* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, excep t under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 16 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee, Nos. 97- 6282 97-6349

v. (D.C. No. CR-97-89-R) DARRELL L. FRECH and SALLY M. FRECH, (W.D. Okla.)

Defendants - Appellants.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before ANDERSON , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record , this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered submitted without o ral argument. Defendants, Mr. Darrell Frech and Ms. Sally Frech, were indicted by a grand jury on charges of conspiracy and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1 The convictions stemmed from the “Agricultural Related Damages Program.”

Appellee’s Br. at 3. Defendants asserted that this “Program” was the result of an alleged class action lawsuit in which the Federal Reserve, the Internal Revenue Service, and the entire banking system in the United States were allegedly found fraudulent and unconstitutional. Seeid. Defendants claimed that citizens could receive money through this program by filing a claim for damages and paying a $300 fee to Defendants.

2Docket number 97-6282 refers to that interlocutoryappeal. -2- 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Mr. Frech was also charg ed with money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). At thei r arraignments before a United States magistrate judge, Defendants expressed theirdesire to represent themselves. See R., Vol. I, Docs. 1, 4; Supp. R., Vol. IV at 4-12; Vol. V at 4-11. Approximately one month later, in response to the g overnment’s Motion and Brief for Hearing on Defendants’ Waiver of Counsel, the d istrict court held a hearing to further advise Defendants of their right to counsel . See id. at Vol. 1, Doc. 10; see generallyVol. III. During that proceeding, the court appoi nted “standby counsel” to be available to Defendants. See id. at Vol. III at 23, 26-28; Supp. R., Vol. I, Docs. 18, 19. Defendants chose to represent themse lves at trial rather than to accept the counsel appointed by the district court. See id. at Vol. I, Doc. 40. A jury convicted Defendants on all counts charged in the indictment. 1 Prior to sentencing, Defendants filed an appeal in this court challenging the district court’s jurisdiction. 2 This court reserved judgment on that appeal. The issues raised in that appeal and the issues raised by Defendants in the appeal filed3 Because the two appeals present essentially the sa me arguments, we do

not address the government’s argument that appeal n umber 97-6282 should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. -3- after their sentencing, docket number 97-6349, are virtually identical, 3 and the two appeals have been consolidated. We construe De fendants’ pro se pleadings liberally. See United States v. Warner , 23 F.3d 287, 290 (10th Cir. 1994). Defendants argue that their convictions are invalid for several reasons and ask this court to issue a writ of mandamus which will d ismiss the indictments against them, vacate the jury verdict, dismiss the districtcourt’s orders and judgments, and set aside their sentences. See Appellants’ Br. (No. 97-6349) at 38. We address each argument in turn. Defendants maintain that their Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel was violated because they were and remain “ in want of Effective Assistance of counsel.” Id. at 1, 34. Defendants assert that the district cou rt erroneously ruled that they knowingly and intellige ntly waived their right to counsel. We review de novo whether a defendant has voluntarily, knowingly, an d intelligently waived his right to counsel. See United States v. Taylor , 113 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 1997). Defendants’ contentio n that they were denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the ir constitutional rights is a legally frivolous assertion which obscures the factthat Defendants’ own4For example, Defendants refused to accept the assi stance of counsel who

utilized the appellation “esquire” because they bel ieve this is a title of nobility which infringes on their rights as sovereigns and a s Christians. See R., Vol. III at 5; Supp. R., Vol. VI at 7. -4- obstreperous demands resulted in their proceeding t o trial without representation. 4 The record reveals that the district court went to great lengths to encourage Defendants to accept appointed counsel at their arr aignments, prior to and during their trial, and at sentencing. The district courtrepeatedly conducted the proper inquiry to determine that Defendants knowingly and intelligently waived their right to counsel, and the district court made expli cit findings in this regard. See United States v. Silkwood , 893 F.2d 245, 248 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied , 496 U.S. 908 (1990); cf. Taylor , 113 F.3d at 1140 (“[A] refusal without good cause to proceed with able appointed counsel is a ‘voluntary ’ waiver.” (citation omitted)). Although the Sixth Amendment provides defendants wi th the right to counsel in criminal cases, defendants who are appoi nted counsel are not entitled to counsel of their own choosing. See United States v. Nichols , 841 F.2d 1485, 1504 (10th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Willie , 941 F.2d 1384, 1390 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[defendant’s] clear expression that he could only work with an attorney who shared his views . . . [inter alia] co nstitute[d] a valid implied waiver of his right to counsel”), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 1106 (1992). Defendants repeatedly stated that they would only accept couns el who were not bar-5-

association members. The district court did not er r in denying Defendants’ desire for counsel who were not licensed to practice in Ok lahoma and before the federal district court. See Nichols , 841 F.2d at 1503 & n.10 (“A defendant does not have a constitutionally protected right to be represente d by a person who is not admitted to the bar.”). Defendants were not willin g to accept court-appointed counsel unless counsel signed a contract authored b y Defendants. See R., Vol. I, Doc. 39; Vol. III at 20-21, 24-25. It was not unre asonable for the proposed courtappointed counsel to refuse to sign Defendants’ pro posed contract. Defendants also argue that the search warrant utili zed to seize evidence introduced at trial was defective because it misstated that the owner of the real property to be searched was Mr. Frech. See Appellants’ Br. (No. 97-6349) at 17- 19. Defendants also allege that the warrant was in valid because it was not supplemented with an affidavit of probable cause “s upported by oath or affirmation from a de jure injured party.” Appella nts’ App., Ex. 8 at 2. We review the reasonableness of a search warrant de novo . See United States v. Kennedy , 131 F.3d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1997). When deter mining whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for find ing probable cause to issue the warrant, we give great deference to the magistrate judge’s decision. See Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Kennedy , 131 F.3d at 1375. We note that Defendants did not file a motion to suppress the evidence-6-

