COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Malveaux, Fulton and Friedman

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

JEROME HENRY MEEKINS

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 1149-21-1 JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN

OCTOBER 11, 2022

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE

Robert G. MacDonald, Judge

Samantha Offutt Thames, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Virginia 

Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

Jeff S. Howell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Jerome Henry Meekins appeals from an order revoking and resuspending his previously 

suspended sentences of five years’ incarceration. Meekins contends that the court abused its 

discretion by 1) conditioning the suspension on drug testing and treatment when the underlying 

convictions were not drug related and 2) imposing three years’ good behavior. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Poole v. Commonwealth, 

73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). In 

doing so, we discard any of appellant’s conflicting evidence and regard as true all credible evidence 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

UNPUBLISHED
- 2 -

favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that 

evidence. Gerald, 295 Va. at 473.

In 2017, Meekins cashed two checks, each for $200, that he took from a local church. 

Following an investigation into the checks, Meekins pleaded guilty to three felonies—two counts of 

forgery and one count of uttering a forged document. The circuit court sentenced him to a total of 

five years’ incarceration on all three charges, suspended on several conditions: 

1) five years of good behavior;

2) an indefinite period of supervised probation;

3) submitting to random or regular urine screens as prescribed by his probation officer;

4) payment of court costs;

5) being barred from all Union Banks in Virginia for a period of five years; and

6) reporting to probation after the hearing. 

Meekins was also ordered to pay $400 in restitution. The court ordered that his supervised 

probation last “not less than one year” and indicated Meekins was to be released in the “discretion 

of the probation officer upon successful completion of the terms of probation or until restitution is 

paid in full.”

During his initial probationary period, Meekins tested positive for cocaine several times. He

was unable to enter a rehab program due to drug use and later declined to enter the program. He 

subsequently was discharged from an intervention program following additional positive tests. 

Meekins then participated in substance abuse treatment in late 2020. He successfully completed the 

treatment in every way except for making the final payment for the program. In May 2021, he 

tested positive for cocaine again. In June 2021, appellant’s probation officer filed a major violation 

report alleging that Meekins had tested positive for cocaine on five occasions.
- 3 -

In September 2022, Meekins pled guilty to violating the terms of his probation by using 

drugs. At the revocation hearing, Meekins did not contest that he had violated the conditions of his 

probation. The Commonwealth noted that the court was statutorily required to revoke and 

resuspend Meekins’ sentence, but requested that the court make “substance abuse treatment and 

testing a special condition” of the resuspension to “facilitate” appellant receiving “substance abuse 

treatment.” Meekins argued that such a condition was unnecessary because “it’s already included in 

the statute that he is not to use illegal substances or to . . . unlawfully use, possess or distribute 

controlled substances or related paraphernalia” and posited that the court did not need to impose a 

condition that was “already in the statute.”

The court revoked the previous suspension of five years, thereby imposing five years of 

incarceration. It then resuspended all five years on the following conditions: 

1) three years of good behavior;

2) an indefinite period of supervised probation;

3) payment of costs; and

4) special conditions.

The special conditions included twelve months of face-to-face meetings with a probation officer and 

monthly urine screens, plus substance abuse counseling and/or testing as prescribed by the 

probation officer. Meekins asked the court to consider imposing only a two-year period of good 

behavior because he had “not reoffended” and his cocaine use harmed only himself. The court 

declined to modify the good behavior period because of the harm that appellant’s drug use posed to 

the community.

This appeal followed. Meekins asserts two assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred by resuspending sentences contingent on one year of drug testing 

and treatment, and
- 4 -

2. The trial court erred by resuspending sentences for a period of three years good 

behavior.

ANALYSIS

I. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Making Meekins’ Drug Testing and 

 Treatment a Condition of Meekins’ Resuspended Sentence

Appellant asserts that the court abused its discretion by conditioning the resuspension of his 

sentences on his compliance with drug testing and treatment. He argues that his underlying 

convictions were not drug offenses and thus the special conditions requiring drug testing and 

treatment were unreasonable.

Further, Meekins contends that the conditions were unnecessary because his probation 

officer may mandate drug testing and treatment without a direct order from the trial court. 

Meekins’ argument focuses on the effect of having the court impose conditions rather than the 

probation officer; he asserts this “bypass[es] the statutory requirements.” He relies on Code 

§ 19.2-306.1, which limits the court’s ability to impose active incarceration for a “technical 

violation” on probation. Technical violations may occur in several ways, but relevant to this 

opinion, they occur when the probationer fails to follow the instructions of his probation officer. 

