1

Filed 10/12/16 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

CITY OF TRACY, as Successor Agency, etc.,

et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

MICHAEL COHEN, as Director, etc., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

C077440

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2013-80001570-

CU-WM-GDS)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

AND DENYING PETITION 

FOR REHEARING

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 29, 2016, for publication in 

the Official Reports, be modified as follows: 

1. Delete the modifier year “2011” from the following pages of the slip opinion:

Page 2, last line of body text, “to any 2011 sponsor agreements that”

Page 3, third line of first partial paragraph, “to a 2011 sponsor agreement;”
2

Page 3, first full paragraph, fifth line, “pursuant to a 2011 sponsor agreement,”

Page 3, last line of body text, “any predissolution 2011 sponsor agreements.”

Page 4, first line of first partial paragraph, “of 2011 sponsor agreements”

Page 8, second line of the part 1.0 heading, “2011 Sponsor Agreements”

Page 8, third line from bottom of the page, “include 2011 sponsor agreements 

predating dissolution.”

Page 9, second line of the part 2.0 heading, “Pursuant to 2011 Sponsor 

Agreements”

Page 9, penultimate line on the page, “under 2011 sponsor agreements”

2. On page 7, last line, insert the word “predissolution” before the phrase 

“sponsor agreements” and delete the last three words on the last line “executed in 2011,” 

so that the last sentence on the page (which continues over to p. 8) will read:

As noted at the outset, for the purposes of this audit, the 

Legislature applied the postdissolution definition of 

enforceable obligations that specifically excluded transfers 

pursuant to predissolution sponsor agreements which 

previously had been considered enforceable under section 

34167.

3. On page 9, first full paragraph, penultimate sentence of the paragraph, 

delete the word “these” and replace with the word “new” and add the phrase “, as well as 

any payments pursuant to sponsor agreements antedating 2011.” to the end of the 

sentence, so that the penultimate sentence of the paragraph will read as follows:

In short, the Legislature intended to layer upon the existing 

statutory dissolution framework a new procedure and 

definition to recapture diverted tax increment that the 

sponsors and former redevelopment agencies siphoned away 

through new sponsor agreements beginning in January 2011 

in response to the imminence of ERAWKI before the 

judicially delayed dissolution date of February 2012, as 

detailed in the February 2012 report of the Legislative 
3

Analyst (Brentwood, at p. 499, fns. 13 & 14), as well as any 

payments pursuant to sponsor agreements antedating 2011.

4. Page 12, last complete sentence on the page, add a new footnote (fn. 9) at 

the end of the sentence as follows:

However, the City is correct that it was entitled to be paid for the 

redevelopment work that its own staff directly provided; this was not the 

case in Brentwood, a distinction that the Department overlooks. 9

_________________

9 In a petition for rehearing, the Department argues that a 

sponsor‟s provision of services for redevelopment projects 

must be pursuant to a written services agreement authorizing 

them, lest the sponsor unilaterally obligate the former 

redevelopment agency. While reimbursement agreements 

such as the one at bar cannot sanction payments for third 

party services, they are sufficient authorization for a sponsor 

to provide services in furtherance of the redevelopment 

projects identified in the agreement.

There is no change in the judgment. Respondents‟ petition for rehearing is denied.

BY THE COURT:

 HULL , Acting P. J.

 ROBIE , J.

 BUTZ , J.
1

Filed 9/29/16 (unmodified version)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

CITY OF TRACY, as Successor Agency, etc., et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

MICHAEL COHEN, as Director, etc., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.1

C077440

(Super. Ct. No. 34-2013-

80001570-CU-WM-GDS)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, 

Shelleyanne W.L. Chang, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

City of Tracy, as successor agency, and City of Tracy, Bill Sarton, City Attorney; 

Goldfarb & Lipman, Dolores Bastian Dalton, James T. Diamond, Jr., and Karen M. 

Tiedemann, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

 

1 We again adjust the appellate title in one of these appeals, putting the official capacity 

cart (“Successor Agency, etc.”) back behind the party name horse (“City of Tracy”), and 

deleting the Department of Finance as a party, a redundant defendant. (City of 

Brentwood v. Campbell (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 488, 492, fn. 3 (Brentwood)). 
2

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Douglas J. Woods, Assistant Attorney 

General, Marc A. LeForestier and John W. Killeen, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Defendants and Respondents.

In 2011, the political branches of our state government decided as a matter of 

public policy that abuses of the redevelopment law, which constituted an ever-growing 

drain on state finances, required the dissolution of nearly 400 redevelopment agencies 

and the winding down of outstanding redevelopment obligations; this resulted in a frantic 

scurry on the part of “sponsoring entities”

2 (usually cities) and their conjoined former 

redevelopment agencies to lock up “tax increment” revenues—the share of property taxes 

to which redevelopment agencies had been entitled before the enactment of this “ „Great 

Dissolution.‟ ” (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 

243-248; Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 491, 492, fn. 4, 499 & fns. 13, 14.) It 

has also resulted in scores of actions in the Sacramento County Superior Court (§ 34168, 

subd. (a)) that primarily involve the sponsoring entities and their equally conjoined 

“successor agencies”

3 seeking to evade this legislative determination. 

We confront a recurring issue in this appeal. In 2012, the Legislature decided to 

apply the postdissolution exclusion of any agreements between a sponsor and a former 

redevelopment agency (hereafter, sponsor agreements) from the definition of 

“enforceable obligations” (see fn. 3, ante, at p. 2) to any 2011 sponsor agreements that 

 

2 “ „Sponsoring entit[ies]‟ ” are the local entities that created the former redevelopment 

agencies, the officials of the local entities usually constituting the redevelopment agency 

boards. (Health & Saf. Code, § 34171, subd. (n); undesignated statutory references are 

to the Health and Safety Code).

3 “ „Successor agenc[ies]‟ ” are essentially caretakers, the boards of which usually are 

also the officials of the former sponsoring entities, empowered only to complete ongoing 

“ „[e]nforceable obligations‟ ” (those which are still entitled to tax increment) of the 

former redevelopment agency. (§ 34171, subds. (j), (d); Brentwood, supra, 

237 Cal.App.4th at p. 491, fn. 2.)
3

antedated dissolution (which previously had still been included in the definition), for the 

purpose of retransferring to “taxing entities”4 any redevelopment agency transfers to 

sponsors pursuant to a 2011 sponsor agreement; the Legislature also created an audit 

process to identify these sponsor transfers. (Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 494; §§ 34167, 34171, subd. (d)(2), 34179.5, 34179.6.) 

The City of Tracy (City) brought this action as the successor agency to its former 

redevelopment agency (and also in its own right) against Michael Cohen as director of 

the Department of Finance (the Department) to challenge administrative determinations 

that invalidated the transfer of funds from the former redevelopment agency—before its 

dissolution—to the City because this action was pursuant to a 2011 sponsor agreement, 

and that directed return of a portion of the funds (constituting bond proceeds) to the 

successor agency and another portion (constituting former tax increment) to the AuditorController of San Joaquin County (Auditor-Controller),5 the administrator of the trust 

fund for former tax increment (§ 34182, subd. (c)), to distribute to the taxing entities. 

(Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 & fn. 3.) The trial court granted judgment 

in favor of defendants. 

Without any analysis of Brentwood, which antedates its briefing, the City makes 

a lengthy argument in its opening brief (to which it does not return in its reply brief) that,

as a matter of statutory analysis, the 2012 audit procedure and its incorporation of 

the postdissolution definition of enforceable obligations was not intended to apply to 

any predissolution 2011 sponsor agreements. It also contends there are constitutional 

 

4 “ „Taxing entities‟ ” are the entities now entitled to tax increment after the abolition of 

redevelopment agencies. (§ 34171, subd. (k); Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 492.)

5 The Auditor-Controller is the nominal other defendant. Although he filed an answer 

contesting the petition, neither party points to any further participation on his part in the 

litigation in the trial court and he has not filed a brief on appeal. 
4

obstacles to retroactive exclusion of 2011 sponsor agreements from the definition of 

enforceable obligations.6 Alternately, it argues that the transfers it received come within 

the “goods or services” exception to the exclusion of sponsor agreements. (§ 34179.5, 

subd. (b)(3).)

7 Finally, the City contends that it was entitled to a declaration that the 

Department may not constitutionally avail itself of an administrative remedy that allows 

the Department to order diversion of future local tax revenues (sales, use, and property) 

to recover wrongfully transferred tax increment from a sponsoring entity. (§§ 34179.6,

subd. (h), 34179.8, subd. (a).) 

We agree that a portion of the payments made to the City reflect goods or services 

that the City provided to the redevelopment project that the successor agency was 

overseeing. Our decision in City of Bellflower v. Cohen (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 438,

remittitur issued May 3, 2016 (Bellflower), renders moot any need for a declaration in the 

present action that the administrative diversion of future local tax revenues violates a

 

6 In this context, the City mentions a violation of due process in a heading, and adverts 

in passing to interference with a vested interest in the body of its analysis, but does not 

develop either argument. This forfeits any further consideration of these suggestions 

(Imagistics Internat., Inc. v. Department of General Services (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 

581, 593 (Imagistics)), which are also unavailing in any event. (Brentwood, supra, 

237 Cal.App.4th at p. 498, fn. 12; see Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles 

(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1, 6.)

7 Improperly admixed under the due process heading is an unrelated lurking argument 

that the trial court improperly ordered return of the bond proceeds because these may 

now properly be expended on the redevelopment expenses for which the bonds were sold. 

(§ 34191.4.) This manner of raising the issue forfeits our plenary consideration. 

(Imagistics, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 593, fn. 10.) We simply observe that, while it 

does seem pointless to order the return of bond proceeds that the successor agency can 

then expend on the same project, it is also difficult to find ultimate prejudice to the City, 

thus requiring modification of the judgment.
5

provision of our state charter (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 24, subd. (b)).8 We otherwise 

reject the City‟s claims and affirm the judgment as modified.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As is typically the case with the statutory interpretation involved in these 

redevelopment agency dissolution cases, the particular facts are largely irrelevant. We 

include them primarily for context.

The City created its former redevelopment agency in 1970, designating its city 

council as the administrating body. The former redevelopment agency adopted a 

community redevelopment plan in 1990 for the project area. In 2008, the former 

redevelopment agency developed a five-year implementation plan, which included the 

development of a downtown shopping plaza. To this end, the City and its former 

redevelopment agency issued bonds in 2008, from which the former redevelopment 

agency received $2.13 million in proceeds (rounded to the nearest ten thousand, as will 

be all dollar figures in this opinion). However, the former redevelopment agency did not 

enter into any contractual obligation to carry out the planned downtown improvements 

before 2011.

In January 2011, the Governor announced his intention to seek the abolition of 

redevelopment agencies, leading to the resultant frenzy on the part of former 

redevelopment agencies and their sponsoring agencies throughout the state to lock up 

unencumbered tax increment. (Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 493, 499.) The 

City and its former redevelopment agency were among these. At a January 2011 special 

meeting of the city council in its joint capacities, the City and its former redevelopment 

agency entered into a “cooperation agreement” for the former redevelopment agency to 

fund identified improvements from the five-year plan, for which the City would acquire 

 

8 Further references to articles are to the California Constitution.
6

land and provide design and construction services. The sources of the revenue were all 

“funds currently held by the [redevelopment agency] . . . not previously budgeted or 

appropriated for other . . . projects . . . .” The agreement specified four projects: the 

downtown shopping plaza, downtown infrastructure, acquisition of properties for joint 

public-private improvements, and a signage program. In response to an inquiry whether 

there was any binding commitment to these four projects, the City‟s finance director 

stated at the meeting that the agreement “does not mean the projects are being funded. 

The plan is simply moving forward.” The agreement “will allow the City Council to 

proceed and to award contracts for these projects.” The purpose of entering into the 

cooperation agreement was to “directly address some of the issues presented by the 

Governor‟s proposed budget”; rather than return redevelopment agency reserves to the 

“state” (actually, to the taxing entities), “the action . . . transfers the funds to the City.” 

The City and the redevelopment agency thus enacted resolutions approving the 

agreement. The redevelopment agency on the same date transferred $4.18 million in tax 

increment funds and $2.13 million in bond funds to the City pursuant to the agreement. 

In declaring that it was not subject to the California Environmental Quality Act, 

the cooperation agreement recited that it was a funding mechanism that did not commit 

any funds to any specific public improvement. The agreement provided that the funds 

the City received from the redevelopment agency could be used to pay for “land 

acquisition, relocation, demolition, site preparation and remediation, design, and 

construction” of the listed projects, and reimbursement of the City‟s “staff, consultant and 

other administrative costs in connection therewith.” The City and the redevelopment 

agency retained the power to modify the plan to add or delete projects. 

The City estimates the construction costs for the plaza project on its February 

2014 completion to have been $3.81 million. The City had entered into contracts in May 

2011 with third parties to provide landscaping and engineering services for the plaza for a 
7

total cost of $141,000. The City incurred an additional $911,000 in “design, construction 

management, staff and inspections costs” for the work of City employees in connection 

with the plaza project. In June 2011, the City entered into a $2.30 million contract with 

Knife River Construction to build the shopping plaza. An additional $460,000 in funds 

were attributed to a 20 percent contingency fee. The City also entered into a contract in 

June 2011 with a third party to buy land near the plaza for $650,000. This brought the 

total amount of expenditures at issue to $4.46 million, which reflected the $2.13 million 

in bond proceeds and $2.34 million in tax increment from the former redevelopment 

agency (our rounding of the components resulting in a larger sum than the total).

On June 28, 2011, the Legislature enacted the Great Dissolution as an urgency 

measure, immediately freezing the authority of the former redevelopment agencies to 

incur further obligations and providing a process for the dissolution of the former 

redevelopment agencies on February 1, 2012 (as judicially reformed). (Brentwood, 

supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 494.) After that date, the successor agencies were 

responsible for winding down the outstanding enforceable obligations of the former 

redevelopment agencies, which did not include “sponsor agreements” between the former 

redevelopment agency and its sponsoring agency. (Ibid.; §§ 34171, subd. (d)(2), 34177, 

subd. (a).) Pursuant to section 34179.5, enacted in 2012, a successor agency had to 

undertake audits of the former redevelopment agency‟s accounts, subject to the 

Department‟s review. Upon the Department‟s determination that transferred funds were 

not the subject of any enforceable obligation, a successor agency had the obligation to 

transmit such funds in its possession to the county‟s auditor-controller for distribution to 

taxing entities and make a diligent effort to recover funds already transferred to the 

sponsor agency. (Brentwood, at p. 495.) As noted at the outset, for the purposes of this 

audit, the Legislature applied the postdissolution definition of enforceable obligations 

that specifically excluded transfers pursuant to sponsor agreements executed in 2011, 
8

which previously had been considered enforceable under section 34167. Section 

34179.6, as noted, provided an administrative remedy in the form of diverting future local 

tax revenues to recoup funds wrongfully transferred to a sponsor agency.

In reviewing the result of such an audit, the Department concluded the cooperation 

agreement was an invalid sponsor agreement, and consequently the $6.31 million transfer 

was not an enforceable obligation. The City returned $1.84 million to the successor 

agency under protest. The Department directed that the remaining bond proceeds be 

returned to the successor agency, and the tax increment to the Auditor-Controller. 

The City then brought the instant action in July 2013. The Department thereafter 

issued a demand that the City comply with its administrative findings, or else it would 

direct the diversion of the City‟s future local tax revenues to reclaim the $4.46 million. 

However, it never took action to direct the diversions. Under protest, noting that it had 

already expended all the funds at issue on the redevelopment project, the City remitted 

the contested amounts from its general fund in December 2015 in order to meet an 

impending deadline for obtaining a “finding of completion” (§ 34179.7). 

DISCUSSION

1.0 The Legislature Intended Retroactively to Invalidate Transfers Pursuant to 

2011 Sponsor Agreements

In interpreting the Great Dissolution legislation, we do not owe any deference to 

the Department; we decide the issue de novo. (Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 500.)

