An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA 14-51

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 2 September 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

Robeson County

Nos. 05 CRS 12241, 55647

GARY MAURICE WALTERS

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 28 June 2013 by 

Judge William R. Pittman in Robeson County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 

General Daniel Snipes Johnson, for the State.

Attorney Paul F. Herzog for Defendant.

ERVIN, Judge.

Defendant Gary Maurice Walters appeals from judgments

entered based upon his convictions for first degree kidnapping, 

attempted first degree murder, and assault with a deadly weapon 

with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury. On appeal, 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his 

motion to dismiss the charges that had been lodged against him 

on the basis of an alleged violation of his right to a speedy 
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trial and (2) instructing the jury concerning the issue of his 

guilt of first degree kidnapping. After careful consideration 

of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s judgments in 

light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the 

trial court’s judgments relating to Defendant’s convictions for 

attempted first degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon 

with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury should remain 

undisturbed and that Defendant is entitled to a new trial in the 

case in which he was convicted of first degree kidnapping.

I. Factual Background

A. Substantive Facts

1. State’s Evidence

On Wednesday, 17 August 2005, Paul Franklin was in 

Lumberton. On that evening, Mr. Franklin was “upset over [his] 

marriage situation.” Based upon previous experiences, Mr. 

Franklin knew that a prostitute could lead him to a place at 

which he could purchase cocaine. As a result, Mr. Franklin 

picked up “an African American young lady,” whom he described as 

“short, peti[t]e,” at the intersection of Carolina Avenue and 

First Street.

After purchasing crack cocaine on First Street, Mr. 

Franklin and the young woman drove to the Redwood Inn, where Mr. 

Franklin rented a room in which he and the young woman smoked 
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the small amount of cocaine that Mr. Franklin had purchased. 

Once the cocaine in Mr. Franklin’s possession had been consumed, 

the woman offered to call her cousin if Mr. Franklin wanted more 

cocaine. After meeting Defendant, who was the woman’s cousin, 

Mr. Franklin bought cocaine from him.

Over the course of the next two days, Mr. Franklin 

continued to buy and smoke cocaine. After running out of money 

with which to purchase additional cocaine, Mr. Franklin allowed 

Defendant to use his gray Ford Windstar. According to Mr. 

Franklin, Defendant returned to Mr. Franklin’s room every “five, 

six, eight hours” and gave him a new supply of cocaine in 

exchange for the use of the van.

On the early morning of Friday, 19 August 2005, Mr. 

Franklin asked Defendant to take him to an ATM to make a $100 

withdrawal from his account, into which his weekly wages had 

been deposited.1 As a result, Defendant and Mr. Franklin drove 

to an ATM near the Redwood Inn at approximately 3:30 a.m. After

Mr. Franklin told Defendant that he would buy a “third of 

cocaine” with the proceeds obtained during the ATM transaction,

Defendant brought cocaine to Mr. Franklin’s hotel room at the 

Redwood Inn. Mr. Franklin, however, claimed that the cocaine 

 

1At the time of the incident, Mr. Franklin worked as a truck 

driver for Florida Rock and Tank out of Navassa, which is 

located near Wilmington.
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that Defendant offered him was only worth $75.00. At that

point, Defendant broke off a wooden table leg from a piece of 

hotel room furniture.

Christopher Bass and Shelly Scott woke to the sound of

Defendant, who was a friend of Mr. Bass, knocking on their door 

and asking to speak with Mr. Bass at approximately 5:30 or 6:00 

a.m. on 19 August 2005. At Defendant’s request, Mr. Bass 

followed Defendant, who was driving Mr. Franklin’s gray Ford 

Windstar, in Ms. Scott’s Honda Civic. After driving for 

approximately twenty minutes, Defendant parked beside the Lumber 

River near the Three Bridges Road in or around Pembroke.

After Mr. Bass parked on the main road and walked down to 

the location at which the van was parked, Defendant opened the 

van door. At that point, Mr. Bass saw Mr. Franklin lying on the 

rear passenger seat. According to Mr. Bass, Mr. Franklin was 

breathing heavily and his “face was mangled and beat up.” When

Defendant asked Mr. Bass if “he should kill [Mr. Franklin],” Mr. 

Bass questioned Defendant about “why he did it” and “what [had]

happened.” In response, Defendant explained that Mr. Franklin’s 

injuries resulted from “a drug deal gone wrong” and that he had 

beaten Mr. Franklin with a wooden table leg at the Redwood Inn. 

After telling Defendant that he should not kill Mr. Franklin, 

Mr. Bass began walking back to the Honda Civic. Once Defendant 
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entered the Honda Civic as well, Mr. Bass drove Defendant to the 

residence of his mother in Fairmont before returning home

himself.

According to Ms. Scott, Mr. Bass “flipped out and assaulted 

[her]” when he returned home. Mr. Bass, who claimed to have

“seen someone with their face hanging off” and “their eyes 

popped out of their head,” was “screaming and cussing.” Over 

the course of the next several hours, Mr. Bass assaulted Ms. 

Scott’s mother and brother as well. Although Mr. Bass nailed 

the windows to the residence that he shared with Ms. Scott shut 

and fed her sleeping pills in an attempt to keep her from 

leaving, Ms. Scott eventually escaped and called 911. Mr. Bass 

corroborated Ms. Scott’s story after turning himself in and 

being charged with three counts of assault.

At 7:01 a.m. on 19 August 2005, emergency medical service 

personnel were dispatched to a location off Three Bridges Road,

where they found Mr. Franklin in his van. Although the 

attending emergency medical service personnel were initially 

unable to determine whether Mr. Franklin was still alive, a 

check of his vital signs established that he was in critical 

condition. As a result, the emergency medical service personnel 

utilized the standard trauma response protocol by placing Mr. 

Franklin on a backboard and stretcher, administering oxygen, 
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fitting a brace around his neck, providing him with intravenous 

fluids, and putting him on a cardiac monitor.

At 9:56 a.m. on 19 August 2005, investigating officers were 

dispatched to the Redwood Inn in response to notice that Mr. 

Franklin’s room had been found in disarray. During their 

examination of Mr. Franklin’s room, investigating officers

discovered blood on the walls, the air conditioning unit, the 

microwave, broken pieces of furniture, and the floor. A number 

of pieces of wood that had originally constituted a table leg, 

one of which bore Defendant’s fingerprint, were recovered from 

the room as well.

Mr. Franklin sustained severe facial injuries as a result 

of the beating that he received, with every bone in his face 

having been broken. Mr. Franklin underwent eight surgical 

procedures in order to repair the damage. After Mr. Franklin

contracted a Staph infection during one of these procedures, the 

attending physicians were unable to fully repair his nose. 

Although his attending physicians were able to use a skin graft

taken from his right arm to address the injuries to his nose,

Mr. Franklin still has difficulty breathing and suffers from

sleep apnea. In addition, Mr. Franklin sustained left eye optic 

nerve damage, which causes him to experience double vision and 

have difficulty seeing. Finally, Mr. Franklin’s face is 
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severely scarred. Although he is no longer on disability, Mr. 

Franklin could not return to work as a truck driver given his 

inability to pass the commercial driver’s license examination.

2. Defense Evidence

Defendant’s mother, Dorothy Walters, testified that her son 

was living at her residence in Fairmont during August 2005. 

More specifically, Ms. Walters testified that Defendant was

still at home in bed when she left the house at 7:30 a.m. on 18 

August 2005; that he was outside in the yard when she returned 

from work at 2:30 p.m.; and that he was at home when she 

returned from fishing with her daughter at approximately 8:00

p.m. Although Defendant was not at home at 8:30 p.m. on 18 

August 2005, he returned home between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. and 

was still at home at 6:00 a.m. on 19 August 2005. According to 

Ms. Walters, Defendant left to cut his grandfather’s lawn at 

approximately 9:30 to 9:45 a.m. on 19 August 2005 and returned

at approximately 1:00 p.m.

