Filed 12/23/14 In re Yvette L. CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re YVETTE L. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B254339 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK91450)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MANUEL L.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Los Angeles County. Carlos E. Vasquez, Judge. Affirmed. Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Mark J. Saladino, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Coun sel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________ __________________ _________________2 Manual L. challenges juvenile court or ders denying his petiti on for a modification and terminating his parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 366.26.) 1 Appellant shirked his duty to parent his two young dependent children. Just as the court was about to terminate parental rights, appellant re quested reunification services. Appellant’s belated appearance did not convince the juven ile court that it would be in the children’s best interest to restart the dependency proce ss while appellant began services, particularly
because he demonstrated no ability to take custody. Continuing appellant’s “weekend
visitor” status is less beneficial than a permanent, stable home. We affirm.
FACTS This appeal involves siblings Yvette L. (born in 2008) and Daniel L. (born in 2010), who were detained by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in January 2012. One year earlier, DCFS inves tigated a report that the children’s mother Cindy T. (Mother) is an addict who sold drugs from her home. When Mother gave birth to a stillborn in July 2011, she and the fetus tested positiv e for methamphetamine. DCFS instituted a voluntary case in August 2011, after Mother agreed to undergo drug rehabilitation. The children were placed w ith Baudelia T., their maternal grandmother (MGM). Voluntary efforts failed: Mother did not participate in drug testing or a substance abuse program. Mother reported that the children’s fath er, appellant Manuel L. (Father), kicked
her in the stomach. The MGM saw Father hit Mother, and accused Father of using drugs with Mother, of breaking her wi ndows, flattening her tires and destroying her property. Father is a known gang membe r, who, at the time the children were detained, was sought for questioning by police in connection with a murder. DCFS filed a petition on January 17, 2012, alleging that Mother cannot care for her children due to her drug abuse and failure to participate in remedial services; further, Mother did not provide her five -year-old daughter Ailyn with medical care for the girl’s

1 All statutory references in this opinion are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 seizures and speech delays, placi ng the children at risk of harm. 2 Father’s whereabouts were unknown. The court found a prima faci e case for detaining the children, leaving
them with the MGM. In the jurisdiction report, the MGM stated that “‘Daniel does not even know his
mother . . . he thinks that I am his mother because I was rea lly the one that took care of them.’” Mother did not visit the children, and the children do not ask about her. The
MGM does not want the children in foster care with strangers and is willing to care for them until adulthood. They are healthy an d comfortable in the MGM’s home. Neither
Mother nor Father was available for comment on the allegations: they did not contact DCFS or inquire about visitation.
The MGM indicated that Father “has not been seen for approximately 1 year.” DCFS conducted a due diligence se arch for Father through 22 sources, without success. At the jurisdiction hearing on March 2, 2012, the court found insuffic ient evidence of a proper search for Father. It proceeded wi th the case as to Mother, sustained the allegations against her, and asserted jurisdiction over the children.
DCFS conducted a further search for Fath er. On May 25, 2012, the court found that the search was adequate, and that there is a substantial danger if the children were placed in Father’s care. It denied Father reunification services as a presumed father unless he presented himself to DCFS within six months. In August 2012, DCFS reported that the children refer to the MGM as “mom.” The MGM opined that Mother is still not sobe r. Though verbal, Yvette did not ask for her parents. The MGM met the children’s ne eds and wanted to provide them with a permanent home. Father never contact ed DCFS to arrange visitation. Mother did not comply with the case pl an by attending drug treatment programs, and did not arrange for monito red visits. The court termin ated Mother’s reunification

2 Mother and Ailyn are not pa rties to this appeal. Fatheris not related to Ailyn.4 services on August 24, 2012, and set a hearing to select a permanent plan. In September 2012, the court identified the goal as adoption. DCFS submitted a report for the selection and implementation he aring. The report notes that the court never provided reunificati on services to Father, and Mother’s services
were terminated. The MGM wa nts to adopt the children: she has known them since birth, they have resided with her since mid-2011, and she is meeting all of their needs. The children are healthy and happy in the MGM’s home and want to stay with her.
