Filed 5/17/21 P. v. Souza CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DENNIS DALE SOUZA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H047779

 (Monterey County

 Super. Ct. No. 18CR011585)

I. INTRODUCTION

After the trial court denied his motion to quash the search warrant and suppress 

evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant Dennis Dale Souza pleaded no contest to 

possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351),1 misdemeanor possession 

of a controlled substance injection or ingestion device (§ 11364, subd. (a)), and 

misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (§ 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court 

sentenced defendant to two years in county jail pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, 

subdivision (h).

Defendant contends that the evidence against him must be suppressed because 

there was not probable cause to issue the search warrant and the police officer’s reliance 

1 All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code unless 

otherwise indicated.
2

on the warrant was objectively unreasonable. The Attorney General counters that the 

search warrant affidavit provided probable cause for the warrant and that even if there 

was not probable cause, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

For reasons that we will explain, we determine that the search warrant affidavit 

established probable cause for issuance of the warrant because it provided the magistrate 

with “ ‘a substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a search would 

uncover wrongdoing.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 659 

(Westerfield).) Moreover, even if we were to find that there was not probable cause for 

the search, we would conclude that suppression is unwarranted because the officers 

executing the warrant relied on it in good faith. (See United States v. Leon (1984) 468 

U.S. 897, 923 (Leon).) Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Preliminary Hearing Evidence

On December 5, 2018, Monterey Police Officer Jeremiah Ruttschow went to 

Saf Keep Storage and determined that defendant had a storage unit there. Someone 

using defendant’s personal access code had entered the storage facility approximately a 

half hour before Officer Ruttschow’s arrival. Video footage showed a white Lexus 

entering the facility when defendant’s code was used. The Lexus left the facility 

approximately 10 minutes later.

Pursuant to a search warrant, Officer Ruttschow subsequently searched 

defendant’s storage unit, finding a small black pouch containing approximately 

13.06 grams of suspected heroin in four small packages, approximately 1.01 grams of 

suspected methamphetamine in two small packages, and five methamphetamine pipes. 

Officer Ruttschow also found over 100 small plastic baggies consistent with those used 

to package heroin, a digital scale, two syringes, and defendant’s credit card.
3

Defendant stated that he had a couple grams of heroin in the storage unit and that 

he was a methamphetamine user but did not use heroin. Defendant admitted selling 

heroin and that he had been inside the white Lexus.

The parties stipulated that “the substances found [were] methamphetamine and . . .

heroin.”

B. Charges

An information was filed charging defendant with possession of heroin for sale 

(§ 11351), misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance injection or ingestion 

device (§ 11364, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (§ 11377, 

subd. (a)).

C. Motion to Quash the Warrant and Suppress Evidence

After the information was filed, defendant filed a motion to quash the search 

warrant and suppress the evidence against him (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), contending that the 

search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause and that it was not objectively 

reasonable for the officer to rely on the warrant.

1. Search Warrant Affidavit

On December 5, 2018, Monterey Police Detective Jeff Reiland requested a 

warrant pursuant to Penal Code section 1524 seeking to seize evidence of stolen or 

embezzled property, property or things used as a means of committing a felony or public 

offense or concealing such property, and/or evidence tending to show a felony had been 

committed or a particular person had committed a felony. The search warrant affidavit 

specified the place to be searched as Saf Keep Self Storage, unit 29, in Del Ray Oaks and 

the property to be seized as a set of 1988 Ford Ranger keys, a Samsung cell phone 

charger, and several articles of clothing.

Detective Reiland submitted a six-page statement of probable cause signed under 

penalty of perjury as part of the affidavit. In the statement, Detective Reiland detailed 

that he had been a peace officer since August 2007 and was assigned to the field training 
4

unit from November 2016 to October 2018, where he conducted and assisted in the 

investigation of hundreds of crimes including robbery, burglary, fraud, identity theft, and 

financial crimes. Detective Reiland stated that he had been assigned to the investigations 

unit since October 2018, where he conducted investigations, prepared and executed 

search warrants, and prepared cases for prosecution. Detective Reiland had attended over 

600 hours of advanced officer training.

Detective Reiland averred that on December 4, 2018, at approximately 8:27 p.m., 

officers were dispatched to a reported disturbance at Del Monte Pines Motel. On the 

officers’ arrival, the reporting party said that he saw three men walk toward room 7, 

heard sounds of a commotion coming from the room, and then saw the three men leave.

Detective Reiland stated that Monterey Police Officer Arrollo contacted room 7’s 

occupant. The occupant told Officer Arrollo that when he opened the door after hearing 

a knock, three Hispanic men dressed in red pushed their way into his room, attacked him, 

and took his backpack. The backpack contained the occupant’s 1988 Ford Ranger keys 

and wallet. The occupant then said that the men did not enter the room and his wallet 

was not missing, although he was unable to locate it. The occupant became 

uncooperative with Officer Arrollo and at one point stated that the backpack was empty, 

but he maintained that the backpack had been taken. The occupant believed the three 

men showed up because he was a Sureño gang member. The occupant declined to state 

whether he could identify the men.

Detective Reiland stated that at approximately 9:40 p.m., Officer Arrollo was 

directed to contact J.S., Sr., regarding the incident. J.S., Sr., told Officer Arrollo that he 

went to the motel with his son, J.S., Jr., and another man, later identified as defendant, 

to collect $1,200 that the occupant owed. When the three men entered the room, the 

occupant and a woman were there. J.S., Sr., told Officer Arrollo that the occupant said 

he could only pay half of what he owed. An argument ensued and the occupant told them 

to leave. J.S., Sr., stated that they took the backpack that was on the bed and left.
5

Detective Reiland averred that he spoke to J.S., Sr., at the police department at 

approximately 10:55 the following morning. J.S., Sr., stated that the occupant told 

defendant to come to the motel so that the occupant could pay him the money he owed. 

J.S., Sr., went to the motel with J.S., Jr., and defendant. After the men got the occupant’s 

room number from the front desk, the occupant invited them into his room and said that 

he could only pay back half of the money owed. An argument ensued. The occupant 

pulled out a knife and swung it in the air. The occupant began fighting with J.S., Jr., 

who knocked the knife away. J.S., Sr., said that as they were leaving, the occupant 

threw a backpack at J.S., Jr., and J.S., Jr., “collected it.” J.S., Sr., stated that the backpack 

contained a set of keys. J.S., Sr., dropped J.S., Jr., and defendant off at the Elks Lodge. 

About an hour and a half later, J.S., Sr., got a call from J.S., Jr., to pick him up. Detective 

Reiland did not find any incoming calls on J.S., Sr.’s phone that corroborated his 

statement.

Detective Reiland stated that at approximately 11:58 a.m., J.S., Jr., arrived at the 

police department and agreed to speak with him. J.S., Jr., said that he went to the motel 

with J.S., Sr., and defendant to collect a debt. The front desk gave J.S., Sr., the 

occupant’s room number. J.S., Jr., said that the occupant invited them into the room and 

that there was a woman inside. According to J.S., Jr., an argument began between 

defendant and the occupant when the occupant stated that he could only pay back some 

of the money. The occupant “starting then telling [defendant] that he was burned and 

screwed and that he was not going to pay him his money.” The occupant pulled a knife. 

J.S., Jr., initially told Detective Reiland that he did not fight with the occupant, but then 

admitted to punching the occupant and getting punched. As they were leaving, the 

occupant threw a backpack at them. J.S., Jr., picked up the backpack and they left. 

J.S., Jr., stated that the backpack contained a cell phone charger and a pair of sunglasses. 

J.S., Jr., said that he threw the backpack into a trashcan at the Elks Lodge.
6

Detective Reiland averred that after he asked J.S., Jr., about the inconsistencies in 

his story, J.S., Jr., admitted that the occupant had not been expecting them, but insisted 

that the occupant had invited them into his room. J.S., Jr., was placed under arrest and 

read his Miranda rights.2 J.S., Jr., agreed to speak to Detective Reiland.

Detective Reiland stated that J.S., Jr., said that “[b]efore the robbery, [J.S., Jr.,] 

received a call from [J.S., Sr.,] asking him to go with [defendant] and [J.S., Sr.,] to the 

motel.” J.S., Jr., knew they were going to the motel to collect the money and J.S., Sr., 

wanted him to go because he and defendant believed the occupant had “other people 

(who he described as southsiders) at the motel.” J.S., Sr., and J.S., Jr., convinced the 

front desk to give them the occupant’s room number. J.S., Jr., knocked on the door to the 

occupant’s room while defendant stood out of sight. When the occupant answered the 

door, defendant pushed the door open and the three men entered. Defendant demanded 

the money. When the occupant stated that he was not going to pay him, defendant went 

through some drawers but did not take anything. J.S., Jr., then physically fought with the 

occupant, who brandished a knife at him. J.S., Jr., stated that the occupant threw his 

backpack at him and he left with it. The backpack contained a pair of sunglasses and a 

cell phone charger. The men went to the Elks Lodge, and J.S., Jr., went inside with 

defendant and “another friend.” J.S., Jr., said that he threw the backpack into a trashcan 

at the Elks Lodge.

