SUMMARY

June 16, 2022

2022COA64

No. 20CA0218, People in Interest of J.G. — Juvenile Court —

Delinquency; Constitutional Law — Fourth Amendment —

Searches and Seizures — Searches in School Settings

A juvenile appeals the judgment adjudicating him delinquent 

for possessing a handgun as a second-time juvenile offender and 

possessing a weapon on school grounds. The juvenile contends 

that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress the 

gun because school officials discovered it in the course of an 

unreasonable search of his backpack at school. 

In this case, a division of the court of appeals applies the twopart test established in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 

(1985), to novel facts. The T.L.O. Court laid out a two-part inquiry 

for determining reasonableness. Under T.L.O., a court must first 

determine whether the search was justified at its inception, and 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
then determine whether the search was reasonably related in scope 

to the circumstances that initially justified the interference. Id. 

This case concerns the application of the first part of the inquiry. 

Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student at school 

is “justified at its inception” when a school official has reasonable 

suspicion that a search will turn up evidence that the student has 

violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. The 

division concludes that reasonable suspicion is a sufficient, but not 

necessary, means of justifying a search at its inception under T.L.O. 

The division holds that a search may be justified at its 

inception without reasonable suspicion where the record shows that 

the student had a substantially diminished expectation of privacy in 

his or her person or property. Because the high school here 

implemented a safety plan for the juvenile that included a search 

requirement, the division concludes that J.G. didn’t have a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in his backpack and that the 

search was justified at its inception even without reasonable 

suspicion of other wrongdoing. Accordingly, the division affirms.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA64

Court of Appeals No. 20CA0218

City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 19JD641

Honorable Laurie A. Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of J.G.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI

Opinion by JUDGE WELLING

Fox and Johnson, JJ., concur

Announced June 16, 2022

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Melissa D. Allen, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
1

¶ 1 J.G., a juvenile, appeals the judgment adjudicating him 

delinquent based on findings that he possessed a handgun as a 

second-time juvenile offender, see § 18-12-108.5(1), C.R.S. 2021, 

and possessed a weapon on school grounds, see § 18-12-105.5, 

C.R.S. 2021. He contends that the juvenile court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress the gun because school officials discovered 

it in the course of an unreasonable search of his backpack at 

school. 

¶ 2 This case involves a novel application of an established legal 

test. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985), the 

Supreme Court held that the legality of a search of a student in the 

school context depends “simply on the reasonableness, under all 

the circumstances, of the search.” The T.L.O. Court laid out a twopart inquiry for determining reasonableness. Id. First, a court 

must determine whether the search was justified at its inception. 

Id. Second, a court must determine whether the search was 

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that initially 

justified the interference. Id. This case concerns the application of 

the first part of the inquiry. 
2

¶ 3 Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student at school 

is “justified at its inception” when a school official has reasonable 

suspicion that a search will turn up evidence that the student has 

violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Id. 

at 341-42. We conclude that reasonable suspicion is a sufficient, 

but not necessary, means of justifying a search at its inception. 

¶ 4 A search may be justified at its inception without reasonable 

suspicion where the record shows that the student had a 

substantially diminished expectation of privacy in his or her person 

or property. Because the high school here implemented a Safety 

Plan for J.G. that included a search requirement, J.G. didn’t have a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in his backpack sufficient to trigger 

a warrant requirement. And based on this, we conclude that the 

search was justified at its inception even without reasonable 

suspicion of other wrongdoing. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Overview

¶ 5 J.G. attended a public high school in Denver. In December 

2018, the juvenile court adjudicated J.G. delinquent for two 

offenses: felony menacing and possession of a handgun by a 
3

juvenile. Based on this adjudication, on January 15, 2019, the 

school’s Threat Appraisal Team completed a Preliminary 

Information Gathering Form (PIGF) and a Full Threat Appraisal 

(FTA). 

¶ 6 The Threat Appraisal Team used the FTA to develop an Action 

and Intervention Plan, which we will refer to as J.G.’s “Safety Plan,” 

as that is the nomenclature used before the juvenile court. Officer 

Johnny Avila, the School Resource Officer, participated in creating 

the Safety Plan. J.G.’s mother, J.G.’s guardian ad litem, the Dean 

of Students, and several other school officials also participated. 

¶ 7 In February 2019, J.G. was involved in a motor vehicle theft. 

J.G.’s companion in that incident unlawfully possessed a firearm 

during the theft. Following that incident, J.G. remained in 

detention until April 2019. On April 22, 2019, to support J.G.’s 

transition back to school, the Threat Appraisal Team conducted 

another assessment and amended the Safety Plan. 

¶ 8 School officials conducted the search at issue in this case 

pursuant to the Safety Plan. The parties contest whether the Safety 

Plan justified the search. 
4

B. PIGF, Original Safety Plan, and Amended Safety Plan

¶ 9 The PIGF is the first part of Denver Public Schools’ “Threat 

Response System.” The PIGF consists of six steps that help the 

Threat Appraisal Team complete the FTA, which, once completed, 

became J.G.’s Safety Plan. Step one, titled “Make Sure All Students 

Are Safe,” includes several boxes, only one of which the Threat 

Appraisal Team checked: 

¶ 10 In step six, titled “Determine next steps,” the Threat Appraisal 

Team checked a box indicating that the incident warranted the 

completion of the FTA. 

¶ 11 The FTA consists of eight steps. Step seven of the FTA, titled 

“Develop an Action and Intervention Plan,” contains a chart with 

generic fields on the left and corresponding information specific to 

J.G. on the right. 

¶ 12 On April 22, 2019, after his release from detention following 

the motor vehicle theft incident, the Threat Appraisal Team 

amended J.G.’s Safety Plan. All previous requirements remained in 
5

effect, but the Threat Appraisal Team included additional 

requirements. As amended, the Safety Plan contained the following 

pertinent items excerpted from a larger chart:

. . . .

¶ 13 The juvenile court admitted the PIGF and the Safety Plan into 

evidence at the suppression hearing. Officer Avila also testified that 

the Safety Plan was intended to remain in effect for “the duration of 

[J.G.]’s stay at [the high school].” Officer Avila stated that the 

Safety Plan also prohibited “[J.G.] from being in possession of a 

book bag.” The Safety Plan wasn’t amended after the April 22, 

2019, meeting.

C. J.G.’s Return to School

¶ 14 J.G.’s mother tried to enroll J.G. in a different high school in 

the Denver Public Schools system for the 2019-2020 academic year. 
6

That other school placed J.G. on a waitlist. A requirement of J.G.’s 

probation, however, was enrollment in high school. Thus, as the 

new academic year approached, J.G.’s mother hastily arranged for 

him to return to the same public high school he had attended the 

prior year. 

¶ 15 On Wednesday, August 21, 2019, the week before the 2019-

2020 academic year started, J.G.’s mother went to the school to 

arrange his re-enrollment. One of the school’s counselors told 

J.G.’s mother that he could only start attending school once they 

had made a schedule for him. On the same day, J.G.’s mother also 

spoke to William Thompson, the Dean of Students at the high 

school. J.G.’s mother testified at the suppression hearing that Mr. 

Thompson told her that “he didn’t think that [J.G.] would need a 

safety plan this year.” Mr. Thompson, however, didn’t testify at the 

suppression hearing. 

¶ 16 On Monday, August 26, 2019, the first day of the new school 

year, Joe Naughton, a counselor at the high school, emailed J.G.’s 

mother confirming that J.G.’s schedule had been created and that 

he could return to school for the 2019-2020 academic year. J.G. 

returned to school the next day. 
7

D. The Search

¶ 17 On the morning of August 29, 2019, J.G.’s third day back at 

school for the fall semester, Mr. Thompson attempted to call J.G.’s 

mother; but she was at work and didn’t answer. Mr. Thompson 

then left a message for her indicating that he would be speaking 

with J.G. and that he needed to go over a few things with both of 

them. 

¶ 18 Later that day, Mr. Thompson and campus security officers 

notified Officer Avila that they needed his assistance with J.G. in 

the gym. They informed Officer Avila that J.G. wasn’t complying 

with a request to search his backpack. Officer Avila testified that 

Mr. Thompson and campus security officers initiated the attempted 

search pursuant to the requirements of the Safety Plan, not 

because J.G. had acted in a manner causing reasonable suspicion 

to warrant the search. 

¶ 19 Officer Avila responded, and he and the school officials walked 

J.G. to a hall where fewer observers were present. Officer Avila and 

Mr. Thompson continued to tell J.G. that he needed to comply with 

the search, as he always had before. J.G. then tried to sidestep all 

the officials and leave the building while holding the backpack. By 
8

this point, J.G. was acting aggressively. Officer Avila held J.G.’s 

arms and escorted him to the security office. 

