United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 23, 2009

Decided June 23, 2009

Before

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐3720

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DENNIS O. SAID,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 08‐CR‐24‐C‐01

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

In 2003, officials from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency performed a

routine audit of the First National Bank of Blanchardville, Wisconsin, and determined that

the bank was insolvent.  They closed the bank and the FBI started an investigation, which

led to the bank’s president, Mark Hardyman.  Hardyman had approved numerous

fraudulent loans and had kept those loans hidden from the bank’s board of directors and

from bank regulators.  Dennis Said was the recipient of about $6 million of those fraudulent

loans and, after the investigation, he was charged in a 39‐count indictment.  Said ultimately

pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and one count of money

laundering, id. § 1957, and received a sentence of 100 months.  (Hardyman, who did not

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐3720 Page 2

benefit from the scheme except through bonus pay, also pleaded guilty and got 108

months.)  Said filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer moves to withdraw under

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because he cannot discern any nonfrivolous ground

for appeal.  Said did not accept our invitation to respond to his lawyer’s submission.  See

CIR. R. 51(b).  Limiting our review to the potential issues identified in counselʹs supporting

brief, see United States v. Cano‐Rodriquez, 552 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2009), we grant counselʹs

motion and dismiss the appeal.

In his Anders submission, counsel addresses only potential challenges to Said’s

prison term.  First, he considers challenging the district court’s calculation of Said’s

guidelines range.  Even after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we will reverse if

the district court made a nonharmless error in calculating the guidelines range.  See United

States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 666‐67 (7th Cir. 2009).  The court began its calculation by

grouping the two offenses of conviction and using the offense level for the money

laundering count because it is higher.  See U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.2(d), 3D1.3(b).  That is, the court

began with a base offense level of 7, see id. §§ 2S1.1(a)(1), 2B1.1(a)(1), to which it added 18

levels for the $3.7 million loss attributable to Said, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J).  Next, the court

added 4 levels because the offense “substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness” of

the bank, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(B)(i), as well as another level because Said engaged in money

laundering, see id. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(A).  Finally, the court subtracted 3 levels for acceptance of

responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, for an adjusted offense level of 27.  With a criminal history

score of IV, Saidʹs guidelines range was 100 to 125 months. See id. ch. 5, pt. A.

Said’s only objection to the calculation of his guidelines range was that he should

not have gotten the four‐level increase for substantially jeopardizing the safety and

soundness of the bank. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(B)(i).  (This provision was numbered

2B1.1(b)(13)(B)(i) at the time, but its substance has not changed.)  The government

presented the testimony of a federal bank examiner involved in the audit who explained

that Said had been allowed to borrow more than 12 times the amount that a single

customer may legally borrow and that Said’s defaulted loans accounted for 15% of the bad

assets on the bank’s books.  In the bank examiner’s opinion, Said had substantially

jeopardized the safety and soundness of the bank.  Said argued that he should not get the

four‐level increase because the safety and soundness of the bank would have been in

jeopardy even if he had not been involved in the scheme and because he could not have

done anything without the help of Hardyman, the bank’s president.  The court sided with

the government.  We review the application of the guidelines de novo, see Abbas, 560 F.3d at

662, but as counsel explains, there was no error.  That others also contributed to the bank’s

insolvency is beside the point; the bank examiner’s testimony provides ample support for

the district court’s ruling.  See United States v. Frith, 461 F.3d 914, 918 (7th Cir. 2006); United
No. 08‐3720 Page 3

States v. Young, 413 F.3d 727, 732‐33 (8th Cir. 2005).  Thus, a challenge to the court’s

calculation of the range would be frivolous.

Next, counsel considers arguing that the district court did not properly consider the

factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and as a result imposed an unreasonable sentence.  At

sentencing Said asked for a below‐guidelines sentence based on his age and serious health

problems, but the court instead imposed the lowest possible within‐guidelines sentence,

100 months.  The court explained that, in light of Said’s history and characteristics, that

sentence was “sufficient and no greater than necessary” to hold him accountable, protect

the community, and achieve parity with the sentences imposed on the other participants in

the scheme.  That was a sufficient evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors.  See United States v.

Woods, 556 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2009).  Moreover, because Said’s prison term is within the

guidelines range, we would afford it a presumption of reasonableness.  See United States v.

Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 714‐15 (7th Cir. 2009).  Thus, any argument about the reasonableness

of Said’s sentence would be frivolous.

Accordingly, counselʹs motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is

DISMISSED.