Detective Reiland averred, “[J.S., Jr.,] said he did not see any weapons, but heard 

a metal click and saw [defendant] put something in his pants. [J.S., Jr.,] said it could 

have possibly been a handgun since he saw [defendant] with a handgun three days ago 

at his storage unit in Del Ray Oaks. [J.S., Jr.,] provided a general area . . . where 

[defendant’s] storage unit was located.” Detective Reiland stated that J.S., Sr., was the 

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
7

registered owner of a black Corvette and that J.S., Sr., and J.S., Jr., stated that the three 

men went to the Elks Lodge in the Corvette.

Detective Reliand stated that Officer Reed found an empty backpack in a trashcan 

near the Elks Lodge’s front door. Surveillance footage showed three people getting out 

of a Corvette, including J.S., Jr., who was carrying a backpack. The footage showed 

J.S., Jr., going through the backpack, removing numerous items, and putting them in his 

pockets. J.S., Jr., then put the backpack in a trashcan by the front door and went to the 

parking lot. Defendant was also captured on the surveillance footage.

Detective Reliand averred that Sergeant Ruttschow located the woman who was in 

room with the occupant. The woman told Sergeant Ruttschow that when the occupant 

opened the door after hearing a knock, three men forced their way inside. The occupant 

was pushed backwards towards the bathroom, but the men seemed surprised when they 

saw her in the room and appeared uncertain about what to do. The woman did not 

understand what was being said, but the interaction was confrontational from the outset. 

When she stood up to intervene, she was shoved to the ground. Someone mentioned 

“ ‘gun,’ ” but the woman never saw a gun and did not know if anyone had one. The men 

took a backpack that was on the bed and left. The woman said the men may have also 

taken some cell phone chargers. The woman was unable to identify the men, but the 

descriptions she gave were similar to J.S., Sr., J.S., Jr., and defendant.

Detective Reiland stated that defendant arrived at the police department at 

approximately 3:40 p.m. Defendant was placed under arrest, Mirandized, and agreed to 

speak to the detective. Defendant said that the occupant told him to come over so he 

could pay defendant the money he owed him. Defendant first stated that the occupant 

gave defendant his room number, but defendant later admitted that the occupant did not 

tell him what room he was in. Defendant said that the occupant invited them into the 

room and pulled a knife on them. Defendant subsequently stated that the occupant tried 

to shut the door on J.S., Jr., but they pushed the door open and went inside. Defendant 
8

said that the occupant tried to stab J.S., Jr., and told them to “ ‘get the fuck out.’ ” 

Defendant stated that “[J.S., Jr.,] and [the occupant] got into a fistfight, but that [J.S., Jr.,] 

was defending himself.” The men left after the altercation. The occupant threw a 

backpack at J.S., Jr. Defendant initially said the backpack was empty but later stated 

there was toilet paper and a bag of baggies inside. J.S., Sr., dropped defendant and J.S., 

Jr., off at the Elks Lodge. A friend took defendant to his room at the Oceanside Inn. 

Defendant denied searching the occupant’s belongings or the drawers in the occupant’s 

room, although he said he was unsure whether he touched the backpack. Detective 

Reiland asked to look at defendant’s phone to confirm whether the occupant had called 

him, but defendant refused. Defendant indicated that he was currently homeless. Police 

confirmed that defendant had been a guest at the Oceanside Inn but had checked out 

earlier that day.

Detective Reiland averred that Sergeant Ruttschow went to Saf Keep Storage in 

Del Rey Oaks and was told that defendant had a storage unit there. The facility’s staff 

provided Sergeant Ruttschow with a copy of defendant’s identification from defendant’s 

rental file and with surveillance footage that showed a car entering the facility’s gate on 

December 5, 2018 at 2:26 p.m., after someone used defendant’s personally assigned gate 

code. The vehicle left the facility at 2:38 p.m., which was approximately one hour before 

defendant arrived at the police department.

Detective Reiland stated that he ran defendant’s criminal history and learned that 

defendant was a convicted felon forbidden from possessing, purchasing, or owning any 

firearms or ammunition. Detective Reiland averred that based on his training and 

experience, he knows that people who commit violent crimes and are gang members

or associate with gang members often possess firearms, ammunition, and other weapons 

to protect themselves and instill fear in their victims and that “[i]n this case, [J.S., Jr.,] 

mention[ed] hearing a metal click that could have been a firearm and saw [defendant] 

with a firearm three days prior to this event at his storage unit. [The woman] also heard 
9

someone mention ‘gun’ while in the room.” Detective Reiland stated that based on his 

training and experience, he knows that “thieves commonly conceal stolen items inside 

storage units because they do not have a permanent residence. [Defendant] provided his 

address as the Salvation Army, 800 Scott Street, which . . . allows subjects to receive 

mail only. Salvation Army does not allow residential housing at this location.” Detective 

Reiland “believe[d] the search of [defendant’s] storage unit will lead to the discovery of 

the stolen property as well as clothing worn by [defendant] during this crime” and 

“believe[d] searching this location will lead to further evidence to support that 

[defendant] is in possession of the stolen items.” Detective Reiland stated that based on 

his training and experience, there was probable cause to believe, and he did believe, that 

grounds existed for the issuance of a search warrant.

2. Motion to Quash and Suppress, Opposition, and Hearing

Defendant contended in his motion to quash the search warrant and suppress the 

evidence that the affidavit did not establish probable cause that contraband or evidence 

of a crime would be found in his storage unit and that the good faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule did not apply. Defendant argued that there was not probable cause to 

believe that a crime had occurred or that there was evidence to recover and that the 

affidavit did not establish a nexus between the storage unit and the items sought.

The prosecution filed written opposition to the motion, asserting that the affidavit 

established probable cause to justify the search and that the officers relied on the warrant 

in good faith, rendering suppression of the seized evidence unwarranted. The prosecution 

argued that the affidavit detailed that defendant and his associates admitted they were in a 

confrontation with someone and took an item of property and that someone had accessed 

defendant’s storage unit using defendant’s personal code approximately an hour before 

defendant gave his statement to the police.

The trial court determined that the affidavit established probable cause. The court 

observed that the affidavit indicated that defendant did not have a residence but that 
10

officers learned that defendant had a storage unit that he accessed the afternoon after the 

incident and shortly before he went to the police station. The court stated, “[T]he fact 

that he goes there . . . shortly before he goes . . . to the police station, I could understand 

why that would lead an officer to believe the stolen goods were put there when he doesn’t 

have a normal residence.”3 The court further found that the exclusionary rule would not 

serve its purpose in this case because there was no reason for the officers executing the 

warrant to believe the search was unlawful.

D. Pleas and Sentencing

Defendant pleaded no contest to the charges. The trial court sentenced defendant 

to two years in county jail pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the evidence against him must be suppressed because 

there was not probable cause to issue the warrant as the affidavit did not establish a 

connection between the evidence to be seized and the location to be searched. Defendant 

argues that the fact that he was with J.S., Jr., on December 4, 2018, and that someone 

entered and exited his storage unit the next day does not constitute probable cause to 

search the unit because defendant was not seen in possession of the evidence, there was 

no reason to believe the evidence was in his storage unit, and “a generalized speculation 

that homeless thieves keep their possessions in storage lockers is legally insufficient.” 

Defendant further contends that the evidence must be suppressed because reliance on the 

warrant was objectively unreasonable as the affidavit “literally attributed the possession 

of the desired evidence to someone other than the subject of the warrant” and there were 

no facts stated in the affidavit that the evidence sought could be found in defendant’s 

storage unit. 

3 The court stated that it did not rely on the information in the affidavit about a gun 

because the affidavit did not include a gun as an item of property to be seized.
11

The Attorney General counters that the affidavit established probable cause to 

search defendant’s storage unit as it demonstrated a fair probability that defendant was 

“involved in taking [the] backpack” and that defendant would have received at least some 

of the backpack’s contents given that defendant and his associates went to the motel room 

to collect the money the occupant owed defendant. The Attorney General argues that 

because the affidavit established that defendant was homeless, the magistrate could 

reasonably infer that defendant would keep “the spoils of his crimes” in his storage unit 

and that evidence of defendant’s crime would be in the unit since defendant appears to 

have accessed the unit shortly before he arrived at the police department. The Attorney 

General alternatively contends that even if there was not probable cause to issue the 

warrant, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rules applies because the affidavit 

“was not so ‘plainly deficient’ that no reasonable well-trained officer could have relied 

on it.”

A. Legal Principles

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits ‘unreasonable 

searches and seizures’ and requires search warrants to be issued only upon a showing of 

‘probable cause’ describing with particularity ‘the place to be searched, and the . . . things 

to be seized.’ ” (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 659.) “ ‘Probable cause sufficient for 

issuance of a warrant requires a showing that makes it “ ‘substantially probable that there 

is specific property lawfully subject to seizure presently located in the particular place for 

which the warrant is sought.’ ” [Citation.] That showing must appear in the affidavit 

offered in support of the warrant. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The showing required in order 

to establish probable cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence or even a prima 

facie case.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 

369-370.) The existence of probable cause for issuing a search warrant is measured by a 

“totality-of-the-circumstances approach.” (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 230 

(Gates).) “ ‘The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
12

commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , 

including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay 

information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place.’ ” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040-1041, 

quoting Gates, supra, at p. 238.)

“ ‘The question facing a reviewing court asked to determine whether probable 

cause supported the issuance of the warrant is whether the magistrate had a substantial 

basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a search would uncover wrongdoing.’

[Citations.]” (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 659.) We review the magistrate’s 

determination of probable cause deferentially and overturn it “ ‘only if the affidavit fails 

as a matter of law to set forth sufficient competent evidence’ supporting the finding of 

probable cause.” (Id. at p. 660.) “ ‘ “Although in a particular case it may not be easy to 

determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution 

of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference 

to be accorded to warrants.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Weiss (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 

1082-1083.)

B. The Affidavit Established Probable Cause

Defendant contends that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause because 

it did not provide a nexus between the evidence sought and his storage unit. While 

defendant concedes that there was “reason to believe that [he] was involved in an 

altercation with [the occupant of room 7],” he argues that there was “no reason at all to 

believe that evidence of that altercation would be found at [his storage unit]” since the 

affidavit demonstrated that the occupant’s property was taken by J.S., Jr., and did not 

contain any information that J.S., Jr., gave the property to defendant or left it at 

defendant’s storage unit. We are unpersuaded.

“The affidavit must establish a nexus between the criminal activities and the place 

to be searched. [Citation.]” (People v. Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715, 721.) 
13

However, a magistrate “ ‘is entitled to rely upon the conclusions of experienced law 

enforcement officers in weighing the evidence supporting a request for a search warrant 

as to where evidence of crime is likely to be found. [Citation.] It is not essential that 

there be direct evidence that such evidence will be at a particular location. Rather, the 

magistrate “ ‘is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to 

be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” 

(People v. Lazarus (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 764.)

Here, there was “ ‘a substantial basis’ ” for the magistrate to conclude that there 

was “ ‘a fair probability’ ” that evidence of defendant’s altercation with the occupant of 

room 7 and stolen property would be found in defendant’s storage unit based on the 

nature of the crime, defendant’s homelessness, the entry into the storage facility with 

defendant’s personal code the day after the incident and roughly an hour before 

defendant’s arrival at the police department, and Detective Reiland’s statement that in his 

experience, “thieves commonly conceal stolen items inside storage units because they do 

not have a permanent residence.” (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 659.) The affidavit 

established that defendant, J.S., Sr., and J.S., Jr., went to room 7 to collect the money the 

occupant owed defendant. The occupant, the woman inside the room with him, 

defendant, and J.S., Jr., all stated that the men forced or pushed their way inside, although 

defendant and J.S., Jr., initially denied doing so. After a physical fight between J.S., Jr., 

and the occupant, the men left with the occupant’s backpack.

Although J.S., Sr., and J.S., Jr., told the police that it was J.S., Jr., who left the 

room with the backpack and surveillance footage later captured J.S., Jr., going through 

the backpack and pocketing its contents, the affidavit demonstrated that the occupant 

owed defendant money and that J.S, Jr., went to the motel to help defendant collect it. 

