T h e Honor able Ka rl S. Fore ster, United States District Judge f or the Ea stern District of * Kentucky , sitti ngby

desig nation. Th e pr op e r spe lli ng of Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt’ s las t nam e is unc le ar. Th e do c ke t sh e e t a s w e ll 1 a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt

or de r s pe ll the name wi th o ne “ r” at ti me s a nd wi th t wo at ot he r t ime s. NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0799n.06 F iled: October 31, 2006 No. 05-2325 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
Mo nic a De Me rr e ll, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. City of Cheboy

g an, et a l., De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FRO M THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STRI CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: GIBBONS, MCK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; and FORESTE R, Distric t Judge. * McK eague, Circu i t J u dge. Ronald Whi te, a Cheboy g an police of

fice r, shot and killed Michae l David DeMerre ll. Plaintiff-Appellant, pe rsonal re prese ntative of Mr. D eMer rell’s e state, 1
su e d O ff ic e r Wh ite , a lle g ing unre a so na ble us e of le tha l f or c e in v iol atio n o f t

he F ourt h A me ndme nt,
as we ll as the City

of Cheboyg an, the Cheboy g an chie f of police, and the Cheboy g an depa rtment of public saf

et y , alleg ing supe rvisory

and municipal liability . The district cour t gr anted summary judgme nt to Def

endants-A

ppellees. Plaintiff-Appellant filed a timely appea l, c ontending that t he district court improper ly g rante d summary

judgme nt as to O fficer White beca use Plaintiff-No. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 2 - Ap pe lla nt’ s e xpe rt ’s re po rt

ra ise d a fa c tua l di sp ute a s to the re a so na ble ne ss of

Of fi c e r Wh ite ’s us e of deadly forc e, and as t o the re maining de fenda nts beca use of e vidence of Off

icer Whit e’s a lleg ed lack of training and ong oing violations of Cheboyg an citizens’ constitutional rights. F or the re asons state d b e low , w e a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt. I. BACKG ROUND Michae l DeMer

rell lived with his gir lfriend, Ale ta Siefer t, in Cheboy g an, Michig an. Unable to wor

k, DeMe rre ll rece ived Social Secur ity disability pay ments. DeMer

rell wa s an alcoholic, a

nd althoug h he had unde rg one inpatient re habilitation for his alcoholism in J anuar y 20 02 , h e wa s a g a in d

ri nk ingin F e br

ua ry 20 02 , g e tti ngint oxic ate d e ve ry da y , a c c or din gto Siefert. De Merr ell’s drinkingbothere d her, a nd they had shoutingmatches ove r it. On the mor nin gof Marc h 1 3, 20 02 , K e ithL a Duke , D e Me rr e ll’ s f ri e nd , v isi te d D e Me rr e ll
at D e Me rr e ll’ s h ome and

wa nte d to c e le br ate L a Duke ’s ann ive rs ary ; a c c or din g ly , h e br ou g ht a
case of bee r with him, which he a nd DeMe rre ll beg an to drink. L aDuke left in the af ternoon, a nd Siefert notice d that DeMe rre ll was drunk. De Merr ell continued to drink, and he eng ag ed in a number of bizarr e and da ng erous a ctivities, including drivinga vehic le to the top of a pile of wood that he ha d been ha uling, shre dding lampshades in the house w ith pruning she ars, a nd attempting to star

t a cha insaw while c laiming that he wanted to de stroy ever y thing he had eve r
ma de . D ur ingthe c ours e of the se a c tiv iti e s, Sie fe rt

atte mpt e d to sto p h im, tol d h im that sh e did not want to deal with him, and ca lled him “stupid” and “a n idiot” severa l times. After this confrontation, Siefer t felt something stra

ng e on her

back a nd turned to find De Me rr e ll c omi ng

at he r w itha

kn if e . Si e fe rt state d th at D e Me rr e ll s ta bb e d h e r i n th e ba c k w ithNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 3 - the knife; he also stabbed he r in the ar m when he a g ain came at her with the knife a

nd she ra ised her a rm in defe nse. Siefer

t manag ed to knock De Merr ell back, se cure the knife, a nd run out of the ho us e to s a fe ty . O nc e outsi de , s he so ug ht h e lp f ro m ne ig hb or s, kn oc kin gon se ve ra l do or s; howeve r, De Merr ell shouted afte r her that if she did not return, he would hurt J ulie, DeMe rre ll’s five year old gr anddaughter who lived w ith the two of them, and ove r whom Siefer t had leg al g uardia nship. Si efe rt eve ntually

arr ived at the house of a ne ighbor who ca lled the police, at which time Siefer

t told the officer

that she had be en attac ked and sta bbed and that DeMer

rell had threatened Juli e. Offic ers Ronald White and Ron Har tman arr ived at the ne ighbor ’s house a round 10 p.m. Offic er White saw a

lot of blood as well as the w ound on Siefert’ s arm, and when he a sked her who did this to her, Siefert r esponded that it was DeMer rell. Off icer Whit e testified that he had about half a

dozen previous contac ts with DeMerr ell and that De Merr ell had bee n drinking on the majority of those occ asions. Offic er White drove his police sport utilit y vehicle to De Merr ell’s house, pa rked in the drivewa y , and looked through the scre en door at the front of the house, which w as the g ener al entra nce. O ffice r White saw J ulie next t o DeMe rre ll, and DeMe rre ll was holding a g un. Offic er Whit e advise d Trooper s Don Bole n and Micha el Pionk, other offic ers who ha d joined him at DeMe rre ll’s residenc e, of this, and he retre ated to the r ear of his SUV afte r sec uringthe shotg un that w a s is su e d to the po lic e ve hic le . D e Me rr e ll c ame outsi de wi th h is w e a po n, at w hic h ti me Offic er White furthe r re treated to a position behind another police vehicle that was par ked in the street.No. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 4 - At this point , Offic er White attempted to neg otiate with DeMe rre ll, telling him to put the
wea pon down, that it was not worth it, and that ther e wa s a youngchild cry ing on the porch, yet De Me rr e ll i g no re d th e c omm and s. Of fi c e r Wh ite c on tin

