THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Richard Ralph and Eugenia Ralph, Appellants, 

v. 

Paul Dennis McLaughlin and Susan Rode McLaughlin, 

Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-000866 

Appeal From Charleston County 

Roger M. Young, Sr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5681 

Heard May 15, 2019 – Filed August 21, 2019 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

G. Dana Sinkler, of Gibbs & Holmes, of Wadmalaw 

Island, and Ainsley Fisher Tillman, of Ford Wallace 

Thomson LLC, of Charleston, both for Appellants. 

George Hamlin O'Kelley, III, of Buist Byars & Taylor, 

LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondents. 

GEATHERS, J.: This case involves a property dispute on Seabrook Island between 

neighbors Richard and Eugenia Ralph ("the Ralphs"), and Paul and Susan 

McLaughlin ("the McLaughlins"). The dispute in question concerns the destruction 

of a drainage easement by the McLaughlins that, the Ralphs allege, exacerbated

drainage issues on the Ralphs' property. At trial, the jury found for the Ralphs on 

their cause of action for trespass and awarded them $1,000 in nominal damages. On

appeal, the Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in 1) failing to apply the rulings and 
 

 

 

 

 

 

factual determinations from a previous grant of summary judgment to a third-party 

defendant as the law of the case; 2) entering a directed verdict for the McLaughlins 

on the issue of punitive damages; 3) failing to find the McLaughlins trespassed as a

matter of law; and 4) failing to grant the Ralphs a new trial absolute, a new trial nisi 

additur, or a new trial on damages. We reverse and remand the case for a new trial 

on compensatory damages and punitive damages. 

FACTS

In 1984, E.M. Seabrook, Jr. prepared and recorded a plat depicting blocks 32 

and 33 of Seabrook Island ("the Seabrook plat"). In 1987, he similarly prepared and

recorded a second plat depicting blocks 32 and 33. To alleviate drainage issues 

concerning several lots on block 32, Seabrook established a twenty-foot-wide 

drainage easement and a corresponding no-build area across the back of lots 21 

through 28, which are reflected in the plats. The plats also reflect a twenty-foot-wide 

drainage easement running between the property lines of lots 21 and 22, extending 

ten feet into each lot. The drainage easements contained a pipe that began at the 

front corner of lot 22, ran down the property line, turned ninety degrees, and

extended across lots 22 through 28 before emptying into a water hazard on the

neighboring golf course.1

In 1997, the Ralphs purchased lot 23 and recorded their deed, which granted 

them the property "with, all and singular, the Rights, Members, Hereditaments and 

Appurtenances to the said Premises belonging, or in anywise incident or 

appertaining." The deed also indicated the property was subject to "the Covenants, 

Conditions, Restrictions, Limitations, Affirmative Obligations and Easements of 

Record . . . ." Similarly, in 1998 or 1999, Carroll and Lorraine Gantz ("the Gantzes")

purchased lot 22 and recorded their deed. The Gantzes' deed indicated lot 22 was 

subject to "a twenty[-]foot (20') easement for drainage and a ten[-]foot (10')

easement for drainage as shown on the [Seabrook plat]," as well as "the area

designated as 'No Build Area' shown on the [Seabrook plat]." 

In 2002, the Gantzes, predecessors in title to the McLaughlins, approached the 

Seabrook Island Property Owners Association ("SIPOA") about eliminating the 

twenty-foot drainage easement and no-build area on the back of lot 22. Thereafter, 

SIPOA unanimously voted to give the easement back to the owners of lot 22. On

September 11, 2002, a new plat prepared by Forsberg Engineering ("the Forsberg

plat") entitled "Plat Showing Abandonment of an Existing 20' Drainage Easement

1

 Lots 23 through 28 are downstream from lot 22. 
 

 

 

 

Lot 22, Block 32," was recorded. The Forsberg plat also indicated the current 

no-build area was to be abandoned. 

In October 2002, the Gantzes conveyed lot 22 to the McLaughlins, and the

deed was recorded. The legal description of the property indicated that it remained 

subject to the ten-foot drainage easement depicted in the Forsberg plat and "all 

Restrictions, Covenants, Easements, Rights-of-Way, Matters and Conditions of 

record affecting said property . . . ." Mr. McLaughlin indicated he never discussed 

the twenty-foot easement with the Gantzes or SIPOA prior to closing, but he 

maintained that the real estate agent asserted the easement had been abandoned.2

Mr. McLaughlin also testified his closing attorney brought the twenty-foot easement 

to his attention before indicating that it had been abandoned, telling him "everything 

was appropriate and in order." 

In 2006, the McLaughlins approached SIPOA's Architectural Review Board 

about building a house on their property. According to the plans, part of the house 

was to be sited over the twenty-foot easement and no-build area. At an August 15, 

2006 SIPOA meeting, the preliminary plans were unanimously approved subject to 

several stipulations.3 Thereafter, the McLaughlins received a letter from the 

administrator of the Architectural Review Board, dated August 18, 2006, stating: 

The Architectural Review Board has approved the 

Preliminary Plans submitted for Block 32 Lot 22, 

Seabrook Island, SC. Please address the following 

comments of the ARB and re-submit plans for Conditional

Review. 

1. Owner is to assume all responsibility for the 

underground drainage line at the 20' drainage 

easement/driveway.[4]

2 However, Mr. McLaughlin conceded that the real estate agent had never shown 

him any documents concerning the abandonment of the easement. 

3 These stipulations are identical to the comments included in the letter from the 

administrator of the Architectural Review Board. See infra. 4 In a later lawsuit, SIPOA indicated it "defined the 'cost necessary to remove the 

easement' to be the cost of re-working the drainage in a manner that maintains the 

existing drainage for other related lots, i.e., the cost of installing alternative drainage

in a manner that will not undermine or adversely affect such existing drainage system 

'downstream.'" Mr. McLaughlin indicated he understood this to mean the
 

 

 

 

 

2. Owner is to assume all responsibility for the 

abandoned drainage easement that may contain a 

pipe. 

3. Property lines must be located prior to any grading 

because of the Right-Of-Way for the SIPOA 20' 

drainage easement. 

In June 2007, the McLaughlins received a letter from SIPOA regarding a plan 

to address the drainage pipe and eliminate the twenty-foot easement. The Ralphs 

received the same letter. After receiving the letter, Mr. Ralph met with John 

Thompson, the executive director of SIPOA, to voice his objections regarding any 

plans to remove the drainage pipe. 

Over the course of the next year, the McLaughlins sought financing for their 

construction, closing on a loan in June 2008. At some point, the McLaughlins 

received a call from the chair of the SIPOA legal committee indicating there were 

some issues concerning the drainage pipe. On September 22, 2008, Thompson sent

an email to the owners of lots 21 through 28 seeking to schedule a meeting 

concerning the easement. The email summarized the dispute surrounding the 

easement5 and indicated the drainage pipe was still functioning. The email further 

indicated that several neighbors objected to the removal of the pipe due to concerns 

over adverse effects it would have on drainage and that SIPOA had hired an

engineer, Robert George, to evaluate the consequences of removing the pipe.6

The meeting between SIPOA, the McLaughlins, and the affected property 

owners was held on September 29, 2008. At the meeting, Mr. George presented his

findings and advised against removing the drainage pipe on lot 22, indicating that 

doing so would increase the likelihood of flooding and exacerbate existing drainage 

problems. Another meeting was held to discuss the issue on October 1, 2008.

Following the meetings, several emails were exchanged between the affected

property owners and the McLaughlins. In these emails, the property owners 

continued to express their concerns about the adverse impact the removal of the pipe 

McLaughlins, "bore the financial responsibility of taking care of removing [the pipe]

if [they] wanted to." 

5 In his email, Thompson indicated SIPOA had voted to give the easement back to 

the property owners, but only two had chosen "to take the formal action to remove 

the easement from the recorded documents at the [c]ounty record[]s office . . . ." 

6 Additionally, the email contained an attached report prepared by Mr. George 

advising against the removal of the drainage pipe on lot 22. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

would have on their properties, and the McLaughlins adamantly denied the existence

of an easement on their lot. After the McLaughlins and their neighbors failed to 

reach an agreement, SIPOA indicated it had exhausted its options. On October 22, 

2008, SIPOA sent a letter to the affected property owners indicating that it had 

rescinded the May 2002 resolution abandoning the easement. 

On December 5, 2008, the McLaughlins emailed the neighboring property 

owners asserting that there was no easement on their property, they had been patient 

with SIPOA, and they would begin construction on their home. On December 9, 

2008, the McLaughlins authorized their construction team to remove the drainage

pipe. On the same day, SIPOA filed a lawsuit against the McLaughlins seeking a 

temporary restraining order to prevent the removal of the pipe.7

 However, SIPOA

withdrew the lawsuit two days later on December 11, 2008.8 Following the removal 

of the pipe, the McLaughlins built part of their home over the no-build area and the 

area formerly containing the pipe. 

On September 30, 2011, the Ralphs filed a complaint9

 against the

McLaughlins seeking actual and punitive damages and alleging the McLaughlins 

caused flooding and poor drainage on the Ralphs' property by destroying the

drainage easement. On December 6, 2011, the McLaughlins filed an answer and a

third-party complaint against SIPOA alleging reliance on representations by SIPOA. 

On February 14, 2014, the Ralphs moved for partial summary judgment on their 

trespass claim. The McLaughlins filed a motion for summary judgment on February 

19, 2014, and, a day later, SIPOA filed a motion for summary judgment. While

these motions were pending, the Ralphs moved to strike the matter from the docket 

pursuant to Rule 40(j) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP),10

and the parties entered into a consent order striking the case from the docket on June 

24, 2014. The Ralphs moved to restore the case to the active docket on May 11, 

7 It is unclear whether the McLaughlins removed the pipe before the filing of the

lawsuit. The lawsuit was filed at 11:40 a.m., and Mr. Ralph testified the pipe was 

removed around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. However, Mr. McLaughlin testified the pipe was

removed before the lawsuit was filed.

8 In his deposition, Thompson indicated the lawsuit was withdrawn as moot because 

the pipe had already been removed. 

9 The Ralphs filed an amended complaint on July 17, 2013, pleading trespass, 

punitive damages, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

10 Pursuant to Rule 40(j), "[a] party may strike its complaint . . . from any docket one 

time as a matter of right, provided that all parties adverse to that claim . . . agree in

writing that it may be stricken . . . ." 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2015, and the case was restored by consent order on June 23, 2015, pursuant to Rule 

40(j), SCRCP.11

After the case was restored, the parties refiled their motions for summary

judgment. On May 11, 2016, the Honorable G. Thomas Cooper, Jr.,

12 heard all three 

motions for summary judgment, denying both the Ralphs' motion and the

McLaughlins' motion. However, Judge Cooper granted SIPOA's motion for 

summary judgment, finding there was no evidence to show SIPOA had made any 

promises to the McLaughlins and, as a matter of law, the McLaughlins could not 

have reasonably relied on SIPOA. 

At trial, the Ralphs presented Howard Yates as an expert in real property. 

Yates indicated that he examined the chains of title for the Ralphs and McLaughlins 

and opined that both properties became subject to the drainage easement after the

properties were first purchased according to the Seabrook Island plat. Yates

explained the lot owners each held a special property interest in the easement. Yates

further testified SIPOA could not unilaterally abandon the easement, indicating 

abandonment would require the consent of everyone who held a special property 

interest. Additionally, while Yates conceded that lot 22 was subject to the Forsberg 

plat, he maintained that it was still subject to the earlier plats as well. Yates further 

testified that determining whether SIPOA had authority to abandon the easement 

would require an attorney to look at the deed and plats and that such a review would

only take twenty to thirty minutes. 

The Ralphs also presented Robert George as an expert in civil engineering,

registered land surveying, and storm-water drainage. George testified that the 

Ralphs' yard is a trough and the original design for Seabrook Island was meant to 

alleviate this issue. George further explained this design was interrupted by the 

McLaughlins' removal of the pipe, leading to increased water flow into the Ralphs' 

yard, increased "ponding,"13 and poor drainage. Additionally, Mrs. Ralph indicated 

the standing water in their yard could reach a depth of eight inches and could take 

several days to drain, whereas the water would typically dissipate within a day and

a half before removal of the pipe. 

11 Pursuant to Rule 40(j), "[u]pon being restored, the case shall be placed on the 

General Docket and proceed from that date as provided in this rule." 

12 While Judge Cooper ruled on the motions for summary judgment, the rest of the

case was before the Honorable Roger M. Young, Sr. 

13 The term "ponding" was used to describe the accumulation of standing water as a

result of poor surface absorption caused by the high water table on Seabrook Island. 
 

 

 

Concerning damages, the Ralphs estimated their house was worth $775,000 

without the backyard ponding issues. After removal of the pipe, both of the Ralphs 

testified that they believed the value of their property had dropped by at least

$200,000. The Ralphs also presented Nick Thompson as an expert in commercial

and residential appraisal. Thompson indicated he had trouble appraising the Ralphs' 

property because he had not been able to find any sales with a similar problem.

According to Thompson, the lack of comparable sales indicated that either the 

Ralphs' drainage problems were unique and a similar situation had never existed

before or property owners with the same problems had not been able to find a buyer. 

Thompson then estimated the Ralphs' property had decreased in value by ten, fifty, 

or sixty percent. Thompson further indicated he believed the Ralphs' property to be 

worth approximately $567,000 before the pipe was removed, opining that the Ralphs 

would be lucky to sell their property for half that price afterwards. Additionally, 

Mrs. Ralph testified that they had paid Mr. George $17,000 in an attempt to alleviate 

the drainage problem, but no solution could be implemented. 

After the Ralphs rested their case, the McLaughlins moved for a directed 

verdict on several issues, including punitive damages. The Ralphs argued Mr. 

McLaughlin's testimony indicated that he acted with reckless disregard for the rights 

of his neighbors.14 The circuit court indicated it did not think punitive damages were

applicable because Mr. McLaughlin believed he had the right to remove the pipe. 

Ultimately, the circuit court found, "I don't think he was acting malevolently, 

certainly not to the level of clear and convincing, so I'll grant their motion for 

punitive damages." 