Moreover, the surveillance footage established that defendant was present at the location 

where J.S., Jr., was going through the backpack and taking its contents. In addition, 

J.S., Jr., told Detective Reiland that defendant demanded money from the occupant and 
14

went through some drawers at the motel room. While defendant denied to Detective 

Reiland that he went through any drawers, defendant admitted knowledge of the 

backpack’s contents, first stating that it was empty but later saying there was toilet paper 

and baggies inside. Defendant could also not be sure whether he touched the backpack. 

From this information in the affidavit, the magistrate could reasonably infer that 

defendant, not J.S., Jr., would ultimately take possession of any property stolen from the 

occupant as it was defendant who was owed the money and the reason for the men’s 

conduct was to recoup the occupant’s debt.

The affidavit further established that defendant was homeless and rented a storage 

unit. The day after the offense and approximately one hour before defendant arrived at 

the police department, someone using defendant’s personal code entered the storage 

facility. Detective Reiland stated in the affidavit that “[b]ased on [his] training and 

experience, [he] know[s] thieves commonly conceal stolen items inside storage units 

because they do not have a permanent residence” and averred his “belie[f] [that] the 

search of [defendant’s] storage unit [would] lead to the discovery of the stolen property 

as well as clothing worn by [defendant] during this crime.” Given defendant’s lack of a 

permanent residence, his rental of a storage unit, the access of the storage facility with 

defendant’s personal code the day after the incident and shortly before defendant went to 

the police department, and Detective Reiland’s experience with thieves concealing stolen 

property inside storage units, the magistrate had “ ‘a substantial basis’ ” to conclude that

there was “ ‘a fair probability’ ” that evidence of the offense and stolen property would 

be inside the unit. (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 659.)

Defendant relies on People v. Pressey (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1178 (Pressey) to 

argue that the affidavit did not establish probable cause. In Pressey, the magistrate’s 

finding of probable cause to search the defendant’s residence rested on the defendant’s 

simple possession of controlled substances during a traffic stop and an experienced 

officer’s opinion “that drug users with controlled substances on their person or in their 
15

car are likely to have more of those substances where they live.” (Id. at p. 1182.) The 

Court of Appeal held that “probable cause to search the residence of someone suspected 

of using illegal drugs requires more than an opinion or inference, available in every case, 

that drugs are likely to be present.” (Id. at p. 1190.)

In reaching its decision, the court observed that while some courts have upheld a 

warrant to search a drug dealer’s residence based solely on evidence that the occupant 

was a dealer coupled with an experienced narcotics officer’s opinion that contraband 

would likely be found in the dealer’s home, other courts have required additional facts 

concerning the residence, “ ‘such as that the seller went to his home prior to the sale, or 

that the sale occurred near the home, which would support the inference that the supply 

is probably located there.’ ” (Pressey, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183.) Nonetheless, 

the court was unaware of any decision finding probable cause to search a drug user’s 

home based solely on the user’s simple possession of narcotics and the court declined to 

so hold, citing the differences inherent in drug trafficking versus drug use, the heightened

expectation of privacy in the home, and concern over the breadth of such a rule as “there 

may be some reason to suspect that ‘everyone engaged in criminal activity (drugs or 

otherwise), keeps evidence of the criminal activity at home.’ ” (Id. at p. 1190.) The court 

stated that its holding “does not mean that probable cause to search a home could never 

arise from the particularized suspicions of an experienced narcotics officer, or the 

circumstances of an arrest for drug possession, only that illegal drug use does not 

necessarily provide probable cause to search the user’s residence, and that such cases 

must be decided on their own facts.” (Ibid.)

We find Pressey distinguishable. Beyond the evidence that linked defendant to 

the crime and the motive evidence that provided a reasonable inference that defendant 

would ultimately possess the property taken from room 7’s occupant as the occupant 

owed defendant money, the fact that the day after the incident and approximately one 

hour before defendant went to the police department someone using defendant’s personal 
16

code accessed the storage facility where defendant rented his unit provided a sufficient 

nexus between the crime and the storage unit.

For these reasons, and given the deference afforded a magistrate’s determination 

that there was probable cause to issue a search warrant, we determine the magistrate had 

“ ‘a substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a search [of defendant’s 

storage unit] would uncover wrongdoing.’ ” (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 659.) 

The affidavit did not “ ‘fail[] as a matter of law to set forth sufficient competent 

evidence’ supporting the finding of probable cause.” (Id. at p. 660.)

