IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

JOHN MUNIC ENTERPRISES, INC.,

AN ARIZONA CORPORATION,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

BETH ANNE LAOS AND ENRICO B. LAOS, WIFE AND HUSBAND,

Defendant/Appellant.

No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0108

Filed May 6, 2014

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. C20099937

The Honorable Charles V. Harrington, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Altfeld & Battaile P.C., Tucson

By Robert A. Kerry

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Waterfall, Economidis, Caldwell, Hanshaw & Villamana, P.C., Tucson

By Corey B. Larson

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Chief Judge Howard authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Judge Brammer and Judge Olson concurred.1

H O W A R D, Chief Judge:

¶1 Beth and Enrico Laos (“the Laoses”) appeal from the 

trial court’s denial of their Rule 60(c)(5), Ariz. R. Civ. P., motion for 

relief from judgment entered in favor of John Munic Enterprises, Inc.

(“Munic”), and its denial of their request for a fair market valuation 

hearing pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1566. On appeal, they argue that the 

court was biased against them, that it erred in applying the Uniform 

Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”) to prevent a 

settlement amount between Munic and its attorney from serving as a 

credit against the judgment entered against them, and that 

fundamental fairness and equity entitled them to a fair market 

valuation hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 The underlying facts are undisputed. In March 2009, 

the Laoses sought a loan from Munic in order to avoid the nonjudicial foreclosure of a ranch they had purchased. Munic loaned 

them $900,000 for this purpose. When the Laoses failed to repay any 

amount of the loan, Munic discovered that Beth Laos had 

misrepresented the value of assets that secured the loan. Munic 

sued the Laoses for breach of contract and fraud and was granted 

summary judgment on both claims and awarded contract damages 

in the amount of $1,362,305.70, which covered the loan principal, 

unpaid interest, and attorney fees. The trial court declined to enter 

 

1The Hon. J. William Brammer, Jr., a retired judge of this 

court, and the Hon. Robert Carter Olson, a retired judge of the 

Arizona Superior Court, are called back to active duty to serve on 

this case pursuant to orders of this court and the supreme court.
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

3

any additional compensatory or punitive damages on the fraud 

claim. 

¶3 Over a year after the judgment was entered, the Laoses 

discovered Munic had sued its attorney for legal malpractice in 

connection with his work on the loan and had obtained a 

confidential settlement amount from him. The Laoses moved for 

relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(c)(5), arguing that Munic 

should reveal the amount of the settlement so that it could be 

credited against the judgment entered against them or, in the 

alternative, that Munic should be required to enter a satisfaction of 

judgment. They also requested a fair market valuation hearing for 

the value of the ranch. The trial court denied the motion and the 

request for a valuation hearing. We have jurisdiction over the 

Laoses’ appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). 

Trial Court Prejudice

¶4 The Laoses first argue the trial court was biased or 

prejudiced against them because it looked into other cases involving 

the Laoses pending on the superior court’s docket. However, they 

did not make this argument below in their motion for 

reconsideration or through an affidavit requesting the judge’s

disqualification pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-409. Additionally, they 

stipulated to the same trial judge entering an amended judgment to 

confirm this court’s jurisdiction. “The right to apply for a change of 

judge for cause is waived if not timely filed.” Fendler v. Phx. 

Newspapers Inc., 130 Ariz. 475, 481, 636 P.2d 1257, 1263 (App. 1981). 

Therefore, they have waived any error. See Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 

Ariz. 299, 300, 878 P.2d 657, 658 (1994) (errors not raised in trial court 

cannot be asserted on appeal); Marsin v. Udall, 78 Ariz. 309, 313, 279 

P.2d 721, 724 (1955) (untimely to move to disqualify judge when 

judgment already rendered on pleadings). 

