Opinion issued July 6, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-22-00286-CR, NO. 01-22-00287-CR

———————————

STEPHEN CHARLES HERNANDEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 207th District Court

Comal County,1 Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. CR2016-725 & CR2016-726

1 The Texas Supreme Court transferred this appeal from the Court of Appeals for the 

Third District of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (authorizing transfer 

of cases between courts of appeals). Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 

“the court of appeals to which the case is transferred must decide the case in 

accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare 

decisis if the transferee court’s decision otherwise would have been inconsistent 

with the precedent of the transferor court.” Tex. R. App. P. 41.3. The parties have 

not cited, nor has our own research revealed, any conflict between the precedent of

the Third Court of Appeals and that of this court on any relevant issue.
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant Stephen Charles Hernandez guilty of the first-degree 

felony offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sexual assault of a child. 

Appellant pleaded true to an enhancement paragraph and, in accordance with the 

trial court’s charge, the jury sentenced appellant to confinement for life. In two 

issues, appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his challenges for 

cause to two prospective jurors and (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his 

convictions. We affirm. 

Background

In September 2016, appellant was charged by indictment with one count of 

aggravated sexual assault of a child (Cause No. 2016-725) and one count of sexual 

assault of a child (Cause No. 2016-726). The indictments included an enhancement 

paragraph alleging that appellant had been previously convicted of a third-degree 

felony sex offense in Maryland. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charged offenses. 

The cases were consolidated and tried together. 

At trial, appellant stipulated to the enhancement paragraph regarding his 

previous out-of-state conviction. Following opening statements, the State called the 

following witnesses: Michaela Vick, Julie Wiley, Angie Mickey, Danny Dufer, 

Ronald Womack, Ashlyn Henshaw, H.B., the complainant, and Noella Hill.
3

1. Michaela Vick

Michaela Vick, a crime scene technician with the Comal County Sheriff’s 

Office, testified that appellant’s fingerprints matched the fingerprints on a prior 

judgment of conviction for a third-degree sex offense involving a child in Maryland 

in 1992. The arrest report, which was attached to the out-of-state judgment, stated 

that the complainant alleged appellant fondled her vaginal and breast areas on 

numerous occasions while she babysat his children.

2. Julie Wiley 

Wiley was an assistant principal at Mountain Valley Middle School in Canyon 

Lake. H.B. was an eighth grader at the school in 2016.

On the morning of March 9, 2016, H.B. was sent to Wiley’s office for a dress 

code violation. Wiley testified that typically a student either changes clothes or is 

picked up by a parent. She testified that H.B.’s dress code violation was not a serious 

issue.

Before Wiley reached her office, H.B. ran down the hallway and out of the 

school. Wiley testified that when she caught up to H.B., she was “very heated, 

animated”’ and yelled “you can’t make me go back” and “I’m not going home to 

that pedophile.” When Wiley and H.B. returned to school, H.B. refused to talk to 

Wiley but spoke with the school counselor, Angie Mickey. Upon learning what H.B. 
4

had shared with Mickey, Wiley called Children’s Protective Services (CPS) and law 

enforcement.

3. Angie Mickey

The State designated Mickey as its outcry witness. In 2016, Mickey was the 

school counselor at Mountain Valley Middle School.

On March 9, 2016, Wiley brought H.B. to Mickey’s office to speak with her. 

Mickey testified that H.B. was crying and very upset. H.B. told Mickey that her 

mom’s boyfriend fondled her breasts and genitalia, that he bought her gifts in 

exchange for performing sexual acts, and that she performed “blow jobs” on him. 

H.B. told Mickey that her mom’s boyfriend bought her a phone and a pass to an 

amusement park in exchange for performing sexual acts on him when they lived in 

Iowa. H.B. told Mickey that the sexual abuse began when she was in sixth grade.

H.B. told Mickey that, on the previous day, her mother walked in while H.B. 

was performing oral sex on her mom’s boyfriend, and that her mom called her a 

“whore.” Mickey testified that she learned through school records that H.B.’s 

mother’s boyfriend was Stephen Hernandez. Mickey testified that H.B. was afraid 

the abuse would happen again if she went home and was fearful that someone would 

find out.
5

4. Sergeant Dufer

Sergeant Dufer with the Comal County Sheriff’s Office was assigned to 

investigate the sexual assault case involving appellant. Sergeant Dufer ordered a 

forensic interview of H.B. at the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) and a sexual 

assault nurse examiner (SANE) exam. Following the CAC interview, Sergeant Dufer 

executed a search warrant on H.B.’s residence to collect any physical and forensic 

evidence present at the home. 

Sergeant Dufer testified that he collected a pair of basketball shorts and an 

orange t-shirt from a clothes hamper in the bathroom that H.B.’s mother shared with 

appellant. He interviewed several people including H.B., her mother and 

grandmother, appellant’s boss and co-workers, appellant’s daughters, and a family 

friend. Sergeant Dufer discovered that H.B. had a membership pass to 

Adventureland in Des Moines, Iowa, and that appellant had been previously 

convicted of a third-degree sex offense in in Maryland. 

As part of the investigation, Sergeant Dufer ordered swabs be taken from the 

floor of appellant’s bedroom and H.B.’s bedroom closet where appellant allegedly 

ejaculated the day before H.B.’s outcry. Sergeant Dufer testified that the lab results 

of those swabs were inconclusive.
6

5. Sergeant Womack 

Sergeant Womack of the Comal County Sheriff’s Office assisted in the 

execution of the search warrant on H.B.’s residence in March 2016. He operated the 

department’s coherent laser system used to detect the presence of biological material

such as semen. Sergeant Womack testified that the system fluoresces if it detects 

biological material. Based on information obtained in the investigation, Sergeant 

Womack used the laser machine to look for semen on the floor of H.B.’s bedroom 

closet, the clothes hamper in appellant’s bathroom, and a pair of appellant’s shorts 

found in the hamper. The analysis of appellant’s shorts revealed the presence of 

semen on the right inside leg of the shorts.

6. Ashlyn Henshaw

Ashlyn Henshaw, a DNA Section Supervisor for the Texas Department of 

Public Safety (DPS) Crime Laboratory, testified about the laboratory results for the

items collected and submitted in the case to the crime lab for testing. The items 

consisted of swabs from the floor of H.B.’s home, shorts and a t-shirt belonging to 

appellant that were collected from a hamper in the master bathroom which appellant 

shared with H.B.’s mother, and an oral swab that was collected from H.B. by the 

SANE examiner. Henshaw testified that the presumptive testing for semen on the 

floor swabs was negative, the presumptive testing for semen on the t-shirt was 
7

negative, and the testing on H.B.’s oral swab was inconclusive. She testified that the 

presumptive test for semen on appellant’s shorts was positive for male DNA. 

7. H.B.

H.B. was twenty years old at the time of trial. She testified that her biological 

father was incarcerated at Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary in Kansas. She believed 

that her mother lived in Canyon Lake but was unsure of the exact location. 

When H.B. was eleven years old, she lived in Marion, Iowa, with her mother 

and two brothers. H.B. testified that she shared a bedroom with her brothers, and 

that she had her own bed and her brothers shared a twin bed. When she was in fifth 

grade, H.B., her mother, and her brothers moved into appellant’s house. H.B. 

testified that the house was big, with eleven bedrooms and six-and-a-half bathrooms. 

She was excited to move into the house because she had her own room and bathroom 

and there was a horse she could ride. H.B. testified that appellant was nice and 

welcoming when they first moved in and that she looked up to him as a stepfather.

H.B. testified that one day she asked appellant if he would take her for a 

motorcycle ride. They went to B-Bop’s restaurant in Altoona, Iowa, and from the 

restaurant they could see an amusement park called Adventureland. Appellant asked 

H.B. if she would like to have a season pass to Adventureland, and H.B. replied that 

she would. Appellant told her that she would have to take off her clothes when they 

got home in exchange for a pass. When they returned home, they went to H.B.’s 
8

bedroom, and appellant sat on the bed while H.B. stood in front of him and took her 

clothes off. Appellant asked H.B. if he could touch her breasts. When H.B. said yes, 

appellant grabbed her breasts. H.B. testified that she felt uncomfortable. Appellant 

told her not to tell anyone and, if she did, she would never see her grandmother again, 

she and her brothers would be separated and “go into the system,” and H.B. would 

not be able to see her mother again. After H.B. put her clothes back on, appellant 

took her to Adventureland to get a season pass.

H.B. testified that her relationship with appellant returned to normal 

afterwards and she acted as if nothing had happened. H.B. testified that she was 

ashamed of what had happened and blamed herself. She testified that her family had 

been previously involved with CPS and she knew that they could remove children. 

H.B. testified that she was scared that if she told anyone she would have nowhere to 

live and that she would be separated from her brothers.

H.B. testified that when she was in sixth grade, she asked her mother for a 

phone but her mother could not afford to buy her one. Appellant later offered to get 

H.B. a phone in exchange for “at least a blow job.” H.B. testified that appellant 

wanted to try to have sex with her as well. While her mother was in the shower, H.B. 

and appellant went to the garage. Appellant instructed H.B. to take her clothes off, 

and appellant took his clothes off as well. H.B. testified that appellant attempted to 
9

have sex with her but it hurt and she pushed appellant off of her. Afterwards, H.B. 

performed oral sex on appellant.

H.B. testified that appellant tried to have sex with her on multiple occasions 

but that it did not work. On one occasion, appellant tried to have sex with H.B. in 

his bed and used a small pink vibrator. H.B. testified that appellant eventually got a 

phone for her.

H.B, her mother, and her brothers later moved to Houston with appellant. H.B. 

testified that she continued to perform sexual acts with appellant in exchange for 

gifts. On one occasion, appellant took H.B. to a hotel to have sex with her in 

exchange for a new iPhone and clothes. H.B. testified that appellant penetrated her 

a little bit that time and that he took her to the same hotel on multiple occasions. 

In addition to the hotel, appellant came to H.B.’s room on many occasions to 

touch her while she was sleeping and that she began wearing a bra at night because 

of it. On one occasion, appellant told H.B. “next time, don’t wear a bra.” H.B. 

testified that her mother, who was in the nearby laundry room, overheard appellant 

and “started freaking out.” H.B. testified that this incident was the first time her 

mother learned about appellant’s abuse.

The summer before H.B. began eighth grade, she moved to a house on Irene 

Drive in Canyon Lake with her mother, brothers, and appellant. H.B. testified that 

her mother began sleeping in H.B.’s room to protect her from appellant. Appellant 
10

continued coming into H.B.’s room at night to wake her up and tell her to come back 

to his room. H.B. testified that she “was done trying to have sex” with appellant 

because it hurt, and she mainly performed oral sex on him instead. 

H.B., her mother and brothers, and appellant later moved into a house off Eden 

Ranch Drive in Canyon Lake. One day, appellant was home early when H.B. 

returned from school. When H.B. asked appellant why he was home so early, he 

showed her an iPad in a black and pink case and told H.B. she could have it if she 

gave him “a blowjob at least.” H.B. testified that appellant was wearing an orange 

Texas Longhorns shirt and long shorts at the time. Appellant and H.B. went into her 

bedroom closet where she began performing oral sex on appellant. H.B. testified that 

when her mom arrived home, appellant quickly pulled his pants up and ran out the 

back door to his bedroom. H.B.’s mother began screaming and calling H.B. names. 

The next day, H.B. received a dress code violation at school. H.B. testified 

that a dress code violation meant that a student could either change clothes or receive 

an in-school suspension (ISS). H.B. opted to change clothes but there were no extra 

shirts in the school nurse’s office so H.B. was told she had to sit in ISS for the day. 

H.B. refused and ran out of the school. When the school’s assistant principal and a 

police officer caught up with H.B. and asked her where she was going, H.B. told 

them she was not going back to her “crazy mom” or “pedophile stepdad.” H.B. 

returned to school and told the school counselor about appellant’s sexual abuse of 
11

her. Afterwards, CPS picked H.B. up at school and took her to the hospital for a 

SANE exam. H.B. testified that she and her brothers were placed in a youth home 

shelter. H.B’s grandparents were later granted temporary guardianship of H.B. and 

her brothers. H.B. and her brothers returned to live with their grandparents in Iowa. 

8. Noella Hill 

Hill, a registered nurse and SANE examiner, performed a SANE exam on 

H.B. on March 9, 2016. Hill testified that a SANE exam consists of taking a patient’s 

medical history, a physical exam, and a genital exam. 

During the history portion of the SANE exam, H.B. told Hill about appellant’s 

sexual abuse of her over the years, the dress code violation at school, and her outcry 

to Mickey. Hill testified that H.B. was very upset during the exam and was concerned 

about her mother getting into trouble. Hill collected oral swabs of H.B.’s mouth. Hill 

testified that H.B. had eaten, drank, and brushed her teeth/used mouthwash between 

the incident of sexual abuse and her SANE exam. Hill testified that H.B. declined a 

genital examination. H.B.’s medical examination records were admitted into 

evidence as State’s Exhibit 45. 

After both sides rested, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual 

assault of a child and sexual assault of a child. During the punishment phase, 

appellant pleaded true to a prior conviction for a third-degree sex offense as alleged 

in the indictments. After the jury found the enhancement paragraph true, it assessed 
12

appellant’s punishment at confinement for life in the Texas Department of Criminal 

Justice in each cause. The trial court ordered that the sentences run consecutively.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

We first consider appellant’s second issue in which he claims that the evidence 

is legally insufficient to support his convictions because, if sustained, that issue

would afford the greatest relief. See Bradleys’ Elec., Inc. v. Cigna Lloyds Ins. Co., 

995 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1999) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3). In re D.L.W.W., 617 

S.W.3d 64, 77 n.31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (“Because legally 

insufficient evidence requires a rendition of judgment in favor of the party raising 

the challenge, we must address a legal-sufficiency challenge first.”); Campbell v.

State, 125 S.W.3d 1, 4 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

A. Standard of Review

We review appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the 

standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 

323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under that standard, we examine all 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19. Evidence is insufficient under this 

standard in four circumstances: (1) the record contains no evidence probative of an 

element of the offense; (2) the record contains a mere “modicum” of evidence 
13

probative of an element of the offense; (3) the evidence conclusively establishes a 

reasonable doubt; and (4) the acts alleged do not constitute the criminal offense 

charged. See id. at 314, 318 n.11, 320; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009); Mottin v. State, 634 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).

The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give 

their testimony, and our role on appeal is simply to ensure that the evidence 

reasonably supports the jury’s verdict. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The jury may reasonably infer facts from the evidence 

presented, credit the witnesses it chooses, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or 

testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. Galvan-Cerna v. State, 

509 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Canfield 

v. State, 429 S.W.3d 54, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). 

Inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. See Curry v. 

State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

“Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the 

guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish 

guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Each fact need 

not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all 

incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Nisbett v. State, 
14

552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “On appeal, the same standard of 

review is used for both circumstantial and direct evidence cases.” Hooper, 214 

S.W.3d at 13.

B. Applicable Law 

A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child if the person 

intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the mouth of a child younger 

than fourteen years of age with the male sexual organ of the person or causes the 

mouth of a child younger than fourteen years of age to contact the male sexual organ 

of the person. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1), (2)(B). A person commits sexual 

assault of a child if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of 

the mouth of a child younger than seventeen years of age with the male sexual organ 

of the person or causes the mouth of a child younger than seventeen years of age to 

contact the male sexual organ of the person. Id. § 22.011(a), (c).

