COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 2, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP394 Cir. Ct. No. 2013FA385

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

KIM C. GRONEWOLD,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

JAN GRONEWOLD,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Outagamie County: 

MITCHELL J. METROPULOS, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2021AP394

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jan Gronewold1appeals a postdivorce order,

arguing that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by concluding 

there was no substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification in his 

monthly maintenance obligation. We reject Jan’s arguments and affirm the order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Jan and Kim Gronewold were married in December 1987. The 

parties divorced after nearly twenty-six years of marriage. At the time of the 

divorce, Jan’s financial disclosure statement (hereinafter, “FDS”) reflected that he

was employed in sales with a base monthly income of $5,788.47 and that he had 

the possibility of earning monthly commissions ranging from $0 to $2,500. Kim’s 

FDS revealed employment as a teacher’s assistant with a monthly income of 

$1,691. 

¶3 As part of the final divorce proceeding, the parties entered into a 

stipulation providing that effective November 13, 2013, Jan would pay 

maintenance to Kim in the amount of $1,200 monthly. Maintenance would 

continue at that level through the month during which the closing on the sale of 

the parties’ residence occurred. Jan would thereafter pay maintenance of $2,100

monthly. Of that amount, $1,700 was to be paid by income assignment. In 

addition, Jan would also make quarterly payments to Kim in the amount of $1,200 

on January 15, April 15, July 15, and October 15 of each year. The parties further 

agreed that an increase or decrease in Jan’s income of twenty-five percent from 

the then-present level of $94,000 per year would be considered a substantial 

 

1

 Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them individually by their first names.
No. 2021AP394

3

change in circumstances allowing the circuit court to review the amount of 

maintenance payable by Jan. 

¶4 In February 2014, Jan and Kim stipulated to a modification of 

maintenance. At that time, Kim’s gross monthly income was $1,902 for each of 

the nine months of the school year. Jan’s gross monthly income was $7,833.33,

which included his base pay plus estimated commissions. Pursuant to the parties’ 

stipulation, maintenance was modified from $1,700 in monthly payments plus 

$1,200 paid quarterly to $1,800 in monthly payments with no quarterly payments. 

¶5 In May 2019, Jan filed a motion to modify maintenance, alleging 

that he had been laid off from his job. He asked the circuit court to set his 

maintenance obligation at zero dollars per month starting April 23, 2019, and 

continuing until he was reemployed. The family court commissioner held open 

the issue for more information. Jan’s FDS showed monthly unemployment 

income of $1,591. Kim’s FDS showed monthly gross income—which did not 

include maintenance—of $1,811.56. 

¶6 After Jan’s maintenance payments were suspended for three months 

due to his unemployment, he was able to secure employment as a sales agent 

earning a monthly income of at least $5,000 with the potential for commissions in 

future years. In July 2019, Jan filed a motion to modify maintenance from $1,800 

per month to $1,200 per month. Thereafter, on July 29, 2019, the parties 

stipulated to a temporary sliding scale maintenance obligation for the period of 

August 1, 2019, through July 31, 2020. Jan’s maintenance payments would range 

from $1,300 to $1,800 per month if his monthly income was between $5,000 and 

$7,833 or higher. Jan’s maintenance obligation would be negotiated if his 

monthly income was less than $5,000. After July 31, 2020, maintenance would 
No. 2021AP394

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revert to the previously stipulated amount of $1,800 per month. An August 6, 

2019 order approved the stipulation. 

¶7 On June 23, 2020, the parties entered into another stipulation, as Jan 

was again unemployed. The parties agreed that Jan’s maintenance obligation 

would be waived beginning June 1, 2020, through September 30, 2020. The 

stipulation also provided that Jan’s maintenance payments would automatically 

resume at the previously stipulated monthly amount of $1,800 effective October 1, 

2020, or upon Jan’s reemployment, whichever occurred first. The circuit court 

approved the parties’ stipulation in an order dated June 24, 2020. 

¶8 In October 2020, Jan filed a motion to terminate maintenance. In his 

affidavit in support of the motion, Jan noted that he was able to secure 

self-employment as a subcontractor making $6,000 per month, effective 

September 1, 2020, which was “nearly 25% less of the income [he] was earning at 

the time of the final [divorce] hearing.” Jan also argued that other grounds 

supported the termination of his maintenance obligation including: Kim’s 

increased income of $24,000 per year; Kim’s engagement to a doctor with a 

“marriage-like relationship”; Jan’s age and health issues; Kim’s age; and Jan 

having insufficient funds to save for retirement and to pay bills. At the time of his 

motion, Jan’s FDS revealed he had gross monthly income of $5,832 and monthly 

medical insurance premiums of $938.57. Kim’s FDS revealed gross monthly 

income of $2,033.33 for nine months of the year. 

¶9 The family court commissioner denied Jan’s motion. The 

commissioner concluded that Jan failed to show how his medical conditions 

adversely affected his ability to generate income or his earning capacity. Jan 

subsequently filed a timely request for de novo review by the circuit court. 
No. 2021AP394

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¶10 At the de novo hearing, Jan argued that his gross monthly income 

had decreased to $5,832 as compared to $7,833 at time of the final divorce 

hearing. In addition, at the time of the de novo hearing, Jan was required to pay

self-employment tax and health insurance at a monthly cost of nearly $1,000,

along with other business-related expenses. With these expenses, Jan contended

his monthly net income was only $2,376, and with the maintenance obligation of 

$1,800, he had insufficient income to “survive.” Jan also raised various other 

changes in circumstances for the circuit court’s consideration. Further, Jan 

reiterated that Kim was in a “marriage-type relationship” with a doctor and that 

her overall financial situation had improved since the time of the final hearing. 

Kim testified and disputed these notions. 

¶11 Contrary to Jan’s argument, the circuit court determined that 

whether a substantial change in circumstances had occurred justifying the 

termination or modification of Jan’s maintenance obligation should be measured 

from the June 2020 stipulation and order. The court further found that based upon 

Jan’s stated monthly income of $5,832 and Kim’s monthly income of $2,033.33, 

there was an equal division of the parties’ disposable income with maintenance set 

at $1,800 per month. The court therefore found there was no substantial change in 

circumstances and denied Jan’s motion. Jan now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶12 An award of maintenance may be modified only upon a finding of a 

substantial change in circumstances. WIS. STAT. § 767.59(1f)(a) (2019-20).2 A 

 

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2021AP394

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substantial change in circumstances is one in which it would be unjust or 

inequitable to strictly hold either party to the judgment. Rosplock v. Rosplock, 

217 Wis. 2d 22, 33, 577 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).

¶13 Whether there has been a substantial change of circumstances is a 

mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 32-33. The circuit court’s factual findings 

regarding the “before” and “after” circumstances and whether a change has 

occurred will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 33. However, 

whether the change is substantial is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. 

Because the court’s legal determination is intertwined with its factual findings, we 

nevertheless give weight to the court’s decision. Id.

¶14 Jan argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to 

terminate or substantially reduce his maintenance payments to Kim for several 

reasons. Jan first argues that whether a substantial change in circumstances 

occurred should be measured from the parties’ divorce judgment and not from the 

order resulting from the parties’ June 2020 stipulation. The original divorce 

judgment stated that a reduction in Jan’s income of twenty-five percent or more 

would constitute a substantial change in circumstances. According to Jan, his 

income at the time of the judgment was $94,000 per year. He contends that his 

current monthly income of $5,832 is more than twenty-five percent less than he 

was earning at the time of the divorce, and, therefore, the court erred in finding no 

substantial change in circumstances. 

¶15 Jan’s argument is incorrect and ignores multiple stipulations and 

orders since the divorce judgment. “[T]he appropriate comparison regarding any 

change in the parties’ financial circumstances is to the set of facts that existed at 

the time of the most recent maintenance order.” See Kenyon v. Kenyon, 2004 WI 
No. 2021AP394

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147, ¶21, 277 Wis. 2d 47, 690 N.W.2d 251. Thus, when determining whether to 

modify maintenance, a court “should compare the facts regarding the parties’

current financial status with those surrounding the previous order in determining 

whether the movant has established the requisite substantial change in 

circumstances, such that modification of the maintenance award is warranted.” 

