### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4004- 21
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. E.T

. and R.H., Defendants, and R.E.T., Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________ IN THE MATTER OF L.T

. and K.M., minors.

___________________________

Submitted December 20, 2023

– Decided March 25, 202 4Before Judges Accurso, Gummer and WalcottHenderson.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 4004

- 21 On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FN- 04 -0 181

- 21. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (David A nthony Gies, Designated Counsel, on the briefs ). Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mary L. Harpster, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender , Law Guardian, attorney for minor K.M. (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Neha Gogate, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant R.E.T. appeals from the Family Part's Fe bruary 11, 2022 order , now final, that defendant abused and neglected his then fifteen-year- old stepdaughter Kyra in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c) (3) by engaging in acts of sexual abuse. 1 Because we conclude there is substantial credible e vidence in the record to support the court's finding, we affirm.

1 Consistent with the names used by the parties in their brief s, parties' fictitious names are used here for clarity and confidentiality to protect the anonymity of the children. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).3 A- 4004

- 21 I. In August 2020, when Kyra was fifteen years old, sh e disclosed to her best friend, Ellen, that defendant had been sexually abu sing her since the age of ten. Ellen told Kyra's mother, Elsa, about Kyra's allegations. According to Elsa , she asked Kyra about the allegations the next day and Kyra started cursing and yelling at her. Elsa also stated that she had called Kyra's care management organization (CMO) team to i nform them about what Kyra had said. 2 Kyra's behavioral therapist and psychiatri st went to the home to meet with Elsa and Kyra about the allegations of abuse

. Kyra told them she wanted to hurt herself; they advised Elsa to take h er to the hospital. Kyra' s CMO team referred the matter to the Division . Crawley interviewed Elsa at the hospital. Elsa told him Kyra had an extensive mentalhealth history; specifically, that she had been seeing therapists and had been with a CMO team since the age of nine or ten. Elsa also reported that Kyra had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, anxiety, inte rmittent explosive disorder, post -traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) , oppositional defiant disorder and

2 According to William Crawley, an investigator with New Jersey D ivision of Child Protection and Permanency (Division or DCPP), Elsa indicated Kyra worked with a CMO worker , a behavioral therapist, a psychiatr ist , and a psychologist. Elsa referred to them as Kyra's "CMO team."4 A- 4004

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attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and had been prescribed various medications. She further explained Kyra ha d a history of behavior al problems at home and at school including lying, ste aling , and defiance. After speaking with E lsa , Crawley spoke with Kyra in her hospital room. Kyra stated that she had "told her best friend that her stepfather 'raped her' [two and a half] months ago and it's been happening sinc e [she] was [ten]." Crawley reported Kyra's abuse allegations to the Camden Cou nty Prosecutor's Office - Special Victim's Unit Detective Cody Skinner. The next day, Detective Skinner interviewed Kyra, who disclosed details of the sexual abuse. 3 She elaborated on a n incident of sexual abuse that had occurred about two and a half months prior while El sa and Kyra's younger sister "were at dance [class]" and she was home alone with defendant:

He took my clothes off and told me to take my cloth es off too. His penis was hard. After I took my clot hes off, he had sex with me, and I just laid there. I did not know what to do. After he had sex with me, he would take a shower and take me to Wendy's to eat.
On that occasion, Kyra stated defendant "put his peni s in [her], and it lasted for a few minutes" and that "[n]ormally he w ould finish . . . [o]n [her]

3 A recording of

Detective Skinner's interview was transcribed into the Division's investigation report.5 A- 4004

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back and stomach." She explained to Detective Skin ner she did not "remember exactly" the first time defendant had sexually abus ed her but recalled the abuse had begun when the family, including defendant, liv ed at Kyra's maternal grandmother's home for two to three years. She exp lained that on a different occasion that when she was fourteen-years old, defe ndant had come home after working the night shift, "woke [her] up and . . . t urned [her] over[,] took [her] clothes off and had sex with [her]." She also disclosed that "[h]e made [her] grab his penis and move his hand how he wanted [her ] to move it," but that "he made [her] stop jerking him off when [she] was [ten to thirteen] years old." She stated she believed he had made her have sex with h im "[thirty to forty] times . . ." and "[i]t would he in his room when [h er] mother and sister were not home [and] [h]e used to hit [her] at [fourteen] and [E lsa ] would tell him to stop." She recalled defendant "would slap her in the face . . . [and] [h]e would hit [her] from [twelve to fourteen] years old." Defendant wo uld tell Kyra "not to tell [her] mother [and] [h]e would bribe [her] with mone y when [she] was younger." She explained that the abuse would happen when E lsa and her sister went to dance on "Wednesday[s] and Mondays" but also "when he would come home at night after working the night shift." She also sta ted that "he took a picture of6 A- 4004

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[her] lying there one time when [she] was ten at th e apartment on Central
Ave [nue]" with her clothes off and then "had sex with [her]" after. The Division filed a complaint for abuse and neglect against def endant and E lsa , alleging defendant had sexually abused Kyra and s eeking to assume her custody, care and supervision. Months later, the matter proceeded to a fact-findin g hearing. The Division presented t wo witnesses, Kyra and Stephanie V. Lanese, M.D. , and entered three exhibits into evidence without objection : (1) Crawley's investigation report , (2) Dr. Lanese's curriculum vitae and (3) Dr. Lanese's New Jersey CARES report. 4 Defendant testified and called Kyra's maternal aunt as a witness. The parties also stipulated to the entry of the Division’s investigat ive report, obviating the need for investigator Crawley to testify.
At the hearing , Kyra testified that defendant had begun sexually ab using her when she was about nine or ten years old , when the family lived with her maternal grandmother and that defendant "had been r aping [her] for five years" by the time she finally reported the abuse to Ellen. She also testified that she had disclosed the details of defendant's ongoing se xual abuse to Ellen because

4 CARES is an acronym for Child Abuse Research Educat ion and Service Institute.7 A- 4004

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she believed that her mother and sister would be go ing o ut that same evening, leaving her at home alone with defendant. Accordin g to Kyra, as she had done many times in the past, she asked Ellen to spend th e night at her home and when Ellen did not initially agree to sleep over, she co nfided the details of defendant's ongoing sexual abuse. Kyra testified she had told Ellen about the abuse because "she felt very comfortable with her" and that after she told her what defendant had been doing to her, they both started crying. Kyra testified the abuse would start by defendant a sking her "if [she] wanted to play" and th at she came to learn what "play" meant because defe ndant "would for ce [her] until eventually [she] put two and two toget her." She described the abuse in detail, stating it would typ ically occur when her mother was at work, her mother and younger sister were at dance, or when she was left

at home alone with defendant

. Kyra also recounted that defendant would undress himself and her and "position [her] how he wanted," and "put his penis in [her] vagina," and that she was also "force[d]" to perform oral sex. She stated defendant would stop when someone came home or he would "finish on [her] back . . . or stomach." She also testified defenda nt had told her to keep the abuse8 A- 4004

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a "secret" from her mother. 5 In describing where the abuse took place, Kyra testified defendant would force her to have sex with him usually in the bedroom he shared with her mother, her bedroom, or the basement. Dr. Lanese testified that her initial evaluation of Kyra occurred via telemedicine because of the COVID-19 pandemic proto cols, but that she had examined Kyra in -person the following day. 6 She testified Kyra had told her defendant "would undress her completely, undress hi mself, and position her however he wanted, and put his penis in her vagina and then when he finished, he finished on her back or stomach." Kyra also des cribed feeling "hurt and used but she denied having any physical problems." Dr. Lanese testified Kyra had told her that "some of this interaction started whe n she was ten and had been ongoing for the past five years." When asked about Kyra's "delayed disclosure," Dr. Lanese explained it was "quite common" for chil dren to delay report ing sexual abuse for "multiple reasons" and further exp lained that:

most children tell me they were scared to tell. Th ey were afraid of what would happen once they told, th e consequences of telling. A lot of children are afr aid they're going to get in trouble, especially when th ey're

5 E lsa denies knowing about the abuse, and nothing in the record suggests that Kyra had told her mother about the abuse prior to h er disclosure to Ellen.

6 At the start of the hearing, all parties stipulated to Dr. Lanese's qualification as an expert in pediatrics and child abuse.9 A- 4004

- 21 younger because they feel like they participated in the act and that they hold some of the blame. Some of them have been threatened. So some children don't want to tell until they feel like they're safe.

. . . Sometimes, they just won't think they're going to b e believed and sometimes they're just so ashamed of w hat happened to them that they don't want to tell anyon e. When asked to address Kyra's behavioral issues , Dr. Lanese explained that children often do not know how to describe or under stand what happened to them, and this uncertainty can manifest as aggressi on, anxiety, and anger. She reiterated that a child’s reaction to the trauma can present similarl y to ADHD and may be misdiagnosed

. On cross examination, d efen se counsel challenged her diagnostic assessment based on the fact that Kyra had not allo w ed an examination of her genitalia

. Dr. Lanese responded that a genital exam would not necessarily provide any physical evidence of abuse because bodi es accommodate sexual acts and injuries, if they occur, can heal. She further explained the lack of physical evidence was not dispositive because Kyra had provided an extensive history of her abuse and it was not uncommon for doctors to ma ke diagnoses based on history alone without any physical findings. Dr. L anese used the example of a10 A- 4004

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patient who complains of a headache and a doctor's diagnosis thereof to illustrate that no physical evidence is necessary in some case s. In his testimony, defendant denied all allegations of abuse. He testified that he had been in Kyra's life since she was three years old and that Kyra started calling him "daddy" about a year after he and E lsa had been together. Despite acknowledging that Kyra was an excellent student an d was involved in several extracurricular activities, defendant focused on Ky ra' s behavioral issues that he said had begun in preschool and escalated as she got older

. He testified that when she was about eight-years old, Kyra's behavior was so concerning that he and E lsa sought out family services from CMO. He also testified that Kyra had begun misbehaving more freq uently during the summer of 2020

— when Kyra was fifteen

— which he attributed to his belief that she was no longer taking her medications. Defendant further testified that around August 2020 , he and Elsa had taken away Kyra's phone and revoked her social-media priv ileges as punishment for her poor behavior

. He discussed gaining access to her cell phone and finding Kyra had posted videos and naked pictures of hersel f and was talking about multiple sex partners on social media. Defendant m aintains that Kyra made up11 A- 4004

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the allegations of sexual abuse against him as retribu tion for punishing her for her behavior, including taking away her phone. At the close of the hearing, the judge rendered a d ecision from the bench, finding the Division had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Kyra was an abused and neglected child pursuant to N.J.S .A. 9:6- 8.21(c)(3) because defendant had sexually abused her. Regarding Dr. Lanese's testimony, the judge recounted the details of the abuse as described in Dr. Lanese's report and concluded Dr. Lanese’s testimony was consistent wit h her report and helpful in understanding Kyra's overall behavioral issues and her delay in disclosing the abuse. The judge acknowledged the case turned on the credi bility of the witnesses

— Kyra and defendant

— given their divergent testimony, stating:

I think overall what I’m gathering from the defense ’s standpoint is the defense would have this [c]ourt believe that [Kyra] is not telling the truth and that she’s making up these allegations as retaliation against her parents for punishing her or taking her phone away or as another way of her acting out of her mental heal th disorders such as her Oppositional Defiance Disorde r, bipolar, anxiety, ADHD[.] However, the judge did not believe Kyra had lied ab out the abuse "because she was mad at her parents for taking away her phone or that she wanted to live with her grandparents ."12 A- 4004

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The judge also addressed Ky ra's diagnosed mental-health disorders and noted that based on the testimony and evidence, the re was no dispute Kyra had had emotional and behavioral issues through out most of her life for which she had received various forms of treatment. The judge found Kyra had testified credibly, stating:

In my opinion, it makes sense based upon Dr. Lanese ’s testimony that [Kyra] did delay this disclosure. I t makes sense that she told her best friend because according to [Kyra] she knew that [Ellen] would tel l [Kyra's mother], and she admitted that she and her mother had a rocky relationship in the summer of 2020 and so [Kyra] most likely knew that her mother wouldn’t believe her. And [Kyra] was right, her mo ther did not believe her. And her grandmother did not believe her at first. . . so I find [Kyra's] testim ony to be credible. Although she had somewhat of a flat affe ct, she answered all questions directly on direct as we ll as cross-examination. I find that her demeanor based upon my observations [was] the same on direct as we ll as on cross. I think she was appropriately upset w hen she was answering questions about what was found by her parents on her phone in August of 2020. In contrast, the judge did not find defendant's argu ments and explanations credible or believable. She found "a distinct diff erence in his demeanor on cross-examination than on direct examination" and t hat his testimony "actually corroborate[d] some of [Kyra's] testimony with resp ect to overnight s and [her] new friendship [with Ellen.]" The judge also opine d that some of defendant's13 A- 4004

