2001 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-20-2001

Ross v. Hotel Employees

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 00-3142

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2001 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Ross v. Hotel Employees" (2001). 2001 Decisions. Paper 212.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/212
Filed September 17, 2001 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 00-3142 

GEORGE A. ROSS, 

 Appellant 

v. 

HOTEL EMPLOYEES AND 

RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES 

INTERNATIONAL UNION; 

ROBERT BAKER, Co-Trustee; 

CAROL CARLSON, Co-Trustee 

Appeal from the Judgment of 

the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

Civil Action No. 98-cv-01131 

Magistrate Judge: Francis X. Caiazza 

Argued: September 14, 2000 

Before: ROTH, McKEE and RENDELL, Circuit Judge s 

(Opinion filed: September 17, 2001) 

 THOMAS M. CASTELLO, ESQ. 

 (Argued) 

 Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. 

 3000 USX Tower 

 600 Grant Street 

 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

 Attorney for Appellant 

 RICHARD L. STOPER, Jr., ESQ. 

 (Argued) 

 SUSAN L. GRAGEL, ESQ. 

 Rotatori, Gragel & Stoper CO., L.P.A. 

 1040 Leader Building 

 526 Superior Avenue, East 

 Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

 Attorneys for Appellees 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
We are asked to review the district court's grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Hotel Employees and 

Restaurant Employees International Union ("HEREIU"), and 

Robert Baker and Carol Carlson; and against plaintiff 

George Ross. Ross sued under Title III of the Labor

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. For the 

reasons that follow, we will affirm. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background1 

George Ross is a member of Local 57, a subordinate labor 

organization of HEREIU. Before January 6, 1998, Ross had 

been an elected non-salaried member of the Executive 

Board of that Local as well as an appointed full time 

salaried employee holding the title of business agent.2 

On September 5, 1995, the United States entered into a 

Consent Decree with HEREIU. The Consent Decree 

appointed a federal monitor "for the remedial objective of 

relieving HEREIU and Local 57 from the direct or indirect 

influence of any organized crime group or the threat of 

such an influence." App. At 104. Sometime during the 

summer of 1997, the United States Department of Justice 

began investigating organized crime's relationship with 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. The procedural history of this appeal is rather unique as the district 

court entered summary judgment after declaring a mistrial. 

2. At all times relevant to the issues before us, Ross held an appointed 

office. 

 2 

Local 57. Thereafter, the federal monitor brought charges of 

corruption involving several officers of Local 57 including 

Louis Sanfilippo, President; Nancy Davis, SecretaryTreasurer; Vince Fera, Recording Secretary; and Louis 

Masco, a union member. 

At the same time this investigation was proceeding, a 

power struggle erupted between Local 57's "power base" 

and three of the other officers of the Local: Ross, Nassan 

and Brown.3 Ross and Brown were then business agents of 

Local 57, and Nassan was a general organizer. According to 

Ross, the power struggle progressed to the point that the 

Local's Executive Secretary, Nancy Davis,4 asked the 

International to assume control of Local 57 by establishing 

a trusteeship. 

In November of 1997, the federal monitor also requested 
that a trusteeship be established based on the charges 

brought against the officers of Local 57. Eventually, Robert 

Baker was appointed as the first of two Trustees who 

assumed control of Local 57.5 On the same day he was 

appointed, Baker fired Nassan, Ross and Brown; and 

Sanfilippo resigned. However, Nassan, Ross and Brown 

were rehired within 24 hours of their firing after 

complaining to the monitor. 

An election for officers of Local 57 was scheduled for 

March 1998, but the Trustees canceled the election, and 

suspended the Local's constitution and by-laws. In April of 

1998, Ross, Nassan and Brown filed the first of two

lawsuits challenging HEREIU's right to impose a 

trusteeship. They named HEREIU and the two Trustees as 

defendants (the "Trusteeship case"). The plaintiffs asserted 

that, "[g]iven the resignation of Sanfilippo and the failure of 

HEREIU or the Trustees to suspend Nancy Ross, it is clear 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. Inasmuch as we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment against 

Ross, we must assume that the allegations of his amended complaint are 

true, and draw all inferences which reasonably arise from those 

assertions in his favor as the nonmoving party. Woessner v. Air Liquide 

Inc., 242 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2001). 

4. Nancy Davis is also referred to as Nancy Ross in the record, as she is 

George Ross' former wife. 

5. Carol Carlson was appointed as co-trustee about four weeks later. 

 3 

that the continuation of the Trusteeship is improper and 

therefore must be dissolved." Ross' Complaint atP 26 (No. 

98-629). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and equitable 

relief under Title III of the Labor Management Reporting 

and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the "LMRDA") which governs 

the creation and maintenance of trusteeships by labor 

organizations. See 73 Stat. 519 SS 301-01 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 

SS 461-66 (1998 & Supp. 2000) The prayer for relief

included a request that the court dissolve the Trusteeship, 

reinstate the constitution and by-laws of Local 57, and 

order immediate elections. The plaintiffs also moved for a 

TRO to enjoin the Trustees from running Local 57's 

operations. That motion was denied. At the end of April, 

Nassan and Brown withdrew from the lawsuit, leaving Ross 

as the only plaintiff.6 

During the summer of 1998, the Trustees decided to hold 

new elections and terminate the Trusteeship. They also 

issued new election guidelines under which Ross became 
ineligible to run for office because his union dues were 

delinquent. Ross argues that these guidelines were 

specifically intended to remove him as an eligible candidate.7 

In addition to the new election guidelines, the Trustees also 

"proposed a new Constitution which terminated George 

Ross' position as full time salaried business agent." Ross' 

Amended Complaint at P 38 (No. 98-629). 

In July of 1998, Ross filed a second lawsuit against the 

same defendants in state court (the "election case"). Ross 

sought a declaration that he was an eligible candidate for 

the upcoming election, and an injunction to prevent the 

election from proceeding until his eligibility could be 

determined. That suit was removed to federal court on 

motion of the defendants, and the district court thereafter 

refused to enjoin the election. Ross was not permitted to 

_________________________________________________________________ 

6. Ross argues that Nassan "cut a deal" with HEREIU and the Trustees 

to dissolve the Trusteeship, and hold elections in exchange for Nassan 

withdrawing from the lawsuit and his support of Ross. 

7. In support of this argument, he points out that he had been elected 

to the Executive Board of Local 57 on three prior occasions even though 

his dues were then delinquent. Inasmuch as we are reviewing a grant of 

summary judgment, we must accept this argument as true. 

 4 

run for office because of the aforementioned eligibility 

restrictions. On the day of the election, Ross, Nassan and 

Brown received letters terminating their employment as 

business agents. As a result of the election, Nassan was 

elected president and principle officer. After the swearing in 

of the new officers of the union, the Trusteeship was 

dissolved. Ross was not re-appointed as a business agent 

by the newly elected officers. 

In December of 1998, the defendants filed a motion for 

summary judgment in the Trusteeship case. They argued 

that Ross' claim for equitable relief had been rendered moot 

by the election of new officers and the resulting dissolution 

of the Trusteeship. Ross answered arguing that the crux of 

the Trusteeship case was that the Trusteeship had been 

imposed in bad faith to remove political opposition. He 

insisted that all actions carried out pursuant to the 

Trusteeship were void. In February of 1999, Ross filed an 

amended complaint in the Trusteeship case alleging 

continuing harm and asking the district court to: 

 Void the following actions taken in conjunction with 

 that Trusteeship: 
 i. The suspension of the Local By-Laws and

 Constitution; 

 ii. The firing of the Plaintiff, George Ross on 

 January 6, 1998; 

 iii. The imposition of the new eligibility 

 requirements to run for elected office intended to 

 exclude George Ross as a candidate for the July, 

 1998 elections; 

 iv. The firing of George Ross on August 10, 1998. 

Ross' Amended Complaint, P 9 (No. 98-629). He also 

requested temporary reinstatement, scheduling of new 

elections, monetary damages, counsel fees, and costs. 

The district court consolidated Ross' two lawsuits and the 

matter was scheduled for trial. Essentially, Ross contended 

that he was harmed in two respects as a result of the 

improper continuation of the Trusteeship. He alleged that 

he had suffered damages as a result of being declared 

 5 

ineligible to run for office in the August 1998 elections. He 

also alleged damages as a result of the termination of his 

appointed position as a business agent. Prior to trial, the 

defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude 

evidence or argument regarding Ross' purportedly improper 

exclusion from the August election. The court denied that 

motion but did enter an order precluding Ross from 

"seek[ing] any relief which would effect a change in the 

union election." Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant 

Employees Int'l Union, No. 98-1131, slip. op. at 9 (W.D. Pa. 

Oct. 4, 1999). 

After both sides rested in the ensuing trial, the jury 

reported that it was deadlocked and the court declared a 

mistrial. However, before the scheduled retrial was to begin, 

the defendants moved for summary judgment on all of

Ross' claims. The defendants argued that Ross was 

precluded from asserting an individual claim for monetary 

damages under Title III of the LMRDA. Ross opposed the 

motion by relying solely on the law of the case doctrine. He 

contended that the court had already implicitly decided 

that an individual could sue for damages under Title III 

because the court sent the damage suit to the jury in the 

first trial. 

The district court rejected Ross' law of the case argument 
stating: "the issue of whether Title III supports Ross's 

individual requests for relief has not yet been adjudicated 

by the Court." Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant 

Employees Int'l Union, No. 98-1131 slip. op. at 12 (W.D. Pa. 

Jan. 12, 2000). The court noted that Ross had not asserted 

a timeliness challenge, and concluded that it had broad 

discretion to entertain the defendants' motion for summary 

judgment even though the issues had been submitted to a 

jury. Id. at 6 (citing In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 

794 (3d Cir. 1992)). The court ultimately held that interests 

of judicial economy counseled in favor of adjudicating the 

summary judgment motion and granted summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants and against Ross. 

In doing so, the court relied on the text and legislative 

history of the LMRDA as well as relevant precedent from 

other circuit courts of appeals. The court held that Ross' 

claims were all individual in nature and that Title III of the 

 6 

LMRDA does not allow plaintiffs to seek individual relief. Id. 

at 12-13, 16-17. Rather, the district court concluded that 

Title III was intended to protect local unions, not their 

individual members. Id. at 14. The court relied in large part 

upon Gesink v. Grand Lodge, International Ass'n of 

Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 831 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 

1987), in stating: 

 the purposes listed in Title III as justifying the creation 

 of a trusteeship have nothing to do with protecting 

 union members' or employees' individual rights; rather, 

 they seek to protect locals from `corruption' or 

 `financial malpractice' of their agents and to ensure 

 that such agents comply with their obligations and 

 `otherwise carry [ ] out the legitimate objects of ' the 

 union. 

Ross, slip. op. at 12. The court concluded that Ross' claim 

was not appropriately brought under Title III because each 

form of requested relief was intended to compensate him, 

not his Local. 

 Plaintiff 's requests for lost wages, medical insurance 

 coverage, and other `out of pocket costs' associated 

 with his termination as business agent, as well as his 

 request for reinstatement, are asserted on his own 

 behalf and for his own benefit, not for that of Local 57. 

Id. at 16-17. The district court did acknowledge that Ross 

sought other equitable relief including a declaration that 

the Trusteeship was improperly imposed in bad faith and 
the voiding of certain of the Trustee's actions. Id. at 17 n.3.8 

_________________________________________________________________ 

8. The district court also discussed Ross' repeated attempts to invalidate 

the August 1998 election despite its previous ruling that Ross was 

barred from seeking to effect a change in the election. The district court 

reaffirmed its previous ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain 

this 

part of Ross' claim. Ross v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 

Int'l Union, No. 98-1131 slip. op. at 7-8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2000). The 

court reasoned that Title IV of the LMRDA vests the Secretary of Labor 

with exclusive jurisdiction over an individual union member's postelection suits regardless of when members first seek relief regarding 

elections. See id. at 8-10 (citing Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 

Furniture Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 

467 U.S. 526, 541, 544 (1984)). Post-election relief to invalidate 

elections 

or seek new elections must first be pursued with the Secretary of Labor. 

Id. at 11 n. 2. Therefore, Ross "[was] barred from pursuing claims 

requiring an invalidation of the August 1998 election." Id. at 10-11. 

 7 

However, inasmuch as that relief was ancillary to Ross' 

primary attempt to redress his individual injuries, Ross' 

entire case was dismissed. This appeal followed. 9 

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant toS 304 of 

the LMRDA. 73 Stat. 519 S 304, 29 U.S.C. S 464. We have 

jurisdiction from the district court's final order granting 

summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise 

plenary review. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fidelity and 

Deposit Co. of Maryland, 205 F.3d 615, 626 (3d Cir. 2000). 

III. Discussion 

Ross' appeal presents two questions for resolution. First, 

we must determine if Ross has waived the arguments he 

makes now because he did not raise those arguments in 

opposition to the defendants' summary judgment motion in 

the district court. If we address the merits of his claim we 

must decide the very important question of whether Title III 

of the LMRDA affords Ross a cause of action under the 

circumstances of this case. 

A. Waiver 

As noted above, Ross' opposition to the defendants'

motion for summary judgment in the district court was 

limited to his contention that the law of the case precluded 
summary judgment because the merits of his claim had 

been submitted to a jury. The district court disagreed with 

his position, and that ruling has not been appealed. On 

appeal, for the first time, he argues the merits of the 

defendants' claim that Title III of the LMRDA does not 

provide a cause of action for individual relief. 

Generally, "absent compelling circumstances an appellate 

court will not consider issues that are raised for the first 

time on appeal." Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 929 (3d 

_________________________________________________________________ 

9. Ross does not now challenge the district court's denial of his 

assertion 

that the law of the case precluded entry of summary judgment, or the 

district court's refusal to overturn the union's election. 

 8 

Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds recognized in Carter 

v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Singleton v. 

Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976)). In Patterson, we 

explained: 

 This prudential policy seeks to insure that litigants 

 have every opportunity to present their evidence in the 

 forum designed to resolve factual disputes. By 

 requiring parties to present all their legal issues to the 

 district court as well, we preserve the hierarchical 

 nature of the federal courts and encourage ultimate 

 settlement before appeal. It also prevents surprise on 

 appeal and gives the appellate court the benefit of the 

 legal analysis of the trial court. It is however not a 

 jurisdictional bar, and the statement of policy permits 

 exceptions in appropriate cases. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

The case at bar has important implications for the field 

of labor law, and raises a question of first impression in 

this circuit. Moreover, the procedural posture also raises 

procedural questions that we have not previously 

addressed. As noted above, the summary judgment motion 

was made after a jury deadlocked and a mistrial was

declared. However, because of that unique procedural 

posture, the defendants can hardly claim at this late date 

that Ross' assertion of a private cause of action under Title 

III is a surprise, or that Ross' position prejudices them. 

