alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Thomas Field, Petitioner, v Board of Education, Yonkers Public Schools District, Respondent.

[49 NYS3d 472]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Education, Yonkers Public Schools District, dated September 12, 2013, which adopted the recommendation of a hearing officer dated July 22, 2013, made after a hearing, finding the petitioner guilty of misconduct, insubordination, and incompetence, and terminated his employment.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

*703The petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging a determination terminating his employment as a custodian at a middle school in Yonkers. The termination was recommended by a hearing officer who presided over a disciplinary hearing held in connection with charges that the petitioner had engaged in-acts of misconduct, insubordination, and incompetence, and was adopted by the Board of Education, Yonkers Public Schools District.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the proper standard of review in this matter is the substantial evidence standard. The petitioner’s claim that the proper standard of review should be a fair preponderance of the evidence is without merit. That standard applies when the penalty of dismissal is accompanied by some added stigma (see *Matter of Miller v DeBuono,*90 NY2d 783, 794 [1997]). Here, no such added stigma is present since the petitioner’s termination neither bars him from seeking future employment as a custodian nor subjects him to a requirement that his name be placed on a public registry (see *Matter of Lebron v Village of Spring Val.,*143 AD3d 720 [2016]; *Matter of Agnew v North Colonie Cent. School Dist.,*14 AD3d 830, 831 [2005]). Applying the substantial evidence standard, we find that the hearing officer’s determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record (see *300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights,*45 NY2d 176, 179-180 [1978]).

The petitioner’s contention that the charge and specifications provided insufficient notice of the charges against him is without merit. The specifications, along with the bill of particulars and the report prepared by the Yonkers Public Schools District Director of District Safety & Security, were reasonably specific, in light of all the relevant circumstances, to apprise the petitioner of the charges against him and to allow for the preparation of an adequate defense *(see Matter of Block v Ambach,*73 NY2d 323, 332 [1989]; *Matter of Lebron v Village of Spring Val.,*143 AD3d at 721; *Matter of Zlotnick v City of Saratoga Springs,*122 AD3d 1210, 1211-1212 [2014]).

Finally, the penalty imposed was not so disproportionate to the misconduct as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness *(see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County,*34 NY2d 222, 233-234 [1974]; *Matter of Overton v Board of Educ. of the Yonkers City School Dist.,*72 AD3d 1094 [2010]).

Eng, P.J., Leventhal, Cohen and Duffy, JJ., concur.
No. 09-10771.

#### Robert H. Messersmith, Petitioner v. John Kerestes, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy.

562 U.S. 851, 131 S. Ct. 107,

178 L. Ed. 2d 66,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6103.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>  5
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME AND THE CONDENSED BALANCE SHEETS AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<CASH>                                               183,993
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<RECEIVABLES>                                      2,501,879
<ALLOWANCES>                                         161,064
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2016-1622.

#### State v. Curtis.

Allen App. No. 1-15-55, 2016-Ohio-6978.

O’Neill, J., dissents.
2017-0229.

#### State v. Canada.

Franklin App. No. 16AP-7, 2016-Ohio-5948.
# Bahrain hosts Chili Cook Off, All Hands and Award Ceremony

/ Published March 17, 2022
NEW CUMBERLAND, Pa., 
DLA Distribution Bahrain hosted their first annual Chili Cook-Off, as well as their All Hands and Award Ceremony on Feb. 23.

The winner of the chili cook-off this year was Jarrick Rudolph, who won top honors for his southern chili. Rudolph was awarded with bragging rights for “Top Cook” until the next cook-off.

“The chili cook-off was a great morale builder, and everyone had fun,” DLA Distribution Bahrain deputy commander Karen Lundy said. “We have not been able to do anything as a depot in a long time and it was appreciated by all.”

The chili cook-off was incorporated with Bahrain’s “All Hands,” which included a brief on a variety of subjects. It also included the “Hails and Farewells” and the First Quarter and Length of Service awards; as well as Letters of Appreciation.

The winners of the first quarter award were Omar Wissar and Lee Diaz. Letters of appreciation were awarded to Wissar Roderick and Ligorio Dias. Certificates for length of service were awarded to Jude De Souza and Shaima Haji.
159 A.3d 1281

#### NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. J.L.G., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. IN THE MATTER OF B.G., M.A., AND M.G., MINORS.

Argued April 24, 2017

Decided May 17, 2017

*T. Gary Mitchell,*Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant *(Joseph E. Krakora,*Public Defender Parental Representation, attorney; *T. Gary Mitchell,*of counsel and on the brief).

*Sara M. Gregory,*Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency *(Christopher S. Porrino,*Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; *Andrea M. Silkomtz,*Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and *Sara M. Gregory,*on the brief).

*Olivia Belfatto Crisp,*Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for minor M.A. *(Joseph E. Krakora,*Public Defender Law Guardian, attorney; *Olivia Belfatto Crisp,*on the brief).

PER CURIAM

The judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division is affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed Judge Simonelli’s majority opinion, reported at 450 *N.J. Super.*113, 160 A.3d 112 (App. Div. 2017).

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this opinion.
#### Leslie Benzies, Respondent-Appellant, v Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., et al., Appellants-Respondents.

[52 NYS3d 629]

Appeal and cross appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barry R. Ostrager, J.), entered December 22, 2016, which granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as moot.

After defendants submitted papers on their appeal, but before plaintiff submitted papers on his opposition and cross *601appeal, plaintiff filed an amended complaint before Supreme Court. A motion to dismiss the amended complaint is pending before Supreme Court. We take judicial notice of the amended complaint (see *Assured Guar. [UK] Ltd. v J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgt. Inc.,*80 AD3d 293, 303 [1st Dept 2010], *affd*18 NY3d 341 [2011]), and find that it renders the present appeals moot (see *Federated Project & Trade Fin. Core Fund v Amerra Agri Fund, LP,*106 AD3d 467 [1st Dept 2013]; *100 Hudson Tenants Corp. v Laber,*98 AD2d 692, 692 [1st Dept 1983]).

Concur—Tom, J.P., Sweeny, Richter, Kapnick and Webber, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shawn N. Gavigan, Appellant.

[768 NYS2d 652]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Farneti, J.), rendered August 8, 2001, convicting him of assault in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.

We agree, with the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred when it charged justification pursuant to a theory of self-defense *(see*Penal Law § 35.15), but refused to submit to the jury the defense of justification in defense of premises.

It is well settled that a jury must be charged on justification as a defense to the crime with which the defendant is charged if any reasonable view of the evidence would support the claimed defense and the defendant has requested the charge *(see People v Daniels,*248 AD2d 723, 724 [1998]).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the defendant *(see People v Watts,*57 NY2d 299, 301 [1982]), we conclude that there was a reasonable view of the evidence to support a justification charge pursuant to Penal Law § 35.20 (2). The defendant, an employee of a bar, presented evidence that he had repeatedly asked the victims to leave the bar prior to the altercation. This evidence supports a finding that he reasonably believed the victims were committing a criminal trespass and that physical force was necessary to protect the premises. Accordingly, the failure to grant the defendant’s request to charge *749that defense constitutes reversible error *(see People v Padgett,*60 NY2d 142, 145 [1983]). Santucci, J.P., Luciano, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  Exhibit 10.21

                                    EXHIBITS

10.21 NORPAK MANUFACTURING INC. AGREEMENT

VERIDIEN LOGO

May 7, 1999

Norpak Manufacturing Inc.
85 Chambers Dr.
Unit No. 8
Ajax, Ontario
L1Z 1E2

Attention: Mr. M. Cruickshank

Dear Mr. Cruickshank,

This letter confirms that Norpak Manufacturing Inc. ("NORPAK") has entered into
an agreement with Veridien Corporation or a subsidiary thereof ("VERIDIEN"),
wherein Veridien and Norpak agree to a strategic alliance with respect to the
marketing, sales and distribution of Norpak's product line in conjunction with
Veridien's existing product line in the United States and Internationally.

Veridien agrees to market, sell and distribute Norpak's product line at the
prices stipulated on the attached schedule "A" or such other prices, which both
parties may agree upon from time to time.

It is further agreed, where Norpak has an existing customer relationship, a
mutually agreed upon program for customer service and sales assistance will be
established, implemented and provided by Veridien. At this time, Norpak's
existing United States customer list includes all companies on attached
schedule "B".

Payment terms to Norpak for product purchases will be on a net 60 days basis or
as may otherwise be mutually agreed upon.

This agreement will be in effect immediately upon its execution by both
parties.

The term of this agreement will be for a period of five (5) years from the date
of execution and may be extended on an annual basis after the initial term, if
both parties so mutually agree.

Either party upon 180 days written notice may terminate this agreement.

The parties agree to execute such further documentation as may be reasonably
required to give effect to this distribution, sales and marketing agreement.



<PAGE>   2

We look forward to forging what we expect will be a mutually rewarding
relationship with Norpak.

Yours truly,
Veridien Corporation
Per:

/s/ Sheldon C. Fenton
---------------------
Sheldon C. Fenton
President & CEO

Agreed and accepted this 8 day of May, 1999.

Norpak Manufacturing Inc.
Per:

/s/ Michael Cruickshank
-----------------------
Michael Cruickshank
President

                                  SCHEDULE "A"

Medium Size Alcohol Swabs
Large Size Alcohol Swabs
Iodine Swabs
Towelettes - Small Size
             Viraguard(R)
           - Large Size
             Viraguard(R)

                                  SCHEDULE "B"

Buchwald & Co.
Dynarex Corporation
Henry Schein Inc.
Kinray
Kmart
Medicine Shoppe International Inc.
MedLine Industries Inc.
Micro Bio Medics
SMS Ambassadors Corp.
Universal Products Marketing Inc.
Wal-Mart
No. 09-1502.

#### Baretta Bentley, et al., Petitioners v. Millennium Healthcare Centers II, LLC, dba CareOne at Dunroven, fka Dunroven Healthcare Center, et al.

562 U.S. 837, 131 S. Ct. 160,

178 L. Ed. 2d 40,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 5783.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 363 Fed. Appx. 891.
2016-1149.

#### Disciplinary Counsel v. Doumbas.

Sua sponte, Marc George Doumbas, Attorney Registration No. 0074028, last known business address in Strongsville, Ohio, found in contempt for failure to file an affidavit of compliance on or before March 23, 2017.
No. 10-5238.

#### Damon Franklin, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 910, 131 S. Ct. 263,

178 L. Ed. 2d 174,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6845.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied.

Same case below, 980 A.2d 1174.
Presidential Documents

31879

Federal Register

Vol. 63, No. 111

Wednesday, June 10, 1998

Title 3—

The President

Presidential Determination No. 98–24 of May 29, 1998

Determination Pursuant to Section 2(c)(1) of the Migration

and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as Amended

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

Pursuant to section 2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act

of 1962, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2601(c)(1), I hereby determine that it is

important to the national interest that up to $37,000,000 be made available

from the United States Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund

to meet the urgent and unexpected needs of refugees, victims of conflict,

and other persons at risk in Africa and Southeast Asia. These funds may

be used, as appropriate, to provide contributions to international and nongovernmental agencies.

You are authorized and directed to inform the appropriate committees of

the Congress of this determination and the obligation of funds under this

authority and to publish this memorandum in the 

œ–

Federal Register.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, May 29, 1998. [FR Doc. 98–15680

Filed 6–9–98; 8:45 am]

Billing code 4710–10–M
#### In the Matter of Colberdee C., an Infant. Monroe County Department of Social Services, Respondent, James C., Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 265]

Appeal from an order of Family Court, Monroe County (Taddeo, J.), entered May 4, 2001, which determined that respondent sexually abused his daughter.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Respondent appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition determining that he sexually abused his *1317daughter. Contrary to respondent’s contention, Family Court’s findings of sexual abuse are supported by a preponderance of the evidence *(see*Family Ct Act § 1046 [b] [i]; *see also Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Margaret F.,*186 AD2d 255, 256 [1992]). Respondent correctly contends that where, as here, the evidence includes out-of-court statements of a child, such statements must be adequately corroborated to constitute admissible proof of abuse *(see Matter of Tanya T.,*252 AD2d 677, 678 [1998], *lv denied*92 NY2d 812 [1998]). However, the testimony of a physician detailing the physical indicia of abuse is sufficient to corroborate such unsworn out-of-court statements *(see Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N.Y. v Evelyn R.,*217 AD2d 697 [1995]; *see also Matter of Tyler K.,*261 AD2d 834 [1999]; *Matter of Kimberly K.,*123 AD2d 865 [1986]).

In this case, the out-of-court statements of the four-year-old victim that she and her daddy “had sex” and her frank description of the activity were corroborated by the testimony of a physician that the victim had injuries that were indicative of sexual abuse. The court has considerable discretion in determining whether a child’s out-of-court statements describing incidents of abuse have been reliably corroborated and whether the record as a whole supports a finding of abuse *(see Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Zakheima M.] v Lorenzo M.,*239 AD2d 498 [1997]). We conclude that the physician’s testimony sufficiently corroborates the child’s out-of-court statements and that petitioner met its burden of proving that respondent sexually abused his daughter by a preponderance of the evidence. Present—Pigott, Jr., P.J., Pine, Wisner, Hurlbutt and Gorski, JJ.
No. 10-5184.

#### Kenneth A. Roberts, Petitioner v. Deb McCulloch.

562 U.S. 908, 131 S. Ct. 255,

178 L. Ed. 2d 169,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 7019,

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David Brown, Appellant.

[55 NYS3d 295]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lewis, J.), rendered October 27, 2015, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (four counts) *872and conspiracy in the fourth degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial (see CPL 30.30). In felony cases, the People are required to be ready for trial within six months after the commencement of the criminal action *(see*CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the period of time in question, 55 days, during which one of the witnesses was unavailable due to his illness and a recommendation from his doctor that he not travel to New York, was excludable as an exceptional circumstance (see CPL 30.30 [4] [g] [i]; *People v Zirpola,*57 NY2d 706, 708 [1982]; *People v Alcequier,*15 AD3d 162, 163 [2005]; *People v McLeod,*281 AD2d 325, 327 [2001]; *People v Celestino,*201 AD2d 91, 95 [1994]; *cf. People v Stanley,*275 AD2d 423 [2000]).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the fact-finder’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor *(see People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The Supreme Court’s *Sandoval*ruling (see *People v Sandoval,*34 NY2d 371, 376-377 [1974]) constituted a proper exercise of discretion, and did not deprive the defendant of the right to testify on his own behalf (see *People v Smith,*18 NY3d 588, 594 [2012]; *People v Hayes,*97 NY2d 203, 207-208 [2002]; *People v Manigat,*136 AD3d 614, 615 [2016]; *People v White,*60 AD3d 1095, 1096 [2009]; *People v McLaurin,*33 AD3d 819, 820 [2006]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Brown,*262 AD2d 328, 329 [1999]) and, in any event, without merit.

Balkin, J.P., Cohen, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 23.1




Consent of Independent Registered Chartered
Accountants




We consent to the incorporation by reference in
Registration Statements No. 333-98603, 333-9216, 333-6502, and 333-6500 on Forms S-8 of our reports dated February 9, 2006 (which audit report
expresses an unqualified opinion and includes a separate report titled Comments by Independent Registered Chartered Accountants for U.S. Readers on
Canada  U.S. Reporting Differences referring to changes in accounting principles that have a material effect on the comparability of the
Companys financial statements and changes in accounting principles that have been implemented in the Companys financial statements)
relating to the consolidated financial statements of NovAtel Inc. appearing in this Annual Report on Form 20-F of NovAtel Inc. for the year ended
December 31, 2005.




(signed)  Deloitte & Touche LLP




Deloitte & Touche LLP Independent Registered
Chartered Accountants Calgary, Canada May 17, 2006


---
# DLA Aviation commander continues his battlefield tour with a trip to Warner Robins

/ Published Sept. 27, 2022
RICHMOND, Va., 
Defense Logistics Agency Aviation Commander Air Force Brig. Gen. Sean Tyler spent two days meeting those who support the warfighters at DLA Aviation at Warner Robins, Georgia, Sept. 7 and 8. DLA Aviation at Warner Robins Commander Air Force Col. Brian Mayer hosted Tyler during his visit.

The DLA Aviation team at Warner Robins is responsible for supporting the Air Force’s Air Logistic Complex on Robins Air Force Base with parts and maintenance to keep aircraft like the Air Force’s C-130, C-5 and C-17 transport planes, as well as F-15 Eagle fighter jets and special operations aircraft, in the air.

During his visit, Tyler toured four of the major depot locations on Robins Air Force Base and coined four Aviation employees for their outstanding job performances.