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behavior "seemed a little bit odd" and found defend ant combative when he testified about the Division's investigator "pester ing [him]." She also stated his combative demeanor on cross-examination "led [her] to believe that he was not telling the truth."
On February 11, 2022, the judge entered an order in wh ich she found, by a preponderance of the evidence, R.E.T. had abused and neglected Kyra pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8. 21 (c)

. In a July 15, 2022 order, the judge terminat ed the litigation, awarded joint legal custody of Kyra to Elsa and Kyra's father and physical custody of Kyra to her father and barred d efendant from having contact with Kyra. Defendant raises the following issues for our consider ation in this appeal.
POINT I

THE FAMILY COURT JUDGE’S SINGULAR FOCUS ON THE DCPP EXPERT’S OPINION REGARDI NG THE CHILD’S DELAYED DISCLOSURE IMPROPERLY INFLUENCED THE COURT’S EVALUATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE. POINT II THE DCCP EXPERT'S DIAGNOSIS WAS A "NET

OPINION" BECAUSE SHE DID NOT EXPLAIN HOW SHE DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN TRAUMA AND A MENTAL HEALTH DISORDER. (Not Raised14 A- 4004

- 21 Below) POINT III [DEFENDANT'S] TRIAL ATTORNEY RENDER ED

A CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE AS LEGAL COUNSEL WHERE HE DID NOT OBJECT TO THE DCPP EXPERT'S NET OPINION. (Not Raised Below)
II. Review of a family court's findings of fact is limi ted. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.Y.A., 400 N.J. Super. 77, 89 ( App. Div. 2008). The reviewing court must determine whether the findings are supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Ibid. Deference is afforded to a trial court's credibility determinations because the trial court had the ability to observe the demeanor, tone, and physical actions of all the wit nesses during the hearing. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J . 261, 279, 293 (2007) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). The fa ctual findings will not be disturbed unless the findings go "'so wide of th e mark that a mistake must have been made.'" Ibid. (quoting Pioneer Nat'l Tit le Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 155 N.J. Super. 332, 338 (App Div. 1978)). Under Title Nine , an "abused or neglected child" means a child less than eighteen years of age whose parent or guardian:15 A- 4004

- 21 (1) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such ch ild physical injury by other than accidental means whic h causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or s erious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairme nt of physical or emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ; (2) creates or allows to be created a substantial or on going risk of physical injury to such child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause dea th or serious or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ; (3) commits or allows to be committed an act of sexual abuse against the chi ld; (4) or a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent dange r of becoming impaired as the result of the failure o f his parent or guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a minimum degree of care (b) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court. [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).] The Division must prove abuse or neglect of a child by a prepond erance of the evidence. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b). Prima faci e evidence that a child has been abused or neglected includes: "proof of injur ies sustained by a child or of the condition of a child of such nature as would or dinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parents or guardian." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(2). Proofs must be evaluated based on the totality of the16 A- 4004

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circumstances "because the evidence can be synergis tically related." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R. , 205 N.J. 17, 39 (2011). Ordinarily, a child's out- of -court statements "relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence; p rovided, however, that no such statement, if uncorroborated, shall be suffici ent to make a fact-finding of abuse or neglect." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). Corro boration requires "direct or circumstantial evidence beyond the child's statemen t itself." Critically, however, i n New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanenc y v. Y.A., we held "the corroboration requirement of the statute does not apply where the child vi ctim testifies to the abuse at a fact-finding hearing." 43 7 N.J. Super. 541, 542 (App. Div. 2013). Defendant argu es the judge erred by relying on Kyra's "material inconsistencies between her Zoom testimony and DCPP 's investigation summary" and asserts "Dr. Lanese's written report d id not corroborate the teenager's testimony either." He also contends Kyr a fabricat ed the claims of sexual abuse and was motivated by animus and reveng e for discipline defendant had imposed as a consequence for her inappropriate posts on social media

. Alternatively, he suggests the claims are the result of her ongoing psychological issues. In support of these contentions, defendant points to Kyra's psychological17 A- 4004

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and behavioral challenges exhibited throughout her childhood. He maintains that she is not to be believed and argues that the judge's singular focus on the
D ivision's expert's opinion regarding Kyra's delayed disclosur e improperly influenced the court's evaluation of the implicatio ns to be drawn from the totality of the evidence. Defendant further argues the Division' s expert's report constitutes a net opinion because Dr. Lanese did not explain how she distinguished between trauma and a mental-health disorder. Lastly, defend ant claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Dr. Lanese's t estimony and report. The judge issued a comprehensive and thorough opini on finding Kyra's testimony more credible and believable than defenda nt's, stating she found Kyra's live testimony consistent with the Division's inve stigation report and Dr. Lanese's report. She specifically referred to Kyra 's disclosure to her best friend Ellen. The judge also relied on Dr. Lanese’s explanation of why children delay disclosing abuse. On this point, the judge found " it was not unusual for her not to tell these healthcare providers during the five years that this was going on because she did not feel comfortable telling them a nd she was only ten years old when it started."18 A- 4004

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The judge also found "the manner of [Kyra's] disclo sure . . . all ma[de] sense to [her.]" She further acknowledged the poss ibility, based on her review of the evidence and testimony, that "one of t he reasons why she didn’t say anything [was] because she had a bad relationship w ith her mother in particular the summer of 2020," around the time of the disclos ure to her best friend. 7 Contrary to defendant's arguments, the judge considere d Kyra's history of psychological issues when she stated "the defense w ould have this [c]ourt believe that [Kyra] is not telling the truth and th at she's making up these allegations as retaliation against her parents for punishing her or taking her phone away or as another way of her acting out of h er mental health disorders such as her Oppositional Defiance Disorder, bipolar , anxiety, ADHD . . . ." Critically, however, the judge did not find defenda nt's arguments and explanations credible or believable. She fou nd his demeanor during crossexamination was combative, and that his testimony c orroborated Kyra's testimony as to her friendship with Ellen and the o vernight stays.

7 Moreover, the judge's findings were clearly based o n her view of Kyra's testimony detailing the acts of sexual abuse, state ments which did not require corroboration to support a finding of abuse against defendant. See Y.A., 437 N.J. Super. at 542.19 A- 4004

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We a re also persuaded that the judge correctly considered evidence of Kyra's psychological and mental- he alth diagnos es in the context of her findings as to Kyra's behavior given Dr. Lanese's explanation that "it could seem like a child is suffering from mental health issues but it 's really the trauma." We further recognize that because allegations of sexua l abuse involve conduct that is deeply personal and offensive, and generally shroud ed in secrecy

— rarely involving witnesses

— courts are ultimately tasked with deciding the se cases based on the credibility of those directly involved

— the alleged perpetrator and victim. Such was the case here; where Kyra alleged conduct that took place when she was at home alone with defendant or late a t night and for which there were no witnesses. On hearing the evidence , the judge correctly based her decision on the testimony and evidence presented and decided who m to believe based on their testimony

— what made sense, what was believable and observatio ns of each witness's demeanor. M.M., 189 N.J. at 293 . I n doing so, she concluded, based on testimony she found more credible than defendant 's denials, that defendant had sexually abused Kyra. On this basis, w e discern no error in the judge' s findings and opinion . As previously stated, our review of the family court's findings of fact is limited,20 A- 4004

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I.Y.A., 400 N.J. Super. at 89 , and the court's findings will be upheld where the re is adequate, substantial, credible evidence in the record to support those findings. Defendant's alternative theories and his efforts to discredit Kyra's testimony are unavailing as there is a sufficient b asis to uphold the judge's findings based on the detailed testimony presented by Kyra, which the judge found to be credible. The judge "ha[d] the opportu nity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appea r[ed] on the stand; [and had] a feel of the case that can never be realized b y a review of the cold record."
N.J. Div

. of Youth and Fam. Serv s. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). Moreover, as previously stated, we have long recognized "[b]e cause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matter s, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding," and the conclusions that flow logically from those findings of fact. Cesare v. C esare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1 998) . Against this backdrop, we discern no basis to di sturb the judge's decision. Defendant's argument that Dr. Lanese's testimony co nstituted an impermissible net opinion because she failed to exp lain how she distinguished between trauma and a mental-health disorder is unde rmined by the trial record. The net opinion rule "requires that an expert '"giv e the why and wherefore" that21 A- 4004

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supports the opinion, "rather than a mere conclusio n." '" Townsend v. Pierre , 221 N.J. 36, 54 (2015) ( quoting Borough of Saddle River v. 66 E. Allendale,
LLC , 216 N.J. 115, 144 (2013) (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344 , 327 ( 2011 )) )