¶ 20 Officer Avila, Mr. Thompson, and the security officers placed 

J.G. in a private security room and told him that they were going to 

search him. J.G. responded that he would comply with a search of 

his person, but not to a search of his backpack. Officer Avila then 

restrained J.G. while one of the security officers removed J.G.’s 

backpack and completed the search. 

¶ 21 The campus security officer opened the main compartment of 

J.G.’s backpack and found a fully loaded handgun. Officer Avila 

immediately arrested J.G., placed him in handcuffs, and completed 

a thorough search of his person. Later the same day, Mr. 

Thompson sent J.G.’s mother a suspension notice. 

E. Suppression Hearing

¶ 22 At the suppression hearing, J.G. argued that the handgun 

should be suppressed because (1) he was seized and searched 

without reasonable suspicion; (2) the Safety Plan didn’t constitute 

consent to a search; and (3) even if the Safety Plan could be 

interpreted as consent, it was no longer in place at the time of the 

search on August 29, 2019. 
9

¶ 23 The juvenile court denied J.G.’s motion. The matter proceeded 

directly to trial and the court adjudicated J.G. delinquent for 

(1) possessing a handgun as a second-time juvenile offender and 

(2) possessing a weapon on school grounds. J.G. appeals the 

court’s denial of his suppression motion. 

II. Analysis

¶ 24 J.G. contends that the juvenile court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶ 25 The review of a suppression order presents us with a mixed 

question of law and fact. People v. Brown, 2019 CO 63, ¶ 8. We 

accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

competent evidence, but we review its application of the law to 

those facts de novo. Id. Likewise, the interpretation of written 

documents presents a question of law subject to de novo review. 

Collins v. Colo. Mountain Coll., 56 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Colo. App. 

2002). 

¶ 26 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 

seizures. People v. Bailey, 2018 CO 84, ¶ 18. This prohibition 

safeguards individuals’ privacy and security against arbitrary 
10

intrusion by government officials, People v. Coke, 2020 CO 28, ¶ 33, 

and it extends to searches of students by public school officials, 

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333. 

¶ 27 Ordinarily, a warrantless search must be supported by 

probable cause to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. 

Id. at 340. This standard, however, is relaxed in the school setting 

to accommodate “the substantial need of teachers and 

administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.” Id. at 

341. Accordingly, the warrant requirement is not suited for the 

school environment and is generally not applicable to searches of 

school children. People in Interest of P.E.A., 754 P.2d 382, 387 

(Colo. 1988). We therefore evaluate the legality of school searches 

under the less stringent reasonableness standard established by 

the Supreme Court in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42. 

¶ 28 To determine reasonableness, the need to search must be 

balanced against the invasion that the search entails. P.E.A., 754 

P.2d at 387. Reasonableness must be assessed “under all the 

circumstances” of a search. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. This 

determination involves a two-part inquiry. A school search is 

reasonable if it is (1) justified at its inception and (2) conducted in a 
11

manner “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 

justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (quoting Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)); P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 388. 

B. Application

¶ 29 J.G. argues that the search that revealed the gun was illegal 

because school officials and Officer Avila didn’t have reasonable 

suspicion to search his backpack. J.G. highlights that students 

have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bags that they bring 

onto school grounds. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 326. J.G. further 

asserts that he didn’t do anything to provoke the search, as there 

were no reports that he’d engaged in suspicious behavior on August 

29, 2019. 

¶ 30 On appeal, J.G. makes several contentions related to the 

Safety Plan. First, J.G. argues that the Safety Plan didn’t prohibit 

him from carrying a backpack on school grounds. Second, J.G. 

asserts that even if the Safety Plan included such a prohibition, it 

had expired after the 2018-2019 school year and wasn’t in effect at 

the time of the search. More fundamentally, J.G. argues that the 

Safety Plan couldn’t provide reasonable suspicion because it was 

only based on his history of prior offenses. Accordingly, J.G. 
12

contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his suppression 

motion. We disagree. 

