IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

April 15, 2019 Session

NOAH RYAN ET AL. v. LAVERNA SOUCIE

 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County

No. 17-0447 Pamela A. Fleenor, Chancellor

No. E2018-01121-COA-R3-CV

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the defendant’s conduct, which impeded the

plaintiffs’ use of a state right of way for ingress to and egress from the plaintiffs’

commercial property. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 

following its determination that the defendant had created a nuisance and had 

intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs’ business relationships. The defendant has 

appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded 

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., and RICHARD H. DINKINS, JJ., joined.

Patrick B. Hawley, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Laverna Soucie.

John P. Konvalinka, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellees, Noah Ryan d/b/a Ryan 

Heat and Air and B.M. Crane d/b/a Crane Development Company.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On June 20, 2017, the plaintiffs, Noah Ryan d/b/a Ryan Heat and Air and B.M. 

Crane d/b/a Crane Development Company (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a complaint in 

the Hamilton County Chancery Court (“trial court”) against the defendant, Laverna 

Soucie. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Ryan operated his business on 

commercial property owned by Ms. Crane, who is his mother-in-law.1 Plaintiffs 

 

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In the complaint, Plaintiffs specifically averred that Mr. Ryan “owns and legally operates a business 

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additionally averred that Ms. Soucie owned a nearby tract of residential property 

improved with a home. According to Plaintiffs, Ms. Soucie had recently engaged in 

conduct that impeded Plaintiffs’ necessary route of ingress to and egress from their 

property to a public road known as Parker Lane.

Plaintiffs further alleged that the City of Chattanooga (“the City”), via ordinance, 

had rezoned a portion of Ms. Crane’s real property to reflect a commercial designation in 

1995, “for the purpose of allowing commercial business on Crane’s Property having a 

street address of 3222 Parker Lane with ‘access to site’ (from Parker Lane to Crane’s 

Property) as described on the map attached to, and a part of, such approved and enacted 

ordinance.” Plaintiffs asserted that they had continuously used and exclusively 

maintained the gravel road providing such access since that time. According to 

Plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint, the United States Postal Service had instructed 

Mr. Ryan to place a mailbox for his business at the point where the gravel road abutted

Parker Lane.

As averred, at some point following her purchase of nearby property in 2014, Ms. 

Soucie began impeding Plaintiffs’ use of the gravel road by, inter alia, planting trees and 

placing a trailer in front of the gate to Plaintiffs’ property, even though Ms. Soucie does 

not own the real property across which the gravel road exists. Plaintiffs’ specific claims 

included that Ms. Soucie’s actions (1) substantially interfered with their use of the gravel 

road and their own property, (2) constituted a nuisance, and (3) interfered with and 

harmed Mr. Ryan’s business and business relationships. Consequently, Plaintiffs sought 

damages and injunctive relief. The trial court subsequently granted Plaintiffs a temporary 

restraining order and set the matter for hearing. 

In response, Ms. Soucie filed an answer, contending that title to the property 

traversed by the gravel road at issue had been conveyed to the State of Tennessee in 1982 

and 1984 without any encumbrances reflected in the deeds. Ms. Soucie averred that the 

City lacked authority to encumber property owned by the State with an easement and 

asserted that Plaintiffs’ use of the gravel road was unnecessary because their property had

access to Center Street. Ms. Soucie also raised various affirmative defenses, including 

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and failure to join an 

indispensable party.

 

known as Ryan Heat and Air principally on commercially zoned property . . . owned by his mother-inlaw, B.M. Crane (“Crane”) doing business as Crane Development Company.” Although the commercial 

real property at issue herein is owned by Ms. Crane, because Mr. Ryan operates a business on said 

property with Ms. Crane’s apparent authorization, we will refer to the commercial real property as 

“Plaintiffs’ property” or “their property” herein for ease of reference.
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Although the parties subsequently attempted mediation, no settlement was 

achieved. Ms. Soucie thereafter filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied in 

an order dated December 7, 2017. On December 14, 2017, the eve of trial, Ms. Soucie 

filed a motion to recuse, alleging that she had recently learned that the chancellor had 

previously been in partnership with counsel for Plaintiffs. Ms. Soucie alleged that neither 

the chancellor nor Plaintiffs’ counsel had disclosed their previous business relationship to 

her. She therefore insisted that the chancellor’s impartiality in the matter could be 

reasonably questioned, such that recusal was proper. In accordance with Tennessee 

Supreme Court Rule 10B, Ms. Soucie filed a supplement to her motion, asserting that the 

motion was not presented for an improper purpose. 

The trial court entered an order on December 18, 2017, denying the recusal 

motion. The court found that the motion was untimely because the complaint had been 

filed on June 20, 2017, and numerous orders had been entered and continuances granted 

since that time. The court noted that “waiting five months to file a motion to recuse and 

[] filing that motion one day prior to trial, is not timely.” With regard to the affidavit 

required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B that must be based on personal 

knowledge, the court found the instrument filed by Ms. Soucie’s counsel to be

inadequate. The court determined that “counsel’s lack of personal knowledge of the 

matter set forth in the memorandum is both pronounced and conspicuous as the 

memorandum attempts to speak to many matters that occurred in the case prior to 

counsel’s appearance in the case and are incorrect as pointed out below.” The court thus 

determined that the motion was not supported by a proper affidavit.

With regard to the merits of the recusal motion, the trial court determined that 

there was no basis for recusal in the case at bar. The chancellor noted that she had 

“entertained hearings and trials from all of her prior employers . . . and has never 

announced that she was formerly employed by that firm.” The trial court further 

determined that “there is no appearance of impropriety where opposing counsel was a 

former partner 23 years ago with the Chancellor.” Finally, the court found that there was 

no bias or prejudice that would prevent a proper adjudication in this matter.

The trial court subsequently conducted a bench trial on March 9, 2018, and May 1, 

2018. On May 21, 2018, the trial court entered a final judgment, wherein the court made

detailed findings of fact, including that Plaintiffs possessed the right to use the gravel 

road in question, or the “Driveway” as it was referred to by the court. The court 

ultimately determined that Ms. Soucie “intentionally, unreasonably and substantially 

inconvenienced and interfered with Plaintiff[s’] use of the Driveway,” thereby

constituting a nuisance. The court awarded damages to Plaintiffs in the amount of 

$14,850, which represented the cost of hauling refuse from Plaintiffs’ property after Ms. 

Soucie rendered the gravel road impassable for the waste disposal truck. Although the 
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court further found that Ms. Soucie had intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs’ business 

relationships, no additional damages were awarded for this claim. Ms. Soucie timely 

appealed. 

II. Issues Presented

Ms. Soucie presents the following issues for our review, which we have restated 

slightly:

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Ms. Soucie’s motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6).

2. Whether the trial court erred by determining that the weight of the 

evidence preponderated in favor of the award of monetary damages

to Plaintiffs.

3. Whether the trial court erred by holding Ms. Soucie liable for 

nuisance and intentional interference with business relationships. 

4. Whether the trial court erred by denying Ms. Soucie’s motion for 

directed verdict.

5. Whether the trial court erred by denying Ms. Soucie’s motion to 

recuse. 

In addition to rephrasing the issues raised by Ms. Soucie, Plaintiffs raise the following 

additional issue, which we have similarly restated as follows:

6. Whether this Court should consider Ms. Soucie’s contentions 

regarding her motion to dismiss when such contentions were not 

raised in the trial court. 

III. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of 

correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 

13(d); Nashville Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 194 S.W.3d 415, 424 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2005). “[F]or the evidence to preponderate against a trial court’s finding of fact, 

it must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect.” Rawlings v. John 

Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). We review 

questions of law de novo. See Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 231 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tenn. 
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2007). “We defer to the trial court’s determinations of witness credibility because the

trial judge could observe the witnesses’ demeanor and hear in-court testimony.” 

Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686, 694 (Tenn. 2018).

We review a trial court’s ruling concerning a motion to dismiss de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. See Woodruff by & through Cockrell v. Walker, 542 S.W.3d 

486, 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2017). Concerning 

motions for recusal made pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we likewise 

review the denial of such a motion de novo with no presumption of correctness. See

Elseroad v. Cook, 553 S.W.3d 460, 462-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). 

IV. Denial of Motion to Dismiss

Ms. Soucie contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dismiss 

filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). In the motion, Ms. Soucie 

specifically alleged that because she was not the record owner of the real property “that is 

the subject of the plaintiffs’ suit against her,” Plaintiffs could not receive the relief they 

sought in the complaint. She therefore argued that Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted. The trial court disagreed, finding in its resultant 

order denying Ms. Soucie’s motion to dismiss that Plaintiffs had adequately stated claims

of nuisance and interference with business relationships in their complaint. The court 

pointed out that neither claim required Plaintiffs to allege or demonstrate that Ms. Soucie 

owned the real property in question. We agree.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 sets forth two requirements for stating

claims for relief: (1) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief” and (2) “a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” 

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) provides adverse parties the opportunity to 

move for dismissal of deficient claims. 