B. Procedural Facts

On 30 August 2005, a warrant for arrest charging Defendant 

with attempted first degree murder was issued. On 8 September 

2005, a warrant for arrest charging Defendant with first degree 

kidnapping was issued. On 8 May 2006, the Robeson County grand 

jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with first 
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degree kidnapping, attempted first degree murder, and assault 

with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious 

injury. On 21 September 2012, Defendant filed a motion seeking 

the entry of an order dismissing the charges that had been 

lodged against him on speedy trial grounds.

The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the 

trial court and a jury at the 24 June 2013 criminal session of 

the Robeson County Superior Court. On 25 June 2013, the trial 

court denied Defendant’s dismissal motion. On 28 June 2013, the 

jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant of first degree 

kidnapping, attempted first degree murder, and assault with a 

deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury. 

At the conclusion of the ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial 

court entered judgments sentencing Defendant to a term of 220 to 

273 months imprisonment based upon his conviction for attempted 

first degree murder, to a consecutive term of 110 to 141 months 

imprisonment based upon his conviction for assault with a deadly 

weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and to 

a consecutive term of 110 to 141 months imprisonment based upon 

his conviction for first degree kidnapping. Defendant noted an 

appeal to this Court from the trial court’s judgments.

II. Legal Analysis

A. Right to a Speedy Trial
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In his initial challenge to the trial court’s judgments, 

Defendant contends that the trial court “committed prejudicial 

error when it denied [his] motion to dismiss for lack of speedy 

trial.” More specifically, Defendant contends that the delay 

involved in this case was significant, that the lengthy delays 

revealed by the present record were attributable to the State 

rather than to Defendant, that the State did not call 

Defendant’s case for trial for more than a year after he 

asserted his right to a speedy trial, and that Defendant was 

clearly prejudiced by the lapse in time between the date upon 

which he was charged and the date upon which this case was 

called for trial given the weakness of the alibi defense that he 

was able to present before the jury. Although the delay at 

issue here is, as best we can tell, unprecedented, we conclude, 

based upon a careful analysis of the applicable law, that 

Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s 

judgments on the basis of this contention.

1. Applicable Legal Principles

Every individual formally accused of committing a crime has 

the right to a speedy trial. State v. Lyszaj, 314 N.C. 256, 

261, 333 S.E.2d 288, 292 (1985); State v. Avery, 302 N.C. 517, 

521, 276 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1981). More specifically, the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, which has been made 
-10-

applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Klopfer 

v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993, 18 L. 

Ed. 2d 1, 8 (1967) provides, in pertinent part, that, “[i]n all 

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 

speedy and public trial[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Similarly, 

Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution 

provides that “[a]ll courts shall be open[] [to] every person . 

. . without favor, denial, or delay.” N.C. Const. art. 1, § 18. 

When reviewing speedy trial claims, we employ the same analysis 

for purposes of both the Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 

18. State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 27, 489 S.E.2d 391, 406 

(1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135, 118 S. Ct. 1094, 140 L. Ed.

2d 150 (1998). “The standard of review for alleged violations 

of constitutional rights is de novo.” State v. Graham, 200 N.C. 

App. 204, 214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009), appeal dismissed and 

disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 857, 694 S.E.2d 766 (2010).

In evaluating the validity of a defendant’s claim to have 

been deprived of his state and federal constitutional right to a

speedy trial, reviewing courts consider four factors: “(1) the 

length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) [the]

defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) 

prejudice to [the] defendant[.]” State v. Washington, 192 N.C. 

App. 277, 282, 665 S.E.2d 799, 803 (2009); see also Barker v. 
-11-

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93, 33 L. Ed. 

2d 101, 117 (1972).

We regard none of the four factors 

identified above as either a necessary or 

sufficient condition to the finding of a 

deprivation of the right of speedy trial. 

Rather, they are related factors and must be 

considered together with such other 

circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, 

these factors have no talismanic qualities; 

courts must engage in a difficult and 

sensitive balancing process. But, because 

we are dealing with a fundamental right of 

the accused, this process must be carried 

out with full recognition that the accused’s 

interest in a speedy trial is specifically

affirmed in the Constitution.

State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 118, 579 S.E.2d 251, 255 (2003)

(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193, 33 L. Ed. 

2d at 118-19). We will now analyze the validity of Defendant’s 

speedy trial claim using the four factor test described above.

