alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Andru G. and Others, Children Alleged to be Neglected. Jasmine C., Appellant; Administration for Children’s Services, Respondent.

[64 NYS3d 886]

Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Emily M. Olshansky, J.), entered on or about October 20, 2016, to the extent it brings up for review a fact-finding order, same court and Judge, entered on or about January 21, 2016, finding, after a hearing, that respondent mother neglected the subject children, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Appeal from the *457fact-finding order unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the order of disposition.

The finding of neglect is supported by a preponderance of the evidence *(see*Family Ct Act §§ 1012 [fj [i] [B]; 1046 [b] [i]). The record shows that the children were subject to actual or imminent danger of injury or impairment to their emotional and mental condition as a result of their exposure to repeated incidents of domestic violence between the mother and other members of the family, including the father of one of the children *(see Matter of Serenity H. [Tasha S.],*132 AD3d 508 [1st Dept 2015]; *Matter of Angie G. [Jose D.G.],*111 AD3d 404, 405 [1st Dept 2013]). In each of the incidents, all three children were in the apartment and were in imminent danger of physical impairment, since they were in close proximity to violence directed against a family member, even absent evidence that they were aware of or emotionally impacted by the violence *(see Matter of Kelly A. [Ghyslaine G.],*95 AD3d 784, 784 [1st Dept 2012]). One incident that occurred during a custody exchange involved the mother and the child’s father each pulling on the child. This “single incident” is sufficient for a finding of neglect *(see Matter of Tavene H. [William G.],*139 AD3d 633, 634 [1st Dept 2016]).

Family Court also properly found neglect based on the evidence that the mother failed to provide adequate shelter, since she took no steps to remedy the condition of the room she shared with the children, which was cluttered with boxes and plastic bags containing the children’s laundry, which she said she had not washed for one year *(Matter of China C. [Alexis C.],*116 AD3d 953 [2d Dept 2014], *lv dismissed*23 NY3d 1047 [2014]). The mother also medically neglected one of the children by failing to obtain prompt and proper treatment for his dental abscess, while keeping him for an unauthorized four-day visit *(see Matter of Nivek A.S. [Juanita S.],*148 AD3d 459 [1st Dept 2017]).

Concur—Tom, J.P., Renwick, Gische, Oing and Singh, JJ.
# Tornado Safety emphasized in March

/ Published March 24, 2020
Richmond, Va. , 
As spring approaches, so does changes in weather. One weather event you need to make a plan of action for is Tornados!  

According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association’s National Climate Data Center, the Commonwealth of Virginia has an average of 18-20 tornado events per year. The season usually starts in April and ends in November.  

The Virginia Department of Emergency Management and the National Weather Service have several resources on their websites to help individuals prepare for weather-related events.

 A tornadic event can threaten your family and destroy your property. It is important to include this destructive weather event into your overall preparedness plans. Your plan should include what you and your family should do when at work, home and school. Like any life changing event, planning and practicing your plan now could determine whether or not you survive a tornadic event.

**How Do You Get Started?**

-Visit Ready.Gov – this website is loaded with information on planning and how to prepare for different types of events.-Identify which counties/cities in which you live and work. NOAA weather warnings are issued for counties and cities.-Make your plan! Make sure you communicate, practice and update your plan annually or if there are life changes.-Have a survival kit. The kit should last at least 72 hours.

**What Should You Do During a Tornadic Event?**

-Do not wait until you see the tornado to act!  Listen to local area radio or television stations, NOAA radio, and/or DLA AtHoc  notification system for updates and warnings.-Move to an underground shelter, basement or safe room. If none are available, a small, windowless interior room or hallway on the lowest level of a sturdy building is the safest alternative.-If outside, move to a shelter or run to low ground away from any vehicles. Lie flat and face down, protecting the back of your head with your arms.-Find a local emergency shelter and know the best routes to travel there.-If you are in your vehicle and the tornado is visible but at a distance, you may be able to travel out of its path by moving at a right angle to the tornado.-If your vehicle is hit by flying debris while you are driving, pull over and park. Do not park on a bridge or under an overpass.