When faced with a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 

12.02(6), the trial court’s review is limited to “only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, 

not the strength of the plaintiff’s proof or evidence.” See Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat 

for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011). When a trial court’s ruling on a 

Rule 12.02(6) motion is appealed, “the appellate court must construe the complaint 

liberally, presuming all factual allegations to be true and giving the plaintiff the benefit of 

all reasonable inferences.” See Trau-Med of Am., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 

691, 696 (Tenn. 2002). This Court has explained that a trial court “should grant the 

motion to dismiss only if it appears that the plaintiff cannot establish any facts in support 

of the claim that would warrant relief.” Woodruff, 542 S.W.3d at 494 (citing Doe v. 

Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d. 919, 922 (Tenn. 1999)). 
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Through her motion to dismiss, Ms. Soucie argued that Plaintiffs’ complaint was 

insufficient under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 because it failed to allege facts 

demonstrating that a party to this action held a property interest in the State’s right of 

way. This assertion is predicated on Ms. Soucie’s assumption that claims of nuisance and 

intentional interference with business relationships require a factual showing that a 

defendant’s actions not only caused a disturbance to a plaintiff’s use of property but that 

such actions occurred on real property in which one of the parties maintains an interest. 

We determine, however, that Ms. Soucie’s postulate in this regard is erroneous.

This Court has defined a nuisance as “anything which annoys or disturbs the free 

use of one’s property, or which renders its ordinary use or physical occupation 

uncomfortable.” Caldwell v. Knox Concrete Prods., Inc., 391 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1964). “[A] nuisance extends to everything that endangers life or health, gives 

offense to the senses, violates the laws of decency, or obstructs the reasonable and 

comfortable use of property.” Id. 

As our Supreme Court has explained:

Depending on the surroundings, activities that constitute a nuisance in one 

context may not constitute a nuisance in another. Whether a particular 

activity or use of property amounts to an unreasonable invasion of 

another’s legally protectable interests depends on the circumstances of each 

case, such as the character of the surroundings, the nature, utility, and social 

value of the use, and the nature and extent of the harm involved.

* * *

Nuisance law has since developed over the centuries to the point where a 

nuisance may now consist of a physical condition on the land itself (i.e., 

vibrations, pollution, or flooding), cause discomfort or inconvenience to the 

occupants of the property (i.e., odors, dust, smoke, noise), or consist of a 

condition on adjoining property which impairs the occupier’s tranquility 

(i.e., conducting an unlawful business or keeping diseased animals). W. 

Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 619-20 (5th ed.

1984). So “long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable, such as 

would be offensive or inconvenient to the normal person, virtually any 

disturbance of the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance.”

Id. at 620.
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Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355, 364-365 (Tenn. 2002) (other internal 

citations omitted).

The wide scope of activities reached by the law of nuisance has not been limited to 

only those tortious activities occurring on a named party’s real property. For example, 

our Supreme Court has held that a defendant, who acted exclusively on a public roadway, 

created a nuisance when the defendant’s actions interfered both with public travel on the 

roadway and with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of his real property. See Richi v. 

Chattanooga Brewing Co., 58 S.W. 646, 646 (Tenn. 1900). In Richi, the conduct of an 

unauthorized private railroad, operating on public property, was determined to constitute 

a nuisance, inter alia, because the railroad obstructed ingress to and egress from the 

plaintiff’s lot. See id. 

Similarly, in the more recent case of Anthony v. Constr. Prod., Inc., 677 S.W.2d 4, 

10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), this Court determined that a contractor hired by the State to 

perform road work was properly held liable for creating a nuisance along the roadway 

that interfered with the plaintiff landowners’ use of their commercial property. In 

Anthony, the plaintiff landowners sued the private contractor, alleging that the 

contractor’s act of digging a trench in front of the plaintiffs’ business, which prevented 

proper ingress and egress to the business, and allowing said condition to remain for more 

than a year, constituted a nuisance. See id. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered 

judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. See id. This Court affirmed the 

trial court’s finding of liability, rejecting the contractor’s argument that summary 

judgment should have been granted in its favor. See id. (“The factual disputes are clear 

on the issues of [the defendant’s] negligence, and the creation of a nuisance that affected 

the [plaintiffs’] property.”). As demonstrated by both of these cases, the actor’s liability 

was not predicated on its ownership of or interest in the land whereupon the act causing 

the nuisance occurred.