seized as a result of the warrant’s execution. At trial, Defendants objected to the introduction of some evidence based on the alleged invalidity of the warrant. See R., Vol. IV at 78, 129-30, 142. During the trial, however, the court determined that the warrant was properly issued and executed. Defendants’ argument that the search warrant was in valid is without merit. Defendants have not proved that the warrant was inv alidly issued or improperly executed. See United States v. Maestas , 2 F.3d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993); Mason v. United States , 719 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1983). These Defe ndants offer no evidence that the facially valid warrant w as based on a deliberately or recklessly false statement of material fact. See Maestas , 2 F.3d at 1491. The magistrate judge properly relied on the statements of the investigating officer in the affidavit to determine that there was sufficien t probable cause to issue the warrant. We conclude that this warrant is well wit hin the standards we have set for search warrants. See United States v. Richardson , 86 F.3d 1537, 1545 (10th Cir.) (reaffirming that an affidavit lacking person al knowledge of illegal activity is not fatal to the probable cause determination), cert. denied , U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 588 (1996); United States v. Sullivan , 919 F.2d 1403, 1423-24 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that although the affidavit supporti ng the search warrants contained errors, the trial judge’s findings were not clearlyerroneous and defendants did not demonstrate otherwise). The warrant properly state d that Defendants’ residence-7-

was to be searched. Cf. United States v. Dahlman , 13 F.3d 1391, 1397 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that mentioning the word “residence” in a warrant sufficiently counterbalances an ambiguous property description), cert. denied , 511 U.S. 1045 (1994). The ownership of the place to be searched was not material to the warrant’s validity. Additionally, if for some reas on the warrant were invalid, the officers’ good-faith reliance on the facial validity of the warrant would fit the exception to the suppression doctrine set forth by United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See Dahlman , 13 F.3d at 1397-98. Defendants claim that they are not subject to the U nited States criminal statutes under which they were convicted because th e federal government and the District Court for the Western District of Oklahomahave no jurisdiction over them. See Appellants’ Br. (No. 97-6349) at 10 (“[Defendants] have recognized that the Original 1787 Constitution has manipulativ ely been Suppressed and is no Longer a fundamental American Law and . . . [Defend ants] have Declared their own Declaration of Independence from the De Facto UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.”). Defendants also argue that the capi talization of their names in court documents constitutes constructive fraud and, therefore, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction over them. Defenda nts claim that the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma is not t he proper venue for determination of this case. We review the districtcourt’s exercise of jurisdiction-8-

and determination of venue under the de novo standard. See United States v. Cuch , 79 F.3d 987, 990 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 384 (1996). Defendants’ arguments that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over them are similar to those labeled “frivolous” and “ silly” by this court. Collins , 920 F.2d at 629-30. Defendants “blithely ignore 18 U.S.C. § 3231 which explicitly vests federal district courts with juris diction over ‘all offenses against the laws of the United States.’” Id. at 629. Defendants’ assertion that the capitalization of their names in court documents co nstitutes constructive fraud, thereby depriving the district court of jurisdictio n and venue, is without any basis in law or fact. Defendants have not argued that th ey are not residents of Alfalfa County, Oklahoma, which lies in the Western Distric t of Oklahoma for purposes of determining venue. Additionally, the acts charg ed in the indictment were committed in the Western District of Oklahoma. We conclude that venue was properly in that district. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); Fed. R. Crim. P. 18. Defendants’ remaining arguments are legally untenab le. Defendants’ allegation that the trial court erred in not allowi ng them to voir dire potential jurors is clearly without merit. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a) (giving the courts discretionary power over voir dire); United States v. Ainesworth , 716 F.2d 769, 770 (10th Cir. 1983) (“We have previously dismissedthis argument as frivolous-9-

and do so again.”). Defendants contend that they c annot receive due process of law in the courts of the United States and that a “ Judicial Declatory [sic] Judgment” recorded in Oklahoma county records shoul d be afforded full faith and credit by the United States federal courts. Defend ants maintain that this declaratory judgment has res judicata effect in thi s matter. Defendants fail to cite any legitimate authority for their contention that the federal courts should give full faith and credit to the judgment of a private court convened by Defendants in Alfalfa County, Oklahoma. Defendants maintain that their conduct under the pu rported Agricultural Related Damages Program was authorized by United St ates statutes, the United States Constitution, and a presidential executive o rder. They argue that, therefore, their conduct was not illegal. Defendan ts’ allegation is without legal merit. During the trial this argument was dissecte d, explained, and disproved. Alternatively, this allegation might be read as an assertion that the government failed to prove the intent element of Defendants’ c rimes. Cf. Appellants’ App., Ex. 26. It appears from the record that this issue was presented to the jury by Defendants. See R., Vol. IV at 123-25, 144. The jury was presente d with sufficient evidence from which it could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants possessed the requisite intent to defrau d their victims. The jury was properly instructed on the defense of good faith an d the definition of the terms-10-

“willingly” and “knowingly.” See Supp. R., Vol. III at 23, 28, 34-35. Finding no legal merit in any of Defendants’ argume nts that their convictions and sentences should be reversed, we AF FIRM Mr. Darrell L. Frech’s conviction and sentence, and we AFFIRM Ms. Sally M. Frech’s conviction and

sentence. AFFIRMED . Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge