#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Victoria Caldwell, Appellant.

[55 NYS3d 311]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Collins, J.), rendered October 28, 2015, convicting her of falsifying business records in the first degree *1022(four counts) and wilful violation of the Public Health Law, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of falsifying business records in the first degree (four counts) and wilful violation of the Public Health Law beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear testimony, and observe demeanor *(see People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant’s contention that a severance of the trial from all of the codefendants was warranted on her behalf is without merit. Severance motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court *(see People v Mahboubian,*74 NY2d 174, 183 [1989]). “Severance is compelled only where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer a defendant’s guilt” *(People v Martins,*306 AD2d 423, 423 [2003]). Here, initially, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for a severance with respect to several of the codefendants. As to the remaining codefendants, the core of each their defenses was not in irreconcilable conflict with that of the defendant *(see People v Turnbull,*52 AD3d 747 [2008]; *cf. People v Mahboubian,*74 NY2d at 184). As the proof against the defendant was supplied by the same evidence, only the most cogent reasons would warrant a severance *(see People v Bornholdt,*33 NY2d 75, 87 [1973]). The defendant failed to provide any such cogent reason to warrant full severance.

The defendant’s contention that her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under *Bruton v United States*(391 US 123 [1968]) was violated by the admission into evidence of statements made by a nontestifying codefendant to a prosecution witness is partially unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Jenkins,*93 AD3d 861 [2012]; *People v Rodriguez,*210 AD2d 266 [1994]; *People v Halstead,*180 AD2d 818 [1992]). In any event, the contention is without merit. *Bruton*does not apply, and no violation of the Confrontation Clause exists, when the challenged statements are not incriminating *1023on their face, but only become so when linked with other evidence introduced at trial *(see People v Johnson,*27 NY3d 60 [2016]). Here, the challenged statements did not directly implicate the defendant *(see People v Gilocompo,*125 AD3d 1000 [2015]), and, hence, were not “facially incriminating” statements *(Richardson v Marsh,*481 US 200, 207 [1987]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

Balkin, J.P., Cohen, Miller and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.