UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ CHARLES C. ASHFORD, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. SCOTT CROW, Director, Respondent - Appellee. No. 20-6077 (D.C. No. 5:20- CV-00316-F) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING CERTIFIC ATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , KELLY , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Petitioner-Appellant Charles Ashford, a st ate inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) from the district court’s di smissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging the ex ecution of his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Ci r. 2000) (COA required for state § 2241 petitioners). To obtain a COA, Mr. Ashford must make “a substa ntial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits . . . [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 20, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 reasonable jurists would find the district c ourt’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDa niel, 528 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In 1997, Mr. Ashford was conv icted in Oklahoma state court of sexual abuse of a minor child and sentenced to life imprisonment . In March 2020, Mr. Ashford filed this § 2241 petition. He maintains that, at the tim e of his conviction, Oklahoma law treated a life sentence as a sentence of 45 years’ im prisonment. He also argues that because his life sentence should be treated as a 45-year sentence under ex post facto principles, he is entitled to the application of ea rned credits. Upon recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court adopted the conclusions of the magistrate judge that: (1) at the time of Mr. Ashford’s conviction, Okla homa did not construe life se ntences as a sentence for 45 years’ imprisonment; and (2) he is not entitle d to the application of earned credits. Ashford v. Crow, CIV-20-316-F, 2020 WL 2516580 (W.D. Ok la. May 15, 2020), adopting 2020 WL 2516188 (April 23, 2020). The district court also denied Mr. Ashford’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Id. On appeal, he argues that a 45-year sentence is for discharge, not merely parole eligibility. He further argues that the district court abused its discretion in not holding an evidentiary hearing and in denying a COA becau se it made a merits determination rather than merely assessing whether his cl aims were reasonably debatable. The district court’s disposition is not r easonably debatable. Contrary to Mr. Ashford’s assertions and as recognized by the district court and magistrate judge, Oklahoma law does not automatically treat a lif e sentence as a sentence to a term of 45 years, but rather uses 45 years as a benchmar k to determine when an inmate serving a life3 sentence may become eligible to be considered for parole. Taylor v. State, 248 P.3d 362, 378 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 332.7(a). Moreover, Oklahoma law is clear that a prisoner serving a life senten ce is not eligible for the application of earned credits. Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138(A). We DENY a COA, deny the motion to pr oceed IFP, and DISMISS the appeal.

Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge