J-S56003-17

* Retired Senior Judge specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

THMED D/B/A MEDSTAR AND MEDSTAR 

LOCUM TENENS

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ADVANCED URGENT CARE OF 

MONTGOMERYVILLE

APPEAL OF: MEHDI NIKPARVAR

Appellant No. 624 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered January 30, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2015-31947

BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE, AND PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017

Mehdi Nikparvar filed a notice of appeal from an order denying an 

objection to a sheriff’s determination that an entity called Merck Real Estate 

did not have a claim to personal property subject to execution by Appellee 

Thmed d/b/a Medstar and Medstar Locum Tenens (“Thmed”). We dismiss 

this appeal. 

Thmed instituted this action against Advanced Urgent Care of 

Montgomeryville (“Advanced”) for breach of contract. Thmed is a provider 

of medical staff, and entered a contract with Advanced for those services. 

After Advanced failed to pay for the staff provided by Thmed, Thmed filed 
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this action. Advanced was served with the complaint, but never responded 

to it. On February 2, 2016, Thmed entered default judgment against 

Advanced in the amount of $137,507.25. Advanced never filed a petition to 

open or strike the default judgment. Over five months later, on July 12, 

2016, Appellee filed a writ of execution on personal property located at 

Advances’ premises, and a sheriff’s sale was scheduled. 

On August 18, 2016, an entity called Merck Real Estate (“Merck”) filed 

a property claim to the personal property, which consisted of equipment and 

computers, located at Advanced’s business premises. See Pa.R.C.P. 

3202(a) (“A claim to tangible personal property levied upon pursuant to a 

writ of execution shall be in writing and substantially in the form provided by 

Rule 3258 and shall be filed with the sheriff prior to any execution sale of 

the property claimed.”). The sheriff scheduled a hearing, where no one from 

Merck appeared. On September 20, 2016, the sheriff denied the claim due 

to the fact that a representative from Merck did not arrive at the hearing to 

establish the merits of Merck’s claim. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 3204 (“Within ten 

days after the claim is filed the sheriff shall, with or without formal hearing, 

determine whether the claimant is prima facie the owner of the property in 

whole or in part.”). 

Merck filed an objection to the sheriff’s determination to deny its 

claim. Pa.R.C.P. 3207(b) (“The claimant may, within ten days after the date 

of the mailing of the copy of the determination and valuation, file with the 
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prothonotary and with the sheriff an objection to the determination 

substantially in the form provided by Rule 3260, with or without bond.”). 

On January 4, 2017, the court of common pleas held a hearing on the 

objection. Merck was not represented by an attorney, but Joanne Ramos 

appeared. She stated that she filed the property claim on behalf of Merck at 

Appellant’s request and that he completed the paperwork for the claim. She 

acknowledged that no one from Merck came to the hearing before the 

sheriff. Ms. Ramos presented a document that was a property lease. It was 

executed by Mr. Nikparvar herein as a representative of Advanced, the 

lessee. According to the document, the owner of the personal property 

located at Advanced’s premises was Merck, which leased that property to 

Advanced. The name of the individual who signed the lease on behalf of 

Merck is not typed, and his or her signature is illegible. The trial court 

denied Merck’s objection to the sheriff’s determination. Mr. Nikparvar, the 

owner of Advanced, filed the present appeal contesting the determination 

that Merck does not own the personal property. 

Mr. Nikparvar raises these issues:

A. Did the lower court abused [sic] its discretion in affirming 

the sheriff’s determination and denying the Appellant’s 

objection?

B. Whether the lower court failed to weigh the Appellant’s 

substantial evidence with respect to the lease and 

entitlement of the personal property?

Appellant’s brief at 5. 
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Thmed correctly observes in its brief that Mr. Nikparvar lacks standing 

to litigate these issues.1 In Johnson v. Am. Standard, 8 A.3d 318 (Pa. 

2010), our Supreme Court noted that standing was a threshold issue and 

involved a question of law. The Johnson Court continued that, at its core, 

the concept of standing is that “a person who is not adversely affected in 

any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not aggrieved thereby and 

has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge.” Id. at 326 

(quoting Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 

A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975)); accord Interest of K.C., 156 A.3d 1179, 1182 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted) (“A party is ‘aggrieved’ when the party 

has been adversely affected by the decision from which the appeal is 

taken.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 501 (“Except where the right of appeal is 

enlarged by statute, any party who is aggrieved by an appealable order, or a 

fiduciary whose estate or trust is so aggrieved, may appeal therefrom.”).

Mr. Narparver complains that the trial court should not have denied 

“Appellant’s” objection to the sheriff’s determination. Merck, not Mr. 

Narparver, filed the objection to the sheriff’s determination, and Merck, not 

____________________________________________

1

 We note that, at the hearing before the trial court, it was unclear whether 

Ms. Ramos was acting for Merck or Advanced. She was instructed to bring 

in the lease, which indicated that Merck, rather than the judgment debtor 

Advanced, owned the personal property. Thus, until Mr. Nikparvar filed this 

appeal, there was no issue of standing. The trial court ruled that the 

proceedings before it were a nullity since Merck was not represented by 

counsel.
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Mr. Narparver, filed the property claim before the sheriff. The “Appellant’s 

substantial evidence” that the trial court alleged failed to weigh was that 

Merck, not Mr. Narparver, owned the personal property. Merck is the 

aggrieved party in this matter. Indeed, according to the lease agreement, 

Mr. Narparver signed that document on behalf of Advanced, the judgment 

debtor herein, and another individual executed the lease agreement as a 

representative of Merck. Even if the lease agreement is a sham, Advanced, 

and not Mr. Narparver, owns the personal property in question, and it is the 

entity with standing to pursue this appeal. See Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540 

(Pa.Super. 2014) (shareholder cannot sue bring suit in individual name for 

injuries suffered by corporation). Since Mr. Narparver does not own the 

property, he is not aggrieved by the trial court’s ruling and does not have 

standing herein. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. See Green by 

Green v. SEPTA, 551 A.2d 578 (Pa.Super. 1988)

Appeal dismissed. 

Judge Stabile joins the memorandum.

Judge Platt concurs in the result.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/19/2017