Appellant asserts that by making the drug testing and treatment special conditions of probation—

rather than simply allowing the probation officer to instruct Meekins to do these things—the court 

elevated any failure to comply with drug testing and treatment from a technical violation to a 

full-blown probation violation. Thus, Code § 19.2-306.1 would not limit the court’s ability to 

impose a longer period of active incarceration for a violation.
- 5 -

A. Meekins’ Arguments Relating to Code § 19.2-306.1 Are Not Preserved on

 Appeal

Meekins’ arguments based on Code § 19.2-306.1 are barred by Rule 5A:18 because they 

were not preserved before the circuit court at the time of the ruling. Meekins argues that the 

following exchange contains an objection to the drug testing and treatment requirement:

[Commonwealth]: I would ask that when you revoke and resuspend 

as you’re statutorily required to do, that you make the substance 

abuse treatment and testing a special condition. It’s not meant as a 

punishment, at least from the perspective of this Commonwealth’s 

attorney. It’s meant to help facilitate substance abuse treatment 

where someone might not be as willing to engage in it as they are 

under the penalty of possibly going back to jail or prison.

The Court: [Defense Counsel?]

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, it’s already included in the statute 

that he is not to use illegal substances or to possess—I will not 

unlawfully use, possess or distribute controlled substances or related 

paraphernalia. You don’t need to kill the lily, Judge. It’s already in 

the statute.

Rule 5A:18 provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time 

of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” 

“The purpose of this contemporaneous objection requirement is to allow the trial court a fair 

opportunity to resolve the issue at trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appeals and retrials.” 

Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 195 (2015).

“Specificity and timeliness undergird the contemporaneous-objection rule [and] animate 

its highly practical purpose.” Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019). “Not just any 

objection will do. It must be both specific and timely — so that the trial judge would know the 

particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Id. (quoting Dickerson v. 

Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)). Accordingly, “[m]aking one specific argument on 

an issue does not preserve a separate legal point on the same issue for review.” Edwards v. 
- 6 -

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 760 (2003) (en banc) (citing Clark v. Commonwealth, 30 

Va. App. 406, 411-12 (1999)). “[I]f a trial court is aware of a litigant’s legal position and the 

litigant did not expressly waive such arguments, the arguments remain preserved for appeal.” 

Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010).

On appeal, Meekins puts a different twist on the statements he made to the circuit court 

as to why he did not want the special conditions controlling his probation. See Floyd v. 

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 584 (1978) (holding that appellate courts will not consider an 

argument that differs from the specific argument presented to the trial court, even if it relates to 

the same general issue). Appellant did not argue before the circuit court that the special 

conditions of probation had to be related to the underlying offense, as he does here. He also did 

not address, in any way, that the special conditions violated the intent of Code § 19.2-306.1. His 

argument before the circuit court was that the drug testing and treatment conditions were 

redundant, and this was not sufficient to make the circuit court aware of the arguments he now 

raises on appeal.1

B. The Circuit Court’s Conditions of Probation Were Reasonable and Within its 

Discretion

“We review conditions of probation imposed by a trial court as part of its sentencing 

determination for abuse of discretion.” Murry v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 117, 122 (2014) (citing 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 733, 735 (2007)).

Meekins’ arguments also fail on the merits. Circuit courts are granted broad discretion to 

determine the conditions of probation. See Code §§ 19.2-303, 19.2-306(C). Appellant relies on 

Murry, 288 Va. at 122, which stated that “probation conditions must be reasonable in light of the 

1

“Although Rule 5A:18 contains exceptions for good cause or to meet the ends of justice,”

where it has not been raised “we will not invoke them sua sponte.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 57 

Va. App. 341, 347 (2010).
- 7 -

nature of the offense, the [appellant’s] background, and the surrounding circumstances.” 

However, this case cannot be read to support Meekins’ position that special conditions must be 

related to the underlying offense. In other words, drug testing conditions are not strictly limited 

to drug offenses. In Murry, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the terms of the 

defendant’s probation subjected him to warrantless, suspicionless searches that were not 

reasonable in light of his convictions, background, and surrounding circumstances. Id. at 120. 

Murry requires only that the terms of probation be reasonable in light of those factors. It does 

not mandate that terms of probation are unreasonable per se because they do not correlate 

directly to the convictions. To the contrary, Murry suggests that probation terms may be 

reasonable when considered in the context of “background” and “surrounding circumstances.” 

