NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 18a0149n.06 No. 17-3493 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. ROBERT L, BANNISTER, Defendant-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

)

BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, GIBBONS, and WHITE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Robert Bannister pled guilty to bei ng a felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to dist ribute cocaine. The district c ourt sentenced him to time served and three years of supervised release, a signi ficant downward variance from the recommended Guidelines range. The government appealed th is sentence as substantively unreasonable. Because the district court gave adequate justification for the do wnward departure and its decision is entitled to wide discreti on, we affirm the sentence.
I. In 2015, Bannister pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). After his arrest, Bannister was released into a residential drug treatment program. For approximately eighteen months, Banni ster remained on pre-trial re lease. During that period, Bannister stayed clean, got the fi rst lawful job of his adult li fe, and co-founded Team Recovery,No. 17-3493, United States v. Bannister

2 a non-profit affiliated with the Toledo Police Depa rtment that works with schools, hospitals, and churches in helping individuals and families c oping with drug addiction. At the sentencing hearing, Bannister focused on his achievements since his arrest, while the government focused on Bannister’s prior criminal record. After confirming the uncontested Guidelines range and conducting a thorough analysis of the sentencing factors, the court ultimately senten ced Bannister to time served and three years’ supervised release. The government objected to the sentence as substantively unreasonable, mainly contesting that the sentence did not adequa tely weigh the Guidelines range, promote just punishment and respect for the law, or reflect the seriousness of the offense.
II. This court reviews the substantive reasonabl eness of a sentence for abuse of discretion, “regardless of whether the sentence is within or outside the advisory Guidelines range.” United
States v. Russ , 600 F. App’x 438, 447 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007)). A sentence is substantively unreas onable when the district court “selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on imperm issible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Keller , 498 F.3d 316, 323 (quoting United States v. Collington , 461 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 2006)). When imposing a sentence, the distri ct court should begin w ith a consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines range. United States v. Aleo , 681 F.3d 290, 299 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Gall , 552 U.S. at 49). If the district court fails to consider the Guidel ines, the sentence is substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Bistline , 720 F.3d 631, 633 (6th Cir. 2013) ( Bistine II ) (finding a sentence substantively unreasona ble where “the district court never mentioned [defendant’s] guidelines range”).No. 17-3493, United States v. Bannister

3 Here, the government contends that the distri ct court failed to consider the recommended Guidelines range. However, the district cour t specifically confirmed Bannister’s Guidelines
range and inquired about the calculat ion of that range, demonstrat ing that it did consider the Guidelines range and nevertheless found it appropr iate to impose a sent ence outside the range given the unique circumstances of Bannister’s good behavior. Additionally, the government argues that the district court failed to properly consider all the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(a) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . .”) (emphasis added). But our review of the transcript fr om the sentencing hearing shows the district court engaged in a substantial analysis of the sentencing factors. While the district court admitted that some of the factors counseled against its lenient sentence, it ultimately concluded that “on balance, . . . it would be a just sentence” in light of the extraordinary circumstan ces of this case. (DE 48, Sent. Tr., Page ID 308.) The extensive analysis here is the exact kind of balancing of the sentencing factors that is required of a district court judge. The district court ha s wide discretion in sentencing and “[t]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably ha ve concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall , 552 U.S. at 51. Given the district court’s extensive delib eration, the broad discretion afforded to district judges at sentencing, a nd Bannister’s truly remarkable re habilitation, we cannot say that the imposition of a noncustodial sentence here was substantively unreasonable

. III. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.