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*********************************************** 
JOHN RAUSER v. PITNEY BOWES,

INC., ET AL.

(AC 41025)

Alvord, Keller and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, who was employed by the named defendant, P Co., appealed

to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board

affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner

dismissing his claim for benefits related to injuries that he had sustained

when he was assaulted in a parking lot following a social gathering with

fellow employees at bar and restaurant, while on work related travel

for P Co. In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for benefits, the commissioner

determined that the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden to show that

his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, which

was based on his finding that, between 8 p.m. and midnight on the night

when the plaintiff was socializing with his fellow employees at the

restaurant, he was engaged in a substantial deviation from his work

related activities. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the board erred

in affirming the commissioner’s decision because the commissioner

failed to set forth a factual determination with respect to whether, at

the time he sustained the subject injuries, he was returning to his rental

vehicle to return to his hotel room, and, therefore, he was on the direct

route of his business travel. Held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate

that either the commissioner or the board misapplied the law in evaluating his claim for workers’ compensation benefits: the evidence amply

supported the commissioner’s determination that for several hours,

between 8 p.m. and midnight, the plaintiff was engaged in a substantial

deviation from his employment activities, and the commissioner did not

make any express finding with respect to whether the plaintiff sustained

a compensable injury while on the direct route of his business travel

because the plaintiff failed to present any persuasive evidence in support

of that theory of recovery, as the evidence that the plaintiff relied on

in support of his claim demonstrated only the location where the assault

occurred, and the mere presence of the plaintiff at the scene of the

assault, in and of itself, did not demonstrate that he had completed his

deviation and had resumed his business travel; moreover, even if this

court were to view certain testimony of the plaintiff and a coworker as

dispositive evidence that, at the time of the assault, the plaintiff was

returning to his vehicle to return to his hotel and, thus, as evidence that

he was assaulted while on the direct route of his business travel, the

plaintiff was unable to rely on that testimony in support of his claim,

as the commissioner found that it was not credible and the plaintiff

did not demonstrate that the factual findings that resulted from the

commissioner’s credibility determinations were unreasonable.

Argued March 19—officially released June 11, 2019

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Third District dismissing the

plaintiff’s claim for certain benefits, brought to the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the commissioner’s decision, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Michael Kerin, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Michael M. Buonopane, for the appellee (named

defendant).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The plaintiff, John Rauser, appeals from

thedecision ofthe CompensationReview Board(board),

affirming the decision of the Workers’ Compensation

Commissioner for the Third District (commissioner)

dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The plaintiff claims that the board erred

in affirming the commissioner’s decision in light of the

fact that the commissioner failed to set forth a factual

determination with respect to whether, at the time he

sustained the injuries for which he sought benefits, he

was on the direct route of his business travel.1 We affirm

the decision of the board.

On the basis of the subordinate factual findings made

by the commissioner, we set forth the relevant facts

as follows. On or about June 11, 2014, the plaintiff

was employed by the defendant Pitney Bowes, Inc.,2 as

a director of channel management. He had been

employed by the defendant for twenty-eight years. Part

of his work related duties required him to develop a

rapport with members of the defendant’s sales staff in

order to understand and evaluate not only what they

have sold to the defendant’s customers, but to approve

or disapprove of their sales methods. On June 8, 2014,

the plaintiff and another coworker, both of whom

resided in Connecticut, traveled to Spokane, Washington, to meet with local sales staff employed by the

defendant. As with prior work related travel of this

nature undertaken by the plaintiff to evaluate sales, the

defendant paid for expenses related to airfare, lodging,

car rental, food, and alcoholic drinks.

