FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

HAROLD P. GEWERTER, No. 10-16384

Objector-Appellant, D.C. No.

v.  2:08-cv-00437-

LRH-RJJ CMKM DIAMONDS, INC.; 1ST

GLOBAL STOCK TRANSFER LLC; OPINION

HELEN BAGLEY; SERGEY

RUMYANTSEV; BRIAN DVORAK,

Defendants. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 14, 2011—San Francisco, California

Filed August 26, 2011

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Carlos T. Bea,

Circuit Judges, and Michael M. Anello, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

*The Honorable Michael M. Anello, District Judge for the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. 

16377
COUNSEL

Karen J. Shimp, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee

Securities & Exchange Commission.

Harold P. Gewerter, Las Vegas, Nevada, pro se.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal by Harold Gewerter, a Nevada attorney,

seeking review of the Nevada district court’s order denying

SEC v. GEWERTER 16379
his motion to quash a subpoena for bank records of his client

trust account. The district court concluded that it did not have

the authority to consider Gewerter’s motion since the subpoena was issued by another district court. We hold that we

have jurisdiction over this appeal in the circumstances of this

case, because the bank has no incentive to disobey the subpoena and force an otherwise appealable contempt order. We

affirm the district court, because it correctly interpreted the

provisions of Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

governing issuance and quashing of subpoenas.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In April 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission

(“SEC”) filed a civil action in the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada against several defendants, including an individual named John Edwards, alleging that they had

violated federal securities laws. In June 2009, the Nevada district court entered a final judgment in favor of the SEC and

ordered Edwards to pay nearly $55 million in disgorgement,

civil penalties, and prejudgment interest. Edwards did not

comply with the district court’s order. 

In its efforts to collect the judgment against Edwards, the

SEC discovered that in May 2008, Edwards had wired

$25,000 to the client trust account of Harold P. Gewerter, Esq.

Ltd., Gewerter’s law firm, which had represented Edwards in

earlier, unrelated matters. The trust account was maintained in

Nevada at the Bank of the West. 

On January 12, 2010, the SEC served a subpoena on Bank

of the West for all records related to Gewerter’s client trust

account, from January 1, 2008 to the date of the subpoena.

Because Bank of the West is headquartered in northern California, the SEC had the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California issue the subpoena. Gewerter,

who lives and practices in Nevada, filed a motion to quash the

subpoena in the Nevada district court, arguing that the sub16380 SEC v. GEWERTER
poena was overly broad, oppressive, and unduly burdensome,

because the trust account records the subpoena sought

included records related to clients other than Edwards. The

Nevada district court denied Gewerter’s motion to quash

without prejudice, concluding that under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 45(c)(3) it had no authority to quash a subpoena

that was issued by a court in another district. Gewerter

appeals.

II. Appellate Jurisdiction

[1] The SEC argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider

Gewerter’s appeal. Generally, we may review a discovery

order only when the subpoenaed party has refused to comply

with the order and appeals the resulting contempt citation. See

United States v. Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2010).

When a discovery order is directed at a disinterested thirdparty, however, the order is appealable. This is because a disinterested third-party, like the bank in this case, would normally have no real stake in the outcome of the proceeding. It

therefore would not risk a contempt citation, which would

otherwise secure an opportunity for a party affected by the

subpoena to appeal. See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530,

533 (1971) (citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7,

12-13 (1918)). See also Church of Scientology of California

v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992) (“[A] discovery

order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an

immediately appealable final order because the third party

presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk

contempt by refusing compliance.”). 

[2] In this case, Bank of the West, the subpoenaed party,

is a disinterested third-party custodian of records. As a disinterested third-party, Bank of the West cannot be expected to

risk contempt in order to create an opportunity for Gewerter

to appeal. Gewerter therefore cannot rely on the contempt

process to obtain review of the district court’s order denying

his motion to quash. We have previously held that an interlocSEC v. GEWERTER 16381
utory appeal in a discovery matter is available when the contempt process is unavailable. See Wilkinson v. FBI, 922 F.2d

555, 558 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that an order denying a

post-judgment discovery motion is appealable, because a litigant dissatisfied with such an order “cannot rely on the contempt process to provide an opportunity for appeal”).

Accordingly, in order to prevent the SEC from obtaining

records relating to his trust account, Gewerter must be permitted to seek immediate review of the district court’s order

denying his motion to quash. Otherwise he would be “powerless to avert the mischief of the order.” See Ryan, 402 U.S. at

533. 

III. The Merits of the Appeal

We now turn to whether the Nevada district court erred in

ruling it lacked authority to quash the subpoena issued by the

California district court. This is an issue of first impression

for this Court. 

[3] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(3) governs when

a court may or must quash or modify a subpoena. It specifically refers to the “issuing court.” Prior to the 1991 amendments, Rule 45(b) provided that “the court” may quash or

modify a subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b) (1990). It did not

specifically identify which court. 

[4] Amendments, which became effective December 1,

1991, however clarified that a motion to quash or modify a

subpoena should be decided by “the court by which a subpoena was issued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A) (1992). The

1991 amendments also clarified that one court could issue a

subpoena while the underlying action was pending in another

court. Rule 45(a), as amended, required every subpoena to

“state the name of the court from which it issued; and state the

title of the action, the name of the court in which it is pending,

and its civil action number . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A),

(B) (1992). The rule also provided for sanctions to be

16382 SEC v. GEWERTER
imposed by “[t]he court on behalf of which the subpoena was

issued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1) (1992). Similarly, the authority to hold a party in contempt rested in “the court from which

the subpoena was issued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e) (1992). 

The current version of Rule 45 simplifies the language, and

even more clearly provides that a motion to quash or modify

a subpoena should be adjudicated by the court that issued the

subpoena, i.e., “the issuing court.” Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 45(c) provides, in pertinent part: 

(1) Avoiding Undue Burden or Expense; Sanctions.

A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid

imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena. The issuing court must enforce

this duty and impose an appropriate sanction—which

may include lost earnings and reasonable attorney’s

fees—on a party or attorney who fails to comply. 

(2) Command to Produce Materials or Permit

Inspection. 

(A) Appearance Not Required. . . . 

(B) Objections. . . . 

(i) At any time, on notice to the commanded person, the serving party may

move the issuing court for an order compelling production or inspection. . . .

(3) Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena. 

(A) When Required. On timely motion, the

issuing court must quash or modify a subpoena. . . .

SEC v. GEWERTER 16383
(B) When Permitted. To protect a person

subject to or affected by a subpoena, the

issuing court may, on motion, quash or

modify the subpoena. . . . 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c) (2011). Rule 45 also gives the issuing

court contempt power. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(e) (“The issuing

court may hold in contempt a person who, having been

served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena.”).

[5] On the basis of the clear language of Rule 45, we must

hold that the court that issued the subpoena, and not the court

where the underlying action is pending, can entertain a motion

to quash or modify a subpoena. Our holding is consistent with

the decisions of two other Circuits that have decided this

issue. See In re Digital Equip. Corp., 949 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.

1991) (holding that the South Dakota district court, where the

underlying action was pending, did not have jurisdiction to

rule on the objections to a subpoena issued by the Oregon district court); In re Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 341 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (noting that “[s]ubpoenas are process of the issuing

court, . . . and nothing in the Rules even hints that any other

court may be given the power to quash or enforce them” (citations omitted)). 

[6] We now join the Eighth and the D.C. Circuits and hold

that the issuing court, and not the court where the underlying

action is pending, has the authority to consider motions to

quash or modify subpoenas under Rule 45 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the District Court for the

Northern District of California issued the subpoena, the District Court for the District of Nevada did not err in deciding

that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Gewerter’s motion to

quash. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial without

prejudice of Gewerter’s motion. 

AFFIRMED. 

16384 SEC v. GEWERTER