C. Analysis

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

convictions because (1) physical and DNA evidence linking him to the charged 

offenses was lacking, (2) there were inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony, (3) 

H.B. had more than one motivation to make an outcry, and (4) the other witnesses’ 

testimony was not corroborating evidence but merely bolstering. The State responds 

that when the combined and cumulative force of the evidence, and reasonable 
15

inferences from that evidence, are viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s 

verdict, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming and therefore legally 

sufficient.

The uncorroborated testimony of a child victim is alone sufficient to support

a conviction for sexual assault of a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07(a);

Gonzalez v. State, 522 S.W.3d 48, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). 

The State has no burden to produce any corroborating or physical evidence. Martines

v. State, 371 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see

also Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d,

206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“The lack of physical or forensic evidence 

is a factor for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence.”).

Here, H.B. testified that when she was eleven years old, appellant took her on 

a motorcycle ride to B-Bop’s restaurant in Altoona, Iowa. They could see an 

amusement park called Adventureland from the restaurant. H.B. testified that 

appellant asked her if she would like to have a season pass to Adventureland and, 

when she replied “yes,” he told her she would have to take off her clothes when they 

got home in exchange for the pass. H.B. testified that when they returned home, they 

went to H.B.’s bedroom, appellant sat on her bed while H.B. stood in front of him, 

she took off her clothes, and appellant grabbed her breasts. After H.B put her clothes 

back on, appellant took her to Adventureland to get a season pass.
16

H.B. testified that when she was in sixth grade, she asked her mother for a 

phone but her mother could not afford to get her one. Appellant later offered to get 

H.B. a phone in exchange for “at least a blow job.” While her mother was in the 

shower, H.B. and appellant went to the garage. Appellant instructed H.B. to take her 

clothes off, and appellant took his clothes off. H.B. testified that appellant attempted 

to have sex with her, but it hurt and she pushed him off of her. Afterwards, H.B. 

performed oral sex on appellant. H.B. testified that appellant tried to have sex with 

her on multiple occasions but it did not work. On one occasion he tried to have sex 

with H.B. in his bed and he used a small pink vibrator. H.B. testified that appellant 

eventually got a phone for her.

H.B. testified that she continued to perform sexual acts with appellant in 

exchange for gifts after they moved to Houston. On one occasion, appellant took 

H.B. to a hotel to have sex with her in exchange for a new iPhone and clothes. H.B. 

testified that appellant penetrated her a little bit that time, and that he took her to the 

same hotel on multiple occasions. In addition to the hotel, appellant came to H.B.’s 

room on many occasions to touch her while she was sleeping. 

H.B. testified that the summer before she began eighth grade, when she was 

thirteen years old, H.B., her mother, her brother, and appellant moved to Canyon 

Lake. Appellant regularly came into H.B.’s room at night to wake her up and tell her 

to come back to his room because H.B.’s mom was asleep in H.B.’s bed in an attempt 
17

to protect her from appellant. H.B. testified that she “was done trying to have sex” 

with appellant because it hurt and she mainly performed oral sex on him instead.

After they moved to a house off Eden Ranch Drive in Canyon Lake, appellant 

was home early one day when H.B. returned from school. H.B. testified that when 

she asked appellant why he was home early, he showed her an iPad in a black and 

pink case and told H.B. she could have it if she gave him “a blowjob at least.” 

Appellant and H.B. went into her bedroom closet and she began performing oral sex 

on appellant. H.B. testified that appellant was wearing a Texas Longhorns shirt and 

shorts at the time. H.B. testified that when her mother arrived home, appellant 

quickly pulled his pants up and ran out the back door to his bedroom. 

H.B.’s testimony alone about appellant’s pattern of sexual abuse of her 

beginning when H.B. was eleven years old until she was fourteen years old is 

sufficient to support appellant’s convictions. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 

38.07(a). Contrary to appellant’s suggestion, the lack of physical or DNA evidence 

tying him to the charged offenses does not render H.B.’s testimony insufficient.

Neither DNA evidence nor physical evidence is required to support a sexual assault 

conviction. See Pena v. State, 441 S.W.3d 635, 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2014, pet. ref’d) (“The absence of DNA or fingerprint evidence at trial does not

render the other evidence insufficient to support the conviction.”) (citing Garcia v.

State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (noting victim’s 
18

testimony alone was sufficient to sustain rape conviction, despite lack of physical 

evidence)); Sims v. State, 84 S.W.3d 768, 774 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. ref’d) 

(upholding conviction where victim’s testimony identified defendant as attacker 

despite absence of “scientific evidence”); see also Dudley v. State, No. 01-20-00175-

CR, 2021 WL 4848470, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 19, 2021, pet. 