The plaintiff had business meetings with Spokane

sales staff on June 9 and 10, 2014. On June 11, 2014,

a Spokane based sales representative, Trish Lopez,

invited the plaintiff and other supervisory staff to a

social gathering at a Spokane bar and restaurant named

Fast Eddie’s All Purpose Pub (Fast Eddie’s). Lopez sent

the invitations on behalf of Sean Johnson, who was

employed by the defendant as a general financial sales

specialist. There was no formal agenda for the event,

as there would be for a business meeting, and attendance was considered to be voluntary. The invitation,

which Lopez sent by e-mail, specified that the gathering

at Fast Eddie’s was scheduled to begin at 5:30 p.m. The

plaintiff and several of his Spokane colleagues attended

the gathering. The plaintiff began consuming alcoholic

beverages immediately upon his arrival at or about 5:30

p.m. The plaintiff engaged in what he viewed as joking

around with his colleagues, although he acknowledged

that several of his jokes and comments were ‘‘inappropriate and beyond the bounds of what [the defendant]

would say is acceptable.’’ For example, the plaintiff

offered to assist two of his female colleagues with work

matters in exchange for ‘‘sexual favors.’’ Only a small

portion of the conversation at Fast Eddie’s was devoted
to discussing the defendant’s interests.

Lopez had been instructed by one of her superiors,

Jonathan Allen, to keep an open tab at Fast Eddie’s to

cover expenses up to $500, but no later than 8 p.m.,

whichever occurred first. At 8 p.m., Lopez closed the

tab incurred at Fast Eddie’s, which totaled $304.78.

Later, Lopez was reimbursed for this expenditure.

After 8 p.m., the plaintiff and some of his colleagues

left Fast Eddie’s and went to a neighboring restaurant and bar named Borracho Tacos & Tequilera (Borracho). There, the plaintiff consumed even more alcoholic

beverages and continued to make comments of a sexual nature to and in the presence of his coworkers. For

example, the plaintiff stated to a female coworker

that if she would expose her breasts to him, he would

‘‘approve anything’’ that she sent to him. While at Borracho, one of his coworkers overheard him making a

comment of a sexual nature to at least one other patron

who was not an employee of the defendant. By 9:30

p.m., the plaintiff was visibly intoxicated, and, by midnight, the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content was estimated to be .202, which significantly impaired his

judgment, control, memory, skills, ability to react, and

ability to assess risk.3 Moreover, the plaintiff’s blood

alcohol content greatly exceeded the legal limit for purposes of operating a motor vehicle in Washington.

Shortly after midnight on June 12, 2014, the plaintiff,

accompanied by Johnson, exited Borracho. While walking outside in the vicinity of Borracho, several men,

who were unknown to the plaintiff and Johnson, beat

the plaintiff severely.4 The plaintiff sustained life threatening injuries for which he required immediate hospitalization. Following his release from the hospital, he

underwent significant periods of rehabilitation both in

Washington and Connecticut. Although the plaintiff’s

condition has improved, he continues to experience the

effects of some of his injuries, including a diminished

sense of taste and smell, as well as difficulty in performing some cognitive functions.

The plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits

related to the injuries he sustained in Spokane. The

commissioner held a hearing related to the claim, which

the defendant disputed, during which the commissioner

considered documentary evidence related to the events

at issue, the plaintiff’s employment, and his medical

treatment following the assault. The commissioner

also considered the testimony of the plaintiff and several other witnesses who observed the plaintiff during

the events leading up to the assault, including Johnson, Lopez, Desiree Cimarrustti, and Peter Binder. The

commissioner went on to consider the testimony of

Kevin O’Brien and Robbie Narcisse, both of whom had

investigated the relevant events in the course of their

employment with the defendant. Additionally, the commissioner considered the testimony of Marc Bayer, a
toxicologist who had analyzed the plaintiff’s blood

alcohol content and opined with respect to the degree

to which the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content likely

affected him during the events at issue. Finally, the

court considered the police reports related to the

assault.

