alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Court of Appeals

**First District of Texas**

BILL OF COSTS

No. 01

- 14

- 00571

- CV

Ted Kaldis aka Ted Lefteris Kaldis

v

.

Crest Finance

NO. 2012

- 71189 IN THE 281ST DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS C OUNTY

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID/DUE STATUS PAID BY

MT FEE

MT FEE

MT FEE

MT FEE

MT FEE

MT FEE

RPT RECORD

CLK RECORD

FILING

STATEWIDE EFILING

MT FEE $10.00

$15.00

$10.00

$10.00

$10.00

$10.00

$610.00

$74.00

$175.00

$20.00

$10.00 05/15/2015

04/17/2015

03/27/2015

01/16/2015

10/03/2014

09/19/2014

08/20/20 14

07/31/2014

07/21/2014

07/21/2014

07/11/2014 E

- PAID

E

- PAID

E

- PAID

E

- PAID

E

- PAID

E

- PAID

PAID

PAID

PAID

PAID

E

- PAID ANT

ANT

ANT

APE

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

APE



### The costs incurred on appeal to the First Court of Appeals Houston, Texas are $95 4 .00

.

Court costs in this case have been taxed in this Court’s judgment

I, Christopher A. Prine

, Clerk o f the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas, do hereby certify that this is a true statement of the costs of appeal in this case.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness myhand and the seal of the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas, this July 2 4 , 2015

.
# Director recognizes history of government entities

/ Published Aug. 4, 2022
BATTLE CREEK, Mich, 
As we reflect on our command’s 50th anniversary and prepare for our celebration on August 11th here at HDIFC, it is only fitting that we recognize that some uniformed services are also celebrating their own milestones. 

August has the honor of celebrating the birth of both the US Coast Guard and the Department of Defense. The United States Coast Guard celebrates its 232nd birthday on August 4th while Defense Department was created on the August 10, 1949. Semper Paratus—Always Ready.

Saying that DoD was created in 1949 is a little misleading as the federal government has overseen the U.S. Armed forces since our nation’s inception. Prior to 1949, it was known as the War Department. With the National Security Act Amendment of 1949, the Department of Defense name and centralized defense department was established. DLA falls within the Department of Defense that is oversaw the Secretary of Defense operating as a cabinet-level position reporting directly to the President. 

The Coast Guard was created when the first Congress authorized Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton to construct ten vessels, known as “revenue cutters,” to combat smuggling and enforce tariff laws. In a typical year, the Coast Guard will respond to 20,000 search-and-rescue cases and saves more than 3,500 lives. 

Just like DLA Disposition Services, both of these great organizations have undergone name changes. But what has not changed is the commitment to protect, defend and serve our country. 

So please join me in wishing both the Coast Guard and DoD a happy anniversary.

I look forward to seeing all those in Battle Creek for our celebration on August 11!
No. 09-11403.

#### Gary Eye, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 878, 131 S. Ct. 192,

178 L. Ed. 2d 115,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6946.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 594 F.3d 634.
#### In the Matter of Markeith G. and Others, Children Alleged to be Abused. Deon W., Appellant; Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent.

[58 NYS3d 359]—

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Robert D. Hettleman, J.), entered on or about March 15, 2016, to the extent it brings up for review a fact-finding order, same court and Judge, entered on or about March 15, 2016, which found that respondent-appellant sexually abused one of the subject children and derivatively abused the two others, unanimously affirmed, and the appeal from the order of disposition otherwise dismissed, without costs, as taken from a nonappealable order. Appeal from fact-finding order, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the order of disposition. Appeal from order of protection, same court and Judge, entered on or about March 15, 2016, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as taken from a nonappealable order.

The Family Court’s determination that respondent sexually abused the female child is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]; *Matter of Shirley C.-M.,*59 AD3d 360, 360 [1st Dept 2009]). That child’s in-court testimony regarding the sexual abuse respondent inflicted upon her was sufficient to support the abuse finding (see *Matter of Fendi B. [Jason B.],*142 AD3d 878 [1st Dept 2016]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, including its evaluation of the alleged inconsistencies in the child’s testimony (see *id.).*Respondent’s intent to gain sexual gratification from the acts described by the child was properly inferred from the acts themselves, especially given the lack of any other explanation (see *Matter of Dorlis B. [Dorge B.],*132 AD3d 578, 579 [1st Dept 2015]).

The Family Court properly drew a negative inference from respondent’s failure to testify at the fact-finding hearing (see *Matter of Ashley M.V. [Victor V.],*106 AD3d 659, 660 [1st Dept *4252013]). The criminal case pending ¿gainst him at the time of the hearing did not deprive the court of the right to draw on adverse, inference from his failure to testify *(see Matter of Rachel S.D. [Luis N.],*113 AD3d 450 [1st Dept 2014]; *Matter of Jonathan Kevin M. [Anthony K.],*110 AD3d 606, 607 [1st Dept 2013]).

A preponderance of the evidence supports the Family Court’s determination that respondent derivatively abused the two male children. The female child’s testimony that the male children were sleeping in the same bedroom as she when respondent sexually abused her establishes that respondent’s parental judgment and impulse control were so defective as to create a substantial risk of harm to any child in his care *(see Matter of Marino S.,*100 NY2d 361, 373-375 [2003], *cert denied*540 US 1059 [2003]; *Matter of Brandon M. [Luis M.],*94 AD3d 520, 520-521 [1st Dept 2012]).

The order of disposition and the order of protection are not appealable, because they were entered on consent *(see Matter of Ian C.,*254 AD2d 132 [1st Dept 1998]).

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Renwick, Andrias, Moskowitz and Gesmer, JJ.
No. 09-1460.

#### Entertainment Productions, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Shelby County, Tennessee, et al.

562 U.S. 835, 131 S. Ct. 141,

178 L. Ed. 2d 36,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 5875.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 588 F.3d 372.
*October 5, 2017*

2017-Ohio-8093.]

2017-1344.

#### Brewer v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections.

In Mandamus. Upon consideration of respondents’ motion to move case to standard case docket. Motion granted. On relator’s request for clerk to refuse to file respondents’ motion. Request denied.

French and O’Neill, J., dissent in part and would deny respondents’ motion.

O’Donnell, J., dissents in part and would deny respondents’ motion and deny relator’s request as moot.
|   | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Banco Santander-Chile. |
|--------|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|        /s/ Claudio Melandri                                  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:         Claudio Melandri                     |
| Title:           Chief Executive Officer |

|        /s/ Miguel Mata                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:         Miguel Mata                          |
| Title:           Chief Financial Officer |

|        /s/ Gabriel Montoya                                |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Name:         Gabriel Montoya                   |
| Title:           Financial Controller |

----
2016-1780.

#### Polen v. Heaston.

Tuscarawas App. No. 2016AP020011, 2016-Ohio-7508.
No. 10-5392.

#### Darryl Jerome Moore, Petitioner v. Tennessee.

562 U.S. 919, 131 S. Ct. 290,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7450.

178 L. Ed. 2d 190,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, Middle Division, denied.

Same case below, 309 S.W.3d 512.
No. 09-11420.

#### George Cabot, Petitioner v. Illinois.

562 U.S. 879, 131 S. Ct. 195,

178 L. Ed. 2d 117,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6831.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, denied.

Same case below, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1113, 369 Ill. Dec. 491, 986 N.E.2d 804.
#### Mohammed Hoque, Appellant, v Mehri Trans, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[58 NYS3d 597]