They have obviously assumed that he had a private cause 

of action under Title III throughout the course of this 

litigation including trial. Although Ross failed to respond to 

the merits of defendants' arguments in the summary 
judgment motion, the district court was afforded the rare 

advantage of a fully developed record in analyzing the 

issues raised by the motion for summary judgment. 

Inasmuch as the defendants are not unfairly prejudiced by 

the lateness of Ross' arguments, and given the importance 

of the issues raised by this grant of summary judgment, we 

think it appropriate to resolve this appeal on the merits, 

and not upon the procedural grounds that the defendants 

argue in the alternative. 

Moreover, the district court did not err in considering a 

motion for summary judgment after a mistrial. If there are 

 9 

no issues of material fact and a party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, judgment may be awarded at 

any time, even after trial, under Rule 56 or under Rule 50. 

There was no reason to require the court to go through the 

procedural calisthenics of a second trial merely because the 

motion for judgment was brought after the mistrial.

Accordingly, we will consider the merits of the arguments 

before us. 

B. Title III of the LMRDA 

This dispute arises in the context of a trusteeship that 

was imposed pursuant to Title III of the LMRDA. 10 The 

_________________________________________________________________ 

10. Title III of the LMRDA provides in relevant part: 

 S 302 Purposes for which a trusteeship may be established 

Trusteeships shall be established and administered by a labor 

organization over a subordinate body only in accordance with the 

constitution and bylaws of the organization which has assumed 

trusteeship over the subordinate body and for the purpose of correcting 

corruption or financial malpractice, assuring the performance of 

collective bargaining agreements or other duties of bargaining 

representative, restoring democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying 

out the legitimate objects of such labor organization. 

S 303 Unlawful acts relating to labor organization under 

trusteeship 

(a) During any period when a subordinate body of a labor organization 

is in trusteeship, it shall be unlawful (1) to count the vote of delegates 

from such body in any convention or election of officers of the labor 

organization unless the delegates have been chosen by secret ballot in 

an election in which all the members in good standing of such 

subordinate body were eligible to participate . . .
* * * 

S 304 Enforcement 

(a) Upon the written complaint of any member or subordinate body of 

a labor organization alleging that such organization has violated the 

provisions of this title (except section 301) the Secretary shall 

investigate 

the complaint and if the Secretary finds probable cause to believe that 

such violation has occurred and has not been remedied he shall, without 

disclosing the identity of the complainant, bring a civil action in any 

 10 

LMRDA defines a trusteeship as "any receivership . . . or 

other method of supervision or control whereby a labor 

organization suspends the autonomy otherwise available to 

a subordinate body under its constitution or bylaws." 73 

Stat. 519 S 3(h), 29 U.S.C. S 402(h). Title III limits the 

establishment of trusteeships as follows: 

 `Trusteeships shall be established and administered 

 . . . for the purpose of [1] correcting corruption or 

 financial malpractice, [2] assuring the performance of 

 collective bargaining agreements or other duties of a 

 bargaining representative, [3] restoring democratic 

 procedures, [4] or otherwise carrying out the legitimate 

 objects of such labor organization. 

73 Stat. 519 S 302, 29 U.S.C. S 462. Specifying proper 

purposes protects the local union organization and its 

membership as a whole from the misuse of the trusteeship 

_________________________________________________________________ 

district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the labor 

organization for such relief (including injunctions) as may be 

appropriate. Any member or subordinate body of a labor organization 

affected by any violation of this title (except section 301) may bring a 

civil action in any district court of the United States having 

jurisdiction 

of the labor organization for such relief (including injunctions) as may 

be 

appropriate. 

* * * 

(c) In any proceeding pursuant to this section a trusteeship established 

by a labor organization in conformity with the procedural requirements 

of its constitution and bylaws and authorized or ratified after a fair 

hearing . . . shall be presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from 

the date of its establishment and shall not be subject to attack during 
such period except upon clear and convincing proof that the trusteeship 

was not established or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable 

under section 302. After the expiration of eighteen months the 

trusteeship shall be presumed invalid in any such proceeding and its 

discontinuance shall be decreed unless the labor organization shall show 

by clear and convincing proof that the continuation of the trusteeship is 

necessary for a purpose allowable under section 302. In the latter event 

the court may dismiss the complaint or retain jurisdiction of the cause 

on such conditions and for such period as it deems appropriate. 

73 Stat. 519 SS 301, 302, 303, 304, 29 U.S.C.SS 461, 462, 463, 464. 

 11 

power. Title III provides that a trusteeship is"presumed 

valid for a period of eighteen months . . . and shall not be 

subject to attack during such period except upon clear and 

convincing proof that the trusteeship was not established 

or maintained in good faith for a purpose allowable under 

section 302." 73 Stat. 519 S 304(c), 29 U.S.C. S 464(c). The 

provision also states: "[a]ny member or subordinate body of 

a labor organization affected by a violation of this title may 

bring a civil action in any district court . . . for such relief 

(including injunctions) as may be appropriate." 73 Stat. 519 

S 304(a), 29 U.S.C. S 464(a). It is this provision that 

provides the proverbial "rub" here, as we must determine if 

the individual relief that Ross is seeking is "appropriate" 

under Title III.11 

Our inquiry is therefore circumscribed by our 

interpretation of this statute. 

 In any case turning on statutory interpretation, our 

 goal is to ascertain the intent of Congress. To 

 accomplish this goal, we begin by looking at the 

 statute's language. If the language is plain, we need 

 look no further. If the statutory language is ambiguous 

 or unclear, we may look behind the language to the 

 legislative history for guidance. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

11. At oral argument, and vaguely in his brief, Ross argued that we 

should read the enforcement section of Title III in light of S 401 which 

is 

the introduction section of the LMRDA and discusses the purposes and 

policy of the LMRDA. S 401(b) discusses protecting the rights of 

employees and the public in general: 

 The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor 

 and management fields, that there have been a number of instances 

 of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of 

individual 
 employees, and other failures to observe high standards of 

 responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and 

 supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of 

the 

 rights and interests of employees and the public generally as they 

 relate to the activities of labor organizations, employers, labor 

 relations consultants, and their officers and representatives. 

73 Stat. 519 S 2(b), 29 U.S.C. S 401(b). Ross contends that this section's 

use of the word "employees" indicates that protecting employees of the 

union was the underlying purpose of the LMRDA. For reasons we 

discuss below, we disagree. 

 12 

Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 233 (3d 

Cir. 1998). The intricate legislative history of the LMRDA 

has caused the Supreme Court to note that: 

 Archibald Cox, who actively participated in shaping 

 much of the LMRDA, has remarked: 

 `The legislation contains more than its share of 

 problems for judicial interpretation because much of 

 the bill was written on the floor of the Senate or 

 House of Representatives and because many sections 

 contain calculated ambiguities or political 

 compromises essential to secure a majority. 

 Consequently, in resolving them the courts would be 

 well advised to seek out the underlying rationale 

 without placing great emphasis upon close 

 construction of the words.' 

Wirtz, 389 U.S. at 468 n.6 (citing Cox, Internal Affairs of 

Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58

Mich. L. Rev. 819, 852 (1960)). Thus the practice of 

interpreting ambiguous statutory language in light of its 

legislative history is of particular value in the context of the 

LMRDA. Although we do not consider the word 

"appropriate" an ambiguous term in and of itself, to the 

extent that the text of the LMRDA does not adequately 

define the term in context, and thereby definitively 

establish what remedies are "appropriate" under Title III, 

we are compelled to consult the statute's legislative history. 

