UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

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No. ACM S32714

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UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Lonnie E. SANDERS III

Airman Basic (E-1), U.S. Air Force, Appellant

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Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary

Decided 30 November 2022

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Military Judge: Colin P. Eichenberger.

Sentence: Sentence adjudged on 10 June 2021 by SpCM convened at 

Royal Air Force Mildenhall, United Kingdom. Sentence entered by military judge on 27 July 2021: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 5 

months, forfeiture of $1,190.00 pay per month for 6 months, and a reprimand.

For Appellant: Major Theresa L. Hilton, USAF.

For Appellee: Major Lecia E. Wright, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.

Before KEY, ANNEXSTAD, and GRUEN, Appellate Military Judges.

Judge GRUEN delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior Judge

Key and Judge ANNEXSTAD joined.

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This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as 

precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4. 

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GRUEN, Judge:

A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted Appellant, consistent with his pleas, of one specification of assault consummated by battery,

(Charge I), in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice 
United States v. Sanders, No. ACM S32714

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(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 928, and one specification of failure to obey a lawful order 

(Charge II), in violation of Article 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892.

1 The military 

judge sentenced Appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for five 

months, forfeiture of $1,190.00 pay per month for six months, and a reprimand.

Appellant has raised one issue: whether his sentence is inappropriately severe. We find it is not and that there is no error materially prejudicial to a 

substantial right of Appellant, and we affirm the findings and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant’s conviction for assault consummated by battery arose from his

getting into bed with SP, a fellow Airman, and touching her between her legs

with his hand while she was sleeping. For this conduct, Appellant was issued 

an order to remain 500 feet away from SP’s residence, a room in the on-base 

dorms, which he violated resulting in his failure to obey a lawful order conviction.

Appellant enlisted in the United States Air Force on 7 January 2020. In the 

fall of 2020, he was stationed at Royal Air Force (RAF) Mildenhall, United 

Kingdom, where he met SP. Appellant became romantically interested in SP, 

while she denied having any reciprocal interest in Appellant. It was stipulated 

by the parties that the two “were close friends and went out together more than 

once.” On 23 October 2020, SP invited Appellant to her dorm room where they 

watched a movie, laid together on her bed under the covers, and “ma[d]e out” 

before SP fell asleep. Appellant stated in his Care2 inquiry that he too fell 

asleep under the covers on SP’s bed and believed they had both slept “a couple 

of hours” before he awoke. Upon awaking, he could see that SP was still sleeping, yet he put his hands down her pants, under her underwear, and touched 

SP “between her butt” which he described as an area “like between her legs.”

Appellant denied touching her vagina. Appellant admitted that nothing in 

their conduct towards or with each other would have led him to believe she 

wanted to be touched while she slept, and he understood that SP could not 

consent to the touching because she was sleeping. 

SP awoke to Appellant touching her. She became upset immediately, confronted Appellant, and then kicked him out of her room. SP reported Appellant’s conduct to her commander, who issued a Military Protective Order

(MPO) to Appellant on 29 October 2020, requiring him to stay at least 500 feet 

away from SP’s residence in the dorms at RAF Mildenhall. The MPO was still 

1 All references to the UCMJ are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 

ed.).

2 United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969).
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in effect on 7 February 2021, when SP saw Appellant in the dayroom of her

dorm building. The dayroom was less than 500 feet from SP’s room. Appellant 

admitted that after receiving the MPO, which he believed was a lawful order, 

he continued to go to the dayroom to play games with his friends.