uo us ly atte mpt e d to ne g oti ate wi th De Me rr e ll, but D e Me rr e ll o nly ta un te d th e of

fi c e rs , te lli ngthe m th at th e y we re no t takin ghim

to jail, that they

wer e “pussies” who “didn’t have the ba lls to do i t,” and sa ying, “ Come on, shoot me.” ( J A 389-90). O ffice r White testified that duringthis ti me DeMe rre ll became more a g itated
and wa s w avin gthe we a

po n in the of fi c e rs ’ d ir e c tio n. Of

fi c e r Wh ite fu

rt he r t e sti fi e d th at f

ina lly DeMe rre ll raised the we apon, pointing it in the off icer s’ direc tion, and took a fe w steps towar d the offic ers, at which time Offic er White shot DeMer rell, killing him. Off

icer Whit e wa s the
o n l y o ff i ce r o nth e s ce n e w h o fi re d atDe M erre l l , an d

i tturn edo u tth atDe M erre l l wa s h o l d i n g a pellet gun. Only Offic er White was de posed. Other office rs submitted copies of their inc ident
re po rt s. Se ve ra l of

fi c e rs and a ne ig hb or state d th at O ff

ic e r Wh ite atte mpt e d to ne g oti ate wi th De Me rr e ll, that D e Me rr e ll w ave d th e g un aro un d in

the dir e c tio n o f t

he of fi c e rs or dir e c tly pointed it at the office rs, and that De Merr ell advanc ed on the of fice rs just prior to beingshot. Ad dit ion a lly , T ro op e r B ole n s tate d th at a lth ou g h h e did no t di sc ha

rg e his we a

po n, he ra ise d it and pointed it at DeMe rre ll, and he applied tr igg er pr essure to discharg e the we apon whe n Offic er White fire d. Serg eant Micha el B reg e said that whe n he sawDeMe rre ll beg in to lift t he
wea pon in the direc tion of the offic ers, he beg an to squee ze the trig g er of his own wea

pon. Deputy Br enda Chimner stated that she re alized she nee ded to shoot DeMer rell bec ause he was closing in on the office rs and wa s not list eningto their commands.No. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 5 - Plaintiff-Appellant filed a complaint on August 20, 2004, alleg ing violations of the Mic hig an c on sti tut ion

a g a ins t a ll d e fe nd ants , a ssa ult and batte ry un de r M ic hig an la

w a g a ins t Offic er White, wrong ful death under Michig an law a g ainst Defe ndants-Appe llees, and a vio latio n o f 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 and the F ourt h A me ndme nt o f t

he fe de ra l Co ns tit

uti on a g a ins t Def endants-A

ppellees. Plaintiff-A

ppellant and De fenda

nts-Appellee s both hired experts who submitt ed re ports. Plaintiff-Appellant’s e x pert c oncluded that De Merr ell did not pose an immediate threat to Office r White or to the other off icer s, and there fore Offic er White’s use of deadly forc e wa s improper a

nd unnece ssary . Def

endants-A

ppellees’ expert conclude d that Offic er White used objec tively rea sonable for ce when he shot De Merr ell. Def endants-A

ppellees move d for summary judgme nt, assertingthat the claims ar e pr e c lud e d b y

the de fe ns e of

qu a lif ie d immun ity

un de r f e de ra l la w a nd g ov e rnme nta l li a

bil ity under Michig an law a

nd that liability

cannot lie a g ainst Cheboyg an and Jones, either unde r respondeat superior

or under any other theor

y . The district cour

t gr anted the motion, conc luding that the claim ag ainst Offic er White was ba rre d by qualified immunity , the claim ag ainst J ones did not present a g enuine issue of materia l fac t beca

use Plaintiff-Appe llant did not present any
e vid e nc e that Jone s h a d a ny ro le in O ff

ic e r Wh ite ’s sh oo tin gof

De Me rr e ll, and

the c la im a g a ins t the City of Cheboyg an had no ba sis because there was no c onstitut ional deprivation under § 1983. As a re sult, the court dec lined to exercise supplementa l jurisdiction over PlaintiffAp pe lla nt’ s st ate law c la ims
. II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

ReviewNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 6 - Th is c ourt

re vie ws the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo
. Sig le yv . Ci ty of Par ma He igh ts , 4 37 F .3 d 5 27 , 5 32 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Johnson v. Karnes , 3 98 F .3 d 8 68 , 8 73 (6 th Cir . 2 00 5) ; Daniels v. W

oodside , 3 96 F .3 d 7 30 , 7 34 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) . Summa ry jud g me nt i s proper “if the ple ading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff

idavits, if any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the
mov ingpa

rt y is e nti tle d to a

jud g me nt a s a

matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); ac c or d Johnson , 3 98 F .3 d at 87 3; Da nie ls , 3 96 F .3 d at 73 4; Leadbetter v. G illey , 3 85 F .3 d 6 83 , 6 89 (6 th Cir. 2004). The c ourt dec iding a motion for summary

judgme nt must vi ew the e vidence and draw all rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the non-movingparty . Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Cor

p. , 4 75 U. S. 5 74 , 5 87 (1 98 6) ; Harbin-Bey v. Rutter , 420 F.3d 571, 575 ( 6th Cir. 20 05 ); Johnson , 3 98 F .3 d at 87 3; Da nie ls , 396 F.3d at 734. Howeve r, the “ mere exis tence of
some alleg ed fa ctual dispute betwe en the pa rties will not defeat an otherw ise proper ly supported motion for summary