. "The rule . . . mandates that experts 'be able to identify the factual bases for their conclusions , explain their methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the methodology are reliable.'" Id. at 55 (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 417 (1992)). Our review of Dr. Lanese's report and testimony rev eals the details of her discussion with Kyra regarding the sexual abuse, he r opinion regarding why some victims of assault delay disclosure, and the r ecommendation that Kyra seek a mental-health professional for trauma-based counseling "because she experienced a trauma." As we explained in New Jers ey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. I.B., 441 N.J. Super 5 85 , 589

- 91 (App. Div. 2015), the type of "psychological evidence of emoti onal effects," as discussed by Dr. Lanese, is "routinely admitted in Title Nine cases" and "admissible as substantive evidence to corroborate the child's all egations of abuse ." See N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam

. Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 436 (App. Di v. 2002).22 A- 4004

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Contrary to defendant's claims, Dr. Lanese explicit ly discussed the relationship between trauma from the sexual abuse a nd mental-health disorders and explained "if you have a child who has some men tal health issue to begin with, it [the abuse] can exacerbate those mental he alth issues." And , in response to a question about whether it could seem like a ch ild is suffering from mental health issues but it's really the trauma, Dr. Lanes e responded "[a]ctually yes. We have , several children that it's really PTSD , it's from the trauma, but they present similar to ADHD. So they are hyperactive." Dr. Lanese further discussed her recommendation tha t Kyra see a mentalhealth professional "to evaluate the full extent of her disclosures for her statements" and recommended that they be trauma-bas ed because in her opinion, "she [Kyra] experienced a trauma." Moreover, on cr oss-examination, when asked about Kyra's history of bipolar disorder, Dr. Lanese responded, "I am not negating her history of bipolar disorder." Rather than providing a "mere conclusion," as argued by defendant, Dr. Lanese "ga ve the why and wherefore" supporting her opinion, Townsend , 221 N.J. at 55 (internal quotations omitted), and "offer[ed] objective support [grounded in the e videntiary record] for . . . her opinion s," Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 3 95, 410 (2014) ( quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp., 207 N.J. at 373 ). Thus, Dr. Lanese's opinion23 A- 4004

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did not constitute a net opinion and, thus, was adm issible. Finally, defendant argues trial counsel's performan ce was constitutionally deficient under the standard set forth in Stricklan d v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 -688 (1984), as adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fr itz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). 8 Specifically, he argues trial counsel was ineffecti ve by failing to: challenge Dr. Lanese's written report through a pre trial motion, object to the admission of Dr. Lanese's written report at the fac t-finding hearing, object to her opinion regarding the reasons a child may delay disclosure , and challenge Dr. Lanese's expert opinion testimony through a pos t-trial motion. Defendant's claims against trial counsel are belied by the record, which shows trial counsel's extensive cross-examination of Dr. Lanese as to the basis for her report. Specifically, trial counsel was ab le to elicit testimony whereby

8 The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Strickla nd/Fritz two-part test in parental termination cases to determine whether cou nsel was ineffective. N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam

. Servs. v. B.R., 192 N.J. 301, 308-09 (2007). In B. R. , the Court "direct[ed] that claims of ineffective as sistance in termination cases be raised on direct appeal." 192 N.J. at 311. The Court elaborated that "[i]n many cases, the issue will be resolvable on the app eal record alone" and expounded that "approaching the issue of effective assistance of counsel during the direct appeal process . . . is the most timely and efficient method for resolving that important issue." I d. at 311- 12. The Court Rules have since reflected that in Division appeals "[c]laims of ine ffective assistance of trial counsel shall be raised exclusively on direct appea l of a final judgment or order." R. 5:12

- 7.24 A- 4004

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Dr. Lanese conceded that "she is not negating [Kyra 's] history of bipolar disorder," her report was based on Kyra's statement s, Kyra had refused to submit to a physical exam, and that she had not interview ed defenda nt

. Moreover, we concur with the State's position that trial counsel's decision not to object to the admission of Dr. Lanese's expe rt repor t was not deficient as counsel used the report to cross-examin e Dr. Lanese. Based on this record, defendant fails to show trial counsel's performance fell outside the realm of professionally acceptable performance, and, but for this claimed deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have pre vailed at trial. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 699-700. Affirmed.