[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-11301

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cr-00051-JES-CM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LENIN MARTINEZ-ALVARADO, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 19-11309

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cr-00036-JES-MRM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LENIN MARTINEZ-ALVARADO, 

a.k.a. Lenin Alvarado-Martinez, 

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 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(October 25, 2019)

Before MARCUS, MARTIN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Lenin Martinez-Alvarado (“Alvarado”) appeals his 54-month total sentence 

for illegal re-entry into the United States and violation of his supervised release. On 

appeal, Alvarado argues that the sentences are substantively unreasonable because 

the district court did not appropriately weigh his personal history, circumstances, 

and criminal history in determining the sentences’ length and in running the 

sentences consecutively. After thorough review, we affirm.

We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which 

“merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 

515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 

351 (2007)). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is 

unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). 

In reviewing the “‘substantive reasonableness of [a] sentence imposed under 

an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” 

Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). The 

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district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to 

comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).1

 The court must consider 

all of the § 3553(a) factors, but it may give greater weight to some factors over others

-- a decision which is within its sound discretion. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 

789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). However, a sentence may be substantively 

unreasonable when a court unjustifiably relies on any single § 3553(a) factor, fails 

to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, 

or selects the sentence arbitrarily. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191-92. A sentence that 

suffers from one of these symptoms is not per se unreasonable; rather, we must 

examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the sentence’s 

reasonableness. Id. at 1192. “[W]e will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) 

that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor . . . as long as the sentence 

ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United 

States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation, alteration and 

emphasis omitted). We will vacate a sentence only if we “are left with the definite 

and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in 

1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 

offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to 

protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training 

or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the 

pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted 

sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range 

of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 

612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191). 

We consider as indicators of reasonableness whether the sentence is well 

below the statutory maximum and whether it falls within the guideline range. See

United States v. Nagel, 835 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding a sentence 

was substantively reasonable because it was below the statutory maximum); United 

States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming a within-guideline 

sentence because sentences within the guideline range are expected to be 

reasonable). In addition, the Guidelines advise that any term of imprisonment based 

on the revocation of supervised release shall be consecutive to any sentence the 

defendant is serving. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). 

Here, Alvarado has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by 

imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. At the sentencing hearing -- which 

dealt both with Alvarado’s illegal re-entry offense and the violation of his supervised 

release -- the district court considered the personal struggles that Alvarado 

highlighted, including his economic motivations, back problems, and alcohol abuse, 

in conjunction with the other § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including the need to 

deter Alvarado and others from illegal re-entry and to provide just punishment. The 

court acknowledged that Alvarado had accepted responsibility and that a number of 

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his convictions were not serious, but the court balanced those offenses against his 

repeat removal and re-entry violations, concluding that the need to deter and provide 

just punishment outweighed the lesser offenses. As for its decision to run the 

sentences consecutively, the court weighed Alvarado’s argument against the 

guideline’s range and policy statements, ultimately following § 7B1.3(f) and running 

the sentences consecutively. Notably, the court’s revocation sentence was lower 

than the Bureau of Prison’s recommendation, and both sentences were within the 

guideline’s range and below the statutory maximum. Nagel, 835 F.3d at 1377; Hunt, 

526 F.3d at 746. On this record, we cannot say that district court imposed a 

substantively unreasonable sentence, and we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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