2. Analysis of the Barker Factors

a. Length of Delay

In determining the length of the delay for speedy trial 

purposes, the relevant time period begins on the date upon which 

the indictment is returned. State v. Goins, __ N.C. App. __, 

__, 754 S.E.2d 195, 198 (2014). Thus, the relevant period for 

purposes of this case began on 8 May 2006 and ended when 

Defendant’s case was called for trial on 25 June 2013. As a 
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result, the period of delay for purposes of this case is eightyfive months.

b. Reason for Delay

According to the decisional law governing the resolution of 

speedy trial issues, the “constitutional guarantee does not 

outlaw good-faith delays which are reasonably necessary for the 

State to prepare and present its case[.]” Washington, 192 N.C. 

App. at 283, 665 S.E.2d at 804. For that reason, Defendant

bears the burden of “offering prima facie evidence showing that 

the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the 

prosecution[.]” Id.; see also Goins, __ N.C. App. at __, 754 

S.E.2d at 198. As a result, in the event that the defendant has 

established that the delay that he or she experienced should be 

attributed to the State, the State “must . . . offer evidence 

fully explaining the reasons for delay and sufficient to rebut 

the prima facie evidence.” Washington, 192 N.C. App. at 283, 

665 S.E.2d at 804. We do not believe that Defendant has 

established that the lengthy delay revealed by the present 

record stemmed from negligence or willfulness on the part of the 

State.

As an initial matter, we note that, when a defendant 

consents to a delay in the course of litigation, he may not 

claim that he suffered from that delay. State v. Grooms, 353 
-13-

N.C. 50, 63, 540 S.E.2d 713, 722 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 

838, 122 S. Ct. 93, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001). As Defendant 

concedes, his trial counsel requested a continuance on 22 June 

2007 in order to obtain a DNA lab report2 and sought a second 

continuance on 18 January 2008 for the same purpose. In 

addition, Defendant consented to a continuance sought by the 

State on the same grounds on 20 August 2008. As a result, a 

considerable portion of the lengthy delay that occurred in this 

case resulted from actions taken or consented to by Defendant.

The lab report was delivered to counsel for the parties on 

21 August 2008. Subsequently, the charges against Defendant 

were scheduled for trial in October 2009. Although both parties 

were present and ready for trial, Detective Howard Reaves of the 

Lumberton Police Department had failed to inform the prosecutor 

that he was not available due to shoulder surgery. Although the 

 

2As this Court has previously held, delays resulting from 

the fact that the State Bureau of Investigation crime laboratory 

has not completed testing evidence are not attributed to the 

State for purposes of speedy trial analysis. State v. Dorton, 

172 N.C. App. 759, 764, 617 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2005), disc. review 

denied, 360 N.C. 69, 623 S.E.2d 775 (2005). Although Defendant 

vigorously argues that the length of time needed to obtain the 

relevant laboratory report should be attributed to the State 

given that some portion of the resulting delay stemmed from a 

failure on the part of the investigating officers to notify the 

prosecutor of the existence of the evidence that needed to be 

tested and the State’s failure to make more strenuous efforts to 

obtain completion of the required testing, he cites no authority 

in support of this proposition, and we know of none other than 

Dorton, which cuts against Defendant’s position.
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record does not contain any explanation for the State’s failure 

to have engaged in more effective communications with the 

Lumberton Police Department, we are unwilling to conclude that 

the fact that the case against Defendant was not reached in 

October 2009 because the lead detective had undergone shoulder 

surgery amounts to neglect or willfulness on the part of the 

State given that the effect of improved communication would have 

likely been that Defendant’s case was not scheduled for trial at 

all in October 2009.

