Filed 7/5/24 P. v. Peacock CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HENRY LAWRENCE PEACOCK,

JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B331833

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. A646845

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Michael C. 

Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Henry Lawrence Peacock, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s 

order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code 

section 1172.6.1 We affirm because the record of conviction 

establishes Peacock was the sole perpetrator and actual killer. 

He thus is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The charges and jury verdicts

In 1988 the People charged Peacock with the murder

and attempted robbery of Luis (Ruben) Zepeda. The People 

alleged Peacock personally used a firearm in the commission 

of the offenses, and that he murdered Zepeda while engaged 

in the commission of robbery. Peacock was the sole defendant 

named in the information.

In July 1989 a jury convicted Peacock of the first degree 

murder and attempted robbery of Zepeda. The jury found true

the allegations that Peacock personally used a firearm and 

that he murdered Zepeda while engaged in the commission or 

attempted commission of robbery. The trial court sentenced 

Peacock to life in the state prison without the possibility 

of parole, plus two years for the firearm enhancement. The 

court stayed the sentence on the attempted robbery count. 

Another panel of this court affirmed Peacock’s conviction. 

(People v. Peacock (Feb. 11, 1992, B045750) [nonpub. opn.].)

More than three decades later, on March 30, 2022, Peacock

—representing himself—filed a form petition for resentencing 

under section 117[2.6]. Peacock checked boxes on the form 

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective 

June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered section 

1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
3

stating (1) the information filed in his case “allowed the 

prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder 

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other 

theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely 

on that person’s participation in a crime,” (2) he was “convicted

of murder . . . following a trial,” and (3) “[he] could not presently 

be convicted of murder . . . because of changes made to Penal 

Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” Peacock also 

checked a fourth box that stated, “Having presented a facially 

sufficient petition, I request that this Court appoint counsel 

to represent me.”

The trial court appointed counsel for Peacock. The 

prosecution filed a response to Peacock’s petition, contending 

Peacock was “not eligible for relief as a matter of law” because 

he was “the actual killer.” The prosecution stated, “The jury 

was instructed on first-degree felony murder, but the only theory 

presented to the jury was that Petitioner was the actual killer.” 

The prosecution noted Peacock’s jury was not instructed on 

aiding and abetting. The prosecution attached to its response 

the jury instructions and verdict forms from Peacock’s 1989 trial.

Peacock filed a reply. Peacock didn’t deny being the 

actual killer. Instead, he contended two of the jury instructions 

given at his trial–CALJIC Nos. 8.20 and 8.21—permitted the jury 

to convict him “based on an imputed malice theory.”2 Peacock 

2 The then-current version of CALJIC No. 8.21, entitled 

“First Degree Felony-Murder,” provided,

“The unlawful killing of a human being, 

whether intentional, unintentional or 

accidental, which occurs [during the 

commission or attempted commission of 
4

argued, “Consistent with the jury verdict, Petitioner could 

have been convicted under a then (but no longer) valid theory 

of causation whereby Defendant was not the actual killer but 

was rather the ‘proximate cause’ of decedent’s death: there is 

nothing inherent in the jury’s verdict and in the trial court’s 

jury instructions that would rule out an accident or some other 

proximate causation of death which doesn’t rise to the level of

‘actual killer.’ ” Peacock also argued the jury’s “true” finding 

on the allegation that he “personally used a firearm” in the 

commission of the murder and attempted robbery was “not 

a basis at the prima facie stage” to deny his petition.

The court held a hearing on June 27, 2023. The district 

attorney and Peacock appeared by Webex. Peacock’s courtappointed counsel appeared in person. Peacock confirmed 

he could see and hear the court.

the crime] of robbery is murder of the first 

degree when the perpetrator had the specific 

intent to commit such crime. [¶] The specific 

intent to commit robbery and the commission 

or attempted commission of such crime must 

be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The current CALCRIM jury instruction on first degree 

felony murder contains similar language: the defendant must 

have intended to commit the underlying felony, such as robbery 

and, while committing or attempting to commit that underlying 

felony, the defendant personally committed an act “that directly 

caused the death of another person.” A person “who was the 

actual killer” “may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing 

was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.” (CALCRIM No. 

540A.)
5

The court stated, “This matter is calendared for a 

prima facie determination as to Mr. Peacock’s Penal Code 

section 1172.6 petition.” The court asked “if either attorney 

would like to augment the record or add anything” to the papers 

they’d submitted. The prosecutor replied, “No. I’m going to

submit on my pleadings, Your Honor.”

Peacock’s counsel said he’d had “the chance to do some 

more research” after he filed his brief. Counsel cited People v.

Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 and People v. Maldonado (2023) 

87 Cal.App.5th 1257. Those cases, counsel said, hold “if there’s 

any now invalid legal theory under which the jury could have 

convicted” or “even confusing jury instructions which contradict 

each other,” the court should find a prima facie case.

Counsel continued, “And that’s what we have here. . . .

[W]hat we have with the jury instructions given where the

jury could have convicted [Peacock] without him being the

actual killer based on imputed malice.” As for the firearm 

enhancement, counsel argued the jury could have made that 

finding “if the discharge of the firearm was made without intent 

to kill but was simply an accident.” Counsel then referred to 

“reckless indifference to human life” and a “major participant.” 

Counsel stated, “[N]one of [the verdicts] actually have a finding 

that the defendant was the actual killer.”

The prosecutor stated Langi “involved a second-degree 

murder and aiding and abetting instruction, so that would not 

be applicable here.” The prosecutor continued, “[T]here are 

no aiding and abetting instructions [in] Peacock’s case. It was 

all or nothing. He . . . was either the actual killer or he had 

to be found not guilty. And by virtue of them convi[ct]ing him, 

he was convicted as the actual killer.”
6

The prosecutor added, “Then or now in a felony murder 

prosecution, he is not eligible for relief. He could currently 

be convicted of a felony murder as the actual killer without 

any further showing but the fact that he killed the victim. And 

once you establish that, there’s really nothing further to look at 

at the prima facie stage.”

In reply, Peacock’s counsel reiterated that “it [apparently 

referring to the killing] could have been accidental or 

unintentional.”

After both counsel submitted, the court said, “I began 

my review last week, and I was here for some time yesterday 

in the afternoon into the early evening reviewing the petition, 

the People’s response, and the reply brief authored by [Peacock’s 

counsel].” The court described the verdicts and listed the nine

jury instructions that “were key in the court’s analysis.” The 

court cited People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 (Harden)

and discussed it at some length.

The court then stated,

“The only theory the People proceeded on was 

that Peacock acted alone and was the actual 

killer. The jury returned a true finding on the 

personal use allegation. [¶] The natural and 

probable consequences doctrine was not read 

to the jury. No jury instructions were given 

as to aiding and abetting or even suggested 

that another perpetrator was involved. There 

was no instruction as to accomplice liability. [¶] 

The record of conviction in Mr. Peacock’s case 

irrefutably establishes as a matter of law that 

the jury determined he was the actual killer, 
7

and this court reaches this conclusion without 

any fact-finding, weighing of evidence, or 

credibility determinations and bases its 

decision only on the jury instructions, Penal 

Code section 189, and the relevant case law 

that I cited. [¶] For the foregoing reasons, the 

court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 

that defendant Peacock was convicted as the 

actual killer under a valid theory of murder 

within the revised Penal Code section 189. 

The petition for relief is respectfully denied.”

DISCUSSION

1. Governing law

Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 

1437) amended existing law on accomplice liability for murder 

“ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person 

who is not the actual killer . . . .’ ” (People v. Gutierrez-Salazar

(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417, quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, 

§ 1(f); § 189, subd. (e)(1).) To accomplish this goal, Senate Bill 

1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule 

and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine 

as it relates to murder, to ensure a person’s sentence is 

commensurate with his individual criminal culpability. (See 

generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. 

Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843; People v. Lewis (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 971 (Lewis).) Under the amended statute, 

a person may be convicted of felony murder only if (1) he was 

the actual killer; or (2) he was not the actual killer but, with the 

intent to kill, he aided and abetted the actual killer’s commission 

of murder; or (3) he acted as a “major participant” in a felony 
8

listed in section 189 and acted with “reckless indifference 

to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2018, 

ch. 1015, § 3; see Gentile, at p. 842.) Senate Bill No. 775 

(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, extended 

resentencing eligibility to individuals convicted of murder on 

any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person 

based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (Stats. 

2021, ch. 551, § 2(a).) 

