Docket No. 107498.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

In re ANDREW B. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee v.

Andrew B., Appellant).

Opinion filed February 19, 2010.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

The question presented in this appeal is whether section 3–611 of

the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405

ILCS 5/3–611 (West 2006)) and the discharge provisions in sections

1–109 and 2–104 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/1–109, 2–104 (West

2006)) mandate full physical release of an individual previously

ordered discharged before the State may file a subsequent petition for

involuntary admission. 

The circuit court of Winnebago County ordered that respondent

be involuntarily admitted pursuant to section 3–600 of the Code (405

ILCS 5/3–600 (West 2006)). The appellate court affirmed, rejecting

respondent’s argument that the petition seeking his involuntary
 1Respondent contends an earlier petition for involuntary admission was

dismissed by the trial court on April 10, 2007, and he was ordered

discharged, but the record does not contain this order.

-2-

admission was untimely filed under section 3–611 of the Code. 386 Ill.

App. 3d 337, 347. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment

of the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND

The instant case arises from a series of commitment proceedings

involving respondent, Andrew B., an individual with a history of

mental illness. On March 26, 2007, respondent voluntarily admitted

himself to Singer Mental Health Center. On May 7, 2007, respondent

expressed a desire to leave the facility, and a social worker filed a

petition for respondent’s involuntary admission under sections 3–403

and 3–404 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3–403, 3–404 (West 2006)).1

Ultimately, the State voluntarily dismissed the petition, and the trial

court ordered respondent discharged on June 12, 2007, but

respondent was not physically released. Instead, the next day a social

worker filed a petition for respondent’s emergency admission by

certificate under section 3–600 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3–600 (West

2006)). As with the previous petition, this petition was voluntarily

dismissed by the State, and the court again ordered respondent

discharged on June 19, 2007. Respondent, however, was not released,

and on June 20, 2007, a social worker filed another petition for his

emergency admission under section 3–600. 

The June 20, 2007, petition is the subject of the instant appeal.

The petition alleged that respondent was delusional, unable to protect

himself from harm, consumed only one-third of his meals, refused his

medications, and drank dangerous amounts of water. Two

accompanying psychiatrists’ certificates were attached to the petition

and contained similar allegations. The trial court ordered respondent

evaluated by a qualified examiner and scheduled a hearing on the

matter. 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that

because he was never physically released pursuant to the court’s

previous discharge orders, his continued detention at the facility
-3-

violated his rights under the Code and entitled him to a full and

complete release. The court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss,

concluding “the failure to discharge [respondent], if there was, in fact,

a failure, and it’s not clear that there was” did not necessarily

invalidate otherwise valid subsequent emergency admission

proceedings. 

At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Howard

Paul, a psychiatrist, and Dr. William Welch, the court-appointed

examiner and clinical psychologist. Dr. Paul treated respondent since

his admission, and he believed respondent needed immediate

hospitalization because he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Dr.

Paul opined respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious

physical harm on himself or other individuals and had shown conduct

that would cause others to believe respondent would harm them. Dr.

Paul further opined respondent could not take care of his own basic

physical needs because he consumed excessive quantities of water,

causing potentially fatal seizures from a dangerously low level of

sodium in his blood. According to Dr. Paul, on at least one occasion,

respondent had a grand mal seizure as a consequence of his diminished

blood-sodium level. Dr. Paul believed hospitalization was the least

restrictive environment for respondent. 

Dr. Welch, the court-appointed examiner, testifiedthat respondent

generally refused to talk during his interviews. Dr. Welch reviewed

respondent’s medical record and, in his opinion, respondent was

seriously mentally ill and unable to care for his own basic physical

needs. 

Following the hearing, the trial court found the State proved by

clear and convincing evidence that respondent was mentally ill and

could not provide for his basic needs to protect himself from serious

harm and, therefore, was subject to involuntary admission for 90 days.

The court further found that hospitalization was the least restrictive

alternative. 

On appeal, respondent argued the trial court’s order should be

reversed because the emergency petition was untimely filed. 386 Ill.

App. 3d at 338. According to respondent, although the trial court

twice ordered his discharge from the facility, he was not physically

released and was continually confined since his request to leave on

May 7. Citing section 3–611’s mandate that a petition be filed within
-4-

24 hours of admission (405 ILCS 5/3–611 (West 2006)), respondent

argued that the petition at issue, filed June 20, was not filed within 24

hours of his admission and was therefore invalid.

The appellate court first determined that, while the expiration of

the underlying 90-day admission period rendered respondent’s appeal

moot, his claims should be considered under the public interest

exception to the mootness doctrine. The court next recognized that

respondent’s argument challenging the validity of the petition based

on its timeliness and his continuous detention mirrored the arguments

accepted by the courts in In re Helen S., 342 Ill. App. 3d 330 (2003),

and In re Nancy A., 342 Ill. App. 3d 355 (2003). Helen S. and Nancy

A. held that when a petition seeking involuntary admission of a patient

was dismissed and the patient ordered discharged, but the patient was

not physically released, any subsequent petitions were untimely under

section 3–611 if not filed within 24 hours of the patient’s initial

admission.

The appellate court, however, disagreed with Helen S. and Nancy

A. and reached the opposite conclusion. Relying on In re Shaw, 153

Ill. App. 3d 939 (1987), the court concluded that when a petition

seeking involuntary admission of a patient is dismissed and the patient

ordered discharged, a new petition could still be filed, regardless of

whether the individual was physically released. Citing Shaw, the court

reasoned that after dismissal of the petition and entry of the discharge

order, the facility no longer had authority to detain the individual

because he or she could no longer be considered a patient. 

Nonetheless, according to the court, if that individual thereafter

exhibited symptoms warranting involuntary admission, the individual

could be detained for 24 hours pending the filing of a new petition.

The court explained that “[t]he validity of this new petition has no

relation to the validity of the old petition, nor is it tainted by any

impropriety in the respondent’s prior detention. A new petition begins

a new proceeding, to be judged for validity independent of any prior

proceedings.” Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial

court’s judgment. 386 Ill. App. 3d at 347.

We allowed respondent’s petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d

R. 315. 
-5-

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, respondent challenges the trial court’s involuntaryadmission order. Initially, however, we note this appeal is moot

because respondent’s underlying 90-day admission period has expired.

In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 350 (2009). Therefore, we must

determine whether an exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 351. We first consider the public interest

exception because the appellate court found the exception allowed

review of respondent’s appeal. 386 Ill. App. 3d at 340. The State also

agrees that the public interest exception applies here.

The public interest exception permits review of an otherwise moot

appeal when: (1) the issue is of a public nature; (2) an authoritative

determination is necessary to guide public officers in future cases; and

(3) there is a likelihood the issue will recur. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d

at 355. This exception must be construed narrowly and established by

a clear showing of each criterion. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 355.

Here, respondent challenges the validity of a petition seeking his

involuntary admission filed after the facility did not physically release

him following multiple discharge orders. This issue undeniably

presents a question of public nature because it involves a dispute over

the procedural requirements for involuntarily admitting individuals

previously ordered discharged, thus satisfying the exception’s first

element. The second element is satisfied because our appellate court

is divided on the issue, resulting in the need for an authoritative

determination by this court. The third element is also satisfied because,

as illustrated in this case, the issue is likely to recur when mentalhealth professionals believe continued involuntary admission is

warranted after entry of a discharge order. Consequently, we conclude

the public interest exception applies and next address the merits of

respondent’s claims. 

Respondent argues strict compliance with the Code’s definition of

discharge is required and, therefore, he was entitled to physical release

after the trial court ordered his discharge. Citing sections 1–109 and

2–104 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/1–109, 2–104 (West 2006)),

respondent observes that discharge is defined as “the full release of

any person admitted or otherwise detained under [the Code] from

treatment, habilitation, or care and custody,” and when an individual

is discharged he is statutorily entitled to receive all of his lawful
-6-

personal property from the mental-health facility.

Relying on section 3–611 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3–611 (West

2006)), respondent contends that a petition seeking involuntary

admission must be filed within 24 hours of an individual’s admission

to a mental-health facility. Respondent argues because he was not

physically released, but instead was continuously detained, the

subsequent petitions were untimely filed after 24 hours of his original

admission, citing Helen S. and Nancy A.