To properly review the issues presented on appeal, we have also considered 

relevant provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc. of 

Tenn. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 15 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (considering 

provisions of a Restatement in analysis); Rose v. Third Nat. Bank, 183 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1944) (considering provisions of a Restatement in analysis). As the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 821D (1979) explains, a private nuisance is a “nontrespassory 

invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.” Comment b of 

Section 821D further elucidates:

The phrase “interest in the use and enjoyment of land” is used in this 

Restatement in a broad sense. It comprehends not only the interests that a 

person may have in the actual present use of land for residential, 
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agricultural, commercial, industrial and other purposes, but also his 

interests in having the present use value of the land unimpaired by changes 

in its physical condition.

Id. As further explained in Section 821E:

The liability for private nuisance exists only for the protection of persons 

having “property rights and privileges,” that is, legally protected interests, 

in respect to the particular use or enjoyment that has been affected. . . . It 

denotes rights and privileges in respect to land effective against persons in 

general—sometimes termed “rights in rem.” One having “property rights 

and privileges” in land can maintain an action under the rule here stated, 

only if the conduct of the actor interferes with the exercise of the particular 

rights and privileges that he owns.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821E, comment a.

The instant analysis necessarily invokes the separate and differing attributes of 

trespass and nuisance. In contrast, a trespass is “an invasion of the interest in the 

exclusive possession of land, as by entry upon it,” whereas a nuisance is “an interference 

with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land, and does not require 

interference with the possession.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D, comment d. 

Although there may exist some degree of overlap respecting these distinguishable causes 

of action, by way of example, the comments to § 821D of the Restatement explain:

[T]he flooding of the plaintiff’s land, which is a trespass, is also a nuisance 

if it is repeated or of long duration; and when the defendant’s dog howls 

under the plaintiff’s window night after night and deprives him of sleep, 

there is a nuisance whether the dog is outside the plaintiff’s land or has 

entered upon it . . . .

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821D, comment e. 

Based upon the above-referenced authority, we conclude that a claim of nuisance 

does not require demonstration that a party maintains an ownership interest in the real 

property upon which the act of nuisance occurs. Rather, a nuisance claim requires a 

showing that the defendant has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s use and 

enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property, wherever the nuisance act occurs. See Lane, 92 

S.W.3d at 365; Caldwell, 391 S.W.2d at 9. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. 

Soucie’s conduct interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their commercial 

property, which was the real property upon which the business operated. We find it 
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inconsequential that the conduct establishing the nuisance occurred on real property 

belonging to the State.

Concerning Plaintiffs’ claim of intentional interference with business 

relationships, our Supreme Court has explained that such a claim requires the following 

elements to be shown:

(1) an existing business relationship with specific third parties or a 

prospective relationship with an identifiable class of third persons; (2) the 

defendant’s knowledge of that relationship and not a mere awareness of the 

plaintiff’s business dealings with others in general; (3) the defendant’s 

intent to cause the breach or termination of the business relationship; (4) the 

defendant’s improper motive or improper means; and finally, (5) damages 

resulting from the tortious interference. 

Trau-Med, 71 S.W.3d at 701 (internal citation and footnotes omitted). Similarly, this 

claim sets forth no requirements concerning ownership of real property; rather, this basis 

for relief focuses on the conduct and knowledge of the defendant.

Without weighing the strength of the factual allegations contained in the 

complaint, we note that Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. Soucie took several actions which 

restricted Plaintiffs’ use of their commercial property. In the complaint, Plaintiffs alleged 

that Ms. Soucie planted trees and placed a trailer in the gravel road providing access to 

Plaintiffs’ property from Parker Lane, thereby impeding or preventing the enjoyment and 

use of their real property. Plaintiffs further claimed that Ms. Soucie’s conduct had 

substantially interfered with and harmed Mr. Ryan’s business. Construing the complaint 

liberally, as we must, we recognize that sufficient factual allegations in support of 

Plaintiffs’ claims were included in the complaint. See Trau-Med, 71 S.W.3d at 696. We

therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss on that basis.

We note that Plaintiffs have asserted that Ms. Soucie, in support of reversal of the 

trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss, improperly included additional factual or 

legal contentions within her appellate brief that were not included in the motion to 

dismiss initially, such as whether the State was an indispensable party. As our Supreme 

Court has explained, “the resolution of the motion is determined by an examination of the 

pleadings alone.” Highwoods Props., Inc. v City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 700 

(Tenn. 2009). Therefore, we will not consider any additional factual or legal contentions 

that were not contained in the original pleadings. Having determined that based on the 

language contained in the complaint, Plaintiffs complied with Tennessee’s liberal 

standard for pleadings, no further consideration of the motion to dismiss or additional 

issues related thereto is necessary.
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V. Nuisance Claim

Ms. Soucie has appealed the trial court’s determination that she was liable to 

Plaintiffs based on their claim of nuisance and the court’s award to Plaintiffs of 

injunctive relief and monetary damages. Ms. Soucie again contends that Plaintiffs failed 

to establish evidence of any party’s property interest in the State right of way. Ms. 

Soucie posits that because her actions and the resulting harm occurred on real property 

not belonging to a party to this action, a determination of nuisance would be improper. 

Having previously determined that a claim of nuisance does not require that a party 

maintain an ownership interest in the property where the act of nuisance occurs, we 

determine Ms. Soucie’s argument to be unavailing.

Similar to the conduct of the railroad in Richi and the contractor in Anthony, Ms. 

Soucie’s actions in the present case prevented Plaintiffs from enjoying the unhindered use 

of their commercial property because Ms. Soucie impeded ingress and egress across the 

right of way. Normal business activities on Plaintiffs’ property, including retrieval of 

trash by a waste disposal company and receipt of deliveries from a supplier, ceased due to

Ms. Soucie’s obstruction of Plaintiffs’ street access via the State right of way. The 

expense burden resulting from the inability of Plaintiffs’ trash service to reach Plaintiffs’ 

property and remove waste produced by Plaintiffs’ business was shown to total $14,850. 

These substantial economic costs, as proven at trial, clearly amount to a sufficient

inconvenience to disturb the normal person. See Lane, 92 S.W.3d at 365.

Ms. Soucie also contends that the record preponderates against the trial court’s 

finding that Plaintiffs possessed a grant of permission from the State to use the right of 

way. Ms. Soucie suggests that because Plaintiffs used the right of way absent permission 

from the State, she cannot be held liable for restricting Plaintiffs’ use thereof. Insofar as 

our Supreme Court has emphasized the circumstantial nature of nuisance, see Lane, 92 

S.W.3d at 365, we have undertaken a review of Ms. Soucie’s postulate. Based upon our 

thorough review of the evidence, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Plaintiffs 

possessed a grant of permission for the reasons stated below.

In reaching its determination that Plaintiffs had permission from the State to use 

the right of way, the trial court reviewed testimony from three lay witnesses: Christopher

Smith, a current State employee; Joe Graham, a friend of Plaintiffs who assisted in the 

request that Plaintiffs’ property be rezoned as commercial; and Perry Mayo, a former 

Building Codes Coordinator for the City of Chattanooga. When the Cranes sought to 

have their real property rezoned from residential to commercial, the City required a 

separate street access point from the Cranes’ adjoining residential property in order to 

obtain City planning approval. During trial, each witness discussed the Cranes’ requested
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grant of permission to traverse the State right of way for access to Plaintiffs’ property for 

commercial use. 

Mr. Mayo testified that he participated in the rezoning of Plaintiffs’ property in 

1995. He related that to obtain rezoning approval, Plaintiffs’ property would have 

needed a street access point. According to Mr. Mayo, the City’s traffic engineering 

official always required that a parcel have street access before it could receive rezoning 

approval from traffic engineering. Mr. Mayo further noted that the Cranes’ real property 

was not approved for rezoning on an initial request because the property lacked street 

access separate from the adjacent residential parcel. He further explained that because 

the Cranes’ property was successfully rezoned at a later date, the Cranes must have 

received State authorization to use the right of way between Parker Lane and the 

commercial property. Although Mr. Mayo did not speak to the legal nature of the grant 

of permission from the State, he maintained that the approval from the City trafficengineering official indicated that the State provided the Cranes with street access to their 

property via the right of way. He observed that in his experience, the State had issued 

verbal, but not written, authorizations granting use of State property for access to 

properties like the parcel belonging to Plaintiffs.

Mr. Graham testified that he likewise participated in the rezoning of the Cranes’ 

property in 1995. Mr. Graham agreed to assist Mr. Crane with the rezoning application 

and a related building permit application. Following a pre-planning meeting with City 

officials regarding the rezoning of the property, Mr. Graham recalled having been

informed by City officials that the real property would need a separate street access point 

before it could be rezoned as commercial. The property previously shared street access 

with an adjacent residential parcel also owned by Plaintiffs. According to Mr. Graham,

municipal zoning regulations required a separate street access for the commercial 

property. Mr. Graham stated that after learning of the need for separate access, he 

communicated with the State on several occasions regarding approval of the right of way 

for use as street access to the Cranes’ property. Although Mr. Graham conceded his lack 

of knowledge of any easement recorded for such purposes, he added that the State did 

ultimately issue a letter approving use of the right of way as a street access point for the 

Cranes’ commercial property. 

