[Cite as In re B.G. , 2020-Ohio-1414.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SANDUSKY COUNTY

In re B.G. Court of Appeals No. S-19-047

Trial Court No. 21730236

DECISION AND JUDGMENT Decided: April 10, 2020

* * * * * Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant. Dean E. Ross, for appellee.

* * * * * SINGER, J. {¶ 1} This is an appeal from the September 26, 2019 judgment of the S andusky County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating th e parental rights of appellant, C.C., the mother of B.G. (“the child”), and granting permanent custody of the2. child to appellee, Sandusky County Department of Job & Family S ervices (“appellee” or “agency”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment

. {¶ 2} Appellant sets forth three assignments of error: 1. The trial court erred in finding the minor child herein had been in the temporary custody of Sandusky County Job and Family Service s 12 of 22 months, pursuant to O.R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), when the evide nce on the record concerning the dispositional timeline was not clear and convincing. 2. The evidence supporting the trial court’s finding the minor child herein had been abandoned pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) wa s not clear and convincing, and/or the court’s decision was against t he manifest weight of the evidence. 3. The evidence supporting the trial court finding the minor c hild herein could not be returned to mother pursuant to O.R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(c) was not clear and convincing, and/or the cour t’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 1

1 We note that appellant’s citations are incorrect. Nonetheless , we will address the merits of appellant’s arguments, and apply the correct code sections.3. Background {¶ 3} Appellant was 15 years old when the child was born to her in Ju ly 2016. G.G. is the child’s biological father. Father is not a party t o this appeal. {¶ 4} In January 2017, appellant and her younger sibling were removed from their parents’ custody and were placed, along with the child, in the care of appellant’s grandmother. Thereafter, appellant and the child were placed w ith S.K. {¶ 5} On October 4, 2017, appellee opened a case after being contacte d by S.K., who reported the child resided with her but appellant was in th e juvenile justice center. S.K. informed appellee she did not want appellant to return to the home when released from detention because S.K. could not provide the level of supe rvision that appellant needed. Appellant had continued, negative behavioral issues wh ich included leaving home without permission, smoking marijuana, and not following t he rules of the home. {¶ 6} On October 31, 2017, appellee took emergency temporary custody of appellant and the child. Appellant was placed in a group home for girls and the child was placed in a foster home. {¶ 7} On November 1, 2017, a complaint in dependency and neglect was filed regarding the child. That same day, a shelter care hearing was held and appellee was awarded interim temporary custody of appellant and the child. {¶ 8} On November 22, 2017, appellee filed a case plan with respect t o appellant and the child. It was noted in the plan that the risks and saf ety threats which required the child to be removed included the child’s grandmother could not care for him due to her4. drug use and mental health, so the child’s great-grandmother ha d cared for him while appellant was staying with her 18-year-old boyfriend, and there was domestic violence in the great-grandmother’s home. The plan set forth that appellan t would: complete a drug and alcohol assessment; provide random drug tests when requeste d; take a mental health assessment; take medications as prescribed; participate in the Independent Living Program; follow the rules of her probation; have visits with th e child; and follow all recommendations of the service providers. {¶ 9} On December 6, 2017, an adjudicatory hearing was held; appellan t consented to a finding that the child was dependent. In additi on, appellant was found to be a neglected and dependent child. A magistrate’s decision wa s filed on December 8,

2017. {¶ 10} A dispositional hearing was held on January 5, 2018, where, acc ording to the magistrate’s decision filed on January 10, 2018, appellant “consented to the children being placed in the Temporary Custody of [appellee] and agreed to the services detailed in the Case Plan.” Thereafter, numerous dispositional review h earings were held. {¶ 11} In late December 2018, appellant was emancipated and voluntaril y left appellee’s custody. The child remained in the foster home. {¶ 12} On March 5, 2019, a dispositional review hearing was held and t he court extended appellee’s temporary custody of the child until Novemb er 1, 2019. A magistrate’s decision was filed on March 11, 2019.5. {¶ 13} On June 5, 2019, appellee filed a motion requesting modificatio n of temporary custody to permanent custody, as well as a motion for a permanency hearing. {¶ 14} On September 11, 2019, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) filed her final report and recommendation. {¶ 15} The permanent custody hearing was held on September 24, 2019, a nd the court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judg ment entry on September 26, 2019, granting permanent custody of the child to appellee. App ellant appealed. The Permanent Custody Hearing {¶ 16} Appellant and father did not attend the hearing. Appellee call ed four witnesses: the child’s foster mother, two caseworkers and the GAL. The testimony which is relevant to appellant’s appeal is summarized below.

Foster Mother {¶ 17} Angela George testified she was the child’s foster mother start ing October 31, 2017, when he was one year old. At that time, the child could not communicate, he was addicted to any kind of technology screen a nd he did not play with toys. The child would scream, have tantrums and throw things. If the child did not have a phone in his hand, if the television was not on or if someone else had a phone, the child

would scream and throw a fit. It took about three months to te ach the child to use sign language to communicate or to point to what he wanted, and not scream. In addition, the child would eat everything put in front of him, and he had to b e reminded to chew and6. slow down. Foods with sugar caused the child to have diarrhea, which in turn caused diaper rash. {¶ 18} George testified she had very good communication with appellant at first and would tell appellant about what the child was eating, that he had diarrhea and “let’s not do this,” and to limit his television time. However, by De cember 2018, “communication really was not going well” so George started wri ting in a notebook, which she exchanged with appellant. In the notebook, George wr ote the child’s mood before the visit, if he had eaten or needed to eat, if he neede d diaper cream and reminders like no sugary foods. {¶ 19} George had asked appellant, from the time appellant lived in th e group home, to put diaper cream on the child during visits as the chi ld had very sensitive skin and had diarrhea, so he needed diaper cream because the drive f rom the group home to the foster home was 20 minutes long. Appellant did not buy dia per cream, so a staff member at the group home purchased it. George tried many diffe rent types of diaper cream and found Desitin worked the best for the child. George noted appellant “ended up purchasing some diaper cream, but she seemed to refuse to buy D esitin.” George did not send a diaper bag with the child for visits, as the goal was fo r appellant to show she could provide for the child during visits. {¶ 20} George testified during visits between appellant and the child, appellant was told not to use her phone, but she would sneak it anyway. Once, appellant’s phone was taken away from her. If the child had a phone during his v isit with appellant, “[i]t7. wasn’t good” when he returned to the foster home, as “it caused all the behaviors to come up again.” {¶ 21} George testified that after appellant left the group home, ther e were visits at her apartment, but those visits ended because appellant was not home when the caseworker brought the child for a visit. George recalled appe llant would often cancel visits with the child, and on February 4, 2019, appellant calle d to cancel the next day’s visit because she said she was ill. However, George saw appell ant with two friends at Walmart on February 5, 2019, and appellant “was playing around and acting perfectly fine.” George then saw appellant driving her car, although app ellant did not have a

driver’s license. {¶ 22} George testified appellant went from January 26, 2019, until Ju ne 19, 2019, without visiting the child. When the child was not having cons istent visits, his behaviors at the foster home improved. After the June 19, 2019 visit, th e child “seemed to be very confused * * * and started more behaviors” like throwing things and grabbing things. Appellant’s last visit with the child before he left the George s’ care was in mid-July 2019, the day before his third birthday. To George’s knowledge , appellant did not do anything for the child’s birthday. George has been in contact with the child’s new foster parents to support them and give them information.

Caseworker Lisa Mullholand {¶ 23} Lisa Mullholand testified she was an ongoing caseworker for app ellee, and worked with appellant, father and the child from August 1, 2018 , through February 2019.8. At first, appellant lived in an independent living group home i n Findlay, Ohio, and the child lived in a foster home in Bluffton, Ohio. In late Decemb er 2018, appellant turned 18 years old, left the group home and moved into her own apartm ent. At that time, appellant had over $5,000. Appellant bought a car and allowed her sister to drive it. The sister totaled the car and because appellant only had liability insurance on the car, she lost about $3,000. Appellant always had her hair and nails done, wh ich cost upwards of $300, and she wore new clothes. By the end of February 2019, a ppellant had no money. {¶ 24} Mullholand testified appellant is a hard worker and while appel lant was in care, she worked as many hours as she could until she was told to decrease her work hours so she could fit in parenting time and school. While in the group home, appellant visited with the child twice a week. When appellant lived in t he apartment, the child visited four times between December 2018 and February 2019. Du ring those visits, there were issues because appellant wanted to fill out a Medicaid app lication, and appellant had to be reminded many times to water down the juice for the child and not to overfeed him. {¶ 25} Mullholand stated appellant had a difficult time planning her d ay. Appellant had stopped attending counseling because she did not feel she needed it, she was not going to school and she did not go to doctors’ appointm ents for her medical condition. Appellant was also unable to show her medications h ad been refilled or that she was taking the medicines. In addition, appellant had numer ous boyfriends and many people in and out of her apartment. Appellant’s sister and the sister’s boyfriend were living at the apartment at one point, were doing drugs and were involved in incidents of9. domestic violence. Mullholand observed appellant was not doing any of the things she should have been doing to get her child back. {¶ 26} In January 2019, appellant’s behavior was off, as her movements were slow, her eyes were half closed and bloodshot. Mullholand was concerned that appellant was using drugs, which appellant denied. On January 11, 2019, appellant tested positive for marijuana. By February 2019, appellant admitted she smoked pot, and tested positive for marijuana on February 25, 2019. {¶ 27} Also by February 2019, because of the back and forth visitation , Mullholand made a referral for appellant’s visits with the chil d to be held at Harmony House in Findlay. While appellant was not happy because it cos t money to go to Harmony House, it was obvious to Mullholand that appellant was driving and had money for everything else. A program, called Bridges, would have hel ped appellant pay for the visits and a variety of other things, if appellant maintained a minimum school schedule. There were also concerns that appellant was driving without a d river’s license, as she only had a permit. {¶ 28} Mullholand opined appellant tried to act like a parent but beca use of her age and wanting to be a teenager, she did not make the child he r priority. Appellant’s last visit with the child was January 25, 2019. When Mullholand las t met with appellant, on February 25, 2019, appellant looked the worst Mullholand had se en her in a long time. Appellant was pale, her hair was unkempt and she was not feelin g well. In addition, appellant was going to be evicted from her apartment because sh e did not have money to10. pay her rent and bills. Appellant said a friend had robbed her and she had few friends as she trusted people she should not have trusted. {¶ 29} Mullholand acknowledged that appellant was not at the hearing, which was not surprising because sometimes appellant’s coping skills are avoidance. When asked if the 144-day period that appellant did not visit with the child was avoidance, Mullholand stated no, “[t]hat’s ‘I’m too busy doing my own thing.’”