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating absence of defendant’s 

DNA on knife and insufficient male DNA on complainant’s oral swab did not render 

other evidence insufficient to support defendant’s sexual assault conviction). We 

note that while the laboratory analyses of the swabs taken from H.B.’s mouth was 

inconclusive due to the low quantification of male DNA, there was no evidence 

presented that appellant ejaculated in H.B.’s mouth during the last incident of sexual 

abuse before her mother arrived home, and there was evidence that H.B. had eaten, 

drank, brushed her teeth or used mouthwash between the incident and her SANE 

exam. Further, analysis revealed the presence of semen on the inside of the shorts 

appellant wore during the last act of sexual abuse. This evidence was consistent with 

H.B.’s testimony that appellant was wearing those shorts at the time she performed 

oral sex on him and when he ran out of her room because H.B.’s mother had arrived 

home.

The jury also heard Wiley’s and Mickey’s testimony about H.B.’s demeanor 

and reaction to the dress code violation on March 9, 2016. Wiley, the assistant 
19

principal, testified that H.B. was “very heated, animated” when Wiley caught up 

with her after H.B. had run out of school, and that she yelled “you can’t make me go 

back” and “I’m not going home to that pedophile.” Mickey, the school counselor, 

testified that H.B. was crying and very upset when she met with her, and that H.B. 

eventually confided that her mother’s boyfriend had fondled her breasts and genitalia 

and bought her gifts in exchange for sexual acts. H.B. expressed a fear of going home 

and being around appellant again to Mickey. Hill, the SANE examiner, testified 

about her evaluation of H.B. and the description of the sexual abuse H.B. provided 

during the exam. Hill testified that H.B. told her what happened at school and about 

her outcry to Mickey, and that H.B. provided details about appellant’s abuse of her. 

The jury also saw photographs of H.B. at each of the homes where she had lived 

with appellant and a copy of the pass to Adventureland that appellant gave her in 

exchange for the first sexual act she performed for appellant, all of which were 

consistent with H.B.’s timeline and description of events. There was also evidence 

that appellant had been previously convicted of sexually abusing a young girl in a 

manner similar to the manner in which he first abused H.B.

Appellant argues that H.B. had more than one motivation for making the 

outcry. In particular, he points to H.B.’s testimony that she blamed appellant for her 

dog’s death, she wanted to live with her grandmother in Iowa, and she was upset 

about being in trouble for the dress code violation at school. He asserts that although 
20

a sexual assault conviction can be supported on the uncorroborated testimony of the 

child sexual assault victim, there were inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimony 

and that, under these circumstances, an appellate court can find that the evidence is 

legally insufficient to support the conviction.

The jury acts as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses at trial and 

may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Sharp v. State, 

707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Ledford v. State, 649 S.W.3d 731, 

739 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). We defer to the

responsibility of the fact finder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh

evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. See Febus v. State, 542 

S.W.3d 568, 572, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“Though Appellant argues that it was 

more reasonable for the jury to conclude that the police had made a clerical mistake,

we must defer to the jury’s resolution regarding competing inferences and 

evidentiary conflicts”); see also Riordan v. State, No. 03-16-00297-CR, 2017 WL 

3378889, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 4, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (“Appellant’s interpretation of the evidence and testimony, 

however, simply reflects conflicts in the evidence. These were all matters left to the 

jury to resolve. Reconciliation of any conflicts or contradictions in the evidence is 

within the exclusive province of the jury.”) (citations omitted). As a reviewing court, 

we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence in the record and 
21

thereby substitute our own judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 

S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we 

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence 

is sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for the offenses of aggravated sexual 

assault of a child and sexual assault of a child. 

We overrule appellant’s second issue.

Challenges for Cause

In his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

challenges for cause to Jurors Nos. 7 and 61.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A venireperson is challengeable for cause if he “has a bias or prejudice against

the defendant or against the law upon which either the State or the defense is entitled

to rely.” Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16(a)(9), (c)(2). To be challengeable, the bias or prejudice 

must “substantially impair the prospective juror’s ability to carry out his oath and

instructions in accordance with the law.” Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 295. “Before a 

venireperson may be excused based on bias or prejudice, the law must be explained 

to him, and he must be asked whether he can follow that law regardless of his 
22

personal views.” Id. The proponent of a challenge for cause has the burden of 

establishing that the challenge is proper by showing that “the veniremember

understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his prejudice well

enough to follow the law.” Id.

“We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause with considerable

deference because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate a veniremember’s

demeanor and responses.” Id. at 295–96 (citing Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 

517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). Thus, a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause 

may be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 296. “When a

veniremember’s answers are ambiguous, vacillating, unclear, or contradictory, we

give particular deference to the trial court’s decision.” Id.; Robinson v. State, 989 

S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (“If a venire 

member equivocates on her ability to follow the law, the reviewing court must defer 

to the trial court’s judgment.”).

B. Challenges to Prospective Jurors Nos. 7 and 61

During the panel voir dire discussion, the State questioned Juror No. 7 about 

witness credibility. The following exchange took place:

Prosecutor: So as a juror, your job is to listen, to keep an open mind. 

You can believe some, none or all of what someone says, if you listen 

to them and you believe them beyond a reasonable doubt. 

So everyone comes in on the same footage. I know I have my 

police officer here from Hays County—and you knew I was going to 
23

call on you—even though, Juror Number 7 here is a police officer and 

if he came in here and he had on his gun and his badge and he’s got 

on his vest and his gear that he puts on every day, just because he has 

a badge and a gun doesn’t mean he gets more credibility. 