Father had no visits with them . Mother has not complied with the case plan by attending a drug treatment program. DCFS recommende d termination of parental rights and implementation of a plan of adoption.
The court conti nued the December 2012 permanent plan hearing because Father was not given notice. The social worker se nt new notices to Father, who called DCFS on December 27, 2012, then filed a statement of parentage. Mother and Father made their first appearances in the case at a hearing on January 3, 2013. The court continued the hearing so that DCFS could complete an adoptive home study. In a June 2013 status report, DCFS stated that the children are well-adjusted in the home of the MGM, whom they refer to as their mother. Ail yn receives needed medications and is now able to interact appr opriately with her siblings. The family is
well-bonded. The MGM meet s the children’s needs and is committed to providing permanency to them through adoption. Father filed a request for a modification on June 17, 2013. He asked the court to give him custody of the children as he is a nonoffending parent under the petition. He argued that he was not given proper notice of the jurisdiction hearing. Alternatively, he
asked the court for six months of reunification services. Fath er stated that he sees the children every weekend and they are “extremely bonded” to him. He declared that he
lived with the children from the time of their birth until Daniel was one month old, and has provided for them and cared for them in a paternal manner by feeding them, reading to them, and helping them with their educati on. The paternal uncle declared that the
MGM was aware of the children’s contacts w ith Father, and knew that she could lose5 custody if DCFS found out that Father was having unmonitored vi sits. The court set Father’s petition for hearing. In a supplemental report, DCFS stated th at Father perpetrate d domestic violence against Mother and, according to the MGM, ha s not been a part of the children’s lives for several years. The children regularly stay with their paternal uncle, and the MGM acknowledged that the children may have seen Father at those times, when she was not
there. The children confirmed th at they see Father, but they could not recall any recent or specific dates. The paternal uncle reported that Father visits the chil dren. Father stated
that he sees the children at his brother’s house. He did not contact the MGM because they do not get along. Father admitted that he formerly used marijuana, but said that he stopped using the drug in r ecent months. Father also ad mitted that he and Mother engaged in multiple physical altercations during their relationshi p. DCFS opposed
reunification services for Father and recomme nded adoption by the MGM. Father began having monitored visits with the children every other weekend. Counsel for the children oppos ed Father’s petition for a modification. The minors contended that DCFS made multiple efforts to locate Father, but he chose to remain
hidden. Because Father was aware of the dependency petition, and the children’s placement with the MGM, his challenge to their placement at the selection and implementation hearing is insignificant. Th ere is no changed circumstance that would benefit the children, who consider the MGM to be their mother and love living with her. Father has shown no plans to care for his children permanen tly, and it would harm them to be separated from their half sister Ailyn. On January 22, 2014, the court found thatFather’s modification request is not in
the best interest of the childre n, even if there was a change of circumstances. The court cited “a strong interest in th e permanency of th ese children [who] ha ve lived with the maternal grandmother ever since they can re member.” Father re quested a hearing to contest the proposed termination of his parental rights. At the contested permanent plan hearing, Father testified th at the children began living with the MGM several years ago. Sinc e then, he has visited them every weekend,6 and the children refer to him as “Dad” or “Pap i.” He takes them to restaurants, plays with them, and disciplines them verbally when necessary. The children are the love of his life, and there has never been a period of time when he did not vi sit them. His visits are monitored by family members. On cross-examination, Father explained that he did not seek custody when the children were detained by DCFS because “I just moved away” following his separation
from Mother. He continued to see the children on weekends, when they would all stay at his brother’s house. During those visits, Fa ther would purchase food and clothing for the children, and feed and bathe them. Since Ja nuary 2014, Father ha s had day-long visits
with the children at the MGM’s home. In closing argument, DCFS observed th at Father never requested reunification services until the eve of the pe rmanent plan hearing, after th e court identified adoption as the proposed plan. Father did not assert patern ity for a year, and did not state that he is prepared to take custody. He simply di d not want his parent al rights terminated; however, the issue before the court is permanen cy for the children. Daniel has not lived
with Father since he was one month old: he does not recognize Father as a daily caregiver but rather as someone who visits on weekends. Minors’ counsel requested that parental rights be terminated because Father’s visits were monitored and inconsistent, and he does not occupy a parental role. The children look to the MGM for daily nurturing since two years, and this permanent relationshi p should not be disrup ted. Father asked the court to implement a legal guardianship to protect his parental rights. He does not want to disrupt the children’s permanent home with the MGM.