These claims require statutory construction, presenting a question

of law we review de novo. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 40

(2009). When construing a statute, our goal is to determine and

effectuate the legislature’s intent, best indicated by giving the statutory

language its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d

32, 44 (2009). We must consider the entire statute in light of the

subject it addresses, presuming the legislature did not intend absurd,

unjust, or inconvenient results. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 44. Reviewing

courts will not depart from the statute’s plain language by reading into

it conditions, exceptions, or limitations that contravene legislative

intent. Weather-Tite, Inc. v. University of St. Francis, 233 Ill. 2d 385,

390 (2009).

Because respondent was involuntarily admitted pursuant to article

VI of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3–600 et seq. (West 2006)), providing

for emergency admission by certification, we first briefly outline the

applicable statutory framework. Section 3–600 authorizes involuntary

admission of a person 18 years of age or older in need of immediate

hospitalization. 405 ILCS 5/3–600 (West 2006). When an individual

is believed to be subject to involuntary admission under that section,

a petition may be filed with a mental-health facility. 405 ILCS

5/3–601(a) (West 2006). 

The petition must include, inter alia, a detailed statement

explaining why the individual is subject to involuntary admission,

including signs and symptoms of a mental illness and any acts, threats,

or other behavior supporting the allegation. 405 ILCS 5/3–601(b)(1)

(West 2006). The petition must also be accompanied by a certificate

of a physician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist stating the

individual is subject to involuntary admission and requires immediate

hospitalization. 405 ILCS 5/3–602 (West 2006). The certifying

professional’s statement must be based on a physical examination of
-7-

the individual made within 72 hours of the admission. 405 ILCS

5/3–602 (West 2006). 

Ultimately, section 3–611 requires the mental-health facility

director to file in the trial court the petition and two supporting

certificates within 24 hours after the individual is admitted to the

facility. 405 ILCS 5/3–611 (West 2006). A final order for involuntary

admission is limited to 90 days, subject to extension if the trial court

determines the individual is subject to continued involuntary

admission. 405 ILCS 5/3–813 (West 2006).

Section 3–611, in relevant part, provides:

“Within 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and

holidays, after the respondent’s admission under [article VI],

the facility director of the facility shall file 2 copies of the

petition, the first certificate, and proof of service of the

petition and statement of rights upon the respondent with the

court in the county in which the facility is located. Upon

completion of the second certificate, the facility director shall

promptly file it with the court. *** Upon the filing of the

petition and first certificate, the court shall set a hearing to be

held within 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and

holidays, after receipt of the petition.” 405 ILCS 5/3–611

(West 2006).

Thus, section 3–611’s 24-hour filing requirement is triggered by an

individual’s admission under article VI, providing for emergency

involuntary admission by certificate. Respondent contends, for

purposes of section 3–611, his admission commenced with his original

physical entry into the mental-health facility on March 26, 2007. We

note, however, that respondent was not admitted pursuant to article

VI when he first entered the facility, making inapplicable the 24-hour

filing requirement of section 3–611. 

Moreover, although the Code does not define the term

“admission,” respondent’s construction of the term as meaning only

physical entry into a facility is inconsistent with the use of the term in

other provisions of the Code. See Stern v. Wheaton-Warrenville

Community Unit School District 200, 233 Ill. 2d 396, 410 (2009)

(reviewing court should not review statutory provisions in isolation,

but should instead review the terms in consideration with other
-8-

relevant provisions). Section 3–813 allows continued involuntary

admission beyond the initial 90 days when the trial court finds “the

recipient continues to be subject to involuntary admission.” 405 ILCS

5/3–813 (West 2006). Section 3–801 provides that “[a] respondent

may request admission as an informal or voluntary recipient at any

time prior to an adjudication that he is subject to involuntary

admission.” 405 ILCS 5/3–801 (West 2006). These provisions clearly

allow a patient who is physically inside a mental-health facility to be

subjected to another “admission” when his condition warrants

additional treatment or care. 