judgme nt; the require ment is that there be no genuine issue of material fac t.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) ( emphasis in orig inal); accord Leadbe tter , 3 85 F .3 d a t 68 9- 90 ; W

eave r v. Shadoan , 340 F.3d 398, 405 ( 6th Cir. 2003). To be “ materia l,” the fa cts must be such that they might af fec t the outcome of the suit, and to be “g enuine,” the dispute must concer n evidenc e upon which the jury could reasonably return a verdic t for the non- moving pa rty . Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 252 (empha sis added). Acc ording ly , the non-movingparty must present sig nificant probative evidenc e in orde r to defe at the summary

judgme nt motion. Id. at 24 9- 50 ; Stephenson v . Allstate Ins. Co. , 328 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 2003).No. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 7 - B. Su m m ary Judgm ent to Off icerWhite Based on Q ualif ied Im m uni ty Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th at sh e pr e se nte d e vid e nc e to c re ate a fa c tua l di sp ute reg ardingthe objective r easona bleness of O ffice r White’s use of de adly forc e. The ref

ore,
a c c or din gto D e Me rr e ll’ s e state , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt t o O ff

ic e r Wh ite on the g rounds of qua lified immunit y was improper
. To preva il on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a per son acting under c olor of state la

w depr ived him of a right secure d by the Constitut ion or the laws of the United States. Sample v. B ailey , 409 F.3d 689, 695 ( 6th Cir. 2005). As stated above , PlaintiffAppellant alleg es unre asonable use of letha l force in violation of the Fourth Ame ndment. For there to be an e x cessive f orce claim that is cog nizable under the F ourth Amendment, a seizure must occur. Du nig

an v . No ble , 3 90 F .3 d 4 86 , 4 92 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) . T he Sup re me Court ha s h e ld that appre hension by

use of de adly

forc e constitutes a se izure for F ourth Amendment purpose s. Tennesseev. Garne r , 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). “Qua lified immunit y

is a g overnme nt official’ s ‘entitlement not to stand trial or fa ce the other burde ns of litigation.’” Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 5 3 3 U. S
. 1 9 4 , 2 0 0 (2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Mitchell v. Fo rsy th , 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). It is a defe nse designed to aid the e ffe ctive func tioning of g ov e rnme nt, name ly

by re c og nizi ngthat po lic e of fi c e rs may

e rr but th at “ it i s b e tte r t o r isk so me
err or and possible injury

from such e rror

than not to decide or

act at all.” Dunigan , 390 F.3d at 490-91 (quotingScheue r v. Rhodes , 4 16 U. S. 2 32 , 2 42 (1 97 4) ). Ac c or din g ly , th e c e ntr a l pu rp os e of qualified immunity

is to protect offic ers “ from undue inter fer ence with their duties and fr omNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

Some decisions by this Circuit hold that the qualified immunity test is a three -par

t test. See, 2 e.g. , Sa mp le , 40 9 F .3 d at 69 6; Feathers v . Aey , 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003). Other decisions hold that the test is a two-par t test. See, e .g. , Dunigan , 3 90 F .3 d at 49 1; So lom on v . A ub ur n H ill s Po lic e De pt. , 3 89 F .3 d 1 67 , 1 72 (6th Cir . 2 00 4) . T he te sts are e sse nti a lly the same , o ri g ina lly d e l i n e at e d

b y Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201. Since the ana ly sis in this c ase does not proce ed beyond the first part of

the test, the other pa

rts need not be considere d; acc ording ly , n o o p i n i o n is give n reg arding the superior ity

of either approa ch. See Sauc ier , 5 33 U. S. at 20 1; Un tal an v . Ci ty of L orain , 430 F.3d 312, 314 ( 6th Cir. 2005); Dunigan , 390 F.3d at 495. - 8 - potentially

disabling thre ats of liability .” Sa mp le , 4 0 9 F. 3 d at6 9 5 (qu o t i n g Elder v. Holloway , 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994)). Th e Sup re me Court

ha s d e lin e ate d a

tw o- pa rt te st i n o rd e r t o d e te rm ine the a pp lic a bil ity of the qu a lif

ie d immun ity

de fe ns e in t

he c on te xt of

an e xce ssi ve fo rc e c la im. Saucier , 5 33 U. S. 2
at 20 1- 02 . T he thr e sh old qu e sti on is whe the r, “ [t]ak e n in

the light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pa rt y
asser ting the injury , . . . the fa cts alleg ed show the of fice r’s c onduct violated a c onstitut ional rig ht.” Id. at 20 1. Th e Court sp e c if ic a lly he ld t hat in e xce ssi ve fo rc e c a se s, the F ourt h Am e ndme nt i s v iol ate d if the fo rc e a

pp lie d is e xce ssi ve un de r t he ob je c tiv e re a so na

ble ne ss standard. Id. (c i t i n g Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). In Graham , the Court held that assessingobjective r easona bleness “r equire s car eful attention to the fac ts and circ umstances of eac h particula

r ca se, includingthe seve rity of the crime at issue, whether

the suspect pose s an immediate thre at to the safe ty of the off icer s or others, and whether

he is ac tively

resisting arr est or attemptingto evade arr est by flig ht.” 490 U.S. at 396. The Court also held that r easona bleness “must be judg ed fr om the perspe ctive of a
rea sonable off

icer on the sce ne, rather than w ith the 20/20 visi on of hindsight” ; acc ording ly , the calc ulus must t ake into ac count “the f act that police office rs ar e ofte n forc ed to make split-sec ondNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 9 - judgme nts–in circumstance s that are tense, unc erta in, and ra pidly evolving–about the amount of forc e that is nec essar

y in a par ticular situation.” Id. at 39 6- 97 . Impo rt ant f or thi s c a se , th is Cir c uit ha s h e ld t