The court examined the ev idence to determine whether the relationship between Father and the children promotes the child ren’s well-being to such a degree as to outweigh the benefit of a permanent home. Fathe r’s visits were pleasant: he played with the children, took them to a pizza parlor, and occasionally gives them money; however,
the court was not convinced that this amounts to a parent/child relationship. There is no testimony that Father provides regular financia l support, or has undertaken parental duties on a regular basis. The children have lived with the MGM for an extended period—in7 Daniel’s case, for most of his life. The cour t found that there is insufficient evidence to disturb the policy favoring adoption.
The court found that the children are a doptable, and it would be detrimental to return them to the parents. It terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and
transferred the children’s care to DCFS for adoptive planning and placement. The MGM was designated as the prospective adoptive parent. Father appeals from the orders denying his petition for a modification an d terminating his pa rental rights.
DISCUSSION 1. Father Did Not Request Custody When the Children Were Removed The juvenile court had jurisdiction over the children beginning in March 2012, when it sustained two counts of child negl ect and endangerment due to Mother’s drug abuse. “[A] jurisdictional finding good agai nst one parent is good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring her within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent.” ( In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397, italics added.) Prior to DCFS intervention, the children we re in Mother’s custody: Father stopped being a custodial pare nt when Daniel was one month old.
When the court orders removal of a child from a custodial parent, it determines whether the noncustodial parent desires cust ody. “If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unle ss it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emo tional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) Father did not request custody wh en the children were
removed from Mother. DCFS was unable to locate Father; as a result, Father did not
receive reunification services . (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1).) The statute authorizing placement with a nonoffending, noncustodial parent was not triggered here, because Father did no t request custody when the children were removed from Mother. Father did not appear until the eve of the permanent plan hearing, knowing full well that his child ren were with the MGM the en tire time. Father argued to the juvenile court that he “made an appropriate plan by allowing them to reside with their maternal grandmother and their half sibling.” Father did not make a plan for the children.8 On the contrary, he said that he did not cont act the MGM because they do not get along. Instead, DCFS made a plan w ith the MGM to provide child care and the court approved that plan, absent any expression by Father of a desire or ability to take custody. Although Father argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred by denying him custody under section 361. 2, this is misleading. Father did not make any showing that he
is able to care full time for two small children: he did not say what his living situation is,
or whether it is suitable for children. He vi sited the children first at his brother’s house, and now at the MGM’s house, on weekends. Father acknowle dged that he does not wish to disrupt the children’s home w ith the MGM. At most, he se eks to continue in his role as a weekend visitor, without the day-to-day responsibilities that the MGM has provided
since 2011. Section 361.2 does not require that custody “be immediately awarded to a noncustodial parent regardless of when in the dependency process the parent comes forward. Rather, its language suggests that the statute is applicable only at the time the
child is first removed from the custodi al parent or guardian’s home.” ( In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 453.) Even if the statut e applies at a later stage of the proceedings,
it “assumes the existence of a competent parent able to immediately assume custody.” ( Id. at p. 454.) Father did not show an ability to immediately assume custody. Nothing in the statutory framework suggests that the Legislature wished to elevate a presumptive parent’s belated interest in custody over a ch ild’s interest in stab ility and permanency at the tail end of the dependency process. ( Ibid. ) Father cannot rely on cases in which fathers promptly came forward within six mont hs of disposition, when he did not do so himself. (See In re Jonathan P. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4t h 1240, 1253-1254; In re Suhey G. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 732, 743.) Father suggests that he would have gotten involved earlier, if only he had received notice of the proceedings from DCFS. Father ha s been secretly visiting the children: it is
reasonable to infer that he did not want th e government to know where he was, no doubt because the police were looking for him, as we ll as DCFS. Father’s family participated
in this charade. The childre n’s paternal uncle was the prime mover in keeping Father’s9 whereabouts hidden, as he was the person who collected the child ren from the MGM and took them to see Father. The paternal unc le frankly declared that he knew the MGM would get in trouble if the DCFS social worker found out about Father’s unmonitored visits with the children. Given the family ’s complicated efforts to keep DCFS from learning of Father’s contacts with the child ren, knowing that Father was forbidden from having unauthorized visits, Fath er’s complaint that he was not given proper notice of the proceedings rings hollow.
