alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Mental Health Awareness: It’s okay to answer Question 21 

/ Published May 3, 2022
FORT BELVOIR, Va., 
May is Mental Health Awareness Month – a good time to bring up Question 21 on Standard Form 86, “Questionnaire for National Security Positions,” which federal employees complete for initial or renewed security clearances.

Question 21 asks if you’ve received mental health treatment. It ties into the Psychological Conditions section of the adjudicative guidelines used to help to determine a person's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Many employees fear seeking mental health care could adversely impact their security clearance eligibility. This could not be further from the truth.

The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility are working to destigmatize mental health and dispel the myth that an individual is likely to lose or be denied a clearance after seeking mental health care.

SF-86 states: “Mental health counseling in and of itself is not a reason to revoke or deny eligibility for access to classified information or for a sensitive position, suitability or fitness to obtain or retain federal employment, fitness to obtain or retain contract employment, or eligibility for physical or logical access to federally controlled facilities or information systems.”Of 96,850 adjudicative actions that contained psychologically related issues from 2012 through 2020, only 62 clearances were denied or revoked based on mental health. That’s just .00115% – proof it’s rare for an individual to lose a clearance because of a psychological condition.Voluntarily seeking mental health treatment is seen as a positive step and often mitigates security concerns by showing an individual takes responsibility for their mental health. Not seeking treatment, discontinuing required treatment or not reporting treatment can be a greater concern because it questions a person’s ability to safeguard the nation’s secrets.Your local DLA Intelligence Personnel Security Office is available to answer questions regarding mental-health reporting requirements and obtaining and maintaining a security clearance.
September 1, 2016

Mr. Richard W. Zollinger, PE Principal Environmental Engineer R. W. Zollinger Consulting Engineers, Inc. 1408 Coraopolis Heights Road Moon Township, PA 15108

Re: FAA-2015-0021

Dear Mr. Zollinger:

This letter is to provide notification that we have reviewed your petition for exemption, and
have determined that we will con tinue to process your petition.

As referenced in the June 22, 2016, letter posted to your docket at www.regulations.gov , we are reviewing pending Section 333 petitions to determine if the recently-issued regulation, Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 107 ( www.faa.gov/uas ) will satisfy your request. We have determined that your request requires further regulatory relief (T ier 3), and we will continue working on your petition for exemption.

We have found that your petition, if granted, would set a precedent. Therefore, we will publish a summary of your petition in the Federa l Register for public comments, if we have not done so already.

We will advise you of the agency’s final deci sion on your petition as s oon as possible. If you have any questions regarding your petition, please contact me at 333exemptions@faa.gov

.

Sincerely,
/s/
Brenda Robeson Program Analyst
<PAGE>   1

EXHIBIT 23.1


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


       We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration
statement of International Home Foods, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No. 333-43297) of
our report dated March 6, 1998, on our audits of the Consolidated Financial
Statements of International Home Foods, Inc. as of December 31, 1997 and 1996,
and for the years ended December 31, 1997 and December 31, 1996, which report is
included in the International Home Foods, Inc. Annual Report for the year ended
December 31, 1997 and is incorporated by reference into this Annual Report on
Form 10-K.




                                                        Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P.
Parsippany, New Jersey
March 30, 1998
Exhibit 10.1


AMENDMENT
TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


This Amendment to
Employment Agreement (“Amendment”), is made and entered into as of the 30 day
of May, 2006, by and between CORPORATE OFFICE PROPERTIES, L. P. (the “Employer”),
CORPORATE OFFICE PROPERTIES TRUST (“COPT”) and RANDALL M. GRIFFIN (the “Executive”).


RECITALS


A.   Executive and Employer executed an Employment
Agreement dated July 13, 2005, providing for the employment of the
Executive by the Employer upon the terms and conditions therein stated, of which
the Basic Term is scheduled to expire on June 30, 2008.


B.   Employer has requested and Executive has
agreed to extend the Basic Term for an additional two (2) years and the
parties desire to enter into this Agreement on the terms and conditions set forth
herein.


NOW, THEREFORE, in
consideration of Executive’s continued employment under the Employment
Agreement, it is covenanted and agreed by and between the parties hereto as
follows:


1.    AMENDMENT TO PARAGRAPH 4(a).  The first sentence of Section 4(a) of
the Employment Agreement is deleted and the following is inserted in lieu
thereof:


The Executive’s employment hereunder shall be for a
term commencing on April 1, 2005 and expiring on June 30, 2010 (the “Basic
Term”)


2.    NO OTHER AMENDMENTS. With the exception of
paragraph 4(a) of the Employment Agreement, this Amendment does not affect
or otherwise supersede any other provisions of the Employment Agreement or
otherwise limit its enforceability in any way.


IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the date first written
above.


 


	
  “Employer”

  	
   

  	
   

  	
  “Executive”

  
	
  CORPORATE OFFICE PROPERTIES L. P.

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Maryland limited liability company

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
  Corporate Office Properties Trust,

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  General Partner

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Jay H. Shidler

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Randall M. Griffin

  
	
   

  	
  Jay H. Shidler

  	
   

  	
  Randall M. Griffin

  
	
   

  	
  Chairman of the Board

  	
   

  	
  Date: 5/30/06

  
	
   

  	
  Date: 5/30/06

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  CORPORATE OFFICE PROPERTIES TRUST

  	
   

  
	
  a Maryland estate investment trust

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Jay H. Shidler

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Jay H. Shidler

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Chairman of the Board

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  Date: 5/30/06
No. 09-11516.

#### Charles M. Rynes, Petitioner v. McKither Bodison, Warden.

562 U.S. 885, 131 S. Ct. 213,

178 L. Ed. 2d 128,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6500.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 371 Fed. Appx. 393.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Willie McRae, Appellant.

[51 NYS3d 434]

Aarons, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Herrick, J.), rendered December 9, 2013, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, and in full satisfaction of a two-count indictment and other then-pending charges, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and executed a written waiver of appeal in open court. Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, County Court imposed upon defendant, as a nonviolent predicate felony offender, a prison sentence of seven years to be followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.

*1329We affirm. Initially, we find that defendant’s oral and written waiver of appeal was knowing, voluntary and intelligent *(see People v Sanders,*25 NY3d 337, 339-341 [2015]; *People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]). The record reflects that County Court distinguished the right to appeal as “separate and apart” from the rights automatically forfeited by a guilty plea, and defendant acknowledged that he signed and understood the written appeal waiver after reviewing it and conferring with counsel regarding its contents *(see People v Hall,*147 AD3d 1151, 1151 [2017]; *People v Dolberry,*147 AD3d 1149, 1150 [2017]). While defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his plea survives the appeal waiver, this claim was not preserved by an appropriate postallocution motion *(see People v Smith,*121 AD3d 1131, 1132 [2014], *lv denied*24 NY3d 1123 [2015]; *People v Waite,*120 AD3d 1446, 1447 [2014]), and defendant made no statements during the plea colloquy that triggered the narrow exception to the preservation requirement *(see People v Williams,*27 NY3d 212, 219-220 [2016]; *People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]; *People v Austin,*141 AD3d 956, 957 [2016]).

Defendant’s claim that the sentence was harsh and excessive is foreclosed by the valid appeal waiver *(see People v Macon,*142 AD3d 739, 739 [2016], *lv denied*28 NY3d 1073 [2016]; *People v Rushlow,*137 AD3d 1482, 1483 [2016]), which includes his “right to invoke [this Court’s] interest-of-justice jurisdiction to reduce the sentence” *(People v Bethea,*133 AD3d 1033, 1033 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], *lv denied*27 NY3d 992 [2016]). To the extent that defendant raises a claim regarding what counsel investigated or discussed with him, this concerns a matter that is outside the record on appeal and is more properly suited for a CPL article 440 motion *(see People v Daniels,*139 AD3d 1256, 1257 [2016], *lv denied*28 NY3d 1183 [2017]; *People v Taylor,*135 AD3d 1237, 1238 [2016], *lv denied*27 NY3d 1075 [2016]).