hat [a] lthough the F ourth Amendment ‘r easona bleness’ inquiry

is larg ely fac t-driven, summa ry jud g me nt f

or de fe nd ant p ub lic se rv ants fo un de d in qu a lif ie d immun ity

is nonetheless a

ppropriate when the undisputed material fa cts, or the plaintiff’ s ve rs ion of dis pute d mate ri a l f

a c ts, de mon str ate that a

hy po the tic a l r e a so na

ble office r would not have known that his actions, under the circ umstances, we re objectively

unrea sonable. Sc ott v . Clay Cou nty , 2 0 5 F. 3 d

8 6 7 , 8 7 7 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant , 142 F.3d 898, 902- 03 (6th Cir. 1998)). I f the a nswer to the f

irst part of the Sa uc ie r inquiry is in the affirma

tive, the sec ond qu e sti on is whe the r t

he ri g ht w a s c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d. 53 3 U .S. at 20 1. Th e Sup re me Court he ld that th e inq

uir y on thi s q ue sti on is “ wh e the r i t w ou ld b e c le ar t o a re a so na ble of fi c e r t hat hi s conduct wa s unlawful in the situation he conf ronted.” Id. at 202. The district cour

t held that Offic er White was e ntitled to qualified immuni ty , applying the prec edingauthorities in conductingits analy sis. I n disposing of Plaintiff’s c laim at the first step of the Sa uc ie r analy sis, the court noted that “ all office rs observe d DeMe rre ll advance toward th e mw i tha

g unp o i n t e d , ” an d

atl e a s to n e o th e r

o f f i c e r w a s a l s o r e a dy

t o s h o o tD e M e r

r e l l
. ( JA 45-46). The court thus found “ overwhelming e vidence of De Merr ell’s threateningconduct in the
rec ord” a nd that “Of

fice r White was conf

ronted with a da

ng erous, volatile situation involving a n intox icated, a

rmed, a g g ressive suspe ct that, it is uncontested, was a dvancingon the police a nd defy ing c ommands to stand down.” (JA 46). The c ourt pointed out that simply beca use oneNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

The languag e used by

the di strict court is slightly confusing ; the opinion states that “Patrick 3 Nichols stated that DeMe rre ll .
. . did not point the g un at police.” Howeve r, in N i ch o l s ’ actual statement, he makes no aff irmative st atement that DeMe rre ll did not point the gun at the police or in their direc tion; rather, he stated that “De Merr ell was waving this gun around a nd in the direc tion of the po lic e car s and

po lic e of

fi c e rs .” He nc e , th e c ourt ’s c or re c t c on c lus ion

tha t “ Ni c ho ls’ statement ca

nnot fairly be read as contra dicting Office r W hite’s t estimony and the state ments of the other off icer s.” - 10 - witness said that DeMe rre ll was wavinghis hands about and did not point the g un at police, a 3 fac t issue did not ex ist because that statement did not contradic t Office r White’s testimony and the other of

fice rs’ stateme nts that DeMer rell adva nced towa

rd the off icer s with his gun pointed in their direc tion. Thus, the court held, “ plaintiff has not shown that Of fice r White’s actions
we re unre a so na

ble or that th e us e of

de a dly fo rc e in t his c a se c on tr ave ne d th e F ourt h Amendment.” ( J A 45-46). A ccor dingly , summary judgme nt was g rante d as to Off icer Whit e. On appe al, Plaintiff-Appe llant raises seve ral points in support of her c laim that summary jud g me nt b a se d o n q

ua lif ie d immun ity

wa s im pr op e r. F ir st, sh e c la ims that th e ins tant c a se is simil ar to other

case s that denied summary judgme nt. Second, she c ontends that the district court
e rr e d in ig no ri ngthe c on c lus ion s o f h e r e xpe rt re po rt that D e Me rr e ll d id n ot p os e an imme diate threat to the office rs; hence , she ar g ues the e x pert’s r eport c reated a f actua l dispute reg arding objective r easona

bleness. Third, she argues that the district cour t failed to addr ess Off

icer Whit e ’s a c tio ns pr ior

to t he sh oo tin gin d e te rm ini ngwh e the r h e a c te d in an o bje c tiv e ly
rea sonable manne r. F inally , she cla ims that the distance betwe en De Merr ell and the of fice rs at the mom e nt o f t

he sh oo tin gsh ow s th at O ff ic e r Wh ite did

no t a c t in an o bje c tiv e ly

re a so na ble
manner .No. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

Plaintiff-Appellant c ites t wo ca s es in support of her claim that summary

judgme nt was 4 improperly

g rante d, Brandenburg v. Cureton , 882 F.2d 21 1 (6 t h Cir. 1989), and Sigley v. City of Pa rm a H e igh ts , 437 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2006). Howeve r, these c ases do nothingto support Plainti ffAppellant’s argument, as they are both easily

distinguishable f

rom the instant case for se vera l rea sons. I n Bran de nb ur

g , for instanc e, unlike the instant c ase there was actua l phy sical evidenc e that Br andenbur g did not have his fing er on the t rig g er of the rifle and wa s not aiming it at the off icer s when he was shot. 882 F.2d at 215. Sigleyis di s t i n gu i s hable f rom the instant case , amongother rea sons, beca

use there wer e actua l c onflicting views of fa ct; namely , an off icer stated that the c ar the dece dent was driving was “swe rving into him,” where as anothe r witness testified that the of fice r wa s runningalong side the vehic le and that the of fice r p o i n t ed his wea

pon down and into the window. 43 7 F .3 d at 53 1. Ad dit ion a lly , an a uto ps y c on du c te d on the su sp e c t re ve a le d that he wa s sh ot i n h is mid-back, just left of the midline. Id. - 11 - 1. Appli cable Sixth Circuit Quali fi ed Im m uni ty Cases Tw o c a se s f

ro m th is C ir c uit

that are on

po int wi th t he ins tant c a se fo un d th e of fi c e rs ’ actions objec tively