Senate Bill 1437 also provided an avenue for a person 

convicted under the former law to petition the sentencing court 

to vacate his conviction and be resentenced if he could no longer 

be convicted under the amended law. (People v. Strong (2022) 

13 Cal.5th 698, 708–709 (Strong); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 959–960.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing

of entitlement to relief, the trial court must issue an order to 

show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, 

the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the petitioner is guilty under the amended law. 

(§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3); Strong, at pp. 708–709.)

At the prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true 

the petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether the 

petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were 

proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) However, “[t]he 

record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s 

prima facie inquiry under section 117[2.6], allowing the court 

to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that 

are clearly meritless.” (Ibid.) The jury instructions are part 

of the record of conviction, because the instructions “given at 

a petitioner’s trial may provide ‘readily ascertainable facts from 

the record’ that refute the petitioner’s showing, and reliance 
9

on them to make the eligibility or entitlement determinations

may not amount to ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence

or the exercise of discretion,’ ” which may not take place until 

after an order to show cause issues. (People v. Soto (2020) 

51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055, review granted on other grounds

Sept. 23, 2020, S263939, and held for Lewis, review dismissed 

Nov. 17, 2021, and opinion citable to the extent not inconsistent 

with Lewis; see People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 949

[jury instructions showed trial court never instructed the jury on 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine; summary denial 

of petition affirmed].) The verdicts also are part of the record of

conviction. (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47–48, 55–56 

[affirming summary denial of petition; jury instructions and 

verdicts irrefutably established as a matter of law that defendant 

was ineligible for resentencing].)

We independently review the trial court’s determination 

that Peacock failed to make a prima facie showing. (People 

v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; Harden, supra,

81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)

2. Peacock is ineligible for resentencing as a matter 

of law

Peacock asserts he established a prima facie case for relief. 

He says “scrutiny of the record of conviction does not inevitably 

lead to th[e] conclusion [that he was the actual killer as a matter 

of law] nor does any other information in the record establish 

ineligibility for relief.” Peacock contends “whether appellant

acted alone or not in the commission of his criminal conduct 

requires a finding of fact that is not permitted at the prima facie 

stage.” Peacock then states: “[E]ven if the trial court did not err

in concluding from the record of conviction that appellant acted 
10

alone, it could not thereafter conclude as a matter of law that 

appellant was necessarily ‘the actual killer’ within the meaning 

of section 189, subdivision (e)(1).” Why is that? Because, Peacock 

says, he “might have caused the victim’s death but lacked an 

intent to kill or a depraved heart,” and “nothing in the record 

of conviction establishes that the jury could not have imputed 

malice” to him.

It is difficult to know what to make of these contentions. 

Peacock seems to be asserting, in the alternative, that either 

he wasn’t the killer—someone else was—or he was the killer 

but it was an accidental or “unintentional” killing.

We previously granted the Attorney General’s request 

for judicial notice of the reporters’ transcripts of Peacock’s trial. 

At the trial, Angel Valdiviez testified he and Zepeda drove to 

Los Angeles from Texas to visit family and their friend Arturo

Ozaeta. Zepeda was driving a Chevrolet pickup truck. They 

picked up their friend from his workplace and drove to a 

supermarket to buy film. As Valdiviez opened the glove box 

to put the film in it, he heard someone say, “ ‘All of you step

back away from the truck.’ ” Valdiviez looked up and saw 

a “gun toward[ ] [Zepeda’s] head.”

Valdiviez, Ozaeta, and Zepeda all stepped away from the 

truck. Zepeda had his hands up. “Right after that,” Valdiviez 

heard a shot—“a pow”—and then two more shots. Zepeda said, 

“ ‘He shot me. He shot me.’ ” Valdiviez saw Zepeda had been 

shot in the side. Zepeda approached the shooter and they started 

to struggle. Valdiviez went to help Zepeda. Blood was “really 

squirting out” of Zepeda. Ozaeta ran to call 911. The shooter 

had a gun—a small revolver—in his right hand. The gun slipped 

out of his hand.
11

Valdiviez and Zepeda were beating up the shooter. Zepeda 

was bleeding from the side of his chest. Blood was going down 

his shirt. Zepeda stood up, gasping for air. Valdiviez tried to

help Zepeda to the truck and they both fell into the truck. 

Valdiviez turned and the shooter was going down the street. 

