Docket No . 107498.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

In reANDREW

B. (The People of the

S tat e o f Illinois, App ellee v. An drew B ., Ap

pel l an t).
Opinion filed February 19, 2010.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE de li v ered th e j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Ju st ice Fit zg er ald and Jus t ices Fr eeman, Tho mas, G ar man, Karmeier , a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

The qu es t io n p r es en t ed in this appeal i s w he the r s ec ti on 3 –61 1 of t he Me n tal He al th and Dev el opmen talDis abi li ties Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/ 3–6 11 ( West 200 6) ) a nd t he disc har ge p ro visions in sect ions 1–109 and 2–104 of the Co de (405 I LCS 5/1–109, 2–104 (West 2006) ) ma

ndate ful l ph ys ic al release of an

in div idu al pr ev io us ly ordered di scha

rge d b ef ore th e Sta te m ay f i l e a su bs eq ue nt p eti ti on f or i nv olu ntary adm i ssi on. The ci rcu i t cou rt of Winnebago Co unt y or der ed t hat re spo ndent be in volun taril y a dmi tt ed pur suan t to se cti on 3 –60 0 of

the Code (405 ILC S 5 /3 –60 0 ( West 200 6) ). The app ellate co ur t affirmed, re ject ing respo ndent’s argu

men t t h at the p eti

tion see ki ng h i s i nv olu ntary1 Respo nd en t con ten ds a n ear lier pe

tit io n f or i nv ol un tary adm iss io n w as dis miss ed by th e tri al co urt on April

10, 2007, an d he wa s or der ed di sc ha rg e d, but the re co rd doe s n ot co ntain th isor de r.
-2- ad m i ss i on was unti me ly fi le d unde r se ct ion 3 –61 1 o f the Co de

. 38 6 I ll. App. 3d 3 37, 347 . Fo r t he r eas ons t hat follow , w e affirm the judg ment of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.

I. BACKG

ROUND T he inst an t ca se ar ise s fr o m a seri es of comm

itm ent proceedin

gs involvingresp ond en

t, A nd rew B., an i nd i vi dua l wi th a hi story of
me ntal il ln ess. On M arch 26 , 20 07, respondent volun taril y a dmi tt ed himse lf to Si n ger M en tal He al th Center. On May

7, 2007, re spo ndent express ed a desi

re to le ave the f

acili ty, and a s ocial

worker fi le d a pe ti ti on for respondent’s i

nvol untary adm

is si on under sections 3–403 and 3–4 04 of

th e Code

(405 IL CS 5/3 –403, 3 –404 (We st 2006 )). 1 Ult imat ely, t he St at e vo lunt ar ily dismissed t he pe t itio n, a nd t he t r ia l courtord ered resp on de n t dis charged on Jun e 12, 2007, but
re spo ndent was not physi cally released. Instead, the nex t day a social
w ork er fil ed a pet itio n for re spo ndent ’s emer genc y admission by
certif i ca te under section 3–600 of

the Code (405 ILCS 5 /3–600 ( West 2006) ). A s wi

th th e p rev i ou s pe t it io n, t his p et it io n w as vo lun t ar ily dis mi ssed by the State , and th e co ur t aga in or der ed r esp ond ent dis charged

on J une 19, 2007. Respondent, however, was n ot released, and o n Ju ne 20 , 20 07 , a s o cia l wo rke rfiled an o t he rpe t it io n fo rhis
em ergen cy adm i ssi on un der s ection 3–6 00. The Ju ne 20 , 20 07 , pe t it io n is t he su bje ct o f t he inst an t ap pe al. The petition al

le ged that re sp on den

t wa s del us i on al, un

ab l e to prot ect himse lf fr o m ha rm, co nsu med o nly o ne - t hir d o f his mea ls, r efu se d h is medi cations, and d ra nk da ng erous am ounts of water. Two
acc omp anying

psy chi atrists’ certif

ic ates were att ached

to the pe ti ti on and contai

ned si m i l ar al l egati ons. Th e tri al courtor der ed r esp ond ent eval uated by a qualif ie d exam in er and sch

edu le d a hear ing o n t he
matter. Resp ond ent fil

ed a mot ion t o di sm

is s the petiti on, arguin

g that because he was n

ever phy si cally released pur suant t o t he cou rt ’s pre vi ou s d i sch arge

ord er s, h i s c on

ti n ue d dete n ti on at th e f ac i l i ty-3- violated hi s righ ts under the Code and en titled h im to a full and
com pl ete release. The court denied resp ondent’s motion to dism iss,
co ncluding “the f

ai lure to disc

harge[resp ondent], i f

th ere w as , i

n f ac t,
a fai lure, an d it’s n ot cl ear that ther e was” did no t ne ce ss ar ily i n v al i da te ot herwi se v al i d sub se que nt e merg en cy ad m i ss i on procee di ngs

. At the heari

ng, th e S tate

pres en ted the testi mony of Dr. Howard Pa ul, a psy

chi atrist, and Dr. Wi

ll ia m W el ch, the cou

rt- appoin ted
exam in er and cl i ni cal psy chologi st. Dr. Paul treated respondent si nce his adm i ssi on, and h e b el

i ev ed re sp on den

t n ee de d i

m med i ate hos pi tal iza ti on be ca us e h e suf f ere d f rom paranoid s chi

zophrenia. Dr. Paul opine d respondent was reasonably expected to inf

li ct serious phy si cal harm on hi ms el f or other ind ividua ls and h ad shown conduct that wo uld ca use ot her s t o be liever es po nd en t wo uld ha rm them. Dr. Paul f urthe r opi ne d res ponde nt coul d not take

care o f his o wn ba sic phy si cal ne ed s be ca us e h e c o nsu med ex ce ss iv e quantiti es of water, ca us in g pot en

ti al l y f atal se izu res f rom a dan ge rous l y l ow l evel of sodium in his bl oo d. Acco rd ingt o D r. Pau l, o n at least one oc cas ion,
re spo ndent had a gr and ma l s eizure as a consequen

ce of hi s di mi ni shed bl ood- sodium

le vel . D r. Pau l b eli

eved hospitali

zation was the least restri cti ve en vi ronm en t for res ponde nt. Dr. We lch , t he co ur t

- ap po int ed ex amine r , t es t ifie d th at re spo ndent gen era lly r efus ed to t al

k durin g hi s i nterviews. Dr. Wel

ch revi ewed respo ndent’s me dic al

rec or d and, i

n hi s opin ion, responden

t was se r io us ly men t ally i ll a nd una

ble to care for his own

basi c phy si cal
ne eds

. Fo llowing the

he ari ng , th e tri al cou rt f ound the St at e pr ove d by cl ear an d c o nvin cin g e vid ence t hat re spo ndent was menta lly ill and
coul d n ot prov i def orhi s bas ic

needs to prot ect hi

ms el f f rom serious ha rm and, theref

ore, was su

bj ec t to i nv ol un tary ad m i ss i on for 90 days. The cou rt f urth er f oun d that h os pit alizat ion wa s t he least re st rict ive al terna tiv e. On app eal, re spo ndent ar gue d t he t rial co ur t ’s o rd er sho uld be reversed because the em ergency pe ti ti on wa s u nt imely file d. 38 6 I ll. App. 3d a

t 338 . A cc ordi

ng to r esp ond ent , al

though the tri al court twiceordered h is d isc ha r ge fr o m t he fac ilit y, h e w as no t ph ysic ally released and was c ontinual

ly confi ned si nce h is requ es t to l ea

ve on May 7. C i ti n g s ec ti on

3– 61 1’ s m

an da te that a p et it io n be filed wit hin-4- 24 hours of adm

is si on (405 ILCS 5/3–6 11 (W est 200 6)), re spo ndent argued tha t the pe ti ti on at iss ue , filed Ju ne 20 , wa s no t filed wit hin 24 hours of his adm

is si on and was theref

ore inv alid. The appe l l ate court

first det er mined t hat , w hile the ex pi rati on of t he underlyi

ng 90-d ay admi

ssion period r endered respo ndent’s appeal
moot, hi s clai

ms shoul d be considered under the publi c in terest exce ption t o t he mootness doctrine. The c ourt nex t recognized that respo ndent’s ar gument cha ll engi ng the validi

ty of the peti

tion bas ed
on it s t imeline ss an d h is continuousdeten ti on m i rror ed th e a rgum en ts accepted by t he co ur t s in In re Helen S. , 342 Il l . Ap p. 3d 33 0 (200 3), and In re Nanc y A. , 342 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 35 5 (200 3). Helen S. and Nancy A. held t hat when a pet itio n see king i nv ol un tary ad m i ss i on of a pat ient
was dis mi ssed an d the patien

t o rdered disc

harged, butthe patien

t was not physically release d, any

subs equ ent pet itio ns were untim el y un der
se cti on 3–611 if not file d withi