The decisive issue is that Father knew sinc e the inception of these proceedings that Mother no longer parented thei r children. Yet Father did not declare paternity until his parental rights were about to be terminated. A father “must promptly attempt to assume his parental responsibilities . . . [and] dem onstrate ‘a willingness himself to assume custody of the child—not merely to block adoption by others.’” ( Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849.) Pa rents who “refuse to meet their parental obligations face the profound loss of a relati onship with their child.” ( In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1238.) 2. Finding of Detriment to the Children Father contends that the juvenile cour t never found that his custody would be detrimental to the children, which must prec ede termination of parental rights to avoid severing a positive, nurturing pare nt-child relationship. ( Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 253, 256; In re T.G. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1, 20.) The dependency law no longer uses the term “p arental unfitness” and instead requires a finding that awarding custody of a dependent child to a parent would be detrimental. ( In
re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211.) Here, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that a substa ntial danger exists to the physical and emotional health of the children and there is no reasonable means to protect them without removal from Father’s custody, during a hearing on May 25, 2012. The court’s finding is supported by the record. The DCFS reports indicate that
Father kicked Mother in th e stomach; the MGM witnessed Father’s domestic violence.
The MGM also accused Father of damaging her property a nd using drugs. Father does10 not deny the accusations. Indeed, Father admits to drug use and to multiple incidents of domestic violence. Further, the police were actively searching for Father in connection
with a murder when th e children were detained. Contrary to Father’s claim, the court’s finding was not based purely on Father’s absen ce but rather on the unc ontested reports of Father’s violence. (§ 358, subd. (b) [the court may consider DCFS reports when making a dispositional finding].)
The cases that Father c ites are inapposite. In In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 845, a noncustodial father s ubmitted to depe ndency jurisdiction, then disappeared for three years. No claim was made of domestic violence. Upon the father’s reappearance at the permanent plan hearing, the juvenile court denied him visits and terminated his parental rights. This was erro r because the record did not show that giving custody to the father would be detrimental. ( Id. at p. 848, fn. 3.) By comparison, the
record here shows that Father has a histor y of drug use and domestic violence—and admits to it—which supports the lower court’s finding of detriment. Even less on point is
In re Z.K. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 51, 55, in which a father absconded from the state with an infant and the hapless mother spent five ye ars searching for her child, only to have her parental rights terminated just as she finally received news of the child’s whereabouts. Father has not been searching for his lost children during the course of this case: he elected to have the MGM parent the childre n instead of stepping up to take custody
himself. He was content to be a weekend visitor who sees the children when it is
convenient for him to do so.
3. Denial of Father’s Pe tition for a Modification When reunification services are bypasse d or terminated, this “ordinarily
constitutes a sufficient basis for te rminating parental rights.” ( In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236-237.) A parent may revive the reunification issue only by demonstrating changed circumstances. (§ 388; In re Nolan W.