**What Should I do After a Tornadic Event?**

-Let family and friends know you are safe. Social Medial is a good tool.-If evacuated, return to the impacted area only when authorities say it is safe to do so.-Continue listening to local news or a NOAA weather radio for updated information and instructions.-Check for injuries. If you are trained, provide first aid to persons until first responders arrive.-Do not enter damaged buildings. They could be unstable and cause injuries.

If have any questions or comments about tornado preparation and safety, please feel free to contact DLA Installation Management Richmond at 804-279-4087.
No. 09-1373.

#### Ricky Bell, Warden, Petitioner v. Gregory Thompson.

562 U.S. 831, 131 S. Ct. 102,

178 L. Ed. 2d 29,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6464.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 580 F.3d 423.
No. 09-10198.

#### Lavar Brown, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania.

562 U.S. 844, 131 S. Ct. 76,

178 L. Ed. 2d 52,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6065.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Eastern District, denied.

Same case below, 605 Pa. 103, 987 A.2d 699.
No. 09-10559.

#### Ricky Lamar Brown, Petitioner v. Florida.

562 U.S. 846, 131 S. Ct. 89,

178 L. Ed. 2d 56,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6050.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, denied.

*57Same case below, 26 So. 3d 583.
No. 09-11274.

#### Domingo Hernandez, Petitioner v. United States.

562 U.S. 871, 131 S. Ct. 171,

178 L. Ed. 2d 102,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6619.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied.

Same case below, 360 Fed. Appx. 287.
Exhibit 32.1
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
     I, Leonard R. Stein-Sapir, Chairman of the Board and Chief ExecutiveOfficer of Morgan’s Foods, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify, pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
(1) The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the periodended November 7, 2004, (the “Report”), which this certificationaccompanies, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operationsof the Company.   Dated: December 22, 2004 /s/ Leonard R. Stein-Sapir   Leonard R. Stein-Sapir, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
21
2016-0252.

#### State ex rel. Bradford v. Dinkelacker.

Hamilton App. No. C-150714. Reported at 149 Ohio St.3d 683, 2017-Ohio-1342, 77 N.E.3d 935. On motion for reconsideration. Motion denied.

Fischer and DeWine, JJ., not participating.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk August 6, 2009

p0720 

# Order

August 6, 2009

138399

WILLIS AUXIER, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 138399 COA: 281793 Kent CC: 07-001536-NF NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 27, 2009 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented shou ld now be reviewed by this Court.
#### Richard H., Matter of

2d Dept: 144 AD3d 799

denied
Exhibit 4(e) 






FEE WAIVER AGREEMENT 



        THIS
FEE WAIVER AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”) is signed as of June 1, 2004 by Fund Asset
Management, L.P. (the “Investment Adviser”) and Merrill Lynch Focus Value Fund, Inc. (the
“Fund”). 



        WHEREAS,
the Investment Adviser has entered into an Investment Advisory Agreement, dated July 15,
1982, with the Fund whereby the Investment Adviser provides certain management and
investment advisory services to the Fund; 



        WHEREAS,
the Investment Adviser has entered into a Fee Waiver Agreement dated October 10, 2001
wherein the Investment Adviser agrees to waive 0.15% of its 1.00% investment advisory fee; 



        WHEREAS,
the Investment Adviser desires to increase the fee waiver to 0.25% of its fees; 



        WHEREAS,
the Investment Adviser understands and intends that the Fund will rely on this Agreement
in preparing a registration statement on Form N-1A and in accruing the expenses of the
Fund for purposes of calculating net asset value and for other purposes, and expressly
permits the Fund to do so; and 



        WHEREAS,
the shareholders of the Fund will benefit from the ongoing waivers by incurring lower
Fund operating expenses than they would absent such waivers. 



        NOW,
THEREFORE, the Investment Adviser agrees to waive 0.25% of its 1.00% investment advisory
fee, thereby reducing the investment advisory fee to 0.75% of the Fund’s average daily
net assets for the period of this Agreement. 



        This
contractual fee waiver shall be effective through November 30, 2005 and for annual
periods thereafter unless the Investment Adviser shall notify the Fund of the termination
of the contractual fee waiver not less than 30 days prior to the end of the then annual
period. 



        IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Investment Adviser and the Fund have agreed to this Fee Waiver
Agreement as of the day and year first above written. 



