In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-18-00117-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 297th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1395360W

Before Meier, Gabriel, and Birdwell, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell

SAMMY AGUIRRE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After the trial court placed appellant Sammy Aguirre on deferred-adjudication 

community supervision for felony assault against a member of his family or 

household,1 the court found that he violated a condition of the community 

supervision, revoked the community supervision, and sentenced him to four years’ 

confinement. Aguirre does not appeal his conviction or his sentence. Rather, he 

challenges the trial court’s assessment of certain fees and costs. In his first point, he

argues that the trial court erred by assessing $685 in court-appointed attorney’s fees. 

In his second point, he asserts that the trial court erred by assessing a $28 cost “Due 

to CSCD” and by assessing $1,112 in unpaid probation fees as reparations. We 

modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified.

Background

The State charged Aguirre with assaulting a member of his family or 

household; the charging instrument alleged that he had a prior conviction for that 

offense. In December 2014, pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, he pleaded guilty. 

In accordance with the plea bargain, the trial court deferred adjudication of his guilt 

and placed him on community supervision for three years. The trial court’s deferredadjudication order stated that he owed attorney’s fees in an amount “to be 

determined.” A “certificate of proceedings” filed in the record upon his plea stated 

 1

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2018).
3

the same. Likewise, a bill of costs stated that attorney’s fees were “to be determined,” 

and Aguirre’s conditions of community supervision required him to pay attorney’s 

fees “in the amount of $TBD.”

In December 2017, the State filed a petition for the trial court to revoke 

Aguirre’s community supervision. After holding a hearing, the trial court found that 

Aguirre had violated a condition of his community supervision, convicted him, and 

sentenced him to four years’ confinement. In the judgment adjudicating his guilt, the 

trial court ordered him to pay $1,825 as reparations. A document filed by the 

community supervision and corrections department shows that $1,112 of the 

reparations were unpaid probation fees, that Aguirre owed $28 that was “DUE TO 

CSCD,” and that he owed $685 in attorney’s fees.2 The trial court also signed a nunc 

pro tunc order that corrected the December 2014 deferred-adjudication judgment so 

that it recited that Aguirre owed attorney’s fees of $300. Aguirre brought this appeal.

Attorney’s Fees

In his first point, Aguirre argues that the trial court erred by requiring him to 

pay attorney’s fees. He contends that the court could not require him to pay attorney’s 

fees because he was indigent throughout the proceedings, as evidenced by his 

representation by appointed counsel. He recognizes that a trial court has authority to 

order an indigent defendant to pay attorney’s fees to the extent that the defendant has 

 2

These three amounts equal $1,825; we therefore reject Aguirre’s assertion that 

the “composition of [the $1,825] is not entirely clear.”
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resources to do so. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2018). 

He argues, however, that the trial court never found that he was able to pay any 

amount and that the court therefore lacked the authority to require him to do so. He 

contends that because he “was found to be indigent . . . and there is nothing in the 

record to demonstrate a material change in circumstances, the evidence is insufficient 

to support” the requirement that he pay $685 in attorney’s fees. Finally, he argues that 

the trial court violated his right to due process by assessing the attorney’s fees.

With respect to the $300 in attorney’s fees that arise from the initial deferredadjudication proceedings (as established by the “to be determined” language in the 

2014 judgment and by the $300 assessment in the 2018 nunc pro tunc order), the 

State contends that Aguirre forfeited his complaint by not objecting to the 

requirement that he pay attorney’s fees when he was originally placed on community 

supervision. Generally, to present a complaint on appeal, a defendant must have 

presented the same complaint to the trial court and must have received a ruling. Tex. 

R. App. P. 33.1(a). These preservation-of-error requirements apply to constitutional 

complaints, including assertions of violations of due process. Yazdchi v. State, 428 

S.W.3d 831, 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1158 (2015).

To argue that Aguirre forfeited his complaint about the trial court’s assessment 

of $300 in attorney’s fees, the State relies on the court of criminal appeals’s decision in 

Riles v. State, 452 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We agree that Riles compels us 

to hold that Aguirre forfeited his complaint.
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In Riles, like in this case, the trial court deferred adjudication of Riles’s guilt, 

placed her on community supervision, and ordered her to pay attorney’s fees without 

specifying an amount. Id. at 334. Also like in this case, the record contained other 

documents (including plea paperwork) reciting Riles’s obligation to pay attorney’s 

fees. Id. Riles did not appeal from the order deferring guilt and imposing community 

supervision. Id. When the trial court revoked her community supervision and 

adjudicated her guilt, the court required her to pay $1,000 in attorney’s fees. Id. at 335. 

