[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-13846

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-14098-RLR

ANTRAEVIS SMITH, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Respondents-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(January 28, 2020)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Antraevis Smith, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his 

counseled 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We granted a certificate of 

appealability as to whether the state court unreasonably applied Apprendi v. New 

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), or relied on an unreasonable determination of the facts,

in concluding that the jury’s verdict legally supported his convictions and life 

sentences for robbery with a firearm and carjacking with a firearm. After careful 

review, we affirm the denial of habeas relief. 

I.

In 2009, the State of Florida charged Smith and two codefendants, Jamelle 

Davis and Derreck Littles, with carjacking with a deadly weapon, Fla. Stat. 

§§ 812.133(2)(a) and 777.011, and Smith and Littles with robbery with a deadly 

weapon while wearing a mask, Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(a), 777.011, and 775.0845. 

Davis pled guilty to carjacking with a deadly weapon and testified against Smith at 

his jury trial. The state declined to prosecute the charges against Littles. 

At trial, the victim, Duane Ambrister, testified about the robbery and 

carjacking. Late one night, he was sitting in his parked, running vehicle when two 

masked men with guns approached, knocked on the windows with the guns, and 

demanded that Ambrister open the doors. Ambrister unlocked the doors and got out 

of the vehicle. Upon seeing Ambrister, one of the masked men ran off. The other 

man went through Ambrister’s pockets, taking $1,200 in cash, and then jumped in 

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the driver’s seat of the vehicle, which was still running, and drove off. Ambrister

testified that he knew Smith, but he did not believe that Smith was either of the two

robbers. 

Smith’s codefendant Davis testified that he was involved in the carjacking and 

robbery with Smith and Littles. According to Davis, Smith and Littles executed the 

robbery while he waited in a nearby vehicle. Later that night, police pulled over 

Davis’s car and found the masks, gloves, and guns that were used in the robbery. 

In discussing the jury instructions, the parties and the court agreed not to 

include any lesser offenses. In other words, they agreed to require the jury to find 

that the offenses were committed with a firearm in order to return a guilty verdict. 

Separately, the parties and the court agreed to ask the jury to find whether Smith 

personally possessed a firearm as to each offense, which they viewed as a factual 

finding essential to the application of a mandatory minimum penalty, see Fla. Stat. 

§ 775.087(2)(a). 

After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury as to carjacking,

robbery, and aiding-and-abetting liability. With regard to carjacking, the court 

stated,

[T]o prove the crime of carjacking, the State must prove the following 

three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that Mr. Smith took 

the motor vehicle from the person or custody of Duane Ambrister. 

Second, force, violence, assault or putting in fear was used in the course 

of the taking. And third, the taking was with the intent to temporarily 

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or permanently deprive Duane Ambrister of his right to the motor 

vehicle or any benefit from it.

The court continued, 

If you find the Defendant guilty of the crime of carjacking, then you 

must further determine beyond a reasonable doubt if in the course of 

committing the carjacking the Defendant carried some kind of weapon. 

An act is in the course of committing the carjacking if it occurs in the 

attempt to commit carjacking or in flight after the attempt or 

commission.

If you find the Defendant carried a firearm or other deadly weapon in 

the course of the carjacking, you should find him guilty of carjacking 

with a firearm or deadly weapon. 

The trial court’s instructions for robbery followed the same pattern. The court 

first gave the elements for simple robbery and then stated, 

If you find the Defendant guilty of the crime of robbery, you must 

further determine beyond a reasonable doubt if in the course of 

committing the robbery, the Defendant carried some kind of weapon. 

An act is in the course of committing the robbery if it occurs in an 

attempt to commit robbery or in flight after the attempt or commission.

If you find the Defendant carried a firearm in the course of committing 

the robbery, you should find him guilty of robbery with a firearm.

Finally, the trial court instructed the jury on aiding-and-abetting liability as 

follows:

If the Defendant helped another person or persons commit or attempt 

to commit a crime, the Defendant is a principal and must be treated as 

if he had done all the things the other person or persons did if the 

Defendant had a conscious intent that the criminal act be done and the 

Defendant did some act or said some word which was intended to and 

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which did incite, cause, encourage, assist or advise the other person or 

persons to actually commit or attempt to commit the time. To be a 

principal, the Defendant does not have to be present when the crime is 

committed or attempted.