C. The Good Faith Exception Applies

Even if we were to conclude that there was not probable cause to issue the 

warrant, we would determine that the good faith exception precludes application of the 

exclusionary rule here. In Leon, the Supreme Court held that when “an officer acting 

with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and 

acted within its scope,” the “marginal or nonexistent benefits” produced by suppressing 

the evidence obtained “cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” (Leon, supra,

468 U.S. at pp. 920, fn. omitted, 922.) The court observed that the purpose of the 

exclusionary rule is to chill future police transgressions; the rule is not designed to punish 

the actions of errant judges or magistrates. (Id. at p. 916.) Thus, suppression of evidence 

is appropriate only if (1) “the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by 

information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false 

except for his [or her] reckless disregard of the truth”; (2) “the issuing magistrate wholly 

abandoned his [or her] judicial role” such that “no reasonably well trained officer should 

rely on the warrant”; (3) the affidavit was “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 

render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable’ ”; or (4) the affidavit was so 

deficient in particularizing the place to be searched or the things to be seized that the 

executing officer “cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” (Id. at p. 923.) In 

considering the issue, we apply the objective test of “whether a reasonably well trained 
17

officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s 

authorization.” (Id. at p. 922, fn. 23; see also People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 

606 [if “a reasonable and well-trained officer ‘would have known that his [or her]

affidavit failed to establish probable cause,’ ” suppression is warranted, but if such an 

officer “reasonably could have believed that the affidavit presented a close or debatable 

question on the issue of probable cause,” the good faith exception applies].)

Defendant contends that the third circumstance is present here as no reasonable 

officer would have believed that there was probable cause because the affidavit attributed 

possession of the evidence to someone else (presumably, J.S., Jr.) and “there were no 

facts stated in the affidavit, particularized or otherwise, that the evidence in question 

could be found [in defendant’s storage unit], short of a conclusory observation that [he] 

is homeless.”

We determine that a “reasonably well trained officer” would not have “known” 

the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 922, fn. 23.) 

Detective Reiland’s probable cause statement detailed that several individuals, including 

defendant himself, implicated defendant in the altercation with room 7’s occupant and 

the theft of the occupant’s backpack. The probable cause statement also included 

corroboration of the individuals’ accounts, namely, surveillance footage showing 

someone who appeared to be defendant at the Elks Lodge after the incident with 

individuals who matched J.S., Sr.’s and J.S., Jr.’s descriptions and the police’s recovery 

of an empty backpack in a trashcan near the Elks Lodge’s front door. Although the 

footage showed J.S., Jr., rifling through the backpack and pocketing its contents before 

throwing the backpack in the trash, the affidavit established that the incident occurred 

because the occupant owed defendant money, as defendant himself admitted, 

demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that defendant would ultimately possess the items 

taken from the occupant.
18

Relying on another case involving a warrant to search a drug user’s residence, 

United States v. Garcia (2011) 809 F.Supp.2d 1165, defendant argues that “the only basis 

on which the police could point to [defendant] actually possessing stolen items in his 

storage locker was the conclusory assertion that ‘thieves commonly conceal stolen items 

inside storage units because they do not have a permanent residence.’ ” However, as we 

explained above, the affidavit contained more than Detective Reiland’s opinion based on 

his training and experience to establish probable cause that evidence of the incident 

would be found in defendant’s storage unit. The affidavit showed that police 

corroborated defendant’s homeless status and rental of a storage unit. In addition, the 

affidavit established that surveillance footage from the storage facility revealed that 

defendant’s personal code was used to enter the facility the day after the offense and 

approximately one hour before defendant arrived at the police department, which 

reasonably linked defendant’s storage unit to the incident. And, because the affidavit 

demonstrated that the motive for the incident was to recoup the occupant’s debt to 

defendant, we do not agree with defendant’s assertion that “[n]o other facts were 

submitted in the affidavit to suggest that [defendant] would have had the evidence.” The 

debt motive, stated in the affidavit as consistently recounted by J.S., Sr., J.S., Jr., and 

defendant, provided a fair probability that defendant would indeed possess the evidence. 

Thus, on this record, we determine that the officers executing the warrant relied in good 

faith on the warrant’s issuance. (See Leon, supra, at 468 U.S. at p. 923.)

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying 

defendant’s motion to suppress.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

ELIA, ACTING P.J.

DANNER, J.

People v. Souza

H047779