Id., ¶27.

¶16 Accordingly, the circuit court correctly determined that the existence 

of a substantial change in circumstances should be measured from the last order 

affecting maintenance—specifically, the order adopting the parties’ June 2020 

stipulation. In that stipulation, the parties agreed that Jan’s maintenance would be 

waived due to his unemployment. Jan’s maintenance obligation, however, was set 

to resume at its prior level of $1,800 monthly at the earlier of Jan’s reemployment 

or October 1, 2020. Jan acknowledged this in an affidavit filed in support of his 

motion to terminate maintenance. The prior level of monthly maintenance at 

$1,800 referenced in the June 2020 stipulation was based upon the parties’ July 

29, 2019 stipulation, which set Jan’s obligation at $1,800 per month beginning 

August 1, 2020. Under these circumstances, there was no basis for the court to 

look at the divorce judgment to determine if there was a substantial change in 

circumstances justifying a modification of maintenance. 

¶17 Further, the circuit court properly concluded that there had been no 

substantial change in circumstances warranting modification since the June 2020 

stipulation and order. In the stipulation, Jan represented that he had no income 

due to his unemployment, but he nevertheless agreed that maintenance would 

resume at $1,800 per month either when he became reemployed or on October 1, 

2020. On October 26, 2020, Jan filed a FDS that showed gross monthly income in 

the amount of $5,832. In Jan’s affidavit in support of his motion to terminate 
No. 2021AP394

8

maintenance, he similarly claimed that his income was approximately $6,000 per 

month. The court therefore implicitly found that no reduction in Jan’s income or 

earning capacity had occurred since the June 2020 order. The court rejected Jan’s 

argument that Kim’s earning capacity had changed, finding instead that Kim’s 

income and financial situation were the same as at the time of its June 2020 order. 

Kim had the same living arrangement, the same job title and employer, and similar 

income, and she was not engaged to be married. On these facts, the court properly 

determined that Jan failed to show a substantial change in circumstances

warranting a termination of his maintenance obligation. 

¶18 Jan next argues that the circuit court failed to consider all the factors 

under WIS. STAT. § 767.56 in rejecting his motion to terminate maintenance. Kim 

correctly argues, however, that before a court can consider the factors under 

§ 767.56, the court must determine if there was a substantial change in 

circumstances justifying a modification or termination of maintenance. See 

Rosplock, 217 Wis. 2d at 32-37. Here, the court determined that no substantial 

change in circumstances justifying the requested relief had occurred. Because the 

court concluded there was no substantial change in circumstances, there was no 

need for the court to consider the statutory factors. 

¶19 Jan next argues that there was no basis for the circuit court to 

determine that the parties were in the essentially the same position as they were at 

the time of the divorce judgment. Jan’s argument, however, is based on measuring 

the change in circumstances from the divorce judgment and not from the most 

recent June 2020 order, as required by law. See Kenyon, 277 Wis. 2d 47, ¶21. 

According to Jan’s FDS and affidavit filed in October 2020, Jan’s monthly income

at that time was between $5,832 and $6,000, while Kim’s circumstances remained 

unchanged. After considering the parties’ income, the court determined that the 
No. 2021AP394

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previously stipulated monthly maintenance award of $1,800 provided for a 50/50 

split of the parties’ income. This conclusion was consistent with what the law 

provides as a starting point for a maintenance award in a long-term marriage, such 

as here. See Finley v. Finley, 2002 WI App 144, ¶19, 256 Wis. 2d 508, 648 

N.W.2d 536. 

¶20 In addition, Jan argues the circuit court prevented him from 

adequately presenting his case and permitted Kim’s counsel to provide false and 

misleading information. Specifically, Jan contends that the court erred 

in: permitting Kim’s attorney to make disparaging remarks about him; failing to 

sanction Kim’s attorney for a false affidavit; allowing lies; intimidating and 

discriminating against him during the hearing; and failing to allow him to prepare 

for cross-examination. We decline to address these arguments because they are

underdeveloped. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 

(Ct. App. 1992). Jan fails to show how the court relied upon any improper 

remarks or information provided by Kim’s attorney, or how the court prevented 

him from making his case. 

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.