Finally, the record reflects that the delay between October 

2009 and the date upon which Defendant’s case was actually 

called for trial in June 2013 stemmed from congested trial 

calendars in the Robeson County Superior Court. At one point, 

the prosecutor handling Defendant’s case was responsible for as 

many as fifteen homicide cases. As a result of the fact that 

Defendant had been released on bond in January 2007, it was not 

unreasonable for the prosecutor to give priority to homicide 

cases and other cases involving defendants who were in pretrial 

detention. State v. Brown, 282 N.C. 117, 123-24, 191 S.E.2d 

659, 664 (1972); State v. Hughes, 54 N.C. App. 117, 119, 282 

S.E.2d 504, 506 (1981). Although Defendant argues that the 

State could have taken a number of steps, such as requesting the 

assignments of additional judges or prosecutors, in order to 
-15-

relieve the docket congestion that delayed Defendant’s trial, a 

similar argument was not deemed persuasive in Spivey. Simply 

put, the fact that a considerable portion of the lengthy delay 

at issue here resulted from docket congestion issues in Robeson 

County indicates that the delay between the date upon which 

Defendant was formally charged and the date upon which his case 

was called for trial did not result from neglect or willfulness 

on the part of the State. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 117, 579 S.E.2d 

at 256. As a result, we are unable to conclude that the lengthy 

delay at issue in this case should be attributed to the State 

for speedy trial purposes.3

c. Assertion of Defendant’s Right to a Speedy Trial

Although Defendant was formally charged with first degree 

kidnapping, attempted first degree murder, and assault with a 

deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury 

in May 2006, he did not assert his right to a speedy trial until

September 2012. In other words, Defendant did not advance any 

contention in reliance upon his federal and state constitutional 

right to a speedy trial for six years after he had been formally 

 

3In addition, Defendant notes that his case was not called 

for trial at some point during the period from 2009 until 2013 

as a result of the fact that Mr. Franklin was out of the 

country. However, the record contains no indication that Mr. 

Franklin’s absence was caused by the State or that the State had 

any advance indication that Mr. Franklin would be unavailable on 

a contemplated trial date.
-16-

charged with assaulting, kidnapping, and attempting to murder 

Mr. Franklin. As the Supreme Court has noted, a “[d]efendant’s 

failure to assert his right to a speedy trial, or his failure to 

assert his right sooner in the process, does not foreclose his 

speedy trial claim, but does weigh against his contention[.]” 

Grooms, 353 N.C. at 63, 540 S.E.2d at 722. As a result, 

Defendant’s delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial 

weighs against him in the ultimate balancing process.

d. Prejudice to Defendant

In order to obtain relief on speedy trial grounds, a

“defendant must show actual, substantial prejudice.” Spivey, 

357 N.C. at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 257; see also Hughes, 54 N.C. 

App. at 120, 282 S.E.2d at 506 (stating that “[c]ourts will not 

presume that a delay in prosecution has prejudiced the 

accused.”). As we have previously acknowledged, “[t]he right of 

a speedy trial is designed: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial 

incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the 

accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense 

will be impaired.” State v. Lee, 218 N.C. App. 42, 54, 720 

S.E.2d 884, 893, disc. review improvidently allowed, 366 N.C. 

329, 734 S.E.2d 571 (2012) (quoting State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 

674, 680-81, 447 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1994)).
-17-

In his brief, Defendant contends that he made the required 

showing of prejudice based upon the fact that he suffered 

“oppressive” pretrial incarceration and experienced anxiety 

stemming from social stigma arising from his status as a person

charged with committing serious criminal offenses who had been 

released on bond. In addition, Defendant contends that his 

ability to mount a successful defense was prejudiced by the 

lengthy delay that occurred in this case given that only one of 

seven possible alibi witnesses was able to appear at his trial

due to illness, death, or disappearance. Having made bond on 27 

January 2007, Defendant was out on bail for a substantial 

portion of the period between the return of the indictments 

charging him with first degree kidnapping, attempted first 

degree murder, and assault with a deadly weapon with the intent 

to kill inflicting serious injury and the date upon which this 

case was called for trial. In addition, the record contains no 

evidentiary support for Defendant’s claim to have been 

significantly stigmatized and to have suffered a great deal of 

anxiety as a result of the substantial period of time during 

which he was under bond. Finally, Defendant failed to provide 

any detailed description of the evidence that would have been 

available from the potential alibi witnesses. In addressing a 

similar contention to the effect that “potential defense 
-18-

witnesses who were originally ready and willing to testify . . . 

became reticent,” we held that the defendant’s failure to 

explain the nature of the evidence that he was precluded from 

presenting or the manner in which the delay between the date 

upon which the defendant was formally charged and the date upon 

which his case was called for trial caused his inability to 

present testimony from these “reticent” witnesses meant that the 

defendant had failed to show “actual, substantial prejudice.” 

