1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37555

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Plaintiff-Respondent ,

v.

SIERRA DAWN GRACE ,
Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2010 Unpublished Opin ion No. 750

Filed: December 21, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, S tate of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and sentence for possession of methamphetamine, affirmed

. Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Publi c Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ Before GUTIERREZ, Judge, GRATTON, Judge

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM Sierra Dawn Grace appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional guilty plea to
possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Gra ce challenges the denial of her motion to suppress. Specifically, she argues that the district court made a clearly erroneous factual finding
that Grace voluntarily consented to a search of her purse. The incident in question occurred after

Officer Ken R ivers approached Grace and sought to determine if she had any connection to a
fight that had been called in. In addition to questioning Grace about any involvement in the fight, Officer Rivers requested verification of identification and requested permiss ion to search
Grace’s purse. Grace responded “S ure” to the request for search of her purse, handed her purse2

to the officer adding, “I don’t see why you have to do this though . . . .” Officer Rivers
discovered a pipe containing methamphetamine residue i n the purse.
Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, the determination of
which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds

, 146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d
327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart , 145 Idaho 641, 6 48, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). “Findings will not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial

evidence in the record.” Stewart , 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. Jaborra

, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 4 85 (Ct. App. 2006)). The voluntariness of an individual’s consent is a question of fact to be determined based
upon the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 248

- 49 (1973);

State v. Varie , 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). In order to be valid, consent cannot be
the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 248. The mere
presence of officers asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute
improper police duress or coercion. See United States v. Watson , 423 U.S. 411 , 424

- 25 (1976).
Instead, the court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and find consent involuntary only if “coerced by threats or force, or granted only in sub mission to a claim of lawful authority . . . .” State v. Hoisington , 104 Idaho 153, 158, 657 P.2d 17, 22 (1983) (quoting

Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 233).
The district court found that the state met its burden of proving that Grace voluntarily

consented to the search of her purse. Here, it is clear that consent to search was freely given by Grace. Rivers asked Grace if he could search her purse. Grace replied “Sure” and handed her purse to Rivers. At no time did Grace tell Rivers he could not search her p urse or withdraw consent in any other way. The Court finds as a fact that Grace’s questioning of why Rivers had to search her purse as she handed it to him did not act as withdrawal of her consent. The act of handing Rivers the purse and her
response wer e an unequivocal consent to search. Grace’s consent is further evidenced by her holding items from her purse as it was being searched when asked and her later statement that she wouldn’t have let Rivers go through her purse if she knew there was anything in it. No threats were made by Rivers towards Grace if she did not consent to the search of her purse. Though Rivers was initially accompanied by another officer, [Rivers] was the only officer conducting the search. Further the questions asked by Rivers regarding G race’s permission to search her purse allowed Grace adequate opportunity to reject his requests. The tone of voice used by Rivers during the encounter was [calm] and unthreatening. As such, the act of handing3

her purse to Rivers and her respo nse of “Sure” constituted adequate consent to search by Grace. See State v. Knapp , 120 Idaho 343, 348, 815 P.2d 1083, 1088 (Ct. App. 1991) (consent to search may be in the form of words, gestures, or conduct).

On appeal, Grace argues that “the district court made a clearly erroneous factual finding that Ms. Grace voluntarily consented to a search of her pur[se].” She focuses exclusively on the fact that, while the officer was searching her purse, Grace stated, “I don’t see why you have to do
this, thoug h

. . . .” Grace’s reliance on this single statement, to the exclusion of all of the other
facts in the record, does not show clear error in the district court’s determination that Grace’s
consent was voluntary. Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding, based on the
totality of the circumstances, that Grace voluntarily consented to the search of her purse. Grace has failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress. Accordingly, Gr ace’s judgment
of conviction for possession of methamphetamine is affirmed.