On appeal from the judgment adjudicating her guilt, she argued, as Aguirre argues, 

that the “trial court erred in ordering her to pay the [attorney’s fees] without any 

evidence that she had the ability to pay [them].” Id.

The court of criminal appeals held that Riles had forfeited her complaint. Id. at 

337–38. The court explained that the record established her knowledge that the trial 

court had imposed an unspecified attorney’s fee in the deferred-adjudication order 

and that she had an obligation at that time to challenge “the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting payment of the fee.” Id. at 337. The court explained that “any 

issue related to the original plea proceeding [could] be taken only in an appeal to the 

original order of deferred adjudication.” Id. (citing Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 

661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). Further, the court held that because Riles had 

knowledge of her obligation to pay attorney’s fees, her lack of knowledge of the exact 

amount was inconsequential. Id. In sum, the court held that Riles “had knowledge that 
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she was to be charged for her appointed attorney fee, . . . but she forfeited her claim 

by foregoing her initial appeal.” Id. at 338.

The principles supporting the decision in Riles compel the same result here. 

Although Aguirre did not have knowledge of the particular amount of attorney’s fees 

that the trial court would later assess against him, he knew in 2014, when the trial 

court signed its order deferring adjudication of his guilt, that the trial court was 

requiring him to pay attorney’s fees. Indeed, at that time, he signed a document 

reciting the conditions of his community supervision, including that he pay attorney’s 

fees in an amount to be determined. He did not appeal the trial court’s deferredadjudication order. We therefore hold that he forfeited his complaint that the trial 

court lacked authority to assess $300 in attorney’s fees for representation leading to 

the deferred-adjudication order. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Riles, 452 S.W.3d at 337–

38; Manuel, 994 S.W.2d at 661–62; see also Ford v. State, No. 12-17-00307-CR, 2018 WL 

1737085, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Apr. 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (citing Riles and holding similarly); Moore v. State, No. 06-14-00209-CR, 

2015 WL 1448389, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) (same). We overrule his first point to that extent.3

 3

Aguirre also contends that the record reflects that he has already paid the $300 

assessment and that the amount should be credited against the total amount of 

reparations owed. The State contests whether a notation in the clerk’s record proves 

that Aguirre has paid the fees, and we are unable to determine such. We trust that if 

Aguirre has already paid the fees, the clerk of the court will not seek collection again.
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The trial court required Aguirre to pay $685 in attorney’s fees. With respect to 

the remaining $385, the State concedes that nothing within the record supports the 

imposition of those fees and asks us to strike them. We agree that nothing in the 

record supports the remaining $385 in fees. We therefore sustain Aguirre’s first point 

to that extent. See Steen v. State, Nos. 02-18-00036-CR, 02-18-00220-CR, 2018 WL 

4782164, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 4, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (reciting the State’s concession that costs were unlawful 

and deleting the costs).

Other Costs

In his second point, Aguirre argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to 

pay, as part of the $1,825 reparations, $28 “Due to CSCD” and $1,112 in unpaid 

probation fees.

We have repeatedly held that a cost that is labeled “Due to CSCD,” without 

any further explanation, must be deleted because we cannot discern authority for the 

cost. See, e.g., Gatewood v. State, No. 02-18-00021-CR, 2018 WL 4625780, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Sept. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); 

Demerson v. State, No. 02-18-00003-CR, 2018 WL 3580893, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth July 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We reach 

the same holding here and sustain Aguirre’s second point to the extent that we will 

delete the $28 “Due to CSCD” cost.
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Concerning the $1,112 cost as reparations for unpaid probation fees, Aguirre 

argues that unpaid probation fees cannot be assessed as reparations. He concedes, 

however, that we have held to the contrary. Indeed, we have consistently rejected the 

precise argument that Aguirre makes here.4 See, e.g., Riojas v. State, No. 02-18-00026-

CR, 2018 WL 3580897, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (collecting cases). In accordance with our prior 

decisions, we overrule Aguirre’s second point to the extent that he complains about 

the $1,112 as reparations for unpaid probation fees.

Conclusion

Having sustained parts of Aguirre’s two points and having overruled other 

parts, we modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting $385 of the attorney’s fees 

ordered by the trial court and the $28 “Due to CSCD” cost, thus reducing the total 

amount of reparations owed to $1,412. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as 

modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b).

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: December 31, 2018

 4

We note that Aguirre does not contest that he owed probation fees and that 

the fees were unpaid.