In dismissing the claim for benefits, the commissioner found that any business purpose for which the

plaintiff was present at Fast Eddie’s ended by the time

that Lopez paid the bar tab at 8 p.m., and that any food

or drink consumed at Fast Eddie’s or Borracho after

that time was ‘‘purely social in nature and unrelated to

the business interests of [the defendant].’’ The commissioner also found that ‘‘the intoxication, the sexual

comments, and the drinking that continued until the

midnight hour constitute a substantial deviation from

work in furtherance of the employer’s business . . . .’’

The commissioner concluded that ‘‘the [plaintiff] failed

in his burden of persuasion to show that the assault

arose out of and in the course of his duties for the

employer’’ and that the claim was not compensable.5

Following the commissioner’s decision, the plaintiff

appealed to the board. In relevant part, the plaintiff

claimed that the commissioner had erred in his determination that the plaintiff’s injuries did not arise out of

and in the course of his employment. The plaintiff

argued that ‘‘he was assaulted and sustained injuries

. . . incidental to his work for [the defendant] and he

would not have been where he was when he was

assaulted if it was not for his business trip to Spokane,

Washington and, more specifically, at the work event

which was at Fast Eddie’s on the night of June 11, 2014.’’

Relying on the commissioner’s factual findings, the

board rejected the plaintiff’s argument. It stated: ‘‘The

fundamental question which must be answered here is

whether, at the time of the injury, the [plaintiff] had

deviated from his employment and was not doing something incidental to his employment. Pertinent to this

inquiry, the . . . commissioner found that after 8 p.m.

on June 11, 201[4], the [plaintiff] was no longer serving

the business interests of the employer. The consumption of food, alcohol, and the nature of the discussions

occurring after 8 p.m. on June 11, 201[4], constituted

a substantial deviation from activities related to the

[defendant’s] business. . . . Such factual determinations will not be disturbed unless they are contrary to

law, without evidence, or based on unreasonable or

impermissible factual inferences. . . . On review, we

are not persuaded that the trier’s conclusion violates

this appellate standard.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote

omitted.) The board also stated: ‘‘In the present matter,

the [defendant’s] encouragement of the [plaintiff’s]

social activities can only be inferred to support the time

the claimant spent at Fast Eddie’s. After 8 p.m. on the

evening in question, the [plaintiff] no longer enjoyed
the express consent or implied acquiescence of his

employer for his social pursuits.’’ Accordingly, the

board affirmed the commissioner’s dismissal of the

plaintiff’s claim.

The plaintiff argues that it is unnecessary for this

court to resolve the issue of whether the commissioner correctly determined that, during the four hours

between 8 p.m. and midnight, he had substantially deviated from his work on behalf of the defendant. He relies

on the legal proposition that, even after an employee

has completed a substantial personal deviation from

his work, once he has resumed the direct route of his

business travel, any injury occurring on that business

route is ordinarily compensable. See, e.g., 2 A. Larson,

Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law (2018) § 17.03

(‘‘we may also set aside one clearly compensable type

of case—that in which the personal deviation has been

completed and the direct business route has been

resumed’’); 2 A. Sevarino, Connecticut Workers’ Compensation After Reforms (7th Ed. 2017) § 4.22.9, p. 579

(‘‘[a]ny identifiable and significant deviation from a

business trip for personal reasons takes the injured

worker out of the course of employment until s/he

returns, if ever, to the pursuit of business matters’’).

Before this court, the plaintiff claims that the board

erred in affirming the commissioner’s decision in light

of the fact that the commissioner failed to make a factual determination with respect to whether, at the time

he sustained the injuries for which he sought benefits,

he was on the direct route of his business travel.6

The plaintiff argues that the evidence demonstrates

that he was ‘‘on the direct business route of travel from

Fast Eddie’s . . . to [his] employer provided automobile’’ when he sustained the injuries underlying his

claim. He argues in relevant part: ‘‘As the undisputed

documentary evidence in the present case demonstrates, the [plaintiff] at the commencement of his being

attacked by unknown assailants was returning to the

rental car provided for his transportation during his

business trip in Spokane, in order to return to his

employer provided hotel to begin work the next morning. He fled away from his vehicle, eastward back along

