United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 19-2936

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Kasey Lea Racette

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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 Submitted: April 16, 2020

Filed: May 29, 2020

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

After pleading guilty to conspiracy to engage in interstate transportation of

stolen goods and access device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2314,

1029(a)(2), and 1029(b)(2), Kasey Racette was sentenced to 33 months

imprisonment. On direct appeal, she challenges her sentence as substantively
unreasonable. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the judgment

of the district court.1

At sentencing, the district court calculated Racette’s advisory Guidelines range

as 33 to 41 months imprisonment, based on a total offense level of 19 and a criminal

history category of II. Thus, her 33-month sentence was at the low end of the

Guidelines range. Racette asserts that her within-Guidelines range sentence is

substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to give sufficient weight

to the following facts in the record: (1) that a co-defendant, who had a similar role in

the offense, received a sentence of time served; (2) that Racette was essentially a 

first-time offender and that she voluntarily withdrew from the conspiracy before the

investigation commenced; and (3) that a prison sentence would be harmful to

Racette’s minor daughter. 

We review the substantive reasonableness of the defendant’s sentence for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith, 795 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2015) (per

curiam). “A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court fails to

consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the

appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” 

United States v. Lozoya, 623 F.3d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted). A sentence within the Guidelines range may be presumed reasonable on

appeal. United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 

Racette has not convincingly demonstrated why the district court abused its

discretion in imposing a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. First,

although the district court did not mention all of them by name, it clearly weighed the

1The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

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relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. It explicitly noted the nature and circumstances

of the offense, and it expressed concern that Racette was not serious about returning

to a law-abiding life, that she was not concerned with the consequences of her

actions, and that she was likely to re-offend in light of her criminal history and

inability to comply with the terms of her pretrial release. This was a sufficient

justification for imposing the sentence. See United States v. Powills, 537 F.3d 947,

950 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[a] district court is not required to recite each of the

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as long as the record makes clear that

they were considered”). 

Additionally, we find unpersuasive Racette’s arguments concerning the

mitigating factors in the record. First, the district court found that Racette’s role in

the offense was less extensive than that of co-defendant Richard Frazier, who was

sentenced to the statutory maximum of 60 months imprisonment, but more extensive

than that of co-defendant Orlando Frazier, who was sentenced to time served. This

finding is not clearly erroneous in light of the record. See United States v. Allmon,

500 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review). Accordingly, Racette’s

argument that the district court’s sentence resulted in an unwarranted sentencing

disparity between her sentence and that of her co-defendant, Orlando Frazier, is

without merit.

Second, Racette’s argument that she was essentially a “first-time” offender is

incorrect as a factual matter—the presentence investigation report noted that Racette

had a criminal history category of II, as she had prior drug and motor vehicle

convictions. Moreover, the district court expressly accounted for her criminal history

in its explanation for the sentence. The district court also recognized Racette’s

voluntary withdrawal from the conspiracy as a mitigating factor, but found that it was

not entitled to significant weight because Racette continued to engage in criminal

conduct and did not try to stop others from engaging in the scheme. Although

Racette may have preferred that the district court give her withdrawal from the

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conspiracy more weight, it did not abuse its discretion by declining to do so. See

United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

Finally, the district court’s failure to explicitly mention the hardship to

Racette’s daughter as a mitigating factor was not an abuse of discretion. The district

court was well aware of this claim, as it came up during the hearing, but it declined

to vary downward on this basis. See United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 995

(8th Cir. 2008) (“[A] district court that is aware of an argument does not abuse its

discretion by not considering it.”); see also United States v. Lewis, 593 F.3d 765, 773

(8th Cir. 2010) (“The district court considered [defendant’s] arguments for a

downward variance but appropriately exercised its discretion in rejecting them.”). 

Moreover, declining to give significant weight to this fact is appropriate in light of

the Guidelines’ policy of discouraging downward departures and variances on the

basis of family ties and responsibilities. See USSG § 5H1.6.

For these reasons, we affirm Racette’s sentence. 

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