n 24 hours of the pati

ent’s i ni tial admissio n. The appe l l ate court, h

owev er, di sa

gr ee d w i th Hele n S. and Nancy A. an d r each ed th e op pos i te co nclusio n. R elying on In re Shaw, 153 I ll. App. 3d 939 (1987), the court co nc lu de d that w he n a pe ti ti on see king i nv olu ntary ad miss io n o f a p at ien t is dismissed a nd t he pa t ient ordered dis charged, a ne

w petition c ould still

be f il ed, reg ardless o f whether t he individual was physically release d. Citing Shaw , the c ourt reasoned t hat aft er dismissal of t he pe ti ti on a nd en try of the dis charge order, the fac il

ity no longe rhad authority to detain the i ndi vi dual be caus e he or sh

e coul d no l onger be cons i dered

a pati en t. Nonetheless, ac cord

i ng to the cou rt , if that indi

vi dual thereafter exh ibited sympto ms war ra nt ingin

volun tary adm is si on, the in

div idua l
co uld be de t ained fo r 2 4 ho ur s pe nding t he fili ng o f a new p et itio n. The c ou rt explained t hat “[t ]he validity o f this new pet itio n ha s n o rel ati on t o t he va lidit y o f t he o ld p et it io n , no r is it t ainte d by any i m pr opri ety i n th e re sp ond en t’s pri ordeten tion . A new p et itio n begins a new proceedi

ng, to be j udg ed f or v al i di ty i nd ep en de nt of an y pri or procee di ngs .” Acco rd ingly, the appe ll ate court aff

irm ed the trial court ’s j udgme

nt. 386 Ill . App. 3d at 347. We al l owe d re sp ond

en t’s pe ti ti on f orle ave to appeal. 210 Il

l. 2d R. 315

.-5- II. AN AL YSIS On appeal, respondent chall enges the t r ial c o ur t ’s inv o lunt ar yad m i ss i on ord er. Ini

ti al l y , h owe ve

r, w e n ote th i s a ppe al i s m oot because respondent ’s underly in g 90-day admission period has e xpi red. In re Alfred H.H. , 233 I ll . 2d 345 , 350 ( 2009). Therefore, we must det er mine whether an

excepti on to the mootness doctrine app l ies. Alfred H.H. , 233 Ill . 2d at 351. We fi rst consider the pub li

c i nterest exce ption because the appella

te court found the ex

ception al lowed reviewof responden

t’s appeal . 386 Ill . App. 3d at 340. T he Stat e also agrees that the publ

ic in terest exception appl

ie s here. The publ ic in terest exception perm

its rev ie wof an othe rwise moot appeal wh en : (1 ) the i ssue i s o f a pu blic natu re ; (2 ) a n aut hor itat ive de term i na ti on i s n ec es sa ry to gui de pu bl i c of f i cers i n f uture cas es; a nd ( 3) t he r e is a l

i kel i hood the i ssue wi l l recur

. Alfred H.H. , 233 Ill . 2d at 355. This

excepti on mus

t be construedna rr o wly

and e st ablished by a cl ear showi ng of each cri teri on. Alfred H.H. , 233 Ill . 2d at 355. He re , r es po nde nt cha lleng es t he v alidit y of a pe ti ti on se ek ing his i nv olu ntary adm is si on fi le daft er t he fac ilit y did no t ph ysic ally release him followi ng m ulti ple d isc ha r ge o r de r s. T his is su e u nd en iab ly pr es en ts a question of

publ ic nature because

it i nvol vesa dis pute over t he pr o ce du r al r eq uir eme nt s fo rinvo lun t ar ily ad mit t ing ind ividua ls pr ev io us ly

o r de r ed dis ch ar ge d, t hu s s at isfying t he ex ce pt io n’s fi rst el em en t. The sec ond e l em

en t is sati sf i ed b eca use our appe l l ate court is div ide d on th e issue , r esu lting in t he nee d fo r a n aut hor itat ive de term i na ti on by this court . The t hi

rd elem ent is also satisf

ie d because , as illus t r at ed in

this case, t he iss ue is lik ely t o r ec ur wh en men t alh ea l th pr o fes sio na ls be lieve co nt inu ed invo lun t ar y ad miss io n is warranted af ter en try o f adi sc ha r ge o r de r