, supra , 45 Cal.4th at p. 1235; Kimberly H. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 67, 72; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.) There must be a genuine change in circumstances such
that the child’s best interest s will be promoted by the pr oposed change in order. ( In re11 Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.Ap p.4th 246, 250; In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) To make this determination, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. ( In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.A pp.4th 247, 258; In re
Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.) The ru ling cannot be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion—an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination that exceeds the bounds of reason. ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319;
In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) a. Changed Circumstances Father’s asserted “changed circumstance ” is that his whereabouts changed from unknown to known when he finally called DC FS on December 27, 2012, a year after the children were detained, altho ugh they began living with the MGM in mid-2011, when Mother was offered voluntary dr ug rehabilitation services. It is difficult to see this as a genuine change in circumstances. Fath er knew that the MGM was the full-time caregiver, but never troubled to assert his parental rights, content to linger on the sidelines and have secret meetings with the children, engineered by his brother. Not until this highly convenientsituation appeared to be ending did Father make his move in dependency court. Apart from shirking his parental duty to provide a home for the children after they were detained from Mother, Father did not stat e that he is currently able to provide the children with a stable, safe, pe rmanent home. On the contra ry, he wants the children to stay with the MGM, and he can visit. In other words, no change from before. Without a showing of parental ability to provide a safe home for childre n, an eleventh-hour attempt to extend the dependency proceeding is unavailing. ( In re A.S ., supra , 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) In addition, Fath er did not show that he reso lved his admitted issues with drugs and domestic violence by enrolling in anger management, parenting, or domestic violence classes, so the court could not safely release the children to Father even if he had a home for them. The problems raised at disposition hearing pe rsisted, unchanged.12 b. Best Interests of the Children In determining a child’s best interest, th e court considers (1) the seriousness of the reason for dependency jurisdiction; (2) the st rength of the bonds be tween the child, the parent and the caretakers; and (3) whether th e problems leading to dependency may be easily removed or ameliorated. ( In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530-532.) Here, the initial reason for detaining the child ren was Mother’s drug abuse; however, the
children also had to be detain ed because Father was nowhere to be found and certainly not active enough in his children’s lives to make himself immediately known to DCFS and demand sole custody and termination of dependency jurisdiction as a nonoffending, noncustodial parent. Even after Father pres ented himself to DCFS in December 2012, he waited six more months to request custody or reunification services. With respect to the second factor, the strength of the bonds between the children, Father, and the MGM, th e totality of the circumstances does not favor Father. Daniel has
lived with the MGM effectivel y since birth. She is the only parent—meaning a full-time caregiver—that Daniel has ever known, and he considers her to be his mother. Yvette
has lived with the MGM since age three, and considers th e MGM to be her mother.
There is no evidence that either of the children ask about Fath er. Although Father claims to have visited them every weekend th roughout the dependency proceedings, he apparently did not make an impression on his ch ildren, as they could not recall any recent
visits. There is no evidence th at Father ever took the children to medical appointments or regularly provided their food, clothing and hyg ienic needs. The children loved living as a family unit with the MGM and th eir half sister Ailyn.
There is no evidence that Father could provide his children with the kind of permanent, stable home that the MGM has pr ovided, and he never took the initiative to
tackle his domestic violence issues. Father di d not demonstrate an ability to take custody.
There is no evidence that the children showed separation anxiet y when visits with Father were over, which tends to discount the strengt h of their bond. By contrast, the children are strongly bonded to the MGM, who has cared for them full time for most of their lives.13 We cannot say that the juvenile court ex ceeded the bounds of reason when it cited the children’s strong interest in permanency with the MGM and their half sister as a basis for denying Father’s petition for a modification. On the eve of th e permanent placement hearing, after two years in foster care, the ch ildren’s interest in permanency and stability outweighs Father’s recent inte rest in reunification. ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309; In re Anthony W.