his direct business route, for about thirty yards in his

attempt to evade his attackers, but was caught and

brutally beaten and kicked.’’ The plaintiff further

argues: ‘‘At the time of his attack, he was in the direct

route of his business travel, in the alley serving both

the restaurant where his business meeting had occurred

and the second restaurant where he had gone with

fellow employees to socialize following the business

meeting.’’ Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the facts

of the present case are similar to the facts at issue in

prior decisions in which our Supreme Court determined

that claimants were entitled to workers’ compensation

benefits after they deviated from a business purpose

but sustained injury after they later had returned to
business activities. See, e.g., Carroll v. Westport Sanitarium, 131 Conn. 334, 339, 39 A.2d 892 (1944); Ohmen

v. Adams Bros., 109 Conn. 378, 385–86, 146 A. 825

(1929); and Carter v. Rowe, 92 Conn. 82, 85, 101 A. 491

(1917).

The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[w]hether or not [he] was

on the direct business route back to his rental car and

hotel was . . . a key finding of subordinate fact which

the commissioner should have made in order properly

to apply the law to the facts.’’ Thus, the plaintiff urges

us to conclude that the commissioner and the board

improperly applied the governing legal principles to the

facts of the present case. Furthermore, he urges us to

conclude that, in light of the undisputed facts that

appear in the record, the commissioner and the board

erred in concluding that the injury was not compensable.

‘‘The principles that govern our standard of review

in workers’ compensation appeals are well established.

The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from

the facts found must stand unless they result from an

incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts

or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn

from them. . . . Neither the . . . board nor this court

has the power to retry facts. . . .

‘‘The standard of review to be used by the board

when reviewing a commissioner’s findings is set forth

in Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-301-

8.1 That section directs the board not to retry the case

before it, but to determine whether evidence supports

the commissioner’s finding. . . . [T]he . . . [board’s]

hearing of an appeal from the commissioner is not a

de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [I]t is oblig[ated] to

hear the appeal on the record and not retry the facts.

. . . [T]he power and duty of determining the facts

rests on the commissioner, the trier of facts. . . . [T]he

conclusions drawn by [him] from the facts found must

stand unless they result from an incorrect application

of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference

illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.’’ (Citations

omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Sellers v. Sellers Garage, Inc., 92 Conn. App.

650, 650–51, 887 A.2d 382 (2005).

‘‘It is an axiom of [workers’] compensation law that

awards are determined by a two-part test. The [claimant] has the burden of proving that the injury claimed

arose out of the employment and occurred in the course

of the employment. There must be a conjunction of

[these] two requirements . . . to permit compensation. . . . An injury is said to arise out of the employment when (a) it occurs in the course of the employment

and (b) [it] is the result of a risk involved in the employment or incident to it or to the conditions under which

it was required to be performed. . . . [C]ases have held

that an injury [occurs] in the course of the employment
when it takes place (a) within the period of the employment, (b) at a place where the employee may reasonably

be and (c) while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties

of the employment or doing something incidental to

it. . . . There must be a conjunction of [these] two

requirements [of the test] . . . to permit compensation. . . . The former requirement [of arising out of

the employment] relates to the origin and cause of the

accident, while the latter requirement [of occurring in

the course of employment] relates to the time, place

and [circumstance] of the accident. . . . Whether an

injury arose out of and in the course of employment is

a question of fact to be determined by the commissioner. . . . If supported by competent evidence and

not inconsistent with the law, the commissioner’s inference that an injury did or did not arise out of and in the

course of employment is, thus, conclusive.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Mleczko v. Haynes Construction Co., 111 Conn. App. 744, 748–49, 960 A.2d 582

(2008).

The plaintiff does not make any significant attempt

to undermine the commissioner’s determination that,

between 8 p.m. and midnight, he was no longer at a

place he reasonably may have been expected to be in

the course of his employment and he was no longer

fulfilling the duties of his employment or doing something incidental to his employment. Although the plaintiff attempts to depict his conduct between 8 p.m. and

midnight in an employment related light by characterizing it as ‘‘[a] period of personal socialization with his

fellow employees,’’ he nonetheless acknowledges that

‘‘there was sufficient evidence for the . . . commissioner here to have found that there was a substantial

deviation from the original business purpose (attending

a business function at Fast Eddie’s . . .) that caused

[him] to leave his hotel and drive to the parking lot

adjacent to the scene of the assault.’’

Indeed, the weight of the evidence reflects that, after

8 p.m., the defendant was no longer supporting financially any type of social gathering involving the plaintiff

and the defendant’s business interests were no longer

being discussed by the plaintiff. During the course of

the evening, the plaintiff became highly intoxicated and

engaged in conduct that led to his reprimand by the

defendant. Moreover, the evidence suggests that, during

the latter part of the evening, the plaintiff, due to alcohol

consumption, lacked the capacity to engage in any type

of productive work related pursuits.7 The plaintiff may

have continued to socialize with some of his coworkers

after 8 p.m., but that fact is not dispositive with respect

to the issue of whether he was acting in the course of

his employment. This is not a close issue; the evidence

amply supports the commissioner’s determination that

for several hours, between 8 p.m. and midnight, the

plaintiff was engaged in a substantial deviation from

his employment activities. Cf. McMorris v. New Haven
Police Dept., 156 Conn. App. 822, 833, 115 A.3d 491

(‘‘[a]t the time he was injured, the plaintiff was where

he would have been expected to be in the course of

his employment as a police officer’’ and his deviation

from his normal route to work ‘‘was so inconsequential

relative to his job duties, which includes driving into

work, that it did not remove him from the course and

scope of his employment’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]), cert. denied, 317 Conn. 911, 115 A.3d 1106

(2015); Kish v. Nursing & Home Care, Inc., 248 Conn.

379, 391, 727 A.2d 1253 (1999) (‘‘plaintiff’s decision to

momentarily [stop] to mail a personal card was so

inconsequential . . . so as to not remove her from acting in the course and scope of her employment’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

We now turn to the plaintiff’s primary contention in

this appeal, namely, that ‘‘the uncontradicted evidence

clearly and unequivocally demonstrates’’ that, following

his personal deviation from work related activities

between 8 p.m. and midnight, he resumed his business

activities and sustained injury while on his direct business route of travel. Specifically, the plaintiff argues

that the police reports and crime scene photographs

reflect that he was assaulted in an alley between the

building that housed Fast Eddie’s and the building that

housed Borracho. The alley is connected to a rear parking area.

It suffices to observe that the evidence on which the

plaintiff relies in support of this claim demonstrates

the location at which the assault occurred. There is no

dispute as to this fact. The police reports and crime

scene photographs, however, are far from dispositive

with respect to the issue of whether the plaintiff was

at that precise location at the time of the assault

because, as he argues presently, he was returning to

his rental automobile in order to return to his hotel. It

is plausible that the plaintiff was in the parking lot or

the alley near Borracho for any number of reasons that

were unrelated to his returning to his automobile or

his returning to his hotel. For instance, he may have

exited Borracho merely to make a telephone call or

to engage in a private conversation with a third party

outside of the restaurant. He may have been in the area

because he was asked to leave Borracho and, perhaps,

was headed to another bar. The plaintiff’s mere presence at the scene of the attack in and of itself does

not demonstrate, as the plaintiff suggests, that he had

completed his deviation and had resumed his business

travel. ‘‘The determinative question is whether the plaintiff, at the time of [his] injury, was engaged in the line

of [his] duty in the business affairs of [his] employer.’’