After this ruling, the Ralphs made two additional arguments in support of 

punitive damages. First, the Ralphs argued that, under South Carolina law, a 

purchaser is imputed with knowledge of all the other deeds in his chain of title and 

the act of digging up the pipe could be construed as willful because the McLaughlins

are presumed to have known the easement ran across their property. The circuit 

court responded, "Well, I got to disagree with you on that. That's language in the 

deed. I doubt there's probably anybody in this room, including all the lawyers, who

read the deed when they bought their piece of property. They had their lawyer read

it, and it's there." Second, the Ralphs argued the conclusion in Judge Cooper's 

unappealed grant of summary judgment—that the McLaughlins could not rely on 

14 Mr. McLaughlin testified he attended the SIPOA meeting where Mr. George 

presented his findings, was aware removing the pipe could have adverse effects on

the downstream lots, and proceeded with construction despite the concerns of his 

neighbors. 
 

 

 

 

any representations by SIPOA—was the law of the case. As such, the Ralphs argued

this conclusion should be binding, and they should be allowed to argue to the jury 

that the removal of the pipe was intentional and punitive damages applied. However, 

the circuit court ruled the grant of summary judgment to SIPOA was not binding on 

the jury. After dismissing these arguments, the circuit court reiterated that it was 

granting the directed verdict on punitive damages. 

The McLaughlins' case centered on the theory that they had justifiably relied 

on SIPOA and the purported abandonment of the easement in removing the pipe. 

The McLaughlins also testified they had observed significant amounts of standing 

water in the Ralphs' yard when visiting their property prior to construction. 

Additionally, Mr. McLaughlin explained that when determining where to site their 

house, SIPOA's Architectural Review Board required the McLaughlins to preserve 

a large oak tree in the middle of their property. As such, the McLaughlins had the 

option to site the house on the front or back side of the oak tree, and they ultimately 

decided to site the house on the back side.15 Mr. McLaughlin further indicated he

removed the pipe because he was frustrated; he had not asked any of his neighbors 

for permission to remove the pipe or begin construction; and following construction, 

he told SIPOA that it could take on the responsibility of providing a solution to the 

Ralphs' drainage problem. 

After the close of the McLaughlins' case, the Ralphs moved for a directed 

verdict on trespass, arguing SIPOA's purported abandonment of the drainage 

easement would not have affected the Ralphs' property rights. The circuit court 

denied the motion, finding the issues of trespass and abandonment were both for the 

jury. After closing arguments, the circuit court charged the jury on, among other 

things, the law of easements, trespass, abandonment, and nominal damages. After 

deliberating for about five hours, the jury indicated it was deadlocked, and the circuit 

court issued an Allen16 charge. After resuming deliberations for a little over an hour, 

the jury returned the following verdict: "We, the jury, find for the plaintiff against 

the defendant in the amount of $1,000 actual nominal[17] damages . . . ." 

On February 3, 2017, the Ralphs moved for, in the alternative, a new trial

absolute, a new trial as to damages, or a new trial nisi additur pursuant to Rule 59, 

SCRCP. In denying the motions for a new trial absolute and a new trial nisi additur, 

15 The drainage easement and no-build area ran along the back side of the property. 

16 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).

17 The verdict form only had a space for actual damages, but the jury wrote in the 

word nominal underneath. 
the circuit court found it was the jury's intention to award nominal damages and that 

such an award was supported by the evidence at trial. Additionally, in denying the 

motion for a new trial as to damages, the circuit court cited the same rationale and 

indicated a new trial as to damages was not warranted because a directed verdict on 

the issue of trespass would not have been proper. This appeal followed. 

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the circuit court err by failing to apply the rulings and factual 

determinations in the previous grant of summary judgment to SIPOA as the 

law of the case? 

2. Did the circuit court err by entering a directed verdict for the McLaughlins on 

the issue of punitive damages? 

3. Did the circuit court err in failing to find the McLaughlins trespassed as a

matter of law? 

4. Did the circuit court err in failing to grant the Ralphs a new trial absolute, a 

new trial nisi additur, or a new trial on damages? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Directed Verdict

"In reviewing [] a motion for directed verdict . . . , the appellate court applies 

the same standard as the circuit court." Hollis v. Stonington Dev., LLC, 394 S.C. 

383, 394, 714 S.E.2d 904, 910 (Ct. App. 2011) (second alteration in original) 

(quoting Mishoe v. QHG of Lake City, Inc., 366 S.C. 195, 200, 621 S.E.2d 363, 366 

(Ct. App. 2005)). As such, "this [c]ourt must view the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion." Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 398 S.C. 90, 99, 727 S.E.2d 407, 411 

(2012). "In essence, we must determine whether a verdict for a party opposing the 

motion would be reasonably possible under the facts as liberally construed in his 

favor." Hurd v. Williamsburg Cty., 353 S.C. 596, 608, 579 S.E.2d 136, 142 (Ct. 

App. 2003). "The appellate court will reverse the [circuit] court's ruling on a 

[directed verdict] motion only when there is no evidence to support the ruling or 

where the ruling is controlled by an error of law." Zinn v. CFI Sales & Mktg., Ltd, 

415 S.C. 93, 108–09, 780 S.E.2d 611, 619 (Ct. App. 2015) (second alteration in 

original) (quoting Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 434–35, 629 S.E.2d 642, 

648 (2006)). 
 

 

 

 

New Trial

"A [circuit court]'s order granting or denying a new trial upon the facts will 

not be disturbed unless [its] decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence[] or the 

conclusion was controlled by an error of law." Curtis v. Blake, 392 S.C. 494, 500, 

709 S.E.2d 79, 82 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Folkens v. Hunt, 300 S.C. 251, 254–55,

387 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990)). "Review by an appellate court of the grant or denial 

of a new trial is 'limited to consideration of whether evidence exists to support the

[circuit] court's order.'" Id. at 505–06, 709 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting Lane v. Gilbert 

Constr. Co., Ltd., 383 S.C. 590, 597, 681 S.E.2d 879, 883 (2009)). "In deciding

whether to assess error to a court's denial of a motion for a new trial, we must

consider the testimony and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party." Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 405, 477 

S.E.2d 715, 723 (Ct. App. 1996); Umhoefer v. Bollinger, 298 S.C. 221, 224, 379 

S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ct. App. 1989). 

New Trial Nisi Additur 

"The denial of a motion for a new trial nisi is within the [circuit court]'s

discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Vinson, 

324 S.C. at 406, 477 S.E.2d at 723. "This [c]ourt has the duty to review the record 

and determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion amounting to an error 

of law." Id. at 406, 477 S.E.2d at 723–24. "We will only reverse if the [circuit court] 

abused [its] discretion in deciding a motion for new trial nisi additur to the extent 

that an error of law results." Green v. Fritz, 356 S.C. 566, 570, 590 S.E.2d 39, 41 

(Ct. App. 2003). "The [circuit court] who heard the evidence and is more familiar 

with the evidentiary atmosphere at trial possesses a better-informed view of the 

damages than this [c]ourt. Accordingly, great deference is given to the [circuit 

court]." Vinson, 324 S.C. at 405–06, 477 S.E.2d at 723 (internal citation omitted). 

"Therefore, on appeal of the denial of a motion for a new trial nisi, this [c]ourt will 

reverse when the verdict is grossly inadequate or excessive requiring the granting of 

a new trial absolute." Id. at 406, 477 S.E.2d at 724. 

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Law of the Case 

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in failing to apply the findings of fact 

and conclusions of law in the grant of summary judgment to SIPOA as the law of

the case. The McLaughlins argue the circuit court properly refused to apply the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in Judge Cooper's summary judgment order 
 

 

 

 

 

 

as the law of the case because there was no ruling in his order applying to the Ralphs 

and McLaughlins; Judge Cooper denied the summary judgment motions of the 

Ralphs and the McLaughlins; and Judge Cooper ruled on the issue of indemnity, not 

trespass or punitive damages. We agree with the Ralphs. 

"An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and requires affirmance."

Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 403 S.C. 560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 

(2013); see also Berry v. McLeod, 328 S.C. 435, 442, 492 S.E.2d 794, 798 (Ct. App. 

1997) ("There is no appeal from this ruling, and thus, it becomes the law of the

case."). "Where no exception is taken to findings of fact or conclusions of law, they 

become the 'law of the case.'" Walters v. Canal Ins. Co., 294 S.C. 150, 151, 363 

S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Ashy v. WeCare Distribs., Inc., 289 S.C. 

526, 528, 347 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ct. App. 1986)). "The law of the case applies both 

to those issues explicitly decided and to those issues [that] were necessarily decided 

in the former case." Ross v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 328 S.C. 51, 62, 492 S.E.2d 62, 68 

(1997). "This State has a long-standing rule that one judge of the same court cannot 

overrule another." Shirley's, 403 S.C. at 573, 743 S.E.2d at 785. 

 In Shirley's, our supreme court found that previous unappealed orders by 

separate judges did not constitute the law of the case because the issues in question 

were distinctly different. Id. In so holding, the supreme court found that neither of 

the previous unappealed orders specifically ruled on the issue in question. Id. 

Similarly, in Binkley v. Burry, this court found that a previous judge's unappealed 

order in regard to notice of the existence of an easement did not constitute the law 

of the case concerning notice of the scope of the easement. 352 S.C. 286, 294–95, 

573 S.E.2d 838, 843 (Ct. App. 2002). The Binkley court held, "the question of notice 

regarding the existence of an easement is distinct from the question of notice as it 

relates to the scope and enforceability of the easement." Id. at 294, 573 S.E.2d at

843. The court further held that while "the law of the case doctrine may preclude [] 

challenging [the] finding that the Binkleys did not have notice of the scope and 

enforceability of the easement, the doctrine does not prevent [] raising the issue of 

when the Binkleys had notice of the existence of the easement." Id. at 294–95, 573 

S.E.2d at 843.

Here, Judge Cooper's grant of summary judgment made explicit rulings and 

findings of fact concerning the McLaughlins. Specifically, Judge Cooper ruled "as 

a matter of law, there is simply no genuine issue of material fact that the 

McLaughlins reasonably relied on the unambiguous acts, representations, and 

writings of SIPOA or otherwise reasonably based their decision to remove the pipe

in 2008 . . . ." Judge Cooper's grant of summary judgment was not appealed. As

such, the finding that the McLaughlins could not claim reliance on SIPOA in 
 

 

 

 

removing the pipe was the law of the case. See Shirley's, 403 S.C. at 573, 743 S.E.2d 

at 785 ("An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and requires affirmance."). 

The issue of whether the McLaughlins could rely on SIPOA is the exact issue 

the Ralphs raised to the circuit court in arguing that Judge Cooper's order constituted 

the law of the case. Accordingly, we find the circuit court erred in ruling that Judge 

Cooper's findings were not binding on the court and the jury. We note the 

McLaughlins' defense was significantly based on the theory that they were acting in 

reliance on SIPOA. Moreover, the circuit court's decision to grant the directed 

verdict on punitive damages was based largely on its determination that the 

McLaughlins believed they had the right to remove the pipe based on SIPOA's 

representations. We address the impact of this error below. 

II. Punitive Damages 

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in granting a directed verdict as to 

punitive damages because more than one reasonable inference could be drawn from 

the evidence as to whether the McLaughlins acted with reckless disregard for the 

property rights of the Ralphs. We agree. 

Preservation 

At the outset, the McLaughlins argue this issue is not preserved because the 

Ralphs did not raise the issue of punitive damages in their post-trial motions and did 

not object when the directed verdict was granted. We disagree.

"It is well-settled that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,

but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit] court to be preserved

for appellate review." Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 S.E.2d 

543, 546 (2000). "The losing party must first try to convince the lower court it has 

ruled wrongly and then, if that effort fails, convince the appellate court that the lower 

court erred." I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 422, 526 S.E.2d 

716, 724 (2000). "Without an initial ruling by the [circuit] court, a reviewing court 

simply would not be able to evaluate whether the [circuit] court committed error." 

Staubes, 339 S.C. at 412, 529 S.E.2d at 546. "If the losing party has raised an issue 

in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the party must file a motion to 

alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue for appellate review."

I'On, 338 S.C. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724 (emphasis added); see also Elam v. S.C. 

Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 24, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004) ("A party must file such

a motion when an issue or argument has been raised, but not ruled on, in order to

preserve it for appellate review." (second emphasis added)). "Imposing this
preservation requirement on the appellant is meant to enable the lower court to rule 

properly after it has considered all relevant facts, law, and arguments." I'On, 338 

S.C. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724. However, "[p]ost-trial motions are not necessary to 

preserve issues that have been ruled upon at trial . . . ." Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 

S.C. 71, 77, 497 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1998). As such, the mere fact that a party received 

an unfavorable ruling does not require that party to re-raise the issue in a Rule 59(e) 

motion to preserve it. See Eubank v. Eubank, 347 S.C. 367, 373 n.2, 555 S.E.2d 

413, 416 n.2 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The 'raised to and ruled on' rule of error preservation 

requires only a ruling, not necessarily a favorable one." (emphasis added)). 

The issue of punitive damages was raised to the circuit court when the 

McLaughlins moved for a directed verdict. In opposing the motion, the Ralphs 

argued that evidence in the record supported the inference that the McLaughlins 

acted recklessly, that the McLaughlins had imputed knowledge of the easement

through their chain of title, and that the law of the case precluded the McLaughlins 

from claiming reliance on SIPOA. See I'On, 338 S.C. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724 

("The losing party must first try to convince the lower court it is has ruled wrongly 

and then, if that effort fails, convince the appellate court that the lower court erred."). 

After hearing arguments from both sides, the circuit court granted a directed verdict

in favor of the McLaughlins. See Staubes, 339 S.C. at 412, 529 S.E.2d at 546 

("Without an initial ruling by the [circuit] court, a reviewing court simply would not 

be able to evaluate whether the [circuit] court committed error."). Accordingly, 

because this issue was raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court, the Ralphs were 

not required to make an objection or raise the issue in a post-trial motion to preserve 

it for appellate review. See I'On, 338 S.C. at 422, 526 S.E.2d at 724 ("If the losing 

party has raised an issue in the lower court, but the court fails to rule upon it, the 

party must file a motion to alter or amend the judgment in order to preserve the issue 

for appellate review." (emphasis added)); Wilder Corp., 330 S.C. at 77, 497 S.E.2d 

at 734 ("Post-trial motions are not necessary to preserve issues that have been ruled

upon at trial . . . ."). 

Merits 

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in failing to submit the issue of

punitive damages to the jury. The McLaughlins argue the circuit court properly 

granted a directed verdict on punitive damages because there was no evidence to

support the inference that the McLaughlins acted recklessly, willfully, or wantonly. 

We agree with the Ralphs. 

"The purposes of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer and deter the 

wrongdoer and others from engaging in similar reckless, willful, wanton, or 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

malicious conduct in the future." Wimberly v. Barr, 359 S.C. 414, 423, 597 S.E.2d 

853, 858 (Ct. App. 2004). "Punitive damages may be awarded for trespass when a

defendant's acts have been willful, wanton or in reckless disregard of the rights of 

another." Id.; see also Hinson v. A. T. Sistare Constr. Co., 236 S.C. 125, 131, 113 

S.E.2d 341, 344 (1960) ("Trespass through mere negligence affords no ground for 

punitive damages; but such damages may be awarded whe[n] the trespass is wil[l]ful 

and deliberate."), overruled on other grounds by McCall by Andrews v. Batson, 285

S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). "'Recklessness implies the doing of a negligent 

act knowingly'; it is a 'conscious failure to exercise due care.'" Berberich v. Jack, 

392 S.C. 278, 287, 709 S.E.2d 607, 612 (2011) (quoting Yaun v. Baldridge, 243 S.C. 

414, 419, 134 S.E.2d 248, 251 (1964)). "If a person of ordinary reason and prudence 

would have been conscious of the probability of resulting injury, the law says the

person is reckless or willful and wanton, all of which have the same meaning—the

conscious failure to exercise due care." Id. Moreover, "[a] jury may award punitive 

damages even 'when the wrongdoer does not actually realize that he is invading the 

rights of another, provided the act is committed in such a manner that a person of 

ordinary prudence would say that it was a reckless disregard of another's rights.'"

Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 385 S.C. 344, 353–54, 683 S.E.2d 818, 823 (Ct. 

App. 2009) (quoting Camp v. Components, Inc., 285 S.C. 443, 444, 330 S.E.2d 315, 

316 (Ct. App. 1985)). 

"When ruling on a directed verdict motion as to punitive damages, 'the circuit 

court must view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Hollis, 394 S.C. at 

393–94, 714 S.E.2d at 909–10 (quoting Mishoe, 366 S.C. at 200, 621 S.E.2d at 366).

"It is not the duty of the [circuit] court to weigh the testimony in ruling on a motion 

for a directed verdict." Fairchild, 398 S.C. at 99, 727 S.E.2d at 411. Rather, "[t]he 

issue of punitive damages must be submitted to the jury if more than one reasonable 

inference can be drawn from the evidence as to whether the defendant's behavior 

was reckless, willful, or wanton." Hollis, 394 S.C. at 394, 714 S.E.2d at 910 (quoting 

Mishoe, 366 S.C. at 201, 621 S.E.2d at 366). Once the issue has been submitted to

the jury, "the plaintiff has the burden of proving [punitive] damages by clear and

convincing evidence." S.C. Code Ann. § 15-33-135 (2005). Accordingly, in ruling 

on a directed verdict motion as to punitive damages, the circuit court must determine 

whether there are any reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the 

conclusion that the defendant's behavior was reckless. If such an inference can be 

made, the issue should be submitted to the jury, who in turn must determine whether

recklessness was proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
 

 

 

 

As referenced above, this court has previously addressed when the issue of 

punitive damages must be submitted to the jury in Mishoe and Hollis. In Mishoe, 

the plaintiff suffered serious injuries to her left ankle and right knee when her foot 

got caught in a hole while walking across the pavement near a hospital's emergency 

room exit. 366 S.C. at 199, 621 S.E.2d at 365. In determining that the circuit court 

correctly denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and a judgment not

withstanding the verdict, this court noted that the chief executive officer of the 

hospital was provided with actual, written notice of the hole almost a year before the 

plaintiff's accident. Id. at 201, 621 S.E.2d at 366. The court then stressed that, 

despite such notice, the hospital took no action to repair the hole or to warn visitors 

or patients of its existence. Id. at 201–02, 621 S.E.2d at 366. Accordingly, the court

determined "evidence of this written notice [was] sufficient to submit the issue of 

[Defendant]'s willful, wanton, reckless, or malicious conduct to the jury." Id. at 202, 

621 S.E.2d at 366. 

 In Hollis, this court again found that the circuit court properly denied a

directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages. 394 S.C. at 390, 714 S.E.2d at 

907–08. In the case, the defendant purchased property directly upstream from the 

plaintiffs for the purpose of developing a residential subdivision. Id. at 390, 714 

S.E.2d at 908. As a result of the defendant's development, the plaintiffs experienced

severe flooding on their property that inhibited access to their home and filled their 

ponds with up to four feet of sediment. Id. In determining the issue was correctly

submitted to the jury, the Hollis court noted that the defendant "ignored regulations 

regarding erosion control, stormwater runoff, and even its own engineer's plans; took 

no action to prevent or correct damage it knew it was causing to the ponds; and used 

threats and deception to avoid the consequences of its misconduct." Id. at 394, 714 

S.E.2d at 910. The court then highlighted the circuit court's summary of the 

evidence, finding that the plaintiffs had expressed concerns about the development's 

effects on their property both before and during construction, the South Carolina 

Department of Health and Environmental Control and Richland County had put the

defendant on notice that it was not maintaining its stormwater management plan, the 

defendant inadequately maintained the stormwater management system, and the 

defendant attempted to bully and threaten the plaintiffs. Id. After reviewing the 

record, the Hollis court found that the circuit court "correctly denied the motion 

because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [plaintiffs], the jury 

had ample evidence from which to find [defendant] acted in reckless disregard of 

the rights of others." Id. at 395, 714 S.E.2d at 910. 

We find the decision to grant the directed verdict was based on an error of 

law, as the circuit court's determination that the McLaughlins justifiably relied on
 

 

 

 

 

SIPOA's representations in removing the pipe was in direct contravention of Judge 

Cooper's determinations of law.18 See Zinn, 415 S.C. at 108–09, 780 S.E.2d at 619 

("The appellate court will reverse the [circuit] court's ruling on a [directed verdict] 

motion [] when . . . the ruling is controlled by an error of law." (second alteration in 

original) (quoting Law, 368 S.C. at 434–35, 629 S.E.2d at 648)). However, even 

absent Judge Cooper's ruling, the circuit court should have submitted the issue of 

punitive damages to the jury. 

First, the jury could have found the McLaughlins knew or should have known 

that their downstream neighbors had property interests in the drainage easement and 

no-build area before the McLaughlins removed the pipe and built their house. Mr. 

McLaughlin indicated he relied on the representations of his real estate agent and 

did not speak to SIPOA about the existence of the easement before purchasing the 

property. However, under South Carolina law, the McLaughlins had a duty to 

inquire into the property rights in the easement, as they are presumed to have 

knowledge of the recorded easements in their chain of title. See Moyle v. Campbell, 

126 S.C. 180, 193–94, 119 S.E. 186, 190 (1923) ("The law imputes to a purchaser 

of real estate notice of the recitals contained in the written instruments[] forming his 

chain of title and charges him with the duty of making such reasonable inquiry and 

investigation as is suggested by the recitals and references therein contained."

(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)); Binkley v. Rabon Creek Watershed 

Conservation Dist. of Fountain Inn, 348 S.C. 58, 71, 558 S.E.2d 902, 909 (Ct. App. 

2001) ("Notice of a deed is notice of its whole contents . . . and it is also notice of 

whatever matters one would have learned by any inquiry which the recitals of the 

instrument made it one's duty to pursue." (alteration in original) (quoting 66 C.J.S.

