No. 2--99--1445

_________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

_________________________________________________________________

ARTHUR ROSS,	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

	)	of Stephenson County. 

	Plaintiff-Appellant, 	)	

	)	

v.		)		No. 91--MR--37

	)

THE CITY OF FREEPORT; THE	)

FREEPORT BOARD OF FIRE AND	)

POLICE COMMISSIONERS; 	)

COMMISSIONERS REGINALD D. 	)

McGEE, BRIAN BORGER, 	)

DENITA MORRIS, DAVID SHOCKEY,	)	

MARK WAGNER; and CHIEF OF 	)

POLICE DONALD PARKER, 	)	Honorable 

	)	Barry R. Anderson,

	Defendants-Appellees. 	)	Judge, Presiding. 

_________________________________________________________________

 	JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

	In September 1991, the plaintiff, Arthur Ross, filed his

original complaint for administrative review against the

defendants, the City of Freeport, the Freeport Board of Fire and

Police Commissioners (Board), commissioners Reginald D. McGee,

Brian Borger, Denita Morris, David Shockey, Mark Wagner, and Police

Chief Donald Parker.  The cause of action was eventually removed to

the federal district court, and, after the complaint was amended,

the cause was remanded to the state circuit court in May 1999.

	The amended complaint alleged that the plaintiff was employed

as a police officer with the City of Freeport in May 1991.  On May

8, 1991, the plaintiff had a conversation with Police Chief Donald

Parker, during which the plaintiff disclosed that he had a personal

medical problem and requested a leave of absence in order to seek treatment.  Although Chief Parker initially agreed to grant a leave

of absence, he subsequently changed his mind.  The complaint

alleges that, on May 9, 1991, Chief Parker threatened and coerced

the plaintiff into resigning.  The plaintiff alleged that he was

misled to believe that his resignation would be preferable to a

leave of absence and that if he obtained medical treatment he could

apply for reinstatement within one year of his resignation.

	The plaintiff then made a timely application to the Board for

reinstatement after resignation and a request for a leave of

absence pursuant to the Board's rules and regulations.  The

plaintiff also requested a hearing by the Board concerning his

"coerced resignation under threat of disciplinary charges."  The

Board refused to consider each of these requests.

	The amended complaint consisted of four counts, and each count

was directed against all of the defendants.  Count I of the amended

complaint sought administrative review of the Board's refusal to

consider the plaintiff's requests for reinstatement as a police

officer, for a leave of absence, and for a hearing on Chief

Parker's alleged coercion.  The action for administrative review

was brought pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (the Review

Law) (735 ILCS 5/3--–--101 et seq. (West 1998)).   Count II sought a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff was entitled to

reinstatement and monetary compensation.  Count III alleged

fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of Chief of Police Donald

Parker in purportedly promising future reinstatement as an inducement for the plaintiff to resign.  Count IV alleged that the

defendants breached their employment contract with the plaintiff. 

	The defendants moved to dismiss all of the counts on various

grounds. The trial court declined to dismiss count I

(administrative  review) but dismissed counts II, III, and IV,

citing Dorner v. Illinois Civil Service Comm'n, 85 Ill. App. 3d 957 (1980).  The trial court ruled that Dorner stands for the proposition that other statutory and common-law causes of action

cannot be joined to a complaint for administrative review

    On November 18, 1999, the trial court denied the plaintiff's

motion to reconsider and entered a finding that counts II, III, and

IV were appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill.

2d R. 304(a)).  The plaintiff timely appealed.  The defendants have

raised arguments with respect to counts I through IV of the second

amended complaint and request that this court dismiss the complaint

in its entirety.  However, count I remains pending in the trial

court and has not been appealed.  Since it is not properly before

this court, we do not have jurisdiction to review it.  Stykel v. City of Freeport, No. 2--99--1446 (January 22, 2001), slip op. at 4.  We therefore limit our review to the central question raised by

the plaintiff, that is, whether the trial court erred in dismissing

counts II, III, and IV.   