In this case, Meekins had a background of drug use and a history of testing positive for illegal 

substances while on probation. It was not unreasonable for the court to impose the special 

conditions, and there was no abuse of discretion in the probation conditions imposed by the 

circuit court.

II. The Circuit Court Did Not Err in Imposing a Three-Year Period of Good Behavior

Appellant next argues that the court abused its discretion by imposing three years of good 

behavior. He asserts that three years was unreasonably long because he had not reoffended or 

harmed anyone else, had remained in contact with his probation officer, and had complied with all 

the restrictions except for the use of drugs. Further, although he struggled with drug use, he fully 

complied with the drug treatment requirements given him by his probation officer. Finally, 

appellant emphasizes that his criminal history was insignificant other than the underlying 

convictions and maintains that the court abused its discretion by imposing “such a lengthy term of 

good behavior” when appellant “clearly does not pose a threat to others.”
- 8 -

After suspending a sentence, a circuit court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any 

cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the 

period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “In revocation appeals, the trial 

court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse 

of discretion.’” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)). “If the court, after hearing, finds good cause to 

believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension, then the court may revoke the 

suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.” Code 

§ 19.2-306(C). “The court may again suspend all or any part of this sentence for a period up to the 

statutory maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to be 

imprisoned . . . and may place the defendant upon terms and conditions or probation.” Id.

Here, appellant did not contest that he had violated the terms and conditions of his 

probation at his revocation hearing.

2 Accordingly, after revoking and resuspending appellant’s 

sentences, it was within the circuit court’s discretion to place him “upon terms and conditions or 

probation,” including a period of good behavior. Id.; see Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 

2 At the hearing, Meekins did not allege he had paid restitution in full, nor did he argue 

that his probation ended upon payment of restitution. In oral argument before this Court, it was 

suggested that his probation terms called for probation to end once restitution was paid in full 

under the original sentencing order. The record does contain a subsequent dismissal order, with 

a different case number than the original sentencing order, dismissing the “matter” and noting 

restitution was paid in full. Meekins asks us to apply the ends of justice exception to the 

requirements of Rule 5A:18. This exception is narrow and to be used sparingly. Holt v. 

Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 199, 209 (2016) (en banc). It places the heavy burden of 

establishing a manifest injustice on appellant. Id. at 210. “Where the record does not 

affirmatively establish error, we cannot invoke the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18.” 

Smith v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 710, 724 (2012). Here, the original sentencing order is not 

clear as to whether payment of restitution ended probation, and the only record of payment is 

contained in an order under a different case number than this case. The existing record does not 

illustrate that restitution in this case was fully paid. Meekins has not met his heavy burden, and 

we decline to apply the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 here. Notably, a claim that an 

order is void ab initio can be brought, with proper proof, at any time by a party to the challenged 

order. Bonanno v. Quinn, 299 Va. 722, 736-38 (2021).
- 9 -

217, 220-21 (1960) (holding that a condition of “good behavior” accompanies the period of 

suspension as a matter of law, even if the circuit court fails to mention it is a condition).

Appellant argues that the length of the condition was unreasonable given the mitigating 

circumstances. Meekins, however, asked the circuit court to impose two years of good behavior. 

Thus, we infer that the third and final year of required good behavior is the only portion of the 

term Meekins considers unreasonable.

The record demonstrates that Meekins was making legitimate attempts to comply with 

the terms of his original probation—we recognize that he consistently reported to his probation 

officer and nearly completed a drug program. Balanced against those circumstances, however, 

was appellant’s continued cocaine use as demonstrated by several positive tests.

In setting the length of the good behavior condition, it was “within the trial court’s 

purview to weigh any mitigating factors” appellant presented, including appellant’s compliance 

with the probation officer’s drug treatment and other directions, the lack of new criminal 

convictions, and his criminal record. Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000). 

“The exercise of judicial discretion ‘implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.’” 

Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 645, 650 (2005) (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 

Va. 357, 367 (1946)). After weighing all of the circumstances in this case, the circuit court 

conditioned the resuspension of appellant’s sentences on three years of good behavior. That

decision to impose a third year of good behavior was not arbitrary and reflects a proper exercise 

of discretion.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by imposing special condition terms 

requiring drug testing and treatment. It did not abuse its discretion in requiring a third year of 
- 10 -

good behavior. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s order revoking and resuspending 

Meekins’ sentences.

Affirmed.