The City contends the incorporation in section 34179.5 of the postdissolution 

definition of enforceable obligation for the audit and retransfer process should not be 

interpreted as intending to include 2011 sponsor agreements predating dissolution. To 

this end, it gives a strained reading of section 34179.5, and concocts “conflicts” with 

sections 33445 (the statute previously authorizing sponsor agreements), 34164 (which 
9

froze any new predissolution redevelopment activities), 34167.5 (which allowed asset

transfers to third parties pursuant to enforceable contracts), 34177 (a provision of which 

directs distribution of unencumbered funds designated for subsidized housing to auditorcontrollers), and 34167 itself (the predissolution definition of enforceable obligations), 

without explaining why the Legislature could not conclude “in retrospect [that] the facts 

on the ground demonstrated . . . the need to have abrogated the authority to enter into 

sponsor agreements from the moment that ERAWKI [end of redevelopment as we knew 

it] was foretold . . . .” (Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 499.) 

In Brentwood, we rejected this tactic of hunting indirectly through legislative 

mouseholes for an elephant of legislative intent. “[I]f this were in fact the intent in 

enacting section 34179.5[,] it would have been so much more straightforward simply to 

define „enforceable obligation‟ by reference to section 34167 rather than section 34171.” 

(Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 501.) In short, the Legislature intended to layer 

upon the existing statutory dissolution framework a new procedure and definition to 

recapture diverted tax increment that the sponsors and former redevelopment agencies 

siphoned away through these sponsor agreements beginning in January 2011 in response 

to the imminence of ERAWKI before the judicially delayed dissolution date of February 

2012, as detailed in the February 2012 report of the Legislative Analyst (Brentwood, at 

p. 499, fns. 13 & 14). We accordingly reject without further elaboration the City‟s 

arguments to the contrary.

2.0 The Legislature Did Not Violate the Constitution in Retroactively 

Invalidating Transfers Pursuant to 2011 Sponsor Agreements

2.1 Section 34179.5 Does Not Result in a Gift of Public Funds

The City argues that the redirection of funds transferred under 2011 sponsor 

agreements is a gift of public funds in violation of article XVI, section 6. The claim, 
10

which is not renewed in its reply brief, ignores this court‟s decision in California 

Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1457 (CRA v. Matosantos).)

We rejected this claim in CRA v. Matosantos. Relying on authority that a 

redirection of local tax revenues (derived only for general purposes from residents of the 

county) from specific local agencies to the county‟s general fund is not a gift of public 

funds (CRA v. Matosantos, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1499), we concluded that tax 

increment is similarly derived only for general purposes, and could thus permissibly be 

reallocated from redevelopment agencies to taxing entities for the general benefit of 

county residents (id. at pp. 1499-1500). We accordingly reject this argument again. 

2.2 Section 34179.5 Does Not Violate Article XIII, Section 25.5, Subdivision

(a)(7)

The City contends the electorate, through a 2010 initiative adding article XIII, 

section 25.5, subdivision (a)(7) to the state charter, prohibited the Legislature from 

reallocating tax increment from the former redevelopment agencies to taxing entities. 

The contention, which is not renewed in its reply brief, ignores this court‟s decision in 

Brentwood. 

We determined that this constitutional protection of former redevelopment 

agencies no longer applies after the point at which the Legislature decided that the 

redevelopment agencies did not have any further authority to exercise redevelopment 

powers, and thus the withdrawal in 2012 of the authority to enter into sponsor agreements 

in 2011 was constitutional. (Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 499-500.) We 

thus reject this argument again. 

2.3 Section 34179.5 Does Not Violate Article XIII, Section 24, Subdivision (b)

The City (mistakenly referencing a different initiative) makes an abbreviated claim 

that the same 2010 initiative, in also adding article XIII, section 24, subdivision (b),

prohibited the Legislature from reallocating its general fund to the taxing entities to repay 
11

wrongfully diverted and already expended tax increment. As we will explain, while this 

provision precludes the Legislature from seizing incoming local tax revenues via an 

administrative process and reallocating them to taxing entities, it is not an obstacle to the 

pursuit of judicial remedies against sponsors wrongfully appropriating redevelopment 

agency funds. 

“[T]he Legislature „may not reallocate, transfer, borrow, appropriate, restrict the 

use of, or otherwise use the proceeds of any tax imposed or levied by a local government 

solely for the local government‟s purposes.‟ ” (Bellflower, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 451, quoting art. XIII, § 24, subd. (b), italics added.) Accordingly, the authorization in 

section 34179.6 from the Legislature for the Department to order diversion of future local 

tax revenues from sponsors to taxing entities was unconstitutional; the constitutional 

provision is “a prohibition on transferring away from the local government any tax 

revenue to which the local government is entitled.” (Bellflower, supra, at p. 453.)

However, we were careful to note that “[w]ithholding the tax revenue to which the 

sponsoring agency is entitled is not the only means by which the State can acquire from 

the sponsoring agency the funds that should [have been] distributed to other taxing 

entities, if such a result is justified. For example, the State is authorized to obtain judicial

relief for violation of the dissolution law. (§ 34177, subd. (a)(2).).” (Bellflower, supra,

245 Cal.App.4th at p. 453, italics added.)

The import of Bellflower is that the Legislature cannot withhold local tax revenues 

from sponsors through administrative fiat as a remedy for violation of the directives in 

the Great Dissolution. However, the sponsors are not rendered judgment-proof by virtue 

of the constitutional provision, such that their general funds are immune from answering 

for a violation of state law in court. A judgment is not a legislative action to “reallocate, 

transfer, borrow, appropriate, restrict the use of, or otherwise use” local tax revenues in 

the coffers of a sponsor. (Art. XIII, § 24, subd. (b).) The City does not direct us to any 
12

indicia in the November 2010 initiative materials that would compel us to infer such a 

drastic restriction on judicial authority in the postdissolution landscape. We decline to do 

so.

3.0 To the Extent the City Itself Provided Redevelopment Services (as Opposed 

to Third Parties with Whom It Contracted), It Comes Within the Exception 

to Section 34179.5 for Goods or Services

In Brentwood, we concluded section 34179.5 unambiguously “exempts only a 

transfer of money in exchange for a type of good or service from its ambit. As a result, 

Brentwood must demonstrate that the payment from its former redevelopment agency 

comes within this definition.” (Brentwood, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.) Because 

the payments were solely to reimburse the city for its payments for goods or services to 

third parties, we concluded these did not come within the exception in section 34179.5. 

(Brentwood, at pp. 502-503.)

The City contends payments from the former redevelopment agency for the costs 

of redevelopment services that City staff provided, as well as for the costs to the City for 

services that third parties provided, come within the exception. Brentwood forecloses the 

City from receiving payments for the latter; we do not see anything in the cooperation 

agreement to indicate that the former redevelopment agency was engaging the City‟s 

services as a manager for the specific projects involving the third party contracts, or 

engaging it to execute any redevelopment contracts with third parties in general. The 

cooperation agreement described itself as simply a “funding mechanism” for future 

redevelopment work—i.e., a reimbursement agreement for these third party 

arrangements. However, the City is correct that it was entitled to be paid for the 

redevelopment work that its own staff directly provided; this was not the case in 

Brentwood, a distinction that the Department overlooks. We also decline to accept the 

Department‟s suggestion that we should “interpret” the unambiguous section 34179.5 as 

including a requirement for payments from a former redevelopment agency to be 
13

contemporaneous with redevelopment services that a sponsor provided. We therefore 

will modify the judgment to grant a writ of mandate directing the Department to reduce 

its determination of the total required reimbursement by $911,495 (the exact figure at 

issue).

4.0 Bellflower Has Established That Section 34179.6 Is Unconstitutional, So the 

Erroneous Denial of a Declaration in the Present Case Is Moot

Bellflower determined that the remedy provided in section 34179.6, subdivision 

(h) violates article XIII, section 24, subdivision (b) because it purports to allow the 

Department to order the reallocation of local tax revenues. (Bellflower, supra, 

245 Cal.App.4th at p. 451.) That decision is now final.

The trial court thus erred in finding to the contrary in denying the requested 

declaratory relief. However, we cannot assume that the Department will act in disregard 

of this declaration (indeed, it never acted upon its threats to employ the remedy in the 

present case), so the issue of a declaration to the same effect in the present case is moot. 

(Burke v. City etc. of San Francisco (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 32, 34-35.) We therefore 

decline to modify the judgment to include a declaration of unconstitutionality.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to grant a writ of mandate directing the Department to 

reduce its determination of the total required reimbursement by $911,495. As 
14

thus modified, the judgment is affirmed. Neither party shall recover costs on appeal. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).) (CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION)

 BUTZ , J.

We concur:

 HULL , Acting P. J.

 ROBIE , J.