NUMBERS 13-15-00085-CR 

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

JAMARKAS HOLLAND, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 117th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

Appellant Jamarkas Holland appeals his conviction for aggravated assault with a 

deadly weapon, enhanced to a first-degree felony by appellant’s prior felony convictions. 

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.42, 22.02 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S). The jury 

found appellant guilty, and the trial court assessed punishment at seven years’

confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. By 
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one issue, Holland argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove he used or exhibited 

a deadly weapon in the commission of an assault. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Holland and his girlfriend, Caitlyn Dewbre, were living in Dewbre’s vehicle in 

Portland, Texas. Dewbre testified that Holland had a drinking problem, mental issues, 

and recently got out of the penitentiary. Dewbre testified that she decided to take 

Holland to a homeless shelter in Corpus Christi. As they were driving from Portland to 

Corpus Christi, the two argued and Holland became physically violent with Dewbre. 

Holland hit Dewbre in the face with his fist and bashed her head against the console. 

As Dewbre drove over the Harbor Bridge into Corpus Christi, Holland pulled out 

Dewbre’s fishing knife and threatened her with it. Dewbre testified “[Holland] told me ... 

that he would murder me where I stood, and he stabbed the knife into the front 

dashboard.” Before the day of the incident, Dewbre testified she would occasionally find 

her fishing knife in the passenger side door where Holland usually sat, and she would 

place it back in the trunk. Dewbre testified that Holland had been “organizing things” in 

the trunk earlier that day.

After Holland stabbed the knife into the dashboard, Dewbre was “completely 

terrified.” When they arrived at the homeless shelter in Corpus Christi, Holland refused 

to leave the vehicle. Holland grew upset because he could not find a lighter, so Dewbre 

drove to a nearby gas station. In the parking lot of the gas station, the two continued to 

argue and Holland grabbed a roll of duct tape and hit Dewbre in the face with it. Holland 

then left the scene in someone else’s vehicle, and Dewbre called 911 to report the 
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assault.1 Shortly after leaving the gas station, Holland also made a 911 call to report that 

he was assaulted by Dewbre.

Officers Jason Wicks and Steven Brown arrived at the scene, and obtained a video 

statement from Dewbre which was admitted at trial. In the video, Dewbre provides 

details of the events that took place, and describes the knife that Holland stabbed into the 

dashboard as a “white fishing knife.” At trial, she testified that the knife had a “lock 

handle on it and the blade may be that long. It was a gutting knife used for fishing.”

Officer Wicks observed the puncture wound in the dash and testified it could have been 

caused by a knife. Officer Wicks described Dewbre’s injuries as follows: swelling to her 

face, and blood dripping from her nose. Officer Brown took photos of the puncture in the 

dashboard and Dewbre’s injuries which were admitted at trial. Dewbre later requested 

and obtained a protective order against Holland. Dewbre was treated for injuries to her 

nose, neck and back.

After interviewing Dewbre, Officer Wicks was dispatched to another location where 

Holland was located. Officer Wicks did not observe any injuries on Holland and noticed 

that Holland smelled of alcohol. Holland did not possess the knife at the time of the 

arrest and the knife was never recovered. 

Detective Robin Cassel testified that the knife was not found at the scene. Its 

white sheath was recovered months later by Dewbre from the trunk of her vehicle. 

Detective Cassel did not check for fingerprints and could not tell if Holland touched the 

sheath. During his testimony at trial, Holland denied stabbing the knife into the 

 

1 Sometime during the quarrel in the car, Holland grabbed Dewbre’s phone, which he later threw 

at her. 
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dashboard and denied threatening Dewbre with a knife. He claimed the threat to Dewbre 

was a joke. He testified he knew a fishing knife was usually kept in the trunk of the 

vehicle.

The jury found Holland guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. This 

appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

“The standard for determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support 

a conviction is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (emphasis in original); 

see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). The 

fact-finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be 

given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 

707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the factfinder’s exclusive province. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

We resolve any inconsistencies in the testimony in favor of the verdict. Bynum v. State, 

767 S.W.2d 769, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). Juries are permitted to make 

reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial, and circumstantial evidence 

is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor. Hooper v. State, 

214 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as 
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defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766, 773 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997)). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the 

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily 

restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for 

which the defendant was tried. Id. To convict Holland of aggravated assault under a 

hypothetically correct jury charge, the State was required to prove that Holland (1) 

intentionally or knowingly; (2) threatened another with imminent bodily injury; (3) while 

using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 

22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).

A deadly weapon is defined as “anything that in the manner of its use or intended 

use is capable of causing death or serious injury.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 

1.07(a)(17) (West, Westlaw 2015 through R.S.). The State is not required to show that 

the “use or intended use causes death or serious bodily injury” but that the “use or 

intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” McCain v. State, 22 

S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

III. DISCUSSION

Holland argues that the evidence is insufficient to show he committed the offense 

of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Specifically, he complains the evidence is 

insufficient to show appellant actually had or used the knife during the assault, and the 

evidence does not show the knife was actually deadly. 

Regarding his first argument, appellant asserts the following: (1) Dewbre’s 
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testimony alone is not enough evidence to support appellant had or used a knife; (2) the 

puncture on the dashboard and recovered knife sheath do not establish there was a knife 

used or exhibited; (3) Dewbre’s injuries do not indicate the use of a knife; and (4) the 

State failed to produce the actual knife at trial. 

We note that the victim’s testimony alone can constitute legally sufficient evidence 

to support a finding that a defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon. See Padilla v. 

State, 254 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref'd) (victim's testimony 

alone, if believed, is sufficient to support conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon); Carter v. State, 946 S.W.2d 507, 510–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

1997, pet. ref'd) (upholding aggravated kidnapping conviction on ground that victim’s

testimony alone was sufficient evidence to show defendant used or exhibited a firearm 

even though gun was not recovered). 

Dewbre testified regarding the size of the knife, the color, and the intended purpose 

for which the knife was made—gutting fish. She also testified regarding how Holland

could have possibly come into possession of the knife while he was “organizing things” in 

the trunk of her car on the day of the assault. Both Holland and Dewbre testified that the 

knife was kept in the trunk of the car. Dewbre stated that she occasionally found the 

knife in the passenger side door where appellant usually sat. Lastly, Dewbre testified 

that Holland threatened her with the knife and stabbed it into the dashboard. 

Dewbre’s testimony is corroborated by a puncture wound in the dashboard which 

the investigating officers believed could have been made by a knife. Holland testified 

that he did not have a knife during this altercation with Dewbre. However, in a sufficiency 
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review, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See

Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 293–94. We also defer to the jury’s determination regarding the 

witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Brooks, 323 

S.W.3d at 899. Here, it appears that the jury believed the testimonial evidence Dewbre 

provided about the knife and disbelieved Holland. We conclude that a rational trier of 

fact could have determined from this testimony that appellant exhibited a knife during the 

assault. See Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 293–94.

With respect to his second argument, Holland asserts the evidence did not 

establish that the weapon was actually deadly, and the knife is not a deadly weapon by 

design. A knife is not a deadly weapon per se. Blain v. State, 647 S.W.2d 293, 294 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1983). However, it can be a deadly weapon if in the manner of its use 

or intended use it was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See Thomas v. 

State, 821 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Brumbalow v. State, 432 S.W.3d 

348, 353 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, no pet.); Magana v. State, 230 S.W.3d 411, 414 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref'd) (citing Williams v. State, 575 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1979)).

Factors that may be considered in determining whether a knife is being used as a 

deadly weapon include: (1) the words of the accused, such as threats; (2) the intended 

use of the knife; (3) its size, shape, and sharpness; (4) testimony by the victim that he 

feared death or serious bodily injury; (5) the severity of any wounds inflicted; (6) the 

manner in which the assailant allegedly used the knife; (7) physical proximity of the 

parties; and (8) testimony as to the knife’s potential for causing death or serious bodily 
8

injury. See Thomas, 821 S.W.2d at 619; Brown v. State, 716 S.W.2d 939, 946–47 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1986); Williams, 575 S.W.2d at 32; Romero v. State, 331 S.W.3d 82, 83 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd); Magana, 230 S.W.3d at 414; see also Blain, 

647 S.W.2d at 294 (“[t]he State can, without expert testimony, prove a particular knife to 

be a deadly weapon by showing its size, shape and sharpness, the manner of its use, or 

intended use and its capacity to produce death or serious bodily injury”). The design of 

the knife is not dispositive and only one of the factors to be considered when determining 

whether an object is a deadly weapon. See Bailey v. State, 46 S.W.3d 487, 491–92 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. ref‘d); see also TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(17).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that the most important of the above 

factors is the manner in which the weapon was used. See Dominique v. State, 598 

S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (citing Denham v. State, 574 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1978)). Moreover, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, “although 

admission of descriptions of the knife by witnesses and introduction of the knife into 

evidence are an aid to the jury in its determination of the knife's deadly character, 

evidence has been held sufficient where no knife was introduced or clearly seen by the 

witnesses.” Brown, 716 S.W.2d at 946 (citing English v. State, 647 S.W.2d 667, 668–69 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).

Dewbre was in the car with Holland when he threatened to murder Dewbre. While 

they were in close proximity in Dewbre’s vehicle, Holland conveyed an intent to use a

knife to inflict death or serious bodily injury by stabbing a knife into the dashboard. In 

addition, Dewbre testified she was “completely terrified.” She sought and obtained a 
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protective order against Holland because of her fear of him. In her testimony, Dewbre 

described the knife as a fishing knife and its use as a “gutting knife.” She demonstrated 

the size of the knife to the jury as “maybe that long.” When gestures by a witness, such 

as “like this” or “this long,” appear in the appellate record without further explanation, a 

presumption arises that the undescribed gesture supports the jury’s findings. See Finley 

v. State, 449 S.W.3d 145, 150 n.20 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014), aff'd, 484 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2016); Morales v. State, 293 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, 

pet. ref'd); Rogers v. State, 756 S.W.2d 332, 336–37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

1988, pet. ref'd); Gaona v. State, 733 S.W.2d 611, 613–14 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi 1987, pet. ref'd). We conclude a rational trier of fact could have determined from 

the evidence that the knife was a deadly weapon. See Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 293–94. 

After reviewing the evidence, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to prove that

appellant committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Id. We overrule 

appellant’s issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 

30th day of June, 2016.