NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24b0003n.06

BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

IN RE: JOHN STEVE HUFFMAN,

Debtor.

___________________________________________

TEENA COLEBROOK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN STEVE HUFFMAN,

Debtor-Appellee.

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No. 24-8010

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

Nos. 23-bk-03264; 24-ap-90018—Randal S. Mashburn, Bankruptcy Judge.

Decided and Filed: June 13, 2024

Before: CROOM, GUSTAFSON, and STOUT, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judges.

_________________

LITIGANT

ON RESPONSE TO SHOW CAUSE ORDER: Teena Colebrook, San Luis Obispo, California, 

pro se.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

CROOM, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. This appeal arises from the bankruptcy 

court’s order, entered on April 19, 2024, granting Teena Colebrook’s (“Appellant”) motion for in 

forma pauperis status, but dismissing her adversary complaint. (Order, ECF No. 22, Adv. P. 3:24-

AP-90018.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002, to be timely, Appellant 

>
No. 24-8010 In re Huffman Page 2

needed to file her notice of appeal by May 3, 2024. Appellant did not, however, file her notice of 

appeal until May 13, 2024, ten days beyond the deadline. Thus, the Panel issued an order on May 

28, 2024, directing Appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. Appellant 

filed a response to the show cause order on June 5, 2025.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002, subject to certain exceptions not 

relevant to this proceeding, “a notice of appeal must be filed with the bankruptcy clerk within 

14 days after entry of the judgment, order, or decree being appealed.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a). 

For purposes of Rule 8002(a), “entry” is defined as “when [a judgment, order, or decree] is entered 

in the docket[.]” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(5). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that 

while Rule 8002 is non-jurisdictional, it remains “mandatory.” Tennial v. REI Nation, LLC (In re 

Tennial), 978 F.3d 1022, 1028 (6th Cir. 2020). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that pro se 

status does not relieve an appellant from complying with the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. 

See Kinney v. F. Scott Milligan & Anderson Lumber Co., Inc. (In re Kinney), No. 3:21-CV-131-

TAV-JEM, 2022 WL 806599, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2022) (quoting Cmty. Fin. Serv. Bank v. 

Edwards (In re Edwards), 748 F. App’x 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2019) (enforcing the Rule 8002 deadline 

against a pro se appellant and stating that “although courts must construe liberally pro se filings, it 

does not follow that courts must excuse a pro se litigant’s failure to comply with straightforward 

rules for which no legal training is required.”) (cleaned up)); see also Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 

108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that a failure to comply with “procedural requirements that a 

layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer,” for example, cannot be excused by a litigant’s pro 

se status.). “The leniency granted to pro se [litigants] ... is not boundless.” Martin v. Overton, 391 

F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). 

In her response to the show cause order, Appellant acknowledged the memorandum opinion 

entered on April 19, 2024, but asserted that the order dismissing the case was not entered until April 

24, 2024 when the bankruptcy court issued notice of entry of the order.1 A review of the 

1

“Appellant emphatically states that the Order of April 19th, 2024, was only a Memorandum and not an 

Appealable Final Order of the Court until April 25th, 2024 when appellant received a notice “ORDER GRANTING 

APPLICATION FOR IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS, BUT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT” which appeared to 

have been filed on April 24th, 2024 and did cause understandable confusion; which starts the proper running of the 

correct calculation of the Notice of Appeal in accords and pursuant to BAP Rule 8002 (a)(2)[.]” (Appellant’s Resp. to 

Order at 2, BAP Case No. 24-8010 ECF No. 4.)
No. 24-8010 In re Huffman Page 3

bankruptcy court docket shows that the order dismissing the adversary proceeding was in fact 

entered on April 19, 2024, the same day as the separate memorandum opinion. (See Mem. Op., 

ECF No. 21, & Order, ECF No. 22, Adv. P. 3:24-AP-90018); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(5). 

Rule 8002(a) clearly states that a party has 14 days from “entry of the judgment, order, or decree 

being appealed.” Fed R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) (emphasis added). “The time for filing a notice of 

appeal runs from the date of entry of the order. See [Fed. R. Bankr. P.] 8002(a). No service of the 

order is necessary to start the running of the appeal period.” Hoffman & Kuhn v. Brandham (In re 

Branham), 953 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1992) (table) (emphasis added) (citing In re Ozark Restaurant 

Equipment Co., 761 F.2d 481, 482 n.1 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Goff v. Pfau, 418 F.2d 649, 654 (8th 

Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 931 (1970))). Appellant’s argument that the time period for filing 

her notice of appeal did not begin to run until the bankruptcy court issued notice of the order is 

without merit.2

Appellant also asserted that the Panel calculated the time for filing a notice of appeal 

incorrectly under Bankruptcy Rule 9006. 

For the Panel or the Office of the Clerks’ calculations to include SATURDAY, AND 

SUNDAYS, IS A DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE RULE AND PROCEDURES 

OF LAW AND OF THE BANKRUPTCY & APPELLATE COURT THAT IS 

BINDING ON THE BK PANEL. DISCREDITING AND CLEARING ANY AND 

ALL ALLEGE DEFICENCY WITHIN Appellant’s Notice of Appeal.

(Appellant Resp. to Order at 2–3, ECF No. 4, BAP Case No. 24-8010.) This argument is also 

without merit. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006, entitled “Computing and Extending 

Time; Time for Motion Papers,” provides that when a time period in the Federal Rules of 

Bankruptcy Procedure “is stated in days or a longer unit of time,” a party must:

(A) exclude the day of the event that triggers the period;

(B) count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays;

and

2Even if the April 24, 2024 service date were the applicable starting point for the Rule 8002(a) calculation, 

Appellant's deadline for filing a notice of appeal would have expired on May 8, 2024. Thus, Appellant's May 13, 2024 

notice of appeal would have still been untimely.
No. 24-8010 In re Huffman Page 4

(C) include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or 

legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not 

a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added). Rule 9006 also provides that if the clerk’s 

office is inaccessible on the last day for filing under subsection (a), then the time for filing “is 

extended to the first accessible day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday[.]” Fed. R. 

Bankr. P. 9006(a)(3). The order on appeal having been entered on April 19, 2024, the deadline for 

filing a notice of appeal was Friday, May 3, 2024. That day was not a Saturday, Sunday or legal 

holiday and the clerk’s office was accessible on that day.

Finally, Appellant’s assertion that she should receive more time to file a notice of appeal due 

to the delay in receipt of the certificate of notice of entry of the order must also be rejected. The 

bankruptcy court’s CM/ECF Notice of Electronic Filing states that the bankruptcy court sent 

electronic notice to Appellant on April 19, 2024, via her email: “tc4gold@gmail.com”. (BNC 

Certificate of Notice, ECF No. 25, Adv. P. 3:24-AP-90018.) Additionally, Appellant also admits 

receiving notice of the order on April 25, 2024. (See Appellant Resp. to Order at 2, ECF No. 4, 

BAP Case No. 24-8010.) Because Appellant admits receiving notice of the order prior to expiration 

of the Rule 8002(a) 14-day time period on May 3, 2024, her May 13, 2024 notice of appeal was 

untimely. See Tennial, 978 F.3d at 1028 (rejecting the appellant’s excuse for a dilatory filing, 

where notice was received on the final day of the deadline for filing an appeal.)3 

Accordingly, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

3Appellant did not file a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal within the time allotted by 

Bankruptcy Rule 8002(d) nor did she file a qualifying tolling motion under Rule 8002(b).