Valdiviez and Ozaeta “held [the shooter] in the street until [a]

security guard [from the store] put . . . handcuffs on him and

brought him back to the scene,” and put him in a police car.

At trial, Valdiviez identified Peacock as the shooter. 

He said he remembered the shooter’s face: “It’s in my dreams 

every night.” Ozaeta also identified Peacock at trial.

Zepeda suffered a gunshot wound to the left chest. 

The bullet went through his left lung, then his aorta, then his 

right lung, and “came to lie” in his right chest wall. This “severe 

gunshot injury through the aorta and lungs” caused the victim 

to go into cardiac arrest.

Peacock testified on his own behalf at trial. He told 

the jury that, around noon that day, he was at a bus stop and

ran into “a guy I know of named Snake.” Peacock had “[s]een

him around the neighborhood a lot of times” but didn’t know 

his real name. Peacock had a gun in his back pocket “[f]or 

protection.”

Both Peacock and Snake got on the bus, then later got off. 

They decided to “ ‘get a beer.’ ” Peacock went into a store to 

buy beer. He “told [Snake] to hold my gun.”

Peacock came out of the store about five or ten minutes 

later. He didn’t see Snake. He saw people by a truck and heard 

“some screaming and some saying ‘help.’ ” Peacock “walked over 

there to see what was going on.” He saw “a guy laying [sic] in 

the back of the truck bleeding.”
12

Peacock crawled into the truck to help the man. Peacock 

“didn’t really feel a heartbeat” so he “started pumping his heart 

several times.” Peacock was doing C.P.R. Peacock then got out 

of the truck to ask for help and “they jumped on me.”

At the court’s jury instruction conference with counsel, 

the court noted Peacock’s defense was “an alibi.” “[F]or that 

reason,” the court continued, there was “no issue as to whether 

or not he’s an aider and abettor. He either is the perpetrator 

or he’s not, correct?” Peacock’s counsel replied, “Correct. I don’t 

think there should be anything about an aider and abettor.”

The prosecutor did not mention aiding and abetting or 

any other accomplice liability theory in his closing argument. 

The prosecutor said the case was “a whodunit.” Nor did 

Peacock’s counsel tell the jury that Peacock was merely an 

accomplice. Instead, he argued the prosecution witnesses were 

“mistaken” about who the shooter was.

Peacock contends “this court should not consider the 

reporter’s transcripts from appellant’s original trial” because

“[a] court may not take judicial notice of irrelevant matters.” 

But the transcripts of Peacock’s trial are not “irrelevant.” 

They are part of the record of conviction.3

3 In his request for judicial notice of the trial transcripts, 

the Attorney General states, “The transcripts of the trial are 

relevant to this appeal because the superior court relied upon 

those transcripts at the hearing on appellant’s petition for 

resentencing.” The Attorney General appears to be mistaken. 

Nothing in the record indicates the district attorney submitted 

the trial transcripts; he filed copies of the jury instructions and 

the verdict forms only. At the hearing on the petition, Peacock’s 

counsel asked the court to “put on the record what it’s relying on 

. . . in the prima facie case.” The court stated it had “read and 
13

Moreover, even without the trial transcripts, we would 

affirm the denial of Peacock’s petition. No other defendant or 

alleged perpetrator is mentioned in the information or anywhere 

else in the record. The jury instructions establish Peacock’s jury 

was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine or any other theory imposing liability on him as an 

accomplice to a murder by Snake or anyone else. (See People v.

Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1198, 1201 [“jury instructions 

contained no reference to an accomplice”; denial of petition 

at prima facie stage affirmed]. Cf. People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 

100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1232, 1247 (Beaudreaux) [same; record 

of conviction—instructions, verdicts, and jury’s findings—“refute 

conclusively [defendant’s] attempt to allege entitlement to section 

1172.6 relief”]; People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1161, 

1167–1169 (Mares) [appellate court “need not credit the truth of

any fact in the preliminary hearing transcript” to affirm denial 

of petition at prima facie stage; “record supports no theory other 

than those where [defendant] was the actual killer”], review 

granted May 1, 2024, S284232.) The verdict forms demonstrate 

the jury convicted Peacock of first degree murder under the 

felony-murder rule and found true the allegation that, in the 

commission of the offenses, Peacock personally used a firearm.

4

considered” Peacock’s petition, the People’s response, and 

Peacock’s reply. The court detailed the verdict forms and the jury 

instructions attached as exhibits to the prosecution’s response,

listing the CALJIC number and Bates stamp number of each.

