[Cite as State v. Williams, 2014-Ohio-4196.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 90845

STATE OF OHIO

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs.

PATRICK WILLIAMS

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

APPLICATION DENIED

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-07-494311-A 

Application for Reopening 

Motion No. 475308 

RELEASE DATE: September 23, 2014 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Gregory Scott Robey 

Robey & Robey 

14402 Granger Road 

Maple Heights, Ohio 44137 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Adam M. Chaloupka 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

8th Floor Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J.: 

{¶1} Patrick Williams has filed an application for reopening pursuant to App.R. 

26(B). Williams is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment, as rendered in State v. 

Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90845, 2009-Ohio-2026, which affirmed his 

convictions for aggravated murder, murder, and felonious assault. For the reasons that 

follow, the application to reopen is denied. 

{¶2} The appellate judgment was released on April 30, 2009, and journalized on 

May 11, 2009. The application for reopening was not filed until May 29, 2014. This 

falls well outside the time limits of App.R. 26(B)(1), which requires applications to be 

filed within 90 days after journalization of the appellate judgment. The only exception 

that would permit us to review an untimely application is if applicant establishes good 

cause for filing at a later time. Id. 

{¶3} The Supreme Court of Ohio, with regard to the 90-day deadline provided by 

App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), has firmly established that 

[c]onsistent enforcement of the rule’s deadline by the appellate courts in 

Ohio protects on the one hand the state’s legitimate interest in the finality of 

its judgments and ensures on the other hand that any claims of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel are promptly examined and resolved. 

Ohio and other states “may erect reasonable procedural requirements 

for triggering the right to an adjudication,” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush 

Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982), and that is 

what Ohio has done by creating a 90-day deadline for the filing of 

applications to reopen. [The applicant] could have retained new attorneys 

after the court of appeals issued its decision in 1994, or he could have filed 

the application on his own. What he could not do was ignore the rule’s 

filing deadline. * * * The 90-day requirement in the rule is “applicable to all 

appellants,” State v. Winstead (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 278, 
1996-Ohio-52, 658 N.E.2d 722, and [the applicant] offers no sound reason 

why he — unlike so many other Ohio criminal defendants — could not 

comply with that fundamental aspect of the rule. 

State v. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, 2004-Ohio-4755, 814 N.E.2d 861, at ¶ 7. See also 

State v. LaMar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467, 2004-Ohio-3976, 812 N.E.2d 970; State v. Cooey, 73 

Ohio St.3d 411, 653 N.E.2d 252 (1995); State v. Reddick, 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 647 N.E.2d 

784 (1995). 

{¶4} Applicant has failed to establish “good cause” for the untimely filing of his 

application for reopening. He maintains that there is good cause for his delayed filing 

because he has had “no personal contact” with his appointed appellate lawyer, and he did 

not receive copies of the appellate filings nor notice of the decision. Additionally, 

applicant asserts that he was only 17 years old at the time of the trial and relied on his 

appellate lawyer to raise all possible issues, to his detriment. 

{¶5} Applicant cites no case that has found any of the foregoing grounds as good 

cause for an application to reopen that is filed approximately five years after the appellate 

decision was journalized. However, there is ample authority that has found these reasons 

do not establish good cause for an untimely application to reopen. 

{¶6} Appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to raise every 

conceivable assignment of error on appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 

3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); Gumm, supra; State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 630 

N.E.2d 339 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has upheld the appellate 

attorney’s discretion to decide which issues he or she believes are the most fruitful 
arguments and the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and 

focusing on one central issue or at most a few key issues. Jones. 

{¶7} It is well settled that “neither misplaced reliance on counsel nor lack of 

communication between counsel and appellant provides good cause for a late filing of his 

application for reopening.” State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92646, 

2012-Ohio-3565, ¶ 3, citing State v. Alt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96289, 2012-Ohio-2054; 

State v. Austin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87169, 2012-Ohio-1338; State v. Alexander, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81529, 2004-Ohio-3861. 

{¶8} Citing the applicant’s young age is the equivalent of arguing that his 

ignorance of the law or lack of legal training and knowledge should establish good cause 

for the delayed filing. However, it is equally well established that these grounds do not 

provide good cause to allow review of an application that is filed five years beyond the 

deadline. See State v. Mosley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79463, 2005-Ohio-4137, ¶ 4 (“it 

is well-established that a lack of legal training does not establish ‘good cause’ for the 

untimely filing of an application for reopening”). 

{¶9} Applicant also “cannot rely on his own alleged lack of legal training to 

excuse his failure to comply with the deadline. ‘Lack of effort or imagination, and 

ignorance of the law * * * do not automatically establish good cause for failure to seek 

timely relief’ under App.R. 26(B).” LaMar, 102 Ohio St.3d 467 at ¶ 9, quoting Reddick, 

72 Ohio St.3d at 91. 
{¶10} It is proper to deny applications for reopening solely on the basis that they 

are untimely filed and without good cause for the delay. Gumm, 103 Ohio St.3d 162, and 

LaMar. Applicant’s failure to demonstrate good cause is a sufficient basis for denying 

his application for reopening. See, e.g., State v. Almashni, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

92237, 2010-Ohio-898, reopening disallowed, 2012-Ohio-349. 

{¶11} Applicant has not established good cause for filing an untimely application 

for reopening. 

{¶12} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied. 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., and 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR