[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2014-Ohio-41.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsJULIAN WILSON, JR. 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 13CA39 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Richland County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2012 

CR 0761 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 8, 2014 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JAMES J. MAYER, JR. WILLIAM BRINGMAN 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 13 East College Street 

JILL COCHRAN Fredericktown, OH 43019-3015 

ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 

38 South Park Street 

Mansfield, OH 44902 
[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2014-Ohio-41.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Julian Joseph Wilson, Jr. appeals his conviction 

entered by the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-appellee is the State 

of Ohio. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} Karen Brown (“Brown”) and appellant Julian Wilson, Jr. began dating in 

June of 2012. The two dated until October of 2012, breaking up for a brief period 

between July and August. Throughout their relationship, Brown and appellant 

maintained separate residences. Brown testified that on October 15, 2012, she and 

appellant were dating and getting along well. However, on that date, while appellant 

was at Brown’s home in Mansfield, Ohio, he went through her cell phone and found a 

message from another man. Brown testified the message was an old message from a 

friend. Appellant testified it was a recent and explicit text message from another man. 

Brown and appellant started arguing. Brown stated appellant punched her in the hand, 

causing her to drop the cell phone, took her cell phone, and left the residence. Brown 

subsequently went to her friend’s house and called appellant to inform him she needed 

him to return her phone. Brown testified appellant told her if she wanted the phone 

back, she would have to return to her residence. 

{¶3} Brown stated when she and her friend arrived at her home appellant met 

her at her friend’s vehicle and lifted his shirt to display a kitchen steak knife with a 

wooden handle tucked between his waistband and stomach. Brown’s friend did not see 

the knife because Brown’s body blocked her view of appellant and Brown told her friend 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 3 

to return home. Brown testified appellant whispered to Brown that he would kill her right 

then and there if she yelled and told Brown to get into the house. 

{¶4} According to Brown, when she and appellant walked inside her home, 

appellant shut and locked the door. After Brown and appellant started arguing, 

appellant removed the knife from his waistband and used the knife to stab between her 

legs at the pillow she was sitting on. The pillow was not damaged. Brown stated 

appellant would not allow her to leave and when she requested to use the bathroom as 

a ploy to escape through the bathroom window, appellant told her he would follow her to 

the bathroom. Brown testified appellant told her the only way she was leaving the home 

was in a body bag. When Brown’s sister called her, Brown stated appellant told her 

sister he killed Brown. Brown testified the incident lasted approximately one hour, 

during which time appellant would not let her leave her home. At one point, appellant 

dropped or set the knife down and Brown was able to pick up the knife and hide it 

between her legs. However, Brown stated that appellant then punched her in the face 

to make her return the knife. 

{¶5} Brown testified when her fifteen year old son, T.L., entered the home, she 

escaped out the back door. Brown did not leave the scene or run to the neighbor’s 

house, but yelled for T.L. to leave the house and told him appellant had a knife. On 

cross-examination, Brown testified appellant previously punched her on the day of her 

father’s funeral and one other time. 

{¶6} T.L. testified when he got to Brown’s house, the door was locked. T.L. 

could hear people inside, but it took them a long time to answer the door and he felt 

something was not right about the entire situation. After two or three knocks, appellant 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 4 

answered the door and let T.L. inside the home. T.L. saw Brown crying and Brown told 

T.L. appellant hit her. T.L. testified appellant admitted to striking Brown. T.L. and 

appellant began fighting and appellant punched T.L. and pushed him out of the house 

through the screen door. T.L. stated he did not see the knife until he and appellant got 

outside and when appellant pulled the knife out of his pocket, T.L. attempted to pin the 

knife hand against the wall. Brown stated she feared appellant was attempting to stab 

her son and thus she wrapped her arms around T.L., pulling him back. When appellant 

attempted to stab T.L., appellant stabbed Brown in the back of the hand. Appellant left 

the scene and Brown received medical attention after a neighbor called the police. 

Brown went to the hospital and was treated with several stitches in her hand. 

{¶7} Office Corey Kaufman (“Kaufman”) was sent to the scene on report of a 

stabbing. He was unable to locate appellant after the incident, but went to the hospital 

to take pictures of Brown’s wounds. Kaufman testified Brown was scared and nervous 

after the incident. 

{¶8} Dr. Crouse (“Crouse”), an emergency room doctor at MedCentral in 

Mansfield, treated Brown at the hospital. Brown informed Crouse she had been 

punched in the face and stabbed in the hand. Crouse examined Brown and confirmed 

her injuries were consistent with Brown’s allegations. Brown had bruising on the left 

side of her face and this contusion was most likely from being struck by someone’s right 

hand. The injury to Brown’s hand was consistent with being stabbed with a knife. 