. Co ns eq ue nt ly, we concl ude th e pu blic in t er es t ex ce pt io n a pp lies an d n ex t ad dr es s t he mer it s o f resp ondent’s

clai m s. Resp ond ent argues strict

co mpliance wit h t he Code’ s def i ni ti on of dis chargeis

required an

d, therefore, he was entitled to physi cal release after the trial

courtor der ed his d ischar ge. Citing s ect ions 1 –10 9 and 2–104 of th e Code (405 IL CS 5/1 –109, 2 –104 (We st 2006 )),
re spo ndent observes that di scharge is def in ed as “ the f ul l rel ea se of any pers on ad

m i tted or otherwise detai

ne d un der [the Code ] f

rom t re at ment, habilitat ion, or car e and cus t od y,” a nd when an i ndi vi dual is dis charged h

e is statut oril

y e ntitled to r ecei

ve al l of hi s l awful-6- pe r so na l p r o pe r t y fr o m t he men t al- he alt h fa cili t y. Relying on section 3–611 of

the Code (405 ILCS 5/3–611 (West 2006) ), respondent contends t hat a peti tion see ki ng i nv olu ntary adm is si on mus

t be fi le d withi n 24 hours

of an i nd i vi dua l ’s ad m i ss i on to a m ental -heal th faci li ty. Responden

t argu es be ca

us e h e w asnot ph ysic ally releas ed, b ut inste ad w as c ont inuo usly det ained, t he subs equ ent peti

tions we re un t imely

fi le d after 24 hours of h

is origi nal adm is si on, citi ng Hele n S. and Nanc

y A. These clai m s req ui re statutory

co nst ru ct ion, pr ese nt ing

a q ue sti on of la w we revi

ew de novo

. People v. Davison , 233 Ill . 2d 30, 40 (2009 ). W

hen co ns t ru ing a st at ut e, ou r g oa l is to det er mine and ef f ec tua te th e l eg i sl atu re ’s i n ten t, best i ndicated by

gi vi ng th e statutory lan gu ag e it s p lainand ordi na ry mean i ng. People

v. Lew is , 234 Ill . 2d 32, 44 ( 200 9) . We must co nsider t he ent i re sta tute in li ght of t he subj ect it addresses, presum in g the le gis la

ture did not in

tend absurd,
un j us t, or in

conv en i en t resul ts. Lew is , 2 34 I ll. 2d a t 44. Review ing
cou rtswill no t de pa r t fr o m t he st at ut e’ s p lainlangua ge by r ead ingi n to it cond i tions, ex cepti ons, or l i m i tations tha

t contra v ene leg islative i n ten t. Weathe r-Tite, Inc. v. Un ivers ity

of St. Franci

s , 233 Ill . 2d385, 390 (2 009). Because respondent was invo lun t ar ily ad mit t ed pu r su an t t o ar t icle VI of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3–600 et seq. (Wes t 200 6) ), pr ovid ing f oremergency

admission b

y certif ication, we fi

rst b riefly out line the ap plic ab le statut ory f

ramework. Section 3–600 authorizesi nv olu ntary ad m i ss i on of a person 18 y

ears of age

or ol der i n n ee d of i m med i ate hos pit alizat ion. 405 IL CS 5/3 –600 (We st 2006 ). Wh en an in div idua l i s b el i ev ed to be

sub j ect to i nv olu ntary adm is si on under thatsec t ion,
a pe t it io n ma y b e fi

le d with a m

ental-heal th facili ty. 405 ILCS 5/3–6 01(a) (We st 2006 ). The pe t it io n mu st inc lu de, inter al ia , a det ailed st at ement explaining wh

y th e individual is su bject t o invo lunt ar y admission, including sig ns a nd symp t o ms of a menta l il lness and any

acts, t hreats,
orot her behav

ior suppor ting the all

egation. 405 I LCS 5/3–601(b)(1) (We st 2006 ). Th e p eti

ti on m us t also b e acc om

pa n i ed b y a c er ti f i ca te of a physician, qua lif

ied exa miner, o r c lini

cal ps ycholo gist st at ing t he in div idua l is su bj ec t to i nv ol un tary ad m i ss i on an d r eq ui re s i m med i ate hos pit alizat ion. 405 ILC S 5 /3 –60 2 ( West 200 6) . T he ce rt ify ing pr ofe ssio nal’s st at ement must be bas ed o n a ph y si cal exam i na ti on of-7- t he in div idua l m ade wi thin 72 hours of the ad mission. 405 ILCS 5/3–6 02 (W

est 200 6). Ult imate ly, se cti

on 3– 61 1 r eq

ui re s th e m en tal -hea l th f ac i l i ty di rectorto file in t he t rial co ur t t he pe t itio n and t wo sup po rt ing certif ic ates wit hin 24 ho ur s aft er t he individual is ad mitt ed t o t he fa cili t y. 405 ILCS 5/3–611 (West 2006) . A f i na l order f or in vol unta ry adm i ssi on i s l i m i ted to 90 day