See West Virginia Univ. Hospital, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 

98 (1991) (it is appropriate to resort to legislative history to 

determine the meaning of ambiguous legislation). The 

legislative history of Title III confirms our analysis. 

C. The Legislative History of Title III 

In 1957, the Select Committee on Improper Activities in 
the Labor Management Field of the United States Senate, 

more commonly known as the "McClellan Committee," 

began investigating and gathering findings on the internal 

affairs of labor unions. Note, Landrum-Griffin and the 

Trusteeship Imbroglio, 71 Yale L.J. 1460, 1473 (1962) 

(hereinafter "Note, Trusteeship Imbroglio"). The McClellan 

Committee's findings "exposed the details of the sad state of 

 13 

democracy in large sections of the labor movement and 

provided numerous examples of the abuses of the 

trusteeship power." Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. 

Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 357 n. 8 (1998) (quoting Note, 

Trusteeship Imbroglio at 1473). 

 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 

 of 1959 was the product of congressional concern with 

 widespread abuses of power by union leadership. The 

 relevant provisions of the Act had a history tracing 

 back more than two decades in the evolution of the 

 statutes relating to labor unions. Tensions between 

 union leaders and the rank-and-file members and 

 allegations of union wrongdoing led to extended 

 congressional inquiry. As originally introduced, the 

 legislation focused on disclosure requirements and the 

 regulation of union trusteeships and elections. 

 However, various amendments were adopted, all aimed 

 at enlarged protection for members of unions

 paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal 

 Constitution; not surprisingly, these amendments-- 

 ultimately enacted as Title I of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 

 SS 411-415--were introduced under the title of "Bill of 

 Rights of Members of Labor Organizations." The 

 amendments placed emphasis on the rights of union 

 members to freedom of expression without fear of 

 sanctions by the union, which in many instances could 

 mean loss of union membership and in turn loss of 

 livelihood. Such protection was necessary to further 

 the Act's primary objective of ensuring that unions 

 would be democratically governed and responsive to 

 the will of their memberships. 

Id. at 352 (citing 105 Cong. Rec. 6471-6472, 6476, 15530 

(1959)). 

Title III of the LMRDA, the trusteeship title, first emerged 

as Title II12 of the Kennedy-Ives Bill passed by the Senate in 

_________________________________________________________________ 

12. A review of the Senate Report no. 187, April 14, 1959 [To accompany 

S. 1555] in the Section-By-Section Analysis reveals that Title I was 
originally the reporting provision and Title II was the trusteeship 

provision. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2352 - 2362. Later, Title 

I became the Bill of Rights provision, Title II became the reporting 

provision and Title III became the trusteeship provision. 73 Stat. 519 S1 

et seq., 29 U.S.C. S 401 et seq. 

 14 

June of 1958. Lynn, 488 U.S. at 357 n.8. It appeared again 

in January of 1959 in the Kennedy-Ervin Bill. Id.; Note, 

Trusteeship Imbroglio at 1475. The Kennedy-Ervin Bill 

focused on disclosure and reporting requirements, 

trusteeships and elections. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 

at 2318-72; Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352. The accompanying

Committee Report to the Kennedy-Ervin Bill reflects the 

overarching concern of guaranteeing internal union 

democracy while minimizing governmental interference with 

the internal affairs of unions. See, e.g., 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

at 2322-23; Jerry E. Linde, Title III of the Labor or 

Management Relations and Disclosure Act: For Greater 

Judicial Protection of Union Democracy and Local Automony, 

9 J. Corp. L. 271, 276-80 (1984); Marcia Greenblatt, Union 

Officials and the Labor Bill of Rights, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 

601, 601-02 (1989). This report acknowledged that 

trusteeships had been effective in the past "to insure order 

within [labor] organizations." U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 

News at 2333. However, it also acknowledged the McClellan 

Committee's findings regarding the misuse of the 

trusteeship authority. The Committee Report noted: 

 in some instances trusteeships have been used as a 

 means of consolidating the power of corrupt union 

 officers, plundering and dissipating the resources of 

 local unions, and preventing the growth of competing 

 political elements within the organization. 

Lynn, 488 U.S. at 357 n. 8 (quoting 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 

2333). The Committee Report also explained why then

current law was ineffective: 

 A trusteeship will ordinarily be set aside unless the 

 local is given a fair hearing including notice of the 

 charges and an opportunity to defend. But if the forms 

 of fair procedure are observed there appears to be little 

 the courts can do and there are very few cases staying 

 or upsetting trusteeships upon substantive grounds. 

 Men have frequently been subjected to fines as large as 

 $1,000 for bringing suit against a union; others have 

 been expelled from the membership. 

 The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare therefore 

 concurs in the select committee's recommendation that 
 15 

 there should be a `limitation on the right of 

 internationals to place local unions in trusteeship.' 

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2333. 

The Kennedy-Ervin Bill underwent seven months of 

rewriting and debate involving several amendments. Note, 

Trusteeship Imbroglio, at 1475. A major alteration was the 

addition of a "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor 

Organizations." Id. The Bill of Rights"was adopted as an 

amendment on the Senate floor by `legislators[who] feared 

that the [original] bill did not go far enough because it did 

not provide general protection to union members who spoke 

out against union leadership.' " Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352 

(quoting Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982)). 

Those legislators believed this Bill of Rights was needed to 

further protect the rank-and-file members and reinforce the 

other provisions of the LMRDA, including the trusteeship 

provision. 

In these debates, Senator McClellan stated: 

 I do not believe that racketeering, corruption, abuse of 

 power and other improper practices on the part of 

 some labor organizations can be, or will ever be, 

 prevented until and unless the Congress of the United 

 States has the wisdom and the courage to enact laws 

 prescribing minimum standards of democratic process 

 and conduct for the administration of internal union 

 affairs. I mean by that, . . . that the Congress should 

 prescribe and define by law what the rights of union 

 members are, place in them by democratic process the 

 power to secure those rights and protect them in their 

 efforts to do so from reprisals of any kind from their 

 would-be exploiters, manipulators, and bosses. Without 

 such protection, other provisions of law may be of little 

 benefit and meaningless. Without such protection in 

 the exercise of his legitimate rights the records of our 

 committee's investigations show over and over again 

 that a rank-and-file member dare not risk any 

 opposition to a corrupt or autocratic leadership. If he 

 does so, he may be beaten, his family threatened, his 

 property destroyed or damaged, and he may be forced 

 out of his job--all of these can happen and have 

 happened. 

 16 
 Having these things in mind, . . . I introduced S. 1137 

 to provide a bill of rights for working people--for union 

 members. 

105 Cong. Rec. 6471-72 (emphasis added). 

The Bill of Rights was therefore "[d]esigned to guarantee 

every member equal voting rights, rights of free speech and 

assembly, and a right to sue." Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352 

(quoting Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982)). 

Between January and September of 1959, when the 

LMRDA was finally enacted, most of the debate concerned 

the new additions and amendments, "while the trusteeship 

title glided quietly through the labyrinthine process from 

bill to bill with little change and less discussion." See Lynn, 

488 U.S. at 357 n.8 (quoting Note, Trusteeship Imbroglio at 

1475). Neither the discussions on the House nor Senate 

floors focused on the relationship between Title I and Title 

III. Id. Senator Dodd, however, did propose an amendment 

to Title III which sparked some debate. Specifically, Dodd 

wanted the trusteeship provisions to go even further in 

order to prevent the manipulation of the trusteeship power 

and the resulting harm that had been so well documented 

by the McClellan Committee. Note, Trusteeship Imbroglio at 

1475-76. Dodd's amendment created a presumption that 

trusteeships in place longer than thirty days were invalid 

unless the international union, at a hearing before the 

Secretary of Labor, could present clear and convincing 

proof of a proper purpose. Id. Senator Dodd explained the 

rationale for his proposed amendment as follows: 

 The [Kennedy-Ervin] bill now provides a procedure 

 under which an individual union member may appeal. 

 The point is that the full burden of proof is placed 

 upon such union member, who thus would have to 

 fight the international or the national union; and in 

 that fight the limited, sparse, or -- most often-- 

 nonexistent power of the individual union member 

 would be pitted against the tremendous prestige and 

 power of the national or the international union. . . . 

 the philosophy behind my amendment is an old Anglo- 

 American philosophy . . . that the burden of proof for 

 so serious a matter as destroying a local union, or local 

 17 

 union autonomy -- and that is what a trusteeship 

 usually does -- should rest upon the national union 

 seeking to impose the trusteeship. 
105 Cong. Rec. at 6675. 

Dodd then focused on the importance of protecting the 

local membership given organized crime's entanglement 

with certain elements of the labor movement as unearthed 

during the congressional inquiry. He explained: 

 In the past, as we know from the revelations of the 

 McClellan committee, and as we know from litigation, 

 the imposition of trusteeships was one of the greatest 

 abuses of the Teamsters Union. My recollection is that 

 more than 120 trusteeships were imposed by that 

 union some of them for more than 20 years. Think of 

 it. For more than 20 years, the local members, the 

 wage earners, were without any say at all with respect 

 to their local unions. 

* * * 

 All I seek by the amendment is to give the members of 

 a local union an opportunity to say to someone, a 

 judge, or other competent authority, `This trusteeship 

 should not be imposed on us.' 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Senator Ervin opposed Dodd's amendment. Ervin argued 

"the bill as now drawn furnishes adequate protection for 

the rank and file of members of unions which are placed in 

trusteeship."13 Id. at 6677. Additionally, Senator Morse 

argued: 

 [W]e should look at the trustee section of the bill as it 

 comes to us in the light of the other sections of the bill, 

 and note what the committee has done by way of 

_________________________________________________________________ 

13. Part of Ervin's discussion specifically explained that the bill "takes 

care of the main reason why trusteeships are sometimes arbitrarily 

imposed, namely, to enable international officers to control the selection 

of delegates to international conventions. The bill contains a specific 

provision to the effect that the local union in trusteeship may be 

represented at an international convention only by delegates elected by 

a secret ballot of the members of the local." 105 Cong. Rec. 6677. 

 18 

 setting up democratic procedures to protect the rank 

 and file of the local unions. As we provide democratic 

 guarantees in the bill, I believe we should keep at a 

 minimum any interference with the operation of the 
 internal affairs of the union. 

Lynn, 488 U.S. at 357 n. 8 (quoting 105 Cong. Rec. 6678). 

Dodd's amendment was subsequently rejected. 

When the Kennedy-Ervin Bill went to the House, the 

enforcement section of the trusteeship title was changed.14 

The Kennedy-Ervin Bill did not grant individual union 

members standing to bring suit in federal court. The 

Committee Report accompanying the bill explained that 

"section 206 makes clear that Federal suits under Title II 

are possible only upon suit initiated by the Secretary of 

Labor." U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1959, p. 2363. The 

enforcement section which Congress passed, and which is 

still in force, allows the local union itself or an individual 

union member to bring suit in federal court. See 73 Stat. 

519 S, 29 U.S.C. S 464. 

The legislative history is silent on the issue of whether a 

union member, as an appointed officer, may seek individual 

damages. However, Congressman Ludwig Teller offered

supplementary views regarding the reasoning behind the 

amendment of the enforcement section. Teller explained 

that Congress wanted to facilitate individual claims without 

any involvement by the Secretary. U.S. Code Cong. &

Admin. News 1959, p. 2500. This allowed Congress to

curtail the inordinate power of the Secretary while saving 

taxpayer dollars and eliminating any requirement that a 

union member first obtain governmental permission to sue.15 

Id. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

14. The enforcement provision currently in force is S 304 of the LMRDA, 

29 U.S.C. S 464. 

15. Congressman Teller stated: 

 HR 8342 is a substantial improvement over S. 1555 (the Kennedy- 

 Ervin bill), the Senate-passed labor management reform bill which 

 our committee used as a basis for its deliberations.. . . Reducing 

 the excessive powers of the Secretary of Labor, as we did in our 

 committee bill H.R. 8342, is in line with our traditions which 

favor 

 19 

This expansive discussion of legislative history does not 

conclusively establish what type of relief is "appropriate" for 

an individual union member who is also an appointed

official. However, it places that inquiry into its proper 

context and guides our interpretation of the relevant 

statutory language. In interpreting Title III in the context of 
the discussions in Congress and the findings of the

McClellan Committee, we conclude that the amendment

authorizing individual law suits was intended to underscore 

the concerns surrounding trusteeships under Title III. By 

allowing individual members to bring suit rather than the 

Secretary, Congress intended more avenues for enforcement 

of the trusteeship provision, not more types of relief. 

Nothing in the legislative history of Title III suggests that 

Congress contemplated an individual bringing suit for 

compensatory damages arising from the loss of an 

appointed union position under that title. The statutory 

scheme of the LMRDA strongly suggests that the individual 

rights that Ross seeks to vindicate must be redressed under 

Title I. As noted above, that provision was initially referred 

to as the "workers' bill of rights" when it was introduced. 

Title III, which came first, was meant to protect the 

subordinate labor organization, and Title I was 

subsequently added specifically to address the rights of 

individual union members. Accordingly, we conclude from 

the legislative history that the relief that Ross seeks is not 

"appropriate" under Title III. An examination of the relevant 

cases confirms this conclusion. 

D. Applicable Case Law 

We have not previously interpreted S 304, the 

enforcement provision of Title III. However, Finnegan v. Leu, 

456 U.S. 431 (1982), and its progeny guide our analysis. In 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 the diffusion of power, will save the taxpayer many millions of 

 dollars annually without impairing the basic objectives of the 

 proposed law, and will permit individuals to prosecute their own 

 cases in the courts without having to obtain permission of a 

 Government agent or official to do so. 

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1959, p. 2500. 

 20 

Finnegan, Leu defeated Brown in an election for president 

of Local 20 of the International Brotherhood of the

Teamsters. Id. at 433. Brown had been openly supported by 

a group of the local's business agents including Finnegan. 

Id. After Leu assumed office, he discharged all of the 

business agents who had supported Brown pursuant to a 

provision in the local's bylaws that purported to give the 

president the "authority to appoint, . . and discharge the 

Union's business agents." Id. at 433. The business agents 

then sued in district court contending that their 

termination violated Title I of the LMRDA.16 Id. 
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the legislative 

history of the LMRDA, and concluding that "the Act's 

primary objective [was] ensuring that unions would be 

democratically governed and responsive to the will of their 

memberships." Id. The Court noted that"[i]t is readily 

apparent from the legislative history of Title I, that it was 

rank-and-file union members--not union officers or 

employees, as such--whom Congress sought to protect." Id. 

at 437. The plaintiffs were members of the union with 

protected speech rights, as well as salaried employees of 

the union. Accordingly, the Court had to determine whether 

the rights afforded plaintiffs as members of the union 

"immunized [them] from discharge at the pleasure of the 

president from their positions as appointed union 

employees." Id. 

The Court concluded that the plaintiffs' Title I rights had 

not been violated because plaintiffs had not been precluded 

from exercising any of those rights, and the LMRDA did not 

protect appointed officers who "backed the wrong horse." 