Caseworker Jackie Hamann {¶ 30} Jackie Hamann testified she was a caseworker for appellee, and was assigned to work with appellant and the child when appellee rec eived custody of both of them on October 31, 2017. Hamann was the caseworker until July 2018, when Mullholand was assigned to work with appellant and the child. Hamann was then reassigned to work with appellant and the child on March 1, 201 9. {¶ 31} Initially, appellant was placed in independent living, which is a group home for girls, and had case plan services including “mental health counseling, drug and alcohol,” and Help Me Grow with the child. The child was place d with the Georges from October 31, 2017, to September 16, 2019, when he was moved to a foster-to-adopt home. {¶ 32} Appellant’s visits with the child were always supervised. Earl y on, appellant was in contact with a lot of boys, who she met at the park. Although Hamann had many conversations with appellant about the timeframes and focusing on the child, appellant did not visit with the child from January 25, 2019, u ntil June 19, 2019.11. {¶ 33} On March 20, 2019, Hamann met with appellant at the office. Ap pellant had just gotten back from a week’s vacation in North Carolina w ith her mother and grandmother to visit her grandfather. {¶ 34} On April 24, 2019, Hamann went to Fremont, Ohio, to an apartmen t where she had heard appellant was living. Hamann followed appellant’ s sister’s boyfriend to the apartment, he opened the door, went in, then slammed the do or in Hamann’s face. After Hamann knocked on the door several times, another man ope ned the door and asked what she wanted. Hamann asked for appellant, the man sla mmed the door and a few minutes later, appellant came out into the hallway. Appell ant told Hamann the man was her boyfriend, she had known him for a long time and she li ved with him. Appellant admitted she had lied to Hamann previously about how long she h ad known her boyfriend. When Hamann told appellant about the timeframes and there was not a lot of time left, appellant yelled and cussed at Hamann, then stormed into the apartment. {¶ 35} Hamann next saw appellant on May 20 or 21, 2019, and appellant was still with her boyfriend and was not doing services. Appellant had n ot gone to TASC (Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime), she was not in counse ling and the Bridges program had closed her case for noncompliance. Hamann met with appellant on May 29, 2019, and appellant said she was no longer with her boyfriend. {¶ 36} In June 2019, Hamann visited with appellant, who had had her as sessment and just started TASC. Appellant was referred to drug and alco hol treatment at Firelands,

but went for mental health treatment instead. Hamann testified that on June 16, 2019,12. appellant posted on Facebook “‘Happy Father’s Day, baby... ‘you’r e such a great dad, and I love you the way you are with your kids.’ ‘You are amazi ng.’” Appellant also posted pictures of her boyfriend. {¶ 37} On July 9 and 17, 2019, appellant tested positive for cocaine. Also in July 2019, appellant told Hamann she was no longer with her boyfrien d because he was abusive and had hit her and bit her leg. In August 2019, appel lant went back to her boyfriend. From June 2019 to August 2019, there were 11 visits scheduled for appellant and the child; appellant visited the child five times. {¶ 38} For a while, Hamann could not locate appellant. On September 5 , 2019, appellant called and said she was back in town and with her boy friend. Appellant had been in Columbus, Ohio, living with her uncle, but it did not g o well because he is an

alcoholic. {¶ 39} Hamann had attempted to locate a family member who could care f or the child, but no one was suitable.

GAL {¶ 40} Angela LeForce testified she was appointed, in May 2018, as the GAL to represent the child. She had little contact with appellant and father, but she did talk with them at review hearings. LeForce observed one home visit betwe en appellant and the child while appellant lived at the group home. {¶ 41} On March 5, 2019, LeForce saw appellant at the review hearing a nd scheduled a home visit at appellant’s apartment for March 22, 2 019. On that day, when13. LeForce went to appellant’s apartment and knocked on the door, there was no answer. There was a letter on the apartment door, so LeForce took a pic ture of the letter. The letter was addressed to appellant, was from Findlay Digital Aca demy, and had a handwritten note that said “‘Please read, important explanation .’” The letter provided notice of appellant’s non-compliance with her GED classes. LeF orce tried to call and email appellant, but never received a response. LeForce acknow ledged appellant was a hard worker and had saved money, but noted appellant started to decline and then everything fell apart. LeForce noted appellant did not see the child from January 25, 2019, until June 2019. {¶ 42} LeForce observed the child at his foster home, talked to the fo ster mother and spoke with caseworker Hamann. LeForce looked at the best i nterest factors and determined the child requires permanency. In her report, LeFor ce recommended that permanent custody of the child be awarded to appellee for purpo ses of adoption.

