[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 110 (Tuesday, June 9, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Page 31533]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-15268]



[[Page 31533]]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-341]


In the Matter of Detroit Edison Company (Fermi 2); Exemption

I

    The Detroit Edison Company (the licensee) is the holder of Facility 
Operating License No. NPF-43, which authorizes operation of Fermi 2. 
The license provides, among other things, that the licensee is subject 
to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or 
hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of a boiling-water reactor at the licensee's 
site located in Monroe County, Michigan.

II

    Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
``Criticality accident requirements,'' requires that each licensee 
authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a 
criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material 
is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 
70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these 
monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas 
subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two 
detectors.
    Paragraph (a) of 10 CFR 70.14 states that the Commission may, upon 
application of any interested person, grant such exemptions from the 
requirements of the regulations in 10 CFR Part 70 as it determines are 
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common 
defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest.

III

    The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at Fermi 2 is 
in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that 
is stored on site in any given location is small enough to preclude 
achieving a critical mass. The Commission has evaluated the possibility 
of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at Fermi 2 and has 
determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur 
if the licensee meets the following seven criteria:
    1. Only three new fuel assemblies are allowed out of a shipping 
cask or storage rack at one time.
    2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the 
k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence 
level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with 
fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a 
moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
    4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are 
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
flooded with pure water.
    5. The quantity of forms of SNM, other than nuclear fuel, that are 
stored on site in any given area is less than the quantity necessary 
for a critical mass.
    6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, 
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive 
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
    7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight 
percent.
    By letter dated April 27, 1998, the licensee requested an exemption 
from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request the licensee addressed the seven 
criteria given above. The Commission has reviewed the licensee's 
submittal and has determined that Fermi 2 meets the applicable 
criteria. Criteria 2 and 3 are not applicable to Fermi 2 because plant 
procedures preclude the use of the fresh fuel storage racks. Therefore, 
the staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely for an 
inadvertent criticality to occur in SNM handling or storage areas at 
Fermi 2.
    The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate 
action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that 
such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has criticality 
accident monitors conforming to 10 CFR 70.24 in the areas in which fuel 
is handled outside the inner metal shipping cask and administrative 
controls over the handling of the casks in other areas. The low 
probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the licensee's 
criticality accident monitors and administrative controls, constitutes 
good cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 
70.24(a).

IV

    The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Detroit Edison 
Company, an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a) for 
Fermi 2.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment (63 FR 29256).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of June 1998.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-15268 Filed 6-8-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P