This was true even if it meant that those officers were 

"forced to `choose between their rights of free expression 

. . . and their jobs.' " Id. (citations omitted). The Court 

explained its rejection of plaintiffs' Title I claim as follows: 

 For whatever limits Title I places on a union's authority 

 to utilize dismissal from union office as `part of a 

_________________________________________________________________ 

16. The suit was filed under LMRDA SS 101(a) (1) and (2) which 

"guarantee equal voting rights, and rights of speech and assembly, to 

`[e]very member of a labor organization.' " Id. at 436 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 

S 411 (1998)). 

 21 

 purposeful and deliberate attempt . . . to suppress 

 dissent within the union,' (citations omitted), it does 

 not restrict the freedom of an elected union leader to 

 choose a staff whose views are compatible with his 

 own. Indeed, neither the language nor legislative 

 history of the Act suggest that it was intended to 

 address the issue of union patronage. To the contrary, 

 the Act's overriding objective was to ensure that unions 

 would be democratically governed, and responsive to 

 the will of the union membership as expressed in open, 

 periodic elections. 

Id. at 441. 

Here, Ross also held the "dual status" of union member 
and appointed union officer. Defendants argue that because 

Ross was employed during the entire time the trusteeship 

was in place, Finnegan precludes him from asserting a 

claim "arising from the decision of the newly elected officers 

of Local 57 not to retain him as a business agent after the 

trusteeship ended." Defendants' Br. at 9. Defendants are 

correct that the newly elected officers of Local 57 were free 

"to choose a staff whose views are compatible with [their] 

own." Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441. 

However, the analysis does not end there because, unlike 

in Finnegan, we are here concerned with a trusteeship that 

was created pursuant to Title III. Ross argues he is entitled 

to compensation because the continuation of the 

Trusteeship was in bad faith and for the purpose of

removing him as political opposition within Local 57 in 

violation of S 304 of Title III.17 The Supreme Court 

_________________________________________________________________ 

17. There is some confusion about Ross' position regarding whether the 

Trusteeship was appropriately created and/or maintained. Defendants 

quote Ross as having conceded that the Trusteeship"was appropriate 

and was imposed for a proper purpose." See Defendants' Br. at 2. 

However, we do not interpret Ross' testimony as a concession. Rather, he 

was asked if he was aware of the serious charges facing the officers of 

the union and whether such serious charges justify establishing a 

Trusteeship. He responded, "[w]ell, according to the International, that's 

the way they feel. But, I think we should have been spoke [sic] to first. 

. . . I do believe that is a valid reason for an International to come in 

and 

take over." App. at 250. Ross did not necessarily concede, however, that 

 22 

addressed a similar argument in the context of a 

trusteeship in Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. 

Lynn, 488 U.S. 347 (1989). 

There, the trustee who had been appointed to run the 

local asked Lynn, who was an elected business 

representative of Local 75, to support a proposed dues 

increase. However, rather than support the increase, Lynn 

insisted that expenditures be reduced and he organized the 

opposition to the proposal to raise union dues. Id. at 349- 

50. Five days after the proposal was defeated, the trustee 

informed Lynn that he was being removed from his elected 

position of business agent. Id. at 350. Lynn exhausted his 

administrative remedies within the union, and then filed 

suit under Title I alleging that his removal constituted 

illegal retaliation in violation of the statutory right of free 

speech set forth in S 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA. 73 Stat. 519 

S 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. S 411(a)(2). 
The Court began its analysis by noting similarities

between Lynn's plight, and the plight of the plaintiffs in 

Finnegan. The Court recalled that the Title I rights of the 

plaintiffs in Finnegan had been chilled"albeit indirectly, 

because [they] had been forced to choose between their 

rights and their jobs." Id., at 354. Nevertheless, the 

Finnegan plaintiffs had not recovered because the choice 

that they were left with did not violate the purpose of the 

LMRDA. 

 Whether such interference with Title I rights gives rise 

 to a cause of action under S 102 must be judged by 

 reference to the LMRDA's basic objective: "to ensure 

 that unions [are] democratically governed, and 

 responsive to the will of the union membership as 

 expressed in open, periodic elections." In Finnegan, this 

 goal was furthered when the newly elected union 

 president discharged the appointed staff of the ousted 

_________________________________________________________________ 

the actual motivation for taking over was the justification asserted by 

the 

International. Moreover, even if he may have conceded the Trusteeship 

was established for a legitimate purpose, he clearly insists that it was 

maintained for an improper purpose, and that he has a cause of action 

under Title III as a result. 

 23 

 incumbent. Indeed, the basis for the Finnegan holding 

 was the recognition that the newly elected president's 

 victory might be rendered meaningless if a disloyal staff 

 were able to thwart the implementation of his 

 programs. While such patronage-related discharges 

 had some chilling effect on the free speech rights of the 

 business agents, we found this concern outweighed by 

 the need to vindicate the democratic choice made by 

 the union electorate. 

488 U.S. at 354-5 (citations omitted). However, the Court 

stressed that Lynn's situation was quite different for he was 

removed from an elected position, and his removal thereby 

had a direct impact on the democratic governance of the 

union itself. 

 The consequences of the removal of an elected official 

 are much different. To begin with, when an elected 

 official like Lynn is removed from his post, the union 

 members are denied the representative of their choice. 

 Indeed, Lynn's removal deprived the membership of his 

 leadership, knowledge, and advice at a critical time for 
 the Local. His removal, therefore, hardly was an 

 integral part of ensuring a union administration's 

 responsiveness to the mandate of the union election. 

 Furthermore, the potential chilling effect on Title I 

 free speech rights is more pronounced when elected 

 officials are discharged. Not only is the fired official 

 likely to be chilled in the exercise of his own free 

 speech rights, but so are the members who voted for 

 him. Seeing Lynn removed from his post just five days 

 after he led the fight to defeat yet another dues 

 increase proposal, other members of the Local may well 

 have concluded that one challenged the union's 

 hierarchy, if at all, at one's peril. This is precisely what 

 Congress sought to prevent when it passed the 

 LMRDA. "It recognized that democracy would be 

 assured only if union members are free to discuss 

 union policies and criticize the leadership without fear 

 of reprisal." 

Id. at 355. Accordingly, the Court held that Lynn's

allegation of retaliatory removal stated a cause of action 

under Title I of the LMRDA. 

 24 

Ross was appointed and his complaint alleges only a

violation of Title III.18 The Court in Lynn was quite explicit 

in tying Lynn's cause of action to Title I. The Court 

emphasized the importance of Title I as follows: 

 we find nothing in the language of the LMRDA or its 

 legislative history to suggest that Congress intended 

 Title I rights to fall by the wayside whenever a 

 trusteeship is imposed. Had Congress contemplated 

 such a result, we would expect to find some discussion 

 of it in the text of the LMRDA or its legislative history. 

 Given Congress' silence on this point, a trustee's 

 authority under Title III ordinarily should be construed 

 in a manner consistent with the protections provided in 

 Title I. 

Id. at 356-57. 

Title I was enacted to protect rank-and-file members of 

the union and to insure union democracy by protecting the 

independence of elected union officials even though the free 

speech rights of the union's membership are implicated. 

