UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1135

CATHERINE W. WEBER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, a subsidiary of 

CIGNA Corporation,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Lynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior 

District Judge. (6:11-cv-00032-NKM-BWC)

Submitted: July 30, 2012 Decided: August 20, 2012

Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

G. Edgar Dawson, III, Chad A. Mooney, PETTY, LIVINGSTON, DAWSON 

& RICHARDS, PC, Lynchburg, Virginia, for Appellant. Zoe 

Sanders, William C. Wood, Jr., NELSON MULLINS RILEY & 

SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Catherine W. Weber sought a declaratory judgment 

holding that she is entitled to benefits under her deceased 

husband’s life insurance policies. The district court granted

Appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Weber 

appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, applying 

the same standard we apply to motions to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Independence News, 

Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2009). 

We accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and 

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Weber. Burbach 

Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 

(4th Cir. 2002). In order to survive a motion for judgment on 

the pleadings, the complaint must contain facts sufficient “to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). 

Weber’s husband, Carl (“Carl”), was killed in the 

crash of a personal aircraft on which he was a passenger. Prior 

to his death, Carl participated through his employment in an 

insurance plan that included accidental death and dismemberment

benefits issued by Life Insurance Company of North America, a 
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subsidiary of CIGNA Corporation (“Appellee”). The policies 

contain eleven “Common Exclusions” that bar the award of 

benefits for loss resulting from a number of events, including 

among others, suicide, skydiving, or driving under the 

influence. At issue in this case is Common Exclusion 6(a), 

which bars benefits for loss occurring during “(6) flight in, 

boarding or alighting from an Aircraft or any craft designed to 

fly above the Earth’s surface (a) except as a passenger on a 

regularly scheduled commercial airline.” The remainder of 

Common Exclusion 6, subsections (b) through (g), bars coverage 

for loss occurring during a variety of flight-related 

activities.

On appeal, Weber challenges the district court’s 

conclusion that Common Exclusion 6 is unambiguous and therefore 

enforceable. Weber claims that had Common Exclusion 6 ended at 

subsection 6(a), “any reasonable person would understand and 

expect that only commercial airline passengers [would] be 

covered in the event of an accidental death,” but that 

subsections 6(b) through 6(g) are superfluous when read in 

conjunction with subsection 6(a), and therefore blur the issue 

of what flight activity is actually excluded from coverage.

The district court rejected this argument, relying 

upon Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 166 

F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1948), in reaching its conclusion that each 
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provision in the policies must be independently read. As the 

district court noted, the structure of Common Exclusion 6 is 

similar to the challenged exclusions upheld in Provident Life. 

We conclude that the district court correctly ruled 

that each of the subsections contained in Common Exclusion 6 

details a separate type of risk that is excluded from coverage. 

Read on its own, Subsection 6(a) bars coverage for accidents

caused by or resulting from “flight in, boarding or alighting 

from an Aircraft or any craft designed to fly above the Earth’s 

surface except as a passenger on a regularly scheduled 

commercial airline.” In addition to this general exclusion, we 

agree with the district court that Common Exclusions 6(b) 

through 6(g) articulate additional grounds of exclusion barring 

coverage for certain activities otherwise arguably not covered 

by Common Exclusion 6(a). Thus, the subsections of Common 

Exclusion 6(a) are neither conflicting nor ambiguous. We 

accordingly conclude that Subsection 6(a) clearly bars coverage 

for Carl’s death.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED