alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Heartland Brewery, Inc., Appellant-Respondent, v Nova Casualty Company, Respondent-Appellant.

[52 NYS3d 55]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barry R. Ostrager, J.), entered September 7, 2016, which denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment declaring that defendant Nova Casualty Company was obligated to provide Heartland with coverage under the policy, and denied Nova’s cross motion for summary judgment declaring that Nova was under no obligation to provide Heartland with coverage under the policy, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant Nova Casualty Company provided plaintiff Heartland Brewery, Inc. with property and casualty coverage for several of its premises throughout New York City. The policy provided for limited coverage for flooding, but specifically excluded “loss or damage to property located in Flood Zones A or v as defined by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).” During Superstorm Sandy, plaintiff’s premises located at 93 South Street sustained substantial flood damage. When plaintiff presented its claim to defendant, defendant declined coverage because the premises was located in FEMA Zone AE, which defendant asserts is a subzone of Zone A. Plaintiff challenges this interpretation, claiming that Zone AE is not a subzone or part of Zone A, but rather is separately defined under FEMA’s regulations (44 CFR 59.1 *et seq.).*

The question of whether the terms of a contract, such as an insurance policy, are ambiguous is a question of law for the *523courts to determine. The contract language is to be read in light of common speech and interpreted “according to the reasonable expectations and purposes of ordinary businesspeople when making ordinary business contracts” *(DMP Contr. Corp. v Essex Ins. Co.,*76 AD3d 844, 846 [1st Dept 2010]).

When it comes to exclusions from coverage, the exclusion “must be specific and clear in order to be enforced” *(Seaboard Sur. Co. v Gillette Co.,*64 NY2d 304, 311 [1984]) and ambiguities in exclusions are to be construed “most strongly” against the insurer *(Guachichulca v Laszlo N. Tauber & Assoc., LLC,*37 AD3d 760, 761 [2d Dept 2007]). As this Court has recognized, there are circumstances where extrinsic evidence may be admitted prior to an exclusion being strictly construed against an insurer *(Southwest Mar. & Gen. Ins. Co. v Preferred Contrs. Ins. Co.,*143 AD3d 577 [1st Dept 2016]), and “[w]here . . . ambiguous words are to be construed in the light of extrinsic evidence or the surrounding circumstances, the meaning of such words may become a question of fact for the jury” *(American Sun Co. of N.Y. v National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford,*25 AD2d 734, 734 [1st Dept 1966]).

Here, the language of FEMA’s flood zone regulations raises an issue of fact rendering the insurance policy’s exclusion of flood coverage ambiguous *(see Sylvania Gardens Apts. v Legion Ins. Co.,*2001 WL 1807780, *2, 2001 Phila Ct Com Pl LEXIS 67, *6 [2001]).

We have considered the remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Acosta, J.P., Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick and Webber, JJ.
#### Laura Moore-Brown, Appellant, v Sofi Hacking Corp. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[57 NYS3d 38]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered November 24, 2015, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted the motion of defendants Sofi Hacking Corp. and Mohammed Sakaria for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate a serious injury to her cervical spine within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants made a prima facie showing that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury to her cervical spine by submitting the expert report of an orthopedist, who found full range of motion and opined that plaintiff’s alleged injuries had resolved *(see Birch v 31 N. Blvd., Inc.,*139 AD3d 580 [1st Dept 2016]). Those findings were consistent with the conclusion of defendants’ neurologist who found no neurological deficits and a limitation in one plane of range of motion, which did not undermine his conclusion that plaintiff suffered no permanent injury as a result of the accident *(see Paduani v Rodriguez,*101 AD3d 470 [1st Dept 2012]; *Sone v Qamar,*68 AD3d 566 [1st Dept 2009]). Defendants’ neurologist also relied on plaintiff’s MRI report, which showed preexisting degenerative disc disease in her cervical spine, in concluding that she suffered no traumatic injury causally related to the accident *(see Alvarez v NYLL Mgt. Ltd.,*120 AD3d 1043 [1st Dept 2014], *affd*24 NY3d 1191 [2015]; *Colon v Vincent Plumbing & Mech. Co.,*85 AD3d 541 [1st Dept 2011]). Defendants further demonstrated an absence of causation through the report of an expert in emergency room medicine, who opined that plaintiff’s post-accident medical records showing no complaints of neck pain and a normal cervical exam, were inconsistent with any claim of traumatic injury to her cervical spine *(see Frias v Gonzalez-Vargas,*147 AD3d 500, 501 [1st Dept 2017]). Furthermore, plaintiff testified that she did not seek treatment for her claimed cervical spine injuries from a neurologist until some eight months after the accident, which is “too remote in time to establish a causal relationship” between her claimed injuries and the accident *(Jones v MTA Bus Co.,*123 AD3d 614, 615 [1st Dept 2014]; *see Henchy v VAS Express Corp.,*115 AD3d 478, 479 [1st Dept 2014]).

In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to her cervical spine causally related to the accident *(see Mayo v Kim,*135 AD3d *568624, 625 [1st Dept 2016]).

Concur — Tom, J.P., Renwick, Manzanet-Daniels and Kapnick, JJ.
#### In the Matter of Kaiden L. Westchester County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Richard L., Appellant.

[52 NYS3d 903]

Appeal by the father from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Westchester County (Hal B. Greenwald, J.), dated January 13, 2016. The order, after a dispositional hearing, terminated the father’s parental rights and transferred guardianship and custody of the subject child to the Westchester County Department of Social Services for the purpose of adoption. Assigned counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]), in which he moves for leave to withdraw as counsel for appellant.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Under the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied with the sufficiency of the brief filed by the assigned counsel pursuant to *Anders v California*(386 US 738 [1967]). Upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on the appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is, therefore, granted *(see id.; Matter of Whittaker v Quiles,*144 AD3d 931 [2016]; *Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.],*89 AD3d 252 [2011]).

Dillon, J.R, Cohen, Duffy and Connolly, JJ., concur.
arraguirre 

NRS 34.330; Int'l Game Tech., 124 Nev. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558. 

Generally, an appeal is an adequate legal remedy precluding writ relief. 

Pan, 120 Nev. at 224, 88 P.3d at 841. 

Having considered the petition, we are not persuaded that our 

intervention is warranted at this time. NRAP 21(b)(1); Pan, 120 Nev. at 

228, 88 P.3d at 844; Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851. Accordingly, 

we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

, J. 

cc: Hon. David R. Gamble, Senior Judge 

Schuering Zimmerman & Doyle LLP 

Mandelbaum, Ellerton & Kolkoski 

Matthew L. Sharp, Ltd. 

Stephen H. Osborne 

Carson City Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) I947A 41140
November ,2014 Mr. Kevin Schlemmer, Chief, EAS Division Office ofAviation Analysis U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJerseyAvenue, S.E. Washington, DC 20590 :..,·.:.I ;•

Re; Continuation ofAlaska Airlines' Essential Air Service at Cordova, Gustavus, Petersburg, Wrangell, and Yakutat, Alaska, Docket OST-1998-4899 Dear Mr. Schlemmer : This letter is to express strong supportfor the selection ofAlaska Airlines to continue to provide essential air service to ourcommunity. Alaska's service connects SoutheastAlaska passengers to one or more major communities of interest, with single-plane service to Anchorage, Juneau, Ketchikan or Seattle. From these hubs, ourcommunity can access the airline's extensive route system and benefit from its marketing relationships with other carriers. The passenger and cargo aircraft, which AlaskaAirlines proposes to continue using on this route, provides freight, mail and cargo capacity that other carriers simply cannot provide. Further, Alaska Airlines aircraft are equipped with Required Navigation Performance Technology, which enables the airline to reliably access the airport during inclement weather, thus reducing diversions and cancellations and, in turn, enabling people and products to dependably reach the community.**~imply** put, Alaska Airlines' service is critical to the economicwell being ofour community and Isupporttheir application to provide Essential Air Service to Southeast Alaska. Sincerely, 

# 14

I
#### In the Matter of DataSafe, Inc., et al., Appellants, v American Express et al., Respondents.

[769 NYS2d 30]

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Sherry Klein Heitler, J.), entered July 10, 2003, as corrected by an order, same court and Justice, entered July 9, 2003, which, to the extent appealed from, granted, in part, respondents’ motion to quash and for a protective order, and denied, in part, petitioner’s motion to compel discovery from respondents, nonparties to the underlying Massachusetts action, regarding certain documents and depositions of respondents that were the subject of subpoenas dated July 26, 2002, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Petitioner DataSafe has sought documents from respondent American Express relating to every aspect of respondent’s development of a “suite” of Internet privacy products, including all documents related to a certain survey conducted by American Express respecting the market for such products, as well as any contacts or discussions respondent may have had with any other entity regarding these types of products. The salient issues in the underlying Massachusetts lawsuit, in which no wrongdoing is alleged against American Express, however, concern the motives of FedEx, the defendant in that suit, in discontinuing its relationship with DataSafe. American Express’s internal development of its own line of privacy products, and the specific results of its market survey respecting such products, are not discernibly relevant to those issues. What is relevant is what FedEx was told about the American Express survey, not whether the survey actually supported such asser*225tions. Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Accordingly, particularly in view of the broad discretion vested in Supreme Court to supervise discovery *(see Daniels v City of New York,*291 AD2d 260 [2002]), we perceive no basis to disturb the appealed determination. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Tom, Mazzarelli and Ellerin, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 107 (Thursday, June 4, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30506-30507]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-14765]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Human Genome Research Institute; Notice of Closed 
Meetings

    Pursuant to Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meetings:

    Name of Committee: National Human Genome Research Institute 
Initial Review Group, Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications 
Subcommittee.
    Agenda/Purpose: To review and evaluate grant applications and/or 
contract proposals.
    Date: June 4, 1998.
    Time: 9:00 am-5:00 pm.
    Place: Holiday Inn Hotel, Bethesda, Maryland.
    This notice is being published less than fifteen days prior to 
the meeting due to the urgent need to meet timing limitations 
imposed by the review and funding cycle.

    Name of Committee: National Human Genome Research Institute, 
Special Emphasis Panel 01.
    Agenda/Purpose: To review and evaluate grant applications and/or 
contract proposals.
    Date: June 30, 1998.
    Time: 8:30-12 Noon.
    Place: Holiday Inn Hotel, Bethesda, Maryland.

    Name of Committee: National Human Genome Research Institute 
Initial Review Group, Genome Research Review Subcommittee.
    Agenda/Purpose: To review and evaluate grant applications and/or 
contract proposals.
    Date: June 20, 1998.
    Time: 1:00-5:00 pm.
    Place: Holiday Inn Hotel, Bethesda, Maryland.

    Name of Committee: National Human Genome Research Institute, 
Special Emphasis Panel 02.
    Agenda/Purpose: To review and evaluate grant applications and/or 
contract proposals.
    Date: June 30, 1998.
    Time: 8:30 am-5:00 pm.
    Place: Holiday Inn Hotel, Bethesda, Maryland.

    Name of Committee: National Human Genome Research Institute, 
Special Emphasis Panel 03.
    Agenda/Purpose: To review and evaluate grant applications and/or 
contract proposals.
    Date: July 1-2, 1998.
    Time: 8:30 am-5:00 pm.
    Place: Holiday Inn Hotel, Bethesda, Maryland.

[[Page 30507]]

    Contact Person: Rudy Pozzatti, Ph.D., Office of Scientific 
Review, National Human Genome Research Institute, National 
Institutes of Health, Building 38A, Room 604, Bethesda, Maryland 
20892, (301) 402-0838.
    The meetings will be closed in accordance with the provisions 
set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 U.S.C. The 
applications and/or contract proposals, and the discussions could 
reveal confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program No. 93.172, Human 
Genome Research)

    Dated: May 27, 1998.
LaVerne Y. Stringfield,
Committee Management Officer, NIH.
[FR Doc. 98-14765 Filed 6-3-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
2017-0215.

#### State v. Jackson.

Cuyahoga App. No. 104645, 2017-Ohio-107.
|                                                                                                                  
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                                                  
|View History:  Monthly  Annual Download Data (XLS File)                                                          
|View History:  Monthly  Annual                                                                                    
|View History:  Monthly  Annual                                                                                    
|View History:                                                                                                     
|                                                                                                                  
|Price of Cameron (Calcasieu Pass), LA Liquefied Natural Gas Exports to Singapore (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
|                                                                                                                  
|                                                                                                                  
|Price of Cameron (Calcasieu Pass), LA Liquefied Natural Gas Exports to Singapore (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet)
|                                                                                                                  

|Year                                                                                                                              | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May  | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep   | Oct   | Nov | Dec
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---- | --- | --- | --- | ----- | ----- | --- | ---
|2022                                                                                                                              |     |     |     |     |      |     |     |     |       | 38.93 |     |    
|2023                                                                                                                              |     |     |     |     |      |     |     |     | 11.16 |       |     |    
|2024                                                                                                                              |     |     |     |     | 6.71 |     |     |     |       |       |     |    
|                                                                                                                                 
|- = No Data Reported;  -- = Not Applicable;  NA = Not Available;  W = Withheld to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
|                                                                                                                                 
|Release Date: 7/31/2024                                                                                                          
|Next Release Date: 8/30/2024
#### STATE ex rel. EMANUEL YNGVE v. PETER GRIFT and Another.1

October 20, 1908.

Nos. 16,037—(266).

Certificate of Nomination.

*Held,*that the provision of section 214, R. L. 1905, to the effect that a certificate of nomination of a candidate for a public office by the electors, shall state the party or political principle of the nominee, is mandatory, and that a certificate which makes no attempt to comply with such provision is void.

Petition by relator praying for an order directing the county auditor of Isanti county not to print upon the official ballot to be used at the general election on November *3,*1908, the name of Joseph K Johnson as candidate for election to the office of county superintendent of schools.

An order to show cause having been granted, the matter was argued and the petition granted.

*Godfrey G. Goodwin,*for relator.

1

 Reported in 117 N. W. 921.

PER CURIAM.

Order to show cause why the county auditor of the county of Isanti should not be directed to omit from the official ballot the name of respondent Joseph B. Johnson as a candidate for the office of county superintendent of schools. The respondent claims that he is entitled to have his name placed upon such ballot by virtue of a certificate of nomination by the requisite number of electors of the county, pursuant to R. L,. 1905, § 213.* The relator claims that such certificate of nomination is void, because it fails to comply with section 214, Id., which provides that: “Such certificate of nomination, * * ■ * shall contain the name of the person nominated, the office for which he is nominated, the party or political principle he represents, expressed in not more than three words, and his place of residence.” It is admitted that the certificate in this case made no attempt to state what party or political principle the. respondent represented. We have, then, the single question whether this provision of the statute is merely directory or mandatory.

*30The respondent relies ujion the case of Davidson v. Hanson, 87 Minn. 211, 91 N. W. 1124, 92 N. W. 93, in support of his claim that the provision is directory. The case is not here in point, for the question of the sufficiency of a certificate of nomination was in no manner involved in that case. It is too obvious to justify any extended argument that the legislature intended that a person should be represented .as somebody or as standing for something in the certificate of nomination. We accordingly hold that the statute in this respect is mandatory, and that the certificate in this case .is not sufficient to authorize the auditor to place the name of the respondent Johnson upon the official ballot as a candidate for the office of county superintendent of ■schools of the county of Isanti.

It is therefore ordered that the auditor of such county refrain from so placing the name of respondent Johnson upon such ballot as a' candidate for such office.
**EXHIBIT 31.2**

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, Darrell B. Lee, certify that:

 

1.               I have reviewed this Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q of MOCON, Inc.;

 

2.               Based on my knowledge, this report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period coveredby this report;

 

3.               Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;

 

4.               The registrant’s other certifyingofficer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

a)              Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;

 

b)             Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and

 

c)              Disclosed in this report any change inthe registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred duringthe registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and

 

5.               The registrant’s other certifying officer(s)and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controlover financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committeeof registrant’s Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):

 

a)              All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

b)             Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date:  May 15, 2006

 
| /s/ Darrell B. Lee                           |   |
|----------------------------------------------|--------|
| Darrell B. Lee                               |
| Chief Financial Officer and Vice President   |
| (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |

 

----