[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-10818

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00137-WS-B-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SAMUEL CURRY, JR., 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

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(February 9, 2017)

Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Samuel Lavon Curry, Jr. appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm 

as a convicted felon and his sentence of 84-months imprisonment. The district 

court imposed this sentence after assessing both a four-level enhancement pursuant 

to USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with another 

felony and a two-level enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. 

After careful review, we affirm.

I.

On June 25, 2015, Curry was indicted on one count of possessing a firearm 

as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Curry pleaded not 

guilty and proceeded to trial. 

At trial, the government called Officers Kevin Kelley and Roland Roberson 

of the Mobile Police Department to testify about stopping a car that Curry was 

driving, Terry frisking him, and later discovering a firearm near his person. As 

relevant to this appeal, Officer Kelley gave the following testimony: Upon 

witnessing suspicious activity between Curry and James Smith and following 

Curry’s car after Smith got into it, he called Officer Roberson for back-up. Once 

Officer Roberson got close to the scene, Officer Kelley pulled Curry over because 

of an expired tag. Curry said his driver’s license was suspended, so Officer Kelley

returned to his patrol car, confirmed that Curry’s license was suspended, and 

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decided to remove both Curry and Smith from Curry’s car so that he could 

inventory the car and have it towed. 

Officer Kelley had Curry get out of his car and conducted an open-palm 

Terry frisk of his person without going into his pockets. Curry was wearing a thick 

leather jacket during the search, and Officer Kelley did not feel a firearm during 

the pat-down. Without handcuffing Curry, Officer Kelley placed him in the 

driver’s side back seat of the patrol car. Kelley then helped Officer Roberson 

remove Smith from Curry’s car and pat him down. Smith was not handcuffed. 

Just as Officer Roberson was about to place Smith in the back seat, Roberson

reported to Officer Kelley that he had seen a firearm wedged between the backseat 

partition and the doorjamb of Kelley’s patrol car. Officer Kelley immediately went 

to secure Smith and watch Curry so that Officer Roberson could remove the 

firearm and place it in his own patrol car. He saw the gun before Officer Roberson 

secured it. Afterwards, the officers detained and searched Curry and Smith more 

thoroughly, but discovered no other firearms. 

Officer Kelley said that the back seat of his patrol car is one solid piece of 

plastic designed to prevent people from concealing items underneath the back seat, 

and the government introduced photographs of Officer Kelley’s patrol car and the 

passenger’s side back seat. He also said he checked the back seat of his patrol car 

every day before starting his shift, each time he placed someone in his car, and at 

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the end of each shift. When conducting his routine checks, he opens the driver’s 

side door to climb into the back seat and searches from driver’s side to passenger’s 

side. Officer Kelley said that on the day he detained Curry, he had checked the 

back seat and opened the passenger’s side door at the beginning of his shift and 

had found no items. Further, no one else had been in the back seat before he 

placed Curry there. 

Officer Roberson testified next and largely corroborated Officer Kelley’s 

testimony. However, his testimony differed in one respect: he said that he secured 

the firearm immediately after seeing it and then showed it to Officer Kelley while 

Kelley was still at Curry’s car. 

At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, Curry moved for a judgment 

of acquittal. The court denied the motion, and then Curry put on his case. First, 

Smith gave his version of the events. He said Curry picked him up that morning to 

take him to look at a car that a woman had asked him to repair. When they arrived 

at the woman’s house, she was not there. Officer Kelley pulled Curry over as they 

were leaving. When Officer Kelley removed Curry from Curry’s car, he Terry

frisked Curry, handcuffed him, and put him in the back of the patrol car. During 

the Terry frisk, Officer Kelley “patted [Curry] all the way around, [and] shook his 

clothes.” Officer Roberson did the same to Smith and then handcuffed him, put 

him in the back of Officer Kelley’s patrol car, and went back to search Curry’s car 

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with Officer Kelley. Then, the officers transferred Smith from Officer Kelley’s car 

to Officer Roberson’s car and searched him again. Smith saw one of the officers 

go back to Officer Kelley’s car and “reach down inside the pocket of the door and 

pull something out.” Smith never saw a firearm on Curry, never saw the firearm 

that was admitted into evidence, and never knew Curry to have carried or even 

owned a firearm. On cross, Smith testified that he and Curry sat in the back seat of 

the first police car for “maybe 5 minutes” and that no firearm was found until the 

police officers removed him from the first police car. 