A reasonable construction of these provisions, therefore, is that

the Code refers to “admission” in a legal sense to describe the

individual’s legal status. As the State contends, this consists of a

combination of the person’s susceptibility to being detained and his

actual detention. In other words, section 3–611’s reference to

“admission” is not always limited to the individual’s original physical

entry. When, as here, the individual is physically present in a mentalhealth facility and requires additional care and treatment following

entry of a discharge order, section 3–611’s 24-hour filing period

logically begins when a new petition is presented to the facility

director, as opposed to the date of his original physical entry into the

facility. Accordingly, the June 19, 2007, petition seeking respondent’s

emergency involuntary admission under article VI was timely because

it was filed within 24 hours after it was presented to the facility

director. 

Respondent also relies on the Code’s definition of discharge and

the statutory requirement that his belongings must be returned to him

upon discharge. According to respondent, these statutory provisions,

with section 3–611, require that when a patient is ordered discharged,

the patient must be physically released from the facility before the

State may file a new involuntary-admission petition. Respondent’s

argument is supported by the appellate court’s decisions in Helen S.

and Nancy A.

In Helen S. and Nancy A., the appellate court determined when an

involuntary-admission petition is dismissed but the individual is not

physically released, a subsequently filed petition must be dismissed as

untimely under section 3–611 if not filed within 24 hours of the initial

admission date. Helen S., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 335-36; Nancy A., 342
-9-

Ill. App. 3d at 364. The court in both decisions concluded, absent a

physical release, there was only one “admission” for purposes of

section 3–611. Helen S., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 335-36; Nancy A., 342 Ill.

App. 3d at 364.

Respondent’s argument and the decisions in Helen S. and Nancy

A. contradict our determination that the term “admission” is not

limited to an individual’s physical entry into a mental-health facility,

and overlook the plain meaning of the Code’s definitions related to

discharge. It is undisputed that section 1–109 of the Code defines

discharge as the “full release” of an individual, and section 2–104 of

the Code requires the return of the individual’s belongings upon

discharge. 405 ILCS 5/1–109, 2–104 (West 2006). Neither of these

provisions, nor section 3–611, however, require that a respondent

ordered discharged must be physically released from the facility before

commencement of subsequent involuntary-admission proceedings

under article VI. Instead, the only express requirements for filing a

section 3–600 petition and accompanying supporting certificates are

contained in sections 3–601(b) and 3–602 (405 ILCS 5/3–601(b),

3–602 (West 2006)). 

Respondent’s position, therefore, essentially requires this court to

mandate full physical release of an individual ordered discharge before

commencement ofnewinvoluntary-admission proceedings, in the total

absence of any express or implied legislative intent to impose that

requirement. Respondent’s argument violates the fundamental

principle of statutory construction that this court cannot read into the

statute additional elements not intended by the legislature. WeatherTite, Inc., 233 Ill. 2d at 390. Consequently, we reject his argument

that the Code requires physical release of an individual ordered

discharged before commencement of new involuntary-admission

proceedings.

Supporting our construction of the Code, the appellate court in

People v. Read, 228 Ill. App. 3d 664, 667 (1992), determined that

prior physical release of the respondent is not required before the

State may initiate new involuntary-admission procedures. Noting the

trial court had entered a discharge order, the Read court concluded

that requiring physical release from the facility would require the court

to “construe the statute as requiring the performance of an empty

formality when the legislative intent has been otherwise achieved.”
 2We cite Read and Shaw only for the proposition that failure to release an

individual following a discharge order does not prevent the State from

initiating a new involuntary-admission proceeding. 

-10-

Read, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 667. Thus, the Read court concluded the

State was permitted to initiate new involuntary-admission procedures

despite the facility’s failure to relinquish physical custody of the

respondent. Read, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 667.

The appellate court reached a similar conclusion in Shaw. In that

case, a voluntarily admitted patient requested discharge within the five

days mandated by the Code. Shaw, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 940. The

respondent was not released within the requisite five days, however,

and an involuntary-admission petition was filed. Shaw, 153 Ill. App.

3d at 940. The trial court dismissed that petition and ordered his

discharge, but he was not physically released and a second petition

was filed. Shaw, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 940. Ultimately, the trial court

ordered the respondent’s involuntary admission based on this second

petition. Shaw, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 941. 

The Shaw court acknowledged that the respondent should have

been physically released, but nonetheless determined that the

respondent was technically no longer a patient after the expiration of

the statutory time frame entitling him to discharge. Shaw, 153 Ill. App.

3d at 945. Rejecting the respondent’s challenge to his involuntary

admission based on the failure to release him, the Shaw court reasoned

“the mere failure to discharge, whether or not occasioned by the

mental health facility’s own omission in failing to follow through on

a court order, does not necessarily insulate the respondent from

subsequent, otherwise-valid involuntary proceedings.” Shaw, 153 Ill.

App. 3d at 945.

Consistent with Read, Shaw, and the plain meaning of the Code’s

provisions,2 we conclude that section 3–611’s 24-hour filing

requirement and the discharge provisions in sections 1–109 and 2–104

do not prohibit the State from filing a petition for involuntary

admission of an individual who had previously been ordered

discharged but was not physically released. Because Helen S. and

Nancy A. contradict our conclusion, we overrule those decisions. 

Here, respondent’s admission legally ended when the trial court
-11-

entered the discharge order. A valid petition for emergency admission

under article VI was then timely filed by the facility in compliance with

section 3–611. Although the facility did not physically release

respondent, his continued presence inside the facility did not invalidate

the subsequently filed petition. As the appellate court concluded here,

“[a] new petition begins a new proceeding, to be judged for validity

independent of any prior proceedings.” 386 Ill. App. 3d at 342.

Although we reject respondent’s construction of the Code, we find

it necessary to express our concern with the series of events that

occurred in this case. After respondent requested discharge he was

twice ordered discharged, but, for reasons not entirely clear in the

record, he was not released. Instead, the State repeatedly sought his

involuntary admission, and eventually was successful. Although the

State timely filed the multiple petitions seeking respondent’s

admission as required by the Code, we are still troubled by the

potential that mental-health facilities could file repetitive petitions,

resulting in the indefinite confinement of an individual without a

court’s examination of the matter. 

The State acknowledges “that the existence of a legal power to file

a valid petition for involuntary commitment before the duty to

discharge a person is fully implemented does not mean that this power

is exempted from judicial supervision, or that courts must disregard

an abuse of power if it occurs.” As even the State concedes, an

unrestrained and unlimited pattern of repeatedly dismissing and

refiling involuntary-admission petitions “could be abused to deprive

a person of his liberty, contrary to one of the Mental Health Code’s

fundamental purposes.” We agree, and remind our courts to be ever

vigilant to protect against abuses of power and preserve the

fundamental liberty interests of individuals subjected to involuntaryadmission proceedings.

More importantly, though, is our belief that this matter is one that

deserves the attention of the General Assembly. Our appellate court

has observed an increasing number of involuntary-commitment cases

requiring review. See In re Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d 332, 338

(2007) (Steigmann, P.J., specially concurring) (noting that 50

decisions were rendered by the court regarding involuntary admissions

in one year). The appellate court has also repeatedly expressed serious

concerns with the State’s failure to adhere to the Code’s procedural
-12-

safeguards meant to protect the fundamental liberty interests at stake.

See, e.g., In re Suzette D., 388 Ill. App. 3d 978, 987 (2009) (“we find

the State’s perfunctory manner in prosecuting these [involuntaryadmission] petitions disturbing”); In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778,

785 (2003) (admonishing that proceedings under the Code “should

not be conducted pro forma”); In re Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d 221,

230-31 (1994) (collecting cases) (expressing “dismay at the slipshod

manner with which these cases are handled” and concluding that the

State routinely disregards procedural safeguards). We agree with the

appellate court’s view and reiterate our sincere belief that the General

Assembly should carefully consider the challenging issues presented

by these cases. As one appellate court justice asserted, “[m]entalhealth cases are treated differently than other proceedings because we

have permitted them to become different.” In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill.

App. 3d 586, 598 (2007) (Knecht, J., dissenting).

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the plain meaning of section 3–611 of the Code and

the statutory definitions related to discharge do not prohibit the State

from filing a new petition for involuntary admission of an individual

ordered discharged but who is not physically released before filing the

petition. We overrule the contrary holdings in Helen S. and Nancy A.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.