Mr. Smith, a licensed engineer employed by the Tennessee Department of 

Transportation (“TDOT”), testified that he opened a file pertaining to the section of the 

State right of way at issue after being contacted by both Ms. Crane and Ms. Soucie. 

According to Mr. Smith, he found no document permitting use of the State right of way 

as an access to Plaintiffs’ property. Mr. Smith admitted, however, that he had only begun

working for TDOT in 2006 and was therefore unfamiliar with the 1995 rezoning of the

property.
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The trial court considered each witness’s knowledge of the 1995 rezoning process 

before making its finding that Plaintiffs had permission from the State to use the right of 

way. In determining that such grant of permission existed, the trial court primarily relied 

on the respective testimonies of Mr. Graham and Mr. Mayo because both witnesses were 

involved in the City’s rezoning and building permit process for Plaintiffs’ property when 

the State’s grant of permission was provided in 1995. The trial court contrasted those 

witnesses’ knowledge of the 1995 rezoning process with Mr. Smith’s acknowledged lack 

of such knowledge. Regarding the matter, the court noted that Mr. Smith admitted his 

lack of knowledge and participation in the 1995 rezoning process because his 

employment with the State did not begin until 2006. 

Ms. Soucie asserts that the trial court erred in crediting the testimony of Mr.

Graham and Mr. Mayo. In support, she points to the inconsistency exhibited by their 

respective testimonies, primarily regarding whether the State’s grant of permission was 

provided in writing. Mr. Mayo relied on the traffic engineering official’s approval of the 

Cranes’ application for rezoning of their property as evidence of the State’s grant of 

permission, whereas Mr. Graham testified that he had seen a letter from the State that 

established the grant of permission. The court nonetheless resolved the difference by 

concluding that although the witnesses disagreed on the nature of the grant of permission, 

both Mr. Graham and Mr. Mayo agreed that the State had provided permission for use of 

the right of way for ingress to and egress from the Cranes’ commercial property. 

The trial court ultimately determined that Plaintiffs possessed a grant of 

permission for ingress to and egress from their property via the right of way, reaching 

such finding after weighing the relative knowledge of each witness regarding the grant of 

permission acquired from the State in 1995. Persuaded by the testimony of Mr. Graham 

and Mr. Mayo, the trial court noted that both witnesses explained that street access to the 

Cranes’ property was a prerequisite to the 1995 rezoning approval. Concerning these 

findings of fact, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s determinations of witness credibility.” 

Coleman, 551 S.W.3d at 694.

 

Despite Ms. Soucie’s contention to the contrary, the weight of the evidence does 

not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact. Mr. Smith’s testimony denying 

his knowledge of a State grant of permission for Plaintiffs’ use of the right of way is not 

conclusive on this issue. As the trial court found, Mr. Smith lacked personal knowledge 

regarding the 1995 grant of permission preceding the rezoning action. For those reasons, 

we conclude that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s determination

that a grant of permission for use of the right of way was provided by the State to the 

Plaintiffs for ingress to and egress from their commercial property. Having determined 
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that Ms. Soucie’s actions interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their real

property, we affirm the trial court’s award predicated upon nuisance.

VI. Intentional Interference with Business Relationships

Ms. Soucie also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that she interfered 

with Plaintiffs’ business relationships by preventing their use of the right of way as a 

driveway to the business operation. Having carefully reviewed the elements of this claim 

and the proof presented, we disagree.

As previously explained, our Supreme Court has elucidated that a claim of 

intentional interference with business relationships requires that the following elements 

be shown:

(1) an existing business relationship with specific third parties or a 

prospective relationship with an identifiable class of third persons; (2) the 

defendant’s knowledge of that relationship and not a mere awareness of the 

plaintiff’s business dealings with others in general; (3) the defendant’s 

intent to cause the breach or termination of the business relationship; (4) the 

defendant’s improper motive or improper means; and finally, (5) damages 

resulting from the tortious interference. 