rea sonable. In Rhodes v. M cDanne l , this Ci rcuit, holding that the offic er’ s 4 use of de adly

forc e wa s justified, affirme d summary judgme nt in a case in which an of fice r respondingto a domestic disturbanc e re port shot and killed J ames West, who had a dvance d on th e o f f i c e r s w i tha

r a i s e d m a c h e t e . 9 4 5 F
. 2 d

1 1 7 , 1 1 8
- 1 9 ( 6 thC i r . 1 9 9 1 ) ( p e r c ur i am )
. In Rhodes , the uncontrove rted e vidence was that West advanc ed on off icer s with a motion to i nflict harm, namely

by way of a r aised mac hete. Id. at 120. In the instant case the uncontrove rted
e vid e nc e is that D e Me rr e ll a dv anc e d o n o ff ic e rs wi th h is gun

po int e d at th e m, t

hu s a lso advanc ing on of

fice rs with a motion to inflict harm. Additionally , in the instant case O ffice r Whit e re peate dly

attempted to neg otiate with DeMe rre ll and tried to convince him to drop the
wea pon, but to no avail; thus, officer s were even mor e patient than w ere the offic ers in Rhodes , who only repe atedly

war ned West to halt. Id. Finally , althoug h Plaintiff-Appellant make s much of the fa ct that Off

icer Whit e wa s the only

office r to fire his weapon at DeMer rell, it should beNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 12 - noted that summary

judgme nt was af

firmed in Rhodes e ve n th ou g h th e fa c ts i nd ic ate that on ly one off icer fired his we apon at West. Id. at 118. Boyd v . Baeppler

is also an ana logous c ase f rom this Ci rcuit that compe ls the conclusion to uphold the district court’s dec ision in t he instant ca se. 215 F .3d 594 (6th Cir. 2000). In Boyd, Offic ers B aepple r and Wilsman responded to the r eport of a n alleg ed shooting , and they found Boyd, who met the desc ription, in the ge nera l are a. Id. at 597-98. The office rs saw B oy d had a g un in his hand, and they

exit ed their c ar, or deringhim to st op and identify ing the mselves as police. Id. at 598. Off

icer s Wi lsman and B aepple r testified that B oy d continued to flee , that Ba eppler fired at Boyd, that Boyd responde d by turning and pointing his we apon at Wilsman, that Wils man f

ir e d o ne sh ot t

hat do wn e d B oyd, that B oyd li ft e d h is t or so and tur ne d to po int

his
we a po n at Wils man, and

that B a e pp le r f

ir e d s e ve n mo re sh ots at B oyd unti l he dr op pe d h is
wea pon. Id. at 603. B oy d died, and his estate sued the off icer s under § 1983; althoug h the district court denie d the offic ers’ motion for summary judgme nt, this C ircuit reve rsed, granting the qualified immunity

claims of the of

fice rs. Id. at 604. In Boyd, the only

ey e witnesses to the shootingwer e the two of fice rs, and they

told the
same c onsistent story , just as in the instant action; y et the uncontr overte d testimony in the instant
c a se ha s e ve n mo re a ssu

ra nc e s o f r e lia

bil ity , a s a

ne ig hb or ha s c or ro bo rate d th e of

fi c e rs ’ testimony and stateme nts. The Boyd court noted that the only inconsistent evidence was a repor t by plaintiff’s expert that conc luded, af ter re viewingthe state’s a utopsy repor t, Boyd might not have be en able to turn and point his weapon a fter Wilsman’s shot. Id. at 60 3. Ho we ve r, thi s Circuit did not acce pt the argument that such spec ulative evidenc e wa s sufficient to cr eate aNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 13 - g enuine issue of

materia l fac t. Id. Much like Boyd, the only inconsistent evidence in the instant
case is Pl aintiff-A

ppellant’s expert re port. Indeed, like the expert in Boyd, the expert in the ins tant c a se so le ly

re lie d o n s e c on da

ry e vid e nc e pr od

uc e d b y the state . Wh at make s th e re po rt in the pre sent ca se eve n more unre liable, howeve r, is the fa ct that the expert’s pre mises are ref uted by the fa cts in the rec ord. Ac cording ly , if the re port in Boyd was not suffic ient to raise a g enuine iss ue of mate ri a l f

a c t, t he n th e re po rt

in t he ins tant c a se sure ly

is n ot. Case law f

rom this Ci rcuit compe ls the conclusion that the district cour t properly g rante d Offic er White’s summary judgme nt motion on t he basis of qua lified immunit y in the instant case. The c ases that Plaintiff-A ppellant cites in support of he r ar g ument contain dissimilar fac tual
sc e na ri os that de fe at th e ana log ie s sh e atte mpt s to make , whe re a s o the r c a se s f ro m th is C ir c uit dictate that the grantingof summary judgme nt to Office r White must be affirme d. 2. P laintif

f-App ellant’s Expert Re port Plaintiff-Appellant on a

ppeal r epeatedly

contends that the district c ourt ig nored he r
e xpe rt ’s op ini on

that O ff ic e r Wh ite a c te d in

an o bje c tiv e ly

unre a so na

ble mann e r; a c c or din gto Plaintiff-Appellant, this opinion creates a g enuine issue of materia l fac t that prec ludes summary jud g me nt. F or

se ve ra l r e a so ns , s he is i nc or re c t. First, the e x pert re port larg ely supports the position of Defe ndants-Appe llees as we ll as the opinion of the district court. Indeed, the expert contends, “[I ]tis my opinion that had Mr. DeMe rell [sic] made a

ny specific forwa

rd movement at or toward O ffice r White or any other of fi c e r at th e sc e ne or