Would you agree with that Juror Number 7?

Juror No. 7: Yes.

Prosecutor: Do you think that you can just judge a book by its cover?

Juror No. 7: No, ma’am.

Prosecutor: All right. So when you come in and when officers come 

in, you have to be able to look at everything, you've got to listen. 

You might have good officers, you might have bad officers. 

Would you agree with me?

Juror No. 7: Yes, ma’am.

. . . . 

Prosecutor: Let me ask you, just because I know he’s going to do it, I’m 

going to get to you first. Because of your experience, your training, you 

being a police officer, do you still think you could be fair and impartial 

and sit in a case like this and listen to the evidence—hold on, hold on 

before you tell me anything—listen to all of the evidence and judge the 

credibility of each witness keeping an open mind and not rendering a 

decision until you hear all of it? 

Juror No. 7: I do think I could. But I am biased, because like I said, I’ve 

taken this report, I’ve taken this call, I’ve talked to the victims. I know 

how in depth the investigations are. So I would be biased. 

Prosecutor: Okay. But can you set your bias aside, because your [sic] 

biased to the offense. You’re not biased to this defendant, are you?

Juror No. 7: No.
24

In the course of both sides making their strikes for cause, defense counsel 

asked Juror No. 7 about several of his earlier responses:

Defense Counsel: During Ms. Frazier’s voir dire, during her jury 

questions, you talked a little bit about having some bias about a case 

like this because of your work.

Juror No. 7: I think it’s possible, yes, sir.

Defense Counsel: Can you explain that a little bit more?

Juror No. 7: Well, I’m a deputy with the Hays County Sheriff’s Office 

and I have taken sexual assault reports, sexual assault of a child. Just 

saying that I have that kind of insight that a normal civilian would not.

Defense Counsel: So if somebody comes and testifies and it’s different 

from what your personal insight is to these kind of cases, are you going 

to rely on your personal insights or are you going to rely on what the 

testimony is in the courtroom?

Juror No. 7: I wouldn’t say that. I was just saying that I have a different

perspective, that’s all. So I would rely on the other testimony and 

evidence presented. 

Defense Counsel: Okay. When you say you have a bias on these cases, 

does your work effect how you’re going to hear the evidence in this 

case? 

Juror No. 7: I think—so you’re talking about credibility, that I might 

put more weight into, say, an officer or investigator’s testimony than 

say your average other person might.

Defense Counsel: Why is that?

Juror No. 7: Because of my experience and I know what these guys do, 

and I don’t think that they are doing anything—I’m not going to say 

wrong. But they are not misrepresenting anything like that. 
25

Defense Counsel: So are you going to treat them with—sort of a starting 

point, are you going to treat them with more credibility than another 

witness?

Juror No 7: Yes. That’s kind of what I was trying to say with the whole 

bias part. 

Defense Counsel: Okay. Would you be able to set that aside and treat 

them equally like any other witness who came in, or is that bias going 

to affect your ability to hear the case?

Juror No. 7: I can certainly try, but like I said, being a police officer and 

seeing other police officers knowing what they go through and what 

they do.

Defense Counsel: So I kind of need a yes or no. Sorry to flip that script 

back on you. 

Juror No. 7: No, no. I understand. I want to say yes, but it might—I’d 

have to say no just to be on the safe side, because like I said, if I see 

another officer, I’m going to assume that he’s doing everything by the 

book and wants what’s best for the victim and justice in general.

Defense Counsel: Pass the witness.

Prosecutor: So are you going to assume or are you going to wait to hear 

what he’s done and look at his credentials and listen to the evidence 

before you give that weight?

Juror No. 7: No. Of course, I’m going to listen to everything. I’m just 

saying I’m going to be—I would start off with believing him more. 

Prosecutor: Well, you understand that the law says you can’t do that?

Juror No. 7: Right.

Prosecutor: Okay. And so does that mean, then, at this point, you’re 

going to—even though the law would be that you cannot do that, you 

would still do that? You couldn’t set that aside and take them as equal?
26

Juror No. 7: I could do that. I could put it aside and look at them—I 

don’t think they are lying or anything like that. But I’m trying to be 

honest.

Prosecutor: No, I agree. And you understand there are good cops and 

bad cops, right? There’s cops out there that have done wrong?

Juror No. 7: Yes, ma’am. 

Prosecutor: Maybe they have handled the scene improperly or maybe 

they have done something in their personal life that causes them to be 

on a Brady list or some sort of thing. So not every cop is assumed to be 

credible just because they are cop [sic]. Would you agree with that?

Juror No. 7: Yes, ma’am. Good point.

Prosecutor: And so when an officer comes in, can you set aside the 

preconceived notion that you assume they are all good, and listen to the 

testimony, listen to the credibility and listen to what they did and see if 

that is sufficient and that is—and then you can give whatever weight 

you want to their testimony. You can give more, less, none at all, but 

you have to wait. And that’s the question, can you wait? If you can’t, 

that’s totally fine. 

Juror No. 7: I can. I just want to be completely upfront and honest. I 

mean, that’s just—

Prosecutor: But your bias isn’t against this defendant?

Juror No. 7: Of course not. 

Prosecutor: So your bias is against the crime of sexual assault of a 

child?