On 3 May 2021, charges were referred to a general court-martial, which

included, inter alia, a sexual assault charge for “touch[ing] [SP’s] vulva with 

his finger with an intent to gratify his sexual desire without her consent” in

violation of Article 120, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920. On 14 May 2021, Appellant 

entered into a plea agreement whereby, in exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea,

the convening authority agreed, inter alia, to “[w]ithdraw and dismiss the [ ]

charges referred on 3 May 2021,” prefer a charge of assault consummated by 

battery in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, and prefer anew the failure to obey 

a lawful order specification. The convening authority also agreed to refer the 

new charges to a special court-martial, thereby reducing the potential sentence 

Appellant could receive. The maximum allowed punishment based on Appellant’s guilty plea at a special court-martial was a bad-conduct discharge, 12 

months’ confinement, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for 12 months—

or an equivalent fine, and a reprimand.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Law

We review issues of sentence appropriateness de novo. See United States v. 

Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270, 

272 (C.M.A. 1990)). Our authority to review a case for sentence appropriateness “reflects the unique history and attributes of the military justice system, 

[and] includes but is not limited to, considerations of uniformity and evenhandedness of sentencing decisions.” United States v. Sothen, 54 M.J. 294, 296 

(C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted). We may affirm only as much of the sentence as we find correct in law and fact and determine should be approved on 

the basis of the entire record. Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d). “We 

assess sentence appropriateness by considering the particular appellant, the 

nature and seriousness of the offense, the appellant’s record of service, and all 

matters contained in the record of trial.” United States v. Anderson, 67 M.J. 

703, 705 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (citations omitted). Although we have great 

discretion to determine whether a sentence is appropriate, we have no power 

to grant mercy. United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation omitted).

B. Analysis

The maximum punishment Appellant could have received for the crimes 

with which he was convicted was a bad-conduct discharge, 12 months’ 
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confinement, monthly forfeitures of two-thirds pay for 12 months, and a reprimand—which trial counsel argued was an appropriate punishment. The military judge sentenced Appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 

five months, forfeitures of $1,190.00 pay per month for six months, and a reprimand.

Appellant argues the sentence imposed by the military judge was inappropriately severe because he took responsibility for his actions by admitting his 

wrongdoing and pleading guilty to the charged offenses. He further argues that 

his guilty plea “is a significant rehabilitative step that should have weighed in 

his favor.” Additionally, Appellant relies on his presentation of mitigation evidence to support his argument that his sentence was too severe. We do not 

agree that Appellant’s adjudged sentence was inappropriately severe. 

The circumstances surrounding the assault consummated by a battery are 

aggravating. Appellant admitted that he knew SP was not interested in him 

romantically and that “nothing sexual happened prior to her falling asleep that 

could have led the [Appellant] to believe she wanted to be touched after she 

was asleep.” Even so, he made his way into bed with SP; lifted the blankets;

pulled up her pants so that he could access her body, knowing that she was 

asleep and could not consent to his touching her; and proceeded to put his hand

under her clothing touching her on her buttocks and between her legs. 

The circumstances surrounding the violation of a lawful order are also aggravating. Appellant knew, as of 29 October 2020, when he received the MPO

requiring him to stay at least 500 feet away from SP’s dorm, that he was lawfully obligated to obey the order. Appellant understood the order had a valid 

military purpose, specifically “[i]t prevents things from escalating and people 

getting upset.” Still, he made a knowing and conscious decision to go to the 

dayroom in SP’s dorm building on 7 February 2021, so that he could play games 

with his friends. SP saw Appellant and subsequently reported the violation. 

There is no indication that Appellant had any respect for the order, or more 

importantly, the reason behind the order, which was to protect SP from being 

exposed to Appellant given the allegations against him. We have conducted a 

thorough review of Appellant’s entire court-martial record, including Appellant himself, the nature and seriousness of the offenses, Appellant’s record of 

service, and all matters contained in the record of trial. We conclude that the 

nature and seriousness of the offenses support the adjudged sentence. Understanding we have a statutory responsibility to affirm only so much of the sentence that is correct and should be approved, Article 66(d), UCMJ, we conclude 

that the sentence is not inappropriately severe, and we affirm the sentence 

adjudged and as entered by the military judge.
United States v. Sanders, No. ACM S32714

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III. CONCLUSION

The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no 

error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the findings and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court