Notice § 19, at 454 (1998))); Harbison Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Mueller, 319 S.C. 99, 

103, 459 S.E.2d 860, 863 (Ct. App. 1995) ("A homeowner is charged with 

constructive notice of any restriction properly recorded within the chain of title.").19

Additionally, SIPOA notified the McLaughlins that if they removed the drainage

pipe, they bore the responsibility of doing so in a manner that maintained the 

drainage system for the downstream lots. Despite receiving such notice and hearing 

the objections of their neighbors, the McLaughlins refused to acknowledge the 

18 See supra Section I. 

19 As such, we do not agree that the circuit court's contention that most people do 

not read their deeds overcomes this presumption, particularly when considering 

Mr. Yates's testimony that an attorney could have discovered the easement after 

twenty to thirty minutes of searching the title. See Moyle, 126 S.C. at 194, 119 

S.E. at 190 ("Generally the means of knowledge and the duty of using them are 

equivalent to knowledge."). 
 

 

 

 

 

existence of the easement. Finally, Mr. McLaughlin conceded that he authorized his 

contractors to remove the pipe after getting "frustrated" with SIPOA's inability to 

provide a solution that allowed the McLaughlins to build their house as sited. 

Therefore, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Ralphs, we find 

the jury could have determined that a person of ordinary reason and prudence would 

have been on notice that the McLaughlins' downstream neighbors had property

interests in the drainage easement. Thus, the jury could have reasonably found that 

the McLaughlins acted in conscious disregard of the rights of their downstream 

neighbors in removing the drainage pipe and building in the no-build area. See 

Berberich, 392 S.C. at 287, 709 S.E.2d at 612 ("'Recklessness implies the doing of 

a negligent act knowingly'; it is a 'conscious failure to exercise due care.'" (emphasis

added) (quoting Yaun, 243 S.C. at 419, 134 S.E.2d at 251)); id. ("If a person of 

ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of the probability of 

resulting injury, the law says the person is reckless or willful and wanton, all of 

which have the same meaning—the conscious failure to exercise due care."). 

Second, even if the McLaughlins believed they had the right to remove the

pipe, this would not preclude a jury from finding that they acted recklessly. See 

Fairchild, 385 S.C. at 353–54, 683 S.E.2d at 823 ("A jury may award punitive 

damages even 'when the wrongdoer does not actually realize that he is invading the 

rights of another, provided the act is committed in such a manner that a person of 

ordinary prudence would say that it was a reckless disregard of another's rights.'"

(quoting Camp, 285 S.C. at 444, 330 S.E.2d at 316)). At trial, Mr. McLaughlin 

acknowledged that he was aware several of his neighbors had raised concerns about

the removal of the pipe. Mr. McLaughlin also acknowledged that he attended the 

meeting where Mr. George gave his presentation and understood removing the pipe 

would have adverse effects on his neighbors' properties. Finally, Mr. McLaughlin 

testified that the McLaughlins could have sited their house on the front or back side 

of the oak tree in the middle of their lot. However, the McLaughlins never attempted 

or offered to site the house on the front side, which would have left the drainage 

easement intact. When taking these facts in the light most favorable to the Ralphs,

we find the jury could have determined that a person of ordinary reason and prudence

would have known that removing the drainage pipe would produce negative 

consequences for the downstream properties that relied on the drainage easement. 

Thus, the jury could have reasonably determined that the McLaughlins acted in

reckless disregard of the rights of their downstream neighbors by removing the pipe 

and building in the no-build area. See Berberich, 392 S.C. at 287, 709 S.E.2d at 612 

("If a person of ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of the 

probability of resulting injury, the law says the person is reckless or willful and 
 

 

 

 

wanton, all of which have the same meaning—the conscious failure to exercise due 

care."). 

In ruling that a directed verdict was justified, the circuit court indicated it did 

not think the McLaughlins were acting recklessly or intentionally because it found

the McLaughlins reasonably believed they had the right to remove the pipe. The 

court stressed that it did not "think [the McLaughlins were] acting malevolently, 

certainly not to the level of clear and convincing . . . ." (emphasis added). In so

ruling, we find the circuit court invaded the jury's province by improperly weighing 

the evidence. See Fairchild, 398 S.C. at 99, 727 S.E.2d at 411 ("It is not the duty of 

the [circuit] court to weigh the testimony in ruling on a motion for a directed 

verdict."). Because a reasonable juror could have found the McLaughlins acted 

recklessly in either 1) removing the pipe and building in the no-build area when they 

knew or should have known that their neighbors had property interests in the 

drainage easement or 2) removing the pipe with knowledge that it would adversely 

affect their neighbors' properties, the circuit court erred by not submitting punitive 

damages to the jury. See Hollis, 394 S.C. at 394, 714 S.E.2d at 910 ("The issue of 

punitive damages must be submitted to the jury if more than one reasonable 

inference can be drawn from the evidence as to whether the defendant's behavior 

was reckless, willful, or wanton." (quoting Mishoe, 366 S.C. at 201, 621 S.E.2d at 

366)). 

III. Directed Verdict on Trespass 

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict 

on the issues of abandonment and trespass because both were questions of law and 

not fact. The McLaughlins argue both issues were properly submitted to the jury, as 

they were both questions of fact. We agree with the Ralphs. 

"When ruling on a directed verdict motion [], 'the circuit court must view the 

evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Hollis, 394 S.C. at 393–94, 714 S.E.2d at 909–

10 (quoting Mishoe, 366 S.C. at 200, 621 S.E.2d at 366). "A case should be 

submitted to the jury when the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable 

inference." Fairchild, 398 S.C. at 99, 727 S.E.2d at 411. However, "[o]ur courts 

have recognized that when only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the 

evidence, the question becomes one of law for the court." Hurd, 353 S.C. at 609, 

579 S.E.2d at 143. Thus, "[w]hen the evidence yields only one inference, a directed 

verdict in favor of the moving party is proper." Id. at 609, 579 S.E.2d at 142.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"The unwarrantable entry on land in the peaceable possession of another is a

trespass, without regard to the degree of force used, the means by which the 

enclosure is broken, or the extent of the damage inflicted." Snow v. City of 

Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 552, 409 S.E.2d 797, 802 (Ct. App. 1991). "The entry itself 

is the wrong. Thus, for example, if one without license from the person in possession 

of land walks upon it, or casts a twig upon it, or pours a bucket of water upon it, he 

commits a trespass by the very act of breaking the enclosure." Id. "To constitute an

actionable trespass, [] there must be an affirmative act, the invasion of the land must 

be intentional, and the harm caused must be the direct result of that invasion." Id. at

553, 409 S.E.2d at 802. "Intent is proved by showing that the defendant acted 

voluntarily and that he knew or should have known the result would follow from his 

act." Id. Accordingly, the owner of a servient estate commits trespass by 

intentionally destroying an easement without the consent of the easement holder.

See Susan F. French, Relocating Easements: Restatement (Third), Servitudes § 

4.8(3), 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 4–5 (2003) (noting the majority rule since the 

late 19th century has been that "the owner of the servient estate commits trespass by 

relocating [or destroying] an easement without the consent of the holder of the 

easement."). 

At trial, Mr. McLaughlin conceded that he authorized his contractors to 

remove the pipe and build part of his home over the easement and no-build area. See 

Snow, 305 S.C. at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802. ("To constitute an actionable 

trespass . . . the invasion of the land must be intentional . . . ."). Additionally, Mr. 