s, su bj ect to exten

sion if the tri al court det ermi nesthe in

div idua l i s subj ect to continue d in volun tar y adm i ssi on. 405 ILCS 5/3–8 13 (W est 200 6). Section 3–611, in

relevan t par t, pro vides: “Wit hin 24 hours, excl

ud in g S at ur days, Su ndays a nd holi days, after t he respo ndent’s ad miss io n u nd er [ ar t icle VI], t he fa cil ity dire ct or of t he facility shall fil e 2 c op ies o f the pet itio n, t he first cer t ifi

cat e, and p ro of o f service of t he pe ti ti on and s t at ement of

ri gh ts upo n t he r esp ond ent wit h t he courtin t he co un t y i

n w hic h th

e f ac i l i ty i s l oca ted . Up on com pleti on of t he se con

d c erti f i ca te, th e f ac i l i ty di rectorsha ll pr o mpt ly fil e it w ith t he co ur t . * ** U po n t he filin g o f the pe ti ti on and f i rs t ce rtif i ca te, th e c our

t sh al l set a hear ing t o be he ld wit hin 5 day s, e xcluding S at ur days, Su ndays a nd holi days, af ter rec ei pt of th e petition.” 405 ILC S 5/3–611 (We st 2006 ). Thus, section

3–611 ’s24-h

our fi li ng requi remen t is triggered b

y a n ind iv idu al’s admission under articl e VI, providi

ng f or emergency i nv olu ntary admiss ion b y

certi f i ca te. R es pon de nt c onte

nds, f or purposes o f se ct io n 3 –6 11 , his a dmis sio n c o mmenc ed wit h his origi nal phy si cal entry i nto t he m ental -heal th faci li ty on March

26, 200 7. We note, h owev er, tha

t res pon de nt wasnot

ad mit t ed pu r su an t t o ar t icle VI when he fir st en t er ed t he fa cili t y, ma kin g in applic abl e the 24-hour f i l i ng r equi rem en t of se cti on 3–6 11. Moreov er, alt hou gh t he Code doe s n

ot def i ne the term “a dm i ssi on,”r es po nd en t ’s co nst r

uc t io n o f t he t er m as mea ning o nly phy si cal en try i n to a f ac i l i ty i s i n con siste n t wi th t he us e o f t he t er m in ot he rprovisi

ons of the Code. See Stern v . Wheaton -Warr

enville Community

U nit Schoo l District 200 , 233 Ill . 2d 396, 410 (2009) (revi ewi ng court should n

ot reviewst at ut o ry pr o visio ns in isolat ion, butsh ould i

nstead revi

ew the terms i

n consi deration wi

th ot her-8- re levant provisions) . Secti on 3–8 13 al

l ows con tin ued i nv olu ntary adm i ss i onbeyond t he initial 90 days w hen t he t rial co ur t finds “the
re cipient con

ti n ue s to b e s ub j ec t to in voluntary adm

issi on.” 405 I LCS 5/3–813 (West 2006) . Sect ion 3–801 pro vides that “[a] resp o ndent
ma y re qu est a dmis sio n as a n informal o r vo lunt ar y recipient at any t ime p r i or to an adjudication tha t he is su

bj ect to i

nv olu ntary adm i ssi on.”405 ILCS 5/3–801 (West 20 06 )

. T he se pr o visio ns c lea r ly allow a pat ient w ho i s ph

y si ca l l y i n si de a m en tal -hea l th f ac i l i ty to be subj ectedto a n oth er

“ ad m i ss i on ” w h en h i s c on di

ti on wa rra n ts addi tion al treatm en t or care. A rea son abl e construction of these provisi ons, therefore, is that t he Code refers to “adm is si on” i n a l egal sens e to descr ib e t he indi vidual’ s le gal

status. As the Stat e contends , t hi s c o nsis t s o f a
com bi na ti on o f t he pe r so n’s su sc ep t ibil it y t o be ing de t ain ed an d h is actual detent ion. In

oth er words , s ec ti on

3– 61 1’ s ref

eren ce to “admission” is

not alway

s lim ited to the in div idua l’ s origi nal phy si cal
en t ry. W he n, as he r e, t he ind ividua l is ph ysic ally p r es en t in a men t alhealt hfa cility and r equ ires a ddit ional ca re and t re at ment fo llowing
en try of a di scharge orde r, se cti on 3 –61 1’ s 2 4-h