Juror No. 7: Yes.

Following the exchange, defense counsel moved to strike Juror No. 7 because 

“he stated clearly he’s going to hold some witnesses with more credibility than 
27

others before hearing the evidence.” The prosecutor responded that Juror No. 7 

stated only that he had a bias against the offenses and not against appellant. She 

argued that after Juror No. 7 was provided with an explanation of the law, he 

confirmed that he could follow the law. The trial court denied defense counsel’s 

challenge for cause to Juror No. 7.

During his portion of voir dire, defense counsel asked the jury panel the 

following question: 

So the question I’ve got is: Are you going to be able to, given this kind 

of case, the kind of evidence that we expect to hear, are you going to be 

able to sit and listen to all the evidence? I’m just going to go through 

from the beginning, all right?

Juror No. 61 answered “no.”

Later, defense counsel asked Juror No. 61 about her answer to the question:

Defense Counsel: Do you remember during my section of the questions 

where I was asking about an ability to listen to all the evidence in the 

case? Do you remember what your answer was? 

Juror No. 61: It was no. 

Defense Counsel: Can you explain that? 

Juror No. 61: Yes. I have one of those minds that relives and rethinks. 

I can’t watch movies, certain movies. I can’t read books because I just 

play things over and over in my mind. And I know I would play, 

whether it’s words or visuals, it doesn’t matter, I would play it over and 

over in my mind. That would be difficult for me.

Defense Counsel: So I think you answered a couple of different 

questions that maybe I didn’t ask. So what is—would you be able to 

listen to all the evidence in a trial like this and not make your mind up 
28

after just hearing a portion, but keep your mind open and listen to all 

the evidence?

Juror No. 61: I could listen to it, but it would be difficult on me 

physically. 

Defense Counsel: Okay. What do you mean by that?

Juror No. 61: I probably wouldn’t sleep at night. 

Defense Counsel: All right. So—

Juror No. 61: Depending on what was said.

Defense Counsel: So you would listen to the evidence, but how would 

that affect your ability to make a decision?

Juror No. 61: It would not affect the way I made a decision; it would 

affect me personally.

Defense Counsel: All right. Are you able to listen to the evidence in 

this case?

Juror No. 61: I would do it if I was called. And I would deal with my 

own physical—I could deal with it for a week.

Following this exchange, defense counsel stated, “I don’t know what to do 

with that answer, Judge. I’m going to move to strike for cause.” The trial court 

denied the challenge for cause to Juror No. 61.

Prior to the sides exercising their peremptory challenges, defense counsel 

requested two additional peremptory challenges “because of the two strikes . . . that 

were not granted to the defense. That was [Juror] Number 7 and [Juror] Number 61.” 

The trial court denied the request. The jury was seated and sworn.
29

Before the start of testimony the next day, defense counsel advised the trial 

court that he had a couple of housekeeping issues:

Number one, I was a little imprecise yesterday at the end of the day

because I was tired. When I stated on the record that I did not object to 

the jury as seated, I was not intending to waive any objections during 

the strike conferences. I was merely not objecting to the jury as that it 

reflected the strikes that I actually made, and that none of the people 

that I struck were seated on the panel.

. . . . 

The second issue there is the final step, I believe, which I—because I 

was tired, that I didn’t take was to identify the people that I would have 

struck if I had gotten the extra strikes or if the Court had done those.

And this is just as a proffer, not asking—it’s just an issue that I offer 

as a proffer, is that Jurors 21 and 32 would have been the strikes that I 

would have made if the—and I had noted those. Those are—and I would 

tell the Court as an officer of the Court, those were in my notes 

yesterday as the strikes that I did not make, that I would have made next 

if I’d had—if those numbers—if the ruling had been different.

C. Preservation of Error

We initially address the State’s contention that appellant waived his claim that 

the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause to Jurors Nos. 7 and 61. To 

preserve error for a trial court’s erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, appellant 

must show that (1) he asserted a clear and specific challenge for cause; (2) he used 

a peremptory challenge on the complained-of venire member; (3) his peremptory 

challenges were exhausted; (4) his request for additional strikes was denied; and (5) 

an objectionable juror sat on the jury. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 105 (Tex.
30

Crim. App. 1996). The defendant must make the proper objection before the panel 

is sworn. Credille v. State, 925 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

1996, pet. ref’d).

1. “Clear and Specific Challenge”

After both sides questioned Juror No. 7, defense counsel moved to strike him 

on the ground that “he stated clearly he’s going to hold some witnesses with more 

credibility than others before hearing the evidence.” The prosecutor responded that 

Juror No. 7 stated only that he had a bias against the offenses and not against 

appellant, and that after Juror No. 7 was provided with an explanation of the law he 

stated that he could follow the law.

The State argues that appellant waived his claim of error because he did not 

articulate a clear and specific challenge for cause after the State explained the law 

to him. Appellant’s statement that he was moving to strike Juror No. 7 because “he 

stated clearly he’s going to hold some witnesses with more credibility than others 

before hearing the evidence” was sufficient to preserve his claim of error with 

respect to Juror No. 7.

Following questioning of the venire panel, Juror No. 61 was questioned 

individually regarding her ability to serve on the jury. After Juror No. 61 was 

excused, defense counsel stated, “I don’t know what to do with that answer, Judge. 

I’m going to move to strike for cause.” The trial court denied the challenge.
31

The State argues that appellant waived his claim of error with respect to Juror 

No. 61 because he did not articulate a clear and specific challenge for cause. We 

agree. Defense counsel’s statement that he “[did not] know what to do with [Juror 

No 61’s] answer” was not a clear and specific challenge for cause to Juror No. 61.

2. “Objectionable Juror”

The State also argues that although appellant requested two additional 

peremptory challenges, he failed to identify in a timely manner which objectionable 

jurors sat on the jury because his peremptory challenges were exhausted by 

exercising them on Jurors Nos. 7 and 61. 

The record reflects that defense counsel only identified the objectionable 

jurors—Jurors Nos. 21 and 32—after the jury had been seated and sworn. 

Appellant’s objection to the composition of the jury after it was sworn and seated 

failed to preserve error. See Credille, 925 S.W.2d at 115 (“[An] objection after the 

jury was sworn [i]s not timely . . . Because [the] appellant failed to press the trial 

judge to make a specific ruling before the jury was sworn, he failed to preserve 

error.”); see also Dimas v. State, No. 14-01-01123-CR, 2002 WL 31769381, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (“Appellant’s assertions identifying the objectionable jurors, after 

the jury panel was sworn in, were not timely; thus, appellant failed to preserve 

error.”).
32

D. Trial Court’s Rulings

However, even if appellant had preserved his claim of error, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s challenges for cause to Jurors Nos. 7 

and 61.

1. Juror No. 7

Appellant argues that Juror No. 7, a deputy with the Comal County Sheriff’s 

Office, made it clear that he had a bias in favor of the State. Thus, he argues, the trial 

court erred in denying his challenge for cause.

During questioning, Juror No. 7 agreed that a testifying officer is not entitled 

to more credibility because he comes in with a gun and badge, and that there are 

good and bad officers. He stated that he was biased because of his experience 

working these types of cases and has a different perspective than civilians but he

thought he could keep an open mind and not reach a decision until he heard all the 

evidence. When asked if he would rely on his personal insights or the testimony at 

trial, Juror No. 7 responded that he would rely on the evidence presented at trial. 

Juror No. 7 stated that he would initially treat an officer’s testimony with more 

credibility than another witness’ testimony. When the prosecutor explained that the 

law prohibits him from doing so and asked whether he could set aside his bias and 

treat witnesses equally, Juror No. 7 stated that he could.
33

“When the record reflects that a venire member vacillated or equivocated on 

his ability to follow the law, the reviewing court must defer to the trial judge.” 

Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 295. “A trial judge’s ruling on a challenge for cause may 

be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 296. Here, Juror No. 7 

vacillated and equivocated on whether he would treat law enforcement witnesses 

with “more credibility than another witness.” While Juror No. 7 expressed that he 

would initially treat a testifying officer with more credibility than another witness, 

after he was provided with an explanation of the law he stated that he would listen 

to the evidence before determining the weight to give to the testimony. See Ladd v. 

State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (stating jurors “are not 

challengeable for cause simply because they would give certain classes of witnesses 

a slight edge in terms of credibility, because ‘[c]omplete impartiality cannot be 

realized as long as human beings are called upon to be jurors.’”) (quoting Jones v.

State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)); see also Nunez v. State, No. 

13-17-00671-CR, 2019 WL 1831715, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg

Apr. 25, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Juror 12

vacillated on her answers concerning impartiality, but she is not biased as a matter 

of law. She stated that she understands the defendant’s right to a fair trial and she 

indicated that she would try to be impartial even though she was not completely 

certain of her ability to do so. Thus, we will afford great deference in this case to the 
34

trial court’s discretion because the trial court was in the best position to evaluate 

juror 12’s answers and demeanor”). Affording deference to the trial court’s 

discretion, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s 

challenge for cause to Juror No. 7.

2. Juror No. 61

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause 

to Juror No. 61 because she made it clear she had a bias when she stated she would 

be physically affected by having to listen to the evidence. Appellant asserts that a 

juror who cannot listen to the evidence without having serious physical 

consequences or worries about her psychological well-being cannot be fair and 

impartial.

In response to a general question to the venire members asking whether they 

had the ability to sit and listen to the evidence, Juror No. 61 responded “no.” Defense 

counsel later questioned the juror individually about her answer. Juror No. 61 stated 

that she has the type of mind that replays things over and over and that hearing the 

evidence would physically affect her. When asked whether the physical impact of 

listening to the evidence would affect her ability to reach a decision, Juror No. 61 

unequivocally responded that it would not affect the way she made a decision and 

that it would only affect her personally. When asked whether she could listen to the 
35

evidence, she replied that she would if called and could deal with the physical 

impact. 

To be challengeable, a juror’s bias or prejudice must “substantially impair the

prospective juror’s ability to carry out his oath and instructions in accordance with

the law.” Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 295. Appellant has not met his burden to establish 

that his challenge for cause to Juror No. 61 is proper. See Feldman, 71 S.W.3d 738. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his challenge for cause to Juror 

No. 61. 

Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Amparo Guerra

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Farris and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).