ma de a dir e c t thre at w ithhis ha

nd g un to a ny of fi c e r, de a dly

fo rc e wo uld have be en justified.” ( J A 425). Ye t the condition in that sentence was satisfied: unc ontroverte dNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 14 - statements indicate that DeMer rell took sever al steps in the direc tion of the offic ers pr ior to being shot and that DeMe rre ll wildly wave d the gun or pointed it at the off icer s just before he was shot by Offic er White. Acc ording ly , to the extent that taking seve ral steps in the dire ctions of the office r constitutes a “ specific forwa rd movement” and waving a g un in the office rs direc tion or pointing it at them constitutes a “dir ect thre at” that De Merr ell made with his gun, even PlaintiffAppellant’s e x pert must conclude , by his own words, that Off

icer Whit e wa s justified in using deadly forc e. Second, the e x pert opinion that Plaintiff-Appellant r elies upon mere ly expressed a le g al conclusion; ac cording ly , the district court prope rly ignor ed it. Indeed, this Circuit has held unde r Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 704(a) that such testimony by an expert is improper. Se e Be rry v . Ci ty of D e tro it , 25 F.3d 1342, 1353 ( 6th Cir. 1994). In Be rry , this Ci rcuit held that “ [w] hen the r ules speak of an expert’s testimony

embra cingthe ultimate issue, the re fer ence must be to stating op ini on s th at su

ggest the answe r to the ultimate issue or that g ive the jury all the information fr om whi c h it

c an draw i nfe re nc es as to the ultimate issue.” Id. (empha sis added). In th e ins tant c a se , Pl a int if f- Ap pe lla nt’ s e xpe rt

te sti fi e d a s to a

le g a l c on c lus ion

be c a us e h e s t at e d th at“ i tw a s o b

j e c t i v e l y un r e a s o n a

b l e f o r O f f i c e r W h i t e t o s h o o tM r . D e M e r r e l l
. ” ( JA 430). As stated pr eviously , objective r easona bleness is the pre cise leg al standar d of Graham to be used in the qua lified immunit y inquiry of Saucier
. See Sauc ier , 533 U.S. at 201; Graham , 490 U. S. at 39 6. Ad dit ion a lly , Pl a int if f- Ap pe lla nt’ s e xpe rt ’s op ini on

fu rt he r s tate s th at “ a

re a so na ble office r on the sce ne would not have conclude d at the time that there exis ted proba ble ca use that Mr. DeMe rre ll posed a sig nificant thre at of de ath or ser ious phy sical injury to the office r orNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 15 - others.” ( J A 430). This testimony also expresses a le g al conc lusion, goingbeyond “stating opinions that sugg est the answe r to the ultimate issue.” Be rry , 25 F.3d at 1353. Sti ll other conclusions by

Plaintiff-Appellant’s e x pert we re imprope r leg al conc lusions, namely that the “use of deadly forc e by [Officer Whit e] was improper a

nd unnece ssary .” See H

ygh v. J acobs , 96 1 F .2 d 3 59 , 3 64 (2 d Ci r. 19 92 ) (pr e c lud inge xpe rt te sti mony

in a § 1 98 3 e xce ssi ve fo rc e c a se that an off

icer ’s conduc t was not “justified under the circ umstances,” not “war rante d under the circ umstances,” and “totally improper” ). Third, eve n if the expert’s re port had not improper ly stated leg al conc lusions, itstill does not chang e the r esult that there is no g enuine issue of materia l fac t in the instant case be cause the repor t consists entirely

of pre mises that contradic t the uncontrove rted fa cts. See M cLean v. 988011 Ontario, Ltd. , 224 F.3d 797, 800- 01 (6th Cir. 2000) (“ [A] n expert’s opinion must be supported by

more than subjec tive belief a nd unsupported spec ulation and should be supported by g ood g rounds, base d on what is known.”) (quoting Pomella v. Re gency Coach Lines, Ltd. , 899 F . Su pp . 3 35 , 3 42 (E .D . M ic h. 19 95 )) ; Gree nwell v. Boatwright , 184 F.3d 492, 497 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (“ Ex pert testimony , howeve r, is inadmissible when the fa cts upon which the e x pert ba ses his testimony

contra dict the evidenc e.”)
. For instance, in c oncludingthat Offic er White’s ac tions
wer e improper

and unnec essar

y , the expert claims that “[n]owhere in any of the attached statements or doc uments are there repor ts of Mr. DeMe rre ll taking a proscr ibed path at or towards Of

fice r White that justi fied him dischar g ing his shotgun into Mr. DeMer rell.” ( J A 425). Th is s imp ly

is n ot t ru e . Ind e e d, un c on tr ov e rt e d te sti mony , s tate me nts by se ve ra l po lic e of

fi c e rs , and a statement by

a neighbor all state pr ecise ly the opposite, namely

that DeMe rre ll took severalNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 16 - ste ps in t he dir e c tio n o f t

he of fi c e rs jus t pr ior

to b e ingsh ot. In a dd iti on , th os e same state me nts ind ic ate that D e Me rr e ll c on tin uo us ly ig no re d o ff

ic e r c omm and s to put hi s gun do wn , w ild ly
wave d the gun in the office rs’ dire ction, and pointed the gun at the off icer s prior to beingshot. The e x pert re port of Plaintiff-Appe llants, however , ignor es all of these fac ts. In light of the repor

t’s support of the district cour t’s opinion when the uncontr overte d fa c ts a re a pp lie d to the re po rt ’s state me nts , it s r e fu sa l to a c kn ow le dg e the un c on tr ov e rt e d f a c ts,
and its ins ist e nc e on

statin gle g a l c on c lus ion s th at si mpl y c on tr a dic t and

avo id r e fe re nc e to t

he se fac ts, it cannot be said that the district cour t erre d in ignor ing Plaintiff- Appellant’s e x pert re port
or that th e re po rt

c re ate s a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t in re g ard s to wh e the r O ff