	     	FUND ASSET MANAGEMENT, L.P.
	 	 	 
	 	By:	                /s/ Donald C.
Burke
      

    
	 	Name: 

      Title:
      	             Donald C. Burke
                                                       

      First Vice
President and Treasurer
	 	 	 
	 	MERRILL LYNCH FOCUS VALUE FUND, INC.
	 	 	 
	 	By:	
      /s/ Terry K. Glenn
      


    
	 	Name: 

      Title:
      	Terry K. Glenn
                                                      

      President
# Shop service centers recognized for outstanding support to Oklahoma Air Logistics Center

/ Published Dec. 29, 2021
Richmond, Va., 
Defense Logistics Agency Aviation at Oklahoma Commander Air Force Col. Jason Kalin recognized employees in his shop service centers in September for their outstanding support of the Air Force’s Air Logistics Center on Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.

DLA Aviation at Oklahoma has 22 SSCs in 11 different locations on the base serving Oklahoma ALC maintenance groups by putting material as close as possible to the artisans working the production lines that keep the aircraft flying.

“The closer and more accurately we put this material where it is needed, the quicker the maintainers are able to use it to repair end items for the aircraft,” said Samuel “Carl” Eggleston, chief of the Material Management Division with DLA Aviation at Oklahoma.

One measure of success within the SSCs is fill rate.  Fill rate is a measurement of [parts] issued from the SSC to the customers. Fill rate tells DLA Aviation how well material is being positioned for our customers.  The fill rate goal for the SSCs is to have a part in the center and be able to issue it when requested 75% of the time.

DLA Aviation at Oklahoma starting tracking fill rate in July 2015 and at that time it averaged 65% across the SSCs. The metric is hard to meet because variability in orders make predictions troublesome, said Eggleston.

The SSCs have met the metric 11 times since they started tracking it, with two of those times being this fiscal year.  This year the shops exceeded the goal, once in August by reaching 76.2% and then again in September with a fill rate of 76.73%., resulting in a rolling 13-month average of 72.16%.

Eggleston said he sees a direct correlation between the success they have achieved with SSC fill rate and optimization efforts.

Optimization is how well material is being forward stocked; is the right material at sufficient levels to meet our customers’ monthly need.

In October 2018, the first-time optimization was tracked, the metric was 25.9%.  While there is no active metric goal, in August DLA Aviation at Oklahoma recorded its second highest optimization rate at 60%.  The highest ever was in September when it hit 64.26%.

Eggleston believes the optimization rate has increase because of the activity’s efforts to provide guidance to the SSCs through standardized reporting, changes to rules of engagement, sharing best practices and showing leadership support.

“Everyone played a role in increasing these metrics, offering help, support and lessons learned to each other,” he said.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-7691

ELMER NATHANIEL ADAMS, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge. (CA-02-1137-7) Submitted: April 15, 2004 Decided: April 20, 2004 Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Elmer Nathaniel Adams, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Drummond Bagwell, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Elmer Nathaniel Adams seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The order is appealable only if a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Adams has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 16-4017

___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v. Camille Touche lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of South Dakota - Aberdeen

____________ Submitted: April 13, 2017 Filed: June 12, 2017 [Unpublished]

____________ Before RILEY, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Camille Touche brings this app eal after the district court 1 revoked her supervised release on a federal senten ce that she was serving, and imposed a

1 The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.revocation sentence of 11 months in pris on and no additional s upervised release. Twice before, the district court had revoked Touche’s supervised release, and imposed revocation sentences and additional supervisedrelease, for violations of her release conditions. For reversal, T ouche argues that her revocation sentence is illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 3583, because the cumulative tota l of her revocation prison terms exceeds by one month the term of supervised release that was originally imposed, or that is authorized for the underlying offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b). We affirm. Touche’s argument fails. Under the law applicable to her offense, which she committed in 2007, revocation sentences are not aggregated in determining statutory limits. See United States v. Lewis , 519 F.3d 822, 824-25 (8th Cir. 2008) (former § 3583(e)(3) requirement to aggregate revocation prison sentences changed with April 30, 2003 addition of phrase “on any such revocation”; where original offense of conviction was committed thereafter, plain language of § 3583(e)(3) permits sentencing without considering or aggreg ating prison terms for prior revocations). 2 Touche argues that Lewis was wrongly decided, but the decision is binding unless overruled by the cour t en banc. See United States v. Lovelace , 565 F.3d 1080, 1085 (8th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we affirm the judgmen t, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