	The plaintiff first argues that, because there is some

question whether the Review Law applies to his claim for

reinstatement as a police officer, he should be able to join common-law actions for declaratory judgment, fraudulent

misrepresentation, and breach of contract, even though

administrative review could be obtained.  The plaintiff states that

the only reason the trial court dismissed counts II, III, and IV

was that there was no authority for the joinder of other actions

with an administrative review action under Dorner. 

	In Stykel, we recently considered the question presented here and explained the significance and applicability of Dorner.  In Dorner, the plaintiff, a correctional academy trainer, maintained that his layoff was a subterfuge for his discharge from employment. 

He sought review of the decision of the Civil Service Commission

not to offer him a voluntary reduction in employment status and

place him in a currently vacant position.  The trial court reversed

the decision of the Commission and ordered the Department of

Corrections to offer the plaintiff the next available trainer

position, but the court denied an award of back pay, and the

plaintiff appealed.  As we explained in Stykel, the Dorner court held that the power of the trial court was limited under the Review

Law to either affirm or reverse the decision of the administrative

agency or to remand the cause for additional evidence.  Dorner, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 963.  The Dorner court noted in passing that there was “"no provision in the Act [Review Law] for the joinder of a mandamus action for reinstatement to the former position or an action for

back wages.”"  Dorner, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 963.  The Dorner court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the Department of Corrections either to offer the plaintiff the next

available position, to compel reinstatement, or to order back pay;

the reviewing court remanded the matter to the Commission for

further proceedings consistent with the court's finding that the

plaintiff was entitled to a lower classified position that had

become available following the plaintiff's layoff.  Stykel, slip op. at 6, citing Dorner, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 963.

	In Stykel, this court concluded that the question in Dorner was the scope of the trial court's power to award relief under the

Review Law.  Since the plaintiff in Dorner had not filed additional causes of action invoking the trial court's original jurisdiction,

joinder was not at issue.  In Stykel, this court further concluded that Dorner did not prohibit the joinder of any and all causes of action with an administrative review action; rather, the plaintiffs

should be permitted to join any additional counts that are

“"cognizable”" when the Review Law applies to the actions of an

administrative agency.  Stykel, slip op. at 7.  However, as in the present case, this court had to examine what additional causes of

action were permissible, since the Review Law is ordinarily the

exclusive remedy for the review of a decision by an administrative

agency. 

	In Stykel, the plaintiffs were applicants for firefighter positions with the City of Freeport.  They received a score of zero

on the written examination and were effectively rendered ineligible

for employment.  The plaintiffs sought a hearing by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, which denied the request. The

plaintiffs then filed in the trial court a complaint for

administrative review, claiming they were wrongfully denied

certification as eligible for employment and wrongfully denied a

hearing.  The plaintiffs eventually filed an amended complaint

adding counts for declaratory judgments, civil rights violations

under federal law  (42 U.S.C. §1983 (1994)), and  breach of implied

oral contract.  As in the present case, the trial court granted

defendants' motion to dismiss all of the counts except those for

administrative review, and the court made a Rule 304(a) finding of

appealability. 

	After examining the scope of the Dorner decision, this court then considered whether the plaintiff could assert common-law

causes of action in addition to the actions under the Review Law.

Relying on Mueller v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 267 Ill. App. 3d 726 (1994), we noted that the Review Law provided the

exclusive remedy to review all final decisions of fire and police

boards in employment matters, including promotional examinations,

unless some limited exception appliesd.  Stykel, slip op. at 8, (citing Mueller,  267 Ill. App. 3d at 731).  The Review Law was enacted to eliminate conflicting, inadequate common-law and statutory remedies for the judicial review of administrative

decisions and to substitute a single, uniform, and comprehensive

remedy.  Stykel, slip op. at 8.  Therefore, once a final decision has been rendered by an administrative agency and the circuit court

may grant the relief the party seeks within the context of reviewing that decision, a circuit court has no authority to

entertain independent actions regarding the actions of an

administrative agency.  Stykel, slip op. at 10, (citing Dubin v. Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490 (1989)).

