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							No. 3--00--0647

_________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2001

THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID,		)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

ex rel. TAMARA ALLEN,			)	of the 9th Judicial Circuit,

							)	McDonough County, Illinois

	Petitioner-Appellant,		)	

							)

	v.						)	No. AO--F--26

							)	

FRED DIXSON,					)	Honorable

                                )	Patricia A. Walton

	Respondent-Appellee.		)	Judge, Presiding

_________________________________________________________________

	ORDER	JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the Court:

_________________________________________________________________

	Fred Dixson executed a written acknowledgment of paternity

admitting that he was the biological father of Fred Dixson, Jr. 

However, when Dixson was subsequently faced with the prospect of

paying child support and providing health insurance for Fred Jr.,

he moved for genetic testing to determine whether Fred Jr. was

his child.  The judge granted the motion and ordered testing at

the State’s expense.  The State filed this interlocutory appeal,

and we reverse.

	The following provisions of the Illinois Parentage Act of

1984 (the Act) (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1998)) govern this appeal.

	"§ 5.  Presumption of Paternity.

	(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

	* * *

	(3) he and the child’s natural mother have signed

an acknowledgment of paternity in accordance with rules

adopted by the Illinois Department of Public Aid ***[.]

	***

	(b) *** A presumption under subdivision (a)(3) or

(a)(4) is conclusive, unless the acknowledgment of

parentage is rescinded *** upon the earlier of:

	(1) 60 days after the date the acknowledgment of

parentage is signed, or

	(2) the date of an administrative or judicial

proceeding relating to the child (including a

proceeding to establish a support order) in which the

signatory is a party[.]"  750 ILCS 45/5(a)(3), (b)(1)

through (2) (West 1998).

	"§ 6.  Establishment of Parent and Child

Relationship by Consent of the Parties.

	(a) A parent and child relationship may be

established voluntarily by the signing and witnessing

of a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage ***. ***

	(b) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this

Act, paternity established in accordance with

subsection (a) has the full force and effect of a

judgment entered under this Act and serves as a basis

for seeking a child support order without any further proceedings to establish paternity.

	(c) A judicial or administrative proceeding to

ratify paternity established in accordance with

subsection (a) is neither required nor permitted.

	(d) A signed acknowledgment of paternity entered

under this Act may be challenged in court only on the

basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,

with the burden of proof on the challenging party. ***" 

750 ILCS 45/6(a) through (d) (West 1998).

	The record shows that Fred Jr. was born to Tamara Allen on

January 14, 2000.  Three days later, Allen and Dixson executed a

voluntary acknowledgment of paternity admitting that they were

Fred Jr.’s biological parents.  The resulting presumption of

paternity became conclusive because neither Allen nor Dixson

rescinded their voluntary acknowledgment in accordance with

subsection 5(b) of the Act.

	The Illinois Department of Public Aid (Department), ex rel. Allen, later filed a complaint seeking child support and health

insurance coverage from Dixson for Fred Jr.  Dixson then appeared

in court and denied that he was Fred Jr.’s biological father,

moving for genetic testing to determine paternity.  The judge

entered an order granting the motion and requiring the Department

to pay for the testing.  The Department filed a motion to vacate

the order.  The judge denied the Department’s motion, noting that

she allowed the testing "so as not to deprive [Dixson] of his

rights of due process."

	We believe the judge erred.  Subsection 6(b) of the Act

provides that no further proceedings are necessary to establish

Dixson’s paternity and responsibility for supporting Fred Jr. 

Subsection 6(c) expressly prohibits further administrative or

judicial proceedings devoted to ratifying Dixson’s paternity. 

Furthermore, subsection 6(d) provides that Dixson cannot

challenge his voluntary acknowledgment of paternity except on the

basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.  There is no

indication in the record that he alleged any of these

circumstances before the trial court.  He does not allege them in

this appeal either, having neglected to file a brief.  It appears

that he voluntarily acknowledged paternity but simply wishes to

avoid financial responsibility for Fred Jr.  Under the facts

before us, the Act precludes genetic testing, or any other

proceedings, to determine whether Dixson is Fred Jr.’s biological

father.

	Our holding does not jeopardize Dixson’s due process rights. 

The voluntary acknowledgment form he signed provided ample notice

of his rights and the ramifications of acknowledging paternity.

	In a section entitled "Notice of Rights and

Responsibilities," the form explained that Dixson was subjecting

himself to payment of child support and waiving his rights to

genetic testing and representation by counsel in proceedings to

determine paternity.  In the same section, the form explained

that Dixson could rescind his voluntary acknowledgment within the

statutorily-prescribed time period.  In a different section, immediately above the signature line, the form provided:

	"I acknowledge that I am the biological father of

the child named on this Voluntary Acknowledgment of

Paternity form.  I waive my right to genetic testing. 

I have read and understand the rights and

responsibilities listed on the back of this form and I

understand that by signing this Voluntary

Acknowledgment of Paternity, I waive these rights.  I

accept the obligation to provide child support as

determined under state law.  I have been provided an

oral and written explanation of my rights,

responsibilities and implications of signing this

form."

	The judge did not specify why she felt genetic testing was

necessary to protect Dixson’s due process rights.  Dixson

initially had rights to challenge his paternity.  However, he

waived those rights by signing the voluntary acknowledgment form

and not rescinding it later.  Statutory and constitutional rights

may be waived as long as the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and

intentional.  In re Estate of Ferguson, 313 Ill. App. 3d 931, 730 N.E.2d 1205 (2000).  A waiver is permanent and cannot be

withdrawn without an unequivocal showing that it was unknowing,

involuntary, or unintentional.  Estate of Ferguson, 313 Ill. App. 3d 931, 730 N.E.2d 1205.  Dixson has not even tried to make such

a showing.  We see no due process violation.

	The judgment of the McDonough County circuit court is  reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

	Reversed and remanded.

	BRESLIN, J., with HOLDRIDGE and SLATER, JJ., concurring.