NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY LEE HENRICUS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-15347 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02699-KJN 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Kendall J. Newman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 13, 2017**

San Francisco, California

Before: KOZINSKI and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and ARTERTON,***

District Judge.

Timothy Henricus seeks social security disability benefits for a period 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Janet Bond Arterton, United States District Judge for 

the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

FILED

SEP 18 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 

beyond what the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) awarded. We reverse and 

remand for further proceedings.

When faced with contradictory opinions, the ALJ must give specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record to reject a 

treating physician’s opinion. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 

1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). An ALJ must give a germane reason for rejecting the 

opinion of a physician’s assistant, who is considered an “other source” under the 

Social Security regulations. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2012). Here, the ALJ rejected the functional capacity opinion of Henricus’s 

treating physician Dr. Hembd and his assistant, Ms. Zichella, without giving any 

reasons for doing so or even mentioning it. This was error. See Garrison v. 

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ALJ errs when [s]he rejects a 

medical opinion . . . while doing nothing more than ignoring it.”); Molina, 674 

F.3d at 1111. The error was not harmless, because the vocational expert testified 

that, if their opinion was credited fully, Henricus would be precluded from all 

work. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.

Henricus argues that the ALJ also erred by rejecting parts of Dr. Monks’s 

functional capacity opinion. We disagree. The ALJ limited Henricus to simple, 

repetitive tasks based on Dr. Monks’s opinion. This limitation shows that the ALJ 

intended to adopt Dr. Monks’s opinion. See Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 
 3 

(9th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing between discrediting and interpreting a medical 

opinion); see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 

2008) (reasoning that the ALJ is responsible for translating functional limitations 

into a residual functional capacity). As a result, we must uphold the ALJ’s 

interpretation of Dr. Monks’s opinion so long as it was rational. See Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ’s limitation to simple, routine work reflects a rational interpretation 

of Dr. Monks’s opinion, and rationally reconciles portions of that opinion that 

might otherwise appear to be in conflict. As a result, the ALJ did not err in her 

treatment of Dr. Monks’s opinion.

Finally, we remand for further proceedings rather than for an award of 

benefits to allow the Commissioner to properly evaluate Dr. Hembd and Ms. 

Zichella’s opinion in the first instance. See Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 

407 (9th Cir. 2015).

REVERSED and REMANDED.