J. S50006/14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

FREDDIE KNIGHT, : No. 911 WDA 2013 

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, April 3, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0005253-2012 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND ALLEN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 2, 2014 

 This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered April 3, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County following appellant’s 

guilty plea to several charges stemming from a motor vehicle accident. We 

affirm. 

 At appellant’s guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth presented the 

following summary of the evidence: 

That on February 12, 2012, the victim, 

Tammy Roberts, and her boyfriend, Peter Gearhart, 

were having dinner at the Creighton Hotel located at

995 Freeport Road in East Deer Township, Allegheny 

County. 

 Roberts and Gearhart left the restaurant 

around 10:00 that evening, intending to walk to their 

home which was only a few blocks away. After the 

victim and Gearhart exited the restaurant, they 

found themselves on the sidewalk at the foot of 
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several cement stairs descending from the main bar 

entrance. 

 They noticed the defendant’s vehicle traveling 

southbound on Freeport Road. Peter Gearhart would 

have testified that the defendant’s vehicle which was 

a 1996 purple Ford Mustang appeared to be traveling 

at a high rate of speed and when adjacent to the 

hotel lost control with the car descending into a yaw 

[sic] and traveling sideways. 

 Before coming to rest, the defendant’s car 

struck Tammy Roberts and pinned her leg and foot 

against the front cement stairs of the Creighton 

Hotel. 

 Gearhart could see the defendant, 

Freddie Knight, in the driver seat of the vehicle with 

the female later identified as Carrie Arblaster in the 

front passenger seat. 

 The defendant then put the car into reverse 

and began to flee the parking lot. Realizing the 

defendant was leaving the scene, Mr. Gearhart threw 

a full sixpack of beer he was carrying at the 

defendant’s car cracking the windshield. 

 The defendant fled in his vehicle down a side 

street and eventually out of view of Mr. Gearhart. 

 Police were immediately called and the 

description of the defendant and his vehicle was 

broadcast over police ban [sic]. Fawn Township 

police officer Christopher Cattone, while on patrol, 

spotted the defendant’s vehicle on Route 908, some 

12 miles from the Creighton Hotel. 

 Defendant’s vehicle appeared to be heavily 

damaged, was smoking, and the head and taillights 

were flickering. 

 Officer Cattone initiated lights and sirens and 

attempted a traffic stop of Knight’s vehicle. At that 
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point Knight accelerated his vehicle with Officer 

Cattone in pursuit. 

 As the chase proceeded down Route 908, 

speeds reached approximately 70 to 80 miles per 

hour. Near the intersection of 908 and Ridge Road, 

the defendant drove his car completely into the 

oncoming lane of traffic and onto the shoulder, 

finally turning onto a gravel road called Greenhaven

Lane. 

 The defendant’s vehicle then spun out of 

control, striking the pursuing police car before 

coming to a stop. 

 Defendant Freddie Knight then emerged from 

the driver’s side door and escaped on foot into the 

surrounding forest. Officer Cattone gave chase on 

foot into the woods where he found the defendant 

several hundred yards away attempting to hide 

under some vegetation and brush. 

 Refusing repeated commands to show his 

hands which the defendant had placed underneath 

himself, Officer Cattone deployed his taser once on 

the defendant which compelled Knight to follow 

directions thereafter. 

 Knight voluntarily submitted to a blood draw at 

Allegheny Valley Hospital. The blood [was] tested by 

the Allegheny County Office of the Medical Examiner 

at Lab 12LAB01319. Testing performed showed 

negative results for all legal and prescription 

narcotics but did find a low level whole blood ethanol

reading of 0.019 percent. 

 The defendant gave a statement to 

investigating Allegheny County police detectives in 

which he admitted driving the Mustang, striking the 

victim, and fleeing from the police. 

 Although the defendant claimed his vehicle was 

struck from behind by a pickup truck causing him to 

lose control of his vehicle before the collision at the 
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hotel, he did concede that he fled the scene and also 

the police subsequently due to his driver’s license 

being suspended. 

 The Commonwealth would have introduced the 

certified record from the Pennsylvania Department of 

Transportation showing this defendant’s driver’s 

license at the time of this incident was suspended 

due to various traffic violations. 

 Carrie Arblaster, who was the passenger in 

defendant’s vehicle, would have testified consistent 

with the defendant that their vehicle had been forced

off the road by a truck. 

 Arblaster would have also testified that she 

repeatedly told the defendant to return to the scene 

of the collision to which the defendant refused saying 

he had a suspended license. 

 Arblaster also screamed at [defendant] during 

the police pursuit, telling him to pull over. Again,

[defendant] responded that he had to escape due to 

the collision and his license being suspended. 

 The standard vehicle accident reconstruction of 

the accident was impossible in this case mainly due 

to the defendant leaving the scene. 

Detective Zabelski and others later inspected the 

defendant’s vehicle and found it to be serviceable 

other than the damage sustained in this incident. All 

breaking [sic] systems worked appropriately. 

 Also [in] an attempt to corroborate or disprove 

the defendant’s claim about the truck striking the 

rear of the defendant’s vehicle, detectives inspected 

and photographed the rear bumper. Some minor 

damage was noted making a definitive scientific 

stance on defendant’s contention impossible. 

 Also the defendant did not appear to have the 

proper insurance covering the vehicle. 

. . . . 
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 The victim’s injuries in this case, 48-year old 

Tammy Roberts was initially treated at the scene by 

EMS service medic no. 272. A bystander with some 

military combat experience had also applied a 

tourniquet to the victim’s leg prior to EMS arriving.

 As the victim’s right foot and leg were 

completely pulverized, EMS personnel realized 

amputation would be necessary. 

 Victim was transported via Life Flight 4 to 

Allegheny General Hospital where she was intubated 

and underwent immediate emergency surgery for 

right lower extremity blood [sic] trauma with tibia 

fibula fracture, open as well as vascular injury. 

 Ms. Roberts was categorized as being in critical 

condition and was intubated. Because of extensive 

trauma to her right leg, her right leg was amputated

below the knee. The victim also underwent some 

14 follow-up surgical procedures over the next few 

weeks and months to remove necrotic tissue and 

shape the stump on her leg to allow for the use of 

the prosthesis. 

 In the weeks and months following the medical 

procedures, the victim went through physical therapy 

to use a prosthetic leg. 

 Ms. Roberts is present today. She is in a 

wheelchair. She does have a prosthetic leg. She is 

still in the process of learning to use that. She’s due 

to be outfitted with a new, as it was described to me, 

digital prosthesis which will happen sometime before 

the defendant’s sentencing. 

Notes of testimony, 12/13/12 at 10-18. 

 Appellant pled guilty to accidents involving death or personal injury, 

resisting arrest, accidents involving death or personal injury while not 

properly licensed, and fleeing or attempting to elude police in exchange for 
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the withdrawal of several other charges. On April 3, 2013, the court 

sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 5 to 10 years. 

On April 12, 2013, a post-sentence motion requesting reconsideration of 

sentence was filed. The trial court denied the post-sentence motion on 

April 23, 2013. This appeal followed. Appellant was ordered to file a 

Rule 1925(b) statement and he complied. Appellant raises the following 

issue: 

I. DID THE SENTENCING COURT ACT 

UNREASONABLY BY IMPOSING EXCESSIVE 

SENTENCES RUNNING CONSECUTIVELY AT 

EACH COUNT AND EXCEEDING THE 

GUIDELINES AT SOME COUNTS, WITHOUT 

ADEQUATELY CONSIDERING ALL STATUTORILY 

REQUIRED SENTENCING FACTORS? 

Appellant’s brief at 6. 

 Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

 Challenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of

right. An appellant challenging the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s 

jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: 

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has 

filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider 

and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial 

question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the 
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Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9781(b). 

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

are generally waived if they are not raised at the 

sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the 

sentence imposed. 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations 

omitted). 

 Instantly, appellant filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration 

and then filed a timely notice of appeal. In addition, appellant has complied 

with the briefing requirements of Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 

17 (Pa. 1987), and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) by including a concise statement of his 

reasons for challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Last, 

appellant presents a substantial question for our review. We have held that 

“when a sentence exceeds the aggravated range of the guidelines and there 

is an allegation of excessiveness, this Court must review the record to 

determine whether there was an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. 

