Opinion issued February 13, 2014.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00062-CV

———————————

JENNIFER NICOLE COMPTON, Appellant

V.

TAMMY PFANNENSTIEL AND TIMOTHY REED, Appellees

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 05-FD-0608

O P I N I O N

In this dispute over the conservatorship of two children, the trial court 

appointed their mother, father, and maternal grandmother as joint managing 

conservators, further designating the grandmother as the person with the right to 

designate the children’s place of residence. The mother appeals, contending that 
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that the trial court erred in (1) finding that her mother (the children’s grandmother) 

has standing to assume joint conservatorship; (2) appointing the grandmother as 

the conservator with the exclusive right to determine the children’s primary 

residence; and (3) excluding testimony regarding the grandmother’s decision not to 

seek custody of a third child. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Background

At the September 2012 final hearing to determine conservatorship, Tammy 

Pfannenstiel, the children’s grandmother, appeared and sought conservatorship of 

J.R. and B.R., the children. Jennifer Compton, the children’s mother—and 

Pfannenstiel’s daughter—also sought conservatorship, and she challenged 

Pfannenstiel’s standing to seek it. Timothy Reed, the children’s father, appeared 

and testified. Reed agreed to Pfannenstiel’s joint conservatorship and the trial 

court’s order determining the children’s visitation schedule.

Pfannenstiel testified that Compton uses and sells drugs, places J.R. and 

B.R. in dangerous situations, neglects them, does not adequately feed or care for 

them, and does not meet their medical needs. Pfannenstiel further testified that 

Compton had been arrested four times during the previous six months. A police 

detective for the City of Santa Fe testified and confirmed the arrests, including 

three for driving without a valid license and one for possession of a controlled 

substance. At the September 2012 final hearing to determine conservatorship, 
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Tammy Pfannenstiel testified that Jennifer Compton sells drugs, places J.R. and 

B.R. in dangerous situations, neglects J.R. and B.R., does not adequately feed or 

care for J.R. and B.R., and does not meet J.R. and B.R.’s medical needs. 

Pfannenstiel further testified that Compton had been arrested four times during the 

previous six months. Teresa Brewer, J.R. and B.R.’s paternal grandmother, also 

testified that Compton neglected J.R. and B.R. 

Reed testified that Compton was not a fit mother, and did not adequately 

feed the children. When the children visited him, they exhibited signs that they 

had not been fed, and would hide food. He and Compton never married, but 

shared a drug problem, and he was incarcerated for burglary for four years. He 

testified that he could not physically take care of the children. He believed that the 

children “would be better in a stable environment” and Pfannenstiel’s 

conservatorship of the children “is necessary.” Two school counselors testified 

that they shared the concern that Compton was not meeting the children’s 

nutritional needs, and that the boys had an excessive number of school absences.

Compton’s sister and father testified on Compton’s behalf. They denied that 

Compton had a drug problem and neglected the children, but acknowledged her 

lack of employment and housing. Compton briefly testified as well, and denied 

that the children were underfed or neglected; she invoked her Fifth Amendment 

right and refrained from testifying about the drug possession charge. The ad litem 
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for the children reported to the trial court that the children desired to live with their 

grandmother because she provided safe shelter and food.

The trial court awarded joint conservatorship of J.R. and B.R. to 

Pfannenstiel, together with Compton and Timothy Reed. See TEX. FAM. CODE 

ANN. § 153.131 (West 2008). The trial court designated Pfannenstiel as the joint 

conservator with the exclusive right to determine J.R. and B.R.’s primary 

residence, within Galveston County and counties contiguous to it. See id.

§ 153.134(b)(1). The court ordered that Compton’s visitation with J.R. and B.R. 

be supervised for at least the first three months. Reed, the children’s father, 

approved of the trial court’s conservatorship arrangement.

Compton complained on appeal that the trial court did not file findings of 

fact and conclusions of law in support of its conservatorship order. To address this 

complaint, we abated the appeal, whereupon the trial court promptly supplemented 

the record with the following:

[T]he children’s mother, Jennifer Compton, is unfit to serve as the 

children’s sole managing conservator, or to have the children in her 

primary care, custody, or control. More specifically, the Court finds 

that Jennifer Compton is unfit because of her ongoing drug use and 

abuse, extreme recent neglect of the children [who are the] subjects of 

this suit, as well as her recent physical and verbal mistreatment of the 

children . . . that she had been arrested four times in the last six 

months, that she has not been able to hold a job; that she had no valid 

vehicle operator’s license; and that she is guilty of driving while her 

vehicle operator’s license was suspended.
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In its findings, the trial court quoted from the testimony of both grandmothers 

about the children’s living conditions while in their mother’s custody, describing 

that testimony as “compelling” support for its rulings.

Discussion

I. Standing 

Compton first challenges her mother’s standing to seek and obtain managing 

conservatorship over the children; she contends that the trial court erred in 

awarding managing conservatorship to a grandparent, over a mother’s objection.

Standard of Review

A party’s standing to seek relief is a question of law that we review de novo. 

Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004). 

In our review, we consider the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling. In re McDaniel, 408 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2011, orig. proceeding). In a child custody suit, “[a] party seeking relief must 

allege and establish standing within the parameters of the language used in the 

statute.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Hawkins, No. 01-09-00060-CV, 2010 WL 3718546, 

at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 23, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). A 

party that seeks grandparent standing in a suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship is statutorily required to establish standing with “satisfactory proof.” 

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004(a) (West 2008). “Satisfactory proof” is proof 
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established by a preponderance of the evidence as the facts existed at the time the 

suit or intervention was filed. McDaniel, 408 S.W.3d at 397. If a plaintiff fails to 

establish proper standing, then the trial court must dismiss the suit. Id.

Analysis

A grandparent has standing to request the managing conservatorship of a 

child if the trial court finds that conservatorship is necessary because, otherwise, 

“the child’s present circumstances would significantly impair the child’s physical 

health or emotional development.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004(a)(1) (West 

2008). At the hearing, Pfannenstiel proffered evidence of Compton’s drug use, 

recent criminal arrests, and extreme neglect of her children during the preceding 

eight months. Reed and his mother concurred in the proposed conservatorship 

arrangement. Because the record supports the trial court’s finding that the 

children’s present circumstances would significantly impair their physical health 

and emotional development, it did not err in concluding that their maternal 

grandmother had standing to seek to become a joint managing conservator of the 

children. See id. 

Compton responds that Pfannenstiel decided not to seek immediate 

modification of the trial court’s temporary orders in the case, and observes that the 

trial court had denied Pfannenstiel’s initial request for grandparent conservatorship 

eight months earlier. According to Compton, the trial court’s decision on the 
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temporary orders, and Pfannenstiel’s decision not to seek modification of them 

sooner, demonstrates that the children’s environment was not harmful while they 

were in her primary care. We disagree. Compton’s neglect and mistreatment of 

her children during the period following entry of those orders significantly 

impaired the children’s physical health and emotional development, commensurate 

with the standard required for Pfannenstiel to gain the standing to seek grandparent 

conservatorship at the final hearing.

II. Exclusion of evidence

Compton also challenges the trial court’s decision to exclude testimony 

related to conservatorship of another of her children, W.M. Reed is not the father 

of W.M. Compton claims that the trial court should have admitted additional 

evidence about her mother’s decision not to seek conservatorship of that child. 

Compton, however, did not preserve this contention for appellate review.

To preserve any complaint against a trial court’s exclusion of evidence, the 

complaining party must demonstrate the substance of the excluded evidence 

through an offer of proof or bill of exception unless the substance of the evidence 

is apparent from the context. TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); see also Sink v. Sink, 364 

S.W.3d 340, 347 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); Fletcher v. Minn. Mining & 

Mfg. Co., 57 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); 

Akukoro v. Akukoro, No. 01-12-01072-CV, 2013 WL 6729661, at *6 (Tex. App.—
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Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“While the reviewing court may 

sometimes be able to discern from the record the general nature of the evidence 

and the propriety of the trial court’s ruling, it cannot, without an offer of proof, 

determine whether exclusion of the evidence was harmful.”).

Compton neither made an offer of proof before the trial court nor filed a bill 

of exception. The testimony relating to Pfannenstiel’s decision about W.M.’s 

conservatorship is limited:

Compton’s attorney: Okay. Are you concerned about the health, safety and 

welfare of [W.M.]?

Pfannenstiel: Definitely.

Compton’s attorney: You haven’t asked for custody of [W.M], have you?

Pfannenstiel: No. I do not have standing to go after him.

. . .

Compton’s attorney: You haven’t asked for custody of [W.M.], have you?

Pfannenstiel: No, not at this time.

Compton’s attorney: Okay. Do you think you have standing to ask for 

custody of [W.M.]?

Pfannenstiel: I do not under the law. I know what I am told.

The trial court thereafter sustained Pfannenstiel’s relevancy objections, ending 

Compton’s inquiry. Compton contends further evidence about the decision was 

relevant because Pfannenstiel would have sought custody of W.M., too, if

Pfannenstiel sincerely believed that the children’s circumstances impaired their 
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physical health or emotional development. Compton, however, did not 

demonstrate the substance of Pfannenstiel’s excluded testimony; the limited record 

regarding the stricken testimony belies Compton’s assertion that Pfannenstiel 

would have testified that Compton was a fit mother to W.M. We hold that 

Compton has failed to preserve her evidentiary challenge.

III. Conservatorship 

Beyond standing, Compton further contends that the trial court’s 

appointment of her mother as a joint managing conservator of Compton’s children 

is an abuse of its discretion, because parents are presumptively the managing 

conservators of their children. 

Standard of review

Trial courts have wide discretion with respect to conservatorship, control, 

possession, and visitation matters involving the child. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 

S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007). We 

review a trial court’s decision on conservatorship matters for an abuse of 

discretion, and reverse the trial court’s order only if we determine, from reviewing 

the record as a whole, that the trial court’s decision was arbitrary and unreasonable. 

Patterson v. Brist, 236 S.W.3d 238, 239–40 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, 

pet. dism’d) (citing Turner v. Turner, 47 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)). A court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference 
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to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 

S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). 

Analysis

A trial court must appoint a child’s parents to be joint managing 

conservators, or one parent as the sole managing conservator, unless it concludes 

that “appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the 

child, because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical 

health or emotional development.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131 (West 2008). 

It is unsettled whether the statute applies to the appointment of a non–parent in 

addition to both parents. We hold that it does; in the ordinary case, parents should 

be free from legal interference in the parent–child relationship. The statute reflects 

this principle. See Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2009, no pet.) (holding that statute applies “when a non–parent seeks managing 

conservatorship in lieu of or in addition to both parents.”); In re De La Pena, 999 

S.W.2d 521, 534–35 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (holding that statute 

applies when trial court jointly appoints non–parent and parent as managing 

conservators and designates non–parent as conservator with exclusive right to 

determine child’s primary residence). 

The evidence in this case satisfies the statutory threshold, including evidence 

of Compton’s drug use, recent criminal arrests, and extreme neglect of her children 
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while in her care; the trial court reasonably could find that the record demonstrated 

significant impairment of the children’s health and emotional development. The 

father acceded to the necessity of the grandparent conservatorship in the children’s 

interest. We hold that the trial court was within its discretion in naming a 

grandparent as a joint managing conservator to protect the children’s physical 

health and emotional development.

Conclusion

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing 

Pfannenstiel as a joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to determine 

the children’s primary residence. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

Jane Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Brown.