The Honor able Christopher A. Boy ko, United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District * of Ohio, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 08a0193n.06 Filed: Apr il 10, 2008 No. 06-4018

UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. DAVID D . LET NER, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE SOU THER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

BEFORE: CLAY and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges; and B OYKO, Distr ict Judge. * CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. De fe nd ant D a vid D. L e tne r c ha lle ng e s his c on vic tio n o n tw o c ounts of bank r obbery , under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d), and two counts of use of a firea rm in a cr ime of violence, unde r § 924(c )(2) (A)( ii). He a rg ues that the district c ourt err ed by admitting a g overnme nt

w i t n e s s ’ p r i o r

s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h w e r e i n c o n s i s t e n tw i t h t h e w i t n e s s ’ t e s t i m o n y. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Def endant challeng es the district c ourt’s admission of two prior state ments by his brother a

nd codefe ndant: an unsworn statement which wa s admitted as impeac hment ev i d en ce, and a plea ag ree ment implicating De fenda nt which his brother a dopted under oath at his plea he aring . For the2

rea sons which follow, we hold that the di strict court did not abuse its discretion in admit ting e ither statement, and AF F IRM Def endant’ s conviction. STA TEM EN T OF F AC TS On J anuar y 18, 2005 and aga in on J anuar y 26, 2005 two men robbe d the National City Ba nk in Day ton, Ohio. Both robbe ries followe d the same pattern. Two white men e ntere d the bank tog e the r, dis g uis e d b y

a t- shir t or ba nd ana wr a pp e d a ro un d th e ir

he a d, and

c arr yinga g un in t he ir g loved hands. Althoug h clothes, g loves and masks c overe d m o s t o f t heir fe ature s, enoug h of the robber s’ ey es we re e x posed to allow witnesses to notice the ir red e y ebrow s and ey elashe s. Sometime after the second robber y , Def endant’ s sister-in-lawEva L etner contac ted police to report a

domestic dispute

. Eva de scribed D efe ndant David D. L etner and his brother

to police, and the pol i ce s u b sequently obtained photos of the two men which showed that they had re d

e y e br ow s and e y e la sh e s. Al tho ug h b oth L e tne r b ro the rs the n b e c a me su sp e c ts i n th e Natio na l Cit y Ba nk robber y investigation, no further prog ress was made in this i nvestig ation until March 12, 2005. On that date, D efe ndant’s brother Greg g L etner was arre sted while fleeing from an armed r obbery and shootout at a Kr og er g roce ry store. Dur ing a

subsequent interr og ation, Gre g g admitted to four bank robbe ries, including the two at National City Ba nk, and name d Def

endant a s his accomplice in the National City

Ba nk robber ies. On May 26, 2005, Gre g g L etner pled g uilty to multiple counts, including thr ee c ounts of bank

ro bb e ry . D ur ingthe ple a col lo qu y , th e judg e re a d to Gr e g g a le ng thy state me nt o f t

he fa c ts

un de rl yinghis g uil ty ple a , a nd a c op y of thi s st a te me nt w a s p ro vid e d f or Gr e g g and

his a tto rn e y

to revie w. Included in this statement was an acknow ledg ement that “[o] n the afte rnoon of on or about Janu ary 26 th, 20 05 , th e De fe nd ant G re g g T. L e tne r an d his br oth e r en te re d the same Natio na l Cit y3

Ba n k t h ey h ad ro b b ed o n t h e J an u ary 1 8 t h o f 20 0 5 , ” wh i ch t h ey ro b b ed aga i n . ( J

. A

. 1 9 3 ) Gr egg testified under

oath that he unde rstood this statement of fac ts and that he had no que stions reg arding the state me nt. Th e dis tr ic t ju dg e then a sked Gr e g g if

the state me nt r e pr e se nte d “ the fa c ts underlying—a lleg edly

underlying e ach of

these c ounts that y ou wish to enter your plea s of g uilty to.” Gre g g responde d “Ye s, sir.” (J.A. 196) Def endant’ s trial for his role in the ba nk robber ies beg an on J anuar y 30, 2006. I n prepa

ration for the tr ial, the prosec ution met with Greg g L etner and his atto rney

to discuss Greg g ’s testimony in his brother’ s trial. Although G reg g initially informed the pr osecution that he w ould not be willing to t e sti fy a g a ins t his bro th er, he e ve ntu a lly tol d th e pr os e c uti on

tha t he wo uld

te sti fy a t th e tr ia l. Duri nghis te sti mony

a t hi s b ro the r’ s tr ia l, G re g g de sc ri be d, in g re a t de ta il, his ow n invo lve me nt i n the ba nk ro bb e ri e s. He de sc ri be d howhe dis g uis e d h ims e lf duri ngthe ro bb e ri e s. He de sc ri be d h is

o w n a c t i o n s an d t h o s e o f h i s a c c o mp l i c e d u r i n g t h e r o b b e r i e s , an d h e d e s c r i b e d h ow he a ndhis

acc omp li c e w o u ld

f le e th e b an k

in a s to le nv e h ic le , o n ly

to a b an d o nth e v e h ic le a

s h o rt d is ta

n ce

awa y . When a sked about the identity of his a ccomplice , howeve r, Gre g g testified that he ha d “no idea.” (J.A. 845) After asking sever al questions to lay the foundation for impeac hment, the prosec utor then asked the following question: “[D]o y ou rec all telling a g ents in response to que stions about the first National B ank robber y on J anuar y 18th, 2005, that y our brother , David L etner , enter ed the National City Ba nk located at 4789 West Third St ree t with y ou for the pur pose of r obbing—” (J.A. 855) A t this point, Defe ndant’s attorne y objected to this line of questioning , and his objection

was e ventually

overr uled.4

I n r e sp on se to t

he e ns ui ng li ne of

qu e sti on ing , G re g g c on tin ue d h is r e fu sa l to ide nti fy his brother a s his accomplice . Despite many questions from the prose cutor s ee k i n g such an identification, Gre g g eventua lly declare d “I’m n o t g oing to sa y who was w ith me on the bank robber ies. Period. No matter how many times y ou ask the que stion, I ’m not g oing to tell y ou.” (J.A. 889) After

Gre g g ’s testimony , the judg e instructed the jury that it could only

consider G reg g ’s unsworn stateme nts for impeac hment purposes. L ater in the proce eding , the judg e allowe d the prosec ution to int roduce the statement of fac ts acc ompanying G reg g ’s plea a g ree ment as substantive evidenc e. In admitting this e vidence , the judge ag ain instructed the jur y , this ti me informing them that, u nli ke Gr e g g ’s pr ior

un sw or n s tate me nts to l aw en fo rc e me nt ag e nts , the sw or n sta te me nt c ou ld be conside red a s proof of D efe ndant’s guilt. The district cour

t also hear d testimony

from L ay shia Stewart a

nd Ky ra Redf ord, two sisters who wer e roma

ntically involved with the L etner

brothers during the time rele vant t o this case . The sisters’ testimony corr oborate d much of Gre g g L etner ’s testimony reg arding the details o f t he

ro bb e ri e s. Am on g oth e r t hin g s, the ir

te sti mony

re ve a le d th a t aro un d the tim e of the ba nk ro bb e ri e s, the L e tne r br oth e rs wo uld tr e a t bo th s ist e rs to l a vis h, c a sh -f un de d s ho pp ingsp re e s and dr ugbin g e s, even thoug h neither br other wa s working at the time. The sisters a lso te s t i fi ed ab out overhe aring

c on ve rs a tio ns wh e re De fe nd ant and Gr e g g dis c us se d c ov e ri ngthe ir fa c e s w itht- sh ir

ts t o h ide the ir ide nti tie s, and Ky

ra a dd e d th a t th e c lot

he s b oth br oth e rs wo re duri ngthe ro bb e ri e s w e re the same as those they

“alwa y s wore” around the house. (J.A. 1180)

DI SCU SSIO N Stan dard of Revie w5

A district court’s de cision reg ardingthe admis sion of evidence is g ener ally revie wed unde r an abuse of discre tion standard. Gibson v. United States , 271 F.3d 247, 254 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (re v’d on other g rounds). How ever , Def endant a lso raises constit utional challeng es t o the district court’s admission of Greg g L etn e r ’ s prior unsworn state ments. “To the e x tent that Def endant' s claims sound in d ue pr oc e ss, we re vie w the m de novo .” Un ite d S tates v . M on c iv ais , 492 F.3d 652, 658 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Anal y sis A witn es s ’ p ri or inconsistent statement may be admitted as substantive e vidence if “[t] he de c lara nt te sti fi e s a t the tr ia l or he ari ng and is su bje c t to c ro ss- e xami natio n c on c e rn ing the state me nt, and the state ment . . . was g iven under oath subj ec t t o t h e penalty of per jury at a tria l, hear ing, or other proc eeding , or in a deposition . . . .” Fe d. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). D efe ndant ar g ues, howe ver, that t h e dis trict court abused its discr etion in a dmitti ng the statement of fac ts a ccompa nyi n g Gr egg L etner ’s plea a g ree ment. Acc ording to Defe ndant, bec ause the district judge only asked G reg g if the statement of f

acts re prese nted the c i rc u m s t ances “a lleg edly ” under ly ing the fac ts which he wa s pleadingg uilty

to, Greg g never

adopted that state ment under oath. Whil e it i s tr

ue that th e dis tr ic t ju dg e a sk e d Gr e g g if the state me nt r e pr e se nte d “ the fa c ts underlying—a lleg edly

underlying e ach of

these c ounts that y ou wish to enter y our plea s of g uilty to,” (J.A . 1 96 ), De fe nd ant p la c e s to o mu c h w e ig ht o n th e jud g e ’s us e of the wo rd “ alle g e dly” in t

his context. DuringGre g g ’s plea he aring , he stated that he under stood the plea a g ree ment and that he was in ac cord w ith it i n its entirety

. Gre g g then agr eed that it was “the ag ree ment and provisions that [ h e w i s h ed ] t o ex ec u t e a n d en t er [ h i s ] p l ea s o f gu i l t y u

p o n . ” (J

. A. 2 2 0 ) F u rt h erm o re , wh i l e G re gg

was a witness at Def

endant’ s trial, the prosec utor expressly asked Gre g g if he re membere d ag ree ing6

to the statement of f

acts unde r oath, a

nd Gre g g testified that he did. Given the se fa cts, we c annot conclude that the district court abused its discr etion by finding that Gre g g had pre viously aff irmed the entire ty

of his plea a g ree ment under oath. Accor dingly , we hold that any prior inconsistent statements containe d in that ag ree ment wer e prope rly admitted as substantive evide nce. We r e a c h a sim ila

r c on c lus ion wi th r e sp e c t to the a dmi ssi on of Gr e g g ’s un sw or

n s tate me nts made while he was be ing inter rog ated by

police. De fenda

nt argues that under the common law, the Fe dera l Rules of Evidence and the Due Proces s C l au s e, Greg g ’s unsworn state ments impli cating De fe nd ant w e re no t a dmi ssi ble e ve n a s im pe a c hme nt e vid e nc e . F or the re a so ns that f

oll ow , th e se

argume nts la c k me ri t. A. De fend ant ’s Co m m on La w Cla im Def endant f irst argues that, under

the Secon d C i rcuit’s de cision in United States v. Cunningham , 446 F.2d 194 ( 2d Cir. 1971) , “whe re the witness g ives no testimony injurious to the party calling him, but only

fails to rende r the a ssistance whic h was e x pecte d by profe ssing to be without knowle dg e on the subject, there is no reason or basis for impea chment.” Id. a t 19 7. Th is holding, howe ver, is take n from an a lmost 40 y ear old opinion, and is nothing more than a statement of the old rule that a par ty may not impeach their

own witness unless they are surpris ed b y

the witness’ testimony

. See id. (“the maxi mum leg itimate e ffe ct of the impeaching testimony can ne ver be mor e tha

n the c anc e llatio n of the a dv e rs e ans we r b y wh ic h th e pa

rt y is s ur pr ise d .

. . .” ) Wh ile Cunningham repr esente d an ac curat e s t at em ent of the la w at the time it was de cided, the F eder al Rules of Evidence have r emoved Cunningham ’s c omm on law l imi tatio n o n a

pa rt y imp e a c hin g its own witness. See F e d

. R

. E v i d

. 6 0 7 ( “ T h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f a w i t n e s s m ay b e a t t a c k e d b y an y p art y, inc lud ingthe pa

rt y c a lli ngthe wi tne ss. ” ); se e als o Cunningham , 446 F.2d at 1 9 8 (a cknowledging7

that the impeac hment evidenc e at issue in that ca se would be ad m i s s i ble under the then-pr oposed Fe dera l Rules of Evidence ). Be cause Def endant’ s common law cla ims rely on an outdated r

ule, they la c k me ri t. B. Defendan t’s F ederal Rules of Evid ence Cl aim J ust as the district court did not violate any common law doctr ine i n ad m i t t ing G reg g ’s

un sw or n s tate me nt, it a lso did

no t a bu se its dis c re tio n und e r t he F e de ra l Ru le s o f E vid e nc e . Ru le 60 7 p ro vid e s th a t “ [t]he c re dib ili ty of a wi tn ess may

be a tta c ke d b y

any pa rt y , in c lud ingthe pa

rt y calling h i m ,” and Rule 613( b) per mits a witness’ prior inconsistent statement to be a dmitted as impeachme nt evidence, s o l o n g as “the witness is affor ded an oppor tunity to expl ain or de ny

[t he statement] and the opposite party is affor ded an oppor

tunity to i n t er ro gat e t he witness . . . .” Evidence of unsworn pr ior inconsistent statements by a witness may

only be admitted for impeachme nt purposes ag ainst a cr iminal d ef endant, not as evidence supporting that defe ndant’s conviction. See R ush v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. , 399 F.3d 705, 722 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Howeve r, whe n th e district cour

t instructs a jury

to consider impea chment evide nce only for its proper , limit ed purpose, “ [w] e will presume that the jury followed this instruction.” United St ates v. Newsom , 452 F.3d 593, 604 ( 6th Cir. 2006). “The presumption is overcome only wher e evide nce ha s been admitted that is so prejudicial that, eve n with a limit ing instruction, the defe ndant' s rig ht to a fa ir trial is compromised.” United States v. Burns , 298 F.3d 523, 543 ( 6th Cir.2002). We h ave he ld, however , that a prose cutor “ may not employ

impeachme nt by

prior inc on sis te nt s tate me nt ‘as a me re su bte rf ug e to g e t be fo re the jur y e vid e nc e no t ot

he rw ise admissible.’” Apanovitch v . Houk, 466 F.3d 460, 485 ( 6t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ). As J udg e Posner ha s8

explained, this Rule pre vents prosec utors from bring ing in through the back door hear say evidenc e that c ou ld n ot e nte r t

hr ou g h th e fr on t: [I ]t wo uld be an a bu se of th e rul e, in a

c ri min a l c a se , f

or the pr os e c uti on

to c a ll a witness that it knew would not g ive it useful evidence, j u s t s o i t could introduce he ars ay e vid e nc e a g a ins t the de fe nd ant in the ho pe that th e jur y wo uld mis s th e su

btl e dis tin c tio n b e tw e e n im

pe a c hme nt a

nd su bs tant ive e vid e nc e -o r, if

it d idn ' t mi ss i t, wo uld ig no re it. Th e purp os e wo uld no t be to im peach the w itn e ss b ut t o p ut i n hear say as substantive evide nce a g ainst the defe ndant, which Rule 607 doe s not contemplate or

authorize. United States v. W

ebster , 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 ( 7th Cir. 1984). Under the Seventh Circui t ’s fo rm ulation of this rule, whethe r impeac hment evidenc e may be admitted hing es upon whe ther the pr osecutor “ knew” that a witness would not pro v i de helpf ul testimony

. Id. Simi larl y , th e F if th C ir c uit ho lds that “ [t]he pr os e c uti on . . . may no t ca ll a

wi tne ss it knows to be hostile f

or the primary purpose of eliciting otherwise inadmissible i m p ea chment testimony , for suc h a sche me mere ly serve s as a subterfug e to avoid t he hearsay rule.” United States v. Hogan , 763 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1985) (rev’d on other grounds) . The F ourth Circuit, howeve r, ha s c ri tic ize d th is s ub

je c tiv e sta

nd ard a s r e qu ir inga

jud g e “ to c ra

wl ins ide the pr os e c uto r' s h e a d to divine his or her true motivation.” See U nited States v. Inc e , 21 F.3d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1 9 94). Acc ording ly , that circ uit applies a familiar objective standa rd to deter

mine whether o r not the p r o s e c u t i o nm ay p r e s e n ti mp e a c h m e n te v i d e n c e t o t h e j u r y: [I ]n deter mining whether a Gover

nment witness' testimony offe red as impeachme nt is admissibl e, or on the contra ry is a “m er e subterf

ug e” to g et bef

ore the jury su bs tanti ve e vid e nc e wh ic h is othe rw ise ina dmi ssi ble a s h e ars ay , a tr ia l c ourt

mus t apply Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 403 and weig h the testimony ' s impeachme nt value a g a i n s ti t s t e n d e n c y t o p r e j u d i c e t h e d e f

e n d an tu n f

a i r l y o r t o c o n f u s e t h e j u r

y. Id.9

We do not need to deter

mine, howeve r, which of

these standa

rds to apply to the instant case , a s G re g g ’s un sw or

n s tate me nts are a dmi ssi ble un de r e ith e r test. Un de r t he F if th a nd Se ve nth Circuit’s subjective test, we must ask whether the prosecution knew that Gr eg g L etner would not provide “ useful evide nce” in his testim ony , W ebster , 73 4 F .2 d at 11 92 . D e sp ite his unwi lli ng ne ss to n a me De fe nd ant a s h is a c c omp lic e , h ow e ve r, Gr e g g ’s te sti mony pr ov ide d th e pr os e c uti on wi th

a we alth of valua

ble evidenc e. Gr eg g provided a very detailed de scription o f t he bank r obberie s Def endant wa s char g ed with, including the clothes he and his ac complice wor e, the manne r in which they disguised themselves and the m eans by which they

esca ped. Much of

this testim ony

confirme d statements by

the L etner brothers’ g irlfriends, who testified about incr iminating stateme nts made by both brothers, and about t he clothes they routinely wore . Be cause this Court aff ords wide de fer ence

a district judg e’s evidentiar y ruling , Gibson , 271 F.3d at 254, under a subjective standa

rd, the district court did not abuse its discr etion by permitting Gre g g to te stify g iven the us ef u l n es s o f t he uncontrove rsial portions of his testimony to the prosec ution. See W ebster , 734 F.2d at 1192. Th e imp e a c hme nt e vid e nc e a g a ins t D e fe nd ant w a s a lso a dmi ssi ble un de r the ob je c tiv e , Ru le 40 3 b a lanc ingte st. Un de r t hat te st, e vid e nc e sh a ll o nly be e xclu de d w he n “ its pr ob a tiv e va lue is substantial ly outweig hed by the dange r of unfair pre

judice.” F ed.R.Evid. 403 (empha sis added). “B eca use appe llate cour

ts w ork with a rec ord which cannot fully convey a trial' s nuance s, dy

namics

and a tm os ph ere, th e y

have a lim ite d c a

pa c ity to r e vie w the ba lanc e str uc k b y the tr ia l c ourt
. Con se qu e ntl y , we wi ll no t re je c t a tr ia l c ourt ' s ba lanc ing un le ss the ‘s ub sta nti a l pr e judice’ c lea rly outweig hs the ‘probative value.’ ” Un ite d S tates v . Ch am be rs , 441 F.3d 438, 456 (6th Cir. 2006) (q u o t i n g Un ite d Sta te

s v . S wift , 809 F .2 d 320 , 323 (6 th Cir .1 98 7) ). Mo re ov e r, a s “th e pr e jud ic e to be we ighe d is the un

fai r prejudice cause d by admission of t he evide nce. E vidence that is prejudicial10

on ly in t he se ns e that it pa int s the de fe nd ant in a ba d li g ht i s n ot u

nf a ir ly pr e jud ic ia l pu

rs ua nt t o Ru le 403.” Id. (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . S an de rs , 95 F.3d 449, 453 ( 6th Cir.1996) (emphasis in orig inal)). Ad mitte dly , G re g g L e tne r’ s uns wo rn statem ents we re hig hly pr e jud ic ia l to De fe nd ant— Gr e g g sp e c if ic a lly name d D e fe nd ant a s h is acc omp lic e in t he ba nk ro bb e ri e s. Neve rtheless, whe n a jury is g iven a limiting instruction re g ardingits consideration of impea chment evidenc e, we have he ld that such an instruction limits t he likelihood of unfair prejudice to the Def endant. See U

nited States v. Foster , 376 F.3d 577, 592 (6th Cir. 2004)

. On the other side of the scale , Gre g g L etner

testified in g reat detail, an d with remar kable c andor, r eg ardinghis role in the bank robbe ries. I t was only afte r hours of such testimony that he suddenly claimed that he did not know the answ er to a

question. Given the c redibility which Gre g g had established during his prior te sti mony , th e jur

y mig ht h a ve be e n c on fu se d b y th e su dd e n unc e rt a int y of an o the rw ise c re dib le witness. Acc ording ly , the impeachme nt e vidence offe red by the prosec ution is probative insofa r as it communicated to the jury that they should not view Greg g ’s testimony reg ardinghis acc omplice

as cr edible. I n light of the impeachme nt evidence ’s probative value, a nd the limiti ng instruction’s eff ect in reduc ing its prejudicial value, we conclude that the district court did not clea rly err in admitting the pr os e c uti on ’s imp e a c hme nt e vid e nc e . Re g ard le ss of ho w we may have de c ide d th is q ue sti on in the fi rs t in sta

nc e , o n a pp eal , “‘we mus t lo ok

a t th e e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to i ts proponent, maximi zing its probati v e v al u e and minim izi ng its prejudicial ef fec t.’” Newsom , 452 F. 3 d at 6 0 3 (q u o t i n g United States v. Bonds , 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir. 1993) ). E v al u at i n g the evidenc e in such a light, we hold that the district c ourt did not abuse its discr etion under the Fe dera l Rul e s o f E vid e nc e by

a dmi tti ngGr e g g ’s pr ior

un sw or n s tate me nt.11

C. De fend ant ’s Due P r oc e ss C lai m Finally , relying on this Court’s dec ision in United States v. Shoupe , 548 F.2d 636 ( 6th Cir. 1977), De fenda

nt argues that admitting Gre g g L etner ’s prior unsworn statement would violate the Due Proc ess Clause. In Shoupe , we held that a criminal defe ndant was denied a fa ir trial when the prosec ut o r, v i a a se ries of e ighte en questions ostensibly asked to impea ch a w itness, rec ited the “entire substance” of the witness’ prior unsworn stateme nt to police. Id. a t 64 0–41 . A c c or din g to Shoupe , “the r ecitation by the prosecutor of the entire substance of a witness' s disavowed, unswor n prior stateme nts, which, if cre dited by the jury , would be suff icient to sustain a conviction, abr idge d defe ndants' rig ht to a fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment.” Id. at 644. We d o n ot d e ny

that Shoupe is superf

icially simil ar to the i nstant case . Both involve prior unsworn stateme nts which, if believe d by a jury , would be suff

icient to sustain a conviction. Shoupe , howeve r, distinguished its fa cts from those in Un ite d Sta te s v . H arris , 523 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1975), wh e re we pe rm itt e d im

pe a c hme nt e vid e nc e to b e a dmi tte d in lig ht o f a

jur y ins tr uc tio n p ro pe rl y limit ing the use of this impeac hment evidenc e. Id. at 175. Shoupe did no t hold , an d we do no t ho ld today , that a limiting instruction will save evide nce which is “so pre judicial that, even w ith a limit ing instruction , t h e d ef

endant's rig ht to a fair tr ial is compromised.” Burns , 298 F.3d at 543. Neve rtheless, the distinction betwee n a jury which is proper ly instructed, and one which is not, wa s signific ant in Shoupe , 548 F.2d at 643, and it is significa nt in the instant case a s well. I ndeed, the prior unsworn statement in this cas e i s s ubstantially simil ar to those whic h we found admissible in Ha rri s . There , we uphe ld the adm i s sion of two witness’ prior unswor n statements that the Ha rris d ef endant had been the ir ac complice dur ing a bank robbe ry . Id. at12

17 4– 75 . A ft e r t

ho se wi tne sse s r e pu diate d the ir pr ior un sw or n s tate me nts a t tr ia l, w e pe rm itt e d th os e

re p u d i at i o n s t o b e i mp ea ch edb y t h e w i t n es s ’ u n s wo rn s t at em en t s , n o t i n g t h at t h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge proper ly instructed the jury

. Id. a t 1 7 5

. T h e r u le w e an n o u n c e d

in Ha rris is n o le ss a

pp lic a ble to Gre g g L etner . Gre g g made pr ior unsworn statem en t s i d en t ifying his a ccomplice in two bank

ro bb e ri e s; h e repu diat e d th os e state me nts , a nd wa s im pe a c he d b y

the m. S ub se qu e nt t o th is impea c h me n t, th e ju

r y w a s p r o p e r ly in s tr

u c te d a s to th e p u r

p o s e f o r w h ic h th e y c o u ld use the impeachme nt evidence . Acc ording ly , we hold that the district cour t did not violate due proc ess by

a dmi tti ngGr e g g L e tne r’ s uns wo rn state me nts
. CO NC LU SION B oth Gr e g g L e tne r’ s pri or sw or n sta te me nt an d his pr ior un sw or n sta te me nt w e re pr op e rl y admitted. Acc ording ly , we AF F IRM Def endant’ s conviction.