4 See Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1244–1246

[distinguishing People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588

because, in that case—unlike in Beaudreaux—the jury was 

instructed on natural and probable consequences].
14

As the sole and actual perpetrator of Zepeda’s murder, 

Peacock is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (People 

v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 969–973 (Garcia) [affirming 

denial of resentencing because record of conviction “unequivocally 

establishes” defendant was the sole perpetrator and actual 

killer]; Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47–48, 56 [same];

People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1104–1105, 1110–

1111, 1128 [affirming denial of petition at prima facie stage; 

defendant was shooter; jury convicted defendant of first 

degree murder with personal use of firearm enhancement and 

felony-murder special circumstance]; People v. Hurtado (2023) 

89 Cal.App.5th 887, 889, 893 [no need for a hearing because 

“the defendant was the only person who committed the crime”]; 

People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 743–744; People 

v. Gallo (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 594, 599–600; People v. Edwards

(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 666, 669, 674 [affirming summary denial 

of resentencing petition where record of conviction showed 

defendant was actual killer]; see also People v. Delgadillo (2022)

14 Cal.5th 216, 233 (Delgadillo) [defendant “not entitled to any 

relief under section 1172.6” because he “was the actual killer 

and the only participant in the killing”]; Beaudreaux, supra,

100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1239 [defendant bound by jury’s findings 

that he personally and intentionally fired a weapon in the course 

of an attempted robbery that caused the victim’s death].)

Finally, Peacock contends “the record of conviction does 

not exclude the possibility that [he] only proximately caused the 

victim’s death.” This contention borders on the unintelligible.

Peacock’s defense at trial was not that he “only proximately 

caused” Zepeda’s death. His defense was that Snake did it, and 

he was inside the store at the time. (Cf. Beaudreaux, supra,
15

100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1241 [defendant’s denial of responsibility 

for victim’s death “put in issue his role in [victim’s] killing, and 

he had the incentive and opportunity at trial to claim that he 

did not personally shoot [victim]”].)

Peacock relies on People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1 

and People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64. Our colleagues 

in the Third District summarized those cases in Garcia, supra, 

82 Cal.App.5th at p. 971:

“In Lopez, the victim was bludgeoned to death 

during a home-invasion robbery involving two 

perpetrators, but there was no direct evidence 

that the defendant was the person who 

bludgeoned the victim. (Lopez, at pp. 5–10, 19.) 

Similarly, in Vang, there was no direct 

evidence that the defendant personally 

committed the act that killed his wife. There, 

the defendant, who had a long history of 

domestic violence, got into an argument with 

his wife and followed her after she fled in a car. 

(Vang, at pp. 69–70.) He eventually forced her 

to stop and coerced her into his vehicle through 

force or fear. (Id. at p. 69.) As he was driving 

away, she opened the door and jumped out of 

the vehicle; the fall from the vehicle resulted 

in her death. (Ibid.)” 

Here, again, Peacock never contended at trial that he 

somehow acted as Snake’s accomplice—one of two perpetrators 

as in Lopez. Instead, Peacock testified under oath that he wasn’t 

even there, plainly implying Snake must’ve been the shooter—

using Peacock’s gun—while Peacock was in the store.
16

Moreover, as we have explained, a person “who was the 

actual killer” “may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing 

was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.” (CALCRIM No. 

540A. See Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1243–1244 

[“even assuming hypothetically [defendant] could produce 

evidence of [an] accidental discharge” of the firearm, it wouldn’t 

matter; “[w]e still have the long-standing rule that a defendant 

is guilty of felony murder if, while intending to commit a 

qualifying felony, he personally performs an act that causes 

death, regardless of whether the fatal act was intentional 

or accidental”].)

In sum, the record of conviction conclusively establishes

Peacock was the sole perpetrator and actual killer. “As the 

Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear, the structure of 

section 1172.6 shows the Legislature intended for the trial courts 

to winnow petitions, rejecting those without any merit at the 

prima facie hearing based on information contained in the 

record of conviction.” (Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173, 

citing Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971, Delgadillo, supra, 

14 Cal.5th at p. 233, Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 700; 

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 464.)
17

DISPOSITION

We affirm the order denying Henry Lawrence Peacock, 

Jr.’s, petition for resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.