for collateral estoppel to apply, a party must 

show (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the 

issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was 

actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court 

in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the 

merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential 

to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom 

the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with 

a party to the earlier proceeding. First Union Nat['l]

Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J. 342, 352 

(2007) [(citing Hennessey v. Winslow Twp., 183 N.J. 

593, 599 (2005)).]

The Entire Controversy Doctrine is found in [Rule]

4:30A. Pursuant to [Rule] 4:30A: "Non-joinder of 

claims required to be joined by the entire controversy 

doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted 

claims to the extent required by the entire controversy 

doctrine. . . ." R. 4:30A.

The purpose of the entire controversy doctrine is to 

avoid fragmentation of litigation and to promote party 

fairness, judicial economy and efficiency. See Thomas 

v. Hargest, 363 N.J. Super. 589, 596 (App. Div. 2003). 

Thus, a litigant is required to assert in one action all 

claims arising from a single controversy. Id. at 595. In 
5

A-1079-18T2

order for the doctrine to bar the action being asserted, 

the plaintiff must have had a fair and reasonable 

opportunity to fully litigate its claim in the prior action. 

Id. [at 546.]

The entire controversy doctrine is one of judicial 

fairness and will be invoked in that spirit. Crispin v. 

Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 96 N.J. 336, 343 (1984). The 

doctrine was judicially created as a "reflection of . . . 

the unification of the state courts" in light of our 

Constitution's recognition of "the value in resolving 

related claims in one adjudication so that all matters in 

controversy between parties may be completely 

determined." Higgins v. Thurber, 413 N.J. Super. 1, 

11-12 (App. Div. 2010). The objectives of the doctrine 

are: (1) to encourage the comprehensive and 

conclusive determination of a legal controversy; (2) to 

achieve party fairness, including both parties before the 

court as well as prospective parties; and (3) to promote 

judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding 

fragmented, multiple and duplicative litigation. Id. at 

12.

. . . . 

In support of its [m]otion, [d]efendant cites to Malaker 

Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm[ittee] v. First 

New Jersey Nat[tional] Bank, in which the [appellate]

court held that the entire controversy doctrine [barred]

the claims because "the bank's claims in the prior suit, 

upon which judgment was recovered, and plaintiffs' 

claims in the present litigation, do derive from the same 

transaction or series of transactions—the underlying 

alleged agreements to extend credit." [163 N.J. Super. 

463, 498 (App. Div. 1978).] Here, [d]efendant argues 

that [p]laintiffs' claims against it are "entirely 

dependent on a challenge to [U.S. Bank's] ownership of 

the Subject Property. However, [U.S. Bank's] right to 
6

A-1079-18T2

foreclose the Subject Property was established by the 

court's entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure on 

November 24, 2015." Further, ownership was 

established by the Essex County Sheriff's issuance of a 

Sheriff's Deed on August 6, 2016.

. . . .

Plaintiff Lee contends that [d]efendant has violated the 

New Jersey Fair Foreclosure Fairness Act. 

Specifically, [p]laintiff Lee states that, in New Jersey, 

ownership of real property is transferred by deed, and 

the transfer of a property interest is complete upon 

delivery of same. Here, according to [p]laintiff Lee, the 

certification of Brian J. Yoder, Esq. fails to certify that 

the Sheriff's Deed . . . was transferred and completed; 

that [U.S. Bank] is "person who takes titles, as a result 

of a [S]heriff's sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure to a 

residential property["]; and that [d]efendant, as an 

agent of [U.S. Bank], provided the Notice to Tenants in 

accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:50-70. Further, [p]laintiff 

Lee asserts that the certification of Brian J. Yoder, Esq. 

also fails to offer any credible evidence to prove that it 

was the intent that the Sheriff's Deed be effective upon 

its physical delivery to [U.S. Bank] or to transfer the 

Subject Property to same.

[Plaintiff] also asserts that [d]efendant has failed to 

demonstrate that it did not violate the New Jersey Fair 

Foreclosure Fairness Act and, as such, the allegations 

set forth against [d]efendant remain undisputed. Nor 

has [d]efendant presented any credible evidence that 

[U.S. Bank] had taken title[] to the Subject Premises

prior to, or after, sending the Notice to Tenants. In 

support of this assertion, [p]laintiff Lee cites to an 

apparently unanswered letter dated August 2, 2018 in 

which he demanded proof that ownership of the Subject 

Property had in fact changed. . . .
7

A-1079-18T2

In reply, [d]efendant argues that, despite any claims to 

the contrary, the evidence attached to the [m]otion to 

[d]ismiss is admissible. Defendant cites to [Rule] 902 

which provides that extrinsic evidence of authenticity 

as condition precedent to admissibility is not required 

with respect to New Jersey public documents and 

certified copies of public records. [N.J.R.E. 902.] 

Here, all of the documents on which [d]efendant relies 

are limited to true and correct copies of New Jersey 

public documents and copies of public records. 

Therefore, all of [d]efendant's exhibits are selfauthenticating and admissible.

Further, [d]efendant states that the publically recorded 

Sheriff's Deed demonstrates that title to the Subject 

Property has vested in [U.S. Bank]. While [p]laintiff 

Lee claims that no proof was submitted of any physical 

delivery, [d]efendant contends that such extrinsic 

evidence is not required as "the public recording of the 

Deed automatically creates a presumption at law of 

delivery with the intent to transfer." Ibid.

[(Citations omitted).]

The judge concluded that dismissal was warranted under Rule 4:6-2(e)

because "the record is replete with evidence showing that [U.S. Bank] gained 

title to the Subject [P]roperty via the Sheriff's [s]ale." Further, the judge aptly 

noted that, on November 25, 2015, a final judgment and writ of execution were 

granted in favor of U.S. Bank. On May 31, 2016, the Essex County Sheriff sold 

the Subject Property to U.S. Bank and issued a Sheriff's deed on August 6, 2016. 

On July 10, 2017, plaintiff's motion to vacate the Sheriff's sale was denied, and 
8

A-1079-18T2

on June 26, 2018, a post-sale Notice to Tenant was properly forwarded to the 

tenants in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:50-70. The judge concluded there was 

"proof" of ownership vesting in U.S. Bank, the issue of ownership "has been 

clearly decided," and plaintiff's claims are barred under the doctrines of res 

judicata, collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine. This appeal 

followed.

"On appeal, we apply a plenary standard of review from a trial court's 

decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e)." Rezem Family 

Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011).

"[W]e owe no special deference to a trial judge's legal interpretations in deciding 

any motion." Giannakopoulos v. Mid State Mall, 438 N.J. Super 595, 600 (App. 

Div. 2014).

"In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e) our inquiry is 

limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the 

complaint." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 

(1989). "The essential test is simply 'whether a cause of action is "suggested" by 

the facts.'" Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013) (quoting Printing 

Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746). Reviewing courts must "search[] the 

complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a 
9

A-1079-18T2

cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim, 

opportunity being given to amend if necessary." Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 

N.J. at 746 (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 

244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). 

Applying this standard of review, following our review of plaintiff's 

arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Law Division's 

order substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Claypoole's comprehensive 

and well-reasoned statement of reasons.

Any argument raised by plaintiff not explicitly addressed in this opinion 

lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.