McLaughlin acknowledged that he did not obtain the Ralphs' permission before 

doing so. See id. at 552, 409 S.E.2d at 802 ([I]f one without license from the person 

in possession of land walks upon it . . . he commits a trespass by the very act of 

breaking the enclosure." (emphasis added)). Thus, upon establishing an ownership 

interest in the easement, the Ralphs would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

See French, supra, at 4–5 ("[T]he owner of the servient estate commits trespass by 

[destroying] an easement without the consent of the holder of the easement." 

(emphasis added)); see also Hurd, 353 S.C. at 609, 579 S.E.2d at 143 ("Our courts 

have recognized that when only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the 

evidence, the question becomes one of law for the court."). As we will discuss 

below, ownership of the drainage easement at the time it was destroyed was a 

question of law. Therefore, we find the circuit court erred in submitting the issue of 

trespass to the jury. 

The existence of the drainage easement was undisputed at trial. However, the 

McLaughlins argue any ownership interests in the drainage easement had been 

extinguished before they removed the pipe because SIPOA had unilaterally 
abandoned the easement. Whether SIPOA could effectively abandon the drainage 

easement turns on the ownership interests in the easement before it was purportedly 

abandoned. Because determination of such ownership interests was a question of 

interpreting the Seabrook Plat and subsequent deeds, it was a question of law. See 

Slear v. Hanna, 329 S.C. 407, 410–11, 496 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1998) ("The 

determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact . . . [, however, 

if] the action is viewed as interpreting a deed, it is an equitable matter . . . ." 

(emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)). 

"[W]here a deed describes land as is shown on a certain plat, such plat 

becomes a part of the deed." Blue Ridge Realty Co. v. Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 

118, 145 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1965). "[T]he purchaser of lots with reference to the plat

of the subdivision acquire[s] every easement, privilege[,] and advantage shown upon 

said plat . . . ." Carolina Land Co., Inc. v. Bland, 265 S.C. 98, 105, 217 S.E.2d 16, 

19 (1975); see also Corbin v. Cherokee Realty Co., 229 S.C. 16, 24, 91 S.E.2d 542, 

546 (1956) ("Such purchasers acquire[] every easement, privilege[,] and advantage 

[that] the plat represent[s] as belonging to them."). "It is generally held that when

the owner of land has it subdivided and platted into lots and [easements,] and sells

and conveys the lots with reference to the plat, he thereby dedicates said [easements] 

to the use of such lot owners [and] their successors in title . . . ." Williamson, 247 

S.C. at 118, 145 S.E.2d at 924–25. "[A]s between the owner, who has conveyed lots 

according to a plat, and his grantee or grantees, the dedication is complete when the 

conveyance is made . . . ." Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 30, 71 S.E.2d 509, 511 

(1952) (citation omitted). "Such an easement is deemed a part of the property to 

which the grantee is entitled and of which he cannot be divested except by due

process of law." Bland, 265 S.C. at 106, 217 S.E.2d at 20 (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, an easement dedicated by plat is an easement appurtenant. See Tupper 

v. Dorchester Cty., 326 S.C. 318, 325, 487 S.E.2d 187, 191 (1997) ("[A]n 

appurtenant easement inheres in the land, concerns the premises, has one terminus 

on the land of the party claiming it, and is essentially necessary to the enjoyment

thereof."). Therefore, such easements pass with the dominant estate upon 

conveyance. See id. ("[An easement appurtenant] passes with the dominant estate 

upon conveyance."). 

The Seabrook Plat included the easement and no-build area across lots 21-28. 

Therefore, the easement was dedicated to the property owners upon conveyance of 

the lots in question. See Williamson, 247 S.C. at 118, 145 S.E.2d at 924–25 ("It is 

generally held that when the owner of land has it subdivided and platted into lots and 

[easements,] and sells and conveys the lots with reference to the plat, he thereby 

dedicates said [easements] to the use of such lot owners [and] their successors in 
 

 

 

 

 

title . . . ."). As such, we find the Ralphs (as owners of lot 23)—as well as the owners 

of lots 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28—acquired ownership interests in the drainage 

easement and no-build area across lot 22 as a matter of law. 

Consequently, because the lot owners had property interests in the drainage

easement, the question of whether SIPOA's unilateral abandonment was effective

was a question of law. "It is [a] well-settled principle that an owner of an easement 

may relinquish that easement by abandonment, express or implied." Immanuel 

Baptist Church of N. Augusta v. Barnes, 274 S.C. 125, 131, 264 S.E.2d 142, 144 

(1980) (emphasis added). "The pivotal issue in determining whether there has been 

an abandonment is the intention of the owner." Id. (emphasis added). "[Intent to 

abandon an easement] may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the owner and 

the nature and situation of the property . . . ." Bland, 265 S.C. at 109, 217 S.E.2d at 

21 (emphasis added). Thus, a third-party cannot unilaterally affect the rights of the 

easement holder or unilaterally abandon an owner's easement by recording a new 

plat. See Corbin, 229 S.C. at 24, 91 S.E.2d at 546 ("The Florenza Company could

not without the consent of [the owner] change the location or width of [the 

easement]." (emphasis added)); Bland, 265 S.C. at 107, 217 S.E.2d at 20 ("The fact 

that a new plat of the property in question was made did not destroy the easement 

created on the [original] plat."). 

Under South Carolina law, it is clear that an easement may only be abandoned 

by its owner. See Barnes, 274 S.C. at 131, 264 S.E.2d at 144 ("It is [a] well-settled 

principle that an owner of an easement may relinquish that easement by 

abandonment, express or implied." (emphasis added)). As such, SIPOA's purported 

abandonment of the drainage easement could not affect the Ralphs' interest as a

matter of law. See Bland, 265 S.C. at 106, 217 S.E.2d at 20 ("Such an easement is 

deemed a part of the property to which the grantee is entitled and of which he cannot 

be divested except by due process of law." (citation omitted)). Similarly, the 

recording of the Forsberg Plat could not affect the Ralphs' interest as a matter of law. 

See id. at 107, 217 S.E.2d at 20 ("The fact that a new plat of the property in question 

was made did not destroy the easement created on the [original] plat."). Rather, Mr. 

Yates correctly testified that abandonment of the drainage easement would not be

effective unless all of the lot owners with an interest in the easement agreed to the 

abandonment. See Barnes, 274 S.C. at 131, 264 S.E.2d at 144 ("The pivotal issue 

in determining whether there has been an abandonment is the intention of the owner." 

(emphasis added)). Therefore, we find the circuit court erred in submitting the issue 

of abandonment to the jury. 

Accordingly, because the Ralphs established ownership of the easement as a

matter of law and the ineffectiveness of SIPOA's abandonment as a matter of law,
 

we find the Ralphs were entitled to enforce the easement as a matter of law. 

Therefore, because Mr. McLaughlin admitted authorizing his contractors to remove 

the pipe and build over the no-build area, the issue of trespass is susceptible to only 

one inference and should not have been submitted to the jury. See Hurd, 353 S.C. 

at 609, 579 S.E.2d at 142 ("When the evidence yields only one inference, a directed

verdict in favor of the moving party is proper."). As such, we find the circuit court

erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict on trespass. 

