[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 113 (Friday, June 12, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 32253-32256]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-15642]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362]


Southern California Edison Company, et al., San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3; Issuance of Director's Decision 
Under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, has acted on a Petition for action under 10 CFR 2.206 
received from Ms. Patricia Borchmann dated June 23, 1997, as 
supplemented by letters dated June 28, July 11, and October 21, 1997, 
for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Units 2 and 3.
    The Petitioner requested that the Unit 2 and Unit 3 outages be 
extended until all outstanding public health and safety concerns 
identified were fully resolved. In its letter dated September 22, 1997, 
acknowledging the Petition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(Commission or NRC) informed the Petitioner that as a result of its 
evaluation of the concerns raised, only two issues would be considered 
pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 for preparation of a Director's Decision. The 
first issue involves whether, when responding to issues regarding SONGS 
identified by members of the public, the NRC has fragmented responses 
and failed to comprehensively address issues in total and whether 
issues identified at SONGS when considered as a whole, reveal trends or 
systemic problems in the operation of the SONGS units. The second issue 
involves the SONGS analysis of evacuation time in the emergency 
preparedness plan.
    The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined that the Petitioner's request should be denied for the 
reasons stated in the

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``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-98-05), the complete 
text of which follows this notice and which is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the Local 
Public Document Room located at the Main Library, University of 
California, P.O. Box 19557, Irvine, California 92713.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of June 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Director's Decision Under 10 CFR Sec. 2.206

I. Introduction

    By Petition dated June 23, 1997, and supplemented by letters of 
June 28, July 11, and October 21, 1997, Patricia Borchmann (Petitioner) 
requested that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) 
take action with regard to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 
(SONGS) Units 2 and 3. The Petitioner requested that the NRC take 
immediate action to prevent the SONGS units from restarting until all 
the issues she raised were resolved. In support of the requested action 
the Petitioner asserted a variety of safety issues concerning the SONGS 
units. The issues raised included those concerning the emergency 
evacuation plans for SONGS, the size of the SONGS pressurizers, the 
condition of the SONGS Unit 1 membrane under the spent fuel pool (SFP) 
and SFP leak detection monitoring, loss of coolant accident dose 
calculations, the potential for criticality accidents due to the use of 
high density storage racks in the SFP, the NRC's failure to 
comprehensively address issues that have been raised and the 
withholding of certain data, the production of tritium and the 
cumulative effects of low level radiation. In its letter dated 
September 22, 1997, acknowledging the Petition, the NRC informed the 
Petitioner that there was insufficient basis to warrant the immediate 
action requested and that as a result of an evaluation of the issues 
raised, only two issues would be considered pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 
for preparation of a Director's Decision. The first issue involves 
whether, when responding to issues regarding SONGS, the NRC has 
fragmented responses and failed to comprehensively address issues in 
total and whether issues identified at SONGS when considered as a 
whole, reveal trends or systemic problems in the operation of the SONGS 
units. The second issue involves the SONGS analysis of evacuation time 
in the emergency preparedness plan. The Petitioner stated that the 
evacuation time estimates and the traffic capacity analysis for SONGS 
underestimated the actual number of vehicles that would be on the road 
and were based on the flawed assumption of only one vehicle per 
household. Further, the Petitioner was concerned that the analysis did 
not assume lane closures of major roads, which have been observed 
during natural events in the past.
    My Decision in this matter follows.