Peters, P.J., Garry, Devine and Mulvey, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Heath E. June, Appellant.

[54 NYS3d 253]

Appeal from an order of the Oswego County Court (Donald E. Todd, J.), dated March 10, 2014. The order determined that defendant is a level two risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order determining that he is a level two risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law § 168 *et seq.).*Contrary to defendant’s contention, County Court did not err in assessing 20 points against him under the risk factor for a continuing course of sexual misconduct. “ ‘[T]he court was not limited to considering only the crime of which defendant was convicted in making its determination’ ” *(People v Davis,*145 AD3d 1625, 1626 [2016]). Here, we conclude that the reliable evidence presented at the hearing, including the victim’s grand jury testimony and her statement to the police, was “sufficient to establish that defendant engaged in a continuing course of sexual misconduct with that victim” *(People v Whyte,*89 AD3d 1407, 1408 [2011]; *see generally People v Hubel,*70 AD3d 1492, 1493 [2010]).

We also reject defendant’s further contention that a downward departure from the presumptive risk level was warranted in this case. Although the court may “depart” from the *1702presumptive risk level, “[t]he expectation is that the [risk assessment] instrument will result in the proper classification in most cases so that departures will be the exception—not the rule” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006]). While “[a]n offender’s response to treatment, if exceptional, can be the basis for a downward departure” *(id.*at 17), defendant’s participation and moderate success in treatment programs does not demonstrate that his response was exceptional *(see People v Pendleton,*112 AD3d 600, 601 [2013], *lv denied*22 NY3d 861 [2014]; *People v Watson,*95 AD3d 978, 979 [2012]; *People v Parker,*81 AD3d 1304, 1304 [2011], *lv denied*16 NY3d 713 [2011]). Furthermore, defendant’s self-serving statements regarding his progress carry little if any weight *(see People v Martinez,*104 AD3d 924, 924-925 [2013], *lv denied*21 NY3d 857 [2013]). We therefore conclude that “ ‘defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his response to treatment was exceptional’ ” *(People v Butler,*129 AD3d 1534, 1535 [2015], *lv denied*26 NY3d 904 [2015]).

Finally, to the extent that defendant contends that the court should have considered his marriage, new apartment and recent employment in determining whether a downward departure was warranted, we further conclude that “ [defendant's ‘stable lifestyle’ was already taken into account by the risk assessment instrument” *(People v Cabrera,*91 AD3d 479, 480 [2012], *lv denied*19 NY3d 801 [2012]).

Present—Smith, J.P., Peradotto, DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Curran, JJ.
No. 09-11098.

#### Kevin Smith, Petitioner v. Jon Ozmint, Director, South Carolina Department of Corrections, et al.

562 U.S. 862, 131 S. Ct. 142,

178 L. Ed. 2d 85,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 5974.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 356 Fed. Appx. 646.
Exhibit 8.1



Subsidiaries



The following table sets forth our significant subsidiaries as of December 31, 2003, including the principal activity, ownership interest and, if
different, percentage of voting power held by us. All of our significant subsidiaries are incorporated in Chile.



|                                                |  |                  |  |          |  |       
|----------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------- |  | -------- |  | ------
|                                                |  | Percentage Owned
|                                                |  | 2003            
|                                                |  | Direct           |  | Indirect |  | Total 
|                                                |  | %                |  | %        |  | %     
|Subsidiary                                      |  |                  |  |          |  |       
|Santiago Leasing S.A.                           |  | 99.50            |  |         |  | 99.50 
|Santiago Corredores de Bolsa Ltda.              |  | 99.19            |  | 0.81     |  | 100.00
|Santander S.A. Administradora General de Fondos |  | 99.96            |  | 0.04     |  | 100.00
|Cobranzas y Recaudaciones Ltda. (C y R)         |  |                 |  |         |  |      
|Santiago Factoring Ltda.                        |  |                 |  |         |  |      
|Santander S.A. Agente de Valores                |  | 99.03            |  |         |  | 99.03 
|Santander Administradora de Fondos Mutuos S.A.  |  |                 |  |         |  |      
|Santander S.A. Sociedad Securitizadora          |  | 99.64            |  |         |  | 99.64 
|Corredora de Seguros Santander Ltda.            |  | 99.99            |  |         |  | 99.99 



On April 25, 2003 Santander
Administradora de Fondos Mutuos S.A. was absorbed by Santander S.A. Administradora General de Fondos. On October 31, 2003 the subsidiary Cobranzas y Recaudaciones Ltda. (C y R) was sold to America Consulting S.A. On December 1, 2003 Santiago
Factoring was absorbed by the Bank.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,Robert L. Demorest, certify that:

1.     I have reviewed this Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q of MOCON, Inc.;

2.               Based on my knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period coveredby this report;

3.               Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

4.               The registrant’s other certifying officer(s)and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:

a)              Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

b)             Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of theend of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c)              Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and

5.               The registrant’s other certifying officer(s)and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controlover financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committeeof registrant’s Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

a)              All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)             Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

Date:  November 13, 2006

 
| /s/ Robert L. Demorest                 |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| Robert L. Demorest                     |
| Chief Executive Officer  and President |
| (Principal Executive  Officer)         |

 

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#### Heather Hitchcock, Respondent, v Cayuga-Onondaga Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Appellant.

[769 NYS2d 770]

— Appeal from an order of Supreme Court, Cayuga County (Corning, J.), entered March 25, 2003, which granted claimant’s application to serve a late notice of claim.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed with costs for reasons stated in decision at Supreme Court, Cayuga County, Corning, J. Present—Pine, J.P., Wisner, Hurlbutt, Kehoe and Hayes, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-1021
HERMIONE WRIGHT, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HOME QUARTERS WAREHOUSE, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge. (MISC-95-48-2) Submitted: June 20, 1996 Decided: June 28, 1996 Before HALL, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Hermione Wright, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying the motion for extension of time in which to file a complaint pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Wright v. Home Quarters Warehouse, Inc. , No. MISC95-48-2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 4, 1995). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented inthe materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Frank M. Flower & Sons, Inc., Appellant, v North Oyster Bay Baymen’s Association, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[55 NYS3d 139]

In an action to recover damages for breach of a settlement agreement, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.), dated August 4, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground of collateral estop-pel.

*966Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint is denied.

Prior to filing an answer in this action to recover damages for breach of a settlement agreement, the defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was another action pending between the same parties based on the same cause of action, and pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (10) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that “the court should not proceed in the absence of a person who should be a party.” The defendants did not request dismissal on any other grounds. The Supreme Court rejected both of these grounds for dismissal.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion on the ground of collateral estoppel *(see*CPLR 3211 [a] [5]) based on a judgment entered in a separate, related action involving the parties. At that time, an appeal from the judgment in the related action was pending before this Court *(see North Oyster Bay Baymen’s Assn. v Town of Oyster Bay,*130 AD3d 885 [2015]). The plaintiff contends on appeal that the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendants’ motion on a ground not raised by the parties.

Under the circumstances of this case, we agree that the Supreme Court erred in granting the defendants’ motion on the ground of collateral estoppel, because that ground was never raised or briefed by the parties. The parties had no opportunity to address the issue of collateral estoppel, and this “lack of notice and opportunity to be heard implicates the fundamental issue of fairness that is the cornerstone of due process” *(Rosenblatt v St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC,*119 AD3d 45, 54 [2014]; *see Misicki v Caradonna,*12 NY3d 511, 519 [2009]; *Evans v Argent Mtge. Co., LLC,*120 AD3d 618, 620-621 [2014]; *cf. Mew Equity, LLC v Sutton Land Servs., LLC,*144 AD3d 874, 877 [2016]; *Town of Brookhaven v MMCCAS Holdings, Inc.,*137 AD3d 1258, 1258 [2016]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the complaint.

Balkin, J.P., Cohen, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.