¶ 31 At issue here is the first prong of the T.L.O. standard —

namely, whether the search of the backpack, based on the Safety 

Plan, was justified at its inception. The T.L.O. Court explained that, 

“[u]nder ordinary circumstances,” the search of a student’s property 

is justified at its inception if there are “reasonable grounds for 

suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student 

has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” 

469 U.S. at 341-42 (emphasis added); see also People in Interest of 

C.C-S., 2021 COA 127, ¶ 19. Reasonable suspicion is a sufficient, 

but not necessary, justification of a search at its inception. 

¶ 32 The ultimate inquiry rests on a determination of 

“reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” Id. at 

341. Therefore, whether J.G.’s Safety Plan was still in effect for the 

2019-2020 school year is determinative. If the Plan was in effect, 

then J.G. had a substantially diminished expectation of privacy in a

backpack that his Safety Plan prohibited, and that was nonetheless 

subject to search. For the following reasons, we conclude the 

Safety Plan was in effect and the search was reasonable.
13

1. The Safety Plan Subjected J.G. and His Backpack to Search

¶ 33 J.G. contends that the Safety Plan didn’t prohibit him from 

bringing a backpack to school. J.G. maintains that the only 

mention of a backpack restriction is a single checked box in step 

one of the PIGF. J.G. highlights that the PIGF was only a shortterm response to an emergent situation. J.G. argues that the Safety 

Plan was the only document with ongoing effect and it didn’t 

include a backpack prohibition. 

¶ 34 Rejecting J.G.’s contentions, the juvenile court found that the 

Safety Plan prohibited J.G. from bringing a backpack to school. 

We, however, conclude that the Safety Plan’s search requirement is 

the controlling factor in this inquiry. 

¶ 35 Under the Safety Plan, next to the box concerning “[b]ackpack, 

coat, and other belongings,” there is individualized text relating to 

J.G. that reads: “Student will not have a locker and would need to 

be searched daily,” and “[s]tudent will be able to leave materials in 

classes. Student is not anticipated to have homework.” This same 

page of the Safety Plan also describes the level of supervision to

which J.G. was to be subjected, and by whom the supervision

would be conducted: “Student will need to be searched everyday by 
14

admin and security. Student will need [to] report to the [Campus 

Security Officer’s] office.” 

¶ 36 The following text was added to the Safety Plan on April 22, 

2019: “Maintain prior level of supervision: student will stay on 

campus during lunch and will do another check-in with the main 

office to monitor his attendance following the lunch period. If 

student leaves or is unaccounted for, another search will clear.”

¶ 37 We acknowledge that the PIGF isn’t part of the Safety Plan. 

Nonetheless, even if we were to agree with J.G. that the explicit 

prohibition of the backpack in the PIGF wasn’t intended to be 

permanent, this detail isn’t dispositive. This fact must be placed in 

its proper context: a consideration of all the circumstances of the 

search as part of a reasonableness analysis. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 

341. 

¶ 38 Importantly, the Safety Plan limited the items that J.G. could

bring onto campus and carry between classes; the school ensured 

he could leave materials in classes and further limited his need to 

carry items between classes by not assigning him homework. The 

Safety Plan further prohibited J.G. from having a locker, thereby 

denying him access to areas where he could stow any property in a 
15

manner or place that shielded it from school officials’ view. These 

requirements were enforced through constant check-ins and 

routine searches. 

¶ 39 Officer Avila — who was present when the Safety Plan was 

developed — testified that the Plan was “very strict” and included a 

backpack prohibition. Officer Avila further testified that J.G. had 

complied with the Safety Plan until the incident on August 29, 

2019. We needn’t, however, decide whether the Safety Plan 

prohibited J.G. from bringing a backpack to campus. 

¶ 40 Rather, we conclude that regardless of whether the Safety Plan 

included a backpack prohibition, it unequivocally contained a 

search requirement. Further, the only reasonable interpretation of 

the Safety Plan is that the mandatory searches were intended to 

encompass J.G.’s person and anything he brought to campus, 

including a bag. Therefore, J.G. didn’t have a legitimate expectation

of privacy in his backpack. 

2. The Safety Plan Was in Place for the 2019-2020 School Year

¶ 41 Next, J.G. argues that even if the Safety Plan prohibited him 

from bringing a bag and subjected him to being searched, it wasn’t 

in effect at the time of the search. Thus, J.G. contends that 
16

because he had done nothing else to provoke the search, it wasn’t 

justified at its inception. We aren’t persuaded.

a. The Safety Plan Didn’t Expire

¶ 42 First, J.G. asserts that there was no evidence that he had been 

told that he was subject to the Safety Plan during the 2019-2020 

school year. Rather, J.G. contends that Mr. Thompson told his 

mother that a Safety Plan would likely not be necessary for the new 

school year. Moreover, J.G. emphasizes that the school never held 

a re-entry meeting to advise J.G. that he remained on a Safety Plan. 

¶ 43 At the suppression hearing, Officer Avila testified that the 

Safety Plan was effective “for the duration of [J.G.’s] stay at [the 

high school].” Officer Avila testified that he was present for all of 

the meetings related to the creation and amendment of J.G.’s Safety 

Plan. Officer Avila reiterated that the Safety Plan was a “standing 

order,” such that no new threat assessment was required for the 

2019-2020 academic year. Officer Avila confirmed that the Safety 

Plan wasn’t amended after the April 22, 2019, meeting. 

¶ 44 Relatedly, J.G.’s mother testified that she had signed the 

Safety Plan and was aware of the procedures required to amend it. 
17

She further testified that she hadn’t attended any meetings to 

amend the Safety Plan. 

¶ 45 Although J.G.’s mother also testified that Mr. Thompson had 

told her that “he didn’t think that [J.G.] would need a Safety Plan 

for the [2019-2020] year,” Mr. Thompson didn’t testify at the 

suppression hearing. Therefore, the juvenile court considered 

J.G.’s mother’s testimony of Mr. Thompson’s purported remark as a 

hearsay statement for the limited purpose of what J.G.’s mother 

believed. The juvenile court noted that nothing in the record 

suggests that J.G.’s mother communicated this statement to J.G. 

¶ 46 We note that the Safety Plan doesn’t specify a timeframe and 

that it also doesn’t include an expiration date. Thus, we construe 

the Safety Plan as remaining effective as long as J.G. attended the 

same high school. This is consistent with the indefinite nature of 

other documents, such as J.G.’s 504 Plan,1 which were intended to 

remain in effect for the duration of J.G.’s time at the school. 

1 A “504 Plan” is a plan that provides a qualifying student with a 

disability accommodations that enable him or her to participate in 

the educational services and programs provided by the school. 

Such plans are implemented to ensure compliance with Section 504 

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C § 794. See People in 
18

b. Discipline Incident Report

¶ 47 Second, J.G. asserts that the Discipline Incident Report, which 

Mr. Thompson drafted after the search, confirms that the Safety 

Plan was in effect for the 2018-2019 academic year, but not at the 

time of the search. J.G. highlights that Mr. Thompson stated that 

J.G. “had been” on the Safety Plan “during the 18-19 school year,” 

but it was only on the day of the search that “the decision was 

made that [J.G.] should remain on the safety plan.” We aren’t 

persuaded. 

¶ 48 It’s true that considerable uncertainty surrounded J.G.’s 

return to school for the 2019-2020 academic year. Mr. Naughton 

created the schedule that permitted J.G. to return to school and 

informed J.G.’s mother once it was completed. J.G. returned to 

school on Tuesday, August 27, 2019. The juvenile court 

acknowledged, however, that “[n]obody was really on notice.” 

Indeed, the Discipline Incident Report shows that Mr. Thompson 

believed that J.G. had started school on Wednesday, August 28, 

2019. Further, the juvenile court emphasized an apparent lack of 

Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶¶ 17-18 (discussing Section 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act).
19

communication between Mr. Naughton and Mr. Thompson, 

commenting that Mr. Naughton may not even have known about 

the Safety Plan. 

¶ 49 Before returning to school, J.G. was supposed to attend a reentry meeting. At this meeting, school officials would clarify that 

the Safety Plan was still in place. It appears that due to the 

uncertainty surrounding J.G.’s start-date, no re-entry meeting was 

held. Accordingly, the school officials’ failure to hold a re-entry 

meeting isn’t dispositive. 

¶ 50 Moreover, we disagree with J.G.’s construction of the 

Discipline Incident Report. Nothing in the document shows that 

the Safety Plan had expired. It’s true that J.G. “had been” on the 

Safety Plan for the 2018-2019 school year. The Safety Plan, 

however, is, as discussed above, an ongoing document that could 

only be changed pursuant to certain procedures. School officials 

never initiated the procedures required to amend or discontinue the 

Safety Plan. Therefore, we don’t ascribe significance to Mr. 