Luddie v. Foremost Ins. Co., 5 Conn. App. 193, 196, 497

A.2d 435 (1985). We reiterate that ‘‘the claimant in a

workers’ compensation case bears the burden of proving that the employee’s employment proximately

caused the claimed injury.’’ DiNuzzo v. Dan Perkins
Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 294 Conn. 132, 147 n.11, 982 A.2d

157 (2009).

In our careful review of the record, we observe that

the only other relevant evidence before the commissioner with respect to this narrow factual issue, i.e.,

whether the plaintiff had returned to his direct business

route of travel, came in the form of the hearing testimony of the plaintiff, as well as deposition testimony

of Johnson. At the hearing, the plaintiff testified that

he had ‘‘very little memory’’ of the events of June 11,

2014 through ‘‘almost August’’ of 2014. He described

his recollection of relevant events from the evening in

question as being ‘‘spotty.’’ Nonetheless, he testified

that the alley in which he was assaulted was the fastest

route between Borracho and his automobile that was

in the parking lot behind the restaurants. He testified

that he ‘‘was told’’ by one or more other persons that

the assault occurred while he was walking back to his

automobile. The plaintiff testified that he did not know

or could not recall if he had planned on driving back

to his hotel after leaving Borracho. He testified: ‘‘I was

going towards the car. I don’t know if, as we were

walking, if we had discussions about whether or not

we would drive home.’’ Johnson testified that he and

the plaintiff made a decision to leave Borracho together,

that they utilized the alley that led to the parking lot

behind Fast Eddie’s, and that they were ‘‘headed to

[their] vehicles’’ that were parked in the parking lot

when the assault occurred.

Even if we were to view the testimony of the plaintiff

and Johnson as dispositive evidence with respect to

the issue of whether, at the time of the assault, the

plaintiff was returning to his automobile for the purpose

of returning to his hotel and, thus, as evidence that he

was assaulted while on the direct business route of

travel, the plaintiff is unable to rely on his testimony

or Johnson’s testimony in support of his claim.8

In his

findings, the commissioner expressly stated in relevant

part: ‘‘I find the [plaintiff] was candid and that his testimony was credible [with respect to] the reason for the

trip to Spokane and the occurrences during the early

part of the evening at Fast Eddie’s. I find the [plaintiff]

not credible concerning what occurred in the latter

portion of the evening at Fast Eddie’s and at Borracho

because his head trauma and inability to remember

much of the evening renders the testimony unreliable.’’

Moreover, the commissioner stated: ‘‘I find the testimony of . . . Johnson not to be credible.’’ The plaintiff

has not demonstrated that the factual findings that

resulted from the commissioner’s credibility determinations were unreasonable. We reiterate that ‘‘[i]t is within

the discretion of the commissioner alone to determine

the credibility of witnesses and the weighing of the

evidence.’’ Ayna v. Graebel/CT Movers, Inc., 133 Conn.

App. 65, 71, 33 A.3d 832, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 905,

38 A.3d 1201 (2012).
It appears that the commissioner did not make any

express finding with respect to whether the plaintiff

sustained a compensable injury while on the direct business route of travel because the plaintiff failed to present any persuasive evidence in support of that theory

of recovery. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that

the plaintiff has not demonstrated that either the commissioner or the board misapplied the law in evaluating

the claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

The decision of the Compensation Review Board is

affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff’s statement of the issues sets forth two distinct issues. The

first issue, which we resolve in this opinion, is whether the commissioner

erroneously failed to make a factual finding with respect to whether the

plaintiff was on the direct route of his business travel at the time he sustained

the injury at issue and, in light of that error on the part of the commissioner,

whether the board erroneously affirmed the commissioner’s dismissal of

his claim for benefits. The second issue is whether the board erroneously

‘‘failed to find’’ that he was on the direct route of his business travel at the

time he sustained the injury at issue. Setting aside the fact that the plaintiff’s

second claim is legally untenable on its face, as the board is not a trier of

fact, we observe that the plaintiff has failed to set forth an independent

analysis of the second claim in his brief. Accordingly, we deem the second

claim to be abandoned. See, e.g., Tonghini v. Tonghini, 152 Conn. App. 231,

239, 98 A.3d 93 (2014) (assignments of error not briefed beyond statement

of claim will be deemed abandoned and not reviewed by this court).

2 Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc., which is identified in the

record as the defendant’s workers’ compensation insurer, also is named as

a defendant in this action. For ease of reference, references to the defendant

are to Pitney Bowes, Inc.

3 Following the events of June 11, 2014, the defendant reprimanded the

plaintiff for both sexual harassment and excessive alcohol consumption.

4

Johnson sustained physical injuries as well.

5 As the plaintiff correctly observes, the commissioner did not find that

the injuries for which he sought workers’ compensation benefits ‘‘were

caused by his misconduct, intoxication, or by his participation in a social

or recreational event; nor was there testimony or other evidence in the

record to support such a finding.’’ Neither the commissioner nor the board

relied on these theories in determining that the claim should be dismissed.

6 Consistent with his appellate argument, the plaintiff, in his proposed

findings submitted to the commissioner, asked the commissioner to find

that, at the time of the assault, he and Johnson were ‘‘in the parking lot

behind Fast Eddie’s and planning on heading to their hotels and homes,

respectively.’’ The plaintiff also asked the commissioner to find that ‘‘[t]he

[plaintiff] was heading back to his rental car which was furnished to him

by [the defendant] when he was attacked by unknown assailants’’ and ‘‘in

a place he was reasonably expected to be.’’

In the plaintiff’s motion to correct the commissioner’s finding and dismissal, he asked the commissioner to find that at the time of the assault,

‘‘[t]he plaintiff was in a place that he was reasonably expected to be, to

wit, in the parking lot where he parked to go to Fast Eddie’s for business

entertainment that was not only condoned but also encouraged by his

employer. He was heading toward his vehicle with . . . Johnson with the

intent of returning back to the hotel (which was all paid for by [the defendant]).’’ The court denied this ground set forth in the motion to correct.

7 The plaintiff, correctly referring to the principle that Connecticut has

established a no-fault workers’ compensation system that imposes a form

of strict liability on employers; see, e.g., Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360, 377,

44 A.3d 827 (2012); urges this court not to focus solely on the issue of

whether a work related injury occurred and not to consider whether his

conduct at the time of the injury was socially proper or moral. Thus, the

plaintiff argues that ‘‘in the present case [his] intoxication and reportedly

offensive behavior are irrelevant: there is no evidence in the record nor

finding of fact below to suggest that the injuries [he] sustained in this assault

were due to his intoxication or wilful misconduct . . . .’’
In affirming the decision of the commissioner, the board aptly observed

on the basis of the evidence presented that the plaintiff had made comments

that were ‘‘inappropriate and offensive’’ during the events at issue. The

board then stated: ‘‘We presume that this testimony was offered so as to

support an inference as to the [plaintiff’s] intoxication level and that the

nature of discussions was not in furtherance of the [defendant’s] business.

If the purpose of the testimony was to cast the character of the [plaintiff]

in a bad light, we remind all that workers’ compensation is a no-fault remedy.

The character of a claimant neither assures nor bars entitlement to the

remedy.’’ This court fully agrees with the board’s succinct explanation in

this regard and, likewise, has evaluated the plaintiff’s conduct solely for the

purpose of evaluating whether he is entitled to benefits according to law.

8 We observe that, although the plaintiff argues that the evidence demonstrated that he was attacked while on the direct business route of travel

between Fast Eddie’s and his automobile, the evidence on which the plaintiff

relies, which includes, but is not limited to, his own testimony, demonstrates

that he was attacked after exiting Borracho, not Fast Eddie’s. As the plaintiff

recognizes, Borracho and Fast Eddie’s are distinct businesses, and although

Borracho is located near Fast Eddie’s, they are located in separate buildings

that are separated by an alley.