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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TREVON MARC EL SALTER,
Defendant and Appellant. B250452
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA408132)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Dennis J. Landin, Judge. Affirmed.

Laurie Wilmore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald Engler, Acting Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Blythe Leszkay and Elaine F. Tumonis, Deputy Attorneys General , for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________2

Trevon Marcel Salter appeals from a judgment which sentences him to a n aggregate term of 10 yea r s and 4 months for attempted robbery

. 1 ( Pen

. Code
, §§ 664/211. ) We affirm.
FACTS
A t about 2:30 in the morning on February 21, 2013, Juan Contreras was walking
home from work along 7 th Street and turn ed left onto Broadway. Mr. Contreras had his cell phone in his hand and was putting on headphones at the time. Because of construction, the sidewalk was partially enclosed by scaffolding and plywood that created

a narrow passage

- way about t wo and one

- ha lf feet wide and six feet long.
Before Contreras reached the scaffold ed passageway , he paused to allow two males, later identified as Salter and codef endant Rafael Madrid, to pass him. 2 The two men were walking side

- by

- side toward Contreras and the passageway was too narrow for
all three men to fit. Ins tead of passing Contreras, Salter and Madrid stopped within one
foot of Contreras. Contreras had hi s back against the wall and he could see Broadway
and 7 th streets. Salter ’s back and Madrid’s back were toward the street.
Madrid said , “W hat’s up with you?” and pulled out what Mr. Contreras thought
was a knife. When Contreras did not respond, Mr. Mad rid demanded, “Y ou don’t hear me? Give me your phone.” Madrid thrust the object that Contreras believed to be a knife upwards two times. Salter remained side

- by

- side with Madrid, with one hand in his pocket and the other holding a skateboard, but otherw ise never moved and did not say anythi ng. Contreras feared for h is life because he thought Salter was going to hit him
with the skateboard and that Madrid would stab him. Contreras could not find a way to
run because there was a wall to on e side and a wa ll to his back.

1 Salter’s sentence included a consecutive term for a prior robbery conviction for which he had earlier been placed on probation, and a pri or serious felony conviction enhancement based on the prior robbery conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a).)

2 Madrid and Salter were jointly charged with the attempted robbery of Contreras, and they were tried together. Madrid is not involved in the current appeal.3

As the se events were unfolding, Contreras saw a police patrol car stopped at the signal

. Contreras repositioned himself so that he was no longer blocked from the patrol
car’s v iew by a magazine stand . He wa ved to the officer. At that point, Salter and Madrid turned, saw the patrol car, and fled in opposite directions. Los Angeles Police Department Sergeant Jeritt Severns, the officer in the pat rol car, parked in front of
Contreras. Contreras told Sergeant Severns that the men tried t o rob him by wielding a knife and demanding his cell phone. 3 Sergeant Severns testified that he was in his patrol car and stopped at the
intersection of 7 th Street and Broadway whe n he saw two men standing and facing a third man with only about a foot bet ween them. The positioning of the men seemed odd to
him. He saw Contreras raise his arms and yell for help while beginning to run for the patrol car. The other two men turned
, saw Sergeant Severns , and then ran or skated away
in opposite directions. Wh en Contreras reached the patrol car, he told Sergeant Severns that the men had tried to rob him with a knife and demanded his cell phone. Sergeant Severns radioed for back up and followed Salter for approximately one

eighth of a mile, never losing sight of him . He was arrested and taken into custody.
A perimeter was set up
, and other officers detained Madrid. No knife was foun d in the area and, although Contreras was shown a box cutter and a screwdriver, he did not identify either one as the weapon. At the field show

- up, Mr. Contreras positively
identified Salter and Madrid, saying he was 100 percent sure that they were the men
involved in the incident.
Offi cer Juan Ibarra interviewed Contreras at the scene that morning for approximately five minute s . Of ficer Ibarra testified that Contreras spoke rapidly and
seemed to be scared. According to Officer Ibarr a, Contreras stated that he was walking

3 Contreras’s testimony at trial differ ed from his testimony at the preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing
, Contreras testified that Salter had the knife and spoke to him, that both men held skateboards
, and that Madrid had remained sil ent. At trial, Contreras claim ed not to remember testifying and claim ed the incident happened the way he testified to in trial. In argument to the jury, the prosecutor relied on an aiding and abetting theory against Salter.4

northbound on Broadway when he saw two men riding skateboards coming south
towards him. Because of the co nstruction and the narrow passageway, Contreras stopped to let the men pass but instead, the men stopped, confronted him, and demanded his cell phone. Contreras told Officer Ibarra that the man who had his hand in his pocket made him believe he had a weap on in his pocket and said to him, “What do you got? What do you got?” Contreras then told Officer Ibarra that he (Contreras) saw a patrol car and ran toward it, yelling for help.
Officer Ibarra also testified that Contreras said on e man ran northbound on Broadway and the other ran eastbound on 7 th Street . Officer Ibarra testified that
Contreras stated that the man who ran north had the knife
, and that the man who ran east was the one who had h is hand in his pocket. The man who ran north was detained b y Sergeant Severns and turned out to be Salter.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Verdict
Salter contends there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of aiding and abetting an attempted robbery. Specifically, Salter argues the e vidence did not show that he had the specific intent to aid Madrid in committing the robbery, and did not show that he did any act or spoke any word s to assist or encourage Madrid to commit the robbery Salter argues the evidence showed no more than that he was pr esent with Madrid, and that he did not try to stop Madrid from committing the robbery. We find the evidence sufficient to support Salter’s conviction. When a criminal conviction is challenged as lacking evidentiary support, “ the
court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence

– that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value

– such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ” ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We do not reweigh the evidence and will not reverse a judgment even if a5

different verdict could reasonably have been reached. ( People v. Proctor (1992)
4 Cal.4th 499, 529.) The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a
conviction. ( Peopl e v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) To be convicted of aiding and abetting, the prosecution must prove four elements: (1) the principle actor committed the crime, (2) the defendant knew the principle actor intended to commit the crime, (3) the defen dant intended to aid in the commission of that crime, and (4) defendant did, in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of that crime. (CALCRIM No. 401.) We agree with the People that the evidence is sufficient to find that Salter played a supportive role in the attempted robbery by standing next Madrid, and assisting in the
intimidation of the victim . While Salter is correct that his mere presence at the scene, and
his flight from the scene are insufficient alone to establi sh aiding and abetting an attempted robbery , we disagree that this is all the evidence shows. Here, Salter was not merely present at the scene, and did not merely run from the
scene. Salter stood shoulder to shoulder with Madrid, the two facing Contreras from a distance of only about one foot. Salter’s stance trapped Contreras , led him to believe
Salter had a weapon in his pocket
, and scar ed that Salter would hit him with the skateboard. Salter did not merely run from the scene; he and Madrid ran in dif ferent directions, making pursuit more difficult.
The evidence provide d a sufficient basis from which a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Salter assisted the attempted robbery and
shared the intent to commit a robbery when he physically blocked the victim’s pathway and intimidated him, thus helping to facilitate the attempted robbery

. II. The Jury Was Properly Instructed
Salter contends his constitutional right to due process was violated when the t rial

c ourt instruct ed the jury on aiding and abetting . S pecifically, Salter argues that the use of standard aiding and abetting instruction

–– CALCRIM No. 401

–– failed to explain to the jury that evidence of his presence at the scene and failing to intervene to stop Madrid ’s attempted robbery were not sufficient to establish his criminal liability as an aider and6

abettor

. Salter argues CALCRIM No. 401 lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of due process. Salter argues t he language of CALCRIM No. 401 fail e d to communicate to the jury that there must be additional evidence of guilt besides a defendant’s presence and failure to prevent a crime , and could have suggest ed that presence and non

- prevention, together
, are enough to show aiding and abetting. Salter argues the instruction should expressly advise jurors that presence and non

- prevention, even together, are not sufficient to show guilt as an aider and abettor. He is mistaken

. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 401 as follows:

“ To pr ove that a defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove that: 1. T he perpetrator committed the crime; 2. T he defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; 3. B efore or during the commiss ion of the crime
, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; and 4. T he d efendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of th e crime.

“ Someone aids and abets a crime if he knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he specifically intends to
, and does, in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime [¶]

. . . [¶] If you conclude that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a person i s present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does not
, by itself
, make him an aider and abettor

. ” (Emphasis added.)

T he instruction clarifies for the jur ors that the y may consider the defendant’s presence or the defendant’s failure to prevent the crime as evidence of aiding and abetting. But, it further clearly articulate s that those fact alone are not sufficient to prove accomplice liability. The jury was instructed to consider the instructions as a whole and, when read as a whole, it is not reasonably understood to have the meaning th at Salter seeks to place on it.
The instruction requires that a defendant have the intent to aid in the commission of the7

crime. No juror would understand the challenged sentence in isolation and believe that Salter’s mere presence or flight, in and of itself
, would suffice for accomplice liability.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

BIGELOW, P.J.
We concur:

FLIER, J.

GRIMES, J.