The verdict form asked the jury to find, as to Count I, whether Smith was 

“Guilty, of Carjacking with a Firearm,” or not guilty, and, as to Count II, whether 

Smith was “Guilty, of Robbery with a Firearm,” or not guilty. Under both counts, 

the verdict form stated, “If you find the defendant guilty you must now make a 

further finding. Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually 

possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense?” The trial court went 

over the verdict form but did not clarify how “actual[] possess[ion]” differed from 

the standard applicable to the charged offenses.

While deliberating, the jury sent a question asking whether it could check 

“guilty” to the charges but “no” as to whether it found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Smith “actually possessed a firearm during the offense[s].” The prosecutor and 

defense counsel agreed that the jury could do so, if its decision was unanimous. The 

court responded to the question: “Members of the jury, yes, if the finding is 

unanimous.” The jury then returned a verdict, finding Smith guilty of both counts 

but checking “no” as to whether Smith actually possessed a firearm during the 

commission of the offenses. The court adjudicated Smith guilty and sentenced him 

to concurrent life sentences. 

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Subsequently, Smith filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to 

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a), raising the subject of his instant § 2254 petition. The trial 

court denied the motion, finding that Smith’s sentences were not illegal. The court 

concluded that the jury was able to find Smith guilty as charged, despite finding that 

he did not personally possess a firearm during the commission of the offenses, 

because the jury was instructed on aiding-and-abetting liability under Fla. Stat. 

§ 777.011. Smith appealed, and the state appellate court summarily affirmed. 

Smith then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. The district court, 

adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied the petition. 

Smith now appeals, and we granted a COA on the following issue: “[w]hether the 

state court unreasonably applied Apprendi [], or relied on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts, in concluding that Mr. Smith’s convictions and 

concurrent life sentences for robbery with a firearm and carjacking with a firearm 

were legally supported by the jury’s verdict.” 

II.

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, 

“but we owe deference to the final state habeas judgment.” Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t 

of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).

Specifically, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), where a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a federal 

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court may grant habeas relief only if the state-court decision (1) “was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state 

court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was 

unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 

465, 473 (2007). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal law 

if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that 

principle to the facts. Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 817 (11th Cir. 2011). To be 

“objectively unreasonable,” the state court’s ruling must be more than incorrect—it 

must be “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Similarly, the “unreasonable 

determination of the facts” prong does not permit habeas relief “merely because we

would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance” or if “reasonable 

minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.” Brumfield 

v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (cleaned up). 

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Smith’s claim is based on Apprendi. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held 

that the “notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment” require that, 

“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 

crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 476, 490. The “statutory 

maximum,” for purposes of Apprendi, “is the maximum sentence a judge may 

impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 

defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in original). 

Therefore, a judge may not lawfully “inflict[] punishment that the jury’s verdict 

alone does not allow” because “the jury has not found all the facts which the law 

makes essential to the punishment.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Under Florida law, the basic versions of carjacking and robbery are 

punishable by maximum terms of imprisonment of thirty and fifteen years, 

respectively. See Fla. Stat. §§ 812.133(2)(b), 775.082(3)(b)(1); Fla. Stat. 

§§ 812.13(2)(c), 775.082(3)(d). If the defendant carried a firearm or other deadly 

weapon in the course of committing the offenses, however, the statutory maximum 

increases to life imprisonment. Fla. Stat. §§ 812.133(2)(a), 812.13(2)(a). 

Additionally, Florida “punishes aiders and abettors the same the same as principal 

offenders.” Boston v. United States, 939 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2019); see Fla. 

Stat. § 777.011 (“Whoever commits any criminal offense . . . , or aids, abets, 

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counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such 

offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree 

and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such.”).

Smith argues that his life sentences clearly violate Apprendi because the trial 

court did not instruct the jury as to the essential firearm or deadly weapon element 

of the offenses and the jury found he did not actually possess a firearm. As a result, 

in Smith’s view, the jury failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that either he or a 

codefendant carried a firearm during the offenses. Based on the jury’s verdict alone, 

according to Smith, he “can only be sentenced for simple carjacking (thirty-year

maximum sentence) and simple robbery (fifteen-year maximum sentence).” 

Here, Smith has not shown that the state court unreasonably applied Apprendi

or relied on an unreasonable determination of facts. While the jury instructions and 

verdict form are not models of clarity, the record contradicts Smith’s claim that the 

trial court failed to instruct the jury as to the firearm or deadly weapon element of 

the offenses. The verdict form specifically asked the jury to find whether Smith was 

“Guilty, of Robbery with a Firearm,” and “Guilty, of Carjacking with a Firearm.” 

And the essential elements of those offenses were included in the jury instructions. 

After instructing the jury on the elements of simple carjacking and robbery, the trial 

court stated that, if the jury found Smith guilty of those elements, it “must further 

determine beyond a reasonable doubt if in the course of committing [the offenses] 

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the Defendant carried some kind of weapon.” And if the jury found that Smith 

“carried a firearm,” the court instructed, it “should find him guilty of [carjacking or 

robbery] with a firearm.” Thus, the jury was properly instructed that, to find Smith 

guilty of the charged offenses, it must find that he carried a firearm. See Fla. Stat. 

§§ 812.133(2)(a), 812.13(2)(a). 

Smith faults the trial court for failing to specifically instruct the jury that Smith 

could be found guilty of the charged offenses “if any of the defendants carried a 

firearm or other deadly weapon.” Appellant’s Br. at 12 n.3. Instead, according to 

Smith, the instructions asked the jury to find only whether “the Defendant” carried 

a firearm, but in response to the interrogatory on the verdict form, the jury

specifically found that he did not “actually possess[] a firearm during the offense[s].” 

While we agree that the trial court could have done more to clarify how 

“actual[] possess[ion]” as used in the interrogatory differed from the standard 

applicable to the charged offenses, we cannot say that the denial of habeas relief was 

unreasonable. Although the jury ultimately found that Smith did not actually possess 

a firearm, the state post-conviction court1 reasonably concluded that the jury’s 

finding on that matter did not undermine Smith’s convictions or sentences because 

the jury was instructed on aiding-and-abetting liability. 

1 Because the Florida appellate court affirmed the post-conviction court without issuing an 

opinion, we “look through” to the lower court’s reasoning and presume that it reflects the higher 

court’s reasons for affirming. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). 

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Under § 777.011, Fla. Stat., which was alleged in the charging document, 

Smith could still be convicted of and punished for committing the charged offenses

with a firearm even if he did not personally possess a firearm. See Lopez v. State, 

833 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“The law of principals allows Lopez 

to be convicted of [carjacking with a firearm and robbery with a firearm] regardless 

of whether he personally possessed a firearm, even if he could not be given a 

minimum mandatory sentence.”). Under that liability doctrine, as the trial court 

instructed the jury, Smith “must be treated as if he had done all the things the other 

person or persons did” if he aided or abetted that other person. For that reason, the 

trial court did not need to specify that the jury could find Smith guilty if someone 

other than Smith carried a firearm. And there was evidence that Smith aided or 

abetted a carjacking and robbery during which a firearm was carried and brandished. 

Thus, the jury’s verdict, viewed in light of the jury instructions, reasonably 

reflects a finding that Smith aided or abetted a codefendant who carried a firearm 

during the offenses, and therefore is treated as if he carried a firearm, but that he did 

not in fact personally carry a firearm. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. That is a legally 

valid and consistent verdict under Florida law. See Lopez, 833 So. 2d at 284 

(affirming convictions in similar circumstances). Because no additional factual 

findings were necessary to sentence Smith to concurrent life sentences based on that 

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verdict, see Fla. Stat. §§ 812.13(2)(a), 812.133(2)(a), his sentences do not violate 

Apprendi.

In sum, the record reasonably supports the state court’s decision that Smith 

was properly convicted of and sentenced for armed carjacking and armed robbery. 

Despite the less-than-clear jury instructions, reasonable minds might disagree as to 

whether the jury “found all the facts which the law makes essential to the 

punishment.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. Even if we might have decided the matter 

differently had it been our call in the first instance, Smith has not established “an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Giving due deference to the 

state court’s decision, we must affirm the denial of Smith’s § 2254 petition. 

AFFIRMED.

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