Next, fingerprint expert Claiborne Myers testified that no discernible 

fingerprints were lifted from the firearm found in Officer Kelley’s car. Finally, 

Curry took the stand. Curry testified that he gave Smith a ride to another house so 

that he could check on a car there. When the car owner did not come to the door, 

Smith went back to Curry’s car. As they were leaving, Officer Kelley pulled 

Curry’s car over. Officer Kelley asked Curry for his license, and he replied that it 

was suspended. After Officer Kelley asked Curry to exit his car, Kelley searched 

him extensively, ran through his pockets, put handcuffs on him, walked him to the 

driver’s side of Kelley’s patrol car, and sat him in the car. Then, Officer Kelley 

searched and handcuffed Smith and sat him down in the back passenger’s side of 

the patrol car. Officer Roberson arrived on the scene 15 minutes after Curry was 

pulled over, after Curry and Smith had been in the back seat of Officer Kelley’s 

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patrol car for about 5 minutes. Officer Roberson transferred Smith from Officer 

Kelley’s car to his own patrol car, leaving the backseat passenger door to Kelley’s 

car open. It was not until Officer Roberson came back to Officer Kelley’s car to 

shut the passenger door that he saw the firearm, which was pushed against the back 

passenger seat on the same side that Smith was sitting. The first time Curry saw 

the firearm was when Officer Roberson found it, pulled it out, and asked Curry if 

he had seen it. Curry testified that the firearm was not his. He said he has never 

owned or possessed a firearm as an adult because he knew the consequences of 

being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. 

The government called Officer Kelley as a rebuttal witness. Officer Kelley 

testified that only a few seconds passed between when he requested assistance 

from Officer Roberson and when Roberson arrived on scene, as Roberson was only 

one street over at the time of the call. He asserted that Curry and Smith were not 

located in the back seat of his patrol car before Officer Roberson’s arrival, and that 

Smith was not placed in a patrol car until after the firearm was discovered. Curry 

moved again for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied. The jury found 

Curry guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon. 

Before sentencing, a probation officer circulated a draft presentence 

investigation report (“PSR”), received objections from Curry and the government, 

and then prepared a final PSR. In addition to the facts set out at trial, the PSR

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found that when Curry’s car was inventoried post-arrest, officers discovered a 

plastic bag containing cocaine powder in the car’s cup holder, and that when asked 

by the officers, Curry admitted the drugs were his. The government knew about 

these facts before trial, but agreed not to use them in its case-in-chief. Based on 

these facts, the PSR recommended a four-level enhancement under USSG § 

2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony (here, 

“Possession of Cocaine”). The PSR also recommended a two-level enhancement 

pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice based on the government’s 

argument that Curry provided materially false testimony during trial “to contradict 

the testimony of the police officers.” With a total adjusted offense level of 20 and 

a criminal history category of VI, the PSR found Curry’s applicable guideline 

range to be 70 to 87 months. 

Curry objected to both of these enhancements. As to the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) 

enhancement, Curry adopted and re-alleged his objections to the draft PSR, where 

he objected to the factual assertions that “officers found a plastic bag of powder 

cocaine in the vehicle’s cup holder” and that he admitted “the drugs” were his. He 

also objected on the grounds that the white powder was not cocaine or another 

controlled substance and that there was no nexus between the powder and the 

firearm. However, he did admit that there was a white-powder substance in his

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car. As to the § 3C1.1 enhancement, Curry objected to the factual assertion that he 

obstructed justice by giving false testimony at trial.

At the sentencing hearing, Curry argued the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement 

should not apply because the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the substance found in his car was cocaine. He clarified that “he 

admitted that th[e] substance was his, but he did not admit that it was drugs.” The 

government responded in part by submitting into evidence a second toxicology 

report showing that the substance contained a trace amount of cocaine. Curry also 

argued against the obstruction enhancement and stood behind his trial testimony. 

