NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 22-3259

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RONDABAY LIGGINS-MCCOY,

Appellant

 

v.

DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS OF THE SENATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; ANTHONY H. 

WILLIAMS, in his individual capacity only

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-19-cv-01639)

District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

October 26, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: December 6, 2023)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Rondabay Liggins-McCoy appeals the District Court’s summary judgment 

denying her claims for: (1) disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and 

(2) age discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. We will affirm. 

I

Liggins-McCoy is a 64-year-old woman who worked as a constituent services 

staffer for State Senator Anthony Williams until her employment was terminated on 

January 4, 2019. During her eleven years in Senator Williams’ office, Liggins-McCoy’s 

duties included event planning, liaising with community leaders, and “performing 

constituent services work.” App. 512. Though Senator Williams was Liggins-McCoy’s

supervisor, her employer was the Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania Senate.

In 2017, Liggins-McCoy was diagnosed with cancer and began treatments. This 

caused her to miss work sometimes, which created a staffing shortage at one of Senator 

Williams’ offices. Several times Liggins-McCoy applied for and received leave time

under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), with her final request approved in a 

letter dated December 4, 2018. The next day, Senator Williams’ then-Chief of Staff, 

accompanied by a Democratic Caucus human resources representative, told LigginsMcCoy that her position was being eliminated in an office reorganization.

After she was terminated, Liggins-McCoy sued the Democratic Caucus and 

Senator Williams. In relevant part, she claimed that the Caucus committed disability 

discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and 

that Senator Williams aided and abetted the Caucus’s age discrimination in violation of
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the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Stat. § 955(e). The District Court 

entered a summary judgment against Liggins-McCoy, holding that sovereign immunity 

barred the Rehab Act claim against the Caucus and that Liggins-McCoy failed to 

establish an underlying PHRA violation by the Caucus for Senator Williams to aid and 

abet.

1 This timely appeal followed.

II2

Liggins-McCoy makes two arguments on appeal. First, she contends that her 

Rehab Act claim is not barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because the 

Democratic Caucus waived immunity for such claims. Second, she argues that naming

the Caucus as a PHRA defendant was unnecessary to bring a § 955(e) aider and abettor 

claim against Senator Williams. We address each argument in turn.

A

Liggins-McCoy argues that the Democratic Caucus waived sovereign immunity 

from Rehab Act claims, and the District Court’s finding to the contrary was erroneous. 

But she failed to establish that the Democratic Caucus was a “program or activity . . .

receiv[ing] federal financial assistance,” Strathie v. Dep’t of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 

1 Liggins-McCoy also brought a claim against Senator Williams arising under the FMLA.

This claim was tried before a jury, resulting in a verdict for Senator Williams. LigginsMcCoy does not challenge that verdict on appeal. 

2 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction over the Rehab Act claim under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the PHRA claim under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the summary 

judgment against Liggins-McCoy de novo, applying the same standard as the District 

Court. Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015).
4

(3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added), a burden she must satisfy to prevail “not only . . . [in]

an Eleventh Amendment immunity inquiry, but also in order to make out a prima facie 

case under the [Rehab Act],” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 

F.3d 193, 198 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008). The evidence Liggins-McCoy offers on this score falls 

short of the mark. 

Liggins-McCoy contends that the Caucus waived sovereign immunity when the 

Pennsylvania legislature distributed $1 billion in federal COVID-19 relief funds. But the 

text of the Rehab Act permits federal suit only where the state “program or activity 

receiv[es] Federal financial assistance,” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added), not where 

it merely distributes funds.3 Thus, sovereign immunity is generally waived as to programs 

or activities receiving funding, not those states or state entities distributing the funding.

See Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 171–72 (3d Cir. 2002). The record shows that 

the Caucus did not receive or use any federal COVID-19 funds for its own benefit. As the 

District Court aptly noted, the state budget for Fiscal Year 2021–22 indicates that

COVID-19 relief funds were allocated to other programs and agencies, not the Caucus 

itself. 

3 The District Court also rejected the contention that the Caucus waived sovereign 

immunity because the COVID-19 relief funds were not appropriated until two years after 

Liggins-McCoy’s termination. Because no evidence shows that the Caucus received any 

federal financial assistance, we need not decide whether funds must be received at the 

time of the alleged discrimination.
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Even if we accepted Liggins-McCoy’s contention that state entities can waive 

sovereign immunity by distributing federal funds, her claim still fails. The only entities 

with a conceivable role in distributing the COVID-19 relief funds are the Pennsylvania 

General Assembly which votes on the state budget and the Governor who enacts the 

budget, not the Democratic Caucus—which is but one-half of one house of the state 

legislature.

In sum, “viewing all facts in the light most favorable” to Liggins-McCoy, there is 

no evidence supporting a waiver of sovereign immunity. United States v. Care Alts., 952 

F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2020). So we agree with the District Court that the Eleventh 

Amendment bars Liggins-McCoy’s Rehab Act claim against the Democratic Caucus. 

B

Liggins-McCoy also contends that the District Court erroneously rejected her 

aiding and abetting claim against Senator Williams because she did not name the Caucus 

as a PHRA defendant. While we have never held that pursuing a § 955(e) aider and 

abettor claim against a supervisor requires joining the employer as a named defendant,

Liggins-McCoy mischaracterizes the District Court’s reasoning. The Court did not grant 

summary judgment only because Liggins-McCoy failed to name the Caucus as a 

defendant. Rather, the Court noted Liggins-McCoy’s failure to “address any primary

violation by the Democratic Caucus.” App. 23.

Liggins-McCoy presents nothing to undermine the District Court’s conclusion, 

and we agree that her failure to offer evidence supporting a primary PHRA violation by 

the Caucus dooms her § 955(e) claim against Senator Williams. See Jones v. Se. Pa. 
6

Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[L]iability as an aide[r] and abett[or] 

under the PHRA hinges on [the employer’s] liability.”) (internal quotations omitted). For 

starters, Liggins-McCoy’s brief opposing summary judgment cited no evidence 

supporting a finding of age discrimination by the Caucus. On appeal, Liggins-McCoy 

insists that she “did present the record evidence and argument” supporting age 

discrimination by the Caucus. In fact, her brief below argued only that Senator Williams 

and his staff engaged in age discrimination and did not explain why those actions should 

be imputed to the Caucus. 

The three exhibits Liggins-McCoy cited in this section of her brief also failed to

show that the Caucus committed a primary violation of the PHRA. The first exhibit was

an excerpt from the deposition of Rudolph Taylor, a staffer of Senator Williams who 

assumed some of Liggins-McCoy’s duties after her termination, establishing Taylor’s 

date of birth. The second and third exhibits were an excerpt from Liggins-McCoy’s 

deposition and the age discrimination charge she filed with the Pennsylvania Human 

Relations Commission, both claiming that a Caucus representative was on the call when 

Senator Williams’ staff notified Liggins-McCoy that her position was being eliminated. 

The District Court correctly held that these facts were insufficient to show that the 

Caucus committed a primary violation of the PHRA. That a Caucus representative was

present during this meeting, without more, does not establish that the Caucus 

discriminated against Liggins-McCoy because of her age. To the extent that this was any 

evidence at all, “more than a mere scintilla of evidence” was required to defeat summary 

judgment. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). 
7

Thus, despite acknowledging her burden of “establish[ing] a cognizable predicate 

offense against the Caucus in order to hold Williams liable as an aider/abettor,” LigginsMcCoy Reply Br. 1, Liggins-McCoy did not present sufficient evidence on this “essential 

element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof” at the summary 

judgment stage.

4 Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993).

* * *

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

4 Williams urges affirmance on other grounds, arguing that our opinion in Jones, 796 

F.3d at 327, holds that sovereign immunity for an employer bars PHRA aiding and 

abetting claims against supervisory employees. We need not address that claim because 

Liggins-McCoy failed to adduce facts supporting a PHRA violation by the Democratic 

Caucus. See United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 753 (3d 

Cir. 2017) (“[The Court of Appeals] can affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment on any basis supported by the record.”).