Crouse opined the knife that made the wound would have been capable of inflicting 

death. 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 5 

{¶9} Appellant testified on his own behalf. Appellant stated he and Brown 

never had any physical altercations, but did previously have verbal altercations. 

Appellant testified on October 15, 2012, he was looking through Brown’s cell phone 

while at her house. When he encountered an explicit text message on the phone 

between Brown and another man, appellant confronted Brown and she “went crazy,” 

stormed out of the house and left him with her cell phone. After Brown called appellant 

to request her phone back, appellant stated he told her she had to come back and 

retrieve it from him at her home. Appellant testified Brown returned home with a friend 

and he met her at the car. Brown and appellant went into the home and appellant 

stated he did not lock the door when they entered the home. Appellant estimates he 

and Brown fought for approximately ten to fifteen minutes after going into the home. 

Appellant testified he never hit Brown and never had a knife. 

{¶10} According to appellant, T.L. knocked on the door and came into the house 

because the door was unlocked. Appellant denied hitting Brown, but Brown told T.L. 

that appellant hit her. Appellant stated after T.L. and appellant began fighting, T.L. 

backed him up against the screen door and pulled out a folding knife that was brown 

and gold and T.L. accidentally stabbed Brown in the hand as she reached around T.L. 

Appellant testified he did not restrain Brown from leaving the home, did not threaten her 

with a knife, and did not have a knife with him at any point on the day of October 15, 

2012. Appellant left the scene but did see the police and ambulance arrive from down 

the street. Appellant initially testified he went home after the incident, but later testified 

he did not go home for three days after the incident. On cross-examination, appellant 

opined that Brown made up the assault because she knew appellant intended to reunite 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 6 

with his ex-girlfriend. Appellant denied any knowledge of how Brown received her facial 

injury. Appellant testified regarding his criminal record, including several prior felonies 

for theft offenses and admitted a prior conviction for aggravated assault, but denied 

physically harming anyone. 

{¶11} Brown testified during rebuttal and stated that T.L. did not stab her 

accidentally. Further, that she did not know at the time of the incident that appellant 

was getting back together with an ex-girlfriend or that he had gotten back with her at the 

time of trial. 

{¶12} On November 13, 2012, appellant was indicted with one count of 

kidnapping under R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), a felony of the first degree, one count of felonious 

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) for causing or attempting to cause serious 

physical harm, a felony of the second degree, one of count of felonious assault under 

R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) for causing or attempting to cause physical harm with a deadly 

weapon, a felony of the second degree, and one count of assault under R.C. 

2903.13(A). 

{¶13} Appellant filed a Request for Intention to Use Evidence and Demand for 

Discovery on November 28, 2012. Also on November 28, 2012, appellant filed a 

request for bill of particulars pursuant to Criminal Rule 7(E). Appellee filed its Criminal 

Rule 16 discovery compliance on November 28, 2012, listing Corey Kaufman, Karen 

Brown, T.L., and Dorothy Latimore as witnesses for trial. Appellee supplemented 

discovery on March 4, 2013, and March 21, 2013. The trial was continued from the 

original trial date of February 25, 2013 to March 25, 2013. Counsel for appellant filed a 

motion to continue the trial due to a pending custody trial set for the same day. The trial 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 7 

court denied the motion, stating that criminal cases assigned for trial have priority over 

custody cases. 

{¶14} On March 25, 2013, the day of trial, appellant filed a motion to quash or 

dismiss indictment for failure of appellee to provide a bill of particulars as requested on 

November 28, 2012. Appellee filed a bill of particulars on March 25, 2013, providing the 

conduct that constituted the crime was as follows: “On October 15, 2012 at 75 Sturges 

Avenue, Mansfield, Ohio, the defendant wielded a knife at Karen Brown, refusing to let 

her leave for approximately an hour. He poked at her with the knife and stabbed her in 

the hand as he was attempting and threatening to stab [T.L.]. Karen Brown required 

stitches. The knife he used is capable of inflicting death.” The same facts were 

included in each of the four counts in the bill of particulars. 

{¶15} Prior to the beginning of the trial, the trial court heard arguments on 

appellant’s motion to quash or dismiss indictment. Appellant argued he was prejudiced 

because he only received the bill of particulars the day of trial. Appellee argued there 

was no prejudice to appellant because the State gave appellant open file discovery, 

including police reports, witness statements, and medical records. The trial court 

denied the motion but informed appellant that “if as this trial develops you’re in a 

position where you feel that you want to reargue this question because of the 

development of the evidence, you’re not precluded from doing that.” No further motions 

or objections were made on this matter during the trial. 

{¶16} At the close of appellee’s case and again at the end of trial, appellant 

made a Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal. The trial court denied appellant’s 

motions. The trial court instructed the jury on the various counts. The trial court stated 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 8 

that, “in Count II of the indictment Julian Wilson, Jr., is charged with felonious assault on 

Karen Brown * * * Before you can find Mr. Wilson guilty of felonious assault, which I will 

call serious physical harm felonious assault, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that on or about the 15th day of October, 2012, in Richland County, Ohio, he knowingly 

caused serious physical harm to Karen Brown.” Regarding Count III, the trial court 

stated, “In Count III of the indictment Mr. Wilson is charged with felonious assault on 

Karen Brown by means of a deadly weapon. * * * Before you can find Mr. Wilson guilty 

of felonious assault, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about October 

15, 2012, and in Richland County, Ohio, he knowingly caused or attempted to cause 

physical harm to Karen Brown by means of a deadly weapon.” The trial court instructed 

on Count IV that “before you can find Mr. Wilson guilty of assault, you must find beyond 

a reasonable doubt that on or about the 15th day of October, and in Richland County, 

Ohio, Mr. Wilson knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to [T.L.].” 

{¶17} The jury returned a verdict of not guilty of Count I kidnapping, guilty of 

Count II felonious assault, not guilty of Count III felonious assault, and guilty of Count IV 

misdemeanor assault. Appellant filed a pro se motion for judgment of acquittal on April 

8, 2013. After the state responded on April 11, 2013, the trial court denied the motion. 

Appellant was sentenced to four years on the Count II felonious assault and six months 

on the Count IV misdemeanor assault to be served concurrent with each other but 

consecutive to a one year sentence on a probation violation in Case No. 10-CR-622. 

{¶18} Appellant now appeals and assigns as error the following: 

{¶19} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INDICTMENT 

FOR APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE A TIMELY BILL OF PARTICULARS. 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 9 

{¶20} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING COUNT II AND IV 

FOR APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE STATEMENTS SET FORTH IN ITS 

BILL OF PARTICULARS FOR SAID COUNTS.” 

I. 

{¶21} Appellant first argues the trial court erred in not dismissing the indictment 

for appellee’s failure to provide a timely bill of particulars. We disagree. 

{¶22} Criminal Rule 7(E) provides that, “[w]hen the defendant makes a written 

request within twenty-one days after arraignment but not later than seven days before 

trial * * * the prosecuting attorney shall furnish the defendant with a bill of particulars 

setting up specifically the nature of the offense charged and of the conduct of the 

defendant alleged to constitute the offense.” Further, R.C. 2941.07 states that upon 

the request of the accused, “the prosecuting attorney shall furnish a bill of particulars 

setting up specifically the nature of the offense charged and the conduct of the 

defendant which is alleged to constitute the offense.” The purpose of the bill of 

particulars is to “elucidate or particularize the conduct of the accused alleged to 

constitute the charged offense.” State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 478 N.E.2d 

781 (1985). 

{¶23} However, the failure of the prosecuting attorney to provide a criminal 

defendant with a bill of particulars after a timely request does not automatically result in 

a reversal of a conviction. State v. Cossack, 7th Dist. No. 03MA110, 2005-Ohio-2784. 

The failure to provide a bill of particulars upon request is harmless error unless a 

defendant demonstrates that his “lack of knowledge concerning the specific facts a bill 

of particulars would have provided him actually prejudiced him in his ability to fairly 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 10 

defend himself.” State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 1999-Ohio-288, 709 N.E.2d 1166 

(1999). 

{¶24} In this case, the failure of appellee to provide a bill of particulars until the 

day of trial did not preclude or hinder appellant from effectively presenting his defense. 

Appellant provided no specific reason why he was prejudiced by the filing of the bill of 

particulars on the date of trial. As indicated by appellee during the hearing on 

appellant’s motion to dismiss, appellee had an “open discovery” policy through which 

appellant and his counsel were provided with copies of the police reports, medical 

records, and witness statements available to the State of Ohio. Appellant had the 

opportunity to assess the evidence appellee planned to present during trial and 

appellant had the opportunity during his testimony to assert that T.L. accidentally 

stabbed Brown during the October 15, 2012 incident. Appellant thus prepared his 

defense without a bill of particulars, did not complain of its absence until the day of trial, 

and does not indicate how he could have defended himself differently had he been 

provided with the bill of particulars prior to the date of trial. 

{¶25} Appellant requested the bill of particulars on November 28, 2012. When 

appellee failed to comply with appellant’s request, appellant took no further action until 

the day of trial when he filed a motion to quash or dismiss indictment. “A proper method 

of protesting the state’s failure to provide a bill of particulars would have been to file a 

motion to compel compliance with the order.” State v. Shirley, 12th Dist. No. CA2012-

07-127, 2013-Ohio-1948, quoting State v. Ray, 12th Dist. No. CA2009-06-022, 2010-

Ohio-2434. Appellant failed to file a motion to compel and likewise failed to request a 

continuance of the trial. Further, though the trial court denied appellant’s motion to 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 11 

quash or suppress, the trial court specifically informed appellant “if as this trial develops 

you’re in a position where you feel that you want to reargue this question because of the 

development of the evidence, you’re not precluded from doing that.” No further motions 

or objections were made on this matter during the trial. 

{¶26} Accordingly, appellant has failed to prove he was prejudiced by appellee’s 

failure to provide a bill of particulars until the day of trial. Appellant’s first assignment of 

error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶27} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should 

have dismissed Counts II and IV because appellee failed to prove the statements made 

in the bill of particulars. Appellant contends since the same facts were included in the 

bill of particulars under each charge and appellant was found not guilty of kidnapping, 

appellee failed to prove the statements in the bill of particulars beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Further, that since the facts contained in all counts of the bill of particulars were 

the same, it was not clear as to which charge corresponded with each victim. We 

disagree. 

{¶28} The purpose of a bill of particulars is to “particularize the conduct of the 

accused to constitute the charged offense.” State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 

478 N.E.2d 781 (1985). The bill of particulars is not designed to “provide the accused 

with specifications of evidence or to serve as a substitute for discovery.” Id. Thus, it 

must only set up the specific nature of the offense charged and the conduct of the 

defendant alleged to constitute the offense. Crim. R. 7(E). Further, a bill of particulars 

“need only be directed toward the conduct of the accused as it is understood by the 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 12 

[S]tate to have occurred.” State v. Gingell, 7 Ohio App.3d 364, 455 N.E.2d 1066 (1st 

Dist. 1982). Criminal Rule 33(E)(2) provides that a variance between the allegations 

and the evidence at trial is not reversible error unless the defense is prejudiced or 

misled thereby. 

{¶29} In this case, the indictment provided by appellee contained the statutory 

language of each charge against him. The bill of particulars appellee supplied appellant 

with provided a specific date, location, and description of the alleged offenses sufficient 

to inform appellant of the conduct being alleged. The bill of particulars provided that 

appellant “wielded a knife at Karen Brown, refusing to let her leave for approximately an 

hour. He poked at her with the knife and stabbed her in the hand as he was attempting 

and threatening to stab [T.L.]. Karen Brown required stitches.” The testimony 

presented at trial supports the statements provided in the bill of particulars. Brown 

testified appellant poked at her with a knife, stabbing the pillow she was sitting on. 

Brown and T.L. testified appellant stabbed Brown in the back of the hand when she tried 

to pull T.L. away as appellant attempted to stab T.L. Dr. Crouse stated the contusion 

Brown sustained was in the back of her hand, required stitches, and was consistent with 

a knife wound. 

{¶30} Simply because the description provided in Count I of the bill of particulars 

was the same as in Counts II and IV of the bill of particulars does not necessitate a 

finding that appellee failed to meet their burden in this case. While the narrative 

included facts regarding counts appellant was found not guilty of, it also specifically 

included a description of the offenses in Counts II and IV, stating that appellant stabbed 

[Brown] in the hand as he was attempting and threatening to stab T.L. and that Brown 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 13 

required stitches. We find appellant was on notice as to what conduct was being 

alleged in Counts II and IV and there is no variance between the testimony at trial and 

the allegations contained in the bill of particulars. 

{¶31} Appellant also argues since the facts listed in the bill of particulars are the 

same for each count, it is not clear which count corresponds with victim Brown and 

which count corresponds with victim T.L. As noted above, the purpose of the bill of 

particulars is to “elucidate or particularize the conduct of the accused alleged to 

constitute the charged offense.” State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 478 N.E.2d 

781 (1985). The description of facts in each charge of the bill of particulars sets forth 

the conduct of appellant alleged to constitute each offense. Further, the trial court made 

it clear to the jury who was the victim in each charge in its jury instructions as the 

victim’s name “Karen Brown” was included in Counts I, II, and III, and the victim’s name 

“T.L” was included in Count IV. 

