_________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 

 

 

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

State of California 

XAVIER BECERRA 

Attorney General 

: 

OPINION : No. 17-601 

: 

of : April 11, 2018 

: 

XAVIER BECERRA : 

Attorney General : 

: 

CATHERINE BIDART : 

Deputy Attorney General : 

: 

Proposed relator, the CITY OF DIXON, applies to this office for leave to sue 

proposed defendant DEVON MINNEMA, Dixon city council member from the city’s 

District 4, in quo warranto to oust him from that office on the ground that he did not 

reside in District 4 at all times required by state law. 

CONCLUSION 

Proposed relator does not raise a substantial question of law or fact that warrants 

initiating a judicial proceeding, and allowing the proposed quo warranto action to 

proceed would not serve the public interest. Proposed relator’s application for leave to 

sue in quo warranto is therefore DENIED. 

1 

17-601 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS 

Proposed relator the City of Dixon (City) is a general law city with a city manager 

form of government.1 As such, eligibility to be a council member requires continuous 

residence in the represented City district from the time nomination papers2 are issued.3 

Here, the City requests leave to sue proposed defendant Devon Minnema (Minnema) in 

quo warranto4 under Code of Civil Procedure section 803 to challenge his right to hold 

the office of city council member from the City’s District 4. 

Specifically, the City alleges that Minnema is ineligible to hold office because he 

did not reside in District 4 on August 2, 2016, the date on which he obtained his 

nomination papers, and also questions his residence in District 4 from that date and 

continuing through his election to the council in November 2016. For the reasons 

discussed below, we find that the City’s allegations do not raise a substantial legal or 

factual issue that would warrant the initiation of a quo warranto lawsuit. 

Quo warranto 

A party granted leave to sue from the Attorney General may bring a lawsuit in the 

name of the People of the State of California “against any person who usurps, intrudes 

into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office . . . .”5 In considering whether to 

1 See Gov. Code, § 34851 (authorizing city manager form of government). 

2 See Elec. Code, §§ 10220 (setting forth process for nominating candidates by voters’ 

signing nomination papers) & 10227 (prescribing process for issuing nomination papers 

for signature). 

3 Gov. Code, § 34882; 83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 181, 183 (2000) (proposed defendant 

ineligible to retain office if he or she resided outside of district when elected); 

79 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 243, 245 (1996) (“in the absence of statutory expression to the 

contrary, a residence requirement for election remains as a condition to the continued 

right to hold office”), quoting 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 26, 28 (1992). 

4 Latin for “by what authority,” quo warranto was originally a writ used by English 

monarchs to challenge a royal subject’s claim to an office or franchise supposedly 

granted by the Crown. (California Attorney General’s Office, Quo Warranto (1990), p. 1, 

available at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ag_opinions/quo-warrantoguidelines.pdf [as of March 29, 2018].) Quo warranto has evolved into a statutory 

proceeding to determine, among other things, whether a person is entitled to hold a 

particular public office. (Id. at p. 3.) 

5 Code Civ. Proc., § 803. The statute also authorizes the Attorney General to bring 

2 

17-601 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

grant leave to sue, we must determine whether (1) there is a substantial issue of fact or 

law warranting a judicial resolution, and (2) allowing the proposed quo warranto action to 

proceed would serve the overall public interest.6 Our analysis is guided by the principle 

that a “chief object in requiring leave is to prevent vexatious prosecutions, and the rule is 

inflexible that there must be affidavits so full and positive from persons knowing the facts 

as to make out a clear case of right in such a way that perjury may be brought if any 

material allegation is false.”7 

Applicable law concerning “legal residence” or “domicile” 

In this context, the residence of a public official or candidate for public office 

means his or her legal residence, also referred to as domicile8

—which is in turn defined 

as a person’s fixed habitation where he or she intends to remain, and intends to return to 

whenever absent.9 While a person may have multiple residences, a person may have one 

domicile only at any given time.10 Thus, a domicile “cannot be lost until another is 

gained.”11 To change domicile, it requires a “union of act and intent.”12 

Because a determination of domicile is based not only on physical conduct, but 

also intent, the requirement that a substantial showing be made before we authorize 

judicial resolution is particularly pertinent.13 The determination of domicile is a mixed 

question of fact and law which may involve many factors, such as acts and declarations 

such a suit directly. 