II. Discussion

A. Assessment of Whether SONGS Issues Considered as a Whole Reveal 
Trends or Systemic Problems
    In the Petitioner's June 28 letter, the Petitioner asserted that 
NRC responses to another individual's concerns reflected a tendency to 
fragment issues and isolate responses, and that the NRC failed to 
comprehensively address the ``big picture.'' In the October 21 letter, 
the Petitioner asserted that the NRC responses to concerns related to a 
SONGS Unit 1 SFP plastic membrane further reinforced the Petitioner's 
concerns related to the NRC fragmenting issues. In the NRC's September 
22, 1997, and February 17, 1998, responses to the Petitioner, the NRC 
indicated that an assessment would be performed to determine if issues 
considered as a whole reveal trends or systemic problems associated 
with the safe operation of the SONGS units. The NRC further informed 
the Petitioner that it would review the handling of the Unit 1 SFP 
membrane to determine if issues considered as a whole indicated 
systemic problems or trends associated with the operation of the SONGS 
units.
    In order to effectively respond to concerns related to SONGS, the 
staff has maintained documentation of the issues raised and the NRC 
responses to these issues. To ensure that NRC responses to SONGS Units 
1, 2, and 3 issues are consistent and that previously raised issues are 
taken into consideration, the NRC has designated a manager to serve as 
the NRC point of contact for responding to these issues.
    Furthermore, the process for evaluation and determination of the 
safety significance of issues raised includes reviewing previously 
identified issues regarding SONGS. The previously identified concerns 
and responses are evaluated to determine if they are similar, if they 
have an impact on the issues under review, if they should be included 
in the evaluation of the issue under review, and if the response to the 
issue under review changes previous evaluations.
    The staff performed an independent review of the previous SONGS 
issues together with those noted in the Petition. This review 
determined that there was no indication of trends or systemic problems 
affecting the safe operation of the SONGS units or affecting the 
validity of existing conclusions. Moreover, the staff did not find any 
evidence that issues had not been fully considered or that 
relationships with other issues had been ignored. In sum, the staff has 
concluded that issues identified regarding the SONGS units have been 
satisfactorily reviewed and that there is no basis for the Petitioner's 
assertion.
B. Analysis of the SONGS Traffic Capacity Analysis
    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Section 
50.54(q), states, in part, that ``[a] licensee authorized to possess 
and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect 
emergency plans which meet the standards in Sec. 50.47(b) and the 
requirements in Appendix E of this part.'' Part 50 of 10 CFR, Appendix 
E, Section IV, ``Content of Emergency Plans,'' states, in part, that 
``[t]he nuclear power reactor operating applicant shall also provide an 
analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other 
protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume 
exposure pathway EPZ [emergency planning zone] for transient and 
permanent populations.'' Guidance on developing an evacuation time 
estimate (ETE) study is given in Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Rev. 1, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants.'' The analysis of the time required to evacuate the transient 
and permanent population from various areas within the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ at San Onofre is set forth in Appendix G of the SONGS 
Emergency Plan. The ETEs in the San Onofre Emergency Plan are also 
reflected in the emergency plans for the offsite jurisdictions located 
in the plume exposure pathway EPZ for San Onofre, which is about 10 
miles in radius.
    As indicated in the September 22, 1997, response to the Petitioner, 
the NRC requires nuclear power plant licensees to study the population 
distribution relative to the transportation network in the vicinity of 
a nuclear power plant and to develop ETEs on the basis of the results 
of the study. However, NRC regulations do not

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specify any preset minimum evacuation time that must be met in order 
for a site to be acceptable or for emergency plans to be approved. The 
objective of an ETE study is to have ETEs that reasonably reflect the 
evacuation times for the various sectors and distances surrounding a 
nuclear power plant site for a number of evacuation scenarios for use 
by emergency planners and decisionmakers in the emergency planning 
process. ETEs are used primarily during the planning process to 
identify potential traffic bottlenecks so that effective traffic 
control and management measures can be developed. In the event of a 
serious accident requiring offsite protective actions such as 
evacuation, plant conditions are the primary indicators used by the NRC 
and licensee to determine protective actions rather than offsite dose 
calculations and estimates of evacuation times.
    Guidance on protective actions for severe reactor accidents is 
given in draft Supplement 3 to NUREG-0654, ``Criteria for Protective 
Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents,'' issued in July 1996. 
This guidance states that in the event of a severe reactor accident 
involving actual or projected core damage with potential for offsite 
consequences, plant operators should recommend prompt evacuation of the 
area near the plant. In this case, the decision to evacuate is based on 
plant conditions, including the status of the reactor core and the 
systems intended to protect the core, and not on the amount of time it 
may take to evacuate the nearby areas.
    The NRC staff took the Petitioner's concerns into consideration 
during a review of an updated ETE analysis for San Onofre submitted by 
the licensee on July 25, 1997, in Revision 7 to the SONGS Emergency 
Plan. The Petitioner asserted that the emergency plans for SONGS 
underestimated the actual number of vehicles projected to be used 
during an emergency event, resulting in an overestimated assumption 
about traffic system capacity. The Petitioner stated that the 
evacuation and traffic capacity analysis for SONGS was based on the 
flawed assumption that only one vehicle per household would be used 
during an evacuation following an emergency event at SONGS. The 
Petitioner indicated that this was not a realistic assumption and that 
many more vehicles would be used during an emergency evacuation because 
parents working at separate locations would need more than one vehicle 
to evacuate with children attending different schools or day care 
centers or engaged in other activities.
    Although the use of one vehicle per household is often assumed in 
ETE studies, the NRC found, based on a review of the ETE study in 
Revision 7 to the SONGS Emergency Plan (Section 3.4, pages 12-13), that 
the San Onofre ETE analysis assumes a higher number of vehicles. 
Different numbers of vehicles are used in daytime and nighttime 
scenarios to reflect different conditions. All the scenarios assume 
more than one vehicle per household. Based on its review, the NRC 
concludes that the methodology used to generate the number of 
evacuating vehicles reasonably reflects the number of potentially 
evacuating vehicles for an emergency at San Onofre.
    The Petitioner asserted that even under worst-case scenario 
assumptions, such as flooding, the current ETE analysis assumes there 
would be no lane closures, such as occurred during flooding and 
mudslides in 1994 in Laguna Beach. On the basis of a review of the ETE 
analysis in Revision 7 of the SONGS Emergency Plan, the NRC found that 
the ETE study contains a comprehensive analysis of road closures after 
earthquakes (Chapter 11, pages 66-80), and that the road closures in 
the analysis were very severe and provide a very clear understanding of 
the sensitivity of the ETE analysis to road closures (Section 5.4, page 
17). Thus, the NRC concludes that ETEs can be used by emergency 
planners to aid in decisionmaking for a wide range of adverse 
conditions, including lane and road closures caused by flooding and 
mudslides.
    The Petitioner expressed a concern for the need for an updated 
traffic capacity analysis and evacuation time study to evaluate 
capacity and levels of service on Interstate 5 (I-5) at the Via de la 
Valle exit at peak hours during summer when both Del Mar Fair and Del 
Mar Race Track are operating. The Via de la Valle interchange is about 
30 miles to the south of San Onofre. This is well beyond the influence 
area of the EPZ <SUP>1</SUP> evacuation traffic. Furthermore, areas to 
the south of San Onofre generally have lighter evacuation traffic since 
the population in the EPZ is more concentrated to the north. Thus, the 
NRC finds that there is no reason that the ETE needs to consider 
traffic congestion in the Via de la Valle Interchange area on I-5 as it 
is well beyond the EPZ and outside the EPZ perimeter traffic control 
area.
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    \1\ Regarding the Petitioner's comment that an evacuation zone 
limited to only 10 miles is ``sorely inadequate,'' the size of the 
EPZs for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States is 
established by NRC regulations, and the NRC has consistently found 
that a plume exposure EPZ of about 10 miles in radius provides an 
adequate planning basis for radiological emergency planning. See 
NUREG-1251, Vol. 1, ``Implications of the Accident at Chernobyl for 
Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Power Plants in the United 
States,'' April 1989, and see Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham 
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383, 395 (1987) 
where the Commission ruled that 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) precludes 
adjustments on safety grounds to the size of an EPZ that is ``about 
10 miles in radius.''
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    Finally, on January 27, 1998, FEMA informed the NRC that on the 
basis of the results of the full-participation exercise conducted at 
San Onofre on October 28, 1997, FEMA found that the offsite 
radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of 
California and the jurisdictions specific to the San Onofre site can be 
implemented and provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures 
can be taken off site to protect the health and safety of the public in 
the event of a radiological emergency at San Onofre.

III. Conclusion

    The NRC staff has conducted a review of the previous SONGS issues 
together with the issues raised by the Petitioner and determined that 
there is no basis for concluding that the NRC has fragmented issues and 
there is no indication that issues reveal trends or systemic problems 
with the conduct of reviews of these concerns or operation of the SONGS 
units. As a result, I find that the NRC has evaluated the issues 
appropriately and find no trends or systemic flaws that would 
invalidate those reviews.
    As discussed above, the NRC staff has evaluated the emergency 
planning concerns raised by the Petitioner and found that the current 
emergency plans and preparedness at San Onofre adequately address the 
Petitioner's concerns. On the basis of FEMA's findings on offsite 
emergency preparedness and the NRC's findings on the adequacy of onsite 
emergency preparedness, the NRC continues to find that there is 
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be 
taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the SONGS facility.
    For the reasons discussed above, no basis exists for taking the 
action requested by the Petitioner. Accordingly, the Petitioner's 
request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is denied. A copy of this 
Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the 
Commission to review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 of the 
Commission's regulations. As provided by this regulation, the Decision 
will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after 
issuance, unless the Commission, on its

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own motion, institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of June 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
[FR Doc. 98-15642 Filed 6-11-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7690-01-P