{¶32} Appellant also argues in his second assignment of error that appellee 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the Count II 

felonious assault because appellant did not knowingly cause serious physical harm to 

Brown as he was attempting to stab T.L. We disagree. 

{¶33} Sufficiency of the evidence is the standard applied “to determine whether 

the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as matter of law 

to support the jury verdict.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 

541 (1997). In reviewing the record for sufficiency, “the relevant inquiry is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 14 

doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), superseded by 

constitutional amendment on other grounds. 

{¶34} Appellant was convinced of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(A)(1) which provides that: “(A) No person shall knowingly * * * (1) Cause 

serious physical harm to another * * *.” The requisite culpable mental state for felonious 

assault is “knowingly,” which is defined, “[a] person acts knowingly, regardless of his 

purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will 

probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is 

aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). It is well established 

that one may be presumed to intend results which are the natural, reasonable, and 

probable consequences of his voluntary acts. State v. Farmer, 156 Ohio St. 214, 102 

N.E.2d 11 (1951). Further, “it is not necessary that the accused be in a position to 

foresee the precise consequence of his conduct; only that the consequence be 

foreseeable in the sense that what actually transpired was natural and logical in that it 

was within the scope of the risk created by his conduct.” State v. Losey, 23 Ohio 

App.3d 93, 96, 491 N.E.2d 379 (10th Dist. 1985). 

{¶35} In this case, Brown testified when she saw appellant take out the knife 

when he and T.L. were fighting outside the home, she believed appellant was going to 

stab T.L. in the back. Further, when she stepped in to pull T.L. away and prevent him 

from being stabbed, appellant stabbed her in the back of the hand. T.L. also testified 

appellant had the knife and stabbed Brown with the knife as she was reaching around 

T.L. to pull him back from appellant. Dr. Crouse confirmed Brown had an injury on the 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 15 

back of her hand consistent with being stabbed. When appellant testified, he denied 

having a knife and stated T.L. accidentally stabbed Brown. 

{¶36} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellee, we find there 

was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the serious 

physical harm Brown sustained in the hand was a natural and logical consequence and 

within the scope of the risk created by appellant’s voluntary conduct and was the 

reasonable and probable result of appellant’s actions. We find the evidence provided at 

trial was sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction. 

{¶37} Appellant next contends an acquittal of Count III, felonious assault with a 

deadly weapon, necessitates an acquittal on Count II, felonious assault with serious 

physical harm, because the verdicts are inconsistent. We disagree. The Ohio Supreme 

Court has held that each count of an indictment charges a complete offense and that 

separate counts of an indictment are not interdependent, but are each complete in itself. 

State v. Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d 440, 683 N.E.2d 1112 (1997). Further, “an 

inconsistency in a verdict does not arise out of inconsistent responses to different 

counts, but only arises out of inconsistent responses to the same count.” Id.; State v. 

Brown, 12 Ohio St.3d 147, 465 N.E.2d 889 (1984). Thus, “inconsistent verdicts on 

different counts of a multi-count indictment does not justify overturning a verdict * * *.” 

State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 819 N.E.2d 1047, 2004-Ohio-6548 (2004). In this 

case, appellant alleges inconsistency between the verdicts on a multi-count indictment. 

As held by the Ohio Supreme Court, this is not the type of inconsistency that justifies 

setting aside a verdict. 
Richland County, Case No. 13CA39 16 

{¶38} In the last paragraph of his reply brief, appellant argues the indictment 

filed in the case does not contain any allegation of subject matter jurisdiction of where 

the offenses occurred in violation of R.C. 2941.03(D) and requests this Court dismiss 

the indictment against appellant. However, appellant did not assign as error the 

insufficiency of the indictment in his appellant’s brief. App. R. 16(A)(7) provides that 

assignments of error shall be argued in the brief of appellant. App. R. 16(C) states that 

a reply brief is to “reply to the brief of the appellee.” New assignments of error cannot 

be raised in a reply brief. State v. Nichols, 5th Dist. No. 01-CA-016, 2002-Ohio-4048, 

citing Sheppard v. Mack, 68 Ohio App.2d 95, 427 N.E.2d 522 (8th Dist. 1980). 

Therefore, we decline to address appellant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the 

indictment as it was raised for the first time in appellant’s reply brief. See 

CSAHA/UHHS-Canton, Inc. v. Aultman Health Found., 5th Dist. No. 2010CA00303, 

2012-Ohio-897. 

{¶39} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Richland County Common 

Pleas Court is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Wise, J., and 

Baldwin, J., concur