### The HONORABLE RICHARD H. KYLE, United States District Judge 1 

### for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation. _______________ No. 96-4101

_______________ Rhonda Yarbrough, * * Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Western vs. * District of Arkansas * United Steelworkers of * America; United Steelworkers * of America Local 6794; and * Cleata Draper, * * Appellees. *

_______________ Submitted: June 9, 1997 Filed: September 15, 1997

_______________ Before BOWMAN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD , Circuit Judges, and KYLE , District 1 Judge.

_______________ KYLE, District Judge. This acti on arises from events which took place during a 1994 labor strike against Nickell Molding Company (“the Company”) in Malvern , Arkansas. The UnitedSteelworkers of America (“USWA”) and its affiliate, Local No. 6794 (“the Unions”)authorized the strike. In support of th e strike, workers set up picket lines at the entrance to the Company’s plant

. Of the Company’s approximately 75 employees, 13, including appellant Rhond a Yarbro ugh(“Yarbrough”), crossed the picket lines and continued to wor k during the strike. The strikers carried picket signs prepared by th e Unions. In addition, strikers prepared and carried several handmade signs

.

### The Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd, United States Magistrate 2 

### Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. -2- For th e most part, all such signs contained non-objectionable message s referring to the strike.
Following ten days of picketing without incident, a striking m ember, Cleata Draper (“Draper), carried a sign which id entified Yarbrough by name and contained language subsequently found by a j ury to be defamatory — for purposes of this appeal the defamatory nature of the sign’s message is not challenged.

Yarbro ughsued the Unions and Draper, alleging several claims ; however, only her def amation claim survived pretrial motions. Finding in favor of Yarbrough, the jury awarded her $500 “actual” damages against eac h Defe ndant. It also awarded her punitive damages as follows: $5,00 0 against Draper, $5,000 against Local 6794, and $35,000 against USWA.

Fo llowing the jury’s verdict, the Unions moved for judgment as a matt er of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(1)(C). The trial court 2 granted the motion as to USWA and Local 6794, but denied it as to Draper. Yarbrough appeals; Draper does not. We affirm.

In re viewing the trial court’s Order, we must keep in mind th e heightene d burden of proof a party who seeks to impose liability upon a lab or union for the unlawful acts of its members or agents must meet

. Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states: No officer or member of any association or organiza tion, and no as sociation or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individua l officers, members, or agents, except upon clear pro of of actual participation in, or

### -3- actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof
. 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1973)(emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court has described the purpose and meaning of Section 6:
The driving force behind § 6...was the fear that unions might be destr oyed if they could be held liable for damage done b y acts beyond their practical control...Although the statute does not define “clear proof,” its history and rationale sugges t that Co ngress meant at least to signify a meaning like tha t commonly accorded such s imilar phrases as “ clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof .”

United Mi ne Workers v. Gibbs , 383 U.S. 715, 736-37, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 114 4 (1966)(emphasis added). Plaintiff’s burden in a case such as this is t o “persuade by a substa ntial margin....” Id ., 383 U.S. at 737, 86 S.Ct. at 1145.

The issue below, and the only issue before this Court, is whethe r Ya rbroughpresented “clear proof” of the Unions’ “participation in, ” “actua l authorization” of, or “ratification of such acts after actua l know ledge thereof.” The “act” in the instant case is the defamator y message on the handmade sign held by Draper on the picket lines. Yarbrough acknowledges that “she was required to show by clear proof that the Unions authorized, participated in, or ratified the action of its
mem ber, Cleata Draper.” (App. Brief. p. 12.) Contending that sh e presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the “clear proof” standard, she relies upon the follo wing: (1) a Union representative gave permission to Union members to carr y handmade signs; (2) had the Unions either provided signs for all members or

### -4-

given instructions as to what was permissible on any handmade signs, the situation here could have been avoided; and (3) evidence of other sign s containing names of persons crossing the picket lines should have bee n sufficient to support a determination that the Unions ratified Draper’s actions.
In reviewing a judgment as a matter of law, this Court uses the same standard as the district court:

In a motion for [a judgment as a matter of law], the question is a legal one, whether there is sufficient evidenc e to support a jury v erdict. This court must analyze the evidence in th e lig ht most favorable to the prevailing party and must no t engage in a weighing or evaluation of the evidence or consider questions of credibility . We have also stated that to sustain a motion for [a judgment as a matter of law], all the evidence mus t point one way and be susceptible of no reasonabl e inference sustaining the position of the nonmoving party.

White v. Pence , 961 F.2d 776, 779 (8 Cir. 1992)(footnote and citation s th omitted); see also Jarvis v. Sauer Sundstrand Co. , 116 F.3d 321, 324 (8 th Cir. 1997).

The District Court, in a thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum an d Order, concluded that the evidence presented did not constitute clear proo f that either the USWA or Local 6794 authorized, participated in, or ratifie d Dra per’s preparation or display of the defamatory message on the picke t sign. Specifically, the District Court found that (1) “no evidence wa s presented that...any...union official knew that any crossover employee’s [Plaintiff Yarbrough] name would be used or that an objectionable message would be displayed;” (2) “no evidence [was prese nted] demonstrating actual participation, authorization, or ratification of Draper’s act;” and

### -5-

(3) th ere was no evidence “from which participation, authorization, o r ratification may be reasonably inferred.”

We hav e made our own review of the trial record, the trial court’ s Mem orandumand Order, the Briefs submitted to this Court, and counsel’ s oral arguments. That review demonstrates that t he District Court properly granted judgment as a matter of law because there was no “clear proof” to support the jury’s verdict; nor was there evidence from which reasonable infe rences might be drawn to support the jury’s determination of th e Unions’ participation, authorization, or ratific ation of Draper’s conduct.

We share the trial court’s evaluatio n of the evidence — there was no evidence that any Union officer knew that Yarbrough’s name would be used
or that objectionable language would appear on the handmade sign. It is also clear from the testimony that immediately after the display of th e objectionable sign, t he Unions instructed the strikers not to bring signs to the picket lines which contained personal names — and those instruction s were followed. Finally, there is no evidence co nnecting the Unions to the display of the defama tory message. The evidence to which Yarbrough cites to support her claim may demonstrate the Unions’ negligence in allowin g Draper to carry the defamatory sign, but it does not support, and certainl y does not clearly

supp ort, the conclusion that the Unions participated in, authorized, or ratified Draper’s action. Under these circumstances, th e trial court was required to direct the entry of judgment in favor of the Defendant Unions.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

### -6- A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.