, supra , 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 251-252.) The court properly denied Father’s petition for a modification. 4. Termination of Parental Rights At the selection and implemen tation hearing, the court mu st select adoption as the permanent plan and terminate parental rights if it finds that the child is likely to be adopted. (§ 366.2 6, subd. (c)(1); In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 49; In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.) Adoption is the plan preferred by the Legislature. ( In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826; In re Ronell A. (1995) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) 3 A parent may avoid termination of parental rights by showing why a statutory exception applies, and that terminat ion would be detrimen tal to the child. ( In re
Celine R.
, supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) In re Derek W.
, supra , 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 826;
In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.) Father argues that his parental rights should not be terminated. To avoid termination, he must show that he has “mai ntained regular visitation and contact” with the children and there is a “compelling reas on” to believe that ending the parental relationship would be detrimental to the child ren. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) He bears the burden of proving that the children would be “greatly” harmed by termination of parental rights, and that he holds a “parental” role with the child. ( In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466-468.) Father must show both prongs of the excep tion: regular visita tion and a benefit to
the children if the relationshi p were continued that outwei ghs the well-being the children would gain by permanently stay ing with the MGM in the home they have always known.

3 Father does not dispute that the children are likely to be adopted.14 As to the first prong, Father testified that hi s visits have been consistent throughout, even if they were not approved by DCFS or the court. Father’s testimony was uncontroverted. As to the second prong, the dependency court determined th at the children’s relationship with Father is not so significant that they wo uld be greatly harmed if it were severed. The court’s determination is support ed by substantial evidence. ( In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) Daniel was eight months old and Yve tte was three when DCFS learned of Mother’s drug abuse in 2011. Mother had just given birt h to a stillborn who tested positive for methamphetamine. The children we nt to live with th e MGM while Mother was encouraged to participate in drug rehab ilitation. There is no indication that Father was prepared to step up and ta ke custody of his children. Instead, the reports show that Father was on the run from the police, who wa nted to question him in connection with a murder, and he had engage d in domestic violence. Father continued to lay low for the duratio n of the dependency proceedings. He claims to have visited the children regularly, yet never came forward to assert his parental rights. He let the MGM fulfill all parental ro les for the three children in her care, one of whom has medical problems. His only excuse for neglecting his parental obligations is that “I just moved away” wh en he separated from Mother. Father maintains that the juvenile cour t erred by not allowing him to call fiveyear-old Yvette as a witness. After a visit with Father in Novemb er 2013, Yvette came
home and told the MGM that she did not want to have to choose between the MGM and Father, after the paternal aunt told Yvette that she had to choose who she wants to be
with. The MGM indicated that she would tell Father that his family’s discussion of case matters with the children was emotionally dama ging. Father argues that he should have been able to ask Yvette directly, on th e witness stand, about her ambivalence. The court is not required to have a depe ndent child testify at a hearing, but is required to consider the child’s wishes and to act in the child’s best interests. The child may ask to be present or the court may order it. (§§ 349, 366.26, subd. (h)(1)-(2).) “[I]t is within the juvenile court’s discretion to exclude the testimony of a child in order to15 avoid psychological harm to the child, even thou gh that testimony is relevant, the child is competent to testify, and the ch ild is both practically and lega lly ‘available’ to testify.” ( In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1088.) In Jennifer J. , a seven-year-old expressed “ambivalence” respecti ng termination of parental tie s, so her parents sought
direct evidence of her desire to continue parental contacts. ( Id . at pp. 1083-1084.) The child’s attorney objected that a seven-year-old should not be asked to make distinctions between adoption and ongoing parental c ontact and could be traumatized by the questions. ( Id. at p. 1086, fn. 4.) The minor’s te stimony was not crucial to resolving a disputed issue, because the ev idence already showed that sh e was bonded to her parents. In any event, the court could decide “that adoption was the best disposition of Jennifer’s