The court denied both of Curry’s objections. As to the obstruction 

enhancement, the court specifically stated, “I heard Mr. Curry’s testimony along 

with the jury. I did not find it credible. I found it to be offered to try to dissuade 

the jury from convicting him and, obviously, it falls within the meaning of 

obstruction of justice within the meaning of the guidelines.” The court then 

sentenced Curry to 84-months imprisonment. 

I. 

Curry makes three arguments on appeal. First, he says there was insufficient 

evidence to support the jury’s finding that he constructively possessed the firearm 

found in Officer Kelley’s patrol car. We review de novo whether sufficient 

evidence in the record supports a jury’s verdict in a criminal trial, “viewing the 

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evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and drawing all reasonable 

factual inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Jiminez, 564 

F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009). We will not reverse a jury’s finding of guilt

“unless no reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010). Further, we “must 

accept a jury’s inferences and determinations of witness credibility.” United States 

v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a felon to possess a firearm, 

and the government must prove “three distinct elements” to sustain a conviction: 

(1) that the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) that the defendant knew he was in 

possession of a firearm; and (3) that the firearm affected or traveled in interstate 

commerce. Wright, 392 F.3d at 1273 (quotation omitted). As for the possession 

element—the only disputed element at Curry’s trial—the defendant’s possession 

can be either actual or constructive and can be proven by direct or circumstantial

evidence. Id. However, “[m]ere physical proximity to [a firearm] is not in itself 

sufficient to establish either actual or constructive possession of the [firearm].” 

United States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 1984).

Here, the district court did not err in determining that the trial evidence was 

sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Curry constructively possessed the 

firearm found in Officer Kelley’s patrol car. Kelley testified that (1) he thoroughly 

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checked the back seat of his patrol car every day before starting his shift, each time 

he placed someone in his car, and at the end of his shift; (2) on the day Curry was 

arrested, Kelley conducted this same check before starting his shift and had no 

other back-seat passengers before Curry; (3) he conducted a brief Terry search on 

Curry while Curry was wearing a thick leather jacket and then, without 

handcuffing, placed Curry in the driver’s side back seat of Kelley’s patrol car; and 

(4) as Officer Roberson was about to place Smith in Kelley’s patrol car, Roberson 

reported to Kelley that he saw the firearm wedged in between the backseat 

partition and the doorjamb. Officer Roberson’s testimony corroborated these 

details and the government also submitted photographs of the passenger’s side 

back seat of Officer Kelley’s car. This evidence supports a reasonable inference 

that Curry had actually possessed the firearm at the time of the stop. 

Further, the jury was entitled to reject Smith’s and Curry’s testimony that the

Terry frisk was thorough, that they were handcuffed, that they both sat in Officer 

Kelley’s car for a period of time, and that Curry never possessed the firearm. See

Wright, 392 F.3d at 1273–74. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the jury’s 

guilty verdict, reasonable triers of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Curry had the firearm on his person before being placed in Officer Kelley’s car. 

See Farley, 607 F.3d at 1333. Thus, we affirm Curry’s conviction. 

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II.

Second, Curry argues the district court clearly erred in assessing the 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement because (1) it applied the enhancement based on 

information found in the PSR that was not presented or admitted during trial; and 

(2) it used facts relating to the white powder to apply the enhancement even though 

the government specifically agreed not to pursue any inquiry into the white power 

at trial. In Curry’s view, there was not enough evidence for the district court to 

find that Curry possessed drugs. 

USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides a four-level enhancement where a 

defendant “possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony 

offense.” A district court’s determination that a defendant used a firearm in 

connection with another felony offense is a factual finding, and is thus reviewed 

for clear error. United States v. Whitfield, 50 F.3d 947, 949 & n.8 (11th Cir. 1995)

(per curiam).