	Thus, we concluded that a plaintiff bringing an administrative review action for failure to hire was precluded from seeking a

declaratory judgment that he iswas entitled to be hired.  Stykel, slip op. at 13.  We also determined that the Review Law preempted

a cause of action for breach of contract based on the final

decisions of fire and police boards.  Stykel, slip op. at 14.  Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the

plaintiff's counts seeking declaratory judgment and breach of

contract.  However, we 

	held that the Review Law did not preempt

actions for civil rights violations brought under federal law (42

U.S.C. §1983 (1994)), which provided a distinct remedy, and we

permitted those counts to proceed.  Stykel, slip op. at 17. 

	Turning to the instant case, the plaintiff has brought a

complaint for administrative review.  Under Stykel, the plaintiff is precluded from bringing a separate action for declaratory

judgment requesting reinstatement.  The plaintiff's allegations of 

fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract allegations against the

Board and its members are also precluded under Stykel, as they relate solely to the correctness of the Board's decision regarding

the plaintiff's requests for reinstatement, a leave of absence, and a hearing on Chief Parker's alleged coercion.  Under Mueller and Stykel, the Review Law provides the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff as to the Board and its members in regards to the acts or

omissions of the administrative agency, and he must bring his

claims in accordance with the Review Law and within the ambit of

our decision in Stykel.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of count II as to all defendants and its dismissal of

counts III and IV as to the Board and its members.

	The plaintiff asserts that its causes of action for fraudulent  misrepresentation and breach of contract against Chief Parker and

the City of Freeport are not preempted by the Review Law because

these defendants were not parties to the administrative agency

proceeding.  The plaintiff asserts that it could have filed these

as separate actions against these parties and that there is no

reason that these actions cannot proceed with the administrative

review claim.

	We agree with the plaintiff that the trial court erred in dismissing ithis fraudulent misrepresentation count as to Chief

Parker and the City of Freeport.  This count alleged that Chief

Parker intentionally made false representations and statements to

the plaintiff in order to induce him to resign.  The plaintiff

alleged that he relied upon these false statements in deciding to

resign and suffered monetary damage.  These allegations state an

independent cause of action against Chief Parker and the City of

Freeport unrelated to the correctness of the Board's decision

regarding his claim for reinstatement as an employee.  As such,

they are not preempted by the Review Law, and we reverse the trial court's dismissal of count III as to these defendants.

	However, we believe that the Review Law does preempt a cause

of action for breach of contract as to Chief Parker and the City of

Freeport in this case.  See Stykel, slip op. at 14.  As noted above, the trial court found that the plaintiffs pleaded a cause of

action for administrative review against all defendants, including

Chief Parker and the City of Freeport.  The trial court therefore denied the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the administrative review count, and that action proceeds as to Chief Parker and the

City of Freeport.  The propriety of that portion of the trial

court's order is not before us.  See Stykel, slip op. at 14.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Review Law preempts a cause for

breach of contract against Chief Parker and the City of Freeport in

this case and conclude that the trial court properly dismissed count IV as to all defendants.

	In closing, we note that, to the extent that there are any

other issues to be resolved in the administrative review

proceeding, such as, for example, those pertaining to jurisdiction or the

authority of the Board, those issues must be resolved in the trial

court in the first instance.  The trial court is free to consider

all questions of law and fact presented by the record before the

court, including the agency's interpretations of any statute or

rules interpreting a statute.  See American Stores Co. v. Department of Revenue, 296 Ill. App. 3d 295 (1998). 

	For the reasons stated, we affirm that portion of the trial

court's order dismissing counts II and IV as to all defendants and

the trial court's dismissal of count III as to the Board and its

members.  However, we reverse that portion of the trial court's

order dismissing count III as to Chief Parker and the City of

Freeport and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent

with the views expressed herein. 

	Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

	HUTCHINSON, P.J., and McLAREN, J., concur.