6 87 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 30, 31 (2004) (explaining that we make no final judgment on 

the merits but “a substantial showing must be made before we will authorize a judicial 

challenge to a person’s right to hold public office”); 83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at 

p. 182 (2000). 

7 8 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 221, 222 (1946), quoting Lamb v. Webb (1907) 151 Cal. 451, 

456. 

8 Walters v. Weed (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1, 7; 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 8, 11 (1989). 

9 Elec. Code, § 349, subd. (b); Gov. Code, § 244, subd. (a) (“It is the place where one 

remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to 

which he or she returns in seasons of repose”). 

10 Elec. Code, § 349, subd. (b); Gov. Code, § 244, subd. (b). 

11 Gov. Code, § 244, subd. (c). 

12 Gov. Code, § 244, subd. (f). 

13 87 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 31. 

3 

17-601 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

by the official, his or her mailing address, voter registration, car registration, tax returns, 

and where a homeowner’s or renter’s credit is taken, but the critical element is intent.14 

The parties’ contentions and our analysis of the evidence 

Minnema resided outside of the City’s District 4 before July 27, 2016. Prior to 

that date, Minnema, at 21 years of age, resided in the City’s District 3, with roommates, 

in his mother and stepfather’s home, while they lived in Texas for fourteen months. On 

July 26, 2016, Minnema learned from the District 3 incumbent council member that the 

member would seek reelection that fall; upon learning of this, Minnema stated that he 

would move to District 4, so as not to run against the District 3 incumbent. The parties 

do not dispute these preliminary facts. What is disputed, however, is the question where 

Minnema resided when he obtained his nomination papers on August 2, 2016, through 

his election a few months later. 

On the one hand, Minnema has stated under penalty of perjury that he moved to 

District 4 on July 27, 2016, and has resided in District 4 ever since. Specifically, he 

states that he moved on that date to 1320 Revelle Court, and then on September 19, 2016, 

to 1205 Valley Glen, both of which are locations within District 4.15 

On the other hand, the City alleges in its application for quo warranto that 

Minnema did not reside in District 4 from the time he obtained his nomination papers 

through his election. In response to doubts expressed to the City about Minnema’s 

residence, the City hired an investigator to look into the matter, and its allegations here 

are largely based upon its investigator’s report. 

As to the Revelle Court address, the City relies on unsworn statements made by 

neighbors to its investigator that they did not see Minnema or his vehicle there (although 

the investigator’s report also indicates at least one neighbor occasionally saw Minnema 

and his vehicle there during the relevant period), and a sworn affidavit from Revelle 

14 See, e.g., 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 74, 76–77 (2016); 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 90, 93 

(2002); 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 197, 209–210 (1990); 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 15, 22 (1989); 

72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 14. As discussed below, we have been presented with 

evidence that includes Minnema’s declaration (specifically, an affidavit of residence), 

mailing address, voter registration, and other items, such as affidavits by witnesses and 

copies of rental receipts. 

15 Although outside the time period raised in the City’s application for leave to sue, 

Minnema also states that he moved to 1115 Bello Drive, which is also in District 4, on 

May 15, 2017. 

4 

17-601 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Court neighbor Fermin Rubio, who stated he did not observe Minnema living on Revelle 

Court but was “confident” that he would have if that had been the case. The City further 

disputes Minnema’s Revelle Court residency because it was temporary, because 

Minnema was still seen at his mother and stepfather’s home in District 3 during this time 

period, and because Minnema’s former roommates at the District 3 home told the 

investigator that Minnema moved from there to the Valley Glen address without 

mentioning the intervening Revelle Court address. The City also alleges that Minnema 

produced no physical evidence of his presence at Revelle Court and rebuffed its requests 

for an affidavit of residence. 

As to the 1205 Valley Glen address, the City disputes Minnema’s residence at this 

location in large part because he claims to have resided in its garage, which lacks a 

bathroom.16 The City also alleges that Minnema and his mother contacted a property 

manager during the relevant period, urgently seeking housing for Minnema in District 4. 

The City’s investigator, however, found that Minnema initially resided at 1205 Valley 

Glen on a periodic basis, but concluded that the timing of his move there was unclear due 

to contrasting witness statements, the lapse of time, and the lack of a traditional lease. 

The investigator also generally concluded it was likely that Minnema stayed the night at 

multiple residences after his conversation with the District 3 incumbent. 

In his sworn response to the City’s application for quo warranto, Minnema 

maintains that on July 27, 2016, the day after learning that the District 3 incumbent 

would seek reelection, he began formally residing at 1320 Revelle Court, where his aunt 

and uncle live, in District 4, and moved numerous boxes of his belongings there. 

Minnema also maintains that on September 15, 2016, he moved to 1205 Valley Glen, 

owned by his friend’s mother, from whom he rented the garage space, while continuing 

to look for more suitable housing. 

With his response, Minnema provided his signed affidavit of residence in District 

4 that the City had previously requested. He also provided a copy of a post office 

confirmation dated August 2, 2016, showing his address change to 1320 Revelle Court, 

and his voter registration and nomination papers—both processed on August 2, 2016, and 

signed under penalty of perjury—which list his address as 1320 Revelle Court. Minnema 

updated his voter registration on September 19, 2016, to show his address as 1205 Valley 

Glen. 

Neither party otherwise addresses the potential legal implications—for example, 

building and safety violations—of such a living arrangement, and we see no need to do so 

to determine the issue before us. 

5 

17-601 

16 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In addition to his affidavit, change-of-address confirmation, voter registration, and 

nomination papers, Minnema also provided sworn affidavits by his uncle, mother, 

stepfather, and former roommates, as well as copies of rental receipts, text messages with 

his aunt, and communications with friends and potential landlords documenting his 

search for housing in District 4. 

The affidavit from Minnema’s uncle, signed October 4, 2016, states that Minnema 

resided at 1320 Revelle Court since June 1 of that year. No affidavit by Minnema’s aunt 

was provided, but a copy of Minnema’s text messages with her corroborate his 

arrangements to stay at the Revelle Court house in a fully-furnished bedroom.

17 Because 

Minnema asserts that he resided on Revelle Court for only about a month and a half, until 

other accommodations could be found, we would not expect much physical evidence to 

exist of his residence there. But in addition to his uncle’s affidavit and text messages 

with his aunt, Minnema also provided a copy of a bill in his name sent to him at the 

Revelle Court address during the relevant period. He also provided a copy of a picture of 

him, dated August 15, 2016, with his aunt and uncle’s pets whom he helped take care of 

during one of the weeks he was there while his aunt and uncle were in Hawaii. And the 

City investigator’s report includes a copy of Minnema’s public Facebook post, dated 

August 2, 2016, in which he replies “Revelle Court” to a question of where he lives. 

As to the City’s allegation that he was still seen at the home of his mother and 

stepfather in District 3 after July 27, 2016, Minnema attributes this to his propertymanagement duties at that address while his mother and stepfather were away in Texas 

until they returned in September of 2016. With regard to his former roommates’ 

statements to the City’s investigator that Minnema moved from the District 3 address to 

“Valley Glen” (without mentioning the intervening Revelle Court address), the 

roommates explain under oath that they were not referring to the specific address of 1205 

Valley Glen, but to the Valley Glen subdivision in which Revelle Court is located. 

We next turn to the affidavit from Minnema’s father. He attests that, on July 27, 

2016, the day after Minnema confirmed that the District 3 incumbent was running for 

reelection, he helped Minnema move several boxes and a bookshelf to 1320 Revelle 

Court, and then on September 15, helped him move those items and a box spring and 

mattress to 1205 Valley Glen. The affidavit states that on both occasions, they used 

Minnema’s father’s pickup truck, due to problems with Minnema’s and his mother’s 

We note that, as the City points out, there is a discrepancy in dates between 

Minnema’s uncle’s affidavit and his own: His uncle states that Minnema resided at 1320 

Revelle Court since June 1, while Minnema states he resided there from July 27 through 

mid-September of 2016. To address the discrepancy, Minnema explains that he began 

formally residing there on July 27, but first made the arrangements back in June. 

6 

17-601 

17 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

vehicles. The affidavit also states that, during the week of September 1, 2016, Minnema 

left his vehicle at his father’s residence (which is located outside of District 4) while 

Minnema visited his mother and stepfather in Texas, accounting for the vehicle’s absence 

from Revelle Court for one of the weeks he resided there.18 

Minnema’s mother and stepfather also attest that, near the end of September, they 

helped Minnema move the rest of his belongings to the 1205 Valley Glen garage space, 

and witnessed on multiple occasions his messy living space there. An affidavit from a 

resident of the room above the garage at 1205 Valley Glen attests that Minnema moved 

into the garage space in September. Minnema also provided copies of text messages 

arranging to rent that space, along with rental receipts that cover the period between midSeptember of 2016 through mid-May of 2017. And, according to the City’s own 

investigation, a few neighbors corroborated seeing Minnema’s vehicle nearby, as did the 

property owner and her son (both of whom lived there). 

As to Minnema’s refusal to voluntarily comply with the City’s requests for a 

signed affidavit of residence, we believe that his refusal to the City has little significance 

because he provided it with his response, along with his sworn statements of residence on 

his nomination papers and voter registration.19 

Finally, we address the City’s argument that, notwithstanding the issue of 

Minnema’s physical presence at his claimed residences, Minnema lacked the intent to 

permanently reside in District 4 so as to establish his domicile there. Specifically, the 

City asserts that Minnema’s alleged residences were temporary, not permanent, and that 

he sought to establish residence in District 4 solely to run for office. Minnema maintains 

that he intended his move to District 4 be permanent, and points to his previous ties to the 

district, including his attendance at public schools and church, and his service on a 

downtown association, within the district. In our view, Minnema’s documented 

communications of his search for housing in the district during the relevant period 

support his sworn stated intent to remain there.20 

18 Minnema’s travel to Texas during the week of September 1, 2016, is corroborated 

by affidavits by Minnema’s mother and stepfather, as well as a copy of Minnema’s flight 

itinerary. As he was away for one week of the short period he allegedly resided on 

Revelle Court, it would be unsurprising for neighbors not to have seen him there 

(although the investigator’s report indicated at least one had done so). 

19 See 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 197, 199 (official permitted to challenge 

entity’s ouster of official for allegedly not residing in district, despite the fact that official 

had not provided affidavit of residence to ousting entity that had requested it). 

20 Likewise, the City’s allegation that Minnema and his mother contacted a property 

7 

17-601 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In any event, the City’s challenge to Minnema’s intent is misplaced. Even though 

Minnema’s living space at the Valley Glen address was a garage, a domicile need not be 

a traditional place of residence, so long as it is a place of fixed habitation.21 And there is 

no requirement for an intent to permanently remain at a particular dwelling; instead, what 

matters is the intent to permanently remain in the district.

22 It is of no consequence that 

Minnema sought residence in District 4 to run for office, and made temporary moves 

within the district while establishing a domicile there: Moving to an electoral district in 

order to run for office in that district does not defeat the intent for domicile, nor do 

temporary moves within the district.

23 Again, it is the intent to remain within the district 

that matters.24 We believe that Minnema’s actions, which “speak louder than words,”25 

are consistent with and reflect his stated intent, and that the City has presented 

insufficient evidence to cast doubt upon that intent. 

After carefully considering all of the evidence presented, we find that no 

substantial showing has been made that would warrant the initiation of a quo warranto 

action on the question of Minnema’s residency.26 In sum, the City’s challenge is based 

on scant, ambiguous, circumstantial, and largely unsworn evidence—as opposed to the 

direct, sworn statements of action and intent (and supporting documentation) that 

Minnema has provided. In general, “ambiguities concerning the right to hold public 

manager during the relevant period, urgently seeking housing for Minnema in District 4, 

is consistent with his stated desire to find more suitable housing and supports the element 

of intent to remain in the district. 

21 See Collier v. Menzel (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 24, 31 (finding that public park, while 

not legally designated as a place for camping, can qualify as the place of fixed habitation 

for domicile, because it is a physical area where a person can sleep and otherwise use as a 

dwelling place). 

22 DeMiglio v. Mashore (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1269–1270 (explaining that 

permanency and intention to remain “have nothing to do with the actual dwelling,” and a 

person “could be domiciled in one town all his or her life and have many residences, 

some obviously temporary”). 

23 Id. at pp. 1267, 1269–1270. 

24 See ibid. 

25 See 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 93, quoting Estate of Lagersen (1959) 169 

Cal.App.2d 359, 366. 

26 See 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 63, 69 (1989) (our role is to determine whether there is a 

fact or question of law that should be determined by a court). 

8 

17-601 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

28 

office should be resolved in favor of eligibility.”27 We recognize that the parties offer 

competing scenarios here, but we have broad discretion in ruling on quo warranto 

applications, and the presence of an arguable or debatable issue does not necessarily 

establish that the issue is a substantial one, much less that the dispute warrants judicial 

resolution in a quo warranto action.28 In light of the evidence presented to us, we 

perceive no substantial question of law or fact that would warrant a judicial examination 

of the issue whether Minnema was domiciled in District 4.29 And, given our analysis, we 

27 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 23, citing Helena Rubenstein Internat. v. Younger 

(1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 406, 418. 

See Rando v. Harris (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 868, 880-882 (relator’s arguable 

interpretation of City Charter provision did not automatically elevate claim into a 

substantial question of law or fact for purposes of determining the appropriateness of quo 

warranto, let alone demonstrate an “extreme and indefensible abuse of discretion” in 

denying application); 96 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 48, 49 (2013); see also City of Campbell v. 

Mosk (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 640, 650 (“We do not believe . . . that the debatable issue 

inevitably produces the quo warranto. Indeed, the Attorney General’s exercise of 

discretion is posited upon the existence of a debatable issue. . . . The crystallization of an 

issue thus does not preclude an exercise of his discretion; it causes it. . . . The exercise of 

the discretion of the Attorney General in the grant of such approval to sue calls for care 

and delicacy. Certainly the private party’s right to it cannot be absolute; the public 

interest prevails”). 

29 At most, the City’s allegations might support a finding that Minnema had multiple 

residences, which are permissible. (See Fenton v. Bd. of Directors of the Groveland 

Community Services Dist. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1114; Lowe v. Ruhlman (1945) 

67 Cal.App.2d 828, 833 [“It is elementary that a person may have a residence separate 

from his domicile”]; 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 287, 289 (1992) (finding it is “not probatively 

significant” that proposed defendant “has purchased or moved to a residence outside the 

district, since an individual may well have multiple residences as that term is commonly 

understood and as distinguished from the concept of domicile.”) Where facts indicate a 

person has two residences, the question of which one is the legal residence is a matter of 

intent. (Sherman v. Reynolds (1927) 83 Cal.App. 403, 406–07; Chambers v. Hathaway 

(1921) 187 Cal. 104, 106.) As we have explained, we do not believe the City has 

presented sufficient evidence to cast doubt on Minnema’s stated intent to be domiciled in 

District 4. 

We note that our conclusion here is consistent with those we have reached in 

comparable prior opinions where the facts were “conflicting and equivocal toward 

establishing the domicile of the proposed defendant” but found “insufficient to grant 

leave to sue in quo warranto . . . .” (79 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 21, 27 (1996), quoting 73 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 197.) In one instance, for example, where it was alleged 

9 

17-601 
 

 

 

 

 

further conclude that it would not serve the public interest to perpetuate, or expend scarce 

judicial resources on, such an inquiry.

30 For the reasons discussed above, the application 

for leave to sue in quo warranto is DENIED. 

***** 

that an official did not reside in his district, his declaration of intent recited supporting 

facts and included voter registration, mail delivery, and unequivocal affidavits attesting to 

his presence at his address within the district. (8 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 221– 

223.) The proposed relator offered unverified allegations that the official’s car 

registration and postal address were outside of his district, that his utility usage at his 

residence outside the district was normal, while such usage at his residence within the 

district was minimal, and that he sought additional gas from the rationing board to cover 

his commute from his out-of-district address. (Id. at p. 223.) We denied leave to sue 

because the proposed relator’s evidence, weighed against the official’s direct evidence, 

was not persuasive. (Ibid.; see also, e.g., 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 289; 72 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 70–71 [weighing “very strong direct evidence” of 

“intent versus only some circumstantial evidence to the contrary” to conclude such 

circumstantial evidence fell short of justifying quo warranto action to challenge 

domicile]; 72 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 22–23.) 

30 99 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 81. 

10 

17-601