Trau-Med, 71 S.W.3d at 701 (internal citation and footnotes omitted). In Trau-Med, the 

High Court expressly adopted comment c of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B, 

which states in pertinent part:

The relations protected against intentional interference by the rule stated in 

this Section include any prospective contractual relations . . . if the potential 

contract would be of pecuniary value to the plaintiff. . . . Also included is 

interference with a continuing business or other customary relationship not 

amounting to a formal contract.

Trau-Med, 71 S.W.3d at 701 n.4. 

Concerning particularly the requirement that the defendant has been shown to 

have acted with improper motive or by improper means, our Supreme Court has 

instructed:

It is clear that a determination of whether a defendant acted “improperly” or 

possessed an “improper” motive is dependent on the particular facts and 

circumstances of a given case, and as a result, a precise, all-encompassing 
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definition of the term “improper” is neither possible nor helpful. However, 

with regard to improper motive, we require that the plaintiff demonstrate 

that the defendant’s predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff.

Id. at 701 n.5. 

In the instant action, the trial court found in relevant part as follows concerning 

Plaintiffs’ claim of intentional interference with business relationships:

The Court determines that [Ms. Soucie] moved to the end of a dead 

end street mistakenly thinking she owned all the vacant property 

surrounding her and that the nearby properties were all residential. When 

[Ms. Soucie] discovered that Mr. Ryan was going to operate his business on 

property that she thought was residential, she told Ryan he was operating 

an illegal business. When the Ryans told her they were going to access the 

business via the Driveway, she took matters into her own hands to stop 

Plaintiff[s] from using the Driveway. Although Plaintiff[s] told [Ms. 

Soucie] that [Plaintiffs’ supplier] and [Plaintiffs’ waste disposal service]

would only use the Driveway during the daytime and infrequently, [Ms. 

Soucie] planted trees on the Driveway and also parked her truck and trailer 

on the Driveway to block access to the site.

The Court concludes that [Ms. Soucie] knew that Plaintiff was 

starting his heat and air business and that [Ms. Soucie] planted her trees and 

placed her truck and trailer on the Driveway to prevent the Plaintiff[s’]

support services from using the Driveway. As such the Court concludes the 

Plaintiffs have established by a preponderance of the evidence that [Ms. 

Soucie] intentionally interfered with Plaintiff[s’] business relationships.

Our thorough review of the record supports a determination that the evidence 

preponderates in favor of the trial court’s factual findings concerning this claim. Mr. 

Ryan testified that Plaintiffs held specific business contracts with third parties, a supplier 

and a waste disposal company. Mr. Ryan related that he informed Ms. Soucie “in early 

2017” of Plaintiffs’ ongoing business relationship with York, a supplier, and also notified 

Ms. Soucie that deliveries would be made by York via the right of way. Similarly, Mr. 

Ryan informed Ms. Soucie of Plaintiffs’ contract with a waste disposal service, which

would arrive once per week to haul away trash via the right of way. Although Ms. 

Soucie denied having knowledge of Plaintiffs’ business relationships with identified third 

parties, the trial court credited Mr. Ryan’s testimony concerning his conversation with 

Ms. Soucie. Ms. Soucie did admit, however, that the Ryans had notified her in January 

2017 of their intention to use the right of way as access to their property. Clearly, these 
-15-

business relationships provided a pecuniary value to Plaintiffs, as demonstrated by 

Plaintiffs’ proof concerning the damages caused when the waste disposal service was 

unable to traverse the State right of way to collect Plaintiffs’ business refuse.

Despite knowledge of Plaintiffs’ intent to utilize the driveway access for deliveries 

and waste disposal services, Ms. Soucie proceeded to obstruct passage by planting trees 

and placing other objects so as to impede usage. The evidence preponderates in favor of

the trial court’s determination that Ms. Soucie “planted her trees and placed her truck and 

trailer on the Driveway to prevent the Plaintiff[s’] support services from using the 

Driveway.” Ms. Soucie intended to terminate Plaintiffs’ use of the road for suppliers and 

other business uses by purposefully obstructing property owned by the State that

Plaintiffs had used for business purposes for a number of years. As found by the trial 

court, Ms. Soucie acted with an improper motive, and her actions caused Plaintiffs to 

incur damages. By reason of her objection to Plaintiffs’ use of the right of way for 

business purposes, she obstructed the right of way by improper means. The trial court 

properly concluded that Ms. Soucie intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s business 

relationships.

VII. Motion to Recuse the Trial Court Chancellor

Ms. Soucie contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion to 

recuse. Ms. Soucie argues that the chancellor’s impartiality could reasonably be 

questioned because the chancellor allegedly “concealed” her prior partnership with 

Plaintiffs’ counsel. Following our thorough review, we conclude that the trial court 

properly denied Ms. Soucie’s recusal motion. 

Tennessee courts employ an objective test for measuring whether recusal is proper 

to protect against actual bias or the appearance of bias. See State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 

287, 307 (Tenn. 2008). As our Supreme Court has explained: 

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: “A judge shall 

respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that 

promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 

judiciary.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 2(A). Likewise, Canon 3 requires: 

“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the 

judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 

limited to instances where: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party or a party’s lawyer . . . .” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 

3(E)(1).
-16-

Id. at 308. In Cannon, our Supreme Court determined that the mere existence of a

friendship between a trial court judge and an assistant district attorney, without further 

evidence, was insufficient to mandate recusal. Id. 

Moreover, this Court has previously determined that mandatory recusal was 

unnecessary, absent some other showing of bias, in a case where a trial court judge had 

shared office space with a party’s attorney eight years prior to the filing of the parties’ 

divorce action wherein that judge presided. See Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). But see Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 805-06 (Tenn. 2009)

(determining that recusal was appropriate when the judge and counsel had filed 

misconduct claims against one another and been involved in numerous hostile meetings, 

because judicial impartiality was in doubt). 

Here, Ms. Soucie alleges that the chancellor and Plaintiffs’ counsel were in

partnership together twenty-three years prior to this action’s filing. The evidence 

proffered in support of Ms. Soucie’s motion to recuse resembles the circumstances

presented in Kinard. In both instances, a party’s attorney had engaged in a former 

business relationship with the trial court judge. See Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 228. 

Tennessee case law provides, however, that a party moving for recusal must be prepared 

to provide specific evidence of extrajudicial bias or prejudice toward a party or party’s 

attorney. As this Court has elucidated regarding bias and/or prejudice:

[A]lthough “bias” and “prejudice” generally “refer to a state of mind or 

attitude that works to predispose a judge for or against a party[,] . . . [n]ot 

every bias, partiality or prejudice merits recusal.” Alley v. State, 882 

S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Rather, “[t]o disqualify, 

prejudice must be of a personal character, directed at the litigant, [and] 

‘must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the 

merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from . . . 

participation in the case.’” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 

S.W.2d 692, 697 (Mo. App. 1990)). “Personal bias involves an antagonism 

toward the moving party, but does not refer to any views that a judge may 

have regarding the subject matter at issue.” Id. (citing United States v. 

Baker, 441 F. Supp. 612, 616 (M. D. Tenn. 1977); 46 Am. Jur. 2d “Judges” 

§ 167 (1969)). Moreover, “[i]mpersonal prejudice resulting from the 

judge’s background experience does not warrant disqualification.” Id.

(citation omitted). Where “the bias is based upon [the judge’s] actual 

observance of witnesses and evidence given during the trial, the judge’s 

prejudice does not disqualify the judge.” Id.
-17-

Durham v. Tenn. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev., No. M2014-00428-COA-R3-CV, 

2015 WL 899024, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).

In the case at bar, Ms. Soucie presented no evidence of personal bias or prejudice 

on the part of the chancellor. Applicable law does not mandate a judge’s recusal from a 

case simply because that judge is acquainted with or was once professionally associated

with a party’s counsel. Ergo, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Ms. Soucie’s motion to 

recuse.

VIII. Directed Verdict

Finally, Ms. Soucie argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for a 

directed verdict.2 Notably, however, Ms. Soucie’s brief completely fails to comply with 

the requirements concerning a proper written argument in regard to this issue. Tennessee 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) provides that an appellant’s brief must contain an

argument setting forth “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues

presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require 

appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references to the record 

(which may be quoted verbatim) relied on.” As our Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n

issue may be deemed waived, even when it has been specifically raised as an issue, when 

the brief fails to include an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 

27(a)(7).” Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012). This Court has likewise 

elucidated that an issue may be considered waived when a party has failed to “cite 

authority for its arguments or to argue the issues in the body of its brief.” See Forbess v. 

Forbess, 370 S.W.3d 347, 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). We therefore conclude that Ms. 

Soucie’s issue concerning whether trial court erred in its failure to grant her motion for a 

directed verdict has been waived. 

IX. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. 

Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Laverna Soucie. This case is remanded to the 

trial court for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment and collection of costs assessed 

below.

_________________________________ 

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

 

2 We note that the trial court properly treated this motion as one for involuntary dismissal under

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02, which governs such motions in bench trials, as opposed to 

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 50, which governs motions for directed verdict in jury trials.