Settlement Credit

¶5 The Laoses next argue the trial court erred by 

concluding that UCATA prevented crediting the settlement Munic 

obtained from its attorney against the judgment entered against 

them and therefore denying their Rule 60(c)(5) motion. We review 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

4

the denial of a Rule 60(c)(5) motion for an abuse of discretion. Ezell 

v. Quon, 224 Ariz. 532, ¶ 15, 233 P.3d 645, 649 (App. 2010). A court 

abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law. City of Tucson v. 

Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 58, 181 P.3d 219, 236 

(App. 2008). We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. 

First Credit Union v. Courtney, 233 Ariz. 105, ¶ 9, 309 P.3d 929, 931 

(App. 2013). “When the statutory language ‘is clear and 

unambiguous,’ we look no further and ‘assum[e] the legislature has 

said what it means.’” Id., quoting Clear Channel Outdoor, 218 Ariz. 

172, ¶ 6, 181 P.3d at 225.

¶6 Rule 60(c)(5) allows a trial court to relieve a party from 

a judgment if “the judgment has been satisfied, released or 

discharged.” The Laoses claim Munic’s settlement with its attorney 

satisfied, or at least partially satisfied, the judgment against them.

But the trial court concluded that “UCATA does apply to this case” 

because § 12-2501(G) “defines ‘property damage’ to include 

‘economic loss[.]’” The court then found that because the liability of 

Munic’s attorney and the Laoses was several, and not joint, the 

settlement could not be used to offset their judgment under UCATA. 

See § 12-2506(A); Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 185 Ariz. 493, 507-08, 

917 P.2d 222, 236-37 (1996). 

¶7 Sections 12-2501 through 12-2509, A.R.S., establish 

Arizona’s version of UCATA. By its plain language, the act applies 

to persons who become “liable in tort.” § 12-2501(A). “The right to 

contribution under §§ 12-2501 through 12-2504 applies to all 

tortfeasors whose liability is based on negligence, strict liability in 

tort or any product liability action, as defined in § 12-681, including 

warranty.” A.R.S. § 12-2509(A). Section 12-2506(A) sets a default 

rule that in “personal injury, property damage or wrongful death”

actions liability is several and “in direct proportion to that 

defendant’s percentage of fault.” 

¶8 UCATA’s purpose is to “abolish joint and several 

liability in most circumstances” so that “‘each tortfeasor [is] 

responsible for paying his or her percentage of fault and no more.’” 

State Farm Ins. Cos. v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 217 Ariz. 222, 

¶ 12, 172 P.3d 410, 413 (2007), quoting Dietz v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 Ariz. 

505, 510, 821 P.2d 166, 171 (1991) (first emphasis added; second 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

5

emphasis in Dietz). Although § 12-2506(F) defines “[f]ault” as 

including the “breach of a legal duty,” we recently concluded that 

“[i]n the context of the UCATA . . . breach of a contractual 

undertaking is [not] included within the meaning of ‘breach of a 

legal duty.’”2 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Bondwriter Sw., Inc., 228 

Ariz. 84, ¶ 24, 263 P.3d 633, 638 (App. 2011). We also determined

that “[t]he fact that economic losses are included within the 

definition of ‘property damage’ does not compel the conclusion that 

the comparative fault provisions of UCATA apply to breach of 

contract claims.” Id. ¶ 25.

¶9 Munic received a judgment in its favor on both its 

contract and tort claims against the Laoses. The judgment did not 

include compensatory or punitive damages for the fraud claim. In 

granting judgment in Munic’s favor on the contract claim, however, 

the trial court awarded damages and attorney fees pursuant to the 

terms of the contract. Because the Laoses are liable in tort and 

contract, we must review the substance of the damages at issue to 

determine whether UCATA was intended to apply to this situation. 

See Thomas v. Goudreault, 163 Ariz. 159, 163-64, 165, 786 P.2d 1010, 

1014-15, 1016 (App. 1989) (courts look to substance not labels; 

analyzing damages involved to determine relevant law). 

