THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Ex Parte: Edward J. Westbrook, Petitioner, 

In Re: The Murkin Group, LLC, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2018-002263 

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 

Opinion No. 27957 

Submitted February 28, 2020 – Filed March 18, 2020 

JUDGMENT DECLARED 

Edward J. Westbrook, of Richardson, Patrick, Westbrook 

& Brickman, LLC, of Charleston, pro se. 

Theodore von Keller, of Crawford & von Keller, LLC, of 

Columbia, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: This case is before us in our original jurisdiction to determine 

whether Respondent, the Murkin Group, LLC (Murkin), engaged in the 

unauthorized practice of law (UPL). We hold Murkin has engaged in UPL. 

UNDERLYING FACTS 

In April 2017, the Wando River Grill (Restaurant) became dissatisfied with the 

service of its linen supplier (Cintas) and Cintas' ability to supply the type of linens 

Restaurant needed. Restaurant contacted another supplier to secure some or all of 
 

its required linens and notified Cintas of its need to suspend at least a portion of 

Cintas' services. Cintas claimed Restaurant's suspension of service constituted a 

breach of the parties' contract, invoked a liquidated damages provision in the 

contract, sought more than $8,000 in damages, and hired Murkin to collect the 

outstanding debt.1

 Petitioner, a South Carolina attorney, represented Restaurant in 

the resulting dispute. 

In April 2018, Murkin sent a demand-for-payment letter to Restaurant demanding 

$8,106.43. Email communications followed between Murkin and Restaurant 

regarding Restaurant's issues with Cintas' past performance of the parties' contract 

and possible reinstatement of the contract, and Cintas' provision of linens. Murkin 

claimed Cintas would waive its damages claim if Restaurant paid a "one-time 

processing fee for the reinstatement" of services and signed certain "documentation 

that [Restaurant] need[ed]" to sign to reinstate Cintas' service. Murkin prepared 

and sent a reinstatement agreement to Restaurant with signature lines for 

Restaurant and "The Murkin Group, on behalf of Cintas Corporation – Charleston, 

SC." 

Because the Murkin-prepared reinstatement agreement materially altered the terms 

of the parties' original contract and imposed new obligations on Restaurant and 

because the agreement's terms were contrary to discussions Cintas personnel had 

directly with Restaurant, Restaurant sent the proposed reinstatement agreement to 

Petitioner. Restaurant's manager also informed Murkin he was attempting to 

continue a dialogue with Cintas to resume Cintas' linen service, but Cintas 

personnel refused to respond. Murkin informed Restaurant's manager all 

communications were to be handled through Murkin. 

After learning of Murkin's response to Restaurant manager, Petitioner contacted 

Murkin, indicated Restaurant had issues with Cintas' performance under the 

1

 Murkin is a Florida limited liability company that provides debt collection services to its clients 

in exchange for a contingency fee. Murkin advertises itself as having "in-house collection 

specialists." Pursuant to its Service Agreement with its clients, once an account is turned over to 

Murkin, the client agrees to cease all communication with the debtor regarding the account and 

allow Murkin to be the sole point of contact. The Service Agreement provides that the client 

authorizes Murkin to act as its agent and to collect the accounts according to Murkin's policies 

and procedures. The agreement further provides, "In the event it becomes necessary to forward 

Client's Accounts to an attorney for legal action, Client directs and authorizes [Murkin], as its 

agent, to assign the Accounts to an attorney as designated by [Murkin] . . . . [Murkin] must 

receive authorization from the Client prior to filing a lawsuit or settling an account." 
 

 

parties' contract, and requested Murkin have its South Carolina counsel contact 

him directly. In response, Murkin's representative stated, "Whether or not this gets 

forwarded to local counsel[] is a decision which our office will make, with our 

client, when we feel it appropriate," and reiterated any resolution of the matter 

would require Restaurant to sign Murkin's reinstatement agreement. 

Restaurant did not sign the reinstatement agreement, and no South Carolina 

counsel for Murkin or Cintas contacted Petitioner. In response to Restaurant's 

refusal to sign, a Murkin representative emailed Petitioner and threatened the 

matter could "escalate, which potentially could cost your client a lot more[] if our 

clients [sic] wishes to file a suit action [sic], our attorney there[] would add on 

attorney fees, court costs, sheriff fees for service of process and, of course, accrued 

interest."2

 The Murkin representative stated that, if Murkin did not hear back from 

Petitioner, Murkin would assume Restaurant was not willing to resolve the 

balance, and the representative would "make . . . specific recommendations on how 

I feel Cintas should proceed." 

In November 2018, Petitioner emailed Murkin asking for the South Carolina Bar 

numbers of several Murkin employees "if they are members of the Bar." The 

Murkin representative responded stating Petitioner's desire to deal with Murkin's 

local counsel "means nothing, since that is a decision made between our client and 

our office." The representative further claimed authority to bind any attorney to 

whom Murkin referred the matter to settle for no less than Murkin demanded, 

stating, "our attorneys, once they receive signed Suit Authorization documents, 

executed by our client, will not settle for less [than the $8,106.43 discussed in 

April 2018] . . . . [Our attorneys] will also be directed[] to not accept payment 

arrangements on the balance . . . ." 

In December 2018, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Court's request in 

Medlock v. University Health Services, Inc., 404 S.C. 25, 28, 743, S.E.2d 830, 831 

(2013), and In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 309 S.C. 304, 305, 422 

S.E.2d 123, 124 (1992), that any individual who becomes aware of conduct that 

might constitute UPL should bring a declaratory judgment action in the Court's 

original jurisdiction. 

2

 This communication was legally misleading as the linen service contract between Cintas and 

Restaurant did not allow a "[law]suit action," but required arbitration of any disputes. 

Additionally, the service contract did not provide for the recovery of attorney's fees. 
We referred the matter to the Honorable Kristi F. Curtis as special referee to take 

evidence and issue a report containing proposed findings of fact and 

recommendations of law. The parties elected to move forward without discovery 

on a stipulation of facts. Oral arguments were held at the Sumter County 

Courthouse on September 20, 2019. Judge Curtis filed her report on September 

30, 2019, recommending this Court find Murkin's actions constituted UPL. 

Murkin filed exceptions to the report. After careful consideration of the briefs and 

oral argument in this case, we hereby adopt Judge Curtis' recommendations and 

findings as discussed below. 

In her proposed conclusions of law, Judge Curtis found Murkin went beyond the 

mere collection of a debt and crossed into UPL by: 

(1) becoming involved in negotiating a contract dispute between 

Cintas and Restaurant and interposing itself between the parties 

for the purpose of negotiating a settlement on behalf of Cintas; 

(2) purporting to advise Cintas as to what legal action it should take; 

(3) indicating to Restaurant that it would advise Cintas as to whether 

to accept a settlement offer; 

(4) purporting to control whether and when the case would be 

referred to an attorney; 

(5) purporting to control the actions of the attorney and claiming it 

could direct the attorney not to settle the claim or make payment 

arrangements with Restaurant; 

(6) threatening to file suit and making specific claims about what 

types of damages would be recoverable in the lawsuit; and 

(7) giving legal opinions and interpreting the terms of the contract 

between Restaurant and Cintas. 

LAW 

Pursuant to the South Carolina Constitution, this Court has the duty to regulate the 

practice of law in South Carolina. S.C. Const. art. V, § 4; In re Unauthorized 
Practice of Law Rules, 309 S.C. at 305, 422 S.E.2d at 124; see also S.C. Code 

Ann. § 40-5-10 (2011) (stating the Supreme Court has inherent power with respect 

to regulating the practice of law). The Court's duty to regulate the practice of law 

and the legal profession "is to protect the public from the potentially severe 

economic and emotional consequences which may flow from the erroneous 

preparation of legal documents or the inaccurate legal advice given by persons 

untrained in the law." Linder v. Ins. Claims Consultants, Inc., 348 S.C. 477, 468– 

87, 560 S.E.2d 612, 617 (2002). 

This Court has long held the practice of law is not confined to litigation, but 

encompasses activities and actions in other areas that "entail specialized legal 

knowledge and ability." State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426, 430, 357 S.E.2d 

15, 17 (1987). However, the Court has also recognized "it is neither practicable 

nor wise to attempt a comprehensive definition" of what constitutes the practice of 

law but, instead, "to decide what is and what is not the unauthorized practice of law 

in the context of an actual case or controversy." In re Unauthorized Practice of 

Law Rules, 309 S.C. at 305, 422 S.E.2d at 124. 

In Crawford v. Central Mortgage Co., the Court found a mortgage company's 

execution of loan modifications at the request of distressed borrowers did not 

constitute UPL because the loan modifications were merely adjustments to existing 

loans made to accommodate defaulted borrowers. Crawford, 404 S.C. 39, 47, 744 

S.E.2d 538, 542 (2013). The Crawford Court held requiring attorney supervision 

over such actions would create a cost to the consumer that outweighed the benefit, 

and the existence of a robust regulatory regime and competent non-attorney 

professionals militated such requirements. Id. The instant matter is substantially 

different from Crawford in which the mortgage company was acting on its own 

behalf and not through a third party. Here, Murkin is not a party to the contract 

between Restaurant and Cintas, but a third-party non-lawyer attempting to 

negotiate a contract modification on behalf of its client. 

In Roberts v. LaConey, the respondent and a creditor entered into an assignment 

wherein the respondent agreed to collect a judgment in exchange for 66.6% of the 

amount recovered. Roberts, 375 S.C. 97, 101, 650 S.E.2d 474, 476 (2007). The 

respondent wrote letters to the debtor in which he offered legal opinions and made 

threats about the consequences the debtor would face if the debtor did not 

cooperate and satisfy the judgment. The respondent further threatened the debtor 

with legal actions, including threatening to have the debtor "ARRESTED and 

brought to court in restraints the way Moses was brought before Pharaoh in the 
 

 

movie, 'The Ten [C]ommandements.'" Id. at 102–03, 650 S.E.2d at 477. The 

Roberts Court found the purported "assignment" executed between the parties was 

actually an agreement to collect a debt for a fee; therefore, the respondent was not 

acting entirely on his own behalf, but on behalf of the original judgment holder. 

Id. The Court further held the respondent's preparing pleadings, filing documents 

with the circuit court in his own name, sending letters to the debtor that contained 

legal opinions, and identifying himself as "acting as 'Plaintiff's Attorney[]'" 

constituted UPL. Id. at 104–05, 650 S.E.2d at 478. 

In Linder, the Linders hired ICC, a public insurance adjuster company, to assist 

with the filing of a claim with their insurance company after their home was 

damaged in a fire. Linder, 348 S.C. at 483–84, 560 S.E.2d at 615–16. ICC's 

advertisements described the company as a "professional Loss Consulting Firm" 

that represented their client's "best interest" in handling property damage claims. 

Id. at 484–85, 560 S.E.2d at 616. ICC also stated in a client fact sheet, 

"REMEMBER, your insurance company has already appointed a professional to 

protect THEIR interest. ICC WILL PROTECT YOURS!" Id. at 485, 560 S.E.2d 

at 616–17. The Linders entered into a contract with ICC in which they agreed to 

pay ICC a percentage of the amount the company recovered on their insurance 

claim. ICC notified the Linders' insurance company that ICC should be contacted 

for "any further information and negotiations" concerning the Linders' claim. Id. at 

484, 560 S.E.2d at 616. When the Linders' insurance company rejected their claim 

for the full value of their gun collection, ICC advised the Linders the guns should 

be covered under their policy. Id. at 484, 560 S.E.2d at 616. 

The Linder Court found public insurance adjusting was not per se UPL. However, 

the Court found ICC's adjusters impermissibly engaged in UPL when they (1) 

advised clients of their rights, duties, or privileges under an insurance policy 

regarding matters requiring legal skill or knowledge, i.e., interpreting the policy for 

clients; (2) advised clients on whether to accept a settlement offer from an 

insurance company; (3) became involved in the coverage dispute between the 

client and the insurance company; and (4) utilized advertising that would lead 

clients to believe that public adjusters provided services that required legal skill. 

Id. at 493, 560 S.E.2d at 621. 

DISCUSSION 

In the instant case, Murkin—similarly to the respondent in Roberts and ICC in 

Linder—engaged in UPL when it interpreted Cintas' service contract with 
Restaurant, gave legal opinions as to what damages were recoverable under the 

Cintas-Restaurant contract, sought to negotiate the contract dispute between Cintas 

and Restaurant, and purported to advise Cintas on whether to accept a settlement 

offer and to negotiate the amount of settlement. 

Other states have addressed the issue of whether a collection agency engages in 

UPL when an agency specifically claims it controls, or implies it has the right to 

control, the actions of a licensed attorney. See J.H. Marshall & Assocs. v. 

Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 594–95 (D.C. 1973) (finding collection agency that was, 

in essence, selling the services of a lawyer whom it controlled and directed 

engaged in UPL, and holding the agency could not "properly interpose itself 

between a creditor and an attorney seeking to collect the creditor's claim. To do so 

either directly or indirectly, by assignment or otherwise, has been held to be the 

unauthorized practice of law"); see also State ex rel. State Bar of Wis. v. Bonded 

Collections, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 250, 256–59 (Wis. 1967) (holding collection agency 

that advised creditor when to file a lawsuit, hired an attorney, directed the attorney 

when to file suit, and directed the lawsuit, engaged in UPL); Richmond Ass'n of 

Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n, 189 S.E. 153, 158 (Va. 1937) (holding collection agency 

that (1) hired an attorney to perform collections, (2) retained the right to discharge 

him, (3) supervised his conduct, (4) gave him orders, and (5) received reports from 

him engaged in UPL). 

In the instant case, Murkin similarly engaged in UPL when it purported to advise 

Cintas when to file suit, gave legal opinions on what types of damages would be 

sought, and purported to control the actions of the attorney and to direct the 

attorney not to settle the case or accept payment arrangements. 

Finally, while Murkin characterizes its action as "debt collection," we agree with 

Judge Curtis' conclusion that the true nature of the underlying matter is a contract 

dispute. Restaurant was not delinquent in paying an invoice, nor had it refused to 

pay for services rendered. Restaurant terminated the service contract with Cintas 

prior to its expiration and, while the contract contained a liquidated damages 

clause, these alleged damages were not an admitted debt but a contract dispute. As 

Judge Curtis concluded: 

At the very [least], once Restaurant expressed issues with Cintas' 

performance under the Agreement and disputed whether it owed any 

additional monies to Cintas under the Agreement, this became a 

contract dispute. Murkin's agents then continued to represent Cintas 
in the matter, advising Cintas on what legal action to take, advising 

Cintas when to turn the matter over to an attorney, interpreting the 

contract provisions, recommending settlement figures and purporting 

to advise Cintas on when to accept settlement, giving legal opinions as 

to what damages would be recoverable in a lawsuit, and purporting to 

control and direct any future attorneys who would work at Murkin's 

direction. All of these actions constitute the unauthorized practice of 

law. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the forgoing, we find the record supports Judge Curtis' findings and hold 

Murkin's actions constituted UPL. See Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. at 430, 357 

S.E.2d at 17; see also Crawford, 404 S.C. at 47, 744 S.E.2d at 542; Roberts, 375 

S.C. at 104–05, 650 S.E.2d at 478; Linder, 348 S.C. at 560 S.E.2d at 617. We 

enjoin Murkin from engaging in any further such conduct. 

JUDGMENT DECLARED. 

BEATTY, C.J., HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur. KITTREDGE, J., 

not participating.