NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IBRAHIM RAIMI,

Petitioner,

 v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 18-71708

Agency No. A209-869-999

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted July 6, 2020

Portland, Oregon

Before: BENNETT and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and PEARSON,** District 

Judge.

Ibrahim Raimi, a native and citizen of Ghana, petitions for review of an 

order of the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding an immigration judge’s 

denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 

the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Benita Y. Pearson, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 30 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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§ 1252(a)(1). We grant the petition and remand.

1. Raimi seeks asylum and withholding of removal because he fears 

persecution on account of his sexual orientation. The Board upheld the 

immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding, on the basis that Raimi did not 

mention his sexual orientation during his border interview and discussed only his 

religion. Substantial evidence does not support the Board’s determination. When 

viewed “in light of the ‘totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,’”

Raimi’s testimony was not inconsistent. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1043 

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).

In his border interview, Raimi was asked why he traveled under a different 

name and why he came to the United States. In response, Raimi stated that he is a 

Christian and that he understood the United States to be a “good” place and a 

“Christian country.” When asked why he left Ghana, Raimi said that he was chased 

out of his house by a Muslim group. When asked whether he feared returning to 

Ghana, Raimi said that he did.

Viewed in context, Raimi’s testimony at his border interview is not 

inconsistent with later testimony given at his credible-fear hearing, during which 

he elaborated on the basis for his fear of persecution. During the border interview, 

Raimi answered the questions posed to him, none of which called for him to 

discuss his sexual orientation. When asked during his credible-fear interview about 
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his fear of the Muslim group, Raimi explained that the group targeted gay people 

and that he was specifically targeted by them. In identifying an inconsistency in 

Raimi’s testimony, the Board appears to have assumed that the group must have 

been motivated by either anti-Christian or anti-gay animus, overlooking the 

possibility that both motives might have been present. Either way, the Board was 

required to consider Raimi’s “explanation for a perceived inconsistency, and other 

record evidence that sheds light on whether there is in fact an inconsistency at all.”

Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044 (citation omitted); see Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 

1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). The Board did not do so here because it did not give 

reasoned consideration to Raimi’s explanation of the Muslim group’s anti-gay 

animus.

The Board similarly perceived an inconsistency in Raimi’s testimony about 

the reason his father poured pepper into his eyes. But although Raimi’s borderinterview testimony could be construed to suggest that his father attacked him 

because he was a Christian, Raimi did not say that it was the only reason he was 

attacked. Instead, Raimi consistently tied his father’s animus to his Christianity and

sexual orientation, not one or the other exclusively.

The Board also relied on the immigration judge’s comments about Raimi’s 

demeanor, but we have never upheld an adverse credibility finding based on 

demeanor alone. We see no reason to do so in this case, when the immigration 
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judge’s demeanor findings lack identifiable support in the record. See Shrestha, 

590 F.3d at 1042. The immigration judge need not provide “running commentary” 

on a witness’s demeanor during the hearing, but to permit meaningful review, the 

immigration judge must identify the basis for a demeanor finding with greater 

specificity than was done here. Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 

2017) (per curiam); see Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1042.

Because the adverse credibility finding cannot stand, we remand Raimi’s 

claims for asylum and withholding of removal on an open record. See Soto-Olarte, 

555 F.3d at 1093–96.

2. As for Raimi’s CAT claim, the Board’s analysis of country conditions 

in Ghana was inadequate. Under the pertinent regulations, the Board must consider 

all relevant evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). When “there is any indication that 

the BIA did not consider all of the evidence before it, . . . the decision cannot 

stand.” Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2011). “Such indications 

include . . . failing to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence.” 

Id. at 772.

Here, the Board did not address several material aspects of the State

Department’s 2016 report on human rights in Ghana. For example, the report 

recognizes that Ghanaian law criminalizes sexual intercourse between men. The 

report also states that Ghanaian “police were reluctant to investigate claims of 
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assault or violence against LGBTI persons.” It further explains that “[g]ay men in 

prison were often subjected to sexual and other physical abuse.”

We have held that sexual assault can amount to torture. See AvendanoHernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015). Given the unaddressed 

country conditions relevant to Raimi’s sexual orientation, substantial evidence 

does not support the conclusion that, based on objective evidence alone, Raimi is 

unlikely to be tortured with the acquiescence of the Ghanaian government. See 

Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008). We therefore remand 

for reconsideration of Raimi’s CAT claim. See Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 976

(9th Cir. 2014).

3. On remand, Raimi should have the opportunity to argue for the 

admission of the two letters he contends were incorrectly excluded at his merits 

hearing. See Perez-Arceo v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 1178, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016). Because 

those letters are not in the administrative record, we express no opinion as to their

relevance. We otherwise reject the due process challenges Raimi has raised.

PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.