ic e r Wh ite acte d in an objectively

rea sonable manne r that would def eat the grantingof the summary judgme nt motion on t he basis of qua lified immunit y . 3. Offic e r Whi te ’s Ac ti ons P r iorto th e Shoo ti ng Plaintiff-Appellant a lso makes much of the fac t that Office r White pulled his poli ce SUV dir e c tly int o D e Me rr e ll’ s d

ri ve wa y . T his fa c t, a c c or din gto P la int if f- Ap pe lla nt’ s e xpe rt , is contra ry to standard hig h-risk re sponse tactics. A ccor dingly , Plaintiff-Appellant a rgues, Off

icer Whit e ac ted in an objec tively unrea sonable manne r; Plaintiff-Appellant a lso claimed at ora l
argume nt t

hat O ff ic e r Wh ite ’s pu lli ngint o th e dr ive wa y e sc a late d th e sit

uatio n. In s up po rt , Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt c ite s Y ates v. City of Cleveland, a § 1983 ca se ar ising out of a police shooting in which this Circuit affirmed the denial of summar y judgme nt beca

use the off

icer enter ed a da

rk hallway at a pr ivate re sidence at appr ox imately 2:45 a.m. without identifying himself a nd without shining a flashlig ht. 941 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1991). The court he ld that such ac tions on theNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 17 - part of the office r we re not objec tively rea sonable; indee d, the plaintiff found the office r in the hallway and thoug ht the office r wa s an intruder , which ca used him to knock the off icer back throug h the door a

nd the offic er to fir e his wea pon in response. Id. at 445, 447. Plaintiff-Appellant’s r eliance on this case is misplaced f or two re asons. Fir st, Y

ate s is ina pp os ite to t

he ins tant c a se . Ind e e d, thi s Ci rc uit ha s h e ld, “ [W]e mu st a

na ly ze t he e ve nts surrounding[t he § 1983 cla imant’s] death in temporal seg ments. . . . The ‘se g menting’ rules of Boyd and Dicke rson divided the ana ly sis of possible errone ous actions taken by the offic ers pr ior to shots being f

ired.” Cla

y br oo k v . B irc hwe ll , 2 7 4 F. 3 d

1 0 9 8 , 1 1 0 4 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Boyd v. Bae ppler , 2 15 F .3 d 5 94 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ; Dicke rson v. Mc Clellan , 101 F.3d 1151 ( 6th Cir. 19 96 )) . A c c or din g ly , e ve n if Of fi c e r Wh ite vio late d ta c tic a l me tho ds by pu lli nghis SUVint o DeMe rre ll’s drivewa

y , that err or occ urre d well bef ore the shot was fire d. Indeed, a fter pulling his SUV into t he drive way , Offic er White went up to the fr ont door of De Merr ell’s re sidence , retre ated be hind the SUV, retre ated f urther be hind one of the ve hicles in the stree t, and continuously

eng ag ed in neg otiations with DeMerre ll all before DeMe rre ll advance d on the
o f f i c e r s w i thh i s w e a

p o np o i n t e d

atth e m . A c c o r d i n g l y, th e e r r o r i n v o l v i n gth e S U V , i f

an y,
occur red pr ior to the shooting se g ment; hence it does not factor into the question of the
rea sonablene ss of Off

icer Whit e’s a ctions. Y ate s is also inapplicable be cause it is factually dissimi lar fr om the instant case. I n Y ates , the offic er’ s actions wer e the c ause of the scuff le that included the shootingof the victim; indeed, the of fi c e r i nte nti on a lly

e nte re d th e da

rk ha llw ay of a pr ivate re sid e nc e at 2: 45 a .m. and did no t in any way identify himself, conduct that the c ourt cha rac terized as “mor e than mer ely neg lige nt.”No. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 18 - 941 F.2d at 447. When the victim found the office r, he r easona bly thought the of

fice r wa s an int ru de r, and

the of fi c e r w a s k

no c ke d thro ug h th e do or , whic h c a us e d h im t o f

ir e his we a

po n in response . Id. at 442. In the instant case , there is no such causa l connec tion, and PlaintiffAppellant fa ils to st ate why simply pulling into a per son’s drivewa y made Of fice r White’s conduct objec tively

unrea sonable. De Merr ell could not have be en conf used re g ardingthe office rs’ identity

like the victim was in Y

ates , beca use there wer e patr ol vehicles pre sent and Offic er White eng ag ed in continuous neg otiations with DeMerre ll to put hi s wea pon down. Even if Off icer Whit e er red in pulling direc tly

into DeMerr ell’s drivew ay , the er ror c ould be char acte rized as neg lige nt at most, and the Y ate s court he ld that “mere neg lige nce ma y not serve
a s a ba sis fo r a

se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. ” 94 1 F .2 d at 44 7. Ac c or din g ly , th is f a c t do e s n oth ingto
su pp or t Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt’ s c la im that O ff

ic e r Wh ite a c te d in

an o bje c tiv e ly

unre a so na

ble
manner . L ikewise, we fail to see how Offic er White pulling into the drivew ay esca lated the situation, as Plainti ff- Appellant cla ims. I ndeed, that event happe ned we ll before the shot was fired: a fter pullinghis SUV into t he drive way , Offic er White approa ched the front door of De Me rr e ll’ s r e sid e nc e , r e tr e ate d b e hin d th e SUV , r e tr e ate d f ur the r b e hin d o ne of

the ve hic le s in the str e e t, a

nd c on tin uo us ly e ng a g e d in

ne g oti atio ns wi th D e Me rr e ll a ll b e fo re De Me rr e ll advanc ed on the of

fice rs with his weapon pointed at them. I t is clear, a bsent any evidenc e to the contra ry , that any