Trial Court’s Decision {¶ 43} The trial court noted it took judicial notice of all of the rec ords contained in the court’s file, including all previous findings and judgment entries. In addition, exhibits A through H were admitted by the court into evidence. The cour t made certain findings, by clear and convincing evidence, including: the child has bee n in appellee’s custody since October 31, 2017; the child was adjudicated dependent; mo ther was sporadic with her efforts to complete case plan services; mother failed to pr ioritize the child in her life, spending her available time and financial resources in other ar eas; mother struggled with14. drug use, employment, housing, transportation and other basic l ife matters; and mother had gaps in seeing and visiting the child, as long as 144 days. {¶ 44} The trial court concluded the child has been legally abandoned by appellant, the child has been in the temporary custody of appel lee for at least 12 months of 22 consecutive months, and the child cannot be placed with e ither parent within a reasonable period of time, and should not be placed with either parent. The court further concluded the permanent placement of the child in appellee’s cu stody is clearly in the child’s best interest. In addition, the court concluded appell ee made reasonable efforts for the child to return home, which efforts were unsuccessful. Lastly, the court concluded appellee made reasonable efforts to establish a perma nency plan for the child’s placement in appellee’s permanent custody with the goal of find ing an appropriate adoptive family for him.

Law Standard - Permanent Custody {¶ 45} A trial court’s decision in a permanent custody case will not b e reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence

. In re A.H. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1057, 2011-Ohio-4857, ¶ 11, citing In re Andy-Jones , 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 03AP-1167 and 03AP-1231, 2004-Ohio-3312, ¶ 28. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the kno wledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, ges tures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibi lity of the proffered15. testimony.” Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland , 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). Furthermore, “[e]very reasonable presumption must be m ade in favor of the judgment and the findings of facts [of the trial court].” Karches v. Cincinnati , 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 19, 526 N.E.2d 1350 (1988). Hence, a judgment suppor ted by some competent, credible evidence going to all essential elements of the case i s not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ; C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. , 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus. {¶ 46} The juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if the court finds, by clear and convincing evi dence: (1) the existence of at least one of the four factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)( 1)(a) through (d), and (2) the child’s best interest is served by granting permanent custody t o the agency. In re M.B. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP755, 2005-Ohio-986, ¶ 6; R.C. 2151. 353(A)(4). Clear and convincing evidence requires proof which “produce[s] in the min d of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be establis hed.” Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syl labus. Factors under R.C. 2125.414(B)(1) {¶ 47} R.C. 2125.414(B)(1)(a), (b) and (d) state: (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned * * * and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a re asonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents. (b) The child is abandoned.16. * * * (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agen cies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *. R.C. 2151.414(E) {¶ 48} R.C. 2151.414(E) requires a trial court to find that a child ca nnot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent if any one of sixteen factors are met. R.C. 2151 .414(E)(1)-(16). R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) and (10) provide: (4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate wi th the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingnes s to provide an adequate permanent home for the child;

* * * (10) The parent has abandoned the child. Appellant’s First Assignment of Error {¶ 49} Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding, by clear a nd convincing evidence, that the child had been in appellee’s temporary custo dy for 12 of 22 months. Appellant argues there is no evidence in the record as to who w as legally responsible for appellant and the child’s removal from their home on October 31 , 2017, or what specific

behaviors or conditions necessitated the child’s removal into a ppellee’s temporary17. custody. Appellant also asserts there was no testimony at the final hearing regarding the facts of the removal or in support of the court’s finding of de pendency, nor was there a judgment entry of adjudication entered as an exhibit. Appellan t submits the case docket and individual docket entries, without testimonial evidence at the permanency hearing, do not represent clear and convincing evidence of the dispositiona l timeline. {¶ 50} Appellant further argues, assuming the docket entries are suffi cient proof, appellee’s temporary custody of the child lapsed between May 1, 2019 and June 5, 2019, as there is nothing in the record that temporary custody was ex tended prior to May 1, 2019. Appellant notes on October 10, 2018, a docket entry stat es temporary custody is extended until May 1, 2019, then on June 4, 2019, a docket entr y again extended temporary custody. On June 5, 2019, appellee filed a motion fo r permanent custody, and the matter set for a dispositional hearing. Thus, appellant ma intains, appellee’s temporary custody of the child terminated on May 1, 2019, and t he motion for permanent custody was not filed 30 days before the termination of tempora ry custody. {¶ 51} Appellee counters two witness testified at the permanent custod y hearing regarding the child’s removal from the home into appellee’s tem porary custody on October 31, 2017, and the trial court took judicial notice of a ll of the previous entries in the court’s case file. Appellee contends the judgment entries show a clear and convincing timeline that the child was continuously in appellee ’s custody from October 2017 until appellee filed its motion for permanent custody in J une 2019. In particular, appellee observes it filed a motion to extend temporary custody on March 1, 2019, which18. the court granted on March 11, 2019, by consent of all of the p arties at the hearing, including appellant. Law and Analysis {¶ 52} At a dispositional hearing, “[t]he court may admit any evidenc e that is material and relevant, including, but not limited to, hearsay, opinion, and documentary evidence.” R.C. 2151.35(B)(2)(b). In addition, a court may ta ke judicial notice of prior proceedings in the same case. See State v. Treen , 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-99-060, 2000 WL 639001, (May 19, 2000); Evid.R. 201. See also Pollard v. Elber , 2018-Ohio-4538, 123 N.E.3d 359, ¶ 13-14 (6th Dist.). {¶ 53} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child was in appellee’s temporary custody for at least 12 of 22 months before the permanent custody motion was filed. The r ecord shows the child has been in appellee’s temporary custody, uninterrupted, since October 31, 2017, and appellee filed its motion for permanent custody on June 5, 2019 . We therefore find the evidence does not support appellant’s contention that appellee’ s temporary custody of the child terminated on May 1, 2019. {¶ 54} The evidence in the record which supports the court’s finding c onsists of the testimony of the foster mother, caseworkers and the GAL fro m the permanent custody hearing, as well as the court’s previous findings and judgment entries, of which the court properly took judicial notice. The relevant, previous rulings include: the October 31, 2017 magistrate’s order placing the child in appellee’s tempora ry custody; the19. December 8, 2017 magistrate’s decision stating appellant consen ted to a finding that the child was dependent; the December 10, 2018 magistrate’s decisio n extending appellee’s temporary custody of the child until May 1, 2019; and the March 11, 2019 magistrate’s decision extending appellee’s temporary custody of the child un til November 1, 2019. {¶ 55} We conclude the trial court’s finding that the child was in app ellee’s temporary custody for at least 12 of 22 months before the perma nent custody motion was filed, was supported by competent, credible evidence and was no t against the manifest weight of the evidence. See R.C. 2125.414(B)(1)(d). Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is found not-well taken. Second Assignment of Error {¶ 56} Appellant argues the evidence supporting the trial court’s find ing that the child had been abandoned was not clear and convincing, and/or t he court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant contend s appellee’s temporary custody of the child ended on May 1, 2019, so the child should have been returned to her, and even if she had stopped visiting the child, the period of t ime after January 25, 2019, until May 1, 2019 was approximately 95 days. Appellant also su bmits there were “the extenuating circumstances of mother’s new driver’s license” dur ing that time frame. For these reasons, appellant claims she did not abandon the child. Law and Analysis {¶ 57} R.C. 2151.011(C) states “a child shall be presumed abandoned wh en the parents of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact w ith the child for more than20. ninety days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact w ith the child after that period of ninety days.” This provision creates a presumption of abandonment, which may be rebutted. In re S.B. , 183 Ohio App.3d 300, 2009-Ohio-3619, 916 N.E.2d 1110, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.). {¶ 58} Upon review, the record shows appellant and the child were plac ed in appellee’s temporary custody on October 31, 2017. Initially, a ppellant visited with the child regularly but shortly after she turned 18 years old and l eft appellee’s custody, she stopped visiting with the child. The GAL, the foster mother an d a caseworker all testified at the permanent custody hearing that from late January 2019, u ntil June 19, 2019, appellant did not visit the child. We find this evidence suppo rts a presumptive finding that appellant legally abandoned the child by failing to have c ontact for over 90 days. {¶ 59} To rebut this presumption, appellant offered “the extenuating circumstances of [her] new driver’s license,” as well as the cl aim that appellee’s temporary custody of the child terminated on May 1, 2019. We h ave already established the evidence did not support appellant’s claim that appellee’s temporary custody of the child terminated on May 1, 2019. Even if we were to accept app ellant’s claim, the period of time appellant did not visit with the child was approximatel y 95 days. Further, appellant’s assertion of “the extenuating circumstances of [her ] new driver’s license,” with no elaboration or explanation is insufficient to rebut the presumptive finding that she abandoned the child by failing to visit him for more than 90 da ys. We therefore find the reasons presented by appellant do not rebut the presumption tha t she abandoned the child.21. {¶ 60} The evidence in the record shows appellant did not visit the ch ild from January 26, 2019, until June 2019, which is well over the 90-da y statutory presumptive period of abandonment. We conclude there was clear and convinc ing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that appellant legally abandoned the child, and this finding was supported by competent, credible evidence and was not against t he manifest weight of the

evidence. See R.C. 2125.414(B)(1)(b). Accordingly, appellant’s second assig nment of

error is not well-taken. Third Assignment of Error {¶ 61} Appellant asserts the evidence supporting the trial court findi ng that the child could not be returned to her was not clear and convincing , and the court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. She contends there was no testimony as to the basis of the child’s initial removal from the home, and there was no clear and convincing evidence that the child’s social, medical and commun ication issues supported his removal from the home or the termination of her parental ri ghts. Appellant also argues since she was emancipated in late December 2018, which w as close to the time of the motion for permanent custody and hearing, her ability to fu nction as an adult was not fully known. {¶ 62} Appellee counters the November 6, 2017 magistrate’s decision me ntioned the evidence in support of placing the child in appellee’s temp orary custody, and the November 22, 2017 case plan set forth the concerns that caused the initial removal from the home. Appellee observes appellant consented to the content s of the case plan, in22. which the case plan services were listed, but she did not utili ze the services. Appellee notes the caseworkers’ testimony and the evidence presented at the hearing established that appellant failed to complete the services, and the foster mother and caseworkers’ testimony detailed appellant’s housing, financial, medical, vis itation and other issues. Lastly, appellee submits appellant did not even attend the fina l hearing, as she had something else scheduled. Analysis {¶ 63} Upon review, the record shows the child initially lived with ap pellant at appellant’s parents’ home until appellant and the child were re moved due to appellant’s mother’s drug use and mental health issues. The child then liv ed with appellant’s grandmother while appellant stayed with her 18-year-old boyfrie nd, until a domestic violence incident occurred, and appellant and the child were pl aced with S.K. {¶ 64} In early October 2017, the child resided with S.K. while appell ant was in the juvenile justice center, but S.K. did not want appellant to return to the home when she was released from detention. In late October 2017, appellee to ok emergency temporary custody of appellant and the child, and placed appellant in a g roup home and the child in a foster home. When appellant turned 18 years old, she moved i nto her own apartment. Thereafter, appellant had issues with drugs, maintaining stable housing, being financially responsible, attending to her health and medical needs, associa ting with problematic people, failing to regularly visit the child, failing to make t he child a priority and failing to complete case plan services.23. {¶ 65} The record further reveals the child’s behaviors improved while he was in foster care. Given the child’s young age, he was not able to e xpress his wishes. However, the GAL recommended that permanent custody of the chil d be granted to appellee so that the child could be adopted. {¶ 66} We find there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the child could not be returned to appella nt, and the court’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evide nce in the record shows appellant demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child an d an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is not well- taken. {¶ 67} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Sandusky County C ourt of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Appellant is ord ered to pay the court costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.24. In re B.G. C .A. No. S-19-047

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ______________________

_________ JUDGE Arlene Singer, J.

_______________________________ Thomas J. Osowik, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.