2 Only when a court imposes both a revocation sentence and additional supervised release do prior revocation prison terms limit the permissible sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); United States v. Zoran , 682 F.3d 1060, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 2012). -2-
#### Karen L. Smoczkiewicz, Respondent, v Zygmunt A. Smoczkiewicz, Appellant.

[770 NYS2d 101]

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by a judgment entered May 14, 2002, the father appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Maraño, J.), dated November 25, 2002, which denied, without appointing a Law Guardian for the child or conducting a hearing, his motion to modify the judgment of divorce by changing residential custody of the parties’ son from the mother to him.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

*706On February 15, 2002, the parties and the Law Guardian for their two children entered into a stipulation of settlement of the mother’s action for a divorce, in open court, pursuant to which, inter alia, the parties would have joint custody of their two children, with the mother to have residential custody. The stipulation of settlement further provided that the father would remain in the marital residence, and the mother and children would relocate to another residence within the same school district as the marital residence, after the mother received her distributive award. The stipulation of settlement was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce, which was entered on May 14, 2002.

On October 10, 2002, the father moved to modify the judgment of divorce by changing residential custody of the parties’ 13-year-old son from the mother to him. He alleged, as changed circumstances, that the mother had relocated to a new residence and that the son expressed a strong preference to remain in the marital residence. The Supreme Court denied his motion without appointing a Law Guardian for the child or conducting a hearing, and the father appeals. We affirm.

“A parent who seeks a change in custody is not automatically entitled to a hearing but must make some evidentiary showing sufficient to warrant a hearing” *(Teuschler v Teuschler,*242 AD2d 289, 290 [1997]). Moreover, where parents enter into an agreement concerning custody “it will not be set aside unless there is a sufficient change in circumstances since the time of the stipulation and unless the modification of the custody agreement is in the best interests of the children” *(Matter of Gaudette v Gaudette,*262 AD2d 804, 805 [1999]).

Here, the father failed to show that there had been a change in circumstances which could support a finding that it was in the son’s best interest to change residential custody to himself. The fact that the mother had relocated to a new residence does not qualify as a change in circumstance, as it was expressly contemplated by the parties’ agreement. Furthermore, the father’s assertion that his son would prefer to remain in the marital residence with him is not determinative. This application was made a mere five months after the stipulation of settlement, which contained the parties’ agreement concerning custody, was incorporated into the judgment of divorce. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly denied the father’s motion without appointing a Law Guardian for the child and conducting a hearing. Florio, J.P., Smith, Luciano and Rivera, JJ., concur.
(October 5, 2017)

#### In the Matter of Peggy M., Appellant, v Michael O’L., Respondent.

[60 NYS3d 819]

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (Diane Keisel, J.), entered on or about December 16, 2014, which dismissed the petition to modify a visitation order, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

A full evidentiary hearing on the petition to modify a visitation order less then four months after the order, was not required, because petitioner made no offer of proof of a change in circumstances, and the court possessed sufficient information for a determination of the child’s best interests *(see Matter of Martha V. v Tony R.,*151 AD3d 653 [1st Dept 2017]). Respondent was awarded custody in September 2011, based, inter alia, on petitioner’s campaign to undermine the child’s relationship with him *(.Matter of Michael O. v Peggy M.,*110 AD3d 499 [1st Dept 2013]). In July 2014, the court denied respondent’s petition to suspend all visitation, but modified the 2011 custody order to limit petitioner to two supervised visits per month.

Concur — Acosta, P.J., Renwick, Webber, Oing and Moulton, JJ.
No. 09-10781.

#### Lorenzo Robinson, Petitioner v. William Sullivan, Warden.

562 U.S. 852, 131 S. Ct. 108,

178 L. Ed. 2d 66,

2010 U.S. LEXIS 6114.

October 4, 2010.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

Same case below, 588 F.3d 1212.