This is true whether or not a trusteeship is involved. Ross 

tries to avail himself of the holding in Lynn by arguing that 

his removal has an impact on the democratic governance of 

the Local.19 He seems to be arguing that Title III was the 
_________________________________________________________________ 

18. Ross' brief states: 

 As a result of the improper use of a trusteeship, Ross suffered 

direct 

 or proximate damages. But for the imposition of the trusteeship, 

 Ross still would be employed. Since the trusteeship was intended 

for 

 an improper purpose and maintained in bad faith, the Defendants 

 violated the LMRDA. Ross, as a member of Local 57, was "affected" 

 by the violation of the LMRDA. The damages requested were 

 "appropriate" to make him whole. 

Ross' Brief at 23 (emphasis added). 

19. Ross' brief states: 

 The actions of the International Union will have also a chilling 

affect 

 on all members of Local 57. If the International Union succeeds in 

 destroying Ross and leaving him with no recourse, then other 

 members will refrain from opposing the International Union. On the 

 other hand, if the International Union is required to defend Ross' 

 action and to compensate him for its misuse of the trusteeship, 

then 

 25 

mechanism by which his free speech rights (i.e., Title I) 

were violated. However, the rights that may have been 

chilled are nevertheless Title I rights, not Title III rights. 

Therefore, the holding in Lynn does not further his position. 

"The potential chilling effect on Title I free speech rights is 

more pronounced when elected officials are discharged. Not 

only is the fired official likely to be chilled in the exercise of 

his own free speech rights, but so are the members who 

voted for him." Id. at 355. We are not persuaded by Ross' 

attempts to secure compensation for a claimed violation of 

Title I under Title III. His position is, in fact, in substantial 

tension with Finnegan. After all, in Finnegan, the Court 

allowed an appointed officer to be removed even though 

doing so required employees to chose between free speech 

and continued employment. The Court reasoned that choice 

was necessarily concomitant to allowing elected officials to 

implement the programs and leadership that a majority of 

the union membership had voted for. Although there was 

no issue of a trusteeship in Finnegan, it is very difficult to 

square that analysis with Ross' assertion that he has a 

cause of action because of the Trusteeship here. 

As the Supreme Court found in the Title I setting, 
nothing in the legislative history of Title III establishes that 

Congress intended to protect appointed officers like Ross 

under the circumstances here. Ross' reliance upon Title III 

may well be an attempt to circumvent the holding in

Finnegan. But for the existence of the Trusteeship and the 

fact that Ross brought this suit under Title III, Finnegan 

would be more precisely on point. Ross' claim that he was 

victimized by an appointed Trustee rather than an elected 

officer does not alter the fact that the rights he seeks to 

vindicate are Title I rights, not Title III rights. Accordingly, 

we believe our analysis here must still be guided by 

Finnegan, and that is confirmed by our reading of Gesink v. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 the International Union will think twice before using a trusteeship 

 as a means to harm one of its members. In this respect, Ross' 

 actions benefit all members and inure to the benefit of the 

 `subordinate body of a labor organization' in addition to himself. 

Ross' brief at 23 (emphasis added). 

 26 

Grand Lodge, International Ass'n of Machinists and 

Aerospace Workers, 831 F.2d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In Gesink, the International appointed a trustee who 

subsequently filed charges against Gesink, a business 

representative for the local. Id. at 215. Gesink was 

thereafter removed from his office by the president of the 

International, and he was barred from holding any office for 

five years. Id. Gesink sued for damages under Title I and 

Title III. His claim for damages under Title III was based 

upon his assertion that he was entitled to relief for 

deprivation of his salary and other emoluments of his office 

during the Grand Lodge supervision of the District Lodge. 

He argued that the supervision violated Title III of the 

LMRDA. Id. at 216. The Court dismissed his Title III claim 

stating: 

 In light of the legislative history of Title III of the 

 LMRDA and the Supreme Court's ruling in Finnegan , 

 this Court finds that there is no cause of action for 

 individual damages under SS 462 and 464. Any right of 

 action pursuant to those sections belongs to the 

 subordinate union, while a union member may sue to 

 enforce the act's provisions, such suits should be 

 limited to relief on behalf of the union. As the Supreme 

 Court concluded in the Title I context, this Court 

 concludes that nothing in the legislative history of Title 

 III indicates an intent to protect the positions of union 

 officers and employees. 
Id., at 216. Similarly, in Pope v. Office and Professional 

Employees International Union, the court stated:"Title III of 

the LMRDA is designed to protect a subordinate union as 

a whole, whereas Title I . . . is designed to protect the 

individual rights of the members of a union." 74 F.3d 1492, 

1504, (6th Cir. 1996). 

The district court here found that Ross is not seeking 

compensatory damages and reinstatement in order to 

protect the local union and its membership from the

actions of the Trustee. Rather, the court concluded that 

Ross sought relief to redress personal losses purportedly 

inflicted upon him by the Trustee. Ross v. Hotel Employees 

and Restaurant Employees Int'l Union, No. 98-1131, slip. 

 27 

op. at 16-17 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 1999). His efforts to now 

argue that his relief will benefit the union by vindicating its 

members' free speech rights is little more than a belated 

attempt to import considerations that govern Title I relief 

into a suit brought only under Title III. 

Despite the holding in Finnegan, Lynn , and Gesink, Ross 

urges that we be guided by Higgins v. Harden, 644 F.2d 

1348 (9th Cir. 1981). There, the International Association of 

Machinists ("IAM") appointed Simpson and Harden to 

exercise control over a local for which Higgins was an 

organizer. Thereafter, Harden attempted to remove Higgins 

from his position as organizer by claiming that Higgins had 

been unproductive. Higgins responded by suing under

SS 101-611 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. SS 401-531. He alleged 

that the IAM had imposed an unlawful trusteeship in the 

form of Simpson and Harden, that those trustees were 

without authority to terminate him, and that his 

termination had actually been in retaliation for his political 

support of the directing business representative of the local 

who had apparently fallen into disfavor with the 

International, and been "forced out" by Harden. Id.

The district court held that the International had, in fact, 

established a trusteeship. That trusteeship was declared 

invalid because the International had not complied with 

IAM's own constitution and bylaws. Accordingly, the court 

held that Harden did not have the authority to remove 

Higgins, and Higgins was awarded back-pay and attorney's 

fees. Id. The court of appeals affirmed that part of the 

district court's opinion. However, the court of appeals 

merely assumed that the requested individual relief was 

"appropriate" under Title III. 
We decline to embrace Higgins for several reasons. 

Although the court there assumed that an individual right 

of action exists, under Title III, it did not directly address 

the issue. See Gesink, 831 F.2d at 216 (finding that the 

Higgins court "apparently assumes there is an individual 

right of action . . . but . . . does not discuss the issue"). It 

never analyzed the legislative history that Finnegan and 

Lynn instruct is so important to a proper inquiry. Moreover, 

Higgins was decided before Finnegan and Lynn, and the 

Higgins court therefore did not have the benefit of the 

 28 

Supreme Court's discussion of the LMRDA contained in 

those later cases. 

Ross also urges reliance on McDonald v. Oliver , 525 F.2d 

1217 (5th Cir. 1976). In McDonald, new elections were held 

after a trusteeship was established, but the International 

invalidated the election results and refused to install the 

new officers. Id. at 1222-23. The newly elected officers 

brought suit under Titles I and III seeking to end the 

trusteeship; and win installation as officers, and back-pay. 

Id. The Secretary also brought an action under Titles III 

and IV based on a finding by a Labor Department official 

that the continuation of the trusteeship and the failure to 

recognize the election violated Titles III and IV of the 

LMRDA. Id. at 1224. The district court declared that the 

election was valid, ordered the immediate installation of the 

officers, and awarded back pay. Id. at 1225. The Court of 

Appeals affirmed, reasoning that: 

 [a]lthough the primary purpose of an individual's 

 lawsuit is obviously to vindicate his own rights or 

 facilitate his own candidacy, there can be little doubt 

 that he renders a substantial service to the union as 

 an institution and to his members individually in 

 protecting local democratic processes through Titles I 

 and III. The successful litigant dispels the "chill" cast 

 upon the rights of others. 