A district court’s factual finding is clearly erroneous when a review of the 

evidence leaves us “with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” 

United States v. Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d 622, 628 (11th Cir. 2015). “The 

government bears the burden of establishing the facts necessary to support a 

sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. A sentencing 

court “may consider all relevant information, regardless of its admissibility under 

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the rules of evidence.” United States v. Onofre–Segarra, 126 F.3d 1308, 1310 

(11th Cir. 1997). This includes “evidence heard during trial, facts admitted by a 

defendant’s plea of guilty, undisputed statements in the [PSR], or evidence 

presented at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 

1356 (11th Cir. 1989).

The district court did not clearly err in finding that Curry possessed the 

firearm in connection with a felony drug offense. First, the government did say it 

would not pursue a “line of inquiry” about the white powder, but only in its casein-chief at trial, which sought to prove only that Curry had possessed a gun in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The government did not say it would avoid 

bringing up the white powder in all other contexts; in fact, it indicated it would do 

so at trial if Curry took the stand. Second, although Curry was not indicted or 

convicted for drug possession, there is no requirement that the other felony offense

committed “in connection with” the firearm offense be indicted or result in a 

conviction, as Curry acknowledged in his briefs. Third, as proof of Curry’s drug 

possession, the court properly relied on (1) the undisputed statement in the PSR

(along with Curry’s clarification at sentencing) that Curry “admitted that [the white 

powder] was his”; and (2) the lab report put into evidence at sentencing that 

indicated the white powder contained at least a trace of cocaine. See Wilson, 884 

F.2d at 1356. This evidence was sufficient to support the court’s finding that it 

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was more likely than not that Curry was committing a drug felony1 while in 

possession of a firearm. 

III. 

Finally, Curry argues the district court clearly erred in assessing the 

obstruction enhancement because the jury simply discredited his testimony. We 

review a district court’s findings of fact concerning an obstruction of justice 

enhancement for clear error. United States v. Bagwell, 30 F.3d 1454, 1458 (11th 

Cir. 1994). Further, we “accord special deference to the district court’s credibility 

determinations.” United States v. Banks, 347 F.3d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 2003). 

A district court may grant an enhancement for obstruction of justice if:

(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 

obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the 

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of 

conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the 

defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a 

closely related offense . . . .

USSG § 3C1.1. The commentary to § 3C1.1 provides a non-exhaustive list of 

conduct warranting an obstruction enhancement, including committing perjury and 

providing materially false information to a judge. USSG § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(B), (F). 

 1 The court could have found Curry to have committed the drug felony of knowingly or 

intentionally possessing a controlled substance after having a prior drug-related conviction in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Federal law allows a drug felony conviction to stand where 

there is “[a]ny measurable amount of [a]ny controlled substance,” even a “trace or scintilla” of 

the substance. United States v. Harold, 588 F.2d 1136, 1143 (5th Cir. 1979) (quotation omitted).

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding 

precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. Id. at 

1209. 

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“Perjury here is defined as false testimony concerning a material matter with the 

willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, 

mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 981 (11th Cir. 

2015) (quotation omitted). To avoid “according the enhancement whenever a 

defendant testifies on his behalf and is found guilty,” which would infringe upon 

the defendant’s constitutional right to testify, the district court “must make an 

independent factual finding that the defendant willfully gave perjured testimony.” 

United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994). Although specific 

findings “identifying the materially false statements individually” are preferable, 

“it is sufficient if the [district] court makes a general finding of obstruction

encompassing all the factual predicates of perjury.” United States v. Diaz, 190 

F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 1999).

Here, the district court specifically found that Curry’s testimony was not 

credible and was offered only “to try to dissuade the jury from convicting him.” 

The district court did not clearly err in finding that Curry willfully testified 

untruthfully at trial where his testimony differed substantially from that of Officers 

Kelley and Roberson with respect to material facts like whether he and Smith were 

handcuffed, which patrol car or cars he and Smith were placed in, how thorough 

Curry’s Terry search was, and how much time had passed before Officer Roberson 

arrived. Like the jury, which credited the officers’ testimony in rendering a guilty 

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verdict, the court determined that Curry lacked credibility, and we defer to that 

determination here. See Banks, 347 F.3d at 1269. Thus, the district court did not

clearly err because there was sufficient evidence for it to find, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that Curry willfully gave materially false testimony under oath. 

See Moran, 778 F.3d at 981–82.

AFFIRMED.

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