In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-21-00053-CR

ZAFRES LAMONN MCDONALD, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 188th District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 50098-A

Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and Carter,* JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Stevens

____________

*Jack Carter, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Zafres Lamonn McDonald entered an open plea of guilty to unauthorized use of a motor 

vehicle and pled true to the State’s habitual-offender punishment-enhancement allegations. See 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07. After hearing evidence on punishment, the trial court sentenced 

McDonald to eighteen years’ imprisonment. McDonald appeals.

In addition to this appeal, in companion cause numbers 06-21-00052-CR, 06-21-00054-

CR, and 06-21-00055-CR, McDonald appeals his convictions for two counts of evading arrest or 

detention with a motor vehicle and credit card abuse. McDonald has filed a single brief raising a 

sole issue common to all his appeals. He argues that the trial court erred by failing to enforce an 

alleged plea agreement. 

We addressed this issue in detail in our opinion of this date on McDonald’s appeal in 

cause number 06-21-00052-CR. For the reasons stated therein, we likewise conclude that the 

trial court properly concluded that there was no binding plea agreement in this case. As a result, 

we overrule McDonald’s sole point of error on appeal. Even so, we must modify the trial court’s 

judgment to reflect the proper degree of offense. 

McDonald’s judgment lists the degree of offense as a second-degree felony, but 

McDonald’s charge for unauthorized use of motor vehicle was a state jail felony. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(b). As a result of the State’s habitual-offender punishmentenhancement allegations, McDonald’s offense was punishable as “a felony of the second

degree.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.425(b). While the enhancement allegations were used to 

elevate McDonald’s punishment range, they did not change the classification of the underlying
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offense. See id.; Ford v. State, 334 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Bledsoe v. 

State, 480 S.W.3d 638, 642 n.11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d). As a result, the

judgment’s recitation that McDonald’s offense was a second-degree felony is incorrect. 

“This Court has the power to correct and modify the judgment of the trial court for 

accuracy when the necessary data and information are part of the record.” Anthony v. State, 531 

S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. 

State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d)). “The authority of an appellate court to reform incorrect 

judgments is not dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it turn on the question of 

whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.” Id. (quoting Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 

529–30). 

We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that McDonald was convicted of a state 

jail felony. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Scott E. Stevens

Justice

Date Submitted: January 10, 2022

Date Decided: March 2, 2022

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