30808 Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 108 / Friday, June 5, 1998 / Notices

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety

Advisory 98–2 addressing safety

practices to reduce the risk of casualties

caused by failure to activate the

available two-way end-of-train telemetry

device (two-way EOT) to initiate an

emergency brake application beginning

at the rear of the train when

circumstances require an emergency

application of the train airbrakes.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices

Specialist, Office of Safety Enforcement,

FRA, 400 Seventh Street, SW., RRS–11,

Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC. 20590

(telephone 202–632–3370), or Thomas

Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of

Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,

SW., RCC–12, Mail Stop 10,

Washington, DC. 20590 (telephone 202–

632–3178).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Several

recent freight train incidents potentially

involving the improper use of a train’s

airbrakes have caused FRA to focus on

railroad airbrake and train handling

procedures related to the initiation of an

emergency airbrake application,

particularly as they pertain to the

activation of the two-way EOT from the

locomotive. FRA and the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are

currently investigating four incidents in

which a train was placed into

emergency braking by use of the normal

emergency brake valve handles on the

locomotive, and although the train in

each instance was equipped with an

armed and operable two-way EOT, the

device was not activated by the

locomotive engineer. These incidents

include:

• A March 30, 1997, incident

occurring near Ridgecrest, North

Carolina, involving Norfolk Southern

train No. P32, resulting in 42 cars

derailed and two crewmembers injured;

• An October 25, 1997, incident

occurring in Houston, Texas, involving

Union Pacific train Nos. IHOLB–25 and

MTUHO–21, resulting in five

locomotives derailed and totally

destroyed and two crewmembers

injured;

• A November 3, 1997, incident

occurring near Alvord, Texas, involving

Burlington Northern Santa Fe train Nos.

HALTBAR 1–03 and ESLPCAM 3–11,

resulting in three locomotives and seven

cars derailed and two crewmembers

injured;

• A March 23, 1998, incident

occurring near Herington, Kansas,

involving Union Pacific train Nos.

MKSTUX–23 and IESLB–21, resulting

in one locomotive and six cars derailed

and one crewmember injured.

The facts and findings developed in

the investigations currently being

conducted by FRA and the NTSB will

be published when the individual

investigations are complete.

FRA’s preliminary findings indicate

that in all of the incidents noted above,

there was evidence of an obstruction

somewhere in the train line, caused by

either a closed or partially closed angle

cock or a kinked air hose. This

obstruction prevented an emergency

brake application from being propagated

throughout the entire train, front to rear,

after such an application was initiated

from the locomotive using either the

engineer’s automatic brake valve handle

or the conductor’s emergency brake

valve. Furthermore, the locomotive

engineers in each of the incidents stated

that they did not think to use the twoway EOT, when asked why they failed

to activate the device.

Two-Way End-of-Train Device

Regulation

On January 2, 1997, FRA published a

final rule amending the regulations

governing train and locomotive power

braking systems contained at 49 CFR

part 232 by adding provisions

pertaining to the use and design of twoway EOTs. See 62 FR 278. Two-way

EOTs provide locomotive engineers

with the capability of initiating an

emergency brake application that

commences at the rear of the train. The

purpose of the new provisions was to

improve the safety of railroad operations

by requiring the use of two-way EOTs

on a variety of trains pursuant to 1992

legislation, and by establishing

minimum performance and operational

standards related to the use and design

of the devices. Furthermore, the

regulatory provisions related to two-way

EOTs are intended to ensure that trains

operating at a speed over 30 mph or in

heavy grade territory are equipped with

the technology to effectuate an

emergency application of the train’s

airbrakes starting from both the front

and rear of the train. The specific

exceptions contained in the regulation

are aimed at trains that: (i) Do not

operate within the express parameters;

or (ii) are equipped or operated in a

fashion that provides the ability to

effectuate an emergency brake

application that commences at or near

the rear of the train without the use of

a two-way EOT. See 49 CFR

232.25(e)(1)–(e)(9).

Based on FRA’s review of the above

incidents, and its awareness of other

incidents involving non-use of two-way

EOTs under similar circumstances, it

appears that further guidance regarding

the use of the devices may be of

assistance to our nation’s railroads. This

advisory may be especially beneficial to

individuals responsible for train

operations that do not have a thorough

understanding of two-way EOTs and

their function. Accordingly, FRA

believes that the following

recommended procedure for activating

the two-way EOT should be taken to

reduce the likelihood of future incidents

caused by an inability to stop a moving

train that encounters a train line

obstruction.

Recommended Action

FRA recommends that each railroad

adopt and implement a procedure that

requires the locomotive engineer or

other train crewmember to activate the

two-way EOT, on trains equipped with

the device, using the manual toggle

switch, whenever it becomes necessary

to place the train airbrakes in emergency

using either the automatic brake valve

handle or the conductor’s emergency

brake valve. FRA also recommends that

the two-way EOT be activated whenever

an undesired emergency application of

the train airbrakes occurs. FRA believes

that the likelihood of future incidents,

such as the ones described above, would

be greatly reduced if, besides following

existing procedures regarding

emergency train braking, railroads

require additional action to be taken by

a member of the train crew. FRA

believes that this additional procedure

would not only ensure that an

emergency brake application is

commenced from both the front and rear

of the train, but that it will help

familiarize the engineer with the

activation of the device and will educate

the engineer to react in the safest

possible manner whenever

circumstances require an emergency

brake application. FRA further

recommends that railroads have an

operating supervisor personally conduct

a face-to-face meeting with each

locomotive engineer and conductor to

explain the contents of this advisory,

preferably during a mock demonstration

in order to reinforce employee

familiarization with the operation of the

two-way EOT, and to ensure that each

individual has a thorough

understanding of how and under what

circumstances to activate the two-way

EOT. In issuing this safety advisory,

FRA acknowledges the following
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 108 / Friday, June 5, 1998 / Notices 30809

railroads that have already taken the

lead on this issue by having in effect a

similar or comparable requirement:

Burlington Northern Santa Fe, Conrail,

CSX, Norfolk Southern, and Union

Pacific.

FRA may modify Safety Advisory 98–

2, issue additional safety advisories, or

take other appropriate necessary action

to ensure the highest level of safety on

the Nation’s railroads.

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 1, 1998.

George Gavalla,

Acting Associate Administrator for Safety.

[FR Doc. 98–14975 Filed 6–4–98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA–97–3194; Notice 2]

Cosco, Inc.; Grant of Application for

Decision of Inconsequential

Noncompliance

Cosco, Incorporated of Columbus,

Indiana, has determined that

approximately 82,176 child restraint

systems fail to comply with 49 CFR

571.213, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, ‘‘Child

Restraint Systems,’’ and has filed an

appropriate report pursuant to 49 CFR

part 573, ‘‘Defects and Noncompliance

Reports.’’ Cosco has also applied to be

exempted from the notification and

remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C.

Chapter 301—‘‘Motor Vehicle Safety’’

on the basis that the noncompliance is

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.

Notice of receipt of the application

was published, with a 30-day comment

period, on February 20, 1998, in the

Federal Register (63 FR 8735). NHTSA

received no comments.

FMVSS No. 213, paragraph S5.7,

requires that each material used in a

child restraint system shall conform to

the requirements of S4 of FMVSS No.

302, ‘‘Flammability of Interior

Materials.’’ This requires that any

material that does not adhere to other

material(s) at every point of contact

shall meet the burn rate requirements of

S4.3 when tested separately. Materials

are to be tested as a composite only if

the material adheres to other material(s)

at every point of contact.

Following compliance tests

conducted by the National Highway

Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),

Cosco has confirmed through its

investigation that it manufactured and

distributed a number of Touriva

convertible child restraint systems

whose covers incorporate an additional

polyester fiberfill pillow which does not

meet the flammability requirements of

FMVSS Nos. 213 and 302. The Cosco

child restraints affected and the dates of

production are as follows: Touriva

Overhead Shield Accu-Just (Model 02–

025; 3/95 to 6/96); Touriva Luxury

Overhead Shield AccuJust (Model 02–

045; 2/95 to 6/96); Touriva Overhead

Shield (Model 02–034; 4/94 to 6/96);

Touriva Overhead Shield Accu-Just

(Model 02–054; 4/94 to 6/96); Touriva 5

point (Model 02–564; 3/95 to 6/96);

Touriva Overhead Shield (Model 02–

055; 1/95 to 6/96); Touriva Luxury

Overhead Shield (Model 02–065; 3/95 to

6/96); Olympian Overhead Shield

(Model 02–257; 6/96); Touriva 5 point

(Model 02–597; 6/96); Touriva Safe TShield (Model 02–096; 4/96 to 6/96);

and Touriva Overhead Shield Accu-Just

(Model 02–064;1/95 to 6/96). All of the

models listed are convertible child

restraints incorporating the same shell

design and a pillow in the head contact

area, but the different models are a

combination of restraint types, cover

designs, and options. In each of the

noncompliant models, a polyester

fiberfill is utilized to form the pillow in

the head area of the cover, and it is this

polyester fiberfill material which

exceeded the 4 inches per minute

maximum burn rate when tested in

accordance with S4 of FMVSS No. 302.

In its investigation, Cosco found burn

rates ranging from 17.3 inches per

minute to 39.5 inches per minute in six

tests conducted on two different

samples of the polyester fiberfill in

question.

Cosco supports its application for

inconsequential noncompliance with

the following:

As the non-complying polyester fiberfill is

incorporated into a pillow located in the

child restraint near the top of the pad; it is

a vertical surface. This configuration makes

the likelihood of ignition from cigarettes or

any other similar ignition source virtually

nil.

Complying materials encase the relatively

small amount of non-complying polyester

fiberfill. The amount of potentially noncomplying polyester fiberfill incorporated in

the pillow is 0.0951 pounds. The various

Touriva convertible child restraints range in

weight from approximately eight to ten

pounds. This means that approximately one

percent of the child restraint is potentially

non-complying. Furthermore, as is confirmed

in the NHTSA tests which identified the noncomplying polyester fiberfill, the material

encompassing the non-complying polyester

fiberfill complies with the FMVSS 302

Flammability Standard. This includes the

fabric covering the surface of the pad, the

polyurethane foam in the pad, the fabric

backing of the pad, and the polypropylene

shell itself. Thus, the only way the noncomplying fiberfill would be exposed to a

source of ignition that has not already

consumed the child restraint is if the cover

of the pillow is torn, exposing the fiberfill,

and an ignition source then finds its way to

this exposed fiberfill. The probability of such

a sequence of events occurring is virtually

nil. These facts make the potential of the

non-complying polyester fiberfill in the

pillow contributing to an injury or death

even less likely.

Cosco has no reports of the burning of a

cover of one of the suspect models (or any

other child restraint system cover). All

occupant protection studies which Cosco has

reviewed, indicate an almost infinitesimal

risk of injury or death by vehicle fires in

total, at least in collisions. Cosco is unaware

of any data on fires of the interior of vehicles

unrelated to collisions.

The agency has reviewed Cosco’s

application and has decided that the

noncompliance is inconsequential to

motor vehicle safety. NHTSA agrees

with Cosco that the noncompliant

polyester fiberfill material incorporated

in the pillow of noncompliant Touriva

child restraint systems is unlikely to

pose a flammability risk due to the

unlikelihood of exposure to an ignition

source given the pillow’s vertical

orientation on the child restraint, the

fact that the noncompliant material is

fully encased by materials which

comply with the flammability

requirements of FMVSS No. 302, and

the very limited quantity of

noncompliant material used in

construction of the child restraint.

The agency granted an application for

inconsequential noncompliance

submitted by PACCAR, 57 FR 45868

(October 5, 1992), in which the

circumstances were analogous to those

presented in the Cosco application.

PACCAR manufactured mattresses for

the sleeper areas of certain truck

tractors. A small portion of the material

used in the construction of the

mattresses, and subject to the

requirements of FMVSS No. 302, failed

the burn rate test. The agency

determined that ignition of the

noncompliant material was unlikely

and, due to the small volume of the

material, would not pose the threat of a

serious fire if ignited. As a result of this

analysis, the PACCAR petition was

granted.

NHTSA disagrees with Cosco’s

assertion that the risk of injury or death

in vehicle fires due to collisions is

‘‘infinitesimal.’’ Nevertheless, although

it is possible that fuel-fed fires from

vehicle crashes could consume a

vehicle’s interior, the flammability of

the polyester fiberfill materials would

be irrelevant to the severity of such a

fire and to the potential injuries

incurred by a child.