future notwithstanding Jennifer’s expressed views to th e contrary and the court’s full knowledge of those views.” ( Id. at p. 1087.) Thus, if th e child’s feelings can be presented without live testimony and the issues would not be materia lly affected by the child’s testimony, the court may decide not to require it. Here, Yvette’s statement was not “spontan eous” as Father claims. Rather, the paternal aunt caused the child to feel threatened. This pr ovoked Yvette to express her concerns to the MGM. There is nothing am bivalent about the child ren’s happiness with the MGM, or their desire to stay with her. No one cl aims that the children ever demanded to live with or spend more time with Father, or Moth er, for that matter. Father proposed to have Yvette describe their rela tionship and explain wh ether she understands adoption and opposes it. Yvette, through co unsel, strongly opposed having a five-yearold explain the difference be tween adoption and guardiansh ip and her testimony would
be that she did not want to be the one who picked between Fa ther and the MGM. At this point in the proceedings, subjecting the child to examination at trial would not be productive, when she is willing to concede that the court had to decide what future was in her best interest. It is not fair to ask yo ung children “to choose whether they ever see their natural parent again or to give voice to approving that termination.” ( In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593; In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 820.)16 Father complains that the court prevented him from de scribing specific incidents in which he disciplined the ch ildren. Father was allowed to testify about his method of discipline. He said, “I just ta lk to them. I just tell them, do n’t do that, and they listen to me.” The court sustained an objection that specific incidents of misbehavior were
irrelevant. This was not an abuse of disc retion: long narratives describing specific
incidents of childish behavior were not necess ary for the court to understand that Father plays a role in the children’s upbringing. Father visited the children regularly, but even frequent and loving contact between parent and child is not sufficien t to establish the requisite be nefit to the child if Father does not occupy a parental role and will not take custody. ( In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419; In re
Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093 , 1108-1109.) A “pleasant” relationship is not enough to establish a benefit to the child because “it bears no resemblance to the sort of consistent, daily nurturing that ma rks a parental relationship.” ( In re Derek W.
, supra , 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827.) “Int eraction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child.” ( In re Autumn H. , supra , 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Apart from the incidental benefit of parent -child interaction, we must consider “the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of th e child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the pa rent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.” ( In re Autumn H. , supra , 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Daniel lived with Father fo r the first month of his life: he only
knows Father from visits. Yve tte was three when Father cede d his parenting duties to the MGM. While Father may love the children, he does not occupy a parental role, such that they look to him for th eir needs. It is difficult for a pa rent who has essentially never had custody to show that his relationship outwe ighs the benefit of a permanent adoptive home. ( In re Casey D. , supra , 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) Father does not dispute that the children are thriving with the MGM, or that the MGM will adopt them. He doe s not even want them to be moved from the MGM’s17 home. He simply wants a guardianship to be in place. This is not part of the legislative plan mandating a preference for adoption. “Once the court determines adoption is feasible, the less desirable and less permanent alternatives of guardianship and long-term
foster care need notbe pursued. “ ( In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792, 1799; In re
Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.) Although Father insists that he did nothing wrong that would warrant the te rmination of his parental rights, the fact remains that he was not, is not, and does not plan to be the children’s daily care giver. He has left this job to the MGM, and wants it to stay that way. Father’s opposition to adoption, on principle alone, is not sufficient to ov ercome the legislative prefer ence in favor of adoption. Father did not carry his bur den of showing that the children would be greatly harmed by the termination of his parental right s, or that the benefits of continuing their relationship outweigh the benefits of a stable, permanent home. The juvenile court could reasonably find that Father’s relationship is no t sufficiently beneficial. In a guardianship or continued foster care, the children would have an unstable placement. Where, as here, children are likely to be adopted, the court mu st choose “the most permanent and secure
alternative that can be afforded.” ( In re Beatrice M. , supra , 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1419.)
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

BOREN, P.J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.