our f i l i ng pe riod lo gic ally b eg i n s w h en a n ew peti ti on i s pre se n ted to th e f ac i l i ty di rector, as opposed to the date of hi s origi nal phy sical en try into t he fa cili t y. Acco rd ingly, the June 19, 2 007, pet ition seeking respo ndent’s
em ergency invo lun t ar y ad miss io n u nd er ar t icle VI was timel y b ecause it was f il ed wi thin 24 hours after i

t was presented t o t h e f ac i l i ty di rector. Re sp ond en t al so rel i eson t he Co de’ s de fini

t ion o f dischar ge a nd t he st at ut o ry re qu ire men t t ha t his belong ings must be r et ur ne d t o him upon discha rg e. Acco rd ing

to re sp on den

t, these stat uto ry provisi

ons, wi th section 3–611, re quir e t hat when a pat ient is ordered disch

arged, t he pati en t mu st be phy sical l y releas ed f

ro m t he facility befo re t he Sta te may f i l e a n ew i n v ol un tary -a dmi ssion pet ition. Respo ndent’s
ar gument is sup po rt ed byt he ap pellat e co ur t ’s de cisions in Helen S. and Nanc y A. In Hele n S. and Nanc

y A. , the appell

ate court determi

ned wh en an i nv ol un tary -ad m i ss i on pe t it io n is dis mis se d b

ut the i nd i vi dua l i s n ot ph ysic ally releas ed, a

subsequently

fi led petition m

ust be di sm

is sed as
un t imely un de rse ct io n 3 –6 11 if

no t filed wit hin24 hours of the i ni tial adm i ssi on da te. Helen S ., 342 Ill . App. 3d at 335 -36 ; Nanc y A. , 342-9- I ll. App. 3d at 3 64 . Th

e c our t i n b oth de cisi on s c on cl uded , a b se n t a ph ys ic a l rel ea se , th ere

wa s on l y one “ ad m i ss i on” f or pu rpos esof
se cti on 3–611

. Helen S. , 342 Ill . App. 3d at 335 -36 ; Nanc y A. , 34 2 I ll. App. 3d at 364. Resp ond ent ’s ar gument and t he dec isions in Helen S. and Nancy A. contradict our det ermi nation tha

t t he term “adm

is si on” i s no t li mi ted to an i

ndi vi du a l’s ph ysic al e nt ry int o a me nt al- he alt h fa cili t y, and overlook the plai

n m eani ng of the C ode’s de fini

ti on s rel ate d to dis charge. It is undi

sputed that section 1–109 of the Code def i nes dis chargeas the “f

ull release” of

an i nd i vi dua l , an d s ec ti on 2

–10 4 of t he Cod e req ui re s th e retu rn of th e i nd i vi dua l ’s be l ongi ng s u pon disch arge. 40 5 ILCS 5/1–109, 2–104 (West 2006). Neither of these pro vi sions, nor

se cti on 3 –61 1, h

owe ve r, re qui re th at a res pon den t ordered discha rg ed mus t be ph ysic ally releas ed f rom th e f aci l i ty b ef ore co mmencement o f s ubsequen t inv oluntary -admission proceedin

gs under arti cle VI. Instead , the on l y ex pres s req ui rem en ts f or f il in g a section 3–600pe ti

ti on and acc omp an

y i ng s upporti ng c erti f i cates are con t aine d i n s ections 3 –601(

b) a nd 3 –602 (405 IL CS 5/3 –601( b), 3–602(We st 2006 )). Respo ndent’s pos i

ti on , theref

ore , e ss en ti al l y re qui re s th i s c our t to
man da te full phy sical release of an

i ndi vi dual ordered di sch arge b ef ore co mmencement o f

new invo lun

tary-adm is si on proceedin

gs, in the tot al abse nc e of any

express or i

mpl ie d le gis la

tive i ntent to im

pose that
re qui re men t. Re sp on den

t’s argu men t v i ol ate s th

e f un da men ta l pr inc iple of statutory c onstruc tion that thi s court canno t re ad int o t he sta tute a ddi ti ona l el em en ts n ot intend ed bythe l

egi slature. WeatherTi te, Inc

. , 2 33 I ll. 2d a t 390 . C ons equ ent ly, we r eject his arg ument that the Code requires ph ysical release of an

in div idua l ordered dis charged

be fo r e c o mmenc eme nt o f ne w in vo lun t ar y-a dmis sio n pro ceedings. Supp ort ingo ur co nst ruc t io n o f t he Co de , t he ap pe llat e c o ur t in People v. Read , 228 Ill . App. 3d 664 , 667 (1992), det ermi ned that pri orphy si cal