¶10 “To determine whether contract or tort law applies in a 

specific case, the court must consider the facts of the case, ‘bearing in 

mind the purposes of tort law recovery as contrasted with contract 

law.’” Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368, 376, 694 P.2d 198, 206 (1984), 

quoting Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. 

444, 448, 666 P.2d 544, 548 (App. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by 

Phelps v. Firebird Raceway, Inc., 210 Ariz. 403, 111 P.3d 1003 (2005). 

“[C]ontract remedies are designed to redress loss of the benefit of 

the bargain while tort remedies are designed to protect the 

public . . . .” Arrow Leasing Corp., 136 Ariz. at 447, 666 P.2d at 547. 

When a party is induced to enter a contract by fraudulent 

misrepresentations and justifiably relies on the misrepresentation, 

 

2Fault also can include a breach of warranty action, but we are 

not presented with that issue here. 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

6

the contract is voidable by that party, but is not automatically void. 

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(1) (1981) (hereinafter 

“Restatement (Contracts)”). But whether the party chooses to void 

the contract or not, it also has an independent tort action for fraud. 

Morris v. Achen Constr. Co., 155 Ariz. 512, 514, 747 P.2d 1211, 1213 

(1987).

¶11 The summary judgment in Munic’s favor awarded 

damages and attorney fees based on the terms of the contract, but 

did not award additional damages as requested by Munic’s fraud 

claim. Thus, although Munic could have sought to void the 

contract, Restatement (Contracts) § 164(1), it instead sought to 

enforce the contract by its terms and receive the benefit of its 

bargain. The only recovery Munic received in this case thus fits 

squarely within the type of remedy that contract law is designed to 

provide. See Arrow Leasing Corp., 136 Ariz. at 447, 666 P.2d at 547; 

Thomas, 163 Ariz. at 165, 786 P.2d at 1016. 

¶12 Under these circumstances, we conclude the damages in 

this case sound primarily in contract. Therefore UCATA was not 

intended to apply to this situation in which the Laoses were not 

primarily “liable in tort” pursuant to § 12-2501(A) or liable for a

breach of a legal duty causing personal injury, property damage or 

wrongful death within the meaning of § 12-2506(A), (F). See Fidelity 

& Deposit Co. of Md., 228 Ariz. 84, ¶ 25, 263 P.3d at 638. Accordingly, 

the trial court erred in applying UCATA to this case. 

¶13 Munic argues we nonetheless may apply the collateral 

source rule in this contract case and uphold the trial court because 

our prior case law on this subject was ill-reasoned and is against the 

weight of authority in other jurisdictions. The Laoses counter that 

the collateral source rule is strictly a tort doctrine and should not 

apply to contractual damages. If the court has reached the correct 

result for the wrong reasons, however, we are bound to affirm its

ruling. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 213 Ariz. 400, n.7, 142 

P.3d 708, 712 n.7 (App. 2006). 

¶14 The collateral source rule is a doctrine, usually applied 

in personal injury cases, which provides “that benefits received by 

the plaintiff from a source collateral to the defendant may not be 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

7

used to reduce that defendant’s liability for damages.” Dan B. 

Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 3.8(1) (2d ed. 1993) (hereinafter 

Remedies). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A, states the rule 

as follows: 

(1) A payment made by a tortfeasor or by a 

person acting for him to a person whom he 

has injured is credited against his tort 

liability, as are payments made by another 

who is, or believes he is, subject to the same 

tort liability.

(2) Payments made to or benefits conferred 

on the injured party from other sources are 

not credited against the tortfeasor’s 

liability, although they cover all or a part of 

the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.3

Thus, the rule prevents a tortfeasor from avoiding liability for 

damages when the injured party has been compensated by a third 

party. Sw. Fiduciary Inc. v. Ariz. Healthcare Cost Containment Sys. 

Admin., 226 Ariz. 404, ¶ 20, 249 P.3d 1104, 1109 (App. 2011). 

¶15 This court, however, rejected the rule’s application to 

“ordinary contract cases” in Grover v. Ratliff, 120 Ariz. 368, 370, 586 

P.2d 213, 215 (App. 1978). In Grover, we stated that the “collateral 

source rule is a concept of damages in tort cases and does not apply 

to an ordinary breach of contract case” because the rule “‘is punitive; 

contractual damages are compensatory. . . . [I]f applied to an action 

based on breach of contract, [it] would violate the contractual 

damage rule that no one shall profit more from the breach of an 

obligation than from its full performance.’” Id., quoting Patent 

Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Constr. Co., 64 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 

(Ct. App. 1967). Our more recent opinion in Norwest Bank (Minn.), 

 

3The Laoses noted at oral argument that the comment to this 

rule discusses four types of collateral sources not used to offset the 

liability of the tortfeasor. But the rules as stated are not so limited. 

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A & cmt. c.
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

8

N.A. v. Symington simply quoted Grover for the proposition that the 

rule did not apply in ordinary contract cases, again relying on the 

reasoning of Patent Scaffolding. 197 Ariz. 181, ¶ 36, 3 P.3d 1101, 1109

(App. 2000). But that case left open the possibility that the trial court 

could refuse to offset a settlement from the deficiency judgment if it 

concluded the damages were not similar enough, and declined to 

consider such refusal an application of the collateral source rule. 

Id. ¶ 37. 

¶16 In a case decided just three years after Patent Scaffolding,

however, the California Supreme Court explicitly overruled the 

statement that the collateral source rule is “punitive.” Helfend v. 

S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 181 (1970). It concluded 

the rule was not punitive and, at least in the tort context, has 

“several legitimate and fully justified compensatory functions” 

including encouraging the purchase of insurance, aiding the jury in 

the computation of damages, better approximating full 

compensation to victims by allowing victims a larger pool of funds 

from which to pay their attorneys, and in preventing the tortfeasor 

from benefiting from a victim’s thrift. Id. at 178-81. Moreover, even 

in Patent Scaffolding, the court had left open the possibility that the 

rule could be applied in cases of tortious or willful breaches of 

contract. 64 Cal. Rptr. at 191. 

¶17 Additionally, in Fleming v. Pima County, 141 Ariz. 149, 

155, 685 P.2d 1301, 1307 (1984), our supreme court refused to offset 

unemployment compensation against an award of damages for 

wrongful discharge, characterizing those forms of compensation as a 

collateral source. The court was unable to deduce whether the 

damages were awarded under a tort or breach of contract theory. Id. 

at 154, 685 P.2d at 1306. But it reasoned that applying the collateral 

source doctrine “‘encourag[ed] employers to provide more stable 

employment’ and provid[ed] for ‘persons unemployed through no 

fault of their own.’” Id. at 155, 685 P.2d at 1307, quoting A.R.S. § 23-

601. Thus, at least in the wrongful discharge context, our supreme 

court concluded applying the collateral source rule supported state 

public policy and did “not give plaintiff a ‘windfall.’” Id.

¶18 Although the cases from other jurisdictions are divided, 

those applying the collateral source rule in contract or similar cases 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

9

illustrate that in many contexts application of the rule would serve 

valid and valuable purposes that also are consistent with contract 

law principles. Enforcing the expectation interests of the parties is 

one of the principal goals of remedying a breach of contract. See 

Restatement (Contracts) §§ 344(a); 347 cmt. a. Applying the 

collateral source rule has been held to advance that goal. See State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nalbone, 569 A.2d 71, 75 (Del. 1989)

(“[T]he extent to which the collateral source rule should be applied 

to permit double recovery should depend upon the contractual 

expectations that underlie the collateral source payment.”); 

Sunnyland Farms v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 301 P.3d 387, ¶ 50

(N.M. 2013) (court should honor expectation of parties to collateral 

source over breaching party); McConal Aviation, Inc. v. Comm. 

Aviation Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 133, ¶ 21 (N.M. 1990) (breaching party 

should not reap benefit of negotiations to which it is not a party). 