*750In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Butler, J.), entered June 3, 2016, which denied his motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured while walking across 27th Street, at its intersection with Hoyt Avenue North, in Queens, when he was struck by a vehicle owned by the defendant Mehri Trans, Inc., and operated by the defendant Tabrej I. Modak. The accident occurred while the defendants’ vehicle was making a left turn onto 27th Street from Hoyt Avenue North. After the accident, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries. Prior to the completion of discovery, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted his own affidavit, in which he stated that he was walking within a crosswalk, with the pedestrian signal in his favor, when the defendants’ vehicle failed to yield the right-of-way and struck him. He also stated that he had looked in all directions to check for approaching vehicles before entering the crosswalk. Contrary to the defendants’ contention, this evidence was sufficient to establish the plaintiff’s prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of their liability, including the plaintiff’s freedom from comparative fault *(see Dunajski v Kirillov,*148 AD3d 991, 992 [2017]; *Chou v Ocean Ambulette Serv., Inc.,*131 AD3d 1091, 1092 [2015]; *Zhu v Natale,*131 AD3d 607 [2015]). However, in opposition, the defendants submitted an affidavit from the defendant driver, who stated that he yielded the right-of-way to the plaintiff, but that the plaintiff then turned unexpectedly in the crosswalk and struck the defendants’ vehicle as it was passing him. This evidence raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault in the happening of the subject accident *(see Castiglione v Kruse,*27 NY3d 1018 [2016]; *Dunajski v Kirillov,*148 AD3d at 993).

In light of our determination, we need not address the defendants’ remaining contention, that the plaintiff’s motion was premature.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Rivera, J.R, Chambers, Maltese and Barros, JJ., concur.
# DLA, DHA agree on joint military health care support

/ Published Aug. 15, 2019
PHILADELPHIA, 
The Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Health Agency took a step forward in strengthening their partnership as they agreed on a joint approach for improving logistics support to the military health care community.Army Lt. Gen. Darrell K. Williams, DLA Director, and Navy Vice Adm. Raquel Bono, DHA Director, signed a memorandum of agreement that established DLA as the acquisition enabler of choice for medical materiel Aug. 15 at the DHA headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia.As combat support agencies, both DLA and DHA share similar roles and responsibilities in providing rapid, synchronized and low-cost medical logistic support to Department of Defense customers. The defined roles and responsibilities in the MOA prevent duplicated efforts as it assigns medical materiel acquisitions to DLA and medical services acquisitions to DHA.“The partnership with DHA and DLA reflects a shared commitment to sustaining medical readiness of our military forces across the globe,” Williams said. “Our singular focus as DHA’s acquisition enabler is to ensure rapid, reliable and cost effective medical logistics solutions for our Warfighters and our nation.”With the MOA in place, both agencies can now leverage their acquisition competencies to complement one another and optimize the overall support to service members and DOD beneficiaries."Combat support agencies like DHA and DLA not only provide direct support to combatant commands, they support one another as well," Bono said. "The Military Health System is undergoing one of the most sweeping organizational reforms in decades, and through actions such as this MOA with the DLA, we strengthen our partnerships. These synergies elevate our overall readiness and contribute to efficiencies needed to support our priorities."The MOA reaffirms a partnership that dates back to 2013, and reflects DLA’s support to DHA as it expands its mission and assumes all administration and management responsibilities of military treatment facilities from the services.In addition to the responsibilities, the MOA also creates opportunities for the agencies to adapt to new requirements, improve medical logistic support programs and reduce costs.
Amendment of Employment Agreement



 Exhibit 10.2 
 AMENDMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment of Employment Agreement is made as of May 25,
2006 by and between Main Street Banks, Inc., a Georgia corporation (the “Company”) and Samuel B. Hay, III (“Executive”). 
 WHEREAS, the Company and Executive entered into an Employment Agreement, dated September 8, 2004 (the “Employment Agreement”) and desire to clarify certain terms thereof and amend the
Employment Agreement pursuant to the terms set forth herein. 
 NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and for other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the Company and Executive hereby agree as follows: 
 1. Company
Obligations. The Company’s obligations under Section 7(a) of the Employment Agreement are deleted in their entirety and replaced with the following: 
 (i) the Company shall pay to Executive $1,518,820 within 30 days of the Date of Termination; 
 (ii) on the
Date of Termination, all of Executive’s outstanding stock options and other incentive awards from the Company in the nature of rights that may be exercised shall become fully exercisable and all restrictions on Executive’s outstanding
awards of restricted stock shall lapse; 
 (iii) Executive shall be entitled to keep the following Company personal property currently in his
possession: cell phones and personal digital assistants (including current phone numbers); and 
 (iv) to the extent not theretofore paid or
provided, the Company shall timely pay or provide to Executive any other amounts or benefits required to be paid or provided or which Executive is eligible to receive under any plan, program, policy or practice or contract or agreement of the
Company; provided that the Company shall have no obligation to provide Executive with a vehicle. 
 2. Counterparts. This Amendment of Employment
Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original. 
 3. Definitions. Terms not otherwise defined
herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Employment Agreement. 
  

 1 








 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company and Executive have duly executed this Amendment of Employment Agreement as of the date
first written above. 
  

			
	Main Street Banks, Inc.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Edward C. Milligan

	Name:	 	Edward C. Milligan
	Title:	 	Chairman
	
	 /s/ Samuel B. Hay, III

	Samuel B. Hay, III


  

 2
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of The Dewey Electronics Corporation (the
"Corporation") on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2008 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, John H. D. Dewey, Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Corporation.


/s/ John H.D. Dewey
-------------------
John H. D. Dewey, Chief Executive Officer
Date: September 26, 2008

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to The Dewey Electronics Corporation and will be retained by The Dewey
Electronics Corporation and furnished to the Securities and exchange commission
or its staff upon request.


                                       40
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Green, Appellant.

[54 NYS3d 284]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Juan M. Merchan, J.), entered March 25, 2016, which denied defendant’s petition to modify his sex offender classification, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant failed to meet his burden under Correction Law § 168-o of presenting clear and convincing evidence that a downward modification to level two is warranted. Defendant has a long history of sex crimes, and even while residing in a nursing home and confined to a wheelchair he sexually abused incapacitated fellow residents. In his current situation, defendant is able to move around, by wheelchair and without supervision, in his nursing home, which houses a population of potential victims. Defendant has not established that his medical condition has deteriorated to the point that he no longer poses a serious risk of reoffense, or that his recent good behavior warrants a modification *(see e.g. People v Wragg,*41 AD3d 1273, 1274 [4th Dept 2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 809 [2007]).

Concur—Tom, J.P., Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels and Kapnick, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2

                            Section 906 Certification


I, Richard L. Hannigan Sr., Chief Financial Officer of Voyager Entertainment
International, Inc., certify that (i) the attached annual report on Form 10-KSB
of Voyager Entertainment International, Inc. for the fiscal year ended December
31, 2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the Form
10-KSB Report for said period fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of Voyager Entertainment
International, Inc.

/s/ Richard L. Hannigan Sr.                             Dated: April 15, 2005
---------------------------                                    --------------
Richard L. Hannigan Sr.
Chief Financial Officer
#### Hudson City Savings Bank, Respondent, v Jason Seminario, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[51 NYS3d 159]

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Jason Seminario appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), entered September 24, 2014, as granted those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against him and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Jason Seminario and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due are denied.

In August 2011, the plaintiff, Hudson City Savings Bank (hereinafter Hudson City), loaned to the defendant Jason Seminario (hereinafter the defendant) the sum of $292,000, evidenced by a note and secured by a mortgage encumbering real property in Farmingdale. In March 2013, Hudson City commenced this action to foreclose the mortgage, alleging that the defendant defaulted on the loan on June 1, 2012. The defendant answered the complaint, alleging, among other affirmative defenses, that Hudson City lacked standing to commence the action, failed to provide proper notice of default and acceleration, and failed to comply with RPAPL 1304 and 1306. After *707the defendant failed to appear at a settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408, Hudson City moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due. The defendant opposed the motion. By order entered September 24, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the motion. We reverse the order insofar as appealed from.

Hudson City failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. As Hudson City concedes, its motion papers, including the affidavit of its assistant vice president and accompanying exhibits, failed to contain any proof of compliance with RPAPL 1306, a condition precedent to commencement of the action (see *TD Bank, N.A. v Leroy,*121 AD3d 1256 [2014]). Since Hudson City failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and to appoint a referee to compute the amount due, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers *(see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,*64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.

Dillon, J.P., Cohen, Duffy and Connolly, JJ., concur.