Id. at 1227. The court also concluded that Title III should 

be "construed in light of the varius other provisions of the 

LMRDA." Id. at 1229. The court recognized that the primary 

purpose of the LMRDA is "not only to stop and prevent 

outrageous conduct by thugs and gangsters but also to 

stop lesser forms of objectionable conduct by those in 

positions of trust and to protect democratic processes 

within union organizations." Id. The court concluded by 

finding that the international union was thwarting union 

democracy in violation to the LMRDA. 
Although McDonald suggests that a successful suit under 

Title III confers benefits on the entire union membership, 

the holding does not advance Ross' argument as much as 

he would like because McDonald was also decided before 

Finnegan and Lynn. Moreover, McDonald was elected and 

 29 

Ross was appointed. The decisions in Finnegan and Lynn 

readily establish the importance of that distinction and 

undermine McDonald as support for Ross' action under 

Title III. 

Similarly, we find that Ross' reliance upon Pruitt v. United 

Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 659 F. 

Supp. 1511 (N.D. Ga. 1987), vacated on other gr'ds, 893 

F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1990), is misplaced because Pruitt too 

is distinguishable from the instant case. There, the court 

was not asked to find a private cause of action for damages 

under S304 of Title III. Rather, Pruitt sued under both Title 

I and Title III alleging that an appointed trustee had 

prevented him from assuming an elected position in 

retaliation for the exercise of free speech. Id. at 1514. The 

court discussed the statutory presumption of validity that 

attaches to trusteeships under S 304 of Title III in inquiring 

into whether the trusteeship in question had been imposed 

for a proper purpose. Id. at 1517, 1520. The issue 

addressed by the court was whether the "plaintiff 's Title III 

claims fail as a matter of law under the clear and 

convincing evidence standard [of S304]." Id. at 1519. The 

court merely ruled that "a triable issue may exist as to 

whether the trusteeship was maintained to block plaintiff 

from assuming his elected position" Id. at 1520. More 

importantly, Pruitt, unlike Ross, stated a Title I claim based 

upon his assertion that the trusteeship had precluded him 

from assuming an elected position. Id. at 1522. 

Finally, Ross relies upon the decision of the Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Pope v. Office and

Professional Employees International Union, 74 F.3d 1492 

(6th Cir. 1996). Pope was an appointed business 

representative of Local 268 of the Office and Professional 

Employees International Union (OPEIU). Soon after his 

appointment, he alleged wrongdoing and mismanagement 

on the part of officers of Local 268. Id. at 1496. Support for 

Pope's outspoken criticism of the Local's leadership soon 

flourished, and he became a candidate for president of the 

Local despite opposition of the OPEIU, and local board. Id. 

at 1497. After one very chaotic meeting of the Local, the 

OPEIU granted the local board's request, and imposed a 

trusteeship to control Local 268 pending a hearing to 
 30 

determine its propriety. Id. at 1498. Thereafter, the union 

held a hearing and determined that the trusteeship was 

appropriate despite Pope's protestations to the contrary. 

Shortly thereafter, Pope was fired, and his union 

membership was withdrawn without notice or opportunity 

to be heard. Id. at 1499. Pope was therefore ineligible to 

run for president of the Local. Elections were held, a new 

slate of officers was elected, and the trusteeship was 

thereafter terminated. Id. at 1500. However, before the 

trusteeship was terminated, Pope sued in district court. 

Pope argued that the trusteeship violated Title III of the 

LMRDA, and that denying him eligibility to run for union 

office violated Title I of the LMRDA. Id. He sought monetary, 

declaratory and injunctive relief. However, after the 

elections took place the declaratory and injunctive claims 

were dismissed as moot. Id. The suit proceeded to trial, and 

the jury awarded Pope compensatory and punitive damages 

against the OPEIU. Id. 

OPEIU appealed claiming that the LMRDA is designed to 

protect rank and file union members and not officers and 

employees and that Pope therefore lacked standing as an 

appointed employee. Id. at 1501. In resolving those issues, 

the Court reconciled the jury's verdict with the holdings in 

Finnegan, Lynn, and Gesink. The court also reconciled the 

jury's verdict with the holding in Cehaich v. International, 

UAW, 710 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1983), a case involving similar 

facts decided subsequent to Finnegan. Cehaich and Pope 

had both been appointed employees of local unions, but 

Cehaich's "status as a member of the union did not change 

after he was terminated from his appointed position. He 

was not fined, suspended, expelled or disciplined." Pope, 74 

F.3d at 1502. The court reasoned as follows: 

 In Finnegan, the appointed officials of an ousted board 

 were not protected by the LMRDA because union 

 members elected a new board. In Lynn, the elected 

 officials were protected because they had been elected 

 by the union members. The purpose of ensuring 

 democracy is furthered by allowing Pope a cause of 

 action under the LMRDA. Pope was appointed a

 business representative by an elected local executive 

 board. That board was not ousted as in Finnegan . 

 31 

 Moreover, unlike Cehaich, Pope was expelled from 
 union membership immediately after his termination 

 from his position as business representative. Thus, 

 Pope's case is clearly distinguishable from Cehaich. 

 Pope is entitled to protection under the LMRDA 

 because he was disciplined in a manner which affected 

 his right to fully enjoy the rights and privileges of 

 union membership. 

Id. at 1503. 

However, most significantly for our purposes, the court 

held that Pope's suit was not moot merely because the 

trusteeship had since been terminated. The court reached 

that result by reading Title I and Title III together and 

concluding that "[t]he question of the propriety of the 

trusteeship is not moot because it has direct bearing on 

whether Pope's Title I rights were violated." Id. The violation 

of Title III supported Pope's claim for damages because "[his 

was] an action at law to recover damages for the 

suppression of Title I rights as a result of the imposition of 

a trusteeship." Id. at 1505. 

However, Ross is not alleging a violation of Title I. He was 

not expelled from membership, and he was reinstated to his 

appointed position within 24 hours of being removed from 

it.20 In reviewing the grant of summary judgment for the 

defendants here, we must assume that they denied Ross' 

eligibility to run for election solely to keep him from 

running in the election. Although a union member's right to 

seek elective office is protected under Title I, Id. at 1503; 

Gesink, 831 F. 2d at 217, Ross seeks relief solely under 

S 304 of Title III. Based on the text and legislative history of 

Title III and the Supreme Court's decisions in Finnegan and 

Lynn, we hold that Title III does not allow a private cause 

of action for individual damages flowing from the 

termination of an appointed employee. Relief underS 304 

_________________________________________________________________ 

20. We do not suggest that a union member must be stripped of his/her 

union membership to state a cause of action under Title I or that prompt 

reappointment will always insulate a defendant from claims of 

retaliation. However, we do note that Ross does not argue that his 

termination as an appointed officer was a scheme to suppress his 

freedom of speech and assembly as a union member under Title I. 

 32 

must be sought on behalf of the local union organization 

and the entire membership must reap the benefits. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly 

determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
and that, on the record before it, Ross' Title III claim failed 

as a matter of law. The relief Ross seeks is simply not 

"appropriate" within the meaning of Title III. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in granting summary judgment to 

the defendants under Title III of the LMRDA and that order 

will be affirmed. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

 33