“esc alation” due to Office r White’s pulling into the drivewa y dissipated once the offic ers r epea

tedly attempted to pea cef

ully resolve the situation, including re treating into theNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 19 - str e e t and c on tin uo us ly ne g oti atin gwi th D e Me rr e ll. F ur the rm or e , Pl a int if

f- Ap pe lla nt f a ile d to
a sse rt any su pp or tin ga uth or ity fo r t his e sc a latio n c la im that he ra ise d at or a l argume nt. 4. Di st anc e Be twe e n Offic e r Whi te and D e M e r r e ll Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt f ina lly argue s th at O ff

ic e r Wh ite did

no t a c t in an o bje c tiv e ly
re a so na ble mann e r b e c a

us e the tw o w e re 25 -3 0 f

e e t a pa rt , a dis tanc e that w a s n ot c los e e no ug h to pose an imminent threat to Office r White acc ordingto Plainti ff- Appellant’s e x pert. This point require s litt le discussion. I t matters little whether the distance be tween O ffice r White and De Me rr e ll w a s 2 5- 30 fe e t or 15 -2 0 f e e t be c a us e the un c on tr ov e rt e d te sti mony and state me nts from off icer s and a ne ighbor

place DeMe rre ll on a direc t path approa chingthe offic ers. Moreove r, seve ral off

icer s stated that DeMe rre ll aimed his gun at the office rs at the time he w as sh ot. In o the r c a se s w he re thi s Ci rc uit ha s h e ld t

hat of fi c e rs are e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity when a g un is pointed at them, any discussion reg ardingthe importance of a diff ere nce of ten fe et is notably absent. See B oyd , 2 15 F .3 d at 60 4; Sa rge nt v . Ci ty of T ole do Po lic e De

pt. , 1 50 F. Ap p’ x 470 , 4 75 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) (u np ub lis he d) ; Burnette v. G ee , 137 F. App’ x 806, 812 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). In whole, the district cour t corre ctly

applied Sa uc ie r and Graham in gr antingsummary jud g me nt t o O ff

ic e r Wh ite on

the ba sis of

qu a lif ie d immun ity . T he dis tr ic t c ourt tho ro ug hly revie wed the r ecor d and found that there w as “ove rwhe lming evide nce of DeMe rre ll’s threateningconduct” and that “O ffice r White was conf ronted with a da

ng erous, volatile situation involving an intoxicated, ar med, ag g ressive suspe ct that, it is uncontested, was a dvancingon the police and de fying c ommands to stand down.” Ac cording ly , the cour t held, “plaintiff ha s notNo. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 20 - sh own th at O ff

ic e r Wh ite ’s a c tio ns we re unre a so na ble or that th e us e of

de a dly fo rc e in t his c a se contravened the Four

th Amendment.” ( J A 45-46). Sixt h Circuit prec edent doe s nothing but reinfor ce the district court’s c onclusion. Acc ording ly , summary judgme nt was prope rly

g rante d as to Off icer Whit e. C. City of Cheboygan an d Police Chief Jon es Plaintiff-Appellant a dditionally argues that the district cour t erre d in gr antingsummary judgme nt to the Cit y

of Cheboyg an and Police Chief J ones bec ause she produce d evidenc e of Offic er White’s lac k of trainingand Of fice r White’s employ ers’ disreg ard ofwhat PlaintiffAppellant re fer s to as “White’s prior ong oing violations of Cheboy g an citizens’ constitutional rig hts.” Def

endants-A

ppellees a rgue that such a

claim ca nnot exi st absent a c onstitut ional violation on the part of Of fice r White. Defe ndants-Appe llees’ position is supported by case law, and the point nec essitates little discussion. 1. City of Cheboygan Reg ardingmunicipal liability under § 1983, the Supreme Court has he ld that if the offic er inflicted no constitutional injury on a per son, then it is “inconceiva ble” that the c ity

could be liable to the per son. City of L os Angeles v . Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (pe r cur iam). Acc ording ly , beca

use Off icer Whit e is entitled to summary judgme nt beca

use there was no constitutional viol ation, Plaintiff-Appellant’s c laim ag ainst the city must also fail. Id. (“I f a person ha s suffer ed no constitutional injury at the hands of

the individual police offic er, the fac t that the depa

rtmental re g ulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally

excessive fo rc e is q uit e be sid e the po int .” ); Sc ott , 205 F.3d at 879 (“[O]ur conclusion that no office r-No. 05-2325

DeM errell v. Cheboy

gan, et al

- 21 - de fe nd ant h a d d e pr ive d th e pla int if f o f a ny c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht a

fo rt ior i de fe ats t

he c la im a g a ins t the County

as we ll.”). Ac cording ly , the district court prope rly dismiss ed Plaintiff-Appe llant’s claim ag ainst the City

of Cheboyg an. 2. P olice Chief Jones Re g ard ingsu

pe rv iso ry lia bil ity un de r § 19 83 , th is C ir c uit ha s h e ld t

hat “ [a]t a min imum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supe rvisory officia l at least implicitly authorized, approve d knowing ly

acquie sced in the un c on sti tut ion al c on du c t of the offending subordinate.” Turner v. City of T aylor , 4 12 F .3 d 6 29 , 6 43 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T his ru le fi nd s su pp or t in other c ircuits as we ll. A. M. v . Lu ze rn e Cou nty

J uv e nile De t. C

tr. , 372 F.3d 572, 586 ( 3d Cir. 2004) (holdingthat there are two theories of supervisory

liability , both requiringa violation of
c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts ); Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico , 864 F.2d 881, 902 ( 1st Cir. 1988) (setting forth a two- part test for

supervisory

liability , one par

t of which re quires a c onstitut ional violation). Acc ording ly , if there is no unconstituti onal conduc t by an off endingsubordinate, a s in the instant case, a

plaintiff ca

nnot make the r equire d showing . There fore , the district court proper ly dismiss ed Plaintiff-Appe llant’s claim ag ainst Poli ce Chief J ones as we ll. III . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , w e AF F I RM the or de rs of the dis tr ic t c ourt .