¶19 Thus, when a party has paid valuable consideration 

before the breach to a collateral source to insure against a loss or 

otherwise to protect its interest, there is no logical reason to deny 

that party a benefit it has paid for and grant it to another party who 

neither negotiated for it, paid for it, nor absorbed the opportunity 

costs of securing it, but who has precipitated the loss. To do so 

would subsume the expectations of the third-party contract into the 

breached contract, devaluing or eliminating the separate benefit of 

the third-party contract which was supported by separate 

consideration, and place the breaching party in a better position than 

if it had performed the contract. Such a result is illogical and 

inconsistent with the Restatement, which “implements the policy in 

favor of allowing individuals to order their own affairs by making 

legally enforceable promises.” Restatement (Contracts) § 344 cmt. a. 

That the breaching party in these cases is forced to pay damages in 

line with the expectations of the parties actually serves the maxim 

that a party should not profit more from breach of a contract than its 

full performance. See Restatement (Contracts) § 347 cmt. e. 

¶20 And collateral payments resulting from a third-party 

contract ordinarily are not meant to cover the “judgment debtor’s 

obligation” but, instead, to settle or satisfy the obligations of the 

third party, whether those arose contractually or otherwise. See 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

10

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50(2). Thus, it makes little 

sense, in the name of fulfilling the expectations of the contract, to 

give the breaching party the benefit of a separate contract negotiated 

before the breach by the non-breaching party with a third party.4 

¶21 Furthermore, in the case of breaches of contract having

a willful or tortious character, as when the breaching party secures 

the benefit of a contract by fraud, the collateral source rule prevents 

any further unjust enrichment of the breaching party. See GNP 

Commodities, Inc. v. Walsh Heffernan Co., 420 N.E.2d 659, 668 (Ill. App.

Ct. 1981) (where contract secured by misrepresentations of 

breaching party, “no reason [exists] why the collateral source rule 

should not apply to bar defendants from reducing damages by proof 

that plaintiff has been compensated from a source to which they 

have not contributed”). Even courts that generally will not apply 

the rule in contract cases concede the rule ought to apply in these 

situations. See, e.g., Patent Scaffolding, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 191; see also 

Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mercy Clinics, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 823, 830

(Iowa 1998) (leaving open application of rule in cases of tortious or 

willful breach). Though the breaching party “may not be a 

wrongdoer in the same sense as is a tortfeasor” it seems particularly 

unobjectionable that in these cases “the injured plaintiff [should] 

recover twice [rather] than that the breaching defendant escape 

liability altogether.” Hall v. Miller, 465 A.2d 222, 226 (Vt. 1983); see 

 

4 But in “ordinary contract cases,” refusing to apply the 

collateral source rule makes sense where a benefit to the nonbreaching party accrues as a direct result of the breaching party’s 

action or where the non-breaching party is able to mitigate its 

damages after the breach by finding a substitute transaction, as these 

are all acts within the ordinary contemplation of the contract. See 

Remedies § 12.6(2); see also All Am. Sch. Supply Co. v. Slavens, 125 Ariz. 

231, 233, 609 P.2d 46, 48 (1980) (“Arizona has long held that damages 

for breach of contract are those damages which arise naturally from 

the breach itself or which may reasonably be supposed to have been 

within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered the 

contract.”). The Laoses conceded at oral argument that under the 

facts presented here, this is not a mitigation case.
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

11

also El Escorial Owners’ Ass’n v. DLC Plastering, Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

524, 542 (Ct. App. 2007) (where conduct underlying breach of 

contract involves tort, collateral source rule applies); McConal 

Aviation, 799 P.2d 133, ¶ 35 (“‘If there must be a windfall certainly it 

is more just that the injured person shall profit therefrom, rather 

than the wrongdoer shall be relieved of his full responsibility for his 

wrongdoing.’”) (Montgomery, J., specially concurring), quoting

Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958). Moreover, this 

approach brings symmetry with the bankruptcy code, which has 

long refused to discharge contractual debts incurred by fraud. See 

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). 

¶22 Additionally, the supposed “double recovery” often 

will prove to be more hypothetical than actual. In many contract 

cases the plaintiff has assigned its claims to the collateral source or a 

subrogation has occurred. No double recovery occurs then because 

the breaching party bears the full burden of its breach; the collateral 

source can pursue the claim against the breaching party or the 

breaching party can fully repay the collateral source. Sunnyland 

Farms, 301 P.3d 387, ¶ 49.

¶23 Persuasive scholarship also supports application of the 

collateral source rule to at least some contract cases. Professor 

Dobbs concludes that the division of the courts on this issue “at all is 

probably best seen as a reflection of the fact that different contract 

cases may demand different answers.” Remedies § 12.6(4). Thus, he 

reasons, courts ought to consider the rule’s application using “a case 

by case analysis,” taking into account the “performance called for by 

the contract, the nature of the breach, the nature of the parties’ noncontractual relationship, . . . the nature of the benefits in issue, and 

the subrogation rights of the collateral source” in determining 

whether to apply the rule. Id. Other scholars have agreed the rule 

should apply in contract cases, noting that, particularly where the 

non-breaching party has paid separate consideration to receive the 

benefit or the plaintiff has subrogated its rights to the collateral 

source, the rule ought to apply, and that the type of breach involved 

is an important consideration. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Collateral 

Source Rule in Contract Cases, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 705, 708-12, 719-21 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

12

(2009); John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract 

Damages, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 56, 63-73, 77-86 (1983). 

¶24 Conducting a case by case analysis, we conclude this is 

not an “ordinary contract case” as in Grover and Symington. Rather,

it is more like Fleming in which the analysis of the policies behind 

the collateral source rule dictates it should apply. Beth Laos was 

able to secure the contract through her misrepresentations. Munic 

recovered judgment on both contract and tort theories, but the trial 

court declined to award “additional damages” for the fraud claim. 

It did find, however, that the underlying conduct was based on a 

tort, stating “Beth Anne Laos intentionally misrepresented the 

amount and status of her assets offered as collateral to [Munic] for 

the purpose of obtaining a loan from [Munic].” Thus, the eventual 

breach had a “willful or tortious” character that justifies applying 

the collateral source rule in this case. 

¶25 Moreover, fulfilling the expectations of the parties also 

dictates that we apply the rule. Munic had paid specific 

consideration to its attorney before the breach with the anticipation 

that its attorney would protect its interests. Nothing in the record 

suggests that the Laoses were parties to Munic’s agreement with its 

attorney. When Munic’s attorney failed to protect its interests, 

Munic was able to resort to the law of professional negligence in 

order to seek a recovery for its losses—a right it had purchased by 

choosing to hire an attorney in the first place. And, as the Laoses 

conceded at oral argument, Munic’s action against its attorney was 

not brought to mitigate its contract damages. Allowing the Laoses 

to benefit from the extra protection Munic had purchased for itself 

would give them the benefit of a bargain to which they were not a 

party and for which they had paid no consideration. And it would, 

at the same time, deprive Munic of a benefit for which it had paid.5 

 

5At oral argument, the Laoses argued they had paid Munic’s 

attorney fees related to this transaction. But they were unable to 

direct the court to any evidence in the record of that fact. If a fact is 

not in the record, we may not consider it. See Schaefer v. Murphey, 

131 Ariz. 295, 299, 640 P.2d 857, 861 (1982). The Laoses also failed to 

cite any authority that payment of Munic’s attorney fees as closing 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

13

¶26 Additionally, Munic’s attorney waived any right it had 

to an assignment or subrogation of Munic’s rights against the 

Laoses. So, although Munic may have some level of double 

recovery, that result may be associated with its attorney’s 

determination not to pursue the Laoses rather than any double 

payment from the Laoses. If that decision turns out to be favorable 

for Munic, that is a benefit it should reap for advancing Arizona 

policy by settling its claim; the Laoses should not “reap the benefit 

of a settlement to which [they were] not a party.” McConal Aviation, 

799 P.2d 133, ¶ 21; Yollin v. City of Glendale, 219 Ariz. 24, ¶ 15, 191 

P.3d 1040, 1046 (App. 2008) (“‘It has always been the policy of 

[Arizona] law to favor compromise and settlement; and it is 

especially important to sustain that principle in this age of 

voluminous litigation.’”), quoting Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 11, 373 

P.2d 1, 8 (1962). 

