NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOSHUA RYAN CHRISTENSEN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0292 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201900697

The Honorable Billy K. Sipe Jr., Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Deborah Celeste Kinney

Counsel for Appellee

Harris & Winger PC, Flagstaff

By Sarah Snelling

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-28-2022
STATE v. CHRISTENSEN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Joshua Ryan Christensen appeals his convictions and 

sentences for kidnapping and attempted sexual assault. Because he has not 

shown that reversible error occurred, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Seven-year-old M.B. was walking home from school along a 

residential street when Christensen began following him on foot. 

Christensen then ran toward M.B., put his hand on M.B.’s shoulder, and 

guided the boy to the side of the road where Christensen proceeded to strip 

off M.B.’s clothes while “holding him down.” The attack ended when

M.B.’s parents pulled up in a vehicle and threatened to call police. A 

neighbor’s security camera captured the incident on video. 

¶3 The State charged 25-year-old Christensen with kidnapping, 

a class two felony, and attempted sexual assault, a class three felony. Before 

trial, the superior court granted Christensen’s motion under Arizona Rule 

of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 11 and appointed two experts—

Drs. Laurence Schiff and Mark Harvancik—to evaluate both Christensen’s 

competency to stand trial and his mental status at the time of the offense. 

¶4 The experts provided differing opinions regarding 

Christensen’s competency, and the court found Christensen was 

incompetent but restorable. See Rule 11.5(b)(2). After Christensen received

restoration treatment for approximately ten weeks, the court found he was 

restored to competency.

¶5 Christensen waived his right to a jury and raised a defense of 

guilty except insane (“GEI”) under A.R.S. § 13-502. At a bench trial, the 

court found Christensen guilty of both charges and rejected his GEI defense. 

Noting that the State did not allege aggravating circumstances, the court 

subsequently imposed a presumptive 17-year prison term for the

kidnapping conviction to be followed by lifetime probation for the 
STATE v. CHRISTENSEN

Decision of the Court

3

attempted sexual assault conviction. Christensen timely appealed, and we 

have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

A. Other-Act Evidence

¶6 At the outset of the bench trial, Christensen stipulated to the 

admission of several items of evidence, including the police report 

documenting the charged offenses. The report included statements made 

by Christensen, his mother, and his caregiver, alluding to prior instances 

where Christensen had committed similar acts. At trial, the officer who 

wrote the report confirmed that these statements were made to him. When 

asked on direct whether he had discussed prior instances of similar acts 

with the caregiver, defense counsel objected on Rule 404 and hearsay 

grounds, which the court overruled, because the statements were in the 

police report that had already been admitted. 

¶7 Christensen argues, for the first time on appeal, that the court 

erred in admitting the police report, asserting it included “multiple 

instances of hearsay” and violated Rules 404(b) (prohibiting the 

introduction of prior act evidence to prove character traits) and 403 

(prohibiting the admission of evidence that presents the danger of being 

unfairly prejudicial). However, Christensen stipulated to the admission of 

the police report. See Pulliam v. Pulliam, 139 Ariz. 343, 345 (App. 1984) 

(“[Parties] may stipulate as to evidentiary matters such as the admission, 

exclusion or withdrawal of evidence from consideration.”). Generally, 

“parties are bound by their stipulation unless relieved therefrom by the 

court.” Id. Thus, Christensen cannot claim error from the admission of the 

police report on appeal. See State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 10 (1989) 

(“Usually, a stipulation waives defendant’s right to object to the evidence 

on appeal.”); Gustafson v. Riggs, 10 Ariz. App. 74, 76 (1969) (“The stipulation 

of evidence into the record . . . waives any error arising from the 

introduction of the evidence itself.”).

¶8 Christensen also argues the court erred in allowing the police 

officer to testify about the statements in his report. But as the court noted, 

those statements had already been admitted as part of the police report, and 

the officer merely confirmed what was already in it. Thus, even if it was 

error to allow this testimony, it was harmless. See State v. Williams, 133 Ariz. 

220, 226 (1982) (the erroneous admission of evidence that is ”entirely 

cumulative constitute[s] harmless error”).
STATE v. CHRISTENSEN

Decision of the Court

4

B. Defense of Guilty Except Insane

¶9 Christensen argues the superior court erred by rejecting his 

GEI defense. We review the court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. State

v. Zmich, 160 Ariz. 108, 111 (1989).

¶10 “A person may be found guilty except insane if at the time of 

the commission of the criminal act the person was afflicted with a mental 

disease or defect of such severity that the person did not know the criminal 

act was wrong.” A.R.S. § 13-502(A). “Arizona defines the word ‘wrong’ in 

accordance with generally accepted moral standards of the community

[, which] necessarily includes both legal and moral wrong.” State v. Romero, 

248 Ariz. 601, 605, ¶ 16 (App. 2020) (quotation and citation omitted). 

“[L]egal insanity is an affirmative defense,” and a defendant must prove 

his or her “legal insanity by clear and convincing evidence.” § 13-502(A), 

(C). 

¶11 Three experts testified at trial as to Christensen’s ability to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct underlying the charged 

offenses. Dr. Schiff, a psychiatrist, diagnosed Christensen as having

attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and intermittent explosive 

disorder, an impulse control disorder. Dr. Schiff testified that Christensen 

“knew what he was doing . . . was wrong . . . at the time regarding the 

allegations against him.” See A.R.S. § 13-502(A) (excluding “impulse 

control disorders” from mental diseases or defects that can support a GEI 

defense); State v. Buot, 232 Ariz. 432, 436, ¶ 19 (App. 2013) (“[O]ur 

legislature has expressly provided that an ‘impulse control disorder[]’ does 

not constitute a mental disease or defect sufficient to sustain an insanity 

finding.”). Similarly, Dr. Harvancik, a psychologist, opined that 

Christensen “knew what he did was wrong” as confirmed by test results 

that indicated Christensen “[w]as able to process information at a higher 

level.” In contrast, Dr. Katrina Buwalda, also a psychologist, diagnosed 

Christensen as having autism. She testified that she “talked to 

[Christensen] a little bit about the crime” and opined that although 

Christensen knew at the time of trial that “what he did was wrong,” she did

not “think he thought it was wrong at the time.”

¶12 Christensen argues the superior court improperly 

disregarded Dr. Buwalda’s opinion, and he asserts the evidence otherwise 

established that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at 

the time he committed the offenses. According to Christensen, Dr. Schiff’s

and Dr. Harvancik’s evaluations were primarily focused on his current 

competency to stand trial, and Dr. Buwalda was the only expert to 
STATE v. CHRISTENSEN

Decision of the Court

5

specifically examine his mental state at the time of the offense. Thus, 

Christensen concludes that Dr. Buwalda was the only qualified expert on 

the issue of insanity. But by arguing that the court should have deferred to 

Dr. Buwalda’s testimony given the type of evaluation she conducted, 

Christensen is essentially requesting that we reweigh the expert evidence. 

See State v. Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, 487, ¶ 9 (App. 2013) (When evaluating 

claims of insufficient evidence, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence to decide 

if we would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact.”) (quotation and 

citation omitted); Zmich, 160 Ariz. at 111 (“The fact that only one expert 

testified that the defendant was not . . . insane at the time of the crime while 

three experts claim he was . . . is not dispositive of this issue.”).

¶13 Christensen also argues “[t]he evidence the trial court relied 

on in reaching a decision on the GEI defense was insufficient and amounted 

to an abuse of discretion.” He points out that a fourth expert, Dr. Serena 

Gorguiero, should have conducted a Rule 11.8 evaluation, but the court 

failed to order a report from that expert. He also notes that the expert 

reports for the three testifying experts were not entered into evidence at 

trial. 

¶14 Christensen, however, never objected to proceeding without 

Dr. Gorguiero’s evaluation. GEI is an affirmative defense, and Christensen 

bore the burden of proof. § 13-502(A), (C). Further, it was Christensen’s

responsibility to ensure the expert reports were admitted at trial. The 

superior court did not err in ruling on the record before it.

¶15 Moreover, other evidence supports the superior court’s 

rejection of Christensen’s GEI defense. See Zmich, 160 Ariz. at 111 (trial 

court may consider evidence other than an expert’s opinion to determine 

whether defendant “comes within the purview of [§ 13-502]”). During his

police interview just after the incident, Christensen was “apologetic” and 

explained that he sometimes “gets urges” to hurt others like the victim here. 

The evidence established that Christensen “took off running” when M.B.’s 

mother confronted him and called police. Christensen later admitted 

during one of his psychological evaluations that he “tried to rape” the 

victim and “knew it was wrong.” Christensen also admitted he had been 

“in trouble for this type of thing before and . . . usually gets off with a 

warning.” 

¶16 Based on this record, the superior court could properly 

conclude Christensen knew at the time he committed the offenses that “the 

criminal act was wrong.” § 13-502(A). Accordingly, Christensen has not 
STATE v. CHRISTENSEN

Decision of the Court

6

shown that the court abused its discretion in rejecting Christensen’s 

insanity defense. 

C. Sentencing

¶17 Christensen argues that his presumptive 17-year sentence and 

lifetime probation “is greater than ought to be inflicted under the 

circumstances.” Because no aggravating circumstances were shown, the 

maximum prison sentence the superior court could have imposed for the 

kidnapping conviction was the presumptive 17-year prison term actually 

imposed. Christensen asserts the court failed to afford “proper weight” to 

the mitigating factors he presented at sentencing. 

¶18 The superior court considered as mitigating factors 

Christensen’s immaturity, mental health issues, and lack of criminal 

history. However, when weighed against the circumstances of the offenses, 

the court determined the presumptive prison sentence—as the maximum 

permissible based on the State’s failure to allege aggravating factors—was 

appropriate. 

¶19 The weighing of mitigating factors is a matter for the trial 

judge’s sound discretion. State v. Harvey, 193 Ariz. 472, 477, ¶ 24 (App. 

1998); see also State v. Long, 207 Ariz. 140, 148, ¶ 41 (App. 2004) (holding the 

court must consider mitigating evidence but need not find the evidence 

mitigating). Christensen has not shown an abuse of discretion. 

¶20 Alternatively, Christensen requests we exercise our statutory 

authority to impose a less severe sentence. See A.R.S. § 13-4037(B) (“Upon 

an appeal . . . from the sentence on the ground that it is excessive, the court 

shall have the power to reduce the extent or duration of the punishment 

imposed, if, in its opinion, the conviction is proper, but the punishment 

imposed is greater than under the circumstances of the case ought to be 

inflicted.”). On this record, however, Christensen has not shown that the 

presumptive prison term was excessive. We therefore deny Christensen’s 

request for a more lenient sentence. See State v. Linsner, 105 Ariz. 488, 490 

(1970) (“[T]he power to revise and reduce sentences imposed by the trial 

court should be used with great caution and exercised only when it clearly 

appears that a sentence is too severe.”).
STATE v. CHRISTENSEN

Decision of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm Christensen’s convictions and sentences.