Goins, __, N.C. App. at __, 754 S.E.2d at 199. As a result,

Defendant has failed to establish the existence of the actual 

prejudice needed to support an award of appellate relief on 

speedy trial grounds.

e. Ultimate Balancing Analysis

After analyzing each of the factors enumerated in Barker on 

an individual basis, we are now required to make the ultimate 

determination of whether Defendant’s federal and state 

constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by 

considering all four factors in conjunction with each other. As 

an initial step in that process, we note that a one-year trial 

delay has been held to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Webster, 

337 N.C. at 678, 447 S.E.2d at 351 (quoting Doggett v. United 

States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 n.1, 120 L. 

Ed. 2d 520, 528 n.1 (1992)). In light of that fact, we find the 
-19-

eighty-five month delay at issue here exceedingly disturbing. 

However, our analysis of each of the other Barker factors favors 

the State. Simply put, Defendant failed to assert his right to 

a speedy trial for six years after having been charged with 

committing the crimes for which he was convicted in this case. 

In addition, Defendant either sought or consented to a 

substantial portion of the delay at issue in this case. 

Moreover, the record does not support Defendant’s contention 

that the remaining delay resulted from neglect or willfulness on

the part of the State as compared to factors over which the 

State did not have any reasonable degree of control. Finally, 

Defendant has not demonstrated that he suffered any actual 

prejudice as the result of the eighty-five month delay at issue 

here. As a result, consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding 

in Spivey to the effect that the defendant was not entitled to 

relief on speedy trial grounds despite the existence of a four 

and a half year delay, Spivey, 357 N.C. at 123, 579 S.E.2d at 

257, we hold that the trial court did not err by refusing to 

dismiss the charges that had been lodged against Defendant in 

this case on speedy trial grounds.

B. Jury Instructions

Secondly, Defendant contends that the trial court 

erroneously instructed the jury concerning the issue of his 
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guilt of first degree kidnapping. More specifically, Defendant 

contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury 

that it could convict Defendant of first degree kidnapping if it 

found beyond a reasonable doubt that he restrained or confined 

Mr. Franklin for the purpose of facilitating his commission of 

or flight after committing assault with a deadly weapon with the

intent to kill inflicting serious injury on the grounds that the 

challenged instruction lacked sufficient evidentiary support. 

Defendant’s contention has merit.

“No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the 

unanimous verdict of a jury in open court.” N.C. Const. art. 1, 

§ 24. Similarly, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1237(b) provides that a 

jury verdict “must be unanimous, and must be returned by the 

jury in open court.” Although a defendant’s failure to object 

to an instructional error does, as a general proposition, 

prohibit the defendant from obtaining appellate review of a 

challenge to that instructional error under the customary 

prejudice standard applicable to issues that have been properly 

preserved for appellate review, State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 39, 

331 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1985), “[w]here, however, the error 

violates [a] defendant’s right to a trial by a jury of twelve, 

[a] defendant’s failure to object is not fatal to his right to 

raise the question on appeal.” Id., 331 S.E.2d at 659; see also 
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State v. Brewer, 171 N.C. App. 686, 691, 615 S.E.2d 360, 363 

(2005) (stating that “[v]iolations of constitutional rights, 

such as the right to a unanimous verdict . . . are not waived by 

the failure to object at trial and may be raised for the first 

time on appeal”) (internal citations omitted), disc. review 

denied, 360 N.C. 484, 632 S.E.2d 493 (2006). Although there is 

no unanimity violation in the event that the “trial court merely 

instructs the jury disjunctively as to various alternative acts 

which will establish an element of the offense,” State v. Lyons, 

330 N.C. 298, 303, 412 S.E.2d 308, 312 (1991), the situation is 

very different in the event that the record does not contain 

sufficient evidence to support a finding that one or the other 

of the grounds for finding Defendant guilty of first degree 

kidnapping listed in the trial court’s instructions had adequate 

evidentiary support.

In State v. Johnson, 183 N.C. App. 576, 646 S.E.2d 123 

(2007), the trial court instructed the jury that it could find 

the defendant guilty of second degree kidnapping if it found 

that he acted either with the purpose of facilitating his 

commission of breaking or entering, or larceny, or to facilitate 

his flight after committing those crimes. Id. at 581-82, 646 

S.E.2d at 127. However, the undisputed record evidence 

reflected that, when defendant restrained or confined the 
-22-

victim, he had already committed the crimes of breaking or 

entering and larceny, Id. at 584, 646 S.E.2d at 128, a fact that 

established that the defendant had not restrained or confined 

the victim for the purpose of facilitating his commission of a 

breaking or entering or a larceny. Id., 646 S.E.2d at 128. As 

a result, given the fact that the record did not contain 

sufficient evidence to support both of the theories enumerated 

in the trial court’s instructions, we awarded the defendant a 

new trial. Id. at 585, 646 S.E.2d at 128.

The same situation that existed in Johnson is present here. 

As Defendant contends, all of the record evidence tends to show 

that Defendant feloniously assaulted Mr. Franklin before 

Defendant removed Mr. Franklin from the Redwood Inn. According 

to Mr. Franklin:

[Defendant] just reached down and broke the

table leg off, and with the room being in my 

name, I said, ho, ho, ho. I jumped up, and 

that’s the last thing I remember until I was 

taken to the river, and he took a rock and 

busted the window out.

Similarly, Mr. Bass testified that Defendant drove Mr. 

Franklin’s van to the Lumber River, opened the door to display

Mr. Franklin “laying out across the seat in the back behind the 

driver’s seat,” and told him about beating Mr. Franklin with a 

table leg at the Redwood Inn. Although the State contends that 

the assault that Defendant committed against Mr. Franklin had 
-23-

not ended by the time of this conversation in light of Mr. Bass’

testimony that Defendant asked “if [he thought] he should kill 

[Mr. Franklin] or something,” nothing about this evidence tends 

to show that Defendant assaulted Mr. Franklin at any time after 

their departure from the Redwood Inn. Similarly, the fact that 

Mr. Franklin did not remember what occurred beside the Lumber 

River, that Mr. Franklin’s blood was found in the van, and that 

Defendant broke out the van’s window with a rock and caused 

broken glass to enter Defendant’s wounds does not establish that 

Defendant engaged in any assaultive behavior beside the Lumber 

River or at any time after Defendant and Mr. Franklin left the 

Redwood Inn. As a result of the fact that the trial court in 

this case instructed the jury with respect to the issue of 

Defendant’s guilt of first degree kidnapping on the basis of two 

theories, “one which [was] not supported by the evidence and one 

which [was],” and the fact that “it cannot be discerned from the 

record upon which theory or theories the jury relied in arriving 

at its verdict,” Johnson, 183 N.C. App. at 584, 646 S.E.2d at 

128, Defendant, like the defendant in Johnson, is entitled to a 

new trial in the case in which he was convicted of first degree 

kidnapping.

4

 

4Although the State contends that we should refrain from 

following Johnson on the grounds that it is inconsistent with 

prior decisions of the Supreme Court, the State has not cited 
-24-

III. Conclusion

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that, 

while Defendant’s speedy trial claim lacks merit, the trial 

court erred by allowing the jury to find Defendant guilty of 

first degree kidnapping on the basis of a disjunctive 

instruction concerning the purpose for which Defendant acted

that lacked adequate evidentiary support. As a result, the 

trial court’s judgments in the cases in which Defendant was 

convicted of attempted first degree murder and assault with a 

deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury 

should, and hereby do, remain undisturbed and Defendant should, 

and hereby does, receive a new trial in the case in which he was 

convicted of first degree kidnapping.

NO ERROR IN PART; NEW TRIAL IN PART.

Judges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

 

any decisions limiting Johnson’s precedential effect to the 

specific factual situation at issue in Johnson and we have not 

identified any such decision in the course of our own research. 

As a result, we conclude that we are bound by Johnson despite 

the State’s contention to the contrary.