An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

NO. COA 13-934

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 18 February 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

v. Guilford County

Nos. 11 CRS 073416, 073417

DONALD SCOTT HENDERSON,

Defendant.

On writ of certiorari to review judgment entered 23 May

2012 by Judge Lindsay R. Davis, Jr. in Guilford County Superior 

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 February 2014.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Benjamin J. Kull, 

Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Gerding Blass, PLLC, by Danielle Blass, for defendantappellant.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Defendant Donald Scott Henderson was indicted for 

conspiracy to deliver cocaine, trafficking by possession of 

cocaine, trafficking by transporting cocaine, and maintaining a 

vehicle for selling controlled substances. Prior to his trial, 

defendant moved to suppress evidence seized by police after 

stopping and searching his vehicle on 12 April 2011. After a 
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hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. 

Defendant then pleaded guilty to all charges, reserving his 

right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Although 

defendant expressly reserved the right to appeal, defendant 

failed to give timely notice of appeal. This Court granted his 

subsequent petition for writ of certiorari.

The evidence presented at the suppression hearing tended to 

show that on 12 April 2011 Greensboro Police Department 

Detective J.B. Blanks and Corporal J.H. Marsh arrested a suspect 

on cocaine-trafficking charges. After the arrest, the suspect 

agreed to become a confidential informant. He informed the 

officers that, on the same day, he had plans to buy one-eighth

of a kilogram of cocaine from a black male named Donnie who had 

green eyes and was approximately 40 years old. He also told the 

officers that Donnie drove a silver or gray Dodge Magnum. This 

transaction was arranged by a black female named Alikii Allen

who was known to the confidential informant. The officers 

listened in on several telephone conversations between the 

confidential informant and Ms. Allen as they confirmed and 

arranged their meeting.

The officers knew that defendant and Ms. Allen would take 

I-40 to the Guilford College Road exit to get to the 

confidential informant’s residence. As a result, officers were 
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stationed in the area around the exit to await the arrival of 

the silver or gray Dodge Magnum. Detective Blanks and Detective 

Goodykoontz saw the Dodge Magnum take the exit ramp off the 

interstate, and Corporal Flynt and his partner Officer C.H. 

Peeden followed the car while driving an unmarked police truck. 

During this time, Ms. Allen or defendant apparently became aware 

that they were being followed by the police because Ms. Allen 

called the confidential informant and told him that the police 

were following them. Defendant drove past the planned meeting 

location and turned left onto Sapp Road. Corporal Flynt then 

made the decision to stop the defendant’s car. Detectives

Blanks and Goodykoontz searched the car and found, in the center 

console, a Crown Royal bag containing one-eighth of a kilogram 

of cocaine.

_________________________

Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted 

his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless 

search of his vehicle because neither the stop nor the search 

were supported by probable cause. We disagree. 

When we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress we consider “whether the trial court’s findings of fact 

are supported by the evidence and whether the findings of fact 

support the conclusions of law.” State v. Haislip, 362 N.C. 
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499, 499, 666 S.E.2d 757, 758 (2008). “[T]he trial court’s 

findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by 

competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.” State 

v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted), appeal after remand, 355 

N.C. 264, 559 S.E.2d 785 (2003). “The trial court’s conclusions 

of law, however, are reviewable de novo.” State v. Hyatt, 355 

N.C. 642, 653, 566 S.E.2d 61, 69 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 

1133, 154 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2003).

Defendant argues that findings of fact five and eight are 

not supported by the evidence from the suppression hearing. 

Finding of fact five states: 

The “confidential source” provided 

identifying information including the 

defendant’s first name, a physical 

description, his employment, a description 

of the vehicle he would deliver the cocaine 

in, a description of a second accomplice, 

and an account of the informant’s prior drug

dealing relationship with the defendant.

Defendant asserts that the evidence does not support the 

findings that the confidential informant provided defendant’s 

name, a physical description of defendant, or defendant’s 

employment. 

Testimony at the hearing disclosed that the confidential 

informant told officers that he was going to buy drugs from a 

man named Donnie. Defendant contends that this evidence does 
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not support the trial court’s finding that the confidential 

informant provided defendant’s name because Donnie is not his 

“actual name.” While defendant’s legal name is Donald, it 

appears that he is also known as Donnie based on the testimony 

at the suppression hearing. Therefore, the evidence that the 

confidential informant told officers that defendant’s name was 

Donnie supports the trial court’s finding that the confidential 

informant provided defendant’s first name.

Next, the evidence supports the finding that the 

confidential informant provided a physical description of 

defendant. Detective Blanks testified that the confidential 

informant said he planned to buy drugs from “a black male named 

Donnie, with green eyes.” Corporal Marsh also testified that 

the confidential informant “described Donnie as a black male, 

almost, approximately, 40 years of age.” Detective Blanks’s and 

Corporal Marsh’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding 

that the confidential informant provided a physical description 

of defendant.

Lastly, defendant correctly states that the evidence does 

not support the trial court’s finding that the confidential 

informant provided information regarding defendant’s employment. 

A review of the transcript from the suppression hearing reveals 

no mention of defendant’s employment. Thus, there is no 
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evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the 

confidential informant provided information regarding 

defendant’s employment. This error, however, affords defendant 

no relief.

“The test for prejudicial error is whether there is a 

reasonable possibility that, had the error not been committed, a 

different result would have been reached.” State v. Scott, 331 

N.C. 39, 46, 413 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1992). In this case, due to 

the accuracy of the other information provided, defendant’s 

employment is simply irrelevant to the stop or search. 

Therefore, a different result would not have been reached at the 

suppression hearing if the trial court had not found that the 

confidential informant provided information about defendant’s 

employment.

Defendant also argues that finding of fact eight is not 

supported by the evidence. Finding of fact eight states: 

Assisting police officers responded to a 

specific highway exit and were able to 

identify the described vehicle approach the 

meet [sic] location at the agreed time. The 

vehicle was occupied by two individuals 

matching descriptions already provided by 

the “source[.”]

Defendant contends that the evidence does not support this 

finding because the vehicle was stopped before it approached the 

meeting location, there was no child in the car as had been 
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reported by the confidential informant, and the female in the 

car did not match the description given by the confidential 

informant. 

Corporal Flynt testified that he and his partner followed 

the Dodge Magnum through the intersection of Guilford College 

and Hornaday. They were expecting the car to pull into one of 

the parking lots after the intersection but it never did. 

Instead, defendant turned down Sapp Road and Ms. Allen called 

and told the confidential informant that the police were 

following them. Then defendant turned on McClellan Road, and 

Corporal Flynt knew that this road was a dead end. At that 

point, Corporal Flynt and his partner decided to stop the 

vehicle. This testimony supports the trial court’s finding that 

police officers identified the described vehicle as it 

approached the meeting place. Corporal Flynt testified that he 

watched the vehicle as it approached and drove past the meeting 

location, after Ms. Allen had telephoned the confidential 

informant to tell him that the police were following them. 

Next, there is conflicting evidence about whether the 

information given to the police included that a child was in the 

car. At one point, Corporal Marsh testified that Ms. Allen had 

told the confidential informant that defendant had to drop his 

son off before meeting the confidential informant. Corporal 
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Marsh, however, later testified that there was information that

a child was in the car.

As stated earlier, a trial court’s finding may be supported 

by competent evidence even if there is conflicting evidence. 

See Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826. There was 

competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that 

there were two people in the vehicle, despite Corporal Marsh’s 

conflicting testimony, because Corporal Flynt’s and Detective 

Blanks’s testimony suggested that there should have been only 

two people in the car.

Finally, defendant argues that Ms. Allen’s race did not 

match the description given by the confidential informant. 

Defendant contends that because Corporal Marsh testified that 

Ms. Allen was described as a “Dominican girl,” the officers 

should have been looking for an Hispanic female. Defendant’s 

argument, however, confuses race and nationality.1 While there 

is no evidence in the suppression hearing transcript of Ms. 

Allen’s nationality, there is competent evidence, based on 

Corporal Flynt’s and Detective Blanks’s testimony, to support 

the trial court’s finding that Ms. Allen matched the description 

 

1 We note that Hispanic is not considered a race in the United 

States, but defendant argues that it is a race so we treat it as 

a race. Race, U.S. Census Bureau 

http://www.census.gov/population/race/ (last updated Nov. 28, 

2012).
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because she was black and the confidential informant described 

her as black.

Having determined that the trial court’s findings of fact 

are supported by competent evidence, we review de novo the trial 

court’s conclusion of law that the warrantless search of 

defendant’s car was supported by probable cause. 

The United States Constitution and the North Carolina 

Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 506, 417 S.E.2d 502, 

510 (1992). As a general rule, a warrant is required for every 

search and seizure; however, there are exceptions. State v. 

Trull, 153 N.C. App. 630, 638–39, 571 S.E.2d 592, 598 (2002), 

appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 691, 578 

S.E.2d 596–97 (2003). For example, a motor vehicle that is on a 

public road may be searched without a warrant if the search is 

based on probable cause. State v. Isleib, 319 N.C. 634, 638, 

356 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1987). Probable cause exists when an 

officer has knowledge based on reasonably trustworthy 

information about facts or circumstances that are sufficient “to 

warrant a man of reasonable caution to belie[ve] that an offense 

has or is being committed.” State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 261, 

322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

When a confidential informant’s tip is the basis for a 
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warrantless search, a court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances to determine if probable cause exists. State v. 

Earhart, 134 N.C. App. 130, 133, 516 S.E.2d 883, 886, appeal 

dismissed, 351 N.C. 112, 540 S.E.2d 372 (1999). Under the 

totality-of-the-circumstances test a court weighs all of the 

indications of reliability and unreliability surrounding an

informant’s tip. Id. at 133–34, 516 S.E.2d at 886. Some of the 

factors a court considers when conducting the totality-of-thecircumstances test are the informant’s basis of knowledge for 

the tip, the reliability of the informant’s tip, and whether 

there is independent police corroboration of the facts relevant 

to the informant’s tip. Id. at 134, 516 S.E.2d at 886.

In this case, the confidential informant had previously 

bought drugs from defendant and had arranged to buy more drugs 

from defendant before agreeing to become a confidential 

informant. Thus, he had personal knowledge of the information 

he shared with the police. In addition, officers were able to 

listen to the confidential informant’s telephone conversations 

with Ms. Allen as they confirmed and coordinated their meeting. 

From these conversations, officers knew the route that defendant 

and Ms. Allen would take to reach the confidential informant’s 

residence and were able to place a surveillance team in the 

area. As a result, officers observed a car with occupants 
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matching the descriptions provided approach the meeting 

location. Officers also knew, from monitoring the confidential 

informant’s telephone calls, that Ms. Allen and defendant drove 

past the meeting location out of concern that the police were 

following them. Therefore, based on the confidential 

informant’s knowledge and the officers’ ability to confirm the 

details of the tip, a man of reasonable caution, having such 

information, would have reason to believe that an offense was 

being committed.

Affirmed.

Judges ELMORE and HUNTER, JR. concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).