Monahan, 860 A.2d 180, 182 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 878 A.2d 

863 (Pa. 2005). 

 Preliminarily, we note that the sentencing judge has a great deal of 

discretion in imposing a sentence. A sentence will not be reversed absent an 

abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Keiper, 887 A.2d 317, 319 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Moreover, 

[b]y statute, this Court is required to vacate a 

sentence and remand for resentencing if the 
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sentencing court imposed a sentence that is outside 

of the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is 

unreasonable. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3). 

. . . . In reviewing the record the appellate court 

shall have regard for: 

(1) The nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant. 

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court 

to observe the defendant, including any 

presentence investigation. 

(3) The findings upon which the sentence 

was based. 

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the 

commission. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d). 

 In addition, when a sentencing court deviates 

from the sentencing guidelines, it is important that 

the court reflect a consideration of the sentencing 

guidelines, the background and character of the 

defendant, the circumstances of the crime, and 

impose a sentence that is consistent with the 

protection of the public and the rehabilitative needs 

of the defendant. 

Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 519 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal 

case citations and quotations omitted). 

 We observe that the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines are not 

mandatory, and thus do not prohibit any particular sentence within the 

statutory maximum. See, e.g., Commonwalth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 

621 (Pa. 2002) (plurality); Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 366 
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(Pa.Super. 2005). Here, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 

5 to 10 years’ imprisonment. More specifically, the trial court imposed 

consecutive terms of 2 to 4 years for appellant’s offenses of accidents 

involving death or personal injury and accidents involving death or personal 

injury while not properly licensed which fell beyond the aggravated range of 

the guidelines, but below the statutory maximum.1

 The trial court imposed 

consecutive terms of 6 to 12 months for the resisting arrest and fleeing and 

eluding offenses which fell in the aggravated range.2 Thus, absent an abuse 

of discretion, we may not disturb the sentencing court’s imposition of 

sentence. 

 Appellant argues the trial court failed to give the required 

individualized consideration to all the Section 9721(b) factors when 

sentencing him to an “excessive sentence” in the aggravated range on two 

counts and “completely outside” of the aggravated range on two other 

counts. (Appellant’s brief at 25-26.) We begin by noting that appellant has 

waived any argument concerning the two offenses, resisting arrest and 

fleeing and eluding police, for which he received a sentence in the 

aggravated range. This claim was not preserved in his motion for 

 

1

 With an offense gravity score of 5 and a prior record score of 3, the 

guidelines provide for a standard range of 6 to 16 months and an 

aggravated range of 16 to 19 months. 

2

 With an offense gravity score of 2 and a prior record score of 3, the 

guidelines provide for a standard range of RS (restorative sanctions) to 

4 months and an aggravated range of 4 to 7 months. 
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reconsideration. (See Docket #13.) Additionally, our review of this matter 

indicates this claim was not in appellant’s court-ordered Rule 1925(b) 

statement and, as such, was not addressed by the trial court in its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion. (See Docket #21.) The first time it appears is in his 

appellate brief. See Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355 

(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 936 A.2d 40 (Pa. 2007) (an appellant 

can seek to appeal discretionary sentencing issues only after preserving 

them during the sentencing hearing or in post-sentence motions). We will 

proceed to address appellant’s concerns regarding the sentence he received 

that fell outside the guidelines but within the statutory maximum. 

 Appellant complains the trial court placed too much emphasis on the 

victim’s serious injuries and his prior criminal history which were factors 

already accounted for by the guidelines, while failing to adequately consider 

his rehabilitative needs and other mitigating factors, such as, his job and the 

effect incarceration would have on his family. Appellant contends the trial 

court should have placed greater weight on the fact that he took 

responsibility by pleading guilty, apologizing for his actions and expressing a 

willingness to pay restitution. 

 Initially, we note the trial court had the benefit of a pre-sentence 

report. “Our Supreme Court has determined that where the trial court is 

informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is aware of 

all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the 
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court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” 

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2009), citing 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18-19 (Pa. 1988). “The 

sentencing judge can satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing 

sentence be placed on the record by indicating that he or she has been 

informed by the pre-sentencing report; thus properly considering and 

weighing all relevant factors.” Id., citing Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 

A.2d 758, 766-767 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

 It appears appellant is asking us to re-weigh the mitigating factors. In 

Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009), this court 

noted the sentencing court was fully informed of all mitigating factors at 

play. The Macias court stated: 

We presume that the court, which was in possession 

of those facts, applied them. The sentencing court 

merely chose not to give the mitigating factors as 

much weight as Appellant would have liked and 

decided that the facts did not warrant imposition of a

sentence lower than the standard range. We 

cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and 

impose our judgment in place of the sentencing 

court.

Id. (emphasis added). 

 At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth pointed out appellant 

failed to make any payment on the $11,259 in restitution that he owed the 

victim. (Notes of testimony, 4/3/13 at 3, 9.) The prosecutor stated he had 

not objected to appellant being out on bond because it was his hope that 
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appellant would make some sort of payment to the victim. (Id.) The trial 

court noted that during the time appellant was out on bond, he was involved 

in a domestic violence assault and a fleeing and eluding offense. (Id. at 

14.) The court noted appellant’s driving history: operator must be licensed, 

three violations; driving while under suspension, two violations; driving too 

fast for conditions, one violation; and he failed to respond to notifications 

from PennDOT ten times. The trial court went on to state: 

 The Court has taken into consideration the 

pre-sentence report, the sentencing guidelines, his 

individual background, his expression of remorse 

today, as well as him pleading guilty. The Court 

notes and incorporated earlier the prior proceedings 

wherein the injuries to Miss Roberts were listed. 

 Briefly stated, she has undergone amputation 

on one of her legs. She has had at least 14 surgical 

procedures. Skin graphs [sic]. And she has stated 

several times it has absolutely ruined the quality of 

her life. Despite her resilience and her resolve to 

resume life as best she can. 

 The Court finds that the defendant’s history 

here, he has been sentenced to a period of 

community supervision, which has failed to impress 

upon him and rehabilitate him to a positive lifestyle. 

He has undergone periods of county incarceration for 

a burglary charge, 2 to 12 months in 1992. Another 

3 to 23 and-a-half for a theft case in 1990. And a 

burglary sentence in 1992 of two to five years. And 

both times, in state and county, he was paroled and 

had to be revoked from those paroles by virtue that 

he failed to abide by the conditions of parole. And 

he had a firearms charge in 2003 where he got two 

years[’] probation. 

 The Court has taken into account the long 

period of time where he was apparently living in 
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conformity with the law. The Court notes that those 

offenses are reflected in the prior record score and 

the Court is not considering them outside of that, 

except for the fact to note the various periods of 

supervision, which he has been extended in the 

community or locally or minimal periods relatively 

speaking of state incarceration, which has failed to 

impress upon him the need to conform to the laws of 

society. And which in this incident, has resulted in 

harm to Miss Roberts. Not only her, but her 

significant other, as well as her extended family. 

And I think her grandchildren talked about it at a 

prior proceeding. 

 Consequently, the Court believes consistent 

with the statutory obligation, taking into account the

defendant’s individual background, rehabilitative 

needs, such as they are and have previously 

attempted to be addressed and noted. 

 The Court has taken into account the impact of 

this crime on Miss Roberts and her extended family 

in terms of the injuries. The Court also has to 

consider the protection of society so that persons are 

removed from the danger of Mr. Knight’s conduct in 

the future insofar as I can be within the parameters 

of the law in my sentencing obligation. 

Id. at 15-17. 

 Based on the above, the trial court was aware of the sentencing 

guidelines, considered all requisite factors, and stated its reasons on the 

record for sentencing appellant outside the sentencing guidelines. See 

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 191-192 (Pa.Super. 2008) (no 

abuse of discretion for sentencing outside guidelines where sentencing court 

considered all requisite factors, had benefit of presentence report, and had 

opportunity to observe defendant’s characteristics and history), appeal 
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denied, 980 A.2d 607 (Pa. 2009). We conclude that the trial court placed 

adequate reasons on the record to support its deviation from the guidelines. 

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in the sentence 

imposed. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/2/2014