Thompson’s use of the past tense in the Discipline Incident Report.

¶ 51 Further, we aren’t persuaded that Mr. Thompson’s statement 

that J.G. would “remain” on the Safety Plan indicates that the Plan 
20

expired. On the contrary, a plain meaning interpretation supports 

the juvenile court’s finding that the Safety Plan continued to apply 

to J.G. as it had previously. See Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary 1919 (2002) (defining “remain” as “to continue 

unchanged in form, condition, status, or quantity”). When school 

officials became aware that J.G. had returned for the 2019-2020 

academic year, they decided it shouldn’t be amended but that it 

would stay in place. 

¶ 52 Thus, any failure to enforce J.G.’s Safety Plan during the first 

few days of the 2019-2020 academic year can’t be reasonably 

construed as a lapse in the effectiveness of the Safety Plan itself. 

Likewise, any lack of enforcement due to oversight isn’t dispositive 

in our consideration of the reasonableness of the search under all 

the circumstances.

¶ 53 In sum, J.G.’s history of firearm offenses properly informed the 

content and restrictiveness of the Safety Plan. We note that J.G. 

had complied with the Safety Plan for months and was aware of its 

requirements. Based on the foregoing, and the seriousness of the 

threat posed by gun possession on school grounds, we conclude 

that the juvenile court properly determined that compliance with 
21

the Safety Plan was a condition of J.G.’s attendance at the same 

high school. Accordingly, we conclude that the Safety Plan was still 

in effect at the time of the search.

3. The Search Was Reasonable Under All the Circumstances

¶ 54 Finally, J.G. argues that the Safety Plan was insufficient to 

provide school officials with reasonable suspicion to justify the 

search at its inception. J.G. contends that school officials had no 

reason on August 29, 2019, to believe that he was violating any law 

or rule, or that he was acting in a manner justifying the search. 

Therefore, J.G. maintains that the only reason for the school 

officials’ perceived need to search him was his history of prior 

offenses. J.G. insists that such a history can’t provide reasonable 

suspicion for a search. 

¶ 55 We disagree with J.G.’s contentions and hold that the school 

officials’ search satisfied both prongs of the T.L.O. standard. 

a. The Safety Plan Justified the Search at its Inception

¶ 56 J.G. relies on federal and Colorado authority arising from 

investigatory stop jurisprudence outside of the school context to 

contend that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the 

search. See United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1996),
22

cited with approval in Outlaw v. People, 17 P.3d 150, 157-58 (Colo. 

2001). J.G. relies on Davis for the proposition that knowledge of “a 

person’s prior criminal involvement is not, standing alone, sufficient 

to create reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1469. Davis, however, isn’t 

applicable.

¶ 57 In Davis, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there 

were insufficient facts to provide an adequate articulable basis 

justifying an investigatory detention. Id. at 1470. Officers were 

patrolling an area with a history of criminal activity in a marked 

patrol car. At approximately 10 p.m., the officers saw a car with 

four individuals inside it parked in front of a building known to be 

associated with criminal activity. 

¶ 58 As the officers arrived, one of the individuals in the car got out 

of the car, made eye contact with one of the officers, then broke eye 

contact and began walking toward the building with his hands in 

his pockets. The officers recognized the individual as a gang 

member, ex-convict, and seller of narcotics. The officers told the 

individual to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. When he 

continued walking, the officers seized him. The Tenth Circuit Court 
23

of Appeals concluded that the officers’ conduct wasn’t based on “a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” Id. at 1468. 

¶ 59 Unlike the search in Davis, the school officials’ search of J.G. 

occurred in the school context. Fourth Amendment rights are 

different in public schools than elsewhere; the reasonableness 

inquiry can’t disregard the custodial and tutelary nature of publicschool officials’ power over schoolchildren. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 

47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995). Thus, the school 

environment permits “a degree of supervision and control that could 

not be exercised over free adults.” Id. at 655. Accordingly, we 

necessarily review the facts at issue here differently than the court 

reviewed those in Davis. 

¶ 60 This case is distinguishable from Davis by the fact that this 

case concerns gun possession at school. “Allegations of gun 

possession on school campuses are different from traditional 

Fourth Amendment cases.” M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 563, 565 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 2011). It’s widely accepted that these cases are

“unique because of the seriousness of the threat, the location of the 

threat, the vulnerability and number of potential victims, and the 

lessened expectation of privacy of students.” Id. (emphasis added). 
24

¶ 61 Here, the Safety Plan was developed as part of the Denver 

Public Schools’ “Threat Response System.” Officer Avila testified at 

the suppression hearing that the Safety Plan was devised for J.G.’s 

safety, and for the safety of all others at the school. The Threat 

Appraisal Team developed the Safety Plan based on a specific, 

articulable, and objective basis — namely, J.G.’s adjudication of a 

firearm offense. Cf. id. at 567 (The court held that an anonymous 

tip of a student bringing a gun to school three months earlier 

provided school officials with reasonable suspicion to conduct a 

search; “[R]ecent tragedies make it clear that school officials could 

not ignore the possibility that the student could possess a firearm 

on school property. These officials had not only the right, but the 

responsibility, to look further into the threat.”). Thus, the Safety 

Plan represented a legitimate school rule implemented to reduce the 

serious threat posed by J.G. concerning gun possession at his high 

school. 

¶ 62 We’ve concluded that the Safety Plan included a search 

requirement. We’ve also concluded that the Safety Plan was in 

effect at the time of the search. Therefore, we now determine that 
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J.G. didn’t have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his backpack 

while at school. 

¶ 63 Based on the Safety Plan’s explicit search requirement, J.G.’s 

case doesn’t involve the “ordinary circumstances” at play in T.L.O.,

469 U.S. at 341-42. Accordingly, we base our conclusion not on a 

reasonable suspicion inquiry, but rather on the fact that the Safety 

Plan stripped J.G. of a legitimate expectation of privacy in his 

backpack. 

¶ 64 Students’ expectation of privacy is balanced against the 

“substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining 

discipline in the classroom and on school grounds,” and the 

school’s “legitimate need to maintain an environment in which 

learning can take place.” P.E.A., 754 P.2d at 387 (quoting T.L.O., 

469 U.S. at 339-40). Students in the school environment thus have 

a lesser expectation of privacy. Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 

963 P.2d 1095, 1106 (Colo. 1998). 

¶ 65 J.G.’s Safety Plan isn’t a “trivial school regulation or precatory 

guideline for student behavior.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, 

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather, the Safety 

Plan relates to one of the most acute concerns in schools today: 
26

possession of a dangerous weapon. Indeed, “[v]iolent, unlawful, or 

seriously disruptive conduct,” such as gun possession on school 

grounds, “is fundamentally inconsistent with the principal function 

of teaching institutions . . . . When such conduct occurs amidst a 

sizable group of impressionable young people, it creates an 

explosive atmosphere that requires a prompt and effective 

response.” Id. at 376. 

¶ 66 By bringing a backpack to school and refusing to submit to 

the routine searches contemplated by his Safety Plan, J.G. violated 

school rules. Given the protective purpose of J.G.’s active Safety 

Plan, the warrantless search of his backpack was justified at its 

inception. 

¶ 67 Therefore, based on a consideration of all the circumstances, 

school officials’ search of J.G. was justified at its inception.

b. The Search Was Permissible in its Scope

¶ 68 Likewise, the search was permissible in its scope, satisfying 

the second prong of the T.L.O. test. As part of this inquiry, the 

court must determine whether the search, as conducted, “was 

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 

interference in the first place.” Id. at 341 (majority opinion) (quoting 
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Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). A search “will be permissible in its scope 

when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives 

of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and 

sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id. 

¶ 69 Here, school officials attempted to conduct a routine and 

mandatory search of J.G. pursuant to the Safety Plan. J.G.’s 

refusal to submit to the search in the gym area justified Officer 

Avila in escorting J.G. to the security office. Likewise, once in the 

security office, Officer Avila’s restraint of J.G. was reasonably 

related to enabling a search of the backpack as J.G., according to 

the Discipline Incident Report, became belligerent while continuing 

to refuse to submit to the search. Further, the ultimate search, 

which consisted of a campus security officer removing and opening 

J.G.’s bag, wasn’t excessively intrusive. 

¶ 70 In sum, the search conducted by school officials on J.G. was 

reasonable under all the circumstances and therefore legal. 

Further, J.G.’s arguments regarding consent aren’t relevant to the 

facts of this case. We decline to address them. Finally, because we 

conclude that the search was legal, the exclusionary rule doesn’t 

apply. 
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III. Conclusion

¶ 71 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

judgment.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.