re lease o f the re spo ndent is not re quir ed be for e t he Sta te may i n i ti ate new invo lunt ar y-ad mission pr oc edu re s. N ot ingt he trial court had en

tered a disch

arge order, t he Read

cour t concl uded that re qui ri n g p h y si ca l re l ea se f rom th e f ac i l i ty wo uld requi

re the court to “co ns tru e th

e statu te a s req ui ri n g th e p er f orm an ce of an em pty f orm al i ty when the le gis la

tive i n tent has b een

otherwi se a chi ev ed.”2 We ci te Read and Shaw

on ly fo r the pro po sit io n t hat fai lu re tore lease

an in di vidualfollowing a discha rge order does not pr event the S ta te fr om in itiatin g a n ew in vo lu ntary- adm

iss io n proc ee di ng

. -10- Read , 228 Ill . App. 3d at 667. Thus, the Read court concl ud ed th e Sta te was perm

i tted to i n i ti ate new i nvol untary-adm

is si on procedures de sp i te t he facility’s failure t o r elinquish physical cu st od y of t he resp ondent. Read , 228 Ill . App. 3d at 667. The appel la te court reached a

simi lar co nclusio n in Shaw . In that case, a v o lun t ar ily ad mit t ed pa t ien t r eq ue st ed dis ch ar ge wit hin t he five day s mandated b

y the C ode. Shaw , 153 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 940. T h e re spo ndent was not rel

eas ed wi thi n the requ

i si te f i ve day s, howev er, and an i nv ol un tary -ad m i ss i on petition was f

il ed. Shaw , 153 Ill . App. 3d at 940. The tr ia

l c ourt dis

mi ssed that petition a

nd ordered h is dis charge, bu

t he wa s n ot ph y si cal l y rel ea se d a nd a s ec ond pe ti ti on was f i l ed. Shaw , 153 Il

l . Ap p. 3 d at 940

. Ul

tim atel y , the tri al court ordered the respondent’s i nvol untary adm

is si on based

on t his seco nd peti tion

. Shaw , 153 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 941. T he S h a w court acknowl edged that the respondent should have been phy si cally released, but nonethel ess determi

ned t hat t he
re spo ndent was techni

cally no longe ra pa ti en t af ter th e e xp i rati on of t he statutory

tim e f ram e en titl i ng h i m to dis charge. Shaw , 153 Ill . App. 3d at 945. Rej ecti

ng th e res ponde nt’s chal l enge to his i

nv olu ntary ad m i ss i on base d on t he failure t o r elease him, the Shaw court reasoned “the mere fa ilure t o d ischar ge, whet her or not oc cas ioned by th e me ntal h ea l th f ac i l i ty ’s own om i ss i on i n f ai l i n g to fol low through

on a court order, do es not necessa ril y i nsul ate the r esponden

t f rom su b se qu en t, ot herwi se-val

id i nvol untary proceedi

ngs.” Shaw , 15 3 I ll. App. 3d at 945. Co nsist ent wit h Read , Shaw , a nd t he plain meaning of t he Cod e’s pro vi sions, 2 we concl

ude t ha t sec t ion 3 –61 1’s 2 4- hou r filing
re quir ement and the discharge provisi ons i n sections 1–109 and 2–104 do no t pr o hibit t he St at e fr o m f il in g a peti tion f or in vol unta ry a dm i ss i on of an i ndi vi dual who had prev

iousl y been ordered dis charged

bu t wa s n ot phy si ca ll

y rel eased. Because Hele

n S. and Nanc y A. contrad

i ct our conc l

usi on, we overru l e those deci sions. Here, re spondent’s adm

i ssi on legal l y ended w hen the tri al

court-11- entered the d i sch arge order. A

val id pe tition f or emergency

ad m i ss i on under article VI was then

t imely fil ed byth e f ac i l i ty i n com pl i an ce wi th
se cti on 3– 61 1. Alt hou gh the faci li ty did n ot physical

ly release
re sp on den

t, his co nt inued p re senc e inside t he fac ilit y did n ot i n v al i da te t he su bse qu en t ly

fil ed p et itio n. As t he appel

la te court concl

uded here, “[a] new peti

tion begi ns a n ewproceedin

g, to b e j udge d f

or val i di ty in dependen t o f an y pri or pro ceedi

ngs.” 386 Il

l. A pp. 3d at 342. Al thoughwe reje ct respondent’s construction of the Code, we find it ne cessary to express o ur co ncern wi th the series of events t ha t occurred in

this case. Af ter respondent requested disch arge he was t wic e or der ed d ischar ged , bu t , fo r r eas ons not ent irely clear in th e re cord, h e w as n ot re l ea se d. I

n ste ad , the S tate

re pea t edly so ught his i nv olu ntary adm is si on, and eve

ntua lly was suc ces sful. Alt hou gh t he Sta te t imely file d t he mul tiple petit ions seeking respo ndent’s ad m i ss i on as required by

the Code , we are st ill t ro ubled by t he pot entia l t ha t men t al- he alt h fa cilit ies co uld fil e re petitive petitions,
r es ult ing i

n th e i n de f i n i te c on f i n em en t of an i n di v i du al wi th out a court’s ex am i na tion of the m atter. The St at e ac kno wledg es “t hat t he ex ist en ce o f a le ga l po we rt o file
a val id p eti ti on f or i n v ol un tar y com m i tmen t b ef oreth e d

uty to dis chargea

person i s f

ull y i mpl em ented does not mean

that this power is exem pte d f rom j udi ci al su pervi si on , or th at courts m

ust disreg ard
an ab us e of pow er i f i t occ urs.” As ev

en the State concedes, an unrestrain ed and u nl i mited pat t er n of r epe at edly dismissing and
re fil ingi nv olu ntary -adm ission p et itio ns “co uld be a buse d t o d epr ive
a pe rs on of his l

iberty, co ntra ry to one o f the Mental Health Co de’s funda menta l pur po ses. ” We a gr ee, and re m i n d ou r c our ts to be ev

er vigilantto p rot ec t aga inst a buse s o f po wer and p re ser ve t he fun dam ental li berty i nterests of i

ndi vi dual s subj ectedt o inv o lunt ar yadmission proceedings. More im port antly , though, is our bel

ie f t ha t t his ma t t er is one that deserves t he at t en t io n o f t he Ge ne r al A ss emb ly. Our ap pel l ate court hasobserved

an incre asing num

ber of i nvol untary-com

mi tment cases re quir ing review. See In re Dorothy J. N. , 373 Il l . Ap p. 3d 33 2, 33 8 (2007) (Ste i gm

an n, P.J ., spe ci

al l y con curri ng) (notin

g that 50 dec isions wer e r ende re d by t he courtre gar ding invo lunt ar y admissions in one ye ar). The appell

ate court hasal so repeatedly expresse d seri ous con cern s wi th th e S tate ’s

f ai l ur e to adhere to the Code’s procedural-12- saf eguards me ant to pr ot ect the funda me ntal l ib erty i nterests at stake. See, e.g. , In re Suzette D. , 388 Ill . App. 3d 9 78, 987 (2 009 ) ( “we find t he S t at e’ s p er fu nc t o ry man ne rin p r o se cu t ing t he se [ inv o lunt ar yadmissio n] pet itions d istur bing”); In re JohnR. , 339 Ill . App. 3d 778, 785 (2003) (ad

m on ishin g t ha t pr o ce ed ing s u nd er t he Co de “sh o uld not be conducted pro forma ”); In re Luttr ell , 261 Il l . App. 3d 221, 230-31 ( 1994) ( collecti

ng cases) (ex

pre ss i ng “ di sm ay at the s l i ps hod
ma nne rwi th which t hese cas es a re handled ” and co ncluding t hat t he Sta te r o ut ine ly

dis regards procedural saf

eguards). We agreewit h t he appe l l ate court ’s v ie w and rei terat e our sin

cere bel ie f that t he General Ass emb ly sho u ld c areful

ly consider the chal

le ngi ng i ssues presen

ted by t he se ca se s. As o ne ap pe llat e c o ur t jus t ice as se r t ed , “[ m]e nt alh ea l th cas es a re treat ed di ff

erently than ot her proceedin

gs becaus e we have permi

tt ed them to becom

e di ff erent.” In re Lisa G. C. , 37 3 I ll. Ap p. 3d 58 6, 598 ( 2007)(Kn ech t, J., di sse nti ng)

.
III. CONCLUSION We hol d that the p l ai

n m ea ni ng of section 3–611 of

the Code and t he sta tutor y de f i n i ti on s rel ate d to dis charge do n ot proh i b i t th e S tate f rom fi li ng a n ew petiti on for i

nvol untary ad mi ssion of an i

ndi vi dual ordered dis charged b

ut who is not phys ic ally

released befo re fil ing t he pet itio n. We o ver ru le the co nt r ar y ho ldin gs in Hele n S. and Nanc

y A. For the foregoin

g reasons, we af

f i rm th e a pp el l ate cou rt’ s j udgm

en t.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.