¶27 Furthermore, the settlement resolved potential 

professional negligence liability, which was a separate legal wrong 

susceptible to damages beyond the scope of the contract. See 

McConal Aviation, 799 P.2d 133, ¶ 13 (settled negligence claim 

“would not have represented double recovery” on separate breach 

of contract claim). This is consistent with the trial court’s conclusion 

that the liability of the Laoses and Munic’s attorney was several, not 

joint. 

¶28 Thus, to the extent the Laoses rely on Pasco Industries, 

Inc. v. Talco Recycling, Inc., 195 Ariz. 50, ¶¶ 72-74, 985 P.2d 535, 550 

(App. 1998), and American Home Assurance Co. v. Vaughn, 21 

Ariz. App. 190, 192, 517 P.2d 1083, 1085 (1974), for the proposition

that a plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same wrong, those cases 

are inapposite because Munic has recovered for different wrongs. 

The Laoses also rely on Hyatt Regency Phoenix Hotel Co. v. Winston & 

Strawn, 184 Ariz. 120, 907 P.2d 506 (App. 1995). But in that case this 

court allowed a settlement with a joint tortfeasor to reduce a 

 

costs would make them parties to or beneficiaries of the contract. 

See Ness v. W. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 174 Ariz. 497, 503, 851 P.2d 122, 128 

(App. 1992) (argument waived if made without supporting 

authority). 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

14

judgment against another joint tortfeasor. Id. at 138-40, 907 P.2d at 

524-26. Munic’s attorney was not a joint tortfeasor with the Laoses

and thus Hyatt Regency is inapposite. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not err in refusing to offset Munic’s settlement with its attorney 

against the judgment entered against the Laoses. 

Fair Market Valuation Hearing

¶29 The Laoses finally argue that the trial court erred in 

denying their request for a fair market valuation hearing pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 12-1566 to determine the value of their foreclosed home. 

They maintain “fairness dictates they be informed if the Judgment 

had been satisfied or extinguished before such obligation to request 

a valuation hearing should arise.” “Because this issue involves 

statutory interpretation and application, it is a question of law that 

we review de novo.” Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Tolliver, 183 Ariz. 343, 

345, 903 P.2d 1101, 1103 (App. 1995). 

¶30 Section 12-1566(C) requires that a judgment debtor 

request a fair market valuation hearing within thirty days of the sale 

of real property and does not authorize the court to extend the time. 

The Laoses did not make a timely request. And they have not

provided any authority for their position that the trial court should 

have extended this deadline in fairness, or had the authority to do 

so. “Arguments unsupported by any authority will not be 

considered on appeal.” Ness v. W. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 174 Ariz. 497, 

503, 851 P.2d 122, 128 (App. 1992). Moreover, they concede that 

failing to request the hearing timely “may have been the fault of 

their then existing counsel.” Their request, therefore, has no 

connection to their discovery of Munic’s settlement with its attorney. 

Accordingly, we reject this argument. 

Attorney Fees

¶31 The Laoses request their attorney fees on appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 

Because the Laoses were not successful in this appeal, we deny their 

request. Munic also requests its fees and costs pursuant to § 12-

341.01, Rule 21, and the contract. We award Munic its fees and costs 
JOHN MUNIC ENTERS., INC. V. LAOS

Opinion of the Court

15

pursuant to the terms of the contract upon its compliance with Rule 

21.

Disposition

¶32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court.