IV. New Trial Motions 

The Ralphs argue the circuit court erred in denying their motion for a new trial 

absolute, a new trial on damages, or a new trial nisi additur because its judgment 

and order denying a new trial were characterized by errors of law and the damages 

award was wholly unsupported by the evidence. As indicated above, the circuit 

court committed several errors of law, particularly 1) failing to apply Judge Cooper's 

ruling as the law of the case; 2) granting a directed verdict on punitive damages; and 

3) submitting the issues of trespass and abandonment to the jury. As a result of these 

errors, we agree that the Ralphs are entitled to a new trial.20 

A new trial is an appropriate remedy when "the verdict is inconsistent and 

reflects the jury's confusion." Vinson, 324 S.C. at 404, 477 S.E.2d at 722. As such, 

a circuit court must take certain steps to prevent juror confusion. In crafting a jury 

charge, "[o]nly law applicable to the case should be charged to the jury. Instructions 

that do not fit the facts of the case may serve only to confuse the jury." State v. 

Blurton, 352 S.C. 203, 208, 573 S.E.2d 802, 804 (2002). Similarly, "it [is] the duty 

of the [circuit court] to eliminate from the proceedings the questions of law[] and to 

submit to the jury only questions of fact . . . ." Duren v. Kee, 41 S.C. 171, 176, 19 

S.E. 492, 494 (1894). Accordingly, when a jury charge consists of irrelevant and 

inapplicable principles that confuse the jury in a manner affecting the outcome of 

the trial, it constitutes reversible error. Cole v. Raut, 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 

30, 33 (2008). Likewise, "it is reversible error to charge a correct principle of law

as governing a case when such principle is inapplicable to the issues on trial." Dunsil 

v. E.M. Jones Chevrolet Co., Inc., 268 S.C. 291, 295, 233 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1977).

20 Because we find the Ralphs are entitled to a new trial based on several errors of 

law, we decline to address their argument that the evidence in the record does not 

support the jury's nominal damages award. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of 

Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an 

appellate court need not address appellant's remaining issues when its determination 

of a prior issue is dispositive). 
 

 

 

 

 

When taken together, we find the failure to apply Judge Cooper's order as the

law of the case and the failure to grant a directed verdict on trespass likely

overburdened and confused the jury, affecting its damages award. The circuit court

should have instructed the jury on the law of the case and precluded the McLaughlins 

from arguing reliance on SIPOA to the jury. Furthermore, because trespass was 

established as a matter of law, the jury should have only been responsible for 

determining damages and punitive damages. Instead, the circuit court allowed the

McLaughlins to argue reliance to the jury; did not instruct the jury that the 

McLaughlins could not rely on SIPOA as a matter of law; and submitted the issues 

of trespass, abandonment, and damages to the jury. See Blurton, 352 S.C. at 208, 

573 S.E.2d at 804 ("Only law applicable to the case should be charged to the jury."). 

As such, the jury's role expanded from simply determining damages to ruling on 

complex questions of law.21 See Duren, 41 S.C. at 175, 19 S.E. at 494 ("[Q]uestions 

of law do not go to the jury . . . ."). 

Moreover, by allowing the jury to hear evidence of reliance and rule on the 

issue of abandonment, the circuit court gave credence to the McLaughlins' theories 

that 1) the easement could have been abandoned by SIPOA and 2) they justifiably 

relied on SIPOA's representations that the easement had been abandoned. In turn 

these theories supported the overall theme of the McLaughlins' case: that they were

not responsible for damaging the Ralphs' property because they did not know the 

easement existed. However, both of these theories are misleading, as SIPOA could 

not have abandoned the easement as a matter of law and any purported reliance on 

SIPOA was irrelevant in determining damages.22 Accordingly, we find the 

combined effect of these errors likely confused and overburdened the jury in a 

manner prejudicial to the Ralphs. See Cole, 378 S.C. at 404, 663 S.E.2d at 33 ("A 

jury charge consisting of irrelevant and inapplicable principles may confuse the jury 

and constitutes reversible error where the jury[']s confusion affects the outcome of

the trial."); Dunsil, 268 S.C. at 295, 233 S.E.2d at 103 ("[I]t is reversible error to

charge a correct principle of law as governing a case when such principle is 

inapplicable to the issues on trial."); see, e.g., C. I. T. Corp. v. Corley, 196 S.C. 339,

21 As indicated above, the issues of abandonment and trespass were both questions 

of law rather than fact. See supra Section III. 

22 Moreover, even though the issue of trespass should not have been submitted to the 

jury, we note that any purported reliance on SIPOA's representations by the 

McLaughlins would have also been irrelevant in determining trespass. See Snow, 

305 S.C. at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802 ("Although neither deliberation, purpose, motive, 

nor malice are necessary elements of intent, the defendant must intend the act which 

in law constitutes [trespass]."). 
 

 

 

 

 

342–43, 13 S.E.2d 440, 441–42 (1941) (reversing a circuit court's order that

conflicted with a previous unappealed order constituting the law of the case). 

Second, we find the failure to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury 

also constitutes reversible error. See Zinn, 415 S.C. at 108–09, 780 S.E.2d at 619 

("The appellate court will reverse the [circuit] court's ruling on a [directed verdict] 

motion [] when there is no evidence to support the ruling or where the ruling is 

controlled by an error of law." (second alteration in original) (quoting Law, 368 S.C. 

at 434–35, 629 S.E.2d at 648)); see, e.g., Rhodes v. Lawrence, 279 S.C. 96, 97–98,

302 S.E.2d 343, 344 (1983) (remanding for a new trial after determining the circuit

court erred in granting a directed verdict on punitive damages). 

As such, we agree that the Ralphs are entitled to a new trial. However, we

find the scope of the new trial can be limited on remand. "The law in South Carolina 

is clear that when a verdict in favor of a plaintiff is fully supported by the evidence 

on the issue of liability but the damages awarded are inadequate, a new trial may be 

ordered on the issue of damages alone." Cartin v. Keller Bldg. Prods. of Charleston, 

299 S.C. 152, 153, 382 S.E.2d 922, 923 (1989). In other words, "[a] new trial on 

damages alone is not warranted unless the evidence presented indicated that a

directed verdict on the issue of liability would have been proper." Pelican Bldg. 

Ctrs. of Horry-Georgetown, Inc. v. Dutton, 311 S.C. 56, 61, 427 S.E.2d 673, 676 

(1993); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-33-125 (2005) ("Unless the plaintiff is entitled 

to a directed verdict on the issue of liability, any new trial must include both issues 

of liability and damages."). 

 As discussed above,23 we find the Ralphs were entitled to a directed verdict 

on trespass. Therefore, as the issue of liability has already been established as a

matter of law, it is not necessary to remand the case for a new trial absolute. See 

§ 15-33-125 ("Unless the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of

liability, any new trial must include both issues of liability and damages."). 

Accordingly, we remand the case for a new trial on compensatory damages and

punitive damages only. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court erred in failing to apply Judge 

Cooper's ruling as the law of the case, granting a directed verdict on the issue of

punitive damages, and submitting the issues of trespass and abandonment to the jury.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial on

23 See supra Section III. 
compensatory damages and punitive damages. Furthermore, on remand, Judge 

Cooper's determination that the McLaughlins could not reasonably rely on SIPOA's 

representations shall be applied as the law of the case. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

WILLIAMS and HILL, JJ., concur.